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# THE KUNG-SUN WARLORDS OF LIAO-TUNG (189-238)

by K.H.J. Gardiner

When the Later Han dynasty finally lost effective power in the year 189, a swarm of warlords sprang up all over the empire to scramble for the supreme prize of imperial power, or simply to seize wealth and status, and protect them against the hands of jealous rivals. By the turn of the century the numbers of these contestants had already been drastically reduced, and by the time that the Ts'ao family finally established themselves as emperors of Wei in 220, only three other warlord families were still in the field. Two of these eventually established rival imperial lines - the Liu in Szechwan, and the Sun in southern China. The remaining warlord house, the Kung-sun 公孫 of Liao-tung, survived until 238, although only at the very end of their sway did they lay claim to the imperial title. Because of this, and because of the comparative paucity of source material concerning the activities of the Kung-sun warlords,[1] they have generally been overlooked, although their history affords an instructive example of how Chinese military leaders in this period achieved and maintained political power. Furthermore the Kung-sun regime in Liao-tung, surviving for almost half a century, is in many respects an anticipation of the subsequent separation of Liao-tung from Chinese rule, first under the Mu-

jung Yen (fourth to fifth centuries), and then under the kingdom of Koguryŏ (fifth to mid-seventh centuries).

For these reasons it has seemed worthwhile attempting to gather together the available information on the Kung-sun, with the idea of trying to form a reasonably coherent, although necessarily incomplete, picture of their rule. In what follows I shall be mainly concerned with the rule of Kung-sun Tu 度 and his son and successor, Kung-sun K'ang 康 , leaving the account of the last of the Kung-sun for a subsequent occasion.

*Kung-sun Tu's Rise to Power*

Kung-sun Tu (150?-204) not only founded the fortunes of his house but also raised them to the highest point they ever attained. He was born about the middle of the second century A.D.,[2] probably in Hsiang-p'ing 襄平 , the most considerable city in the commandery of Liao-tung, and also that which housed the administrative headquarters of the governor. His father, Kung-sun Yen 延 , moved from Hsiang-p'ing to the neighbouring commandery of Hsüan-t'u 玄菟 , in order to avoid serving as an official. Further details are unknown; indeed, his move to Hsüan-t'u is virtually all that is known of Kung-sun Yen, and even this is impossible to date; it could have happened either before or after the birth of Kung-sun Tu.

Both Hsüan-t'u and Liao-tung were frontier commanderies, but Hsüan-t'u was centred further to the north-east, amongst the mountains of the upper Hun-ho 渾河 . Its administrative headquarters were in Kao-kou-li hsien 高句麗縣 , which derived its name from the Kao-kou-li tribes who inhabited much of the adjacent highlands. The Kao-kou-li were nominally dependants of Han China, and the governor of Hsüan-t'u was generally responsible for relations with them, which were, however, all too frequently hostile, since the tribespeople were accustomed to descend from their strongholds in

the mountains to plunder the Chinese settlers of the plains at the least sign of weakness in the local administration. Since their revolt against China in 12 A.D. they had formed the kingdom which is perhaps better known under its Korean title, Koguryŏ; it was their raids which, at the beginning of the second century, had forced the transference of the Hsüan-t'u administration from an area even further to the east to the site which it occupied in Kung-sun Tu's day.[3]

To the west, north and north-west of Hsüan-t'u were lands inhabited by the Hsien-pi 鮮卑 and Wu-huan 烏桓 tribes who, though normally politically fragmented, were also a constant threat to the Chinese colonists of south-eastern Manchuria. About the time of Kung-sun Tu's birth the Hsien-pi, by now settled along the whole extent of China's northern frontier, had been temporarily united under the rule of a chieftain of genius called T'an-shih-huai 檀石槐,[4] with the result that the pressure along the whole border was suddenly increased at a time when the Han government was paralyzed by economic collapse and the court ascendancy of the "external families." The Hsien-pi raided Liao-tung commandery in 159,[5] and in the summer of 162 they plundered the neighbouring territories of the dependant state of Liao-tung.[6] A few years later the king of Puyŏ (Chinese, Fu-yü 扶餘), traditionally an ally of the Hán court, attacked Hsüan-t'u at the head of an army which the *Hou-Han shu* estimates at 20,000 strong, only to be defeated by the governor, whose troops killed 1,000 of the invaders.[7] During these same years 167-169, King Paekko 伯固 of Koguryŏ also raided the Chinese border, presumably in Hsüan-t'u, where he was defeated in the latter year and forced to surrender and resume his client status.[8]

Kung-sun Tu's early youth was evidently passed amongst the Chinese settlements of Liao-tung and Hsüan-t'u during this critical period, and it must have been at about the time of the Puyŏ raid on the latter commandery that he began his career as a very junior officer attached to the headquarters of the governor, Kung-sun Yü. Although Kung-sun Yen

had himself declined office in Liao-tung, he apparently raised no objections to his son's appointment to the establishment of the neighbouring commandery.

When Kung-sun Tu joined his staff, Kung-sun Yü had just lost his own son, Kung-sun Pao 豹 , who had died at the age of eighteen. Struck by the fact that Kung-sun Tu was the same age as this boy, and had moreover borne the name Kung-sun Pao in his childhood, the governor took to his young subordinate and became his patron, arranging for his further education, and even for his marriage.[9] Perhaps partly as a result of this influential support, Kung-sun Tu was officially recommended for government service in 169, and left Hsüan-t'u for the capital.[10]

Once in Lo-yang, he received a junior post in the office of the Masters of Writing *(Shang-shu* 尚書 *)* - the palace secretariat. Although well down in the official hierarchy, this post was by no means as insignificant as it might appear, since, through the Masters of Writing, Kung-sun Tu could have made contact with most of the leading political figures of the day. In fact court politics were in turmoil at the time, following the overthrow of the Tou family clique and the seizure of power by the eunuchs in 168. In the same year that Kung-sun Tu reached the capital more than 100 *literati* connected with one or other of the great families were imprisoned and put to death, while a further 600 or 700 were permanently debarred from office. It was a time when a young man who was prepared to be somewhat unscrupulous might easily make a career for himself, and when parvenus such as Ts'ao Sung 曹嵩 , Ts'ao Ts'ao's father, were coming into prominence. Unfortunately the surviving sources give no indication as to how far Kung-sun Tu was able to exploit this fluid situation, since in its first stages, at least, his career followed a routine pattern: a court appointment followed by a spell in the provincial administration - in his

case as Inspector of Chi Circuit (*Chi-chou ts'e-shih* 冀州刺史), in the north-east of the Great Plain. In this post, however, he was apparently not a success, and various popular rumours provided a pretext to dismiss him.[11]

Here it must be remembered that the fullest account of the Kung-sun family which still survives - that composed by Ch'en Shou for the *San-kuo chih* - has almost certainly been based upon the work of historians writing under the Wei dynasty with a decided bias against the Kung-sun, whom they regarded as rebels and usurpers, and that this bias colours the whole of Ch'en Shou's narrative. His sketch of Kung-sun Tu's life builds up a picture of the man as a conventional tyrant, and passes over or underplays his more positive achievements. This attitude of the sources may well be partly responsible for the absence of any information about Kung-sun Tu's career in between his post in Chi circuit, which he presumably held at some time during the decade 170-180, and his appointment to the governorship of Liao-tung at the end of 189. However, even making allowance for the bias of the *San-kuo chih*, it is unlikely that Kung-sun Tu held any substantial post during this interval, and it may well have been only the further dramatic change which took place in the political situation in 189 that gave him the chance which shaped the rest of his life.

Under the ascendancy of the eunuchs the Han government had become increasingly incapable of dealing with the problems of empire. As a result of maladministration and economic collapse, massive rebellions occurred, amongst the most notable of which were the celebrated Yellow Turbans rising of 184, the Liang-chou rebellion, which began in the same year and continued for almost three decades, and the revolt of Chang Ch'un 張純 in Chi circuit in 187-189. To cope with these risings, large bodies of troops were put into the field nominally in the service of the government, but in fact, since the court was frequently in no position to pay them, as almost the private armies of various generals.

A struggle for power at court after the death of Emperor Ling in the summer of 189 brought this situation to a head, and in September of that year, one of these generals, Tung Cho 董卓, a man who had fought against both Yellow Turbans and Liang-chou rebels, seized the capital and deposed the emperor. But Tung Cho's action proved to be merely the opening move in a struggle between rival warlords which was to continue long after he himself had been removed from the scene. Several of his leading opponents disappeared from Lo-yang only to reappear in the provinces, where they proceeded to recruit armies of their own which would enable them to strike back at him. In an effort to secure widespread recognition for his regime, Tung Cho hurriedly despatched various of his dependants to governorships in the provinces. Kung-sun Tu, recommended to Tung Cho by the latter's lieutenant, Hsü Jung 徐榮,[12] was one of these men, being ordered to govern Liao-tung late in the autumn of 189.[13]

It is possible that after retiring from the post of Inspector of Chi Circuit, Kung-sun Tu went to live in Liao-tung. Certainly the story of his son being summoned to take up a post under the Prefect of Hsiang-p'ing prior to 189 suggests this. It would also explain the speed with which he appears to have moved into action against his enemies once appointed to office. For a *novus homo* to have reached the distant commandery of Liao-tung, setting out from Lo-yang in 189, would itself have been a major achievement, for the countryside north of the Yellow River was swarming with bandits and rebels. Other than the supporters of Yüan Shao 袁紹, who led the gentry combination against Tung Cho, there were the notorious Black Mountain bandits, and the survivors of Chang Ch'un and his supporters who had been responsible for the death of Yang Chung 楊終, a previous governor of Liao-tung commandery; they had subsequently been defeated by the Chief Commandant of Cavalry, Kung-

sun Tsan 瓚, in a battle fought in the territories of the dependant state of Liao-tung.[14] It is not clear whether the court had appointed a successor to Yang Chung before Kung-sun Tu. Certainly communication between Liao-tung and Lo-yang would have been extremely difficult until Kung-sun Tsan's defeat of the rebels at the end of 188, although even if Kung-sun Tu did not reach Liao-tung in 189, Tung Cho's official courier must have got through. Kung-sun Tu must have found the commandery he was to govern almost completely isolated, exposed to the attacks of both border tribes and Chinese bandits.

Yet, if his biography is to be believed, it was not against these enemies that he first took action, but against his own personal foes. According to the *San-kuo chih*, Kung-sun Tu "having begun his career as an insignificant official in Hsüan-t'u, was despised by the people of Liao-tung."[15] Presumably Hsüan-t'u, north-east of Liao-tung and much more exposed to barbarian influences, was regarded as a "backwoods" outpost by even the townsfolk of Hsiang-p'ing. Moreover, Kung-sun Tu's father, by abandoning an official career in Liao-tung and moving to Hsüan-t'u, may well have alienated some of the "great families" of his old commandery. While Kung-sun Tu was out of office, several of the local gentry in Liao-tung seem to have snubbed him rather pointedly: one man, a certain Kung-sun Chao 昭, whose family came from the dependant state of Liao-tung, and who had held office as Prefect of Hsiang-p'ing hsien some time before Kung-sun Tu's designation as governor, had actually summoned Kung-sun Tu's son, Kung-sun K'ang, and appointed him to the very lowest post on his staff - *wu-chang* 伍長, described in the *Hsü Han-shu* as "overseer of five families."[16] On arrival at his headquarters the new governor was not slow to take vengeance for this calculated insult. He sent for Kung-sun Chao and had him publicly executed by being beaten to death with a bamboo cane in the marketplace of Hsiang-p'ing.[17] The incident was symptomatic of much which was to follow:

> There were those in the commandery, bearers of a great name or with important family connections, such as T'ien Shao 田韶, whom he felt to have been lacking in benevolence towards him in past dealings; all of these he now had "legally" executed, until he had exterminated 100 or more families, and the whole commandery trembled.[18]

The *San-kuo chih* here links the killing of Kung-sun Chao with the elimination of T'ien Shao and the great clans - which follows on directly in the text - suggesting that both actions were instances of Kung-sun Tu's use of his official powers to serve the ends of private vengeance. Yet it should be remembered that Kung-sun Tu arrived in Liao-tung at a critical period both for the commandery and for the Chinese world as a whole. It was essential that his authority as governor should be respected, otherwise the Chinese colonies of the north-east could have been engulfed in the wave of petty warlordism which was even then reducing central China to a wilderness. If Kung-sun Tu did take action against the local gentry families - and here the figure given, "over 100 families," seems a little too round to inspire confidence - it may well have been because of the threat posed by their bodies of armed retainers, rather than because of any private grudges of his own. A story told in *San-kuo chih* 11 may help to point this:

> Since the "Yellow Turbans" were at the height of their power,[19] [Ping] Yüan 邴原[20] went to Liao-tung. Both he and Liu Cheng 劉政 - like him a man from Pei-hai 北海 commandery - were men of martial spirit, capable of daring schemes; so Kung-sun Tu, the governor of Liao-tung, feared and hated him [*i.e.* Liu Cheng] and wanted to kill him. He arrested all his household, but [Liu] Cheng himself escaped. [Kung-sun] Tu then made an announcement throughout the prefectures of the circuit that whoever dared to hide [Liu] Cheng would be held as guilty as [Liu Cheng himself].

> Being in desperate straits, [Liu] Cheng went to [Ping] Yüan and threw himself upon the latter's protection.
>
> (P'ei Sung-chih notes: The *Wei-shih ch'un-ch'iu* 魏氏春秋[21] says, [Liu] Cheng gave himself up to [Ping] Yüan, saying, "A hunted bird will even dash into a man's bosom." [Ping] Yüan replied: "How do you know that this bosom is one that you can dash into?")
>
> [Ping] Yüan concealed him for over a month. At that time T'ai-shih Tz'u 太史慈 was going back home,[22] and [Ping] Yüan entrusted [Liu] Cheng to him. Eventually [Ping] Yüan told [Kung-sun] Tu: "General, some time ago you wanted to kill Liu Cheng, considering him a danger to yourself. Now that [Liu] Cheng has already left, hasn't the threat to you also disappeared?" And when [Kung-sun] Tu agreed, he added, "What you feared in [Liu] Cheng was his cleverness. Now that he has escaped, someone else will put that cleverness to use. Why then keep his household in custody? It would be better to release them, so as not to add to his feeling of resentment." [Kung-sun] Tu accordingly let them go, and [Ping] Yüan provided them with supplies and an escort back to their native commandery.[23]

In the turbulent politics of the end of Han it was by no means unusual for a man to lose both his office and his life at the hands of some bravo to whom he had given shelter - Lü Pu's assassination of Tung Cho in 192 is perhaps the most celebrated case. Kung-sun Tu's measures against Liu Cheng and his attacks on the gentry families of Liao-tung were probably both motivated by his desire to eliminate potential rivals. The same reason may partly explain his hostility towards Li Min 李敏, a former governor of Ho-nei commandery and an outstanding figure in local gentry circles in his native commandery of Liao-tung. Li Min's story is given in the *San-kuo chih* after the account of Kung-sun Tu's elimination of the leading Liao-tung gentry, and immediately following a lengthy passage dealing with the new governor's pretensions to royal status.[24] Li Min

> detested what Kung-sun Tu was doing and, being afraid that he would kill him, he put to sea with his household and dependants. Greatly enraged, Kung-sun Tu dug up [Li Min's] father's tomb, broke open the coffin and burnt the corpse. He also executed members of Li's clan![25]

Here the action of Kung-sun Tu is much more difficult to defend on the grounds of political expediency, although it is clear that the *San-kuo chih* account has left out much of the background to his quarrel with Li Min. However, it must again be emphasized that Kung-sun Tu's biography tends to dwell upon this aspect of his activities, rather than upon his more constructive policies. Thus the *San-kuo chih* gives the impression that Kung-sun Tu began his rule in Liao-tung with a massacre of local gentry, and yet it seems somewhat unlikely that a new governor would have started his tenure of office in this way or, had he done so, that such officially approved figures as T'ai-shih Tz'u, Kuan Ning, Ping Yüan and Wang Lieh would have been attracted to Liao-tung by the reputation of his government, which the *San-kuo chih* also claims to have been the case.[26] In Ping Yüan's biography we are told that, when he had been living in Liao-tung for a year, several hundred families went over to him;[27] similarly in the account of Kuan Ning: "When [Kuan] Ning had been living in the north [for some time] and showed no intention of moving thence, more and more people came gradually to follow his example."[28] If people were migrating to Liao-tung in increasing numbers from others parts of China, it suggests a stability in this corner of the north-east which was not at that moment enjoyed by the rest of China, and the credit for this security, here attributed to the sage influence of figures such as Ping Yüan and Kuan Ning, must surely go in part to Kung-sun Tu's administration, which not only provided some sort

of sanctuary from the widespread devastation of the Yellow River valley, but also formed a stable power base from which the Kung-sun family ruled for three generations.

*Kung-sun Tu and the Frontier Tribes*

Only in one place does the *San-kuo chih* refer to any sort of civil disturbance during the rule of Kung-sun Tu. Curiously enough, this reference does not come in his own biography, concerned as this is to display him as a tyrant, but in the account of the Kao-kou-li:

> When Kung-sun Tu was displaying his prowess to the east of the Sea, [King] Paekko sent the *taega* 大加 Ugŏ 優居 and the Keeper of Records *(chu-pu* 主簿 *)* Yŏnnin 然人 and others to aid him in an attack upon the Mount Fu 富山 bandits, who were then destroyed.[29]

Since the Mount Fu bandits are otherwise unknown, it would be easier to assess the significance of the incident if the mountain itself could be located. Unfortunately, Mount Fu does not occur as a place name in the north-east in the *Shui-ching chu* 水經注 or any other early geographical text. Its only other known occurrence is on the stele of King Kwanggaet'o of Koguryŏ, erected in 414, but here again the text of the inscription is in such a fragmentary condition that it is difficult to say more than that Mount Fu appears to have been situated in an area through which the Koguryŏ army passed on its way to chastise a hostile border tribe in 395.[30] Since at this date the Mu-jung Dynasty of Later Yen was at the height of its power, and is known to have stationed garrisons along its eastern border, it seems unlikely that King Kwanggaeto's punitive expedition could have involved a direct attack on Mu-jung held territory. This in turn suggests that the mountain lay in some outlying district which might well have served as a base for various malcontents earlier because of its inaccessibility

from the administrative headquarters of Liao-tung, such as the mountainous region between the valleys of the Hun-ho and the Hun-chiang.

If this is so, then the assistance which King Paekko offered in putting down the Mount Fu bandits might well be no more than an isolated example of Koguryŏ co-operation with China to crush a bandit settlement which had nuisance value for both powers, although even such co-operation contrasts strangely with the statement in Kung-sun Tu's biography that "he fought against the Kao-kou-li in the east and against the Wu-huan in the west."[31]

It would probably help to reconcile the conflicting reports of Kung-sun Tu's relations with Koguryŏ if the Mount Fu expedition could be dated. Unfortunately the expression used in the *San-kuo chih* is extremely vague, but it does tend to suggest a date fairly early in Kung-sun Tu's rule, since Paekko, the ruler of Koguryŏ who lent him assistance, was already reigning before 132, and is thus unlikely to have survived long after 189.[32] If Paekko died fairly early in the decade 190-200, it is possible that the hostilities between Liao-tung and Koguryŏ to which *San-kuo chih* 8 refers reflect a new situation created by the change of reign in the latter country.[33] This would not conflict with the statement in the *San-kuo chih*'s account of Koguryŏ that, "from the time of Paekko, they raided Liao-tung on several occasions."[34] It would also explain the alliance between Kung-sun Tu and the Puyŏ kingdom of central Manchuria, a traditional enemy of the rulers of Koguryŏ. According to the *San-kuo chih*,

> At the end of the Han period, Kung-sun Tu's influence extended to the east of the sea, and outer barbarians submitted to his authority, so that King Wigut'ae 尉仇台 of Puyŏ became a dependant of Liao-tung instead [of Hsüan-t'u]. At this time, Koguryŏ and the Hsien-pi were both strong, and taking into

> consideration that Puyŏ was situated in between these two incorrigible rebels *(erh-lu* 二虜*)*, Kung-sun Tu gave [Wigut'ae] a girl of his own clan *(ch'ung-nü* 宗女*)* in marriage.[35]

Taken together these various indications suggest that relations between the Lord of Liao-tung and the neighbouring state of Koguryŏ did not remain as harmonious as they appear to have been at the beginning of Kung-sun Tu's rule. However, it seems unlikely that there was any major breach with Koguryŏ at this time; perhaps the alliance between Liao-tung and Puyŏ helped to overawe the "incorrigible rebels," since soon after the death of Kung-sun Tu in 204, Han Chung 韓忠, sent by the succeeding ruler of Liao-tung as envoy to the court of a powerful Wu-huan chieftain, was able to boast, "Our commandery of Liao-tung lies to the east of the vast ocean, with millions of men and the services of Puyŏ and Yemaek at its command."[36]

For the relations of Kung-sun Tu with these other neighbours of Liao-tung, the Wu-huan and Hsien-pi tribes, there is even less evidence available. As already stated, the Wu-huan tribes at this period - and indeed throughout their recorded history - formed no united confederacy, but a number of groups under various tribal leaders, many of whom styled themselves "kings." Several of these are listed in the *Hou-Han shu* and *San-kuo chih*,[37] including the "Severe King" *(Ch'iao-wang* 峭王*)* of the Liao-tung Wu-huan, Su-p'u-yen 蘇僕延, who claimed the allegiance of over 1,000 settlements *(lo* 落*)*. Su-p'u-yen and the other Wu-huan chiefs became involved in the struggle between Kung-sun Tsan, the warlord who controlled the northern commanderies from Liao-hsi to Shang-ku,[38] and Yüan Shao, who controlled the rest of the great plain north of the Yellow River.[39] This struggle ended after nine years in 199 with the complete destruction of Kung-sun Tsan which, since Yüan Shao had to turn almost immediately to the south to face the threat from Ts'ao Ts'ao, left the Wu-huan chieftains with

greatly increased prestige. Although the *San-kuo chih* claims that Kung-sun Tu fought against the Wu-huan in the west,[40] these were now too powerful for him to overawe; he and his successor could only hope to win them over from their alliance with the Yüan family by diplomatic means, which explains the presence of a Liao-tung embassy at the court of Su-p'u-yen in 204.

The case of the Hsien-pi tribes is somewhat different. T'an-shih-huai's vast confederacy had fallen apart soon after his death in about 181,[41] never to re-form. According to both the *Hou-Han shu* and the *San-kuo chih* the various Hsien-pi chieftains fought against each other, and "the tribes scattered" - some of them, such as the ancestors of the T'o-pa, moving as far away as the north of the Gobi. It was not until after the turn of the century that K'o-pi-neng 軻比能, the next chieftain of more than local importance, came to power amongst the Hsien-pi: thus the *San-kuo chih* is hardly correct in characterizing the period of Kung-sun Tu's rule in Liao-tung as a time when "the Hsien-pi were strong."[42] As already noticed, Liao-tung had formed the object of Hsien-pi raiding parties on several earlier occasions, and it is possible that the commandery's border settlements continued to suffer from sporadic plundering, but it would appear that the prestige of Kung-sun Tu combined with their own disorganized condition to prevent the Hsien-pi from mounting any major attack upon the area.

This survey of the admittedly scanty sources for Kung-sun Tu's dealings with the neighbouring non-Chinese peoples shows that his "foreign policy" was largely successful. Both Koguryŏ and Puyŏ were at one time or another his allies, and at the same time Liao-tung was preserved from the raids of its traditional enemies, the Wu-huan and Hsien-pi - largely, it is true, because of the involvement of the former in central Chinese politics and the preoccupation of the latter with their own internal disputes.

In addition to Liao-tung, Kung-sun Tu almost certainly held Hsüan-t'u, but it is not too clear how far his power extended beyond these limits. To the south-east, across the gorges of the Yalü, lay the Korean commandery of Lo-lang 樂浪, with its administrative headquarters in the vicinity of the modern city of P'yŏng-yang. Kung-sun Tu's successor Kung-sun K'ang later intervened in this area, re-establishing various of the Chinese settlements which appear to have been overrun by the Korean tribes, but his father's name never appears in this connection. A single inscribed brick dating from 195 is at the moment the only relic of the Lo-lang colony which can be securely dated to the period of Kung-sun Tu's rule,[43] although datable remains from the earlier half of the second century and the latter half of the third are relatively abundant. According to the *San-kuo chih*,

> Towards the close [of the Han dynasty] under the Emperors Huan and Ling, the Han 韓 and Ye 濊 tribes became so strong and dominant that the commandery and prefectural authorities could no longer keep them in check, and the people [of the colony] fled to the Han states 韓國 in great numbers.[44]

The general decay and administrative collapse described in this passage apparently continued unabated until Kung-sun K'ang arrived on the scene, which suggests that Kung-sun Tu was unable or unwilling to bring the Chinese colonies of peninsular Korea under his control. A few decades later, under Kung-sun Yüan, it is clear that Koguryŏ controlled the Yalü estuary, making communication between Liao-tung and P'yŏng-yang impossible except by the sea route; in this connection it is interesting to notice that Kung-sun K'ang, who restored the Lo-lang settlements, is also associated with an expedition against Koguryŏ. This suggests that the rulers of Koguryŏ may have begun to extend their power along the lower course of the Yalü by as early as the turn of the century - hence any attempt to recover lost ground in Lo-lang necessitated an attempt to break Koguryŏ's hold over the land route.

Inability to control the land route to Korea may have contributed to Kung-sun Tu's neglect of the Lo-lang colony, but it is also fairly clear that his forces were elsewhere engaged. His biography notes that he "crossed the sea, and seized on all the prefectures of Tung-lai 東萊 establishing the post of Inspector of Ying Circuit *(Ying-chou ts'e-shih* 營州刺史) [to control his conquests]."[45]

The commandery of Tung-lai had its headquarters at Huang 黃, on the northern coast of the Shantung peninsula, and most of its prefectural towns lay either along this coast or in the south-west of the peninsula. At the time that Tung Cho seized power in Lo-yang, the westernmost parts of this area, in common with the neighbouring commandery of Pei-hai 北海, were infested with bandits or rebels who styled themselves "Yellow Turbans." Later many of these bands collected round Mount T'ai, whence they became known as the T'ai-shan bandits. Their activities isolated the easternmost parts of the Shantung peninsula, with the result that it was not difficult for Kung-sun Tu to despatch forces to take over this backwater in which he would not have had to face opposition from any major warlord. It was comparatively easy to travel by sea from Liao-tung to Shantung in two days or less during the winter months, when the prevailing winds blew from the north;[46] furthermore, owing to the island chain extending north-eastwards from the coast of Shantung above Huang prefecture, ships making this voyage could seldom have been out of sight of land. The return trip, from Shantung to Liao-tung, could most conveniently have been made early in the summer (before the advent of the typhoon season) when the prevailing winds blew from the south-west, although by tacking, the voyage could probably have been made with some difficulty at most times of year.

The *San-kuo chih* once again provides no date for Kung-sun Tu's seizure of eastern Shantung. However, by the summer of 195, Yüan Shao's son, Yüan T'an 袁譚, who had been made Inspector of Ch'ing 青 Circuit by his father, had driven K'ung Jung out of Pei-hai commandery, and was extending his power eastwards.[47] Eventually Yüan T'an seems to have taken over Tung-lai, since the *San-kuo chih* mentions a governor of this commandery called Kuan T'ung 管統, one of the few who remained loyal to Yüan T'an after the latter had quarrelled with his brother Yüan Shang 尚 in 203.[48] Thus it would appear that between the summer of 195 and the death of Yüan Shao in 202, the Yüan family gained control over the former Kung-sun holdings in Shantung.[49] On the whole it is unlikely that Kung-sun Tu's "Ying circuit" survived for more than four or five years; fortunately for the stability of his house, the Lord of Liao-tung seems to have made no attempt to recover this overseas possession, or indeed to intervene at all in the massive struggle between Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Yüan family which developed during his later years.[50]

During these years, Kung-sun Tu seems to have turned increasingly to attempts to further his prestige by the same kind of outward display which had led him to rename Tung-lai as "Ying circuit." He divided Liao-tung commandery into three: the city of Hsiang-p'ing, in which he resided, together with the surrounding area, became the "Marquisate of Liao-tung," the revenues from which went to Kung-sun Tu as "Marquis." The rest of the old Liao-tung commandery became the two commanderies of Liao-hsi 遼西 ("West of the Liao") and Chung-Liao 中遼 ("Central Liao").[51] All of these territories, together with Hsüan-t'u, formed the new administrative unit of P'ing 平 circuit, with Kung-sun Tu himself as "Shepherd" *(Mu* 牧*)*.[52] He also conferred the honorary title of Marquis upon his dead father, Kung-sun Yen, who became known as "The Marquis who Established Righteousness" *(Chien-i hou* 建義侯*)*. So far there was nothing unusual - measures such as

these were common amongst the warlords of Kung-sun Tu's day. However, the *San-kuo chih* also alleges that he established shrines for the worship of the founders of the Former and Later Han dynasties, had altars built south of Hsiang-p'ing where he carried out the imperial sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, regularly performed the imperial ceremony of "ploughing the first furrow"; reviewed his troops in imperial state, rode in a phoenix carriage and established Cavalry of the Yak-tail Banner and Cavalry of the Feathered Forest on the model of the imperial court.[53] These assertions are in keeping with *San-kuo chih*'s endeavours to paint Kung-sun Tu as a usurper, but they seem somewhat self-contradictory; it is hard to see why, if he had imperial pretensions himself, he should establish the worship of the Han founders.[54] Furthermore the description of Kung-sun Tu's semi-imperial state scarcely tallies with his assumption of the comparatively modest title of "marquis." It is hard to resist the conclusion that we have here clichés imported into Kung-sun Tu's life by pro-Wei historians who sought to present the career of this founder of the Kung-sun house in the stereotyped image of a tyrant and usurper.

In fact, Kung-sun Tu had some reason to be proud of his achievement. He had created a stable administration in Liao-tung itself, defended the commandery against raids by the surrounding non-Chinese peoples, and established alliances with some of the more important of these neighbours. Most of these successes came within the first few years of his rule, and it was apparently at this time also that he was successful in taking over eastern Shantung. But as the situation in China gradually stabilized and the flow of refugees into Liao-tung grew less, it proved impossible to hold on to these possessions on the mainland. Nevertheless, Kung-sun Tu's consolidation of his rule in Liao-tung meant that he was able to transmit his lordship to two successive generations of descendants, a feat

which very few of the warlords of this period were able to match.

In 204 Ts'ao Ts'ao, who by now controlled the emperor and was preparing for his final struggle against the Yüan family, secured the appointment of Kung-sun Tu as "General Who is Martial and Majestic" *(Wu-wei chiang-chün 武威將軍)* with the revenues and rank of "Marquis of Yung-ning District" *(Yung-ning hsiang hou 永寧鄉侯)* an insignificant territory which has never been identified. The appointment may have been intended to secure the support or at least the neutrality of Kung-sun Tu in the coming struggle; if this is so, it was ill-judged in view of the titles which Kung-sun Tu had already assumed. The *San-kuo chih* pictures him as exclaiming, "I rule over Liao-tung like a king. What's this Yung-ning place?" He put the insignia of his rank away in the arsenal at Hsiang-p'ing, and on his death this same year, Kung-sun K'ang, his son and successor, contemptuously enfeoffed his younger brother, the incompetent Kung-sun Kung 恭 as Marquis of Yung-ning.[55]

*Kung-sun K'ang and Ts'ao Ts'ao*

For the career of Kung-sun K'ang there is considerably less information than for his father's; half a dozen entries in the *San-kuo chih* together with scraps of earlier works quoted in P'ei Sung-chih's commentary make up a body of material which is insufficient even to enable the date of Kung-sun K'ang's death to be determined with reasonable certainty. What is known of the activities of the second "Lord of Liao-tung" may be reduced to three headings: his relations with Ts'ao Ts'ao, his invasion of Koguryŏ, and his establishment of Tai-fang commandery. Of these, Kung-sun K'ang's dealings with Ts'ao Ts'ao come first, chronologically and perhaps in importance - at least in the view of the writers of the sources on which we depend.

During the closing years of Kung-sun Tu's rule the political situation in China had undergone a clarification. From the welter of struggling *condottieri* a few major warlords had emerged to dispute for supremacy. Amongst these a leading place was taken by Yüan Shao and

his sons; after the destruction of Kung-sun Tsan in 199, the territories they controlled extended to the border of Kung-sun Tu's domains in Liao-tung, and even before this the Yüan would appear to have taken over Kung-sun Tu's conquests in Shantung.[56] But Yüan Shao's prestige was severely shaken by his inability to deal with Ts'ao Ts'ao when his army confronted the latter's at Kuan-tu 官渡 in the summer of 200; two years later he died, and his sons were too busy fighting against each other to think of extending their territories by attacks on other warlords.

The quarrels of the Yüan family presented a splendid opportunity to Ts'ao Ts'ao, who offered his support to Yüan T'an, Yüan Shao's eldest son, and then moved against the other Yüan brothers. On 13 September 204 Yüan Shao's former capital, the town of Yeh 鄴, fell to Ts'ao Ts'ao, and the two younger Yüan, Yüan Shang and Yüan Hsi 袁熙 fled north to the Wu-huan. It was then time to turn against Yüan T'an whom Ts'ao Ts'ao finally destroyed in February 205, some months after the death of Kung-sun Tu.

During his struggle against the Yüan it was clearly of importance to Ts'ao Ts'ao to prevent any third party from entering the field against him, and it is doubtless in this context that his appointment of Kung-sun Tu as "General Who is Martial and Majestic" must be seen. A similar intention lay behind his despatch of the envoy Ch'ien Chao 牽招 to Su-p'u-yen, the "Severe King" of the Liao-tung Wu-huan, somewhat later in 204.

Although, as already noticed, Kung-sun Tu treated the news of his new court appointment with contempt, there is no evidence that he ever contemplated more active measures against Ts'ao Ts'ao.[57] Any attempt to form a northern combination against Ts'ao Ts'ao could only have benefitted Kung-sun Tu's long-standing rivals, the Yüan clan. It seems more likely that he would have used the opportunity provided by the collapse of Yüan power to extend his

influence amongst the Wu-huan. The Wu-huan chieftains had been showered with favours by Yüan Shao, who had sent various of his alleged daughters - in fact daughters of his personal followers - to be their wives. Ts'ao Ts'ao's final occupation of the Yüan power-base in Hopeh seems to have coincided with Kung-sun Tu's death, but the presence of Kung-sun K'ang's envoy Han Chung at the camp of Su-p'u-yen before the end of 204 might suggest that the rulers of Liao-tung hoped to take advantage of the temporary power vacuum in the far north to gain influence amongst the Wu-huan. The fact that Han Chung had been despatched with insignia to appoint Su-p'u-yen[58] as *shan-yü* makes this all the more likely.

If the *San-kuo chih* is to be believed, it was at this meeting that Kung-sun K'ang, in the person of his envoy, was made brusquely aware of the extent of Ts'ao Ts'ao's influence. When Han Chung sneered, "At the present day, honour goes to the strong. What makes Ts'ao Ts'ao so special?", Ts'ao Ts'ao's envoy Ch'ien Chao jumped up and, hurling abuse at both Han Chung and his master, attempted to kill the Liao-tung envoy, whose life was only saved thanks to the intervention of Su-p'u-yen. We are further informed that, as a result of this display of "majestic anger," Su-p'u-yen was suitably impressed, gave up his plans to send 5,000 cavalry to the assistance of Yüan T'an, and dismissed Han Chung.

As it stands, the point of this story is clearly to exalt Ts'ao Ts'ao, through his envoy, at the expense of the Kung-sun house; in this respect it fits in with the general tendency to blacken the Kung-sun rulers already noticed in several passages of the *San-kuo chih*.[59] On the other hand, the presence of an envoy from Liao-tung amongst the Wu-huan at this juncture, just after Ts'ao Ts'ao's capture of Yeh, and the naming of Kung-sun K'ang rather than Kung-sun Tu as ruler of Liao-tung suggest that, unlike a similar incident reported in the biography of Liang Mao, Ch'ien Chao's dispute with Han Chung cannot be completely

dismissed as a fiction invented by propagandist historians writing under the Wei dynasty. And if anything like this incident did occur, it must surely have impressed upon Kung-sun K'ang the need to keep a close watch on the rapid march of events in northern China.

It seems likely that Su-p'u-yen was ready to support Yüan T'an as the eldest son of his former patron and ally, Yüan Shao. The rapid destruction of Yüan T'an in the months that followed may again have impressed him with the threat constituted by Ts'ao Ts'ao, and by the summer of 205 the chieftain of the Liao-tung Wu-huan was acting in concert with other Wu-huan leaders in an abortive attempt to expel Ts'ao Ts'ao's officials from Yu circuit.[60] From the time that this attempt was crushed by Ts'ao Ts'ao in the following autumn, Su-p'u-yen and the other Wu-huan chieftains remained the staunch allies of Yüan Shang and Yüan Hsi. But in the summer of 207 Ts'ao Ts'ao launched an all-out campaign against them, defeating the allies in battle at Mount Po-lang 白狼 in the mountains to the north-east of the eastern extremity of the Great Wall. The battle shattered the Wu-huan confederacy; T'a-tun 蹋頓, perhaps the most powerful of the Wu-huan chieftains, was killed, and Su-p'u-yen and the two Yüan brothers fled across the Liao to Kung-sun K'ang, along with various other Wu-huan leaders.

Kung-sun K'ang's attitude to the Yüan-Wu-huan alliance before this is not clear. The fact that the leaders who escaped from the disaster at Po-lang fled to him suggests that he was not actively hostile, yet at the same time a powerful combination of the Wu-huan and the Yüan faction was as much a threat to him as to Ts'ao Ts'ao. The *San-kuo chih* credits Ts'ao Ts'ao with the remark (made later in 207) that "He [*i.e.* Kung-sun K'ang] always feared [Yüan] Shang and the rest,"[61] and certainly according to a fragment of the *Tien-lüeh* 典略 quoted by P'ei Sung-chih, he had reason to do so:

> [Yüan] Shang was brave and tough, and hoped to take over [Kung-sun] K'ang's followers. He made arrangements with [Yüan] Hsi, saying, "Now we have arrived in K'ang's [territories], we are certain to be invited to an interview with him. Let's both take the opportunity to strike him down, brother. If we gain Liao-tung we will still have a power-base.[62]

Yüan Shang's opportunity never presented itself. After leading his soldiers a little further into Wu-huan territory, Ts'ao Ts'ao turned back. Under the circumstances it would clearly have been tempting fortune for Kung-sun K'ang to have seemed to offer any kind of support to the Yüan brothers, even if he had no suspicion that they were plotting against him. As it was, he clearly saw the chance of getting rid of potentially dangerous rivals while at the same time making a conciliatory gesture in the direction of Ts'ao Ts'ao.

> He first of all placed his bravest men [in ambush] in the stables [of the house], and only afterwards sent the invitation to the Yüan brothers. When they arrived, K'ang's troops emerged from the ambush, bound the two Yüan, and made them sit on the frozen ground. [Yüan] Shang asked for a mat. [Yüan] Hsi remarked, "Your head is about to make a journey of 10,000 *li*; what do you want with a mat?" Then their heads were cut off.[63]

Along with the Yüan brothers, Kung-sun K'ang put to death Su-p'u-yen, the Wu-huan chieftain whose favour he had tried to win only three years previously, and a number of other Wu-huan leaders. The heads of all the leading victims were sent to Ts'ao Ts'ao, although the troops who had accompanied the Yüan brothers - according to the *San-kuo chih* these still amounted to several thousand cavalry - were presumably taken into Kung-sun K'ang's own forces.[64] It is not clear that Kung-sun K'ang made any formal submission to Ts'ao Ts'ao at this point. According to

the *Wei-lüeh*, Kung-sun K'ang's son, Kung-sun Huang 晃, who was eventually sent to the Wei court as a hostage, did not go there until the time of Kung-sun Kung, *i.e.* after Kung-sun K'ang's death.[65] In 207 it was certainly more important for Ts'ao Ts'ao, having disposed of the Yüan brothers and the Wu-huan, to return to face his rivals in western and central China, than to enforce the submission of the distant and strategically unimportant Kung-sun domains, and his attitude is perhaps indicated by the fact that, apparently as a recompense for Kung-sun K'ang's action in putting the Yüan brothers to death, he secured the latter's appointment as General of the Left *(Tso chiang-chün 左將軍)* and Marquis of Hsiang-p'ing. Kung-sun K'ang had adopted his father's style of "Shepherd of P'ing Circuit,"[66] and had presumably also inherited the title of "Marquis of Liao-tung." As already noticed, the Liao-tung marquisate was formed when Kung-sun Tu separated the old Liao-tung commandery into three, apparently keeping the city of Hsiang-p'ing and the territories to the east of it under his personal rule. These lands presumably made up the "marquisate," and their revenues perhaps supported the mock-imperial state in which Kung-sun Tu is said to have lived.[67] Thus in creating Kung-sun K'ang "Marquis of Hsiang-p'ing" Ts'ao Ts'ao was in effect acquiescing in the arrangement created by Kung-sun Tu, and thus showing a rather different attitude from that which had been revealed when he attempted to create Kung-sun Tu himself "Marquis of Yung-ning District" three years earlier.

Conceivably Ts'ao Ts'ao intended to deal with the Kung-sun at some future date. However, after his defeat at the Red Cliffs in 208, he became increasingly preoccupied with the affairs of central and western China, so that he was unable to launch a second northern expedition. Thus from the point of view of immediate and practical politics, his expedition against the Yüan-Wu-huan alliance in 207 could be considered a blessing rather than a threat to the

lords of Liao-tung. Kung-sun K'ang was confirmed in his position; his nearest rivals, the Yüan warlords and the Wu-huan chiefs, were swept away, and his western frontier thereby guaranteed. The opportunity for intervention in the affairs of China proper, which existed during his father's rule, was now gone; but the stabilization of the western frontier meant that the Kung-sun warlords were now free to devote themselves to expansion further east, and there is little doubt that, once it became apparent that Ts'ao Ts'ao was unlikely to reappear in these regions, this chance was taken.

*Kung-sun K'ang's Invasion of Koguryŏ*

We have already seen that there are a number of tenuous indications in the *San-kuo chih* which appear to point to hostilities between Liao-tung and Koguryŏ towards the end of Kung-sun Tu's rule: the assistance given him by King Paekko of Koguryŏ in crushing the Mount Fu bandits probably belongs to the years soon after 190, and the "several occasions" on which Koguryŏ raided the frontiers of Liao-tung are probably to be associated with Kung-sun Tu's "fighting against Kao-kou-li in the east" and to be dated round about the turn of the century, perhaps reflecting a new situation created by a change of reign in Koguryŏ.[68]

The capital of the five tribes of Koguryŏ at this time seems to have been situated somewhere in the valley of the Hun-chiang 渾江 (sometimes called the Tung-chia chiang 佟家江),[69] a northern tributary of the Yalü, to which it runs for some distance roughly parallel. From strongholds in this region - an area remote and inaccessible to most armies which the Chinese local authorities could field - the Koguryŏ tribesmen could cross the intervening mountains and descend upon the Chinese settlements of the upper Liao and its tributaries. The slender agricultural basis of the Koguryŏ state, resulting from the restricted cultivation possible in the Hun-chiang valley, provided an added stimulus to such expeditions, and also prompted the tribes to extend their hegemony in another direction, over the Okcho 沃旦, a people settled in the

coastal strip of north-eastern Korea, from whom they exacted tribute in the form of agricultural produce and slaves.[70]

At the turn of the second-third century A.D. the relations of Koguryŏ with its Chinese and non-Chinese neighbours were also affected by certain tensions within the five tribes. It is clear from the *San-kuo chih*'s description of Koguryŏ in the middle of the third century, that at this period the royal authority was still quite limited, and that the tribal nobles, *taega*, enjoyed considerable power: they could appoint three ranks of lesser functionaries on their own initiative, informing the king simply of the names of the men they had raised to office. In some cases - for example that of the chieftain of the Sonnobu 涓奴部 - they also "had the right to set up ancestral shrines [of their own] and to worship the spirits of the stars and the national gods of Earth and Harvest."[71] While the king of Koguryŏ at this period was evidently more than *primus inter pares*, he was still a long way from the completely dominating ruler which, largely as a result of increasing Chinese influence, he later became. The situation was complicated by the fact that, probably about the turn of the first-second century A.D., the kingship, previously vested in the heads of the Sonnobu, was transferred to the Kyerubu 桂婁部, another of the five tribes.[72] Although, as already noted, the leaders of the Sonnobu continued to enjoy special status and privileges, as the kingship continued to grow in power at the expense of the tribal nobility, their displacement from the royal office may well have led to increasing feelings of resentment.

These underlying tensions were apparently brought into the open as a result of a disputed succession to the kingship some time after Paekko's death.[73] According to the *San-kuo chih*'s account,

> Paekko died. Of his two sons, Palgi 拔奇 was the elder, and Iimo the younger. Palgi being unfilial *(pu-hsiao* 不肖 *)*, the people of the realm combined to establish Iimo as king.
>
> Since, from the time of Paekko onwards, they had raided Liao-tung on several occasions, and had moreover received over 500 families of northern barbarians who had escaped [from Liao-tung],[74] during the Chien-an period, Kung-sun K'ang sent an army to attack them, destroying their kingdom and burning down their settlements. Palgi, resentful of that fact that he had been unable to gain the kingship in spite of being the eldest son, went and surrendered to Kung-sun K'ang, together with the *[tae]ga* of the Sonno[bu], each leading more than 30,000 people from the lower orders *(hsia-hu* 下戶 *)*. On his return [from Liao-tung] he settled in the Piryu river. The northern barbarians who had surrendered [to Iimo ?] also revolted against him, and Iimo changed his residence, setting up a new kingdom in the area where Koguryŏ is situated today.[75]

As already noticed, this account describes Iimo as succeeding to the throne immediately upon the death of Paekko, and virtually unopposed. The reader is thus left with the impression that Palgi, the eldest son, remained in Koguryŏ for a fairly lengthy period after Iimo's accession, resentful but not openly opposing his brother until Kung-sun K'ang's invasion. The mention of the Chien-an period (196-220) as a date for the invasion gives the impression that Paekko died before the beginning of this period, *i.e.* before 196, and if he succeeded to the throne before 132, this is most likely. It is unlikely that Kung-sun K'ang would have launched his major attack upon Koguryŏ until 208 at the earliest, in view of the fluid and potentially dangerous state of affairs on his western borders. Thus the *San-kuo chih*'s account involves Palgi remaining in Koguryŏ as a malcontent for some thirteen or fourteen years which, in view of the large numbers who are said to have accompanied him when he eventually went over to the Chinese, seems somewhat surprising.

A very different and largely independent version of these events is preserved in the twelfth-century Korean chronicle, the *Samguk-sagi:*

> First of all, when Kogukch'ŏn-wang 故國川 died,[76] his queen, who belonged to the U 于 family, left the palace by night without issuing any proclamation of mourning, and sought out Palgi 發岐, the [late] king's younger brother, at his private residence. She told him, "Our king has no direct descendants; you should succeed him."
>
> But Palgi was unaware that the king had died, and replied, "In view of the fact that the succession has already been settled by Heaven, this is no subject for frivolous talk. Then again, is it right for a married woman to wander about at night?"
>
> So the queen was ashamed, and turned aside to the house of [a younger brother] Yŏn-u 延優. Yŏn-u rose up, robed himself and set a cap upon his head, and went out to welcome her at the gate. He brought her in, set her in the seat of honour, and had meat and drink brought before her. The Queen said, "His Majesty has died, leaving no sons; Palgi is the eldest [of you brothers] and ought to succeed, but his heart is set against me, and he is arrogant and cruel, without regard to propriety. For this reason I look to you."
>
> Then Yŏn-u became even more obsequious towards her, taking the knife himself to carve for her. [As he did so] he happened to cut his finger; so the Queen loosened her waist-band and bound it about his wounded finger. When she was about to return, she said to him, "The night is far gone; I am frightened of what might happen. I wish you would accompany me to the palace." So Yŏn-u went with the Queen and they entered the palace hand in hand. The next morning at daybreak, pretending that it was an order from the late king, she had the council of ministers make Yŏn-u king.
>
> When Palgi heard about it, he was very angry, and surrounded the palace with men-at-arms. He called out, "According to the rules of propriety, when the elder brother dies, the younger succeeds. But you have

committed a great crime, passing me over and usurping my place. You had better come out quickly, or I will put you to death, together with your wife and children!" But Yŏn-u shut the doors of the palace for three days, and none of the people of the realm would follow Palgi.

Then Palgi saw that it would be difficult [to effect anything], and he fled with his wife and child to Liao-tung, where he went to see the governor, Kung-sun Tu *[sic!]*. He told him, "I am a younger brother of Nammu, king of Koguryŏ, and by the same mother. Nammu has died without any sons, but my own younger brother, Yŏn-u, has plotted with my sister-in-law of the U clan to take the throne himself in defiance of the natural order of things. This is why, in righteous anger, I have come to throw myself upon your honourable country. I humbly request that you will lend me 30,000 men-at-arms, and order me to attack him, so that I can thereby put an end to his disorders." Kung-sun Tu agreed to this.

But Yŏn-u sent his younger brother Kyesu 屬須 to lead soldiers to oppose him, and the Chinese troops suffered a great overthrow. Kyesu himself led the pursuit, and Palgi called out to him, "Can you bear to harm your aged elder brother? Kyesu, you cannot be without feeling for your brother; you would not dare to harm him!"

[Kyesu] replied, "Even though it was not right for Yŏn-u to have refused to yield the kingdom up to you, yet you are ready to destroy the kingdom of your ancestors out of your anger over this single incident. What kind of thinking is this? And after you are dead, how will you be able to face those same ancestors?"

When Palgi heard his words, he could not bear the shame and, running to the Pae 裴 river, he cut his throat and died. Kyesu mourned for him and, having hurriedly covered the body with turfs, returned [to the capital].[77]

Here only the figure of 30,000 - appearing as a number of Chinese troops rather than of Koguryŏ refugees - suggests any connection with the

*San-kuo chih* account. It may be urged that the *Samguk-sagi* is a very late source, and in its account of a Chinese defeat at the hands of a Koguryŏ prince we are obviously in the domain of patriotic legend rather than history.[78] On the other hand, it can be shown that this part of the *Samguk-sagi* contains material taken from a text written in 600, the *Sin-jip* 新集, which was itself rearrangement of much earlier traditions.[79] In view of this it would be unwise to reject its testimony completely, particularly since its picture of the Chinese governor of Liao-tung taking advantage of a quarrel over the succession which had already broken out in Koguryŏ is a little more convincing than the *San-kuo chih* account, which seems to envisage the two rival princes continuing in Koguryŏ without open hostilities for a period of several years.

The *Samguk-sagi* may well be correct in asserting that the invasion of Koguryŏ launched by the governor of Liao-tung was determined by the opportunity presented by divisions within Koguryŏ itself; on the other hand, there can be little doubt that its statement that the Chinese invasion was routed comes from a late retelling or rewriting of Koguryŏ history in which Chinese successes against the Korean kingdom were to be explained away, minimized, or flatly contradicted. The detail given in the *San-kuo chih*'s version at this point seems far too specific and accords too well with later developments to be rejected. Thus Palgi and his adherents, after surrendering to Kung-sun K'ang, are reported as having gone back to settle in the Piryu, *i.e.* Hun-chiang, valley. This settlement could only have occured under the aegis of the power of Liao-tung, and confirms the *San-kuo chih*'s earlier statement that this area, the centre of the old Koguryŏ kingdom, had been overrun by Kung-sun K'ang's armies. The fact that Iimo was obliged to shift his residence also points in the same direction.

Since Iimo's new capital is specifically stated by the *San-kuo chih* to have been the same as that city, Hwando 丸都, which appears as the Koguryŏ capital in various Chinese sources from the third to the fourth century,[80] and Hwando has been convincingly located near the valley of the upper Yalü,[81] it would seem that the king of Koguryŏ withdrew to the south-east in order to avoid the Chinese armies (and perhaps other elements hostile to him such as the Sonnobu and the rebel northern barbarians). By shifting eastwards, Iimo was able to retain control of the tributary peoples of the eastern coast, the Okcho and the Ye, and it was presumably by keeping command of these resources that Koguryŏ was finally able to recover from the devastation of its home territory. Meanwhile the settlement of Palgi and the leaders of the Sonnobu on the Hun-chiang became a client or buffer state between Liao-tung and the unconquered lands of Koguryŏ further east.

*Kung-sun K'ang and the Founding of Tai-fang*

The crushing of Koguryŏ and the establishment of the puppet state ruled by Palgi provided an excellent opportunity for Kung-sun K'ang to extend his power into the Korean peninsula. The coastal route crossing the Yalü estuary was now open, and there was no longer any danger of a Chinese army entering Lo-lang from the north-west being cut off by Koguryŏ tribesmen seizing the crossings over the Yalü. From this point of view, although the expedition of Kung-sun Mu 模 and Chang Ch'ang 張敞 is undated in the *San-kuo chih*, it may safely be assigned to the period immediately following Kung-sun K'ang's defeat of Koguryŏ.

As already noticed, by this date the Korean commandery of Lo-lang had evidently been isolated for several decades, and exposed to the raids of the surrounding Han and Ye tribes.[82] Large numbers of the Chinese settlers had apparently abandoned their land holdings in Lo-lang, and gone over to these tribes, with the result that large tracts had gone out of cultivation. We read of "the wasteland south of T'un-yu

prefecture" 屯有縣以南荒地 .[83] To these conditions the dislocation of the trade route between Japan and China as a result of the continuous fighting in China itself may have contributed something.

Kung-sun K'ang's generals, Kung-sun Mu and Chang Ch'ang, evidently found the commandery administration in Lo-lang either at the point of collapse or already completely disorganized. However, they were able to rally sufficient support amongst those settlers who remained to strengthen their own ranks and to defeat both the Han and the Ye. Perhaps to encourage the development of the abandoned lands in the south of Lo-lang, Kung-sun K'ang ordered that the old prefecture of Tai-fang 帶方 on the estuary of the Han river should become the headquarters of a new commandery of Tai-fang, with jurisdiction over the southernmost prefectures of Lo-lang.[84] It seems unlikely that Chinese power extended very far to the south of the Han river, and Tai-fang may also have been intended as an advance post to cover the Chinese settlers of the lowlands of western Korea against attack from the surrounding tribes.

According to the *San-kuo chih* the new measures were successful: "The former inhabitants gradually made their appearance [once more], and after this the Wa (Japanese) and the Han became subject to Tai-fang."[85] The last sentence probably indicates the restoration of the trade route linking China with the lands further east. Along this route came "tribute missions" from the Han tribes of southern Korea and the inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago, missions which may have travelled as far as the Kung-sun capital at Hsiang-p'ing, or even, now that the pacification of northern China had been accomplished, the imperial court at Hsü-ch'ang 許昌 . Tai-fang retained its importance as a staging-post along this route long after the Kung-sun family had disappeared from the scene, and by the end

of the century the new commandery figures in the Chin census with considerably more inhabitants than Lo-lang itself.[86]

. . . . . .

There is little more that can be said of Kung-sun K'ang's administration. In later histories he tended to be eclipsed by his more famous father. As already seen, the *Samguk-sagi* attributes the invasion of Koguryŏ to Kung-sun Tu, while the *Chin-shu* credits him with the establishment of Tai-fang.[87] As a result of his token submission to Ts'ao Ts'ao, Kung-sun K'ang enjoyed a relatively secure position, and considerable freedom of action, thanks to which he was able to take measures against Koguryŏ and to reorganize the Korean commanderies. At the same time he was able to retain the services or at least the friendship of several of the leading refugees who had come to Liao-tung in his father's time, although, as the *San-kuo chih* points out, he tried to prevent such men as Kuan Ning and Wang Lieh from leaving his service to enter that of the Ts'ao dominated imperial court.[88] It would appear that during Kung-sun K'ang's time Ts'ao Ts'ao was not able to exercise any real control over Liao-tung, although, having once decided to acknowledge Ts'ao Ts'ao's power after the battle of Mount Po-lang in 207, Kung-sun K'ang seems to have been careful to offer no serious grounds for any kind of punitive expedition to his powerful neighbour, putting to death the envoys which Sun Ch'üan 孫權, the warlord who controlled the land south of the Yangtzu, had sent in an attempt to win his support.[89]

## NOTES

1 Virtually the only sources for the history of the Kung-sun warlords are the *Hou-Han shu* 後漢書 (*HHS* hereafter, references are to the Po-na ed.), and, more importantly, the *San-kuo chih* (*SKCCC* hereafter, references are to Lu Pi's 盧弼 *San-kuo chih chi-chieh* 三國志集解, Peking, 1957). While the *San-kuo chih* was written within a century of Kung-sun Tu's rise to power, it suffers from an evidently hostile bias towards the Kung-sun family, scarcely surprising when it is recollected that Ch'en Shou wrote his work at the court of a dynasty whose ancestor, Ssu-ma I 司馬懿, had gained much of his reputation from the campaign in which he destroyed the Kung-sun in 238. Under the circumstances it would have been most unwise for Ch'en Shou, himself a former courtier of the Liu rulers of Szechwan, to have given a sympathetic account of the one-time rulers of Liao-tung.

For some minor details, the seventh-century *Chin-shu* 晉書 (*CS*, references are to the Po-na ed.) and the eleventh-century *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑 (*TCTC*, all references being to the Ku-chi ch'u-pan she 古籍出版社 ed. with the notes of Hu San-hsing 胡三省, Peking, 1956), are useful. No epigraphic material has come to light for the Kung-sun period.

2 *SKCCC* 8.25b describes how Kung-sun Tu, at the age of eighteen was taken up and patronized by Kung-sun Yü 瑜 when the latter was governor of Hsüan-t'u. Kung-sun Yü is known to have been governor of Hsüan-t'u in 167 - see *HHS* 7.25a-b and 85.6a - and to have been succeeded by Keng Lin 耿臨 by 169 (*HHS* 85.11a and *SKCCC* 30.29a) Kung-sun Tu's biography also gives the impression that a fairly lengthy period - more than a year at least - elapsed between the time when Kung-sun Yü became his patron, and the time of Kung-sun Tu's recommendation to the court as *yu-tao* 有道 in 169 (see *HHS* 57.22a-b). Taken together these indications suggest a birth-date not later than 151.

3 See H. Ikeuchi, *Mansenshi kenkyū* 滿鮮史研究, *Jōseihen* 上世編, vol.1 (Kyōto, 1951), pp.161-176 ("Bujun no shiseki" 撫順の史蹟) and pp.177-189 ("Gentogun no zokken Kōrei no ishei" 玄菟郡の屬縣高顯の遺址).

4 For the career of T'an-shih-huai, see *HHS* 90.13b-20a; *SKCCC* 30.13b-15a.

5 See *HHS* 7.14a and 21.14b-15a.

6 *HHS* 7.19b and 90.14b. A dependant state *(shu-kuo* 屬國 ) was an area inhabited by non-Chinese tribes who had recognized Chinese suzerainty and were probably registered and taxed by Chinese officials, yet still retained a measure of autonomy. Presumably the population in such areas was not sufficiently assimilated to the Chinese way of life to be placed under the direct administration of a commandery; in the case of the dependant state of Liao-tung, the area seems to have been formed into the commandery of Ch'ang-li 昌黎 on its reconquest by the Wei dynasty in 238. See *CS* 14A.14a. It had, however, been subject to prefectural administration under Former Han. See Rafe de Crespigny, "An Outline of the Local Administration of the Late Han Empire," *Chung-chi Journal* VII, 1 (November 1967).61. Thus the position under the Later Han represents something of a retreat.

7 The governor was Kung-sun Yü - see *HHS* 7.25a-b and 85.6a - which gives the name of the king of Puyŏ in the latter reference as Fu-t'ai 夫台 (Korean, But'ae), possibly a corruption for Gut'ai 仇台 (Chinese, Ch'iu-t'ai). A Puyŏ crown prince variously called Gut'ae or Wigut'ae 尉仇台 (Chinese, Wei-ch'iu-t'ai) is said to have visited the Chinese court in 120, and to have led Puyŏ troops to assist the Chinese garrison of Hsüan-t'u against the king of Koguryŏ just over a year later. However, this prince can scarcely be the ruler of Puyŏ called Wigut'ae to whom Kung-sun Tu married a girl of his own clan some time after 189 (see *SKCCC* 30.23a), since if Wigut'ae were old enough to lead an army in 121, he would have been approximately ninety years of age by the time that Kung-sun Tu became governor! It seems that either there were several princes of the name or, more likely, it represents a Chinese transcription of a Puyŏ title.

8 See *HHS* 51.15a-b; 7.3a-b and 85.11a; also *SKCCC* 30.29a.

9 *SKCCC* 8.25b. Kung-sun Yü is unlikely to have been a close relative of Kung-sun Tu. The surname was extremely common in this period, particularly in northern China, and, since normally no senior official was allowed to administer the commandery or prefecture in which he was born, it is unlikely that his family came from Hsüan-t'u. But cf. note 13, below.

10 Kung-sun Tu was recommended by the governor of his commandery (Hsüan-t'u or Liao-tung?) as "possessing the Way" *(yu-tao)*, presumably in accordance with the government edict issued following a partial eclipse of the sun on 23 June 168. See *HHS* 7.2b, and 57.22a-b. *Yu-tao* was a conventional expression indicating possession of the officially approved virtues, although it was not so frequently used as some other classes of recommendation. Cf. *HHS* 5.23b for a similar edict by Emperor An.

11 In one of the few places where it differs from the *SKC* account of Kung-sun Tu's life, the *HHS* (74B.11a-12b) states that he "first of all declined office as a junior member of the staff of Hsüan-t'u commandery, but later served briefly." The text then passes immediately to his appointment as governor of Liao-tung, omitting the other posts mentioned in the *SKC*. Since the *HHS* appears to have no independent source of information on the Kung-sun, it is probable that Fan Yeh has here confused Kung-sun Tu with his father.

12 Hsü Jung was apparently a soldier of some ability, since he defeated both Sun Chien 孫堅 (*HHS* 72.10b) and Ts'ao Ts'ao (*SKCCC* 1.22a). On the murder of Tung Cho in May 192, Hsü Jung went over to Wang Yün王允 and Lü Pu 呂布, but was killed less than a month later while attempting to prevent the mutineers led by Li Chüeh 李傕 from capturing Ch'ang-an (*HHS* 72.17b). Hsü Jung, who was himself from Liao-tung commandery, seems to have been one of the few leading figures from that district who admired Kung-sun Tu.

13 The *SKC*'s only statement about the date of Kung-sun Tu's appointment comes at the end of the biography of his grandson, when the length of Kung-sun rule in Liao-tung is put at fifty years, "beginning from the time when [Kung-sun] Tu occupied Liao-tung in the sixth year of Chung-p'ing."始度以中平六年據遼東 (*SKCCC* 8.38b), *i.e.* 189. On the other hand, *HHS* 74.10b dates Kung-sun Tu's appointment in the first year of Chung-p'ing 中平元年, *i.e.* 184. However, as already seen, the *HHS* account is in general derived from the *SKC*, and it seems likely that a graphic confusion between 元 and 六 is responsible for the *HHS* date.

In support of the *SKC* date it may be pointed out:
(i) *HHS* 73.1b gives Yang Chung as the governor of Liao-tung in 187 who was killed by the Chang Ch'un rebeles. This conflicts with its own dating of the beginning of Kung-sun Tu's governorship to 184.
(ii) At the time of his recommendation of Kung-sun Tu to Tung Cho, Hsü Jung held the post of General of the Gentlemen of the Household (*Chung-lang chiang* 中郎將 )according to *SKCCC* 8.25b. However, in 184 Tung Cho was himself only General of the Gentlemen of the Household of the East (*Tung chung-lang chiang* 東中郎將 ), and it is inconceivable that his subordinate could have had the title General of the Gentlemen of the Household. Moreover, Tung Cho was a comparatively minor figure in 184, and would certainly not have had the

authority to appoint a governor to Liao-tung commandery, which was far from the area in which he was campaigning. Thus the date 184 is adopted, and the whole of the *SKC*'s story linking Kung-sun Tu with Hsü Jung and Tung Cho must be abandoned. Note that Kung-sun Tu's appointment to Liao-tung infringed the rule by which men were not supposed to govern their native commanderies, but cf. Kung-sun Tsan's biography in *HHS* 73*(lieh-chuan* 63).6b-16a.

14 See *HHS* 73.1a-2b and 7b-8a for an account of this rebellion. The account in *TCTC* which is based upon these passages has been translated into English by Rafe de Crespigny. See *The Last of the Han (Australian National University Centre of Oriental Studies Monograph 9*, Canberra, 1969), pp.34-35, 41-43. Chang Ch'un's principal ally amongst the Wu-huan was Ch'iu-li-chü 丘力居 "King" *(Wang* 王 *)* of the Wu-huan of Liao-hsi.

Kung-sun Tsan, who defeated Chang Ch'un's rebels, came from a Liao-hsi family, and was not related to Kung-sun Tu. Cf. above, note 9.

15 *SKCCC* 8.25b.

16 *Hsü Han-shu, chih* 28.8b-9a.

17 *SKCCC* 8.25b-26a. The point being that Kung-sun Chao was not merely put to death, but executed as a common criminal.

18 *Ibid.*

19 The biography of Kuan Ning 管寧 , which immediately follows that of Ping Yüan in the *SKC*, states: "When the world was in great turmoil, [Kuan] Ning went to Liao-tung together with Ping Yüan and Wang Lieh 王烈 of P'ing-yüan 平原 , having heard that Kung-sun Tu's authority was respected on the other side of the sea" *(SKCCC* 11.30a). However, according to the *Fu-tzu* 傅子 , a collection of writings by the Western Chin dynasty statesman and scholar Fu Hsüan 傅玄 , quoted in the P'ei Sung-chih commentary to *SKC*, Kuan Ning returned to the Chinese court in 223 after an absence in Liao-tung of thirty-seven years *(SKCCC* 11.33a-b). This would imply that the journey of Kuan Ning and his friends to Liao-tung took place in 187 - at least two years before Kung-sun Tu became governor. True, a variant text gives twenty-seven years instead of thirty-seven, but the *SKC* itself goes on to quote a memorial which puts Kuan Ning's stay in Liao-tung at "over thirty-years" *(SKCCC* 11.37a-b). However, unless it is taken as specifically referring to the period of thirty-seven years mentioned in the

*Fu-tzu*, this passage need only imply that Kuan Ning travelled to Liao-tung between 190 and 192, which would both give him time to have heard of Kung-sun Tu's reputation and to have resided in Liao-tung for over thirty years before returning to court in 223.

According to Ping Yüan's biography - *SKCCC* 11.24b - he went to Liao-tung after having been nominated as *yu-tao* by K'ung Jung 孔融, then Chancellor *(Hsiang* 相 ) of Pei-hai. K'ung Jung was appointed Chancellor of Pei-hai by Tung Cho after his capture of Lo-yang, thus towards the end of 189 at the earliest. Hence, with the exception of the *Fu-tzu* passage already mentioned, most of the indications are that Ping Yüan, Wang Lieh and Kuan Ning travelled to Liao-tung together in about 190-191.

A critical text of the *Fu-tzu* has been established by Yeh Te-hui 葉德輝 in *Kuan-ku t'ang so-chu shu, erh-chi* 觀古堂所著書二集 (Ch'ang-sha, 1902).

20 The name Liu Cheng also occurs as Liu Fan 劉攀 and Liu Chü 劉舉. See *SKCCC* 11.25a.

21 The *Wei-shih ch'un-ch'iu*, also known as the *Wei ch'un-ch'iu* 魏春秋 was written by Sun Sheng 孫盛, a scholar of the Eastern Chin dynasty. Originally a work of twenty chapters, it has been almost completely lost except for a few brief quotations such as the foregoing, mainly preserved in the text of P'ei Sung-chih's commentary. These have been collected in the *Ku-chin shuo-pu ts'ung-shu* 古今說部叢書, *i-chi* 一集 (Shanghai, 1910).

22 T'ai-shih Tz'u was from Tung-lai, on the northern coast of Shantung. He retired to Liao-tung after he had antagonized a number of powerful gentry families in his circuit, but returned soon after to assist K'ung Jung, who had been besieged by "Yellow Turbans" in Pei-hai. (These rebels are identical with the ones mentioned here in Ping Yüan's biography; their affiliation with the more famous rebels of this name who rose in 184 remains obscure). T'ai-shih Tz'u was eventually sent by K'ung Jung to get help from Liu Pei 劉備, who became chancellor of the nearby "kingdom" of P'ing-yüan either at the end of 191 or early in 192. See *SKCCC* 49 (Wu-shu 4, biography of T'ai-shih Tz'u).7a-b and *HHS* 70 (biography of K'ung Jung).8a. Cf. also note 19 above.

23 The danger represented to a warlord by a powerful and daring "refugee" at his court is well illustrated by the *Tien-lüeh*'s account of Yüan Shang and Yüan Hsi, see below, pp.80-81.

24 This of course contributes to the picture of Kung-sun Tu as a stereotype; not merely a tyrant, he is also to be shown as a usurper. Thus the *SKC* devotes considerable space to the interpretation of an ominous appearance which was said to prophesy the tenure of power by Kung-sun Tu himself and three successors (*SKCCC* 8.26a-b). Once again, Kung-sun Tu's pretensions to royal status are put curiously early in his career as governor; in 190, in fact, when he can scarcely have been in the commandery for more than a year.

25 *SKCCC* 8.26b.

26 Kung-sun Tu's behaviour to all these men is described as exemplary. He wanted to appoint Wang Lieh to office, and always kept an empty lodging house waiting for all three. He is said to have been particularly impressed by Kuan Ning's refusal to discuss anything except classical learning (*SKCCC* 11.30b). This can all be put down to the convention by which a truly virtuous scholar impresses even a wicked man, but the reason why these worthies were attracted to Kung-sun Tu's domains in the first instance is not explicable in these terms. Another man who is said to have held philosophical discussions "amongst the mountains and cliffs" of Liao-tung was Kuo Yüan 國淵, a companion of Ping Yüan and Kuan Ning. See *SKCCC* 11.9b.

27 See *SKCCC* 11.25a.

28 *SKCCC* 11.30b.

29 *SKCCC* 30.29a. *Taega* (Chinese, *ta-chia*) was a noble title in early Koguryŏ. Cf. *SKCCC* 30.26b: "The *taega* belonging to the same ancestral tribe as the king all have the title *kuch'uga* 古鄒加." On the other hand, the title *chu-pu* seems to have been borrowed from China, and has hence been translated in accordance with its Chinese usage. See Kim Ch'ŏl-jon 金哲埈, "Koguryŏ Silla ŭi kwan'gŭp chojik ŭi sŏngnip kwajŏng" 高句麗新羅의官階組織의成立過程, in *Yi Pyŏng-do paksa hwagap kinyŏm nonch'ong* 李丙燾博士華甲紀念論叢 (Seoul, 1936). A Japanese summary of the Koguryŏ section appears in *Chōsen kenkyū nenpō* 朝鮮研究年報 1 (1959).7-14. See also pp.84-85 below and notes.

30 See Pak Si-hyŏng 朴시형, *Kwanggaet'o rungbi* 광개토릉비 (P'yŏngyang, 1966), pp.150-162. The best text of the Kwanggaet'o inscription is probably that contained in a special number of the magazine *Shohin* 書品 100 (1959), entitled *Kōtai-Ōhi* 好太王碑. An early English translation of a rather different text of the same inscription is B. Szczesniak's "The Kôtaiô Monument," *Monumenta Nipponica* VII, 1-2 (January 1951).

31 *SKCCC* 8.26a. Although many of the warlords of this period incorporated barbarian auxiliaries into their forces - Hsiung-nu served in Ts'ao Ts'ao's army, while Kung-sun Tsan, Yüan Shao and Liu Pei all used Wu-huan cavalry at some stage in their careers - it would be rash to assume on the basis of the Mount Fu incident that Kung-sun Tu habitually relied upon help from Koguryŏ or other frontier tribes to maintain his position in Liao-tung.

32 See *HHS* 85.11a, which dates the accession of Paekko before "the first year of the Yang-chia 陽嘉 era of Emperor Shun, when the six military colonies were established in Hsüan-t'u." If Paekko had come to the throne *c.*130 as a young boy, he would have been reigning for almost sixty years when Kung-sun Tu became governor, and have been about seventy years of age. Such a floruit, although unusual, is by no means impossible, as is shown by the well attested seventy-eight-year reign of Paekko's descendant, King Changsu 長壽 : 413-491. The *SKC* itself indirectly suggests an early date for Paekko's death since, after its reference to the Mount Fu bandits, it goes on to record how Iimo succeeded Paekko. The next dated event is Kung-sun K'ang's invasion described as taking place "in the Chien-an reign," *i.e.* 196-220, but evidently in the period 204-220. This could be interpreted as meaning that the death of Paekko and succession of Iimo took place before the Chien-an reign began in 196.

33 It is not quite clear who succeeded King Paekko. According to *SKCCC* 30.29a-b, "Paekko died. He had two sons, the eldest called Palgi 拔奇 (Chinese, Pa-ch'i) and the younger called Iimo 伊夷模 (Chinese, I-i-mo). Palgi being unworthy to succeed, the people of the realm then together raised Iimo to the throne. From the time of Paekko, they had raided Liao-tung upon several occasions etc.." The text then goes on to describe how, taking advantage of the division in Koguryŏ, Kung-sun K'ang, who became governor of Liao-tung in 204, invaded the neighbouring state and was promptly joined by Palgi. As will be shown, this expedition is unlikely to have taken place before 208. Thus the *SKC* account implies that when Paekko died, after a reign of at least sixty years and presumably at the age of about seventy, his two sons engaged in a dispute over the succession which was still unresolved sixteen or seventeen years later. Although this is by not means impossible, it is chronologically unlikely, as a comparison with the successions to other long-lived monarchs in the Far East will show. Moreover, the *SKC*'s information

concerning the Koguryŏ royal genealogy is known to be faulty, since that text omits a King Su-sŏng 遂成, known from the *HHS* to have reigned immediately before Paekko (see Gardiner, "The Hou-Han-shu as a Source for the Early Expansion of Koguryŏ," *Monumenta Serica* XXVIII [1969].180-185).

The twelfth-century Korean chronicle *Samguk-sagi* 三國史記 (hereafter *SGSG*) gives a completely different version of the succession to Paekko, according to which this king was succeeded first by a son called Nammu 男武, known under the posthumous title of Kogukch'ŏn wang 故國川王 (wrongly identified in a footnote with I-i-mou of the *SKC*. See *SGSG*, Gakutō-sōsho reprint [Tokyo, 1964] of the Kojŏn Kanhaenghoe edition [Keijō, 1931] 16 [Annals of Koguryŏ 4].3b). Nammu died childless, and his death - which according to the chronology of the *SGSG* took place in 197 - was succeeded by a struggle for power between his two brothers, Palgi 發岐 and Yŏn-u 延優, in which the former, the elder of the two, was unsuccessful and took refuge with the governor of Liao-tung. See *SGSG* 16.7a-9a. Evidently the Palgi of the *SGSG* 發岐 and the Palgi of the *SKC* 拔奇 are one and the same, while Yŏn-u 延優 (Chinese, Yen-yu) the successful younger brother, is presumably to be identified with Iimo 伊夷謨 who plays a similar role in the *SKC*'s version. However, this means that the *SKC* has no knowledge of a King Nammu, and consequently the Japanese scholar H. Ikeuchi dismissed this king as a late fabrication. See H. Ikeuchi, *Mansenshi*, pp.225-233.

As against this it may be pointed out that the *SGSG*'s account is certainly based on much older material (see Gardiner, "The Samguk-sagi and its Sources,", *Papers on Far Eastern History* 2 [September 1970].1-42), and that in this tradition King Nammu is by no means a barren name, but one to which several stories given in the *SGSG* became attached. The posthumous name of this king contains the name of his burial-place (*SGSG* 16.6b) which, unidentifiable when the *SGSG* was composed, was presumably still remembered when the *Sin-jip* 新集, on which this part of the *SGSG* seems to have been based, was composed *c.*600. Indeed, the *SGSG* contains an evidently early story which refers specifically to the tomb of Kogukch'ŏn-wang (see *SGSG* 17.1b-2a). Moreover, according to the Kwanggaet'o stele inscription (see Pak Si-hyŏng, pp.208-233) it was evidently a long-standing custom in Koguryŏ, as in Japan, to appoint a number of families to act as tomb guardians for a dead king. In view of this practice, the existence of a tradition localizing the burial-site of any given ruler of Koguryŏ may be taken as a fairly reliable indication of the historicity of such a king, although it does not, of course, indicate anything about his place in the series.

It is known that the *SGSG* erroneously makes the three kings of Koguryŏ who reigned during the second century - Kung 宮, Su-sŏng and Paekko - into three brothers, instead of three successive

generations, as they correctly appear in the *HHS*. It is possible that a similar genealogical confusion has operated in the case of Nammu. If this ruler were not the *brother* of Iimo or Yŏn-u, as he appears in the *SGSG*, but the *father* of the latter king, he would provide the link which seems to be missing in the *SKC*'s genealogical scheme. A Koguryŏ king with a brief reign *c.*194 - *c.*204 might well have been passed over by the *SKC*, as happened with the similarly brief reign of Su-sŏng earlier in the century. This would also explain why the rivalry between Palgi and his brother was still unresolved as late as 208-209, the easliest date at which Kung-sun K'ang could have intervened in Koguryŏ.

34 *SKCCC* 30.29a. *SGSG* 16.4a refers to a raid upon Koguryŏ by the governor of Liao-tung in the sixth year of Nammu, which was defeated with heavy losses to the Chinese after the latter had scored an initial victory. Unfortunately this type of incident tends to be rather a cliché in the annals of Koguryŏ, and there is no way of telling whether this particular record is the memory of a real event or just another mirror-image. The chronology of this part of the *SGSG* is utterly unreliable.

35 *SKCCC* 30.23a. See also note 7 above. The early chapters of the *SGSG* Annals of Koguryŏ contain numerous stories of warfare against Puyŏ, and the Chinese histories confirm the long-standing hostility between these two closely related peoples, as for example when Puyŏ forces aided the Chinese against Koguryŏ in the winter of 121-122. See Gardiner, "The Hou-Han-shu as a Source," pp.159-161.

36 *SKCCC* 26.14a. The term "Yemaek" 濊貊 (Chinese, Wei-mo), possibly to be translated "the Ye and the Maek," has an extremely vexed history - see T. Mikami, "Wai-jin to sono minzoku teki seikaku"穢人とその民族的性格 in *Kodai Tŏkoku Ajia-shi kenkyū* 古代東国アジア史研究(Tokyo, 1966) for a recent summary of the discussion. Evidently the terms were used at different times with rather different application. The Ye or Ye-maek were (amongst others) tribes inhabiting the eastern seaboard of Korea, who by this period seem to have become tributary to the growing power of Koguryŏ; hence the name is sometimes applied by extension to Koguryŏ itself, as I assume to be the case here.

Han Chung is evidently boasting, and it is difficult to know how much weight to give to his words. On the other hand, Puyŏ is known to have been an ally of Kung-sun Tu, and it seems likely that the rulers of Liao-tung would have regarded Koguryŏ likewise as a dependency, albeit a rather untrustworthy one.

37 See *HHS* 90.6b-7a; *SKCCC* 30.7b. A recent translation of both passages may be found in Jos. L.M. Mullie's "Les Wou-houan," *Central Asiatic Journal* XII, 4 (1969).257 and 264-265.

38 See above, pp.64-65.

39 See above, p.64.

40 See above, p.70.

41 See *HHS* 90.20a-b; *SKCCC* 30.15a.

42 See above, p.70.

43 See S. Umehara, "Rakurō Taihō gun jidai kinen meisen shūroku" 樂浪帶方郡時代紀年銘塼集錄, *Koseki chōsa hōkoku* 古蹟調查報告 I, 1 (Keijō, 1932); also "Chōsen Hokubu shutsudo kinen sen shūroku" 朝鮮北部出土紀年塼集錄, *Shinagaku* VII, 1 (1933-1935). The brick in question bears the inscription 興平二歲□月黃氏造. It was found in the region of P'yŏng-yang, by the Taedong river.

44 *SKCCC* 30.39b. Translation based upon that in H. Ikeuchi's "A Study on Lo-lang and Tai-fang, Ancient Chinese Prefectures in Korean Peninsula," *Mem. Toyo Bunko* 5 (1930), which is an English version of an article originally written in Japanese and collected in the same writer's *Mansenshi kenkyū* quoted earlier. The *Wei-lüeh* 魏略 as quoted by P'ei Sung-chih in the notes to *SKCCC* 30.39b, gives a story which graphically describes similar conditions in the Chinese colony at the end of the Former Han dynasty. See Gardiner, *The Early History of Korea (Australian National University Centre of Oriental Studies Monograph 8*, Canberra, 1969), p.10 for a translation.

45 *SKCCC* 8.27b. The term 營州 is given in the *Erh-ya* as an old term for the area which later formed the state of Ch'i. See *Erh-ya chu-shu* 爾雅注疏 (Ssu-pu pei-yao ed.) 6.1a. Although Ying-chou is alleged to be one of the twelve circuits into which Shun divided China, there is no actual example of its use as an administrative unit before Kung-sun Tu's piece of grandiloquent archaism.

46 See P.M. Roxby, ed., *China Proper*, published by the Naval Intelligence Division, H.M. Stationery Office (London, 1944), I, 207-216. It should be remembered that T'ai-shih Tz'u who, as already noticed, took refuge with Kung-sun Tu soon after the latter became governor, was a native of Tung-lai commandery, to which he apparently returned *c.*192, in both cases presumably travelling by this sea-route. See note 22 above.

47 See *SKCCC* 6.52b.

48 See *SKCCC* 11.18a.

49 *SKCCC* 6.52b suggests that Yüan T'an's rule was most effective in its early stages, so that his annexation of Tung-lai should probably be placed soon after his success against K'ung Jung in the summer of 195. However, the measure of control which the Yüan family were able to exert in this remote area may well be doubted, since communications between the central plain and Shantung continued to be threatened by the T'ai-shan bandits, whose leader, Tsang Pa 臧霸, was recognized by Ts'ao Ts'ao as "Chancellor" of Lang-yeh 琅邪 in 199, and indeed later took part in the final campaigns of Ts'ao Ts'ao against Yüan T'an. It is significant that when Kuan T'ung marched to the assistance of Yüan T'an in 203, his wife and children left behind were immediately killed "by bandits" and his return to the commandery became impossible.

50 See below, p.78.

51 The Liao-hsi set up by Kung-sun Tu must be distinguished from the commandery of the same name on the western shore of the Liao-tung gulf, originally controlled by Kung-sun Tsan, and after 199 ruled by Yüan Shao and his Wu-huan allies. It is probable that the capital of Kung-sun Tu's Liao-hsi was at Wu-lu hsien 無慮縣, which had contained the headquarters of the Commandant of Western Liao-tung in Former Han times. The whereabouts of Chung-Liao commandery is unknown. See de Crespigny, *The Last of the Han*, p.402, note 25.

52 The name 平州 occurs in the *Ch'un-ch'iu* - Hsüan 1 - but only as the name of a settlement in Ch'i where Duke Hsüan of Lu had an interview with the Marquis of Ch'i. Evidently here again, Kung-sun Tu was the first to give an ancient place-name a new career in administrative geography. His term 平州 was subsequently taken up and used for the same area under the Western Chin dynasty. See *CS* 14.11b. The title "Shepherd" carried more authority than that of "Inspector" since "Shepherd" was a post of 2,000 bushel rank, while "Inspector" ranked at only 600 bushels, well below the post of governor of a commandery. See *Hsü Han-shu, chih* 28.1a-2a.

53 *SKCCC* 8.27b-28a. See also *TCTC* 59.1917, translated in de Crespigny, *The Last of the Han*, p.72. The *TCTC* also contains an account of Kung-sun Tu's relations with Kuan Ning, Ping Yüan and Wang Lieh, summarized from *SKCCC* 11.24a-33a, at 60.1929-1930, de Crespigny, pp.85-87; and an account of his death, taken from the biography in *SKC*, at 64.2057, de Crespigny, p.231.

54 It is conceivable that Kung-sun Tu regarded Tung Cho's emperor as a usurper. This was certainly the view taken at one time by Yüan Shao, cf. *SKCCC* 6.72b where P'ei Sung-chih quotes a letter of Yüan Shao to his cousin Yüan Shu: 有幼君無血脈之屬. Thus Kung-sun Tu might have been preparing to support Liu Yü 劉虞 proposed as emperor by Yüan Shao, or some other puppet of the Liu clan, unless his construction of these shrines is nothing more than historical cliché.

55 See *SKCCC* 8.28a; *HHS* 74B.12b.

56 See above, pp.74-75.

57 In the biography of Liang Mao 涼茂 *(SKCCC* 11*)*, who was sent out by Ts'ao Ts'ao as governor of Lo-lang, but detained by Kung-sun Tu, we are told that the latter, having "heard that Lord Ts'ao has gone on a distant campaign leaving Yeh undefended," wished to attack that city with a force of 30,000 foot and 10,000 cavalry. Liang Mao remonstrated with him, pointing out that Ts'ao Ts'ao was in process of uniting the empire and giving peace to the people, and Kung-sun Tu thereupon abandoned the idea *(SKCCC* 11.8a-b). However, as P'ei Sung-chih already pointed out *(ibid.)*, it is scarcely possible that Kung-sun Tu should have plotted to take Yeh from Ts'ao Ts'ao, since Ts'ao Ts'ao did not occupy Yeh until late in 204, while Kung-sun Tu died before the end of that year. It might be added that, whereas Yeh fell to Ts'ao Ts'ao on 13 September, by the time that Ts'ao Ts'ao contemplated his next campaign, that against Yüan T'an which took place in the opening months of 205, Kung-sun Tu had already been succeeded by his son Kung-sun K'ang (see *SKCCC* 26.14a).

These chronological considerations make it fairly certain that the incident related in Liang Mao's biography belongs to the realm of fiction. However, its intention - to exalt Ts'ao Ts'ao at the expense of the Kung-sun house - reveals distinct affiliations with the incident involving Han Chung and Ch'ien Chao - see below p.79 - leaving little doubt that both accounts are drawn from the writings of historians concerned to extol the virtues of the Wei ruling house and writing in northern China before 265.

58 For this incident see *SKCCC* 26.13b-14b. In this passage, Su-p'u-yen is referred to by his title *Ch'iao-wang*, "Severe King." Elsewhere in the *SKC* he is variously called Su-p'u-wan 速僕丸 (*SKCCC* 1.68b) or Su-fu-wan 速附丸 (*SKCCC* 30.10a), or Su-p'u-yen 蘇僕延 (*SKCCC* 30.7b). The last form is that used in *HHS*.

59 Cf. p.63 above, and p.78, note 57.

60 See *SKCCC* 1.62a.

61 *SKCCC* 1.68b.

62 *SKCCC* 6.71a. The *Tien-lüeh* appears to have dealt with the events of the concluding years of the Later Han Dynasty, and to have been written by Yü Huan 魚豢 in the middle of the third century. For its relationship to the *Wei-lüeh* 魏略 see Rafe de Crespigny, *The Records of the Three Kingdoms (Occasional Paper 9, Centre of Oriental Studies, Australian National University,* Canberra, 1970), pp.75-76.

63 *SKCCC* 6.71a-b. Yüan Shang appears to have been killed in the ninth month of the year Chien-an 12, *i.e.* some time between late October and November 207, by which time the southern Manchurian winter, beginning in late October, would have already started - cf. "frozen ground" in the text above. *HHS* 74B (*lieh-chuan* 64B).11a-b gives a slightly different version of the same event.

64 Evidently large numbers of Wu-huan also became *foederati* of Liao-tung. *SKCCC* 28.9b mentions the surrender to Wei in 237 of over 5,000 Wu-huan who "had followed Yüan Shao and [later] fled to Liao-tung." See also note 74 below.

65 *SKCCC* 8.38b.

66 See *SKCCC* 26.13b, and p.75 above, with note 52.

67 See above, pp.75-76.

68 If the reign of the mysterious King Nammu 男武 omitted by the *SKC* is to be inserted at this point. See *SKCCC* 30.29a and 8.26a; also pp.69-71 and notes 32 and 33 above.

69 See S. Mishina, "Kōkuri O-to kō 高句麗王都考," *Chōsen gakuhō* 1 (May 1951) for a discussion of some of the problems involved in locating the early capitals of Koguryŏ.

70 See Gardiner, "The Hou-Han-shu as a Source," pp.163-171.

71 *SKCCC* 30.28b 涓奴部…適統大人…得主宗廟祠靈星社稷. The extent to which customary practice restricted Koguryŏ royalty is also suggested by the fact that another tribe, the Chollobu 絕奴部, regularly provided the king's wife, and its chieftains in return received extraordinary honours.

72 Ikeuchi's arguments about Kung 宮, who ruled Koguryŏ at the beginning of the second century A.D., being the first Kyerubu king, here seem to be conclusive. See H. Ikeuchi, *Mansenshi*, "Kokuri no Go-zoku oyobi Go-bu" 高句麗の五族及び"五部, especially pp.325-330 and 374-383.

73 Tribal disputes amongst the Koguryŏ nobility at a much earlier date are suggested by the surrender of a Koguryŏ noble to the governor of Lo-lang in 47, together with 10,000 followers. See Gardiner, "The Hou-Han-shu as a Source," pp.167-170.

74 Although the text does not specify these "barbarians," and they could easily have been any one of a number of non-Chinese groups in and around Liao-tung, it is tempting to connect them with the Wu-huan supporters of Yüan Shang whose leaders were executed by Kung-sun K'ang in 207. The 500 families would then be a Wu-huan group who had escaped massacre or domination by the governor of Liao-tung and taken refuge in Koguryŏ, and a further indication that Kung-sun K'ang's attack on Koguryŏ took place after 207. Cf. also note 64 above.

75 *SKCCC* 30.29a-b.

76 Kogukch'ŏn-wang is the posthumous title of Nammu, the king inserted in the *SGSG* between Paekko and Iimo. See above, notes 32 and 33. Kim Pu-sik 金富軾, the author of *SGSG*, confuses the issue by attempting to identify Nammu with Iimo (Chinese, I-i-mo) and Yŏn-u with Wi-gung 位宮 (Chinese, Wei-kung). See *SGSG* 16.3b, 7a. It is possible that the "old kingdom" in Kogukch'ŏn refers to that in the Piryu, *i.e.* Hun-chiang valley, before Iimo shifted the capital. However, the phrase also occurs in the posthumous titles of two fourth-century kings of Koguryŏ, and moreover it is not clear when these titles were bestowed.

77 *SKCCC* 16.7a-8b.

78 Cf. the account of the Chinese invasion of 244-245 in *SGSG* 17.2b-4b which similarly converts a national catastrophe into a victory for Koguryŏ. This entry is discussed by H. Ikeuchi in "Chinese Expeditions to Manchuria under the Wei Dynasty," *Mem. Tōyō Bunko* 4 (1929).110-119.

79 See Gardiner, "The Samguk-sagi and its Sources," pp.20-24, and note 33 above.

80 See for example *SKCCC* 30.25a, *CS* 109.5a, *TCTC* 97.3051 etc.

81 See Mishina, "Kōkuri O-to kō" and Ikeuchi, "Chinese Expeditions," pp.82-86.

82 *SKCCC* 30.39b, and pp.73-74 above.

83 *SKCCC* 30.39b.

84 No record of prefectures under the Kung-sun, or under the Wei who succeeded them, has survived. However, judging from the account which appears in *CS* 16A.12a, the commandery of Tai-fang included the prefectures of Lieh-k'ou 列口 (possibly near the mouth of the Taedong), Ch'ang-ts'en 長岑, T'i-hsi 提奚, Han-tzu 含資 and Hai-ming 海冥, all formerly under the control of Lo-lang, and Nan-hsin 南新, apparently either a new prefecture (perhaps formed from land conquered from the Han tribes) or one of the other former Lo-lang prefectures renamed.

85 *SKCCC* 30.40a.

86 *CS* 16.12a gives the inhabitants of Lo-lang as 3,700 households and those of Tai-fang as 4,900 households. Although both these figures are naturally well below those recorded for the population in Later Han times (they appear to be based upon the survey carried out in 282, the *T'ai-k'ang san-nien ti-chi* 太康三年地記), they indicate a considerable rise in the prosperity of Tai-fang in view of the desolate appearance of this commandery when it was founded. From 291 to 301 Tai-fang was used as a place of banishment for the Ssu-ma prince, Ssu-ma Yu 司馬繇, the Prince of Tung-an 東安. See *CS* 38.3a. For a modern discussion of Kung-sun activities in Korea, see H. Ikeuchi, "A Study on Lo-lang and Tai-fang, Ancient Chinese Prefectures in Korean Peninsula," *Mem. Tōyō Bunko* 5 (1930).80-84. A more recent article by K. Aoyama, "Taihō gun kō" 帶方郡攷 in *Chōsen gakuhō* 48 (July 1968).17-26 adds little that is new to the discussion.

87 *CS* 16.12a.

88 *SKCCC* 11.33a, quoting from the otherwise unknown *Hsien-hsien hsing-chuang* 先賢行狀, states that, although summoned to court by Ts'ao Ts'ao, Wang Lieh was not allowed to return to central China by the governors of Liao-tung, and died in that commandery in 218 at the age of seventy-eight. *SKCCC* 11.30b indicates that Kuan Ning received similar treatment, because Kung-sun K'ang, "who gave out the appearance of being a mere general and governor, but really had the ambition of a king" always wanted to bestow high military office upon him but "never dared to speak of it, such was his respect for [Kuan Ning]." As will be shown, Kuan Ning returned to central China after Kung-sun K'ang's death.

*SKCCC* 8.32b quotes a memorial of Hsia-hou Hsien 夏侯獻, a Wei Dynasty statesman and courtier, and a member of the powerful Hsia-hou clan which was closely allied to the Ts'ao family. The memorial is quoted by P'ei Sung-chih from the *Wei ming-ch'en tsou* 魏名臣奏, a lost collection compiled by Ch'en Shou himself - see de Crespigny, *Records*, pp.81-82, and states "As to the Chief Commandant of the Imperial Equipage *(Feng-ch'e tu-wei* 奉車都尉), Tsung Hung 騣弘, he first made his way [to Liao-tung] bringing imperial orders in the time of Emperor Wu [*i.e.* Ts'ao Ts'ao]. When Emperor Wen came to the throne and wished to convey his orders [to Liao-tung] he was going to send [Tsung] Hung with his wife and children back to his native district."

Evidently Tsung Hung was a native of Liao-tung who had gone over to Ts'ao Ts'ao, and was entrusted with what was apparently a delicate mission of establishing relations with the Kung-sun house before the death of Ts'ao Ts'ao (15 March 220). Possibly it was Tsung Hung who brought the decree appointing Kung-sun K'ang Marquis of Hsiang-p'ing. In any case the narrative seems to imply an interruption of relations after Tsung Hung's first mission, from which he had apparently returned to the Wei Court, for when the first Wei emperor wanted to re-establish relations with Liao-tung he turned to the same man. This fits in with the picture of Kung-sun K'ang intercepting and frustrating imperial messages summoning Kuan Ning and Wang Lieh.

89 See *SKCCC* 8.31b.