Japanese New Left Movements
and their Legacy for Civil Society

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Declaration
I, Takemasa Ando, declare that this work is wholly my own work.

Takemasa Ando

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I should like to express my appreciation Maxine McArthur for her help with proofreading of this thesis.

Abstract
This thesis explores the legacy for the civil society of Japanese new left movements, which consisted mainly of anti-Vietnam War groups, radical student groups, young workers' groups. When the poverty problem was disappearing for the Japanese middle class during the economic boom in the 1960s, the movements reflected on the problems experienced by traditional progressive movements and did not limit themselves to changing political regimes or policies. First of all, this thesis argues that, against the backdrop of increasing control over workers in offices and factories due to the mass production system, and intensifying competition between young people for academic qualifications, Japanese new leftists aimed to transform their conservative and depoliticized consciousness called “everydayness”.

Second, this thesis discusses how Japanese new left movements resorted to violence and lost their popular support. The activists regarded direct action, such as confrontation with the police, as a benchmark of how far they had achieved transformation of their conservative consciousness. Whereas confrontational direct action gave a sense of liberation to the activists and promoted greater mobilization of the movements, some community residents suffered physical injury or damage to their property from armed conflicts between protesters and police officers.
From around 1970, I argue, the police successfully contained the movements by initially arresting a number of activists and then working with people in the community, who were concerned about new leftists' violent protests against outsiders or within their own groups. In particular the police focused on improving public relations to gain support from the media. This made it possible for the police to successfully stigmatize Japanese new left movements as "extremists" and identify themselves as guardians of citizens from the movements' violence. In this difficult situation many activists were disappointed with the violence and left the movements.

Finally, this thesis discusses the legacy of Japanese new left movements for civil society in the 1970s. Against the backdrop of demobilization of the movements, some activists sought to organize urban consumers in order to support organic farming in rural areas while others tried to build fairer relations with people living in other Asian countries who suffered from poverty and political oppression. These activists had in common their clearer understanding of problems caused by the economic boom, such as environmental deterioration or exploitation of developing countries.

I also explore the negative legacy of the movements. "New Politics" theories, which were modelled by political change in European industrialized countries after the 1970s, show that new left movements were transformed into "new social movements", which worked on issues like ecology, anti-nuclear power, gender equity, and rights for ethnic minorities, and influenced bureaucracy and political parties. However, widespread disappointment with Japanese new left movements in civil society, which derived from the failure of their violent protests, prevented the movements from playing a role in networking between each protest against rapid modernization in different local
communities, and prevented them from “New Politics” agendas to the attention of political institutions.
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Introduction

1. How I Encountered New Left Movements

On 8 March 2003, I was in Hibiya Park, Tokyo with a group of friends. It was a warm, early spring day, when the “Coalition of the Willing” initiated by then American president George W. Bush and supported by the Japanese government was about to embark in a war against Iraq. More than 40,000 people came to join the rally and demonstration held in the park to stop the war. I was a postgraduate student of politics at a Japanese university at the time, and joined the action with several of my friends. The spectacle of the park was different from usual. Before this action, I had been seldom involved in activism. Student associations in my senior schools were not active, and I was not interested in participating in them. Like many other students, I kept distant from the student union on campus in my undergraduate days. Student activism was not popular at the time I entered university in 1996, and many students were attracted by groups focused on sport or hobbies, such as tennis or skiing.

About half a year before the action in Hibiya Park, I had participated in a few demonstrations to stop the American war in Afghanistan under the name of “war on terrorism”; the majority of participants in those demonstrations were older men. On the day of the action against the Iraq War, by contrast, I saw a wide range of people from all ages who were angry with the war. The Concert Hall in the park in which the rally was held was full of protesters, so we waited outside the hall until the march started. My friends prepared a colourful placard saying “nanshiki sayoku (flexible leftists)”. Although the meaning of the message was not clear, I am unable to forget the small cardboard placard. The
line of the march was so long that we waited for a long time to leave the park and walked through the busy shopping streets of Ginza and Yūrakuchō to Tokyo Station. I had had my doubts about the effects of mass actions to stop the war before that day, but the large-scale demonstration compelled me to change my mind.

After that day, rather than forgetting everything about the experience, I looked for more opportunities to join some political actions. By chance, I got an email invitation to a one-day fieldtrip in early July of that year to Kōriyama, Fukushima prefecture, hosted by a social movement network working for public education on social problems caused by the World Trade Organization (WTO). I ventured to apply for the trip with my friend at graduate school who had joined me in the rally in March. On the day of the fieldtrip, I woke up early in the morning and took a bus from Shinjuku to Kōriyama. We visited a farm family in a rural village and saw killifish in the environment-friendly rice field. After that, we ate incredibly delicious rice balls and pickles made by the farmers. To be honest, I had been anxious about the trip before the day, because I had not had a good impression of “activists (katsudōka)”. Here I define “activists” as those who question dominant practices or ways of thinking in a society and are committed to actions for social and political change with other people. I had imagined that activists were difficult people to communicate with. Such an impression is not unusual in Japan; activists are usually seen as old-fashioned and alien. However, the activists whom I saw in Kōriyama kindly taught us, their rather nervous visitors, about the rice field, the purpose of the fieldtrip, and their activism. I was thus encouraged by the fieldtrip to join activism at my own pace.

Since then, I have met various activists from labour movements, antiwar movements, farmers’ movements, consumer movements, women’s
movements, and poor people's movements. All in all, I think that their political standpoint is critical: they question dominant values in Japan and the world, are very sceptical about powerful political forces, such as large corporations and governments, and seek radical social reforms without resorting to violence. Most of the groups are supported only by members' fees and donations in order to keep their independence from the political forces. It is obvious that they struggle to survive financially and, in a sense, their administration is less than professional, but for these reasons I felt all the more relaxed and at home in the groups.

The encounters with the activists have given me many new experiences; these experiences contain a mix of surprise, confusion, excitement, and discoveries. A short while after joining the activism, I found that some of the activists were or are members of "new left" groups or networks, though there are many activists who are not affiliated with any political groups; most of the older activists joined anti-Vietnam War movements or radical student movements in the 1960s and 1970s. I sometimes find legacies of the past in their activism. The activists like to use some unfamiliar "jargon". An example is "sōkatsu (summing-up)". Sōkatsu is usually used after the activists finish their actions, such as demonstrations or rallies, and gather to evaluate the actions. Whilst this word has been used in Japanese new left movements for a long time, I felt odd when I first heard the activists use the words.

All of the experiences may not have been delightful, but joining the activism has been exciting and stimulating. Many activists are kind to me, and the most impressive thing is their tremendous sincerity about their activism. Most of them are unpaid volunteers (or low-paid staff) though they do not necessarily have a good income. Their meetings usually begin around seven in
the evening after the activists finish their jobs, and they do not end until nine or ten. In Japan, many workers are so busy that they do not have enough time to join social activities on weekdays. I am often surprised to learn that the activists sacrifice their time, career advancement, and money for the activism to which they are committed. This makes me feel that they are much more trustworthy than those who comment coolly and cynically, "Japanese civil society or social movements are weak, because social activists are narrow-mindedly ideological" (I have to say that I was this kind of person).

The activists study hard. Most of them are part-time activists, but they have a good knowledge of political and social issues. I met a young female member of a small labour union who studied art at university. She has such knowledge about labour laws that I cannot compete with her. I learnt that several years ago, she was harassed by someone senior in a company and eventually was fired. She could not forget this unfortunate incident and has learnt the labour laws thoroughly. Since the activists deal with issues which are crucial to their or others' everyday life, they strongly feel the necessity to study. Their efforts propel me, a graduate student who has spent more than ten years on campus since I entered undergraduate school, to rethink the fundamental, but important question, "why and what should I study?".

It is worth noting that many of the activists are very ethical. It is no exaggeration to say that their activism is closely associated with the way they live. One day, I went to a small Japanese restaurant with a couple of activists after a meeting, where we ordered tempura which included vegetables, fish, and prawn tempura. When the tempura was served, no one started eating the prawn tempura (prawn is the favourite food of most Japanese people). They told me that they had not eaten prawn for a long time, because many imported prawns were produced by Japanese agribusinesses which invested in Asian
countries, exploited local fisher people, and destroyed the environment. The activists knew all too well how the prawns on their dining table were produced. I felt humble to find out that the activists try to be ethical about details in their everyday life which most people do not care about.

Their ethical way of living helps them to commit themselves to their activism. "Activism" may remind us of conspicuous actions such as demonstrations or rallies, but I came to know that many activists did not neglect simple and boring work. When I first saw them mailing, I was surprised to see how skilful they were at their work; copying and folding hundreds of handouts, putting them into envelopes, sealing these envelopes, and sending them to their group's members. This work was done swiftly and beautifully; their long commitment to activism made it possible for them to be so skilful. I was also impressed that the activists, particularly older activists who have many experiences, are willingly involved in taking part in petty tasks, such as bringing and setting up laptops and screens, running to photocopy machines to copy handouts, and preparing small change for the reception at rallies. They taught me what was necessary for sustainable activism.

On the other hand, I have seen some conflicts among activists. I think that many of the conflicts derive from personal matters, such as emotional entanglement, rather than political differences. I find that conflicts between ethical activists often result from differences of view over the way they commit themselves to activism. It is ironical that such personal conflicts are caused by their powerful commitment. Even many of the activists have two different aspects: whilst they are ethical about social injustice, the excess of ethics leads them to being harsh on other people and ending up moralising.

Some develop techniques to defuse such conflicts: like one young activist in his thirties who works in a company during the day, but spends so
many hours on activism that I often doubt that he does his jobs in his workplace. He is distinct in his fair personality: I have never seen him discriminate between people on the basis of their social position or length of involvement in the group, etc. He likes to make jokes with his Kansai accent even during serious discussions. Other members and I found his jokes annoying at times because they forced us to pause in our discussions. However, the fact is that the more devoted to activism we are, the more excited we are likely to be. Since we are too busy doing what we have to do, we tend to lose our composure, be less careful about our circumstances, and follow routines; we miss some members’ dissatisfaction with our talks in meetings; we rely on our routine phrases, slogans, or strategies without improving them to spread our opinions to a wide range of people. I realise that his untimely and rather silly jokes have the effect of distancing us from too-focused or blinkered involvement in our activities. I do not think that he does this intentionally. I guess that he has unconsciously learnt it from his long experiences of activism.

Other activists also attempt to find a way to prevent their ethics from causing them to be aggressive to other people. However, personal conflicts between activists show that these attempts are not necessarily successful. Since their behaviour is based on their ethics, one ethic confronts another from time to time; this makes the conflicts in social movement groups more serious than in those of other organizations, because in paid work, even though rank-and file workers might be dissatisfied with their boss, they are finally subordinate to the boss, and put up with their dissatisfaction in return for salaries. In social movement organizations, on the other hand, the relationship between activists is not hierarchical but equal (at least in theory), and their activities are spontaneous and unpaid. Consequently, conflicts between
activists are often harder to solve. I have to say that the activists whom I know are not always successful in recruiting newcomers, particularly younger people, in spite of their great efforts. Many of the activists see their movements as less powerful than those of the past or those in other countries. I heard an old activist say, “our movements have been in a long slump since I first joined the movements about 30 years ago”.

I cannot pinpoint when and why I began to survey the history of Japanese new left movements. I always wanted to know more about the movements I came across. In my earlier Ph.D. life at a Japanese university, my research topic was Japanese fascism in the prewar period. At that time, I was often worried by difficulties in finding connections between my research topic and myself. After beginning the historical survey of Japanese new left movements, I have finally found a conjuncture between the present and past, and the distance between my research and activism is closing. The change of my research topic makes my Ph.D. life longer than originally planned, but I feel happy in my experiences of activism over the past several years. The historical research on Japanese new left movements teaches me that the activists have worried about the excess of their ethical sincerity since the late 1960s. Their moralism has produced many tragedies in the movements. The most symbolic is intra- or inter-group violence (*uchigeba*), but also the activists have been physically hurt or mentally traumatized by a number of unknown conflicts.

In what follows, I write the history of Japanese new left movements in the 1960s and 1970s: many activists were very sincere about their efforts to be ethical; they were passionate about acting to redress the suffering of powerless people in Japan and other Asian countries and to build alternative economies based on social justice and sustainability; they were disturbed by aggressiveness caused by the excess of ethics, and some of them attacked
their colleagues; many of them were shocked by these tragedies and gave up their commitment, while a small number of them continued their struggle to balance their ethics; the new left movements were stigmatized by the media; this stigma prevented new左 and later movements from gaining a wide range of support from civil society. I do not intend to idealize the new leftists, but most of them were so ethical that they were sensitive to issues which other people did not usually mind. How did such activists fall prey to this “excess of ethics”? I want to discuss this paradoxical question. My experiences show that we are not free from the concerns, anxieties, worries, and pains which the activists suffered in the past. In this sense, we are still held back by the past. I try to explore the legacy of Japanese new left movements in order to understand where we are now. This is all my research can do in appreciation of kindness from the respectable persons whom I came to know in activism.

2. Rapid Economic Growth and “Disciplinization”

What are New Left Movements?

What is the legacy of Japanese new left movements? This is the research question of this thesis. I begin with the definition of new left movements. Todd Gitlin, a sociologist and former activist of American new left movements and sociologist, stressed that “New Left” had two aspects.¹ “New” indicates that they should be distinguished from Communists or Social Democrats. The USSR intervened in the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and many Hungarian citizens were killed by the Soviet military. The cruel political oppression of the Soviet system when Joseph Stalin was the General

Secretary of the Communist Party was uncovered and became known to leftists all over the world in the late 1950s. The discredit of the Soviet spread even to some communist countries, and the Sino-Soviet split worsening from the late 1950s. Many leftists were driven to relinquish hope for the Soviet as an ideal society; they were called “new leftists”. New leftists were “new” in the sense that they were more independent from “old leftists” who adhered to the Soviet-style Socialism or Communism.

On the other hand, new left movements were “Left”; they inherited their interest in social justice from old leftists. While old leftists prioritized the class issue and saw revolutionary change initiated by proletariats as the goal of their activism, new leftists addressed more various issues: opposition to wars which did not directly affect themselves; protests against rising control over students by university authorities; support for minorities’ actions against discrimination. It should be emphasized that the rise of new left movements was a trend in industrialized countries from the late 1950s: they were formed and diffused in industrialized countries in the late 1950s and the 1960s, mobilized a wide range of people, reached a peak in 1968-69 when anti-Vietnam War movements and campus disputes were boosted in many industrialized countries, and declined in the early 1970s.

American new left movements are, if narrowly defined, limited to student movements of SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), the most influential network of student groups on campus, but the movements are usually defined in a more inclusive manner to encompass black, student, antiwar, and other groups. Following this definition, I include in Japanese new left movements a broad range of people’s movements in the 1960s and the 1970s: student

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movements (Zenkyōtō, the All-campus Committee for Struggles, and the töha, new left factions, discussed below), anti-Vietnam War movements (Beheiren, the Citizens’ Federation for Peace in Vietnam), and young workers’ movements (Hansen Seinen linkai, the Antiwar Youth Committee).

Some points should be added to this definition of new left movements. First, new left movements are not the same as new social movements (NSMs). NSMs have emerged particularly in some European industrialized countries since the 1970s and have addressed problems caused by industrialization, such as environmental deterioration or discrimination against minorities. It is true that new left movements partly overlapped NSMs in Japan as well as in these European countries; many surveys show that ideas and personnel of NSMs were often inherited from new left movements. However, while new left movements limited their focus particularly to actions against the Vietnam War and campus disputes, and identified themselves as leftists, NSMs deal with broader issues, such as anti-nuclear, ecology, gender equity, rights for sexual or ethnic minorities, and solidarity with Third World countries, and no longer necessarily adhere to a leftist identity.

Second, new left movements were not reduced to shinsayoku, a Japanese translation of the phrase “new left”. “Shinsayoku” is usually regarded as consisting of “extreme leftists (kyokusa)” who have sought to adopt “violent revolution (bōryoku kakumei)”. This understanding of shinsayoku is widely shared by Japanese people. “Shinsayoku” is almost equal to the töha, that is, factional groups which criticized the JCP for its bureaucratic culture, founded their own organizations after the late 1950s to build the true vanguard party, and have been infamous amongst many Japanese people because of violent conflicts within the groups or terrorist attacks since the 1970s. I do not use “shinsayoku”, partly because the word is stigmatized by the Japanese police.
and media, and partly because a large number of activists who were not affiliated with the töha should be subsumed in the definition of new left movements. Japanese new left movements were thus not limited to the töha, but rather they gained participation and support from a wider range of people in the late 1960s.

Rapid Economic Growth in the 1960s

In order to understand what Japanese new left movements protested against, discussions about the economic and social background are necessary. Japan achieved rapid economic growth between the late 1950s and early 1970s; the average growth rate in Japan between 1955 and 1973 reached about 10%. This figure was much higher than other industrialized countries in the same period: the USA 3.4%, UK 3%, West Germany 5.4%, France 5.6%, and Italy 5.6%. The rapid growth entailed industrial expansion. Employment in the manufacturing and tertiary industries increased from 23.14 million in 1955 to 45.62 million in 1975, while those employed in primary industries decreased from 16.11 million in 1955 to 7.35 million in 1975. The economic boom also resulted in urbanization; the family structure was transformed by population migration. The number of sole person households surged from 2.08 million in 1955 to 5.99 million in 1975, and nuclear family households more than doubled from 8.60 million in 1955 to 19.30 million in 1975. In 1975, these single and nuclear households reached 80% of all Japanese households.

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The workplace was also transformed during the economic boom. The mass production system began to be introduced in Japan in the interwar period\(^5\), but it spread widely after the 1950s. In the late 1950s, for example, the steel industry introduced Industrial Engineering (IE), the latest method of labour management which was developed in the USA under the influence of the scientific management system invented by Frederic Taylor. The management divided the working process into several parts, a time frame was set for each part, and workers were assigned to the divided and simplified parts. Many workers in the steel industry were forced to complete the part within the set time frame and became more subject to the control of labour management, which was pursuing the improvement of productivity.\(^6\) This transformation had been occurring not only in Japan but also in other industrialized countries since the early twentieth century. Sociologist Peter Wagner stressed that the social transformation led inevitably to “disciplinization” across a broad range of society. “Disciplinization” was aimed to enhance efficiency, order, stability, and predictability, and workers were deprived of their autonomy in decision-making in the workplace.\(^7\)

Wagner also points out that “disciplinization” was facilitated by the diffusion of the consumer culture as well as by rationalization of the workforce. Many people living in America, Britain, France, Germany, and other industrialized countries became able to access durable goods, such as houses, cars, household goods, and long-distance travel for leisure purposes in the twentieth century. These people came to rely more on money and the

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market for their lives than before; subsistence agricultural production in workers' families quickly decreased. Their lives were homogenized in this process of "commodification". For example, the American suburb was the prototype of a commercialized style of consumption, in which residents lived in standardized houses and were subject to a standardized lifestyle.8

In Japan, too, the economic boom brought with it the expansion of the consumer culture. The leisure industries grew rapidly in this period; the sales of the restaurant industries (including cafés or bars) soared from 133.8 billion yen in 1955 to 2.3771 trillion yen (nominal terms) in 1970, and the entertainment industries (including pachinko, bowling, and golf) from 102.2 billion in 1955 to 1.6229 trillion in 1970.9 Mass-produced durable goods were available to a large number of Japanese households. In 1970, 92% of households living in cities with a population of more than 50,000 population possessed electric washing machines and electric refrigerators, and 90% of them possessed black-and-white TVs.10

An increasing number of Japanese people were involved in affluent lives during the rapid economic growth. The start of this period was described with the well-known phrase "mohaya sengo dewa nai (the postwar era has ended)"; the ruins of the Second World War were about to disappear, the cities were quickly reconstructed, and more and more people were liberated from poverty, despite gaps between regions, ethnicities, and classes. In the late 1950s, the growing consumer ethic was shown in the catch phrase "three sacred treasures": an electric washing machine, a refrigerator, and a television marked the acquisition of middle-class status. The 1950s list gave

8 Ibid., pp.85-86.  
9 Hazama (ed.). Kôdo Keizai Seichô ka no Seikatsu Sekai, p.244.  
way to that of a car, a colour TV, and an air-conditioner in the 1960s, and another catch phrase, the “three C’s”, was similarly coined to characterize these new consumer desires. In 1964, the Summer Olympics was held in Tokyo. This symbolized that Japan had become a member of the group of richer countries. Highways, trains, subways, hotels, and other infrastructure were constructed before the Olympics, rapidly changing the landscape of Tokyo and other cities.

“Disciplinization” in Politics

The political arena was not free from “disciplinization” either. In this period, the dominant political antagonism in Japan was between conservatives, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and progressives, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Regardless of confrontation on national security, both sides of politics made an implicit consensus on industrial development as the national goal. This consensus was facilitated by shuntō (the spring labour struggle). Shuntō began in 1955 and became an important annual event for Japanese workers in the mid-1960s. In shuntō, labour representatives negotiated with managers, particularly for wage rises. Labour unions, which strongly supported progressive parties in elections, came to focus on redistributing incomes to a wide range of people rather than questioning industrialization.

Political scientist Claus Offe raised the three central features of the postwar political system in industrialized countries.\(^{11}\) First, industrial growth was the biggest national goal in Western countries and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. Business owners and managers were encouraged to invest for profits;

the duties of the national government were to boost GDP, distribute incomes to people, and solve the poverty problem in the country. Second, the dominant political cleavage in this period was between capital and labour. Organized workers and managers politically competed with each other. However, this competition was not about the pros and cons of industrialization but about what proportion of income should be distributed to each side. Third, political decisions were mediated through representative democracy, in which the rule of the majority was the basic principle. Minorities’ discontent on political decisions tended to be neglected or ignored in this style of democracy. In particular, the agendas which questioned the national goal of industrialization were seldom put into agendas of political institutions. This meant that people were unable to express their opinions effectively without being integrated into the dominant political system.

The welfare system also involved Japanese people in “disciplinization”. The development of welfare programs had started during wartime, but the social security system expanded widely in the postwar period. The Japanese government was required by the new Constitution to enact a series of social security laws for low income families, children, and physically handicapped people between 1946 and 1949. It was during the economic boom in particular that social security programs were rapidly developed; legislations for a universal health insurance program were passed in 1958; the 1959 National Pension Law came to cover all citizens including public servants and farmers. In Japan big business provided social welfare, such as retirement allowance, financial support for superannuation, and houses, to their employees. This “corporate welfare” played a role in complementing insufficient social service from the state.
The welfare system made a great contribution to reducing poverty through provision of social security, but the emergence of welfare states had another aspect; the growing "disciplinization" discussed by Peter Wagner. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci pointed to this aspect. In the early twentieth century, when the welfare system was being introduced in industrialized countries like the USA, Gramsci stressed that workers were increasingly controlled even in everyday life. He indicated that in America, the large automobile company Ford tried to intervene in the private lives of its employees and control how they spent their wages and how they lived. The American state prevented workers from "alcoholic and sexual depravation" in order to "increase his muscular-nervous efficiency and not to corrode or destroy it". The boundary between the public and the private thus became fuzzier in the period of welfare states.

3. Self-revolution in "Everydayness"

New Left Movements Questioned "Disciplinization"

During the economic boom, many Japanese people came to be increasingly dissatisfied with the outcomes of the rapid economic growth. This can be inferred from NHK (Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai)’s questionnaire surveys. 59% of the respondents (the total number of the respondents was about 1,500) opposed the further promotion of economic growth in the 1973 survey, while only 22% favoured it. The respondents raised concerns at pollution, rising

prices, and the loss of humanity as major problems caused by economic growth.\textsuperscript{13}

In the 1950s, people's movements for democracy and peace developed by those known as "the postwar progressives (sengo kakushin seiryoku)", including anti-military base movements, ban-the-bomb movements, labour movements, women's movements, and so on, successfully mobilized a large number of Japanese people who were concerned about deterioration of their livelihood based on their bitter memories of loss and the devastation of their lives in and immediately after the Second World War. This mobilization reached a peak in the Anpo protests of 1960, which were large-scale people's resistance against the revision of the Anpo Treaty (the Japan-US Security Treaty) strongly promoted by the LDP government. The main focus of "the postwar progressives" was to defend people's lives, so they did not much highlight people's frustration with "disciplinization" in industrialized society.

In the late 1960s, Japanese new left movements questioned rising social control over people's everyday life. The society in which people were involved in "disciplinization" was dubbed the "controlled society (kanri shakai)" by the new leftists, and "alienation" was a popular word in the movements. There were three major types of Japanese new left movements: student movements, antiwar movements, and young workers' movements.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{14} Residents' movements and women's liberation movements were also active in this period and are examined particularly in Chapter 5. However, these movements are not the main focus of this thesis and are discussed to explore the legacy of new left movements. I assume that, although residents' movements and women's liberation movements were affected by the new left, these movements were so distinct in the characteristics of ideas and actions that they cannot be included into the category of new left movements. The same also applies to movements of ethnic minorities in Japan such as Ainu and zainichi Koreans, which should also be distinguished from new left movements in the sense of the term used here, although (as noted in Chapter 4) some new leftists began to work on issues rights for ethnic minorities in the 1970s.
First, new left movements were developed most actively on campus. In the mid-1960s, student movements in various parts of Japan began to question the strict control by university authorities over students' lives and gained support from a large number of students who had not joined such movements before. In the late 1960s, they quickly shifted their focus from problems on campus to a wider range of social changes. New left students strongly criticized the JCP and Minsei, its youth groups, for their bureaucratization. The new left students divided into two main streams: the töha and Zenkyōtō (Zenkyōtō was a loosely-linked network of university students). The two streams were to some extent in conflict with each other, but both often took joint actions on campus and on the streets, and their membership often overlapped, at least in the late 1960s.

The second major element in the Japanese new left movements was the mass protests against the Vietnam War, in which the United States was engaged at that time. The protestors came to know that Japan was providing the USA with strong support for the Vietnam War and many Vietnamese people were being killed by the US military operations. Though most Japanese people were not directly affected by the war, various people of all ages were passionate about actions against the Vietnam War from the viewpoint of social justice. Beheiren (the Citizens' Federation for Peace in Vietnam), a network of antiwar activists which was formed in 1965, played a central role in organizing rallies, marches, and other antiwar actions. The activists not only felt sympathy for war victims in Vietnam, but they also felt responsible for the Japanese government's support of the USA and claimed that transformation of their society was crucial for stopping the war.

Third, many young workers' actions were also an important part of new left movements. The activists criticized large labour unions for their insufficient
actions against the Vietnam War and protested against rising social control in the workplace. The young workers were dissatisfied with older unionists who (they argued) only devoted their energy to actions for wage rises and who seemed indifferent to the Vietnam War. In 1965, they formed the Antiwar Youth Committee, a network of antiwar workers. The Committee became well known for taking radical direct action in factories or offices in opposition to the war, such as wild cat strikes or occupation of workplaces, and were identified as a part of new left movements, because the young workers often participated in joint actions on the streets with other new left groups.

**Self-revolution in “Everydayness”**

Japanese new leftists focused more on transforming their consciousness than on bringing about immediate change to national policies or political institutions. The activists were concerned that the more deeply Japanese people, including themselves, were seduced by affluent lives, the more conservative and apolitical they became. At least in the late 1960s, many new leftists believed that personal transformation would lead to broader social and political change. Such conservative and apolitical consciousness was articulated by the activists in the word “everydayness (nichijôsei)”. The connotation of “everydayness” is close to that of everyday life, a research topic which political and social theorists frequently discuss, but whilst everyday life is usually seen by the theorists as “a problematic, a contested and opaque terrain”\(^\text{15}\), a place in which various players contest for power, Japanese new leftists saw “everydayness” as a place dominated by the ruling class.

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Theoretical discussions about the politics of everyday life originate from Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. The analysis of Marx and Freud were located at the level of everyday life. For them the everyday is not as it appears; behind the appearance of everyday life lies another actuality; this actuality is a forceful realm of desire and fear for Freud, and the material circumstances (the division of labour) for Marx. They assumed that the symptoms of actuality could be discerned in the everyday.\textsuperscript{16} This way of seeing everyday life as a realm in which actuality is hidden affected a wide range of Western political and social theorists. Studies on everyday life developed as an increasing number of people living in industrialized countries came to be involved in popular culture in the early 20th century. For example, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, two of leading intellectuals in the Frankfurt School, argued how people were influenced in everyday life by forms of popular cultures produced by the "cultural industry".

This view of everyday life as a place of representation of actuality can be found in discussions of Herbert Marcuse, a second-generation intellectual of the Frankfurt School. While “anti-disciplinary politics”\textsuperscript{17}, such as rejection of organization, hierarchy, and leadership, spread to various new left groups or individuals in industrialized countries in the 1950s and 1960s, he sought to theorize the new phenomenon of rising social control in everyday life. In \textit{One-Dimensional Man}, he found that class conflicts were blunted in advanced capitalist societies, like the United States. More and more people, he argued, were losing individual freedom, and were becoming subordinate to domination by the capitalist ruling class and experiencing social alienation. In the sphere of labour, they were obliged to sell themselves as a labour commodity and

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp.6-7.
conformed to the requirements of labour organizations. Marcuse criticized growing consumerism for providing new forms of social control. Individuals were satisfied with “false needs” promoted by mass culture or advertising and lost the ability to dissent. He also pointed out that economic, political, and military elites utilized technology as an instrument of profitability and social control, so technological rationality was reduced to the logic of efficiency and turned into capitalist rationality. Influenced in part by postwar US sociology, Marcuse developed his argument about the reality of people’s everyday life in advanced capitalism.\textsuperscript{18}

In Japan, many intellectuals including writers, philosophers, ethnographers, and Marxists began to discuss everyday life in the context of rapid industrialization and urbanization during the 1920s and 1930s. Tosaka Jun was one intellectual who clearly articulated this issue. In his analysis of popular culture, he argued that the origins of people’s everyday practices were concealed in the productive relationship. Influenced by Marx’s materialism, Tosaka pointed out that actuality was hidden in everyday life. This view of everyday life came from his criticism of modernity.\textsuperscript{19} Studies of everyday life became less prominent when Western modernity was regarded as the goal of Japanese society to be achieved in the early postwar period. The Japanese new leftists brought everyday life back to the agenda of civil society in the late 1960s. They shared with Marcuse and other Western thinkers their interest in the looming problems caused by industrialization. They did not just translate the Western intellectuals’ arguments into Japanese, but they elaborated their own ideas based on the specific Japanese context.

The new leftists viewed “everydayness” as a realm in which actuality is hidden, and believed that it was essential to separate themselves from and transform it. Self-revolution (jiko henkaku) in “everydayness” was thus at the core of the idea of new left movements. Transforming “everydayness” was an approach focused on the way the activists themselves lived, but they also believed that their actions would lead to a transformation of Japanese society and the world. The activists were encouraged by this belief to commit themselves to the movements. Each group of new left movements might have different enemies, such as university authorities for student activists, or the Vietnam War for antiwar activists. However, the activists shared the basic goal of changing depoliticized consciousness in everyday life.

4. Why New Left Movements Declined Rapidly

New Left Movements Faced the Deadlock

Japanese new left movements, addressing the problems of “controlled society”, successfully mobilized and gained support from a wide range of people in the late 1960s. However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the movements faced the rapid decline of mobilization in the 1970s; many new leftists, who had been passionate about transforming everyday life, were haunted by apathy or despair, and finally gave up their commitment. For example, when recalling his experiences, Kosaka Shūhei, a former activist of Zenkyōtō at Tokyo University, wrote:

The way new leftists had acted in the 1960s made their lives difficult in this period [—in the 1970s]. These difficulties came from the way of starting their actions from self-transformation or
questioning their way of life. Such a way did not cause problems while the movements were growing. The activists were excited by their activism as more people joined the movements. However, the manner of actively connecting themselves with social circumstances—"this issue is relevant to me"—turned into ethical obligation—"that issue is also relevant to you [so you must commit yourself to it]"—in the declining stage of the movements. Illusions that were produced during the period of growth of the movements were broken. Not only did the activists not know how to live, but also they lost themselves, and only empty self-consciousness and irritation were left behind....

I think that the brightest persons of my generation were disintegrated or nearly wrecked. I also suffered from a slight personality disorder at that time. I lost a sense of reality about my circumstances and my body, and was like a ghost hanging around with abstract ideas. There were many activists who almost went crazy. In such circumstances, I was unable to do some things which I had previously been able to do, such as making phone calls, delivering documents to someone, or saying something to other people. I had to make a real effort to wake up early or brush my teeth regularly. Everydayness is composed of chains of behaviour which are seen as natural. Losing a sense of reality means that I became unable to do such behaviour.20

In the 1970s, when new left movements rapidly declined on campus and on the streets, a large number of activists "did not know how to live", "lost themselves", and "almost went crazy".

After the decline of new left movements, some of the following generation became hostile to the movements. Yûki Sôichi, a high school teacher who was born in 1954 and entered Waseda University after the setback of the movements on campus, was very critical of what former new leftists had done in the late 1960s and 1970s.

I doubt in fact whether they [the Zenkyōtō generation—the generation who were university students between the late 1960s and the early 1970s when Zenkyōtō movements were very powerful on campus] actually “struggled”… they claimed that they protested against the authorities to gain a sense of liberty and build ties with a broader range of people, but did they need to destroy things and hurt people? They could have dropped out and been hippies as their seniors had done, or they could have done volunteer work as their juniors are now doing. Whatever happens, these actions would be very unlikely to cause trouble to other people. Or, did they feel that they had to destroy the regime which alienated their freedom? However, the regime was not destroyed. It was barely scratched. Despite this, how can we say that “the legacy [of Zenkyōtō] is still alive”? 

No, the Zenkyōtō generation may say that “we committed vandalism just for fun”, as did Inose Naoki [—a well-known writer of the Zenkyōtō generation]. How funny they were when they took desks and chairs on campus and built barricades with them, or they burned the desks and chairs instead of firewood! But these were criminal acts. It is minimal adult etiquette for them to say “we feel ashamed of the mistakes we made in our youthful days”. They cannot avoid being ridiculed and told “you were, in short, childish”.

Eventually, it seems that all the “possibilities of Zenkyōtō” amounted to becoming extremely abstract and losing a sense of reality, so the following generation including us did not inherit any possibilities. It is true that reality is boring for us and probably for younger people as well. Or, the Zenkyōtō generation sent an implicit message that “reality is boring. Boredom makes us lose motivation, so we had better not open our eyes to the reality in order to motivate ourselves”, and this had a negative impact on the following generation. This was the biggest sin of the Zenkyōtō generation. A few groups of the Zenkyōtō generation went toward the extreme and did not produce anything. Their biggest contribution was to teach us that they were wrong.21

His critical comment suggests that such negative impressions of new left movements as “childish” were widespread in Japanese civil society after the

movements rapidly declined in the 1970s. What happened to these movements which had been so successful in mobilization in previous years? I examine not only fruitful ideas and actions of the movements but also the deadlock which the activists faced. Why were the possibilities of resistance and solidarity not completely realized? When discussing the decline of Japanese new left movements, I owe much to labour historian James Green’s approach. In his book *Taking History to Heart*, citing a passage from the book by well-known movement historian Howard Zinn, James Green wrote:

Radical historians have “to show how good social movements can go wrong, how leaders can betray their followers, how rebels can become bureaucrats, how ideas can become frozen”.

Irokawa Daikichi, a Japanese historian who surveyed people’s movements for democratic rights (*jiyū minken undō*) in the Meiji period, made a similar point about the historiography of movements. He wrote:

The purpose of the history of ideas... is to help people, who aim at true human liberation, create more positive ideas. In order to do this, we must carefully indicate problems of people’s movements in the past, their way of thinking which caused the problems, and weak points of their mentality. It is also important to draw on the wellsprings of people’s histories, regardless of their many defects, and to redefine them as the spontaneous creation of people’s ideas.

Both historians commonly pointed out that the ideas and actions of the movements would not be fruitful without having a deeper understanding of their defects.

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Direct Action and the Police

How did Japanese new left movements face deadlock? It is often argued that the rapid decline of the movements resulted from their violent protests against outsiders or within their own groups: actions which included terrorism, guerrilla fighting, intra- or inter-group violence (uchigeba). In the late 1960s, direct action was one of the most popular choices in the repertoire of Japanese new leftists, especially young people. Political theorist April Carter defined direct action as “a means for people to exert pressure on governments or other powerful institutions such as business corporations”\(^{24}\). She stressed that direct action is “essentially nonviolent methods of noncooperation, obstruction or defiance”, such as “limited, usually symbolic, sabotage or aggressive confrontation with the police”\(^{25}\). Carter cautiously excluded from direct action “deliberate attempts to terrorise individuals to end what the activists see as immoral activities”. In the definition, we must be careful not to confuse “non-violent direct action” with violent protests.

In the 1970s, radical direct action taken by Japanese new leftists sometimes turned to violent protests. In particular, many of the activists were so shocked by the repeated intra- or inter-group violence that they decided to leave the movements. According to a survey of the National Police Agency, 1,776 internal conflicts occurred from 1968 to 1975, in which 4,848 people were injured, 44 were killed, and 3,438 were arrested.\(^{26}\) One of the most well-known and tragic cases was when activists of the United Red Army (Rengô


\(^{25}\) Ibid., p.1

Sekigun) killed their colleagues under the name of "purging (shukusei)" in military-style training in a mountainous area in the early 1970s.

In a questionnaire survey published as *Zenkyōtō Hakusho* (White Paper on Zenkyōtō), 24.0% of the 563 former new leftists stated that they were propelled by "intra- or inter-group violence" to leave the movements; 16.9% of them stated that the activities of the United Red Army moved them to give up their commitment.²⁷ Given that 52.9% did not provide an explanation for their departure and that both "intra- or inter-group violence" and "the United Red Army" are concerned with violent protests, we can judge that a large number of former new leftists were so disturbed by violence that they eventually decided to leave the movements. I seek to explore how the creative direct action taken by Japanese new left movements was transformed into violent protests.

The exclusive focus on the characteristics of the ideas of Japanese new left movements, that is, internal factors of the movements, is not sufficient to explore how direct action was transformed into violent protests. Based on some recent works of social movement studies, I examine how the police controlled new left movements and how the policing influenced the (de)mobilization of the movements. The Political Opportunity Structure theories regard policing as an important index for judging how the state provides opportunities and constraints to social movements. Policing was defined as "the police handling of protest events" by Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, leading scholars on policing protests.²⁸ They also stressed that policing varies depending on the state and the time. Given their argument, this thesis

²⁷ Zenkyōtō Hakusho Henshū linkai (ed.). *Zenkyōtō Hakusho*. Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1994, p.413. This book was edited by dozens of former Zenkyōtō activists in the early 1990s. They sent letters with a questionnaire to 4,962 former activists and obtained more than 500 replies.

develops contextualized discussions about Japanese police strategies and their impact on mobilization of new left movements.

Discussions about transformation of direct action into violent protests are complemented by a survey of the way in which the mainstream media described new left movements. As will be discussed later, the main data source of this thesis is “the new left media”, that is, media which supported new left movements by publishing reports on the movements’ ideas and actions. Whereas “the new left media” provides us with the perspective of the movements, the mainstream media, such as the Asahi Shinbun and the Yomiuri Shinbun, illustrate how the movements were seen by outsiders. The mainstream media were not necessarily sympathetic to new leftists, and were particularly hostile to direct action taken by the activists. The mainstream media had much stronger influence over the making of public opinion than “the new left media”. The mainstream media should be thus analysed as a crucial factor affecting demobilization of the movements caused by violent protests.

Social movement scholar Sydney Tarrow claimed that violent protests have ambivalent effects. Violence propels the media to pay attention to the movements, which can facilitate mobilization of social movements. On the other hand, violent protests tend to transform intricate and multi-polarized relations between protestors, authorities, and audiences into bipolarized relations between allies and enemies, and separate non-violent supporters from the movements. Based on his argument, I discuss the paradoxical outcomes of violent protests in the context of Japanese new left movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

5. Research Method

The Discourse Analysis of Japanese New Left Movements

This section moves to discussions about research method. How should I approach the legacy of Japanese new left movements? Recalling his past experiences, former activist Kosaka Shûhei wrote:

"Place" must be examined as an intricate power relationship, which constrains people living there. Ideas are constrained by the formation of the "place". This is "inevitability" beyond people's "perception". The puzzle is why this "inevitability" led to the emergence of the United Red Army as "a part" of our movements.30

His discussions are very abstract, but the point is that he felt as if he and his colleagues had been "constrained" by their ideas and actions. What were the activists were "constrained" by? What were the rules of "place" which even they did not perceive? The aim of this thesis is to explore such implicit rules, what the recent historical or sociological studies often call "discourse", by teasing out the new leftists' voices.

Political scientist David Howarth stated that "discourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules". He raised an example of "a forest standing in the path of a proposed motorway". "Forests" have multiple meanings in a particular society produced by the historically specific rules of languages. The meanings compete and conflict with each other: in the discourse of developers, trees are usually regarded as a disposable means for continued economic growth and prosperity; in the discourse of

environmentalists, they represent essential components of a viable ecosystem or objects of intrinsic value and beauty. These socially and politically constructed discourses do not coexist equally: some discourses are more dominant and hegemonic than others. For instance, in a society where modernization is seen as a matter of the highest priority, the discourse of developers is more powerful than that of environmentalists.

I hypothesise that Japanese new left movements constructed a specific discourse space, a space of shared understandings constituted by published writings and face-to-face debate in the late 1960s. It is true that this space was not necessarily fixed and closed; it interacted with the discourse space of other social actors or groups in foreign countries as well as in Japan. In the late 1960s, Japanese new leftists frequently exchanged their ideas and actions with the new leftists of America, Germany, France, and other industrialized countries. For example, at the Democratic convention in Chicago of August 1968, American new leftists adopted the snake dance demonstration devised by Japanese activists in an effort to move Democrats to confront the Vietnam War. This example clearly reveals interaction of new leftists beyond national borders. However, I stress in this thesis that the discourse space of Japanese new left movements was to some extent independent from that of other countries, based on the social, institutional, and historical context of the movements.


32 The discourse analysis is a kind of interpretive approach, such as textual hermeneutics, ethnography, and so on. The discourse analysis overlaps but is distinct from hermeneutics which seeks to reconstruct the fixed and stable meanings of texts or actions or to uncover their true meanings. It aims to “analyse the way in which political forces and social actors construct meanings within incomplete and undecidable social structures”. This means that the meanings of texts or actions are fluid and dynamic, because the meanings are always produced and transformed through individuals’ practices (Howarth, David. *Discourse*. Buckingham; Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2000, pp.128-29).

Discourse is shared collectively; it is like a web of unconscious structural rules which affect people's practices. In this sense, the discourse produces power. Individuals who are involved in the rules cannot clearly perceive or handle them. David Howarth emphasized that the discourse is different from "frames", by which groups or people make strategic efforts to fashion shared understanding in order to legitimate their actions; it should not be viewed as "instrumental devices that can foster common perceptions and understandings for specific purposes". I contend that some key words coined and used by Japanese new leftists, such as "controlled society", "self-revolution", or "everydayness", were operated in the specific convention of discourses based on their historical contexts, and even activists could not control the effect produced by the discourses.

Existing Literature and Features of this Thesis

The hypothesis of this thesis is that Japanese new left movements as defined above, that is, the network of anti-Vietnam War groups, radical student groups, and young workers' groups, which addressed the issue of transforming "everydayness", shared common underlying rules of text or action in the late 1960s and 1970s. This hypothesis may help us to promote a comprehensive understanding of Japanese new left movements. Most previous research on the movements have focused separately on particular groups or sectors, like Beheiren, the Anpo protests in 1960; the early tōha, radical students,

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34 Howarth. Discourse, p.3.
the Sanrizuka struggle\textsuperscript{39}, the United Red Army\textsuperscript{40}, women's liberation movements\textsuperscript{41}, and new left intellectuals\textsuperscript{42}, in order to gain detailed knowledge of the groups' ideas and actions; some have separated antiwar movements from student movements; some have differentiated between Zenkyôtô and the tôha; others have stressed inter-generational differences within Zenkyôtô. Based on these research, this thesis aims to explore underlying discourse shared by a wide range of new left groups. I believe that this helps us to outline a comprehensive picture of the new left movements.

The key aim of this thesis is to provide a framework to connect between the positive and negative legacies of the movements. Existing literature has tended to discuss the constructive aspects of the movements (e.g. their critical ideas about controlled society) and their disruptive aspects (e.g. intra- or inter-group conflicts) separately. For example, literary critic Suga Hidemi looks positively at the outcomes of Japanese new left movements\textsuperscript{43}. Influenced by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein's discussions about the "world revolution of 1968", Suga regards Japanese new left movements as a precedent of present protests against "global capitalism". However, he tends to idealize the movements too much and fails to properly judge political and social effects of the movements on civil society. On the other hand, sociologist Oguma Eiji, in his comprehensive research on the legacy of new left movements, harshly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38}Takahashi Akira and Daigaku Mondai Kenkyûkai. “Nihon Gakusei Undô no Shisô to Kôdô” in \textit{Chûô Kôron} May, June, August, and September 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{39}Apter, David Ernest. \textit{Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan}. Cambridge; Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984.
\item \textsuperscript{40}Steinhoff, Patricia G. \textit{Nihon Sekigunha: Sono Shakiteki Monogatari}. Tokyo: Kawade Shobô, 1991.
\end{itemize}
criticized the movements for producing some crucial problems, such as violence against other people and their property.\textsuperscript{44} He tends to minimize the positive legacy of the movements in his criticism of the movements. In contrast to Suga and Oguma, I try to argue that both of the positive and negative legacies are inseparably connected with each other as two sides of a coin.

This approach was indeed suggested by several former activists. In the 1970s, when new left movements declined rapidly, at a roundtable about the outcomes of the movements, Tsumura Takashi, a former student activist, distanced Zenkyōtō from violent actions taken by the tōha. His interlocutor Inoue Sumio, an activist of anti-Vietnam war movements, expressed some reservations about this distinction:

I cannot say that there was no connection between the "lynch murder" incident of the United Red Army and Zenkyōtō movements—there were close relations beneath the surface. I think that people who addressed various issues at that time should frankly discuss this.\textsuperscript{45}

Other former new leftists also honestly admitted that the brutal actions taken by the United Red Army were not someone else's business for them. A man who entered Chūo University in 1966, joined student movements, and worked in publishing after graduating, recalling his experiences in the late 1960s and 1970s, wrote:

Many friends entered mountain areas to commit themselves to their struggles which seemed hopeless. Some friends were killed in the so-called lynch murder incidents. Other friends are still in jail. They are a

\textsuperscript{45} Tsumura Takashi (ed.). Zenkyōtō: Jizoku to Tenkei. Tokyo: Satsukisha.
projection of myself. I will bear this in mind as long as I am alive. I must pay a price for the rest of my life.\textsuperscript{46}

The reason why intra- or inter-group violence had a negative effect on the mobilization of the movements was that many new leftists who would never have dreamed of joining the United Red Army themselves had a certain sympathy for or attraction to its ideas and actions, and therefore felt their own ideas to be undermined when they understood the true scope of the United Red Army's violence. The statement cited above urges us to consider the proper research method of examining the legacy of Japanese new left movements. The distinction between the positive and negative legacies of the movements helps us to insulate the former from unproductive criticism (I also seek to do this in what follows). However, we must keep it in mind that this distinction always entails the risk of idealizing radical ideas and actions of the movements and closing our eyes to problems caused by the movements, or alternatively of stigmatizing the movements as "childish" and denying them completely. The approach of outlining a comprehensive picture of the movements, on the other hand, makes it possible for us to explore the relationship between the constructive legacy of the movements and their disruptive legacy.

A further feature of this thesis, which makes it different from existing literature, is that it seeks to place the key elements of the ideas of the movements in a longer-term historical framework. Some scholars have recently conducted research on the characteristics of current Japanese civil society and social movements.\textsuperscript{47} Although these studies successfully explore

\textsuperscript{46} Zenkyōtō Hakusho Henshū linkai (ed.). Zenkyōtō Hakusho, p.124.
differences between the Japanese case and the cases of other countries, further work remains to be done in analysing the emergence, development and influence of these characteristics. It is often pointed out that the destiny of Japanese new left movements has had a major influence on the discourse of contemporary civil society. However, the precise nature of this influence has not so far been analysed in much depth. In discussing the legacy of new left movements, this thesis focuses particularly on the way in which the ideas of the movements emerged from the early 1960s onward, and on the way in which they influenced activism from 1970 onward. A major contribution of this thesis is thus to fill the gap of existing literature and historicize the characteristics of Japanese civil society today.

Meanwhile, the thesis also aims to shed fresh light on the background to the emergence of the late 1960s new left movements. In this context, I pay particular attention to the “kikyō movement” (movement for the democratization of the hometown) which followed the Anpo struggle of 1960. As I shall argue in the following chapter, this relatively neglected movement constitutes an important part of the historical background to the emergence of late 1960s new left ideas.

“The New Left Media”

Finally, regarding the data used in this thesis. As mentioned above, the primary material of this thesis is from “the new left media”. “The new left

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media” encompassed journals, newspapers, books, etc. written by Japanese new left movements and their sympathizers. In the late 1950s and the 1960s, new left movements in some Western countries produced their own journals, such as New Left Review in Britain, Socialisme ou Barbarie and Argument in France, or Das Argument and Neue Kritik in Germany.49 “The New Left journals” identified themselves as a part of a broader movement and covered intellectual and political debates about the ideas and actions of the movements.

In Japan, the monthly or weekly “new left journals”, such as Asahi Jânaru or Gendai no Me (which were first published around the time of the Anpo protests of 1960) were enthusiastic about covering new leftists’ actions, gave strong support to the movements, and gained many readers in the 1960s and 1970s. Some journals which were first published immediately after the end of the Second World War, such as Tenbô or Shisô no Kagaku, became sympathetic to new left movements in the late 1960s. Each new left group issued their own journals or newspapers, like Beheiren Nyûsu by Beheiren or Shingeki by Tôdai Zenkyötô (the Tokyo University Zenkyötô), in order to spread their ideas and actions to various people. I also include in “new left journals” small-scale publications (mini komi) issued by various new left groups. “The new left media” were not equal to propaganda journals published by the tôha. The media covered actions taken by a wide range of new left groups in order to associate one action with another. “The new left media” did not have as many readers as the mainstream media, but had strong influence over the movements. The discourse space of new left movements partly

overlapped with but was largely outside that of "the intellectual world" produced by general magazines (sōgō zasshi), such as Sekai or Chūō Kōron, which covered progressive intellectuals' debates about democratization and won large numbers of readers in the earlier postwar period. This discourse space was also strengthened by face-to-face communications between activists on campus, on the streets, in student dormitories, or in cafés. The analysis of "the new left media" helps us to uncover the discourses which were produced in and shared with new left movements in this period.

It should be mentioned here that I do not use interviews as my major data source. This is because, firstly, it is not easy to single out some people as interviewees from the thousands of people who joined new left movements in the 1960s and 1970s. I believe that plenty of accessible documents published at that time can provide me with sufficient evidence for my argument. However, the primary reason for avoiding the use of interviews is that the interview data, which inevitably entail uncertainty or lack of stability, are not necessarily appropriate for accomplishing the goal of this thesis, that is, to explore the discourse shared by Japanese new left movements in that period. Many recent studies point out that interviews are produced through mutual actions between interviewees and interviewers. "Uncertainty" stems from the fact that interviews are always the products of both informants and researchers. Oral sources are influenced by various factors, such as collective memories of an historical event, interviewees' personal history after they experienced the event, the personal relationship between interviewees and researchers, or interviewers' needs for their research.

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Retired veteran and historian Fred H. Allison explored how USA Vietnam War veterans remembered their past experiences. He interviewed some veterans at different times, in 1968 and 2002. He found out that while the earlier interview was stark and bland about the interviewee’s horrific experiences in the battlefields of Vietnam, the interviewee tried to provide explanations, contexts, dramas, values, significance, and justification in the later interview. Allison claimed that interviewees usually create coherence in speaking about their experiences to make the experiences understandable for themselves as well as for interviewers. It is supposed that the more emotional (joyous, painful, horrific, etc.) their experiences are, the truer his claim will be.

The experiences of Japanese new left movements are very emotional for many former new leftists. They often state that the experiences were, for good or bad, a turning point in their life: while some were desperate about the movements, gave up their commitment, and have never been involved in the movements since then, others were and are proud of their past and continuing commitment to political activism. Subsequently, the memories of their experiences are often characterized by nostalgia, self-justification, or denial. This is why I select more stable written documents as the primary data. For the same reason, the use of memoirs written by former new leftists is minimized.

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52 I do not claim here that oral sources are inferior as historical data to written documents. Interviews are valuable in achieving different goals; oral history makes it possible for us to explore relations between the past and the present. Historian Alistair Thomson wrote: “Some critics of oral history have claimed that the fact we compose our memories invalidates the use of memory by historians. That might be true for oral historians who sought to use memory as a literal source of what happened in the past. But if we are also interested, as we must be, in the ways in which the past is resonant in our lives today, then oral testimony is essential evidence for analysis of the interactions between past and present, and between memory and mythology” (Thomson, Alistair. “ANZAC Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in Australia” in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.). The Oral History Reader Second Edition. London: Routledge, 1998, p.245).
do not contend that my analysis is more “objective” than the activists’ memories, but rather, the discourse analysis of this thesis is mediated by my own analysis. Interviews have the risk of mixing the discourse used in the 1960s and 1970s with nostalgia or justification based on hindsight or discourses that became dominant after the period. This thesis tries to go back to the discourse produced at that time and tease out its implications.

However, this method of exploring the implicit collective rules of texts or actions may prevent us from approaching the various everyday practices of Japanese new leftists which could not be reduced to discourses. I do not deny this, but I also try to use more casual conversations, such as roundtables or interviews undertaken at the time, as the basic data of analysis in order to uncover the activists’ practices as well as discourses. The challenge of this thesis is thus to walk a narrow line between overgeneralized accounts and excessively concrete analyses.
Chapter 1 begins with discussions about the Anpo protests in 1960. This massive protest greatly affected the discourse of Japanese new left movements in the late 1960s. New leftists emphasized several limitations of the Anpo protests and felt obliged to overcome their limitations. Before moving to discussions about new left movements, this chapter examines the Anpo protests, a large-scale people’s movement for democratization. First of all, I seek to explore the history of people’s movements for democratization (sengo minshushugi) after the end of the Second World War as the background of the Anpo protests. Second, I move on to discussions of the Kikyô movement (Kikyô Undô, the movement for democratization of the hometown\(^1\)). As soon as the Diet ratified the bill of the revised Anpo Treaty on 19 June 1960 in spite of the powerful protests, thousands of university students and intellectuals tried to spread the protests against the Anpo Treaty to their hometowns during the summer break of July and August (at that time many university students came from rural areas, so “hometown” means their rural origins). During their visits to their hometowns, the activists realized and tried to solve the problems of the Anpo protests, so the Kikyô movement foreshadowed the new left movements of the late 1960s. In this way, this chapter looks at the Kikyô movements to explore the legacy of the Anpo protests, which affected the actions and ideas of new left movements in the late 1960s.

\(^1\) The Kikyô movements were called “the Kikyô activities (Kikyô Katsudô)” in the Kansai district.
1. “The Postwar Progressives” and the Anpo Protests of 1960

People’s Movements for Democratization to 1960

In May and June 1960, large numbers of Japanese people joined protest actions on the streets against the bill to revise the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (known by its Japanese abbreviation as the Anpo Treaty) and against the undemocratic decision-making of PM Kishi Nobusuke and the ruling LDP. Takabatake Michitoshi, a well-known political scientist, stated:

“The Anpo protests of 1960” were a watershed in the intellectual history of the postwar period. After the defeat in the Second World War, the major political confrontation was between “conservatives” and “progressives”. People’s movements and ideas produced in the confrontation in various parts of Japan were merged and finally flowed into the decisive battle of “the Anpo protests of 1960”. This resulted in a massive people’s uprising of a sort which had never been experienced in modern Japan, and in subsequent political tension.2

Why did the people protest against the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty? The military treaty was initially signed in 1951 immediately after Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The official occupation by the Allies ended and Japan returned to being an independent state in 1952, but the Anpo Treaty permitted a U.S. military presence in Japan to defend Japan from anticipated attacks by the Communist countries. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) initiated many democratic reforms of the Japanese state, like the abolition of the Special Higher Police (Tokkō Keisatsu), the enactment of

labour laws which gave permission for collective bargaining and strikes to workers and the introduction of a new Constitution.

However, SCAP shifted its focus to constraining people's movements for democratization soon after the Communist revolution in China in 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the expansion of the Cold War to the Asian region. In this period, Japan began to remilitarize and founded the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai) in October 1950. In 1952, it was transformed into the National Safety Forces (Hoantai), and was finally reorganized into the Self Defence Forces (Jieitai) in 1954. In this situation, Japan and the USA started to negotiate the revision of the Anpo Treaty in the late 1950s. Whereas the Japanese government and the ruling LDP aimed to obligate the USA to defend Japan from attacks by neighbouring countries, the main purpose of the revision from the perspective of the USA was to require Japan, its economically expanding junior partner in the Asian region, to share some of the burden of security in the Far East. Some Japanese conservative elites welcomed the offer of some degree of remilitarization from the USA, but many Japanese people were concerned that Japan's remilitarization would be facilitated by the revision of the Anpo Treaty.

Kishi Nobusuke was a key figure in the revision of the Anpo Treaty. He became PM in 1957 and strongly pushed the agenda of revising the Anpo Treaty. Kishi had played a key role in Japan's colonization of Manchuria, northeastern China, and in founding the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. He had occupied the position of the Minister of Commerce and Industry in December 1941, when the Japanese government decided to attack Pearl Harbour, and was indicted as a class-A war criminal in the postwar period. His past career and reputation for being a strong-arm politician reminded Japanese people of their bitter experiences during the wartime. Kishi was also
passionate about strengthening Japan's alliance with the USA. He sought to amend the Constitution of Japan, because the Constitution, which was established after the Second World War and known as the “Peace Constitution”, included Article 9 which renounced the maintenance and use of military forces. In order to remove Article 9, Kishi and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) needed to gain two-thirds of the votes of the Upper and Lower Houses. The LDP was formed in 1955 by consolidating two conservative parties, the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō) and the Democratic Party (Minshutō), to win two-thirds of the seats in the Diet, amend the Constitution, and remilitarize to the degree commensurate with being an independent country. The amendment of the Constitution and remilitarization was among the most important goals for the LDP. Kishi was very faithful to the will of Japanese conservative elites.

Protest actions against American military bases in Japan were preludes to the Anpo protests of 1960. In the 1950s, anti-military base struggles were active in various regions of Japan. The Anpo Treaty and the Mutual Security Agreement, which was signed in 1954, allowed the USA military to use bases in the Japanese territory. While some local people had their land expropriated to provide sites for military bases, others were disturbed by damage to their farming or fishing activities and by violence from the U.S. military personnel. The number of reported violent incidents by American personnel reached thousands per year in the early 1950s, and the actual figure was believed to be even greater.

The deployment of the American military led to Japanese people's protests against American bases in Uchinada (Ishikawa prefecture), Sunagawa (Tokyo), Kitafuji (Shizuoka prefecture), and other places. For example, local farmers in the Sunagawa district launched very down-to-earth protest actions
against the construction plan of the base. They and their supporters blocked several attempts by the Japanese government to survey the area from July to November of 1955. The farmers threw animal manure at police officers in order to defend their land. They fought under the slogan "even if stakes are driven in our land, we will never let stakes be driven into our spirits (tochi ni kui o utarete mo, kokoro ni kui o utarenai)".

The strength of popular opposition forced the Japanese government to stop surveying the land and change its original plan. In this period, many Japanese people, while desiring American consumer culture, saw the USA as an invader and a colonizer of their country. The people's protests against military bases stemmed from anger at the destruction of their peaceful lives caused by the USA. The anti-base movements were thus based on an antipathy to the USA and a feeling of nationalism among Japanese people. Their nationalism was clearly shown in that young activists in the JCP or union members often sang "The Song of People's Actions for Independence (Minzoku Dokuritsu Kõdõtai no Uta)", which began with "Defend the people's liberty. Stand up, our country's workers". This anti-US sentiment led a number of people who took part in the anti-base protests to going on to participate in protests against the revision of the Anpo Treaty in the late 1950s to 1960.

The Anpo Protests

After PM Kishi took office in 1957, he declared his intent to enforce a nationwide rating system for teachers to be administered by school principals. The Japan Teachers' Union (Nikkyôso), a national network of teachers' unions, organized a national campaign and went on general strikes against the introduction of the rating system. Kishi also sought to introduce the Police Duties Bill (Keisatsukan Shokumu Shikô Hô) into the Diet in October 1958. The
Bill allowed police officers to expand their power of interrogating, searching, and arresting. These oppressive policies reminded many Japanese people of their lives under the control of the militaristic state in the prewar period. An increasing number of Japanese people were concerned that Japan would return to the authoritarian state and go to war again. These memories and concerns helped people's groups for democratization to organize the national campaign against Kishi and the LDP; labour unions, antiwar groups, and other organizations successfully mobilized a large number of people to strikes, rallies, and demonstrations against the Police Duties Bill.

In 1959, the national campaign shifted their focus to the revision of the Anpo Treaty. Japan and the USA had already begun their negotiations on the revision of the Treaty in 1958. The People's Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty (Anpo Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi) was formed in March 1959. This national campaign network was composed of 134 people's organizations, including nuclear disarmament groups, anti-military base groups, women's groups, farmers' unions, youth groups, and so on. The aim of the People's Council was to coordinate anti-Anpo demonstrations in Tokyo with labour strikes, rallies, and other local protests.

While the Council did not mobilize a wide range of people to protests against the Treaty, some student activists took radical actions to stop the negotiations. In January 1960, about 700 student activists tried to blockade Haneda Airport to prevent PM Kishi from visiting American President Dwight Eisenhower, but the police protected Kishi from the demonstrators, and Kishi flew to the USA and finally signed the revised Anpo Treaty on 19 January. The demonstrators shifted the focus of their actions to stopping the ratification of the Treaty in the Diet. On 19 May, the JSP's members, who sat in protest in front of the Diet Building against the ratification of the bill, were expelled by the
police. Then the Lower House MPs voted for the Anpo Treaty and extended the Diet session in the absence of opposition members. Many Japanese people became angry with the LDP’s undemocratic way of decision-making over the Treaty. These strong-arm methods fuelled people’s actions against the Anpo Treaty. From that day, “The Defence of Democracy” was added to the slogan of the Anpo protests, and protest actions expanded rapidly in late May and early June. During this period, demonstrators marched on the Diet, the PM’s office, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, and the American Embassy again and again.

Labour unions organized large-scale strikes on 4 June, and about 4.6 million workers participated in the strikes. Many public transport services, such as railways, buses, taxies, etc., stopped on that morning. One railway worker drove a train very slowly as part of the strike by his union. Many passengers, although they suffered inconvenience from the strikes, waved to him to express their support for his action. He was moved to tears. This example shows that the strikes were supported by a large number of ordinary people who were also angry with or concerned about the LDP’s undemocratic politics. The mobilization of the Anpo protests was facilitated by TV broadcasts. TVs began to be widely diffused in Japan following the wedding of Crown Prince Akihoto in 1959. Those who did not have their own set watched TV news in electrical appliance shops, restaurants, and neighbours’ houses to know what happened in the Diet and on the streets (most people could not afford to buy TVs themselves at that time).

The people’s power reached a peak on 15 June. Labour unions in the public and private sectors mobilized 5.8 million workers in the strikes. 110,000 demonstrators from labour unions, student groups, antiwar groups, progressive

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parties, and others, surrounded the Diet in Tokyo to stop the revision of the Treaty and protest against the undemocratic ruling party. About 1,500 student activists clashed with the police, who were armed with water cannons and tear gas, and finally entered the Diet. Since the demonstrators were violently attacked by the police and right wing groups, many of them were seriously injured. Kanba Michiko, a woman student from Tokyo University who joined the protests despite her asthma, was killed in the clash between demonstrators and the police. The anger of the protesters towards the Kishi cabinet and the LDP was aggravated by the death of Kanba.

Who Participated in the Anpo Protests?

The massive protests were based on a wide range of people’s movements for democracy and peace, which consisted of anti-military base movements, ban-the-bomb movements, labour movements, women’s movements, and the like. Activists of those movements were known as “the postwar progressives (sengo kakushin seiryoku)”. The major players in the Anpo protests were young people, women, and urban residents who had been liberated from the authoritarian state and enjoyed postwar democracy. They thought that the protection of their livelihood was more important than political ideologies. They were urged by their bitter memories during and immediately after the Second World War to join the actions. During wartime, many Japanese people had been mobilized for the war under the slogan of “Sacrifice yourself for the country (messhi hōkō)” or “Be loyal to the emperor and love your country (chūkun aikoku)”. Whilst some of them were conscripted to fight on the battlefield, others were forced to work in military factories. They suffered from hunger or disease, were seriously wounded, and lost their property, family, relatives, neighbours, and friends. Even after the war ended, they had suffered
from hunger coming from the lack of food caused by inflation. Because of these memories, many Japanese people were concerned that Japan would go to war again. The slogan of the Anpo protests, “Defence of Peaceful Life, Democracy, and the Constitution of Japan”, was thus supported by a wide range of survivors of the war.

Labour unions undoubtedly played a key role in organizing the Anpo protests: they organized three large-scale strikes on 4, 15, and 22 June 1960. However, the protests were also endorsed by people who did not belong to any labour unions or political organizations. The Voice of the Voiceless (Koenaki Koe no Kai) was a symbolic example of this grassroots support. In the middle of the Anpo protests, The Voice of the Voiceless was formed by Kobayashi Tomi and other “ordinary people” who were not members of political organizations. Although a large number of demonstrators joined actions against the Kishi cabinet and the LDP, PM Kishi had claimed that the “the voice of the voiceless”, that is, the silent majority, supported him. In response to his comment, Kobayashi and other members maintained that even the silent majority was not on the side of Kishi and the LDP, and formed the Voice of the Voiceless.

In this period, each labour union or political organization usually gathered their members together to the march under their own banners, so those who were not affiliated with any political groups had trouble finding their place in demonstrations. The members of the Voice of the Voiceless carried a placard saying, “Anyone can join The Voice of the Voiceless group”. They called for bystanders to walk together with them. This was effective in breaching the barrier between people marching on the streets and those standing on the sidewalk. On 15 June, at the largest demonstration surrounding the Diet, 300 bystanders walked with them by the time they circled
the building. The Voice of the Voiceless played a role in connecting the Anpo protests with ordinary people.

**Progressive Intellectuals**

Progressive intellectuals gave academic legitimacy to people's protests against Kishi and the LDP. Their views were strongly influenced by political and social theorists in modern Europe, such as Max Weber and Karl Marx. It should be noted that Marxism was a strong intellectual authority for most intellectuals in the postwar period. During wartime, almost all progressive intellectuals were suppressed, or abandoned resistance to the Japanese state. Many intellectuals in the postwar period insisted that Marxism had made it possible for the few who did resist to gain insights about the war and predict that Japan would lose it. A growing number of intellectuals were fascinated with Marxism, which they believed offered insights into "the laws of history" on the basis of a scientific view of the world. Even intellectuals who did not identify themselves as Marxists were also influenced by the basic framework of Marxism, such as progress, enlightenment, or modernity. Prominent political scientist Maruyama Masao, economist Ōtsuka Hisao, and many other "modernists (kindai shugisha)" owed much to the Kōza School (Kōza-ha), a group of Marxist intellectuals in the prewar period, for their analysis of Japanese society; they regarded Japan as a feudal society, claimed that Japan ought to take the West as an ideal model, and sought to modernize their country and liberate Japanese people from remnants of feudalistic practices which had led to the emergence of fascism during wartime. The Anpo protests of 1960 were seen by these intellectuals as a great step to democratize Japan.

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4 Sasaki-Uemura. *Organizing the Spontaneous*, p.43.
5 Tsuzuki. *Sengo Nihon no Chishikijin*, Ch.5.
Many progressive intellectuals participated in people's democracy movements between 1945 and 1960. Maruyama Masao, a well-known professor of Tokyo University working on Japanese politics, gave support to some democratization groups in the 1950s. He was born in 1914, conscripted by the army, and was dispatched to Korea during wartime. After the Second World War, Maruyama was a member of the Peace Council (Heiwa Mondai Kondankai), an intellectual group which advocated pacifism based on the Four Principles for Peace (Heiwa Yon Gensoku): peace treaties both with Eastern and Western countries; neutrality; opposition to military bases; opposition to remilitarization. The forcible ratification of the Anpo Treaty on 19 May 1960 persuaded Maruyama to be involved in the Anpo protests. He was one of the organizers of the rally at the Kanda Education Hall on 24 May. In front of 2,500 intellectuals, he maintained that the Anpo protests had become a struggle for democracy after the eviction of the opposition party members on 19 May. He was always careful not to be involved in political parties, but Maruyama's presence gave public credibility to the protests, and his speeches encouraged many people to participate in the protests.

Shimizu Ikutarō was also a well-known intellectual of this period. Shimizu was born in 1907 and did prominent work on sociological theory and the mass media in the prewar period. After the Second World War, he became famous as an active intellectual. In the early 1950s, Shimizu worked for the Peace Council with Maruyama and other intellectuals. In the 1950s, Shimizu gave strong support to anti-military base struggles. When visiting Uchinada, a small village of Ishikawa prefecture, in the early 1950s, he witnessed the fact that American military personnel were stationed in the village and threatened local people's lives. In 1955, he visited Sunagawa, a small village of Tokyo, and joined the struggle by local farmers against the expropriation of their land
for US bases. In Sunawaga, radical student activists gave support to farmers and clashed with armed police officers against the expropriation. Although some intellectuals had an aversion to such radical actions of students, Shimizu offered clear support to them. In May and June 1960, he spoke many times to demonstrators in various regions of Japan and justified their protests against the Kishi cabinet and the Anpo treaty.

**Progressive Parties**

Progressive parties, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), also played a key role in the large-scale mobilization. The JSP was founded in November 1945. Legal proletarian parties in the prewar period were consolidated into the JSP after the Second World War, but the party split in 1951 over whether to support the San Francisco settlement. In October 1955, the left-wing and right-wing factions of the party decided to reunite. The JSP won slightly more than one-third of the seats in the Lower House. In this period, the LDP sought to amend the Constitution for further remilitarization, but a vote of approval in the Diet of two-thirds was necessary to revise it. This parliamentary representation of the JSP prevented the LDP from attempting to revise the Constitution and promoting remilitarization. The JSP had only small numbers of their own affiliated groups, but it had close connections with people's movements for democratization. In particular, the JSP were strongly supported by Sōhyō (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) in the election, the largest national council of labour unions at that time.

The JCP gained strong support from progressive intellectuals and activists immediately after the Second World War. It was the only party which had consistently protested against the military action of the Japanese state.
before 1945. The JCP was first founded in July 1922. Because the party sought to abolish the Emperor system and deny the private ownership system, it was strictly controlled and outlawed by the Japanese state until the end of the war. During wartime, many Japanese communists were arrested and became political prisoners for a long time. While some of them were tortured to death, others were struck down by disease and died in prison. In the postwar period, many progressives who regretted that they had allowed the state to go to the war that resulted in Japan’s disastrous defeat followed the JCP’s leaders who had not converted in jail, put up with torture, and survived.

The JSP and the JCP often competed with each other for hegemony over progressive movements, but they had worked together since the early 1950s. After their collaboration in protests against military bases, the introduction of the teacher rating system, and the Police Duties Bill, the two progressive parties became a part of the national network of the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty in the late 1950s. It is worth noting that mobilization of the parties to the Anpo protests was based on grassroots support. This is clearly shown in nuclear disarmament movements. The movements were slow to gain support in the Occupation era, because publishing information about the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was restricted by SCAP. They were sparked after the Bravo hydrogen bomb test conducted by the USA at Bikini atoll on 1 March 1954. The Daigo Fukuryū Maru, a Japanese fishing boat which trawled for tuna, was showered with radioactive fallout. Since 23 of the crew developed symptoms of radiation poisoning, many Japanese people felt that they were still victimized by American nuclear weapons.

After the Daigo Fukuryū Maru incident, a large number of housewives began to join peace movements. For instance, a small group of housewives in
Suginami, Tokyo, formed Children of the Cedars (Sugi no Ko Kai), a women’s reading circle in 1953. The housewives were inspired by a lecture by Yasui Kaoru, a professor working on international law, to read works in sociology. In May 1954, after the American bomb test, they launched a petition campaign to ban the hydrogen bomb and collected 100,000 signatures within a month. By October of that year, the number of signatures reached 1.1 million. Children of the Cedars and other nuclear disarmament groups in local areas were not necessarily affiliated with the JCP and JSP, but they often worked with the progressive parties for nuclear disarmament.

Student Activists

Student movements also played a key role in protests against the Anpo Treaty. In the Second World War, many high school and university students were forced to the battlefields or made to work in factories and were wounded or killed. Many students who survived were urged by these bitter memories to act for the democratization of universities (gakuen minshuka) after the war. They strongly criticized political leaders in the Japanese state and universities for having supported militarism. The student activists aimed to form student associations (jichikai) in each university. Since university students automatically became members of student associations, the associations were very influential. In September 1948, Zengakuren (the National Federation of Student Associations), which consisted of student associations of universities in various parts of Japan, was formed. The focus of student activists was to stop tuition increases in this period; the government had decided to triple tuition in national universities, and the tuition of private universities would be

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doubled due to increased inflation in 1948. Zengakuren was committed only not to fighting tuition increases but also to being active on political issues, such as their actions against the communist purge promoted by SCAP and the Japanese government.

Student associations were initially influenced by the JCP. In the early 1950s when Japan was involved in the Cold War in East Asia and began to remilitarize, the JCP's leaders, who were affected by the Chinese Communist Party's struggles, ordered its members to launch an armed fight against the Japanese state. They aimed to liberate Japanese people from their subordination to America through guerrilla fighting in rural areas. Young activists of the party learned how to make firebombs and secretly received military training in schoolyards at midnight. The activists migrated to villages or factories in order to organize rural people or workers, and they were engaged in blowing up trains, torching police stations, and conducting other guerrilla activities. These young activists' groups known as "sanson kōsakutai" (squads for actions in mountain villages) were severely criticized by public opinion for their violent actions, and the JCP lost all of its seats in the national Diet in the early 1950s.

In the Sixth National Council of the JCP (rokuzenkyō) in July 1955, the JCP's leaders suddenly changed from the course of armed struggle to lawful activities in the Diet and became reluctant to take confrontational actions. Many young activists who had engaged in armed struggles on the front were forced to go back to their campuses. Some of them were disappointed with the JCP's irresponsible leadership, suffered from mental trauma, and finally decided to leave the party. In the late 1950s, other student activists who were also angry with the JCP's leadership were expelled from the JCP, and formed new student groups popularly known as the tōha (party factions), including the
Communist League (Kyōsan Shugisha Dōmei). The Communist League, which was well-known for radical direct action, dominated Zengakuren in place of the JCP-affiliated youth groups in the late 1950s. The JCP's influence over progressive student activists began to weaken in this period. During the Anpo protests, student groups of the töha were repeatedly criticized by the JCP for their confrontational actions, but nevertheless the JCP affiliated groups and non-JCP groups worked together to stop the ratification of the Anpo Treaty in the Diet.

Sōhyō and the Miike Strike

The three strikes against the Anpo Treaty in June 1960 discussed earlier show that labour unions were a powerful political force in the Anpo protests. Sōhyō was particularly supported by a large number of workers in various regions of Japan. When Sōhyō was founded in 1950, SCAP expected it to be the centre of anti-communist labour unions. However, Sōhyō was soon radicalized after Takano Minoru became the secretary general in 1951. It combined economic issues with political struggles, and developed radical opposition to the Japanese government's remilitarization. Workers of Sōhyō played an active role in participating in political issues, such as actions against military bases or nuclear armaments, as well as economic issues, so Sōhyō was one of the most influential elements of "the postwar progressives". During the Anpo protests, Sōhyō successfully mobilized millions of workers to the large-scale strikes and helped the protests to expand to a wide range of Japanese people.

7 In Japan, each university authority collected student association fees together with tuition from students. The authorities provided the leadership of its student association with the fee intended for the administration of student association buildings, so political factions sought to win dominance in the associations to secure a source of revenue for their activities.
Around 1960, Sôhyô focused its mobilization on the Miike strike and the Anpo protests. The Miike strike starting from 1959 was large-scale and long-term (313 days) in the Mitsui Miike coal-mine in Fukuoka prefecture. The coal workers' union went on strikes against dismissal of about 1,200 workers, wage cuts, and deterioration of working conditions. Historian Andrew Gordon viewed the Miike strikes as "contests for the workplace."8 Who controlled the workplace? This was the issue for the Miike strikers. The managers were afraid of "the workplace struggle (shokuba tōsō)"; the activists organized workers in workplaces in order to gain the power in making decisions over production. How many people worked in the workplace? Who were leaders in the workplace? The activists had some influence on decision-making over such issues and limited the managers' power in the workplace.

The Miike coal mine was well-known for workers autonomy.9 The workers were willing to organize meetings and discuss problems in their workplace. They were paid by how much coal they produced, but this caused some problems; workers fought with each other over who was assigned to places of greater productivity. In order to solve the conflicts, the Miike labour union introduced a rotation schedule. The union tried to allocate the places to each worker fairly. Workers also produced coal as quickly as possible without concern for their safety. The more profit they generated, the more they were in danger from accidents, such as landslides or explosions in the mine. The labour union determined rules in the workplace. The rules prohibited workers from producing coal without concern for their safety. The union controlled how much coal workers produced. Their decisions might reduce production and

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8 Gordon, Andrew. "Contests for the Workplace" in Gordon (ed.). *Postwar Japan as History.*
profits, but they were essential for a safer workplace. Because the managers wanted to control the labour union in the workplace, they fired 300 union leaders. Sôhyô saw both the Miike strike and the Anpo protests as opposition to the backlash against democratization in the postwar period. The Miike strike was thus closely linked by Sôhyô to the Anpo protests; both “Anpo and Miike” were the national campaigns for democratization in 1960.

2. The Spread of the Anpo Protests to Rural Areas

The Aims of the Kikyô Movements

Although large numbers of people joined protest actions against the Kishi cabinet and the LDP, the bill for the revision of the Anpo Treaty was approved by the Diet on 19 June 1960. The protesters prevented the Upper House from giving approval to the bill, but the Constitution said that the approval of the Lower House would be sufficient even if the Upper House blocked the bill. Some of the protesters were profoundly disappointed and disturbed by their failure to kill the bill. For example, Shimizu Ikutarô was in front of the Diet with his family at the moment when the bill was approved at midnight on 19 June. He lamented and sobbed bitterly over it. On the other hand, many other people did not lose their enthusiasm. In particular, university students strongly felt that they needed to spread the Anpo protests to a wide range of people during summer break in July and August.

The summer break was a difficult period for student activists. Final-year students were busy looking for jobs. Most of them usually withdrew from political and social activities after they entered companies. Other students returned to their hometowns during the summer break. Student activists found
it necessary to have opportunities to discuss democracy, peace, and the Anpo Treaty in their hometown to maintain the power and energy of the Anpo protests on the streets. Student activists were thus encouraged to organize the Kikyō movements. Ariga Hiroshi, a leader of the Kikyō movements, described the aim of the movements as follows:

I thought about what we should do, in order to stop the decline of the protests and to be active in spreading the enthusiastic actions to the people. Given summer break, I claimed that we had to develop much broader national movements in various regions of the country and to act for great effects on democracy beyond the issue of approval of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. After that, we prepared a liaison group for the so-called Kikyō movements. If each student, who returned to their hometown, discussed the issue of democracy in various parts of Japan, it would be a great progress.¹⁰

His comment shows that the main purpose of the Kikyō movements was to provide university students with opportunities for discussing democracy and the Anpo Treaty during the summer break. The movements also aimed to spread the Anpo protests to local areas. Many activists were concerned that rural people might not be as interested in the revision of the Anpo Treaty as activists on the streets in urban areas. Fukutake Tadashi, a sociologist who researched the social structure of rural areas in Japan, stressed the gap in feeling about political issues between rural and urban people:

The passion is considerably different in Tokyo and in rural areas. When making a speech to rural people, I said that “you may see us as too hot-blooded, but we are normal and you are too cold-blooded”. Generally speaking, this is the current situation of rural areas.¹¹

¹¹ Ibid.
The student activists had felt that the Anpo protests spread to a wide range of people in June 1960, but this was indeed limited only to the streets of urban areas. Their next challenge was to expand the protests to villages.

**Students Launch the Kikyō Movements**

It was just before the revision of the Anpo Treaty was approved in the Diet that the Kikyō movements were proposed by some student activists. In a rally on campus on 10 June, some students and teachers in the College of Arts and Sciences of Tokyo University claimed that they ought to "practice the Kikyō movements now". After that, more and more students in various regions of Japan agreed on their proposal. On 2 July, a rally of Kikyō students in the metropolitan area was held in the Education Hall in Kanda, Tokyo. 350 students from 30 universities and many scholars gathered together and decided to launch the Kikyō movements. They planned to cooperate with university students of their hometowns and facilitate democracy in their personal relations with family and friends during the summer break.

Because the word "Kikyō movements" originated from students' protests against military bases in the 1950s, it reminded many Japanese people of negative images of sanson kōsakutai (squads for actions in mountain villages).

Led by the JCP, sanson kōsakutai had taken military and violent actions in

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14 In 1953, some student activists in the College of Arts and Sciences at Tokyo University were concerned about the remilitarization of Japan and launched a campaign to oppose it. This campaign spread to various regions of Japan, and many student activists were involved in the Kikyō movements. Their aims were to protest against the amendment of the Constitution of Japan, stop constructing U.S. military bases, and give support to victims of flood disaster (Hōsei Daigaku Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo. *Nihon Rōdō Nenkan Dai 27 shū 1955 nen ban*. Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankai, 1968, pp.677-78).
rural areas for revolution in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{15} As discussed earlier, the JCP leadership believed that the revolution would be realized in Japan in the near future in the early 1950s and mandated some young members to go “underground” and pursue an unsuccessful strategy of guerrilla fighting in rural areas, provoking a serious public backlash.\textsuperscript{16} However, such a negative impression was being erased by the passion and energy of students and scholars who were about to head to their hometowns. The Kikyō movements of 1960 spread more widely and were larger than those of the past.\textsuperscript{17} Tens of thousands of undergraduates and postgraduates and more than 2,000 scholars participated in the Kikyō movements. They were impressed by the people’s power in the Anpo protests and passionate about democratizing their hometowns in various parts of Japan.

On 20 June, the day after the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was approved in the Diet, the Group of All Students for Protection of Democracy (Minnade Minshushugi o Mamorukai, hereafter the GASPD) was formed to organize the Kikyō movements. Its head office was located in the office of Ishida Takeshi, a scholar on Japanese politics, at the Institute of Social Science of Tokyo University. The GASPD worked to provide information on the Kikyō movements and the basic data of the Anpo protests. Intellectuals gathered together in the National Association of Scholars and Researchers for Protection of Democracy (Minshushugi o Mamorou Zenkoku Gakusha


\textsuperscript{16} It was not true that the Kikyō movements in the early 1950s did not produce any positive outcomes. Small numbers of the activists continued to stay in their hometowns to organize community groups. Yamashita Hajime, a scholar of literature, pointed out that the successful Kikyō movements of 1960 were often based on some of the groups (Yamashita Hajime. “'Kusa no Ne' deno Tōitsu o: Chūō no 'Hibiware’ o Tadasu Michi” in Shūkan Dokushojin 8 August 1960, p.1).

\textsuperscript{17} Kitagawa Takayoshi. “Tsukiarataru Kabe wa Atsuku tomo: Undō no Tokuchō to Igi” in Asahi Jānaru 7 August 1960, p.17.
Kenkyūsha, hereafter the NASRPD) and did joint actions with the GASPD in the Kikyō movements.

The Kikyō Movement Centre played the role of an information centre. The national centre was founded in Tokyo, and local centres were established in each prefecture "from Obihiro in the north to Kagoshima in the south"\(^{18}\). The local centres were based in the offices of lecturers or in the dormitories of universities. Student activists stressed that the Kikyō movement centre did not aim to control local activists. They were very careful to avoid a centralized structure, because they believed that the rule of the JCP over local activists had prevented the Kikyō movements in the 1950s from successfully mobilizing the people.

Progressive activists were stigmatized as "communists (aka)" in the rural area. This impelled the Kikyō students of 1960 to keep their distance from political parties and from the töha, that is, leftist factions which competed with the JCP-affiliated groups over the leadership of Zengakuren after the late 1950s. In addition to intense struggles between progressive parties and the töha over the hegemony of student groups, the Communist League was engaged in an internal conflict in this period. The töha and the political parties sought to control the Kikyō students by providing them with financial and technical support. It was not easy for the students, who lacked know-how and funds, to distance themselves from the political parties and the töha. However, some journals, such as Asahi Jânaru or Sekai, and student newspapers provided financial support to the Kikyō students in return for reports written by the activists about the movements. The activists also asked leaders of their hometowns, such as the mayor or retail store owners, to provide funds to the

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movements. Since many rural people were afraid of being involved in the political parties and the töha, the student activists kept themselves independent from these political groups in order to gain popular support.

“Democracy to our Hometown”

The Kikyō students initially claimed that their aim was to democratize rural areas. The activists believed that backward and feudal villages in Japan had to be modernized and democratized. Such a way of thinking was clearly shown in the slogan of “Democracy to our Hometown (furusato e minshushugi o)” or “Democracy to our Grassroots (kusanone made minshushugi o)”. The activists who entered university around 1960 grew up in the political climate of postwar democracy (sengo minshushugi) and learned the idea of democracy in their school days. They studied a textbook named Democracy in school in the chaotic time after Japan was defeated in the Second World War.

The Kikyō students focused on problems of feudalism, patriarchy, and political apathy of rural areas, which prevented villagers from being democratized. The problems were called “the rural wall (nōson no kabe)” by the activists. The activists insisted that rural people, who were restricted by traditional relations of their family or village, could not express their ideas freely, or they were ignorant of political issues, which resulted in reproducing the rule of conservative political forces in villages. Sociologist Fukutake Tadashi conducted a survey on more than 250 villagers’ awareness in the Shōnai area of Yamagata prefecture in this period. The outcome showed that only 33.6% were concerned about the Anpo Treaty and more than half supported the LDP.19

In early July, the beginning of the summer break, one student after another returned to their hometown. The return was an annual event, but this year was special for them. In their hometowns, the Kikyō students were passionate about actions for "Democracy to our Hometown": they organized various cultural activities, such as lectures, workshops, roundtables, plays, movies, or camp fires; the student activists made slides and panels on the Anpo protests and showed them to local residents; they held medium- or small-scale rallies rather than large-scale ones in order to build closer relations with the residents. The Kikyō students sought, first of all, to build close communication with rural people and then to discuss political issues, such as the Anpo Treaty or democracy.

The Kikyō students asked local youth groups, women's groups, and other community groups to help to organize their activities. The alumni networks were effective in mobilizing rural people to the rallies.20 The activists got in touch with their classmates of junior high school (grade 7-9) or high school (grade 10-12) who worked in local public offices and called for them to spread information on the movements or to book halls for rallies. They also put up posters and gave out handouts on the streets, and passed notices on to neighbourhoods to mobilize local people to the Kikyō movements.

3. How the Kikyō Students Faced the “Rural Wall”

Rural Areas in the Middle of Drastic Change

What was the situation in rural areas in 1960? Many Japanese rural people were concerned about the outcomes of trade liberalization in this period.

At the same time as the revision of the Anpo Treaty was occurring, the Japanese and American governments issued the Broad Outline of Japan-U.S. Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization (Nichibei Bōeki Kawase Jiyūka Keikaku Taikō). After that, the Japanese government began to promote trade and capital liberalization. In 1964, Japan accepted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)’s Article 9 obligations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Article 8 obligations, and it became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These prevented Japan from regulating the foreign exchange rate and restricting trade volume on the grounds of fiscal deficits. In this way, Japan was fully incorporated into the international market. The trade liberalization rate of Japanese agricultural products increased from 41% in 1960 to 93% in 1963.21

The Basic Agriculture Law (Nōgyō Kihon Hō), which was introduced in 1961, facilitated further liberalization of agricultural products. The policy of "selective expansion" and "structural reform" defined in the Law aimed to improve agricultural productivity by selecting internationally competitive products, introducing modern management, and expanding the scale of areas under cultivation. This meant that less competitive products and farmers would exit from the market. The Law predicted that the number of Japanese farmers would decrease from 5.8 million to 2.5 million households in the future.

Trade liberalization and the reform of agriculture were transforming the landscape of rural areas. Because full-time farmers faced difficulties in earning a living only by agriculture, the number of part-time farm households increased rapidly. An increasing number of rural people found jobs away from their hometowns, and the labour force of villages flowed out to the cities. In 1950,

the agricultural population had been almost half of the entire workforce, but it dropped to less than one-third in 1960. It was estimated that the decrease of the agricultural population would accelerate in the future. Rural people were more and more subject to the urban economy in this period.

As a result of the flow of the rural population to cities, many villages suffered from depopulation. In the middle of the drastic change in rural areas, the Municipalities Consolidation Law (Chôson Gappei Sokushin Hô), which was executed in 1953, pushed local governments to be reorganized. The National Municipalities Directory (Zenkoku Shichôson Yöran), a directory which was published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, indicated that the number of municipalities rapidly declined from about 10,000 in 1953 to 3,500 in 1960.

Rural People’s Distrust of the Kikyô Students

In this difficult situation for rural people, the Kikyô students returned to their hometowns. Neither conservative nor progressive political forces could take any effective steps to solve the impoverishment of rural areas. At first, local residents did not necessarily welcome the Kikyô movements. The residents were wary of the political flavour of the movements. For example, a lacquer workers’ union (whose members mostly worked in the craft industry in rural areas) was critical of “the Anpo protests which would cause troubles”22. The workers did not have a good impression of the Anpo protests, because they were afraid that the protests would provoke the anger of the USA, their best customer, and would have negative effects on their sales. Some farmers in Kitakoma, Yamanashi prefecture, were also critical of the protests, because the price of cotton, their source of income, dropped after student activists of Zengakuren surrounded the car of which James Hagerty, a secretary of

President Dwight Eisenhower, on 10 June. This radical action finally moved Eisenhower to cancel his planned visit to Japan, and conflicts between America and Japan were revealed. Conservative political forces in villages insisted that Zengakuren had caused the price decline of cotton.23

Farmers were very busy within their work, such as rice planting, in May and June, when the Anpo protests reached a peak, so local residents did not have time to engage in the protests. Rural people looked coldly on the Kikyō students. They made remarks like this:

When we were very busy, what on earth were these urban people playing at? They demonstrated in the centre of cities and stopped trains and cars rather than doing their important work. Finally, some steam trains stopped. It is we, the people, who suffered.24

The Kikyō students spent much energy in stressing that they were independent from existing political groups which aimed to expand their influence over rural areas. As discussed earlier, political conflicts over the hegemony of Zengakuren and the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty escalated between the JCP and the töha in this period. Yamashita Hajime, a scholar of literature who visited the Kikyō movements in Fukushima prefecture, stated about the conflicts:

In Fukushima, I also felt that the splits of the People’s Council and Zengakuren in Tokyo spread quickly to local areas, and their impact, inevitably, tended not to represent the reality [of the splits], so even the Kikyō movements were obstructed by the stupid partisanship to some extent.25

23 Ibid., p.13.
Rural people did not necessarily trust the student activists. In 1960, the university entrance rate was around 10%, so university students were seen as the elite class, and most of the families who allowed their children to go to university were relatively wealthy people. A member of a local assembly in Fukushima prefecture, who belonged to the JSP, expressed his distrust of the student activists:

Most of the students are from bourgeois families. Their parents probably support the conservative party. The Kikyō students should persuade their parents first.26

Most of the Kikyō students had left their hometown when going to university in urban areas, so they were seen as “foreigners” by villagers even though they were born and grew up there. Many rural people believed that university students would get jobs, be promoted in government or large corporations, and dominate them in the future, so they were wary of the student activists. A member of the assembly of Aizu in Fukushima prefecture, who was in the JSP, stated:

Students are assured of management posts [in bureaucracy or companies] in the future. If they are in the posts, what will they do? They will probably oppress labour movements. That is their job. It cannot be helped.27

In part, local residents' distrust derived from the activists' own behaviour. Some of the Kikyō students did not try to adjust to local customs and act as a member of the community. A member of an agricultural cooperative in a district in Nagano prefecture complained about the Kikyō students:

26 Ibid., p.9.
27 Ibid.
Students did not join the Bon festival dance [a traditional Buddhist custom to honour the spirits of ancestors] even if they returned home around the period of Bon. Ordinary people felt that the students would be in a higher position than themselves. When young villagers who cut grass, worked on a farm every day, and looked forward to singing and dancing at the Bon festival saw the students outside the festival, they kept themselves distant from the students.28

The Wide Gap between Cities and Villages

There was a wide gap in life style between urban students and rural residents. They found this gap when working together. One day during the summer break, a meeting concerning the Kikyō movements lasted till late at night and some of the student activists missed the last train. Local residents were surprised that one of the activists remarked that he would get back by taxi, and came to see him as a person different from their class.29 The Kikyō students faced the wide gap between rural and urban areas. A young local farmer wrote:

All of the student activists must feel that the wall which they face is too thick. I am concerned that the student activists may see farmers as hopeless, get fed up with them, and become reluctant to go into villages again when facing the reality of farmers who are bovine, silent and unresponsive, incomprehensible, and unable to understand democracy itself. Some farmers saw the students were tired and heard them talk about their tiredness.... Why does this happen? One of the reasons is fundamental splits in emotions, thoughts, and ways of thinking. Even workers who live in the same neighbourhood find it difficult to get on well with farmers. How can the students do this?30

29 "Gakusei no Kikyō Undō o Genchi ni Miru", p.10.
The Kikyō students had to face further difficulties even when they got opportunities to have a conversation with farmers. In particular, they were disturbed by talk about agricultural problems. The farmers, who were not interested in the political issue of the Anpo treaty, knew a great deal about issues concerning their lives, such as trade liberalization or agricultural modernization. On the other hand, the student activists did not have enough knowledge about the issue of agriculture, so they realized that they could not discuss it with local residents on equal terms.

Since some local people expected the student activists to solve the problems of their villages, and they were disappointed that the Kikyō students could not present any concrete answers to the problems. The activists did not know how to get rural people to be interested in political issues. At a roundtable of the Kikyō students who returned to Suwa, Nagano prefecture, one of the students stated their difficulties in discussions with rural residents:

Local people distinguish the issue of defence of democracy from issues which are related to their lives such as agricultural problems. We could not conclude how to connect the former with the latter.

In the middle of the summer break, the Kikyō students who visited Hokkaido, Kansai, and Kyūshū reported that the activists were driven into a difficult situation. They claimed that “political apathy is deep-rooted” or “no changes will occur in farming and fishing villages.”

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31 Interview with Shimizu Takichi (9 May 2003).
33 “Zadankai: Kono Me o Dō Sodateru ka”, p.128.
4. Transformation of Relations with the Hometown

“Movements from the Inside”

After student activists were unsuccessful in gaining support from rural people, they revised the movements. Firstly, many of the student activists rethought the aims of the movements. They had initially seen “Democracy to our Hometown” as the goal of their actions. The activists assumed that they, as educated urban activists, had to play a role in modernizing and conveying democracy to rural people living in feudal communities. In this sense, the Kikyō movements had aimed to “enlighten” ignorant villagers.

However, some of the Kikyō students learned from their failures to enlighten rural people. Just before the beginning of the Kikyō movements, Shirotsuka Noboru, a philosopher who gave support to the movements, gave the following advice to the activists:

[The Kikyō movements] must be "movements from the inside (uchi kara no undo)" rather than "movements from the top". If the Kikyō students give lectures about the principle of democracy, rural people will end up just getting knowledge. If the Kikyō students impose this on rural people, the people will feel antipathy to the students. The point is that democracy should become flesh and blood and be supported by rural people's experiences. Therefore, it is important that student activists who will return to their hometown try to adjust to rural people's lives and think or organize the movements together with the people.35

There were two important meanings in the phrase “movements from the inside”. The first was to review the top-down style of organizing the movements.

Some of the Kikyō students realized that they would not gain support from

local people without changing their style of mobilizing people. They stopped preaching to villagers and transformed the slogan of “Democracy to our Hometown” to “The Truth to our Hometown”. Many demonstrators were heavily attacked by the police and gangsters during the Anpo protests, but newspapers and TVs did not cover the violence very much. The Kikyō students focused their actions in rural areas on conveying the unknown facts of violence and oppression in the Anpo protests.36

The second new approach was to transform the way the activists spread their ideas and values to rural people. After failing to convey to rural people the idea of democracy, the Kikyō students found out that they had to learn from and debate with rural people. Ariga Hiroshi, a leader of the Kikyō students, stated that “there is no possibility of developing social movements without interaction”37. He claimed that the idea of democracy would not spread widely without promoting interactive face-to-face communication between urban activists and rural residents.

The Kikyō students found it necessary to change the style of their communication in getting rural people to think about democracy. They stressed that listening to other people's voices was crucial. Immediately after the comment cited earlier, Shirotsuka Noboru wrote:

Begin with “listening” rather than “speaking”. There is a deep gap of awareness between rural areas and Tokyo. Accurate understanding of the local situation is necessary, so it is indispensible to “listen” carefully to how rural people accept the current situation, what they question, what they want to know, what they desire, and what they do for it.38

36 Interview with Shimizu Takichi (16 May 2003).
38 Shirotsuka. “Undō o Seikō Saseru Tameni”, p.3.
Shirotsuma stated that the Kikyō students ought to begin by listening to local people's voices and gaining trust from them as a step to mutual communication. He also insisted that basic knowledge about each of rural areas which the activists visited was essential for the communication.

**Changing the Style of Communication**

Writer Usui Kakuzō also advised the Kikyō students how to spread their ideas to local residents. His proposal was to read local newspapers of the past month carefully and find out several issues important for rural people. He warned that students should "devote themselves to building a bridge with rather than persuading local people."39 The experience of failures caused some of the Kikyō students to find it important to have detailed knowledge about rural areas and to cooperate with local groups. The activists began not with such abstract topics as "Anpo" or "democracy" but with topics in which local people were interested. For example, a student who returned to Okaya, Nagano prefecture, joined a local youth club. While he attended all of its meetings, he found that the decision-making process of the local budget was not transparent enough to residents. In this way, he came to understand the lack of democracy in Japan in the context of local politics.40

Fujita Shōzō, a political scientist and a supporter of the Kikyō students, expected that the movements would transform the communication style of Japanese people. He wrote:

> In our country, the vertical communication penetrates from top to bottom like a down escalator, but the horizontal communication has

never been achieved and splits between above and below like a stair, and both overlap each other.\textsuperscript{41}

After analysing the current situation of Japanese society, Fujita stated that face-to-face conversation between people of all occupations and ages had possibilities for changing the top-down communication style. He claimed that he found a glimpse of the horizontal communication style in the Kikyô movements. He wrote:

I think that we should speak to the public “as if we spoke to each and every person”. Let’s produce the principle of public communication from personal communications. I think that the emergence of a “public”, which is different from “the public” imposed by the state authority, will create people’s spontaneous spaces.\textsuperscript{42}

After failing to enlighten rural people, the student activists were aware that they needed to “listen” to local people’s voices and be interested in local issues. Their reflection changed the purpose of the Kikyô movements. The activists had initially aimed to raise the slogan of “democracy to our hometown”, but they came to focus on transforming their own way of thinking, instead of transforming rural people. In 1960, university students were only a small proportion of their contemporaries. Their elite consciousness and jargon prevented them from making rural people understand them. Their unsuccessful experiences of the Kikyô movements in the earlier stage helped the activists to realize that they could not build ties with rural people without reflecting on their communication style.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.218.
For instance, a student who returned to Suwa, Nagano prefecture, maintained that democracy would not be realized until both student activists and rural people re-examined their own consciousness and behaviour; what he called “return to the inside of life”. He saw the Kikyô movements as an attempt to transform the activists themselves:

We need to maintain the contacts with local people from now on which have been built in the past two months and pass on the relations to the next generation. The contacts may be only an exchange of letters, but mutual communication, rather than imposition of our ideas on local people, is nevertheless essential. The perpetuation of the Kikyô movements will be guaranteed by this communication. Furthermore, our important task is to develop and maintain what we have studied in the movements.\(^{43}\)

Because their knowledge was not helpful in discussing local issues, the Kikyô students began to reflect on their study on campus. They found it useless to understand democracy abstractly and necessary to deepen local knowledge in solving problems which rural people faced. While having deeper understanding of the local situation, the Kikyô students sought to transform their own way of thinking through self-reflection before democratizing rural areas.

The New Relationship between Cities and Villages

As the end of the summer break came close, some of the Kikyô students had a clear idea of this self-reflection. For example, Toya Ikichi, a student who returned to the northern area of Nagao prefecture, dubbed the idea, which was cultivated through the Kikyô movements, as *mochikaeri*.

The Kikyō movements are necessary, and we can get "mochikaeri" through the movements, because we visit our hometown, that is, precisely our living place. This means that the Kikyō movements are a "place of remaking", which intellectuals who only provide analysis and make passive resistance are unable to approach. The place will be helpful for both the subject and the object. The place results in "bringing awareness which was fostered in the hometown back to their everyday life in urban areas (ninshiki no mochikaeri)", and it is in these conditions that political and economic changes will occur... Naturally, we face great obstacles in returning home with some knowledge learnt from books. The confrontation of the obstacles affects us. At that moment, we start learning. What are the problems of a local area? How should the problems be solved and are they linked with politics? Do we have any recognition and ideas to be overcome? What does our study mean? Our recognition starts to be intensified.⁴⁴

Toya's comment shows that some of the Kikyō students began to remake their way of thinking. Toya claimed that "knowledge learnt from books" was not useful in solving local problems, because the knowledge was disconnected from rural people's everyday life.

In these discussions, the Kikyō students came to see their encounters with rural residents as a catalyst to examine their ideas and knowledge. They believed that the idea of democracy would not "become flesh and blood" without learning from their bitter experiences in the hometown and bringing them back to their lives in urban areas. After the Kikyō students had many experiences in villages, some of them became confident in what they had gained from the movements. Toya Ikichi wrote:

We have small tools, that is, awareness and method. We must not let these rust and have to sharpen them.45

In particular, the Kikyō movements of Nagano and Fukushima prefecture were relatively successful. For example, the Kikyō students in Aizu, Fukushima prefecture, organized an open lecture in a public hall on 26 July. 600 people of all ages and occupations, including the elderly, housewives, and high school students, joined the lecture. Three well-known intellectuals, Tsurumi Shunsuke, Shirotsubo Noboru, and Yamashita Hajime, spoke about the Anpo protests.46 At a small roundtable talk after the lecture, the Kikyō students exchanged their opinions with rural residents, and a woman promised them that she would talk about the lecture with her workmates and family.

The Kikyō students believed that this would be the beginning of a new relationship between university students and rural residents, between cities and villages. A housewife who lived in Yoichi, Hokkaido, sent a letter written about her encounter with the Kikyō students to Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun:

People in our village who went to university in Tokyo always “achieved success and fame” and became our rulers when they returned to their “hometown”. We thought that they were the same as tax officers. However, you [—the Kikyō students] promise us, this summer, to side with us permanently and to do works for our society and people during your lifetime. We start to trust your word. I think that such mutual trust may be the biggest achievement of the movements.47

45 Ibid.
46 “Gakusei no Kikyō Undō o Genchi ni Miru”, p.12.
Most of the Kikyō movements did not go well, but some of the Kikyō students, particularly in Nagano and Fukushima prefecture, produced solid results. These students were successful in developing mutual trust with young people living in rural areas. A further survey on the movements in rural areas is necessary to answer why they did so, but Nagano and Fukushima had had a history of mass education since the 1920s and 1930s. These education programs, such as seikatsu tsuzurikata undō (campaigns to encourage children to write about their lives) or jiyū daigaku undō (campaigns for free universities), were organized by educated young people and characterized by their independence from the state. The infrastructure of people's education in each district, more or less, influenced the outcomes of the Kikyō movements.

5. The End of the Summer Break

Debates over the End of the Kikyō Movements

At the end of the summer break, the Kikyō students left their hometown with the experience of many failures and some successes. On 17 September, they organized a rally in the Hitotsubashi Education Hall, Tokyo, in order to review their experiences of this summer. At the rally, the Kikyō students debated over the future of the movements, and opinion was split.

The majority of the Kikyō students insisted that they should conclude the movements. In the beginning of the Group of All Students for Protection of Democracy (GASPD) on 23 June, the student activists had planned to dissolve

the organization after they gained a certain number of achievements. They thought that the end of the summer break was a good time to end the GASPD. Student activists who supported the end of the Kikyō movements were afraid of being involved in conflicts between progressive parties and the tōha. During the Kikyō movements, they had been suspected by rural people of being organizations of political groups. Whilst they claimed that the "return to the inside of life", that is, self-reflection on their consciousness and behaviour, must be done over the course of their life, it was natural that they were reluctant to maintain the organization of the movements.

On the other hand, small numbers of the Kikyō students proposed that they maintain the GASPD to further develop their precious experiences of this summer into "permanent development of the Kikyō movements". Some of the activists had promised local people to practice the movements in the future. Shimizu Takichi, a student activist who insisted that they should not dissolve the organization, stated:

The storms of the Anpo protests and the following Miike strike, the Kikyō movements have passed, and journalists almost forget the series of seasons of political turmoil in the autumn breeze. Because of semester exams, job hunting, and the like, the movements are disappearing without being theorized.... Should we let such considerable energy of student activists disappear without any achievements? More important than that, should we disappoint young people in villages and housewives in towns, who cooperated with and supported the movements from their heart, and make them say, "That's just what I thought"?  

50 Interview with Ariga Hiroshi (17 October 2003).
Shimizu was concerned that rural residents would be disappointed with the student activists if the organization of the Kikyō movements did not last and the mutual trust which students built with the residents would also collapse.

Many student activists eventually stopped being committed to the Kikyō movements at the end of the summer break. In this sense, the Kikyō movements were virtually dissolved in the rally on 17 September. Some of the student activists opposed the dissolution of the GASPD and wanted to maintain it for their actions in the future. The NASRPD, the scholar group that supported the Kikyō movements, was in a standstill after the summer break.52

In the summer break of the following year, a woman student activist who returned to Aizu Wakamatsu in Fukushima prefecture wrote:

I am deeply offended by my senior who was embarrassed and made excuses when I asked “will you return home this year?” and by a graduate who proudly calculated the amount of his bonus. I cannot criticize them from the theoretical view, but even if my offense is emotional and trivial, I will keep holding these mixed feelings, though no one can understand them.53

Some student activists might quietly and individually “return to the inside of life” on the basis of their experience during the summer break, even if they did not visit their hometown directly. However, the networks of people in cities and villages that were made by the Kikyō movements almost disappeared.

Some intellectuals were disappointed with the outcomes of the Kikyō movements and pointed out problems with the movements. For example, Asada Mitsuteru, a literary critic, noted that the Kikyō movements were just a “revival of the enlightenment movements of the nineteenth century in the

present period\textsuperscript{54}. He claimed that the movements were so outdated that their failure was inevitable. Sociologist Shimizu Ikutarō also looked at the movements negatively. Whereas some progressive intellectuals, such as Takeuchi Yoshimi, a well-known scholar working on Chinese literature, were proud that the Anpo protests were historic people's protests for democratization that had a place in the history of Japan, Shimizu insisted that the protestors were not successful at all, because they could not stop the revision of the Anpo Treaty. The protests were, Shimizu maintained, just urban people's self-satisfaction. He claimed that the Kikyō movements were not able to overcome the problems of the Anpo protests, and rural people did not sympathize with their self-satisfaction.\textsuperscript{55} After their criticism, few referred to the Kikyō movements, and most Japanese people came to forget them.

\textbf{Rethinking the Kikyō Movements}

Many of the student activists found it necessary to continue to transform the relationship between rural and urban areas. However, the Kikyō movements split due to differences in the way students practiced self-reflection: while some of the activists claimed that they would go back to everyday life and re-examine their ideas and behaviour individually, others suggested that their self-reflection should be done collectively through the return to their hometowns. The latter group organized a rally on the Kikyō movements before the national election in November 1960 and visited rural areas again during winter break in December. In spite of their efforts, the Kikyō movements declined rapidly.


Student activists who continued to engage in the return to their hometowns were disturbed by the difficult situation in which one participant after another left the movements. These difficulties provided them with a good opportunity to rethink the fundamental issue of “why we do the Kikyō movements”. Toya Ikichi, one of the student activists cited earlier, wrote:

Let’s propose that your group gathers together again. Even three or five people are all right. Doing it at your own pace is fine. Anyone who is seriously concerned about their lives, hometown, and country is welcome. Also, people who acted hard in the summer break are more welcome....How about having a rally in which the Kikyō students in each prefecture gather together? How about having a national rally? The Kikyō movements are a place open to all. They are a place to exchange information, collect data, and debate, and contact many people living in various regions who struggle in the smell of earth, in addition to students. They are a place to expand and deepen activities. The building of the open space will result in expansion of grassroots participants. The Kikyō movements are particularly a place of sympathy. They are a place where ties between individuals are significant rather than the individuals being measured in terms of quantity.56

It should be noted that Toya regarded the Kikyō movements as “an open place”. The movements were viewed as a meeting place between the Kikyō students and local farmers, between urban and rural people, and between people of all ages and men and women alike. It was an open “place” where people who had never met with each other were able to have a conversation and exchange their opinions. For them, the Kikyō movements were a place in which people were encouraged to facilitate self-revolution in their communication style or knowledge through their encounters with various people.

Summary

In 1960, large-scale people’s protests against authoritarian states occurred in South Korea, Turkey, Iran, and France as well as in Japan. The Anpo protests and the Kikyō movements were a part of these global protests for post-colonization and democratization. The Anpo protests were framed and organized as the national campaign against the Japan-US Security Treaty, and a wide range of people’s movements for democratization gathered together in the protests. The mobilization of the Anpo protests was based on the memories of loss and devastation in and immediately after the Second World War, which were widely shared among Japanese people. It was also fuelled by the people’s antipathy to their subordination to the USA which had occupied Japan for seven years.

However, the campaign against the Anpo Treaty and for democratization did not spread to rural areas, despite thousands of university students and scholars participating in the Kikyō movements during the summer break of 1960. The student activists initially tried to “enlighten” rural people about the value of democracy, but they were not successful in communicating with them. Some of the activists began to learn from their bitter experiences of the Kikyō movements. They reflected on their elitism and changed their way of thinking rather than trying to change rural people. This transformation of the activists helped them to open up possibilities of changing the conventional communication style between rural and urban people. The student activists cultivated the idea of “learning from the hometown” through their experiences.

of the Kikyō movements. This self-reflexive idea prefigured the slogans of "self-revolution (jiko henkaku)" or "self-negation (jiko hitei)" raised by Japanese new left movements in the late 1960s, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

On the other hand, the networks of the Kikyō movements almost disappeared after the rally on 17 September. The attempts of student activists living in urban areas to reflect on their way of thinking through their involvement with the hometown disappeared until new leftists re-started them in the 1970s. An increasing number of Japanese people came to accept Japan's position as a junior partner of the USA and a bulwark against communist countries in the Asian region. In the 1960s, the Japanese economy achieved rapid economic growth in return for Japan's subordination to America's diplomatic policy. However, this did not mean that political protests disappeared during the economic boom. Many Japanese people questioned their affluent lives under the Anpo Treaty. I will discuss this in Chapter 2.
Ch.2 Transforming “Everydayness”: How were Japanese New Left Movements Formed in the 1960s?

This chapter discusses the characters of Japanese new left movements, which consisted mainly of antiwar activists, radical students, and young unionists. In order to explore this, I trace the history of how the movements were formed in the late 1960s. It is well known that new leftists exchanged information with each other beyond national borders in the late 1960s. This interaction made it possible for Japanese new leftists to share the protest styles and ideas with those of other industrialized countries. Based on discussions about transnational ties among the activists, I focus on the historical process of how the specific character of Japanese new left movements was produced.

This chapter, first of all, explores a key idea of Japanese new left movements. I describe this as self-revolution in “everydayness (nichijōsei)”. When Japan achieved rapid economic growth in the late 1960s, new leftists were concerned that Japanese people were not interested in political issues, such as the Vietnam War, in their affluent lives. They sought to highlight rising social control over everyday life and transform people’s depoliticized consciousness called “everydayness”, rather than national policies or political institutions. This is shown in that student activists of Tokyo University, the most privileged university in Japan, raised the slogan “self-negation (jiko hitei)” to question their own elitism.

Second, Japanese new left movements were known for confrontational direct action called “gewalt (gebaruto)” or “counter-violence (taikō bōryoku)”.

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1 Japanese new left movements were influenced by the ideas and protest repertories of those in West Europe and North America. See Takahashi Akira (ed.). *Hangyaku suru Sutyūdento Pawā: Sekai no Gakusei Kakumei*. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1968.
Many of the activists were willing to clash with armed police officers though they were at risk of being seriously wounded. Why were they passionate about direct action? I look at the meanings of gewalt from the perspective of new leftists to explore why direct action became popular and radical.

In discussing the characteristics of Japanese new left movements, I do not emphasize the specifics of each activist, intellectual, faction, or group. Rather this chapter seeks to understand the common discourse which was shared by a wide range of new leftists, particularly student activists. I focus mainly on the discourse of Zenkyōtō (the All-campus Committee for Struggles), a loosely-linked network of students that was formed on campus in the late 1960s. Zenkyōtō kept itself distant from the töha—new left factions which criticized the JCP for being bureaucratic and split from the party after the late 1950s—in order to build a true vanguard party. However, I would argue that many töha activists shared their ideas and actions with Zenkyōtō and took part in joint actions on campus and on the streets. I also hypothesise that the discourse of Zenkyōtō spread beyond the boundary of student groups to other new left groups, such as the Antiwar Youth Committees² (Hansen Seinen linkai) and Beheiren³ (the Citizens’ Federation for Peace in Vietnam), so I also examine the discourse of these groups to complement my analysis.

² The Antiwar Youth Committee was a young workers’ organization to protest against the Vietnam War. Because Sōhyō (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) was not greatly committed to antiwar actions, many young workers who were dissatisfied with Sōhyō joined the Committee and took confrontational actions to stop the war. The Antiwar Youth Committee will be discussed more in Chapter 5. See also Takami Keiji. Hansen Seinen linkai: 70 nen Tōsō to Seinen Gakusei Undō. Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1968.
³ Beheiren was formed in 1965 immediately after the Vietnam War broke out. It successfully mobilized a wide range of people who were not affiliated with political organizations to demonstrations against the war. Beheiren shared its ideas and protest repertoires with the Antiwar Youth Committee and Zenkyōtō. Yoshikawa Yūichi, then secretary of Beheiren, stated: “Until 1968, Beheiren took some joint actions with the Antiwar Youth Committee, Zenkyōtō, and the töha. The joint actions were based on the fundamental principle of democracy: no one should be excluded if we share issues and make consensus on the rule of actions with them. Beheiren was critical of Japan’s cooperation in the war. It not only blamed the Japanese government for this cooperation, but also pointed out that Japanese people were involved in supporting the government, so
1. Organizing Young People

The Vietnam War and its Implications for Japanese People

In the 1960s, many Japanese people experienced transformation of their lives resulting from rapid economic growth. In the 1960s, Japan recorded an annual growth rate of over 10%. PM Ikeda Hayato, who took office in July 1960, announced the Income Doubling Plan (*shotoku baizō keikaku*). This Plan played a role in distracting people's attention from political issues. The real GNP doubled between 1960 and 1966, even earlier than originally planned. The annual growth rate of the workers' wages reached about 10%. The real income of people also increased in spite of rising prices. Japan was rapidly urbanized in the course of the economic boom. While only 30% of the population had lived in cities immediately after the Second World War, the figure increased to 70% by 1970.4

As discussed in the Introduction, workers were incorporated into the competitive system in their factories or offices in the period of economic growth. The economic boom affected Japanese people's consciousness. According to *the White Paper on National Life* (Kokumin Seikatsu Hakusho) about 90% of the population identified themselves as middle stratum (*chûryû*) in the mid-

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1960s. In the 1950s, “the postwar progressives” had organized national movements for democratization mainly for the defence of people’s livelihood. In the 1960s, when the state declared that they would guarantee people’s economic welfare, what could be raised as a new issue instead of the poverty problem? “The postwar progressives” had trouble in mobilizing people living in peaceful, but controlled everyday life.

In this period, the memories of the Second World War were not as significant in mobilizing people as before. In the 1950s, the memories of loss and devastation in the war, which were widely shared by Japanese people, helped “the postwar progressives” to succeed in mobilizing people. These memories were fading away in the course of the economic boom in the 1960s. It was in this period that the United States became heavily involved in the Vietnam War. Muro Kenji, a student of Meiji Gakuin University and a young member of Beheiren who was born immediately after the Second World War, stated:

I do not have any memories [of the Second World War]. I have heard about the war, but after all, it occurred before I was born, regardless of whether it was 100 years ago or 10 years ago. I have not experienced the war and nor did I feel the miseries [caused by the war].

For most Japanese people, the Vietnam War was someone else’s problem. Muro Kenji stated:

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The dead are Vietnamese and the people fighting are American. We do not suffer.... I believe that I, myself, have to inherit experiences of the Second World War from older generations, but that is not all. We cannot inherit all of the experiences [from older generation]. We need to admit this. We learned the war as knowledge after the fact. We do not need to have an inferiority complex. We have to begin with the assumption that we do not have experiences of the war. I think that our current younger generation cannot be empowered without building new morals and the ways of thinking based on our situation where the memories of the war are not clear.⁷

The majority of the Japanese responded to the Vietnam War differently than to the Second World War. The Vietnam War caused little direct damage to their livelihood. Some of them even expected the war to provide opportunities of making profits from the economic boom fuelled by military procurement. In 1966, Okamura Akihiko, a journalist, wrote an article on a strike by national railway workers against the Vietnam War, and asked people who did not join the strike what they were thinking about it. A man who worked as an executive of a medium-sized company answered:

Anyway, it is important that Japan makes profits. Both people who go on strikes against the Vietnam War and people who supported it can say whatever they want to, because the war is not Japanese people's problem after all. If Japan is directly involved in the war, no one would drink and talk about it as someone else's problem. Let's make profits quickly and enjoy prosperity. No matter how much some people oppose the war, it cannot be denied that Japan enjoys a military procurement boom.⁸

Some companies increased their contracts for maintenance and repair of American ships, aircrafts, and vehicles. Visiting soldiers spent money in the

⁷ Ibid., pp.75-77.
hotel and entertainment industries. Military procurement was only one factor in the economic boom in Japan in this period, and its scale was much smaller than that of the Korean War in 1950-53, but the Vietnam War was obviously integrated into Japanese people's affluent lives. In this way, antiwar activists faced difficulties in mobilizing people without relying on their memories as victims of the Second World War.

University Students in the Midst of Economic Growth

University students, as well as the rest of the Japanese people, faced a drastic change in their lives caused by rapid economic growth. One of the most obvious changes was their clothes. In the early and mid-1960s, many male students wore black school uniforms, but by the later 1960s they were beginning to wear jeans, which were popular with American students. The number of university students increased quickly. In 1960, the university entrance rate was less than 10%, but half of men and one-third of women went to universities and two-year colleges by the middle of the 1970s. Since universities in various parts of Japan constructed new concrete buildings to accommodate growing numbers of students, the landscape of campuses changed. While the mass production system was introduced in the 1960s, factories or offices needed a large number of administrative or technical staff who controlled the mass-produced goods. Many companies modernized their facilities and organizations in this period, so their employees were required to do scientific research, get information, and have basic knowledge of economics in sales, marketing, and accounting.

A good academic background (gakureki) was a must for workers who wanted to be employed by big companies, be promoted, and earn higher wages. Young people were involved in tough competition to pass university entrance examinations as a step to get a “good” job. University students were no longer automatically promoted to executive level in companies. When entering a company, people who graduated from university were usually assigned to in the bottom rank of low-ranking administrative or technical staff. They had to compete with their colleagues in order to be promoted to executives. In this sense, not all university students were the elite class.

How did young people feel in this situation? First, they had antipathy to increased academic competition, but they found it difficult to reject the competition. Ōtsuka Akira, who entered the College of Engineering of Nihon University in 1968 and then participated in student movements, looked back on his teens as follows:

In the years of my junior high school, high school, preparatory school, and university, I felt alienated under the regime of the “entrance examination-first principle (juken shijō shugi)” and suffered from the pressure of examinations. My only resistance was to skip classes and hang out in cafes. The more I resisted, the worse my grades got, and it was I that was eventually worried about this. It was as if I was living with handcuffs which put my hands under restraint, and the cuffs became tighter as I resisted. I hated the authorities, that is to say, teachers and the school system. I finally entered university, but the classes were more boring than those of high school and many students were crowded into small rooms.¹¹

Second, young people were worried by identity crises. They were expected to be standardized into the labour force when working in companies.

This meant that they could be replaced by someone else. Because they felt that they had lost their distinctive personalities, they experienced identity crises.

Yonezu Tomoko entered Tama Art University in 1966. She wanted to get a trendy job and live independently. She was fond of drawing, so she wanted to be a designer. Other than this, she did not know what to do in her future. She looked back on how much she was disturbed at this time.

The days before students blockaded the campus were gloomy, and I felt that I had no place to go. When opening a window, I always saw the same scene. I did not know where I would go in the future, I did not have any brighter prospects, and I did not have any job prospects. I thought that being a designer would be cool, but many other people also thought so. Designers were in oversupply....but I had no place to go, and I could not find a breakthrough to express myself. I was afraid that I would live forever in such gloomy days, so I wanted a way out. I think that many people felt that way in this period.12

Saitō Susumu, then a student who entered the Faculty of Agriculture of Tokyo Education University in 1968, was disgusted with society in which “people have to learn and work like a robot for the benefit of a few rulers”. He wrote a poem.13

I want to live
Without fights
Without crying aloud
Without laughing deeply
Steadily
I study without any purpose
I’m fed up with such a life

My life is like a paper painted
With blue and gray colour
With plenty of water
I do not live
I am made to live
I want to live humanly
Humanly
Human
Not a monkey but human
Not a machine but human
I don’t know
But
For human beings,
Living used to be joyful
Human beings are domesticated
Why on earth
Is everyday life
So gloomy?

Student Movements in a Slump

The young people’s worries provided student activists with great opportunities to mobilize more and more students to student associations on campus, but the student associations had been in a long slump since the Anpo protests of 1960. Student activists did not respond well to the young people’s worries. They failed to mobilize a wide range of students to join protests against the University Management Law14 (Daigaku Kanri Hō) in 1962 and the Japan-Korea Normalization Treaty15 (Nikkan Kihon Jōyaku) in 1965. Antiwar

14 PM Ikeda Hayato declared in 1962 that he would seek to amend the University Management Law. Many student activists were concerned that the amendment aimed to strength control over the activists. They organized rallies and demonstrations against the Law and the Ikeda cabinet.
15 The Japanese government began to discuss the Normalization Treaty in 1951, but the negotiation did not progress because of several difficult issues, such as war reparations. South Korean President Park Chung-Hee took office in 1963. Because he was interested in strengthening economic ties with Japan, he was passionate about ratifying the Treaty. However, many South Korean people, who had been colonized by Japan in the Second World War, were afraid that Japanese companies would increase their influence in Korea. They developed protest actions to stop the ratification. Some Japanese student activists
movements as well as student movements were in a slump in this period. As Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, an activist who participated mainly in anti-Vietnam War movements in the late 1960s, recalled it:

For some years, from the end of the Anpo protests to 1964, that the phrase "noren ni ude oshi (pushing against a wall of air)" had been popular. Many people accepted the revised Anpo Treaty, the Self Defence Forces increased, and citizens were passionate about working for "income doubling". The atmosphere was gloomy and suffocating, but no one knew how to break through the atmosphere, find the clear sky, and breathe the fresh air. It was not clear where the weak point of the enemy was and which parts of the wall we could break through most easily. It was just like noren ni ude oshi. People worked hard, and then returned straight to a TV in a living room at their home. Some of them debated national and world politics with abstract words in student associations or study groups, but they did not know how to associate the discussions with everyday life. Or, in contrast, they comforted each other in the pain of "struggles". It was as if words floated in the air in vain in those days.¹⁶

Student movements lost support from ordinary students because of conflicts and splits in the movements. After the Anpo protests of 1960, each of the töha, that is, new left factions which competed with the JCP-affiliated groups over the leadership of Zengakuren (the National Federation of Student Associations), repeatedly experienced internal conflicts and splits, and many other leftist factions were newly formed and soon disappeared. While Kakumaru-ha (the Revolutionary Marxist Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League of Japan) had a majority in Zengakuren in the 1960s, the coalition of Chûkaku-ha (the National Committee of the Federation of

Revolutionary Communists), the Communist League which was dissolved after the Anpo protests and rebuilt, and the Liberation Group of the Socialist Youth League (Shaseidō Kaihō-ha)—known as "the Coalition of Three Factions (sanpa Zengakuren)—sought to expand their influence.

Each of the tôha had their own student groups on campus. There were many billboards (tatekan) made by the tôha's activists on campus in order to convey their political statements. In the lunch break, the activists often made political speeches in front of their billboards and competed with other factions. In Japan, each university authority collected a student association fee together with tuition from students. From the student association fee, the authorities provided the leadership of its student association with funds intended for the administration of student association buildings. The tôha sought to win the leadership of the associations in order to make use of the fee for their activities.

At a roundtable on student life, a student who was a reporter of a campus newspaper criticized student activists for working only for their faction rather than for ordinary students:

> When contacting student activists to write articles for a campus newspaper, I strongly feel that the activists act according to the interests of each faction. I would like to be more involved in student movements, but I feel that the activists do not respond to individuals' anger. I think that they should abolish political factions.17

Many university students were full of apathy because of the political conflicts between student groups. Many of the students began to commit themselves to student movements or anti-Vietnam War movements in the late 1960s, but they were apolitical in the early 1960s.

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Hegemonic Struggles over Young People

In the 1960s, old leftist groups and new religious groups were active in organizing young people who were worried about academic competition or identity crises caused by the economic growth. The membership of Minshushugi Seinen Dōmei (the Democratic Youth League, hereafter Minsei), the youth organization of the JCP, was 10,000 in 1958, but Minsei proudly announced that its members increased to 90,000 in 1963. A new religious group, Sōka Gakkai, also remarked that the membership of its youth sector increased from 100,000 in 1958 to 2,200,000 in 1966. While Zengakuren and “the postwar progressives” faced difficulties in mobilizing them, both Minsei and the Sōka Gakkai rapidly expanded their influence over young people.

Why were Minsei and the Sōka Gakkai relatively successful in attracting young people? They were successful in organizing young people who were worried about academic competition or identity crises. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the late 1950s, the JCP lost much of the support which the party had gained in the early postwar period. In particular, many young people left the JCP after the party changed its radical strategies, such as guerrilla fighting in rural areas, in the Sixth National Council of the JCP (rokuzenkyō) in 1955. The Communist League, one of the töha which was known for its confrontational actions, increased its influence in Zengakuren during the Anpo protests.

Some of the JCP’s leaders were concerned about this slump, and claimed in the Ninth General Assembly of the Central Committee of the JCP in March 1960 that “the revolution in Japan will not be able to be realized without

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18 The Sōka Gakkai is a new religious group. It derived from Nichiren Buddhism and was formed in 1930. In the 1950s and 1960s the Sōka Gakkai focused on organizing poor people living in urban areas and quickly increased its membership.

organizing young people who will play a central role in the new era”. Because
Minsei began to organize cultural activities, such as choirs, dances, games, or
hikes, in order to attract young people to the party, it was called “singing and
dancing Minseidô (uta to odori no Minseidô)”. Minsei provided many young
people, who were concerned about loneliness and isolation, with opportunities
to find friends and forget their gloomy lives.\(^2^0\)

The Sôka Gakkai also discovered a specific way of organizing young
people. After Ikeda Daisaku took the office of president in 1960, the Sôka
Gakkai changed its strong-arm style of “shakubuku (a Buddhist way of
persuasion to organize new members)” into two-way roundtable
communication. Some members of the Sôka Gakkai chatted with other
members about their health problems, anxieties, and concerns about the future.
This helped them to solve their isolation and loneliness. According to James
White, a religious sociologist, the Sôka Gakkai increased its members in the
1960s by making rank-and file members’ voices heard in the decision-making
of the organization.\(^2^1\) The Sôka Gakkai was different from religious
organizations which urged believers to live an ascetic life. It was not
necessarily hostile to affluent lives, so its members were encouraged by the
Sôka Gakkai to realize their desires, such as luxuries or career success.\(^2^2\)

While Minsei and the Sôka Gakkai were relatively successful in
organizing young people, conservative forces sought to recover from its
setbacks in struggles over mobilization of the young generation. Since they
were concerned that “the postwar progressives” had gained support from
young people in the Anpo protests, the LDP worked out “the Basic Principle of

\(^2^0\) Hirotsu Kyôsuke. Minseidô no Kenkyû: Nikkyô no Seinen Rôdô Undô no Seikaku to

\(^2^1\) White, James G. The Soka Gakkai and Mass Society. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1970, Ch.5.

\(^2^2\) Tsurumi Shunsuke, Mori Hideto, Yanagida Kunio, and Shimane Kiyoshi. Shakubuku:
Youth Policy (seishōnen kihon rinen)" in the early 1960s. The Principle noted that the LDP would "make efforts to passionately construct the economy and build a moral state without resorting to class struggles". Based on this Principle, the Ikeda Hayato cabinet allocated 31 billion yen to human resource development policies. The policies aimed to encourage young people to master skills for industrial production in order to channel their energies into economic growth.23

Ishihara Shintarō was one of the politicians in the LDP who responded well to voices of young people who were worried about academic competition or identity crises. Ishihara, a famous fiction writer, ran for the Upper House election in 1968, gained 3 million votes, and won a seat. He used the slogans "young liberals" and "the country for the younger generation", and warned that mahōmu shugi (family-centred society) would lead to a drain on young people's imagination. Ishihara stated in his speech:

Instead of imagining and dreaming their own state-building, young people lose their imagination in exchange for mahōmu shugi, which is an ideology of the small world sold by the mass media on TV screens and in questionnaires of magazines. They gain immunity to a fever, which young people are often in.... In sum, it depends on whether to believe in yourself. Youth can live like youth should, even in the present. Only people who believe in embodying and realizing their aspirations in the state and society can challenge and make it.24

Ishihara attempted to strengthen young people's loyalty to the state by making use of their growing anxiety and dissatisfaction. He used the media to

dramatize his political actions and gained a wide range of support. Minsei, the Sōka Gakkai, and conservatives, in spite of the differences in their style and purpose, sought to organize young people who were worried about academic competition and identity crises.

2. The Great Impact of Haneda and Sasebo

The difficult situation of student movements began to change in 1965-67. Large numbers of students participated in actions to stop tuition increases, for self-government in student association buildings and dormitories, investigation of university authorities’ corruption, and other issues. For example, many students of Keio University went on a strike against the steep rise in tuition fees in early 1965. Before that, while only a few activists of the student association had been active, most of the university students had been depoliticized. During the strike, however, a struggle committee was formed in each class, and an increasing number of students were committed to activism.

At Takasaki Keizai University, local politicians and business people had often intervened in the issues of whom the university employed or who was allowed to enter it. Because the Takasaki local government announced a tuition increase at the university in 1965, about 500 students sat in protests in the Town Hall and five were arrested. In January 1967, many students of the

university began to blockade their campus to uncover the corruption of university authorities, local business people, and local politicians.\textsuperscript{27}

The Haneda and Sasebo Incidents

It was the Haneda and Sasebo incidents in the end of 1967 and early 1968, however, that triggered the major upsurge of student protests. The Haneda incidents were clashes between student activists and police officers near Haneda airport on 8 October and 22 November 1967. The media, especially some leading newspapers such as the \textit{Asahi Shinbun}, criticized America for getting involved in the Vietnam War and Japan for cooperating with America. In newspaper articles, their correspondents, who were stationed in Vietnam, revealed the violent realities of the American bombing of North Vietnam.\textsuperscript{28} These reports led many Japanese people to become critical of the war. PM Satô Eisaku planned to visit South Vietnam and the USA in October and November 1967 in order to have summit meetings on solutions to the Vietnam War with their political leaders, but he was suspected of visiting Vietnam to discuss Japan's further commitment to the war. Thousands of workers and student activists, particularly the Coalition of Three Factions (\textit{sanpa Zengakuren}, discussed earlier) took radical action against PM Satô's visit. On 8 October, about 2,500 joined blockades and clashed with riot police near Haneda Airport, and Yamazaki Hiroaki, a student from Kyoto University, was killed in the clashes.

The Sasebo incident was another key event for student movements in this period. This incident was a protest by students, antiwar activists, and others against the USA's nuclear aircraft-carrier \textit{Enterprise}'s visit to Sasebo

\textsuperscript{27} "Takasaki Keizai Daigaku Shi Tôkyoku no Kainyû o Haishi, Mamorubeki Jichi no Kakuritsu e" in \textit{Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun} 11 October 1965, p.5.

\textsuperscript{28} Havens. \textit{Fire across the Sea}, pp.35-39.
port near Nagasaki in January 1968. A large number of aircraft took off from the Enterprise to bomb North Vietnam after the Vietnam War broke out, so many antiwar groups, including those which were affiliated with the JSP and the JCP, were concerned about its visit to the port. The visit of the Enterprise was also a sensitive issue for some Japanese people who were victims of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. On 17 January 1968, hundreds of student activists wearing helmets confronted heavily armed police officers, and many of the activists were injured and arrested. On the following day, 50,000 people joined a rally at a baseball stadium. Some new leftists joined the rally hosted by the JSP and the JCP, but others took confrontational direct action, and sometimes conflicted with the JCP-affiliated groups as well as with the riot police.

"Haneda" and "Sasebo" became an important turning point for student movements. Students had been concerned that they could not find a connection between everyday life and issues discussed in political institutions such as PM Satō's visit to the USA. Many Japanese people who felt isolated from decision-making in large-scale organizations, such as companies or schools, had regarded them as politically powerless. An increasing number of young people were involved in severe competition, were atomized, and could not find friends to talk to about their dissatisfaction. However, such young people were encouraged by the Haneda and Sasebo incidents to feel that they could break through this deadlock. The student activists who joined the actions believed that their visit to the sites of conflicts enabled them to bridge the division between everyday life and politics, and to affect political decisions.

such as the Enterprise's visit to Sasebo port. In this way, the activists showed many people a way of overcoming their powerlessness.  

A student who participated in the Haneda incidents stated:

The point is whether to be satisfied with restricted freedom. If we give up [challenging the power of the state], this will mean that we accept the current situation. In order to avoid this, we have to recognize and remake our mentality by confronting the authorities again and again. In no sense, will we give way to the power of the state, which is armed every day and always urges us to be subordinate to it.  

The student activists questioned "restricted freedom" in their affluent lives by physically clashing with the authorities. Many Japanese people knew the fact that Japan gave the USA strong support for the Vietnam War. Are you closing your eyes to the facts? was the question addressed by the student activists. Although the radical actions in Haneda and Sasebo were mainly taken by the Coalition of Three Factions, large numbers of young people who were worried by isolation, alienation, and identity crises shared the question. The Haneda and Sasebo incidents provided the activists with a great opportunity to break through the deadlock of the movements.

Radical Actions of Students were Supported

In Sasebo and Haneda, the student activists were committed to social justice, but the mainstream media responded harshly to their radical actions. On the day following the first Haneda incident in late 1967, the Asahi Shinbun criticized the student activists for their "organized violence" and the "abnormal

state of student movements. In a lead article, the Asahi said, "if radical students see taking violent actions to influence society and attract public attention as 'revolutionary', they, as students, are relying too much on society, abusing freedom of expression, and digging a hole for themselves". This view did not change even when the Sasebo incident occurred in early 1968. The article reporting on clashes between student activists of Hosei University and riot police on 15 January noted that students should attend classes rather than joining actions against the visit of the Enterprise.

However, the view slightly changed on 17 January, when the police attacked many student activists who came to Sasebo to join the actions with water canons, tear gas, and night sticks. Even some local people, who watched the attack, and several reporters of the Asahi, NHK, etc., were involved in the attack and badly injured. While the policing was criticized by the mainstream media for being too strict, some local people began to give support to the activists who were going to join the major actions on the following day. It was reported by an observer of the Sasebo incident that 700,000 yen was donated for students in Sasebo in a single day. Some local people served meals to the radical student activists, others were willing to provide accommodation to them, and sex workers for American military personnel gave medical treatment to wounded students. An observer also wrote:

At night on 17 January, I heard a worker complain in tears that "police officers are awful. Zengakuren will undoubtedly win in the end" over a beer in a pub on a street corner, which surprised me. The citizens surrounded Sasebo Bridge from the morning on the following day. From that day, they stepped forward to the bridge and called out "Fuck the police!" and "Students, go for it!" on the wooden parapet of the bridge. The citizens did not give way to repeated warnings from the police to move back through a loud speaker, or to tear gas grenades, against which they could not open their eyes for a moment. Finally, they hide
student activists who escaped from truncheon-wielding police. A riot trooper, who brandished his truncheon and did not know what to do, walked away with a parting shot, "I'll arrest you for obstructing the performance of my duty"32.

Even the student activists had not expected to gain strong support from ordinary people. They hardly ever cared about whether their actions were supported by other people. Their radical actions were based on their sense of justice rather than rational calculations and strategic considerations.

How were their radical actions in the Sasebo incident reported in the mainstream media? Even the *Asahi Shinbun*, which was more sympathetic to leftists than other newspapers, did not support the actions. However, the newspaper provided a couple of articles on local people’s support for the activists and criticism of strict policing, so the *Asahi*’s view was obviously moving to a more impartial position than before.

The radical action at Haneda and Sasebo was incompatible with the more centralized style of progressive parties and labour unions. Many leaders of the parties, particularly the JCP, were irritated by the student activists’ behaviour. The JCP labelled the töha as "Trotskyists" and depicted them as betrayers of revolution. On the day following the first Haneda incident, on the campus of Waseda University, a number of Minsei students criticized the töha for their radical direct action taken in Sasebo33. However, the spontaneous actions were accepted by a wide range of young people who were worried about academic competition and identity crises.

3. Beyond the Failure of the Anpo Protests

Resistance against Controlled Society

The Haneda and Sasebo incidents fuelled "campus disputes (gakuen funsho)" in various parts of Japan in 1968 and 1969. Large numbers of students who had not been interested in political activism came to join student movements. In 1968, 165 universities, 80% of the all universities in Japan, were involved in disputes, and 70 universities were barricaded. Student movements had been in a slump since the end of the Anpo protests of 1960, but they were revitalized especially after the Haneda and Sasebo incidents. It should be emphasized that the focus of the movements changed. The movements were different from the activities of "the postwar progressives" in that they no longer focused on changing national policies and political institutions. Rather they questioned rising control over everyday life in affluent society, what new leftists called "controlled society (kanri shakai)". Many young people came to see themselves as experiencing "alienation (sogai)" in controlled society. Beheiren, the people's networks against the Vietnam War, and the Antiwar Youth Committee, and young workers' groups against the War were formed in this period. Although Beheiren and the Antiwar Youth Committee focused on issues slightly different from student movements, they were also interested in the issue of overcoming controlled society and alienation. In this way, the network of Japanese new left movements was formed and spread widely after Haneda and Sasebo.

As discussed in the Introduction, Hebert Marcuse pointed out that economic rationality turned into capitalist rationality. Many new leftists also warned that the logic of efficiency was dominant in all parts of controlled society. They pointed out that even universities were not free from the
influence of the idea. For example, student activists of Tokyo Education University opposed a planned relocation of its campus. The national university was founded in 1949 to foster teachers, but the Japanese government decided to reorganize it into a research institute for scientific technology in the early 1960s. The business sector required the government and university to facilitate scientific research in the economic boom. The administration of Tokyo Education University planned to shift its campus from the centre of Tokyo to Tsukuba, Ibaragi prefecture, in 1963 to gain much greater space for scientific and technological research. In the earlier stage of their protests, the student activists had opposed the relocation in order to defend the independence of scientists from the government. However, the student activists gradually realized that scientific research would contribute to further innovation by companies to make their profits, and came to focus on questioning the academic-industrial partnership (sangaku kyōdō rosen).³⁴

In this way, new left students claimed that universities played an important role in reproducing the productivity-first society through scientific research. They insisted, in short, that universities were a tool to make corporate profits. They came up with slogans such as “Scrap Universities (daigaku kaitai)” and “Scrap the Imperial Universities (teikoku daigaku kaitai)”. Research assistants and students who specialized in science and technology had not been so active in previous student movements, but in the late 1960s many were angry with the fact that scientific research conducted at universities was subcontracted by private companies, lamented that universities were not independent from corporations, and joined student movements.

As new leftists became wary of the value of scientific research, they questioned the roles of intellectuals in progressive movements. In the Anpo protests of 1960, progressive intellectuals played a key role in identifying political and social problems and giving people ideas about which direction they should go. In the early 1960s, university students were usually advised to read works written by Maruyama Masao, one of the most reputed intellectuals in movements for democratization in the postwar period. However, progressive intellectuals were discredited in the late 1960s. New leftists criticized these intellectuals for closing their eyes to the hierarchical relationship on campus. Each of the departments at Japanese universities consisted of the research/tutoring groups (kenkyūshitsu) moderated by professors. Each group usually had a professor, an associate professor, a research associate, postgraduate students, and undergraduate students. There was a hierarchical relationship in these groups; professors had official and unofficial power over other members of the groups. New leftists claimed that progressive intellectuals ignored the hierarchical relationship on campus. The slogan “Scrap Universities” chanted by new leftists meant that the activists aimed to remove the hierarchical relationship and the university system, which produced the relationship.

“Everydayness”

It should be noted that new leftists, particularly student activists, focused on people’s daily consciousness and behaviour called “everydayness (nichijōsei)”. Why did “everydayness” become a target to be changed by new leftists? As discussed earlier, while an increasing number of Japanese people were more subject to the intensified labour management in the workplace, they felt uneasy and uncomfortable. In the earlier stage of industrialization, factory
workers might have identified their managers, who controlled them, as the enemy, but “who are the enemies?” was not clear in the large organizations of controlled society, such as schools, factories, or offices.

Apolitical and conservative consciousness spread to all aspects of people’s lives. Such consciousness was articulated by new leftists in the word “everydayness”. In this way, new leftists, particularly student activists, came to regard “everydayness” as a target to be changed. The word encouraged many young people who felt uncomfortable in controlled society to think that they were influenced by the invisible power. “Everydayness” became a buzz word in new left movements. For example, the slogan of the campus festival of Tokyo Education University in 1965 was “Re-examining Everydayness (nichijōsei no saikakunin o)”. Its student activists came to know that they could no longer ignore depoliticized consciousness in the people’s affluent lives.35

Such an understanding of “everydayness” was shared by anti-Vietnam War activists as well as new left students. For example, Yoshioka Shinobu, an activist of Beheiren, stated:

There are so many goods which stand between rulers and ruled that we cannot identify the rulers from our side, and our freedom is currently restricted by the goods. We can also enjoy leisure activities and maihōmu shugi (my-home-ism; i.e. family-centred society). Leisure activities and homes are certainly among the things we should defend. However, it is a fact that maihōmu is now so integrated into the dominant regime that it is not worth while defending it. I support the pursuit of true individualism, so I want to defend maihōmu. However, we cannot help feeling gloomy, because we find it difficult to discuss social issues with maihōmu-oriented people. In controlled society, a large number of goods, homes, leisure activities, and restricted freedom are inserted as a

lubricant between rulers and ruled. We are now living in the society in which people are invisibly controlled.36

I argued in Introduction that some political and social theorists on industrialized society, like Herbert Marcuse, were critical of consumerism. Most Japanese new leftists did not develop the criticism of consumerism as strongly as these intellectuals, because consumer goods, like washing machines and TVs, were expected to facilitate individualism and encourage marginalized Japanese people, such as women or youth, to become liberated from feudalism. Unlike these activists, Yoshioka pointed out that people’s adherence to consumer goods, known as maihōmu shugi, risked producing new forms of domination. Yoshioka’s critique of controlled society ultimately led him to oppose to the Vietnam War. He claimed that “who ruled whom” was very obscure in controlled society, so Japanese people had difficulties in identifying victimizers and victims in the Vietnam War. He wrote:

In what position are Japanese people in the Vietnam War? Neither those who join anti-Vietnam War movements and nor those who do can help facing this issue. Some people certainly join the movements because “we pity the Vietnamese people”. However, as Japan is increasingly committed to the war, it is no longer sufficient that we just say, “We are sorry for Vietnamese people”. We have to recognize that we Japanese people are victimizers. Regardless of our intention, we are victimizers.37

According to Yoshioka, “who is ruler” and “who is ruled” was less obvious in controlled society, so although Japan was deeply involved in the Vietnam War, most Japanese people saw themselves as unconnected to it. He

37 Ibid., p.4.
claimed, however, that if rulers and ruled are identified, Japanese people would be aware that they were a part of the ruling group, and would reflect on their position and relationship with Vietnamese people. Antiwar activists insisted that their criticism of controlled society would lead inevitably to opposition to the Vietnam War.

This focus of new leftists on transforming “everydayness” does not mean that they were distracted from political issues such as the Japan-US Security Treaty. In the 1950s, a number of Japanese people joined protests against the Anpo Treaty in order to defend their livelihood from America. When the Japanese state, which was in close alliance with the USA, promised to assure their people of a livelihood and provide them with an affluent life in the 1960s, new leftists realized that their opposition to the Anpo would be ill-founded without questioning the idea of defending their livelihood. Transforming “everydayness” was seen as an indispensible step towards addressing bigger political issues. This shows that self-revolution in “everydayness” was associated with political and social change.

The Memories of Dead Colleagues

During their protests against the university authorities, new left students often blockaded campuses. They found it effective to create spaces behind barricades in which they could separate themselves from “everydayness” and transform their consciousness and behaviour. In the spaces behind the barricades, they ate and slept together, organized reading groups, talked about their worries or concerns, and discussed problems of university and society. The independent “spaces” behind the barricades helped them to get over their loneliness and to build closer ties with other students. When making decisions on significant issues, such as whether to initiate or continue a strike, the
student activists took time to discuss the issues with each other. The
discussions in those spaces helped the students to foster mutual
understanding and build the deeper relationship with their friends. The spaces
also encouraged the students to transform “everydayness”.

Most of the new left students found it difficult to change their
consciousness and behaviour, but the memories of their colleagues who were
committed to and died in the movements impelled them to transform
“everydayness”. Kanba Michiko, Yamazaki Hiroaki, Oku Köhei38, Waida Shirō39,
and other activists had died during or after the Anpo protests, and thousands
of people were badly injured in the movements. They were a kind of mirror
which propelled new leftists to overcome their weakness and work hard to
transform “everydayness”.

Kanba Michiko, an activist of Tokyo University, was born in 1937. She
entered the JCP in 1957, left the party soon, and then became a member of
the Communist League. She participated in various people’s movements in the
late 1950s, such as protests against the Police Duties Bill (Keisatsukan
Shokumu Shikkkō Hô), and was arrested during a demonstration at Haneda
airport against PM Kishi’s visit to the USA in January 1960. After that, she
became more passionate about being involved in the series of the Anpo
protests, and was killed in clashes between demonstrators and police officers
on 15 June 1960. An anonymous poem written for her and placed beside the
altar in the place where she was killed said: “We will never forget the people

38 Oku was an activist of one of the tôha. He was so moved by the death of Kanba Michiko
that he participated in demonstrations against the Anpo Treaty in June 1960. After he
entered Yokohama City University in 1963, he was involved in student movements. He
was a passionate and stoic activist. Oku was heavily injured in the clashes with the police
in February 1965. In the following month, he worried so seriously about his life, love affairs,
and activism that he committed suicide.
39 Waida was a student activist of one of the tôha at Nihon University. In June 1966, he
participated in actions against the Japan-Korea Normalization Treaty, confronted the
police, and was seriously injured. He finally died from his injuries a month later.
with black hands who beat you. Our friend, watch us. We will struggle*. The poem was memorized as a tribute to her later in the 1960s.40

Many young people were shocked by the death of Yamazaki Hiroaki in the first Haneda incident. Murakami Kyōko was one of them. She entered Tokyo Woman’s Christian University in 1968 and initially enjoyed a peaceful campus life: chatting with her friends on the lawn; eating corn dogs in the cafeteria; going for hikes with men from Tokyo University. In May of that year, the student association went on strike against the report of the Central Education Council (Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai) and the University Operations Temporary Measures Law (Daigaku Unei Rinji Sochi Ho) which proposed to increase the control of the government over universities. Murakami Kyōko was impressed by the slogans “Scrap Universities”, “Rebellion is Rational (Zōhan Yuri)”, or “Self Negation (Jiko Hitei)”, so she joined the strike as an active member of the association. She recalled:

The issue of how I thought about myself was grave. But it was fascinating and attractive, because I was always asked what I wanted to do. I also had to think about how to confront this social situation not as part of an organization but as a human being…. I thought that the report of the Central Education Council and the University Control Law had problems, but I was not so sure about them. I was driven by a feeling that I, as a student, had to do something at that moment. I felt that I could not do anything about the death of Yamazaki, a student of Kyoto University, during the demonstration against PM Satō’s visit to the USA when I was a third-year high school student. I thought that I had to share with this student the political issue which he had risked his life to tackle. No, I wanted to share it with him.41

40 Nakajima. Zengakuren, p.81.
41 Murakami Kyōko. "Jikohitei wa Tsurai lyashi no Michi e" in Onnatachi no Genzai o Tou Kai. Zenkyōtō kara Ribu e, p.110.
Murakami’s comment shows that some student activists focused not on specific issues, such as the report of the Central Education Council, but on the more abstract issue: how do they transform their own consciousness. The death of Yamazaki propelled them to step in and transform “everydayness”.

Andō Konpachi was a third-year student of Nihon University in 1968. He enjoyed hanging out and looking for girls in high school. After he entered the university, he spent his days drinking, looking for girls, dressing up to go out, and playing mah-jongg and pachinko. However, he was deeply shocked by the death of Yamazaki.

He had something which he risked his life to confront. I don’t have that, do I? What was equal to the life of a person? I did not know.42

He then looked for and read articles on Zengakuren in newspapers and weekly magazines, and was moved to tears by the pure heart of the students.

I hope to understand the death of Yamazaki. I would like to know what he thought about when his bones cracked under truncheons and he died.43

After that, he took a seminar on Marxist economics and stood as student association in his class of the student association. He joined student movements at Nihon University and tried hard in order to “make himself catch up with Yamazaki as much as possible”.

The memories of activists who committed themselves to activism and eventually died or got injured drove many new leftists to transform

43 Ibid., p.170.
“everydayness”. Kimura Kazutoshi was a 23-year-old student in early 1968. He hesitated to participate in protests at Sasebo in January 1968. Later, he regretted this:

I wanted to go to Sasebo, too. The blood which students shed is ours, and it is young people’s hot blood. I should have shed my blood with them. I was constrained by the travel cost of 10,000 yen, my family, and year-end exams. Social constraints were stricter, but were these all real reasons [why I did not go to Sasebo]? Did the reasons really prevent me from going to Sasebo? Did I run away? I may have run away. I did escape… I have not shed my blood yet.44

Kimura’s comment shows that new left students idealized those who were committed to activism at the risk of getting injured and damaging their academic prospects or family relationship. This idealized image pushed many new leftists to be extremely ethical. The austere ethics of new leftists made it possible for them drastically to criticize controlled society drastically.

The Shadow of the Anpo Protests

The memories of the Anpo protests of 1960 were very influential in shaping these austere ethics during the late 1960s. Saishu Satoru, a research assistant of Tokyo University who was a member of the Research Assistant Struggle45 (Joshu Tōsō), insisted that he felt obliged to overcome the problems of the Anpo protests:

45 At Japanese universities research assistants were supposed to work with professors, but many of them were actually subject to professors and involved in the hierarchical relationship at university. Some research assistants at Tokyo University participated in protests against the relationship and poor research conditions, and engaged in joint actions with other new leftists in the late 1960s.
I would like to emphasize, though I may be very narrow-minded, that I, as a member of the Anpo protest generation (anpo sedai), am the most profoundly haunted by the words of Yoshimoto Takaaki: “Focus on your everyday consciousness (nichijôsei ni tesshiro)”. Looking back on myself, I can see that I had had the arrogant idea that I was participating in protests against the revision of the Anpo Treaty for someone else—"the people (jinmin)"—under the slogan of “self-sacrifice (umekusa suteishi)” without considering my own social position. The phrase “stick to your daily consciousness” refuses to look at things objectively and abstractly. We are inevitably required directly to confront ourselves through internal dialogues in each of our situations, without using the concepts which are irrelevant to our life, such as “the proletariat” and "students working with the proletariat". It was because the idea [of examination of “everyday consciousness”] was produced in the Zenkyôtô movements that the movements had an impact and became influential.46

Yoshimoto was a writer well-known for being critical of the 1950s and early 1960s progressive intellectuals and the JCP. Influenced by Yoshimoto’s works, Saishu, a research assistant working in biology at Tokyo University, came to rethink his commitment to the Anpo protests in 1960. He criticized himself for having fought for people’s liberation without problematizing his privileged position. To him, the Anpo protests thus became a target to be overcome.

Another example of the negative views on the Anpo protests amongst new left movements can be discerned in an article in a student newspaper Bunri Sensen (the Humanities Front), published by new left students in the College of Humanities of Nihon University. This article clearly shows how new leftists understood their protests:

The Anpo protests were literally struggles by all the people, and their scale was symbolized in the protest actions surrounding the Diet day after day. However, the slogans of “Defend Parliamentary Politics” or

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"Oust the Kishi Cabinet" and the outcome of their [the Anpo protests'] final failure showed that we [new left students] had to go beyond the limitations of the Anpo protests, which were influenced by the framework of "Potsdam democracy" [—democracy which was facilitated by the Allies based on the Potsdam Declaration and developed in the postwar period], and develop the class struggle further under this framework.\textsuperscript{47}

The Anpo protests were undoubtedly supported by a wide range of people, but the protesters (it was argued) did not realize the problems of representative democracy. This article shows that many new leftists found it necessary to go beyond representative democracy and actively promote people's participation.

In this way, new leftists obligated themselves to overcome the failure of the Anpo protests in the late 1960s. They sought to emphasize their differences from the Anpo protests. The view of the Anpo protests as a failure was widely shared through the media even by those who did not actually participate in the protests. The student activists learned this view from conversation or discussions with their seniors in club rooms (bushitsu), cafes, student dormitories, and on the streets.

**Old Left as “Fake”**

New leftists often claimed that the problems of the Anpo protests were embodied in old leftists, progressive parties or labour unions. In particular, they criticized the JCP for acting without any concern for "everydayness". New leftists regarded the JCP as a target to be overcome and kept themselves distant from it. On 20 January 1968, many labour unions joined the rally in the Hibiya Concert Hall of Tokyo against the visit of the American nuclear aircraft carrier to Sasebo port. One of the leaders of Sôhyô (the General Council of

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Bunri Sensen} April 1969, p.1.
Trade Unions of Japan) said to the workers, "Return to the workplace with your passion which you have in the rally of today, and direct it to the spring labour struggle." This comment shows the old leftists' mentality which was criticized by new leftists. The leader saw the visit of the aircraft carrier to Sasebo port as a secondary issue. More important for him was shuntō (the spring labour struggle) a few months ahead, which had already been fitted into the schedule of Sōhyō. After the Miike strike, Sōhyō shifted their focus to shuntō, the annual joint action taken by labour unions in various parts of Japan. Shuntō made it possible to improve many Japanese people's working conditions, but it tended to limit its focus only to wage rises. New leftists maintained that union activists were interested only in their wages and did not tackle the antiwar issue seriously. They contrasted the old leftists with their own new left colleagues who were committed to actions for social justice, some of whom finally died or were injured.

A big difference between new and old leftists was how they looked at technology. In the period immediately after the Second World War, "the postwar progressives", particularly the JCP, believed that science would help them to be liberated from the poverty problem. They also claimed that progressive intellectuals would play an important role in facilitating science. This view was shared by a wide range of Japanese people when modernization was seen as their national goal. However, as is shown in the case of Tokyo Education University, in the late 1960s scientific research was criticized by new leftists for helping companies to make further profits and developing dangerous technologies. The activists also questioned the privileged position of intellectuals at university. In the Anpo protests of 1960,

48 Nakajima, Zengakuren, p.35.
many progressive intellectuals, such as Shimizu Ikutaro\footnote{After the Anpo protests of 1960 Shimizu kept distant from progressive movements, and shifted to state-centred nationalism and supported nuclear armament after the 1970s.} or Maruyama Masao, took a leadership role in the protests against the LDP and the Kishi cabinet, but in the late 1960s new leftists no longer paid their respect to the intellectuals in the late 1960s. This is shown in that Maruyama’s office on the campus of Tokyo University was occupied by several new leftists in December 1968, when the activists blockaded the campus. They trusted small numbers of intellectuals who were independent from universities, such as Yoshimoto Takaaki or Hani Gorô, and who gave justification to the activists’ radical action.\footnote{Minsei and the JCP claimed that Japanese young people were victimized by the Emperor System (\textit{tennōsei}) during wartime and by the USA in the postwar period. They believed that scientific research would help Japanese people to be liberated from the oppressive Japanese and American states. In the late 1960s, some activists of Minsei and the JCP were shocked by new leftists’ claim that the Japanese government helped the USA to victimize Vietnamese people. Kawakami Tôru, who was a leader of the JCP-affiliated student associations in the early 1960s and then worked in Minsei, looked back on this: “This might be my personal problem, but people in the JCP did not overall have a viewpoint of self-negation, so they did not see themselves as victimizer. Hence, I was surprised when non-sect radicals [Zenkyôtô] addressed the issue of self-negation later. Then, for the first time, I came to think seriously about how to respond to the issue” (Kawakami Tôru and Ökubo Kazushi. \textit{Sobyō 1960 nenndai}. Tokyo: Dôjidaisha, 2007, p.144). Some young activists of Minsei, who faced the issue of self-negation seriously, worked with their colleagues in the JCP who were concerned about bureaucratism in the party and formed an informal group, and discussed the internal reforms of the party. Although they were finally punished by the party’s leaders in the early 1970s (\textit{shin hiyorimishugi jiken}), this shows that the ideas of new left movements had an impact on some activists in the JCP.}

Kashiwazaki Chieko’s comment helps us to understand how much antipathy new leftists had to the JCP. She was born in 1943 from “a typical bourgeois family”, entered Tokyo University in 1962, got married in 1967, and commenced her Ph.D. program on Russia and Eastern Europe in 1968. She was busy researching, doing some part-time work, and doing housework. However, she was greatly shocked by the death of Yamazaki Hiroaki in 1967. She wrote:

"..."
It was not the state power that killed Yamazaki. It was I that killed a person who tried to build solidarity with Vietnamese people at risk of his life. I thought that I, at 24 years old, was far inferior to the 18 year-old youth.\(^{51}\)

After that, she determined to act seriously without deceiving herself.

On 9 January 1969, she joined lockouts with other new left students on the Hongō campus of Tokyo University. When she was escaping from the riot police officers, some activists of Minsei threw stones and bottles at her and her colleagues from the top of the building in order to help the police to arrest the new left students. She felt that Minsei and the JCP, which cooperated with the riot police while calling themselves the vanguard of revolution, were “fakes” and “deceivers”. She wrote:

> The reason we do not trust the JCP and Minsei is that they “struggle” from the absolutely objective standpoint and separate themselves from their own internal conflicts. They do not understand that the mentality produced in the history of Japanese revolutionary movements—the movements that assume that only they are “good people” while the evil is the state—is arrogant.\(^{52}\)

Likewise, many new left students were disgusted by old leftists who joined political activism without reflecting on “everydayness”. Although the students expressed their feelings through Marxist jargon, it was evident that they kept a distance from traditional leftist movements. Akita Akehiro, a leader of student movements at Nihon University, explained the issue to Fukuda Yoshihiro, a dramatist who was more than 10 years older than Akita, as follows:


\(^{52}\) Ibid., p.268.
Fukuda: ...what is your mirror? In the past, for example, leftists were justified their everyday actions like "oh, I was not wrong today" by reading Lenin's works. Even now, some activists of the töha are like this.

Akita: I do not like to do that. Marx and Lenin do not refer to Nichidai Tōsō [—the Nihon University struggle, which will be discussed later], and I think that they only provide us with principles of the struggle, such as "Don't make compromises with enemies". The principles of organizing are not helpful. The important things are discussion and the synthesis of views (sōkatsu) with everyone. The theoretical framework of our struggles is composed of a synthesis of views.

In the late 1960s, tension between new and old leftists was found in other industrialized countries as well as in Japan. However, Japanese new leftists, especially student activists, felt obligated to commit themselves to overcoming the failure of the Anpo protests of 1960, differentiating themselves from old leftists, and transforming "everydayness". In Japan, the introspective idea of new left movements led to heated conflicts between old and new leftists.

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54 The heated confrontation between old and new leftists was a characteristic of Japanese civil society in this period. In the USA, communism was excluded from the official political arena in the 1950s, so American new leftists did not need to specify their differences from old leftists, but rather they were affected by communists in their views of social injustice. For example, SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) eliminated its anti-Communist exclusion principle for members when it organized the first major national demonstration against the Vietnam War in 1965 (Gitlin. The Whole World is Watching, p.21). In Italy, the PCI (the Communist Party of Italy) was one of the most powerful parties in the 1960s and 1970s. In this political situation, Italian new leftists often took joint actions with PCI activists and labour unionists on housing conditions, the price of transport, and so on. This alliance lasted until the PCI began to support the conservative Christian Democratic Party in 1978, became a part of the national government, and was looked upon as an enemy by the new leftists (della Porta, Donatella. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.27-33).
4. Direct Action as a Symbol of Self-revolution

The Emergence of Zenkyōtō

New left students prioritized spontaneous participation over organizational consensus. In the late 1960s, Zengaku Kyōtō Kaigi (the All-campus Committee for Struggles, hereafter Zenkyōtō) was formed mainly by "non-sect" students who did not belong to any of the tōha. Zenkyōtō criticized the JCP for having a top-down style of decision-making. Zenkyōtō preferred direct democracy to representative democracy in making decisions on the policies of their activism. If someone did not agree on a decision, they did not need to abide by it.

Why was direct democracy so important for Zenkyōtō? Japanese universities were usually composed of some faculties (gakubu) which each contained several departments (gakka). The departments held classes to which students belonged. As discussed earlier, all students automatically became a member of student associations (jichikai) when entering university. In the associations under Zengakuren, students usually debated political issues in their class and selected a representative from their class, and the representative joined the meetings of each department and of the whole campus, so the student associations were run by the principle of representative democracy.

The principle of Zenkyōtō was, in contrast, direct democracy. An activist of Zenkyōtō wrote:

Zengaku Kyōtō Kaigi (Zenkyōtō) is an organization in which the tōha and non-sects [—activists who did not belong to the tōha], students and scholars, and individual-membership groups and mandatory-membership groups gather together without any
hierarchies. The boundary between members and non-members is not obvious at all.... For example, those who participated in the research assistant struggle (joshu kyōtō), needless to say, do not specify any agreements, but when organizing the struggle, the research assistants agreed on the following: first of all, individuals participate in the struggle only by independent decision; second, the struggle does not have a leadership, and makes decisions through everyone’s discussions; third, the struggle will dissolve when spontaneous participants decrease and do not gather together.55

Although Zenkyōtō was critical of the official ideology of the töha which sought to build a vanguard party, some rank-and-file members of the töha shared with Zenkyōtō the principle of spontaneous participation and the aim of transforming “everydayness”56. Many activists of Zenkyōtō were impressed by the direct action of the töha’s activists in the Haneda and Sasebo incidents. The memories of Haneda and Sasebo encouraged many rank-and-file activists of the töha to act according to social justice and spontaneity rather than their groups’ interests.

56 Some new leftists also pointed out this. For example, Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, an antiwar activist and a supporter of Zenkyōtō, wrote in 1969: “Young people who have the style of acting individually for or participating spontaneously in antiwar or anti-establishment actions support the current movements. This is, of course, true in Beheiren, Zenkyōtō on campus, and the Antiwar Youth Committee. Anti-JCP factions, such as Shagakudō (The Federation of Socialist Students), Chūkaku (The National Committee of the Federation of Revolutionary Communists), Hanteigakuhyō (The National Student Council of Anti-Imperialism), and Kakumaru (The Revolutionary Marxist Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League of Japan) are changing, but this style can be found in each activist of the factions. This is why the ebb and flow of each of the töha are floating and their leaders are so disturbed [by the similarities between each of the töha] that they resort to intra- or inter-group violence” (Tsurumi Yoshiyuki. “1970 nen to Beheiren: Tōitsu ni tsuite no Shiteki Oboegaki” in Betonamu ni Heiwa o! Shimin Rengō (ed.). Shiryō ‘Beheiren’ Undō Chūkan. Tokyo: Kawade Shobō shinsha, 1974, p.110 [first published in Oda Makoto (ed.), Beheiren, Sanichi Shobō, 1969]”).
Nichidai Tōsō

In the late 1960s, student movements were the most visible at Nihon University and Tokyo University. Students of the two universities differed in their social position, which resulted in subtle differences in their ideas or slogans. However, they shared the principle of acting spontaneously according to the idea of transforming “everydayness”. Nihon University was a large-scale private university whose students would be usually employed after graduation in companies as low-ranking administrative workers. The students were disturbed by overcrowded classrooms and boring lectures. The administrative board of the university was dominated by Furuta Jūjirō, the board president. He did not permit autonomy to the students, so the university administration kept strict watch on all spontaneous activities. Students were not even allowed to give out leaflets on the campus of the university.

Right wing groups and taiikukai members, that is, students of sports departments who were generally politically conservative, violently attacked students' political actions against the university authorities. For example, the student association planned to invite historian Hani Gorō and sociologist Hidaka Rokurō, well-known progressive intellectuals, to speak at the reception party for new students on 20 April 1967. However, this was obstructed by taiikukai members, and the university administration ordered the student association to withdraw the invitation. On the day, about 200 rightists hit student activists with baseball bats while some professors looked on. After that, the campus was virtually under martial law. The administration ordered students to ban discussions in each class and dissolve the student association. Some student activists were punished by the university authorities.57

students of Nihon University felt so threatened by the rightist activists and *taïkukai* members that they could not help obeying the university authorities.

In April 1968, the media reported corruption by the Nihon University authorities, including 3.4 billion yen illegal payments, which triggered protests by students. They stopped being subordinate and began to express their anger through their political actions. On 11 May, student representatives who were selected by each class held a meeting on the corruption issue, though the university ordered them to cancel it. After that day, hundreds of student activists came to organize rallies or meetings without permission. On 23 May, many of them had the “great 200-meter demonstration” on campus while rightists obstructed it forcibly. This was the first demonstration on the campus of Nihon University. The demonstrators chanted the school song of the university rather than such songs as *International* which were popular among leftists at that time. This episode suggests that many students who had not been involved in political activism before participated in the demonstration. A student who joined in the demonstration stated:

> The fundamental cause of our struggle was that we entered Nihon University in order to study and learn truth as human beings, but the university deals with us not as human beings but as commodities, makes use of us as tools, and sends us off into bourgeois society, though university should be the most humanistic place. We had an overwhelming feeling of isolation and resentment, which triggered the radical struggles.\(^{58}\)

More and more students who were angry with the university thus joined protests against the university authorities.

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Around 20,000 students were mobilized to Nichidai Tōsō (the Nihon University struggle). Students were fearful of violence from rightists and *taiikukai* members, but they tried to overcome the fear and transform their weakness. Seimiya Makoto, a somewhat older activist of Nichidai Tōsō, claimed that the basic idea of young activists in Nichidai Tōsō was "self-revolution (*jiko henkaku*)":

Self-revolution is an underlying idea of this struggle [Nichidai Tōsō], and we are required to face some issues [addressed by the activists]. The idea [of self-revolution] is based on permanent self-negation. It may sound far-fetched to say that what I am today is different from what I was yesterday, but this occurs at least to many students of Nichidai Zenkyōtō. Furthermore, activists of Nihon University shoulder the heavy burden of military issues, like how they will confront rightists, as well as of theoretical issues concerning student movements, and they have to answer these issues every day. But unlike our generation who were gloomy about the "burden", the activists act as if it was something easy.\(^{59}\)

It should be emphasized that many activists found Nichidai Tōsō fun rather than painful. Sakai Akio, a student who was the president of the Struggle Committee of the College of Law, expressed his excitement about the struggle:

Nichidai Zenkyōtō acted without forgetting to smile. If I am asked "what did you gain on 30 September [1968, the day when the public negotiation of student activists with the university authorities was held]?" I will reply "it was fun". In our isolated campus life, we could shout "fuck you" at Furuta whom we saw as the most evil, and forced

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him to say "I am sorry". When we had demonstrations which about 10,000 people joined, it was often said that we "demonstrated with a big smile on our face"\(^60\).

The basic idea of Nichidai Tōsō was characterized as self-liberation. The protest actions made it possible for the student activists to escape from the gloomy days when they were forced to conform to rules imposed by the university authorities. They no longer felt lonely in the struggle, because they could spend time with their colleagues and discuss their lives, or society. Nichidai Tōsō gave the student activists pleasure.

Tōdai Tōsō

Tōdai Tōsō (the Tokyo University struggle) began in the Medical School in January 1968. In this period, the Ministry of Health and Welfare sought to introduce a bill to obligate graduates of medical schools to be registered as intern doctors. This meant that after graduating from university and passing the national examination for medical practitioners, graduates of medical schools would be forced to work in bad conditions as intern doctors for several years and be involved in the hierarchical relationship in the research/tutoring groups (kenkyūshitsu) headed by professors. Many medical students joined a lock-out against the bill to stop reproducing the hierarchical relationships on campus and tightening control over their training. Tōdai Tōsō also originated from antipathy to rising social control.

Since some of the medical students, who had not joined the lock-out, were unfairly punished by the university authorities\(^61\), an increasing number of

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\(^61\) Some of the medical students locked out a senior medical staff's office to protest against the bill to obligate graduates of medical schools to be registered as intern doctors.
medical students, who were angry with the unjust treatment, blockaded the campus again. On 15 June, the authorities required the police to expel the student activists from the campus by force. This led not only medical students but also other students who had not been interested in the issue to become angry with the university authorities and joining the lock-out. Eventually, they occupied the Yasuda Auditorium, the symbol of the university. Some of the student activists stayed in tents in front of the Auditorium, playing guitars and singing together, and debating university and social problems.

The student activists went far beyond the issue of rising control by the university authorities over students to such broader issues as the social role of the university. As with the student activists of Tokyo Education University who pointed out the problems of the academic-industry cooperation, the Tokyo University activists claimed that universities helped private companies to make profits. In particular, they criticized university professors for obstructing their protests to “defend academic freedom”. Adachi Kazuhiro, a research assistant of the College of Arts and Science, urged those who were afraid that further lock-outs would collapse the university to continue the lock-outs. He wrote:

Who are the people who will be in trouble when Tokyo University is scrapped? They are the teachers who are assured of public respect (how inane!) and status with the title of professor or associate professor; they are the shameless netoraiki students [people who do not join the lock-outs and take a rest at home during them] and rightists who find pleasure in getting the graduation certificate of Tokyo University, getting into the fast track, becoming high officials or elite engineers, and acting as agents of the regime; they are members of the JCP and Minsei who are...

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on 19 February 1968. In March the university authorities made a decision of punishing 17 students for the lock-out (it was revealed soon that one of the 17 students were not in Tokyo and did not join the lock-outs). This decision made many student activists at Tokyo University angry with the undemocratic decision making by the university authorities, and their protests were radicalized.
afraid that their colleagues will be purged in councils academic in the Departments, act only for the political hegemony on campus, and do not care about Tōdai Tōsō.62

The student activists involved in the struggle found it crucial to reflect on their privileged position. Students at Tokyo University were expected to become high-ranking officials or elite engineers after they graduated from the university. The student activists were very critical of the university system which produced the hierarchical relationship in the research/tutoring groups, but it was they who would take advantage of the system in the future. The activists who faced this fact argued that they had to transform their own elitism. Adachi Kazuhiro continued:

However, I was shocked after criticizing these people. The critique was immediately turned to me. Was it I who should be criticized? Was it I that should be negated and smashed? Was it I that was unconsciously complicit in vicious authoritarianism and elitism without careful consideration, without criticizing the negative roles of Tokyo University, or questioning my own egoism?... I could not help saying yes. I negated myself with anger and antipathy. I think that I became able to join the struggle in the true sense of the term once I negated myself.63

The slogan “self-negation” became popular among student activists at Tokyo University. Yamamoto Yoshitaka was a Ph.D. student who researched elementary particle theories. This promising physicist was passionate about Tōdai Tōsō and became the convener of Tōdai Zenkyōtō. He stated:

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63 Ibid., p.116.
We have to be committed to examining our own existence in everyday life according to the critical principle, and we must return to awareness from the viewpoint of universalism. Based on the awareness, we then have to negate ourselves who parasitize society and stand against the working class, and bring about social change from this viewpoint. I can speak only abstractly, but this is some sort of a conclusion.64

“Self-Negation” was a symbolic word for new left movements. Student activists of Tokyo University were obligated by this word to reflect on their own elitism. Although the approach might be different, student activists of both Tokyo and Nihon Universities focused on self-revolution in “everydayness”.

Gewalt for Self-revolution

New left students found it difficult to transform their daily consciousness and behaviour, because they could not identify a target to be changed. In an interview in Beheiren Nyûsu, Matsugi Nobuhiko, a writer, introduced an interesting story about new leftists:

I heard an instructive story from a student of Zenkyôtô. Student activists want to fight against the enemy with their whole body, but they say that there is no enemy. Their enemy is ultimately not people but the system, so only destroying the wall in a bank is not really productive. The student activists were very disturbed by the lack of a visible enemy against which they could have a direct confrontation. I was convinced by his story.65

New left students did not usually feel they were facing the enemy or the authorities when they sought to transform “everydayness”, so they seldom gained a sense of accomplishment or fulfilment through their actions. Matsugi

implied that new leftists desired to confront the enemy in order to gain the visible results of changing “everydayness”.

Many new leftists felt uneasy about the lack of a benchmark to show how far they achieved self-revolution in “everydayness”. This made it difficult for the activists to feel a sense of accomplishment or fulfilment. In order to get such a sense, they took direct action called “gewalt (gebaruto)” or “counter-violence (taikō bōryoku)”. They were very creative in developing various repertoires of direct action: the zigzag or snake-dancing demonstration; occupation of a symbolic space such as Haneda Airport; confrontations with the riot police by demonstrators wearing colour-coded helmets and carrying wooden fighting staves with the riot police; distribution of flowers to passers-by on the streets.66

New leftists sought to distinguish “violence for emancipation” from “violence for oppression”. Nomura Osamu, a philosopher who worked vigorously on the theorization of “violence for emancipation”, wrote:

As compared to overwhelming violence from rulers, students' violence in demonstrations is obviously trivial. Demonstrations must be protected, but if violence or non-violence is judged only by the quantitative scale, it seems strange. I also regard students' demonstrations or lockouts on campus as non-violent, not because their violence is small but because they are aimed to eliminate violence. In short, their actions are non-violent. It is undeniable that the students' violence includes the moments of [real] violence, but the moments are much tinier than those of the authorities' violence. This is the moments of counter-violence against the authorities.67

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According to Nomura, the aim of direct action called “gewalt” or “counter-violence” was to bring violence, which was monopolized by the state, back to the people and to abolish the violence of the state. New leftists saw gewalt as violence for social justice. They gave legitimacy to people's direct action or counter-violence against the state or the university authorities.

It should be emphasized that direct action was aimed to produce symbolic effects. At a roundtable of student activists on direct action, Egusa Fukuji, a student of Tōdai Zenkyōtō who specialized in science, stated:

I think that the issue of violence is concerned with criticism of the ideas of modern bourgeois society. Ideologically, when we have gebabō [—a wooden stick which new leftists carried in their confrontation with the police] and a helmet, it is nothing else but symbolic action. Because various indirect rules are certainly built into current society, identifying the power is almost impossible. The power dogs us somehow, and does not reveal itself when we try to find it. Violence is actually a symbol to reveal that the indirect rules are themselves a violent system.68

New left students came to be “armed” with a helmet and gebabō after the Haneda incident, but they were obviously all too powerless against heavily armed riot police. A student activist of the Communist League, one of the tōha, stated:

A helmet and a wooden stave? They will not be helpful in promoting violent revolution even if they are escalated. The childish things are not arms at all. Eventually, they are only the expansion of demonstrations.69

The activists thought that direct action was different from armed struggles, because the purpose of their action was only to produce symbolic effects rather than to harm someone.

Why did some new leftists feel a need to clash with the riot police, rightists, or Minsei? The activists were disturbed by the lack of a visible enemy, but the clash gave them a sense of fulfilment or accomplishment at transforming their “everydayness”. Their wooden staves were seen not as arms but rather as the symbol of confrontation with controlled society.

Kashiwazaki Chieko, a student activist mentioned earlier, wrote:

Why do we do gewalt? We are weak. We, human beings, have unavoidable weakness. Morally corrupted teachers, Minsei, and rightists, as negative examples, illustrate to us that to be a student of Tokyo University, which has cozy relations with the power structure, is to become an oppressor or criminal against ordinary people, but we are attracted by dull and comfortable lives. We feel that we may go toward the easy direction, so we resort to gewalt to accuse and negate ourselves.... Gewalt aims to purify our ideas to the last drop. In order to place ourselves on the edge of the cliff, to drive ourselves into the place of no way out, to make our words “genuine”, and never to escape from the struggle, we use gebabō against “our ugly selves” which are revealed in Minsei, rightists, and the riot police. We take on a large burden by using gebabō against the objectified enemy. “Are we really ethical enough to beat them? Are they and we just two of a kind?” Only when we continue to address these questions drastically will our “gewalt” be purified and our ideas will be deepened. We cannot resort to “gewalt” without the process of firmly believing that our ideas are absolutely superior to theirs. It is through such a strict self-examination before we use gebabō that we will become genuinely trained and enhanced.70

70 Kashiwazaki. Gebaruto Rōza Tōsō no Shuki, pp.201-03.
Kashiwazaki’s comment shows how new leftists looked at direct action. Gewalt was seen as a benchmark of how much they were seriously committed to transforming “everydayness”. Direct action enabled new leftists to feel as if they were liberated from controlled society and to get a sense of fulfilment or accomplishment. They clashed with the authorities with their helmets and gebabō, and felt scared and sometimes got injured, but this gave them a sense of living. A student of Nihon University stated:

I have never felt that I am alive, because I do not know why I live, so I do not care when I will die. I have no prospects in the future and no meaning in my life. When facing death with a helmet and a wooden stave, I feel alive somehow. I can be aware of being alive.⁷¹

In order to get a sense of accomplishment and living, more and more new left students identified the riot police, rightists, and Minsei as the enemy, and clashed violently with them. Kashiwazaki suggested that the enemy was an ugly side of the activists themselves, so they tried to differentiate themselves from the enemy, which symbolized the failure of the Anpo protests in 1960. In this sense, new leftists took inward-looking symbolic actions to get a sense of fulfilling their self-revolution in “everydayness” rather than to produce political or military effects. Direct action was thus increasingly radical, and the number of people who were arrested increased. For example, 345 activists were arrested in the second Haneda incident in early November 1967. The figure surpassed that of the entire Anpo protests in 1960. In 1968 alone, more than 6,000 students were arrested during protest actions.⁷²

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Summary

The economic boom of the 1960s transformed Japanese people's lives. Many of them increased their cash income and became able to enjoy consumer goods. Because "the postwar progressives" did not tackle the issue of young people's concerns about academic competition and identity crises, they were unable to mobilize a wider range of young people than before. However, some members of the töha broke through the deadlock of leftist movements in the Haneda and Sasebo incidents of late 1967 and early 1968 through their confrontational actions. After that, the activists tried to transform their depoliticized and conservative consciousness in affluent life, which they called "everydayness". Zenkyōtō helped a large number of students on campus to participate in protests against the Vietnam War and against rising social control by university authorities.

It should be emphasized that the memories of the Anpo protests of 1960 greatly influenced the character of the ideas of new left movements. Many new leftists, the töha and Zenkyōtō, claimed that the Anpo protests had failed because old leftists, especially the JCP, focused only on policy or regime change. The new leftists felt increasingly need to transform "everydayness" in order to differentiate themselves from old leftists. The introspective idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" was thus produced in new left movements.

Many new left students were worried by the lack of a sense of fulfilment or accomplishment in transforming "everydayness". They felt as if they were fighting against invisible enemies. Direct action known as gewalt or counter-violence provided them with a benchmark to gauge how much they were committed to transforming "everydayness". An increasing number of new leftists wearing helmets and gebabō clashed heavily with their "enemies", such
as the riot police, rightists, and Minsei, to distance themselves from the enemies. It was from this process that the characteristic of ideas and actions of Japanese new left movements were formed in the late 1960s.
Ch.3 Challenges to the Japanese New Left Movements from the 1960s into the 1970s: What Difficulties did the Idea of Self-revolution in “Everydayness” Face?

Japanese new left movements mobilized large numbers of ordinary people to protest against rising social control in the late 1960s. Comparative research using event analysis of NSMs in Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and France conducted by political scientist Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues pointed out that NSMs, like peace movements, anti-nuclear energy movements, ecology movements, solidarity movements, and squatters’ movements, reached a peak of mobilization in the early 1980s. In contrast, Japanese new movements were in a long slump in the 1980s. The outcome of an event analysis based on the Asahi Shinbun clearly showed that the number of protest events (rallies, demonstrations, strikes, or the like) organized by Japanese new movements, such as environmental groups, women’s groups, consumer groups, welfare organizations, and human rights groups, increased rapidly in the late 1960s, began to decrease in the early 1970s, and showed a clear downward trend from around 1975. It is estimated that this resulted mainly from the rise and fall of new left movements, such as the anti-Vietnam War movement or the student movement. The “decline” of the movements ought to be judged not only by the decrease in the number of protest events but also by people’s changing values. From this point of view, some scholars

stress that the ideas of the new left movements remained influential in Japanese civil society after the 1970s.³

These discussions about the continuing influence of the movements may be convincing to some extent, but it is worth noting that many former new leftists feel that their experiences were not inherited by the following generation. Yoshikawa Yūichi, a former secretary of Beheiren, the people’s network against the Vietnam War, referred to this when anti-Iraq War movements were growing in 2003:

The Dankai generation [—baby boomers who were born immediately after the end of the Second World War] joined [anti-Vietnam war movements], but this generation has now disappeared from social movements. Only very young and very old people are active. Where have the generations between the two gone? ...the disconnection is a factor which has prevented the experiences of the previous movements from being successfully inherited.⁴

Makino Gō, a former activist who participated in Zenkyōtō in the Chūkyō area, also referred to an ironic outcome of the Zenkyōtō movements, in which those who were the most committed to the movements tended to give up their commitment after the movements declined.⁵

These analyses might not rest on surveys based on factual evidence, but they point out a controversial issue for Japanese new left movements: why did the movements decline rapidly and why were their experiences not passed on? This chapter examines problems within new left movements and challenges from without to show what prevented new leftists from spreading their ideas to a wide range of people. This helps us to understand why the

movements moved into a phase of decline. I conclude that Japanese new left movements rapidly declined due to mass arrests around 1970, and the difficulties produced by the negative effects of self-revolution in “everydayness” made this decline more serious than is merely indicated by the decreasing number of protest events.\(^6\)

Many activists and scholars have pointed out that the decline resulted from violent protests, such as terrorism, guerrilla fighting, intra- or inter-group conflicts known as *uchigeba*. In particular, most new leftists were so shocked by repeated *uchigeba* that they decided to leave the movements. Chapter 2 argued that new left movements succeeded in mobilizing many young people in the late 1960s by taking creative direct action. However, the direct action, called gewalt (*gebaruto*) or counter-violence (*taikō bōryoku*), turned to violent protests in the 1970s, which propelled most of the activists to leave the movements. Based on discussions in Chapter 2, this chapter seeks to explore how new left movements declined and what difficulties the activists faced in this period.

I also focus on examining police strategies to control new left movements. The recent trend in social movement studies views policing as a key factor of social movements’ opportunities and constraints.\(^7\) This analytical method claims that (un)successful mobilization of social movements ought to be discussed from the viewpoint of struggles between social movements and the police (or the state). After containing new leftists on the streets and on campus through mass arrests and preventive detentions around 1970, the

\(^6\) Goodwin and Jasper argued that social movement researchers have not been interested in discussing how a movement is demobilized while they have focused on examining how a movement is mobilized (Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper (eds.). *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concept*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003, p.315).

\(^7\) See della Porta and Reiter (eds.). *Policing Protest*. This book provides us with instructive perspectives on how the police in Britain, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland controled new left and other movements in the 1960s and 1970s.
Japanese police changed their security policy. The police often arrested key activists before large-scale protests and detained them in cells (ryūchishō) of police offices. One of the most unfamous preventive detentions of this period occurred when 131 student activists holding wooden placards were arrested in front of Hōsei University in Tokyo on 15 January 1968. They were on the way to joining protests against the USA’s nuclear aircraft-carrier Enterprise’s visit to Sasebo port, but they were charged with the crime of carrying “offensive weapons” (their placards) in public places. Many lawyers criticized this preventive detention for being legally questionable. The police aimed to control new leftists more effectively both by urging local communities to cooperate in policing activities and by training police officers as servants who met people’s demands. I show that some senior police officers discussed these new strategies to control new left movements. Some studies on the Japanese police stressed close ties between the police and communities over public security. This means that the Japanese police realized the success of security policing could not be realize without the basis of powerful community policing. The focus on hegemonic struggles between the police and the movements makes it possible for us to understand how these ties were formed.

1. Vigilante Groups against Direct Action

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9 This chapter focuses on examining how senior police officers transformed their strategies to control new left movements. I do not discuss how rank-and-file police officers responded to the transformation of the strategies.
After Barricades were Dissolved

During rapid economic growth in the 1960s, many Japanese people were involved in affluent lives and closed their eyes to the fact that many Vietnamese were killed by the American military and that Japan gave strong support to the USA. New leftists, however, sought to transform their conservative and depoliticized consciousness called “everydayness”. The idea of “everydayness” made it possible for a wide range of new leftists to perceive the invisible power controlling their daily life and open up a new arena for struggles in affluent lives.

However, many new leftists soon found it difficult to resist the power hidden behind everyday life. They were confused by the lack of objective criteria for determining how far they had transformed “everydayness”. The activists were concerned that their practice of self-revolution might be complacent. In the late 1960s, new leftists viewed spaces behind barricades on campus as the place where new leftists practiced self-revolution in “everydayness”, but many of the blockades on campus were dissolved in September-November in 1969.

Some students of Nihon University were anxious about the future of their activism, as shown in this conversation in the space behind the barricades:

—If you lose the barricades, what will you do?
—I will be in trouble, because I will lose my living place, clothing, food, and housing. I can eat without money here.
—I sometimes think what I should do if the barricades are broken down. I have few places to go. In fact, I have no place to go.
—There is no place to go either materially or mentally. After the barricades are destroyed, we have to build new ones. We must be constructive and go in this direction.
—In short, after the destruction of the barricades, we have to maintain the current solidarity based on the student association building. Red is good, the colour of the building had better be red.

—Many student activists will leave Nihon University after this struggle. It is said that after this struggle, the barricades will be replaced by the militant student association; we will have to stand counterattacks from rightists; we must be transformed into being constructive; we will fight back against the rightists, but I cannot put up with being patient so long.\textsuperscript{11}

The students did not give clear expression to their anxieties, but their conversation implies that they faced difficulties in transforming "everydayness" outside the spaces of the barricades.

\textbf{Escalation of Counter-violence}

New left movements did not have clear criteria on how far they had achieved self-revolution in "everydayness". The criterion would have been more obvious if they aimed to change policies. As discussed in Chapter 2, "gewalt" or "counter-violence" was seen as a criterion of appreciating how far new leftists had transformed "everydayness". New leftists felt pain in their clashes with the riot police. This pain made it possible for the activists to recognize that they sought to transform their consciousness and behaviour. The activists were propelled by the lack of visible criteria to take further direct action.

As gewalt escalated, the police authorities boosted the number of police officers in order to control protesters. In the fiscal year of 1969, 5,000 new police officers were recruited; 2,500 of these officers were assigned to the riot

\textsuperscript{11} Nichidai Zenkyötō (ed.). \textit{Barikedo ni kaketa Seishun: Dokyumento Nichidai Tōsō}. Tokyo: Hokumei Shobō, 1969, pp.78-79. This conversation between several student activists at Nihon University was reported by one of the editors of the book.
police, and 1,000 were assigned as security police officers. The police focused particularly on controlling radical student activists. In August 1969, the Diet enacted the University Operations Temporary Measures Law (Daigaku Unei Rinji Sochi Hô); this law gave the police the power to intervene in campus disputes. On 21 October 1969, when large numbers of people were predicted to participate in the International Antiwar Day demonstration, 25,000 police officers of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (hereafter TMPD) and 75,000 officers in various parts of Japan were mobilized to control demonstrators.

For example, student activists at Tokyo University who occupied a number of buildings on campus including the Yasuda Auditorium were arrested by the police. On 18 and 19 January 1969, 8,500 riot police sealed off the Hongo campus, tore down barricades, and cleared the occupied buildings. 819 students were finally arrested in the two days of conflict. More than 600 activists were prosecuted, and their trial had lasted for several years. 15 occupants in the Yasuda Auditorium were given a 2-year prison sentence.

The number of activists who were arrested increased in this period: 1,400 in demonstrations on the International Antiwar Day in October 1968; 1,940 in confrontation with the police near Haneda airport on 16 November 1968; 697 in strikes against the Anpo Treaty on 23 June 1969; more than 1,700 in actions against the reversion of Okinawa to Japan on 19 November 1971. Just in 1969, 14,728 were arrested (85% of them were student

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13 "'Hijô Taisei' ka no 10 gatsu 21 nichu Hansen Dei" in *Asahi Jânaru* 2 November 1969, p.5.
activists). In some cases the government allowed the police to control protests beyond the law based on the Antisubversive Activities Law (Hakai Katsudō Bōshihō), enacted in 1952 to keep public order. Even in more routine cases, activists were forced to observe rules by which the police were able to regulate protest actions in public spaces: for example, by limiting the number of people in a column to 6 people during street demonstrations. These rules made it possible for the police to accuse demonstrators of violating the rules and arrest them. Since many new leftists worried about this mass arrest and prosecution, the movements were rapidly demobilized around 1970.

New leftists were increasingly driven by the tightened security into an unfavourable position. In this situation, a small number of them began guerrilla action with petrol bombs; some radical groups whose members came from new leftists sought to achieve military success. In the late 1960s, when new left movements were supported by a wide range of people, military success was not compatible with the principle of the movements, but as gewalt was seen as the visible criteria of how far new leftists achieved self-revolution in “everydayness”, some of them became militarized to get a sense of accomplishment or fulfilment.

The pursuit of direct action for military success changed new left groups. In order to maximize the effects of military actions, the activists gave legitimacy to division of labour by gender role in the groups: while men, as the more physically dominant, fought on the front, women, as the less physically dominant, cooked on the home front. This division of labour was strengthened especially in situations such as when new leftists clashed with police officers.

Tokuyama Haruko questioned this division of labour reproduced in new left movements. She entered Waseda University in 1964. When she came

back from her family home in January 1966, some students began to conduct sit-in strikes on campus for the autonomy of the student association building. In the debate sessions of each class, which were hosted by the student association, she was so impressed by lively discussions between all her classmates about the strikes that she became more involved in the lock-outs in the space behind barricades. The university authorities required the police to remove the student activists from the campus of the university. When the protesters clashed with the 3,000 riot police on campus, she was frustrated with the division of labour by gender role:

Women students were covertly assigned to "rescue missions" and were seen as "porters" in demonstrations. We were so irritated by this. Although I was physically less strong than men, I wanted to join demonstrations instead of carrying luggage and to make a speech at rallies instead of cooking rice balls for demonstrators. I did what I wanted to do, but this was tiring to me, because the division of labour by gender role was taken for granted [by other activists] at that time.18

Some women activists felt that "the division of labour by gender role" was dominant even in the space behind the barricades. They were dissatisfied with the division of labour reproduced in new left movements, though the movements aimed to create an alternative space based on social justice. Many of the women activists finally left new left movements.

The Loss of Popular Support

The militarization of new left groups had another negative effect to the movements: the isolation of radical activists. The strategy of guerrilla fighting

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was so risky that most activists were reluctant to join. In the International
Antiwar Day demonstration in 1969, some activists conducted guerrilla fighting
on the streets with firebombs, while 25,000 police officers were positioned in
various parts of Tokyo. A journalist reported a young demonstrator as asking:

"I am a worker of the Antiwar Youth Committee [—the network of
young workers' groups for stopping the Vietnam War and which
criticized Sôhyô and other labour unions for not tackling the anti-
Vietnam War issue seriously. Discussed in detail in Chapter 5]. Where
is the main demonstration of today? Since someone told me that it was
in Takadanobaba, I went there in the afternoon, but it had already gone.
It is said that it is now in Shinjuku, so I come here..." The young
person dressed in the style fashionable with demonstrators, cotton
gloves and a jumper, was worried, and was soon lost in the crowd.
Today, a large number of non-sect workers [—workers who did not
belong to the tôha], who went on the streets to express their "antiwar"
feelings, did not know where to go between the powerful security
police and the tôha groups, which were engaged in guerrilla fighting.19

He distinguished between the tôha and "non-sect" or Zenkyôtô, but it is
reasonable to think that a large number of Zenkyôtô activists, who supported
direct action, were also a part of guerrilla fighting on the day, though the tôha
groups certainly played the main role in organizing it.

The militarization of new left groups gradually changed the view of
bystanders outside new left movements who had given implicit support to the
movements or looked at them from a neutral standpoint. The bystanders
became afraid of gewalt which took place so erratically that they could not
predict when and where it would occur. Some residents suffered physical injury
or damage to their property from armed conflicts between protesters and police
officers. For example, on 17 June 1971, radical new leftists clashed heavily

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19 "Hijô Taisei' ka no 10 gatsu 21 nichii Hansen Dei", p.5.
with the riot police in a demonstration in Meiji Park against the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.\textsuperscript{20} Some residents who lived near the Park were wounded in the clashes. Mononobe Nagaoki, an antiwar activist who watched the demonstration, gave his report on the suffering of residents:

Meiji Park is in front of the Olympic street. Residents live quietly with their small-scale workplaces on the opposite side of the Park. They suffered damage from the fierce fighting between demonstrators and the riot police. It was a carpenter’s shop that was the most heavily damaged. He is an old-fashioned carpenter who makes joinery with chisels and hammers on the dirt floor of his house. New timber and goods in the making were used to set up barricades. Another person works as an electronic constructor at his shop. He had a batch of pipes for the wiring taken out and stolen. Not only that, one resident after another complained; stones were thrown at their houses; they could not sleep from fear.\textsuperscript{21}

In the late 1960s, many new leftists claimed that their direct action was legitimate, because gewalt was aimed to correct injustices caused by the state or the university authorities. However, residents or police officers sometimes suffered physical damage from the legitimatized violence. What did new leftists think about this? In April 1969, when the problems of gewalt had not yet been highlighted, student activists of Kyoto University discussed counter-violence at a roundtable. Ōta Shizuo, a Zenkyōtō student in the Faculty of Letters, had already addressed a question:

\textsuperscript{20} Okinawa was occupied by the USA after the Second World War, but it reverted to Japan in 1972. The reversion of Okinawa was a part of both states’ security strategies to strengthen the Anpo Treaty. In fact, the number of American military bases did not decrease after the reversion. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Japanese and American government discussed the reversion, some new leftists acted to eliminate the bases from Okinawa.

For example, many people say that student activists' violence is inevitably defensive, and neither murderous nor offensive. Fortunately or unfortunately, no one has been killed in the struggles, but this shows that our ethics is not enough...the riot police may be, as a phenomenon, a representation of the authorities and may support it at the grassroots level, though I think that they are just the lowest-ranked officers. If we look at them individually, the police suffer a sense of alienation. Those who work as the police, naturally, suffered the class contradiction more heavily than us. We have to build up advanced theories or actions gradually in order to liberate them from the contradiction.²²

He could not illustrate it clearly, but he implied that the idea of counter-violence gave radical new leftists an implicit consensus that any form of gewalt was permissible. But was counter-violence still legitimate if people outside the movements, including the police, suffered damage, were injured, or killed by it? At the roundtable, the reply of another student was that "I am indifferent to ethical issues [concerning the outcomes of gewalt]," and other students nodded sympathetically with him. This shows that many new leftists did not think seriously about the negative outcomes of counter-violence in the 1960s.

Around 1970, new left movements were losing popularity, but most new leftists did not care about popular support very much. This attitude derived from the principle of new left movements. The principle is shown in a student activist's comment in the middle of the blockade of the Yasuda Auditorium of Tokyo University in 1968:

The blockade of the main campus represents our principle: we challenge our existence itself, and build and develop the struggle.

Immediately before the blockade, it was said that we had no choice but to be isolated if we did this. Can we not get anything unless we transform ourselves together with ordinary people in our actions? We thought that we could build a beautiful popular movement by sticking to the principle of our actions.23

The activists felt it was secondary to gain popular support from the public; more significant for them was living faithfully by their principle. Their actions had been supported by some bystanders outside the movements after the Sasebo incident. However, they did not think seriously about what would happen if they stuck to their principle.

The Emergence of Vigilante Groups

Radical new leftists were also shocked by reactions of local residents in cities. Some residents who were concerned about damage from new leftists' radical actions organized vigilante groups to protect themselves from the actions. For example, vigilante groups in Tokyo began to announce that they would expel “violent students” from their cities after the end of 1968.24 Before the International Antiwar Day on 21 October 1969, about 40 private self-protection groups were formed in some districts of Tokyo, such as Shinjuku, Kanda, Yotsuya, and Shibuya.25

Many young people of Beheiren sang folk songs and had debate sessions in the square at the western gate of Shinjuku Station. In July 1969, the local government of Shinjuku changed the “square” into a “walkway”, and all rallies were banned. Shopkeepers of the shopping street helped the police to watch young people who gathered together in the place. A director of the

23 “Ware Ware wa Naze, Yasuda Kôdô o Senkyo Suruka” in Asahi Jânaru 4 August 1968, p.5.
chamber of commerce on the shopping street near the station explained why they formed a vigilante group known as the Shinjuku Station Vicinity Environment Task Force:

After *füten* [—jobless young people with long hair, bells, and strange sunglasses who gathered together near Shinjuku station] came, violent students came. In particular, people of Beheiren had rallies in the square at the western gate [of Shinjuku Station] every Saturday. They grew larger. Young people then planned to make Shinjuku a Mecca for student demonstrators. Although the riot police sought to control demonstrators, that way was too simple and unwise. If they clashed, it was only pedestrians that suffered, and signboards of shops were broken down, and customers were quite scared. In particular, department stores closed at 5 or 6 pm to avoid their danger. Other small shops which were intimidated followed the department stores, and we could seldom do business. If women and children got injured, it would be serious, so sales ladies returned home earlier. We could not do business. If a store window and a signboard are broken down, they can be repaired. It is not so serious, but it is a greater damage that we cannot do business. Hence, local people who did not want to trust the security issue only to the riot police and police officers proposed to organize their own security group. They organized a task force which consisted of seven chambers of commerce around Shinjuku Station rather than only one neighbourhood association. In discussions on its name we thought the “Student Demonstration Task Force” or the “Futen Task Force” might be problematic, so we made the name a little obscure and formed the “Shinjuku Station Vicinity Environment Task Force”.

In November 1969, the *Asahi Shinbun* reported on a vigilante group around Kamata station, the station near Haneda Airport. The group tried to hunt down demonstrators around Haneda Airport who protested against PM

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Satō's visit to the USA. PM Satō was to discuss the reversion of Okinawa to Japan with American president:

In a restaurant street near Kamata station, owners of fish shops stood wearing headbands, and rubber boots, and carrying wooden swords. At 4:15 pm, five activists wearing helmets escaping from the riot police threw five or six petrol bombs. A young vigilante clashed with an activist wearing a white helmet. “You bastard!” A wooden sword hit the man wearing a white helmet, just as the vigilante was struck by an iron pipe. Both shed blood. The other three vigilantes quickly ran to help, and the man wearing a white helmet still held his head.27

The emergence of vigilante groups shows that new leftists were losing their implicit support from local people. In the Sasebo incident of January 1968, students’ radical actions were supported by some local residents related to as “the crowd” by the media. The crowds emerged again in the demonstration against the field hospital for the US military in Ōji, Tokyo, in March 1968. Because an increasing number of American military personnel were wounded in Vietnam, there was a plan to build a hospital in Ōji. Many local residents protested against this, and new leftists, particularly many of the töha activists, worked together with the residents. On 8 March, many student activists, who had helmets and gebabō, clashed with armed police officers. Whilst the Asahi Shinbun criticized their clashes of destroying local people’s property, it also reported that thousands of members of “the crowd”, who opposed the field hospital, chanted “Police, go home!” and shouted “Don’t cooperate in the Vietnam War”28.

27 Asahi Shinbun 17 November 1969.
28 Asahi Shinbun 9 March 1968.
“The crowd” gave support to new leftists’ radical actions on the International Antiwar Day of 21 October 1968. A large number of demonstrators blockaded public facilities in all parts of Tokyo including Shinjuku station, and many of them were arrested for rioting. On the following day, the Asahi Shinbun ran several comments by citizens who were angry with the destruction of trains and stations. A 23-year-old woman said, “Do they [radical new leftists] really believe that they can gain support from people by protesting against the Vietnam War in such a destructive way?”

By the end of 1968, “the crowd” was being replaced by local residents who were concerned about damage from direct action. In the actions against the PM’s visit to the USA in November 1969, the residents formed vigilante groups to protect themselves from some student activists’ direct action. On 17 November, one day after 77 citizens of Kamata were injured by the activists’ firebombs, the Asahi Shinbun wrote, “Many people want to complain about and protest against PM Satō’s visit to the USA, but extremist groups, which adopted indiscriminate guerrilla strategies, were excluded by residents from the main battle field on the day.”

The Sasebo incident slightly changed the media’s view on direct action. The media might be still critical of new leftists’ direct action, but they also questioned the government’s policies or the police violence by publishing several articles on the emergence of crowds who gave support to new leftists. When “the crowd” thinned and instead vigilante groups emerged, the media began to criticise new leftists of radical action without any reservations.

Many radical new leftists were so shocked by the emergence of vigilante groups that they had to rethink their optimistic belief that ordinary

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29 Asahi Shinbun 22 October 1968.
30 Asahi Shinbun 17 November 1969.
people were their supporters. In the Haneda incident, hundreds of new leftists took direct action called counter-violence or gewalt in late 1967. The action gained support from some local residents of Sasebo in January 1968, not only because the visit of the American nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise reminded the residents of their bitter memories of the Second World War, but also because the residents were impressed by students’ commitment to actions for social justice. The support spread to a wide range of Japanese people who were also dissatisfied with rising social control.

Akita Akehiro, a leader of Nichidai Tōsō, discussed ties between student activists and workers at a roundtable in early 1969:

Even now, the ties [between student activists and workers] were naturally produced to some extent. One day, a worker sat outside the space behind the barricades [on the campus of Nihon University]. It may be a rude way of saying it, but he looked like a vagabond. When I asked him who he was, he said that he was from “Sanya [—a well-known living place for day workers in the Taitō and Arakawa district in Tokyo]”. When I asked the additional question why he came here, he said “it is too late to return home today, so I will stay here all night”. I was very happy to hear it. In Kanda [—the city where the campus of the university was located], some citizens casually donated about 300 yen, and shopkeepers around the campus provided Zenkyōtō students with free food.31

Because the worker from Sanya was sympathetic to Nichidai Tōsō, he decided to stay up all night in the blockaded university. Akita claimed that this episode shows unofficial ties between students and workers in this period. It may be overstating the case to suggest that new leftists’ radical actions gained nation-

wide support, but it is clear that the support spread widely to many workers living in various regions of Japan.

However, the emergence of vigilante groups shows that the ties between counter-violence and popular support were being eroded. In the Sasebo incident and thereafter, many new leftists believed optimistically that their radical actions would be supported by a wide range of Japanese people. In facing the emergence of vigilante groups in local areas of cities, however, they were aware that the ties were fragile.

2. Policing Protest Based on Communities

70 nendai no Keisatsu (the Police in the 1970s)

In this section, I move to the issue of how the police sought to control new left movements. Before the movements became popular in the late 1960s, the police force rationalized its organization by establishing division of labour and assigning police officers to each specialized department, such as criminal affairs, traffic, or security. Furthermore, the chief of the security bureau in the National Police Agency (hereafter, the NPA) ordered that köban\(^{32}\) (police boxes) should be amalgamated under the slogan of modernization or rationalization. These organizational reforms aimed to deal with crime over a wider area which resulted from expansion of urban traffic networks.\(^{33}\)

In the late 1960s, a greater number of the riot police were mobilized to strictly control new left movements. In 1969, the government increased the

\(^{32}\) Köban (police station) is the small neighbourhood police station in Japan and the smallest organizational unit in the Japanese police system. In small towns or villages, köban are linked to chūzaisha, a police residence attached to the office. Police officers live in chūzaisha with their family. Köban are thus located in local areas for community policing.

number of the riot police across the country; it was 5,700 in 1967, but almost doubled to 9,700 in 1969. The idea of “self-government at universities (daigaku no jichi)” had prevented the police from intervening in students’ protests, but the police became active in dissolving blockades on campus in this period. A large number of activists were charged with the crimes of taking offensive weapons to rallies (kyōki jūnbi shugōzai) or interfering with the police’s duties in demonstrations (kōmu shikkō bōgai), and were arrested on streets and on campus.

However, it soon became clear that this strategy was not necessarily effective. In particular, on the International Antiwar Day in October 1968, Shinjuku Station was thrown into chaos: student activists clashed with the riot police and a fire broke out, and the Self-Defence Forces were finally deployed in order to maintain public order. In addition, extremely strict policing created a bad impression of the police amongst people outside the movements. Police injured several news reporters when they clashed with student activists in the Sasebo incident of January 1968. For this reason, the media was sceptical of and sometimes hostile to the police. The media helped the public to be wary of the police. The police finally controlled new leftists by force, but they did not gain support from a broad range of people.

Around 1970, the police reviewed the way of controlling new left movements. For this purpose, the General Task Force of the Police Administration (Keisatsu Unei ni Kansuru Sōgō Taisaku linkai), a committee on police administration, was formed by the NPA and the Cabinet in 1970. The Task Force debated transformation of policing strategies. In June of 1971, it altered its name to the General Task Force of the NPA (Keisatsuchō Sōgō

34 "Wakai Chikara ga Enjita Shinjuku Hapuningu: 70 Nen ga Tsukitsuketa Yokkyū Fuman” in Asahi Jānaru, 3 November 1968, p.4.
Taisaku linkai) and submitted its final report, 70 nen dai no Keisatsu: Gekidō to Henka eno Taiō (the Police in the 1970s: The Responding to Turbulence and Changes). The report written by security elites, including senior officers of the NPA, affected legislation and operations by the police in the 1970s.

In its introduction, the report warned that many negative impact caused by rapid modernization, such as environmental pollution or social alienation, propelled Japanese people who felt dissatisfied with their society to join radical social movements.36 The report then quoted Newsweek's appreciation of the Japanese police and lauded the police's achievements. However, it was also concerned that the “safest city in the world” could face a crisis in the near future because of drastic social change caused by rapid economic growth, such as urbanization, motorization, the coming of the information society, and lifestyle change. In this period, the NPA's senior officers produced scientific evidence pointing to worsening security in the future and predicted that security in 1980 would become 1.7 to 1.8 times worse than that of 1970.37

The CR Strategies in Urban Areas

The report made two proposals for policing strategies in the 1970s: “building closer connection with the people” and “grasping people's demands”. The former strategy aimed to build mutual surveillance communities under the leadership of the police by way of Community Relations (CR). CR was based on communities which were composed of homes, workplaces, neighbourhood associations, shopkeeper's associations, PTAs, and clubs. According to the committee, CR made it possible for police officers to grasp local residents'
demands and ask them to cooperate in the security of local areas by creating closer communication with the residents.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{70 nendai no Keisatsu} saw revitalization of local communities as a key factor in keeping public order. CR was promoted in local areas under the slogan of, for example, “the echo campaign makes your towns brighter (\textit{machi o akaruku suru yamabiko undō})” in Yamagata prefecture, “the campaign to solve troubles in local areas (\textit{chiiki no komarigoto o kaiketsu suru undō})” in Saitama prefecture, or the like. This policing strategy, which was based on local communities, had been developed in interwar Japan.\textsuperscript{39} After the First World War, the police had trouble in controlling newly emerging labour movements. The police attempted to require local communities to support them in controlling labour unionists, socialists, and communists. In \textit{70 nendai no Keisatsu} the senior officers did not refer to the policing strategies produced in the interwar period, but their community strategies clearly show that they were influenced by the strategies of building ties with local communities for public order.

However, rapid urbanization in this period made it more difficult for the police to grasp the actual situation of local areas than it had been in the interwar and immediate postwar periods. From the interwar period onwards, Japanese police officers have visited all the houses of an area for which they were responsible, gained pieces of various information in the neighbourhood, and made use of it for criminal investigations. According to the \textit{Police White Paper} published in 1976, police officers’ interviews with neighbourhoods helped them to apprehend 23.6\% of all serious criminals in cities and 39.4\% of

\textsuperscript{38} Nishio Baku. \textit{Gendai Nihon no Keisatsu: CR Senryaku towa Nanika}. Tokyo: Taimatsusha, 1979, pp.125-27. The CR strategies were originally invented in the USA to control black people’s protests. In 1969, \textit{Crowd Control and Riot Prevention} (written by Raymond Momboisse), a bible of the CR, was translated into Japanese by an officer of the NPA to make use of the strategies in policing Japanese new leftists.

those in villages in 1966, but the figure dropped to 13.1% in cities and 16.5% in villages in 1975. This shows that as large numbers of people flowed to and from communities and residents were not familiar with each other, the interviews became less and less effective in grasping the situation of local areas.

In this situation, the police sought to work together with public relation agencies in collecting information about local communities. Hakuhōdō, one of the largest public relation companies, helped the police to make CR maps, the database about human relations in communities or companies indicating who were the leaders or key members of these organizations. Public relations companies also provided similar community relations maps to other corporations. For example, Hakuhōdō provided one power company with CR maps, and the company made use of them to target key figures of a local area in which the company planned to construct a new power station and convince these people to support the construction.

Hakuhōdō built close ties with the police by giving some retired senior police officers executive positions in the company. In 1973, Machida Kinichi, a person who had formerly been in charge of CR in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, was invited to Hakuhōdō as a consultant. Machida played an important role both in instructing how the police should practice the CR strategies and in spreading the strategies to police officers working in local areas. In the 1970s, senior police officers sought to reconstruct and modify their traditional policing strategies in the context of rapid urbanization in the 1970s. PR companies played a complementary role in gathering information on local communities to promote the CR strategies.

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41 Ibid.
Revaluation of Gaikin Keisatsu

70 nendai no Keisatsu also highlighted the important role of “gaikin keisatsu”, police officers working in köban in local areas. They used to be called “scarecrows (kakashi)” in a contemptuous sense, but “gaikin keisatsu” were viewed as the main force of the police in the new policing strategies discussed in the 1970s. In particular, the writers of 70 nendai no Keisatsu evaluated as essential the local foot patrol, which enabled each police officer to build closer ties with local residents. Gaikin keisatsu was again seen as a key figure in policing in local areas. Their patrol of every home and office became an essential part of police cooperation with local communities.

Senior police officers noted that they needed to suspend the rationalization policies in the 1960s which had aimed to abolish and amalgamate köban. 70 nendai no Keisatsu wrote about the rationalization policies:

The close relationship between people and the police is built on the process of mutual communication. However the police are gradually becoming estranged from residents. For instance, the introduction of patrol cars deprives the police of opportunities to communicate with the public, even though this communication is very useful and essential for police activities. The important role of communication with the people should not be underestimated even when we seek to rationalize our organizations. We have to make efforts to contact and exchange information with people to build the cooperative relationship.42

42 Keisatsuchō Sōgō Taisaku linkai (ed.). 70 nendai no Keisatsu, pp.22-23.
In this way, the police decided to stop rationalizing their organizations. According to the *Police White Paper*, the number of *kôban* in various parts of Japan was 16,112 in 1972, and the number had risen slightly to 16,517 in 1980.

Needless to say, the police did not necessarily give up aggressive and forcible policing. This is shown in that the number of police officers increased from 178,000 in 1969 to 246,000 in 1979, mainly in order to suppress social movements. Nevertheless, the 1970s was a major turning point in police administration, because policing strategies shifted their focus from forcible oppression to “persuasion” to get residents to work for public order. For example, senior police officers proposed that the departments of “the civil police”, such as *gaikin keisatsu* or the traffic police, should be reinforced in order to meet people’s demands. In the late 1960s, the number of riot police in TMPD increased rapidly, but some of the newly employed officers were repositioned to the rescue service, policing of gangsters, traffic control, and the like.

**The Construction of Surveillance Communities**

The emergence of vigilante groups encouraged the police to construct mutual surveillance communities. It was in this period that the Association for the Prevention of Crime (*Bôhan Kyôkai*), an organization which provides information to the police, was formed to play the role of collecting information.43

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44 Asahi Shinbun 30 August 1972, p.9.
45 In the 1970s, the police attempted to rebuild traditional communities, which were about to collapse due to rapid urbanization in this period. However, this attempt was not successful, and senior police officers realized that the decline of communities was inescapable. In the 1980s, the police began to introduce the latest technologies, such as security cameras, into policing. In recent years, the police come to see Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) as collaborators in their policing in cities. *The Police White Paper* published in 2004 suggested that even dog-lovers' associations in local areas would help them to watch suspicious people.
on crime in local areas and informing residents of it. The numbers of Offices for Prevention of Crime (Bōhan Renrakujo), local branches of the Association, rose sharply in the 1970s, and about 30,000 Offices were newly built in 1974.46 More than 570,000 Offices in various parts of Japan worked in order to inform the police about troubles or accidents which occurred in the neighbourhood and pass information from the police about criminals on to residents.

A notice from the police in Ueno, Tokyo, clearly shows how the police tried to control new leftists. The notice entitled "A call for the prevention of damage from collective violence" asked residents to watch out for violence by student activists and to work with the police:

(1) Call the emergency number 110 as soon as you find or get information on violent student groups' plans to attack kōban or stop trains in stations.

(2) Give your family and salespeople (or employees) a warning every day to follow police instructions when they are in the danger zone, and in particular not to follow curious bystanders.

(3) Remove, in advance, stones, wooden sticks, empty bottles, or the like, which violent student groups are likely to use as weapons, to a place where nobody can find them.

(4) Call the emergency number 110 if students come to timber shops, iron shops, gasoline stations, and pharmacies, to buy wooden sticks, bamboo, gasoline, and dangerous drugs, which students are likely to use as weapons.

(5) We ask heads of neighbourhood associations to pass our information on to you. If the associations give you a warning, remove dangerous goods in order to prevent damage so that you are not attacked by violent students or your windows are not broken by stones.47

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The notice referred to the emergency number 110 when residents discovered suspicious people in their communities. Most Japanese people are now familiar with the emergency call 110, but that was not so in the 1970s. The police worked hard in this period to make it familiar to residents for earlier and more effective initial investigations on crime. In this fashion, the police attempted to make use of the residents' worries about violent protests and work with local residents to control new left movements.

3. Police officers as Servants to the Public

The Police “Serving the People”

70 nendai no Keisatsu also suggested that police officers should be disciplined as servants to the public. This implied that each police officer was trained like a worker in the service industries. In December 1972, the General Administrative Agency of Cabinet (Sōrifu) conducted a large-scale and wide-ranging poll of how the people viewed the police. The police became interested in making use of the poll as the important data to find out people's needs. The poll inquired about the public's impression of “extremist groups” as well as of the police.

Some senior officers of the NPA, who had not controlled the movements effectively in the late 1960s and tried to learn from this mistake, came to believe that successful public security was no longer possible without responding to people's demands. They insisted that police officers should provide the kind of service demanded by residents. Based on some public opinion surveys and public hearings, patrolling for the prevention of crime, the
regulation of pollution from companies, policing yakuza and the control of the
sex industry were seen as an important part of police duties.

Under the slogan of meeting people's demands, the police were not
afraid of being criticized for excessively intervening in people's everyday life.
An article in the Asahi Shinbun written on 14 May 1976 noted that, in the
middle of 1970, the Hyogo Prefectural Police launched a campaign to control
local problems; men urinating outdoors, unconfined dogs, illegal dumping of
household garbage, dropping of cigarettes, and fighting by drunken people.48
At almost the same time, the TMPD set up a telephone counselling hotline for
people's concerns in everyday life, such as family troubles or love affairs.
Japanese police officers in rural areas had played the role of a kind of
counsellor to local people from the 1920s. In the 1970s, police officers came
once more to be assigned to this role.

It was when a new production-consumer system known as "Toyotism"
began to spread to various parts of Japan that the senior police officers
suggested that police officers should be trained as "servants of the public".
This management strategy, which was named after Toyota Motor Corporation,
was based on the principle that it was important for companies to grasp exact
information on market demands and feed it back into their decisions about
what kinds of goods should be produced. During the economic boom in the
1950s and 1960s, a wide range of Japanese people had already purchased
mass-produced and cheap durable goods. This resulted in the 1970s in
saturation of the market for basic goods such as washing machines or
refrigerators. Some Japanese companies, responded by developing a new
market strategy—"limited production of diversified goods"—to overcome the
saturation. They attempted to invoke people's desires by providing a small

number of special goods rather than a large quantity of standardized ones. The strategy, which aimed to provoke consumers’ desires and change the production system to be more flexible, was introduced in various service industries as well as in manufacturing industries.

After the 1980s Toyotism had a great impact on consumer consciousness.\(^4^9\) However, as they became accustomed to good quality service supplied by private companies that researched the needs of the market, consumers began to feel dissatisfied with service from public offices and demand a better quality service. In order to satisfy the people with their service, senior police officers felt that they needed to make an in-depth investigation of information on market demand and channel back the information into the contents of service. In the 1970s, at the beginning of Toyotism, officers came to see a good image of the police among residents as crucial to promote local residents’ cooperation in public security, just as sales of goods depended on their image from consumers. 70 *nendai no Keisatsu* recommended that each police officer should inform households about children’s safety or publish community information in local newsletters to create a good impression of the police in local communities. The report, though it did not refer directly to Toyotism, had a deep understanding of the essence of the strategy.

**Creating Positive Images of the Police**

In order to create positive images, the police also sought to build friendly relations with the media. The Sasebo incident in January 1968, in which police officers assaulted some news reporters, showed that the police did not see the media as influential. On 16 May 1970, the riot police assaulted

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some camerapersons again during a demonstration organized by foreign members of Beheiren. When a demonstrator handed their statement to an official of the American Embassy in Tokyo, a cameraperson from the *Sankei Shinbun* and other people who tried to take pictures were obstructed, hit on the head, and kicked in their abdomen by riot police officers.\(^{50}\)

In the 1970s, however, the police began to change their strategies, saw the media as a powerful group, and paid careful attention to the way the police were being reported. For instance, in this period they began to provide journalists with media briefings containing more detailed information about criminal cases. This propelled the news media to make use of the information from the briefings. Journalists of the Japanese mainstream media usually belonged to *kisha club*, an association of reporters, in the National Police Agency, and the police communicated with and conveyed information to journalists through the *kisha club*. A journalist from the *Sankei Shinbun* stated that many journalists came to rely too much on the police as an important news source and to believe the source to be accurate.\(^{51}\) News stories using this source helped the police to gain trust from people.

It should be noted that *gaikin keisatsu* were regarded as a focal point in the role of police role as servants, because *gaikin keisatsu* had face-to-face relations with residents in local communities. When the operation rules of the *gaikin keisatsu* changed in 1969, "active service for the public" was included as a duty of *gaikin keisatsu* in Article 2 of the new rules. In 1970, when the Working Rules of *Gaikin Keisatsu* (*Gaikin Keisatsukan Kinmu Yösoku*), enacted in 1955, were revised for the first time in 15 years, the duty of service for people was seen as "the basic idea of the new rule". The change in these

\(^{50}\) *Asahi Shinbun* 17 May 1970, p.22.

\(^{51}\) Nishio. *Gendai Nihon no Keisatsu*, p.44.
rules played a role in spreading to the entire organization of the police the idea of police officers as servants. *70 nendai no Keisatsu* described *gaikin keisatsu* duties as following:

> *Gaikin keisatsu* activities on the streets should be naturally evaluated from the standpoint of the public. However, people’s evaluation of the police depends significantly on police officers’ friendly words or behaviour and kind regards rather than their legally accurate or swift actions. While a little act of kindness leads people to appreciating all the police, a little rude word causes people’s antipathy to the police. Hence, police officers should become aware that their acts or words affect the evaluation of the police by the people."52

Likewise, Nakai Seiichi, a senior police officer in the department of *gaikin keisatsu*, claimed that police officers should be educated in their small actions or words in everyday life:

> It is important and essential for police officers on the streets to draw the attention of the public. In other words, *gaikin keisatsu* should do "visible activities (*miseru katsudō*)". For example, police officers should help children to walk across a pedestrian crossing, in order to show off their daily activities and to get support from residents.53

Nakai cited some examples of “visible activities”: a police officer who gave a call to a repair plant on behalf of a person with a flat tire on his car; police officers who looked around for dry ice together with people whose parents suddenly died during the night (*the Police White Paper* published in this period was full of these kinds of stories). Nakai stressed that residents’ impression of

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52 Keisatsuchō Sōgō Taisaku linkai (ed.). *70 nendai no Keisatsu*, pp.46-47.
the police was influenced by how far gaikin keisatsu could go beyond their legal duties and meet the demands of the people.

Nakai, who regarded police activities as a service, urged police officers to pay attention to their daily actions or words all the time. On the one hand, police officers had to do their duties in a warm-hearted way, so as not to be seen by residents as arrogant and unfriendly. On the other hand, they were also required to do their duties with confidence in order to be seen as reliable figures. He believed that gaikin keisatsu were required to combine a warm heart with confidence on the streets. “A friendly police officer, who was doing his duties of traffic control on the streets, washed his friendly face and then put his black glasses back on. Then his face quickly changed into a dignified one.” Nakai claimed that this was an ideal image of police officers.54

In July 1970, the NPA began a year-long campaign of “humour and police officers (yümoa to keisatsukan)”. During the campaign, police officers were propelled to tackle the improvement of their daily acts or words. After the reform of police officers was developed, even an activist who was critical of the police noted that “behaviour and words of gaikin keisatsu became so polite that I was confused by it”55.

Furthermore, senior police officers suggested that the way of evaluating police officers should be improved. They maintained that gaikin keisatsu must not be evaluated by how many people they arrested, because this would led them to controlling people too strictly to improve their performance and would eventually provoke people’s antipathy to the police.56 The senior officers claimed that “a view from the people”, in short, how much the police worked for

54 Ibid., p.110.
the people, was the most significant factor in evaluating police officers’
performance.

The Police as Guardians of Citizens from “Extremists”

Did the police gain support from people? Looking into the media’s view
of the police is a way of gauging this. The mass media did not completely shift
to full support for the police. They were harsh on repeated scandals involving
police officers in this period. Headlines of the Asahi Shinbun in the late 1970s
were full of the scandals: “The former chiefs and others in the Hyōgo
Prefectural Police were punished for suspicious connections”; “A drunken
sergeant stole someone’s luggage during the daytime in Osaka”; “An assistant
inspector choked a woman and robbed her of 160,000 yen”; “A rookie
policeman who drank heavily and urinated in a train told a person who scolded
him that “I will arrest you”; “A police officer killed a female university student”;
“A drunken policeman assaulted a housewife”.

On the other hand, the media covered articles critical of direct action
taken by new leftists. Around 1970, they began to call groups which took
contfrontational actions “extremists”. The Asahi Shinbun seldom dubbed
Japanese radical activists as “extremists” until 1968. However, this had
changed in November 1969, when a parcel including a bomb was delivered to
the American Cultural Centre (amerika bunka sentā) in Tokyo and some new
leftists were identified as suspects (they were finally declared not guilty). The
Asahi Shinbun began to frequently use the word “extremists”, and more than
hundred articles used the word in November and December of 1969. The word
“extremists” was more often found in articles in the newspaper in the 1970s.

In this way, new leftists were described negatively in the 1970s. For
example, some activists of the töha threw firebombs in Shibuya, Tokyo, when
protesting against the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in November 1971. A police officer was mortally injured, and five passengers of a train, who were caught up in the incident, were badly wounded. The actions were severely criticized by reporters in the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, one of the leading newspapers. The headlines were sensational: Citizens in Tokyo are engaged at "riots on Sunday"; "Fighting through 'suicidal attacks'"; "Extremists on the rampage"; "Set fire indiscriminately in Tokyo". "Don't let 'citizens' enemies' get away with it".

The *Yomiuri Shinbun* also stressed the contrast between "extremists" and "citizens" by covering stories on the latter who suffered damage from violent actions: an old woman, who was forced to stop *pachinko* [pinball], said "I don't know those students, but they are not welcome. I was about to hit the jackpot. The violent groups should be exiled to islands"; an owner of a sushi restaurant, who lost customers because of the turmoil of the actions taken by some new leftists, said "I will fight the students at any cost and beat one of them at least if they go in my shop". In December 1971 when the wife of a chief police officer in TMPD was killed in her home by terrorist bombs, the selfish and brutal image of new leftists spread widely to people, and was finally established as a result of the abduction case of the United Red Army in Asama Sansô of 1972 (discussed in more detail below). It is worth noting that the media, on the other hand, characterized police officers as guardians of citizens from extremists.

The Public Relations Office of the Cabinet Secretary (*Naikaku Sôriddaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu*) published the Opinion Survey on the Police every few years. 605 people in July 1974 and 430 in November 1978 in all regions of Japan participated in the interview. According to the reports, to the question

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57 *Yomiuri Shinbun* 20 November 1971, p.13.

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“how have the police improved?” 49% of the interviewees in 1974 and 43% in 1978 answered “the police have become friendly”, and 45% in 1974 and 36% in 1978 said “the police have come to behave and speak gently”, though only about 20% of the interviewees replied that their general impression of the police improved in those periods. This shows that the NPA’s efforts to gain support from the people were successful to some extent. It may be true that the success did not stem only from the police’s new strategies, but their efforts to build ties with the media, pay careful attention to the way the police were being reported, and produce a discourse of “the police as guardians of citizens from extremists” seem to have had some effect. In other words, it helped to disseminate the image of new leftists as brutal and selfish “extremists” worked in isolating the activists from the public.

In the early 1970s, the police were aware that they needed to get more support from residents to control new left movements. Whereas the police tried to reinforce ties with local communities and train gaikin keisatsu as servants to the public, most new leftists saw self-revolution as more important than popular support, and a number of them, especially student activists, resorted to counter-violence as a symbol of self-revolution in “everydayness”. In this fashion, new left movements were driven into an increasingly difficult situation.

4. The Three Difficulties of New Left Movements

As new leftists lost their support from ordinary people, they found it difficult to practice the idea of self-revolution in “everydayness”. The difficulties that they faced can be classified into three issues: the potential risk of intra- or inter-group violence, the spread of a feeling of failure, and discontinuity in their experiences. In the next chapter, we shall examine how some new leftists
attempted to continue and develop their activism in the 1970s, but here we shall examine some forces that persuaded many new leftists to abandon activism altogether.

Obviously one of the biggest reasons for demobilization of the movements was the threat of the overwhelmingly superior force of the state: as discussed earlier, the police developed a policy of massive arrest and preventive detention; a large number of activists decided to avoid confronting with the police on streets and on campus. However, this massive arrest does not provide a full accounting of the rapid decline of the movements. It does not explain why many new leftists gave up the movements altogether and never returned to activism. In order to explore this, we need to consider not only the police's power but also the difficulties produced by the effects of self-revolution in "everydayness".

**Difficulties in In-depth Examination of “Everydayness”**

The first difficulty concerned the goal which new leftists tried to achieve. The activists had to examine all parts of their everyday life if they were to be faithful to the principle of self-revolution in "everydayness". As discussed in Chapter 2, Japanese new leftists sought to transform their consciousness and behaviour in everyday life in order to overcome the failure of the Anpo protests of 1960. The idea of self-revolution in “everydayness” made it possible for new leftists to expand the arena of political struggles, to identify powers which produced people's depoliticized consciousness, and to radically criticize the system of controlled society. On the other hand, the activists were driven into a difficult situation, because they were not allowed to make a compromise in transforming all aspects of their lives.
Some new leftists who were faithful to the principle of the movements examined their colleagues’ consciousness and behaviour. They required their colleagues to be committed to transforming “everydayness”. Documents written by the East Asian Anti-Japanese Armed Front (Higashi Ajia Hannichi Busô Sensen) illustrated that this group were passionate about examining and transforming the members’ “everydayness”. In 1974, the group carried out terrorist bombing at the head office of multinational companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsui. When the group’s members exploded bombs in the head office of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, eight people including passers-by were killed and 385 people were wounded. The group criticized these companies for colonizing Asian countries in the past and present. The group’s members carried out terrorist attacks to negate their social position as a victimizer over Asian people. In short, terrorist bombing was their way of “self-negation (jiko hitei)”, the slogan which had been supported by a wide range of student activists at Tokyo University in the late 1960s.

The East Asian Anti-Japanese Armed Front produced a textbook on armed struggles titled Toshi Gerira no Kakumei Dokuhon (The Urban Guerrilla Fighters Reader). This book gave readers detailed instructions on the urban guerrilla war: “On the surface, you should behave as if you live normally”; “In principle, neighbourly companionship ought to be shallow and limited, but greetings with your neighbourhoods are the minimum required”; “If breaking off relations [with your old friends] causes any troubles, it is not necessary [to break off them], but you must remember that the relations are not necessarily essential. You should not disclose your true self to them or to your family and must not refer to the self at all”; “Guerrilla fighters do not drink alcohol. Drinking makes them lose their temper, break out of bounds, and drop their guard easily. It is the worst enemy for guerrilla fighters. In particular, drinking parties should
be strictly prohibited. These instructions show that these activists were obliged to closely examine their consciousness and behaviour in order to be a fully-fledged “revolutionary”.

As some new leftists were committed to self-revolution in “everydayness”, they were nervous about their colleagues’ trivial actions or behaviour, such as love affairs or clothes. This could cause conflicts and trouble between them. For example, the United Red Army’s activists beat some of their colleagues to death. Their memoirs noted that this “punishment” resulted from critique of the murdered people’s minor behaviour. In January 1972, Tôyama Mieko, a member of the group, was lynched to death in the middle of military training in the secret base in a mountainous area. She was criticized by her colleagues for her behaviour: she took casual clothes as if she were going skiing rather than training; her hair remained long and she had a ring on her finger; she relied too much on and was coquettish with men. Her colleagues forced her to reflect on her failure to become a fighter for the revolution, and eventually beat her to death.

I do not claim that all new leftists fell into such a pitfall. It was true that these tragedies occurred more with the töha than Zenkyôtô, and the case of the Red Army was extreme, but this example clearly shows that the risk of intra- or inter-group violence derived from an understanding of self-revolution in “everydayness”. Some of the new leftists, who were faithful to the principle of the movements, tried to push their colleagues to transform their consciousness and behaviour, but this had the risk of being too harsh on the colleagues. The activists were sometimes irritated by their colleagues’

“everydayness”, accused them of insufficient self-revolution, and at worst ever attacked them. In this chapter, I have not sought to specify the reasons of each case of intra- or inter-group violence. The violence was sometimes caused by political struggles for power in different factions or each faction. However, I stress that the violence was more or less affected by the idea of self-revolution in “everydayness” produced in Japanese new left movements. This is the reason why many new leftists were psychologically shocked by intra- or inter-group violence, although all of their actions did not necessarily result in violence. This is the reason even many new leftists who were indifferent to intra- or inter-group violence worried about it.

Difficulties in Open-ended Self-revolution

The second difficulty concerned problems coming from the idea of open-ended self-revolution. New leftists, who followed the principles of the movements, were obligated to examine and transform “everydayness” permanently. If their goals were to change policies or political institutions, they might have been able to end their campaign when achieving the goals or winning some concessions from bureaucracy or parliament. However, new leftists tried to achieve very obscure goals and results, so they did not know when to stop their actions.

As early as the Tōdai Tōsō (the Tokyo University struggle), many new leftists were already finding it difficult to struggle endlessly. In early 1969, some students of Tokyo University, who had been boycotting classes and examinations since the middle of 1968, faced the difficult decision of whether to stop boycotting. Some of them, who lived faithfully by the principle of self-

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60 Patricia Steinhoff focused on analysing a well-known intra-groups conflict of the United Red Army from the psychological and organizational point of view to explore why its members killed their colleagues. See Steinhoff. Nihon Sekigunha.
revolution, continued to boycott the mid-term examinations in June of 1969. These student activists were forced to fail the class and repeat the same year if they continued the strike against classes and examinations. This meant that they had to take on a large financial and mental burden. Many of them thought seriously about their decision on the strike, decided to take the examinations, and finally gave up their commitment to the movements. At a roundtable of student activists in Shingeki, the journal of Tōdai Zenkyōtō, a student gave an explanation of why some people gave up their commitment completely:

It seemed that “sect” [—the töha] activists get a clear direction, but “non-sect” [—Zenkyōtō] activists reflect on all of their decisions [of whether to stop boycotting examinations], because “non-sect” people associated the Tokyo University struggle with their personal problems for better or worse. In the case of the boycott struggle, those who decided to take examinations, though they would be able to play a role in supporting activism in the future, said “I took exams, so I am a rightist” and escaped [from their future role]. These people ended up not even joining workshops in their class and meetings organized by the anti-Vietnam War Coalition [—an antiwar group on the campus of Tokyo University], which had previously helped to mobilize students to the struggle. I think that the boycott struggle had some big problems.61

Watanabe Takayuki, a student of the College of Engineering of Nihon University, graduated from a prestigious high school and enjoyed his university life through mah-jongg, driving, skiing, and dates with his girlfriends. When he had almost completed his course credits, he encountered the 200-meter demonstration (many students participated in the demonstration on campus for uncovering the university authorities’ corruption on 23 May 1968). After he

became involved in Nichidai Tōsō, he gained “pleasure of emancipation” from the struggle. He wrote:

I struggled with questions, and validated and established theories through actions. Real learning is wonderful. I thought that this was learning at university and its practice. In the past, I primarily accepted things which were given from the top without questioning them, and learning was rarely active, joyful, and painful. I finally experienced learning in my life in Nichidai Tōsō, something which I had never imagined before.62

However, he was disturbed by the decision whether to continue or give up the strike in the period of the final exams. If he continued, it would mean staying in university one more year and imposing a heavy financial burden on his parents who had to pay for their two other children’s education.

It is not obvious when I began to feel disgusted with myself: I was irritated with evacuation classes [—classes held outside the blockaded campus] of the College of Law and the College of Economics; I felt empty when escaping from the riot police chasing after us and from the students of Minsei [—the youth group of the JCP] who threw stones at us; students of the College of Engineering were also upset with the resumption of classes; the gloomy atmosphere began to spread to our family. I am about to give in to these mixed feeling. I hate myself....

Now I do not know what to do. It is obvious that Nichidai Tōsō has not progressed. Although I decided to graduate university after the struggle progressed, I cannot overcome myself and make a decision [of continuing to be committed to the struggle] at the moment.63

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63 Ibid., p.91.
Similar worries and reluctance can be found in Murakami Kyōko's memoir. A student who entered Tokyo Woman's Christian University in 1968, she worked as an active member of the student association. The association had gone on strike against the report of the Central Education Council and the legislation on university reform. Because students found that the university authorities did not intend to negotiate with them honestly, they gave up dialogue. In this process, their goals and slogans became more and more abstract.

After the end of the summer vacation of 1968, some students were concerned about the prolonged strike and opposed continuing it. Murakami was disturbed by the dilemma whether to continue the strike, but she could not escape from it. Looking back on this time, she wrote:

Well, because we decided to continue the strike, nonparticipation [in it] was equal to desertion in the face of the enemy. Although I was reluctant to follow the All-campus Committee of the university which sought to tackle issues outside campus and rapidly became radical, I could not criticize them and did not like to be among the reactionary forces. This was something that I could have predicted from the start, because the strike did not begin with specific issues. I tried not to think, "I feel scared" or "what should I do if I am arrested?", and wavered between both sides [continuing the strike or not] for a month. I reached a decision to leave my family's home and live alone.64

Many student activists who continued the strike were eventually arrested. Murakami also went to a jail. Her parents came to see her. As she put it:

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64 Murakami. "Jiko Hitei wa Tsurai Iyashi no Michi e", p.111.
What did we get from the struggle? I felt in the middle of
demonstrations that “we may be able to change our society and stop
[its going wrong]. But that was just empty whistling in the dark.65

The Psychological Pressures of Activism

Many serious new leftists were obligated to transform “everydayness”
continuously, but the obligation turned slowly to strong pressure. Some of the
activists were worried by the pressure, gave up their commitment, and were
haunted by a sense of failure which discouraged them from referring to their
experiences. A roundtable of Zenkyôtô students in late 1969, when barricades
on campus had come down, shows that some students suffered from the
strong pressure produced in new left movements.

A student of Chûô University stated that students were seriously
distressed when they made a decision on (non-)participation in boycotting
classes and examinations:

An overwhelming majority of students in the evening course who
boycotted exams were non-sect radicals [—Zenkyôtô activists]. They
saw it as a personal problem. What does it mean if I take exams?
Does it mean betrayal [of the ideas and actions of the struggle]?
One student considered the boycott for three days, finally reached a
decision not to take the exams, and collapsed. In this way, we
actually face very difficult issues.66

He stressed that Zenkyôtô activists were more disturbed at making a decision
to continue the strikes than the tôha members, but all new leftists, who sought
to associate the strikes with their personal issue of self-revolution in

65 Ibid., p.112.
66 “Gakusei Zadankai Shiko Shiko Yatte ikô: Yon Daigaku (Chûdai, Tôdai, Tôkyôdai,
"everydayness", could not avoid facing these worries regardless of whether they were Zenkyōtō or tōha.

In the late 1960s, the idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" made it possible for new leftists to address the problems of controlled society. Around 1970, the activists were in turn disturbed by the idea. At the end of the roundtable, a student of Nihon University stated:

> When my friends and I gathered together, we said that we had been very happy in the past. In the struggles with the authorities and rightists, we ran the risk of being blinded or disabled for life. Because we were involved in such struggles, we strengthened our solidarity. We were very happy in this sense. We, ourselves, do not understand why we were happy at that time and why we are now struggling only out of a sense of obligation.6 7

He remarked that their participation in new left movements, at first, gave him and his colleagues a feeling of emancipation from controlled society and closer relations with other activists. However, around the time when barricades on campus were taken down, the activists could not enjoy their activism but rather were disturbed by it.

As discussed earlier, the goal of Japanese new leftists, self-revolution in "everydayness", was obscure. Around 1970, some of the activists felt so uneasy about the lack of visible criteria for how far they had transformed "everydayness" that they stopped being engaged with the movements. Saishu Satoru, a key member of the Research Assistant Struggle (Joshu Tōsō) of Tokyo University, stated in an interview conducted in 1972:

> Activists are able to devote themselves to their struggles when the end of the struggle is at hand. This was symbolized in the struggle at

67 Ibid., p.18.
the Yasuda Auditorium [in June 1968, new leftists at Tokyo University began to blockade the Auditorium, a symbol of the university. The blockade was dissolved by the riot police in January 1969]. Everyone except the töha activists was able to concentrate on the struggle which they thought would end soon. On the other hand, we are disturbed if the struggle is endless. For example, actions for transformation of our life last endlessly, so we are at a loss what to do. Peasant rioters or rioters in the cycling stadium (keirinjō) devote their energies intensely, because they find that the riots will end soon regardless of whether they like it or not. We are able to concentrate on our struggles when we know that the struggles cannot last....We are the most afraid that the struggles will spread to our everyday life...We will be disturbed when the struggles last endlessly. In this way, we want to bring an end to the struggles by converting our idea, going crazy, and acting out of line. We force ourselves to carry out unsustainable actions and ideas. This way of acting or living is now popular. Everything lasts so long.68

Most new leftists found it difficult to bring an end to their commitment by themselves, because it meant that they would betray the principle of new left movements. Many of them who felt driven into a corner took "unsustainable actions", such as clashes with the police, in order to finish their commitment. Being arrested made it possible for them to be liberated from their worries about open-ended self-revolution. Saishu pointed to the mental mechanism in which increasing numbers of new leftists took desperate actions and then left the movements.

Giving up the Commitment

Many new leftists, who lived faithfully according to the principle of self-revolution in "everydayness", faced deadlock. Some of them took further direct action in order to break through the situation. In this period, the police were

successful in framing new leftists as brutal extremists, so the activists came to know that they were increasingly losing support from people. The most despairing time for the activists was intra- or inter-group violence: some activists attacked their colleagues, and finally injured or killed them. Since the principle of the movements did not allow new leftists to make a compromise, the activists who finally decided to give up their commitment were traumatized. A former activist, who gave up his commitment to student movements and got a job with a small publisher, expressed his concerns at a roundtable titled “conversion after getting a job (shūshoku tenkō)” in Asahi Jânaru in April 1969.

We cannot realize the pure ideal, what we have acquired during the struggles on campus, in everyday life. Because we joined the struggles, we will be much more isolated from everyday life and gray than other people who did not join them.69

After his comment, Mr. C, another former activist who left his university and worked in a delivery company, also stated:

I do not feel a sense of tragedy but feel very anxious. I will be distrustful of myself, because I left my university even though the struggles were in a difficult situation, and because my own commitment to the struggles on campus was so opportunistic.

It is worth noting that a sense of failure produced in new left movements prevented them from passing on experiences they obtained in the movements on to the next generation. This is the third difficulty which new leftists faced. At another roundtable among former student activists, a student of Tokyo University, who joined the struggles and was arrested in 1969, referred to

former activists (including himself) who gave up their commitment to the movements and started working in a company as follows:

We are viewed as those who gave in, but the view may be one-sided. Nonetheless, many of us feel reluctant to talk [about our experiences], because we are disturbed by a feeling that we made a compromise in getting a job, though we should not have done it, and we are now just a part of the current regime. In this gloomy situation, we cannot say anything without cheating ourselves. I do not know what I should say. It is also painful that I cannot say anything though I have something to say.\(^7\)

The mental trauma coming from giving up their commitment to the movements made it difficult for the activists to advise other people about their experiences, because they could not describe their experiences. They found it self-deceiving to put any words to the experiences.

At a roundtable of several activists of Nichidai Tōsō published in *Asahi Jānaru* in 1970, participants stated that they could not convey their experiences to newer student activists. Mr. O, an activist of Nichidai Zenkyōtō in Kōriyama, was concerned that new students were unable to get information on Nichidai Tōsō except from the media. He remarked: "I think that we need to tell new students about the quality of Nichidai Tōsō". Mr. M, another activist of Nichidai Zenkyōtō in the College of Economics, stated:

There is a new student who makes and gives out leaflets alone. We gave him technical advice, such as places where he will be in trouble if he gives them out, but the problem is that I can only build such relations with him. One of the reasons why we cannot contact new students is that we are prohibited from entering onto the campus freely, but that is not all, and we have not been able to find

\(^7\) "Zadankai 60 nen to 70 nen no ‘Sonogo’" in *Asahi Jānaru* 21 May 1971, p.36.
the reasons yet. If we come to clearly realize them, we will be able to easily revitalize Nichidai Tōsō....

His comment shows that around 1970, many new leftists faced difficulties in conveying their successful and unsuccessful experiences to younger students.

In this situation, new leftists found it difficult to recruit young people. This was partly because they were stigmatized as brutal and selfish “extremists” and partly because there was a high risk of being arrested by the police. Many new leftists, except some radical groups, were reluctant to take direct action on streets and on campus; it was strictly controlled by the police; it was an unpopular repertoire in the media. The loss of direct action deprived new leftists of a sense of self-liberation in activism. This was another reason of prevented the activists from recruiting young people who were dissatisfied with rising social control.

Mental Trauma and “Conversion (tenkō)”

Many passionate new leftists were forced to pay a high price. About 1,600 students who were arrested during Nichidai Tōsō and a number of other students who were expelled from the university or dropped out voluntarily could not get a graduation diploma. They had trouble in getting jobs at companies. Akita Akehiro, a former convener of Nichidai Zenkyōtō, began to work as a repair-person in an automobile factory in Hiroshima, his hometown, several years after Nichidai Tōsō. According to Takagi Masayuki, a journalist who wrote many articles about student activists, Akita talked very little about the struggles after he returned to his hometown. He obviously suffered great psychological damage. All the people who knew his past felt it a pity that he

was robbed of his sparkle. Yamamoto Yoshitaka, a former convener of Tōdai Zenkyōtō, became a physics teacher in a famous preparatory school. Because he was very passionate about his teaching, he was popular among students. However, his psychological damage was evident in the fact that he avoided talking about political issues.

After being frustrated, many other new leftists also gave up their commitment to the movements and left their universities. Some of them were fortunately successful in getting jobs in companies. Mr. O was a radical student activist who had worn a helmet and carried a gebabó and thrown firebombs at the police on the streets. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Tokyo University in 1971 and worked in Nissan Motor Company. In an interview, he stated of his past and present:

After getting practical training in the company, I felt that I had been an idealist during my college days. In the training, I saw the entire process of automotive manufacture including soldering in a factory. I feel that there is an implicit consensus in the company which orders all people to go in one direction. This is capitalism itself. If a dissident is in the company, he will soon be banished. I think that the company is so huge that it is beyond my reach.

Mr. N, who graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Kyoto University and got a job at the Tōyō Trust Banking Company in 1969, was a famous activist of Zenkyōtō in his university days. After employment, he wore a navy blue suit and talked politely, the same as other bankers:

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73 Ibid, p.135.
74 “Shakai ni Tokekonda Shin Sayoku Gakusei no Tsuiseki” in *Shūkan Shinchō* 16 September 1972, p.32.
I am ashamed of my old self though it is a little too late. Yes, I was immature, so it will be scandalous if the fact that I [—a former student activist] work in the banking institution is disclosed. The trust of society is important for the banking institution.75

Has Japanese Companies Integrated New Leftists

Japanese companies were so wary about former student activists that many of the activists found it difficult to get jobs in the companies. On the other hand, some companies attempted to make use of former activists' energy to revitalize their organizations. In 1969, at a roundtable of business managers on the university disputes, Tanaka Shinichi, a vice-president of Jūjō Paper, stated:

...people who resorted to gebabō will not continue the same after entering companies. From the viewpoint of private businesses, these people have possibilities to become highly motivated in their work if we make good use of them. An interesting story says that current business leaders do not usually come from among high-achieving students of Tokyo University—such students work in the Minister of Finance, the Bank of Japan, or other bureaucratic jobs. Many of the business leaders are required to be energetic. We cannot generalize, but we can perceive this trend. From this viewpoint, at least I do not want to condemn their whole life if the former activists did wrong things in their young days. However, it is certainly dangerous to accept them without any conditions. It will cause trouble if suspect people get into our company. In this sense, I am cautious about them, but I am not too concerned about their presence.76

In an interview with managers of big businesses about whether to employ former student activists, Yuasa Yūchi, a president of Yuasa Battery,  

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75 Ibid, p.36.
answered the question “how much do you think that activity and energy are important in recruiting students?” as follows:

I think an ability to get things done important. Extremely radical students are not welcome, but those who are interested in social issues, have healthy ideas, and are willing to act, can be accepted. Young people are likely to be passionate, very sensitive, idealistic, and progressive. We will reject feckless, indifferent, and apathetic people (sanmu shugi). Workers who are not interested in problems of their companies, labour unions, and social issues are not reliable at all. They are satisfied only with their salary. They correspond to non-political students and netoraiki students [— students who did not join any demonstrations, rallies, and lockouts] on campus. Such workers lack passion about their job, creativity for development, and, not to mention, spirit to work seriously with rationalization of management.77

Gotô Noboru, a president of Tōkyū Corporation, also stated:

Netoraiki students are the worst. I can understand that non-sect students become a little active in the bad conditions of current universities. Rather, pure students who are committed to the reform of their university may be better than earlier generations. I do not think that the quality of students is worse than before. How many hours students study in a classroom on campus does not determine whether they are good or bad.78

As the economic boom had ended in the early 1970s, Japanese companies found it necessary to reform their organizations in order to win tough international competition. However, administrative or technical workers as well as blue-collar workers were robbed of opportunities to exert their

wisdom and knowledge in the workplace by the mass-production system. Many workers just performed their routines in the workplace as instructed. They were forced into being more subordinate to the control of labour management. The workers, who were unhappy at their simple and boring jobs, became passionless and self-absorbed.

Some big companies began to encourage workers to form small groups in their workplace, work together with their workmates, and consider how to do their work effectively (represented by the quality control movement known as QC, which was often adopted in the automobile industry). The key to this labour management was to encourage workers to be actively involved in their jobs.79 As discussed above, some big companies' managers noted that they expected former student activists to play a key role in reforming their companies. The managers believed that they could make good use of the activists' passion and energy if they were able to convert the activists into business people.

Some of the new leftists who got jobs in companies accepted this implicit offer from businesses. Miyazaki Kunio examined how Japanese companies sought to integrate former student activists. Mr. S was a council member of the student association of Hitotsubashi University and gradually joined new left movements. He graduated from the university in 1970, got a job in a precision machine maker, and was soon assigned to its local corporation in Hong Kong. He described his experiences as follows:

One and a half years after I entered the company, I was ordered to work in Hong Kong and was charged with some duties as "a frontline soldier". The duties included export of clocks and their parts. I actually made a deal with "black marketeers", that is to say,

79 See Kumazawa. Shinpen Nihon no Rōdōshazō, pp.167-72.
outlaws from Asian countries, and watched them so that they did not send goods into the black market. It was exciting, because I, who had antipathy toward the state and the regime, was quite delighted at making a deal with black marketeers who deviated from the state and the regime. I did not feel uncomfortable and ambivalent. Rather, I was saved [by my busy days for work in Hong Kong].

Okuyama Reiko, who entered Osaka College of Foreign Languages in 1965, was influenced by leaflets which she was given out at the entrance gate of the campus every day. She felt as if the leaflets told her that she should be more interested in social problems rather than devoting herself to studying. She read all of the leaflets and went to student rallies. After graduating from the college, she was employed in the Osaka branch of the Bank of Tokyo. She was assigned to the export division and charged with purchase of export bills. She recalled:

I received the latest information on various countries by fax from oversees every day. The information was necessary for purchase of export bills, and I received information on the exchange rate, which changed every day after the introduction of the floating rate system. The devaluation of the dollar and the oil shock made work at the bank, which had been busy before, much busier, but the busy work gave me energy, I felt where the world was going, and I enjoyed the days very much. I almost forgot that I had been criticized for “working in the bank, a vanguard of capitalism”. In line with my expectation, I was liberated from student movements and social problems.

As discussed above, the idea of self-revolution in “everydayness” had a risk of having a negative impact on mobilization of new left movements. Most

new leftists were not sure why they were facing deadlock. It was ironic that new left movements declined increasingly as a result of the activists being faithful to the principle of the movements. Whereas new left movements lost support and only brutal intra- or inter-group conflicts were highlighted by the media, the number of nihilistic young people increased. According to an analysis by sociologist Inoue Shun, the young people defended themselves from the real pain of their anticipated defeat and disappointment.\(^{82}\) Being nihilistic helped them to survive once new left movements no longer gave them any outlook. This meant that Japanese young people's idealism, that is, their expectation of changing the world and building a just society, was dissipated.

**Summary**

In the late 1960s, Japanese new leftists took radical direct action as a way of establishing a benchmark to determine how far they transformed their conservative and depoliticized consciousness, which they referred to as "everydayness". This approach was successful in mobilizing many young people. Some new leftists practiced the idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" through direct action called gewalt or counter-violence. The police controlled the activists strictly between 1968 and 1971. Due to the massive arrest of the activists the movements demobilized rapidly. Some activists were militarized in order to gain visible criteria of how far they had achieved self-revolution in "everydayness". The counter-violence sometimes caused damage to local residents, who had not participated in the movements but given them implicit support. Some residents began to form vigilante groups

\(^{82}\) Inoue Shun. "'Asobi' Toshite no Nihirizumu: 'Nihiru' koto no Imi" in Tenbō April 1971.
in local areas to defend themselves from the violence, but many new leftists did not feel very concerned about the loss of support from the public so much.

Meanwhile, senior police officers developed new strategies for policing new left movements in this period. They suggested that the police should urge residents, who were anxious about new leftists' gewalt, to work together with them for public security and build a surveillance system in local communities. They also suggested that police officers should be trained as "servants" to the public to gain support from residents. The transformation of policing strategies was symbolized in the development of Community Relations (CR) and in highlighting the role of *gaikin keisatsu*. These strategies made it possible for the police to create an image in the media as guardians of citizens from brutal activists. This image prevented many new leftists from taking direct action on streets to gain a sense of liberation. While the movements were deprived of the aspect of self-liberation, the self-reflective idea was emphasized, and the idea of the movements became more introspective. In this way, new policing strategies affected the discourse of new left movements.

In this difficult situation, many new leftists gave up their engagement in the movements. They were disturbed by three difficulties entailed by the idea of self-revolution in "everydayness". First of all, the activists tried to transform the whole range of their consciousness and behaviour. Some of them required their colleagues to examine and transform "everydayness". This always had the risk of being too harsh on their colleagues and causing troubles or conflicts between the activists. Even new leftists who had never dreamed of joining the United Red Armies and other radical groups felt that they were not entirely unconnected to inter- or intra-group conflicts called *uchigeba*, so many new leftists were deeply shocked by repeated violence among some of the activists.
Second, the idea of self-revolution made it difficult for many new leftists to compromise in transforming everyday life. They were always propelled to change “everydayness” drastically, so they were seriously disturbed by a sense of failure after they gave up their commitment. Third, the sense of failure prevented them from passing on their experiences to the next generation. Many new leftists felt that no words were able to describe their experiences, so they were reluctant to deceive themselves by putting their experiences into words. It was ironic that many new leftists faced these difficulties because they were faithful to the principle of new left movements. Many activists were propelled by the three difficulties entailed by self-revolution in “everydayness” to leave the movements. These difficulties further aggravated the initial decline of the movements which had resulted from mass arrests.
This chapter examines how new leftists continued their commitment in the 1970s. Many Japanese new leftists left the movements around 1970, but this did not mean that the movements completely disappeared. In the 1970s, Tsumura Takashi, a former activist of Zenkyōtō, wrote:

Zenkyōtō activists found their own issues outside campus. Some of them stayed and promoted the courses of “han daigaku [—“anti-universities”. i.e. lectures which were critical of the existing university system]” on campus, or they continued to tackle education reform, but many of the individuals or groups of Zenkyōtō, as a whole, found their own issues and went in different directions. This did not mean a “failure” of the movements. People would suffer a sense of “failure” only when they held fast to an illusion, grasped everything only by words, and found the gap between the outcomes of their actions and the illusion…. When the Zenkyōtō activists went in different directions, they began to develop their “theories”; they considered the way of having relations with discriminated people, built real relations with them, and changed the quality of those relationships. In this process, they criticized discrimination and developed their theories on democratic organizations. They discovered residents’ movements which protested against pollution and economic development, joined and learned from the movements, changed to a less environmentally destructive lifestyle as much as possible, and sought to develop a more ecological lifestyle. These attempts led Zenkyōtō to promote their theories of ecology and criticism of industrialization.¹

Tsumura claimed that new leftists spread to various parts of Japan and continued their commitment to tackling various issues, such as environmental destruction, gender equality, discrimination against ethnic minorities, or poverty in Third World countries. In the late 1960s, new leftists aimed to live faithfully

¹ Tsumura (ed.). Zenkyōtō, pp.115-16.
according to the principle of the movements, that is, self-revolution in “everydayness”. This chapter explores how the activists inherited the principle from their predecessors and deepened it after large numbers of new left groups collapsed in the 1970s.

Chapter 3 showed that many new leftists were worried by the ironic results of their actions around 1970. The harder they worked to transform “everydayness”, the more difficulties they faced. An increasing number of the activists were propelled to leave the movements. In this difficult situation, some of the new leftists sought to find a way of making their commitment sustainable and began to organize the alternative learning movement. How did new leftists deepen their ideas and sustain their commitment? This is the first question in this chapter.

Second, this chapter examines Japanese international solidarity movements. In the 1970s, some of the new leftists also tried to build ties with people’s movements for democratization in Asian countries, because they found out that Asian people often suffered the destruction of their lives from development projects promoted by Japanese companies, and Japanese people’s affluent lives were connected with Asian people’s suffering. I explore how the activists found the connections, tried to redress injustices, and build ties with Asian people. This is the second question in this chapter. This chapter thus aims to trace the history of new left movements in the 1970s to explore their legacy for Japanese civil society.

1. “Shiko Shiko Yatte Ikō (Do it in your Place at your Pace)”
Many new leftists were so deeply shocked by intra- or inter-group conflicts that they left the movements in the 1970s. In February 1972, several activists of the United Red Army (Rengō Sekigun) kidnapped an old couple who looked after a summer cottage (Asama Sansō) in Karuizawa, Nagano prefecture. After the kidnappers were arrested, it was revealed that they had killed 14 of their colleagues under the name of "purges (shukusei)" in their military-style training in mountainous areas. Once the media reported this sensationally, this horrible news quickly spread. Many new leftists were shocked by the reports and came to despair of their activism. Takagi Masayuki, a journalist who worked on student movements, wrote a report on the growing worries and anxieties in new left movements after the news of the murder spread:

"Are they [—the media reports] all true? I find it hard to believe it". A student activist of the tōha group, who worked hard in political activism on campus, said this in a gloomy voice which was different from usual, was lost for words for a while, and put the phone down without further words. The news of the surprising abnormal incident by a small group of the United Red Army was broadcast according to information sourced from the police, and some people went on excursions with their children during the following holidays to the place where the dead bodies were discovered. In the situation in which Japanese people were affected by mass hysteria, activists who joined anti-establishment movements in the past or are now involved in them took the incident the most seriously.2

The activists did not think that the murder was irrelevant to them. Takagi noted that a number of students who visited Unita Shobō in Kanda, a bookstore which sold many publications and pamphlets by or on new left

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movements, decreased significantly on the day when intra- or inter-group violence occurred. According to his analysis, students were so despairing of the violence that they did not feel like thinking about their activism on the day of the violence, even if they were not directly involved in the violence.³

Because of the repeated intra- or inter-group conflicts, young people faced deadlock and gave up their commitment to the movements. About ten thousand students who had joined Nichidai Tōsō dropped out of university.⁴ Many of them had thought seriously about what to do and finally decided to leave the movements. Activists of the Anpo protests of 1960 may also have suffered a sense of failure from the rapid decline of the protests, but most of them focused mainly on changing institutional politics (against the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty), so even when failing to achieve change, they could return to the shelter of their private lives. In contrast, new leftists in the late 1960s rejected the distinction between the public and the private. Since they raised the slogan of transforming their depoliticized consciousness in everyday life as a step to change the public sphere, they were no longer allowed to return to their private lives when they faced a deadlock in the movements. In the late 1960s, new left students criticized the university system for reproducing the hierarchical relationship of society. After the campus disputes ended, many of them decided to leave their university, because they thought that staying in university was a betrayal of the principle of the movements.

Not only student activists but also other young people faced deadlock in the 1970s. This is shown in the outcome of the World Youth Survey in 1972.

⁴ "Undō no Chinsen to Takakuka" in Asahi Jānaru 5 February 1971, p.5.
and 1977. The questionnaire surveyed 18-24 year-old people who lived in eleven countries, Japan, the USA, Britain, West Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, India, the Philippines, and Brazil. 73.5% in 1972, and 57% in 1977 of Japanese young respondents were "more or less dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with their "society" (the other options were "satisfied" and "more or less satisfied"). The figure was very high relative to the other ten countries (the highest in 1972, and the second highest next to France in 1977).

The answer of Japanese respondents to the question of why do you do nothing regardless of dissatisfaction with your society is also worth noting. In the survey of 1977, two-thirds of the respondents selected the answer of "individuals can do nothing" to the question. This figure was overwhelmingly higher than those of other countries (see Table 1). The other options included "the affairs of society should be handled by persons in the proper position" or "there are other things which are more important to me". The answer of Japanese young people converged on "the problems involved are beyond the reach of individuals". Thus, the World Youth Survey shows that Japanese young people in the 1970s, who lived after the decline of new left movements, felt serious despair and were disappointed with political activism as a means of social change. One reason for despair and disappointment appear to have been mainly the repeated intra- or inter-group conflicts within new left groups.


Table 1: The percentage of respondents who selected “the problems involved are beyond the reach of individuals” (Source: The World Youth Survey 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>38.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>46.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>18.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>32.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRZ</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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</tbody>
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How to Transform “Everydayness”

In this period, “shiko shiko yatteikō (do it in your place at your pace)” became a popular phrase. The phrase revealed that some new leftists resolved to continue their commitment to self-revolution in “everydayness” at their own pace rather than give it up. At a roundtable after barricades were dissolved on campus, Mr. T, a student who had joined Tōdai Tōsō and subsequently left university to become a day worker in Sanya stated:

We will be unable to present a vision by engaging in macro-politics [—policies, institutions, or regime] at this time. I would like to persist in changing micro-politics [—power relations in everyday life] in Sanya, so I will devote myself to becoming a fully-fledged day worker and my life to activities in Sanya.7

Mr. T then moved to detailed discussions about how he, from outside of Sanya, was involved in the community activities. His comment shows how much he learned from his efforts to adjust to people’s lives in Sanya. On the other hand, the comment also implied that new leftists found it hard to believe in producing the drastic social change at the “macro-politics” level. The belief which they had in the 1960s might have been just an illusion, but it is not unusual in social changes that large numbers of people are encouraged by an illusion. In the early 1970s, this illusion had almost disappeared in Japanese new left movements.

7 “Zadankai Kyanpasu o Misutete” in Asahi Jânaru 5 February 1971, p.17.
The outcome of the World Youth Survey discussed earlier suggests that passion for social change was disappearing and instead apathy was widespread amongst young Japanese people in the 1970s. After new left movements declined, many young people did not know how to express their frustration with controlled society. An increasing number of new leftists faced deadlock and left the movements without sufficiently reviewing and discussing their experiences. Tamura Masatoshi, a leader of Nichidai Zenkyötö, wrote:

I will say again and again that I am looking at 1968. I would like to review with many people what I talked about, did, was engaged in, and failed in. I suggest that we should start organizing our memories. The memories are decaying. Keeping them in an individual's mind is impossible, and we should not do this. We should organize both pleasant and unpleasant memories. We should change the experiences into ones for use in everyday life, externalize them, and allow them to fight with other experiences before they are rationalized away. Let's make efforts from the inside. Silence means that we accept the current situation.8

He was deeply concerned that the experiences gained by new leftists in the 1960s were about to vanish. Many new leftists stopped discussing their experiences when they gave up their commitment to the movements.

In this difficult situation, some of the activists began to discuss the way of continuing to engage in movements. In the middle of the repeated intra- or inter-group conflicts in the early 1970s, Oda Makoto, a well-known activist of Beheiren, wrote:

I am always puzzled that people's continuous commitment is not discussed so much, though people's participation in social

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movements is discussed again and again. The reason is that social movements are discussed from the viewpoint of vanguards or leaders in the movements, that is, “great people (erai hito)—if I am allowed to express it with a strange word—or they are discussed by those people. The word “great people” is different from in the normal usage. Here, it means people who are so capable, knowledgeable, courageous, and active that they are eligible to be leaders of the movements. They usually take their continuous commitment for granted. However, what about people on the edge, not in the middle, of the movements: those who are not as capable, knowledgeable, courageous, and active as the “great persons”? Whilst the great persons “keep living” in the movements, ordinary people do not have any space for existence. Well, ordinary people are not sure of whether to live in the movements. They do not know it, but they “keep living”. I think that the issue of continuous commitment is the most important for ordinary people. The issue is significant for Beheiren, which assumes from the beginning that it does not have the “great persons” and that everybody is at once in the middle and on the edge of the movements without distinction between vanguards and rearguards.⁹

Oda claimed that social movements were composed of two kinds of human beings. The one was a small group of vanguards who were highly competent, had strong willpower, and continued to be active no matter what difficulties they faced. The other was the majority of people who always wavered over whether to participate in activism. In the late 1960s, new left movements grew so rapidly that their organizers did not need to discuss the issue of how activists continued to commit themselves to the movements. New leftists had assumed that people would not stop being engaged in the movements. However, when more and more activists gave up their commitment to the movements in the 1970s, they could not help thinking that

discussions about their continuous commitment were indispensable to maintaining the movements.

Inoue Sumio, a young activist of Beheiren also discussed this issue. He wrote:

In recent days, many people around me have begun to discuss "strategies on the way of living (ikikata no senryaku)". These are discussions about how we are going to live from now on. The fundamental thing is how to live, or to put it indirectly, the more fundamental thing is how and what job with you earn your livelihood. As a matter of course, this is also a big problem for those who have a regular job in the present. In this case, the issues are how people are currently earning their livelihood, whether the livelihood and the way of living are fair, whether they can find any other ways, that is, other "strategies on the way of living", and whether changing the way of living slowly along the line of these "strategies" is possible.10

The issue of "strategies on the way of living", which he addressed, was based on the principle of new left movements. In the late 1960s, new leftists focused on transforming "everydayness". This meant that the activists were obliged to examine their private lives as well as the public sphere; they could no longer ignore the way of earning their livelihood, one of the most crucial aspects of "everydayness". Curiously, the issue of livelihood had not been discussed in the late 1960s, but some new leftists realized in the 1970s that they should debate the way of making a living to transform everyday life. Inoue discussed this in the early 1970s, in the period when many new leftists had given up tackling the issue of self-revolution in "everydayness". New leftists thus came to discuss how they overcame a feeling of failure and sustained their engagement in the early 1970s.

In particular, some activists of Beheiren found it important to discuss their continuous commitment, but these discussions spread widely to other new leftists too. New leftists assumed that their activism was based on people's voluntary participation, so their participation was always more fragile than the semi-compulsory mobilization in the old left's large-scale organizations such as labour unions. In the 1970s, many new leftists realized that they had to debate their continuous commitment, because they were also in danger of being suddenly frustrated and giving up their engagement in self-revolution in "everydayness".

The Balance between Different Aspects of Living

How could new leftists continue their commitment to self-revolution outside the spaces behind the barricades? Oda Makoto was one person who was passionate about discussing this issue. In his book *Yonaoshi no Rinri to Ronri* (The Ethics and Logic of Social Change) published in 1972, he claimed that the book was written not for self-appointed "revolutionists (*kakumeika*)" but for "ordinary people or common people" who were always concerned about their lives and future while they wanted to change their society.\(^1\)

According to Oda, people's "living (*kurashi*)" could be classified into three aspects.\(^2\) The first was "life (*inochi*)". This was linked with the nature of human beings as a creature who could feel, think, laugh, or cry. The second was "work (*shigoto*)". "Work" connected a person's "living" to those of other people. The third was "play (*asobi*)". The three aspects had their own logic and ethic, and each one was influenced by the other two. Oda insisted that "living" was composed of the fragile balance between the three aspects. For example,

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\(^2\) Ibid, p.115.
“play” enriched people’s minds, but if person who only played without working, would soon fall into bankruptcy.\(^\text{13}\)

Citing student activists as an example, Oda warned that the balance of the three aspects was easily disrupted. The activists were too devoted to “work”, that is, their participation in the public sphere. This caused the lack of “life” and “play” in their “living”. He wrote:

People who downplay their own “life” and “play” are unable to understand the importance of someone else’s “life” and ‘play”. They are full of hypocrisy: “I give up my ‘play’ and am ready to die for revolution and struggles, but how about you?” They regard other people as hopeless and cowardly opportunists or revisionists. They eventually compete in their degree of commitment to serving their struggles.\(^\text{14}\)

Oda claimed that some new leftists devoted all of their time and energies to their “work”, that is, political activism. This robbed them of a spirit of tolerance and finally led them to intra- or inter-group conflicts. Similar discussions can be discerned in the women’s liberation movement. As discussed in Chapter 3, female activists criticized male activists for their unbalanced life: men were engaged only in public activities without participating in routine, such as food preparation or toilet cleaning, in the spaces behind the barricades.

“Living” or everyday life had not been so crucial for “the postwar progressives” in the 1950s, but new leftists saw it as an indispensible part of social change in the late 1960s. However, many of the activists made too simplistic a connection between “everydayness” and grand, abstract concepts such as imperialism and revolution. Muro Kenji, a young activist of Beheiren, stated the problems as follows:

\(^{13}\) Ibid, pp.204-05.
\(^{14}\) Ibid, pp.200-01.
In the period of Zenkyōtō movements, young activists sought to connect self-negation, their personal issues in everyday life, with the industrial-academic cooperation (sangaku kyōdō) or Japanese imperialism (nihon teikoku shugi), highly abstract issues. We live in frameworks like bean sweets without bean jam [an no nai monaka, that is, form without content].

In the 1970s, new leftists became aware that they could not transform everyday life without balancing between different aspects of "living". How could they grasp "living" concretely without ignoring internal conflicts between its different aspects?

2. Learning from People's Lives

The Alternative Learning Movement

In the spaces behind the barricades on campus, new leftists had sought to organize their own learning activities called "Han Daigaku (anti-university)", "Hihan Daigaku (critical university)" or "Jishu Kōza (independent courses)". After the barricades came down on campus and many new leftists gave up their commitment, the alternative learning movement (gakushū undō) was formed both within and outside campus. What was the aim of organizing the movements? Kikuchi Yoshinobu, an activist who joined the movements on campus at Rikkyo University in the early 1970s, wrote:

The Jishu Kōza movements aim to incorporate social movements into the existing university system, to spread the ideas of the movements to institutions, make the actual institutions work

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15 Fukutomi Setsuo, Yoshikawa Yūichi, Muro Kenji, Asō Kaoru, and Okada Osamu. "Jiritsu Shita Ningen no Ryūtsū eno Tabidachi" in Shimin January 1974, p.82.
effectively, and transform them. Not only that, but the movements try again to inherit various issues and half-formed ideas from the struggles in 1968 and 1969 with a sense of reality in the present.16

In the difficult situation of the 1970s, the alternative learning movement aimed to tackle “various issues and half-formed ideas”.

Two examples of the alternative learning movement are discussed in this chapter. The first is the “Terakoya”, which was founded in spring 1971 in a room of a small apartment in Takadanobaba, Tokyo. In the early 1970s, a couple of German student activists of der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS), a network of German student groups, encouraged Japanese new leftists to form a reading group independent from existing universities. Dozens of Japanese new leftists began to run the “Terakoya”, a school which offered of several courses on language, philosophy, history, and so on. They named the school after the name of cottages (hottate goya) and people’s schools in the Edo period (terakoya).17 The other example of the alternative learning movement is the Jishu Köza (independent lectures). The Jishu Köza was founded in a classroom of Tokyo University in October 1970, after a symposium hosted by some research assistants in the Faculty of Engineering. Ui Jun, a research assistant who specialized in urban engineering, gave regular lectures on environmental pollution.

Many former student activists joined the Terakoya and the Jishu Köza in order to restart their commitment to activism. As discussed earlier, they were deeply disturbed by a feeling of failure in this period. Looking back on the beginning of the Jishu Köza, Ui wrote:

The prime reason for opening these courses was that former activists would degenerate if they did not do anything. I believed that not only the activists but also students at Tokyo University and young people who studied hard for the entrance examination of the university would degenerate. We ought not to leave them alone. Furthermore, some people lost their jobs while others were wounded in Tōdai Tōsō. Many students were unable to return to their university. Our aim was to restart their failed attempts, even though it was a little late. We decided to take our time drastically criticizing the Japanese university system (Tokyo University was the top of this system) and “scrapping the system” (many people had tried this in various places, but they had not succeeded).

The alternative learning movement was thus seen as a place where former new leftists would recover from their mental trauma, reconsider their experiences of the past, and restart their engagement with activism.

Restarting New Left Movements

The alternative learning movement sought to tackle the problems of “Does academic knowledge actually serve people’s lives?” and “What sort of knowledge serves the people?” The movement’s participants tried to revive these issues, which had been addressed by new left movements in the late 1960s. In his remarks in the first lecture on Kōgai Genron (a fundamental theory of pollution) at the Jishu Köza, Ui suggested that students should “learn things which are essential for their lives rather than useful for social climbing”. According to Ui, academic knowledge, which students could gain at university, was not necessarily useful in their everyday life; rather going to a reputable university was a ticket to higher positions in governments and companies. This was the reason why new leftists had criticized the university

system for reproducing social hierarchies in the late 1960s. In the 1970s, many alternative learning activists regarded their study as a means of solving people’s problems in everyday life rather than of passing entrance examinations or being promoted in government or company jobs.

The goal of the Terakoya was “study in the field (no no gaku)”. This slogan indicated that the activists aimed to learn with and for ordinary people who lived outside campus. In order to achieve the goal, the activists were careful about the location of desks and chairs in the classroom. They pointed out that a platform was usually located in front of student’s desks in the classroom on campus, so the distinction between teachers and students was obvious. In the Terakoya, in contrast, all participants sat around a table. This meant that relations between lecturers and students were not always fixed: a person might be a student at one time, but the same person could be a teacher at another.20

The alternative learning activists were interested in debating administrative duties. They were different in this from new leftists, particularly student activists, in the 1960s. Because many new leftists had not thought seriously about their continuous commitment, they had tended to ignore or neglect administrative duties which were essential for their continuous commitment. Only one person was initially responsible for the finance of the Terakoya, but fiscal problems in 1974-75 encouraged many of the activists to discuss administrative duties.21 They concluded that the problems resulted not so much from the lack of funds as from their failure in running the group. After that, the activists introduced the collective management style in the Terakoya.

Sawai Keiichi, a convener of the Terakoya in the late 1970s, looked back on the crisis:

When I took over as convener, Mr. Yagaki [—an administrative staff member who had been responsible for finance] was not always in the office, so I felt that administrative duties, trivial things such as sharing information on lecture groups or cleaning the office, were very important, because we would be unable to gather and debate once a week without such duties having been done. Our activities should not be a "play" in the world of ideas (this may not be a good word). Some members were willing to take on work which the secretary had done by himself before. They became aware of the importance of administrative duties. Then other people also came to realize this and worked as council members or editors of our journals. I think that the Terakoya has progressed in terms of administration in the past five years.22

The council was formed in the middle of the 1970s after the fiscal problems were revealed. Each course was obliged to send a delegate to the council (the Terakoya was composed of plural courses on language and philosophy). In the council, the delegates discussed administrative duties, such as the editing of their journals, finance, and cleaning.

The activists of the Jishu Kôza were also interested in discussing administrative duties in the committee. The duties, such as lecture recording, transcribing, printing, and contacting lecturers, were essential to run their weekly courses and publish their journals regularly.23 The activists became aware of the importance of administrative duties through their daily management of the Jishu Kôza. New left movements were based on spontaneous participation rather than semi-compulsory mobilization by large

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organizations, so the lack of volunteers for administrative duties was always a concern for new leftists. Whereas large organizations could usually solve the problem by employing administrative staff, new leftists had to rely on volunteers if they were faithful to their principle. The way to share the burden of administrative duties was thus a crucial issue for the movements.

The Place for Self-revolution in “Everydayness”

Although the alternative learning movement was different in their approach to administrative duties from new left movements in the 1960s, they sought to continue the idea of self-revolution in “everydayness”. Yamaizumi Susumu, a former convener of the Terakoya, put it this way in Terakoya Tsūshin:

Whether the topic of study is foreign languages, technology, and philosophy, the subjectivity of those who learn is the most crucial issue. Unless this issue is considered, foreign language will turn out to be a tool for career success, and technology and philosophy will disintegrate into mere information.... The issue of subjectivity has to be discussed, first of all, by us people who have lost the possibilities of counter-spaces or are unable to find strategic spaces. This is not a pleasant story. The Terakoya is a place where we expose our feeble selves in order to build subjectivity. This is the idea of self-negation, which we inherited in some sense from the Zenkyōtō movements, intellectual movements in which the subject was built by exposing ourselves as a target to be negated.24

He claimed that the aim of study in the Terakoya was not to gain knowledge but to “build the subjectivity”, negating and transforming ways of thinking. The idea of self-revolution in “everydayness” clearly remained influential in the ideas of the Terakoya.

24 Yamaizumi Susumu. “‘Terakoya’ kara Terakoya e” in Terakoya Tsūshin May 1974, p.5.
The activists of the Jishu Köza were also interested in transforming "everydayness" although they did not use the word. Their monthly journals helped them to reflect on their way of thinking. Yasukawa Sakae, a member of the committee of the Jishu Köza, stated:

"Young people write poor sentences with great effort. These articles may not have great social impact, but at least the young people can transform themselves. I think that the Jishu Köza is such a place."  

Many activists of the Jishu Köza were neither writers nor scholars, so their articles written in the journals were not necessarily sophisticated. Nevertheless, Yasukawa noted that writing poor articles in the journals was worthwhile, because it encouraged the activists to reflect on their ideas and actions.

In the late 1960s, many new leftists were worried by the lack of visible benchmarks of achievement on how far they had changed their depoliticized consciousness in everyday life. They solved the problem by developing an abstract understanding of "everydayness". The understanding pushed some activists to take actions such as guerrilla fighting. In order to avoid such a pitfall of self-satisfaction, alternative learning activists tried to learn with various people in terms of occupation, gender, and age. For example, the Terakoya of the 1977 fiscal year was composed of 130 members. Their age was between the twenties and sixties, and their occupations were students, office workers, public servants, teachers, doctors, and part-time workers. This meant that the members were able to meet a wider range of people in the Terakoya than in spaces behind barricades in which had mostly been occupied by students. The

activists of the Jishu Kōza were not limited to students of Tokyo University, though the lectures were given on the campus of the university. In particular, the members of the committee which ran the lecture courses contained many extramural people, and they made a great contribution to the Jishu Kōza's unique activities.27 The alternative learning activists practiced the idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" with colleagues who came from various backgrounds. The colleagues played the role of watchdog for young activists in the movements, who tended toward self-satisfaction.

New Leftists' Visit to Local Struggles

In the 1970s, the alternative learning movement spread to various regions of Japan. Some alternative learning groups were integrated into university curricula or turned into adult education centres in local areas. Whereas this might be a great result in terms of institutionalizing the ideas of the movement, these education centres slowly lost the aspect of being an alternative school which was critical of the existing education system.28 In the late 1970s, some members of the Terakoya pointed out that as the groups and lectures increased, the content of each lecture was becoming highly specialized and less open to everybody. The members of one lecture found it difficult to have close communication with those of other lectures, so each lecture tended to be isolated.29

28 For example, the Jishu Kōza movement in Osaka City University was integrated into the official curricula of the university in this period. Some activists were concerned that it would deprive the movement of the goal of transforming "everydayness". See Yagi Kösuke. "Iki Nagaraeru 'Daigaku Tōsō': Osaka Shiritsu Daigaku no Jishu Kōza 'Ron' no Konnichi" in Gekkan Kyöiku no Mori September 1979.
29 "Atomu Repōto Terakoya Kyōshitsu ban 'Watashi no Daigaku'" in Takadanobaba December 1979, pp.31-32.
Other activists of the alternative learning movement went in different directions. They visited various regions of Japan to build ties with grassroots activists living in rural areas. In this period, an increasing number of rural people were involved in residents' movements (jūmin undo), protest actions against the destruction of the local environment. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese state mobilized material and human resources to achieve GNP-based economic growth and material affluence under the ideology of "developmentalism". The ideology assumed that the national economic growth would be beneficial to all the people including rural residents: the national government invested huge public funds in infrastructure projects in rural areas; local governments would then attract heavy industry to their towns, which would result in expanding industry in those areas and creating demand for their related industries; large numbers of workers would be employed in the industry, earn cash incomes, and spend them in local shopping areas; this spending would thus have spill-over effects on all the people living in the area.

However, the ideology ignored the dark side of developmental projects. In fact, rural people suffered from the negative impact of "developmentalism": the heavy industry brought industrial pollution and damage to rural areas;

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30 Kumamoto Kazuki. "Zenkyōtō Igo" in Shisō no kagaku October 1975, p.15. In the 1970s, some young people began to build small communities in rural areas. They attempted to live in self-sufficient communities independent from commercialized cities. Their attempts were parts of young people's trend, "from campus to the local". See Kon Sakimori. Komyūn o Ikiru Wakamon tachi. Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1987.

31 Residents' movements are characterized as "indigenous, based on living places". They can be distinguished from citizens' movements (shimin undō), such as antiwar movements or student movements, which act away from members' living places (Nakamura Kiichi. Jūmin Undō 'Shi' ron. Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1976, p.14). Residents' movements will be discussed more in Chapter 5.


some rural people had their land expropriated by local governments which sought to construct huge factories, power plants, and other large-scale facilities; local small companies lost competition with big businesses and declined rapidly; workers who lost their jobs in these companies emigrated to Tokyo and other big cities to find new jobs; the problem of depopulation became serious in rural areas. In this difficult situation, more and more rural people were angry at the destruction of their livelihood and began to join residents' movements.34

Many alternative learning activists visited some key local conflict sites, such as Minamata35, Sanrizuka (discussed below), Sanya36, Okinawa37, as well as little-known factories, villages, or communes. Some members of the Jishu Kôza formed special groups on Okinawa, Shibushi Bay, and other places in which many local people suffered the negative impact of "developmentalism".

35 Minamata is a small village in Kumamoto prefecture. The village became well-known for Minamata disease, which killed and maimed hundreds of people. It came from methyl mercury poisoning in industrial wastes released into Minamata Bay by Nihon Chisso (the Japan Nitrogen Company). The Minamata victims were initially rebuffed by governments and the company. After some scientists identified the cause in the 1960s, Chisso and the government claimed that the Minamata problem was privately settled by the agreement drafted in 1959 which Chisso paid to Minamata victims for sympathy rather than compensation. This agreement did not admit their responsibility for pollution emission, so the Minamata victims took legal action against Chisso and the government.
36 Sanya is the largest place in several Tokyo yoseba, gathering places for casual labourers. The workers lived in the cheap accommodation of the doyagai (lodging-house district), a densely populated area. A large number of discriminated people, such as Koreans, Chinese, other Asians, Okinawans, Ainu, and outcasts (hisabetsu burakumin), lived in Sanya. The majority of the workers were employed by the construction industry. Because some companies worked together with yakuza, Japanese gangsters, the workers had to confront the yakuza in requiring the companies to improve their working conditions (Fowler, Edward. SAN'YA BLUES: Laboring Life in Contemporary Tokyo. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996, Ch.1).
37 Okinawa was occupied by the USA after the Second World War. Local people in Okinawa were disturbed by problems caused by the presence of American military bases, such as noise or violence from the U.S. military personnel. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 did not lead to their liberation from the problems. Whereas the area of the military bases in the mainland of Japan decreased around 1972, that of Okinawa did not change. Since the three-quarters of the American military facilities in Japan were stationed in Okinawa in 1974, many Okinawan people were disappointed with the Japanese government, which gave permission for the military bases to the USA (Arasaki Moriteru. Okinawa Gendaishi. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996, Ch.1).
The Jishu Köza no longer stayed on campus; it visited various regions of Japan. The encounters with rural people made it possible for the activists to reflect on "everydayness" with a wealth of knowledge about realities which these rural people faced. When the Kikyô movements were forgotten by many activists after the summer of 1960, the concept of going to local areas to reflect on their social position had disappeared from the discourse of young people’s activism. New leftists focused mostly on organizing people living in cities in the context of the urbanization of the 1960s. However, when new leftists faced deadlock in the 1970s, they recast the way of learning from local people as a significant step to transform “everydayness”.

For example, in the late 1960s, Tani Yöichi, a student at Kagoshima University, organized a boycott of examinations to protest against mobilization of the riot police to the campus of the university to solve the disputes, but he was shocked that only about 10 students supported the boycott. Later he was engaged with his colleagues in residents' protests against the construction of a petroleum plant in rural areas of Kagoshima. He realized that what he had learned at university was inimical to farmers and fishers rather than serving their lives. In June 1971, he leased a room in Minamata and began to assist local fishers. In November of the year, some of the Minamata disease patients (see note 35 in this chapter) sat in protest in front of the office of Nihon Chisso, the offending company, and he stayed with them in their tents. He faced various difficulties in supporting the patients. A fishing cooperative, which was concerned about the infamous reputation of fish contaminated by toxic chemicals, and local workers who feared the loss of their jobs, were hostile to his activities. However, his ties with the patients made it possible for him to be aware of their daily concerns, such as their children's jobs and marriages, the separation of husbands and wives, or the like. In this way, he built personal
ties with grassroots activists and had a deeper understanding of “everydayness” through his visit to the place.38

Another example is the network of organic farming between farmers in Sanrizuka, a small rural district of Chiba prefecture near to Narita. In the late 1960s, local farmers in Sanrizuka were angry at the government’s undemocratic decisions about the construction project of Narita Airport, and protested to stop the project and defend their land (Sanrizuka Tōsō). Although the protests were powerful, they were slowly driven into a difficult situation. As one resident after another gave up the protests and their land in the 1970s and 1980s, small numbers of farmers continued to protest, and changed the way of modern farming encouraged by the government; they stopped using chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and launched organic farming.

Many new leftists who had joined the local residents’ protests since the 1960s regularly purchased organic vegetable produced by the farmers to give support to the protests and farming. The farmers delivered a box called “one pack vegetable (wan pakku yasai)” to the purchasers in which about ten kinds of freshly-harvested vegetables in season were packed. Several handouts on their protest actions against the construction project were also put in the box. When the farmers began to organize “the one pack vegetable” in 1976, only 38 households living in cities purchased the vegetables, but the number of the purchasers quickly increased to about 1,200 in 1981. What did the farmers aim at through organic farming? In a handout delivered in July 1978, the farmers wrote:

Our purpose of stopping the construction project of Narita Airport is to require the government to transform the policy of abandoning

Japanese farmers. We aim to transform the structure of Japanese politics. We think that just doing organic farming in Sanrizuka is not enough, we farmers would like to build organic relations with each other and urban workers.\textsuperscript{39}

The purchasers living in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama, received the packed vegetables twice a month. The producers delivered the packs to some groups of purchasers and built face-to-face relations with the purchasers. The aim of the one pack vegetable was to transform people's relationships, rather than do business, through organic vegetables.

Urban purchasers/activists were encouraged by the one pack vegetable to reflect on and transform their lifestyle. The price of the one pack vegetable was fixed; the purchasers paid a fixed price for a vegetable box regardless of the amount or kinds of vegetables. The aim of the price-fixing was to protect farmers from uncertainties in the market economy and guarantee their lives. The one pack vegetable helped the activists to build fairer relations with rural farmers. The relations were distinguished from those between producers and consumers. In the one pack vegetable system, the purchasers did not request the farmers to put their favourite vegetable in the box. This might be inconvenient for them, and the supermarkets were, of course, more convenient, but the purchasers did not complain about it. Rather they reflected on their convenient lives in cities in which they could buy any vegetable for almost the same price regardless of seasons or weather.

At a roundtable talk about the one pack vegetable project, Takegawa Yasunori, an activist of the National Union of General Workers Tokyo Nanbu (Zenkoku Ippan Tokyo Nanbu—the network of labour unions for employees in small companies) remarked:

Our group [of purchasers] has many people who are involved in activism, and some of them return home at 10 or 11 pm. We usually eat out before joining the one pack vegetable project, but now we have come to make all kinds of efforts to prepare for cooking quickly, and have transformed our diet though we are busy. The number of double income families whose husbands begin to enjoy cooking after joining the one pack vegetable—though I have not done it yet (laugh)—has increased. This means that we come to think about the relationship between men and women through our diet. Not only that, but we purchase pollution-free soap jointly. In this way, the one pack vegetable helps us to consider our “lives”.40

Most of the activists were usually so busy with rallies, demonstrations, and meetings that they tended to neglect the fundamental aspects of their lives, such as preparation of meals. The one pack vegetable project moved the new leftists to reflect on their lives and to become careful about small things in everyday life; what you ate, where the food came from, how the food was raised, and how it was cooked.

The Sanrizuka Struggle was exceptional in that various new leftists were committed and interacted. It was true that the struggle was not free from problems caused by direct action or intra- or inter-group conflicts, and did not gain a wide range of support. The Sanrizuka Struggle helped the police and media to give the stigma of “extremists” to new leftists. Nevertheless, the networks between farmers and activists mediated by the organic vegetables shows one way in which new leftists transformed “everydayness” through their commitment to rural people.

While visiting rural areas, some of the new leftists came to know that large-scale development projects caused serious damage to vulnerable

40 Ibid., p.170.
people's livelihood. They also realized that their affluent lives in cities were not possible without the destruction of rural people’s lives. The activists became more sensitive to their social position in Japanese society. A member of the Jishu Kôza emphasized the significance of her visit to local areas like this:

Now we should not begin to gather together under a new authority and convey its “messages”. Rather, we should begin to learn from struggles in the “local” and create the local in our life. The local does not mean a geographical location different from Tokyo. It is a place against the “centre”: a centre which is filled with a flood of words irrelevant to our life and virtual images. The local is the “place” of our life, and rootless people perceive it by shouting “we are alive”.

Her comment suggests that alternative learning activists visited local areas in order to transform themselves rather than rural people. The flow of the activists from the alternative learning movement to local areas was thus affected by the ideas of new left movements produced in the late 1960s. Grassroots activists were not always tolerant of the activists’ visits and ignorance about the local situation. Since some of the activists were obsessed with the stereotyped image of local residents fighting against authorities and urged the residents to be a part of national or international campaigns, conflicts and tension occurred between the residents and the activists.

However, grassroots activists fighting for the defence of their livelihood were a kind of a mirror for new leftists who tried to gain a richer and deeper understanding of their lives. In the early 1970s, the alternative learning movement worked with residents’ movements in various regions of Japan. In May 1973, Gekkan Chiiki Tôsô, a monthly journal about information on...

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residents’ movements, covered several articles about the alternative learning movement in Numazu\(^\text{42}\), Shizuoka, Yokkaichi\(^\text{43}\), Mie, and other places.

3. Building Ties with Asian People

Pollution Export to Asia

Japanese companies were criticized by many rural residents for destroying the environment during the 1960s. In the 1970s, the companies began to shift their investment to other Asian countries. Japan had lost economic relations with many Asian countries after its defeat in the Second World War. In the 1950s, the USA expected Japan, its junior partner, to reconstruct its economy and to be a bulwark against communist countries in East Asia. America incorporated Japan into the division of labour in the Asia region as a part of its anti-communist strategies. In particular, war reparations and yen loans helped many Japanese transnational companies to enter the market in Southeast Asian countries.\(^\text{44}\) Japan was also able to import cheap raw materials from these countries. Japan could not have achieved rapid

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\(^{42}\) Numazu is a city in Shizuoka prefecture. In the 1960s, the construction of a petrochemical complex was planned on the waterfront of Mishima, the city next to Numazu. Residents of Numazu were concerned about the complex’s negative impact on their health and the environment. They joined lobbying, rallies, public meetings, and demonstrations to stop the construction. This was one of the earliest protests against public pollution during the economic boom. The protest in Mishima and Numazu will be discussed more in Chapter 5.

\(^{43}\) Yokkaichi is a city in Mie prefecture. Since the petrochemical industry complex was built in the coast area and air pollution flowed into residential blocks, thousands of people suffered from severe asthma in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1967, nine Yokkaichi victims, who were supported by communities and scientists, started to fight in court with companies which ran the complex. They finally won the lawsuit in 1972, and the companies admitted causal responsibility.

industrialization in the 1960s without indirect support from Southeast Asian
countries.45

Japanese corporations increased the amount of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in the 1970s, especially in 1972, as the result of the
revaluation of the yen. Many large Japanese corporations became
transnational in this period. *Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō Sōran* (the compendium
of business overseas), a series of annual reports written by Tōyō Keizai
Shinpōsha, shows how rapidly Japanese major companies increased their
overseas branches and the amount of overseas investment and loans between
1972 and 1978. For example, Mitsui Bussan increased from 147 branches and
48.9 billion yen in 1972 to 272 branches and 248.7 billion yen in 1978.
Mitsubishi Shōji increased from 106 branches and 71.6 billion yen to 201
branches and 140.2 billion yen, Matsushita Electric Industrial from 25 branches
and 11.0 billion yen to 128 branches and 59.3 billion yen, and Nissan Motor
from 9 branches and 7.4 billion yen to 20 branches and 32.6 billion yen.
Japanese businesses focused particularly on investing in Asian countries. In
both the 1974 and 1977 fiscal years, Asia accounted for almost one-third of the
entire FDI of Japanese companies.46

Why did Japanese companies increase their investment in Asian
countries in the 1970s? The transformation of international finance in the early
1970s, that is, the devaluation of the U.S. dollar and the introduction of the
floating rate system, led to rapid yen appreciation. Domestic industries shifted
their factories to the Asian region to avoid the loss which would be caused by
yen appreciation. "Pollution export" was another reason for increased

45 Cummings, Bruce. "Japan's Position in the World System" in Gordon (ed.). *Postwar Japan as History.*
46 Tsushō Sangyō Shō (ed.). *Wagakuni Kigyō no Kaigai Jigyō Katsudō* (Shōwa 53 nen ban). Tokyo: Ōkurashō
investment in Asia. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, domestic antipollution and residents’ movements were successful in pushing the government to regulate the construction of pollution-emitting factories in Japan, so Japanese companies decided to relocate their factories to Asian countries. The companies were also attracted by cheaper labour forces, plentiful resources, and the lack of corporate regulations in other Asian countries.

The Kawasaki Steel Corporation’s factory in Mindanao, the Philippines, was a typical example of “pollution export”. In the postwar period, Kawasaki constructed iron works in Chiba prefecture and became a leading company in the steel industry. In the early 1970s, residents’ movements required local governments to monitor and regulate Kawasaki’s pollution emission, so Kawasaki was no longer able to construct pollution-emitting factories in Chiba as before. The company planned to relocate the factories overseas, particularly to the Philippines. This plan was supported by both the Philippine and Japanese governments. In 1974, Japanese PM Tanaka Kakuei had a summit meeting with Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos about the strengthening of economic ties between both countries. Immediately after the meeting, the Philippine government gave Kawasaki permission to build the pollution-emitting factories in the country. A PR paper published by Kawasaki at that time clearly suggests that the relocation was aimed at “pollution export”.

A sinter plant is... the facility which emits the most air pollutant in the steel mill. Kawasaki made the decision of constructing new sinter plants, which were necessary for the new sixth smelter, overseas rather than in the steel mill of Chiba... these new sinter plants will be

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built in Mindanao as a part of economic cooperation with the Philippines, and are now under construction.48

The Philippine government granted some favours to Kawasaki's project. The favours included permission for the 100% foreign capital project and a low-price offer of industrial sites. The government displaced about 2,000 local residents in order to provide a huge space on the waterfront to Kawasaki. Some local residents in Mindanao who refused to give up their lands were thrown into jail49.

Japanese companies benefited from preferential treatment from local governments in Asian countries. For example, after the IMF investigation team put pressure on the South Korean government to open the market to foreign companies50, the government constructed the Masan export-free zone in which foreign companies gained many special favours, such as tax exemption, the deregulation of labour relations, and simpler administrative procedures.51 The increasing investment of Japanese companies in Asia led to the destruction of local people's lives. This was the background to the strong anti-Japanese movement in some Asian countries in this period. When PM Tanaka visited Southeast Asian countries in January 1974, 5,000 Thai people surrounded his hotel and chanted “Go home, Tanaka!”, and 10,000 Indonesians gathered around the Japanese embassy and threw stones at it while lowering the Japanese national flag.

The Japanese government, companies, and people came to have great influence over Asian people's lives in the 1970s. However, many of Japanese

49 Ibid, p.33.
labour unionists were not sensitive to their influence over Asia. For example, some local workers who worked in a Matsushita factory in Malaysia sought to organize a labour union independent from the company, but the Matsushita labour union in Japan (which consisted mainly of Japanese workers) pushed other Malaysian workers to form a company-dominated union, and most active Malaysian members were kicked out of the union. Eventually, the Malaysian workers in Matsushita were forced to accept worse working conditions than those of Japanese workers. This episode reveals that many Japanese workers were not as interested in Asian people’s suffering as in their own wage.

Some alternative learning activists who visited local areas in the 1970s became aware that they greatly affected Asian people’s lives. In 1974, two young activists in the “Asia group” of the Jishu Kōza were informed by an economic journal published by zainichi Korean people that Toyama Chemical, a Japanese pharmaceutical company, planned to construct a chemical factory in Incheon, South Korea. The company was prohibited from building the factory in Toyama prefecture because of mercury pollution, so it tried to relocate it to South Korea. The two activists got in touch with antipollution activists in Toyama and sought to organize a joint action. On 27 April 1974, they surrounded the head office building of Toyama Chemical in Kayabachō, Tokyo, with the banner of “STOP POLLUTION EXPORT, THE MERCURY EFFLUENT PRODUCTS COMPANY”, while protesters in Toyama gave out leaflets on the same day. The company was afraid of being criticized by the

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52 Mutō Ichiyō and Matsuo Kei. “Rightwing Unions’ International Activities” in AMPO July-September 1975, pp.70-83.

53 Zainichi Korean are Korean people who migrated to Japan in the colonial period and their descendents living in Japan.
Japanese media, and gave up the plan to relocate the factory only three days after the joint action.\textsuperscript{54}

Some of the Japanese new leftists acted to correct the unfair relationship between Japan and other Asian countries. In 1976, the Han Kôgai Yushutsu Jôhô Sentâ (the Information Centre to Oppose Pollution Export) was formed by about 40 groups, including the Jishu Kôza and the Chiba Kôgai Juku (the Pollution School of Chiba), which criticized Kawasaki for exporting industrial pollution to Mindanao. The Centre aimed to watch Japanese companies and to uncover the reality of pollution export.\textsuperscript{55} In this fashion, some new leftists began to build fairer relations with Asian people in the 1970s, when Japanese companies quickly increased their investment in the Asian region.\textsuperscript{56}

The Asian People's Conference

In the history of the relationship between Japanese new leftists and Asian people's movements, the Asian People's Conference on the Future of Economic Development and Environment (Ajia Jin Kaigi) on June 8-15 1974 was significant.\textsuperscript{57} About 40 Asian activists fighting against authoritarian states and transnational corporations were invited to the conference. The conference was hosted by Japanese groups including those belonging to the anti-Vietnam War movement, antipollution movement, and Christian social movements.\textsuperscript{58}

The purpose of the conference was to exchange information on the

\textsuperscript{54} Inoue Sumio. "Bokura wa Kôgai Yushutsu to Tatakai Hajimeta" in Tenbô, November 1974, pp.53-56.


deterioration of Asian people's lives, pollution export by Japanese companies, and oppression against Asian people by authoritarian states, and to discuss the future of Asia.

On the first two days of the conference, Asian and Japanese participants went together to Sanrizuka and the industrial area in Chiba prefecture in which the factories of Kawasaki and Asahi Glass were located. On the following two days, about 80 Japanese activists joined a teach-in group with Asian activists. The Asian guests, who were from Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, and some zainichi Korean people, informed the Japanese activists about their countries' political economies and people's living conditions. On the next day, they held general and concurrent meetings about the destruction of Asian people's livelihood caused by Japanese corporations: problems such as industrial pollution, poor working conditions, sexual violence, or political prisoners. On the final day, more than 1,000 people attended a rally in the Meguro Auditorium. The Asian People's Joint Statement was issued and several joint actions were proposed before the rally ended.

As a result of the conference, hundreds of Japanese activists were informed of the poor living conditions faced by many Asian people. A young activist from the Philippines told Japanese students who were members of the Chiba Kōgai Juku about Kawasaki's pollution export to Mindanao. An activist from Malaysia claimed that most people in Southeast Asian countries were not legally allowed to demonstrate against pollution-emitting Japanese

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59 Kuniyoshi Tatsutoshi. "Kōgai Juku no Hitobito" in Shisō no Kagaku November 1975, p.70. The Chiba Kōgai Juku was formed in 1972 in Chiba city, a part of Keiyō industrial complex, by residents who were worried about public pollution caused by Kawasaki. Local young people, young mothers who had elementary and junior high school children, doctors who were concerned about negative impact on children's health, and school teachers participated in regular seminars held in a temple and deepened their understanding of public pollution.
companies. Protest actions were more strictly controlled in Asian countries than in Japan. For example, the Philippine government passed basic laws for worker protection in the early 1970s, but the laws were suspended under martial law issued in 1972. In particular, the government denied several labour rights for workers, such as strikes or pickets. The Anti-Subversive Activities Law, which was executed in 1957, provided the government with the legal basis to oppress Filipino people’s movements.

The dialogue with Asian activists helped the Japanese activists to realize that they exerted a significant but invisible influence on Asian people: the government regulations prevented Japanese companies from emitting industrial pollution in Japan, so they relocated pollution-emitting factories to Asian countries, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, or South Korea; because the Asian authoritarian states restricted people’s political freedom, those who lived in the states could not protest against pollution export; Japanese people benefited from this while Asian people suffered the deterioration of their living conditions. The Japanese activists came to perceive that their affluent lives were possible at the expense of many Asian people.

4. Asian People as a Mirror of Self-revolution

Women Activists’ Encounters with Asia

In particular, some Japanese women activists were concerned about violence against Asian women. Some of the Asian activists who participated in

the Asian People's Conference stated that Asian women suffered from poor working conditions and sexual violence. Japanese women activists were urged by their report to form ties with Asian women. Ajia no Onnatachi no Kai (the Asian Women's Group), a Japanese women's liberation group which was formed in 1977 to publicise the situation of violence and oppression in Asian countries and act against it from the viewpoint of women, stated:

What does our movement aim at? In our statement, our purpose is “never to help to invade Asian countries or to send our husbands and boyfriends on journeys of economic and sexual invasion”. In order to do this, we have to change our life itself fundamentally, because we have to have a direct confrontation with the reality in Japan and in our life, which is possible at the expense of Asian people, and resist the trend of the times. Japanese people usually pursue goods and money, enjoy their egoistic lives, and want peace only for themselves and their family. The scary reality is that women neither feel pain at the fact that foreign women are starving to death and are subject to torture, nor even try to know the facts. While businesses and governments work internationally or transnationally, women are divided by national borders. We organized various activities in the last two years in order to break the barrier, and to build ties and solidarity with excellent women in Asia, such as Korean female workers doing the drama performance which we enjoyed in the rally today, and women in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and to break through the regime in Japan which discriminates against and oppresses us, women.

The comment cited above shows that some Japanese women activists came to recognize their responsibility for the unjust relationship between Japanese and Asian women. They tried to build fair relations with Asian women and cross the divide between Japanese and Asian women. An example is the joint protest of Korean and Japanese women against sex tours

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64 Ajia to Josei Kairi June 1979, pp.28-29.
called *kisen kankō*. On 25 December 1974, several days after a protest action in South Korea by student activists of Ewha Womans University, about 50 members of Japanese women's groups and Christian groups gave out their leaflets in the Tokyo International Airport against "sex tours" by Japanese men to South Korea with their banner saying "SHAME ON YOU, TOURIST GROUPS FOR SEX TOUR". In 1973, several Japanese women activists were informed by South Korean women activists that many Japanese men travelled to South Korea to pay poor Korean women for sex. In the late 1960s, the Pak Chung-Hee administration announced that they would develop the tourist industry to solve the poverty problem in their country. This meant that the Korean government provided implicit support to tourist agents who organized prostitution. In the early 1970s, the number of Japanese tourists who went to South Korea increased quickly, and about 70% of all tourists to South Korea were Japanese people in 1973. However, the joint action of Korean and Japanese women against *kisen kankō* pushed the Korean government to control prostitution more strictly.

Some Korean activists compared *kisen kankō* with Korean comfort women (*jūgun ianfu*) during wartime when Korea was colonized by Japan. They regarded both cases as sexual slavery; while the latter women were abducted or recruited to work in the Japanese military, the former case was driven by the Korean government, which sought to achieve economic growth through tourism, into prostitution. In the postwar period, the issue of comfort women was little talked about in Japan and South Korea. Some of the Japanese women activists who participated in the joint action against *kisen*

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65 "Kisen" originally meant beautiful and intelligent women working in the royal palace who were good at dancing and familiar with music in the Rhee Dynasty. The meaning of *kisen* was, however, transformed into mere prostitutes when the Japanese colonial administration introduced the state-managed prostitution into Korea in the early twentieth century.
kankō began to uncover the facts of comfort women. They helped some former comfort women to require the Japanese government to compensate for sexual crimes during wartime. In this way, the Japanese women activists stepped beyond their own interests to transform the unfair relationship between Japanese and Asian women.66

Many Japanese new leftists were encouraged by the encounters with Asian activists to change themselves. This is shown in the comment by the Asian women’s group cited above. In Asia, “women are starving to death and are subject to torture”. In Japan, on the other hand, “people usually pursue goods and money, enjoy their egoistic lives, and want peace only for themselves and their family”. The Japanese activists realized that Japanese people’s affluent lives were possible at the cost of many Asian people. The Japanese female activists claimed that Japanese people “have to transform our life itself fundamentally” from the viewpoint of the Asian people.

Just as rural residents were a mirror for new leftists who were committed to self-revolution in “everydayness”, so too did Asian people provided another mirror for the activists. “Developmentalism”, the Japanese state’s official ideology during the economic boom, was supposed to propel “backward people”, such as Japanese rural residents or Asian people, to be modernized. In contrast, the Japanese new leftists continued to focus on transforming themselves rather than rural or Asian people. The idea of self-revolution in “everydayness” was thus opposite to “developmentalism” in terms of their viewpoint on Asian and rural people.

The Banana Study

A further example of this process is provided by the influential work of the activist, scholar, and writer Tsurumi Yoshiyuki (1926-94). Tsurumi claimed that new left movements in the late 1960s addressed the issue of transforming everyday life and opened up the new political arena, but he also pointed out that new leftists did not know how to recruit and educate activists. Tsurumi, an activist who joined Beheiren and had ties with other new leftists, learned from his experiences in the late 1960s: even if ideas were fruitful, actions would not last without a method of practicing the ideas. Tsurumi’s comment shows that some new leftists became interested in discussing practical methods in the 1970s.

As discussed in Chapter 2, an increasing number of Japanese people had lost a sense of reality in everyday life in the middle of rapid economic growth. They tended to limit everyday life narrowly to their consumer lives or have an abstract understanding of it. In his work Yonaoshi no Ronri to Rinri, Oda Makoto reminded people that everyday life consisted of different and contradictory aspects. In the late 1960s, when many Japanese people enjoyed affluent lives while Japan gave support to the American military for the Vietnam War, new leftists addressed the issue of recovering a sense of reality and going beyond the narrow definition of everyday life. In the 1970s, the activists went one step further and tried to develop a clear understanding of relations in which they were involved between rulers and ruled. They became interested in the issue of developing the way of imagining distant people's suffering and becoming aware of their relations with these people.

Some activists tackled this issue through “the banana study”. This study focused on tracing the history of a banana onto the dining table of a Japanese family: where, by whom, and under what conditions is it grown, and how does it pass through the channel of distribution to the dining table? The study uncovered that bananas were grown using a large amount of pesticide on plantations in Asian countries in which many local small farmers were dispossessed of their land. It also illustrated that the channel of distribution was dominated by transnational companies, while Asian farmers did not get enough returns and suffered from debts. A banana, a familiar food in their lives, helped Japanese people to gain a clear picture of connections between the plantations of Asia and the dining tables of Japan. Tsurumi claimed that people’s indignation and anger at injustice in a distant place was based on “the power of imagination (kosōryoku)"\(^68\), the power of identifying their connections with other people.

Tsurumi’s book, *Banana to Nihonjin* (Bananas and Japanese People), showed how the power of imagination could be cultivated. The banana study was initiated by Tsurumi in the Pacific and Asian Resource Centre (Ajia Taiheiyyō Shiryō Sentā, abbr. PARC), a Tokyo-based research and aid NGO in the early 1970s, but the study spread to various regions of Japan. An example is “Philippine Bananas and Us, the Nagoya Group”. This group was formed after Dodon Santos, a farmer of Mindanao, was invited by a couple of Tokyo-based NGOs, including PARC, Worker Information (Rōdō Jōhō), and the Consumers Union of Japan (Nihon Shōhisha Renmei). He made a speech in Nagoya in autumn 1980. After Santos finished his speech on banana plantations in the Philippines, a Japanese woman asked the question “do you mean that we must not eat bananas contaminated by pesticide?” Santos said,

"Workers of the plantations suffered hardships and oppression from transnational companies, and the bananas were produced for you, the Japanese people. I would like to illustrate this relationship between us, banana workers, and you. Furthermore, I would like ask you a question: what will you do about this reality?" The audience on the floor was deeply impressed by his question.

The speech encouraged some local activists to form a group in order to correct their relations with Filipino workers.69 First of all, the activists of Nagoya organized a reading group, slide shows, and films on Philippine bananas. Then they researched the channels of distribution in the wholesale market of Nagoya by themselves. Furthermore, the activists sent the Ministry of Agricultures, Forestry and Fishery, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and companies of Japan a paper which demanded they improve working conditions and stop environmental devastation in the banana farms of the Philippines.

Ikezumi Yoshinori, Sugimoto Teruko, and Nakamura Yoko, members of the Nagoya Group, wrote:

A banana is not a daily necessity. Japanese people have other nutritional foods. In short, a banana is an optional food. A banana was once a luxury item. It changed to a mass-produced and low-cost item. In doing this, American and Japanese transnational companies opened up banana farms in Mindanao. However, low-price bananas could not be provided unless Filipino people worked in banana plantations at such a low wage that they could not earn their living. Furthermore, they were forced to use massive quantities of dangerous pesticides. Whereas Japanese people enjoyed a low-cost favourite food, Filipino people, literally, worked at risk of their lives. Indeed, the problem of Philippine bananas clearly shows the unequal and unfair

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relationship between Japan and the Philippines, and other Third World countries.70

The Journey to Asia for Self-revolution

The idea of the banana study, which combined critical research with activism, encouraged many Japanese activists to form research NGOs in the 1970s.71 In the late 1960s, while many Japanese people did not care about Vietnamese people's suffering caused by the Vietnam War, Japanese new leftists tried to expand the power of their imagination and connect Japanese people's affluent lives with the suffering. However, as Tsurumi argued, the activists were not interested in the way of fostering this power of imagination, so they were not successful in getting a clear picture of relations between the two distant spaces, Japan and Vietnam.

In the 1970s, many new leftists came to see the way of fostering the power of imagination as important. For example, Hanasaki Kôhei, a philosopher who gave support to student movements and anti-Vietnam War actions in the late 1960s and joined residents' movements in Hokkaido in the 1970s, maintained that "a journey for social movements" would be effective to cultivate the power of imagination. He stressed the importance of encounters during the journey:

A journey cuts us off from everyday life and transforms us into a free-moving person without any possessions. In liberating ourselves from mooring ropes along the shore, we get away from daily conventions and a familiar landscape, encounter unfamiliar people, and go into an unfamiliar landscape. Although we are emancipated in doing this, we feel anxious and uneasy. Between emancipation and anxiety,

70 Ibid, pp.i-ii
we can look at our daily world from the viewpoint of foreigners. We can watch ourselves, who live in the daily world, from an objective perspective.\textsuperscript{72}

He claimed that a journey cuts ourselves off from conventions in everyday life and provides us with a sense of liberation and uneasiness, but it helps us to view our routine differently from usual and to be linked to someone else who lives far away from us. In short, he believed that the journey was effective in facilitating self-revolution in “everydayness”.

**Organizing Journeys for Self-revolution**

Similar views on journeys were often discussed by other new leftists at that time. Tsurumi Yoshiyuki stressed that a journey should be open to everyone. He suggested that Japanese workers should visit some Asian countries during their holidays in order to become aware of their relations with Asian people. He stated in a dialogue with historian Kato Yûzô:

Practically speaking, journeys must be combined with settling down. At the moment, when some Japanese young people hear about an interesting activity somewhere in Kyûshû, they visit there and ask its leader to let them stay for one or two months. Is the same thing possible in Asia? Many people cannot go travelling because they have to make their living, so the journey must be somehow combining with settlement. I am these days thinking about a network combined by the two [kinds of people]: some people live modestly without standing out in Asian countries, get on well with local people, and gradually engage in production activities, while travellers [from Japan] could rely on these people [in visiting there].\textsuperscript{73}


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Tsurumi discussed the way of building ties with local residents in Asian countries. He suggested that Japanese activists should find some Japanese people who had settled in Asia and ask them to play the role of mediators between Asian people and Japanese workers who were not familiar with the places. The important thing was that a journey to Asia should be repeated rather than done once and for all. He added that educational facilities should be founded in Japan in order to follow up self-revolution practiced in the journey. The facilities prevented those who visited Asian countries from forgetting what they had felt and known during the journey and giving up their commitment to transformation of "everydayness" after their return to Japan.

An example of the journey was the tour of the Banana Boat, which was organized by Japanese consumer groups in October 1986. In the tour, 520 people from 175 groups boarded ships from Kobe and travelled to several islands in the south of Okinawa. They visited the construction site of a new airport in Shiraho, Ishigakijima, and the proposed site in Tokunoshima to build a nuclear waste processing facility, and came to know the negative impact of economic development, such as environmental deterioration, on local people. Two guests were invited from the Philippines where the authoritarian Marcos administration had been ousted by people's movements for democratization. They talked about the destruction of their lives caused by Japanese transnational companies. Many participants in the tour found out the dark side of Japanese people's affluent lives for foreigners as well as for Japanese rural people.\(^\text{74}\)

The guests from Negros, an island of the north-western Philippines, talked about the poverty of their island and proposed "grass-roots trade for independence". Some of the Japanese participants were encouraged by the proposal to found the Alter Trade Company, a company for fair trade between Filipino and Japanese people, in Bacolod, the Philippines, in December 1986. The company researched local agricultural products in Negros, cut out the intermediate distribution process, exported Muscovado sugar (a kind of unrefined brown sugar) directly from local farmers in Negros to Japanese consumers, and secured a fair price for the product. When importing Muscovado sugar, the company was supported by some Japanese cooperatives and consumer unions. For example, Kyôseisha, a cooperative in Kyushû, continued to purchase the product from an early period. The cooperative also organized a trip to the Negros for its members. The trip helped some members of the cooperative to know the real situation of local farmers in the Philippines who produced sugarcane and build personal ties with them by staying in the farmers' houses. The actions might be small-scale, but new ties beyond national borders between producers, consumers, and traders were being built in the 1970s.

**Drawing the Map of Asian People**

Japanese new leftists who went to Asian countries aimed to transform the existing relationship created by Asian political leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew, Ferdinand Marcos, or Tanaka Kakuei. What ties did they seek to build with Asian people? How could the activists transform the existing relationship between rulers and ruled? The "Asian People's Joint Statement", which was

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76 Ibid, pp.149-50.
issued on the final day of the Asian People’s Conference, contained the following passage:

We, participants in this Conference, are people, Asian people. We are not persons in the position of power. They are now dominating our country and Asia. The powerful and the rich destroy our health, our safety, our way of life, and us. …We must change this condition. We must transform our society from the bottom and destroy the web of the powerful and the rich. We must struggle against them in order to do this. We form solidarity in this struggle. It is this solidarity that will lead us to final victory. We are in solidarity in this struggle. We are one. In this struggle, Asia’s people are one.

This statement shows that Asian people’s solidarity could be based on indignation at the destruction of people’s lives which was caused by Japanese transnational companies and local states in the Asian region. In other words, Japanese new leftists aimed to build networks between Asian and Japanese people who opposed “developmentalism”.

The new leftists emphasized that they had to be careful not to have an abstract understanding of Asian people who suffered the destruction of their lives. This was a lesson from their bitter experiences of the rapid decline of the new left movements in the early 1970s. The activists believed that face-to-face relations with Asian people would prevent them from acting complacently. On the first day of the Asian People’s Conference, its organizers asked all the participants to introduce themselves. The self-introduction took three hours, but the organizers saw “What is your name?” “What activities are you involved in?” as essential to build up face-to-face relations.

Tsurumi Yoshiyuki claimed that building personal relations with Asian people was like “drawing a map”. He wrote:
Japanese and Southeast Asian people cannot find each other. Purely economic relations, which regulate us, are built first, and such regulations are imposed as a fait accompli. However, we do not need to stop there. We have begun dialogues by using the power of imagination, though this is invisible. We would not need to draw a map if we could see the other side in advance. Let us launch the ship slowly. The map is composed of the aggregate of relations. The relations should be described objectively, but our map does not have a method of objective description like the projective method of a geographical map. If anything, it just consists in meeting and talking with the other side. Our method of objectification is close to relativisation (sōtaika). The other side is not the government or the privileged classes but ordinary people. We are not sure who the people are, where they are, and what they look like. The same is true of when Asian people look at Japan. There is no other way but taking our time and feeling our way.77

Normal maps might be drawn by looking down at the whole from the top, but the map on Asian people's relations could be drawn only by building face-to-face relations with each other. Tsurumi stated that the new map would represent a new culture which was created by large numbers of exchanges between Japanese and other Asian people.

Summary

This chapter traced the development of ideas and actions by new leftists in the 1970s which ranged from the alternative learning movement to Asian people's solidarity movements. In this period, some new leftists inherited the idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" from their predecessors, and developed a deeper understanding of it. In the late 1960s, many new leftists sought to transform "everydayness" in the spaces behind the barricades, but

77 Tsurumi. *Ajia o Shiru Tameni*, pp.185-86.
they did not know how to continue to do this after the barricades were dissolved. When new left movements declined rapidly in the 1970s, some of the new leftists organized the alternative learning movement to discuss the way of continuing their commitment to self-revolution in “everydayness”. The activists came to see administrative work, which new leftists had tended to neglect in the late 1960s, as significant in maintaining their movements.

New leftists also realized that they ran the risk of being complacent about their self-revolution, because their understanding of “everydayness” was depleted and abstract. In order to overcome this problem, some of the new leftists visited rural people living in various parts of Japan who faced the destruction of their lives caused by large-scale development projects and were involved in residents’ movements. Their visits to residents’ movements made it possible for the new leftists to be aware of the negative impact caused by industrialization, such as environmental deterioration, and the reality of rural people’s everyday life. Rural residents were thus regarded by the new leftists as a reference point of self-revolution in “everydayness”.

In the 1970s when Japanese transnational companies rapidly increased their investment in Asian countries, the new leftists sought to build ties with Asian people who suffered pollution export from the companies and political oppression from the companies and local authoritarian states. The Japanese activists found connections between Asian people’s suffering and their affluent lives in Japan, and tried to transform their everyday life. In this sense, they also regarded Asian people as a mirror of self-revolution in “everydayness”.

The challenges faced by the new leftists, which I have traced in this chapter, were the beginning of Japanese new social movements, such as feminist, ecological, consumer, or international solidarity movements. The movements did not spread widely until the 1980s and thereafter, but their basic
ideas were already cultivated in the 1970s. The achievement of the new leftists might be invisible, but the activists undoubtedly sowed the seeds of people's actions for democracy and social justice.
Chapter 4 discussed what ideas and actions Japanese new leftists bequeathed to Japanese civil society. This chapter is the counterpart of the last chapter: what did they *not* leave behind? The comparison with other industrial countries helps us to examine a possibility that might have happened, but that actually did not. The “new politics theory”, which is debated by political scientists and sociologists, focuses particularly on political transformation in European industrialized countries after the 1960s. The theory suggests, first of all, that a change in people’s values occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when the countries had already been modernized and material needs like freedom from hunger had been satisfied. Increasing numbers of people were concerned about negative effects of industrialization and supported “post materialistic” values, such as autonomy, political participation, or social justice. In this situation, new movements—new left movements first, then new social movements—came to focus more on new issues such as environment protection, gender equity, and solidarity with the Third World than on the traditional class issues.

Second, the new politics theory points out that value changes were accompanied by the reformation of party politics. After the 1960s, the traditional political cleavage between conservative and progressive parties was weakened, and “new parties” based on the new movements expanded their influence.\(^1\) The parties addressed the new issues, which conventional parties had not addressed in parliamentary politics. This second process, the shift from new movements to new parties, was not a feature of the Japanese case.

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In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had remained in power since 1955. This conservative party gave strong support to industrialization policies and provided its supporters living in rural areas with pork barrel spending. On the other hand, the JCP (Japan Communist Party) and the left-wing faction of the JSP (Japan Socialist Party), traditional progressive parties, were influenced by the Soviet-model state socialism in this period. The basic structure of Japanese politics in the postwar period did not change until the early 1990s, when the LDP temporarily lost power (even in the 1990s many members of new parties, such as the Japan New Party, the New Party Sakigake, and the New Frontier Party, were those who had broken away from the existing parties, so these new parties should be distinguished from the Green and other new politics parties that appeared in Europe).

Why did new parties not emerge in Japanese party politics? This chapter traces the historical process of Japanese new movements in the 1970s to explore the absence of new politics. First of all, I examine theoretical discussions on new politics. The discussions show that there were two ways in which new politics was formed in European countries: either through transformation of existing progressive parties or through the founding of the Green parties. In the later parts of this chapter, I discuss the two possible paths in the context of Japan. Secondly, I move to the historical context, discussing how Japanese progressive parties, particularly the JSP, failed to gain support from new movements. The Antiwar Youth Committee (Hansen Seinen linkai), a young workers' network which shared its style and ideas with other new leftists in student or antiwar groups, was affiliated with the JSP in

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2 The JCP was one of the most influential parties in postwar Japan. However, as discussed in earlier chapters, Japanese new left movements maintained that the problems of the Anpo protests of 1960 and "the postwar progressives" were symbolized in the JCP. The new leftists saw the JCP as a target to be overcome, so they confronted and clashed with JCP-affiliated groups in the late 1960s. This illustrates that the JCP seldom had possibilities to work together with new left movements.
the late 1960s. This meant that the JSP had opportunities to adopt the values and issues addressed by new leftists and to expand its support base. However, the JSP, though it at first gave support to the Committee to some extent, eventually expelled the new left workers from the party around 1970. This led inevitably to a split between the JSP and new movements. I claim that the split was one factor that prevented Japanese progressive parties from developing new politics.

Thirdly, I explore why Japanese new left movements could not form new parties in the 1970s. Whereas new movements in some European countries were able to form broader networks and the networks were a major step toward the founding of new parties, like green parties in the 1970s and 1980s, this did not happen in Japanese national politics in this period, with rare exceptions in local politics such as the Seikatsu Club Co-Op (Seikatsu Kurabu Seikyō). Why did the broader networks and new parties not emerge in Japan? In discussing this issue, many scholars of Japanese politics have emphasized the roles of the LDP, a catch-all party. They argue that the LDP responded to demands from various interest groups, such as farmers' groups, workers' groups, and business groups, so new parties could not find spaces in the national party formation.

This might be convincing, but the LDP did not respond to most of the issues addressed by new movements. These issues were so antithetical to the principle behind LDP's industrialization policies that the party found it difficult to compromise. In order to explore why new parties were not formed, this chapter focuses on new movements which, according to the new politics theory, were supposed to produce the new party. In particular, I point out that new leftists

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3 See Leblanc. *Bicycle Citizens*, Ch.5.
were unable to help women’s liberation movements and residents’ movements (jûmin undô), which shared the ideas with new movements, to build wider networks in the 1970s.

1. The Possibilities of New Politics in Japan

What is New Politics?

What is new politics? Thomas Poguntke, a scholar on new politics and Green parties, describes the shift from “Old Politics” to “New Politics” as follows:

In a nutshell, Old Politics means preoccupation with economic growth, stable prices, a stable economy, strong military defence and conventional political style. Adherents of the New Politics, on the contrary, demand that ecological imperatives guide economic decisions, that rights to participation and the freedom to realise alternative lifestyles should be extended, and unilateral disarmament be promoted in order to reduce international tensions. Furthermore, the New Politics is concerned with equal rights for all kinds of social minorities, solidarity with the Third World and a general left-wing orientation. Also, supporters of the New Politics tend to be prepared to engage in unconventional political participation.5

Poguntke pointed out that supporters of new politics had a tendency to be post-materialistic, young, urban, and educated people. Such people played a central role in new movements which tackled issues of ecology, gender equity, discrimination against ethnic minorities, and poverty and violence in Third World countries. Low degrees of bureaucratization and orientation toward

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direct democracy were also indispensable organizational features of new politics.

Political scientist Russell Dalton emphasized that the new movements had some features inherently contradictory to party politics. He claimed that environmental and ecology movements, which were a symbol of new movements, were “hostile to political parties because of their different goals and different philosophy, that of maximizing their electoral appeal”. Since the election was the greatest concern for political parties, parties had to aggregate political interests in order to increase their vote share. This often led the parties to marginalizing some controversial issues for voters, such as environmental protection or rights for sexual minorities.6

Dalton also maintained that “the adherence of most political parties to the iron law of oligarchy produces a bureaucratic and hierarchic style of decision making that conflicts with the norms (and likely the political interests) of environmentalists”. New movements, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, criticized bureaucratic and parliamentary politics for restricting political participation to voting. In this sense, the principle of new movements was not consistent with that of representative democracy, which inevitably produced a hierarchical relationship between representatives and rank and file members. Sociologist and feminist Hilary Wainwright dubbed such non-institutional orientations of new politics as “anti-politics”. She stated in her book on new left movements that Western new leftists “believed they were creating a new form of politics: anti-politics seemed to be becoming a political force with its own groundsprings of power”7.

However, anti-politics did not necessarily mean that new politics was separated from conventional party politics. Some case studies in European countries show that anti-politics could be transformed into "alternative politics". In Germany, one of the most well-known cases of new politics, the German Greens, was formed based on the principles of new politics. The party was able to expand its influence and gain some seats first in local assemblies and then in the European Parliament in the late 1970s, and made great progress in national politics in the early 1980s.8

Political scientist Ferdinand Müller-Rommel argued that "new politics parties" changed conventional party politics. He outlined three characteristics of new parties.9 First of all, new parties were hostile to industrialization. The parties were sceptical of an unquestioned commitment to economic growth. Müller-Rommel stated that "these parties advocate an alternative life-style through less emphasis on material growth".

Second, new parties had a specific organizational structure. Whereas old parties including both conservatives and progressives were characterized as bureaucratic organizations, new parties gave strong support to participatory party organization and decentralization. The parties tried to solve problems of bureaucratic organizations by giving more autonomy in decision-making to local branches. The third characteristic of new parties is their mobilization of "New Politics voters". New parties gained votes from younger, new middle class, urban, and highly educated people. These people had a new value orientation and were weary of conventional political parties. These

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characteristics of new parties were clearly based on people's value change discussed above.

The Lack of New Parties in Japan

In contrast with European new politics, Japanese party politics did not change much in the 1970s and 1980s. Whilst the LDP, an old conservative party, remained in power, old progressive parties, such as the JSP, the JCP, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), did not adopt the ideas and organizational structure based on the principles of new politics. Several attempts to found new politics parties were not successful. Some scholars insisted that a transformation of party politics did not occur in Japan because post-materialistic values did not spread widely enough amongst Japanese people. Scott Flanagan maintained that Japanese people might have overcome traditional values, such as self-discipline, piety, conformity, and devotion to authorities, in the 1960s and 1970s, but the shift to "post-bourgeois" values, discussed by Ronald Inglehart, a leading scholar on new politics, did not happen in Japan.10

There is some evidence against Flanagan's discussions. The result of the annual questionnaire survey of 1,500 Japanese people conducted by the Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation) in the 1970s shows that Japanese people did not necessarily look positively at the economic boom in this period. In 1974, only 18% of the respondents thought that economic growth had more positive aspects than negative. In 1973, 59% of the respondents were concerned about further economic growth. The factors of environmental pollution, price rises, and the loss of humanity were

raised by the respondents as negative aspects of growth.\textsuperscript{11} These data show that many Japanese people were weary of industrialization in the 1970s and began to support post-materialistic values.

Ronald Inglehart claimed in \textit{The Silent Revolution}, a classic work on new politics, that the emergence of new parties did not always follow people's value change.

At least some of the available parties must take noticeably different stands on the relevant dimension in order for the individual to have an opportunity to act on his values. No matter how intensely the values are held, if political elites offer no real choice the individual can do little except feel frustrated—unless he is prepared for the arduous task of organizing a new political party or taking over an existing one.\textsuperscript{12}

He maintained that value change did not lead automatically to producing political cleavage between old and new parties. In other words, cleavage did not emerge unless people's suspicion about industrialization was politically articulated into new issues, such as environmental protection, gender equity, equal rights for minorities, or the like. The new politics theory illustrates that political articulation was promoted by new movements. In other words, new movements played the part of translating people's vague dissatisfaction into politicized language.

There were undoubtedly opportunities for the emergence of new politics in Japan in the 1970s. More and more people were dissatisfied with negative outcomes caused by industrialization in this period. According to the NHK questionnaire survey cited above, 78% of the respondents felt "isolation from

\textsuperscript{11} NHK Hősō Seron Chôsajô (ed.). \textit{Zusetsu Sengo Seron shi}, pp.195-97.

politics" and more than 80% were "not satisfied" or "not satisfied enough" with politics. The same survey said that almost one-third of them "had no party to support", that is to say, they were independent voters or did not go to vote. The percentage of the LDP's votes in the election for the Lower House in 1976 was 41.8%, that is the lowest figure since the party was founded in 1955 (the 1976 figure had been the lowest until the election for the Lower House when the LDP lost office in 1993). On the other hand, the JSP also lost votes in the election of 1976; the percentage of its vote decreased to 20.7%.

These results show that both old conservative and progressive parties did not respond well to people's changing values. The dominant political cleavage of postwar Japanese politics was between the LDP, conservative forces which gained support from rural people and businesses, and the JSP, progressive forces which were backed by unionized workers. While an increasing number of Japanese people became sceptical of industrialization in the 1970s, this political system known as the 1955 system (55 nen taisei—1955 was the year when the LDP and JSP were founded) did not function as well as before.

Some comparative studies on European politics illustrate that there were three paths for translating people's desire for new politics into agendas of party politics: a breakaway from old left parties, the amalgamation of small left parties, and the founding of Green parties. The first path involved splits in old parties. New movements, which addressed the issues and style of new politics, conveyed new conflicts to large old socialist parties. Some of the party leaders as well as their rank-and-file members gave support to new politics and conflicted with other members who were concerned mainly about the economic stability of the working class. This led to splits within the traditional parties.

People who broke away from the parties sought to put agendas of new politics on the table of the parliament.  

For example, the Socialist People's Party (SF) of Denmark broke away from the Danish Communist Party in 1959-60. The split was promoted by the Soviet Union's repression of the Hungarian uprising and its antagonism to president Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia. SF criticized the Communist Party for its Soviet-style socialism exemplified by democratic centralism. In the 1970s, many activists from women's movements and anti-nuclear movements joined SF. They transformed the decision-making process in the party into one of transparency. As a result, the party won an increased commitment by women; the proportion of women in each party committee reached at least 40 percent. In this way, SF was able to access new movements.  

The second path to party politics is the amalgamation of small left parties. Small left parties in some European countries worked together with new movements to conduct extra-parliamentary action, such as blockades of nuclear plants, in the 1970s. The new movements played a role in uniting different parties together. The aligned parties sought to put new politics on the agenda of political institutions. This pattern was the case in the Netherlands. Although both the Pacifist-Socialist Party (PSP), which emanated from peace movements in 1957, and the Political Radical Party (PPR), which broke away from the Catholic People's Party in 1968, kept distance from Soviet-style socialism and gave support to participatory democracy, they had not cooperated with each other. However, in the 1970s, both parties participated in extra-parliamentary actions organized by new social movements, like blockades of nuclear plants or large peace demonstrations. The movements'  

\[15\] Wainwright. Arguments for a New Left, pp.201-02.
activists also put pressure on PSP, PPR, and the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) to form the “small-left unity”. In the 1980s, the three parties addressed in their joint programme new politics issues, such as environmental deterioration, discrimination against women and homosexuals, and poverty in Third World countries. They began their coordination first in the European election, and then in the national election. Finally, in September 1989, the PSP, PPR, and CPN formed the Green Left for the upcoming national election together with the Evangelical People's Party (EVP) and independents.¹⁶

The third path is the founding of Green parties based on new movements. This occurred in Austria, Australia, Belgium, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland. The German Greens were founded in 1979. 500 delegates from an ideologically dissonant range of organizations joined the inaugural meeting in a school hall near Frankfurt. They defined a nuclear-free Europe as the most important issue for their networks. The party gained seats in the national parliament in October 1983 and won 8.3% of the national vote. The German Greens also performed well in the European election and won 8.2% of German votes in 1984.

The Greens played a distinctive role in parliamentary politics.¹⁷ First of all, the party sought to put the new politics agendas, particularly environmental issues, on the table. Second, the German Greens, as a “social movement party”, represented the interests of new movements, like anti-nuclear, feminist, local residents, counterculture, or gay groups. Third, the party followed the principle of participatory democracy. This made it possible to integrate grassroots activists' voices and prevent centralized decision-making in the

party. Though all of the goals were not achieved, the German Greens was a platform that aligned different groups and made new politics agendas public.

Chris Rootes, a researcher on Green politics, claimed that new parties grew out of specifically anti-nuclear movements. For example, in the Netherlands, the Parliament passed a law about the financing of a liquid metal fast breeder reactor in 1973. This law obliged all electricity consumers to pay a 3% surcharge on their electricity bill for the development of the new reactor in Kalkar in West Germany. Ecology and anti-nuclear movements united to protest against the construction of the reactor. Radical young people, who came from women's groups, squatters' groups, and other small groups (what they called "basic-groups") also joined the protests and developed new forms of action, such as the blockades of nuclear energy plants. Several leftist parties also helped the groups to organize the protests. Stopping the nuclear reactor in Kalkar was a focus of various Dutch people's movements in the 1970s and early 1980s. The actions became a great step towards small leftist parties converging in the Green Left in the late 1980s.18

Anti-nuclear movements were less institutionalized than conservation movements, environmental groups which had longer histories. Anti-nuclear movements usually sought to stop the construction projects of new nuclear power stations in local areas, so their concerns were urgent, and intense and short-lived mobilization was necessary. Rootes also pointed out that "because anti-nuclear movements are usually conceived as single-issue campaigns, they are typically organized as broad networks of pre-existing groups, very

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often including small left-wing parties." This shows that anti-nuclear movements provided a platform for uniting a wide range of new movements as a step to new parties. It should be added that urban groups including the new left played a key role in associating local protests against nuclear plants with national energy policies.

Based on the discussions above, the following sections will trace two ways new politics could operate in the context of Japan in the 1970s. One is the transformation of progressive parties: progressive parties were influenced by new movements, changed their ideas, reformed their organizations, and built networks with other small parties over the new politics agendas. I explore this way in discussions about the JSP's innovation in Section 2. The other way new politics could operate is the founding of Green parties: new movements built wider networks over the new politics agendas and finally founded new parties, such as the Greens, from outside existing party politics. I examine this way in Sections 3 to 5: I look at two new movements, women's liberation movements and residents' movements (including anti-nuclear movements), to explore their discussions about broader networks of new movements outside the conventional party formation.

2. The JSP's Failure to Transform

SDF: The Emergence of a New Party?

In April 1977, before the election for the Senate, the Socialist-Citizen League (Shakai Shimin Rengô) was formed. This political group criticized both

conservative and progressive parties for their outdated political style and declared that it would reform the archaic progressive forces. The Socialist-Citizen League changed its name to the Social Democratic Federation (Shakai Minshū Rengō, hereafter the SDF) on 26 March 1978. In its inaugural statement, the SDF stated:

We make it clear that we turn our eyes toward the future. Instead of the industrial society in which people are alienated and the eco-system is destroyed, we aim at a communal society in which human rights and people’s life are guaranteed and three major values—freedom, justice, and solidarity—are realized. In other words, we aim at “the beginning of the real history” of human society.20

The statement proposed a series of policies, such as a review of economic growth, the reform of public welfare, decentralization, and the creation of post-industrial society. It also declared that the party would seek to build networks between “libertarian socialism” and “new citizens’ movements”. In sum, the SDF aimed to found a new party which was supported by new movements emerging in various regions of Japan in this period.

However, the SDF did not succeed in gaining much support from new movements. The party’s support base was mainly labour unions in big private companies rather than new movements such as ecology movements, women’s movements, and anti-nuclear movements.21 Some members of the party ran for the Upper House election in 1977. In this election, the SDF tried to urge

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21 Ibid, p.128. In the postwar period, many Japanese large labour unions, which were affiliated with Sōhyō and Dōmei (Japan Trade Union Federation), two of the largest national labour councils, were supported mainly by fulltime workers in big private companies and public sectors, but they were not successful in organizing casual workers (mainly women workers). After the 1960s, the labour unions tended to focus on improving labour conditions, particularly on wage rises. This strategy made it difficult for the unions to expand their support to unorganized workers, such as women or young people.
former Zenkyōtō leader Akita Akehiro and co-op movement leader Iwane Shizuko to be candidates as a symbol of its cooperation with new movements, but eventually this attempt was unsuccessful. Kan Naoto, an activist belonging to a citizens’ group in the Musashino area of Tokyo, announced himself as a candidate from citizens’ movements, but he could not win consensus from his group, the Citizens’ Group for Participatory Democracy (Sanka Minshu Shugi o Mezasu Shimin no Kai). Because he could not convince his colleagues in the group of his participation in the SDF in advance, Kan eventually withdrew from the group before the election. The SDF, although it intended to be a new party on the basis of “new citizens’ movements”, faced difficulties early in its founding.

At that time, the SDF was usually viewed by the media as an “anti-communist centrist party” rather than a new party based on new movements. The view was intensified by SDF’s leader Eda Saburō’s involvement in the Group for New Japan (Atarashii Nihon o Kangaeru Kai) in this period. In the late 1960s, some union leaders in private companies, which were affiliated with IMF-JC (International Metalworkers Federation-Japan Council), planned to found a new national council of labour unions. The Group for New Japan aimed to promote cooperation between capital and labour and lessen the

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23 Mainichi Shinbun 10 June 1977, p.23.
25 Eda Saburō was an activist in farmers’ movements during wartime. In the postwar period, he became a member of the Diet from the JSP. In the 1960s, Eda took the office of secretary general in the party and supported the structural reform group (kozō kaikaku ha), a group of intellectuals and activists who were affected by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s theories and sought to establish the hegemony in political institutions, such as bureaucracy or parliamentary politics, as a step to revolution. He thus kept himself distant from orthodox Marxists.
26 IMF-JC was founded in 1964. It consisted of private companies in the manufacturing industry, such as electronics or automobiles. IMF-JC adopted more moderate strategies than Sōhyō and aimed to win a wage rise indexed to productivity improvement.
influence of confrontational unions in the public sector which belonged to Sōhyō (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), such as the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union (Jichirō), National Railway Workers' Union (Kokurō), Japan Teachers' Union (Nikkyōso), or Japan Postal Workers Union (Zentei). The Group sought to support political forces working for economic policies to stabilize inflation, reform the tax system, and restructure the social security system.27

In the middle of the 1970s, when the LDP lost its support because of the Lockheed Scandal (discussed later), several influential opposition politicians, like Eda Saburō (he was in the JSP at that time), Yano Junya (Kōmeitō), and Sasaki Ryōsaku (the Democratic Socialist Party), participated in the Group for New Japan.28 They aimed to oust the LDP from office and coordinate centre-left political forces. This background shows that Eda, a founder of the SDF, focused more on political negotiations between political leaders than on collaboration with new movements.

The Emergence of the Antiwar Youth Committee

Before the SDF was formed in the middle of the 1970s, Eda and the JSP, in fact, had already missed a significant opportunity to transform the ideas and organizational structure of the party when the Antiwar Youth Committee (Youth Committee for Opposition to the Vietnam War and to Stop

28 Takaoka Susumu. "Atarashii Nihon o Kangáeru Kai' no Uchimaku" in Gendai no Me September 1976. The Group for New Japan, whose president was Matsumae Shigeyoshi, a chancellor of Tōkai University, was formed in July 1976 in order to end the LDP's rule (but the group noted that its aim was not to found a new political party). While the group tried to adopt the principles of citizen's movements (this was shown in that Matsuda Michio, a citizen activist, was invited to be its vice president), it was also supported by moderate socialists, such as the structural reform group.
Ratification of the Japan-Korea Normalization Treaty) was expelled from the party around 1970.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the JSP played a central role in “the postwar progressives (sengo kakushin seiryoku, people’s movements for democratization in the postwar period)”. “The postwar progressives” mobilized a large number of Japanese people who were afraid of being involved in the war to protest against the construction of military bases, the Police Duty Bill, or the Anpo Treaty, and so on. Labour unions which were affiliated with Sôhyô played a key role in organizing the protests. Because the unions believed that the JSP would prevent the LDP from going to war and would defend people’s lives, they gave strong support to the JSP in the elections. In this sense, the JSP was supported by various people’s movements in the 1950s.

The economic boom of the 1960s transformed Japanese society. The threat to people’s lives from the war was becoming less urgent for many Japanese people. “The postwar progressives” did not pay much attention to the issue of stopping the Vietnam War, which broke out in 1965. Many young workers were so sensitive to the issue that they questioned Japan’s cooperation with the American military in the war and formed the Antiwar Youth Committee on 30 August 1965.29 The Youth Bureau of the JSP, the Youth Group of Sôhyô, and the Socialist Youth League (Shaseidô), that is, a group of the tôha—new left factions—hosted the inaugural meeting and invited various youth groups which opposed the Japan-South Korea Normalization Treaty and the Vietnam War.

What did the Antiwar Youth Committee aim to achieve? As discussed in Chapter 2, more and more workers were disturbed by a sense of alienation in the 1960s. The latest technologies and modern organizational systems were introduced in factories or offices to improve productivity. The management divided the working process into several parts; workers were assigned to each simplified part. Skilled workers were replaced by lesser skilled workers and were forced into being more subject to the control of labour management. Many Japanese workers, especially young workers, were frustrated by their simple and boring jobs. They were also disappointed with labour unions. As symbolized by the spring labour struggle (shuntō), Sōhyō came to focus its actions more on wage bargaining with managers during the economic boom. The unions became reluctant to address non-economic issues such as the Vietnam War. Young workers who wanted to be committed to opposing the war felt alienated from labour unions.

The Antiwar Youth Committee claimed that "Japan is no longer a victim but a victimizer". Young workers in the Committee stressed that Japan had a strong economic and military influence over Asian people; the USA, which aimed to undermine the influence of communism in Asian countries, helped Japanese companies to make huge profits from increasing investment in the Asian region. Whereas mobilization of "the postwar progressives" was based on many Japanese people's bitter experiences as victims in the Second World War, the Antiwar Youth Committee maintained in the late 1960s that Japanese people were no longer war victims but rather on the side of the victimizers. In this way, the young workers criticized the "postwar progressives" for being apolitical during the economic boom and sought to transform conservative consciousness, what was called "everydayness". The idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" enabled the activists to confront with the Vietnam War and the

The Committee also insisted that "we make our decisions by ourselves". The young workers in the Committee asserted that labour unions' actions against the Vietnam War were becoming routine. Many of the unions paid their workers in return for their participation in demonstrations. The workers just did their duties of chanting slogans and plodding their way in the demonstrations. Many young workers in the Committee tried to break through the routine. They decided to join actions against the Vietnam War by their own will rather than being paid by the unions. The young workers took an unconventional and confrontational protest style.

After March 1968, the Antiwar Youth Committee began to fight more radically under the slogan "Act against the war in the workplace (shokuba ni hansen o)" and to take direct action, such as support for strikes in small companies, wildcat strikes, or occupation in the workplace. The most symbolic action was to blockade the import of American tanks. The USA required Japan to give military support behind the front during the Vietnam War. The Japanese government frequently ordered national railways to transport American military supplies. Some railway workers in the Committee refused to transport weapons which would be used to kill Vietnamese people.

The JSP's View on the Antiwar Youth Committee

The Antiwar Youth Committee was seen as a part of new left movements, but it was different from Zenkyōtō and Beheiren in its closer relations with old leftists; the Socialist Youth League, a youth group of the JSP, joined the Committee. This meant that the Committee had the possibility of changing an old leftist party from within. The JSP's view on the Committee split
into two. At the party convention in January 1968, several representatives from the Socialist Youth League and local delegates in Osaka, Yamaguchi, and Fukushima prefecture took a positive view of the Committee positively. On the other hand, representatives from the Japanese Federation of Synthetic Chemical Workers’ Unions (Gōka Rōren) and Ehime prefecture claimed that the party should control the Committee. At the end of the controversial discussions, the JSP’s leaders, including president Narita Tomomi and Secretary General Eda Saburō, decided not to cut the party’s ties with the Committee. The leaders allowed individual workers to decide whether to participate in the Committee. They also called for the Committee to join the Anti-Anpo Planning Committee30 (Han Anpo Jikkō linkai) organized by the JSP and Sōhyō in order to keep the Antiwar Youth Committee under control.31

The JSP leaders tried not only to control the Antiwar Youth Committee but also to work with them in the late 1960s, because they found it necessary to gain support from the growing group of new leftists who addressed new issues and style of political activism.32 As early as 1963, when the JSP failed to get a good result in the general election, Narita Tomomi warned that the JSP relied too much on votes from union members and did not have many party members. In an article published in August 1969 titled “Tō Kensetsu to Seinen Sensen (the party-building and the youth front)”, Narita admitted that the party was not able to ignore issues addressed by the Committee, such as individual members’ independence, rising social control, and criticism of Japanese transnational companies:

30 The Japanese and American governments planned to renew the Japan-US Security Treaty known as the Anpo Treaty in 1970. In the late 1960s both old and new left groups organized their protests to stop renewing the treaty.
32 See Ueda Tetsu. “Wakai Seron o Sodateyō: Han Taisei no Seron Zukuri no Tameni” in Gekkan Shakaitō September 1968, pp.64-70.
Then, how can we break through in building a bigger party? I think that a key, the most promising key, is in our party's basic stance on the current youth problem and our concrete commitment to youth labour movements, that is to say, the current youth front, because the younger generation, who is the most sensitive to the transformations of the time, roughly and straightforwardly poses issues which we are now facing, and because the political vanguard of the generation, though it may not have any visions or plans, suddenly takes actions to pose the issues to us.33

Narita also insisted that young workers in the Antiwar Youth Committee felt alienated from decision-making in progressive parties and labour unions, so the JSP should take steps to solve the problem of their alienation.

However, Sôhyô was more critical of the Committee's actions than the party. Sôhyô was so disturbed by the radical actions that it pushed the JSP to break ties with the Committee, but the JSP rejected this. In early 1969, the party published the following statement on the Committee:

The Antiwar Youth Committee has been consistently composed of youth groups of labour unions since it was formed, and is open to unorganized individuals.... Since the Antiwar Committee was formed, our efforts to strengthen the Committee and involve young members in the party were two sides of the same coin. Today, the Antiwar Youth Committee in various parts of the country progresses, because young party members in the Socialist Youth Federation, their supporters, and youth groups of labour unions make great efforts.34

This statement shows that the JSP sought to keep distance from Sôhyô on its relations with the Committee in the first half of 1969.35

The Purge of the Antiwar Youth Committee

On 15 November 1969, the Committee planned to take direct action at Haneda against PM Satō Eisaku's visit to the USA to discuss Japan's cooperation in the Vietnam War. Sōhyō was so nervous about the plan that it urged the JSP to make the Committee stop the action. The party's leaders took into consideration the negative effects of confrontational actions on the forthcoming general election and decided to order the Committee to stop it. Nonetheless, the JSP was badly defeated in the election on 27 December 1969 and number of its seats in the Lower House was reduced from 141 to 90. The media pointed out that small parties, such as the Democratic Socialist Party or Kômeitō, won votes from former JSP supporters. On the day following the election, the Asahi Shinbun also pointed out that the JSP had failed to gain support from young people because of its bureaucratization or factional conflicts. The party's leaders' influence was reduced and they could not reject requests from Sōhyō to eject the Committee from the party. After several private debates, the outreach meeting of the central committee in the JSP made a decision to dismiss seven members working in the party central secretary's office in February 1970. The official reason was to cut payroll costs in order to reduce the deficit of the party. However, given that all of the dismissed were key activists in the Committee, the lay-off was, in fact, seen as a purge of the Antiwar Youth Committee from the party.

The annual general meeting of the party on 20-22 April 1970 was chaotic. The agenda of expelling the 13 key activists in the Committee from the party was resolved in the meeting. About 180 young members in the Committee crowded into the Kudan Convention Hall, and the party required the riot police to defend the meeting from the Antiwar Youth Committee members'
The campaign policy, which was resolved at the meeting, declared a break with the Committee in an indirect way:

Initially, the Antiwar Youth Committee was a spontaneous youth group with the principles of autonomy, originality, and unity. We had sought to "foster and reinforce the Committee", but it was wrong. We should correct our previous policy.

In this period, many activists in the Committee, who worked as union organizers or JSP campaigners in various regions of the country, were fired and ejected from workplaces and from the JSP's branches in prefectures. This shows that the JSP decided to cut their ties with new left movements, particularly with young workers.

The JSP's Isolation from New Movements

In the 1950s, the JSP and Sōhyō (called the JSP-Sōhyō block) were successful in gaining a wide range of support from those who found the war abhorrent. The ties with people's groups made it possible for the party to be a parliamentary counterbalance to the LDP, which occupied the majority of seats in the Lower House. However, the expulsion of the Antiwar Youth Committee from the party shows that the JSP gave up absorbing the style and issues of the Committee, which was supported by many young workers in the late 1960s. In the 1970s, the party was disturbed by weakening ties with people's movements other than labour unions that were affiliated with Sōhyō.

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The Antiwar Youth Committee translated young people's dissatisfaction with controlled society into political actions. The influence of the young workers on the JSP and Sōhyō should not be overstated. Nevertheless, since the Committee's role in labour movements corresponded to that of Beheiren in antiwar movements and Zenkyōtō in student movements, the expulsion of the Committee from the JSP in 1970 produced a symbolic message of the JSP's separation from new left movements. Several years later, Eda Saburō and his colleagues broke away from the JSP and founded the SDF, which was intended as a new politics party, but the JSP had already lost its ties with new movements and Eda was one of the persons who was responsible for the purge. It was quite unlikely that the SDF would gain a wide range of support from new movements, which had already been disappointed with the JSP.

Why did the JSP lose its popularity after the 1970s? This is a controversial issue in Japanese politics. Many studies claimed that the party's adherence to Soviet-style state socialism resulted in its long slump in the elections. If that is the case, what was then an alternative course which the JSP could have taken? Comparative studies on new politics illustrate that old progressive parties could take the course of working with new movements in order to freshen the party's ideas and expand their support base. In short, the JSP had a possibility of shifting its support base to young, urban, and post-materialistic people by adapting to the principles of new movements. However, the JSP and Eda Saburō purged the Antiwar Youth Committee from the party and missed the possibility around 1970.

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It followed that the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) could not get out of the old left culture. When he was a MP of the SDF in the 1980s, Kan Naoto complained about this:

So, I joined, from citizens' movements, the founding of the SCF with Mr. Eda Saburō, who broke with the JSP, and the SCF was reorganized into the current SDF. The most difficult thing for me was differences in the styles of movements, or the culture, rather than those of policies. This may be shameful for us to say this, but as soon as someone put pollution-free soap instead of dish detergent in the sink in the head office of the SDF, the soap was replaced by the previous dish detergent. We have been doing it for three years, but this has not changed yet. I find it difficult to transform our life style, that is, detergent with which we wash tea cups, though changing slogans and policies may be easier.41

Kan stressed the gap in the mentality between party politicians and activists of new movements. The activists focused on the issue of transforming everyday life; they did not neglect the issue of whether to use dish detergent or pollution-free soap.42 Kan's comment shows that the SDL, although it aimed to be a "social movement party", did not tackle the most significant issue of Japanese new left movements, self-revolution in "everydayness".

3. The Lockheed Scandal and the Anti-LDP Election Campaign

42 In this period stopping using dish detergent was a symbolic issue for consumers' and environmental groups, which were affected by discourses of new left movements. This is shown in the fact that many reports about the pollution-free soap issue were covered in Gekkan Chiiki Tōsō, a monthly information journal of residents' movements, which shared some basic ideas with new leftists.
People's Anger with the Lockheed Scandal

The following three sections discuss how new left movements, women's liberation movements, and residents' movements responded to the Lockheed Scandal. This political scandal led a large number of people to distrust the LDP and existing parties. It meant that there were opportunities for new left movements to spread "new politics" to Japanese politics in this period: young, urban, and educated people who were disappointed with existing politics came to support postmaterialistic values addressed by these movements; new parties based on a wide range of political alliances could have been produced from within the movements; the parties might have changed the national party system. In what follows, I argue that this change did not occur in Japanese politics at this time: the new movements did not make use of these opportunities and play a role in facilitating this political transformation.

In February 1976, an infamous scandal was uncovered in the subcommittee on multinational companies of the diplomatic committee in the USA's Upper House. It was revealed that the Lockheed Corporation, a large US military company, paid a bribe via famous Japanese rightist Kodama Yoshio and large Japanese trading company Marubeni Corporation to some LDP politicians including former PM Tanaka Kakuei and leading business people so that Japanese Self-Defence Forces would purchase airplanes made by the Lockheed Corporation. Many Japanese people were shocked to hear that dozens of political and business leaders were suspected of corruption. They were also irritated by the leaders' desperate efforts to cover up the scandal.

Many people in citizens' groups, including some new leftists, began to take action for investigation into the truth of the Lockheed Scandal. The Citizens' Group for Examination of the Lockheed Scandal (Lockheed Mondai o
Tsuikyû Suru Shimin no Kai) was formed on 10 February. The Woman Voters' League of Japan (Nihon Fujin Yûkensha Dômei), the Japan-Korea Solidarity Liaison Conference (Nikkan Rentai Renraku Kaigi), and the Consumer Union of Japan (Nihon Shôhisha Renmei) demonstrated in Sakamotochô Park, Tokyo, on 29 February. It rained very hard on the day, but large numbers of people joined the demonstration in order to express their anger with the scandal. A woman in her fifties stated the reason she participated in the demonstration:

I wanted to know what actually happened. I think that many more people wanted to join. But everyone works hard. People who live so seriously cannot join, because they do not have courage and time. But I do not want to suppress this anger in my mind....

Throughout March, people's protests became bigger and bigger. On 8 March, 40,000 people gathered in a large-scale demonstration which the JSP, the JCP, and Kômeitô co-hosted. Even non-union or non-party affiliated people joined the demonstration. Hundreds of protesters demonstrated at Kodama Yoshio's house, the head office of Marubeni Corporation, and the Diet, day after day. The Woman Voters' League of Japan and other groups launched the Lockheed caravan. The caravan started from Sukiyabashi in Tokyo on 27 May and went campaigning in order to uncover the truth of the Lockheed Scandal in various regions of Japan from Tôhoku to Okinawa. The wide range of people's distrust in the LDP was shown in that the campaigners received a lot of donations and encouragement from one local resident after another.

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44 Mainichi Shinbun 1 March 1976, p.19.
45 Asahi Shinbun 27 March 1976, p.23.
46 Asahi Shinbun 1 June 1976, p.23.
The Citizens' Joint Desk on the Lockheed Scandal began to publish *Shūkan Pinatsu* (the Weekly Peanuts) from 27 March, a newspaper that aimed to uncover the truth of the scandal. About 30 former activists of Zenkyōtō and Beheiren (Beheiren was dissolved a year before the Vietnam War ended in 1975) in their late twenties and early thirties devoted their time to writing and editing articles, selling the newspaper, and doing administrative work. The newspaper did not have its own sales channel, but its sales were amazingly strong. On a certain day when several young activists stood in front of Takadanobaba Station, each of them sold 100 copies of the newspaper every hour and people queued up in order to buy it.

These protests against the Lockheed Scandal did not decline even in July. Some citizens' groups formed the Group for PR on the Lockheed Scandal (Rokkido Iken Kōkoku Undō no Kai). The Group funded an advertisement column on the scandal in a couple of national newspapers. The campaign gained official approval from 60 well-known figures, such as commentator Yoshitake Teruko, cartoonist Akatsuka Fujio, writer Oda Makoto, and TV personality Nakayama Chinatsu. This action was effective in attracting public attention to their campaign. In this period, dozens of former new leftists formed and ran the Rescue Centre for Insider Information (Jōhō Kakekomi Sentār). The Centre received 350 whistle-blowing calls on corporate and government corruption in only two weeks, and was busy answering telephone calls day after day.

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47 "Peanuts" was a code word amongst corrupt politicians and business people. It was said that the word meant a bribe (1 peanut amounted to 1 million yen).
48 Mainichi Shinbun 12 April 1976, p.3.
49 Shūkan Pinatsu, 22 May 1976, p.2.
50 Mainichi Shinbun 3 July 1976, p.23.
The Anti-LDP Election Campaign

In August 1976, dozens of citizens’ groups to uncover the truth of the Lockheed Scandal formed the Planning Committee of Citizens Angry with the Lockheed Corruption to Smash the LDP (Rokkido Oshoku ni Ikaru Shimin wa Jimintō o Tsubusu Jikkō linkai). The Committee aimed to build people’s broad networks against the LDP during the upcoming Lower House election at the end of the year. However, the groups which joined the Committee could not agree on any joint election campaigns except not voting for the LDP’s candidates. In Shūkan Peanuts, a member of the committee wrote:

In terms of the election, not voting for the LDP is agreed. But we suddenly feel confused when discussing which party to vote for. Our claim loses dignity, and it is unavoidable that we feel depressed. A person stated that people who voted for the LDP in the last election were responsible for the structure of corruption, so they had to assume their responsibility, and voting not for the LDP was one of the ways. Another person stated that we try to keep convincing citizens not to vote for the LDP in the way they can accept.52

The Committee could not finally prepare any joint campaigns for the election, though they agreed on being anti-LDP.

In the Lower House election on 5 December, many voters were so distrustful of the LDP that the party lost 16 seats from the last election. This shows that the election was an opportunity for new parties to progress in, or at least make a step toward the Diet. Why did this not happen? One of the influential factors was the electoral system. Some studies on Green parties in European countries show how the electoral system encouraged (or discouraged) small parties to go into parliamentary politics. For example, British people were more aware of the significance of environmental

52 Shūkan Peanuts 4 September 1976, p.2.
destruction than other European people in 1980, but its electoral system, single-seat electoral districts, resulted in the election contests between the two or three candidates who were the most likely to have some chances of winning. This means that it was difficult for the Green party or other small parties to gain seats in the elections in the UK.

The electoral system of the Lower House in Japan in this period was not necessarily disadvantageous to small parties. Multi-seat electoral districts gave small parties more chances of gaining seats than single-seat electoral districts. This is shown in the success of the New Liberal Club (Shin Jiyū Kurabu) in the Lower House election of 1976. The party was formed in this period mainly by former LDP politicians who were critical of the Lockheed Scandal. The NLC gained support especially from urban voters who were dissatisfied with conventional old parties. In the election of 1976, the party increased its seats from five to 17 (25 candidates ran for the election). Whereas the NLC, a new conservative party, played a role in keeping protest votes against the LDP within conservative political forces, new progressive parties did not emerge in the Lower House election of 1976.

4. Women’s Reaction to the Upper House Election in 1977

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54 Takabatake Michitoshi. Gendai Nihon no Seitō to Senkyo. Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1980, p.137. From this election, candidates were allowed to give out their personal handouts on the streets and other places. The handouts made it possible for the candidates to create their own image more freely than officially designated campaigns, such as the election broadcast and the election bulletin. PR agencies were not involved, but the importance of PR grew in the election campaign of 1976. See Okino Yasuharu and Kōno Satoshi (eds.). Dai 34 kai Sōsenkyo Kojin Bira 300 sen. Tokyo: Kokumin Seiji Kenkyūkai, 1977, pp.207-09.
Women Voting for Women

After the NLC gained seats in the Lower House election of 1976, other new parties, such as the Socialist-Citizen League and the Progressive Liberal League (Kakushin Jiyū Rengo55), were prepared to run for the Upper House election in July 1977. The electoral system in the Upper House, proportional representation, was more advantageous to these small parties than single-seat electoral districts. Wasted votes were smaller in proportional representation, and seats were distributed in proportion to the number of votes. Electoral districts were classified into national and local. The LDP was highly powerful in the local electoral districts, but small parties had possibilities of getting seats, especially in the national district.

When the Lockheed Scandal was still fresh in people's memories in 1977, the new parties were supported particularly by the younger generation. A number of young people helped to organize street speeches by the new parties' candidates and worked as campaign volunteers.56 From the beginning of the Lockheed Scandal, many women activists took a major role in searching for the truth of the scandal; the Woman Voters' League of Japan took actions early on the scandal; the Women's Democratic Club (Fujin Minshu Kurabu) and the Consumer Union of Japan, which consisted of many female members, played an important role in organizing the actions.

55 In terms of the Progressive Liberal League, see Kan Naoto and Baba Kōichi. Gekiron Shaminren vs Kakujiren. Tokyo: Chibara Shobō, 1979, pp. 52-61. Baba Kōichi and Katō Kōichi. Zenkoku Jūdan Senkyo Repōto: Rakusen 130, 504 hyō. Nagano: Asuka Shobō, 1980, pp. 182-84. The Progressive Liberal League attempted to build ties with citizens' groups by designating Ui Jun, a well-known environmentalist, as the convener of the anti-pollution section and lenaga Saburō, a famous historian who took legal action against the government on textbook screening, as the convener of the education section, but this attempt was not successful. The Progressive Liberal League could not eventually nominate civil activists for candidates in the election. It was seen as a group of entertainers, such as Oshima Nagisa, Ei Rosuke, Itsuki Hiroyuki, Nosaka Akiyoshi, and Aoshima Yukio.

In this situation, some women's groups, including women's liberation activists, formed the Women's Group for Political Reform (Seiji o Kaetai Onna tachi no Kai) for the Upper House election of 1977. The Women's Action Group in International Women's Year (Kokusai Fujin nen o Kikkake to Shite Kōdō o Okosu Onna Tachi no Kai), Women Eros (Onna Erosu), Women's Journal (Josei Jānaru), Women's Revolt (Onna no Hangyaku), Agora, Lib Centre in Shinjuku (Ribu Shinjuku Sentā), Group Fire, and other groups joined the campaign. Under the slogan of “Women Voting for Women”, the women's groups gave support to three female candidates in the election: Yoshitake Teruko, a leader of the Women's Action Group in the International Women's Year in 1975, who ran for the national electoral district as an independent; Tawara Moeko, a commentator who ran for the Tokyo local district as an independent (supported by the Progressive Liberal League later); and Tanaka Sumiko, an incumbent who ran for the national district from the JSP.

The three candidates claimed that the LDP was interested only in economic growth and did not care about its negative impact on weaker people, like women. In her campaign poster, Yoshitake wrote:

Let us stop politics that makes too much mess for those who come after. We have been, devastatingly and significantly, deprived of our living (kurashi) since the LDP took power thirty years ago. Living is the most beloved place for human beings. The deprivation of living means that human life itself is oppressed. The evidence is shown in that sky, water, and even food, which are supposed to cultivate people’s life, turn into foreign material in the present, and the weak, such as women, children, older people, and disabled people, pay the price. The LDP, which sees production or convenience as more important than people’s living, is engaged in politics that makes too much mess for those who come after.
come after. This way of thinking, which places the greatest emphasis on the construction of bridges and buildings, completely lacks the viewpoint of its negative impact on people. In sum, the current politics is possible only when the weakest people pay the price.58

Her comment reveals that Women's groups were critical of the LDP's industrialization policies from the standpoint of marginalized people. Several basic elements of new politics agendas, such as criticism of economic growth, can be found in her statement.

On 28 January 1977, the Women's Group for Political Reform hosted a rally titled “Talk, Women: If Women Change, Politics will Change” in the Yamanote church in Tokyo, and about 600 women came together from various parts of Japan to join it. Because the rally was successful beyond the group's expectations, they planned to hold another rally. An increasing number of woman volunteers were willing to make handouts for the rally and give them out on the streets. The handouts called for women to vote for woman candidates: “now is the time to send women's representatives to the Diet”. A rally entitled “Women's Big Speech Meeting on Current Affairs (Shin Onna no Jikyoku Daizenjitsu kai)” was held on 18 June, and 600 women in their teens to sixties participated in it.59 Some women's lib groups organized rallies in other major cities. For example, in Nagoya, a rally entitled “the Round Table Discussion on Women and Politics (Onna Seiji Dai Tôrôn Kai)” was held on 4 June, and about 300 women joined it. Rallies were also held in Kyoto, Osaka, and Hiroshima.

59 “Watashitachi wa, Ima Ugoki Dashita...” in Onna Erosu March 1978, pp.102-08.
Women's Reluctance to Engage in Electoral Politics

In the Upper House election in July, only Tanaka Sumiko won a seat, and the other two candidates failed. Nevertheless, Yoshitake Teruko won 260,000 votes, and Tawara Moeko won 320,000 in spite of their lack of support from big parties. Their good fight resulted from many volunteers' great contribution to the energetic campaign. However, the refusal by women activists to engage in the election campaign was persistent. An example is shown in a roundtable discussion in Agora, a journal of women's liberation movements, after the election. Several discussants were proud that the election campaign by the Women's Group for Political Reform enabled women's liberation movements to be known to the public. However, one of the discussants claimed that there was still a "huge gap" between "insurgence within the regime" and "dropping out of the regime and struggling on the outside". Funamoto Emi, one of the discussants, stated that she would select the latter:

I find that an increasing number of people, who identify themselves as a Lib [—Women's libber], form groups in companies. If it continues to increase, we will be able to discuss not only women's specific concerns but also their related issues, such as wages or discrimination. If we continue to do this, we will realize that women are unable to be liberated in capitalist society. Hence, I think that women's lib should aim at anarchy, that is, a society without any power relations. The basic premise is no power relationship between women. The Women's Group for Political Reform stated that "politics is everyday life, everyday life is politics". The slogan is good, but fighting in extraordinary spaces will be necessary until politics becomes everyday life. Women's lib activists should think more concretely about their ideal state and future.60

Funamoto did not necessarily select "fighting in extraordinary spaces" from a strategic view of the current power balance. Rather, she referred to the basic principle of women's liberation movements. Her comment implies that the strategy of "dropping out of the regime and struggling on the outside" was more suitable to the anarchistic nature of the movements. She stressed that the fundamental purpose of women's lib was to be liberated from all kinds of power relations. In short, women's liberation movements aimed not to take power or negotiate in political institutions, like bureaucracy or parliamentary politics, but to change the relationship of men's dominance over women in everyday life.

Second-wave feminism, which emerged in the late 1960s in other industrialized countries as well as in Japan, focused on transforming power relations between men and women. Feminists claimed that the state was a ubiquitous system of patriarchal power and women were excluded from formal institutions, so the state embodied men's interests much more than women's. This means that second-wave feminism tended to reject women's engagement in official political institutions. Political scientist Valerie Bryson wrote:

For some radical feminists, the whole idea of the competitive pursuit of power is rejected as an embodiment of male values, and conventional politics is abandoned: organizational hierarchies are avoided, political separatism is favoured over participation in existing organizations or institutions, which are seen as a mere playground for male egoists.61

In Japan, parliamentary politics was one of the most difficult areas for women to enter at that time. The percentage of women amongst Diet members

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elected in 1974 was only 3.4%. This disadvantaged position propelled Japanese women activists to distance themselves from parliamentary politics. Some comparative studies indicate that feminists in European countries also took "proactive symbolic action of the movement as an outsider" in the 1970s. Rather than specifically targeting the state or aiming at institutional reform, they sought to enhance people's awareness of patriarchy in all spheres of public and private life and create spaces independent from men, such as feminist bookstores, reading groups, collectives, cultural spaces, etc.

Japanese women's liberation movements followed the trend of feminist movements in industrialized countries in the 1970s.

How were Women’s Liberation Movements Formed?

Women's movements in postwar Japan did not always have an "anti-politics" orientation. Women's group activities in local areas, called säkuru katsudô, were an important part of "the postwar progressives". As discussed in Chapter 1, the Children of the Cedars (Sugi no Ko Kai), a women's reading circle which was formed in Suginami, Tokyo, in 1953, was committed to the petition campaign to ban the hydrogen bomb after the Daigo Fukuryû Maru incident, the suffering of Japanese fishing boat Daigo Fukuryû Maru from the Bravo hydrogen bomb test conducted by the USA at Bikini atoll on 1 March 1954. Women's liberation movements kept distance from these earlier

63 Ibid., p.36.
women's movements and inherited the idea of transforming "everydayness" from new left movements. As discussed in Chapter 4, during the campus disputes in the late 1960s, many women's activists were required to play a complementary role, such as food preparation or rescue activities, in the spaces behind the barricades on campus. They left the movements and highlighted the issue of changing the division of labour by gender role, which new leftists tended to downplay.65

An article in a journal *Metroparichen* published by a women's liberation group of Hokkaido, put it this way:

Where were women in the process of the Anpo protests and the campus disputes of 1969 by which people in various parts of the country were upset? They were, for example, on the home front—rescue activities, food preparation, carrying stones, and so on—or on the front—making an inflammatory speech with men's words and using *gebabō*, in short, they became men. However, as Wada Akiko [—a popular singer] sings, "a woman is a woman, not a man". We, as women, could not become satisfied. When the word humanity means only male in the present, females cannot join struggles for all humanity's liberation, and feel something strange in the actions. This is an issue in the 1970s for women who struggled in the 1960s.66

65 In the USA, many women activists were involved in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an organization for civil rights, in the 1960s. In particular, thousands of them went south, to places like Mississippi, and gave support to the civil rights movement in 1964-65 (known as the "Freedom Summer"). The journey encouraged some white women volunteers to equate sexism with racism, criticize SNCC for shutting women out of decision-making, and create a proto-feminist consciousness (Linden-Ward, Blanche and Carol Hurd Green. *American Women in the 1960s: Changing the Future*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993, p.55). In Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an American new left student organization, many women activists were also empowered, discovered feminism, and began to leave SDS by 1967 (ibid., p.160). These examples show that women's liberation movements were affected by and split from new left groups in the USA as well as in Japan.

Women's Liberation movements as well as new left movements criticized controlled society for producing a sense of alienation, but women's alienation was not the same as men's. In the system of patriarchy, the dominant gender norms pushed women to play a complementary role in society and support men. Women activists set up the goal of liberating themselves from the norms and living by their own values. As discussed in the sections on Nichidai Tōsō and Tōdai Tōsō in Chapter 2, the idea of Japanese new leftists, self-revolution in "everydayness", was composed of "self-reflection" and "self-liberation", but the women activists particularly stressed the latter.

On 21-24 August 1971, hundreds of women activists gathered together in the "lib camp" in Shinanodaira, Nagano prefecture. A handout for the camp reveals the idea of self-liberation:

I do not know whether Ms. Alcott wrote in Little Women "A revolution which people do not enjoy is not a revolution", but let us say it: a leftist woman with poor mentality, who forgets how to enjoy by thinking that pleasure without any principles is bourgeois and opportunistic, is a virgin who has never been in a field of lust. A virgin produces nothing. Don't you feel sad that your muscle will weaken over time? Our mothers and grandmothers could not even find their own lust, and we will be able to reward them only by being sexually aroused and winning back energies of which they have been deprived for a long time for them and us. Swing a hoe in the field of lust. Accept yourself (this lovely yourself!) who is anxious about being wrong or be despised in doing this. It is a pity to die before doing all the things I want to do. Let us do anything we hesitated to do because we thought that it might be bourgeois or shameless.67

Women activists who took this approach focused mainly on changing their own way of thinking. Japanese women usually had been taught since their childhood in schools or at home that women should suppress their sexual feelings. These activists tried to liberate themselves from these dominant gender norms and determine their life, such as jobs or relations with their partners, by themselves. In this sense, the idea of such women’s liberation movements was close to that of Nichidai Tōsō, which encouraged its student activists to gain freedom from strict control of university authorities. The argument of this section shows that the women activists were strongly influenced by new leftists in the late 1960s, who aimed to transform “everydayness” rather than political institutions or public policies, though at the same time they were critical of the austere culture of new left movements.

Discussions in Nagoya

In the election campaign of 1977, women’s lib activists recognized that their activities were alien to the campaign. This was revealed in the debate of the Round Table Discussion on Women and Politics in Nagoya. Whereas local organizers expressed their gratitude to the Women’s Group for Political Reform, they raised their doubts about the group’s actions:

We, who are dissatisfied with confinement of politics to the election campaign, hesitate to support your election campaign right now. Even if we succeed in sending our representatives to the Diet, their activities will be ruled by the current overwhelming majority under the seemingly democratic logic of majority decision. Furthermore, does the way of sending our representatives and entrusting our agendas to them satisfy our desire to make decisions in politics, that is, our life, by ourselves?68

This comment clearly shows that the idea of new leftists, self-determination on issues in everyday life, influenced the women activists in Nagoya. After the comment quoted above, the local organizers asked why the Women's Group for Political Reform launched the election campaign and how the group would represent women's interests in parliamentary politics.

Ozawa Ryōko, at once a secretary of the Women's Group for Political Reform and a member of the local assembly in Urawa, Saitama prefecture, stated that she just aimed to achieve what was needed from the standpoint of women's daily life, even if it was only a little, in the Diet, that is, in one of the places of political struggle. She continued to assert that:

In terms of the election, some activists think that representative democracy is nonsense, they should not work on election campaigns, and social movements should keep pure. We would be unable to build a consensus if we discussed it. After having done various things, I just think that the election is one of the things at which we cannot look sceptically.69

In the face of the doubts from the local activists of Nagoya, Yoshitake Teruko revealed her annoyance with the activists:

Why do you talk about such things now again in this way? You are allergic to politics. In return, I would like to ask you a question of whether now is the time to despair in politics and say such a thing.70

After the debate, the organizers of Nagoya wrote:

69 Ibid., p.44.
70 Ibid., pp.43-44.
Women, who have a feeling of “I never accept the current situation”, struggle in each place. From this view, Ms. Yoshitake selects the Diet as her new battlefield. We wanted her to clarify how to struggle in the Diet and what relations she would build with the Group of Calling for New Alliance [—Atarashii Rendō o Motomeru Kai, a Yoshitake’s supporter group]. However, she seemed to be unable to understand our questions well.71

The debate in Nagoya did not finally lead to the formation of any women’s election campaign groups.

The debate revealed that the idea of self-revolution in “everydayness” was not always consistent with actions to change political institutions, such as election campaigns. In general, an election campaign has the risk of reproducing the division of labour by gender role, because all campaigners have to act as efficiently as possible in the short term in order to win many votes. After the Upper House election of 1977, a woman campaigner participated in a summer school organized by the Women’s Action Group in International Women’s Year. Discussing her experiences of the election campaign, she stated:

Talking about the election campaign, when we thought that we “have to win a seat”, we went into the efficiency-first principle and produced the division of labour by gender role: women cook while men repair a broken speaker. We have to rethink such little things.72

This comment reminds us of women activists’ experiences in the late 1960s. As discussed in Chapter 3, many new leftists were not sensitive about the way

they reproduced the dominant gender norms in confronting police officers and seeking military success.

It is true that not all women's movements rejected their commitment to political institutions. However, the idea of self-revolution in "everydayness", which was influenced by new leftists, prevented women's liberation movements from building broader networks and being involved in parliamentary politics. In this way, Japanese women activists had not yet formed the idea of bridging institutional politics with everyday politics in the 1970s.

5. Residents' Movements and Party Politics

The Emergence of Residents' Movements

In the 1970s, residents' movements (jūmin undō), as well as women's liberation movements, criticized the LDP and other dominant political forces for supporting industrialization policies without concern for people's lives. A number of local people suffered the destruction of their living environment caused by the building of garbage facilities, dams, highways, Shinkansen (bullet train) lines, airports, and large-scale industrial complexes. However, the Japanese government did not deal with the problems seriously, because they believed that economic growth would produce benefits to the entire nation. This led local residents to unite in protest against public pollution caused by the large-scale development projects.

In particular, people's protests against a petrochemical complex in Mishima and Numazu, Shizuoka prefecture, were a well-known case. In the 1960s, the construction of a petrochemical complex was planned on the
waterfront in Mishima. Many local people knew at that time that a petrochemical complex in Yokkaichi, Mie prefecture, was doing serious harm to the environment and the health of residents, so residents in Mishima and Numazu were concerned about the complex's negative impact on their lives. They began to organize a campaign against the construction, such as lobbying, rallies, public meetings, and demonstrations. The protests finally convinced the mayor of Mishima to give up the plan. In this fashion, industrialization policies promoted by the LDP and other dominant political forces were in crisis in the 1970s.

Residents' movements originated differently from new left movements, such as Beheiren, Zenkyōtō, and the Antiwar Youth Committee. New left movements were a section of the political left and composed mainly of urban people, but a wide range of rural people, irrespective of ideological differences, engaged in residents' movements. Whereas new left movements raised some abstract slogans of "self-negation", residents' movements set up more concrete goals. Nakamura Kiichi, then an activist in a residents' movement, argued that residents' movements had "specific indigenousness based on living in the land", while "citizens' movements", such as student or antiwar groups, were characterized by a "consciousness of serving universal values independently of the land".73

Suspicion of Kökyōsei

On the other hand, residents' movements shared doubts about Japan's rapid industrialization with many new leftists. During the economic boom, the Japanese state was passionate about mobilizing human and material resources in order to achieve GNP-based economic growth efficiently. The

state often controlled or oppressed people’s protests against the destruction of their lives in the name of the national interest. In the case of the construction project of the Tōhoku Shinkansen (Bullet Train) line in the 1970s, its proponents claimed that the network of express trains would make it possible for everyone to travel quickly. The proponents often used the buzzwords “Development and Prosperity” and “The Shinkansen opens our way to our future”. Although many local residents expressed their concerns about noise, safety, and the devastation of local economies, local governments pushed the Shinkansen project in the name of public interest.74

This example shows that residents’ movements had to confront “the public (kōkyōsei)”. The word allowed politicians, administrators, and businesses to justify large-scale development projects and imposed the stigma of “residents’ egoism (jūmin ego)” or “local egoism (chiiki ego)” on residents who opposed the projects. Ishikawa Akiko, a resident of Kōbe in Hyōgo prefecture, joined protests against the building of the Kōbe sixth waste disposal facility. The Kōbe local government planned to build a disposal facility in the centre of Suma New Town, but many local residents, who were concerned about public pollution, opposed the plan of the building. In response to a criticism of them for being NIMBY, Ishikawa wrote:

> Our protests are seen as “ego”, but I think, what is wrong with ego? Nobody wants to get sick owing to pollution. If people living in other areas do not want it, they should say “No” as well. If so, political persons cannot help rethinking it. People will have to reduce their waste if antipollution measures are not enough.75

Her comment stressed that “rejection” was their weapon to protect their lives. The basic idea of residents’ movements was characterized as rejection of “the public” and persistence in “ego”.

Residents’ movements also shared with new left movements their antipathy to old leftists. In the 1960s, the JCP and the JSP expanded their influence over prefectural assemblies and municipal assemblies: the progressive parties took over administration in several large cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and Okinawa, known as kakushin jichitai (progressive local governments); the parties increased the number of their mayors in various parts of Japan from 10 in 1964 to about 100 in 1971. Because some of the progressive governments stood on the side of the proponents of large-scale development projects rather than stopping them, many residents’ movements kept themselves distant from progressive parties in the 1970s.

For example, in the late 1960s, the local government of Kunitachi in Tokyo put forward a plan into action to build several pedestrian overpasses in an avenue from Kunitachi Station straight to the south. Some residents were concerned that the plan would destroy the beautiful scenery in the area. They took legal actions against the plan and fought for environmental protection and the right to free movement of pedestrians. They were dissatisfied with progressive politicians. The governor of Tokyo, the mayor of Kunitachi, and some members of local assemblies, who belonged to the progressive side of politics, did not support the residents’ protests. The politicians, who followed the policy of the JSP and the JCP, ignored and occasionally obstructed the movements instead of listening to their voices.76 This pushed residents’ movements to be independent from progressive political forces.

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In this way, residents' movements came to criticize old leftists and progressive governments for their bureaucratic politics. They rejected top-down decisions in constructing "public" facilities. This is clearly shown in the example of the League for Opposition to the Yokohama New Freight Line (Yokohama Shinkamotsusen Hantai Dômei). The National Railway planned to construct a new freight line between Tsurumi and Totsuka in Kanagawa prefecture. Many residents living along the line, who were concerned about public pollution such as noise or vibration, formed the League in 1967 in order to protest against the building of the new line. The League insisted that the aim of the construction was to make profit from freight transport rather than improve public transportation. The League was irritated with the progressive local government in Yokohama and its mayor Asukata Kazuo, because they did not oppose the construction, but rather were on the side of pro-construction without enough community consultation.

The Centralized Political Structure of Postwar Japan

Residents' movements shared the basic ideas, such as criticism of industrialization or antipathy to the old left, with new left movements. Was there a possibility that residents' movements in various regions of Japan might have built broader networks with new left movements in this period?

Initially, residents' movements had only very limited channels to political institutions. In the political system of postwar Japan, the national government was able to make decisions on how much it distributed subsidies to local governments, so the central government controlled local governments through the subsidies. Ethan Scheiner, a scholar of Japanese politics, writes:

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In reality, Japanese local governments lack the flexibility to be able to raise their own sources over the long run to pay for large projects or higher levels of service. The central government’s regulation of local taxes is especially restrictive—even when compared to other unitary systems—and grants and loans are typically given solely for purposes defined by the central government.\(^7\)

This centralized political structure pushed resident groups to lobby powerful politicians in the national parliament and bureaucrats in Tokyo in order to stop large scale development projects. Conservative political forces, such as big companies, had usually dominated the political channels and built strong ties with senior bureaucrats and ruling-party politicians\(^7\), so political opportunities had been very narrow for residents’ movements which protested against the projects.

**New Political Opportunities for Residents’ movements**

In the 1960s, residents’ movements began to explore their political opportunities. First of all, the growing movements put pressure on local governments and their mayors to stop large-scale development projects. In some cases, the movements were successful in making these politicians rethink the projects. This strategy to approach local governments was popular in the 1960s, because more and more progressive political forces won the chief administrative post in some local governments. The successful protests against the construction of the petrochemical complex in Mishima and Numazu by pressuring its progressive mayor became a model for residents’ movements.


\(^{79}\) Ibid., p.114.
The protests encouraged many local groups to focus their energy on sending progressive politicians to local governments and assemblies in the 1960s.

In the 1970s, however, the close relations between progressive local governments or politicians and resident groups were being broken in some cases, such as the Yokohama New Freight Line, so residents’ movements had to change the strategy. In the early 1970s, Yamaguchi Bushû, a leader of farmers’ movements in Ibaragi prefecture who joined the protests in Sanrizuka, Chiba prefecture, against the construction project of Narita International Airport, stated:

We cannot tap people’s real energy without letting people’s power be active and work directly, that is, letting people exercise their power. In principle, we should not include winning the posts of mayors or members of assemblies in our goals. In fact, if we win posts as town councillors, these councillors will be privileged bosses who are isolated from ordinary people. This is essentially true in the case of councillors of the JCP or the JSP. The councillors find the life purposes of their lives in their activities in the assemblies and become social creatures who are isolated from the people rather than working with them. If ordinary people have power, they will completely satisfy each of their demands independently of parliament and mayors. Essentially, no matter what actions we take in the administrative organization, we will be integrated into this organization. No matter how we make our requests in the assemblies and whatever mayors do, we will be involved in pro-government groups. Raising such an assembly-centred principle as our goal is fundamentally incorrect. If residents unite, we will be able to influence any mayors to a significant extent.80

Protesters at Sanrizuka opposing the construction of the airport did not gain explicit support from progressive parties. Because they were isolated from any

political forces, they hardly ever had any expectations about support from political parties and local governments. In the 1970s, this situation was true of some other residents' movements as well as in Sanrizuka.

Second, residents' protests, although they did not have formal channels to political institutions, could have influenced national politics through the media. In the late 1960s, the media covered an increasing number of reports on public pollution in various parts of Japan. This helped to set the tone of public opinion critical of environmental deterioration and the destruction of rural people's lives. When the reports reached a peak in 1970, the government and the LDP could no longer ignore the issue of public pollution. They focused their efforts on passing a series of laws in the Diet in 1970 to regulate the emission of pollution (This session of the Diet was known as "the Pollution Diet"—kōgai kokkai). In his work on the environmental politics of Japan, Jeffrey Broadbent describes the impact of resident protests on national policy-making as follows:

Only when the electoral threat to the LDP and the productivity threat to big business (from protests and from court fines) both increased sharply did the LDP pass substantive formal legislation. Both of these threats came from the rising wave of protest. In other words, the wave of protest changed the Ruling Triad's political opportunity structure for the worse. In general theoretical terms, popular agency created an unfavourable structure of threatening political-economic sanctions for the Ruling Triad.

The possibility did exist for residents' movements to change national politics from outside conventional routes to political institutions. In order to do this, residents' movements had to build networks with other movements, make their protests larger, influence the media, and alter public opinion.

81 Broadbent. *Environmental Politics in Japan*, p.106.
82 Ibid., p.128.
Anti-nuclear Movements Initiated by Old Leftists

As discussed earlier, some case studies of new politics in European countries illustrate that the anti-nuclear issue provided a platform for uniting residents' movements with new movements in the 1970s.\(^3\) However, in almost the same period, Japanese new movements were seldom successful in building their ties with residents' movements over the anti-nuclear issue. In the 1970s, protests against the nuclear power were very active in various parts of Japan. For instance, the government planned to promote a large-scale development project, which included the construction of a home port for a nuclear powered vessel, around Mutsu Bay in 1969, but this plan pushed local community groups which were concerned about public pollution to form the League against the Mutsu Ogawara Development (Hantai Dômei) in October 1971. However, "radical groups" were excluded from the League in the constitution, while new left groups were stigmatized as "extremists" by the mainstream media.\(^4\) When the *Mutsu*, a nuclear power-driven vessel, was first tested in the ocean in the north of Aomori prefecture and there was a minor leak of neutron and gamma rays from the reactor shielding in 1974, many local people in Aomori prefecture and thousands of activists joined large-scale actions against the launch of the *Mutsu* at Ōminato Port in Mutsu. It was the JSP and Sôhyô rather than new movements that organized the actions. They were reluctant to take confrontational actions, such as blockades in construction sites, which were popular repertoires in Western anti-nuclear


movements, but rather they focused on taking conventional actions, such as legal actions and participation in public hearings. 

After the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the US-Soviet tensions rose and many Western countries changed from "détente" to more confrontation against the USSR. When America and the Soviet Union were prepared to deploy a number of nuclear missiles in the early 1980s, many Japanese people were concerned about the possible outbreak of a nuclear war between the USA and the Soviet Union. In March 1982, about 200,000 people joined an anti-nuclear rally in Hiroshima. 400,000 people participated in another rally in Tokyo in May 1982. The organizers stated that they had sent 80 million signatures supporting a ban on nuclear weapons and advocating disarmament to the United Nations. However, Japanese anti-nuclear movements differed from the ideas and style of new movements in the 1970s and 1980s. First, Japanese anti-nuclear movements preferred conventional protests, such as signature campaigns, to confrontational direct action, which was popular in anti-nuclear movements in Western Europe, in 1975-89.

Second, large organizations, such as political parties or labour unions, organized the large-scale protest events. It is true that anti-nuclear sentiment was deeply rooted among Japanese people, who had experienced the bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Nevertheless, a questionnaire survey, which was conducted by a citizen's group of Yokosuka in an anti-nuclear rally in Tokyo on 23 May 1982, showed that 62% of about 600 respondents were required by political organizations with which they were affiliated, such as labour unions or progressive parties, to join the rally.
It is worth noting that Japanese anti-nuclear power movements were inclined to be separate from no-nuke movements. Since organizers in the rally in Hiroshima on 21 March 1982 were concerned that the word “anti-nuke” might include anti-nuclear power generation, they changed its slogan to “Actions for Peace in Hiroshima”. Some anti-nuclear groups in Hiroshima were angry with this and hosted their own rally and demonstration.\textsuperscript{88} Japanese anti-nuclear movements in the 1970s and 1980s were thus composed mainly of old left groups, such as large labour unions and progressive parties. Local residents and NGOs did not play a crucial role in organizing the movements until the 1990s.

When tackling important political issues, “the postwar progressives” often formed a united front (“\textit{kyōtō}” or “\textit{tōitsu sensen}”), a pyramidal alliance between labour unions, people’s organizations, and progressive parties. Residents’ movements, which criticized old leftists for top-down politics, were, naturally, unable to join such an alliance, so it was unlikely in the 1970s and 1980s that the anti-nuclear issue would be a platform to unite residents’ movements with other movements.

**Networks without New Movements**

What networks could residents’ movements join? The networks could not be centralized, bureaucratic, and top-down, but must be decentralized, horizontal, and bottom-up; while a local struggle was independent from others, all struggles could gather together on a significant issue if necessary. This was the ideal model of organization which new leftists suggested in the late 1960s. Because residents’ movements shared with new leftists their ideas of antipathy to economic growth and top-down politics, they had a possibility of building

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., pp.17-18.
broader networks with the new movements in order to increase their influence and change the discourse of the media.

Where were new movements in this period? New left movements had been in a serious slump in the early 1970s. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the 1970s some new leftists visited residents' movements in local areas and sought to build mutual trust. However, these tended to be just personal or small groups ties and did not extend to broader networks. Because the image of new leftists as brutal and selfish “extremists” was produced in the media and due to violent protests, such as intra- or inner-group conflicts or guerrilla fighting, in this period, local activists kept themselves distant from the movements. It seldom followed that new leftists successfully urged residents' movements to tackle a specific national issue. This was shown in a questionnaire survey of Shimin, a journal on new movements. In 1970, its editorial group sent questionnaires to 350 citizens’ groups (they selected community-based groups, so these groups corresponded to residents' movements) and gained 125 replies. The outcome of the survey revealed that most of the residents' movements were based on traditional community groups or progressive parties’ organizations. To a question about organizations with which community groups worked, only two groups, the League of Shibayama and Sanrizuka against the Construction of the Airport (Sanrizuka Shibayama Kūkō Zettai Hantai Dōmei) and the Council for United Front of Uchinada (Uchinada Kyōtō Kaigi) noted that they did joint actions with new left movements, such as student groups, Beheiren, and the Antiwar Youth Committee. The survey clearly shows that there were few networks between residents' movements and new left movements.89

89 "Zenkoku no Shimin Undō" in Shimin March 1971.
Only small numbers of activists sought to build the networks over several important national issues. On 25 March 1977, about 200 activists from residents' movements, labour movements, farmers' movements, and women's movements, gathered together in a rally against the construction of the airport in Sanrizuka and the launch of the nuclear vessel *Mutsu*. The activists regarded the opposition to the airport and the vessel as an issue on which they worked jointly, because they claimed that the contemporary problems in Japanese society were clearly revealed in these issues. Ironically, Maeda Toshihiko, a leader of the Sanrizuka struggle, pinpointed the difficulty of such a network in his opening remarks of the rally:

Now people go beyond progressive parties and labour unions, which are despised by both enemies and supporters; now people are empowered to confront the authorities and capital by themselves. Farmers, fishers, citizens, and workers in various regions of the country refuse to be ruled by these parties and unions, and are about to stand up to fight on their own. However, it is undeniable that people's struggles emerging in various regions have their own weak points. First of all, the struggles do not change into movements. There were various attempts to turn a specific struggle into a universal movement in the past, and some kind of regional or thematic rallies to exchange experiences were often held, but none was successful in enhancing a specific struggle into a universal movement.⁹⁰

One specific “struggle” after another, such as protests against the construction of the airport, might be formed, but these were not orchestrated into a “movement”. Because each “struggle” remained fragmented and small, it could not influence the dominant discourse and change decision making in political institutions. Maeda frankly talked about this dilemma. Although some

activists worked hard, they were not successful in building networks over broader issues between residents' movements and new movements in the 1970s.

In the early 1970s, the feature stories of Gekkan Chiiki Tōsō, a monthly information journal of residents' movements, were mainly about local people's struggles against the construction of large-scale facilities promoted by governments and corporations. In the late 1970s, the focus of the articles shifted to issues centred on people's lifestyle, like actions against detergents, campaigns for food safety, anti-cosmetic pollution movements, or campaigns for the reform of school lunches. Residents' movements kept distance from broader political issues, and focused more on the reform of their lifestyle. It was true that resident groups worked hard in transforming their lifestyle into a more environmentally-friendly and ethical one, but it was also true that the movements could not find pathways to broader networks and political institutions, so they limited their actions to the arena of lifestyle.

Summary

The JSP's Failure to Absorb New Politics

In the late 1960s, the Antiwar Youth Committee, a part of the new left movement, was successful in mobilizing many young workers who felt alienated in their workplace to radical actions against the Vietnam War. The workers criticized union activists for being conservative in their affluent lives during the economic boom. The emergence of the Committee provided the JSP with an opportunity to refresh its personnel and ideas, but the leaders of the JSP and Sōhyō, a strong supporter of the party in the election, expelled the
Committee from the party after the defeat of the Lower House election at the end of 1969. This meant that the JSP missed an opportunity for transforming to a new politics party around 1970.

In 1989, Kan Naoto, a then Diet member who belonged to the SDF, claimed, on the grounds of his research on the age of Lower House members of the JSP and the LDP, that the JSP did not succeed in recruiting its members from the Zenkyôtô generation, which played the central role of mobilization of new left movements in the late 1960s. He warned that the aging problem was more serious in the MPs of the JSP than in those of the LDP. While the number of MPs under 40 in the LDP was 66 (22.1% of all MPs), there were only five in the JSP under 40 (5.6%). This shows that the JSP failed to absorb the ideas and style of new movements.

In the early 1970s, there were few possibilities that “new parties” could be formed by progressive political forces. The JSP could not gain support from the growing number of middle-class voters living in urban areas who were dissatisfied with the outcomes of industrialization. These non-partisan votes were estimated to split between new conservative parties, such as the NJC, centrist parties, such as Kômeitô or the Democratic Socialist Party, and abstention from voting. Ronald Inglehart wrote in *Silent Revolution*:

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92 The role of Kômeitô needs to be considered in discussing the lack of new politics in Japan. In the 1970s, the party addressed the issue of “alienation of human beings” in capitalist and socialist countries, and offered a solution of “human socialism” which would make it possible for people to achieve liberation and utilize their capacities (Hori Yukio. *Kômeitô Ron: Sono Ködô to Taishitsu*. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1973, pp.101-04). Kômeitô criticized big companies for monopolizing wealth, and aimed to save weak and poor people and improve social welfare (lizuka Shigetarō. *Rengô Seiken: Kôryô to Ronsô*. Tokyo: Gendaishi Shuppankai, 1974, p.167). However, the party did not reject “expansion of productivity in the entire economy”. Kômeitô assumed that economic growth, of which new leftists were wary, was essential to enhance people’s happiness (Hori. *Kômeitô Ron*, pp.113-14). Kômeitô also did not oppose the construction of nuclear power stations in principle, though the party was concerned about safety (Honda. *Datsu Genshiryoku no Undô to Seij*, p.177). Hence, Kômeitô tried to win support from people who were sceptical of the outcomes of industrialization by remaking the ideas raised by new left movements in their own fashion.
The emergence of a relatively large Post-Materialist section of the middle class offers the Left a new opportunity—if it can appeal to the emerging groups without alienating its traditional base. Inglehart implies that the increase of post-materialistic voters was just an opportunity for leftists. The JSP missed this opportunity to expand its support base in this period.

The Absence of New Parties

The Lockheed Scandal, the infamous political corruption already discussed, in which some members of the LDP were involved, was revealed in the middle of the 1970s. Because of the scandal, an increasing number of Japanese people were distrustful of the existing political forces. Hundreds of activists launched the anti-LDP campaign in the Lower House election in December 1976 and the Upper House election in July 1977. Some women activists joined actions to support the three female candidates in the Upper House election of 1977, but the actions did not expand to a wide range of women's lib activists. Residents' movements, which were active in various regions of Japan in this period, also limited their focus to local issues rather than linking them to broader national issues.

Japanese women's liberation movements inherited the idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" from new left movements, and acted against the dominant gender norms in the male-centred society which were inscribed in their mindset. The idea propelled women activists to be reluctant to participate in election campaigns, which differed completely from actions in everyday life. The activists were afraid of reproducing the dominant gender norms by being

involved in the division of labour in conventional politics. They focused their energies on transforming their mindset rather than being involved in parliamentary politics.

Residents' movements tended to limit their focus narrowly to local issues, but some studies on European countries illustrate that new left and other urban groups helped some community protests against environmental destruction, such as the construction of nuclear plants, to be a nation-wide issue. However, due to the effects of self-revolution in "everydayness" (discussed in previous chapters), Japanese new left movements were in a serious slump in the mid-1970s and stigmatized as brutal and selfish "extremists" in the media. The rapid demobilization and the wide-spread negative image of the movements prevented new leftists from bridging residents' movements with national networks. This lack of connections with urban groups isolated these local protesters from national politics.

In some European countries, new parties were critical of industrialization policies, encouraged rank-and-file members to participate in decision-making in the party, and were supported by younger, urban, and educated voters from the middle class. However, such parties were not formed in Japan during the 1970s. In almost the same period, Shimizu Shinzō, at once a union activist and a progressive intellectual, discussed the lack of new political forces on the basis of new movements in the national Diet. He stated:

In 1968 and 1969, when new left movements reached a peak and went into a decline, they neither emerged as political forces nor influenced the whole political climate. Rather, their orientations and energies spread to small group's radicalism in various places; people who had put their hopes in Zenkyōtō or the Antiwar Youth Committee also split into thousands of groups, and they, in the phrase of those days, shifted from personalization (shika) and individualization (koka) to the introverted
generation (*naikō no sedai*), then to the passionless stratum (*shirake só*). In the present, emerging political forces, which aim to gain support from the people, tackle political issues in everyday life and encourage the people to join, in contrast to the *tōha* which focuses on national or global issues. The subordinate class, which does not have any choice but be radical, is now left behind without any political representatives.94

People’s discomfort with industrialization and their desire for alternative politics were not represented by any political forces in the 1970s. Who would be successful in representing them? This is a story of the 1980s and thereafter, and so goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

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Conclusion

1. The Outcomes of Self-revolution in “Everydayness”

What is the legacy of Japanese new left movements? The legacy was greatly affected by the idea of self-revolution in “everydayness”, the common underlying rules of text or action in the discourse of the new left movements. This thesis has explored how this idea encouraged many new leftists to recognize power relations in everyday life and commit themselves to actions for social justice. Their ideas were initially very abstract, but they gradually found more concrete ways for social change. There were two subcategories of self-revolution in “everydayness”: “self-liberation” and “self-reflection”. Each was typically found in the struggles at Nihon University and Tokyo University, two of the most radical protests by student movements at that time. The differences between the ideas of self-liberation and self-reflection stemmed from those of social class, so both ideas sometimes contradicted and conflicted with each other, but the two categories merged and achieved some kind of balance at least in the late 1960s, when mobilization of the movements reached a peak.

The categories were gradually losing the balance in the 1970s. The influence of self-reflection became stronger than that of self-liberation. The image of new leftists as brutal and selfish “extremists” in the media prevented the activists from taking direct action on streets to gain a sense of liberation. The idea of self-liberation was thus separated from the idea of self-reflection in the movements. The loss of self-liberation was also due to Japan’s economic position in the world. The Japanese economy overcame the recession caused
by the oil crises more quickly than other industrialized countries in this period. More and more Japanese people became able to enjoy affluent lives and were depoliticized in the middle of the economic boom in the 1970s. Japanese new leftists were impelled by this political climate to regard self-reflection in their own conservative consciousness as an indispensable step to transforming their society. The emphasis on self-reflection in “everydayness” helped Japanese new leftists, who were mostly from the urban middle-class, to feel sympathy for the suffering of socially disadvantaged “minorities”, such as poor people in Asian countries, sexual and ethnic minorities, disabled people, and rural residents whose lives had deteriorated from large-scale development projects, and to construct fairer relations with the minorities. In this way, the reflexive middle-class in Japan cultivated ties with social minorities in the 1970s.

This thesis has also explored the unintended outcomes of Japanese new left movements which were bequeathed to the next generation in civil society. The movements declined rapidly in the 1970s, and many of the activists suffered mental trauma. This led to producing three characteristics of Japanese civil society. The first is that broader networks were absent for Japanese new movements in the 1970s. Some European environmental activists played the key role of building an alliance between different movements in the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, the building of broader networks among new movements was facilitated in the anti-nuclear issue. However, the anti-nuclear issue did not help the grassroots activists to be connected with the arena of national politics in Japan. As discussed in Chapter 5, anti-nuclear movements were led mainly by old leftists, such as progressive parties and large labour unions, from the early postwar period to the mid-1980s. Japanese new movements did not play a role in uniting the urban middle class with local residents in rural areas.
The second characteristic of Japanese civil society is the narrowly limited institutionalization of new movement groups. The survey of European new politics illustrates that new movements have opened up political opportunities for access to bureaucracy and parties and have put their values and agendas on the table of political institutions since the 1970s. Social movement scholars David Meyer and Sydney Tarrow argued that some industrialized countries were heading toward "a Movement Society" in the 1990s; social protests became more perpetual, frequent, diverse, and professional. The point of their argument is the "institutionalization" of NSMs (New Social Movements). Social movement groups moved from the edges of political legitimacy and became something more akin to interest groups and political parties.  

I emphasize that institutionalization of Japanese new movements was limited. The idea of self-revolution in "everydayness" was initially combined with their expectations for broader social change in the late 1960s. As the movements lost popular support and the activists were troubled by a sense of failure, the idea came to be defined narrowly as local and personal transformation. Self-revolution in "everydayness" became more and more introspective in the 1970s. This led to the activists being indifferent about and even hostile to institutionalization of their claims. The rapid decline of new left movements resulted in the loss of the anticipated opportunity to put the new

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2 Ibid., p.23.
politics agendas on the table of political institutions. The JSP’s decision to cut ties with new left movements around 1970 was also a key factor in facilitating limited institutionalization of new politics in Japan.

The third characteristic of Japanese civil society is people’s aversion to direct action. Direct action was and is often taken by NSMs, particularly anti-nuclear movements, in European countries; many activists tried to stop the construction of nuclear power stations through occupation of the sites or blockades in the 1970s and 1980s. This kind of action was seldom taken by Japanese anti-nuclear movements. As discussed in Chapter 5, Japanese anti-nuclear activists preferred conventional protests, such as signature campaigns, to confrontational direct action in the 1970s. I have explored the historical process of how antipathy to direct action was produced in Japanese civil society in the 1970s. This provides some hints to the question of why the anti-nuclear activists avoided taking confrontational actions though the activists did not have enough access to political institutions. Given that direct action was unpopular in Japanese civil society and the media, confrontational strategies had so many risks of losing popular support that the anti-nuclear activists were reluctant to take direct action. The diffusion of antipathy to direct action thus made Japanese new movements face the difficult decision of whether to adopt confrontational strategies. Although new movements were small, a structure that contained the potential to cause conflicts or splits over decisions regarding direct action was produced in the 1970s.

2. Relevancy and Future Research Topics

I believe that the implications of this thesis go beyond the research field of Japanese politics and civil society. Based on the Japanese case, I
discussed the relationship between personal and social change. NSMs, such as environmental or feminist movements, in various parts of the world seek to transform power relations in everyday life, so NSMs regard personal ethical commitment as an essential step to broader social change. How do they spread their ethics to other people? How do they continue ethical commitment? These crucial issues have not been sufficiently examined by social movement scholars. The difficulties which new leftists faced in their commitment to personal and social transformation, discussed in this thesis, are relevant to these activists. The case study of Japanese new left movements may help social movement scholars to further develop arguments about dilemmas between personal and social change.

This thesis also offers social movement scholars some suggestions for direct action. I have stressed that sorting out non-violent direct action from violent protests is not easy. Political scientist April Carter drew a distinction between direct action and violent protests, but she also admitted that distinguishing non-violence from violence is difficult, because whether an action is non-violent or violent is usually judged through interaction between both insiders and outsiders of the movements, such as the police, the media, or bystanders.\(^3\) Social movement groups are unable to determine the character of their direct action by themselves; there are always risks of being criticized for brutal violent actions by outsiders even when the groups regard their actions as non-violent.

The aim of direct action is to exert pressure on governments, corporations, or other powerful institutions. Given that police forces are well organized in modern states, the use of force by social movement organizations is not effective. This makes the symbolic aspect of direct action important:

\(^3\) Carter. *Direct Action and Democracy Today*, pp.7-8.
through direct action activists seek to address problems which have not been highlighted, attract media attention, and gain support from communities. A recent successful example of direct action is the French farmers’ dismantling of a McDonalds franchise. On 12 August 1999, French farmer José Bové and his colleagues of the Union of Ewe’s Milk Producers ransacked a McDonalds’ construction site in Millau, the South Aveyron region of France. In April 1999, the European Union banned the import of hormone-treated beef from the USA because of concerns for food safety. The USA, supported by the World Trade Organization, retaliated against the ban by imposing tariffs on the import of some French dairy products, including Roquefort cheese, which was crucial to support the local economy. The farmers viewed McDonalds as a symbol of America-oriented globalization and dismantled the franchise to spread the issue of the American retaliative tariffs to a wide range of people. The farmers were well-prepared to announce the aims of their actions in the media and asked the police and the McDonald’s manager to make sure that the site would be clear of workers and that no tools were left lying around. The non-violent action of dismantling the franchise won over the public, such as journalists, politicians, intellectuals, and other social movement groups.⁴

Chapter 5 explored how Japanese “new politics” in the 1970s differed from the linear evolution from grassroots movements to political institutions modelled in Germany and other European countries. I need to undertake more detailed discussions about Japanese NSMs after the 1980s in order to characterize Japanese alternative politics. In particular, discussions in this thesis illustrate that “limited institutionalization” and “aversion to direct action” should be highlighted. Some researchers, especially on environmental politics,

claim that limited institutionalization of Japanese new movements lasted after the 1980s. For example, Miranda Schreurs points out that Japanese environmental movements are less institutionalized in the arena of national politics than those of Germany and the USA.\textsuperscript{5}

Limited institutionalization may also be true in the broader range of Japanese civil society. Based on the Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS), a cross-national survey on civil society organizations and interest groups conducted by six researchers in 1997, and other statistical data, political scientist Robert Pekkanen characterized Japanese civil society as consisting of "members without advocates"—there are many active small groups at the local level, but large professionalized advocacy groups are very few at the national level.\textsuperscript{6} He claimed that advocacy groups beyond a limited number of industry or professional groups are so ineffective that they do not figure prominently in public debates. His empirical research underpins discussions in this section about limited institutionalization in Japanese civil society.

The aversion to direct action also seems to have remained in Japanese civil society in the 1980s and onwards. The outcome of the World Value Survey 1990-91 illustrated that only 12% of the Japanese respondents participated in "a challenging act", including a lawful demonstration, a boycott, an unofficial strike, or occupying a building. Political scientist Russel Dalton showed that the figure was the lowest among industrialized countries in North and West Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{7} Further empirical research may be necessary to discuss this issue, but I am able to point out that the decision of whether to take direct action implies the risks of a split between confrontational

\textsuperscript{5} Schreurs. \textit{Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.}
\textsuperscript{6} Pekkanen. \textit{Japan's Dual Civil Society.}
groups and moderate pressure groups in Japanese civil society. Political scientist Iris Marion Young argued that direct action helps activists to address issues which are excluded from the formal decision-making process and to make political institutions more open to marginalized voices.\(^8\) Having a diversity of protest repertoires makes it possible for social movement groups to provide potential participants with varying modes of political expression and mobilize a wider range of people. In this sense, the diversity is a source of strength for social movements. Hence, the diffusion of an aversion to direct action deprives Japanese social movements of their strength.

Institutionalization and direct action thus play a role in facilitating democracy, limited institutionalization and antipathy to direct action are an obstacle to democracy in Japanese civil society. Since institutionalization and direct action are indispensable parts of NSMs in European countries, looking at them helps us to explore the features of Japanese NSMs.\(^9\) This issue will be addressed in future research.

3. The Future of Youth Activism

Based on what has been discussed above, I return to the question of “what is the legacy of Japanese new left movements?” in this section. Some former new leftists, particularly Zenkyōtō activists, claimed that the legacy may

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\(^8\) Young, Iris Marion. “Activists Challenges to Deliberative Democracy” in Political Theory October 2001.

\(^9\) Recent studies show that an increasing number of civil society groups in Japan tend to be more symbiotic with the state and have a quasi-government characteristic (see Schwartz and Pharr (eds.). The State of Civil Society in Japan. Ogawa, Akihiro. The Failure of Civil Society?: The Third Sector and the State in Contemporary Japan. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009). There is a disconnection of culture between these emerging groups and new left movements. The culture of new leftists seems to be inherited by Japanese global justice movements, which are examined by Jennifer Chan (Chan. Another Japan is Possible). This topic will be discussed in future research.
be invisible, but it is alive in each of the activists. The ethical idea of self-revolution in “everydayness” produced in Japanese new left movements made it possible for the activists to reflect on their affluent lives and bring about local or personal transformation. On the other hand, the movements unintentionally produced the three characteristics of Japanese civil society in the 1970s: the absence of broader networks, limited institutionalization, and splits over direct action. In short, “the new politics turn” was not fully developed in Japanese politics. These characteristics prevented Japanese activists from mobilizing various people to political actions, developing creative protests, and conveying their values and ideas to the political arena effectively. This is also the legacy of Japanese new left movements.

The recent development of anti-poverty movements is changing the character of Japanese civil society. In Japan, the economic downturn and deregulation of the labour market, known as “neoliberal reforms”, in the last decade has replaced full-time workers with part-time workers. About one-third of Japanese workers are now employed as part-timers; their labour contracts are so unstable that they cannot think about their lives in the future; their wage is not high enough to live; they are not assured of social security, such as health care. It is estimated that the “working poor”, who have an annual income of two million yen or less, constitute one in four or five of the Japanese working population. In October 2007, small labour unions, women’s groups, and community organizations, formed the Anti-poverty Network (Han Hinkon Nettowāku) to provide poor people with various means of support, attract media attention to the poverty problem, and lobby the Diet members to tackle the problem. The Anti-poverty Network has contributed greatly to highlighting the poverty problem in Japan. Since the media sensationaly cover the problem
and the Network's activities, many Japanese people have come to know about it.

Because of growing poverty in Japan, the anti-poverty activists focused more on being liberated from their poverty than on feeling sympathy for the suffering of social minorities. In this sense, the dominant discourse of Japanese civil society is now shifting from self-reflection to self-liberation. On the other hand, the introspective idea of self-reflection is not as popular as before. More and more young activists find it important to "enjoy" their activism. For example, many young activists participate in the "Freeter Mayday" (freeter, or furitâ, means young people who do not have full-time employment or who are unemployed, or who face difficulties in making a living because of their low wage). This event began in 2004. In Japan, large labour unions organize demonstrations for workers' rights every late April or early May, but the unions consisted mainly of full-time workers. In the "Freeter Mayday", demonstrators dance on the streets while disc jockeys play music. The style of the young activists is different from that of old and new leftists who usually walk and chant slogans in demonstrations. Many young activists support the protest style, because the style provides them with a feeling of self-liberation. In this way, the young activists are undoubtedly producing a new activist culture.

This may mean that the legacy of new left movements is disappearing in Japanese civil society. When having a private conversation about the culture of Japanese new left movements, an Australian antiwar activist said to me "because the Japanese young generation do not know the history of new left movements and are not held back by the legacy of the movements, they can break through the culture". She may be right: many young Japanese people are increasingly involved in social movements ranging from advocacy to
lifestyle change. They are so free from the legacy of new left movements that they can develop various creative actions.

New left movements may be history, but I think that the issue which Japanese new leftists faced is relevant to the young activists in their own context. Whilst "neoliberal reforms" undermined Japanese young people in the Japanese middle class, from whence most new leftists came, the idea of self-reflection now seems to be fading from the scene in civil society. However, this does not mean that marginalized people's suffering in Japan, in Asia, and in other parts of the world has ended. Many of the young people are in a position in which they are able to do something to eliminate the suffering. They are required to face the issue of finding a convergence between self-liberation and self-reflection. Even now it is significant for young Japanese activists to reflect on everyday life, recognize the relationship between the distant suffering and their lives, and transform the relationship. These empowered young people not only desire to overcome their own poverty problem. Many of them are also sceptical about the mass consumption and work-oriented lifestyle, begin to reflect on it, and try to find alternative lifestyles based on sustainability and social justice. In doing this, the young activists cannot avoid tackling the issue of balancing their ethics, which new leftists faced in the past. Even the recent "new" activism is not free from this old issue. Learning the history of Japanese new left movements does not provide the activists with a clear answer of the way to balance their ethics. Nevertheless, I think that the history is fascinating, because it is full of many new leftists' emotions, such as pleasure, sorrow, and worries.

I have discussed many sincere new leftists who were committed to activism in this thesis. Learning from their sincerity, we have to go beyond it and face the issues to which new leftists could not provide answers: How can
activists be at once ethical and tolerant about themselves and others? How can their groups be at once specialized and democratic? What relations do activists have with governments and corporations? How can activists take creative direct action which is open to everyone? How can activists connect everyday politics with political and social change? How can activists find a pragmatic course of radical change? Many new leftists saw these questions as either-or (ethical or tolerant, specialized or democratic, pragmatic or radical, and the like), but we do not need to follow new left movements in this regard. It is activists themselves who debate with their colleagues and find creative solutions in their own context. It is only in people's passion and action for social change that the solutions will be found. This is what I have learned through my research on and commitment to Japanese political activism.
Bibliography

Articles and Books


Takahashi Akira and Daigaku Mondai Kenkyûkai. "Nihon Gakusei Undô no Shisô to Kôdô’ in *Chûô Kôron* May, June, August, and September 1968.


Yamano Haruo. “Shinano Jiyū Daigaku no Seiritsu to Tenkai” in Nihon Rekishi April 1977


Appendix 1

The following are newspapers, newsletters, and magazines used as the major data source. These are classified into each sector of new left and related movements. Articles of the texts written in the 1960s and 1970s are examined in order to explore the discourse of new left movements. Books about or written by new leftists published in this period are also the major data source of the thesis (listed in Bibliography).

General magazines (sōgō zasshi)
Asahi Jânaru
Gendai no Me
Gendai no Riron
Jōkyō
Sekai
Shinchïhei
Shisô no Kagaku
Shûkan Dokushojin
Tenbô
Ushio

Anti-Vietnam War
AMPO
Beheiren Nyûsu
Konkyoichi

Student protests
Bunri Sensen
Kyôiku Daigaku Shinbun
Kyoto Daigaku Shinbun
Shingeki
Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun

Women’s liberation movements
Agora
Ajia to Josei Kaihô
Fujin Minshu Shinbun
Onna Erosu
Onna no Hangyaku

Alternative learning movements
Geppō Kōgal o Nogasuna
Jishu Kōza
Jishu Kōza Tsūshin
Terakoya Tsūshin
Terakoya Zasshi
Tsuchi no Koe Tami no Koe

Residents' movements
Gekkan Chiiki Tōsō
Kankyō Hakai
Shimin