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THE KUNG-SUN WARLORDS OF LIAO-TUNG (189-238) - CONTINUED

by K.H.J Gardiner

In a previous contribution I discussed the career of the late second-century warlord Kung-sun Tu, showing how he gained control of the Chinese frontier commandery of Liao-tung, and how he and his son and successor, Kung-sun K'ang, maintained their position in face of a growing threat from the Ts'ao family, which by the end of the year 220 had unified the whole of North China under its rule. In this connection I suggested that particular importance was to be attached to the relations of the Kung-sun warlords with the surrounding non-Chinese peoples - the Hsien-pi and Wu-huan tribal confederacies, and the highland kingdom of Koguryŏ. In what follows I shall attempt to show the significance of the decline and collapse of the Kung-sun house, under Kung-sun K'ang's brother, Kung-sun Kung, and son, Kung-sun Yüan, in terms of relations between the Chinese settlers of Liao-tung and their non-Chinese neighbours.

Kung-sun Kung

The date of Kung-sun K'ang's death is unknown. It must have taken place before April 221, since in that month his successor, Kung-sun



Kung 公孫恭, who by then already held the position of Governor of Liao-tung, was formally appointed General of Chariots and Cavalry (*ch'e-ch'i chiang-chün* 車騎將軍) by the Wei court.[1] According to the *San-kuo chih*, when Kung-sun K'ang died he left two sons, Kung-sun Huang 公孫晃 and Kung-sun Yüan 公孫淵, both too young to be considered in Liao-tung as acceptable successors to their father's position. It was this that led to the nomination of their uncle, Kung-sun Kung. Since Kung-sun K'ang is known to have been old enough to have commenced his official career by 189, when his father became governor of Liao-tung, it would seem that he must have been over thirty by the time that he succeeded his father in 204. Under the circumstances, the fact that he left two children

both of whom were too young to succeed him, suggests that his tenure of office was comparatively brief.

On the other hand, a memorial by the Wei Dynasty statesman Hsia-hou Hsien 夏侯獻 states,

> When Emperor Wen came to the throne and wished to convey his orders [to Liao-tung], he was going to send [Tsung] Hung [駿] 弘 with his wife and children back to his native district [there], presenting him with a carriage, an ox, and a hundred pieces of thin silk. But because of the benefits he had received from the Wei House, [Tsung] Hung had come back [to settle in Liao-tung]. So he requested that his wife and children should stay behind, while he alone went to convey the emperor's commands. And indeed it was only *then that Kung-sun K'ang submitted*. Because he had transmitted the emperor's commands and conveyed his ideas successfully, [Tsung] Hung was rewarded with the rank of a Marquis of the Imperial Domain.[2]

Emperor Wen's formal accession to the throne took place after he had received the abdication of the last Han Emperor, on 10 December 220. It is hardly likely that he would have despatched an immediate mission to Liao-tung, particularly in view of the fact that the man sent on the mission was, as we are told, unwilling to go. In 238 Ssu-ma I, who was about to proceed on an expedition against Liao-tung, was asked by the Wei Emperor Ming how long it would take.

He replied, "A hundred days for going, another one hundred days for the attack, still another hundred days for coming back, and sixty days for rest; thus one year will be sufficient."[3] Ssu-ma I 司馬懿 was travelling with an army, whose progress would necessarily have been slow; on the other hand, Tsung Hung was going as a formal envoy, not a courier, and the object of his mission was to impress the ruler of Liao-tung. Under the circumstances, his journey would not have been a hurried one either, and he would certainly have remained in Liao-tung for some time before returning, for if the ruler of Liao-tung was offering his submission to the central government, it would scarcely have been courteous of him to send back the envoy as soon as

he arrived. All in all it is unlikely that Tsung Hung started for Liao-tung until some time after 10 December 220, and it is also unlikely that his journey to Liao-tung and back to the Wei court was accomplished in anything under a hundred days, so that he would hardly have returned by the beginning of April. On the other hand, we know from *San-kuo chih* 2.45b, that in that very month the Wei court bestowed the title of General of Chariots and Cavalry upon Kung-sun Kung, who was already recognized as governor of Liao-tung, which implies that news of Kung-sun Kung's succession to Kung-sun K'ang must have reached the Wei *before* April 221. As will be seen, there is hardly time for the despatch of an envoy to Liao-tung, the return of that envoy, and the subsequent arrival of the news of a change of ruler in Liao-tung, all between mid-December 220 and April 221, yet this is the sequence of events which is implied if both the Hsiao-hou Hsien memorial and the account of Kung-sun Kung's promotion in *San-kuo chih* 2 are accepted. If it is necessary to choose between the two texts, then the statement in the text of the *San-kuo-chih* seems likely to be the more reliable, and it is quite possible that the text of the *Wei ming-ch'en tsou* 魏名臣奏 used by P'ei Sung-chih in the fifth century, containing the memorial of Hsia-hou Hsien, miswrote "Kung-sun K'ang" for the name of his less well known brother. In view of these doubts it is difficult to use the passage from the memorial to date the death of Kung-sun K'ang and the accession of Kung-sun Kung.[4]

Submission to the Wei dynasty is certainly more in keeping with what is known of the policies of Kung-sun Kung than those of his elder brother, who had detained such men as Wang Lieh and Kuan Ning at his court and refused to allow them to proceed to the Wei Court to take up office (Kuan Ning, indeed, was still

in Liao-tung in Kung-sun Kung's time). In the event, Kung-sun Kung turned out to have been a most inappropriate choice as governor, since he suffered from an illness which had the effect of making him both impotent and indolent, so that, according to the *San-kuo chih* "he was incapable of governing the realm."[5] But if Kung-sun Kung was unable to attend to the government of Liao-tung and the other conquests of Kung-sun K'ang himself, this meant that the administration fell into the hands of his subordinates - which was perhaps the reason why the latter put him forward as ruler on Kung-sun K'ang's death.

Predictably, the weakness of the ruler of Liao-tung gave the new Wei dynasty its chance to extend its effective power into this north-eastern area, apparently for the first time. Unlike either of his predecessors, Kung-sun Kung was obliged to bind himself to the Wei by sending a hostage to their court in the person of his eldest nephew, Kung-sun Huang.[6] Moreover, in spite of the impressive - but probably purely nominal - military rank which Emperor Wen had bestowed upon him, Kung-sun Kung was not recognized as Marquis of Hsiang-p'ing in succession to his brother, but only as Marquis (*hou* 侯) of P'ing-kuo 平郭.[7] P'ing-kuo hsien, although doubtless an important place - according to the *Han-shu* it contained a state depot for the manufacture of salt and a state iron works[8] - was yet unmistakably a subordinate prefecture of Liao-tung, and not to be compared with Hsiang-p'ing, which housed the administrative headquarters of the commandery. Although the difference in official rank may have appeared more of a reality at the Wei court than it did in Liao-tung, it at least indicates that Ts'ao's successor felt there was no need to bestow upon Kung-sun Kung the same status as his deceased brother who, in addition to the court rank he held in his lifetime, was also posthumously created Commander-in-Chief.[9]

A similar indication of decline in Kung-sun prestige may perhaps be found in the fact that it was under the "rule" of Kung-sun Kung that the last of the scholars mentioned in the *San-kuo chih* as having taken refuge in Liao-tung departed for Central China. As already noticed,[10] these men had mostly gone to Liao-tung some thirty years earlier. But of the five names mentioned in the sources, three - T'ai-shih Tz'u, Kuo Yüan and Ping Yüan - had evidently returned to the Han court before the death of Kung-sun Tu, while Wang Lieh is stated to have died in Liao-tung in 218-219 at the age of seventy-eight (*i.e.* seventy-seven according to Western reckoning).[11] Kung-sun Kung seems to have continued the policy of his father and elder brother in patronizing these men, but in 223 Kuan Ning, the last survivor of the group, was recalled to take up office at the Wei court, and left Liao-tung, returning to Kung-sun Kung all the gifts which the latter and his two predecessors had bestowed upon him.[12] As a mark of respect Kung-sun Kung escorted Kuan Ning to the southern suburbs of his capital (presumably Hsiang-p'ing); he was evidently unable to prevent Kuan Ning's departure, again in marked contrast to his brother, who had effectively intervened to prevent either Kuan Ning or Wang Lieh taking up office under the Ts'ao family in his day.[13]

It seems likely that the weakness of Kung-sun Kung's government will have provided the Koguryŏ kingdom with a chance to renew its traditional struggle with the Chinese colonists of Liao-tung, although this is not indicated specifically in the *San-kuo chih*. Certainly the puppet kingdom established under the disaffected Koguryŏ prince Palgi in the Piryu valley can scarcely have survived for any length of time, since the *San-kuo chih* states

that Palgi subsequently went back to Liao-tung, while his son apparently returned to Koguryŏ, presumably (although no date is given) even before the death of Kung-sun K'ang.[14] Soon afterwards King Iimo launched another attack upon Hsüan-t'u, but this was beaten off by the combined forces of Hsüan-t'u and Liao-tung, another severe defeat being inflicted upon the raiders from Koguryŏ. In spite of this success, the Kung-sun house is unlikely to have been able to bring the Piryu valley back under its control during its few remaining years of rule; indeed, as will be shown, by 234 Koguryŏ influence had extended as far as the mouth of the Yalü.[15]

Thus the overall picture of Kung-sun Kung's rule is one of weakness and retreat, with the Kung-sun house unable to retain either its authority over the nearby non-Chinese peoples, or its prestige as a domain virtually independent of imperial control. In these circumstances it is quite likely that there was considerable discontent with Kung-sun Kung in Liao-tung so that, when he came of age, Kung-sun Yüan was able to seize the opportunity of his elder brother's absence to depose his uncle and take control of the commandery himself, in 228. Kung-sun Kung was imprisoned, but not put to death, and indeed survived the disaster of 238, being released by Ssu-ma I after the latter's victory.[16] Once in power, Kung-sun Yüan formally notified the Wei court of his succession to the post of governor, and after some hesitation he was confirmed in office, although not until after the Palace Attendant Liu Yeh 劉曄 had made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Wei court to take advantage of the unsettling effect of Kung-sun Yüan's *coup* to put down the warlord house once and for all, and crush those who had "allied themselves with barbarians beyond [the frontiers]."[17] His advice went unheeded, however, and Emperor Ming, the second ruler of the Wei dynasty, not merely con-

firmed Kung-sun Yüan as governor of Liao-tung, but even bestowed upon him the additional title of "General Who Shows Forth [Our] Majesty" (*Yang-lieh chiang-chün* 揚烈將軍).[18]

Kung-sun Yüan's relations with Wei and Wu to 233

Superficially there would appear to be considerably more material concerning the last Kung-sun ruler than for his three predecessors. Not only is the section dealing with him in the combined Kung-sun house biography much longer than that devoted to all the earlier Kung-sun,[19] but here and elsewhere in the *San-kuo chih,* P'ei Sung-chih's commentary has preserved letters and memorials of Kung-sun Yüan to the Wei court or to Sun Ch'üan, ruler of Wu. Moreover, since the final destruction of Kung-sun Yüan was effected by Ssu-ma I, the ancestor of the ruling family of the Chin dynasty, there is also a lengthy and largely independent account of this campaign in the *Chin-shu.*[20] A closer examination, however, reveals that almost all of this material sheds light on only one aspect of Kung-sun Yüan's policies - his diplomatic activity. It is only rarely that occasional phrases allow anything of Kung-sun Yüan's internal administration or his relations with the non-Chinese peoples surrounding Liao-tung to be ascertained. Finally it should also be noticed that, since Kung-sun Yüan was the only member of his house to take the imperial style, and since moreover his "rebellion" was put down by the ancestor of the Chin dynasty, under which most of the historians who composed the surviving sources on the Kung-sun house flourished, it is only to be expected that these sources reveal an especially strong anti-Kung-sun bias when dealing with Kung-sun Yüan which it is not always possible to correct.

The "international situation" faced by Kung-sun Yüan upon his seizure of power was substantially different from that which his uncle had encountered when he succeeded Kung-sun K'ang. In northern China the Wei dynasty was now well entrenched and probably at the height of its power, but it faced a ring of enemies whose combined strengths, though not enough to topple the Ts'ao house, represented a threat more serious than any which had appeared since the days of Ts'ao Ts'ao himself. Fortunately for the Wei, in 219, shortly before the accession of the new dynasty, the two southern warlords, Sun Ch'üan and Liu Pei, had quarrelled with each other, and continued hostilities for several years thereafter. This had led Sun Ch'üan, the warlord of Wu, to make a temporary submission to Wei; but by the end of 222 the Wei court had decided that Wu was unreliable, and attacked Sun Ch'üan, with the result that the old alliance of the Sun and the Liu was renewed from 224 onwards. By this time a further danger for Wei had also appeared in the north, where previously the frontier tribes had mostly remained quiet since Ts'ao Ts'ao shattered the Wu-huan confederacy in 207. Now the Hsien-pi, scattered and broken since the death of their great leader T'an-shih-huai *c.*181, showed signs of coming together again under the leadership of an energetic chieftain K'o-pi-neng 軻比能 whose forces repeatedly raided Wei's frontier commanderies. This new factor presented the Wei court with the threat of serious military difficulties developing on several frontiers at once,[21] and under such circumstances it was clearly important to clarify the ambiguous position occupied by the Kung-sun house in the far north-east. As already noticed, this need had led to an extension of effective Wei influence into Liao-tung during Kung-sun Kung's tenure of office, and when Kung-sun Yüan seized power there was even a suggestion that the Wei court should take the opportunity to despatch an army to Liao-tung to secure the north-east

once and for all. Although this advice had been rejected for the time being, and Kung-sun Yüan recognized as governor of Liao-tung, it was not apparently thought necessary to bestow upon him a rank as exalted as that given to his uncle, who had been "General of Chariots and Cavalry."

Yet, just as it was important for the Wei to secure the allegiance of the lords of Liao-tung, it was equally important for the rivals of the Ts'ao house to gain Kung-sun support and thereby menace their enemies from several directions at once. Sun Ch'üan had already realised this during the lifetime of Kung-sun K'ang, and had despatched envoys to attempt to make common cause with the latter, apparently quite without effect. Unfortunately, our sole source for this event is a reference in a long memorial despatched by Kung-sun Yüan to the Wei court in 233, in which he attempted to show that his family had a long-standing record of loyalty to Wei. According to Kung-sun Yüan, "My father K'ang formerly killed Sun Ch'üan's envoys, and brought upon himself the enmity of Sun Ch'üan."[22]

It is perhaps unlikely that this was a mere empty claim without any foundation, but the account of Sun Ch'üan's reign in *San-kuo chih* 47 makes no mention of the embassy in question and nothing more is known of it.

In 229 Sun Ch'üan finally assumed the imperial style and proclaimed his own reign-period. It seemed appropriate to renew the attempt to enter into relations with the rulers of Liao-tung, and in the fifth month of that year (June-July) two further messengers were despatched from the Wu court to Liao-tung.[23] Nothing is known of the fate of these two men, but it is unlikely that they were received quite so coolly by Kung-sun Yüan as their predecessors had been by his father. It may be significant in this connection

that in 230 the Wei court finally decided to confer upon Kung-sun Yüan the office of "General of Chariots and Cavalry" formerly held by his uncle; it was perhaps felt that his loyalty needed a little encouragement.[24] There were no further developments until April-May 232, when Sun Ch'üan again sent out a number of ambassadors on the difficult sea journey from the Yangtze estuary to Liao-tung.[25] The despatch of this second embassy less than two years after the first suggests that Kung-sun Yüan's reception of the 229 mission had been quite encouraging - although there were certainly statesmen in the south who opposed the idea of pursuing relations with the Kung-sun.[26]

The new Wu embassy also came to the knowledge of the Wei government, which reacted strongly. Not unnaturally supposing Kung-sun Yüan to be playing a double game, and anxious to be rid of him before his understanding with Wu was strong enough to present a real threat, Emperor Ming was persuaded to order a combined land and sea expedition against Liao-tung. The land forces were put under the command of Wang Hsiung 王雄, then Inspector (*ts'e-shih* 刺使) of Yu 幽 Circuit,[27] while the fleet was commanded by T'ien Yü 田豫, a veteran of the north-eastern frontier who had served as Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan until just before this time.[28] News of these hostile preparations quickly reached Liao-tung. Whatever Kung-sun Yüan's earlier attitude towards the Wu envoys had been, the news of these preparations certainly determined him to throw in his lot with Sun Ch'üan. As he himself wrote in his letter to Sun Ch'üan:

> [Wei] has listened to the lying words of the Inspector of Yu Circuit and the Governor of Tung-lai, raising crowds of troops from the Circuit and planning an attack upon my commandery.... Now I understand that such virtue as Your Majesty's cannot appear again....therefore in all humility and with awe in my heart, of my own accord I make my submission.[29]

It is not clear whether Wang Hsiung's army ever engaged with Kung-sun Yüan's forces. Since the sources are silent, it is probable that the emperor changed his mind about the projected campaign, and that they were consequently disbanded, a similar order being sent to T'ien Yü in charge of the fleet.[30] But by this time it was already autumn, and T'ien Yü calculated that the Wu envoys would be travelling back to South China with the southward blowing winter monsoon. Banking on the chance of rough seas and unfavourable winds, he stationed some of his men at Ch'eng-shan, on the tip of the Shantung peninsula, where ships travelling from the north-east were often thrown ashore and wrecked. His gamble payed off, and apparently several of the Wu ships which had been driven off course eastward by the winds were wrecked or ran aground at Ch'eng-shan, and their crews were either drowned or captured. Amongst those killed was the leading Wu envoy, General Chou Ho.[31]

But not all the ships which set out from Liao-tung were wrecked at Ch'eng-shan. P'ei Ch'ien, the assistant envoy, clearly escaped, since he returned to Liao-tung in the following year.[32] Moreover, the Annals of Wu records the arrival in Chien-yeh of the two envoys from Liao-tung, Colonel Su Shu 宿舒 and the Prefect of the Gentlemen of the Palace (*lang-chung* 郎中), Sun Tsung 孫綜, in November 232.[33] Presumably these men left Liao-tung in the company of the Wu envoys, and successfully rode out the storm which drove Chou Ho and the rest ashore at Ch'eng-shan. They brought with them the letter from Kung-sun Yüan to the "Wu Emperor" to which reference has already been made; couched in elegant language it really conveys little more than Kung-sun Yüan's resentment at the treatment he had received from the Wei court, and his decision to acknowledge Sun Ch'üan as Emperor, partly as a result of the embassies which he had received from the latter.[34] The letter accompanied a "tribute" of

sable furs and horses which apparently delighted Sun Ch'üan so much that, early in 233, he expressed his pleasure in an edict ordering a major amnesty. This edict celebrates the Liao-tung "tribute" and refers to Kung-sun Yüan as "Imperial Commissioner Holding the Tally, in command of Yu Circuit and 'Shepherd'-Designate of Ch'ing Circuit, Governor of Liao-tung and King of Yen" 使持節督幽州領青州牧遼東太守燕王.[35] These titles were to be formally bestowed upon Kung-sun Yüan by a vast retinue of Wu courtiers and officials, together with their attendant troops, who were sent out from Chien-yeh in April 233 to escort Su Shu and Sun Tsung back to Liao-tung.[36]

But meanwhile Kung-sun Yüan's attitude had undergone a change, which is perhaps not unrelated to a change in policy which the Wei Court evinced at the same time. For the second time Emperor Ming abandoned the attempt to solve the Liao-tung problem by force of arms, and resorted to diplomacy. "Holding that the officials and people of Liao-tung had been misled by Kung-sun Yüan"[37] he despatched the Gentlemen of the Palace Wei Chen 衛臻 and Shao Mao 邵瑁 to proclaim an imperial edict amnestying all those who had had relations with the rebels, and offering to make a new beginning with them.[38] Although Kung-sun Yüan is not named in the edict, the document could only have been proclaimed with his assistance, and there can be little doubt that, in spite of the introductory words from the *Wei-lüeh* which now stand before it, it was intended to apply to Kung-sun Yüan himself as well.

Although there is no statement anywhere in the *San-kuo chih* concerning this edict, so that it is not even clear whether Wei Chen and Shao Mao reached Liao-tung, let alone whether the imperial message they carried was made known to the people there, it seems likely that it was this new opportunity to rally to the side of Wei which made Kung-sun Yüan think again. Could he afford an open breach with the Ts'ao court?

Its territories stretched practically as far as his own frontiers, whereas contact could only be maintained with Wu by means of a sea journey which, as events had already shown, was both difficult and dangerous. But rather than rejecting the Wu embassy out of hand, Kung-sun Yüan determined to destroy its leaders and seize the treasures they had brought with them, sending a careful selection of these to the Wei court to buy his restoration to grace and favour.

At this time some 400 or more members of the Wu embassy were lodged in and around the city of Hsiang-p'ing.[39] These were the principal envoys and their escort, the men who had brought Sun Ch'üan's edict conferring the title King of Yen and various insignia upon Kung-sun Yüan, and the bearers of presents from the Wu court. According to his subsequent memorial to the Wei court, Kung-sun Yüan used his own returned envoys, Su Shu and Sun Tsung, to spy on the Wu ambassadors,[40] and in order to accomplish his purpose more easily he had the southerners moved and lodged in separate places, some being even sent to Hsüan-t'u commandery, far to the north-east.[41] For some time he seems to have hesitated, perhaps awaiting the most favourable opportunity; according to his memorial he intended to wait for the onset of the cold season, beginning in late October, presumably because if he took action against the embassy at this time, Sun Ch'üan would have been effectively prevented from intervening to save his men because of the unfavourable conditions for travelling from southern China to Liao-tung during the winter months.[42] But the delay in securing a formal reception began to arouse the suspicions of the Wu embassy, and Kung-sun Yüan was obliged to move against them before they could re-establish contact with the bulk of their troops under the generals Ho Ta and Yü Tzu, who were anchored with the Wu fleet at T'a-chin 沓津.[43]

The lodgings of the leading Wu ambassadors were quickly surrounded, and Chang Mi, Hsü Yen, Wan T'ai and P'ei Ch'ien were all killed, apparently without much resistance. Kung-sun Yüan then found himself faced, like his father twenty-six years before, with the problem of what to do with the escort troops of the men he had killed. He determined to despatch them to stiffen the border garrisons, reasoning that, whatever their antipathy towards himself, these men were hardly likely to make common cause with the frontier tribes against the Chinese settlers of Liao-tung - a belief which may not have been justified.[44]

But by far the greater part of the armed forces who had accompanied the Wu mission still lay at T'a Ferry with the ships. Hurriedly Kung-sun Yüan sent a heavy concentration of his own troops to ambush the soldiers of the fleet, ordering his general, a certain Han Ch'i 韓起, to proceed at top speed so as to strike at the southerners before the news of the massacre in the capital could reach them. Another official[45] was to invite Ho Ta and Yü Tzu ashore for a formal reception, while offers to open trade in horses were relayed to their men. One of the principal objects of the Wu mission had been to secure the hardy northern breed of horse unobtainable in southern China, and invitations such as this were well calculated to appeal to the cupidity of the visitors. But the sudden and repeated invitations aroused the suspicions of Ho Ta and Yü Tzu; they refused to come ashore themselves, but allowed those of their men who wished to trade to do so. In his subsequent memorial to the Wei court, Kung-sun Yüan describes what followed:

> Five or six hundred men came ashore with the intention of trading, but the gong sounded [for battle] and sharp pointed arrows began to fly in all directions. We cut off the heads of more than three hundred of the enemy, while some two hundred or more were wounded, leapt into the water, and drowned, the rest escaping into the mountains and valleys. Of these un-

> countable numbers [*sic*!] either came [later] to surrender or starved to death in their hiding places.[46]

The intention to exaggerate both the threat posed by the Wu embassy and his own achievement in overcoming it is clear in Kung-sun Yüan's memorial. On the other hand, since neither Ho Ta nor Yü Tzu are named as being killed, it seems clear that these two, and perhaps the majority of the Wu armed escort, must have got away to carry news of the disaster to Sun Ch'üan.

Meanwhile, Kung-sun Yüan despatched his Chief Clerk of the Department of the West (*hsi-ts'ao yüan* 西曹掾) Kung-sun Heng 公孫珩[47] to escort a selection of the prisoners he had taken to the Wei court, along with the heads of the leading envoys and a quantity of captured treasure - as much as he felt might be necessary to purchase his return to favour. Kung-sun Heng carried with him a lengthy and elaborate memorial in which the ruler of Liao-tung defended his past conduct.[48] Kung-sun Yüan's main defence was that he and his ancestors had always been loyal to the Wei, and that his conduct over the past eighteen months had only been part of a deliberate scheme to lure Sun Ch'üan to destruction. He regretted only that he had been unable to kill Sun Ch'üan himself, and urged the Wei Emperor to let him know if he received news of any attempts to wreak revenge on the part of the southern warlord.

Sun Ch'üan presumably received news of the disaster about the same time from those who had escaped from T'a Ferry. His rage was unbounded, and the *Chiang-piao chuan* 江表傳 purports to convey his angry outburst:

> I am now sixty years old; there is no hardship in the world that I have not tasted. But now I have suffered

> a reverse from a mouse; my temper rises up like a mountain. If I do not in person cut off the head of this mouse and throw it into the sea, I shall have no face left to rule over the myriad states. Even if I suffer adversity from it, I will not regret it.[49]

But however great Sun Ch'üan's anger, it was then the middle of winter (January-February 234) and by the time the weather had improved to the extent that a northern expedition was possible, a number of his leading ministers had intervened to make him see the folly of hazarding himself on an enterprise which necessitated a long and perilous sea voyage away from home while Wu's principal enemy remained strong in northern China.[50] And by this time, Sun Ch'üan had discovered another potential ally and supplier of horses in the north.

Kung-sun Yüan and Koguryŏ

In the event the bloody conclusion at Hsiang-p'ing and T'a Ferry of the elaborate diplomatic "game" which had been going on for several years benefitted neither of the principals. Kung-sun Yüan had now cut himself off from any possibility of southern support, and although, as he had calculated, the Wei court publicly received him back into favour, confirming him in office in Liao-tung and conferring the additional titles of Grand Marshal *(ta ssu-ma* 大司馬) Duke of Lo-lang 樂浪公 upon him, he was shrewd enough to realise that in real terms his position had deteriorated, since he was now wholly dependent upon the forebearance of the Wei, and whenever the latter felt that they had their hands free, they could turn upon him the whole weight of their power, which he would have to face without allies. The uneasiness felt by Kung-sun Yüan is apparent from an incident which occurred when Fu Jung 傅容, and Nieh K'uei 聶夔, the Wei envoys sent to bestow upon him the title Duke of Lo-lang, arrived in Liao-tung, early in

234.[51] Kung-sun Yüan's own envoys (*i.e.* Kung-sun Heng and his companions) returning from Loyang warned him that:

> "These men are all hand-picked for their courage and prowess; they are not ordinary people." So [Kung-sun] Yüan became suspicious and afraid, and when [Fu] Jung and [Nieh] K'uei arrived and proceeded towards the audience pavilion, he came forward and surrounded the place with both cavalry and infantry, only then going in to receive his investiture. [Fu] Jung and [Nieh] K'uei were most alarmed, and when they returned to Loyang they reported the state of affairs [in Liao-tung].[52]

But if Kung-sun Yüan had gained nothing by his execution of the Wu envoys, Sun Ch'üan of Wu had even more obviously lost, and lost not only men and valuables, but also prestige - and the chance of gaining much needed northern horses for his army. However, the very measures which Kung-sun Yüan took against the southern envoys were responsible for introducing Sun Ch'üan's men to another power in the north, like Kung-sun Yüan a possible ally and a source for horses. The story is told in the annals of Wu:

> When Chang Mi, Hsü Yen and the rest came to Hsiang-p'ing with 400 or more officials in their train, Kung-sun Yüan plotted against them. So first of all he scattered their men amongst the various districts of Liao-tung, and stationed the assistant envoys Ch'in Tan 秦旦, Chang Ch'ün 張羣, Tu Te 杜德, and Huang Chiang 黃疆, with sixty of the subordinate officials and soldiers, in Hsüan-t'u commandery, some 200 *li* to the north of Liao-tung. Wang Ts'an 王贊, the local governor, controlled 200 households, in all about 300 or 400 people. Ch'in Tan and his men were all quartered in the houses of local people upon whom they were also dependent for their food and drink.
>
> After forty days or more had gone by, Ch'in Tan held a conference with Huang Chiang and the others, at

which he said, "We have been sent a great distance with a mandate which we have now dishonoured, and find ourselves abandoned here! Aren't we as good as dead men? Now as far as I can see this commandery is very weak. If one morning we were to join forces and set fire to the stockade and outbuildings, killing the senior officials to avenge the insult to our state, even if we were killed, we would have no regrets. Wouldn't this be better than clinging to a wretched existence as permanent prisoners?"

[Huang] Chiang and the rest agreed; and so they made a secret agreement to rise up during the night of the nineteenth day of the eighth month (9 October).[53] But at noon on that day, Chang Sung 張松, a local man, informed against them, and [Wang] Ts'an thereupon got his troops together and shut the city gates. But [Ch'in] Tan, [Chang] Ch'ün, [Tu] Te and [Huang] Chiang all scaled the walls and escaped, although [Chang] Ch'ün was then suffering from an abcess on his knee. As he could not keep up with his companions, [Tu] Te stayed by his side to support him, and like this they went on together for 600 or 700 *li*, over steep mountains and valleys, But [Chang] Ch'ün's disability grew worse until he could go no further, and lay down in the grass while the others stood around him and wept.

[Chang] Ch'ün said, "Unfortunately I am seriously hurt, and death is at hand. You gentlemen had better hasten on ahead in the hope of reaching some inhabited place. If we waste time staying here to guard each other we shall all perish in this desolate wilderness. What would be the use of that?"

[Tu] Te said, "Wandering in a region 10,000 *li* away from our homeland, we share life and death. I cannot bear to leave you behind."

He then urged [Ch'in] Tan and [Huang] Chiang to go on ahead, while he himself remained behind to take care of [Chang] Ch'ün, gathering fruit and vegetables to feed him.

A few days after parting [from their companions], [Ch'in] Tan and [Huang] Chiang were brought before King [Wi-]gung [位]宮 of Koguryŏ, and took the opportunity of proclaiming a rescript [from the sovereign of Wu] to [Wi-]gung and his

> Keepers of Records.[54] The rescript stated that there had been a present [for the king] but that this had been seized by the people of Liao-tung. [Wi-]gung and his men were highly delighted, and immediately accepted the commands given in the rescript, sending a man back with [Ch'in] Tan to fetch [Chang] Ch'un and [Tu] Te. In the same year, [Wi-]gung sent twenty-five of his *cho-ǔi* to escort [Ch'in] Tan and the rest back to Wu, together with a tribute of 1,000 sable skins and 10 sets of falcon skins.[55]

This lengthy quotation by P'ei Sung-chih from the lost official history of the state of Wu - *Wu-shu* - is particularly valuable for the picture it preserves of conditions on the Chinese north-eastern frontier under Kung-sun Yüan. Allowance must of course be made for exaggeration on the part of the Wu envoys. The distance between the capital of Hsüan-t'u commandery and the lands controlled by the king of Koguryŏ is unlikely to have been nearly as much as the estimate given here, although it may well have appeared much more to four exhausted and desperate men, more especially when retold for the benefit of the ruler of Wu, and indeed the *San-kuo chih* itself gives the distance between Kao-kou-li (*i.e.* Hwando, the capital) and Liao-tung as a round 1,000 *li*.[56] On the other hand, the puny numbers of settlers in the Hsüan-t'u garrison town, although possibly somewhat underestimated, is unlikely to be far from the truth, since it would never have occurred to Ch'in Tan to recommend such a desperate scheme as his attempted *coup* in a city which was well armed and populous. The whole episode, with its background of desolate and uninhabited countryside suggests a sharp decline in the population of the northeastern borders of China which is in keeping with what is known to have been happening in other parts of the northern frontier during the Later Han period itself.[57]

The picture of a much reduced population in and around the frontier outposts of Liao-tung fits in with Kung-sun Yüan's intention given in his memorial to the Wei court quoted earlier, of settling the captured Wu troops as a border garrison,[58] although the experience of Ch'in Tan and his friends was to prove that even under such conditions the unwilling border guards might still come to terms with Kung-sun Yüan's enemies. If the population had declined so noticeably in the border regions, whereas it does not appear to have done so in Hsiang-p'ing,[59] the reason should be sought out in new and unfavourable conditions which affected only the borders, and this almost certainly means renewed hostility from the peoples across the frontier, in particular from Koguryŏ. As already noticed "from the time of King Paekko" the people of Koguryŏ are said to have "raided Liao-tung upon several occasions,"[60] and even after Kung-sun K'ang's massive punitive expedition, they evidently gradually regained the power to strike back at the Chinese settlements.[61] The weak administration of Kung-sun Kung must have favoured their recovery, and in his memorial already quoted concerning the policy to be adopted towards Kung-sun Yüan after 233, Hsia-hou Hsien states, "Moreover Koguryŏ and the Yemaek 濊貊 are at enmity with [Kung-sun] Yüan and both raid and plunder [his territories]. Now on the one hand he has lost the support of Wu, and on the other he faces the problem of barbarian raids."[62] The evidence of the story of Ch'in Tan and his companions that the ruler of Koguryŏ was happy to assist men who were the enemies of Kung-sun Yüan also confirms Hsia-hou Hsien's statement, and it is thus scarcely surprising that Sun Ch'üan of Wu attempted to redeem what he had lost in Liao-tung by an alliance with Koguryŏ, encouraged by the friendly reception which his officers had experienced at the court of Wi-gung in the autumn of 233.

But the Wei court, having emerged victorious from the diplomatic contest over Liao-tung were not prepared to see Wu regain influence in

this area by using Koguryŏ as a pawn to coerce Kung-sun Yüan.[63] Moreover Wang Hsiung, the Inspector of Yu Circuit, who had now been in office for several years, had been able to put his talent for intrigue to good effect by forming a number of useful connections amongst the northern tribes.[64] He now found a way to send secret instructions to King Wi-gung urging him to take the opportunity of gaining favour with the Wei Court by arresting the southern ambassadors. What followed is described later in the *Wu-shu* extract already partly translated:

> After a year had passed [*i.e.* in 234, Sun Ch'üan] sent the envoy Hsieh Hung 謝宏 and the Palace Writer (*chung-shu* 中書) Ch'en Hsün 陳恂 to invest [Wi-]gung as *shan-yü* 單于[65] and to confer robes and other valuables upon him. Having reached the An-p'ing 安平 estuary [*i.e.* the mouth of the Yalü] Ch'en Hsü and his companion sent Colonel Ch'en Feng 陳奉 on ahead to see [Wi-]gung. But the Inspector of Yu Circuit had suggested to the latter that he might earn merit [in the eyes of the Wei court] at the expense of the envoys from Wu. [Ch'en] Feng got wind of this, and came back [to An-p'ing]. Meanwhile [Wi-]gung sent his Keepers of Records Ch'aekcha 笀咨 and Taego 帶固 to An-p'ing,[66] but when they met [Hsieh] Hung, he seized and bound more than thirty [of their escort], and took them as hostages. Then [Wi-]gung apologized, admitting his fault, and offered [the envoys] several hundred horses. Only then did [Hsieh] Hung despatch Ch'aekcha and Taego to take the rescript and accompanying presents to the king. Since his ship was small, [Hsieh] Hung only brought back eighty of the horses [to Wu].[67]

This incident of relations between Wu and Koguryŏ throws a number of interesting sidelights on interstate relations in the Far East at this period. First, it again shows the emphasis and importance which the southern state attached to securing northern horses, a feature of its relations with Liao-tung earlier. Secondly, it

illustrates further the growth of Wei influence. Once Wei officials had established friendly contacts with Koguryŏ, the traditional enemy of the Chinese colonists in Liao-tung, then the refractory Kung-sun régime was presented with the threat of attack from two sides at once. Finally, the fact that the Wu envoys were able to anchor at the mouth of the Yalŭ and remain there for some time, while the King of Koguryŏ sent men to intercept them, apparently discounting the possibility of any intervention by Kung-sun Yüan, suggests that this area had passed out of the control of the ruler of Liao-tung. Hsi-an-p'ing prefecture lay close to a settlement of a separate branch of the Koguryŏ people, the so-called "Small River Maek," and it had also formed the object of raiding expeditions from Koguryŏ in the mid-second century A.D.[68] Koguryŏ troops again plundered Hsi-an-p'ing a few years after the Wei conquest of Liao-tung, provoking massive reprisals by the Chinese which came near to destroying the Koguryŏ state. Taken in conjunction with the account of depopulation on the north-eastern frontier in the earlier *Wu-shu* passage, this sequence of events suggests that during the latter years of Kung-sun rule, the governors of Liao-tung were no longer able to control effectively even the outlying prefectures of Liao-tung commandery itself, and such non-Chinese inhabitants as the "Small River Maek" may well have found it more expedient to recognize the overlordship of the king of Koguryŏ. Moreover, if the Yalŭ estuary, between Liao-tung and Korea, was no longer controlled by Kung-sun Yüan at this period, this in turn throws grave doubts upon the "Duke of Lo-lang's" ability to administer either Lo-lang or Tai-fang, the Korean commanderies recovered by his father. In this connection it may be worth noting that when Liao-tung finally fell to the Wei, in 238, these Korean colonies were only taken over by a separate military expedition.[69]

In the event, the Wu attempt to take Koguryŏ as a dependable ally in the north in place of Liao-tung ended in disaster. The Annals of

Wei in the *San-kuo chih* note that, in the seventh month (August-September) of 236, "King [Wi-]gung of Koguryŏ executed Hu Wei 胡衛, the envoy of Sun Ch'üan, and sent his head and those of his companions to [the Inspector of] Yu Circuit."[70] The Inspector of Yu Circuit in this case was probably Kuan-ch'iu Chien whose biography in the *San-kuo chih* states that he obtained the post "during the Ch'ing-lung period (233-236) when the Emperor was planning to suppress Liao-tung."[71] Like Kung-sun Yüan earlier, King Wi-gung probably realised that Sun Ch'üan was too remote to do anything for his potential allies in the north-east except occasionally offer them costly presents. His hostility was not to be feared, while his friendship, necessarily implying the hostility of the much larger and nearer power of Wei, was more of a liability than an asset. So for the moment, both Liao-tung and Koguryŏ were aligned with Wei against Wu.

But whereas the opposition of Koguryŏ and Liao-tung to the ruler of Wu was largely accidental, and brought about by rather exceptional circumstances, the hostility between Koguryŏ and Liao-tung, and between Liao-tung and Wei, was the natural enmity between close neighbours which, in the case of Liao-tung, was exacerbated by the actions of Kung-sun Yüan. The Wei court was unlikely to forget or forgive his brief flirtation with the southern warlord, while his suspicious reception of the Wei envoys in 234 when he greeted the ambassadors of the emperor at the head of his own men-at-arms seemed to demonstrate his undependability. According to his biography, Kung-sun Yüan "frequently used abusive language to visitors from Wei [who stayed in his realm]."[72] Once K'o-pi-neng's Hsien-pi confederacy had collapsed upon the latter's assassination in 235, conditions in the north became favourable for a major effort on the part of the Wei court to reduce Liao-tung, and this was launched in 237. Initially unsuccessful, the attempt

was renewed in the following year under another general, and this time the ruler of Koguryŏ sent several thousand troops to assist the imperial forces, under the command of *taega* and Keepers of Records.[73] The second campaign succeeded in destroying Kung-sun Yüan and bringing to an end his semi-independent warlordship, but this proved of doubtful benefit to the ruler of Koguryŏ, who soon discovered that he had merely helped to replace a weak enemy by a very much stronger one, so that when Koguryŏ recommenced its raids upon the Chinese settlements of Liao-tung and Hsüan-t'u, it provoked the massive retaliation of the Chinese campaigns of 244-245.

The Fall of the Kung-sun House

According to the biography of Kuan-ch'iu Chien and the Annals of Wei, the plan for the invasion of Liao-tung in 237 originated with the Wei court.[74] Elsewhere in the *San-kuo chih* it appears as a suggestion made in a memorial by Kuan-ch'iu Chien: "Since Your Majesty's accession to the throne, there has been nothing worth writing down. Wu and Shu, relying on their natural strongholds, cannot easily be subdued. Perhaps we may take the soldiers useless against them to conquer Liao-tung."[75] Whoever originated the plan for the attack on Liao-tung, it was not long before Kuan-ch'iu Chien had levied the troops of Yu Circuit, as well as Hsien-pi and Wu-huan auxiliaries, and marched towards the Liao river. Like his predecessor Wang Hsiung, Kuan-ch'iu Chien combined the post of Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan with that of Inspector of Yu Circuit, and for the purposes of this campaign he had also been created General Who Crosses the Liao (*tu-Liao chiang-chün* 渡遼將軍). The Hsien-pi who joined his army were probably those led by Mo-hu-pa 莫護跋, ancestor of the Mu-jung 慕容 clan which was to play a leading part in the politics of the north-east from the closing decades of the third century until early in the fifth.[76] At this time

Mo-hu-pa's tribes were settled on the Liao-hsi frontier. There is no indication that Koguryŏ or its ruler sent any assistance to the imperial cause in Kuan-ch'iu Chien's campaign.

Having reached the Liao, Kuan-ch'iu Chien despatched a messenger to Kung-sun Yüan bearing a sealed decree from the emperor, ordering him to lay down his office and return to the Wei court. Kung-sun Yüan's reply was to mobilize his forces and advance against Kuan-ch'iu Chien. What became of the unfortunate messenger is not stated, but somehow the Wei general received news of the ruler of Liao-tung's intentions, and himself crossed the Liao to meet his enemy on the latter's home territory. He seems to have clashed with Kung-sun Yüan at Liao-sui 遼隧, on the eastern bank of the Liao and somewhere near the modern city of Hai-ch'eng 海城.[77] The result of the battle was a defeat for Kuan-ch'iu Chien, and the latter's position was further jeopardized by the summer monsoon which now came on, bringing ten days of uninterrupted rain, and consequent heavy flooding of the Liao river. With a victorious enemy in front of him and a flooding river behind, Kuan-ch'iu Chien's position was clearly no longer tenable, and he recrossed the Liao back into Wei territory, an imperial edict ordering him to withdraw as far as Yu-pei-p'ing 右北平 to the east of the Luan 灤 river in modern Hopeh.[78] He was accompanied by more than 5,000 Wu-huan tribesmen who had followed their chieftains to Liao-tung in 207, and had from then on presumably led an uneasy existence as *foederati* of the successive rulers of Liao-tung. Under their chieftains K'ou-lou-tun 寇婁敦 and Hu-liu 護留 they now surrendered to the imperial forces, and sent an envoy to present tribute at court, some twenty or more of their leading men receiving honorary titles in recompense.[79]

As in 232, when its earlier attempt to solve the Liao-tung question by military force had failed, the court now proceeded to issue an amnesty, but this time it was specifically directed to "the people of Liao-tung who had been unable to surrender because they were being coerced by Kung-sun Yüan."[80] There was indeed little more that the government could do for the present, since floods had been widespread throughout the north, with resultant crop failures, which put further operations in the area out of the question until the new year.[81]

Kung-sun Yüan retaliated with a series of contradictory measures which bear the hallmarks of panic. In reply to the government's amnesty order to the people of Liao-tung, he had his officials - "the Chief Clerk to the Commander-in-Chief (*ta ssu-ma chang-shih* 大司馬長史) Kuo Hsin 郭昕, the Adviser to the Army (*ts'an-chün* 參軍) Liu P'u 柳甫, and 789 other men"[82] - memorialize the Wei Court to urge it to grant him a pardon. The memorial is lengthy and elaborate, citing parallels with Han history and extolling the benevolence and loyalty of Kung-sun Yüan and his ancestors, for whom the petitioners state that they are ready to live and die. But Kung-sun Yüan must have doubted from the beginning whether such an appeal could now be effective. Having inflicted a disgrace on the imperial armies, he had now gone too far to turn back, and with this in mind he assumed the title King of Yen 燕, and proclaimed his own reign-period Shao-Han 紹漢 "Succession to Han" which implied the illegality of the Wei court.[83] He set up the various court appointments appropriate to an independent ruler, and despatched an envoy to one of the Hsien-pi chieftains to appoint him *shan-yü*, adding an urgent invitation that the Hsien-pi should plunder the northern borders of Wei. But K'o-pi-neng had now been dead for two years, and none of the other chieftains had sufficient prestige to command a large-scale attack upon the Chinese border, being preoccupied with their own internal disputes.

By now the Wei Emperor had summoned his leading military commander Ssu-ma I. Ssu-ma I had been in charge of the defence of the western frontier against Chu-ko Liang, the resourceful general and chancellor of the State of Shu-Han. But Chu-ko Liang had died in 234, and almost immediately there had followed a number of disputes amongst the Shu-Han commanders, with the result that the threat from this western state became negligible, and the emperor felt free to summon Ssu-ma I to take charge of the campaign against Kung-sun Yüan. The Grand Commandant reached the Wei court in January 238, and after a brief interview with the emperor, marched off towards Liao-tung with an army of 40,000 men.[84] He reached the banks of the Liao in the following June.

Kung-sun Yüan had heard of the further preparations which were being made against him, and had hurriedly sent an envoy to Sun Ch'üan in Wu to "apologize" for his action in 233 and to beg help of a southern army against Ssu-ma I. Not unnaturally, the first reaction of the ruler of Wu was to order the execution of this messenger in retaliation for the destruction of his embassy six years earlier, but Sun Ch'üan was persuaded by one Yang Tao to make a show of complying with Kung-sun Yüan's request for assistance, so that whichever side were defeated it might be possible to gain something from the loser.[85]

Meanwhile, following his strategy of the previous year, Kung-sun Yüan had despatched two generals, Pei Yen 卑衍 and Yang Tso 楊祚, with the greater part of his forces, to wait at Liao-sui and dispute the crossing with Ssu-ma I. But Ssu-ma I had no intention of repeating the mistakes of Kuan-ch'iu Chien. His general Hu Tsun 胡遵 was sent to cross the river and break through Pei Yen's line towards the south-east. While the Liao-tung forces were hastily

reforming in that direction, Ssu-ma I himself crossed the Liao further north and hastened directly towards Kung-sun Yüan's capital at Hsiang-p'ing. When he reached Shou-shan 首山, a mountain to the west of the city, Pei Yen made another last-minute bid to intercept his march on the orders of Kung-sun Yüan, who had instructed him to fight to the death. However, Ssu-ma I's men secured an even more outstanding victory than before, and went on to lay siege to Hsiang-p'ing.[86]

It was now July, and the monsoon which had washed out Kuan-ch'iu Chien's campaign in the previous year returned with days of continuously heavy rain and widespread flooding. But Ssu-ma I, realising that his expedition had reached a crucial phase, determined to persevere in the siege, and executed one of his officers who dared to speak of changing camp.[87] His encirclement of Hsiang-p'ing was by no means complete, however; thanks to the flooded Liao river, supply ships were able to sail up to the walls and bring provisions into the beleaguered city from the Liao estuary, and Kung-sun Yüan's men were also able to forage and pasture their flocks outside the city walls.[88] It was perhaps at this stage that Ssu-ma I received the help of forces sent by a long-standing enemy of Kung-sun Yüan, King Wi-gung of Koguryŏ.[89] Although there is no reference made to the fact in the *San-kuo chih*, it is also known that Mo-hu-pa and his Hsien-pi served in the imperial forces at this time. Doubtless with the battle of Mount Po-lang in mind, the northern tribes had no wish to find themselves once again fighting for a lost cause, as thirty years earlier.[90]

When the rain finally stopped and the floods began to drain away, Ssu-ma I was able to complete the encirclement of Hsiang-p'ing and press the siege in earnest, constructing artificial mounds from which both catapults and men with crossbows mounted on movable wooden towers could shoot down into the city and harass the besieged. The sudden



Ssu-ma I's Liao-tung Campaign

tightening of the siege is also said to have produced considerable shortages inside Hsiang-p'ing, where there had apparently been no real attempt to economize supplies owing to the ease with which it had been possible earlier to bring these in from outside. With the outbreak of famine and cannibalism inside Hsiang-p'ing, the morale of the defenders began to collapse. General Yang Tso and various other officers surrendered to Ssu-ma I.[91] Then on the evening of 3 September a shooting star was seen streaking across the sky, a traditional omen of death and destruction. "Within the city the people were panic-stricken",[92] and Kung-sun Yüan, deciding that the end had come, sent his State Chancellor (*hsiang-kuo* 相國) Wang Chien 王建, and the Imperial Clerk Grandee (*yü-shih ta-fu* 御史大夫) Liu Fu 柳甫[93] to ask that the siege be raised, in which case he promised to present himself bound and suppliant at Ssu-ma I's camp. But Kung-sun Yüan's double-dealing diplomacy, veering between Wei and Wu, had earned him an unenviable reputation for treachery. Ssu-ma I would have nothing to do with his proposal, and had the two senior officials who had brought it put to death. He sent a message to Kung-sun Yüan informing him of what had occurred, and pointing out that in ancient times, even in the case of two rulers of equal rank, it had been the custom for the defeated one to surrender unconditionally to the victor: "These two men were dotards who must have failed to convey your intentions; I have already put them to death on your behalf. If you still have anything to say, then send a younger man of intelligence and precision."[94] In desperation, Kung-sun Yüan sent his "Palace Attendant" (*shih-chung* 侍中) Wei Yen 衛演 to request that he be allowed to send a hostage to the Wei court as his uncle had done many years before. Presumably he had in mind his son Kung-sun Hsiu 公孫修 or some other close relative. In any case, having

encouraged him to send another message, Ssu-ma I now contemptuously dismissed it, and informed Kung-sun Yüan that nothing was left except to fight to the death. The negotiations had only served to prolong the siege and place a further strain upon the supplies within the city. The weakened defenders were now at the limit of their resources, and on 29 September Hsiang-p'ing was stormed by the imperial troops.

Kung-sun Yüan and Kung-sun Hsiu put themselves at the head of a forlorn hope consisting of a few hundred horsemen, and managed to break through the closing ranks of the besiegers and escape towards the south-east, but they were followed to the Liang river and there they were cut down and killed, Kung-sun Yüan's head being subsequently sent to Loyang for public exposure.[95]

Ssu-ma I now proceeded to eliminate all opposition in Liao-tung by a systematic purge. He tracked down all who had held office, however junior, under Kung-sun Yüan's rebel Yen regime, and put them to death. This massacre accounted for the lives of over 1,000 people according to the *San-kuo chih*, over 2,000 according to the *Chin-shu*.[96] The latter source also states that Ssu-ma I "set up two standards in the city," at which he assembled "old and new rebels," *i.e.* presumably young and old. Men of fifteen years and over whose sole crime was that they had served in the forces of Kung-sun Yüan were put to death, to the number of over 7,000, and their bodies were heaped up to form a great mound.[97] Although these figures do not pretend to be exact, and could be taken as exaggerations, it should also be remembered that they derive from a source generally sympathetic to Ssu-ma I, so that it is just as possible that the loss of life following the fall of Hsiang-p'ing may have been even heavier. After this blood letting, Ssu-ma I graciously pardoned the survivors,

and ordered that those families who wished to return from Liao-tung to central China should be allowed to do so.[98] This policy, combined with the favours shown to non-Chinese tribes - Mo-hu-pa was appointed *Shuai-i wang* 率義王 and allowed to settle with his people to the north of Chi-ch'eng 棘城 in northern Liao-tung[99] - was disastrous in its long-range effects. It accelerated the depopulation of Chinese settlements in the north-east which had already become apparent under the rule of Kung-sun Yüan; moreover this development was given a further impetus by the Wei court in the years immediately following, when large numbers of the Liao-tung population were deported to central China. This followed on a descent upon southern Liao-tung by a Wu naval force commanded by general Sun I 孫怡 in April-May, 239, less than a year after the conquest.[100] The Wei generals stationed in Liao-tung, Chang Chih 張治 and Kao Lü 高慮 were defeated by the southerners, who returned to Wu with numbers of the Chinese colonists of Liao-tung on their vessels. Rather than attempting to fortify Liao-tung against any possible repetition of this incident, the government decided to evacuate the population from the exposed areas, and less than two months later (June-July, 239) the inhabitants of the district to the east of T'a Ferry were deported to the borders of Ch'i 齊 commandery in Shantung, where a new prefectural district - Hsin-t'a hsien 新昌縣 - was created to administer them.[101] In the following year, the inhabitants of two other coastal districts in Liao-tung - Wen 汶 and Pei-feng 北豐 - were also deported to Ch'i, presumably for the same reason.[102] Thus Chinese settlers were being moved away from Liao-tung at the very moment when non-sinicized tribes were being encouraged to occupy adjacent uninhabited areas. By the beginning of the Western Chin period, the registered population of Liao-tung had fallen from 64,158 households in the middle of the second century, to 5,400 households, while the number of prefectures had fallen

from eleven to eight.[103] Even after allowance is made for the transference of one prefecture from Liao-tung to Hsüan-t'u, and for possible corruption in the *Hou-Han shu* population figure, there still seems a clear indication of a decline both in real population and in administration. For this state of affairs the measures adopted by Ssu-ma I and the Wei government in the years 238-241 must be held at least partially responsible, pointing the way directly to the alienation of Liao-tung from Chinese rule which took place after 300 and lasted for several centuries, when the area was held first by the Mu-jung Hsien-pi, and later by Koguryŏ.

It is not clear how far these short-sighted policies were also followed in the Korean commanderies. While Ssu-ma I was besieging Hsiang-p'ing, a separate expedition had been sent out under a certain Liu Hsin 劉昕 and Hsien-yü Ssu 鮮于嗣, which crossed the Yellow Sea and occupied the former Kung-sun possessions in the Korean peninsula.[104] Presumably Liu Hsin and his companions used the ships which had been constructed in northern China in response to the imperial decree of 237 which has already been noticed.[105] Interestingly enough, the Wei court seems to have taken over without hesitation the new administrative division of the Chinese colonies in Korea which had been created by Kung-sun K'ang, and Liu Hsin was appointed governor of Tai-fang, while Hsien-yü Ssu was made governor of Lo-lang. Once in Korea the new governors distributed the seals and insignia of the new Wei regime to the various petty chieftains of the Han tribes, who came in crowds to make their submission.[106] For these chieftains the restoration of contact with an imperial court after an interruption of more than half a century seemed to suggest the approach of a new era of prosperity. They were soon disabused. The Chinese colonial administration in Korea could be exacting as well as

beneficent towards the surrounding inhabitants, and when an inept junior official - a certain Wu Lin 吳林 - introduced a division of responsibility for the Han tribes between Lo-lang and Tai-fang, a major rebellion took place which was only put down in 246, and which cost the life of Kung Tsun 弓遵, the then governor of Tai-fang.[107] However, the end result of the rebellion was that Chinese control over the peninsular colonies was re-established on a much firmer footing, and during the Western Chin period towards the end of the century the Chinese commanderies in Korea seem to have experienced a kind of "Indian summer," judging from the numerous embassies from the Han tribes recorded in the *Chin-shu*, and the great number of inscribed and dated bricks belonging to the Western Chin period which have been unearthed by Japanese archaeologists.[108] Yet here also, according to the *Chin-shu* population figures, there was a marked decline, either in the number of Chinese settlers, or in the ability of the government to register households for tax purposes, probably in both: the *Chin-shu* gives a combined total 8,600 households for the commanderies of Lo-lang and Tai-fang, less than a sixth of the *Hou-Han shu* figure for Lo-lang (which then included Tai-fang).[109]

Nevertheless, although the reconquest of Liao-tung by Ssu-ma I and the associated reconquest of Lo-lang and Tai-fang by Liu Hsin and Hsien-yü Ssu did nothing to halt the decline of Chinese settlement in the north-east, and even accelerated the process, at the time it still seemed to be the first step in the recovery of Chinese influence in the further east. Within a few years, Kuan-ch'iu Chien's forces had virtually eliminated the hostile kingdom of Koguryŏ, and his generals had re-established friendly contacts with Puyŏ, while in the Korean commanderies the Han revolt had been put down and Chinese control over both the Han and the Yemaek reaffirmed. Moreover, contact had been established, probably as early as 239, with the Wa tribes of

Japan, and several embassies from "Queen Pimiku" 卑彌呼 (or Himiko?) reached the Wei court during the years 239-247.[110] All these possibilities of contact with the peoples of the further east had been created by the removal of the Kung-sun regime which had "prevented contact between the Eastern Barbarians and China."[111]

Conclusion

The half century of Kung-sun rule in Liao-tung is not a period rich in either cultural or military achievements; on the contrary it marked something of a hiatus in the spread of direct Chinese influence into the countries further east. It is nevertheless a period well worth studying closely as an example of the rise to power of a local "warlord" house, a type of regime which frequently characterizes Times of Troubles in later Chinese history. For the Kung-sun themselves it may be said the preservation of settled and orderly government in Liao-tung while the anarchy in central China was at its worst was due largely to the work of Kung-sun Tu and his son Kung-sun K'ang. Also, by encouraging settlement in Liao-tung and reorganizing the Korean commanderies, these rulers seem to have checked - although only temporarily - the gradual decline of Chinese colonization in the north-east which had already become apparent in the Later Han period. Unfortunately their successors were men of lesser calibre, who were also faced with more complex problems. The weakness of the Kung-sun house under Kung-sun Kung reached such a point that it almost appeared that Liao-tung and the eastern commanderies would be peaceably absorbed by the Wei dynasty. But unluckily for the inhabitants of Liao-tung, Kung-sun Kung was replaced by his nephew Kung-sun Yüan, who made a vain bid to preserve the independence of Liao-tung by playing at inter-state diplomacy, while at the same time he proved himself

incapable of preventing the gradual depopulation of much of the land his father and grandfather had controlled. While the conquest by Ssu-ma I removed the burden of supporting yet another "imperial" court from the taxpayers of Liao-tung, it did nothing to relieve this decline of the Chinese settlements, and indeed only accelerated it. Under these circumstances the Wei "reconquest of the east" could only be a brief brilliant episode without sequel.

ABBREVIATIONS

References in the notes follow the conventions adopted in my earlier contribution on this subject in *PFEH* 5 (March 1972).59-107.

SKCCC : Lu Pi's *San-kuo chih chi-chieh* (Peking, 1957 edition).

CS : *Chin-shu (Po-na* edition).

TCTC : Ssu-ma Kuang's *Tzu-chih-t'ung-chien* with notes of Hu San-hsing (Peking, 1956 edition).

HHS : *Hou-Han shu (Po-na* edition).

NOTES

1 See *SKCCC* 2.45b. The third month of the second year of the Huang-ch'u reign ran from 10 April to 9 May 221.

2 *SKCCC* 8.32b. Italics added. For Tsung Hung's earlier visit to Liao-tung see "The Kung-sun Warlords of Liao-tung," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 5 (March 1972).107, note 88.

3 See *Chin-chi* 晉 記 by the fourth-century scholar Kan Pao 干寶, quoted *SKCCC* 3.52a.

4 One is tempted to suggest that the mission sent to Liao-tung after Kung-sun Kung's accession may in fact have been to confer the title "General of Chariots and Cavalry" on him in the spring of 221.

5 *SKCCC* 8.28a.

6 See *SKCCC* 8.38b, quoting the *Wei-lüeh*, and *SKCCC* 24.15a. Both passages make it clear that Kung-sun Huang was the older of the two brothers, and Kung-sun Yüan, who remained in Liao-tung, the younger. Bearing in mind that Kung-sun Yüan eventually (in 228) seized power from his uncle, it is also possible that Kung-sun Kung saw the despatch of his eldest nephew to the Wei court as a convenient was of getting rid of the "legitimate" claimant and thereby strengthening his own position. On the other hand, the

Wei court also had reasons for strengthening its hold over Liao-tung, if it was aware of the fact that the southern warlord Sun Chüan had already made unsuccessful efforts to draw Kung-sun K'ang into an alliance against Ts'ao Ts'ao - see Kung-sun Yüan's letter quoted in the *Wei-lüeh*, cited in P'ei Sung-chih's note at *SKCCC* 3.31b. Kung-sun Huang eventually warned the Wei court of the treacherous intentions of his brother, but was nevertheless obliged by Emperor Ming to commit suicide together with his family in 237-238. See *SKCCC* 8.38b.

7 *SKCCC* 8.28a.

8 This probably indicates a site near the coast, a supposition confirmed by the expedition of Mu-jung Huang 慕容皝 across the ice of the Pohai Gulf to a spot near P'ing-kuo in 336. See *CS* 109.2a; *TCTC* 95.3005. The location of the Han P'ing-kuo prefecture just south of the present town of Kai-p'ing 蓋平 in north-western Liao-tung is now generally accepted. See Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 and others, *Manshū rekishi chiri* 滿洲歷史地理 (Tokyo, 1913), I, 124-125; Lu Pi quoting *Ta-Ch'ing i t'ung-chih* in *SKCCC* 8.28a, etc.

9 *SKCCC* 8.28a. It is of course possible that the reason why Kung-sun Kung was made Marquis of P'ing-kuo was that Kung-sun Huang was deemed to have inherited the rank of Marquis of Hsiang-p'ing. On the other hand, there is no indication in the sources that Kung-sun K'ang's heir ever held this rank.

10 Gardiner, "Kung-Sun Warlords (1)," pp.68-69 and notes 19 and 26.

11 See *SKCCC* 11.33a, quoting from the otherwise unknown *Hsien-hsien hsing-chuang* 先賢行狀 which puts Wang Lieh's death in 218. His biography in *HHS lieh-chuan* 71.36a puts it in the following year, while agreeing with the *Hsien-hsien hsing-chuang* about his age at death. See also Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," p.91, note 88.

12 *SKCCC* 11.33a. According to the book *Fu-tzu* 傅子 quoted in P'ei Sung-chih's notes at this point, Kuan Ning foresaw trouble in Liao-tung when Kung-sun Huang was passed over in favour of his uncle, since he realised that Kung-sun Yüan was talented and ambitious enough to make a bid for power.

13 See Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," p.91 and *SKCCC* 11.30b.

14 *SKCCC* 30.29b.

15 See below, pp.162-163.

16 *CS* 1.7a.

17 See *SKCCC* 24 (Biography of Liu Yeh).15a, and *TCTC* 71.2250-2251, which differs slightly. In his remark about "alliances with barbarians" it is unlikely that Liu Yeh was thinking specifically of conditions at the end of Kung-sun Kung's rule; he presumably had earlier events in mind, such as Kung-sun K'ang's mission to Wu-huan in 204. See Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," pp.78-79.

18 *SKCCC* 8.28b.

19 In Lu Pi's *SKCCC*, the space amounted to Kung-sun Yüan (including P'ei Sung-chih's commentary and that of Lu Pi) amounts to ten-and-a-half double pages, as compared with three double pages for his three predecessors.

20 See *CS* 1.5b-7a.

21 For K'o-pi-neng's career, see *SKCCC* 30.15b-18a. According to the *Han-Chin ch'un-ch'iu* 漢晉春秋, a work written towards the end of the fourth century, Chu-ko Liang, the famous Chancellor and Regent of the south-western state of Shu, formed an alliance with K'o-pi-neng in 231. See *SKCCC* 35.24b. However, this seems somewhat unlikely, since, as pointed out by Lu Pi, it was in this same year that K'o-pi-neng made a temporary submission to the Wei court, at the very moment that Chu-ko Liang was campaigning against Wei in the west. See Annals of Emperor Ming, *SKCCC* 3.17b.

22 See *SKCCC* 8.31b.

23 *SKCCC* 47.34a gives their names as "the colonels Chang Kang and Kuan Tu" 校尉張剛管篤.

24 Proclaimed on 16 March 230, along with a promotion in rank for Ssu-ma I and one other elder statesman. Either at this time, or two years earlier when his position as governor of Liao-tung was formally confirmed, Kung-sun Yüan received the Marquisate of P'ing-kuo. Although neither the Annals of Wei nor Kung-sun Yüan's biography ever refer to him by this title, formerly

held by Kung-sun Kung, Sun Ch'üan's letter to Kung-sun Yüan in 233 addresses him as the "Holder of the Tally, General of Chariots and Cavalry, Governor of Liao-tung and Marquis of P'ing-lo under the late Wei dynasty" 故魏持節車騎將軍遼東太守平樂侯 (as Lu Pi has pointed out, "Marquis of P'ing-lo" 平樂侯 here is almost certainly a miswriting for 平郭侯 "Marquis of P'ing-kuo" - see *SKCCC* 47.38b-39a). Kung-sun Yüan is unlikely to have received further titles from the Wei court before 233 after his reception of the Wu envoys in 232; thus his appointment as Marquis of P'ing-kuo must date from before 232. "Late Wei dynasty" refers to Kung-sun Yüan's earlier service under Wei before his assumed recognition of the "true" Wu regime.

25 The Wu Annals, *SKCCC* 47.36b give the names of two envoys, General Chou Ho 周賀 and Colonel P'ei Ch'ien 裴潛. Chou Ho is also mentioned in the Wei Annals, 3.20a. On the other hand, Kung-sun Yüan's letter to Sun Ch'üan apparently written in 232 and presumably kept in the Wu archives, from which it found its way into the *Wu-shu* 吳書, the official history compiled at the Wu court, and thence into P'ei Sung-chih's notes at *SKCCC* 8. 28b-29a, refers to "Colonel P'ei" (evidently P'ei Ch'ien) and "Chief Commandant Ko" 葛都尉: "From first to last, when Colonel P'ei, Commandant Ko and the rest arrived, I received Your Sage Instructions, both extensive and thorough, and wrapped them with white silk and tied them up with white silk strings so that they might readily be brought before both the living and the dead" 前後裴校尉葛都尉等到奉被勅誡聖旨彌密重紈累素迭明備著. The identity of Chief Commandant Ko is a mystery. Several men of this surname are known from the *SKC* - see for example *SKCCC* 55.19a; 65.5b and 63.6b, note quoting *Chin-yang ch'iu* 晉陽秋 - and it is not clear whether Chief Commandant Ko is one of these or another. Nor is it clear from Kung-sun Yüan's words whether he went to Liao-tung in 229, in 232 or on another otherwise unrecorded mission.

26 As for example Yü Fan 虞翻, already in exile at this time, whose objections to the Liao-tung embassy of 232 are recorded in a note quoted from the *Wu-shu*, *SKCCC* 57.12a-b.

27 Wang Hsiung, whose family came from Lang-ya 琅邪, was the virtual founder of the important Wang house which produced so many statesmen and generals - such as Wang Jung 王戎, Wang Yen 王衍 and Wang Tao 王導 - in Chin times. Ch'en Shou, the author of the *SKC*, seems to have fallen foul of the Wang clan, since his references to Wang Hsiung are invariably hostile, and

although Wang Hsiung was clearly an important figure in his day, there is no biography of him in the *SKC*. According to Ch'en Shou, Wang Hsiung was an inveterate intriguer, who for several years occupied the post of governor of Cho 涿 commandery and in that position plotted against the then Inspector of Yu Circuit, Ts'ui Lin 崔林 (*SKCCC* 24.4b), whom he eventually succeeded. Wang Hsiung had probably become Inspector of Yu Circuit at the latest by 232, since he is described as such in a quotation from the *Chan-lüeh* 戰略 of Ssu-ma Piao 司馬彪 (a third-century work) at *SKCCC* 14.36a, and the biography of T'ien Yü, who was also ousted from his office of Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan by the intrigues of Wang Hsiung's clique, describes the latter as Inspector of Yu Circuit before T'ien Yü was transferred to the post of Governor of Ju-nan 汝南, *i.e.* before the operations against Kung-sun Yüan.

28 T'ien Yü had begun his career as a subordinate of the north-eastern warlord Kung-sun Tsan, and had subsequently been recruited by Ts'ao Ts'ao. Early in the reign of the Emperor Wen he was made Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan 護烏桓校尉, and filled that office with considerable success for nine years, until his upright administration brought him into collision with Wang Hsiung's clique, apparently trying to get Wang Hsiung the post of Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan in addition to his office as Inspector of Yu Circuit (*SKCCC* 26.10a). T'ien Yü was consequently transferred to the post of governor of Ju-nan, but was awarded the title of "General Who Destroys the Barbarians" (*t'ien-i chiang-chün* 殄夷將軍) for his services in the north. When the emperor was in some difficulties as to whom to appoint to conduct the campaign against Kung-sun Yüan, T'ien Yü was recommended to him, and placed in charge of the troops of Ch'ing 青 Circuit (*i.e.* Shantung), but he retained his rank as Governor of Ju-nan, a commandery in an entirely different circuit. His anomalous position eventually led to friction with the Inspector of Ch'ing Circuit, and was indeed a curious appointment, since it involved T'ien Yü in co-operation with Wang Hsiung, whose intrigues had been largely responsible for his recent transfer of office.

The *Chan-lüeh* quotation (*SKCCC* 14.36a-b) which is the principal source for this abortive campaign, describes T'ien Yü as Inspector of P'ing Circuit at the time, but in spite of the early date of the *Chan-lüeh*, this can hardly be correct,

since P'ing Circuit was an administrative division used only by the Kung-sun themselves - see Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," p.75 and discussion at *SKCCC* 14.36a - and T'ien Yü is nowhere else mentioned by this title.

29 *SKCCC* 8.29a 聽幽州刺使東萊太守誰誤之言 猥興州兵圍客臣郡……伏惟陛下德不再出……是以懷慚懷慕自納.
The Circuit Inspector of Yu is of course Wang Hsiung; the Governor of Tung-lai is unidentified. One might expect a mention of T'ien Yü here, since it was he who commanded operations against Kung-sun Yüan in Ch'ing Circuit (within which Tung-lai was situated) and his eventual attack on the warships returning from Liao-tung took place at Ch'eng-shan 成山, which fell under the jurisdiction of Tung-lai commandery. It would not have been impossible for the Wei court to have created T'ien Yü Governor of Tung-lai for the duration of operations against Kung-sun Yüan; on the other hand, *SKCCC* 26.10b specifically states that T'ien Yü was placed in charge of the expedition against Kung-sun Yüan, but retained his original office 本官, *i.e.* Governor of Ju-nan, as Ssu-ma Kuang interprets this passage (see *TCTC* 72.2277). It is hardly likely that he can have been Governor of Tung-lai as well, and thus the reference in Kung-sun Yüan's letter must either be a misunderstanding or refer to someone else.

30 There is no reference to the proposed expedition to Liao-tung in the Annals of Wei. The main source is the quotation from Ssu-ma Piao's *Chan-lüeh* already noticed, which is appended by P'ei Ch'ien to the biography of the Wei statesman Chiang Chi 蔣濟, who opposed the campaign, at *SKCCC* 14.36a-b, and which concludes: "[T'ien] Yü set out, but eventually returned without the expedition having been brought to completion" - nothing being said about the fate of Wang Hsiung's forces. T'ien Yü's Biography (*SKC* 26) also makes no mention of Wang Hsiung (whose involvement in the campaign is nevertheless confirmed by Kung-sun Yüan's letter), and speaks as if T'ien Yü were in sole command: "Taking into consideration the numerical strength of the enemy, and the fact that his forces would have to cross the sea [to attack them], the Emperor ordered T'ien Yü to disband his army" 帝以賊衆多又以渡海, 詔豫使罷軍 (*SKCCC* 26.10b).

31 Although he is, curiously enough, omitted from T'ien Yü's biography, his death at the hands of the latter is recorded in the Annals of Emperor Ming, *SKCCC* 3.20a. T'ien Yü's biography states that "At first his generals all laughed at him for waiting for

the rebels in empty places. But when the rebels were defeated, they were eager to enter the sea and catch the ships from the waves with hooks. Fearing that the enemy would become desperate and fight to the death, T'ien Yü did not permit this." Translation from Achilles Fang, *The Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms* (Cambridge, Mass.), II (1952),394.

This suggests considerable numbers of men and ships being stranded along with Chou Ho. T'ien Yü's biography states that he was once again denied credit for his victory owing to slanders spread by the jealous Inspector of Ch'ing Circuit - see above, note 28.

There is a minor discrepancy in the dating of this event between the Annals of Wei (*SKCCC* 3.20a) which place it in the ninth month of this year (October) and the Annals of Wu (*SKCCC* 47.36b) which date it a month earlier, putting the reception of the envoys at the Wu court in November. Presumably the Wu date will have been that reported at the Wu court by the returning mission and be the correct date for the wreck at Ch'eng-shan, while the Wei date represents the time at which the news of Ch'eng-shan was formally received at Emperor Ming's court.

32 See Kung-sun Yüan's memorial to the Wei Court at *SKCCC* 8.30b-31a. The biography of Yü Fan states that the Wu envoys of 232 "encountered a wind at sea, and many were drowned and lost." See *SKCCC* 57.126.

33 *SKCCC* 47.36b.

34 For the full text of this letter, see *SKCCC* 8.28b-29a.

35 *SKCCC* 47.38a-b.

36 *SKCCC* 47.38b names the leaders of this mission as the Grand Minister of Ceremonies (*t'ai-ch'ang* 太常), Chang Mi 張彌, the Bearer of the Golden Mace (*chih-chin-wu* 執金吾), Hsü Yen , and General Ho Ta 賀達, and speaks of some 10,000 people being sent in all. This number is certainly an exaggeration, although it appears from Kung-sun Yüan's memorial to the Wei court at *SKCCC* 8.30b-32a that this was the figure which the Wu ambassadors themselves claimed. The same source also names a Commander of the Gentlemen of the Household (*lang-chung chiang* 郎中將), Wan T'ai 萬泰, a general Yü Tzu 虞咨, and Colonel P'ei Ch'ien, the assistant envoy of 232 now making a second (and final) visit to Liao-tung. Another group of four junior envoys are named at

SKCCC 47.41a.

As is evident from *SKCCC* 47.38b, there was considerable opposition to the despatch of such an elaborate mission to Liao-tung by Sun Ch'üan's advisors, but the "Emperor of Wu" overruled the objections.

37 *SKCCC* 8.29a. The explanation of the edict in these words is apparently Yü Huan's, and although it forms part of P'ei Sung-chih's quotation from the *Wei-lüeh*, it does not come from the original edict.

38 *SKCCC* 8.30a.

39 The location of this important city, the administrative centre of Liao-tung throughout both Han dynasties and the Three Kingdoms Period, is not certainly established, although most commentators seem inclined to place it in the neighbourhood of the present town of Liao-yang 遼陽. See Shiratori Kurakichi and others, *Manshu rekishi chiri*, I,107-110; Wang Hsien-ch'ien 王先謙, *Han-shu pu-chu* 漢書補注 (Peking, 1956), p.2936; Wang Hsien-ch'ien and others, *Hou-Han shu chi-chieh* 後漢書集解 (Peking, 1959), pp.4110-4111; *SKCCC* 3.36a, etc.

40 See *SKCCC* 8.30b.

41 See *SKCCC* 47.41a.

42 *SKCCC* 8.31a.

43 Again not definitely identified, but presumably somewhere near the coast. According to a statement of Sun Ch'üan's minister Lu Mao 陸瑁 (*SKCCC* 57.35b), "T'a Island is still a long way off from the place where Kung-sun Yüan is" 沓渚去淵道里尚遠. So also the Wei courtier Chiang Chi, as quoted from the *Han-Chin ch'un-ch'iu*, *SKCCC* 14.38b-39a. Both passages mention T'a Island 沓渚, which is presumably close by the T'a Ferry 沓津 mentioned in Kung-sun Yüan's memorial. Cf. also *SKCCC* 4.5b.

44 See below, pp.158-161. Kung-sun Yüan describes his own behaviour as follows: "The mob of escort troops and accompanying officials, being all junior officers, corporals and such men of insignificant rank, I hadn't the heart to put to death, [knowing that] they had all been sent on a distant mission without their full consent. So when they presented themselves bound and begged [to surrender]

I received them all, and sent them to the border garrisons." See *SKCCC* 8.31a.

45 According to *SKCCC* 8.31a, the Acting Chief Clerk *(ling-chang shih* 令長史 Liu Yüan 柳遠 was entrusted with this dangerous piece of duplicity.

46 *SKCCC* 8.31a.

47 The Head Clerk of the Department of the West was concerned with the promotion and recommendation of officials both in the central administration and, at the end of the Later Han, in the administration of various warlords. See Rafe de Crespigny, *The Last of the Han (Centre of Oriental Studies Asian Monographs 9,* Canberra, 1969), pp.465-466, note 7.

48 Extracts from this document are quoted from the *Wei-lüeh* at *SKCCC* 8.30b-32a.

49 Translation based upon Achilles Fang's in *The Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms,* I, 405. The *Chiang-piao chuan,* a more-or-less contemporary history written by the Wu scholar Yü P'u 虞溥 about the middle of the third century, survived until T'ang times but has since been lost. See Rafe de Crespigny, *The Records of the Three Kingdoms (Australian National University Centre of Oriental Studies Occasional Paper 9,* Canberra, 1970), pp.51, 88. The present extract is quoted in P'ei Sung-chih's commentary at *SKCCC* 47.40b.

50 These memorials are preserved in the biographies of the officials concerned. See *SKCCC* 57.34b-36b (Biography of Lu Mao) and 58.10b-11a (Biography of his brother, Lu Hsün) and 53.16a-17b (Biography of Hsüeh Tsung). All three memorials are included in *TCTC* 89.2286-2288, and have been translated by Achilles Fang, pp.405-410.

51 The conferring of this title upon Kung-sun Yüan is recorded in the twelfth month of the year Ch'ing-lung 1 (18 January - 15 February 234) - see *SKCCC* 3.24b. Apparently the Wei envoys, Fu Jung and Nieh K'uei, set out at this time, and reached Liao-tung some time in early spring. Note that in spite of Hsia-hou Hsien's memorial at *SKCCC* 8.32b-33a (see Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," note 89, and above p.143) the veteran envoy Tsung Hung was not sent on this mission.

52 *SKCCC* 8.33a.

53 Here Ssu-ma Kuang's *chün-chung* 郡中 is probably more correct than the *pu-chung* 部中 which occurs in the present text of the *Wu-shu* 吳書 version. See Achilles Fang, p.426.

54 For this title *chu-pu* 注簿 and *cho-ŭi* 皁衣 , below, see Kim Ch'ŏljun 金哲埈, "Koguryŏ Silla ŭi kwan'gŭp chojik ŭi sŏngnip kwajŏng" 高句麗新羅의官階組織의成立過程 in *Yi Pyŏng-do paksa kwagap kinyŏm nonch'ong* 李丙燾博士華甲紀念論叢 (Seoul, 1956), for a study of this and other Koguryŏ official titles. Although the king's name is given in the *Wu-shu* as "Kung" 宮 , he is evidently the same king who is called 位宮 Wi-gung - Chinese, Wei-Kung - in *SKCCC* 30.29b-30a.

Fang points out (p.426) that the rescript proclaimed by the Wu envoys was evidently a forgery. It seems to have been a curiously clumsy ruse, since it would surely have been self-evident that the sovereign of Wu could not have issued any commands concerning a situation which had not arisen until his envoys arrived in Liao-tung, and one is driven to suspect some corruption or exaggeration in the text.

55 See *SKCCC* 47.41a-b, quoting from the lost *Wu-shu*. The whole passage is given in modified form at *TCTC* 89.2289-2290, and translated by Achilles Fang, pp.410-411 and 425-426.

56 *SKCCC* 30.25a.

57 Hsüan-t'u appears in the *Han-shu* (28A.9b) with 45,006 households and 221,845 individuals, an average of 4.9 per household. In the *Hsü Han-shu* (*chih* 23.19a) Hsüan-t'u figures with 1,594 households and yet a total of 43,163 individuals, figures which cannot be correct. One is tempted to suspect that in 戶一千五百九十四口四萬三千一百六十三 the second 四 is a dittography, but even this would leave the very high average of 7.6 individuals per household. The *Chin-shu* (14.12a) gives no figure for individuals, but puts the population at 3,200 households, at a time when there were no significant barbarian incursions. It may well be that during the difficult times at the end of the Later Han, when invasions or raids from Koguryŏ were common, the population dropped below even the 3,200 households mark, although the figures given in the *Wu-shu* passage are merely intended to indicate a general impression, and should not be taken too literally. As they stand, they represent an average of 1.5 to 2 individuals per

household, a rather low figure. In this respect the main point of the story seems to be that the Hsüan-t'u garrison, although still capable of defending the fortified settlement itself and perhaps even its immediate environs, was clearly not strong enough to extend Chinese influence into the surrounding countryside, or to encourage settlement outside its own walls. Cf. Lao Kan, "Population and Geography in the Two Han Dynasties," in E-tu Zen Sun and John de Francis, ed., *Chinese Social History* (Washington, 1956), p.97, and Y. Suematsu, *Gento-gun no kokōsū ni tsuite* 玄菟郡の戸口数について in *Tōyōshi ronsō* 東洋史論叢 (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 537-544.

58 See above p.155.

59 Once again no firm figures are available, but *Chin-shu* 1.7a states that in September 238, after a campaign lasting four months, Ssu-ma I conquered Liao-tung and that a population of 40,000 households or 300,000 individuals was thereby added to the Wei empire - of whom 9,000 males were promptly executed in Hsiang-p'ing by the victor. On the basis of these figures, the total population of Hsiang-p'ing at the end of Kung-sun Yüan's rule must have been at least something of the order of 20,000-30,000 people, although allowance must be made for large numbers coming into the capital from the surrounding countryside during the war.

60 See Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," p.70.

61 See above p.147.

62 *SKCCC* 8.32b. The Yemaek refers to the inhabitants of the eastern coastal strip of the Korean peninsula, a group of tribes who were racially akin to the Kao-kou-li and at this period appear to have been tributary to them. See "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," note 36, and Gardiner, "The Hou-Han-shu as a Source for the Early Expansion of Koguryo," *Monumenta Serica* XXVIII (1969).156-166, note 16. It seems likely that any depredations carried out by them would have been against Lo-lang and Tai-fang, the Korean holdings of the Kung-sun house. See below p.163.

63 Could Sun Ch'üan have had some rash scheme of using Koguryŏ as a base to attack Kung-sun Yüan? He is credited with this in *SKCCC* 3.45b.

64 Wang Hsiung concurrently held the office of Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan, see above note 27, and in 235 managed to get the hostile Hsien-pi leader K'o-pi-neng assassinated, and to engineer the division of his hordes amongst his three younger brothers - see *SKCCC* 30.18a. Although the Inspector of Yu Circuit is not named in the passage from the *Wu-shu* translated below, since Wang Hsiung was already in office in 232 - see p.151 above - and still in office in 235, it was evidently he who sent the instructions to the king of Koguryŏ, not Kuan-ch'iu Chien, as supposed by Fang - see Fang, p.427.

65 Although this title was regularly assumed by the supreme chieftain of the Hsiung-nu and other northern tribes such as the Wu-huan and the Hsien-pi, it was not used in Koguryŏ, and Sun Ch'üan's action reveals his ignorance of Koguryŏ custom.

66 According to Pan Ku's note to *HS* 28A.9b, Hsi-an-p'ing 西安平 is where the river formed by the combination of the Ma-tz'u 馬訾 and the Yen-nan 鹽難 enters the sea. Although there is some doubt about the separate identity of these rivers, almost all scholars are agreed that their combined stream refers to the lower Yalŭ. Thus 安平口 refers to the Yalŭ estuary, and the prefecture of Hsi-an-p'ing, one of the eighteen included in Liao-tung commandery in Han times, must have been so called because it lay somewhere to the west of the Yalŭ estuary, either in the area of the present town of An-tung 安東 (see Yi Pyŏng-do's map in *Hanguk-sa, Kodae-p'yŏn* 韓國史古代篇 (Seoul, 1959), facing p.252, also K. Shiratori and others, *Manshū rekishi chiri*, pp.125-126); or, more probably, further west at Ku-shan 孤山, where the Ta-yang ho 大洋河 flows south into the bay of Korea. This latter identification was first put forward by T. Ōhara 大原利武 in *Kandai gogun nisui kō* 漢代五郡二水考 (Kyōto, 1933), pp.40-42, and is supported by the statement in *SKCCC* 30.27b that "The Kingdom of Koguryŏ was set up along the Great River (*i.e.* the Yalŭ), and there [its people] dwell. But there is also a small river north of Hsi-an-p'ing prefecture which flows southwards to the sea, and a branch of the Koguryŏ people have established a state there, being known as 'The Small River Maek' 小水貊. They produce excellent bows, known as Maek bows." The mention of a small river flowing from the north of Hsi-an-p'ing southwards into the sea seems to preclude the possibility of this passage referring to tribes still settled in the old homeland of Koguryŏ, the Tung-chia or Hun-chiang, and Ōhara's identification seems worthy of serious consideration, in spite of


Liao
Estuary
Ta-yang-ho
?Hsi-an-
p'ing
?Hsi-an-
p'ing
An-p'ing
Estuary
Yalu
River
Hun
Chiang
Hwando
KOGURYŎ
LO-LANG
COMMANDERY
Ch'ong-ch'on
P'yŏng yang
0 30 60 90 Km 120
Geography S.G.S. A.N.U.

the more far-fetched statements that disfigure other parts of his work.

"The Small River Maek" should not be confused with the dissidents who left Koguryŏ at the time of Kung-sun K'ang's invasion, some of whom are stated to have settled, for a time at least, in the valley of the Piryu, *i.e.* Hun-chiang. The *SKC*, the source for both references, mentions the two quite separately and makes no attempt to connect them. Hsi-an-p'ing, as a lowland settlement within fairly easy reach - presumably by river-craft - from the Koguryŏ fortified settlements upstream, was several times the object of Koguryŏ raids, as for example when the prefect of Tai-fang was killed there escorting the wife and children of an unknown governor of Lo-lang either to or from China in the mid-second century A.D. (*SKCCC* 30.29a) or in 242, when King Wi-gung plundered Hsi-an-p'ing (*SKCCC* 30.30a). It seems possible that the real motive behind these clashes may have been competition for control over the "Small River Maek" between the kingdom of Koguryŏ and the local Chinese prefect at Hsi-an-p'ing.

67 *SKCCC* 47.41b-42a. The use of *chu-pu* 注簿 lead expeditions of a military or semi-military character - cf. *SKCCC* 30.29a and Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," p.69 and note 29 - suggests that this office, although evidently derived from a Chinese prototype, had a somewhat different function in Koguryŏ from its Chinese original.

68 See note 66 above and map, opposite.

69 See below, pp.174-175 and *SKCCC* 30.20b and 40a, also H. Ikeuchi, "A Study on Lo-lang and Tai-fang, Ancient Chinese Prefectures in the Korean Peninsula," *Mem. Toyo Bunko* 5 (1930).86-95.

70 *SKCCC* 3.39a. 高句麗王宮斬送孫權使胡衛等首,詣幽州.

71 *SKCCC* 28.9b. According to *SKCCC* 30.18a, Wang Hsiung was still both Inspector of Yu Circuit and Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan in 235, when he despatched an emissary to murder K'o-pi-neng. Kuan-ch'iu Chien, who also held both offices, must therefore have succeeded Wang Hsiung either late in 235 or the succeeding year.

72 *SKCCC* 8.33a.

73 *SKCCC* 30.30a. Cf. p.29a, and Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," note 29 for *taega*. The leaders in this expedition are not named.

74 The Biography, at *SKCCC* 28.9b, states that "During the Ch'ing-lung period (233-236) when the emperor was planning to suppress Liao-tung, he appointed Kuan-ch'iu Chien Inspector of Yu Circuit because of his reputation as a clever planner, and gave him the additional rank of General Who Crosses the Liao, the Holder of the Tally and Colonel Protector of the Wu-huan." The Annals seek to connect the appointment of Kuan-ch'iu Chien with Sun Ch'üan's embassies to Koguryŏ, stating, "Sun Ch'üan having sent envoys across the sea to establish relations with Koguryŏ in order to attack Liao-tung, Kuan-ch'iu Chien, the Inspector of Yu Circuit, was sent to camp on the southern borders of Liao-tung" (*SKCCC* 3.45b-46a).

75 *SKCCC* 22.26b, repeated in *TCTC* 90.2319. The translation in the text is taken from Achilles Fang, p.517.

76 As already noticed, the *SKC* confirms the presence of Hsien-pi auxiliaries in Kuan-ch'iu Chien's army. *CS* 108.1a, virtually the only source for the ancestors of the Mu-jung, states that Mo-hu-pa led his people into Liao-hsi "at the beginning of the Wei," and that he won merit in the campaign of Ssu-ma I against the Kung-sun in 238. He is not specifically stated to have fought in the earlier campaign. The Mu-jung clan would appear to have been one of the groups who joined T'an-shih-huai's confederacy in the middle of the second century A.D. See G. Schreiber, "The History of the Former Yen Dynasty," *Monumenta Serica* XIV (1949-1955).393.

77 Most historians seem to be in agreement about the situation of this prefecture. See *Manshū rekishi chiri*, pp.115-118, and *SKCCC* 8.33a-b, note. The various accounts of this campaign are not completely consistent, and that in Kuan-ch'iu Chien's biography - *SKCCC* 28.9b-10a - suggests that he set up his base at Liao-sui from the beginning, while the account in the annals of Emperor Ming - *SKCCC* 3.45b-46a does not mention the battle at all. It does, however, present the clearest outline of events, and thus has been mainly followed in the reconstruction presented here, being supplemented with the account in Kung-sun Yüan's biography at *SKCCC* 8.33a-b.

78 The imperial edict recalling Kuan-ch'iu Chien is mentioned only in the Annals version at *SKCCC* 3.46a.

79 See *SKCCC* 3.46a and, with somewhat more detail, *SKCCC* 28.9b-10a. Cf. also Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," note 66.

80 *SKCCC* 3.46a. The edict was proclaimed on 23 July and, if the order of events as given in the Annals of Emperor Ming can be trusted, it followed on the defeat of Kuan-ch'iu Chien by Kung-sun Yüan, which will have taken place in late June or early July.

81 *Ibid.* The situation in the north was so serious that imperial commissioners were sent out to see to the burial of those drowned by the floods and to distribute grain to the starving people. Somewhat earlier, however, the people of the four north-eastern circuits of Yu, Chi, Ch'ing and Yen had been ordered to prepare seaworthy vessels, presumably in preparation for a sea-borne attack upon Liao-tung or the Korean commanderies.

82 *SKCCC* 8.33b. In spite of its length, this memorial which runs from p.33b to p.36b, and is quoted by P'ei Sung-chih from the lost *Wei-shu* 魏書 , contains little that is significant for the history of the Kung-sun. Of Kung-sun Tu it states, "When he first took charge of the commandery, he received a poor and desolate [land], but revealed a majesty like that of the sun and moon, and established plans which showed his supernatural ability in war. He gathered together the scattered crowds of people....and shook the barbarians with the radiance of his majesty. His virtue extended over the flock of living beings, and it was thanks to him that the land of Liao-tung was spared devastation. Confucius said, 'If it had not been for Kuan Chung, we should be wearing our hair long and buttoning our coats on the left.' So, if it had not been for [Kung-sun] Tu, this commandery long since would have been nothing but a few desolate mounds, with its people captive in barbarian courts..." (*SKCCC* 8.34a). There is a great deal more in this vein.

83 Although Kung-sun Yüan did not proclaim himself emperor - presumably because he hoped for assistance from Sun Ch'üan, the self-styled "Emperor of Wu" - the title he chose for a reign-period shows a *de facto* claim to the imperial position, and may be compared with his grandfather's alleged worship of the Han founders. See Gardiner, "Kung-sun Warlords (1)," p.76.

84 It was at this interview that Ssu-ma I informed the emperor that the campaign would require 100 days for going, another 100 days for the attack, still another 100 days for coming back, and 60 days for rest. See *SKCCC* 3.52a, P'ei Sung-chih's note quoting Kan Pao's lost *Chin-chi*.

85 *SKCCC* 8.36b-37a, quoting the *Han-Chin ch'un-ch'iu*. Cf. p.173 below.

86 Here again there is some discrepancy between the account in *CS* 1.5b-7a and that in the biography of Kung-sun Yüan - *SKCCC* 8.37a-38b. The latter seems to suggest that it was Ssu-ma I himself who crossed the river and marched south-east, then altering his line of march to turn suddenly north-east. In spite of its earlier composition, this account seems rather less probable than the *CS* version which I have substantially followed here.

87 *CS* 1.6b, which gives the name of the officer executed as an example as Chang Ching 張靜.

88 For the convoys, see *SKCCC* 8.37b; the pasturing of animals outside the city walls is mentioned in *CS* 1.6b, which also states that "when the rain finally stopped, the encirclement was completed."

89 Mentioned only in the account of Koguryŏ, *SKCCC* 30.30a. See above, pp.164-165.

90 Mo-hu-pa's help is indicated only in the account of the Mu-jung ancestors, *CS* 108.1a.

91 *SKCCC* 8.37b. Yang Tso had evidently survived the battles outside Hsiang-p'ing; the text seems to connect his surrender with the deteriorating conditions in Hsiang-p'ing, suggesting that he had managed to re-enter the city.

92 *CS* 1.6b. The date of the shooting star's appearance occurs only in *SKCCC* 8.38a, but here it is stated to have fallen *south-east* of Hsiang-p'ing, whereas in the *CS* passage the shooting star comes from the *south-west* of Hsiang-p'ing, and falls to the *north-east*. Yet it is also stated to have fallen into the Liang 梁 river generally identified with the T'ai-tzu 太子 river, which on most identifications of Hsiang-p'ing would have flowed south-east from the city (see accompanying map, p.170). One can only suppose that the CS writer was somewhat hazy about the geography of Liao-tung, and found the Liang river, where Kung-sun Yüan was eventually killed, a peculiarly suitable site for such an omen.

SKCCC 8.38b lists various other supernatural occurrences which marked the closing stage of the siege, omens of Kung-sun Yüan's downfall. "A dog wearing a turban and red silk clothes got onto the roof [of Kung-sun Yüan's residence]; a little boy was steamed to death in the boiler during the cooking, and in the northern market of Hsiang-p'ing there was a piece of living flesh, several feet long and in circumference, with a head, eyes and a mouth, but no hands or feet, which kept shaking and moving. The diviners said, 'It has an imperfect form, and a body but no voice; this kingdom will perish.'" There is no way of telling whether these incidents are rumours which spread in the panic-stricken city, or the embellishments of a later historian who felt that such a signal event as the fall of Hsiang-p'ing must have been heralded by appropriate signs.

93 These titles are of course those which Kung-sun Yüan arrogated for his officials after he had himself usurped the royal title. The "Imperial Clerk Grandee" Liu Fu 柳甫 is probably the same man as the Adviser to the Army Liu P'u 柳普 who had signed the memorial to the Wei court late in the previous year.

94 *CS* 1.7a, taken over by *TCTC* 91.2336. Fang's translation, (p.574) fails to bring out the malice of Ssu-ma I's irony. He is playing with the condemned Kung-sun Yüan as a cat with a mouse, and after suggesting a further stage in the negotiations, contemptuously dismisses the final messenger as a waste of time.

95 *CS* 1.7a and *SKCCC* 8.38a. Both passages state that Kung-sun Yüan was killed at the place where the shooting star fell, although this only fits in with the direction of the meteorite's flight as given in the *SKC*. In either case the suggestion of a deliberately contrived piece of "poetic justice" is such as to cast grave doubt upon the value of the information. That Kung-sun Yüan was killed on the Liang river is however confirmed by the *Shui-ching chu* 水經注, a sixth-century text. See Wang Hsien-ch'ien 王先謙, annotated ed. (Ch'ang-sha, 1892) 14.29a-b. Since the *SKC* does not name the river on which Kung-sun Yüan was killed, this testimony is significant.

96 *SKCCC* 8.38a; *CS* 1.7a.

97 The practice of heaping up the bodies of slain enemies and covering them with earth so as to form a great mound was of considerable antiquity in China, the *locus classicus* being a discussion which

the *Tso-chuan* (Hsüan, 12) puts into the mouths of King Chuang of Ch'u and his minister after their defeat of Chin at Pi in 597 B.C.: "In ancient times, when the intelligent kings punished disrespectful and disobedient states, they took the greatest criminals among them, and buried them under a mound as the greatest punishment. Thus it was that grand monuments were made for the warning of the unruly and bad" (translation of James Legge, *Chinese Classics*, V, [Hong Kong reprint, 1960], p.321). Clearly the main aim of this practice was to strike terror into potential opponents who were regarded as criminals, as with the somewhat similar monuments erected by Assyrian kings, notably Ashurnasirpal II - See D.D. Luckenbill, *Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia* (Chicago, 1926-1927), I, 441, 445, 463. From Yen Shih-ku's commentary to *HS* 84.21a, it is clear that *ching-kuan* 京觀 simply means "a high place" in this context, and thus Legge's translation "a great mound" is to be preferred to "Capital Look-out."

98 *CS* 1.7a. The same source states that Ssu-ma I repaired the graves of Kung-sun Yüan's generals Lun Chih 綸直 and Chia Fan 賈範, both of whom had been killed by the ruler of Liao-tung for opposing his assumption of the royal title, and that he also released from prison Kung-sun Kung, the deposed uncle of Kung-sun Yüan. But these statements embody a historical cliché, and are clearly aimed at presenting Ssu-ma I in the image of a classic dynastic founder, King Wu of Chou, who, according to the *Book of Rites*, "When he got down from his chariot [after conquering Shang] enfeoffed the descendant of the Hsia rulers in Chi, and placed the descendant of Yin in Sung; he repaired the grave of Prince Pi Kan and released Chi-tzu from prison." (See *Li-chi* 19 "Yüeh-ching" [*Shih-san ching* ed., Shanghai, 1914 reprint] 39.14a). As with the death of Kung-sun Yüan at the place where the shooting star fell, this incident comes from the stereotypes of moralistic history, and it is difficult to place very much reliance upon it.

99 See *CS* 108.1a. According to the *T'o-pa Wei-shu* 96.26a, Mo-hu-pa's son, Mu-yen 木延, had evidently succeeded his father by the time of Kuan-ch'iu Chien's expedition against Koguryŏ in 244-245, in which he accompanied the Chinese forces, and was further promoted to the rank of *tso-hsien wang* 左賢王. His son Mu-jung She-kuei 慕容涉歸, moved to Liu-ch'eng 柳城 in Liao-hsi, and afterwards raided Ch'ang-li 昌黎, between Liao-tung and Liao-hsi, an area in

which an unspecified Hsien-pi tribe, probably allies of the Mu-jung if not belonging to that group, were allowed to settle in October-November 244 - see *SKCCC* 4.10a.. See Schreiber, pp.391-395.

100 *SKCCC* 47.46b-47a. The expedition is mentioned only in the Annals of Wu, and was accompanied by Yang Tao, who had urged a policy of "wait and strike" when Kung-sun Yüan's last envoy arrived in Wu in 238 - see p.168 above. Although the exact areas affected by the raid are not specified, the fact that it must have been a naval expedition, together with the Wei court's response in moving the population from the coastal areas, suggests that southern Liao-tung would have been principally affected.

101 *SKCCC* 4.5b.

102 *SKCCC* 4.6b. All commentators are agreed that Wen 汶 was situated near modern Kai-p'ing, *i.e.* on the western coast of Liao-tung and not far from P'ing-kuo hsien. Pei-feng does not appear amongst the list of *hsien* in Liao-tung in either *Han-shu* or in *CS;* it may have been a creation of the San-kuo period. Presumably it also lay near the coast. See *Manshū rekishi chiri,* pp.126-127; 211-212, and *SKCCC*.

103 For these population figures, see *HHS chih* 23.19a and *CS* 14.12a. The *HHS* figure is highly suspect, since it represents an increase in the number of households over the *HS* figure of 55,972, while the actual size of the commandery had been greatly decreased by the abandonment of some of the eighteen *HS* prefectures and the transference of others to Hsüan-t'u. The *HS* figure for individuals is 272,539, an average of 4.8 individuals per household; that for the *HHS* is 81,714, an average of 1.27 individuals per household which is absurdly low, and should be compared with the figures for the nearby commandery of Lo-lang, where the population figure in individuals shows a decline of 33% on that of Former Han, but still gives an average of 4.17 individuals per household. If the *HHS* figure for individuals is "correct," it suggests a population of *c.*20,000 households in Liao-tung in the second century. Almost certainly the population had declined even further by Kung-sun Yüan's day, so that the figure of 40,000 households and 300,000 individuals stated to have been annexed to the empire by Ssu-ma I's conquest in *CS* 1.7a is greatly exaggerated - unless it is meant to include the population of the Korean commanderies as well. Cf. above, notes 57 and 59.

104 *SKCCC* 30.40a.

105 See above, note 81 and *SKCCC* 3.46a.

106 *SKCCC* 30.40a, discussed and translated in Ikeuchi, "Lo-lang and Tai-fang," pp.87-95. The date of the expedition by Liu Hsin and Hsien-yü Ssu is not clear; both here and at *SKCCC* 30.30b, the only other place where it is mentioned, the only indication of a date is "During the Ch'ing ch'u Period." The first year of this reign period, 237, can be effectively ruled out, since an expedition would hardly have been sent to peninsular Korea when the ruler of Liao-tung had just defeated Kuan-ch'iu Chien; moreover, as noted above, the ships used by Liu Hsin were presumably those ordered built in 237. The occupation of Lo-lang must therefore have taken place either in 238 or 239. In view of statements about embassies from Wa 倭 , *i.e.* Japan, 238 seems certain. See below, pp.175-176 and note 110.

107 *SKCCC* 30.40a. The date of this rising is discussed in Ikeuchi, "Lo-lang and Tai-fang," pp.92-93.

108 For the embassies see *CS* 97,2b also *CS* 3. *passim*. For the inscribed bricks see S. Umehara 梅原末治,"Rakurō-Taihō-gun jidai kinen meisen shūroku" 樂浪帶方郡時代紀年銘塼集錄 , *Koseki chōsa hōkoku* 朝鮮古蹟調查報告I, 1 (Keijō, 1932) and "Chōsen hokubu shutsudo kinen sen shūroku 朝鮮北部出土紀年塼集錄 , *Shinagaku* VII, 1 (1933-1935). The embassies are discussed in Y. Suematsu, *Shiragi-shi no sho mondai* 新羅史の諸問題 (*Tōyō Bunko Publications, Series A, No. 36,* Tokyo, 1964), pp.126-135.

109 Population figures for Lo-lang in the Later Han are at *HHS chih* 23.19a; for the Western Chin, *CS* 14.12a.

110 The first embassy of Pimiku to China is dated to the sixth month of the second year of the Ch'ing-ch'u reign 景初二年六月 , *i.e.* June 238, in *SKCCC* 30.47a. However, this date is extremely suspicious, as it falls at a time when Ssu-ma I had only just begun his confrontation with Kung-sun Yüan, and a Japanese envoy could scarcely have got through to the Wei court at Loyang, as this one is said to have done. The same text states that the envoy was provided with an escort to Loyang by the governor (of Tai-fang) Liu Hsia 劉夏 .

As has already been seen, the Wei expedition to recover Tai-fang and Lo-lang could only just have been sent out at this juncture, and the name of the governor appointed to Tai-fang in the account of the expedition at *SKCCC* 30.40a is given as Liu Hsin 劉昕 夏 is an unlikely miswriting for 昕 ; if Liu Hsia is distinct from Liu Hsin, he must have been his successor, and since he could not have taken up his post as early as June 238, the date "the second year of Ch'ing-ch'u" must be assumed to be an error for "the third year of Ch'ing-ch'u," so that the date of the embassy will have been June-July 239. Moreover the reading "third year" actually occurs in the quotation from the *SKC* appended as a note to the thirty-ninth year of the Empress Jingu (己未 =239) in the *Nihongi*. See *Nihon shoki* 日本書紀 (Shin-tei zoho Kokushi taikei ed., Tokyo, 1951),I, 257, translated in W. Aston, *Nihongi* (London, 1956 reprint), Part One, p.245. The early Sung encyclopaedia *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan* 太平御覽 also quotes a text of the *SKC* which states "In the *third* year of the Ch'ing-ch'u period, Kung-sun Yüan died and the Queen of Wa sent..." (See *Ssu-pu ts'ung-kan* ed., 1967 reprint, 782.2b). It therefore seems likely that the first embassy of Pimiku to Wei must be dated to June-July 239 rather than June 238, and that the occupation of Lo-lang and Tai-fang by Wei must accordingly be dated to 238, as suggested by Lu Pi at *SKCCC* 30.47a-b.

In this connection, it is perhaps worth noticing a curious theory put forward long ago by W. Eberhard. In his *History of China* (English ed., London, 1950), pp.115-116, Eberhard states, "The Wu kingdom entered into relations with a man who in 232 had gained control of the present South Manchuria and shortly afterwards assumed the title of king. This new ruler of 'Yen', as he called his kingdom, had determined to attack the Wei dynasty, and hoped, by putting pressure on it in association with Wu, to overrun Wei from north and south. Wei answered this plan by recourse to diplomacy, and very effectively. It began by arranging that Wu should have reason to fear an attack from its western neighbour Shu-Han. A mission was also dispatched from Wei to negotiate with Japan. Japan was then emerging from its stone age and introducing metals; there were countless small principalities and States, of which the State of Yamato, ruled by a queen, was the most powerful. Yamato had certain interests in Korea, where it already ruled a small coastal strip in the east. Wei offered Yamato the prospect of gaining the whole of Korea if it would turn against the State of Yen in South Manchuria. Wu, too, had turned to Japan, but the negotiations came to nothing, since Wu, as an ally of Yen, had nothing to offer. The queen of Yamato

accordingly sent a mission to Wei; she had already decided in favour of that State. Thus Wei was able to embark on war against Yen, which it annihilated in 237."

This ingenious reconstruction unfortunately falls to pieces as soon as it is examined in detail. The following points may be noted:

(i) Wu had already attempted to establish relations with the Kung-sun house before the accession of Kung-sun Yüan - in 228, not 232 - to the domains held by his father and grandfather in Southern Manchuria. The first Wu embassy to Kung-sun Yüan was in 229.

(ii) There is no record of any hostilities, or fear of hostilities, between Shu-Han and Wu during the period 230-240. At this period the two states were in constant alliance against Wei. In 234 Wu strengthened its garrison on the Shu-Han frontier, but the reason for this was that Sun Ch'üan feared the possible collapse of Shu-Han after the death of Chu-ko Liang in September-October that year. See Biography of Tsung Yü 宗預, *SKCCC* 45.7a.

(iii) There is no record of any embassy from Wei to Wa before 238, and in fact there cannot have been any such embassy at this period, since *SKCCC* 30.20b states unequivocally that intercourse between the Eastern barbarians, which included Wa, and China, was discontinued during the Kung-sun regime and only recommenced on the fall of Kung-sun Yüan.

(iv) Although the men of Wa are said to have gone to Pyŏn-han, in *southern* Korea, to trade for iron at this period, it is highly unlikely that Queen Pimiku could be said to have "ruled" any part of Korea, indeed it has even been suggested by Prof. N. Egami that the ancestors of the rulers who eventually overcame Pimiku's state were reigning in southern Korea at this period - see N. Egami, "The Foundation of the People and the Origin of the State in Japan," *Mem. Tōyō Bunkō* 23 (1964). Neither in the third nor the fourth century did Japanese rule extend to "eastern Korea."

(v) None of the Wei embassies to Wa conferred any title to rule in Korea upon the Queen Pimiku or other chieftains. Such titles were however bestowed in the fifth century upon various early Japanese rulers, when the Chinese colonies in Korea had long since been submerged.

(vi) The concept of Wa turning "against the State of Yen in South Manchuria" is meaningless as applied to the politics of the third century A.D.

(vii) There is no record of any Wu embassy to Wa.

(viii) Wei conquered "Yen" in 238, not 237, after Kung-sun Yüan had contributed to his diplomatic isolation by putting to death the Wu envoys in 233, an incident which Eberhard unaccountably omits. Relations between Wei and Wa thus had nothing to do with the diplomatic isolation of "Yen."

(ix) There is no evidence that Kung-sun Yüan had "determined to attack the Wei dynasty." His only overt offensive act, as opposed to defending his own territory, was his invitation to the Hsien-pi in 237 - *after* he himself had been attacked by Kuan-ch'iu Chien.

(x) Pimiku is described in the *SKC* as queen of "Yamatai"邪馬台 It is very far from certain that this place is identical with the part of Japan known in later times as Yamato. For some indication of the centuries of scholarly argument to which this problem has given rise see John Young, *The Location of Yamatai: A Case Study of Japanese Historiography (John Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, Series 75, No.2,* Baltimore 1958).

111 *SKCCC* 30.20b. See also foregoing note.

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