Military Doctrines and Democratic Transition: A Comparative Perspective on Indonesia's Dual Function and Latin American National Security Doctrines

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This paper attempts to clarify the ideological characteristic of the Indonesian military's dual-function doctrine (or *dwifungsi*) by bringing cross-national comparative perspectives into the scope of analysis. In scholarship of Indonesian military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI), comparative analysis has been conducted to better understand the political role of the military.¹ This paper aims to make a contribution to such an attempt by examining the ideological basis of ABRI's political involvement compared with other militaries which have also played heavy political roles.

ABRI frequently claims that Indonesian civil-military relations, represented in the official doctrine of *dwifungsi*, are unique, as *dwifungsi* is deeply rooted in the nation's history and culture. *Dwifungsi* insists that ABRI, since the independence war in 1940s, has played a guardian role in nation-building, and thus has a right to involve itself in the sociopolitical field apart from its defence role. This doctrine was officially adopted under General Soeharto's New Order regime which was launched after the abortive coup in 1965 and the subsequent fall of President Sukarno. The Soeharto polity was backed by ABRI and the military involvement in politics was intensified during the first decade of the new regime. Having faced the growing social criticism of *dwifungsi* and demands for political democratization during three decades, ABRI officers have insisted that the doctrine is not aimed at militarism but directed to democracy based on Indonesia's own cultural and historical values. It is implied that ABRI's political engagement should be understood as a commitment to the development of *Pancasila* democracy, and thus cannot be compared with...
the political roles played by military regimes in other developing countries.

ABRI's claim may be partly true, but it still invites comparison with other Third World militaries which have developed doctrines to justify their political intervention, and the way in which these have been eroded in the face of democratic pressures. Although culture and history produce particular patterns of civil-military relations in a society, they do not eliminate commonalities between nations, due largely to similarities in the military's organizational environment and status in the modern nation-state. Thus the idea of dwifungsi may be better understood through comparing civil-military relations in the process of third-world democratization.

Our target analytical parameter here is the military doctrine of political activism—how it has been shaped, reproduced, and finally revised as the military faces the political demand for democratization. From this perspective, we will primarily—but not exclusively—examine the cases of Latin America where militaries have developed a political doctrine, the so-called the National Security Doctrine (DSN: Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional). In all cases there, the militaries which had once governed experienced a retreat from politics with the reinstallation of civilian governments. We ask: in what ways has the DSN played a significant role in the processes of military intervention and withdrawal? And what are the lessons and implications for the dwifungsi-democratization issue?

In order to answer these questions, the first four sections of this paper examine the genesis and application of the DSN. Then, in the following three sections, the general dynamics of military disengagement from politics and related theoretical problems are discussed. Finally, we will come back to the DSN and attempt to clarify some major aspects of crafting military doctrines to marginalize military influence and consolidate democratic transition. The implications for dwifungsi are examined in those contexts.
The formulation of DSN

Many students of military regimes in Latin America have noted new features of military intervention in the mid 1960s. Especially in Brazil (1964), Peru (1968), Chile (1973) and Argentina (1976), new military regimes were established not only to solve problems of short-term political instability, but also to achieve far-ranging projects of political, economic, social and cultural reform. These coups were no longer revolts by lower-ranking commanders but were decisions of military headquarters; they were the product of professional officers who had formulated the DSN in higher educational institutions within the military, for example at the Superior War College (ESG) in Brazil and the Centre for Higher Military Studies (CAEM) in Peru. This doctrine linked internal security and economic development as the professional tasks of the military. Given the economic stagnation experienced since the 1950s, which showed the structural limitations of Latin America's domestic markets in making the transition from import-substitution industrialization to self-sustained economic growth, these countries faced the rise of populist forces and radical politics as the masses were mobilized for wider political participation. The DSN was intended to counter these challenges and to set internal security as a precondition for further economic development, thus providing the necessary rationale for the military's political domination.

The genesis of this doctrine, its inclination to see security and development as a coherent whole, and the logic of legitimizing military involvement in political life, are quite similar to ABRI's *dwifungsi*. It was the rise of the communist party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and Sukarno's radical-populist policies which created political and economic concerns among army generals. The Army Staff and Command College (Seskoad), had conducted studies of economic development, collaborating with US-trained economists. In a second army seminar in 1966, the army declared its commitment to internal security and economic development, and defined itself as the guardian of national development and the dynamizer of national life. ABRI's self-perception of its role was soon formulated as the doctrine of *dwifungsi*.
Similarity can also be seen in the evolution of the two doctrines. The DSN was presented by Latin American military thinkers as a doctrine derived from the social sciences, especially from political science and geopolitics; this, it was thought, might make it scientific, technical, and therefore politically neutral.\(^5\) ABRI officers—especially the young generation—rationalized *dwifungsi* by employing a systems approach from political science, with its functionalist description of political order, presented, for example, by Huntington and Janowitz. Geopolitics and geostategy were also emphasized in consolidating threat perceptions which led to the conclusion that the national environment had forced ABRI to accept internal security and economic development as inseparable goals, in turn legitimatizing the military's political role in society.\(^6\) In both the DSN and *dwifungsi*, emphasis on objectivity in defining threat environments is an important means to internalize doctrinal legitimacy in both the military and society. This doctrinal arrangement shows a commonality in the ways that the military attempts to institutionalize its access to the political arena.

Pion-Berlin (1988:396) argues that DSN had three components: security/development, geopolitics, and counterinsurgency (CI). CI developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s in France and the US, respectively, in response to revolutionary warfare in Algeria and Vietnam. The French and American CI theorists took the writings of Mao Tse Tung seriously, believing that revolutionary efforts were successful only where they cultivated popular support through a politically informed strategy that combined political, military, economic, societal and psychological aspects. The DSN's operational design was greatly influenced by the French counter-revolutionary doctrine and the US civic mission program—practised, for example, in the Philippines—which involved psychological operations to 'win the hearts of the people', improve the popular image of the government, and gather information about subversive elements from local residents.\(^7\) It was in this context that internal security missions defined in the DSN encompassed military, political, social, economic, cultural and ideological defence as a coherent whole, creating the Latin American version of *Ipoleksosbudmil* (the acronym used in the Indonesian military in referring to 'ideological-political-economic-sociocultural-military' areas of national life).\(^8\) In its
doctrinal formulation, CI against Maoism was reinforced by Clausewitz's dictum that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means'. The fusion of CI and Clausewitz contributed to the blurring of the boundary between military and non-military aspects of national life (Pion-Berlin 1988:386-87).9

In this way, the DSN's basic pillars—of convergence of internal security and economic development, its geopolitical platform, and counterinsurgency—seem to be compatible with dwifungsi's components.

Another issue is the self-image of Latin American armies before the formulation of the DSN. This is significant in assessing the ideological incentive to create such an all-encompassing military doctrine. Nunn's study (1992:113-50) describes their self-images as centred on being creators, defenders and integrators of the nations. These are all familiar terms for the student of the Indonesian military. The officers in Brazil and Chile, however, further attempted to synchronize these self-images with constitutional legitimacy, by revising constitutions and legally assigning the military to protect the 'constitutional order' and serve as the 'guarantor' of the constitution. Thus, the revised constitutions in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s generally acknowledged the military's legitimate political role and justified military participation at all levels of policy making and administration.10 'Constitutionalization' of the military's political mission and self-image was a necessary step to secure the implementation of the DSN and to diversify its basis of legitimacy. In Indonesia, where the constitution was not revised under the New Order, ABRI's self-image as the defender of the constitution (UUD 45) has not been given such constitutional status, but dwifungsi's political mission was formally legalised in 1982, providing legitimation in the eyes of ABRI officers.

ABRI's traditional claim that dwifungsi is uniquely Indonesian seems, therefore, to be undermined. ABRI shares significant similarities in doctrinal settings and legitimacy-building measures with many of the politically active militaries in Latin America. What, then, of the impact of doctrine? Doctrine has impact both internally and externally on the military. The main focus of discussion in scholarship on the Latin American military regarding the internal aspect has been the impact of DSN on military professionalism; in regard to the external aspect, the
main concern has been the assessment of policy variants under the common doctrine. We will examine the two below.

The DSN and 'new' professionalism

Alfred Stepan (1973) contributed greatly to the study of Latin American military politics by providing a controversial argument about the changing pattern of military professionalism after the formation of the DSN. His argument can be summarized as follows. Samuel Huntington's classical conception of military professionalism presumes that the military's primary mission is the conduct of external warfare, thus its professionalization inevitably leads to the specialization of military skills in a way that is incompatible with any other significant social and political roles. Therefore, according to Huntington, professionalization depoliticises the military. Stepan accepted this argument in part but developed his thesis that, in Latin America, where the primary mission of the military is internal warfare, the skill-specialization of military officers is not limited to narrow military affairs but expands to the wider social, economic, and political spheres. Thus, when internal security is the military's chief concern, professionalization politicizes the military and encourages its role expansion. This is what he called 'new professionalism', in contrast to Huntington's 'old professionalism'. In his model, Stepan emphasized the role of DSN which requires economic development for the maintenance of internal security. He paid particular attention to the processes through which the doctrine had been studied and socialized in the ESG and CAEM since the 1950s, and concluded that such military schooling changed the professional orientation of the Brazilian and Peruvian militaries (ibid.:48-62). By defining this new trend as the 'new professionalism of internal security and national development', Stepan introduced a landmark concept in the literature on modern Latin American civil-military relations.11

At this point, our comparative study should pay attention to the linkage of five factors: doctrine, internal security, economic development, professionalism and political activism. Stepan's assumptions flow as follows: a change in threat target (from external to internal) leads to the modification of doctrinal content (from conventional warfare to security-
development fusion) [Step 1]; a change in doctrinal content alters the type of professionalism (from ‘old’ to ‘new’) [Step 2]; and a change in professional orientation shifts the military's role in society (from a moderator of the political game to the director of the political system) [Step 3]. Before examining how this thesis fits ABRI's case, it is worth looking at major critiques of Stepan.

First, the new professionalism thesis has been criticized from a historical perspective. McCann (1979:506-7), for example, argues that: ‘if you study the Brazilian military role in politics from the perspective of the post-1964 political arena, Stepan's “new professionalism” seems reasonable. If you approach it from a historical analysis of the military institution, it begins to lose its newness and the situation of the last fifteen years appears as the logical outcome of long-range evolution’. McCann insists that since the 1930s the Brazilian army has been committed to internal security to fulfil its historical responsibility as guardian of national unity and order (ibid.:519-20). His argument supports Nunn's extensive historical study, published a year before Stepan's article. Stepan's argument posits a historical break of the mid 1960s. Nunn however asserts:

that the military profession exists in Brazil in a context different from that of some other parts of the Western world is no longer in doubt. That the profession now exists in Brazil in a different context than in that country's past is, however, questionable. The army has changed radically since 1870, but within the parameters of change, especially since 1920, the professional army has maintained its role as ‘defender of national honour’ (Nunn 1972:54).12

What is unchanged since the early twentieth century, according to Nunn (1972:47, italics added) is that ‘the professional officer has a sense of responsibility toward the nation (ethnic aggregation) and the state (the political domain) and the society or community. When the state does not serve the interests of the national and societal totality, however, it is in danger of being opposed by the one who sees himself as truly representative. In Brazil it is the professional soldier who sees himself in this role'.
Secondly, from an institutional perspective, an objection has been posed by Markoff and Baretta (1985). Their detailed study suggests that Stepan exaggerates the role of the ESG. Long before the ESG was established, the army vainly attempted to govern Brazil. Moreover, they believe that the ESG had concerns for economic development and internal security from early days. They therefore conclude that 'Stepan's new professionalism is actually old professionalism in the Brazilian context'.

For students of comparative civil-military relations, these criticisms, based on historical and institutional perspectives, and directed at Step 3 (see above)—i.e. the impact of professionalism on the military's role in society—carry some conviction, as Stepan tends to dismiss the gradual historical process in which rival perspectives compete for predominance, a process natural in any institutional change. However, in terms of Stepan's broader argument including Step 1 and Step 2, the critiques are less convincing. Both Nunn and McCann identify concerns within the military regarding internal security and economic development from the 1930s. They argue that both professionalism and Messianic self-images resulted in 'professional militarism'. But these points do not deny Stepan's argument that internal security and economic development became the military's simultaneous 'professional missions' after the formation of the DSN. In other words, internal security and economic development were 'concerns' before the 1960s, but not yet defined as primary professional missions. As Stepan emphasizes, it was the new doctrine in the mid 1960s which institutionally established and legitimized internal security as the primary mission of the already highly professionalized Brazilian military, and systematically linked economic development as a prerequisite for the attainment of internal security. Stepan's argument in Step 1 and Step 2, therefore, survives. It is not sufficient for his critics to reject his new professionalism argument by simply objecting to the final point, Step 3.

Other scholars have applied Stepan's concept to Third-World militarism elsewhere, including the Indonesian military. Casper (1991), for example, describes the new professionalism as one of the sources of political activism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She suggests that: 'the nation-building programs taught at the National
Defence College and the Command and General Staff College brought institutional change within the AFP and it was clearly an important factor in explaining its willingness to intervene to put an end to the Marcos regime'. Moreover, 'in both Brazil and the Philippines, the military schools introduced or expanded nation-building and administration classes. This training led the officers to see themselves as equal to bureaucrats and politicians, whereas previously they had been willing to defer in non-military areas' (ibid.:197, 200, 206). In terms of Step 3, this argument seems to fit the new professionalism since it shows that professional socialization of domestic affairs leads to political activism. But it is not clear, first, whether economic development and internal security were built into the primary professional mission, or, secondly, whether there was a visible 'change' in the schooling program. If the political activism merely resulted from the military's anxiety about the corrupt dictatorship and the inefficient state administration, and if its goal was to overthrow the national leader, and if the 'contextual' change in education is not presented, the argument does not accurately fit Stepan's thesis. It is, rather, close to Nunn's argument—that professionalization tends to lead to politicization—which supports the classic studies of Finer and others.

The core argument in Stepan's new professionalism, therefore, is not whether a professional military thinks internal security is a part of its task. As Stepan's critics have shown, such a concern certainly existed long before the mid 1960s. What makes Stepan's thesis interesting is the introduction of a new doctrine encompassing internal security and economic development as a coherent whole, with the resulting shift in the primary professional mission from a normal defence role—whether concerned with external defence or internal security—to that of state manager. If the military merely expands its role while receiving professional training, without change in professional orientation, the case better fits one or other of the professionalization-politicization schemes presented by Huntington's critics for the analysis of Third World military intervention in politics.

To emphasize the significance of the role of the doctrine, Stepan interestingly mentioned the case of Indonesia, where Seskoad had formulated a development and security doctrine in the early 1960s that
was later implemented under the New Order government (ibid.:51, n.5). However, Seskoad's emphasis on economic development and internal security were—unlike their Latin American counterparts—not derived from professional concerns. There was not even a single sentence in the official document of the 1966 Second Army Seminar at Seskoad about the professional mission of ABRI in the coming decades. In the early New Order, both stability and economic development were certainly built into ABRI's *Hankamrata* (Total People's Defence) doctrine, but their link with professionalism was thin. This was understandable given the fact that politicization of the officer corps came first and professionalization followed, in the history of the Indonesian military. Thus, Step 3 in Stepan's thesis is not applicable in the case of ABRI. ABRI's professionalization of internal security and national development—which proceeded after ABRI had secured its dominant role in politics—only reinforced what was already there under the New Order. Professionalism is a key concept among the generation of officers who entered the military academy after the late 1950s, in relation to the better management of *dwifungsi*. It is in this context that the concept has been reinterpreted to incorporate the sociopolitical mission of *dwifungsi*. Thus it cannot be said that the change in professional orientation politicized ABRI—the thesis argued by Stepan; rather, an already-politicized military promoted the idea of new professionalism in adaptive ways.²⁰

Finally, in contrast to the Latin American military, which identifies itself in the first place as a professional institution and secondly as a political actor, ABRI—as expressed in the *dwifungsi* declaration—defines itself first as a freedom-fighter who has a right to participate in politics, and secondly as a professional soldier. This difference again demonstrates that ABRI's political commitment is not primarily derived from professional concern.

We have seen that ABRI and Latin American political militaries share many characteristics, such as components in their doctrines and professional education which focuses heavily on the value of political stability; nevertheless, what Stepan sees as the 'new' dynamics, i.e. the way in which the change in professionalism politicizes the military, does not fit ABRI's experience. What, then, of the interpretation of the doctrine, and what does the comparison imply?
Variants of DSN interpretation

Scholarship on DSN acknowledges the variety of doctrinal interpretations among military regimes. First, in terms of the influence of geopolitics in doctrinal assessment, the case of Peru is often distinguished from Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Pion-Berlin (1989a:421-25) points out that, relative to these three countries, the Peruvian military regime between 1968 and 1975 gave less weight to geopolitical theories in its rationale for the authoritarian national security state. Rather, DSN was modified by military thinkers associated with the reformist military regime to pay more attention to national development. Although the weighting is a matter of degree, the Peruvian style is often described as 'soft-line' in contrast to the geopolitical emphasis of the 'hard-line' approach seen in Brazil, Argentina and Chile.21

In the hard-line school, DSN advocates associated emerging 'subversive' activities (mainly but not exclusively communist) in the domestic arena with the geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers. They asserted that the repression of progressive social and political change was imperative to maintain national security. Within this broad paradigm, the geopolitical thinking said little about how the national security threat would take root domestically, or who would be its principal sponsors. A space for arbitrary interpretation existed here, and the ambiguity was manipulated by an aggressive military that felt free to choose its own enemies. As Pion-Berlin (1988:390) suggests, this obscurity provided a licence for unbridled state power and militarization of society. 'Ideological subversion' then became the invented subject of military operations.22

ABRI's threat perception and dwifungsi legitimisation have shared a similar logic. Wawasan Nusantara, which is defined as an unalterable 'national' geopolitical doctrine, sees subversion as the main threat to security, which may be enlarged through foreign ideological penetration. The subversion takes the form of anti-Pancasila and anti-UUD 45 ideology, according to the Indonesian geopolitical theory. In defining subversive actors, ideologies and activities, this doctrinal vagueness has provided ABRI with interpretative power to label certain groups as subversive agents. As democratic pressure grew under the late New Order,
this frequently became ABRI's dominant approach. Military concepts of KGB (new-style communism), OTB ([communist] organization without organization), GPK (security-disturbance movements), and 'Western' liberalism, for example, allowed ABRI to paint government critics as subversives. By doing so, ABRI created a 'buffer zone' between the government and legitimate social demands, absorbing 'excessive' demands and transferring them to the area of non-politics, that is, military operations. The 'flexible' geopolitical doctrine also produced a rationale for the military to conduct Ipoleksosbudmil missions to safeguard national sovereignty. Dwifungsi was built into this formula as an embodiment of ABRI's commitment to national security and development.

Apart from geopolitics, the DSN's economic-development aspect should be noted. The hard-line approach interpreted the link between security and development in terms of orthodox strategies of modernization and the need to remove the political obstacles for economic growth. Typically, officers favoured closing channels to mass mobilization that encouraged populist politics and 'unreasonable' labour demands (Fitch 1993:23). However, in Peru reformist and radical officers developed an alternative 'soft-line' interpretation which stressed economic dependency, socio-economic inequality, and elite-dominated political systems as the principal causes of domestic insurgency. They also advocated socialist reform. The Peruvian experience made scholars aware of the breadth of possible interpretation of DSN. There, a professionalized and politically active military in the 1960s found that the principal threat to national security and development lay in exploitation by the oligarchy and its foreign accomplices, leading to the emergence of a radical reformist military regime.23

Peru's left-wing variety of DSN not only illustrated the indigenization of a common doctrine but also indicated that commitment to particular policies was extremely weak. Dwifungsi is the same. Since the beginning of New Order, ABRI has faced the growing intra-military criticism of dwifungsi's 'policy implementation', although there seems to have been an agreement on its 'principle'. In the case of the DSN, Fitch (1986:29) argues that the general acceptance of the DSN did not prevent serious internal splits over specific policies in Brazil. Also, Stepan, who in 1973
emphasized the significant role played by Peru's CAEM in socializing the new professional doctrine, later revised his assessment, insisting that CAEM circles were actually not the core ruling group which implemented the radical reform project.\textsuperscript{24} It can be concluded that both \textit{dwifungsi} and the DSN provide a coherent ideological lens through which military officers can look at the state of the nation, their expected missions, and how economic development is imperative for internal security, but it does not necessarily help unify the officer corps or cultivate consensus on policy implementation.

The DSN and antipolitics

Despite variations in interpretation and policy implementation, the military regimes under DSN influence shared a common structure of political control. A major attempt to generalize this commonality can be found in the work of Loveman and Davies (1989), who insist that the basic paradigm of these regimes—'military antipolitics'—applies to both leftist and rightist variants. For them, the left-right gap was bridged by a common perception among professional officers who rejected the political process, seeing it as the source of underdevelopment, corruption and evil.

It [antipolitics] is antiliberal and anti-Marxist. It assumes repression of opposition, silencing or censoring of the media, and subordinating the labor movement to the objectives of the regime.... It does not willingly tolerate strikes by workers.... It places high priority on economic growth and is usually little concerned with income distribution except insofar as worker or white-collar discontent leads to protest and disorder.... It can use elections, pseudopolitical parties, and plebiscites in order to give a veneer of "democratic" legitimacy to authoritarian direction of the state and society \textit{(ibid.:12-13)}.

The Peruvian revolutionary project (1968-75) adopted mobilizational inclusionary strategies of economic modernization but the left-wing military antipoliticians did not see themselves as being dedicated to class interests. Contaminated by DSN, officers found the principal enemies in the Peruvian landed oligarchy and allied US capitalists, but this was a
reflection of their nationalism, not Marxism. In this context, the radical revolution took the form of authoritarian statism to command the direction of social empowerment. Here, antipolitics was adopted to maintain the supremacy of the state over society, as seen in right-wing regimes inspired by the DSN.

Antipolitical techniques also provided similarities. In Brazil, the military's political project involved the development of the industry of torture, aiming to eliminate 'subversives'—often by summary murder of suspects—in order to 'atomize' Brazilian society. Rabid anti-Marxism was also a feature of the military regimes of Chile and Uruguay, where terror became an official instrument to accomplish the 'public' policy of social cleansing. The DSN-inspired Proceso government in Argentina (1976-83) also launched a notorious campaign of state terror against its internal threats—politicians and subversives. This 'dirty-war' left thousands dead as well as disappearances of 'subversives' in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Zirker 1988:592; Epstein 1984:39).25

Importantly, once DSN emerged as the dominant belief, military rulers in these countries concluded that security and development could only be achieved by a long-term military regime, thus relieving them from insisting—in the traditional way—that intervention in politics was temporary or undesirable in principle. Under these circumstances, whatever their differences over economic management, the construction of an antipolitical environment was soon recognized as imperative to achieving security and development. As if to reflect their role perception as the national guardian, ambitious and aggressive military programs of political control were generally justified as 'defensive' missions to rescue their nations from the threat of subversion and chaos (Loveman and Davies 1989:307).

These characteristics of the 'new professionalism of military antipolitics' (Loveman and Davies 1989), commonly seen in the Latin American professional militarism, are nothing new for students of ABRI. ABRI's antipolitical officers are anti-liberal and anti-Marxist. They have supported measures to censor the media. Intervention in labour affairs has been a part of the mission of Kopkamtib/Bakorstanas.26 They have relied primarily on the 'trickle-down' growth strategy, while concerns about the widening socio-economic gap in society are assessed in security
terms. Pseudo-democratic institutions—such as elections, party-politics, parliaments and constitutionalism—are supported to give a ‘democratic face’ and legitimacy to the regime, but ‘political society’ has been subjected to intervention, quite frequently by using both formal and informal channels and direct and indirect measures. Extra-judicial killings of citizens, systematic torturing of suspected ‘subversives’, and abduction of political activists—including teenager students—have been conducted in highly professional ways, often by ABRI's best-trained special force, Kopassus.27

However, for our comparative study, it is not enough merely to recognize these similarities in the external outcomes of military antipolitics. It is also necessary to see the pattern of perceptual development before and after the introduction of the DSN. Military intervention in politics surely existed in pre-DSN Latin America, but the engagement was essentially ad hoc.28 The military at that time often targeted internal threats in its combat operations, while concerns about economic underdevelopment also existed. If these two factors—internal security and economic development—were present both before and after the introduction of the DSN, why did the military seek its enduring involvement in politics only in the latter period? One answer lies in the nature of the DSN.

There was little fundamental change in the military's ‘ways’ of attacking internal subversive elements, namely, by mobilizing intelligence, paramilitary units and special anti-terrorist troops. What changed, however, after the DSN phenomenon was the military's ‘definition’ of these elements. The doctrine had systematically incorporated modernization economics into the professional internal-security mindset. The military's old ‘concerns’ about underdevelopment were now elaborated with the inclusion of the concepts of the open world economy and latecomer modernization. Having packed these economic theories into its arsenal, the military reached two conclusions. First, successful implementation of development projects could not be achieved through traditional short-term access to the government. Secondly, ‘catch-up’ economic modernization—which required low wages and disciplined labour to attract foreign investments (or to facilitate capital accumulation in the case of left-wing regimes)—needed strong state
control over society. It was against this background that repressive antipolitics became the logical outcome of the military's commitment to these two ends. To maintain political stability, regime critics had to be eliminated. To control society, 'politics'—which is uncertain and disturbs social harmony—had to be buried and replaced by 'administration' with a high discipline. Definitional expansion of 'subversion' (or more broadly deviance from state projects) had its roots here, aiming to justify the military's elimination and surveillance activities.29

Therefore, in answering the question above, it can be argued that, in terms of internal military dynamics, the *prime mover* in the transition between 'traditional' and 'new' militaries was not the aspect of internal security but that of economic development. If the DSN had only carried concerns about internal security, neither permanent takeover of the government nor establishment of an antipolitical environment was crucial or justifiable. Many developing countries assign their soldiers to counterinsurgency missions without leading to military takeover of the government. It was the spread of economic development thought (or ideology) to the professional doctrinal arena that gave birth to a military which sought perpetual involvement in politics and the adoption of antipolitics.30

These reflections on the doctrinal origin of antipolitics provide some hypotheses for our study of the Indonesian military. It seems obvious that the New Order ABRI desired to permanently involve itself in politics. It has been said that there is no 'back-to-the-barracks' in ABRI's dictionary. Since the New Order was not a military regime in a strict sense, a simple comparison with hard-core militarism in Latin America should be avoided. However, it can be argued that ABRI's claim for permanent involvement in politics—and its antipolitical attitudes—are similarly derived from its built-in economic development ideology. When the retired revolutionary generation officers say that ABRI should retreat from everyday intervention, their motive is not only to earn popularity in society but, to some extent, reflects their belief in the traditional role perception of ABRI. As in Latin America before DSN, the Indonesian military's core role perception was that of guardian, believing intervention was the result of civilian failure to protect national interests. Importantly, as was obvious in the Latin American case, this traditional perception
itself did not necessarily oblige the military to permanently intervene in politics. It would at most lead the military to having a permanent veto power. As if showing their preoccupation with such traditionalism, Indonesia's retired generals have often claimed that if Gen Sudirman (the charismatic first commander of the Indonesian army during the revolutionary period) were still alive, he might oppose the current implementation of *dwifungsi*.

On the other hand, the post-revolutionary generation's self-image was cultivated through education. In this process, traditional perceptions were surely inherited, but officers were also indoctrinated in the economic modernization ideology. From our comparative perspective, this suggests the hypothesis that the socialization of the New Order military has had a major impact on the officers' perceptions of the desirable level of military commitment in everyday political life. This level—we assume—is much higher than that of the traditional role-perception, because the development mission provides far more areas of military concern related to stability maintenance. Of course, not a small number of current officers may think that economics is too complex to be handled by soldiers. However, in assessing ABRI as an institution, this indoctrination process has no doubt encouraged the officer corps to regard everyday and permanent engagement in the non-military sector as legitimate.

In this regard, we may conclude that, although there is a generally accepted view that the introduction of professionalism has distinguished younger generation officers from the revolutionary generation, it is more precisely their professional commitment to modernization ideology that has marked these academically trained officers. If we accept a claim by many officers that *dwifungsi* has existed since the early days of the Republic, we can also argue that this 'old' *dwifungsi* was already replaced by 'new' *dwifungsi*. The new version under the New Order has favoured everyday involvement in all levels of politics to constantly provide the professional 'service' of stability maintenance for the realization of long-term economic development—a 'national interest.' Some self-images derived from the old version, such as 'self-sacrifice' for the nation, and ABRI's role as 'defender' and 'integrator' of the nation, have backed up
both internal legitimation of the new *dwifungsi* and external support of antipolitical projects.

Our comparative doctrinal analysis implies that many of the *dwifungsi*-related phenomena are not unique to Indonesia. If so, what of the process and dynamics of doctrinal erosion in the face of the growth of democratic pressure? In many Latin American military regimes inspired by the DSN, political change in the 1980s led to military disengagement from politics and the resurgence of civilian government. Civilians have endeavoured to trim aggressive military doctrines in order to secure military subordination to democracy. Their aim has been to dismantle officers' implications of modernization ideology from their professional military concerns while not threatening the traditional military loyalty to the nation. What is the problem of crafting military doctrine in this new way? What implications are there for Indonesia? In order to examine these questions, we need first to look at the general dynamics of the military extrication process and scholarly attempts to conceptualize civil-military relations in democratic transition. We will examine these issues of extrication in the next three sections—discussing approaches, analytical deficiencies, and political dilemmas—before returning to the questions raised above.

**Extrication problem I: approaches**

Beginning in 1979, South American military governments gradually relinquished power to civilians, for example in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil. Economic crisis had undermined the position of the ruling military, encouraging divisions within the military institution—always a key factor in motivating a military seizure of power—and provoking the overthrow of military government. Needler's timely study found common attitudes among the officer corps in some of these countries. Military presidents, who had come to power as institutional representatives of the military, were seen as using the armed forces to build a personal power base independent of the military institution and for self-interested purposes that the institution itself did not share (Needler 1980:622). The increasing gap between the ideal of being the guardian of national interests and the reality of being a tool of a self-interested and unpopular
president made it possible for military officers to perceive the transfer to civilian government as an acceptable choice. This perception was encouraged by the deepening economic crisis which showed day after day the government's inability to defend the 'national interest'. Similar attitudes can be found among Indonesian officers during the late New Order period. A growing number of active-duty officers perceived Soeharto's apparent tendency to protect his personal political interests at the expense of ABRI's institutional interests since the early 1990s.

Apart from the collapse of the president-military relationship, many studies of regime change also recognize internal military conflicts in the process of polity transition. Fitch's comparative study in 1986 emphasized that, for a decade prior to military extrication, a visible common feature among military regimes in Latin America had been the conflict between the faction in power and those who performed normal military functions (Fitch 1986:34). This assessment was reflected in O'Donnell and Schmitter's influential theoretical work, published in the same year. They argued that:

[A] factor encouraging a withdrawal from government concerns the agencies of repression. Whenever this 'instrument' is used protractedly and indiscriminately, and whatever the initial formal engagement of the military, the units specially responsible tend to develop an increasing autonomy and capacity to command resources. This exacerbates old rivalries between service branches and leads to skirmishes over jurisdictions and methods.... [F]aced with the growth of security agencies, professionally minded officers may become willing to support a civilianization of authority which can deal effectively with such excesses (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:35).

Emphasizing the role of intra-military conflict—namely between the security unit's hardliners and moderate professionals—O'Donnell and Schmitter concluded that: 'there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners' (ibid.:19).

This assessment sees the primary cause of democratic transition as a 'contingent' result of a game among authoritarian agents. Transition,
therefore, is random, uncertain, unplanned, unpredictable and shaped by their strategic choices. This view challenges structural explanations which have tried to find causes in the socio-economic and political structure—i.e. the lack of regime adaptability to the growing political, economic and international pressures on the authoritarian regime.\(^{34}\) The new emphasis was on the action aspect rather than structure. Reflecting this tendency, current theories of military disengagement from politics involve a set of different approaches between action and structure. It seems reasonable to assert that the structural approach may not explain the direct trigger of military extrication, because it only describes the environment in which decision-makers operate. However, this does not undermine the significance of structural analysis, especially when we look at the entire process of withdrawal as a 'set'.

By 'process', we mean a set of three steps: the pressure for change, the decision to withdraw, and the institutionalization of the new civil-military relationship. In explaining the decision, the action focus is useful, but to explain the pressure for, and the subsequent institutionalization of, withdrawal, there is no doubt that the structural focus is indispensable. For example, attention has to be paid to political structure which determines the availability of civilian leaders to whom the military may hand over government responsibility (or make partners in a new coalition). The economic aspect is also significant: the process by which economic crisis delegitimizes the military's claim for better economic management under authoritarianism, and the way in which social mobilization and the rise of a middle-class—as the result of economic growth—increase the demand for demilitarizing the political system.\(^{35}\) Even the aspect most unlikely to be the direct trigger to withdraw—the international system—is important in assessing the way in which the influx of international values, such as human rights and democracy, undermines the legitimacy of military rule.\(^{36}\) The action approach, on the other hand, explains things not covered by structural approaches, such as the military's motivation and rationale to disengage and its optimal timing. Thus, in understanding the entire process of military disengagement, both structure and action are indispensable and mutually supporting rather than conflicting. This assessment resonates
with general scholarly efforts to conceptualize how the structure regulates the action and how the action reproduces the structural environment.\textsuperscript{37}

This general interest among social scientists in the structure-action interaction has inevitably influenced the study of democratization and military disengagement from politics. One recent approach has been to place an analytical unit between action and structure, namely institution. This approach, generally referred to as the ‘new institutionalism’, tries to bridge actions and structure by analyzing the mediating role of institutions both in regulating action patterns and in producing policies that affect the structural pattern.\textsuperscript{38} Although this has not yet become the mainstream approach in scholarship on democratization, there now seems to be a consensus about the need for a balance between structural and action explanations.

It is in this theoretical context that our doctrinal focus on the analysis of the military extrication process should be located. One characteristic of doctrinal study is that it can potentially bridge different analytical levels. For example, it can cover state-military relations and the individual officer's political perception. It can also bridge the gap between the military's corporate identity and internal cleavage within the officer corps. Moreover, our focus mediates the analyses of 'universal' military values—such as professionalism—and their 'indigenous' applications.

The doctrinal study encompasses two processes of military extrication from politics: the process in which democratic demand (i.e. structural pressure) is perceived by individual officers and reflected in the doctrine's interpretative change; and the process in which military officers conduct policies (i.e. actions) based on their doctrinal re-interpretations which encourage democratic space in the political structure. In other words, the doctrinal focus is helpful to mediate the S-A analysis, while at the same time it relieves us from borrowing a psychological approach to assess officers' political perceptions. As seen in the previous sections, our study of the DSN bridges the analysis of the individual officer's belief-system and the construction of military regimes in Latin America. The process of regime demilitarization should be examined in the same framework.
Extrication problem II: analytical questions

We have argued that the process-centred view of military extrication treats different approaches as mutually supportive. However, in the scholarly attempt to understand the changing patterns of civil-military relations, there are some analytical problems which are still unsolved. In this section, we examine three of them—namely, intervention level, culture, and the role of professionalism.

Danopoulos (1988:7-13) suggests that there are four factors determining military withdrawal: the nature of intervention—whether the military functions as a praetorian moderator, a guardian, or a ruler; the performance of soldiers as political governors—the degree and pace of legitimacy deflation; professional military concerns—institutional incentives to go back to the normal military function; and the availability of acceptable alternatives—whether the military can find reliable civilians or not. Legitimacy deflation is a significant indicator, but there are many cases in which the military dominates politics without public legitimacy, and it implies 'loss of legitimacy' is too vague to be regarded as a determinant of military extrication. Moreover, presence or absence of the civilian alternative largely depends on the military's preference, thus it is hard to reduce it to the level of comparative generalization. Factors one and three have been subject to more extensive debate.

Levels of intervention

Any attempt, like that of Danopoulos, to conceptualize the nature of military involvement tends to be categorical or typological. Welch, for instance, argues that military involvement should be assessed along a spectrum, marked at one pole by unquestioned dominance of military officers over all political decisions and at the other pole by untrammeled control by governmental officials. He then distinguishes three 'levels of intervention', namely military influence in politics, military participation in politics, and military control of government (Welch 1993:74-75;1987:13). The aim of identifying these levels is to characterize the changing position of the military in politics. This kind of approach follows Finer's (1962:86-90) classic description of four levels of
intervention—influence, blackmail, displacement of the civilian cabinet, and supplantment of the civilian regime.

Criticism may be derived from at least three perspectives. First, as Luckham (1971:2) has asserted, Finer's typology would make it difficult to account for the structural and behavioural similarities of the military in countries where military intervention has been pushed to different levels, such as Haiti, Batista's Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, but where the military role in society and politics is very similar. In other words, the typological approaches adopted by Finer, Danopoulos and Welch look only at the different political status of the military at a given time, and make it more difficult to perceive the similarities or 'likeness' which undoubtedly exist between certain levels of military intervention. As we will see later, this question of likeness becomes a central issue in understanding the problem of incomplete extrication, which cannot be covered adequately by the 'level' analysis.

Secondly, from a political process perspective, Lovell and Albright (1997:7) have recently argued that the notion of the civil-military distinction failed to take account of the behaviour of the military as an interest group. The typological view of the level of military intervention makes it difficult to deal with the dynamics of change—for example, movement from 'participation' to 'influence'—which can activate lobbying (overt or covert) or political assertiveness on the part of the military. Since intervention analysis treats the position (or status) of the military in politics as the dependent variable, military politics resulting from a shift in the level cannot be covered within this framework. Thus, in facing the problem of military re-intervention in politics, level analysis can say little about its dynamics.

Thirdly, typologies of intervention level become useful cross-national indicators only in comparing militaries where boundaries between military and political roles are sufficiently clear. If the boundary is blurred, distinctions between the 'ruler' and the 'moderator' or between 'participation' and 'influence'—that try to identify the military function in the government—are insufficient for grasping the potential power of the military which still engages in far-ranging political activities. Analysis of this sort can unintentionally mix two types of militaries (boundary-clear and boundary-blurred) and place potentially different
militaries at the same intervention level. From this perspective, it should be noted that LIPI's *dwifungsi* study in 1996-7, which provided the first systematic and comprehensive criticism of *dwifungsi* by civilians, employed the framework by arguing that ABRI should reduce its political role to the level of 'participation' from the current level of 'dominance', and should gradually decrease it to 'influence' (Samego *et al.* 1997:231). As a political platform, this study showed a collective demand for demilitarizing the Indonesian polity. However, viewed from the standpoint of extrication theory, the typology does not seem to be appropriate to the case of ABRI, which has traditionally rejected the boundary in accordance with its *dwifungsi* doctrine. ABRI may interpret 'influence' as synonymous with *tut wuri handayani*, which—according to official interpretation—has already been manifest and implemented since the early 1990s. The intervention level analysis, therefore, may employ a framework unsuitable for the military, which sees no clear boundary between military and political roles.

Above all, the approach which sees the extrication phenomenon as movement along a continuum of civilian and military influence cannot deal with the problem of blurred political-military boundaries shaped by a country's experience. Because of this limitation, some scholars employ cultural approaches in the study of military extrication.

*Culture*

Rebecca Schiff's theory of cultural concordance rejects the current tendency of emphasizing the separation of civil and military institutions and the authority of the civilian sphere over the military to prevent domestic military intervention and secure military withdrawal. By contrast, the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, political elites and society, in order to prevent domestic military (re)intervention. Schiff identifies longstanding cultural values as the prime source of determining the type of mutual accommodation (Schiff 1995:7-9,12; 1997:120-23).

This approach is insightful in the sense that—unlike the intervention-level analysis—it does not presuppose a clear boundary between political and military affairs and it recognizes military decisions as the product of
political consensus. However, the cultural approach invites methodological questions. Once we see culture as the determinant of the concordance style, we are turned away from the perspective of power. In other words, concordance, or a political pact, often reflects a state of uneven equilibrium enforced by the powerful military. Civilian acceptance of this equilibrium is not always driven by 'cultural values' but often by a fear of coercion or, at best, a pragmatic calculation of political strength. There is no doubt that a country's civil-military interaction is influenced by cultural factors, but if we make culture the independent variable in the explanation of military (dis)engagement, rational-choice aspects of political decision making tend to be left aside, and this is not consistent with dominant paradigms in contemporary social science.

Apart from the methodological problem, our doctrinal study of dwifungsi—and, to a lesser extent, the DSN—leads us to see culture as a political tool of domination rather than as a mediator, or a 'shared value', for the making of elite agreement. Manipulating culture and tradition is one mode of military legitimation of its political involvement in Indonesia. Both concordance theory and our doctrinal study respect the important role played by culture in determining the pattern of civil-military relations. However, the former emphasizes its role in formulating collective consensus among elites, whereas the latter refers to the military's tactical interpretation of indigenous culture to control political discourse in favour of military engagement in non-military affairs. Perhaps both aspects can be seen in a single military regime, such that the difference is not a matter of significance. However, as a comparative analytical tool, our approach to culture seems to be less abstract and more user-friendly, since it enables researchers to adopt the 'official' description of culture to analyze how it is used to justify military intervention.

Professionalism

Returning to Danopoulos's four factors motivating the military to disengage, let us now focus on the third factor—professionalism. Danopoulos (1988:7) argues that 'the disposition or motivation to
disengage refers to a situation in which the military becomes convinced that the time has come to return to its prescribed professional mission.\textsuperscript{44} This view provides a significant theme in the scholarly analysis of how domestically-involved militaries are transformed into externally-oriented ones—or, borrowing Stepan's terms, shift from 'new' to 'old' professionalism. However, at a different level of discussion, of relevance to ABRI, it remains a question whether or not it is relevant to link professionalism with the military's 'motivation' to withdraw. It should be noted at the outset that neither non-professionalism (i.e. lack of corporate loyalty to the nation) nor hyper-professionalism (i.e. overloyalty to the nation and overconfidence in its managerial ability) motivates extrication, since the former may undermine the top leadership's decision to disengage for the sake of the nation, while the latter urges the officer corps' distrust of civilians.\textsuperscript{45} Although we may exclude these extreme cases, we still have to accept—in order to see professionalism as a motivation to disengage—an argument that the military decides to withdraw because it wants to be a professional military. Needless to say, this is a weak thesis because the term 'professionalism' here already contains apolitical connotations. The argument defining professionalism as the 'disposition' to extricate, therefore, tends to be tautological.\textsuperscript{46} If the motivation has to be found, it is usually the desire of the military to improve its public image, or to end internal military splits.

This assessment is, of course, not to dismiss the link between professionalism and extrication. Characteristics attached to professionalism—such as autonomy, cohesion, corporate interests, and loyalty to the nation—may influence the 'pattern' of withdrawal. For example, a degree of institutional cohesion helps explain the difference between chaotic and organized withdrawal. Maniruzzaman's data-rich study suggests that abrupt military withdrawal from politics is common in the case of non-professional militaries, whereas professional militaries maintain an effective chain of command and tend to plan their withdrawal (Maniruzzaman 1987:chapters 3, 4).

Institutional autonomy is also a significant factor influencing disengagement patterns. Bratton and van de Walle (1971:171) found that African soldiers—relative to Latin American—were reticent about handing power back to civilians and initiating managed transitions. The
reason for this was the weak autonomy of the military vis-à-vis social structure. They argue that, instead of professional training, nationalistic sentiments, and shared \textit{esprit de corps}, African militaries in general are riven by political factionalism and patronage systems based on ethnic solidarities in the ranks. Thus military reinterventions are usually driven by a defence of patrimonial material privilege (\textit{ibid.}:215-16). In this sense, the lack of institutional autonomy—or high social permeability—of African armies makes it difficult for them, compared with Latin American counterparts, to adopt stable disengagement plans through the command structure.

In sum, professionalism is a significant focus not because it explains the motivation to disengage, but because it illustrates the (in)ability of the military to arrange the transformation of its ‘institutional’ orientation in an organized way. Without this ability, any withdrawal attempt may face disruption. Viewed from this standpoint, ABRI’s relative position can be found somewhere between less-professional African and historically-professional Latin American cases. Although ABRI’s professional standards have been undermined by Soeharto’s (and Sukarno’s) neopatrimonial manoeuvring, this has not penetrated as deeply as it has in African armies. ABRI’s professional identity is strong and its sense of ‘national interest’ is entrenched. Its command structure is well established, and, in comparison with African cases, its ethnically diverse officer corps largely shares the profession’s corporate values. ABRI officers themselves have insisted on these aspects. Thus ABRI would seem to possess sufficient professional capacity to transform its institutional role orientation via the decision of the top leadership, if it so decides; unlike African cases, ABRI’s accommodation to managed withdrawal is therefore not unlikely if there is a will on the part of the current ABRI leadership. This assessment undermines one primitive justification of \textit{dwifungsi}: that ABRI may use guns if it is segregated from politics.

\textbf{Extrication problem III: dilemmas of incomplete transition}

In the previous two sections, we have discussed the general dynamics of the extrication process and some problems in its theoretical terrain. Our final focus is on the question of incomplete withdrawal, which reveals
some common dilemmas in the process of democratic transition and implies the importance of revising military doctrines in order to prevent military re-intervention. Our attempt at employing the lesson of the DSN for the better assessment of the prospects for dwifungsi needs to clarify these ‘dilemmas’.

The term ‘withdrawal’ is used to explain a ‘characteristic’ of military behaviour, but it cannot encompass the ‘degree’ of that behaviour because of its relativist nature. Viewed from the military, its abandoning of direct government ‘responsibility’ is obviously a withdrawal phenomenon, but in the eyes of civilian democratizers such a step may be perceived merely as alleviation of political control without disturbing military ascendancy.48 The difference in standpoint leads to different assessments of the same event. Thus, it should first be noted that when we discuss the issue of incomplete extrication we deal primarily with the perspective of those who want to civilianize the polity and establish a strong civilian control mechanism.

Incomplete extrication typically may be found in the struggle over two issues: first, the handling of past human-rights abuses by the military, and, secondly, the revision of professional military missions. When the military abandons government responsibility, civilian successors are almost doomed to face the popular demand for prosecuting the military that has committed human rights violations during its rule. Absorbing the demand is decisively important in consolidating the political legitimacy of the new civilian government.49 The dilemma, however, is that the military’s instincts of self-preservation may provide a motive for re-intervention when it finally understands the government's inability to let the ‘patriot’ military withdraw with ‘honour’. A common feature in Latin America, Fitch suggests, is that total withdrawal is unlikely without guarantees that human rights abuses and other crimes committed during the previous government will not be prosecuted (Fitch 1986:35).50

The other dilemma is in choosing between the need to revise the military's professional mission, and the need to avoid threatening its institutional autonomy (and the possible backlash from doing so). However, the new government needs to ensure that the military's autonomy is not too great, as this may allow some civilians, who are unsatisfied with the new government leaders and seek to advance
themselves in the ‘democratic’ competition, to ‘knock on the door of the barracks’. Moreover, it is argued that a ‘moral’ institutional status and a creditable/honourable role in accomplishing (but not setting) national goals must be provided for the military, within a functioning political democracy, while at the same time modifying its messianic self-image.51

Such balancing of policies is not easy. But the goals are very clear: to segregate the military from the political arena and to depoliticize the military institution. Scholars have argued that these can be achieved by infusing, or restoring, apolitical professional missions. In other words, as Huntington (1996:6) puts it, the emphasis is on rewriting doctrines and revising curricula in service academies (as discussed in the next section). To use a familiar concept, military doctrines have to be reshaped to define the clear boundary between military and political affairs and exclude the latter from the professional mission of the military. It is in this process of restructuring missions and establishing strong control mechanisms that conflict may intensify between the new civilian government and the military, as the latter sees such policy initiatives as threatening.52 After all, the legacy of human-rights violations and the revision of military missions are the two issue-areas of greatest potential conflict between the new civilian government and the military, and contain serious dilemmas for democratic civilians. Because of this, many regimes have experienced a long period of incomplete military extrication.53

Incomplete withdrawal is a situation in which the military has transferred government responsibility to civilians but retains ambitions and significant power sources to threaten the new civilian authority. It reflects demilitarization of the government while maintaining the militarization of the political system (Rouquié 1987:375). The fundamental change in the military’s political perception is scarcely recognized at this stage. At the height of its rule, the military rejected participatory democracy for the achievement of ‘national objectives’ as determined by professional officers. When faced with democratic pressures later, the military relaxed its political control or, in other words, deregulated the political market.54 The decision to extricate itself was most unlikely to have been the outcome of the military’s commitment to civil-society values; extrication is more likely to have been seen as the
safest way to restore the internal cohesion of the military. Nunn (1995:27) concludes that Latin American officers under the civilian authority still endanger (re)democratization, as they view the growing civilian political culture as a threat to military nationalism and to 'national values'. When threatened, he continues, they tend to fall back on tradition, national values, geopolitics, and national security to justify their continued existence. The reality of imperfect withdrawal has led many scholars to conclude that it is ‘prerogatives’ retained by the military which have left civil-military relations unchanged in essence and have hindered civilian governments in their efforts to consolidate new democratic regimes. The ‘prerogative approach’ has become a major tool for analyzing the problems of incomplete extrication.

However, this approach essentially assumes the status quo. Is it true that civil-military relations have not advanced? If so, can we deduce an explanation exclusively from the fact that the military still ‘holds’ these prerogatives, as Zaverucha (1993) insists? Explaining the scope and depth of prerogatives can certainly help us understand the perceived corporate interests of the military, but we should note that these prerogatives are not identical with military influence in politics. What is more crucial is the ‘using’ of the prerogatives. For example, in ABRI's case, what makes ABRI influential in the legislative process is not the holding of the prerogative, i.e. appointed military seats in the parliament (DPR), but the lobbying of the ABRI Fraction in the DPR (F-ABRI). If F-ABRI does nothing, the prerogative is not a source of influence. Similarly, kekaryaan (sending officers to non-military positions) is a prerogative of ABRI (officers instead call it ‘service’) but it has to be ‘used’ effectively in order to control politics. If ABRI merely has such a prerogative but lacks resources, legitimacy, and capacity, the intended purpose of the prerogative cannot be achieved. In this sense, the prerogative approach—which analyses ‘conditions’ rather than ‘process’—does not allow us to draw conclusions about the actual military influence in the polity.

The status quo assumption of the prerogative approach is challenged by scholars who favour the political-process approach. Fitch (1986), for example, argues that the recreation of political space and the diminished threat of violent repression has encouraged the re-politicization of
previously demobilized civilian sectors more rapidly and explosively than anticipated by most regimes. Despite the efforts of military leaders to control the selection of their civilian successors, the return to elections has typically produced unwanted results which cannot be repudiated. Similarly, Wendy Hunter's rational-actor approach leads her to conclude that: 'over time, democratically elected politicians have successfully contested the power of the military over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of influence' (Hunter 1995:427). Civil-military relations, therefore, are not static. The structure may remain the same, but the rules of the political game are constantly changing. Although the civilian authority may face difficulties in prosecuting military officers for past human-rights abuses, and may allow the military to retain its politicized professional missions, this does not mean that incomplete withdrawal results in political decay. The two most common dilemmas for the new civilian authority are no doubt critical to the politics of civil-military relations, but they are not everything. The practice of antipolitics is no longer legitimate and democratic civilians freely compete to mobilize the masses.

In sum, as with our earlier discussion of structure-action (S-A) approaches to the understanding of extrication, the condition-process approaches in the analysis of incomplete withdrawals should not be seen as contradictory but as complementary in explaining different aspects of the same event. A problem emerges only when one approach oversteps into the territory of the other and tries to generalize about the entire event. Such an 'obtrusive' conclusion may cloud the original merit of the approach. In analyzing dilemmas of incomplete extrication, this problem has to be remembered. We have seen that past human rights abuse by the military pose a major dilemma. But, does this allow us to say—as Huntington and others say—that making human rights abuses a non-issue is a prerequisite for successful transition? It can be argued that if the military is divided during the transition, human rights issues can be used by military softliners to purge the hardliners, which may smooth the transition. In Indonesia's transition from the Soeharto to the post-Soeharto regime, past human-rights issues were used in purging officers close to Lt-Gen Prabowo, a core hardline officer who is Soeharto's son-in-law, and in consolidating the new ABRI leadership under Gen Wiranto.
Crafting internal-external doctrinal transformations

We have examined major issue-areas of military extrication and concluded that: (1) our doctrinal focus provides a middle-range perspective to fill the gap between structural and action explanations; (2) neither intervention-level nor cultural descriptions sufficiently cover the problem of the blurred politico-military boundary set by doctrines; (3) the degree of professionalization may influence the extrication pattern, but is less likely to be its primary motivation (this is evident when the military is unwilling to be apolitical after the disengagement) and (4) civilian dilemmas about reducing military prerogatives are discernible, but they do not determine the entire civil-military power balance—the growing domain of civilian initiatives leaves the military unable to use certain prerogatives in the political process. Based on these assessments, this final section brings the DSN back into our discussion and examines the ideological-institutional problem of doctrinal transformation in consolidating political control of the military.58 Broadly speaking, the doctrinal transformation has two dimensions—external and internal. External transformation is concerned with the relative (or absolute) shift of military roles in society. Its focus is on military missions. Internal transformation refers to the change in corporate military perception and thought. We will consider these two dimensions—missions and thought—as the target of doctrinal reform for democratic civilians who endeavour to subordinate the military to government authority.

External transformation

To begin with missions: current scholarship seems to have reached a grand consensus that the military's political duties under the DSN should be removed from the scope of professional military missions. In addition to military control of formal political institutions, the DSN also provided a rationale for the use of military intelligence to conduct missions quite different from those associated with external defence, for example infiltrating businesses, universities, labour unions and political parties.59 It is not enough for the new government to prohibit these activities if the military retains incentives to engage in them. The 'loss of mission' may
simply confuse the military profession and stimulate its political reintervention. As seen earlier, what is said to be important is the provision of alternative but credible missions which do not harm democratic life.

Welch (1987:22-23) suggests that physical movement of troops to border areas, or outside the country for international peace-keeping efforts, facilitates transformation. According to him, the ‘appropriate’ mission would include relatively limited direct involvement in internal development or civic action. In regard to limited involvement in development projects, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:32) cynically state that the military's role in running state and parastate enterprises can be useful in occupying the time and interests of officers who might otherwise find little else to do. Even at the risk of increasing the danger— and cost—of corruption, it exposes those officers to a range of non-military contacts wider than those provided by the unavoidable civilian ‘coup-inducers’. Except for the latter, which merely tries to keep the military out of political activity, these proposals are all aimed at redirecting the military's professional missions.

Problems are easily found in both reality and theoretical assumption. The former raises the question of feasibility and the latter focuses on the dubious linkage between these missions and military depoliticization. The feasibility problem can be seen, for example, in Brazil. There, although civilian leaders considered shifting the military orientation to external defence missions, at the same time they knew that such missions were not necessary in post Cold War Latin America, where social and economic issues loom large. Under these circumstances, President Pranco has guided the military to expand its civic-mission programs since 1992; because deploying troops for civic action is far less costly than training them for external missions. However, this tends to aggravate civil-military tensions because the officer corps regards the civic-mission role as less appropriate for soldiers who are professionally trained for national security. A simple but important question here is: why are its corporate interests thought to be threatened? A part of the answer lies on the officers' growing sense of gap and distortion between their role perceptions and newly assigned missions. Arranging new missions does not solve the fundamental problem if the military retains the mental
legacy of the DSN. This leads to the second issue—the assumption that new missions may distance the military from politics.

In the post Cold War international environment, new missions are no doubt helpful to give credible and honourable roles to the professional militaries with a civilian-control philosophy. It is, however, too early to expect the same outcome in the case of professional militaries with the DSN legacy. Their perceptual universe may even identify these missions as a source of strengthening commitment to their long-term doctrinal beliefs, resulting in a growing gap between their self-image and the real situation. The case of ABRI—a professional military with the dwifungsi mentality—may contribute to the understanding of this.

ABRI has been involved in peace-keeping missions organized by the United Nations since 1957. Its troops—called Garuda Contingents—have been deployed to various places seventeen times, half of them during the 1990s. Officers like Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono and Brigadier-General Edi Budianto earned good reputations for their leadership during such operations. 62 For ABRI, involvement in peace-keeping missions not only provides a rationale for its active participation in the international community and for maintaining its ‘professional’ capacity judged by international standards, but also reinforces ABRI’s long-term commitment to dwifungsi practices. When asked about his experience in Cambodia, a navy intellectual, Rear Admiral Kustia, insisted that:

[O]ne reason why ABRI earned a high reputation among foreign military observers was that it was only ABRI personnel who got closer to the rakyat [people] in Cambodia. Other foreign soldiers asked the local people not to come inside the fence of their camps. Our soldiers were the opposite. They welcomed locals to visit them and sometimes gave medicines which were prepared for their own use.... Although other foreigners were surprised, it was not something special for ABRI because they had been trained with dwifungsi and AMD (civic action program). They just did what they had done in Indonesia. ABRI’s motto is that ‘what is good for the rakyat is what is good for ABRI.’ Our experience in Cambodia showed that the dwifungsi mission was universally applicable.63
Similarly, Air Vice-Marshals Graito Usodo, who was involved in the Cambodia mission, recalled that:

> Success in Cambodia was the product of *dwifungsi* which trained soldiers with the spirit of professionalism and self-dedication. Giving medicines to the local people is a common activity designed by Opster [territorial operations]. We just used it in Cambodia and we just got high reputation. There is nothing special.64

ABRI's participation in peace-keeping missions has demonstrated its professional capacity to international society, but has not revealed any contradiction between internal and external security missions. Indeed, the peace-keeping mission encourages ABRI to retain its traditional political doctrine. Military thinkers can argue that *dwifungsi* missions have proved ABRI's appropriateness in the international arena, and thus reinforce the process of *dwifungsi* re-legitimation.

ABRI's civic missions have similar effects. They include disaster relief, family planning, reforestation, rural food productivity, and more broadly defined socio-cultural development (The White Book:48-54). There is no doubt that these civic missions have contributed to the improvement of national life, but along with their overt purposes, these missions have provided ABRI with a constant basis for the internal socialization of its messianic self-perception. Regarding civic missions, the 1995 White Book insisted that ABRI was not influenced by cultural-based peculiarities but was united in its nationalism. ABRI officers, therefore, were in a good position to assist the government in maintaining social harmony (ibid.:54). This perception easily translates into the idea that ABRI is an agent of national integration and modernization, while civilians are self-interested; or that ABRI dedicates itself to the national interest, while civilians care only about their sectional interests. Needless to say, these organizational self-images have been at the core of *dwifungsi* legitimation and therefore have motivated broader political activities.

Under these circumstances, the peace-keeping and civic missions may be ineffective in keeping the military out of politics. Rather, it is highly probable that if the mission shift is attempted by civilians, the officers' messianic self-image will identify the gap between their broad national concerns and the limited role given to them. This may open the officers'
eyes to the civilians' inability to protect the 'national interest' and their lack of understanding of the military's competence to do so. Such a perception encourages military resentment towards the civilian authority, as in the case of Brazil. The argument that external warfare, border defence, peace-keeping and civic actions provide alternative professional missions to secure military non-intervention thus cannot be accepted without substantial reservation. The argument only becomes relevant where the military does not see any serious contradiction between its self-image and the reality. Perhaps it is limited to professional militaries which are inspired by the civilian-control doctrine.

Internal transformation

This is not to deny the significance of mission transformation, but to insist on its likely failure if not accompanied by internal doctrinal transformation, that is, counterbalancing the military's self-image as embodied in the DSN or dwifungsi. This transformation is crucial in the process of democratic transition in order to prevent the military from developing an interpretation of democratization which is quite different from that of the civilian authority. The gap in civil-military perceptions becomes an impediment to formulating the target and means of democratic reform—including the degree of military extrication and the assignment of alternative military missions.

In the case of Brazil, according to Stepan (1988:50-51), the professional military, with the mental legacy of the DSN, accepted that democratization was a necessary process but believed that it required 'self-guards' (or control mechanisms) in order to be accomplished. The interpretation of national security was tactically adapted to emphasize its leading role in promoting the 'principle of self-defence of democracy'. In this process, the military attempted to neutralize the emerging political opposition—the legitimate expression of dissenting opinion about government policy—labelling it as 'contestation', and seeing it as a systematic attack on the regime itself and thus illegitimate and subject to repression according to the self-defence principle. Similarly, in Indonesia, the military—which accepted the need for democratization—developed techniques to neutralize the democratic pressure which
emerged under the late New Order regime. *Dwifungsi* employed the *kewaspadaan* (latent threat) approach, which incorporated the concept of globalization as a threat inviting foreign political ideas, in order to delegitimize the opposition in the name of defending the principle of Pancasila democracy.67

In these circumstances, the core aspect of military thinking is the fusion of the sanctified image of ‘national interests’ and messianic self-role perception. The *nation* is recognized as an organic entity whose interests are embodied in the *state* in which the *government* handles its daily activities while the *military*—as a national representative—is expected to be the ‘direct’ guardian of the sacred national interest.68 This set of perceptions, which motivates the military to ignore the government, is the target of internal doctrinal transformation. In this regard, Zagorski (1992:82) insists that ‘the strategy includes the redefinition of armed forces’ sphere of competence, [so] as to induce them to alter both their technical and nationalist conceptions’. Reformers, he continues, must promote a view of nationalism that links loyalty to the nation with loyalty to the democratic regime. This idea resonates with Stepan’s (1988:143-45) assessment of educational problems in the Brazilian military. He relates how, in the war college courses, social and political conflicts were not accepted as a constituent element of a democracy. The recurrent assumption was that conflicts are dangerous. The DSN implanted a perspective of the state as the agent for structuring civil and political society so as to dissuade the articulation of conflict where possible, and to repress such articulation when necessary. Thus, Stepan continues, the democratic leadership of the state has to play a role in creating new doctrines of national defence that provide positive alternatives to these ideas and should include a curriculum with more serious attention by social scientists to the inevitable role of conflict in any polity.

Limiting the professional sphere of competence, reorienting the content of nationalism, and introducing the idea that political conflicts are needed for a viable political system are, therefore, considered necessary for transforming military thinking under democratic transition. The question thus becomes how civilians can initiate this process of internal transformation. The institutional redesigning of civil-military burden-sharing is central to this. Stepan (*ibid.*:144-45), for example,
suggests the need for establishing new national-defence colleges under a civilian Minister of Defence and the systematic professional incorporation of the military into a civilian-led national-security council. For him, the latter may reduce the military's sense of isolation, create a more effective system of mutual exchange of information and grievances, and thus enhance the capacity for democratic control. Zagorski (1992: 83) further insists on the need for consensus—within the council—that doctrinal change does not assume civil-military politics to be a zero-sum game and presupposes mutual dialogue about national security and the military's role in attaining it. The next step, according to him, is to institutionalize civil-military burden-sharing in formulating four layers of military doctrine, namely, the grand strategy, strategy, tactics and policy. 

The significance here is that the civilian authority is expected to have full control over 'entrance' and 'exit,' i.e. grand strategy and policy, while the military retains autonomy in the two fields in the middle. This division of labour is considered to be helpful in neutralizing DSN thinking and institutionalizing check mechanisms. Programs designed for the internal transformation of military doctrine are expected to reduce the perceived gap between new missions and the military's self-image, and, in effect, smooth the process of external transformation in the long-run.

ABRI and civilians: establishing the procedure?

Based on this assessment, what can be said about ABRI's possible path to internal transformation? We have discussed four major procedures:

1. shrinking the professional sphere of competence;
2. revising the content of nationalism;
3. socializing the idea that political conflicts are normal, and indeed necessary, for any stable polity; and
4. institutionalizing civil-military burden-sharing in formulating the defence-security framework.
These programs seem to be applicable to ABRI's case too, though, of course, special attention should be paid to Indonesian particularities. The following discussion considers procedural direction rather than the program's contemporary feasibility.

Concerning (1), ABRI's professional commitment has involved *dwifungsi* management. Limiting this ultimately means clearly demarcating the defence and political fields and having ABRI personnel retreat from all political assignments. But even, say, confining and auditing the role of intelligence may greatly shrink ABRI's professional competence in influencing daily political life, because information is the dynamo of professional military operations. Therefore, reforms might involve the establishment of an intra-military norm that sees domestic intelligence—such as surveillance of labour movements and campus life, as well as the manipulation of political party affairs—as a deviation from the professional criteria of the security apparatus.

Regarding (2) and (3), the role of Pancasila must be considered. Although this vague national ideology was frequently used as an exclusive doctrine against regime critics under the Soeharto regime, its literal content recognizes social plurality and harmony. It can therefore be utilized by future civilian leaders to induce ABRI to review its perception in such a way as to recognize political conflict as a necessary aspect of the political process—not as a threat to security. Such reform requires two steps: (a) fortifying an explicit interpretation of Pancasila that does not see political conflict as a threat to national unity; and (b) (re)defining the relationship between ABRI's role and Pancasila. The first of these steps should be accomplished exclusively by civilian initiatives, while the second can be left to ABRI's. Once the political use of Pancasila is to a certain extent confined, ABRI's commitment to the nationalist symbols (Pancasila and UUD45) is less likely to become a source of political repression.

Finally, (4) refers to civilian involvement in the formation of the defence-security framework and burden-sharing at each doctrinal level. In the current Indonesian context, the National Defence Security Council (*Wanhankamnas*)—a presidential advisory body—may be identified as the place to initiate doctrinal change at the top level. This inevitably requires its functional expansion—from the current one of formulating
the 5-Year Defence Policy Outline—under civilian initiative. Appointing civilians to the posts of Defence Minister, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, and Minister for Interior and Lemhanas governor also falls within the scope of new institutional designing. In terms of doctrinal revision, both Wawasan Nusantara and Ketahanan Nasional—as grand strategies—can become civilian fields with military advice, while the middle-range strategy based on Hankamrata is left for military autonomy. In policy implementation, the Council could oversee policies at the national level—for example, kekaryaan, F-ABRI, dispatch of special forces, and defence intelligence—whereas at the regional level, the conduct of various territorial operations could become subject to the governor's authority. By controlling 'entrance and exit', the future civilian authority may initiate the internal transformation which is needed for civilians to neutralize ABRI's distorted political views based on the 'latent threat' perspective. Justification and implementation of this political alarmism embodied in dwifungsi can, to a large extent, be regulated by the initiatives of democratic civilians to redefine military threats at the level of grand strategy and prevent such operations at the policy level.

ABRI's political extrication is of course a different question. Up till now, ABRI has not indicated a wish to totally disengage from politics. What is publicly advocated by some officers is the need for dwifungsi adjustment. However, when/if the time of the generals passes away in the near future, Indonesia's civil-military relations will enter a transition phase like that in many of the DSN-inspired states discussed above. There are many ways in which dwifungsi may be adjusted or even abandoned, but all will involve the four procedures of internal transformation noted above in order to eliminate the doctrinal basis of possible military re-intervention and to incorporate ABRI into the process of regime democratization.

Notes

1 See, for example, Crouch (1997:207-235).

2 Pancasila is a set of five national principles declared by Soekarno in 1945. It consists of belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian democracy based on consultation and consensus, and social justice.
Among various cross-national comparative strategies, Riggs (1994) provides a useful framework which focuses on formal political concepts that are used homogeneously in different countries but implemented heterogeneously. Using the concept of presidentialism, his work systematically integrates the variants of presidential regimes and generalizes the patterns of country-particular reflections. Our analysis follows his model.

On the political and economic background of the DSN, see Calvo’s excellent summary (1979:69-72).


Pion-Berlin puts equal weight on the influence of French and US armies in the formulation of DSN. Nunn (1995:6) argues, however, that the basic doctrinal model was French although encouraged by the US army.

Dwifungsi identifies Ipoleksosbudmil as the scope of military engagement. Among dwifungsi theorists too, Clausewitz’s famous aphorism has frequently been employed, for example in Notosusanto (1984:208). Here Clausewitz’s thesis is similarly misinterpreted or manipulated. The DSN and dwifungsi advocates use the dictum to conclude that military and political matters cannot be distinguished, thus the military should have a say in politics. However, Clausewitz’s own intent was to argue that it is politics that controls the military, not the other way around.

Loveman (1997:138-139). On the ideological premises for such constitutional settings, see also Pion-Berlin (1989b) which examines cases in Argentina and Peru.

O’Donnell’s influential book, published in the same year as Stepan’s article, endorsed the politicization impact of professionalism by using the case of Argentina. He argued that enhanced military professionalization had two effects: (1) raising the threshold of political turmoil that would result in systematic military intervention in politics; and (2) encouraging a far greater degree of political involvement by the military (O’Donnell 1973:166).
For a description of the historical development of professionalism in the Brazilian military, see also Nunn (1983).

Markoff and Baretta (1985:179, 182). They also support Nunn's study which emphasizes continuity rather than change, by insisting that one of the roots of the military activism of the 1920s throughout Latin America was the growing professionalism of the armed forces.

According to organization theory, this coexistence of competing perspectives is due to the fact that, in the early stage of institutional transformation, the transaction cost of altering an entire system is so large that it demands a cushion by selectively introducing new values into the established system. See Powell and DiMaggio (1991:4).

Markoff and Baretta (1985:186) admit that Brazilian officers in the 1930s often regarded internal security as an unprofessional mission.

Apart from these main points, McCann (1979:506) doubts the relevance of 'new' professionalism, since the 'old' one is not applicable to pre-1960s Brazil. He says that 'Stepan marshalled his data so adroitly that one nearly forgets to ask if the first premise is correct. Does Huntington's description of the "old professionalism" apply to the Brazilian army?' However, this criticism is weak because Stepan never claimed that old professionalism fitted the Brazilian military. He uses Huntington's thesis in order to contrast it with his new idea derived from his examination of changing patterns in Brazil and Peru. If Stepan is to be criticized in terms of old professionalism, a point should be made, instead, about his 'acceptance' of Huntington's paradigm in building his theory. Stepan's concept of new professionalism is the antithesis of Huntington's professionalism but this undermines the coherence of a causal relationship between professionalism and politicization, because Huntington does not envisage the possibility that 'external' security concerns also facilitate military politicization. Needless to say, the strategy of total warfare which mobilizes all national resources for external defence frequently leads to military politicization. Our Indonesian case is an excellent example. However, again, this is a criticism linked only to Step 3.

However, as seen in Nunn's description above, it is more accurate to say that Brazilian officers inspired by the DSN see themselves 'above' politicians and bureaucrats.

The classical debate is as follows. Against Huntington (1957:84), who argues that 'a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state', Finer (1962:25-27) argues that professionalism cultivates a high sense of nationalism among the officer corps that may encourage an interventionist orientation. Janowitz (1964:40-49) also insists that professionalization promotes officers' administrative capacity with the result that skill differentiation between military
and political management becomes blurred, in the eyes of officers, leading to the development of an interventionist military in the developing countries. Moreover, Abrahamsson (1972:17-18), from an organizational theory perspective, argues that professionalization strengthens the military's sense of corporate interests and may facilitate military intervention in politics once threatened by civilian politics. Sarkesian's (1984) vivid comparison of Huntington and Janowitz minimizes their differences but stresses their complementary nature in many respects. Needless to say, it is impossible to deduce from the degree of professionalism an explanation for political commitment without assessing the country's political environment. However, understanding how the process of professionalization influences the political orientation of the military itself is still a significant task in political science.

As if avoiding a claim of historical continuity, Stepan emphasizes that the Latin American military came to redefine its mission primarily in terms of dealing with threats to internal security, especially after the defeat of the conventional army in Cuba by Castro's guerrilla force. Then, highly professionalized militaries in Brazil and Peru developed doctrines and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgent movements, leading to a focusing of energies on the 'professionalization' of their approach to internal security and national development. See Stepan (1973:50-51). These processes should be seen as a whole in order to defend Stepan's thesis from criticism based on the historical perspective.

MacFarling's study of *dwifungsi* argues that ABRI is an instructive example of new professionalism because 'officers are members of a cohesive, well trained organization that has focused its corporate energies on achieving and maintaining national stability' (1996:188). This view identifies a phenomenal similarity but does not pay attention to any causal relationship in Steps 1-3. If the military is simply professional and plays the role of national stabilizer, it rather fits Finer's old model.

See also Atkins (1997:168-169). It does not mean that regime repression was 'soft' in Peru, but reflects a general feeling that geopolitics is a primary military concern while development is a social matter.

In the countries of the Southern Cone, a dominant interpretation emerged in the 1970s which asserted that groups which failed to uphold 'Western Christian values' were the active, or unwitting, accomplices of subversive forces trying to undermine noncommunist regimes and attack the moral and spiritual foundations of the nation. For details, see Fitch (1993:23-24). Fitch's article provides an excellent description of the detailed process whereby foreign doctrines were introduced and localized in Latin America.

The regime was the revolutionary military government headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado between 1968 and 1975. Velasco's revolutionary projects
involved land reform and nationalization of enterprises in several industrial sectors. For successes and failures of the left-wing DSN projects under Velasco, see Lowenthal (1975) and McClintock and Lowenthal (1983). Becker (1982) stresses the rise of the 'new bourgeoisie' under the regime, although its structural dependence on the state prevented the emergence of liberal-democratic ideology among the new middle class.

24 Stepan (1978:144-146) argues that none of the key radical officers who initiated the reform project was a graduate of CAEM. All, however, had strong connections with the intelligence sector which had investigated several corruption cases linking local elites and foreign actors during the previous Belaúnde administration. Philip (1980:427-429) suggests that CAEM graduates were instead prominent in the technocratic faction that supported reform from above, but opposed mass mobilization in support of those reforms.

25 The prestigious Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared called the DSN 'the doctrine behind the repression' in the country. See Pion-Berlin (1988:383). It is said that 8,960 people disappeared under the regime. In Brazil, 125 people disappeared while in Uruguay the number was 25 (Stepan 1988:70).

26 Kopkamtib (the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), an extra-judicial military agency, had been ABRI's major tool of internal security activities, including the ideological screening of party candidates and government employees, elimination of communist remnants, and suppression of campus and labour activists. This agency was replaced by Bakorstanas (Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability) in 1988, which inherited many of these internal security tasks.

27 Kopassus received training from the US; training of Kopassus officers also took place in Australia.

28 More precisely, Latin American militaries, with few exceptions (e.g. Venezuela and Mexico), traditionally believed that they—as 'guardians' of national interests—had a legitimate short-term political role when these interests were threatened in crises where civilian institutions were weak, fragmented and ineffectual (Fitch 1993:21). See also Bacchus's (1985) work which analyses the ideological basis of this orthodox short-term intervention by the Brazilian army and the rise of disputes when it adopted a long-term version after the Brazilian revolution in 1964.

29 This assessment owns much to Giddens' inspiring work (1987) which describes how the development of administrative technology in the modern state changed the definition of social 'deviance' and adapted the modes of its surveillance and control. See especially chapters 7, 8, and 12.

30 We limit our argument here to the impact of doctrine on the political activism of the military. Needless to say, however, political orientation cannot be explained solely by doctrine or ideology. Zagorski (1992:54,72-74) argues that the DSN
provided a ready rationale to legitimize permanent military involvement. But he
does not clarify what role the developmentalist ideology had in this.

31 Interview with Ali Sadikin, 30 July 1996; written interview with Gen (ret) A.H.

32 The testing of this hypothesis would require relational analysis of educational
programs and officers' perceptions. It could be conducted, for example, by
observing quantitative-qualitative changes in education materials in Seskoad and
matching them with content analysis of officers' writings.

33 The most prominent cases were Ecuador's General Guillermo Rodíguez Lara,
Argentina's General Levingston, and Bolivia's General Juan Pereda Asbún. The
overthrow of Preda was plotted by what was called 'the generational group'
within the military, a set of younger officers, academy trained, more
professionally oriented, who were tired of the continual factionalism and political
meddling of the top echelons of the officer corps (ibid.: 618).

34 Application of game theory, for instance by Przeworski (1992), represents a
distinct challenge to the structural approach. On the contest between the
structural and contingent analyses, see, for example, Bratoon and van de Walle

35 The relationship between economic change and the military has been a
1967—insists that professional armies in Latin America have middle-class
origins and have acted as representatives of middle-class interests, compensating
for that class's inability to establish itself as a well-integrated hegemonic group.
Huntington (1968:222) elaborates this insight and concludes that the military's
historic role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it to the lower
class. However, this Nun-Huntington hypothesis does not show how the officers
of middle-class origin protect middle-class political demands such as for wider
political participation and freedom of the mass media. Regarding Indonesia, there
is also an argument that dwifungsi's claim to be a social dynamizer, a middle-
class value (Indonesia Reports [Political Supplement], No.19, December 1986,
pp.7-8). However, ABRI generally views the rise of the middle class as a
political threat undermining Pancasila values. Apart from the middle-class
argument, Putnam's (1967:97) quantitative cross-national analysis stresses that
socio-economic mobilization in general undermines the military's role in
politics, because it may increase the number of political actors and diffuse
political resources available to the military. Huntington (1968: Chapter 1), on
the contrary, argues that, as social mobility increases, the political system may
fail to absorb social demands, resulting in political disorder which invites
praetorian military intervention. O'Donnell's (1973) influential study concludes
that the most likely consequences of modernization (with high social mobility)
in Latin America are bureaucratic-authoritarian military regimes, due to the
increasing demand for wage repression to encourage capitalist economic growth. Ruhl (1982), who retested Putnam's analytical indicators, also rejected Putnam's thesis on empirical grounds. More recently, Danopoulos (1988:4) insists on the positive correlation between high levels of socio-economic development and the degree to which the military is disposed to let go of political power. But a causal relationship is not provided here.

Welch (1993:75,86,88) argues that civil-military relations in Third World countries are facing serious fundamental challenges due to the collapse of the Second World in 1989. The collapse of communist regimes affected the Third World through diminished military aid and greater emphasis on peace-keeping. The legitimacy of military rule may also be undermined by the loss of rationale in the form of the threat of international communism.

Skocpol (1985:21) suggests that 'organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions, and make possible the raising of certain political issues'. In civil-military relations, the structure-action (S-A) interaction was presented, for example, by Suh (1987: Chapter 2). However, his model presents the S-A flow in a simple linear direction, excluding the feedback process (how actions regulate actors and structure). One of the influential works which successfully included the feedback loop in S-A analysis was Giddens' (1987) 'structuration theory'. However, one criticism of structuration theory is its lack of attention to the role of intermediators in the process by which individual actions influence the structural reconfiguration. See Thompson's (1989) perceptive work on evaluation and criticism of structuration theory. In more recent civil-military relations studies, the S-A issue is often presented in terms of organization-behaviour interaction. See Crouch (1997) for an attempt to analyze the interaction of organizational structure, ideology, culture, and political behaviour in comparing Southeast Asian militaries' reactions to democratization.

See O’Neil (1996) and Bratton and Walle (1997:41-45) who employ this neo-institutional approach in their analysis of democratic transition. Bratton and Walle argue that it can overcome the major weakness of the contingency approach to democratization, that is 'excessive voluntarism' which creates a problem of 'presentism'—by heavily discounting the past—and a lack of predictive power as a comparative political theory. Both these studies are strongly inspired by the study of DiMaggio and Powell. For an excellent overview of 'new institutionalism' and its differences with 'old' studies of political institutions, a recent work by Selznick (1996), who is labelled by DiMaggio and Powell as a representative of the 'old institutionalists,' is helpful. The term 'institution' does not refer to formal organization, but is defined as 'a social order or pattern that reveals a particular reproduction process and owes its
survival to relatively self-activating social process'. This includes, for example, rituals, cultures, ideologies, laws and social beliefs. See Jepperson (1991:145).

A similar assessment is presented in Stepan (1986:77).

Hanneman's (1985) cross-national quantitative measuring of the level of intervention shows that existing typologies of the military role in politics are insufficiently detailed.

_Tut wuri handayani_ is a Javanese expression describing how a father supports his young children from behind as they learn to walk. This is one of ABRI's leadership principles frequently argued in the face of growing social demands for regime opening.

A similar problem can be found in the study of democratization in general, which tries to categorize the level of democracy or the degree of authoritarianism in developing countries, by using a continuum between democracy and authoritarianism. Several concepts such as pseudo-democratic, semi-democratic, soft-authoritarian are placed along the continuum but, viewed from a country-specific stance, some cases show that democratic-authoritarian, or 'responsive-repressive' characteristics are not contradictory but mutually supportive for regime maintenance. See Crouch (1996: Chapter 1) which advocates this perspective by examining the case of Malaysia.

King, Keohane and Verba's brilliant study suggests that the concept of culture can be a hindrance to empirical _evaluation_ of theories and hypotheses. Therefore it should be avoided in constructing causal theories. For details, see King, Keohane and Verba (1994:99-114). A similar evaluation can be applied to Huntington's (1984:210) interesting argument that: 'countries that have relatively stable authoritarian rule are more likely to evolve into relatively stable democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated between despotism and democracy. In the latter, neither democracy nor authoritarian norms have deep roots among the political elites, while in the former a broad consensus accepting authoritarian norms is displaced by broad consensus on or acceptance of democratic ones'. Here, 'consensus' and 'norms' are treated as independent variables, but, like culture, they are too abstract and unobservable to form the basis of a concrete causal hypothesis. Another case is Pinkney's (1990:163) cross-national study which concludes that, with few exceptions, right-wing military regimes have generally fewer objections in principle to withdrawing from politics than those on the left. This is not a cultural approach, but an example of using unclear independent variables.

Here, professional mission refers to external defence tasks.

For a similar assessment, see Lissak's (1976:19) classic study of Third World military role-expansion.

We can rephrase Danopoulos's above quotation as follows. 'The motivation to _stop playing politics_ refers to a situation in which the military becomes
convinced that the time has come to return to an *apolitical military*. The right question here is why the military wishes to be apolitical, and the answer to this becomes the motivation to withdraw. A similar problem can be found more generally in the literature—for instance, Finer (1983)—which emphasises ‘preconditions’ for military withdrawal—such as presence of alternative civilians and the need for civil-military pacts. These ‘prerequisites’ are treated as factors of extrication, but they are also the consequences of withdrawal; thus one ends up saying that civilianization needs civilians. Among many criticisms of this ‘precondition approach’ to military extrication, see Pion-Berlin (1995) for one suggesting its tautological nature.

Soeharto insisted on 22 July 1993 that: ‘ABRI’s political participation was intended to involve ABRI in the policy-making process in order to avoid a situation where ABRI might raise their guns against unwelcome policies’.

The concept of ‘government responsibility’ is borrowed from Sundhaussen (1984). Although he himself does not emphasize it, the concept greatly contributes to the study of Third World military politics. It gives us an analytical lens to examine the military which has given up government control but still plays a very active role in the process of political decision making—a phenomenon which cannot be covered by the dichotomous view of withdrawal and intervention.

Prosecution is especially important to show the new government's commitment to democratic principles, social justice and the rule of law. See Huntington's (1991:213-214) listing of the reasons. On the political strategy of the civilian authority using the human-rights issue to strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis the military, and its limitations, see Zirker's (1988) study of Brazil.

Argentina is suggested here as exceptional. But a year after Fitch's publication, a military coup was attempted to oppose prosecution of human rights. In 1988 two additional military uprisings were attempted. Although civilian governments led by Alfonsín and later Carlos Menem suppressed all of them, the government decided to pardon those officers who had been charged with human rights violations and even with coup attempts. Huntington's (1991:231, 252) well-know policy advice to the Third World democratizers was: ‘If [regime] transformation occurs, do not attempt to prosecute authoritarian officials for human rights violation. The political costs of such an effort will outweigh any moral gains’. But, he says, if prosecution is morally and politically desirable, do it promptly against the authoritarian leaders, not against middle- and lower-ranking officials. Against 'new' coup attempts, however, he recommends ‘to ruthlessly punish the leaders of coups against your new government’. Thus, he distinguishes between 'past and present,' and between 'human-rights and coups'. Our focus in this section is, of course, on past human-rights abuses.
See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:32, 35). They also emphasize that, in order to achieve these ends, the military spirit of professionalism has to be secured by democratic civilians. According to them, professionalization is often disturbed by civilian leaders who want to install officers loyal to their aspirations in high military office, even if that means jumping ranks or appointing less professionally competent candidates.

See Stepan (1988: Chapter 6). To emphasize the danger of a threatened military, Danopoulos (1992:20) suggests that the crafting of civilian control should include 'group participation and a sense of involvement in the definition of the broad methods and means of governing, conflict resolution, leadership selection, foreign and security policy goals, and the ways of distributing wealth'. However, giving such broad participation may undermine a new civilian’s effort to demarcate the political-military boundary.

Zagorski's (1992:46) empirical study suggests that the incomplete period took eighteen months in Argentina, five years in Brazil, seven years in Chile, six years in Peru, and five years in Uruguay. Indonesia's transition from the Soeharto to the Habibie government has been in progress for less than a year, but similar dilemmas are already visible.

See, for example, Black's (1980) study of military perceptions during the Brazilian version of keterbukaan (openness), which started in 1979 and was called political decompression (distensão) or opening (abertura). According to Black, democratization was perceived by Brazilian officers as allowing political participation by those who accepted the military's own interpretation of its 'moderating role' (p.635). Zirker (1986) found a growing nationalist inclination among the hardline officers during abertura.

For the best analysis of military prerogatives, see Stepan's (1988) extensive study of incomplete extrication under the civilian president, José Sarney, in Brazil (1985-90). He lists eleven areas in which the military seeks prerogatives: in the constitution; in its relationship with the chief executive; in coordination of the defence sector; in its allocation of cabinet members; in the legislature; in appointment of senior civil servants; in the intelligence sector; in the role of the police; in military promotions; in state enterprises; and in the legal system. Stepan's model was modified and updated by Zaverucha (1993), who concluded that: 'civil-military relations did not advance, and particularly nothing substantial was done to curtail military prerogatives. Indeed the military continued openly challenging the constituted civilian authorities. Leaders of the democratic transition opted out of confronting the military over its scope for autonomy. In those rare cases when the Executive and Legislature tried to impose their will, the military threatened to disrupt the transition and the civilians simply resigned themselves to the continuation of military prerogatives' (ibid.:299).
Hunter’s detailed case studies of labour-rights, and budgetary and development issues leads her to conclude that military prerogatives are not necessarily translated into effective influence over policy outcomes. See Hunter (1997:71).

Scholars tend to look at different interests involved in the process of authoritarian breakdown which is characterized by internal division within the military between hard- and softliners. However, the literature seems to have favoured a dichotomy of ‘civilian vs. military’ in the handling of past human rights abuses. Here, the role of the continuing internal split is less focused. The military, which retains old prerogatives, is said to become defensive in the face of civilian attempts at undermining its corporate interests and institutional autonomy. However, this perspective limits our observation of the pluralistic political process. When the key officers in the new military leadership—usually the softliners—endeavour to restore internal unity which has deteriorated as a result of their conflicts with the hardline group, they may endeavour to deal with the civilian authority on the issue of human rights, both in order to facilitate (and legitimize) the purging of the hardline faction and to strengthen the internal legitimacy of the current military leadership. If that is the case, the degree of the military’s cooperation in the handling of past human rights abuses still depends on the logic of the internal military split, not the dichotomy of civil-military conflict. The new military leaders may find a technique to sideline human rights pressures by explaining the violations as the conduct of hardliners who had deviated from the military disciplinary codes. The ‘professionally’-oriented softliners may think that, in order to defend the ‘institutional’ position of the military in the transition process, and to regain its internal cohesion, purging hardliners is a necessary step. Coping with democratic civilians is a rational choice if it helps to achieve that end.

Welch (1992:327) suggests that ‘there is a commonality in the literature of Latin American militaries that the new doctrine of national security has changed the military’s professional role and stimulated its political role expansion, but reasons for muting the “new” professionalism remain unexplored in detail in the literature’. Doing so requires us to examine at least three aspects: mission, professionalism and doctrine.

On the relationship between the DSN and internal intelligence, see Zagorski (1992:55-58).

Huntington (1996:10) similarly suggests peace-keeping missions because, although not conventional warfighting, they do involve the deployment of armed forces abroad in situations where they could be called upon to fire or be fired upon. Moreover, the involvement of the military in new international alliances and collaborative relationships can provide military establishments with constructive and demanding missions.
For details, see Hunter's (1994) cross-national comparison of civilian initiatives in redirecting military missions, and their problems. In Brazil, reducing the military budget also worked negatively as officers became unable to maintain their living standards and many started to find second jobs (ibid.: 643). In Indonesia, a similar concern was officially expressed by the Army Chief, Gen Edi Sudradjat, who had conducted internal military reforms, the so-called 'Back-to-Basics' in 1992.

Bambang Yudhoyono was leader of Garuda Contingent 7 to Cambodia (1991), while Edi Budianto—a classmate and friend of Prabowo at the military academy—led Garuda Contingent 14 to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993. Bambang was the key adviser to Gen Wiranto.

Interview with Rear Admiral A.A. Kustia, Coordinator of Expert Staff for Navy Chief-of-Staff, 3 October 1996. During the UN peace-keeping operations in Cambodia, Japanese Foreign Minister, Koji Kakizawa, who visited the country, commented that among foreign military observers Indonesian troops seemed to be the best disciplined and most friendly towards the local people.

Interview with Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, Expert Staff for ABRI Commander in the Field of Industrial Affairs, 26 November 1996.

Regarding external warfare in general, Odetala's case study illustrates that the mission may even undermine the professional standard in the cases of African militaries. He suggests that the conduct of wars created the necessity for rapid crash-training as well as 'quick' promotions within the military because of manpower needs to prosecute such wars. Premature promotions of more junior officers to act in more senior positions adversely affected organized growth of the professional military institutions (Odetola 1982:24). This may be an extreme case, but it casts doubt on the assumption that the external defence mission promotes professional orientations.

We intentionally avoid using the term 'Western professionalism', which is often used by scholars in explaining the non-interventionist military, to avoid the cultural-value orientation contained in the terminology which inclines to the 'excessive universalism' of linking it to democratization and 'Western' values.

Together with this, the New Order military's interpretation of democratic pressures tended to use the systems approach to neutralize criticism. The 1995 White Paper argues that 'the range of domestic political problems has expanded basically because the rate of growth of political aspirations has far outstripped the rate at which the practice of democracy has matured. Imbalance between these two factors can disturb political stability' (p.10). This interpretative model—which seems to borrow Huntington's (1968) political order thesis—allowed ABRI to view criticism as a matter of system disequilibrium, obscuring the aspect of policy failure of the regime (and ABRI) as the cause of growing political aspirations.
These are common perceptions of political militaries in developing countries. Lissak (1976:20) argues that their role perception stems from the distorted development of an otherwise legitimate distinction between the nation and the state. This distortion is manifested by an officer corps which considers itself the exclusive embodiment of the will of the nation and views all other functional groups as expressing only partial and temporary interests. Their self-image as guarantor of the permanent interests of the nation provides (in their eyes) the necessary legitimacy for them to assume the right to rule. Finer (1962:26) also suggests that: 'the moment the military draws the distinction between nation and the government in power, they begin to invent their own private notion of national interest and from this it is only a skip to the constrained substitution of this view for that of the civilian government'. These self-images are strengthened by military professionalization in two ways: first, the indoctrination of national loyalty; secondly, the paradoxical reality that the profession's life-style gradually alienates officers from the rest of society. Feld's (1968:65-66) excellent study suggests that this alienation inclines the officer corps to assert that it is bound by a unique allegiance to the state, the constitution or a national tradition rather than to any particular regime (government).

Similar institutional reforms are recommended by Christopher Donnelly, special adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs to NATO's secretary-general, in referring to the cases of Eastern European militaries which faced a wave of political demilitarization (Donnelly 1996).

The grand strategy—identification of primary enemies and threats—should be formulated by civilians with military advice. The strategy—how to combat them—should then be developed by the military with the approval of the civilian authority. Tactics—how weapons and organizations are to be used—should be almost entirely under military direction. The policy—the provision of manpower, material and other military resources—should be almost entirely under civilian control.

Our argument here is not aimed at generalizing the direction of military reform which is, to large extent, determined by country-particular factors. Rather, the attempt is to clarify the configuration of the transformation process which is applicable to many civil-military patterns under democratic transition. It is beyond our focus to formulate catch-all alternative missions, partly because our analytical focus is not on grand theory, and partly because it is too early to evaluate this issue in the context of Indonesia's rapidly evolving civil-military relations.

ABRI may insist that there is no civil-military dichotomy under Pancasila which insists on 'mutual help'. However, our discussion here focuses on the strategy of non-military forces which want to reduce the influence of ABRI in politics. From this perspective, the distinction between ABRI and others, or the military
and civilians, is inevitable. Although Pancasila and UUD45 have been used by Soeharto and ABRI as tools of exclusion, civilian empowerment of these regime symbols has been an effective critical activity in the sense that it uses the regime's own language to criticize military policies as deviations from Pancasila and UUD45 and directly attack the very core of the regime's ideological project. See Rasyid (1994:349) and Liddle and King (1996:29-30) for vivid evaluations of this mode of resistance. Rasyid was recruited by the Habibie government as the chairman of the Study Team for Political Laws (Tim Pengkajian UU Politik) which was formed to revise the New Order political laws which had restricted popular political participation. It is possible that his assessment of Pancasila will become a tool for engineering future civil-military relations, and he himself admits the efficacy of the approach. (Interview with Professor Ryaas Rasyid, 29 October 1998).
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