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"Alles Gescheite is schon gedacht worden; man muss nur versuchen es noch einmal zu denken."

Goethe. Sprüche in Prosa.
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PREFACE.

While acknowledgement is due to many persons I am particularly grateful to Professor Manning Clark for enabling me to carry out this research.

I also wish to thank especially Mr. G.F. Fairbairn, my supervisor, Dr. A.H. Johns and Dr. T.L. Suttor for their guidance and many helpful comments.

Also I am greatly indebted to Mr. J.D. van Pelt of the Commonwealth National Library not only for his expert advice but also because he enabled me to carry out this research in Canberra owing to his splendid efforts in gathering a collection of Indonesiana, which is undoubtedly the most extensive and valuable in Australia.

Thanks are also due to Miss Dorothy Leaper of the General School of Studies Library for her efficiency in obtaining material from overseas and other Australian libraries, and to Mr. E. Gent of the Commonwealth National Library ("B" Block) for his helpfullness.
INTRODUCTION.

It should be mentioned from the outset that this study is only indirectly concerned with Indonesian History proper, as it deals solely with the activities of the Dutch in the Central West- and East-Coast area of Sumatra during the period 1816-1871. The objective of this investigation is to provide an account – and if possible a reasonable explanation – of the extension of Dutch political and economic control in that part of Sumatra. However, in order to provide a reasonable explanation I have found it necessary to examine the subject not only in terms of local issues but also in the wider context of European history, especially the history of nineteenth century Anglo-Dutch relations. Therefore this thesis purports to be an integrated account of Dutch expansion in Central Sumatra, which to my knowledge has not been attempted so far either in English or in Dutch. In fact it has primarily been Dr. Tarling's recent work on British policy in the Malacca Straits and the Peninsula which has given me the idea for this thesis, i.e. to add to his work by investigating the actions of the other contender in the area: Holland.

But I wish to point out immediately that my work cannot claim the same degree of exhaustiveness and finesse as Dr. Tarling's for the reason that I have not been able to draw directly on archival material in Holland and Indonesia. Although I do not wish to underestimate the dangers posed to historical research by selections and compilations of documents, I hope to show in the following precis of the story that the printed sources which I was able to use are a good enough sample on which to base valid conclusions.

Immediately on the return of the Dutch to the East-Indies in 1816 Sumatra figured prominently in the disputes which arose with the British authorities about the restitution of the colonies. An Anglo-Dutch Convention of August, 1814 restoring to Holland some of its former colonial empire was particularly vague as to what territories exactly were to be returned to the Dutch; and moreover the Convention did not settle any of the outstanding pre-war disputes which had been caused by British demands for a greater share of the East-Indian trade and a post at the Southern entrance to the Malacca Straits. Finally in March, 1824 a new treaty was concluded in which Holland was given dominion over the whole of Sumatra with the exception of Achin. Considering that any territorial expansion at this time by a non-British nation would be dependant on the fiat of Britain, the most important power in South East Asia,
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I found it of great importance to the story to investigate why and how Sumatra came to be recognized as a Dutch dominion.

The published source material at my disposal provided a practically full coverage of the period 1814-1824; and I did not feel handicapped by any gaps; at least not in regard to the more important issues. I have made extensive use of the compilations of documentary material by van der Kemp and van Deventer; the papers and correspondence of Elout who was Commissioner-General, plenipotentiary at the London talks in 1820, and Minister for Colonies, successively; the papers and correspondence of the Minister of State Falck; correspondence of the Commissioners-General and Governor-General van der Capellen; papers and correspondence of high officials such as Muntinghe and de Graaff; reports and minutes of the London negotiations of 1820 and 1824; and correspondence and papers of Canning, Castlereagh and Raffles.

Suspicion of British intentions to retain a political and commercial hold on the Archipelago - which Holland considered as its sphere of influence - was aroused almost immediately on the arrival of the Dutch in Batavia in 1816, when Fendall, the British Lieutenant-Governor of Java, retarded the handing over of the colonies and i.a. stipulated that Holland was to recognize treaties concluded with Indonesian princes during the English interregnum. This initial suspicion was raised to a
high pitch when in 1817 it became known that Raffles had been appointed as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, a British colony in Western Sumatra. Though Raffles' anti-Dutch sentiments were well known, I have been able to establish that the Batavian authorities knew already before Raffles' arrival about his plans for establishing a new British empire in the East-Indies, which was to include the whole of Sumatra. Consequently in order to anticipate Raffles the Dutch colonial authorities - despite their limited military and financial resources - tried to occupy as many points in the Archipelago as possible.

Raffles denied the Dutch claim to the whole of the Archipelago and soon after his return to the Indies in 1818 attempted to establish British influence in Sumatra, Borneo and Riouw. The actions of Raffles, however, added considerably to two major difficulties which confronted the Dutch on their return to the East-Indies in 1816. Firstly how to re-establish their political prestige which had been non-existent in most of the Archipelago for nearly twenty years; and secondly how to regain a footing in the East-Indies trade which by then had practically become a British monopoly.

The Batavian government feared that if it did not react strongly to Raffles' challenge the little prestige which it enjoyed among the Indonesian princes would decrease even
further. Therefore Raffles had to be stopped and all traces of previous British influence in the Archipelago had to be obliterated.

Furthermore Batavia realized that a British colony in South Sumatra or anywhere else close to Java would be a serious threat to its grandiose plans for making that island into the most important entrepot in the whole of Asia. It should be noted that Holland or for that matter any other nation at that time was not in a position to compete with the British on equal terms for the East-Indian trade. The British merchant in Java virtually enjoyed a monopoly for two reasons. Firstly owing to superior production techniques in the home country he was able to undersell any other competitor. Secondly the fact that British ships traded directly between England and the colonies, while Dutch ships mostly had to come out in ballast, as Holland had little to sell, caused British shipping rates to be lower, enabling the English trader to pay higher prices for colonial produce.

Under those circumstances Dutch colonial trade could hardly be expected to prosper; and in 1818 a moderate tariff was introduced in order to give Dutch shipping and trade a reasonable amount of protection.

However, the Batavian government feared that any measure to protect Dutch shipping and trade would be in vain if the
British succeeded in setting up a free-trade port close to Java.

It was mainly Raffles who drew the attention of the Dutch to the potential importance of Sumatra, where at Semanka Bay (Sunda Straits) he intended to establish a British free-trade port, which he was convinced would soon surpass Batavia in importance. Consequently in order to stop this threat by the British to the prosperity of Java, the Dutch stronghold in the Archipelago, the colonial authorities repeatedly suggested to The Hague that a new convention should be concluded with Britain, which would leave the whole of Sumatra in the Dutch sphere of influence in return for the surrender of the remnants of Holland's previous empire on the Indian continent.

In the meantime vigorous Dutch protests in Calcutta and London had resulted in a disavowal of Raffles' actions by the British government. But the disputes between Raffles and Batavia had brought to the fore again the pre-war demands by Britain for a larger share of the East-Indian trade and a settlement South of Pulu Penang.

Although British trade had not suffered any ill effects so far the Calcutta government had become suspicious of the expansionary moves of the Dutch and their attempts at protection. Subsequently at the end of 1818 Calcutta ordered Raffles to conclude a treaty with Achin in Northern Sumatra.
and to occupy Riouw or another suitable position at the Southern end of the Straits of Malacca in order to safeguard the sea route to China and to protect British trade in the Archipelago. Raffles, who found Riouw already occupied by Dutch forces, planted the British flag on the island of Singapore in January, 1819.

Batavia protested vigorously to what it termed a violation of Dutch territory, but refrained from taking any direct action as it expected that also this last move by Raffles would be disapproved of in London. But the Dutch clearly misjudged the intent of British policy in the Straits of Malacca, which since pre-war days had been to secure control of this vital seaway to China. To the dismay of Holland - which considered it as another example of Albion's perfidy - the English government in 1820 made the recognition of Singapore a condition sine qua non before commencing negotiations for the settlement of the disputes in the East-Indies. Moreover England made it clear that it would not stand for a mere permissive toleration of British trade, but that it wanted positive concessions.

The Dutch negotiators readily agreed to trade concessions but refused to give in on Singapore. The negotiations broke down and were not taken up again till 1824, when finally on 17th March a new treaty was signed.
The treaty emphasized the principles of non-interference in trade, most favoured nation treatment, and stipulated that in the respective colonies duties were not to be higher than 100% above those levied on national ships and subjects. Furthermore Britain obtained the Dutch colonies in India, Malacca, Singapore and a guarantee of non-interference in the Malayan Peninsula, while in exchange the Dutch obtained Riouw, the Carrimons and Billiton. Holland was also given dominion over Sumatra - with the exception of Achin - and obtained the British possessions in that island with a guarantee of non-interference.

Although the Dutch had been successful in removing British influence from Sumatra their main purpose in doing so - i.e. to protect the prosperity of Java - was defeated by the recognition of Singapore as a British port, which was in an even better position to trade with the Archipelago than Southern Sumatra.

In fact the interest shown by the Dutch in Sumatra during the period 1816–1824 was largely of a strategic nature and it was only the port of Padang at the West-Coast, which because of its coffee exports, was considered to be of some economic importance.

Although the direct political influence of the Dutch East India Company at the West-Coast of Sumatra had never extended any further than the narrow strip of territory between the
Central Sumatran mountain range (Bukit Barisan) and the coast, the Dutch soon after their return to West-Sumatra in 1819 tried to extend their control into the hinterland of Padang, i.e., Minangkabau. In the second section I have attempted to establish why the Batavian government - despite its increasing financial difficulties in Java - decided on political expansion in West Sumatra and to describe to what extent the Dutch had reached their objectives by 1830.

The Dutch would probably have been content - at least for some time to come - to continue the practice of the Company in concentrating on trading activities at the coast and leaving the interior untouched, if not a civil war in Minangkabau, which adversely affected the prosperity of Padang, had caused them to interfere.

Since the beginning of the century a fanatic Muslim sect, called the Padris, had tried to convert the Minangkabaus, whose Muslim faith was rather unorthodox, to their views and way of life. The Padri movement, however, was more than an attempt at religious reform and cut deeply into the traditional patterns of Minangkabau social and political life, as it tried to abolish such specifically Minangkabau institutions as the matrilineal system on the grounds that it conflicted with the Muslim law. Minangkabau social and political life was based on a compromise between customary law (adat) and the Muslim law and neither one nor the other dominated. Therefore the theocratic ideas of the
Padris, who as strict Mohammedans did not differentiate between Church and State, caused a great deal of opposition from the strongly tradition conscious Minangkabau people. When finally some of the Padri leaders resorted to violence and tried to terrorize the people into accepting their doctrines and leadership, a civil war broke out in which thousands of people were killed and agricultural production and trade were nearly brought to a standstill.

The most important motive for Dutch intervention in Minangkabau was to protect the trade of Padang which was suffering considerably from the ravages of the Padris. The Batavian government - plagued by financial difficulties in Java and disappointed at the unprofitability of most of its other possessions - was particularly sensitive about the prosperity of Padang which was considered as a potential source of profit owing to its increasing coffee exports.

In addition to the concern for the prosperity of Padang, the Dutch feared that if they did not take action in Minangkabau, the British might stir up trouble and try to draw the trade from the interior to Bencoolen and their other West-Coast settlements. The suspicion of Raffles was still very real and the Dutch had become rather sceptical about the assurances of the British government, especially after it steadily refused to abandon Raffles' settlement at Singapore.
Furthermore, when the Dutch forces clashed repeatedly with the Padris and the population in general showed a great deal of apathy, it soon became obvious that the Resident of Padang whose reports had been based mainly on information from anti-Padri sources had led himself and the Batavian government astray in the assessment of the situation in Minangkabau. Contrary to expectation the whole of the country was practically under Padri rule and the Dutch, who had envisaged only a short campaign, in fact had blundered into a major conflict, which they could ill afford at a time when the financial situation in Java was very precarious and their available resources were already severely strained by costly expeditions to other parts of the Archipelago where rebellion had broken out.

But a withdrawal from Minangkabau was not feasible because it would damage even more the already low prestige of the Dutch government in the Archipelago. Moreover, attempts to come to terms with the Padris, who were at the top of their strength and who were waging a holy war against the European unbelievers
were doomed to failure. Consequently the only way open to the Dutch was to take the offensive. But the military strength of the Padris was far greater than had been expected and after two years of hard fighting (1822/23) the Dutch forces had only managed to establish a strong foothold in Minangkabau.

However, by the end of 1823 Batavia, which was forced to cut down its expenditure in order to avoid a complete financial collapse, ordered a temporary halt to the Dutch offensive in Minangkabau. But this temporary measure became permanent when in 1826 a special Commissioner-General, who was sent from Holland to deal with the financial crisis in the colonies, ordered stringent economy measures and prohibited any military expansion or intervention in the islands outside Java.

Consequently the Dutch were not able to push any further into Minangkabau, but instead tried to consolidate their position by building a defence line and by concluding treaties with the various Padri regions. Initially the West-Coast authorities managed to maintain the status quo, but when after 1826 a considerable number of troops had to be withdrawn in order to deal with the rebellion of Diponegara in Java (1825-1830) the military situation gradually deteriorated.

In the meantime the Batavian government which initially had been uncertain about keeping Minangkabau occupied after the Padris were exterminated had apparently become impressed by the revenue potential of the rich and populous valleys of the
Sumatran interior, and at the beginning of 1823 decided to
remain at least in part of the country. The system of admin-
istration which the Dutch subsequently tried to introduce was
based on Javanese conditions. Especially the fact that
indigenous leaders and officials were to be appointed by the
Dutch authorities was resented by the Minangkabaus, who unlike
the Javanese were used to more democratic procedures of govern-
ment. Also attempts to introduce the Javanese land rent system
and indirect taxes on opium and salt in a country where taxation
in any form had hitherto been unknown, and the continuous
demands for unpaid forced labour for roads and fortifications,
together with the general disappointment at the apparent
inability of the Dutch to defeat the Padris, caused a great
deal of dissension in the government districts.

By 1829 the military position of the Dutch had greatly
deteriorated and a complete collapse was only prevented by the
dissension among the Padris themselves. The authority of the
government hardly reached further than the guns of its forts,
while its prestige was discredited by both Padris and anti-
Padris alike.

The failure of the West-Coast authorities to reach the
original objective of establishing peace and order in Minangkabau
should be seen in the wider context of general Dutch policy in
this period or rather the lack of it. The Batavian government
since 1816 had been concerned to break with the earlier practices
of the Dutch East India Company and had tried to introduce a more liberal system of administration and government. However, owing to the unassailable position of British trade and commerce in the Indies and also because of a great deal of financial bungling the colonial government in 1824 found itself at the verge of bankruptcy. During the subsequent dispute about the best system to make the colonies a profitable proposition — the sole raison d'etre of overseas possessions at this time — administration had to be carried on without the aid of a clearly defined line of policy, which resulted in haphazard government.

The sources used for this period do not show any significant gaps, at least not in regard to the Dutch point of view. Although I was able to use some accounts by Padri leaders those sources were lacking in detail and on many points Dutch accounts of the Padri movement had to be taken for granted.

The most important source used was the work of E.B. Kielstra, who wrote a detailed story of the Dutch in West Sumatra during the period 1819-1880. Kielstra's essays are actually detailed compilations of documents — often reproduced in full — interspersed with a narrative; and they contain a wide cover ranging from correspondence of village officials to Cabinet minutes in The Hague. Another important source used was the work of De Stuers who was Resident of the West-Coast from 1825 to 1829.
In addition a great deal of information was gathered from the sources mentioned for the first section.

A major change in Dutch colonial policy occurred during the years 1829-1830. Proposals for the development of colonial agriculture by means of encouraging private investment and the settlement of European planters were set aside, mainly because the results of such a policy were considered to be too slow in forthcoming. Instead the King accepted a plan submitted by General van den Bosch for an extension of the East-India Company's system of forced deliveries of export produce. This produce was to be consigned to the Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij (N.H.M.), a privileged trading body set up in 1824 largely on the initiative of the King for the purpose of combatting more successfully foreign competition in the Java trade.

Van den Bosch considered the colonies purely as a business venture and consequently his objective was to obtain large profits with the smallest possible overheads. This principle is clearly reflected in his policy concerning the islands outside Java, i.e. the so-called Outer-Possessions. Van den Bosch severely criticized the hitherto haphazard attempts of the Batavian authorities to extend Dutch influence throughout the whole of the Archipelago, and he laid down the definite rule that the effectiveness of Dutch control in those islands
should be proportionate to the profitability of the territory concerned. Furthermore, van den Bosch argued, the rather limited resources of the Dutch should not be dissipated over the whole of the East-Indies, but they were to be concentrated in areas which showed promise of immediate profit. In this category he included first of all Java and then the spice islands of Banda, tin producing Banka; and also Sumatra:

"...an island that accounts for at least 40 shiploads of products annually and that can be an outlet for much industrial produce..........................."

The rest of the Archipelago was to be left alone for the time being.

In respect of Sumatra van den Bosch argued that to base Dutch influence in that island on military conquest would be futile. Dutch control of Sumatra would only remain unchallenged and stable if the Sumatrans were made to realize that their own interests were closely tied up with those of Holland. Therefore administrative officials should try to encourage the known inclination and capacity of the Sumatrans for trade and commerce, but they were to refrain from compulsion in order not to upset the strongly democratic susceptibilities of the indigenous people, which would only result in resentment and ill feeling towards the Dutch government.
Although initially unwilling to extend Dutch influence into the interior of the island, van den Bosch soon realized that merely occupying the important trading centres at the coast would not be sufficient to obtain the greatest possible benefit from Sumatra. As productive capacity was kept below par by the continuous ravages of the Padris, and in addition much of the coffee crop found its way to Singapore instead of the Dutch controlled ports at the Western seaboard, van den Bosch decided that the whole of Minangkabau was to be occupied.

Consequently in June, 1832 the Dutch forces started an all out drive and by the end of October they had wiped out Padri resistance in the whole of Minangkabau.

However, in January, 1833 Minangkabau was in full rebellion and the Dutch forces which were thinly spread over the whole of the country were forced to withdraw to their original positions. By June, 1833 most of the country, with the exception of the Padri stronghold of Bondjol, had been brought under control again.

In October, 1833 van den Bosch, who attributed the widespread anti Dutch sentiment to the irresponsible actions of the military and oppressive administrative measures such as taxation and unpaid compulsory labour, devised a system of administration which was designed to make the presence of the Dutch less resented.
The main task assigned to the administration was to convince the Minangkabaus that the benefits of Dutch rule far outweighed its burdens. Therefore indigenous autonomous rights could not be interfered with unless this was absolutely necessary for the preservation of peace and order. Taxation and unpaid forced labour were abolished forthwith and in order to compensate for the loss in government revenue customs duties would be increased, a move which hardly would be noticed by the Minangkabaus. Furthermore the production of export crops was to be encouraged not by compulsory methods but by a system of monetary incentives and improved communications. The Minangkabaus were to be offered a sufficiently high minimum price for their coffee, which firstly would ensure higher production and secondly would cut out trade with Singapore as all coffee would be at the government's disposal. In addition roads were to be improved in order to enable horse cart transport between the highlands and the coast; and the N.H.M. would be induced to set up depots at various points in Minangkabau where coffee could be exchanged for such commodities as textiles, salt and opium.

Subsequently the West-Coast authorities informed the population of the government's intentions in the so-called Plakaat-Pandjang (lit. Long Decree) in which a pledge was given of non-interference with autonomous rights and the Minangkabaus were exhorted to co-operate with the plan to increase production and
trade which was not only designed to increase the government's prosperity but also that of their own.

But it took a number of years before any serious attempts could be made to put van den Bosch's policy directives into practice, because between 1833 and 1838 the Dutch were forced to spend most of their energy and resources in attempting to conquer the Padri fortress of Bondjol. One of the main causes of this military setback was apart from the valour and skill of the defenders and the incapability of the Dutch officers, the dissension among the Dutch themselves. Effective military action against Bondjol was greatly hampered by the sharp difference of opinion which existed between the Resident and the military commander as to how Bondjol was to be brought into line.

Finally in August, 1837 Bondjol fell; and during the next three years the Dutch continued their drive Northwards in order to exterminate the remnants of Padri resistance. During the course of those operations a detachment of troops which after the fall of Dalu-Dalu - the last Padri stronghold - was sent in pursuit of a number of Padri leaders, reached the East-Coast of Sumatra at the confluence of the Panei and Bila rivers where a small post was established.

After the last pockets of Padri resistance had been wiped out the Dutch forces established firm control in the Northern part of the West-Coast, where during 1839/40 the ports of Baros, Tapus and Singkel were occupied after fierce resistance by the Achinese.
Thus, by 1840 van den Bosch's objective of bringing the whole of Sumatra — with the exception of Achin — under Dutch control was nearing its completion. The remainder of the island to be occupied were the Batta-lands Proper and the East-Coast sultanate of Siak and dependencies.

The source material for this section did not present any great problems, as a great deal of archival material dealing with this period has been published. In addition to Kielstra most important were the published papers of van den Bosch and his published correspondence with Baud, the Colonial Minister, and Governor-General de Eerens. I have also made extensive use of an official history — edited by Colijn — of Dutch policy in the Outer-Possessions during the nineteenth century, which contains many valuable documents. Furthermore the memoirs of Lange and van der Hart — two high ranking army officers — and of Francis — a high official — proved to contain a great deal of valuable information.

By the time the Padris — the first obstacle to van den Bosch's Sumatra policy — had been exterminated, another and more formidable barrier to Dutch expansion in Sumatra was raised by Britain.

The Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 had failed from its inception to fulfil its purported objective of finally settling both commercial and territorial disputes between the two countries in the Archipelago.
Attempts by the Batavian authorities to provide effective protection to Dutch trade and industry caused a deterioration of relations with Britain, especially after 1830, when the international position of Holland — owing to the Belgian question — had weakened a great deal.

During the Thirties Holland had great difficulty in staying afloat financially largely because of the difficulties with Belgium, and therefore the Dutch were opposed even more than previously to grant trade concessions to the British. The Home country needed all the financial help it could obtain from the colonies in order to pay for the large standing army it was forced to keep during the years 1830-1839 and in order to cope with the ever increasing debt.

In addition the Belgian revolution and the subsequent dissolution of the union with Holland resulted in a major problem in regard to colonial trade. The separation of Belgium meant to Dutch traders the loss of a regular supply of manufactured goods for export, because Holland itself had hardly any secondary industry of its own. Both the King and van den Bosch realized that Holland would not be able to compete with Britain in the East-Indian trade unless a Dutch secondary industry was built up, especially cotton mills.

The N.H.M. played an important role in the scheme which was devised to encourage the manufacture of Dutch cottons. This company granted low interest loans to industrialists — many
of whom were Belgian emigres - and set up weaving schools in conjunction with the government. More important the N.H.M. concluded contracts - which included guarantees against losses - with the Dutch government for the delivery of cottons to the East-Indies and became the chief exporter to the colonies.

Moreover, the government's growing need for funds forced the King into borrowing from the N.H.M., which in return was given the disposal of the whole Java crop. So, the N.H.M. came to hold a practical monopoly of the Java import and export trade.

The subsequent numerous British protests demanding tariff concessions were steadily sidestepped by the Dutch government. But finally at the end of 1835 The Hague - fearing direct British action against Dutch shipping - was forced to give in and lowered the tariff differential by half.

When it became clear that further British requests for the restitution of excess duty paid since 1824 and the admission of consuls in the colonies would not be met, the British Foreign Office in 1838 decided to oppose any further expansion of Dutch influence in the Archipelago.

Subsequently, allegations made by the Straits Settlements about Dutch "encroachments" and attempts at monopolizing the trade and commerce of Sumatra were taken up by the Foreign Office in order to force Holland to adopt a more liberal trade policy in the whole of the Archipelago.
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While the efforts of British merchants and manufacturers to find new outlets for their produce were accentuated by the severe world depression of the late 'Thirties and early 'Forties, Holland was equally hard hit by this world crisis. The slump in prices of colonial produce had brought the N.H.M. - and with it the Dutch government - to the verge of bankruptcy, because the company was unable to extend any further loans to the government as it was unable to balance previous loans with the proceeds of the sale of Java produce. Obviously under those circumstances concessions to British trade were out of the question.

On the other hand the Dutch government feared that if it provoked Britain any further it would run the risk of losing Java, the mainstay of Holland's economy. Therefore The Hague - without giving in on principle - tried to do everything possible to avoid any causes of complaint; and it informed the British government that it had postponed the occupation of Siak, a sultanate on the East-Coast of Sumatra, which the English insisted that should remain independent.

But when the Foreign Office insisted that in any case Holland had no right to occupy Siak or any other independent Indonesian state, J.C. Baud, the Dutch minister for Colonies, tried to play safe by giving Britain conclusive proof that Holland had no intention of monopolizing the Sumatra trade. According to Baud a Dutch occupation of the East-Coast of
Sumatra would be an unprofitable proposition, because England would only assent if Holland guaranteed equal treatment of British trade. Baud who was unwilling to give up Dutch territorial rights in the East-Indies, tried to avoid a discussion of those rights by taking away the cause of dispute. Thus, on 1st September, 1841, he ordered the Batavian authorities — without notifying the British government — to withdraw their forces not only from the neighbourhood of Siak but from the whole of the East-Coast area.

When early in 1842 Britain proposed to replace the 1824 treaty with a new agreement Baud played his trump card about the Dutch withdrawal from the East-Coast of Sumatra and pointed out that there was no reason for discussions as no disputes existed any more.

But when England insisted Baud tried to stall negotiations as long as possible on the grounds that Holland owing to its financial difficulties was not in a position to grant concessions.

However, Baud grasped the opportunity to regain the diplomatic initiative when in the middle of 1842 Britain used another approach and suggested a new commercial — but no territorial agreement — on the basis of reciprocal concessions. The Dutch Colonial Minister feigned a certain amount of interest in
the British proposals granting access of Java sugar on the English Home market in return for concessions to British trade in Java. But when in the beginning of 1843 Baud was pressed by London for an answer his counter proposals - which included a demand for the admission of Dutch colonial produce into England on Dutch ships and a reduced tariff for dairy produce - were obviously designed to wreck any chance of agreement. Consequently the negotiations - as Baud had hoped - ended in failure.

Van den Bosch's plan to take control of Sumatran trade and commerce by occupying the wealthy interior and sealing off the West- and East-Coasts, could still be reached without the occupation of the East-Coast, Baud argued. The East-Coast itself had little economic value and was only important because of the transit trade between the Sumatran interior and the Straits Settlements. Although the Dutch had been prevented by Britain to seal off the East-Coast they, according to Baud, could still control this transit trade at its source by closing the borders of their territories in the interior.

The subsequent policy of the authorities in Minangkabau to revert the direction of trade - which was naturally inclined towards the East - to the Dutch controlled ports of the West-Coast caused the tribes living along the Eastward flowing rivers
to become hostile to the Dutch government and resulted in repeated invasions and pillaging of the Dutch border districts.

According to Michiels, the governor of the West-Coast, the only effective way to stop those hostile actions was to occupy the territories concerned. But Baud objected to any military expansion and pointed out that all that would happen was to remove the cause of hostility - i.e. the trade barrier - further Eastwards. The Colonial Minister, however, had no objections to remove the trade barrier altogether providing other measures could be found to make the occupation of Minangkabau worthwhile to the Dutch government. Whatever course of action the Batavian government decided to take, Baud emphasized that military expansion was out of the question and that in no case Sumatra should be allowed to become a financial burden.

The revenue system which in 1847 was finally adopted in Minangkabau was based on increased customs revenue, which was to be obtained by raising the output of export produce. Accordingly the Minangkabau growers were ordered to deliver their coffee to the government at a guaranteed minimum price. Moreover, the government was to bear the burden of the high transport cost of coffee from the highlands to the coast. Roads were to be improved in order to take horsecart transport and government depots where coffee could be delivered were to be built throughout the country.
Though Michiel's economic policy found ready acceptance in The Hague, his persistent demands for expansion into the East-Coast region were steadily refused. Similarly Governor-General Rochussen who was of the opinion that owing to the repeated attempts by the British to penetrate into the Dutch sphere of influence, i.e. in Borneo, Celebes and the Lesser Sunda Islands, the established policy of non-expansion and non-intervention had become obsolete, was frustrated by The Hague in his plans for extending effective Dutch control throughout the whole of the Archipelago.

Although Baud had become anxious to establish Dutch sovereign rights in the whole of the East Indies, especially after the British moves in Borneo and the occupation of the island of Labuan in 1846, he only agreed to effective occupation and administration of those islands which showed promise of immediate profit. Otherwise outward signs such as the issuing of Dutch flags to local rulers would have to suffice as an indication of Holland's sovereignty.

In Sumatra, according to Baud, no more profit was to be obtained from extension of control into the East-Coast area. Instead any further expansion in that direction would certainly provoke Britain and could result in the loss to Holland of what it had gained so far.
The Dutch government considered the colonies only as a business proposition; and therefore the main principle of colonial policy and administration was to obtain the largest possible profits with the smallest possible overheads. In regard to Sumatra this objective had been reached and consequently no further military expansion was considered worthwhile.

For my study of Anglo-Dutch relations between 1824 and 1841 I am particularly indebted to two works.

For the understanding of the Dutch point of view the study of Goedemans was indispensable. The author has gone very deeply into the subject matter and has reproduced many documents in part or in full.

In regard to the British point of view I have mainly relied on the exhaustive treatment of the subject by Tarling; and generally I have taken his well documented conclusions for granted.

In addition I was able to gather further information from a variety of sources of which the more important ones were Kielstra, Posthumus' documents on economic history, and Colijn's official history.

A major change in public thinking in regard to colonial policy occurred after 1848, when — as a result of the bloody political upheavals in the rest of Europe — a parliament—
ary revolution took place in The Hague, which brought a liberal faction to power. A new Constitution transferred a great deal of the former power of the King over the colonies to Parliament, including the control of finance.

The liberals were very critical of the colonial monopoly system of van den Bosch and they demanded its abolition in order to provide more scope for private enterprise in colonial trade and agriculture. In addition the compulsory and oppressive features of the "culture system" were condemned on humanitarian grounds.

However, initially the liberal programme demanded a gradual abolition of the existing system, because most parliamentarians - realizing their unfamiliarity with the actual situation in the Indies - were unwilling to press for too drastic changes in colonial administration out of fear that the flow of profits might diminish.

Though measures were taken to stop the oppression and ill treatment of the Javanese, no immediate abolition of the culture system - which was concentrated in Java and had proved to be a financial success - was advocated. But instead the idea of a division of labour between the government and private enterprise took shape, i.e. private capital was to specialize on the economic development of the Outer-Possessions, which so far had been largely neglected. Private capital investment, it was
considered, would increase the revenue earning capacity of the more valuable Outer-Possessions and would therefore ease the government's task of occupying those territories effectively, the need for which was growing more urgent with the increasing danger of foreign infiltration.

Emphasis was placed on the development of mining, especially of coal and iron, two commodities which with the development of steam ships, railways and the mechanization of the sugar industry, had become of great economic and strategic importance.

But no great upsurge occurred in mining mainly because the abolition of the culture system during the 'Sixties opened up opportunities for investment in agriculture in Java - a less risky venture than mining in the Outer-Possessions. The initial plan for a division of labour between the government and private enterprise failed, because Dutch public opinion - which in the meantime had become better informed about the situation in Indonesia - demanded an immediate withdrawal of the government from the economic sector.

At the same time however continuous pressure was put on the government by the liberals to abandon the policy of non-expansion and non-intervention in the Outer-Possessions. Apart from purely economic motives, the liberals stressed the duty of the Dutch government to protect the Indonesians from misrule, extortion and such evils as slavery and piracy.
In addition the colonial government pointed out repeatedly that the costly expeditions which were needed to suppress rebellion, piracy and slavery were useless if they were not followed up by effective occupation and administration.

But The Hague, which still insisted on large profits from the Indies and was unwilling to increase the colonial budget, remained opposed to any expansion of political control.

However, the colonial government between 1850-1870 in order to stop foreign infiltration took matters into its own hands and on various occasions put the Home government before a fait accompli.

The effect of the new liberal colonial policy on the administration of the West-Coast of Sumatra in the period 1850-1870 was very limited.

A proposal in 1857 to abolish the adat pusaka (i.e. matrilineal inheritance law) and the suku government on the grounds that those institutions were detrimental to the material and moral development of the people, was put aside. The government argued that such radical interference with the indigenous social and political structure was bound to create unrest and instability, and pointed out that the Dutch cause would be better served by keeping the traditional social and political order intact. This unwillingness to introduce European ideas of government and administration, apart from serving as another
illustration of the traditional Dutch policy of divide and rule, is further explained by the fact that peace and order in Minangkabau had been soundly established since the beginning of the 'Forties after twenty-five years of war and that this territory had finally started to pay off. Indeed, the coffee policy of Michiels had worked well, especially as his successors had tried to make this industry as attractive as possible to the people from a financial point of view and had attempted to abolish any of its oppressive features. The government therefore was reluctant - as it had been in Java - to change its economic policy in Minangkabau while that territory was already a profitable proposition; and it was not till 1908 that the coffee monopoly on the West-Coast of Sumatra was abolished.

On the East-Coast of Sumatra the Dutch since 1841 had strictly abstained from intervention, but during the 'Fifties the danger of foreign intervention forced Batavia to extend its influence into that area; and in 1858 treaties were concluded with Siak, Djambi and Indragiri.

The treaty with Siak did not only cause renewed disputes with the Straits Settlements, as was to be expected, but also with Achin, which claimed sovereignty over some of the Siak dependencies.
Although this Dutch–Achinese dispute was one of many that had occurred since 1819, it had far more drastic consequences than any of the previous ones, as it resulted in a full scale war which lasted for more than thirty years.

Van den Bosch had felt hampered in his plans for Sumatra by the fact that Holland — according to the treaty of 1824 — could not infringe the sovereignty of Achin. But owing to the strained relations with the British during the 'Thirties and 'Forties any Dutch overtures to have this restrictive clause removed would have been rejected out of hand.

However, between 1850 and 1870 an Anglo-Dutch rapprochement is discernible because the main cause of friction between the two countries was gradually disappearing with the abolition of the culture system and the introduction of a more liberal trade policy by Holland also in its colonies. Another major reason which drew the English and Dutch closer together in South East Asia was the fear of settlements in that area by other European powers.

When in 1862 the Dutch decided to extend their influence over the pepper ports to the north of Siak Proper, Britain was willing to acquiesce providing Holland would treat British trade on an equal footing.

Finally a new Anglo-Dutch treaty was concluded in 1870 which gave Holland a free hand in Sumatra including Achin.
There were various reasons which made it desirable that Achin should be incorporated into the Netherlands East Indies. The Achinese claim of sovereignty over the East-Coast pepper ports was seen as a constant source of instability in those territories, which soon after Dutch occupation had proved to be of great economic value owing to the successful experiments in the growing of high grade tobacco. Moreover the continuous acts of slavery and piracy by the Achinese could not be condoned any longer by a liberal and humanitarian government, especially not when after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 the Straits of Malacca became one of the major thoroughfares for international shipping. In addition it was feared that the attempts of the Achinese to obtain overseas support against the ever increasing power of the Dutch in Sumatra might result in the permanent settlement of a third European Power in the Malacca Straits area.

Holland declared war on Achin in 1873, but it took more than thirty years before this country was finally subdued.

While for the period 1816-1848 I was able to find a good sample of source material, I was less fortunate in regard to the years 1848-1873.

I felt especially handicapped when trying to establish the main motives of the Dutch in renewing their expansion on the East-Coast of Sumatra. I was forced to piece together the
story mainly from various secondary works, such as Somer, de Klerck and Colijn. Although I was able to obtain some additional information from the records and proceedings of the Dutch Parliament, the documentary coverage at my disposal was insufficient to make a detailed analysis possible. Therefore my treatment of this particular aspect cannot claim to be exhaustive; and it was especially at this point that I felt the consultation of the Dutch and Indonesian archives would have been extremely useful. The same remark is true for my discussion of administrative policy on the West-Coast and its effect on indigenous society.
1.

SECTION I.
DIVISION OF THE SPOILS; SUMATRA; 1816-1824.

i. The Background: 1750-1814.

Britain's attitude in the latter half of the eighteenth century towards the greatly weakened Dutch colonial empire should be seen mainly in terms of European foreign policy considerations. While since the seventeenth century the British and the Dutch had been closely allied in their attempts to keep their common enemy: France, at bay, by the middle of the eighteenth century the ties of friendship between Britain and Holland had been considerably weakened. The merchants of Rotterdam and Amsterdam had become increasingly perturbed about the rising power and prosperity of Britain, which by then had far surpassed the Dutch Republic in world importance. Dutch trading interests generally strongly supported the anti-Orangist party: the Patriots, who under the influence of the French "philosophes" strove for a more democratic regime and for closer ties with France. The British government however attempted to reinforce the Orangist regime in the Netherlands and this policy is also reflected in the British attitude towards the Dutch in the colonies.

From about the middle of the eighteenth century the China tea trade had become of the greatest importance to the British East India Company, which as a consequence desired to extend
its influence to the East Indian archipelago in order to protect the important sea route to China and to buy East Indian produce, which could be sold in China for tea. The British government, however, tried to restrain the East India Company from pressing too far South in order to avoid a clash with the Dutch, who claimed a trading monopoly over the whole of the archipelago, although by that time the Dutch East India Company was too weak to enforce such a monopoly.

This British policy of appeasement, however, did not succeed, and during the American War of Independence Anglo-Dutch relations rapidly deteriorated, because the Dutch did not want to give up their lucrative trade with the American colonists. The war (1780-1784) which subsequently broke out between Holland and England, was disastrous for Dutch trade and international prestige, while it brought the Dutch East India Company to the verge of bankruptcy. During the war the Orangist regime in the Netherlands had been overthrown by the anti-British Patriots and therefore at the peace negotiations in 1784 Britain pursued a tougher line in regard to the East Indian archipelago, where it obtained the right of free navigation and trade. Furthermore in 1786 England occupied Pulu Penang at the Northern end of the Straits of Malacca, partly in order to protect the Southern entrance to the Bay of Bengal and partly to set up an entrepot for the China trade.
It was not till 1788, after the "ancien regime" of the Orangists had been restored in Holland with the help of Prussian arms and after defensive treaties had been concluded with England and Prussia, that the British government reverted again to its previous policy of appeasement in South East Asia, where it tried to find a solution which would be acceptable to both countries. But a British proposal to leave the spice monopoly in the Moluccas to Holland in return for a British station at Riouw, at the Southern end of the Straits of Malacca, encountered a great deal of opposition from the Dutch. No agreement however had yet been reached on the British demand for a share of the East Indian trade, when in 1795 Holland was occupied by a French revolutionary army and the Prince of Orange and his entourage were forced to flee to England.

Soon after, the British under the terms of the defensive treaty of 1788 occupied most of the Dutch colonies, with the exception of Java and a few smaller posts. At the peace of Amiens (1802) most of the colonies were restored to Holland again, but with the important exception of Ceylon and part of Guyana in the West-Indies. But after the renewal of the war with Napoleon in 1803 the Dutch colonies were again occupied by the British and this time also Java fell into English hands (1811).
After the defeat of Napoleon the British government resumed its traditional policy of seeking friendly relations with Holland; and it was mainly on the insistence of Britain that in 1815 the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (i.e. Holland and Belgium) was set up as a strong bufferstate against any future aggression by France towards the North. Furthermore Britain in order to cement the ties of friendship between the two countries, declared itself willing to restore to Holland some of its previous colonial empire. A Convention of 13th August, 1814 restored to the Dutch:

"...the colonies, factories and establishments which were possessed by Holland at the commencement of the late war, viz.: on the first of January 1803 ........."(1)

The Convention further stipulated that Britain would retain the Cape of Good Hope and some of the Dutch colonies in the West-Indies, while the island of Banka would be ceded to the Netherlands in exchange for the old Dutch possession of Cochin and its dependencies in Southern India. But the pre-war disputes between England and Holland in the Est-Indies, especially those concerning the Straits of Malacca, were not settled by the Convention.

ii. The Dutch quest for Sumatra: 1816-1824.

Although the financial and military weakness of the Dutch on their return to the Indies in 1816, precluded them from re-establishing their previous political and commercial supremacy, a growing suspicion and fear of English plans in territories neighbouring to Java, the Dutch stronghold, was largely responsible for the Dutch moves to extend at least their nominal authority as far as possible throughout the whole of the East Indies. The Dutch considered the possession of Sumatra and the smaller islands bordering the Malayan Peninsula as a pre-requisite to their prosperity, because those islands would act as a barrier against the English attempts to establish an entrepot port closer to the centre of trade in the archipelago: Java, where the Dutch were trying to build Batavia into the commercial and trading centre of the whole of the Indies.

Suspicion of British motives and plans in the archipelago was aroused soon after the arrival of the Dutch Commissioners-General\(^2\) in Java. Commissioners-General

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(2) The Commissioners-General were sent to the Indies as the representatives of the King, who under the Constitution had absolute power over the colonies. Their functions were: to take over the colonies from the British; to re-establish Dutch power there; and to devise a suitable system of administration. Although their instructions were rather wide, because the actual situation in the Indies was hardly known in the Hague, they specifically stated that the administration should be based on such liberal principles as the protection of the indigenous population and the increase of their welfare and happiness.
Elout(3) and Buyskens who reached Batavia on 26th April, 1816, were very perturbed about the refusal of Fendall, the Lieutenant-Governor of Java,(4) to hand over the colonies immediately, on the grounds that he had received no orders to do so. Especially Elout, the head of the mission, became very suspicious of Fendall's motives, although in fact without reason.

The point was that when Major Nahuys, who had been sent to prepare the way for the Commissioners-General, arrived in Batavia on 5th March, 1816, Fendall was greatly surprised to hear about the impending return of the Dutch, especially as he had been told in Calcutta only the previous December, when he had received his appointment to Java, that the Dutch were

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(3) Elout, Cornelis Theodorus (1767-1841); lawyer; appointed to the Commission on the Civil and Criminal Code (1799); In April 1814 appointed Commissioner-General for the Netherlands East-Indies (1816-1819); Plenipotentiary at Anglo-Dutch talks in London in 1820; Minister of Finance, 1821-1824; Minister for Colonies, 1824-1829.

(4) The East Indies during the British regime were divided into three administrative areas: Java and dependencies (i.e. Madura, Palembang, Banka, Celebes); Bencoolen and dependencies; the Moluccas. Each of those divisions was directly responsible to Calcutta, the seat of government of the British East India Company. Fendall therefore could only act on the orders from his superiors in Calcutta, where any instructions from the British government for the surrender of the colonies to the Dutch would have arrived in the first place.
not expected to return for at least another two years.\(^{(5)}\)

He wrote to Calcutta on 15th March to ask for instructions expressing his surprise at the unexpected tidings; and he explained the delicate position he would be in if the Dutch did not have with them on their arrival any positive instructions from London for the surrender of the colonies.

In fact Fendall's apprehension proved to be right, as the Dutch arrived without any proper warrants from the British government. The Commissioners-General before their departure had asked the Dutch government to inquire in London if the necessary orders for the return of the colonies had been despatched to the authorities concerned and although the Dutch ambassador reported on 8th October, 1815 that those documents were about to be signed this did not actually happen till

\(^{(5)}\) Elout to Goldberg, Secretary-General, Dept. of Colonies, 30th May, 1816. in Deventer M.L. van "Het Nederlandsche Gezag over Java en Onderhorigheden sedert 1811." Deel I, s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1891. p.65. Note: The British authorities in Calcutta were under the impression that the defeat of Napoleon after his escape from Elba would take far longer than it in fact did (Hundred Days). In the meantime the British government (1815) had sent orders to Calcutta counteracting the earlier instructions to return the colonies to the Dutch.

21st December. The warrants arrived in Calcutta on 2nd June, 1816 and Fendall received them on 4th July. Despite the initially civil attitude of Fendall, practically every action by the British authorities was decried by the Dutch as harming their interests, which in turn incited the British to become really obstructive. When Commissioner-General Van der Capellen arrived on 10th May, 1816, Fendall withdrew the earlier permission for the Dutch troops to land unless a declaration was signed that this did not signify a surrender of British sovereignty. This formality had to be repeated with the arrival of each troopship and when the ship "De Ruyter" arrived on 21st May and Fendall happened to be on an inland tour it became very odious. Elout complained that now their days in Java were numbered, the English were trying to take as much wealth out of the island as possible. Timber was being cut indiscriminately, leases were being withdrawn before their expiry date and resold.


(8) Capellen, Godert Alexander Gerard Philip, Baron van der (1778-1848); doctor of law (Utrecht, 1803); in 1814 Secretary for Commerce and Colonies; in 1815 Commissioner for the Prince of Orange of the provisional government of Belgium; Commissioner-General for the Netherlands East Indies (1816-1819); Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, 1819-1825.

It was quite clear, he concluded, that the British were trying to harm the interests of the Dutch government to the greatest possible extent. At the end of June, however, Fendall, having received information from London about the departure of the Dutch to the Indies, declared himself willing to commence negotiations about the cession of the colonies, although he stressed that the actual surrender could not take place till he was ordered to do so by Calcutta. Fendall proposed a number of conditions, mainly of a financial nature, but also including a request that the Dutch should recognize treaties made with indigenous princes during the British administration. Especially the last proposal was badly received by the Commissioners, who pointed out that the question under consideration was a convention between two sovereign states not a capitulation. The convention of 1814 stipulated an unconditional return of the

(10) Elout to Goldberg, 30th May, 1816. In Deventer "Gezag" op.cit. p.70

(11) Kemp P.H. van der "Oost-Indie's Herstel in 1816 near oorspronkelijke stukken." s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1911.p.64. Note: In fact Raffles before his departure from Java (25th March, 1816) had tried to soften the blow to his personal ambitions, caused by the English decision to restore the colonies to the Dutch, by intimating to the indigenous princes that Holland in the Convention of 1814 had promised to respect and confirm the measures taken by the British administration. This was a pure invention. Source: Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag ...." op.cit.pp.346-7.
colonies and subsidiary questions therefore should be settled after the restitution had actually been made. Early in July, however, Pendall was finally able to act after having received a reply from Calcutta to his earlier request for instructions in March. He was ordered not to postpone the cession of the colonies even if the Dutch did not have proper warrants, because:

"...The notoriety of the cession, the departure of the Dutch armament with the full knowledge of the British government...render it morally impossible that any one cause can exist for suspending the arrangements...." (12)

Although the British government, so the instruction continued, had no right to force the Dutch to guarantee the treaties made with native rulers during the British administration, it had the "strongest moral and political obligations" to try to preserve for those princes the benefits which the treaties had promised them. If the Dutch would not agree to an unconditional guarantee, they should be asked to refrain from making political alterations in the territories concerned till the question had been settled by the European governments. If this request was also refused then the cession of the colonies should not be protracted any longer but should be effected under protest.

The negotiations which followed were long and difficult owing

(12) Calcutta to Batavia, 18th May, 1816. in Kemp "..Opvattingen.." op.cit. pp. 489-97.
to the obstinacy of both Fendall and the Commissioners-General and it was not till 23rd July that a convention was signed regulating the cession of Java and its dependencies, although Banka and Palembang which caused special difficulties were excluded. Java was officially handed over to Holland on 19th August, 1816, but Fendall was not able to leave till the beginning of 1817 owing to the difficulties which arose about the handing over of Palembang and Banka.

The geographical description in the Convention of 1814 of what exactly was to be returned to Holland was very vague, and only the island of Banka which was to be exchanged for the Dutch possession of Cochin and its dependencies in Southern India, was specifically mentioned. Ironically it was Banka which caused the greatest trouble between the Dutch and British authorities in Java. The omission of both Palembang and Banka from the convention of 23rd July was caused by the Dutch refusal to guarantee a treaty concluded in 1812 with the Sultan of Palembang, in which he surrendered his sovereign rights over the island of Banka, with its large tin deposits, to Britain. Before the Dutch forces in Java had capitulated to the British in 1811, Sultan Badrudin of Palembang had rid himself of the Dutch garrison by killing them, soldiers, officials, wives and children, and throwing their bodies in
the river. The Sultan then declared himself independent both of the Dutch and of the new masters of the archipelago: the English. Although the sultan's claim for independence might have been technically right this did not deter Raffles, Lieutenant-Governor of Java, from sending an expedition in 1812 under Gillespie to punish the murderers, and to obtain the valuable tin deposits of Banka and Billiton, dependencies of Palembang. Raffles wished to keep Banka and Billiton permanently within the British empire and Lord Minto, the governor-general at Calcutta, agreed that, although Palembang in itself had only little commercial value, Banka and Billiton were important and in order to make their eventual return to the Dutch more difficult the islands should be politically separated from Palembang and brought under the direct control of the British Crown. Consequently Gillespie, after Sultan Badrudin had fled, conducted negotiations with the Sultan's brother Ratu Achmad Najm al Din, whom he placed on the throne. On 17th May, 1812 a contract was signed in which the Sultan ceded the full sovereignty over Banka, Billiton and dependencies


(14) Minto to Raffles, 15th December, 1812. in "Memoir.....of Raffles" op. cit. p. 347.
to the British Crown and the British East India Company. Fendall therefore insisted that if the Dutch did not recognize the treaty of 1812 with Palembang, they implicitly refused to recognize British sovereignty over Banka, which the Convention of 1814 transferred to Holland in exchange for Cochin and its dependencies. The Commissioners-General however refused to guarantee the treaty of 1812, nor would they give an undertaking not to interfere politically in Palembang until the dispute was settled by the European governments. The British then ceded Palembang and Banka to the Dutch in February, 1817, but refused to cede the island of Billiton on the grounds that the Convention of 1814 made mention only of Banka and not of its dependencies. Although the Commissioners-General agreed to the British suggestion that the question of Billiton should be referred to the governments in Europe for a decision, they added that they would occupy the island for the common interest of all, as it was infested with pirates and smugglers, but owing to the lack of military resources the Dutch were not able to do so till 1821.

(17) Fendall to Commissioners-General, 21st January, 1817, quot. ibid. p.376.
(18) Commissioners-General to Fendall, 28th January, 1817. quot. ibid. p.376.
Clearly, the first post-war relations between the English and Dutch colonial authorities had been strained and unfriendly; and Pendall and his staff returned to Calcutta disgusted with the behaviour of the Dutch, especially of that of Elout. Apparently Van der Capellen's moderation was favourably commented upon by those who had returned to Calcutta from Java but in regard to the rest of the Dutch:

"...The impression is general and strong as to an unfriendly bias in the majority of those to whom the island of Java has been delivered."(19)

The Commissioners-General, however, insisted that Pendall had been deliberately delaying the return of the colonies, and their suspicion of British motives is well illustrated by the following extract from one of their despatches to the government in The Hague:

"...The English authorities as well as private Englishmen in those regions are very discontent about the restitution of all the Indian possessions to the Netherlands, but especially of that of Banka; and they ascribe this cession in general to the lack of knowledge of the British government in Europe about the importance of those possessions; and they are still hoping all the time that once a good opportunity will arise to regain those possessions; this is especially true in regard to Palembang and Banka."(20)


This feeling of suspicion was raised to a high pitch when rumours spread throughout the Indies in 1817 that Raffles was about to return to the Archipelago as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen. Raffles, who had been recalled to England in 1815 to answer charges of mismanagement brought against him by General Gillespie, had been able to clear his name and had regained the confidence of the Directors, who appointed him to Bencoolen, and although this establishment did not warrant the title, he was given the designation of Lieutenant-Governor in recognition of his previous services in Java. From the instructions to Raffles by the Court of Directors it is clear that he did not have any authority to act politically i.e. to expand British political control in the East Indian archipelago without the foreknowledge of the Company's government in London. But while still in England

(21) The instructions to Raffles were as follows:
"It is highly desirable that the Court of Directors should receive early and constant information of the proceedings of the Dutch and other European nations, as well as of the Americans, in the Eastern Archipelago. The Court, therefore, desire that you will direct your attention to the object of regularly obtaining such information, and that you will transmit the same to them by every convenient opportunity, accompanied by such observations as may occur to you, whether of a political or commercial nature. You will furnish the Supreme Government with copies of these communications. In the event of any such communications appearing to you to be of a nature to require secrecy, you will address your letter to the Secret Committee."

Raffles was considering action which went far beyond the terms of his official instructions. The Dutch, so Raffles claimed, would try to exclude the British from a fair share of the East Indian trade, because they had done so before, and because of their language and behaviour since their return. Even if the Dutch were well disposed towards British trade, it would be imprudent not to take measures in case they changed their minds in the future. Therefore the British government should insist that Holland would recognize the treaties made by the British during their term of government with the indigenous princes. In contrast to the Dutch, Raffles interpreted the Convention of 1814 literally; and consequently he held that Holland should only be restored to those points in the archipelago which has actually been in its possession on 1st January, 1803. Raffles claimed that apart from Java, Banka and the Moluccas, there was at least one sixth of the East-Indies, where the former exclusive rights of the Dutch could well be challenged, because treaties with those territories such as Riouw had been concluded before 1803 and had not been renewed since then, while in another sixth of the archipelago such as the interior of Sumatra and part of Borneo the Dutch had never exercised any exclusive rights. The British therefore could rightfully conclude treaties with native princes in at least one third of the
archipelago and in order to facilitate communications with those princes and to establish a entrepot for British trade a more strategic point should be occupied in the archipelago in addition to the existing establishments at Bencoolen and Pulu Penang. Raffles favoured the island of Banka for such an establishment and pointed to Pulu Bintang in the Riouw archipelago as a second choice.

How far the ideas of Raffles about the establishment of British influence in the East Indies were publicly known is difficult to ascertain, but already in 1816, nearly two years before his arrival in Bencoolen, the Commissioners-General wrote to the government in The Hague, that Raffles, while he was in Europe, would undoubtedly use his special knowledge of the area to emphasize to the British cabinet and the Directors of the Company which parts of the Indies would be important from the point of view of British interests. The Commissioners also mentioned that they had been sufficiently informed about Raffles great plans for Sumatra, which on his return they expected he would undoubtedly try to put into practice, while he would use anything as a pretext for interfering between the indigenous princes and the Dutch authorities. A number


of reasons can be ascertained for the Dutch suspicion of
Raffles: e.g. his well-known anti-Dutch sentiments, his
attempts to revert the decision of the British government
to restore the colonies to the Dutch, and the presence in the

(24) The following extract from Raffles' History of Java (pub:
1817, vol. I, p.65) is an example of his thinking on Dutch
colonial policy. Commenting on a population decrease in
the East Indies he writes:

"...Bad government was the principal cause; a system of
policy which secured neither person nor property—
selfish, jealous, vexatious and tyrannical. It is no
less true than remarkable, that wherever the Dutch
influence had prevailed in the Eastern Seas, depopula-
tion has followed. The Moluccas particularly have
suffered at least as much as any part of Java, and the
population of those islands, reduced as it is, has
been equally oppressed and degraded....................."

That the History of Java was known to the Commissioners-
General very soon after its publication, is clear from a
reference made to it by Elout in a despatch to the
government in the Hague on 21st December, 1817. (Falck's
Gedenkschriften, op.cit. p.450.)

(25) The Commissioners-General, who apparently had been able to
lay their hands on some of the British archives, in a
letter to the Hague of 20th February, 1818, quoted a
despatch to the Secret Committee in London of 15th August,
1815 in which Raffles tried to persuade the British
government to retain Java and requested:

"...that deeming it a matter of extreme consequence to
the national interests in the present critical state
of public events (Napoleon), to place all the author-
ities in England in the possession of the information
now forwarded, since the opportunity might again occur
of retaining under (the) British flag the possession of
an Eastern Empire, the value of which has until lately
perhaps been hardly known, and which if now given up,
may be lost forever, or regained only at great expense
of blood and treasure......................."

Source: Kemp P.H. van der "Sumatra in 1818 - naar oorspronk-
elijke stukken", s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1920. Bijlage II.
p. 266.
Dutch colonial administration of former close associates of Raffles such as Muntinghe. During 1817 the Dutch authorities in Java appeared to have received intelligence which pointed more directly to the actual plans which Raffles had in mind. Van Braam, Commissioner for the take over of the Dutch possessions in India, wrote from Chinsura in August 1817 that rumours were circulating that Raffles was departing from England with great plans of establishing a system of administration in Sumatra similar to the one which he had previously introduced in Java and that he would try to extend British influence as far as Palembang. But even before this report was received in Batavia, Elout had already written to Holland that the appointment of Raffles to Bencoolen and his designs on Sumatra, Bali and Borneo had put the Commissioners-general on their guard and that steps had been taken to bring the princes there under Dutch influence.

(26) Muntinghe, Herman Warner (1773-1827); doctor of Law, Groningen, 1797; left for the Indies in 1804, where after quick promotion he was appointed President of the High Council of Justice (1809); during the British regime he was a member of the Council of the Indies and became the trusted advisor of Raffles, who in the foreword to his History of Java pays tribute to the capacities of Muntinghe.


(28) Elout to Goldberg, Secretary-General of Dept. of Colonies, 10th October, 1817. quot. Kemp "Opvattingen." op. cit. p. 382.
But while the Commissioners-General already attributed the whole train of events since their arrival to Raffles i.e. the protraction of the take-over and the insistent demand for a Dutch guarantee of British treaties, the news of Raffles' impending return and the foreknowledge of some of his plans forced the Dutch into taking preventive action. The Dutch therefore attempted to obliterate any vestiges of British influence which remained in the archipelago in order to prevent Raffles from finding any pretext for interference. It was the fear of Raffles which made the Batavian government decide in October 1817 to demote the sultan of Palembang, because he had been put on the throne by the British in 1812 and would therefore be susceptible to intrigue from Bencoolen. Muntinghe, who because of his previous close association was considered to be the most suitable person to deal with Raffles, was appointed as a special commissioner to bring the territory of Palembang under the firm control of the Dutch. Muntinghe who had been prevented from carrying out his mission speedily owing to bad sailing weather, arrived in Banka on 19th March, 1818 on his way from Batavia to Palembang, while Raffles reached Bencoolen only a few days later (22nd March, 1818).

One of Raffles' first acts after his return to the Indies was to claim part of the Dutch territory of the Lampongs in Southern Sumatra, where he planned to establish harbour facilities for British ships which were engaged in the China trade. Such a port, as he remarked to Marsden, would soon rival Batavia as an entrepot. When he sent a detachment of troops to occupy Semangka Bay, which was considered as a suitable location for a port, and had the British flag hoisted there, the Batavian government refrained from taking military action, but instead protested vigorously to the Calcutta government about what it considered as a violation of Dutch territory. The next trouble spot was Palembang, where Raffles took the opportunity to interfere when on 17th June, 1818 he received a letter from the Sultan requesting his help against Muntinghe who was approaching Palembang from Banka. He sent Captain Salmond with an armed party through the interior to Palembang in an attempt to anticipate the arrival of Muntinghe, but while this detachment was still on the way another letter from the Sultan arrived in Bencoolen informing that the Dutch had already arrived. Raffles then sent a despatch to Salmond ordering him to act as he saw fit and enclosing the Sultan's letter, a proclamation, threatening letters to Muntinghe and

(30) Raffles to Marsden, 7th April, 1818 in "Memoir.." op.cit. p.322.
the Commissioners-General, and a request to Major Farquhar, the resident of Malacca, not to hand over that territory to the Dutch. The proclamation, which was issued in the name of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen and the representative of the British government in the Eastern Archipelago, stated that, as the Dutch had proceeded to Palembang under the protest of the British authorities in Java and had made arrangements which were injurious to the interests and the rights of the Sultan, he declared those arrangements null and void because they were not in keeping with the Convention of 1814. In another despatch to Salmond, Raffles included letters to the Sultans of Riouw and Pontianak inviting them to become allies of the British, who as they surely would know were far more humane than the Dutch, with whom in any case they were not bound to have relations according to the Convention of 1814. He urged Salmond to take the utmost care to have those letters delivered quickly, because he had received intelligence that the Dutch were preparing to send a large force to Pontianak, although they had no exclusive rights there.


The course of events however ran differently from what Raffles had expected because the British detachment was taken prisoner and Salmond was sent back to Bencoolen via Batavia, while most of Raffles' rather compromising correspondence had fallen into the hands of Muntinghe. But more important to Raffles, the debacle at Palembang was a serious setback to his plan for bringing the whole of Sumatra within the British sphere of influence. According to Raffles in order to stop endless disputes with the Dutch and to ensure for Britain a fair share of the East Indian trade, Sumatra:

"...should undoubtedly be under the influence of one European Power alone, and this power is of course the English................................................................." (33)

Consequently Raffles had tried to expand into Southern Sumatra (Lampongs) and in order to establish a territorial link between Bencoolen and Palembang he had journeyed into the mountainous interior of his residency where on 23rd May he had concluded a treaty with the Passumahs who lived on the border of Bencoolen and Palembang. In July, 1818 Raffles journeyed over the mountains East-ward from Padang into the hitherto


(34) Kemp "Sumatra in 1818.." op.cit. p.80.
unknown country of Minangkabau, where he concluded a treaty with the "emperor", in which the Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen was named as the representative of the "emperor" in all the Malay states i.e. most of Sumatra. Raffles speculated that if he established relations with Minangkabau, which in former days had ruled over a large part of Sumatra, he would be able to establish British influence indirectly in most of the island. Furthermore an exclusive British treaty with Minangkabau would make Padang, which was the natural outlet for produce from the interior, useless to the Dutch. In the meantime Raffles had already refused to hand over Padang to a Dutch mission which had arrived in Bencoolen on 3rd June on the grounds that the Dutch refused to guarantee to pay the large deficit which had been incurred during the British administration since 1795, but in fact Raffles wanted to retain Padang, because it was "the only valuable station on the West-Coast of Sumatra". The Palembang affair gave him an ever stronger pretext to protract the cession of Padang, which he would not surrender, so he wrote to Muntinghe, until

(36) Raffles' Memoir op.cit. Vol.2. p.32.
the affairs of Palembang had been arranged according to his wishes.

In addition to the difficulties about Padang, the action of Muntinghe to exclude the British from Palembang also retarded the take-over by the Dutch of their old establishment of Malacca on the Peninsula. The Dutch commissioners who had arrived in Malacca on 19th July, 1818 had already been held up till the beginning of September by the absence of the British resident, Major Farquhar, who had been sent on a mission to Borneo in an attempt to anticipate the arrival there of a Dutch expedition. But when Farquhar had found that Borneo was already occupied by the Dutch, he instead concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Riouw. After his return however, Farquhar, who knew about the Dutch action in Palembang, tried to postpone the handing over of Malacca as long as possible and he insisted that the Dutch first should come to an agreement about British financial claims. The Commissioners however persistently refused and finally the colony was handed over to them on 23rd September, 1818. The Commissioners had


been instructed after the completion of their business at Malacca to proceed to Riouw, where they were to extend old contracts or conclude new ones, because Batavia considered that territory as Dutch, as abandonment before the war by the Dutch authorities of Malacca had never been officially approved. Furthermore Muntinghe in a letter from Palembang early in September had told the Commissioners about the intercepted correspondence of Raffles with the Sultans of Pontianak and Riouw and he urged them to sail as soon as possible to Riouw in order to prevent a British settlement there. The Dutch arrived in Riouw on 8th November and concluded a new treaty which they considered would supersede the earlier one made by Farquhar.

By the end of 1818 then, a number of territorial disputes had arisen between the Dutch colonial authorities and Raffles, caused mainly by the vagueness of the Convention of 1814, which was open to different interpretations. While Raffles, as noted above, took the Convention of 1814 literally, the Dutch

(39) Ibid. pp. 77-78.
(40) Muntinghe to Wolterbeek, Commissioner for Malacca, 18th August, 1818, quot. ibid. pp. 9-11.
(41) Wolterbeek to Resident of Malacca, 29th November, 1818, quot. ibid. pp. 36-37.
interpreted the Convention as restoring to them their
previous sphere of influence in the East-Indies, i.e. the
whole of the area South of Pulu Penang. The way the Dutch
saw their position in the Indies is well illustrated by Elout,
who reasoned that the English jure belli had occupied a number
of Dutch colonies, which after the war had been restored to
Holland by the Convention of 1814. On the other hand in those
territories, which the English could have occupied jure belli,
but had not done so, the Dutch right had "slept" and had been
fully restored again after the conclusion of peace. The
Dutch therefore considered the actions of Raffles as subversive
and as violating their rights.

For the sake of clarity I will anticipate the rest of the
story somewhat and indicate here in short the motivation
behind the Dutch response to the challenge posed by Raffles.

The actions of Raffles in Sumatra and his burrowing in
Riouw and Borneo, which the Commissioners-General considered
not only as a danger to the political security of the Nether-
lands Indies but also to their prosperity, added considerably
to two major interrelated problems, which confronted the Dutch
on their return to the Indies in 1816. Firstly how to re-
establish their political prestige and authority after an

(42) "Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis der Onderhandelingen met
Engeland betreffende de Overzeesche Bezittingen, 1820-
1824, getrokken uit de nagelaten papieren van wijlen
den Minister van Staat, Elout." s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff,
1863.p.49.
absence of more than twenty years from most of the archipelago, and secondly how to find a footing in the East Indian trade, which by that time had become a near-monopoly of the English. To the Dutch it was clear that if they wanted to succeed in solving those two problems they could not bear any foreign interference in what they considered as their territory, but especially not of a nation, which because of its unassailable competitive position could outbid or undersell any other competitor for the East Indian trade. As it appeared to the Dutch the only possible solution to the problem of regaining some of their previous commercial influence in their colonies, was to try to keep the English as far away as possible from Java, the centre of trade in the archipelago. The motive then behind the moves of the Commissioners-General to re-establish Dutch influence in as wide an area as possible was primarily one of economic survival, because the Dutch feared that if Raffles succeeded in establishing a British port closer to the centre of the archipelago in order to gain a fair share of the trade there, as he termed it, would mean the loss by Holland of the whole of that trade to Britain. Raffles therefore had to be stopped by every possible means.

When the Dutch returned to the Indies in 1816 they had to build up their commercial and political influence completely anew. The British had become the pre-dominant commercial
power; and Holland had great difficulty in even finding a footing in the East-Indian trade, not only because the English had taken over from the Dutch during the long absence of the latter, but rather because the terms of trade had changed greatly in favour of Britain. While before the war the Dutch East India Company had still carried on a valuable trade in Indian textiles between India, Indonesia and the Far East, this trade had now been cut out by the destruction of the native Indian textile industry, which was not able to compete with the cheaply machine produced cottons from England. Dutch shipping was also at a serious disadvantage because English ships bound for the colonies carried the products of British industry and made a far more profitable voyage than Dutch ships which generally had to come out in ballast, as Holland had only little to sell. The English merchant in Java therefore was in a position to offer more for coffee and other produce owing to the cheaper shipping rates, while he could undersell any other competitor because the cost prices of British machine produced goods afforded him a wider profit margin.

But despite the odds, the Dutch were bent on regaining their previous commercial preponderance in the archipelago and they cherished rather grandiose plans of making Batavia into the sole entrepot for the Indies, while Falck wanted to go even further when he wrote that Batavia would fulfil only
half its destination if it remained solely the administrative centre of the East-Indies and did not become a rich commercial city and the most frequented market place in the whole of Asia. To that purpose the Commissioners-General issued a regulation in 1818 ordering all ships from Europe and America to make Batavia their first port of call. The Commissioners, so they wrote, had been impressed by the example of Raffles, who in an attempt to protect British trade from the competition of an expected increase in European shipping after the defeat of Napoleon, had issued a decree on 1st February, 1815 making Batavia the only port of call in the Indies for ships coming West of the Cape. Together with this measure to concentrate the whole of the East-Indian overseas trade in Batavia, the Commissioners-General introduced a new tariff which was designed to give Dutch shipping and trade a moderate amount of protection. While after the cession of the colonies the Dutch authorities pending an investigation into the desirability of new legislation had left the existing tariff unchanged and did not class British ships as foreign, the

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Falck, Minister of Colonies to the King, 1st October, 1819 in Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag." op.cit. p.287.


Note: Raffles on 1st February, 1815 had raised the tariff to a rather high level: 10% of the invoice value plus 30% on goods imported on British ships, and 10% plus 60% on goods imported on foreign ships. But when Major Nahuys arrived in Java in 1816, Raffles, for obvious reasons, lowered the tariff from 10% to 6%. Source: Welderen Rengers D.W. "The failure of a liberal colonial policy-Netherlands Indies. 1816-1830." The Hague, Nijhoff, 1947. p.70.
Commissioners-General had soon come under pressure from interested quarters in the home-country demanding protection for national shipping and industry. Although the prominent Dutch liberal and anglo-philie G.K. van Hogendorp could theorize that he did not believe that the Dutch merchants and manufacturers were inferior to those of England nor that the Dutch were lacking in capital and energy, the King and a number of Dutch merchants and Belgian manufacturers realized that if Holland wanted to gain some benefit from its overseas possessions it could not afford to introduce a system of complete free trade, because the competitive position of the English was too unequal for the Dutch to overcome. Belgian manufacturers wanted a secure market for their goods which were difficult to sell in Europe after the Napoleonic free

(46) Hogendorp, Gijsbert Karel van (1771-1834); wrote a thesis on American federalism (Leiden, 1786); ardent Orangist and appointed Pensionary of Rotterdam; no official position between 1795-1813, but became head of an Amsterdam trading company; showed a great deal of interest in the plans for the reform of the East India Company and wrote a great deal on matters of colonial administration; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1813-1814); Vice-President of the Council of State (1815) and largely responsible for the drafting of the Constitution of 1815; appointed Minister of State in 1815 but resigned the following year owing to the continuous clashes of his strongly liberal ideas with the conservative outlook of the King; lost a great deal of his early fervour for the House of Orange; remained in Parliament from 1816-1825 and wrote a great deal on economic matters.

(47) Welderen Rengers "Failure..." op.cit. p.33.
trade system had been replaced by the old practice of high tariffs especially in France. Wappers-Melis, a Belgian and a free-trade opponent, claimed that the Dutch Kingdom itself produced far more iron products, clothing, glass and other manufactures than were absorbed by internal consumption. This surplus could easily be exported to Java, where the market should be reserved for the mother country which had the right to all the benefits of the Java trade, as it paid for the running of that colony. Dutch merchants wanted protection of shipping and trade and a petition by the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1817 questioned if there existed any other nation which admitted Holland into its colonies on an equal footing. While British shipping and trade was not interfered with in Java, the Dutch were trading at a great disadvantage at the Cape and in Ceylon. Now that Java had been definitely secured, it was high time, so the petition went on, that the Dutch government took measures in order to gain some advantage from that territory, where trade and commerce were monopolized by the British, because by right the market for Java coffee belonged in Amsterdam not in London. The petition

further suggested that duties on cargoes carried in foreign ships to and from Java should be 25% higher than those carried in Dutch ships; that the coffee trade should be exclusively reserved to the Dutch; and that those measures should remain in force till Dutch commerce and shipping was sufficiently strong enough to compete with other nations on a free trade basis. The Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce however and also the Commissioners-General thought the Amsterdam proposals too severe and were of the opinion that in any case Dutch shipping was not sufficiently developed to carry on the major part of the Java trade. Consequently the Commissioners-General on 28th August, 1818 introduced a rather moderate tariff which was applicable to Java and Madura and which specified the following duties: Dutch ships 6%; foreign ships with Dutch goods 9%; foreign ships with other goods 12%; while the duties would be calculated on the invoice value of the goods plus 30%. On an invoice value of 100 guilders the duty would in fact amount to 7.8%, 11.5% and 15.6% respectively, while previously they would have been 13% and 16%.

(49) De Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken van Amsterdam to Goldberg, 23rd January, 1817. In Posthumus, op.cit. pp.5-6.

(50) "Rapport van den Commissarissen-Generaal over In en Uitgaande rechten op Java en Madura, 1818" in Elout's Bijdragen op.cit, pp.269-273.

(51) Welderen Rengers "Failure.." op.cit. pp.71-72.
But British trade against which the new tariff was mainly directed, was hardly affected owing to the manner in which the regulations were applied. Dutch customs officers were lowly paid and on the whole they were inefficient and corrupt and so it was easy for British merchants to by-pass the new customs regulations. British traders used various practices to neutralize the effect of the new tariff such as the under-valuation of goods shown on the invoice by subtracting premiums, discounts and other charges and by showing cost prices only. Even the exchange rates were tampered with in order to undervalue the £ in Batavia as compared with Calcutta. Another common practice was to naturalize British ships by issuing them with Dutch shipping papers on their arrival in Batavia; then those ships after having unloaded their cargo in Batavia, took Java produce to Holland from where they sailed to English ports to collect goods which would be imported into the Dutch colonies at the Dutch rate of duty. In 1823 English cunning went as far as to re-baptize the British ship "Barossa" into "Baroness van der Capellen". Apart from the failure of the colonial authorities in properly executing the customs regulations of 1818 the Home government in any case proved


(53) Ibid. p. 453.
to be dissatisfied with the degree of protection intended, and on 25th April, 1819 a royal decree was issued declaring products of Dutch origin brought in on national ships, free of duty, with the exception of victuals. (54)

The Commissioners-General however were acutely aware that whatever measures they took to bind the trade and commerce of Java to the national economy, their efforts would have been largely in vain if the British succeeded in setting up a free-trade port in or near the centre of the archipelago, because such an establishment would undoubtedly draw away a great deal of trade from Batavia. Owing to their unfavourable competitive position the Dutch at that stage could not afford to indulge in the fashionable philosophy of commercial liberalism, while the British could. Therefore the Batavian government spent a great deal of effort attempting to prevent Raffles from realizing his plans.

In addition to the direct preventive action taken in Palembang, Riouw and Borneo, the Commissioners-General resorted to the sending of strong protests to the Calcutta government in August and October, 1818, in which they requested the British authorities to stop Raffles and in which they explained their preventive actions by pointing out that the Dutch colonial authorities were fully entitled to deal with an individual who

(54) Ibid. p.445.
without any authorization took it upon himself to disturb peace and order in the East Indian area. The answer of Calcutta to those protests, which was received in January, 1819, disavowed the actions of Raffles in the following terms:

"...We do not hesitate to declare to your excellencies, that we have never sanctioned, nor have approved the procedure of the Lieutenant-Governor of Fort Marlborough in exercising any interference in the affairs of Palembang and in deputing a British officer thither for the purpose of counteracting your measures...."

And Batavia was further informed that Raffles had been given strict orders to surrender Padang, to withdraw from the Lampongs and to refrain from interfering in the rest of Sumatra. At the same time however the government in Calcutta did not seem to approve of the Dutch actions in Palembang, when it added that it was not clear why the Dutch had been so hasty in deposing the sultan and in anulling the British treaty of 1812. The latter points apparently went unnoticed when the Commissioners-General highly satisfied with the official disavowal of Raffles' actions, wrote a very amiable letter to Calcutta.


(56) Governor-General in Council (Calcutta) to Commissioners-General, 10th October, 1818. *Quot. Kemp "Opvattingen..." op. cit. pp. 407-408.*

Furthermore, the Batavian government had repeatedly requested The Hague to complain about Raffles in London. But the Dutch ambassador to Britain, Fagel, who at the end of 1818 had been ordered to take up the question, reported that Castlereagh seemed to be far better instructed on the matter than he had expected, and it appeared that Raffles not only had sent detailed reports to the Company but also to the British government. Fagel further intimated that Castlereagh appeared to be rather impressed by Raffles' argument that the Dutch were trying to exclude Britain from the Archipelago. On 12th January, however, the Dutch ambassador was able to report to his government that the actions of Raffles were disapproved and that the British government would take action, but unfortunately for the Dutch on the next day a protest by Raffles about the "encroachments of Holland" appeared in the British press and brought the whole question into the open. Castlereagh was reported to be greatly displeased about Raffles' indiscretion and after a question had been asked in the House of Lords about the Palembang affair, the government refused to table the documents concerned on the grounds that Raffles in his subordinate


position as commercial resident had no authority to act publicly. On 12th February, Castlereagh, in an official note to the Dutch ambassador, wrote that the acts of Raffles would be entirely disavowed, because that gentleman was merely a commercial agent, who had not been authorized to act politically in any matter whatsoever. But the points of difference, the note continued, which unfortunately had arisen should become the subject of further discussion between the two governments. A copy of Castlereagh's note was sent to the Indies and the behaviour of the Commissioners-General were commended by the King, who directed them to maintain with calm determination the rights and the interests of the nation and the prestige of the Dutch name in case of similar difficulties in the future.

Although the Commissioners-General was gratified with the official disavowal of Raffles' actions, they were bent upon preventing the occurrence of similar trouble and this

(60) Fagel to the Hague, 15th January, 1819. *ibid.* p. 401

(61) Castlereagh to Fagel, 12th February, 1819. *in Deventer Nederlandsch Gezag.* *op. cit.* pp. 277-278.

(62) Minister of Colonies to Governor-General van der Capellen, 2nd March, 1819 *in Ibid.* p. 277. *Note:* On 16th January the Commissioners-General had declared their mission completed and Elout and Buyskens soon after departed for Holland, while Van der Capellen remained behind as Governor-General (1819-1825).
in their view could only be effected by the removal of Raffles from the archipelago. They had therefore repeatedly suggested to the Dutch government that Bencoolen and the other British possessions in Sumatra should be exchanged for the Dutch possessions in India. The idea of an exchange was not new and already in 1814 G.K. van Hogendorp had written that the Dutch colonies in India were valueless because of the British preponderance in that area and he had therefore suggested that they should be exchanged for Bencoolen and Pulu Penang, leaving Southern Sumatra to the Dutch and Padang and Northern Sumatra to the English. Although van Hogendorp's proposals were not taken up at the time, the danger to Dutch commerce and trade and the general lack of peace and order in the archipelago caused by Raffles' activities made the Commissioners-General see the desirability of such an exchange and this explains their interest in Sumatra at this time. As early as October, 1816 the Commissioners-General had made it clear to their government that their moves in Sumatra during this period were to be seen as preventive. And Elout wrote in

(63) Similarly to the Dutch, Raffles had urged his superiors to effect a territorial rationalization in order to stop the ever recurring demarcation disputes with Holland. He suggested therefore to leave Java and the Spice Islands exclusively to the Dutch, while Sumatra, Banka, Malacca and Borneo should become English. Source: Raffles to Secret Committee of the East India Company, 3rd. July, 1818. in Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag..." op.cit. pp.257-259.

1817 that, while the intended action in Palembang should be considered as an attempt to stop Raffles from realizing his known plan to extend British influence there, he also wished that Bencoolen and the other English possessions were in the hands of the Dutch, and he thought that it would be worthwhile giving the colonies on the continent of India in exchange for them. The government in The Hague, however, did initially now show a great deal of interest in the suggestions for territorial exchange, but it showed more concern when the Commissioners-General soon after Raffles' arrival in Bencoolen reported that their previous apprehensions had proved to be well founded, while pointing out that in regard to their actions in Sumatra:

"...it is not a vain desire for the extension of Dutch authority without use of definite purpose, which makes us think or act as we did, but it is the sincere and well founded conviction that it is absolutely necessary for Dutch trade and shipping, for the prosperity, yes, even for the security of Java (if there were stronger expressions we would use them) to have the complete mastery of Sumatra, if possible, but in any case to cede nothing of the influence and authority which the Dutch have exercised for so long in Palembang, and in the Lampongs....................................."(66)

In another despatch Elout urged that the Dutch government should make sure that "that restless person" would disappear from the

(65) Elout to Goldber, 21st December, 1817. in Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag..." op. cit. pp. 210-212.

(66) Commissioners-General to Director-General of Colonies, 30th June, 1818 in Deventer "Nederlandsch Gezag..." op. cit. pp. 254-256.
Indies and this according to Elout could be best effected by the cession of the Dutch factories in India in exchange for the British possessions in Sumatra and by promises on the part of both countries not to interfere in each others' sphere of influence. This continuous pressure from the Batavian authorities made the Netherlands government finally decide at the end of 1818 to suggest to Britain to settle the disputes which had arisen in the East by means of territorial exchange. But while Holland was under the impression that the British government would be sympathetic to its claims, both London and Calcutta by this time had become rather apprehensive of the Dutch designs in the Indies. The British feared that the Batavian government in its attempts to expand its influence as widely as possible and to protect Dutch trade and shipping, in fact was trying to exclude Britain completely from Malaysia both politically and commercially.

Raffles, who had arrived in Calcutta in October, 1818 in order to brief his superiors on the situation in the East Indies, managed to bring the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, around to his view concerning the danger to British trade caused by the Dutch moves in the Malacca Straits. But he

(67) Elout to Falck, Minister for Colonies, 9th August, 1818. in Falck's Gedenkschriften." op. cit. p.453.
(68) Boulger "Raffles..." op. cit. p.296.
failed to interest Lord Hastings in his plans for Sumatra, because the Governor-General, so Raffles remarked, was more inclined to make the Equator the demarcation line between the English and Dutch spheres of interest and to exchange Sumatra for Malacca. Raffles however was able to write to his friend Marsden in November, 1818, that:

"...it is determined to keep the command of the Straits of Malacca, by forming establishments at Acheen and Rhio (Riouw), and that I leave Calcutta in a fortnight, as the agent to effect this important object. Acheen I conceive to be completely within our power, but the Dutch may be before hand with us at Rhio (Riouw)...

Raffles after having found the Carimon Islands near Riouw unsuitable and Riouw itself occupied by the Dutch, went on as instructed to Johore where on 29th January, he landed on the island of Singapore. The Dutch protested because they claimed that Singapore came under the jurisdiction of the sultan of Riouw, but they refrained from action as they expected that also this time Raffles would be recalled by his superiors. Singapore however remained occupied by the British and in 1824 the Dutch gave up their claim to it. Raffles then had finally succeeded in realizing part of his plans for the archipelago by wedging a British post into the protective barrier which the Dutch had attempted to build

(69) Raffles to Marsden, 16th October, 1818 in Raffles Memoir op.cit. vol.2. pp. 4-5.
around Java. It should be remarked that even before the wars with France the British East India Company had been interested in a settlement at Riouw, but negotiations with Holland had not been completed when in 1795 the war with France broke out and the Dutch colonies in any case came under the control of Britain. Although after the war the need of the East India Company for East Indian produce to pay for China tea was far smaller, because opium had become plentiful in India, British manufacturers, especially during the post-Napoleonic depression, were eager to find outlets for their products and they were putting a great deal of pressure on the British government to keep and to extend the market which had been built up in the East Indies during the war. The British government therefore found itself in a dilemma between the demands of traders and manufacturers in the home-country and the demands of its European foreign policy, which involved the cultivation of Dutch friendship. The problem was eventually solved by the well known British capacity to compromise: the Dutch were given the satisfaction of an official disavowal of Raffles' actions in Sumatra, while on the other hand Britain obtained a station at Singapore in order to satisfy its merchants and industrialists.

The Netherlands government, however, was apparently under the mistaken impression that the official disavowal of Raffles'
actions, also meant an implicit approval by the British of Dutch policies in the Indies. This is quite clear from the instructions by The Hague to the Dutch Ambassador in London, Fagel, who was requested at the end of 1818 to see Castlereagh about a revision of the Convention of 1814 and to suggest an exchange of the Dutch factories in India for the British colonies in Sumatra and Pulu Penang. As Fagel immediately and quite rightly pointed out, the British would never give up Pulu Penang. Moreover Castlereagh, whom Fagel previously had reported as rather impressed by the arguments of Raffles became suspicious, when in the middle of 1819 reports arrived from India about the alleged aspirations of the Dutch in the archipelago and the subsequent occupation by the British of Singapore, and he wrote to Clancarty, the British ambassador in The Hague:

"..The Dutch government probably think that they can establish the same exclusive dominion over the islands, which we have gradually acquired over the continent, and that other nations will submit to trade in those seas under such discriminating duties as may give the Dutch the sort of protection, which the British trade enjoys in the Indian ports......"(73)


(72) Fagel to Falck, 15th December, 1818. quot.Ibid. p.438.

(73) Castlereagh to Clancarty, 13th August, 1819 in Posthumus "..Documenten.." op.cit. p.29
But, so the British Minister continued, the Netherlands government should realize that it could not afford the armed forces needed to control such a vast area of islands. Instead it should establish its direct authority over Java and their old possessions, where he hoped the Dutch would not introduce an exclusive trade policy. In regard to the rest of the archipelago Holland should come to:

"an understanding with that power (I mean Great Britain) which may open the native commerce of the other islands to a fair and friendly competition." (74)

Such an arrangement, so Castlereagh concluded, would take away the need for Britain to expand politically in the archipelago, which in any case was against its wishes.

Clancarty submitted Castlereagh's despatch to the Dutch Foreign Minister, who replied that Holland in fact was trying to effect what the British Minister was suggesting. The Netherlands had no desire whatsoever to adopt "a mad policy of exclusion", but was only concerned to re-establish authority in those places which had been ceded by the Convention of 1814 and in those territories where Dutch authority had lapsed in pre-war days, but where its sovereignty had never been abandoned. Therefore the Dutch claims in Riouw in addition to those in Java and Sumatra should not be seen as

(74) Ibid. p.30.
an attempt to exclude the commerce of other nations from
the archipelago. But the Dutch denial of the accusations
brought against them did not convince the British government
nor deter it from pressing its claims for Singapore. Clan-
carty submitted a memorandum to the Netherlands government
containing the conditions on which the British government
was willing to negotiate. These were: The Netherlands was
to give a clear exposition of its territorial claims in the
East Indies, indicating how much of their claims rested on
direct sovereignty and how much on treaties concluded with
indigenous rulers. Furthermore Britain could never agree to
a practical exclusion or a mere toleration of its trade, nor
would it leave the keys to the China Sea, the Sunda and
Malacca Straits, completely under Dutch control. Other
conditions were a guarantee of free shipping and trade and
the admission of consuls in the Dutch colonies. The position
however which the Dutch took up concerning the British demands,
is probably most clearly expressed in a commentary by Elout,
whose reasoning formed the basis of the King's instructions

(75) Clancarty to Castlereagh, 18th August, 1819. in Ibid.
pp.31-32.

(76) Clancarty to the Netherlands Government, 20th August,
1819, in Kemp P.H. van der "De Stichting van Singapore,
de afstand ervan met Malakka, etc." in Bijdragen tot de
pp.341-346.

(77) "Consideratien nopens de afdoening der geschillen tussen
Groot-Britannien en de Nederlanden, 1819." in "Elout's
Bijdragen. op.cit. pp. 1-58.
to the plenipotentiaries for the Anglo-Dutch talks in London (July-August, 1820). Elout argued that the territorial disputes should be solved by territorial exchange: i.e. Sumatra for the Dutch possessions in India, because, so he reasoned, England would desire to have a free hand in India, while the same was true for the Dutch in the East Indies, and also because Bencoolen was of no commercial importance to Britain nor were the factories in India of any use to the Dutch anymore. Elout however considered to grant the British request for an exposition of Dutch territorial rights in the Indies as dangerous, because he realized the difficulties which could be brought up concerning those territories, where Dutch authority had lapsed in the pre-war era. Furthermore he considered the request for a guarantee of non-interference in shipping and trade as superfluous, because instead of "a practical exclusion" there already was "practical free commercial intercourse" in the Indies. But if the British insisted on this point, he had no objection to those principles being clearly expressed in the new convention, although it should be pointed out to the British government that it was not the Dutch, but the British themselves, who appeared to want a "practical exclusion",

(78) Instructions of 10th July, 1820 in Ibid pp.81-90.
because otherwise he could not explain the British monopolies at the Cape and Mauritius and the exclusive clauses in the treaties made by Raffles with the indigenous princes. Elout also maintained that Singapore should not be ceded to Britain. If the British were really worried about the safety of the keys to the China Sea, then surely, so he argued, they were in a position to seize those keys, should the Dutch ever prove to be troublesome. But in fact there had not been any obstruction to shipping in that area for 200 hundred years and in any case the interests of the one party were no sufficient grounds for interfering with the rights of the other. Then Elout again explained the motive behind the post-war Dutch expansionary moves in the Indies:

"...And truly we do not desire to possess any of those places for their own sake. I would like to see them in the hands of any nation, which would be willing to guarantee me, that the interests of the Netherlands, as the weaker party, would be respected (and which would guarantee) that the commerce of Dutch citizens would not suffer neither from the measures taken by higher or lower authorities, nor from the open usurpations or secret tricks of sub-ordinate agents." (79)

But, so Elout continued his argument, the actual situation was such that if the Dutch ceded Singapore and the Riouw archipelago, they would lose their influence there completely, and their trade in the rest of the Indies, especially the coastal trade, would suffer a great deal. Furthermore Elout advised against granting the other British request for

(79) Elout's *Bijdragen*. op.cit. p.57
admission of consuls, which was not surprising considering his personal experiences with a so-called "mere commercial agent".

Fagel however reported from London early in 1820 that the British government had intimated that Holland should expect to make sacrifices, because public opinion in Britain, owing to the accusations of exclusion and monopoly, was unfavourable to the Dutch. Van Nagell, the Dutch Foreign Minister, was incensed at

(80) Fagel to Van Nagell, 14th January, 1820, in Kemp "Geschiedenis Tractaat," op. cit. pp. 205-206. Note: Castlereagh's foreign policy toward Holland and its colonies was severely criticised in the British press, as can be gauged from the following extract from "The Times" of 31st July, 1820:

"...We thought it might be useful - and we are sorry for its being a truth of so disagreeable a nature - to inform him (i.e. Castlereagh), that the whole fabric of his foreign policy - that policy which, as his admirers have boasted, was more peculiarly and emphatically his own - is tumbling or about to tumble, about his ears, and, what is worse, about the ears of his countrymen in every quarter of the globe.....(Commenting on the Dutch) The Indian Government of the Netherlands has since (i.e. 1816) been accused by our authorities of pursuing a system of aggrandisement and exclusion hostile to the commercial interests of this country.....One of the means by which this plan (of the Dutch) is said to be prosecuted has been the renewal of all the dormant and obsolete treaties, which, in the course of two centuries, the Dutch had imposed upon the natives. We hope there may be no truth in these accusations.....But, if it be otherwise, it is undoubtedly time that the firmness of Ministers should be called into play, to redeem, so far as may yet be practicable, the bad effects of their own singular munificence. The post established by Sir Thomas Raffles at Sincapoor (Singapore) appears to have given umbrage to the Dutch...(but) The Dutch have attempted Palembang...(and) We do not know that the British government has resented this encroachment...on the contrary, the whole effort of our Colonial Minister in the House of Lords was to screen the Dutch, and to disclaim Sir Thomas Raffles. Well, then why should Holland quarrel with our occupation of Sincapoor (Singapore), which be it remembered, is, on the part of England, a purely defensive position, to cover her direct trade with China from her own dominions? With the Straits of Sunda we have not meddled...(but) Let us ask our Dutch neighbours fairly, what business they have with the Straits of Malacca? Do they wish to lay tolls upon that passage, as Denmark has done upon the Sound?"
the prospect of making new sacrifices, because Holland did not claim anything which did not belong to her. All it tried to do was:

"...qu’à conserver les débris de leur immense fortune. Un employé de la Compagnie des Indes Anglaises (i.e. Raffles), esprit turbulent et brouillon, échauffe une querelle, et accuse audacieusement les vues du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Par ses intrigues et ses delations il envenime les esprits, et pour les tranquilliser, il faudra que les Pays-Bas fassent des sacrifices......"(82)

But this was not only the view of interested Dutchmen; Clancarty could see how the disputes in the Indies had started when he wrote:

"..I believe that all our difficulties with the Dutch in those parts (i.e. the Indies) have originated from Sir Stamford Raffles. His conduct excited, as it appears, the jealousy of Mr. Capellen (i.e. Van der Capellen).... Hence grew several of the establishments made by them, and from these the necessity of making others on our part appeared to our own government at Calcutta......"(83)

It was however in the interests of British trade policy, which already since before the war had been concerned to find a station in the archipelago South of Pulu Penang, to use the accusations of Raffles and Calcutta as a pretext for occupying Singapore. Because rather than defense or a desire for

(81) Holland had already lost to England: The Cape, Ceylon and part of Guyana.


(83) Clancarty to Castlereagh, 20th August, 1819, in "Correspondence, Despatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh." 1853 vol. xii. p.137.
territorial expansion, it was the commerce and trade of the archipelago which the British were primarily interested in, unless they feared that Holland might again be occupied by France and therefore would pose an indirect danger to the safety of the Straits of Malacca. But this however was unlikely to happen at that time. The disputes between Raffles and the Dutch had brought to the fore again the pre-war demands by Britain, which had remained unsettled in the Convention of 1814, for a fair share of the trade of the archipelago and a station South of Pulu Penang. The occupation of Singapore therefore should be seen as a continuation of pre-war British trade policy and as an attempt to exclude a large share of the East Indian trade from being charged with Dutch duties, however moderate they might be. Or to put it in different terms: in occupying Singapore and declaring it a free-trade port, Britain was actually attempting to perpetrate its already existing near-monopoly in the East-Indian trade. A British free-trade port would obviously attract many indigenous traders, because there they were able to sell higher (no import duties) and to buy cheaper than in the Dutch held ports. While the British were happy to leave Java, Sumatra and the rest of the archipelago exclusively to Holland, English influence through Singapore was felt till deep into the Dutch territories. Some evidence for my contention that London used the accusations of Raffles
and Calcutta mainly as a pretext for occupying Singapore, can be found in the content and tone of the instructions sent to Bengal for the implementation of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824.

Such then was the state of opinion of both Britain and

(84) Directors of Political Committee to the Government of Bengal (Calcutta), 30th July, 1824, in Kemp ""Geschiedenis Tractaat," op.cit. pp.237-239. The comments of the Directors about freedom of navigation were as follows:

"13. The treaty contains no stipulation concerning the freedom of navigation as it has not been alleged that British vessels have met with any interruption in any part of the archipelago."

and in respect of most favoured nation treatment which was to be accorded in the respective colonies, the instructions read:

"...We are not aware that this stipulation will require any new measure on your part in favour of the Dutch or that it will entitle British subjects to any new privilege at Dutch ports, of which they are not already in possession."

The fact that the Dutch had been accused of concluding treaties with the indigenous Indonesian princes in order to monopolize trade was commented upon as follows:

"...These statements have been denied by the Dutch and we have certainly had no specific evidence of the fact; but however this may have been, the evil cannot exist in future."

I think it is clear from the above extracts that the Directors of the Company were aware of the exaggeration of the accusations which had been brought against the Dutch colonial authorities. They appeared to consider the Treaty of 1824 as a preventive move to stop the Dutch from carrying out any such designs in the future. But apart from normal trade relations with the Netherlands East Indies the British wanted also to draw away as much trade as possible from the Dutch and that was the reason for their persistence in obtaining Singapore.
Holland on the problems which had arisen in the East Indies, at the time when negotiations commenced in London at the end of July, 1820. By 5th August agreement had already been reached on a number of points such as: a disavowal of the actions of subordinate agents, including the treaties of Raffles in Sumatra; most favoured nation treatment was to be accorded by both nations in their respective colonies, both countries were to guarantee non-interference in shipping and trade, with the exception of the Moluccas, where the Dutch were allowed to keep their spice monopoly; no exclusive clauses were to be allowed in treaties with native princes, while all those treaties, past and future ones, had to be notified to the other party. But among the more important problems which remained unsolved were the questions of Singapore, Billiton, the Dutch factories in India, and reciprocal tariffs. It was decided however to postpone the discussions on Singapore till October, 1820, when it was expected that more detailed information on the situation would have reached London. But in fact the negotiations had broken down, because of the unwillingness of the Dutch to renounce their claims on Singapore; and it was not till the second half of 1823 that the discussions were resumed again.

(85) Verbaal van het verhandelde tussen de Britsche en Nederlandsche gevolmachtigden, ter regeling der Indische zaken in 1820. 20th July, - 5th August, 1820 in Elout's Bijdragen op cit. pp.100-147.
Once again Singapore became a stumbling block and to the British suggestion to buy the island from the Dutch, the Netherlands replied that from their point of view the main purpose of the negotiations was to effect territorial exchange. Consequently, the Dutch plenipotentiaries showed more interest in another British proposal to exchange Bencoolen and the other British possessions in Sumatra for Malacca and Singapore. They reasoned that Singapore in itself was of no value to the Dutch and they doubted if the British would gain much benefit from it, because the flourishing of that free-trade port would be largely dependent on Dutch trade policy. The more Holland, so the negotiators argued, would facilitate trade in its own ports, the smaller would be the share of the East Indian trade which Singapore would draw. This argument however was rather out of touch with the actual state of affairs in the Indies, where the Dutch, because of their uncompetitive position, would be forced rather towards protection than free-trade. As Van der Capellen wrote in 1825:

"...Here we are less enthusiastic about the treaty of March 1824 than one appears to be in the Netherlands, and also (we are less enthusiastic) about our acquisitions in Sumatra, which will press heavily on our finances, while Sinkapoor (Singapore) has not changed in importance since all I have written about it from 1819 onwards. But that does not appear to have aroused one's curiosity, as the Estates-General have not even requested the tabling of the correspondence on this important point................................................................." (87)

(86) Fagel and Falck to Elout, 12th January, 1824. in Ibid. pp.173-178.

(87) Van der Capellen to Falck, 9th April, 1825. in Falck's Gedenkschriften. op.cit. pp.526-527.
The Dutch negotiators pointed out further that Malacca, which for a long time had been a financial burden, would after the British occupation of Singapore, become completely valueless; and although Bencoolen had also proved very costly to the British, the ownership of that territory would mean the disappearance of all other European influence in Sumatra and that consideration should outweigh all other objections.

Elout however was not greatly impressed with the argumentation and the proposals of the Dutch negotiators in London, because he considered that Bencoolen was not enough in exchange for Malacca and Singapore. Although he agreed that a determination of the two countries' spheres of influence was a desirable thing, he added that such an arrangement should be clearly circumscribed and apart from the Straits of Malacca also the rest of the archipelago should be included in the attempt to demarcate British and Dutch political influence. He cited Borneo in this regard and also Billiton.

Agreement on territorial exchange was finally reached and a treaty was signed by the two countries on 17th March, 1824. The first seven articles of the treaty dealt with commerce and trade and apart from the stipulation that duties in the respective colonies were not to be higher than double

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(88) Fagel and Falck to Elout, 12th January, 1824 in Elout's Bijdragen op cit. pp.176-177.

those levied on national goods and ships, they confirmed the principles agrees upon at the discussions in 1820. But in addition: the Netherlands ceded to Britain: Malacca, Singapore, the factories in India, while undertaking not to interfere politically in the Malayan Peninsula. On the other hand Britain ceded to Holland: Bencoolen cum annexis, Billiton, Riouw and the Carimons, while undertaking to refrain from making any settlements or concluding any treaties in Sumatra. Furthermore in regard to Achin, where Raffles had concluded a treaty in 1819, Holland agreed not to interfere politically in that territory, while England would change its treaty with Achin, which was exclusive, into an agreement for the friendly reception of British ships. Another important clause in the treaty was the stipulation that the territories which had been ceded under the terms of the treaty could not be surrendered to a third power. If abandoned, then those territories would come automatically in the possession of the other party.

Sir Charles Forbes, who called the British and the Dutch equally rapacious, described the treaty of 1824 well when he termed it a "division of spoil."

(90) See page: 53.
(91) Full text of treaty in Elout's Bijdragen, op.cit. pp.222-234.
SECTION II
THE EXTENSION OF DUTCH INFLUENCE ON THE WEST-COAST
OF SUMATRA: 1819-1830.

Sumatra in the first quarter of the nineteenth century
was not a political unity, but consisted of a number of
different states and communities some of which were independ­
ant, while others were dependencies of other Indonesian or of
European powers.

The sole binding element between those diverse nations and
communities was a similarity in religion and language. The
Mohammedan religion had by this time spread through most of
Sumatra, although with the notable exception of the Batta
tribes in the Northern part of the island and smaller pockets
in the interior. Also various dialects of the Malay language
were spoken in Southern and Eastern Sumatra, in the interior
(Minangkabau), and in the coastal districts, but the major
exception again were the Battas and also the Achinese at the
Northern tip of the island, who belonged to a different
linguistic and racial group.

The population of Sumatra at the beginning of the nine­
teenth century has been estimated roughly at seven million
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(1) Blink, H. "Opkomst en ontwikkeling van Sumatra als
economisch-geographisch gebied." s'Gravenhage, Mouton,
1926. p.35.
The coastal fringes of the island were generally inhabited by the so-called Coastal Malays, Chinese and Arabs and a small number of Europeans, who were nearly all engaged in carrying on trade with the peoples of the interior.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Dutch and the English had occupied a number of points at the West-Coast, while at the East-coast the Dutch had an establishment at Palembang and had also concluded commercial treaties with the sultanates of Djambi and Siak. The political influence, however, of the Europeans had never extended any further than their coastal establishments, from where they carried on trade with the interior.

While the Dutch in the period 1816-1824, as was pointed out, in the previous section, were mainly interested in Sumatra because of its strategic importance, soon after returning to Padang in 1819, they attempted to extend their political influence into the hinterland of Padang i.e. Minangkabau. An investigation as to why and how the Dutch attempted to establish their authority in Minangkabau during the period 1819-1830, forms the substance of this Section.

The land of Minangkabau is situated in Western Sumatra in the centre of the mountain range (Bukit Barisan), which

(2) The English had establishments at Bencoolen, Natal and Tapamulli, while the Dutch had posts at Padang, Ajer Bangis and Baros.
divides the island from North to South. Minangkabau Proper consisted of the regions of Tanah Datar, Agam and Lima Puluh Kota (Fifty Towns), from where the Minangkabaus had spread to the North as far as the Batta lands, and Eastwards into the upper basins of the Siak and Kampar rivers, and even as far as the Malayan Peninsula, where in the fifteenth century they had established a number of colonies (Negri Sembilan). Southwards the Minangkabaus had migrated into Korintji and Indrapura.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth century the Minangkabau dynasty had established its hegemony over the whole of central

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(4) Note: Minangkabau kingship was in fact exercised by a triumvirate; each of those princes enjoyed equal prestige and had been assigned a defined field of authority. The Radjo alam (ruler of the world), who resided at Pagerrujong presided over political affairs and was also the last source of appeal in disputes about non-political matters. The second prince was the Radjo Adat, who resided at Buo and who exercised the highest authority in legal matters, while the Radjo Ibadat at Sumpu Kudus was in charge of religious affairs. Those three princes were advised by four nobles of the realm: the Bandaharo of Sungai Tarap, who was in charge of the Southern regions of the West-Coast; the Tuan Kali of Padang Ganting who took care of the Batang Hari districts; the Mangkudum of Sumani, who handled the affairs of the colonies in Malaya (Negri Sembilan); and the Indomo of Surcoaso, who was in charge of the Northern districts of the West-Coast. Those four nobles carried the title of Datu Pamuntja and were allowed to wear the colours of the realm and to levy taxes in their districts. All matters which arose were first brought before these four councillors, but if no agreement could be reached then the matter was referred to the princes at Buo or Sumpu Kudus. If still no solution could be found then the dispute was referred for final decision to the Radjo Alam at Pagerrujong. Source: Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Oost-Indie, vol. 2., 1918. article on Minangkabau pp.738-740.
Sumatra and it controlled the ports of Padang, Bencoolen, Priaman and Indrapura at the West-Coast and Palembang, Djambi, Indragiri, and Siak at the East Coast. But by the time the Dutch arrived in Sumatra in the seventeenth century, the authority of the Minangkabau princes had dwindled down considerably and their power did not extend much further than Minangkabau Proper. Achin, a principality in Northern Sumatra had taken over the control of a large tract of the Western seaboard; and Palembang, Siak and Djambi had become independent, although those sultanates still looked for a considerable time to the House of Minangkabau with a mystic veneration and considered it as a "primus inter pares". (5)

Kingship, however, was a foreign imposition, which had not succeeded in supplanting the originally democratic political structure of Minangkabau; and in fact the political functions of the Minangkabau princes had never meant much more than to act as mediators in the ever recurring disputes between the many independent political units (nagari) which made up the realm of Minangkabau. The authority of the

(5) Note: Raffles had tried to speculate on this "mystic veneration", when in 1818 he concluded a treaty with the "emperor" of Minangkabau, which he thought would facilitate the execution of his plan to bring the whole of Sumatra under British influence. See Bastin "..Native policies.. Raffles.." op.cit. pp.137-138.

(6) The dynasty was of Hindu origin.
Minangkabau princes was completely dependant on the goodwill of the people, because they had no army to enforce their regulations, nor had they sufficient wealth to recruit one:

"...They were kings without soldiers: the poorest pretense of monarchs the world has known. With their disappearance, the actual government of the negari (nagari) went on quite as before............."(7)

There was no central sovereign power in Minangkabau, but political authority was exercised by the representatives of a number of "super-clans" (suku), of which there were originally four. Those suku however, did not live in different regions of the country, but instead small sections of each of those suku had together formed a large number of independant small republics (nagari). Sovereignty however was not vested in those republics as such, but had remained in each of the sections of the various suku of which the nagari was comprised. Furthermore the suku was not only a political entity but also a social unit, which was organized on a matrilineal basis.

The smallest social unit was the djurai i.e. the family, which was headed by the eldest borther (mamma) of the eldest woman in the house. A number of djurai constituted a kampueng (clan)

i.e. a group of people descended from the one common female ancestor; and in charge of a kampueng was a panghulu, who was chosen from the male relatives of the oldest woman of the lineage. A number of kampuengs finally made up the suku, at the head of which usually the panghulu of the oldest kampueng was placed. It should be added that office bearers were not only selected on account of their seniority in the clan, but also because of their capabilities in performing their office satisfactorily; and a representative had to be healthy, both physically and mentally; law-abiding; sensible; and trustworthy. The nagari then was administered by a council comprised of the representatives of the respective suku in the community. Although the council had executive power it could not initiate legislation nor make laws; and its function was largely advisory as it was concerned only to interpret the law which had been laid down in the adat and the Mohammedan code.

(8) Adat originally meant custom, tradition, legend, but it came to mean to the Indonesian the nature of things in the sense of our expression "second nature". Adat could be described as the constitutional basis of indigenous life, but it should not be seen as a completely rigid set of rules. Adat is a living thing, which gradually changes according to the need of society, as is apparent from the following indigenous classification of the adat:

1) Adat nan sabana adat i.e. true adat or what has been received from the Prophet in the Qu'ran;
2) adat nan di adatkan i.e. adat which has been originally given;
3) adatnan taradat, i.e. adat which has gradually grown;
4) adat istiadat i.e. adat which has become invalid.


According to tradition Minangkabau adat (adat nan di adat-kan) originated from two famous law givers, Karumanggungan, (Contd.)
All decisions however had to be arrived at unanimously, nor could leaders of lower rank such as mamma's and panghulus act on their own account, because anything they did needed the unanimous approbation of the djurai and kampueng respectively. Sovereignty therefore remained vested in the family unit and probably a more democratic system, in the true sense of the word, could not be devised, as minorities could not be tyrannized by majorities. On the other hand under such a system of government many disputes were liable to arise and it was the function of the Minangkabau dynasty to mediate. Apart from the ties of race, language and kinship the Minangkabau dynasty was the sole external factor which gave to this agglomeration of small independant republics a certain degree of unity.

The conversion of Minangkabau to Islam is thought to have commenced in the middle of the sixteenth century, i.e. in the period when the Sufi movement was an important element in the discussion.

(8) cont'd.

who was more autocratic in his views, and Parapatih, who was more democratic minded. Therefore two distinct adat-systems came about and the four original suku were bi-partitioned into two laras (adat-systems) called Koto-Piliang and Bodi-Tjaniago. A nagari belonging to the Koto-Piliang system has more democratic features e.g. the floor of the council hall (balai) is level as an indication that all the representatives are equal in status; and more scope is given to the principle of discussion and election. In a nagari adhering to the Bodi-Tjaniago system some of the representatives sit on a dais in the balai, while the existing office bearers have some say in the appointment of their successors.

Source: Josselin de Jong "Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan" op.cit. pp.71-75.
in Islamic civilization. In contrast to the earlier traditions of Islamic teaching, which emphasized the relation of God to His creation and what man had to do in order to be saved, the Sufi were concerned to show how the ultimate goal could be reached. Mysticism was an integral element of the Sufi systems and many mystical orders (tarikas) sprang up, some of which still exist to-day in the Muslim world, including Indonesia. What is important in this context is that the Sufis absorbed many non-Islamic elements in their teachings and:

"....it is possible to characterize the Sufis as they presented themselves to the Indonesians as follows: they were peripatetic preachers ranging over the whole known world, voluntarily espousing poverty; they were frequently associated with trade or craft guilds according to the order (tarika) to which they belonged; they taught a complex syncretic theosophy largely familiar to the Indonesians, but which was subordinate to, although an enlargement of the fundamental dogmas of Islam; they were proficient in magic and possessed powers of healing; and not least, consciously or unconsciously, they were prepared to preserve continuity with the past, and to use the terms and elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamic context............................................(9)"

Islam modified the spirit of indigenous life and thinking, but it did not overthrow the established social and political order. The Muslim religious teachers became part of Minangkabau

society and participated in the discussions of the council meetings alongside the adat-chiefs, but they had no power of compulsion either in religious or political matters. The balance between Islam and adat is expressed in such proverbs as:

"the shara states the law, adat puts it into effect"

and

"the shara is naked, adat is its covering..........."

During the eighteenth century a sect of fanatic puritans, the Wahabites appeared in Arabia; and their teachings spread also to India and Indonesia, where they seem to have made a special impact on the religious teachers of Minangkabau, and were the cause of a fierce and devastating civil war.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century three religious teachers returned from Mecca to Minangkabau: Hadji Miskin, Hadji Piobang, and Hadji Sumanik, who under the influence of Wahabi doctrine embarked upon a reformation of morals and religion in Minangkabau. When Hadji Miskin on his return

(10) The Wahabites wanted a return to the early teachings of the Qu'ran; and anything which had since accrued to the body of Islamic teachings was classed as heretical and as detracting from the worship of Allah. Veneration of the saints and holy men of Islam and the mysticism of the Sufis was condemned and had to be eradicated. Institutional religion according to the Qu'ran was introduced often by fire and sword; and the shaving of beards, the smoking of tobacco were forbidden, while alms had to be given on secret profits such as those on trading.

to Pandai Sike in the region of Agam tried to induce the people to adopt a stricter observance of the faith and to refrain from indulging in cockfighting, tobacco and opium smoking and the use of alcohol, vices which were prevalent among the Minangkabaus, he struck a great deal of opposition and was eventually forced to flee. During his exile he met Tuanku nan Rintji of Kamang, who was impressed by his teachings and concluded an alliance with seven other Tuankus in Agam, which came to be called "harimau nan selapan" or the "eight tigers"; Nan Rintji then commenced to "convert" the region of Agam by fire and sword.

In Tanah Datar the reform movement was headed by Tuanku Passaman, later better known as Tuanku Lintau, who i.a. introduced regulations as to the kind of dress the reformers had to wear i.e.: a white dress reaching to the ankles and a white turban. From this practice came the name orang putih (men in white) as distinct from the opposition party the orang hitam (men in black). Other terms used are orang muda (young or new men) and orang tua (old, conservative men). A more common term used in the literature is that of Padris, which probably denotes "man from Pedir" in Northern Sumatra from where Islam originally spread Southwards.

Another Padri stronghold was Bondjol in Alahan Pandjang, which under the leadership of Tuanku Imam Bondjol held out till 1837 against the Dutch drive to subdue the Padri held regions of Minangkabau.

The moral reforms which the Padris attempted to introduce caused a great deal of dissatisfaction and in some instances they interfered with the adat; e.g. cockfighting, which the Padris wanted to abolish was part of the ritual of house building, harvest festivals and even marriage ceremonies; and as a Minangkabau proverb said: each nagari should be provided with a council hall, a mosque, pathways, a bathing-place and cock fight pit. But the Padri movement was far more than an attempt at moral reform, because it cut much deeper into the traditional social and political structure of Minangkabau. There were two features in Minangkabau society, i.e. matriarchy and the suku system of government, which especially conflicted with the Muslim law, to which the Padris strictly adhered; and therefore they introduced, wherever they extended their influence, a pattern of Islamic government, appointing imams (theocratic rulers) and kadis (judges), who often replaced the traditional adat-leaders. It was especially this revolutionary aspect of the Padri movement, which caused a great deal of fierce opposition.

(12) Josselin de Jong "Minangkabau..." op. cit. p.78.
from most of the Minangkabaus who through the whole of their history had been strongly adat-conscious. But when the Padris initially did not make much headway, some of their leaders resorted to terrorizing practices in order to reach their goal; and soon the whole country was in the grip of a relentless civil war. One account by a moderate Padri adherent about the beginning of the civil war in the district of IV Angkat in Agam, commences as follows:

"I, Fakih Saghar, am full of burning desire to extend the faith; I am full of inexpressable joy when the numbers of believers increase. Therefore the desire took hold of me to dissuade the people from staging cockfights, the drinking of toeak and of all the actions which are not allowed by God and the prophet of God............................................"

But, so the story continues, the people were opposed to the introduction of a stricter observance and they broke into the mesdjid (mosque) and plundered it. But when later some Padris came to stop a cockfight and the people became very menacing causing the reformers to take flight, Fakih Saghar told his men:

(13) Note: While most of the tuankus (religious teachers) of Minangkabau wanted to introduce a stricter observance of the faith; not all of them agreed with the terrorizing methods used by Nan Rintji and his followers. Tuanku Nan Tua one of the most prominent religious teachers in Minangkabau, at whose feet many of the Padri leaders had sat, disapproved strongly of the murdering tactics of his pupils and advocated the peaceful introduction of the purified religion by means of preaching and example. Source: Account of Fakih Saghar in De Stuers "De Vestiging en uitbreiding der Nederlanders ter Westkust van Sumatra." vol. 2. Bijlagen, 246-251.
"...if we do not fight now, then our shame will never be expiated and will stain our children and grand children. Therefore let us commence firing. Perhaps the enemy will be wounded in vengeance for the destroyed mesjid. Then I fired. God ruled that a man from Bukit Belabuh was mortally wounded and another one was killed by my men. From that day onwards the war flared up with great force. Much commotion, envy, treason and enmity came about. Hate flamed up between brothers and sisters and between parents and children."

The following quotation from Fakih Saghar’s account is an illustration of what most Minangkabaus probably felt about the Padris:

"...we have to kill Fakih Saghir; because his intentions are not pure in the furthering of religion, but he feels upset about the destruction of the mesjid; he wants to show off his wisdom and show that he is above us; he is destroying us and is despoiling our customs and traditions, and making our land unhappy. We never saw the tuankus of former days act like this, but this is only done by their children." (14)

Initially Tanah Datar, where a great number of the adat-party had fled, managed to repulse the attacks of the Padris, but eventually also most of this region was conquered by the reformers. Tuanku Lintau then called a meeting of all the nobles and adat-chiefs at Kota Tenga, where he openly accused a number of nobles of immorality and godlessness and then had them killed on the spot. A general bloodbath ensued, from

(14) "Account of Fakih Saghir" in De Stuers "Vestiging..." op. cit. pp. 243-246.
which only a few of the nobility escaped, including the Radjo Alam of Minangkabau, Jang di Pertuan Radja Muning, who fled to Djambi. Thus after having conquered nearly the whole of the country, the Padris tried to complete their revolution by extinguishing the Minangkabau dynasty, which as we have seen, was the only external factor keeping the many Minangkabau republics together.

When nearly the whole of Minangkabau had come under the rule of the Padris and the civil war had practically ended, a third force appeared on the scene: the Dutch, who soon after their return to Padang in 1819 tried to drive the Padris out of Minangkabau and to bolster the power of the adat-party. This was a new development, because the Dutch never had any direct dealings with Minangkabau before; and the direct political influence of the Dutch East India Company had never extended any further than the narrow strip of territory situated between the Bukit Barisan and the sea. There the Company had erected a number of fortified posts such as those at Padang, Priaman and Ajer Bangis, where it traded such commodities as textiles, ironware, and salt in exchange for pepper, gold, benzoin and other produce, which was brought down from the interior by indigenous, Chinese or Arab traders.

Nor had the British, who had been in control of the Dutch posts at the West Coast since 1795, made any attempts to extend
their influence beyond the narrow coastal strip; or at least not till Raffles arrived in Sumatra in 1818. Raffles was probably the first European to enter into the till then rather mysterious land of Minangkabau; in July, 1818 he had journeyed into Minangkabau, ostensibly on a scientific mission, but in fact in an attempt to extend British influence there in order to render the port of Padang useless to the Dutch, if they eventually returned there. Raffles had concluded a treaty with the "emperor" of Minangkabau and at the request of the people he had left a British garrison behind at Samawang near Lake Sinkara as a protection against the Padris, with whom he had not been able to come to terms. However, the British garrison at Samawang was withdrawn after Raffles' plans for Sumatra had been disapproved by his superiors.

Initially, the Dutch, who had returned to Padang on 17th May, 1819, had no intention of following Raffles' example and extend their authority into the interior of the island. The

(16) Kielstra, E.B. "Sumatra's Westkust van 1819-1825." in Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlands-Indie, 1887, p. 12. Note: Any further references to this source will be indicated by: Kielstra I.
(17) See Section I, p. 36.
Dutch Resident, Du Puy, reported soon after his arrival that at that time there was not much to be feared from Raffles in the interior, as the British troops had been withdrawn from Samawang; and although he had not been able to ascertain the exact intentions of Raffles' moves in Minangkabau, so much was clear that they had not been "the friendliest towards the Netherlands government"; furthermore he had sent a fact-finding commission to Minangkabau and he intended to consult with the military commander of Padang about the necessity of establishing a Dutch garrison at Samawang. But in another despatch dated the same day, Du Puy advised that the post at Samawang should be occupied and also that the garrison of Padang needed reinforcements, because of the dangers posed by a fanatical sect called the Padris.

However, the Batavian government was not impressed by the arguments of Du Puy nor was it eager to extend its control into the interior, considering the difficulties which it faced.

(18) Note: Du Puy, James; English born; entered the British administration of Java in 1812; in 1816 went over into the Dutch colonial service. Because of his previous relations with Raffles, he was appointed to the "trouble spot" of Padang. See Kielstra I, p.14.


(20) Du Puy to Batavia, 15th June, 1819. Quoted in Kielstra I., op.cit. p.23.
already had to cope with in Palembang, Borneo and the Celebes; and it replied that to divide the small military force, which was available at the West-Coast, would endanger the safety of all the Dutch possessions there, while it could not see any reasons why the garrison of Padang should be reinforced.

Chassé, who had been head-merchant of the Company at Padang from 1792-1794 and on whom the Batavian government at that time depended for advice on the affairs of the West-Coast of

(21) Note: The sultan of Palembang had rebelled against the Dutch in 1818 and had repulsed an expedition from Java in 1819; Palembang remained virtually independent till 1821, when a large Dutch force (2580 men and 414 guns) finally captured the town's fortresses and the sultan was deposed. The new sultan however also schemed against the Dutch and in 1825 Palembang became government territory i.e. under the direct administration of Dutch officials.

In Borneo where the Dutch had concluded treaties in 1818, the Chinese kongsis refused to submit to increased poll-taxes and increased indirect taxation (opium and salt); the sultans were too weak to assert themselves and in 1821 a Dutch expedition was sent, but it took till 1825 before order was restored.

In the Celebes the principality of Boni had already defied the government during the British regime. The Dutch on their return were engaged in a practically continuous struggle of more than forty years to maintain their authority in Southern Celebes.


Sumatra, was of the opinion that Raffles had meant the post at Samawang as a point of departure for British penetration into Minangkabau; and therefore that post was not suited for the defence of Padang, because if it proved to be too strong then the enemy would by-pass it and pour into the Lowlands. To interfere, so Chasse continued, in the Minangkabau civil war would be "a vain misuse of people, money and war-material."

Although it seems quite certain that the Batavian government would have preferred to take the advice of Chasse, the circumstances at the West-Coast had changed considerably since pre-war days and forced the government to take a different course of action; and in September, 1820 it decided to interfere in Minangkabau on the side of the weaker party i.e. the adat-chiefs. A number of reasons for this decision can be ascertained.

Firstly there was the fear, as expressed by Du Puy, of a Padri attack on the Dutch posts at the coast; and this fear was not altogether without ground, as in fact during the British regime the Padris had attempted to sack Padang and had only been repelled after reinforcements from Bencoolen

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(23) Note: The Dutch usually termed the coastal strip around Padang as the Padang Lowlands and Minangkabau as the Padang Highlands.


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(26) had been called in, while on other occasions the British authorities had kept the Padris at bay by buying them off. But the apprehension of the Resident appears to be somewhat exaggerated, considering that there is no evidence that the Padris planned or actually did attack the Dutch posts during the fifteen months it took the Batavian government before it decided to take action in Minangkabau. Most probably the anxiety of the resident was caused by the highly coloured reports about the situation in Minangkabau given to him by a number of emigré Minangkabau adat-chiefs, who had fled to Padang. Those emigrés had already during the British administration pressed the authorities to interfere on their behalf in the Minangkabau civil war, but until the arrival of Raffles without success. Raffles during his journey into the interior in 1818 had been accompanied by two Minangkabau nobles, two Tuankus of Suroasso, who were probably related to the Indomo of Suroasso, one of the councillors to the (28) Minangkabau dynasty. Raffles actually had taken the side of the adat-party when he concluded a treaty with the remainder of the Minangkabau dynasty, by means of which he planned to bring a large part of Sumatra under British control. On his

(28) See p.59. note (4).
(29) See Section I, p. 36
return from Minangkabau he had called the two Tuankus of Suroasso to Bencoolen where they were considered as representatives of the Minangkabau Court and were given a monthly allowance. However, soon after the return of the Dutch the two Tuankus appeared in Padang and the Batavian government approved a request of Du Puy to grant them a monthly remittance because it was considered that those two princes might be useful to the government if it ever decided to invade Minangkabau.

Soon after, the two Tuankus of Suroasso accompanied by a detachment of soldiers were sent to Minangkabau on a fact-finding mission; and it was largely on the report of this mission that Du Puy based his appraisal of the situation in Minangkabau.

Although Du Puy, as he reported to the government during a visit to Batavia in August, 1820, had so far not given in to the overtures of the adat-party and had refrained from giving military assistance, he pointed out to the Batavian authorities that he had held out some hope to them of government assistance in the future, fearing that otherwise they might approach the British. Leaving aside the question of how much

(32) Ibid.
Du Puy's apprehension of the British was founded, it should be noted that Dutch suspicion of Raffles was still very real; and this was especially so after Raffles had refused to cede the old Dutch post of Ajer Bangis to the North of Padang, on the grounds that this establishment had been abandoned by the Dutch East India Company before 1795. Furthermore the official disavowal of Raffles both by the Calcutta and London governments were taken rather sceptically by the Batavian government, when the British steadily refused to abandon Raffles' settlement at Singapore. As van der Capellen reported to the Hague in 1820:

"...now everything is quiet (in Padang), although the neighbourhood of Bencoolen does not hold out hope for a continuous peace, as long as the government there remains in the hands of a man who will leave nothing untouched to put the Dutch government in an unfavourable light and to create enemies against her........" (34)

Dutch suspicion of British plans in regard to Sumatra is still quite noticeable as late as 1824, when Muntinghe, commenting on the proceedings of the Anglo-Dutch negotiations, was of the opinion that the English would never leave the whole of Sumatra within the Dutch sphere of influence; and he expected that the Dutch requests for the whole of Sumatra would be

(33) Kielstra I, p.16. Note: The question of Ajer Bangis was only finally settled at the treaty of 1824, when that establishment together with all the other British posts in Sumatra were ceded to the Dutch.

(34) Van der Capellen to the Hague, 1st March, 1820. quot. Deventer "Gezag.." op.cit. p.301.
countered by the British contention that they considered such states as Minangkabau, Siak, Djambi and Indragiri as independent and that they therefore had no jurisdiction in the matter. The Dutch negotiators at the Anglo-Dutch talks in London in 1824 went as far as to blame the difficulties with the Padris solely on the machinations of Raffles.

But in addition to his fears of British intervention in the affairs of Minangkabau, the Resident of Padang urged the Batavian government to establish close relations with that country on a number of other grounds. The incursions and the pillaging of the Padris, so Du Puy argued, had brought indigenous economic life nearly to a standstill; production had decreased considerably and the flow of trade from the interior districts to the West-Coast, which was so vital to the prosperity of the Dutch establishments there, had become a mere trickle. The government therefore should interfere in Minangkabau and restore peace and order there; and in doing so it would not only safeguard the security of its coastal possessions but also their prosperity. Furthermore, so the Resident assured the Batavian government, it would add an extensive, populous and fertile region to its territory. But there were two further points of information given by Du Puy,

(36) Fagel and Falck to Reinhold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 12th January, 1824. in "Elout's Bijdragen..." op.cit.p.176.
which probably turned the scale in favour of intervention there and then, when he told the government that a comm-
ission which he had sent to Minangkabau had reported firstly
that the adat-chiefs were willing to cede their territory to
the Netherlands government in exchange for protection against
the Padris, and secondly that the Minangkabau people were
expected to rise immediately against the hated Padris when
the Dutch troops would arrive in the country.

At any rate the Batavian government was apparently quite
impressed by the arguments of the Resident and it authorized
him:

"...if at his return (to Padang) nothing to the contrary
had happened, to conclude with the heads of the interior
districts treaties on the basis of surrender to and
occupation by the government of their territory, and
the establishment of a military post at Samawang or
elsewhere, consisting of a hundred men and a few pieces
of artillery, in order to protect the inhabitants
against the Padris and to restore peace and order in
the highlands............................................" (39)

In addition the reported willingness of the Minangkabaus to
cede their country to the Dutch and to rise against the Padris,
was seen by the Batavian government as a favourable condition
for reaching at comparatively little cost its main objective

(37) See p. 76 para. 1.
(38) Du Puy to the Batavian Government, 11th August, 1820.
(39) Resolution of Governor-General in Council, 11th September,
in interfering: i.e. the restoration of peace and order in Minangkabau, which was a pre-requisite to the prosperity of Padang and the other Dutch possessions at the coast. It should be noted that exploitation for the benefit of the mother-country was generally accepted at the time as the sole raison d'être of colonies; and therefore anything which interfered with that major objective would be considered as very serious by the colonial authorities. Consequently, in order to understand the Batavian government's concern about the prosperity of Padang, it should be seen in the wider context of general Dutch economic policy in the Indies; and a digression on the general economic situation especially in Java seems therefore necessary at this point.

The Dutch on their return to Java in 1816 tried to increase the output of export commodities as much as possible in order to put the financial and economic structure of the country on a sound basis; and also in order to repay the considerable debt which the Netherlands government had taken over from the bankrupt East India Company at the beginning of the century. However, a fundamental problem which had to be solved was the unwillingness of the Javanese farmers to produce for the European export market. But while the Dutch East India Company had overcome this difficulty by the introduction of a system of forced deliveries of a number of
specified products such as coffee, the re-introduction of a similar system conflicted with the "liberal" ideas of colonial policy which were prevalent in government circles at the time. It was therefore decided to extend and modify the land rent system, which had been introduced by Raffles in a number of districts in Java. Under this system the government considered itself as the owner of the soil, which it rented out to the farmers, who could produce what they liked and could pay their rent in kind or in money. But in order to ensure a steady amount of government revenue during the switchover to the land rent system, the Batavian authorities decided, as Raffles had done, to continue, despite their liberal principles, the system of forced deliveries in the important coffee producing areas of the Preanger (West-Java) and the Minahassa (North Celebes). Coffee at that time was the most lucrative Indonesian export product and its price had increased from 7.50 dollars per picul in 1816 to 20.00 dollars per picul in 1818. But in addition coffee was very important to the Treasury and e.g. in 1818 accounted for about half of government revenue; and although this proportion had declined to about one-third of the total in 1823, coffee remained the mainstay of government financial stability.

(40) Welderen Rengers "Failure.." op.cit. pp.60-68.
(41) Gonggrijp, G "Schets ener economische geshiedenis van Indonesie", Haarlem, Bohn, 1957. p.67
(42) Welderen Rengers "Failure.." op.cit. p.81.
Another experiment tried by the government in order to raise the output of agricultural commodities for export, was the leasing of virgin lands to European planters; and to safeguard the interests of the indigenous population a regulation issued in 1818 restricted such leases to virgin soil, forbidding the renting of communal lands and the buying of villages and seignorial rights from Javanese nobles. Planters however sidestepped those regulations by concentrating their holdings in the semi-independent principalities of Djocjakarta and Surakarta, where they rented large tracts of soil, villages and their manpower included, from the Javanese princes. Subsequently Governor General van der Capellen decided in 1823 to abandon the system of granting leases to private enterprise for various reasons. Firstly he appears to have been genuinely concerned about the alleged bad treatment of the Javanese villagers by European planters in the Principalities; secondly the settlement of Europeans in the Principalities where they might obtain political power was considered an obstacle to the government's plan to bring those regions under its direct control; furthermore the government viewed the competition to its own coffee by that produced on private estates as a threat to its financial stability.

But the failure of this experiment together with a fall in coffee prices and bad financial management generally, was

(43) Ibid. pp. 80-81.
responsible for the financial difficulties the Batavian government found itself at the beginning of the twenties. This financial embarrassment was increased even more by the costly expeditions which had to be sent to many points in the Outer-Possessions, many of which proved to be a loss financially; and as van der Capellen wrote in 1820:

"...as well as things keep going in general in our beautiful Java, the more sorrowful I am lately about nearly all our Outer-establishments. Financially everything is disappointing." (44)

However, the government's opinion of Padang seemed to be more hopeful; and already in 1818 Elout had pointed out that Padang was an important possession, because of its coffee production, while van der Capellen commenting on a proposal by Palmer, a British merchant, to exchange Padang for Bencoolen, was of the opinion that:

"...Bencoolen itself is worthless and is only important for us because of its closeness to our other possessions. Padang, so far as I know, is an important establishment capable of improvement." (45)

It was the promise of profitability and especially its coffee potential which made the Batavian government consider Padang

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(44) Van der Capellen to The Hague, 22nd February, 1820. in Falck's Gedenkschriften. op.cit. p.493.

(45) Elout to Goldberg, 10th May, 1818. in Deventer "Gezag..." op.cit. p.244.

as an important establishment. Du Puy had reported in 1819 that government income at Padang consisted of the sale of opium, arak and of customs revenue, but that it was especially the latter which showed a great deal of promise, because of the rise in coffee production. In 1818 exports of coffee had reached 6000 piculs and this figure was expected to increase 12-15,000 piculs in 1819 and double that amount in the following years, providing the high coffee prices were maintained on the world market. Direct taxation did not exist, so the Resident further reported, but in regard to indirect taxation he was of the opinion that a salt monopoly would be the most profitable tax, as great quantities of that commodity were imported into Padang.

The Batavian government, however, was keen to develop Padang into a paying proposition as soon as possible; and it instructed Du Puy to carry out a more thorough investigation into taxation and to report which taxes he considered could be introduced in Padang and its dependencies. But Du Puy replied that he was sure that the population of the West-Coast was as yet too uncivilized and too poor to bear any taxation of any importance. The state of agriculture was far from advanced and it was only coffee from which the

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people in some district gained some benefit. In another despatch of a few days later the Resident was somewhat more explicit about the possibilities of coffee as a source of government revenue. The Resident thought that if the proper measures were taken, coffee cultivation could be introduced throughout the whole of the residency; and as coffee was the only agricultural commodity from which any advantage could be expected around Padang, its production should be encouraged. But the manner in which the output of coffee should be increased the Resident left for the government to decide, although he was of the opinion that as coffee production had sprung up spontaneously it should be left free, providing the whole crop was marketed at Padang; and therefore an annual census of production should be introduced in order to check on any smuggling to Bencoolen or elsewhere.

However, the great interest shown by the Batavian government in the coffee potential of the West-Coast of Sumatra should be seen in the light of its financial difficulties in Java and the generally disappointing results in the other Outer Establishments. It is not surprising therefore that the Batavian government set aside its general objections to expanding its authority in the Outer Possessions, in order to ensure

(49) Du Puy to Batavia, 14th August, 1820, in Ibid. p. 281.
that the chance of Padang becoming a paying proposition and a source of future wealth would not be adversely affected either by British interference or by internal disruption.

But apart from the all important economic motive and the fear of the British, it should also be pointed out that the anti-Padri attitude of the Dutch was in keeping with their traditional hostility towards any fanatical religious movements, which tried to curb the power of the indigenous princes, through which the Dutch actually ruled. The Dutch East India Company in the past had supported the secular rulers against the attacks of fanatical Muslims, who had become dissatisfied with the pomp and splendour and the worldliness of the princely courts. This policy of combatting Muslim fanaticism and of supporting the indigenous political structure through which the Dutch exerted their influence was not changed after the fall of the Company; and Muntinghe even suggested that the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 should incorporate a clause obliging the two governments to co-operate:

"...to make the pilgrimages to Mecca difficult, to weaken and gradually undermine the Mahommedan faith." (52)


In accordance with the resolution of the Batavian government (53) of 11th September, 1820, Du Puy went ahead and on 10th February, 1821 he concluded a treaty with a number of Minangkabau chiefs, who as the treaty describes, were deputed by all the heads of the country. In the treaty the whole of the realm of Minangkabau was formally ceded to the Netherlands government, which undertook to protect the inhabitants against the Padris and to restore peace and order. The government also undertook not to interfere with the adat. It seems hardly possible that such a small number of chiefs could have had the authority to cede the whole of Minangkabau, considering the political structure of the country, which consisted of a great number of political jurisdictions. The rather cynical remarks of De Stuers, who was Resident of Padang from 1825-1829, are quite to the point: the people who signed the treaty, so De Stuers argued, were desperate and had nothing to lose, but everything to gain. The signatories who were deputies could only have agreed to a preliminary draft, which according to the adat had to be approved unanimously by every single head in the country. But so De Stuers continued:

(53) See p. 79.

by the illusion of the so-called formal cession of the country and the high sounding and imaginative name of the realm of Minangkabau ... one soon fell for the dream, which did not seem impossible to realize, of subjecting the whole of the country to the authority of the government 

At any rate the treaty soon proved to be a dead letter, because the conditions upon which it was based hardly existed. When on 28th February the post at Samawang was occupied by a hundred soldiers the heads of the ceded districts immediately requested that a number of villages around the Dutch post, which were Padri controlled, should be attacked and burned forthwith. But the Resident advised that those villages were to be subjected by peaceful means. Letters which were subsequently sent to the respective village heads requesting them to subject themselves to the Dutch government did not have the desired effect, and Du Puy after consultation with the military commander decided to make a show of strength in order to intimidate the Padris. On 28th April, Captain Goffinet attacked the village of Sulitajer without provocation, but the Padris put up such a fierce resistance that the place only fell two days later. This rather hasty action by the Dutch started off a war with the formidable Padris, which would last for more than twenty years. Despite the strong opposition which he had encountered at Sulitajer, Captain Goffinet did not

(55) De Stuers to Batavia, 30th August, 1825. in Kielstra I. p.130.
seem unduly perturbed about the military threat of the Padris; and he was of the opinion that with another fifty soldiers and another howitzer he would be able to crush Padri resistance even as far as Lintau, which was considered as their main stronghold.  

The Batavian government was very perturbed about the military action, which had taken place in Minangkabau, and it commented rather tersely on the proceedings of Du Puy, who was told that he had apparently overstepped his instructions:

"partly because he had requested the cession of the whole of Minangkabau and partly because he had admitted to the treaty those princes who were fugitives and who had no authority over those territories which they had ceded in the treaty........................................"

Aggressive military action, so Batavia pointed out, was contrary to its intentions which were to act as a protector and not as an aggressor; and it ordered the Resident to avoid as far as possible any military action in the Samawang area, not only because this would give a wrong impression of the government's intentions but also because the safety of such a small garrison, which was so far removed from the coast, was involved. However, the government decided to send reinforcements to Padang, but it instructed the Resident:

"...to find out accurately and without delay about the situation in the interior, and especially if the Padris have taken control of those lands and the whole of the realm of Minangkabau... and to state exactly what advantages the government would gain in driving out the Padris, if they really have conquered the whole of Minangkabau and exercise control there........." (57)

It is evident that the Batavian government did not have the slightest idea about the actual state of affairs in Minangkabau, nor that they believed that the Padris were such a formidable military force. But soon after, when the Padris attacked the Dutch post at Samawang, the government began to realize that it had come into contact with a movement which had far larger resources and military strength than had originally been imagined and with which the then available forces at the West-Coast could not cope. Du Puy and consequently the Batavian government had acted on insufficient intelligence. Since the Resident had never visited the interior personally, the information which he had supplied to the government was largely based on the reports of anti-Padri chiefs; and as was already pointed out before the fact finding commission which Du Puy had sent to Minangkabau had consisted of two Minangkabau princes (Tuankus of Suroasso), who could hardly be expected to be free from bias and to give a true picture of the situation in

(57) Resolution of the Governor-General in Council, 17th September, 1821. quot. Kielstra I, p.34.
the interior. Du Puy, judging by the scanty information he sent to Batavia knew hardly anything about the Padri movement and what the reformers actually stood for. Already in 1818 Raffles had warned the Commissioners-General about the dangers posed by the Padris, but this warning had been dismissed, because those fables of Raffles:

"...could not make a great impression on us, who had heard similar arguments at the take-over of Java, (and) who had been well informed about the unimportance of the so-called trouble in Padang..."

Although it has not been proved possible to find out who informed the government in 1818 about the "unimportance" of the Padri movement, it is certain that the Batavian government definitely underestimated the Padris. In a sense the government blundered into a war with a formidable enemy, owing to the lack of proper intelligence about the local situation; and at a time when it could least afford it, considering the financial difficulties in Java and the many other trouble spots it had to deal with in the rest of the archipelago.

In October, 1821 the Batavian government decided to send Lieutenant-Colonel Raaff with reinforcements to Padang, instruc-

(58) Kemp "Sumatra in 1818" op.cit. p. 76.

(59) a. Raaff Antoine Theodore (1794-1824); born at s'Hertogenbosch (Bois-le-duc); fought as sous-lieutenant in Napoleon's Russian campaign; joined the Dutch colonial army in 1815 and made rapid promotion and was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel in 1821; died from fever at Padang in 1824.

b. The total strength of the Dutch forces on the West-Coast of Sumatra was now brought to 500 officers and men.
ting him that the troops should only be used after consultation with the Resident and after a proper evaluation of the situation in Minangkabau had been made; and the government emphasized that everything possible should be done to come to terms with the Padris in a peaceful way. But Raaff, who arrived in Padang on 8th December, 1821, reported that the military situation in Minangkabau had so deteriorated that there was no other way out than to hit the Padris hard; and that only after they had been sufficiently subdued negotiations should be started. The existing indecisive policy, so Raaff argued, had made the Padris more audacious, while the insufficient protection granted by the Dutch forces to the population had caused many villages to go over to the other side. In contrast however to the views of De Stuers, who was of the opinion that Raaff could have avoided a war with the Padris and could have come to an understanding with them, it seems to me that there was hardly any other way open to Raaff than to start an offensive. It should be pointed out that the Padris who were waging a holy war (perang sabil) had already been provoked a great deal before Raaff arrived; and therefore no reason exists to believe that the reformers would have desisted from attacking the Dutch possessions at this stage.

(61) De Stuers "Vestiging..." op.cit. Deel I, p.59.
From the Padri point of view first Raffles and then the Dutch had openly sided with the degenerated and godless adat-party and they had harboured fugitives in Padang, with whom they had closely co-operated (e.g. the Tuankus of Suroasso). Also the treaty of February, 1821 was obviously directed against the Padris and the subsequent attack on Sulitajer would have certainly dispelled any remaining doubts as to the intentions of the Dutch government. The Padris, however, were at the height of their strength and had occupied the greater part of Minangkabau; and they would never have let the Dutch, the unbelievers (kafirs) occupy the country without fierce opposition. The Padris, as was pointed out before, were attempting to bring about a complete revolution in Minangkabau and in fact had already established a number of Islamic states, which would resist for as long as they could becoming subject to a non-Islamic (kafir) government.

On the other hand the Batavian government was unwilling to be done out of its "rights" conceded under the treaty of February, 1821; and although it had reprimanded Du Puy about the comprehensiveness of the cession and about the fact that many of the signatories were refugees who had no real authority, there is no evidence in the correspondence that the government ever thought of revoking the treaty. All Batavia seemed to complain about was that those territories, against expectation,
would have to be conquered. Furthermore, although it probably realized that the treaty of February, 1821 was "phoney", it could not withdraw and leave Minangkabau to the Padris, because this would have meant a serious loss of prestige, which was undesirable at a time when Dutch authority was challenged at many points in the Archipelago.

Therefore the insistence of the Dutch on their "rights" to occupy Minangkabau and the nature of the Padri movement, coupled with what had already happened before, made a full scale war inevitable.

But also Raaff was underestimating the military strength of the Padris, as he soon found out, when he started his all out drive against the stronghold of Lintau. Raaff first took his troops along a different route over the mountains into Agam and from there into Tanah Datar; and his plan was to crush the forces of Tuanku Lintau, which if successful, would brake Padri resistance completely, so Raaff thought. But in order to safeguard his supply lines Raaff was forced first to subjugate the VI Kotas in Agam; and this manoeuvre caused the Padris of Bondjol and Rau to the North of Agam who carried on trade with this area, to come to the rescue in great numbers under the leadership of Tuanku Imam Bondjol. Only at the end of 1822 did Raaff feel confident enough to attack the Padri stronghold of Lintau, where Tuanku Lintau had fled after his defeat by the Dutch in Tanah Datar. But the campaign against
Lintau ended in a failure for the Dutch; and owing to his depleted forces Raaff could only resort to mopping up operations in Tanah Datar and he left Lintau alone for the time being. In the beginning of 1823 Raaff, after having received reinforcements from Java, attempted another attack on Lintau, but again the operation ended in failure and the Dutch forces were routed at the strong mountain fortress of Marapalm. Soon after this defeat the Padris of Bondjol with strong forces moved towards the Lowlands, but with the help of the Dutch navy and a manoeuvre by Raaff towards the VI Kottas, this dangerous attack was repelled. Notwithstanding the military difficulties which were experienced, the Batavian government had full trust in the actions of Raaff and Du Puy and by a resolution of 8th April, 1823 the Resident and the military commander of Padang were both commended for the way in which they had furthered the interests of the government on the West-Coast of Sumatra.

But in reply to a request by Raaff and Du Puy for instructions after the setback suffered at Marapalm, the government instructed that Raaff should for the time being remain on the defensive and refrain from attacking Lintau.

Furthermore he was ordered to do everything possible to reinforce the Dutch hold on the territory which had already been conquered, while he should attempt to obtain better and more comprehensive intelligence about the military strength of Lintau; and finally it instructed Raaff to return to Batavia in order to consult with the government about what further action was to be taken in the Padang Highlands.

When Raaff left in September, 1823 for Batavia, he had succeeded in conquering the greater part of Tanah Datar and part of the region of Agam, but his forces were too weak to stage an offensive against that part of Minangkabau which was still under Padri rule. So by 1823 the Dutch had succeeded in establishing a strong foothold in the middle of Minangkabau, but their objective, i.e. the complete defeat of the Padris, was still far from being achieved. The consultations of Raaff with the Batavian government resulted in a confirmation of the earlier instructions to put a temporary stop to the drive against the Padris. Raaff was given reinforcements in order to complete the original strength of his forces; and the government was of the opinion that:

"...his (Raaff's) return to Padang with that show of force would undoubtedly have a beneficial effect on friend and enemy alike... (and)... the peaceful establishment of our authority may therefore be expected." (64)

(63) Resolution of Governor-General in Council, 6th June, 1823 in Kielstra I, pp. 82-83.

(64) Vander Capellen to Minister for Colonies, 4th December, 1823 in Kielstra I, op. cit. p. 104.
While there were strong convictions in government circles in Batavia that the whole of Minangkabau should be conquered forthwith, the decision to assume a defensive attitude should be seen in the context of the financial crisis in Java, which had been latent for a number of years, but which had now come to a head. Van der Capellen had become so financially pressed that he was forced to negotiate for a loan with the House of Palmer and Co. of Calcutta, offering as collateral the colonial revenue and the movable and unmovable property of the Netherlands government in the Indies. Under those circumstances, and especially if Raaff's estimate that another 950 men would be needed for an effective offensive against the Padris is taken into account, the government's decision to temporize becomes more intelligible.

While the Batavian government, as was pointed out previously, was mainly concerned to restore peaceful conditions in Minangkabau in order to safeguard the prosperity of Padang, it did remain hesitant for some time about retaining the conquered territories after the Padris would have been defeated; and van der Capellen as late as October, 1822 commented about the military action in Minangkabau as follows:

(65) Welderen Rengers "Failure.." op.cit. pp. 91-92.
(66) Kielstra I, p.82.
"...But what all this will result in, and what the advantages of these new possessions will be, if it is thought advisable to retain them, is yet uncertain. However, it is far less uncertain that the restoration and permanent establishment of peace and order in both the Padang Lowlands and Highlands, which will be the result of this operation, will open up new and considerable sources of prosperity, which if properly guided, will increase the trade of Padang considerably..." (67)

However, by April, 1823 the earlier qualms of van der Capellen about the advisability of keeping the conquered districts had apparently been set aside; and the government resolved to inform the Resident of Padang and the Military Commander that:

"...it is considered appropriate and desirable to keep part of the Sumatran interior, and especially Tanah Datar, in the possession of the Government..." (68)

Furthermore in the same resolution the authorities at Padang were requested to submit proposals as to where forts had to be erected and where administrative officials should be placed. In regard to administrative policy they were ordered to "take account as far as possible of the manners and customs of the inhabitants of the realm of Minangkabau". In addition a careful investigation was ordered into the rights of succession of the remaining members of the Minangkabau dynasty to the

(67) Van der Capellen to the Minister for Colonies, 3rd October, 1822. *Quot.* Kielstra I, op. cit. p.70.

government of the country; and finally the Padang authorities were empowered to appoint indigenous chiefs to administrative positions; and to report on what kind of taxes could be levied in order to recompense the government for the considerable expenses incurred in bringing peace and order to the country.

In reply to the above instructions Raaff and Du Puy reported that they considered the existing fortifications as sufficient to keep the country under control; and that they had appointed an assistant-resident at Pagerrujong to take over the administration and government of all the districts of Minangkabau, which had been brought under government control, but that in regard to the districts bordering the Padris it was advisable to leave authority in the hands of the military for the time being. They further reported that Radja Muning was the last legal prince of Minangkabau, but as this prince had declined to take on the government of his country on account of his advanced age and had requested that one of his legal successors would be appointed instead, they suggested that Sutan Alam Begagar Shah should be appointed as Radja of Minangkabau; who should be empowered by the Governor-General to appoint the indigenous administrative officials in order to enhance his prestige with the population. However, in regard to taxation

(69) Radja Muning was the only member of the ruling triumvirate which had managed to escape the bloodbath at Kota Tengha. (see p.69-70)

(70) Nephew of Radja Muning, who had fled to Padang and who also had been one of the signatories of the treaty of February, 1821.
it was pointed out that as the population had never been subject to any indirect taxation, a simple tax such as a poll-tax should be introduced, while indirect taxation could be levied on such items as opium, tobacco, cockfights and market places.

Subsequently on 4th November, 1823 the Batavian government issued provisional regulations for the administration and public finance of Padang and dependencies.

The regulations were based largely on the legislation in force in Java and which had been designed for Javanese conditions. The Resident who was the highest source of executive power was aided in his task by a number of assistant-residents and also by a hierarchy of indigenous officials, ranging from the Head-Regents of Padang and Minangkabau to the village heads. The Head-Regents and Regents were to be appointed by the Governor-General and the district-heads by the Resident, who was also to approve the election of the village heads, who were to be proposed and chosen according to the customs of the land. This division of administrative power, centred as it was in the Resident, constituted a revolutionary

(72) Provisioneel Reglement op het binnenlandsch bestuur en dat der financiën in de residentie van Padang en onderhorigheden. In Kielstra I, op.cit. pp. 95-103.
(73) Regents were high indigenous officials in the colonial administration of Java; the Regents usually belonged to the Javanese nobility.
change in the traditional political and social structure of Minangkabau; and as De Stuers rightly remarked a few years later:

"..This regulation conflicts entirely with the independant and republican form of government of this country........ which does not restrict itself to so many radjas or minor princes, but which in addition to them consists of so many heads of laras, sukus and tribes (and which therefore) cannot at once be changed into a centralized form of government without causing the greatest shock...."(74)

Difficulties occurred immediately when the Resident commenced to make appointments to the various administrative posts; the people of the XIII Kotas, East of Padang, objected to the person appointed as Head-Regent of Padang, who as it seems was in any case hardly known outside the town, because the people tended to stick to their traditional leaders; and also the appointment of Sutan Alam Bagagar Shah as regent of Tanah Datar caused a great deal of jealousy among the other Minangkabau notables.

The second revolutionary innovation was direct taxation. The Batavian government, dismissing the advice of Raaff and Du Puy, insisted on the introduction of a land rent similar to the one introduced in Java. So long as no proper survey of the land had been made the tax should be levied on the village as a whole. Furthermore the land rent could be paid in money or

(75) Ibid. p.140.
in kind, but the price of the products delivered for tax purposes was to be determined in such a way that the population would prefer to pay in money. The village heads were to be made responsible for the gathering of the taxes and would be paid 8% of the tax paid, or 10 cents per guilder.

Raaff during his visit to Batavia in September, 1823 had apparently given the government a rosy picture about Minangkabau and about the eagerness of the population to co-operate with the Dutch authorities, at least this is the impression given by a despatch of van der Capellen to the Hague of October, 1823; and consequently Batavia went ahead

(76) Van der Capellen to Falck, 29th October, 1823. In "Falck's Gedenkschriften" op. cit. pp. 520-521. The comments of Van der Capellen about Raaff's visit are as follows:

"...Colonel Raaff (an excellent officer, who also would make a good administrator) is here at the moment. We are busy regulating the affairs of Padang and Minangkabau. Only now, after having been informed about all the particulars by Raaff, I must do justice to Mr. Raffles, because he did not exaggerate his reports about that beautiful land, as was thought earlier. Imagine that the population which now falls under the rule of the government amounts to about one and a half million people, including both the coastal districts and the fertile regions from which the Padris have been driven by our weapons, and where the population is very thankful for the liberation from the Padri suppression. They fear nothing more than to be left by us, and they are prepared to accept from us any institution which we want to introduce there, especially when the introduction thereof is entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Raaff, who has spent one and a half years among them with his well disciplined troops; and whom they have seen depart from there with uneasiness. The orders given by him (Raaff) to complete roads which had been started, and to cut timber for the reinforcement of our establishments; and other measures which indicate our intentions to remain there, have put them (the Minangkabaus) at ease.

(cont'd)
introducing a number of measures which were quite revolutionary. But those regulations, considering the conservative nature of the Minangkabaus and their attachment to the adat, caused a great deal of dissatisfaction.

Colonel Nahuys, who visited Minangkabau in 1824 compared the marked divergence in national character between the Sumatran and the Javanese with the difference which existed between the free North American and the down trodden Russian; and he pointed out that the government was making a big mistake in trying to introduce a land tax in Minangkabau, which undoubtedly would cause a great deal of dissatisfaction. The cooperation of the Minangkabaus would be far easier obtained if the government abstained from forcing its administrative regulations on them, which the people could not understand

(76) Cont'd.

Earlier (i.e. when Raaff was there) the inhabitants executed all the work which was ordered by Colonel Raaff with the greatest willingness and speed. I am certain that not one indigene could complain about his (Raaff's) treatment. After having everything explained to me, I am convinced that a regular system of land tax, initially on a very low scale, could be introduced without much trouble, and could ensure us, as in Java, increasing revenue, especially when at the same time continuous care is taken to have proper justice and a good police protection of property and persons, and good treatment of the population, which seems to be attached to us. Shortly Colonel Raaff will depart from here with all he needs and he will be appointed as Resident of Padang. Our possessions at the West-Coast of Sumatra will become after Java the most important establishments of this Archipelago...
in the first place, as according to the adat they were only obliged to follow up the orders of the nagari government. Agriculture and trade, so Nahuys argued, would undoubtedly increase more if supported by the government by means of monetary incentives instead of being burdened by taxation. (77)

In addition the indirect taxes on opium, cockfights, tobacco and market places, and the repeated requisitioning of unpaid forced labour for the construction of roads and forts caused a great deal of hostility to the Dutch in the government districts; this hostility was even more increased by the often dismal behaviour of the Dutch troops, who not only repaid the cruelty of the Padris with the same measure, but who also (78)


(78) Nahuys comments on the behaviour of the Dutch troops as follows:
"But when I consider, that all our victories have to be bought with the blood, not only of those who are guilty and of indigenes who have taken up arms against us, but also of many innocent people, women, children and defenceless old people, then I have no desire for such laurels stained with murder. And this is however nearly always the case when our troops overrun an enemy dessa (village). Young and old, able-bodied or defenceless, are not given any quarter by our savage soldiers, but are pitilessly put to the sword." (Source: Ibid. p.195.)

Nahuys relates the following incident about a Padri prisoner:
"...I found an unarmed Padri, who had surrendered himself, in the hands of a few of our soldiers and Minangkabaus, who were cold-bloodedly torturing the unfortunate man to a cruel death....Not without difficulty did I stop the angry evil-doers, who openly claimed to have the right to treat the Padri, whose beard had already been partly pulled out, in the same way as they would be treated when captured by the Padris.................." (Source: Ibid. p.211)
often treated the anti-padris Minangkabaus with little respect.

However in 1825, the government tried to bring its administrative policy closer into line with popular thinking; and it abolished the positions of head regents and stipulated that from then on the regents were to be chosen in rotation from the four original sukus, i.e. Bodi-Tjaniago and Koto-Piliang; and it was also decided to postpone the introduction of the land tax for the time being, while instead an attempt would be made to extend the indirect taxes over the whole of the country. But the emphasis in the new regulations on the hated taxation on opium, cockfights etc. and the fact that nothing was done to alleviate the burdens of unpaid forced labour, did hardly anything to abate the ill-feeling of the Minangkabaus towards the government.

Resident Du Puy had requested permission to retire from the colonial service on account of sickness; and on 4th November he was honourably discharged, and as a sign of the government's satisfaction with his services he was given a gratuity of 6000 guilders. In his place Colonel Raaff was appointed, who was now put in charge of both military and civil matters in the residency of Padang.

(80) Governor-General to the Minister for Colonies, 4th December, 1823. in Ibid. pp.103-4.
At the beginning of January, 1824, Raaff received intelligence that the Padris of Bondjol were willing to come to peaceful terms with the government; and a Malay merchant who had been sent to investigate, reported that the Tuankus of Bondjol and Alahan Pandjang were willing to negotiate for a peaceful settlement and requested that Mr. A.F. van den Berg, with whom they had trade dealings should be sent to them in order to carry out negotiations.

In view of the latest instructions of Batavia to consolidate Dutch power in Minangkabau, a treaty with the powerful Padris of Bondjol was very welcome to Raaff. Although in addition there was the fear that the British, who apparently had sent an emissary from Bencoolen to Bondjol in order to conclude a peace treaty, might attempt to draw the whole of the trade of the Northern districts of Minangkabau to their own ports.

Apart from the mutual antipathy on religious and political grounds there were two other factors which kept the Padris of Bondjol and the Netherlands Indies government divided. Firstly

(81) Van den Berg was an ex-government official turned merchant; in the thirties he established a sugar plantation and sugar mill near Padang.


(83) See p.56.

(84) Nahuys "Brieven.." op.cit. p. 194.
the Bondjol Padris violently opposed the attempts of the Dutch to occupy the VI Kottas in Agam, which conducted their trade mainly with Bondjol; and secondly, the attempts of the Dutch to seal off the coast between Priaman and Ajer Bangis, where the people of Bondjol carried on their export and import trade with Achin, Malaya and Singapore; e.g. the independant sultan of Trumon, at the Northern part of the West-Coast, exported to Bondjol guns, powder, textiles, salt and iron, while buying gold and other produce. However, some trade must also have existed between Bondjol and Dutch ports, considering the reference made by the Tuankus of Bondjol to the Dutch trader van den Berg.

How important and flourishing the trade of Bondjol had become can be gauged from the Memoir of the Bondjol leader, Tuanku Imam, who relates that since the Padri government of the Tuankus Imam, Gapu and Halamat had been established in Bondjol:

(85) Dawis Datoek Madjolelo and Ahmad Marzoeki "Tuanku Imam Bondjol, Perintis Djalan ke Merdekaan", Djakarta/Amsterdam, Djambatan, 1951. p.78.

(86) Francis E "Herinneringen uit den levensloop van een Indisch Ambtenaar, van 1815 tot 1851. Medegedeeld in Brieven. Batavia, Van Dorp, 1856, p.184. Note: Francis lists also opium as an important item of trade with Bondjol. But this seems rather far fetched considering the aversion of the Padris for this commodity.
"...this place (i.e. Bondjol), after five years under the government of Tuanku Imam, grew extensively, while its prosperity increased so much, owing to the increase in trade and industry, that many went there, because victuals were cheap, and rice, cattle and horses were plentiful. (and) When the construction and armament of the fort had been taken care of, the people only concentrated on trade; (and) with the enjoyment of peace and concordance the nagari of Bondjol increased in prosperity; and the merchants of neighbouring places went to trade there."

Owing to the absence of any reference in the Memoir of Tuanku Imam Bondjol to the treaty of 22nd January, concluded between the Dutch and Bondjol and also because of the lack of any other indigenous sources, it is difficult to establish precisely why the leaders of Bondjol at this point of time were interested in concluding a peace treaty with the Dutch. However, the explanation of De Stuers, who was on the spot soon after the event, sounds reasonable. The Dutch navy was patrolling the coast in order to stop "smuggling", as the Dutch termed it, and although this measure was not completely effective, it affected the trade of Bondjol to some extent. Bondjol realized that if it came to terms with the Dutch and paid lip service to the latter's request for co-operation with their policy of channeling all the trade of the interior through Dutch ports, they would not in fact lose a great deal of their commercial

(87) "Memorie van Tuanku Imam" in De Stuers op.cit. Bijlage B. pp.222-223.
(88) Ibid. vol. 2. pp. 77-78.
freedom. Looking at the commercial clauses of the treaty between Bondjol and the Dutch, it seems hardly likely that the people of Bondjol, who were traders, ever seriously considered buying salt and other items from Padang or from other Dutch ports, while elsewhere they were able to buy the same commodities for lower prices. But the realization of the fact that war was damaging to their trade probably weighed as heavily on the minds of the Bondjollers as it did on the Dutch; and in this sense the desire for peace by Bondjol was probably genuine enough. At least some support for this contention is given by Tuanku Imam in his Memoir, when he gives the impression that Bondjol went to war with the Dutch in order to safeguard Agam; and the intrusion by the Dutch into Minangkabau had disturbed the continuous development of Bondjol during a twenty-five year period of peace and order. Furthermore at the time of the treaty the initial cause of friction with the Dutch i.e. the VI Kotas in Agam, had been removed, because this region which had been conquered by Raaff in July, 1823, had fallen into the hands of the Padris again.


(90) "Memorie van Tuanku Imam,..." op.cit. p.233.
in September of the same year. But when the Dutch attacked
the VI Kotas soon after the treaty with Bondjol had been
concluded, the leaders of Bondjol sent the treaty document
back to Padang, because in their opinion the treaty had been
broken by the Dutch. Obviously the people of Bondjol wanted
a recognition of the status quo; and they desired peace in
order to return to their trading and business activities which
had been interrupted by the threat of the Dutch to their
security.

However, Raaff, who appears to have been elated by the
treaty, wrote that the government would greatly benefit from
it mainly in respect of:

"...trade, the establishment of the authority of the
Netherlands government on the West-Coast of Sumatra;
and the subjection of the remaining Padri leaders in
the realm of Minangkabau. ........................." (93)

But Raaff's explanation about the change of heart of the
Padri leaders of Bondjol in trying to seek closer relations
with the Dutch, which he attributed to their recent military
setbacks in Agam, does not seem sufficient; especially if
there is taken into account the tremendous fighting spirit
and military power of Bondjol, which was to keep the Dutch

(91) Kielstra I, op.cit. p.63.
(92) G.A. Baud to Batavia, 14th June, 1824. quot. Kielstra I,
op.cit. p. 109.
(93) Raaff to Batavia, 26th January, 1824. quot. Ibid. pp.106-
107.
at bay until 1837. Raaff also optimistically believed that the Padris of Bondjol would co-operate with the Dutch authorities in subjecting the other Padri nations, which were still defying Dutch authority; and he therefore had no qualms about attacking the VI Kotas when this region did not seem willing to conclude a treaty with the government. But as pointed out before, the Padris of Bondjol considered the treaty of January, 1824 as a recognition of the status quo; and so they considered the clauses of the treaty making it obligatory to help the Dutch in subjecting their unwilling brethren and to police the Dutch trade regulations, merely as ornamental and which therefore could be disregarded when convenient. Furthermore Bondjol knew well enough that the Dutch did not have sufficient power to enforce those regulations and clauses.

From the Dutch point of view, however, the VI Kotas were of strategic importance, because this region commanded the supply route from the coast to the Dutch posts in Minangkabau. As Raaff had explained to Batavia in 1822, the conquest of the VI Kotas would ensure that:

"....once peace had been established, a desired communication would be effected between Priaman, Agam and Tanah Datar.............................................."(94)

But before Bondjol returned the treaty document, Raaff had suddenly died, overcome by fever, on 17th April, 1824 when

(94) quot. Kielstra I, p.56 no exact date quoted.
only twenty nine years old.

 G.A. Baud, who was appointed as temporary Resident was instructed:

 "...in expectancy of the appointment of a new resident of Padang to continue carefully along the lines of the previous resident; and to keep especially in mind the desire of the government to consolidate its position in the Padang Highlands and to try to negotiate with the heads of the Padris, who are not yet subjected." (95)

 Baud first tried to convince the Padris of Bondjol by letter about the "justness" of the Dutch attack on the VI Kotas. But Bondjol replied that it would not be agreeable to negotiate unless the VI Kotas were evacuated by the Dutch. As Baud doubted the authenticity of the reply, he sent a pro-Dutch Muslim religious leader to Bondjol with a letter and a copy of the doubted reply, but soon afterwards the Resident received a report that his emissary had been killed in the neighbourhood of Bondjol. (96)

 Colonel De Stuers, who had been appointed Resident of Padang on 2nd November, 1824, did not fare much better in his attempts to come to terms with the Padris of Bondjol.

 The new resident had been instructed i.a. to investigate the possibilities for ending satisfactorily the continuing hostilities with the Padris; and he had been requested to do everything possible to come to an agreement with them about

(96) Baud to Batavia, 6th September, 1824. quot. Ibid. p. 110.
demarcation lines, which were not to be violated by either party. Batavia apparently wanted to avoid the mistake made by Raaff over the VI Kotas and was eager to make a settlement on the basis of the status quo.

But at the end of 1825 De Stuers was only able to report to Batavia that so far his attempts to come to terms with the Padris of Bondjol had been in vain. Bondjol had asked nothing less than a complete withdrawal by the Dutch from Agam, "which regarding our military position cannot be spared."

However, his attempts to come to terms with the Padris of Lintau and L Kotas, so the Resident continued his report, had been more successful. Although during the first eight months of office it had proved impossible to come into contact with Lintau or L Kotas, De Stuers had been fortunate in making the acquaintance of a young Arab merchant called Said-Salimü'l-Djafried, who had declared himself willing to go to Lintau. This merchant after having been thoroughly briefed by the Resident, left for Lintau on 29th September, 1825; and he succeeded in persuading Lintau and L Kotas to send representatives to Padang. The Padri delegates arrived in

Padang on 29th October, 1825 and after a formal reception, De Stuers handed them a short statement explaining the Dutch position i.e. the government would be willing at all times to protect Padri traders in its territories; and it would never interfere in the religious affairs of Padris and non-Padris alike. However in return the government expected that the traders from the Dutch territories would be allowed to travel in the Padri countries and that they would be given protection there; and furthermore the government expected that the Padri leaders would take firm measures against those subordinate officials in their territories, who were responsible for the repeated burning and pillaging in the Dutch border districts.

However, the immediate reply of the Padri representatives was that they desired that the Dutch government would help them in introducing their religious teachings in the whole of Minangkabau, the government districts included. But, so De Stuers reported, they did not insist as on previous occasions, that the Dutch should completely withdraw from Minangkabau. De Stuers, true liberal as he was, replied to the Padri request that:

"...it was open to anybody to take on the Padri religion. The government would rather see the inhabitants religious than godless, but it could not stand for the destruction of the land and the murdering of the people (99) as a pretext for the introduction of the new principles."

A few days later the Padri delegates communicated to the Resident that they were in general agreement with the views of the government, but with the exception of two points which they considered were in conflict with their religious beliefs:

"...The first point is that the people are allowed to play and the second point is that they are allowed to smoke opium. Both those things are bad for the people and preclude them from being happy. The Colonel should be convinced of that. If we Malays (i.e. Minangkabaus) are allowed to do both those things, then it is impossible that there will be peace as they always will cause disturbances. And if the Colonel wishes to live in peace with us for ever, then we request that he for our sake will forbid those things gradually." (100)

Subsequently on 15th November, 1825 a treaty was signed between the Padris of Lintau and L Kotas and the Netherlands government. Both parties recognized each others' sovereignty in their respective territories and they promised to deliver criminals and wanted persons. Furthermore traders from both sides would be protected in the respective countries and the Padri governments promised to take measures to stop the invasions and pillaging in the border districts.

De Stuers attributed the willingness of the Padris of Lintau and L Kotas to come to peaceful terms with the Dutch government to the severe military defeats which they had

(100) Ibid. p.159.
suffered at the hands of the Dutch when in the beginning of 1825 they had attempted several times to invade Tanah Datar. Those defeats so the Resident thought, had made the Padris realize that the "kafirs" (unbelievers) were there to stay, and they therefore had adjusted their thinking accordingly; and there is some support for this contention of the Resident if the course of events of the next few years is taken into account. The point is that, as soon as it became apparent to the Padris that Dutch military strength had been considerably weakened by the transfer of a large number of troops to Java in 1826, they put the treaty of 1825 aside and started again to attack the Dutch positions in Tanah Datar.

In order to see the story in Minangkabau in its proper perspective, it is necessary at this point to divert to Java where new developments had taken place, which caused the government order of 1823 to the Padang authorities to temporarily stop their offensive against the Padris, to remain in force far longer than originally had been expected. As was discussed before, the financial situation in Java during the years 1824/25 had worsened into a severe crisis. But when the news of the projected loan with Palmer and Co. of Calcutta had become known in the Hague, which so far had been under the impression that the financial situation in Java was sound, it caused a great furore. Immediately a special

(102) See p.97.
Commissioner-General, Count Du Bus de Gisignies, was appointed to restore the financial stability of the Indies and to report to the Home government as to what kind of measures were to be taken to make the colonies a paying proposition. Du Bus immediately introduced a programme of severe economy measures; public expenditure was heavily cut, retrenchments were made in the colonial service, and salaries were slashed. In regard to the Outer-possessions he ordered a strict observance of the principles of non-intervention and non-expansion. On the strength of a despatch of Du Bus, who had not yet arrived in the Indies, the Lieutenant-Governor-General De Kock sent a circular in March, 1826 to all the civil and military authorities in the Outer-Possessions, emphatically instructing them to abstain strictly from any military action and from interfering in local affairs, but to take every care to maintain or improve their good relations with the princes and the people. This policy decision alone would already have handicapped De Stuers a great deal in his attempts to bring about a general state of peace and order in Minangkabau, but his dilemma was made far more acute when he

(104) De Kock to the authorities in the Outer-Possessions. March, 1826. in Kielstra E.B. "Sumatra's Westkust van 1826-1832" in Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlands-Indie. 1888. pp. 217-218. Note: Further references to this source will be indicated by Kielstra II.
was ordered in August, 1826 to send a large part of his military forces to Java, where a serious rebellion had broken out under the leadership of the Javanese Prince Diponegara. This large scale rising had broken out in the Principalities and it took the Dutch five years (1825-1830) and a large number of their forces to wipe out resistance, mainly because of the guerilla tactics used by the Javanese.

But in the meantime De Stuers was in the unenviable position of trying to keep intact the conquests made so far by the Dutch in Minangkabau, while the military forces at his disposal were quite insufficient to withstand a full scale attack by a united Padri force. The actual strength of the Dutch forces at the West-Coast of Sumatra had been reduced from 1568 men on 1st July, 1825 to 682 men on 20th September, 1826.

Under those circumstances the Resident could only try to do his utmost in coming to terms with the Padris. While previously the Dutch army had been able to keep the two contending parties in Minangkabau separated by force, now the only way open to De Stuers was to follow the opposite policy and try to bring the Padris and their opponents together in order to ensure the greatest possible degree of peace in the country, which was a pre-requisite to the survival of the Dutch in Minangkabau. Obviously if a major war had broken

out between the Padris and the anti-Padri districts, the Dutch with their weak military forces would have been swiped out of the country together with the adat-party.

But, so De Stuers reported, this attempt at reconciliation was made difficult by a number of factors. Firstly the opening up of normal trade communications between the Padri and anti-Padri districts was severely hampered by the unwillingness of the Padri leaders to let their people traverse the government districts, where they would be exposed to the temptations of cockfighting and opium smoking. In order to overcome this obstacle the Resident introduced measures forbidding the staging of cockfights, but this action of course caused great dissatisfaction among the adat-party. However, the most obvious and fundamental obstacle to bring about a fraternization, was the strong and unbridgeable division of opinion of the two contending factions about socio-political matters. The adat-chiefs considered the Padri leaders as usurpers of the legal government of the country. On the other hand the Padris considered the adat-chiefs as the greatest obstacle to the introduction of their principles, not only because they condoned the smoking of opium and the staging of cockfights, but even more so because they had an obviously vested interest in the suku-system of government and the matrilineal social organization, which were considered to
be in direct conflict with the Muslim Law.

A further point which made the establishment of peaceful conditions very difficult was the absence of any central indigenous authority which was able to keep the many political units under control. But in this regard, so the Resident reported, a solution suggested itself in the person of Said-Salimu'l-Djafried, whom De Stuers continued to employ as his agent among the Padris. The Said had proved himself in bringing about the treaty of 1825; and after that he had been able to make contact with the representatives from Bondjol who had been sent to Lintau to enquire about the treaty of 1825. The Said returned with those Bondjol emissaries to their homeland, where at Passam he met the Tuankus of Bondjol, who expressed their desire to him for a government post consisting of a merchant and a few soldiers, in order that trade relations could be established; and at another meeting with the tuankus of Bondjol at Basoh the Said had explained to them the meaning of the treaty of 1825 with the Padris of Lintau and L Kotas. Soon after the Resident received a letter from an unknown source requesting him to remove the existing regent of Tanah Datar from his post and to replace

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(106) Report of De Stuers to the Minister for Colonies, 27th September, 1826. in Ibid. p.233
him by the Said, while other letters originating from Bondjol and Rau repeatedly stated: "We follow Lintau, we put the Said at our head". Although it appeared that the Said was trying to carve out an important position for himself, the Resident decided that he could not do without his services and in order to enhance his status among the Minangkabaus he gave him the title of Radja Perdamaian (Prince of Peace). It should be noted however that in any case the Said i.e. a person related to the Prophet, would have commanded a great deal of respect among the population and this probably accounts for his successful dealings with the Padris. But unfortunately the Said was not able to complete his task fully, because a few years later he was murdered, probably on the orders of the Regent of Tanah Datar, who felt himself threatened in his position.

However, the most important factor enabling De Stuers to hold on to the government occupied part of Minangkabau with the small military force available to him, was the increasing dissension among the Padris themselves. Already soon after his arrival in Padang in 1825 De Stuers had reported:

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(108) Ibid. p. 236.
(109) Ibid. p. 237.
"...this internal division of the Padri leaders is very useful to the Netherlands government, because it will gradually cause their doom, and it would be therefore more advisable for the sake of our interests to maintain as much as possible the state of peace which at present exists between the Padris and the Government, than to cause them by forceful means and a threatening attitude to again unite their forces. Only such a union makes their power dangerous to us................

It was reported that in Bondjol, Tuanku Nan Gapok had been murdered by one of his own men; and that after the treaty of 1825 Lintau and the region of Talawas had become hostile to each other and that Tuanku Lintau had several attempts made on the life of Tuanku Nan Saleh of Talawas, because he disagreed with this Tuanku's rather moderate teachings. The Resident thought that there was a possibility of an even greater degree of anarchy among the Padris, when their present leaders died. He believed that it could mean the complete disintegration of the Padri sect.

Although De Stuers had managed to avoid an open clash with the Padris, the authority and prestige of the Dutch government had diminished gradually to nothing. How low the prestige of the government had sunk among the Padris is illustrated by the fact that the Tuankus who had signed the

(111) De Stuers to the Minister of Colonies, 27th September, 1826. in Kielstra II, op.cit. p.233.
(112) De Stuers to the Batavian Government, June, 1827. in Ibid. pp. 251-252.
treaty of 1825 requested the Resident in 1827 that they should be paid a djizjah, i.e., a tribute paid by the conquered to the victor. Subsequently De Stuers obtained approval from Batavia to send yearly "friendly presents" worth one hundred guilders each to the tuankus Nan Rintji of Agam, Passaman of Lintau, di Gugu of L Kotas and Nan Saleh of Talawas, providing those Tuankus promised to stop the continuing troubles in the border districts. By 1829, when De Stuers after repeated requests had been granted permission to resign from his post, the authority of the Dutch in Minangkabau had become no more than nominal. In a report written before he left Padang, De Stuers described the situation in Minangkabau as follows: Unrest was widespread in most of the territory, but intervention by the government was useless and dangerous, considering its insufficient military strength. Military action could only be effective in those places where the government had forts i.e., at eight points on the Coast and four in the interior. Pointing to the growing dissatisfaction among the population, the Resident advised that, as nothing could be done to stop the pillaging of the Padris in the border districts, the government should try to alleviate the ill-feeling caused

(113) De Stuers to the Minister for Colonies, 27th September, 1826. in Kielstra I, p.233.
by some of its administrative regulations, such as the leasing of opium sales. The Minangkabaus, he added, were opposed to any kind of taxation, and as the government was not able in any case to police the opium regulations in the whole of the country, it would not lose a great deal if they were abolished altogether, while it would take away one of the grievances of the Minangkabaus.

But De Stuers' successor, Resident MacIlavry, was far more pessimistic about the military danger posed by the Padris. The new Resident reported in November, 1829 that it was solely because of their internal division that the Padris, who could not be trusted in any case, had not wiped out the Dutch positions in Minangkabau during the term of office of De Stuers. The fact that during 1827 and 1828 some large scale attacks by the Padris of Lintau and L Kotas had taken place in the border districts, convinced the resident that the reformers would not confine themselves to pillaging and burning excursions, as De Stuers had tried to make out in his reports. The Padris were apparently still bent on further conquest; and the assumption of De Stuers that since 1825 a state of peace had existed with the Padris of Lintau and L. Kotas was disproved by the facts, so MacIlavry argued. The

authority of the government was laughed at by Padri and anti-Padri alike and the Resident felt that the only way to improve the situation was to re-establish the greatly diminished prestige of the government by military force. He therefore pointed out to Batavia that military reinforcements were sorely needed and that the policy of De Stuers to leave the Padris in the hope that they would disintegrate on their own account, was unrealistic and dangerous.

While the Batavian government seemed to agree with MacIllavry, it put his request for troop reinforcements aside, till the military situation in Java, where the rebellion under Diponegoro was still not completely suppressed, had sufficiently improved.

But now the Resident took affairs somewhat into his own hands when he wrote to the military commander of Minangkabau that, although he could not give any general approval for offensive action, he would agree to any military moves made outside the forts which were designed to help the population in re-conquering those villages which they had lost to the Padris since 1825. The Resident pointed out that as long as

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the expansionist moves of the Padris had not extended
behind the Dutch defence line, military action had not been
necessary, but now the Padris were penetrating between the
Dutch forts and therefore threatening the entire military
position of the Dutch in Minangkabau.

However, disquieting reports from Padang about attacks
on Tapanuli by the Achinese, the withdrawal of the Dutch
garrison from Tiku owing to Padri pressure, and the pene-
tration of Bondjol to the coastline near Natal, impelled the
Batavian government to follow the same line of action as taken
by MacIlavry; and it decided in May, 1830 to send a hundred (118)
troops and a man of war to Padang.

By the middle of 1830, then, the period of complete
military inaction as inaugurated under De Stuers had ended;
and Kota Gadis in Agam was severely punished and its defenders (119)
put to the sword, while also an attack on Ajer Bangis by a
combined force of troops from Bondjol and Achin was repelled (120)
with great loss to the enemy.

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(118) Resolution of the Governor-General in Council, 3rd May
1830, quot. Ibid. p.278.
(119) Report of MacIlavry to the Governor-General, 25th
August, 1830/ quot. Ibid. pp. 280-81.
SECTION III

VAN DEN BOSCH AND SUMATRA; 1830-1841.

Although the Commissioners-General and subsequently Governor-General Van der Capellen had tried to replace the policies of the Dutch East India Company with a more "liberal" system of colonial administration, the principle that the colonies should not be a burden but rather a source of profit to the mother country was adhered to as strongly as ever. The objective of profitability was clearly expressed in the instructions to Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies, who was ordered, while making policy decisions, to keep firmly in mind:

"...the rule, that the purpose of government ought to be, to balance with the income from the Netherlands Indies all the expenses of administration; ..............." (1)

The instructions went on to point out that the Indies existed mainly for the benefit of Dutch trade, shipping and industry, and the "further monetary and other interests of the mother country". Then, as an afterthought, and in keeping with the "liberal" principles fashionable at the time, it was added that also the "happiness" of the population of those possessions was to be furthered.

(1) Confidential Instructions to Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies by Royal Decree no. 79 of 13th September, 1825. Quot. Wijck H van der "De Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Bezittingen onder het bestuur van den Kommissaris-General Du Bus de Gisignies, (1826-1830)." s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1866. p. 6.
The failure of colonial policy under van der Capellen brought to the fore the question as to how the colonies should be made into a profitable commercial venture, and on this question of policy a great deal of controversial opinion existed both in the Indies and in the Netherlands.

The financial and economic situation in the Indies during the years 1826-1830 was far from favourable. The large deficit left behind by van der Capellen was balanced by a loan of 20 million guilders from the Amortization Syndicate in 1826, while repayments and interests, amounting to 1.4 million guilders per year were guaranteed by the Estates-General. A similar loan of 15 million guilders had to be made in 1828 in order to pay for the costs of the Java War (1825-1830).

The economizing policies of Du Bus had improved the financial situation in the colonies to such an extent that the yearly repayments of the loans of 1826 and 1828 plus interest could have been met from the East Indian budget.

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(2) The Amortisatie Syndicaat was an institution - a type of public corporation - created by law on 27th December, 1822 primarily for the purpose of debt amortization. The second function of the Syndicaat was to obtain funds from the public - in addition to the revenue it received in the form of an extra percentage on taxes and from crown lands - in order to cover government expenditure which was not provided for in the budget. The King, however, obtained complete control of the Syndicaat and used it as means to remain financially independant from Parliament.
surplus when the Java War had ended. The really important problem which confronted the Indian government at the end of the twenties was the worsening balance of payments situation. The export income of the Indies had been steadily declining between 1824 and 1829, owing to the continuous fall in world market prices and the excess of imports over exports amounted to about one million guilders in 1830. The fall in the export trade from the Indies made the usual way of remitting money to the Netherlands i.e. by buying bills of sale from private traders, practically impossible, since hardly any large transactions of that kind were made. Remittance in the form of gold


(4) Java-Value of exports(a) - in '000 guilders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Indigo</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Sugar</th>
<th>Tobacco</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,561</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,686</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8,583</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>9,202</td>
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<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6,850</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,512</td>
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<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>7,831</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4,546</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1,531</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6,403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(5) Welderen Rengers "...Failure..." op.cit. p. 122.
and silver specie of which already a large amount had been exported became difficult and was furthermore actively discouraged in order to prevent a complete upset of the colonial monetary system, while the large amounts of copper money which the Indian government received were not suitable for exchange transactions.

The King was adamant that the colonies should become self-sufficient and profitable in the shortest time possible, because his political prestige was at stake as he was sure that parliament would not grant any more loans, without demanding a greater say in the running of the colonies. The problem to be solved then was largely one of balance of payments. To cut imports was not politically possible as this would adversely affect the home industry, especially that of Belgium. The only other solution was to increase the value of the export trade by increased production. This brought up the question as to what was the best way to increase the productive capacity of the colonies i.e. by the extension of the Company system of forced deliveries or the introduction of private European capital and management and the use of free indigenous labour.

In a report of May, 1827, submitted by Du Bus, but written by his secretary, the prominent liberal, Willem van Hogendorp, a solution was proposed to the problem of raising the agricultural output of the Netherlands East Indies. Van
Hogendorp suggested that the policy of van der Capellen should be reversed and that private European entrepreneurs should be re-admitted into Java, to whom virgin soil was to be rented or given on perpetual lease. The existing system of forced deliveries in the Preanger (West-Java) should be abolished and instead free indigenous labour was to be used on the European plantations.

The Minister for Colonies, Elout, agreed that in principle colonial agricultural production should be developed by Dutch private enterprise, but realizing that such a development would take time, he advised the King that the system of forced deliveries in the Preanger should be kept intact until Javanese agriculture had been sufficiently developed by private enterprise.

The King submitted those proposals on colonial agricultural policy to van den Bosch, who in a report of March, 1829

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(7) Ibid. p. 102.
(8) Note: Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844); at the age of seventeen went to the East Indies as a lieutenant of the Royal Engineers. Fell in disfavour with General Daendels and was forced to leave the Indies for Holland in 1810, where in 1815 he was put in charge of the military affairs of the East Indies. In 1816 he was promoted to major-general. In 1818 he published a work on the Dutch colonies entitled: "De Nederlandsche Bezittingen in Azie, Amerika en Afrika, in derzelver toestand en aangelegenheid voor dit rijk, wijsgeerig, staathuishoudkundig en geographisch beschouwd" in which he criticized the policies of Raffles and showed himself a supporter of the policies of the Company, providing that the misuses which had crept in would be stopped. In the 1820's van den Bosch was in charge of the Maatchappij van Weldadigheid (Humanitarian (Cont'd)
showed that he was generally opposed to the introduction of a system of production as advocated by van Hogendorp and Elout. Van den Bosch, on the basis of a comparative study of production costs of Java and the West-Indian colonies, of which he had first-hand knowledge, argued that the cost prices of Javanese sugar and coffee would be 60% higher on the European market than the lowest cost prices of West-Indian sugar and coffee. He insisted therefore that the system of forced deliveries as existing in the Preanger should be extended over the rest of the Government-owned territory of Java.

As a solution to the problem of ensuring the benefit of the increased agricultural output of the colonies to the mother country, van den Bosch proposed that three quarters of the export crop should be guaranteed to the Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij (N.H.M.). Van den Bosch argued that even a 25% (8) Cont'd.

Company) which was concerned to resettle city paupers on the undeveloped moors in the Eastern Netherlands. In 1827 van den Bosch was appointed Commissioner General to the Netherlands West Indies and on his return he was appointed Governor-General of the East Indies on 16th October, 1828.

(9) Knibbe "Vestiging." op. cit. pp. 102-103.

(10) Note: The Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij was created by Royal Decree of 29th March, 1824 for the purpose of increasing Dutch trade and industry. Although essentially a private joint stock company in which the King personally had invested a great deal of money and had guaranteed the payment of dividends to investors in case of trading losses, the N.H.M. enjoyed a number of privileges. It was given monopoly of the transport of government goods from and to the colonies and the government coffee produced in the Preanger and the spices of the Moluccas were consigned to it for transport and sale in Holland. On the other hand the N.H.M. was ordered to use only Dutch ships and export by preference Dutch goods.
The King became very favourable towards the system of van den Bosch, because the latter's proposals promised far quicker results than those of Elout who advised "a wait and see" policy and to let the situation be remedied by the "natural laws of demand and supply". The financial and economic distress in which the Netherlands had been since the

(12) Van den Bosch to the King, 13th May, 1829. in Knibbe "..Vestiging.." op.cit. Bronnen (Sources) pp.45-50. 
(13) Welderen Rengers "..Failure.." op.cit. p. 123.
Napoleonic wars demanded positive action; and in addition the King's political position and his own financial interests were at stake, if the colonies were not quickly made into a profitable business proposition. In a personal interview of 23rd May, 1829 the King told van den Bosch to go ahead and charged him with the express assignment that, above everything, the East Indian Budget should be balanced within the shortest possible time. When Elout was notified of the King's decision he resigned, as he saw the system of van den Bosch, especially the privileged position of the N.H.M., as a return to the days of the Dutch East India Company.

On 24th July, van den Bosch departed for the Indies where he arrived on 2nd January, 1830.

The most important objective of Dutch colonial policy during the period 1830-1870 was to increase the size of the remittances from the Indies in order to enrich the Netherlands treasury. The large profits of the "culture system", as the system of forced deliveries of van den Bosch came to be called were not used for the development of the Netherlands East Indies, but instead the instructions to van den Bosch laid down that the administration of the colonies should be kept

(14) Elout to van den Bosch, 20th May, 1829 in Knibbe "Vestiging." op. cit. p. 67.
on as simple a footing as possible, lest the profitability of the colonies to the mother country would be reduced. Legitimate interest in the Outer-Possessions could only be taken if the norm of profitability, actual or potential, was satisfied; otherwise those areas should be left as they were, although they could not be abandoned without the express permission of the Hague.

In addition to the norm of profitability there was the question of manpower, both civil and military. Van den Bosch argued that Java alone offered such an extensive field for Dutch enterprise that for years to come it could absorb most of the manpower and other resources available. Better results could be expected from an effort that was concentrated and that was under the close supervision of the central administration, than when the Dutch wasted their energies over the

(15) The order to simplify administration as much as possible, especially in the Outer-Possessions is contained in article 26 of the Instructions to the High Government of the Netherlands Indies by Royal Decree of 16th May, 1829. In Knibbe op. cit. Bronnen (Sources) p.56; article 1 of the Special Instructions to Governor General van den Bosch by Royal Decree of 16th May, 1829. In Knibbe op. cit. Bronnen (Sources) pp. 59-60 forbids i.a. the abandonment of any part of Netherlands Indies Territory, while articles 13(p.63) and 16(p.64) illustrate the profitability motive.
whole extent of the archipelago. While concentration of resources was advisable for purposes of defence, the fact that most of the Outer-Possessions proved to be a financial burden was also of great importance. Banka and Banda (and also Sumatra, he hoped, in the near future) were the only profitable establishments outside Java. The whole variety of produce suitable for the European market could be produced on Java and Sumatra alone, and it would be advisable therefore to cut down on military and administrative expenditure in the other islands as much as possible.

The policy of van den Bosch to concentrate on Java, Sumatra and Banka only, while strictly abstaining from expansion of control in the other possessions was finally approved by the King in 1837, although in practice this policy had been the rule since the early thirties.

Apart from the general policy objective of profitability, and the fact that consequently only limited resources of manpower and capital were made available for the development of the Outer-Islands, the thinking of van den Bosch in regard to

(16) Bosch J van den "Verslag mijner verrichtingen in Indie, gedurende de jaren 1830, 1831, 1832 en 1833" (Account of my actions in the Indies during the years 1830 etc.) in BTv. 1864. p.466.

those territories was largely conditioned by two other important considerations. Firstly, article 14 of his instructions requested the Governor-General to investigate how far the system of import and export duties, adopted since 1825, had been effective, and he was to forward proposals for improving the situation if need be. In addition Van den Bosch was requested:

"...to give his particular attention to the means whereby the indigenous trade, now to a large extent shifted to Singapore, can again be attracted to the ports of the Indian Archipelago, and in that regard he shall be allowed to take such measures as he shall think useful, while taking into account the stipulations of the treaty of 17th March, 1824, concluded with England............."(18)

The second consideration was the Governor-General's admiration for the policies of the Dutch East India Company, which in terms of the Outer-Possessions had generally meant trade relations only and the least possible political interference. Van den Bosch argued that:

"...Everywhere where the former Company had been established in that way, our return is desired; only where the greed and the desire to rule of the officials of that Company had sidetracked her and let her strive for territorial possessions, did she waste her energies and exhaust her finances..........................."(19)

(18) Bijzondere Instructie voor den Gouverneur Generaal Van den Bosch, K.B. 16 Mei, 1829. (Special Instructions for Governor-General Van den Bosch) in Knibbe op.cit. Bronnen (Sources) pp.63-64.

Van den Bosch was convinced that it would be in the Dutch interest to bring the whole of the Indian archipelago as much as possible under Dutch influence, but he criticized the previous attempts made in that direction on the grounds that the measures taken had been haphazard and that no definite objectives had been projected. He hoped that during his term of office he would be able to construct a sound basis upon which Dutch authority throughout the whole of the archipelago could gradually be built. He argued that as the sole purpose of extending Dutch influence was to secure the export and import trade of those countries, territorial possession would not lead to any results, but would involve costly administrations to be set up and wars to be conducted to the detriment of friendly relations with the people concerned. Nothing was more hateful to an uncivilized people than when:

"...a handful of Europeans take it on themselves to request money from them, and in case of non-payment, either out of incapability or unwillingness, to see them take away their own possessions.........")(20)

Instead van den Bosch proposed that on all the islands where the government had or could obtain rights it should take control of all the important trading towns at the coasts and establish fortified posts or small forts there. Taxation in

(20) Van den Bosch to Baud, 31st January, 1831 in "..Briefwisseling..." op.cit. p.77.
those places should not be higher than was needed to cover the expenditure of the establishment, while a fair degree of protection should be given to Dutch trade. If it was thought useful, communications should be opened up with the interior, where a fortified market place should be established, where the population could exchange their produce for the commodities they wanted. The people should however be left free to dispose of their crops at the coast, if they wished, lest the market place should become hateful to them. Government authority and interference in indigenous affairs should not extend further than the range of the forts' guns, although, when asked to, the government should mediate in internal disputes. This, so the governor-general argued, was the only feasible way to turn the people away from trading with Singapore, as the commodities they wanted would be put up for sale at their doorsteps and at a lower price.

Van den Bosch during the thirties and early forties showed a great deal of personal interest in Sumatra:

"...an island that accounts for at least 40 shiploads of products yearly and that can be an outlet for much industrial produce." (22)

(21) Ibid. pp.78-79.

(22) Van den Bosch to Baud, 27th August, 1831, in "Briefwisseling..." op.cit. p. 106.
The actions of the new Resident of Padang, Lieutenant-Colonel Elout, who took up his post on 4th March, 1831, cannot be fully understood unless they are seen in the perspective of the plans and thinking of van den Bosch.

Before Elout's departure for Padang, the governor-general had taken great pains to explain to him the general principles of policy which were to be pursued on the West-Coast of Sumatra. Dutch influence could not be properly established on the basis of military conquest and territorial possession, but only by proving to the indigenous population that their own interests were closely tied up with those of the government. The first major task to be accomplished was to pacify the Padris, which he hoped could be effected by peaceful means after it was clearly explained to them that all the government was interested in was to facilitate trade, but that it did not plan territorial expansion. Assuming that peace could be established in such a way then the next step would be to improve communications and to set up a trading post near the Padri territories. If it was found that the interior could easily be reached along the East-ward flowing rivers, then also the East-Coast of Sumatra would have

(23) Van den Bosch to Elout, 26th December, 1830. in Kiestra II, op.cit. pp.287-295.
to be occupied at strategic points. If however the peace overtures to the Padris did not have any success then initially all efforts should be concentrated on the protection of the anti-Padri districts. From time to time at opportune moments "painful blows" should be inflicted on the Padris who would finally have to be beaten decisively. This however should not be attempted before sufficient forces were available. The resident was ordered not to engage in offensive operations but if these were considered necessary then an expeditionary force from Java would be sent. The co-operation of the leaders in the anti-Padri districts should be cultivated as carefully as possible; the mistake of seeing indigenous institutions and philosophies through western eyes was to be avoided and:

"...in a word, we must act in the spirit of those governments in Europe, where many feudal institutions still continue to exist, and where the rights of the landlords are only interfered with in so far as general laws are broken..................")(24)

Van den Bosch made it clear to the Resident that he would personally take charge of the whole plan for Sumatra, but that he had tried to explain his ideas for Elout's benefit when submitting policy proposals.

(24) Van den Bosch to Elout, 26th December, 1830, op.cit. p.291.
 Provisional instructions based on the ideas of van den Bosch described above were issued to Elout on 14th January, 1831 and the resident was given a few hundred troops, largely recruits, as reinforcements.

Elout arrived in Padang on 5th February, 1831 and after a survey of the situation he became very pessimistic, as his predecessor MacIllumvry had been, about the military position of the Dutch and the authority of the government in general. In one of his first letters to van den Bosch he complained that if he could not get another 300 fully trained soldiers he could not guarantee the safety of the posts in the interior nor of those on the coast.

The situation at the coastline was critical for the Dutch. In December, 1829 the Dutch post on the small island of Pontjan in the bay of Tapamuli had been taken by surprise by Achinese raiders, who after destroying most of the fortifications had left again before an expeditionary force from Padang had arrived. Early in January, 1830 the Dutch establishment at

(25) Voorlopige Instructie voor de Resident van Sumatra's Westkust, 14th January, 1831. in Kielstra II, op.cit. pp.295-298. (Provisional instructions etc.)


(27) MacIllumvry to Minister for Colonies, 23rd April, 1830. in Kielstra II, op.cit. p.276.
Ajer Bangis had been besieged by a combined force of Achinese and Padris from Bondjol. The post which was defended against great odds by its tiny garrison was relieved after four days by the armed praos of a Buginese trader from Padang, who was friendly to the Dutch government. Soon after, Natal was closed in by the Achinese from the seaside and by the Padris of Bondjol from the landside, but the post was relieved by a Dutch expeditionary force on 7th April, 1830. Those attacks by the Padris of Bondjol were designed to keep open their trading outlets and they were apparently suggested by the Achinese.

During the period of Dutch military inaction under de Stuers the Padris of Bondjol had steadily expanded their influence into the Batta lands and the Northern regions of the coast, while the Dutch were watching helplessly. Bondjol was stirred into action against the Dutch forces by the more active policy of MacIlavry and Elout, the successors of the Stuers, who:

"....had tried hard to re-establish peace in the country, so that the population (i.e. of Bondjol) began to live again, as it were and started to make frequent visits to Padang again............................................

(30) According to Tuanku Imam Bondjol in Van Ronkel "..Inland-sche Getuigenissen.." op.cit. p.1107.
(31) MacIlavry to Minister for Colonies, 23rd April, 1830. in Kielstra II, pp.277-278.
(32) "Memorie van Tuanku Imam Bondjol.." in De Stuers op.cit. P.244.
In January, 1831 the XIII Kotas attempted an attack on Padang, but they were repulsed by a detachment of Dutch troops and put to flight.

Narras, a coastal town to the North of Priaman, and its hinterland, the VII Kotas, which since the time of Du Puy had been under the rule of Tuanku Nan Tjerdik had for some time refused to recognize the supremacy of the Dutch government. Attempts at the end of December, 1830 to subjugate Nan Tjerdik had failed and Elout had been instructed to try to persuade this district to come to terms in a peaceful way. If this could not be accomplished, then he should try to gather as much intelligence as possible about the military strength of the area. The negotiations with Narras however were not successful and Elout complained repeatedly that further postponement of decisive action against Nan Tjerdik and the VII Kotas would produce an unfavourable effect on the rest of the Low-lands. Van den Bosch became eventually convinced about the necessity of military action in the coastal area and he sent an expeditionary force of 450 men to the West-Coast in May, 1831 for the immediate purpose of bringing Narras and the VII Kotas to reason. Van den Bosch instructed Elout that,

(33) *Nederlandsch Oost Indies Leger...* op. cit. vol. 1, p. 164.
(34) Provisional Instructions to Elout, 14th January, 1831. in Kielstra II, pp. 296-97.
when peace and order had been established at Narras, steps should be taken to reinforce the government's position in Ajer Bangis and Natal, while also the situation at the coastline between Tiku and Ajer Bangis, which had been reported by MacIlavry as being completely under the influence of Bondjol, should be investigated.

To van den Bosch, impressed as he was with the methods of the old Company, only two methods suggested themselves to control that part of the West-Coast (i.e. between Tiku and Ajer Bangis): a blockade by the navy to stop all trade or what would be more effective in teaching the Padris of Bondjol a lesson, to destroy the ports of Katiangan and Massang and the villages a few hours inland, and to prevent them from being rebuilt. Van den Bosch expected further suggestions on the matter, but he wanted to make it clear that his:

"objective would always be to master the whole coastline from the Southern corner of Sumatra to Achin, and to blockade the entrance to hostile ports, which we might not be able to occupy, or to destroy those ports....." (36)

Early in June, 1831 Narras was taken after heavy fighting and the V Kottas and VII Kotas were subsequently subdued. The successful military actions in the Lowlands apparently had frightened some of the districts in the Highlands, and Batipu

(35) MacIlavry to the Minister for Colonies, 23rd April, 1830 in Kielstra II, op.cit. pp. 277-278.
(36) Van den Bosch to Elout, 10th May, 1831. in Kielstra II, op.cit. p.305.
subjected itself voluntarily, while Tanah Datar showed a more friendly attitude towards the government.

While van den Bosch was pleased with the military actions so far, he stressed again that his main objective was to subject the whole of the coast to Dutch influence, even if this goal had to be obtained by burning and destroying villages along an extensive part of the coastline. But any military offensive against the Padris in the Highlands had to be avoided because of the situation in Europe, where the Belgian revolution had broken out. Van den Bosch did not want to weaken the military position of Java as long as the international implications of the Belgian revolution were not yet clear. A conflict with England was possible and the governor-general wanted to defend Java which was of great economic importance to the Dutch, as strongly as possible. The uncertainty about the outcome of the Belgian question prevented van den Bosch from taking any decisive action against the Padris of Minangkabau till about the middle of 1832 when it had been clear that a war between England and Holland would be very unlikely. In the meantime van den Bosch ordered

(37) Lange "Nederlandsch Oost Indisch Leger..." op. cit. pp. 176-177.
(38) Van den Bosch to Elout, 2nd September, 1831. in Kielstra II, pp. 307-309.
(39) Van den Bosch to Baud, 13th May, 1832. in "Briefwisseling..." op. cit. p. 143.
that the objective to be pursued would be the consolidation of Dutch power along the coastline and the improving of communications with the Highlands.

The military situation in Minangkabau, however, had unexpectedly improved, when the military commander, Captain de Quay, mindful of the earlier instruction of van den Bosch to inflict "painful blows" to the Padris at opportune moments, took the formidable redoubt of the Marapalm by surprise in the night of 5th August, 1831. Elout who had shown himself opposed all along to the non-offensive policy of van den Bosch against the Padris, seized this opportunity to press again for decisive military action to be taken against the Padris of Minangkabau. The taking of the Marapalm had opened up the whole of Lintau to the Dutch and the advantage obtained should be followed up as quickly as possible in order to make use of the tremendous impression which this military feat had made on the whole of Minangkabau, where previously the Dutch had been repulsed with great losses. Before advancing into Lintau the other Padri districts in the rear should be brought under government control or at least those areas which had been under Dutch influence during the time of De Stuers. The question whether the Padris of Minangkabau should be completely annihilated would depend on how much the government was willing to

(40) Van den Bosch to Elout, 2nd September, 1831. in Kielstra II, pp.307-309.
spend on the West-Coast of Sumatra, which "in regard to the soil is not inferior to Java." West-Sumatra would never be able to show a profit if its administration was not working properly and to effect this additional soldiers were needed. The quicker those re-inforcements came, the sooner could Batavia expect the residency to become self-sufficient, and even profitable. The first steps to be taken in that direction would be the subjection of the Northern part of the coast and the XIII Kotas near Padang.

At the end of August, 1831 the region of the XX Kotas, including the stronghold of Sulitajer, and the region of Talawas were again brought under Dutch control. This consolidation process continued and in October Elout reported the occupation of Ladang Lawas and Padang Luak, in Agam.

Van den Bosch refused Elout's demands for additional troops to be employed in Minangkabau, but instead he sent an extra 300 men to Padang in order to occupy the port of Katiangan, where the "smuggling" trade, which was so damaging to Dutch interests, was concentrated. After Katiangan had been occupied, attempts should be made to come to friendly terms with the Padris of Bondjol and then the situation in Baros

(41) Elout to van den Bosch, 1st September, 1831, in Kielstra II, pp. 312-313.
(42) Kielstra II, p. 314.
(43) Elout to van den Bosch, 24th October, 1831 in Kielstra II, pp. 318-319.
and Tapanuli was to be investigated. Elout was also reminded that a report was still expected about how the West-Coast of Sumatra could best be made useful to the interests of the government. Van den Bosch made it emphatically clear to Elout that:

"...To conduct wars or to subject peoples, and to ask only after one has reached his goal, what to do with the conquests, does not fit in with our interests nor with our ways of thinking..." (44)

In order to set up a good administration and to use the available means to the best advantage, the first requirement would be, van den Bosch argued, to know and to obtain the benefit of the resources of the land. He would therefore send no more troops before he was properly advised about the benefits which could be expected from the West-Coast of Sumatra.

Katiangan, which was fiercely defended by the Padris of Bondjol fell into Dutch hands on 11th December, 1831.

Major Michiels, who left on a fact-finding mission to the Northern part of the coast at the end of December, 1831, advised on his return that the situation there was far from favourable. Michiels was of the opinion that the great efforts which had been expended on the conquest of Minangkabau should have been used to confirm the hold of the Dutch on the

(44) Van den Bosch to Elout, 14th October, 1831. in Kielstra II, p.321.
whole of the coastline. The pressure of the Dutch on the Padris of Minangkabau had forced the latter to direct their attentions to the North and the Dutch posts there (Ajer Bangis, Natal and Tapanoeli) had not been properly protected. The Dutch should re-establish themselves in Baros, which so far had remained undamaged and which had increased in prosperity through the immigration of merchants from the destroyed regions of the South.

Elout was squarely opposed to Michiels on this issue. The Resident argued that if the Dutch had not tried to stop the Padris in Minangkabau then they would have undoubtedly penetrated into the coastal areas and Padang would have been in the same position as Michiels had found the Northern ports. The Padris at the Northern end of the coast were hostile to the Dutch because of the interference to their trade with the Achinese. The more this trade was stopped the less would be the means at the disposal of the Padris to wage war against the government and they would be gradually forced to conduct their trade with Dutch controlled ports. A proof of this was the increased supplies of coffee and other produce to Priaman and the growing imports of cottons and other textiles into Padang. If the government tried to expel the Padris from the

(46) Michiels to van den Bosch, 15th February, 1832. in Kielstra II, p. 327.
Northern ports then they would still be able to interfere with traders from the interior coming to the Dutch-held ports and trade therefore would be diverted to the East-Coast. From a military point of view it would be better, Elout argued, to keep considerable forces in Minangkabau in order to drive the Padris northwards, where they would become entangled in a war with the Achinese of Trumon, Singkel and Tapus. This stand of Elout was in line with his continuous demands to van den Bosch for an extension of government control in Minangkabau, where the situation had improved appreciably since the military actions of 1831, but where still much was left to be desired. It was necessary to have strong garrisons in Minangkabau in order to deal quickly and effectively with any trouble. Elout also submitted a report by the military commander of Minangkabau, Captain de Quay, on the military policy which he thought should be followed. De Quay was of the opinion that the military advantages obtained in 1831 such as the surprise of the Marapalm would be useless if they were not followed up and if they were not used to rid the Minangkabaus once and for all from their enemies: the Padris. Only in this way could peace and order be established on a sound basis. De Quay suggested further that all the indigenous

(47) Elout to van den Bosch, 6th March, 1832. in Kielstra II, pp. 327-329.
(48) Elout to van den Bosch, 17th December, 1831. in Kielstra II, pp. 330-334.
fortifications should be demolished as soon as they had fallen into government hands. This would prevent the Minangkabaus from putting up strong armed resistance against the government after the Padris had finally been defeated, because in the field the Minangkabaus were no match for the Dutch whom they were only able to resist in fortified positions. MacIlavry had earlier reported that a split seemed to have occurred among the Padris and that a moderate faction had been making headway and van den Bosch in his first instructions to Elout had ordered the Resident to attempt to play off the moderate faction against the other Padris and to try to obtain peace in that way. Elout reported in June, 1832 that the disunity among the Padris had become quite pronounced and that the moderate faction had grown in importance. It appeared therefore that the Padri reforms had not made a lasting impression on the population, but that:

"...nearly the whole of the population at present prefers to be Malay (i.e. Non-Padri).............; consequently the majority is inclined towards the rule of the government, and the time has come in which we have to master the whole of the interior. In general we have held a too high opinion of the strength and unity of the Padris............." (51)

(49) Report of De Quay, December, 1831. in Kielstra II, pp. 335-338.
(50) Van den Bosch to Elout, 26th December, 1830. in Kielstra II, pp. 289-290.
(51) Elout to the Minister for Colonies, 2nd June, 1832, in Kielstra II, pp. 342-3.
In the meantime van den Bosch had already decided in March, 1832 that he was free to take up his plans for Sumatra again, as he had received news from the mother-country that the Belgian question was about to be settled. First of all government authority was to be firmly established in the Sumatran interior i.e. the area bordered to the South-East by Palembang, to the North by the Battalands, to the East by Djambi, Indragiri and Siak, and to the West by Padang, because that part of the island:

"...contained that rich and extensive country, which, inhabited by a more industrious people, had steadily provided the means for a not inconsiderable coastal trade and which had been the most important consumer of imported goods there (i.e. of the whole of Sumatra; tr. note.).................................................." (52)

Van den Bosch further pointed out that while the Dutch East India Company had been able to restrict its activities to the coast from where it carried on its import and export trade with the interior, changed circumstances after the war forced the Dutch to occupy Minangkabau in order to remedy the unsettled conditions that were responsible for keeping production below par and in order to prevent the Minangkabaus from trading with Singapore. Experience had taught, van den Bosch argued, that the best means for establishing sound and

(52) Van den Bosch to Elout, 20th February, 1832. in Kielstra II, pp. 344-348.
durable control over an indigenous society was to exercise that control through the indigenous leaders themselves. He suggested therefore that the dynasty of Minangkabau should be revived, because such a prince, who would be completely dependent on the Dutch for his position would be a very malleable instrument through which to further the government's interests. A contract should be concluded with the prince of Minangkabau in which the latter was to recognize that his principality was a fief of the Dutch government and that it would be taken away from him if he did not exactly follow the orders and wishes of that government. Before the establishment of the dynasty, and in order to give it a greater degree of prestige, it was necessary to conquer the rest of Minangkabau and to establish the authority of the government there. After those areas had been conquered the authority of the government should first be consolidated and measures were to be taken to make the area profitable. Serviceable roads from Padang to the interior and from there to the East-Coast were a necessity, while another main road from North to South would facilitate communications with the Padang-East-Coast road. All the remaining trade outlets in Sumatra would have to be controlled in order to channel the whole of the island's trade into Dutch-held ports. The productive capacity of the island should be increased by means of forced
deliveries or by leaving the initiative to the population themselves, whichever proved to be feasible, but it should be kept in mind that Dutch rule was to be made as bearable as possible.

Elout was very enthusiastic about the proposals of van den Bosch, but he disagreed with the re-establishment of the Minangkabau dynasty, which for years had not exerted any influence on the population. To act through such an insignificant intermediary would give the population the impression that the government was really weak. The government's interest was therefore better served, according to Elout, when it ruled the Minangkabaus directly.

Even before Elout's comments had been received van den Bosch had decided to go ahead and had sent reinforcements to Padang, which arrived there during June. Soon afterwards, the Dutch offensive against the Padris of Minangkabau started and the Padri forces crumbled against the well-directed Dutch attacks. Lintau was conquered by the end of July; Bondjol fell into Dutch hands in September; and the last resistance of the Padris in the L Kotas was broken at the end of October.

The Padris of Minangkabau who had resisted Dutch penetration since 1821, had finally, so it seemed, been decisively beaten.

(53) Elout to van den Bosch, 8th June, 1832. in Kielstra II, p. 349.
Elout wrote enthusiastically about the situation in Minangkabau and he reported that the victories of the Dutch over the Padris had made a tremendous impression in the whole country. Many districts subjected themselves voluntarily and the leaders of areas as far away as the Batta country of Angkola and Toba came to subject themselves to the government and to ask its protection against the usurpations of the Padris and Achinese. The defeated Padris themselves seemed surprised at the humaneness with which the government treated them and at the Dutch praise of their attempts to stop the vices of the Minangkabaus such as cockfighting. Trade was flourishing and no less than 70,000 piculs of coffee had been delivered to Padang in 1832. Roads and forts were under construction in the newly conquered territories. The resident however was not altogether happy about the military situation, as he was afraid that the number of troops available would not be sufficient to cope with a major uprising against the government in such a vastly expanded area. He sent Captain de Quay to Batavia to explain the military situation to the government personally and to request more troops to keep peace and order and to maintain the authority of the government in the recently acquired possessions.


(55) Kielstra II, p. 373.
In the beginning of January, 1833 van den Bosch sent provisional instructions to Elout dealing with the administration and the military occupation of the West-Coast. It was repeated again that the main policy objective of the government was to add the whole of the territory between the Sunda Straits and the border of Achin to its possessions. The administrative structure as prescribed by the instructions differed in certain important aspects from the administrative regulations of 1823 and 1825 (See pp. 98-102 and pp. 105-106.) European officials were invested with administrative power to the district level and the positions of head-regents and regents were to be abolished. The village heads who were to be chosen according to local custom, were made directly responsible to the European official in charge of the district. The capital of the residency was to be established at such a point in the interior that troops could reach the most distant areas of the Residency within four or five days marching. In order to keep peace and order effectively small forts with a garrison of about 25 men should be erected in each district, while care was to be taken that all the indigenous fortifications would be abolished. No new taxes should be introduced, but the existing taxes on opium, salt, and passars (market-places) and the rates on imports and exports were to remain in force for the time being. Officials should try to abstain from interfering
in internal affairs as much as possible, while they should try to increase the productive capacity of the country by means of persuasion. In general the administration should be conducted in the most simple and inoffensive manner.

There was however no opportunity to put those instructions of van den Bosch into practice, because by the time they had reached Padang the country was in full uproar.

On the first of January, 1833 intelligence was received at Fort de Kock that two soldiers of the garrison of Bondjol had been killed near Pisang. Lieutenant-Colonel Vermeulen Krieger who with a detachment of troops had gone to Pisang to investigate, received a report there on 12th January, that the whole garrison of Bondjol had been killed by the population on the previous day. All the other garrisons of the Northern part of Minangkabau, with the exception of Fort Amerongen at Rau, shared the same faith as that of Bondjol. The government's authority in Agam and L Kotas was also severely shaken, but Elout managed to avoid a complete military collapse by concentrating his troops in Agam and Tanah Datar and by reinforcing the posts at the coast.

The fact that the Dutch forces were spread so thinly over the whole of the country, e.g. the garrison of Bondjol consisted

(56) Van den Bosch to Elout, 9th January, 1833. in Kielstra II, pp. 376-380.
of only 46 men, provided the Minangkabaus with the opportunity to stage a general rising, but its main cause was the growing dissatisfaction of most quarters of Minangkabau society with its new rulers. After the general defeat of the Padris in 1832 Elout tried to introduce measures to ensure endurable conditions of peace and order, but his attempts, although well intended, were generally unsuccessful. The measures which Elout took in Bondjol are an example of the failure of his policy to create settled conditions after the upheaval of the Padri war. Initially the resident re-established the original suku government in Bondjol, but when he found that Baginda Kale, the most prominent of the adat—chiefs, was not suitable to govern, he by—passed all of this chiefs twelve sons and the other of the adat—leaders, and instead appointed the former Padri leader, Tuanku Muda, the right—hand mad of Tuanku Imam, as regent of Bondjol. Elout had apparently been advised to take this step by Tuanku Alam of Kota Tua, whom he trusted completely, as this leader had succeeded several times in persuading Padri leaders to subject themselves to the government. Tuanku Alam managed to have Tuanku Imam and Tuanku Muda return to Bondjol from their hiding place in order to subject themselves to the government on the condition that their lives would be spared

(57) Kielstra E.B. "Sumatra's Westkust van 1833—1835" in BTIV 1889. p. 163. Note: Any further reference to this work will be indicated by: Kielstra III.
and they would be allowed to keep the possessions which they still retained. Tuanku Alam then suggested that Tuanku Muda should be appointed regent and Elout agreed to this. The resident called a meeting of the population informing them that this choice was provisional till the time when more candidates with greater rights to the government of Bondjol would have been found. Tuanku Muda was to govern according to the rules which were laid down by the Dutch government and was not allowed under any circumstances to re-introduce the severe measures of Tuanku Imam of which he had been largely the executor. This


Note: Tuanku Imam in his Memoirs relates the story of the appointment of Tuanku Muda as follows:

After Elout had called Tuanku Imam before him the resident told him: "You are old now, Tuanku Imam. You should not take any more work on; it is better, that you will enjoy peace and quiet in your old days and leave the care of work to the younger people." 'I agree', Tuanku Imam said, 'I will follow your advice and your wise judgement, Colonel, and I subject myself to your wishes.' 'Then you can', so Colonel Elout continued, 'choose somebody from amongst you, who is capable of becoming your successor.' Thereupon Tuanku Imam replied: 'I will follow your wishes Colonel; because I do not know anybody who would be capable to succeed me than him on whom your choice will fall.' 'If then Tuanku Imam leaves that choice to me' so continued Colonel Elout, 'then I would like to appoint Tuanku Muda as regent of the region of Alahan Pandjang, because is not this Tuanku Muda really the favoured of Tuanku Imam and has good judgement and is capable and courageous?' 'I agree,' Tuanku Imam said, 'I will follow your advice.' Then Colonel Elout suggested to call together on the following morning all the penhulus and hulubalangs and the people of Bondjol, in order to appoint Tuanku Muda as regent of the region of Alahan Pandjang............"

Source: De Stuers op.cit. vol. 2. Bijlage B. p. 229.
move obviously caused a stir among the adat-party and with them the larger part of the population resented the appointment of a person, who had terrorized them for so many years. A second factor which caused a great deal of dissatisfaction was the rather drastic way in which Elout disposed of the many disputes which existed about the ownership of property between the Padris and their opponents who had returned from exile. The Resident ordered that those who were in the actual possession of property at the time of the arrival of the Dutch forces would be considered as the legal owners. Elout had also ordered that prisoners of war kept as slaves should be released on the payment of ransom. This caused a great deal of trouble in regard to the Batta slaves who were pagans and therefore not considered by the Minangkabaus as coming under the provision of the adat. Elout ordered that the Batta slaves should be gradually released so that the people of Bondjol would be forced to work their own ricefields and take a greater interest in agriculture generally. This measure also caused a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Dutch, because many of the Batta women who had been taken prisoners had been taken as second or third wives or concubines by the men of Bondjol and even the regent Tuanku Muda was forced to

release a woman who had a child by him. The third and probably the most important cause for dissatisfaction with the Dutch was the wanton behaviour of the troops and their arbitrary interference with the people's liberty and property. The soldiers lived in the temple and in the houses of the town, from which they had ejected the inhabitants, and they brought:

"dogs and all kind of dirt into the temple and the houses.." and the people had to contend with forced labour and deliveries of rice without payment, while the troops appropriated the people's fruit, cattle and fish

"..The severe and callous actions of the troops caused a general rumbling in Alahan Pandjang and brought the inhabitants together at a general meeting at Tandike.."(61) Many grievances were brought up at that meeting and it was deplored that instead of a peaceful and quiet administration which they had expected under the government of the Dutch, they had instead been maltreated and surpressed. It was therefore resolved that the people would not stand for it any longer and that they would revolt. Letters were sent to the other districts exhorting them to rise against the Dutch on 3rd January, 1833.

(60) Government-Commissioner Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch, 25th December, 1833 in Kielstra III, p. 333.
(61) "Memorie van Tuanku Imam" in De Stuers op.cit. pp.230-231.
(62)"Memorie van Toeankoe Imam..." in De Stuers op.cit. pp. 230-231.
In Agam and Tanah Datar the people became dissatisfied with the government, when on the insistence of the former Padri leaders the Tuankus Alam and Nan Gapok it forbade the staging of cockfights, except on high feast days. Moreover, the name of the government was often made even more hated among the Minangkabaus by the unauthorised levying of taxation by indigenous officials who would use those levies for their own benefit. The regents of Bua and Tanah Datar had been found to levy tithes on their own account and when they were severely reprimanded by Elout they also became hostile to the government. The situation in Minangkabau was such that, even apart from the often bad behaviour of the troops and the inefficient civil administration which was largely conducted by inexperienced army officers, the hate and the jealousy which existed between the Padri and anti-Padri sections of the community had made it very difficult for the Dutch to introduce measures which would not offend at least one section of the Minangkabaus.

Soon after the rising occurred, Elout realized that he had put too much trust in the Padri leaders, who:

"...had only in appearance subjected themselves to the government, but their real purpose had been to win time. They will not be ruled by the uncircumcised, (i.e. the Dutch).............................................." (65)

(63) Kielstra II, p.370.
(64) Ibid. p. 371.
(65) Elout to De Quay, 28th February, 1833. quot. Kielstra III, p. 166.
Elout suspected that Sentot, the Commander of the Javanese legion, had been in contact with the leaders of the revolution long before it had taken place. According to the Resident, Sentot had planned to become the ruler of Sumatra with the help of the Dutch, whom he had promised the leaders of the rising to discard after he had reached his goal. Van Sevenhoven later was of the opinion that the Minangkabaus who hated Sentot because of his ostentation and his grand airs had played on his vanity and had therefore caused his downfall. In any case Sentot was tricked into coming to Padang from where he was sent to Batavia to justify himself against the charges brought by the Resident. The government was at a loss what to do with the prince and eventually exiled him to Bencoolen. Elout received information in March that the regent of Tanah Datar and the tuankus Alam, nan Gapok and nan Tjerdik had been involved in the conspiracy which had resulted in the rising of the previous January. Soon afterwards he had nan Tjerdik arrested and sent to Batavia, where he was released again, but forbidden to return to Sumatra. Tuanku Alam who was captured at the end of April was on the orders of Elout to be tried before the full assembly of the heads of Agam, but the tuanku was found dead in his prison and his "head was cut off and stuck on a pole". In May the regent of Tanah Datar was

(67) Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch, 25th December, 1833. in Kielstra III, p. 355.
(68) Kielstra III, op.cit. p. 184.
(69) Ibid. p. 187.
taken prisoner and sent to Batavia.

In May, 1833 van den Bosch decided to send an expedition of 1100 men to Sumatra under the command of Major-General Riesz, who was appointed Government-Commissioner for Sumatra with supreme civil and military authority. Elout was to remain military and civil commander of the West-Coast but he was to take his orders from Riesz. Van den Bosch planned to come to Sumatra himself to regulate affairs there in July or August by which time he expected that the whole of the interior would have been brought under control.

The expedition arrived in Padang in the latter part of June and the Dutch soon afterwards took the offensive again. Agam and L Kotas were brought under control once more and Riesz ordered that all the indigenous defensive structures around the kamponds of Agam were to be demolished within three weeks unless those kamponds wanted to be regarded as hostile to the government. Elout who had already taken a tougher line in his dealings with the Minangkabaus and had banished a number of their leaders, now advised to Riesz that the only way to establish order in Minangkabau was by brute force and he persuaded the government Commissioner to set an example to the population.

(70) Van den Bosch to Elout, 9th May, 1833. in Kielstra III, pp. 205-206.
by executing a number of Minangkabau leaders who had figured prominently in anti-Dutch activities.

Van den Bosch arrived in Padang at the end of August, 1833 and he ordered that a full scale attack on Bondjol should take place on 16th September. The first attack on Bondjol failed. Renewed attacks in the next few days, under the command of van den Bosch himself, were not any more successful. After this rather miserable debut on Sumatra soil, the Commissioner-General turned his attention to matters of administrative policy.

Soon after his arrival van den Bosch had observed that the population showed feelings of extreme bitterness towards the army and vice versa, which he believed was largely the fault of the formers' insensitive behaviour. When van den Bosch returned to Padang from his tour of the interior, he decided on a number of principles that would form the basis of a new administrative policy for the West-Coast of Sumatra. The general hostility shown to the government, he argued, was clearly due to the excessive use of unpaid forced labour, too much interference in internal affairs, onerous taxation, and arbitrary executions. The proof of his allegations were to be

(72) Riesz to Elout, 22nd July, 1833. in Kielstra III, p. 212.
(73) Kielstra III, p. 225.
(74) Van den Bosch to the Minister for Colonies, 26th August, 1833. in Kielstra III, pp. 221-222.
found in the friendly dispositions shown to the government by such districts as Batipu and Halaban where those incidents had not occurred, or only to a minor degree. The strong feelings of the Minangkabau towards his freedom and his own institutions and customs had apparently not been taken into account sufficiently by the officials and army personnel. The only way to restore the trust of the people in the Dutch government was to change the system of administration and to replace the existing Resident, who, although he was not to blame, would be connected too much in the people's mind with the old practices. Elout therefore was honourably discharged and replaced by the Councillor of the Indies, Van Sevenhoven, who was appointed Government Commissioner for Sumatra in

(75) Van den Bosch seemed to ignore the motives of those small districts to be on friendly terms with the Dutch. They had become the staunchest supporters of the government in its drive against the Padris in order to be able to rob and plunder the Padri-districts. The Dutch were only too careful not to offend those districts and they did everything possible to cultivate their friendship. But when the Padri war had finally ended and the opportunity to obtain spoils of war had dried up, Batipu revolted against the Dutch in 1841, but hardly gained any support of the rest of Minangkabau, which apparently had not yet forgotten what it had to suffer from that district during the civil war.

(76) Van den Bosch to Van Sevenhoven, 11th October, 1833. p. 230, Kielstra III.
conjunction with Major-General Riesz, although the latter would have the final say on points in dispute. Van Sevenhoven would be assisted by Francis, the inspector for the Outer-(77) establishments.

The new system of administration was to be based on the following principles:

The indigenous population should be freed from all pressing taxation; forced labour was to be avoided as much as possible, but if it was needed then it should be paid for. In fact a number of taxes had already been abolished by van den Bosch: a decree of 2nd October, abolished the tax on passars (market places) and fixed the wage rate for forced labour at 50 cents per day. On 7th October the tax on the killing of pigs and cattle was abolished and on the same day a tax on indigenous businesses in Padang, which had been introduced by Elout in the previous January, was withdrawn. (78)

The previous system of paying indigenous officials with part of the tax revenue was to be abolished, but instead those officials were to be paid monthly salaries ranging from 25 to 250 guilders according to their status and their capacity for furthering the interests of the government. The taxes on salt

(77) Resolution of van den Bosch, 11th October, 1833. in Kielstra III, p. 230
(78) Kielstra III, pp. 228-229.
and opium would remain as they were, but export duties were to be increased by 20%.

The autonomous rights of the population in internal affairs should be interfered with as little as possible and therefore the government was to refrain from appointing heads, interfering with the indigenous judicial system and any other internal matters. On the other hand the Dutch would retain the right to call up villagers for military service in case of emergency; to have access for its troops to the whole of the country; and to build roads and fortifications. Furthermore the government would have the right to arbitrate in internal disputes and to forbid or prevent wars.

Production, especially of those commodities which were in demand on the European market, was to be encouraged by monetary incentives and the grower should be free to dispose of his products. The population should be shown the benefits of Dutch rule, not its burdens. It would not be difficult to further the interests of the government concurrently with those of the population, because they converged to a large degree. The trade from the interior to the coast was of the utmost importance both to the government and to the Minangkabaus themselves, therefore anything which obstructed this trade such as taxation was to be abolished, while anything which would tend

(79) Resolution of van den Bosch of 11th October, 1833, in Kielstra III. p. 231.
(80) Ibid. p. 232.
to increase it, such as the building of roads, should be encouraged. Depots were to be erected at important centres in Minangkabau such as Fort van der Capellen and Fort de Kock, where a government guaranteed minimum price of 9 guilders per picul would be offered for coffee. This would attract a large proportion of the coffee crop to the government, because the local dealers would not be able to compete at this price and it would also encourage the population to increase their output. The Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij should be co-opted in the effort to raise the productive capacity of the country. The N.H.M. should be given a number of depots in the interior where the population could exchange their produce for such commodities as textiles, iron, salt and opium. The last two items could be supplied to the N.H.M. by the government at fixed prices. The Company would then have to deliver coffee to the government in exchange at the price of 9 guilders per picul. In order to prevent private traders from raising the local price of coffee the government could manipulate the export duties. On the other hand private enterprise should not be completely killed in order to prevent the N.H.M. from charging exorbitant prices for commodities to the population. This increase in production was only possible if an efficient transport service was set up and if roads were improved and new
ones built of a kind that could carry carts and horses.

Van den Bosch left Padang on 15th October, 1833 and arrived in Batavia on 13th November, where he wrote to the Minister for Colonies that in Sumatra new efforts had to be made in order to reach the final goal, but that after a personal visit and investigation he:

"...was more than ever convinced that that possession should be considered as of the utmost importance to the government, and the setback experienced there in the execution of the planned measures must be ascribed to the wrong direction which has been given to the affairs in Sumatra."

The Government Commissioners Riesz and van Sevenhoven commented on the policy instructions of van den Bosch as follows:

"...the principles, prescribed and developed therein, are completely different from those which formerly had been accepted for this coast, and which were the fruit rather of the illusions of the officials than of a thorough knowledge of people and land."(83)

On 25th October the Commissioners issued a decree, the so-called Plakaat-Pandjang (lit. Long Decree), which contained an exposition of the new government policy as prescribed in the resolution of 11th October. The decree was addressed to the population of Minangkabau and it stressed that the government had tried to redress those measures which were irksome to the

(81) Resolution of van den Bosch of 11th October, 1833. in Kielstra III, pp. 235-236.
(82) Van den Bosch to the Minister for Colonies, 23rd November, 1833. quot. Kielstra III, p. 249.
(83) Van Sevenhoven and Riesz to the Minister for Colonies, 11th November, 1833 in Kielstra III, p. 327.
population and those which were oppressive. The government was only interested in furthering the interest of the population as well as its own interests by trying to increase trade and by interfering as little as possible in the internal affairs of the country. In order that this plan should succeed the co-operation of the population was needed.

The new policy of van den Bosch however presumed that the whole of Minangkabau was effectively, or would soon be effectively under Dutch influence. But in this the Commissioner General was somewhat premature, because the subsequent long war with Bondjol (1833-1837) drained the resources and the energy of the Dutch to such an extent that they were prevented from putting the new ideas into practice.

After the departure of van den Bosch from Sumatra it took practically another four years before Bondjol was finally captured by the Dutch. This unexpected and rather costly affair brought van den Bosch nearly to despair and made him even consider abandoning his project for Sumatra altogether. Probably the most important factor responsible for this long drawn out war was the indecisiveness of the Dutch local authorities, which was caused by a sharp division of opinion.

(84) Plakaat Panjang (Long Decree), 25th October, 1833. in Kielstra III, pp. 322-326.
as to how Bondjol and the rest of the West-Coast was to be pacified.

The instruction left behind by van den Bosch for the new military commander Colonel Bauer did not leave much doubt as to how the Commissioner-General wanted military affairs conducted. Bondjol had to be captured by force as quickly as possible. The new commander was ordered firstly to pay special attention to questions of discipline and training. In regard to tactics he was advised to use surprise attacks, because experience had taught that open attacks on the enemy positions were often unsuccessful. Matua and the XII Kotas should be taken as quickly as possible and then Bondjol should be mastered. Auxiliaries of districts which had shown themselves friendly towards the government such as Batipu and Halaban should be used and their leaders were always to be treated with distinction. The army however should be severely disciplined at all times, because the people of the districts which were to be conquered should have no need to add any more grievances to the ones which they already harboured against the government. The population of the districts which came under government control after armed conquest should initially be required to work on the roads and to build forts and they should also pay the normal tribute to the Minangkabau auxiliaries.
After that, however, no more unpaid services were to be demanded from them.

Van Sevenhoven after he had investigated the situation in Minangkabau felt even more strongly than van den Bosch that so far the policies of the Dutch at the West-Coast had been clearly oblivious of the fact that instead of pacifying the population as intended they were creating a strong feeling of resistance against the government:

"...We did not even see that our actions were an unbearable burden; we have affected the arteries of the basis of the social existence of the Minangkabaus, and did not notice it............................................." (86)

In regard to Bondjol he thought that the Dutch themselves were largely responsible for the rising of January, 1833 because of their senseless actions. The people of Bondjol were right, in their view, to throw the oppressors out of their country. And although the Bondjollers were usually seen by the Dutch as traitors and murderers who should be punished, he could not see why:

"...we have the vocation to punish the nations for the wrongs which they, (only) according to our views, committed..................................................

(85) Instruction of van den Bosch to Bauer, 13th October, 1833 in Kielstra III, pp. 244-247.
(86) Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch, 25th December, 1833 in Kielstra III, p. 328.
(87) Van Sevenhoven to van den Bosch, 25th December, 1833 in Kielstra III, p. 334.
Van Sevenhoven therefore was of the opinion that attempts should be made to conclude peace with Bondjol and with the other hostile districts and he would bend all efforts in that direction. Van Sevenhoven however was not given a great deal of time to put his plans into effect, because soon afterwards he was replaced by his assistant Francis, who was appointed Resident of the West-Coast.

In a lengthy report Van Sevenhoven reiterated his opinions as to what policy should be followed on the West-Coast of Sumatra. He pointed out that the decision to go ahead with the conquest of Bondjol and the other hostile districts would mean that the new policy of administration would suffer a great deal, because the request for auxiliaries, victuals and coolie labour would undoubtedly cause a great deal of dissatisfaction. Furthermore any defeat suffered by the government troops on the West-Coast would endanger again the safety of the whole government territory. And defeat was not out of the question, because it could be expected that Bondjol and the other northern regions would put up fierce resistance, especially as the long drawn out war had taught them a great deal about the European military arts.

Van Sevenhoven's successor Francis had very similar ideas in regard to the policy to be followed on the West-Coast and although it was established from the instructions

left by van den Bosch, who in the meantime had left for
Holland, that Bondjol and the surrounding districts were to be
taken by force, Francis disagreed with this procedure and
Governor-General Baud decided on a compromise. The orders of
van den Bosch would be changed to the extent that no attack on
Bondjol would take place till all the requirements needed for
such an assault were available. The Resident in the meantime
would continue to try to bring those districts to terms by
negotiation.

Despite this decision the military commander, Lieutenant-
Colonel Bauer, started a military offensive in June, 1834
against the Padri districts to the North of Agam. Francis
however had received reports that those districts were willing
to co-operate with the government, although the position of
Bondjol was still uncertain. In any case the Resident had
specifically forbidden the military commander to start a military
offensive, because it would endanger the life of the negotiators

(89) Baud J C; born at The Hague, 1789; arrived in the Indies
1811; secretary of General Janssens; employed by British
administration, 1811-1816; secretary of Commissioners-
General and Governor-General van der Capellen; returned
to Holland in 1821; member of the foundation commission
of the N.H.M.; secretary Department of Colonies, 1824-
1832; on special mission to the Indies, 1832; Governor-
General ad interim, 1833-1836; Staatsraad (State Concillor),
1836; member of Raad van State (Advisory Council), 1838;
Minister for Colonies, 1840-1848; member of the Tweede
Kamer, 1850-1858.

(90) Decision of Governor-General Baud, 2nd May, 1834. in
Kielstra III. p. 355.
and it would also bring the intentions of the government under suspicion. The Resident pointed out that the insensible actions of Bauer had greatly damaged the trust of the Minangkabaus in the government and the dissatisfaction of the people would grow considerably, because the whole country had to be put on a war footing again with the consequent burdens of troop deliveries, forced labour for transport, and the construction of roads and forts.

Bauer justified his actions by pointing to the instructions of van den Bosch and the necessity of relieving the pressure exerted by the Padris on the Dutch forces to the North of Bandjol, from where he had received urgent requests for help.

The military offensive of Bauer caused a dispute about jurisdiction and both Francis and Bauer had written to Batavia and The Hague, where van den Bosch was now minister for Colonies, and tried to rule the affairs of Sumatra from afar, but with no less enthusiasm. As a result of his unauthorized actions Bauer was severely reprimanded by Governor-General Baud and although van den Bosch agreed with Baud's action he was very much opposed to the policy pursued by Francis. The minister believed that the attempts by various administrative officials on the West-Coast to interpret his instructions to Bauer as not necessarily

(91) Francis to Baud, 30th June, 1834. in Kielstra III, pp.370-71. (92) Kielstra III, p. 363.
meaning aggression, had been:

"..only a pretext in order to drive through their opinions about the way matters should be handled there, instead of strictly obeying orders. That Colonel Bauer should not have attacked without the permission of the resident is perfectly true; but the latter was also not allowed to protract the attack when everything was favourable to it..." (93)

Van den Bosch was not convinced at all that the Northern districts could be brought under control by peaceful means, because he believed that the Padris were only playing for time.

Peace negotiations with Tuanku Imam in October, 1834 had come to nothing because, Bauer believed, the war party in Bondjol was still too strong in Bondjol for the Tuanku to cope with. Subsequently the military commander against the will of Francis pressed on with his campaign and tried to isolate Bondjol as much as possible. The Resident however predicted that the resources available were not sufficient to take Bondjol by storm and he was of the opinion that the Padri stronghold would eventually give up if the blockade was kept up. Bauer in any case was forced by the approaching wet season to postpone his attack on Bondjol till the following year.

While in the first few months the preparations for the final assault on Bondjol continued, Francis went on to try to end the war by peaceful means. But by April the Resident had to

(93) Van den Bosch to Baud, 16th February, 1835. in Kielstra III, p. 377.
(94) Bauer to Elout, 7th October, 1834. in Kielstra III, pp. 472-473.
(95) Francis to Baud, 12th December, 1834. in Kielstra III, p. 475
admit that the successful completion of the negotiations was very doubtful and that to postpone the attack on Bondjol any longer would serve no purpose.

Bauer commenced his operations again on 21st April, 1835 and by June he had succeeded in surrounding the Padri fortress. This siege however, would last for more than two years. The Dutch forces were too weak to take Bondjol by storm and the effectiveness of the army and its morale was gradually weakened by the long wait and the recurrent fevers and diseases. By the end of 1835 Bauer was inclined to try negotiations again but now Francis was opposed to them because he feared that the discouragement of the troops, both European and indigenous, would become even greater. A decisive victory was sorely needed because the length of the war was causing a great deal of dissatisfaction among the rest of the Minangkabaus.

In November, 1835 the Batavian government decided to send Lieutenant Steinmetz to the West-Coast to compile a report on the actual situation in order to enable the government to take proper action to end hostilities. Steinmetz arrived in Padang on 8th January, 1836 and reported that the situation was bad, but not altogether hopeless. The force before Bondjol which consisted of only 1300 hundred regulars and 1500 hundred

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(96) Francis to Bauer, 10th April, 1835. In Kielstra III, pp. 484-485.
auxiliaries with a few pieces of ineffective artillery, was clearly insufficient to take Bondjol, and it was not even capable of conducting an effective siege, especially as disease and demoralization among the troops was high and even the commander, Colonel Bauer, was repeatedly incapacitated by sickness. The conclusion of Steinmetz that the Dutch forces were not able to close off Bondjol properly from the rest of Sumatra ties in with the reason given by Tuanku Imam in his memoir why he was able to keep the Dutch at bay for such a long time. Steinmetz continues his report by pointing out that for the Dutch troops to withdraw through such mountainous country would be murderous, especially as so many sick had to be carried. Furthermore the Minangkabaus in general seemed to be very dissatisfied with the situation and they appeared only to wait for the first major Dutch defeat in order to rise again against the government. Therefore there was no solution other than to destroy Bondjol but in order to do that considerable

(97) Report of Steinmetz 1836. in Kielstra E.B. "Sumatra's Westkust van 1836-1840" in BTLV. 1890. pp. 128-137. Note: Further references to this source will be indicated by: Kielstra IV.

(98) Tuanku Imam relates: "...the heads and the hulubalangs of the surrounding district of Agam and other districts, which had been conquered by the Dutch troops, sent letters from all sides to Tuanku Imam, in order to encourage him and to press him not to give up, while they came to his aid with people, powder and lead, which enabled him to resist so strongly..............................."
Source: De Stuers op.cit. p. 236.
reinforcements of troops and better and heavier artillery was needed.

The government in Batavia acted quickly on this advice and in February, 1836 it sent Major General Cleerens with strong reinforcements to Padang. Cleerens was told by Francis that a quick victory was sorely needed because of the threat of a general rising in the rest of Minangkabau, but Bauer was of the opinion that negotiations should be continued because of the deteriorated state of the army. Cleerens agreed with Bauer that peace should be made with Bondjol in order to avoid a general military collapse.

Francis, rather against his will, effected an armistice, but the following negotiations were very protracted owing to the dissension within Bondjol about the peace proposals suggested by the Resident. Both the Resident and the military leaders seemed to think that Tuanku Imam was willing to conclude peace but that he was held back from doing so by the warlike sections of the Bondjol community. Cleerens wrote at the end of May, 1836:

"...Daily I am becoming more confident about the negotiations; the raprochement between the soldiers and the Padris of Bondjol is growing every day. I am of the opinion that the fortifications on the mountain of Bondjol cannot be taken by force, and everybody else shares that feeling................................................." (100)

(99) Cleerens to Bauer, 28th April, 1836. In Kielstra IV, pp. 150-151.
(100) Cleerens to Cochius, 26th May, 1836. In Kielstra IV pp. 154-55.
Cleerens' hope for a peaceful settlement was rudely shattered when the Padris resumed hostilities at the beginning of June, 1836. The Dutch were now forced to act offensively, but it was not until December that after long preparation Cleerens attempted to take Bondjol by assault. The attack however was a complete failure.

The government now sent General Cochius, Commander in Chief, to Sumatra in order to investigate the situation and to report on what action was to be taken. Cochius suggested that Major-General Cleerens should be replaced in his command by an officer who was less hesitant, but who was well versed in Indian warfare and who had the capacity of infusing his troops with confidence and courage.

At the end of May, 1837 Batavia decided to replace Cleerens with Lieutenant-Colonel Michiels who was considered to have the required qualities, but had also shown himself to be very self-opiniated. Cochius therefore was requested to remain in Sumatra till he was sure that Michiels could be entrusted with the task.

Colonel Michiels took over the command of the army before Bondjol on 6th August, 1837 and he managed to capture this Padri redoubt by 16th August.

(101) Kielstra IV., p. 160.
(102) Cochius to the Governor-General, 8th May, 1837. in Kielstra IV. pp. 171-172.
(103) Governor-General De Eerens to Cochius, 31st May, 1837. in Kielstra IV. pp. 172-173.
Tuanku Imam had fled but on 28th October, 1837 he gave himself up to the Dutch who sent him into exile, first to Java and later to Ambon. He was transferred from there to Menado in 1841 where he died on 6th November, 1854.

After the fall of Bondjol the next military operation which the Dutch conducted was directed against the XIII Kotas, near Padang. Michiels had drawn a cordon of troops around this district and opened up negotiations with its leaders in order to effect a peaceful subjection. On 10th January, 1838 an agreement was reached with the Radja Bandara of Solok and Datu Sutan of Selaju to the effect that if they had not succeeded in persuading their people to subject themselves by the 26th of the month the Dutch would take up arms. The people of the XIII Kotas did not agree to this and the Dutch, aided by auxiliary troops from Batipu, Halaban, Tandjong Alam and Agam, invaded the district which after sporadic fighting fell into government hands at the end of February. The adjoining district of IX Kotas then also subjected itself to the government.

The most important military activities at the end of 1837 and during 1838 were concentrated in the Northern districts, where the Dutch were trying to eliminate the last of the Padris

(104) Kielstra IV. pp. 176-177.
(105) Michiels to Batavia, 12th February, 1839. in Kielstra IV. pp. 269-270.
who under the leadership of Tuanku Tambusi ruled over an extensive area largely populated by Battas. In November, 1837, van Beethoven, the officer in command of the Northern district occupied Pertibi, Kota Pinang and Padang Lawas. By March, 1838 Tuanku Tambusi had been pushed back within his own area and the Dutch troops were only five marching days from his main stronghold there: Dalu-Dalu. Owing mainly to the lack of sufficient forces it was December, 1838 before the Dutch captured Dalu-Dalu, the last stronghold of the Padris in Sumatra. The main purpose of the operations against Tuanku Tambusi had been, according to Michiels, to:

"...free the Battas from the suppression of the Padris and thus.....to secure the aid of a people, whose allegiance was guaranteed both by self interest and thankfulness..."(106)

Michiels received intelligence in December, 1838 that Tuanku Tambusi had instigated the head of Panei on the East-Coast to make a diversionary movement at the rear of the Dutch forces and that the head of Kota Pinang who did not want to co-operate in this move had been murdered. A detachment of infantry which was sent towards Kota Pinang went further than originally intended and set up a post at the confluence of the Panei and Bila rivers. Michiels also reported that in the beginning of 1838 relations had been established with the people of Mintareh, V Kotas, Kampar nan Sembilan, and VI Kotas

Panghalan Kota Baru, which were subsequently situated from North to South alongside the Dutch held territories of Lunder, Lubu Sikaping and L Kotas. Michiels thought that this would probably bring the sultan of Siak, the most powerful nation at the East-Coast, within the Dutch camp, because the districts which were government controlled accounted for most of Siak's trade.

Soon after the fall of Bondjol the heads of Baros, a port at the Northern end of the West-Coast, had requested Resident Francis under the terms of treaties made with the former Dutch East India Company for help against the Achinese who were pressing Southwards. The occupation of Baros however had to wait till Tuanku Tambusi had finally been defeated. In the meantime a few men-of-war went to Baros and surrounding ports in order to show the flag. Finally in April, 1839 Michiels had enough troops available to occupy this port. The Dutch occupation of Baros caused a stir among the Achinese of the seatowns of Tapus and Singkel and the commander at Baros reported that the Achinese were taking on a threatening attitude. Michiels decided to bring the ports of Tapus and Singkel into submission by a naval blockade, but his measure was apparently not effective nor did negotiations with the Radja of Singkel have any

(107) Michiels to Merkus, 12th December, 1839. in Kielstra IV. p. 272.
tangible results. On the 10th October, 1839 the Achinese attacked Baros in force but the assault was repulsed. The Dutch however did not want to attack the Achinese ports till they had sufficient troops and armaments available. On 9th April, 1840 Michiels started the offensive and by 13th April, Tapus was occupied, while Sinkel fell into Dutch hands on 25th May. The goal set by van den Bosch to bring the coastline of Sumatra from the Southern point to Singkel had been reached, while in the interior the government was in control of Minangkabau, the Southern Battalands, and had extended its influence as far as the East-Coast.

After a period of seventeen years of practically continuous warfare the Dutch had finally managed to extend their influence over an extensive part of the Western Coastline of Sumatra and the interior. Dutch authority in this area however was largely nominal, based as it was on conquest and subsequent military occupation. The anti-Padri sections of the community had so far stood behind the government and had aided it with troops, labour and food supplies, albeit with ever growing unwillingness, especially during the long fight with Bondjol. With the fall of Bondjol and the subsequent final defeat of the Padris the bond which tied the anti-Padri population to the Dutch was broken. The fear of the return of the ruthless Padris had shackled many of the Minangkabaus to the Dutch cause, but now those same allies had become actual or potential enemies of
the government. Already as early as 1824, Nahuys had pointed at the possibility of such a development when he quoted a Minangkabau leader as having said:

"...if only we had peace with the Padris of Lintau (then) we would have no need here of the Orang Hollanda (Netherlanders)........................."(108)

The continuous warfare with Bondjol had prevented the execution of most of the policy decisions which van den Bosch had made in 1833, but soon after this formidable Padri fortress had been conquered, attempts were made to put the administration of the West-Coast on a more solid footing, taking the plans and decisions of van den Bosch as a basis. (109)

On 29th November, 1837 Colonel Michiels was appointed governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra and the Resident Francis was honourably discharged. The governor was invested with the highest civil and military power and the area under his command was divided into two residencies: Padang, which included Minangkabau; and Ajer Bangis, which included the Batta lands. This administrative change was largely the result of representations

(109) Michiels Andreas Victor, (1797-1849); 2nd Lieutenant in Napoleon's army, 1814; went to the Indies in 1816; promoted to captain, 1818; major, 1828; lieutenant-colonel, 1832; colonel and governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra, 1837-1849; killed in action in Bali, 1849.
made by the Government-Commissioner, General Cochius, who had pointed out that the area under the government's control was too large to be handled effectively by the one Resident. The prescribed policy of economic development and non-interference in internal affairs, as laid down by van den Bosch in 1833, would take a great deal of supervision from above, which the Resident could not be expected to give, as he was tied up too much with administrative affairs in the capital Padang. Cochius had further argued that both the highest civil and military authority should be vested in the one person, in order to avoid the recurrence of clashes of opinion such as had occurred between Bauer and Francis, which had been so detrimental to the Dutch cause.

It was explained in a set of instructions to administrative officials that the major policy objective would be to make the Dutch government the most respected body in the country, surpassing the indigenous leaders in trustworthiness, wisdom and power. This process would be facilitated if care was taken to treat indigenous institutions and customs with the highest esteem. Another point to be kept in mind was that the existing disunity among the Minangkabaus in religious matters,

\[\text{(111) Cochius to De Eerens, 20th October, 1837. in Kielstra IV. pp. 181-189.}\]
caused by the rise of the Padri movement, should be left as it was, because such a situation was of political advantage to the government. Co-operation with the indigenous population was of the greatest importance but interference should be guarded against. Administrative officials were urged to learn more about indigenous languages and customs, which would help them in their attempts to explain to the population the rationale of government policy and which would also avoid misunderstanding that could so easily lead to unnecessary friction and trouble.

In case of open conflict with the government, local authorities were empowered to act on their own initiative, without first contacting their superior officers. If such action was taken then it would have to be effective, because experience had shown that a single defeat could be more damaging to the government's cause than inaction while awaiting reinforcements. (112)

In the instructions to the governor it was emphasized that the objectives which van den Bosch had stipulated in 1833 were to be continuously striven for. As Bondjol had been conquered, a feat that had created a great deal of respect for the government through the whole of the country, and as a large army was still in the field, the situation appeared favourable for the

(112) Instructions for Officers and Officials at the West-Coast of Sumatra. Resolution of Batavian Government. 29th November, 1837. in Kielstra IV. pp. 195-8.
attainment of those objectives. But, first of all the available military forces were to be used to consolidate the power of the government in those territories which had already been conquered in order that some benefit from those possessions in the form of increased agricultural export would accrue to the government.

In December, 1837 General Cochius had submitted proposals for the military establishment to be kept on the West-Coast, while also keeping in mind the plans of van den Bosch for the extension of Dutch control over the whole of Sumatra with the exception of Achin. The removal of the Padri threat, which made the whole of the Minangkabau population a potential enemy of the government necessitated the placing of strong garrisons in Minangkabau, while with Bondjol out of the way the opportunity should be taken to expand into the Northern areas where the Battas were apparently willing to become subjects of the government. The general estimated the number of troops needed on the West-Coast at 5239, excluding those required for Bencoolen.

Colonel Michiels was in full agreement with the proposals of Cochius and stressed that the opportunity should be taken

(114) Cochius to the Governor-General, 9th December, 1837. in Kielstra IV. pp. 209-220.
(115) Lange "Nederlandsch Oost Indisch Leger..." op.cit. vol. II. p. 299.
to bring the whole coastline as far as Sinkel under Dutch control, but he would need extra troops in addition to those requested by Cochius in order to carry out such a campaign with success. Steinmetz, head of the civil administration of Minangkabau, was also of the opinion that the fall of Bondjol had exerted a favourable effect; the opportunity should be taken to execute the plans for expansion, especially as so many Sumatran nations of the Eastern side of the island were sending emissaries to establish relations with the Dutch government.

Although governor-general De Eerens was in general agreement with the proposals of Cochius, he referred the final decision to the Hague, especially as the cost of the proposed military establishment was high. At an estimated two million guilders per year it formed a quarter of the total military budget approved by the King. The governor-general informed the home government that he had authorized the Military Department in Batavia to work for the time being on the basis of Cochius' proposals.

The Hague however was not very impressed with the rather expensive proposals and the King on the advice of van den Bosch

approved the appointment of P. Merkus (119) as Government Commissioner for Sumatra, whose task it would be to devise a civil and military organisation for Sumatra, more in line with the thinking of the High Government, especially that of van den Bosch, who in a long and detailed memorandum to the governor-general explained his ideas as to how the affairs of Sumatra were to be handled in future. Van den Bosch criticized the proposed organization on the grounds that the proposals were apparently made without considering the actual objective which the government had in mind in regard to Sumatra. It was impossible to subject and subsequently occupy the whole island by force. The establishment of Dutch authority could only be based on a policy of co-operation with the indigenous population and consideration to its institutions and customs. Authority would be durable and well established only when the Sumatrans finally realized that they were better off under the conditions of protection and of peace and order granted by the government.

(119) Merkus, Pieter; born at Naarden, 1787; studied law at Leiden; went to the Indies in 1815 where he held a number of important administrative posts; governor of the Moluccas, 1822-1827; President of the High Court, 1828; Member of the Raad van Indië (Council of the Indies), 1829; returned to Holland 1836, where owing to his liberal ideas he came in conflict with van den Bosch and was pensioned off; reinstated to his previous position in 1838 and returned to the Indies in 1839; government commissioner for Sumatra, 1839; vice-president of the Raad van Indië, 1840; acting governor-general, 1841; governor-general, 1842; died at Surabaya, 1844.
If that policy objective had been kept in mind then it would have seemed obvious that military force was hardly necessary nor that such a large administrative staff would have been needed. The main task of the administration was to keep intact the indigenous institutions and the friendly relations with the population, while interfering as little as possible in the internal affairs of the country. Van den Bosch agreed that financial sacrifices had to be made in order to subject Sumatra to government control, but he was opposed to accepting the submitted proposals unless it could be proved that there was no other way of reaching the desired objective, which was to make the productive capacity of Sumatra serviceable to the Dutch. The Cochius submission, van den Bosch complained, also failed to show how the money was to be found for such an expensive organization. It would seem that the expenditure required would absorb a large part of the profit made in Java for a considerable time to come. It would be very unwise to try to reach the projected goal of increased production and trade by force because the Sumatrans themselves had their own industries and they liked to trade and they were furthermore very attached to their freedom and their own way of life as regulated by the adat. Unfortunately too many officials, especially military officers, were unable to see that the administrative policies followed in Java were not suitable in
Sumatra, where circumstances and the indigenous background were so different. In Sumatra the Dutch should only interfere when the state of peace and order was interrupted by internal dissension or by open resistance against the government. In the areas which had already been subjected the following principles of administration were to be adhered to:

The indigenous leaders should be united with the government cause. Any measure which would diminish the prestige and standing of the indigenous leaders were to be avoided. The alliance of the population to their leaders was not to be used under any circumstances to introduce taxation or compulsory labour services, because a head who was willing to co-operate in those matters with the government would lose his influence among his people. The indigenous leaders were to be paid regular salaries the cost of which was to be met from the income of import and export duties and not from direct taxes on the indigenous population.

The sole advantage then which the Dutch could expect from Sumatra was a greater share of that island's trade, while on the other hand they should try to increase that trade as much as possible. This would not be difficult, considering that the Sumatrans were industrious and carried on a considerable trade on their own account. Production and trade would increase when communications were improved and Dutch traders moved into the interior to establish trading posts there and to introduce the
In regard to the territories which were not yet under Dutch control van den Bosch laid down the following rules which were to be observed when expansion into those areas was planned: firstly, the construction of roads leading to those districts was a pre-requisite for any further move. The coastal area should be occupied first, where the policy of non-interference and economic development should be strictly adhered to, and where indigenous fortifications were to be demolished. The next step would be to contact, with the help of the indigenous leaders of the coastal area, the people of the interior districts, who van den Bosch thought, would be sensible enough to co-operate with the government when they had witnessed the prosperity of the coastal district growing under the rule of the Dutch.

Van den Bosch was convinced that such a policy if strictly adhered to could not produce any friction nor dissatisfaction as neither the political liberties nor the economic prosperity of the inhabitants was adversely affected but instead would be greatly improved. He agreed however that such a state of affairs could not be expected to come about straight away and for the time being extraordinary means would have to be employed. In peace time the following policy was to be adopted: the strength of the military establishment would be
as large as Sumatra itself could pay for, while as a last resort and in times of great necessity a temporary loan could be raised on expected revenue. In case of war military expenditure would have to be supplemented from Java.

Those principles and ideas of van den Bosch were incorporated in the instructions given to the newly appointed Government-Commissioner for Sumatra, Merkus, who arrived in Padang in July, 1839.

While Merkus was ordered to adhere to the principle of least possible interference, as laid down by van den Bosch, he realized that the European government had to make some contact with indigenous society if it wanted to reach its objectives. One of the main objectives of the Dutch was the maintenance of peace and order, which was a pre-requisite to the real interest of the government in Minangkabau: the advancement of production and trade. The indigenous political situation, as Merkus saw it, was still very unsettled and explosive. The Minangkabaus were by nature quarrelsome and small disputes, which were ever recurrent, could and often did develop into more serious trouble. In addition the Padri war, which only recently had

(120) Memorandum of van den Bosch to Governor-General de Eerens, 29th December, 1838: The Introduction of this memorandum is printed in Kielstra IV, pp. 285-289, and the remainder is to be found in the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, 1867, I, pp. 387-407.

(121) Instructions to Merkus, 29th December, 1838, in Tijdschrift voor Nederlands Indie, 1867, I, pp. 408-414.
been decisively concluded, had left in its wake many points of dispute of a political and socio-economic nature. The introduction of a centralizing and a stabilizing force was highly necessary. Previous attempts to introduce an indirect system of government as existed in Java where a number of regents, who were directly responsible to the Dutch government, stood at the head of an indigenous administrative system, had ended in failure. The first regent of Tanah Datar, who was a member of the old Minangkabau dynasty, had been removed from his office because of inefficiency and treason, while in Agam and L Kotas the appointed regents commanded far less prestige among the people than the traditional suku-heads. Even in Batipu the regent, who had enriched his people such a great deal with the spoils of war from the anti-Padri districts during the Padri war, appeared to have difficulties in keeping his territory under control. The introduction of a more centralized indigenous administration, as the Padris had attempted and which had caused such a great deal of fierce opposition from the adat-conscious Minangkabaus, was still very impolitic. The place taken in Java by the indigenous officials (regents) should in Minangkabau be occupied by the Dutch themselves. Those European officials would have as their main task to become acquainted with the numerous indigenous leaders in their districts and they should try to cultivate the friendship of
these heads as much as possible in the interest of the government. They should try to get the "feel" of the people's mentality and try to gain their confidence in order to guide them gradually to the realization that their own interests were closely tied up with those of Dutch. The regulations of 1837, Merkus argued, did little to remedy the political anarchy which existed in the country. Under those regulations the country was divided into a large number of districts, where the officers in charge received their orders directly from Padang. This caused a disruption of administrative cohesion where it was most needed i.e. at the local level. Merkus therefore suggested that the large number of districts should be reformed into larger administrative units (afdeling) at the head of each of which an administrative officer with the rank of assistant resident should be placed, who would have sufficient discretionary power to deal with those affairs which were related to his own area. In addition the prestige of the administrative officer, which had suffered such a great deal during the Padri-war, should be enhanced by raising his status and granting him more power in order to obliterate the existing image of the administrative officer among the population:

"as a subordinate authority, supplying coolies and foreseeing in the needs of the military...........

(122) Proposals of Merkus on the administrative organisation of the West-Coast, 13th March, 1840 in Kielstra IV. p.322.
Merkus then proposed to divide the West-Coast into the following assistant-residencies: Padang, Tanah Datar, Agam, L Kotas, Priaman, Ajer Bangis, Rau, Mandailing and Ankola.

Apart from the introduction of larger self-contained administrative units Merkus wanted to integrate those units into residencies, the areas of which were demarcated according to ethic lines. The Batta population of the Northern districts was to be administratively separated from the Minangkabaus, while Padang and surrounding districts would form a separate residency from Minangkabau Proper. Merkus concluded that the proposed administrative structure would probably conflict with the intentions of his instructions, but he considered that the idea of van den Bosch to leave indigenous society completely on its own was not practicable under the circumstances. A great deal of European supervision was needed to keep peace and order in the country and only when the population had been forced to become used to conditions of peace and order could they be left to their own devices and the size of the administrative establishment be subsequently diminished.

Those proposals of Merkus were provisionally approved by the Batavian government, pending final acceptance in The Hague.

On 3rd September, 1840 Merkus issued regulations for the governor of Sumatra's West-Coast and the residents of the

(123) Resolution of the Batavian Government, 13th April, 1840. in Kielstra IV, pp. 326-328.
Padang Highlands (Minangkabau) and Ajer Bangis. Those regulations formed the basis of Dutch administrative policy on the West-Coast till 1870 and they were the final outcome of a period of trial and error that had lasted for nearly twenty years. Gradually the Dutch had come to realize that the Sumatran social and economic structure and the mentality of the people demanded the application of principles of administrative policy different from those adhered to in Java. The regulations of 1840 were a far cry from the attempt in the early twenties to introduce a uniform administrative system throughout the Archipelago, based on the Javanese pattern. The Dutch realized that they were not strong enough to rule the whole of the East Indies by force, nor that they had enough manpower available of the right calibre to set up an administration which was run completely by European officials. And even if they had, the cost of such an establishment would have been regarded as prohibitive in the light of the profit motive which was the most important basis of Dutch colonial policy at this time. The Dutch therefore assigned to themselves the role of a police force which would establish and maintain conditions of peace and order as a pre-requisite to the encouragement of production and trade. Indigenous society was

(124) Kielstra IV, pp. 337-341.
(125) See pp.
to be left as it was and no new-fangled European political or social ideas, including Christianity, were to be introduced to the population, lest peace and order should be disturbed and remittances to the mothercountry suffer. In Java the "culture system" was introduced, a system, which according to van den Bosch, was based on principles that were generally accepted in the existing indigenous society. The Prince was the landlord while the farmers were his tenants paying rent in the form of money or in kind to the Prince. The government had taken the place of the former landlords. In Minangkabau the land was largely owned by the village communities and therefore the government could not take over ownership, as it had done in Java, without causing a great deal of social and political disturbance. Thus van den Bosch decided to improve the productive capacity of Minangkabau by indirect means: i.e. improvement of the system of communications, the introduction of the population to European manufactures, the protection of merchants and traders and the granting of minimum prices for coffee and other produce desired by the government. At the same time the population's autonomy in the running of its own affairs would be untouched. Increased prosperity would make the Minangkabaus eventually realize that their own interests co-incided with those of the government and a closer co-operation with the Dutch would be the result. Van den Bosch was convinced that economic development would increase the
state of civilization of the indigenous population, which would become more "reasonable" and therefore less troublesome, to the greater benefit of both parties concerned.

The governor then was specifically ordered to carry out his administration according to the principles laid down by van den Bosch in 1833. In no case was he allowed to undertake military expeditions without the foreknowledge and approval of the Governor-General. The main objective of his administration was the maintenance of peace and order, and the development and extension of production and trade, in order to increase by those means the country's income. The population of the West-Coast was to be given the greatest possible autonomy in the running of its own affairs and the governor was instructed to pay special attention to the improvement and extension of communications, the introduction of new branches of agriculture and the extension of the existing ones, the advancement of trade with areas which were not under the immediate control of the government, the production of building materials and the training of indigenous people as tradesmen.

The instructions for the residents were on similar lines

as those to the governor, although they were somewhat more
detailed.

The governor of the West-Coast, Colonel Michiels, was
particularly vexed about the regulation forbidding him to
undertake military expeditions without the previous approval

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(127) *Instructie voor de residenten der Padangsche Boven-
landen en Ajer Bangis, 3rd September, 1840. in Kielstra
IV. op. cit. pp. 337-341.*

Extracts:

"Art. 6. They shall always keep in mind that as main
principle of the administration of the West-Coast of
Sumatra has been adopted:

a. that the indigenous population shall be exempted
from all pressing direct taxes;

b. that she shall be exempted from all unpaid seignorial
services, with the exception of the construction and
maintenance of roads;

c. that, as the population of the various districts
shall be left in the complete possession of its
autonomous rights, the Government will refrain from
appointing heads and from interfering with the
internal police, the carrying out of justice and
all internal affairs; but that to the contrary it
has retained for itself (the right):

1. to call up, if necessary, from each district men,
the number of whom to be regulated later, to be
used as auxiliaries either against internal or
external enemies;

2. to erect forts and to construct roads for the
maintenance of public order and the advancement
of trade;

3. not to allow wars between districts or kampons,
but to settle all disputes, about which the parti-
es cannot come to an agreement, by mediation and
common discussion;

4. to punish before the Council of Justice at
Padang, crimes committed against the Government
such as rebellion, obstruction, the murder or ill
reatment of government personnel or soldiers,
the theft of its property and also similar offences
committed against persons, who are under the
Government's protection"

.../Contd.
of Batavia. Merkus had further explained to Michiels that he could act on his own account in cases, where districts, which so far had remained independent, showed willingness to subject themselves voluntarily, but were held back from doing so by influential minorities. If a major conflict developed from such military action then the governor would have to refer to Batavia. Michiels argued that it was not possible to judge a priori if the expected resistance of a minority group in an unoccupied district would not develop into a major conflict. If it did then one could not expect the military commander to wait for orders from Batavia. According to Michiels persuasion would not be enough to bring the remaining independent districts under government control. Persuasion should be supported by at least a show of force if not the actual use of it. The governor concluded his argument by pointing out that the great change to the better which had taken place on the West-Coast since 1837 had occurred during

(127) Contd.

"Art. 10. They shall encourage with all the proper means the output of all products suitable for the European market, (they shall) try to improve the existing branches of production, especially those of coffee and pepper, and try to introduce new ones. For the encouragement thereof and that of trade they shall give all help and assistance.

(128) Merkus to Michiels, 7th September, 1840. in Kielstra IV, op.cit. pp. 341-342.
his term of office and as a result of his policies:

"Already one sees the Malay (i.e. Minangkabau) forget his beloved rifle for new agricultural pursuits; (and) proper coffee plantations are being laid out in the Padang Highlands under the direction of the officials." (129)

This rather idyllic situation as portrayed by Michiels was rudely and unexpectedly disturbed by an anti-government rebellion in Batipu, a region which for a number of years had been one of the staunchest supporters of the Dutch in their drive against the Padris. The rising of Batipu will be discussed in the next section as it had some affect on a decision made in the Hague in 1841 to revert or rather slow down the rate of Dutch expansion into Sumatra, as envisaged by van den Bosch and Michiels.

(129) Michiels to van den Bosch, 22nd October, 1840 in Kielstra IV. op. cit. pp. 345.
SECTION IV.
SUMATRA SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND HOME POLITICS: 1841-1850.

By 1840 the plan of van den Bosch to subject the whole of Sumatra — with the exception of Achin — had nearly been completed. In their drive against the Padris since 1821 the Dutch had occupied Minangkabau; the Southern Battalands; the West-Coast up to the borders of Achin; and they had also penetrated into the East-Coast, where at the confluence of the Panei and Bila Rivers they had established a small post. In the meantime the Dutch had expanded into the East-Coast area from another point i.e. Palembang. In 1834 the Sultan of Djambi had called on the Dutch resident of Palembang for help against his unruly vassals. Subsequently a treaty was concluded in which the Dutch were granted the right to rebuild their old fort at Muara Kompeh and to levy import and export duties. In 1839 after continuing internal dissension the Batavian government decided to dethrone the sultan and to declare Djambi government territory i.e. to bring this region under direct Dutch administrative control instead of leaving the administration to the Sultan and his officials. In 1838 a contract was

concluded with Indragiri in which sovereignty was transferred to the Netherlands government, but the indigenous administrative structure left intact. However, when the Batavian authorities in 1840 were preparing to extend their influence over Siak and its dependencies - which would have completed their objective of controlling the whole of the East-Coast - they were stopped, rather unexpectedly, by an order from The Hague.

On 1st September, 1841, Baud, the Minister for Colonies, ordered the Batavian government to withdraw its troops from Eastern Sumatra. But he added rather significantly that before the actual withdrawal the local rulers should be made to recognize Dutch sovereignty. This decision to withdraw was obviously in conflict with the Sumatra policy of van den Bosch, which was designed to bring the whole of Sumatra within the control of the Dutch within a 25 year period. Yet in trying to find an explanation for this new move it is difficult to assume that Baud, who was the right hand man of van den Bosch and the

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(2) Baud to Batavia, 1st September, 1841. in Kielstra V, pp. 390-397. Note: The order of Baud was as follows:"...in general the following line of action is to be prescribed i.e. a. Withdrawal of all civil and military posts at the East-Coast, also of those posts in the interior which are immediately connected with the occupation of the East-Coast. Djambi, Bila and other intermediary points are included in this order; but care has to be taken, when withdrawing, to obtain full recognition of our sovereignty."
executor of the "culture system", disagreed on principle with
the established Sumatra policy. In point of fact most of the
available evidence shows that The Hague's decision to withdraw
from the East-Coast of Sumatra was the result mainly of British
pressure. For this reason it is necessary at this point to
discuss in some detail the state of Anglo-Dutch relations since
1824.

Although the treaty of 1824 ostensibly had settled the
territorial and economic questions which had arisen since the
return of the Dutch to the Indies in 1816, the relations between
the two countries had deteriorated considerably since, owing
mainly to increased commercial rivalry.

Accordingly it should be recalled that Holland since 1816
had been trying to regain a share of the Java market by means of
protecting its shipping and industry. But when it appeared that
those measures did not have the desired effect, the Batavian
authorities took more drastic steps and in February, 1824 passed
an ordinance which subjected cottons and woollens of foreign
origin to a duty of 25%, while admitting Dutch textiles duty-free.
This measure, as the British were quick to point out, was in
conflict with article 2 of the treaty of 1824, which stipulated

(3) See: [book], Section I, pp. 29-35.
that duties on British imports were not to be more than one hundred percent higher than those levied on Dutch goods, while in the case of Dutch goods being admitted duty-free, no more than 6% was to be levied on British goods. But the Dutch government contended that as the article in question only referred to ships and citizens and not to goods, the ordinance of February, 1824 was not at variance with the treaty.

At any rate Britain appears not to have pressed the question any further. Probably the most important reason for this was the desire of the British government - considering that British imports into Java were still rising despite the high

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(4) Canning to Falck, 25th February, 1825, in Posthumus "Documenten.." op.cit. p. 112.

(5) Elout to van Reede, Minister for Foreign affairs, 19th March, 1825. in. Ibid. pp. 113-115. Note: The actual wording of article 2 of the treaty of 1824 was as follows: "The subjects and vessels of one nation shall not pay, upon importation or exportation, at the ports of the other in the Eastern Seas, any duty at the rate beyond the double of that at which the subjects and vessels of the nation to which the ports belongs, are charged. The duties paid on exports or imports at a British port on the continent of India or in Ceylon on Dutch bottoms, shall be arranged so as in no case, to be charged at more than double the amount of duties paid by British subjects, and on British bottoms. In regard to any article upon which no duty is imposed, when imported or exported by the subjects, or on the vessels of the nation to which the port belongs, the duty charged upon the vessels or the subjects of the other shall in no case exceed six percent." in Smulders C M "Geschiedenis van het tractaat van 17 Maart, 1824 gesloten tussen Nederland en Groot-Britannie.." Utrecht, 1856. pp.64-65.
duties - not to strain unnecessarily the traditional ties of friendship with Holland at a time when its relations with the ultra-reactionary Holy Alliance - of which France in the meantime had become a member - had become far less cordial, especially after it had given support to the nationalist movements in Greece and South America.

Yet, soon after Belgium had broken away from Holland in 1830, Britain re-iterated its previous requests for an alleviation of duties on British imports in the Dutch colonies. This renewal of British protests about Dutch colonial tariff policy after a lapse of more than six years should be seen in the context of the vast change which had taken place in the European

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[(6) The following statistics might illustrate this point:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dutch Origin</th>
<th>British Origin</th>
<th>Other Foreign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>213,061</td>
<td>1,384,834</td>
<td>80,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>1,266,495</td>
<td>738,186</td>
<td>119,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>856,087</td>
<td>1,698,740</td>
<td>43,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>2,940,635</td>
<td>1,819,435</td>
<td>23,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,276,278</td>
<td>5,641,195</td>
<td>266,835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Posthumus "Documenten..." op.cit. p. 228.

(7) Note: It should be noted that the Dutch King, although bound by a written constitution in fact ruled as a benevolent despot. He was able to do so because by a great deal of financial juggling he managed to avoid Parliamentary censure on many of his personal policies. Continued pressure from Britain could have driven the Dutch into the French camp, which would have defeated Britain's original intention in setting up the United Kingdom of the Netherlands to act as a strong bulwark against France.
international situation since the French and Belgian revolutions of 1830.

For, soon after the Belgians had revolted against the Dutch in August, 1830, it became apparent that the Dutch King stood alone in his attempts to subdue his rebellious subjects in the South. The Great Powers — who at the Congress of Vienna had guaranteed the integrity of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands — one after the other refused to intervene on behalf of William I, because most European statesmen — with the exception of a few French and Dutch extremists — were unwilling to risk a general war over Belgium, which it was feared would result from intervention. The immediate danger, however, of a war between France and Belgium on the one side and the Eastern Powers — i.e. Russia, Austria and Prussia — on the other was averted by two developments. Firstly Russia which intended to send an army against the Belgians was prevented from doing so by the outbreak of the Polish rebellion. Subsequently Austria and Prussia refrained from military intervention, as they were now without the actual support of Russia. Secondly England, which — in order not to disturb its rapid economic growth — was bent upon preserving peace, to that purpose called a meeting of the Great Powers in London. Talleyrand — now Louis Phillipe's ambassador in London — supported the British proposal to declare Belgium independent, a move which had actually been designed by Palmerston to keep the Belgians from asking for military assist-
ance from the French. But Louis Phillipe, realizing the danger posed by the Holy Alliance to his regime, desired to come to terms with England, the only other non-absolutionist power in Europe. Both Palmerston and Talleyrand were convinced of the desirability of an Anglo-French "rapprochement" in order to counter-balance the Holy Alliance. Consequently an entente between England and France - although a very uneasy and precarious one - came about.

Thereupon the Great Powers - to the chagrin of the Dutch King - decided in December, 1830 to declare Belgium independent. However, the conditions of separation - the so-called XXIV Articles - were rejected by the Belgian Congress; and a revision of the Articles was in turn rejected by the Dutch King. But in order to settle the Belgian question speedily the Great Powers guaranteed the newly elected King of the Belgians, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the execution of the conditions of separation. Upon which William I sent his army into Belgium; and the Dutch were only prevented by French military intervention from completely routing the Belgian forces. Subsequently, in order to force the Dutch King into line the British and French governments decided in October, 1832 to blockade the Dutch coast and to place an embargo on Dutch shipping. This embargo, however, was lifted

again in May, 1833, when at a conference in London between England, France and Holland a preliminary settlement was reached, which provided for an armistice and the retention of the status quo until the question would be finally settled. However, the Dutch King, clinging to the hope for a change in the international climate that would be more favourable to the Dutch cause, refused to come to a final agreement with Belgium until 1839. This policy of "perserverance" proved to be a very heavy burden on the Dutch treasury, because Holland was forced to keep a large standing army and was furthermore obliged to repay the whole of a considerable state debt, part of which would have otherwise been taken over by Belgium.

The Belgian revolution and its aftermath i.e. the obstinacy of William I in refusing to accept the conditions of separation as laid down by the London Convention - had a profound effect on Dutch colonial policy.

In order to state the issues at stake clearly it should be recalled here that the economic policy of William I had been designed to reach the following three objectives: to revive Dutch trade; to encourage secondary industry in the home country; and

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to make the colonies financially self-sufficient and, if possible, profitable to the mother country. Those three objectives were interdependent. Consequently in order to break the British monopoly of the Java trade William I had founded the Nederlandse Handelsmaatschappij (Netherlands Trading Company) a large trading body, which the King argued would be in a better position to challenge the British than small individual ventures. From their side the East Indian authorities had introduced a number of measures protecting Dutch shipping and Belgian industry. Although those measures benefited Dutch merchants and Belgian industrialists, the price differential between East Indian imports and exports, especially after the fall in coffee prices during the twenties, caused a chronic balance of payments problem in the Indies. A reduction of imports was not feasible as Belgian manufacturers were dependent on the colonial market and Dutch shippers were in need of home manufactures in order to make voyages profitable in the fact of stiff English competition. The only other solution to the problem therefore was to raise the output of export commodities. The "culture system", as proposed by van den Bosch, was primarily intended to solve the recurrent balance of payment problems in the colony. Furthermore, van den Bosch argued, a state-controlled production system would enable

(10) For a more detailed description of the Nederlands Handelsmaatschappij see Section III, p. 132. Further references to this company in the text will be indicated by the abbreviation: N.H.M.
the government to make the N.H.M., which hitherto had suffered only losses, a paying proposition by consigning to it government produce for shipment to Holland, thereby cutting out a great deal of foreign competition.

But while van den Bosch was still engaged in introducing his system, the outbreak of the Belgian revolution and the subsequent heavy financial burdens on the home treasury forced him to expand the "culture system" on a far wider scale than originally had been intended. Apart from being a remedy for colonial financial difficulties the system of van den Bosch became an indispensable means of keeping Holland financially afloat during the difficult years of "perseverance" between 1830 and 1839.

Secondly the Belgian revolution had an equally drastic effect on Dutch colonial trade. Prior to 1830 Belgian industrial production had been an integral part of Dutch economic policy. The King who was a shrewd merchant and who had studied at first hand the tremendous economic changes which had been taking place in England during his prolonged stay there, realized from the inception of his reign that Dutch traders would never be able to compete with the British, unless they could export manufactures produced in the home country which would make their outbound

(11) See : Section III, p.132.
journeys worthwhile. Consequently the King actively supported Belgian industry - which had sprung up during the regime of Napoleon - by opening up the colonies for its products.

However, with the separation of Belgium in 1830, one of the cornerstones of Dutch post-war economic policy i.e. industrial production, fell away; and Holland which had virtually no industry found itself in a worse trading position than in 1814.

British traders were not slow in seizing the opportunity presented by the Belgian separation and the resulting weakened international position of Holland to request the British government to press the Dutch for tariff concessions in Java. British commercial and manufacturing interests welcomed the break up of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, which meant that Belgium would lose its preferential position in the Dutch colonial market, while Holland, devoid as it was of secondary industry, would be forced to supply its colonies with manufactures from foreign sources. Under those circumstances, it was argued in British trading circles, it would obviously be harmful to Dutch interests to keep charging high duties on foreign imports into Java, because the resulting high prices would cause a considerable decline in the consumption of European imports. Therefore the British government should request Holland to lower its tariffs in the colonies, offering in return a larger share of
the British home market for such Dutch staple products as gin and dairy produce. British intentions are clear from the following extract:

"..to us it would ensure the principal supply of cotton and woollen manufactures to the rest of the population of the Indian archipelago on such terms as would in a short time double the consumption, and as it would be impossible for the manufacturers of the Netherlands, or, indeed, of any other country, to compete with us in those markets on equal terms to any extent (it) would (13) quadruple our present exports to the Indian archipelago.."

The Dutch, however, were not content, as van den Bosch put it, to restrict their trading activities in the East Indies to "earn a small commission fee" on foreign commerce. Hence the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce in order to channel exports of foreign cottons to Indonesia through Dutch ports suggested to the government to subject imports of foreign cottons into Java to a duty of 10% if re-exported from Holland and to a duty of 20% if exported directly from the country of origin. Following this a Royal decree of 4th May, 1831 subjected cottons imported into Java to a duty of 12½% if re-exported from Holland and to a duty of 25% if shipped directly from the country of origin.

(13) Deans to Wellington, 26th October, 1830. in Posthumus "Documenten" op. cit. pp.196-198.
(14) Van den Bosch to Clifford, Minister of Colonies, 8th December, 1831. in Ibid. p.243.
(15) De Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken van Amsterdam to the King, 13th December, 1830 in Ibid. pp.204-219.
(16) Clifford to van den Bosch, 15th August, 1831. in Ibid. p.239.
This measure, however, was abolished again in October, 1832 when it appeared that it was mainly Belgian industry which was benefiting from it. Belgian textiles – which were forbidden to enter Holland after November, 1830, went via Dunkirk or England to Rotterdam from where they were re-exported to the Indies at the lower rate of duty.

At any rate van den Bosch – whose opinions weighed very heavily with the King – considered that a tariff differential of 10%, as suggested by Amsterdam, would not be a strong enough incentive for British traders to ship their goods through Dutch ports. He pointed out that British ships, which came out directly from England to Java would only discharge there that part of their cargo which could be disposed of profitably, while the remainder would be sold at Singapore from where those goods would be re-exported to the rest of the Archipelago, Indo-China, and China. More important, van den Bosch argued, was the fact that British freight charges on homebound journeys were far lower


(18) Note: The reports of van den Bosch's success could not fail to impress the King, especially not when already in August, 1831 a remittance of one million guilders could be made from the Indies to the home treasury.

(19) Note: There is evidence, however, that English merchants in fact did take advantage of the lower duties. See Tarling N "British policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-1871" (Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. XXX, part 3 (no. 179) p. 100.
than those charged by Dutch shippers. The reason for this freight differential was that ships — numbering from 50 to 60 per year — which were chartered by the British government to transport convicts to Australia at high prices, on their return voyage were able to pick up cargoes in the Indies for as low a rate as 80 guilders. British merchants therefore were able to offer higher prices for colonial produce, causing the driving up of prices in the colony, which was largely responsible for the continuing losses suffered by the N.H.M. while preventing smaller Dutch concerns from participating in the East Indian trade at all. Van den Bosch therefore suggested that — as a transitory measure — import duties on foreign cottons should be put at 50% and those on Dutch goods at 25%. This measure, according to the governor-general, was not incompatible with the treaty of 1824 and would have the double advantage of increasing Dutch shipping and cutting out British competition and its concomitant of high prices. But although it was important to prevent Dutch colonial shipping from being replaced by the British, it was even more important — so van den Bosch argued —

(20) Note: The fact that the Dutch merchant navy was only very small after the war and the N.H.M. was only allowed to charter Dutch ships caused freight rates to be very high. In 1828 the rate was still 230 guilders for an outward and return voyage. But when in the beginning of the thirties Dutch shipyards had caught up with the shortage the N.H.M. would not offer more than 180 to 190 guilders per voyage. Source: Mansvelt op.cit. pp. 231-232.
to ensure Dutch traders of a regular supply of Dutch manufactured goods. Only when industry at home and in the colonies would have been made complementary to each other, would Dutch trade be based on a sound foundation. In addition a Dutch textile industry with an ensured outlet for its products in the colonies would provide a profitable source for investment for Dutch rentiers, who so far had invested a great deal of their money in foreign enterprise. Furthermore the establishment of factories would increase employment and help to ease the growing pauper problem in the larger Dutch cities. However, the only way to ensure a definite market for Dutch textiles in the colonies, according to van den Bosch, was to instruct the N.H.M. to export those textiles to the Indies and to sell them there at any cost. The profit made on the export and sale of colonial produce - which the company would receive in consignment - would compensate it amply for any losses made on the importation of Dutch manufactured cottons.

(21) Note: In 1829 still half of Dutch private capital funds were invested in foreign countries. Source: Westendorp Boerma J J "De tijd van Koning Willem I in het Noorden (1815-30)." in Algemeene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden. Vol. IX. Chapter IX, p.239.

(22) Note: Van den Bosch was genuinely interested in the re-settlement of paupers; in 1819 he had been responsible for the founding of the Maatschappij voor Welzadigheid (Humanitarian Society) which was engaged in settling city paupers on reclaimed land.

(23) Note: Those ideas of van den Bosch are contained in two letters to Clifford, Minister for Colonies, dated respectively; 15th August and 8th December, 1831. in Posthumus "Documenten." op.cit. pp.239-249.
In the next few years those ideas of van den Bosch were put into practice with only slight modifications.

Both the King and the N.H.M. showed a great deal of interest in furthering the development of a Dutch textile industry. This development was greatly facilitated by the influx into Holland of a number of Belgian textile manufacturers - and their skilled employees - who were unwilling to forego the profitable outlet for their products in the Dutch colonies. Subsequently in January, 1833 the Dutch government approved the following plan - proposed by Ainsworth and modified by the N.H.M. - for the establishment of a textile industry. Firstly weaving schools - to be paid for by the government in conjunction with the N.H.M. - were to be established in order to teach modern production methods. Secondly the N.H.M. was to advance low interest loans to manufacturers while in addition a Royal decree of 18th January, 1833 offered a premium of 25 cent for each piece of calico produced in Holland from Dutch spun yarn.

But van den Bosch, who in the meantime had returned to Holland where he was appointed Minister for Colonies, was not

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(24) Brugmans I J "Paardenkracht..." op.cit. pp.74-75.

(25) Note: Thomas Ainsworth; son of Lancashire cotton manufacturer, who was in partnership with Sir Robert Peel. After his father's bankruptcy Ainsworth went to France. In 1827 he was invited to Belgium by Cockerill, the founder of Belgian heavy industry. In 1830 he went to Holland where he acted as technical advisor in the textile industry.

satisfied with the growth of the Dutch cotton exports - valued at 1.5 million guilders per year -; and he proposed to the N.H.M. to double that amount immediately. But the N.H.M. was unwilling to do this unless the government would guarantee a substantial percentage of possible losses. Subsequently in April, 1835 a contract - the so-called "Lijnwaden-contract" - was concluded which obliged the N.H.M. to export yearly Dutch cottons to the value of 3 million guilders. Those cottons were to be sold as quickly as possible and at any price. In return the Minister for Colonies guaranteed to compensate the company for losses up to 12% of the yearly invoice value. 

In addition to a government guarantee on import losses the N.H.M. was given a practical monopoly of the trade in Java produce. This development was largely the result of the growing financial difficulties of the Home government owing to the prolonged Belgian crisis. When after 1830 the Amortization syndicate found it increasingly difficult to provide the King with extra-parliamentary funds, owing to the loss of Belgian domains and taxes, the government was forced to look for another supply of extra funds. This was found in another creation of the King i.e. the N.H.M. Van den Bosch pressed the company into

(28) See Part I, Section III, p.128 note. 2.
a number of rather unorthodox financial transactions with the government, threatening to give consignments of Java produce to private traders if the N.H.M. did not comply. The N.H.M. was forced to provide the King with ever increasing forward loans on the security of the Java crop. This development of "the culture and consignment system" did nothing to alleviate the colonial balance of payments problems, which had been the cause of the adoption of van den Bosch's system in the first place. Therefore in 1835 - in order to overcome this problem - an arrangement was made whereby the N.H.M. would deposit the proceeds of its textile imports into the colonial treasury, receiving in return government produce for consignment to Holland.

The resulting rise in imports of highly protected Dutch cottons and the ever growing importance of the N.H.M. as an

(30) Note: The following statistics, representing the value of purchases of Dutch manufactured cottons by the N.H.M. do illustrate this point:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guilders</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guilders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>4,425,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>5,741,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>6,669,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>1,837,840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>6,003,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>3,580,799</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mansvelt op.cit. p.236

The position of the Dutch and English shares of the Java import trade can be seen from the following figures:

Imports of cottons into Java and Madura.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Dutch(incl. re-exports)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Dutch(incl. British re-exports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mansvelt op.cit. p.333.
exporter of Java produce made it increasingly more difficult for private traders to compete. Hence numerous British protests about Dutch trading policy in Java followed. But when the Dutch government steadily refused to comply with British demands for tariff concessions, the British notes became increasingly sharper in tone. Finally – at the end of 1835 – the Dutch government, mainly out of fear of direct hostile action

(31) Note: The growing importance of the N.H.M. as an exporter of colonial produce can be noted from the following statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
<th>N.H.M.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
<th>N.H.M.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>million guilders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>million guilders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mansvelt op.cit. p.18 vol.2

(32) Note: e.g. Palmerston on 16th November, 1835 instructed Jerningham, the British ambassador in The Hague, to inform the Dutch Minister: "...that H.M.'s government cannot consent to prolong a correspondence between the two governments, which has been so wholly unsatisfactory in its result; and you will express to H.Exc. the confident expectation of H.M.'s government that this question will now be brought to a prompt and satisfactory settlement by the immediate issue of orders to the governor-general of Java to carry into full execution the stipulations of the treaty of 1824, and by the prompt repayment of the duties, which have been unjustly levied from British subjects...."

Source: Posthumus "Documenten..." op.cit. p.345.
by Britain against Dutch shipping and trade, decided to give in to the British demands for tariff concessions in Java. But although The Hague instructed the East Indian authorities to charge from then on Dutch imports with 12\% and British goods with 25\%, the Dutch Foreign Minister expressly stated that Holland did not agree with the British interpretation of article 2 of the treaty of 1824 as to mean the inclusion of goods as well as ships and subjects.

The British government, however, was not satisfied with the Dutch concessions; and kept pressing for restitution of excess duties paid by British merchants since 1824 and the admission of British goods on Dutch ships at the lower rate of 12\%. The Hague refused to give in to those demands, but instead pointed out that Dutch imports in British India were charged with more than 6\% - the limit set by the treaty of 1824 -

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(33) Note: In December, 1835 the Dutch Foreign Minister advised the King that he and other members of the Cabinet were inclined to give into to the British demands for trade concessions in Java, because they feared that Britain again might put an embargo on Dutch shipping. This fear was based on: "...the opposition and jealousy which the trade, shipping, industry and the overseas possessions of the Netherlands have always met with from the side of the English (and on) the existing spirit of hostility towards the Netherlands of the present British cabinet, especially of Lord Palmerston, and (was based on) the weak diplomacy of Austria, Prussia and Russia, those powers of which especially Russia had several times openly declared that - although regrettingly - it will look on without opposition at measures taken by Great Britain at sea against the Netherlands."

Source: Posthumus op.cit. p.360.

(34) Verstolk, Dutch Foreign Minister, to Jerningham, 25th December, 1835. in Posthumus op.cit. pp.371-373.

while British goods were admitted duty-free. The British government, however, decided to continue its demand for restitution, while Palmerston in the meantime attempted to induce the British East India Company to modify its tariffs in India in order to bring them into line with the official British interpretation of article 2 of the 1824 treaty. But early in 1838 Palmerston was forced to let his claims for restitution rest, owing to the unwillingness of the British East India Company to change its tariffs.

Nevertheless British demands for further trade concessions in Java - accentuated as they were by the severe economic crisis of the late thirties and early forties - continued. Furthermore Disbrowe, the British Ambassador in the Hague suspected that the N.H.M. which now had to pay 12½% duty on its cotton imports, was secretly refunded by the government. The ambassador also complained that the valuation of imports in Java was carried out arbitrarily and unfairly. Actually the British ambassador was on the right track, because a new secret "Lijnwaden-contract" had been concluded with the N.H.M. on 14th October, 1837. This contract included a provision for the compensation by the Dutch

(36) Verstolk to Disbrowe, 29th April, 1836, in Ibid. pp.435-437
(38) Tarling op.cit. pp.110-111.
government of any extra cost incurred by the company in its cotton exports to Java. The reference to imports duties here is obvious. This new secret arrangement with the N.H.M. was again largely the work of van den Bosch, who had urged the company to increase its exports to a value of 8 to 10 million per year. By increasing the volume of cotton exports van den Bosch tried to stop the considerable outflow of specie from Java, which was caused by the fact that private English and Dutch traders - who were unable to exchange their goods for colonial produce - were forced after the Anglo-American financial crisis of 1837 to remit in specie because drawing bills on London had become impossible.

But the drain on silver continued; and in July, 1839 the Java Bank suspended the payment of specie. As a result a recession occurred in the Java textile trade and large stocks remained unsold. In the meantime the unorthodox and rather erratic financial operations of the King and van den Bosch had brought both the N.H.M. and the Dutch government to the verge of bankruptcy. The N.H.M. had found it increasingly difficult to balance the forward loans which it was forced to make to the government with the proceeds of Java produce, which it received

as collateral, especially after the spectacular fall in world prices which took place since 1837. This financial crisis forced the King to abandon his policy of "perseverance" in regard to the Belgian question; and by the treaty of 19th April, 1839 he accepted the conditions of separation (XXIV Articles) as laid down by the Great Powers. Furthermore the government - after attempts by the N.H.M. to raise the necessary funds on the loan market had failed - was forced to submit to Parliamentary approval a loan of 56 million guilders - on the security of the colonies - for the liquidation of the state debt, which since 1830 had increased by 300 million guilders, of which 40 million guilders were owing to the N.H.M. But the Dutch Parliament, which then for the first time was given a true picture of the state's finances - rejected the budget. As a consequence van den Bosch and the minister for Finance resigned. Next, the King, who had been forced to concede to Parliament the right of disposal over future colonial surplusses, **(40)** abdicated on 7th October, 1840.

This, however, did not solve the problem of the state debt. **(41)** Although Disbrowe could speculate that since the colonial monopoly system of van den Bosch was under heavy criticism in the Dutch parliament, the prospects for trade concessions to

**(40)** Mansvelt op.cit. p.443.
**(41)** Tarling, op.cit. p.112.
Britain had improved, the problem remained of refunding the government's debts of nearly 40 million guilders to the N.H.M. In fact the King - before his abdication - had already concluded the so-called "Kapitalisatie-contract" whereby the debt - put at 39 million guilders at 5% - was to be paid off before 1849, while the N.H.M. was to receive till 1848 all government colonial produce in consignment, with the exception of spices and tin. Therefore owing to its vast financial difficulties the Dutch government was not in a position to grant further concessions to British traders in Java. Consequently when Disbrowe in 1843 was still negotiating with the Dutch government for a satisfactory agreement on the Java trade, Baud, the new Minister for Colonies, concluded a contract with the N.H.M. for the export of 3 million guilders worth of cottons to the East Indies. The Company was not given - as previously - a guarantee against losses, but at the same time it was put into a favourable position by having its proceeds remitted at par while the official rate stood at 80%.

It was not till the end of the forties - when Britain itself had abandoned the Navigation Acts and the Netherlands had regained a great deal of its economic and financial strength - that the Dutch government made any concessions to Britain in

(43) Mansvelt op.cit. p.443.
regard to the Java trade. Until then the Dutch steadily refused to give in on such issues as general tariff reduction and the admission of consuls.

The unsuccessful attempts of the British government to induce the Dutch to abandon their mercantilist policies in the East Indies had a profound effect on the Foreign Office's attitude in regard to Dutch expansion in Sumatra. Already in 1837 a petition of Singapore merchants had reached London complaining about a decree of the Java government - issued in 1834 - which restricted foreign trade with the East Indies to the ports of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya. The complaint however was put aside, as at this time the British government still hoped for a general commercial settlement in the Archipelago, while in addition it did not want to jeopardize the successful outcome of Anglo-Dutch negotiations on a commercial treaty in Europe which were being conducted at the time. But when in 1838 it became clear that the British demands about Java would not be met, the Foreign Office decided that further expansion by the Dutch in the Archipelago would be undesirable and harmful to British interests. The Foreign Office was concerned to find a general commercial settlement in the Archipelago and as long as British demands for trade concessions were

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(44) **Tarling op.cit. p.138 Note:** An Anglo-Dutch commercial treaty pertaining to Europe only was signed in 1837. The treaty provided for reciprocal most-favoured nation treatment; and the equalizing of shipping charges.

(45) **Note:** "Such an extension of Dutch influence or territorial possession would in all probability be attended with consequences injurious to British interest, and should be looked upon with jealousy by the government of this country." Source: Foreign Office despatch, January, 1838. *quot*. Tarling op.cit.
not met, it would oppose any extension of Dutch power in the East-Indies. The first instance in which Britain actively opposed Dutch expansion was in Sumatra. The Foreign Office took up the complaints of the Straits Settlements, which saw Dutch expansion in Sumatra as a threat to their entrepot trade. But the first protest - in June, 1839 - about the proceedings of the Dutch colonial authorities in Baros and Singkel petered out when it appeared that those places were old possessions of the Dutch, which had been re-occupied on the orders of the government in accordance with article 6 of the treaty of 1824. Palmerston accepted the Dutch explanation and went even as far as to declare in Parliament on 27th March and 28th May, 1840 that Holland had not broken article 6 of the treaty of 1824. Power politics probably explain this rather unexpected behaviour of Palmerston, who otherwise was certainly not very gentle in his dealings with the Dutch. In 1839 the so-called Eastern Question had come to a head when Mehemet Ali had met out a crushing defeat to the Turkish Sultan. England and France were opposed to each other on this question; the first being inclined to support the Sultan while the other stood behind Mehemet Ali. Anglo-French relations became very strained indeed when in July,

(46) See Section III, pp. 185-186.
(47) Tarling op.cit. pp.139-140. Note: Article 6 read: "It is agreed that orders shall be given by the two governments to their officers and agents in the East, not to form any new settlements on any of the islands in the Eastern Seas, without previous authority from their respective governments in Europe."
1840 England together with Prussia, Austria and Russia - but without France - imposed a settlement on the two contending parties. During this international crisis both the French and English ambassadors were concerned to obtain the diplomatic support of the Netherlands. To the great discomfort of Disbrowe the French suggested to Holland that it should conclude treaties with the United States, Sweden and Denmark in order to protect its neutrality. Furthermore in September, 1840 a Franco-Dutch commercial treaty was signed in Paris opening up the Moselle and the Rhine for Dutch trade and permitting Java produce to be imported into Eastern France. Despite the growing friendly relations between Holland and France, the French ambassador, Bois le Comte, clearly realized that if Holland was forced to choose it would have to side with England, because:

"...the Netherlands which has to maintain its finances, its trade, its whole existence by its possession of Java, is thereby completely dependent upon England. On the day it will be forced to take sides, it will express itself for England out of fear to loose Java..." (49)

Disbrowe of course also knew the economic predicament the Dutch would be in if they ever lost Java; and as he wrote in January, 1841, the break with Belgium had disturbed the natural economic development of the Netherlands, because Holland had become completely dependent on its colonies. The industrial competition

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between England and Holland had actually ended and the Dutch navy was so insignificant that it could not stop the English fleet either in Europe or the colonies. Nevertheless Disbrowe was apparently alarmed about the growing influence of the French ambassador in official Dutch circles; and he thought this development important enough to request an audience with Queen Victoria. However, in October, 1840, Disbrowe was able to report home with a great deal of satisfaction that he had interviewed the Prince of Orange, who:

"spoke to me about the Eastern Question...and I know he felt convinced...of the justice of our cause and of the folly committed by M.Thiers." (52)

In the meantime Palmerston was taking a tougher line again in regard to the Dutch colonies; and in August, 1840 a rather unsubstantiated claim by trading interests in the Straits — exaggerating the killing of a native trader by the Dutch at Panei (East-Coast of Sumatra) into an attempt to stop native traders from dealing with Pulu Penang — was taken by Palmerston as a pretext for reminding the Dutch government that it should keep strictly within the limits laid down by the treaty of 1824. (53)

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(51) Disbrowe to London. 23rd May, 1840. Quoted. Ibid, p. 44.
(52) Disbrowe to Palmerston. 6th October, 1840. Quoted. Ibid, p. 44.
Soon afterwards, the earlier complaints by Singapore merchants about increased tariffs and restriction of foreign shipping to a few ports, were taken up by the Foreign office; and Disbrowe was instructed to protest that those measures were in conflict with the 1824 treaty. But Verstolk, the Dutch Foreign Minister, replied that the higher duties imposed since 1834 bad been directed against Belgian trade; and that consequently after the 1839 treaty with Belgium had been signed those measures had been recalled. The movements of foreign shipping had been restricted to facilitate the levying of customs; and although also this decree would be withdrawn, it had not—so Verstolk

(54) See p.230
(55) Palmerston to Disbrowe, 29th January, 1841. in Ibid, pp, 21-22. Note: Article 4 of the treaty of 1824 read as follows: "Their Britannic and Netherlands Majesties engage to give strict orders as well to Their civil and military authorities, as to Their ships of war, to respect the freedom of trade established by articles 1, 2 and 3; and in no case, to impede a free communication of the natives in the Eastern Archipelago with the ports of the two governments respectively, or of the subjects of the two governments with the ports belonging to the native powers."

(56) Note: It should be noted that as officially no state of peace existed between Holland and Belgium during the years 1830-1839, the Dutch instead of military measures resorted to economic warfare. Consequently in 1834 Belgian imports into the Dutch colonies were charged with a duty of 50-70%.

Source: Mansvelt op.cit. p.287.
argued - contravened the stipulations of the treaty of 1824.

In addition the Dutch Minister dismissed charges of attempts (57) to exclude British trade from the Archipelago; and in order to emphasize this point Verstolk added a copy of the Dutch treaty (58) of 1834 with Djambi.

In the meantime, however, Disbrowe had managed to lay his hands on some compromising documentary material - obtained from members of the liberal and Anglophile party in The Hague - about the real intentions of the Dutch in Sumatra. Disbrowe informed Palmerston early in 1841 that according to confidential information he had received, the Dutch were actually planning to establish a trade monopoly in Sumatra. The King, so the ambassador continued, had recently requested a person who had been in the Indies for a considerable time to advise him on the situation in Sumatra. The report brought out by this expert was strongly

(57) The following extract serves as an illustration of British thinking on that point: "For it is notorious that the result (i.e. of the treaty of 1824) has been a most painful contrast to the anticipations of the Contracting Parties; the Dutch having increased the imports on British manufactures five or sixfold beyond what they were before the said treaty; and they have engaged in wars of many years' duration with the best customers of British subjects in the four chief islands of the Archipelago; they have infringed on the promised freedom of trade by the creation of a royal commercial monopoly, and subjected British commerce and intercourse to greater difficulties and restraints than they were liable to before any treaty existed; and the consequence has been, that British trade with the native states in those islands has been injuriously affected." Larpent, Chairman of the London East India and China Association, to Palmerston, 11th January, 1841. in Papers relative...op.cit.p.5.

(58) Verstolk to Disbrowe, 10th April, 1841. in Ibid. pp.36-47.
opposed to the existing policy of expansion in Sumatra on the grounds that it would eventually lead to trouble with England. The advantages of the present policy in Sumatra were so uncertain that it would not be worthwhile to cause an argument with Britain. Disbrowe further related that he knew from a reliable source that the King had not as yet made up his mind about what policy to follow in Sumatra; and therefore, Disbrowe advised, the time was opportune to send another protest to The Hague about the Dutch actions in Sumatra. In addition Disbrowe had been able to obtain a copy of the "Kapitalisatie-Contract" - a secret arrangement -; and he wrote to Palmerston that although there was nothing in the contract suggesting that foreigners were to be kept from the Indies, he feared that English trade would stop completely if the Dutch succeeded in introducing into Sumatra the same restrictive measures they applied in Java.

Subsequently on 31st May, 1841 Palmerston - who obviously had made good use of the inside information sent to him by Disbrowe - protested to the Dutch government that its treaty with Djambi conflicted with article 3 of the treaty of 1824.

(59) Note: It should be kept in mind that until 1848, it was the King who had the final say in colonial affairs.
(60) Disbrowe to Palmerston, 8th February, 1841, quot. Goedemans op. cit. pp. 50-51.
(61) See p. 229.
(62) Disbrowe to Palmerston, 22nd February, 1841. quot. Ibid. p. 53.
because it allowed the Dutch to levy customs and to introduce (63) a salt monopoly. At about the same time a more substantial point was raised by Britain when it protested against the rumoured occupation by the Dutch of Siak, an independent native state, with which Farquhar in 1818 had concluded a treaty. This treaty, although it had not been communicated to the Dutch in 1824, was, according to Palmerston, not invalidated by article 9 of the treaty of 1824, because this article only referred to "prospective engagements" and not to existing ones. Verstolk, however, disagreed with the British interpretation of article 9 and denied the validity of Farquhar's treaty. Article 9 according to Verstolk, should

(63) Palmerston to Disbrowe, 31st May, 1841. in Papers relative etc. op. cit. pp.54-55. Note: Article 3 of the 1824 treaty reads as follows: "The High Contracting Parties engage that no treaty, hereafter made by either with any native power in the Eastern Seas, shall contain any article, tending, either expressly or by the imposition of unequal duties, to exclude the trade of the other Party from the ports of such native power and that, if in any treaty now existing on either part, any article to that effect has been admitted, such article shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the present treaty. It is understood that, before the conclusion of the present Treaty, communication has been made by each of the Contracting Parties to the other, of all treaties or engagements subsisting between each of them respectively, and any native power in the Eastern Seas; and the like communication shall be made of all such treaties concluded by them respectively hereafter."

(64) Palmerston to Disbrowe, 8th March, 1841. in Papers relative op. cit. p.29. Note: Article 9 of the treaty of 1824 reads: "The factory of Fort Marlborough and all the possessions of Great Britain on the island of Sumatra are hereby ceded to His Netherlands Majesty; and His Britannic Majesty further engages that no British settlement shall be formed on that island, nor any treaty concluded by British authority, with any native Prince, Chief or State therein..."
be read in conjunction with article 10, which stipulated that the Dutch government undertook to refrain from concluding any further engagements in the Malayan Peninsula. Surely, so Verstolk argued, the British government would not admit that any treaties concluded by the Dutch in the Peninsula before 1824 were still valid. The only exception, so the Dutch note continued, to article 9 was the special provision made in the treaty in regard to Achin, with which Raffles in 1819 had concluded a treaty; and:

"If it had been the intention of the High Contracting Parties to admit of other exceptions, based on treaties prior to that of 17th March, 1824, the explanatory notes in question would certainly not have failed to make mention of those treaties, as they have done of that which relates to the Kingdom of Acheen................."(66)

If Holland, so the note continued, wanted to establish itself in Siak, then the Farquhar treaty of 1818 was not a valid obstacle. But the Dutch government had no desire to occupy that territory as yet and orders to that effect had already been sent to the governor-general of the East-Indies.

(65) Note: Article 10 of the treaty of 1824 reads: "The town and fort of Malacca and its dependencies, are hereby ceded to His Britannic Maj., and His Netherl. Maj. engages Himself and His subjects, never to form any establishment on any part of the Peninsula of Malacca, or to conclude any treaty, with any native, Prince, Chief or State therein."

(66) Verstolk to Disbrowe, 11th May, 1841. in Papers relative etc. op.cit. pp.48-51.
It should be noted here in this context that van den Bosch already in December, 1838 had warned governor-general De Eerens that the establishment of Dutch authority at the Siak river and to the North of it would have to be prepared with the utmost caution in order to forestall English opposition until the Dutch had effectively established themselves everywhere in Sumatra. In reply to a request by Merkus, government commissioner for Sumatra, for elucidation on this point, Baud stated that van den Bosch had been acutely aware of the possibility of English opposition to Dutch expansion in Sumatra. This apprehension, so Baud continued, had certainly been substantiated by later developments as the British government had asked the Dutch government for an explanation of its policies in Sumatra. There were indications that Britain wanted to sidestep the treaty of 1824, as it insisted that a treaty concluded in 1818 with Siak was still valid. Furthermore a number of vicious articles in the British press left no doubt as to the unfavourable public opinion in England in regard to the actions of the Dutch in Sumatra. In conclusion therefore Baud advised Merkus to delay the occupation of the East-Coast.

(67) Van den Bosch to de Eerens, 29th December, 1838. in Kielstra V, op.cit. p.385.
(68) Baud to Merkus, 26th November, 1840. in Ibid. pp.385-386.
But Palmerston was hardly impressed by the reply of Verstolk; and instead pointed out that the British treaty of 1819, with Achin had been specifically mentioned because it contained some exclusive clauses which conflicted with the spirit of the treaty of 1824 and had therefore to be modified. But this did not mean that it had been abolished. In contrast, the treaty of 1818 with Siak did not contain any exclusive clause and was therefore not specifically mentioned in the treaty. However, this also did not mean that this treaty had become invalid and that:

"...Great Britain abandoned all interests in the maintenance of the independence of the native states of Sumatra, and engaged not to interfere in support of that independence. On the contrary, the Declaration of the British Plenipotentiaries of the 17th March, 1824 contains a passage directly at variance with that interpretation, for it distinctly expresses the confidence of the British Government, that no measures hostile to the King of Acheen, of which there was then reason to apprehend were in contemplation, would be taken by the Dutch authorities in Sumatra; and now, upon the same principle and equally in consonance with the stipulations of the Treaty of 1824, Her Majesty's Government express their hope that no measures will be undertaken by those authorities, for destroying the independence of the State of Siac...................." (69)

When it thus became quite obvious that Palmerston was not content with a temporary postponement of the occupation of Siak

(69) Palmerston to Disbrowe, 11th May, 1841. in Papers relative op.cit. pp.56-57.
by the Dutch, but contested the right of the Netherlands to expand its authority at all in the East-Coast area, the Dutch Foreign Minister was at a loss what to do and could only advise Baud not to reply to the British note for the time being.

But a development within Sumatra itself forced the issue. In June, 1841 the first reports reached Holland about the rebellion at Batipu in Minangkabau. However the importance of this incident became very much inflated, especially in the mind of the King, who apparently saw the rebellion as a confirmation of the earlier warnings given to him about the impractibility of the existing policy in Sumatra. Consequently soon after official reports about the Batipu incident had been received on 12th August, 1841 it was decided at a conference between the King and Baud:

"...that it would be desirable in many ways to change those principles to such an extent that although the subjection of that territory (i.e. Sumatra) to the border of Achin would remain the final goal, this would no longer be considered as an object which had to be pursued using every effort................."(72)

(70) See Section III, p. 205.
(71) See Disbrowe to Palmerston, 8th and 22nd February, 1841. pp. 235-236 of this section.
(72) Kielstra V, op. cit. p. 390.
Thereupon on 1st September, 1841 an order was sent to the Governor-General instructing the withdrawal of the Dutch forces from the East-Coast of Sumatra and extending to Sumatra the general rule of non-expansion and non-intervention as laid down by van den Bosch for all the Outer-Possessions with the exception of Sumatra, Banka and Banda. Baud based this decision on the argument that the conquest of Sumatra drew away too many troops from Java. Furthermore, so the Minister argued, the recent rebellion of Batipu had shown that the territory which had already been brought under Dutch influence was still far from being pacified. It was therefore necessary first to consolidate the power of the government in the territory which was already occupied; and only when this objective had been accomplished could the rest of Sumatra be conquered without the need for extra troops from Java.

However, in agreement with most commentators on this issue, I have found that Baud's argument of the weakened military position in Java was a pretext; and that in fact the real reason for the decision to withdraw from the East-Coast of Sumatra - as will be shown in the next pages - was far different from the one given by Baud publicly.

(73) Baud to Batavia, 1st September, 1841. in Kielstra V. pp.390-397. See also p. 207 of this section.

(74) Ibid.
Although Baud took the view that it was no business of the British to interfere in Dutch colonial affairs, he was acutely aware of the weak position of Holland. First of all he feared that England - if sufficiently provoked - might take away the colonies. A pretext for doing so could easily be found in the fact that one of the conditions under which the colonies had been returned - i.e. the unification of Holland and Belgium - was not being fulfilled anymore. Secondly, the Belgian question had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy and made its recovery completely dependent upon the possession of the colonies, especially Java. Thirdly the Dutch liberal party - which had a strong bias towards England - had grown considerably in strength; and wanted to avoid at any cost a clash with Britain, its spiritual leader. Lastly, the new King, William II, was bent upon avoiding any conflict, at least at the beginning of his reign, in order to restore the popularity of the throne, which had declined in some quarters of the Dutch population owing to the Belgian policy of his father and the subsequent financial debacle. Therefore Baud - as we have seen - was forced to make concessions to the British in order to stop any further provocation. Taking those factors into consideration then, the following dictum of Baud about the East-Coast:

(75) See This section p. 232.
"...that that territory is not considered valuable enough to venture a clash with England about..." (76) becomes more intelligible. This opinion by Baud about the value of the East-Coast was probably based on a report by Merkus, who, after having conducted investigations, concluded that the trade of the East-Coast had decreased in proportion to the increase of the trade of Padang. Exports of coffee were small and imports of salt had decreased. Most of the salt and cottons imported into Siak during the last few years had come from Minangkabau. The same information is contained in a despatch from Baud to Merkus of 6th May, 1841 in which the earlier request to temporize with the occupation of the East-Coast was repeated more positively. Although, so Baud wrote, he had nothing against the policy of van den Bosch to bring the whole of Sumatra under Dutch control it was obvious that the execution of such a policy was sub-ordinate to more important interests and that:

"...we have to avoid i.a. encouraging by means of hastiness and persistence the obvious inclination of England to obstruct the realization of our plans." (79)

The necessity for the Dutch to settle in Siak was not great enough to risk a controversy with England. If, so Baud argued, after the occupation of Siak this port would be opened up to

(76) Baud to Verstolk, 8th April, 1841. quot. Goedemans op.cit. p.58
(78) See this section p. 239.
international trade - as the Dutch would be forced to do - then Holland would have no benefit from it, as the British would certainly claim that according to article 3 of the treaty of 1824 no differential tariff could be introduced. But although the Dutch government could validly object that article 3 did not apply to independent states which were conquered, the East-Coast was not of sufficient importance to argue about with the British. While Baud conceded that the possession of the East-Coast would greatly facilitate reaching the final objective of completely controlling the whole of the Sumatran import and export trade, he pointed out that the same objective could be reached by less offensive means; i.e. the consolidation of Dutch power in the populous interior, which in any case accounted for most of the production of coffee and the consumption of cottons, as the East-Coast was only sparsely populated and poorly endowed with natural resources. This object had already been achieved to a great extent and as a consequence most of the East-Coast trade with the interior of Sumatra had been diverted to the West-Coast. Baud further pointed out that:

"At present we have in the interior advanced so closely to the borders of Siak; and we have under such complete control the market places from where formerly produce was sent exclusively to Siak, where requirements of European goods were obtained, that English trade with Siak on its own account and without our establishment on the river of the same name will considerably
decrease. Therefore such an establishment, it appears to me, could safely be postponed to a more opportune time. " (80)

To recapitulate, Baud realized that England could not be provoked much more, or Java, the mainstay of the Dutch economy might be lost. Dutch expansion into the East-Coast was useless if the Dutch could not introduce differential tariffs there. In any case the Dutch already controlled the wealthy interior of the island and thereby most of the Sumatran trade. Under those circumstances it would be unwise to persist in occupying the East-Coast and running the risk of losing everything which had been gained so far. This appears to me the real motive behind the decision of Baud to stop expansion in Sumatra. Therefore the incident of Batipu should be seen as a pretext for making the withdrawal from the East-Coast more palatable for Dutch public opinion.

Indeed, the weakness of the argumentation in Baud's public statements about the reversal of the Sumatra policy of van den Bosch can be gauged from the comments by the East Indian administration on the order of 1st September, 1841. The reaction to this despatch was very unfavourable; and Michiels in reply to a request by the Batavian government for his comments on the change of policy, objected to Baud's contention that owing to the rapid

(80) Ibid.
expansion of control in Sumatra since 1838 the Dutch had overreached their strength. The importance of the Batipu incident had been overemphasized in Holland, according to Michiels, because in fact peace and order in the Dutch controlled territories was established so soundly that a considerable number of troops could be withdrawn from Sumatra without endangering the security of the Dutch position. It was a great pity that now the completion of the final goal — i.e. the subjection of the whole of Sumatra — was so near, the government saw fit to stop expansion altogether, because:

"...not one century, nor twenty-five years are needed for the subjection of Sumatra; one year, (and) the will alone is sufficient to complete that task in the fullest sense of the word." (81)

However, in order to comply with the instructions from The Hague, Michiels proposed a number of modifications in the existing administrative and military policy. The posts at Bila, Padang Lawas and intermediary points were to be abandoned. But the mountain range East from Angkola and Mandailing; and the Batta districts, including those of Toba and Silindung, were to remain under Dutch control largely for strategic reasons. Governor-General Merkus — who was also opposed to the idea of non-expansion — accepted the proposals of Michiels and submitted

Merkus also reported the withdrawal from Indragiri after the conclusion of a treaty in which Dutch sovereignty was recognized. But in regard to Djambi the governor-general expressed his doubts as to the feasibility of withdrawing the garrison of Muarah Kompe, as such a measure would probably have an undesirable effect on the situation in Palembang. The proposals were submitted to the King on 25th January, 1844 and Baud commented that the measures which had been taken were in accordance with the instructions given earlier, because they would attain the desired objectives of:

"...an increase in the military forces in Java and the adoption in Sumatra of a cautious policy, which produces more guarantees for order than the too hasty expansion which was a feature of the earlier accepted policy....." (84)

In a further despatch on Djambi in February, 1844 Merkus stressed the desirability of keeping a military force in that territory, because the Sultan, according to a report by the Resident, would certainly be murdered or driven away, if left without Dutch support. But in order not to antagonize the British Merkus suggested that a non-differential tariff should be introduced, which in any case would not cause a great loss to the government, as customs revenue amounted to only 3400 guilders yearly. In

(82) Merkus to the Minister for Colonies, 20th March, 1843. in Kielstra V, pp. 445-461.
(83) Ibid., pp. 450-451.
(84) Baud to the King, 25th January, 1844. in Ibid. pp. 461-462.
(85) Merkus to Baud, 11th February, 1844. in Ibid. p. 451 note 1.
August, 1844 the Home government permitted the East Indian authorities:

"...not to evacuate Djambi, as long as the peaceful condition of Palembang might require the continuous occupation of that territory, but to introduce there, without making any fuss about it, a non-differential tariff....................." (86)

Although Baud, as we have seen, was forced to make concessions to the British; and actually stopped Dutch expansion in Eastern Sumatra, he had made it clear that this was only a temporary measure, implying that Holland had the fullest right to occupy the East-Coast if it desired to. On the contrary Palmerston insisted that the Dutch had no right at all to interfere in the independent Sumatran principalities. But on this fundamental issue Baud did not give in; and consequently in order to prevent this question from being hammered to a conclusion by Palmerston, the Dutch Minister took recourse to the well-tried diplomatic tactic of protracting as long as possible a reply to the rather sharp notes of May and June, 1841. In addition Baud purposely kept the British ambassador ignorant of the decision of September, 1841 to withdraw from the East-Coast, because he was convinced that if the Dutch would withdraw from Eastern Sumatra the complaints from the Straits Settlements on which the British protests were based would gradually stop. This in fact happened.

Baud's diplomatic manoeuvre was helped along by political developments in England, where in September, 1841 Palmerston was succeeded by Aberdeen, who needed some time to take up again from where Palmerston had left off.

But while Baud tried to keep the withdrawal from the East-Coast as a trump card to be played at an opportune moment, Disbrowe on his part had been trying to induce the Foreign Office — without the knowledge of the Dutch government — to replace the treaty of 1824 with a new one, which would be more in accordance with British interest. Already in June, 1841 the British ambassador had outlined a plan to obtain a better deal for British commerce and trade in the Archipelago. In that report Disbrowe had commented about the financial difficulties of the N.H.M. and the Dutch government as follows:

"...It is now evident that the system of the late King, by which He endeavoured to bolster up the manufacturers of the country, has fallen to the ground. As the contracts (i.e. with the N.H.M.) will cease in the year 1843, there is still time to consider whether any steps can be taken to ensure to the British merchants the supply of the Java market.........................."

The Dutch government which was threatened by bankruptcy would be inclined, so Disbrowe argued, to give up its attempts to foster its own textile industry, and instead obtain its cottons from British industry, provided Britain would offer sufficient compensation. Therefore England should concede some of its shipping advantage to Holland, because if it proved too difficult for Dutch ships to compete in the East-Indian trade, the Dutch
could well decide to obtain their cottons from Belgium. Another attraction which could be offered to Holland was to offer admission of Java sugar into Britain. While Palmerston was not given time to act on those suggestions, Disbrowe in October, 1841 drew the attention of Aberdeen to them. Aberdeen took the matter up and suggested to Dedel, the Dutch ambassador in London, that it would be desirable to discard the treaty of 1824 and to conclude a new agreement in order to put a definite stop to the endless Anglo-Dutch disputes in the Archipelago.

However, Baud - when informed about Aberdeen's intentions - immediately grasped the tremendous repercussions which such a move would have on the Dutch position in the Archipelago. He realized that the treaty of 1824 was the foundation upon which Dutch territorial rights in the East-Indies rested; while in addition, from a commercial point of view, the treaty was distinctly advantageous to Holland, as the many complaints by British trading interests showed. Therefore in a submission to the King, Baud declared that:

"...In so far as I can judge the matter, I consider all negotiations about the establishment of a new foundation for shipping and trade in the Indies as highly dangerous for the Netherlands...(and)....In my opinion our interest requires that we restrict ourselves...to informing that ambassador that no disputes exist any more............."(90)

(90) Baud to the King, 10th January, 1842. quot. Goedemans op.cit. pp. 90-93.
Baud decided that the time had come to play his trump card; and consequently on 13th January, 1842 the British Ambassador was informed that already in September, 1841 orders had been sent to the Indies for the withdrawal of the Dutch forces from the East-Coast of Sumatra. The sole reason for the Dutch occupation of that territory had been, so the note explained, to intercept war supplies to the Padris in Central Sumatra. But as this fanatic sect, after a struggle of 25 years duration, had finally been subdued, the Dutch government saw no reason for occupying the East-Coast any longer. Furthermore as the decrees of 1834 had been suspended, no points of dispute existed any more.

Although Disbrowe seemed initially rather perplexed by the Dutch note, which gave concessions which had not been asked for i.e. the complete evacuation of the East-Coast, Aberdeen was soon to point out that the Dutch note sidestepped the most important point of dispute i.e. the right to occupy independent native states in the Archipelago. The Dutch concessions, so the British Minister argued, were no guarantee against any future actions by the Dutch in independent Indonesian territories; and

(91) See: pp. 234-235.
in any case he could not see what the subject of rebellious Indonesians had to do with the question under consideration. The fact remained that the Dutch treaty with Djambi and the occupation of Baros and Singkel were against the treaty of 1824. Finally, Disbrowe was urged to press upon the Dutch government that Britain was willing to start negotiations immediately to obtain greater reciprocity in the trade relations between the two countries in the Archipelago.

There were three reasons for the eventual refusal by the Dutch government to negotiate with Britain about a new settlement in the Archipelago. Firstly the realization, especially by Baud, that Holland because of the existing precarious state of its economy and finances could not afford to suffer a reduction in the financial remittances from the colonies. Secondly, as we have already noted, Baud feared that a change in the treaty of 1824 would severely shake the foundation of Dutch territorial rights in the Archipelago. Thirdly, at this time a swing in Dutch public opinion towards France became evident, especially on the part of the King.

The persistent refusal by Britain to recognize the right of the Dutch to occupy independent native states made Baud realize that his attempts to satisfy the British government by making a de facto concession, while not giving in on principle, had actually failed; and as he wrote:
"...I have to abandon the position taken earlier, that in regard to the relations of Britain with the Netherlands no points of difference exist any more..." (94)

Baud therefore adopted a new stalling technique. While feigning a certain amount of interest in the British proposals to negotiate, he pointed out that the time for such negotiations was rather unsuitable, as the existing economic situation in Holland did not permit a reduction in the flow of profits remitted from the colonies for the time being.

But while Baud was opposed to negotiations with England mainly on economic and political grounds, the King was set against such a move largely on personal grounds. William II - a rather impulsive personality - had been alienated from Britain and the East-European Powers because of the Luxembourg Question. He therefore was inclined to seek closer co-operation with France; and the French ambassador in The Hague did everything possible to help along this development, especially because France, which was disquieted by the formation of the German Zollverein, tried to reinforce its position. As a counter-balance to the Germans the French tried to bring about a customs union between themselves, Belgium and Holland. The

(94) Baud to van Kattendijke, 31st March, 1842. Goedemans, op. cit. p.121.
(95) Van Kattendijke to Disbrowe, 20th April, 1842. quot. Ibid. pp.121-122.
(96) Note: In 1840 the question arose whether Luxembourg - which was under the House of Orange - should join the recently formed German Zollverein (Customs Union). England together with the East-European Powers finally managed to join the duchy in a commercial union with Germany, against the will of William II, who wanted a union with Belgium.
(97) Bois le Comte to Desages, 18th August, 1842. quot. Goedemans op. cit. p.125.
Dutch King was full of enthusiasm for the French plan and sent a special envoy to Paris for discussions. From the instructions to this envoy it can be seen that William was greatly annoyed at the way his father and he himself had been treated by the Allies:

"...The destruction of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has changed my position: from being the enemy of France I have become the ally of that country......"

The King could understand why France acted as it did during the Belgian revolution, but he could not understand the position the Allies had taken. In regard to the Luxembourg question he was thankful for the help offered by France and:

"...my policy consists of being on good terms with all powers, but on more confidential terms with France, without becoming a satellite of that planet. In a war between France and England I will not hesitate to choose the side of France, especially if, as is very probable, the United States will participate with us...................."(98)

Although the enthusiasm of the King went too far, according to the French ambassador, who therefore tried to temper it down somewhat, it cannot be denied that the strong Francophile feelings of the King, who after all had the final say in colonial affairs, contributed to the decision to refuse to negotiate with Britain.

(98) Bois le Comte to Guizot, 30th April, 1842. quot. Ibid. pp.126-127.
In the meantime Disbrowe during further discussions with the Dutch, had come to the conclusion that it would be difficult to insist on greater reciprocity in colonial trade so long as the rather stringent measures in the British colonies were not removed. Consequently the British refrained from using the complaints of British merchants, but instead tried to reach their goal of obtaining better conditions for English trade and commerce in the Archipelago by means of exchanging concessions. Java sugar was to be given preferential treatment on the British home market, while discussions would be held about a similar treatment of coffee and other colonial produce. In return the British expected preferential treatment for their shipping and trade in the Dutch colonies.

When Baud in private discussions with Disbrowe showed sufficient interest in the British proposals, a note was sent to the Dutch government on 29th August, 1842, which in fact was the first official British reply to the Dutch refusal to negotiate the previous April. Although in this note Britain still insisted on the independence of Siak, it would refrain from raising this question any further, because the Dutch had

(99) Disbrowe to Aberdeen, 30th May, 1842. *quot.* Goedemans *op.cit.* p.131. *Note:* Disbrowe wrote: "...taking into consideration the mode in which the import duties are levied at Calcutta, I am afraid it would be difficult to insist on the principle contained in the treaty of commerce and navigation signed in 1837 between Great Britain and the Netherlands" (i.e. most-favoured nation treatment).

withdrawn from that area. It was, however, regretted that the Dutch were unwilling to negotiate on commercial questions and therefore they were themselves responsible if they suffered any harmful effects by persisting in this attitude.

This note was rather satisfying to Baud, as the earlier British insistence on a revision of both trading and territorial agreements had been reduced to commercial questions only. In reply Baud suggested that Java produce should be imported into Britain on Dutch ships, but as this conflicted with the Acts of Navigation, Disbrowe had to refer the matter to the British government. In the meantime Baud promised to look into the matter of lower duties. However when by the end of December, 1842 no further reply to the British proposals had been received Disbrowe sent a threatening note to the Dutch government. But it still took some time before The Hague replied. The Dutch offered a reduction of 5% in the import duties on British textiles in the East-Indies, but in return requested that Java sugar should be allowed into Britain when carried on Dutch ships and furthermore that British duties on Dutch butter and cheese should be reduced. The Foreign Office was opposed to the Dutch proposals and especially to the last mentioned request. The negotiations ended again in failure, as undoubtedly had been the hope and the intention of both the King and Baud.

(102) Baud to van Kattendijke, 4th October, 1842. pp. 139-141. quot. Goedemans op. cit.
(103) Disbrowe to van Kattendijke, 27th December, 1842. quot. Tannig op. cit. p. 115.
After the Anglo-Dutch negotiations of 1842/1843 had failed the British Foreign Office continued its policy of obstructing Dutch expansionary moves wherever possible. The Dutch, as we have seen, had already been stopped in Sumatra and now Britain turned its attention to Borneo, Celebes, Bali and some of the other Lesser Sunda Islands.

In fact the British denial of the right of the Dutch to occupy independent Indonesian states brought about a situation very similar to the one which had existed in the period 1816-1824, when the Batavian government in order to prevent Raffles from establishing a British East Indian empire tried to occupy as large an area of the Archipelago as possible. The treaty of 1824 had been designed to eliminate those territorial disputes by dividing the Archipelago into a Dutch and British sphere of influence. However, Palmerston's interpretation of articles 9 and 10 of the 1824 treaty actually nullified the Contracting Parties' agreement on a demarcation line, causing the Dutch territorial position to become again rather shaky.

(1) Tarling, op.cit. pp.147-152.
(2) See Section I, pp. 15-26.
(3) See Section IV, pp. 237-238.
In any case that is how Baud saw the situation in 1843. In a letter to Merkus the Colonial Minister — after having referred to the attempts of British officials between 1816 and 1824 to keep parts of Borneo and Sumatra for Britain and the subsequent illegal occupation by the British of Singapore — pointed to the recent settlements of individual Englishmen in Borneo, Bali and Lombok; and to the fact that owing to British pressure Holland was forced to refrain from making establishments on the East-Coast of Sumatra. An obvious danger to Dutch territorial rights existed, Baud continued, and therefore he instructed Merkus to guard those rights effectively. Especially in those islands which were in danger of being occupied by a foreign power, Dutch sovereign rights should be made clear. There were various means for reaching that objective, according to Baud, without causing a great deal of publicity, such as scientific explorations; administrative measures, subduing riots; and mediating in disputes. On the other hand, he warned, his instruction did not mean that the existing policy in regard to the Outer-Possessions — i.e. non-expansion and non-interference — was set aside. The Minister explained that the Outer-Possessions were to be divided into two categories. Firstly those islands which were fit for economic exploitation and which the government intended to occupy in gradual stages, such as Sumatra and Borneo. The second category consisted of those islands where the govern—
ment was only interested in maintaining its sovereign rights, leaving exploitation for the distant future; and in those areas the administrative structure should be at a minimum and the official attitude a passive one. The way, however, in which Baud envisaged that expansion should take place in islands coming under the first category is clarified in a letter to Governor-General Rochussen in 1845. Military occupation and the introduction of a government administration would only occur, after colonists - who Baud hoped to attract from China and other parts of Asia - had established trading centres and requested government protection. Thus, the policy of non-expansion had been relaxed to such an extent that expansion i.e. actually taking possession, could occur provided it followed economic exploitation.

This policy of Baud was dictated by two factors. First, Baud did not want to spend part of the financial surplus of Java


(5) Baud to Rochussen, 28th October, 1845.quot. Somer op.cit. pp.60-61. Note: Rochussen, Jan Jacob; born at Breda 1797; died at The Hague in 1871; Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Amsterdam, 1826-1837; Minister for Finance 1840-1843; Governor-General of the East-Indies, 1845-1851; Member of the Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives), 1852-1857; Minister for Colonies, 1858-1861; Member of the Tweede Kamer, 1864-1869.
for establishing Dutch authority on a firm basis in the whole of the Archipelago, regardless of the economic feasibility of such a move. Only when quick financial returns, which would add to the remittances sent home, were to be expected would expansion be considered worthwhile. At this stage, it should be noted, imperialistic ideas about the establishment of a Greater Netherlands State were still far from the minds of Dutch politicians. The colonies were considered as a necessary source of income which kept Holland's economy afloat. Therefore anything which tended to reduce this coveted colonial surplus had to be prevented. Furthermore, although Java probably could have provided the funds for the effective occupation of the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, there still remained the problem, which had already been pointed out by van den Bosch, of manpower needed for administrative and military purposes.

On the other hand the fear of British penetration into the Dutch sphere of influence forced Baud to relax the established policy of non-expansion and non-interference in cases where this was economically feasible; if not, then Dutch sovereign rights in the Archipelago had to be made clear to the outside world by such devices as the issuing of Dutch flags to local rulers and the erection of posts featuring the Dutch coat of arms.

(6) See Section III, p. 135.
Meanwhile in the Dutch-controlled parts of Centra Sumatra no serious disturbances of peace and order occurred between 1841 and 1844. But in 1844 a rebellion took place in Pau, near Padang, which was instigated by some discontented indigenous leaders and a group of fanatic Muslims from the surau (i.e. Mohammedan school) of Lubuq Lintah (near Pau). A detachment of government troops which was sent to put down the disturbances was repulsed with heavy losses. But soon afterwards the rising was subdued and ten of the rebels were sent into exile to Banda, Riouw and Ternate.

More important, however, was the deterioration of the situation in the districts bordering the Dutch held territories, where refugees and Muslim fanatics had congregated and staged repeated invasions into Minangkabau. Government troops early in January, 1845 repulsed a band of invaders from the kampung Ajer Angat (East of Sidjundjung); and action had also to be taken against the III Kotas Sungei Pagu and Sungei Abu, which were threatening the XIII Kotas and had occupied the kampung Talang Berbunga. Michiels, who already in 1842 had directed the attention of the Batavian authorities to the difficulties which could be expected from the independent districts in the interior,

(7) Kielstra V, op.cit. p.534.
(8) Ibid. pp.534-535.
(9) See Michiels' comments on policy decision of 1st September, 1841 in his despatch of 3rd October, 1842. _Quot._ p.247.
pointed out that apart from the fact that many anti-government elements had fled there the inhabitants were forced to become hostile to the Dutch government because of its policy to divert as much trade as possible from the East-Coast to Padang. This interfered with the traditional transit trade between Minangkabau and the East-Coast ports, which was carried on by the people living along the Eastward flowing rivers in the interior. According to Michiels it was impossible to put an effective stop to those hostilities unless those territories were effectively occupied by the Dutch. Furthermore, Michiels - pointing to Baud's instructions of 1st September, 1841 which allowed conquest only when this was necessitated by circumstances - submitted that the repeated incursions from the Kwantan and Sungei Pagi districts were a case in point. But a resolution by the Batavian government of 4th May, 1845 declared that the latest instructions from The Hague dictated a cautious policy; and although the Governor's report was considered important enough to be submitted to the Home government, in the meantime:

"...no new districts are to be occupied unless this is absolutely necessary for our safety within the borders which have been occupied lately............................................"(11)


Together with Michiels' report governor-general Van Rijnst submitted to Baud that the hostility of the interior districts could be stopped by abolishing the severe restrictions on the import and export trade with the East-Coast, which included the confiscation of goods when smugglers were caught. The core of the trouble, according to van Rijnst, was that not enough competition existed in the government territories owing to the prominence of the N.H.M. and the salt and opium monopolies, which caused low prices to be paid for local produce and high prices for foreign imports. The trading conditions in Western Sumatra should be made more attractive by creating a more competitive market. This would increase the import and export trade of the government districts far more than the existing oppressive measures adopted for stopping East-West trade.

Baud in his reply to the King about those submissions reiterated his earlier argument that in no case Sumatra was to become a financial burden; and

"...in regard to the argument, that a continuous expansion of territory would tend to ensure general peace and cause a consolidation of our power, I still remain of the opinion that, as great necessity yet exists to keep our measures in proportion to our financial means no conquests should be made than are strictly required for the quiet administration of what has already been occupied. We must as it were proceed reluctantly...."
Although, so Baud conceded, occasions could arise which necessitated expansion he did not agree with Michiels that the present difficulties with the border-districts warranted such a move. The dissension was apparently caused by measures taken by the government to give the trade of the Sumatran interior a Western direction, despite the fact that this trade was naturally inclined towards the East. The argument by Michiels that dissatisfaction would stop if the East-Coast ports were occupied was not valid as all that would happen was that the dissension would be displaced from the interior to the East-Coast. The real issue at stake was the fact that the Sumatran people did not want to be burdened by any form of taxation or other types of government interference. Furthermore the occupation of the East-Coast would cause a renewal of the arguments with Britain, which denied the Dutch the right to levy differential tariffs there; and:

"...in order to prevent such an argument, we would have to introduce – when in possession of the East-Coast – very liberal tariffs; and how would that possession in such a case be advantageous from the point of view of our trade and industry? Not at all................." 

Baud, however, was inclined to agree with the proposals of the governor-general to abolish the restrictions of the trade with the East-Coast, providing the loss in government revenue was not too great. But if it appeared that such a policy would
result in a considerable increase in imports from the East-Coast of such commodities as salt, opium and cottons then one would have to choose between two equally disagreeable alternatives i.e.:

"...the continuation of the existing system, together with the hostile feeling of a great part of the indigenous population, or the sacrificing of part of our revenue in Sumatra and of a fairly considerable market for Netherlands cottons."

Under the circumstances, Baud thought, the best means to solve the problem would be to introduce a poll tax, which would enable the government to reduce the tariff on coffee quite considerably. On the other hand a poll tax, Baud feared, could cause even greater dissension among the population than already existed. But the Minister left it for the governor-general to decide — after having received further information and advice — on a new policy or to acquiesce in the existing situation with all its obvious inconveniences.

It took, however, till September, 1846 before Michiels replied to a request by the governor-general for his further opinion on the question of East-West trade in Central Sumatra. The governor tried to play down the earlier objections raised by the governor-general to the severe restrictions on trade with the East-Coast; and he pointed out that those restrictions

(13) Baud to the King, 27th November, 1845. quot. Kielstra V. pp. 543-547.
(14) Baud to Batavia, 8th December, 1845. quot. Ibid. p. 543.
were not causing any more inconvenience to the people concerned than the levying of customs did anywhere else. Michiels agreed that one solution to the problem of low prices for export produce and high prices for imports was to decrease duties; but:

"...the Malay did not pay any land or poll tax; and as long as that is the case the treasury could not do without the customs revenue." Furthermore it was important to make the West-Coast — where so much Dutch money and energy had already been spent — a paying proposition as soon as possible. The amount of customs revenue received depended obviously on the output of export commodities; and:

"...Therefore the question is: is this output sufficient? Is it proportional to the real productive capacity of a population of nearly 500,000, who inhabitate the most fertile regions of the rich island of Sumatra? I venture to say with confidence: no." Agriculture, so Michiels argued, was mainly left to the lower layers of society in Minangkabau, while also a great deal of work was left to the women. The Minangkabau, however, spent most of his time in idleness unless he sought to overcome his boredom by inciting civil strife or war. In addition the Minangkabau had little incentive to engage in agriculture, as the natural fertility of the land provided him — without much effort on his own account — with enough food for his subsistence.
Furthermore the profit incentive was greatly weakened because the grower of export produce received only little return for his hard work, as most of the profit ended up in the pockets of middlemen and coolies, who had to be paid a considerable amount of money for transporting the produce to the coast. Therefore the only way to encourage the production of export commodities, according to Michiels, was to ensure the grower a larger share of the profits. This was possible even with low prices ruling the market. Despite the instructions laid down by van den Bosch in 1833 which forbade interference in indigenous affairs - including agricultural production - Michiels argued that in this case it was absolutely necessary that the government took direct steps in an attempt to raise the output of coffee - the most important export commodity produced in Minangkabau - because output had so far remained far below what it should and could have been. In order then

(15) **Note:** Indeed a substantial fall in coffee production had occurred since 1843 as the following statistics show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports of coffee from Padang - piculs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
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<td>1820</td>
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<td>1846</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to encourage the production of coffee and to balance govern­ment expenditure with local revenue Michiels proposed to offer to indigenous planters in Minangkabau a minimum guaranteed price of 7 guilders per picul. Also the grower should not be burdened by transport costs; and therefore the governor proposed to have the coffee transported by compulsory service. Only about 5% of the working population would be needed for this unpaid transport service; and in any case the governor considered this personal tax only a very small burden especially on the large number of loafers who did not pay any other taxes and only wasted their time gambling.

But the resident of Minangkabau, Steinmetz, was opposed to the proposals of Michiels. The Resident argued that in a country where democratic institutions were prominent and individual landownership was very restricted; and where furthermore the fertility of the soil did not require a great deal of effort to provide the population with its essential needs, a system of heavy duties was the worst that could be devised. High tariffs depressed the price of export produce causing a fall in production; and they increased the cost of imports,

causing a fall in consumption of European manufactures. If
the existing system was maintained then it would have to be
followed very soon by compulsory measures, because the people
on their own account had no incentive to grow more coffee. A
compulsory system was fitting in Java where the people were
used to being forced from above, but this was not so in
Sumatra, where the population was accustomed to a great deal
of personal freedom. Steinmetz therefore was of the opinion
that a system of direct taxation—the incidence of which
should be appropriate to the wealth of the individual districts—
would be a far more appropriate revenue earner than customs
duties. (17)

Also General Von Gagern—who had been on an inspection
tour of West-Sumatra—was inclined to agree with Steinmetz;
and he submitted that in order to raise production it would be
better to rely on the self-interest of the people than on force.
It was highly desirable that duties should be reduced; commun-
ications through the mountain passes improved; and the hated
compulsory services abolished. (18)

But governor-general Rochussen declared himself in agree-
ment with the proposals of Michiels and by resolution of 30th

(17) Note of the Resident of Minangkabau, September, 1846. in
Ibid. pp. 1468-1471.
(18) Note of General Von Gagern, 25th September, 1846. in Ibid.
pp. 1471-1473.
March, 1847 he empowered the governor of Sumatra's West-Coast to offer planters a guaranteed minimum price of six guilders per picul of coffee delivered to the government; to pay the indigenous heads and officials, who encouraged production, 50 cents per picul of coffee produced in their districts; and to have the coffee transported to the coast without the help of the growers. Furthermore the governor was requested to investigate and report on the best means for improving roads and means of transport; and to see if it would be desirable for the government to bear part of the cost of coffee transport.

Subsequently on 20th September, 1847 Michiels issued a decree ordering that all coffee produced was to be delivered to the government at fixed prices, after which it would be sold at Padang by auction. All coffee transported from Minangkabau to the coast had to be accompanied by certificates issued by the administrative officer in charge of the district from where the coffee originated. Any coffee transported without such a certificate was to be confiscated.

More detailed instructions were issued by Michiels in October, 1847. Coffee, none of which could be bought or sold by private persons before delivery to the government, was to be delivered by the grower at the nearest government warehouse,

(20) Michiels instructions of 20th September, 1847. in. Ibid. pp. 1478-1479.
after having been cleaned, hulled and dried. Growers would be paid immediately on delivery at rates fixed in proportion to the quality of their produce. But after a period of six months no more 3rd grade coffee would be accepted; and the administrative officers and indigenous heads concerned were to ensure that only the best quality coffee would be delivered. To that purpose administrative officers were instructed to hold regular inspections, choosing suitable areas for the use of large regularly laid out plantations and inducing the population to adopt more efficient production methods. In regard to the transport problem the governor decided the following. The growers were required to deliver their produce to government warehouses, which were to be erected at convenient points all over the country. Large central stores were to be built at Padang, Pandjang, Fort de Kock, Fort van der Capellen, Pajacombo and Solok, while smaller warehouses were to be erected at eleven other centres. Those buildings were to be constructed by the population at no cost; and the government would only supply certain building materials such as iron. The cost of transport from those establishments to the coast was to be born by the government. Preferably use should be made of horse-carts and packhorses, but where this was not feasible coolies were to be employed. Furthermore the main tracts leading from Minangkabau to the coast would be widened to such an extent that
they could take horse drawn carts. In fact, so Michiels reported, work on the road from Kaju Tanam to Padang Pandjang was already so far advanced that it was usable for horse-cart traffic; and a contract had been concluded with W. Townsend, a Padang merchant, for the delivery of government salt to Kaju Tanam and the carrying of coffee from there to the coast. In addition to the provisions made for transport, indigenous leaders and officials were offered incentive payments of 50 cents per picul of coffee produced in their respective districts, providing they were considered as showing sufficient zeal in the promotion of coffee production.

Summarizing, those instructions by Michiels include many features of the culture system in Java. In fact the Minangkabaus, apart from being required to deliver all coffee to the government, were forced indirectly to grow more and better coffee by the pressure put on them by their own leaders, whose financial interests were at stake. However, the new system — as will be discussed in the next part — worked well and resulted in a considerable increase in output.

But while Michiels had managed to convince his superiors of the necessity of his economic policy at the West-Coast his

attempts to have the Home government waive its objections to
the occupation of the East-Coast were far less successful.
In fact both Michiels and governor-general Rochussen were
opposed — although for somewhat different reasons — to the
policy of non-expansion in the Outer-Possessions. Michiels' concern was more localized as he tried to convince the Home
government that the occupation of the East-Coast was a pre-
requisite to the proper establishment of peace and order in
Central Sumatra. But Rochussen pressed The Hague for a
revision of the policy of non-expansion in general on the
grounds that Dutch sovereignty could never be properly upheld
without effective occupation. Actually Rochussen's requests
had been triggered off by Baud himself, who in December, 1845 when upset by the activities of the British in Borneo — had asked what could be done:

"...for the establishment of our territorial and political supremacy in the Indian Archipelago and the security of our sovereign rights over those parts where those rights...can be disputed with us by other nations.................." (25)

(24) Note: On 10th December, 1845 in reply to Dutch protests about the appointment of Brooke as British agent in Borneo, Aberdeen had pointed out to the Dutch ambassador that this did not interfere with the treaty of 1824 because article 12 of that treaty which prevented the British from making establishments or concluding treaties, did not apply to Borneo as that island had not been specifically named as belonging within the Dutch sphere of influence. See Irwin "Nineteenth Century Borneo" op.cit. pp.105-106.

(25) Baud to Rochussen, 19th December, 1845. in Colijn "Politiek beleid.." op.cit. p.34.
But when the British government a few days later notified The Hague about the establishment of a coaling station on Labuan, an island off the coast of Borneo, Baud tried to answer the question of protecting sovereign rights himself by instructing Rochussen to declare the whole of Borneo a province (gouvernement) of the Netherlands Indies, in order to stop any further British penetration into Borneo. Baud was apparently mainly interested in presenting the outside world with a formal declaration of Dutch sovereignty, but Rochussen wanted to go further than that and introduce effective control, because:

"...possession in name gives little guarantee for the future, (but) de facto possession obtained by efficient and progressive development will take away all pretexts and does not only secure our supremacy but it will also increase our shipping and trade."

The time had come, Rochussen continued, to use some of the financial surplus produced by Java and which so far had all been remitted to the mother country, for the development of the Outer-Possessions. However, Rochussen's request for 100,000 guilders needed for his plan to establish the provinces of West and East Sumatra; the construction of roads in South

(27) Rochussen to Baud, 18th June, 1846. quot. Ibid. p.40.
Sumatra; and the setting up of a special commission for the Outer-Possessions, was refused by Baud on the grounds that:

"...most of the Outer-Possessions have always been financial burdens. The improvement of their prosperity and trade is certainly desirable, but by wishing to do too much at once, their deficits would keep growing from year to year."

Although very anxious to affirm Dutch sovereignty in the Archipelago, Baud considered it sufficient to do this outwardly, without establishing direct internal control. The Colonial Minister still clung to the policy objectives which were laid down by van den Bosch in 1833; i.e. first to exploit Java and Sumatra while keeping the rest of the Archipelago loosely under Dutch control until such time that economic exploitation in those areas became feasible.

In Sumatra the major objective of controlling the wealth of that island had largely been reached; and further expansion into the East-Coast was, according to Baud, not a profitable proposition because the British would object to the introduction of differential tariffs. The main objective of Dutch policy in Sumatra was the establishment of a trading monopoly, which in any case had been reached to a considerable extent as the most fertile parts of the island - i.e. the valleys of Minangkabau - had been brought under firm Dutch control.

(28) Baud to the King, 1846 quot. Ibid. pp. 43-44.
Especially after the introduction of Michiels system of coffee production this area could be expected to become a paying proposition in the near future. In short, van den Bosch and Baud and for that matter the majority of Dutchmen at the time considered the colonies solely from a business point of view, although — as will be discussed in the next part — differences of opinion existed as to how this business should be run. Money was only to be spent — and even then as little as possible — on those islands which promised a quick return. The other areas in the Archipelago were to be kept in reserve for future exploitation. It should be noted that at this time imperialistic motives are far from the minds of the Dutch. Political expansion was allowed only for purely economic reasons. Such nationalistic notions as the establishment of a Greater Netherlands state and the spreading of Dutch culture are still far away in the distant future. In fact the policy of least possible interference in indigenous affairs points decidedly the other way. Interference in internal affairs was only permitted if it would increase profitability and even then the authorities would think twice about causing social upheavals which would disturb peace and order, which in turn would result in costly expeditions and increase overheads. During the period under discussion the Dutch considered themselves as the managers of a gigantic business enterprise, no more and no less.
However, the Dutch were not allowed to monopolize the trade of the Archipelago for themselves; and in 1824 they had been forced into a partnership with the other contender Britain. But this partnership had in fact broken up mainly because of the incompatibility of the partners. The economic and military superiority of Britain tended to reduce Holland to a sleeping partner with an ever decreasing share of the profits. The Dutch tried to prevent East Indian trade and commerce from becoming a British monopoly by introducing a monopoly of their own. It was this monopoly aspect of Dutch colonial policy - necessitated by British supremacy in the first place - which made Britain decide to call a halt to any further Dutch expansion into hitherto independent Indonesian territories. But Baud appears to have been content with what had been achieved so far and did not wish to take measures which only could decrease the profitability of the colonies. However, Baud was not permitted to pursue his policies for much longer, because in 1848 he was relieved of his post when a liberal government took over in The Hague after a bloodless revolution, which was a consequence of violent political upheavals in other parts of Europe during that year. The effects of 1848 on Dutch colonial policy were considerable, but their discussion will be left for the next section.
SECTION VI.
THE EFFECT OF LIBERALISM AND HUMANITARIANISM ON THE POLICY OF NON-EXPANSION.

The constitutional revision of 1848 caused a marked change in the relations between the mother-country and the colonies. A great deal of the power over the colonies was transferred from the King to Parliament. The States-General were given the responsibility over colonial finances; and they were also requested to prescribe a new Regeeringsreglement (Fundamental Law) for the colonies. In addition the King was required to submit to Parliament annual reports on colonial administration and affairs.

This increased parliamentary jurisdiction over colonial affairs gave the Liberal faction - which had become increasingly critical of government colonial policy - the opportunity to press its demands for a modification of the monopoly system

(1) Note: The Constitution of 1848 provided that:
"Article 59. Supreme power over the colonies and possessions of the Realm in other parts of the world is vested in the King. Fundamental laws regulating the government's administration there are to be laid down by law. The monetary system is to be regulated by law. Other matters, concerning those colonies and possessions, are to be regulated by law, as soon as the necessity thereof appears to exist.
Article 60. The King is to give annually to the States General a comprehensive report about the administration of those colonies and possessions and about the existing state of affairs there. The management of and responsibility for finances is regulated by law."

of van den Bosch. The liberals were just as eager to receive the ever growing profits from the colonies, but for both economic and humanitarian reasons they wanted a change in the culture system. The following quotation from a parliamentary speech by van Hoevell gives a clear illustration of the liberal position:

"...The impression is given, that the opposition wants to deprive the nation of those millions; the impression is given, that our system were: no direct benefits from the Indies. This is an untruth. We, however, want those benefits by other means; we do not want to further the interests of the Netherlands at the cost of the Indian population, but by means of their prosperity. That prosperity comes first and then the benefits...."(2)

The liberals demanded more scope for private enterprise in colonial trade and agriculture, mainly because Dutch entrepreneurs were desiring to invest surplus capital, which the culture and consignment system had enabled them to accumulate in the first place. Furthermore there was a strong belief in the liberal doctrine that private enterprise - free from unnecessary government interference - would not only increase

(2) Speech of van Hoevell in the Tweede Kamer (Second Chamber), 18th July, 1854. in Handelingen der Regeering en der Staten Generaal betreffende het Reglement op het Beleid der Reg­ eering van Nederlandsch-Indie. Derde Deel. Beraadslagingen. Utrecht, Kemink, 1857. p.37. Note: Wolter Robert baron van Hoevell went to the Indies in 1836 as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. Van Hoevell was an ardent liberal and had a genuine interest in trying to improve the lot of the indigenous population. In his periodical the "Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie" he propounded his ideas, but in 1848 after having participated in an anti-government demonstration in Batavia he lost his position and returned to Holland. There he was elected to the Tweede Kamer (Second Chamber) where he became the liberal faction's expert on colonial affairs.
the profits of the Indies even further, but that it would also create the best possible world for everybody, including the downtrodden Javanese, who were suffering terribly from the excesses of the culture system. In fact the pressure put on the indigenous population by both Dutch and Indonesian administrative personnel in order to raise the production of export commodities even at the cost of food production had resulted in great calamities in some parts of Java. A famine in Demak caused the population to decrease from 336,000 to 120,000 between 1848 and 1850, while in Grobogan the population diminished from 89,000 to 9,000. Initially, however, the liberal programme did not demand an immediate abolition of the culture system, but it pressed for its modification in order to grant more scope for private enterprise and to secure a more humane treatment of the indigenous population. In fact most parliamentarians, realizing their unfamiliarity with the actual situation in the Indies, were unwilling to press for too drastic changes in colonial administration out of fear that the flow of profits might diminish.

Therefore in regard to colonial affairs the liberals tended to be less progressive, as can be seen from the fact that

(3) Colenbrander H.T. "Koloniale Geschiedenis" Deel III. p.42.
the first Thorbecke cabinet included Pahud - a conservative - as Minister for Colonies. Furthermore the new Regeeringsreglement of 1854 was clearly a compromise between liberal and conservative principles. Article 56 of the new reglement stipulated that the existing government cultures would be maintained. However, preparations were to be made for an arrangement whereby after a period of transition the government would withdraw from the economic sector; forced labour would be abolished; and private enterprise would be able to conclude contracts with the indigenous population. Furthermore excessive pressure on indigenous labour was condemned; and an investigation into the workings of the culture system was ordered. Any measures taken by the Governor-General in relation to article 56 were to be mentioned in the annual Colonial Reports to Parliament.

This initial apprehension of the liberals and the unwillingness of the conservatives to abolish government enterprise which had proved to be a reliable source of income led to the idea of a division of labour between government and private enterprise in the exploitation of the Netherlands East Indies. The fact that the culture system was concentrated mainly on Java directed the attention of private enterprise to the

Outer-Possessions. Already in August, 1848 Rijk, the successor of Baud, had pointed out that the East-Indian government - as long as it was required to remit surplus capital to the Home government - would never have sufficient funds and manpower at its disposal for the development of the whole of the Netherlands Indies. Therefore the aid of private capital and management should be co-opted.

This idea of a division of labour is a salient feature of a report by a Commission set up in 1850 to investigate the feasibility of handing over to private enterprise the government tin mines in Banka. The report stated that the apparent lack of interest so far in the exploitation of the vast mineral wealth of the Indies was due to the monopolizing of the economic sector by the government, which had no sufficient means to develop the whole of the Indies on its own account. Therefore any future exploitation should be left to private enterprise. While the Commission agreed that Java and Madura should remain the field for government enterprise, it definitely expected that in the Outer-Possessions the government would restrict itself to the fulfilling of its obligations as a sovereign ruler in order that:

"..exploitation could be extended wherever feasible, when the whole Nation concerns itself with it; and a useful and profitable field can be opened up in the Netherlands Indies possessions for so many industrialists, who are keen in finding a destination for their surplus capital..................

The recommendations of the Commission were adopted by the Government and the first Netherlands Indies Mining Regulations were issued by Royal Decree of 24th October, 1850. The Regulations stipulated that mining concessions in the Outer-Possessions could be granted to Dutch nationals, who had satisfied the government as to their financial capacity to develop the mining deposits properly. The granting of each concession was to be preceded by a survey - paid for by the government - to establish the value of the deposits and the amount of capital required for their proper exploitation. However, the cost of any further protection or encouragement by the government was to be born by the entrepreneur.

The liberal members of the Commission such as van Hoevell were genuine in their belief that the development of the Outer-possessions by private enterprise would improve the situation of the indigenous population; and they were convinced that Holland had a moral duty in trying to improve the lot of the indigenous population:

"...Will the Netherlands fulfil its moral obligations to lift up the people, who are under its sovereignty, from that terrible situation and to civilize them as much as possible? If so, then land reclamation and agriculture are very effective means. The transfer of mining to private enterprise could and should be the first step; thereby the income and productivity of the people will increase and more demand and civilization will be created. ..........................................

However, a far more important motive - at least to the conservatives - was the consideration that private entrepreneurs would be able to ease the task of the government in ensuring the effective occupation of the economically valuable parts of the Outer-Possessions. This idea of a partnership between the government and private enterprise not only to exploit the economic resources of the Archipelago but also to secure Dutch sovereign rights there, is expressed in a departmental note submitted early in 1849, to G.L. Baud - no relation of the earlier J.C. Baud - who succeeded Rijk to the Colonial ministry. The submission pointed out that the measures indicated in 1843 by J.C. Baud for the protection of Dutch rights in the East Indies were not effective on their own account. They should be implemented by an effective exploitation of the rich resources of the islands. But this exploitation should be left to private entrepreneurs, who were to select suitable regions for exploitation, where - with

(9) See pp. 259-60.
the help and protection of the government - they would be able to conclude contracts with the indigenous population or princes. The Minister was clearly impressed and submitted the recommendations to the King, adding that Dutch adventurers of the type of Raja Brooke should be encouraged; and if they had sufficient capital they should be given an assurance of all possible government help and protection.

The function, however, which the conservatives wished to assign to private enterprise is clear from a report by Pahud to the King on the occasion of the Mining Commission's recommendation that the Banka tin mines should be exploited by private capital. Pahud was opposed to this because he pointed out that private enterprise was not needed to take over successful government businesses, but instead to increase the points of support of Dutch authority in the rest of the Archipelago. A conservative member of the Commission put another slant on the Banka question by arguing that private Dutch funds would not be sufficient to take over such a large scale enterprise and that therefore foreign participation, probably British, would have to be invited; and:


(12) Pahud to the King, 30th September, 1850. quot. Ibid. p.15.
"...Once the English are tied up in the affairs of Banka they will expect to be protected and supported by the Netherlands authority; they will, especially as English capital is involved, complain at every possible occasion about the lack of protection, both at sea and land. Also the most unreasonable requests would have to be complied with; and if the Government would not be able to do so, as it forces might be needed in other parts of the Archipelago, then the time has come for England to do on its own account – and as it will be termed for the protection of its shipping and trade – what we were not able to do. And that Power will settle in Banka without ever giving it back to us........................................(13)

Another consideration which centred attention on the development of mining was the growing economic and strategic importance of iron and coal. Steam was replacing sail – also in warships – and iron was used on an ever increasing scale in shipbuilding. The Dutch therefore considered it of great strategic importance to find workable local deposits of those essential commodities, as in the case of war with England – the only possible enemy at the time – the Indies would be cut off from overseas supplies. In addition the mechanization of the sugar industry in Java and somewhat later of railways made a reliable local coal supply even more important. Already in 1846 the King – on the advice of Baud – had approved a scheme for the training of mining engineers in England for the colonial service. The first of those trained experts arrived

in the Indies in 1850; and their activities were regulated by a Royal decree of June, 1852, which instituted a government mining service (Indisch Mijnwezen). The main task of this service - apart from surveying mining concessions according to the Mining Regulations of 1850 - was to carry out a general exploration of mineral resources in the Archipelago, especially of iron and coal. Soon afterwards a number of detailed reports on mineral deposits in the Archipelago were published, which could be used as a guide by prospective investors.

Thus the Mining Regulations of 1850 were the result of a combination of factors: i.e. the pressure of private enterprise for participation in the exploitation of the colonies; secondly the growing concern for the security of Dutch sovereign rights in the Archipelago coupled with the unwillingness of both liberals and conservatives to interfere with profitable government enterprise in Java, relayed the pressure of private enterprise to the Outer-Possessions; thirdly the growing importance - both economically and strategically - of iron and coal created a great deal of public interest in the rest of the Archipelago.

The immediate effect, however, of the Mining Regulations on mining exploitation by private enterprise was rather limited;

and the only direct outcome was the formation of a private company in 1852 for the purpose of tin-mining on the island of Billiton. For the rest private enterprise showed only slight interest in the exploitation of the mineral resources of the Indies until the end of the century, when oil—which was known to exist in great quantities in Java and Sumatra—was becoming a commodity of world importance. The reasons for this lack of interest by Dutch capitalists in East-Indian mining are various. Firstly the recompensation which—according to the Regulations of 1850—had to be given by private firms for government services was found difficult to assess in practice, e.g. the East-Indian government put its costs for the "encouragement and protection" of the private venture in Billiton at 20,000 guilders per year. This was a large amount of money for a company which just started off and which furthermore was hard hit from the beginning by falling tin prices. Secondly the field open for mining exploitation was in fact rather limited by the stipulation in the

(15) Note: When van Hoevell returned to Holland in 1849 his enthusiastic remarks about the possibilities of Billiton as a tin producing centre caused a few Dutch private investors—including Prince Henry of Orange—to become interested. A private company was formed; and after a government survey had established Billiton as a promising tin-mining area the company was granted a concession on 20th April, 1852. After a great deal of initial financial trouble the original private company was changed into a public company in 1860; and become known as the Billiton Maatschappij, which was soon to become one of the largest private ventures in the Netherlands East Indies. Source: Ysselsteyn H A van "De Geschiedenis der Tinwinning op Billiton." s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1927. pp.2-19.

Regulations that concessions were restricted to government territory in the Outer-Possessions, excluding the self-governing territories, which made up the greater part of the area under Dutch influence.

Both the question of recompensation and the restriction of mining concessions to government territory in the Outer-Possessions were repeatedly brought up in Parliament; and in 1857 the Mining Regulations of 1850 were amended accordingly. The complaint about recompensation was quickly solved by allowing the East-Indian government to charge a fixed fee for its services, when granting further concessions. The question of granting mining concessions in self-governing territories, however, posed a number of difficulties. The rights which self-rulers recognizing Dutch supremacy retained included that of granting mining concessions to whomever they wanted, including foreigners. Firstly therefore in 1856 the government decided - in order to prevent undesirable persons from settling in the self-governing territories - that from then on contracts with self-rulers were to include a provision making the granting of mining concessions dependant on government approval. The question of total exclusion of foreigners however, became a controversial point. Mijer, the Colonial Minister, tended to

agree with the recommendation of the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) that:

"...a more liberal attitude would cancel the interest of foreigners to overpower the possessions of a state which granted them a substantial degree of protection and prosperity." (18)

But the conservative Raad van State (King's Council) was opposed to admission of foreigners on the grounds that such a move would endanger the safety of the colonies, which already were:

"...too amply supplied with foreign soldiers, industrialists and missionaries." (19)

As a compromise the Mining Regulations were amended to the extent that only those entrepreneurs who were allowed by general ordinance or special permission to reside in the self-governing territories could be granted mining concessions.

Another factor which made Dutch private enterprise rather hesitant to invest capital in mining ventures was the little success which coal and iron mining had achieved so far, especially in Borneo, while the early difficulties of the Billiton Maatschappij probably had a deteriorating effect on the willingness to invest.

(18) In Secret report of the Minister of Colonies, 4th August, 1857. quot. Ibid. p. 19.
(20) Irwin "Nineteenth Century Borneo..." op. cit. pp. 163-164.
Furthermore during the sixties the opportunity for Dutch private entrepreneurs to invest in agricultural enterprise in Java — a far less risky venture than mining in the Outer-Possessions — was opened by the gradual elimination of the culture system. The earlier attempt of the conservatives to direct the attention away from government enterprise in Java had failed owing to the ever increasing impact of liberalism and humanitarianism on Dutch public opinion, which resulted in a more intensive attack on the culture system. The liberal faction in Parliament had increased in strength; and while during the fifties liberal criticism of colonial policy had been rather theoretical, the presence in Parliament during the sixties of such prominent liberals as Fransen van der Putte, who had years of experience behind him as a planter in Java, enabled criticism of the culture system on practical economic grounds. Both in Parliament and in an increasing number of pamphlets the culture system was attacked on such issues as inefficient and incapable management; the lack of application of scientific techniques which resulted in overcropping, leeching of the soil and low quality produce. A concurrent development was the increasing concern of the Dutch public about the inhumanity of the culture system. While before 1848 hardly any information about the actual situation of the Indonesian population leaked through
to Holland, after that a stream of books and pamphlets appeared informing the Dutch public about the often inhumane treatment which the Javanese received under the culture system. This flood of moral indictment reached its culmination with the publication in 1860 of the "Max Havelaar" by Multatulli, in which apart from severe criticism of Dutch colonial policy, special attention was paid to the vile treatment meted out to the Indonesians by their own princes and leaders.

Consequently the culture system was gradually abolished during the 'Sixties and private enterprise took over where the government left off. Fransen van der Putte eliminated the forced cultivation of pepper in 1864; of tea, cinnamon, indigo, cochineal and nopal in 1865; and of tobacco in 1866. De Waal commenced the liquidation of the forced cultivation of sugar in 1870.

(21) Multatulli pseudonym for Eduard Douwes Dekker, 1820-1887; went to the Indies in 1838 where after having served in many parts of the Archipelago, including West-Sumatra, he was appointed assistant resident of Lebak (Java) in January, 1856. There he became soon involved in a dispute with the Resident, whom he accused of too much weakness in dealing with the local Javanese aristocracy which was pillaging and suppressing the people. Dekker was transferred to another post, but as he did not mend his ways, he was discharged from government service. On his return to Holland he published the Max Havelaar and numerous other works which were concerned to describe the inhumanity of the Dutch colonial system. Multatulli gained a tremendous influence in Holland including Parliament. Apart from a humanitarian and social improver Dekker had the gift of writing and his works are some of the best in Dutch literature in regard to language and style.

(22) Meinsma "Verval...." op.cit. p.73.
Although mining — with the exception of Banka and Billiton — did not experience a great upsurge till the end of the century, the establishment of a government mining service was an important step leading to future exploitation. One example of this are the government surveys in Minangkabau which in 1868-1869 led to the important discovery of an estimated 200 millions of usable coal West of the Ombilin river. The coal layers were estimated to be three to four meters deep and their quality was considered to be at least equal to Hartley (Newcastle) coal. This find — although not immediately exploited — proved to be an important factor in the economic development of Minangkabau, when between 1887 and 1894 a railway was built from Padang to the Ombilin fields and extensive harbour improvements were made at Padang in order to facilitate the export of coal.

However, in this context the mining legislation of the fifties is of importance because it illustrates the general change of attitude which was taking place in regard to the Outer-Possessions.

Another indication of this change in public opinion on the value of the Outer-Possessions is given by a report in 1857 of a Government Commission on white colonization. The

(24) Blink H "Opkomst en Ontwikkeling van Sumatra als Economisch-Geographisch Gebied" s'Gravenhage, Mouton, 1926.
Commission - of which Rochussen was put in charge - was the result of a petition to the King by ten private citizens requesting the government to support a scheme for the colonization of the Outer Possessions by white settlers including convicts. The petitioners stressed the benefits of colonization including the bringing of civilization and Christianity to the Indonesians and the disposal of unwanted persons and criminals in Holland, who when their term of punishment had been completed, should be allowed:

"...after having been improved in the meantime by religion and morality.......to settle as free workmen.........................."

In addition the prospective colonists expected government protection and in return were prepared to pay taxation. However, in order to ensure sufficient protection it was proposed that the government should participate financially in the colonization venture. The obvious inference to be drawn from the petition is that private enterprise is willing to invest in the Outer Possessions, with the provision however that such investment would only take place after or concurrently with the establishment of peace and order. While before 1848 it had been largely outside pressure which on occasions made the government take action in the Outer-

Possessions, now in addition inside pressure tried to force the authorities to establish effective control at least in the economically valuable parts of the Archipelago.

But the Commission was first of all opposed to the idea of developing the Outer Possessions by convict labour on the grounds that such human material was not suitable to acquaint the Indonesians with European civilization. Furthermore the Commission was opposed to large scale white colonization as such. The reasons for this attitude were that costs of transport, settlement and temporary support would be extremely high, while in addition the tropics were considered as too unhealthy for white settlement. However, the most important reason which made the Commission decide against white colonization was the fear that large scale white immigration would interfere with the basic principle of Dutch colonial administration: i.e. indirect rule, which it termed:

"...the foundation of our supremacy over the whole of the Indian Archipelago..."

Large concentrations of white settlers, it was feared, would result in increased interference with the indigenous social and political structure, which the government was concerned to leave untouched as much as possible, for the sake of peace and order. A case in point of such interference was, so the Commission argued, the petitioners' request to obtain land in ownership, which would involve the suppression of the adat,
because Indonesian land ownership was generally on a communal basis. If therefore the government thought it desirable to open up land for European planters then the Commission suggested it should grant long term leases, while ensuring that the land rights of the Indonesian population would not be interfered with.

In fact this suggestion by the Commission became the basic principle of the land legislation which was finally adopted in 1870. Although in 1862 Land Regulations were issued in accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the Regeerings Reglement of 1854, the area of land made available to private enterprise was still very much restricted. The 1862 Regulations stipulated that a private entrepreneur could not obtain crown land in ownership nor on long term lease, while the sale or leasing of land owned by indigenous communities was forbidden. The only way open to private enterprise was to rent virgin land from the government or make contracts with indigenous communities to grow export commodities. In order to overcome those obstacles Fransen van der Putte in May 1866 submitted a bill to Parliament which provided for 99 year leases of crown land; the leasing of


(27) Note: Article 62 forbade the Governor-General to release land for any other purposes than factories. However, the King - if he thought it desirable - could permit the Governor-General to make exceptions.
land owned by indigenous communities; and the eventual replacement of indigenous land laws by the Dutch Civil Code. Especially the last provision caused a great deal of opposition and finally van der Putte withdrew the bill and resigned. His successor Mijer, instructed the Governor-General to proclaim publicly that the government would protect the rights of the indigenous population regarding the ownership and use of land; and that land not in the possession of indigenous communities would be disposed of according to the provisions of the 1862 regulations. In addition the Minister ordered extensive investigations into the actual extent of indigenous land rights. The colonial land question, however, remained the subject of a great many debates in Parliament; and finally in 1870 Minister de Waal managed to find a solution. The Agrarische Wet of 1870 (Land Law) - which was a compromise on van der Putte's bill of 1866 - provided for 75 year long leases of virgin land; the renting of land owned by indigenous communities, with provision for the protection of indigenous rights; and the possibility for the Indonesian - if he desired to - to obtain European legal rights on land (Agrarisch eigendom recht).

(28) Note: Mijer Pieter; born in 1812 at Batavia; doctor of law at Leiden in 1832; returned to the Indies in 1833 where subsequently he filled high posts in the judiciary; returned to Holland in 1855 where he was appointed Minister for Colonies (1856-1858); Member of Tweede Kamer (1860-1866); Minister of Colonies May 1866; appointed Governor-General of the East Indies, September, 1866-January, 1872. Died 1881.

The new land legislation was valid for the whole of the Indies and constituted an important step in facilitating the growth of private capital investment in colonial agriculture. But while the gradual abolition of the culture system and the introduction of land legislation were important factors inducing private investment in agriculture, in regard to the Outer-Possessions another necessary condition for successful European enterprise: i.e. effective government protection still remained to be fulfilled. The Commission on Colonization therefore took up the opportunity to direct the attention of the government to the inefficiency of the policy of non-intervention in the areas outside Java. The Commission — although generally opposed to large scale white colonization — supported the idea of the economic development of the Outer-Possessions by private enterprise using indigenous labour. But it pointed out that if this goal was to be reached the existing government policy in regard to the Outer-Possessions needed urgent revision. Government control should be established or reinforced at least in the more important islands of the Archipelago; and the government should give a public declaration that the Outer-Possessions were earmarked for development by private enterprise and that it was considered desirable that:
"the enterprising spirit of Netherlanders - after mature deliberation - should direct its attention to the various objects which promise profitable exploitation."
necessarily mean that European civilization should be forced on the Indonesians regardless of:

"all the great differences in physical and intellectual capacity, which exist between them and the European, and without taking account of the historical development of the people's character..."

The creation of a homogeneous Indonesian society - which would undermine Dutch supremacy based as it was on the principle of divide and rule - was obviously far from the minds of the Commissioners. The Commissioners, however, were genuinely concerned about the attitude of a government that allowed universal human rights to be trampled upon in its colonies, especially in the self-governing territories. It was not that the Commissioners suggested the introduction of democracy and parliamentary government as the cure of all the troubles of indigenous society - as is so often wrongly suggested to-day - but they wanted a benevolent and humanitarian government to intervene on behalf of the Indonesian people. The only direct Western influence which the Commission thought would be beneficial to those Indonesians who were pagans, such as the Battas and the Dyaks, was the introduction of Christianity. The acceptance of Christian principles would have a civilizing effect on indigenous society and furthermore it would make the introduction of Dutch rule far easier.

(30) Verslag aan den Koning etc. op.cit. Somer. pp.100-111.
However, the Home government's attitude to the question of expansion of control - as suggested by the Commission on Colonization - was far less enthusiastic. Although in 1855 it had decreed in article 43 of the Instructions to the Governor-General that interference in the internal affairs of treaty states was allowed in case of misgovernment and neglect of the people's interests and rights, the main objective of the Dutch government in concluding treaties with self-governing territories was to secure recognition of Dutch sovereignty and the prevention of political contacts by those territories with other Powers. Loudon, the Minister for Colonies, - having the recommendations of the Commission on Colonization in mind - put the Home government's position very strongly when he wrote in 1861:

"...I consider every extension of our authority in the Indian Archipelago as a step nearer to our downfall; and this is even more so as we have already now overreached our power in this respect..." (32)

The expansion of direct Dutch rule was impossible, according to Loudon, because the government did not have sufficient capital, staff and troops at its disposal. Furthermore Loudon - who was apparently influenced by British thinking on colonies at that

(32) Loudon to Batavia, 8th June, 1861. quot. Somers op.cit.p.94.
Note: Loudon James born 1824 at The Hague; doctor of law at Leiden, 1846; in the same year went to the Indies where till 1857 he held important positions in the judiciary; Minister for Colonies, March 1861 - February 1862; Governor-General, 1871-1875.
time seemed convinced of the futility of direct colonial rule, when he wrote:

"...The existence of those facts (i.e. lack of personnel and capital) and the well-known tendency even of uncivilized nations towards self-government poses the question: is not already the extent of our present settlement in the Indies too extensive in proportion to the resources of the Netherlands?..."

However, it should be noted that the real cause preventing the Dutch government from pursuing a more vigorous policy in the Outer-Possessions was the continued insistence of the Dutch parliament on receiving the financial surplusses (batig slot) from the Indies; and as the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) put it in 1852:

"...As long as the Netherlands-Indies shall be held to its obligation of providing a so-called credit-balance (batig slot) of a few million guilders for the benefit of the mother-country... one cannot think about the acceptance or execution of any system of expansion in our outer-possessions, or the occupation of territories, principalities or posts which involve the use of costly military and maritime means..."

The "Batig Slot" policy, however, was not openly attacked in parliament until 1870 when de Waal proposed to use the greater part of the colonial surplus for the construction of public works in the Indies. De Waal's proposal was closely connected with his land legislation of the same year, which consequently necessitated the provision of adequate modern transport

(33) Ibid. p.111.
(34) Colijn "Politiek beleid..." op.cit. p. 73.
facilities. But it took till 1875 before the Dutch parliament agreed to the use of surplus funds for the building of railways in Java and the construction of a modern harbour near Batavia. However, since 1877 the East-Indian budget showed increasing deficits, which were partly caused by the heavy cost of the war with Achin. The roles are now turned and the Indies have to borrow from Holland; and finally legislation is passed in 1898 separating the Home government's finances from those of the colonies.

But in the meantime, Colonial ministers, who were unable to use colonial budget surpluses to finance the establishment of effective Dutch power in the whole of the Archipelago, were forced to prescribe a strict policy of non-expansion and non-intervention. In despite of this the East-Indian government during the fifties and sixties shows an increasing tendency towards annexation and direct intervention in the internal affairs of the self-governing territories. The reason for this was the growing realization that the punitive expeditions which the government was forced to make at an increasing rate in order to stop slavery, piracy and misgovernment, were ineffectual in establishing government authority. Consequently Batavia pointed out on many occasions that the only guarantee for peace and orderly government was direct rule and annexation.

(35) Colenbrander op. cit. p. 64.
Although the Home government remained opposed to such a course of action, it was - as will be shown in the following sections - repeatedly presented with a fait accompli. But it was not until 1898 that a final solution was found to the dilemma of the necessity to expand direct government influence, on the one hand, and the fear of causing a complete collapse of Dutch power in the Archipelago by spreading limited resources over too wide an area on the other hand. This solution was the so-called Korte Verklaring (Short Contract) which was a compromise between annexation and self-government. In this contract the Indonesian prince or community accepted Dutch sovereignty; and promised to obey all orders given by the Netherlands Indies Government. In fact this meant that the indigenous administrative structure was incorporated into the Dutch administrative system without being replaced by Dutchmen.

In conclusion, the years 1848-1873 form a transition period in which the government as entrepreneur is gradually superseded by private enterprise, owing to the growing pressure of Dutch capitalists and the philosophy of liberalism and humanitarianism. The established policy of non-interference and non-expansion is ever more attacked both on the grounds that inroads have to be made upon the indigenous political and social structure in order

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to open up land and to ensure effective government protection of capital investment, but also on the grounds that the government was wrong in condoning misgovernment and the disregard of human rights in the territories which came under its sovereignty. In addition, the colonial government owing to the futility of the measures taken to promote its influence in the Outer-Possessions, increasingly advocated annexation as the only solution to the problem of establishing peace and order in the Archipelago. The Home government, however, remained opposed to this course of action and a growing split occurred between The Hague and Batavia which resulted in increased de facto expansion. Thus expansion in fact occurred not according to a well-defined line of policy, but rather dictated by ad hoc considerations such as the fear of foreign interference. It is only in the beginning of the Twentieth century that the Dutch — during van Heutz' term as governor-general — followed a definite policy of bringing the whole of the Indies under their effective control.

The two ruling forces — i.e. liberalism and humanitarianism — making for change in this period, are basic to the argument in an 1857 report (an appendix to the report of the Commission on Colonization) in which it is proposed to abolish the indigenous land laws of Minangkabau. This proposal caused — as will be shown in the next section — a controversy about the fundamental principles of Dutch administrative policy in West-Sumatra.
SECTION VII.


The Commission on Colonization of 1857 had pointed out in general that the adat pusaka in Minangkabau was detrimental to the material and moral development of the people. Lieutenant-Colonel Andressen - a member of the Commission - who had been attached to Michiels' general staff at the West-Coast since 1843 had written a more detailed report on the subject; the Commission fully agreed with its findings and submitted the report to the King for consideration.

Andressen first of all attacked the adat pusaka on moral grounds. The fact that the husband had no control over his own children left him without a sufficiently strong incentive to work and caused him to become lazy and indolent. Most of the work was left to the women who in addition had to take care of their children without much help from their husbands or their brothers. This state of affairs, according to Andressen, was responsible for the widespread use of abortion in order to stop childbirth:

(1) Adat Pusaka: Minangkabau hereditary law which prescribes that children inherit from their mother and not from their father.
(2) Commission on Colonization to the King, 24th December, 1857. quot. Kielstra E.B. "Sumatra's Westkust sedert 1850" in ETLV. 1892. p.288. Further references to this source will be indicated by Kielstra VI.
"...Thus, the adat pusaka has consequently placed the father on the lowest social level - he only needs to follow his animal instincts - and it has made the mother into a child murderess......."

Secondly Andressen was opposed to the adat pusaka because it prevented the sale or lease of land to outsiders. Although he agreed that respect for indigenous institutions would be the best guarantee for the steady maintenance of Dutch supremacy in the Archipelago, this principle should not be stretched too far; and while it would be irresponsible to:

"...interfere with harmless (indigenous) institutions in order to pursue utopias, or to force those tribes by leaps and bounds on the road to civilization and progress, for which the European nations have needed centuries; I would call it equally irresponsible if those institutions which undermine moral and material interests and obstruct gradual progress are left untouched and are respected, when the possibility exists to modify (those institutions) without causing damaging shocks.........................."

Therefore the government should abolish as soon as possible the adat pusaka, and replace this institution by a hereditary law based on succession in direct line; to introduce the institution of private ownership; to divide the suku land into private and municipal land; and finally to replace the existing suku (3) government by municipal government.

This radical proposal caused a great deal of criticism,

especially from the administrative personnel stationed in Minangkabau.

(4) General De Brauw, governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra, attempted in a lengthy report to refute the allegations made by Andressen. De Brauw pointed out that it was wrong to consider the adat pusaka without reference to the existing social structure and the philosophy behind it. The European concept of a family - i.e. both parents with children - was not known to the Minangkabau; but instead the mother and her children was the accepted unit upon which social cohesion was based. The origin of the adat pusaka was the desire to leave inheritances to persons whose blood relationship to the deceased left no doubt i.e. the mother. This law fitted in well in Minangkabau where polygamy was common; and therefore, so the governor pointed out:

"...what looks unnatural to us, does not do so to the Malay, who is born and bred under the adat pusaka. On the contrary if he suddenly and without preparation was transferred to a land where his adat pusaka did not exist, but instead our hereditary law - which seems natural to us - and the family unit of man, wife and children, upon which this heridity law is based, then he would certainly find it equally wrong and unnatural."

(4) Note: De Brauw C A jonkheer; 1809-1862; military college at Semarang (1822-1826); participated as a lieutenant in the Java war (1825-1830); Lieutenant-Colonel in 1846; chief of staff in third Bali expedition in 1849; subdued Bantam rebellion in 1850; resident governor of the Celebes, 1855-1857; 1857 Major-general; governor of Westcoast of Sumatra, August, 1861-February, 1862.
De Brauw also pointed out that the adat-pusaka was a counter balance to the influence of orthodox Islamic teachers who tried to change those parts of the adat which were in conflict with the Muslim law. Therefore the abolition of the adat-pusaka would mean playing directly into the hands of those fanatical teachers, whose influence the government was concerned to curb as much as possible. Furthermore the fact that those teachers so far had been unsuccessful in abolishing the adat-pusaka showed the people's continued attachment to that institution and dispelled the truth of Andressen's allegation that the Minangkabaus generally favoured its abolition. On the contrary, careful investigations had shown that only in Padang - where the people had been in contact with Europeans for centuries - were there any signs of opposition to the adat-pusaka, but for the rest the people seemed to be as attached as ever to this institution; and moreover, De Brauw argued:

"...not yet a quarter of a century ago the Malays (i.e. the Minangkabaus) were prepared to stake their life and goods on the retention of those institutions, and it is unthinkable that in the short space of time our administration has been established they already have become so attached to our ideas of hereditary law............."

In addition the governor attributed the incidence of abortion - which he claimed Andressen exaggerated, as was shown by the

(5) See pp. 321-323 of this Section for a more explicit treatment of the developments of Islam since the extermination of the Padris.
steady rise in population - not to the adat-pusaka, but to the Mohammedan marriage law which provided for easy and quick dissolution causing married women to be concerned about their physical attractiveness in order to remain eligible for re-marriage. Also the adat-pusaka, according to de Brauw, was not exclusively responsible for the instability of the suku government, because everywhere in Indonesia where a similar type of political structure existed, but no matriarchy, government was equally unstable and the country just as much disturbed by civil strife. In any case, so the governor argued, the existence of the suku government made the interference of the Dutch government indispensable to the indigenous population; and therefore the establishment of Dutch influence was made much easier. The correctness of the administrative system as introduced by Merkus and Michiels was becoming more evident from day to day; good roads were being constructed by the population; the production of coffee was increasing; and the transportation system was working well. It should be obvious, De Brauw argued, that the authority of the government was well established considering that the coffee monopoly and other enforced services did not cause any obstruction; and therefore:

"...institutions giving such results and which are equally profitable to the government and the population cannot be regarded too highly........."

The abolition of the adat-pusaka, which was an institution...
fundamental to the whole of the Minangkabau social structure, would cause a revolutionary situation by breaking up the existing conditions of peace and prosperity which had been established after so much blood and expense. Therefore, De Brauw alleged, the proposals of Andressen were unsound and should not be implemented. The only point of substance raised by Andressen in the governor's opinion was the fact that the adat-pusaka made the sale or lease of land to outsiders practically impossible. But De Brauw stressed that from the Government's point of view the maintenance of the existing peaceful and prosperous conditions in Minangkabau was far more important than the interest of private European planters. This was especially so, as large tracts of land were still available to private enterprise in other parts of the Netherlands East Indies, while the absence of private European enterprise in Minangkabau would do no harm to the treasury, considering that the revenue of coffee production proved to be ample recompensation for government expenditure.

The Batavian government was in complete agreement with De Brauw's advice and Andressen's proposals were put aside. Indeed there are various indications that by this time the authority of the Dutch in Minangkabau had become firmly established. Since the uprising at Pau in 1845 there is no record of major anti-


(8) See Section,V, p.262.
government disturbances or risings in Minangkabau. Consequently in 1856 the Governor of the West-Coast, General van Swieten, was of the opinion that a number of military posts could be abandoned and the actual strength of the military forces could be diminished. Another indication of the existence of normal conditions of peace and order in Minangkabau was the proposal in 1862 to separate the functions of military commander from the position of governor. It was pointed out to the King that the investment of one person with both civil and military power at the West-Coast of Sumatra had been necessitated at a time when Dutch authority was being established by force of arms. But as there were no rebellions to be subdued anymore and the government's authority had been firmly established, the task of civil administration and economic development was becoming too burdensome to be carried by the military commander. Also if:

"...that much promising part of the Netherlands overseas possessions will be brought to the high stage of development and civilization for which it seems to possess all the requirements, then civil authority should be invested in a person who has a sound knowledge of politics and economics, and who is conversant with the institutions, customs and laws of the Sumatran population. .............................................." (10)

(9) Van Swieten to Batavia, 17th September, 1856. quot. Ibid. pp.265-266. Note: Van Swieten Jan. 1807-1888; 2nd Lieutenant to the Indies (1827-1830); in Holland (1830-1835); returned to the Indies in 1835 as Captain; Major (1841); Lieutenant-Colonel (1844); Colonel and Governor of West-Coast of Sumatra (1849-1850); Major-General (1853); Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief (1858-1862); Member Tweede Kamer (1864-66); Commander of Achin Expedition (1873-74).

(10) Minister for Colonies to the King, 2nd September, 1862. quot. Ibid. pp.305-306.
The Hague agreed and in November, 1862 J F van den Bosche was appointed civil governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra. During van den Bosch's term of office a number of important administrative measures were taken. One of those measures was concerned with salary increases for indigenous officials; i.e. the district (laras) heads and kampung heads (penghulu kapala), offices created in 1833 by van den Bosch to form an intermediary link between the Dutch administration and the indigenous suku government. The laras heads - who numbered about 60 in Minangkabau - were the most important officials in their districts, some of which had a population of more than 10,000 people. Their function was to execute all orders given to them by the Dutch administration and therefore the effectiveness of governmental policy depended a great deal on those officials. The Laras head was responsible for keeping law and order; the supervision of coffee and rice production; and the maintenance of roads and bridges. Furthermore all legal matters in the districts had to be brought before him; and he could decide on those cases in conjunction with the suku heads concerned or submit them to the indigenous court - the rapat - which was presided over by a Dutch administrative official and of which

(11) Van den Bosche J F R S; a civil administrator who held posts previously at Palembang and Bezuki (Java); held the post of civil governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra from 1862-1868, when he was appointed to the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies).
he was himself a member. The Penghulu Kapala was an official subordinate to the laras head and acted as his deputy in one or sometimes two kampungs. But the penghulu kapala was not a member of the rapat.

Already in March, 1860 Governor Meis had pointed out to the Batavian government that a salary of 20 guilders per month for laras heads and no remuneration for penghulu kapala at all was unreasonable; and it could not be expected that such little recognition of their services would promote the efficiency of those officials. The governor wrote:

"...Surely, the prosperity of the people is dependant to a great extent on the greater or less diligence of those officials, and especially the maintenance and expansion of coffee production, which already accounts for such valuable revenue, but which will still considerably increase in proportion to the greater interest taken by the indigenous officials............."(13)

To see the question of remuneration of indigenous officials in its proper perspective it is necessary at this stage to describe the working of the system of coffee production which was introduced by Michiels in 1847.

(12) Meis A.; (1809-1861); military school at Semarang (1822-1825); participated in Java war (1825-1830); Captain (1837); Major (1845); Lieutenant-Colonel (1846); participated in Bali expedition (1849); Resident of Palembang (1849/50); Major-General (1854); Commander of Second Military District in Java (1854-1858); Governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra (1858-1861).


(14) See Section, V. op.cit., pp.
Initially the system of Michiels occasioned a great deal of dissension among the Minangkabaus, because officials - as instructed - were trying to introduce the same production methods as were used in Java. Attempts to induce the population to grow their coffee on large well laid out plantations failed partly because of official inefficiency but especially because of the unwillingness of the Minangkabaus who preferred to grow so-called "pagger coffee" (kopi dapur) in small plots around the village or on cleared plots in the jungle (kopi rimbu). To stop dissension governor van Swieten abandoned the idea of Javanese production methods; and he encouraged the growing of coffee in small plots in order to:

"...make coffee cultivation into an industry which would be popular, because it furthered personal gain, but was not based on official pressure or forced services....."(15)

In fact this decision was in accordance with the spirit of the 1854 Regeerings-reglement which required the colonial authorities to prepare for a state of affairs where agriculture would be pursued without government interference.

Thus, in order to make the cultivation of coffee as attractive as possible to the Minangkabaus the governor was concerned to avoid coercion as much as possible. In accordance

(16) See Section VI, p.279.
with this principle van Swieten in 1855 instructed that all coffee delivered should be paid for at the first grade price, irrespective of quality. The governor argued that the price paid by the government was so low that it was ridiculous:

"...that a product, which had a value of 30 guilders was bought for only 7 guilders, later 8.4 guilders and during my term of office at the highest for 9.2 guilders, should be refused solely because it was not of superior quality and could not secure the highest price, e.g. 35 guilders per picul..........."(17)

In 1856 van Swieten could report that the earlier difficulties of terrain - which had necessitated the carrying of produce from the highlands to the coast by coolies had been largely overcome. Most of the produce was transported by horsecarts, which were owned and run by private enterprise. Although those transport establishments generally were well run, those operated by indigenous heads and officials were often inefficient. Therefore indigenous leaders - in order to cover up for their losses - resorted to subjecting the population to forced or badly paid services such as the feeding of horses; the maintenance of stables and the driving of carts. Van Swieten - in order to stop this unnecessary pressure on the population, - which it

attributed to the coffee system as such - decided in July, 1857 to forbid indigenous leaders and officials from participating in the transport business.

The coffee policy of van Swieten was indeed successful; and during his term of office production increased considerably. But the governor attributed this large increase in production not to the introduction of the culture system, but rather to the policy of economic development; i.e. the building of roads and warehouses; and to the policy of making the forced deliveries of coffee as little burdensome as possible by preventing excesses and allowing the population as much freedom of choice as possible in their production methods. In fact van Swieten was rather critical of the culture system which he considered as a necessary evil; and as a means:

"to awaken a people from the sleep of inaction, and to lift up agricultural production from a languishing condition injecting some forceful life into it; but (this should be) only a temporary measure and not a permanent one..........................

(19) Ibid. 1857. quot. Ibid. p.1627.
(20) Coffee delivered to the government - piculs.

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<td>109,000</td>
<td>1674</td>
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Source: Ibid. p. 1674.

Van Swieten's successor, General Meis, generally followed the same policy. Meis, however, changed one of van Swieten's measures i.e. the regulation of 1857 ordering all coffee to be paid for at first grade prices. In response to a complaint by the N.H.M. about the general quality of coffee the governor instructed that only first grade coffee would be bought. But this reversal of policy caused important problems. The refusal of the Dutch authorities to buy any second or third grade coffee made the Minangkabaus sell this type of coffee to East-Coast merchants. When it appeared that in Singapore higher prices were to be obtained for coffee in general first-grade coffee was also sent there. It was estimated that about 10,000 piculs of Minangkabau coffee were annually exported to Singapore; and in order to stop this 'leakage' Meis' successor, de Brauw, decided in November, 1861 that the government would again buy all grades of coffee, but that prices paid would be in proportion to quality.

Van den Bosche who succeeded de Brauw in 1862 continued the policy of van Swieten to make coffee cultivation an agreeable as possible proposition to the Minangkabaus. Accordingly after having convinced himself that in the flat regions of Minangkabau, such as Mandailing, Pau and Rau, the soil was more suitable for

(22) Ibid. p.1620.
rice growing and that coffee cultivation there - although requiring heavy work - resulted in little gain, van den Bosche decided to stop forcing people in those regions to grow coffee. For example, in April, 1863 the people of the district of Ulaban (near Priaman) were allowed to grow rice instead of coffee, because of the unsuitability of the soil. Van den Bosche also took up again the question of higher salaries for indigenous officials which had already been raised by Meis, but so far had remained unsettled.

Meis had pointed out that it was the duty of the government to protect the population from extortion by their own leaders. Underpayment tended to increase the incidence of malpractice and corruption among indigenous officials causing resentment among the people against the government. The regulation of 1857 in particular, which forbade indigenous leaders from participating in the transport business, caused officials and leaders to attempt to obtain extra money by illegal means such as extortion. Actually, so Meis argued, the heads had been treated unfairly in the sense that they initially had practically been forced by the government to start off the transport service, but when the earlier difficulties had been overcome they had been deprived of reaping some of the profits of their work. Dissension was the obvious result; and this did have a detrimental effect on their willingness to co-operate and their administrative
efficiency. Furthermore while the income of the people in general was increasing the salaries of officials should be increased in proportion in order to enable them to keep up their status and prestige. The other major reason, which—as was previously noted—caused Meis to request higher salaries for indigenous officials was the concern to stop the growing influence of orthodox religious teachers on the population.

The influence of the Padris had not died out with the fall of their regime at the end of the thirties; and so-called "independent" teachers continuously kept trying to undermine the position and prestige of the adat-chiefs. In some parts of Minangkabau elements of Padri governmental organization had been incorporated into the indigenous structure; e.g. in Lubu Sikiaping a new institution—the so-called Besar nan IX (The Big Nine)—had evolved, consisting of both adat and religious officials. In addition Meis pointed to an apparent state of tension among Indonesian Muslims, which he attributed to the attempted partition of the Turkish empire by the Western Great

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(24) See note 5. p.310 of this section.

Powers and the Crimean War. In this instance it should be noted that Indonesian Muslims also - both the faithful and teachers alike - showed great reverence to the Sultan of Turkey, who was considered as the only legal supreme ruler of the whole world, to whom all other rulers owed allegiance. In any case, so Meis argued, it would not take much to spark off a general outburst against Dutch authority, especially if Muslim teachers could find examples to prove that the government was trying to undermine the Faith. Therefore the governor was of the opinion that Christian missionary activity should be tightly controlled by the government especially at a time when new clashes between Christian and Muslim States in Europe were probable; and intensified missionary activity:

"..can cause disturbances of more or less importance among the inhabitants of our Indian possessions. There is no better means - on the West-Coast of Sumatra - to overcome those disturbances than to give relief to the indigenous heads and to possess their friendship; because even if they are Mohammedans themselves, they (in order to protect) their authority shun theocracy and in that respect their interests are the same as ours....."(27)

Also Verkerk-Pistorius - an official who spent a number of years in Minangkabau - was of the opinion that all large scale and vehement disturbances were due to the influence of fanatic orthodox teachers. As an example he quotes a certain tuanku sjech Berulah, who during the 1860's - after having lived for

(26) Juynboll TH. W "Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohamme-
(27) See note 13 on page 315 of this section.
many years in Mecca - introduced the teachings of Abu Hanifa in Padang Ganting (Tanah Datar). Those teachings were steadily supplanting the - according to Verkerk-Pistorius - more tolerant Sjafite principles to such an extent that an estimated one eighth of the population had already accepted them. The fact that the Hanifite teachers were strongly opposed to the adat chiefs caused many disturbances. The reference here to Hanifite teachings is interesting as this points again to Turkey, which was not only the centre of this school of interpretation (madzhab) but also of Panislamism, a movement for the political unification of all Muslims under the supreme leadership of the Sultan of Turkey. In fact Panislamism at this time was beginning to cause great concern to European colonial powers, which - although wrongly - believed that the Sultan of Turkey was a type of Islamic Pope.

Accordingly Meis strongly advocated higher salaries for laras heads and penghulus kapala; and in order to bind the suku heads closer to the Administration he suggested that the

(28) Note: Abu Hanifa (767), founder of a fikh (madzhab) - i.e. school of interpretation of the Qu'ran and Tradition, which became prominent in the Turkish empire. Source: Juynboll op.cit. pp.20-21.

(29) Note: Muhamad Ibn Idris as-Sjafi'i (767-820); was a teacher in Bagdad, for some considerable time and later in Egypt. His school of interpretation is widely accepted in Indonesia. Source: Ibid. pp.19-20.


percentages paid to them on coffee delivered should be raised. Those proposals were approved by the Batavian authorities; and finally endorsed by the Home government in March, 1863, with the exception of the proposed higher incentive payments to the suku heads.

The most important aspects of Dutch policy in Minangkabau have now been discussed; and in conclusion I will attempt to review the rationale of Dutch administrative policy in Minangkabau, while at the same time trying to indicate - in general terms - the effects which this policy had on the Minangkabau social and political structure.

At the beginning of the century Minangkabau was in the grip of a fierce revolutionary war, caused by the attempts of orthodox Muslim preachers to overthrow the existing social and political order, many features of which conflicted directly with Islamic teachings. As this war was adversely affecting the profitability of the Dutch possessions at the coast, the Dutch intervened in the struggle on behalf of the adat (i.e. conservative) party; and after a long and bloody war succeeded in defeating the revolutionary party and restoring peace and order. This Dutch interference, however, meant in the first place a retardation of the "natural" social and political development of Minangkabau society. Modernistic tendencies (32) Indisch Staatsblad, 1863, no. 45 (Netherlands Indies Gazette).
which were trying to change the suku-government and the adat-regulated inheritance and property law - institutions which made for a static society - were stopped; and constantly opposed whenever they re-appeared afterwards. The Dutch in fact were constantly trying to keep Minangkabau society static by directly supporting the adat-chiefs, who as their own position and interest were at stake, were opposed to change. The reasons for this attitude by the Dutch can be summed up in the formula: divide and rule. Accordingly the Dutch - in order to obtain a solid hold on the country - monopolised the task of bringing order and regularity in a rather anarchical state of affairs, which was the result of the suku system of government with its numerous independent and often antagonistic political units. The objective of Dutch policy was to make its administration an indispensable centralizing force; and therefore any innate centralizing or unification movement had to be opposed, as otherwise the raison d'être of the presence of the Dutch in the people's eyes - i.e. as a stabilizing force - would become non-existent. Consequently the Dutch - as elsewhere in Indonesia - tried to keep the existing social and political structure intact by bolstering up the authority and prestige of the traditional leaders against any group or movement which challenged their position.

Furthermore, in order to facilitate and smooth the contact between the Administration and the people the Dutch tried to
create a new class of leaders — i.e. the lara heads and penghulus kapala — who would gradually become a type of aristocracy on the lines of the Javanese regents and whose function was to act as intermediaries between European administrative officials and the indigenous population.

The major assumption underlying Dutch opposition to social and political change within indigenous society should be sought in the general thinking that was prevalent at the time on the function of colonies. At least until 1848 the majority of Dutchmen considered colonies solely as business enterprises, or rather as a type of public corporation, which was run in the first place for the benefit of the owners — i.e. the Netherlands — and, more as an afterthought, also for the Indonesians. Trade and commerce, so it was argued, could only flourish under conditions of peace and order; and anything therefore which would disturb such a situation had to be prevented. Foreign influences such as Christianity, European education, orthodox Islam, and foreign consuls, or anything else which might start off social and political repercussions within indigenous society were constantly and consciously kept away. The Dutch government did not believe that it had any business to introduce the Indonesians to European culture and civilization, but that it was solely concerned to create the best possible conditions for trade and commerce with the smallest possible
overheads. A very sound principle from a purely business point of view. Actually van den Bosch had instructed officials not to interfere in indigenous affairs; and to disregard the existence of certain indigenous practices such as slavery and inhuman treatment which would be objectionable to European susceptibilities; unless action was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of peace and order.

But after 1848 a notable change in this aspect of colonial policy is discernable. The Regeeringsreglement of 1854 showed concern for the protection of the human rights of the indigenous population; and required the East Indian government to provide for education. It was noted that in Minangkabau such men as van Swieten and van den Bosche were convinced that the Administration, apart from its task of running a profitable enterprise, had the additional duty of protecting the rights and the interests of the people, even if this was going to cost money. Some more proof of this is furnished by a regulation of 1864 forbidding the import and sale of opium. Following a request from a number of indigenous leaders for the prohibition of the sale of opium, van den Bosche — after having carried out a survey on the use of that drug on the West-Coast — strongly advised its prohibition, although this meant an annual loss of more than 200,000 guilders in licence fees and customs revenue. In this

(33) Indisch Staatsblad, 1864, no. 112.
(34) Van den Bosche to Batavia, 29th October, 1863. quot.
Kielstra VI. pp.329.
context also the new regulations of 1864 about the leasing of pawnshops should be mentioned. Until then, government control over pawnshops had only existed in Padang, but van den Bosche argued that it should be extended over the whole of the West-Coast in order to protect the people from usury. Another instance of government action to protect the rights of the indigenous population was land legislation. A report in 1871 about the establishment of various European plantations on waste lands in Minangkabau caused the government to carry out an investigation into the land rights of the Minangkabaus. After this investigation had been completed the government considered that it had the right to dispose of Minangkabau wastelands in so far as this land was not claimed under the terms of the adat which granted land in private ownership to persons - belonging to the nagari - who kept such land under continuous exploitation. A regulation of 1874 therefore stipulated that wasteland in Minangkabau would be granted on long lease to persons interested, but emphasized that land could not be bought or alienated from indigenous communities.

However, it should be noted that although the Dutch administration showed greater concern for the welfare and protection

of the Minangkabaus, its opposition to indigenous social and political change remained a prominent feature of policy. In this respect also the economic policy of the Dutch in Minangkabau tended to retard natural economic development. Such factors as the forced production and delivery of coffee; government monopoly of salt; the closing of the East-Coast - the other natural outlet for Minangkabau produce -, which cut the earlier class of traders and middlemen out of existence, resulted in a situation where the Minangkabaus became tied to the soil. Thus, Dutch economic policy tended to keep Minangkabau a self-sufficient economic unit, which was closed off from commercial intercourse with the outside world. This isolation, which obviously resulted in economic stagnation, lasted for most of the century; and it was only in 1908 after the coffee monopoly had been abolished that Minangkabau was fully opened up to the outside World.
SECTION VIII

The East-Coast Sultanates of Djambi, Indragiri and Siak comprised an area which was largely covered by rain forest and marshes cut through by a number of wide navigable rivers, which originated in the Central Mountain range (Bukit Barisan) and flowed eastwards into the Malacca Straits. This part of Sumatra was sparsely populated and had little natural wealth; and apart from the earnings on such forest produce as camphor and benzoin the greater part of the national income was provided by the revenue of the transit trade between Minangkabau and the Straits Settlements. More important, however, were the smaller sultanates to the North of Siak which carried on an extensive pepper trade especially with Pulu Penang.

In 1841 the Dutch withdrew from the East-Coast; and, as we have seen, kept only one post in this area i.e. at Muarah Kompeh in Indragiri because this post was considered necessary for the maintenance of peace and order in the Dutch possession of Palembang to the South. For the rest the Batavian government kept strictly from intervening in the affairs of the East-Coast sultanates, even though on several occasions it had been

(1) See Section IV, p. 248.
requested by the sultans to intervene on their behalf in order to restore order in their territories which were continuously torn apart by civil strife. Although they had withdrawn in 1841 the Dutch had openly declared that they did not give up their "right" to occupy those territories in the future; and in fact during the fifties the Batavian authorities felt obliged to avail themselves of this "right" in order to curb foreign influence.

During the 'Forties, cases of infiltration into what the Dutch considered their sphere of influence had resulted in preventive action in Borneo and some of the Lesser Sunda Islands. But during the fifties foreign adventurers seemed to show a marked preference for the sultanates on the East-Coast of Sumatra.

In 1852 an American, Captain Gibson of the "Flirt", was accused of trying to incite the Sultan of Djambi against the Dutch. Gibson was caught and imprisoned in Weltevreden (Java). The Gibson incident, however, directed the attention of the Home government to the East-Coast of Sumatra; and in 1853 the Governor-General was instructed:

"...to conclude as soon as possible contracts with the independent princes of the East-Coast of Sumatra."

and although the Government felt that, considering article 9

(2) See. Section V, p. 258.
of the treaty of 1824, hardly anything was to be feared from the British government, it would in any case:

"..be desirable from a general political point of view that measures were taken to prevent the establishment of other Powers............"(4)

During the following year (1854) the Batavian government proposed the re-occupation of Indragiri, where it was reported that the British firm of Almeida and Sons was planning to develop coal deposits. But the Home government decided to refrain from action for the time being in order not to give the wrong impression to England, which at that time was deeply involved in the Crimean War.

The next trouble spot on the East-Coast of Sumatra was Siak where in 1857 a British adventurer called Wilson, who had been a clerk in the Singapore firm of Martin Dyce and Co., tried to carve out a kingdom for himself. The presence of Wilson in Siak was due probably in the first instance to the unwillingness of both the Dutch and the Singapore authorities to comply with the repeated requests of the Sultan for help to restore his authority which was being undermined by his brother both in Siak Proper and the dependent smaller sultanates in the North-West. Finally the Sultan concluded an

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(3) See Section IV, p.237.
(4) Minister of Colonies to the Governor-General, 29th April, 1853. Quot. Klerck E.S. de "De Atjeh Oorlog- Deel I, Het onstaan van den oorlog." s'Gravenhage Nijhoff, 1912. p.209.
(5) Minister of Colonies to Governor-General, 8th November,1854. Quot. Ibid. p.238.
agreement with Wilson who undertook to restore the Sultan's prestige and authority in return for a trade treaty and a third of the revenue of Siak and dependencies for Wilson himself. Subsequently, after Wilson with a small army of Buginese had restored the Sultan's position, a dispute arose about the actual remuneration for his services. This caused Wilson to turn against the Sultan; and in 1857 both the Sultan and his brother called for help from the Dutch government to free them from the adventurer.

In response to this request for help the Resident of Riouw was sent to Siak, where he managed to effect a reconciliation between the Sultan and his brother. But Wilson, who earlier had left for Singapore, returned a few months later and erected fortifications on the island of Bengkalis. In order to avoid a repetition of Wilson's earlier escapades in Siak the Dutch — who were still unwilling to occupy the sultanates — concluded a treaty of friendship with the Sultan in July, 1857; and sent warships to Bengkalis, which after an ultimatum succeeded in driving Wilson back to Singapore, where he lodged complaints with the authorities about the vile treatment received by a British subject at the hands of the Dutch.


(7) Ibid. pp.239-240.
However, Mijer, the Dutch Colonial Minister, was of the opinion that a treaty of friendship was not sufficient and insisted on more definite measures to put an effective stop to foreign infiltration. Consequently the Governor-General suggested the occupation of one of the Siak ports, where as at Djambi a non-differential tariff should be introduced. Immediate action, however, was postponed because the Dutch government did not want to create the impression of taking advantage of the weakened English position owing to the Indian Mutiny.

Subsequently on 1st February, 1858 the Dutch concluded a contract with the Sultan of Siak in which the Sultan recognized the supremacy of the Netherlands government; and i.a. agreed not to maintain or take up relations with foreign powers without the consent of the Dutch, who in turn took Siak and its dependencies under their protection, promising to maintain and reinforce the position and prestige of the Sultan and the nobility.

Soon afterwards, the Dutch took measures to establish a firmer hold on Djambi. The earlier contract of 1834 with


(10) Full text of the 1858 treaty with Siak is printed in *Bijlage* (Appendix) IV. of Klerck E.S. de *op.cit.*
Djambi stipulated that after the reigning Sultan had died the new Sultan was obliged to notify the Batavian government and at the same time was to renew in writing the recognition of Dutch sovereignty over Djambi. When in 1855 a new Sultan took office the Governor-General was of the opinion that the Sultan's notification did not clearly enough indicate his willingness to recognize Dutch supremacy; and therefore he suggested that a new treaty of a more explicit kind should be concluded. The Sultan was opposed to this. But the Batavian authorities decided to go ahead; even more keenly because of rumours that the United States - which were probably incited by the Gibson affair - were intending to carry out an investigation into Dutch political rights in the Archipelago. Therefore when the Sultan kept refusing to comply with the Dutch request for a new treaty, an expedition was sent to Djambi in August, 1858. The Sultan fled, and appealed for help from the Sultan of Turkey. The Sultan's letter was apparently received in Constantinople, but the Turkish government assured the Dutch ambassador that no reply had been sent.

When the Sultan of Djambi had fled, his uncle - after having agreed to a new treaty - was put on the throne by the Dutch.

In addition to Djambi the Dutch were also forced to

(11) Van Zuylen van Nyevelt, Dutch Ambassador in Constantinople, to the Minister for External Affairs, 30th September, 1858. *Quot.* de Klerck *op. cit.* p. 247.

intervene in Reteh, a region immediately to the North of Djambi which came under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Riouw-Lingga. Sultan Tungku Mahmud of Riouw-Lingga after having been deposed by the Dutch in 1857 had fled to Reteh; and he had succeeded in gaining the support of the head of that region. Dutch attempts to bring Reteh into line were in vain; and in October, 1858 a Dutch expedition after heavy fighting occupied this territory.

Also in 1858 closer ties were established with Indragiri; and an agreement was made whereby concessions for agricultural land or mining would only be granted after the approval of the Batavian authorities.

The re-occupation of the East-Coast did not only cause difficulties with the Straits Settlements - as was to be expected - but also with Achin.

Article 2 of the contract concluded between Holland and Siak contained a description of the dependencies of Siak, which included the pepper ports of Deli, Langkat, Assahan and Bila. A dispute arose with Achin, which claimed sovereignty over some of those territories. This Dutch-Achinese dispute, although one of many which had occurred since the return of the Dutch

(14) Klerck de E.S. op.cit. p.247.
(15) See p. 332 this section.
to the West-Coast of Sumatra in 1819, had far more drastic consequences than the previous ones, because it ended in a full-scale war with Achin, which lasted for more than thirty years. Therefore for clarity's sake a diversion on Dutch-Achinese relations during the nineteenth century is necessary at this point.

A note by Canning and Wynn - the British Plenipotentiaries to the 1824 treaty - expressed the hope that, although England would change the restrictive clauses of Raffles' treaty of 1819 (16) with Achin into an agreement for the friendly reception of British shipping, the Dutch government would refrain from taking hostile measures against the Sultan of Achin. At the same time however the Dutch were requested to protect the general interests of Europeans - i.e. trade and shipping - in Achinese waters. The Dutch Plenipotentiaries agreed with the British request and:

"...they believe that they can ensure that their Government will immediately establish relations with Achin in such a way that this State - without loosing anything of its independence - will offer the sailor and merchant that continuous security, which it seems can only exist through the moderate use of European influence.\(18\)"

(16) See Section I, p. 42.
How the Dutch negotiators imagined that it would be possible to protect European trade and shipping without curtailing the independence of Achin, a country known for its fierce pirates and anti-European attitude, is hard to explain. But in any case the Dutch government until the '60's neither had the power nor, as it appears, the inclination to fulfil the promise made in 1824.

De Stuers and Verploegh - who on 17th February, 1825 were appointed Commissioners for the take-over of the British possessions in Sumatra - were i.a. instructed to notify the Sultan of Achin about the treaty of 1824 which brought Sumatra within the Dutch sphere of influence. Before, however, concluding a definite treaty with Achin, the Commissioners were to await further instructions after they had reported to the government about the action taken by the British in regard to their treaty of 1819 with Achin. But no arrangement was made with Achin at this time; and neither did a commission appointed by Du Bus de Gisignies in 1827 to take stock of the situation in Achin come to anything. In 1828 the Batavian government again decided to send a commission to Achin in order to obtain better treatment for Dutch shipping which was reported to be forced to fly English or American flags in order to protect themselves against Achinese pirates. But owing to the lack of

warships suitable for such a mission the commission was postponed and finally forgotten about. Though the Dutch during 1829 and 1830 were forced to take action against Achinese marauders, who were trying to establish themselves in the Dutch territory of Tapanulli on the West-Coast, no official contact was made with the Sultan of Achin after those attacks had been beaten off.

During the thirties, however, Achinese pirates appear to have become less discriminating in picking out their prey; and in 1831 the American vessel "The Friendship" was plundered while at anchor in the Achinese harbour of Kwalla Batu and the captain and a number of the crew murdered. Consequently the United States government sent the frigate "Potomac" which in reprisal bombarded Kwalla Batu into rubble. The "Potomac" incident made The Hague remind Batavia of the promises made in 1824; and the Minister for Colonies expressed the hope that:

"...as soon as Netherlands influence shall have been properly established in the surroundings of Padang and among the Padris—to which purpose Governor-General van den Bosch is directing successful attempts—measures will be considered to imbue the Achinese with somewhat more respect for our flag than they appear to have at present............."(21)

In the meantime, however, complaints by the West-Coast authorities about Achinese infiltrations into government territory and their co-operation with the Padris are continuously

(20) See Section, II, p. 126.
(21) Officiele Bescheiden op. cit. p. 10.
growing. But the Batavian government refrained from taking any direct action against the Achinese; and even when the Sultan refused to deliver the Dutch government vessel "De Dolfijn" which had been captured by its crew carrying 30,000 guilders in silver and had been located by a Dutch frigate in Achin, the Batavian government took a rather lame attitude. When the Sultan refused to surrender "De Dolfijn" to the Commander of the "Van Spijck", which had found the ship, on the grounds that the captain had no written request from the Governor-General, an official letter was despatched to Achin requesting the return of the Dutch ship. But at the same time the Resident of the West-Coast was instructed to act with careful judgment in the matter; and

"..if the said Sultan returns the schooner Dolphijn in a usable state, not too much ought to be pressed (for the return) of the rest such as the restitution of 30,000 guilders in silver; the (ship's) guns; and the sailors of said schooner, considering it is not advisable to take measures which could cause a war with the sultan...........................................(22)

Subsequently a commission was sent to Achin to take possession of "De Dolfijn" and to report on the military strength of the country. But the Sultan tried to stall the restitution proceedings as long as possible; and finally replied that "De Dolfijn" had been burned at the Pedir coast and that the crew had taken the money. The Commission subsequently advised the Batavian government that owing to the

(22) Resolution of the Governor-General, 14th November, 1836. 
quot. Ibid. p.12.
unwillingness of the Sultan to come to terms and the many previous difficulties experienced with the Achinese, would: "...make it necessary to maintain the honour of the Netherlands-Indies Government with force and to compel the Sultan with strong although proper means to satisfy our fair requests."(23)

But Batavia preferred to remain impassive and the "Dolfijn" affair was dropped.

The main reason for this attitude of the Netherlands Indies government in respect of Achin was the consideration that the remittance of surplus funds home was more important than the upkeep of national honour by means of costly and valueless expeditions. From the Dutch point of view a war with Achin was useless, because it could not result in the establishment of a Dutch trading monopoly for the reason that the treaty of 1824 forbade Holland to infringe the sovereignty of Achin. Van den Bosch felt himself especially hampered by the Achin clause in the 1824 treaty; and he repeatedly asked the Home government if there was no possibility of coming to a new arrangement with England about that territory. He wrote:

"...that island (i.e. Sumatra) can become to us nearly as important as Java; only the treaty of London stands very much in my way. Would it not be possible to change it...on the grounds that the Achinese repeatedly invade the Batta lands and other districts in our territory in Sumatra, (and) to obtain the right to establish ourselves everywhere on the coast of Sumatra, where our security and interest requires this."(24)


(24) Van den Bosch to Baud, 4th June, 1831. in Briefwisseling op.cit. p.97.
But such an agreement was very unlikely to come about during the 'Thirties and Forties, when, as we have seen, Anglo-Dutch relations both in Europe and the colonies were rather strained. The Dutch therefore tried to be careful in their dealings with Achin; and van den Bosch, as can be judged from his later correspondence with Baud, appears to have adjusted himself to the idea of an independent Achin:

"...the subjection of the whole island of Sumatra, with the exception of Achin, must be a political objective of the government, which should be pursued calmly and without haste." (26)

The Batavian government was concerned to prevent English complaints about Dutch violation of Achinese sovereign rights; and an example of this is the sending of warships to the West-Coast in 1838 to protect Trumon and to occupy Baros and Singkel, actions which were considered by the Dutch to be directed against Achinese individuals, not the Achinese state. But despite the attempts not to offend British susceptibilities, the British government, as was pointed out earlier, protested about the Dutch occupation of Baros and Singkel as constituting a violation of Achinese sovereign rights.

However, the inactivity of the Dutch caused European shipping in Achinese waters to become very unsafe. In 1844

(25) See Section IV.
(26) Van den Bosch to Baud, 16th February, 1835. in Briefwissel-
ing. op.cit. p.206.
(27) See Section III. pp.
(28) See Section IV. pp.
two British merchantmen were pillaged, one at Kwalla Batu and one at Kwalla Merdu. British warships after having failed to obtain satisfaction from the Sultan severely punished those ports. In 1851 the French warship, the "Cassini", made an unsuccessful attempt at punishing the port of Diak, where the Neapolitan vessel "Clementina" had been plundered. But the Achinese appeared hardly impressed and in 1852 they pillaged the British schooner "Coney Castle".

Up to this point the Dutch government had left the punishment of Achinese pirates to the nations concerned but in 1853 the Dutch begin to show more initiative in regard to Achin. In fact The Hague had become alarmed about the presence of an Achinese, called Sidi Mohammad, in Paris where he was generally recognized as the envoy of the Sultan of Achin. In addition the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) argued that since the West-Coast of Sumatra had finally been brought under firm control, the time had come to consider the possibility of concluding a definite treaty with Achin. But the governor of the West-Coast of Sumatra, General van Swieten, was of the opinion that to approach the Sultan, who appeared to have little say over his vassals, would be useless. Therefore instead, the governor suggested that it would be far more effective

(29) Resolution of the Governor-General, 8th October, 1853. *Quot.* Officiele Bescheiden. op.cit. p.15.
annually to send warships to the Achinese ports on a showing-of-the-flag mission. The Batavian government agreed with van Swieten’s proposals; and the governor of the West-Coast was empowered to send at the end of each year a large-type warship to Achin in order to show the flag; and to intervene, if requested, in disputes between European traders and the indigenous population. However, for the time being, no friendly correspondence was to be opened up with the Sultan, unless this prince in contrast to his letter of 1837 concerning the "Dolfijn" case showed more definite signs of wanting to come on more friendly terms with the Dutch government. Consequently in 1855 the brig "De Haai" was sent to Achin. But its commander received a rather hostile reception from the Sultan who was apparently very upset about the fact that this officer did not carry a letter from the Governor-General. However, the Batavian government was of the opinion that the Sultan after further visits by larger Dutch warships would be forced to become more friendly, since he could not afford to start an open war with the Dutch out of fear of a rebellion by his vassals who were constantly trying to diminish the Sultan’s prestige and authority. Subsequently in 1856 a larger vessel, [30] Resolution of the Governor-General, 8th October, 1853. [quote.] Ibid. p. 15. [31] Rapport van kapitein-luitenant Couvier dit Dubekart, commander of the "Haai", 4th May, 1855. [quote.] Ibid. pp. 16-18. [32] Resolution of the Governor-General, 10th October, 1855. [quote.] Ibid. p. 18.
the frigate "Prins Hendrik der Nederlanden" was sent; and the governor of the West-Coast in contrast to the Batavian resolution of 14th April, 1854 issued the captain with a letter to the Sultan in order to spare the Dutch mission the same hostile treatment as the commander of "De Haai" had received the previous year. The Sultan was apparently impressed by this second visit; he emphatically declared himself to be willing to come to better terms with the Dutch government and furthermore requested that a treaty be concluded. Moreover, the Sultan expressed similar sentiments in a letter to the Governor-General. As a result a draft treaty was drawn up in Batavia, the main points of which were: the admission of subjects of both nations to trade, shipping and residence; the prevention of slavery, piracy and beachcombing; the waiving of earlier claims on both sides including the question of "De Dolfijn"; and the recognition by the Sultan of the governor of the West-Coast as the representative of the Netherlands Indies government empowered to deal with affairs concerning Achin. An Achinese-Dutch treaty was finally signed on 3rd March, 1857.

However, this treaty soon became a dead letter because acts of piracy by Achinese against Dutch ships continued; and furthermore the penetration of the Dutch into the East-Coast during 1857-58 caused a major clash of interest with Achin,

(33) The treaty is printed in full in note 2 of pp. 19-20 of Officielele Bescheiden. op.cit.
which claimed part of that area as coming under its sovereignty.

The annual despatch of Dutch warships was discontinued in 1858, but in 1861 a man of war had to be despatched in order to request an explanation of the capture of two Dutch vessels, the "Sassah" and the "Johanna", both belonging at Priaman.

The Sultan explained that those ships had been captured by Radja Udah of Klumenong in order to obtain payment of a 50-60 year old debt which was owing to him by Peto Majeh, a Priaman merchant. The governor of the West-Coast therefore was requested by Batavia to collect this debt. But on investigation it was found that the merchant concerned had died some time before, and that his relatives did not acknowledge the debt. At this point the Batavian government decided to pay compensation to the owners of the two vessels, but instructed the governor of the West-Coast to emphasize to the Sultan:

"...that after continued postponement of the payment of compensation - which was recognized as fair and which had already been advanced to the owners of the schooners Sassah and Johanna - the Netherlands Indies Government - however much to its dislike - would have to proceed to obtain satisfaction on its own account, which would damage the relationship with Achin, which had been so much improved of late..."(34)

But the warship "Bromo" which was sent failed to obtain any satisfaction, which according to the Governor of the West-Coast and the captain of the "Bromo" was largely due to the

poverty and powerlessness of the Sultan.

As has been mentioned before, soon after the conclusion of the Siak treaty of 1858, difficulties occurred with Achin about the actual sovereignty over the smaller East-Coast sultanates to the North of Siak Proper. In fact, a shift in de facto sovereignty had taken place during the course of the century when Achin had taken advantage of the growing weakness of Siak — caused by continuous internal strife and division — to extend its hold over the pepper ports to the North-West of Siak Proper. The Sultan of Achin claimed that his sovereign rights extended as far south as Batu Bara — i.e., including the smaller sultanates of Langkat, Deli, Serdang, and Assahan. But the Sultan of Siak called on the Dutch government — in accordance with the stipulations of the 1858 treaty — to help him re-establish his authority both in Siak Proper and its dependencies. The Batavian government was willing to intervene on behalf of the Sultan largely because of its conviction that the most effective way to prevent the possible establishment of foreign influence in that region was to stop the political anarchy which had been prevalent in Siak for most of the century. Consequently, in March, 1862, Netscher, the Resident of Riouw, was ordered to proceed to the Northern dependencies in order to:
"..take personal stock of the existing situation there and to withdraw those states from the usurped sovereignty of Achin and to guide them by friendly means to the acceptance of the sovereignty of Siak.................." (35)

Netscher, who accordingly made a journey to the East-Coast sultanates in August, 1862 described the situation there as:

"..most terrible, everywhere (there is) discord (and)...
great hate against the state of Siak, which because of its unlimited anarchy and misgovernment is in such a state of decay that it cannot possibly give to (its dependencies) the protection which they have a right to..................

All the dependencies, so Netscher continued, desired to come under the protection of the Dutch government in order to stop Achinese encroachments, the only exception in this respect being Assahan, which did not want to recognize either Dutch or Siak supremacy. While there was much discord among the principalities themselves, the report continued, they were all opposed to Siak, which they considered had left them unprotected against Achinese aggression. The Resident further reported that he had taken advantage of this favourable opportunity to obtain declarations from those principalities in which they recognized the sovereignty either of the Dutch government or of Siak.

(35) Resolution of the Governor-General, 27th March, 1862. 

(36) Resolution of the Governor-General, 25th December, 1862.
quot. Ibid. pp.253-254. See also: Officiele Bescheiden op.cit. p.23.
Probably in response to Netscher's activities the Sultan declared during the visit of the "Bromo" that Langkat and the country as far as Batu Baru belonged to him; and soon afterwards the Sultan wrote to the Governor-General requesting that discussions should be held to demarcate the Dutch and Achinese spheres of interest in the East-Coast region. In reply the Governor-General stated that he was very much in favour of such an arrangement; and that he had requested the Resident of Riouw to prepare for negotiations to which the Sultan was invited to send his representatives. But this letter was only delivered in Achin in September of the following year (1863) mainly owing to the dilapidated condition of the warship stationed at the West-Coast and the lack of other suitable shipping.

It soon became evident, however, that Achin was unwilling to cede the East-Coast sultanates - which were de facto under its sovereignty - to the Dutch. In February, 1863 Deli requested the help of the Resident of Riouw against a threatening Achinese invasion. But when the Resident appeared at the East-Coast with two warships the expected invasion did not occur. However, as soon as the Dutch ships had left an official of the Sultan of Achin appeared in the principalities in order to levy taxes and

(37) See page 346.

(38) Governor-General to the Sultan of Achin, 23rd December, 1862. Klerck E.S. de op.cit. pp.256-257.
generally to enforce the Sultan's authority. When the rulers of Langkat and Deli refused to comply they were threatened with force. However the Achinese succeeded in inciting Serdang and Assahan against the Dutch government; and in May, 1863 they went as far as to bombard Batu Bara where the Dutch flag was flying on the ramparts. After these incidents the Resident of Riouw pressed the government to take more effective action against Achin, which obviously was unwilling to come to terms and repeatedly violated the friendship treaty of 1857. According to the Resident:

"...the patience which has been shown shall have to come to an end soon, if we want to avoid losing everything we have gained, (and avoid) being forced to undertake costly and difficult expeditions......"(39)

When in September, 1863 the Dutch warship "Bromo" delivered the letters from the Governor-General to Achin, the Sultan was not impressed by either the first letter which contained the Governor-General's reply to the Sultan's request about a border settlement; or by the second one which complained about the dishonouring of the Dutch flag at Bata Baru. In reply to the Governor-General the Sultan reiterated his earlier position that the whole of the East-Coast up to Bata Baru came under his sovereignty and that in any case the Governor-General had no right to plant the Dutch flag there without the Sultan's

permission. Furthermore the Sultan promised to bring the question of the two Dutch ships the "Sassia" and the "Johanna" which had been captured in 1860, to a satisfactory conclusion within a few days. Following this the Batavian government refrained from making the Bata Baru incident a casus belli; and decided not to press for a quick border settlement. At the same time, however, it was resolved that Achinese sovereignty over the East-Coast sultanates would not be recognized and that those principalities were to be put under Dutch protection. Furthermore the Resident of Riouw and the Governor of the West-Coast were instructed to gather as much information about Achin and dependencies as possible for the use of the general staff in case war broke out with that country.

Further incidents occurred in the East-Coast region during 1864 i.e. the head of Tamiang refused to justify himself before Dutch officials about the murder of two Chinese from Pulu Penang on the grounds that he was only responsible to the government of Achin. In the meantime, however, the anti-Dutch attitude of Serdang and Assahan was becoming increasingly stronger; and the Resident of Riouw advised the Netherlands Indies government that if measures were not taken soon:

(40) quot. Officiele Bescheiden, op.cit. p.25.
(41) Governor-General to the Hague, 24th November, 1863. quot. Ibid. p.25.
"It will not take long before our officials at the East-Coast of Sumatra will not be safe anymore. The trouble is caused by the unpunished insults to the Netherlands flag, and the undisturbed settlement of Achinese on Netherlands Indies territory. As Achin remains unpunished, Assahan and Serdang also think that they can defy us." (42)

Subsequently in August, 1865 the Batavian government decided to send an expedition to bring Assahan and Serdang into line; to drive away any Achinese who had settled South of the Tamiang river; and to destroy their fortifications. Rather interestingly the Batavian government did not consider this action as a violation of the 1824 treaty, because it was not the intention to:

"carry on hostilities against the state of Achin itself, but (only) the repulsion of Achinese encroachments on Siak territory, which is subject to us." (43)

The continuous complications with Achin during the fifties and sixties made the Dutch government increasingly anxious for the removal of the obstacle to direct action against that territory posed by the treaty of 1824.

While van den Bosch, as we have seen, felt particularly hamstrung by this provision, but was forced to acquiesce owing to the worsening of Anglo-Dutch relations, since the fifties, many of the conditions that were responsible for this uneasy


state of relations between the two countries had disappeared. The main cause of friction had been the steady refusal of the Dutch to admit British shipping and trade to its colonies on more favourable terms. The increasing pressure of private enterprise and the growing impact of liberalism and humanitarianism on Dutch public opinion caused the gradual abolition of the culture system. At the same time the other concomitant of liberalism i.e. the principle of free and unrestricted trade, was also making headway in the Netherlands. The example of England which in 1846 had abolished the Corn Laws and in 1849 the Navigation Acts, forced the Dutch government to follow suit. Consequently in 1850 radical changes were made in the Dutch navigation laws, which included such measures as the abolition of differential shipping charges; and the granting of Dutch shipping papers to foreign built ships. Furthermore in 1862 partly as a reaction to the Cobden treaty of 1860 between France and England, the Dutch parliament passed a so-called revenue tariff, which provided for duties of 3% on imports of manufactures; and free entry of raw materials, while all export duties were abolished.

But while the new shipping legislation applied to the colonies, it took somewhat longer before a more liberal tariff

(44) See Section IV.
(45) See Section V.
was introduced in the Netherlands Indies. Although as early as 1850 the Dutch government had submitted a proposal to Parliament for the abolition of differential duties in the Indies, surprisingly enough it had been the Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives), in which the Liberals were strongly entrenched, which was opposed to such a move. Dutch industry, so it was argued, was not yet strong enough to compete on an unprotected colonial market, while furthermore free trade would cause a decline in the staple market for colonial produce in Holland. The liberals defended their attitude by pointing out that during the system of protection before 1848, Dutch industry had become too onesided. However, when it appeared that despite the gradual abolition of the Consignment system, most of the colonial produce was still marketed in Holland and Dutch industry appeared to have secured a strong position in the colonial market on its own account, opposition to the introduction of a more liberal tariff gradually weakened. Subsequently in 1865 the Indian Tariff Law (Indische Tarriefwet) was passed by Parliament introducing a general import duty of 6%. But various goods of Dutch origin were still given a certain amount of protection, including woollens and cottons which were to be admitted at 10% when of Dutch origin and 20% when imported from foreign countries. In 1869, however, this duty was lowered

(47) See next paragraph.
from 20% to 16%; and in 1872 a new tariff was introduced which admitted all imports into the Indies at a general duty of 6%.

Together with the abolition of the culture system and the introduction of liberal tariffs, the Consignment system — the other essential part of van den Bosch's colonial monopoly — was gradually dismantled. In 1857 the sale of government produce in Java — which had been discontinued since 1836 — was renewed and in that year amounted to 6.5% of all government produce, while by 1870 this proportion had increased to 37% of the total. Furthermore, particularly the abolition of the government indigo and spices monopoly in the 60's and of sugar in 1873 caused a considerable decline in the N.H.M. export trade. This company therefore gradually changed from being a government banker, transporter and sales organization, into an ordinary private business enterprise. The N.H.M. adapted itself well to the new circumstances and began to specialize in the buying and selling of colonial produce and banking operations which included the provision of funds to private planters and other enterprises.

This liberalization of the East-Indies trade during the fifties and sixties was one of the major causes of an apparent

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(48) Meinsma "Verval..." op.cit. pp.149-150.
"rapprochement" between England and Holland which occurred at this time.

While in 1840-41 the threatened occupation by the Dutch of Siak brought Anglo-Dutch relations near to breaking-point, the occupation of the same territory in 1858 nearly passed unnoticed by the British government or at least seemingly so. In 1857 Blundell, the governor of the Straits Settlement, refused to take action on complaints made by Wilson about the treatment he had received from the Dutch in Siak. When subsequently the Foreign Office - after direct representations by Wilson - was inclined to take up the matter with The Hague, the British ambassador in Holland was opposed to such a move, because he believed that the Dutch were in a strong position and would reply:

"...we make no attack on the independence of the Raja of Siak - but we cannot permit the creation on the island of Sumatra of a new independent sovereign...."(51)

Consequently the Wilson question was not raised; and the main reason for this appears to have been that Wilson's proceedings were considered by the Foreign Office as contravening article 9 of the treaty of 1824, which stipulated that no British settlements were to be made on the island of Sumatra.

(52) Foreign Office to the India Board, 26th March, 1858. quot. Ibid. p.161.
Also when the Dutch occupation in 1858 of Siak became known to the British the reaction was rather mild; and e.g. Blundell wrote in May, 1858 to the India Office that although it had to be seen how much British trade and commerce would be interfered with, he was inclined:

"...to consider such establishments to be very beneficial. Siak has long been in a state of anarchy and disorganization, and wherever such a state of affairs prevails, trade is at an end and plunder and piracy unchecked..."

(53)

Subsequently when the Dutch ambassador in September, 1858 communicated the treaty with Siak, the British government did not go any further than giving a simple acknowledgement. This seemingly disinterested attitude by Britain becomes more intelligible when it is taken into account that the British government at this time was expecting the introduction of a more liberal tariff in the Dutch colonies. Only a few months earlier Rochussen, then Minister of Colonies, had declared to the British ambassador that a new and more moderate tariff for the colonies was under consideration; and that in any case in Siak - similarly to Djambi - a non-differential tariff would be introduced. But despite the fact that the Dutch government's attempts to introduce a liberal tariff in the East-Indies was

(53) Foreign Office to the India Board, 26th March, 1858. quot. Tarling. op.cit. p. 161.
(54) See Section IV.
retarded by the strong opposition in Parliament and in fact did not come about - in the fullest sense of the word - till the early seventies, the Foreign Office seemed unwilling to press the Dutch too hard; and as Lord Wodehouse wrote in 1860:

"...I believe the policy of Mr. Canning's treaty was much the wisest, viz. to leave to the Dutch the Eastern Archipelago....The exclusive colonial policy of the Dutch is no doubt an evil, but it has been much relaxed of late....It seems to me in many respects very advantageous that the Dutch should possess this Archipelago. If it was not in the hands of the Dutch, it would fall under the sway of some other maritime power, presumably the French, unless we took it ourselves. - The French might, if they possessed such an eastern empire, be really dangerous to India and Australia, but the Dutch are and must remain too weak to cause us any alarm.................................."(56)

While the Straits Settlement's merchants so far had been rather quiet about the Dutch occupation of Siak, the visit of Netscher in 1862 to the pepper ports and the subsequent establishment of Dutch control there, caused a flood of complaints from Pulu Penang and Singapore to the Home Government about the alleged extension of the Dutch trading monopoly to those territories upon which the prosperity of British traders depended so much. Consequently the Foreign Office instructed the ambassador in The Hague to remind the Dutch government about the promises which it had made earlier about British trade in Siak; and in the meantime Aitchison, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department in

(56) Lord Wodehouse, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Memorandum, 18th August, 1860. quot. Ibid. p.164.
India, after having received reports about the growing influence of the Dutch in the East-Coast principalities, advised the Foreign Office that it should insist on the independence of those sultanates, unless a new convention could be concluded with the Dutch which would be more explicit on British rights of trade and commerce in the Archipelago than the treaty of 1824.

However, in reply to representations made by the British ambassador, the Dutch government argued that its actions did not contravene any of the stipulations of the 1824 treaty; and that in any case increased Dutch influence in those territories, instead of being harmful, would be advantageous to British trade because order would be established; piracy and slavery stopped; while furthermore it was to be kept in mind that the tariff was on the point of being liberalized.

But more complaints from the Straits Settlements continued to arrive in London; and the Foreign Office sent another instruction to the ambassador in The Hague to the effect that:

"...Her Majesty's Government have constantly protested against the encroachments of the Dutch on the east coast of Sumatra, and they cannot tolerate the obstructions to British commerce which may result from such encroachments. Her Majesty's Government are willing at the same time to accept the assurances given by the Netherlands Government of their intention to adopt a more liberal commercial policy in the Eastern Seas, and they will see with satisfaction the introduction of an improved system, but the Netherlands Government may

rest assured that if steps are not shortly taken for removing the just cause of complaint which had been afforded to British traders in the East by the obstacles placed by the Dutch authorities in the way of their commercial operations, a state of things will arise which cannot fail to be most injurious to the good relations of the two countries............."(59)

The British government was apparently willing to acquiesce in the Dutch occupation of the East-Coast of Sumatra, providing it could assure a better deal for British trade and commerce there.

But when in 1864 Cremers, the Dutch Foreign Minister, released the details to the British ambassador of the long promised new tariff for the Dutch colonies the British were not content with the concessions made, even though the Dutch Note contained the promise that in Siak and its dependencies non-differential tariffs would be introduced. The British government insisted on the equal treatment of British and Dutch subjects in regard to the tariff and residence qualifications in the Dutch colonies. (61)

Britain, however, was apparently bent upon finding a definite and speedy settlement of its differences with Holland in the Malacca Straits; and in August, 1864, Milbanke, the

(60) For further details of the new tariff See pp.353-354 of this section.
(61) Cremers to Milbanke, 23rd September, 1864. quot. Ibid. p.172.
British ambassador, suggested to van der Putte, then the Minister for Colonies, that a definite understanding between the two countries on the interpretation of the 1824 treaty would be highly desirable.

During the next few years further discussions on the possibility of a new convention on Sumatra, which would be supplementary to the 1824 treaty, were held; and finally in July, 1867 the British ambassador presented the Dutch government with a draft convention relating to the East-Coast territories situated between Djambi and the Achinese border. The draft stipulated that in the case of Dutch occupation of any of those territories, British subjects were to be treated on the same basis as Dutch ones, while in addition Holland was to refrain from introducing differential origin duties; monopolies; differential destination duties; and restrictions on the coasting trade and the residence of British subjects.

While the Dutch cabinet was generally favourably disposed towards the British proposals, it insisted that an agreement on the future of Achin should be included in any eventual Sumatra settlement. Although at this time the British government had no objections in principle as such to a Dutch occupation of Achin, it decided to keep the question of Achin

(63) Tarling op. cit. p.177.
as a diplomatic bargaining point for future negotiations; and accordingly the Foreign Office decided that an assurance should be given to the Dutch government:

"...that in case of the desired commercial concessions being granted, Her Majesty's Government would be disposed to deal liberally with the question of Achin." (64)

After further exchanges of notes and a visit of the governor of the Straits Settlements to Batavia a new draft was finally agreed upon by both governments. Subsequently on 8th September, 1870 a new Anglo-Dutch convention on Sumatra was signed in which the British government gave Holland a free hand in Sumatra including Achin; and the Dutch government in return assured British subjects the same treatment and privileges as enjoyed (65) by Dutch subjects.

From the Dutch point of view the new convention not only put a definite stop to the endless disputes with Britain, but it also offered, as van der Putte phrased it, another distinct advantage in that the earlier British objection to direct action by the Dutch against the state of Achin was waived:

"...I won't expand on this, but will only mention a few names: Gibson; the presence of the Achinese Sidi Mohammad in Paris; the finding of Achinese influence behind every complication in Sumatra, either in Nias, or as in 1864 at the East-Coast. If also that influence (i.e. of the Achinese) is remembered in the war against the Padris; (and) it is remembered that still in 1864 we were forced to take measures to stop

(64) Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 22nd August, 1868. "Ibid. p.178

(65) Full text of the convention is in de Klerck op.cit.Bijlage VII.pp.457-460.
slavery in Nias; and (if it is remembered) that the punishment of Achinese mischief makers at the East-Coast was hampered by the treaty of 1824, then one shall not underestimate the value of the repealing of those restrictions, which were so injudiciously agreed to in 1824. ................................................. "(66)

Although the consideration that the independence of Achin had proved to be a hindrance to Dutch plans in Sumatra would in itself have provided a sufficient reason for the occupation of that country during the time of van den Bosch, now additional reasons for such a course of action are advanced. As already pointed out, since 1848 a growing awareness is discernable in Dutch government circles, that apart from purely commercial pursuits the government had a definite duty - on humanitarian grounds - to create better conditions for its colonial subjects by protecting them from such evils as slavery, extortion and anarchy. As the Dutch cabinet pointed out during the debates on the Sumatra Convention:

"..The Netherlands at present derive, just as previously - perhaps more than previously - much of its relative prestige from the rich heritage which has been bequeathed to it in the East and the West (i.e. Indies). But, it has been correctly pointed out that apart from the advantages which can be gained from overseas possessions, serious and costly duties exist, which have made our task there not easier................................................."(67)

(66) Speech by Fransen van der Putte on 7th July, 1871 during the Tweede Kamer debate on the Sumatra Convention. In Handelingen der Staten Generaal. 1870/71 p.1127.

An independent Achin, it was argued, would make the carrying out of the Dutch government's duties very difficult because of Achin's addiction to slavery and piracy. Furthermore the continued independence of Achin would, it was feared, result in repeated disturbances in the Dutch controlled pepper ports over which Achin still claimed sovereignty. This last consideration became an even more important motive for taking direct action against the Achinese when it appeared that the economic value of the East-Coast sultanates was far greater than originally had been expected.

One result of the more effective European control on the East-Coast since 1858 had been the attempts by the Dutch authorities to raise the economic value of that area. Already in 1858 cotton-growing experiments had been conducted in Siak; and corn and tobacco seeds had been issued to some of the indigenous leaders. But more important Netscher, the Resident of Riouw, who in 1862 had visited the Siak dependencies wanted to consolidate Dutch influence there by attracting European planters. Consequently, largely owing to his efforts a soil survey was carried out in 1863 but its results did not create much interest among European firms in Java. However, in the same year an Arab merchant on a visit to Java succeeded in interesting a number of firms there in setting up a trading venture in Deli where he reported that more than 30,000 piculs
of tobacco were to be bought. When the representatives of those firms on their arrival in Deli found that the Arab merchant had completely misrepresented the true situation, they returned to Java, with the exception of one of them, a certain J. Nienhuis, who remained behind in order to experiment with tobacco growing. In 1864 Nienhuis succeeded in growing 50 packs of tobacco which brought 48 cents per pound at the Rotterdam sales. In 1866 the harvest of 189 packs brought 149 cents per pound; and in 1868 the Amsterdam tobacco merchant P.W. Janssen who had invested 30,000 guilders in Nienhuis' enterprise earned 67,000 guilders profits on his outlay. The success of Deli tobacco spread quickly and soon a number of European planters settled there. In 1870 the Deli Maatschapij, which replaced the earlier enterprise of Nienhuis and Janssen and was largely financed by N.H.M. capital, was able to pay a dividend of 20%.

While the increased economic importance of the East-Coast sultanates provided yet another reason for putting an effective stop to any Achinese attempts to interfere with the peaceful development of that territory, the already existing complaints about Achinese piracy became even more intensified with the large increase in the East-Coast trade, of which the Straits

Settlements were the main beneficiaries. It is therefore not surprising to see the Straits Settlements' press clamoring for effective action against the Acheinese:

"...At all events if we do not choose to chastize them, and bring them to their senses, it is to be hoped that the Dutch may take the matter in hand. Such a state of affairs as has been going on at Acheen and the neighbourhood for some time back, should by no means be allowed to continue, unless indeed it be desired that Penang traders and others are to be regarded as the legalized prey of such a gang of pirates and banditti...."(69)

Another reason for the eradication of piracy, which should be mentioned here was that the Straits of Malacca, as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was fast becoming one of the major thoroughfares for international shipping.

But Acheen presented both England and Holland with yet another major problem, because it was feared that Acheinese attempts to obtain support from countries such as France and the U.S.A. against the ever increasing influence of the Dutch in Sumatra could result in the permanent settlement of a third power in the Malacca Straits region. In fact this consideration had also played an important role in bringing about the Anglo-Dutch Convention of 1870 on Sumatra. In this context therefore it should be noted that at the same time as "laissez-faire" was becoming an accepted principle of economic behaviour in

(69) Penang Gazette, 15th April, 1870. quot. Officiele Bescheiden. op.cit. p.28.
Western Europe, a counteracting current is discernible, especially in Germany and the United States. During the period 1850-1870 world trade - in contrast to the long downward trend since the Napoleonic Wars - showed a spectacular rise, which was largely the result of the break-through of the industrial Revolution in the European Continent and in North America. While this large increase in the volume of world trade made the tension between the Dutch and the English in the Archipelago less acute than it had been during the severe trade depression of the forties, on the other hand the continuous spreading of industrialization in other countries soon resulted in a quest for raw materials which extended outside the national boundaries. The attention of hitherto non-colonial powers became more and more directed towards obtaining overseas possessions in order to secure a cheap and regular supply of raw materials. In addition to this development European nationalism which had been smouldering throughout the nineteenth century received a tremendous lift because the quick growth in national income and prosperity was often attributed not so much to the industrialization process but rather to the innate genius of the nation and the race. Consequently in addition to the competition for raw materials, there appears a strong tendency for trying to outdo the rest of the world in all fields of human enterprise, including the planting of the
national flag in hitherto largely unknown territories, even though in some cases those areas had neither economic or strategic value to the European power concerned.

What is important in this context is that the beginnings of this new spirit of European imperialism i.e. the desire to expand the national ethos as widely as possible, are already noticeable in the late sixties and the early seventies. The quest for colonies by such powers as France and the United States - and later Germany - provided an additional reason for England and Holland to forget their differences and to present a solid front against any attempt by other interested countries to infiltrate into their established spheres of influence; and for example Herman Merivale, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Council of India, was of the opinion that the:

"...acknowledgement of the Dutch supremacy in Sumatra (is) a good thing for us, even if we got nothing by it. I think it would be a good thing for us to have the whole, or all the accessible ports of that island, controlled by a European power, which has every reason to be on good terms with us, and only a few old-fashioned jealousies pulling the other way....But to get their trade in exchange for this acknowledgement would be an excellent bargain....." (70)

Another quotation from a despatch by Ricketts, the British consul at Sarawak, possibly illustrates this point even better:

"...The old policy of working against the Dutch out here seems to me foolish—things are now entirely in a transition state—the influence which we once held together with the Dutch in this portion of the East being now divided among French, Americans, Dutch and English—it would...be...politic to be on terms of amity with the Hollanders, so as in times of difficulty to neutralize the power of the French and Americans."

But while the British preferred the Dutch to be in charge of the whole of the Archipelago, chiefly for strategic reasons, the Dutch themselves—or at least the Liberals—wanted closer co-operation with England in order to counteract the threat of Pan-Germanism—a movement for the unification of all Germanic peoples under the aegis of Prussia. The Dutch Colonial Minister de Waal, during whose term of office the Sumatra Convention was signed, very strongly stressed the danger posed by the rise of Germany to the existence of Holland as a nation; and as an example of this threat he quotes the following statement from an 1867 issue of the "Kreuzzzeitung"—Bismarck's paper—to the effect that the Dutch people:

"...can only save the remainder of their valuable national heritage when closely annexed to Prussia."

Summarizing the findings of this Section, it appears that the thinking of the Dutch government in regard to colonies did undergo a considerable change since the end of the forties.

(71) Ricketts to Layard, 22nd August, 1865, quot. Ibid. p.175.
(72) De Waal E "Onze Indische Financien" Deel I, p.6.
The earlier point of view that the colonies existed only for the purpose of being made serviceable to the interests of the owners gradually changed; and in addition a growing realization is noticeable in Dutch government circles that a positive duty existed in regard to the Indonesians themselves; i.e. to protect them from such social evils as slavery, piracy and anarchy. This in many cases necessitated increased interference and intervention in the internal affairs of indigenous states and communities. Apart from humanitarian considerations, intervention and expansion of effective Dutch control were made necessary in order to stop any interference with the free and unrestricted flow of trade and commerce. The eradication of piracy is a case in point here. But at the same time as the philosophy of liberalism and its concomitant of free trade became prominent in Holland and resulted in vastly improved Anglo-Dutch relations, an intensification of nationalism resulted in the opposition to any other nation occupying part of the Archipelago - i.e. the sphere of influence which now was not only considered as the area demarcated for Dutch economic exploitation but also as the field to be developed and civilized under Dutch tutelage. The belief that unrestricted international competition in trade and commerce would create the best possible world for everybody, including the Indonesians, together with the conviction that it was the duty and the
destiny of the Dutch nation to create a state of affairs in Indonesia enabling the safe and unrestricted conduct of trade and commerce largely explains why the Dutch decided to re-occupy the East-Coast of Sumatra during the fifties; and why they eventually, in 1873, declared war on Achin.
CONCLUSION.

Five distinct phases in Dutch expansionary policy in Sumatra during the period 1816-1873 can be discerned.

I found that between 1816-1824 - the first phase - the main motive of the Dutch to extend their influence in Sumatra was to prevent Raffles from accomplishing his plans for the establishment of a British colonial empire in the East Indies. The Batavian authorities feared that the establishment of a British free trade port too close to Java - the Dutch economic and political stronghold - would be detrimental to its prosperity; and they therefore tried to surround Java with a protective barrier in which Sumatra formed a vital link. Although in 1824 Sumatra was recognized to be within the Dutch sphere of influence, that island had then lost its original importance to Holland, because a British post had been wedged into the protective screen around Java at another point: Singapore.

Thus, Dutch interest shown in Sumatra during the period 1816-1824 was primarily of a strategic nature; and it was only the port of Padang at the West-Coast of Sumatra, which, because of its coffee exports, was considered by Batavia to be of some direct economic importance.
The attempts of the Dutch between 1821 and 1829 to establish their control in Minangkabau - the hinterland of Padang - constitutes the second phase.

Three conclusions emerged from my investigation of this period. Firstly Dutch military intervention in Minangkabau was not part of any general plan for the occupation of the whole of Sumatra, but was rather an ad hoc measure designed to restore peace and order which were a pre-requisite for the prosperity of the Dutch ports on the West-Coast.

Secondly, only after the revenue potential of the rich valleys of Minangkabau had been realized by the Dutch did they decide to keep at least part of the country permanently occupied.

Thirdly, it was largely for external reasons - i.e. the financial debacle in Java and the rebellion of Diponegara (1825-1830) - that the Dutch were prevented from achieving their objectives of restoring peace and bringing Minangkabau under their effective administrative control.

The Sumatra policy of van den Bosch (1830-1841) forms the third phase; and it should first be noticed, I think, that van den Bosch - in contrast to the period 1816-1830 - devised a plan which included the whole of Sumatra.

Secondly, van den Bosch's Sumatra policy constituted an integral part of his general policy for the whole of the Dutch
East Indies; and therefore its main determinant was the principle of profitability.

The desire for large profits with the smallest possible overheads was responsible for van den Bosch's initial plan to seal off the Sumatran coastline and to leave the interior of the island untouched.

Similarly this profitability motive explains his later decision to occupy Minangkabau when it appeared that the Padris were unwilling to come to terms and a great deal of Minangkabau coffee was being exported to Singapore.

Again, the regulations designed by van den Bosch for the administration of Minangkabau show his pre-occupation with business. Occupation of territory for the sake of national grandeur was out of the question; and the sole reason for the presence of the Dutch in Minangkabau was to make that territory a profitable proposition. As the forced introduction of European civilization into Minangkabau would cause social and political upheavals and would result in increased military and administrative expenditure, the cheapest way, according to van den Bosch, for the Dutch to reach their objective would be to leave the existing indigenous social and political structure intact.

However, the execution of van den Bosch's plan was retarded by two developments. Firstly the stubborn resistance
of the Padris kept the Dutch fully occupied until the end of the 'Thirties. Secondly when the Padris were finally disposed of, an even more formidable obstacle was put in the way of the completion of van den Bosch's objectives; i.e. Britain. But this second development brings us to the fourth phase in Dutch Sumatra policy (1841-1848).

During the period 1840-1871 the extent of Dutch expansion in Sumatra - which previously had been dependant mainly on factors of national and local importance - became largely an international issue.

Soon after the conclusion of the treaty of 1824 both parties had tried to twist its stipulations to such an extent that this agreement became hardly more than a worthless piece of paper. The result was that the Dutch territorial position in the East Indies became again very shaky as it had been in the years 1816-1824; and the extent of Dutch expansion in Sumatra became largely dependent on British goodwill, which in turn depended mainly on Holland's willingness to grant concessions to British trade in its colonies.

Until 1848 the Dutch government was unwilling to grant any trade concessions in the colonies, not only because it did not want to abolish the colonial monopoly system of van den Bosch, but also because it needed all the money it could obtain from the Indies in order to keep afloat financially.
The reaction of The Hague to the prohibition by Britain of further Dutch expansion on the East-Coast of Sumatra was twofold.

Firstly the Dutch in order to prevent a discussion of territorial rights tried to take away the cause of dispute by evacuating most of the East-Coast area.

Secondly - and here the profitability motive comes to the fore again - the Dutch government reasoned that owing to Britain's insistence on non-differential tariffs and the fact that the East-Coast itself was known to have only little economic value, this territory had lost its original value to Holland, i.e. to seal off the transit trade between the rich Sumatran interior and the Straits Settlements. This objective, The Hague argued, could still be reached by closing off this trade at its source in the Dutch controlled districts of the interior.

Subsequently in Minangkabau and the other districts of the Central West-Coast the Dutch successfully reverted the naturally Eastward flowing trade to their ports on the Western seaboard.

Thus, despite British opposition the Dutch managed to reach much of their original objective in occupying Sumatra, i.e. to control its trade and commerce.
Consequently, requests by colonial authorities to expand Dutch control Eastwards were repeatedly put aside by The Hague on the grounds that such a move would not increase profits, but instead would only provoke Britain with the possible result that Holland might lose everything it had gained so far.

The parliamentary revolution of 1848 in The Hague inaugurates the fifth phase in Dutch expansionary policy in Sumatra (1848-1873).

Although during this period the Home government kept insisting on receiving colonial financial surplusses (batig slot) and therefore generally remained opposed to further expansion of control, the colonial authorities on various occasions took the law into their own hands and presented The Hague with a fait accompli.

I found three main motives for renewed Dutch expansion on the East-Coast of Sumatra. Firstly the fear of foreign infiltration into that area; and secondly a desire both on economic and humanitarian grounds to stop the recurring internecine struggles in the East-Coast sultanates and to abolish misrule, slavery and piracy. Thirdly, there is an increasing awareness discernible among many Dutchmen that apart from business, which in any case would flourish better under a more liberal system of trade and commerce, it was Holland's duty and destiny to raise the Indonesians themselves to a higher level of prosperity and civilization.
There were two developments which made it possible for Holland to expand its control on the East-Coast of Sumatra without being opposed by Britain.

Firstly, the growing impact of liberalism and humanitarianism on Dutch public opinion since 1848 resulted in the gradual abolition of the culture and consignment system, a process which had practically been completed in 1870. In its place a more liberal system of trade was introduced in the Dutch colonies. This development removed the main cause for British opposition to further Dutch expansion in the Archipelago.

Secondly, during the 'Sixties fears of a third power settling in the East-Indies caused Britain and Holland to draw closer together.

Thus this growing rapprochement between Holland and England resulted in the Sumatra treaty of 1870/71 in which the Dutch were given a free hand in Sumatra, including Achin, in return for equal treatment of British trade in the Netherlands East Indies.

Subsequently, in 1873, the Dutch declaring war on Achin embarked on the last stage of bringing the whole of Sumatra under their control.
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BGV = Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen-Verhandelingen.

BTLV = Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-Land en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indie - Bijdragen.

IG = Indische Gids.

KT = Koloniaal Tijdschrift.

TBB = Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlands Bestuur.

TVI = Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie.

UB = Utrechtse Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis, het Staatsrecht en de Economie van Nederlandsch Indie.


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<td>BERG N P van den</td>
<td>Munt, -crediet-en bankwezen, handel en scheepvaart in Ned. Indie; historisch statistische bijdragen. 1907.</td>
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<td>BLINK H</td>
<td>Nederlandsch Oost- en West-Indie geographisch, ethnographisch en economisch beschreven. Leiden, Brill, 1907.</td>
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<td>Opkomst en ontwikkeling van Sumatra als economischgeographisch gebied. s'Gravenhage, Mouton, 1926.</td>
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<td>Sumatra's Oostkust in hare opkomst en ontwikkeling als economisch gewest. s'Gravenhage, Mouton, 1918.</td>
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<td>BREE L de</td>
<td>Gedenkboek van den Javasche Bank, 1828-1928.</td>
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<td>COLENBRANDER H T S</td>
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