Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Pakistan

TAHIR I. SHAD
JENNIFER GRAY REDDISH

Published by
The Department of Political and Social Change
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University
1996
In recent years there have been some dramatic changes of political leadership in the Asia-Pacific region, and also some dramas without leadership change. In a few countries the demise of well-entrenched political leaders appears imminent; in others regular processes of parliamentary government still prevail. These differing patterns of regime change and regime maintenance raise fundamental questions about the nature of political systems in the region. Specifically, how have some political leaders or leadership groups been able to stay in power for relatively long periods and why have they eventually been displaced? What are the factors associated with the stability or instability of political regimes? What happens when longstanding leaderships change?

The Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific Project will address these and other questions from an Asia-Pacific regional perspective and at a broader theoretical level.

The project is under the joint direction of Dr R.J. May and Dr Harold Crouch.

For further information about the project write to:

The Secretary
Department of Political and Social Change
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (RSPAS)
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200
Australia
MANAGING ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

Tahir I. Shad
Jennifer Gray Reddish

The traditional concept of the modern political unit is a state that incorporates a single national community. Political development includes the process by which heterogeneous communal elements are gradually integrated and homogenized into a single nation (Hayes 1931; Kohn 1979:36-70). Such politics, commonly referred to in the social science literature as 'integrated', rarely exist. As Walker Connor asserted, in 1976, only twelve of a total 155 contemporary states can be described as ethnically homogeneous (Connor 1972:320).¹

Until recently, integration theorists believed that heterogeneous states were unnatural and inherently unstable. States characterized by social and political cleavages eventually would move towards greater harmony and consensus, or cease to exist as viable political units. Assimilation was not only the desired and natural outcome of intergroup relations, but the sine qua non of political stability.² In the 1990s, however, parochial ethnic consciousness appears to have grown throughout the world and divisions have reappeared in new guises. Assimilation and increasing social homogeneity do not appear to be the dominant trend.³

The assimilation model failed to predict and to explain the dynamics of group relations and their significance to the structure and function of the state. Theorists have been unable to tell us how and why parochial identity becomes important at different historical moments. Why do groups separate from each other at one time, and unite at another? Traditional theory also fails to indicate when these dissatisfactions imperil the viability of the state (Brass 1991). Social scientists have begun to question the validity of some of the earlier assumptions and approaches.
They have outlined and advocated an alternative model in which communal pluralism is a legitimate, indeed the only, feasible structural option (Rose 1971; Cobbon 1969; Lynhart 1968). They question whether social homogeneity or fragmentation are independent variables that determine the way a polity operates. Perhaps they are dependent variables, the products of other political, economic and social pressures.

To find the answer to this question, one must re-evaluate the dominant paradigm in integration research. It aims to identify elite strategies and policies adopted to manage problems of national and political integration in heterogeneous societies. Evidence indicates that division of one sort or another is characteristic of most human societies. During the last decade, according to Huntington, communal conflict has emerged as the dominant form of social strife in both developing and modern societies. Few societies on any continent have not experienced this phenomenon, and evidence clearly suggests that its frequency and intensity are increasing. Modernization involves social mobilization; social mobilization generates communal identity and interaction; communal conflict and violence are the inevitable result (Huntington 1972; see also Melson and Wolpe 1971:1-12). This line of inquiry does not question the extent of homogeneity in a political system, but rather, asks how and why societies succeed or fail in managing conflict.

Pakistan is uniquely suited to provide a case study. Few states created since World War II have had greater problems in establishing and maintaining authority. The history of Pakistan can be interpreted as a series of attempts to establish national and political integration.

During the 1930s, the idea of a separate, independent, Muslim state began to take shape in India. Allama Iqbal (1875-1938), the poet-philosopher of Muslim India, is credited with conceiving, articulating, and finally selling the idea of a separate Muslim polity to the Muslim League leadership. Iqbal viewed national identity as territorial and ideological. A unified Muslim society and centre would be preserved through the creation of an Islamic state. He believed Islam would integrate the ethnically and linguistically diverse Muslim community. According to Iqbal, an Islamic community could not exist without a polity.
Iqbal’s beliefs soon gained force in the Indian Muslim community. In 1940, Mohd Ali Jinnah, at the All India Muslim League conference, summarized Muslim thinking of that period. Echoing Iqbal, he stated: ‘The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry nor dine together, and they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions’ (Jamil-ud-Din 1970:380). At the same conference, the Muslim League adopted the famous Objectives Resolution for the creation of a separate political entity within a loose Indian confederacy. As a result, a key change occurred in the Muslim nationalist movement in the post-1940 period.

The Muslim League changed its objective, from securing minority rights within an Indian Union, towards achieving majority rights in a separate and independent political entity (Sayeed 1968; Hardy 1972; Hasan 1991). Grassroots organizations gained momentum at the district and village levels, and middle-class leadership was recruited to build these organizations within the Muslim League. Economic questions of bread and butter were included in the Muslim League programmes.

In a short time, the Muslim League mobilized the Islamic population behind the slogan, ‘Pakistan — a homeland for Muslims’, promising a state in which Muslims could organize their lives according to Islamic ideology. Wheeler succinctly summarized this situation:

Seven short years after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution, a separate state had been achieved. The emergence of Muslim political separatism, the demand for separate representation, then minority safeguards, then provincial autonomy and federalism, and finally a separate state had occurred well within an adult lifetime, and an entire population was confronted with the psychological adjustments of the transition from minority to nationality. The Pakistan movement had appealed to diverse aspirations among the urban middle classes of the provinces that were to remain India, the rural aristocracy of the Indus Valley, and the peasant masses of eastern Bengal. There were, too, those Muslims — both traditionalist and secularist, who did not support the Pakistan idea at all, and also non-Muslims whose destinies had perforce been shaped by the surge of Muslim nationalism. This variegated people was to give institutional form to a new state,
with a heritage from British India of parliamentary democracy and of autocracy, and at the same time, a heritage of repudiation of both of these. From such diverse aspirations and traditions would be built a state and a society in which Islam would have a definite meaning (Wheeler 1970:36).

Pakistan did emerge as a bifurcated nation-state in 1947, but as Keith Callard points out, it possessed little history of national unity. Pakistan also did not comply with the Western definition of a nation-state, i.e. Pakistani citizens did not share a common language; they did not possess a homogeneous culture; they did not comprise a single geographical or economic unit (Callard 1957:1).

Muslim nationalism in India resulted from the Hindu-Muslim dichotomy; the fear of the Hindu majority. Throughout their struggle for independence, Indian Muslims emphasized their unique culture separate from Hindus (Jamil-ud-Din 1952:469; Chaudri 1967; Alan 1966). The leadership of the Muslim League never tried to develop a sense of Pakistani identity inside the Muslim community. The second nation in India was defined as 'Muslims living in the subcontinent', a definition that did not consider the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, regional, and economic differences between Muslims living in various parts of India. The Muslim elite of this time, as in Iqbal's, assumed Muslim identity compensated for these differences.

Religion, though believed to be the quintessential driving force behind Muslim nationhood, did not play an important role in the pre-Pakistan movement, except in the revival movements of the nineteenth century.9 The Muslim League's ideals did not appeal to the ulema, the religious leaders and scholars. 'Islamic state', 'Islamic government', 'Islamic constitution', and 'Islamic ideology' were slogans of the pre-independence era, and these slogans were successfully utilized to mobilize mass support for Pakistan, but no one was quite sure what they meant. Thus, the identity of Pakistan, except as a state distinct from Hindu Indian, remained vague.

The Muslim elite did not make a serious effort to translate this 'Islamic ideology' into a concrete economic, political, sociocultural, and religious organization for the state of Pakistan (Binder 1964:4; Ahmed 1983). Pakistan was thus a divided nation at birth, and Islam, while apparently the country's foundation, could not guarantee the emergence of national identity. Since independence, ironically, Pakistan has failed to resolve this predicament. With the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, the emergence of Bangladesh as an
independent state marked the triumph of ethnic, linguistic nationalism, and the end of a major tragic phase in Pakistan’s political history. But the problem of a Pakistani identity persists.

Pakistan today contains five major ethnic groups. In number, the largest of these are the Punjabis, followed by the Sindhis, the Pathans, Baluchis, and finally the Muhajirs. There is also a significant ‘tribal population’. Each of these groups is defined by a mixture of linguistic and political attributes. The languages spoken by the five major groups are different, and do not represent regional dialects. English is the official language and Urdu is the national language. Approximately 15 per cent of the population speaks one or both (see Hussain 1979). The remaining 80 per cent speak 32 different languages, and numerous dialects.

The tribal population is distributed through the four provinces, but the greatest concentrations are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Azad Kashmir. Considerable numbers of Punjabis, Pathans and Sindhis live outside their respective provinces. This is particularly true in ethnically diverse major urban areas of Pakistan, namely, Karachi, Lahore, and Rawal Pindi. Further, the Pathans even outnumber the indigenous Baluchis in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan (Ahmed 1973:72-93).

Levels of development of the four provinces

Generally speaking, the provinces of Punjab and Sind are the most highly developed, while the other two provinces and the tribal areas are less well developed. Indicators of such gaps include differentials in per capita income, life expectancy, levels of industrialization, and literacy rates. Such gaps are widely perceived and politicized in Pakistan. In fact, the dismemberment in 1971 was occasioned by the perception of widening inequality between East and West Pakistan.

Currently, Pakistan faces secession of ethnic groups due to lack of social cohesion. The most serious is the demand for greater autonomy in Baluchistan. Also, independent separatist feelings in Sind for the creation of Sindhudesh, and demands for an independent Pathan state, to be called Pakhtoonistan, cause political tension.

So far, however, Pakistan has appeared to reinforce national unity. An example occurred in the early phase of the Bhutto regime (1972-77). After the
severe crisis and dislocations of 1971, the return to party competition, the adoption of a constitution with a federal structure, and the substantive economic recovery promoted by the Bhutto regime seemed to give the new Pakistani nation a momentum and a sense of purpose (La Porte 1973:175; Richter 1979:547-57; Richter and Gustafson 1980). Bhutto's personality also played a large role. Contrary to expectations, however, Pakistan, developed serious political setbacks after two years of Bhutto's rule. Regional, ethnic groups provoked largely by the impact of economic deprivation, feelings of political isolation, and the pressures of regional and international conflicts, became unsatisfied with the status quo.

The resulting atmosphere set the stage for a third military coup in July 1977, led by General Zia ul Haq.

Immediately before the coup, unprecedented mass protests and provincial uprisings, accompanied by general civil unrest against the Bhutto regime, erupted. Also, events in neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran exacerbated the internal crises in Pakistan.

The coup brought a military junta to power — and it became the most stable government in Pakistan's history. The members of the military elite believed they possessed the expertise to pursue development programmes, and maintain law and order. Neither, in their judgment, was possible under the rule of the politicians. For the first time, senior army officers monopolized key positions in the central government, as well as in the provincial governments. Pakistan has entered a new, perhaps dangerous, phase in its turbulent political history. These difficulties will not be superficial. They could polarize Pakistani society along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines permanently. The country's unity, security, and integrity will be seen as threatened by the prospect of further territorial division, unless the ruling elite makes substantial policy alterations to satisfy the social, economic and political demands of the ethnic groups. The question of national and political integration has become the key to the survival of Pakistan as a nation-state, in the light of the Bangladesh experience.

The situation in Pakistan, at times, does not seem hopeful. The main question for political analysts today is: how do you solve ethnic conflict, while maintaining the state? There are many theories in political science addressing this question. However, which theory is best for such a task? Though most social
scientists have argued that Pakistan's problems stem from a lack of integration, few agree on an exact definition of the term.

From the early sociological thinkers to the modern nation-building theorists, the main question has been how and why social units cohere (Connor 1972; Weiner 1966). What is it that holds a unit together? (ibid.:54; see also Moynihan 1993). But after achieving agreement on the problem, theorists part company on the definitional issue of what exactly an integrated social unit is. Is an integrated social unit the same as an integrated political unit? If not, how does it differ? There has been little agreement about how to determine whether the political or social unit under analysis is in fact holding together, or on how to identify an integrated unit in the real world. Social scientists, particularly in comparative politics, either pay little attention to the description of the dependent variable (integration), or present divergent conceptions of what integration means.

Some writers analyse integration as a social process. Others see it as a condition that either exists, or does not. Donald G. Morrison et al. state:

Integration is a process by which members of a social system develop linkages and cohesion, so that the boundaries of the system persist over time, and boundaries of sub-systems become less consequential in affecting behavior. In this process, members of the social system develop an escalating sequence of contact, cooperation, consensus, and community (Morrison et al. 1972:385).

Claude Ake also implies a process in his definition of an integrated political system: 'to the extent that the minimal units (individual political actors) develop in the course of political interaction, a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behavior and commitment to the political behavior patterns, legitimized by these norms' (Ake 1967:3; see also Smith 1992; Moynihan 1993; Brass 1991; Kellas 1991).

Milton J. Esman also implies a process creating a national political community:

The essence of nation-building, the process by which groups with strong, and even hostile particularism, antedating the idea of nationhood, and the fact of nationhood, agree to coexist and identify with this newer, larger entity, the nation. In this process, individuals originating in these groups transfer a portion of their loyalty to the symbols and institutions of the new national entity (Esman 1966:61).
But these ideas do not indicate what the end product will be, nor how one might recognize it (Coleman and Rosberg 1964; Brass 1991; Kellas 1991; Smith 1992; Moynihan 1993; Stack 1986). Other scholars seem to envision integration in terms of a condition that either exists or does not exist. Karl Deutsch et al. have defined integration as "the attainment within a territory, of a "sense of community", and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population" (Deutsch et al. 1966:2).

This is called a 'security community', i.e. a group of people who are integrated. According to Deutsch et al., a 'sense of community' is a 'belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least one point: that common social problems must, and can be resolved by the processes of peaceful change'. Peaceful change means the resolution of social problems without resort to large-scale physical force (ibid.).

As an indicator of this state of community, Deutsch postulates that greater social contract transactions between peoples indicates increasing integration, or causes integration (Deutsch 1964a:46-47). But Deutsch does not stipulate the kinds of transactions that must be carried out, and with what degree of intensity, before a unit can be considered finally integrated. Nor does he state the required population size for these transactions, and whether or not each transaction is important. For example, if one measures the flow of mail as an example of transactions in one society, does it have the same meaning in another? Even where integration is rather precisely defined in operational terms, problems of identification and measurement remain.

The obvious disparities between definitions of integration illustrate conceptual confusion in the field. As Fred Hayward observes, the term 'integration" may be defined in an endless number of ways without violating the standards of scientific investigation' (Hayward 1971:316). What is needed is not a "correct' definition but rather a defined set of concepts that can be submitted to testing. 16

Although theorists fail to agree on a definition of integration, most writers concerned with nation-building in developing countries use the term as if a consensus existed. 17 Lack of conceptual clarity has retarded theoretical development in integration studies in another respect. Because the dependent variable
is ambiguous, some students of integration have difficulty establishing a clear
relationship between cause and effect. There is as much confusion about the
causes of integration, as there is about its definition.

Socially relating causal variables to the integration process remains diffi­
cult. Integration in comparative studies is associated with stability, defined as
the persistence of a lack of conflict, common experience and values, types of
political structures, degree of compliance with governmental directives, or size
of units. But the literature sometimes is vague about what roles variables play
in the process or how they play it.

The literature does show general agreement about the importance of the
consensual attitudes and values to the integration process (Lijphart 1971:1-14;
Stack 1986). Clarification of the relation between consensus and other variables,
and how they, either together or individually, determine the degree of integration
remains undefined. The work of Deutsch and other transactionalist theorists
illustrates this difficulty. But a connection is never established between social
interaction and the political institutions and practices that assure peaceful
change.

The populations of different territories might easily profess verbal attach­
ment to the same set of values, without the sense of community that leads to
political integration. The sense of community that is relevant to integration turns
out to be mutual sympathy and loyalties of ‘we feeling’, of trust and mutual
consideration. Partial identification in terms of self-images and interests, of
mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action also
forge national identity. ‘Peaceful change’ could not be assured without this kind
of relation (Deutsch et al. 1966:17). Deutsch and his collaborators are saying
that in units where there is frequent interaction between people, people come to
like each other, and the unit is integrated. In other words, mutual liking has a
direct correlation to frequency of contact.

This proposition assumes that social learning takes place in one direction
only, and leaves out other possible intervening variables that may determine
whether or not people share a ‘we feeling’. Increased communication, for
example, in a situation of economic scarcity, may provoke antagonistic rather
than cooperative attitudes among the majority. Increased communication may
also reflect conflict, not peaceful exchange (Cantori and Spiegel 1973:480-81;
see also Hechter 1986). It is difficult, therefore, to use transition analysis as either a describer or predictor of political integration in Deutsch’s sense, unless the logical steps between the two processes are concretely defined.

Theorists also have had difficulty distinguishing the factor chosen to explain how integration occurs from the definition of integration itself. Does a high positive pattern of transaction flow, in the Deutschian model, in some way facilitate integration, or does it indicate that integration has, to some extent, already taken place? (Bull 1966:373-75). Deutsch holds that both propositions are true (Jacob and Teune 1964:23; Haas.1964:27). Bruce Russett has made a similar statement (Russett 1963:33). But if this is so, then Deutsch’s definition of integration is empirically tautological, since variables used to indicate the state of integration also serve to explain the process. Transactions are caused by a pre-existing consensus, and transactions cause consensus that leads to integration.

This confusion between explanatory and definitional variables also explains why integration does, or does not, exist. Jacob and Teune, for example, define integration as follows:

Political integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity. That is, they are held together by mutual ties of one kind or another, which give the group a feeling of identity and self awareness. Integration, therefore, is based on strong cohesiveness within a social group; and political integration is present when a political governmental unit of some sort is cohesive (Jacob and Teune 1964:4).

In their listing of ten factors explaining the presence or absence of integration, ‘homogeneity’ seems to be tautological: ‘The hypothesis is that social homogeneity will contribute strongly to the feasibility of political integration, and, conversely, that communities, whose members are very different from one another, will have a very hard time achieving or maintaining political integration’ (ibid.:19).

Attitudes and values are indicators of social homogeneity, along with race, religion, language, and ethnic identification. ‘Similarity of people’s expressions of social distance toward one another, and towards persons and groups outside their community, is taken as evidence of a feeling of social homogeneity’ (Morrison et al. 1972:385). Feelings of identity indicate integration, and a feeling of social homogeneity causes integration.
In addition to the problems of definition and conceptualization, there is the problem of operationalization. In other words, how and by what means should integration be measured? For example, comparative politics has emphasized state-wide values consensus as essential to integration. But the question of which values must be nationalized in order to achieve integration, has never been satisfactorily answered. What values does the researcher measure? What sorts of parochial identities, and how many, are relevant to the process? Are there various types or degrees of consensus that vary over time? Are all substantial loyalties inimical to the integration process? The problem is best illustrated by the operational methods followed by Donald Morrison and his collaborators in *Black Africa* (*ibid.*). They define integration as a process whereby citizens develop linkages and cohesions that strengthen the boundaries of the system and weaken those of the subsystems.

It also presupposes that language, religion, or ethnic groups are homogeneous and unchanging in their values and orientations. But existing research shows that differential value orientations exist within communal groups, and that system-wide loyalties are mobilized at certain times, while parochial loyalties are predominant at others. It also suggests that even the content of these identities changes over time (Syed 1982:86-111; see also Kellas 1991:117-34).

The problem, then, in integration theory stems from the fallacy of the 'misplaced level'. Social scientists have inferred characteristics of the total system from the assumed identity of the individuals within groups. In other words, they have deduced that a system’s integration is related to the existence or non-existence of particularistic groups, and in turn have attributed permanent attitude and behavioural characteristics to individuals. Integration theorists thus make inferences that may or may not be correct about units of analysis that are lower and higher than the observed groups, without establishing logical linkages between them. Where there are strong parochial groups, a system will be less integrated and the individuals will have a weak sense of national identity.

But it is an error in logic to infer from the observed fact that disparate groups exist in a society, that a political system is not integrated, or that all the individuals in those groups share the same political attitude. Persons from the same group occupy different positions in society and in the group. They find themselves living in different contexts, and those which may have a stronger influence on their attitudes and behaviour than membership in a primordial
group. In times of war, economic distress, or governmental crisis, identities may undergo change.

Determining the relation between systemic and individual behaviour requires knowing not only that primordial identities exist, but also the conditions that make them relevant to the effective functioning of the state. Primordial identities should be viewed as fluid, not static. These identities may even be as much a response to the realities of the larger political system as they are to the demands of primary group allegiances. As the context in which interaction takes place between people and the political regime changes, the perceptions of individuals about themselves, in relation to others and to the state, evolve as well. Parochial identities also may be dysfunctional to the operation of the larger political system in one context, and not in another. They may be stronger in one political situation than in another. As Aristide Zolberg has stated, perhaps the term 'integration' should refer to 'a shifting relationship between changing identities within the framework of a variety of possible political arrangements, capable of coping with a specifiable range of stresses' (Zolberg 1967:451-52; see also Stack 1986:13-24; Moynihan 1993; Brass 1991; Kellas 1991).

The inability of integration theorists to agree on a general concept of integration precluded their agreement on which variables in the real world represent what it is they want to describe and explain, and how to measure it. Each theorist is proceeding along separate lines of investigation, and there is little synthesis between them. Upon close examination of the literature, two related, normative implications thread their way through the various approaches and conceptual frameworks. First, there is the predisposition towards consensus and shared values, which are equated with a form of national identity, or national political consensus. Secondly, there is an aversion to force and coercion as integrative measures; authoritarian regimes are often left out of analysis. Researchers have argued that integration can exist only in the absence of violent conflict, where there is an inner coherence or equilibrium of values on a state-wide scale that makes the use of force unnecessary. Leonard Binder's definition of national integration is a good example of social scientists' thinking on this question: 'national integration requires the creation of a cultural, ideological consensus of a degree of comprehensiveness that has yet not been seen in the developing countries' (Binder 1964:630; see also Brass 1991). Of course, the absence of violent conflict does not automatically mean that
comprehensive consensus exists, especially when the absence of violence is the result of decapitation and coercion by the state.

This conception is similar to the argument that in order to achieve consensus, social cleavages must be eliminated, or neutralized. It is assumed that a common core of values requires either an ethnically homogeneous unit, or one in which cleavages are numerous and crosscutting, which might reduce the possibility of serious conflict between groups. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg's ideas on territorial integration illustrate this line of reasoning. As they state, the process is 'the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane, in the process of creating a homogeneous, territorial, political community' (Coleman and Rosberg 1964:9).

The association of integration with national political consensus, it can be argued, is an association of integration with democracy. Common to these conceptions is the association of integration, not just with the nation-state as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Identity with central regime</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Elite cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Normative consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consociational democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rule by force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Authoritarian regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Identity with subgroup</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Homogeneous population or cross-cutting cleavages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Normative consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Centralized democratic state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Apathy or alienation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mass society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Totalitarianism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cynthia Enloe has observed (Enloe 1973:261-74; see also Horowitz and Bennett 1978:165), but with the stable, democratic, nation-state. Democratic theory holds that attitudinal consensus is a prerequisite to the functioning of a stable democratic system. Particularistic loyalties indicate a high probability of intergroup conflict, and unity can be achieved only through coercion or force. Force and coercion are seen to be undemocratic means of attaining unity.²⁰

The democratic implications of integration theory are best illustrated by the 2x2 matrix above. In spite of other intervening variables that students of integration consider important to the integration process, their theories assume one kind of identity consensus or another as a precondition for the kind of political system that evolves. Until recently, the model in Box 2 represented the political scientists' conception of an integrated state. Political science has tended to reflect two variations of one model of national integration: a democratic assimilationist version, and a democratic pluralist version.²¹

The primary concern has been to determine, not 'whether cultural unity is a necessary or sufficient condition for political unity' (Rabushka and Shepsle 1979:18), but whether it is a necessary or sufficient condition for democratic political stability. But this implies that non-democratic polities are less integrated and less stable. James M. Malloy has argued that authoritarian regimes are potentially viable modes of organizing development effort (Malloy 1977:3-4; see also O'Donnell 1978:6). Lijphart added a third national integration model with his consociational democracy (Box 1). He takes exception to other integration theories, not because of their concern with stability and democracy, but because he believes that a society segmented by strong, particularistic loyalties can also be democratically ruled. He contends that Box 2 and Box 1 can produce stable democratic systems. 'Political stability can be maintained in culturally fragmented systems, if the leaders of subcultures engage in cooperative efforts to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation (Lijphart 1971:11).

Lijphart also introduces an intervening political variable, 'conscious cooperation', among elites drawn from all major social groups willing to control ethnic competition, and willing to accept the principle of the right of political autonomy for other subcultures. This kind of system gives legitimacy to parochial loyalties, but also requires an overlay of ideological national consensus.
Particularistic groups are incorporated into the larger political system by giving each a stake in the perpetuation of the system, thus producing a national political culture in the form of what Lijphart calls 'moderate nationalism' (Lijphart 1968:29-30).

Even with Lijphart's amendment, the presence of factional groups is still linked with a lack of loyalty to a central regime, a condition that can be ameliorated by a particular form of consensual behaviour of elites and citizens. The term 'integration' remains associated with states that control populations with some sense of national identity, which in turn is still considered a prerequisite of stability and democracy. Basically, integration is conceived as a co-variant process of gradually increasing national and political consensus, along with the growth of democratic political institutions and stability.

Dismissed from the lexicon of integrated states are those in the second vertical column (Boxes 3 and 4). These societies contain groups with little sense of national identity, and are associated with lack of consensus, authoritarianism, and a degree of instability. A pluralistic society (Box 3), for example, as described in Furnivall, is one in which primary individual loyalties remain with the communal group (Furnivall 1939, 1956). Various groups may reside side by side in the same political system, but as Leo Kuper has stated:

Integration rests on common values, and common motivations at the individual level. It presupposes cultural homogeneity. Cultural diversity or pluralism, automatically imposes the structural necessity for domination by one of the cultural sections. It excludes the possibility of consensus, and necessitates non-democratic regulation of group relationships. This implies a distinction between two basic types of society, integrated societies characterized by consensus and cultural homogeneity, and regulated societies characterized by consensus and cultural pluralism (Kuper 1969:11).

One could argue that the assumptions on which the pluralistic society rests are the same as those of the two integration models. A society with high subgroup identity and low central identity would have difficulty in being democratic, or integrated, since it is force, rather than consensus, that maintains the system. 22
The absence of loyalty either to subnational groups or to the central state is characterized by other theorists as a mass society (Box 4). Hannah Arendt argues that an atomized society with an alienated population is particularly vulnerable to totalitarian movements and regimes. The term 'masses' refers to people who no longer are identified with either parochial interest groups or the prevailing regime, to people 'who cannot be integrated into any organization based on common interest, into political parties or municipal government or trade unions' (Arendt 1951:305; see also Kornhauser 1959). Thus, subnational loyalties and atomization are associated with a lack of national consensus, non-democratic forms of government, coercion, and instability. Theorists also argue that societies categorized in this fashion represent various forms of disintegration.

But integration may be a more complex, multilinear process than existing integration models reveal (Verba 1967:113). Taking place on different socio-political levels, proceeding at different rates of intensity, integration appears to be a fluctuating process, responding at different times to different contexts and environments. At this stage of theory, integration need not refer to a known end state, but to a process of changing relations and identities within a variety of possible political arrangements (Zolberg 1967:452). Integration, as a multilinear phenomenon, implies that there can be degrees of cohesion at many different levels. At certain times in a people's history, a significant proportion of the members may, on some issues, identify with groups beyond the boundaries of a province, and on other issues, with citizens of the province in which they reside. The socio-political arrangements of the political unit may change in response to challenges to its structure, and the strategies used to achieve integration may differ, but the political unit that can regulate its affairs effectively is, by definition, considered integrated.23

Another theoretical problem with integration literature is the absence of a comprehensive examination of the global environment as a possible causal factor of integration.24 In general, international systemic factors have not been considered important independent, or intervening, variables in the integration process.

Some writers have argued that perceived political danger to a society's survival tends to increase identification with the nation-state. As Lijphart has explained:
My comparative analysis of five consociational democracies shows that a strikingly favorable factor in the establishment or strengthening of consociationalism is the existence of a foreign threat. In all five countries, overarching cooperation among the subcultural elites was either initiated, or significantly extended, during the periods of international crisis, especially during the First and Second World Wars; and in most cases, these changes proved quite durable (Lijphart 1971:14).

But Lijphart himself takes note of the disparity between his findings and those of Deutsch. In *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch *et al.* specifically exclude external factors as important to the integration process, dismissing the effects of foreign military threats as neither strong nor positive. Even when they were positive, Deutsch finds that ‘their effects were transitory’ (Deutsch *et al.* 1966:44-45; see also Smith 1992).

Even if this interest in the positive effects of outside threats is seen as a sign of modest progress in conceptualization, integration theorists still devote minimal attention to outside states, or to other factors in the international environment. The neglect of these factors in integration theory is problematic, given the large amount of attention writers on international relations are devoting to models of interdependence, to the increasing interpenetration of states, and to linkages between domestic and foreign affairs.

Once one examines the theoretical literature concerning integration, one can then begin to apply it to a case study, such as the increasing ethnic conflict in Pakistan. As noted earlier, Pakistan’s internal havoc threatens to disintegrate the state. What ideas may be taken from the literature and applied to this case? To answer this question, one must examine Pakistan’s integration strategies under both the civilian and military regimes.

**The case of Pakistan**

The breakup of Pakistan in 1971 was not caused solely by the rise of Bengali ethnic nationalism, but also by Indian support — with Soviet backing — of the liberation forces in East Pakistan. In this case, it could be argued that an analysis is not possible without taking into consideration the external environment (see Choudhury 1973:231-32; Dunbar 1972:447-53; Bhutto 1972:27). Thus, one must make a small attempt to redress that weakness, by
comparing civilian (democratic) and military (authoritarian) elite strategies to achieve national and political integration in Pakistan, in the post-1971 period.25

No social or political formations are 'self-regulating'; they must be governed. The more intense the crisis of national and political integration, the more skilled the attentive elites must be in their governance. The alternative is that the political structure will erupt into violence and disintegrate. Pakistan experienced this in 1971. It is therefore important that studies of national and political integration examine elite strategies for the management of ethnic conflict, the institutions and practices through which ethnic conflict can be mitigated and controlled by action of public authority. The concern here, then, is with the strategies and instruments of public policy, which bring such conflict under control.

Civilian and military attentive elites play a critical role in the process of national and political integration; they alone can make a direct negative contribution. The major task of all regimes, whether military or civilian, is to attain control and legitimacy. These needs underlie elite strategies (civilian and military) for achieving national and political integration. The analysis of the military in developing countries has been organized around two themes. Chronologically, the first concern is to explain military intervention, particularly in the form of coups. Increasingly, the trend has been to analyse the consequences of military rule. The trend now is to evaluate the performance of the military as a ruling elite: the military's ability to maintain stability, create political institutions, achieve economic development and national integration. Some writers on the military have argued that the military institutions of developing nations serve to submerge ethnic tensions. Empirically, this line of reasoning has not held up (Pinkney 1973:160; see also Luckham 1970:60-62). Ethnic representation involves decentralization of authority; military regimes, however, tend to focus on centralization of power and authority. Military regimes place greater emphasis upon the need for control, stressing the values of political order and stability.

Civilian (democratic) governments, on the other hand, require more popular support for their survival, and are forced to place more emphasis on gaining legitimacy. Democratic governments usually have interdependent relations with a network of civilian organizations and, under normal circumstances,
ruling civilian elites do not want to endanger their power base by upsetting too many ethnic groups through the use of coercion (Cohen 1976:235).

Therefore, it could be argued that democratic civilian elites will be less coercive, more representative, and will rely on economic distraction as well as symbol creation strategies to achieve integration. For example, the civilian elites in India have granted state autonomy to linguistic and regional communities, and have rarely relied on coercion (Gupta 1970a).26

This contrasts with the unwillingness of the military elites in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Pakistan to address ethnic groups' demands (Dikshit 1976; Hatch 1970; Whiteman 1970; Farer 1976; Gutteridge 1975:22). The negative attitude of the military towards political bargaining, compromise, and accommodation of ethnic groups is well documented in the literature on the military (Janowitz 1964; Lissak 1976:31; Nordlinger 1977:153-54; Welch 1970:47). Indeed, the style of the Pakistani military elite and its emphasis on political order has been likened to that of the former colonial regimes (Cohen 1984:1-31; see also Hussain 1976:927; Pye 1962:246). Unlike the civilian elite that attempts to mediate inter-ethnic conflicts and develop consensus, the military elite has tried in an authoritarian manner to balance ethnic, social, and political forces against each other, thereby achieving a 'forced cohesion without consensus'. Moreover, it has been argued that military elites are more narrowly based ethnically than are civilian elites, and that they tend to promote the interests of their own ethnic groups and regions (Finer 1974:6).27

We also need to identify the type of military regime that we are trying to analyze. S.E. Finer identified five different types of military rule, according to the extent to which the military controls the major policies of a society, and the degree of overtness with which it does so. Finer's five types include: (1) indirect limited military rule, (2) indirect complete rule, (3) dual rule, (4) open direct military rule, and (5) quasi-civilianized direct military rule. For the purpose of this study, the military regime in Pakistan can be identified as 'open, direct military rule' (ibid.).

The research involves a case study comparing civilian and military elite strategies to achieve national and political integration. 'Integration' can be viewed as a measure, not of social homogeneity, but of the ability of a political unit to conduct its important and necessary business without alienating large numbers of its constituents (so they are no longer willing to have their affairs
regulated, or to participate in the particular unit). Such a definition allows the focus to shift to the role of various internal institutions and groups — such as national elites, subnational elites, government and religion— in alienating or accommodating important parts of a population in a complex heterogeneous society such as Pakistan.

The time frame selected for this paper is a 35-year period, 1947-82. This time frame gives us a unique opportunity to compare civilian elite strategies for integration (1947-58 and 1972-77) and military elite strategies (1958-71 and 1977-82); it also enables one to compare a freely elected democratic regime's strategy for integration (1972-77) to that of an authoritarian military regime (1977-82).

The civilian regime that came to power in 1971 was democratic in the sense that power was relatively diffused between core elite and subnational elite, interest groups were functioning competitively, and bargaining, rather than coercion, was the principal instrument for regulation of ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the authoritarian military regime that came to power in 1977 de-emphasized open and competitive politics; political power was centralized, and the military, supported by retired army officers, dominated the decision-making process. Several aspects unique to these three periods will be addressed in this paper.

First, one must examine the civilian periods of the regime from 1972 until the military takeover in 1977. What was the political ideology of integration for the Pakistani civilian elite? What did the civilian elite see as its objective with regard to national and political integration? A civilian government’s ideology also plays a key role for the state. However, do the objectives of the ideological strategy depend upon the objectives of the elite? Is it constrained by relative resources, demographic, organizational, technological, and economic, at the disposition of competing or co-existing ethnic groups?

One must also examine the types of policies and instruments developed by the civilian elite to achieve its national and political integration goals. What was the predisposition of the subnational or counter-elites to these policies during the populist period? Lastly, one must examine the success of these civilian strategies, policies and instruments in forging political and national integration among the population at large.
The same theoretical strategy is used to examine the military regime that took power in 1977. Again, the political idiom of integration is questioned. Did the military view its objectives with regard to national and political integration in Pakistan?

One also must question the ideological predisposition of the authoritarian military regime in the anti-populist period. What types of policies and instruments were developed and used by the military elite to achieve its national and political integration strategies? What was the predisposition of the subnational or counter-elites to these strategies and policies?

As with the civilian regime, one then analyses the military strategies, policies, and instruments used to create a sense of national and political integration among the Pakistani population. This analysis is applied at the provincial and the national level, using Richard Cottam’s checklist as a guide (Cottam 1979)

At the provincial level, one first examines the attitude of the attentive elite. Is there a sense of Baluch, Pathan, Punjabi, and Sindhi sentiment among the attentive elite in these provinces? What idiom does the elite have with regard to Baluch, Sindhi, Pathan, and Punjabi identity and nationality formation?

One then questions the capability and viability of these ethnic groups. Do these factions have the capability to achieve statehood? One must take into consideration the ethnic groups’ population size, territory, and economy (Fuller 1993:108). For instance, does a two-person ethnic group deserve its own country? Does a country need a viable economy to survive?

Another question at the provincial level concerns that of the uniqueness of the ethnic group. What separates an ethnic group from another? What comprises Baluch, Pathan, Sindhi, and Punjabi identity? A ‘unique’ people will share a common history, culture, and preferably, language. Religion, race and ethnic commonalities also play a distinct role. The Israelis trace their roots to their exodus from Egypt in search of the promised land. African-Americans share a common history as well. One might also argue that language and homogeneous racial characteristics make the Japanese a distinct group.

However, once a group is defined ethnically, its political strength is measured. For Pakistan, one measures the number of registered voters in each province, membership in parties, voter turnout in the general elections of 1970,
and the degree of literacy. The second level of analysis occurs at the national level, concentrating on the civilian and military elite. First, one examines the attitude of the attentive elite. Is there a sense of ‘Pakistan’ among the civilian and military elite? How do they conceptualize Pakistan’s national identity? What is the level of political awareness among this elite? To what extent does the elite identify with the nation of Pakistan? How receptive has the population at large been to civilian and military elite strategies for integration? Lastly, one must estimate the expectations Pakistan’s population have of life together as Pakistanis. Are they comfortable with each other and do they share a common history, culture, and language? Do they have a sense of emotion about Pakistan? In order to ascertain the uniqueness of the population, one analyses its culture, language and history. With these levels of analysis in mind, one then can produce some integration strategies.

There are two broad types of state strategies and institutional arrangements to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups. A strategy of national integration is one that seeks assimilation of the entire population of a state to a common identity, and that recognizes only individual rights, privileges, and duties (Akzin 1964:66, 76-111; see also Brass 1991; Smith 1992; Moynihan 1993; Kellas 1991; Stack 1986). Such a strategy is to be distinguished from one of political integration, which seeks only to maintain the cohesion and territorial integrity of a political unit, but does not necessarily demand cultural assimilation of diverse groups to either a dominant or composite culture (Weiner 1966:555; see also Gupta 1970b:39-51). A strategy of pluralism recognizes the existence of differentiated groups in a population, and concedes rights, privileges, and obligations to groups and individuals.28

Both strategies of national integration and pluralism may be promoted in more or less accommodating and egalitarian ways. Integration strategies may be liberal and egalitarian, or they may amount to forced assimilation of minorities into a common mould. Pluralist strategies may recognize all differentiated groups as equal, or they may discriminate among groups, treating members of some as superior or full citizens, and others as inferior, or not entitled to full citizenship.

One expects that some patterns will emerge with regard to integration strategies, when we compare the civilian regime to the military regime. The ideological predisposition, idioms and goals involved in the integration of the
civilian and military elite will determine the strategies chosen, and will at the same time be constrained by the relative resources — demographic, organizational, technological, and economic — at the disposal of the subnational groups.

Although an infinite number of strategies for integration can be generated, almost all of them can be classified under three headings.

The first integration strategy concerns coercion. The state deprives the population of material resources and political power. When Lithuania attempted to break from the USSR in the late 1980s, the state withheld oil supplies. A threatening leader of a counterpolitical group is killed or exiled, decapitating the deviant group's political power. One could argue that the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King was linked to such a plan. The state may institute coercive language policy — the United States expects each citizen to learn English, for instance. Also, the state apparatus may attempt to keep the counterpolitical group depolarized — the Kurds are separated between three countries.

The second method of integration occurs under a utilitarian regime. The government attempts to co-opt its population with concessions to rebellious groups. For instance, the United States ended segregation during the 1960s after African-Americans began to revolt against their oppressive conditions. This action by the US government co-opted the oppressed population by granting them political power and redistributing some of the wealth in their direction. A utilitarian government may attempt to institute a liberal language policy. Singapore is an example of such a country.

A third strategy for the government is normative action. The normative government will create symbols (a national flag, national hero, national holidays) and propaganda; it will maintain the efficacy of the law as well as a national or official language.

These strategies are not exclusive. Regimes often follow a combination of the three. Both the strategies and policies of regimes may change over time, as the relative resources and aspirations of subnational groups shift and original choices prove to be ineffective, or too costly.29

One must also examine the effects of the strategies on ethnic relations. Which strategy is more effective, or do any of them work at all? There are three policy areas which greatly affect ethnic relations: the institutional, the cultural, and that of resource distribution.
An institutional mechanism that promotes positive relations is the granting of local autonomy, and its obverse often results in alienation and unrest. In the cultural area, language is a major source of conflict between ruling elites and ethnic groups, when the dominant or a minority group's language is made the only language for education and government administration. Problems arise in the area of resource distribution when the members of an ethnic group perceive that they are not receiving equitable treatment, whether in regard to material resources or government and military employment.

The likelihood of implementing policies that would ameliorate ethnic relations, and the degree to which these policies will be effective, are both influenced by the political environment, particularly by the willingness of the elite of dominant ethnic groups to share power with minority ethnic groups (Akzin 1964:237-38), and by the availability of, and prospects for, access to alternative political arenas for minority groups. The prospects for pluralist solutions to ethnic group conflicts are dim if the ideology of the elite does not transcend the boundaries of the major ethnic group, and if the subnational elite is not allowed access to elite positions and political power.

The response of ethnic groups to elite policies is influenced by those policies, and the degree to which the ruling elite is perceived as legitimate. Some ethnic groups call for more participation in national decision-making; others call both for increased participation nationally and for more local autonomy; some are mainly concerned with maintaining or gaining a local autonomy. Those groups most alienated often call for the formation of a separate nation state (Wright 1975).

The creation of Bangladesh is attributed to a variety of causes, such as foreign intervention, economic disparity, deprivation of political power, and racial distance. These issues, however, were all ensconced in the real problem that precipitated the internal crisis: the problem of national and political integration.

In the pre-1971 period, the attentive elite in Pakistan seldom paid any attention to this problem facing the state. The attentive elite followed the theory of the Muslim League that Islam as a unifying force would take care of communalism. As a result, it was only in the post-1971 period that the attentive elite began to articulate and formulate integration strategies.

Thus, in the case of Pakistan, the study of elite strategies for integration becomes critical. Ethnic differences or similarities perse do not necessarily lead
to Balkanization of a multi-ethnic state. The intervening variables that play a significant role are the strategies and policies of the governing elites, both at the national and regional levels. Thus, if the political system is considered the independent variable, a significant political success would be achieved by granting political autonomy, separate political status within a sovereign state, or control over the educational process in public schools attended by members of the group.

To conclude this discussion of ethnic integration, one must compare and contrast the military and civilian strategies implemented to achieve national integration in Pakistan. The civilian period of 1971-77 under Bhutto featured a civilian elite government that attempted to develop a melange of socialist economics and Islamic religion. Under the vague title of 'Islamic socialism', the core elite emphasized pragmatic and popular conceptions of Islam as opposed to orthodox religious practices. The civilian elite had some initial successes, but Bhutto and the core elite consolidated power; it alienated the Muhajir, the Baluch and the Pathan who, like the Bengali, came to feel politically, economically, and culturally alienated. Bhutto and his regime were quick to sense that people in post-1971 Pakistan wanted a regime based on religious and development slogans—a state that emphasized fulfilment of mass needs: bread, clothing, shelter. Thus, Pakistan entered the populist period.

After ensuring military support, the civilian elite put into effect its economic strategy. The Bhutto regime nationalized its industries, insurance companies, and banks; it instituted minimum wages, trade unions and worker participation in industry. In the agricultural sector, land reform was instigated that encouraged peasants to take land from landlords without compensation. Bhutto's strategy attempted to build a mass coalition of workers, peasants, and students. Bhutto believed that he was the head and mind of the nation—a democracy in which all groups would be represented and involved in the development of a mature democratic structure.

He accumulated power under this highly personalized rule. The civilian elite developed a highly effective police apparatus, the Federal Security Force (FSF), which was used to inflict severe punishment on Bhutto's adversaries. Its brutality was unmatched in dealing with opposition parties and the press.

But the political strategy towards minority provinces was most problematic in the Bhutto period. While the PPP commanded a comfortable majority at the federal level and in the more populous provinces of the Punjab and Sind, it had
an insignificant following in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, the two minority provinces with volatile electorates and autonomist parties. No political party had obtained a clear majority in either of these provinces, but the National Awami Party (NAP) had won a plurality of votes in Baluchistan, and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami (JUI) the largest number of seats in NWFP.

This strategy produced a war in Baluchistan in which the centre used 100,000 troops over three years to pacify Baluchistan. Moreover, once set into motion, the war in Baluchistan began to have its own logic, because prolonged warfare necessarily created the opportunity for revolutionary groups to assume positions of leadership in the Baluch national movement as a whole, and the military action was henceforth deemed necessary to prevent further radicalization of an essentially regional movement.

The civilian elite pursued a policy of accommodation concerning language, allowing each province to decide its provincial language while retaining Urdu as the national language. Sindhi nationalist Sayid Ghulam Mustafa Shah, commenting on the language crisis, stated:

Urdu has become a trick of politicians and economic aggressors. A superficial language alien to Pakistan was expected to inspire allegiance to the concept of Pakistan. In Pakistan, except for the Punjabi military, bureaucracy and the Muhajir community, Urdu is rejected by all provinces. It is a painful realization that the ruling elite with a Sindhi at the helm has accepted a tongue foreign to the people of Pakistan and declared it a national language, and worse still, equated it with patriotism and nationalism but used it as an instrument of oppression. subjection and fooling indigenous people of Pakistan (Sindh Quarter, 10[July]:2).

When the provincial assembly of Sind declared Sindhi as the provincial language, it created problems for the centre. The declaration also directed that all civil servants would have to learn Sindhi within three months or be fired. This led to massive riots by the Muhajirs who spoke only Urdu, but who dominated the provincial bureaucracy. Karachi was paralyzed. The centre diffused the situation, facilitating a compromise between the Sindhis and the Muhajirs.

In the absence of the NAP, Bhutto and his regime had little to fear from the remaining opposition parties. Bhutto, however, did not count on the opposition parties forming themselves into the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) for the
purposes of contesting the general election. Nor did he anticipate a concerted attack by Islamic parties. Bhutto was accused of anti-Islamic behaviour. The religious community declared *jihad* (holy war) against his rule.

When the PPP won a massive victory in the 1977 general elections, the opposition insisted the results were fraudulent. The PNA demanded Bhutto's resignation and called on the army to remove him. Bhutto refused to yield, unleashing the Federal Security Force on opposition parties, newspapers, lawyers and journalists. This policy led to civil riots in the major cities, a high death toll, and the flight of capital. The economy was paralyzed. Bhutto was eventually compelled to call out the army and declare martial law.

Bhutto's quest for personal power, the suppression of minorities and the use of military might to solve political problems led to the destruction of democracy, riots, and disaffection in the army. On 5 July 1977, Bhutto was arrested, and later executed. The PPP was banned and Pakistan's only freely elected civilian regime came to an ignominious end.

Pakistan's civilian regime was corrupted by a single man's lust for power. Whereas most researchers promote populist regimes as the best possible ruling elite, the military tends to be the best. Their highly organized, egalitarian structure brings order. However, the military in Pakistan inherited a legacy of political decay.

The advent of military rule in 1977 meant a shift from materialist socialism towards Islam as an integrating strategy. The construction of an Islamic nation characterized the post-1977 period. The manipulation of Islam and coercion were the main integration strategies used by a predominantly Punjabi army to deny existence of separate nationalities within Pakistan.

Crawford Young aptly describes authoritarian formulas:

The military regimes offer a very different structure of access to politics. Incentives for cultural mobilisation by political entrepreneurs are removed; numbers *per se* are no longer the name of the game. Indeed, strong disincentives are likely to be part of the operating principles of such regimes through the banning of parties and ethnic associations, prohibition of communally oriented publication, and like measures (Young 1976:520).

It was the need to save Pakistan that prompted the armed forces to act in 1977. The military elite felt that political parties would lead to factionalism, and, eventually, to civil war. They viewed the armed forces as the only institution that
could transcend parochial issues and regional questions, represent the national interest, and foster integration. But as Young noted, 'in the praise occasionally extended to military elites as national builders in the developing world, insufficient note is taken of the possibility of major inequalities in representation within the military elites' (ibid.).

Islamic doctrine did not prevent the secession of East Pakistan, and it is an open question whether appeals to religion could prevent a further unravelling of Pakistan. However, Islam has proven successful in integrating different ethnic groups only in times of external threat. The disturbances that erupted in Sind in 1982 showed the difficulties that arise during the establishment of a centralized Islamic state. In addition, there were riots between Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims over property rights as well as over the government’s Islamic policy, which seemed to be more appropriate for the Sunni than for the Shi’a. Bitterness between the sects had historic roots, and the riots reflected the ever-present nature of their dissatisfaction. The military used force to subdue the situation rather than to reconcile rival moral claims.

At the provincial level, the military elite strategies alienated the Sind province and, to a lesser extent, Baluchistan. Of the four nationalities, the Sindhis and the Baluchis were for all practical purposes excluded from the structure of the state. Sindhis and Baluchis constituted one per cent of the armed forces and the bureaucracy.35

The Sindhis constitute roughly 25 per cent of the population and have little representation in the army or bureaucracy. Commercially, they are a small force, and worse, in their own province, they have a feeling of being taken over by the Punjabis and the Muhajirs. The population of Sind is now 49 per cent non-Sindhi.

In the last half of 1982, there was considerable instability in Sind, verging on insurrection, precipitated by the military’s announcement of a new political system. In the view of the military, the new political system was truer to Islamic precepts and practice than anything Pakistan had experienced.36

The major obstacle to integration is representation. Pakistan’s political history has been traumatic, and the fear persists in the military elite that any reduction in their authority will accelerate the disintegration that has already shredded the national fabric. Pakistanis, according to this logic, do not possess the cohesiveness that promotes accommodation and co-operation, and it is only the integrity and unity of the military that sustains the nation.

28
With this analysis in mind, several conclusions may be drawn from the Pakistani experience. This case suggests that both civilian and military elite strategies have been a dismal failure in Pakistan since 1947.

Pakistani elites, beginning with Jinnah, too often have relied on strategies for nation-building in terms of assimilation, which would come about through Islam and identification with the Pakistani state. The people of Pakistan, with the exception of the Muhajirs, have had great difficulty in transferring their provincial and ethnic loyalties to the symbols and institutions of the "new national entity" (Esman 1966:61).

The Pakistani civil war in 1971 and the war in Baluchistan in 1973 illustrated that a 'sense of community' or 'we feeling' (Deutsch 1964a, 1964b; Deutsch et al. 1966:2-4), a sentiment of 'Pakistaniness', did not develop. The Bengali elite had decided that they could not reach agreement with Punjabi elites and resolve common problems; the result was tragic. Punjabi elites attempted to coerce people to assimilate through large-scale force.

The classic theorists of integration view this as a social process, and as the development of sentiment towards a national identity. These theorists failed to address the following question: Was it possible for a state such as Pakistan which was characterized by deep and enduring ethnic cleavages and linguistic identities to maintain some form of political community even if provincial linguistic ethnic identities did not change? These integration theorists presupposed that language, religion, or ethnic groups are homogeneous in values and orientations and that these orientations are unchanging. The Pakistani case suggests that there is considerable differentiation within ethnic and provincial groups in Pakistan along caste and tribal affiliations (see Coleman and Rosberg 1964; Laponce 1974: 134-35; Tull 1975; Nicholson 1948). The civil wars in Pakistan and Nigeria clearly illustrate that ethnic identities are far more persistent and dangerous than once thought.

This discussion clearly shows that assimilation, through language and values consensus, led to the rise of Bengali, Baluch and Sindhi identities which themselves became strongly separatist in order to thwart the integration strategies of the centre. If Pakistan does not disintegrate, Pakistani elites will have to develop sound integration strategies and come to terms with diversity.

Theorists of consociation and conflict reduction differ from earlier integrationist theorists in important respects. Theorists of the social process approach argue that integration requires consensus and that social cleavages have to be
eliminated. They assume that a common core of values requiring assimilation would result in increasing identification with the 'nation-state'. Those concerned with consociation and conflict reduction are more modest about goals and integration (Esman 1973:49-78; Nordlinger 1972:73-87; Lijphart 1968:3-44, 1969:207-25, 1977:73-87; McRae 1974; Daalder 1974:604-21; Young 1976; Enloe 1973). Based on experience, they argue that it is necessary for heterogeneous states to live with ethnic cleavages and identities, rather than eradicate them through coercion and assimilation. These theorists' central premise is that efforts to ameliorate ethnic conflicts must begin with the elites, in Pakistan's case, both provincial and national elites. They argue that elite agreement is required as an important step towards accommodation, especially because linguistic, cultural and ethnic identities will be difficult to change in the near future. Theories of consociation and conflict reduction tend to give considerable importance to formal institutions, such as federalism or proportional representation. Arend Lijphart identifies four strategies for consociational democracy: (a) 'ground coalition' of all ethnic groups; (b) mutual veto in decision making; (c) ethnic proportionality in the allocation of certain opportunities and offices; and (d) ethnic autonomy, that is, federalism.

In general, there can be no doubt that societies characterized by deep ethnic cleavages and political conflict need inter-ethnic elite cooperation and strategies that can bring integration about. However, in the development of effective integration strategies, in Crawford Young's words, 'leadership of exceptional ability, skill, and integrity is an absolute requisite of consociationalism. Nation building can only move forward through on-going consociational bargaining and compromise' (Young 1976: 527).

Finally, Ali Jinnah's words seem as appropriate today as they did in 1948:

There are great tasks to be accomplished and great danger to overcome: overcome them we certainly shall, but we shall do so much quicker if our solidarity remains unimpaired and if our determination to march forward as a single united nation remains unshaken. This in the only way in which we can raise Pakistan rapidly and surely to its proper worthy place in the community of nations (Jinnah 1960).
Notes

1 For an elaborate discussion of cultural diversity, see Young (1976).

2 Horowitz (1985:3) states:

Not so long ago, the proposition was advanced that increased political consciousness could be expected to consolidate the unity of states with homogeneous populations and “strain or destroy” the cohesion of states with diverse populations. It has become clear that few states are homogeneous and many are deeply divided. Ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon.

The evidence is abundant. The recurrent hostilities in Northern Ireland, Chad and Lebanon; secessionist warfare in Burma, Bangladesh, the Sudan, Nigeria, Iraq, and the Philippines; the Somali invasion of Ethiopia and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus; the army killings in Uganda and Syria and the mass civilian killings in India-Pakistan, Burundi, and Indonesia; Sikh terrorism, Basque terrorism, Corsican terrorism, Palestinian terrorism; the expulsion of Chinese from Vietnam, of Arakanese Muslims from Burma, of Asians from Uganda, of Beninese from the Ivory Coast and Gabon; ethnic riots in India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Zaire, Guyana, and a score of other countries — these comprise only the most violent evidence of ethnic hostility.

See also Schuman (1966:28-40); Segall, Doornbos, and Davis (1946:87-109); Morrison (1982:86); Paden (1980); Tinker (1968:125); and Lebow (1973: 122-25).

3 Theorists of developed countries have been hard-put to account for the ethnic and racial conflicts that have created the wave of nationalist and separatist movements in advanced industrial states. For developing nations, conflicts are expected, and they are seen as part of the transition period. But after industrial society is firmly established, it is argued that such divisions will become residual, not systematic, or indeed intensifying contradiction (Marx 1957; Tonnies 1957; Weber 1946:180-95; Durkheim 1947).

4 For general theoretical literature, see Schemerhorn (1976); Enloe (1973:319-55); Achola (1981:585-604); Lebow (1973: 122-25); Brass (1991); Moynihan (1993).

5 Nordlinger has argued that elites play a critical role in the process of conflict resolution. ‘They, and they alone, can make a direct and positive contribution. The presence among elites of certain motives for conflict regulation, conciliatory attitudes learned and reinforced over time, and the political security of top conflict group leaders are sufficient condition of conflict regulation behavior’ (Nordlinger 1972:118).

I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. An Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of Muslims.' (quoted in Weekes 1964:81).

It should be pointed out that Muslim nationalism drew its strength not from the areas of major Muslim population concentration (which would later constitute Pakistan), but from Hindu areas where the Muslims were clearly in a minority (see Hodson 1969).

For a distinction between Islam as a belief system and as a group identity, see Smith (1970:161).

Approximate populations of provinces in 1982 were: Punjab, 54 million; Sind, 20 million; NWFP, 18.6 million (including tribal areas, but excluding Afghan refugees); and Baluchistan, 5.25 million. Comparable figures for ethnic communities do not exist. Figures calculated by using 1972 census data, and assuming 3 per cent annual growth rate per province (Government of Pakistan, Bureau of Census 1972; see also Harrison 1980). Total population estimates range from 88.5 million to 94.8 million (see Nyrop 1983).

Shahid Javed Burki (1980:4) calculates that in 1977, the mean per capita income in the two richer provinces (Punjab and Sind) was 28 per cent higher than in the poorer provinces.

In 1977, the mean life expectancy in Baluchistan (rural), was 42 years, and in rural NWFP, 44 years. Mean life expectancy in Punjab and Sind was 60 years (Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1977).

In 1977, there were 3,000 'registered factories' with over 20 employees in the Punjab, and 2,889 in the Sind, while in the NWFP there were only 262, and in Baluchistan, 10 (Pakistan Statistical Division 1981:1-15). Similarly in 1977 of all 'establishments with 20 or more employees excluding defense establishments', 7,859 were found in Punjab, 2,673 in the Sind, 1,046 in NWFP, and 290 in Baluchistan (Pakistan. Report on Annual Establishment Inquiry. 1976-77 [1981]:1).

Useful overviews of the nationalities question are found in Ziring (1975:629, 644); Sayeed (1981); and Ayoob (1976:149-69).

Amitai Etzioni, however, develops an elaborate discussion of political unification. He identifies three kinds of integrative elements: coercive, utilitarian, and identitive, by which he means values or symbols built by educational and religious institutions, symbol creation, and other mechanisms. Also relevant are levels of cultural homogeneity, elite attitude, and the desired scope and sequence of governmental integration. A people's values will often relate also to issues of political participation, distributive justice, and use of force. The coercive, utilitarian, and identitive powers should not be viewed as separate and autonomous agents that coalesce and interact (Etzioni 1965: chap. 2).

'Concepts are judged not by their truth or falsity, but by their theoretical utility.' This is a maxim, underscored by Holt and Richardson in their discussion of the nature and function of paradigms (1970:24).
17 For example, see Smock and Smock (1975). Although the Smocks make fifteen references to the problem associated with 'national integration', or the prospects of Ghana or Lebanon achieving it, the term is never defined.

18 The term 'fallacy of the misplaced level' was coined by Frederick W. Frey (1970:290).

19 Coleman and Rosberg (1964:9) define the integration process in two senses: 'territorial' integration quoted above, and 'political integration, which refers to the progressive bridging of the elite mass gap on the vertical plane'.

20 The two strands of democratic theory, often called conflict and consensus models, are illustrated in the writings of John Stuart Mill and James Madison. In Considerations on Representative Government, Mill sets forth his theory of the relationship between nationality and representative government. He argues that as a general principle, the boundaries of a government should coincide with nationality. A nationality is composed of people 'united by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others'. This harmony of 'feeling among people could be caused by identity of language, religion, race and geography; but the strangest of all is the identity of political antecedents'. He concludes that in a country composed of different nationalities, popular government is not possible (Mill 1958:229-37). Although Mill stressed a pre-existing harmony among people as a prerequisite for democracy, Madison, in The Federalist Papers. No. 10, saw territorial expanse and governmental institutions as necessary and sufficient harmonizing influences. He emphasized that the proposed form of representative government to be inaugurated in the United States would provide the necessary equilibrium for the crosscutting interests that exist in the country. Noting that factions are a threat to the stability of a 'popular' government but that force is an unacceptable means of dealing with them, he maintained that the proposed form of federal government is the best way of controlling parochial interests, and moulding them into a national political consensus. Through selected representatives 'whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations', a common good is arrived at, that the central government can legislate and administer without recourse to coercion (Madison 1961:77-84). In Mill's theory, national consensus is the independent variable. In Madison's theory, it is the dependent variable. However, in both theories. some form of national political consensus is essential for the stability of the political system.

21 The definitions of integration by Binder (1964), Coleman and Rosberg (1964) and Deutsch (1964a, 1964b) follow the assimilationist model. Integration is seen as a process of assimilation of diverse groups. The pluralist model (sometimes referred to as the 'conflict model' or the 'equilibrium model') postulates that multiple group affiliations and crosscutting social cleavages reduce the importance of parochial identities with society, and thus produce a national, political culture or normative consensus. 'The multiple groups of individuals make for a multiplicity of conflicts crisscrossing society. Such segmental participation, then, can result in a kind of balancing mechanism, preventing deep cleavages along one axis' (Coser 1964: 78-79; see also Lipset 1963: 70-78).
22 M.G. Smith expands Furnivall’s definition of plural society in *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (1974:86): ‘Given the fundamental differences of belief, value and organization that connote pluralism, the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current form’.

23 Crawford Young notes that ‘in contemplating Nigeria and India in tandem, a parallel pattern is visible. Both polities went through a phase when the manifold lines of conflict became structured about a single code of confrontation. British India could not survive the superposition of its cleavages into the single Hindu-Muslim division. Reduction of Nigeria’s diversity to the Lapidary formula of Ibo-Yoruba-Hausa created a three-person game whose stakes of cultural anxiety were far too high. The political arena was then redefined by partition in India, by the creation of twelve states in the place of the original three regions in Nigeria. Cultural politics are thereby transformed and diffused. Not of course, eradicated; but the segmentation of conflict tends to encapsulate it, to contain its tensions at the periphery of the system. Nigeria and India offer the opportunity for a comparative exploration of the hypothesis that cultural complexity may play a positive role in national integration if the polity is so structured as to draw advantage from it’ (Young 1976: 275-76).

24 The terms ‘global environment’, ‘external environment’, and ‘international system’ are used interchangeably. They are conceived in James Rosenau’s terminology to consist of all ‘the human and nonhuman phenomena that are located external to the geographic space of the society, of which the polity is a part’ (Rosenau and Rosenau 1969:45).

25 However, there has been a substantial amount of literature on non-democratic regimes in Africa and Latin America. See Young 1976; Bienen 1968; Coleman and Rosberg 1964; Smock 1971; Luckham 1971; Clinton 1971:43-66. Corbett 1972:399-436; Milne 1981; and Fegely 1978:80-84.

26 The two major exceptions to this being the use of force by the Indian Army against the Sikhs in 1955 and Nagaland in the 1970s (see Rajnayor 1980:50-51).

27 See the excellent study of military organization by Stanislav Andreski (1971).

28 Four broad state-nation patterns are distinguished in Akzin (1964, chap. 6): the ‘integrationist’, ‘pluralism on the basis of inequality’, ‘pluralism on the basis of equality’, and ‘secession’ patterns.

29 Sudan is a good example. The Sudanese leadership had to accept a pluralistic state structure when their integrative objectives proved unfeasible.

30 This definition follows Akzin (1964:31 who stresses that a nation must exceed purely local dimensions. The size criterion distinguishes isolated villages or kinship groups, whose separateness arises from an absence of communication with other groups, rather than out of a self-conscious awareness of differences from other groups.

31 See Akzin (ibid.:133) on the importance of control over the public schools in multi-ethnic societies generally. Also see Geertz (1963: 125).
32 The FSF was used to silence opposition parties and leaders. Arrest, illegal imprisonment, kidnapping, rape and assassination of real and imagined enemies of the regime were common under civilian rule. Prominent opposition leaders known for their sharp criticism, such as Nazir Ahmed, Khawja Rafiqi Maulvi Shamsuddin, were assassinated during Bhutto’s tenure. Special tribunals were set up to try political prisoners; under the Defence of Pakistan Rules over 1,000 people were tried.

33 Although the press had never been independent in Pakistan, whatever little freedom it enjoyed was greatly restricted by various legal and political manoeuvres such as the press publication ordinance and new print quotas. Publication of newspapers and periodicals was suspended without due process if they reported on meetings and speeches of opposition leaders.

34 The coercive strategy of the military elite was much more selective than that of the civilian elite. There were almost 50,000 political prisoners in gaol under the civilian regime; there were less than 500 political prisoners under the military.

35 The least problematic in terms of its integration was the NWFP. The Pathan are by far the most integrated in Pakistan: they were well represented in the military and in the bureaucracy. Economically the province is well integrated. Seventy per cent of the volume of trade and income of the NWFP is with Punjab.

36 India, too, has some bearing on Sindhi problems. It is probable that India had some role in Sind disturbances, if only in that the statements of India’s Gandhi and notions of democracy and self-determination gave some encouragement to Sindhi nationalists.

37 The earlier literature on integration stressed assimilation and has a predisposition towards consensus and shared values. To achieve consensus social cleavages had to be eliminated, or neutralized (see Jacob and Teune 1964: 5-6).

38 Since 1947 Pakistani elites have viewed demands by ethnic groups as the ‘poison of provincialism’. National elites have accused provincial elites of elevating the province over the country.

39 The major criticism of conflict reduction and consociational democracy is that it is based on a study of relatively small European states (Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands) that have attained democracy and stability in spite of considerable heterogeneity. Their success is attributed to the success of elite cooperation that transcends the ethnic and linguistic cleavages. Val R. Lorwin has argued ‘that the European democracies differ significantly from polities in which there is a rigid cleavage of caste, tribalism, race, language. The ‘spiritual families’ into which these European polities are divided are not airtight as ascriptive groups are. Even where differences are ascriptive, as between language groups in Belgium and Switzerland, the main political parties are not organized along ethnic lines, and ethnic differences alternate and compete for attention with class, religious. and (in Switzerland) differences between cantons. Hostility is less intense towards members of other groups than in severely heterogeneous societies’ (Lorwin 1974: 35). Horowitz argues ‘that
the problem of cause and effect is most serious with those theories that generalize from European models to Asian or African models' (Horowitz 1973:1-6).

40Lijphart's argument for consociationalism is the unsuitability for heterogeneous societies such as Pakistan of 'adversary' Anglo-American democratic institutions. This point is well illustrated in the period 1971-77 (Lijphart 1977:25-44).
References


Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, 1952. Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah. Lahore: M. Ashraf.


Ziring, Lawrence, 1975. 'Pakistan: A Political Perspective', Asian Survey 15(7):629-44.