

**THE RISE OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA:
IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY AND RELIGIO-
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION**

MOHAMED NAWAB MOHAMED OSMAN

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and
International Relations
Australian National University

**Department of Political and Social Change
Research School for Asian and Pacific Studies
Australian National University**

April 2012

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is the result of my own research. Where I have drawn upon the work of other scholars, due acknowledgement has been made in the text.



Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman
10th April 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An academic mentor once told me that the journey towards a PHD will be one filled with the most trials and tribulations. Never did I imagine the scale of the trials that was to come before me until I embarked on this journey. The obstacles I overcame would not have been made possible if not for the relentless support and encouragement from various individuals. My main reason for pursuing a PHD at ANU was to work with Assoc Prof Greg Fealy, who pushed me beyond my comfort zone and helped me to extend my analysis to a more scholarly level. I never regretted that decision and I could not have asked for a better supervisor. Greg's insightful comments and criticisms were important in shaping both my thinking and analysis. He was not just a supervisor but also a mentor and friend.

My other supervisors Assoc Prof Edward Aspinall and Prof James Piscatori were instrumental in providing guidance throughout the stretch of the PHD period. Prof Joseph Liow of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies was also very supportive, and despite his heavy duties, served as my academic mentor, assisting me in developing intellectual clarity. His excellent academic work continues to be a source of inspiration for me. My father-in-law, Mohandas Kamath, tirelessly read the chapters of the thesis and shared with me his insights. He was always there to assist in editing and polishing various drafts of the thesis. Prof Paul Hutchcroft, Director, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, had an open door policy and was always happy to discuss the thesis, giving his valuable suggestions.

My warm thanks to Prof Martin Van Bruinessen and Prof Neil Robinson for reading several chapters of my thesis and providing important insights towards sharpening some of the arguments in the thesis. I freely exchanged various ideas about the arguments in the thesis with Prof Jean Francois-Meyer and Dr Farish Noor. These eminent scholars assisted me in understanding some of the larger intellectual discourses taking place within the realm of political Islam. Dr Suha Taji-Farouki, the eminent scholar on HT was always a source of inspiration and provided useful insights about HT. My appreciation

also goes to RSIS for their kind sponsorship of my PHD. In particular, I would like to thank Ambassador Barry Desker, the Dean of RSIS for believing that I could make useful contributions to the field of political Islam.

My fieldwork in Indonesia was made easier due to my academic association with the Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC), Islamic State University of Syarif Hidayatullah and the Habibie Centre. Dr Amelia Fauzia and Dr Chaider Bamualim were instrumental in assisting me at CSRC. Dr Umar Juoro assisted in linking me to the Habibie Center. I must register my utmost appreciation to Ustaz Muhammad Al-Khaththath, who had kindly furnished me with important details about HTI and HT. He was also instrumental in arranging for interviews to be conducted with former HTI members such as Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi and Mustafa Bin Nuh. I am truly grateful to Ustaz Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi for granting me an interview, which was especially difficult for him, given the bitterness of the experience that he went through after leaving HT. Ismail Yusanto, Hafidz Abdurrahman, Rahmat Kurnia and Harith Abu Ulya were always helpful in giving me access to HTI publications and documents. Erwin Al-Jundi, the leader of GEMA provided me with a glimpse of the lives of young HTI activists by kindly inviting me to his hostel and introducing me to members of GEMA. Beyond members of HTI, friends such as Sidney Jones at the International Crisis Group, Muis Naharong, Prof Bahtiar Effendy and Dr Lutfie Assyakaunie assisted me tremendously throughout the course of my fieldwork.

My fieldwork in Malaysia would not have been made possible if not for the assistance rendered by Dr Sharifuddin Md Zain and Abdul Hakim Osman. They not only introduced me to many HTM members but also allowed me to attend several internal study circles of HTM. In Australia, Abu Hamza Elias introduced me to members of HT Australia and invited me to several of the party's events. He also arranged for me to interview Sheikh Ismail Al-Wahwah. Sheikh Ismail Al-Wahwah provided me with details of HT's history. His in-depth knowledge of the party's history allowed me to re-write and re-assess the history of HT. He was especially candid about his description of the splits within HT, despite other HT members inducing him not to divulge this information. In Jordan, Moad Faouri and Marwan Faouri hosted assisted me to track and meet former members of HT. In Lebanon, Osman Bakhash made time from his busy

schedule to meet me and explain HT's activism in the Middle East. In London, Burhan Haniff was always willing to share his views about HT's position in relation to different Islamic issues. Meetings with Maajid Nawaz and Mahbub (Ed) Husain were particularly useful in gaining perspectives that are critical of HT. Jawed Khan whom I met several times in Singapore and Malaysia provided me with important books, documents and videos about HT. He was extremely broad-minded and was always willing to share his thoughts about HT.

My study and life in Canberra became more satisfying and pleasant, indeed far less arduous, particularly by the enduring friendships that were forged with new friends and colleagues. Discussions with Quinton Temby about the thesis and political Islam in Indonesia were important in helping me to understand the larger dynamics of radical Islamism in the country and their far-reaching implications. Dr Emrah Tuner, Gokhan Taneri, Abdul Celil Gelim, Dr Isa Degemirci and Irfan Yilmaz were like my own family members and made Canberra more livable.

I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to my beloved parents for their enduring love and support throughout my undergraduate and graduate studies. Their prayers have made this journey possible. Appreciation is also in order to my wife, Pritiya Kamath, who has constantly been a pillar of strength. She often took time off from her own busy schedule to help with the frenetic editing, while continuing to support me with my various other academic pursuits. My son, Rahish Rauther, was a source of continuous love, although I feel guilty that he had to contend with a father who was often absent. The sight of his smile and the sound of his laughter soothed my mind and strengthened my perspective whenever I encountered difficulties. Last but not least, I thank God for giving me the gift of life to appreciate the joy and beauty of the creation that surrounds us. May this thesis gain His blessings and contribute to the betterment of mankind.

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the emergence and growth of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI; Party of Liberation). HTI is a branch of the international movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir. The party has been very successful at utilising political space to recruit and mobilize activists, build loyal cadres with a deep grasp of its ideology, and most importantly, create a common identity among members.

Its ability to forge a collective identity within the movement has led to a high rate of membership retention. Drawing on extensive interviews conducted in the field, the thesis describes the journey a person undergoes before becoming a member of HTI. The interviews will focus on the processes of 'culturing' and socialization to which prospective recruits are subject, which result in behavioural, cognitive and affective changes. It is this transformation that produces a distinctive Hizb ut-Tahrir identity.

This study notes that while collective identity is the most important factor in HTI's growth, it is by no means the only one. Other factors have also contributed to its growth. The open political system that followed the collapse of the authoritarian New Order government enabled the party to emerge publicly after some two decades of underground activity, and begin overtly recruiting members and launching collective actions. I examine the party's resource mobilization strategies and examine how these strategies have resulted in its successful membership recruitment, raising of funds and expansion of its organizational structure. Consideration is also given to how the party's anti-systemic rationalistic ideology has led to potential members choosing HTI over other Islamist movements in Indonesia

This thesis employs a structural-cognitive approach to understanding the growth of HTI. The political opportunity structure and resource mobilization variant of the social movement theory will be utilized to understand the structural factors that impacted HTI. The cognitive factors will be explained by using the theories of ideology and identity. This theoretical approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of HTI's growth.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI-	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
AFKN-	Al-Fatih Kaafah Nusantara
AKKBB-	Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan (The National Alliance for the Freedom of Religion and Beliefs)
Bakorpem-	Badan Koordinasi Penganut Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (Coordinating Agency For the Overseeing of People's Beliefs)
BKIM-	Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa (Student Body for Islamic Propagation)
BWAS-	Badan Wakaf As-Salam (The As-Salam Wakaf Body)
DDII-	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Islamic Predication Council of Indonesia)
DKM-	Dewan Kerja Masjid (Mosque Working Committee)
DPD-	Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (Local Area Leadership Committee)
DPP-	Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Committee)
DPW-	Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah (Provincial Leadership Committee)
FOSDIK-	Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer (Forum of Contemporary Islamic Studies)
FKSK-	Forum Kajian Sosial Kemasyarakatan (Forum for Social Research)
FPI-	Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender's Front)
FSLDK-	Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (The Campus Proselytizing Brotherhood Network)
GEMA-	Gema Pembebasan (Cry of Freedom)
HDI-	Hizbut Dakwah Indonesia (Party of Dakwah)
HIP-	Halaqah Islam dan Peradaban (Studies on Islam and Culture)
HT-	Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party)
HTA-	Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia
HTI-	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
HTM-	Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia

ICMI-	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Professionals)
IPB-	Institute Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural Institute)
ITB-	Institute Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Technical Institute)
IPDN-	Institute Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri (The Institute for Local Governance)
JAT-	Jamaah Ansarul Tauhid
JI-	Jemaah Islamiyah
JT-	Jamaah Tarbiyah
KAMMI-	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Association of Action for Indonesian Muslim Student)
KISDI-	Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (The Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Muslim World)
KLI-	Komando Lashkar Islam (Army of Islamic Commando)
KSICC-	Kelompok Studi Islam Standard Chartered (The Standard Chartered Islamic Study Circle)
KSUII-	Kongres Solidarity Ummat Islam Indonesia (The Congress for the Solidarity of Indonesian Muslim)
LDK-	Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Proselytizing Network)
LIPIA-	Lembaga Ilmu Pendidikan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (The Network for the Teaching of Islam and Arabic)
LJ-	Lashkar Jihad (Army of Jihad)
LPBA-	Lembaga Pendidikan Bahasa Arab (The Network for the Teaching of Arabic)
MB-	Muslim Brotherhood
MHTI-	Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Women Members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia)
MMI-	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council)
MUI-	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council)
NII-	Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State)
NKK/BKK-	Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan (Normalization of Campus Life/Coordinating Body for Student Affairs)
NU-	Nahdlatul Ulama

PAN-	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
PAS-	Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia)
PBB-	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon Party)
PERSIS-	Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association)
PETA-	Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland)
PII-	Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party)
PK-	Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)
PKB-	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKS-	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperity Justice Party)
PMII-	Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian Muslim Student Association)
POS-	Political Opportunity Structure
PPP-	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
RMT-	Resource Mobilization Theory
RRI-	Radio Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Radio)
SD-	Sekolah Dasar (Elementary School)
SMA	Sekolah Menengah Atas (Senior High School)
SMP-	Sekolah Menengah Pertama (Junior High School)
SMT-	Social Movement Theory
TJ-	Tablighi Jamaat
UGM-	Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)
UI –	Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)
YMMA-	Young Muslim Men's Association

GLOSSARY

Ahmadiyah (sometimes spelt as *Ahmadiyya*): It is a sect founded by Ghulam Mirza Ahmed in India. Members of the sect believe that Ahmed is a Prophet (who is subordinate to Muhammad) while others within the sect consider him a reformer. Most Muslims do not consider Ahmadiyahs to be Muslims.

Al-Muhajiroun: It is the movement founded by Omar Bakri Mohamed, the former leader of HT in Britain. The group subscribes to a radical Islamist ideology, which is inspired by both Salafi and HT teachings. It has chapters in Europe and Asia. The group was proscribed in 2010 due to its links to terrorism.

Amir: The term is used to describe the leader of HT worldwide.

Ansar: It refers to Muslims in Medina who assisted Prophet Muhammad upon his arrival in the city.

Aqidah: Islamic belief in the idea of the Oneness of God and Prophet Muhammad as his Messenger.

Bai'ah: It is the pledge of allegiance to leader or teacher. Such a practice is common in a Sufi brotherhood and Islamist movements.

Bid'ah: It is a pejorative term used to refer to innovations introduced to Islam, which contradict its teachings.

Da'awah (also spelt *da'wa* or *dakwah*): A term that can literally be translated as the call to Islam. It also refers to Islamic missionary activity, proselytizing or predication meant to make Muslims more observant of Islam. The term *dakwah* is used to describe the unofficial underground Islamic student movement during the New Order regime.

Dalil: The evidence used to support Islamic rulings and edicts.

Dar-al-harb: The abode of un-believers, referring to areas under non-Muslim rule.

Dar-al-Islam: (also spelt *darul Islam*): The abode of Islam, referring to areas under Muslim rule.

Dar-al-kufr: The abode of ignorance and refers to areas where Islamic laws are not applied.

Daris: Its literal translation is student. It is a term used to describe a person who is part of a HT study circle.

Dauroh: A retreat that is focused on Islamic studies.

Eid-ul-Fitr: A Muslim celebration to mark the end of the month long obligatory fast that Muslims undertake yearly.

Faqih: Islamic jurist or an expert in Islamic laws.

Fard: An Islamic obligation

Fardhu ain: an individual obligation that every Muslim must fulfill.

Fardhu kifayah: A collective obligation of Muslims that must be fulfilled by some Muslims.

Fatwa: Islamic edict issued by a senior Muslim cleric.

Fikrah: Islamic thought or way of thinking

Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence

Habaib (Also Habib): Used to describe an Indonesian religious scholar of Arab descent.

Hadith: The traditions of Prophet Muhammad comprising the collections of his sayings and practices.

Halaqah (sometimes spelt halaqa): Islamic study circle. It refers to a cell within the HT organizational structure.

Hanafie: One of the four accepted schools of jurisprudence originating from the teachings of Imam Abu Hanifa (699-767), a seventh century Muslim jurist. The adherents of this school are concentrated in Turkey, South Asia, Central Asia and the Levant areas.

Hanbali: One of the four accepted schools of jurisprudence originating from the teachings of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855), a ninth century Muslim jurist. The adherents of his school are in the Arabian Peninsula. It is also seen to be the most rigid of the four schools of jurisprudence.

Hizbiyyin: Members of HT and HTI.

Hizbul Khilafah: It is a breakaway group formed by HTI dissidents in 1999 with the same objectives as HTI. It is largely inactive.

Ijma' al-sahabah: Literally means consensus of the Prophet's companions. However it is used to refer to the different schools of jurisprudence in Islam.

Ikhwan: Islamic Brotherhood. An abbreviation sometimes used to describe the Muslim Brotherhood movement

Imam: Usually referred to the person who leads a Muslim congregation prayer but can also refer to an Islamic scholar.

Infaq: Donations made in the name of God.

Jihad: Literally striving in the cause of Islam. Muslims believe that the personal struggle to attain spirituality is a lesser jihad while the struggle to strive for society is seen as a greater jihad. This greater jihad could be anything from missionary activity to holy war. Islamists and neo-fundamentalists most often use it to describe some form of armed action.

Jahil: State of ignorance.

Jahiliyah: Literally the age of ignorance. It is used in the modern context by some Islamists to describe the predicament of present Muslim societies for abandoning Islam.

Jilbab (also known as *hijab*): Headscarf worn by Muslim women.

Ketua Umum: Chairman or Leader

Khilafah: Caliphate

Khittah: Founding principles

Kufr: Disbelief in Islam or acts that contributes to disbelief.

Ma'sul: Refers to a HT leader who is in-charge of several districts, often making up one or several cities

Mabda': The basis of an ideology.

Madrasah (also spelt *madrasa*): an Islamic school, which has a stronger, focus on traditional Islamic studies such as the subjects of Islamic jurisprudence. Some madrasahs might also teach subjects such as Mathematics and the Sciences.

Mafahim: Literally a term that refers to concepts but used here to describe concepts associated with HT's ideology.

Majelis Al-Ummah: The legislature assembly in a Caliphate.

Mawlid Nabi (also spelt as *Maulid*): A term used to refer to the celebrations of Prophet Muhammad's birthday.

Mazhab (also spelt as *madhhab*): One of the schools of jurisprudence

Media Ummat: A fortnightly newspaper produced by HTI

Mu'tamad: A term that refers to a HT leader who is responsible for a HT wilayah or province. He is normally the leader of HT in a country.

Muhajiroun: The group of early Muslims in Mecca who followed Prophet Muhammad when he migrated to Medina

Mujaddid: Refers to a person who appears in every century to revive Islam.

Mushollah: A prayer room where a Muslim can perform the daily obligatory prayers.

Mushrif: A male leader of a HT cell

Mushrifa: A female leader of a HT cell

Mu'tazilah: It is a school of theology that emerged in the eight century. The school relied on the synthesis of rational thought and Islamic theology. The school takes a logical approach at deriving Islamic laws.

Naqhba: Literally the term is used to describe the tragic Arab loss to Israel during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

Naqib: HT leader at the district level

Niqab: Face veil used by some Muslim women. The practice is usually associated with Wahhabi and Salafi Muslims, although not exclusively so.

Pengajiaan: Literally refers to the act of studying. It is now often used to refer to a religious class.

Pesantren: Islamic boarding and day school where students receive an intensive religious education.

Pesantren Kilat/ Pesantran Ramadan: Intensive Islamic classes organized during school holidays or during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan

Qias: The use of logic and rational thoughts to derive an Islamic ruling.

Reformasi: Literally it means reformation. It is used to describe the movement that sought a regime change in Indonesia between 1997 and 1998.

Riba': Literally refers to usury. Often used to refer to the taking or giving of interest, which many Muslims consider to be prohibited in Islam

Salafism: Literally it refers to the way of the predecessors. It is a sect that promotes a return to the way of the Prophet and his companions. They accept the Qu'ran and Hadith as points of reference in deriving Islamic laws and reject the need to follow only one of the mazhabs. The sect considers Shiites and Sufis as deviants. Most contemporary Islamist movements are Salafis to some degree.

Salafi-Jihadi: It refers to extreme Salafism, which advocates the use of violence in order to change a society to be more Islamic

Shafi'e: One of the four accepted schools of jurisprudence originating from the teachings of Imam Abdullah Ahmad Al-Shafi'e (767-820), an eighth century Muslim jurist. His adherents are found in Southeast Asia, parts of India and North Africa.

Shari'ah (also spelt *Sharia*): Islamic law

Sheikh: A term used to refer to men of considerable knowledge or those of higher learning

Shiite: It is one of the two main branches of Islam. The key difference that separates Shiite Islam from Sunni Islam is the belief that Ali (599-661), the Prophet's son-in-law and cousin is the rightful heir to the Prophet. About 15% of Muslims are Shiite.

Shura: Consultation and deliberation used to arrive at a decision impacting the Muslim community. Is often used to show compatibility of Islam and democracy

Sunnah: Normative practice and examples as laid down by the Prophet.

Sunni: It is one the two main branches of Islam. Unlike Shiites, Sunnis do not believe in Ali's right to succession although Ali is revered as one of the four Caliphs of Islam. There are four main schools of thought that are often identified as being part of the school.

Tadaruj: A gradual change brought about by the gradual implementation of Islamic laws.

Tahlilan: This is a Sufi practice of reading special supplications on Thursday nights. It is also done during such occasions as birthday celebrations, the birth of a newborn and after a person has passed away.

Tafsir: The exegesis of the Qur'an

Takfir: A concept, within Islamic jurisprudence, denoting a Muslim who is an apostate that deserves to be punished through killing.

Tanzim: Literally translates as putting the house in order. It is used by HT to describe the official recognition of a new chapter as being part of its global structure.

Tassawuf: It is the dimension of spirituality in Islam that focuses on the development of one's internal self.

Tauhid: It is a term in Islam, which focuses on the belief in the Oneness of God.

Thalibul nusrah: A concept developed by An-Nabhani to describe the process of seeking assistance from powerful individuals within society in an effort to change the government through a revolution.

Thaqafa ghayr mutabannah: They are un-adopted texts of HT, which are non-compulsory readings. Members are encouraged to read them. These are often books written by HT leaders.

Thaqafa mutabannah: They are adopted texts of HT which are compulsory readings for daris and members of HT. These texts are normally by HT's ideologues like An-Nabhani and Zalloum

Tsatqif: A process of culturing as described by HT.

Ummah (also spelt umma): A community of believers, as used to describe all Muslims

Ulama: Islamic scholars

Ushr: A compulsory land tax imposed on Muslims under Islamic laws.

Usrah (sometimes spelt usra): These are study cells, employed as the basic unit of organization, in movements like the Muslim Brotherhood.

Wahhabis: An Islamic sect, which originated with the eighteenth century reformation movement of Muhammed Ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703–1787). It is the official religion practiced in Saudi Arabia after Al-Wahab formed an alliance with Muhammed Ibn Saud, an Arabian tribal leader. Wahabism is similar to Salafism, although they are not exactly the same. Adherents of Wahhabism tend to be oriented towards Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia.

Wakaf (sometimes spelt waqf): It is a religious endowment usually in the form of a building or land for charitable purposes. Usually *waqafs* are apportioned for the building of a mosque or Islamic school.

Wilayah: Literally it means a province. It forms the territory that makes up the larger HT unit. This unit often follows the national boundary of a country. However there are some *wilayahs* that are made up of several countries.

Zakat: It is one of the five pillars of Islam, which involves giving a fixed portion of one's wealth to charity. It is an obligation only for those who can afford it.

NOTE: The rendering of Arabic terms and proper names follow both international convention and Indonesian usage by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. No diacritics are given in the thesis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration ~ i
Acknowledgements ~ ii
Abstract ~ v
Abbreviations ~ vi
Glossary ~ ix
Table of Contents ~ xv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ~ 1

Focus of Study ~ 2
Interpreting Islamism ~ 6
Literature Review ~ 8
Research Questions and Central Argument ~ 22
Theoretical Approach ~ 23
Data Acquisition ~ 31
Organization of Thesis ~ 33

CHAPTER TWO: THE SELECTED ELITES OF A GLOBAL ISLAMIC PARTY, A HISTORY OF HIZB UT-TAHRIR ~ 37

Sheikh Taqi-ud-din An-Nabhani: Early History ~ 38
The Formation of Hizb ut-Tahrir ~ 43
Forming a Global Islamic Party: HT Under Abdul Qadeem Zalloum ~ 53
The Development of a Global Islamic Party: HT Under Ata Abu Rashta ~ 64
Conclusion ~ 71

CHAPTER THREE: UNRAVELLING THE HISTORY OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA ~ 72

HTI: The Beginnings ~ 73
Bin Nuh, Al-Baghdadi and HTI ~ 78
Building the Foundation of HTI ~ 80
Setting up an "Official Branch" ~ 85
HTI in the Post New Order Political Environment ~ 88
Consolidating its Position in Indonesia ~ 92
Recent Developments in HTI ~ 96
Conclusion ~ 99

CHAPTER FOUR: CAPITALIZING ON OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE CALIPHATE ~ 101

Opportunities and Constraints Facing Social Movements ~ 102
Forming a HT Chapter under the New Order Regime ~ 106
HTI and Suharto's Overtures Towards Islam ~ 114
Transitioning Towards Democracy: HTI and the Demise of the New Order ~ 120

Launching the Struggle for a Caliphate ~ 125
Why is HTI not Moderating? ~ 127
Conclusion ~ 128

CHAPTER FIVE: PROCURING RESOURCES FOR THE PARTY ~130

Procuring and Mobilizing Resources in SMT ~ 131
Organizing the *Hizbiyyin* ~ 133
Understanding the Recruitment Strategies of HTI ~138
Recruiting Under the New Order Regime: Creating an Organization and Forming the Core Group of HTI Leaders ~ 139
Recruiting in the Post New Order Period: Expanding Membership ~ 140
 Websites and Digital Resources ~ 141
 Printed Materials: Pamphlets, Journals and Books ~ 142
 Public Discourses ~ 144
 Prayer Halls and Mosques ~ 146
Active Mobilization: Recruiting Students, Women and Non Muslim Papuans ~ 149
 Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia ~ 149
 Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan ~ 151
 The Special Case of Papua ~ 153
Building the *Nusrah* Network: Enhancing Social Capital for the Party ~ 155
 Muslim Groups and Personalities ~ 156
 Political Leaders and Local Bureaucrats ~ 158
Funding the Movement ~ 161
Violence as a Mobilization Strategy? ~ 164
HTI's Resource Mobilization Strategies: Strengths and Limitations ~ 166
Conclusion ~ 170

CHAPTER SIX: THE POWER OF IDEAS, THE IDEOLOGY OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA ~ 172

The Concept of Ideology ~ 173
Ideology in Social Movement Theory ~ 176
The Ideology of HTI ~ 178
 Core Concepts ~ 180
 Adjacent Concepts ~ 186
 Peripheral Concept ~ 190
Inter-Ideological Conflict: Tackling the Mainstream Muslim Organization (NU) ~ 192
Intra-Islamism Competition: HTI and PKS ~ 194
Ideology and the *Hizbiyyin* ~ 197
Conclusion ~ 203

CHAPTER SEVEN: DEVELOPING A *HIZBI* IDENTITY ~ 205

Framing and Identity in Social Movement Theory ~ 206

Inciting a Sense of Crisis ~ 208

Religious Seeking and HTI's Framing Strategies ~ 212

 Capitalism Results in Impoverishment and Moral Decay ~ 213

 Western Conspiracies to Destroy Islam ~ 215

 Islam as a Complete Way of Life ~ 216

Culturing the *Hizbiyyin* ~ 218

 Halaqah: The Foundation of Culturing ~ 218

 Building New Social Networks ~ 222

 Preparing the Future Elites ~ 224

Adopting a Hizbi Identity ~ 225

 Behavioural Changes ~ 226

 Affective Changes ~ 228

 Cognitive Changes ~ 230

Membership Retention and Identity ~ 231

Conclusion ~ 233

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION ~ 234

Comprehending and Reflecting on the Growth of HTI ~ 234

Rethinking Hizb ut-Tahrir ~ 238

Studying Islamist Movements in Indonesia ~ 239

Is HT a Threat and How do we Deal with It? ~ 239

The Future of HTI and HT ~ 243

Suggestions for Future Studies ~ 245

BIBLIOGRAPHY ~ 247

References ~ 247

Interviews ~ 271

CHAPTER ONE: COMPREHENDING THE PHENOMENON OF HIZB UT-TAHRIR IN INDONESIA

We need to carry this message from the East to the West so that on Judgment Day, We can be proud that we have fulfilled our responsibilities that Allah has ordained for us. By Allah! Nothing can dignify, liberate, and elevate this *ummah* except for the return of the *Khilafah* (Mahmud Atchay, Leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir United Kingdom at the International caliphate Conference in Jakarta, August 2007)

On August 2007, an estimated 80,000 to 90,000 people gathered in the Bung Karno Stadium in Jakarta, Indonesia to call for the re-establishment of the caliphate. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a chapter of the transnational movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), whose key aim is the revival of the caliphate, organized the event.¹ In a theatrical performance during the event, two groups of Indonesian Muslim boys ran into the stadium. One group carried flags of Islamic countries, while the other carried flags of ‘oppressor states’ (United States, Britain, France and Israel). The boys carrying the flags of the oppressor states started attacking the boys carrying the flags of Muslim countries. In a dramatic turn of events, a different group of boys carrying the black and white flags, bearing the Muslim proclamation “There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger” (the flag of HT) drove the boys carrying the flags of the oppressor states out of the stadium. The performance sought to convey that Muslims are currently being oppressed by villainous Western imperialist powers and that it is only with the re-establishment of the caliphate that the Muslim world will be free. HT members are thus seen to be heroes who are out to emancipate the Muslim world. The message that the caliphate is a necessity for the Muslim world was repeated by most of the speakers invited to the event, including Mahmud Atchay, a leader of HT in the United Kingdom (quoted above). While, the revival of the caliphate is a call made by many Islamic thinkers and reformers since its abolishment in 1924, HT and HTI, have taken this concept to a new level by making it an obligation for all Muslims.² Evidence from

¹ The thesis has spelled HT as Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is the correct transliteration from Arabic but would use the localized spelling of HT, which is Hizbut Tahrir when discussing the Indonesian chapter of the party.

² It must be noted that the Ottoman caliphate differed from the idealized caliphate of HT in having political authority in the Ottoman Empire only, and at best a sort of nominal recognition among Muslims elsewhere. Since 1908, the caliph has lost most of his power to the Constitutional movement in Turkey.

several surveys indicates that few Indonesians aspire for the establishment of an Islamic state and even fewer believe in the revival of the caliphate.³ This is but one of the reasons that make HTI a paradox and an interesting case study.

Focus of Study: Why Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia?

The emergence and growth of HTI is important for several reasons. Islam in Indonesia has often been described as being localized and is thus different from the Islamic heartland in the Middle East. While, Indonesian Islam was never entirely divorced from the gamut of different Islamic ideologies elsewhere, such as the ideas associated with the MB and the Iranian Revolution, these ideologies have taken a local form through groups that are independent from their ideological inspirers. This makes HTI unique. It is perhaps the only organization that is controlled entirely by a Middle East based leadership. Its operations, funding and selection of senior leaders, are decided overseas by the HT headquarters. Representatives from the *Amir* of HT are sent to Indonesia several times a year to monitor the activities of the party in the country.⁴

Partly due to its links to the Middle East, the party has been secretive about its sources of funding, the personalities who are part of its central leadership as well as the linkages between the party and its parent organization in the Middle East. Despite its secretive nature, Ken Ward observed that HTI has remained largely unnoticed by the country's authorities despite its transnational agenda, which contradicts the concept of the unitary state of Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, NKRI). He noted that the secretiveness and non-conformity of HTI have not prompted frequent public warnings from political leaders or security authorities about the need for vigilance towards the party. This is in a country where officers often rail against foreign conspiracies that

³ Evidence from the Lembaga Survey Indonesia (LSI) survey conducted in 2004 showed that only 5% of Indonesian Muslims support HTI's idea of the caliphate. Another survey conducted in October 2006 indicated that only 7.2% of Indonesian Muslims support HTI. See LSI "Prospek Islam Politik", p. 14. Accessed from www.lsi.or.id on 21 January 2007. Surveys conducted by the LSI are seen to be the most accurate in Indonesia.

⁴ HT defines itself as a political party although it is not a party in the conventional sense of contesting elections and being involved in democratic processes. The word party is thus used throughout the thesis to reflect HT's self-definition. See Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, no. 7 (2009), p. 647.

threaten to weaken and break up Indonesia.⁵ While the reason for this could be HTI's relatively peaceful approach to political activism, it is still strange that the party is not seen to be a threat, especially in light of the fact that even a legal Islamic political party, such as the Prosperity Justice Party (*Partai Keadalian Sejahtera*, PKS), and *Shiite* groups, are constantly under public scrutiny for their supposed hidden agendas.⁶

Some of the other ideas that the party espouses such as its rejection of democracy and capitalism also make HTI interesting. Several surveys conducted in Indonesia have shown that, in general, Indonesians believe in the ideals of democracy and capitalism.⁷ As such, it is politically inexpedient for a group to reject such ideas that have become so mainstream in Indonesia. To add to this conundrum, HTI seems to be attracting large numbers of Muslim professionals, who work in multi-national companies (MNC) and are thus part of the capitalistic venture in Indonesia. Many of HTI's activities are held in the 'Golden Triangle' area of Jakarta, which houses most of the global financial institutions and regarded as the epicentre of capitalism in Indonesia. Yet, the same individuals seek to overthrow the Indonesian economic system. HTI is not just an interesting case study, due to its unconventional ideas, but also due to the rapid growth that the party seems to be undergoing in Indonesia

The Growth of HTI

HTI first made its public entry in July 2000, and later in that year, the party organized the first international caliphate conference, which officially propelled the organization into the public realm.⁸ It was reported that about two thousand people attended the event. In August 2007, seven years after the first conference, the party organized the conference referred to earlier in this chapter where an estimated 80,000 to 90,000 people attended.

⁵ Ken Ward, "Non-violent extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2009), p. 140.

⁶ The PKS is an Indonesian Islamist political party. Islamist student activists founded it as the Justice Party in 1998. It was subsequently renamed the Prosperity Justice Party after failing to meet the minimum electoral threshold in 1999 elections. It is currently the fourth largest party in the Indonesian parliament.

⁷ An example of this is the survey conducted the Indonesian Survey Bureau (LSI) in May 2006, which saw 82% of correspondents agreeing that democracy is the best way of governance. See LSI "Prospek Islam Politik", p. 11. Accessed from www.lsi.or.id on 21 January 2007.

⁸ The first issue of the republished *Al-Islam* featured an article about the importance of reviving the caliphate. See Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, "Hijrah Menuju Khilafah Islamiyah," *Al-Islam*, 1 July 2000., pp. 1-2.

The size of these gatherings pales when compared to the conferences and gatherings staged by other Muslim organizations, such as Nahdlatul *Ulama* (NU) and Muhammadiyah. No other Islamist organization, with the exception of PKS, has had attendances with such large numbers. While it must also be qualified that most attendees at the event were not members of HTI, the scale of the event in itself makes it significant when compared to the first conference organized in 2000. Within a span of seven years, the party was able to galvanize attendees by several folds. By 2007, HTI had also established chapters in all thirty-three Indonesian provinces. This is a clear reflection of the rapid growth that the organization has undergone.

Within eleven years, since its emergence in 2000, HTI has not only seen an increase in its number of members but also become more visible in the Indonesian public realm. HTI leaders complained about the difficulty of getting the mass media to cover its programs in the earlier days of its public emergence.⁹ At least two reports that covered the first international caliphate conference ridiculed both HTI as an organization and the ideas it espoused, criticizing it as marginal and insignificant.¹⁰ By 2007, HTI had increased its media presence in both the local and international media. With the exception of coverage by *Republika*, which tended to be favorable to HTI, the tone of some articles took a more alarmist tone and portrayed HTI as a major threat to Indonesian society. However, HTI leaders were also invited to represent the view of conservative Islam in debates held to discuss Islamic issues.¹¹

Despite, having the image of a radical Islamist group, some prominent national and military leaders were willing to attend and participate in HTI's events. Speakers at HTI events included former Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari, former Youth and Sports Minister, Adyaksa Dault, Tyasno Sudarto, former chairman of Muhammadiyah Amien Rais and former army chiefs of staff Ryamizard Ryacudu and Tyasno Sudarto.¹² It is

⁹ Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Reviving the Islamic Caliphate: Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization Strategy in Indonesia," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010), p. 607.

¹⁰ For an example of such article, see Nasrullah Ali Fauzi, "Belum Apa-Apa Sudah Antidemokrasi," *Panji Masyarakat*, 7 June 2000; Herry Mohammad and Kholis Bahtiar Bakri, "Khilafah Islamiyah: Ibarat Pelari Maraton," *Gatra*, 10 Jun 2000., p. 90-91.

¹¹ After the pornography laws were passed, a debate was held by Indonesian Channel One to discuss the issue. HTI leader, Rokhmat S Labib was invited to debate against Siti Musdah Mulia, a prominent Muslim feminist. See <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/09/16/debat-kontroversi-ruu-anti-pornografi-siti-musdah-mulia-vs-rokhmat-s-labib-mei/>. Accessed on 12 November 2008.

¹² See International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree," in *ICG Asia Report* (Jakarta/Brussels2008).

likely that these figures could have maintained relationships with HTI for personal reasons rather than a real belief in its ideals. Nevertheless, HTI was successful in convincing one of these figures about their ideas. Siti Fadilah, the former health minister still remains close to HTI figures and consults them on a range of different issues.¹³ It was through the advice of HTI leaders that Siti Fadilah was able to make an announcement that the H1N1 strain of the swine flu virus was man-made and likely to have been transmitted to the developing countries by the governments of developed countries.¹⁴ Subsequently, she published a book, *Saatnya Dunia Berubah* (Time for the world to Change), in which she alleged that the U.S. and the World Health Organization (WHO) were conspiring to secure Indonesian samples of the avian flu virus in order to have a monopoly on vaccines. She received extensive support from HTI members including several scientists and doctors who assisted her in writing the book.¹⁵ The book was launched at a HTI event and the party was also involved in a campaign supporting Siti Fadilah's decision to close NAMRU, the *US Naval Medical Research Unit* laboratory in the country. It is perhaps an exaggeration to claim that HTI was solely responsible for the closing down of this facility. Nevertheless, the party's role in supporting the Health Minister played an important role in adding pressure to the Indonesian government to do the same.

Since its emergence, HTI's political influence has increased progressively. In 2006, utilizing the Muslim Community Forum (*Forum Ummat Islam*, FUI), HTI through its former chairman, Muhammad al-Khaththath, organized the so-called 'One Million Muslim March'. The march, which in fact drew far less than a million people called for the enactment of anti-pornography laws.¹⁶ A watered down version of the initial proposed legislation was passed in the Indonesian parliament. The march organized by FUI and HTI placed an added pressure on the Indonesian government to enact the laws. Perhaps an even clearer example of HTI's lobbying is over the issue of the banning of *Ahmadiyah*. Through organizations like the Indonesian *Ulama* Council (*Majelis Ulama*

¹³ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 12 August 2010, Jakarta and Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 25 July 2011, Jakarta.

¹⁴ It is said that these governments wanted to

¹⁵ "Lima Tuntutan Umat", Forum Umat Islam, http://swaramuslim.com/siyasah/more.php?id=5963_0_6_0_m. Accessed on 25 May 2011.

¹⁶ "Minggu, Aksi Sejuta Umat", *Kompas*, 20 May 2006. Muhammad Al-Khaththath was the coordinator for the march. Also see Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and its Mobilization Strategy in Indonesia", pp. 601-609.

Indonesia, MUI), HTI worked to push for the banning of *Ahmadiyah*. The party coordinated the efforts of some Islamic groups under the ambit of FUI to hold demonstrations and public talks to pressure the Indonesian government to ban the group. While the party (and the other Islamic groups) did not attain its goal of banning the *Ahmadiyah*, the government's decision to restrict the activities of the *Ahmadiyah* was seen as a minor victory by HTI leaders.¹⁷

Interpreting Islamism

The term Islamism has become a highly contested term and has attracted debates and controversies throughout the world. Graham Fuller has described Islamism as a body of faith that has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.¹⁸ The eminent scholar on Islam, John Esposito has described Islamism as Islam interpreted as an ideology to support political and social activism.¹⁹ Denonoeux defines Islamism as the usage of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations to pursue political objectives.²⁰ All these definitions basically see Islamism as providing political solutions to contemporary societal challenges. However these definitions tend to be limited in their scope and fail to take into account the complexities associated with the concept of Islamism. Another approach to understanding Islamism is that taken by proponents of security studies.

Since 9/11 some terrorism and security experts have attempted to link the concept of Islamism to violence and acts of terror. Rohan Gunaratna has described Islamism as a dangerous ideology, which grew out of Islamic teachings.²¹ Gunaratna sees Islam as a religion that inspires a dangerous ideology of Islamism. Such assertions are unfortunately alarmist in nature. Gunaratna has attempted to substantiate his claims by narrating the views of terrorist groups and figures without checking whether they are based on Islamic

¹⁷ "Another Blow to Pluralism", *Jakarta Post*, 7 June 2008.

¹⁸ Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York, Palgrave 2003), p. xi.

¹⁹ Middle East Quarterly, "Is Islamism a Threat? A Debate," *Middle East Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (1999).

²⁰ Guilain Denoeux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam," *Middle East Policy* 9, no. 2 (2002), p. 61.

²¹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda* (London: Hurst & Co, 2002).

teachings. As such, his definition of Islamism bears little relevance for the purposes of this thesis.

A scholar that has gone to great lengths at defining Islamism is the distinguished expert on Islam, Olivier Roy. Roy's conception of Islamism is without doubt the most nuanced. Hence, I will accord more discussion to his work. Roy argues that Islamism is an ideology in which the adherents return to the preaching in the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet by means of a political revolution to change the system, but is less concerned about the application of Islamic law.²² Roy also wrote about 'neo-fundamentalism', an ideology that, he argues, is beginning to replace Islamism. He argues that unlike Islamists who operate within a national context, neo-fundamentalists reject the boundaries of the nation-state and seek to re-establish the caliphate. Neo-fundamentalists also seek to implement Islamic laws and return to a concept of true Islam.²³ Examples of neo-fundamentalists according to Roy are groups like Al-Qaeda, *Salafis* and HT. While I aver that Roy's distinction between Islamism and neo-fundamentalism is a very important idea, I differ slightly on the distinction he has drawn between the two groups.

I agree with Roy's definition of 'neo-fundamentalism' being an ideology that focuses on the return to true Islam (Qur'an and the example of the Prophet). Neo-fundamentalists emphasize strongly on personal piety, often with great attention to the minutest details. Neo-fundamentalists also tend to lack interest in major social and political issues. Some apolitical *Salafi* and *Tablighi Jamaat* would fall in this category. Using Roy's analysis as a reference point, I define Islamism as an ideology that thinks of Islam as a system (political, economic and social) and seeks to bring about a political transformation of society and state. This includes the implementation of Islamic law and the framing of economic activities in Islamic terms. While Islamism is also associated with perceived notions of piety such as in one's dressing, dietary habits and being more observant of Islamic rituals, the emphasis on piety is secondary to the main emphasis on political transformation. In this respect groups like the MB, Al-Qaeda and HT would fall within the category of Islamists.

²² Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 35-39.

²³ *ibid*, p. 84-90.

For the purpose of this thesis, I will use the above definition of Islamism to describe HT. It is a movement that seeks the replacement of all Muslim states with a caliphate; the party is also focused more on the need to replace the current systems with Islamic systems. Likewise, the focus on personal piety and Islamic rituals is secondary to the main aim of reviving the caliphate as will be shown in later sections of the thesis.

Literature Review

Works on Islam, especially those related to Islamic political movements, have grown rapidly following the events of 9/11. While some good analytical works have emerged from these studies, a large number of these works tend to be alarmist in nature, warning that Islamic movements are a threat to world peace. HT and HTI are often cited as examples of such dangerous Islamic political movements. The studies of Islamist movements in Indonesia have also increased significantly in the last few years. The important role that Islamic groups played during the political demonstrations in 1998 led to the demise of the New Order regime under Suharto and the two Bali bombings only served to increase the interest in Indonesian Islamism. In the next section, a review of works on Islamism in Indonesia, will be undertaken.

Islamism in Indonesia

Works on Islamism in Indonesia can be broadly grouped into three categories. The first category of works is written in a descriptive style. These works tend to be superficial surveys of Islamist movements. Often, these works provide a historical background, ideology and beliefs of these movements without providing any analysis or posing serious research questions.²⁴ Often, these works are glaring with factual errors and inconsistencies in the line of argument. One such work described the growth of Islamist movements as a passing moment in Indonesian history.²⁵ It then points out that the

²⁴ For examples of these works, see Imam Tholhah and Choirul Fuad Yusuf (eds), *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer Era Reformasi* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Depag, 2002); S Yunanto (ed), *Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and Southeast Asia* (Jakarta: The Rideap Institute and Frederich Ebert Stiftung, 2003) and Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal, Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002).

²⁵ Djamhari Makruf, "Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia: Fenomena Sesaat" in Bahtiar Efendy and Soestrino Hadi (eds) *Agama dan Radikalisme Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Nuktah, 2007), pp. 3-33.

'moderate' form of Islam that is entrenched in Indonesia, as embodied in Muslim organizations like the Nahdlatul *Ulama* and Muhammadiyah, will overcome the challenge of such movements.²⁶ These works provide new information about different Islamist groups but do not contribute significantly to new understandings of Islamism and Islam in Indonesia.

Terrorism and security studies experts have written the second category of work. These works posit the view that Islamism in Indonesia poses a threat to the country and the region.²⁷ 'Experts' such as Sadanand Dhume and Zachary Abuza do precious little to understand the thinking, ideology and methodology of the different categories of Islamists by lumping all of them together as the same.²⁸ Similar to their contributions to the larger body of literature on Islamism, these writings are phrased in an alarmist fashion and serve only to create fear and anxiety about the threat of Islam. These supposed experts have little understanding of Indonesian politics, society, languages and customs, which makes it difficult for any value to be extracted from their research. Greg Fealy commented that many of these writers rely heavily on intelligence briefings and documents. This often leads to errors, particularly due to a lack of understanding of important Islamic terminology.²⁹ Natasha Hamilton-Hart expressed similar views in her insightful article about terrorism studies in Southeast Asia. Her scathing attack on some of the leading experts on terrorism in the region is targeted at their academically unproductive attempts to reconstruct the trail of terrorist activity on the basis of official information. The upshot of this misunderstanding and misrepresentation is that terrorism is often conflated with the ideology of Islamism.³⁰

²⁶ *ibid*, p. 33 and Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme Hingga Post-Modernisme* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996).

²⁷ For instance, see Rohan Gunaratna (ed), *Changing Face of Terrorism* (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004).

²⁸ An example of this Zachary Abuza's assertion that there is nexus of Muslim terrorist (JI), *Salafi* communities and Islamic political parties (PKS) seeking to form an Islamic state in Indonesia. See Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 81. Sadanand Dhume asserts that little differentiates the PKS and groups like JI. They share the same ideology and thinking and goals. See Sadanand Dhume, "Indonesian Democracy's Enemy Within" *Yale Global*, 1 December 2005.

²⁹ Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, *Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia* (Canberra: ASPI, 2005), p. 12.

³⁰ International Crisis Group, "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia," in *ICG Asia Report* (Jakarta/Brussels 2002), p. 303.

Country specialists and experts such as Martin Van Bruinessen, Robert Hefner, Greg Barton and Greg Fealy are responsible for the third category of work.³¹ They charted new directions in the study of Islamist movements in Indonesia. Unlike the terrorism experts, these scholars' authoritative, detailed and highly reliable accounts of Islamist movements in the region have shed new light in the understanding of Islam in Indonesia. Amongst the first scholars to broach the historical dimension of Islamist groups in Indonesia is Martin Van Bruinessen.³² According to him the most contemporary Islamist movements are off-shots of two historical Islamist movements, the *Masyumi* and Darul Islam.³³ His article also gives a concise description of the organizational structure, aims and ideologies of the movements. Van Bruinessen represents a scholarly tradition that utilizes primary sources such as interviews and documents produced by Islamist movements. Differences are drawn between Islamist movements operating in Indonesia.³⁴ The approach taken by these scholars is a more nuanced one where different aspects of movements are examined. While acknowledging the threat of violent Islamist movements, these scholars adopt a more open attitude towards non-violent Islamist movements. In fact, they see the potential of some of these movements to make positive contributions in Indonesia.

I have personally been influenced by their style of writing. I have undertaken in-depth primary research through the study of documents and extensive interviews to understand HTI. While acknowledging the radical vision that HTI subscribes to, I shall undertake the study of the radical ideology of HTI within the context of Indonesia. My study aims to understand HTI from an authentic perspective, providing an analysis of its thinking, goals and strategies.³⁵ In doing so, I intend to take a neutral stance towards studying the movement.

³¹ One of the best works on Islam in Indonesia is Robert Hefner's *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

³² Also see C Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1981).

³³ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Southeast Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002), pp. 117-154.

³⁴ See Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, pp. 12-18 and International Crisis Group, "Why Salafism and Terrorism Don't Mix," in *ICG Asia Report* (Jakarta/Brussels 2004).

³⁵ Although I am not a member of HTI, I attended several internal meetings and study circles, which are not open to outsiders. I also interact with HTI leaders and members at a personal level. As such, my analysis is as close as it gets to the insider's views of HTI.

Scholarships on Hizb ut Tahrir

It is indeed surprising to note the dearth of scholarship on HT. HT has been an important movement within the Middle East for much of the 1960s and 1970s. The party's influence and strength could be seen from its ability to infiltrate the armies of Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia where the party has attempted coups.³⁶ In more recent times, HT is also believed to be the largest Islamist opposition group operating in Central Asia.³⁷ The importance of HT is however not reflected in the number of academic works written about the party. To date, there have been only two books, one monograph, one conference report as well as several journal articles focusing their attention on HT. These works are based on HT's activities in Central Asia and Britain. It is even more problematic as many of these works look at HT through the narrow lens of terrorism/security studies.

Historical-Political Frame

The most important work to date on HT is Suha Taji-Farouki's, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the caliphate*. The book, which adopts a historical analysis of HT, offers an excellent overview of the history and ideology of the party.³⁸ Taji-Farouki also provides extensive details on the life and thinking of the founder of HT, An-Nabhani.³⁹ For Taji-Farouki, HT is a religio-political movement, which grew out of the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, it grew to become a transnational Islamic movement, partly due to repression from the Arab regimes in the Middle East, forcing members to escape to western countries. Her book also gives details about the organizational structure of the movement. The extensive interviews conducted by the author and the use of a wide body of primary documents, affirms this study as the best account of HT. In spite of this, there are several weaknesses in this work and its

³⁶ Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996). This book is seen to be the fairest treatment of the party by many HT activists.

³⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2002).

³⁸ Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, pp. 151-187.

³⁹ Another example of an analysis of An-Nabhani's thinking is Suha Taji-Farouki, "Islamic Discourse and Modern Political Methods: An Analysis of Nabhani's Reading of Canonical Textual Sources of Islam," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 11, no. 3 (1994), p. 365-393.

theoretical underpinnings are weak. Little is also mentioned about the modes of recruitment and motivations for joining HT. The book is rather limited in its geographical coverage to HT activities in the Middle East and Europe, with limited information about its activism in Asia.

Another scholar who has written about HT is Peter Mandaville. Mandaville has described HT as a modernist radical Islamist group that operates on classical Leninist lines. He elucidates that “activists travel the country, setting up closed cells in towns and universities, indoctrinating members in the party’s beliefs and worldview.”⁴⁰ In his second book, *Global Islamic Politics*, Mandaville attempts to explain the features that set Al-Qaeda and HT apart. Here he draws an analogy with the Bolshevik Revolution in which HT is described as the advocates of “*khilafah* in one country” while Al-Qaeda is depicted as being more Trotskyite and favouring a continuous worldwide *jihad*. He also addresses the importance of identity as a factor in attracting young Muslims to HT, arguing that party members and activists must be encouraged to see Islam as a higher order identity while de-emphasizing their national affiliations.⁴¹ This is the key strength of Mandaville’s work. In Chapter 7 of the thesis I shall address the importance of identity in retaining members within HTI. Mandaville also succinctly explained aspects of HT’s organizational structure and recruitment strategies. These aspects of HT and HTI will be discussed in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, Mandaville’s grasp of HT’s beliefs and aims is problematic. His assertion that HT advocates the formation of a caliphate in one state is inaccurate. HT has maintained that the party will call on all Muslim states to unite under one caliphate, failing which it is obliged to wage *jihad* against those, which have refused to join.⁴² He also made the mistake of referring to HT as being a *Salafi* movement.⁴³ This mistake could have stemmed from his belief that HT and *Al-Muhajiroun* (an offshoot group of HT) are more or less the same.⁴⁴ While *Al-Muhajiroun* does subscribe to a more *Salafi* orientation, An-Nabhani the founder of HT has been critical of *Salafi* thinkers and rejects their ideology.

⁴⁰ Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Re-Imagining the Ummah* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 129.

⁴¹ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 270.

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 271

⁴⁴ Mandaville, *Transnational Islam*, p. 116.

In his seminal work, *Globalised Islam*, Olivier Roy's analysis includes a case study of HT. He refers to HT as one of the "neo-fundamentalists" groups. Similar to traditional fundamentalist groups, he holds that HT seeks to establish an Islamic state (caliphate), implement Islamic laws as well as return to what they deem to be a state of true Islam. He also proposes that certain dimensions of HT's ideology refer to traits that are present in neo-fundamentalist movements. He notes that,

HT has become an uprooted and deterritorialised movement, with no thought of taking power in a given country. The caliphate it wants to establish has no territorial basis. HT uses pseudo-Koranic terminology, taken out of context, with no consideration of history and social circumstances. Its concept of *Khilafat* has little to do with the historical caliphate; even if the party sees 1924 as the year when it ended, this does not mean that it wishes to revive the Ottoman political system. In fact, for HT, the caliphate is not a real geographical entity and has no territorial or sociological roots. It has to be established as soon as possible for the whole *ummah* and not on a specific territory. This global and abstract conception of the *ummah* is typical of neo-fundamentalism. The development of HT exemplifies how a former Islamist party turned neo-fundamentalist, even if it differs from all other neo-fundamentalist movements.⁴⁵

While Roy's analysis on HT's conception of the caliphate and the *ummah* is succinct and will be extrapolated in greater detail later in the thesis, his claim that HT is de-territorialized in all aspects does not fit in with some of the findings of this study. Later chapters of the thesis will demonstrate that the HT chapter in Indonesia remains strongly attached to its chapters in the Middle East, and even takes orders from this central leadership. The more important aspect of Roy's work is his contribution to the study of Islamism. As highlighted above, Roy brought forth a new recognition that Islamism is today shaped by a confused understanding of identity, especially amongst Muslim youths. His analysis is thus a study of HT that examines both the macro and micro dimension of Islamism and draws a correlation between these factors. This approach of combining the historical-hermeneutic approach and the sociological approach will be adopted in this thesis.

⁴⁵ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 238.

Terrorism and Radicalism Frame

Recent literature on HT has primarily attempted to study the group through the lens of international terrorism and Islamic radicalism. Examples of these works include Zeyno Baran's *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency* and *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology* edited by the same author. Zeyno Baran also coined the phrase 'conveyor belt for terrorism' to describe HT.⁴⁶ Other authors go further, by implicating HT as the next Al-Qaeda and warning of the danger they can pose to the international community.⁴⁷ In his assessment of HT in Central Asia, Ariel Cohen predicts that HT could well become the next Al-Qaeda. He believes that HT is attempting to overthrow the Central Asian governments through violent coups.⁴⁸ Echoing this view is Rohan Gunaratna who claims that many Al-Qaeda members, such as Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, were former members of HT.⁴⁹ The approach undertaken by these 'experts' is often security and policy oriented and tends to be written with a politicized agenda. As a response to the earlier works by Baran and Cohen, Swiss academic, Jean Francois-Mayer has contested the views expressed by Baran and Cohen.⁵⁰ Few of these studies take a nuanced approach to analyzing HT. With the exception of Francois-Mayer's work, the key research focus of these authors dwells in determining whether HT is a security threat. Baran and Cohen do not provide much useful insights of the context in which HT in Central Asia operate. These works are also marred with factual inaccuracies. For instance, Baran in an attempt to cluster HT and Al-Qaeda together observed:

⁴⁶ Zeyno Baran, "The Road from Tashkent to the Taliban: An Islamist Terror Group Is Undermining a U.S. Ally," *The National Review*, 2 Apr 2004. Accessed from <http://www.nationalreview.com> on 14 January 2005.

⁴⁷ Ariel Cohen, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia.," in *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* (Heritage Foundation, 2003).

⁴⁸ *ibid*, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, "Links with Islamic Groups" in Zeyno Baran (ed), *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology* (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2004).

⁵⁰ Sadek Hamid, "Islamic political Radicalism in Britain: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir" in Tahir Abbas (ed) *Islamic Political Radicalism. A European Perspective* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007); Noman Hanif "The caliphate: Islam's Challenge to Global Order?". Accessed on <http://usa.mediamonitors.net> on 4 October 2011, Jean Francois Mayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir - The Next Al-Qaida, Really? *PSIO Occasional Paper* (Geneva, PSIO, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs DFA Political Affairs Division IV) No 4, pp. 3-24. and Houriyah Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, *Hizb Ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Structure* (London: Center for Social Cohesion, 2009).

While Al-Qaeda can be thought of as the overarching symbol representing militant, radical Islam, HT's global networks directly convey the radical Islamist message to the Muslim grounds.⁵¹

It is also misleading to lump HT together with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. This is especially given that HT has been severely criticized by groups subscribing to *the Salafi-jihadist* ideology. As early as 1980, the spiritual guide of Osama Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, wrote a vehement critique of HT arguing that the group has strayed from Islam. More recently, the ICG wrote of the tension between the *Salafis* (the religious ideology that Al-Qaeda subscribes to) and their HT 'brothers'.⁵² The ICG has also declared that HT is incapable of posing a serious threat to any of the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia as it lacks funds, members and institutional support.

More recently, in his book *The Islamists*, Ed Husain, a former member of HT in Britain, has argued that HT posed a serious threat to Britain and must be countered conclusively by the government.⁵³ The book is a first-hand account of how an individual becomes drawn to radical groups like HT. While Husain falls short of labeling HT as a terrorist group, he unequivocally calls for the banning of HT. His argument is based on his personal experience. He believes that the ideas HT advocates have resulted in the murder of a Christian Nigerian student by a radical Muslim student who was influenced by HT's ideas.⁵⁴

Unlike the works of Baran and Cohen, Husain's analysis of HT provides details of HT's ideology, the context of its emergence in the UK and his personal motivation for joining HT. The information in the book provides a fresh perspective on the HT in the UK. Notwithstanding its strength, the work's singular weakness is that it tarnishes all Islamists with same brush. Husain does not advance a clear working definition for the term Islamist. While acknowledging differences amongst groups like the MB, *Jamaat-e-*

⁵¹ Zeyno Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency* (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2004), p. 13.

⁵² International Crisis Group, "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb Ut-Tahrir," in *ICG Asia Report* (Osh/Brussels2003), p. 31

⁵³ See Ed Husain, *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left* (London: Penguin, 2007). Ed Husain's colleague Maajid Nawaz has also written several opinion pieces approaching HT along similar lines. For instance, see Maajid Nawaz, *In and Out of Islamism* (London, The Quilliam Foundation: 2008), pp. 1-11.

⁵⁴ Husain, *The Islamist*, p. 152.

Islami, HT and *Wahhabi*, he regards all of them as security threats to Britain. Moreover, Husain's analysis is also flawed given that he was part of the HT in Britain when it came under the leadership of Omar Bakri Muhammad at a critical juncture. This was when Omar Bakri was sacked from his position, as he was deemed to have strayed from the methodology espoused by HT. Inevitably, Hussain's assessment of HT in Britain is based solely on the period when the HT leadership in the country veered from the key ideology of the party. It is the purpose of this thesis to correct some of these errors, especially with regard to understanding HT's ideology. It will also attempt to provide an alternative view of HT that differs from the radicalism/terrorism centric perspective.

The Social Movement Frame

One of the more recent theoretical approaches used to study HT is the social movement theory (SMT). While there are different interpretations of social movement theory, which will be elaborated upon later in the chapter, SMT can be loosely understood as an interdisciplinary approach that seeks to understand the emergence of movements launching collective action against the state to bring about social transformation.⁵⁵ Several variants of SMT have emerged. One of them is the functionalist approach, which contends that movements emerge and grow due to social deprivation of individuals. Another branch of SMT is the political opportunity structure, which argues that movements emerge due to external political factors that give opportunities for movements to emerge and grow. A third branch of SMT is the resource mobilization theory, which highlights that movements emerge and grow due to the availability of resources. The final variant of SMT is the framing theory, which argues that movements grow due to their ability to market ideas by achieving intellectual resonance with individuals whom they target for recruitment. SMT has been employed by Emmanuel Karagiannis in his book on HT in Central Asia.⁵⁶ Through a synthesis of different variants of SMT, Karagiannis studies the

⁵⁵ For the purpose of the thesis, collective action is defined as direct actions such as protests, demonstrations, public rallies undertaken in pursuit of movement's goals. Violence as a form of collective action is precluded from this study given that HTI is not a violent movement and has never undertaken any act of violence. See Sidney Tarrow, "Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoires of Contentiousness" in Mark Traugott's (ed) *Recurrent Patterns of Collective Action* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 89.

⁵⁶ Emmanuel Karagiannis, *Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir* (New York: Routledge, 2009). Also see other articles by the author of HT in Central Asia. See Emmanuel Karagiannis, "Political Islam and Social Movement Theory: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan" *Religion, State*

emergence of HT as an opposition force in three Central Asian Republics; Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. He concludes that SMT does not satisfactorily explain the emergence of HT. Instead, he argues that it is HT's ideology that is the key factor leading to its emergence in the region. Another important aspect of his work is his assessment on links between HT and other Islamist movements, such as the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* (IMU) and the *Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan* (IRPT).⁵⁷ He debunks some of the earlier studies on HT in Central Asia linking these groups to HT. Karagiannis' book provided a theoretically and empirically rich treatment of HT in Central Asia, which makes the book an excellent introductory work on HT in Central Asia.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the study suffers from several problems. A major gap in Karangianis' work is its theoretical framework. He treats ideology as a factor that lies outside of SMT, as is evident from his definition of ideology. This is despite the fact that there are views within SMT that ideology should be an integral part of the theory. It seems that the author is unaware of these debates as they are not mentioned or discussed in the book. While he alludes to the role of ideology in mobilizing collective actions, he does not explain further the actual relationship between ideology and collective actions or how HT members relate to its ideology. As such, the book does not satisfactorily explain the actual importance of ideology in the growth of HT in Central Asia.⁵⁹

Beyond the problem with its theoretical approach, there are a number of factual inaccuracies and gaps in the book. The author's account of HT's history seems to show a lack of rigorous research. For instance, the account on splits within HT is speculative and will be addressed in the next chapter of the thesis.⁶⁰ Perhaps, the biggest problem with the book is an over-reliance on intelligence reports from the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This is especially so, since the authoritarian nature of their regimes makes any information about HT emerging from the countries suspect. There has been a tendency for these governments to exaggerate the threat of HT in their countries to

& *Society* 33, no. 2. (2005), pp. 137-149; Emmanuel Karagiannis, "Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir *Al-Islami*" *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 2. (2006), pp. 261- 280; Emmanuel Karagiannis, "The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir *Al-Islami*" *Nationalities Papers* 34, no. 1. (2006), pp. 1-20.

⁵⁷ For details of the IRPT, see Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).

⁵⁸ Karangianis, *Political Islam in Central Asia*, pp. 58-68.

⁵⁹ *ibid*, pp. 91-102.

⁶⁰ *ibid*, p. 30.

justify the use of harsh political oppression. As in Karangianis' work, I shall also discuss the importance of ideology. The relationship between ideology and SMT as well as the links between ideology and collective identity will be discussed cogently within a larger theoretical discussion. In this thesis, I shall also explain why ideology plays an important role when potential party members have to choose between HTI and other Indonesian Islamist movements.

Interpreting Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

The literature on HT in Indonesia is scarcer. Only two books, several thesis and short articles have been written about HTI. Attempts by some scholars to assess HTI reveal several flaws. Firstly, there is a lack of understanding of the actual ideology of HT. Most authors such as Agus Salim and Syamsul Arifin refer to HTI as a modernist movement with Jamroni and Jamhari even suggesting that HTI is a *Salafi* movement. Secondly, many of these sources have factual inaccuracies or serious errors about the history of HTI.⁶¹ These inaccuracies often lead authors to draw erroneous conclusions about HTI. The assumption by many authors that HT is a splinter group of the MB is due to the fact that many of these authors have not understood the conflict between HTI and the MB inspired *Jamaah Tarbiyah* (JT) movement within the *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (LDK). Lastly, most works on HT tend to rely on limited primary sources produced by HTI. All of these works do not cite key texts of HT, some of which have yet to be translated to Bahasa Indonesia. Such works are important in trying to understand the ideology, beliefs and objectives of the party. As a result of these problems, the corpus of research on HTI with the exception of Agus Salim's thesis, has not contributed significantly to our understanding of the history and development of HTI.

Terrorism and Radicalism Frame

The tendency to classify all radical Islamist groups together can be seen in many studies

⁶¹ The best work on HTI to date is an article by Greg Fealy. In spite of this, even this work suffers from several historical inaccuracies including the assumption that Abdullah Bin Nuh pursued HT due to disappointment with other Islamic groups in Indonesia. See Greg Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking a "Total" Muslim Identity", in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (eds), *Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the west*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 151-164.

on HTI. These works tend to be alarmist in nature and are often written with a systematic attempt to portray HTI as a dangerous organization that could potentially destabilize Indonesia. Such an agenda could be seen in the attempt of one such work to link HTI to the larger *Salafi* movement in Indonesia, which is deemed to be a threat to the country.⁶² It describes HTI's ideology, objectives and the political and economic system envisioned by the movement. Virtually no analysis of these areas is made except for the claim that HTI is a threat to Indonesia. As highlighted earlier, the authors' understanding of HTI's ideology is also erroneous. Jajang and Jamrohi write:

HT's ideology is based on the *Salafism* of Rida, Abduh's reformism and Al-Afghani's pan-Islamism.⁶³

This is a direct contradiction of the actual ideology of HT and HTI. Figures such as Rashid Rida, Muhammad Abduh and Jamal Al-Din Afghani have been constantly criticised by HT ideologues and members for having sold Islam out to the west. A HT leader writes:

The strategy of bridging the gap between Islam and the west were carried out by so called Muslim reformers such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, Jamal Al Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rifa'a al Tahtawi, Rashid Rida, Taha Husayn, and 'Ali 'Abdul Raziq, most of whom they alleged maintained a close relationship with the British or French governments, either overtly or covertly.⁶⁴

Despite the weaknesses stated above, the book provides some introductory information about HTI's objectives, methodology and activities in Indonesia.

Another work on HTI utilising this lens is Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf's *The Image of the Other as Enemy: Radical Discourse in Indonesia*. This book analyses the systematic construction of the image of the 'Other' by HTI and the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI). The author documents discourse patterns in the groups' publications and

⁶² Jajang Jahroni and Jamhari, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persata, 2004), pp. 161-205

⁶³ *ibid.*, p. 176-177.

⁶⁴ Shaikh Talib Awadallah, *The Beloved by Allah Emergence of Light from Al-Aqsa Mosque Launch of Hizb ut-Tahrir's March* (London: Khilafah Publications, 2006), p. 28.

speeches stereotyping non-Muslims as being hostile towards Islam and envisioning Islam's imminent victory over all other civilizations.⁶⁵ Ahnaf makes the case that assertions of HTI and MMI on several issues are misleading. He accuses these groups of ignoring the actual Qur'anic verses to justify the literal interpretation of the Qur'an proposed by these fundamentalist groups. This discursive approach to studying HTI provides an interesting approach in studying movements like HTI. In criticizing HTI, the author himself is guilty of the same mistake about the literal reading of the Qur'an, albeit in the opposite manner. His interpretation of the Qur'an is flawed from an attempt to give a liberal reading to the text, failing to acknowledge that certain verses from the Qur'an do enjoin Muslims to take up arms under special circumstances. The biggest problem with the book lies in its sloppy research, leading to factual inaccuracies that could have been easily avoided had the author read some basic HTI texts. For instance, the author notes that HT and HTI have no organizational structure, central figures or top leader.⁶⁶ A scan of literature on HT would reveal that HT is a highly structured organization with a hierarchical leadership.⁶⁷ The book is also marred by numerous errors in its account of history and methodology. Similar to other works written within the terrorism/security, Ahnaf grouped HTI and MMI within the same radical extremist category failing to realize distinct differences between the ideology and methodology of the two groups.

Social Movement Frame

Another theoretical framework that has been employed in a study on HTI is the social movement frame. Agus Salim's *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization and Collective Action Frames* is perhaps the most informative academic work on HTI so far. He assesses the emergence of HTI utilizing the key variants of SMT, namely the political opportunity structure, resource mobilization and framing. Salim's work is groundbreaking research that captures aspects of HTI's history and its evolution from the time it was a clandestine group to the point where it becomes a legal political organization. Nevertheless, several

⁶⁵ Muhammad Iqbal Asnaf, *The Image of the Other as Enemy: Radical Discourse in Indonesia* (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 2006).

⁶⁶ *ibid*, p. 10.

⁶⁷ For instance, see Taji Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, pp. 114-152.

problems can be identified in this work. Besides making the same error of categorizing HTI as a *Salafi* movement and describing Abdullah Bin Nuh as the first leader of HTI, the thesis did not engage SMT satisfactorily.⁶⁸ There was an absence of an overarching argument or theoretical framework to link each of these variants of the theory. Each variant of the theory was used independently to explain the emergence of HTI. Furthermore, his assessment of the macro dimensions of HTI's emergence meant that the micro dimensions of HTI's emergence were not discussed. This includes reasons for members joining HTI or their choice of HTI over other Islamic groups.

Historical-Political Frame

The study of its history is yet another way to understand HTI. An example of this approach is that undertaken by Indonesia specialist, Ken Ward. In his article, he traces the trajectory of the future of political Islam in Indonesia through the study of HTI's history. Ward highlights several reasons as to why HTI has avoided being targeted by the Indonesian authorities despite its semi-clandestine organizational structure. The author also devotes a section on HTI and violence, which conclusively rebuts assertions that HTI is involved in violent activities.⁶⁹ Even so, the article has several factual errors already highlighted earlier.⁷⁰ While acknowledging the fact that HTI's influence has grown, the author does little in trying to understand the reason for this growth. As such, the article's conclusion that HTI is likely to grow but is unlikely to attain its goals of reviving the caliphate in Indonesia is supported by little empirical data.⁷¹ Nevertheless, his analysis is useful in understanding the larger dynamics of HTI's history and its impact on the future of HTI.

Another work that seeks to examine HTI from a narrative frame is Syamsul Arifin's *Ideologi Dan Praksis Gerakan Kaum Fundamentalists*. The book analyses the ideology of

⁶⁸ Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization and Collective Action Frames" Unpublished Masters Thesis (Jakarta: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 2005).

⁶⁹ Ken Ward, "Non-violent extremists", p. 149.

⁷⁰ Similar to earlier writings on HTI, the author argued that Abdullah Bin Nuh invited Al-Baghdadi to Indonesia. *ibid*, p. 150. The author also does not seem to realize that the official spelling of HT is Hizb ut-Tahrir rather than the localized spelling of HT which is Hizbut Tahrir. Throughout the article the larger HT is spelled in the localized spelling (Hizbut Tahrir).

⁷¹ *ibid*, pp. 161-2.

HTI through its examination of its history and activities. It looks at factors that have shaped HTI's ideology and how this ideology in turn has shaped the social relationship between its members.⁷² The author categorizes HTI's ideology as fundamentalist, arguing this on the basis of its rejection of modernism and its definition of the concept of the nation state based on Islam as a political system.⁷³ In spite of this, the work bears several weaknesses. For one, his attempt at analyzing the religious and political ideology of HTI is not undertaken comprehensively. He draws his conclusion about HTI's ideology by referring to two books, the *Structuring of a Party* and the *Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir* written by its founder An-Nabhani. The lack of reference to other important works of An-Nabhani such as the *Political System of Islam* and the *System of Islam* has resulted in a semi-accurate portrayal of HTI's ideology. As a result, aspects of HTI's ideology such as its proposed political, social and economic systems are ignored.

Besides Greg Fealy's work, which comes closest to accounting for the rise of HTI in Indonesia, the rest of the research-work has done little to account for the growth of HTI in Indonesia. It is the aim of this thesis to fill this gap in literature through the utilization of a combination of both the historical-political approach and social movement approach.

Research Questions and Central Argument

It is the aim of this study to investigate the growth of HTI in Indonesia. It seeks to examine why HTI has experienced rapid growth. Scholarly works on HTI tend to focus on the group's history, organizational structure and ideology. Unfortunately, the narrative and description of these studies have been largely inaccurate. The thesis will offer new insights on HTI's history, organizational structure and ideology. This research will also be adding considerable new details about HTI and correcting errors in existing literature. Nonetheless, its primary focus lies in explaining HTI's rapid growth in Indonesia.

In trying to comprehend the growth of HTI, a series of smaller questions are posed. Firstly, this study seeks to understand why HTI emerged publicly in 2000 and the

⁷² Syamsul Arifin, *Ideologi Dan Praksis Gerakan Kaum Fundamentalists* (Jakarta: UMM Press, 2004), p. 3.

⁷³ *ibid*, p. 4.

political factors that impact on the party's strategies. Secondly, it will examine HTI's recruitment and mobilization strategies by asking how HTI recruits members, builds organizational capacity and secures material resources. Thirdly, the thesis explores the reason why HTI members choose HTI over other Islamist groups or organizations. Lastly, this dissertation seeks to understand why members remain in the party despite having no guarantee of real tangible benefits or results from their activism. Here I will draw on the POS and RMT variants of the Social Movement Theory (SMT), incorporating also theories of identity and ideology as a framework, to better understand and answer the questions posed.

The central argument of this study is that the key to understanding HTI's growth lies in the role that collective identity plays in attracting new members and retaining its existing members within the party. Factors such as institutional and non-institutional opportunities within the Indonesian political system, HTI's resource mobilization strategies and the anti-systemic ideology of HTI, serve as political, organizational and religious incentives for individuals to join the party and launch collective action. Notwithstanding this, collective identity remains the most crucial factor in the party's growth.

Theoretical Approach

This thesis seeks to go beyond the radicalism and the historical-political approaches of studying HT and HTI. It aims to delve into some aspects of HTI's history, organizational structure, goals, ideas and programs within a theoretical framework. These issues will be addressed within the larger context of an analysis of HTI movement.

Why SMT?

Social movement theorists have sought to assess the emergence and success of a movement through several social movement frameworks. As highlighted earlier, SMT has several variants including those that involve relative deprivation, political opportunities, resource mobilization, framing and identity. The key strength in the use of

SMT lies in the fact that it offers an alternative explanation to understanding Islamism in Indonesia. Earlier conventional interpretations of Islamic activism tended to study the phenomenon as a direct outcome of accumulated cultural grievances, distinct cultural traits or an expression of socio-economic grievances. SMT seeks to provide a more comprehensive explanation for the rise of Islamic political movements by taking into consideration both the external socio-political and religious environment that a movement operates in, the internal dynamics that shape movements, decisions, strategies and activities as well as the motivations and attractions of individuals drawn towards a social movement. This being the case, SMT is useful in answering some of the questions that are posed in the thesis.

SMT as a theory has evolved over time. Earlier SMT theorists tried to understand the emergence of social movements through the 'strains' theory. This theory argues that a variety of strains in society, due to relative deprivation, may produce psychological grievances that can only be alleviated through collective action.⁷⁴ The key weakness of this theory is its assumption that social actions take place in a sporadic fashion and are not the result of proper strategies and calculated moves.⁷⁵ As cited above, relative deprivation links social change to psychological states of individuals. Nonetheless, there are many reasons that may be responsible for changes in a person's psychological state. This means that while relative deprivation might be a reason why individuals launch collective actions, it may not necessarily be the sole reason.

The rethinking of this earlier approach came about with the emergence of the resource mobilization theory (RMT), a variant of SMT. Rather than viewing social movements as consisting of individuals who behave in an irrational manner in response to structural issues that exist in the society, this theory assumes that individuals involved in social movements act in a rational manner. According to the resource mobilization theory,

⁷⁴ Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). It must be added here that relative deprivation theory is part of the collective behaviour theory, which also includes the structural-functionalism theory and symbolic interactionism. For a discussion on collective behaviour theory, see Steven M. Buehler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19-29.

⁷⁵ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 17-19.

social movements must be able to mobilize key resources if they are to emerge.⁷⁶ This approach focuses on the internal dynamics of a social movement such as its organizational structure, ability to secure financial support and creation of formal institutions and informal networks aimed at assisting it towards its end goal. While providing an understanding of the dynamics and tactics of social movements it also analyzes the growth, decline and change of the movements from the standpoint of their ability to procure and mobilize resources towards their stated objective. In essence, the theory makes the case that movements, which are more successful at recruitment of members and mobilizing resources, are also likely to be more successful in attaining their goals. A key weakness of the RMT is its failure to assess external factors that could hamper or assist the growth of a social movement. While RMT is a powerful tool for analyzing social movements at the macro level, it does little at assessing cognitive factors such as individual incentives and motivations for joining them.

The political opportunity structure (POS) theory seeks to comprehend external factors that impact a social movement's action, strategy and ability to mobilize members and supporters towards a certain goal.⁷⁷ In a way, these political opportunity structures refer to the dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for, or constraints against, people undertaking collective action.⁷⁸ Existing political opportunity structure arguments have concentrated on its four central dimensions, namely, declining state repression, increasing political access, divisions among the elite and the co-opting of influential allies.⁷⁹ These dimensions tend to focus on institutional POS and as such are not exhaustive. There are also other dimensions of POS that are more contexts specific. I have defined these dimensions collectively as non-institutional POS. Political opportunity structures are important in examining the political and socio-economic conditions that allow social movements to emerge and grow. Studies, which apply POS, have shown that changes in political and socio-economic contexts impact the likelihood of a group undertaking collective action. In sum, POS can be used as a heuristic device to

⁷⁶ John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movement: A Partial Theory" in John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds), *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987, pp. 15-48.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁸ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁷⁹ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

generate hypotheses about how changes in political context impact on the incentives (or disincentives) for social movement actors to launch collective action and explain the reaction of actors towards different political systems. One key limitation of POS is the difficulty to prove empirically that a given change in dimension of POS is likely to alter the incentive for or against collective action. Similar to RMT, POS theory does little to comprehend or understand the perspectives of individuals within social movements.

Another important variant of SMT is framing theory. Framing is a process whereby actors in a social movement, produce, arrange and disseminate discourses that resonate among those they intend to mobilize.⁸⁰ In practice, the concept refers to the interpretations of events provided by social movement organizations that are intended to resonate with the beliefs of supporters.⁸¹ The theory integrates social psychological factors with SMT. Likewise, framing theory attempts to link micro factors (i.e. social psychological factors) and macro factors (structural and organizational factors).⁸² It argues that only when there is "frame alignment" that recruitment and mobilization is possible.⁸³ Frames offer cognitive tools for making sense of events and experiences by interpreting causation, evaluating situations, and offering prescriptive remedies.⁸⁴ The framing theory also provides an insight into how movements act to change the cognitive structure of targets, and the conditions, which lead to the success of movements in doing so. However, the theory has remained largely under-developed and the empirical case studies that utilize this theory often view framing from the perspective of the movement rather than individuals. Framing theory could be more effective in studying micro factors if the theory is rehabilitated with other social psychological theories.

Another problem that has emerged within discussions on framing theories is the tendency for scholars of SMT to discount the importance of ideology and to use the term ideology and framing interchangeably. In an important work discussing the relationship

⁸⁰ David Snow, E Burke Richford David Snow, Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Process, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," *American Sociologist Review* 51, no. 4 (1986), pp.461-481.

⁸¹ Robert Benford, "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," *Social Forces* 71, no. 3 (1993), pp. 677-701.

⁸² Snow (et al.), "Framing", 1986, p. 464

⁸³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the west* (Boulder, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p. 16.

between the concepts of framing and ideology, Oliver and Johnston argued for the distinct usage of frames and ideologies. They argued that ideologies tend to link theory, norms and values in an inter-connected fashion. Ideologies also focus on the content of the whole systems of belief, are historically stable in nature and tend to define movements' boundaries.⁸⁵ On the other hand, they argue that frames tend to be shallow, are situated specifically in areas of contention, and can be assimilated relatively easily and quickly.⁸⁶ While the authors made a convincing case about the distinction between the concepts of frames and ideologies, they did not propose any significant way whereby ideologies can be included within SMT. A possible framework for the inclusion of ideology within SMT will be proposed later in the chapter.

In response to criticisms about the failure of both the RMT and POS approaches in addressing the questions of how structural inequality gets translated into discontent, Mc Adam and associates offer the concept of micro-mobilization. By this, they mean informal networks, which are held together by strong bonds that are used as the basic building blocks of social movements. Nevertheless, this idea has been criticized for failing to illustrate how movements transform individuals into movement actors. Alberto Melucci is perhaps the first SMT theorist to argue for the inclusion of collective identity within SMT. He notes that the collective identity formation process refers to the process in which actors produce meanings, communicate, negotiate and make decisions.⁸⁷ This means that social movement actors often undergo changes in their behaviour and thinking after being socialized within the culture of a particular social movement.⁸⁸ The inclusion of collective identity within SMT is also an important attempt at bringing and understanding the micro perspective of the individual actor within a social movement. Nonetheless, Melucci does not elaborate on exactly how collective identity can be included into the study of social movements.

⁸⁵ Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston, "What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research" *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5, no. 1. (2000), p. 47.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*

⁸⁷ This definition was made by Alberto Melucci who first proposed the need for SMT theorists to include collective identity in studies of social movements. See Albert Melucci, *Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements* in B Klandermans, H, Kriesi and S Tarrow (eds) *International Social Movement Research*, Volume 1, (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1988), p. 333.

⁸⁸ F Polletta and M. J. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27(2001), p. 284.

In line with this approach, Quintan Wiktorowicz brings his analysis of an Islamist group to the individual level. He asks an important question about why individual Muslims choose to join radical Islamic groups, which are deemed risky and offer little benefits to them. In answering this question, Wiktorowicz proposes that individuals go through four processes, namely, cognitive opening, religious seeking, framing and socialization before adopting a collective identity, as defined by the social movement.⁸⁹

He further argues that individuals involved in radical Islamic groups often experience a cognitive opening which challenges their prevailing beliefs, making them open to new ideas and are thus more susceptible to being influenced by these groups.⁹⁰ This cognitive opening could occur as a result of different experiences such as discrimination, socio-economic crisis and political oppression. He notes that many of these individuals experiencing a cognitive opening try to resolve their difficulties through a process of 'religious seeking'.⁹¹ It is at this stage that Islamist groups develop framing strategies to attract these individuals to their cause.⁹² Individuals are then exposed to a 'culturing process' through which they are exposed to a group's ideology and made to believe that their salvation lies in furthering the group's objectives. The process of collective identity formation is important in understanding the perspective of the individual. Nevertheless, the problem with this approach is its failure to capture the macro factors that impact social movements. In addition, Wiktorowicz also seems to be describing the process of individuals joining the movements rather than explaining the reasons for them doing so.

The Role of Ideology

Another problem related to the utilization of SMT in this thesis is its inability to explain the growth of HTI vis-à-vis other Islamic groups. Since the collapse of the New Order regime, there has been a proliferation of both radical and moderate Islamic groups. Muslims in Indonesia can choose from a myriad of different Islamic organizations that exist within the Indonesian society. SMT does not explain the reasons as to why

⁸⁹ Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising*, p. 84.

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

⁹¹ *ibid.*

⁹² An important work that built on Wiktorowicz's path breaking work is that by Gabriele Marranci. He chartered out the process of how young British Muslims become radicalized. See Gabriele Marranci, *Understanding Muslim Identity: Rethinking Fundamentalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

individuals decide to choose one organization over another. It is in this regard that Freeden's concept of ideology can fill the theoretical gap.

Freeden regards ideology as "configuration of logically 'de-contested' meanings of concepts".⁹³ According to Freeden an ideology has three components: core concepts, adjacent concepts and peripheral concepts.⁹⁴ Both adjacent and peripheral concepts tend to evolve with time and are open to diverse interpretations. Ideology thus takes a 'particular route from the core through adjacent concepts, to peripheral ones, as well as by the reverse movement'.⁹⁵

The ideology of Islamism makes a good test for Freeden's definition. Islamism as a concept that consists of some core beliefs such as the need to implement Islamic laws and the importance of an Islamic political, economic and social system. For instance, groups inspired by the MB tend to accept democracy as being an important tenet of the Islamist ideology whereas Islamists inspired by the Al-Qaeda notion of Islamism reject democracy, arguing instead for a theocracy or a semi-theocracy to be formed in Islamic countries. Adjacent and peripheral concepts, such as the correct method to bring about an Islamic system, often bring about major intra-ideological debates. Despite the importance of ideology as a key to understanding the growth and success of social movements, it is often ignored in literature on social movements. This thesis will thus attempt to touch on the use of ideology in studying social movements.

Towards an Integrated Structural-Cognitive Model

The analysis of various theories above reveals that none of these theories on their own are sufficient to answer the questions that are posed in the thesis. As such, a synthesis of variants of SMT, theories of identity and ideology is needed to address some of the issues raised earlier in the thesis. As highlighted above, the key limitation of the macro approaches (POS and RMT) is that these theories tend to ignore the micro level factors

⁹³ *ibid*

⁹⁴ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 30.

⁹⁵ *ibid*, p. 81.

(identity and ideology).⁹⁶ In the same way, micro level analysis which tends to focus on ideology and identity have a tendency of ignoring the larger macro level factors that impact the growth of social movements.

It must be acknowledged that the proposed theoretical framework is complex. Nevertheless, it is important that in trying to understand the growth of HTI, both structural (macro) and cognitive (micro) factors are taken into account to answer all the questions that this thesis poses. In this proposed integrated model, both the macro and micro perspectives will be assessed. At the macro level, POS will assist us in understanding the incentive for actors within a movement to emerge and launch collective action against the state. It will be shown that perceived institutional and non-institutional opportunities in the Indonesian political system allow HTI to emerge publicly, conduct public events and launch collective action in an effort to recruit members. RMT explains the strategies employed by HTI to recruit and mobilize members towards its fold. As highlighted above, both POS and RMT explain incentives for individuals to join the movement but do little to account for the decision-making process undertaken by individuals or the transformations that individuals undergo to become members of a group like HTI. It is in this regard that the concepts of ideology and collective identity are essential. The concept of ideology as defined by Freedman explains the decision-making process of individuals and why potential members choose a group like HTI over other Islamic or Islamist groups. Most importantly, the four processes described by Wiktorowicz, explain collective identity formation, and the changes that individuals undergo after adopting the collective identity. A synthesis of these theories and concepts would provide for a better understanding of HTI's rapid growth in Indonesia.

Data Acquisition

⁹⁶ Examples of works utilizing POS include Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Other works utilizing RMT includes, Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). While these works provide an excellent insight to the opportunities created and strategies employed by Islamist movements in their challenge to the state, it does little to examine the views of individuals towards these movements.

I have combined documentary and fieldwork approaches to acquiring data on HT and HTI. I have examined most of the literature produced by HT in English, Bahasa Indonesia, Malay and Urdu. My poor Arabic proficiency made me depend on an interpreter to translate several works written by An-Nabhani which have yet to be translated into English. I have also read non-adopted texts, which are typically written by leaders of HT. Some of these materials were inaccessible and were provided to me by members of HT in India, Malaysia and Australia. I have also obtained every copy of the monthly HTI journal, *Al-Wa'ie*, and collected the weekly HTI's bulletin, *Al Islam*, since 2004. Since 2008, I have also gathered copies of HTI's fortnightly newspaper, *Media Ummat*. Beyond the documentary research, I follow the main websites of HTI and HT on a daily basis. I read blogs and Internet forums linked to HTI members and their critics. Several members of HT in Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, United Kingdom and Lebanon have also added me as a 'friend' on the social networking site, Facebook, that allows me to access important events as well as discussions related to HT. I have viewed videos produced by HTI and watched videos uploaded by HT and HTI members on Youtube.

Apart from gathering documentary and visual representations of facts and data, I have conducted fieldwork trips to Indonesia, Malaysia, Lebanon, Jordan and Britain between 2007 and 2011 to interview HT and HTI members and ex-members. I interviewed more than one hundred members of HT in different parts of the world, with the most interviews conducted with members of HTI. In Indonesia, I met activists in Bogor, Banda Aceh, Pekanbaru, Batam and Bali. I also conducted interviews with leaders of major Muslim organizations in Indonesia who were both supportive and critical of HTI. In 2010, I interviewed HT's media representatives from Denmark, Holland, Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan and Belgium at a HT event held in Beirut. They provided me with a glimpse of HT's history, activities and political standing within these countries. In Malaysia, I conducted interviews with members of HTI living in Malaysia as well as with leaders of HT in Malaysia. All interviews with the exception of three were face-to-face meetings.

Beyond interviews, I have been a participant observer at several HT events in Indonesia, Malaysia and Lebanon. I was allowed to attend several *halaqah* sessions in Malaysia and Indonesia where I observed the internal process of cadre building. I attended public talks,

seminars and conferences organized by HTI or those that featured prominent HTI leaders. I observed HTI members at several demonstrations held in central Jakarta. At these events, I was able to interact with members of HTI who were always willing to share their thoughts about Islam and HTI. I also attended major Islamic events such as the Muslim Community Congress (*Kongres Ummat Islam*) in 2010 to observe HTI's leaders and members interacting with leaders and members of other Muslim organizations. I was privy to some of the breakout sessions during the congress where HTI members were actively involved in the formulating of strategies for the Muslim community in Indonesia. In 2007, I attended the second international conference held by HTI and in 2010, I attended a conference organized by HT in Lebanon. These conferences provided me with opportunities to observe the interactions between members of HT from different parts of the world. At a less formal level, I was invited by HTI leaders and members to their homes where I had opportunities to dine with them and was able to observe their lives at a more personal level.

Limitations to Data Acquisition

There were several limitations that I encountered during the fieldwork process. Members of radical groups like HTI viewed me suspiciously, since they had no reason to trust a researcher or scholar coming from Australia or Singapore, seeking to understand their movement. Their immediate reaction was to assume that such individuals are working for intelligence services. As such, I made little progress with leaders of HTI during my first few interviews. Subsequently, as I gained their trust, they opened up to me and I was given good access to the party, perhaps better than other scholars working on HTI. This could have been due to the fact that HTI leaders and members saw me as a prized potential recruit.

Another problem associated with researching a semi-clandestine movement like HTI is the unwillingness of ordinary members of the party to speak to researchers. In general, members will first seek permission from key party leaders such as the members of HTI's central board before speaking to me. In other situations, members were not even willing to be interviewed, simply referring me to party leaders. I endeavored to work around this by speaking casually to HTI members after party events and asking them for an interview

once they had developed a certain level of trust in me. Often these members would be willing to be interviewed only after several casual meetings.

As a male researcher, it was also difficult for me to conduct interviews with female members of HTI. Female HTI members are willing to meet only in a group, which makes interviews less effective. Due to the presence of another party member, female members tended to be more cautious in their responses and gave only rehearsed answers on several key issues. Lastly, I had difficulties eliciting a response from HTI's critics about the movement. Leaders of organizations like NU, who are known to be highly critical of HTI, were reluctant to be disparaging of HTI. Often they gave only vague answers to questions related to HTI.

Organization of Thesis

This thesis is mainly focused on the case study of HTI at the national level but will draw on case studies of HTI at provincial and district levels whenever necessary. Comparisons with the experiences of HT chapters in other parts of the world will also be made whenever relevant. In this first chapter, the main precepts of the theoretical framework were discussed. The chapter also outlined the key objectives of the thesis and the ways in which the thesis will narrow the gap in literature on HT and HTI. In each of the subsequent chapters (except Chapter 2 and 3), a brief theoretical proposition rooted in the larger framework will be introduced. Subsequent sections of the chapter seek to test the empirical validity of the theory through the case study of HTI. Thus, rather than presenting all elements of the theoretical framework at the start, the framework will be divided into themes to make the argument more manageable.

Chapter 2 is an introductory chapter. The chapter is a historical narrative of the larger HT party as well as its ideas and beliefs. The chapter argues that HT began as a Palestinian-centric Islamic movement with the aim of liberating Palestine through the revival of the caliphate within the Arab world. It was only later through the initiative of the party's chapters in the western world that the party expanded to the other parts of the Muslim world and the party began to place the revival of a caliphate in Arab lands as its

objective. The chapter begins by examining the thinking and religio-political activism of the founder of HT, Sheikh Taqi-ud-Din An-Nabhani. The chapter then proceeds to examine the changes that the party underwent, under the leadership of its subsequent leaders, Abdul Qadeem Zalloum and Ata Abu Rashta, in reshaping its goals.

Chapter 3 is a historical account of HTI. This chapter argues that the founding and initial growth of HTI was the effort of an individual, Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi rather than that of the transnational HT leadership. It further argues that it was only in the mid-1990s that the party began to show interest in Indonesia, after Ata Abu Rashta took over the helm of the party leadership. The chapter begins with an account of the initial founding of a HT chapter in Indonesia by examining the lives of its founder Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi as well as that of his Indonesian patron, Abdullah Bin Nuh. The chapter then proceeds to examine the development of HTI from a student network to an Indonesian-wide movement. The last part of the chapter will examine more recent developments within the party.

Chapter 4 examine the external factors that impact the growth of HTI. In particular the chapter focuses on the impact of the political system on the growth of social movements like HTI. It argues that both institutional and non-institutional opportunities, as well as constraints, impact decisions undertaken by the party to emerge publicly and launch collective action against the Indonesian state. There are three sub-sections to the chapter. The first part of the chapter will examine POS present during the New Order regime that led to Al-Baghdadi to first sow the seeds for the subsequent emergence of HTI. The second sub-section will deal with the way HTI reacted to the opening up of the political system during the *keterbukaan* period. The last section will examine the decision of HTI to emerge publicly in 2000 and the debates surrounding this.

Chapter 5 examines the recruitment and mobilization strategies of HTI. The chapter argues that HTI's effective resource mobilization strategies have allowed the party to build a strong organizational structure, procure funds and recruit members, which have led to the growth of the party. However, the party has been less successful in building social capital, which is likely to limit the party's future growth. The chapter comprises three sub-sections. The first sub-section will examine the organizational structure of HTI

as well as the different recruitment strategies HTI employs to attract different segments of Indonesian society. This section explores the mass recruitment strategies such as the usage of publications, mass media and public events aimed at recruiting activists. It also looks at targeted recruitment strategies such as the party's recruitment of women, students and non-Muslims in Papua. The second sub-section examines the strategies used by HTI aimed at building social capital for the party. Here HTI's relationship with politicians, military officers, local bureaucrats and leaders of Muslim organizations will be assessed. The last section of the chapter, studies the impact of the success and the limitations of HTI's resource mobilization strategies.

Chapter 6 focuses on the extent to which ideological factors have played a role in the growth of HTI. It seeks to answer the question of why HTI members choose HTI over other Islamist groups in Indonesia. It argues that the HTI's anti-systemic ideology, together with its indoctrination methods ensure that members remain committed to HTI's goals. Employing Freeden's definition of ideology, this chapter will examine how HTI's use of intra-ideological competition has been able to counter other Islamist groups, such as PKS.

Chapter 7 is an attempt to understand the micro aspect of HTI's growth. It attempts to understand the transformation of an ordinary Muslim to a *Hizbiyyin* and how it is achieved. Essentially, the high rate of retention that the party enjoys is due to the behavioural, cognitive and affective changes that a recruit undergoes after adopting the *Hizbi identity*. This identity is attained only after a recruit undergoes the processes of cognitive opening, religious-seeking and culturing before he becomes a member. The first part of the chapter will therefore map out the identity theories as discussed by Quintan Wiktorowitz in his study of the *Al-Muhajiroun* movement in the United Kingdom. The second section will discuss the experiences of HTI recruits when they go through their journey, within the framework of the three processes described by Wiktorowitz. The last section of the chapter discusses the expression of their identity through the process of boundary marking, where members undergo behavioural, affective and cognitive changes.

Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. This chapter will draw out the theoretical and policy implications of this study. The first section of the chapter will highlight the new insights the thesis has brought to the study of HTI, HT and Islamism in Indonesia. In the second section, policy implications of the study will be expounded. Lastly, the chapter will try to chart some future directions that HT and HTI might take. The chapter will also propose future studies that could be undertaken based on the findings and theoretical framework of this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO: THE SELECTED ELITES OF A GLOBAL ISLAMIC PARTY, A HISTORY OF HIZB UT-TAHRIR

They are the selected elite of the *Ummah*, the beautiful mole that no eye can miss, the lamps of light boost in their mouths, their tongues speak of the evidences of the Book (Qur'an), they are the selected elite. (Sheikh Talib Awdallah, Member of HT in Palestine)

Since its inception, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) members have always seen themselves as the chosen Muslim elites who will save the Muslim world and restore it to the glorious days. It is this belief that has drawn thousands of its activists around the world to work towards its final goal of re-establishing the caliphate.¹ HT is arguably the only Islamic movement in the Muslim world, which spreads across five continents and yet remains effectively under the control of a central leadership based in the Middle East. As such, HT has been described as a global, cohesive movement with a common goal. Global here is not used to simply indicate the fact that the party has chapters in different countries but also to specify that members subscribe to the same ideology, have a common political objective and share a common identity.² While certain aspects of these assertions are true, a proper comprehension of HT's history will challenge certain understandings of how truly global HT is. This chapter argues that HT was established with the primary aim of freeing Palestine through the formation of a caliphate in an Arab country but expanded to become a transnational Islamic party due to political persecution that the party faced in the Arab world. Nevertheless, this did not change the objective of HT's central leadership to establish an Arab caliphate. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discussed the religio-political thinking of its founder An-Nabhani as well as

¹ The Indonesian chapter alone counts about 30,000 members.

² See Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*; Roy, *Globalised Islam* and Mandaville, *Global Islamic Politics*. The only scholar that challenges the notion of HT as a global movement is Kirstine Sinclair. However, she came to this conclusion based on the different activities organized by HT chapters in Denmark and UK. She does not highlight that even at the level of objective, there is a difference in the thinking the central leadership of HT and local level leadership. See Kirstine Sinclair, "The Caliphate as a Homeland: Hizb Ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain" (University of Southern Denmark, 2010), pp. 157-159.

the political context that impacted this thinking. It will be asserted that despite his religious background and education, An-Nabhani subscribed to the Arab nationalist ideology. It was only later with the failure of the coup attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government and the Arab loss in the 1948 War that he started subscribing to a more Islamist ideology. It was at this point that he began advocating the need for the establishment of a caliphate in an Arab country to liberate Palestine. This section will also document the expansion of HT to neighboring countries. The second part will analyze HT under the leadership of Abdul Qadeem Zalloum. This section discussed how HT spread beyond the Arab world due to persecutions that members faced in the region. This part will also discuss the change in the party's focus from emancipating Palestine to simply re-establishing the caliphate in Arab lands. It will be argued that despite this change, the party's leadership remained focus on reviving the caliphate in an Arab country. The last part of this chapter will examine HT under the leadership of Ata Abu Rashta, the third *Amir* of HT. It will analyze the changes in strategies of the party as a result of its further expansion. This chapter is divided according to the leadership of the three *Amir* due to the key role the leaders of the party plays in shaping its strategies and directions.

Sheikh Taqi-ud-din An-Nabhani: Early History

Sheikh Taqi-ud-din An-Nabhani (1909-1977) is a figure who draws intense reaction from his followers and detractors alike. For HT members, An-Nabhani is not just the founder of the party but is a true *mujaddid* (reformer of Islam). His detractors have described him as a hypocrite, who has divided Muslims, and accused him of being an American agent.³ Yet, nobody can doubt that An-Nabhani played a major role in the politics of the Muslim world. Born in 1909 in the village of Ijzim (part of the city of Hebron in today's Israel) in the then Ottoman Syria (now Israel), An-Nabhani hailed from a family of leading religious intellectuals. His father, Sheikh Ibrahim An-Nabhani was a *faqih* (Muslim jurist) and taught Islamic law in various Ottoman schools. His maternal grandfather, Sheikh Yusuf An-Nabhani (1849-1932), who had a profound

³ An example is the Wahhabi scholar, Sheikh Abdur Rahman Dishmaqiah who accused An-Nabhani of being sponsored by the Americans. See http://www.dimashqiah.com/articles.aspx?id=183&page_id=0&page_size=15&links=False. Accessed on the 5 May 2011.

influence on him, was an official working in the Ottoman judiciary. Yusuf An-Nabhani was a judge at several *Shari'ah* courts including those in Jenin, Constantinople (Istanbul), Mosul (Iraq), Latakia (Syria), Jerusalem (Israel) and Beirut (Lebanon). He was also a renowned scholar of Sufism. The influence of Yusuf An-Nabhani on the younger An-Nabhani could be clearly seen in the latter's understanding of Islamic jurisprudence, which will be discussed in later chapters. His grandfather introduced him to the politics of the Ottoman caliphate and also to many high-ranking Ottoman personalities in Istanbul, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. Years later, some of these figures rendered their assistance to the younger An-Nabhani when HT started its activities in these countries. Yusuf An-Nabhani was also well-known for his criticisms of Muslim reformers such as the Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (leader of the *Wahhabi* movement), Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh.⁴ These figures were deemed as collaborators of Western powers who were keen to destroy Islam, and undermine the Ottoman caliphate.⁵

The most important imprint that Yusuf An-Nabhani left on his grandson was the importance of the caliphate. For Yusuf An-Nabhani the caliphate acted as the bastion of Islam and symbolized the unity of Islam and Muslims. To underscore this belief, he published several books on the importance of the caliphate.⁶ The collapse of the caliphate in 1924 had a major impact on the An-Nabhani family. Apart from their fortunes, the family lost their social status that they enjoyed under the caliphate. Yusuf An-Nabhani was so devastated by the developments following the collapse of the caliphate that he decided to leave Hebron for Beirut. The indelible influence of Yusuf An-Nabhani on the younger An-Nabhani is clearly seen from latter's early writings, in which he attributed the predicaments of the Muslim world to the collapse of the caliphate.⁷ The revival of the caliphate thus became the cornerstone of An-Nabhani's political ideology.

⁴ For his criticism of *Wahhabi's* religious ideology, see Yusuf An-Nabhani, *Shawahid Al-Haqq Fil-Istighatha Bi-Sayyid Al-Khalq (the Proofs of Truth in the Seeking of the Intercession of the Prophet)* (Beirut Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 2003).

⁵ For details of the relationship between Afghani and the British, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).

⁶ Quoted in B Abu Manneh, "Sultan Abdul Hamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," *Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (1979), p. 153.

⁷ Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *Ingadh Filasinn* (Damascus: Ibn Zaydun Press, 1950).

Another personality that had a strong influence on An-Nabhani was the Palestinian preacher and nationalist Sheikh Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam. Al-Qassam was a martyr and national hero for the Palestinians due to the armed struggle he undertook against the British which led to his death.⁸ Little is known about how the two men first met. Nevertheless, several HT leaders speculated that An-Nabhani had attended Al-Qassam's lectures at the Istiqlal Mosque in the city of Hebron.⁹ HT members also believe that An-Nabhani was instrumental in assisting Al-Qassam in developing plans for a revolutionary upheaval against British rule.¹⁰ This is unlikely, given that Al-Qassam began developing a group of fighters for an armed struggle as early as 1923, when An-Nabhani was just thirteen years of age. An-Nabhani might have learned from the organizational structure of the Al-Qassam's movement, the Young Muslim Men Association (YMMA). Similar to the YMMA, An-Nabhani divided HT into small cells of eight to ten men.¹¹ Members of each cell knew only members of their respective cell. This organizational structure will be expounded later in the thesis.

An-Nabhani was interested in religious studies at a young age and had memorized the Qur'an by the age of twelve. Recognizing the interest of his grandson in religious learning, Yusuf An-Nabhani persuaded An-Nabhani's parents to send their son to the prestigious *Al-Azhar* University in Cairo to pursue his tertiary education in 1928.¹² At *Al-Azhar*, he studied Islamic law and became acquainted with ideas of Egyptian intellectuals. Amongst those he met were luminaries of Islamism such as Hassan Al-Banna, leader of the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood), Sheikh Al-Akhtar Hussein (a prominent scholar in *Al-Azhar*) and Sayyid Qutb (another leader of the Muslim brotherhood). An-Nabhani was also a regular participant at intellectual debates and discussions on religious and political issues in Cairo. He was known as an ardent critic of the seemingly apolitical stance of the *Al-Azhar ulama*. An-Nabhani's stay in Cairo was important in sensitizing him to the different political orientations in the

⁸ Details on Al-Qassam could be found in Abdullah Schiefel, "The Life and Thought of Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam," *Islamic Culture* 23, no. 1 (1980), pp. 61-83 and Shai Lachman, "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine 1929-1939: The Case of Shaykh Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam and His Movement," in *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel*, ed. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (London: Frank Cass, 1982).

⁹ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, Member of HT in Australia, 20 October 2009, Sydney.

¹⁰ Hizb ut-Tahrir, "Profile of Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta," <http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/prominent-members/profile-of-sheikh-ata-abu-rashta.html>. Accessed on 29 September 2009.

¹¹ Taji Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, p. 30.

¹² Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 15.

region.¹³ He became aware of the larger political and religious debates taking place in the Arab world. HT members would often assert that their founder was a formally accredited religious cleric owing to his formal religious training at *Al-Azhar*. For many of them, this gives added credence to his ideas and thinking.¹⁴ They are also quick to add that other Muslim reformers such as Al-Banna and Maulana Abul A'la Maududi of the *Jamaat-e-Islami* never had such training making the movements they led, religiously inferior.¹⁵

Upon returning from Cairo, in 1932, An-Nabhani taught Islamic law in several government schools. His political activism did not end in Cairo. He maintained strong relations with several political movements such as the MB and the Arab Nationalist bloc. Subsequently, in 1938, he became head cleric at the central Haifa court. Later he was promoted to the position of deputy judge and then judge of the Ramallah Court. In 1941 An-Nabhani and Muhammad Nimr al-Khatib, a prominent Islamic cleric, founded an Islamic society in Haifa the *Jam'iyat al-I'tisam*.¹⁶ The aim of this society was to form a political party to revive Islam as a political ideology. It is believed that in 1945 when al-Khatib decided to merge the society with the local chapter of the MB, An-Nabhani left the society and maintained his own independent position.¹⁷ This appears to be in stark contrast with the views of several academics that argue that An-Nabhani became a member of the MB. Moreover, his lack of support for the MB's military campaign against Israel, seem to point to the fact that he was never a member of the MB.

An-Nabhani: The Arab Nationalist?

¹³ Hizb ut-Tahrir America, *Sheikh Muhammad Taqiuddin An-Nabhani*. Accessed from <http://hizb-america.org/about-us/prominent-members/170-sheikh-muhammad-taqiuddin-al-nabhani> on 15 July 2010.

¹⁴ Even detractors of HT noted that An-Nabhani's ideas tend to be closer to Islamic traditional scholarship. See Husain, *The Islamists*, p. 84.

¹⁵ Interview with Burhan Haniff, 16 October 2007, London and Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, Former Member of HT's Central Second Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman. For details about Maududi's political thought, see Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-I Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1994). and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

¹⁶ Taji-Farouki, *The Fundamental Quest*, p. 2. The movement translates literally as Society of Devotion. Nevertheless, it is likely that the meaning here is derived from the Sufi concept of *I'tisam* which means Devotion to God.

¹⁷ Nimr Al-Khatib became a member of the MB and lived in Jordan until his death in 2010. He also wrote an influential book about the Arab-Israeli conflict. See Nimr Al-Khatib, *Ahdath Al-Nakba Aw Nakbat Filastin* (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Haya, 1967).

The Arab-Israeli conflict following the United Nation's Resolution to partition Israel into Jewish and Arab states affected An-Nabhani considerably. He was forced to flee to Damascus following the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Within the same year, An-Nabhani returned to Jerusalem, which had come under Jordanian rule to take up a judicial appointment at the *Shari'ah* court of Jerusalem.¹⁸ The experience of the Arab-Israeli conflict impacted decisively his political thinking. An-Nabhani, like most Palestinians, blamed Arab leaders, especially King Abdullah of Jordan, for failing to assist the Palestinians. As such, when Abdullah Al-Rimawi approached An-Nabhani, to assist in a plot to overthrow the King, he agreed to participate.¹⁹ The plot, masterminded by Abdullah al-Tall, the governor of Jerusalem, involved the assassination of the King and a military coup in Jordan.²⁰ An-Nabhani was apparently tasked by Al-Tall to contact Husni Al-Za'im, the leader of Syria, to secure the latter's support for Al-Tall's coup plot. Al-Za'im overthrew the Syrian President in a coup. He was an Arab nationalist and had liberal policies and disdain for Islamic laws and clerics.²¹ An-Nabhani's role in gaining Al-Za'im's support is thus further proof of the former's Arab nationalist position. While the King was assassinated, the coup attempt was repelled by the Jordanian intelligence. The actual role that An-Nabhani played in the plot is rather hazy. Nevertheless, it was likely that his role was not a central one, given that he was not arrested despite being in Jerusalem. Perhaps, the most important fact that could be deduced from An-Nabhani's involvement is his sympathy for the Arab nationalist cause. This is shown by his readiness to support and work closely with secular Arab nationalists.

In the years 1949 and 1950, An-Nabhani wrote several treatises, which revealed a shift in his attitude towards nationalism. These treatises saw him first theorizing on the importance of ideology in resolving difficulties facing the Muslim world. In the first

¹⁸ Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 23.

¹⁹ Abdullah Al-Rimawi was a prominent leader of the Ba'ath Party in Jordan. The Ba'ath was founded in the 1940s by Syrian intellectuals, Michel Aflaq and Saleh al-Bitar, the Ba'ath Party's ideology is a fusion of Arab nationalism, socialism and Pan-Arabism. The party sought to unite all Arab nations within one state structure. The party came to power in Syria (1961) and Iraq (1963). The party underwent several divisions and is currently divided into two main factions (Iraqi and Syrian) with parallel structures throughout the Arab world. For more details of the Ba'ath, see Eberhard Kiele, *Ba'ath versus Ba'ath: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989* (London: Tauris, 1990).

²⁰ For details of the plot, see, Naim Sofer, "The Political Status of Jerusalem in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 1948-1967," *Middle Eastern Studies* 12, no. 2 (1976), pp. 73-94.

²¹ For details of the coup and Al-Za'im's rule, see Douglas Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958," *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 1 (1990), pp. 51-75.

treatise, entitled *Saving Palestine*, An-Nabhani made the case for the liberation of Palestine through the formation of a nation he called, the United Arab States encompassing all states in the Arab world. He argued that with the formation of such a political union, the Arab states could then focus their resources and energy towards liberating Palestine. An-Nabhani envisioned that such a political union must be led by inspired individuals who could serve as leaders for the rest of society. To achieve this, he proposed a trans-Arab political party that could depose the governments in Arab countries and unite all these countries.²² In the *Risalat Al-Arab* (The Message of Arabs), which was presented as a memo at the *Cultural Conference of the Arab League* held in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1950, An-Nabhani reiterated his message that the Arab leadership should unite to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their common enemy, Israel. It is important to note that An-Nabhani's earlier writings embraced Arab nationalism as an important ideology. Notwithstanding this, his understanding of Arab nationalism encompasses Islam as a fundamental principle. At this point, An-Nabhani did not advocate for the implementation of Islamic laws or the formation of an Islamic political system. More importantly, An-Nabhani wrote little about the rest of the Muslim world and seemed convinced that the resurgence of the Muslim world lay in the revival of the Arabs. Suha Taji-Farouki emphasized that despite his subsequent rejection of nationalism, An-Nabhani never renounced his earlier writings.²³ This chapter in An-Nabhani's life provides useful insights into the Arab-centric thinking of HT's leadership, which will be discussed later in this thesis.

The Formation of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT)

By 1950, An-Nabhani had grown disenchanted with the different political groups that existed in Palestine and Jordan. It was at this point that he began looking at the possibility that the 'salvation' of Palestine hinges upon Islam rather than nationalism. In 1952, he made some headway when he was working as a teacher at the *Madrasah Ibrahimiyya* in Jerusalem. Together with several like-minded colleagues such as Abdul Qadeem Zalloum (later to become the second leader of HT), Sheikh As'ad Rajab Bayyud

²² David Commins, "Taqi Al-Din an-Nabhani and Islamic Liberation Party," *The Muslim world* 31, no. 3 (1991), p. 194-211.

²³ Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 2.

al-Tamimi, Khaled Hassan and Sheikh Ahmad Daour, he founded HT.²⁴ With the exception of Zalloum, none of the others were part of the MB. There were however many members of a group called *Movement 313* that became HT members. The origin of this movement is ambiguous but it is known to subscribe to an ideology that combines of Arab nationalism and Islam. The group believed that the moment they attained a membership of 313, the way would be paved to the establishment of an Islamic state.²⁵ A key leader of this group, Ibrahim Shakeel Al-Sharabaty, was instrumental in influencing other members to join HT.

The founders of HT felt that it was important that the group be registered with the Jordanian authority as a political party. This, they believed, would give it legitimacy within Jordanian society. The Jordanian government rejected the party's application citing the reason that HT had an anti-state agenda. Subsequently, the party's attempt to register HT as a social welfare organization was also dismissed. In fact, the Jordanian regime started clamping down on the group. They prevented HT members from conducting public meetings, seized its publications and closely monitored key HT members. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the membership of the party grew. By 1953, the party had started branches in Amman, Nablus, Jericho, Jerusalem and Kuwait. Towards the end of 1953, An-Nabhani traveled to Syria to establish a chapter of HT.²⁶ The Jordanian authorities used this opportunity to prevent An-Nabhani from re-entering the county. As a result, An-Nabhani was forced to reside in Damascus and the leadership of HT shifted to Syria. By 1954, An-Nabhani had already established chapters of the party in both Syria and Lebanon.

From its inception, HT declared its main objective as that of establishing an Islamic state, with the eventual aim of the revival of the caliphate. Yet at the core of its objective is the Palestinian question. Many of its early members felt that the 'tragedy' (*nakhba*) of the Palestinian people was due to the abandonment of Islam by Arab rulers. It is assumed

²⁴ Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz. Former Member of HT's Central Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman.

²⁵ Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 38. The rationale for this belief is based on the fact that 313 companions of the Prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina. They were able to form an Islamic state due to their migration. Somehow members believed that the symbolic act of acquiring 313 members will pave the way for the establishment of an Islamic state similar to the Medinan state formed by the Prophet.

²⁶ Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 210.

that the Palestinian problem will be resolved once an Islamic system is in place. An-Nabhani's writings evinced a preoccupation with liberating Palestine and surrounding Arab lands from colonial domination.²⁷ While he believed in the need for the formation of a single caliphate, he seems content for this caliphate to be within the Arab world. He had argued that the historical importance of the Middle East as the centre of Islam and the Arabic language (the language of the Qur'an) spoken in the region made the Arab countries natural choices for the location of the new caliphate. This was clearly stated in his earliest writings.²⁸ His own activism was limited to the Middle East and he never attempted to spread HT's ideas to other parts of the Muslim world unlike pan-Islamist Muslim figures like Al-Afghani. While the first *Mafahim* (Concepts) of HT discussed the issue of a caliphate, its focus was about ridding Arab lands from colonialism and establishing an Islamic system. It was only with the publication of *Method for Reviving the Caliphate* that the party consolidated its objective of re-establishing the caliphate.²⁹ Scholars such as Taji-Farouki have argued that the liberation of Palestine is not a major concern for the party.³⁰ This is accurate in so far as HT's later strategy is concerned. However, the historical developments during this period showed that An-Nabhani and HT were preoccupied with the emancipation of Palestine. It was only in the early 1970s when the party was forced to re-look its goals and began putting Palestine as a secondary agenda of the party.

Expanding the Party in the Arab World

By 1955, newer chapters of HT were established around the Middle East. This was mainly due to the activities of some of its members who were traders. Several *ulama* from Iraq became attracted to the ideas of HT. In late 1955, Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Al-Badri, the *Sunni imam* of the *Al-Dargh* mosque in Baghdad, and Ebraheem Makky, a lawyer, went to Damascus to meet An-Nabhani and discuss the possibility of starting a

²⁷ Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, former Member of HT's Central Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman.

²⁸ See for instance, Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *Concepts of Hizb Ut-Tahrir* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, n.yr.), p. 11. An-Nabhani clearly stated that the primary objective of HT is to free the Arab lands not Muslim lands.

²⁹ Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, *The Method to Re-Establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life* (London: Khilafah Publications, 2002).

³⁰ Suha Taji-Farouki, "Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb Al-Tahrir and *Al-Muhajiroun* on Israel and the Jews," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 4 (2000), pp.21-46.

HT chapter in Iraq.³¹ The meeting led to Al-Badri becoming a member of the party. He rose to become an important member of HT until his execution in 1969 by the Ba'ath regime for his criticism of the regime's arrest of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al-Sadr, a prominent *Shiite* cleric. HT members like Ismail Al-Wahwah believed that the execution had taken place as Al-Badri was making progress in convincing Al-Sadr of HT's ideas and methodology. The authority was worried that this will result in the unity of Iraqis of both *Sunni* and *Shiite* backgrounds against the regime. Zalloum who stayed in Baghdad for several years guided the Iraqi chapter. The fact that Zalloum, one of An-Nabhani's most trusted lieutenants, was sent to Iraq showed that the later had placed great importance to the country.³² An-Nabhani himself traveled to Baghdad several times and was reported to have met and attempted to seek support from Abdul-Salam Arif, leader of the Free Officers group in Iraq. Subsequently, Arif led a coup that saw the overthrow of the Iraqi government and was appointed President of the country.³³ The foundation that the party built in Iraq was to become important in a coup attempt against the Iraqi government in 1972. The HT leadership also sent Moosa Hamadah, an engineer from Ramallah, to Cairo to start a chapter of HT in Egypt. Together with a Palestinian student, Mohammed Badawy Al-Natsheh, who was studying at the *Al-Azhar*, a chapter was established in Egypt by 1956. HT was sidelined due to the popularity of the MB, its traditional archrival. Sources within HT noted that Hamadah and Al-Natsheh were deported from Egypt due to their involvement with HT.

The year 1956 proved to be historic for the party. The party decided to contest the Jordanian elections and fielded six candidates. The candidates were fielded as independents and not formally under the HT's banner. Only Sheikh Ahmad Ad-Daur won a seat in the district of Tulkarm. Several scholars noted that this win could be attributed to the fact that the MB supported Ad-Daur's candidacy.³⁴ HT has vehemently

³¹ Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 213.

³² *ibid*, p. 40.

³³ The Free Officer Movement was a movement made up of Iraqi military officer inspired by Nasser. They incensed by the Iraqi's monarchy pro-Western and anti-Nasser stance. They overthrew the Iraqi government in 1958 and replaced the monarchy with a republic. For more details of the coup, see Charles Tripp, *History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 167-193.

³⁴ Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 11 and Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank*, p. 216. Also see Azzam Tamimi, "Opponents of Democracy: The Religious and Political in Contemporary Islamic Debate" at <http://www.mpacuk.org/mpac/data/c6fd87b2/c6fd87b2.jsp>. Accessed on 14 January 2007.

denied this.³⁵ HT members believed that there was a possibility that some members of MB decided to support the party due to internal divisions within the MB.³⁶ Given the intense competition between the two groups, it is hard to imagine that members of MB would support a HT candidate.³⁷ HT's decision to contest the 1956 elections has been a source of criticism against the party. Critics declared that HT's condemnation of democracy is hypocritical given that the party participated in an election, an important process of democracy. In response to these criticisms, HT members asserted that Ad-Daur did not stand for elections to seek power but simply to bring the *da'awah* of HT to the Jordanian parliament. While this claim cannot be quantified, several of his actions after being elected, indicated this position. In rejecting the legitimacy of the Jordanian state, Ad-Daur refused to take an oath of allegiance to the state and made long speeches about the need for the revival of the caliphate.³⁸ Ad-Daur also did not vote for any legislation, as the state's constitution was not based on Islam and hence was considered illegitimate by the party.³⁹ By 1957, chapters of the party had been established all over Jordan. In fact, some members of the party felt that the party was ready to usurp power and establish the caliphate.

The popularity of HT drew a severe backlash from the government. In 1958, the Jordanian government began cracking down on the party by arresting its members, banning civil servants from being members of HT and expelling Ad-Daur from parliament. Ad-Daur was charged with sedition and was jailed for two years. Many leaders of the MB also viewed HT as a threat. Political competition between the two groups often translated to street fights between activists of MB and HT. The situation grew so bad that members of MB began to report on HT to the Jordanian intelligence service resulting in scores of the party's activists to be detained.⁴⁰ The episode with MB was to mark the beginning of a long drawn conflict between the two groups, which extended to Europe, North America and Asia.

³⁵ Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 216.

³⁶ Interview with Dr Imran Waheed, 29 October 2007, London.

³⁷ Taji-Farouki noted that the schism between MB and HT is so intense that members of each group had begun reporting on the activities of the adversary group. See Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 14-15.

³⁸ Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 104.

³⁹ *ibid*, p. 105.

⁴⁰ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 1 July 2010, Sydney and Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, former Member of HT's Central Committee, 12 July 2010, Amman.

Under pressure from the Jordanian government, the Syrian government deported An-Nabhani to Lebanon. As a result of An-Nabhani's reputation as a political dissident, the government of Lebanon refused to allow him entry.⁴¹ It was only through the interference of the Mufti of Lebanon, Shaikh Hassan Al-Al'aya, an associate of his grandfather that he was permitted entry. He received Al-Al'aya's patronage making it easier for him to operate in Beirut.

Divisions within Party's Ranks

Several developments in 1958 led to disagreements within HT ranks. The first issue emerged due to dissatisfactions amongst senior members that the decision-making process within the party was too centred on An-Nabhani. Senior members of the party including founding member, Daud Hamdan, insisted on decisions being taken collectively and that all matters be put to a mandatory vote.⁴² An-Nabhani was against this arguing that collective leadership is akin to democracy, which contravenes Islamic principles of governance. A second issue emerged on HT's activities in Syria. The intense persecution of members led many senior members of HT to move to Damascus. These leaders had asked An-Nabhani to cease activities in Syria. This would allow the party to use Damascus as a base for spearheading their activities in the other Arab countries. An-Nabhani refusal led to members such as As'ad Bayyoud Tamimi to leave the party. This was a major blow for HT. Tamimi had been an important recruiter for HT who had tremendous influence amongst HT members in Jordan. An-Nabhani was greatly shaken by this episode. In a letter he sent to Tamimi that was subsequently distributed to members of HT, he wrote,

As'ad is dear to us but Islam is dearer, and since the betrayal of As'ad had been proven, it has been decided to kick him out of the Hizb. May Allah bless you, O Abu Talat (Tamimi), you were our teacher and big sheikh, one of the pioneers in the Hizb, the

⁴¹ Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia, *Mengenal Pengasas HT* (Kuala Lumpur: n. p, 2005), p. 14.

⁴² Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 56.

companion of Abu Ebraheem and Abu Yusuf in the *Da'awah* and before it, you slapped the Hizb and its challenge in the face so badly, you let down the *Ummah*.⁴³

This centralization of power in the hands of the *Amir* of HT was later to become a major issue of contention for the HT later in 1993 and 1998, when several splits occurred within the party. The lack of dialogue and the consolidation of power in the hands of the *Amir*, continue to be a feature of the party to this day. Consequently, many of those who left HT, became members of the *Palestinian Liberation Organization* (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. This highlights their continued pre-occupation with the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than the push for a global caliphate. As'ad went on to form the *Palestinian Islamic Jihad* in 1978.

Perhaps, the most important development that took place in 1958 was the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser and the popularity of his ideology in the Arab world. Nasser had taken over power in a military coup that saw the removal of the unpopular Egyptian monarch, King Farouk. He positioned himself as the champion of the Arab people by introducing several populist measures. Nasser's Egypt professed neutralism by signing arms deals with the Soviet bloc states and also nationalized the Suez Canal. The nationalization of the Suez led to an attack on Egypt by France, Britain and Israel. A cease-fire was later initiated due to military interventions of the Soviet Union and United States.⁴⁴ His constant criticisms of Arab kings and leaders, who were generally disliked by the Arab populace, made him very popular. The successful union of Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) sealed his position as a champion of the Arab world. Nasserite parties sprung all around the Arab world. For HT, the success of Nasser resulted in the weakening of their position. Notwithstanding Nasser's persecution of Islamic groups in Egypt, some members of HT became attracted to his ideology and saw in him, the solution to the Arab quandary. HT's criticism of Nasser made the party

⁴³ *ibid*, p. 65.

⁴⁴ For details of Nasser's thinking and influence, see Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 89-169.

extremely unpopular.⁴⁵ It was only in the early 1960s that many Arabs became increasingly disillusioned with Nasser and Nasserism.⁴⁶

Staging Islamic Revolutions in the Arab States

The 1960s marked a new era for HT. The party secured its position in several countries and began preparing to depose the governments in some of the Arab countries. Its strengthened position could be attributed to organizational changes made in the party. In 1959, the central committee of HT began implementing a new system of governing the party.⁴⁷ All urban centres were divided into zones according to local demographic and geographical criteria. Each zone was assigned a zone commander who was a senior member of HT. Members of HT within a zone were assigned specific tasks depending on their job and residence. While the party encountered difficulties in implementing the structure in Jordan, due to state persecution, this new system of organization enhanced recruitment and resulted in the party's growth in other parts of the Middle East.⁴⁸ Some aspects of this organizational structure are still maintained by the party.

A key factor that saw the strengthening of the party was an initiative that An-Nabhani introduced. An-Nabhani suggested that the party seek support from important and powerful groups within the society. Prophet Muhammad purportedly used this strategy described as *thalibul nusrah* (seeking the assistance of important power brokers) in his plan to establish an Islamic state in Medina.⁴⁹ An-Nabhani argued that the Prophet had first attained support from important political and military figures in Medina before staging a coup against the ruler of Medina and establishing the first Islamic state. Party members began forging ties with politicians, religious clerics and most importantly military officers. Of these groups, military officers were viewed as being the most

⁴⁵ A detailed criticism of Nasser can be found in Hizb Tahrir, *Partisan Massing* (London: Khilafah Publications, 2001), p. 50.

⁴⁶ The disillusionment with Nasser had been due to the Arab defeat in the 1967 war against Israel and his acceptance of an American peace plan with Israel which Israel later reject. See James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 162-170.

⁴⁷ Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 21.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Details of this can be found in Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change* (London: Khilafah Publications, 1999), p. 12.

important crucial. Thus, the party actively recruited military officers to achieve its final aim.

By 1964, the party felt sufficiently confident that it had prepared the Muslim ground in Jordan for the establishment of a caliphate. Yet, the party took several more years before launching a full-scale coup to ensure further consolidation of its position. It appeared that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 convinced the party's leadership that the resulting, heightened, tension between the two superpowers would bring about a conducive environment for the establishment of a caliphate which will could act as a third force.⁵⁰ In 1968, several HT chapters staged its first coup attempt after securing support from a section of the Jordanian military. HT had also acquired support from pockets of the Syrian and Iraqi militaries for simultaneous coup attempts to be staged in both countries. The Jordanian government foiled the coup attempt after a member lost his nerve and reported the plan to the authorities. The Jordanians notified the Syrian and Iraqi governments about the conspiracy, resulting in arrests of members in both countries.⁵¹ In 1969, another attempt was made at staging a coup, which was again thwarted by the Jordanian intelligence service. The failures of the two coup attempts dealt a terrible blow for the party's leadership. HT members in Jordan were arrested and imprisoned. Many more were forced to flee the country.

In 1971, HT staged one the most important of its coup attempts in Jordan. This plan was kept a secret from even some activists of the party and had the support of senior officers in the Jordanian military. The leadership was so confident of the success of this coup that they had prepared a media release to be distributed to the press following the coup, declaring the establishment of a caliphate in Jordan.⁵² The failure of this coup attempt was a major setback for the leadership and significantly impacted its future strategies. In 1972, HT organized one of its most significant coup attempts in Iraq. HT members had infiltrated the Iraqi army and attempted a coup in Southern Iraq. Led by Salih Sirriya a Palestinian HT member, the plot was discovered and exposed by the Iraqi government.

⁵⁰ Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 27.

⁵¹ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 20 October 2009, Sydney.

⁵² Taji Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 29.

Sirriya escaped unscathed and fled to Egypt.⁵³ Later, Salih Sirriya led another coup attempt in April 1974 along with approximately a hundred members of HT. They stormed the Technical Military Academy in Heliopolis, where they attacked the armory and procured weapons. They were to use the weapons to assassinate President Anwar Sadat and take over the Egyptian government.⁵⁴ Sirriya was tried, convicted and executed in November 1976. It is noteworthy that all the coup attempts had the support of the military. The strategy of infiltrating the military became an important aspect of its modus operandi. These coup attempts also showed that HT has no problem using violence to attain its final goal of the caliphate. These issues will be discussed in greater details in the later parts of this thesis. The failure of the last coup in Jordan affected An-Nabhani significantly. In one of his latest writings, he expressed his frustration with the state of the Muslims, whose slow thinking and actions, he felt, resulted in their state of despair.⁵⁵ An-Nabhani visited Iraq again in 1976 in order to assist in another coup attempt. He was arrested and tortured by the Iraqis, resulting in his hands becoming paralyzed. He was then deported to Syria from where he later went to Lebanon. Here, his health deteriorated and he finally died on 20th June 1977. His long time follower, Abdul Qadeem Zalloum, succeeded him.

While, HT was formed as an Islamic party aiming to revive the Islamic way of life, it was clear that its primary concern was the emancipation of Palestine. An-Nabhani and its early leaders believed that only with the existence of a caliphate can the Palestinian problem be resolved. The establishment of HT chapters during this period coincided with the decision of members to seek employment abroad (such as in Kuwait), due to prosecution that HT members encountered in a particular country. Yet the focus of HT has always been in countries surrounding Israel such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. An-Nabhani started HT with the belief that its members were the chosen elites of God. Nevertheless the realities of politics and repression that the party was subjected to led to its spread to other parts of the Middle East. It was only with the death of An-

⁵³ Shereen Khairallah, "The Islamic Liberation Party: Search for a Lost Ideal", *Vision and Revision in Arab Society 1974*, (Beirut: Cenam Reports, 1975), p. 87.

⁵⁴ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 27-28.

⁵⁵ Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *Sur'at Al-Badiha* (Beirut, n.p., 1976), p. 3

Nabhani that HT spread beyond the Levant area and began emphasizing on its struggle for the caliphate.

Forming a Global Islamic Party: HT Under Abdul Qadeem Zalloum

Abdul Qadeem Zalloum was born in the city of Al-Khaleel in 1924. Members of HT affectionately refer to him as Abu Ibrahim. He hailed from a family of religious scholars who worked for the Ottoman religious bureaucracy. His father Sheikh Abdul Ghafar Yunus Zalloum, was the Mufti of Al-Khaleel in Palestine. His family also ran a mosque, the *Ibrahimiyyah Mosque* in the city where An-Nabhani used to preach. He studied at the *Madrasah al-Ibrahimiyyah* and later at the *Al-Azhar* University where he graduated with a Post-Graduate Diploma in Law and Education. In Cairo, he was deeply influenced by the teachings of Hassan Al-Banna, the leader of the MB and had become a member of the group. Upon returning to Palestine, he was appointed a religious teacher at the *Madrasah Usamah bin Munqidz*. He continued being an active member of MB in Jordan. In 1952, he met An-Nabhani, who convinced him of the flaws in MB's ideology and the need for another political vehicle to be formed. Zalloum was one of the party's founders. He contested the Jordanian elections of 1952 and 1958 in the Al-Khaleel constituency but was unsuccessful in securing the seat.⁵⁶ Zalloum was an important international recruiter for HT and was assigned to set-up HT chapters in several countries including Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Prior to An-Nabhani's visit, Zalloum would make trips to assess the political and religious landscapes of these countries.

He was also known for his loyalty to An-Nabhani and rose to become An-Nabhani's closest aide. Their closeness was such that An-Nabhani willed his personal papers and letters to Zalloum.⁵⁷ Zalloum's appointment as *Amir* of HT was uncontested. Under his leadership, the party expanded to other parts of the world including Europe, the United States, Africa, Asia and Australia. Nevertheless, the proliferation of HT chapters is not due to a systematic policy that HT had undertaken to spread its ideology. The party remained Palestinian and Arab-centric. Rather, many of the HT activists decided to migrate from their home countries in search of employment. More importantly, the Arab

⁵⁶ Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, 12 July 2010, Amman.

⁵⁷ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 1 July 2010, Sydney.

regimes in the Middle East increased their suppression of HT members, forcing many to seek political asylum in Western countries. It was only with the spreading of members to other parts of the world that the HT leadership started recognizing the need for the party to be more global in its approach. Beyond the movement of members, several political developments in the Muslim world also encouraged this reassessment.

Political Developments in the Muslim World

The first significant event that took place after Zalloum's taking over of HT's leadership was the Iranian Revolution. Prior to the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Iran, HT leaders were convinced that Khomeini's followers would topple the regime of the Shah of Iran. Members of HT in Europe and Lebanon were assigned to meet Khomeini in Paris. Subsequently, a delegation led by Sheikh Ad-Daur was sent to Teheran to meet Khomeini and his foreign minister Ibrahim Yazdi. Another prominent member of the delegation is HT's current central media representative, Osman Bakhash. The inclusion of Bakhash is significant given that he was one of the few leaders of HT from a *Shiite* background. Khomeini and Yazdi were presented with HT's proposed constitution for the caliphate. The delegation also urged Khomeini to purge Iran of any foreign influences and declare the formation of a caliphate with Khomeini himself as the caliph. Later, another memo was sent to Khomeini questioning his lack of action towards implementing HT's constitution.⁵⁸ Out of frustration for Khomeini's lackluster response, HT declared that Khomeini was an agent of the United States. The Khomeini episode clearly highlighted HT's willingness to overcome sectarian differences reflected in their willingness to appoint a *Shiite* caliph. It is also important to note that the party is uncompromising and clearly unwilling to adopt any other form of Islamic system except that prescribed by the party's ideology. Most importantly, it demonstrated the political naivety of HT leaders that a *Shiite* cleric would be willing to implement its constitution. It also marked the first recognition that the caliphate can be revived outside the Arab world. It must be noted here that Iran was an exception to HT's strategy. After the Iranian experience, HT's leadership continued to focus its attention on the Arab countries as the location for a future caliphate.

⁵⁸ Interview with Osman Bakhash, Central Media Representative of HT, 19 July 2010, Beirut.

In August 1978, HT sent a party delegation to meet Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi had earlier raised his objections to the use of the Hadith in determining Islamic rulings. He expressed these views at several talks that he delivered in Libya. The HT chapter in London contacted the Libyan embassy requesting to meet Gaddafi to discuss this issue. Gaddafi agreed to meet HT members in Tripoli. During the meeting, which lasted four hours, HT members refuted Gaddafi's view on this issue. Subsequently, HT sent a communiqué to Gaddafi refuting his views on the Hadith. HT went further to urge Gaddafi to hand over power to HT so that a caliphate can be established in Libya. This is again a reflection of novice political behaviour. Later, HT circulated the communiqué to serve as an example of how HT is willing to speak up for Islam even in facing a ruthless dictator. This was a calculated move started to strengthen the position of HT in the eyes of the Muslim populace. While the communiqué did not receive the anticipated result, its circulation incensed Gaddafi. In retaliation, Gaddafi ordered the public hanging of members of HT in a Libyan university. He also ordered the killing of Mohamed Mustafa Ramadan, a member of the HT delegation to Libya. He was shot by an officer of the Libyan intelligence service outside the Regent's Park Mosque in London.

The 1980s proved to be a lull period for the party. The party formed new chapters in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Britain, Germany, Netherlands, Indonesia and Austria. Yet, despite this expansion, the party's presence was largely unfelt in many of these countries. The leadership's posture during this period is reminiscent of that during the height of Nasserism. Several international developments and HT's own positions on some issues could explain its lack of popularity. The Iranian Revolution led many Muslims to look to Iran as a model for an Islamic state. To counter the influence of the Iranians, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states began funding Islamist groups such as the MB, *Wahhabi* and *Salafi* groups. This funding proved important for these groups in their efforts to galvanize popular support against the government. For instance, MB began using these funds to provide free education and social services for the Muslim populace in Jordan, Egypt and Syria. These initiatives made MB extremely popular. In some cases, this popularity came at the expense of HT. HT's refusal to support the war in Afghanistan and Palestine also made the party unpopular. HT's belief that struggles

against the Russians and Israelis will be of no avail if the caliphate is not first revived resulted in the party being ostracized by Muslims in the Middle East.

The intensity of the persecution it faced resulted in the party's leadership going underground. With the exception of its key leaders, HT members did not even know the whereabouts of Zalloum or his actual country of residence. The culture of secrecy within HT made potential recruits suspicious of the party. This, in turn affected HT's ability to attract new members and even more difficult for it to expand its operations. The Iranian revolution and the expansion of the party beyond the Levant countries and Egypt led to party reviewing some of its approaches. The party began re-shaping some of its policies and stated the revival of the caliphate as its main objective while the Palestinian issue became a secondary focus for the movement.

Splits within HT

The leadership of Zalloum was marred by several splits that occurred in the party. Members of HT felt that Zalloum was an ineffective leader. Zalloum had difficulties understanding and coping with the rapid expansion of HT. For instance, Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi felt that he did not get any support in his effort to start a chapter in Indonesia because Zalloum was too Arab-centric in his focus. There was still a strong view that the first caliphate must be established in the Middle East and not in the peripheral Muslim regions. Others felt that Zalloum was too paranoid about his safety resulting in an excessive culture of fear. Al-Baghdadi recalled a meeting that was to be held with Pakistani leaders in 1999 when Pakistan tested its first nuclear bomb. Zalloum had assigned Al-Baghdadi and another HT leader to attend the meeting due to this paranoia. Al-Baghdadi felt that it would have been good for HT to be represented by its leader.⁵⁹

The first major split occurred in 1983 when Abu Rami, one of the HT leaders in the central committee of HT in Jordan, tried to oust Zalloum. Abu Rami's group, referred to as *The Renegades* by HT members, established another organization with a parallel

⁵⁹ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor and Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz, 12 July 2010, Amman.

structure to the main HT and retaining the use of the name HT. This group is still in existence today and is believed to have a strong presence in Jordan.⁶⁰ This split occurred due to personal differences between Zalloum and Abu Rami.⁶¹ Today, Abu Rami's HT group is largely dormant and has a very small following. Some members of this group have also returned to the HT fold.

Several splits took place within HT again in the 1990s resulting in the formation of several groups, including *Hizb Waed* (Party of Promise) and *Al-Muhajiroun*. Muhammad Showkeiri formed *Hizb Waed* due to ideological differences with Zalloum. He did not attain much success and the organization is now defunct. *Al-Muhajiroun* was formed as an offshoot of HT. Led by charismatic preacher, Omar Bakri Mohamed, who was dubbed as the "Tottenham Ayatollah", the movement was formed after he was sacked from HT due to disagreements between him and the central HT leadership.⁶² In essence, the HT leadership felt that Mohamed was inciting violence, which runs counter to the party's methodology of reviving the caliphate. While *Al-Muhajiroun* claims an international following and membership, there is little evidence to show for this claim. It was perhaps the confrontational attitude of HT members towards the British government and mainstream Islamic organizations that led to the split. Azzam Tamimi, a leader of the Muslim Association of Britain recalled that HT members attended and disrupted his talks due to Tamimi's stance that Islam is compatible with democracy.⁶³

Perhaps, the most important split that took place was in 1997. Several leaders of HT objected to what they deemed to be the authoritarian leadership of Zalloum that was affecting the party's goals. At the *wilayah* (provincial) level, Dr Tawfiq Mustafa (HT Germany), Iyad Hilal (HT America), Ismail Al-Wahwah (HT Australia) and Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi (HT Indonesia), to name only a few, had called for the reformation of the party. These leaders believed that the party had lost its direction and the leadership was too focused on its *nusrah* strategy, rather than engaging the Muslim public. A

⁶⁰ Mahin Abedin, "Interview With Omar Bakri Mohamed" Jamestown Foundation

⁶¹ The Abu Rami's HT continue to use the same texts used by the mainstream HT and even borrows from the multimedia materials produced by the mainstream HT. For more details of the Abu Rami group, see <http://www.hizbuttahrir.info>.

⁶² Interview with Burhan Haniff, Member of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, 15 June 2007.

⁶³ Interview with Dr Azzam Tamimi, Director of the Institute of the International Islamic Thought, 16 June 2007.

complain was also registered about the party's failure to support its chapters outside the Middle East. In a letter responding to these concerns, Zalloum acknowledged the poor response the party received from the Muslim masses but continued to affirm his belief that it is more important for the party to engage the power brokers in Muslim countries. Zalloum also promised to extend more support for the party's chapters outside the Middle East. After several years of assessing the party's leadership, a meeting of leaders opposed to Zalloum was held in Germany in 2000 and Australia in 2002.⁶⁴ In Australia, a decision was made to form a separate organization, called the *Reformers of Hizb ut-Tahrir*. Upon discovering this move, Zalloum sacked those involved. Subsequently, Ismail Al-Wahwah was persuaded by his wife, who remained a member of HT, to return to the fold of the main HT organization. The other leaders are still outside the movement.

It is interesting to note that despite these splits in HT, the organization has remained largely intact. When Omar Bakri decided to form *Al-Muhajiroun*, only a small number of HT members in the UK decided to leave HT. Many of those who were personally close to Omar Bakri decided to remain in the organization. This could also be seen in the example of the 2002 leadership split where members of HTI chose to remain with the organization rather than follow Al-Baghdadi. This decision will be expounded in greater detail in the later part of this chapter. The ability of HT to sustain itself in the face of major issues like this is reflective of the effectiveness of its 'culturing' program. It seems that many members remain closely attached to the organization's ideology rather than to leaders of the organization. This will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Inviting the Taliban to form the Caliphate

In 1996, HT attempted to convince the new rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban about the need to establish a caliphate. The Taliban (Movement of Religious Students), a relatively unknown Afghan Islamist group swept to power in a war-torn Afghanistan in 1996. Under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban declared the formation of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. The HT leadership saw this as an opportunity for a caliphate to be formed. HT leaders felt that the Taliban was sincere about establishing an

⁶⁴ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009 Bogor, and Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 10 March 2009, Jakarta.

Islamic state. The HT leadership sent a delegation of HT leaders from Britain to meet Mullah Omar. In this meeting, Mullah Omar was asked by HT leaders to declare the formation of a caliphate with him as the caliph. Mullah Omar apparently rejected this offer, preferring to focus on developing a puritanical Islamic state in Afghanistan. One HT leader in Central Asia noted that

The difference between us (HT and the Taliban) is that Hizb ut-Tahrir wants a modern life here on earth, to create a heaven on earth and also to prepare people to go to heaven in the afterlife. The Taliban want a life of poverty and all their preparation is only to enable them to reach heaven. Hizb-e Tahrir wants heaven both here and in the afterlife.⁶⁵

It is perhaps simplistic and even denigratory of HT leaders to assume that the Taliban chose to have a society that was poor and undeveloped. The disagreement between the Taliban and HT is at the ideological level. The Taliban draws its ideology from the *Salafi* school of thought. Many *Salafi* scholars consider HT a deviant movement and it is thus not surprising that the Taliban rebuffed HT's gesture.⁶⁶ More importantly, the episode reflects again, political naivety on the part of HT to assume that the Taliban, a group that draws its ideology from a group that has historically been opposed to HT's ideology. The experiences of HT in engaging the Taliban as well as the Iranians and Gaddafi in Libya are reflections of its leadership's inability to comprehend larger-political dynamics. In all these cases, HT did not have a strong presence in the country and failed to understand the complexities of the national political contexts. This problem continued to affect HT today.

The New Arena of Da'awah: HT in Europe

The 1990s also saw HT's expansion in Europe. As discussed earlier, HT members in the Middle East began seeking refuge in Western countries to escape persecution as they were facing from their respective governments. Paradoxically, it is the Western

⁶⁵ Ahmed Rashid, "Interview with Leader of Hizb-e Tahrir," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst: Biweekly Briefing*, http://www.cacianalyst.org/November_22_2000/Interview.htm, Accessed on 2 December 2005.

⁶⁶ For instance the prominent *Salafi* scholar, Sheikh Muhammad Nashiruddin Albani was quoted as saying that HT is a deviant group. See Sheikh Muhammad Nashiruddin Albani, *Hizbut Tahrir Mu'tazilah Gaya Baru* (Kuala Lumpur: Cahaya Tauhid Press, 1998), pp. 1-17.

countries, which were often criticized for an anti-Islamic agenda as they provided HT the space and freedom to expand its agenda. It is believed that HT members also tried to promote the ideas of HT in the former Eastern bloc countries. According to Taji-Farouki, members of the party were arrested and tortured in Romania and the former Yugoslavia as early as 1983.⁶⁷ Al-Wahwah reported conducting *halaqah* in a café in East Berlin during this period and confirmed that some members were actively spreading the ideas in the Eastern bloc countries.⁶⁸ While it is not the aim of HT to establish the caliphate in non-Muslim countries, it sees its role in Europe and the Western world as preparing Muslims for the eventual return of the caliphate.

Several international developments provided HT with the political opportunity to enhance its position amongst European Muslims. HT leaders in Europe positioned themselves as the defenders of Islam when the Gulf War (1991) and Balkan Wars broke out (1995). HT Britain had called on Muslims in the country to support Iraq in the war. They also made a submission to the Iraqi embassy in London demanding Saddam Hussein to declare a caliphate in Iraq.⁶⁹ Since most of the Muslim world was against the American intervention in Iraq, the HT ideology became more attractive for many young European Muslims. Omar Bakri even called for the assassination of John Major, the then Prime Minister of Britain. Another issue that propelled HT into the limelight was the Balkan Wars. HT's position on the issue posited the issue as that the Western countries had deliberately allowed the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia so as to ensure that there would not be a Muslim majority state in Central Europe. HT had also called for Muslims to form an Islamic state so that the Islamic army can fight for the Bosnians. The hard line stance taken by HT in relation to Bosnia, strengthened its position amongst many Muslim youths in Britain.⁷⁰

HT Britain also serves an important role within the larger HT organization. Owing to the influx of foreign workers and students from Muslim countries into Britain, the HT leadership ensures that some of these foreign Muslims are influenced and indoctrinated by HT's ideology, so that HT can grow in more Muslim countries. Several chapters of

⁶⁷ Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 170.

⁶⁸ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 20 September 2007, Sydney.

⁶⁹ *ibid*, p. 178, HT had organized demonstrations in other parts of Europe declaring support for Iraq.

⁷⁰ Husain, *The Islamist*, pp. 79-81.

HT, including those in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, had their roots in students recruited by HT members in Britain.⁷¹ Members of HT Britain have also traveled to India and Pakistan to start chapters of the party in these countries.⁷² The radical positions posited by HT on many issues have also resulted in a backlash against the organization in several European countries. In particular, the tough stance it has taken against the state of Israel and anti-Semitic views have resulted in tough actions taken against the party in Germany and Denmark. In January 2003, the German government disallowed the party from organizing public activities due to anti-Semitism and inciting the use of violence against the state.⁷³ HT leaders claimed that membership of the party is not illegal and the party itself is not banned.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the ban on party activities seems to have paralyzed its operations in Germany. Many of its key leaders in Germany have left and the party seems to have ceased activities in Germany. In Denmark, the party's spokesman, Fadi Abdel Latif was jailed for distributing pamphlets, which indirectly called for the killing of Jews.⁷⁵ The party has remained legal in Denmark. In the UK, the government has also attempted to ban the party since the 7/7 London bombings but have failed to find a legal basis to do so.

Beyond Britain, Denmark and Germany, HT has extended its presence to other European countries including Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands.⁷⁶ More recently, HT has begun organizing activities in the former Eastern bloc. The party claimed a presence in Poland, Ukraine and Russia. Party members have been arrested and tortured in Russia as early as 2003.⁷⁷ The party has shown increased resilience to survive in these difficult circumstances and seems to have been able to extend its reach to newer areas within

⁷¹ The chapters in Brunei and Singapore have been shut down by the intelligence services in both countries. Details about the chapters in Singapore and Malaysia can be found in Osman, "Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia", pp. 646-664.

⁷² Two members of HT Britain, Abdul Hamid and Moien Ibrahim had traveled to India in 2005 to start a chapter of HT in India. Interview with Moien Ibrahim, London, 2 July 2006. Maajid Nawaz and Abdul Haq had traveled to Pakistan immediately after Pakistan tested the nuclear bombs in 1999. Interview with Maajid Nawaz, London, 29 October 2007.

⁷³ "Germany Bans Islamist Group It Says is Anti-Semitic" *Reuters News*, 15 January 2003.

⁷⁴ Interview with Jamal Hardwood, Former Chairman of HT Britain, 30 June 2006, London.

⁷⁵ "Muslim Group Spokesman Gets Suspended Jail Sentence for Posting Flyers Urging Jews Killed" *Associated Press*, 14 March 2003. Chadi Freigeh, the media representative of HT Scandinavia claimed that the accusation was falsified. Interview with Chadi Freigeh, Media Representative of HT Scandinavia, 19 July 2010, Beirut.

⁷⁶ Details about HT in Spain can be found in Athena Intelligence, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir En Espana," *Athena Intelligence Journal* 2, no. 2 (2007), pp. 13-27

⁷⁷ HT maintains a Ukrainian website. <http://www.hizb.org.ua/>

Europe where there is a Muslim minority. The central leadership of HT in the Middle East also coordinates activities in Europe. Members of HT in Britain travel extensively to other European countries to assist newer chapters and ensure that the leadership of these chapters is fully attached to the HT ideology. Maajid Nawaz, a former leader of HT Britain traveled to Copenhagen weekly in the 1990s for this purpose.⁷⁸ One of the leaders of HT Britain, Burhan Haniff travels extensively to Germany, Australia and the United States for similar purposes. It is believed that the Western chapters of HT also currently provide the biggest funding for the party and these funds are subsequently channeled to countries, such as Pakistan and Indonesia.

Extending the Terrains of Da'awah: HT in Central Asia

The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the formation of six new Muslim states.⁷⁹ The HT leadership in Britain was quick to respond to this development by urging the central leadership of HT to begin chapters of the party in these Muslim countries. Party members from Britain and Jordan were sent to these newly formed Muslim countries to spread its ideology.⁸⁰ The party's leadership felt that these new states were fertile regions for HT's activities. The governments that came to power in these states were led by officials of the communist party who have now refashioned themselves as capitalist technocrats. Yet, the system of authoritarian rule did not change. The government continued repressing both political opposition and Islamic groups. The high level of poverty and repressive nature of the Central Asian regimes also provided the right conditions for HT to flourish.⁸¹ One of the advantages the party possessed in Central Asia is the lack of both political and religious challenges in the region, which creates a semblance that the party is the only Islamic group, willing to stand up against corrupt, repressive regimes.

HT first emerged in Central Asia in the 1990s. It is likely that in the formative years, HT focused its recruitment and activities in Uzbekistan. Its success encouraged members to

⁷⁸ Interview with Maajid Nawaz, former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, 29 October 2007, London.

⁷⁹ These countries are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

⁸⁰ The movement activities in Central Asia were captured in Baran, *Islam's Political Insurgency* and Rashid, *Militant Islam in Central Asia*, pp. 115-137.

⁸¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The United States and The Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2009), p. 339

spread the party ideas in southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the wake of the mass repression of members after 1997.⁸² In 1998 Uzbek members apparently supported the establishment of a branch in Tajikistan.⁸³ Since 2000, reports of activities in Kazakhstan have appeared as well.⁸⁴ There have also been occasional reports of HT in Turkmenistan's prisons. The party limits its activities to distributing pamphlets, holding *halaqahs* and socializing with potential recruits. Despite these relative small-scale activities, the party has recruited large numbers of members throughout the region. As of 2003, the *International Crisis Group* estimates membership to be in the thousands with many more sympathizers.⁸⁵ Given the arduous circumstances that the party is operating in, these numbers are highly impressive.

The examples of HT in Europe and Central Asia reflect the different styles of leadership and organizational structure that were adopted by Zalloum. In contrast to An-Nabhani's HT, which was largely based in the Middle East, HT under Zalloum expanded beyond the Middle East and reached places that were culturally and politically different from the Middle East. A member of the central community of HT was tasked to travel and monitor its chapters around the world every three months. Members from more established chapters are sent to assist and guide members at less developed chapters to propagate HT literature as well as strategies of engagement. Notwithstanding this, the organizational support is limited, and ultimately, the success of a chapter is highly dependent on the ability of local leaders to run the party. Often, this means that these chapters will need to deploy different strategies of engagement with the local populace. Perhaps an important point to highlight is the fact that the party remained highly centralized in its organizational structure and its top leadership remains largely Palestinian or Arab with no representation from its chapters in the other parts of the world. With the exception of Pakistan, the targeted areas where the party believed the first caliphate should be revived remains in the Middle East especially in the Levant areas which indicates the sentimental feelings of the party's overwhelmingly Palestinian leadership about the issue of Palestine.

⁸² ICG, "Radical Islam in Central Asia", p. 14.

⁸³ *ibid*

⁸⁴ "Kazakh Police Probe Islamic Militants After Town Leafleted" *BBC Monitoring Services*, 18 October 2000.

⁸⁵ ICG, "Radical Islam in Central Asia", p. 17.

The Development of a Global Islamic Party: HT Under Ata Abu Rashta

On 17th March 2003, Zalloum relinquished his position as the *Amir* of HT due to ill health. He died shortly afterwards on the 29th of April 2003. The period of Zalloum's leadership marked an important shift within the party from an Arab Islamist movement to a global Islamist movement. His leadership also saw the issue of Palestine becoming a secondary focus for the party. The growth that HT experienced during the leadership of Zalloum was phenomenal. Few of the founding members of HT, including An-Nabhani, could have envisioned that HT would become so prominent outside the Middle East. HT under Zalloum also recognized the need for a quick response to developments within the Muslim world. This could be seen from the decision by HT to start a chapter in Pakistan a week after the country became a nuclear state. Zalloum's legacy of restructuring the organizational structure of HT and giving substantial control of HT to its local leaders continue to define the organization to this day.

The transition from Middle East based Islamist party to a global Islamist party was not all smooth. Zalloum could not cope and understand the political dynamics in many countries that he was not familiar with. The fact that Zalloum gave substantial control of the party to the head of its respective regions (*Mu'tamad*) did not mean that all decisions were to be made by these *Mu'tamad*, often key decisions remained the responsibility of the *Amir*. The *Amir* continues to monitor political developments in the different areas through assigned envoys. This meant that there was potential for conflicts especially in areas where the *Amir* and others in the central leadership were not familiar. The splits within HT were largely the result of Zalloum and the central leadership's inability to formulate policies that took the regions outside the Middle East more seriously. Its leaders outside the Middle East initiated three of the four splits in the party. This attested to a problem in the way the central leadership deals with chapters outside the region. A senior HT member referred to these episodes as "shaking the tree to get rid of useless objects."⁸⁶ In reality, these splits did mar the image of HT as a united Islamic party and

⁸⁶ Awdallah, *Beloved by Allah*, p. 119.

had an impact on its future development. This was viewed as serious enough challenge that the new *Amir* of HT began making some structural changes within the party.

The current *Amir* of HT, Sheikh Abu Yasin Ata Ibn Khalil Abu Rashta was born in 1943 in Hebron, Palestine. In 1948, his family was forced to leave their home and moved to a refugee camp in Al-Fawwar after their home was destroyed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.⁸⁷ He completed his primary and middle schools in the refugee camp. Subsequently, he furthered his studies in Hebron and Jerusalem. He was introduced to HT while in Hebron and joined the organization in the mid-1950s and worked closely with An-Nabhani, and Zalloum.⁸⁸ He was active in building chapters of HT in Hebron and Jerusalem. In 1962 he furthered his study in the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University, in Egypt.⁸⁹ Upon completing his studies, Abu Rashta worked in several Arab countries including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as a civil engineer where he assisted in establishing chapters of HT. In 1980, he went to Amman, Jordan, where he was appointed HT's spokesman in Jordan. Abu Rashta came to prominence in Jordan during the Persian Gulf War when he convened press conferences, lectures and debates at public venues throughout the country. He was designated a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International after his detention by the Jordanian authorities in 1998.⁹⁰ After completing a three-year prison sentence for an interview published in 1995 in the journal *al-Hiwar*, he was later imprisoned for a further six months for membership of an unlicensed organization.⁹¹

Creating a New 'Franchise'

One of the first tasks undertaken by Abu Rashta upon assuming the leadership of HT is a re-branding of the image of the party.⁹² Under Zalloum, the image of HT is that of an

⁸⁷ *ibid*, p. 44.

⁸⁸ Profile of Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta at <http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/prominent-members/profile-of-sheikh-ata-abu-rashta.html>. Accessed on 29 September 2009.

⁸⁹ Biography of Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta at <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/arabic/index.php/HTAmir/nubthah>. Accessed on 29 September 2009.

⁹⁰ See <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/jordan?page=10>. Accessed on 29 September 2009

⁹¹ Biography of Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta at <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/arabic/index.php/HTAmir/nubthah>. Accessed on 29 September 2009.

⁹² Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* in Shahram Akbarzadeh, *Routledge Handbook for Political Islam* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 101-102

underground clandestine organization with young, extremist members. The HT leadership under Abu Rashta began a process of softening the image of the organization. This process involved several strategies. Firstly, the party started operating in an environment that promoted openness. Even in places where the party was banned like Pakistan, official spokesmen of the party maintain high public profiles. While Abu Rashta avoided being identified publicly (his photos are no where to be found and his whereabouts are unknown), he has started a personal website where his views and speeches are featured.⁹³ Secondly, the party leaders of the various chapters have been adept at promoting the party and underplaying its views on *jihad* while emphasizing its non-violent methodology and focus on an intellectual struggle.⁹⁴ Michael Whine has pointed out that HT has exercised considerable restraint towards the Danish cartoon caricature issue. He noted that

The group's response to the Danish cartoons issue is instructive. Both in its online and printed material, the party called for peaceful demonstrations and diplomatic and educational initiatives, while condemning the more violent manifestations that incited violence.⁹⁵

The party's website also avoids issuing statements or articles that seem supportive of acts of violence. HT has also tried to revamp its image by utilizing professional looking publications and organizing more grandiose events. HT's publications often use high quality glossy paper for its publications.⁹⁶ Often these publications bear catchy phrases meant to attract the attention of readers. In some cases, these publications do not bear the name of HT. In addition, the party is also beginning to form media teams in countries

⁹³ *ibid*, p. 103

⁹⁴ See various interviews with HT leaders in Australia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Lebanon. Interview with Naveed Butt, Spokesman HT Pakistan at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5EpNdXPxinw>, accessed on 20 September 2009; Interview with Moinuddin Ahmed, Spokesman HT Bangladesh at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIU31qq8rQo&feature=Playlist&p=6BCF26FD698339A0&index=8>, accessed on 20 September 2009; Interview with Ahmed Al-Qasas, Spokesman HT Lebanon at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ulau9EYeyA&feature=Playlist&p=6BCF26FD698339A0&index=6, accessed on 20 September 2009 and Interview with Waseem Douheiri, Media Representative of HT Australia at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Op60dpPKo88&feature=Playlist&p=6BCF26FD698339A0&index=7>, accessed on 20 September 2009

⁹⁵ Michael Whine, "Is Hizb ur-Tahrir Changing Strategy or Tactics" *Centre for Eurasian Policy Occasional Research Paper Series*, No. 1 (July 2006), p. 2.

⁹⁶ An example of this publication is the New Civilization magazine published by HT Britain. It was first published in Autumn 2004. An online version of the magazine can be found at http://www.newcivilisation.com/index.php/main/newciv/back_issues.

where it is allowed to operate legally. These media teams organize talk shows and conduct interviews in a style similar to that of international media bureaus such as the CNN and BBC.⁹⁷ This is aimed at creating an image of the HT as an organization that is well run and coordinated.

Engaging the Media

HT leaders have begun courting the media to publicize their cause. Press conferences are now organized in all countries where HT is allowed to operate legally. These press conferences are often held after a major HT event or to simply explain HT's position on several issues. Similarly, the media especially in Western countries sought interviews with HT leaders to ascertain the level of their radicalism. These media engagements have given the party an outlet to clear misconceptions about the group while allowing the party to air their views to the public.⁹⁸ In 2010, HT organized an *International Media Conference* in an effort to 'educate the media' in the countries HT is operating in about HT and Islam. Underpinning the organization of the conference is the belief that the media plays an important role in influencing the members of the public and as such was looking to change the media's portrayal of HT and Islam.⁹⁹ HT chapters in several countries including the UK, Denmark and Malaysia sponsored members of the press from their respective countries to attend the event.¹⁰⁰ In an effort to showcase the diversity of HT, speakers at the event spoke in their respective languages. The event itself was a typical HT event with continuous speeches by HT leaders about conflicts in the Muslim world and the 'conspiracies' hatched by Western powers to dominate the Muslim world. In essence, the event was a public diplomacy exercise undertaken by HT to both portray its strength of HT and improve its relations with mainstream media. To a large extent, the event was a failure and failed to attract the sort of coverage the party generated in 2007 for the Jakarta conference with only a few Lebanese newspapers reporting on the event.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ *ibid*

⁹⁸ For instance, see Interview with Wassim Doureih, Spokesman of HT Australia on ABC's Lateline at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHFZy0pU9YQ>. Accessed on 30 August 2009.

⁹⁹ Osman, "Hizb Tahrir", 2011, p. 103.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Sayuti Omar, Editor of Harakah, (The Official Newspaper of the Islamic Party of Malaysia) and Interview with Chadi Freigeh, HT Spokesman in Scandinavia, Beirut, 10 September 2010.

¹⁰¹ Osman, "Hizb Tahrir", 2011, p. 102.

Expanding the Frontier of Da'awah

Unlike the leadership of Zalloum, the party under Abu Rashta has supported the expansion of the movement. The party planned initiatives to introduce new chapters in parts of Asia, Africa and North America. These initiatives could be seen from the development of new chapters in several countries and the 'upgrade' of other chapters to a new level of engagement.¹⁰² Several new chapters were developed in Kenya, Tanzania and Mauritius. These chapters were developed by members of HT who are natives of these countries. Many of these members had been recruited while they studied in Britain and other European countries. A case in point is Mahmud Atchay. A British born Mauritian, he began activities in Mauritius as early as 2004 by engaging young Muslim professionals in the country.¹⁰³ By July 2009, the Mauritian chapter of HT was able to develop into a functioning unit that organize its first public conference.¹⁰⁴ Several chapters of HT, namely HT America and HT Canada, that were established in the 1990s also started engaging the society (stage 2 of HT's methodology to attain power) by organizing public conferences in 2009.¹⁰⁵ Abu Rashta's leadership also saw the expansion of resource sharing between the different HT chapters. This resource sharing was established by the central HT leadership as the *Mu'tamad* in each chapter is not allowed to communicate with one another without the permission of the central leadership. Since 2003, HT Indonesia has established a distribution centre for its magazine, *Al-Wa'ie*, in Sydney, managed by members of HT in Australia. The magazine is used by the HT as a recruitment tool for thousands of Indonesians living in Australia who are more fluent in their native Indonesian language.¹⁰⁶ Sources within HT noted that such sharing of resources also occur in Europe where the HT in Turkey assists its chapters in Germany, Austria and Netherlands who are more familiar with the Turkish language. Such sharing of resources has helped to narrow the disparities that exist in the activities of HT in the different chapters.

¹⁰² *ibid*

¹⁰³ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Jakarta, 15 August 2007.

¹⁰⁴ Details of the event can be found at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_3802. Accessed on 21 September 2009.

¹⁰⁵ See article on the event at "Islamists Denounce Capitalism" *The New American*, 17 August 2009.

¹⁰⁶ See details of this in Osman, "Reviving the Islamic Caliphate: Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization Strategy in Indonesia.", p. 611.

Coordinating the Activities of Different Party Chapters

Taking into account the global expansion of the HT, the party's leadership has streamlined the activities of its organization worldwide. In view of this, since 2007, the party has been organizing synchronized conferences in diverse parts of the world. The conferences are organized each year in the Islamic month of *Rajab*, on the day the caliphate was destroyed by the regime of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of the modern Turkish state.¹⁰⁷ They are coordinated and organized concurrently in order to commemorate the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. It was almost certain that the decision to organize these conferences was made by the central leadership of HT. These conferences were organized to showcase HT's strength to the outside world. It is also noteworthy that different HT chapters also utilize the same format in organizing these conferences. For instance, both the HT chapters in Lebanon as well as Indonesia organized conferences focused on Islamic religious scholars (*ulama*) in 2009. Excerpts from these events were then compiled into a video, which was then posted on several websites.¹⁰⁸ Such videos are tools that HT utilize to recruit potential members. HT has also a compilation of a list of its activities pertaining to the various chapters of the party. All of HT's websites at the national level also compile their own articles relating to the HT activities. This is a means by which members are kept informed about the developments in other party chapters while showcasing to potential members the strength and massive presence of the party.

HT has also been identifying certain countries within the Muslim world to be regional centres for HT's activities in these regions. While HT Britain has played this role for HT in Europe, newer countries have been identified for this role. The level of freedom that HT enjoys in these countries could decide which country is selected.¹⁰⁹ These hub centres are to form important centres for transmission of HT's activities in an area. In the

¹⁰⁷ A more detailed description of HT's understanding of the abolishment of the caliphate can be found in Zalloum, *How Khilafah Was Destroyed*, 2000.

¹⁰⁸ See videos titled Call of the Hour (Global Wrap-Up 2007) and Call of the Hour (Global Wrap-Up 2008) at http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=call+for+khilafah&search_type=&q=f. Accessed on 21 September 2009.

¹⁰⁹ Osman, "Hizb Tahrir", p. 103.

Levant area of the Middle East, Lebanon has been identified as the new hub centre. Sudan seems to be playing this role in Africa, Pakistan in South Asia, Yemen in the Arabian Peninsula, Uzbekistan in Central Asia (and Caucasus) and Indonesia in the Asia Pacific. The role of Indonesia is regarded as especially important. Since 2007, HT Indonesia has been taking a more important role within the party. Besides organizing the largest ever HT event held in 2007, the Indonesian chapter has been an important anchor for transmitting HT's ideology to other parts of the region.¹¹⁰ In Europe, the party divided the region into four areas (*wilayahs*), Britain and Ireland; Scandinavia; Benelux and Germany and Austria. This division was probably done along linguistic lines to better facilitate activities of HT in these regions. The author observed in 2010 that leaders of HT in Europe had several smaller meetings at the side of the Lebanese media conference where strategies and coordination efforts between the chapters were probably discussed.¹¹¹ At a more important level, the coordination of its chapters meant that the party could better articulate a consistent position within the party.

The leadership of Ata Abu Rashta saw the consolidation of HT's position as a global Islamic party. He seems to be more willing to invest in its chapters outside the Middle East such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Indonesia.¹¹² In line with its efforts to soften the image of the party, they have also played down some of the more radical strategies that brought notoriety to the party in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the party's leadership remains largely Palestinian, based in the Middle East and are not aware of the political conditions in regions outside the Middle East. The envoy from the *Amir* visits these areas three to four times a year while in some countries in the Central Asia, the envoy are not even sent to monitor the region. This makes it difficult for the party to effectively formulate policies and a global strategy to propound the position of the party. Despite the new approach to leadership, the party is still very much focus on reviving an Arab caliphate shown by several decisions that the party made in relation to its chapter outside the Middle East. At a more basic level, the party's Arab-centric leadership is likely to be a hurdle to the growth of the party in the long run.

¹¹⁰ For details about HT Indonesia's role as the hub for HT in Asia Pacific, see Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Transnational Activism of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," *Southeast Asia Research* 18, no. 4 (2010).

¹¹¹ Personal Observation of Author at the HT Media Conference, Beirut, 5-9 July 2010.

¹¹² Osman, "Hizb Tahrir", p. 104.

Conclusion

The chapter highlighted the evolution of HT from a Palestine-centric Islamic group to a global Islamic movement. It noted that HT was established with the aim of freeing Palestine through the formation of an Arab caliphate but expanded to become a global Islamic party. The chapter began by discussing An-Nabhani's religio-political thoughts and the political context surrounding its evolution. It was noted that An-Nabhani was an Arab nationalist who became an Islamist after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and the failed coup attempt to overthrow the Jordanian king. This section also discussed how and why the Palestinian issue became a secondary objective of the party. The second part of the chapter examined HT under the leadership of Zalloum. This section discussed how the party's spread to beyond the Arab world and saw the change in the party's focus to concentrate its efforts on reviving the caliphate to accommodate its more global structure. Problems related to this transitional phase such as the failure of the *Amir* to understand political dynamics in the newer areas the party was operating in, resulted in splits within its leadership. The last part examined HT under the leadership of Ata Abu Rashta. It analyzed the strategies employed by the party as a global Islamic party. These strategies include the more moderate stance adopted by party leaders, coordination of party activities in different regions and engagement with mainstream media. Nevertheless, complexities surrounding the Arab centric nature of its leadership and a failure to understand the local political contexts in areas outside the Middle East continue to impact the party negatively. In essence while the party has expanded significantly from being a Palestinian led, Middle East based political party to a more global Islamic party, the party still suffers from the fact that its leadership remained Arab-centric and authoritarian making it difficult for the party to grow in some parts of the world. Indonesia is an example of this. The next chapter of the thesis will discuss how developments within the larger HT shaped the historical development of HT in Indonesia.

CHAPTER THREE: UNRAVELLING THE HISTORY OF HIZBUT TAHRIR

INDONESIA

Our success in Indonesia was a true miracle. A miracle, which was blessed by Allah. Who would have thought that the seeds of the party were sown by a man who did not understand Bahasa Indonesia and who did not truly understand the principles of HT. (Hafidz Abdurrahman, Former Chairman of HTI)

The emergence of HT in Indonesia was a miracle for many HT leaders. In his writings, An-Nabhani did not show any understanding of Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia. As highlighted in the previous chapter, he was solely interested in an Arab caliphate. For HT leaders, Southeast Asian Muslims are in the periphery of the Muslim world and are thus not important in its larger agenda to revive the caliphate. As highlighted in the previous chapter, party members residing in Western countries initiated the growth of HT beyond the Middle East. In Indonesia, the spread of the party was the result of an individual, Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, a member of HT from Australia. The transitioning of HTI from a campus based student movement to one of the more prominent radical Islamist groups in Indonesia will be explored in this chapter. The argument that the founding and initial growth of HTI was the effort of an individual rather than that of the transnational HT leadership will also be examined. It is necessary to take into consideration that it was not until the mid-1990s that the party began to show interest in Indonesia. Furthermore, it was only as recently as 2003 when Ata Abu Rashta took over the helm of party leadership that the party began viewing the Indonesian chapter as a more important component of the party. There are three sections in this chapter. The role played by Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi in sowing the seeds of HT in Indonesia will be examined in the first section. This section will highlight how Al-Baghdadi used an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) run by a prominent *ulama* in Bogor, Abdullah Bin Nuh as the main base for his activism. Al-Baghdadi's activities amongst students in the *Institute Pertanian Bogor* (Bogor Agricultural Institute, IPB) will also be highlighted. The period, during which HTI came officially under the control of the larger HT leadership, will be analyzed in the second section of the chapter. Several important developments including the decision of the party to abandon its activities on campus so as to focus on the

recruitment of young Muslim professionals, the decision of Al-Baghdadi to leave the party and changes in its leadership will also be examined. Developments within HTI since 2003 when a new HT *Amir* was appointed will be studied in the final section of this chapter. This section will also examine the changing attitudes of the larger HT leadership towards its Indonesian chapter and the impact of this change.

HTI: The Beginnings

The history of HTI may be traced to Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, member of HT from Australia. Prior to discussing the history of HTI's emergence, it is perhaps useful to briefly highlight Al-Baghdadi's life to provide a context to the later discussions of his political thoughts. Al-Baghdadi was born in 1952 in the city of Sidon. His ancestors hailed from Baghdad, Iraq and had settled in Lebanon for several generations.¹ His family members were active members of HT since the early founding of the party. As HT was viewed as a threat to the Lebanese government, the Al-Baghdadi family was constantly targeted and several family members had to endure torture from the authorities. Al-Baghdadi had become a member of HT at the age of fourteen and by 1967; Baghdadi himself was arrested and tortured. To escape the continuous harassment, the Al-Baghdadi family escaped to Australia where they were granted asylum. His eldest brother had done this in 1965 while the rest of the family followed suit in 1968.² By 1968, the Al-Baghdadi family had settled in Sydney. The story of the Al-Baghdadi family is not unique. Many members of HT in the Middle East were forced to migrate to different parts of the Western world. Most of these members escaped to European countries while a smaller group moved to Australia and the United States.

In 1979, after getting acquainted with Bin Nuh, Al-Baghdadi visited Indonesia. After several visits, he decided to stay in the country. Within a year of staying in Bogor, he had married an Indonesian woman of Arab origin. By 1982, Al-Baghdadi had begun actively building a chapter of HT in Indonesia. During this period, Al-Baghdadi also taught at the *Pesantren Al-Ghazali*, the Centre for Arabic Language (*Lembaga Pendidikan Bahasa*

¹ Al-Baghdadi had informed me about this but refused to elaborate about the exact time the family shifted to Lebanon. Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

² *ibid.*

Arab, LPBA), *Universitas Ibnu Khaldun* and the *Universitas of Ath-Thohiriyah*, a private Islamic university.³ Beyond teaching, Al-Baghdadi also published extensively. His writings expounded on the ideas of HTI. Nevertheless, he ensured that no references were made to HTI. His books touched on a wide range of issues from the permissibility of pig rearing in a Muslim country to the future of the Muslim world.⁴ In 1999, due to disagreements with the party leadership, he quit HT. Details of this disagreement will be discussed later in the chapter. Since 1999, Al-Baghdadi had been a freelance preacher. Despite being in Indonesia for nearly three decades, he and his three children remain Australian citizen. Al-Baghdadi complained that he had major financial issues and had faced challenges in getting his visa renewed in the last ten years.⁵ Al-Baghdadi is today living in Bogor and preaches at several mosques in Bogor and Jakarta. Little is known about whether his family members in Australia are members of HT. Nevertheless, Al-Baghdadi's parents are still living in Sydney and he visits them once every three years.

Another key figure in the historical development of HTI is Kiyai Abdullah Bin Nuh, a prominent scholar of Islam with a following amongst many tertiary students in Bogor and Jakarta. Born on 30th June 1905 in Cianjur, he hailed from a family of Muslim scholars. His father, Kiyai Haji Raden Nuh was a religious teacher and a *hafiz* (one who has memorized the Koran) who also runs his own *madrasah* (Islamic school), the *Madrasah Al-I'anat Talibil Muslimin*.⁶ Bin Nuh received his early education from this school. He mastered the Arabic language by the age of eight. In 1918, Bin Nuh was sent to Semarang in Central Java to study at the *Madrasah Arabiyyah Syamutlul Huda* under

³ LPBA was the precursor to the Indonesian Institute for Arabic and Islamic Knowledge (LIPIA, *Lembaga Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab*), a branch of Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh. Established in 1980, it provides courses in both Arabic and Islamic studies for Indonesian students, the most successful of whom can gain scholarships for postgraduate study at Al-Imam University. See Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, "Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, The Middle East and Indonesia" *The Brookings Project on US Policy Towards Islam*, Saban Centre for Middle East Studies, Analysis Paper, No. 9 (October 2005), p. 21.

⁴ For a sample of these readings see Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, *Babi Haram Babi Halal* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1992); Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, *Ulama dan Penguasa* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1988); Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, *Da'awah Islam dan Masa Depan Ummat* (Jakarta: Al-Izzah Press, 1997).

⁵ In one instance, his family had overstayed in Indonesia for nearly two months and was forced to take a loan to pay the penalty imposed by the Indonesian state for overstaying. Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi.

⁶ Ahmad Zaini Dahlan, *Al-Hijrah Min Allah illa Allah* (Bogor, : Al-Ihya, 1987), p.1.

the stewardship of Syed Mohamed Hasyim Al-Haddad.⁷ In 1922, he moved to Surabaya when Al-Haddad decided to start a school, the *Hadhramaut School* in the city. At the school, Bin Nuh learned several languages including French, Dutch and English. In 1926, Bin Nuh furthered his study in Cairo at the *Al-Azhar* University. He developed an interest in Arabic literature and had a flair for composing poetry in the language. In late 1927, he returned back to Cianjur, Indonesia. Within a year, he shifted to Semarang and then to Cianjur where he taught at his alma mater, *Madrasah Al I'annah*.⁸ In 1934, Bin Nuh moved to Bogor where he taught at the *Madrasah Islamiyyah* and *Madrasah Al-Ihya*. In addition to this, Bin Nuh also built an organization the *Penolong Sekolah Agama* (Network for Assisting Religious Schools).⁹ He shuttled between Cianjur, Jakarta and Bogor for many years. He subsequently formed an important Islamic center of learning, the *Pesantren Al-Ghazali* in Bogor. In 1970 that he finally moved his whole family to Bogor. This Islamic centre comprises a pre-school, two madrasahs, a primary school (SD), a high school (SMP) and a senior high school (SMA).¹⁰ In his personal life, Bin Nuh was married twice and had eleven children in total (six from his first wife and five from his second wife). Bin Nuh also took up several academic jobs in universities such as *Universitas Indonesia* (UI) and *Universitas Gadjah Madah* (UGM) due to his expertise in the Arabic language.

Beyond his involvement in religious studies, Bin Nuh was also known for his strong anti-colonial stance. He was involved with a myriad of anti-colonial armed groups such as the *Pembela Tanah Air* (PETA, Protectors of the Fatherland) and *Barisan Hizbullah* (Hizbullah Front).¹¹ He was the Commander of PETA in Cianjur. Bin Nuh also assisted in the setting up of the *Radio Republik Indonesia* (The Indonesian Republic Radio, RRI) station in Cianjur.¹² When Indonesia achieved its independence in 1949, Bin Nuh shifted to Jakarta and was responsible for the Arabic transmission of the RRI. It was during this

⁷ Iskandar Engku, "Konsep Ukhuwah Islamiyyah Menurut K.H. Raden Abdullah Bi Nuh" (IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2001). p.22.

⁸ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, Son of Abdullah Bin Nuh and Administrator of the *Pesantren Al-Ghazali*, 10 August 2009.

⁹ Iskandar, *Konsep Ukhuwah*, p. 23.

¹⁰ Majlis Al-Ihya, *Al-Ihya Guide Book*, (Bogor: Al-Ihya, 1991), p. 2.

¹¹ PETA was an auxiliary guerilla force formed by the Japanese administration during the Second world War to resist an Allied invasion. Barisan Hizbullah was the military wing of the Islamic party *Masyumi*. See M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Indonesia Since C. 1200* (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 255-259.

¹² Mansur Menas Abdurahman, "Sejarah Singkat K. H. Abdullah Bin Nuh," *Majalah Suara Masjid*, Jan 1989, p. 50.

period that Bin Nuh started the Arabian Press Board, a body responsible for publishing in Arabic and aided in the formation of an Arabic Literature Department at UI.¹³

Bin Nuh's expertise in the Arabic language and literature drew many enthusiasts of the language to him. He became well known within the circles of Middle Eastern diplomats who enjoyed listening to his flowery Arabic language and poems. He became close to the ambassadors of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. He made several visits to these countries. It was during one of these trips that he chanced upon, a book written by An-Nabhani, *The System of Islam (Hadharah Islamiyyah)* in Jordan. In 1978, Bin Nuh wrote several pieces of prose in praise of the late King Faisal Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia. King Faisal was so impressed by the poetry that he invited Bin Nuh to the kingdom as his guest.¹⁴ In 1979, Bin Nuh went to Saudi Arabia to perform the mandatory *hajj* pilgrimage and visit the King. During this trip, he was introduced to the Crown Prince of Jordan, Prince Hassan who was so awed by his Arabic literary skills that he was invited to Jordan. In the same year, Prince Hassan arranged for Bin Nuh's son Mustafa Bin Nuh to be awarded a scholarship to study in Amman as a guest of the royal family.¹⁵ It is thus pertinent to note that despite Bin Nuh's role in assisting the growth of HTI, he did not share all of their views. For instance, HTI is critical of many of the Muslim governments while Bin Nuh had no qualms about maintaining strong relationships with them. In some cases such as that of King Faisal of Saudi, Bin Nuh made efforts to impress the king through his numerous poems. It is clear that he did not share HT's disdain for Muslim rulers.

It is perhaps appropriate at this juncture to discuss an important religious theme that was often discussed and advocated by Bin Nuh in both his writings and speeches. His views about the theme of *Strengthening Brotherhood Amongst Muslims* could explain his attraction to the ideas of An-Nabhani and HT. In particular, two of his works, *Fii Dhilal Al-Ka'bah Al-Baiti Al-Haram* (In the Shade of the Ka'abah and Baitul Haram) and *Laa Tahifiyyata Fill Al-Islam* (There is No Sectarianism in Islam) outline his views about the need for Muslims to be united. Bin Nuh argued that the brotherhood of Muslims was

¹³ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor

¹⁴ I read a copy of the poetry during his interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh. The poem basically described the king as a just ruler whose humility and religiosity should be emulated by other Muslims rulers. King Faisal was also described as the custodian of the two most important mosques of Islam.

¹⁵ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

created since the time the Prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina. It was here that this sense of brotherhood was created between the *Ansar* (the original residents of Medina) and *Muhajiroun* (those from Mecca who migrated to Medina).¹⁶ He noted that the act of performing the pilgrimage is another manifestation of this unity in Islam. He further articulated the view that in order for true Brotherhood to exist, Muslims must be tolerant of differences in religious opinions as long as these opinions were based on the Koran and *Hadith* of the Prophet.¹⁷ It was this belief in tolerance that saw Bin Nuh maintaining close relationships with all Islamic groups in Indonesia. Mustafa Bin Nuh noted that his father had come to the defence of many Islamic groups such as the *Tablighi Jamaat*, the *Shiite* and followers of other Islamic groups.¹⁸ It is this defence of *Shiite* Muslims and his close relationship with the Iranian ambassador that led some Indonesian religious scholars accusing him of being a *Shiite* Muslim. This prompted him to write a book titled *Ana Muslim Sunniyyun Shafiyyun* (I am a *Sunni Shafi'e* Muslim).¹⁹ In this book, Bin Nuh categorically stated his own religious orientation as a *Sunni* Muslim believing in the *Shafi'e* school of jurisprudence but went on to argue that it is incorrect for *Sunni* Muslim scholars to label *Shiites* as heretics. In analyzing Bin Nuh's views on the unity of Muslims, he did not advocate for the revival of the caliphate or the formation of a single political unit comprising all Muslim countries. Nevertheless, he sees it as the duty of Muslims to protect Muslim groups that were trying to revive the practiced Islam regardless of their orientation of political views.

Bin Nuh's reputation as a religious scholar grew over time. By the late 1970s, Bin Nuh had become an influential religious figure in Bogor whose advice was sought after by many Islamic groups.²⁰ While he was generally sympathetic to Islamic movements and groups, Bin Nuh had refused join any of these movements. Due to his religious stature, he had a large number of students studying at the IPB attending his *pengajiaan* (religious class).²¹

¹⁶ Abdullah Bin Nuh, *Al-Ka'bah Al-Baiti Al-Haram* (Bogor: n.p., 1978), p. 1.

¹⁷ Abdullah Bin Nuh, *Laa Tahifiyyata Fill Al-Islam* (Bogor: n.p., 1980), p. 3

¹⁸ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor. Lies Marcos who met Bin Nuh noted in her report that Bin Nuh was committed to achieving unity amongst Muslims and sought to maintain good relations with all Muslim groups See Lies Marcos, *Fieldwork Report on Abdullah Bin Nuh*, p. 5.

¹⁹ Abdullah Bin Nuh, *Ana Muslim Sunniyyun Shafiyyun* (Bogor: n.p., 1982)

²⁰ Iskandar Engku, *Konsep Ukhuwah Islamiyyah*, p. 19.

²¹ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh 10 August 2009, Bogor.

Bin Nuh, Al-Baghdadi and HTI

Bin Nuh had become acquainted with Al-Baghdadi during his trip to Sydney in 1978. He was in Sydney to visit his son, Raden Faisal Bin Nuh who ran an architecture firm in Sydney. During his stay in Sydney, Bin Nuh became known to the Australian Lebanese community as a respected religious scholar. His command of classical Arabic and the depth of his religious knowledge made him a popular speaker within the community. Naturally, he was invited to deliver sermons at several mosques and conduct religious talks in the homes of some members of the community. One of these families was the Al-Baghdadi family. Given the family's strong affiliation to HT, it is highly plausible that they had intentions of trying to recruit Bin Nuh to their cause. During these interactions, the young Al-Baghdadi became attached to Bin Nuh. He began attending Bin Nuh's sermons and classes. Bin Nuh himself had developed a fondness for Al-Baghdadi and the two men had intense intellectual discussions on the predicament of the Muslim world. Even after Bin Nuh left Sydney after six months, the two men continued to correspond via letters.

In 1979, Baghdadi decided to visit Bin Nuh in Bogor. He took a liking for Indonesia and after several visits between 1979 and 1981, Al-Baghdadi decided to migrate to Indonesia. It is perhaps important at this juncture to correct an important misconception that is common in writings on HTI. It is assumed that Bin Nuh had invited Baghdadi to stay in Indonesia so that the latter could start a chapter of HT in the country.²² This view is erroneous. Al-Baghdadi explained that he had made a decision to come to Indonesia because of his intellectual attraction to Bin Nuh and his decision had little to do with an attempt to start a HT chapter. It was only later that he changed his mind upon seeing the possibility of a chapter flourishing in Indonesia.²³ Martin Van Bruinessan, one of the few foreign scholars to have met Abdullah Bin Nuh is of the view that Bin Nuh was probably interested in Al-Baghdadi due to his proficiency in Arabic and the lack of Arabic teachers in his *pesantren*. While this view might seem overly pessimistic, this factor

²² Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", p. 90; Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus baru Islam Radikal* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005), pp. 97-8 and Ken Ward, "Non-Violent Extremists", p. 150.

²³ Both Mustafa Bin Nuh and Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi confirmed this. Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor and Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

could probably be the most important reason for Bin Nuh's interest in Al-Baghdadi.²⁴ Upon moving to Indonesia, Al-Baghdadi lived with Bin Nuh's family and started teaching Arabic at Bin Nuh's *pesantren*. Although supportive of Al-Baghdadi whom he regarded as his adopted son, Bin Nuh never became a member of HT.²⁵ There is also much confusion about the role of Bin Nuh and Al-Baghdadi in the formation of HT in Indonesia. The prevailing view about HTI's leadership is that Bin Nuh was the first leader of HTI.²⁶ It was part of HTI's early strategy to link Bin Nuh directly to HT to give credibility to the new organization. Early leaders of HTI such as Al-Khaththath had deliberately given the impression that Bin Nuh was involved in HTI for this reason. In reality, Bin Nuh was more a patron to Al-Baghdadi. While he was never a member of HTI, he protected the HTI activists. Mustafa Bin Nuh noted that Bin Nuh was also supportive of other Islamic groups such as the *Tablighi Jamaat* (TJ) who also met Bin Nuh on a regular basis. Bin Nuh was also supportive of his son, Mustafa Bin Nuh being involved in HTI. Mustafa Bin Nuh had been acquainted with the ideas of HTI first by reading An-Nabhani's *System of Islam* in Bogor. In Amman, he met activists of HT and joined a *halaqah* of the party. He had also followed several study circles led by the famous HT leader Ahmad Ad-Daur. Mustafa Bin Nuh noted that HT was an underground movement in Jordan and he managed to evade arrest because he was a guest of the Jordanian government. In 1982, Mustafa returned to Jakarta during the university's winter break. He assisted Al-Baghdadi who could not speak Bahasa Indonesia to translate his sermons and religious discussions.²⁷

²⁴ Conversation with Martin Van Bruinessan, 1 June 2011, Singapore.

²⁵ The relationship between the two men was also confirmed an academic who met both men in 1985. He noted that Bin Nuh acted like a father to Al-Baghdadi. Conversation with Martin van Bruneissen, 20 November 2009, Singapore.

²⁶ Elizabeth Fuller Collins first propounded this view in a conference paper. Subsequently, many of the other works on HTI began assuming this to be a fact. See Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Da'awah and Democracy: The Significance of Partai Keadilan and Hizbut Tahrir" *International Seminar on Islamic Militant Movements in Southeast Asia*, Hotel Mulia, Jakarta, 22-23 July 2003. Also see Salim, *The Rise of "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia"*; Rihlah Nur Aulia, "Fundamentalisme Islam Indonesia: Studi Atas Gerakan Dan Pemikiran Hizbut Tahrir" (IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah University, 2004) and Zaki Mubarak, "Islam Fundamentalisme Radikal Dan Kepolitikan Di Indonesia: Gerakan Dan Pemikiran Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin, Laskar Jihad Dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Tahun 1998-2003" (University of Indonesia, 2003).

²⁷ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

Building the Foundation of HTI

The initial recruits of HTI were students at the IPB. Many of these students became familiar with Al-Baghdadi, as many had attended part-time religious classes conducted at the *Pesantren Al-Ghazali* and *Majlis Al-Ihya*. Many of the initial sympathizers of HTI came from this group of students. Al-Baghdadi tapped into the network of Bin-Nuh's students to form the first group of HTI's cadres. Many of these students were members of the *Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa* (Muslim Students Association for the Development of Islamic Spirituality *BKIM*) and the *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (LDK). The organization was formed in 1978 following the abolition of *Dewan Mahasiswa* (Board of Students) in the aftermath of the issuance of the Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (Normalization of Campus Life bill, NKK/BKK), which saw the Suharto regime curbing student political activities.²⁸ Many of these students were struck by Al-Baghdadi's looks. He was a tall, stout man with a big beard and sharp eyes that commanded the attention of anyone who was in his presence.²⁹ Despite his inability to speak Bahasa Indonesia, he was charismatic and a fiery orator. For many of these students, Al-Baghdadi's Australian-Lebanese background made them curious about him. Due to his looks, background and personality, Al-Baghdadi quickly became a popular religious figure amongst Muslim tertiary students at the IPB. While Mustafa Bin Nuh was in Indonesia, he played an important role in linking Al-Baghdadi to the students. When he left to return to Jordan, two graduates from the University of Medina, Abu Aula and Abdul Hannan replaced his role as translator for Al-Baghdadi.³⁰ This is another peculiar feature of the emergence of HTI. Both these figures had a *Wahhabi* orientation but were personally attracted to the ideas of Al-Baghdadi. Nevertheless, they never became members of HTI and subsequently maintained their distance from HTI. It is interesting to note that most of the initial recruits of HTI have ceased to be members of the group. Nonetheless, they remain active in other Islamic groups and parties. These members include Fathul Hidayat (member of the Crescent Moon Party, *Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB), Hassan Rifa'i Al-Faridy (*Shari'ah* Advisor to *Dompot Dhuafa Republika*), Adian Husaini (freelance Islamic Studies Lecturer and deputy chairman of

²⁸ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 7 March 2008, Jakarta

²⁹ Interview with Abu Fuad, 16 August 2007, Bogor

³⁰ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

the *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, DDII) and Saifuddin Asip.³¹ Only Saifuddin Asip (better known as Abu Fuad) remained in HTI.

Al-Baghdadi was extremely careful in propagating the ideas of HTI. During his classes, Al-Baghdadi did not mention his affiliation to HT. This was also a form of strategy to recruit members of other Islamic organizations who otherwise might be put off to join the movement. It was not until 1983 that several key students (mentioned above) were informed about HT. These students became the nucleus of HTI. Interestingly, none of these students were inducted as full members of the party. Besides the *Pesantren Al-Ghazali* and *Al-Ihya*, Baghdadi also utilized the *Al-Ghifari* mosque in Bogor as his base to spread the ideas of HT to other parts of the country. It was here that HTI began to grow rapidly. Utilizing the system of *halaqah* which are conducted at the *Pesantren Al-Ghazali* or in the homes of students, potential HTI members began reading and analyzing several key texts of HT such as the *Systems of Islam* and *Political System of Islam*. Students were also taught Arabic so they could then read some of these materials themselves. The main recruitment strategy that HTI utilized was that of personal networking. Through these networks, HTI began recruiting a second layer of potential members. By 1984, a second layer of leadership was already formed. One of the key leaders of HTI that was recruited during this time was Muhammad Al-Khaththath. Al-Khaththath noted that there was a strong climate of fear. Students often attended the *halaqah* sessions secretly. They would attend and leave the sessions individually and would often make a point to not leave their shoes outside the location of the *halaqah*.³² Al-Baghdadi's students were also active in the Islamic student body known as the LDK at the IPB. Students of Al-Baghdadi also began dominating the LDK in other universities such as *Universitas Padjajaran* in Bandung and the *Universitas Airlangga* in Surabaya.

³¹ *ibid* and Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 12 August 2009, Jakarta. Also see Adian Husaini's personal website where he stated that he had studied with several scholars including Al-Baghdadi. Nonetheless, he did not explicitly state his affiliation to HTI. See Adian Husaini, "Profile of Adian Husaini,"

http://www.adianhusaini.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=114&Itemid=60. Accessed on 20 September 2009.

³² Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 10 July 2009, Jakarta.

Forming and Utilizing the Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK)

By 1986, leaders of various LDKs mooted the idea of forming an umbrella group for the Muslim student body to expand its network and support. The rationale for the formation of this body was to coordinate the activities of Islamic student groups in some Indonesian campuses.³³ Elizabeth Collins affirmed that HTI members initiated the formation of this umbrella organization.³⁴ The rationale for such an organization was for HTI to expand its membership and enhance its recruitment process. The different LDKs were controlled by different Islamic student groups such as the JT and *Jamaah Sholahuddin* and HTI.³⁵ The LDKs held the first national conference of the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication, (*Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, FSLDK*).³⁶ This forum was held to coordinate and unify Islamic proselytizing activities at universities around Indonesia.³⁷ In actuality the FSLDK became a platform for HTI to expand its membership to campuses in other parts of Indonesia. One of the major coups that HTI achieved was when HTI members, secretly recruited Ismail Yusanto, then a leader of *Jamaah Sholahuddin*. Yusanto represented the MB inspired groups in the committee of the FSLDK and secretly allowed the introduction of HT ideas within the FSLDK.

The FSLDK proved to be an important and effective platform for HT's recruitment. Through this network, HTI expanded its activities to other campuses in Indonesia and began to have a presence in Yogyakarta, Makassar and Banjarmasin.³⁸ The first recruits were formally inducted into HTI around 1988, though the organization remained 'underground' and members were warned against openly discussing HT's existence in Indonesia.³⁹ At this time, HTI did not constitute an integral part of HT's organizational

³³ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 10 March 2009, Jakarta. PKS leaders, Zulkieflimansyah and Fahri Hamzah who were leaders of JT confirmed this. Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta, 20 October 2007 and Interview with Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 15 May 2011.

³⁴ Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Islam Is the Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia," *Kultur: Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures* 3, no. 1 (2003), p. 182.

³⁵ The *Jamaah Solahuddin* was a group which shares similar views as JT and MB.

³⁶ *Jamaah Tarbiyah* was an Indonesian Islamic group inspired by the teachings of MB leader, Hasan Al-Banna. Today the group has evolved into a political party, the PKS and continues to maintain ties with the larger MD international network. Yon Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of the Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)*, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2005), p. 119.

³⁷ Rifki Rosyad, "A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movements among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia" (Canberra: Australian National University, 1995), p. 56.

³⁸ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 20 March 2009, Jakarta

³⁹ Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", pp. 130-131.

structure. This means HTI activists were technically not 'official members' of the larger HT yet. Some of the leaders of HTI such as Yusanto and Abdurrahman also moved to Bogor upon graduation to assist in administering HTI. Being aware that the party was becoming more susceptible to intelligence infiltration, HTI leaders decided to allow only the most senior leaders of HTI to maintain contact with Al-Baghdadi.

The HTI leaders also introduced the ideas of HT in an indirect fashion. Several texts, which incorporated the ideas of HT, were compiled to introduce the ideas of HT. The most important of these texts was the *Mafahim Da'awah Islam* (The Methodology of Islamic Propagation).⁴⁰ This text borrowed heavily from the works of An-Nabhani especially the *System of Islam*, *Political System of Islam* and the *Methodology of Hizbut Tahrir*. Readers were first introduced to the problems facing the Muslim world and told that the only way for its revival is through the restoration of the caliphate. Interestingly, in its list of bibliography, the text listed the works of MB's leader Muhammad Qutb, Syed Hassan Ali Nadwi (*Nadwa-ul-Islam* in India) and Muhammad Natsir.⁴¹ The introduction of these works is aimed at assuaging the fears of JT members that the FSLDK was dominated by HTI. Besides the activities of FSLDK, HTI continued to maintain its separate *halaqah*. The rationale for this separate *halaqah* is to ensure that HT members were properly trained in its own ideology. New recruits who were introduced to HT's ideas through the FSLDK were also channeled to these *halaqahs* so that they understood the ideas of the party in an in depth manner. It can thus be concluded that the formation of the FSLDK was aimed at enhancing HTI's membership rather than with a real desire for a neutral platform to be formed for Islamic groups of different orientations.

By the third meeting of the FSLDK held at the *Universitas Sebelas Maret* in Solo, HTI devised a plan to control the FSLDK. Yusanto, Adian Husaini and Al-Khaththath initiated a strategy to disseminate the ideas of HTI through the network by proposing the development of a *khittah* (guiding principles) and *mafahim* (ideology) for the FSLDK. The attendees warmly received the idea. This initial enthusiasm diminished when it became clear following the drafting of the *khittah* and *mafahim* that most of its texts

⁴⁰ See Lembaga Da'awah Kampus, *Mafahim Da'awah Islam* (n.l: n. p, 1988).

⁴¹ *ibid*, p. 140. These figures are seen to be ideologically close to JT.

borrowed heavily from the ideas of An-Nabhani and HTI. A booklet of these ideas was subsequently published by FSLDK. A section of this booklet borrowed heavily from An-Nabhani's *Political System of Islam* in which the authors drew a comparison of the context of *da'awah* in Indonesia and that during the time of Prophet Muhammad.⁴² JT activists saw this as a betrayal. These activists were not aware of Yusanto's switch to HTI and had appointed Yusanto as a JT representative in the drafting committee. This was to mark the beginning of a long drawn conflict between HTI and JT that was to dominate FSLDK.

Leaving the FSLDK

By 1990, in retaliation to the perceived underhanded method used by HTI, Abdi Sumaiti (alias Abu Ridho) was tasked to start a negative campaign against HTI. The most damning revelation came in the form of an article translated by Abu Ridho, which highlighted twelve beliefs within the HTI's religious orientation, which accused HTI of being a deviant group. Some of these beliefs highlighted include allowing the viewing of pornographic materials and giving precedence to political activities above basic Islamic rituals such as prayers.⁴³ A book written by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (under the psuedo name Dr Shadiq Amin) which argued that HT is a deviant group was circulated amongst FSLDK circles.⁴⁴ Subsequently, a translation of the book was produced in Bahasa Indonesia.⁴⁵ This book described several practices of HT that were deemed as contravening Islamic teachings. These included the alleged practice of HT allowing members its members to view pornography.⁴⁶ This conflict between the two groups was to continue for several years before HTI decided to leave FSLDK in 1994.

This book was highly critical of several Islamic movements including HT and *Tablighi*, another movement that was becoming popular amongst Indonesian students during this period. The conflict between HTI and JT became so bad that HTI-JT conflicts dominated

⁴² Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, *Mafahim Dakwah Islam* (Bandung: LDK, 1991), pp. 113-123.

⁴³ Initially only the chapter on HT was translated. Subsequently, the whole book was translated. See WAMI An-Nadwah Al-Alamiyah lil Syabail Islami, *Gerakan Keagamaan dan Pemikiran: Akar Ideologi dan Penyebarannya* (Jakarta: Al Islahi, 1993)

⁴⁴ Shadiq Amin, *Ad-Da'awah Al-Islamiyyah Faridhah Syar'iyah wa Dharurah Basyariyyah* (Amman: n. p., 1975).

⁴⁵ Shadiq Amin, *Mencari Format Gerakan Islam Ideal*, (Jakarta: Al I'thisom, 2005).

⁴⁶ *ibid*, p. 110.

most Indonesian campuses. In between 1991 and 1993, HTI continued to dominate the network of FSLDK enabling the party to expand its network to all the major campuses in Indonesia. This control was further consolidated in 1993 when the constitution of HT was adopted as the constitution of FSLDK. This decision was to prove detrimental for HTI in the long run.

HTI leaders attempted to purge members of JT from the FSLDK at the 8th Conference of the FSLDK in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Besides ensuring that all the key leadership positions were filled by HTI members, HTI also openly adopted *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* as a standard text to be read by activists of LDK.⁴⁷ There was a backlash from JT activists due to this political maneuvering. In 1994, JT activists attempted to wrest control of FSLDK from HTI. Al-Baghdadi decided at this point that HTI should leave FSLDK as the conflict between the two groups was beginning to get out of hand. Many HTI activists opposed this decision leading to some of its early leaders such as Fathul Hidayat and Adian Husaini to leave the organization. Even today, many HTI leaders feel that the decision to leave FSLDK was a mistake as HTI was growing significantly due to the FSLDK network.⁴⁸ Another development that occurred during this time is the appointment of Abu Fuad as the official leader of HTI. It must be noted that this was part of the requirement that HT placed on all its chapters. Nevertheless, real power remained in the hands of Al-Baghdadi.

Setting Up an “Official Branch”

As discussed earlier, HTI was not officially linked to the leadership of HT in the Middle East. Inevitably, the party's decisions were made solely by Al-Baghdadi. Nevertheless, Al-Baghdadi maintained contacts with HT leaders in Australia. In 1992, one of these leaders Ismail Al-Wahwah arranged for HTI to come directly under the control of the larger HT. In 1993, the *Amir* of HT, Zalloum sent his envoy, Abu Zohra to Indonesia to officially place HTI under the control of HT (this process is referred to as *tanzim*). The fact that HTI existed for more than a decade without the supervision of the larger HT

⁴⁷ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 20 March 2009, Jakarta. Also see Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia*, p. 117

⁴⁸ Interviews with several HTI leaders such as Ismail Yusanto, Hadifz Abdurrahman and Rahmat Kurnia.

illustrates the lack of interest of the party's leadership under Zalloum towards the development of the party in Indonesia. While Al-Baghdadi had made several attempts to establish this official relationship, the party's central leadership was reluctant to assist him. It was only through the intervention of Al-Wahwah, one of the party's leaders in Australia did the party agree to assist Indonesia. Yet, the assistance rendered to HTI proved to be limited and it was not until a new leadership was established in 2003 that the party became more interested in its chapter in Indonesia.

Following its departure from the FSLDK, HTI continued to focus its activities within Indonesian universities. Nevertheless, HTI leaders were aware of the need for new platforms to be created outside the universities. By this time, many of the more senior activists had graduated and felt that the party should start recruiting young professionals into the party. One of the first platforms that HTI leaders started was the *Kelompok Studi Islam Standard Chartered* (Standard Chartered Islamic Study Circle, KSICC). The KSICC was an Islamic study circle held at the Wisma Standard Chartered (Standard Chartered Building) in Jakarta. One of the members of HTI worked at the Standard Chartered bank and through this member, HTI was allowed to organize talks, study circles and seminars at the Standard Chartered building. The KSICC also started retreat programs (*dauroh*) for key participants, held about once a month at the famous Indonesian hill station in Puncak.⁴⁹ The KSICC allowed HTI to expose their ideas to participants from a different background, namely mature mid-career professionals. HTI also began organizing holiday training programs for youths known as "*Dirasah Islam untuk Anak Muda*" (Islamic Development for Youths).⁵⁰

Perhaps the most important contribution of the KSICC was the production of the *Buletin Al-Islam* (*Al-Islam Buletin*). This publication was first produced in 1994 and distributed at mosques in Jakarta. The *Al-Islam* bulletin exposed the Muslim community in Jakarta to the ideas of HTI. Building on this exposure, HTI began organizing sessions known as *Temu Pembaca Al-Islam* (*Al-Islam Gathering Sessions*). These sessions were used to expose the *Al-Islam* audience to the KSICC and HTI. Subsequently, it was used as a

⁴⁹ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, Former Chairman of HTI, 21 March 2008, Bogor.

⁵⁰ "Dirasah Islam Untuk Anak Muda", *Al Islam*, no. 185 (7-11 July 1997).

recruiting mechanism for HTI.⁵¹ An article written by Muhammad al-Khaththath criticizing the Central Bank of Indonesia led to HTI coming under pressure from the authorities to cease their activities at the Standard Chartered building.⁵² HTI activists were forced to shift their strategy.

They began utilizing the *Badan Wakaf As-Salam* (The As-Salam Wakaf Association, BWAS) for their activities. The BWAS was first formed in 1995 to respond to the increasing demands from mosques in Jakarta for HTI speakers to deliver the Friday sermons and conduct Islamic religious classes. BWAS acted as an official coordinating body that allocated speakers for these sermons and classes.⁵³ The body was also used to manage funds gathered during the study sessions as well as donations contributed to HTI. In reality, BWAS was formed to give the party a semblance of an Islamic organization that has a religious rather than a political objective. As part of revamping its image, the *Al-Islam* bulletin was renamed As-Salam bulletin.⁵⁴ Upon the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, BWAS organized an important seminar, *Nasionalisme dan Kebangkitan Umat* (Nationalism and the revival of *Ummah*). This seminar, which was organized at a larger scale, was aimed at creating awareness about the need for Muslims to reject nationalism as a political ideology.

This period during HTI's history is reflective of the transition from an underground clandestine movement to a legal organization. By the late 1990s, the Suharto regime was already more lax in its policies towards Islamic groups due to its realization of the growing draw of Islam and the need to appeal to this group. He did this by supporting the formation of the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Muslim Professionals, ICMI) and drawing on the organization to give his regime and Islamic outlook.⁵⁵ Reacting to the Suharto regime's easing of political control and usage of Islamic groups, the party began to posit itself as a religious organization that focused its activities on religious education and development. The party also used this period to consolidate internally while recruiting new members in a more open manner. Yet, the

⁵¹ Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", p. 124.

⁵² Interview with Muhammad al-Khaththath, 18 March 2008, Jakarta.

⁵³ Interview with Rahmat Kurnia, 1 October 2009, Jakarta.

⁵⁴ Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", p. 125.

⁵⁵ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 128-143.

party was still wary of the political environment and retained a high level of secrecy within the party. The party started operating openly, only after the collapse of the regime and the holding of the 1999 general elections that marked the beginning of democracy in Indonesia. A detailed discussion of the internal dynamics within the party will be discussed in Chapter 4.

HTI in the Post New Order Political Environment

The collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 led to a period of democratization and easing of political control. Yet, it took about two years for HTI to react to this change. HTI leaders were unsure about how best to respond to this new dynamics. Baghdadi differed with other HTI leaders about formally declaring the existence of HTI. His experience in the Middle East made him wary of the possibility that other elements within the New Order regime might contest for power and install a regime which is equally repressive. Many activists viewed this as a huge tactical mistake. They felt that the organization could have capitalized on the new political environment to assert their influence in the public realm. It seems that only after the 1999 elections were held that Al-Baghdadi felt that the party was ready to move to the second stage of their struggle, the stage of interacting with the public.⁵⁶ The internal discussions, which took place within HTI, will be discussed in Chapter 4. Muhammad Al-Khaththath took over the party's leadership whereas Abu Fuad joined the advisory council of HTI, which also included Al-Baghdadi. There were misgivings that surfaced after this new leadership selection. Several members of HTI who were not selected decided to leave the party. Although the key reason for them leaving HTI is over the leadership selection, some of the leaders of the breakaway faction got in touch with the *Al-Muhajiroun* group led by Omar Bakri and named their faction *Al-Muhajirun Indonesia*.⁵⁷ Another faction within this group broke away to form a new group, *Hizbul Khilafah*.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ The internal debates within the movement will be discussed in Chapter 4.

⁵⁷ Details about this group can be found on <http://almuhajirun.net>. It seems to have a presence only online and do not conduct any activities.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

HTI officially launched itself as a formal organization in June 2000.⁵⁹ As part of this step, HTI re-launched the *Al-Islam* Bulletin in July 2000. For the first time in its history HTI actually used the name *Syabab Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (The Brotherhood of Hizbut Tahrir) as the publishers of the bulletin. The bulletin was also distributed at some mosques in Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Malang and Surabaya. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the party organized the first international *Khilafah* conference in August 2000 to officially propel the organization into the public domain. The conference which was held at the Senayan Tennis Stadium drew an estimated two to three thousand people.⁶⁰ The conference received extensive coverage from the media.⁶¹ Speakers featured at the event included Sheikh Ismail al-Wahwah (Hizbut Tahrir Australia), Dr Sharifuddin Md Zain (Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia) and Muhammad al-Khaththath. Members of HT from Australia, Malaysia, Jordan and Britain attended this event. This event was aimed at introducing HTI and its ideas to the Indonesian public. Likewise, the event was intended to give confidence to younger members of the group in an attempt to show that the party had a strong presence. The event drew different reactions from the Muslim populace in Indonesia. While some sectors of society were critical of its ideology and aims, others were supportive of its ideas.⁶² After this event, HTI began organizing activities openly and started campaigning fervently for the implementation of *Shari'ah* laws and the revival of the caliphate.

Engaging the Muslim Ummah in Indonesia

In the months following the conference, HTI activists began embarking on programmes to increase its public presence. They also began to actively engage in street demonstrations and other civil disobedience activities. These demonstrations focused on issues ranging from fuel hikes to Israeli aggression against Palestinians.⁶³ Yusanto, the official spokesman for HTI also began engaging the media and issued press statements

⁵⁹ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 21 March 2008, Bogor.

⁶⁰ Interview with Dr Sharifuddin Md Zain, Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia leader, 2 August 2006, Malacca.

⁶¹ For instance, see Mahladi, "Jalan Panjang Menuju Khilafah Islamiyah" *Republika*, 2 June 2000.

⁶² Herry Mohammad and Kholis Bahtiar Bakri, "Khilafah Islamiyah: Ibarat Pelari Maraton," p. 90-91; Nasrullah Ali Fauzi, "Belum Apa-Apa Sudah Antidemokrasi," p. 21 and Dedi Rad, "Ahmad Muflih Saefuddin: Para Kiyai Juga Harus Bertanggung Jawab" *Republika*, 11 June 2000.

⁶³ See "Moslem Organization Lash at Israeli Arrogance", *Asia Pulse* 11 October 2002 and "Rallies Continue Against Utility Price Hikes" *The Jakarta Post*, 12 January 2003.

on a range of different issues on a weekly basis.⁶⁴ HT activists toured the areas around Jakarta, Surabaya, Bogor, Bandung and Tangerang to disseminate their ideas.⁶⁵ HT also began building relationships with major political figures and Muslim organizations. This was done through visits to these organizations where HTI leaders would present their ideas. Several leaders of HTI admit that this engagement process is also aimed at convincing these figures and organizations about the need to revive the caliphate.

HTI leaders also began to travel to different parts of Indonesia to form chapters of the party at the provincial level. The party actively targeted Muslims from other parts of Indonesia who were working or studying in Jakarta for recruitment. This was seen as the most effective way for chapters to develop in the provincial areas. Through these strategies, HTI was able to form chapters in virtually all thirty-three Indonesian provinces. The *Al-Wa'ie* journal which was first published in June 2000 and distributed as part of the conference package is another medium utilized by HTI members to engage the Indonesian Muslim public. HTI's political strategy during this period would prove extremely important in the development of the party. The decision to focus on building relationships with key public figures, enhancing its membership amongst youth and women and the dissemination of political literatures were effective in strengthening the political position of the party.

Departure of Al-Baghdadi from HTI

In 2002, HTI suffered a major set back when Al-Baghdadi decided to leave the organization. As mentioned earlier, several leaders of HT had met in Germany and Australia to discuss the reformation of HT. These HT leaders came to a decision to form a breakaway faction of HT. Al-Baghdadi immediately informed his key confidantes of this decision. Muhammad Al-Khaththath noted that only five members of the HT leadership knew of this decision. The five members were Al- Khaththath, Ismail Yusanto, Ali Murtopo, Rahmat Kurnia and Abu Fuad. Al-Khaththath had advised Al-Baghdadi not to inform the rest of the HTI members about this decision fearing that this

⁶⁴ For instance, see Ismail Yusanto, "Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Mengenai Kenaikan BBM" *HTI Press Statement*, No. 1 (14 January 2002).

⁶⁵ Jakarta Post, 3 June 2003.

could lead to confusions and divisions within the party.⁶⁶ Upon hearing the decision to form this separate organization, the leadership of HT in the Middle East had sent Abu Zohra to look into the matter and persuade Al-Baghdadi to stay as a member of HT. Al-Baghdadi was adamant about his decision. Abu Zohra also met other leaders of HTI including Al-Khaththath, Yusanto and Kurnia. These leaders decided to remain with HT and abandoned Al-Baghdadi. Al-Khaththath believed that this was best for the party. Apparently, an attempt was made in late 2002 to invite Al-Baghdadi to rejoin HT. Zalloum had convinced Al-Wahwah in Australia to return to the party fold. Al-Wahwah's wife remained a member of HT and convinced her husband to return to the party's fold. Zalloum had then sent Al-Wahwah to meet Al-Baghdadi in Bogor to convince the latter to rejoin HT. Al-Baghdadi refused to join the party and even rebuked Al-Wahwah for doing so.⁶⁷

The departure of Al-Baghdadi from HTI was not entirely surprising. Yusanto noted that there were problems between Baghdadi and Zalloum over issues relating to HTI political strategies. Baghdadi had attempted to convince others within the party to leave as well but did not succeed in his attempt to do so as members of HTI decided to remain as part of the global HT network.⁶⁸ This decision was made as many of them felt that Baghdadi did not guide the party in line with the global vision of HT. Hafidz Abdurrahman postulated the view that Baghdadi did not truly understand the methodology and teachings of HT. It was only after his departure and visits from HT leaders from the Middle East that HTI members fully understood HT's vision, mission and methodology.⁶⁹ In describing his departure from HT and HTI, Al-Baghdadi was particularly bitter about the fact that his students whom he had known for years and had considered like his own children had been disrespectful towards him. Al-Baghdadi described an incident in which he saw Abu Fuad after *Eid-ul-Fitir* prayers in 2008. He said that Abu Fuad simply said the *salaam* (Muslim greeting) to him but refused to stop to talk to him. He said that even on a joyous day like the Eid, members had refused to

⁶⁶ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 20 March 2009, Jakarta.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Up till 1998, Al-Baghdadi remained a guide to HTI members. In the introduction to his book *Islam Ideologi*, Ismail Yusanto thanked Al-Baghdadi for editing the book. See Ismail Yusanto, *Islam Ideologi' Refleksi Cendekiawan Muda* (Jakarta: Al-Izzah, 1998), p. xi.

⁶⁹ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 20 August 2007, Jakarta

bury the hatchet.⁷⁰ Al-Baghdadi is highly critical of this stance of HT and noted that Islam did not teach Muslims to behave in this fashion. Others who left the movement such as Mursalin and Abu Saad also expressed their bitterness towards the party.⁷¹ This episode was also reflective of the resilience of the party. The process of indoctrination that members go through plugs them directly to the party's ideology and often focused on the need for loyalty towards the *Amir* of the party. Naturally, party members continue to be loyal to the party even when their recruiter or the leaders of a particular chapter quit the party. In spite of rhetorics advocated by HT leaders that the party placed significant importance to the need for unity amongst Muslims, ex-members are viewed as traitors and are marginalized by party members.⁷² This is a reflection of the boundaries created by the party against those who are outside the party, a theme that will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Consolidating its Position in Indonesia

The period between 2002 and 2009 saw HTI consolidating its position and increasing support for the party. The party began to capture more media attention through major demonstrations that it held against the Iraq and Afghan wars.⁷³ The party also began organizing seminars, lectures and public talks to discuss both international and domestic issues. The party also began intensifying its efforts to build strong ties and relationships with political figures in Indonesia. For instance the party met the then Indonesian Vice-President to discuss details of an Anti-Terrorism law, which was about to be promulgated.⁷⁴ In addition, prior to the 2004 Indonesian general elections, HTI leaders also met and discussed the implementation of Islamic laws in Indonesia with candidates from Islamic parties. This was an attempt to influence these candidates to seriously endeavor to implement these laws.⁷⁵ HTI's influence amongst Muslim religious circles was increasing when two of the HTI leaders, Ismail Yusanto and Muhammad Al-Khatthath were appointed to sit on the board of the MUI. By 2003, the HT leadership

⁷⁰ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 March 2010, Bogor

⁷¹ Interview with Mursalin, 14 May 2011, Jakarta and Abu Saad, 13 April 2011, Jakarta.

⁷² Interview with Maajid Nawaz, 29 October 2007, London.

⁷³ See for instance, "Islamic Countries Urged to Sever Diplomatic Relations with US, *Antara News Agency*, 26 March 2003.

⁷⁴ "Bill on Terrorism Should Not Create Anxiety" *Antara News Agency*, 4 March 2003.

⁷⁵ "Hizbut Tahrir Kunjungi Sejumlah Caleg" *Republika*, 11 February 2004.

was also beginning to see Indonesia as an important chapter of the party. The growth in its membership, growing religio-political influence and the relatively free political space Indonesia compared to other parts of the Muslim world convinced the new HTI leadership that its Indonesian chapter must be supported in a more concrete fashion especially in allocating funds to HTI.⁷⁶ As a result of this growth in interest, HTI was also able to start organizing events at a larger scale.

One of HTI's vital strategies for consolidating its position was to push for the formation of an umbrella organization made up of all the major Muslim organizations. HTI felt that due to the long history of many Muslim organizations in the country, it is difficult for a relatively newer organization such as HTI to make its mark or to call for these organizations to adopt HTI's plans. Instead, there is a need for some neutral platform to be formed that would allow HTI to push its agenda forward in a more acceptable manner to these organizations. In working towards this goal, HTI leaders began involving themselves in the processes of the *Kongres Solidarity Umat Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Solidarity Congress, KSUII). Muhammad Al-Khaththath stepped down from the chairmanship of HTI and was succeeded by Hafidz Abdurrahman in March 2005 to allow the former to focus on strengthening HTI's position in the congress. This congress was mooted by the MUI and had met several times to discuss issues affecting Muslims in Indonesia. The first such congress was held in 2001. The fourth congress held from 19th to the 21st of April 2005 at the Sahid Jaya Hotel became one of HTI's crucial achievements.⁷⁷ The congress was seen to be significant enough that both the President and Vice-President of Indonesia attended the event. HTI played an important role at the congress influencing many of the congress' proceedings.⁷⁸ One of the proposals made by HTI at the congress was the signing of the "Jakarta Declaration".⁷⁹ The declaration called for the implementation of Islamic laws in Indonesia and urged the government to do more to assist in emancipating Palestine. Although the congress' resolutions itself might not be important, given that the congress organizers have little real power to ensure the implementation of the resolutions, the decision to form an umbrella organization of

⁷⁶ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 10 March 2009, Jakarta.

⁷⁷ Interview with Mursalin, Committee Member of FUI and HTI, 25 March 2008, Jakarta.

⁷⁸ The influence of HTI was even acknowledged by the congress organizers. For details of HTI's involvement in the congress, see Tim Penyusun Buku KUIIIIV, *Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia IV: Proses dan Dinamika Permusyawaratan* (Jakarta: Badan Pekerja Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia IV, 2005), p. 3.

⁷⁹ *ibid*, p. 5.

Islamic groups by some conference participants known as the *Forum Ummat Islam* was particularly significant. FUI was a significant effort on the part of HTI to begin influencing other Islamic groups to support its cause. Officially, there are thirty-one organizations that are part of the FUI structure. FUI also runs a fortnightly newspaper, the *Suara Islam* (Voice of Islam). In tandem with the development in FUI, HT chapters at the provincial level were attempting to develop chapters of the FUI at the provinces. In several cities such as Makassar and Surabaya, local chapters of FUI were already formed. GEMA was also instructed to follow this strategy when the student group began engaging other student groups by initiating the formation of *Forum Mahasiswa Islam* (The Muslim Undergraduate Forum) in 2007. This forum consisted of the main Islamic undergraduate organizations such as KAMMI and HMI. The aim of this forum was to unite the Muslim undergraduates to work for the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia. Privately, GEMA leaders admitted that the forum was a platform for them to introduce their ideas to the other student activists, whom they failed to convince in joining the HTI. This was of course a strategy to co-opt members of other Islamic groups secretly, a strategy that HTI has engaged during different periods in its history.

The International Khilafah Conference 2007: Creating a Hub for the Hizbiyyin

In August 2007, HTI organized the largest gathering that HT has seen since its inception in 1953. The participants range from members of HTI to members of other Islamic groups such as the FPI, MMI, Muhammadiyah, MUI and NU. Members of HT from Europe and Asia were also present. Amongst them the largest numbers came from Britain, Denmark, Germany and Australia. Others came from India, Lebanon, Palestine, Malaysia and even Mozambique. The conference was organized as part of a series of *Khilafah* conferences organized by HT in over twelve countries including Palestine, India, Malaysia, Denmark, Britain, Sudan, Ukraine, Kuwait, Yemen, Pakistan and Netherlands.⁸⁰ These conferences were coordinated and organized concurrently in the Islamic month of Rajab (July and August) to commemorate the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. It was announced that the Indonesian conference would be a platform to unite Muslims from all around the world towards the vision of reviving the caliphate. HTI

⁸⁰ For details of these conferences, see *Global Call for the Khilafah*, An-Nahda Publications, Sydney, Australia.

received financial support from the leadership of HT for the event. Several key leaders of HT also attended the event to express their support for HTI.

For HTI, the Jakarta conference was an attempt for HT to showcase their strength to the outside world. Most importantly, HTI wanted to stress to the world that the formation of the caliphate would end the supposed domination of Western powers in the Muslim world.⁸¹ This was clearly reflected in the programme of the caliphate. Beyond rhetorical speeches given by HT leaders about the need for a caliphate to be re-established, some parts of the program showcased a theatrical performance by HTI activists on how the caliphate would prevail against the Western powers described in Chapter 1. The event brought sudden international limelight to the organization. Participants pledged their support for the revival of the caliphate and the implementation of Islamic laws in Indonesia. The success of the conference is a reflection of HTI's transformation to becoming one of the influential Islamist organization in Indonesia. The conference also propelled HTI to an important position within the larger HT organization.

For HTI itself, the event was 'proof' to its members that HTI was growing in strength and was a truly transnational movement. At a follow-up meeting held at the Sahid Jaya Hotel, Jakarta on the 14th of August, HT members from Australia, Denmark and Britain spoke about their experiences in HT as well as about the activities of HT in their respective countries. One of those who spoke was an Australian lady who had converted to Islam and is now a member of HT. Yusanto had asked her to speak to show that HT has appeal even to new converts to Islam.⁸² In another event hosted by the Minister of Youth and Sports, Adyaksa Dault, speakers from the conference spoke to Indonesian students about the importance of the caliphate in ending the domination of the Western colonial powers.⁸³ For HTI, the event benefited the organization in several ways. Yusanto propounded the view that on two fronts the conference assisted HTI significantly. Within HTI, members became more confident of the party's ability to galvanize support for its cause. Besides, HTI instantaneously became one of the more prominent Islamist group in Indonesia.

⁸¹ Conversation with Abu Ismael, HT member from India at the Khilafah Conference, 10 July 2007, Jakarta. Abu Ismael was originally from UK and had shifted to India to start a chapter of HT.

⁸² Personal Observation of Author at the event in Sahid Jaya Hotel, 19 October 2007

⁸³ Personal Observation of Author at the event in the Ministry of Youth and Sports, 20 October 2007.

Recent Developments In HTI

Since early 2008, HTI and FUI have focused on the issue of banning Ahmadiyahs in Indonesia. The Ahmadiyah is an Islamic sect that claims that Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani, an Indian Muslim scholar was the last Prophet after Prophet Muhammad contravening the mainstream Muslim views that Prophet Muhammad is the last Prophet of God.⁸⁴ As part of their campaign, the groups sent a memorandum to the Indonesian President calling for the banning of Ahmadiyah. In retaliation to the actions of the radical groups, an alliance of moderate Muslim intellectuals and leaders formed the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief (*Aliansi Kebangsaan Untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan*, AKKBB) to defend the rights of Ahmadiyahs to practice their beliefs. On 1 June 2008, the AKKBB organized a rally promoting the freedom of religion. It was an attempt to reject hard-line views.⁸⁵ Knowing that HTI was organizing a demonstration near Monas, the AKKBB was asked to move their demonstration to a traffic circle not far from Monas. While the AKKBB agreed to do so, they continued gathering in Monas prior to the actual demonstrations. Members of a militia group called the *Komando Lashkar Islam* (Islamic Fighters Commando) led by Munarman a former human rights lawyer and H M Mursalin a leader of HTI together with members of the FPI had gathered to 'protect' the HTI demonstrators.⁸⁶ Little is known about how the assault started. FUI activists claimed that a man carrying a revolver had proceeded towards the HTI demonstrators resulting in FPI and KLI members attacking the AKKBB activists. While the police admitted that AKKBB demonstrators had no right to gather in Monas, they noted that the provocateurs were FPI and KLI.⁸⁷ After investigations were carried out, the police arrested members of FPI and KLI including Habib Rizieq Shihab and Munarman (who initially escaped and went into hiding but subsequently turned himself over).

⁸⁴ Another branch of the Ahmadiyah known as the Lahori Ahmadiyah claimed that Ghulam Ahmad was a Messiah rather than a Prophet. A detailed study of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia is by Iskandar Zurkarnain. See Iskandar Zurkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2005).

⁸⁵ Group, "Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree.", p. 7.

⁸⁶ Interview with Mursalin, 14 May 2011, Jakarta, and Interview with Munarman, 8 March 2010, Jakarta.

⁸⁷ "Hard-liners Ambush Monas Rally" *Jakarta Post*, 2 June 2008.

For the HTI leadership, the incident put HTI in an extremely bad light. While HTI had always been viewed as a peaceful Islamic group, the incident led to questions about its actual position towards violence. This development was viewed with such concern that an internal investigation was carried out by the leadership of HTI. The leadership of HTI was of the view that Al-Khaththath as the representative of HTI in FUI had failed to ensure that such acts of violence were averted.⁸⁸ HTI leaders also claimed that the attacks on the AKKBB demonstrators were pre-planned and that Al-Khaththath had approved of this attack. In his defence, Al-Khaththath noted that he was unaware of any such plan maintaining that he was not even present during the incident. He continued to maintain that the AKKBB was responsible for the initial attacks. This disagreement was brought to the attention of the HT central leadership. The *Amir* of HT sent an envoy, Abu Mahmud to look into this matter. This had occurred in August 2008. Upon speaking to different parties involved in the issue, Abu Mahmud had advised Al-Khaththath to quit FUI. Abu Mahmud argued that there are Islamic groups in FUI such as the FPI that believed in violence, which is against HT's methodology. Moreover, HTI's involvement in FUI may result in the dilution of its ideology given that there are bound to be compromises that are made in such an umbrella organization. Al-Khaththath refused to abide by the *Amir*'s instruction leading to his sacking from HTI. The uncompromising stance taken by HT is not surprising given its avowedly non-violent stance and that its association in any violent action could impact the image of the party negatively.

Al-Khaththath felt that the reason for HTI's growth is due to FUI and while FUI is an umbrella organization, it is obvious to the Indonesian Muslim public that FUI is a front for HTI given that its Secretary-General is from HTI. Al-Khaththath viewed HTI's leaving of FUI to be a hypocritical move given that HTI leaders mooted the formation of FUI. Al-Khaththath believed that the real reason for his sacking was due to Ismail Yusanto. He noted that Yusanto was getting increasingly edgy about Al-Khaththath receiving more press coverage than him. Yusanto had even told Al-Khaththath that all press statements should go through the office of the spokesman. He came to the conclusion that Yusanto had convinced the HT leadership to sack him because of jealousy. This episode reflects the continuous problem that the party has had to encounter

⁸⁸ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 21 March 2008, Bogor.

which is the authoritarian style of leadership that is practiced in the party. Al-Khaththath also felt that the episode confirmed that the HT leadership is unaware of the local political dynamics and Indonesia. While the party was beginning to adopt a more open stance towards its chapters outside the Middle East, the HT leadership is not cognizant of the nuances of political affairs in Indonesia.

The sacking of Al-Khaththath led to several members of the HTI leadership including Abu Saad, Donny (Chairman of GEMA), Mursalin and Munarman to leave the organization. Al-Khaththath subsequently formed the *Hizbut Dakwah Indonesia* (Indonesian Dakwah Party, HDI).⁸⁹ HDI has also replaced HTI's position in the FUI. Similar to the departure of Al-Baghdadi from HTI, Al-Khaththath's sacking did not affect HTI significantly. Nevertheless, from a strategic perspective the move to leave FUI is affecting the position of HTI in the eyes of many of the other Islamist organizations. Interestingly, these ex-members of HTI seem to be coming together. On a weekly basis, they attend a study circle conducted by Al-Baghdadi. While there is little evidence that Al-Baghdadi will join HDI or FUI, he seems to be acting as a sort of spiritual advisor to the attendees of the study group, many of whom are influential members of the Indonesian Islamist community. Developments within this study circle and HDI's position within FUI are likely to have some political impacts on HTI in future.

Since 2008, HTI began initiating several new initiatives in terms of its mobilization strategy. It organizes a monthly event titled *Halaqah Islam dan Peradaban* (Study Session on Islam and Civilization) aimed at discussing contemporary issues related to Islam. The key purpose of such events is to provide an opportunity for HTI to engage key public figures in debates and discussions. To replace the *Suara Islam*, which HTI utilized as its unofficial newspaper, HTI began producing a fortnightly newspaper, *Media Ummat* to engage the Muslim community in Indonesia. Most recently in July 2009, HTI organized a conference attended by Muslim religious scholars from Indonesia and other parts of the Muslim world. HTI claimed that up till six thousand Muslim

⁸⁹ Interview with Donny, Former Head of the GEMA *Pembebasan*, 11 August 2009 Jakarta and Interview with Mursalin, 14 May 2011, Jakarta.

scholars attended the event although it is impossible for one to decipher between a religious scholar and other participants at such events.

Conclusion

Apart from examining the history of HT in Indonesia, it was also argued in this chapter that the founding and initial development of the movement was largely the effort of Al-Baghdadi and has little to do with the HT central leadership. It was shown that the HT leadership did not know and was not keen to establish a chapter of HT in Indonesia, a country that was seen to be peripheral to the Muslim world and that the HT leadership knew little about. Yet, Al-Baghdadi persisted in his endeavor and established a chapter of HTI by utilizing his personal relationship with Abdullah Bin Nuh. While Bin Nuh himself did not become a member of HT, he subscribed to many of its ideas as noted from his writings. As highlighted above, Bin Nuh acted as an unofficial patron to Al-Baghdadi. Through this initial effort, Al-Baghdadi galvanized enough support amongst students in various Indonesian universities to form the first group of HTI future cadres. The initial cadres were instrumental in the formation of campus based Islamic groups as well as the umbrella organization comprising different Islamic student groups, the FSLDK. The FSLDK proved to be an important medium for HTI to recruit members of other Islamic groups in to their fold. The second part of the chapter examined the period whereby HTI came officially under the control of the larger HT leadership. The official inclusion of HTI into the larger HT proved to be more problematic. Several important developments such as the decision of the party to abandon its activities in campus to focus on recruitment amongst young Muslim professionals and the decision of Al-Baghdadi to leave the party were also highlighted in this section. Despite challenges faced by the party, it was still able to surface publicly. In 2003 when Ata Abu Rashta took over the helm of the HT leadership the party began changing its approach towards its Indonesian chapter. Indonesia was acknowledged as a more important chapter. This must be qualified. Examples of even recent developments have shown the leadership's failure to understand the political context in Indonesia. This change is mainly due to the growth the party experienced especially when compared to the one in Middle East where the party had been operating for more than four decades and had made little headway in

membership and influence. As highlighted in the previous chapter, this rapid growth is the subject of interest that the thesis will explore.

CHAPTER FOUR: CAPITALIZING ON OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE CALIPHATE

We were ready to launch HTI publicly in 1998. We were already talking to elements in the army and *Reformasi* movement but Al-Baghdadi felt that we should wait. On hindsight, it was a waste. We would have been where PKS is if we had seized the moment (Hafidz Abdurrahman, Central committee Member of HTI, 21 March 2008, Jakarta).

The moment was 21 May 1998. Indonesia witnessed the demise of the New Order government led by Suharto. The end of the regime led to the emergence of a myriad of political parties, civil society groups and social movements of varying ideological orientation. The most visible of these were Islamist groups. One such group was HTI. This chapter seeks to understand the external factors that impacted the emergence and growth of HTI. It also seeks to understand the decision making process of the party's leadership in forming a chapter of HT in Indonesia, expanding its membership base and finally emerging publicly to launch collective actions. This chapter argues that both institutional and non-institutional opportunities affected the action, strategy and ability of HTI in mobilizing its members in launching collective action.

There are four parts to this chapter. The chapter will begin by analyzing the theoretical debates surrounding political opportunity structure (POS) theory and its usefulness in examining the growth of HTI. Here, both the objectivist and subjectivist approaches to POS will be assessed. A case will be made to why the subjectivist approach is superior. An analysis of both the institutional and non-institutional aspects of the POS will also be undertaken in this section. In the second part, the paper will investigate the opportunities and constraints that Al-Baghdadi encountered in trying to start a chapter of HT in Indonesia. While the institutional POS was largely negative, several non-institutional POS encouraged Al-Baghdadi to establish a chapter of HT. This section will also examine the institutional POS in the 1990s that encouraged the party to expand its membership base. The third part of the chapter will examine the POS that allowed HTI to finally emerge publicly as a social movement in 2000 following Suharto's resignation. A

discussion will be accorded to determine whether the strategy to time its emergence in 2000 resulted in missed opportunities for HTI to consolidate its position as a key Islamist movement. The last part of this chapter will examine institutional and non-institutional POSs, created by an open political system that allowed HTI to mobilize supporters in launching collective action between 2000 and 2009. It will explore the reasons as to why they moderated their political stance despite their foray into a more open political environment in Indonesia.

Opportunities and Constraints Facing Social Movements

The recent Arab Spring revolts have created a great degree of interest in trying to fathom the role of collective action, through spontaneous mobilization, in successfully overthrowing certain dictatorships (as in Egypt and Tunisia) and failing to do so in others (as in Bahrain). An understanding of POS would allow for an understanding of opportunities present in Egypt and Tunisia, which led to success, and constraints that resulted in the failures of the uprisings in Bahrain. As has been said, the POS theory seeks to assess the external factors that impact a social movement's action, strategy and ability to mobilize members and supporters towards a certain goal.¹ Prior to discussing the different dimensions of POS and its usefulness in understanding the emergence of HTI, it is important to first establish what POS means. There are two variables that determine whether a political/social/economic development is a POS. First, the goals of the movement must be ascertained. A political development becomes POS only if it has a bearing on the goals of the movement. For instance, a change in the social welfare budget allocation is not likely to be a POS for an anti-nuclear movement whereas a change in defence budget is likely to be POS for the same movement. Second, there must be a causal relationship established between a particular development and its impact on the chance of the movement attaining success. For instance, the release of political prisoners in an authoritarian state can become a POS for pro-democracy groups in the country. This gesture could indicate that the establishment was beginning to open up the political system, which could provide an indirect POS for pro-democracy groups. These

¹ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes- Toward a Synthetic, Comparative on Social Movements," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

two variables must be met before a development is seen as a POS. Charles Tilly described this understanding of POS as an objectivist approach to POS.² Proponents of another approach to POS known as the subjectivist approach have advocated for the introduction of a third variable that must be fulfilled before a development becomes a POS. This third variable is described by Jon Elster as social movement actor's reading of a development as POS. He noted that movement activists may not be aware of certain opportunities, or he may overestimate aspects of the available opportunities.³ Other actors might simply misread a particular political development as being insignificant to the movement's goals when in fact the development could potentially assist the movement in attaining its goals. Thus, the subjectivist approach refers to the perception of social movement actors that a political development provides incentives for or constraints on them to undertake collective action.⁴ For the purpose of this thesis, the subjectivist approach to POS will be used. The subjectivist approach is superior due to several reasons. Firstly, the subjectivist approach captures the actual thinking of social movement actors rather than making assumptions that certain opportunities will render specific responses from actors. This makes the subjectivist approach more accurate. Secondly, the subjectivist approach allows for an insight into the decision making process of actors whereby both POS and negative POS (constraints) would be taken into consideration.

Beyond the issue of how POS is defined, scholars of POS have also attempted to identify variables that are likely to create or diminish POS. There are two types of POS that scholars of SMT have discussed. The first type of POS could be termed "institutional POS". There are several views that have emerged amongst SMT scholars about these dimensions of POS. This could be seen in McAdam's typology in which he argued that POS is determined by: (a) popular access to the political system, (b) divisions within the elite, (c) the availability of elite allies, and (d) diminishing state repression.⁵ His argument is grounded in the belief that social movements will time their official challenge to the state depending on the vulnerability of the state. Sidney Tarrow

² Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

³ Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 13.

⁴ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 1998.

⁵ Doug Mc Adam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems and Future Directions in John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald Doug McAdam, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996), p. 24.

identifies three variables of POS, which included the openness of access to political institutions, the stability of political alignments and the availability of allies and support groups.⁶ On the other hand, Herbert Kitschelt, in a comparative study of anti-nuclear movements in four democracies, suggests four components: the capacity to mobilize resources; openness of access to the public sphere and political decision making; the presence of other social movements also contesting the institutions of social control and the capacity of the political system to effectively meet demands.⁷ Some of the variables proposed by Tarrow, Kitschelt and McAdam are in fact similar.⁸ Based on the empirical data on HTI, four variables could be identified as being most useful in impacting HTI's development. These include the openness and closedness of the political system, the presence of important allies, the capacity and propensity of the state for repression and the capacity of the movement to mobilize. The closed political system in this particular context will be used to refer to Indonesia under the New Order regime and an open political system here will be used to refer to a democratic Indonesia after the demise of the regime.

Here, several of the dimensions of institutional POS are rejected, namely elite fragmentation and presence of other social movements contesting the institutions of social control. The variable of divisions within the elite could be subsumed within discussions about the openness and closeness of the political system. It is highly unlikely that elites are fragmented in a closed political system and vice versa is also true. Additionally, the presence of other social movements to challenge the institution of social control has little impact on the case study of HTI. HTI leaders' decisions were not affected by the presence of other social movements.

⁶ Sidney Tarrow, "Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change during Cycles of Protest", *Western Societies Paper* No. 15 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) and Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Social Conflict, Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

⁷ Herbert P Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (1986), pp. 57-85 and Karen E Campbell Holly J McCammon, Ellen M Granberg and Christine Mowery, "How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women's Suffrage Movements 1866 to 1919," *American Sociological Review* 66 (2001), pp. 49-70.

⁸ Popular access to the political system; the openness of access to political institutions; openness of access to the public sphere and political decision and the capacity of the political system to effectively meet demands could all be encapsulated within a category of the "closeness or openness of the political system". Similarly, divisions within the elite and the stability of political alignments can be categorized as the "stability of elite configuration".

The second typology of variables here refers to “non-institutional POS”. In essence this typology focuses on “broader, issue-specific conceptualisation of political opportunity” rather than “narrower specification that focuses on formal institutional openings”.⁹ This type of POS could be found in the works of scholars such as McCammon (et al). In their study of the women suffrage movement, they found that cultural attitudes and economic opportunities for women are the two most important POS, which led to the state’s ratification of women suffrage.¹⁰ In this study, institutional factors such as the type of political system did not have any significant impact on the movement. Likewise, Van Dyke’s study of student groups in America concluded that threats from university authorities and grievances over university’s policies became conceptualized as elements of political opportunity that led to coalition building amongst students rather than any institutional openings.¹¹

An analysis of HTI’s development between 1982 and 2009 points to the fact that both institutional and non-institutional POS impacted the decisions, strategies and actions of these movements. During its formative years, Al-Baghdadi was not deterred from attempting to form a chapter of HTI in Indonesia despite the presence of negative institutional POS, such as the closed political system and the high level of state repression. Non-institutional POS such as the worldwide resurgence of Islam, Islamic student activism and institutional POS such as the patronage of prominent Islamic scholar, Abdullah Bin Nuh, encouraged Al-Baghdadi to attempt the formation of a chapter of HT in Indonesia. Changes in the government’s attitude towards Islam that occurred during the ‘*keterbukaan*’ period provided HTI with the POS to embark on expanding its membership while still remaining an underground group.¹² A non-institutional constraint in the form of inter-organizational conflict with JT also resulted in the shift in its membership recruitment. Prior to the fall of Suharto and in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the New Order regime, HTI’s decision to remain underground

⁹ David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," *Annual Review of Sociology* 30(2004), p. 131.

¹⁰ Holly J McCammon (et al), "How Movements Win," pp. 49-70.

¹¹ Nella Van Dyke, "Crossing Movement Boundaries: Factors That Facilitate Coalition Protest by American College Students 1930-1990," *Social Problem* 50(2003), p. 226-250

¹² The *keterbukaan* period is described as the period of more political openness. Scholars differ on the exact point this started but some have cited 1989 as the year this had occurred. It marked the power struggle between Suharto and the military led by General Murdani, which saw Suharto working more closely with Islamic groups to repel the military challenge.

was based on the misperception that the institutional changes taking place in the state were insignificant. It was only after 2000, nearly two years after the fall of the regime, that HTI took advantage of its institutional POS to expand its membership and emerged publicly to declare its goals and launch collective action.

Every Seed You Plant in Indonesia Grows: Forming a HT Chapter Under the New Order Regime¹³

The decision by Al-Baghdadi to start a chapter of HT in 1982 might seem strange given the high level of repression and closed political system that existed in Indonesia. A cursory examination of the political developments during this period might suggest that there were few institutional POS and many more constraints applying to an internationalist Islamic movement with a transnational objective. The Indonesian New Order regime was at the height of its power. There were no signs of elite fracture within the power hierarchy and the regime scored a massive electoral victory in the 1982 elections when *Golkar*, the state-sponsored party, won over 64% of the vote. There was little sign that the state's propensity for repression was reduced.¹⁴ In such a situation, theorists of POS would predict that it is highly unlikely that social movement actors will mobilize.¹⁵

Yet, Al-Baghdadi thought that Indonesia was fertile ground for the establishment of a HT chapter. Several reasons prompted this decision. He felt that the political system allowed enough space for him to plant the seeds for the formation of a HT chapter. While the Indonesian state repressed Islamic groups, the level of repression, to his mind, was less than in the Middle East. Al-Baghdadi's perception of the less repressive nature of the Indonesian government highlights the subjective nature of POS. Other factors also prompted Al-Baghdadi to make efforts to establish a HT chapter in Indonesia. He noted that the euphoria of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 led to many younger Indonesian

¹³ I borrowed the quote from Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo in their important work on the links between Islamist groups in the Middle East and Indonesia. See Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (Sydney: Lowy Institute of International Policy, 2005), p. 65

¹⁴ Ricklefs described this period as the peak of the New Order. See Ricklefs, *History of Indonesia*, pp. 366-386.

¹⁵ Eisinger, "Protests and POS", p. 15.

Muslim activists turning to Islam as a political solution. He attributed this to the fact that unlike in the Arab world where there is a clear racial bias against Iranians and the *Shiite* nature of the Revolution, many Indonesian Muslims viewed the Iranian Revolution as a positive development.¹⁶ Al-Baghdadi also believed that there was a certain level of Islamic consciousness amongst tertiary students who attended the *pengajiaan* conducted by Bin Nuh. From his perspective, these students were eager to learn and thirsty for knowledge. These non-institutional POS prompted Al-Baghdadi to start a chapter of HT in Indonesia.

Resurgence of Islam in the Muslim World

Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht highlighted the fact that movements often identify with, are inspired by and imitate success of other social movements with similar objectives.¹⁷ They argued that the success of a social movement could expand political opportunities to others regardless of national boundaries. The 1979 Iranian Revolution is the primary example of how success in a social movement expanded opportunities for other Islamic groups including those in Indonesia. In Southeast Asia, many Muslim activists began to see the Iranian model of Islamic governance as an example of governance that they could emulate. Writings of Iranian religious thinkers such as Khomeini and Ali Shariati flooded Indonesian Islamic bookstores.¹⁸ The Iranian Revolution was a matter of concern to many Muslim governments around the world, which feared that the Iranian influence would incite their people to bring about similar revolutions in their own countries. Saudi Arabia was one of the countries which was most concerned by the Revolution. Reacting to fears that its *Shiite* population in its eastern provinces might revolt against the government, the Saudis began funding and supporting like-minded groups throughout the Muslim world, including those in Southeast Asia. In this sense, the reaction to the Iranian Revolution was in the diffusion of a counter-idea that led to a further political opportunity for Islamist movements in

¹⁶ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

¹⁷ Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, "The Cross National Diffusion of Movement Ideas," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528, no. 1 (1993), pp. 56-74.

¹⁸ Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 46. and Adam Schwartz, *A Nation in the Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1999), p. 174. Ali Shariati was a prominent Iranian thinker and scholar who was a popular intellectual and opposition figure against the rule of the Shah of Iran. For more about Shariati, see Ali Rahnama, *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariati* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).

Indonesia. In fact, the impact of Saudi funding was wide-ranging. Fealy and Bubalo identified three organizations as having benefited from it. These organizations include the *Indonesian Islamic Predication Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII)*, the *Islamic Association for Enlightenment (Jamiat Islam wal-Irsyad* usually known as simply *al-Irsyad*); and the *Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam, Persis)*.¹⁹ Along with the Saudi funds came the literature written by MB (*Ikhwanul Muslimin, MB*), a key ally of the Saudis in their efforts to counter Iran. Through the network of Muhammad Natsir, often described as the grand old man of Islamism in Indonesia, the ideas of MB became mainstream and were especially influential amongst Muslim students.²⁰ The main group that was influenced by these ideas was JT. The 'success' of the Saudi project of popularizing their *Wahhabi* doctrine in Southeast Asia was largely due to the fact that they were given a free reign to do so. Southeast Asian governments did not see the Saudis as a threat in comparison to the Iranians.²¹ The resurgence of Islam did not impact Indonesia as directly as it did Malaysia.²² Nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution and the counter-ideological efforts undertaken by the Saudi government popularized ideas of political Islam especially amongst younger Muslims who now saw Islam as an important political ideology. It was this reading of the ground sentiments that led to Al-Baghdadi believing that Indonesia was ready for the ideas of HT.

Islamic Student Activism in Indonesian Campuses

Another non-institutional POS present during this period were the active Islamic student movements in Indonesian campuses. The regime restricted student activities with the aim of de-politicising Indonesian campuses.²³ This followed increasing student criticism of

¹⁹ Fealy and Bubalo, *Between the Local and Global*, p. 59. See Asna Husin, "Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of Da'wah. A Study of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia" (Columbia University, 1998) for details of the DDII.

²⁰ *ibid*, p.105. For details on Natsir's life and thinking, see Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam Di Pentas Nasional* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1987).

²¹ Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, p. 49.

²² The Islamic student movement led by Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia was involved in many Saudi organizations such as WAMY and strongly advocated the formation of an Islamic state in Malaysia. For the impact of Saudi activities in Malaysia, see Shanti Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 74.

²³ See Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p 105.

the country's leadership.²⁴ The government, in order to stem the tide, passed the infamous *Normalization of Campus Life Bill*, (NKK/BKK) in April 1978 which limited students' rights of expression, assembly and association. The policy of NKK/BKK effectively ended student involvement in political issues and severed ties between political parties and student groups.²⁵ An unintended consequence of these restrictions was the proliferation of study circles (*halaqah*) and discussion groups (*usrah*). Students who might have joined more established Islamic student groups such as *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (The Islamic Student Association, HMI) and *Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Student Association, PMII) were now more drawn to such informal groups as these groups were less scrutinized by the authorities. This practice was first introduced by MB in Egypt, whereby *halaqahs* were convened in mosques, campuses or even the homes of its members. An informal movement often referred to as the *Dakwah* movement emerged, the activists of which had vast differences amongst groups that collectively made up the movement.²⁶ These included the *Salafis*, Muslim Brothers, *Tablighi Jamaat* (TJ) and even a violent movement such as the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII). The ideology and objectives of these groups often differed. Most students belonging to these networks were not necessarily inclined towards politics. Often many saw Islamic activities organized by the *Dakwah* movement as a means for personal religious growth.

For Al-Baghdadi, the existence of this network by 1982 was an important opportunity for HT. The HT's methodology for reviving the caliphate included the formation of the *halaqah*, a concept many students of the *Dakwah* movement were already familiar with. The nebulous nature of the network also meant that it was easier for Al-Baghdadi to recruit potential members without being conspicuous and falling under the watchful eyes of the Indonesian authority. The Islamic student network is yet another example of the subjective nature of POS. The proliferation of the *Dakwah* movements in Indonesian campuses was read as a POS by Al-Baghdadi who was convinced that in an intra-

²⁴ For instance, the student council at IPB issued the "White Book of the Student's Struggle" in which the student leaders accused Suharto of deviating from the Constitution and *Pancasila*. See David Bouchier and Vedi Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 120-121

²⁵ Harold Crouch, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," in Coral Bell (ed) *Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four Case Studies* (Canberra: the Australian National University, 1986), p. 21

²⁶ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 15 March 2009, Jakarta; Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, 21 October 2007, Jakarta and Interview with Fahri Hamzah, 15 May 2011, Jakarta

Islamism conflict, HTI would emerge victorious due to the strength of its ideology and methodology.

The Influence of Abdullah Bin Nuh

Sidney Tarrow noted that the availability of important allies is one important aspect of a favourable POS.²⁷ Here allies could include elite groups such as government authorities, powerful business interests and the Church. Prominent elite allies could also prove to be important for social movements. The importance of these allies was underscored by the support given to anti-abortion activists by individual members of the Republican Party in the United States. A decision made by these members to withdraw their support for the cause in the 1990s saw the conflict between the government and anti-abortion activists ebbing.²⁸ Likewise, the support that Al-Baghdadi received from Abdullah Bin Nuh was especially important in his decision to form HTI in Indonesia. Bin Nuh was especially popular amongst Muslim tertiary students in Bogor and Jakarta. Bin Nuh had an extensive network of students, many of whom were undergraduates at the IPB. Bin Nuh was convinced that despite the existence of different sects within Islam, Muslims were united in their belief in God and Prophet Muhammad, a theme that he constantly repeated in many of his writings. For instance, Bin Nuh wrote that:

The Kaabah is a symbol of Muslim unity. Regardless of the differences in sects, Muslims are one.²⁹

Bin Nuh focused his energy on trying to bridge differences between different Muslim groups and sects. His acceptance and respect for all Islamic movements meant that he attracted students from various Islamic movements including, the TJ and JT.³⁰ Former JT activists spoke positively of him and many do not seem to think of Bin Nuh as a person associated with HTI. Lies Marcos, a researcher who conducted an extensive interview

²⁷ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 1994.

²⁸ David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity," *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 6 (1996), p. 1643.

²⁹ Abdullah Bin Nuh, *Fi Dhilal al-Ka'abah al-Bait al-Haram*, p.6.

³⁰ Several articles written about Bin Nuh suggested his influence amongst adherents of various groups. For instance see Lies Marcos, "Field Work Notes on Interview with Abdullah Bin Nuh", Unpublished Report, 1988.

with Bin Nuh noted the similarity between Bin Nuh's ideas and that of HT. For instance, she noted the importance Bin Nuh placed on the need for Muslims to revive the caliphate. Bin Nuh's son Mustafa Bin Nuh took a more nuanced approach in describing his father's relationship with HT. Mustafa acknowledged that Bin Nuh was a strong advocate for the revival of the caliphate. Nevertheless, this did not mean that Bin Nuh was exclusively loyal to HT. He cited an example of how Bin Nuh had given refuge to members of the TJ who were sought after by the Indonesian intelligence service.³¹ Nevertheless Mustafa noted that his father was aware of Al-Baghdadi's involvement with HT and agreed to assist Al-Baghdadi in his attempt to start a chapter of HT.

Al-Baghdadi acknowledged that Bin Nuh's patronage was a contributing factor in his decision to start a HT chapter in Indonesia. He believed that Bin Nuh's stature, as a respected religious figure in Bogor would provide him with the credence to recruit potential members for HT. He was also convinced that Bin Nuh's vast network of students could also be potential recruits. Most importantly, Bin Nuh could protect him and potential HT recruits from state persecution. In this regard, Al-Baghdadi could have been naïve to assume that the Indonesian authorities will not act against him due to Bin Nuh's patronage. In SMT terms, Al-Baghdadi read Bin Nuh's patronage as a POS. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, POS is defined subjectively, which means that regardless of whether Bin Nuh's patronage was indeed an opportunity, Al-Baghdadi saw it as such.

Constraints under the New Order Regime

The discussion above highlights the presence of what is perceived as a positive POS that led to the decision of Al-Baghdadi to work towards the establishment of HT in Indonesia. His attempt to form HT was hampered by two key obstacles. These barriers are state's propensity for repression and the limited resources that he possessed to recruit and mobilize activists.

³¹ Interview with Mustafa Bin Nuh, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

Repression Under Suharto

The New Order regime always viewed political Islam with suspicion. The experience of the Darul Islam rebellion hardened attitudes of the Indonesian military towards political Islam. This attitude can be seen in the way the government dealt with Islamist groups that were deemed to be a threat to the regime, such as the DDII. Likewise, the regime accommodated Islamic groups that were viewed as being useful in enhancing the regime's status, such as Muhammadiyah.³² Similarly, social movements will often innovate in their dealing with the government.³³ This can be seen from the examples of different Islamic groups, such as the NII, that either chose to go underground or created new platforms to continue with their activities. In the case of HT in Indonesia, Al-Baghdadi maintained a high level of secrecy in his attempt to recruit the first group of HT activists.

Al-Baghdadi had started teaching subjects such as Arabic and *tafsir* (exegesis of the Qur'an). These classes were taught in the *Pesantren Al-Ghifari* and it was through these classes that Al-Baghdadi began establishing close relations with some of his students. He had begun preaching some ideas of HT to these students, many of whom were undergraduates at the IPB. Nevertheless, these students were not aware that Al-Baghdadi was a member of HT or that his teachings stem from HT's concepts. It was not until the mid-1980s that a selected group of trusted students such as Saifuddin Asip and Muhammad Al-Khaththath were told about HT. It was also virtually impossible for HTI to recruit members from outside the student communities. For Al-Baghdadi, it was about ensuring that the authorities will not dismantle the group that he was seeking to establish. This was his way of overcoming the constraint of state repression.

The Problem of Resources for HTI

The importance of resources in social movements has been discussed at great length. Kitschelt argued that the ability of social movements to procure resources is often

³² Martin van Bruinessen, "Indonesia's Ulama and Politics: Caught between Legitimizing the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives," *Prisma, The Indonesian Indicator* 49(1990), pp. 52-69

³³ These characteristics were used by Della Porta in analyzing protest policing in Italy and Germany. See Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

determined by political institutions in the state. For instance, the greater the control of economic resources through political institutions, the more limited is the resources available with which to challenge policies.³⁴ In the case of HT in Indonesia, material resources were a major difficulty in its attempt to recruit members. Funding was needed to publish books and other printed materials so that members could learn about HT's ideas. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Al-Baghdadi did not receive support from the central leadership of HT to start a chapter in Indonesia. In 1983, while Al-Baghdadi was back in Australia, he relayed his intention to start a party chapter in Indonesia to the HT leadership. While the leadership did not reject his plan outright, they were also not supportive of his idea. The Arab-centric thinking of HT leaders meant that the leadership believed that resources of the party should only be allocated to the party's activities in the Middle East. Donations from the party's chapters in Western countries were used for the party's branches in the Middle East. The effect of the investment put in Middle Eastern countries is discernable from the number of coup attempts made by HT in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Tunisia after 1979. HT's leaders were not willing to divert resources to what were considered as peripheral areas within the Muslim world such as Indonesia.³⁵

The lack of financial resources was the least of Al-Baghdadi's concern. Most of Al-Baghdadi's students were also not fluent in Arabic. Virtually all books written by HT leaders were written in Arabic making it impossible for them to understand the ideas of HT. Al-Baghdadi's poor grasp of Bahasa Indonesia made him dependent on several translators, some of whom were not even members of HT, such as Mustafa Bin Nuh, to assist him during *halaqah*.

The decision by Al-Baghdadi to form a chapter of HT in Indonesia was prompted by what he perceived as opportunities. The POS included the impact of the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia, the vibrant Islamic student activism and the patronage of Abdullah Bin Nuh. This allowed Al-Baghdadi to recruit enough members to form an informal chapter of HT in Indonesia. Nevertheless, there were several negative POS that hampered the growth of this initial group. They included the state's propensity for violence and the lack of access to material and human resources that the group

³⁴ Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest", p. 64.

³⁵ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 15 February 2010, Jakarta.

encountered. As a result of this, recruitment of members was limited to students in IPB. However, several political developments were to change this state of affairs.

HTI and Suharto's Overtures Towards Islam

The late 1980s saw the leadership shifting its attitude towards Islam. The government became more tolerant of some Islamic groups, even co-opting some of them to be part of the government.³⁶ Several factors prompted this change.³⁷ Islamic resurgence in the 1970s saw more Muslims becoming more pious in their beliefs. Even in Java where local customs have historically taken precedence over Islam, Javanese were beginning to accept many rituals and practices of Islam.³⁸ As Liddle noted, the gaps between modernist and traditionalist Muslims were beginning to narrow by the 1980s.³⁹ The regime could thus no longer ignore the increasing importance that Islam was beginning to play in the lives of many Indonesians. The regime's response to this change was to pre-empt any discontent that could erupt by undertaking reforms. Kurt Schock had argued that due to the centralized nature of non-democratic regimes, there is little institutional access that the populace could rely on since the legislature, executive and judicial arms of the state are controlled by the regime.⁴⁰ The only possibility for institutional access is if the regime chooses to open up access to gain political legitimacy. The Indonesian government response to increased religiosity was thus to open institutional access to groups that could potentially challenge the state.

A second factor and perhaps a more important reason was the growing tension between Suharto and the army. One of the pillars of the New Order regime was ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, The Republic of Indonesia's Armed Forces). ABRI's

³⁶ The New Order attempt to co-opt was not always successful and met with some passive resistance. See Greg Barton, *Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President – a View from the Inside* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 10-15.

³⁷ For a detailed analysis of these factors, see Martin Van Bruinessen, "Islamic state or State of Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia in Ingrid Wessel (ed) *Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996), pp. 19-34

³⁸ Robert Hefner, *Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

³⁹ William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," *Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 3 (1996), p. 623.

⁴⁰ Kurt Schock, "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma" *Social Problems* 46, no. 3 (1999), p. 357.

chief, Benny Murdani was a Suharto's loyalist and had won the trust of the President for years. In spite of this, by 1988, cracks began to develop between Suharto and Murdani. Murdani's criticism of the excesses of Suharto's children and the need for a plan for leadership succession were seen as acts of defiance against Suharto.⁴¹ This subsequently led to the sacking of Murdani in 1988. Here fractures within the elite configuration forced the regime to construct a new elite structure.⁴² As a way of countering the loss of support from elements of ABRI, Suharto started cultivating Islamic groups. One such group that he encouraged was ICMI led by B.J. Habibie.⁴³ Suharto's project to replace the TNI with ICMI was largely successful. Muslim intellectuals and leaders whom Hefner described as 'regimist Muslims' became partners of the state.⁴⁴

An objectivist approach to POS would reveal that several opportunities emerged in the change of Suharto's attitude towards Islam. These POSs were tensions within the elite alignment and partial opening of the political system. Yet, a closer examination of both POS will reveal that they had little or no impact on HTI. Suharto's main purpose for providing access to some Islamic groups does not stem from a desire to see a more important role for Islam in politics but rather to buttress the position of the government. The main benefactor for this change in policy was ICMI, which the leadership saw as a useful ally. For many other Islamic groups that sought to enhance the political role of Islam, the move did not significantly alter their position.

A perceived institutional POS that emerged from this episode was the assumption that the state's propensity for repressing Islamic groups was decreasing gradually. This was at least the reading of Al-Baghdadi. The perception was based on the authority's increasing tolerance, and in some cases support, for non-political Islam. This could be seen in the leadership's willingness to support Muslims in their effort to increase

⁴¹ Suharto's children were involved in various business projects, many of which had links to the government. For details of this, see Robert Edward Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 248-250.

⁴² Fractures between the Filipino military and the regime of Ferdinand Marcos were an important contributing factor that led the latter's ouster in 1983 showing the importance of elite alignment. David Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

⁴³ The role of ICMI in the political development of Indonesia is a subject of much academic interest and debate. Some of these studies include; Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 128-166 and Adam Schwarz, *Indonesia: A Nation in the Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994)

⁴⁴ This term was coined by the eminent scholar on Indonesia, Robert Hefner. See Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 19.

personal piety by way of building mosques and enhancing Islamic education. Al-Baghdadi felt that this was a change from the regime's previous stance that seemed to be "allergic to anything Islamic".⁴⁵ Ismail Yusanto noted that as long as the group could masquerade their activities in the form of enhancing knowledge on aspects of ritualistic Islam, the government would have little issue with this.⁴⁶ In response to this perceived POS, Al-Baghdadi decided to spearhead his mission by infiltrating dominant Islamic student networks thereby recruiting students from many universities. In addition, Al-Baghdadi also encouraged the formation of new front organizations to recruit members beyond the student populace.

Enhancing Recruitment in Indonesian Campuses

In a study of the landless movement in Brazil, Gabriel Ondetti contended that groups would utilize decreasing state repression to enhance recruitment for the movement.⁴⁷ He further argued that the space created by the reduction of repression would allow movements to recruit beyond its traditional constituents. The perceived reduction in repression saw Al-Baghdadi and his students enhancing their efforts to recruit members. Several of these individuals, such as Al-Khaththath, were already active members of the LDK even before they were introduced to the ideas of HT. In this regard, the process of recruitment within the IPB campus was not difficult. Nevertheless, the recruitment continued to be done in a secretive fashion. HTI members such as Yusanto and Al-Khaththath were convinced that the Indonesian government intelligence was not aware of the existence of the HT network, since no member of the group was ever detained or imprisoned. Nonetheless, this cannot be verified. There is a possibility that even if the authorities were aware of its existence, the group was too small and insignificant, compared to the larger opposition groups, to pose any threat.

In 1986, a non-institutional POS arose when the FSLDK was formed. The organization provided the platform for student leaders from different Indonesian campuses to share

⁴⁵ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

⁴⁶ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 12 August 2009, Jakarta.

⁴⁷ Gabriel Ondetti, "Repression, Opportunity, and Protest: Explaining the Takeoff of Brazil's Landless Movement" *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 2 (2006), pp. 62-64.

ideas on how to uplift Islamic consciousness in the campuses.⁴⁸ With the exception of IPB, JT activists dominated the rest of the LDKs in other institutions. Al-Khaththath was tasked with a mission to recruit student activists from other institutions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Ismail Yusanto was a prominent leader of the *Jemaah Sholohuddin* in Surabaya and was considered a highly able and charismatic student activist. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the third meeting of the FSLDK in 1989 held at the Sebelas Maret University in Solo saw HTI dominating the FSLDK. This was done through the adoption of An-Nabhani's ideas in the *khittah* and *mafahim* of LDK.⁴⁹ JT activists were not aware of Yusanto's switch to HTI and had appointed Yusanto as their representative in the drafting committee. JT activists felt betrayed by Yusanto's switch to HT and were indignant about the fact that Yusanto was in fact representing HT's interest. This meant that JT was not represented in the drafting committee, which was overwhelmingly dominated by HT activists.

Sidney Tarrow argues that competition between protest organizations drives the diffusion of disruptive tactics as groups seek to outbid each other.⁵⁰ This would act as a negative POS (constraint) for movements in achieving their objectives. This observation is apt in describing the conflict between HTI and JT in the FSLDK. JT activists started a negative campaign against HT, which included disseminating articles and books that were critical of HT. The conflict between JT and HT acted as constraints for both groups in their aim of pursuing their objectives. In 1991, several leaders of JT approached Muhammad Natsir to assist in resolving the HTI-JT dispute. The choice of Natsir is interesting. Despite his perceived ideological affiliation to MB, he was seen to be a father figure of Islamist movements and was respected by both HTI and JT activists. In the meeting, which was held in Bogor, a debate ensued between Abu Ridho and Al-Khaththath. Natsir who presided over the discussion could not resolve the conflict.⁵¹ Following this meeting, Al-Baghdadi himself refuted the accusations hurled against HTI in a book published in 1991. In between 1991 and 1993, HT activists continued to dominate the

⁴⁸ Ismail Yusanto, "LDK: Antara Visi, Misi dan Realitas Sejarah Perkembangannya" Accessed from http://www.fsldk.20m.com/sejarah/sejarah_visi_misi.htm on 20 February 2011.

⁴⁹ Lembaga *Da'awah* Kampus, *Mafahim Dakwah Islam* (Bandung: LDK, 1991), pp. 113-123.

⁵⁰ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁵¹ Interview with Al-Khaththath, 15 Feb 2010, Jakarta. Former JT leaders such as Fahri Hamzah and Zulkifli Mansyah could not recall this meeting but noted that it is possible that such a meeting did take place as there were several meetings held between HTI and JT activists.

network of FSLDK, enabling the party to expand its network to all the major campuses in Indonesia.⁵² This control was further consolidated in 1993 when the constitution of HT was adopted by FSLDK.

The animosity between JT and HT activists reached its peak by 1993. HT activists recalled that JT members would not even pray behind HT activists in congregation prayers.⁵³ This negative atmosphere created by this ongoing conflict prompted Al-Baghdadi to instruct HT activists to leave both the FSLDK and LDK from the universities. Al-Baghdadi's decision was based on the fear that the conflict between JT and HT activists would escalate to the level of clashes between HT and MB in Jordan in the 1960s. In what ensued, MB and HT members in Jordan, reported against each other to the Jordanian intelligence. In similar vein, he was worried that some JT activists might start reporting against HT activists to the Indonesian intelligence services, which could lead to a clampdown on the party. This was also about the time that an official branch of HT was set up in Indonesia after a visit by a representative of the *Amir* to Indonesia. The *Amir*'s representative, Abu Zohra, also disapproved of HT activists getting embroiled to their detriment in FSLDK or LDK.⁵⁴

In direct opposition to the stand taken by Al-Baghdadi and the central leadership of HT, many HT activists in Indonesia felt that the party could have utilized their control of the FSLDK to marginalize JT activists. HTI leaders such as Rahmat Kurnia believe that HT could have consolidated its position as the most important Islamic student group in Indonesia had they remained in FSLDK.⁵⁵ Hafidz Abdurrahman felt that Al-Baghdadi was not cognizant of the Indonesian political context and his judgment was still clouded by the events of the political dynamics in the Middle East. This led to some of the HTI activists, such as Adian Husaini, leaving the party. There was little indication that JT activists would have reported on HT activists, given that JT itself was an underground movement. Hence the criticisms leveled against Al-Baghdadi were reasonable, as he had missed an important political opportunity to elevate the position of HT in Indonesia.

⁵² Rifki Rosyad, "A Quest for True Islam", p. 58.

⁵³ Interview with Rahmat Kurnia, 20 October 2010, Jakarta.

⁵⁴ *ibid*

⁵⁵ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 15 March 2009 and Hadifz Abdurrahman, 6 March 2010, Jakarta.

HTI's exit from the FSLDK and LDK networks became a political opportunity for JT, which consolidated their position as the most important Islamic student group. They were thus in a better position to join the protest movement against the government in 1997. With the benefit of hindsight, it does seem that Al-Baghdadi missed an important POS to consolidate HTI's position at the student level. HTI's response of enhancing recruitment in response to the perceived easing of political repression against Islamic groups was thus outweighed by the negative POS in the form of the JT challenge. It just goes on to show that Abu Zohra was just not cognizant of the political situation in Indonesia.

Targeting Young Muslim Professionals

Another way that Al-Baghdadi responded to the perceived easing of political repression was by starting to recruit activists beyond the universities. Al-Baghdadi himself joined LPBA as a lecturer in Arabic in 1988. The choice of LPBA is interesting given the strong links between LPBA and the Saudi government, whose *Wahhabi* ideology HT strongly opposed. It was likely that Al-Baghdadi was recruited mainly for his proficiency in Arabic. Moreover, the LPBA did not know of his connections with HT, given that his identity as HT's leader in Indonesia was kept a tight secret. He was removed from his position in 1993 after the LPBA's administration discovered his links with HT following the recruitment of several students from LPBA.⁵⁶ He also taught at the Ibnu Khaldun University together with Ismail Yusanto. These moves were geared towards attempts by the party to recruit students beyond the networks of the FSLDK and LDK.

HT activists created another platform to begin recruiting young Muslim professionals. As highlighted in Chapter 3, these activists established KSISC in 1994 as an attempt to recruit young Muslim professionals into the group. The fact that HTI could use an office within the Standard Chartered building to conduct discussions, without drawing attention from the Indonesian intelligence, showed the easing of restrictions on religious activities. As stated in the last chapter, to assist in its activities, the party also established the BWAS, which acted as an Islamic foundation that provided Islamic publications as well

⁵⁶ Interview with Al-Khaththath, 18 March 2008, Jakarta

as preachers to mosques for the purposes of conducting classes, talks and seminars.⁵⁷ By 1997, Suharto's government was beginning to show signs of weakness, in the midst of growing discontent against the regime, over the state of the economy following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

Transitioning Towards Democracy: HTI and the Demise of the New Order

On 21st May 1998, Suharto resigned after months of unrest that followed the near complete economic collapse that Indonesia experienced as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Prior to its downfall, the regime was already showing signs that it had been greatly weakened. In the midst of the financial crisis, Amien Rais, the leader of the ICMI's expert council, had spoken openly against Suharto and had even indicated his intention to run for the presidency. Student demonstrations throughout the country called for Suharto's resignation. Following the 13-14 May riots targeted at the Indonesian Chinese, Suharto finally resigned, prompted by the military and the defection of his key supporters.

In analyzing Indonesia's transition to democracy, several POS could be observed. The first POS was the presence of other social movements to challenge the social control imposed by the state. In particular, a new Muslim student association, the *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* (The Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union, KAMMI), formed in 1998, played an important role during this period. The main force behind KAMMI was JT and the FSLDK. The idea for the formation of KAMMI was first proposed in 1997 at the tenth FSLDK meeting in Malang. Although, FSLDK issued a statement stating that KAMMI was not its constituent body, it was clear that the movement members were from JT and FSLDK.⁵⁸ Fahri Hamzah a well-known JT activist was the first chairman of KAMMI.⁵⁹ The second POS was the presence of allies in the form of powerful individuals like Amien Rais to support the challenge against the state. Amien Rais was part of ICMI, which was a partner of the regime. As such, his open challenge to the regime was significant.

⁵⁷ *ibid.* Also see *Buletin As-Salam*, BWAS, No. 69.

⁵⁸ Mahfudz Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktifis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi* (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2003), p. 104-5.

⁵⁹ Others in the leadership of KAMMI were also active in JT. Interview with Fahri Hamzah, 15 May 2011.

A major constraint that still existed during this period was the state's propensity for repression and violence. In the midst of its weakening power base, elements within the country's leadership started a violent crackdown on the opposition forces. Forces linked to General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law, were apparently responsible for the killings of four students at the *Universitas Trisakti* who were marching and urging the government to step down.⁶⁰ Prabowo also purportedly worked with the *Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam* (The Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Muslim world, KISDI) to spread anti-Zionist and anti-Christian sentiments by claiming that these elements sought to undermine the Indonesian state. As a result, riots broke out, leading to more than a thousand dead on the 13 and 14 of May 1998. Noticeably, there was an alleged government hand in the riots, indicating clearly the government's propensity for repression. The demise of the regime, and the succession of B.J Habibie as the new president of Indonesia, saw a considerable reduction in the violence. A new political system, which was more open, was emerging.

Missed Opportunity or Calculated Political Move: HTI and the Collapse of the New Order Regime

In a pioneering study of the effect of missed opportunities on women's rights groups in America, Sawyers and Meyer argued that the failure of women's groups to exploit POS led to the marginalization, co-optation and de-politicisation of actors within these groups.⁶¹ HTI's response to the weakening of the New Order regime has been a subject of debate within the party with some arguing that HTI's decision to stay on the sidelines of the protest movement led to the party's marginalization. HTI leaders were already discussing the strategies the party should undertake in responding to Suharto's weakening grip on power. A decision was made for some HTI leaders to meet Indonesian military leaders in 1998 to gain better insights into the political dynamics. A HTI delegation, led by Al-Khaththath, met General Wiranto, the then commander in

⁶⁰ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 224.

⁶¹ Here co-option means that actors or the social movement itself choose to be part of the system by forming political parties to contest in elections while de-politicisation means that members leave the movement as they believe their goals have been achieved. Traci M. Sawyers and David S. Meyer, "Missed Opportunities: Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy," *Social Problems* 46, no. 2 (1999), p. 193.

chief of ABRI, through the auspices of Adyaksa Dault, who was a former LDK activist.⁶² Another military leader that HTI met was Tyasno Sudarto, the then army chief.

In the aftermath of the meetings, HTI leaders debated their next course of action. While some such as Saifuddin Asip, the then chairman of HTI felt that they should emerge publicly and join the demonstrations to call on Suharto to step down, Al-Baghdadi remained adamant that HTI should remain underground as he was convinced the government will survive. Al-Baghdadi's political calculations were based on his experience in the Middle East. The examples of the Hama rebellion in Syria and various attempts to overthrow the Jordanian government, which failed governed his decision. He felt that the Suharto government could very well survive the protests and demonstrations since, to his mind, they were much smaller than the uprisings in the Middle East. He observed that HT in Syria and Jordan were virtually obliterated as a result of these miscalculations and conveyed this to the HTI leaders.⁶³ More importantly, he noted that the regimes propensity for violent actions have yet to decrease with elements of the military continuing to repress opposition to the regime. He felt that it is politically expedient for the party to remain underground and assess the political situation before embarking on any action. While many of the HTI leaders felt sceptical of Al-Baghdadi's decision, they accepted it.

A second debate ensued following Suharto's actual downfall. Al-Baghdadi was apparently surprised by this development. HTI leaders welcomed Suharto's resignation and viewed the development as an important opportunity for the party. However, there were at least two schools of thought within HTI over the next course of action. Most HTI leaders were keen to launch HTI publicly. Al-Baghdadi was still hesitant, but his fears and worries were assuaged by the other HTI leaders who convinced him that the advantages of launching HTI publicly far outweighed the risk of the party being banned and members persecuted.

⁶² Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 15 October 2009, Bogor. Adyaksa Dault was Wiranto's nephew and was to become a leader of the PKS. It is highly probable that Adyaksa did join HTI *halaqah* while he was a student at the University of Indonesia.

⁶³ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

The decision made by HTI's leadership was overturned by the central leadership of HT. The *Amir* of HT rejected the decision made by HTI leaders to emerge publicly. Several reasons could have led to this decision.⁶⁴ Firstly, HT leadership continued at this point to be focused on the Middle East and might not have seen the need for funds to be diverted to *da'awah* efforts in Indonesia, a country they viewed as being on the periphery of the Muslim world. Secondly, the central leadership of HT failed to understand the political situation in Indonesia. The *Amir* had once again extrapolated from his experiences of the Middle East where the overthrow of a dictatorship often led to the ascent of a more brutal regime.⁶⁵ Al-Khaththath felt that the *Amir*'s decision resulted in a missed opportunity for HTI. In his view, HTI could have defined the Islamist agenda if the party had emerged immediately after the fall of the regime.⁶⁶

In analysing HTI's response to the weakening of the government and its subsequent collapse, it is useful to once again draw on Sawyer and Meyer's work. A missed opportunity would result in marginalisation, co-option of members and/or depoliticisation of members. While members of HTI were unhappy with the decisions made by Al-Baghdadi and later the HT leadership, there was no exodus of members from the party, which meant that members were neither co-opted nor depoliticised. Nonetheless, there was a perception among some members that the party's failure to act, led to it being marginalized. These members felt that HTI did not contest the political vacuum filled by JT activists, thereby allowing JT to be the sole voice of Islamist opposition to the regime.

In contrast to the critical views of his HTI activists, the decision made by Al-Baghdadi to remain underground prior to Suharto's resignation could well have been a calculated political decision rather than a missed opportunity. While the regime was showing signs of weakness, its propensity for repression did not decrease significantly. The *Trisakti* killings were a clear manifestation of this. There was a likelihood of Indonesian authorities clamping down on HTI given the fact that it was part of a transnational party

⁶⁴ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 12 October 2009, Jakarta.

⁶⁵ These examples include the overthrow of the Libyan king in 1969 which saw the rise of Muammar Gaddafi who ruthlessly prosecuted all opposition to his regime. Similar examples can be seen in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Interview with Al-Khaththath, 20 July 2010, Jakarta.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

that sought a change of government through a revolution. This is so because very often the foreign agenda of political groups had been used as an excuse by the Indonesian authorities to persecute oppositional political groups.⁶⁷ At the same time, HTI's goal of reviving the caliphate would have found little resonance with the Indonesian centric goals of other oppositional forces. Inevitably, HTI's involvement in the protest movement would have caused increased factions in the fray. Last but not least, many of the important figures such as Amien Rais would not have supported HTI's position. In this regard, HTI's public emergence and mobilization during this period would only have led to the party being marginalized and its members being persecuted.

The downfall of Suharto in May 1998 did remove an important obstacle or negative POS for HTI. While it is expected that HTI leaders would spend several months observing Indonesia's transition to democracy, the time taken for HTI to emerge and mobilize publicly was thought to be excessively long by some HTI activists. These activists believed that HTI could have defined the Islamist agenda if it emerged publicly earlier. Once again, this could in fact be a misreading on their part. It is true that the expanded public sphere allowed a myriad of different Islamist political parties and movements to emerge.

The 1999 elections saw parties with Islamist agendas becoming legalized for the first time since 1950.⁶⁸ These parties included the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*, PK) and the PBB. In addition to Islamic parties, several Islamist movements also emerged around this time. One such group was the *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender's Front, FPI). The FPI, led by Habib Shihab, a prominent member of the *habaib* (Islamic religious scholars of Arab descent) community, carried out raids against bars, discos and brothels in attempt to uplift 'Islamic morality' in the public domain.⁶⁹ These parties and movements advocated the implementation of Islamic laws. Nevertheless, HTI's agenda was quite

⁶⁷ An example of this is the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party).

⁶⁸ See Azyumardi Azra, *Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context* (Jakarta: Solastice Publications, 2006), pp. 27-37 for details on Islam and politics following the collapse of the New Order regime.

⁶⁹ Irfan S. Awwas, *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin dan Penegakan Syari'ah Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001). Also see <http://majelismujahidin.wordpress.com/2008/01/31/profil-majelis-mujahidin/#more-4> Accessed on 13 February 2011.

different from that of these movements. HTI was perhaps the first Islamist movement that emerged post-New Order, which sought to challenge NKRI with a caliphate.

The decision to delay launching HTI publicly also allowed the party to gauge the response of the new authorities and the larger Indonesian Muslim populace towards some of its ideas. In July 1999, HTI organized a public forum on *Nationalism and the Revival of the Islamic Community*.⁷⁰ At this forum, HTI speakers condemned the concept of nationalism and promoted the idea that NKRI should be replaced with a caliphate.⁷¹ The event was organized by BIAS. HTI also started distributing copies of the *Al-Islam* journal weekly during Friday prayers at mosques throughout Jakarta and the surrounding areas. Themes about the revival of the caliphate were discussed in the articles featured in the bulletin, which bears the name of KSICC. Once the party was sufficiently convinced that the political system had become truly open, HTI leaders made another appeal for HTI to be officially launched to the *Amir*. The *Amir* sent an envoy to assess the political situation in Indonesia. Permission for public emergence of HTI was finally granted in early 2000. The weakening of the Indonesian government and its subsequent downfall showed that the presence of POS alone might not facilitate the public emergence of the movement. Constraints on the movement and the availability of resources could impact the final decision of the movement. The next section of the chapter will discuss how HTI utilised the opening of the political system to expand its membership and mobilize members towards collective action against the state.

Launching the Struggle for a Caliphate: HTI between 2000-2009

On 28th May 2000, HTI transformed itself from an underground movement to an official political party when it convened a conference at the Senayan Tennis Stadium in Jakarta. The conference was attended by about two thousand of its members and supporters. It also marked a new phase in HTI's engagement with the Indonesian public. Conventional understanding of POS argues that an open political system is likely to herald greater political space for social movements to launch collective actions, recruit, mobilize and consolidate their position within the state. The party's leadership has utilized the more open political system to do exactly this.

⁷⁰ Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", p. 143.

⁷¹ Interview with Farid Wajidi, 10 June 2009, Jakarta.

A scan of the activities of HTI between 2000 and 2009 revealed an increase in the number of collective actions undertaken by HTI. Collective action is understood as demonstrations, the issuance of official statements, marches, conferences, as well as visits to government offices. A scrutiny of newspaper reports on HTI also reveals a substantial increase in the number of demonstrations between 2004 and 2009.⁷² During this period, Ismail Yusanto being the spokesman of the party issued sixty-two press statements (an average of one press statement per month) addressing issues impacting Indonesia and the Muslim world.⁷³ The collective actions are aimed at achieving several goals. Firstly the party's leadership wanted to gain recognition for HTI as well as its objectives in the minds of the Indonesian public. Ismail Yusanto complained that few Indonesians knew about the party when it first emerged in 2000. However, due the large number of collective actions that the party held, more Indonesians are now aware of HTI and its objective of reviving the caliphate. Secondly, HTI sought to establish the party as the most prominent radical Islamist group in Indonesia. While it is difficult to ascertain whether it has succeeded in doing so, HTI's views on issues are often cited by local and international media to be representative of radical Islam.⁷⁴

Meyer and Staggenborg proffered that political openness would also enhance the prospects for mobilization.⁷⁵ This is true in the case of HTI. The open political system allowed the party to expand its resources and mobilization capabilities. This included the establishment of publishing houses to churn out books, pamphlets and newspapers and the production of audio-visual material aimed at espousing its ideas. The party is now able to devise strategies targeting different segments of the Indonesian Muslim populace for recruitment. The open political system in Indonesia also allows the party to organize international HT events in Jakarta. HTI's resource mobilization strategies will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

⁷² See News Reports from *Republika*, *Tempo* and *Jakarta Post*. *Republika* tend to carry more news about HTI than other newspapers.

⁷³ HTI Press Releases Between 2004-2009 courtesy of Ismail Yusanto.

⁷⁴ The Indonesian English daily, *Jakarta Post* would often cite HTI leaders whenever the newspaper requires a conservative take on issues.

⁷⁵ Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity.", p. 1634.

The most important impact of the open political system was the ability of the HTI to now embark on building social capital in Indonesia. Prior to the fall of the regime, HTI was an underground movement and thus could not build relationships with individuals and organizations that were deemed to be politically and socially influential. Nonetheless, the open political system has made this possible. HTI began establishing relations with military figures, politicians and religious leaders. HTI leaders such as Al-Khatthath and Yusanto were even invited to sit on the board of the MUI. This is by no means an easy feat given HTI's reputation as an extremist organization. HTI played an important role in forming an important umbrella organization comprising 40 Muslim organizations, the FUI in 2005

Why is HTI not Moderating its Demands?

Theorists of the POS strand within SMT have demonstrated that an open political system often leads to social movements moderating their stance and working within the system to achieve their goals. Often in the process, the demands of these movements will be moderated. On the other hand, a closed political system tends to produce underground movements that are confrontational, seeking to undermine the state and might even resort to violence. In his analysis of violence in Pakistan, Hafez argued that the *jihad* culture in Pakistan which prevailed under the Zia-ul-Haq's regime led to the proliferation and strengthening of violent Islamist movements despite the opening up of the political system and the inclusion of Islamists within the government.⁷⁶ Arguably, this *jihad* culture is not prevalent in Indonesia. While some elements within the military have supported Islamist groups in the past, there is little evidence to suggest that there is an official support of extremist elements within Indonesia. Yet HTI has time and again chosen to work outside the system and refused to participate in the electoral system.⁷⁷ While HTI has remained avowedly non-violent in its approach, the extent to which HTI has evolved itself within the system is to simply recruit members, convincing elites about the need to revive the caliphate and creating avenues for itself to subsequently overthrow

⁷⁶ Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel*, pp. 60-61

⁷⁷ HTI leaders have indicated the possibility of contesting elections at several juncture. Nevertheless it seems that these statements were more rhetorical since the party has yet to make any serious attempts to register itself as a political part. See "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Demokrasi No, Pemilu?" *Sabili*, No 5 (20 September 2007), pp. 17-21 and "Hizbut Tahrir Masuk Parlemen, Mengapa Tidak," *Suara Hidayatullah* (April 2005), pp. 39-45

the government. There are perhaps two factors that best explain the reasons for HTI's refusal to work within the system. Firstly, as a transnational party controlled by a leadership in the Middle East, its leaders there makes the final decisions. It is highly unlikely that the party's leadership will tolerate any attempt by any of its chapters to work within the system. More importantly, at the ideological level, HTI represents a form of Islamism, which is puritan and uncompromising. This means that its focus lies mainly in ensuring that the caliphate is revived and do not see any other outcome as a success. The importance of ideology will be further explored in Chapter 6.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to understand the external factors that impacted the emergence and growth of HTI as well as the decision making process within HTI. It argued that both institutional and non-institutional POS are equally important in determining decisions made by HT leaders. It is further argued that these factors were crucial in determining Al-Baghdadi's decision to form a chapter of HT in Indonesia, his recruitment and mobilization strategies as well as the timing for the party to emerge publicly. The chapter began by examining both the objectivist and subjectivist approaches to POS. It is argued that the subjectivist approach is more accurate in determining a POS. It was further explained that institutional factors alone cannot explain decisions taken by Al-Baghdadi and HTI leaders. Non-institutional factors are equally important in doing so. During its formative years, Al-Baghdadi was not deterred from forming a chapter of HT despite the presence of negative POS, such as a closed political system, and the high level of state repression. Non-institutional POS such as the worldwide resurgence of Islam, Islamic student activism and institutional POS such as the patronage of prominent Islamic scholar, Abdullah Bin Nuh encouraged Al-Baghdadi to attempt the formation of a chapter of HT in Indonesia. The chapter then proceeded to examine the changes in the government's attitude towards Islam that occurred during the '*keterbukaan*' period. This decreased state repression and the changing attitude towards Islam provided HTI with opportunities to embark on expanding its membership while still remaining an underground group. A non-institutional constraint in the form of inter-organizational conflict with JT also resulted in the shift in its membership recruitment.

The chapter also discussed whether HTI's delay in its public emergence prior to the fall of Suharto and in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the New Order regime resulted in a missed opportunity for the party to establish itself as a key opponent of the regime and also as an important Islamist group. In conclusion, it was felt that the decision taken by the party was a calculated political decision that salvaged the party from potentially being politically obliterated. In the last section of the chapter, it was shown that the new open political system resulted in the party's ability to launch collective action, embark on new mobilization strategies and build social capital for the party. This section also explained that unlike many other social movements that tend to moderate their position in an open political system HTI did not do so owing to its unswerving foreign leadership and anti-systemic ideology. The next chapter will discuss in details the resource mobilization strategy of HTI.

CHAPTER FIVE: PROCURING RESOURCES FOR THE PARTY

In every country about 100-200 elites control the whole country. These elites comprise the military, political and business elites. You convince these elites about the need to revive the caliphate and the caliphate will be born. The Communist Revolution happened because a small group of Russian elites believed that a communist state is the best option for the country. We are working towards this goal. A large membership is not important. We need members to convince these elites and prepare the masses for the eventual return of the caliphate (Fahmi Amhar, Leader of HTI)

Social movement theorists have assumed that the availability of resources enhances the likelihood of collective action. They see human resources, social-organizational resources and material resources as being significant to the rise of social-movements. In this regard, Fahmi Amhar's claim that HTI was less interested in a large membership might seem surprising to many SMT theorists. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the movement will reveal that HTI has clearly implemented successful resource mobilization strategies, especially in securing manpower and material resources, for the movement. This chapter argues that HTI has effectively built a strong organizational structure, by recruiting members and procuring funds, leading to its growth in Indonesia. However, it has been less successful in building social capital. The development of the argument will closely adhere to the resource-mobilization strand of SMT as its terms of reference.

There are four sections to the chapter. The first section will briefly touch on the theoretical underpinnings of the resource mobilization strand of SMT. The relationship between the organizational structure of social movements and its resource mobilization strategies will be explored. I will discuss how the success of a SMT's resource mobilization strategies can be assessed. The second section of this chapter will also examine the organizational structure of HTI. This section will also examine the different recruitment strategies that HTI employs to attract different segments of Indonesian society. A comparison will be made between the recruitment strategies employed by the party during and after the New Order period. It also explores the mass recruitment strategies such as the usage of publications, mass media, public events and mosques for the furtherance of their goals. It is to be noted that all these mass recruitment strategies

are largely aimed at recruiting sympathizers for the party. Moreover, we will also review the targeted approaches undertaken by the party to recruit potential members through the usage of formal organizations such as *Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* and GEMA. In the third section, we examine HTI's attempts at building social capital. The likelihood of HTI using violence as a mobilization strategy will also be addressed. Finally, the last section assesses the success and limitations of HTI's resource mobilization strategies on the party's growth in Indonesia.

Procuring and Mobilizing Resources in SMT

In her seminal work on Islamist-affiliated charities in Jordan, Egypt and Yemen, Janine Clark noted the importance of these institutions in the growth and development of Islamist movements in these countries.¹ Social institutions are just one of the many resources procured and utilized by Islamist movements to serve as important platforms for recruitment. Such a trend is observable in the development and growth stages of many earlier social movements. In trying to understand these trends, early theorists of SMT developed a variant of the theory, known as resource mobilization theory (RMT). According to RMT, social movements must be able to procure and mobilize key resources as an important factor in their development. RMT further explains that social movements are not likely to emerge successfully and make any headway without important resources. These may take such forms as human resources (members and sympathizers), social organizational resources (formal institutions and informal networks) and material resources (funds). The theory further explains that these resources must be allocated for the explicit purpose of pursuing the group's interests through collective action. Charles Tilly argues that a group is unlikely to be able to contend for power without appropriating mobilized resources to influence other groups towards its objectives.² The evidence from the empirical data in this thesis points to the importance of HTI's organizational structure (social-organizational resource) in its efforts to procure other resources such as members and funds.

¹ Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism*, 2004.

² Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 78

Studies on Islamic social movements have cited the mosque, professionals, student organizations and Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as important organizational resources that such movements utilize to draw potential recruits and mobilize activists.³ Others have noted the importance of using informal networks in not only recruiting new members, but also influencing others outside the movement to assist in its goals. Ziad Muhson in his important study of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt also alluded to the importance of organizational structure in ensuring the long time survival of the Brotherhood.⁴ Recruitment of members is perhaps one of the most important tasks that social movements must undertake, to ensure that there is necessary manpower that they can utilize when needed. David Snow argues that direct contact with an agent of the movement is essential in the process of recruitment.⁵ This is basically an immersion program whereby the potential recruit is systematically introduced to the movement.⁶ Often movements develop a variety of recruitment strategies to target different groups. Garner argues that these strategies usually emanate from the ideology of the movement.⁷ Snow suggests that the recruitment strategy could also be influenced by a movement's organizational structure. He notes that movements with more exclusive structures tend to depend on interpersonal networks while those with a more inclusive structure tend to recruit in public places.⁸ While the organizational structure of a social movement is important, the inclusive and exclusive aspects might not necessarily apply to all social movements. In the case of HTI, the organizational structure could best be described as a group of concentric circles, with the recruitment strategies of the party devised with a clear intent of placing its actors within successive pairs of concentric circles radiating outwards from the centre of the party nucleus.

³ See Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 2002; Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism* and Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson (eds), *The Politics of Islamic Finance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).

⁴ Ziad Muhson, "Islamic Mobilization: Smt and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2001), pp. 487-510.

⁵ L. Zurcher, David Snow and S. Eklund-Olson, "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment," *American Sociological Review* 45, no. 5 (1980), p. 787.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 789.

⁷ R. Ash Garner, *Social Movements in America* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1972); Jo Freeman, "On the Origins of Social Movements," in Jo Freeman's (ed) *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies*, (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 8-30 and John Wilson, *Introduction of Social Movements* (London: Basic Books, 1973).

⁸ Snow, Zurcher and Olson, "Social Networks", p. 796.

Organizing the *Hizbiyyin*

In trying to understand the organizational structure of HTI, it is perhaps useful for current models proposed by SMT theorists to be examined. The two structures most commonly used are those referred to as inclusive and exclusive. Zald and Garner defined an inclusive organization as one with relatively unrestricted membership and requiring minimal level of initial commitment. In contrast, an exclusive organization is one, which requires a higher level of commitment from members who share a set of beliefs and meet a demanding standard of conduct. Often, the exclusive organization's activities permeate every aspect of a member's life.⁹ Members are expected to pay dues, spend their whole life in activities related to the movement and in some cases adopt assumed names. In a study of German terrorism, it was noted that the militants' total dependence on the group, internal assignment of roles and division of labour led to the loss of identity.¹⁰ While aspects of these models are useful in trying to understand HTI, there are several limitations in the two models in studying a movement like HTI. Firstly, its organizational structure has both features of exclusive and inclusive models, and as such, the dichotomy drawn between the two models is not necessarily clear. Secondly, these models do not factor in the role of allies who might actually contribute more to the movement than sympathizers and supporters. This means that its concentric circles model could better explain some of the strategies of HTI.

The concentric circles model comprises three successive layers of radiating rings from the centre. At the first layer are the members of HTI. The second layer are made up of the *daris* (students) of the party, while in the last layer are allies of the party. Members who form the concentric circle are regarded as junior members of HTI. They must first demonstrate knowledge of the party through in-depth study of HT's texts. The process of becoming a member could take anything between two to six years. Potential members are required to take an oath of allegiance (*bai'ah*). Other Islamist movements including

⁹ Donatella Della Porta, "Left Wing Terrorism in Italy" in Martha Crenshaw's (ed) *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 107.

¹⁰ Klaus Wasmund, "The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists," in Peter H Merkl (ed), *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 214.

the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda often adopt this practice.¹¹ *Bai'ah* is an important component of HTI's ideology. Members vow to be loyal to HT's constitution and its leadership. *Bai'ah* also serves an important function of being a binding agent. The practice of *bai'ah* can be traced back to the Prophet himself. It is believed that Prophet Muhammad had received *bai'ah* from the Muslims of Medina after he migrated from Mecca, effectively making him the new leader of Medina. *Bai'ah* is therefore a social contract between the leader of an Islamic group and the people wherein the leader promises to obey Islamic law and the people in exchange for the promise of their allegiance.¹² This practice in essence requires members to hold their allegiance to HT, failing which they will be seen to contravene Islamic laws. It is also seen as a promise to God that a Muslim makes. In spite of this, unlike some Islamist organizations, HTI falls short of declaring ex-members infidels.

Members are often tasked with the role of leading a study cell referred to as a *halaqah* and are usually tested for several months before being given a more important task. In some parts of Indonesia, such as Bali and Aceh, where membership of HTI is small, these members could even sit in HTI's district leadership, known as the *Dewan Pimpinan Daerah* (District Executive Committee, DPD). This structure is extremely hierarchical starting at the lowest level of the DPD followed by the *Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah* (Provincial Executive Committee, DPW), a committee that is in-charge of the movement's activities in each of Indonesia's thirty-three provinces. The DPD is headed by a local chair known as *naqib* and the DPW is led by a *Ma'sul*.¹³ The *naqib* is essentially tasked with the managing a few study circles within the locality while the *Ma'sul* (mayor) manages the different districts operating within the province. In the Indonesian context, a wilayah committee known as the *Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* (Central Executive Committee, DPP) led by a *Mu'tamad* oversees all the activities of HTI. The first such committee was formed under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi in 1993.¹⁴ It was around this time that HTI became part of the global structure of HT. Indonesia became one of the wilayahs (provinces) of HT. The *Ketua Umum* (Chairman) of HTI is Rokhmat

¹¹ Ziad Muhson, "Muslim Brotherhood", p. 50.

¹² Javid Iqbal, "The Concept of State in Islam in Mumtaz Ahmed's (ed) *State, Politics and Islam* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1986), p. 38.

¹³ For more on the leadership structure of HT, see Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, p.116.

¹⁴ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 19 March 2009, Bogor.

S Labib. Although Labib is the official chairman, he might not have been the *Mu'tamad*, the identity of whom is kept a secret. The *Mu'tamad* is expected to take orders from the *Amir* and the central leadership of HT, currently believed to be based in Amman. In the event that the leaders of a particular chapter of HT are arrested, its operations can be managed by the *Mu'tamad* of HT in another chapter. For instance the HT *Mu'tamad* in India is currently managing the affairs of its chapter in Bangladesh, following the arrests of central committee members of HT Bangladesh.

Similar to the chapters of HT in other countries, HTI closely guards the hierarchy of its leadership. While members of the DPP are known, they are careful not to disclose who amongst these members are the *Mu'tamad* and *naqib*. Only members of the DPP will know who the actual *Mu'tamad* is. Seven departments known as *lajnah* (committees) also exist within the DPP, DPW, and DPD. These departments oversee politics, Islamic law, economics, external networking and funds. Two autonomous bodies also exist within the HTI organizational structure, the *Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir* (MHTI, Hizbut Tahrir Women's Wing) and *Gerakan Pembebasan Mahasiswa* (The Undergraduate Emancipation Movement, GEMA).¹⁵ There is a high degree of commitment expected from these members. They provide the necessary manpower and funds for the movement. These members often devote their entire lives to HTI. Members also enjoy certain privileges within the party. As a stakeholder within the party, they have the right to question the *Mu'tamad* and even the *Amir* of HT on decisions that are made within the party. They can also register their concerns about mismanagement within the party chapter to the *Amir* directly.¹⁶

Sympathizers or *daris* of HTI form the second ring of the concentric layer of HTI's organizational structure. These sympathizers often belong to a *halaqah* and are *daris* (student) of the party but not adequately indoctrinated to become full members. They are often grouped together within a study cell referred to as a *halaqah*. Each *halaqah* comprises five to seven HTI activists and sympathizers. The *daris* have to go through a demanding study program if they are to become members. On average, *daris* will take

¹⁵ Interview with Agung Wisnuwardana, Central Committee Member of HTI in charge of Youth Affairs, 24 March 2008, Jakarta

¹⁶ Sources within HTI claims that members can send emails to the *Amir*.

between two to seven years before they eventually become members. It is interesting to note that some *daris* consider themselves as full cadres of the party.¹⁷ The decision to upgrade a *daris* to a full member is made by the *naqib* after receiving feedback from the respective head of the *halaqah*. One prominent leader of HTI noted that about one-third of those who are *daris* continue to be members while the rest remain as *daris* within the party structure.¹⁸ The key difference between the first and second layers of HTI's organizational structure lies in the commitment level expected from the *daris* and members. Unlike members, *daris* do not hold any position within the party's hierarchy. They are also not expected to contribute a portion of their income to the party although they are encouraged to make donations to the party which are not fixed or regular.

The third layer of the concentric circles model of the party refers to the allies of the party. These are people who are members of other Islamic groups, movements and parties but are deemed to share some common goals with HTI. As mentioned in Chapter 3, HTI envisaged a three step process in its aim to revive the caliphate. At the second stage, is a process known as *nusrah* whereby the party is allowed to seek assistance from important elites in the country such as politicians, the military and business community. To this end, HTI leaders and activists devise numerous strategies to build strong social relationships with individuals that are deemed important for its cause. Allies of the party could also be individuals who are not potential *nusrah* partners but who support the idea of reviving the Islamic caliphate. Hafidz Abdurrahman surmised that the percentage of those who will be HTI's sympathizers will be less than 1% of the population and its members are going to be an even smaller number. Notwithstanding this, HTI is working towards its target of ensuring that at least half of the rest of the Indonesian Muslims will support the revival of the caliphate.

¹⁷ This is a common problem not unique to HTI, HT chapters in other parts of the world often have to deal with bad publicity about former members who turn to violence or even denounce HT. Many of these individuals are *daris* rather than full members of HT. Some prominent examples of these *daris* included Ed Husain and Shiraz Maher, both of whom are critical of HT. In the case of Indonesia, several prominent former HTI members included Munarman, the infamous lawyer involved in acts of violence at *Monas* commonly referred to as the *Monas* Tragedy.

¹⁸ Interview with Farid Wajidi, 10 June 2009, Jakarta.

Controlling the Party in Indonesia

HTI's organizational structure provides an important control mechanism for its leadership. Members at different levels know only those whom they report to and several of the key leaders. Some members are not aware of all those who sit in the DPP. Nevertheless, the naqib often maintains a personal relationship with members of the respective *halaqahs* that report to him. Similarly, the *Mu'tamad* in Indonesia is often personally in touch with the ma'sul in each province. A representative from the Amir in Beirut is sent to Indonesia at least four times a year to observe the development of the chapter in Indonesia or whenever a chapter is undergoing a crisis. This representative, one Abu Zohra first started visiting Indonesia in 1993. In 2002, another representative, Abu Mahmud was sent to monitor activities of HTI. In each of these visits, the *Amir's* representative will meet members of the DPP, a few members of the DPW and DPD as well as members of the women and student chapters. Such meetings are held in small groups or even individually (not in the case of women). The purpose of such visits is to ensure that members are well connected with the larger HT leadership and reduce the chance of breakaway factions within HTI. While the structure in place has been largely successful, both Al-Khaththath and Al-Baghdadi have noted that there are severe flaws within the system. In part, the current system ensures that power rests firmly in the hands of the Amir and his central committee with little room for any differences in opinion to emerge. At the same time, the *Mu'tamad* can easily try to sway the *Amir's* representative to meet members who are deemed to be supportive of the country's leadership and as such the central leadership might not be aware of problems within a particular chapter. It is pertinent to note that these different levels of membership within HTI inevitably lead to a diversity of ideas and commitment levels within HTI. At the same time, it allows for those who are interested to study the group to do so in a meticulous way while leaving them out from important decision making positions. As will be demonstrated in the next section, HTI's organizational structure also impacts the party's strategies in procuring other resources such as human and material resources.

Understanding the Recruitment Strategies of HTI

Bert Klandersman proposed that mobilization of human resources within social movements occurred in two stages, by consensus and action mobilization. Consensus mobilization refers to the dissemination of views of the movement. Action mobilization refers to the transformation of those who are likely to be more predisposed to the views of the movement into participants.¹⁹ At the level of consensus mobilization, the focus of the movement is on educating the masses about the ideas of HTI.²⁰ The majority of these masses will not end up being associated with HTI. Consensus mobilization is aimed at creating allies for HTI. Only a small percentage of those that HTI engage within this group will move on to become *daris* or sympathizers thus forming the second layer of concentric circles of HTI and an even smaller group will become members. Few of the core members of HTI tend to be recruited through these strategies. Such strategies could involve the use of publications and the Internet, organizing public events and the usage of mosques. Consensus mobilization also involves the formation of an array of umbrella groups and networks aimed at targeting important allies for the party aimed at building social capital for the party. At the level of active mobilization, HTI targets specific groups that form the bulk of its first concentric circle. The key target groups for active mobilization are professionals and students. Due to the active contributory historical role that students, young professionals and women have played in the party, these groups are often targeted at the level of active mobilization. They are often recruited through the use of affiliated organizations such as student and women's groups, as well as informal networks. Active mobilization may also involve infiltrating an existing organization or network with the aim of recruiting members for HTI. This strategy has proved to be especially important during the New Order period.

¹⁹ Bert Klandersman, "Mobilization and Participation: Social Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory" *American Sociological Review* 49, (1984), pp. 583-584.

²⁰ Donatella Della Porta and Mario Dioni, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publications, 1995), p. 107.

Recruiting Under the New Order Regime: Creating an Organization and Forming the Core Group of HTI Leaders

Within SMT, the formation of an organization is seen to be the most important resource for a movement, because it can be used to secure other resources, such as human and material resources. The architects of a social movement make a variety of strategic choices about the goals, structure and forms of collective actions that the movement will undertake.²¹ Unlike many other social movements in Indonesia, HTI being part of global Islamic party already has a ready template engendering its goals and organizational structure. HTI can only decide on the kind of collective action to be undertaken which is governed by principles of non-violence. Within the organizational template that HTI provides for HTI, the most important aim of building the movement is the recruitment of capable leaders for the party. This is essentially a form of action mobilization.

Within the context of a repressive regime, the organization tends to be underground and initial recruitment would take place through informal networks.²² As mentioned in the previous chapter, many organizations formed during the Suharto regime were built in a similar way. For HTI, this period is seen as a phase of consolidation and building a strong ideological base.²³ A researcher who tried studying the structure of the party in the early 1990s noted that it was virtually impossible to understand or even attempt to establish the leaders of HTI during this period.²⁴ Nevertheless, HTI leaders saw this as an important step in its struggle, which An-Nabhani noted, is the first step in the *da'awah* of the Prophet where he focused on propagating his message to his close family members.

Due to the authoritarian political system, there was a strong culture of secrecy within the movement. Members were not willing to share details about the movement and its leaders. During *halaqah*, members met in homes and were careful not to leave any trace

²¹ Paul Di Maggio and Walter Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 2 (1983), pp. 147-160.

²² Ruud Koopmans and Hanspreter Kriesi, "Institutional Structures and Prevailing Strategies" in Hanspreter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, January Willem Duyvendak and Marco G Giugni (eds), *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 46.

²³ Interview with Rahmat Kurnia, 10 April 2009, Jakarta.

²⁴ Interview with Muis Naharong, Lecturer, Paramadina University, 26 August 2009, Jakarta

that a religio-political discussion had taken place within the location. Even the reading materials used during this period had no reference to HT. Books compiled by Al-Baghdadi and several HT leaders such as the *Bunga Rampai Pemikiran Islam* (Introduction to Islamic Thought) and *Materi Dasar Islam* (Basic Subject on Islamic Studies) that discussed basic subjects like *Aqidah* (Islamic beliefs), *Shari'ah* (Islamic laws) and the caliphate had no mention of the party.²⁵ Although some materials used by the network subsequently included the books written by An-Nabhani, they did not indicate An-Nabhani's relationship to HT. Subsequently, this network grew when Al-Baghdadi's initial students started inviting their friends to attend these classes. In fact, many of the current leaders of HTI had been friends for decades even prior to becoming members of HTI. It was not until several years of attending these classes that leaders of HTI were told that Al-Baghdadi was part of a political party, HT, and that the ideas taught to them during his classes were in fact the ideas of HT. The party also began to recruit beyond student networks when it seemed as if the Suharto regime was beginning to ease political control in the mid-1990s.

The recruitment strategy of HTI during the New Order period was aimed at establishing an organization, which acted as a resource for the party to recruit members who would form the core group making up the first concentric circle within its organizational structure. The main mechanism used by the party for this recruitment was student networks. With the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, HTI saw the need to begin developing a more concrete recruitment strategy aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers for the party.

Recruiting in the Post New Order Period: Expanding Membership

The collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 provided an important opportunity for the party to begin recruiting at a larger scale. SMT theorists believe that such political opportunities will often lead to the larger scale recruitment processes.²⁶ The early leaders

²⁵ These books were used by the LDK network within Indonesia. LDK, *Bunga Rampai*). Also see Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", p. 168.

²⁶ Myra Marx Ferec, "Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: German and American Feminism in the world System" in Silke Roth and Sara Lennox (eds), *Feminist Movements in a Globalizing world* (Washington DC: American Institute of Contemporary German Studies), pp. 13-29.

of HTI began to see a need to strengthen the organizational structure of HTI while at the same time creating a new pool of leaders for the party. While the party's key recruitment strategy during the New Order period was aimed at active mobilization, the post New Order period saw the party beginning to embark on both consensual and active mobilizations. These strategies include the use of publications, public talks, online media and mosque gatherings.

Websites and Digital Resources

The use of online and digital resources is an important way the party embarks on its consensus mobilization strategy with the aim of reaching out to Indonesian Muslim masses. The use of these resources is aimed at reaching the younger segment of the Indonesian Muslim population. One of the key online resources the party employs is the party's website (<http://www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id/>). The website features a daily reporting of various types of domestic and international news relating to the Muslim world. These articles are often followed by commentaries about the articles from members of HTI.²⁷ At the same time, visitors to the website can download past issues of the *Al-Islam* bulletin and *Al-Wa'ie* for up till three years back. A section called *From the Spokesman's Office* features all press statements issued by HTI. Some of the key texts of HT which have been translated can also be found on the website. The website also provides links to the website of other chapters of HT as well as features photographs and videos about developments within HT worldwide.²⁸ Visitors to the website can also provide feedback and comments to HTI and inform their friends about the website through an automated online system. Sections within the website feature articles in Arabic and English. HTI often utilize videos to spread their message. They employ a team of professionally trained video producers and editors to videotape their functions. The most important of these videos is the video of the International *Khilafah* Conference organized by HTI in 2007. This video was professionally done, with comments by forum participants, organizers, and excerpts from speeches given by HT leaders in other parts of the world about the conference. The HTI video crew is also responsible for capturing the HTI events, including seminars, demonstrations, and conferences on video. In essence, the party's website is used to transmit its ideology and objectives to the young Indonesian

²⁷ Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization Strategy", p. 608.

²⁸ Ibid.

Muslims with the final aim of making them allies of HTI, or encouraging them to take the next step forward of joining the party as *daris*.

Beyond utilizing formal means, members of HTI also utilize informal online sources to spread their goals. Many HTI members are active contributors to numerous Muslim online forums, often utilizing these platforms to introduce HT ideas and promote events organized by HTI.²⁹ A popular media platform created by the party is *DakwahKampus.com*, which served to spread its ideology and act as a platform for members to engage in intellectual discourses with other Islamic groups.³⁰ In addition, several HTI members are also beginning to utilize the increasingly popular networking sites, FaceBook and Twitter, to encourage their friends to attend HTI functions. Some of HTI members are also part of diverse groups, which form part of the FaceBook Online groups such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir group, the Revival of the *Khilafah* group, and the International *Khilafah* Conference 2007 group.³¹ The key difference between formal and informal online platforms is that HTI activists utilizing the informal online platforms would not highlight their links to HTI or HT explicitly. Even when key HT leaders write articles, which are posted, on these platforms, they do not identify their links to HTI. Activists of other Islamic groups are also allowed to post articles and views on these platforms, so as to create spaces for intellectual engagements to take place. The main reason for this is to allow the party to reach out to a larger segment of Indonesian Muslim youths, especially those belonging to other Islamic groups. The use of online media outlets is aimed at creating allies and *daris* for the party and can be useful for both consensus and active mobilizations.

Printed Materials: Pamphlets, Journals and Books

The use of publications is one of the key ways that HTI uses to disseminate its ideas. HTI produces a weekly pamphlet, the *Al-Islam* bulletin, which HTI activists throughout the

²⁹ For examples of these postings, see

<http://www.geocities.com/ummahonline/suratpembaca/suratpembaca05.htm> and

<http://www.melayu.com/v2/sembang2/mesej.php?thread=15184>, accessed on 30 December 2007.

³⁰ An excellent article describing the *DakwahKampus.com* is Claudia Nef Saluz, *Dakwahkampus.com* as Informal Student Web Portal of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Nadja Christina Schneider and Bettina Graf (eds) *Social Dynamics 2.0: Researching Change in Times of Social Media and Convergence* (Berlin: Frank and Timme, 2011), pp. 67-84.

³¹ Personal observation of author on the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's FaceBook website. Ibid.

country circulate every Friday, before the weekly Friday prayers. Members of HTI will distribute copies of the bulletin before worshippers enter the main prayer hall. Extra copies of the *Al-Islam* are often left beside donation boxes in mosques.³² Many worshippers, especially amongst the youth, read the bulletin as many of its articles address contemporary issues and are thus more interesting than the dry sermons delivered by the prayer leader.³³ *Al-Islam* features HTI's views about contemporary issues affecting Muslims in Indonesia and other parts of the world and publicizes upcoming events and activities organized by HTI. *Al-Islam* is meant for the Indonesian masses and its language is simple and is very accessible. HTI sees this as part of its culturing process, whereby it introduces its ideas in an interesting manner to the Indonesian public.

Besides *Al-Islam*, HTI also publishes a monthly journal, *Al Wa'ie* (The Reality). *Al-Wa'ie* was first published in 2000 just before the first caliphate conference. The journal was launched at the conference.³⁴ Unlike *Al-Islam*, *Al-Wai'e* has a more esoteric content and is targeted at educated intellectuals. Articles by HTI members or special coverage of domestic or international issues relating to the Muslim world fill up the columns of the journal. Its popularity among young professionals and the student elite can be gauged from the fact that about a hundred thousand copies of *Al Wa'ie* are printed and sold monthly. Of this, at least 10% to 20% are given to politicians, religious leaders and media personalities. I have been given copies of *Al-Wa'ie* during visits to the HTI office. Notwithstanding this, given the cost of *Al Wa'ie* (Rp10, 000), *Al-Wa'ie* sales could be considered to be reasonable. The journal is currently distributed to more than ninety agents in all the Indonesian provinces as well as in Sydney, Australia. In September 2005, HTI began translating *Khilafah* magazine produced by HT Britain from English to Indonesia. The magazine has ceased publication due to poor sales and the decision taken by HTI leaders to focus more on *Al-Wa'ie*. In any case, it is a reflection of the limited range of HTI's market for news outside of Indonesia. More importantly, the heavier focus of the *Khilafah* magazine on international news has also not quite appealed to most

³² Personal observation of author in several mosques in Jakarta and Bogor between March 2009 and December 2010. Also see Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization Strategies", p. 614.

³³ I noticed that more than half of worshippers read the bulletin at Friday prayer sessions in mosques around Jakarta during my fieldwork between 2008 and 2010. *ibid.*, p. 616.

³⁴ Interview with Muhammad al-Khaththath, 20 March 2009, Jakarta. *Ibid.*, p. 611.

Indonesians, who are more interested in the local issues that *Al-Wa'ie* covers. The latest addition to HTI's publication is the *Media Ummat*, a tabloid styled newspaper, which is produced once a fortnight. The newspaper is targeted at the mass Indonesian market and about 50,000 copies are being printed. Beyond magazines, HTI also translates books produced by HT into Bahasa Indonesia. HTI members own several publishing houses in Bogor, a town in the outskirts of Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. These publishing houses include *Pustaka Thariqul Izzah*, and *Al-Izzah Press*.³⁵ These publishing houses also publish books authored by HTI leaders and activists since the 1990s.

The usage of publications as a recruitment strategy is not unique to HTI. A common strategy of social movements is to utilize publications to educate the public about the causes upheld by them, thereby increasing the level of support for the movement.³⁶ Publications are essentially used as a platform for consensus mobilization. HTI's usage of publications is segmented for both consensus and action mobilizations. The *Al-Islam* and *Al-Wa'ie* are utilized as tools for consensus mobilization. Rahmat Kurnia notes that few of the HTI members joined the party upon reading *Al-Islam* or *Al-Wa'ie*.³⁷ The purpose of the publications was simply to influence the public to accept the caliphate as an obligation for Muslims in order that they could be allies to HTI. Ultimately, the books by HT's ideologues and HTI leaders are essentially to serve as tools that are utilized for active mobilization. Many party members have spoken about the importance of HTI books in influencing them to become *daris* of HTI. One HTI member, Budi, notes that the books written by An-Nabhani are the only works that comprehensively describe the Islamic political, economic and social systems.³⁸ It was this that attracted him to learn the ideas of HTI by being one of its *daris*.

Public Discourses

HTI also engages the Muslim public through seminars, talks, and conferences. The seminars and talks are held daily in different parts of the country. Larger seminars tend to

³⁵ I visited these publishing houses in Bogor in March 2008. One such publishing house is located adjacent to the house of HTI's former Chairman Hafidz Abdurrahman. Ibid, p. 607.

³⁶ Edward and Mc Carthy, "Resources and Social Movement", p. 140.

³⁷ Interview with Rahmat Kurnia, 1 October 2009, Jakarta

³⁸ Interview with Budi, 20 August 2009, Jakarta

be organized in Jakarta. Participants at these seminars are often not charged, although they are expected to leave their names and contact numbers at the registration desk. Presumably, this allows for the building of a database of potential recruits. In such seminars, HTI leaders would speak in a panel consisting of two to three speakers. After the speakers have spoken for about 15-20 minutes each, the discussion is then open to the floor for questions and debates. The other speakers could be from a variety of backgrounds including figures from liberal Islamic groups, ministers, academics, and important figures from within Indonesian society. Amongst the figures that HTI has engaged in the past are Sidney Jones (from the ICG), and Din Syamsuddin (Head of Muhammadiyah).³⁹ HTI uses the seminars to get the invited speakers to support their position for the implementation of *Shari'ah* and the revival of the caliphate in Indonesia.⁴⁰

HTI also invites political or religious figures that disagree with their views on religion and politics to debate with them on these issues. The purpose of inviting these figures is two fold. Firstly, it is aimed at encouraging individuals, who might not otherwise attend HTI events, to do so. Presumably, these individuals would find an event in which speakers from different ideological leanings are featured to be more acceptable. Secondly, featuring such figures would allow HTI to engage in dialogue and debate in a democratic environment. In doing so, HTI leaders believe they can show the 'superiority' of their ideas over other contending ideas. While it is not always the case that HTI leaders are able to outwit other speakers, the choice of topics, atmosphere and questions posed during the open discussion, tend to favor HTI speakers. The key target audience of these seminars and talks is the more educated segment of the Indonesian society such as young professionals and students. Even the choice of venue for such events is reflective of this aim. Often these events are organized in hotel ballrooms or in lecture theatres in buildings such as the Wisma Antara building.

³⁹ Jemaah Islamiyah is a terrorist group often referred to Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian wing. For details of JI, See Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005). Ibid, p. 61.

⁴⁰ Personal observation of author at the Forum on Societal Research titled "Siti Fadilah Supari Melawan: Saatnya Indonesia berubah!" at the YTKI Building, Jalan Gatot Pembicara. The speakers at the forum were Siti Fadilah Supari, Jose Rizal (Chairman of MER-C Indonesia), and Farid Wajidi (HTI) on 17 March 2008. *ibid*.

Since 2005, HTI has institutionalized these intellectual discourses by forming the *Forum Kajian Sosial Kemasyarakatan* (FKSK, Forum for Social Research) to organize regular seminars on contemporary issues affecting Indonesia and the Muslim world. In 2008, HTI began a more structured monthly program known as the *Halaqah Islam dan Peradaban* (HIP Studies on Islam and Civilization). HTI also organizes seminars where foreign HT members are invited to speak. These seminars tend to be only for members and sympathizers of HTI and are often held behind closed doors. Such seminars are targeted to boost members' confidence in HTI and strengthen their bonding within the HT movement.⁴¹ The use of public talks and seminars as a recruitment vehicle can largely be seen as a form of consensus mobilization. Moreover, the face-to-face interactions between HTI members and participants, allows HTI to contact some of the participants at a later stage for further discussions. HTI's use of these talks and seminars is another example of its consensus mobilization strategy. Most participants at such talks and seminars are not party members. Some of these participants might become allies of the party, while those who are seen to be more interested in HTI are contacted by HTI members to become *daris* of the movement.

Prayer Halls and Mosques

Studies of many Islamic social movements have revealed the importance of mosques in the recruitment process of Islamic social movements. Mosques assist HTI in creating and maintaining a public space for the party in the ideological sense that they give the party religious virtuousness, while also insulating discussion from alternative beliefs.⁴² HTI used mosques as one of its consensus mobilization strategies by propagating its ideas and expanding its membership base beyond their traditional supporters, the professionals and students. HTI activists have used the mosques located near campuses since the 1980s.⁴³ Since 2000, HTI leaders have encouraged members to be actively involved in the activities of the local mosques close to their homes. HTI members would typically frequent a mosque while not revealing their links to HTI. They are often active in

⁴¹ Personal observation of author at seminar organized by HTI at the Sahid Jaya Hotel, Jakarta on 13 August 2007 where speakers from HT Britain and Sudan spoke.

⁴² Ziad Muhson, "Muslim Brotherhood", pp. 502-503.

⁴³ Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", p.170 and Osman, "Hizbut Tahri Indonesia and its Mobilization Strategies", p. 610.

promoting mosque activities. Hafidz Abdurrahman is of the view that due to the enthusiasm shown by these activists and their tertiary educational background, HTI members will be invited to sit in the *Dewan Kerja Masjid* (Mosque Working Committee, DKM). He noted that these members will use their position in the DKM to invite HTI leaders to conduct lectures within the mosque.⁴⁴ HTI leaders such as Hafidz Abdurrahman and Hariths Abu Ulya are then invited to deliver sermons during the weekly Friday prayers and conduct lectures at many mosques.⁴⁵ Special talks commemorating important Islamic events such as the birthday of the Prophet (*Mawlid Nabi*) are also organized.⁴⁶ Participation in these talks, give HTI leaders an aura of respectability.⁴⁷ This is especially important given that most HTI leaders have never trained as *kiyais* (religious scholars) in the formal sense. HTI activists also use the mosque to organize activities such as the *Pesantren Ramadhan* (Ramadhan Religious School), a program that targets youth within the community. The actions taken by HTI have been viewed by NU leaders as a form of deceit and an attempt to take over mosques built by NU.

Several NU leaders including Masdar F Masudi and Hasyim Muzadi issued open warnings to the NU community about the threat of HTI.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the two largest Muslim organizations seem to be divided about this. Several key leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah, including As'ad Said Ali and Din Syamsuddin, believe that the accusations leveled against HTI might have been exaggerated.⁴⁹ While most NU leaders and activists are known to be vehemently opposed to HTI's ideas, they are often hard

⁴⁴ Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and Its Mobilization Strategies", p. 611.

⁴⁵ For instance, Hafidz Abdurrahman conducts weekly talks every Sunday morning at the *Al-Hidayah* mosque near his house in Bogor. Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 12 August 2010, Jakarta. Ibid.

⁴⁶ I attended a talk conducted by Muhammad al-Khaththath at the *Darul Hidayah* Mosque in Ciputat on 23 March 2008. The attendees at the talk were mostly villagers who are blue-collar workers, a group that is not amongst traditional supporters of HTI. Ibid.

⁴⁷ Dwight B. Billings and Shaunna L. Scott, "Religion and Political Legitimation," *Annual Review of Sociology* 20(1994), p. 173.

⁴⁸ See "Dianggap Sesat, Mashid-Masjid NU diambil alih" NU Online, 25 May 2006 and "Hasyim Muzadi: *Khilafah* Islamiyah bukan Gerakan Agama tapi Gerakan Politik" NU Online, 5 September 2006. A book was also published by some NU and Muhammadiyah activists. The focus of the book was on the PKS but addressed HTI as a threat as well. Sources within more conservative sections of NU argued that the book was written to obtain more funding from Western funding agencies for the activities of the Wahid and Ma'arif Institute. However, these claims cannot be verified. See Abdurrahman Wahid (ed), *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnational di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, Ma'arif Institute & LibforAll Foundation, 2009).

⁴⁹ Interview with As'ad Said Ali, Deputy Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, 20 August 2010 Jakarta and Interview with Din Syamsuddin, Head of Muhammadiyah, Jakarta, 10 August 2010.

pressed to name these mosques. The only example cited is the *Masjid Al Hidayah* in Ketintang, Surabaya. In defending its position, HTI argued that taking over of the mosque has neither been a necessary or desirable act and have dismissed the accusations as a plot by liberal Islamic groups to undermine its activities.⁵⁰ Ismail Yusanto, its spokesman, wrote a rebuttal of the book published on HTI's website. Shorter versions of the article were published in several Indonesian dailies.⁵¹ In this rebuttal, he noted that HTI has been involved in the mosque by way of increasing the activities in the mosque or sitting as committee members but HTI has never attempted to dominate the management of the mosque in a systematic fashion. It is possible that some HTI activists in some parts of Indonesia did attempt to control mosques affiliated to NU. Nonetheless, it is more likely that HTI members were told to sit in the DKMs to ensure that HTI will be allowed to conduct its activities at the mosque.

Harith Abu Ulya is of the view that mosques present an excellent platform for HTI to propagate its ideas to the Indonesian Muslim masses. In spite of this, the number of individuals that become *daris* of the party through interactions with HTI activists at different mosques is small.⁵² It is likely that a larger number of individuals are likely to become allies of the party. HTI's successful use of mosques in its mobilization strategy could be attributed to the willingness of even non-HTI members within the DKM to work with HTI. Many DKM members view HTI more as a *da'awah* organization than a political body due to the fact that HTI is not involved in electoral politics.⁵³ The profile of HTI activists and members, many of whom are well-educated, as well as the non-violent nature of the party, are other contributory factors that convince DKM members that HTI members are worthwhile partners. Beyond strategies that are targeted at the masses, several of its recruitment strategies are targeted at specific groups.

⁵⁰ Interview with Rokhmat S Labib, Jakarta, 15 August 2010

⁵¹ See Ismail Yusanto, Catatan atas Buku *Ilusi Negara Islam* Available at <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/06/30/catatan-atas-buku-ilusi-negara-islam> Accessed on 21 July 2010. Shorter versions of the article published in several Indonesian dailies.

⁵² Interview with Harith Abu Ulya, 5 October 2010, Jakarta.

⁵³ I spoke to a member of the DKM of the Darul Hidayah mosque on 13 March 2008 who was not a member of HTI and was told that he had confidence in HTI activists. This is due to the fact that HTI is not a political party that contest in elections. As such, Muslims are confident that they are not trying to use the mosque to garner votes during elections.

Active Mobilization: Targeting Students, Women and Non-Muslim Papuan

The use of formal organizations as a resource for mobilization is one of the most common strategies of social movements. It is assumed that formal organizations facilitate mobilization. Discussions of the role of organizations have revolved around the type of organization formed by social movements and the factors impacting the choice of different models of organizational structure. Less focus has been devoted to the use of sub-organizations and front organizations as means of recruitment. This section will examine their roles in HTI's recruitment strategy. As part of its active mobilization strategy, HTI has been using sub-organizations such as GEMA and PHTI for the purpose of recruiting *daris* and more importantly leaders for the party. In Papua, the party has used a front organization for the purpose of converting Papuans to Islam and becoming members of HTI. Unlike in the case of consensus mobilization, these organizations are primarily geared towards recruiting segments of Indonesian society that are deemed to be prospective future members and leaders of HTI.

Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: The Bulwark of the Party

Women remain one of the most important membership bases for HTI. The party has embarked on an active mobilization strategy for recruiting women into the party through its women's wing *Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (Women Members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, PHTI). The creation of this division has occurred due to a strong demand by female members of HTI for the creation of an avenue for active participation of women to carry out special activities targeted at women. Febrianti Abassuni, a long time member of HTI currently heads this wing.

Unlike many Islamist movements that shun female participation in politics, women are welcomed into the ranks of party membership, albeit in different roles from those of men.⁵⁴ While the real number of women in HTI cannot be ascertained, the large number of women attending HTI's functions and demonstrations, which sometimes exceed the number of men, is reflective of their important position. It is possible that the women's

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.616.

membership is in fact higher than that of men in the movement. As a form of recognition for its contribution, Abbasuni sits in the DPP of HTI. HTI's position on women is summed up in a special booklet produced by the group titled *Perempuan dan Politik Dalam Perspektif Islam* (Women and Politics from an Islamic Perspective). Here HTI clearly states that both men and women have an equal responsibility to revive the caliphate. HTI goes on further to explain that women have the right to give *bai'ah* to the Caliph and can also be elected into a political post, as long as the post is not that of the Caliph, Provincial Governor, or District Head. HTI also accord a special section of its website to discuss issues relating to women. Amongst the topics that are addressed are women and violence, gender equality, and other women's rights issues.

It can be argued that the HTI has won some women over to their cause by means of a strikingly original and effective approach. This is through a women's magazine that the party published, titled *The Female Reader*, which has received wide readership since its inception in November 2006.⁵⁵ While the magazine cannot be said to be a HTI publication, it is to be noted that about 80% of the contributors are members of HTI. Just like any other ladies magazine, the *Female Reader* features articles related to fashion, women's health, parenting, cooking, and articles related to Women and Islam. The cover page of the magazine always features a stylish, good looking Muslim lady, dressed in fashionable Islamic attire. The tag line that the magazine uses is *Be Smart and Sharii* (Be Smart and *Shari'ah* Compliant). At the same time, every issue features several articles on HTI's concepts and the notion of the caliphate. Yet HT or HTI is hardly mentioned to ensure that readers do not link the magazine to HTI. It is clear that the magazine targets urban, better-educated women, who may be attracted to the fresh approach of the magazine. Consequently, the majority of women within HTI are also urban and tertiary educated. It is currently published bi-monthly and has a circulation of about 20,000.

HTI's strategy of recruiting women is indeed unique for an Islamist group. Even within the larger network of HTI, it is indeed rare to see women playing such an active role. In interviews with women activists of HTI, several reasons were elucidated for their joining of HTI. Many women felt that HTI is one of the few Islamic organizations that accord

⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. 612.

women their due rights as defined by Islam. Women are given the same tasks as men and are given half of the office space at the HTI main office building in Jakarta. Some women also noted that HTI is less orthodox than most Islamist organization about the roles of men and women. A woman activist informed me that her husband, a member of HTI would look after her children whenever she needed to attend HTI activities. This is unlike other Islamist organizations where the sole role of women is as a homemaker. Younger women in HTI felt that the party provided them a new sense of identity, a theme that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. Many women within HTI do not seem to mind the conservative interpretation of Islam, which restricts women's rights such as dress codes and polygamy within HTI. They see this as a being part and parcel of Islamic laws that they must abide by. The active mobilization of women has assisted the party in its aim to increase the number of *daris* and members within the party.

Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan (GEMA)

Students have always formed the base of HTI's membership. Virtually all the leaders of HTI were recruited through student groups. The popularity of HTI among students is due to several reasons. Firstly, HTI presents a utopian vision for the Muslim world, which students being more idealistic tend to be more willing to accept. Secondly, HTI is seen to be a highly 'intellectual' organization. The more academic nature of its books and activities are also more attractive to members. A former member of HTI noted that some students join HTI to look more 'intellectual'. Thirdly, the profile of HTI leaders works to the advantage of HTI. HTI leaders are better educated and are often successful in their careers and thus serve as role models for many students. HTI leaders are also generally younger and can thus relate better to students. During the New Order period, HTI members joined the LDK in several universities with a purpose to recruit. As mentioned in the previous chapter, HTI was dominant in the FSLDK. The decision made by the party to leave FSLDK in 1994 due to the power tussle with JT meant that it lost one of its key recruitment vehicles. In spite of this, HTI never totally severed its ties with the LDK at universities such as UGM, IPB and UI. Beyond involving themselves in the LDK network, HTI created a student committee to propagate its ideas to students. However, this student committee is an extra-campus group and thus could not effectively penetrate the Muslim student body in the universities.

In 2001, HTI made a decision to once again involve itself in student activities within campus. It did so by forming the *GEMA Pembebasan* (Cry of Freedom, GEMA). GEMA is basically a student front for HTI to recruit from among tertiary students. Officially, GEMA does not explicitly declare its links to HTI. Such a stance could be understood from the perspective that HTI hopes to narrow the gap between the party and other student groups that might have otherwise opposed its vision. Nevertheless, GEMA's links to HTI is obvious as both organizations advocate for a similar objective. At the beginning, GEMA was active in several campuses in Malang, Bogor, and Jakarta. Later it expanded its presence to other Indonesian provinces including Makassar, Aceh, Kalimantan and Papua. In August 2004, after gaining significant strength, GEMA was officially inaugurated at the *Japanese Study Center* in UI. At the same time, its website at <http://www.gemapembebasan.or.id> and a monthly bulletin, *Bulletin Gema Pembebasan* were also launched. As in the case of HTI, GEMA also organized seminars, talks, and demonstrations. During some of the talks and seminars, GEMA invited HTI leaders to address the student communities in the campuses. The slight difference between some of its activities and that of HTI's was that GEMA also championed issues that are student specific, such as hikes in tuition fees. Members of GEMA often attend study circles, similar to the HTI *halaqahs* and read the same publications as HTI members. Subsequently, members who are seen to be committed are then invited to join HTI's study circles. This means that not all members of GEMA are members or even sympathizers of HTI.

One of the main activities of GEMA is the formation of academic study groups. These study groups are formed based on areas of research interest and expertise. For instance, at the IPB, one of the main areas of research is global warming. GEMA was also behind the formation of *Forum Mahasiswa Islam* (The Muslim Undergraduate Forum) in 2007. This forum consisted of the main Islamic undergraduate organizations such as KAMMI and HMI.⁵⁶ The stated aim of this forum was to unite the Muslim undergraduates but GEMA leaders admitted in confidence that the forum was a platform for them to introduce their ideas to other student activists who might be less inclined to join HTI.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 615.

The element of deceit in the formation of such forums has invited some criticisms of HTI amongst its detractors. For instance, students belonging to KAMMI have often complained about the poaching of the group's members by GEMA. In its defense, Erwin, the Secretary-General of GEMA argued that it is only natural that the "superiority" of HTI's ideas would become obvious in an open forum where students are able to compare these ideas openly. He noted that GEMA should not be blamed if students find their ideas to be more convincing.⁵⁷ The active mobilization strategy of recruiting students into HTI is indeed important and GEMA serves as one of its key recruitment conduits.

The Special Case of Papua

The least expected group that HTI had attempted to recruit within its active mobilization strategy are non-Muslims in Papua. HTI members in Papua have attempted to convert non-Muslims and influence them with HTI's ideas. While most Papuans identify themselves as Christians, many Indonesian Islamists believe that the Christianity practiced in Papua is fused with indigenous beliefs.⁵⁸ In their mind, the Papuan Christians are weak Christians and can be converted easily. The irony, however, is the fact that many Papuan Muslim converts do not adhere to Islamic practices such as abstaining from eating pork.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the belief that they are weak Christians has increased attempts by numerous Islamic groups at converting non-Muslim Papuans.

HTI teachings took hold in Papua due to the recruitment of Mohamed Fadzlan Garematan, a native Papuan who had converted to Islam.⁶⁰ Fadzlan had established an Islamic charity called *Al Fatih Kaafah Nusantara* (AFKN), which is based in Jakarta but has offices in several areas in Papua. The AFKN's primary role is to proselytize among the indigenous populace in Papua.⁶¹ Fadzlan himself often leads these efforts. Often the

⁵⁷ Interview with Erwin Al-Jundi, Secretary-General of GEMA, 2 September 2009.

⁵⁸ For details about Papua see Peter King, *West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004).

⁵⁹ Charles E Farhadian, *Christianity, Islam and Nationalism in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 81.

⁶⁰ Interview with Fadzlan Garematan, Chairman of AFKN and *Daris* of HTI, 11 May 2010. Also see International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua," in *ICG Asia Report* (Jakarta/Brussels 2008), p. 17.

⁶¹ See AFKN video, *Testimoni Dakwah Menembus Rimba di Pendalaman Irian Jaya* which showcased Fadzlan Garematan's efforts to convert people in Papua. This video was made as part of Fadzlan's efforts to seek assistance from Indonesian Muslims. A copy of the video was given to me by Muhammad al-Khaththath

leaders of Papuan tribes are targeted for conversion. The logic for Fadzlan is that conversion of tribal leaders will lead to the mass conversion of the other members in a tribe.⁶² To achieve this aim, AFKN also offers scholarships to Muslim converts to further their studies.⁶³ HTI leaders have provided funds for these scholarships to AFKN. Several HTI leaders from Makassar are also based in Papua. Their role is primarily to spread HTI's ideas amongst the Muslim trans-migrant population in Papua, although they have rendered their assistance to Fadzlan whenever required. HTI's ability to convert and recruit indigenous Papuans was largely due to the fact that Fadzlan was a native Papuan and as such was trusted by leaders of the Papuan tribes. At the same time, despite its anti-secessionist position, HTI had also fought for more equitable distribution of economic resources (Copper and Gold) for the Papuans, an issue that had drawn a wedge between the Indonesian state and the Papuan people.⁶⁴

For HTI, the recruitment of Papuan converts into the party strengthens its claim about being a global Islamic party, which transcends ethnic affiliations. One HTI leader noted that if the Papuans of a different colour and culture can accept HTI, it means that the party has successfully recruited Indonesian Muslims of all backgrounds.⁶⁵ Converted Papuan Muslims would also be a useful springboard for HTI's future recruitment. This being the case HTI has featured Fadzlan in numerous talks and seminars held by the party in Jakarta. For HTI, this is a manifestation of the growth of the movement throughout Indonesia. The belief amongst HTI leaders that new converts make the most committed Muslims has also given the impetus to HTI's missionary efforts in Papua. While it is difficult to assess the extent of HTI's influence in the area, more than three hundred Papuan Muslims led by Fadzlan attended the HTI conference held in 2007.⁶⁶ Indeed, the recruitment of non-Muslims to the party is something unique to Indonesia, a move no other HT chapter has employed. Beyond the active mobilization recruitment strategy, the party also values the building of social capital for the party. This involves forming personal relationships, with important members of the elite, within Indonesian society.

⁶² Interview with Fadzlan Garematan, 10 May 2010, Jakarta.

⁶³ ICG, "Tensions in Papua", p. 18.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 12 October 2009, Jakarta.

⁶⁶ Interview with Fadzlan Garematan, 10 May 2010, Jakarta.

Building the *Nusrah* Network: Enhancing Social Capital for the Party

The importance of social capital as a resource for social movements to achieve success is an important theme discussed by several theorists of SMT. Social capital here essentially refers to social ties, which entail sentiments of trust and solidarity towards a common objective.⁶⁷ In seeking to build social capital, social movements work with individuals and organizations, deemed to be politically and socially influential, sharing some of their objectives.⁶⁸ They also try to create social capital by establishing ties with individuals and groups who might not share their objectives, but can contribute to the movement significantly in achieving its goals. An-Nabhani himself wrote about the importance of social capital. He noted that it would be extremely difficult for the caliphate to be formed without the assistance of important figures within the society. Citing the example of the Prophet's attainment of power in Medina, An-Nabhani argued that the Prophet had obtained *thalibul nusrah* (vow of assistance) from leaders of the main tribes in the city before attaining power in Medina.⁶⁹ In the modern context, An-Nabhani identified opinion makers such as politicians, military leaders and senior bureaucrats to play the role of expediting the process of re-establishing the caliphate.

HTI has been attempting to cultivate a number of public figures as part of this nusrah agenda. These figures include Muslim leaders, politicians, military leaders, journalists, and civil servants. There are two approaches that the party can use. The first approach is the formation of an umbrella organization comprising different Muslim groups in Indonesia. It is assumed that many Muslim organizations share the same objective of establishing Islamic law in Indonesia and can work with HTI to achieve this objective. In the second approach, the party can build personal relationships with important public personalities and involve these figures with its programs. Here the party naively assumes that they can influence some of these figures to support its objectives.

⁶⁷ James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1990), pp. 304-305.

⁶⁸ Mario Diani, "Social Movements and Social Capital: A Network Perspective on Movement Outcome," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1997), p. 138.

⁶⁹ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Methodology of HT*, 1999.

Muslim Groups and Personalities

One of HTI's main strategies is to push for the formation of networks of Muslim organizations. HTI feels that due to the long history of many Muslim organizations in the country, it is difficult for a relatively new organization such as HTI to make its mark or to expect the others to adopt its plans. To this end, HTI has begun to build linkages to other Muslim organizations as early as the late 1990s. For instance, HTI activists have been actively involved in MUI when several HTI DPP members, including Ismail Yusanto, Farid Wajidi and Rokhmat S Labib were members of the MUI Board. HTI leaders have also built relations with more conservative leaders of Muslim organizations including Muhammadiyah, NU and hardline groups such as JAT, FPI and MMI by paying social visits to these leaders a number of times a year.

The party's leadership was convinced by around 2000 that many of the Muslim organizations were not keen to unite seeing that HTI's caliphate agenda was unattainable. Al-Khaththath devised a strategy of focusing its public aim on the implementation of the *Shari'ah* which many more Muslim leaders found acceptable. He also initiated the formation of a neutral platform that allowed HTI to push its agenda forward in a more acceptable manner to these organizations.⁷⁰ The formation of such platforms is a common strategy used by social movements in an attempt to form alliances to strengthen their position. The opportunity came when the fourth *Kongres Solidarity Umat Islam Indonesia* (The Congress for the Solidarity of Indonesian Muslim, KSUII) was held by the MUI to discuss issues affecting Muslims in Indonesia. HTI leaders attended and ensured that they were represented in the different panel committees.⁷¹ HTI played an active role in pushing for representatives from forty-five Muslim organizations to be signatories to its version of the "Jakarta Declaration".⁷² The declaration called for the immediate implementation of Islamic laws in Indonesia. The Congress also decided to form a loose network of Muslim organizations, Forum Ummat Islam (FUI, Muslim Community Forum). The fact that Al-Khaththath was appointed the Secretary-General of FUI shows the disproportionate amount of influence HTI held in FUI. Mashadi, a former

⁷⁰ Interview with Rahmat Kurnia, 1 October 2009, Jakarta.

⁷¹ Tim Penyusun Buku KUIIIIV, *Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia IV*, p. 6.

⁷² *ibid.*, p. 45.

PKS member of parliament was appointed chairman of the organization. While the “Jakarta Declaration” proved to be rhetorical and was quickly forgotten, the FUI proved to be an important platform for HTI. FUI played vital roles in some developments from 2005. Several leaders of MUI such as Cholil Ridwan and Ma’aruf Amin as well as the leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq became actively involved in FUI. However, FUI was effectively controlled by HTI. From the onset, HTI leaders, especially Al-Khaththath, dominated FUI. Utilizing the FUI, the party was able to push to the forefront, some issues, such as those pertaining to the anti-pornography act and the Ahmadiyah sect.

The success of a social movement’s building of social capital is determined by the willingness of its powerful allies to identify with the movement especially in times of crisis.⁷³ The strength of HTI’s social capital strategy was put to test in 2008, when Al-Khaththath was sacked from HTI. Many Muslim leaders who were involved in FUI chose to work with FUI rather than HTI. This was proof to the limitations of HTI’s social capital strategy. It was believed that Cholil Ridwan and Ma’aruf Amin who were both close to Al-Khaththath played an instrumental role in the decision of MUI to not renew the board membership of HTI leaders. In yet another example of the limitations of its social capital strategy, the MUI Secretary-General, Ichwan Sam was reluctant to invite leaders of HTI to the fifth KUII in 2010.⁷⁴ It was only after several members of MUI protested against this decision that HTI leaders were allowed to attend.⁷⁵ At the congress, sixteen HTI leaders attended and tried once again to ensure that they dominated the discussions. It was obvious MUI members did not appreciate this attempt and many viewed HTI leaders as irritants at the congress.⁷⁶ Even more hardline groups in Indonesia such as FPI and MMI have largely kept their distance from HTI, preferring to work instead with FUI. Thus, it can be concluded that the attempts by HTI to build social capital amongst leaders of Muslim organizations in Indonesia has largely failed.

⁷³ Diani, “Social Capital”, p. 142.

⁷⁴ Interview with Ichwan Sam, Secretary-General of MUI, 7 May 2011, Jakarta.

⁷⁵ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 8 May 2011, Jakarta.

⁷⁶ Personal Observation by Author at the KUII 2010 from 7th to 10th of May 2010 at Asrama Pondok Gede, Jakarta.

Political Leaders and Local Bureaucrats

HTI's social capital strategy also involves building relations with politicians and bureaucrats. Often, HTI leaders will invite politicians to speak at their events or attend some of the social functions that the group organized. After these initial contacts, HTI leaders will organize regular meetings with these politicians and begin preaching the ideology of HT to them. One politician who is often quoted within HTI circles as being close to the party is Adyaksa Dault, the former Minister of Youth and Sports Affairs. HTI leaders and at least two PKS leaders claimed that Adyaksa was a *daris* of HTI. Adyaksa himself admitted this at a dinner organized by HTI, a day after the 2007 conference which was held at the Sahid Jaya Hotel.⁷⁷ However, the fact that he did not inaugurate the 2007 conference after receiving a stern warning from other members of the Indonesian cabinet showed the limitations of HTI's ability to build social capital. Other important politicians that HTI tried to bring to their fold are Amien Rais (founding leader of the National Mandate Party, PAN), Taufik Kiemas and Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari.⁷⁸ Amongst these politicians only Siti Fadilah is known to be truly close to HTI. Amien Rais has openly criticized HTI while Taufik Kiemas has refused to even be seen at HTI events and has rejected several invitations by HTI to attend its events.⁷⁹

The only politician who seemed willing to associate herself and even publicly support HTI's agenda was Siti Fadilah Supari. Sources within HTI claim that the Minister was convinced about the need to prevent Western medical companies from obtaining samples of the bird flu after receiving detailed studies done by doctors linked to HTI about alleged plans by these companies to profit from the endeavors.⁸⁰ Siti Fadilah also made statements about the swine flu being man-made after discussions with these HTI liked

⁷⁷ I was present at the event held at the Sahid Jaya Hotel, Jakarta on 13 August 2007.

⁷⁸ In a book about Taufiq Kiemas in the eyes of Muslim figures, Ismail Yusanto stated his belief that Kiemas is a Muslim figure close to Islam. This could be contrasted with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who stated categorically that Kiemas is just a cultural Muslim who does not understand Islam. See Helmi Hidayat and Zainun Ahmadi (eds), *Taufiq Kiemas di Mata Tokoh Islam* (Jakarta: Baitul Muslimin Press, 2007).

⁷⁹ Amien Rais openly criticized HTI for its unrealistic goals at a forum organized by HTI in 2007. See <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2007/05/03/amien-rajs-dan-hti/>. Accessed on 10 January 2012.

⁸⁰ For details of these allegations see John Mcbeth, "Indonesia's Bird Flu Batte" *Straits Times*, 3 May 2008

doctors.⁸¹ During the height of the bird flu crisis, Siti Fadilah spoke at a seminar hosted by FPSK in Jakarta on 17th March 2008 where she took a snipe at the Western powers for trying to dominate Muslim countries and declared that Indonesia should adopt Islam as an ideology.⁸² While, it is likely that her statements were aimed at drawing support from the Islamist audience in Indonesia, her support for HTI's position has given the party more legitimacy than it could ever command on its own.

HTI's social capital strategy has extended beyond politicians. HTI has gone out of its way to make attempts to forge ties with figures in the Indonesian military, such as former army generals. These include ex-head of army staff, General Tyasno Sudarto who had demonstrated alongside HTI during the Danish cartoon controversy.⁸³ While HTI leaders are not under any illusion that these Generals will become members, they utilize these relationships to gain access to the Indonesian military. Through these relationships, HTI leaders have been invited to deliver religious talks and sermons organized at several military institutions. Their intention to seek assistance from the military has even been publicly admitted by Muhammad al-Khaththath in a rally held at the *Al-Azhar* Mosque in Jakarta on 2nd September 2005. He had called upon the military to assist the HTI in reviving the caliphate. In the region of Papua, a province that is seeking independence from Indonesia, HTI is given free rein to preach its ideas. For the Indonesian military, HTI's ideal of ensuring that the Muslim world does not lose any of its territories is useful in ensuring that Papua remains part of Indonesia. HTI has also organized public talks and demonstrations to oppose the secessionist movement in Papua portraying the movement as a Western attempt to disintegrate Indonesia. This has made HTI more acceptable for the Indonesian military in Papua. More importantly, as Marcus Mietzner noted militant Islamic groups are very popular vehicles for political mobilization by military leaders as they adhere to strict hierarchies based on the authority of charismatic religious leaders,

⁸¹ Interview with HTI and FUI Activists. Beyond these activists, sources within Muhammadiyah confirmed the close relations that Supari maintains with HTI.

⁸² Utilizing its various publication channels, HTI stood up for the Health Minister and praised her for her defiance of Western hegemony. See HTI, "Cengkeraman Asing Lewat Lembaga Kesehatan" *Al-Islam*, No. 403, 30 April 2008.

⁸³ The former general was adorned with a white Arabic robe during the demonstration and demanded that the Indonesian government act more strongly against the Danish government. See *Tempo Interaktif*, 11 February 2006.

which ensures a high level of mobility, efficiency, and secrecy.⁸⁴ He argued that these working relationships are distinctively non-ideological; officers supporting radical Islamic groups are rarely interested in anything else beyond their political and organizational functionality.⁸⁵ This means that rather than convincing these military officers towards its cause, the party is in fact being used by these military officers for their purposes.

The only group targeted by HTI where the party seems to have enjoyed limited success in building its social capital strategy is local bureaucrats. Since the 1990s, HTI had been actively propagating its ideas at the *Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri* (IPDN, The Institute of Local Governance), an institution focusing on the training of future bureaucrats. The institute based in Jatinangor, Sumedang, West Java attracts students from the different Indonesian provinces and has been a fertile ground for recruitment for HTI.⁸⁶ Often, graduates of these institutions will return to their provinces and districts to serve as government bureaucrats. At the same time, they will start local chapters of HTI in these areas. The fact that these HTI members are locals gives added advantage to HTI. The official backing of HTI has led to the group's strong presence in the provinces of Aceh and South Sulawesi where some bureaucrats are members and *daris* of HTI.

In its strategy of building social capital, HTI has largely failed in its objectives of building allies amongst those whom they classify as power elites. With the exception of a few public personalities such as Siti Fadilah and local bureaucrats at different regions of Indonesia, the party could not muster support of important players within the Indonesian political system. As highlighted above, most Indonesian politicians and power elites are reluctant to identify with HTI and its agenda of implementing Islamic laws or reviving the Islamic caliphate. Even within hard-line groups that have more in common with HTI, there is a stronger preference for leaders of these groups to work with FUI, which is no longer linked to HTI.

⁸⁴ Marcus Mietzner, "Politics of Engagement: The Indonesian Armed Forces, Islamic Extremism and the War on Terror" *The Brown Journal of world Affairs* 9, no. 1(2002), p. 78.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, p. 79.

⁸⁶ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 21 March 2008, Bogor.

Funding the Movement

Beyond mobilizing manpower through recruitment and building social capital, the success of social movements is also impacted by its ability to procure funds. Studies have shown that ensuring a consistent flow of financial support has led to the relative success of social movements.⁸⁷ Funds are important for movements to organize activities, publish materials and for the payment of staff working for the movement. For many social movements, the procurement of funds is normally done through fund-raising activities, which could be organized by volunteers or professional fundraisers.⁸⁸ In this regard, HT and HTI are different. The party observes stringent rules about the party being self-sufficient and would not accept funds from external sources. It can be argued that the general success of its strategies to procure funds can be traced to the party's concentric circles organizational structure. Funds are generated from within its organizational structure.

For HTI, raising funds is fundamental to the party's resource mobilization strategy. Due to the secretive nature of an organization like HTI, it is difficult to examine the party's financial standing. Nevertheless, several observations could be made about HTI's resources, which indicate the strength of its financial standing. The party owns several offices in *Tebet*, Jakarta, including a three-level office building (costing close to a hundred thousand dollars) at the *Crown Palace* office complex which was bought by the party in 2008 and several offices used for publishing purposes in Utan Kayu, Jakarta and the city of Bogor. Hafidz Abdurrahman explained that funds for the *Crown Palace* office building was accrued from members' financial contribution.⁸⁹ Several members of HTI are also working full-time for the organization and thus drawing a pay from the party. While their wages cannot be ascertained, these members seem to be living an upper middle class lifestyle, in gated communities, and driving decent cars.⁹⁰ Since a full time

⁸⁷ See J Craig Jenkin and Craig M Eckert, "Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement" *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 6 (1986), pp. 816.

⁸⁸ Pamela E Oliver and Gerald Maxwell, "Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action Theory" in Aldon D Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (ed) *Frontiers in SMT* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 259.

⁸⁹ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 21 March 2008, Bogor.

⁹⁰ Personal observation of author after visiting the homes of several of these HTI leaders.

party member is not allowed to hold any other job or business, their wage must be significant enough for them to live such a lifestyle. The party also seems to have enough financial resources to print up to a million copies of the *Al-Islam* leaflets and organize monthly events in several reasonably stylish auditoriums in Jakarta.

HTI leaders often describe the movement as self-funded.⁹¹ Yet, due to the party's overtly political agenda, the party does not see itself as qualifying to receive *zakat* (compulsory alms) from members or the larger Muslim community. At each level of its organizational structure, members are expected to be financially self-sufficient to organize activities. The core group within its organizational structure contributes the most to its funds. Former members of HTI and the larger HT note that members with a strong financial standing contribute about 20% of their monthly income.⁹² These contributions known as *infaq* are used for HTI's activities. *Infaq* is also collected whenever HTI is embarking on a new project such as the purchase of the office building. By and large, *infaq* seems to be the most important source of income for the party, especially at the provincial and local chapters. The *naqib* and *ma'sul* are responsible for the management of these funds although the party does not pay them. The *infaq* also seems to be divided into two main portions. One portion of the *infaq* is also given to the party's central leadership to assist in national scale activities. This shows that the party's growth seems to be directly impacted by the economic status of its recruits. For instance, in its local chapters such as Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Palembang and Makassar, it has experienced a higher level of success due to the large number of professionals involved in the movement. On the other hand, the party seems to have challenges with funding activities in Bali and Aceh where its recruits tend to be small time businessmen and students.⁹³

The *daris* and allies of the party also contribute to the party's funds. *Daris* are allowed to contribute *infaq* on a voluntary basis. Unlike the *infaq* paid by members, which is contributed monthly, *infaq* from *daris* is requested before the party organizes any major event. Another source of income for HTI seems to be through the sale of publications. These publications include books written by HT and HTI leaders. Members and *daris* are

⁹¹ Interview with HTI leaders including Farid Wajidi, Fahmi Amhar and Muhammad Al-Khaththath.

⁹² Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 25 July 2011, Jakarta.

⁹³ Personal Observation of Author during field work in these areas. For Makassar, see Syamsul Rijal, "Making Hizbiyyin : Hizbut Tahrir in South Sulawesi" (Sub-Thesis, Australian National University, 2009).

expected to purchase some of these books that make up their compulsory reading. HTI would also charge participants a nominal amount at some of their events such as the 2007 *Khilafah* Conference to help in paying for the rental cost of the venue, refreshments, and seminar packages that are given to participants. HTI has also adopted the strategy of making promotional paraphernalia such as T-shirts, buttons and posters, which are sold at its events. The allies of the party also tend to purchase publications and attend events, which also contribute to the party's funds.

A great deal of uncertainty continues to surround the issue of foreign funding of HT and HTI. HT has been accused of receiving funds from Saudi Arabia, Iran and even the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.⁹⁴ There is little evidence that any of these accusations is true given the fact that Wahhabi Muslims have constantly denounced HT as a deviant sect, HT leaders have been relentlessly hurling criticism at Iran, and the Taliban themselves are in dire need of funds, having little to spare for HT which has been critical of its policies.⁹⁵

Former members of the party acknowledged that the party received funding from the central leadership of HT.⁹⁶ It is believed that the party's central leadership received significant contributions from party members in the Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait as well as from members in its Western chapters such as the United Kingdom and Scandinavia.⁹⁷ While Baran had argued that HT received funding from individual businessmen who are not party members, this is highly unlikely given that the party has generally refused to accept even token donations from those outside the party.⁹⁸ These funds are subsequently disbursed to party chapters in the developing world such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Uzbekistan and Sudan. While the amount of these funds is difficult to ascertain, a former member notes that it could amount to several million

⁹⁴ Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 November, 2000; Baran, *Islam's Political Insurgency*, p. 31 and Mateen Siddiqui, "The Doctrine of Hizb ut-Tahrir" in Zeyno Baran (ed) *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology* (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2004), p. 34.

⁹⁵ For a critic of Wahhabis against HT, see http://www.blogistan.co.uk/blog/articles/story_of_an_ex-hizbi Accessed on 13 October 2010. For a critic of the Taliban by HT, see Mahan Abedin, "An Interview with Jalaluddin Patel, Leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK" *Spotlight of Terror*, Vol 8, No 2. Also available at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=2674](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=2674). Accessed on 13 October 2010.

⁹⁶ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 15 February 2010, Jakarta.

⁹⁷ Interview with Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, 29 October 2007, London.

⁹⁸ See Baran, *Islam's Political Insurgency*, p. 31.

dollars. These funds are transferred through wire services. Given the nature of these transfers, it is highly likely that the center for such transfers could be London or Beirut (where there is more laxity in such financial transactions). This source of income is used by HTI to manage large-scale events such as the *Khilafah* Conference in 2007. One former leader of HTI noted that to scale up its activities, HTI could always request for more assistance from the central leadership of HT.⁹⁹ The funding that the party receives from its leadership outside Indonesia also reveals double standards on the part of its leadership. HTI has been the most vocal critic of foreign funding for Indonesian NGOs calling for closer government scrutiny for such funding. Ironically the party itself is receiving funds from outside Indonesia. Given the secretive nature of this funding, it is highly unlikely that the party would have declared these funds, a requirement under Indonesian laws. From the analysis so far, it can be assumed that HTI's strategy of procuring funds has been largely successful. The party has been able to secure enough funds to carry out its activities and pay key members. Members, *daris* and allies of the party also contribute to its funds in different ways, allowing it to have substantially enough to promote and finance its activities.

Violence as a Mobilization Strategy?

Any discussion on HT's mobilization strategy must address the question of HT's attitude towards violence and the potential use of violence as a mobilization strategy due to some accusations about the party's supposed violent tendencies. Several early studies of social movements lead to the conclusion that the use of violence is likely to secure policy changes and access to political power for a social movement.¹⁰⁰ The use of violence has also been shown to increase activists' commitment to social movement organizations.¹⁰¹ This is especially for movements with anti-systemic ideologies that seek an overhaul of a country's political system. However due to the high risks involved in violent actions, social movements might be less inclined to use violence. HTI is an example of the kind

⁹⁹ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 15 October 2010, Jakarta.

See for instance Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Poor People's Movement* (New York: Vintage, 1979) and John Mirowsky and Catherine Ross, "Protest Group Success: The Impact of Group Characteristics, Social Control and Context," *Sociological Focus* 14, no. 3 (1981), pp. 177-192.

¹⁰¹ Verta Taylor and Nella Van Dyke, "Tactical Repertoires of Social Movement" in David A Snow, Sarah A Soule and Hanspreter Kriesi (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 280.

of organization that would have normally adopted violence due to its key objective of replacing the Indonesian political system with a caliphate. Yet the party has not been involved in violence. Nevertheless, the party has not escaped being classified as a violent or potentially violent group. Several terrorism analysts and political commentators studying HT in Europe and Central Asia have suggested that HT supports the use of violence to achieve its goals. The term “conveyor belt for terrorism” has been used in several academic works to describe HT.¹⁰² HT has also come under scrutiny for their alleged support for terrorism. Such views have emerged due to HT’s position on several terrorist attacks. HT has advocated that the 9/11, 7/7 London bombings and other major terror acts were perpetrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as part of America’s plan to undermine the Muslim world.¹⁰³ While HT could be described as a radical group due to its anti-systemic ideology, there is little evidence to show that HT has resorted to violence to further its cause. HT leaders have clarified their stand that the struggle to revive the Caliphate is an intellectual struggle, as it is about convincing people of the importance of the caliphate. They hold that a violent revolution could lead to a new Islamic government, which can never survive, as the society is not sufficiently Islamic to support the new government.

One of the leading scholars on HT, Taji-Farouki has noted that while HT members have advocated *jihad*, HT believes that only the Caliph can call for offensive jihad.¹⁰⁴ Since there is no real Islamic state in the world in their mind, this form of *jihad* cannot be upheld. HTI has also stated its position on terrorism clearly. It has categorically condemned all acts of terrorism such as the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks as un-Islamic while maintaining that US and Britain’s presence in Iraq and Afghanistan are also acts of terror.¹⁰⁵ One of the best examples of its condemnation of terrorism is an article analyzing the Madrid bombings. The writer expounded that even in conditions where *jihad* is valid, the killing of civilians is prohibited and as such terrorist acts like the

¹⁰² Cohen, *Hizb Tahrir and Baran, Islam's Political Insurgency* and Houriyah Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Structure* (London: Center for Social Cohesion, 2009).

¹⁰³ Ismail Yusanto, “War on Terrorism: Antara Fakta dan Propaganda” *Seminar Notes*, 21 June 2004.

¹⁰⁴ Taji Farouki, “Islamists and the Threat of *Jihad*”, p. 29. Another article that has conclusively rejected the notion that HT is a terrorist organization or a conveyor belt for terror is by Swiss scholar Francois-Mayer. See Francois-Mayer, “Hizb ut-Tahrir- The Next Al-Qaida”, 2004.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Jamal Hardwood, London, 30 June 2006.

Madrid bombings are un-Islamic.¹⁰⁶ Interestingly, HT in Indonesia has proven its ability to draw individuals away from violence. There had been a large number of Muslim activists formerly associated with violent Muslim organizations such as the LJ, MMI and FPI who have denounced violence and joined HTI.¹⁰⁷ These new members, through their interaction with HTI, realize that the struggle for Islam is a comprehensive struggle about winning the hearts and minds of people.

HTI's general non-violent position does not mean that the party is avowedly non-violent at all times. The party considers it a religious obligation of Muslims to fight when their lands are occupied. In this regard, HT members are instructed to fight against 'foreign occupiers' in Iraq. A prominent HT leader notes that the party has sacked party members who failed to engage in armed struggle against occupying forces in Southern Lebanon during the Israeli-Hizbollah conflict in 2007 and in Iraq when the Americans entered the country in 2005.¹⁰⁸ HT has also stated that it is the obligation of the caliphate to wage war against any Muslim country that refuses to come under the sovereignty of this state. This means that the party approves the use of violence once the caliphate is born and is willing to use any amount of violence to ensure that all Muslim lands will be re-united under one caliphate.

HTI's Resource Mobilization Strategies: Strengths and Limitations

The success in social movements has been an important theme that theorists of SMT have constantly discussed.¹⁰⁹ Success within the RMT strand of SMT is measured in terms of the ability of movements to procure resources such as funds and manpower as well as the effectiveness of their organizational body in creating discipline amongst movements' activists. Other theorists also emphasize the ability to increase procurement

¹⁰⁶ Javed Ansari, 'Madrid Bombings and the Attempts to Demonise Islam'. In *Khilafah Magazine*, Vol. 17, No. 4, April 2004, p. 10.

¹⁰⁷ Author's Interviews with former members of MMI, FPI and LJ who are now members of HTI. Due to their former links to violent organizations, these activists preferred not to be identified. These interviews were conducted in Mar 2009.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 20 September 2009, Sydney.

¹⁰⁹ See William Gamson, "Defining Movement 'Success'" in Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper (eds) *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts* (Oxford: Blackwell Publications, 2003), p. 350.

of such resources through conducting activities and ensure a continuous flow of these resources for the movement.¹¹⁰ Using these measures of success, HTI's RMT strategies have been largely successful. Since the party's public emergence in 2000, its membership and funds have increased immensely. In terms of its membership, the party has also been successful in recruiting students, women and even some non-Muslims. While the party's success in the building of social capital has been limited, it has made some gains in persuading more of the power elite in Indonesia towards joining its cause. At another level, the party has also been less successful in securing future resources for the party

Growth in Membership

One of the key indicators of HTI's rapid growth is the increase in its membership. While, HT and HTI have made it the party's position not to reveal the exact number of its membership, former HTI leaders have expressed the relative success of HTI on this front. Al-Baghdadi has noted that its actual membership in 1982, when the party found a footing in Indonesia, was only eight key members.¹¹¹ Since then, the party's membership began to expand and reached several hundred in 2000, when the party organized its first official public event. By 2008, the party's membership had ballooned to about thirty thousand members.¹¹² Al-Khaththath also noted that while the number of actual members is small by Indonesian standards, each of these members has at least eight to ten contacts who are party sympathizers or *daris*, many of whom are already committed to the party's aims and objectives. This means that the party has at least two to three hundred thousand members and *daris* that it can draw upon for support. The party has increased its presence from ten provinces in 2000 to all the thirty-three Indonesian provinces by 2008. This is significant in terms of indicating the actual reach of HTI within Indonesia. While membership is an important indicator of growth, other factors, such as HTI's increasing influence, are also important in measuring the success of its recruitment and mobilization strategies.

Important Role in Campuses

¹¹⁰ Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization", p. 142.

¹¹¹ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Jakarta.

¹¹² Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 8 April 2010, Jakarta.

HTI's mobilization strategies have seen the group strengthening its influence in Indonesian society. Despite the fact that HTI is still a small group in Indonesia, its real influence far outweighs its size. In the campuses, GEMA, its student wing, it is also now an important player within Indonesian student movement circles. It plays an important role in student politics in several universities such as UI and the Bandung Technical Institute (*Institute Teknikal Bandung*, ITB). In some of these campuses, GEMA has surpassed many of the more traditional Islamic student movements, such as the HMI and KAMMI.¹¹³ According to a former leader of HMI, GEMA and KAMMI student activists tend to be more active in the campus mosques and have thus superseded the traditional student groups both in numbers and influence. GEMA has yet to contest in student elections due to HTI's rejection of democracy. Its real influence cannot be measured accurately, but student leaders of other Islamic student groups are beginning to see GEMA as a real threat to their survival.

The Impact of Social Capital

HTI's strategies of building social capital with key members of the Indonesian community through engagement with the military, police, intelligence, government officials, and politicians have been largely unsuccessful. With the exception of Siti Fadilah Supari who is no longer a cabinet member, the party cannot boast that any important figure supports its goals. Another group that HTI can claim to be supportive of its goals is lower level government bureaucrats at the provincial level.¹¹⁴ While such claims cannot be quantified, the ease at which HTI operates in Aceh points to this possibility. HTI has been given the task of running the Pesantren Kilat program in all high schools in Banda Aceh by the mayor of Banda Aceh. This program held in the month of Ramadan is a sort of religious course held throughout the month. Many politicians and military leaders are less inclined to HTI's goals and seem more interested to utilize HTI for their own ends rather than help it to achieve its goals.

¹¹³ Interview with Arif Masyudi, former chairman of HMI, 20 March 2010, Jakarta.

¹¹⁴ Interview with members of HTI in Aceh, Iwan Doumy, 22 January 2009, Banda Aceh and Ferdiansyah, 21 January 2009, Banda Aceh.

Another group that HTI claims to have influence over is the leaders of conservative Islamic groups such as FPI. HTI claims to have approached and induced other Islamists, such as the leader of the FPI, Habib Rizieq, to embrace the concept of the caliphate. In an article published in *Suara Islam*, a publication of FUI, Habib Rizieq stated his full support for the Caliphate and even propounded for the formation of the caliphate in the form that HTI has proposed.¹¹⁵ This is a change from an earlier position that Habib Rizieq had adopted in which he stated his support for the Indonesian Pancasila state.¹¹⁶ Habib Rizieq gave his support for the caliphate goal of HTI and also instructed the FPI leadership throughout Indonesia to assist HTI in its activities, prior to HTI's decision to leave FUI. However, Habib Rizieq has also distanced himself from the party after HTI's decision to leave FUI, which he thought was a betrayal of the Islamic cause. The decision of MUI to not reappoint the HTI leader to its board is a manifestation of the limitation of its attempt to build social capital. Ichwan Sam, the Secretary-General of MUI has stated that many MUI leaders are aware of HTI's objective of trying to control the organization and have devised strategies to prevent this from occurring.¹¹⁷

Influencing Government Policies

HTI leaders have constantly focused on its role of pushing for certain laws sympathetic to the Islamic cause to be implemented by the Indonesian government. As a result, HTI has become one of the most influential lobbying groups in Indonesian Islamist circles. Often, HTI will use different platforms to strive for its cause. In 2006, utilizing the FUI, HTI through its former chairman, Muhammad Al-Khaththath, organized the *Aksi Sejuta Ummat* (The Million Muslim March) calling for the enactment of anti-pornography laws.¹¹⁸ The March itself attracted a much smaller crowd but was attended by prominent Islamic leaders in Indonesia. While the march did place some pressure on the Indonesian government to enact the proposed laws, HTI claim as being responsible for inducing the policy change is highly questionable. This is because PKS and even organizations such as MUI and Muhammadiyah played much bigger roles in campaigning for the laws to be

¹¹⁵ Habib Rizieq Shihab, "Selamat Datang *Khilafah* Islamiyyah" *Suara Islam*, 5-19 March 2010. Habib Rizieq also affirms his support for the caliphate in an interview with me. Interview with Habib Rizieq Shihab, 8 March 2010, Jakarta.

¹¹⁶ Andri Rosaldi, *Hitam Putih FPI* (Jakarta: Kayla, 2009).

¹¹⁷ Interview with Ichwan Sam, 7 May 2011, Jakarta.

¹¹⁸ Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir and its Mobilization Strategy in Indonesia", p. 605.

enacted. Another example of HTI's supposed lobbying is the banning of Ahmadiyah. HTI played an important role in amplifying the Ahmadiyah issue and making it known to the laymen in Indonesia.¹¹⁹ It worked with other Islamic groups such as the MUI and the *Badan Koordinasi Penganut Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat Bakorpakem*, (Coordinating Agency For the Overseeing of People's Beliefs) to push for the banning of the Ahmadiyah. Here, the role played by FUI cannot be underestimated. Many of the campaigns and efforts aimed at Ahmadiyah were organized by FUI. As such, HTI claiming sole credit for the campaign is questionable.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to understand HTI's strategies in procuring resources for the party. I have argued that HTI has effectively structured the party's organization, recruited members and procured funds, leading to its growth in Indonesia. The party has been, however, less successful in its attempt at building social capital to secure success for the movement. The analysis of these strategies was undertaken probing under the lens of the RMT strand of SMT. The chapter began by briefly discussing the theoretical underpinnings of RMT and its utility in assessing the strategies of a social movement like HTI to build an organizational structure, recruit members and secure funds. The chapter then explored the concentric circles organizational structure of HTI and examined how this organizational structure was useful for its leadership in controlling the party and its recruitment strategies. It was shown that this organizational structure allowed individuals with different commitment levels to contribute to the party. The second part of the chapter examined the different recruitment strategies that HTI employed to attract different segments of Indonesian society. It was emphasized that the New Order period saw the party building a core group of potential leaders while the post New Order period saw the party expanding membership by increasing the numbers of sympathizers and allies. This section also evaluated the mass recruitment strategies such as the use of publications, mass media, public events and mosques, which were mainly aimed at recruiting sympathizers for the party. On the other hand, the targeted approaches undertaken by the party to recruit potential members through the use of formal organizations, such as Muslimah HTI, and front organizations like GEMA and AFKN,

¹¹⁹ ICG, "Ahmadiyah Decree", p. 12.

also proved to be effective. The third section of the chapter examined HTI's attempt at building social capital. Here it was argued that the party's strategy largely failed to influence any important military, political and religious figure to support its cause. A discussion was also accorded to the possible use of violence as HTI's mobilization strategy. It was argued that this was unlikely given the party's reservations about engaging in any offensive jihad before a caliphate is formed. The last section of the chapter made an assessment of the success and limitations of HTI's resource mobilization strategies on the party's growth in Indonesia. It took the position that although the party had grown in terms of numbers and influence in certain segments of Indonesian society, its political and religious clout remained dubious at best due to its inability to build social capital. Ultimately, HTI's current growth does not necessarily ensure that it will continue along the same growth trajectory, since it can be halted by dwindling membership and inadequate funds, especially if the party is unable to secure these future resources. The ability of HTI to retain members and secure other resources are key to its survival as a movement. A discussion will be accorded to the important question of retention in Chapter 7. The next chapter of the thesis will look at the strength of HTI's ideas in comparison to those of other Islamist movements.

CHAPTER SIX: THE POWER OF IDEAS, THE IDEOLOGY OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA

I use to wreck discos when I was with the FPI. After several weeks the disco would be up and running again but in HTI, I am changing people's minds with the strength of our ideas. Now I try to change the mind of the disco owners and if I am successful, within days the discos will be closed and will never open again. I don't need to shed any blood or hurt anyone. That is the power of ideas. We can change the world with ideas. (Abu Ammar, Former member of FPI and Current Member of HTI, 29 January 2011, Pekanbaru)

In March 2011, Farid Wajidi, one of the leaders of HTI wrote an article titled, *The War of Ideologies* in which he stated the view that there is a current conflict between Islam and the West. He wrote:

The rise of Islam, the implementation of Islamic laws and the promulgation of the caliphate cannot be stopped by Western colonial powers, world leaders who forget that they are facing an ideology that is originating purely from God. They are facing Muslim activists who are sincere, willing to sacrifice their lives to re-establish the caliphate. It is nearing the end for the West and they know it.¹

The depiction of a struggle of ideology between Islam and the West is a constant theme portrayed by HTI to mobilize its members towards collective action. HTI leaders and members show intense determination to revive the caliphate emphasizing that this task is an obligation of all Muslims. For members of HTI, it is a *fardhu ain* (individual obligation) for Muslims to ensure that a caliph exists within the Muslim world to which his or her loyalty is shown. This is different from the views of other Muslim groups that see it as *fardhu kifayah* (community obligation) For HTI members, the revival of the caliphate constitutes the only way for Muslims to overcome their political upheavals and return to the glory days of Islam. The caliphate discourse has become an important tool of recruitment and mobilization for HTI.

¹ Farid Wajidi, "Perang Ideologi", Accessed from <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2011/06/05/perang-ideologi/> on 10 July 2011.

Beyond the inter-ideological conflict with the West, HTI has also embarked on an intra-Islamism debate as highlighted in the statement made by Abu Ammar implying that HTI's ideology is indeed superior to that of other Islamist movements in Indonesia. This chapter seeks to explain why members choose to join HTI over other Islamist movements. Borrowing the concept of ideology as proposed by British political theorist, Michael Freeden, this chapter argues that HTI's rationalistic, anti-systemic ideology explains the choice of members in choosing HTI over other Islamic groups. This is one of the factors accounting for the growth of HTI in Indonesia.² There will be three sections in this chapter. The first section examines the academic discussions about the concept of ideology. It examines the concept and explores ways ideology can be reconciled with SMT. The second discusses ideology of HT. This segment will apply Freeden's definition of ideology in which he described as comprising core, adjacent and peripheral concepts in examining HTI's ideology. The third section will examine how ideology has shaped members' thinking towards HT and other movements. It will show that ideology accounts for why individuals choose to join HTI over other Islamic movements.

The Concept of Ideology

Ideology surfaced during a revolutionary period in world's history and thus carried evaluative and politicized connotations. Marx and Engels introduced a pejorative approach to the study of ideology when they referred to ideology as a class motivated deception of the bourgeoisie, which was contrasted, with the 'correct' understanding of the working class.³ The Marxist understanding of ideology led to counter views about ideology stating that it is the theories of liberal democracy and capitalism that are objective while Marxism is a distorted ideology. Such pejorative use of ideology has led to the unpopularity of the term. As the concept evolved, it is simply seen as a set of political beliefs about how society ought to be.⁴ Regardless of the long tradition of the

² Rationalistic here refers to the use of reason and logic to derive decisions related to Islamic laws. A sect that is often described as rationalistic is the *Mu'tazilah*. For details of the *Mu'tazilah*, see Richard C Martin, Mark Woodward and D. S. Atmaja, *Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism: From Medieval School to Modern Symbol* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997).

³ Michael Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 6.

⁴ Ian Adams, *Political Ideology Today* (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 3.

pejorative use of the term, ideology has been used in non-pejorative ways. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian made an observation that:

Ideologies are prescriptions or maps that tell the individual how to look at events and people, and they provide a simplifying perspective through which the observer can make sense of otherwise overwhelmingly complex phenomena and find definiteness in otherwise vague and uncertain impressions.⁵

In essence, Turner and Killian postulated ideology as a product of active social construction processes by which people understand their circumstances and their possible courses of action. John Wilson's *Introduction to Social Movements* defines ideology as "a set of beliefs about the social world and how it operates, containing statements about the rightness of certain social arrangements and what action would be undertaken in the light of those statements."⁶ Wilson furthers his argument of ideology by introducing a trichotomy of structural elements that constitute an ideology: diagnosis (how things got to be how they are), prognosis (which should be done and what the consequences will be), and rationale (who should do it and why). The approach taken by Wilson as well as Turner and Killian provided an account of reality. Ideology is seen as a static concept, which does not change. However, this definition cannot satisfactorily explain the ideology of Islamism. Islamism, as will be discussed later in the chapter, is not a static ideology but is constantly being defined and re-defined.

Another theorist that sought to move away from the pejorative approach to ideology is Karl Mannheim. Mannheim referred to ideology as total systems of thought held by society's ruling groups to preserve the status quo and hence their political positions. On the other hand, utopia is defined as total systems of thoughts forged by groups opposed to the ruling elites who are interested in the total transformation of society and thus subscribe to a system of ideas that direct total change of society. Mannheim advanced that view that

⁵ Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behaviour*, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 270

⁶ John Wilson, *Introduction to Social Movements* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 91-92.

A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the immediate situation and when passed onto actions, tends to shatter the order of things.⁷

A key strength of Mannheim's definition of ideology is that it has brought forth a new understanding of ideology; that ideas could be generated objectively. He noted that there is a dimension of relativism within ideology, which means that ideologies are not static concepts. Mannheim also believes that a group of individuals will break away from ideologies and arrive at a point of agreement, which will be largely non-ideological. Such an assumption is problematic given that it is highly unlikely that individuals can move away from values attached to ideologies. This is especially so if they have adhered to these ideals for an extended period. While acknowledging the relative nature of ideologies, Mannheim believes that to achieve objectivity, one will need to rid himself of ideology.

Building on Mannheim's relativist understanding of ideology, British political theorist Michael Freeden presented a new approach to understanding ideologies when he urged scholars to observe the morphology of ideologies to better understand the impact of ideology within political life. He proffered that ideologies are made up of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts.⁸ The core concepts within an ideology are concepts that all adherents of a particular ideology use, without which the ideology loses its ideational profile. Some of these core concepts such as the concept of liberty within liberalism will never migrate to an adjacent or peripheral position.⁹ Each of the core concepts have a different meaning that could be better understood as adjacent and peripheral concepts that radiate out from the core concepts, forming interpretative paths constituting different pattern of conceptual combinations within the core concepts.¹⁰ Adjacent concepts form a second layer of understanding that are also attached to the core concepts while peripheral concepts are concepts that are less important within the ideology but nevertheless define certain aspects of this ideology. Concepts can change to adapt to newer political developments and might even borrow from different ideologies. Freeden propounded

⁷ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & K Paul, 1966). p. 341.

⁸ Michael Freeden, *Ideology and Political Theories: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 77-78.

⁹ *ibid*, p. 84.

¹⁰ Michael Freeden, "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?," *Political Studies* 46, no. 4 (1998), p.752.

that the success of an ideology depends on its ability to impose the belief that its own conceptual definitions are the most accurate. Thus, de-contestation of concepts happens continuously in inter-ideological and intra-ideological conceptual competitions.¹¹ Concepts that are seen to be weaker will descend and over time will diminish in definitions of an ideology. An example of the inter-ideological conceptual competition is the concept of freedom of expression. While this concept is hailed as an important tenet of liberalism, it is rejected within Islamism, which argues that freedom of expressions must be within the ambit of Islamic laws. An example of intra-ideological conceptual competition is the differing attitudes of Islamists towards democracy. While many Islamists such as MB see democracy as a modern expression of the Islamic concept of *Shura* (Consultation), other Islamists such as the *Salafis* view democracy as an un-Islamic concept. The *Salafis* argue that ultimately sovereignty should be in the hands of God and not human beings making the concept run counter to Islam.

Freeden's analysis of ideology possesses a number of virtues. Firstly, ideology is detached from both the Marxist's political-economy approach and from the assumption that ideologies are forms of irrational thinking that need to be corrected. Secondly, it displays considerable intellectual imagination by calling for thought-exercises designed to re-draw old ideological boundaries and re-classify ideological systems.¹² Lastly, it re-appraises conventional classification within systems of ideology.¹³ This means that a possibility exist that there will be wholesale ideological transformations. Thus, scholars must be prepared to re-think, alter and substitute obsolete conceptual morphologies that do not denote the dynamics of contemporary political belief systems. Freeden's conception of ideology is thus a more nuanced approach to understanding ideologies like Islamism.

Ideology in Social Movement Theory

Ideology has been a largely ignored concept within SMT. This discounting of ideology began with Snow and colleagues who used the terms framing and ideology

¹¹ Freeden, *Short History*, p. 57.

¹² Manfred B Steger, "Ideologies of Globalization," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 1 (2005), p. 12.

¹³ *ibid.*

interchangeably in their now famed introduction to the concept of framing. Adopting Wilson's conception of the three elements of ideology, Snow [et al] made a case that the process of framing can be understood in similar terms and introduced the concepts of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. Since then, framing has largely replaced ideology. Several scholars of SMT have raised disagreements with the framing variant of SMT.¹⁴ Pamela Olivier and Hank Johnston in their criticism of framing noted that framing theorists have often used frames synonymously with ideology and have failed to assess the relationship between ideology and framing. In trying to establish the relationship between framing and ideology, Oliver and Johnston explained that:

Ideology is complex and deeply held. People learn them or are socialized into them. While a framing effort may successfully persuade someone that a particular issue can be explained by an ideology, framing processes do not persuade people to adopt whole new ideologies. At best, they may initiate the journey. Frame alignment theory and theories of ideology suggest very different accounts of the creation of ideas by movement intellectuals and the transmission of them to those whom they recruit. It is well recognized that intellectuals or "idea specialists" in social movements play different roles from the mass of other participants. In frame alignment theory, people's belief systems are taken largely as givens, and movement intellectuals perform the marketing task of packaging their issue so that it will be accepted by others.¹⁵

In essence, the framing process describes the marketing and resonating aspects of a concept whereas ideology involves the process of education and thinking about the same concept.¹⁶ They were also critical of Snow [et al] for purportedly suggesting that ideology should be taken out of discussions on framing.

In a rejoinder to the piece by Olivier and Johnston, Snow [et al] asserted that Olivier and Johnston misunderstood their definition of ideology and framing. They denied calling for ideology to be replaced with framing. They claimed that their main intent was to show how certain belief systems constrain the usage of framing strategies in mobilization.

¹⁴ Benford noted that framing is often inserted uncritically wherever there is a movement-related idea being defined or debated. Jasper argued that framing tends to reduce the richness of culture to recruitment strategies and Steinberg felt that framing theory tends to be too static and highlights the contextual qualities of frame. Robert Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective" *Sociological Inquiry* 67(1997), p. 409-430; Steven Hart, "The Cultural Dimension of Social Movements: A Theoretical Assessment and Literature Review," *Sociology of Religion* 57, no. 1 (1996), pp. 87-101; James M Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) and Warc Steinberg, "Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Framing from a Discursive Turn," *Theory and Society* 27, no. 6 (1998), pp.845-862.

¹⁵ Olivier and Johnston "What a Good Idea", p. 37.

¹⁶ *ibid*, p. 46.

However, they agreed that there was no attempt on their part to explicitly differentiate between the concept frames and ideology. In spite of this admission, Snow [et al] did not offer any new framework to understanding ideologies and frames or the differences between them. It was simply stated that distinctions between the two concepts could only be ascertained by a detailed empirical study.¹⁷ The debate between Olivier and Johnston and Snow [et al] highlighted several points. Both works agreed about the need for ideology to be considered in a more serious fashion within studies of social movements. These works also suggest that a more dynamic understanding of ideology would dispel earlier criticisms of ideology as being a static and unchanging concept. Regardless of this, both works fail to propose how ideology can be brought back into SMT. This chapter proposed that the gap between ideology and SMT could be addressed by using Freeden's definition of ideology.

Freeden's morphological approach to ideologies focuses specifically on the interconnections between ideas. It allows for political concepts to be contested and de-contested. Ideologies also tend to have a greater weight and tradition than the frames utilized by activists, since the ideological concepts have been subject to extended philosophical development over many years.¹⁸ Freeden's conception of ideology addresses two criticisms that SMT theorists have leveled against the concept. Freeden's concept of ideology does not contain the pejorative attitudes that ideology is often associated with. In addition, it solves the issue of ideology being understood as a static and unchanging concept, which inevitably resolves the contention that the concept does not fit rational choice theory.

The Ideology of HTI

HT defines itself as a political party with Islam as its ideology. It claims to limit its activities to politics and aims to implement Islamic laws and restore the caliphate. The

¹⁷ David Snow, "Framing Processes, Ideology and Discursive Fields" in David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 399.

¹⁸ Kevin Gillan, "Understanding Meanings in Movements: A Hermeneutic Approach to Frames and Ideologies," *Social Movement Studies* 7, no. 3 (2008), p. 263.

party believes that it is only through the revival of the caliphate that the dilemmas affecting the Muslim world can be resolved. HT's ideology can be categorised as being a variant of the ideology of Islamism.¹⁹ Upon setting up HT, An-Nabhani outlined the party's objectives that included the revival of the Muslim world from its perceived decline; the liberation of Muslims from the thoughts, systems and laws of unbelievers; and the re-establishment of the caliphate.²⁰ For An-Nabhani, Islam is an ideology (*mabda'a*), which comprises an idea (*fikrah*) and method (*tareeqah*).²¹ This notion, for An-Nabhani, encapsulates the basic doctrine of Islam as well as the solutions and regulations that emanate from it. An-Nabhani asserted that existing movements have failed for several reasons. He notes that these movements were established based on an imprecise idea (*fikrah*), which was vague and lacked focus. Secondly, the movements did not define a method (*Tareeqah*) to implement their idea; rather, they proceeded through arbitrary and twisted means. Thirdly, the movements relied upon individuals who lacked awareness and determination. Lastly, individuals involved in these movements did not have a correct bond amongst them and were merely bound by their membership, actions and titles.²² To resolve these problems, An-Nabhani proposed that individuals must undergo a culturing process in which they are taught an ideologically correct culture. Taking them through this culturing process requires that each one of them assumes the role of a beginner (student), whose mind is reshaped anew. After generating harmony amongst individual associated with the movement, the next task would be to unite these individual and the society.²³ In essence, An-Nabhani envisaged Muslim individuals whose thinking will be shaped by HT and would carry HT's message to the larger Muslim society as proponents of the party.

Borrowing from Freeden's conception of ideology, HT's ideology can be analyzed in terms of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts. Core concepts within the HT ideology include the implementation of Islamic laws and promulgation of the caliphate. These core concepts are further defined by adjacent concepts, which include the concept of an Islamic political system, an Islamic economic system and unity of the *ummah*. These

¹⁹ The concept of Islamism is first discussed in Chapter 1.

²⁰ Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *Islamic State* (London: Khilafah Publishers, 1998), p. 10.

²¹ Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *The Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir*, p. 52

²² Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *The Structuring of a Party* (London: Khilafah Publishers, 2001), p. 11.

²³ *ibid*, p. 12

concepts explain and to a certain extent define the core concept of HT's ideology. The peripheral concept within its ideology is the idea of *jihad*. The adjacent and peripheral concepts are by no means exhaustive. The choice of these concepts was made due to more attention accorded to them by HT. In essence, the ideology of HT can be described as an anti-systemic ideology that seeks to overturn completely the Indonesian political, economic and social system.

Core Concepts

The two most important core concepts in HTI's ideology are the concepts of Islamic laws and the caliphate. This section will analyze these concepts in greater details.

Islamic Laws

The implementation of Islamic laws has been a constant theme reiterated by almost all Islamist groups in the modern era. For HT, it is the most important concept within its ideology. It is stated that the implementation of Islamic laws is an obligation of all Muslims. HT is of the view that it is prohibited in Islam for man to use his intellect as the sole source of legislation.²⁴ An-Nabhani proposed that the source of legislation must be the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (the Practice of Prophet Muhammad), *Ijma' Al-Sahabah* (interpretations of laws by the Prophet's companions) and *qiyas* (reasoning) as legal resources that could be used in determining a ruling on a particular jurisprudence issue.²⁵

HT also accepts all major law schools (*mazhab*) within both *Sunni* and *Shiite* Islam as long as these views do not contradict the core values of its ideas. HT espoused that a Muslim should follow one *mazhab* in each Islamic rituals. For instance, upon understanding the views of the different *mazhab* a Muslim can choose to follow the *Shafi'e mazhab* in matters of prayers while adopting the *Hanafie mazhab* in matters related to pilgrimage. Essentially, a person cannot mix and match the views of the

²⁴ Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, *The Method to Re-Establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2002), p. 49.

²⁵ An-Nabhani, *Islamic State*, p. 242.

different *mazhab* in one area of ritual. If a Muslim decides that he is to follow the *Shafi'e mazhab*, he has to abide to this *mazhab*'s teachings on all matters related to prayers. Closely related to this is HT's position on traditionalists' rituals such as *tahlilan* (reciting versus from the Koran or supplications at least once a week) and *maulid* (special verses and supplications to celebrate a special day). One HTI leader noted "reading verses from the Qur'an and other supplications for the dead will result them being rewarded by God".²⁶ This meant that in Indonesia, HTI accepts *tahlilan* as a valid ritual. HTI's approach to *tahlilan* and its position on *mazhab* have made it more acceptable for many traditional Muslims especially among some of the more conservative traditionalist *ulama* in Indonesia. In a similar fashion, HT does not reject the teachings of *Shiite* Islam and has many members of this sect in Iraq and Lebanon. For instance, Osman Bakhash, the HT Central Media representative hails from a *Shiite* background.

In a booklet produced by HTI in 2002, the party stated that Islamic laws are God's laws that were sent to humanity through Prophet Muhammad to encompass every aspect of life from personal hygiene to administration of the state. These laws are thus sacred and must be treated with the utmost respect.²⁷ Critics of HT have leveled accusations against the party that its approach to Islamic laws as being too lax and 'rational'. The most quoted example is the permissibility for HT members to view photos of people in the nude. An-Nabhani has clarified that photos are simply objects and that it was only forbidden for Muslims to view another person in the nude if the person is physically present.²⁸ An-Nabhani also believed that it was permissible for a Muslim to handshake a person of the opposite sex, a practice deemed by conservative Muslims as contravening Islamic teachings. This was the official position of HT until 1990 when the party decided that the issue of pornography is too damaging and simply withdrew discussions on the issue from any of HT's official publications.²⁹

²⁶ See the response of Shiddiq Al-Jawi, a key leader of HTI on the issue of *tahlilan* at http://www.khilafah1924.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=205&Itemid=37. Accessed on 23 July 2011.

²⁷ Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, *Selamatkan Indonesia Dengan Syariah: Seruan Kepada Wakil Rakyat dan Ummat* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2002), p. 7.

²⁸ The issue of pornography was discussed in UK version of the *Al-Wa'ie* magazine in February 1990. Interview with a Member of HT from Germany. Ex-members such as Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain confirmed this as well. Interview with Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, 29 October 2007, London.

²⁹ Interview with a Member of HT from Germany and another member from Malaysia.

HT has generally taken a more casual approach towards fulfilling basic Islamic rituals. While An-Nabhani himself did not explicitly prioritize the duty of reviving the caliphate over their basic rituals, ex-members of HT have noted that the party emphasized party activities over basic Islamic rituals such as prayers. Former members of HT such as Ed Husain and Maajid Nawaz cited several instances of HT members missing their prayers due to their involvement in the demonstrations and public events.³⁰ During the 2010 Beirut conference, I noticed that HT members did not take time off from the event to offer prayers in a congregation preferring to use the time instead to network and speak to members of the press.³¹ While this does not contravene Islamic teachings, most Muslims would often prioritize the act of prayer above all other activities.³² Another example of this rational thought is the party's position on music. The party not only allows all kinds of music as long as its lyrics do not promote un-Islamic ideas but has officially sanctioned members using music in their *da'awah* efforts.³³ The party's approach to Islamic legislation is one of the key attractions for members in the movement. The party's rational approach to Islamic legislation at the personal realm is seen as a key attraction as many younger Muslims might like the political aspirations of implementing Islamic laws at the state level but might not want to abide by a set of rigid laws in their personal lives.

The Caliphate

Another core concept of the HTI's ideology is the idea of the caliphate. For HTI, no current state in the world is Islamic and all are regarded as *dar al-kufr* (abode of infidels) or *dar al-harb* (abode of war).³⁴ Only with the establishment of the caliphate will the first *dar al-Islam* (abode of Muslims) be formed. This is seen as the most important component of its ideology. An-Nabhani wrote in *The Islamic State* that the appointment of the caliph is an obligation upon the Muslims. He added an extra stipulation that it is sinful for Muslims to spend more than two nights without giving a *bai'ah* (oath of

³⁰ Interview with Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, 29 October 2007, London.

³¹ Personal Observation of Author at the HT International Media Conference 5-7 July 2010.

³² Muslims who are traveling are given the leniency to perform their obligatory prayers at a later time rather than the usual specified time.

³³ Madeline Gruene, "Demographics and Methods of Recruitment" in Zeyno Baran (ed) *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology* (Washington: Nixon Centre, 2004), pp. 118-119.

³⁴ An-Nabhani, *Islamic State*, p.221

allegiance) to a caliph. The sin would be forgiven only if a Muslim continued to endeavor towards the formation of a caliphate. In justifying his argument, An-Nabhani quoted a *Hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad in which the Prophet said that, "He who died not knowing the *Imam* of his time has died a death of *Jahiliyyah* (age of ignorance and sin)"³⁵ An-Nabhani is thus making a case that it is an obligation for all Muslims to work towards reviving the caliphate and since in the views of *hizbiyyin*, HT is the only Islamic movement working towards the caliphate, it is then imperative on all Muslims to be members of HT. HT members are not sinning since they are struggling to revive the caliphate.³⁶ Another implication of this belief is that a HT member who leaves the party is then viewed as having committed a grave sin. Unlike some of the more radical *Salafis* of the *takfiri* orientation, HT members do not condemn other Muslims as apostates.³⁷ Rather, these Muslims are viewed as weak Muslims and hence are not part of the chosen elites (who are HT members). Even so, HT do consider individuals who have left the party as sinners and often avoid having contact with the person especially if these individuals become critical of the party. In this regard, HT can be said to adopt an "enclave culture", a term coined by Emmanuel Sivan to describe fundamentalists who construct a wall of virtue based on moral values. This wall separates the superior individuals from the central community who were sinning.³⁸ Lately, some HT members have insisted that the first caliph must be the *Amir* of HT. While some in HT are against this idea, others have asserted that such a stance is necessary since only HT has the right ideas and methodology to go about executing the building of a caliphate.³⁹ As a result, due to the esteemed position of the *Amir*, HT members are required to obey the *Amir* and any acts of disobedience may result in expulsion. *Hizbiyyins* are often drilled with the idea that allegiance to the *Amir* is equivalent to loyalty to the party. This has ensured that members remain part of the party even when breakaway groups emerge at lower levels of the leadership.

³⁵ *ibid*, p. 222.

³⁶ HTI published a booklet highlighting the problems with the Muslim world due to its failure to revive the Islamic caliphate. See Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, *79 Tahun Tanpa Khilafah Islamiyah* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2003).

³⁷ A concept within Islamic jurisprudence denoting a Muslim who is an apostate and thus should be punished through killing. One of the modern advocates of this concept is Sayyid Qutb. See S Khatib, "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb" *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no 3 (2002), pp. 145-170.

³⁸ Emmanuel Sivan, "The Enclave Culture" in M Marty (ed) *Fundamentalism Comprehended*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 30.

³⁹ Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, 10 August 2009, Bogor.

In defining the methodology to achieve the Islamic state and caliphate, An-Nabhani and HT proposed the three-step process of culturing, interaction and establishing the caliphate as highlighted in Chapter 2. The party also criticizes approaches advocated by groups such as the MB to achieving this goal. The main criticism against MB is its approach of *tadaruj* (gradualism). HT espoused that such views demean the Islamic religion as it implies that Islam is imperfect and can only be implemented in stages. HT leaders also noted that often the gradualist approach results in failure. They wrote that MB, which works within the political systems of many countries, has failed to accomplish its goals either through the electoral process or through passive resistance. Another methodology that the party criticizes is the method of military struggle or violence. Here the party cited the example of Prophet Muhammad who sought to overthrow the ruling elites in Mecca. The Prophet never used violence to do so. This means that it is wrong for Muslims to use violence as well. In their criticism of the methods used by the more violent groups in Indonesia, such as FPI after the Monas incident, Ismail Yusanto noted that it is impossible for the caliphate to be established through violence. Citing the example of Algeria, Yusanto said that violence is just going to breed hatred against one another.⁴⁰ The third methodology that HT is critical of is the belief that a Muslim should perfect himself first before embarking on any political actions. To HT, this concept is dangerous as Muslims will then be apolitical and keeps themselves away from vital issues such as the re-establishment of the caliphate and will focus exclusively on their personal lives. Harith Abu Ulya opined that this is the sort of Muslim that the enemies of Islam want to create. He cited a “report” obtained from the British archives stating that it was part of the British strategy in India to support the work of the *Tablighi Jamaat*. The ‘report’ claimed that the British’s political control will be solidified if Muslims are apolitical as encouraged by the TJ.⁴¹ It is obvious that its criticism of other methodologies adopted to revive the Islamic state and caliphate are

⁴⁰ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 20 March 2010, Jakarta.

⁴¹ The question of whether this report existed is debatable. However, the *Tablighi Jamaat* have been widely criticized by other Muslim groups for the respect the group showed to the British government. The most quoted example of this is a book written by Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi, one of the founders of the movement where he showed his reverence for the British by writing that the British had every right to arrest him even without any concrete reason as they are the rulers and must thus be put in high esteemed. See Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi, *Tazkiratur Rashid* (Delhi: n.p., 1950), p. 80.

directed at other Islamist and Islamic groups including MB, violent Islamists and TJ.⁴² This is an example of an intra-ideological competition for HT to show its 'superior' methodology and ideology as compared to other Islamists groups.

Beyond highlighting the methodology of reviving the caliphate, An-Nabhani also wrote extensively about the structure and components of the Islamic state. He highlighted four key principles that must guide this state: (a) sovereignty belongs to the *Shari'ah* (b) authority belongs to the *ummah* (Muslim community) (c) the appointment of a single caliph (d) that the caliph alone reserves the right to enact laws. An-Nabhani believed that if any of these principles were missing, the ruling system would be non-Islamic. For a land to be considered an Islamic state, the country's constitution and law, must emanate respect entirely from the *Shari'ah*.⁴³ Therefore, these four principles must be enforced. The basis of the state is the caliph and final authority in all matters must be bestowed on him. The caliph can appoint pious Muslims to the positions of his Assistants; the Commander of *Jihad*; the Judiciary; the Administrative staff; and the *Majlis Al Ummah* (*Assembly of the People*). The structure of the State would be complete if these elements were in place. However, even if any of these pillars of the state structure are absent, the State would still remain Islamic as long as a caliph has been appointed. The *Majlis al-Ummah* will be elected by the people and members of this assembly will then appoint a caliph from its midst.⁴⁴ This is a contradiction to its said principle that the sovereignty of the state must be in the hands of God. HT is perhaps one of the few Islamic groups that enacted a constitution for its proposed state, which contained features of alternative political, economic and social systems. An-Nabhani also proposed that the state must be a unitary state claiming to emulate the Ottoman caliphate in doing so.

The above features of the state are important in several aspects. Firstly, HT's claim to revive the caliphate is not based on any historical precedence.⁴⁵ While the party constantly claimed that it aims to emulate the four rightly guided caliphs, the political and economic systems that they seek to establish were not in existence even during the time of the four first caliphs of Islam. In fact the first four caliphs themselves also

⁴² Interview with Harith Abu Ulya, 5 October 2011, Jakarta

⁴³ An-Nabhani, *Islamic State*, p. 240.

⁴⁴ *ibid*, pp. 244-245.

⁴⁵ This was highlighted by Olivier Roy, see Roy, *Globalised Islam*, p.

differed in the way they administered the caliphate.⁴⁶ The last of the caliphs, the Ottoman caliphate did not meet several of the four principles set by HT. The authority of the state remained in the hands of the caliph and ordinary Muslims did not have any authority within the state. The Ottoman caliphate was also monarchical, which contravenes HT's principle. The laws in the Ottoman caliphate were not always based on the *Shari'ah*. Many pre-Islamic Turkish traditions and laws had a major impact on the state's legislation.⁴⁷ In a way, HT was thus reconstructing the traditional concept of the caliphate by offering a modern vision of it. Secondly, the criterion that the party places on the principles of the caliphate means that no single Muslim country can be seen as a truly Islamic state. Hence, the party rejects all other models for an Islamic state based on the argument that these states cannot be considered to be truly Islamic. Due to the un-Islamic nature, these governments are deemed as illegal and must thus be opposed and replaced.

Adjacent Concepts

Beyond the core concepts within its ideology, there are several adjacent concepts that make up HT's ideology. Freedon wrote that certain concepts can provide definitions to different ideologies.⁴⁸ As such, while the ideologies of democracy and liberty might have their ineliminable cores, they are filled out in a distinctive way due to their mutual proximity.⁴⁹ In this sense, within the ideology of liberty, democracy is an important adjacent concept and hence provides an important meaning to the ideology. In the same way the concept of liberty is an adjacent concept, which provides an important meaning to the ideology of democracy.

Similar to the other ideologies, several adjacent concepts give important meanings to the ideology of HT. HT's core concepts, the Islamic laws and caliphate provide the framework that must be filled with details which can be found in adjacent concepts such as the Islamic political system, Islamic economy and the unity of the *ummah*. Its leaders in Indonesia and beyond often expound these concepts in great detail in various HT

⁴⁶ For details of these differences, see Ira Lapidus, *History of Islamic Societies*, pp. 34-38.

⁴⁷ Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (New York: AA Knoff Inc, 1973), p.38.

⁴⁸ Freedon, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 76

⁴⁹ *ibid*, p. 78

literatures as well as in speeches. The ascend and descend of concepts within ideologies to core, adjacent and peripheral is a common process which is undertaken to ensure that the ideology remains relevant.

Islamic Political System

HT advocates that in the caliphate, several tenets of the state must be observed. A key tenet of the caliphate is the fact that the caliph is appointed by the people, and hereditary rule based on notions of divine right is forbidden. This consultation process is served through the establishment of representative councils composed of men and women from all religions and ethnic groupings. HT's position on the appointment of the caliph is perhaps the most confusing aspect of its political system. This process, which is referred to as *bai'ah* can assume many styles including voting by ticking a card or email.⁵⁰ In spite of the similarity between the electoral process and elections within democratic processes, the party remained opposed to democracy. A manifestation of this anti-democracy position is seen in campaigns undertaken by HT in different countries to boycott elections stating that electoral participation is prohibited in Islam. While acknowledging the similarity between the Islamic political system and democracy, it is the conduct and rationale of elections in a democracy that the party finds problematic. Fahmi Amhar explained that elections are held in a democracy so that legislators can enact laws. Since the constitution and political system in all Muslim countries are not Islamic, this will automatically mean that process of enacting the laws and hence the process of electing the legislators is un-Islamic.⁵¹

The Islamic political system must also entail the formation of a government that is open and accountable. It is a right of the people to question or criticize the decisions of the ruler especially if he contravenes Islamic laws. The difference between this system and that of a democracy is that final power within a democracy rests in the hands of the populace.⁵² For HT, the act of legislating new laws must comply with the tenets of the

⁵⁰ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 1 July 2010, Sydney.

⁵¹ Interview with Fahmi Amhar, 9 August 2010, Jakarta.

⁵² Abdul Qadeem Zalloum, *Democracy is a System of Kufr*, (London: Khilafah Publications, 1995), p. 7.

Shari'ah. Thus, the act of electing legislators to draft and ratify laws that could contravene the *Shari'ah* is equally unacceptable.

Islamic Economic System

Another important adjacent concept for HTI's ideology is the concept of an Islamic economy. At the most basic level, An-Nabhani argued that Islam believes strongly in the fair distribution of wealth and that interest (*riba'*), is prohibited within an Islamic economic system. An-Nabhani had also written that all money must be pegged against the value of gold and avered that the current system of pegging currencies against the US dollars is un-Islamic. Another dimension of the Islamic economy template is the belief that 'public goods' such as water and oil cannot be sold as commodities and must be distributed without charge. HT also rejects all forms of taxes except those ordained by Islam such as *zakat* and *ushr* (land taxes).⁵³ An-Nabhani asserted that both the capitalist and communist economic systems are un-Islamic.

HT members try to put into practice their beliefs in an Islamic economic system in their personal lives. Rahmat Kurnia asserted that it is important for HT to begin encouraging members to adopt the practices of the future caliphate. He acknowledges that current state of the international economic system makes it is impossible for a Muslim to avoid dealing with the prohibited aspects of the capitalist economy, such as using paper money in transactions.⁵⁴ Even so, it is obligatory for members of HTI to avoid practices that are 'disallowed' by Islam if such acts can be evaded. A case in point is the purchase of goods such as cars and houses on credit. As a result, most HT members often live in rented homes or homes inherited from their families. In a paradox within the party, many HT and HTI members continue to work in the banking and financial industries despite the fact that these institutions are the backbone of the capitalist economic system. This contradiction is best depicted in an interview with a HT member in Britain in 2007. The interview was held in a cafe at the heart of London's business district, the Canary Wharf where his office was located. This HT member works for a firm that deals in financial services. The focus of the interview was on capitalism. Despite being at the heart of the

⁵³ Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *The Economic System of Islam* (London: Khilafah Publications, 1997), p. 4.

⁵⁴ Interview with Rahmat Kurnia, 1 October 2009, Jakarta.

Britain's capitalist economy and working in a organization, which feeds on the capitalist economy, he did not think that his ideological criticisms against capitalism is at odds with his own life.⁵⁵ It is indeed interesting that many HT members have a rather contradictory position on capitalism. While they support HT's Islamic economic system, they seem to contradict this position through their direct involvement in capitalistic venture, the very system that they seek to eradicate. HTI leaders noted that members of the party who are involved in such capitalist ventures are encouraged to look for alternative employment opportunities but noted that members are not expected to leave their jobs if they are unable to find alternative jobs.

Unity of the Ummah

Another adjacent concept within the ideology of HT is the concept of the *ummah*. The *ummah* is defined here as all believing Muslims. HT advocates strongly that all Muslims are equal in the eyes of God regardless of their colour, ethnicity and nationality. It is only piety that differentiates two Muslims. At a macro level, HT does not recognize the borders within the Muslim world, as it believes strongly that these borders are colonial constructs designed to weaken Muslims.⁵⁶ Many of the Muslim countries created through the process of redrawing of borders are perceived to be artificial creations of the West. They believe that nationalism was spread within the Muslim world to weaken the Muslims and traced the collapse of the caliphate to the creation of Arab nationalism aimed at undermining the caliphate led by the Turks. In several countries where the state ideology is nationalism, HT has been the most fervent critic of this concept.

At a personal level, HT members especially in the West apply their beliefs in the concept of the *ummah* in their personal lives by marrying into a different community. For instance, a prominent leader of HT in Australia of Arab Lebanese decent is married to an Indonesian Australian while another prominent HT leader in Britain of Pakistani origin is married to a Sudanese member of HT. While HT does not formally encourage this, such practices are viewed positively in the party. HT's strong condemnation of nationalism,

⁵⁵ Interview with Jamal Hardwood, 30 June 2006, London.

⁵⁶ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *Dangerous Concepts to Attack Islam and Consolidate Western Culture* (London: Khilafah Publications, 1997), p. 25.

does not mean that a strong sense of nationalism is absent in the party. To eradicate such feelings, HT has held several major international gatherings where its members from all around the world can gather and interact with one another. Such gatherings were held in Jakarta (2007), Khartoum (2009) and Beirut (2010). Nevertheless, the issue of ethnic allegiance remains a challenge for HT. A former HTI leader admits that the party remains largely Arab-centric in their thinking, citing examples such as the absence of non-Arabs in its leadership and the excessive focus on the Middle East as being targeted areas for the future caliphate.

Once again despite this rhetoric about the *ummah*, HTI leaders themselves hold biased attitudes towards other nationalities and ethnic groups.⁵⁷ One HTI leader recounted his experience while living in Malaysia and how he had trouble adjusting to the country. He noted that Bangladeshis in Malaysia had a pungent body odour and found South Asian food repulsive, making it difficult for him to eat in certain places⁵⁸. The leadership of HTI also remains largely Javanese. It must be qualified that HTI members of other ethnic groups do not seem to mind this arrangement and the relationship between the central HTI leadership and its regional leadership remains good.

Peripheral Concepts

A key peripheral concept that can be identified within the ideology of HTI is the concept of *jihad*. The concept of *jihad* is important to the ideology of HT as it defines the clash between Islam and the West which in the mind of HT members is bound to happen at one point or another. As such, an understanding of these peripheral concepts will provide an understanding the actual long-term goal of the party.

Jihad

HT's conception of *jihad* is related to the core concept of the caliphate, which the party considers as the only *dar-Al-Islam*. This is contrasted with the two other concepts of *dar-*

⁵⁷ Mujiyonto, "Republik Bola dan Berhala" at <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2010/12/27/republik-bola-dan-berhala-nasionalisme/> Accessed on 19 July 2011.

⁵⁸ Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 12 August 2010, Jakarta.

al-harb and *dar-al-kufr*. HT believes that it is an obligation of Muslims to launch *jihad* to free all Muslim lands that are dominated by Western powers after the caliphate is established. While most Muslims see *jihad* as a concept with a wider meaning that includes a personal struggle, a struggle to improve society and a military struggle to defend Islam, HT's definition of *jihad* refers to a military struggle. HT believes that the definition of *jihad* should be limited to a Muslim's military struggle against the enemies of Islam. The basic condition for this kind of *jihad* can only be declared by the caliph. Hence no offensive *jihad* can be undertaken as long as there is no caliphate. According to the party, offensive war is "a war to raise the Word of Allah" among the disbelievers even if they did not attack Muslims"⁵⁹ This *jihad* will be carried out to free Muslims from non-Muslim rule. As for the *dar-al-harb*, the party believes that these lands were Muslim lands that were occupied by non-Muslims. These territories include countries like Spain and the Eastern European countries, which are now inhabited by non-Muslims but were formerly part of the Ottoman caliphate. It will then engage in war to colonize all non-Muslim majority countries. In the absence of the caliphate, Muslims can engage in 'defensive *jihad*' if Muslim lands are colonized by the enemies of Islam.⁶⁰ In such a situation, *jihad* becomes obligatory for all Muslims. During the American attacks on Iraq, HT sacked party members who fled Iraq.⁶¹

Beyond the core and peripheral concepts associated with its ideology, HT defines its ideology in oppositional terms in relation to other ideologies. In doing so, the party has consistently criticized the West as being the enemy of Islam and an entity that must thus be decimated. In Indonesia, the key targets for HTI are the mainstream Islamic organization supporting the *Pancasila* ideology of the state, which is deemed as a secular nationalist ideology by HTI which is hence un-Islamic. The next section of the chapter will examine this conflict with NU.

⁵⁹ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The American Campaign to Suppress Islam* (London: Khilafah Publishers, n. d.), p. 68.

⁶⁰ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Ummah's Charter*, (London: Khilafah Publications, 1989), p. 19.

⁶¹ Interview with Ismail Al-Wahwah, 20 September 2009, Sydney.

Inter-Ideological Conflict: Tackling the Mainstream Muslim Organization (Nahdlatul Ulama)

The inter-ideological conflicts between HTI and mainstream Muslim organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah have intensified in the last few years. During the early days of its founding, HTI leaders avoided direct criticism towards the organizations. The key strategy employed by HTI in facing both NU and Muhammadiyah is to emphasize that the objectives of these organizations are to revive Islamic laws and re-establish the caliphate. A scan through the objectives of these organizations would reveal such assertions are simply untrue. In spite of this, in a booklet documenting the implementation of *Shari'ah* in Indonesia, HTI argued that the early leaders of both Muhammadiyah and NU (Kyai Wahab Hasbullah) formed their respective organizations to revive Islam in Indonesia. HTI highlighted that Kyai Wahab initiated the formation of a *Caliphate Committee* after the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate to assist in efforts aimed at restoring the caliphate. Subsequently Kyai Wahab and Haji Abdul Rozak Fachruddin from Muhammadiyah were tasked to attend the *Caliphate Congress*, which was to be held in Cairo. It is the view of HTI that both leaders were keenly involved in the committee. However, this view is an overstatement of the importance placed on the caliphate issue. While both leaders were initially enthusiastic in their involvement with the movement, both began to focus on other issues deemed as being more important to Indonesian Muslims.⁶² This is yet another example of how HTI makes claims that are exaggerated or misconstrues information to gain support for the party.

On the other hand, HTI's strategy in dealing with NU is to criticize its leadership at the national level while focusing on building bridges with leaders of NU at the provincial and district levels. Freeden highlighted that members of different ideologies would often try to misrepresent the history of the evolution of particular ideologies to give a sense that concepts within its own ideology were closer to the original concepts of a competing ideology.⁶³ Some NU leaders themselves are highly suspicious of HTI and have

⁶² Martin Van Bruinessen, "Muslims in Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question," *Studia Islamika* 2, no. 3 (1995), pp.135-136.

⁶³ Michael Freeden, "Ideology-Balances and Projections" in Michael Freeden (ed) *Reassessing Political Ideologies: The Durability of Dissent* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 196.

explicitly prohibited NU members from joining or even organizing activities with HTI.⁶⁴ Hasyim Muzadi, the previous NU chief even urged the Indonesian government to disallow the 2007 caliphate conference from being held in Jakarta. In reality, these prohibitions have had little effect on some NU leaders. During HTI's caliphate conference in 2007, the provincial head of NU in Nusa Tenggara, Turmuzhi Badhuli attended the gathering and spoke about the need for the caliphate. HTI has also co-organized several joint activities with NU members.⁶⁵

In its ideological conflict with NU, HTI has focused largely on its two core concepts. NU leaders have stated clearly that the organization supports the *Pancasila* as a state ideology since the 1983 NU annual meeting where a final decision was made that there is no inherent contradiction between *Pancasila* and Islam. The discussion about the caliphate is thus viewed as a waste of energy and resources of the Muslim community. The deputy head of NU noted:

For NU, the implementation of *Shari'ah* at the state level should not be a priority for Muslims. It is more important that Muslims are first prepared at a personal level to live an Islamic lifestyle before other aspects of Islamic laws are implemented. More importantly, there are already *Shari'ah* laws implemented in Indonesia that manage Muslim personal laws. This is sufficient to protect the interest of Muslims in Indonesia.⁶⁶

While some NU leaders acknowledged that the founders of NU such as Wahab Hasbullah did support the revival of the caliphate, this support was not necessarily ideological. The support for the caliphate was more due to the fear that the emergence of the *Wahhabi* movement in the Middle East would restrict the freedom of Muslims of other *mazhab* other than *Hanbali*. There were concerns that the new leaders of Arabia would destroy the gravesites of the Prophet and his companions to prevent Muslims from

⁶⁴ Nadhlatul Ulama, *Rekomendasi Konferensi Wilayah Jawa Timur*, PP Zainul Hasan genggong Probolinggo, 2007, pp. 6-9.

⁶⁵ For instance, see HTI Press, "HTI dan Kyai Muda NU di Kajen Pati Diskusi Tentang Khilafah" at <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2011/06/08/hti-dan-kyai-muda-nu-di-kajen-pati-diskusi-tentang-khilafah> Accessed on 21 July 2011.

⁶⁶ Interview with As'ad Ali, 20 August 2010, Jakarta.

visiting as this seen to be an act of *bid'ah*.⁶⁷ In addition, NU also shifted its stance by opposing the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. NU leaders considered that a secular state is the most appropriate form of governance, which would allow Muslims and non-Muslims to live harmoniously together.⁶⁸

In its inter-ideological debates with NU, HTI attempted to show that the concepts attached to its ideology is more Islamic. The thrust of HTI's argument is that its ideology has Islamic roots and is therefore superior to the secular basis of the *Pancasila* ideology. In doing so, the party is attempting to highlight that its ideology is superior to that of NU. Beyond the inter-ideological debates, groups also engage in intra-ideological debates. The next section will examined an example of this intra-Islamism debate between HTI and PKS.

Intra-Islamism Competition: HTI and PKS

Freedden stated that the intra-ideological competition is more significant than inter-ideological conflicts for a group's ideology. Firstly, an ideology is often defined according to the dominant understanding of a particular ideology. This had occurred earlier with other ideologies such as communism where the Marxist-Leninist interpretation became dominant (as opposed to the Trotskyite doctrine). This occurred after the Bolsheviks and Lenin consolidated control over Russia. Secondly, it is also more likely that adherents of a particular ideology would switch to another strand of the same ideology than to a completely different ideology.⁶⁹ For instance adherents of Islamism, are more likely to switch from the radical violent Islamism to a non-violent strand of Islamism rather than a liberal ideology.⁷⁰ This means that these intra-

⁶⁷ Greg Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU 1952-1967* (Jakarta: LKIS, 1998), p. 32.

⁶⁸ Shalahuddin Wahid, "NU dan Khilafah Islamiyah" *Republika*, 12 February 2008. For details of the change in NU's position on the Islamic laws and Islamic state, see Abdurahman Wahid, "Massa Islam Dalam Kehidupan Bernegara Dan Berbangsa," *Prisma* Extra Edition (1984), pp. 3-9.

⁶⁹ Freedden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p. 78.

⁷⁰ Omar Ashour noted that violent Islamists are more likely to join non-violent Islamist movements than movements of other ideological inclinations. He cited various examples from Egypt, Libya and Algeria as case studies. See Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalisation of Jihadists* (London: Routledge, 2009). This theory was further strengthened after 2011 Egyptian Revolution which led to the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak and saw formerly violent Islamists like *Gama El Islamiya* forming the Building and Development Party and contesting the 2011 Egyptian elections.

ideological conflicts could potentially result in HTI gaining more members from other Islamic groups.

HTI shares a sense of camaraderie with some Islamist movements. This was shown during the trial of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the leader of JAT, for alleged terrorist activities in Aceh. HTI members studiously attended the court proceedings to provide support to Ba'asyir. Others within the party felt that it is important that an Islamist leader like Ba'asyir who shares many of HTI's ideals be allowed to spread his ideas. Ba'asyir himself advocates the importance of the caliphate in his sermons, speeches and writings.

As part of HTI's policy to maintain strong ties with other groups, they organized joint activities such as demonstrations, seminars and conferences. These groups include the JAT, FPI and MMI as well Islamic parties such as PBB. HTI leaders highlight that there are some underlying issues with some of these groups. Firstly, the methodology of these groups is wrong. Secondly, these groups are confused in their understanding of certain concepts such as democracy, *jihad* and capitalism. In this section, the focus will be on the intra-ideological competition between HTI and PKS. While HTI is critical of groups such as FPI and JAT, these criticisms tend to be measured. A HTI leader declared:

Groups like FPI, MMI and JAT tend to be action-oriented; they lack a clear methodology and ideology. This means that it is much easier for us to guide and steer them towards our cause. Even if they do not join us, we are still able to lead them as we can see from the activities of FUI. For the political parties, we do not have many differences with some Islamic parties. We have close relationship with the leaders of PPP and PBB. Once again these parties also lack a clear ideology. Their main objective is to win votes. We can convince them as well. PKS is different. They have a clearer ideology and methodology as they are a branch of the *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood). The *Ikhwan* opposed our ideology and methodology from Day 1 even in Jerusalem. So we need to do more *da'awah*. If this failed, then we need to debate them and show the weakness of their argument.⁷¹

⁷¹ Interview with Rahmat Kurnia, 1 October 2009, Jakarta.

While the above observation is simplistic, given that most leaders of Islamist movements do have their own objectives and ideology, it is a reflection of how HTI views these movements and parties. HTI also dichotomize between groups such as JAT, FPI and MMI, which share their rejection of democracy, capitalism, the nation-state and secularism, and the PKS. HTI members feel that PKS pose a genuine challenge to the party. Due to the importance accorded to PKS, HTI leaders have explicitly spoken against PKS.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, An-Nabhani believed that the main weakness with most Islamic movements is their inability to formulate a suitable methodology to restore the caliphate. He focused his main criticism against ideologies that allow for gradualism such as that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hafidz Abdurrahman argued that the PKS is an example of the failures of gradualism. "The party has now been sucked into the political system and has abandoned its aspiration to establish an Islamic state."⁷² He alleged that PKS is more concern about attaining power than to implement Islamic laws. HTI leaders also cited several examples of how PKS cooperate with secular parties and even a Christian party in different provincial elections. In an article written by HTI columnist, Mujiyonto, the party condemned the decision of PKS to field non-Muslim candidates in elections. He argued this pragmatic approach to politics shows that the party has derailed from its original aims.⁷³ HTI's assessment of PKS is echoed by former senior leaders of PKS such as Abu Ridho. He expressed his disenchantment with PKS leaders whom he believed have drifted away from the party's initial objectives.⁷⁴

Another core concept of the HTI's ideology that has placed the party diametrically opposed to PKS is the issue of the implementation of *Shari'ah*. PKS contended that most Indonesians do not understand the *Shari'ah*. PKS claims to educate Muslims about the *Shari'ah* and advocates the *Shari'ah* is first observed at the individual and family

⁷² Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, 21 March 2008, Bogor.

⁷³ Mujiyonto, "Partai Islam Kian Pragmatis" 20 August 2010. Accessed at <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2010/08/20/parpol-islam-kian-pragmatis> on 21 July 2011.

⁷⁴ Phone Interview with Abdi Sumaiti (Abu Ridho), 23 July 2011. Jakarta Also see Mohammed Anshari, "Abu Ridho Benarkan Elite PKS Sudah Melenceng" Accessed from <http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/1335532/abu-ridho-benarkan-elite-pks-sudah-melenceng> on 22 July 2011.

levels.⁷⁵ Rather than focusing on the form of *Shari'ah*, PKS seeks to first imbibe the values of *Shari'ah* by fighting corruption and nepotism in Indonesian society. Fahri Hamzah explained that PKS' approach to implementing *Shari'ah* laws involves several stages. Indonesian Muslims must first adhere to *Shari'ah* laws at the personal realm. As long as this is not fulfilled, the task of implementing *Shari'ah* at the national level will be arduous. The guiding principles and contents of these laws must first be drafted, discussed and approved at the legislative level. It is only after conditions are met that these laws can be realized.⁷⁶ He added that many PKS leaders and activists believe that it is adequate that the principles of *Shari'ah* are applied to guide legislation process. Ismail Yusanto asserted that the PKS' understanding of the *Shari'ah* is erroneous. He disagreed with the view that it is sufficient for the principles *Shari'ah* to be implemented in Indonesia. He argued that the application of *Shari'ah* is a *fard* (obligation) for all Muslims.⁷⁷ In this regard, HTI's position concurs with some former PKS leaders especially those belonging to JT such as Abu Ridho.

Ideology and the *Hizbiyyin*

It is important at this juncture to discuss the role of HT's ideology in influencing members to choose the movement over other Islamist groups. An important question that this chapter seeks to answer is the reasons why HTI members chose to HTI over other Islamist organizations. As noted earlier, Freedman argued that political groups often engage in intra-ideological conflicts to emphasize the strength of concepts within the group's definition of an ideology. In doing so, the concepts attached to the group will emerge as the mainstream understanding of a particular ideology. It is assumed that the dominant ideology will attract adherents of other ideologies. One of the key challenges in ascertaining the outcome of an intra-Islamism competition is the difficulty in identifying members of other Islamist groups who might have joined or left HTI. Nevertheless, a scan of former members of HTI reveal that only a small number actually joins other Islamist movements. Often, these ex-members will form newer groups that have the same objective of reviving the caliphate. This could be seen from the examples of *Hizbul*

⁷⁵ Interview with Zulkifli Mansyah, 21 October 2007, Jakarta.

⁷⁶ Interview with Fahri Hamzah, 15 May 2011, Jakarta.

⁷⁷ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 20 March 2010, Jakarta.

Khilafah and HDI. Interviews with current members of HTI reveal that many of these members joined the movement due to a belief in the superiority of the HTI's ideology as compared to other Islamist ideology. Several concepts of HTI's Islamism attracted them to the party.

Caliphate as an Obligation

Members of HTI often cite the party's ideology as being the rationale for them choosing HTI over other Islamist groups. The most important aspect of HTI's ideology that many of its members find appealing is the concept of the caliphate. A member of HTI in Jakarta, Budi, said:

I have been part of many Islamic groups. I come from a NU background and studied with many NU *ulama* but none of them emphasized the importance of the caliphate. Later, I joined other groups such as *Persis* and JT. While the theme of the caliphate was discussed, it was not central to the ideology of these groups. It was only when I started attending the *pengajian* of HTI that I really understood the importance of the caliphate and was clear about how the caliphate can be achieved. How can we talk about improving the conditions of Muslims when the political system is un-Islamic and we do not have the political strength to make changes. What we need is a top down change that would seep all aspects of our lives.⁷⁸

The concept of the caliphate as defined by HTI, is a key attraction to many of its members. They believe that it is this aspect of HTI's ideology that makes the party superior to other Islamist movements. HTI members are thus convinced that their work towards reviving the caliphate is an obligation that must be fulfilled similar to how other Muslims offer the obligatory five time prayers. In doing so, they distinguished themselves from other Islamic groups and Muslims.

Rational Comprehensive Islam

⁷⁸ Interview with Budi, 20 August 2009. Jakarta

At a more personal level, the party's rational approach towards interpreting Islamic laws is attractive to some educated individuals when differentiating between HT and other Islamist groups. Here rational refers to HT's interpretation of Islamic laws which is heavily influenced by the use of logical thoughts similar to the *Mu'tazilah* sect. On the other hand, comprehensive here refers to HT's approach of trying to develop alternative socio-economic and political models for the Muslim world. This could possibly explain the large number of better-educated individuals joining the party. HTI members often spoke about the comprehensive systems that the party offers to them. Lazuardi Hendrawan, personal assistant to Ismail Yusanto observed that

Unlike other Islamist movements that speak of concepts such as political, economic and social systems of Islam in abstract terms, HTI actually offer a comprehensive system. We even have our own constitution for the caliphate. This shows the comprehensive nature of our program. Everything that the party decides is supported with *dalil* (evidence from the Qur'an and *Hadith*), which gives strength to our arguments.⁷⁹

The party's focus on the caliphate issue rather than ritualistic aspects of Islam is seen as an asset of the party. Iwan Doumy the leader of GEMA in Banda Aceh explained:

Our brothers in HTI always have an answer to every question. These answers are not your typical superficial answers, which you get from religious scholars. These answers are thorough, supported by *dalil* and logically derived.⁸⁰

In responding to a question about controversial views held by the party such as allowing the viewing of nude photos, smoking and shaking of hands between men and women, one HT leader answered:

This is the strength of HT. We do not just blindly follow the crowd. We assess a particular issue based on the evidence; we pass a judgment on the matter and stick by that judgment unless there is stronger evidence presented to us to believe in the contrary.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Interview with Lazuardi Hendrawan, 1 February 2009, Jakarta.

⁸⁰ Interview with Iwan Doumy, 24 January 2009, Banda Aceh.

⁸¹ Interview with a Jaweed Khan, 10 July 2011, Johor Bahru, Malaysia.

HTI activists often spoke about the fact that the Islam that is taught in HTI has elements of both traditional and modernist Islam.⁸² The party's tolerance for traditional practices and acceptance of the views of traditional Islamic jurists makes the party more acceptable to many activists who might have learned Islam from the traditionalist perspective. Party leaders would not themselves organize traditional rituals but would attend and would not stop members from doing so. The party is also modernist in the sense that it has a strong culture of re-interpreting Islamic laws to tackle more contemporary issues. As one HTI activist noted, the difference between the traditionalist school and HTI is that HTI engages much more in contemporary issues affecting Muslims using traditional sources as well as rational thought, which makes its version of Islam more acceptable.⁸³ Another HTI member explained:

For someone like me who is from NU, I find it easier to join HTI over other Islamist movements such as the *Salafi* who are very critical of NU practices. When I joined HTI, I was not told that *tahlilan* was un-Islamic. The *Salafis* like to discuss issues like this. Whether *tahlilan* is allowed or not will not change the state of Muslims. We need to focus on bigger issues. This is the main flaw that I see with other groups like *Salafis*. They are too obsessed with the small issues while missing the bigger picture in the process.⁸⁴

The issue of approach to Islamic law seems to have influenced the decisions of some HTI members to leave NU for HTI. Hafidz Abdurrahman recalled that he learned ritualistic dimensions of Islam. This was taught by rote-learning, which he claimed was

⁸² Seyyed Hossein Nasr provides a useful rich and rigorous definition for traditional Islam. He related traditional Islam to three important concepts, Tauhid (Belief in the supreme oneness of God), *Shari'ah* (Islamic laws as interpreted by the different schools of jurisprudence) and Tasawuf (manifestations of spiritual Islam including Islamic mysticism, Islamic philosophy and Islamic arts). In Indonesia, NU is an example of a traditionalist Muslim group. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islam in the Modern world* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010). Modernist Islam often involves a reinterpretation of Islamic theology in response to colonialism. Modernist Muslims often call for the return to the Qur'an and Hadith of the Prophet rejecting the need for any school of jurisprudence and often vilifying Sufism and Islamic philosophy as un-Islamic practices. Muhammadiyah is often cited as an example of a modernist movement. See Mansoor Moadel, *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 4-8.

⁸³ Interview with Abu Ammar, 29 January 2011, Pekanbaru.

⁸⁴ Interview with Ferdiansyah, 21 January 2009, Banda Aceh.

the conventional way Islam is being taught in NU *pesantrens*. He also observed that different NU *pesantrens* teach different things that might even contradict each other. As far as he is concerned, NU is not united and has no clear objectives and does not organize any sort of significant activities. In contrast, he believed that HTI has a clear objective and also a comprehensible methodology, which is adopted by HT branches all around the world. For ex-NU members like Abdurrahman, the result of the inter-ideological conflict between HTI and NU, it is the core concepts within HTI's ideology that is superior. Such views are of course limited to NU members who are now with HTI. Ahmad Baso, a NU activist concur with some of these views when he highlighted that the younger generation of NU activists have stopped organizing activities in the mosques and *mushollah* (prayer room/area) throughout the country leading to activists from radical groups filling in the vacuum created by NU activists.⁸⁵ Many more NU leaders believe that HTI's ideology is dangerous for Indonesia and must be opposed as seen from open warnings issued by its former chairman Hasyim Muzadi.

Radical but Non-Violent

Membership of HT has been described by Wiktorowicz as high-risk activism.⁸⁶ It involves activities such as condemning the state and openly calling for a *coup d'etat* to replace the Indonesian government. Some of HTI's radical views have led to calls by some quarters in the country to ban the party. This anti-systemic approach of the party can be traced back to the core and adjacent concepts of its ideology. The party rejects every political, social and economic system that currently dominates the world and will not compromise as long as Islamic laws are not implemented and the caliphate is not conceived, the way the party has set it out. For HTI members, this uncompromising position is manifestation that the party's ideology is indeed superior. As noted earlier in this chapter, the changing position of PKS on the implementation of Islamic laws and Islamic state has affected its image as an Islamic party. Abu Ibrahim a former activist of KAMMI recalled:

⁸⁵ Ahmad Baso, *NU Studies: Pergolakan Pemikiran Antara Fundamentalisme Islam dan Fundamentalisme Neo-Liberal* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2006).

⁸⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising*, p. 45.

When I was in KAMMI, we use to attend the *pengajiaan* of several *ustaz* and leaders of PKS. I was really confused. One *ustaz* would tell us that we need to implement Islamic laws immediately and then I attended a lecture and I am told that we need to practice *tadaruj* and prepare the Muslims first before implementing *Shari'ah* laws. Later, I realized that the problem is with their ideology. They are not clear about their ideology and methodology, a problem that Sheikh An-Nabhani highlighted years back when looking at the *Ikhwan*. In HTI, we are clear in our methods. We do not have leaders contradicting each other. I have met *shababs* from Jayapura, UK and Holland who shared exactly the same beliefs as I do".⁸⁷

Such remarks could be reflective of an overzealous attitude of HTI activists to show the unity of its ideological thoughts. Notwithstanding this, my interviews with members of HTI from different parts of the world have often solicited exact answers on the party's position with regards to a range of issues. This may be attributed to the process of identity formation that will be discussed in Chapter 7. In choosing between PKS and HTI, members highlight that PKS is too pragmatic and opportunistic and as such is similar to other secular political parties.⁸⁸ Several scandals have also affected the image of PKS. Stories of the lavish lifestyles led by party leaders, corruption and morality issues were cited as factors for the choice of HTI over PKS. In essence, the party's changing definition of its core concepts has resulted in the perceived weakening of its attachment to Islamism as compared to HTI.

In spite of its radical agenda of seeking a *coup d'etat*, HTI has sought to this in a non-violent fashion. *Jihad* is a peripheral concept within HTI's ideology. As highlighted earlier, HTI believe that offensive *jihad* can only be declared by a caliph and that defensive *jihad* is allowed only if a Muslim country is attacked by a non-Muslim state. Given that there is currently no caliphate and Indonesia is not under attack by any foreign power, HTI members do not need to engage in any sort of violence. This means that party members can push the perimeters of legality without actually crossing it. As one ex-member of HTI who is now with a liberal Muslim group noted:

⁸⁷ Interview with Abu Ibrahim, 8 August 2009, Jakarta.

⁸⁸ It seems that HTI has delegated the task of criticizing other Islamic groups to GEMA. Articles that are critical of PKS and other Islamist groups can often be found on the GEMA website. For instance, see Fathuddin Ja'far, Membaca Aliran Politik PKS Pasca Ritz Carlton. Accessed from <http://www.gemapembebasan.co.cc/2010/07/membaca-aliran-politik-pks-pasca-ritz.html> on 24 July 2011.

When you are young, it is cool to be part of HTI. We demonstrated against imperialism and were anti everything. We had principles and were not sell outs like PKS and other groups. At the same time, you can do all this within the confines of the laws without getting yourself into trouble with the law. You don't hurt anyone and you don't get hurt in the process. That was what was so attractive for me then.⁸⁹

HTI's avowedly non-violent approach in seeking to re-establish the caliphate has been criticized by members of other Islamist groups. Riz Farihin, a former member of JI said:

HTI is just about demonstrations and discussions. They are all talk but in fact do nothing, which is why people get tired of them and leave to join groups like JI, which are more action-oriented.⁹⁰

For younger members of HTI, this allows them to channel their youthful zeal towards a 'noble' cause without getting embroiled in legal issues. In interviews with about ten student members of GEMA, a question was posed about the reaction of their parents towards their HT membership. In all these instances, the students noted that their parents had been largely supportive as HTI is a legal organization, which is non-violent.⁹¹ The perceived clarity of HTI's core concepts over that of other Islamist groups as well as its unwillingness to engage in violence makes the party superior choice compared to other Islamist movements.

Conclusion

This chapter seeks to understand the role of ideology in the growth of HTI. The key argument in the chapter is that HTI's rationalistic, anti-systemic ideology is the most important factor accounting for why members choose HTI over other Islamist groups. The chapter began with a theoretical discussion of the concept of ideology and why it is important for this concept to be included in studies of social movement. It was argued

⁸⁹ Interview with Rahmat, 7 August 2009, Jakarta.

⁹⁰ Interview with Riz Farihin, Former Member of JI, 20 January 2011, Jakarta.

⁹¹ Interview with members of GEMA. Some of the interviewees did highlight that their parents do not approve of them spending too much time demonstrating on the streets.

that the concept of ideology as defined by Freeden can resolve some of the reasons why SMT theorists are reluctant to use this concept. As the chapter progressed, the ideology of HTI was deliberated through the lens of Freeden's conception of ideology. By applying Freeden's definition, the ideology of HTI is broken down into core, adjacent and peripheral concepts that make up its ideology. This section also examined how HTI activists employ the use of concepts attached to its ideology in trying to undermine the ideologies of NU and other Islamist movements. In line with Freeden's theory, it is shown that movements often engaged in such conflicts and competition in their effort to define its ideology as the superior ideology. In the third section the question of how ideology has shaped members thinking towards the movement and the outside world was examined. It showed that ideology is the most important factor that accounts for why members choose HTI over other Islamist groups. Ideology is also used as an important tool when HTI combats the ideas associated with the government and other Islamist movements. In essence, ideology is important in trying to explain the decision of members in choosing HTI over other movements. It does not however explain the journey of ordinary individuals who choose to become members. The following chapter will discuss the journeys of such individuals by utilizing the concepts from theories of identity and the framing strand of SMT.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DEVELOPING A HIZBI IDENTITY

I was really not interested in politics. I was just trying to learn Islam but the brothers in HTI were persuasive. They made me realize how my understanding of Islam is so shallow. That Islam is so comprehensive and encompasses every aspect of life. This was when I realized that we need to fight for Islam and HTI is my vehicle to do so. (Akmal, HTI Member, 29 January 2009, Banda Aceh)

The journey of a Muslim to become a member of a radical Islamic group has been discussed and debated extensively. Given the relatively high cost of membership and the lack of benefits, it is even more intriguing why so many Indonesian Muslims decided to join HTI. Most members of HTI reported that they were not initially predisposed to the ideas of HTI. Nevertheless, many become members and adopted what I have defined as the *Hizbi identity*. This chapter focuses on the cognitive (micro) reasons for HTI's. This chapter is an attempt to understand the transformation of a Muslim to a *Hizbiyyin* and the reasons for this transformation. The chapter discusses the high rate of membership retention that HTI seems to enjoy. It argues that behavioural, affective and cognitive changes that members undergo upon adopting HTI's Islamic identity is the main factors behind the high rate of retention that the party enjoys. The creation of this identity lies in the processes of cognitive opening, religious-seeking, framing and culturing that individuals undergo before becoming a member. The sense of collective identity in turn leads these individuals to become attached to the party's ideology. There are three parts to this chapter. The first part will draw out identity theories as discussed by Quintan Wiktorowicz in his study of the *Al-Muhajiroun* movement in the United Kingdom. The second section will discuss the experiences of HTI members in their journey towards becoming members within the framework of the three processes described by Wiktorowicz. The last section of the chapter discusses the expression of this identity through the process of boundary marking after members have undergone behavioural, affective and cognitive changes.

Framing and Identity in Social Movement Theory

This thesis has utilized SMT in earlier chapters to understand the growth of HTI in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the key limitation of SMT is its focus on the movement or group as the unit of analysis. Realizing the limitations of this, SMT theorists developed a third strand of SMT, framing.¹ The framing theory argues that, “by rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action whether individual or collective.”² An important factor that would determine the success of a frame is whether frame alignment is achieved between individuals and movement interpretive orientations. While frame alignment exposes an individual to a movement’s ideas and might trigger certain cognitive feelings towards the movement, it does not explain why the individual, after the initial exposure, decides to join the movement. In this regard, framing simply accounts for the steps taken by movements to recruit but does not satisfactorily explain an individual’s thinking towards these frames and how frame alignment is achieved from the perspective of the individual. Another weakness of SMT is the fact that the movements that have been studied tend to be limited and are largely focused on progressive left-leaning groups in Western societies. As David S. Meyer noted “By ignoring movements from the other side of the spectrum, we collect less information on political realities with a sampling of movements whose bias contradicts what we learned”.³

It is with this in mind that the thesis will utilize the theory of collective identity developed by Quintan Wiktorowicz. Wiktorowicz in his insightful analysis of *Al-Muhajiroun* in Britain argued that individuals join and adopt a new collective identity as defined by the group after experiencing three stages namely, cognitive opening, religious seeking and socialization.⁴ He noted that a crisis could produce a “cognitive opening”

¹ For instance, see D. A. Snow and R. D. Benford (1992) “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest” in A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller (eds.), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 133–155 and D. A. Snow, “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields” in D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule and H. Kriesi, (eds.) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 380–412.

² Snow et al, “Frame Alignment”, 1986, p. 464.

³ David S Mayer, “Opportunities and Identities: Bridge-Building in the Study of Social Movements” in David S. Mayer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (eds) *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6.

⁴ Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising*, 2005.

that shakes certainty in previously accepted beliefs and renders an individual more receptive to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives.⁵ This cognitive opening can happen through a variety of different ways, including experiencing economic, social, political and individual problems. For instance, a sense of emptiness that an individual feels after the death of a close relative might change his perspective towards life, thus making him vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups. Nonetheless, more often than not, movements themselves can foster a cognitive opening through outreach activism. Activists can use current social networks to trigger a sense of crisis among contacts through discussion and subtle interactions. In the case of HTI, framing strategies are often employed to foster this cognitive opening.

Wiktorowicz elaborated further that for individuals whose identity is partially tied to religion, a cognitive opening might lead to “religious seeking”. This process sees individuals searching “for some satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve his discontent”.⁶ Individuals begin to look into religion more deeply at this stage either through assistance from friends and family members or by personal research. It must be noted that a person experiencing cognitive opening might not necessarily turn to religion. They are equally likely to involve themselves in political groups, even joining socially oriented groups and perhaps even taking up new hobbies. While Wiktorowicz established that the process of cognitive opening is a prerequisite to one’s entering the stage of religious seeking. My research shows that this pre-requisite is not as relevant in the case of HTI members. Many members are individuals who are religiously observant and seeking to understand Islam in a more comprehensive way. They may have simply been left unsatisfied by the way Islam is taught by mainstream Muslim organizations and may not have necessarily experienced a crisis or even cognitive opening. At this stage of religious-seeking, framing activities can produce frame alignment whereby potential recruits identify with the group’s goals and objectives. Wiktorowicz noted that once frame alignment is achieved (even if only in part) deeper socialization processes could take place.⁷ It is at this point that the individual becomes a willing learner and delves more deeply into the movement’s ideology through an assortment of micromobilization

⁵ *ibid*, p. 85.

⁶ John Lofland and Rodney Stark, "Becoming a world Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective," *American Sociological Review* 30, no. 6 (1965), p. 868.

⁷ Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause", p. 10

contexts that were highlighted in the previous chapter such as through attending study circles, seminars, talks and participating in collective action activities. During this initial stage of learning the seeker becomes a *daris* of the movement. As highlighted in previous chapters, this process could take anything from two to four years. This stage involves the initial indoctrination process whereby individuals are exposed to the movement's ideology, where social networks are created and identity construction takes place. Once these students are assessed to be sufficiently ready and deemed to have assumed the *Hizbi* identity, they are then invited to be members of the movement. This process is how movements construct "networks of shared meaning" rooted in the movement's ideology.⁸

The member is then tasked with new responsibilities aimed at recruiting new members and strengthening the position of the movement. The above shows how the processes of cognitive opening, religious seeking and socialization can be used to effectively explain why individuals join HTI and how they adopt a Hizb identity as defined by HTI. The next section of the chapter will apply this theoretical framework in examining several case studies of how HTI members joined the party.

Inciting a Sense of Crisis

While some members of HTI experienced cognitive opening as a result of identity crises or personal experiences such as being victims of racism, I did not encounter any HTI members who experienced such a crisis. Many joined the party as a result of the party's outreach. This outreach takes the form of public campaigns through recruitment channels such as organizing talks, seminars, exhibitions and other channels highlighted in the previous chapter. Outreach can also occur at a personal level through one on one interaction with members of HTI. The form of the outreach itself is perhaps not as important as the message related during the outreach process, which is aimed at fostering a sense of crisis within individuals. In September 2010, at the fifth *KUIII* event, HTI had a booth at the panel exhibition held in conjunction with the event. Besides putting up

⁸ Alberto Melluci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

colourful panels, which prominently featured the symbols of HTI, the party also continuously played videos about the party's activities around the world as well as videos showcasing 'repression' that Muslims around the world suffer at the hands of Western powers. The video caught the attention of many of the visitors to the exhibition. A large crowd gathering around the HTI's panel and many seemed glued to the program that was broadcasted. Disturbing and ghastly images of dead children and women were displayed to induce shock in the minds of many of the bystanders. These images were intended to prompt questions about the conflicts occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan. The videos seemed to work effectively in causing revulsion amongst the bystanders, especially amongst the younger age-groups. Following the screening of the video, HTI activists were quick to engage bystanders discussing in greater detail the respective conflicts and explaining to interlocutors their responsibility to assist in ending the conflict. The bystanders were then invited to leave their contact details with HTI activists and were given some reading materials to introduce these potential recruits to HTI's ideas.

A large number of HTI members interviewed became members through this facilitated cognitive opening process. Many potential recruits are often shocked to watch videos or read about atrocities occurring in the Muslim world. A member of HTI in Aceh, Iwan Doumy became acquainted with HTI through this process of facilitated cognitive opening. After being invited by a friend, first involvement was attending a HTI talk where the speaker Harith Abu Ulya had spoken about the problems of separatism in Aceh.⁹ Being an Acehnese, he was taken aback when he heard Abu Ulya speaking about the need for Aceh to remain part of the Indonesian state, a view that was unpopular in Aceh. He was even more shocked when Abu Ulya revealed the Western imperialist conspiracy to separate Aceh from Indonesia so that Western gas companies could make larger profits for themselves. Abu Ulya had explained that it is un-Islamic for Muslims to spill the blood of fellow Muslims, especially when it will simply benefit Western imperial powers. Iwan noted that unlike other Indonesian figures who spoke about Aceh, Abu Ulya's case for the unity of Indonesia was not made on the basis of nationalism but on the basis of Islamic solidarity. This is indeed a clever way that HTI promote the

⁹ Interview with Iwan Doumy, 24 January 2009, Banda Aceh.

agenda of the caliphate without falling foul of the Indonesian government or military. A similar strategy was used in Papua as highlighted in Chapter 5. He subsequently spoke to Abu Ulya and began enquiring in greater details about HTI. The example of Iwan showed that facilitated cognitive opening is meant to bring about a sense of shock and ethos of injustice in the minds of potential members such that they start re-thinking some of their previously held belief and begin opening up their minds towards ideas presented by HTI

Trust in Fostering Cognitive Opening

Perhaps one of the most common ways, HTI activists seek to recruit potential members is through individual outreach. Members are encouraged to first recruit family members, friends and neighbours. HTI activists are often told to behave in an exemplary way, in order to ease the recruitment of members to the movement. Often activists will discuss political and religious issues with people within their social network to persuade them to rethink some of their previously held beliefs about Islam and the meanings of being a Muslim and in order to facilitate the possibility of new interpretations and ways of thinking about Islam. Due to the personal nature of the relationship, HTI activists are also more familiar with potential recruits and thus conversations can be pitched to the potential recruit's interest level. Aishah, a member of HTI in Bali became acquainted with HTI ideas through an aunt, who brought her to HTI functions and continuously explained HTI ideas and her responsibilities as a Muslim. Aishah noted that she was completely comfortable with HTI partly because her aunt, a person whom she respected and trusted greatly, was a member of the party.¹⁰ As Wiktorowicz noted, trust is often an essential part of the recruitment process. Some members join the movement due to social networks but later begin adopting the ideas of the movement and a new Islamic identity.

Trust can be built through a variety of different ways. HTI's student activists are often encouraged to rent a room near the universities where they are studying. They will then befriend newer students especially those who originate from rural areas of Indonesia. In 2009, I had visited the leader of GEMA, Erwin Al-Jundi several times at his shared

¹⁰ Interview with Aishah, 19 March 2010, Bali.

rented home in Depok. A student at the University of Indonesia, Erwin originated from Pekanbaru. He said,

I came from Pekanbaru, which is a city. Nevertheless, I was rather overwhelmed when I first arrived in Jakarta. It was more developed than Pekanbaru and really busy. I saw the impact of modernization and globalization. While many of these things were good, I was also initially shocked to see the way some women dressed as well as other immoral acts. I also felt alone and really missed my family terribly. I was lucky that I met a brother from HTI who invited me to stay with him at his rented home with three other guys. He became like an elder brother to me. He guided me about the courses I should take, gave me a tour of the area and guided me spiritually making sure that I woke up on time for morning prayers. This inspired me to start a rented home as well so that I could guide new students and I assist them. For many of them who originated from the rural areas of Indonesia, it is even worse. They find it difficult to cope with the urban setting and the fast pace of life.¹¹

Three undergraduates lived in a rented house that Erwin manage. It was obvious that these younger students respected Erwin immensely. It is of little surprise that two of the three students were already *daris* within HTI while the third was being introduced to the ideas of HTI. One the students, Harith said that he had first attended HTI events because of his trust and respect for Erwin. Later, he decided to join a *halaqah* after being convinced by HTI ideas.¹²

HTI members and leaders are thus cognizant of the fact that the building of trust is an important dimension of the recruitment process. The sense of alienation and loneliness that new students feel provides a convenient opportunity for HTI leaders and members to recruit. By providing a sense of security and companionship to these potential recruits, the HTI members gain their trust. My observation of Erwin and the three HTI members reveals that trust is an important factor towards fostering of cognitive opening or the religious seeking phase.

¹¹ Interview with Erwin Al-Jundi, 2 September 2009, Depok.

¹² Interview with Harith, 5 April 2009, Jakarta

Religious Seeking and HTI's Framing Strategies

The state of cognitive opening often leads to the stage of religious seeking. Religious seeking is defined as the process whereby individuals search for a satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve his/her discontent. In the study of *Al-Muhajiroun*, Wiktorowicz noted that members experienced cognitive opening before moving to the stage of religious seeking. As such, he argued that cognitive opening is a necessary pre-condition before the process of religious seeking. While some recruits of movements like *Al-Muhajiroun* and HTI do undergo cognitive opening, others might not have undergone this process at all. The experiences illustrated in the cases of several recruits of HTI points to the fact that individuals do not necessarily experience cognitive opening before entering the stage of religious seeking.¹³ These individuals are simply seeking religion as part of an everyday process to enhance their Islamic knowledge, a common trait amongst religiously observant Muslims. Many HTI members identified themselves as 'truth seekers of religion', which means that they are constantly in a state of seeking for the true understanding of Islam. Many were left unsatisfied with the kind of Islam that they were taught in mosques or by other Islamic groups. Thus, they seek for a sort of system, which provides them with a satisfactory religious meaning to resolve their discontent.¹⁴ It is during the stage of religious seeking that HTI will start embarking on framing strategies to convince potential members that the party provides the most correct understanding of Islam which they are seeking and will attempt to achieve frame alignment with potential members. Three frames are often quoted by members as being most effective at capturing their initial attention. Often, these frames transcend the religious, socio-economic and political realms and appeal to certain socio-cultural symbols within Indonesian society. These frames are also used to capture the attention of potential members through HTI events such as talks, seminars, exhibitions and other recruitment channels. Often members who have experienced cognitive openings are more attracted to frames that address socio-political issues while those who are 'truth religious seekers' are more inclined to HTI's frames that are pertaining closely to Islam. Interestingly, members do not cite key tenets of HTI ideology such as the implementation of Islamic laws and revival of the caliphate as being the most important

¹³ Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising*, p. 98.

¹⁴ Lofland and Stark, "Becoming a world-Saver", p. 868.

in capturing their attention. They seem more interested in some of the issues propounded by HTI, such as those which touch on social justice. This means that most HTI activists become convinced about the core ideas of HTI at a later stage while going through the process of becoming a member.

Capitalism Results in Impoverishment and Moral Decay

One of the common frames cited by HTI members that Capitalism has resulted in the impoverishment and moral decay in Indonesia has sometimes found resonance amongst HTI members who come from more secular backgrounds or those who have experienced cognitive opening. In one of its earliest strategies after HTI emerged publicly, the party began to criticize the government for its decision to raise the price of fuel.¹⁵ HTI argued that the increase in the price of fuel was due to the privatization of the oil sector in Indonesia, which had allowed Western capitalist companies to maximize profits at the expense of the poor. While the validity of this argument is questionable given that the Indonesian middle class tend to benefit the most from these subsidies, the idea that Islam does not allow the sale of natural resources and that these resources should be treated as God's property is hugely popular with potential members of HTI.¹⁶ HTI further contend that the Capitalist system creates a constant need to maximize profit, which often leads to inequitable distribution of wealth resulting in the impoverishment of most Indonesians. One HTI activist hailing from a middle class family noted,

While growing up, I always wondered why the Indonesian Chinese are so rich. They are a minority and not even Muslim. Yet, they dominate the economy of Indonesia, a Muslim country. Muslims who are in the majority are generally poor. I finally got the answer when I attended a lecture organized by HTI. The speaker Zufri Hamdani, an economist began exposing the problems with the neo-liberal capitalistic economy and how it allows a small group of people to dominate the wealth of the country. Later I attended another talk where Dr Fahmi Amhar presented on how our oil revenues have been used for the benefit of the West. One of the points that he highlighted was that despite being the producer of oil, we are also importing oil due to the fact that capitalist

¹⁵ Mencermati Kenaikan Harga BBM in Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, *Bundel Buletin Dakwah Al-Islam Melanjutkan Kehidupan Islam Tahun 1* (Bogor: Yasmin Press, 2004), p. 141.

¹⁶ *ibid*, p. 143.

companies are just trying to profit from our revenues. This issue was what opened my eyes about the need for us to do something to change the system.¹⁷

The sense of injustice that Capitalism benefits only a small group leads to many people becoming HTI activists. In Bali, where members of HTI often hailed from poorer backgrounds, this sense of injustice is more acute. Yatin, the HTI *ma'sul* in Denpasar, Bali, felt that the capitalist system is created to ensure that the non-Muslims who own most of the hotels and businesses in Bali continue to repress Muslims.¹⁸ He also felt that the Capitalist system makes Muslims materialistic and that they are willing to sacrifice their religion in pursuit of money. He felt saddened that Muslims are working in Balinese resorts serving liquor and pork to non-Muslims and that some Muslim women have resorted to prostitution for money.

It is at this stage that frame alignment is achieved between potential members and the party. The usage of Capitalism as an evil that causes impoverishment and moral decay is not uncommon amongst other Islamist movements. In spite of this, several factors differentiate HTI's usage of these issues compared to other Islamist movements. Firstly, HTI leaders who campaign on these topics are often trained in economics or have worked in the financial sectors. They are thus seen as credible individuals in the eyes of potential recruits. Secondly, HTI often cite Western academics and sources such as poll results to substantiate their claims. Although, this is often done in an uncritical fashion, data is sometimes manipulated and misrepresented from the source to give credence to HTI's claim. The success of this framing strategy has encouraged HTI to devote even more resources to this strategy. An example of this is a new journal, the Journal of Economic Ideology and website focusing on economic issues that the party started in 2009. The consistent theme used in the journal is targeted against Capitalism.¹⁹

¹⁷ Interview with Lazuardi Hendrawan, 1 February 2009, Jakarta.

¹⁸ Interview with Yatin, 20 March 2010, Bali

¹⁹ The journal is led by Dwi Condro Triono a HTI leader with a PHD in economics from the National University of Malaysia. For details of journal, see <http://www.jurnal-ekonomi.org/>. Accessed on 15 August 2011.

Western Conspiracies to Destroy Islam

Another frame utilized by HTI is the supposed Western conspiracy to destroy Islam. The West is often portrayed as having an agenda to undermine Islamic values and eliminate Islam from the lives of Muslims through the introduction of Western ideologies, such as secularism, capitalism, socialism, democracy and nationalism. HTI espoused the view that the foreign policies of Western countries, especially the US are aimed at subjugating the Muslim world and ensuring that its resources remain in the hands of the West. As part of its effort to destroy Islam, the West would ensure that leaders of Muslim countries are their allies who would stoop to any level to defend their interest. Since 9/11, HTI has consistently advocated the view that the attacks were part of a conspiracy engineered by the West to justify military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are often cited as examples of how the West is willing to sacrifice Muslim lives to ensure that the oil supply in the Middle East and Central Asia remained in their hands. The *War on Terror* is thus portrayed as a “War on Islam”. As an extension of this argument, HTI fervently argue that the terror attacks in Indonesia were orchestrated by American and Israeli intelligence. They have been in the forefront defending Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.²⁰ Ronny a member of HTI recalled that many of his friends were convinced that Muslims could not have possibly perpetrated the Bali bombings. Ronny noted:

I started reading up about the American agenda to undermine Islam. In the process, I learned that HTI was organizing a seminar to address the issue of the Bali bombings. I attended the seminar and was highly impressed by the research undertaken by HTI speakers. They showed compelling evidence that there were signs that there was a campaign to undermine Islam that was on going. It started with the 9/11 attacks when 4000 Jews were forewarned about the attacks by the Israeli intelligence and did not go to work on the day of the attack. Later, Gloria Arroyo, the President of Philippines, wrote to President Bush proposing that the Eastern parts of Indonesia be merged with the Philippines to form a large Christian empire that will be dominant in the region. Even those who perpetrated the acts were surprised by the scale of the bombing. This clearly showed that the original bombs were replaced by a more devastating bomb by American agents in the region. The Americans and Israelis wanted to use the bombings as an

²⁰ Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 15 March 2009, Jakarta and Hafidz Abdurrahman, 7 April 2010.

excuse to increase their presence in Indonesia and use their base here to encourage Christianization. I started attending more HTI events to learn about contemporary issues affecting Muslims. Later I was invited to join a *halaqah* and I became acquainted to the ideas and have since been a member of HTI.²¹

Ronny's experience suggests frame alignment was achieved as a result of HTI's framing strategy of amplifying conspiracy theories that were already prevalent in Indonesia. Ronny's case is not unique. Conspiracy theories that the Western countries are out to destroy Islam were so dominant that few Indonesians believed that the Bali bombings were the acts of Muslim terrorists or even that the JI terror network during the initial period.²² In this regard, the framing strategy used resonates with the feeling of many Indonesians. This means that HTI can then channel their interest to the socialization phase of the party.

Islam as a Complete Way of Life

As highlighted above, most members of HTI that I interviewed did not experience any forms of cognitive-opening in their joining process but were "seekers of religious truth". These individuals are constantly seeking to improve themselves as Muslims. There are several ways this is done. For some individuals, this means seeking new *pengajiaan* (religious classes), religious talks or seminars to attend. For others, it involves being part of an Islamic group or organization. Members often talk about how HTI *pengajiaan*, talks and seminars are different from what they have been used to. Ahmad, a HTI member in Pekanbaru was apolitical for much of his life. He hailed from a pious family and had gone to Pekanbaru to further his studies at the University of Riau. Among the first things he did when he arrived in Pekanbaru was to start attending the *pengajiaan* at a local mosque near his hostel. He was particularly impressed with the *pengajiaan* conducted by *Ustaz* Ihsan, a local leader of HTI in Pekanbaru. Ahmad recalled,

The classes conducted by *Ustaz* Ihsan were different from the other classes I have attended. Other classes often discussed ritualistic aspects of Islam such as prayers,

²¹ Interview with Ronny, Member of HTI, 1 September 2010, Batam.

²² Sidney Jones, "Facing the Enemy Within" *Time Asia*, 13 October 2003.

fasting and so on. On the contrary, the classes conducted by *Ustaz* Ihsan addressed more contemporary issues related to Islam. I understood from his classes that Islam is not just about rituals but is a way of life that governs every aspect of human life from personal hygiene to state administration. I started asking him questions and we develop a personal relationship. When he invited me to attend *halaqah*. I readily agreed.²³

The belief in Islam as a complete way of life thus produced frame alignment with Ahmad who was already seeking for an Islam that was more compatible with his thought process. The above-cited frames are not the only frames that were employed to capture the attention of potential members. HTI's framing strategies focused on a myriad of different issues from climate change to the need to ban certain groups that are deemed deviant such as the *Ahmadiyah*. These frames are used to capture the initial attention of potential members. These members are then put through a socialization process to ensure that they truly understand the ideas of HT.

Wiktorowicz noted that at the religious seeking stage, potential members of movements are often encouraged by members of radical groups to shop around in order to make an informed judgment about joining the movement. Group members often volunteer to act as independent guide to assist potential members in this search process by taking them to talks and study circles sponsored by other Islamic groups and movement.²⁴ While a study of HTI in Makassar suggested that HTI engaged in this strategy, this is highly unlikely.²⁵ This is due to the fact that HTI explicitly discouraged its members from seeking religious knowledge from other sources besides that conducted by HTI and HT. HTI leaders make it clear that potential members must establish an exclusive relationship of religious learning with HTI if they are to be taken seriously.²⁶ HTI members would often be prepared to emphasize the inadequacies of other Islamist and Islamic groups. This is especially when they encounter members of another movement. HTI leaders would often offer religious guidance to "seekers of religious truth". In 2008, I observed an example of how a HTI leader attempted to engage a group of "seekers of religious truth". After prayers at a mosque located near in an area that housed military officers, Muhammad Al-

²³ Interview with Ahmad, 3 February 2011, Pekanbaru.

²⁴ Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising*, p. 101.

²⁵ Syamsul Rijal, "Making Hizbyyin", p. 57.

²⁶ Interview with Rokhmat S Labib, Chairman of HTI, 15 August 2010, Jakarta.

Khaththath overheard a group of men (whom he believed were military officers) discussing a doubt that one of them had with regards to an injunction on prayers. He immediately approached them and provided them the answer to their question. At the end of the conversation, he suggested to the men to attend his *pengajian*, which was conducted weekly in a nearby mosque, and even suggested that he could conduct private lessons for the men at their homes. This experience suggests that upon identifying those who are religious seekers, HTI members and leaders would themselves aim to guide them towards HTI rather than assist them in ‘shopping’ for the right organization that suited their interest.

Culturing the *Hizbiyyin*

The process of socialization or culturing is perhaps the most critical of the different processes that an individual undergoes before becoming a fully-fledged member of HTI. Wiktorowicz noted that this process is “intended to alter the values of the individual so that self interest is defined in accordance with the goals and beliefs of the movement’s ideology.”²⁷ Beyond instilling the movement’s ideology, this process also results in the creation of new social bonds and kinship ties with fellow members. Ultimately, this process will result in the elevation of an individual from a *daris* to a member while those who are deemed to be unfit to be members might remain as *daris*. It is only when an individual is deemed to have adopted a *Hizbi identity* that they are elevated to the position of members. After the adoption of membership, members are assigned to leadership positions and are further entangled within the social network built by HTI.

Halaqah: The Foundation of Culturing

The process of culturing, or *tsatqif* as commonly referred to involves several stages. The first stage of this process is being part of a *halaqah*. As highlighted in the previous chapters, these *halaqahs* comprised five to eight members who will come under the supervision of a HTI member referred to as *mushrif* or *mushrifa* (female guide). The number of participants in a *halaqah* is capped at eight and in the case of HTI rarely

²⁷ Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause”, p. 3.

exceeds five.²⁸ The rationale of this small number is to ensure that the *mushrif* can engage the participants effectively. The process of being part of *halaqah* is complex. Participants are carefully selected to ensure that there are no members of intelligence agencies who might attempt to infiltrate the *halaqah*. The secretive nature of the *halaqah* process is a legacy of the political fear that existed during the New Order period. The objectives of the *halaqah* are multifold. Firstly, the *mushrif* is expected to impart the ideology of HTI to members. The core concepts of HTI's ideology are introduced and discussed intensively. Secondly, the *mushrif* is also responsible for ensuring that his *daris* undergo a transformation whereby he will become more observant of his daily rituals and other religious observances. Thirdly, the *mushrif* must ensure that the *daris* are sufficiently equipped to explain the concepts of HTI, rebut criticisms of HTI and engage in debates with members of other Islamist movements and groups.

The *halaqah* itself occurs about two times a week lasting around two to three hours and is compulsory. Even senior members, are required to attend *halaqah* conducted by a person who is higher in the party's hierarchy at least once a week. Perhaps the only exceptions are the *Mu'tamad* and *Amir* of HT. Former HT members noted that the *Mu'tamad* would be in individual *halaqah* with the *Amir*'s envoy whenever he visits the country.²⁹ Only under exceptional circumstances such as the death of family members or severe illness are members excused from joining the *halaqah*. Even when a member is travelling, he will make prior arrangement for a *halaqah* session with his *mushrif* to be conducted via the Internet.³⁰ Discipline is also instilled in *halaqah*. Members are expected to be punctual and could be barred from entering a *halaqah* if they are late. Members are also not allowed to discuss matters not related to HTI or HT and can be asked to leave the *halaqah* if they do not abide by this code of conduct. *Daris* are also expected to give their full attention to the *mushrif* and not to interject while he is speaking. The position of the *mushrif* is thus elevated and *daris* are expected to be his loyal followers. Interestingly, the relationship between the *mushrif* and *daris* is similar to that of *Sufi* brotherhoods where the murid is expected to give his blind loyalty to the

²⁸ Taji Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 125 and Interview with Harith Abu Ulya, 5 October 2010, Jakarta.

²⁹ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 25 July 2011, Jakarta.

³⁰ Interview with Jaweed Khan, Member of HT India, 10 July 2011, Johor Bahru, Malaysia.

shaykh of the *Sufi* brotherhood.³¹ The *halaqah* would occur at offices run by HTI and GEMA throughout Indonesia, the homes of HTI leaders or at a mosque. There are no restrictions placed on location of the *halaqah*. In countries where HT is banned, *halaqah* could even take place in a café or restaurant.

Halaqah often involves the reading of some texts recommended by the party known as the compulsory readings (*thaqafa mutabannah*) while there are some other books that are un-adopted or non-compulsory readings (*thaqafa ghayr mutabannah*). The difference between these books are that the adopted readings are targeted at members and thus used in the *halaqah* while the unadopted readings are aimed at introducing some basic ideas of HTI to the Muslim community.³² Several books; the *System of Islam, Islamic State, Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir* and *Structuring of the Party* are compulsory texts for all *daris* to read and understand. These books provide an early understanding of the concepts of the party's ideology. The *daris* will often read about a paragraph from the texts cited above before an explanation is given by *murshid* about the meaning of paragraph. Most of the *halaqah* is spent critically discussing and debating about the significance of the writings. While other works on HTI have criticized the movement for discouraging critical thinking, my observation differs.

In interactions with HTI and HT members, I observed that *daris* are encouraged to think critically, question and even disagree with the ideas expressed by An-Nabhani. An example of this is the issue of violence, which was once discussed in a *halaqah*. A *daris* had asked his *murshid* about the use of violence highlighting that in any coup attempt the chances of sporadic violence erupting is high. A debate ensued between the two and the *murshid* as he continued to deny that HTI would allow violence to be used at any stage. Subsequently, the *murshid* agreed to refer to the matter to the party's leadership for a more detailed answer. The task of the *murshid* is to answer these questions effectively and addressed disagreement conclusively. Often, due to the experience of the *murshid*, he is able to assuage concerns and address questions convincingly. This is also a process for the *murshid* to differentiate those who might be deemed to be suitable members and

³¹ See for instance Sheikh Asif, *Sufi Code of Conduct* (Copenhagen: world Sufi Foundation, 2003).

³² Taji Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, p. 135.

those who are not.³³ While the criterion for what a suitable member might be is not known, former activists noted that members must be intelligent enough to comprehend ideas, critical enough to be engaging and not close-minded. As such, people who are charismatic are the most sought after as long as they do not show signs of being ‘close minded’.³⁴ This essentially refers to people who might be repulsed by the ideas of HTI or might not agree with many of its ideas after an extended period of being in a *halaqah*. Members who are deemed to lack intellectual capacity, are kept as *daris* while others who less critical will undergo the process of learning longer. On average, *daris* become members after undergoing two years of learning although this could stretched for as long as five years.

Beyond the *halaqah*, *murshids* also meet their *daris* for at least two other sessions. These sessions are varied and could take many forms. In most cases, the *daris* would read books that are in the list of non-compulsory readings. These readings are timed according to the contemporary development occurring in Indonesia and the world. In other sessions, the *murshid* might ask the *daris* to read a compilation of different readings. The *daris* are also asked to ask to execute small research projects where he or she is to investigate a topic and make a presentation to his *halaqah* members. These *daris* are thus equipped with the ‘necessary’ knowledge that the party deemed is essential to recruit members, interact with the Indonesian public and debate with members of other political and Islamic groups.³⁵ The *murshid* might also organize individual study for *daris*, especially those who are judged as having potential to become members. In essence, the *halaqah* and study circles are forms of indoctrination, which are done subtly to ensure that the participants do not sense that HTI is forcing down its ideas upon them. HTI’s *daris* are often made to feel as if they had thoroughly studied the ideology of HTI before becoming members. *Daris* are also made to feel that they are in a select group of elites. Thus, many of the *daris* feel that they are part of an exclusive club and strive steadfastly to ensure that they continue to enjoy the privilege of being in this club.

³³ Personal Observation at a *Halaqah* conducted by HTI activist in Bogor and Kuala Lumpur and Interview with HTI activists.

³⁴ Interview with Mursalin, 14 May 2011, Jakarta.

³⁵ A similar observation was made by Kirstine Sinclair in her study of HT in Denmark and Britain. See Kirstine Sinclair, “The Caliphate as a Homeland”, pp. 125-129.

In reality, many *daris* find the experience of being a *daris* exhausting and constricting. It comes as little surprise then that as many as 60% of HTI's *daris* dropped out within the first two years. HTI leaders do not seem troubled by this. As Farid Wajidi maintained, "We are not interested in numbers. It's the quality that counts."³⁶ This is reflective of the party's belief that only those who are fully committed to the group should become members. Beyond the *halaqah* being a platform for indoctrination, the *halaqah* also serves as the basic unit of a new social network that the party creates for these potential recruits.

Building New Social Networks

The building of a new social network is an important part of the culturing process. The *mushrif* does not simply impart knowledge about the movement to the *daris* but also plays an important role in being a guide to the *daris* in his personal life. The *mushrif* act as a brother figure to the *daris* and would often take an interest in his religious development. The *mushrif* would guide the *daris* in matters related to the ritualistic aspects of Islam and will seek to guide him towards becoming a better person. A *mushrif* will always endeavor to be an example to his *daris*. During my interaction with Erwin Al-Jundi, the leader of GEMA, he portrayed an image of a good Muslim who is always striving to improve the society around him.³⁷ Al-Jundi will greet many of the older people living in the surrounding areas who showed obvious fondness for him. He cleans the mosque on a regular basis and even feeds the neighborhood cats. It is obvious that such acts are undertaken so that he will be respected by his *daris* with the hope that they will emulate him. The *mushrif* will often enquire about the personal well being of his *daris*. In the cases of *daris* who are undergraduates, they are often invited to live in a rented home or hostels, which the *mushrif* himself might have rented, as, described earlier. The *mushrif* will delegate the household tasks and ensure that the house is kept in good order to instill discipline.

For members of HTI with professional careers, HTI will assign them to *halaqahs* close to their homes. HTI leaders also ensure that they stay in close proximity to each other. For

³⁶ Interview with Farid Wajidi, 10 June 2009, Jakarta.

³⁷ I visited thrice at his home between 2008 and 2009.

instance, the homes of several HTI leaders are also located within the gated community where the former chairman of HTI, Hafiz Abdurrahman lived in Bogor. The house opposite to Abdurrahman's house is rented home which housed several junior members of HTI. The proximity made it easier for HTI leaders to supervise both members and *daris*. HTI *mushrif*s also encouraged to organize activities such as camping or sporting activities for their *daris* where social bond between the *daris* and *mushrif* is strengthened. The task of building new social ties meant that potential members now form relationships with members of HTI who become even closer to them than their own family members. This will often lead *daris* to remain within the network.

Another way that this new social network for professional members is created is through marriage. While HTI does not instruct HTI members to marry only fellow members, a large number of HTI members prefer marrying a person within the party. Officially, the party allows HTI members to marry non-members even if these individuals choose to remain outside the party. Nevertheless, many HTI female members prefer to marry within the party. A female HTI member admitted that HTI is a good place to find a husband since HTI members are good Muslims. Many are also better educated and hence hold professional jobs. Unlike other Islamist organizations, which encouraged polygamy, the polygamous culture is not strong in HTI.³⁸ Marrying HTI members could also mean social advancements for some women members. Even for those who prefer marrying outside the party, this is done with the ultimate aim of guiding the future spouse to become a HTI member.³⁹ While HTI does not admit to match making members as an official party policy, the former leader of HTI's women's wing, Zulia Ilmawati said:

It is common for us to introduce our friends to each other under any regular context. Obviously we will introduce members who we deemed are suitable for each other since they are like our own siblings.⁴⁰

It is thus common for members of HTI to marry a *daris* of HTI as part of his or her effort to ensure that kinship ties are established which in turn would indirectly lead to the

³⁸ Interview with Wati, 22 March 2009, Jakarta.

³⁹ Interview with Febrianti and Zulia Ilmawati, 20 March 2009, Jakarta

⁴⁰ Interview with Zulia Ilmawati, 20 March 2009, Jakarta.

strengthening of the social ties between members and *daris*. It is very rare that *daris* who are married to HTI members do not become members themselves.

The long period that a potential member remains as the party's *daris* means that they are committed to the cause at the ideational level and is part of a new social network without which he or she will feel completely loss and alone. My experience with Muhammad Al-Khaththath attested to this. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Al-Khaththath was sacked from the party in 2008 after being a member for more than two decades. It was obvious that he reminisced about his time in HTI and kept repeating the fact that he finds it difficult to believe that his 'brothers' of so many years decided to simply push him aside. He often explained that he is unlikely to re-join the party even if invited back, as the scar from the experience is too deep for a reconciliation to take place.⁴¹ While the culture of pushing ex-members out of the party is strong, the party avoids the practice of *takfir*, which is prevalent in some Muslim organizations. This could be seen from the fact that HTI leaders continue to acknowledge Al-Khaththath whenever they meet publicly and even exchange views about different issues.⁴²

Preparing the Future Elites

Upon becoming a member, a newly appointed HTI member will immediately be tasked with several responsibilities. A HTI member is expected to form a *halaqah* with his/her own *daris*. *Mushrif*s are also given the task of conducting small talks, to be MCs at HTI events and to assist the *Ma'sul* of the city. At this stage, a *mushrif* is also less likely to leave the party since a member's appointment to leadership positions will create a sense of ownership towards the party. The immense tasks that the *mushrif*s are given meant that HTI members have little time to reflect on their involvement with HTI. A former HTI member noted that he was so busy in his activities that he hardly had time to reflect on the decisions made by party leaders in Indonesia which on hindsight reflected poor leadership. It was only when he lost his job and had more time that he began to realize

⁴¹ Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, 8 April 2010, Jakarta.

⁴² Personal Observation of author at various Islamic events in Jakarta.

contradictions within the HTI positions on different issues.⁴³ Likewise, every aspect of their lives often revolved around HTI.⁴⁴

Mushrifs are often appointed to the position of *Ma'sul* after three years of being a member. This could mean that the party would instruct members to move to another city. As highlighted in Chapter 5, most HTI members have a day job but some of the HTI leaders draw a salary from the movement. For instance, Rahmat Kurnia, Farid Wajidi, Hafidz Abdurrahman and Harith Abu Ulya are full time members of the party. In some other circumstances, party leaders are required to move to another city to carry out their activities. These financial benefits that members enjoy would tie them even closer to the party. At a less intangible level, the positions that a member occupies within the party provides a sense of confidence and empowerment. In explaining his newfound confidence, a member of HTI said,

In the past I use to be a computer geek. I didn't want to interact with anyone. I was only interested in anything associated with computers. In fact I didn't know how to interact with people. After being in HTI, I am not only confident but more articulate. I can present arguments even when I meet very senior academics and Islamic scholars. This is the unexplained benefit of doing God's work.⁴⁵

The culturing process of the movement through, *halaqah*, the construction of new social networks and allocation of responsibilities to members are part of the culturing process that would lead members to adopt a collective identity as defined by HTI.

Adopting a *Hizbi* Identity

The adoption of a new Islamic identity begins at the stage when a *daris* has just started participating in a *halaqah*. As a *daris* progress to become a party member, more pronounced changes occur leading them to adopting a total new Islamic identity. These

⁴³ Interview with Donny, 20 August 2009, Jakarta. When pressed on to cite examples of this, he preferred not to discuss what he felt was internal party matters.

⁴⁴ Members are encouraged to patronize shops owned by fellow members

⁴⁵ Interview with Saiful, 19 August 2009, Jakarta

include changes in appearance, behaviour, social interaction and thinking. The end result of the process is a new identity, which I termed the *Hizbi identity*.

In an insightful study of lesbian movements, Taylor and Whittier posited three theoretical tools, boundaries, consciousness and negotiation for understanding collective identity constructions.⁴⁶ They observed that boundary markers tend to heighten awareness of group's commonalities of the lesbian movement.⁴⁷ Boundaries mark the social territories of group relations by accentuating the behavioural, cognitive and affective differences with the outside world that is deemed to be hostile. The concept of boundaries is useful in understanding the process of identity construction within HTI. The processes of cognitive opening, religious seeking and culturing that HTI activists undergo results in members undergoing changes in the behaviour, feelings and attitudes towards party members and those outside the party (affective changes) and their thinking (cognitive change) as a result of the construction of a new collective identity.

Behavioural Changes

Behavioural change is often expressed in the way members of a particular movement or group dress as an identity marker. Kuumba and Ajanaku found that the growing of dreadlocks became a global identity marker for people of African descent as the hairstyle is seen to be a "symbolic accompaniment to oppositional collective identities associated with the Black Power movements."⁴⁸ Such symbolic accompaniments are seen in the dress of members. The female members of HTI will start wearing headscarf with a long robe or with blouses and pants that are loose to ensure that the shape of the body is not seen. Unlike other Islamic groups such as the *Salafis*, the wearing of the *niqab*, which

⁴⁶ The authors explained consciousness as the interpretative frameworks that emerge out of a challenging group's struggle to define and realize its interest and negotiation as the symbols and everyday actions subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems of domination. These concepts are less relevant in trying to understand the formation of a collective identity within HTI. See Verta Taylor and Nancy E Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization" in A.D. Morris and C. M. Mueller (eds) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 111.

⁴⁷ *ibid.* Also see Scott A Hunt and Robert D Benford, "Collective Identity, Solidarity and Commitment" in David A Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 433-459 for details of the process of the formation of collective identity.

⁴⁸ Kuumba M Bahati and Femi Ajanaku, "The Hair Aesthetics of Cultural Resistance and Collective Identity Formation," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 3(1998), p. 227.

covers the face, is not popular amongst women in HTI nor is the use of dark clothing. Women in HTI prefer wearing colorful clothes. Wati a member of HTI in Pekanbaru described herself as being a tomboy prior to her knowing HTI. She said,

I use to be a tomboy. I kept really short hair and always wore T-shirt and jeans. All my friends were guys. I enjoyed hanging out with them. After I became acquainted with HTI, I started changing. I started wearing the *jilbab* and stopped wearing clothes that are prohibited by Islam. My friends found it difficult to accept my change initially. Over time, they started respecting me when they realized that I am still the same person except that I am now keeping to the norms of Islam.⁴⁹

For men, they might put on the *kopiah* or *songkok* (different types of head dress popular in Indonesia and Malaysia) to show piety, although this is normally done during official HTI functions. HTI members and leaders will also attempt to dress in clothes to portray the image of a party that is professional and disciplined. This often means the wearing of suits or traditional batik shirts. A member of HTI noted that he could always recognize a member of HTI from the way he is dressed. Unlike many other Islamist movements where there is a tendency to keep long or full beards, party members tend to keep closely trimmed beard and a small goatee to ensure that they fulfill the encouraged practice of keeping a beard while looking neat and professional.

Another key behaviour change is in the display of personal piety. While the party tended to prioritize party's activities over ritual matters, members would ensure that they observed the basic rituals of Islam. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the party views the revival of the caliphate to be the most important obligation for a Muslim and that it must take precedence over other obligations. This included praying in a congregation, frequenting the mosque and giving alms to the poor. A key manifestation of this new found piety is the segregation between men and women. HTI's public events will separate sitting arrangements for men and women. The HTI central office in Jakarta is divided into two areas with different entrances to the building for men and women. HTI members will avoid talking to members of the opposite sex unless it is related to party matters. Piety is also displayed in interactions with family members, friends and others

⁴⁹ Interview with Wati, 22 March 2009, Jakarta.

within their personal and societal networks. Such exemplary character is meant to encourage peers in to become potential members to HTI. In general, student members have reported that their parents are happy with their involvement in HTI due to their increased religiosity. Piety is not simply expressed through rituals but also in the daily lives of HTI members. For instance, HTI members will never buy anything including a house and car on instalments. Paying interests is considered prohibited in Islam. Even Islamic banks that offer interest free loans are not seen to be adhering to Islamic laws. HT members believe that Islamic banking in Indonesia is similar to regular banks but these ventures masquerade their operations using an Islamic disguise. Piety is also manifested through attending HTI events, participating in recruitment strategies and engaging in debates with HTI critics. The behavioural changes are an expression of boundary marking, which separates HTI members and other outside the party.

Affective Changes

The formation of collective identity within social movement often results from the construction of boundaries, which in turn leads to affective changes among members of the movement. Such changes could affect the way members relate to fellow members and those outside the group. The employment of such distinction is aimed at consolidating the collective identity developed within the movement. In the case of HTI, members would often draw distinctions between the party and other groups seen to be opposed to the movement's goals. One such distinction is in the belief that the Islam adhered to by HTI is superior to that adhered to by other Muslims. This fits into the analysis by Olivier Roy about groups like HT seeking to practice "a true Islam".⁵⁰ Unlike the *Salafi* groups of the *Takfiri* orientation in which members would regard others outside the movement as being infidels, HTI simply regards Muslims outside the group as sinners since they are not working towards reviving the caliphate. This creates a paradigm of Us versus Them in the mindset of HTI members.

⁵⁰ Roy, *Globalised Islam*, pp.268-269.

The 'Us' in this conception are the members of HTI who are regarded as brothers and sisters. Members would spend virtually all their time with each other and discussing matters related to the party. This strong social bond leads to a sense of belonging to the party. Party members also feel a sense of brotherhood with members of HTI in other parts of the world. At HTI events, members both men and women would cry whenever visuals of physical tortures of members in places like Uzbekistan are screened. This sense of brotherhood could also be seen in the way HTI members relate to their counterparts from other countries when they are in Indonesia. These members are often featured in talks and seminars to provide a sense of pride that the party is diverse culturally but united in its ideas. Nevertheless, the strong bond that HTI members feel towards members of HT elsewhere is still limited to superficial level of trying to showcase a united front to the world. As highlighted in Chapter 6, ethnic differences continue to affect the way members perceive each other.

In her analysis of HT in Denmark and Britain, Kirstine Sinclair observed that rather than referring to individuals within the party (e.g. the Spokesperson, Chairman etc), members would often refer to the party as a separate entity when discussing elements related to HT's ideology, methodology and policies.⁵¹ Members of HTI will begin their sentence with, "The party or HT believes (says) that ..." when explaining different aspects of the party. Members do not think of other members as individuals. Rather, they see the organisation as a whole. This is a reflection of the strength of its ideology and culturing process. This also means that the leaders of HTI are not the focal point of members. Leaders are obeyed as representatives of the party who are higher in hierarchy. The identification between members and party is so strong that a departure of any leaders does not affect the party significantly.

The creation of 'Them' in the minds of HTI members strengthens their sense of loyalty and attachment to the party. There are three categories of 'Them' in this conception. The first group comprised members of other Islamic groups who are at the outer most of HTI's concentric circle organizational structure. The party accords a certain level of respect to members of groups such as the MMI and JAT and views them as allies in their struggle to establish the caliphate. As mentioned earlier, HTI believed that these groups

⁵¹ Sinclair, "The Caliphate as a Homeland", p. 153

are also working towards the re-establishment of the caliphate albeit in the wrong way. HTI members would befriend members of such organizations and try to correct their methodology by urging them to adopt HTI's strategy. The second category comprises Indonesian Muslims. Such people are seen to be potential recruits and are perceived to be ignorant. The last category comprised of Muslims who are opposed to HTI and the non-Muslims. Groups such as the Islam Liberal Network (JIL) fall in this category. HTI members feel that liberal Muslim groups allied to Western powers to undermine Islam. As highlighted earlier, many members believed that there is a Western campaign to destroy Islam. A siege mentality is thus evident amongst HTI members. They believed that only through struggling for the caliphate that they can protect themselves against 'Western attack' on Muslims and Islam. This siege mentality contributes to the sense of collective identity that the party members feel.

Cognitive Changes

An-Nabhani constantly propounded that Muslims must have the right thinking to deal with the world's problems. His fixation with the thinking process of men led him to write the book, *At-Takfeer* (Thinking), which is a compulsory reading for HTI members. The group that would be working for the re-establishment of the caliphate must be a group that shares the same *fikrah* (thoughts) against those who think in a different way. This serves as an important boundary marker. As such, by the time a person becomes a member of HTI, there would have been a profound paradigm shift in their thinking. This is reflected in his/her thought process and analysis of issues. My own perception is HT members all around the world seems to have a standard analysis and answer to virtually everything related to the Islam and the party.⁵² The experience of Fahmi Amhar, a leader of HT provides an interesting anecdotal insight to this point. Fahmi Amhar had been recruited as a member of HT in Austria while he was pursuing his doctorate degree in 1989. Since HTI was yet to be part of the structure of HT, he was not linked to leaders of HTI. Amhar noted that members of HT Austria were probably not even aware about the existence of HTI. Upon coming back in 1997, he was invited to speak at a mosque. After finishing the sermon, a member of HTI approached him and asked him whether he was

⁵² This could be seen from conversations with HT leaders from Britain, Australia, Denmark, Netherlands Malaysia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Turkey, India and Pakistan between 2007 and 2011.

from HTI. This member then introduced himself as a member of HTI and linked Amhar to the rest of the HTI leaders. HT members profess pride and would constantly emphasize about how their thought process is in unison with the party's.

Membership Retention and Identity

The process of adopting a new Islamic identity is one that results in a complete change among members of the party. Members often relate the joining process as a life changing experience. This life changing experience also means that members would remain in the party as a lifelong commitment. Members who survived several years in the party are likely to be members for life. The high rate of retention could be attributed to the fact that only the most committed of the *daris* make it as members eventually. Given the 'culturing' process which could span several years, it is expected that the rate of retention is high for those who succeed to be members. Members who choose to be part of the party have committed a large part of their lives within the party and thus find it difficult to 'throw' away a large part of their lives.

The difficulties that former members of the party encounter in their process of quitting can also explain why most members remain in the party. The most cited reason for their initial reluctance to quit is due to the sense that they are sinning. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the task of reviving the caliphate is seen to be an obligation for all Muslims. Members believe that a decision to leave HT will incur the wrath of God. Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler explained that members join Islamic groups to receive eternal salvation as part of the saved group."⁵³ Inversely, leaving the group would mean that individuals are no more part of this saved groups and is thus sinning.

A major determinant that led to members staying is the kinship ties that members lose if they were to leave HTI. Ex-members reported that their spouses who chose to remain in HT have threatened to divorce them. For certain members of HTI, the fear of losing friends could result in them continuing to remain members of the party. This means that they risk losing their entire social network they might have built over the years. It could

⁵³ Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, "The Rationality of Radical Islam," *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 2 (2006), p. 318.

also mean losing family members. The example of Al-Baghdadi is in fact reflective of the difficulties a former member of the party undergoes once he chose to leave the party. Al-Baghdadi described his leaving experience as being particularly difficult. He was shunned by most members of HTI following an order that came from the HT leadership that members must cease all contact with him. This ostracism acts as a deterrent for others to not quit the party.

HTI's high rate of retention does not mean that all members remain with the party throughout their lives. Several members and even two former chairmen, Al-Baghdadi and Al-Khaththath quit after spending their entire adult lives being members of HTI. Examples of members quitting have been cited in Chapter 2 and 3. In virtually all these cases the reasons cited for leaving the party was over differences with decisions made by both the party's leaders in Indonesia or the central leadership, rather than over doctrinal issues. This is in contrast with examples of members who quit in other HT chapters where some members have opposed the party and adopted a diametrically opposing position to that of HT.

With the exception of one ex-member, all the former members interviewed expressed their commitment towards HT's objectives of reviving the caliphate and are in different Islamic groups with the same aim. In some of these cases such as in the groups like *Hizbul Khilafah* and *Hizbut Dakwah Indonesia* (HDI), nearly every aspect of HTI's ideas, methodology and even reading materials are maintained. Members also overcome the problem of sinning in such circumstances. It is also a reflection of how successful the process of collective identity formation is within HTI that even individuals who are no longer part of the party retain their beliefs and commitments to the objectives of the party. The formation of these groups is also a way for HTI members to avail themselves from 'sinning' since they are still working toward the revival of the caliphate albeit in a different way.

Former members also do not seem to harbour any negative thoughts towards the party itself. Their anger and disappointment are targeted against the leadership of HT and HTI whom in their minds have strayed away from the original teachings of An-Nabhani and other ideologues of the party. In this regard, they strive to return the teachings of the

party to its original form through the formation of different groups with similar objectives to HT. At another level, former members of HTI tend to congregate around these groups. The shared experience of being in HTI and sharing a collective bond and identity means that these members do not feel the sense of loss as much. A case in point is the sacking of Al-Khaththath from HTI. Several key members of HTI had left the party with him. Members of *Hizbul Khilafah* who expressed their interest to join HDI approached him. Former HTI members involved in HDI also began attending the weekly classes conducted by Al-Bagdadi. As such, the process of leaving becomes less arduous for these members who continue to share this collective identity formed during their time in HTI but continued after they left the party.

Conclusion

This chapter is an attempt to understand the micro dimension of the growth of HTI in Indonesia. It argues that the affective and cognitive changes that members undergo upon adopting HTI's Islamic identity explain the high rate of retention that the party enjoys. This identity is fostered in the processes of cognitive opening, religious seeking, framing and culturing that individuals undergo before becoming a member. Collective identity in turn leads to individuals becoming attached to the party's ideology. The chapter began by sketching the theory presented by Wiktorowicz in his study of the *Al-Muhajiroun*. Unlike the case of the *Al-Muhajiroun*, individuals who become members of HTI do not necessarily go through the process of cognitive seeking. Instead, their first encounter with the party occurs at the stage of religious seeking. The chapter then discussed the experiences of HTI members in their journey to becoming members within the framework of the processes described by Wiktorowicz. The chapter then discussed the changes that individuals undergo upon adopting a *Hizbi identity*. It is noted that this identity is expressed through the process of boundary marking where members undergo behavioural, affective and cognitive changes. This section also discussed the importance of identity in retaining members within the party.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that HTI will revive the *Khilafah* in Indonesia. For that matter, it is highly unlikely that HT can revive the *Khilafah* anywhere in the world. The leadership of HT does not understand the local dynamics of its different chapters. As long as this is the case, the *Khilafah* will remain a distant dream (Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Former Chairman of HTI, 15 Feb 2010, Jakarta)

It is not a question of whether the *Khilafah* will be revived or not. The *Khilafah* will be established. It is the promise of Allah in the Qur'an. The question is when this will happen. I believe that the *Khilafah* is near. *Inshallah* (God Willing) we will see it during our lifetime (Ismail Yusanto, Media Representative of HTI, 12 August 2009, Jakarta)

In 2004, the American National Intelligence Council published a report, which drew a scenario of events, one of which would see the establishment of a caliphate by 2020.¹ The growth of groups like HT in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan seem to affirm this view. This has resulted in growing apprehension in some circles in the west, about the imminent threat posed by HT. While such fears are understandable, responses to HT must be measured and well thought out. Misconstruing the threat posed by them and other similar groups or overreacting to this supposed threat is likely to intensify, rather than temper, the proliferation of these movements. In-depth studies to understand their growth are critical to allaying such fears. Bearing this in mind, I have explored the complex factors that have led to the growth of HTI. I have also proposed a new theoretical framework for studying and understanding Islamist movements. In my conclusion, I shall state the policy implications of the findings in my study, by discussing their relevance to providing some indications about the likely threats posed by HT and HTI, as well as the future direction they hold for the movement.

Comprehending and Reflecting on the Growth of HTI

This study has shown that HTI has grown significantly in the last decade due to its ability to build a common identity amongst its members. This has been facilitated largely by factors such as institutional and non-institutional political opportunity structure (POS) POS, effective resource mobilization strategies and a rationalistic anti-systemic ideology.

¹ National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project*, (Washington D. C: NIC, 2004), p. 83.

In the next section, I shall elaborate on the important role played by these factors in HTI's growth.

The Centrality of Collective Identity

The role played by collective identity in attracting new members and retaining them within the party cannot be underestimated. Through intensive interviews conducted with more than one hundred HTI members, I have been able to demonstrate the processes undergone by a person before becoming a member. They include a series of psychological processes, such as cognitive opening, religious seeking, framing and socialization, leading to a member's complete initiation. Here, I differ from scholars who suggest affiliation to such causes is the result of an identity crisis due to perceived grievances, often contributed to by socio-economic problems. This research clearly shows that individuals are introduced to HTI as a result of religious seeking or by cognitive opening. It also details the importance of socialization in transforming individuals to become members of HTI. The socialization process takes the form of *halaqah*, the formation of new social networks and according positions of responsibility to these individuals. The study shows that as a result of these processes, an individual's identity is transformed when they begin to adopt a new identity, which I have referred to as the *Hizbi identity*. Individuals often display permanent behavioural, cognitive and affective changes as a result of this new identify. An individual who has adopted this new identity is unlikely to change and as a result, the membership retention rate in HTI is extremely high. Even when individuals leave the movement, it is rare to find someone giving up their identity. Analysing this process of collective identity formation and its impact on recruitment and membership retention is central to this thesis.

Structural Factors in HTI's Growth

While collective identity is the most important factor in HTI's growth, it is by no means the only one. Several structural factors have been identified to explain this growth, namely, the availability of institutional and non-institutional support and HTI's effective resource mobilization strategies. In explaining the role of these structural factors, I have resorted principally to the use of the twin theoretical frameworks, namely the POS and the RMT variant of SMT. It is to be noted that the open political system that followed the

collapse of the New Order government, gave the party space to emerge publicly, recruit members, and launch collective actions. While the issue of political context has been addressed in other works, my study provides a broader understanding of how movements emerge and launch collective actions. My extensive interviews with HTI leaders who were involved with the movement in the 1980s and 1990s have provided insight into the factors that impacted their decision-making process. This allowed identification of both the external opportunities and constraints facing HTI.

In explaining how HTI exploited the expanded public space wrought by the period of democratic transition, I have drawn essentially on the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) variant of SMT. My observation was that this was an opportune moment for HTI to build a dynamic organizational structure, recruit members, procure funds and garner social capital. Rather than just describing the resource mobilization strategies used by HTI, I have analyzed them to show how they are interconnected with the party's growth. It was shown that HTI made use of active recruitment and consensus formation in order to strengthen different components of its organizational structure. The description of HTI's organizational structure also made an appraisal of the relationship between HT central and HTI, to better understand how transnational movements like HT administer their widespread and vast membership. These structural factors serve to explain the macro dimension of HTI's growth. I have demonstrated this by detailing how HTI deploys its resources and spearheads its strategies, thereby allowing it to expand its manpower and resources and growing as an organization. On its own, the structural aspect does not address the issue of how individuals react to the movement's strategies, what I have referred to as the micro dimension of HTI's growth. I have sought to achieve this by using the theories of identity and ideology.

Ideology as a Differentiating Factor

This study has also shown that the ideology of a movement is an important factor when individuals decide to choose one Islamist group over another. As outlined earlier in this thesis, scholars of social movement theory have avoided examining a movement's ideology as the concept do not fit rational choice theory, which underpins SMT. I have drawn on the definition of ideology by political theorist, Michael Freeden, to explain

how ideology could be brought into the study of social movements, while resolving the issues associated with the traditional understanding of ideology. Drawing on Freedman's study of the evolution of ideologies, I have been able to show that HTI has been successful in portraying the ideas attached to its Islamist ideology as being superior to those of other Islamist groups. This explains the growing popularity of HTI over other Islamist movements.

Theoretical Proposition

In the introductory chapter, I challenged the prevailing academic and journalistic wisdom that Islamist movements grew chiefly as a result of repression during Suharto's rule, the ensuing political and socio-economic disorder following the demise of the New Order regime and successful mobilization strategies. While the thesis did not discount the importance of these structural factors, I proposed that a focus on these structural factors alone would not answer many questions related to the growth of movements. For instance, structural factors cannot explain an individual's choice of one Islamist movement over another and the successful retention of members in a movement. I also challenged the application of SMT alone to understand this growth. While SMT is useful in understanding structural factors of growth, it tends to ignore the role of the individual, which leads to an unsatisfactory and incomplete account of movement's growth. I consequently proposed that the recognition of the interplay of cognitive factors, such as ideology and identity, was imperative in trying to understand the growth of Islamist movements like HTI. The approaches taken by POS theory, RMT, ideology theory (although less popular) and collective identity theory, have been applied and tested in numerous studies of Islamist groups and other social movements. What is unique about the proposed theoretical approach is in the way the theories are synthesized and applied to explain the factors that impact the growth of HTI.

While my work is focused on HT in Indonesia, my aspiration is to use this framework to explain the growth and decline of other Islamist movements. I could not embark on comparative studies of HT chapters in different countries due to the constraints of time and resources. However, I have applied this framework in studying HT in Malaysia and in particular, Gabungan Mahasiswa Islam Malaysia (GAMIS), the unofficial student

wing of PAS, in my other works. Based on these preliminary studies, I have reason to believe that this framework can be applied to study other Islamist movements.² There will remain some doubt as to whether this framework is universally applicable to all Islamist movements. I leave it to other researchers to confirm or disprove this.

Rethinking Hizb ut-Tahrir

One of the stated aims of this study is to re-assess current understandings of HT as a global, cohesive movement with a common goal.³ Another prevailing notion is that it is a movement that transcends differences in ethnicity, language, traditions and culture. This thesis challenges such perceptions of HT, and shows in fact that it is an Arab-centric movement that is focused on re-establishing the caliphate in the Arab world. It is transnational in so far as its common ideology is concerned, but the party's Arab-centric agenda makes it difficult for it to come to terms with ethnic differences in its overseas chapters.

Several studies on HT have speculated about the actual relationship between HT central and its chapters around the world.⁴ These works do not provide empirical data supporting the assertions, often leading to mis-information, and in some cases exaggerated claims about the impending HT threat. Through extensive interviews with members of HTI and HT and the use of literature previously unavailable, I have explored the relationship between HT central and its chapters, sources of its funding, the leadership's grasp of global politics and its position on violence.

² Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia: The Emergence of a New Transnational Islamist Movement in Malaysia" *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 47, no. 1 (2010), pp. 91-110 and Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Muslim Student Activism in Malaysia: A Case Study of the Gabungan Mahasiswa Islam Malaysia" in Sophie Lemeire (ed) *Contemporary Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: SIRD, 2012) (forthcoming).

³ See Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest* and Mandaville, *Global Islamic Politics*. The only scholar that challenges the notion of HT as a global movement is Kirstine Sinclair. However, she came to this conclusion based on the different activities organized by HT chapters in Denmark and UK. She does not highlight that even at the level of objective, there is a difference in the thinking the central leadership of HT and local level leadership.

⁴ Baran, *Hizbut Tahir*, 2005; Karanggianis, *HT in Central Asia*, 2010 and Sinclair, *Hizb Tahrir*.

Studying Islamist Movements in Indonesia

Studies on Islam and Islamism in Indonesia have produced some insightful works that have enriched our understanding of these topics. In studies of Islamist movements, there has been a stronger focus on the study of violent groups, like JI, or political parties like PKS.⁵ Other studies have focused on NU and Muhammadiyah. There has been less focus on smaller Islamist groups like FPI, FUI and MMI, which are less influential. Studies on these other movements are important, and must be encouraged, so that the potential threat they pose can be assessed in a more informed fashion.

With the exception of Noorhaidi Hassan's exceptional work on LJ, there is a dearth of good analytical works grounded on a sound theoretical framework. As mentioned in Chapter 1, many studies of Islamist groups tend to be descriptive in nature, focusing on their goals, activities and ideology. The few studies that have attempted to actually understand these movements, concentrate on the structural dimensions of these movements, such as their recruitment and framing strategies.⁶ A much smaller number of these works have a stronger focus on the cognitive dimensions.⁷ In this thesis I have proposed a different approach of assessing groups, which takes into consideration both the macro (structural) and micro (cognitive) aspects of a movement's activism. This approach provides a more comprehensive understanding as to why Muslims join Islamist movements. The theoretical framework here could offer a template to future studies of Islamist movements in Indonesia.

Is HT a Threat and How Do We Deal with It?

While it is not the purpose of this thesis to expound on state policies towards HT, the sheer volume of academic and general works portraying HT is a security threat means

⁵ Sidney Jones and her team at the ICG have enriched our knowledge of terrorist groups such as JI. Also see Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia*; Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam* and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS: Suara Dan Syariah* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2012) for good academic works on PKS.

⁶ Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, Ward, "Non-Violent Extremists" and Fealy, "Total Islamic Identity".

⁷ Rijal, "Making Hizbiyyin", 2010.

that this subject cannot be entirely ignored.⁸ Material in this thesis can be drawn on to suggest ways in which policy makers might better deal with HT. Several countries including Bangladesh, Russia, Saudi Arabia and all of the Central Asian countries have banned HT. It has also been proscribed in Pakistan, a country known for its high tolerance for extremist groups.⁹ For these countries, HT's agenda of replacing the current government with a caliphate, by armed revolution if necessary, is viewed as dangerous enough to impose a ban. I believe many of the fears are unwarranted.

In light of this strong perception of the 'danger' posed by HT, the Indonesian authorities' manner of handling of the potential threat has been contrary to the norm. There has not been any report of HTI members being arrested or detained. HTI leaders have sat on the MUI panel, a body that often advises the Indonesian government on Islamic matters and have even been part of various international level committees. They are also known to have forged good relationships with military and intelligence officers.¹⁰ My conversations with senior leaders of Muslim organizations indicate that they are less concerned about HTI than the more moderate Islamist parties like PKS. HTI leaders are guests at many Islamic events at which PKS leaders are *persona non grata*. An example of this is the fifth gathering of the KUII in 2010 where PKS leaders were not even invited.

Despite this openness, HTI has never posed a security threat to the Indonesian government. No HTI member has been involved in violence and there has been no evidence of any infiltration into the ranks of the armed forces or police. This is in direct contrast to the experiences of several countries where it is banned. For instance, Jordan, a country where they are proscribed, has seen the party attempting at least three military coups. Bangladesh, another country where HT is banned, has also seen a coup attempt

⁸ For instance see Baran, *Islam's Political Insurgency*, 2004 and Ahmed and Stuart, *Ideology and Strategy*, 2010.

⁹ For details about the tolerance for Islamist groups in Pakistan, see Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

¹⁰ One HTI leader had once even shown me a sms exchange between a senior intelligence officer and himself which indicates the good relations that HTI maintains with the intelligence officers.

orchestrated by the group. This is despite the fact that the Bangladeshi chapter is relatively new, having been formed only in 2000.¹¹

The Bangladesh case is interesting for several reasons. There are marked similarities between Bangladesh and Indonesia.¹² Both countries have open political systems where elections are held regularly and there is an active civil society.¹³ The memberships of HT in both countries comprise students and young professionals. The key difference lies in the fact that HT is proscribed in Bangladesh, while the party is legal in Indonesia and operates freely.

Here I believe that banning the party had the effect of strengthening its resolve to overthrow the Bangladeshi government. There are several reasons to support this hypothesis. Sources in Bangladesh have reported that HT began aggressively to recruit military officers rather than students, after it was banned. It was reported that the party's outlawing in fact crippled its ability to recruit students in universities. The ban also had the effect of creating public sympathy for the movement, since its activities were regarded as peaceful. The party also successfully took advantage of this public sympathy by framing its ban as being part of the larger Indian and American conspiracy to destroy Islam in Bangladesh. Furthermore, the ban in Bangladesh allowed the party to exaggerate its real strength. Many of the coup plotters were made to believe that they had the strong support of the army when in fact their number was just several dozens.¹⁴ While HT has generally been secretive about its actual size, members are able to gauge its numbers based on public activities. Lastly, the ban resulted in the party's monopoly over the Islamism discourse. The government and moderate Muslims could no longer challenge its discourse publicly in an open democratic setting.

¹¹ The chapter was formed in Bangladesh after Pakistan became a nuclear state in 1999. The party leadership saw Pakistan as a potential target as a location for the caliphate to be re-established. The chapters in Bangladesh and India were formed to assist the Pakistan chapter and a potential future caliphate in the country. Interview with Moien Ibrahim, 2 July 2006, London.

¹² To date, there has not been a substantial study done on HT in Bangladesh. Only one work briefly mention some of its activities in Bangladesh. See Ali Riaz, *Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

¹³ A comparison between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the EIU Democracy index 2011 reveals similar numbers in the electoral process and pluralism as well as the civil rights categories. Indonesia scored 6.92 and 7.06 in these categories respectively while Bangladesh scored 7.42 and 7.06 in the same categories.

¹⁴ Confidential Source.

For these reasons, I aver that Indonesia's hands-off strategy had the moderating effect of actually curbing HTI's influence and growth. While the movement has grown, its continuous public engagement with the government, moderate Muslim organizations, and liberal groups, have given Indonesian Muslims an opportunity to properly assess HTI's objectives and policies. This allows individuals to make more informed decisions if they decide to join the party.

The question of the threat posed by the HT, should also be tackled through an analysis of its political strategies and actions. It is naïve to assume that a movement that has attempted military coups in several countries in the last five decades, is controlled by a foreign leadership whose identity remains unknown, and believes in revolutions to overthrow governments, poses no security threat. Yet, despite this, there is no reason to heighten the magnitude of the HT threat. Suggestions that the party is the next Al-Qaeda or the next major threat to the world are alarmist. Several observations support my view that HT is in fact a less significant threat than it is made out to be. An important factor to note is the incompetence of HT's leadership. The leadership has failed to comprehend the context of local politics in many of the countries that the party is active in. Their dealings with the Iranian, Libyan and Taliban political leaders have particularly shown the HTI's naivety and ineptitude. The party has failed in every coup attempt it has staged since the 1960s. These failures are no coincidence. In general, the coups were poorly planned and coordinated. In Bangladesh, there were three different HT cells in the military. None of the cells was aware of the existence of the other cells, leading to a massive debacle. This occurred when a member of one of the cells told on a member of a second cell, thinking that another group not related to HT was also planning a coup. This is so as the party has clearly prohibited violence in the form of offensive jihad as long as there is no caliph. There is also no substantial evidence of HT members carrying out acts of violence, even in the most repressive circumstances, such as in the Central Asian states. The foregoing shows how an avowedly non-violent position, along with an inept secretive leadership, underscore the point that the threat of HT has been overstated.

The Future of HTI and HT

Several studies of HTI indicate that the party is likely to grow further due to its appeal among young Muslims and the lack of Muslim groups with the sort of credentials that the party possesses.¹⁵ Others like Greg Fealy suggest that there is limit to its growth.¹⁶ My own analysis of HTI concurs with that of Fealy. While I agree that HTI is likely to grow in the short term, I doubt that the party can sustain its expansion in the long term but achieving its goal of reviving the caliphate in Indonesia is quite another matter. Several reasons could be cited here. The party has not attempted any serious expansion into the rural areas. Even if the party devised strategies to attract members from the rural areas, it is unlikely that they will find resonance amongst the rural population and the less educated groups within the country.

Since the focus of HTI's ideology is the restoration of the caliphate, lethargy might begin to set in amongst members if no caliphate is formed in the near future. In a similar vein, in the late 1990s, many HT members in Britain left the party.¹⁷ Many activists were disappointed that the promise (of HT leaders) that a caliphate was imminent in Jordan did not materialize. Since 2007, HTI has also organized major events and conferences in order to demonstrate its ability to draw crowds and portray societal leadership. There are indications that these events are beginning to raise expectations amongst its members by showing HTI's actual strength. Many younger members I spoke to are convinced that the caliphate will be established in Indonesia. A failure to deliver on these expectations is likely to impact on the morale of some these members, leading some to leave the party. The single most important factor that might hamper HTI's growth is the Arab-centric leadership of HT. This leadership does not understand the political context of Indonesia and is likely to make decisions in the future, which may impede its growth. This trend can only be reversed if structural changes are to take place within the larger HT.

HT has long envisaged the staging of peaceful revolutions against the Middle Eastern regimes and believed that these dictatorships will be replaced by a caliphate led by HT.

¹⁵ Salim, *Hizbut Tahir* and Rijal, *Making Hizbiyyin*.

¹⁶ Fealy "Seeking a "Total" Muslim Identity", pp. 162-163.

¹⁷ Husain, *The Islamists*, p. 120

The recent Arab spring did see revolutions taking place in the Middle East, but HT played no role in them. Contrary to its expectations, these revolutions have instead installed democratic governments, led by their archrivals, the MB. The new scenario has made it necessary for them to face unpalatable truths about the movement for many of the HT members. For one, the party does not possess a popular base in the Arab world. Secondly, the party leadership's eleventh hour stand in mustering members to form chapters in Tunisia and Egypt proved embarrassing. The party could only mobilize less than a hundred members in demonstrations held to support it. A high profile women's conference that the party held in Tunisia drew less than two hundred participants. It could thus be assumed that HT's political future in the Arab world is bleak. The one exception that might provide the party with a potential POS is if the MB led governments in these countries fail to resolve the socio-economic problems faced by the people.

In spite of this, HT is likely to grow in certain countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan. The persecutions of HT, the failure of secular leaders to deliver economic goods, and the tarnished image of Islamist parties have given HT the political space to grow.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the Arab-centric goals of its central leadership might deter the party from allocating resources in these countries and might thus impede its growth. The issue of HT's Arab-centric leadership has once again impacted the party. A member of HT Malaysia recently informed me about a proposal by HT Turkey to reform HT.¹⁹ This proposal calls for the party to re-think about its leadership selection process and suggested the possibility of a rotating the position of the *Amir* amongst the *Mu'tamad* of HT's leading chapters. There has also been a criticism of the leadership's over emphasis on the Arab chapters of the party. It seems that leaders of HTI and HTM have supported this proposal. The future of HT thus lies in its ability to re-invent itself by focusing on its growing chapters outside of the Arab countries and lowering its expectations in the Arab world.

¹⁸ Islamist parties in Pakistan have been discredited due to their cooperation with the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf. For details of this and other problems associated with Pakistani politics, see Christophe Jaffrelot, ed. *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* (New York: Zed Books, 2002). and Imran Khan, *Pakistan: A Personal History* (London: Bantam Press, 2011). In Bangladesh, the main Islamist party in Bangladesh the Jamaat-e-Islami has the ill repute of being collaborators with the Pakistanis during the 1971 Bangladeshi war of independence. For details of this see Ali Riaz, *God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh* (Lanham, MD Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

¹⁹ Conversation with a HTM leader, 10 February 2012, Singapore.

Suggestions for Future Research

Few studies on HT have undertaken the task of understanding the reasons for members joining the movement (the exception being Karagiannis' work on HT in Central Asia). More should be done in order to allow interesting comparative studies to be done between different chapters of HT. I could not ascertain whether there are some key differences in the way HT central deals with its chapters in the Arab world and those in Indonesia. This would strengthen (or undermine) my argument about the Arab-centric nature of HT's leadership. I have come to this conclusion based on the empirical data I collected through discussions with HT leaders in Indonesia and Australia. Studies on HT chapters in Malaysia and places where the political openness is similar to that of Indonesia would also make an interesting comparison.²⁰ Such studies could be used as a testing ground for the theoretical framework I proposed further.

Another area that I did not elaborate on in this thesis is the relationship between the central leadership of HTI and its leadership at the provincial level. My study did not establish the similarities, differences and tensions that might exist between chapters of HTI at the different provinces. While I conducted interviews with several members of MHTI, as a male researcher, I was unable to delve enough into the world of PHTI. The interviews I conducted reveal some unique behavioural dynamics amongst these women. There seems to be an odd convergence of feminism and Islamism in many of them. As I have highlighted in Chapter 5 and 7, a clear disjuncture exists between the ideals that these women uphold and the practical aspects of their lives. A study of PHTI would thus bring to light not only the role played by women in Islamist movements but also the potential confluence of feminism and Islamism.

With the exception of Indonesia, I discovered during the course of my library research how few studies there are of the reasons for Muslims joining Islamist groups and parties in Southeast Asia. There were hardly any academic studies documenting the attraction of Muslims to movements like the *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* (Assembly of Malaysian

²⁰ While there is more political openness in Indonesia, both countries were described as flawed democracies in the EIU democracy index. Indonesia was ranked 60 and Malaysia was ranked 71. See Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2011: Democracy Under Stress*, p. 5.

Muslim Youth, ABIM) in Malaysia, the *Pattani* insurgency movements in Southern Thailand, the Moro groups in Southern Philippines and Muslim civil society groups in Singapore, such as the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP). Studies focusing on the attraction to these movements would deepen our understanding of the phenomenon of Islamism in Southeast Asia.

Another area of potential research is the question of why people turn to fundamentalist organizations. Similar to the literature on Islamism in Indonesia, the larger literature on religious fundamentalism have sought to understand a person's journey to fundamentalism by assessing grievances caused by socio-economic and political problems, organizational efforts at reaching out to individuals and the adoption of a new identity. Studies that focus on the interplay and confluence of both structural and cognitive factors would contribute rewarding perspectives in the understanding of religious fundamentalism.

In summing up, my study has explored the developments that have led to the growth of HTI. There are several qualifications that must be made about HTI. For all its rapid growth, HTI is still relatively small in Indonesian terms. Despite its internal secrecy, the party has remained rather benign. Most importantly, its leaders' resounding predictions of future success in founding a caliphate, in reality seems little more than a pipe dream. Nonetheless, HTI does give expression to a particular kind of Islamist sentiment in Indonesia, and in a democracy, such political organisations should be welcomed rather than execrated. A knee jerk reaction of clamping down on its activities may backfire with unintended consequences, as could be seen with HT Bangladesh.

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List of Interviewees

(Names with asterisks are pseudonyms, used at the request of interviewees)

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- Abdurrahman, Hafidz. Former Chairman of HTI. Bogor, 21 March 2008.
- Abdurrahman, Hafidz. Jakarta, 20 Aug 2007; 12 October 2009 and 12 August 2010.
- Abu Saad. Former Central Committee Member of HTI. Jakarta, 13 April 2011.
- Abu Ulya, Harith. Central Committee Member of HTI. Jakarta, 5 October 2010.
- Ahmad, Member of HTI in Pekanbaru, Pekanbaru, 20 January 2011.
- Aishah. Member of HTI in Bali. Nusa Dua, 9 March 2010.

Akmal, Member of GEMA and HTI in Banda Aceh. Banda Aceh, 22 January 2009.

Al-Baghdadi, Abdul Rahman. First (and former) Chairman of HTI. Bogor, 10 August 2009 and 10 March 2010.

Ali, As'ad Said. Deputy Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama. Jakarta, 20 August 2010.

Al-Jundi, Erwin. Secretary-General of GEMA. Depok, 2 September 2009.

Al-Khaththath, Muhammad. Secretary-General of FUI and HDI and Former Chairman of HTI, Jakarta, 18 March 2008; 20 March 2009; 15 October 2009; 15 Feb 2010, 8 April 2010; 8 May 2011 and 25 July 2011.

Al-Wahwah, Ismail. Member of HT in Australia and Former Member of HT Jordan. Sydney. 20 October 2009 and 1 July 2010, Sydney.

Asip, Saifuddin (Abu Fuad). Former Chairman of HTI. Jakarta, 16 August 2007.

Bakhash, Osman. Central Media Representative of HT. Beirut, 19 July 2010.

Bin Nuh, Mustafa. Son of Abdullah Bin Nuh and Administrator of *Pesantren Al-Ghazali*. Bogor, 10 August 2009.

Budi. Member of HTI in Jakarta. Jakarta, 20 August 2009.

Donny. Former Head of GEMA. Jakarta, 11 August 2009.

Doumy, Iwan. Chairman of GEMA in Aceh. Banda Aceh, 20 January 2009 and 24 January 2009.

Ferdiansyah. *Ma'sul* of HTI in Banda Aceh. Banda Aceh, 21 January 2009.

Freigeh, Chadi. HT Scandinavia Media Representative. Beirut, 19 July 2010.

Garematan, Fadzlan. Chairman of AFKN and *Daris* of HTI. Jakarta, 11 May 2010.

Hamzah, Fahri. PKS Member of Parliament and Activists of JT. Jakarta, 15 May 2011.

Haniff, Burhan. Member of HT Britain, London, 15 June 2006 and 16 October 2007.

Hardwood, Jamal. Former Chairman of HT Britain. London, 30 June 2006.

Hendrawan, Lazuardi. Member of HTI. Jakarta, 1 February 2009.

Husain, Ed (Mahbub). Former Member of HT Britain. London, 29 October 2007

Ibrahim, Moien. Member of HT India. London, 2 July 2006.

Ilmawati, Zulia. Former Chairman of PHTI. Jakarta, 20 March 2009.

Jagranvi, Saad. Member of HT Pakistan. Beirut, 18 July 2010

Jaweed Khan. Member of HT India. Johor Bahru, 9 October 2011.

Kurnia, Rahmat. Central Committee Member of HTI. Jakarta, 1 Oct 2009; 20 October 2010 and 12 May 2011.

Labib, Rokhmat S. Chairman of HTI. Jakarta, 15 August 2010.

Masyudi, Arif. Former Chairman of HMI. Jakarta, 20 March 2010.

Munarman. Head of KLI and Former Activist of HTI. Jakarta, 8 March 2010.

Mursalin, H. M. Deputy Head of KLI and Former Member of HTI. Jakarta, 25 March 2008 and 14 May 2011.

Naharong, Muis. Lecturer at Paramadina University who Researched HTI in the 1990s. Jakarta, 26 August 2009.

Nawaz, Maajid. Former Member of HT Britain. London, 29 October 2007.

Omar, Sayuti. Editor of Harakah (PAS Malaysia) and Attendee at the HT Media Conference. Beirut, 18 July 2010.

Palo, Okay. HT Benelux Media Representative. Beirut, 19 July 2010.

Sam, Ichwan. Secretary-General of MUI. Jakarta, 7 May 2011.

Shihab, Habib Rizieq. Chairman of FPI. Jakarta, 8 March 2010.

Sumaiti, Abdi. Former PKS Leader. Jakarta, 23 July 2011.

Tamimi, Azzam. Director of the Institute of the International Islamic Thought. London, 16 June 2007.

Waheed, Imran. Former Spokesman of HT Britain. London, 29 July 2007.

Wajidi, Farid. Central Committee Member of HTI and Former Committee Member of FUI, Jakarta, 10 June 2009.

Wisnuwardana, Agung. Central Committee Member of HTI. Jakarta, 24 March 2008.

Yatin. Member of HTI in Bali. Jakarta, 20 March 2010.

Yusanto, Ismail. Media Representative of HTI. Jakarta, 7 March 2008; 10 March 2009; 15 March 2009; 12 August 2009 and 20 March 2010.

Zulkieflimansyah. PKS Member of Parliament. Jakarta, 21 October 2007.

*Sheikh Abdul Aziz. Former Member of HT's Central Committee. Amman, 12 July 2010.

*Abdullah. Member of HT Turkey. Beirut, 19 July 2010

*Abu Ammar, Member of HTI in Pekanbaru. Pekanbaru, 29 January 2011.

*Hafiz. Member of HT Belgium. Beirut, 19 July 2010.

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*Harith,.Member of GEMA and HTI, Jakarta, 5 April 2009.

*Ronny. Member of HTI in Batam, 1 January 2010.

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