The Caliph, the Imam and the Mates

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University

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11/2012
Statement of Originality

This is to certify that this thesis is the result of my own work. Where I have the works of some scholars, due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

(Word Length: 95968)

Signed: 

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Acknowledgment

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Abstract

Despite the fact that Muslims in Australia are the third largest religious group, surprisingly, analyses of the role of religion in Australian Muslim communities are rare. Studies of Muslims in Australia focuses either on their settlement needs, such as housing and employment, or examine them as part of the larger group of immigrants from Non-English Speaking Backgrounds (NESBs). In either case, the settlement needs of African Muslims, especially from the Horn and North Africa, have been essentially discussed in terms of their ethnic, rather than religious, origins. These studies, while providing much needed information about African Muslims in Australia, fail to consider the role of religion in identity formation and the differences between first and second generation immigrants. The importance of this thesis is that it considers the importance of the religion in the formation of the members of the focus group’s identity and how it affected their integration process. It explores how religious identities can be constructed - maintained and enacted, particularly by second-generation immigrants attempting to reconcile multiple, sometimes conflicting, forms of identity.

To understand the role of theology in the identity formation and the integration process of my respondents, this thesis employed three methods: first, an analysis of Islamic theology on the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic societies, using Islamic texts and a number of the most important Islamic websites; second, a textual analysis of a number of Islamic websites; and, finally, an empirical analysis of the views of the first and second generation Muslim North Africans, utilizing focus groups and interviews.

The data presented here indicates that the integration patterns of the second generation, either born or brought up in Australia, are different from the first generation group. The first generation seems to be more willing to integrate into, and adapt to, their host community through their attempts to establish friendships and local interactions with neighbours and participating in different national and religious activities. On the other hand, although the second generation is de facto more integrable in the society, because of their language skills and employment rates, they are less happy about cultural integration. This reluctance results from their views of Islam, shaped by two important factors: the way they have been brought up; and their interaction with cyber Islam. The result of the interaction between these two factors is a confusing and multi-layered identity within this generation that has led them to look for a new form of universal identity, different from both their parents and their host community. It is a religious identity.
Obviously, the research results presented in this thesis cannot be generalized to the identity formation process of all Muslim Australians, nor is religion as a declared identity likely to be the final phase of what will continue to be a complex process of identity negotiation and evolution for these young Muslims.
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Section One
Introduction

Western societies are secular societies where religious authority, if not religion, is declining. Certainly, religious influence on the institutions of society and government has become less. The process of secularization in Western societies transformed religion from the primary social institution to a much less important one. As such, the role of religion is more obvious in the private domain. In this context, how Muslims live in these secular societies becomes a debatable issue, especially to the extent that Islam is considered by Muslims as superior to any other form of identity or citizenship. At the same time, the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic countries raises doctrinal challenges in Islamic theology and this is particularly important, given that, 400 million of the 1.3 billion Muslims in the world today live as minorities in secular societies in Europe and America.

Muslims in Australia, are the third largest religious group after Christians (64%), and Buddhists (2.1%); 18.7% have no religion. They are faced with the issue of being part of the Islamic Umma, as well as being Australian citizens. This presents a potential conflict. In this context, the Australian public is anxious about whether Islam accepts others and, more crucially, whether Muslims respect and can live in harmony with their host society. On the other hand, Australian Muslims are anxious about whether the West in general, and Australia specifically, accepts both the inviolability of their religion and the way in which they perceive themselves within their host societies.

This thesis will analyze different views and attitudes to the integration and adaptation of Muslims in Australian society using a case study of first and second generation African Muslims from Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. It contends that, in order to understand issues of integration, we need to understand the development of the contemporary debate in Islamic theology about the rights and obligations of citizenship of Muslims towards their Islamic Umma and their host community. This contemporary debate preys on the fears and sensitivity Muslims have about losing their religious identity, the preservation of which is considered a holy duty by the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, especially for those Muslims living in non-Islamic societies.

As such, the thesis explores how these different schools of Islamic theology, and their
conceptualizations of the Islamic state, the Umma and the role required of Islamic Diaspora in the West, have influenced my respondents’ views of their position in their new host community, their ability to integrate and build a civic consciousness and their capacity to become active citizens.

I begin this introduction with a brief consideration of why this thesis is important, before specifying my research questions, then outlining the methods which I have utilised, before, finally, setting out the structure of the rest of the thesis.

a) The Importance of the Thesis:

This thesis is important for a number of reasons. First, most of the studies of Muslims in Australia concentrate on the socio-economic position of migrants and the socio-economic and cultural differences between Australian society and the migrants’ countries of origin. In contrast, this thesis considers the importance of Islam in the formation of the members of the focus groups’ identity and how it affected their integration process. Perhaps surprisingly, analyses of the role of religion in Australian Muslim communities are rare. I return to these issues below when I lay out the structure of this thesis.

Second, studies of Muslims in Australia have concentrated on those from: the Middle East, particularly Lebanon, Syria and Iraq (Abu Duhou and Teese, 1992; Mackie, 1983); Turkey (Batrouney, 1995), or - Asia, particularly, Indonesia (Nilan, Donaldson and Howson, 2007), Malaysia and Pakistan (Fijac and Sonn, 2005). What studies there are of migrants from Africa, either concentrate on their settlement needs, particularly housing, employment, language and communication skills, education, childcare, health and financial and legal services (Trevor Batrouney, 1991), or examine them as part of the larger group of immigrants from Non-English Speaking Backgrounds (NESBs). In either case, their settlement needs have been essentially discussed in terms of their ethnic, rather than religious, origins.

Third, this thesis examines the differences in attitudes between the two generations on Islam, the Umma and the issue of integration within Australian society. This is clearly a crucial issue, not only for Muslims in Australia, but also for the future of Australia.

Finally, during my research it became clear that, particularly, but not exclusively, for the second
generation group, Cyber Islam was a very important source of their knowledge of, and views about, Islam. As such, this also became an increasingly important focus of this thesis. This is a subject that has received no attention in the Australian literature and, indeed, is little studied more broadly.

b) Research Questions:

In this context, this thesis will explore the following questions:

- What is the influence of Islamic theology on the views of the focus groups on integration?
- What are the main differences between the first and second generation migrants’ perception of their religious identity and their integration into Australian society?
- What role does cyber Islam play in the formation of Muslims’ religious identity and how has it influenced both the first and second generation’s integration into Australian society?

C) Methodology:

Three types of research methods are utilised in this thesis:

- An analysis of Islamic theology on the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic societies using Islamic texts
- A textual analysis of three of the most important Islamic websites, IslamOnline.net, qaradawi.net and salafi.com, chosen in large part because they were the websites that my respondents accessed, to explore their treatment of the issue of Muslims’ residency and citizenship in non-Islamic countries.
- An empirical analysis of the views of the first and second generation Muslim North Africans, utilizing focus groups and interviews. Here, I also used a photo-elicitation method to help access my respondents’ view of Australia.

These methods were chosen by the researcher because the strength of qualitative research is its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of people’s experiences. Such methods provide what Nkwi P, Nyamongo I, Ryan G (2001) terms information about the “human” side of an issue—that is, the often contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions and relationships of individuals. Qualitative methods are also more effective, than quantitative methods, in identifying less tangible factors, such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity and
religion. As such, they help us to interpret and better understand the complex reality of a given situation and, where appropriate, interpret the quantitative data.

i) The Focus Groups and Individual Interviews

Interviews were chosen because they are an excellent way of collecting data on individuals’ personal histories, perspectives, and experiences, particularly when sensitive topics are being explored. On the other hand, focus groups are effective in eliciting data about the cultural norms of a group and in generating broad overviews of issues of concern to the cultural groups or subgroups represented.

The researcher worked in close consultation with community leaders to develop a plan to identify and recruit potential participants for this research. Recruitment was determined by the criteria of selection required by the scope of this Thesis. The selection criteria included country of origin, age, sex, religious affiliation (Sunni Muslims) and length of residency in the host country i.e. Australia.

My respondents were Muslim migrants from Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. Fifty participants, 25 women and 25 men, were drawn from first and second generation migrants in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), and New South Wales State (NSW). The first generation group consisted of 15 women and 15 men, aged between 25 and 50 years old, who had resided in Australia for more than 10 years. The second generation group included 10 women and 10 men, aged between 18-25 years old, who were either born in Australia or had resided here for more than 15 years. In terms of religious affiliation, I focused upon Muslims who didn’t belong to, or identify with, any political or religious Islamic group, organization or radical Islamic movement. As such, my aim was to draw my sample from among what might be termed the ‘silent majority’.

The researcher interviewed participants in-depth and one-on-one. The interviewer had a set of topics she needed to study, but not a specific set of questions asked in a particular order. Rather, the interviews flowed, more like a conversation in which the respondent guided the direction of the interview. The focus groups were generally more structured and included 4-7 participants each. There were 15 focus groups in total covering both first (7 groups), and second (8 groups) generation participants. With the second generation group the medium of communication was the English language and for the first generation group, because of the low level of English language skills
among some of these group members, both Arabic and English were used as a medium of communication. Because of the concerns among the second generation that they would not be free to discuss their views in the presence of the first generation, separate focus groups were held for each generation, in which the themes addressed in this thesis were introduced for discussion. I facilitated the discussion in the focus groups, but intervened in the discussion as little as possible.

The focus groups and interviews addressed the following themes: first, the respondents’ understanding of the concept of the Islamic state and the Islamic Umma; second, their position in relation to the theological debate on the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic country; and, third, their integration/adaptation into the Australian society. The overall aim was to better understand the respondents’ identity construction. As such, focus groups and interviews were the most appropriate methods, as they enable the researcher to explore the respondents’ sense of identity formation, belonging and affinity to both their Islamic and Australian identities.

Subsequently, individual interviews were held with all the respondents who agreed (all the second generation respondents and 19 from the first generation); each interview lasted for 10-20 minutes. In the interviews I used both pictures (see below and appendix C for the interview photos) and some questions (see appendix A for the interview schedule) to generate discussion. The structure of interviews and the questions asked were common, although the order in which they were asked varied and supplementary questions were asked which followed-up prior answers.

*ii) The Websites*

In order to identify the various facets of the usage of Islamic Websites, I analysed the sites’ ideological orientation, content richness and Web interactivity.

The ideological orientations of the websites were examined using a qualitative analysis of the following features: structure; objectives, with a particular focus upon how they informed the public about their goals, programs and strategies; messages; and online comments and feedback (see Bunt, 2003).

The level of richness of their online contents was studied by examining different sections of websites, especially the fatwa banks, because they involve one-to-one interaction with Muslims,
living in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries, by answering their enquires, problems and challenges about the different issues that face them in their daily life. All of the fatwa considered in this survey are part of a database of one the following three large web services: IslamOnline.net; qaradawi.net; and salafi.com. Together, there are roughly 20,000 fatwa, all of which were published and saved in English. The fact that these online fatwa are available in English is particularly helpful for Muslims who cannot read Arabic. This is not to say, however, that these websites do not publish fatwa in Arabic. As Eickelman and Anderson (2003: 13) argue, the importance of these online fatwa’s is: “doctrinal in nature thus reaching out beyond their particular contexts. They are increasingly available to a global audience especially in the highly Internet penetrated countries in the West and as they can easily be dissociated from the specific contexts for which they were issued, they may well serve as guidance in comparable cases - even if the muftis would sometimes caution Muslims against this unlimited use”.

As Qin, Zhou, Reid, Chen and Guanpi (2007: 75) argue, there are three features of web interactivity: “one-to one-level interactivity, community-level interactivity, and transnational-level interactivity. The one-to-one-level interactivity attributes measure how well the web sites support individual users to give feedback to the Web site owners (e.g., provides email contact, provide guest book functions, etc.). The community-level interactivity attributes measure how well the web sites support the two-way interaction between site owners and multiple users (e.g., use of forums, online chat rooms, etc.). The transaction-level interactivity measures how well users are allowed to finish tasks electronically on the Websites.” This interactivity was examined by analysing the interaction between the focus group and other users in chat rooms and forums.

To examine the respondents’ views on the popularity, influence and role of cyber Islam, I focussed on two websites which were chosen by the respondents as the most popular and influential ones: IslamOnline.net; and qaradawi.net. The contents of these websites were examined to assess the influence of cyber Islam on the respondent’s identity formation. Respondents from both generations not only used the above mentioned websites, but also other popular interactive Internet applications, such as Facebook and Twitter, which they used for cultural and religious conversations and discussions, as well as political debates.

**iii) Photo-elicitation:**
Visual research methods have theoretically played a minor role in social research, because
sociological research has been a “word-based” discipline, and the capacity of images to reveal “the truth” has been questioned (Harper, 2002: 17). Recently, however, visual research has become a common technique because of its user-friendly and relatively inexpensive technology (e.g., disposable camera). In addition, by using photographs and playing with content (what is in the photo) and process (how photos were presented), researchers can probe participants to discuss social relationships (Rasmussen, 2004; Smith & Barker, 2004).

A key aim of this research was to explore my respondents’ views of Australia. Here, instead of asking them directly about their views of Australia, I used a photo-elicitation method. Photo-elicitation allows the researcher to access the perspectives and experiences of people, their beliefs and how they understand their worlds in a less direct way than normal interviews. A photo-elicitation interview is based on the idea of inserting a photograph (either generated by the subject or by the investigator) into a research interview. This type of interviewing is also referred to as photo-interviewing or projective-interviewing. The photographs serve as a means of communication between the researcher and the participants. As Harper (2002) notes, the use of photographs recognizes that people think visually, elicit longer and more comprehensive accounts of abstract ideas such as identity than interviews and allows greater access to respondents’ values and beliefs, and their ideas of self.

As such, this thesis used photos taken by the researcher as an “ice breaker” activity to create a comfortable space for discussion and to open opportunities to involve the participant so as not to limit their responses. Photo-elicitation has been used before as a way of accessing respondents’ ethnic identity, in large part because it allows more access to less visible aspects of identity. Ethnic difference is often difficult for outsiders to identify, as Gold’s research on Asian immigrants’ definition of Asian ethnicity (1991) demonstrates. Overall, photographs, in this case a series of related images in printed or digital form, provide a means of stimulating comments, memories and open discussion in structured or semi-structured individual and group interviews.

In this research I initially chose 50 pictures to reflect different aspects of Australian society, including political, cultural, economic, leisure and social activities. From among these pictures, participants chose 15 (the pictures can be found in appendix C), which they viewed as most accurately representing Australian society. These different photos, which were utilised in the interviews, were intended to address the various topics identified as crucial in relation to the
integration of the respondents into their new host community and the intergenerational transmission of cultural/ethnic values in families of migrant origin.

The insider status of the Researcher with the respondents created a distinct social dynamic, whereby differences between researcher and participant are brought into focus as a result of shared cultural knowledge. This involves what Ganga and Scott (2006: 1) term as: "insider research, which means social interviews conducted between researchers and participants who share a similar cultural, linguistic, ethnic, national and religious heritage. This insider status takes on an added degree of importance, moreover, when research involves social interaction between a migrant researcher and a migrant participant from within the same imagined community."

Clearly being a cultural insider has many advantages when researching migration, particularly in terms of negotiating access to my respondents, in understanding the spoken and unspoken "language" of the interview and in terms of the recognition of idiosyncratic cultural references. Insider status is also important in bringing internal divisions within an imagined minority community to the fore and, related to this; it helped the researcher to understand reasons for such difference.

Undoubtedly, the researcher’s own position as an insider brought these differences into view early on in the research process, and afforded the researcher the time and the relevant experience to examine and explain the social divisions within this group in greater depth than would have been possible had she been an "outsider". However, the researcher's experience in the field quickly taught her that any binary insider-outsider division is misleading. There is a paradox to being an insider: whilst researchers are closer to those migrants they are studying, both they and their participants are much more aware of each other’s social position as a result. Being an insider brought the researcher closer to the reality that migrant communities are rarely united, and almost always divided by social parameters such as class, generation, age and gender. The generation division is central in shaping the relationship between the researcher and the focus group.

The researcher was attempting to gain entry to the younger members of the family via first generation members of the community. Her assumption, as an "insider" with a shared ethnic/cultural origin, was that this would be a relatively simple strategy. However, the reality of the situation soon proved different. These circumstances were unforeseen. The investigator
had clearly made assumptions based upon a shared insider status that, in reality, was of little practical relevance. The African community in ACT and NSW was socially divided and this had implications for the qualitative research process. However, this time the divide that was the most important was that of age/generation and it became clear that a negotiation of roles between researcher and respondent was needed. In particular, the researcher soon realized the following:

- The idea of being a Muslim for the first generation was different from, and based on different values to, the investigator's idea of what it meant to be a Muslim. This meant that many first generation respondents considered the second generation unaware of the cultural influence on the religion because of their inevitably more limited religious and cultural knowledge.
- It was clearly necessary for the researcher to acquire the trust of the respondents before being able to ask for an interview. After demonstrating her commitment, however, the researcher was granted the status of "adopted insider". This took considerable time and involved taking part in many of the events of the community and becoming a "familiar face"; interestingly, such status worked to dissipate most of the doubts the respondents held about the "genuine" nature of the research.

**d) Thesis Structure:**

This thesis is divided into three main sections. Here, I outline these three sections paying particular attention to a justification of my focus on Islamic theology and especially its views on the role of Muslims in non-Muslim societies.

The first section of the thesis includes the introduction and Chapter One, which reviews the literature on the integration/adaptation of Muslim communities in the West in general and in Australia specifically. The second section consists of three chapters. Chapter Two will discuss the historical development of the relationship between the Caliphate institution and the jurists and the role played by non-Islamic civilizations and cultures in the political culture of the Caliphate institution. The latter redefined the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims and the Islamic Umma and become an important factor, and legal reference point, justifying the religious rules of different schools of jurisprudence in contemporary Islamic theology, in what is known as the Jurisprudence of Minorities.
Outlining this historical development is important for an understanding of the position of Muslims in Australia, because, as already emphasised, it is crucial to take seriously the role that theology and the different schools of jurisprudence play in the formation of the religious identity of migrant groups. In addition, in order to understand the contemporary position of these schools on the questions of citizenship and the role of Muslims in non-Islamic societies, we need a clear grasp of the historical development of Islamic theology on the issue of political authority and of the changes that took place during the Caliphate and its implications on the changes that took place in the definition of the concept of the Umma. These changes during the Caliphate incorporated non-Muslims into the courts of different dynasties and led to the introduction of new forms of government and new classes (Bureaucrats and Military Elites). At the same time, it introduced non-Islamic cultures and philosophies, which, in turn, led to redefining the Islamic Umma, Islamic nationality and citizenship to include non-Muslims. These changes in the components of the Islamic Umma forced Jurists to reconsider the position of non-Muslims in Islamic theology.

Historically, the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims was based on the principle of contractual agreement. This contractual agreement is reflected in different pacts that were signed with non-Muslims, in both a Muslim majority country (the Pacts of Medina, Najran and Jerusalem) and a non-Muslim majority country (the pact of Granada). From an Islamic perspective, the moral challenge regarding non-Muslims is not the problem of recognizing their right not to be Muslim (this is widely acknowledged), but rather recognizing them as equals and part of a relationship of solidarity. This challenge is reflected in the views of different Islamic schools of jurisprudence about the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. These pacts also represent a legal reference for these schools of jurisprudence in their argument for, or against, the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic countries.

Chapter Three then examines the position of different schools of jurisprudence on the question of the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic states and their obligation and duty, both to the host communities in these states and to the Islamic nation. These schools traditionally opposed the subordination of Muslims to any form of non-Islamic political authority and loyalty to, and bonding with, non-Muslim authority.

What constitute an Islamic political authority is controversial. Radical Islamists, who is defined in
this thesis as: “the perspective often associated with those seeking to purge foreign elements from Muslim society. It is an Islamic revivalist movement, often characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life”; define Islamic authority as an authority that derives its legitimacy from applying Islamic law ‘Sharia’; while Modernists and reformists define it in terms of its ability to provide the fundamental human principles defined by Islam and preserve the interests of Muslims. For the latter, applying the Sharia is not a condition for recognizing an authority as an Islamic authority. On the other hand, traditional conservative schools regard residence in a non-Muslim state as unlawful in Islam, based on the following arguments: first, Muslims must not be subject to non-Muslim laws or authority; second, Islam and Muslims must not be put in a position of inferiority to non-Muslims; third, Muslims must avoid aiding or increasing the strength of non-Muslims states; fourth, Muslims are forbidden from forming bonds of friendship or solidarity with non-Muslims; fifth, Muslims are required to avoid environments of sin or indecency; and, finally, in non-Muslim environments it will be more difficult to prevent the loss of religious commitment and identity especially in subsequent generations. What is important for our purposes is that the reasons given for prohibiting residence are precisely objections to relationships with non-Muslims associated with a common citizenship.

In contrast, modernist and reformist schools of jurisprudence, which permitted the residency of Muslims in a non-Muslim state, emphasised the following conditions: first, that it must be done for the right reasons, for example, the Muslim’s inability to reside in an Islamic state; second, affirmation by the Muslim that s/he belongs to the Islamic state and will preserve his/her religious identity; third, the recognition that loyalty to the Islamic nation takes precedence over any other loyalties and citizenship requirement; and, finally, this loyalty to the Islamic Umma must be reflected in the continuous effort of Islamic minorities to fulfil their holy duty of spreading the words of Islam in their host community.

Both Traditionalist and Modernist schools deploy their ideology through different means, such as the establishment of Islamic centres, Schools and Mosques. More recently, the use of the Cyber world, involving Islamic websites and social pages, to reach young Muslim audiences and address the difficulties and challenges that face Muslims in their daily life in their host societies has become much more important. This is what is known as Cyber Islam.
Consequently, Chapter Four will discuss the role of Cyber Islam for three main reasons. First, the different schools of Islamic theology now use Cyber Islam as the main way of interacting with Muslims in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries. Second, Cyber Islam has become an increasing influence on young Muslims worldwide, and particularly upon second generation Muslims in the West (Bunt, 2003). Finally, the data I report later shows the increasing influence of Islamic websites, (more specifically IslamOnline.net and qaradawi.net) on the views of the second generation group of respondents. These bi-language (English and Arabic) websites which target Muslims in the West, not only offer news coverage and opinion, but, most importantly, a live and archived “Fatwa Bank”, wherein religious scholars offer guidance to Muslims in general, and Muslim minorities in the West in particular, on what is permitted and forbidden.

Section Three of this thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter Five will report on the respondents’ perceptions of their identity and citizenship in Australia. It explores their understanding of the relationship between the Islamic Umma and the Islamic State and how this affects their relationship with Australian society, by examining certain themes about this issue introduced by the researcher. The first theme addresses whether the “Islamic Umma” and “the Islamic State” are identical, given that some strands of Islam argue that the former includes “certain ideals or aspirations”, while the latter “represents concrete realities”. Thus, from this perspective, the Islamic Umma is a spiritual entity and not a geo-political sovereignty. The second theme focused on whether citizenship should be based on religious identity, because it’s superior to any other form of identification, and whether an individual’s religious identity conflicts with their citizenship status in non-Islamic countries. Finally, the third theme concerns whether Islam has the ability to accommodate cultural differences, so making it compatible with the Australian/European liberal culture, and facilitating the process of socio-economic and cultural adaptation/integration of Muslims into Australian society.

Chapter Six discusses citizenship obligations, more specifically, political participation and military service. These two duties are the most discussed duties within Islamic school of jurisprudences and for Muslim audiences because they reflect the competition between the duty of citizenship and the duty of faith. Both duties represent a major concern and challenge to all Islamic schools of jurisprudence that oppose this participation based on a doctrine of loyalty to the global political community of fellow Muslims (the Umma).
The justification for this position is based on the following Islamic laws. First, it is stated clearly in the Quran that a Muslim is prohibited from killing a Muslim: “Never should a believer kill a believer; but (if it so happens) by mistake (compensation is due).... Whosoever slays a believer intentionally his reward is Hell forever, and the wrath and curse of God are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him” [Q.4:92–93]. Second, the only just war is one that serves to spread the words of Allah and expand the land of Islam. Third, it is the holy duty of every Muslim, even those residents in non-Islamic countries, to participate and defend the interests of Islam. Fourth, Muslims are not permitted to help non-Muslims, if the action is designed to advance a non-Islamic faith or conception of truth. Finally, Muslims are not permitted to sacrifice their life for other than in the service of Islam. The concern here is that these arguments suggest nothing less than a rejection of civic commitment by Muslims to a non-Muslim society.

In contrast, some modernist and reformist jurists permit political participation because such participation will enable Muslims resident in these countries to negotiate their differences with the host community and advance the interests of Muslim communities, particularly in worldly matters; interests that may overlap with non-Muslim fellow citizens, as well as being in the interests of the Umma.

Without making any assumptions about the popularity of these theological positions among present-day Muslims, it is evident that there is a doctrinal background that could cause a Muslim to doubt the legitimacy of their loyalty to a non-Muslim state. It is of course quite possible that such doubt affects these Muslims’ socio-cultural, political and economic adaptation/integration into their host communities.

Finally, Chapter Seven offers an overview of the factors that affect the socio-cultural adaptation/integration process of the respondents.
Different political theories defined the concept of citizenship and discussed citizenship obligation in modern political thought. Many of these theories relate the concept of citizenship to the formation of national identity, which develops through shared experiences, history and participation, and involves equality of rights and responsibilities, both in the public and private sphere, which creates a sense of belonging within any given community. In this chapter, this thesis will review the literature on the citizenship, nationalism and the integration/adaptation of migrants associated with different political theories, focusing particularly on the literature on the adaptation and integration of Muslims in Australia. It will also look at the literature on cross-cultural adaptation and ethno-religion transformation theories; as well as, the literature on the Sociology of Religion and Muslim Diaspora.

In political philosophy, the question of citizenship and Nationalism is discussed by three main bodies of work: liberal theories; communitarian theories; and civic republican theories. The position of all three is very different from the theory of Nationalism and citizenship in Islamic history and Islamic theology.

Liberal theories define citizenship as a status which entitles individuals to specific set of universal rights granted by the state. The idea that citizens act ‘rationally’ towards the fulfilment of their interests is central for liberal theories (Gaventa, 2002). The liberals make a clear distinction between the public and private spheres. They argue that the public sphere is where political structures and political decisions are made i.e. political life. The private sphere is where civil society exists. The state activities should be confined to the public sphere. In the private domain individuals have the chance to pursue personal goals without interference from the state? (Marsh, O'Toole and Jones, 2007: 35)

The civic republican approach addresses the right and obligation of citizens to participate in political affairs. It implies an ‘active’ role for the individual in relation to his/her political community; it sees citizenship as ‘practice’ (Kabeer, 2002). In contrast, communitarian theories centre on the notion of the socially-embedded citizen and community belonging. They argue that the individual’s realisation of interests and identity can only be defined in relation to the
community to which he/she belongs (Jones and Gaventa, 2002). As such, they place strong emphasis on the responsibilities of citizenship. So, communitarian theory argues that the individual’s interests must be sacrificed to the interests of the community. Collectivism is more important than individual and group interests in the creation of a cohesive society (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones, 2007:36).

Recent approaches to citizenship link the liberal, communitarian and civic republican theories in an attempt to find a way to encompass their main contributions. The focus of these contemporary approaches, Jones and Gaventa (2002) explain, is the need to conceptualise citizenship as both a status and an active practice. These debates are framed by discussions of identity, focusing on how people see themselves and act as citizens. This new approach, known as the ‘model of identity politics’ (Van Oenen, 2002), considers identity as a positive political asset. Identity is essential in the discussions of citizenship, the sense of belonging and struggles for rights (see McKinnon and Hampsher-Monk, 2000). This concept of national identity is problematic because immigration in the Western liberal democracies in the Twentieth Century created new realities based on the existence of different ethnic groups and cultures. National identity develops in a nation-state on the basis of the ability of its citizens to fully practice their rights and duties. In most countries there is de-facto exclusion. Ethnicity, race, religion and ingenuity led to exclusion. Some indigenous communities and migrants groups have the right to vote, but social, cultural and economic exclusion denies them the right and chance to gain political representation (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 11), because the nation monopolies political, economic and social power.

Citizenship is granted by being a member of a nation-state. The nation-state is the combination of a political unit that controls a physical territory (the state); with a national community that has cultural specificity and political legitimacy within these boundaries (the nation). This definition is problematic in societies that have multicultural components, migrants and indigenous groups within their populations. Most countries with the problem of migrants and multiculturalism tend to use the process of naturalization, allowing these groups to be accepted as citizens. Naturalization implies that being a member of a specific nation-state is laid down by natural laws, linked to a dominant culture associated with the dominant ethnic/racial group. Foreigners can only become naturalised through a long process that takes longer time. As such, Feher and Heller (quoted in Castles and Davidson, 2000: 15) point out that “becoming a citizen is based on a process of cultural adaptation and culturalization”.

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This cultural adaptation or culturalization is problematic for Muslims who live in non-Islamic countries because, in Islamic theology, religious identity is superior to any other form of identity. The integration of Muslims in Australia has been discussed from different angles, including a historical description of the first Muslim migrants’, the Afghan Camel Riders, conditions and their role in the building of Australia’s railways, or analysis of their political and socio-economic participation.

The literature on Muslim communities in Australia faces a number of theoretical problems. First, the literature usually considers Muslims in Australia as a whole, unified, community, regardless of the difference in the schools of jurisprudence they follow, whether they are Sunni, Shia or followers of other schools of jurisprudence. Second, it fails to recognize the importance of their countries of origin and the ethno-cultural differences. Third, it is also evident that there is a misunderstanding of the term religion when discussing Muslims in Australia. Many scholars use the term Islam to describe the religion of the Quran or the religion of the millions of people who follow Prophet Mohammed. For Muslims Islam is defined by the Verse (3:19/17): “the true religion of God is Islam”. The Arabic translation of the word religion is “Din”, which means a whole way of life. This thesis will adopt the definition of W. Montgomery Watt (2007), in his book “What is Islam”: “The Islamic vision that informs the whole life of the society and of individuals”. This does not mean that religious beliefs determine the whole of life, but they exercise a certain control over the whole.

The historical literature on Muslims in Australia mainly describes the pattern of Muslim immigration into Australia, from the early Afghan-Muslim migration and their relationship to the wider white society. Typical examples are: Tom L. McKnight’s, The Camel Riders in Australia; Andrew Marku’s, Fear and Hatred; Michael Cigler’s, The Afghans in Australia; and Christian Steven’s, Tin Mosques and Ghan Towns. This literature describes the early immigration of Indians, Syrians and Turks to Australia in the period from 1860 to 2002. The terminological confusion is evident in this literature where different terms were used to describe Muslims in Australia, such as Mohammedans, which means people who are followers of Mohammed’s or the people of the Quran. What is noticeable is that these terms were not used to describe a religious group, but were mainly related to race, ethnicity and culture. In this context, Muslims were defined as a group of people with a similar physical complexion, especially a skin colour, an Islamic culture and a self-
awareness, in relation to other groups living within the same society.

Cultural and religious identification is evident in the discussion of Australian national identity, which usually involves a description of the dominant Anglo-Celtic, Christian, Australian population whose views overrode the claims of the lesser communities within the country. From this perspective, the concept of national identity refers to the identity of the majority groups within communities, which was seen as a collective basis on which government and society should rest, so forming the nation (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). However, other ethnicities and religions were neglected when the questions of national identity were raised.

This is evident when the problems between Australian Arab youth and Australian Anglo Saxon youth are discussed (Ghassan Hage, 1998). Muslims of Middle Eastern origin, or Arabs as they were described in radio talk shows or letters to the editors, were discriminated against and were called upon to prove their loyalty to the nation, or go home, although the majority of them were second generation migrants in Australia. Similarly, Kevin Dunn (2003) highlights the religious and cultural tensions between Muslim groups and the communities they lived in, which is reflected in the resistance of the host communities and local governments to the establishment of Muslim Mosques and religious schools (Hussein, 2002). There have also been disputes about the non-recognition of Islamic Laws, especially in areas that conflict with the secular law, such as drinking alcohol, gambling, sexual relations outside marriage and polygamy; these disputes reflect the religion-cultural tension within the society (Hussein, 2002). The limitation of such studies are that they consider Muslims as a unified community in Australia, which neglects the fact that they are ethnically divided and most of them have their own Mosques, where their ethnic language is used.

Cultural sensitivity has concentrated mainly on the question of assimilation to the culture of the host community (Yacob and Abdurrahman, 2002), although assimilation would not necessarily result in the disappearance of different cultures and religions, as different religions will survive the assimilation process. Preserving minority culture itself presents a challenge to minorities, in particular concerning their individual right to protect and practice their own beliefs. For Muslims, preserving their Islamic identity is a challenge that they face in their host community.

Islam in Europe has become a sign of cultural change and triggers the fears of conflict and loss of national identity. The liberal democratic system in many host communities in the West does not
necessarily grant the peaceful coexistence between different religion and ethno-cultural groups. In contrast, the discrimination that Muslims have faced in many Western societies is not based on racial, cultural or religious differences; rather, the overriding factor is national interest or security, especially after September 11 and during the last Gulf War (Nahid Kabir, 2005). The situation in Australia, as discussed earlier, is similar. Social exclusion and racism towards Muslims in these societies led to their inability to integrate into these societies and provoked a response in which religion and other cultural forms become the sources for survival and resistance.

The consolidation of religion in the life of immigrant groups must be understood in the light of three factors: first, the value of religion as a source of belonging, settlement and community formation; second, the exploitation of religion as a mechanism for social control; and, third, the role of religion in the creation of a common identity and developing resistance in situations of social exclusion and racism (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 135). However, does religion imply a collective behaviour, awareness or consciousness within a given society sharing a common belief?

Religion is the hard kernel of identity for many immigrants (Kastoryano, 1996). Islam has played an important role in consolidating North African communities in France, Turks in Germany and some Asian communities in the UK. It becomes the main basis of culture in these communities opposed to social exclusion, economic disadvantage and racism. It becomes a source of self esteem, moral guidance, ethnic pride and community solidarity, even within groups of immigrants who were secular in their country of origin. This disempowerment came as a result of the failure of multiculturalism to provide immigrants with what Prins and Salisbury (2008: 22-3), in the case of Britain, define as: “national self confidence in a fragmenting society”. This disempowerment created the sense of isolation and a sense of not belonging to the British nation that made the migrants look for other sources of belonging in their ethnic and religious communities. This situation made Muslim communities vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalism and a potential threat to national security. Multiculturalism in Britain failed to address the theological differences within the society. These theological differences make different religious groups unable to conduct a social conversation and develop cultural consent. This fragmentation made some religious groups appear to be culturally unreasonable or to be making theological alien demands (Modood, 2006). Multiculturalism failed to accommodate Muslims and bring peace and harmony within British society. Instead, it alienated young Muslims in the society and led Muslim minorities to be accused of self-segregation and adopting isolationist practices under multiculturalism (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005).
Other literature on Muslims in Australia concentrated on their socio-economic conditions and their inability to integrate into Australian society. Employment levels (Riaz Hassan, 1999), political participation (Al-Momani, Dados, Maddox and Wise, 2010) and English language skills are indicators of adaptation/integration that are used to measure the integration of Muslims in Australia. These studies of their socio-economic position concluded that Muslims occupied low positions in the Australian labour market, despite the fact that some of them had higher qualification than non-Muslims.

Muslim minorities had considerably lower income compared to other religious groups and they were concentrated in low occupational groupings, because of a number of factors, including the language barrier and cultural sensitivities. This low income status made Muslims among the most deprived groups in Australia (Katz and Redmond, 2009). Using data from the 2006 Census, Hassan (2008) found that Australian Muslim households were over-represented at the lower-income levels and under-represented among higher-income households. The author also found that 49 per cent of Australian Muslim children were living in poverty.

Although, some Muslim migrants have high education level, their English language skills is a determinant factor in their employment status. In general, migrants born in non-English speaking countries had lower average incomes than the Australian population as whole. More specifically, refugees from countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan earned only 53 per cent of the average weekly income. (Taylor, 2004)

In addition, the second DIAC Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) found extremely high unemployment rates among humanitarian migrants (43%), even 18 months after arrival. These rates were much higher than among any of the other main migrant categories. Their levels of education appear to contribute very little to employment outcomes and economic participation for migrants in Australia.

In an analysis of the 2006 Census data, Hassan (2008) found that Muslim men were more likely than non-Muslim men to have a university degree (21% and 15% respectively), but their unemployment rates were two to four times higher (depending on age). Hence Muslims had significantly lower labour market participation rates than other Australians. The overall
unemployment rate for Australian Muslims was 13.4 per cent compared to 5.2 per cent for the broader population (DIAC, 2007B: 20). The unemployment rate was particularly high for Muslim young adults (19-24 years) – 26 per cent compared to 14 per cent for non-Muslims in the same age group (Hassan, 2008).

Socio-economic disadvantage was experienced by second-generation Australian Muslims, particularly those in their productive years. This disadvantage was, in large part, the result of stereotyping and discriminatory practices. This can lead to young people, particularly young men, becoming alienated from mainstream society, and make them more vulnerable to religious and nonreligious radicalism. The stereotyping of Islam is perhaps the most significant factor impacting on the ability of Australian Muslims fully to participate in Australian society. Within public opinion, stereotypes and constructions of Islam are constantly reproduced through negative media coverage which then manifests in discrimination. (Pe-Pua, Gendera, Katz and O’Connor, 2010)

1.1 Literature on Adaptation

The literature on the adaptation of immigrants has faced a number of theoretical problems. First, it has suffered greatly from terminological confusion when describing the adaptation process. Terms such as adaptation, assimilation, integration and acculturation are often used with little precision. Second, there is no model that explains the socio-economic adaptation of immigrants.

Cross-cultural adaptation involves the transition into a new culture, which can be challenging to individuals’ cultural norms and traditions. Kim Young Yun (1988) argues that one major difference between members of various cultural groups within America is the degree to which they have immersed themselves in the culture of the United States. So, Locke (1998) argues that members of culturally diverse groups can be placed into several categories. First, there are bicultural individuals who are able to function as competently in the dominant culture as in their own, while holding on to manifestations of their own culture. The majority of this category is from the second generation group. Second, there are traditional individuals who hold on to a majority of cultural traits from the culture of origin and reject many traits of the dominant culture. Thirdly, there are individuals who will acculturate and give up most cultural traits of the culture of origin and traits of the dominant culture. Finally, there are marginal individuals who do not fit into the culture of origin or into the dominant culture.
Immigrants handle cross-cultural changes in various ways. According to Atherton (2005), they use different tactics, including avoidance, denial and withdrawal, as well as regression into pre-existing habits, in order to eliminate discomfort in the new environment. Others develop new habits and begin the process of adaptation, allowing them to become better suited to their new host community environment. This is often accompanied by a period of growth. This progress is not a linear process, but, rather, a back and forth endeavour that will entail periods of regression and subsequent progression. This process needs both decoding, which involves the capacity of strangers to receive and process information, and encoding, which involves designing and executing mental plans in initiating or responding to messages.

Adapting to a new culture requires cognitive capabilities and affective and operational competence (Kim Young, 2005). Cognitive capabilities require the knowledge of the host culture and its language, history, institutions, worldviews, beliefs, norms and rules of interpersonal conduct. Effective competence facilitates cross-cultural adaptation by providing a motivational capacity to deal with various challenges of living in the host environment, the openness to new learning and the willingness to participate in emotional and physical aspects of the host environment. Operational competence relates to the other aspects of host communication competence and facilitates strangers’ outwardly expressing their cognitive and affective experiences. Ethnicity and ethnic communities must be used as a mechanism that allows strangers to receive some of the comforts of their previous culture, maintain connectedness to their original culture and serves to facilitate adaptation.

The host environment and the predisposition of the host community are vital for cross-cultural adaptation. Some cultures make it easier to assimilate than others, and the host environment has a direct impact on the nature of an individual's integration. Some societies display more openness and warmth to outsiders than others. The degree to which a given host environment is receptive of exerts pressure to conform on a stranger is closely influenced by the overall ethnic group strength, which is a measure of a given stranger’s ethnic group's capacity to influence the surrounding host environment at large. The predisposition depends on the ability of the individuals to prepare themselves to enter a new environment, both physically and emotionally, which will have a positive affect on their ability to transition. This takes into account the mental, emotional and motivational readiness to deal with the new environment, including understanding of the new language and culture. (Kim Young, 2005)
This cross-cultural adaptation theory does not take into consideration the society they come from, which shapes their identity, the identity of the society they enter, the process of cultural maintenance and the whole context of their immigration experience.

The migrant’s identity in a new host community revolves around ethno-cultural identity. African migrants in Australia identify with both their previous national identity, as in the Sudanese, Somali or Ethiopian communities, and/or with their ethnic identification, such as Dinka and Nuer (Southern Sudanese tribes), Oromo, Amhara and Tigrinya (Ethiopian ethnicities) or Blen (Eritrean ethnicity). Ethno-cultural identification is popular among African immigrants specifically, and other immigrants in general, in Australia and is reflected in the increasing number of ethnic schools and the language-specific enrolments (198 schools). Ethnic schools are community language schools, which provide language maintenance for different cultural groups that live in Australia. They are supervised by the Australian Federation of Ethnic Schools Associations and the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations. In 2010, the total number of languages that were taught in schools in South Australia alone was 40 (Ethnic schools Board Annual report, 2009/10), which included the following African Languages: Amharic (the number of students increased from 48 in 2004 to 249 in 2010); Dinka (139 in 2005 to 464 in 2010); Madi Dinka (31 in 2005 to 435 in 2010); Nuer (25 in 2006 to 144 in 2010); and Somali (61 in 2007 to 274 in 2010).

Migrants use ethnic identity as a means of transmitting cultural heritage to their children, who represent the second generation in the host communities. Ethnic identity involves past cultural traditions, sociological factors, including economic, social, and political conditions, and a psycho-cultural dimension related to family and peer-group socialization patterns and their interaction. Cultural identification in Muslim life revolves around Islam. Islam becomes the main part of the ethnic identification of Muslims. Religious rituals and symbols often serve as a primary factor in the reproduction of culture and represent ties with the tradition, because, although religious services, Prayers in the case of Islam, are performed in Arabic (the language of the Quran), native languages are used to explain the religion. These languages become a link to the traditional culture and reproduce ethnic identity, especially among the second generation.

The sociology of religion discusses the link between religion and ethnicity for the immigrant. Yang and Ebaugh (2001, 269-288) have noted certain patterns in ethno-religious identifications within
minorities in the USA. First, there is an “ethnic fusion,” where religion is the foundation of ethnicity, or ethnicity equals religion, such as in the case of the Amish and Jews. Second, there is an “ethnic religion”, where religion is one of several foundations of ethnicity. The Greek or Russian Orthodox Churches and the Dutch Reformed church are examples of this type. Here, ethnic identification can be claimed without claiming religious identification, but the reverse is rare. Third, there is “religious ethnicity,” which occurs where an ethnic group is linked to a religious tradition that is shared by other ethnic groups. Muslims and Irish, Italian and Polish Catholics are such cases. In this pattern: “religious identification can be claimed without claiming ethnic identification.” (Fenggang and Ebaugh, 2001) This position concurs with the position held by some Muslim scholars, discussed below, who have suggested that Islam should become the new ethnicity for the minorities in the West, replacing pre-immigration ethnicities and unifying them to create a cohesive Muslim community.

The new immigrant, ethno-religious, identity may change and be reshaped within second generation of immigrants as they are more exposed to the realities in their host communities. The second generation of immigrants are not attached to the context of the country of their origin in the same way as their parents. They become more familiar with the language of the host country and often make it their first, or most comfortable, language for communication. For instance second generation “Koreans” in the USA seem eager to be known as “Christian”, rather than “Korean” (Warner, 2005). Indeed, Warner argues that religions no longer fit well into the old cultural moulds. Thus, the identities of immigrants, whether individual or collective, are predominantly not given, but negotiated. Religious identities, and the use of languages by the immigrants, are tools which mean that their ethno-religious identities in the host country are neither similar to, nor different from, the ethno-religious identities that they had in their country of origin.

This ethno-religion transformation is further discussed by Yang and Ebaugh (2001: 269), who argued that: “migrants adopt three mechanisms to refuse the secularization process of the host community. These mechanisms are: adopting the congregational forms in organizational structure and rituals, returning to theological foundation, and reaching beyond traditional ethnic identification and religious boundaries to include other”. This mechanism of ethno–religious identity is more practiced by the second generation, than the first generation, and it is reflected in the increasing number of religious movements involving younger migrants, which encourage the collective performance of religious duties, such as the performance of prayers in Mosques, the
spread of collective breaking of the Fast, ‘Iftar’, in Ramadan and the large number of seminars on Islamic studies in Mosques and community centres.

The study of the differences in religious participation between first and second generation of migrants in the USA, conducted by Ebaugh and Saltzman (2000: 849), found that the highest rates of participation were among second generation immigrants with two immigrant parents, rather than among first generation immigrants. Indeed, first generation immigrants are not significantly different from non-immigrants, while second generation immigrants with only one immigrant parent have significantly lower levels of religious involvement than non-immigrants.

According to Humphrey (2005), this religious revivalism among the second generation reflects their social marginalization and the problems of racism that second generation Muslims of Lebanese and Turkish descent have faced in Australia; similar to that experienced by the Maghrebis in France, the Turks in Germany and the Pakistanis in Britain. Social marginality has led many to revive their faith, but it has also resulted in social alienation and dysfunctional family crisis, which is why for them Islam is a source of authentic identity, something in which they take pride.

The emergence of this authentic ideology in Australia led to an increase in the number of what Humphrey (2005:79) calls “the new non-ethnic Islamic ‘Dawa’ (call to Islam movements), such as the Islamic Youth Movement and older movements such as the ‘Jamaat Dawa Islamiah’ and the ‘Tablighi Jamaat’ (an ascetic non-political movement)”. This return to authentic identity is challenged by a loss of Islamic religious values and beliefs among a segment of the same second generation groups, which has resulted in the formation of Lebanese and Muslim gangs which have been involved in acts that are prohibited by Islam, such as crimes and sexual assaults incidents that took place between 1999 and 2002, that increased racial antipathy towards Islam, Muslims, Lebanese, and Arabs, all readily conflated identities in the popular media.

The negative media stereotypes led to an increased hostility and harassment faced by Muslim Australians since the beginning of the 1990s. Levels of harassment were reported to be high during the Gulf War in 1991 and the hostility has markedly increased after the many tragic incidents involving Muslims in 2001, locally as well as globally (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004; Munawar, 1997; Yasmeen, 2002; see also Johns and Saeed, 2002).
discrimination against Muslims has shifted from being based upon race, skin colour and ethnicity to focus on religion (Kabir, 2003). Akbarzadeh (2001) argues that this discrimination against Islam exposed second generation Muslim Australians to a conflicting sets of loyalties as they are brought up to feel proud of their religious and ethnic backgrounds but at the same time seek acceptance and recognition by the wider society. Not only had that, but second generation Muslims experienced conflicts of value between Islam, the cultural traditions of their ancestors, and the Australian way of life.

Participants from second generation of the focus group of this thesis identified themselves as Australians, or a mixture of Australian and religious identity. For them, Australian was a national identity associated with where they were born and/or brought up. In this context, the participants showed a clear sense of belonging to Australia, as this is where their homes and families are, and none expressed any desire to live elsewhere. While many still felt a cultural attachment to the country where their parents came from, they acknowledged that religion is an important part of their identity. But, they still felt Australian, rather than Muslim Australians or Australian Muslims, and showed a clear nationalistic feeling towards Australia. Some pinpointed behaviours and values they identified with and thought of as typically Australian, such as taking life easy, having a strong sense of fairness and a concern for other people. Interestingly, the ones who mentioned such values had all spent long periods travelling and living in an Islamic or a Muslim-dominated country, which indicated that they did not realise how much they had internalised these values until they were confronted with different values. Although many participants found that their Australian values were quite different from the traditional cultural values practiced in their ancestors’ countries, they did not see them as in contradiction with their Islamic beliefs. Instead, they seemed to have selectively adopted those Australian values that were consistent with the Islamic teachings and rejected those in direct conflict with their religious beliefs. The difference between what is Islamic/non-Islamic, the Islamic Umma and the Islamic State, in the focus groups’ views, will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis.

Most of the participants felt that they were aware of the distinctions between religion and culture and that they practiced ‘pure/true’ Islam, free of cultural influences. They explained that they had to strike a balance by allowing cultural elements, both Australian and from their ethnic heritage, that were consistent with the teaching of Islam, while rejecting those cultural elements that go against the religion. Some believed that they had a high awareness of the differences between
religion and culture, because they had grown up in a non-Muslim country, away from ‘Official /traditional Islam’ practiced in most Islamic countries.

Although many had adopted the beliefs carried by their parents when they were young, some believed they had obtained a much clearer understanding of the lines between culture and religion through their interaction with cyber Islam, which played an important role in the crystallization of their religious identity, as well as introducing them to what they describe as ‘True Islam’. They identified themselves as Muslims and merely appreciated their ethnic heritages from a cultural perspective. None of the participants felt their ethnic heritage had any significant relevance to their feelings of identity and belonging. The influence of Cyber Islam in identity formation will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis.

The strong religious commitment shown by the majority of participants in this study is not necessarily representative of all Australian-born Muslims. Certainly, it may be that Islamic identity is linked to the participant’s concept of ‘pure/true’ Islam. Although second-generation participants had an enormous respect for their parents and seemed to have internalised their religious beliefs and practices, some participants seemed to place more emphasis on the difference between the traditional Islam practiced by their parents and true Islam. For the second generation participants, ‘pure/true’ Islam is the Islam that was practiced by prophet and the first generation of Muslims during the Four Guided Caliphs periods, before the ‘Dynasties changed/distorted the spirit of Islam’.

1.2 The Literatures on the Sociology of Religion and Muslim Diaspora

The sociology of religion is an area of study that, in many ways, is still emerging and changing, especially when it comes to the relationship between religion and the internet. Cyber religion studies started with two magazine articles: - “Techno-pagans: May the Astral Plane Be Reborn in Cyberspace” in Wired (Davis, 1995); and Time’s “Finding God on the Web” (Chama, 1996). Chama article highlight religious activity on the internet by addressing how the users use religious traditions in a new context such as such as Crosswalk (www.crosswalk.com/) and Gospel.com (www.gospelcom.net/) provide Christians with access to online Bible study tools and various interactive devotional or fellowship groups. Others experiment with new forms of religion, altering and adapting ancient beliefs to this digital environment. (Campbell 2006: 1)
While many forms of religious activity exist online, Campbell (2006: 5-6) listed the most common types: gathering religious information; online worship and rituals; online recruitment and missionary activities; and online religious community. By the beginning of the 21st Century, there were studies focusing, especially among Muslim diasporas, on: religious identity (Metcalf, 1996); community (Lewis, 1994 and 1997); religious authority and the new interpretation of sacred texts (Piscatori, 1990; Akhtar, 1990); the influence of the internet on young Muslims, both in Islamic countries and the Diaspora (Nielsen, 1995); and the role of technology in bringing about religious change in Islam (Robinson, 1993; Atiyeh, 1995; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996).

Discussions on Islam in Western secular societies, or rather on the compatibility of 'Islam' and 'Europe', suggest that the issue revolves around the extent to which European societies should allow challenges to their secular institutions and political cultures. This representation is dominant in both political and popular debates and stems from the idea of a clash between modern, secular, outlooks, embodied by the histories and institutions of secular liberal political cultures and nation-states, and religious, often equated with 'fundamentalist', groups and projects, construed as threatening secularism through their craving for recognition in the public sphere.

The secularization process in most of today's societies has been related to modernity and how religion survives the necessity of living in a secular world, as well as, how secular theories can intellectually, and practically, survive what Berger (2001: 443-44) describes as the: "powerful upsurges of religious movements, some of them having far-reaching social political consequences. Paramount among these are two - the wide resurgence of Islam, both throughout the Muslim countries and in the Muslim diaspora - and the less widely noted explosion of Evangelical Protestantism, especially in its Pentecostal version, over wide regions of the developing world, most dramatically in Latin America ( I would refer here to the work of David Martin). However, these two cases are not unique (though, arguably, they are the most important). There are powerful revitalizations in all the other major religious communities - among Roman Catholics (especially in developing countries), Eastern Orthodox Christians (quite dramatically in Russia), Jews (in Israel and in the diaspora), Hindus and Buddhists. Put simply, most of the world is bubbling with religious passions. And where secular political and cultural elites have been established, they find themselves on the defensive against the resurgent religious movements - for example, in Turkey, in Israel and in India - and, last but not least, in the United States!"
In this context, some scholars, such as Talal Asad (1999), Jose Casanova (1994), Olivier Roy (2007) and Armando Salvatore (2006), discussed the relationship between the secularization theory and religious spheres and norms. Casanova, in his book *Public Religions in the Modern World*, argues that the validity of the secularization theory depends on dividing what passes for one theory of secularization into three separate propositions: 'secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere' (1994: 211).

This structural trend toward separating secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, of growing freedom of religion and of religions turning into denominations, adopted by Casanova, is criticized by Talal Asad, who argues that, because religion has legitimately entered modern politics, it could be argued that the element of differentiation in Casanova's argument no longer holds. Asad gives as an example, the Islamic revival in the Middle-East, which explicitly seeks to work through the nation state. It is not because of their actions that these movements necessarily seem threatening to secularists, it is because religion entered into a space that was previously already occupied by the secular. He concludes that: 'if the secularization thesis seems increasingly implausible to some of us, this is not simply because religion is now playing a vibrant part in the modern world of nations, but because Religion was always involved in the world of power and it is a gross simplification to say that religion has historically been important for national politics' (1999:192).

Armando Salvatore tries to engage both Asad and Casanova. He argues that the underlying question is whether or not Islam fits into European norms of secularity, and that: “secularity should be treated not as a mere question of political culture but as the manifestation of distinctive concepts of authority and practices of power” (2006:543). He contends that the tension between religion and politics is a result of the Christian influence on European culture and the concept of secularity: “is the product of distinctively European trajectories of interaction between states and Christian churches” (2006:554). Thus, for Salvatore, modern liberal theory’s understanding of religion cannot be universally applied to different religious groups, especially Muslims.

Other studies of diaspora discussed the transnational religious phenomena and have emphasised the importance of distinguishing between transnational processes of migration and movement, on one hand, and diasporic forms of consciousness, identity and cultural creation, on the other (Levitt,
2001a; Vertovec 2000). While this distinction is useful (and subtly deployed by these authors), it risks directing the study of transnational social phenomena in certain, limited, directions. If ‘transnationalism’ is mainly about migration and its aftermaths, it is a short step to suggesting that it should be subsumed under the category of cultural assimilation (as recently advocated by Kivisto, 2001), leaving the term ‘diaspora’ to designate populations living outside putative ‘homelands’, as well as the self-understandings of those populations (Saint-Blancat 2002; Vertovec 1999). Migration and diaspora do, of course, define a wide range of social processes and experiences, but they do not exhaust transnationality. Transnational Islam can be used to refer to a variety of phenomena, among which I would emphasise three: demographic movements for political, economic or social reasons; transnational religious institutions, represented by Islamic organizations, religious groups or local mosques; and the field of Islamic reference and debate, which is reflected in the establishment of networks, conferences and increasingly formalised institutions, such as the Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research. These institutions, with their religious authority represented by different Fatwas they issue, focus on the dilemmas faced by Muslims attempting to develop forms of Islamic life compatible with the range of Western norms, values and laws, while promoting the sense of a worldwide community, the Umma, among ordinary Muslims. The scope of influence of these authorities varies greatly, but, in each case, and this is the critical point, it reaches far beyond the borders of the home or the host country. The communications between these sites and Muslims living elsewhere in the world take many forms: newspaper columns; Internet sites; cable television; or books (Eickelman and Anderson 1999).

Roy (2007), in his book Secularism Confronts Islam, tackles an important and controversial question: Is Islam compatible with Europe’s increasingly secular society? He argues that the idea of a homogenous secular Europe is profoundly misleading and is therefore not an appropriate framework within which to analyse the challenges posed by the emergence of plural religious traditions in Europe. Thus, the idea of a homogeneous, secular Europe is a myth that serves the aim of creating an imagined community vis-à-vis Muslims. He also criticized the notion of Muslim fundamentalists that there is a single, immutable version of Islam and argues that most Muslims in Europe are loyal citizens trying to find ways to practice their faith, while abiding by the laws of their secular societies. He gives an example of the French Muslim organizations posing legal challenges to the French Government’s ban on wearing headscarves in schools, but rejecting violent or extralegal measures to achieve their aims. He argues that Muslim intellectuals have
made it possible for Muslims to live concretely in a secularized world, while maintaining the identity of a "true believer." They have formulated a language that recognizes two spaces: that of religion; and that of secular society. But, Western society is unable to recognize this process because of a cultural bias that assumes religious practice is embedded within a specific, traditional, culture that must be either erased entirely or forced to coexist in a neutral, multicultural space.

When dealing with the crisis and challenges of citizenship in Europe, there is a tendency to marginalise the role that majority religion has played in the process of different communities. Indeed, along with language and culture, religion, or religious unity, has been a fundamental ingredient in building nations (Asad 2003; Salvatore 2005). Salvatore (2005: 10) argues that in the post-Westphalia Europe: “the state's domestication of religion started to consolidate as a means to cement national unity. Religious homogeneity was considered a precious source complementary to linguistic homogeneity in building the nations”.

Roy (2007: 114) argues that contemporary Western societies, are, however, secularised: “because the separation of church and state is a constitutional principle (the United States); because civil society no longer defines itself through faith and religious practice (the United Kingdom, Germany, the Scandinavian countries); or because these two forms of secularism converge and reinforce each other, thus giving birth to what the French call laïcité”. Thus, the relation between the West and Islam is discussed either from the perspective of the Christian origins of Western culture or by emphasising the secular nature of the West. For Roy (2007), the critique of Islam in the West is today a rallying-point for two intellectual families that have been opposed to each other so far: those who think that the West is first and foremost Christian; and those who think that the West is primarily secular and democratic. Not only that, but the criticize Islam, using theological and cultural principles, that: the separation between religion and politics is foreign to Islamic theology; and that Islam is not only a religion, but also a culture and a way of life.

Host countries adopted two policies to integrate, both Muslims and other ethno-religious minorities: multiculturalism, usually associated with English-speaking countries, such as, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and northern Europe; and assimilation, adopted by France. Both policies are in crisis, as Roy (2007: 115) argues because: “Multiculturalism therefore implies that religion remains embedded in a stable cultural background, and assimilationism implies that integration, by definition, leads to the secularisation
of beliefs and behaviours, since all cultural backgrounds disappear.”

Muslim diaspora are facing the challenge to engage with new cultures and an ability to adjust to inevitable changes in their own tradition. Islam, for a young generation of Muslim diaspora, becomes represented in new forms and via new media. Much of this involves bringing Islam into the forums of popular culture and making it available, via a wide variety of media and technology, such as the Internet, which become sources of Islamic knowledge, (Cyber Islam will be explored in depth in a subsequent section of this thesis). The new media opened up new spaces of religious contestation, where traditional sources of authority could be challenged by the wider public. The ability of this new media to communicate in English has, according to Lewis (1994: 207), made it easy for this younger generation of Muslims in the West: ‘to access innovative and relevant Islamic scholarship’. Not only that, but, as Mandaville (2001: 173- 4) argues: “the important of diasporic publications, such as the popular magazines Q-News and the Muslim News in the Uk has also contributed enormously towards the availability of sound religious advice through a column by the late Dr Syed Mutawalli ad-Darsh, a prominent religious scholar in the UK. Every fortnight in Q-News he dispenses Fatwas (legal opinions) on a vast range of issues relevant to Islam in modern society. Many of these were answers to questions sent in by readers on marriage, sexuality and contraception – topics which young Muslims often find it difficult to raise with traditional Ulama in local mosques. Several Islamic publishing houses in the UK have also dedicated themselves to producing useful materials for English-speaking Muslims. Among them are Ta-Ha in London and the publishing wing of the Islamic Foundation in Leicester. This latter organization generates a wide range of literature, ranging from children’s books, to treatises on Islamic economics and the translated works of the late Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi, a prominent Pakistani Islamist (and ideologue of the Jama’at-i Islami Party), whose writing often constitutes an important starting point for many young Muslims in the West”.

The interaction, especially online, between Muslims living in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries, led to the appearance of a global Islam. These encounters, according to Mandaville (2001:174): “often play an important role in processes of identity formation, prompting Muslims to relativise and compare their self-understandings of Islam.” The emergence of this new online religious authority undermined the authority of the traditional Ulama in Mosques. Some of these traditional religious scholars seek to posit an essential, immutable Islam: ‘They all profess to be upholding the essence of Islam,’ argues James Piscatori (1990: 778), “yet in fact all are
reinterpreting doctrine. They establish new, supposedly fixed points while denying that shifts of emphasis, nuance or meaning also occur”. Thus, we find intellectuals, such as Akhtar (1990: 66–7), arguing for an explicit “critical Qur’anic scholarship’ and also for ‘a new theology, responsive to the intellectual pressures and assumptions of a sceptical age”. These online religious discussions covers different issues of concern to young Muslims, such as how the Islamic religion is relevant to contemporary life in the West, the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and the formation of their Islamic identity.

It is therefore not surprising, as Mandaville (2002:5) argues “to find that the current generation of young Muslims in Europe has turned away from traditional sources of religious leadership and authority in droves. Most of this younger generation is highly educated and looking for a more sophisticated idiom of Islam. Intellectually they have tended towards major figures within the wider Muslim world such as, initially, Abu Ala Mawdudi and Fazlur Rahman, and today writers such as Abdolkarim Soroush in Iran, Malaysia’s Chandra Muzaffar, and the Qatar-based Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Simultaneously, there has emerged within Europe itself a new breed of Muslim leadership, often focused around highly-educated, relatively young, professionals and intellectuals”

In the eyes of young Muslims today, then, the traditional methods of teaching Islam holds little hope of providing resources for the issues and problems they face in their day-to-day lives. They seek a renewal and reinterpretation of Islam that address their current circumstances of being Muslim in the west. Some organisations, such as Young Muslims UK, argues Mandaville (2002:6) “have decided that one's choice of madhhab or school of jurisprudence should be a personal choice. Where the organisation needs to take a public position on some issue, however, this is decided by a process of Shura (consultation) in which the views of various madhahib are considered. Again, this ethos reflects the style of education which many young Muslims have received in Europe. Reflection and comparison allows them to develop their own responses to the situations and challenges of life in the West; through this activity they are able to develop an emancipator theology that “allow[s] them to be European without breaking with Islam. This amounts to a strong reassertion of the principle and practice of ijtihaad (‘independent judgement’) as a competence possessed by all Muslims and not simply an elite (albeit socially detached) group of ‘Ulama’. This amounts to a strong reassertion of the principle and practice of ijtihaad (‘independent judgement’) as a competence possessed by all Muslims and not simply an elite
(albeit socially detached) group of ‘Ulama’. For many young Muslims today, a legitimate promulgator of ijtihaad is anyone who speaks to a particular question or cause with morality, perspicacity and insight”.

Such tendencies of younger generation Muslims in the West to develop their own version of the principle of Individual Judgement in the Islamic jurisprudence forced a number of modern Muslim intellectuals and jurists, such as Tariq Ramadan, to reassert aspects of Islamic thought in a contemporary light, (this will be explored in depth in section two: Chapter 3 of this thesis). In his book *To Be A European Muslim*, Ramadan (1999), highlighted the importance of the concept of public interest (Maslaha), emphasised by the Medieval theologian Al-Ghazali who points out that Maslaha was the end goal of the entire body of Sharia, for Ramadan an emphasis on public interest means that the question of whether a particular practice should or should not be permitted needs to be viewed in the context of its effect on the entire community rather than simply deemed permissible, ‘Halal’, or forbidden ‘Haram’, by a religious scholars who based their religious rules on a collection of religious edicts ‘Fatwas’, from the tenth century.

The literatures on Muslim diaspora have also commented on the ways in which the passage into diaspora transforms Muslim’ symbols and spaces. These changes, as described by Mandaville (2001:117): “usually take one of three forms: an alteration in the significance assigned to particular ideas and practices; the ‘translation’ of Muslim symbolic language and thought into a Trans-local dialect; or the construction of new forms of religious expression”. Examples are: Sunier P. and Ooijen (1992) work *Religion and Emancipation: A Study of the Development of Moroccan Islamic Organizations in a Dutch Town*, which describes the role and significance of ‘religious’ institutions in diaspora; and Hamid Naficy’s book (1993), *The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles*, which finds that, after time, religious symbols lose their negative connotations and become, instead, associated with a nostalgia for Iran in the media among the exiled Iranian who escaped Khomeini’s Islamic revolution.

In addition, the existence of a large Muslim diaspora in the West forced them to rethink Islam. Muslim intellectuals encouraged Muslims to reflect upon tradition and to make their own moral choices based on responsible and rational readings of the Quran, Sunna and Islamic history. An example of this is Shabbir Akhtar (Lewis,1994:192), who suggests a specifically Islamic manifesto on freedom of conscience and conviction for Muslims. He argues that Muslim life in the West is
therefore not to be lamented, but rather embraced, offering as it does the opportunity to re-read, reassess and re-assert the validity of Qur’anic teaching in new contexts. Other scholars such as Zakai Baddawi (quoted in Metcalf, 1996), consider the existence of Muslims in the West will lead to the emergence of the most radical and innovative Islamic thought. He gave an example of the Muslims in France, as potentially very fertile ground in this regard, because it is there that Muslims face the greatest difficulties in maintaining their religious identity, as well as integrating in the French Society. These challenges, he hypothesises, will produce the most creative solutions. Syed Nadwi (1983: 190) in his book *Muslims in the West: The Message and Mission* gave an example of Fazlur Rahman, whom he considers an example of a new and young Muslim scholar who encourages “Muslims should read the Qur’an and the Hadith without relying on bulky, medieval commentaries. His claim is that these sources ‘were misconstrued by Muslim scholars in medieval times, made into rigid and inflexible guides – for all time, as it were – and not recognised as the products of their own times and circumstances’.

This new tendency to re-examine Islam by new young Muslims intellectuals in the West who are faced with the task of setting the terms of necessary compromise between faith and participation in communal life, led Modern Jurists, such as Dr. Al-Qaradawi, to allow Muslims to resurrect what is called ‘Fiqh Al-Darwra’, (imperative need), which was adopted by medieval scholars to legitimise transgressing the boundaries of doctrinal prescription under circumstances of absolute need; often associated with a Muslim’s presence in a non-Muslim state. It also led to the emergence of what is known in the Islamic theology as ‘Fiqh Al-Agaliat’, (Jurisprudence of Minorities). As Mandaville (2001: 136) puts it: “A new perspective emerges in which a Muslim is able to see his religion both in relation to the norms and structures of the majority society and in relation to other idioms and interpretations of Islam. It is as a result of this wider breadth of vision that a critical renewal of Islam is now beginning to emerge”.

43
Section Two
The Umma

The concepts of true Islam and official Islam and the question of what is Islamic/not Islamic play important roles in the understanding of my participants’ religious identity formation. Many of my participants link true Islam to the first days of Islam (the Prophet and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs period), before the Dynasties period, which they see as marking the establishment of official Islam. Official Islam is defined by participants as the Islam which is practiced/taught by Jurists, who, according to one participant: ‘represent, protect and serve the interests of the political authority and the ruling class’.

The relation between Jurists and political authority throughout Islamic history is linked to the question of the legitimacy of this authority. Jurists in different Islamic eras tend to justify their authority by their acquisition of religious knowledge ‘Elm’, which enable them to redraw and redefine the Umma. The attempt to redefine and redraw the Umma was influenced by many factors that include the question of the sources of legislation in the Islamic theology, the interaction with non-Islamic civilizations and cultures and the role played by non-Muslim minorities in the Caliphate. The importance of the redefinition of the Umma is that it included non-Muslims and changed the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic theology, as well as redrawing, and extending, the boundaries of the historical abodes of Islam to include the new territories within the Islamic state that had non-Muslim majority inhabitants.

This section will be divided into three chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the historical development of the concept of the Umma over time, from the Prophet’s period during the believer’s society, through the caliphate institution, to the present, where independent countries in the Islamic world, recognize the existing of a global Islam and not a centralized Islamic authority. It will also address the question of whether the Umma, in the absence of the caliphate institution, will reflect political communitarianism (Islamic State) or cosmopolitanism (The Umma).

Subsequently, Chapter 3 will discuss the position of Muslim Minorities in the Islamic theology and how different school of Jurisprudence justified their diasporic status. In addition, it will examine how the changes in the position of these minorities become a legal reference on the basis of which jurists from different schools of Jurisprudence addressed questions about the residency of Muslim
minorities in non-Islamic territories, a development which led to the establishment of the contemporary Jurisprudence of Minorities in Islamic theology.

The Jurisprudence of Minorities aim is to address the challenges that face the Islamic Diaspora in the West in their daily life, as well as establishing a dominant Islamic identity among this Diaspora, to serve the interests of the Umma. Jurists from different schools establish different religious rules, 'Fatwas', and increasingly use the cyber sphere to communicate with this Diaspora, establishing what is known as Cyber Islam. Consequently, the importance of Cyber Islam in the formation of Muslim identity in Australia will be discussed in Chapter 4.

This thesis uses Mandaville (2001: 110), definition of the Muslim diaspora, as: - “Muslims whose families have moved between socio-cultural contexts separated by considerable distance during the past two or three generations or those Muslims who have spent significant periods of time outside their countries of origin, be it for reasons of education, labour or political exile”.
Chapter Two

The Umma

2.1 The development of the concept of the Umma

In Islamic thought, "The Umma" represents a universal world order, ruled by an Islamic government (the Caliph), in accordance with the "Law of God" (the Sharia, Islamic religious law), and patterned after the community founded by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) at Medina in 622 AD.

For Muslims, the Umma is synonymous with the believer’s society and the existence of the believer’s society cannot be separated from the existence of the Islamic Umma. Individual responsibility towards the Umma depends on the Muslim’s ability to live his life within the collective consciousness of the believer’s community in order to protect the interests of the Umma. The term Umma must be understood in the context of Muhammad’s new Medinan society after the Hijra. The Hijra marked the establishment of Muslim solidarity towards each other and defined their relations with the non-Muslims of Arabia. The Brotherhood Agreement between the Muslims of Medina, known as the Allies ‘Al-Ansar’, and the Muslims of Mecca, known as Migrants ‘Al-Muhajirun’, which marked the establishment of the believer’s community, was the first written document in Islamic political history.

The essence of the agreement was based on the economic, social and spiritual solidarity of Muslims against others and the distribution of wealth and resources. This was significant because it shifted the consciousness of the society from tribalism, clan and blood relations to the new religious social order: “O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable you of Allah are that (Believer) who has Al-Taqwa (i.e. he is one of Al-Mutaquin (the Pious). Verily, Allah as All-Knowing Well Acquainted (49:13). At the same time, it marked the beginning of the legislative role of the prophet, which made it easier to voluntarily implement the social changes. In addition, social status was determined by faith, loyalty, and cooperation and following the orders, legislations and doctrine of God and his prophet. Finally it marked the beginning of the social classification of the community based on faith. This community was divided to two groups: believers and non-believers.
The Hijra, Mandaville (2001:70-1) argues: “has taken on significance much wider than the specific historical event itself. It has come to symbolise deliverance from oppression and Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), and the institution of a new social paradigm in which ‘the good life’ would accrue from submission to the will of a single divine source”. As Lapidus (quoted by Mandaville, 2001:70-1) puts it: “For Muslims the word has come to mean not only a change of place, but the adoption of Islam and entry into the community of Muslims. The Hijra is the transition from the pagan to the Muslim world – from kinship to a society based on common belief”. In theory, Mandaville (2001: 71) argues that: “the Hijra represented an idiomatic shift with regard to the manner in which community was to be imagined. Social cohesion based purely on clan and kin was seen as a source of constant strife and feuding, whereas a ‘community of believers’ could strive to transcend this base tribalism in the name of a greater unity. In Islam, the core doctrine of Tawhid (unity of and in God) reflects this concern. The Umma, or world community of Muslims, therefore had its initial incarnation in the original group that accompanied Muhammad on the Hijra in 622.”

As Mandaville argues, the importance of the Medina period, (2001:72-3) is that: “Muslims today, and especially those who constitute the diasporic communities, (which will be examined in section three of this thesis), are increasingly returning to the sources of this early period for guidance as to where ‘real’ Islam can be found. Returning to our history, though, there are questions that need to be answered about the politics which emerged from the Medina period. What of the debates which ensued after Muhammad’s death over who was to succeed him as leader of the Muslims? Did these contestations signify the birth or the death of a polit-Islam, community? We could perhaps suggest the following: that with the passing of the Prophet, Islamic political community ceased to exist and Muslim political community – as a space of negotiation – came to take its place. The very fact that today we find competing accounts of the Medinan period – in both Western and Muslim histories – bears testimony to its importance in the Islamic imagination. In this sense, the social construction of Medina in contemporary Islamist discourse can be seen to constitute a vital form of Muslim politics.”

The social construction of Medina revolved around the Constitution of Medina, which was originally a sort of defence pact that united the city’s clans in a pledge to protect Muhammad and his followers; it formed the Umma of Medina. The constitution of Medina consisted of different deeds which were signed by the prophet with both Muslims and non-Muslim inhabitants of Medina and its surroundings, including Jews, Christians and pagans. The freedom of beliefs and
internal autonomy was granted to the non-believers in these different agreements. Asghar Ali (1994: 8) stated that: "this document was a foundational document of this first ever Islamic State - the agreement drawn was not based on revelation. It was a tactful document to shift the centre of power from the tribal unit to the newly created confederation referred as Umma moreover; he allowed various non-believers groups to enforce order within the group by observing their traditional laws". Non-believers were considered allies to the Islamic state at first and later their status developed to a state of confederation with the believer’s community. Non-believers were granted the protection of the believer’s community and freedom of religion on one condition that they don’t form or assist an alliance against the newly formed society of the believers in Medina. In essence, as Montgomery Watt (1956: 241) argues “this composite Umma became a single Umma only after the expulsion of the Jews from Medina”. He draws this conclusion on the basis of the clauses of the constitution of Medina, where it has clearly been laid down that in the beginning the Umma had reference to territory, but gradually the concept of territoriality gave way to that of universality, as the Umma was transformed into a world Umma with the establishment of an Islamic Empire.

Although schisms began to form from the day the Prophet died (and probably even before), but from AD 622 to 661, in the eyes of its adherents, Islam attained near purity. The reign of the first four Caliphs is considered to have been a period of enlightenment, justice and prosperity. It was under these leaders, collectively known as the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, that Islam began its incredibly rapid expansion. It was also under them that the first authoritative edition of the Qur’an was produced and the various sources of social authority were systematised into religious law, the Sharia (Mandaville, 2001).

There are three factors that played an important role in this transformation. First, the expansion of the Islamic empire to include areas with non-Muslim majority, during the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the Dynasties periods, led to the signing of different agreements with non-Muslim communities. These agreements, which became a moral and legal reference point used by jurists from different schools of jurisprudence when discussing interfaith relations from an Islamic perspective, and also the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, were: the Pact of Najran with the Christians of Najran, which reflected a balance of power and alliance between Muslims and Non-Muslims; ‘the Ordinances of Omer’, which stated the religious, political and social obligations of both the Islamic state and Muslims towards its non-Muslims subjects (Masud, 1997);
and the Pact of Granada and the Pact of Jerusalem with the Jews, which dealt with the Muslim minorities relationship with a non-Muslim majority, under non-Islamic authority. Such non-Muslims, both Christians and Jews, were regarded as the People of the Book (those who believe in the God of Abraham) and were considered part of the Umma.

Second, there was the question of succession. The community of the believers in Medina was still very young. Social harmony and social integration between its elements were yet to be formed, which is why the selection of the successor after the Prophet died was influenced, not only by the new emerging class of religious leaders, but also by pre-Islamic factors, such as blood lineage of the prophet, tribal loyalty, as well as by the date at which individuals entered Islam and the length of the period of companionship with the prophet. The nature of the Islamic religion, which interacted with the existing structures of a given society and provided a new moral base that altered the elements that contradicted with this new system and the existing structures, was challenged. This challenge was manifested in the long and bitter debate over the question of succession, known historically as ‘The Saqifah Debate’. Even with the emerging socio-economic transformation in Mecca and Medina, as Ali Asghar (1994: 36) argued: “Bedouin tribes did not undergo any social transformation. In such circumstances it was very difficult for nomination to be accepted. The tribal ethics were reflected by different arguments. Some of Mecca’s tribes nominated Al-Abbas to become the prophet’s successor because he was the prophet’s uncle and senior member of the Qurashite tribe. They supported this nomination by the verse: And those who believed afterwards, and emigrated and strove hard along with you, (in the cause of Allah), they are of you. But kindred by blood are nearer to one another in the decree ordained by Allah. Verily, Allah is all-Knower of everything).” (8, 74) Some Muslims nominated Ali, the prophet’s cousin and his son in law, as his successor. The quote the prophet saying: “He for whom I was the Master, should hence have Ali as his master” (Enayat, 1986: 4).

Those who didn’t agree with both nominations, known as the Sunnis later in the Islamic history, believed that the prophet left the question of leadership to be decided by the community. They argued that the leader had: believe in God and his messenger; be a companion of the prophet, have wisdom and the trust of the people and had to have the consensus (Ijma) of the people especially of the elite, ‘Ahl Alagd wa Al-Hal’ (people who lose and bind). This religious authority was derived from the acquisition and possession of ‘Ilm’, that is Knowledge. The knowledge of the Quran and Sunna gave early Muslims a higher socio-political and religious status than other Muslims. An
early conversion to Islam, immigration to Medina during the early years and involvement in fighting the early battles led to claims of moral excellence and precedence. Good Muslims were the ones who had these characteristics. Political authority was based on the concept of the good Muslim which was clearly manifested in the selection of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and was legitimized by the application of the principle of ‘Baya’ (the oath of allegiance). Subsequently, the Caliphate in effect became hereditary in two successive dynasties, the Umayyad and the Abbasids, whose system and style of government owed rather more to the autocratic empires of antiquity, than to the patriarchal community of Medina. The subject’s duty of obedience remained, and was indeed reinforced; the Caliph’s obligation to meet the requirements of eligibility and fulfil the conditions of incumbency was emptied of most of its content. This historical development had a great influence on the pre-eminent theories of government in Islam, which were formulated between the 11th and 14th centuries, from the treatises of Mawardi (972-1058), to those of Ibn Taiymyya (1263-1328). From the beginning of the dynasties rule to the existing contemporary governments of Islamic countries, the gap between the ideals of Islam (Real Islam) and the practice of Muslim states (Practiced Islam) emerged and reshaped the definition of the Umma.

The emergence of new social realities in the Islamic state, as a result of the expansion of the Islamic territories, made it difficult for a central government to control these new areas. This necessitated a new administration system, both at the centre and on the new peripheries, which was mainly run by non-Muslim administrators and army officers, who had been experienced administrators in the Persian and the Roman Empires. A natural outcome of this new administration system was the establishment of a bureaucratic class. The vast territories and the revenues and wealth that came with the expansion wars, led to the prosperity of the state and the interaction between different cultures, resulting in intellectual prosperity. This intellectual prosperity was reflected in both the translation of the newly occupied territories literatures on government, administration, philosophy and religion, especially those from Persia, the Roman and Byzantine empires, and a fusion between Islamic/Arabic culture and these cultures. Medina is regarded as the birthplace of the Umma and it was from this city that the Arab Muslims carried out their expansion Wars. In doing so, they exchanged information, built an empire, participated in the development of economy and engaged in political activities. This fusion, as Esposito (1988: 12) argues: “changed the Muslims composed Umma, whose original identity and bond were no longer to be tribal ties but a common religious faith and commitment, to include other groups, such as, the Jews and Christians who were identified as a separate community allied to the
Muslim Umma, but with religious and cultural diversity”. As a result of these expansion wars, Islam had less and less to do with a given territory. Instead, it included territories with a majority of non-Muslims inhabitants.

Islamic political thinkers, such as Ibn Taiymyya (1263-1328) and AL-Gazali (1058-1111), defined the Umma as the basic collective religio-political unit. They did have a definition of the state qua state, rather their theories was rooted in the idea of the caliph/Imam, that is the leadership of the community of true believers, the criteria for the selection of the Caliph and the justification of the existing dynasties rule. The concept of the state was not well-delineated until Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), who was influenced by the philosophy of Aristotle, in his famous book “Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun”, articulated his idea of the state in the 14th century. He did not conceive of the idea of “state” in the sense that it was devised by the Romans and later reframed in Europe. Rather, Ibn Khaldun set forth the notion of the Umma as a distinctive Muslim polity. In this context, it must be recalled that the Umma extended to wherever there were Muslims and whatever the prevailing conditions and ideology. Within these terms, the Muslim perception of the state began with the definition of a just state: it was one in which true religion prevailed. Therefore, as Islam was the only true religion, it followed that only an Islamic state was just. The emphasis on the notion of imama (more central to Shia than to Sunni thought) and the Umma, reinforced by the morally delineated role of government in Islamic society, was the hallmark distinction between Islamic political thought and that of the Christian successors of the Roman Empire, who never divorced themselves from the Roman idea of a territorially-defined organization of power (Ibn Khaldun, 2004). Muslims, until modern times, identified themselves primarily as members of the Islamic Umma, locally and generally, wherever it existed. Until the advent of 19th and 20th Century nationalism, together with various degrees of secularism in the Muslim world, the idea of an Islamic state in the Western sense remained largely un-crystallized in Muslim thought.

The term Global Islam means that Islam has less and less to do with its original territory i.e. the Arab land. This was clearly reflected in the fact that most of the world’s Muslims in Islamic history and today are not Arabs. Since the end of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs period, the world has changed, new dynasties and new empires had emerged, many wars broke out and revolutions occurred. Colonization and imperialism by great powers from Europe to Islamic nations has dramatically changed the history and map of the Islamic world. The response to this
colonization and imperialism was to revolt and fight against the enemy and this has echoed around most of Muslim countries. Most of the Middle East and Muslim countries were involved in two World Wars, therefore, many Islamic thinkers learned a hard lesson, for that the revival of Islam was necessary to avoid such wars and to ensure Islamic countries didn’t again fall under colonial rule.

During the colonial period the Umma was evoked to face the changes/challenges posed by modernity. The provision of modern, secular, education, political and economic systems was inevitable and contemporary Muslim society faced challenges either to accept or reject these developments. In Islamic societies, especially those of the Middle East, the moves towards modernity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century’s were particularly disquieting, as the processes of urbanization, industrialization and legislative reforms collided with Islamic norms, in the colonial and postcolonial contexts. As a result, Islamism emerged and was represented by different movements, such as Islamic nationalism, radical Islamist, Modernists, reformists, Salafis and traditionalists, and the conflict within the Umma reached its peak (the position of the Traditionalists, Modernists and Islamists schools of thought on the question of the Umma and minorities will be discussed in the following chapter).

Few social scientists argued that Islamic revivalism was a direct challenge to Western ideology and culture, and its capitalist economy. There is no doubt that Islam plays an important role in the local cultures and lifestyle of Muslims. It is also mobilized as an anti-Western, political ideology that challenges the cultural foundations of a Western-dominated global system. However, it is important, Esposito (1992: 4) argues, that: “the vacuum created by the end of the Cold War not be filled by exaggerated fears of Islam as a resurgent ‘evil empire’ at war with the ‘New World Order’ and a challenge to global stability”.

The crucial questions here are: how do we define the Umma in the existing political system? And Does the Umma manifest itself in a political communitarianism (Islamic State) or cosmopolitanism (The Umma). Many scholars and jurists argue for both. So, Dr. Goma. Ali (2013: 3), the Grand Mufti of Egypt, argues that “the Umma can be divided into two categories. The first category is the Umma of calling which encompasses humanity at large and the second category is the Umma of response to this divine call and it includes those who believed Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and embraced his message and his methodology of life. Therefore this wider understanding of the word “Umma” encompasses humanity at large and engulfs both
Muslims and non Muslims under the Umma of calling. This bigger Umma is addressed in the Quran by “O people..” and when it comes to theological issues that has to do with Islam per se, we find the Quran addressing the second category of Umma by saying, “O Those who believe...”. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was sent for the bigger Umma to encompass all people in their entirety. God says, “And we have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds.” (21:107).

Such divisions embrace the universality of Islam, but emphasise the community of believers. As such, the Umma is the community of believers who shared communal consciousness of belonging to a community/humanity whose membership was open to all, no qualification was required or restriction imposed. At the same time, it became a means of creating, acknowledging, and establishing a religious and cultural identity that belonged to the believers and was independent of the Islamic state. It was a form of a global Umma, without the political sovereignty of an Islamic state.

This global Umma is thus a highly elusive community established on a voluntary basis, rather than by virtue of an existing political territory. It relies on individual belief system and faith solidarity. The existence of Muslims around the globe has blurred the connection between a religion, a specific society and a territory. One-third of the world's Muslims now live as members of a minority. At the heart of this development is, on the one hand, the voluntary settlement of Muslims in Western societies and, on the other, the pervasiveness and influence of Western cultural models and social norms. Muslims in this global Umma tend to reconstruct what it means to be a good Muslim in both a Muslim and a non-Muslim society. To Roy (2004: 175-76): “A Muslim is somebody who says he or she is a Muslim and not somebody who is a Muslim by origin”. The strength and source of unity of the transnational Umma today lies in: “the belief that Muslims must take their religion and its texts in their hands and no longer relies on traditional interpretations that have little bearing on their contemporary lives” (Echchaibi 2011, 40). In this vein, Muslim televangelist Amr Khaled: “asked his viewers to write down personal goals and develop a plan to fulfil them” (Echchaibi 2011: 38).

Roy (2004) considers globalized Islam to be a result of the complex interrelationship between globalization, Westernization and the increasing phenomena of Muslims living as minorities in Europe and USA. He argues that the experiences of these minorities must be explored in a context where existing norms of religious expressions and guidance have lost their authority,
which had led to significant changes in the way Muslims engage their faith. He further contends that an Islamic revival, or "re-Islamation," results from the efforts of Westernized Muslims to assert their identity in a non-Muslim context.

Islamist Jurists and scholars began to invest Islam's growing presence in the West with divine significance. Among other things, some began to interpret the Muslim migration to Europe (and to a lesser, but still significant extent, to North America) as a modern ‘Hijra’, or migration, that was ordained by Allah in order, as Ismail R. Faruqi (1986:19) argues, “to plant Islam in this part of the world”, through Dawa. What is more, many of the scholar-activists realized that Europe’s free and open democracies provided a more fertile environment for Dawa than their former homelands. European law guarantees a greater degree of freedom of conscience, expression and religion for Islamists than many Muslim states, and these freedoms quickly became understood as preconditions for successful Dawa work. Yet, just as the Muslim minorities in Europe opened up new opportunities for Dawa, it also presented a range of new intellectual and juristic challenges for Islamic jurisprudence to address the needs of this Muslim diaspora (the next chapter addresses the question of Islamic diaspora in the Islamic theology).
Chapter Three
The position of the Islamic theology on the Residency of Muslims in non-Islamic states

Islamic Jurists from the early days of Islam argued that submission, loyalty and belonging to non-Muslim authorities had to be avoided because of the dual characteristics of the Islamic religion, as both a set of orders and religious beliefs that its followers should adopt and a political entity. Prophet Mohamed can’t be viewed only as a prophet and a messenger of God. He was also a statesman and a strategist, which emphasised the idea that religion and the state are inseparable. Islam as a religion provides its followers with a road to salvation and to the social, economic and political conditions necessary to achieve such a salvation. These conditions were understood in the light of a defined ethical and moral doctrine. Thus, Islam was not part of a Muslim’s private domain, but it was rather the essence of the Muslim community and, hence, the Islamic Umma. The political identity of Muslims was defined by their faith and their loyalty to their fellow Muslims and this represented a keystone in the foundation of the community of believers, 'The Umma'. Thus, the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic countries is problematic and was discussed by different Islamic Jurists. The position of these different schools will be discussed in detail in the following section.

It is important to deal at the outset with the particular choice of terminology here. In the context of this thesis, the use of the two terms traditionalists and modernists doesn’t imply a temporal perspective, but, rather, refers to the philosophical and ethical positions held by the two schools of thought. The term traditional is used following the Arabic term ‘Taqlidi’, which means dominant, conventional and established, while the term modern refers to the Islamic jurisprudence that was derived from the history, traditions, culture and changes in Islamic society through time. The term Islamism is used to define an emerging modern political Islamic thought, represented by the work of Al-Mawdudi, Al-Bana and Sayed Qutb, that emerged as a discourse out of the failure of nationalist secular elite governments in predominantly Muslim countries. Although Islamism are classified in this thesis under the conservative traditional school but, in the case of the Islamism school, the essential dichotomy between what is traditional and what is Modern does not exist. Talal Asad (1996: 4-5), when analysing the terminology used to describe the movements in Iran and Egypt describes this: “as only partly modern and suggest that it is their mixing of tradition and modernity that account for their ‘pathological’ character. This kind of description paints Islamic
movements as being somehow in authentically traditional on the assumption that ‘real tradition’ is unchanging, repetitive, and non-rational. In this way, these movements cannot be understood on their own terms as being at once modern and traditional, both authentic and creative at the same time”.

The Salafi, also known as the Salafists movement, is a movement named by its proponents in reference to the word Salafi, which means what pertains to the Muslim forefathers who practiced the pure Islam. According to the ideologues of Salafi Islam, religious practices should be based only on the Qur’an and the prophet tradition, not on any ‘fiqhi’ (Jurist), or school of jurisprudence. The concept of Tawhid is central in the Salafi ideology. Salafis argue that Muslims must strictly follow the Qur’an and hold fast to the purity of the Prophet Muhammad’s model. The latter source of religious guidance plays a particularly central role in the Salafi creed. As the Muslim exemplar, he embodied the perfection of Tawhid in action and must be emulated in every detail. Salafis also follow the guidance of the Prophet’s companions (the Salaf), because they learned about Islam directly from the messenger of God. The Salafi approach rejects all subsequent Islamic cultural practices, reinterpretation, extrapolation, and innovations that developed since the time of the Prophet. Illustrative of this opposition are the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the roots of the Salafi/Wahhabi movement, (members call themselves Muwahhidun); and the different subdivisions of the Salafi, such as the Jihadist and the Purists. The Salafi movement in general has a strict interpretation of Islam. While they believe in the rules and guidance found in the Quran, and that the imitation of the behaviour of the Prophet and his closest companions should be the basis for the social order, they do not assign death sentences to all those who do not accept their beliefs.

Islamism differs from traditionalist and Salafi in their attempt to articulate a modernity that is not structured around Euro-centrism. What Bobby Sayyid (2004:103) in his book *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*, argues “to take seriously the Islamists’ claims to being a movement dedicated to a denial of the West, but not to read in this rejection of the West an attempt to re-establish ‘traditional’ agrarian societies. To do this means renegotiating the identity of modernity as well as that of the West”. Their aim is to construct an Islamic modernity, one which retains modern features, but which elaborates them without reference to, or incorporation of, Western political theory; thus, modernity divorced from the West. They consider
Islam as a higher level of Modernity and call for a global Islamic revival against European Imperialism. As Mandaville (2001: 74) puts it: “The rise of European imperialism had a profound effect on many Muslim minds, and proved to be the catalyst for several generations of thinkers whose primary occupation was the removal of the unbelievers from Muslim lands. This could only be accomplished, they believed, through a concerted effort towards Pan-Islamic unity and a ‘reawakening’ of the Muslim conscience. Hence, an intellectual agenda was to be combined with a program of organized political activism”. Two of the major anti-colonial reformist discourses are Gamal al-Din Al-Afghani’s Pan-Islamism (1838–97), and Muhammad Abdu’s (1849–1905) Revival of the Umma.

Islamists, such as Sayed Qutb, Hassan Al-Bana and Al-Mawdudi, argue that the Quran and the Prophet’s tradition are the only sources of legislation in Islamic theology; so, the door is not open for new interpretation. They encouraged the principle of ‘Ijtihad’ (independent reasoning), and assert instead that all Muslims are vested with the capacity to practice Ijtihad. Al-Mawdudi (1992: 7) denied the Ulama “any exclusive jurisdiction over religious matters: Nobody can...claim in Islam to enjoy spiritual monopoly, and the ‘Mulla’ or ‘Alim’ is not a titular head claiming any inherent and exclusive rights of interpreting religious laws and doctrines. On the contrary, just as anybody may become a judge or a lawyer or a doctor by properly qualifying for these professions, similarly whosoever devotes his time and energy to the study of the Qur’an and the Sunna and becomes well-versed in Islamic learning is entitled to speak as an expert in matters pertaining to Islam”. They considered only legitimate government is the Islamic government and the only identity/citizenship is an Islamic identity. The political-religious aim of Muslims is the establishment, if necessary by extreme means, of a society which reflects the values derived, as purely as possible, from the original sources of Islam.

In contrast, the Modernists in their attempt to challenge the lack of a set of guiding principle for Muslims in minority situations, argue that the sources of legislation must be extended to include, beside the Quran and the Prophet’s tradition, other sources, such as Al-Qaradawi’s (2001) ‘existing conditions and realities of the world’ and Ramadan’s (2001) ‘Public Interest’ and (2003) ‘state of the world’. Al-Qaradawi permits the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic countries on the condition that Muslims in these societies must work to establish autonomous Islamic societies within their host communities, which protect their interests and identity and the interests of the Islamic Umma/state, and reflect Islam’s wholesomeness: “Were we to convince Western leaders
and decision-makers of our right to live according to our faith, ideologically, legislatively and
ethnically without imposing our views or inflicting harm upon them, we would have traversed an
immense barrier in our quest for an Islamic state.” (Brown, 2005: 10)

On the other hand, Ramadan’s state of the world theory is based on the argument that the Islamic
Laws and the relationship between Muslim’s minorities in the West and their host communities
must be thought and redefined in terms that make sense to modern, liberal democratic and secular
Western host societies.

3.1. The Traditionalists School

Traditional religious scholars argue that Islamic law in general disapproves of Muslim settlement
under non-Muslim rule. In classical literature, even temporary residency outside of what they call
Dar Al-Islam, or the abode of Islam, was described as not permissible according to Islamic law.
They encourage Muslims to reject Western values and standards, isolating themselves from
Western society and, often, showing intolerance towards other groups in society. They also
courage these Muslims to develop parallel structures in society, i.e. Muslims in the West should
turn their backs on the non-Islamic government and, instead, set up their own autonomous power
structures, based on a specific interpretation of the Sharia. Thus, they prohibit the residency of
Muslims in non-Islamic countries, so that the re-Islamization of the existing Muslim minorities in
the West is a religious duty. These minorities are seen as 'oppressed brothers', who should be
liberated from the evils of Western societies for a number of reasons:

First, Muslims must not be subject to non-Muslim Laws because the key principle of Islam is the
superiority of the divine Islamic system over any earthly system, based on the verse: “O you who
believe! Take not my enemies and your enemies as friends, showing affection towards them, while
they have disbelieved in what has come to you of the truth and have driven out the messenger and
yourselves (from your home land) because you believe in Allah your Lord! If you have come Forth
to strive in my cause and to seek my good pleasure, (then take no these disbelievers and polytheists
as your friend). You show friendship to them in secret, while I am all aware of what conceal and
what you reveal. And whose ever of you Muslims does that, and then indeed he has gone far astray
from the straight path” (60: 1).
Second, Islam and Muslims must not be put in a position where they are inferior to non-Muslims. Some of these jurists explain inferiority in terms of the subjugation to non-Islamic laws, and the inability to practice their religious duties freely. Third, Muslims must avoid aiding or increasing the strength of non-Muslims, especially during wartime, because it is the greatest sin of Allah to another Muslim: “It is not for a believer to kill a believer except that it be by mistake; and whoever killed a believer by Mistake (compensation is due)....And whoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is hell to abide therein; and the wrath and the curse of Allah are upon him, and a great punishment is prepared for him (4: 92). Al-Qaeda used this verse to justify declaring some Islamic countries governments, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, as infidels, for hosting American troops and providing them with assistance. Not only that, but some Jurists questioned the position of American Muslim soldiers who are fighting with the allies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, Muslims are forbidden from forming bonds of friendship or solidarity with non-Muslims. They are required to avoid environments characterised by sin or indecency, because in a non-Muslim environment it will be more difficult to prevent sin or the loss of religiosity among subsequent generations (March, 2007: 240). They believe that the Quran clearly prohibited the residency of Muslims in non-Muslim territory in two verses:

“Verily, as for those whom the angles take in death while they are wrongdoing themselves (as they stayed among the disbelievers even though emigration was obligatory for them), they say (Angles) to (Them) in what condition where you? They reply we were weak and oppressed on the earth, they (Angles) say: was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to emigrate therein? Such men will find their abode in Hell what an evil destination, except the weak ones among men, women and children who cannot device a plan, nor are able to direct their way. These are they whom Allah is likely to forgive them and Allah is ever oft-pardoning, oft-forgiving. He, who emigrates from his home in the cause of Allah, will find on earth many dwelling places and plenty to live by. And whoever leaves his home as an emigrant to Allah and his messenger and death overtakes him, his reward is then surely incumbent upon Allah. And Allah is ever Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful”. (4: 97-100)

“Verily, those who believed, and emigrated and strove hard and fought With their property and with their life in the cause of Allah as well as those who give them asylum and help, these are all
allies to one another. And as to those who believed but did not emigrate, you owe no duty of protection to them until they emigrate, but if they seek your help in religion it is your duty to help them except against a people with whom you have treaty of mutual alliance; and Allah is all seer of what you do”. (8: 72)

From the perspective of the traditionalists, any alliance between Muslims and their host communities will undermine Muslims because of the values and ethics involved in citizenship of non-Muslim nations. They argue that Muslims who become citizens of non-Muslim states will be obliged, at some point, to fight or ally with their state of citizenship against the interest of the Umma in its widest form. They support their point of view with reference, not only to the Quran, but also to the Prophet Sayings, “Hadith”, and the historical events that shaped the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, such as Crusades in the past, and contemporary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These events make it vital to distinguish between the abode of War and the abode of peace, a distinction which is crucial to the interests of the Umma. Here, the Abode of peace is a territory in which Islam is worshipped, and which is governed by Islamic laws.

In their argument against the residency and citizenship of Muslims in non-Muslim states, traditionalists particularly prescribe citizenship duty in relation to military service. They argue that the participation of Muslims in the armies of these states makes Muslims commit the great sin of killing another believer and participating in strengthening the welfare of a non-Muslim state, which contradicts the essence of the believer’s society and the Islamic brotherhood. Here, Marsh (2007: 241) argues that: “All Islamic legal scholars from the earliest times of Islam to the present have agreed that serving in a non-Muslim’s armies against Muslims Forces is apostasy and, thus potentially punishable by death”.

The Islamism school of thought, which emerged as a result of the failure of the post-colonial government in Islamic countries to achieve socio-economic development, and the alienation of the traditional Islamic elements within the society from the decision making process, together with the changing international environment and the wars with Israel, led to a growth in the popularity of Islamic ideas among the educated middle class. The emergence of Hassan Al-Bana’s Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and the establishment of Jamat Islamiya in Pakistan, by Al-Mawdudi, was an outcome of this failure. Islam became the specific language of political (re)articulation for these movements. Both movements believe in the use of violent and non-violent
strategies to change the existing political structure within Islamic countries, as a step towards achieving the ultimate goal of the establishment of the Umma. (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri, 2007: 4-5).

For Al-Mawdudi, it is a system in which Muslims would be able to choose their leaders, with the guidance of the Quran and the Prophet’s teaching, and involves a government which derives its legitimacy from God’s words, by applying the system of Islam. The idea of the separation between religion and the state is not acceptable, because religion cannot be only a part of a person’s private life, but should be an integral part of his whole life. As such, any reinterpretation of the Quran to make it applicable to modern political systems is not permitted because the door for the reinterpretation of the Quran was closed by the death of the prophet who was guided by divine wisdom. Living under any form of government that doesn’t derive its authority from the divine rules of God is a sin, not permitted and represents an open challenge to Islam. In such circumstances, Muslims have to fight to change the laws in a non-Muslim state because any rule other than the Islamic rule is satanic and must be changed. Al-Mawdudi (1974) also expanded his argument to include those Islamic states which are governed by non-Islamic laws and constitutions.

For Al-Mawdudi (1960: 35), the existence of an Islamic state was absolutely necessary for the achievement of social justice and the selection of the leader, the Caliph, is the responsibility of the whole Umma. Because God promises authority to the entire community of believers in the Qur’an, then every member of the Umma is therefore implicated in the caliphate: “Every believer is a Caliph of God in his individual capacity. By virtue of this position he is individually responsible to God. The Holy Prophet has said: every one of you is a ruler and everyone is answerable for his subjects. Thus one Caliph is in no way inferior to another”. His theory, Mandaville (2001:79) argues: “amounts to a popularisation of the caliphate, an attempt to remove its elitist connotations and to place it firmly in the hands of the people. Rather than emphasising the political community’s subordination to the caliph (or head of state), he instead emphasised the caliph’s subordination: first to God, and then to those co-caliphs (i.e. ‘the people’) who have placed their trust in him. Mawdudi coined the term ‘Theo-democracy’ to describe this model”.

Other Islamists, such as Sayed Qutb, have different views regarding modernization. He developed the concept of the state of ‘Jahyliyya’ (ignorance of Islam), a term used to described pre-Islamic conditions. It is important to distinguish between the Qur’anic term of Jahyliyya and the modern
usage of the term. Jahyliyya is a term taken directly from the Qur’an and, in its original Qur’anic usage; Jahyliyya meant simple ignorance of a divine truth that had not yet been revealed by the Prophet. In modern terminology, Jahyliyya describes a society that has willfully rejected a truth that has already been revealed to the world (Euben, 1997: 443). Göle, (2000: 97) argues that in transferring the concept of Jahyliyya: “which originally meant the pre-Islamic period, to contemporary Muslim societies, Mawdudi and Sayed Qutb posited a historical break, made legitimate by the religious idiom. The obliteration of centuries of historical Islamic experience frees the contemporary Islamic actors from historical chains of continuity, enabling them to imagine the blueprint of an alternative society”. For Qutb, few Muslim societies, and certainly not the contemporary Muslim Umma, have fallen into the trap of modernity, globalization and the influence of the Western culture and ideology. He argues that the modern Jahyliyya is associated with Modernization, Westernization, Americanization and Globalization. Qutb was referring to the modern Jahyliyya of the government and the Islamic society in which the society and the government become linked to modernity. Qutb suggests that it is of necessary for all true Muslims to disobey this modern Jahyliyya government and to fight and destroy them by whatever means necessary in order to restore Islamic Sharia law. (Cleveland, 2000: 432).

As such, Islamists argue that, in a sense, all Muslims are part of a diaspora whose ‘home’ is the Umma of the Prophet’s Medina. This was clearly reflected in Al-Bana’s organization of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood. They argue that propagating Islam is the primary reason why the original Muslim Umma was created; the principle of Dawa. This principle involves an obligation to enlarge the Umma. They quote the verse (1: 143): “Thus, have we made of you an Umma justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the nations and the Messenger a witness over yourselves.”

Islamists permitted temporary residence outside of Dar Al-Islam, as long as they are still able to live according to their religious laws, or for those who did not possess the means to emigrate back to Muslim-ruled lands. They justify settlement in the West only insofar as it serves the larger purpose of Dawa. They accepted the existence of Muslim communities in Europe and developed methods by which they could flourish and expand. Khurram Murad (1986: 5), a student of Mawdudi, in his book Dawa among Non-Muslims in the West, argues that the residency of Muslim in non-Islamic lands: “should be conducted for two primary reasons. First, the spreading of Islam within non-Muslim lands, which is a religious obligation for all Muslims and the primary duty of
the Umma. Second, it was vitally necessary as it was the only way to ensure that the Muslims who had settled in the West would retain their Islamic identity and not be absorbed into the West’s non-Islamic, secular culture”. Murad (1986) recommended two approaches for preserving and expanding Islam’s presence within Western societies. The first approach focuses on the principle of Dawa and religious education (Tarbiya), within existing Muslim communities. This aims at creating culturally autonomous “Muslim islands”, or enclaves, in which Muslims should gain control over their neighbourhood and community institutions, while remaining, at the same time, open to non-Muslims. In many cases, this activity included attempts to re-Islamize European Muslims, according to a specific understanding of ‘real’ Islam. The second approach suggested that Muslims should also openly and proactively engage in Dawa. For Murad, Dawa involves not only discussions and words, but also witnessing for Islam by personal example, what he calls: “Dawa by deeds as the most powerful resource needed on the path to Dawa” (1986: 16). Murad’s ideology rejected violence and believed that Dawa was the only suitable means by which to spread Islam and transform it from a culturally alien religion into a religion that could become part of the European society. Using a pragmatic approach, he encouraged the establishment of a home-base movement and organizations which take into account different conditions and structures in different countries, to perform the Dawa.

For a segment of the second generation Muslim minorities in the West, Islamism is an attractive concept that speaks to their confusion and frustration about their inability to integrate/adapt to their host societies. Young Muslims are largely dissatisfied with the Islam of their parents. The generational divide, as we will see in Section Three of this thesis, is hence one of the defining features of the Muslim diaspora today. The identities of the current generation of young Muslims in the diaspora are undergoing some major changes. They are aware that the Islam of their parents was learned in a different socio-cultural setting and in a different era. The first, older, generation studied in this thesis received both direct and indirect socialisation into their religion at home, school and in the wider Muslim majority societies in their homelands. Furthermore, Islam was, for them, part of a wider life-world which provided a continuing infrastructure for the reproduction of religion and belief. This system, however, does not exist in the diaspora. Such a situation means that there are two groups of young Muslims in the diaspora. First, some young Muslims, as Scantlebury (1995: 430) argues: “turn away from their religion, regarding it as an unwanted vestige which serves no purpose in diaspora other than to mark them out as different. These people often go the secular route, voiding Islam from their lives and doing their very best to integrate into their
new cultural environments; in other words, becoming as British or German or American as possible”. For this group, issues concerning race and ethnicity sometimes become the new obstacles. So, Islam is usually only an issue here when it is projected on to them by virtue of their ‘Muslim background’. In contrast, other young Muslims, choose to reaffirm their Islam. By doing so, they remain in the diaspora, but the object of their migrant desire - the place to which they seek to return – changes. Pakistan or Morocco ceases to be an imaginary homeland and, instead, that role falls to Islam. As Scantlebury (1995:340) notes: “a significant number of young Muslims are rejecting a religio-ethnic identity in favour of a search for True Islam”. This also often involves questioning their parents’ lifestyles and Islamic credentials. Much of what the older generation sees as Islam is dismissed by the younger generation as tainted, as mere ‘cultural’ practice or as what they described as ‘Practiced Islam’. The definition of the two terms ‘Practiced Islam’ and ‘True Islam’ will be discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis.

Ataullah Siddiqui (quoted in Mandaville, 2001: 119) argues that: “Al- Mawdudi thought is now often little more than a ‘starting point’ for young, educated, highly literate Muslims. ‘Mawdudi gives important confidence to young Muslims’, he says, ‘and they can then go on to find something else’. Al-Mawdudi’s concept of Ijtihaad, which refers to the exercise of independent judgment in determining one’s opinion is regarded by young Muslims as an effective ideology that encourages free thinking and often figures heavily in situations, such as those faced by diasporic Muslims, where the classical sources provide little guidance in determining a correct course of action. For diasporic Muslims, ‘the West’ is simply part of life; the infrastructure of their daily existence. As Mandaville (2001: 120) argues, this does not mean: “however, that they simply ‘accept’ the West or conform to its requirements; young Muslims are far from uncritical in this regard. Rather, there seems to have occurred a shift in the way they view the West. One interviewee told me that the West is now regarded less as an intrusion and more as a challenge. ‘Muslims want to make sense of their own tradition in light of this challenge’, he explained. Today’s diasporic Muslims understand the foundations of modern political theory and practice. Recent arrivals in diaspora, many of whom are political exiles, find that being in the West affords them a better perspective from which to view the predicament of the modern Muslim movement”.

The Modernists criticized the Islamists on the ground that they don’t acknowledge that migration is an important break, which can lead to changes in the significance of Islam and the experience of being a Muslim. In Islamic countries, Islam was an intrinsic aspect of that life world, one which
was taken for granted. In diaspora, however, Islam becomes yet another stigma of foreignness; a sign of the other. This causes the Muslim to objectify his or her religion and to engage in a self-examination or critique of Islam and its meanings. Modernists argue that a new socio-cultural environment often means new challenges to Muslims, who will need a new Islam that will bring new significance to their lives. Much of this is related to the transition from majority to minority status, the act of moving from an environment in which Islam is an integral component of the cultural landscape, to one in which the wider resonance of its language finds no echo. For modernists, there is a heightened awareness of Islam, as what was once taken for granted is now challenged by the existence of non-Muslim lands. This is a situation which, according to Modernists, requires the construction of new forms of religious orders, expressions and rules that helps those Muslims to find expressions of Islam which resonate in the new socio-cultural environments in which they live, making Muslim life applicable to diasporic life.

3.2. The Modernist School

The concept of modernization in the philosophy of this school is controversial. Radical jurists from this school do not consider it as involving an imitation of the West, but, rather, as an evolution of the tradition and culture of the Islamic society, derived from its history. They differentiate between modernity and the ideology of modernism, which tends to impose Westernization. Contemporary Jurists, such as Tariq Ramadan (1999), concerned with the increasing number of Muslims in the West, consider modernity in terms of understanding the needs of a community based on the principles of Islam, while, at the same time, adapted to the European environment.

These jurists argue that modernity is based on individualism and acknowledges the reality of the pluralism of civilizations, religions and cultures. They encourage Muslim individuals to adopt Islamic principles, values and morals as their guide to develop their personality, as well as their social network. A believer should work hard against corruption, both in the private and the public domains, and work hard for social change, to create a virtuous Islamic society, and not an Islamic state. Applying Islamic laws is not a requirement for classifying a country as an abode of Islam, rather that occurs in a state where Muslims can safely practice their religion, regardless of the laws and constitution that govern it. They argue that some Islamic countries could be classified under the abode of War, given they oppress some Muslims because of theological differences.
Modernists encourage Muslim migration from subordination and aggression, even if it is from a country that is considered an Islamic state; seeing it as a religious duty. It’s preferable to move to Islamic territories, if possible, but they allow residency in non-Islamic territories, referring to the first migration in the Islamic history, when the prophet ordered some of his followers, who were not protected by the tribal system in Medina, to seek asylum and protection from the Christian king, Axumite Negus, of Ethiopia. This incident becomes a legislative reference for these jurists to permit immigration to non-Islamic countries, on the condition that Muslims are unable to live peacefully and with dignity in Islamic countries.

They refer to the argument by Abu Jafar Al-Tabri (quoted in Mansouri, 2007), a prominent Islamic Jurist, who contends that Muslims are obliged to emigrate if it is necessary to practice their religion, or allows a better life that ensures their dignity and respect. It is preferable that they move to other Muslim lands, in order to avoid the negative consequences of living in non-Muslims states identified by the traditional schools. However, if they don’t have access to other Muslim lands, then they are permitted to reside in a non-Muslim state, provided that a number of conditions are met. First, their residency and activity in this state should not endanger the security of Muslims or Muslim states. Second, they can maintain their religion and are not afraid of seduction away from it. Third, they can help non-Muslims to join Islam, which is a holy duty for Muslims. And, finally, they can practice and manifest their religion freely.

This argument expanded the definition of the land of Islam to include any land in which Muslims are freely able to practice their religion, even if it is governed by non-Islamic laws. This is because Islam is a universal religion and the entire earth belongs to God, so Muslim communities, no matter where they live, are considered part of the Islamic nation and have obligations to both their nation and their host community. If a conflict of interests occurred, such as in the case of the American Muslim soldiers who are fighting in Islamic countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, their loyalty, obligation and duty both physically and spiritually must be to their Islamic Nation, because Islam is their ethnicity and identity. They consider this situation as the real challenge that faces Muslims in non-Islamic states, together with keeping their religious identity within the ideological and socio-cultural identity of their host community.

Zain Al-Abdin Ali, the founder of the Institute for Muslim Minorities Affairs in Saudi Arabia, argues that, to protect Islamic culture within these Muslim communities and help them to integrate
in their host communities, Islam has to become the new ethnicity that will overcome ethnic, language, culture and country of origin diversity: “Muslims must squarely confront the reality of the modern secular, multinational state while maintaining the unquestioned primacy of allegiance to Islam. This is a first step towards establishing a unified Muslim community Muslims are encouraged to adopt the proper attitude to live in the new social reality of their host country and determine the nature and extent of their commitment to participate in it” (Esposito, 1999: 610-613). They also need to identify the ideological constraints that impede their full participation in the economic and social spheres of the host community and realize that they will face the challenge of showing commitment to the higher cause of Islam, while accepting their differences with the host community. They must continuously work to establish a peaceful relationship and friendly atmosphere with the host community, in order to show the true spirit of Islam, which provides a solution to the problems of humanity, and to be able to practice their holy duty, which is the call for Islam. This new perspective on Islamic minorities in Islamic Jurisprudence was a response to the increasing number of Muslim’s minorities in the West. It takes into consideration the particularity and complexity of the place, time and circumstances in which these communities live.

This new perspective is considered part of a moderate Islamic Jurisprudence that is based on the balance between the text of Islamic law and regulations and the universal spirit of Islam that acknowledges differences and respects diversity. Dr. Yousif Al-Qaradawi, the founder of this school, argues that this new jurisprudence must be based on the following principles. First, an understanding that the needs of Muslims in the existing international system must be driven by the rich traditions of Islamic jurisprudence, choosing the best way to fit into their contemporary situation without violating the principals of the Islamic law. Second, it must be based on the main sources of jurisprudence, ‘fiqh’, the Quran and the prophet tradition, and take into consideration the rules of jurisprudence established by the great jurists. Third, jurists must consider the existing reality which implies an objective scientific study of the questions that face these minorities and a consideration of their collective, rather than their individual, interests. (Al-Qaradawi, 2001: 46)

Jurists from this new perspective, such as Dr. Al-Qaradawi, Dr. Wahba Al-Zuhayli, Professor in Damascus University, and Imam Al-shazli Al-Nifir, from Tunisia (Al-Qaradawi, 2001), permits it on the condition that Muslims have the ability to practice their faith freely and without interference. Al-Qaradawi (1992: 1980) considers that Muslim settlement in the West isn’t simply permissible. Rather, he argues, it is: “a religious necessity and an obligation for the worldwide
Islamic revival movement. The Muslim presence in the West is necessary because it enables the conduct of Dawa”. In Qaradawi’s view, this serves multiple purposes that include proselytizing to Europeans, creating Islamic enclaves and an Islamic environment for Muslim immigrants and European converts and influencing the social and political climate towards Islam and the Muslim Umma within Western societies. Moreover, he (Ibid.: 249), claims that “persuading the West of the necessity of the emergence of Islam as a guiding and leading force” will eventually mean that Western governments will bring pressure to bear on Muslim rulers to adopt more lenient policies toward the Islamic Movement in their own countries. In Qaradawi’s eyes, this wills “certainly be a great benefit” for the global Islamic movement. He divides the world into three categories: Dar al-Harb; Dar al-Islam; and Dar al-Ahd, or a land of truce. Most European countries (except Serbia) are defined by Qaradawi today as Dar al-Ahd, due to their diplomatic and other connections with Muslim countries. This means, among other things, that Muslims have to respect European laws, as long as they do not conflict with the fundamental principles of Islamic laws. Qaradawi describes his particular teaching on Islamic revival and reform as ‘Wasatiyya’.

Some jurists from this school permit Muslims to live in, and become citizens of, a non-Islamic state, if it is absolutely necessary. Imam Ahmed Al-Khalili (Muhammad, 2008: 4-5), the grand jurist, ‘Mufti’, of the Sultanate of Oman, outlined three conditions that define this necessity: first, the inability to live in any Islamic country; second, it should be considered a transitional period and the Muslim should work hard to move to an Islamic land; and, third, a Muslim should choose a country where he can practice his religion freely. Others divide Muslims living in non-Islamic countries into three categories. The first category includes Muslims who are originally from a country and were converted to Islam. They are permitted to live in this country, if they work hard to spread the words of God and would be able to emigrate if an Islamic state was established or needed their help against aggression. The second category includes Muslims who moved to a non-Islamic country without the necessary reasons mentioned previously, but because they preferred to live in it; their residency is not permitted. Such Muslims will be considered Infidels. The third category includes Muslims who moved because of their inability to survive if they stayed in their Islamic countries; they are permitted to acquire the citizenship of non-Islamic countries, if this is the only way to live safely, but if they can live safely without becoming citizens, then they are not permitted to become citizens. It also argued that, if they become citizens, it will help them to spread the word of Islam and participate in the welfare of Muslims and the establishment of the Islamic state (Muhammad, 2008: 4-5).
Al-Qaradawi (2008), in his attempt to address the differences within this perspective, argues that the virtue of Islamic law is that it is realistic and takes into consideration the requirements and demands of the human being, whether spiritual or material, religious or political, cultural or economic, and regardless of whether this person lived within, or outside, a Muslim society or a Muslim country. Muslims in any given country have to be active members in their societies, so that they can defend their rights. To allow Muslims to become active members in their host communities, Al-Qaradawi established the new school of the Jurisprudence of Minorities (fiqh al-Aqalliyyat).

This new jurisprudence encourages the use of Ijtihaad according to classical principles, such as ‘Maslaha’ (common interest) and ‘Darura’ (necessity or hardship). This, in turn, makes possible legal reasoning that supports greater leniency in interpreting the Sharia for Muslims in non-Muslim lands, compared with what is required of their co-religionists in Muslim lands. Among other things, fiqh al-Aqalliyyat tries to resolve conflicts that inevitably arise between, on the one hand, Islamic law and culture, and on the other, the laws and cultures of Muslims’ Western host countries. It furthermore applies to conflicts between the needs of the Islamic movement, and its Dawah work, and the classical interpretation of Islamic law. Here, Wiedl (2009: 25) argues that: “Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat is based on two conceptual premises. The first is the territorial principle that ‘Islam is a global religion’ (alammiyyat al-Islam), which holds that Islam rightfully belongs in Europe, and which is subsequently used by jurists to justify the permanent settlement of Muslims in non-Muslim lands. The second principle is that of “the objectives of Islamic law” (maqasid al-Sharia), which allows the interpretation of sharia to serve the well-being and prosperity of Muslim communities within Europe and the interests of Islam and the Muslim Nation in general”.

At the core of Qaradawi’s flexible and pragmatic approach is the concept of Ijtihaad, or independent legal reasoning. He frequently advocates renewal and an “opening of the doors of Ijtihaad.” He claims that Ijtihaad is always subject to development and changes according to altered conditions and factors; hence, Fatwas must accommodate time and place, customs and conditions. He also states that Muslims in Europe need less restrictive rulings. If different rulings respond to the same question, he goes on to say, Muslims are permitted to choose the less restrictive. This school applied a number of principles to the participation of Muslims in their host communities. First, Qaradawi describes the principle of element, so “an element that is essential to
the performance of a duty is a duty in itself”, which means that, if it is only possible for Muslims to protect their rights through participating in the political, economic and social life of their host community, then their participation is a holy duty in itself (Qaradawi, 2005).

The legal methodology of the fiqh al-Aqalliyyat remains within the broader framework of classical jurisprudence, which relies on the Quran, Sunna, Qiyas (analogy) and Ijma (consensus). Yet, the European Centre for Fatwa and Research, which was founded by Qaradawi in 1997, additionally encourages the use of juristic devices that allow legal leniencies, so that Muslim communities in non-Muslim lands are able to develop and influence the societies in which they live and engage in Dawa to non-Muslims. These devices are ‘Maslaha’ (public interest), and ‘Maslaha Mursala’ (public interest not based on divine text), ‘Darura, Taysir’ (making the fiqh easy) and ‘urf’ (custom). Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat represents a reassessment and elevation of these devices of traditional Islamic jurisprudence for the purposes of propagating a new understanding of Islam that addresses the novel, and expressly modern, circumstances of Muslims residing in non-Islamic lands (Wiedl, 2009).

This new approach launched a new reformist theology. An important scholar of this theology is Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Bana, who describes himself as an adherent of reformist Salafists ideology, and professes to follow the pan-Islamist ideology of Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu, the founders of Islamic modernism. Wiedl (2009:26) argues that: “he follows the thought of Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu, and distinguishes between ‘Ibadat’ (worship, religious matters) which is clearly prescribed in Islam and ‘Mualamah’ (social matters), which can be adapted to new social realities. According to the juristic principle of ‘al-Ibaha al-Asliyya’ or original permissiveness, he claims that Islam can adopt from foreign cultures all elements that do not contradict its essential religious principles”. Ramadan remains faithful to the classical methodology of interpreting Islamic scripture and, throughout his work; he attempts to find ways of reconciling Islam and modernity. He claims to reject literalist interpretations of the Quran and argues for taking into consideration the historical circumstances of a specific revelation. At the same time, he also rejects the rational and critical hermeneutic approach to the Quran that is utilized by today’s liberal reformers; so, Ramadan (2005) argues that this approach plays too loosely with the core principles of Islam.

Ramadan’s argument supports the establishment of a community that is based on faith, loyal to the
true principles of Islam and adapted to the European environment, what he describes as “Euro-Islam”, which can be consciously shaped by European Muslims, in much the same way that Islam historically has previously adapted itself to a variety of different non-Islamic cultures. The difference between him and the new paradigm is that he advocate the “brothers in humanity” principle and encourages Muslims to become citizens of their host countries, by discovering a self-awareness that would enable them to demand a place in the public and private sphere, so as to create a new ‘We’ based on a common citizenship of a pluralistic society. He argues that Muslims and non-Muslims are “brothers in humanity”, which suggests a universal expansion of the historical Islamic principle of brotherhood to include non-Muslims. This recognition of the ‘brotherhood’ of non-Muslims requires, for Ramadan, that Muslims adopt an attitude of friendliness and patience when performing Dawa to non-Muslims. He rejects the idea of an Islamic state, considers the term “Islamic state” problematic and argues that: “there is no Islamic state. To imitate what was done in Medina in the 7th Century is not only a dream, it’s a lie. You cannot do it now” (Ramadan, 2005: 211).

Ramadan’s reformist theology brings a new perspective to the question of the citizenship of Muslims in non-Islamic states. He combines a basic essentialism with a more structuralist view. In his argument, some characteristics of Islam are indeed unchangeable, most importantly, the concept of ‘Tawhid’, but he believes other sources of legislation must be considered. Based on his definition of the Sharia as a “as system of values, not a political system or as a body of law” (Ramadan, 2005: 212), he presents the principle of ‘the state of the world’ as a new source of legislation.

The state of the world-source depends on the socio-economic, cultural and political circumstances of any given society, which forms the structuralist element in his view. Ramadan allows a major role to the principle of individual judgment in Islamic law, ‘Ijithad’, to respond to new questions, raised in the course of history, and to new social realities. In his view, people can ‘experiment; can bring about progress and reform as long as: "they avoid what is forbidden" (Ramadan, 2004: 22). He argues that Islamic law is a human construction and that some elements may evolve, just as human thought evolves. In Ramadan’s view, Allah does not make mere slaves, but actually invites individuals to a deep study of their own inner lives. He agrees with other jurists that Islam must become the new ethnicity that will lead Muslims to leave ethno-cultural differences aside and turn back to the religious core. However, he argues that they must adjust it to the existing global
structures which provide a good opportunity to rebuild the Muslim nation on a purely religious basis (Roy, 2004: 258).

Addressing the question of whether Europe should be seen as Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Harb (the traditional distinction between lands under Muslim rule and those not, with the implication that the latter should be taken by force), Ramadan (1999) argues that these concepts are seriously outdated. Instead, he proposes seeing Europe as Dar ash-Shahada, a "space of testimony", within which Muslims are sent back to the essential teachings of Islam, so that they can contribute to promoting good and equity within and through human brotherhood by bringing the strengths of the Islamic message to their mostly non-Muslim societies (in other words, unlike some other authors, Ramadan is not calling for the conversion of the West to Islam).

For Ramadan (2004), a moderate Islam is the only way in which Muslim minorities can address controversial questions concerning the dynamics involve in the interaction between Europe and Islam. He encourages European Muslims to enter the debate on an equal footing and stop thinking about themselves as a minority, constituting the ‘Other’, because Islam provides Muslims with the means to respond to contemporary challenges, without betraying their faith and identity. Based on his understanding that Islam is a universal religion, and that Europe is properly understood as ‘Dar Al-Dawa’, he argues that Muslims have to abide by European law, as long as the state does not restrict Dawa and does not force them to violate Islamic law. He further argues that, when obedience to European law forces Muslims to act in a way that conflicts with Islamic law—as, for example, the French ban on the Islamic headscarf and other religious symbols in state schools, then Muslims should refrain from violent protests and choose other ways of resistance, such as democratic dialogue. Because Muslim immigrants, Ramadan (1999) argues, sign a work contract or accept a visa, they also recognize the: "binding character of the constitution or the laws of the country they enter into and then live in." Unless the government specifically contradicts Islamic ways, Muslims are obliged to be loyal citizens and to influence the polity in constructive ways. Their goal should be to be: "in Europe but at home." To be a Muslim in Europe ideally: "means to interact with the whole of society." Ultimately, European Islam should emerge, much as there are already an African and Asian Islam.

This attempt to address the complexity of Muslim minorities in the West and to permit them to fully integrate into their new communities is challenged by what Kevin MacDonald (2006: 171)
calls a “resistance identity” within minorities in the West. MacDonald argues that Islam is regarded by these minorities as an expression of national culture and identity that distinguishes and preserves them against the Westernization process. Identification with Islam is a form of resistance to this process. He argues that Westernization is linked subconsciously with secularization in Muslims’ consciousness, which make Sufi and fundamental Islam popular within these communities.

Muslim minorities become more visible and accepted by the host community’s government, media and local populations, but, over time, their priorities have shifted gradually from straightforward material and economic survival to combating Islamophobia and overcoming barriers toward symbolic and political recognition in public life. In this respect, the role of the second generation of Muslim activists is crucial, because their psychological and spiritual orientation is less and less toward their parents and grandparents countries of birth and more toward the societies in which they live.

3.3 Conclusion:

Since the Ninth Century, Muslim jurists have considered Muslim residency in non-Muslim countries to be dangerous. Not only might residency in the West weaken faith and practice, they argued, but migration to non-Muslim areas might also strengthen non-Muslims in their wars against Islam. Some scholars legitimized living among the infidels, as long as Muslims living outside Islamic lands had no alternative, were helpful to the Muslim cause and were able to practice their religion. The core of these two positions is the Islamic concept of nationhood. While the Prophet established a nation with a territorial dimension, to belong to it one only had to become Muslim in faith and practice. Thus, throughout the middle Ages, Muslims who lived under Christian rule could still be considered part of the Islamic Nation.

Minorities’ jurisprudence and the reformist school represent a challenge to the traditional paradigm, because they re-examine religious attitudes toward both non-Muslims living in Muslims countries and Muslims living in non-Muslim societies by expanding the sources of legislation in Islamic jurisprudence. Some jurists have sought to define the identity and duties of these emigrants using new institutions dedicated to migration and, more recently, using the Internet and satellite television, creating a new phenomenon known as Cyber Islam. They publish literature dedicated to
the subject and answer queries from Muslims in the West; a process that facilitates a centre-periphery relationship.

An example of such an institution is the European Council for Fatwa and Research, a body established in London in March 1997, to address questions relating to Muslim migration. In addition, the establishment of both modern and traditional Islamic websites, such as Islamonline.com, Qaradwai.com, Quran.com, Islamcity.com and salaf-us-saalah.com, recognise the growing numbers of Muslims in the West, arguing that, as long as there are Muslims in the West, their proper status and role should be addressed. To ban or ignore mass Muslim migration to the West would only alienate an influential part of the Islamic nation. Muslim jurists concentrated instead on constructing a legal-religious framework to maintain emigrants Muslim identities, while using the Diaspora in the service of Islam.

Traditionalists, Islamists, and Modernists have engaged on these websites in debates about identity, the Umma, women, tradition and renewal, the text and reason and Islam and the West. These debates revolve around three fundamental issues.

The first issue concerns the sources of legislation in Islamic theology. All of these paradigms agreed that the primary Islamic text, the Quran, and the prophet’s traditions are the main sources of legislation. However, the Minorities jurisprudence and reformists thought allows for the principle of individual judgment, ‘Ijtihaad’, and Tariq Ramadan’s ‘state of the world’ to be added to the sources of legislation, as a way of addressing the complexity of the contemporary world.

The second issue relates to the understanding and evaluation of existing Islamic intellectual modes, their connection to the definition of the Islamic state and the Umma, and to the living conditions of Muslims, both in Islamic and non-Islamic countries.

The third issue relates to how Muslims should define themselves in relation to ‘others’, especially to the Western ‘challenge’. Traditionalists reject modernity and the Westernization process, both in Islamic countries and within Muslim communities in the West. In contrast, Modernists more flexible, allowing residency, as long as Muslims keep their Islamic identity, so permitting Muslims full citizenship and participation in their Western societies, as long as they are guided by Islamic principles.
These debates reflect both an ideological debate about the relationship between Islam and the West and how different schools define the West. Traditionalists see the West as countries that adopt secular socio-economic, cultural and political systems. Westernized societies are considered to be in a state of 'Jahyliyya', which means, here, that the West stands for a disintegrating society, where materialism prevails and people are motivated by their desire for power and wealth. On the basis of the antagonistic historical relationship between Islam and Christianity (particularly the Crusade Wars), the colonial experience, the role of Christian missionaries in Islamic countries, economic exploitation and political domination), the traditionalists reject the Westernization/modernization process of the Islamic world and the residency of Muslims the West, because of the West ability to seduce people to imitate its values and principles, so gradually losing their Islamic identity.

The Modernists define the West not as the ‘others’, an anti-Muslim block, but as a civilization that includes good and bad. They view the relationship between the West and Islam as a relationship between two human realities that need to be addressed according to the existing global socio-economic, political and cultural discourses.

Jurists from both paradigms in issuing their religious rules, 'Fatwas', which are published on their websites, argue that Muslim migrants to the West have only two paths to follow, either a reaffirmation or a complete abandonment of their Islamic identity.

A Muslim must make sure his and his family's identity are strictly maintained and that the Islamic tradition governs and regulates all aspects of their lives, because, as Al-Qaradawi (2006: 37) argues, Muslims, being a minority in these non-Muslim countries, ought to unite together as one man, referring to the Prophet Hadith: “A believer to his fellow believing brother is like a building whose bricks cement each other”; Hence, Muslims in these countries have to unite and reject any form of division that is capable of turning them into an easy prey for others. Success in resisting temptation and seduction for a Muslim, his spouse and his offspring conditions the legality of any immigrant's residence in a non-Muslim society.

Resisting assimilation does not mean seclusion from all that is Western, rather, it involves living according to Islamic values and morals, or what Uriya Shavit (2007) describes as "an Islamic texture of life". This necessitates the establishment of what Al-Ghazali (1984:157) considers
essential institutions, such as Islamic schools, associations, financial institutions and political parties that maintain immigrants': "relation to their heritage, traditions and rituals as if all that changed in their lives is their location". He emphasised the establishment of mosques and clubs, in order to bring second generation young Muslims, who do not know their country of origin and cultural background, together to encourage young Muslims to marry within their Islamic community and transmit their Islamic heritage to their children, so replacing ethno-cultural identities with an Islamic identity.

Most Muslim Jurists further advance the debate about migration with a consideration of proselytizing. Rather than being a threat, migration, under the right circumstances, can be an opportunity to advance the divine plan for a world in which there are no nations, but the Umma, and no political parties, but God's. Al-Ghazali (1984) urges migrants to be "pioneers" in spreading religion and Al-Qaradawi (2006: 154) emphasises the principle of Dawa and encourages: "Muslims in the West to be sincere callers to their religion because it is not only restricted to scholars and sheikhs, but it goes far to encompass every committed Muslim." Loyalty should be to Islam, because, in the view of these Jurists, the Umma and the West are not equivalent to each other. The liberal nature of the Western system is the new frontier for the peaceful Jihad to fulfil the holy duty of Muslims to spread the words of God. Thus, having double nationality to some jurists is beneficial, as long as it is not harmful to Islam.

For Muslims, both in Islamic countries and diaspora, as Eickelman (1988: 80-9) argues, there is a: "trend towards a greater critical awareness of religion. Muslims are increasingly willing to take Islam into their own hands, relying on their own readings and interpretations of the classical sources or following 'reformist' intellectuals who question traditional dogmas and challenge the claims of the Ulama to be privileged sources of religious knowledge". This awareness is related to what Mandaville (2001: 180) describes as: "the massive rises in literacy and the increased presence of religious issues in the public sphere as a result of globalised communications and media technologies. The authority of the written word is no longer the sole reserve of a select few, and the religious elite cannot compete with the myriad range of Muslim voices reading, debating and, effectively, reformulating Islam on the Internet, on satellite television and in a plethora of widely-distributed books and pamphlets. Thus, 'media Islam', the new intellectuals and popular religious discourse, I want to argue, are all contributing towards the emergence of what we might call a new 'Muslim public sphere'."
This new discourse that take place on Islamic websites and the social pages which belong to jurists and thinkers from different school of thoughts in Islam, and how Muslims interact with it will be discussed in the following section. Especially if we take into consideration that these websites and social pages become an unofficial religious authority and education institutions that reshape the Muslim world in general and Muslims minorities’ identity and interaction with their host community. In the next chapter, this thesis analyses some of these websites content and their use by my respondents.
"Googling God" is the term used by a second generation participant to describe his online activity within Cyber Islam. Certainly, the religious landscape of younger Muslims in their 20's in Australia is marked by religious cyber activism. Indeed, the majority of the second generation focus group reported that they participated in a form of cyber activism, compared to a large number of the first generation group. The focus group identified their cyber activities as including: first, listening to preaching, 'khutbahs', or sermons from different Imams, either transmitted 'live' or recorded and uploaded onto these websites; second, discussing and justifying political and religious actions and news, using chat rooms and personal spaces; third, listening to and reading the Quran; and, finally, seeking answers to daily life queries which relate to their residency in non-Islamic countries.

Of course, I recognize that this is not only the case for Muslims. So, Campbell (2006: 5) argues that: “the Barna Research Group (2001) claimed that upwards of 100 million Americans rely upon the Internet to deliver some aspects of their religious experience. They went on to state that the most common religious activities included listening to archived religious teaching, reading online “devotionals,” and buying religious products and resources online. Similarly the Pew Foundation’s Cyber faith report (Larsen, 2001) observed the growing phenomena of “Religion Surfers,” those who solicit religion or spiritual information online and seek to connect with others on faith journeys. Larsen stated that the most popular religious activities online are solitary ones such as searching for religious information, seeking or offering spiritual advice, and sending/emailing prayer requests. Again Pew’s “Faith Online” report (Hoover, Clark and Rainie, 2004) confirmed seeking out religious content comprises the dominant online religious activity”.

These online religious seekers were clearly cultivating traditional and non-traditional religion in a new context, what Chama (1996: 57) describes as: “a transformative act. In their eyes the web is more than just a global tapestry of personal computers. It is a vast cathedral of the mind, a place where ideas about God and religion can resonate, where faith can be shaped and defined by a collective spirit”.

Of course, my study of cyber-Islam could be located comparatively within this broader literature, but that is not my concern here. Rather, this chapter will explore the impact of Islamic websites on
debates relating to the normative boundaries of Islamic identity and community. It is argued that cyber Islam provide channels for new or previously disenfranchised voices to be heard in the public sphere of Muslim Diasporas. Simultaneously, traditional structures of authority are refigured and, to some extent, marginalized in favour of alternative interpretations of religious knowledge perceived as more relevant to contemporary diasporic life in the West.

Young Muslims use these sources to create fresh dialogues, discuss new interpretations, and thus gain Islamic knowledge, rather than utilizing the conventional ways of seeking religious guidance through the mosque and Madrassa, where young Muslims historically went for religious education. This cyber activism goes beyond the traditional ideological and religious frames of reference of many Islamic religious institutions that used to have authority on religious matters, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt, which is considered by the members of the focus groups of both generations as part of official Islam. As such, it is important to look at cyber Islam because it is challenging and mutating a conventional understanding of Muslim identity.

As a religious phenomenon established by Islamic activists, the websites repackage information on Islam, provide new pathways of interaction and interconnection among Muslims and offer an innovative online universe. Scholars, students, activists and ordinary Muslims are developing new links that go far beyond traditional boundaries. It becomes a space where experts, as well as ordinary people, collaborate to develop a consensus on Islam. Not surprisingly, some Muslims now explain their religious affiliation by identifying with a specific website, rather than a mosque or religious sect. Indeed, the strongest and most authoritative Islamic voice in cyberspace, according to Bunt (2003), is: "the Qur'an. Online translations and commentaries provide unrestricted access. Most religious institutions, such as Egypt's al-Azhar and Iran's Qom, have a strong web presence with designated sheikhs and ayatollahs responding across the net to petitioners".

Cyber Islam is also used by Islamic activists to promote and help in the establishment of a unified Islamic community of believers among Muslims living in both countries with Muslim majority population and those where Muslims constitute a minority. At the same time, it has become a medium through which reformation, involving the appropriation and dissemination of information about the Islamic religion and the Islamic world, can be achieved. Finally, it is an open free source that provides Islam with its strength by liberating Muslim societies from what they call "official Islam". Such online religious communities in Campbell’s (2006:6) terms: “are interactive groups, facilitating two-way interaction through computer technologies such as email or Internet relay chat (IRC)”. Campbell (2006:6-7) gives an example of St Sam in Cyberspace, (www.stsams.org),
which provides: “not only, an email forum focused around discussing matters related to the Anglican Communion worldwide, but the site also offers members other chat forums to create a rich interaction—what they describe as a cyber parish.”

The first aim of this chapter is to outline how the views of different Islamic schools of thought on the questions of Islamic nationality, the Umma and the role of Muslim minorities in the West are reflected in these websites. Different Islamic schools are represented by different websites. So, Islamonline.com and Qaradawi.com reflect the moderate school, or what is known as 'Wasatiyya' ideology, azharonline.com and alifla.com represent official Islam, while binbaz.org.sa, alathar.net and ibnothaimeen.com represent the traditional conservative school, or what is known as the 'Salafi' ideology. Second, the Chapter examines how much Cyber Islam influences my respondents’ understanding of Islam, their citizenship duties and their relationship with their Australian host community. In terms of citizenship duties, this thesis concentrates on political participation, socio-economic integration and military service, which will be discussed in detail in section three of this thesis.

This Chapter begins by reviewing the literature on Cyber Islam. Subsequently, it considers methodological issues in relation to studying these websites. Then, it outlines the activities of the different websites and the message they convey to Muslim minorities in the West. Finally, it analyzes in more detail the content of two websites that represent a moderate version of Islam, IslamOnline.net and qaradawi.net, as well as the conservative Salafi website, salaf-us-saalih.com, which was chosen because it illustrates the move of Salafi-Islamic knowledge into computer-mediated environments and reflects the emergence of Salafism as a social movement in the West.

The IslamOnline.net and qaradawi.net websites were selected for two main reasons. First, they are the world's largest Muslim websites with millions of hits (Bunt, 2008). Second, they are very popular with the focus groups. So, almost the entire second generation group stated that they used them for educational purposes and consultation on issues relating to their life in non-Islamic society, compared to two thirds of the first generation group. In the same vein, almost all of the second generation group respected and trusted the moderate version of Islam expressed by the jurists on this website, especially Dr. Al-Qaradawi, compared to two thirds of the first generation group.
4.1 The Literature on Cyber Islam:

Studies on religion and the internet have concentrated on the character of online religious communities and how participation shapes members’ ideas of religiosity (Vries, 2002), religious identity, community and the ritual use of the Internet (Castells, 1997; Hackett, 2003, 2005). In their book Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet, Dawson and Cowan (2004) provide some helpful conceptual distinctions to make sense of the complexity of the internet as it pertains to religion. They distinguish (Dawson and Cowan, 2004; Young, 2004; drawing on Helland, 2000) between ‘religion online’ (information about religion on the internet) and ‘online religion’ (religious experience or practice through the internet). The book also explores the interconnections between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ religion, in other words, what impact internet religion has on more conventional forms of religious practice and expression.

Many scholars have raised important questions regarding the nature of virtual communication: Does it just provide an ‘illusion of sociality’ or is there evidence of genuine social interactions online which can lead to or enhance human communities in the ‘offline’ world (Dawson and Cowan, 2004: 4)? Given the centrality of the concept of the Umma to Muslim, this constitutes an ongoing topic for debate, not only between Muslims, but with other religious groups such as Christians and Jews. Hackett (2006: 69) discusses ‘cyber-evangelists’ invading Muslim chat rooms to challenge aggressively their beliefs and practices. Since the identities of the participants are disguised through their online names, hate speech is not uncommon. There is also a new phenomenon of a ‘bot’ – a floating, disembodied, pre-programmed text message (rather like a ‘pop-up’) that can be sent into chat rooms to deliver biblical verses and statements of faith – like a proselytic missile. The online religious community can be an important ‘venue’ for debating what constitutes right practice, “the straight path”, in a rapidly changing and diversifying world (Hackett, 2006: 69).

The most important feature of cyber activism, as Hoover (2003: 11) describes it, is “personal autonomy”, which gives individuals the right to choose the kind of cyber activism in which they engage. Other studies of cyber activism have discussed: the ways individuals utilize the internet (Bunt, 2000); the way it affects traditional forms of Islamic institutional structures (Lawrence, 2000); and how online Islamic practice may challenge, as well as empower, public and private vectors of contemporary Islamic society (Wheeler, 2002; Anderson, 1999).
In particular, Bunt (2000) examines how the internet can alter the perception of Muslims among non-Muslim audiences, as well as how minority or Diaspora populations in Western countries use the internet in the process of political and media engagement and community formation. In both Islamic and non-Islamic societies, According to Bunt (2000: 17), this Islamic presence on the internet: "concentrated around the usage of the internet as the informational source of choice for dissenting groups". The most popular Islamic websites are websites that provide a digital copy of the Qur'an in different languages, translations and interpretation, as well as websites which provide online Fatwa and discussion groups that permit unrestricted access and commentaries. The cyber sphere has made major religious sources, such as the Qur'an, the Sunna, Prophet Muhammad's biography and classic texts on law and history, available to readers from different backgrounds.

At the same time, other researchers have argued that new media expand the public domain and create new platforms on which people can express their interpretation of Islam. Eickelman and Anderson (2003: 16) contend that new relationships emerge between Muslims all over the world and that modern media create potential for new identities. Similarly, Mandeville (2001: 170) writes that the internet enables Muslims to construct their own Islam and a new kind of imagined community.

More specifically, Anderson (1997: 36) argues that cyber Islam provides a new platform that introduces: "the process of discussing old topics in a new setting". He identifies five topics as particularly important. First, there is some focus on the position of women in Islam. Second, there is an emphasis upon developing the relationships between the diaspora Muslim communities in the West and the cultures of their countries of origin. Third, Cyber Islam offers these diaspora communities an alternative to their mainstream host community's culture and political, social and economic settings. Fourth, it provides an informational weapon/sphere for dissenting groups in both conservative Islamic countries and non-Islamic host communities. Finally, it provides new sources of religious authority and legitimacy which appeal to more: "middle-brow Islam associated with a more middling population: its versions range from fundamentalist to liberal". (1997:37)

Cyber Islam has become what Mazrui and Mazrui (2001) describes as: "an internet-based Islamic reformation that Islamize the computer-mediated communication as part of a wider quest to Islamize scientific (and other forms) of knowledge for the greater project of Islamizing modernity itself". Such Islamization of modernity took place by: first, altering the way Muslims communicate with each other and with non-Muslims; second, removing geographic differences, leading to a cultural change in the ways in which Muslims foster Islamic principles, such as the establishment of cross-border brotherhood and sisterhood; and, third, constructing new Islamic identities, a new
Islamic public discourse and new Islamic audiences, in a process described by Eickelman and Anderson (1999: 12) as a “re-intellectualization of the Islamic doctrine and discourse in accessible, vernacular terms, even if this contributes to basic reconfigurations of doctrine and practice”. Such an intellectualization of Islamic doctrine takes place outside the boundaries of the “legitimate” or official viewpoints (for examples, those of traditionally trained Jurists or scholars in traditional religious institutions, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt and the Islamic Ulama Council in Saudi Arabia). These traditional religious institutions criticize cyber Islam because it allows unqualified Jurists and ordinary Muslims to take Islam, and the decodification of the Quran and the prophet tradition ‘Sunna’, into their own hands, opening new doors for disputes, conflict and unauthorized religious rules, 'Fatwas'.

In response, Cyber Islamic activists developed three arguments. First, they argue that online debate revolves around the Islamic reformation movement and Islamic responses to questions that relate to the interpretation of the Quran and the prophet’s tradition, which are not the exclusive concern of traditional religious institutions or official Jurists, who are often described as being: "out of touch with the modern world and contemporary concerns” (Bunt, 2000:125). Second, they argue that it creates a new social platform which allows/encourages socially underprivileged groups, such as women, to be involved in both income generation and social and political activism on local and global scales. Finally, they contend that it helps in the formation of Islamic identity and Islamic knowledge among young Muslims in the West. Such identity/knowledge, as Schmidt (2004: 36-37) argues, is gained: “through reading of books, and equally through downloads from the Internet and membership of Internet based discussion groups, which young Muslims viewed it a necessary part of their belief structure to question religious teachings, drawing on the experiences of Prophet Muhammad and his companions who would ask about different verses of the Quran”.

In this respect, many contemporary Islamic jurists and thinkers urge Muslims to go back to the sources of Islam, i.e. the Quran and the Sunna, and read for themselves, exercising good judgment and trusting in their own personal opinions as to what the texts mean for Islam today. The late Fazlur Rahman (quoted in Mandaville 2001: 175) argues that: “Muslims should read the Qur’an and the Hadith without relying on bulky, medieval commentaries. Because these sources were misconstrued by Muslim scholars in medieval times, made into rigid and inflexible guides for all time, as it were and not recognized as the products of their own times and circumstances”. This access to information through new technology, Sa’ad al-Faqih (quoted in Mandaville, 2001: 177): “makes the average Muslim revolutionaryize Islam with just a basic understanding of Islamic
methodology and a CD-ROM”. In his view, the technology goes a long way to bridging the ‘knowledge gap’ between a classically trained religious scholar (‘Alim) and a lay Muslim, by placing all of the relevant texts at the fingertips of the latter: “I am not an ‘Alim,’ he says, ‘but with these tools I can put together something very close to what they would produce when asked for a fatwa” (Mandaville, 2001:178).

The estrangement of a community in diaspora, Mandaville (2001: 172) argues involves: “its separation from the ‘natural’ setting of the homeland – often leads to a particularly intense search for and negotiation of identity: gone are many traditional anchor points of culture; conventional hierarchies of authority can fragment. In short, the condition of diaspora is one in which the multiplicity of identity and community is a key dynamic. Debates about the meanings and boundaries of affiliation are hence a defining characteristic of the diaspora community”. In the case of Muslim diaspora, this negotiation of identity requires engagement with new cultures and an ability to adjust to inevitable changes in one’s own tradition: “We cannot assume, argues Barbara Metcalf (1996: 7), however, ‘that the old and new cultures are fixed, and that change results from pieces being added and subtracted. Instead, new cultural and institutional expressions are being created using the symbols and institutions of the received tradition’. - Such a process involves bringing Islam into the host community culture, using different sources, such as the internet to access Islamic knowledge. The existence of non-traditional and unauthorized interpretation of Islam in Islamic websites allowed Muslim communities, especially in the diaspora, to be involved in complex debates about the very nature and boundaries of their religion. What does Islam mean to them? What are the reliable sources about Islam? How can one differentiate reliably between ‘real’ and ‘bad’ interpretations of Islam? Such conversations, Mandaville (2001: 174) argues: “are intensified in western diasporic contexts due to the sheer volume of human traffic that flows through them. Muslims in diaspora come face to face with the myriad shapes and colours of global Islam, forcing their religion to hold a mirror up to its own diversity. These encounters often play an important role in processes of identity formation, prompting Muslims to relativize and compare their self-understandings of Islam”.

Other studies concentrated on how young Muslims seek to construct an Islamic identity online, amidst tensions between tradition and late modern society (Schmidt 1999; Larsson, 2003). Such studies show how the Internet provides access to a variety of alternative interpretations of Islam that can become a resource for identity construction. This access challenges the ideals, norms and beliefs of older generations, which are often based on local traditions of certain pre-immigration,
ethno-cultural and religious contexts. Online interaction can also be used as a resource in developing alternative Muslim identities, based on a common exploration of what these young people see as religious authority. In addition, the question of authority online is a concern, not just for Muslims, but also for other religious groups. It becomes both a threat to traditional religious authority (Bakers, 2005 works on NRMs online), as well as a tool used to control members and maintain structures within established religious movements. Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai’s 2005 work on Jewish fundamentalist communities and the work of Lawrence (2002) and Anderson (1999) on Islam online also provide information on the rise of new categories of religious authority in a networked society.

This new category of religious authorities introduced new kinds of debates on Islamic law in which Muslims joined the jurists in discussing the Sharia and its contemporary applications. They also discuss how to be and become Muslim, and how to share Islam with others in non-Muslim countries and in the face of existing Islamic conventions. In this blurring of boundaries, Lawrence (2002: 238) argues: “a vast middle ground is opening between elite, super-literate, authoritative discourse and mass, non-literate”. This has resulted in emerging minority opinions and contributed to the dissolution of traditional authorities (Anderson 1997; Bunt 2000; 2003; Mandaville 2000), which was clearly reflected in the emergence of fatwa-issuing sites that become what Sisler, Vit. (2013: 43-50), describes as: “a parallel and coherent normative framework in societies which do not recognize the Islamic law. Muslims in Diaspora, particularly in Western Europe, who live in the absence of institutionalized Islamic authorities, create substantial part of the fatwa market. Some sites specialize themselves in the Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities (fiqh al-Aqalliyyat), adapting the Islamic law to the new context. Given the multifaceted character of the contemporary Islam, the rulings and opinions vary greatly. From the point of view of European legal systems this represents an important issue; a group of legal subjects in their jurisdiction are deliberately seeking the rulings of mainly foreign and unsanctioned scholars. Basically, in the reality a mufti could be state-appointed or unofficial, who gains respect due to his education and knowledge. In the cyberspace, the very fact of asking someone for a fatwa remains the most explicit recognition of that person’s authority”.

In the next section, this thesis explores the Fatwas sections in different websites, which the focus group visited for consultation, education and discussion, especially on issues that relate to the challenges/problems that face Muslim diaspora. It will also address the strategies these sites use to gain the confidence of their audiences and establish themselves as an independent religious
authority. The aim is to understand: how these sites provide Muslims living in non-Muslim states with answers to questions about political representation, participation and exclusion; how the internet is changing the ways in which people imagine themselves in relation to their communities, thereby changing the relationship between state and society; and, More broadly, how authority is made, maintained and challenged on these sites. Here, it’s crucial to mention that the question of issuing legal opinions and constructing the interpretative authority in cyber Islamic environments is far more complex than can be addressed here, so that question is beyond the scope of this thesis. As I noted previously, there are hundreds of internet sites varying greatly in their religious and legal background, content, target audience and strategies.

4.2 Islamic Websites

There are numbers of methodological concerns that must be addressed when discussing cyber Islam and Islamic websites. First, there are a large number of Islamic websites and it is impossible to track and keep record of all their activities. Second, it is impossible to identify a site’s owner or location of origin, even using the whois service, which is one of several online services that can provide details of an Internet domain’s ownership, together with technical data from which a computer’s location and operating system can be ascertained (Bunt, 2003). Third, given the number of Islamic sites in cyber-space, it is very hard to track them and build an archive that can be used for research purposes, especially when we take into consideration that most of these sites change their profile and layout and do not keep records of their previous pages and activities. Fourth, most of the discussion groups occur in personal chat rooms and on individual web pages that have restricted access. Finally, most of these websites state in their web pages that they are facing hacking problems that distort their real mission, aims, identity, message and principles.

However, it is possible to identify two main kinds of Islamic websites: firstly, there are websites that concentrate on E-jihad (Electronic Jihad); and, second, there are websites that concentrate on addressing social, cultural and economic issues that face Muslims in general and Muslim communities in non-Islamic countries particularly, (the second kind will be the focus of the next section).

E-jihad is defined as a jihad in cyberspace against what is called the propaganda and false allegations against the message of Allah. Jihadist websites, such as azzam.com, jehad.net and harkatulmujahideen.org, promote the goals of exposing the enemies of Islam, legitimizing jihadist activities, encouraging Muslims to revive "the forgotten pillar of Jihad" and supporting different
Islamic cases and weak Islamic minorities. E-jihad, in contrast to the traditional media, is considered by these websites to be crucial to the development of the Islamic religion and the Islamic Umma, helping ensure the spread and/or survival of Islam at many levels.

The aim/mission of these websites is to: revive the principle of Jihad that is ignored by official religious institutions and religious education in Islamic countries; facilitate communication between different Islamic communities, groups and activists, especially those interested in serving the cause of Islam; and contribute to the establishment of a unified Islamic front against the enemies of Islam. They encourage Muslims everywhere to follow the Qur’an and fight for the creation of a model Islamic community by communicating the Prophet’s message to humanity and living Islam, just as the Prophet did. They quote the verse: "Thus, We have made you a community justly balanced; that you might be witnesses for all humanity, and the Messenger may be a witness for you" (2: 143). There are, to date, no studies of the impact of the jihadist websites on Muslims in either Islamic or non-Islamic countries, which makes it difficult to assess their influence, especially on Islamic activism and political Islam.

Websites that concentrate on addressing the social, cultural and economic issues that face Muslim communities in the world are challenged by many factors including: first, the complexity of these issues; and, second, the absence of religious authorities in non-Islamic countries and the mistrust of official Islamic authorities in Islamic countries. These factors led to the emergence of a new online religious authority issuing what are known as on-line ‘fatwa’. This online authority led, in turn, to the emergence of a new Islamic culture that has a significant impact on areas of global Muslim consciousness and identity, which challenges the existing traditional socio-political structures and national identities. Online religious rules or ‘fatwa’ reflect a shift from traditional religious authority, which depended on the accreditation of jurists by certain institutions, towards a new form of religious order, which depends on the application of Islamic rules to an existing real life or hypothetical questions. Two types of cyber religious authorities can be identified. First, there are Sunni, traditional, conservative, ‘Salafi’, religious authorities on Islamic websites which specialized in establishing religious rules. The best examples are: Islam Q&A, which was founded by Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid from Saudi Arabia in 1997, and uses a number of languages, including Arabic, English, French, Indonesian and Japanese; and ibnothaimeen.com and fatwa-online.com, which were established by the Saudi Sheik Mohamed Ibn Uthaymeen, and aim to serve non-Arabic speaking Muslims and Islamic minorities. Most of these ‘fatwa’ are republished and re-circulated on other websites.
4.3 Cyber Islam and Muslim Minorities in the West

The existence of large numbers of Muslim minorities in the West led cyber jurists, both conservative and moderate, to re-examine their religious attitudes toward these minorities. For the past thirty years, some jurists have sought to define the identity and duties of these migrants through new institutions dedicated to migration and, most recently, using the internet and satellite television. Both sources transmit literature dedicated to the interpretation of Islam and answer queries from Muslims in the West; a process that facilitates a center-periphery relationship. Regardless of their school of jurisprudence, conservative or moderate, nationality or political status, these websites have worked very hard to redefine the role and the proper status of Muslim migrants in non-Islamic countries. Their positions vary from banning to permitting the integration of Muslim minorities into their host community. Jurists from different schools of thought concentrate on constructing a legal-religious framework to maintain the emigrant's Muslim identities, while using the diaspora in the service of Islam, by encouraging them to place religious identity above national and ethnic identities and to promote the interests of a global Muslim nation.

The jurist's consensus, according to Uriya Shavit (2007), involves five principles: first, the idea that a greater Islamic nation exists of which Muslims are members, wherever they live; second, while living in a non-Muslim society is undesirable, it might be legal on an individual basis, if the immigrant acts as a model Muslim; third, it is the duty of a Muslim in the West to reaffirm his religious identity and to distance himself from anything contrary to Islam, hence, he should help establish and patronize mosques, Muslim schools, cultural center and shops; fourth, Muslims in the West should champion the cause of the Muslim nation in the political, as well as the religious, sphere, for there should be no distinction between the two; and, finally, Muslims in the West should spread Islam into the declining, spiritual void of Western societies.

Many conservative websites, such as Islamwen.net, salaf-us-saalih.com and Islamcity.com, argue that Muslim migrants should reaffirm their Islamic identity and serve their Islamic Nation. Jurists who argue in favor of the residency of Muslims in Islamic countries add the condition that migrants resident in the West must make sure that their and their family's identity are strictly maintained and that the Sharia remains the comprehensive source regulating all aspects of their lives. This clearly puts a burden on migrants who try to integrate and embrace their new host communities, especially because most Muslim immigrants, even those who do not regularly practice their faith, came from conservative backgrounds.
The availability of the English language on these websites makes them popular among second
generation migrants in Western liberal societies, regardless of their cultural background. The
English language as a medium of communication in the which are published in the UK, Lewis
(1994:207) argues that the internet and diasporic publications published in English in the UK, such
as Q- News and the Muslims News, means that: “young educated Muslims, impatient of
sectarianism, (are) able through an international language, English, to access innovative and
relevant Islamic scholarship”.

Some parents in diaspora communities seek to reaffirm the Muslim identities of their families
through providing their children with religious education, in Mosques, Madrassa and Islamic
centers, which is delivered by imported Ulama, mainly from the country of origin. However, for
the younger generation of Muslims, traditional religious identity that is imposed by parents is
challenged by a new universal religious identity that is redefined and reshaped through Cyber
Islam activism, which provides them with a new identity. Many of these imported teachers,
however extensively trained in religion they may be, possess little first-hand experience of life in
the diasporic environment. They, therefore, find it difficult to accommodate the needs of young
Muslims. Many writers point to the necessity of developing new, effective, leadership structures
for the next generations. Parents and imported imams are finding that their Islam has less and less
resonance for their children. So, Dassetto and Nonneman (1996: 216) argue that one of the major
questions facing diasporic Muslim communities today is how the transition ‘from the Islam of the
fathers to the Islam of the sons’ will take place. Halliday (1992: 38) notes, for example, that, after
the leading religious figure of the Yemeni community in the UK returned permanently to Yemen,
the younger generation began to question traditional authority. This eventually led to the
establishment of a number of secular nationalist organizations. Similarly, Landman (1997: 38)
reports the problems that Sufi orders in The Netherlands had because of their reliance on a
religious leadership based in the home country.

What is crucial here is the rendering of Islam in an idiom comprehensible to those young Muslims
who have grown up in Western society and who possess certain Western norms in addition to
Islam, to structure the available repertoires of their Islamic identity by acquiring knowledge about
Islam. Much of this, as Mandaville (2001: 125) stated “will involve bringing Islam into the forums
of popular culture and making it available via a wide variety of media”. The Internet has become
one of the most important media that young Muslims in the West use when looking for information
about Islam and authoritative religious sources and persons. So, a large majority of second
generation men and women from the focus group stated that they are members of Islamic websites and join/participate in cyber Islamic forums, discussion groups or chat rooms. A similar number from the same group stated that Islamic websites, especially Islamonline.net and Qaradawi.com, were their preferred sources when it came to religious knowledge and guidance, questions and education. Because these websites tend to present a universal Islamic identity that does not recognize cultural or religious differences, but rather introduces an alternative type of identity which claims jurisdiction over all aspects of citizenship. One of my second generation respondents told me “With globalization, we are forced to confront different interpretations of Islam; you can't hide away from them. These websites provide much needed information, skills and knowledge to engage with modernity/globalization”.

A clear majority of the second generation group argues that the lack of parental control and the possibility of combining different repertoires of knowledge made the internet the key space for them to engage with, and re-enact, their daily lives and their (religious) experiences and beliefs. This is especially important if we take into consideration that these young Muslims are building their lives in a highly Westernized/modernized and cosmopolitan environment. They require an Islam to match this setting: “The traditional frameworks of their parents and the associated institutions of religious scholarship are perceived as being in desperate need of transformation”. (Mandaville, 2001: 126). In addition, the technical characteristics of the internet, particularly the anonymity it affords and the greater knowledge young people have about its use (compared to their parents), seem to make it the ideal place in which young people can create a religion that is partially, if not fully, detached from their culture. The ability of these websites not to identify themselves with national geopolitical borders or religious authorities makes them attractive, and easy to relate to, for these younger generations who are looking for a universal Islam. These websites become, as a second generation respondent, emphasized: “a free educational space in which Muslims can build awareness and seek advice on religious matters, as well as becoming a space for free political expression and new ideas and concepts, and even radical notions of Islamic identity”. For him: “Such interaction mainly takes place in discussion groups, chat rooms, forums and social web page away from censorship and supervision”.

A quick search of sites such as Google.com or Askjeeves.com using the word ‘Islam’ produces a huge number of websites, ranging from discussion sites, through sites of scholars, to personal blogs of Muslims and so on. This means that, on the one hand, the Internet offers a range of possibilities for Muslims to shape their identities, but, on the other hand, the overwhelming number of sites
may also overpower them. People therefore have to distinguish ‘good’ knowledge from ‘bad’ knowledge, or, in the words of some of the second generation respondents in my research, to discern ‘truth’ from ‘falseness’. This reflects what Mandaville (2001:174), describes as: “the complex debate about the very nature and boundaries of their religion. What does Islam mean to Muslims living in the West? From whom can reliable knowledge about Islam be gained? How can one differentiate reliably between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ interpretations of Islam? Such conversations are intensified in western diasporic contexts due to the sheer volume of human traffic that flows through them. Muslims in diaspora come face to face with the myriad shapes and colours of global Islam, forcing their religion to hold a mirror up to its own diversity. These encounters often play an important role in processes of identity formation, prompting Muslims to relativize and compare their self-understandings of Islam”.

One of the ways in which we can analyze this process is by looking at changes in religious knowledge and religious authorities as a result of the Internet. In my research there are various relevant examples. Take for example the discussion on one of the chat rooms, such as, (http://www.singlemuslim.com/about/australia-muslim-chat-room.html), about participating in non-Islamic functions such as Christmas Day or Australia Day. One young chat rooms participant asked if it was halal (permissible) in Islam to participate in such activities/celebrations. Other participants contributed, answering his question by using statements from several scholars, derived from both Salafi websites, such as IslamQ&A.com, and from moderate websites, such as Qaradawi.net. What is important is who gave the answers and what evidence from which sources he or she used. Texts from Salafi websites have little authority among the majority of my second generation group participants, who overwhelmingly use texts from moderate websites mainly from IslamOnline.net and Qaradawi.net.

This reception of texts and messages seems to be a largely individual process. Most of the participants from both generations read them online, downloaded and printed them, but didn’t discuss them with others. A few first generation and second generation respondents, discussed texts from different scholars in chat rooms and online discussion groups. One of my female, second generation, participants, like many other boys and girls in my research, looked online for young Muslims who had the same backgrounds and, therefore, the same interests. Given the fact that the Internet is mostly a textual medium, young Muslims like her often used their religion in order to present themselves and to assess other users. The aim was to make identification with others faster and easier. She explained that: “as a female, I always introduce myself as a Muslim to
protect myself from any unnecessary inappropriate contacts or invitations. I usually chat on Islamic channel, so I expect everyone there to be a Muslim. First things you hear then are, are you a Sunni or a Shia? Do you speak Arabic? Where are you from?”

Similarly, a second generation, male participant argued: "interaction with cyber may take different forms. The way I deal with religious texts and authoritative texts depends on what kind of message and ideology I get from a certain websites. I use my common sense to choose which website I log to. Some of the Salafi and Jihadist websites have a very radical conservative view that I do not agree with".

The second generation paid special attention to how the discussions and deliberations in some of these forums increased the degree of uniformity, solidarity and cohesion between those who shared a “collective identity,” as in the case of some online discourses involving Muslims who belonged to the same Umma, as well as, discovering the differences among themselves and demarcating themselves from non-Islamic practices and lifestyles. It’s worth noting that their views, as we will see later in this section, reflect an interesting feature of cyberspace: a sense of collective identity. This was particularly the case in the Arabic threads that dealt with “pan-Arab” and “pan-Islamic” issues, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Danish cartoons about the Prophet. Consensus on these issues emanated mostly from the participants’ emotional uniformity and common subjectivity, rather than their objective, rational thinking. These and other political issues such as the Arab Spring were used by the websites to create a theme of a “unified Umma.” They were used to create a sense of "Islamic consciousness", or “Umma consciousness”, which unites Muslims under the banner of common faith and shared belief, stressing the moral unity of the Umma, in the face of its internal, as well as external, enemies and opposing forces, and suppressing its political conflicts and sectarian fragmentation. All these factors led to an emotional consensus among participants in the threads that discussed such “pan-Islamic” issues.

According to second generation participants, there is one area in which the Internet seems to be very successful in creating new ties between Muslims, both in Islamic countries and diasporic settings, “international politics”. It’s worth noting that, despite the fact that Islam is not represented by a solid political bloc, particularly since the disbanding of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, there is still an underlying concept of what a second generation participant describes as “Islamic unity and Umma consciousness”, that emerges in the way Muslims interact with international events, which relates to the wellbeing of Muslim communities and Islamic countries through unofficial actors. These unofficial actors are described by Turner (2009: 2) as: “non-state
actors who operate around this principle of an all encompassing concept of ‘Assabiya’ (community feeling), be it Islamic or Arab. Quite often and at varying intervals these actors seek to be the dominant force in efforts to bring the community together under its hegemony”. This was clearly reflected when the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestinian is brought into the daily lives of Muslims by stories of martyrs, films, photos and so on and is used to promote a unified international Muslims front and a global Umma. Images of destruction in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Palestinian areas spread easily, very quickly and on a large scale, and are combined with the idea that Islam is under threat. So, supporting the Muslims in these countries, as the vast majority of the second generation participants argued, will bring Muslims together and help in establishing of what they called "a global cyber Muslim front that represent the Umma", which enables them to understand themselves and the world around them and gives them a framework to engage in debates about local and global politics, or, as another male participant contended: "Being active on the Internet, gathering information, discussing about Islam, supporting Muslims and Islamic causes, is a way of being and becoming a Muslim in itself."

In contrast, two thirds of the first generation parents stated that they would go to a local imam they know with their questions, because, as a male, first generation, participant contended: "We know what kind of qualification the imam had and we usually have a reasonable indication of his school of thought and his viewpoints. On the Internet, this is usually not the case. Asking questions to a scholar of Islam far away, even if he is a trustful Imam, make it difficult to control how people interpret and practice his rulings".

Similarly, a first generation, female participant argued that: "Online Fatwa is not trustful because it allows Muslim, to a certain extent, to create their own Islam and because religious knowledge is no longer the monopoly of accredited Imams. By storing certain texts on the Internet, people can use these texts by spreading them and copy-paste those into new texts that sometimes create a new fatwa different in its essence from the original one".

It is therefore not surprising that the older generation feels more comfortable having Islam taught and read to them by an imam from their own village and in a language that they understand. Those imams are best described by Mandaville (2001:123) as the: “transnational Ulama, religious scholars (or ‘travelling theorists’), who move frequently between diasporic communities and their countries of origin".
Almost all of the second generation participants compared to half of the first generation group identified two aspects of their experience with cyber activism: first, looking, reading and listening to all kinds of stories and pictures that show the greatness of Islam and the benevolence of God; and, second, listening and reading the Quran online. As an example, a second generation, female participant stated that: "I listen to recorded recitals for relaxation and to improve my moral and ethical discipline. It helps me resist everyday temptations and follow the path of God."

Similarly, a male participant contended: "Listening to the Quran is a way to create a dialogue between me and God. Understanding the recitals is important but not necessary. I don't understand Arabic very well. But while I listen, I try to read the English meaning some websites provide".

Another participant argued that: "Listening to Quran make me a better person. I was with my friends a youth centre drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes and joints. When one of them put a cassette tape on with a Quran recital, all of us put away the drinks and the cigarettes".

Islamic websites nurture, and attract people to, a particular kind of moral orientation and religious repertoire. So, a clear majority of the second generation group stated that they listen to the recitals of the Quran on the Internet while surfing or when they are very angry or frustrated. As an example, one male participant stated that: "In chat rooms Quran recitals are often used to end a heated debate in which emotions run very high. In most chat rooms it is not allowed to speak or write texts during when the Quran recital is on. Although most of the time the debate does not immediately end, in most cases the atmosphere does become friendlier during and after the recital".

4.4 An analysis of Islamic websites:

4.4.1 The conservative traditional Salafi websites:

The word Salafi means “to precede.” In Islamic vocabulary, it is used to describe the followers of the virtuous fathers of the faith who were the companions of the Prophet, 'Al-Salaf Al-Salih'. The Salafi's doctrine of 'Tawhid' means, according to Professor Ahmed Moussalli (2009, 11): "to accept and believe in the oneness of God and His absolute authority. Then they divide Tawhid into three sub-concepts: tawhid ‘ubudiyya (unity of worship), meaning a true servant of Allah must single out Allah in all acts of worship and He alone should be worshiped with complete and utter loyalty; tawhid rububiyya (unity of lordship), meaning that a faithful Muslim must accept that Allah as the creator of all things and that sovereignty over them belongs only to Him; Asma’ waal-sifat (unity
of Allah’s names and attributes) means a faithful Muslim believes in Allah’s names and attributes mentioned in the Quran and the authentic Sunna, in accordance to their Arabic meaning. Without any of these sub-concepts, a Muslim loses his true creed. Submission to God, therefore, is not a personal or public act but the focal point that engulfs members of Muslim society in all aspects of their lives. Consequently, the distinction between the personal and the public is replaced by the distinction between the religious and the non-religious or Islamic and un/Islamic”.

The traditional Salafi movement has tended to use cyber sphere to reach a large segment of young Muslims in the West, who are looking for greater accommodation between their religious practice and liberal expectations within their host societies. Of course, this response is also present in other Islamic schools of thought. Interestingly, the critique of (Western) modernity within the Salafi movement led to the classification of these websites as conservative and moderate. The moderate Salafi movement tends to adopt a policy of outreach, to foster greater understanding of Islam.

In its attempt to construct their religious authority, Conservative Salafi websites, such as Salaf-us-Saalih.com, stats that its Fatwas are constructed in a very orthodox way, and emphasize the formal education, high credit and the moral integrity of its scholars, as embodying the proper Islamic way of the decision making. The website explains that the process of decision making is ruled by a strict legalistic pattern of Islamic jurisprudence; especially when the Holy Qur’an doesn’t give a clear guidance about some topic, as a secondary source the Sunna (customary tradition) is consulted. The Sunna is a collection of deeds, sayings and approvals of the Prophet. These traditions are called ‘Ahādīth’ and their validity is carefully examined. The website explains that the authentication of the Hadith is based on the message itself and a chain of narrators. There is an old and extensively developed legal science involving classifying every ‘Hadith’ and its narrators according to their trustworthiness. The most valuated Hadith is the one with an uninterrupted chain of narrators who were all reliable and trustworthy people. The website states that the rulings are based only on such authentic sources, because they explain that God has divided the Muslim community into two groups, the People of Knowledge, ‘Ahl adh-Dhikr’, and those who depend on them. The latter are advised to seek the guidance of the People of Knowledge, particularly in the matters of law and religion. Insufficiently educated people are strongly discouraged from making their own, potentially false, interpretations.

This website tends to adopt a more radical version of Islam, especially in regard to Muslim minorities in the West. This radical version discourages Muslims from residing in Western countries and adopting the unbeliever's nationality. This is clearly manifested in their Fatwa
section, in an answer by Sheikh Rabee’ Al-Madkhalee to a question posted by a British Young Muslim on: "the ruling on residing in the lands of the unbelievers in order to escape the injustice of rulers in some Muslim countries? And the ruling on taking a British nationality".

Sheikh Rabee’ Al-Madkhalee argued that: "Allah knows best, 90% of those who go to Europe and America go there not because any government is chasing them. Even if a government is trying to pursue a Muslim, he should be patient and live in his own country, even in prison, it is better for him than going to Europe and America, especially since these [countries] have measures and policies to recruit Muslims into their societies, to Christianize them and convert them to atheists and heretics. Many people go [to other counties] without being pursued. They go to eat and drink and serve the Jews and Christians in their countries, degrading themselves and Islam. Allah bless you, He has promised he will provide your sustenance, whoever fears Allah and obeys Him, He will make a way out for him and sustain him from where he would not imagine (Quran 65: 3). All you have to do is fear Allah the Mighty and Majestic and obey Him and your provision will come from places you would not imagine. But the devil beautifies for him the idea of going to the West, so he can live there the life of cattle, first in derision and meekness, and then in tribulation and danger surrounding him and his family. When your child is six years old, where will he study? He will study in the schools of the Jews, atheists, secularists and Christians, and they will teach him their way of life, and they will not distinguish [between Muslims and non-Muslims] in this regard, may Allah bless you. Adopting an unbelieving foreign nationality instead of an Islamic one has been declared an act of Kufr by some scholars. A person does not take this nationality except after becoming prepared by submitting to the laws of these countries and aligning his loyalty to them and his enmity for those who go against them. He might also be prepared by fighting [for them]. If the Islamic army approached the unbelievers Land, he [would have to] face the Islamic army because he has become a soldier for the enemies of Allah and is prepared. They might enlist and prepare him to fight the Muslims in their own lands, as has occurred in Afghanistan. They recruited Muslims to fight the Afghans and a fatwa? (Religious edict) was issued by some corrupt scholars stating it is allowed for [a Muslim] to fight the Muslims to confirm his nationality and his allegiance to America. This is the fatwa of Al-Qaradawi, who occupies a great status amongst Muslims due to this fatwa? It is obligatory upon Muslims to migrate [back] to their lands when they hear of these actions and attempts to integrate and merge them into the Western societies". 1

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Moderate Salafi websites, such as IslamQ&A.com, allow Muslim residency in Western societies, but it spreads confusing messages as regards integration and adaptation into the host community in different fatwa in the jurisprudence sub-section of its Muslim minorities section. The Muslim minorities section has the following subsections: Acts of Worship; Family; Ruling for jobs; Calling to Islam; Food and Nourishment; and Alliance and Amity, Disavowal and Enmity.

In these sections, they concentrate on teaching Muslim minorities how to live in the world and become good, knowledge about what is right and what is wrong, what is socially appropriate and what kind of behavior applies in which situations. Or, as they stated: "every Muslim should learn about appropriate Islamic behavior during her/his life, in school and through family". Knowledge is often classified as Islamic/un-Islamic and halal/haram. The traffic on the site indicates that there is a substantial desire for such guidance.

Sheikh Ibn Uthaymeen responded to a young Muslim who asked if it is permissible "to work for a company that is owned by a Christian, who makes fun of Islam and hates Muslims in the case of necessity?"

He argued: "We advise this brother who works with the non-believers to seek work where there are none of the enemies of Allah and His Messenger who follow a religion other than Islam. If this is possible, then this is what he should do. If it is not possible then there is nothing wrong with it, because he is doing his job and they are doing theirs, but that is on condition that there be no fondness or love or feelings of friendship towards them in his heart, and that he adhere to the rulings of Islam concerning greeting them, returning their greetings, and so on. Also, he should not attend their funerals or celebrations, and he should not congratulate them on their festival".

Another Muslim, working in an American company, asked: "if I can sit with colleagues in business trips or functions when they are drinking alcohol. Am I doing sin by just sitting or being with them when I am not drinking or doing anything against the teachings of my religion? If I don't participate in those functions, maybe I will jeopardize my Job".

The fatwa that was issued encouraged him to: "be proud of the teachings of your religion, and strive to apply them, and not to do anything that you are forbidden to do. This is something that will raise you in status and increase your reward. Staying with them even though you are not

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drinking alcohol yourself is still a sin in itself, because Allah has commanded us not to sit in places where evil is committed, otherwise what befalls those who are committing the evil action will also befall us”3.

Interestingly, they permitted students who asked whether "they could work in restaurants that sell wine or offer meals containing pork or other haram things" to work in these restaurants, because: "If a Muslim cannot find work that is permissible according to Sharia, he may work in restaurants run by unbeliever 'kaafirs', so long as he himself does not directly deal with pouring wine or carrying it or making it or selling it. The same applies to serving pork and other haram things”4.

Salafi scholars considered the duty of Dawa, by these minorities, is an important condition for allowing them to live in these non-Muslim countries. In a fatwa, issued to a Muslim living in England on how to serve his religion; the Imam emphasized: "serving Islam by forming bonds with scholars who practice what they preach, those who are known to be sincere and who are well established in jihad and supporting this religion. Marching under their banner and following their lead is very good and beneficial. , you should make Dawa to those whom you see every day and to those whom you see once a week”.

The Salafi scholars discouraged social integration in non-Muslim societies. In a Fatwa issued answering a question by a Muslim about whether "a Muslim is allowed to celebrate a non Muslim religious holidays like Thanksgiving and Christmas?"

It was argued: "haram, by consensus, as Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, said in Ahkaam Ahl al-Dhimma: "Congratulating the non-believers, 'kuffaar', on the rituals that belong only to them is haram by consensus, as is congratulating them on their festivals and fasts by saying ‘A happy festival to you’ or ‘May you enjoy your festival,’ and so on. It is like congratulating someone for prostrating to the cross, or even worse than that. It is as great a sin as congratulating someone for drinking wine, or murdering someone, or having illicit sexual relations, and so on. Many of those who have no respect for their religion fall into this error; they do not realize the offensiveness of their actions. Whoever congratulates a person for his disobedience or bid’ah or kufr exposes himself to the wrath and anger of Allah." They emphasized that: "Congratulating the 'kuffaar' on their religious festivals is haram to the extent described by Ibn al-Qayyim because it implies that one accepts or approves of their rituals of kufr, even if one would not accept those

things for oneself. But the Muslim should not accept the rituals of kufr or congratulates anyone else for them, because Allah does not accept any of that at all, as He says (interpretation of the meaning): If you disbelieve, then verily, Allah is not in need of you, He likes not disbelief for His slaves. And if you are grateful (by being believers), He is pleased therewith for you". (The Quran, 39:7). So congratulating them is forbidden, whether they are one’s colleagues at work or otherwise. If they greet us on the occasion of their festivals, we should not respond, because these are not our festivals, and because they are not festivals which are acceptable to Allah. These festivals are innovations in their religions, and even those which may have been prescribed formerly have been abrogated by the religion of Islam, with which Allah sent Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) to the whole of mankind. Allah says: (whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will never be accepted of him, and in the Hereafter he will be one of the losers." (The Quran, 3:85) It is haram for a Muslim to accept invitations on such occasions, because this is worse than congratulating them as it implies taking part in their celebrations. Similarly, Muslims are forbidden to imitate the kuffaar by having parties on such occasions, or exchanging gifts, or giving out sweets or food, or taking time off work, etc., because the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "Whoever imitates a people is one of them." Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah said in his book “Iqtidaa’ Al-Siraat Al-Mustaqeem Mukhaalifat Ashaab Al-Jaheem”: "Imitating them in some of their festivals implies that one is pleased with their false beliefs and practices, and gives them the hope that they may have the opportunity to humiliate and mislead the weak". Whoever does anything of this sort is a sinner, whether he does it out of politeness or to be friendly, or because he is too shy to refuse, or for whatever other reason, because this is hypocrisy in Islam, and because it makes the kuffaar feel proud of their religion. Allah is the One Whom we ask to make the Muslims feel proud of their religion, to help them adhere steadfastly to it, and to make them victorious over their enemies, for He is the Strong and Omnipotent".5.

Similarly, they encouraged young Muslim generations in the West to avoid participating in non-Islamic activities, such as collecting donation for charitable purposes. A young American Muslim asked: "In my school it is Christmas time? My school has this Christmas tradition. Every year a classroom gets an adopted family that is poor so they can buy gifts, food, and donate money to them for Christmas. Unfortunately, I have refused to donate any money or give any food for the

following reason: -These denotations will be done in the name of Christmas, so that when the adopted family receives these donations, they will say "God Bless the Christians". Am I right for refusing to give donations?"

The fatwa issued in response to this enquiry, by Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid, stated that: "The festivals of the Christians are part of their religion, and if the Muslims venerate the festivals of the unbelievers, 'kuffaar" by expressing joy and giving gifts, this means that they are imitating them. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, “Whoever imitates a people is one of them.” Muslims must beware of imitating the Christians in their festivals and of following the customs that belong only to them. You did well and you did the right thing when you did not agree to collect donations for poor families on the occasion of Christmas, so adhere to that and advise your brothers and explain to them that this action is not permissible, because we Muslims have no festivals apart from Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adhaa. Allah has given us these two festivals and we have no need of the festivals of the kaafirs. If we Muslims want to give in charity, we can give to those who really deserve it, and we should not aim to do that specifically on the days of the kaafirs’ festivals. We should do that whenever there is a need, and make the most of good and great occasions such as the month of Ramadan and the first ten days of Dhu’l-Hijjah, and other virtuous occasions when rewards are multiplied. We should also do that at times of hardship" 6

At the same time, he encouraged young Muslims not to: "imitate the disbelievers in customs, habits and matters of outward appearance and conduct that are characteristic of them. This includes shaving the beard, letting the moustache grow long, and speaking their languages, except when necessary, as well as matters of clothing, food and drink, etc." 7

Salafis scholars, such as Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid and Sheikh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen, consider the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic countries forbidden, if they are able to migrate to Islamic countries. They argue that: "Nobody will be excused for staying in a disbeliever, 'kaafir', country except for those who are truly weak and oppressed and cannot migrate, or those who stay among them for a valid religious purpose such as spreading Islam in these countries. It is forbidden to live among them when there is no need to do so. Travelling to their countries for vacations and leisure purposes, but going there for a legitimate reason – such as medical treatment, trade, and

learning specialized skills that cannot be obtained in any other way – is permitted in cases of need, and when the need has been fulfilled, it is obligatory to return to the Muslim world. This permission is also given under the condition that the would-be traveler has sufficient knowledge to dispel his doubts, to control his physical desires, to demonstrate his religion, to be proud of being Muslim, to keep away from evil places, and to be aware and cautious of the plots of his enemies. It is also permissible, and even obligatory, to travel to their lands for the sake of preaching and spreading Islam. Praising them and their civilization and culture, defending them, and admiring their behavior and skills, without taking note of their false ideology and corrupt religion." 8

On the question of obtaining a non-Muslim country’s nationality, Sheikh Abd-Allaah Ibn Jibreen argued that: "If a person is compelled to seek the nationality of a kaafirs state because he has been forced to leave his own country and he can find no (Muslim) country to give him refuge, then this is permissible, on the condition that he is able to practice his religion openly. But with regard to obtaining unbeliever nationality for purely worldly purposes, I do not think that this is permissible". 9

Interestingly, despite the fact that they do not approve of the residency and integration of Muslims in non-Islamic societies, Salafi scholars have permitted political participation. In a fatwa, by Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid, he stated that: "This is a matter concerning which rulings may differ according to different circumstances in different times and places. There is no absolute ruling that covers all situations, both real and hypothetical. In some cases it is wrong to vote, such as when the matter will have no effect on the Muslims, or when the Muslims have no effect on the outcome of the vote.

In this case voting or not voting is all the same. The same applies in cases where all the candidates are equally evil or where they all have the same attitude towards Muslim may be the case that the interests of Islam require Muslims to vote so as to ward off the greater evil and to reduce harmful effects, such as where two candidates may be non-Muslims but one of them is less hostile towards Muslims than the other, and Muslims’ votes will have an impact on the outcome of the election. In such cases there is nothing wrong with Muslims casting their votes in favor of the less evil candidate. In any case, this is the matter of ijtihad based on the principle of weighing up the pros and cons, what is in the interests of Islam and what is detrimental. With regard to this matter, we

have to refer to the people of knowledge who understand this principle. We should put the question to them, explaining in detail the circumstances and laws in the country where the Muslim community is living, the state of the candidates, the importance of the vote, the likely benefits, and so on. No one should imagine that anyone who says that it is OK to vote is thereby expressing approval or support for disbelieving, 'kufr'. It is done in the interests of the Muslims, not out of love for disbeliever and its people. The Muslims rejoiced when the Romans defeated the Persians, as did the Muslims in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) when the Negus defeated those who had challenged his authority. This is well known from history. Whoever wants to be on the safe side and abstain from voting is allowed to do so. This response applies only to elections for influential positions". 10

They also permit Muslims to serve in the armies of their host countries, as long as they do not wage war against Muslims or those who have entered into a treaty with Muslims. Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Saalih al-'Uthaymeen answered a question from a Muslim living in the United States: "What is the ruling on Muslims serving in the military of non Muslim country? What is the evidence for its permissibility or prohibition? And lastly, what is the status of a Muslim working to help those in the military to fulfill their obligations to Allah while serving in the Army, Navy, or whatever? He responded: "Military matters are problematic, because they involve helping these unbelievers, 'Kuffar', to wage war against the Muslims or those who have entered into a treaty with the Muslims. If no such thing is involved, it may be advantageous for Muslims to work in these armies so as to learn their secrets and be aware of their potential evil. In other words, if working in these armies could be of benefit, it may be permissible, otherwise it is not allowed. On this basis, if a person works as a preacher or imam or muezzin, serving the Muslims and calling non-Muslims to Islam, then there is nothing wrong with this”11.

All forms of Salafi ideology are based on reforming and purifying individuals and communities on the basis of returning to the real/pure Islam of the Qur'an and prophetic Sunna, as understood and practiced by the early Muslims, 'Al-Salaf Al-Salih. They are convinced that living in an Islamic community will protect them from the evils of other societies and reinforce their unity in the face of Islam’s enemies.

This position clearly supports Roy’s (2010), argument that fundamentalism is a symptom of, rather than a reaction against, the increasing secularization of society. Whether it takes the form of the

Christian right in the United States, or Salafists purists in the Muslim world, fundamentalism is not about restoring a more authentic, and deeply spiritual, religious experience. It is instead a manifestation of ‘holy ignorance’. Roy’s biting term is meant to characterize the worldview of those who, having lost both their theology and their roots, subscribe to ideas as incoherent, as they are ultimately futile. The most important thing to know about those urging the restoration of a lost religious authenticity is that they are sustained by the very forces they denounce.

Unsurprisingly, Salafi views on the residency of Muslims in non-Muslim countries, and their attitude to role Muslim minorities should be playing in Western countries is criticized by the vast majority of both generations of my respondents. This disconnection between the Salafi ideology and the members of the focus group is a product of both the existence of this group in a culturally different setting from that of their pre-immigration communities and (as we will see later in this section) their tendency to create a global Islam. This globalization of religion, Roy (2010) stresses, does not marginalize religion, but isolates it from culture: independent of its origins, a globalizing religion can free itself via a “virtual space” that ignores “social and political constraints”. Fundamentalism, no less than secularism, becomes then an export, and converts seek it out. In the past, whole nations were forced to convert by top-down mandates from-invaders or rulers; today, individuals break away from their parent culture to grow up into a new religious identity chosen by themselves. Not only that, but the real source of this dissatisfaction for young Muslims, Mandaville (2001: 122-23) argues: “relates to a much broader issue, the question of whether the older generation is able to engage with Western society and to produce an Islam for this particular habitat. The religious leaders (Imams, Ulama and sheikhs), are viewed as particularly problematic in this regard: These Ulama often seem to be living in a different world; they have very little sense of the important issues of the day. They have fixed minds and are very fixed in their views.” This disconnection between the traditional conservative religious Ulama and the younger generation of Muslims in the diaspora is clear. In this vein, a second generation male participant described the Salafi Ulama and views as: “frozen in history and their ideas are out dated. They need to join the twenty first century and understand that living in your own society does not guarantee anything in the time of Google, Skype, Satellite TV and cyber revolution.”

Similarly, a female participant argued that:
"(the Salafi rejection of) all entertaining distractions: music, theatre and places of pleasure and entertainment such as cafés, discotheques, dance clubs, perfume, the cinema, television and photographs, because they are considered part of infidel cultures is misleading because all these activities and worse is performed in Muslim societies. They need to join the 21st century. They remained me of the Sheikh in the Sunday school in the Mosque, my parents made go to when I was young".

A firm distinction is drawn in Salafi ideology between the members of the community and outsiders, or Muslims and non-Muslims. The Salafi ideology associates the outside people with unbelieving, 'Shirk', and heresy, 'Bida', with their lives considered to be removed from true Islam i.e. 'Tawhid'. This view was largely criticized in both focus groups. It was argued that, first, Western societies cannot be described as unbeliever societies. In Islamic theology, both Christians and Jews are described as the People of the Book. A first generation, male participant emphasized:

"This group are confused and misled. They need to go back and read the Quran, understand the Sunna and understand the history of Islam. The Quran teach us that the nearest to us is those who call themselves Christians." He quoted the verse "You will surely find the most intense of the people in animosity toward the believers [to be] the Jews and those who associate others with Allah; and you will find the nearest of them in affection to the believers those who say, "We are Christians." That is because among them are priests and monks and because they are not arrogant". (The Quran, 5:82).

Similarly, a second generation, female participant contended that:

"If the Salafi looked carefully and studied the History of Islam, they will understand the prophet and his Four Guided Caliphs attitude towards other religions and other communities. Christians are believers. They believe in one God".

The Salafi argue that Muslims must reject any form of imitation of non-Muslims, such as patterns of dress, performance, and social relationships. They emphasize: first, the duty of preaching to Islam from minorities living in the West; and, second, the building of an ideal, alternative, parallel society free from Western cultural influence and control. This society will become an example that represents the virtues of Islam and the Islamic system.

For almost all of the first and the second generations this is a double standards vision, or, as a first generation, male described it:
"Double faced. On one hand they consider non-Muslims infidel and unbelievers and ask us not to deal with them; and on the other hand they live in these unbelievers societies, protected by their systems and benefit from their social services. They spend the unbeliever's tax money to raise their children".

In the same vein, a second generation, female participant argued that:

"How are we going to set an example for the others, if we are not allowed to interact socially with them. We need to attend their important festivals whether religious or social, so that they attend ours and become familiar with our Islamic festivals and traditions."

Similarly, a second generation, male participant contended:

"They should have learned from the early Muslim, 'Al-Salaf Al-Salih', how to respect and protect the dignity of the others. They need to read the history and see how Muslims and non-Muslims were friends and lived in harmony in Medina and other parts of the Islamic state."

In a similar way, a first generation female doctor argued that:

"The greatest thing about the Islamic religion is its capability to absorb and integrate what is best in philosophy, politics, economics, science, and history without the need to disclaim the validity of Islam itself. Islam teaches us to embrace the others and be part of Humanity but the Salafi seems to be afraid from the others. If they know Islam, they will understand the true power of the Islamic revelation as an eternal message capable of meeting the needs that arise from development, modernity and civilization."

4.4.2 The Moderate Islamic 'Wasatiyya' Websites:

Moderate Islamic websites reflect a moderate version of Islam or what is known as 'Wasatiyya'. Here, good examples are IslamOnline.net, which is one of the world's largest Muslim websites, whose main scholar, Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, is the founder of the contemporary, moderate, Islamic school of jurisprudence and the school of the jurisprudence of minorities; and AskImam.com.org, which was established by the South African Jurist Ibrahim Desai. These websites have different sections that include news, current affairs and opinions. However, the most important section is the fatwa section, which deals with issues concerning the daily life and legal status of both Muslims in Islamic countries and Muslim minorities in the West.
The Islamonline.net administrative office is in Doha. Its content is managed and owned by the Qatari Cultural Society, Al-Balagh. It’s a bilingual website that provides its services in both English and Arabic and offers detailed information about Islam, the Prophet Muhammad and the two sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and the Sunna, as well as articles on Islamic history. The pages in English mainly address Muslims from a non-Arabic speaking background, as well as non-Arabic and non-Muslim users. The site structure changes and expands regularly, but the Arabic and English sections are tailored to appeal to their respective audiences. This website is divided into four sections: news; opinions; Muslim minorities; and Islamic movements.

Each of the featured topics or sections is managed by one, or several editors, whose approach and convictions shape the sections and sub-sections of the site. An editorial board supervises content production. The importance of this website lies in its ability to provide immediate responses to the questions and issues raised by Muslims and rests on the popularity of Dr. Al-Qaradawi. As such, for ordinary Muslims it is "the most prominent of this online quorum" (Bunt, 2003: 117).

The goals, as stated by the website, are to: teach and familiarize Muslims with various aspects of their religion; be a source for guiding people to Islam; respond to users’ questions and inquiries to the best of their resources and capabilities; and assist in solving the social and personal problems of Muslims in an Islamic context.

The finance for the website comes from the worldwide marketing of Halal products and the imaginativeness of the operators. The market for "Muslim" products has grown in recent years, especially in Europe and America, where new perceptions of identity, associated with consumption, success and individual spirituality have developed among young Muslims. In recent years, IOL’s know-how and expertise in website production has become another important source of income. Its employees design and support the Internet sites of other institutions. (Arab, Media and Society, 2008)

Qaradawi.net is Dr. Al-Qaradawi’s official website. It’s also a bilingual website that provides its services in English and Arabic. The website is divided into eight sections: the main page; news and reports; religious rules and regulations, 'Fatwa and Ahkam'; interviews and articles; documents and data, Al-Qaradawi’s student association; audio-visual section; and Al-Qaradawi Library.

The Content of the Sites:

12. www.islamonline.net/eng/section, viewed 29/10/2011
Both websites deal with the issues that face Muslims in their daily life. These issues are classified under three categories: political; social; and religious. Political issues are further divided into two categories: current political affairs in Islamic countries; and the political participation of Islamic minorities in the West. This is clearly reflected in the News and Reports sections of both websites. Two important approaches are evident. The first approach aims to establish an independent, trustworthy, source of information, in order to create a network of information shared by different Islamic communities. By reporting this news from Islamic countries and host countries, these sites encourage different communities to exchange and share their experiences, to construct a unified common goal to achieve the Umma. Minorities news, such as the opening of an Islamic Art Museum in New York or the launch of TV ads that are sponsored by My Peace organization to promote Islamic values in Australia, are praised. They are viewed as an effort that must be imitated by other Muslim communities and Islamic minorities in the West to change the: "misconceptions about Islam in response to the negative stereotypes and false images that are generally used to depict Islam and Muslims in the mainstream media" 13

This is seen as especially the case because the: "majority of public opinion polls taken in the last four years show that the views of Americans about Islam continue to be a casualty of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Washington Post/ABC News polls from 2006, for example, found that nearly half of Americans regard Islam "unfavorably," while one in four admits to prejudicial feelings against Muslims. American views of the Muslim world are so colored by the conflict in the Middle East and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that U.S. citizens have no collective appreciation of the fact that most Muslims live in Asia". The site argues that such efforts: "will encourage mutual respect and understanding between non-Muslims and Muslims around the world as well as marking a concerted effort to become better educated about the multifaceted societies that comprise the one billion-strong Muslim population throughout the world." 14

Revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen are covered by these websites and related to the main goal of forming strong Muslim consciousness and addressing the misconceptions about Islam, especially in relation to the controversial issues of political participation and women's rights.

Farwin Fousdeen, a Sri Lankan writer from the Islamonline.net editorial team, wrote under the title "Daughters of Revolution: Egypt’s Women Spur Sisterhood, Shatter Stereotypes".

"She has no voice. She’s uneducated. She’s forced to wear the hijab. She’s compelled to marry a man three times her age. She silently suffers her husband’s beatings. She has no freedom of movement. She’s oppressed. She has a bomb hidden under her burqa! Yes, the Muslim woman has heard it all. Then Egypt ....Asmaa Mahfouz is a Hijabi and has become a symbol in the country’s women movement....... This is Egypt’s new face, the one which is part women, women attired according to the tenets of Islam that is. This is all very new to a world used to the Western educated and (sometimes) Western domiciled, ‘liberal’ women who lead the way in the women’s movements. Egypt’s own, New York based columnist and public speaker Mona Eltahawy ("the woman who’s explaining Egypt to the West") and self-exiled feminist writer and activist Nawal al Saadawi are but two examples. Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned; or hell a fury like a woman scorned. The women of the revolution will forever remain a case study example to women’s movements worldwide. Brief messages by cyber activists did what women’s organizations have been trying to do for decades – bring all organizations under one ‘umbrella organization’ and spur collective action for the ‘common’ good. Its sisterhood never witnessed before. To those who continue to frown ‘down’ on Muslim women, I say this, down with your stereotype!”

This article is welcomed by many website visitors who see women’s participation in these movements as indicating that Justice to Islam has been served. Political news such as the Nahda party victory in the last Tunisian election is welcomed as a victory for the Islamic recovery movement, the moderate Islamic school and the Islamic Umma, and as indicating: "Islamic nation will not return back, after Muslims removed the fear and humiliation from themselves." Both Dr. Al-Qaradawi and Al-Nahad leader Rashid Al-Ganoshi announced, after their meeting on the 29/10/2011, that "this year is the best year in the history of the nation because it witnessed the fall of a number of tyrants, the first of them Zine El Abidin, Hosni Mubarak, Gaddafi and welcomed the revolution in both Yemen and Syria".

Dr. Qaradawi stressed that "they will fight with other dedicated Imams all forms of void, injustice and dictatorship, promising that no matter how long the falsehood remains; it is transient because the right always prevails" 16

In his attempt to form a single Muslim consciousness and a unified front, he encouraged Muslims to reject the term political Islam and consider it a misleading notion that is adopted by the "opponents of Islam" to divide the Umma by using different notions to classify Islam such as: regions, "Asian Islam, African Islam,...etc"; ages, " Umayyad Islam, Abbasid Islam, Ottoman Islam and modern Islam"; race, "Arab Islam, Indian Islam, Turkish Islam, and Malaysian Islam"; and doctrines, "Sunni Islam and Shiite Islam". He insists that there is only one Islam that "revealed by God", and any form of labeling Islam should be rejected, especially those that classify Islam as: "revolutionary Islam, radical, classic, right-wing, leftist, orthodox, spiritual, theological, and first among all this political Islam".

In contrast, he argues that the "truth is that these divisions are all unacceptable; there is only one Islam without any kind of classification and recognition. Islam means the Quran, the Sunna and as understood by the Companions and their followers". 17

The second approach concentrates on introducing scholars/Ulama and organizations which are part of, or relate to, these websites, such as the International Union of Muslim Scholars, headed by Dr. Al-Qaradawi, as independent bodies which are not influenced or controlled by any political authority or ideology; and, most importantly, are not part of official Islam. This is clearly reflected in, first, the discussion of current news from different Islamic countries, which is independently reported by the Islamonline news agency; and, second, the position of these jurists on is called "the Arab Spring", in Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, which Dr. Al-Qaradawi considers to be a form of Jihad against an aggressive and unjust ruler. Indeed, he describes the demonstrators and fighters as Mujahidin and the causalities as Martyrs.

Al-Qaradawi (2008) called for peaceful resistance/jihad and lists four conditions under which armed struggle, or aggressive jihad, would be permitted in Islam: to remove all obstacles to the propagation of Islam; as preemptive warfare in the interests of the Islamic state; to rescue people (Muslims and non-Muslims) from oppressive rulers; and to enable religious cleansing of Arabia to eliminate all non-Muslim religions. This opinion was posted on IslamOnline.net in an attempt to defend Al-Qaradawi's, and moderate's jurists', position against criticism from extremists/radical conservative Ulama, who argue that moderates don't accept offensive jihad.

This position was clearly reflected in two main ways: first, in the call by the International Union of Muslim Scholars in the Qaradawi.net news section for a solidarity Friday with the people of Yemen on the second of November 2011; and, second, in the issuing of (a) fatwa, published in the Al-Rai Newspaper in Kuwait on 13 August 2011, describing the Assad's regime in Syria as heretical and calling on Muslims and Islamic countries to sever ties with it.

This fatwa stated that: "Allah the Supreme said: 'Your guardian can be only Allah; and His messenger and those who believe' [Koran 5:55]. What has befallen our Muslim brothers in Syria compels the scholars to state the truth and deny the lies [regarding] the revolution [of the Syrian people]. This includes: 'first, It is a duty to assist the Syrian people with words and actions, since this is part of the alliance [among the] believers, and a tenet of the faith. Allah the Supreme said: 'And if they seek help of you for the religion, then you must help...' [Koran 8:72]; Second, it is a duty to condemn the murders, torture, and imprisonments carried out by the Syrian regime, and to rule that the Ba'th regime is heretical for its words and actions. Allah the Supreme said: 'But whoever kills a believer intentionally – his recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide eternally, and Allah has become angry with him and has cursed him and has prepared for him a great punishment.' [Koran 4:93]; third, It is forbidden to collude with the Syrian regime or to support its actions. He who does [so is] aiding the oppressor, and is an oppressor himself. Allah the Supreme said: 'Do not cooperate in sin and aggression.' [Koran 5:2]; fourth, every ambassador of the Syrian regime must resign his position. He cannot continue [to be a part] of this oppressive regime; fifth, Arab countries and the Islamic countries in particular, should assist the Syrian people and meet its financial, nutritional, and medical needs. This is considered financial jihad for the sake of Allah; and finally, it is a duty to sever [all] official ties, political, financial, cultural, and in the domain of media – with the Syrian regime. "We call on the religious scholars in Syria to disassociate them from the regime and speak the truth, in order to help the Syrians, who know more than anyone
about the corruption of the regime. Allah the Supreme said: 'and do not conceal testimony, for whoever conceals it – his heart is indeed sinful' [2:283]. 18

The position of the International Union of Muslim Scholars is different from the position of institutions that are considered part of the official Islam, such as Al-Azhar in Cairo or the Senior Scholars of Saudi. They are not only enhancing their independence from official Islamic institutions and agencies, but they also increase their power to influence advice and become an independent religious authority for Muslims. Such powers are exercised by the International Union for Muslim scholars (IUMS) at different levels.

First, they encourage Muslims, the intellectuals and the leaders of the army to join the revolutionaries in their countries: "We recommend that the Libyan people with patience and persistence, such as what is recommended by the sons of Egypt, and invite scholars, judges and university professors, and all groups to come out on Qadhafi and his refusal to be ruler of Libya" (Qaradawi, interview on Al-Gezira TV 29/02/2011).

Second, they emphasis the rules about war and peace in Islam, such as in the statement published in OnIslam.net, where the International Union of Islamic Scholars congratulates the revolutionaries in Libya for their blessed victory and urges them to follow the war ethics of Islam, which include not killing prisoners of war, even if they are war criminals, not killing injured prisoners and ensuring the safety of their families and supporters, including submitting the previous leaders to a fair trial.

Third, they address rulers and encourage them to implement both political and social changes, as is clear in the letter sent by Dr. Al-Qaradawi to the King of Saudi Arabia, encouraging him to make wise and fruitful decisions, such as "allowing women to run in both the municipal and local councils, and the Shura Council", so showing the nation that gradual change is wise and favorable. He also encouraged the King to allow Muslim women to: "practice leadership and become independence and drive their cars like other Muslim countries". Finally, he explained to the king that: "what is forbidden 'haram' by God is clearly stated in his book, or explicitly stated by the Prophet".

18. This Fatwa has been signed and approved by, the head and the secretary-general of the International Union of Muslim Scholars: secretary-general Dr. Ali Al-Fardaqi; Head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars – Dr. Yousif Al-Qaradawi. “The International Union of Muslim Scholars has endorsed the Fatwa.”
Fourth, and most importantly, their religious power and leadership allows them to influence political change and to give legitimacy to political bodies, such as the Libyan National Council and the Syrian National Council, rather than to Islamic governments or official Islamic institutions.

They also encourage governments and religious institutions in Islamic countries to follow the Council’s footsteps in recognizing these movements and congratulate institutions, such as Al-Azhar, for their declaration that: "Ensure the support of the Arab peoples to claim their legitimate rights for freedom, respect for their human rights and social justice among members of the society, and the declaration that any confrontation or the use of force and violence against peaceful protest is a violation of the Charter between the nation and its rulers". 19

Fifth, they declared that the religious rules issued by state jurists and institutions, for example, in the case of Yemen, were illegal. So, Dr. Al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa condemning the statement of the Association of Yemen Ulama/Jurists prohibiting demonstrations against the existing regime because they were considered to be against the Islamic rule that orders Muslims to obey their rulers: "O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result" (4:59)

Dr. Al-Qaradawi declared that these Jurists are unfit to issue such rules, because they overlooked the religious rules and conditions under which Muslims are ordered to obey those in authority. First, the leader has to be elected by Muslims under the principle of Shura, which is the principle of the devolution of power in the Islamic political system. This is not the case for Ali Salih's regime.

Second, the constitution of Yemen which granted the Yemeni people freedom of expression and free elections is considered by Islam to be a binding agreement.

Third, Islam only prohibits people from revolting against or disobeying a ruler who implements not only the Islamic Sharia laws, but also the whole system of Islam. Fourth, these jurists, instead of legitimizing the existing regime, should have advised the existing tyranny not to terrorize the innocents, killing peaceful demonstrators, and warned the military and the security forces of the religious rule on killing innocent Muslims.

Fifth, the international Union of Islamic Scholars declared in a statement that the protection of both the Syrian and Yemeni people is a holy duty of every Muslim and congratulated and encouraged the League of Arab countries on their firm position against the Syrian Government. 20

Finally, they issued a Fatwa permitting the assassination of unjust rulers who are unjustly killing their citizens. So, Dr. Al-Qaradawi issued a Fatwa on February 2011, in a televised interview on Al-Gezira, encouraging any Libyan soldier who could shoot dead embattled leader Moamer Kaddafi, to do so: “To rid Libya of him, whoever in the Libyan army is able to shoot a bullet at Mr. Kaddafi should do so”. He also encouraged the Libyan soldiers “not to obey orders to strike at your own people” and urged Libyan ambassadors around the world to dissociate themselves from Kaddafi’s regime. 21

By holding these positions, these jurists have become a model of an online authority that challenges both political and religious authorities in Islamic countries. They work to establish a digital Umma, emphasizing the concept of the Islamic Umma.

Both websites have also become an Islamic political platform that allows sensitive questions on social and cultural issues, which face Muslims in both Islamic and non-Islamic societies, to be addressed, in a way which would be impossible in the absence of space or freedom in Islamic countries. This is clearly reflected in the section that deals with Muslim minorities on islamonline.net and in the section on religious rules and regulations in qaradawi.net.

4.5 The integration/adaptation of Muslims Minorities in the West

The opinions manifested in its Fatwa sections reflect a broad range of legal schools and approaches. The scholars giving advice on Islam-Online come from various backgrounds, including al-Azhar graduates and European based muftis, and all possess official qualifications.

Islam Online states in its mission statement that Muslim minorities are an important part of the Islamic Umma, which is why they have dedicated sections discussing the issues that face these minorities in their host communities. These issues are discussed under three categories: social and cultural issues; political participation; and military service. They want to present a positive view of the faith to non-Muslims and to strengthen unity in the Muslim world. Thus, the authors try to stay


away from some controversy-causing issues and besides using classical interpretative methods they often refer to the Holy Bible, scientific arguments and foreign laws.

Social and cultural issues can be classified under three categories. First, there are general issues that affect Islam and Muslim communities in the West, such as the publishing of cartoons that ridicule the Prophet in Denmark and the question of identity and integration, which occupies a subsection in the Muslim minorities section in islamonline.net. Second, there are specific issues that relate to the well-being of a certain community in a specific host country, such as the question of the head-covering, 'hijabs', in French and Spanish schools. Finally, there are personal issues, involving financial transactions, mortgages, marriage and divorce.

Discussion of general issues results either from individual inquiries to jurists on both websites about the duty of Muslims in response to such issues, or as a response to news, policies or international incidents that relate to Muslims, which jurists respond to in the form of statements, advice or declaration. For example, the International Union of Muslims Scholars issued a statement on the insulting Cartoons that were published in Danish and Norwegian magazines (Appendix D). The statement encourages: "the Arab and Muslim governments to express to the Danish and Norwegian governments their Muslim people's anger; exercise all possible political and diplomatic pressure on the Danish and Norwegian governments so as to halt all such organized anti-Islam campaigns that aim at spreading hatred of and contempt for Islam, its sanctities, and its believers"; "ask Arab and Muslim countries to boycott an upcoming Middle East exhibition organized by the Danish Center for Culture and Development (DCCD)". It also: "urges officials in Denmark and Norway to take a firm stance against these repeated insults to the Muslim nation and the Prophet who is followed by 1.3 billion people across the globe, in order to preserve the positive relationship that exists between these two nations and their citizen Muslims as well as other Muslims worldwide. If this does not happen, the IUMS will be forced to urge millions of Muslims across the world to boycott all Danish and Norwegian products and activities".

An example of specific issues which affects the wellbeing of a particular Muslim minority community is provided by the 'Prevent' Policy in Britain 22, which is part of the UK Government's counter terrorism strategy that aimed to control Muslims who are considered as "the enemy within". This policy is discussed in an article by Allia Raffia in Islamonline.net. He argued that this

policy was set in 2007 in response to the 2005 London bombings. It aimed to address radicalization by providing a “counter-narrative” to that of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. The Prevent strategy sought to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and: “is the preventative strand of the government’s ‘counter-terrorism strategy’ overseen by the Home Office”. Such policy is criticized by both the writers and commentators on the website for being: "discriminatory against Muslims"; "stereotyping Muslims as terrorists and Islam as an peaceful religion"; "marginalizing and demonizing the Muslim community further"; "unclear as to what it would ultimately achieve (and) prioritizing the Muslim community over others and offer an opportunity for ‘Muslim Community groups’ to receive governmental funding”.

The question of the head-covering hijabs in French and Spanish schools is highlighted in the news section and discussed in the Fatwa section, in response to individual enquiries to the jurists. Interestingly, the news section discussed the issue on the 26/10/2011 under the title 'Hijab row ignites Islam related controversy in Spain' and related it to the question of Muslim identity. It emphasized that, according to the: "Pew Global Attitudes Survey, religion is central to the identity of Muslims in Spain: nearly 70% identify themselves primarily as Muslim rather than as Spanish. This level of Muslim identification in Spain is similar to rates in Pakistan, Nigeria and Jordan and even higher than levels in Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia". This survey also shows that Muslim immigrants are viewed: "with suspicion by Spanish society and that most Spaniards doubt that Muslims coming to Spain want to adopt their national customs and way of life. Almost 70% of Spaniards say that Muslims in Spain want to remain distinct from the larger society. Almost 80% of the Spanish public sees Muslims as having a strong Islamic identity. Among those in the Spanish general public who see Islamic identity on the rise, 82% say it is a bad thing. Around 65% of Spaniards are somewhat or very concerned about rising Islamic extremism in their country" 23

In their book: *Islam Dot Com: Contemporary Islamic Discourses in Cyberspace*, El-Naway and Khamis (2011) argue that consensus between the participants on these controversial issues was not reached through rational-critical debates among the participants. Rather, it was the result of gender, political or religious homogeneity and the participants’ emotional involvement in the issues at hand.

On the other hand, in an interview with Dr. Al-Qaradawi on the Al-sharia Wa Al-Hayat program, that was broadcasted in Al-Gezira television and published on the 31/12/2003 in qaradawi.net, Dr. Al-Qaradawi advised Muslim women in countries that prohibit the head-covering to: "fight back and do not surrender to such laws but that does not mean to stop going out or get an education" and that they only could take off their head cover "in the utmost necessity where their life hood, their children and their family wellbeing is at risk". 24

Personal issues, such as financial matters and marriage and divorce, are discussed mainly in the forms of religious rules, 'fatwa', and counseling in response to questions and issues raised by Muslims living in non-Islamic countries. According to Bettina Gräf (2008): "religious rules, together with psychological and social counseling constitute the core of IslamOnline.net engagement with its members and visitors".

'Fatwa' on IslamOnline.net are classified under five categories: first, edited fatwa are edited versions of previously-issued fatwa, originating from well-known muftis that Islamonline staff members present in response to user questions; second, the Fatwa Bank is a bank that users access to research previous opinions under the names of the Jurists who issued these opinions; third, live fatwa involves an interactive dialogue between the users and jurists - the users know before the session to which mufti they will put their question. Fourth, the Fatwa of the people is a daily updated section which adds a journalistic flare to Islamic jurisprudence 'fiqh', and presents fatwa linked with top news stories of the day. Finally, in Dossiers Islamonline staff members can also take on the role of the users themselves and raise questions, most of which refer to various current events.

Some complicated, controversial and debatable personal issues are difficult for scholars/jurists to respond to with specific religious fatwa, which transfers them into a public issue discussed by website visitors in related Islamic social Web Pages.

An example was discussed on Islamonline.net on the 7/11/2011, where the question of the remarriage of the missing fighter's wives in Afghanistan was raised. An Afghanistan Mufti claimed that 4,000 women have approached the religious scholars in South Waziristan, North Waziristan and scenic valley of Swat for the said decree within the last year. According to Islamic law, stated

the Mufti: "if a husband is missing for four years, his wife can re-marry after getting a Fatwa from a recognized religious scholar".

Although he acknowledges the sense of insecurity and economic problems as major reasons behind these women’s need to seek a Fatwa, he didn't authorize the re-marrying of these women, because he argues that: "we know where these missing persons are. They are in the custody of the Pakistani security forces. It is hard for us to figure out whether they are alive or dead unless the security forces issue a list of dead and alive". He thinks that issuing a Fatwa at this stage may create serious complications, asking: "What if we issue a Fatwa allowing them (women) to re-marry, and tomorrow their husbands are released?" Therefore, he asserts: "they have to wait until the army clarifies that their husband are dead and he appeals to the security forces that for God’s sake don’t ruin the future of these women and their children. If these missing persons are dead, then just let them know, at least privately, so that they could decide their future". This is because, according to the Mufti: "A sense of insecurity and economic woes may drift many of them to wrong paths".

This position is discussed both in Islamonline and on Facebook and Twitter. Respondents’ views varied from acknowledging the Mufti’s "difficult position", to describing it as "irresponsible, do not consider the state of the world, uncreative and should be transferred to the International council of Muslim Scholars to reach a consent". Other respondents, relate the issue to the Islamic legal concept of vital interest, 'Darura', and quote the verse: "He has not placed any hardship upon you in religion" (Qur'an 22:78). They argue that this does not mean that there will be no hardship in the religion at all, but rather lifts the hardship of things which are beyond the Muslim’s strength, which, if they were continually to bear them, would result in harm to the vital interests of the society. They argue that the Mufti should have considered the situation of these families and helped these women under the principle of the "necessary to protect the religion and interests of the community as a whole".

This principle, according to Sheikh Nuha Kieeler, is the foundation of the modern jurisprudence of minorities, which aims to: "examine past fatwa given in such exceptional circumstances, identify the interests in which they were given, the methodological principles of Islamic jurisprudence (al-qawaid al-fiqhiyya) used, the Qur'an and hadith primary texts cited as evidence--and draw conclusions relevant today. In this particular, it is worth noting again that fatwa may vary with

time, place, and those to whom they are given, in view of the human advantages and disadvantages that the shari'a must take into consideration because of being universally applicable to every place and time". 29

For example, in reference to whether Muslims can live in Western countries, Dr. Taha Alwani argues that: "A historical fatwa given by a Moroccan scholar after the fall of Spain 'Andalus' that it is not permissible for a Muslim to remain in a non-Muslim land where shari'a does not rule "for even a single hour of a single day, because, such fatwa was given in view of the need of the Muslim polity to sever all ties and ways of compromise with the non-Muslim occupiers". This was also the main concern, according to Dr. Alwani, of the fatwa given by the Maliki school of Jurisprudence scholars, at the beginning of this Century, concerning the: "unlawfulness of North-African Muslims taking French citizenship, at a time when France wanted to buttress its hegemony over the area by offering citizenship and passports to Muslims; whereas today, North Africans living in France and elsewhere may very well have a valid need for taking such a foreign nationality". 30

Another fatwa was issued by Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi in Islamonline.net on the question raised by a European Muslim about the position of Islam in relation to his citizenship duties toward the country in which he resides, especially if these conflict with his religious duties. Sheikh Mawlawi answered: "In such case the Muslim should try to make a compromise between the two as much as possible. If he is not able, then he has to choose the more important between them. If he opts for his religious duty, he should then declare his choice, bear the consequences, and accept the legal punishment he may receive for his position. He should also announce clearly the reason behind his choice, stating that the legal duty goes against his religious beliefs.

On the other hand, if he chooses to fulfill his national duties, he may be committing a sin, as far as his religious duties are concerned. However, he may be considered in a state of necessity or coercion and thus be forgiven by Almighty Allah". Sheikh Mawlawi relates his judgment to what is known as "the Fiqh weighing and striking balances", 'fiqh Al- Tawazunaat', so as to choose between the two duties.

He continues: "When a Muslim becomes a citizen within a European state; he or she is subjected to many questions, starting from the legality of this citizenship to how far he or she should be committed to its rights and duties. The legality of a Muslim's citizenship in Europe has been confirmed above, as all European states are committed to the UN Charter and all human rights declarations. Therefore, Muslims are not normally persecuted, even though they may suffer from some acts of harassment. As mentioned earlier, emigration today is not obligatory and probably not even desirable, but it is simply permissible"31.

According to Sheikh Mawlawi, the most important duties required from a Muslim as a European citizen can be summarized as follows. First, a Muslim has the duty of preaching. He quoted the verse: (Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation.) (The Quran, 16:125). Second, a Muslim living within a non-Muslim society has a duty to fight corruption and seek reform in every possible field.

Third, a Muslim is obligated to preserve his or her Islamic identity against dissolution, something a Muslim cannot do individually, no matter how much he or she tries. Collectively, however, Muslims can preserve their identity by forming a strong coherent community that demands its own rights and participates with other citizens in demanding general rights.

Fourth, when a Muslim decides to live in a European country as a citizen, he or she has thus committed himself to the duties of this citizenship. This problem is not restricted to Muslims living in a non-Muslim state, but it also faces Muslims living in, and belonging to, Muslim countries, because most Muslim countries, to varying degrees, are not committed to the application of Sharia. Some are even very close to non-Muslim countries in this regard. For example, just as the Hijab is banned in some secular countries, it is also banned in a number of Muslim countries. Another example is the imposition of secular marriage upon Muslims in some Muslim countries, just as it is imposed in some European countries. He argues: "In both cases, a Muslim should try to bring about reconciliation as much as possible. If he could dispose of the legal duty in a legal way, this would be good. If he could not, however, the Sharia ruling of necessity would apply, and he would thus be excused, (Allah does not impose upon any soul a duty but to the extent of its ability). (The Quran 2:286). 32

Another area that concerns both Muslims living in Western countries and Jurists involves citizenship duties, especially military service. In a fatwa (appendix E) posted on 22/4/2010 on islamopediaonline.org, answering a question from an American Muslims on the position of Islam from Muslim military personnel within the U.S. armed forces participating in the war operations and related efforts in Afghanistan and in other Islamic countries, Dr. Al-Qaradawi stated that: "this question presents a very complicated issue and a highly sensitive situation for our Muslim brothers and sisters serving in the American army as well as other armies that face similar situations, Because all Muslims must be united against all those who terrorize the innocents, and those who permit the killing of non-combatants without a justifiable reason. Islam has declared the spilling of blood and the destruction of property as absolute prohibitions until the Day of Judgment". He quoted the verse: "Because of that we ordained unto the Children of Israel that if anyone killed a human being - unless it be in punishment for murder or for spreading mischief on earth- it would be as though he killed all of humanity; whereas, if anyone saved a life, it would be as though he saved the life of all humanity. And indeed, there came to them our messengers with clear signs (proofs and evidences), even then after that, many of them continued to commit mischief on earth (The Quran, 5:32). 33

Dr. Qaradawi initially argues that, if the terrorist acts took place in the U.S. then those soldiers must defend their country because the principle of ruling for the crime of "Hirabah" (waging war against society) must be applied by Islamic Law (Sharia) or the rules of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). He quoted the verse: "The recompense of those who wage war against God and His Messenger and do mischief on earth is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter. Except for those who (having fled away and then) came back with repentance before they fall into your power; (in that case) know that God is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." (5: 33-34).

Second, he argues that the true perpetrators of these crimes, as well as those who aid and abet them through incitement, financing or other support, must be brought to justice in an impartial court of law and punished appropriately, so that it could act as a deterrent to them and to others like them who easily take the lives of innocents, destroy properties and terrorize people. Hence, it's a duty on Muslims to participate in this effort by all possible means, in accordance with the Quran: "And

help one another in virtue and righteousness, but do not help one another in sin and transgression." (5:2).

On the other hand, Dr. Qaradawi argues that the complexity lies in the fact that: "it's often difficult if not impossible to differentiate between the real perpetrators who are being pursued, and the innocents who have committed no crime at all. The authentic saying by the prophet states: "When two Muslims face each other in fighting and one kills the other, then both the killer and the killed are in the hell-fire. Someone said: we understand that the killer is in hell, why then the one who's being killed? The prophet said: because he wanted to kill the other person"

However, because this Hadith does not address the situation in which a Muslim is a citizen of a state and a member of a regular army, thus soldiers have no choice but to follow orders, otherwise their allegiance and loyalty to their country could be in doubt, which will subject them to harm, since they are citizens and must fulfil their citizenship obligations.

This holds as long as: first, his intention (Niyya) is to fight for the truth and defeat falsehood; second, he aims to prevent aggression on the innocents or to apprehend the perpetrators and bring them to justice; third, he can't control other consequences of the fighting that might result in his personal discomfort, since he individually can neither control it nor prevent it; and, finally, soldiers are part of the army and as Muslims they are part of the Muslim community in their country.

Thus, if they refuse to fight and left the army, their departure will result in a greater harm, not only for them, but also for the Muslim community in their country; thus, their personal hardship must be endured for the greater public good, as the jurisprudence (fiqhi) rule states. Dr. Qaradawi concludes that Islamic jurisprudence rules state that necessities dictate exceptions, as well as the rule that says one may endure a small harm to avoid a much greater harm.

This fatwa was widely discussed by visitors to different Islamic websites. Some suggested that these soldiers could: "serve in the back lines - such as in the relief services' sector and similar works", "should seek permission to stay in America to protect it", or "must fight with their army so that they do not raises doubts about their allegiance or loyalty, cast suspicions, present them with false accusations, harm their future careers, shed misgivings on their patriotism, or similar sentiments". 35

In contrast, others rejected the Fatwa and explained that: "We do not want to relax and feel at ease with these gross errors for verily the situation is serious without any joking. Certainly, the drums of war are beating and thousands of bombs and missiles are being rained down upon a land from the lands of Islam to destroy crops and offspring as well as to spread destruction and demolition in the land. This is simply the beginning as they themselves [the disbelievers] have said. And they shall follow this up in other places as has been planned by the oppressors and it is said to those that choose to close their eyes to that day- tomorrow you will be the fuel of their fire".

They quote two verses: the first is "O you who believe, do not take My enemies and your enemies for friends, expressing love with them, while they have rejected the Truth that has come to you" (The Quran 60:1); and the second is "Allah does not forbid you as regards those who did not fight you on account of faith, and did not expel you from your homes, that you do good to them, and deal justly with them. Surely Allah loves those who maintain justice. Allah forbids you only about those who fought you on account of faith, and expelled you from your homes, and helped (others) in expelling you, that you have friendship with them. Those who develop friendship with them are the wrongdoers" (The Quran, 60:8-9).

Other religious rules are issued in response to personal questions, for example, about bank interest and inter-faith marriage. Dr. Al-Qaradawi permitted Muslims living in non-Islamic countries to deal with non-Islamic banks in different areas, such as mortgages and depositing funds. However, he issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from depositing their money in American Banks. In an answer to an enquiry from a Muslim American on the religious ruling concerning depositing money in American banks, Dr. Qaradawi stated that: "Buyer should not purchase and consume U.S. goods, and the owner of the funds should not deposit his money in America so as not to take advantage of them. Because they may not have control of it, and perhaps they may not be able to take their funds. In fact, the deposit of these funds is a big mistake; the newspaper estimated the Arab funds trillions of dollars from the governments, companies and the private sector. We believe that those who deposit those funds in U.S. banks are cooperating in the sin and aggression against their Umma and Allah says (virtue, righteousness and piety and virtue, sin and Alta) so if you give this money to America, you cooperate with this money on sin and aggression against Muslim countries and assisting the Zionist entity". 36

On the issue of inter-faith marriages, a question was posted to Dr. Qaradawi by a Muslim asking: "I need a fatwa regarding the marriage between a Muslim and a Christian woman?" In response, Dr. Qaradawi (2001) argues that, in general, Muslim men are not permitted to marry non-Muslim women. He quoted the verse: "Do not marry unbelieving women until they believe. A slave woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she allures you.... Unbelievers beckon you to the Fire. But Allah beckons by His Grace to the garden of bliss and forgiveness, and He makes His signs clear to mankind, that they may receive admonition" (The Qur'an 2:221).

However, an exception is made for Muslim men to marry from the People of the Book i.e. Jews and Christians, on the conditions that, first, they are chaste or pious and, second, the children of such a union are always to be raised in the faith of Islam. However, if a Christian or Jewish women has had sex outside of marriage, it is not permissible to marry them. He quotes the verse: "This day are all things good and pure made lawful to you....? Lawful to you in marriage are not only chaste women who are believers, but chaste women among the People of the Book, revealed before your time, when you give them their due dowers, and desire chastity not lewdness. If anyone rejects faith, fruitless is his work, and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost" (The Qur'an 5:5).

He emphasized the principle of antipathy (which means it is not forbidden but hated), because of: "the dangers and appropriateness of marrying a Christian woman that includes: first, if the marriage ends in divorce; the court will almost always and without exception give custody of the children to the woman; second, if the husband tries to leave the US with the children and a court order issues a warrant for his arrest for kidnapping; the Dept. of Justice will send FBI officers to arrest the husband and bring back the children, even if he is overseas. In fact, there are special mercenaries for hire that for a fee will kidnap the children and bring them back to the US; third, many Muslims today are weak in faith and suffer from feelings of inadequacy (due to this lack of faith) in front of Westerners (and in particular white Americans); as a result, it is often that the Christian wife who will control their lives. I know of many cases of Muslims who have married these Christian women and due to the environment have ended up in a case of "virtual" apostasy; and finally, how appropriate is it to marry a Christian woman given that there are many Muslim women who lack husbands? These are not only American sisters, converts and immigrant children who have grown up in this country and who need strong Muslim men to learn Islam from them and take care of them; but what about the tens of millions of Muslim women from Muslim countries
who due to war and displacement live very poor lives and are looking for a Muslim man to teach
them and rescue them from their misery”. 37

Other religious rules address modernity and the use of modern devices, such as personal mobiles,
for Islamic purposes. Here, Al-Azhar Sheikh Ali Gomaa presented a fatwa or religious opinion
against the use of Quran recitation recordings as phone tones. He suggested that: "The usage given
in the present question gets the verses of the Qur'an out of that Sharia context into another one
where they are used to alarm when a call is received. Consequently, one's attention to
contemplating the meanings of the Qur'an verses will be interrupted in order to answer the calls. In
addition, this surely will lead to the abrupt interruption of the verse and thus severance of the
meaning - and even inversion of the meaning at times - upon stopping the recitation (ringtone) to
answer the calls. "The same applies to the Adhan; it is improper to make it a ringtone, as the Adhan
is a notification for the start of Prayer time. Thus, using it as a ringtone brings about confusion and
makes people mistakenly think that the time for Prayer is due. It also involves using the Azhan in
something other than that for which it is prescribed." 38

Other opinions from the Islamonline Ask the Scholar section argue that this question can be
contextual. For example, one scholar argues that the text of the Qur'an: "cannot be viewed in the
bathroom on a mobile phone or any other device because things that contain the name of Allah
should be kept far from impure places like WC. However, if the person is quite sure that the words
of Tawhid (There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah) will be kept remote
from impurities (for example, if the person leaves his mobile phone outside while entering the WC
or switches it off before entering), then there is nothing wrong in having that words [sic] appear on
his mobile". In contrast, another scholar argues that: "It is not haram (forbidden) to take these
mobile phones into bathrooms because they do not come under the same rulings as the Mus-haf
(printed copy of the Qur'an). This is so, even after Qur'an has been recorded on them, because it is
sound which is contained inside it, and not writing that is visible" (Bunt, 2010).

Some religious institutions approve this new technology as a medium of communication for
Muslims via the Islam hotline, or 'El-Hatef El-Islami', which was established in Egypt in August
2000 and approved by Al-Zahar. This hotline, according to Bunt (2010, 36): "While not as
extensive as the opinions and answers to questions available on databases such as Islam Online or

38. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/satellite?cid=l264249763406&pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar, viewed 22/10/2011.
Islam Q&A, there are listings of Frequently Asked Questions available onsite, indicating a range of questions and concerns: these were the same questions in Arabic and English. Family relations, sexual relationships and ritual dominated these listings, but this is no indication of the types of calls that are received on the Islamic Hotline, or the weight of traffic to the service. The key element within this present discussion is that this is a mobile phone enabled resource, established by a traditional centre of Islamic influence and scholarship. It sets a likely precedent for other related activities - which blur the distinction between religious authority, Islamic 'online' interfaces and the phone."

There are some concerns expressed in forums regarding the veracity of Islamic applications, especially those which do not fit within a user's beliefs. Such concerns are clearly reflected in the discussions, posts and comments by bloggers in forums such as www.ummah.com/forum. One blogger posted:

"I got so excited with mine, I downloaded so many apps! Then when I looked back and went through some of them such as the Islamic library one it was clearly Shia from the titles of the book so I thought a thread where we could post apps we have or have heard of and know are according to the Quran and Sunna and are reliable in terms of the accuracy when it comes to the Quran or Hadith apps would be useful." 39

Similarly, another posted:

"I'm so glad I don't have a fancy phone. When I read the Qur'an or some Islamic book on the train, people can clearly see what I am reading whether they are unbelievers, 'Kuffar', or Muslims hence why I guess random strange people have begun to ask me questions about my religion. You can't get that with an I-phone. Nothing beats a good book". 40

4.6 Conclusion:

A study of online content can provide useful insights on Muslim identity formation and expression. In comparison to broadcast and print media, individuals seeking and sharing information take a strong hand in guiding the content development of different websites. In other words, the Internet is a less-mediated media tool. It is increasingly becoming an online source of information on the Quran and exposes Muslims to new interpretation, providing opportunities for those with access to the Internet to hear Quran recitations in work, home and college environments.

The importance of Cyber Islam rests on the facts that it: provides a new and uncensored form of interaction between Muslims in different parts of the world; introduces a new religious authority; and provides a new set of decision making processes that does not rely on either traditional religious institutions or religious Jurists and Ulama.

Discussion of the validity of religious rules, 'Fatwas', and of the role and status of Islamic jurisprudence in cyber sphere, give Muslims the chance to discuss real-life issues that are regarded as taboos in Islamic societies, such as sexual abuse, adultery, homosexual, domestic violence, Muslims with HIV, porn addiction and abortion. Other contemporary issues associated with converts to Islam, knowledge of religious duties and political activism are also popular topics on Islamic websites.

In addition, websites such as IslamOnline.net, raise cultural and religious concerns through several fatwa associated with Internet behavior, such as Internet ‘chatting’ especially between the sexes, which according to Brunt (2009, 155) are: "Associated with ‘appropriate’ behavior which may be specific to diverse Muslim interests, in particular how such behavior might contradict forms of religiously sanctioned relationships and appropriate Islamic conduct especially if we put into consideration that traditional and cultural parameters of control have, in some cases, been transcended".

Cyber Islam provides a significant change in the relationship between the political authorities and independent jurists in Islamic countries, and a new perspective on Sunni Islam; one which, is not always well received by political authorities and other Muslim organizations and individuals. Dr.
Al-Qaradawi provides an example of this relationship between Cyber Islam, independent Jurists and their audiences. Through his website, Qaradawi.net, and participation in different Islamic websites, he acknowledges the strategic importance of the internet in reshaping the Islamic Umma, and potentially influences Muslim and non-Muslim perspectives on Islam and Islamic issues. These activities, according to Bunt (2009, 158): "made him the subject of criticism from both official Islam and conservative Muslim groups such as the Salafi".

This criticism of Cyber activity and the content of both Sunni and Shia sites capture the internal dynamics and fragmentation within Islamic thought, both within the same school and between the two schools, especially on issues of jurisprudence. Cyber Islam introduces a new online religious authority that addresses issues of concern to both Muslims and Islamic Diaspora in the West. The shifting of religious authority away from the traditional Ulama' (Islamic scholars) to the what El-Naway and Khamis (2011) describes as an “online religious authority”, and into the hands of Muslims, many of whom are not officially trained to provide Fatwas, raises a number of important questions, such as “who speaks for Islam” in the realm of contemporary deliberations and debates in cyberspace. This new phenomenon was found to be a “double-edged sword”. On the one hand, it broadened the realm of popular engagement and provided a new manifestation of a Muslim Umma that is not based on authority, but on public participation, through independence from traditional religious authority and institutional hegemony. This is supported by the fact that it is the participants, not the moderators, who set the agenda for the issues to be discussed in most of the analysed forums. However, on the other hand, this communal authority of ordinary people, which seems to have replaced the religious authority of the traditional Ulama, is close to anarchy. In addition, mainstream religions, including Islam, are opposed to an anarchic environment, where assertive, and even irrational, personal whims are the norm, rather than the exception. The fact that the role of the religious Ulama, and even the moderators, is totally absent in some of these forums opens the door for spreading false and inaccurate religious information about Islam. The absence of the Ulama’s voice in these forums also opens the door for strengthening, rather than eradicating, conspiracy theories against Islam, as well as dogmatic perspectives, which are not validated by credible and qualified religious authorities.

This online authority, provided by these websites, allows sensitive questions to be addressed, which would be unsuitable or impossible in other circumstances, as well as rewriting the concept of Umma to transcend geographical boundaries and political, regional and sect differences. It
depends on a digital networks and communities reflecting diverse traditions and perspectives, rather than on a single, monolithic, Islam.

These online religious authorities assign certain roles to Islamic diaspora in their host communities in order to serve the interests of the Umma. These roles and question of identity, citizenship duties and belonging were discussed with my respondents. Most of the second generation group believe that they are Australian, or as a male respondent argued:

“We’re Australians. We’ve embraced Australian culture to a large extent; it’s just that instead of being Christian we happen to be Muslims, Muslim Australians. And I think by all other criteria we’re Australians, except from the religion factor. I believe that you can be a Muslim and be an Australian, because being an Australian is more than drinking beer and dating girls. It’s more the idea of having a fair go, working hard and helping people. These are the most important elements of the Australian culture I think, and that’s something you’ll see among Australian Muslims as well”.

Similarly, another female participant argued:

“We think and look at different things in term of social norms and social standards; I’m probably more into the Aussie idea of fairness and hard work. But the way we behave and address ourselves in our daily life reflects that we are Muslims. I don’t think there is a contradiction of being a Muslim and Australian. Yes there are things I can’t do like other girls in my age (20 years old), but that doesn’t mean, I am less Australian”.

Other participants emphasized that their religion is a main component of their identity, or, as a male respondent from the second generation group stated:

“When I tell you I’m a Muslim, I tell you something about myself, but when I tell you my great grandfather was born in Sudan, it doesn’t say anything about me, because I don’t have those much Sudanese values in me. But I have my Islamic beliefs, values and morals. That’s what makes me who am I.”
Similarly, a female participant (18 years old), argued that:

“To be quite honest with you, I don’t have or know any of my relatives here in Australia; all my extended family is in Eritrea or other countries. I’ve never been to Eritrea, so no I think my religion is more important. Yes. I’m a Muslim, I don’t say I’m Eritrean, but I say, I’m an Australian-born Muslim”.

These views reflect a significant influence of Cyber Islam among second generation participants. Most of the participants felt that they were aware of the distinctions between religion and culture and that they practiced a ‘pure/true’ Islam free of cultural influences and official Islam. They explained that they learned about ‘pure/true’ Islam through their online interaction with Muslims from different cultures and backgrounds in different Islamic websites and pages. They learnt how to strike a balance between culture and religion, allowing cultural elements that were consistent with the teaching of Islam, while rejecting those cultural elements that go against the religion. As a female respondent indicated:

“From my discussion with other Muslims living in European countries and the United States, we find out that we can enjoy the Australian culture, but if we find that something is outside the boundaries of Islam, we forget about that part of culture”.

Similarly, a male participant contended:

“I try to follow the Quran and the Sunna; I believe in that only. Many people have put their own cultural views and distorted Islam. But what I believe in is that we have to get rid of all that and focus on ‘what kind of Islam the prophet and the Four Guided Caliphs had left us? Because Islam they left us is the true Islam, the pure Islam, the only Islam, and that are the only Islam for me. If the Australian cultural is ok with the religion, then that’s fine, but if it is something that is not, then it is not for me”

Two thirds of the second generation participants believe that growing up in a non-Muslim country has made them very awareness of the differences between religion and culture. Although many had adopted Islam because they were born to Muslim parents, they believe that they have obtained a much clearer understanding of the lines between culture and religion through their interaction with Cyber Islam, which supports the view held by Bouma (1994) and Saeed (2003) that Muslims living
in non-Muslim countries often place a greater emphasis on religious practice and in general are more aware of the lines between religion and culture than many people in Muslim-dominated countries. They also argue that they have deeper understanding of the concept of the Umma and how to enhance their religion. As one male participant stated:

"A true Islam is the one that does not recognize boundaries, culture or authority, because the true spirit of Islam recognize Muslims merits and their ability to become true believers. True believers are the nucleus of the Umma. The Quran teach us that True believers are those who follow the words of God and his prophet. The prophet encourages Muslims to transcend their differences and form the Umma."

Similarly, a female participant argued that:

"As Muslims living in non-Islamic environment, we have more responsibility in educating people about Islam, we have more of a role in society and it feels good because people want to know. Although, sometimes there's a negative attitude out there especially towards female Muslims who wear head cover, but as Muslims we have to scarify to teach people about Islam. I feel proud of being a Muslim. I try my best to practice Islam and so I think me walking around looking like a Muslim practicing Islam is good for the perceptions about my religion. Maybe, later, perhaps they will see something they think is good."

This “deculturalization” of religion, Olivier Roy (2010) argues, is one of two factors that play important role in the formation of religion today. He defines deculturalization as the loss of the social expression of the religion. The other factor is the “deterritorialization”. For Roy (2010.), “deterritorialization” is not limited to the movement of people, but also involves the circulation of ideas, cultural objects, information and modes of consumption in a non-territorial space, such as the Cyber sphere. Religion has to be disconnected from a certain culture and appear to be universal, in order for the message to be grasped. The tendency of the respondents to use the term “Real Islam” or the “True Spirit of Islam” reflects a tendency to separate religion from its cultural components and to argue that the sacred text i.e. the Quran can be understood outside any particular cultural setting.

In the following section, this thesis will address how the focus group looked at the questions of
belonging, identity, nationality, citizenship duties and the influence of Cyber Islam, which play important role, as we discussed in this chapter, in modifying the ways in which a system of symbols and laws and made them relevant or acculturated to groups of people in particular places and times. I have argued that there are complex negotiations of Muslim identity that are taken place today between Muslims both in Islamic countries and the diaspora. This complexity is reflected in the difficult questions about the viability of various Islamic religious, as well as, political discourses. Questions are being asked about who speaks for Islam today, and the classical sources of ‘Islamic’ knowledge, along with their traditional agents, are facing new challenges from Muslims increasingly confident about taking religion into their own hands and searching for new identity.

In subsequent chapters this thesis will, first, outline the key features of Muslim diaspora from the North and the Horn of Africa in Australia, and seek to understand the interplay between notions of religion and identity and the changing boundaries of Muslim political community. Second, it will also look at how Muslims are reimagining their Umma and what kind of Umma they imagine today, fourteen centuries after the establishment of the Umma in Medina. Finally, it will discuss the socio-economic and political integration of the focus group in the Australian, using both political participation and military service as indicators of integration.
Section Three

Muslims in Australia

Australian society is characterized by the co-existence of different religions. Historically, and for more than 40,000 years prior to European settlement, Indigenous Australians followed religious or spiritual belief systems embedded in complex oral traditions and based on the forces of nature, ancestral influence and reverence for the land. Integral to Indigenous belief systems were Creation stories, notably Aboriginal stories of the ‘Dreamtime’, which combined knowledge, customary law and beliefs about the origin of the land and its people.

Other religions existed in Australia as far back as the 16th century. Muslims, more specifically Muslim fishermen and traders from the East Indonesian archipelago, visited mainland Australia and made contact with local Indigenous people. Christianity entered Australia with European settlement, which brought with it the Church of England. Other churches arrived as transportation and immigration continued and, by the early 19th Century; many Christian groups were represented, including Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Lutherans, Baptists and Methodists. Christianity has remained the dominant religious tradition in Australia, despite sectarian rivalry - notably between Irish Catholics and English Protestants - affecting Australian life until the latter part of the 20th Century.

Muslims and Hindus came to Australia throughout the 19th century to work on cotton and sugar plantations and as cameleers, divers and sailors. Judaism first came to Australia aboard the First Fleet in 1788 and after World War II Jews arrived as refugees, while Buddhist settlement dates to 1848, when, following the discovery of gold, Chinese miners arrived in their thousands. Immigration from South East Asia since the Vietnam War has also increased the numbers of Buddhists in Australia.

In the 21st century, religion in Australia remains dominated demographically by Christianity. In the 2006 census, 64% of the population claimed at least nominal adherence to the Christian faith, 18.7% of Australians declared the had 'no-religion', (while a further 11.2% did not answer the question) and the remaining population is a diverse group, that includes fast growing Islamic and Buddhist communities. The Constitution of Australia prohibits the Commonwealth Government from establishing a church or interfering with the freedom of religion; however, states are permitted, under their own constitutions, to interfere or establish a church or other worship places.
Table 5.1 below shows the difference in religious affiliations between the 2001 and 2006 censuses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>%2006</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>%2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Christian</td>
<td>12,685,829</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>12,764,342</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>418,753</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>357,813</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>148,123</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>95,473</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>281,578</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>113,876</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>98,125</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>242,848</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>92,369</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>3,706,556</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>2,905,993</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated/inadequate</td>
<td>2,223,959</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2,187,688</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,855,293</td>
<td>%100</td>
<td>18,769,249</td>
<td>%100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: The Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 Census, Religious Affiliation). The ABS Dictionary defines "No Religion" as a category of religion which has sub categories such as agnosticism, atheism, Humanism and rationalism.)

The Table shows a decrease in the number of people who identified as Christian, from 68.1% in 2001 census to 63.9% in 2006. However, most other major religious faiths are also practised, reflecting Australia’s culturally diverse society. Approximately 5% of the Australian population in the 2006 census are identified with other non-Christian religions. Most noticeable is the growing number within the non-religious groups. They increased from 15.5% in 2001 to 18.7% in 2006, which make them the second largest group in Australia. Muslim numbers have increased from 1.5% to 1.7%, because of the increasing number of migrants arriving from Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, and due to immigration from Turkey, Egypt and other parts of the Middle East. Although Muslims immigration to Australia is recent compared to their European counterparts, they face the same challenges that Muslims in Europe and North America are facing.

More than thirteen million Muslims, both immigrants and converts, live today in Western Europe and the United States. In Western Europe, the Muslim population is about twelve million. Over 3 million Muslims live in France, about 2 million in West Germany, 1½ million in the United
Kingdom and almost a million in Italy. Half a million Muslims live in Belgium. Almost five
centuries after the fall of Granada, Spain now hosts 200,000 Muslims. In many Western European
countries Muslims have replaced Jews as the second largest religious community; they also
outnumbered the Protestants and the Jews in France and the Catholics in Germany. In North
America, the numbers are much disputed, but the largest-scale study to date shows a Muslim
population of 1.4 million.

Muslims in the West, especially in Europe, can be classified under three categories: first, older
communities that have been living for centuries in South Eastern and Eastern Europe; second,
immigrants from Muslim countries who settled in Western Europe and in North America; third,
indigenous people who converted to Islam (Farouki and Nafi, 2004). These communities tend to
concentrate in urban areas and especially in the centre of cities, which make them very visible.
Some towns have very significant Muslim elements; for example, Bradford in England, the
Parisian suburb of Saint-Denys, and Dearborn in Michigan.

Muslims in the West originate mostly from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, though smaller
numbers come from other regions, such as the Indonesian residents in Holland or the Albanians in
Italy. A single ethnic group of Muslims predominates in each of the three major European
countries: Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians in France; Turks in Germany; and South Asians in
Great Britain.

Their presence in the big cities of the West is problematic because of the cultural differences
between them and the host communities. These cultural differences appear to surface when it
comes to the question of women, radical Islamists and, most importantly, the patriarchal and
'oriental' ways of life. Some scholars, such as the Bosnian scholar Smail Balic, suggest that
Muslims in Europe cannot keep this oriental, patriarchal way of life, which is not part of Islam.
They must give meaning to their religious practices and shape their life in a non-Muslim context
(Farouki, Nafi, 2004: 285).

Balic’s argument is similar to Tariq Ramadan’s (2011) enlightened, liberal European Islam, but
neglects the fact that there are a number of concerns on the question of co-religion in the West.
First, there has been conflict between the indigenous Muslims of Europe, for example in Bosnia,
Albania and Chechen, and the dominant non-Muslims population of these regions, which has led to
the ethnic cleansing of Muslims. This ethnic cleansing of Muslims brought back to the Muslims memories of the Crusades. Second, we have seen a growth in anti-foreigners movements in the West against immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. Third, post-September 11 there has been a growth of Islam phobia. Finally, there have been repercussions from the Middle East conflict between the Palestinians and Israel.

Muslims living in the West are theologically in harmony with the Quran position, which emphasizes that God’s domain is not restricted by East or West. Rather, it is everywhere: "To Allah belonged the East and the West. Whithersoever ye turn there is Allah’s countenance" (2, 115). The growth of this Muslim community has been impressive to judge by the increased number of mosques: Germany and France have about a thousand, while Britain has about 500 (although many may only be a room or two). The central mosques in London and in Washington and the mosques in different Australian cities symbolize this growth. The mosques are full of worshippers. They are the hub of Muslim social and religious activity.

However if there are no theological obstacles for Muslims in the West, there are certainly sociological and political ones. The Muslim presence in the West has added fuel to anti-Islamic sentiments. Young girls wearing the head/face cover in France have become the subject of hostile national news, while Muslims wanting separate schools in England are at the centre of a heated national debate. Apart from this increasingly hostile environment in some Western countries, several other factors have sharpened the Muslim sense of identity.

The increasing number of second generation Muslim immigrants in the West, with half of the Muslims in the West being born there, is problematic. A segment of this second generation rejected the integration and assimilation that their parents often desired. They were no longer the meek, invisible, immigrants, grateful to be allowed in at all; they wished to assert themselves. In this situation, issues of race and religion often fused, as growing racism forced them into a greater sense of religious identity. The economic factor is important, because the younger generation are better educated than their parents, but they consider themselves marginalized and trapped in bad economic conditions.

This section will be divided into three chapters. Chapter Five will review the history of Muslim settlement in Australia and their patterns of immigration, ethnicity and place of origin, with a
particular focus on the socio-demographic and socio-economic status of Muslims from North Africa and the horn of Africa countries, especially migrants from Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. Here, the demographic data is taken from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the 2006 census publications, while historical and sociological studies are used to trace the history of Muslim settlement in Australia. The aim is to provide a context for the later discussion of the views of the focus groups.

Chapter Six will examine my respondents' understanding of the relationship between the Islamic Umma and Islamic State, and how it has affected their integration/adaptation process in the Australian society.

Chapter Seven will examine my respondents' perception of their citizenship obligation, including political participation and military service, as well as their socio-cultural adaptation/integration process.
Chapter Five

Muslims Migration in Australia

Muslims in Australia have a long and varied history that is thought to pre-date European settlement. Some of Australia’s earliest visitors were Muslim, from Indonesia. They made contact with mainland Australia as early as the 16th and 17th centuries. Fishermen and traders from what is today the Makassar region of Indonesia arrived on the northern coasts of Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland. This migration is evident in the cave drawings of the indigenous Australians in this area. The Makassar’s traded with local Indigenous people. In addition, Muslims from coastal Africa and island territories under the British Empire came to Australia as sailors and convicts in the early fleets of European settlers during the late 1700s. In the Nineteenth century, three important Muslim’s ethnic groups arrived to Australia: the Afghans; the Turks; and the Lebanese.

The Afghan camel drivers’ constitute the first significant, semi-permanent, Muslim population settling in Australia in the 1800s. Coming from the Indian sub-continent, these Muslims worked both in the early exploration of inland Australia and in the construction of the service links, such as the rail link between Port Augusta and Alice Springs. The Afghans played an equally important role in the development of the overland telegraph line between Adelaide and Darwin during 1870 and 1872, which eventually linked Australia to London via India (Jones, 1955). Camels were imported and used by European explorers to help open up the dry interior and transport goods and services to different parts of the country.

The large majority of the Afghans were Muslims, but there were also a small number of Sikhs and Hindus. This group was employed on limited term contracts that did not allow their families to accompany them to Australia. Many therefore worked and lived communally as a brotherhood of fellow cameleers, observing strict religious and related halal dietary practices that tended to discourage significant social interaction with others. Because of this early migration, a string of ‘Ghan’ towns were established along the railway. Many of these towns had at least one mosque, usually constructed from corrugated iron with a small minaret. However, the advent of the motor vehicle and the introduction of motor lorry transportation signaled the end of an era for the cameleers. While some returned to their homelands, others settled in areas near Alice Springs and other parts of the Northern Territory. Many married local Indigenous people. Indeed, Peter Scrivener (2004:19) in his book Mosques, Ghan towns and Cameleers in the Settlement History of Colonial
Australia emphasizes that “the descendants of the Afghan cameleers have since played active roles in numerous Islamic communities in Australia and left behind buildings and half-forgotten tombstones as surviving traces of their presence in colonial Australia”.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, small numbers of Muslims were also recruited from Dutch and British colonies in South East Asia to work in the Australian pearling industry. These two groups represented what David Day (2001:259) calls the ‘multi-cultural Australia of the early twentieth century’. This multiculturalism was evident in the buildings of Mosques in Marree in North South Australia, (the first mosque in Australia) and in New South Wales (Broken Hill) in 1886, and the construction of the Adelaide Mosque, which was built within the original Adelaide city grid in 1888, just two generations after the founding of the South Australian Colony.

By 1901, the new nation of federated Australian states was anxious to assert its moral and legal claim to the empty continent by building and securing its fences. The very first act to be passed by the new Federal Parliament in 1901 was the Immigration Restriction Act, which emphasized the new ‘white Australia’ policy that dominated both official and popular race relations for the next six decades. This Act made it difficult for Muslims of non-European background, especially Asian migrants, to come to Australia in the early twentieth century. Only the Albanian Muslims (1920s-1930s) were accepted due to their lighter European complexion, which was more compatible with the White Australia Policy (Day, 2001).

In the post-World War II period, the need for population and economic growth in Australia led to the changes in Australia’s immigration policy which allowed the acceptance of a number of Muslims who began to arrive from Europe, especially the Turks. The presence of Turkish people in Australia dates back to 1901, when a small population of around 200 from the Turkish Ottoman Empire, which included different ethnic entities that were under its control, such as the Jews, Armenians, Georgians and Greeks, came to Australia. Only a minority were Muslim. Their number increased to 300 by the 1911 census and declined during the First World War, when Australia and Turkey fought on opposite sides (Jupp, 2001:709).

Between 1967 and 1971, approximately 10,000 Turks settled in Australia under an agreement between Australia and Turkey. However, large groups of Turkish Cypriots began to migrate to Australia before the agreement. In 1947 the first Turkish Cypriot man arrived and in 1948 the first Turkish Cypriot woman. The numbers of Turkish Cypriots began to increase in the 1960s due to the Cyprus conflict. The Turkish community in Australia today is a well-established, largely made
up of families who have been settled in Australia for longer than a decade and whose children have grown up in Australia.

In 1967 an agreement between the Turkish and Australian Governments, made it easier for the Turkish Cypriots to come to Australia under the assisted migration scheme. This bilateral agreement on assisted migration coincided with increasing Turkish interest in employment opportunities outside Turkey, particularly in Europe. The Turks represented the first large Muslim population to settle in Australia. Between 1947 and 1971, and because of the post-war economic boom, which created new employment opportunities, the Muslim population increased from 2,704 to 22,311. Many European Muslims, mainly Turks, took advantage of these opportunities to seek a new life and home in Australia. At the 2006 Census there were 23,126 Turkey-born Muslims in Australia (Hussein Serkan, 2007).

The first Muslim settlement from the Middle-East was the Lebanese migration and settlement which commenced around 1880. The early Lebanese immigrants were known as Syrians, but they were 'classified' as Turks by the colonial government, because Lebanon was under Ottoman (Turkish) control until the end of the First World War. Three waves of Lebanese immigrations occurred: the first between 1880 and the 1920s; the second between 1947 and 1975; and the third from 1976, which marked the beginning of the Civil War in Lebanon, to the present.

The descendants of the first wave of settlers now extend to five and six generations, while the second-wave Lebanese-Australians include at least three generations. The third wave, which came to Australia during and after the Civil War in Lebanon, typically extends to two generations (Batrouney, 2000). Batrouney emphasizes that the most profound changes in terms of the size, composition and settlement needs of the Lebanese migrants came during and after the Civil War. The first two waves were predominantly Christian and were settled in Sydney and Melbourne (with Maronite, Melkite and Orthodox churches). The first Lebanese religious organization in Sydney was that of St Michael’s Melkite Church which was established as early as 1895. In Melbourne, the first wave settlers and their descendants established the Antioch Ian Orthodox Church of St Nicholas in 1931.

In contrast, the third wave of Lebanese migrants was predominantly Muslim and resulted in a large expansion of Islamic societies and mosques to serve the Lebanese and other Muslim communities. In 1998 the number of Islamic societies had expanded to reach 35 in Melbourne, with over twice that number in Sydney. Each Islamic Society had a full-time or part-time imam. Depending on
their size and length of establishment the mosques serve as social, cultural and sporting centers for their communities by offering senior citizens’ groups, women’s groups, youth groups and sporting activities. The various Islamic societies come together to form Islamic Councils in each of the states, which, in turn, come under the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils. In most states Muslim religious leaders convene as the Board of Imams. The Muslims have established both primary and secondary schools in Sydney and Melbourne in the last 10 years.

5.1 African Australian’s Muslim Migrants

The study of African Muslim migrants in Australia, especially from sub-Sahara and North Africa, faces source material problems. Most of the literature on Muslims in Australia concentrated on two ethnic groups, the Turks and the Lebanese. The limited literature on African migrants discussed migrants from South and West Africa, given that North and Sub-Sahara Africa migration waves and communities are recent. This thesis uses data from the Australian Statistics Bureau and Department of Immigration and Citizenship to review demographic changes, socio-economic and socio-demographic status and patterns of Immigration. Of course, this does not allow an examination of the changes among the second generation, Australian-born members of these communities, because the socio-economic and socio-demographic data published by the Australian Statistics Bureau and Department of Immigration and Citizenship classify Muslims as one group, regardless of their country of origin and ethnicity, or the length of their residency in Australia.

From the 1970s onwards, there was a significant shift in the Government’s attitude towards immigration. With the formal dissolution of the White Australia policy in the 1960s and early 1970s, Australian immigration underwent a massive change. However, the change in composition of migration in the 1970s and 1980s was much more marked for the flows from Asia, than for those from Africa. There has, however, been an increase in the diversity of the Sub-Saharan African migration to Australia in the last decade. Prior to 1991, most African migrants were not of African ethnicity; rather they were the children of European-origin parents from South Africa and Zimbabwe who subsequently moved to Australia. Australia and some African states, such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, were former colonies of Britain and part of the British Empire (and later the British Commonwealth), meaning they shared more linkages with Australia than other African countries that were not British colonies. The large number of South Africans is evident, as are substantial groups from Zimbabwe and Mauritius, who are in many ways similar to the South Africans in the pre-dominance of European-origin groups. Those from Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda also include significant numbers of European-origin migrants. The
proportion of South Africans in the flow of migration from Africa, which had fallen from 78.3% in 1947 to 20.4% in 1971, subsequently began to increase again.

The beginning of the Twenty-First Century has witnessed the settlement of Muslims from more than sixty countries in Australia. Although a very large number of them come from Turkey and Lebanon, there are Muslims from Indonesia, Bosnia, Iran, Fiji, Albania, Sudan, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, among others. In the last three decades, many Muslims have migrated to Australia under refugee and resettlement humanitarian programs from African countries, such as Somalia and Sudan. By 2006, the number of African-born migrants reached 248,699. This accounted for 5.6% of the overseas-born migrant population. Almost three quarters (72.6%) of the African-born resident population were from Southern and East Africa, 22.9% were from North Africa and 4.5% from the Central and West Africa regions. The largest group were born in South Africa (41.9%), with Egypt contributing 13.5%, Zimbabwe 8.1%, Sudan 7.7%, Mauritius 7.3%, Kenya 4.0% and Ethiopia 2.3%; while 51 other countries each contributed less than 5,000 persons, or less than 2.0% of the total (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008).

The three major African regions show different patterns of migration, in terms of both timing and composition. For example, those born in Southern and East Africa continue to account for the largest number of settler arrivals, although their share of the African total has fallen from 85.9% in 1997-98 to 59.0% in 2006-07. In contrast, the proportion of arrivals born in Central and West Africa rose from 2.5% to 17.4% over this time, while the proportion of arrivals from North Africa increased from 11.6% to 23.6%, with a peak of 37.2% in 2004-05.

In 2006-07, people born in Southern and East Africa accounted for 47.4% (3,996) of the arrivals, compared with 11.1% (935) from Zimbabwe, 8.3% (701) from Kenya and 33.1% (2,792) from other countries in this region. Similarly, the pattern of settler arrivals of people born in North Africa closely reflects the numbers from its largest group, Sudan. In 2004-05, Sudanese settlers peaked at 5,654, while in 2006-07 they accounted for 74.7% (2,513) of North Africa-born arrivals, compared with 22.5% (756) for Egypt (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census 2006, People born in Africa).

It is noticeable then, that there have been significant increases in the numbers from some countries, especially Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia. Most of these immigrants have arrived in Australia under three visas categories: refugee-humanitarian (the largest category); skilled labor;
and family reunion. Table 5.1.1 shows the countries of birth of the 6000 refugees granted visas under the humanitarian program in 2009-10.

Some earlier arrivals born in Eritrea and Ethiopia are of Italian origin, while more recent settlers are of African background. Most Ethiopians arrived after 1990 and were predominantly refugees. There were only 359 Somali-born persons in Australia in 1991, but this increased to 2,057 in 1996 and 3,713 in 2001, following the settlement of a substantial community of refugees, especially between 1994 and 1998.

**Table 5.1.1 offshore visa grants by top ten countries of birth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Number of visas granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>1144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (DIAC, Fact Sheet 60, Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program)
Table 5.1.2 shows the number of settler arrivals, by country of birth and migration stream in the period between 30th of Jun 1997 and 30th of Jun 2007.

Table 5.1.2 Number of settler’s arrivals, By Country of birth and Migration stream (1997-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Humanitarian program</th>
<th>Family stream</th>
<th>Skill stream</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1 921</td>
<td>2 063</td>
<td>1 895</td>
<td>5 881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1 434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2 714</td>
<td>1 948</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>4 783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1 007</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1 437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1 754</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>3 181</td>
<td>5 804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central &amp; West Africa</td>
<td>3 796</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>4 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other North Africa</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Southern &amp; East Africa</td>
<td>1 603</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>2 897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2 373</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3 370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>22 445</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>23 134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistic 2006 Census data, People born in Africa)

The number of West Africans living in Australia is relatively small by comparison. Their immigration began in the mid-1960s, with the arrival of students under the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan, mostly from Ghana and Nigeria. The removal of the last vestiges of the White Australia policy saw small numbers of skilled African-origin immigrants, but there has also been an inflow of refugees. In 1996 there were only 3,077 West Africans in Australia, increasing to 5,641 in 2001, with Nigeria and Ghana as the main countries of origin. However, by 2006, their numbers had expanded to 11,255, with most coming under the skilled or family streams of the migration program. Table 5.1.3 shows the visa category of sub-Sahara African migrants compared to the total.
Table 5.1.3 Settler arrivals born in Sub-Saharan Africa compared with total intake according to eligibility category (2007-08)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligibility category</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of total from Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td>38,404</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>11,330</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>5,370</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3,319</td>
<td>44,441</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Eligibility</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Program</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>9,507</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Program Migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Citizen</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>34,491</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,603</td>
<td>149,365</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Graeme Hugo, 2009)

This Table shows that 25.7% of all settlers were accepted under the Humanitarian program, and 23.1% of this group were from Sub-Saharan Africa. There has been a shift in the origin of refugee-humanitarian settlers toward the Horn of Africa, because of political unrest, civil wars and natural disasters in this region. The 2006 census data shows that in 1997 only eight per cent of Australia’s offshore refugees came from Africa; the number had increased to 70.6% in 2003-04 and 34.5% in 2007-08. In 2004 the Minister of Immigration announced that Australia would substantially increase its refugee intake from Africa, especially Sudan. This resulted in a considerable increase in the number of refugee-humanitarian settlers from Africa. However, the last Immigration Minister of the Howard Government reduced the African intake of refugees in the year 2004-5 because of concerns regarding their ability to adjust to Australian society. It was argued that they were culturally very different to the host community; often lacked English language skills and had a history of broken or limited education experience, which led to considerable problems in entering
the Australian labour market; and had large families, which can sometimes lead to difficulties in finding suitable housing (Hugo, 2009).

5.2. Socio-demographic and socio-economic status

Adapting to the host community is affected by several factors. These factors include: personal and social backgrounds; motives for migration; expectations of the new land; customs and values carried from the culture of the previous community; and the nature of the receiving community. In a study of migrant adjustment in Canada, Michalowski (1987: 22-30) categorized factors affecting adaptation into three main factors: demographic factors, like place of birth and place of residence; economic factors, like labour force participation, class of worker and income; and social factors, like education, vocational training and religion.

The socio-demographic and socio-economic status of the African migrants will be discussed under the following headings: residency pattern and employment; level of education; English proficiency; and religious affiliation.

Just over half (51.7%) of the African migrants are concentrated in eight capital cities, compared with 58.3% of the Australia-born population: with 27.7% in Sydney, followed by Melbourne (24.0%), Perth (15.6%), Brisbane (9.5%), Adelaide (4.1%), Canberra (1.2%), Hobart (0.6%) and Darwin (0.5%). Only 16.6% of the new arrivals lived outside the capital cities, especially in Queensland, where 7.2% of Africa-born people are living outside Brisbane. This concentration in the urban areas is due to the fact that their employment opportunities are greater in cities than in rural areas. However, it is interesting that this represented a decrease from 84.7% in 2001, indicating that more Africans are now settling outside the large cities, probably because of the increase in rental rates in these cities, compared to rural areas.

Migrants who have a reasonable command of the English language are more likely to be accepted by their host communities. Studies conducted by the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural, and Population Research (1996), indicated that poor English speakers among recently arrivals migrants had greater unemployment rates and less skilled occupations. Migrants from North Africa and the Middle East have the lowest English language proficiency level, compared to migrants from other regions. English proficiency is generally higher among the younger age groups and skilled labour
visa category holders. In contrast, people aged 55 years and over reported lower levels of English proficiency and men generally have higher levels of English proficiency than women. Of course, this gender inequality in the level of English proficiency (58.1% of women reported lower levels, compared to 49.9% of men) could be attributed to the patriarchal structure of their previous communities, which specify certain gender roles that confine women to the private domain and limit their access to education and employment opportunities, even in their host communities.

The education level of these migrants groups is not reflected in their employment levels. Over 80% of all recent arrivals (between 2002 and 2006) have completed year 12 before arriving in Australia, compared with just over 50% for those who arrived prior to 2002. However, over 60% of this group were unemployed and depended on the social welfare system as a main source for household income, especially among migrants who arrived prior to 2002. Although one quarter of recent arrivals were in the highest income range compared with one-fifth of people who arrived earlier, most of this group came under either the skilled labour visa category or the Humanitarian one (ABS, 3416.0 - Perspectives on Migrants, 2007).

Tables 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 show the English proficiency and educational levels of migrants from Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, East Africa and North Africa arriving between 2006 and 2011. The tables below were composed through the crystal reporting system provided by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Proficiency</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>3190</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>5420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not recorded</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>2349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>2215</td>
<td>2376</td>
<td>4591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Good</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7014</td>
<td>6628</td>
<td>13642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2.2 Educational Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of education</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+6 Years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10-12) years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary or Trade</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>1366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-6 Years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1756</td>
<td>2164</td>
<td>3920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (DIAC, Crystal report, settlement reporting, 2011)

these settlement statistics represent permanent arrivals in this area and produced from the DIAC Settlement Reporting Facility that is updated on the 4th of each month.
The data in these tables have been compiled from a number of sources within the Department and other Commonwealth agencies)

Forty seven per cent of Humanitarian Program migrants who spoke only English at home or who spoke English very well were 'not in the labour force', while 40% were employed. There are some differences between recent Humanitarian Program migrants and Humanitarian Program migrants who have lived in Australia for between 4 and 6 years. They were more likely to be younger (38%), with a median age of 20, and not to speak English well or at all, whereas longer term residents had a median age of 29 and only a quarter (25%) didn't speak English well or at all. On the other hand, it was more common for those aged 15 years and over who had lived in Australia longer to be employed (38%) and to have a post school qualification (30%), when compared to recent migrants (22% and 22% respectively) (ABS, 2010, 3416.0 - Perspectives on Migrants).

Regardless of their educational level, large number of these migrants are more likely to depend on government cash pensions and allowances as their main source of household income. Table 5.2.4 shows the percentage of the employed refuges from the North of Africa and their occupational level in 2009-10.
By 2006, Australia was home to 6,600 Ethiopians. Most of these entrants arrived with little or no English language skills (60%) and arrived under the Humanitarian Programme visa (65%). Overall, 46% identify as Christians, 16% as Muslims, 32% stated no religious affiliation and 6% identified as Orthodox Christian.

Among 2000 Eritreans, 38% identify as Muslim, 37% as Christians, with a smaller number being Coptic and Eastern Orthodox and 25% from other religions. The main language spoken at home by Eritrean people residing in Australia in the 2001 Census was reported as Arabic; 72% were classed as having ‘poor’ or ‘no English language skills, 11% good, 5% very good, while 12% didn’t answer the question.

Of the 4,316 Somalis, most of them identified as Sunni Muslims and their religious practice has helped them establish links with other Muslim communities in Australia. Of the 19,000 Sudanese (born both in Sudan and in refugees camps in neighbouring countries), 34% identified as Muslims and 66% were identified as Christians or having no religion. Somalis are less likely to identify as ‘African’, often preferring their ethnic, religious or other identities. (DIAC 2006, communities profile a, b, c, d)

**The Focus Group**

In the case of the focus group, there are differences in their experiences of Australian society. For the first generation group, growing up in their countries of origin didn’t expose them to the cultural differences faced by the second generation group who grew up in the Australian society. Almost all of the second generation participants stated that they were exposed to both positive and negative
experiences in their school years, especially at schools with few Muslims and a majority of students from Anglo-Saxon backgrounds. It was clear that most felt more comfortable at schools with a more multicultural setting. They believed that the teachers and students at these schools had a better understanding of different religions and cultural backgrounds, and they felt they had more in common with children from other ethnic backgrounds. Some were aware of the ways in which they were different from their peers, even in the early schooling years, due to the color of their skin, their clothes and food restrictions, and their limited freedom to participate in many activities, both during and after school hours. This feeling of being different, became much more pressing for most, but especially female participants, when they reached their teens and started high school. Female participants felt the distance between themselves and their classmates grow as it became common to have boyfriends, smoke cigarettes, go to parties and drink alcohol. A female participant stated:

“I became more aware of my religious identity in high school. Because I was unable to participate in many activities both inside and outside the school such as swimming, going out, dating and having sex because this behavior is not acceptable and Haram in my religion. This is further set me apart from my classmates.”

In contrast, a male participant contended:

“All my high school buddies weren’t Muslims. I’ve pretty much been around and socialized with Australians all my life, so I have to admit it’s a little bit difficult for me sometimes. Because, unlike high school, in university, we have Muslim students and my friends see me at the prayer with them and ask me “do you know this person?” and I go “well, I actually don’t know the Muslim students that well”. I have nothing against them, it’s just that I have to admit, I prefer my Aussie friends.”

It is interesting to note that all the participants from the second generation group who reported strong feelings about being different from their peers at a young age were women. Although, the sample is too small to make any generalisations, this finding suggests that women face greater difficulties in socialising with non-Muslims than their male counterparts. Further research would be valuable to identify these gender specific differences.

The general impression made by all participants, from both generations, is that they are proud and
committed Muslims who identified themselves as Australians belonging in Australia, as well as, being Muslims. But, in the case of the second generation group, their Islamic identity was clearly more important than their ethnic identity. Saeed and Akbarzadeh’s (2001) claim that second and third generation Muslims’ bonds to Australia do not typically lead to a decline in the importance of their Islamic and ethnic heritage. For my sample, their argument seems accurate in regard to religion, but not in regard to ethnicity.

Whereas the Islamic identity of second generation participants was very important, the relationship between their Australian and ethnic identities varied significantly; certainly, the majority rated their ethnic Identities as less important than their religious identity. They identified themselves as Muslim Australians and emphasised that their religious identity has significant relevance to their feelings of identity and belonging to the Australian society.

On the other hand, the first generation group showed more attachment to both their ethnic and religious identity. Participants from this group accepted that certain behaviours in the Australian society are against their religion and in most cases they abstained from such behaviour. However, rather than viewing their religion as a barrier, they viewed it as a source of strength to deal with the difficulties they face in their daily life and a positive factor in their interaction with their host society, especially in relation to the cultural differences.

In the next chapters, this thesis will examine the influence of religious identity on the national identity formation for both generations.
Chapter Six
North and the Horn of Africa Migrants

The studies of immigrant minorities often concentrate on the mechanism of integration and adaptation to the host community. Social adaptation has been defined as the: ‘process by which a group or an individual adjust their behaviour to suit the social environment of the larger society’ (Berry, 1992, 71). Taking this definition into consideration in regard to international migration, the adaptation of immigrants to their host communities is multidimensional. It involves socio-economic, political and cultural aspects. It also depends on various factors that are related to the migrant’s ethno-cultural identity, their experiences in their country of origin and his/her existing socio-economic and socio-demographic status in the host community.

First, respondents in this research had different justifications for their residency and citizenship in Australia. So, some had been persecuted in their Muslim homelands, imprisoned unfairly, their wealth seized and their freedom and dignity taken away, which forced them to become citizens of non-Islamic countries. Others felt that an Islamic system should involve, not only the application of Islamic Sharia law in the legal system, the banking systems and the economy, but also the implementation of devolution of power and consultation in the political system. However, their country of origin had failed to provide this, so, for them; there was no difference between Muslim countries and non-Muslim ones. Yet others argued that a liberal democracy like Australia allows its citizens the right to live in dignity, honour and respect, as well as providing the basic survival needs, which were not available in their Islamic country of origin. Finally, some emphasised that citizens of Western democracies do not fear imprisonment without due cause, whereas, in Muslim countries, they always feared imprisonment. Thus, countries like Australia are safer than their Islamic country of origin.

These arguments address important questions about the two concepts highlighted in previous chapters, the Islamic state and the Islamic Umma, and reflect the different ways in which migrants, as well as jurists, interpret and relate to those concepts. As such, I used the focus groups to ask my respondents a number of questions: What characteristics did they think are necessary for a state to be classified as an Islamic state? How did they define the Islamic Umma and its relation to the Islamic state? How did they understand their minority status in a non-Islamic country, in relation to the various arguments in Islamic theology? To what extent does their perception of what is an
Islamic state and Islamic Umma influence their integration/adaptation into their host community? Finally, what are the factors that affect their adaptation/integration process? This chapter will examine my respondents' understanding of the relationship between the Islamic Umma and Islamic State and how it has affected their integration adaptation process in the Australian society.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the reason for concentrating on these issues is that different schools of Jurisprudence call upon Muslim immigrants in the West to place religious identity above national and ethnic identities and to promote the interests of a global Islamic Umma. Jurists from different schools of jurisprudence agree on the following points: first, a greater Islamic ‘Umma', exists of which Muslims are members, wherever they live; second, while living in a non-Muslim society is undesirable, it might be allowed on an individual basis, if the immigrant acts as model Muslim and is resident there for the right reasons; third, it is the duty of a Muslim in the West to reaffirm his religious identity and to distance himself from anything contrary to Islam, what they call “avoiding temptations”, by helping in establishing and patronize mosques, Muslim schools, cultural centres and Islamic financial system and institutions, such as Islamic banks, mortgage companies etc; fourth, Muslims in the West should champion the cause of the Umma and Muslim people, in the political as well as the religious sphere, because there should be no distinction between the two; and, finally, Muslims in the West have to perform Dawa to spread Islam in the declining, spiritual void of Western societies.

6.1 The Relationship between the Islamic Umma and the Islamic State

Muslims as a minority do not share one position in relation to Australian society. Some prefer to be closely associated with the wider Australian community and have an open, confident attitude to the outside world. Others feel the need for an Islamic space in a community of their own, where they can be themselves. Some prefer to interpret broadly, others more conservatively; the norms of conduct set out in particular traditions of Islam. All, in one way or another, have to find ways to respond to new situations and yet maintain the essence of the transcendent values of Islam. These attitudes are clearly reflected in their various definitions of the Islamic Umma and the Islamic state, as well as in the distinction made between ‘Real’ Islam and ‘Practiced’ Islam.

Interacting with Cyber Islam, as discussed in the previous chapter, helped to promote a sense of religious communalism and collectivism that allowed second generation members of the focus group to reconstruct their identities as members of the same community of faith, The Umma, on
one hand, as well as discovering the differences among themselves and demarcating themselves from non-Islamic practices and lifestyles, on the other hand. The emergence of the new online public sphere and the reconfiguration of the virtual Umma have led to the creation of multiple identities and multiple resistances, which clearly manifested themselves through various Islamic websites, producing varying degrees of consensus, divergence, and negotiation.

A negligible percentage of ordinary Muslims are really knowledgeable about the doctrinal differences in Islamic Jurisprudence. The majority of Muslims know Islam through reciting the Quran, learning about the Prophet’s tradition and practicing the Pillars of Islam. Although, the Quran and the prophet traditions are the main sources of legislation in Islamic Sharia, non-Arab Muslims in general never read them and, if they do, never understand them, because, mostly, they read the Quran (especially) in Arabic which they don’t understand. From their childhood, most Muslims are taught Islam using scriptures and the prophet sayings, ‘Hadiths’, giving them a picture of Islam, as understood by Imams, jurists, teachers and writers. This was clearly reflected in the different perceptions of Islam between first and second generation respondents. Their responses also reflect the complexity involved in differentiating between ‘real’ Islam and ‘practiced’ Islam.

The difference between the two generations was clear when the focus group was asked the question what is Islam? A male, first generation, participant argued:

“For me Islam is ‘Din wa Donia’, i.e. religion and Life. I have to live my life based on the moral values of true Islam, following the prophet and the first companions and followers traditions because they represent the real morals, values and traditions of Islam. What we see today is not real Islam but an Islam that had been influenced by history and society.”

He further elaborated on what ‘true’ Islam meant to him:

“True Islam is the Islam that was practiced and lived by the prophet and his Followers and the four guided Caliphs before the Dynasties, politics and jurists turned it into a philosophy of government and not a philosophy of how to live your life humbly and under the mercy of Allah.”

Similarly, a first generation, male Engineer argued:

“Islam is a way of a life. To be a believer you have to learn the true spirit of Islam that respect
humanity regardless of the differences, because Islam teaches us to understand, respect and value our differences. This is the true spirit of real Islam that is clearly reflected in the choices that the prophet and the first generation of Muslims made both towards their enemies and allies.”

In the same vein, a first generation, female participant stated that:

“Actually Islam today has nothing to do with Real Islam. The genocide being perpetrated in Sudan by the Islamists in Khartoum has nothing to do with real Islam; the unwillingness of the Saudi authorities to allow women to drive has nothing to do with real Islam; the sectarian violence in Pakistan between Sunni and Shiite has nothing to do with real Islam; the practice of female genital mutilation by Muslims all over North Africa, Middle East, Pakistan, Indonesia etc. has nothing to do with real Islam; having sex with teenage girls in Saudi Arabia has nothing to do with real Islam; and women’s oppression and inequality with men has nothing to do with real Islam. Islam is tolerant, just and respects humanity. Real Islam was practiced by the prophet and the first generation of Muslims before the politics of dynasties and government ruined it”

A first generation, female teacher acknowledged:

“There is a big difference between real Islam and the Islam we see today. Real Islam is what you think, what you choose and how to live your life in accordance to the prophet’s and his follower’s traditions. They are our role models and not what everybody i.e. jurists, tell you what to do. Religious people, jurists, teachers job is to give us the skills to learn and understand Quran and not give us ultimatums of what we must and mustn’t be doing”

Similarly, a first generation, male cleaner argued that:

“We are Muslims by being born to Muslim parents, and none of us are Muslim by our choice. The only Islam we know is what our teachers taught us in schools, or what our parents and society teach us about Islam. But when we look around us and compare it to the example the prophet and his early followers do, we know for sure what is happening in our lives and in the Islamic world is not Islam.”

A first generation, housewife was more uncertain than these previous respondents. She contended:
"I don’t know what real Islam is? And how to be a good Muslim. What I had been taught in schools that a good Muslim is a Muslim that perform the pillars of Islam and live according to the Quran and the Prophet’s tradition. It is confusing because even when they explain to us Quran and the prophet traditions in the mosque here or we read in it in different Islamic websites; there are differences between the Imams and I don’t know which interpretation is the right one especially for us who live in non Islamic society and don’t have access to Islamic teachers or Imams in Australia. We don’t know which the right path is. I try to avoid anything that is confusing but it is becoming harder and harder especially here in Australia because with the complexities I am facing every day with my children in schools and with my neighbours. We don’t know how as Muslims to deal with many situations. We are Australian now we don’t want to be isolated and at the same time I don’t know how to become a good Muslim and bring up my children to become good Muslims too.”

The differences between the two notions of real Islam and practiced Islam among first generation respondents could be attributed to a number of factors. First, the first generation grew up in Islamic societies and is aware of the fact that practiced Islam in most Islamic societies is influenced by the socio-economic structures and the ethno-cultural components that was embedded in these societies. Second, their religious knowledge derived from what might be termed ‘official Islam’, that is Islam designed and monitored by governments, jurists and traditional religious bodies and authorities, and taught in different educational institutions. These agencies and educational institutions concentrate on the acts of worship and on Islamic religious practices, including the performance of the pillars of Islam and the laws of transactions between Muslims in their daily life. This ignores the Islamic philosophy of governance and the relationship between religion and state. Third, they understand that, although official Islam originated from the real Islamic teachings of the Quran and the prophet traditions, it is also a product of, and influenced by, historical events that shaped the relationship between the state, religion and jurists; socio-cultural, economic and political factors that governs these societies. Finally, this group relate their perception of the differences between real Islam and practiced Islam to their experiences with political Islam in their countries of origin (Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea), which are governed by Islamist regimes.

Here, it’s crucial to discuss the tendency among the first generation group to isolate separate Islam as an idea from a place or geographical boundaries. Their pre-immigration experiences forced them to define themselves in terms which, as Mandaville (2001: 103) argues: “transcend the (Trans) locality of migrant dwelling, to posit something that is not of (and hence cannot be domesticated
by) the nation-state”. Hence, they create a new articulated diaphoretic identity, which as James Clifford (quoted in Mandaville, ibid: 104), argues “reach (es) outside the normative territory and temporality (myth/history) of the nation-state...Resistance to assimilation can take the form of reclaiming another nation that has been lost, elsewhere in space and time, but that is powerful as a political formation here and now”. For the first generation group, the Quran functions as that portable: “eschatology, an identity bearer in the form of a book which passes easily across boundaries; while the Umma becomes “nostalgia” (Mandaville, 2001:104).

The second generation group also acknowledged that there is a difference between real Islam and practiced Islam as part of a complex negotiation of a religious identity. However, their understandings of real Islam and practiced Islam are different from the first generation. The first generation considers that real Islam is the Islam that acknowledges the spirit and philosophy of Islam, which was practiced by the Prophet, his followers and companions in the early days of Islam and during the Four Guided Caliphs periods. They believe that the foundation of Islamic knowledge is based on the understanding of the spirit of Islam, which is driven from the Quran and the prophet traditions that include both his sayings and practices, and must be applied to a Muslim’s daily life. As such, the second generation group equates true Islam with political Islam. For them, true Islam is represented in the glorious history of the Islamic empire and the establishment of the Islamic Umma. So a male college student argued:

“Real Muslims are Muslims that they make their own destiny and follow the words of Allah. When Muslims practiced true Islam, they established an empire, which ruled the world and spread the words of Allah. That what real Islam will help you to achieve if you believe in it and follow the footsteps of the real Muslims of the past”.

He further elaborated:

“Leaders of the Islamic countries and their jurists do not represent real Muslims or the true spirit of Islam because they are not chosen through Islamic methods i.e. the principle of consultation, and do not follow the Islamic principles in their lives and government that is why they do not reflect the spirit of Real Islam. Caliph Omer is a role model for the true spirit of leadership in Islam.”
Similarly, a second generation, female participant stated that:

"Real Islam is the belief in tolerance or non-discrimination as the foundation principle of the society; the principle to which all other principles must yield. Islam encourages us not to discriminate against other people on the basis of their culture, ethnicity, nationality, religion or race. It teach us not only to be tolerant towards differences but to be able to forgive and live happily and apply the system of Islam in both your private and public life.

In the same vein, a second generation, male participant contended:

"We are part of the Islamic community and owe our highest loyalty to Islam. To spread the words of Allah means an increase the number of Muslims and the power of Islam. That is what true Islam is all about; to be true to yourself and religion and fight the temptation of the world. True Muslims are the Muslims of the past who established and empire and ruled the world. We practice Islam but we are not true Muslims".

The second generation respondents mostly believed in the existence of a utopian version of Islam, where both real and practiced Islam can be discussed, reshaped, renegotiated and integrated. In their view, this integration will be reached and enhanced through an unsupervised and uncontrolled, intellectual dialogue between different sects, schools of jurisprudence and versions of Islam in the cyber sphere. As an example, a second generation, female participant argued that:

"Real Islam is different from what we practice today. There are a lot of things that is not real Islam. Real Islam is lost because we left rulers and their jurists to think for us, control and teach us about our religion. This is no longer the case, because now we can discuss in Islamic websites away from the supervision of official Islam, the rules and regulations of our religion. Cyber Islam gives us the chance to form a unified spiritual community of Muslims without divisions of sects, schools of jurisprudence or geographical boundaries. It helps us to purify our religion and integrate with each others to form a new Umma."

Similarly a second generation male, college student argued that:

"Real Islam teaches you how to make your choices and be responsible from it. It's your ability to make
your decisions and live according to it. That is what the early Muslims did. Muslims in Islamic countries forget how to be true Muslims and fight oppression, corrupted leaders and their official Islam which must be fought and replaced. Muslims shouldn't be afraid of the consequences and must make sacrifices like the first generation of Muslims who scarified their lives, properties and belongings. We are in Australia because our parents did not fight back instead they emigrated."

In the same vein, a second generation, female student argued that:

"Real Islam could be achieved wherever you live by knowing your duties and obligation to your religion and Umma. There would not be corrupted governments in Islamic countries, if Muslims in these countries behaved as real Muslims because the early real Muslims who accompanied the prophet and the four guided caliphs fought corruption and tyranny. This is what Islam is all about fighting corruption, purifying the soul and creating the virtue society".

The second generation’s initial knowledge of, and contact with, Islam was through their Islamic religious classes in mosques and community centers that provide a religious education, which mainly concentrates on teaching children to recite the Quran, to perform the pillars of Islam, especially the prayer, and to learn the Arabic language. As such, they are unaware of the positive/negative influences of the ethno-cultural and socio-economic factors and the history of practiced Islam that interact with the different social components of any social structure. Here, a second generation, female student argued that:

"Real Islam is a power of change that changed the course of history. I was not taught Islam; I was taught how to practice Islam in the mosque, where my parents used to take me every Sunday morning. The Imam taught me how to read Quran, the prayers and the Arabic Language. I was not taught about the mission and the philosophy of Islam. I taught myself my religion."

A second generation, male student elaborated on this self-education process:

"I was too young to understand the difference between what I was taught in the mosque and the real mission of Islam. The mosque teaches us how to perform the pillars of Islam but not what real Islam is. I learned the essence of my religion from Islamic websites. My favorite is Islamonline.com. I can learn, exchange ideas and discuss my religion with Muslims all over the world away from parents and my community version of Islam. This discussion groups helped me expand my knowledge and horizons."
Second, in the absence of an officially-sponsored, Islamic education monitored by the Australian Government or accredited Islamic institutions and centers inside or outside Australia, different Islamic websites become the source of knowledge about Islam for the second generation. The influence of cyber Islam is clear in their understanding of the concepts of the Islamic Umma and the Islamic state, and in the references they quoted and the terminology they used. Islamic websites tend to provide a glorious version of Islamic history to promote Islamic principles and attract young audiences. Indeed, a second generation, female artist stated that:

"We are forming a new Umma away from the official structures, geographical boundaries, nationalities, and official Islam. That is real Islam, the formation of the Umma that unified by the spirit of Islam. We are discussing new ideas and new Islam that is originate from the rich history of the prophet tradition and the glorious past away from the existing religious structures and official practiced Islam".

This search for a true/real Islam reflects this young generation’s search for a new identity. They are aware that the Islam of their parents was learned in a different socio-cultural setting and in a different era. The first generation received both direct and indirect socialization into their religion at home, school and in the wider Muslim majority societies i.e. their homelands. Although, the younger generation has chosen to reaffirm their Islamic identity, they do not identify with their parent’s countries of origin, like the first generation, instead, that role falls to Islam. As Scantlebury (1995: 430) notes, “a significant number of young Muslims are rejecting a religio-ethnic identity in favour of a search for True Islam. Much of what the older generation sees as Islam is dismissed by the younger generation as tainted, or as mere cultural practice. This questioning takes the form of trying to strip away the varying cultural traditions that first generation migrants have, rightly or wrongly, assumed to be Islamic, from the essential core of the religion”.

This intergenerational differences, as Mandaville (2001:126) noted: “is not only the source of conflict in the Muslim diaspora. There are other debates going on within these communities, many of which pertain to questions about the boundaries of who and what Islam is. Muslims in diaspora come face to face with the myriad shapes and colours of global Islam, forcing their religion to hold a mirror up to its own diversity. These encounters often play an important role in processes of identity formation, prompting Muslims to relativize and compare their self-understandings of Islam.” Eickelman and Piscatori (1996: 15) point out that, in the diasporatic context: “Muslims have direct contact with the real differences of language, sect, race, and customs that unavoidably make up the Umma. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom of western social scientists, therefore, the encounter with the Muslim ‘other’ has been at least as important for self-definition as the confrontations with the European other”.

Many modern jurists, as discussed in the previous chapter, had hoped that the circumstances of diaspora would lead Muslims from different parts of the world and cultural backgrounds to focus on that which is common to them all, Islam. In other words, they anticipated the emergence of a new form of cosmopolitan Islam devoid of ethnic or cultural elements. In this sense it was hoped that diaspora might provide the opportunity for the establishment of a greater global Umma away from sectarian divisions. The ability to form such greater global Umma, the characteristics of this Umma, and if its synonymous to the Islamic state is explored here through their responses to different arguments that were introduced by the researcher to the focus group for discussion. The first view argues that the “Umma” and “the Islamic state” are not synonymous, because the former includes “certain ideals or aspirations”, while the latter “represents concrete realities”. Thus, the Umma is a spiritual entity and not a geo-political one. That is why the formation of a spiritual greater Umma is possible. As a first generation, male lawyer argued:

"We are proud to be Muslims, Islam is our religion and we belong to the greater global Islamic Umma, spiritual entity and not a political entity. The Umma is based on the brotherhood of Islam but not necessary a nationality."

Similarly, a first generation, female doctor contended:

"We are Muslim Australians. Islam is our religion but Australia is our country. We derive our moral values from our religion. But we belong to the Australian nation. There is no such a thing as an Islamic Umma or an Islamic state. The Umma represents a spiritual unity and not a political geographical entity. The Islamic state no longer exists. It is a new world with new political order. Religious states no longer exist."

A significant majority of the first generation acknowledges that Islam is a religion that provides a set of rules, regulations and orders that govern both the public and private domain of a Muslim’s life; as well as providing Muslims with the tools, strategies, knowledge and freedom to decide what is applicable and not applicable in relation to their experiences in the public and private domain. The concept of the Islamic Umma is different, because it was influenced, shaped and redefined by various factors through the different historical periods and under different political authorities. So, a first generation, male respondent
argued that:

"The Islamic state was a natural historical development of the Islamic religion. The prophet and his companions established this entity under certain historical circumstances and according to the Islamic principles of consultation and government, to protect the newly formed community of the believers. This situation changed with historical development of the Islamic state and the emergence of different kinds of rulers and governments. Thus, the Islamic state no longer exists"

Similarly, a first generation, female respondent emphasized:

"I am a Muslim that belongs to the Islamic Umma but Australia is my country. My loyalty is to my country and not to the Islamic Umma because there is no such thing as a unified Islamic Umma or an Islamic state. My religion teaches me to respect my obligations and my contracts. When I became an Australian citizen, I signed a contract with Australia. Our Islamic history is full of examples of pacts and contracts with both Muslims and non-Muslims entities. A true Muslim is a Muslim who honor his obligations".

The first generation’s perception of the Islamic Umma as a geo-political entity that was represented by the Islamic state during the prophet’s and the Four Guided Caliph’s periods is different from their perception of the Islamic Umma now. From this perspective, the Islamic state only existed as a political entity during the prophet and the four Guided Caliphs, when Islamic Sharia law, rules and the principle of consultation were applied on the devolution of power and the election of the government. The beginning of the dynasties rule that was based on hereditary succession, ended the geo-political entity, or what is known as the Islamic state, and replaced it with kingdoms ruled by kings and Sultans, even if they were called Caliphs.

At the same time, in the Islamic state during the first days of Islam, citizenship was granted to both Muslims and non-Muslims. Modernists and reformists, such as Al-Qaradawi (2005) and Tariq Ramadan (2003), argue that the relationship between the two groups was governed by the consent of the two groups to the principles of different agreements and pacts. These pacts could be understood, either as a "binding legal appendix" that regulated the relationship between different segment of the society, regardless of their religious affiliations, or as "contractual obligations", that list the conditions of peaceful coexistence which govern the relationship between the state and minorities in an Islamic state or with a non-Islamic state, which "Muslims are encouraged by the Quran to honor and respect" (Al-Qaradawi, 2005: 25).
Muslim minorities today can relate to these principles of coexistence in regard to their residency in their host communities and their relationship with it. Some respondents from the first generation gave an example of the pact of Granada that represents a contractual agreement between Muslim minorities and the Christian authority they lived under. They argue that obtaining the citizenship of these non-Islamic countries is a form of "contractual agreement" that must be applied and their citizenship "obligations and duties" are the terms of the agreement that "should be respected and honored", as long as "their freedom to practice their religion is guaranteed". This view was seen as following the traditions of the prophet and the Four Guided Caliphs who considered and acknowledged the geo-political and strategic factors that motivated these pacts and agreements, Muslim minorities can apply the same principles when it comes to their residency and relationship with their host community. A first generation, male accountant emphasized that the new world order and existing strategic consideration should be acknowledged when the questions of the Umma and citizenship are discussed:

"We Muslims must understand our obligation to the spiritual Umma as part of our religious obligations. There is no such thing as obligations to the Islamic state because it no longer exists. Our obligation is to Australia and my loyalty is to the Australian people and not the Muslims of the world because the new world order is not based on religious identities but on national identity. Thus, Muslims must understand the existing international order and forget about the glorious past of the Islamic state and follow the prophet and the Four Guided Caliph's traditions when they respected and considered the existing political orders in their policies and alliances."

This perception by Jurists that the Umma is an entity that unites Muslims together, regardless of their nation states, citizenship status or residency in Islamic or non-Islamic countries, is misleading. The majority of the first generation respondents acknowledged that the formation of nation-states in Muslim countries, and the relationship between religion and the state, from the dynasties period to the modern post-colonial time, can be explained by a wide range of socio-economic, political and historical events. These events reshaped and influenced the ideological changes in modern Islamic theology and, in some cases, these changes led to the decline of the religion authority in some Islamic countries. Therefore, as a first generation, participant argued:

"Islam in practice has become very different from the "real Islam that is explained in the Koran, taught by the Prophet and other sacred sources of the Islamic religion. Thus, no country in the Islamic world, even those which are governed by Islamic laws such as Saudi Arabia, could be defined as an Islamic state".

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On the other hand, a fair percentage of the first generation respondents argued that the Islamic Umma could become a state with geo-political boundaries, if the Islamic political system is applied. The main characteristics of this system are: the application of principle of consultation and devolution of power; a just society; freedom of beliefs; and respect for the dignity of the human life. A first generation, female respondent stated that:

"We live in a world where countries are unified and allied by different reasons. None of these reasons is religion. Even in the Islamic world, there is no Islamic system but an official Islam that serves the interests of a ruler and not Islam or Muslims. That is why my loyalty is to Australia, my country of citizenship. Jurists have different opinions on our residency in non-Islamic country but they never define what is an Islamic country or an Islamic Umma. They should first define what an Islamic country is before making rules."

Similarly, a first generation, male, first generation respondent argued:

"In the absence of a real Islamic state that based on Islamic principles and governed by an Islamic system, Muslims have no obligation towards an Islamic state. The obligation towards an entity implies the existence of such entity. These two notions of the Islamic state and the Islamic Umma are too vague. We need to define first what make state to be described as an Islamic state. Jurists must first define what an Islamic state is and apply it in their Islamic countries before questioning or make judgments on our options and loyalties."

In contrast, almost half of the second generation respondents believe that the Umma is a spiritual entity that reflects the universality of Islam, which supersedes any other form of political, ethno-cultural or religious identification. A second generation, male participant stated:

"We, Muslims constitute an Umma; we are the nation of Islam, unified by our religion and history. But we do not belong to own country. We come from different countries, nationalities and races. We can protect our interests as Muslim by working together to form a unified spiritual front and then we can achieve our goals of forming a unified political organization that represent all our Islamic courtiers something like the European Union."
Similarly, a second generation, female student argued:

"The Umma exists. We Muslims are unified by our religion and history. But this doesn't mean we belong to one country or must form an Islamic country of our own. Islam respect differences and give us the tools and strategies to negotiate our differences. The Islamic history is rich with examples of how to live in an Islamic or non-Islamic country."

The majority of my second generation respondents argued that the Islamic Umma could be manifested in an Islamic political unity through the unity of different Islamic countries in "an European Union Model" that protect the interests of Muslims, as well as all human kind. Interestingly, they referred to the European Union and not the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference), which has 57 Islamic states in membership; because they consider the latter part of "official Islam", serving "the existing corrupted governments of the Islamic countries". So, a second generation, male receptionist contended:

"I am proud to be an Australians and a Muslim. I don't think the two identities contradict each others. Instead they are one entity. Islam calls for the unity of humanity, the unity of the believers on the monotheistic nature of God and the brotherhood of Muslims. This implies that Muslims can live and obtain the nationality of non-Islamic country because Islam respects all humanity."

Some of the second generation respondents quoted Professor Maqsood Jafri’s (2010) argument on the Islamic Research Foundation International website (www.irfi.org). Jafari argues that the Islamic concept of monotheism, ‘Tawhid’, which is the other name for the unity of humankind, teaches Muslims that we should not divide humans into sections and sects, because the classification of people in such a manner will create divisions, hatred and conflict. That is why the Quran discusses the concept of unity on three levels. First, there is the unity of humanity, which is reflected in the way the Quran addresses the people, as mankind, the believers or the people. One example in Sura Al-Hujurat reads: “O, Mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another; verily, the most honourable of you with Allah is the one who has piety” (49:13). Here, the second level refers to the unity of the people of the Book: the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims. Another example is in Sura Al-Imran: “O, people of the Book! Come to a word that is just between us and you, that we worship none but Allah, and that we associate no partners with him, and that none of us will take others as
lords besides Allah. Then if they turn away, say; Bear witness that we are Muslims” (3:64). The third level is the unity of the Muslims within humanity.

In contrast, more than half of my second generation respondents do not differentiate between the Islamic state and the Islamic Umma. They argue that the Islamic Umma is a spiritual entity manifested in the Islamic state, or as some of second generation participants argued: "a geo-political entity that is unified by the spiritual unity of the brotherhood of Islam. It was established by the Brotherhood Agreement in Medina and became stronger by the application of Islamic principles in government and public life. Membership of the Umma is a privilege to Muslims only, but non-Muslims could be included as citizens of the state”. So, a second generation, male participant argued:

"It's misleading to say the Islamic Umma is a spiritual one. Muslims exists and they constitute a nation that established an empire. Thus, there was an Islamic state and there was an Islamic Umma. Muslims must return to the essence of their religion and work hard to change the existing governments in the Islamic countries because they can't be described as an Islamic government."

A second generation, female participant added that:

"In the absence of an Islamic state, Muslims are permitted to live in different countries because all the Land belongs to Allah and Muslims are encouraged to emigrate and live in non-Islamic lands to escape Oppression and spread the words of Allah."

In the absence of an Islamic state, then the concept of the Islamic Umma should be distinguished from the political entities in different Islamic countries, which cannot be described as Islamic states, but are merely countries whose official religion is Islam. Thus, in the absence of an Islamic state, Muslims’ relationships with non-Muslim societies/countries are governed by the principle that "all the earth belongs to God". At the same time, the prophet encouraged Muslims to live and take refuge in non-Islamic countries in the case of, as a second generation, male student argued:

"Aggression, unsafely environment and the inability to live with dignity, respect and honor" which are the main causes for our parent's immigration".

Interestingly, some second generation respondents gave an example of the immigration of Muslims to Ethiopia during the prophet's time and quoted a religious rule, ‘Fatwa’, by Sheikh Muhammad bin Salih al-Uthaymeen (2010), one of the most prominent Salafi scholars of his time in Saudi Arabia (1925-
2001), on the residency of Muslims in non-Islamic countries that was published on http://www.islamopediaonline.org. The rule stated that: “If a Muslim is persecuted in his home country without any crime, imprisoned for no due reason, his wealth seized unjustly and he has no way of protecting himself and his family from these injustices except taking residence in a non-Muslim country, then in this case, it is permitted for him to take its citizenship without any dislike ‘Karahia’, given he makes sure that he will be able to practice his religion in daily life and is able to guard against the promiscuity and evil widespread over there” 41.

Sheikh Muhammad bin Salih al-Uthaymeen listed the following historical events to support his rule: "first, the Companions migrated to Abyssinia after being persecuted by the people of Mecca; Although Abyssinia at the time was led by the unbelievers. Second, some followers and Companions did not cease their residency even after the migration of Allah’s Messenger to Medina and the establishment of the Islamic state. One of those followers and companions was Abu Musa al-‘Ashari, who did not return until the expedition of 'Khaibar', which took place in the seventh year after the prophet’s migration. Third, the right of protection from all forms of injustice and self preservation is sacred. If individuals cannot find protection except in the land of the unbelievers, then there is no obstacle to migrating to it as long as they freely practice and safeguards their religious obligations and stays away from forbidden abominations". 42

The second argument presented to the focus group concerned the concept of citizenship in Islam, particularly whether religious identity was the basic identity underpinning citizenship.

Half of the first generation respondents defined citizenship in Islam as a political identity and not a religious one. In their view, political identity was based upon political sovereignty, i.e. to be a citizen of a country, this country must exist, be recognized and have a geo-political sovereignty.

In this vein, a male participant argued:

"There is no Islamic citizenship. What is this mean? It only existed during the first periods of Islam when there was an Islamic state. But since the establishment of the dynasties, citizenship of both Muslims and non-Muslims was to the political entity they lived under. In this time it’s more difficult because citizenship of a country is not based on religious identification.”

Similarly, a first generation, female participant argued:

"There is no Islamic citizenship. Citizenship is based on the existence of political identity. Islam is a religious identity. Even in the early days of Islam, citizenship of the Islamic state was granted to all people who lived under it regardless of their religious affiliations."

Thus, in modern times and in the absence of an Islamic state, the concept of the Islamic citizenship is a misleading one that for many first generation respondents must be replaced by a more accurate conceptualization of Islamic identity. Even historically, with the existence of different kinds of Islamic political sovereignties represented by different dynasties and kingdoms, citizenship of the states was not confined to Muslims; there was a religious pluralism within the confines of a state. This new political discourse chief concerns is explicitly to rethink Islamic conceptions of the concept of the state and citizenship; and to enquire as to the nature of the Islamic state and its position vis-à-vis non-Muslims.

This social reality of large numbers of Muslims living within non-Muslim majority societies has prompted some theorists to rethink the categories through which identity and community are represented in Islam. The whole notion of “the other” in Islamic theology is changing’, as Dilwar Hussain (quoted in Mandaville, 2001: 136) stated “we live side by side now, in each other’s domains. Islam is in the West and the West is in Islam”.

The first generation group do not accept the traditional divisions that was suggested by different school of thoughts, as discussed in the previous section, such as Dar Al-Harb, Dar Al-Islam or Dar Al-Ahd, but they endorse the Qur’anic term ‘Ahl Alkitab’ (People of the Book); a Quran term that refers to those to whom Muslims must extend full religious tolerance, such as the Jews and Christians, during the prophet’s period, and other religious minorities, in different historical periods.

In this vein, a first generation, female participant stated that:

"Historically, citizenship of the Islamic state was not confined to Muslims; Non-Muslims were included and served in different position during the prophet and Four Guided Caliphs periods."
They are an integral part of the society and the state regardless whether they are unbeliever or belonged to the people of the Books, whom their status was protected by the Islamic Sharia law.

They believe that, depending on the time and place in which they lived, religious minorities, both in history and the modern world, could be included within the broader categorisation of the People of the Book. Here, a first generation respondent argued that: "A Muslims faith is completed by believing in other books, (the Torah, the Gospel, the Psalms and the Quran), and the messengers of God". Thus, People of the Book should be considered as the "brothers", because, throughout the Islamic history, people of the book were not only defined only in terms of those who was considered a Person of the Book; rather, it defined on how religious groups treated each other both under Islamic and non-Islamic state. Here, a first generation, male participant contended:

"There is no such thing as an Islamic Umma that is the sole privilege of Muslims. Non-Muslims Especially the people of the Books are an integral part of the Umma. Our faith is not complete without believing in other faiths. We should adopt this principle today so that we can live in harmony and integrate in our host communities."

All of the first generation view non-Muslims, regardless of their religious affiliation, as: "people of the book", who deserve tolerance and mutual respect and should not be regarded as the ‘others’, but as an integral part of the Umma. Its noticeable here that this group included non-Muslims in the definition of the Umma. First, they believe that, based on the principle of complete faith (a Muslim’s faith is not complete until he believes in the other three holy Books, the Bible, Torah, the Book of Psalms), other religions could be included within the spiritual boundaries of the Islamic Umma. Second, the position and the role played by non-Muslim minorities in Islamic history, when they shared and protected the interests of the Umma and were integral part of both the private and public domains of Muslims life after the prophet’s time, meant they were classify as brothers of Muslims. Based on these principles of brotherhood, complete faith and the principle of the People of the Book, they classify Australians, regardless of their religious affiliations, as brothers. Third, in modern times, where there is no one faith that is concentrated or exclusively within the boundaries of one territory or any nation which are wholly of one faith, Muslims need to go back to these principle to learn to coexist peacefully and in harmony with others. This new approach to the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims is a result of being Australians, considering Australia as their new home and living within the texture of the Australian society.
Thus, as Ataullah Siddiqui (1998: 27) points out, “one’s whole perception of living Dar al-Harb suggests temporality, otherness, and a sense of compulsion”.

In the case of the second generation group, a small percentage agreed with the first generation that citizenship of the Islamic state requires the existence of a political entity and not a religious one. Thus, citizenship could be extended to non-Muslims for a number of reasons. First, Islam acknowledges religious pluralism and that all religions are equally true and equally good. Second, different political authorities, under different political systems in Islamic history, acknowledged and respected religious pluralism. As a second generation, male participant argued, this is reflected:

"In the high positions held and the role played by non-Muslims elites in the Islamic culture and political system", represented by the court of different Caliphs, kings and Sultans, military and other governmental apparatuses from the early days of Islam, especially during "the second caliph Omer period".

Third, Islam welcomes a peaceful coexistence and cultural conversation with other civilizations, which was clearly reflected in the influence of these civilizations and cultures on the Islamic state, as a second generation, female participant argued:

"non-Islamic civilization and cultures such as the Persian, the Greek and the Roman civilization in the administration, military and government and in the culture of the society and the Islamic state”.

In contrast, almost half of the second generation group argued that an Islamic unity, that includes different Islamic sovereignties, is something that Muslims should be eager to achieve, although this would not necessarily involve one unified Islamic state or a single geo-political sovereignty. In this vein, a male student stated that:

"Islam is a universal religion with universal mission. The unification of Muslims doesn’t mean the establishment of one centralized state. Instead Muslims could be unified spiritually regardless whether they live in Islamic or non-Islamic societies."

Similarly, a second generation, female secretary argued:

"As Muslims, our faith orders us to respect and honor diversity. The respect for diversity was clearly
reflected in the composition of both the early Islamic society and the role played by non-Muslims under different Islamic rules. Respecting diversity make Islam a religion for all humanity. As Muslims we can identify with both the Australian society and other Muslims around the world. With Australians we share the land, destiny and country; and with Muslims we share the faith, history and aspirations."

Finally, a second generation, male student contended:

"I am a Muslim and an Australian. Australia is my country and I am loyal to it, but Islam is my religion. I feel more belonging to the International Islamic community than my own Australian neighborhood community. There are many similarities between me and the Muslims in other parts of the worlds than with my own Australian community. We share the faith, the history and the destiny and even the feeling of alienation in our own countries of citizenship. I am the second generation of immigrants in my family. I am born and raised in Australia, but still I feel a sense of alienation."

This group believes that Muslims are not one homogenous group; they are from different races, cultures and ethnicities but are unified by the principles of Islam. They pointed to the 15 million people in Europe and Australia who identify themselves as a Muslim. For this group, as a female respondent argued:

"the existence of this cultural diversity within Islam is evidence of the universality of Islam. it is crucial to accept the diversity of cultures under the contextual frame work of Islam."

Emphasizing the possibility of the co-existence of the various layers of self-identification, such as nationality and ethnicity, Muslims from different countries and nationalities can create an Islamic entity that unifies them and protects their interests. The various layers of self-identification appear when they identify themselves as Australian, given that they have citizenship status within the Australian society. At the same time, they feel more identified with the Umma, than with their Australian community, because they feel alienated from the latter.

What is meant by the application of the Islamic Sharia in private life was explored further in a group discussion among second generation participants. Here, the views included: a call for the establishment of a parallel court system, based on Sharia law, to deal with Muslim community personal and inheritance disputes; the related opinion that Muslims, as second generation, respondents argued:

"Should be allowed to apply Sharia in family problems and inheritance issues", because, "as Australians, our faith must be acknowledged, respected and applied in our life. Sharia is our way of Life"; and support
for state sponsorship of Muslim financial institutions, organizations, schools and worship places: "The Australian government should put more effort and support to its Muslims citizens". This is because: "If the government considers us equal to other Australians, they will help us to apply our religion in our life and allow us to build our own Islamic institutions such as schools and banks because we are not allowed to accept the interests of banks. I am not aware of rejection to build a catholic school".

This view reflects one of the foundation principles of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, which calls for the application of Islamic Sharia as the main feature and foundation of any proposed Islamic state. Indeed, Islamist slogans have included "Islam is the solution," "the Qur'an is our constitution" and "Islam is a system" (Al-Bana, 1976: 25).

Such statements imply that there is some kind of certainty about what constitutes Islam and what constitutes an Islamic system. It is often assumed that Islamists are seeking to reinstall a glorious, historical, Islamic system, in which religion and state were unified and which existed at some idealized point in Islamic history. Implicit in this view is the assumption that Islam has a specific theory of society, politics and government, which Islamic revivalists are attempting to implement now. In this vein, Hasan al-Bana (1976: 25), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, argued that: "Islam is a complete system which deals with all areas of life. It is a state, a nation, a government, and a community". Al-Bana assumed that the concept of Islam as a system was embodied in the past, although he was not clear as to the specific historical period in which this ideal Islamic state occurred. Not only that, but Islamists demand a regressive transformation; a "Muslim-ruled state" is insufficient, and must be replaced by a theocratic "Islamic state", in which Sharia is the sole legal system.

Al-Bana also contended that, in the absence of an Islamic state, the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims should be governed by strategic considerations. As such, he advocates a new theory of Sharia, positioned midway between traditional and radical forms. This is what Schwartz (2009) calls “Parallel Sharia” and it originated with modern Islamic scholars, such as Al-Qaradawi and the Iraqi-born Taha Jabir Alwani, who lives mainly in the U.S. It differs from traditional Sharia in that it proposes a separate legal canon from established, non-Muslim law, which would be enforced by the same Western authorities under whom Muslims in the West now live. In general, however, Parallel Sharia does not embody obviously radical principles, as it is limited to personal and family law, as well as, increasingly, to financial transactions. It could also be seen as a counter-application
of the diversity present in the Turkish and Islamised Mongol empires, where non-Muslim communities were granted religious and judicial autonomy. Overall, Parallel Sharia appears, or is presented, as a compromise, or accommodating institution, for the Muslim diaspora.

This ideology is clearly reflected in the second generation’s position on the role played by non-Muslims in past and future Islamic states. The position of this group evolves from the complex interaction between Quran verses, prophetic models and the political development of the dynasties and the role played by non-Muslims in them. They argue that the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, which includes Muslims’ relationship with their host community, is governed by the consideration of realities in a specific historical moment. These realities are: socio-economic, as a second generation, male participant argued:

"We have to deal with banks although their interests are not permitted in Islam";

Political and cultural, as a second generation, male participant argued: "I am a member of the Labour Party. I believe in the gradual change from within the system".

From this position, religious identity must continue to be, as a second generation participant argued, “the supreme one over other identities”, but it does not conflict with the citizenship of non-Islamic countries for a number of reasons. First, in the absence of an Islamic state, Muslims are permitted to live in any country that guarantees their religious freedom, although, as a participant from the same group contended: "we should fight to apply our faith in matters that concern Muslims private domain such as Inheritance and personal laws". Second, taking the citizenship of a non-Islamic country is absolutely forbidden, ‘haram’, if it is used to earn respect and honor, or to become like non-Muslims.

So, a second generation respondent argued:

"Is not the case of our parents who migrated to protect and earn a living for their families because earning a livelihood is a religious duty, ‘Faridah’, which the Sharia has not restricted to anyone”.

Here, he quoted: "He it is, Who has made the earth subservient to you, so walk in the path thereof and eat of His provisions, and to Him will be the Resurrection" (Quran 67:15). Third, their
citizenship of this country enables them to, as a male participant contended:

"Perform the sacred duty of spreading the words of Allah" by becoming "models of Muslims and Islam in their community".

The second generation participants justify their position with examples taken from Islamic history, where Muslim merchants and travellers took residence in the land of the unbelievers, such as the immigration of the Afghans to Australia and of the early merchants to the Far East, particularly Indonesia, and some of the Russian states. Finally, it is argued that the system that governs any country does not change overnight. Changing the social, economic, political, judicial and legal system of a country takes time and continuous effort, during which time Muslims would be forced to accept existing laws, until such time as their proposed changes make some significant headway.

Conclusion

It’s clear that it is meaningless to speak of Islam in the sense of a single, monolithic, entity. This was clearly reflected in the respondents from both generations trying to read and understand the textual sources of Islam in new contexts. There is a particular imperative here in the realm of political theory and community. Many Islamic thinkers today highlight the need for Muslims to increase their Umma consciousness, and are developing a more open understanding of the notion of the global community of Muslims. As Anwar Ibrahim (1991: 305) argues, “Recapturing the meaning of the Umma would necessitate that Muslims engage with other people, nations, worldviews, religions and ideologies to work for a set of moral objectives that we can and must define together. But it takes us much further. It requires that we respect the Umma of other people...the history of the Umma has shown exemplary, almost unique models of multiracial, multicultural, multi-religious, pluralist societies. If ever we had the need of recovering such an imperative, it is now”.

There is also emerging a new form of interstitial identity in which the politics of the majority society is not embraced, but neither is that of the ‘homeland’, especially among the younger generation. In the case of the focus group, the two generations have different types of Muslim identity: The first generation group see their Australian and Muslim identity as running in parallel, whereas the second generation have a multi-levelled identity, although with their religious identity
at the core.

The first generation sense of identity is a natural result of a number of factors: first, their pre-immigration experience with political Islam and, thus, their interaction with a practiced Islam that is different from the real Islam; second, the sources of their religious education; third, their ability to draw on, and acknowledge, the historical interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims from the early days of Islam; and, finally, their mistrust of the views of the various schools of jurisprudence and jurists on the issue of their residency in non-Islamic countries and the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims.

This distrust results from a number of factors: first, the long historical experiences with “official Islam” in which there were close links between political authority and religious elites both in different periods of the Islamic history and in contemporary Islamic countries; and, second, the inability of jurists, sometimes even with the same school, to reach a common consensus on simple issues that relate to Muslims daily lives in non-Muslim countries, which makes it difficult for Muslims to decide which School will be the best for them to follow. Of course, most Muslims tend to adhere to the School that is dominant in their country of origin as their version of Islam.

Interestingly, although some studies, (Jiménez, 2011; Markowski, 2009; and Beth, 2012) have indicated that the second generation of migrants are more adaptable and easily integrated into their host community than the first generation, in my research the first generation group showed more willingness to adjust to and accepting the host community.

My research into the second generation revealed that many of them moved through three stages of religious identity development: initially, religion was an ascribed identity, in that they were born and raised in a Muslim Family; second, religion became a chosen identity, where individuals consciously decided to embrace their Muslim identity; and, finally, religion became a declared identity, where individuals choose to retain a positive self-perception and correct public misconceptions about their faith.

As this group moved through each of these stages, their faith became more intense, religious practice increased, and their identification as Muslims become obvious. Although, this group most often reported not being self-reflective regarding their religious background during their...
childhood, their religious practices, such as dressing modestly or attending religion classes at a mosque, were reinforced by their parents and not a reflection of their own religious identity. As they matured, they began to view religion not as an unquestionable, ascribed characteristic, but as a chosen identity. They often mentioned various factors that led to their choosing first and foremost to be identified as Muslim. The most important of these factors was awareness that they were part of a small religious minority in Australia. As they matured, it became increasingly important not only to maintain their religious identity, but also to develop that aspect of themselves. So, a second generation, male student argued that:

"Definitely in my generation, I've noticed that there's return to Islam. Maybe it's because where our parents grew up, they didn't have to think twice about their identity. They were Muslims living in an Islamic country. They took it for granted. They never had to question it or explore it. It was a given. Whereas here, for us, it's something we have to work at because there's no one in our high school or elementary school who teaches us about Islam. We have to go and find out about it on our own. That is how I become aware of the Islamic Umma in the net."

The second generation group sometimes chose to assert their religious identity in order to reject ethnic, national or cultural identities. As the respondents learned more about Islam and drew closer to the religion, they became more likely to reject, or downplay, other aspects of their identity. The relationship between ethnic identity, citizenship and religion was challenged as they began to assert their religious identity. Here, a second generation, male student argued:

"If you had asked me before, my identity would be Australian. I identified myself more with my Australian identity than my ethnic or religious background. With time, I disassociated myself with my ethnic background and I have become more and more Muslim. Now, my identity is Muslim Australian."

They believed that, because of Al-Qada terrorism, their religion was now viewed negatively by many Australians and that they were considered "the others". They felt the need to both explain and demonstrate their faith more strongly than before. Many of the participants remarked that, if they could just show people what a "good Muslim" and a "true Islam" are, some of the stereotyping and antipathy would end. In addition to trying to represent Islam positively and defend their
religion, participants stated that they become more attached to their fellow Muslims in different parts of the world, or what they called “the Global Umma”.

Thus, the second generation group is more resistant to integration into their host community for two main reasons. First, they feel alienated from their host community. Second, Cyber Islam has become the only religious education institution which influences them, in the absence of official supervised, religious education. Cyber Islam reflects the ways in which Muslims and Islamists were themselves making use of the new communication and information technologies to change the context of the sociology of knowledge in Islam, transform Muslim concepts of what Islam is and who possesses the authority to speak on its behalf, and How are they changing the ways in which Muslims imagine the boundaries of the Umma. Finally, their reliance on Cyber Islam alienates them from the ethno-religious tradition of their parents and provides them with a new, utopian, version of Islam, which emerged from the politicization of religion and the conflict between two separate, and often deeply conflicting, strains of ideological Islam: the Traditionalist; and the Modernist. There are several differences between these two versions of Islam, but the most important one involves how they interpret the Sharia and how this, in turn, structures their respective attitudes towards integration and citizenship in the West. Both are at pains to attract audiences, especially from younger generation groups, both in Islamic countries and non-Islamic countries, by exploiting what they call “the glorious days of the Islamic Empire”, to create a universal version of the Islamic Umma.
Chapter Seven
Socio-economic integration, Political participation
And citizenship Duties

The success of the policy of multiculturalism, which was adopted by many European governments and Australia to promote social integration of different ethnic groups, has been questioned. Indeed, both British Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared it a failure. The failure of multiculturalism in Western Europe, as Jurgen Habermas (2006) argues, is because of the transition from a secular to a "post-secular society" in which "secular citizens" have to express a previously denied respect for "religious citizens," who should be allowed, even encouraged, to critique aspects of contemporary society and to find solutions to its problems from within their religious views. Instead of treating religion as a matter of private concern only, religion is once again to be recognized as a legitimate basis of public engagement and political action. This exploration of religion's manifestation in the public sphere is further explored by Modood (2012: 3) who argues that: “The core element of this challenge to secularism is the primacy given to religion as the basis of identity, organization, political representation, normative justification and so on. These matters were thought to be more or less settled (except in a few exceptional cases like Northern Ireland), until some Muslims started to assert themselves as Muslims in the public sphere of various West European countries; which was clearly manifested from the riots in the banlieues of Paris and the Danish cartoon affair to the proliferating bans of various forms of female Muslim dress, conflicts focused on minority/majority relations, questions about integration, equality, racism and Islam, and in turn their relation to terrorism, security, and foreign policy have become central to European politics”.

On the other hand, the two most important issues for both the immigrants and host countries in Europe are security and cultural coherence. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (1997) discussing these two issues argues that Muslims are: fully aware of the secular nature of Western societies; concerned about maintaining the right to practice their faith according to its tenets as revealed to them by God; and concerned about the perpetuation of the faith among their children and the preservation of Islamic values. In contrast, Western societies are concerned with the question of whether Muslims can be integrated into the Western secular system.

This question of the integration of Muslims was further explored by Soharbi and Farquharson
(2012) in their article ‘Discursive Integration and Muslims in Australia’. They identified three Australian discourses about Islam. First, there is a discourse of deviance, where the majority group highlights particular issues and doesn’t balance those with counter example. Soharbi and Farquharson see this as the dominant discourse in the media (see Kabir, 2006). Second, there is the discourse of absence, where the majority group does not recognize the existence of the minority group. Here, they cite the refusal of several local councils in Sydney to give permission to the building of Mosques on the ground that those suburbs are not Islamic. To, Soharbi and Farquharson such policies indicate the non-recognition of the presence of Muslims, thus depriving them of their rights as Australian citizens. Finally, the discourse that emerged after September 11 saw Muslims as a threat to Australian society. Before September 11, the focus was upon the compatibility of Islam with Western, secular, civilizations and the ability of Muslims to integrate in the West.

Many studies have looked at the question of multiculturalism and its success in integrating Muslim diaspora in general and Australian Muslims specifically, using different social inclusion themes, such as the idea of social capital, (Gendera, Pe- Pau and Katz, in Mansouri and Marotta ed. 2012); the implications of social, economic and demographic positions of Muslims (Riaz Hassan, Ibid.); and civic integration (Joppke, 2010).

Sectoral integration and the general sense of integration can happen at an individual level or a community level, and different groups may integrate to different degrees across sectors. For example, Jews in Britain, as Peach (2006) noted, are highly integrated in relation to employment, but are the most segregated religious minority. While, in Germany, Forotuan (2013) argues that the structural, cultural, economic and social integration of Muslims is far better than often assumed.

Akbarzadeh (2006) argues that the question of Muslim integration into broader society, the social implications of multiculturalism and the security threat posed by home-grown extremists are themes that keep popping up in public commentary on Muslims and Islam in Australia. Although it is not publicly admitted, most criticism of multiculturalism implies an inherent incompatibility between being Muslim and being Australian, between the Islamic values and the Australian values. Here, the themes addressed include: the hopes and aspirations of Muslim Australians (Akbarzadeh 2010a); issues of Muslim identities and perceptions of inclusion and exclusion (Yasmeen 2010); the civil and social participation of Muslim women in Australian community life (McCue 2010);
the range of local government strategies to build bridges between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians (Wise and Ali, 2010); racism against Muslims (Dunn and Forrest 2008; Forrest and Dunn 2006); racist attitudes (Dunn, Klocker, et al. 2007); racist actions in Australia (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 1991; 2004); and the negative stereotyping of Muslims that persists in many aspects of the Australian print and electronic media (Manning 2004; 2006), particularly in discourses about Middle Eastern crime and Muslim terrorists (Poynting, Noble, Tabar, and Collins 2004).

This Chapter will address the question of integration with the focus group and whether Islamic and Australian values are compatible. It will also discuss the influence of religious identity on their integration, focusing both upon the respondents’ citizenship obligations, including political participation and military service, and their socio-cultural adaptation/integration process.

The maintenance of culture, including religion, was a main concern raised when the process of social integration and citizenship obligations was discussed with the focus groups. The significance of religion and religious identity is expressed more intensely, and emerges more clearly, when the question of social integration is discussed, because religion provides a crucial basis of identity. The overwhelming majority of respondents articulated their notion of being a Muslim in similar terms. They identified their belief in Islam as the central core of their being, the guiding principle for their lives, a way of life, a moral code by which they live, and a sense of connection with the Supreme Being (Allah) that provided them with a feeling of confidence, comfort and stability. However, as we will see later in this chapter, the relationship between religious and cultural identities is not static. The interviews suggested a dynamic relationship between access to sources of religious knowledge, identity formation and its impact on cultural and social spheres, among both generations of the focus group. This relationship is linked to the individuals revising their views of the culturally-determined and articulated ideas of Islam. The processes either result in them completely shunning these understandings in favour of a more universalistic interpretation of Islam, as is the case with the second generation group, or tolerating/partially accepting them, as is the case with the first generation group. The net result is that the generational difference is evident in relation not only to how they adopt visibly different signs of being a Muslim, Australian Muslim or Muslim Australian, but, also in the way in which they avoid spaces in which culturally-determined manifestations of Islam occur.
The questions then become: Are Muslims successfully resisting integration in their host communities?; Are Muslims who belong to certain socio-economic or demographic groups more likely to integrate than others?

Bisin, Patachini, Verdier and Zenou (2007) conducted a study about the integration of Muslims in the UK, using the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM), which asks a variety of questions about individuals' ethnic and religious preferences (such as the importance of religion, attitudes towards inter-marriage and the relevance of ethnicity in choosing the children's school). They found that: “Muslims can be characterised by the intensity of their religious identity. Indeed, regardless of the dimension of identity we construct, the percentage of Muslims having an intense religious identity is roughly twice as much as that of non-Muslims. For instance, 79% of Muslims in the sample answer that religion is 'very important' to how they live their life, compared to only 42% of non-Muslims. Similarly, 70% of Muslims claim that they would 'mind very much' if a close relative married a white person, compared to 37% of non-Muslims. A greater resistance of Muslims to cultural integration is also signalled by the percentage of Muslims speaking English at home or with friends, which is always significantly lower than that of non-Muslims”.

A major theme in the Australian and international literature relates to the national identity of immigrant minority youth in general, and Muslim youth in particular (see Turner 2003; Kerbaj 2006; Khan 2006; Kabir 2008a). Kabir (2008) studied fourteen Muslim youths from one state school in Melbourne, six males and eight females aged between fifteen and eighteen years, in 2007. Seven were Australian-born of Turkish, Iranian, and Lebanese descent and seven were born in Iraq, Somalia, and Turkey. This study found that the overseas born still identified principally with their country of origin, but were conscious of developing a dual national identity. The conclusion was that the overseas born were slowly integrating into the wider community, but that this process would slow down, if they faced resistance from the wider community. Factors such as language difficulties, parental control and gender roles (in restricting girls’ activities) were identified as barriers to acculturation for Muslim youth. For those Muslim youth who arrived as refugees, the traumatic experience of their flight to Australia also impacted on the adaptation to Australian life.

Such studies didn’t concentrate on the influence of religion in shaping the identity of these younger Australian Muslim migrants. Eid’s (2007: 103-09) Canadian study explores the experiences and
views of second generation Arab Muslim youth. Eid argues that, while: “they generally feel accepted by mainstream society, they also downplay difference and their Arab background to avoid the prejudice that they anticipate will come as a result. Religiosity is in general less alien than ethnicity in their identities and that religion plays a relatively marginal role in the socio-cultural practices of Arab Canadian youth when compared to ethnicity. Further, he finds that their religiosity is constructed mostly outside of formal, institutionalized rituals and is thus individually imagined”.

Although the focus groups studied in this thesis are composed of ‘African Muslims’, ‘they are a diverse group, coming from different cultural backgrounds, speaking different languages and having various levels of religiosity. Thus, the discussion of the political participation and military service as citizenship duties reflects the intersection of these duties with the principles of the believer’s society and the Umma. This is especially the case, if we take into consideration, the position of different theological schools on the adaptation/integration and the residency of Muslim in non-Islamic Western societies varies, discussed in Chapter 2, which range from the fundamentalists’ total rejection, through the traditionalists’ conditional approval to the new modernists/reformists’ approval and acknowledgment of the importance of the existing communities in Western/liberal societies. From a theological perspective, these two duties tend to be the most controversial ones. Jurists emphasize the two main Islamic principles involved in relation to these duties: the duty to command and forbid, suppress evil and combat injustice; and the possibility of securing benefits for non-Muslims. Jurists who are in favour of political participation by Muslims in non-Muslim countries argue that a number of benefits arise. First, it can help to protect Muslim rights in their host communities. Second, it can be used to change specific policies in non-Muslim states for the benefit of both the Muslim minority and Muslims everywhere. Examples here would be the recognition of Islamic Laws, especially personal and inheritance laws as part of the judicial system in the host community or changing the foreign policy of Western states to benefit the Islamic world. Third, it can give non-Muslims an insight into Islam through efforts to ban offensive, scandalous or blasphemous behaviour. Finally, the democratic system of the West can be used to improve the Muslim community’s welfare.

The theme that jurists use to justify and permit Muslim political participation in their host communities is based on the principles of public interests (Al-Qaradawi, 2005), and the governments of rationale (Al-Ghannushi, 1998). Non-Islamic states should be considered as “Governments of Rationale”, which replace the Islamic government or “the government of Sharia”. Thus, citizenship of non-Muslim states and a social coalition with non-Muslims is permitted on the condition that Muslims enter into alliances with secular
democratic groups, which enable them to work towards the establishment of a secular, democratic, government that will respect the five basic human interests and human rights and ensure security and freedom of expression and belief. These are the essential requirements for mankind that Islam aims to fulfil and they also promote the interests of Muslims and the Islamic Umma.

The position of the respondents on the ethical and legal duties that they owe to Islam versus their citizenship duties/obligations to their host community is reflected in their views about political participation in the host community, including the level of engagement with formal and informal public bodies, such as political parties, trade unions, sports and social clubs (not exclusively Muslim groupings), and military service.

7.1. Political Participation

When analyzing the various forms of social and political activities in which Muslim Australians participate, it is interesting to note that, in terms of public engagement, there is no clear difference between the two generations of my respondents. Neither generation is prepared to take a proactive role in the political arena, by attending political meetings, or contacting their Member of Parliament or the media. However, there are some distinctions between first and second generation respondents. The second generation appears to be less inclined to become politically active in traditional political participation arenas than the first generation and more comfortable with cyber political activism. They are less apprehensive about political participation than their first generation parents, who are more active in relation to voting in elections and public rallies. It is interesting that, even though the second generation has fewer barriers to participation, given their greater language skills and experiences and familiarity with the Australian culture and society, they do not appear to have a higher rate of public engagement than their overseas-born parents.

The political participation of this group is discussed under two categories: first, the theological perspective that revolves around promoting the interests of the Islamic Umma; and, second, citizenship obligations towards their new nationality and their community. Table 7.1.1 shows the respondents’ level of political participation.
Table 7.1.1 Political Participation of the Focus group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Generation</th>
<th></th>
<th>Second Generation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you a member of political</td>
<td>3.2 % 96.8</td>
<td>1.2 % 8.8</td>
<td>32.1 % 57.9</td>
<td>34.8 % 55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you vote in the last election?</td>
<td>51.3 % 48.7</td>
<td>6.9 % 3.1</td>
<td>15.9 % 84.1</td>
<td>29.3 % 70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you participate in Australia</td>
<td>74.8 % 25.2</td>
<td>11.7 % 8.3</td>
<td>50.1 % 49.9</td>
<td>53.2 % 46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National events(national Day,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallipoli Day and Canberra Day?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you attend political debates,</td>
<td>24.9 % 75.1</td>
<td>8.2 % 7.1</td>
<td>92.1 % 7.9</td>
<td>95.1 % 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lectures or party functions??</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you participate in political</td>
<td>45.9 % 54.1</td>
<td>7.9 % 7.9</td>
<td>34.1 % 65.9</td>
<td>30.3 % 59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rallies?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you contact your</td>
<td>3.1 % 96.9</td>
<td>0.0 % 0.0</td>
<td>0.0 % 100</td>
<td>1.2 % 98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of parliament?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you Join/participate in</td>
<td>54.3 % 45.7</td>
<td>8.5 % 8.5</td>
<td>79.9 % 20.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cyber Islamic forum or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion Group?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to the question about promoting the interests of the Islamic Umma, the position of the first generation group appears influenced by: first, their lack of trust in jurists and Islamic political activists, which was clearly reflected in the terminology they used when describing Jurists: "State Jurists"; "Governments Ulama"; "King’s and Sheikh’s religious puppets". In addition, even independent, highly respected jurists, such as Al-Qaradawi, were criticized for being unable to define the Umma. As such, a male participant argued:

"Respectful jurists such as Al-Qaradawi are asking us to integrate in our host community and at the same time be good Muslims and promote the interests of the Umma. But he forgets to tell us what the Umma is? Who belong to the Umma and what are its interests?"

Similarly, a first generation, female participant contended:
"I know how to be a good a Muslim but I don't know how to serve the interests of the Umma because I don't know what the interests of the Umma are or where is the Umma? If they mean helping other Muslims, we are helping our families to survive in our Islamic countries but there is no such thing as an Islamic Umma. There are Muslims".

Second, the first generation had the ability to read Arabic, interpret the Quran and the prophet's tradition and form their own understanding of Sharia, Islamic identity and religious obligations towards their Islamic Umma and their host countries. One first generation respondent argued:

"I don't listen to religious rules, 'fatwa', Jurists come up with a new rule every time they face new situations with Muslims such as having mortgages or accept interests from the banks or enrolling my children in Catholic schools. This is confusing and I don't accept it because there are fundamental differences between Jurists from different schools of thought. They need to have one rule or leave us decide for ourselves how to follow the orders of my religion. Islam is based on the principles of choice and responsibility."

Similarly, another first generation, participant stated that:

"The best thing about Islam is that it is based on the principles of choice and individual responsibility and accountability. I listen to rules of different Jurists but I am the one who decide which one to choose and what is good for me because Allah will judge me and not them".

Finally, the influence of their pre-immigration experiences in their country of origin was particularly important, especially if we take into consideration that Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia are countries that are either governed by what are called ‘Islamist regimes’ or suffered from civil wars characterised by religious intolerance. A first generation, female, lawyer stated that:

"Jurists must think more of how to change the governments in different Islamic countries, who are the main reason to the existing of Islamic minorities in the west; before asking us to promote the interests of the Islamic Umma. There is no Islamic Umma; there are Islamic countries with non-Islamic governments."

In the same vein, a male cleaner participant contended that jurists from different theological schools should
"Reach consent or agreement to unify different rules of different theological schools on the basic rules of Sharia before asking us to follow these rules. It's confusing and makes it harder to listen to them. They ask us to promote the interests of Muslims and some Jurists' rules against Muslims' membership in political parties or any form of participation in political, clubs or banks. How are we going to protect our rights and the interests of Muslims if we are not part of the system or the society we live in".

A clear majority of the first generation argued that they were most interested in setting a good example as Muslim Australians, for a number of reasons. First, they believe that the Jurists' conception of the interests of the Islamic Umma, especially those which have a political aspect, such as demanding separate personal and inheritance laws to suit Muslims, or influencing the foreign policies of Australia are not applicable. According to one male participant this is because Muslim minorities are not: "unified. Rather, they belong to different theological schools that have different interpretation of Sharia". As such, there is no "universal unified Muslim front" with "shared interests or one political agenda". At present, what exists are either Islamic communities living in countries with Muslim majorities, where Islam is the official religion of these states, or Muslim communities who live in non-Muslim, majority states.

Second, in a focus group, first generation participants believe that Jurists should draw a line and provide a distinction between Muslims and the political authority of the Islamic countries, given these authorities are the main reason for the existence of Muslim minorities in the West. Thus, instead of encouraging Muslim minorities in the West to protect the interests of the Islamic countries and applying Islamic principles, they should be more interested, as a first generation female participant argued: "applying the Islamic system and the affirmation of the principle of consultation in the Islamic countries first before non-Islamic countries".

Third, first generation participants argue that Australia and its political system show more tolerance in "protecting our lives, our properties and our rights to live with dignity", than did their own Islamic countries of origin. Thus, Australians are more qualified to be described as "brothers and allies, because they are protectors" of the five basic human interests stated by Islam. This is especially the case if we take into consideration the continuous efforts by the Australian government and society to improve Muslims communities' welfare, through direct social spending on eligible Muslim families and the respect, recognition to Islam that is clearly reflected in the building of mosques and religious schools.
Noticeably, they explain their lack of political participation in terms of a number of non-religious factors. First, problems with their English language skills made it difficult for some respondents to express their views and understand party’s programs. Among this group, a fair percentage rated their English language skills as 4, (where 1 was excellent, 2 good, 3 average, 4 bad and 5 nil), in the three areas, (speaking, reading, writing), while almost half stated that they don’t know English. Women’s language skills were consistently lower than men among this group.

Second, their lower incomes made it hard for them to become politically active. However, it is interesting to note that the male interviewees didn't see the high level of unemployment among them (Table 5.2.3), as reflecting racism or religious intolerance, but rather as resulting from, as a male participant argued: "our low level of English Language skills, overseas qualification, skills and training that need to be adjusted to the Australian system and the demands of the labour market, the highly competitive Australian labour market and our low level of knowledge to the Australian workplace culture". These factors limited their career options to low income occupations, such as construction workers or trolley collectors. Third, and most importantly, they highlighted their inability to understand the political system process in Australia especially, as a male first generation participants explained:

"The federal-states relationship, electoral system and internal political parties' structures are difficult for us to understand. We are in the process of understanding different aspects of Australia".

One or two of the older male participants, who had faced repercussions in their home countries because of their political activity, felt that they had very few outlets to make their voices heard in Australia and some feared political involvement because of attitudes in their country of origin. Only one person gave religious reasons for his lack of political participation. He argued:

"Voting to elect non-Islamic government is forbidden and against the Sharia law 'Haram' ".

The role of gender is clear. The female, first generation, respondents attributed their lack of participation to the fact that they were, as one participant stated:

"Uncomfortable with the participation in the public life in general and the political life"

In particular, they were sceptical about whether political parties would hear them. More broadly, they consider the public sphere, as some female participants argued as:
At the same time, like the men, the female interviewees referred to their low employment level (the ratio of males to females is 3 to 1 in favour of the male participants), their low level of qualifications and their low level of English language skills. However, they also emphasised the gender role that they are expected to play as mother and wives.

Table 7.1.2: The education level and employment percentages of the First generation group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>% Males</th>
<th>% Females</th>
<th>% employed</th>
<th>% unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate Degree</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>92.8%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School certificate</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school certificate</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About half of the men indicated that they voted in the last election compared to a quarter of the women. Almost all declared that they voted for the Labour Party, because of, as one male participant said: "their friendly policy towards migrants". Similarly, another female respondent argued: "the Labour Party respects our ethno-cultural and religious difference and they make us feel less isolated". A few emphasised that they didn't want: "to pay the fine in the case of not voting".

For the first generation, the fostering of the national interests of Muslims, the protection of their political rights and the struggle for their political independence must be acknowledged. As a male participant argued, on an:

"Individual basis each according to the Islamic country or the host countries socio-economic and political structure and not as a universal goal. There is no such case as single Islamic case but rather, individual problems that face individual Islamic countries or Muslim minorities".

Yasmeen (2010, p.16-17) surveyed 329 Australians (331 Muslim and 108 non-Muslim), most of whom were adults aged over 25, to explore issues about identities. The majority (84%) of respondents strongly believed that they "could be a good Muslim and a good Australian". Most respondents also believed that it
was important to maintain an Australian identity (with over 60% believing it to be very or extremely important), but saw it as important to maintain an ethnic identity (with over 60% believing it to be very or extremely important). Specifically, no respondents believed it was not important to maintain a Muslim identity (with over 85% believing it to be extremely important). There were no major differences between Australian-born Muslims and Muslim migrants on the question of maintaining identities, though the issue of dual or hybrid identities was not investigated.

Among my respondents, religious identity is more obvious among the second generation. Two approaches could be identified within this group. The first is a pragmatic approach, based on taking advantage of the democratic system in Australia, which allows Muslims freely to practice their religion and defend their moral values publicly. This is because Australia, from a theological perspective, could be considered as an abode of Treaty, rather than an abode of War, and thus a place where Muslims are permitted to settle, integrate and participate actively in the political life.

The second approach is a utopian, idealistic one that believes in the possibility of establishing a unified Islamic community which transcend nationalities, ethnicity and cultural differences and will have more political influence at the domestic level, becoming part of the universal transnational Umma that will protect the interests of Muslims, in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries. According to this approach, Australia, from theological perspective, could be considered as an abode of preaching, where Muslims are obliged to participate in the political life of their country, pay taxes and abide by the law of the land, because it's the only way in which they can become a model and spread the words of Allah.

These two positions were clearly reflected in the answers by second generation respondents to the questions about participation in the political system. The pragmatic approach was obvious in the arguments some presented. So, a male, college student stated that:

"We young Australian Muslims must participate more in the public life especially political parties and organizations because it's the only way we can forward our interests as young Muslims. Ruling that Islam forbid participation is misleading, Islam teaches us to adjust and consider the structures and Strategic considerations of our social environment and behave accordingly."

Similarly, a second generation, female university student argued that:
"Living in ghettos is not an option. We have to use the existing social, political and financial institutions to our benefit. It's a chance for younger Muslim generations in Australia to introduce themselves to the wider Australian society and promote the interests of their communities in Australia as well as the wider international Muslims Umma."

In the same vein, a second generation, male shopkeeper argued:

"How are we going to change our situation and promote the interests of the Islamic Umma. We have to take advantage of the existing political system to our favour."

A fair percentage of men and of women from the second generation group stated that membership in political party would: first, enable the majority community to become aware of, and grow to understand, the concerns and ideas of the younger generation of Muslim minority community; second, provide both the minority and wider communities with role models of engagement between the minority and the majority community’s institutions, as well as becoming the face of Islam in these areas; third, provide means through which younger generation Muslims can promote the interests of their Muslim community and influence the decision makers to acknowledge and address these interests for the benefit of their communities specifically and the Islamic Umma in general - interestingly by the Muslim community they mean different Islamic groups, regardless of their ethno-cultural and nationalities differences; and, finally, allow them to participate in the creation of global Islamic Umma with its nucleus in different Islamic communities.

On the other hand, a larger percentage of men and of women think that Muslim should focus on promoting Islam, rather, than political participation, because more people will become Muslims. As one respondent put it:

"Muslims must concentrate on becoming a role model and calling and explaining "the just system of Islam", "the heavenly principles", "the believer's just society" and "the virtues of following Allah words".

In the second generation focus group, over two thirds attributed their lack of participation to the fact that their participation would not make a difference because the system is based on the majority preference and does not take into consideration minority' rights. So, a male participant argued that:
"Expanding the number of Muslims, forming an Islamic majority, creating one unified Muslims front and principles creates common objectives. These goals are needed to convince non-Muslims of the virtues of Islam and then benefit from the democratic liberal political system to promote the interests of Muslims and the interests of the Umma".

It's clear that this group believes that there is an ideal, Islamic political system that, if applied, will create a heaven on earth. However, in a group discussion, which focussed upon the characteristics of such a system and the mechanism through which it might be established, two parallel themes emerged.

First, some respondents thought in terms of the glorious past of the Islamic empire. Participants considered the "the prophet's rule", "the Four Guided Caliphs state" and "the states that established an empire" as examples of such an ideal state, but had no idea about the structures and the processes through which the principles of the Islamic system could be achieved, especially in the context of the existing global system. Instead, their focus was more upon the education of Muslims in the true Islam that was practiced by the first generations of Muslims. This would make the Islamic society a virtuous society and then everything will fall into place. They argue that Muslims under the rule of the caliphate institution enjoyed progress in all parts of their collective and individual life and that the Islamic state, from the time of the Second Caliph Omar until the great Ottoman state, was the leading state of the World. This state, which was governed by Islamic laws, supervised and encouraged intellectual discourse and learning, science and technology prospered, the economy thrived and the basic rights of its citizens, regardless of their affiliations, were guaranteed. As a second generation, female participant argued:

"We ruled the world by the virtue of Islam, our religion was the light in a dark period and the Islamic Empire was the dominant richest state".

The second theme centered on the intellectual revival of the Islamic Umma, or as second generation male participant described as: "the awakening of the Umma", as the first step towards the expansion of the Islamic world. Here, it is argued that the main reason for the decline of the Islamic countries, and hence the Umma, is the separation between religion and public life. They believe Islam calls for a pluralism of ideas, about women empowerment, the rights of minorities, nationalism, human sovereignty, private ownership, free speech, religious and personal freedom and democracy. The revival of the Muslim World lies not in material progress, but in reviving the Islamic principles, spirit and faith.
In this vein a second generation, male respondent argued:

"we left our religion that is why we failed, our countries are backwards and underdeveloped because we became far away from Islam, our religious values and morals are the key to success, and other liberal theories and systems failed to revive the Muslim World because they are not for us and applying it all aspects of life to morally uplifting the society and to reform the Islamic Umma".

Similarly, in the second generation focus group, some respondents argued that Muslim minorities must:

"Use the democratic system of their host community to abolish the idea of separation of state and religion (because the) the Islamic state and caliphate institution during the four Guided Caliph was based on the principle of protecting the message of Allah and conduct the worldly affairs of its subjects". Protecting the message of Allah involves: "spreading the words of Allah", "working hard to apply the Islamic system", and "establishing the virtuous society".

This argument fails to take into consideration a number of factors. First, the Caliphate institutions during the dynasties periods were totalitarianism, with a lack of accountability. Second, even if it's assumed that Islam is a universal ideology, which, if applied, will lead to the development of the Muslim World and humanity, the structure of such a system, and how it could fit the existing global system, is not clearly identified.

The remaining men and women attributed their lack of participation in the political life, both formally and informally, in Australia to a number of reasons. First, parents from politically repressive countries of origin often discourage their children from being politically active as a male respondent stated:

"My parents want me to concentrate in my studies".

Similarly, a female respondent argued:

"My father thinks politics is a waste of time because we don't have the power of change".
Second, focusing on their Islamic identity is seen as disabling, particularly because of the negative media attention. As a second generation, male respondent contended:

"I will be Isolated and out casted in my school if I become different from others."

In the same vein, a second generation, female respondent argued:

"I will not have any friends other than Muslim's girl, if I wear head cover. We are not good role model to our religion thanks to Osama Bin laden"

Third, women in the second generation group also have some religious, social and cultural obstacles that prevent them from becoming politically active, such as the need to avoid settings where "alcohol is consumed" and the "need for halal food". Others found wearing the hijabs, "declining to shake hands with or sit with males" make the necessary social interactions awkward.

It’s crucial here to mention McCue’s (2010) study of female Muslim youth in Australia. She explores the civil and social participation of Muslim women in Australian community life. The majority of her female Muslim youth informants reported, overall, they had had worthwhile experiences at school, though some had experienced racism and religious intolerance. A number of barriers to the participation of female Muslim youth in non-Muslim schools were also identified, including discrimination on the basis of dress, teacher prejudice, and prevailing non-Muslim youth culture. Other barriers included the attitudes of their parents, family commitments and, for some, language difficulties. McCue (2010) also presents anecdotal evidence that anti-Hijab discrimination is lessening, as more girls take to wearing the hijab. Young women indicated that a desire to express their religiosity and Muslim Australian identity was a reason for wearing the hijab and also saw it as acting as a barrier to the strong peer pressure in youth culture. The report notes that prevailing Australian youth culture places strong peer pressure on young Muslim Australians to participate in activities, such as drinking alcohol, taking drugs and engaging in pre-marital sex, that are contrary to Islamic teachings. The report also identifies barriers that constrained the participation of young Muslim women in sport, including dress, mixed sport activities, public displays during physical activity, religious observances and lack of parental and community encouragement.

Although the English language skills of my younger respondents are much better than their parents, which enables them to understand the political process, they showed a lack of interest in politics in general and the Australian political system in particular, although, of course, this lack of interest is not confined to
Muslim youth.

The vast majority of the second generation group assessed themselves as having better English language skills than skills in the language of their parents’ country of origin. They felt more comfortable in using the English language as a medium of conversation and were less inclined to use their country of origin language (except with their non-English speaking parents), even with their siblings at home. These factors should facilitate their integration/adaptation process and play an important role in their national identity.

Table 7.1.3: Second generation Group Educational level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>% of Males</th>
<th>% of Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University Level</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary/ College</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprenticeship</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second generation, religious identity is more evident than their national identity. They do not identify themselves with their family’s roots, the culture of their parents’ country of origin, nor with the host country, in which they reside, but identify first with Islam. So, here there seems to be a shift from immigrant political mobilization around ethnic and national categories, to an increasing level of mobilization around the political category of “Muslim”. A new Muslim identity has emerged which separates religion from its ethno-cultural background. A strong Muslim identity is picked up by them through their contact with Cyber Islam, which successfully manages to overcome ethno-cultural and national differences between Muslims. In contrast, for the first generation respondents, their Islamic identity derives from personal experiences and memories from their country of origin.

Whether the second generation were born in Australia or just brought up here has virtually no effect on their attachment to their religious identity. This interaction with Cyber Islam led to the establishment of a new category of “Muslim”, which connects the experiences of Muslims in Australia to a broader geo-religious context. Such identification as a “Muslim” establishes stronger symbolic links with Muslims around the world, thus creating the direct links between the situations of Muslims in Europe, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and other parts of the world.
In a focus group discussion, second generation respondents contended:

"The Umma exist, we feel it and see it every day through our interaction in Islamic websites with other Muslims around the world."

"We meet with other Muslims. We discuss our pain, frustration and problems in our host communities. We share experiences and solutions especially of those like us who live in the west".

"This is what Islam is all about. Sharing with our brothers and sisters the experiences and facing the challenges together. If we are separated by boundaries and nationalities; we share Islam and constitute a spiritual Umma"

This change in the perception of religious identity between the first and second generation is best explained by Delwar Hussain (2005:7). He discusses the cultural transformations among the Bangladeshis living in UK and compares the older and younger generations, emphasizing the changes in religious identity building: “An older generation of British Bangladeshis saw Islam as one aspect of a plural, many layered identity; for their children and grandchildren it has become the basis of a monolithic ideology, the supreme identity in the struggle for political and socio-economic interests. It is also both reaction to and defence against the experience of poverty and racism”.

Similarly, Stephenson (2008) argues that a growing number of younger Muslims are seeking to create spaces where young Muslim Australians can be heard. They are using strategies which work against the almost universally negative characterisation of Islam. They are using rap music (the Brothahood), comedy (Nazeem Hussain and Aamer Rahman in the ‘Fear of a Brown Planet’) and a TV panel show (Salam Café) to dismantle stereotypes and encourage young Muslims to be proud of their identity and religion. They are skilled in using the media for their own ends and in using modern technology. Their productions are humorous, sometimes with self-deprecating humour, entertaining, but, at the same time, informative, although they do not set out to lecture.

For my respondents, political and cultural isolation influences identity-building, fostering the solidarity among the Muslims from different cultural backgrounds, as well as establishing a religious identity as a political tool to express these grievances and struggle. Thus, being a Muslim becomes a common identity
for the multi-traditional, Islamic communities and creates favourable conditions for the establishment of an “Islamic Nationalism”.

This concept of Islamic nationalism is evident in active participation in Cyber-Islam and Islamic websites. A sizeable majority of the second generation are active participants in Islamic websites and consider this space as “the space, the place and the new community”, through which they reconfirm their Islamic identity and learn more about their religion, religious duties and obligations. In this vein, a male participant argued:

"Islamic websites become a place of learning. I hated my religious classes in the Mosque, where my parents used to enrol me when I was younger."

Similarly, a second generation, female participant contended:

"I discuss my religion and religious duties online with Muslims from different Islamic schools of Jurisprudence. I am learning how to choose for myself the right path and not what the Imam in the Mosque is ordering me to do. Online we have the freedom to discuss, share and learn our religion."

Other second generation participants embraced a more fundamentalist, restricted, version of Islam in their arguments. They believed in the Islamic Umma and saw Islam as the future for humanity. They may advocate coverings for women on one hand and yet seek integration on the other which reflects the complexity and multi-layered identity formation within this group.

This complexity is reflected in the different educational levels between the men and women. The women explained their higher educational achievement by referring to a number of factors. First, socio-cultural and religious considerations mean that women are not allowed to participate in many socio-cultural activity in the host community that are available to both their male siblings and Australian female friends, such as going, "to clubs, movies and other social gatherings", "things that distract us like dating, having a boyfriend". This gives them plenty of time to study.

Second, their only chance to secure a life of their choice is through having a university degree that will give them "financial independence", "freedom", "a better life", "the right to choose" and the chance to "escape social restrictions" and "get away from the male domination". The absence of women in
apprenticeships is attributed to the gender distribution of careers in their ethnic cultures, where certain apprenticeship careers, such as "plumbers, mechanics, industrial workers and carpenters", are male jobs. Even some apprenticeship careers that are considered suitable for women, such as "hairdressers and cooking", are not socially acceptable or approved because they are "not a career but uneducated labour jobs", an "awkward line of careers" and "unacceptable for a respectable girl".

Third, male interviewees attributed their lower rate of university enrolment to the fact that they are expected to play the role of the father figure in the absence of the father, while, even if the father is present, they are still expected to financially support their families. This explains the higher percentage of men compared to women in both tertiary/college education and apprenticeships.

The vast majority of the focus groups from both generations were not affiliated with Australian Islamic organizations for a number of reasons. First, they felt that neither these organizations, nor their leadership, reflected the diversity of the Muslim communities in Australia, but rather represented the interests of more established Muslim migrant communities, especially the Lebanese community. Second, they argued that some of these organizations had radical political agenda, such as "applying Sharia Laws and an Islamic financial system", "calling for more Muslim representation" and the "formation of Islamic political parties, financial institutions and organizations". They also felt there was: "an internal conflict between different versions of Islam, i.e. Shia versus Sunni and Radicals, 'Salafi', versus Moderates, 'Wasatia'". They did not agree with these conflicts and felt that they contributed to the alienation of Muslims in Australia, because such Muslims are "disrespectful to the host community’s traditions, culture and system", "do not respect the Australian way of life", "want to force our ideology on them" and are "ungrateful to Australia's support and hospitality".

Finally, almost all participants from both generations agreed that a candidate’s religious identification is not significant in their decision to vote for them. To these participants, adequate Muslim representation does not necessary mean having a certain number of Muslim candidates in office, but rather feeling that their community would be treated "fairly"; that a candidate would "protect our interests as Australians first", "look after us as a community and not a religious group" and "work for a better Australia".

For these respondents, having Muslim representatives does not imply better representation or better policies. Instead, what is crucial is equal and fair representation for all, regardless of a person’s religious
affiliation, because this ensures harmony within the society and protects it from religious conflicts and radicalism. In this vein, a first generation, male participant stated:

"I voted in the last election for candidates that are honest, have a good program and felt that they will represent and work for a better Australia".

Similarly, a second generation, female student contended:

"Being a Muslim is not a condition for me to vote for a candidate. What is important is hat is he offering me as Australian and as a Muslim. I don't believe Muslim candidates will serve me better because as a society we must look for who will serve all of us better".

A clear majority of the first generation participants, reflecting on their own experiences in their country of origin, added that being a Muslim does not guarantee that you are virtuous and will serve your community and fellow Muslims. In contrast, a clear majority of the second generation participants argued that more Muslim representation was not possible because of the absence of a unified Muslim community with common goals and interests. Thus, supporting non-Muslim candidates who will serve the interests of the community is the only strategy to promote Muslims interests.

7.2 Military service

Although military service is not a requirement of citizenship, such service, historically, has been recognized as a social marker that reflects a person commitment to their country’s wellbeing. The issue of military service by Muslims in non-Muslims armies is problematic, because, from an Islamic theological point of view, it might involve helping non-Muslims states, at the expenses of the Islamic nation's interests (or those who have entered into a treaty with Muslims), and killing a Muslim. Recently, with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the Muslim American soldiers participating in these areas was debated between Islamic jurists. They held a wide variety of opinions that are available on the Islamic websites and range from total prohibition, through conditional permission, to the view that it should be left to the Muslim soldiers in these armies to form their own opinion. The lack of a centralized Islamic judicial authority makes it difficult to say which opinions hold the most sway.
Jurists such as Dr. Ali Jum’ah (2002), a Professor of Islamic Jurisprudence at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, argued that it is not allowed for a Muslim who is currently serving in the American army to fight against Muslims, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere, because the legality of, and reasons behind, these wars are debatable and they involve killing Muslims, which, unless it is for the right reasons stated in the Islamic law, is the greatest sin of all. Thus, it is better for Muslim soldiers to exercise their right and excuse themselves from participating in the war. In contrast, Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid (2009) permitted such involvement by Muslim soldiers on two, limited, grounds. First, it may be advantageous for Muslims to work in these armies, so as to learn their secrets and be aware of their potential evil. Second, if the Muslim is working as a preacher or Imam, serving the Muslims and calling non-Muslims to Islam, then this is acceptable.

In contrast, modern liberal and reformists clerics such as Al-Qaradawi (2005) permit such military service. They argue that, according to Sharia law, it is not essential for any non-Muslim to render military service in an Islamic state, because Jihad (military service) is only an obligatory religious duty for Muslims. In the history of the relationship between non-Muslims and their Islamic state, non-Muslims have joined an Islamic army to defend the Islamic state in which they live. As an example, the Islamic army led by Salah Eldin to defend Jerusalem against the Crusades had many Christian soldiers in it who were actually defending their country against European occupation. On these grounds, Muslims are allowed to join the army of their country, to defend it, as long as it is obligatory and does not harm the interests of the Islamic Umma. Second, the interests of the state and community you belong to, or live in, take precedence, as long as it doesn’t violate any religious or Sharia rules. Al-Qaradawi argues that, historically, Muslim jurists have not stopped non-Muslims from taking part in fighting voluntarily along with the Muslims in the interest of their state.

Sheikh Abdul-Majeed Subh (2010) addresses the question of whether a Muslim army can help a non-Muslim army attacking another Muslim army, in a fatwa posted on Islamopedia online. He argues that a Muslim army can help a non-Muslim army to attack a Muslim one, if the aim is to remove the oppression of that Muslim army. Muslims should, firstly, try themselves to remove this oppression, by all means possible. However, if they fail, then they can help a non-Muslim army in removing this oppression and achieving the truth, as long as the leadership and the supreme command are held by Muslims. Otherwise, it is totally prohibited.
Other jurists on Islamonline.net have permitted such military service to avoid harm to the Muslim community. They argue that Muslim-American soldiers should not fight against other Muslims, but, if they have no choice and risked harming their community by not participating, then they should find a limited way to participate. They believe Muslim soldiers should strike a balance between the two difficult choices and reach a final decision by themselves, because Jurists cannot issue a general fatwa that will suit the situation of all Muslim soldiers.

Some jurists justify joining the army in a non-Muslim state as a matter of necessity. They consider it unwise to advise Muslims living in a non-Muslim state not to join the army. Whenever the army is deployed for the purpose of keeping internal peace, a Muslim soldier can prevent atrocities against Muslims at the hand of non-Muslims. Usually, wars are not about religion, but about land disputes etc. Muslim soldiers will therefore have to show their loyalty to their country, even if it is a non-Muslim state fighting against a Muslim state. According to al-Qaradawi (2001), there is also no harm in fulfilling the duty of military service following the adoption of a Western nationality. The risk of being obliged to take up arms against other Muslim also exists in the Muslim world itself, as can be demonstrated by recent wars between Muslims, such as the Iraqi-Iranian War or the Gulf War.

A clear majority of the second generation respondents expressed a number of concerns. First, they were concerned about the increasing number of Muslim soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan in the allied forces. Second, they pointed to conflicting Islamic judicial opinions on serving in a non-Islamic army. Third, they focussed particularly on the duties Islam imposes on soldiers in case their country decides to attack a Muslim country or if a Muslim country attacks their non-Islamic country.

A majority of them supported the judicial position of Dr. Shehzad Salem, an Islamic Jurist who agrees, in principle, that serving in the army of any country, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, is permitted, if Muslim soldiers are freely able to practice their religion. They argue that, in the extreme situations that were mentioned earlier, the following rules should operate. First, in a group interview, respondents argued that Muslims must respect their contractual agreement with their host country. The second generation group contended:

"We have to respect our duties", and as "Australians we have to respect the constitution and defend it", "military service is part of citizenship agreement"
Similarly, a second generation, male participant argued:

"I am a cadet and I am going to join the Australian army in the future. This is a form of a contract with the army to perform certain duties in case of war or peace. I must honour these duties to the best of my ability and defend Australia against any aggression regardless of its nature".

Second, they argue that, according to the Qur'an, there is only one valid reason for a Muslim to wage Jihad today that is to curb oppression and injustice perpetrated against Muslims. They contend that the concept of Jihad needs to be redefined to suit modern days. So, a second generation, male participant argued:

"Killing innocent people are not Jihad and killing non-Muslims is a form of aggression. I will not tolerate aggression from Muslims against Australians".

In the same vein, a second generation, female participant contended:

"Injustice and oppression deserve to be uprooted whether they are perpetrated by Muslims or by non-Muslims. Muslim Australians must participate in the war in whatever capacity they have to defend themselves and their country against any aggression".

Third, the assumption that Muslim soldiers are required by their religion not to take part in a war whose main objective is the harm of Muslim interests, even if this implies that they have to suffer losses like penalties or even being dismissed from service, is misleading and ambiguous because, as a second generation, male participant stated:

"The world is more complicated and interests are not easily defined. Especially if we put into consideration that there is no such thing as Muslims interests and there is no one Muslim body to have one interests".

Fourth, if a Muslim country attacks a non-Muslim country with Muslims citizens then according to a second generation, female participant:
"The roles of aggression as stated by Sharia laws must be applied. Because in this modern world we live in, there are peaceful mechanisms to solve problems such as the international law and international bodies".

Similarly, a second generation, male respondent contended:

"If any Islamic country performs an act of aggression and injustice against Australia or any other country without following the Islamic rules of war and without a good reason; then I will participate fully in defending it because Islam do not approve aggression or waging wars"

In contrast, a small percentage of the second generation group were concerned by the possibility of killing a Muslim, which is the biggest sin in Islam, and stated that they would rather not join the army in order to avoid this possibility. A second generation, male respondent contended:

"It's confusing. Jurists have different opinion in this subject. I would rather not have Muslims or non-Muslims bloods in my hands because it's difficult to be responsible from the death of another human being".

Similarly, another second generation, male respondent argue:

"I cannot kill another human being and sleep at night. Muslims and non-Muslims are people and there is no religious obligation or protecting Islamic interest will convince me to kill another person unless it's a self defence".

However, some of the second generation, respondents contended that, while defending Australia was justified, foreign excursions weren’t:

"Violence will not solve problems", "Islam is a religion of peace", and they "will only fight if Australia is in war against other nations whether Islamic or non-Islamic, if these nations attacked or threatened the Australian soil".
It was argued that protecting the offshore interests of Australia is a controversial issue that needs to be addressed. In this vein, a second generation, male respondent argued:

"Waging wars to protect the interests of Australia offshore is a controversial matter. I do not agree with sending the Australians soldiers not only in Afghanistan or Iraq but in any other country unless they attack the Australian soil".

In contrast, almost half of the first generation, most being victims of injustice, believe that religious wars are a myth. In this vein, a male participant argued:

"Killing people whether Muslims or non-Muslims is a sin in all religions. Armies should be used for self defence and not for waging wars."

Similarly, a first generation, female participant contended:

"Religious wars are historical phenomena. If the world is going towards reinventing these wars, then we people must not participate in it. Even if this means not to join the army, do compulsory military service or participate in any form of aggression, war or injustices against any other nations regardless of the religious affiliation".

A small percentage of the first generation group argued that Islam is a religion of peace and not war and that the concept of Jihad is becoming a misleading concept that is exploited by some groups for their own benefit. In this vein, a male respondent argued:

"Violence and aggression are not the best way to solve injustice against Muslims. Different religious groups are exploiting the concept of Jihad to terrorise innocent people. Bombs do not differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims. They kill everybody".

Finally, a fair percentage of the first generation group argued that they would not participate in any aggression or injustice against a Muslim or Islamic-country, regardless of the causes of such action. However, they would kill a Muslim in self-defence, because it’s their national duty to defend Australia against any aggression from any country or any group, regardless of its religious affiliation as long as these groups attack Australia soils.
7.3 Social Integration and Naturalization into the Australian Society:

The compatibility of Islamic culture with Western liberal values and principles and a democratic system is an important issue for Islamic Jurists. The opinion of Islamic Jurists varies widely, but they are mainly concerned with the loss of Islamic identity within Muslim migrant groups. Some Muslim scholars and jurists argue that the legal framework of modern liberal Western countries provides freedom of worship and freedom of conscience that make it easy to keep an Islamic identity. As such, Muslims can fit into these societies, without facing any major obstacle. Moreover, supporters of this view rely on the fact that Islam obliges Muslims to respect the social contract and to be committed, good, citizens who abide by the laws and policies in their host countries. Muslims must work hard to achieve the status of equal members of the society. Thus, integration, involving naturalization (but without loss of religious identity), is a desirable matter, because of the advantages that result from it for Muslims, despite possible disadvantages, which, according to Dr. Al-Qaradawi (2001), should be overcome by Muslims themselves.

Other Jurists, who have a more radical attitude towards the compatibility of Western and Islamic values, argue that the seeming incompatibility Western liberal and Islamic values could be resolved using the dominant secular liberal democratic principles as a mechanism for achieving change.

Jurists who are in favor of social integration and naturalization usually quote the verse: “Allah forbid you not that he should deal benevolently and equitably with those who fought not against you on account of religion nor drove you out from your homes; verily Allah loveth the equitable” (60: 5-8) This verse permitted all kinds of social integration with non-Muslims, whether living in the same or in different states. They support this argument in a number of ways. First, they emphasize that Islam allowed inter-marriage between male Muslims and women from other faiths, especially from the people of the Book, such as Jews and Christians. Second, they point out that Muslims are permitted to eat the food of Jews and Christians, whether acquired through purchasing, as a present, or as their guests. More broadly, they give as an example the articles of the Constitution of Medina, ratified by the Prophet, between his own followers and the tribes of Medina (including Jews), in which Muslims and non-Muslims were considered as members forming one Nation, bonded by the principle of contractual agreement i.e. the constitution.

Radical jurists, on the other hand, reject any form of social integration for a number of reasons. First, Islam is the basis of the community, the philosophy of life and nationality. Second, this form of social integration and naturalization process is contradictory to Islam, because naturalization involves being naturalized into
a new language, a new skin color and a new fatherland, which is impossible without a more or less humiliating form of renunciation, which Muslims must avoid. Third, the concept of nationality in Islam is based on believing in the Islamic faith and it's a matter that depends exclusively on the will and the choice of the individual. Fourth, Islamic identity must come first, because it is a pledge with Allah, His Messenger and Islam.

By virtue of this identity, Muslims will belong to the Umma, irrespective of any national and international boundaries. Naturalization will lead to the loss of identity and the possibility of being persecuted as a Muslim. Finally, Muslims who have adopted the nationality of a non-Muslim country deprive their Muslim mother-state of their own qualities and abilities, as well as those of their children, who will end as apostates and might be forced to perform military service. Thus, naturalization is permitted if it is on paper only and does not affect the Islamic identity of the person involved.

The position of the focus groups is different from the position of Jurists. Most of the respondents argued that Muslim jurists and clerks must renew their understanding and reading of the Quran, prophet's tradition and the history of Islam in the light of the existing modern world structures. Above all, they urge jurists not to settle for the results their ancestors produced, because many of these rules and prescriptions are not applicable in modern societies.

Respondents from both the first and second generation groups argued that the very spirit of Islam is the liberty of consciousness and mind. As a first generation, male respondent contended:

"Islam is liberty and Imams is suffocating us with their Yes's and No's. I use my inner voice and consciousness to make judgments. Imams need to go back and look at the needs of Muslims today and revise their rules and fatwa".

Similarly, a second generation, female respondent argued:

"I am using the logic and my natural senses to the best of my interest because Islam is an instinct religion that teaches us to understand it and use it according to the circumstances in a given time and different conditions and settings".

A theme of cultural apprehension emerged, especially within the second generation group, when
respondents were questioned about issues of language, religious observance and identity, and the relationships between religion and society (Table 7.3.1).

**Table: 7.3.1**

The relationships between religion and society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Generation</th>
<th>Second Generation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
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<td>Religion is very important in my Life.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>72.5</td>
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<td>Do you think that Muslims and Non-Muslims have the same Rights in Australia?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>%N</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>79.3</td>
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<td>Do you perform the prayers?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>51.3</td>
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<td>Do you attend Breaking the fast In Ramadan with other Muslims</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>82.1</td>
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<td>Do you participate in public Islamic activities, (celebration of Eid prayer, festivals)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>%N</td>
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<tr>
<td>74.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you/children/siblings school/neighbourhood/Holidays activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>%N</td>
<td>%Y</td>
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<td>Are you a member or affiliated To a religious organization?</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>Are you a member of an Islamic Voluntary group?</td>
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<tr>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
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</table>

In regard to religious identity, two trends emerged when respondents were questioned about the place of Islam in Australia. First, there was a positive response from the majority to questions on whether Muslim Australians felt ‘comfortable’ in Australian society and whether Muslims have the freedom to practice their religion in Australia. Despite this, a large majority felt there was discrimination against Muslims in
Australian society. In other words, whilst these respondents individually feel comfortable and free to practice their religion, they also feel, overwhelmingly, that their community is experiencing discrimination. A sense of collective victimhood appears to be very visible, if not predominant, among the sample. Discrimination does not have to be personally experienced, as only a sizeable minority, drawn overwhelmingly from the second generation; reported having experiences of discrimination themselves in the last two years. These second generation respondents reported being exposed to discrimination in their school years, which involve being described as: "Al-Qaeda, Murderers, and followers of Bin Laden and satanic".

When respondents from the second generation were asked about their view of the importance of religion in their personal life, a clear majority of men and women agreed that it is "completely important", "vital". In contrast, a small percentage of men and women agreed that they did not "choose to be a Muslim", "it's my parent's religion" and "it's not important". The importance of religion in the personal life of the respondents therefore highlights how issues related to it can present considerable barriers or facilitators in the process of integration and adaptation to the Australian society.

Nevertheless, in the case of the first generation, although a sizeable majority of respondents agreed that Islam is very important in their life, it seems clear that religion, particularly Islam, is not a decisive factor in affecting social integration. Rather, it was affected more by their visible minority status, than by their religious affiliation. In this vein, a first generation, male respondent contended:

"I like to know people and be part of my neighbourhood. Unfortunately, I can't speak English very well that is why it is hard for me to know my neighbours and invite them to my house."

Similarly, a first generation, woman argued:

"I love cooking. When I was in Egypt before resettling in Australia, I used to invite my Egyptian neighbors to try my Ethiopian food. Here in Australia, my neighbors are nice and friendly but because my house is not nice and my English is poor, I feel shy to invite them."

In the same vein, a first generation, female participant argued:

"My children love their school and have many friends. They get invited to their friend's homes. We
participate in school functions. But I can't invite other mothers or children to my house. It is not nice."

It is also important to point to another distinction between the second and first generation migrant Muslims among my respondents. The second generation appears to be more committed to religious duties than the latter. A large majority of men and women in the second generation group perform the five prayers, which are the main pillar of the Islamic religion, compared to a smaller proportion of men and women from the first generation. In contrast, a majority of both men and women from the second generation group indicated membership of a religious organization (not necessarily domestic), compared to a small percentage of men and women from the first generation group. A similar pattern is evident in terms of affiliation to different types of Muslim voluntary groups, with a majority of second generation respondents, but fewer first generation respondents, reporting membership.

On the question of national identity, a clear majority of the first generation group participate in holidays and community activities, compared to a smaller majority of the second generation. The first generation group participates in both community and religious activities, for example Christmas and New Year celebrations. They argue that this does not contradict their religion, for a number of reasons. First, as a first generation, male respondent argued:

"Islam teaches us to believe and respect other faiths. Muslims do not have a complete faith until we believe in the four books and their Prophets. That is why they called People of the book. Christians are People of the book".

In the same vein, a first generation, female respondent argued:

"To be a complete believer or have a complete faith, you have to believe in other messengers of Allah and as long as I do not perform religious rituals such as attending masses in public places or prayers in the church. But participating in other Christmas activities such as decorations in schools and exchanging gifts and cards with my Christian neighbors and friends will show the tolerance and respect that Islam shows to other religions and enhance our relationship with schools and neighbors ".

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Second, participating in these ceremonies helps migrants to integrate in the Australian society. As a first generation, male respondent contended:

"Celebrating Christmas and Australia National day help us to integrate with the people of Australia. These celebrations are an integral part in understanding the culture of the Australian society and with mutual understanding and respect to the cultural components of different cultures in the society is the first step towards our integration in the Australian society".

A surprising finding in this study is that those with high education levels (university degree and post graduate degrees) from the first generation group do not appear to have a higher rate of public engagement with the host community institutions than others. In this group, higher education does not seem to have facilitated a greater sense of public involvement. It also doesn’t appear to affect their interaction with Australian society, so they are no more involved in participating in holidays and community activities.

On the other hand, although a clear majority of the second generation stated that they participated in holiday activities in one way or another in their primary school years, in adulthood they show different attitudes. Only a sizeable minority are involved in such activities, compared to the majority of the first generation.

In contrast, the second generation group participated to a greater extent in Islamic public activities, such as political rallies in support of different Islamic cases that relate to cyber Islamic organizations and Islamic voluntary groups.

Unlike the first generation, a majority of the second generation group do not consider participation in Christmas and New Year celebration or Australia and Anzac days as an integrating strategy. They are particularly reluctant to participate in events that have a religious character, for a number of reasons. First, they argue that integration means mutual respect and recognition for different cultures and religious groups in the society, which doesn’t exist in Australia. As a respondent argued:

"My boss refuses to give me a day off or a paid holiday for my religious events because there is no law that recognizes my Islamic Eid as a public holiday".
Similarly, a second generation, female respondent contended:

"When I was in primary school, although I made Christmas cards for my classmates but the teacher never acknowledged my Islamic Eid. Even in my adulthood, my friends, work mates and work place don't acknowledge it”.

In the same vein, a large majority of the men, but a smaller majority of the women in the second generation group argue that, although the principles of multiculturalism and freedom of religion exist in Australia, it remains a mono-religious country and does not acknowledge the religious celebrations of other religions. There is no official recognition of these celebrations in the form of public holidays, at least for the followers of these religions, or even an official statement congratulating the Australians who practice these religions on their special religious days.

The attitude to the migrants and their particular cultural behavior also plays a crucial role in the formation of their national identity in their new countries. Muslims, as a visible minority group with a strong religious background that is reflected in their interaction with the larger Australian community, are the main group which evokes public debates. How Muslims relate to the broader Australian society reflects what Australia means to them. The two focus groups’ perceptions of what Australia meant to them reflects their understanding of the concept of multiculturalism and their relationship with Australian society, particularly with the White, Anglo/Celtic, Australian community/culture.

To understand their relationship with the white, Australian community, participants from the first and second generation were asked to discuss the extent to which a number of pictures (appendix 1) reflected (or not) the Australian political system, the culture of the Australian society and religious tolerance. The second generation choose the following pictures (figure 7.3.1):
Figure 7.3.1:
The second generation group categorized these pictures as follows: picture 2 and 6 were seen as evoking the political system; pictures 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8 evoked Australian culture; and picture 4 evoked religious tolerance. Crucially, a half of the second generation group considered Australia as mono-cultural society. In this vein, a male respondent argued:

"Australian society could be described as a white Anglo-Saxon/Celtic and not a multicultural country".

Similarly, a second generation, female respondent contended:

"multiculturalism is a myth, a notion and a dream that may come true but the reality is reflected in every aspect of the Australian political, socio-economic and ethno-cultural structures".

In particular, the second generation group emphasized a number of points. First, they stressed the low percentage of non-whites, including Indigenous Australians, in the Australian Parliament. As a second generation, female respondent contended:

"it's a white politics. Africans are new communities but what about other races. I didn't see an Asian party leader or an Indian cabinet minister. where are other groups representations".

Second, and relatedly, they pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the members of the Parliament and the Cabinet are white, of either Anglo-Saxon or Celtic origin. As a second generation, female respondent argued:
"the Parliament forward the interests of the white community and not multicultural Australia". In the same vein, a second generation, male respondent contended:

"They only know us and other migrants ethnic groups in election times. We never see a black or coloured member in the federal government or parliament".

As such, they saw state policies as designed to address the interests and demands of the larger, white, Australian community, so they did not take into consideration minorities, which many respondents argued is clearly reflected in the Government's inability to provide fair opportunities to different groups. In this vein, a second generation, male respondent argued:

"The government is unable to provide even our qualified people, with retraining and better chances of employment".

Similarly, a second generation, female respondent contended:

"we are the poor group who live in poor houses and bad neighbourhoods, work as cleaners and trolley collectors. Even the best of us who has qualification can not find decent jobs".

The remaining half agrees with the other group that the political system reflects the white, Australian community, but they raised two more important arguments. First, they believed that multiculturalism is a valid notion, but it needs time to develop. As a second generation, respondent argued:

"it will take time for the Australian society to accept, acknowledge our differences and respect our rights. we are new migrants and we are in the process of forming a community. we need to know each others first and work hard towards social integration which is the key to success of multiculturalism."

Similarly, a second generation, male respondent contended:

"to have political power, we need to have common goals, interests and work hard to achieve it. to
gain political representation, minorities need time because they are under the process of forming a unified community that truly integrate in the Australian society."

In the same vein, a second generation, female respondent stated:

"if we want to be part of the political process, we have to be able to share the interests of the wider society and not concentrate in our own interests. We need to respect its values so that they respect ours".

Second, they argue that the majority of Australian are whites and democracy involves majority rule. As a second generation, male respondent argued:

"if democracy is the rule of majority, then it is natural for the political system to represent the white Anglo-Saxon/Celtic because they are the major ethnic group who actually formed and built Australia".

A focus upon the separation between the society and government emerged when discussing cultural integration and religious tolerance in Australian society. The majority of participants from this group agreed that, while officially state policy acknowledged cultural differences, in reality cultural tolerance is still developing, because the cultural homogeneous ideology of the white, Australian society remained dominant and undermines the notion of a multicultural society. This is reflected in the general attitude of the public in relation to those who are considered to be different from an Anglo-Celtic, ‘host’ society, ‘norm’. This norm includes both physical features and cultural components, especially religion. As a second generation, male respondent argued:

"we have different features, skin colour and hair texture. being different is not always beautiful".

Similarly, a second generation, female respondent contended:

"my little brother was asked by one of the children in his playgroup to bleach the stains in his skin". 
In the same vein, a second generation, female respondent argued:

"being a Muslim is not easy especially with the existence of Al-Qada. I wear an Islamic head cover 'Hijab', mothers in the mall look worried when my children play with their children".

While, a second generation, female university student argued:

"both female and males students in university avoid contact with Muslims girls because they are worried that we will be easily offended".

When they were asked whether they would identify themselves as Australians, Muslim Australians or Australian Muslims, almost half of them identified themselves as Australians, a fair percentage didn’t respond and less than half stated that they were "Muslims", not "Australian Muslims" or "Muslim Australians". These respondents don’t consider themselves Australians, because they think the mainstream definitions of the Australian national identity tend to ignore or overlook them, i.e the social composition of the overall population and the national identity remains "white". They also didn’t identify as Australian Muslims or Muslim Australians because they believe that:

"Islam is an identity that is superior to any other form of identification".

A second generation, male respondent stated that:

“I’ve been forced to think I’m different because of my skin color, my religion and the shade of beard I keep. I was born and raised in this country and everything I have is for this country. But I’m not allowed to feel a part of it.”

Another female respondent, from the same group, asked:

“Who is the Australian? Is it that I was born here? Or do I have to adopt the culture? Australia is multicultural country. I know that. But there are certain things that I don’t accept, but this society do. So people assume, ‘Oh, he’s not like us. He’s radical. All Muslims feel out of bounds. Where is multiculturalism if the society is treating me differently. For me, this is home. I grow up and went to school here. I don’t have other country to go to. All my childhood memories, deams and
aspirations relate to Australia”.

The second generation's view of national identity supports theorists like Hage (1998), who argued that: “there is a cultural uneveness to belonging representations of the nation, of Australia and Australian-ness, remain too narrow to allow for a wide enough sense of belonging; the link between cultural background and the confidence to judge who is an outsider is through the everyday repetitions of what constitutes national identity” (quoted in Dunn, Forrest, Burnley and McDonald, 2004: 417-418).

Furthermore, this cultural adaptability is problematic for Muslims because their cultural identity coexists with their religious identity and that prevents them from performing certain social functions that appear to be part of the generally expected social behaviour and the norms of the society. One male participant stated that:

“For me, coexistence is about doing what you have to do to live peacefully with other people. It’s not a matter of integrating. I can’t eat pork or drink alcohol. I can’t go out to clubs and find girls. Those are Islamic rules. But going out to clubs, getting drunk and getting with girls are like rules, norms and behaviour that are expected from young people here, if you didn’t do it, you will be if not out casted, then isolated with a certain social group of your kind.”

Thus, in response to this exclusivist forms of national identity, universalist and exclusivist Islamic identity has emerged and being adopted by many in this second generation group as a response to “a securitized Western social environment that undermines their claims to national belonging” (See Archer, 2001; Dwyer, et al, 2008). Interestingly, this group has distanced themselves from both Australian society and the ethno-cultural and religious components of their own communities. Islam has become a medium ground where they can satisfy the desire of their parents and other older local community members/leaders by following certain ethno-religious traditions.

This new identification with Islam has two important consequences. First, it involves the appearance of a new utopian version of Islam, or, as a second generation, male respondent put it:

“the rediscovery of the ‘true’ essence of Islam away from the culturally modified and historically influenced Islam that our parents believe in”.

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Second, it involves a reinterpreted, Western, Islamic approach to their religion that is based on authenticity and a new understanding of the sacred text as the only dependable source. These two consequencies underpin the formation of an identity that ignores borders and unifies like-minded people and this is reflected in the views of a number of respondents. For example, a second generation, female respondent argued:

“I am a Muslim. Not a Sunni, Shia, Salafi, Hanafi or whatever. I’m a Muslim. I’m not Australian or Eritrean. I’m Muslim. I don’t feel an identity crisis, because I feel like I have a relationship with God and so I don’t have any problem saying that I am a Muslim”.

This view reflects a common desire to move beyond differences to a universalist Islam that enables Muslims to transcend exclusive ties, but it doesn’t necessarily suggest active practice or even accurate knowledge of Islam.

Similarly, another second generation, participant contended:

“I’ve eliminated my Australian and Somali ties. Do I need to be one of them (i.e. a Muslim and an Australian), or both of them? No, I don’t need to. I have an Australian citizenship and passport. I have never been to Somalia. But I am a Muslim. Yes, My practice is weak. I have little time in my life for Islam. But it’s still my base. When I have nothing else, it’ll always be there for me”.

Finally, Islam provides an unequivocal answer to some young people’s identity crisis. So, a second generation, male participant who is 18 years old, unemployed and a former band member argued:

“Things in my life were complicated. My parents weren’t happy with my involvement with the band, girls, alcohol, my behaviour at school, and everything I do. I was not happy. So, I turned to Islam and started reading several books and joining Islamic discussion groups in the net. I grew out my beard to emulate the Prophet, which force people in my community to take me more seriously. The Quran is my way of life and my comfort. I don’t need counselling because I can always look at the Quran for counselling, answers and comfort. Everything I need and all my answers is there.”

Perhaps surprisingly, the first generation group had a different view of what Australia means to them. They choose the same pictures as the first group, but they added the following pictures.
Using the same categories, the first group classified these pictures as follow: Political (2,6), Australian culture (1,3,5,7,8,11,12,14) and religious tolerance (4,9,10,13). They argue that, in Australia, there is no intention to exclude people from the wider society. In this view, there are some incidents of discrimination and exclusion which happen on an individual basis. However, the national identity of Australia is still being formed and needs time and more cultural conversation to
be crystallized. They suggest that the current Australia national identity is a natural result of the White Australia Policy that formed the social consciousness of the society. As a first generation, male respondent put it:

"white Australia policy rooted in the social consciousness the classification of people according to their race and skin colour".

This policy, according to a first generation, female respondent, shaped:

"The development of the national identity that is based on the concept of the true Aussies and mates who has certain physical and social characteristics".

This social development allowed the construction of a populist, national identity, which excludes and marginalizes minorities, and led to popular ideas about the need for people to conform to a standard set of perceived cultural and social norms, if they are to be true Australians. Two thirds of the first generation group considered themselves as "Australian", because they believed that, as one respondent contended:

"your country is where you and your family are honoured and feel safe, protected and treated with respect. And where you live with dignity and have the ability to dream for a better life and future for yourself and your children".

This group refuses any form of religious identification, i.e. to be identified as "Australian Muslims" or "Muslims Australian". So, a male respondent argued:

"Australia is more tolerance to religious differences and diversity than many other Islamic countries who discriminated against different Islamic groups such as the Shia in Baharan and Saudia Arabia and Sunni in other parts".

The first generation respondents reflected on their own pre-settlement experiences in their country of origin. They agreed that either themselves or someone they knew had been victims of religious discrimination, intolerance and harassment in their country of origin. A small percentage of whom the vast majority were women who wear head cover, stated that they were exposed to a form of religious intolerance and racism. They related these incidents to the nation’s media and cultural
industry’s views on Muslims in general and Muslim women in particular. One respondent contended:

"they think we are unhappy, discriminated against, oppressed and mistreated by our husbands and within our community. Some comment that they feel sorry for me. I was asked several times to contact women's protection groups if I need help".

Interestingly, female participants found white, Australian women to be more tolerant of them than other ethno-religious groups, including female Muslims from Middle Eastern background, as well as pre-1970s African settlers from their community. They relate this attitude to the ethno-cultural interaction between different groups in their countries of origins; ie. Arabs consider the Arab race better than the African race. This form of racism, as Anderson (1998: 125-7; see also Bonnett, 1996; Kobayashi and Peake, 2000: 393; Miles, 1989) argued, is: "a core ideology on which racism draws. Without the notion of separate and distinct 'races', racial discrimination would lack an ideological basis" (quoted in Dunn, Forrest, Burnley and McDonald, 2004: 422).

A fair percentage of the first generation respondents agreed that they still have their country of origin inside them and, to an extent, hold to their previous national identity. They attributed this tendency to hold to their previous national identity to their lack of personal experience, memory, ethnicity, culture and religious orientation within Australian society. Erikson (1970:18) refers to this form of identity as: “some belief in the sameness and continuity of some shared world image.” They argue that they are in the middle of two competing sets of socio-religious norms, their Islamic ethno-cultural norms and the Christian norms of Australian society, that need to be negotiated and reconciled under the principle of multiculturalism. They need to seek acceptance, recognition or integration in their wider Australian community and accommodate some of the demands that the integration/naturalizations process requires.

In this vein, a male respondent argued:

"you can not become Australian because you have Australian citizenship. Citizenship is a legal status but nationality is a feeling of belonging and loyalty. This feeling is shared and developed with shared experiences and memories. We need time to have this feeling to Australia."
Similarly, a female respondent contended:

"I miss my life in my country. I am not sorry that I live in Australia now. But I have this emptiness inside me. All my childhood memories, friends and family are back home. I love my life in Australia but I think I need time to digest and have a feeling of belonging to the Australian way of life".

At the same time, in a group interview, a first generation, male respondent argued:

"We need to be obedient to our religion and therefore must never stop engaging in our regular religious practices whether in public or private. We have to maintain practicing our religion because it's our way to maintain our religious identity".

The second generation group argue that multiculturalism is a process of engagement, leading to mutual adjustment between different cultures, resulting in readjustment and mutual assimilation, and the creation of a new Australian national identity. As a male respondent argued:

"Australia is in a state of negotiation, construction and formation. It is in a process of merging different ethno-cultural identities to establish a new primary culture".

They believe that different religions have a primary role in this cultural formation. Religious tolerance will facilitate this cultural conversation because religions teach people to respect difference. In this vein, a second generation, female respondent argued:

"The Islamic religion and other religions can facilitate their integration process because Islam teach us to accommodate differences, be tolerant and respect the other’s beliefs and norms even if they contradict with the principles of Islam".

Similarly, a second generation, male respondent contended:

"All religions command people to respect our covenant and conventions and do not cause harm to others, respect and exist peacefully with other".
Both men and women were asked if they were prejudiced against other ethnicities represented in the study, in other words to self-identify as racist or not. This is sometimes characterized as symbolic racism, where people acknowledge their own dissatisfaction or unease with cultural difference.

Only a small percentage self-diagnosed their own racism; these were drawn largely from among older people, men and those with low level of education. However, the majority who did not frankly self-diagnose their own racism sometimes expressed a hidden racism in relation to cross-ethnic, social relations, such as intermarriage. Table 7.3.2 shows the views on intermarriage within the focus group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.3.2: Intermarriage between different ethnic groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approve marriage between other ethnic group</td>
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<td>Approve marriage between other ethnic group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do not approve marriage between other ethnic group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approve Marriage between Muslim Anglo/ celtic White Australian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do Not Approve Marriage between Muslim Anglo/ celtic White Australian</td>
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</table>

Two main forms of racial logic were identified in the discussion of the principle of intermarriage: an old racism, based on the idea that other ethnicities were inferior; and a new racism, based on cultural differentiation from others. Both the old and the new racism are clear in the attitudes of ethnic groups towards each other which was influenced by pre-immigration experiences. Racism based on the inferiority of some races is no longer politically correct. So, people favour disguised, indirect, ways to express it. As such, people see other ethnic groups as having more backward
cultures or inferior socio-economic status.

The majority of the females and males respondents from the first generation were more likely than the second generation to reject intermarriage between ethnic groups. The Sudanese refuse to marry Eritreans/Ethiopians because they consider their ‘Arabic race’, and their version of the Arabic/Islamic culture, to be superior to the African race and African/Islamic culture. This view about the inferiority of the African culture is deeply rooted in Sudanese culture and governs the relationship between different Sudanese cultures, particularly between the cultures in North Sudan and Southern Sudan. Second, they see both Eritreans and the Southern Sudanese as low income and unskilled workers, because they work in careers such as domestic helpers, cleaners and construction workers. They are considered socially inferior by the North Sudanese population.

Interestingly, a clear majority of women respondents from both the first and second generations were more likely to approve a marriage between a Muslim girl and an Anglo/Celtic, White, Australian man, compare with less than half of male respondent from the first and the second generations, who are more likely to endorse marriage between a Muslim girl and an Anglo/Celtic, white Australian. A fair percentage of men respondents from the first and second generation would not endorse it.

In contrast, female respondents from both generations argued that their daughters/siblings will have a better life with a Muslim Anglo/ Celtic White Australian. In this vein, a first generation, female respondent argued:

"they will enjoy equal rights in the relationship. White men show more respect and tender and more open and able to express their feelings without thinking that their manhood is intaked".

Similarly, a second generation, female respondent contended:

"I have a Lebanese friend who is married to an Aussie. He encourage her to achieve her goal and become independent. He helps her in household work and takingcare of their children. African men consider these duties as part of women responsibilities in the house".

It’s interesting to compare these findings to studies of Muslim diaspora elsewhere in the West. In the case
of Muslims in the UK, Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, Zenou (2007) found that: “the integration pattern adopted by Muslim immigrants in the UK contains in fact several important specific aspects that includes: education, employment, and socio-economic characteristics. For non-Muslims, a high level of education (being highly educated in Britain) and a high level of job qualification (being a manager) are among the most important factors that decrease their sense of identity. For Muslims, instead, education does not seem to have any effect on the attenuation of their identity and, on the contrary, being a manager as well as having a high income seems to strengthen their religious faith. Consistently, Muslims living in areas with lower unemployment rates seem to show a higher identity. The picture that emerges from the data is that although Muslims are less likely to become managers than non-Muslims and are poorer, those who succeed show a stronger religious identity. Most importantly, even after conditioning on our rich set of individual and contextual demographic and socio-economic characteristics, the speed of cultural integration is slower for the Muslims than for the non-Muslims. For non-Muslims, the longer they have been in the UK, the more attenuate is the attachment to their culture of origin, whereas for Muslims, the number of years since their arrival in the UK does not show any significant effect on their inclination to assimilate”.

Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, Zenou also compared the two generations and found that: “a Muslim born in the UK who has spent more than 50 years there has on average the same probability of having a strong religious identity as a first generation non-Muslim who has been in the UK for fewer than 20 years. Second generation Muslims never achieve the (lower) level of probability of having a strong religious identity of second generation non-Muslims at any point in time”.

Similarly, a Pew Research Centre report (2006) explored the issue of the social integration of Muslims in Europe and the United States. It argued: “the way in which Muslims perceive their own identity varies between the United States and Europe, as well as between European states. Spanish, German, and British Muslims think of themselves as Muslims “first” and then as members of their respective countries. Opinions are the reverse in the United States and France. In the United States, differences across religions as well as race are common, which may explain why Muslims relate primarily to the country of residence. To the contrary, France’s policy of assimilation mitigates differences by refusing to recognize religious factors in public life, which may actually produce a similar outcome experienced in the United States”.

Using the education, employment, and economic activity as indicators to compare the integration of Muslims in Europe and the United States, Boylan (2007: 132) found that: “Muslims are more integrated
into the American society because their experience in the United States seems to be improving or at least remaining constant over time and that Muslims may be better integrated than other minority groups, especially since 9/11. Undoubtedly, some Muslims feel discrimination and alienation, but as a community, their situation appears comparable to those of the general public.” For Boylan (2007:136), religious identity of the younger American Muslims is evident, but they successful: “in striking a balance between their religious identities and national expectations.”

At the same time, the Pew Research Report (2006a) found that, despite different approaches to integration, the United States and France were similar in some ways. American and French publics both believe that relations between Muslims and Westerners are “good”, but still Muslims in this countries view themselves as Muslim first, and then as a part of American or French society. This contrasts to the British case, where differences between younger Muslims and the wider society are highly visible.

In regard to identity, Nyiri (2007) discusses the findings of six Gallup surveys: three conducted in Berlin, London, and Paris and three general surveys. He noted that the three cities were chosen because Muslims from different backgrounds live in them: many of Berlin’s Muslims are of Turkish origin; many British Muslims came from the Indian sub-continent; and many French Muslims are of North African origin. Furthermore, there are notable differences between these host countries in terms of their policies toward immigrants. He found that Muslims, especially the younger generation, in these three cities closely associate with their religion, their country and their ethnic background. He argues that there needs to be greater recognition that Muslim identity in Europe is a mixture of these three sub-identities. Interestingly, Muslims saw “European” as the identity with which they were least likely to identify.

When it comes to the questions of integration and religious observance, Nyiri (2007) examined six Gallup surveys which considered what respondents thought was necessary for integration into society. The results suggested that both the general and the Muslim populations have similar priorities in terms of the specifics of integration. The most important task, everyone agreed, is mastering the national language. Finding a job was listed next, followed by general agreement among respondents that getting a better education aided integration. Celebrating national holidays was also considered a necessary aspect of national integration. The majority of respondents also agreed that participating in politics is necessary. However, only a minority thought that toning down religious observances was necessary for integration.
At the same time in all three cities, significant majorities of Muslims, 68% in Paris, 85% in Berlin and 88% in London, stated that religion was an important part of their daily lives. These figures stand in stark contrast to those found among the general population: only 23% of French, 36% of British and 41% of German respondents overall considered religion to be an important part of their lives. Nyiri (2007) concludes that the idea that their higher religiosity implies a weaker sense of national identity is simply false. In London and Paris, when Muslims were not forced to choose between religious and national identity, they tended to associate themselves with both. In fact, in none of the three countries were Muslim residents less likely than the populations at large to say they identify strongly with their country (in the United Kingdom, they were actually somewhat more likely to do so).

The survey next probed respondents’ confidence in democratic institutions, asking whether religion is a substitute for democracy and whether the two conflict. Muslim respondents in all three cities had a high level of confidence in democratic institutions, including elections, the judicial system, the national government and the media. In the United Kingdom, Muslims had more confidence in British democratic institutions than non-Muslims. In related questions, 65 percent of Muslims expressed confidence in the police, a percentage similar to that of non-Muslims. The majority of Muslims agreed that it is important for Muslims to be involved in politics, as did the majority of non-Muslims, except in Germany. In addition, the overwhelming majority of respondents, Muslim and non-Muslim, did not think that it is morally justifiable to use violence, even for a noble cause.

**Conclusion:**

There were generational differences between the focus groups on the question of the integration into the Australian society, in relation to both political participation and military service. Although both generations appeared unwilling to become actively involved in the politics of Australia, they had a different justification for their lack of involvement.

Theological issues are not crucial for the first generation position. This was clear in their position on the question of preserving the interests of the Umma and the duty of preaching, questions which different theological schools of thought see as a condition for their residency, integration and political participation. A mistrust of the motivations of the Ulama is evident. They were described as "State Jurists"; "Governments Ulama"; and "King’s and Sheikh’s religious puppets".
The first generation have adapted themselves to a world composed of sovereign nation-states and a new international political order, which is based on having peaceful and equal relations with both non-Muslim states and other Muslims. The historical division of the world into two areas, Muslim and non-Muslim, between whom relations can, at best, be ones of truce; and the associated demands that the life of societies should be regulated by the will of God as revealed in the Quran, not by the will of rulers or of the people is no applicable in the modern international order. As such, the first generation group considers that political participation and military service are citizenship duties, which each citizen of Australia, regardless of their religious affiliation, must respect and perform. They emphasized the division between Muslims and existing authorities in Islamic countries and concluded that the rule of aggression in the Islamic theology prevails when Australia is engaged in a War against an Islamic country. In relation to their lack of political participation, they listed a number of non-religious reasons, such as poor language skills and their inability to understand the Australian political system.

Interestingly, the second generation group appears more divided when it comes to the question of military service. Some consider it as part of their citizenship contractual agreement with Australia, which Islam obliges them to respect. However, others question the theological perspective that requires them to protect both the duty of Jihad and the interests of the Islamic Umma at the expense of their citizenship duties. They acknowledge the need to redefine both concepts in the light of the existing international political order; and the nature of political systems in Islamic countries, which they describe as neither Islamic, nor democratic. Finally, a small percentage believes that they should avoid performing military service in their host country until the theological differences and debates are resolved.

Surprisingly, the second generation group showed more commitment to their religious duties and observance than the first generation group. The importance of religion in the personal life of the respondents from the second generation highlights how issues related to it can present considerable barriers to the process of integration and adaptation to the Australian society. Nevertheless, in the case of the first generation, although a sizeable majority of respondents agreed that Islam is very important in their life, it seems clear that religion, particularly Islam, is not a decisive factor in affecting social integration. Rather, it was affected more by their visible minority status, than by their religious affiliation.

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Conclusion

The existence of a global movement for the maintenance, reproduction and reinterpretation of Islam is evident. The main characteristics of this movement are that it has no central authority and there is very little coordination between its various elements. It is occurring through a diverse range of organisations, both in Islamic and non-Islamic countries, and between Muslims around the globe, who are using new technologies and transnational structures and technologies. In addition, we can also point to the role played by various communication and information technologies, such as cyberspace, to enrich the debates between Muslims and different schools of thought in Islam ‘Madhahib’, in internet chat rooms, about Islam, religious authority and the Umma. Such debates engage in a variety of different questions that range from the question of the consumption of halal meat, through participating in non-Islamic festivals, both at the neighbourhood level and nationwide in diasporatic communities, to the encouragement of high national standards in the teaching and practice of Islam, and, perhaps most broadly, what constitutes “Real Islam”.

The emergence of this new form of Islamic virtual activities has transformed Muslim understandings of the Umma and established new formulations of, and critical perspectives on, Islam, Islamic jurisprudence and the acquisition of religious knowledge and authority. Hassan Al-Turabi (quoted in Mandaville, 2001: 176), the Head of the Islamic National Front in Sudan, suggests a broad answer to the question of who can be regarded as part of the Ulama. He argues that: “because all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, or a jurist is all Ulama”. Likewise, Muhammad Al-Massari (quoted in Mandaville, 2001:177) claims that “every single Muslim, man or woman, is empowered to Ijtihaad. You do not need an ordination from any ruler or scholar”. Muslims are increasingly willing to take Islam into their own hands, relying on their own readings and interpretations of the classical sources or following reformist intellectuals who question traditional dogmas and challenge the claims of the Ulama to be privileged sources of religious knowledge.

Furthermore, the discourse of Islamist intellectuals, both modernists and traditionalists, questions the legitimacy of the states and religious institutions in Islamic countries. They trust neither the mosque nor the state as a source of Islam and consider them part of “official Islam”. This is the reason for the popularity of Islamic websites which originate from outside these institutions. Hence, the new Islam exists in spaces which institutionalized forms of politics cannot reach. This
cyber activism has opened up new avenues for rethinking and reformulating Islamic, away from its traditional ethno-cultural, political and religious setting, to suit the needs of the diasporatic Muslim communities in the West. This means that, in the process of displacing Islam from a particular national context and reconstituting it as a universal ideology, applicable to humanity generally, Muslims developed an increased capacity to recognise, account for and debate the difference within their religion. It is crucial, however, to understand that cyber space is a space in which no particular conception of Islam is imposed. Difference is negotiated, rather than eradicated. As one of my second generation groups puts it, “You learn to adjust and respect to other views, tendencies and differences of Madhahib. You become at ease with different interpretations of Islam and tolerate Shia theology, Sunna sectarianism and Radical Fundamentalist and Jihadist restrictions without feeling that you are diluting your own beliefs”.

Juristic discussions on the legality of residence in non-Muslim territory in the first Islamic centuries are different from modern ones. Juristic positions in the first Islamic centuries developed after the end of the first Islamic state (the prophet and the Four Guided Caliphs periods), as a response to historical challenges represented by the question of succession, the legitimacy of leadership and the relationship between the state and religion. The various positions adopted by different jurists reflected a dynamic process of theo-political and legal developments. Historically, the position of Muslim minorities residing in non-Muslim territory is problematic, because of the traditional dichotomy between the Dar Al-Harab and Dar Al-Islam. The socio-economic and political developments in the Islamic state, at first, and the Islamic world, later, resulted in the appearance of the Abodes of Peace, Treaty and Preach. These different abodes reflect the complexity involved in the relationship between the two concepts of the Islamic Umma and the Islamic state.

The concept of the Islamic Umma developed from a religious and geo-political entity to a spiritual socio-religious one, in which its members shared faith and beliefs and developed a hypothetical moral regime that unifies them against the evils of the world. Historically, the Umma that was established by the Prophet after the Hijra constituted the first political community based on a on a common religious faith and strategic alliance with non-Muslim inhabitants of Medina. After the death of the prophet and the emergence of the question of succession, dynasties rule and then colonial period in Islamic countries, a shift occurred in the conceptualization of the Umma, first, in the anti colonial/ Western hegemony movements, such as Abdu’s Pan Islamism and Qutb’s Revivalism, and, later, in both traditionalist and modernist conceptualization of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. The challenge that
faces this conceptualization is the emergence of new diasporatic communities of Muslims in non-Muslim majority cultures and political identities. Such communities are faced by the question of how they can achieve a balance between their Islamic identity within the collective identity of their host communities, and their resultant citizenship obligations in their host countries.

The existence of these Muslim communities in Western countries, which became more common after the Nineteenth Century, forced Muslim jurists to re-examine religious attitudes toward Muslims living in non-Muslim societies and led to the appearance of different schools of Jurisprudence that discussed the identity and duties of these minorities. It also led to the establishment of new institutions dedicated to these minorities, such as the European Council for Fatwa and Research. More recently, the use of the cyber sphere to answer queries from Muslims in the West has become a means these jurists use to enhance the Islamic identity within younger generations of Muslim communities in the West. The most influential of the modern Jurists is Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian-born and Qatar-based Sunni jurist who heads the European Council for Fatwa and Research, a body established in London on March 29, 1997. He also heads the supervising committee of IslamOnline.net.

Regardless of the school of Jurisprudence to which they belong, jurists agree that to ban or ignore Islamic communities in the West would only alienate them and ensure they lose their Islamic identity. Instead, they have become more concerned to construct a legal-religious framework to maintain emigrants' Muslim identities, while using the diaspora in the service of their conception of the Umma and the role played by different parties in it. They called upon Muslim immigrants in the West to place religious identity above national and ethnic identities and to promote the interests of a global Muslim nation that exists, and of which Muslims are members, wherever they live.

The change in the residency of migrants, from temporary residency (in the early 1980s migration to the West as labourers) to recent permanent residency, and then citizenship, led them to work hard to improve their economic, political and social situations, through the establishment of different Islamic schools, centres, mosques, associations, financial institutions and political parties. These were considered by many scholars as a nucleus of a unified Islamic front. However, with the existence of ethno-cultural differences between these migrant's groups, and with their host country, and the challenge of living in a multicultural society, whose values and traditions do not, in many ways, coincide with their faith, led to the appearance of different forms of identifications, that include religious, ethnicity and cultural identities.
Of course, it is crucial to acknowledge that my respondents are not a representative sample of the North African Muslim diasporic communities in Australia, let alone the multiple Muslim communities here. As such, my intention here has been to explore some of the differences between generations and the role that Cyber Islam plays in constructing those differences. In this vein, my discussion here was organised according to three themes: the relation between the Islamic state and the Islamic Umma; the formation of my respondents’ identity; and the relationship between my respondents and their host community. Each of these themes illustrate a different aspect of the wider debates within the Muslim communities and provided examples of encounters and negotiations with their host communities, as well as identifying some of the ways in which Muslims are rethinking Islam.

It’s clear that Islam represents a third space between the pre-immigration homeland and the host communities in the formation of identity within the focus group. The difference in identity formation between the two generations in this study is obvious. There are economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions to my respondents’ integration process into Australian society, which are distinct, but not mutually exclusive. Crucially, there are different integration patterns among the first and the second generation groups, whether the latter is born or brought up in Australia. The first generation seems to be more willing to integrate into, and adapt to, their host community, through their attempts to establish friendships and local interactions with neighbours and participating in different national and religious activities (Australia Day, Christmas). This approach seems to be a response to both their pre-immigration experiences in their countries of origin, which shaped their views on Islam, the Islamic state and the Umma, and the role they are believe they are required to play to serve the interests of the Umma in their host communities. On the other hand, the second generation is less happy about such cultural integration. This reluctance results from their views of Islam, which is a result of two important factors: the way they were brought up; and their interaction with cyber Islam.

Of course, the formation of the second generation group’s identity is a dynamic and ongoing process. It is actively constructed in the context of their social surroundings and their families. Throughout their childhood, the second generation were exposed to two different social value systems: the Australian liberal secular system; and their parents’ ethno-cultural and religious system. Although their parents, who usually came from conservative backgrounds, often do not regularly practice their faith, they worked hard to promote and transmit their conception of family, gender-roles, religious and ethno-cultural values, such as obedience to parents and rejection of premarital sex and homosexuality, to their children. Their aim was to reaffirm the religious and cultural identity of their families in the second generation. The result is a
confusing and multi-layered identity within this second generation that has led them to look for a new form of a universal identity, different from both their parents and their host community. This gives rise to forms of religious identity, which provides an appealing, moral response, in a way that ethno-cultural heritage could not, and which becomes a favourable identity because of the marginalization they feel within their host society. However, this religious identity is not a product of their parents efforts or the ethno-religious, cultural transmitting system, rather, it is a product of the engagement of this group with cyber Islam, which made it easy for them to relate to a global Umma in which the boundaries of political community don’t exist and the boundaries of the religious identity is constantly open to rearticulation and negotiation. It also gave voice to alternative sources of religious authority and contributes to the development of a wider Muslim public sphere and new breed of Muslim intellectuals. The discourse of the new intellectual, as Mandaville (2001: 190) noted: “often seeks to question the legitimacy of both the state and the mosque (a symbol of traditional conservatism) as sources of ‘authentic’ Islam”.

Cyber Islam also allowed them to read, interpret and produce Islamic knowledge for themselves and helped them to forge and reinterpret the Umma concept using different strategies that includes: exploiting the glorious history of the Islamic state to promote the idea of the possibility of the establishment/existence of a Global Islamic Umma, which will be achieved through the unification of Muslims in different parts of the world; justifying their residency in their non-Muslim communities by enhancing their commitment to their Islamic Umma, which is enhanced by their commitment to the principle of Dawa and becoming a role model Muslims; and acknowledging their need to survive and integrate within their host communities and providing them with Fatwas in relation to their daily diasporatic problems, by introducing and adding new sources of legislation to the Islamic theology, as was discussed in previous chapters, such as Ramadan’s state of the world and Qaradawi’s existing conditions that enabled the emergence of the new school of Minorities Jurisprudence, ‘Fiqh Al-Agaliat’.

The question of dual-loyalty and multi-layered identity is much more obvious in the second generation than in the first. The first generation is more aware of the difference between real Islam and practiced Islam. They interpret the secular, liberal nature of Western states as mere social mechanisms; enabling Muslims to freely practice their religion and fulfil the basic human needs that they believe are the essence of the Islamic religion’s mission to humanity. Yet, by questioning the eternal and universal nature of the Islamic Umma, they disregard, in their residency experience, the duties and obligations that jurists demand that they fulfil. They regard the interests of their country of citizenship as the benchmark for their political participation, military service, socio-economic integration and cultural adaptation in their host community.
They regard their integration/adaptation process as necessary to fulfil their basic human interests, because becoming a citizen of Australia does not contradict with their Islamic identity.

For the second generation group, religious identity is a matter of choice; it is not determined. The present study provides qualitative data that illustrates the processes, decisions and social factors involved in developing a highly acknowledged, religious identity that, in most situations, has overpowered any other ascribed or achieved statuses. Obviously, the research results presented in this thesis cannot be generalised to the identity formation process of all Muslim Australians, nor is religion as a declared identity likely to be the final phase of what will continue to be a complex process of identity negotiation and evolution for these young Muslims. While many other Muslims have not emphasized their religious identity to the same extent that these interviewees have, this research, nonetheless, reveals how religious identities can be constructed, maintained and enacted, particularly by second-generation immigrants attempting to reconcile multiple, sometimes conflicting, forms of identity.

The research indicates crucial lines of future research. First, we need more studies of the role of cyber Islam in the formation of a universal Islamic Umma and of a new religious identity, not only among the Muslim diaspora in the West, but also of Muslims in Islamic countries, that transcend geo-political boundaries. This would involve an analysis of other Islamic websites.

Second, the respondents this study are drawn from a small, and relatively new, migrant community in Australia. A study of identity formation and the influence of cyber Islam within a larger and more well-established Muslim migrant community, such as the Lebanese or Turkish community, would enable us to see if the pattern highlighted here is repeated in these communities where there are third and fourth generation migrants.

Third, it’s worth studying how the interaction between cyber Islam and Muslims both in diasporatic setting and Islamic countries is contributing to the emergence of new forms of critical Islam, by producing thinkers committed to the renewal and reform of religion, as well as the Umma. In a broad sense, then, we can conclude that the renewal and reform of religion and of the Umma is largely a result of a continuous and a complex formation of identity between Muslims, which, most likely, will intensify over time and cross current national borders.
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Appendix A
Indicative Questions for Interview

Age
Country of Origin
Gender: F / M
Do you think that Muslims and non-Muslims have the same rights in Australia?
Do you think that, as long as Muslims are allowed to practice their religion, there is no problem for them living in a secular society like Australia?
Do you think that most Muslims came to Australia looking for a better life and regard it as their home?
Do you think that discrimination and social exclusion against Australian Muslims is leading to resentment and the search for alternatives, including radical teaching and wearing the hijab, particularly among the young?
Do you think that Muslims can be fully integrated into Australian society?
Do you think Muslims have less chance of finding employment when compared to non-Muslims, which makes their integration difficult? If so, why?
Appendix B
Interview Consent Form
Islamic Nationality and citizenship: Muslims Integration in Australia

1. I ............................................................... (please print) consent to take part in Islamic Nationality and citizenship: Muslims Integration in Australia Research Project. I have read the information sheet for this project and understand its contents. I have had the nature and purpose of the research project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the research worker. My consent is freely given.
2. I understand that while information gained during the research project may be published in academic journals or books, my name and position title will not be used in relation to any of the information I have provided, unless I explicitly indicate that I am willing to be identified when quoted.
3. I understand that if I agree to be recorded on audio or visual media, it will be made available upon request. Prior to publication of any audio or visual material, consent will be sought from the participant with a copy sent to them for approval.
4. I understand that any personal, sensitive or potentially incriminating information will be kept confidential so far as the law allows. This form and any other data collected throughout the duration of the interview will be stored separately in a locked office at the Australian National University. Digitally recorded media (audio or visual) and data entered onto a computer will be kept in a computer accessible only by password by Ghada Wadeisa.
5. I understand that although any comments I make will not be attributed to me in any publication; it is possible that others may guess the source of information, and I should avoid disclosing information which is of confidential status or which is defamatory of any person or organisation.
6. I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage, without providing any reason and that this will not have any adverse consequences for me. If I withdraw, the information I provide will not be used by the project.
7. In any publications produced as a result of this research I consent to be identified by (check one):
   □ My full name
   □ My position and organisation (if you tick this box it is possible that you could be identified)
   □ None of the above (complete confidentiality)
   Signed ........................................ Date ....................... .

Photography/Video/Audio
I consent to be recorded by the interviewer. I understand that the media will be stored securely at the Australian National University. I understand that documentation of this kind raises the likelihood of being identified.
Signed ........................................... Date ........................ .

Researcher to Complete
I ............................................................... certify that I have explained the nature and procedures of the research project to ........................................ and consider that she/he understands what is involved.
Signed ........................................... Date ........................ .
Appendix D

IUMS (International Union of Muslim Scholars) Statement on Insulting Cartoons

All praise is due to Allah, and may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon the Messenger of Allah and upon all the prophets and messengers.

The International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS) has observed with deep interest the issue of the publishing of cartoons that ridicule the Prophet, which in turn insults the feelings of millions of Muslims as they see the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) depicted in an offensive manner. The drawings were first published in a Danish magazine on December 30, 2005, after which they were republished on January 10, 2006, in a Christian Norwegian magazine. These drawings were presented in a way that could never be acceptable to any person of good faith, nor ever approved of by any person having sound morals. This depiction is unbefitting of a prophet who delivered the divine message.

The IUMS waited for a long time hoping that efforts exerted by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Arab League, the Muslim World League, and a number of Arab and Muslim countries would result in receiving a proper apology for the offense that was committed by the Danish magazine and followed by the Norwegian magazine. However, this apology never came. The only reply from the Danish was that their prime minister reaffirmed that country's commitment to freedom of expression and condemned any statement or acts against certain groups or people because of their religion or ethnicity.

The IUMS considers that unclear statement as an attempt to intentionally avoid addressing the issue of these disturbing cartoons by speaking about minorities in general terms. This injures the feelings of millions of Muslims around the world as well as those of the 180,000 Danish Muslims who represent three percent of the population.

The IUMS asks Arab and Muslim governments to express to the Danish and Norwegian governments their Muslim people's anger at this direct insult of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) by the publishing of these offensive cartoons. Arab and Muslim governments should also exercise all possible political and diplomatic pressure on the Danish and Norwegian governments so as to halt all such organized anti-Islam campaigns that aim at spreading hatred of and contempt for Islam, its sanctities, and its believers.

The IUMS asks Arab and Muslim countries to boycott an upcoming Middle East exhibition organized by the Danish Center for Culture and Development (DCCD).

The IUMS urges officials in Denmark and Norway to take a firm stance against these repeated insults to the Muslim nation and the Prophet who is followed by 1.3 billion people across the globe, in order to preserve the positive relationship that exists between these two nations and their citizen Muslims as well as other Muslims worldwide. If this does not happen, the IUMS will be forced to urge millions of Muslims across the world to boycott all Danish and Norwegian products and activities.

If the Danish and Norwegian governments make so little of Muslims' feelings, then boycotting is the least that every Muslim should do, and the least that everydayi'iyah and scholar should call for in response to the flagrant abuse of depicting the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) in such offensive caricatures. We call upon these countries to come to their senses and to offer a proper and clear apology to the international Muslim community. And Allah has full power and control over His affairs. All praises be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds.

President of the Union

Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi

Secretary General Dr. Mohammad Salim Al-Awa
Appendix E

Fatwa of Qaradawi to fight Muslims

In The Name of God, The Compassionate, The Merciful : Legal Fatwa

This is the reply to the (religious) inquiry presented by Mr. Muhammad Abdur-Rashid, the most senior Muslim chaplain in the American Armed forces. It concerns the permissibility of the Muslim military personnel within the US armed forces to participate in the war operations and its related efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere in other Muslim countries.

In his question he states that the goals of the (war) operations are:

1) Retaliation against those "who are thought to have participated" in planning and financing the suicide operations on September 11th, against civilian and military targets in New York and Washington (he then detailed the consequences of these operations.)

2) Eliminating the elements that use Afghanistan and elsewhere as safe haven, as well as deterring the governments which harbor them, sanction them, or allow them the opportunity for military training in order to achieve their goals around the world.

3) Restoring the veneration and respect to the US as a sole superpower in the world.

Furthermore, he concludes his inquiry by mentioning that the number of the Muslim military personnel, in the three branches of the American armed forces, exceeds fifteen thousand soldiers. Hence, if they refuse to participate in fighting, they will have no choice but to resign, which might also entail other consequences. Finally, he asks if it is permissible, to those who can transfer, to serve in different capacities other than direct fighting.

The reply:

Praise be to God and peace and blessing be upon the messengers of God. We say: This question presents a very complicated issue and a highly sensitive situation for our Muslim brothers and sisters serving in the American army as well as other armies that face similar situations. All Muslims ought to be united against all those who terrorize the innocents, and those who permit the killing of non-combatants without a justifiable reason. Islam has declared the spilling of blood and the destruction of property as absolute prohibitions until the Day of Judgment. God (glory be to He) said: "Because of that We ordained unto the Children of Israel that if anyone killed a human being - unless it be in punishment for murder or for spreading mischief on earth- it would be as though he killed all of humanity; whereas, if anyone saved a life, it would be as though he saved the life of all humanity. And indeed, there came to them Our messengers with clear signs (proofs and evidences), even then after that, many of them continued to commit mischief on earth." 5:32

Hence, whoever violates these pointed Islamic texts is an offender deserving of the appropriate punishment according to their offence and according to its consequences for destruction and mischief.

It's incumbent upon our military brothers in the American armed forces to make this stand and its religious reasoning well known to all their superiors, as well as to their peers, and to voice it and not to be silent. Conveying this is part of the true nature of the Islamic teachings that have often been distorted or smeared by the media.

If the terrorist acts that took place in the US were considered by the Islamic Law (Shar'iah) or the rules of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), the ruling for the crime of "Hirabah" (waging war against society) would be applied to their doers. God (Glory be to He) said: "The recompense of those who wage war against God and His Messenger and do mischief on earth is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter. Except for those who (having fled away and then) came back with repentance before they fall into your power; (in that case) know that God is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." 5:33-34

Therefore, we find it necessary to apprehend the true perpetrators of these crimes, as well as those who aid and abet them through incitement, financing or other support. They must be brought to justice in an impartial court of law and punish them appropriately, so that it could act as deterrent to them and to others like them who easily slay the lives of innocents, destroy properties and terrorize people. Hence, it's a duty on Muslims to participate in this effort with all
possible means, in accordance with God’s (Most High) saying: "And help one another in virtue and righteousness, but do not help one another in sin and transgression." 5:2.

On the other hand, the source of the uneasiness that American Muslim military men and women may have in fighting other Muslims, is because it’s often difficult- if not impossible- to differentiate between the real perpetrators who are being pursued, and the innocents who have committed no crime at all. The authentic saying by the prophet states: "When two Muslims face each other in fighting and one kills the other, then both the killer and the killed are in the hell-fire. Someone said: we understand that the killer is in hell, why then the one who’s being killed? The prophet said: because he wanted to kill the other person." (Narrated by Bukhari and Muslim.)

The noble Hadith mentioned above only refers to the situation where the Muslim is in charge of his affairs. He is capable of fighting as well as capable of not fighting. This Hadith does not address the situation where a Muslim is a citizen of a state and a member of a regular army. In this case, he has no choice but to follow orders, otherwise his allegiance and loyalty to his country could be in doubt. This would subject him to much harm since he would not enjoy the privileges of citizenship without performing its obligations.

The Muslim (soldier) must perform his duty in this fight despite the feeling of uneasiness of "fighting without discriminating." His intention (niyya) must be to fight for enjoining of the truth and defeating falsehood. It’s to prevent aggression on the innocents, or to apprehend the perpetrators and bring them to justice. It’s not his concern what other consequences of the fighting that might result in his personal discomfort, since he alone can neither control it nor prevent it. Furthermore, all deeds are accounted (by God) according to the intentions. God (the Most High) does not burden any soul except what it can bear. In addition, Muslim jurists have ruled that what a Muslim cannot control he cannot be held accountable for, as God (the Most High) says: "And keep your duty to God as much as you can." 64:16. The prophet (prayer and peace be upon him) said: " when I ask of you to do something, do it as much as you can." The Muslim here is a part of a whole, if he absconds, his departure will result in a greater harm, not only for him but also for the Muslim community in his country - and here there are many millions of them. Moreover, even if fighting causes him discomfort spiritually or psychologically, this personal hardship must be endured for the greater public good, as the jurisprudence (fiqhi) rule states.

Furthermore, the questioner inquires about the possibility of the Muslim military personnel in the American armed forces to serve in the back lines - such as in the relief services' sector and similar works. If such requests are granted by the authorities, without reservation or harm to the soldiers, or to the other American Muslim citizens, then they should request that. Otherwise, if such request raises doubts about their allegiance or loyalty, cast suspicions, present them with false accusations, harm their future careers, shed misgivings on their patriotism, or similar sentiments, then it’s not permissible to ask for that.

To sum up, it's acceptable - God willing- for the Muslim American military personnel to partake in the fighting in the upcoming battles, against whomever, their country decides, has perpetrated terrorism against them. Keeping in mind to have the proper intention as explained earlier, so no doubts would be cast about their loyalty to their country, or to prevent harm to befall them as might be expected. This is in accordance with the Islamic jurisprudence rules which state that necessities dictate exceptions, as well as the rule that says one may endure a small harm to avoid a much greater harm.

And God the Most High is Most Knowledgeable and Most Wise.

Rajab 10, 1422 AH / September 27, 2001

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi [Grand Islamic Scholar and Chairman of the Sunna and Sira Council, Qatar]
Judge Tariq al-Bishri [First Deputy President of the Council d'etat, Ret., Egypt]
Dr. Muhammad S. al-Awa [Professor of Comparative Law and Shari'a, Egypt]
Dr. Haytham al-Khayyat [Islamic Scholar, Syria]
Mr. Fahmi Houaydi [Islamic Author and Columnist, Egypt]
Sheikh Taha Jabir al-Alwani [Chairman of the North America Fiqh Council, Sterling, Va.]

This English version was translated from the original Arabic, authorized and approved by authors of the statement. Source: http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/Qaradawi_et_al.htm, viewed 12/11/2012.