Manufacturing Australian Foreign Policy 1950 – 1966

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"Remorse for Intemperate Speech" William Butler Yeats, (1933)
Out of Ireland we have come, great hatred, little room, maimed us at the beginning.....

...but from the chains of despair we have survived the long haul.
In Australia a peaceful victory, over all we were forced to endure.
Adam Hughes Henry, (2012)

Go raibh maith agat Isca.
Abstract

The transition from the liberal foreign policy approach of the Chifley Labor Government to the more strident anti-communism of the conservative Menzies Government after 1949 is a significant event in 20th Century Australian history. During the period 1950-1966 the Menzies Government faced a range of challenges such as relations with the USA, responses to the USSR and China and the question of Indonesia and decolonisation in post-war Southeast Asia. In response the Menzies Government developed new foreign policies, encouraged a particular style of diplomacy and helped to establish a new Cold War attitude towards Australian international affairs.

In the 1950s, the Cold War, the United Nations (UN) and the establishment of new overseas diplomatic missions (particularly in Asia) placed growing administrative and bureaucratic demands on the machinery of Australian diplomacy. From the mid 1950s the Department of External Affairs (DEA) was restructured in order to meet such demands. This process allowed the Department to establish what were considered to be the defining characteristics and attitudes of a new professional Australian diplomacy. The selection and training of new diplomatic recruits is one such area in which this occurred.

This period saw growing interest from politicians, diplomats and academics for developing new types of foreign policy analysis about communism in South East Asia, or the Cold War in general. While some networks between politics, bureaucracy and academia linked to foreign policy analysis had existed in the 1930s and 1940s, from the 1950s new and more powerful relationships were being established. Various academics, many from the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) and the Australian National University (ANU) forged close and ongoing contacts with the DEA. The relationships between small groups of key individuals and institutions ultimately wielded significant influence on issues such as the Cold War and Australian foreign policy debates.

By the 1960s this small foreign policy network had built a vital relationship with the Ford Foundation of New York. This relationship certainly helped to define dominant attitudes towards Australian foreign policy debates. The ANU, AIIA, DEA and Ford Foundation network established a style of foreign policy analysis that was openly (or at least cautiously) sympathetic to the policies of Canberra and Washington often accepting the official justifications at face value.
Dedicated

To my brother Martin Henry (14 January 1978 – 3 October 1986).

My only ‘Hero’.
This is the devilish thing about foreign affairs: they are all foreign and will not always conform to our whims.

*James Reston*

Diplomacy is disguised war, in which states seek to gain by barter and intrigue, by the cleverness of arts, the objectives which they would have to gain more clumsily by means of war.

*Randolph Bourne*

Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.

*Joseph Stalin*
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List of Acronyms

Australian Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF)
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Australian National University (ANU)
Australian New Zealand Bank (ANZ)
Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)
Canberra University College (CUC)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Commonwealth Public Service (CPS)
Communist Party of Australia (CPA)
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Department of External Affairs (DEA)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
Foreign Office - UK (FO)
Foreign & Commonwealth Office - UK (FCO)
Geelong Grammar School (GGS)
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Information Research Department (IRD)
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Information Branch of the DEA (IB)
National Archives of Australia (NAA)
National Library of Australia (NLA)
Public Service Board (PSB)
Partai Komunus Indonesia/Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI)
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (RSPAS)
South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO)
South Pacific Commission (SPC)
United Nations (UN)
West New Guinea (WNG)
INTRODUCTION

All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.

Until the Federal election of 1949, the Australian Labor Party’s view of the world, and of Australia’s place within it, had been shaped by a desire to engage with the aspirations of Asian nationalist movements emerging from colonialism, and with the prospect, in the United Nations Organisation, of an international authority to peacefully arbitrate future international disputes. The idea that Australia could play an important part as a middle power within this new diplomatic framework has been described by Christopher Waters as ‘liberal internationalism’. Central to this perspective was H.V. Evatt, as Labor’s Minister for External Affairs (and in 1948-49 President of the UN’s General Assembly), who oversaw the international dimensions of the ‘new order’ his party sought to establish through their commitment to domestic ‘post-war reconstruction’. Throughout this process the demands placed on the small foreign affairs department and its staff were considerable, and the day to day responsibility for implementing many of these policy approaches fell to Dr. John Burton, (Secretary of the Department of External Affairs 1947-1950). In this brief but highly significant period of Australian diplomatic activity, the pursuit of diplomatic idealism was tied to the creation of a more specialised expertise in international analysis and diplomacy.

But in 1949 the domestic and international settings changed. The election of the Liberal-Country Party government, led by Robert Menzies, decisively recast the orientation of the nation’s foreign policy. The new Prime Minister, Menzies, and the new ministers for External Affairs, first Percy Spender, and then Richard Casey, saw things differently from the Labor Party, and built their policies around the challenge (and opportunities) of what David Lowe terms ‘the great world struggle’ of the Cold War. In the eyes of such men the rivalry between Washington and Moscow effectively rendered the UN unreliable, while the Asian region became a new battlefront in the confrontation with communism. In turn, this reorientation had a profound effect on the Department of External Affairs (DEA), as it managed Australia’s international relations into the 1950s and onwards. This political and policy reorientation is the subject of this thesis. The core argument being advanced here is that, for all the various political drivers of the turn to Cold War priorities, the changing culture, processes and networks of the officials within
the Department of External Affairs were integral to the manufacture of Australia's foreign policy thinking, and to translating various political and ideological realignments into an anti-communist orthodoxy that proved to be robust and resilient, but ultimately constrictive.

The 'manufacture' of policy had many elements, the concept itself implying that a process of production – of raw materials, of design, refinement, assembly, marketing and distribution – goes into the settling of a government's position on and response to issues. It suggests the interdependence of diverse skills, and the crafting of a specific product intended to find a specific. The concept also focuses also on the management of techniques and resources as well as on the outputs and impacts. This is the model my work brings to the formation of Australia's foreign policy from the election of the Menzies government to the Vietnam War. This thesis emphasises not only the links between the problems to be addressed by policy, the interests that determine a solution and the implementation of a program – all familiar enough in the history of Australia's Cold War - but also the processes connected to the development of policy. This perspective seeks to complement the detailed studies of the ideological and strategic calculations informing the Menzies government's anti-communism by scholars such as Christopher Waters, David Lowe or Frank Cain, with an analysis of the associated transformation of the department that had carriage of such policy, and which contributed significantly to the gradual entrenching a new anti-orthodoxy in Australian policy thinking. More than it is about policy outcomes, then, this thesis is about the networks of policy formation and analysis. My primary subject is a department which, in its own carefully cultivated professionalism, and in the networks of expertise and persuasion it sought to build, powerfully conveys how deeply rooted this orthodoxy became.

As Joan Beaumont noted in 2003, such a reflective engagement with the policy process has been unfamiliar territory for many Australian historians, particularly in a field such as international relations, where attention has been largely focussed on the extent to which Australia's priorities, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, reflected subservience to the United States. In *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making 1941-1969*, Beaumont was joined by Christopher Waters, David Lowe and Gary Woodard in offering a corrective to this approach, closely examining the 'official mind' (borrowing Paul Kennedy’s term) that emerged in the Department of External Affairs as it was transformed by the highly selective recruitment processes, first introduced by Evatt, by
the extent to which foreign policy became an area of considerable ministerial and prime ministerial political engagement, and by the gradual emergence of an identifiable Australian diplomatic ‘style’ and approach. This thesis builds on the new ground and perspectives offered by Beaumont, Waters, Lowe and Woodard, and acknowledges their good work. Yet where their attention was often on weighing the influence the Department of External Affairs was able to exert in determining policy responses on a range of issues, my interest is instead on the processes by which policy gained its powerful coherence both within government circles and beyond it, for example, in networks of expertise encompassing academic analysis, media commentary and public relations that became a vital part of promoting the anti-communist orthodoxy. My argument is that policy was manufactured not only amid the ‘battles of bureaucratic politics’ but within these networks, and that the development of these networks was an integral part of such processes. Like Beaumont, Waters, Lowe and Woodard, I offer an account of the significance of the Department of External Affairs as a player in the changing configurations of Australian government and policy in the post-war decades. But my focus is on the networks that came to constitute an industry of policy formation that extended a good deal beyond the department, and government itself.

In short, then, this thesis examines the period 1950-1966 by seeking to understand the ways in which the resources on which policy drew were manufactured into networks extending from politicians, policy makers to academic specialists, encompassing the cultivation of a public interest in international affairs, and learning from similar processes in other nations, most particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. My focus is on the development of a small professional network during the 1950s, and its consolidation into the 1960s, which included the DEA, the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), the Australian National University (ANU), and a range of international interactions, for example, with the United Kingdom’s Foreign Office, and the Ford Foundation of New York. Implicit within the manufacture of policy were resources that spanned from the selective recruitment of officers, the backgrounds of ministers, the emerging practices of public service professionalism, the growth of academic research and teaching in international relations, and the public relations priorities of all parties – governments, universities, and special interest groups – in promoting increased awareness of issues such as international security. The backdrop to much of this was the transformation of Canberra itself as the national capital, a centre of an ‘industry’ of policy formation, discussion, and dissemination almost without equal at that time, given the
proximity of politicians, officials, experts and publicists in a city suddenly realising the full ambit of national government. Where *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats* is focused on an analysis of the interactions within the administrative decision making process, this thesis is concerned more with the development and origins of particular types of ideas and networks of expertise that were part of a multi-dimensional, multi-institutional response to the political and intellectual world of the Cold War.

Apart from *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats*, this thesis stands on the shoulders of many other significant contributions to Australian diplomatic history, which have established the political contexts, calculations and objectives that framed Australia’s ‘search for security’, as David Lee sees it, amid the ‘end of empires’ (David Lowe) and the challenge of genuinely ‘facing north’ (David Goldsworthy) into a region of change and instability. The focus of this work, however, is not so much on the formulation of policies in response to factors outside Australia, although international aspects must always be acknowledged, but on the intellectual and institutional factors within Australia that manufactured and promoted certain policy options, including the calculations of politicians and their political agendas. Such an approach has already featured in the work of David Lee, who has explored the characteristics and implications of the Liberal Party’s approach to Australian foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s. It is also evident in scholarly examinations of Australian foreign aid policy, such as the Colombo Plan, West New Guinea, and relations with Indonesia. It has also characterised biographical studies of

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5 Stuart Doran, *Western Friends and Eastern Neighbours: West New Guinea and Australian Self-Perception in Relation to the United States, Britain and Southeast Asia, 1950 -1962 PhD*, Division of Historical Studies, Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra: Australian National University, 1999. Doran’s archival research argues that the conservatives saw Australia as the new Imperial power south of Singapore with little to fear from Indonesia. This attitude changed around 1957 due to fears of communist
prominent figures such as Casey⁷ and Spender.⁸ Building on the foundation of such approaches, my purpose is to offer an integrated historical assessment, combining political, policy and biographical methods, aiming to examine Australian foreign policy discussions, thinking and the creation of associated networks of new expertise, during the era of the Menzies government.

To understand the emerging networks presented here, the thesis presents a series of perspectives which progressively indicate how domestic and international influences shaped a new type of relationships between government and non-government agencies, providing the Menzies government and DEA with the impetus, framework, and methodologies to develop its policy orthodoxy. Again, the general context for these relationships will be familiar to scholars of Australian social and political history. The following can serve as a summary of this historical and political context. During the course of World War Two, the Federal government in Canberra gained unprecedented control over the economic and social management of the Australian nation. With these new powers came the need to build professional expertise among a new generation of bureaucrats in order to negotiate and manage the challenges of Australian post-war change, including the implementation of Evatt’s brand of liberal internationalism. The DEA in many ways led those agencies that sought access to this emerging professionalism, and defined for itself, and for Australia, a new voice in international diplomacy. The desire to move towards diplomatic specialisation had already begun by 1949, but it would be adapted to the new ideological alignments that came with a change of government that same year.

By this time, Menzies led a party that had astutely articulated a political philosophy to regain the political initiative, and establish conservative stewardship of post-war

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Australian society. Menzies argued that he would free the ‘forgotten people’ of Australia’s growing middle class suburbs from the directives of the state, and from the ideologies of class and industrial conflict, all of which he linked to the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Within this new political era, the DEA would begin its process of ongoing professionalization during the 1950s. This also corresponded to a growing shift towards individual specialisation, to pragmatic rather than idealist diplomacy supported by research, and analytical perspectives, compatible with Australia’s Cold War priorities. For example, the growth of DEA interaction with the discipline of International Relations, particularly at the new Australian National University (ANU), was one aspect of this phenomenon, as was the DEA’s cultivation of commentary and public debates sympathetic to official policies. Anti-communism was of course strongly embedded within this process, and often provided a vital source of oxygen for Australian foreign policy thinking from the early 1950s.

Chapter One summarises the transition from the Chifley government to the Menzies government after 1949, and those international influences important in the cultivation of new local networks of foreign policy expertise. It does this by identifying the contrasting perceptions of foreign policy and anti-communism held by the opposing sides of Australian politics, and noting the connections between this transition in government, the changing nature of Cold War politics (both domestic and international), and Australian exposure to British and American intelligence diplomatic methods. This political history provides a background to the networks explored throughout this thesis and also introduces key themes, such as the increasing prominence given to the cultivation of public opinion supportive of Cold War strategic priorities. The relationship established between the Menzies government, the US and UK governments, Australian academia and international organisations such as the Ford Foundation of New York, were built on foundations emerging from the transitional period, both in the networks that were established, and methodologies that would be adopted. Chapter one also explores the Menzies government’s desire to seek alliance security, the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and interest in Anglo-American propaganda methods.

Chapter Two continues the exploration of the political transition through a focus on Casey as Australian Minister for External Affairs (1951-1960). For example, by exploring his background, ideas and philosophies as they influenced his engagement in international affairs and the work of his department. Using the Operational Code – a concept borrowed
from political science designed to examine factors influencing decision-making and leadership style - this study of Casey also serves to personalise aspects of the transition from Chifley, illustrating how Casey shaped the culture of Australian foreign policy not just in its political priorities but in its practices – the patterns of assumption and behaviour that would become integral to its anti-orthodoxy. These aspects of Casey work and influence helped to sow the seeds for a new foreign policy community (or what I will term *The Canberra Network*) as it developed throughout the period covered by this thesis.

Chapter Three explores the bureaucratic practices of the DEA by highlighting the ‘nuts and bolts’ of Australia’s diplomatic machinery, its recruitment practices and some of the ways in which diplomats negotiated and interacted within their emerging environment. Such an examination extends our understanding of the new culture noted in Chapter Two, and of the extent to which its own elitism, and the anti-communist orthodoxy, became central to the daily business of diplomacy, the analysis of international affairs, and the culture of Australian foreign policy expertise within the DEA. Many of the philosophical and political consequences of the transition from Chifley to Menzies for the DEA are highlighted in this particular chapter, especially the opportunities for dominant players in the foreign policy community to influence policy, or at least public debate, within a relatively small, carefully regulated network. Unlike the United Kingdom and the United States, the individuals actively engaged in the world of the Australian foreign policy were ultimately part of a small and specialised group. The highest echelons of officialdom within this Australian community all enjoyed great longevity in their employment and professional influence, and attempted to leave a distinctive stamp on the administrative practices of those beneath them. From 1950 until 1969, there were only three permanent departmental Secretaries: (Sir) Alan Watt (1950-54), (Sir) Arthur Tange (1954-64) and (Sir) James Plimsoll (1965-69). Understanding the dynamics, even the style, within their department, is an important dimension of understanding the policies, and ideas, it produced.

The next chapter specifically examines this departmental culture from the perspective of W.D. Forsyth, a senior DEA diplomat whose career spans from the high point of liberal internationalism in the post war period into the entrenchment of anti-communist orthodoxy in the 1950s, and beyond. Forsyth’s experiences demonstrate the challenges of encountering the changing parameters of departmental policy thinking in the 1950s, while battling to remain relevant within the senior echelons of his department. Like
the study of Casey, by focusing on a particular individual – albeit one who was to a large extent an intellectual casualty of this transition – it highlights the subtle yet profound ways in which personal professional conduct, particular forms of policy analysis, and awareness of the expectations of the political masters, was central to the Cold War orthodoxy established through the 1950s.

Having established the importance of the Chifley to Menzies transition, its importance to the changing bureaucratic culture of the DEA, the next chapters turn more specifically to the development of those political and bureaucratic frameworks characterising a Canberra Network into the 1960s. They demonstrate how effectively institutional and professional connections were fostered between the DEA, the AIIA and the ANU, building on the common threads of a shared interest in Australian foreign policy and international affairs, but also on a shared desire to consolidate institutional endurance and influence. This desire led to dialogues with international organisations such as the Ford Foundation of New York, which viewed developments in Australia, and academic analysis of foreign affairs, as a necessary part of an international network of policy expertise guided by American mentorship. By the early 1960s, and funded by significant amounts of Ford money, a new foreign policy community based in Canberra had come to occupy a position that was shaping academic analysis and public opinion about Australian foreign affairs.

The final two chapters explore two events which were important not just to the core anti-communist and security interests of Australian planners in the 1960s, or to The Canberra Network, but to the nature of Australian commitments to international action and intervention. These events were perhaps two of the most significant developments of the 1960s in terms of Australian foreign policy, and they were also the first events that The Canberra Network (the DEA, AIIA, ANU), encountered as a mature and effective entity. Working often in a spirit of shared professional mission, the first Australian military deployment to South Vietnam, and diplomatic reactions to the Indonesian massacres, offer insights into the ways in which The Canberra Network had come to inhabit its historical space, to consolidate policy orthodoxy, and its efforts towards shaping perceptions about Australian foreign policy.

Central to my argument throughout this thesis is that there was generally a cooperative response between government, bureaucracy, commentary and academic research to Australian foreign policy. Individuals and organisations sought these
relationships as a mutually beneficial professional association, and this profoundly shaped the larger ambit of Australian foreign policy debates. These relationships are evident not just in the formal positions and commitments of the government, but in the culture of those that advised it, the recruitment of those who entered the diplomatic corps and within the emerging academic specialisms. Taken together, these networks of policy formation and practice add a vital dimension to our understanding of that span of international engagement from Korea to Vietnam. This foreign policy network engaged in the serious examination of major issues of policy development, assimilating information and building expertise, but it was often driven by professional reputations, winning arguments and side-lining the few viable examples of dissent. It might have served the Australian government, the DEA, and others within the Canberra Network well, but there remains a much larger debate about how well this situation actually served its nation, and about why its anti-communist orthodoxy could become so inflexible. Membership of Australia’s foreign policy network during this period established boundaries between itself and the very few outsiders who openly challenged the validity of government policies. This process of inclusion was not necessarily established by relative quantities of intelligence, talent or professional analysis, but often by how individuals and institutions responded to the dominant political interests.

The few expert individuals who stepped outside of this framework by questioning basic assumptions could face professional difficulties. They might be accused of being of questionable political sympathies or lacking sound judgement, and their professional standing in the eyes of many peers and colleagues could also be diminished. Yet examples of ‘expert’ dissent in Australia during the 1950s and 1960s, notably Dr. John Burton’s book *The Alternative* being an obvious exception, are sadly almost non-existent. If individuals upheld, supported or when necessary refrained from any confrontations with dominant attitudes, their reputations were maintained, enhanced or protected without any threat to their professional careers. How individuals expressed their views, the language they used and the questions they asked helped to define not just their outlook, but also the merit of their professional, political and intellectual standing in the eyes of their peers. The few individuals who moved beyond what were considered to be the acceptable professional and political limits of analysis certainly experienced this phenomenon, were effectively made perennial outsiders, or ongoing figures of hearsay.

Ambitious individuals could certainly attain some personal success within the
emerging Australian foreign policy network by a combination of professional longevity, conformity, hard work, ruthlessness or charisma. Many of these individuals enjoyed long careers and exercised strong influence over their areas of expertise for decades. Acceptance into the Australian foreign policy network as a respected and reliable expert in the eyes of men such as Casey or the DEA was often self-evidently contingent on accepting the main political rationales of the period. This was not an equal contest of competing ideas and concepts. To criticise the strident anti-communism of the period in an open and dissenting manner was to exclude oneself from the centre of the Australian foreign policy network.

The political dynamics of the 1950s and 1960s were intensely confrontational and bitter. Climbing to the top of the tree in this environment required certain pragmatism. Such tendencies were perhaps not untypical of many that rose to the top from either side of Australian politics – and of the wider fields of Australian political culture – during the ideologically charged 1950s and 60s. The pragmatic nature of Australian State and Federal politics was only heightened by issues such as communism, and lingering religious sectarianism. Raymond Williams defines pragmaticism as the art of the possible, meaning only shrewd, manipulate calculation ... [the term pragmatic] ... has been useful as a dignified alternative to unprincipled or timeserving, especially in political movements which profess a set of beliefs and which decide, under pressure, to neglect, discard or betray them, but with a show of skill and intelligence. 

Individuals entertaining professional ambitions, or those who wished to maintain their established place within the emerging world of The Canberra Network by the 1960s, were certainly conditioned by first hand knowledge of the prevailing anti-communist political environment. As Beaumont argues, this preference for pragmatic ambition over intellectual integrity is perhaps a dominant part of Australian political culture. But that pragmatism – whatever professional merits it encouraged or institutional gains it achieved – came with significant costs, one being that it effectively insulated itself from challenge. A community of experts, The Canberra Network, sought to understand, explain, and also to justify, official Australian responses to the challenges of the international environment. This response shifted rapidly from that of Chifley to that of Menzies, impacting on relations


with the USA and the UK, the Australian response to global communism, decolonisation in post-war Southeast Asia, Western military strategy and clandestine intelligence. It did so in ways that were nuanced, complex, perhaps in many ways ultimately flawed, but always very calculated.
CHAPTER ONE

Into the Cold War

If the forces of Communism prevail and Vietnam come[s] under the heel of Communist China, Malaya is in danger of being outflanked and it, together with Thailand, Burma and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further Communist activities.


The shift from the Chifley to the Menzies government after the 1949 Federal election is an important transitional moment in Australian social and political history. This chapter sets out the political and international context of the period and its impact on Australian foreign policy thinking. It explores the attitudes prevailing in governmental and official circles during the Chifley era towards the issues associated with the emerging Cold War and the challenge of communism. These attitudes, as reflected in policy priorities, the internal conduct of the Department of External Affairs, the handling of intelligence matters and of major international relationships, were in many respects antithetical to the views held by the Opposition, and Australia's Anglo-American allies. This chapter, therefore, provides the context, and the contrast, for the chapters examining the 1950's and 1960's. Not only was the transition from Chifley to Menzies one of ideology and politics; it was also one that fundamentally influenced the formation of the personal and professional networks prominent in consolidating the post-1949 foreign policy orthodoxy examined by this thesis.

The Chifley Era

The conduct of Australian foreign policy was a major point of contention between the Labor Party and the conservative Liberal-National Coalition well before the 1949 Federal election. Under the influence of Dr H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, and Dr John Burton, Secretary for External Affairs from 1947 until 1950, Labor established a liberal if not idealistic approach to international affairs. This approach emphasised the constructive role of middle powers such as Australia in the search for international stability and peace. This approach advocated that the United Nations (UN),
or at least multi-lateral negotiations, should be the primary mechanism for settling international disputes and maintaining security. In this emphasis, the Labor government set itself considerably apart from the views, and interests, that until then had exercised a powerful influence over Australian policy.

This contrast in views was most marked in Australian responses to Indonesian demands for independence from Dutch colonial rule after 1945. The Australians rejected the use of Dutch military force (and atrocity) to re-establish their colonial rule and came to recognise the legitimacy of Indonesian demands for independence.\(^1\) The Chifley government advocated a negotiated settlement that secured peaceful outcomes, following this approach often independently of the wishes of the British and American governments. When the Dutch launched their military offensive in 1947, the Australians joined the Indian government in defending the Indonesian Republic in the UN and in calling for an immediate ceasefire. The extent of Australia’s alignment to Indonesian nationalists was evident when – following the United States government’s eventual offer of its Good Offices to settle the Indonesian dispute – the Dutch chose to be represented by the Belgians in these negotiations while the Indonesians chose the Australians. From an Australian perspective, this support for Indonesia was more than a stand against the return of colonialism; it reflected the extent to which regional security issues were as important to the Chifley government as the agendas of major powers.

Australia’s support for Indonesia also reflected John Burton’s general view that the emergence of Asian nationalism and anti-colonialism was not a Trojan horse for global communism, but as a legitimate phenomenon, that needed to be accommodated by Australian foreign policy and the international order. Equally, Burton had insisted, in advising Chifley in 1948, that China’s ‘policy and interest in South East Asia’ would ‘not change’ with a communist take-over: whatever government was in power in China, the security of the region would be significantly influenced by the simple fact of

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\(^1\)Adam Hughes Henry, *Independent Nation – The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1946: Australia, the British Empire and the origins of Australian-Indonesian relations*, Charles Darwin University Press: Australia, 2010. This work highlights that early responses to Indonesian nationalism (1945-1946) were strongly concerned about Dutch military violence and sympathetic to Indonesian aspirations for freedom.
China's size and influence. This was not a view shared by the British and Americans, and it marked a fracture between themselves and the Australians, on the specifics of strategic assessment but also on the apparent gesture of Australian independence. Significantly, the Liberal-Country Party Shadow Cabinet, the alternative Australian government, held that communism threatened the South East Asian region, and linked that threat even to the infiltration of certain sections of domestic society. By the late 1940s it was increasingly evident that the views of the Australian non-Labor parties were similar to those held by the Attlee Labour government in the UK, and compatible with the Truman Administration in the US. Again, these similarities were not simply ones of ideology and politics; they influenced the forms in which the networks of foreign policy and even diplomatic professionalism were judged and developed.

The British were irritated by the Australian attitude towards South East Asian nationalism in particular. By 1948, British intelligence assessments about the rapid emergence of Asian nationalism argued that this phenomenon was largely inspired by communist subversion, a view not shared by the Chifley government in Australia. This was not the only ongoing source of friction between Canberra and London. The British also had concerns about Evatt, who they blamed for leaking a confidential document to American journalist Drew Pearson in 1945. Consequently, 'the British government regarded Evatt as a bad security risk'.

Equally, from the American perspective, the Chifley government was proving unpopular by the late 1940s due to its more measured attitude to the emerging Cold War. The British and the Americans were particularly irritated by Australia's willingness to at least engage with the USSR within the UN, particularly over questions over colonial territories. There was also the issue of negative US intelligence assessments about the left leaning nature of the Chifley government.


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Inevitably, such points of friction about foreign policy priorities became closely connected with other issues, such as trust and collaboration, and eventually, found their way into domestic political debate. Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence, profoundly disagreed with aspects of the DEA line under Evatt and Burton, particularly as it affected military planning and collaboration. Unlike Burton, Shedden supported the dire assessments of the British intelligence establishment about the imminent threat of militaristic communism, and of Chinese communism in particular, foreseeing its spread into South East Asia. British intelligence from the late 1940s estimated that the Soviets would develop the capacity to invade Western Europe by 1957. By 1947, Shedden was advising the government to pursue a strong collective security arrangement between the British Commonwealth and the United States, and a closer orientation of Australian military preparedness to areas of most interest to those powers. Therefore, military planning from within the Australian defence establishment was predicated on the possibilities of conflict between the great powers, rather than regional security. The Australian Chiefs of Staff advised that

Australia's most effective contribution ... [in the case of Soviet aggression] might best be made [by supporting the United Kingdom] in [the Middle East].... If, as in the past, a period elapses after the commencement of hostilities, before the United States of America becomes involved, then it might be preferable for Australia's contribution to be made in the Far East, to stabilise the situation until aid is forthcoming from the United States of America.6

The Chifley government, however, sought an approach to defence planning which sought to preserve regional security and through that, a capacity to influence British and American priorities rather than be subsumed within them.7 Still, Shedden advised Chifley in 1949 that Australia military preparations for a major war should be completed by 1956.8 Shedden was also encountering for the first time, a new and more assertive DEA, which was attempting to guide crucial aspects of Australia’s strategic, as well as diplomatic affairs. Burton had gradually centralised the administrative control of

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the DEA over all cable communications related to Australian foreign policy matters, undercutting the independence with which Shedden had previously enjoyed in his contacts with the British and Americans. Burton’s insistence that matters directly related to foreign policy were only to be dealt with by the DEA was resented by Shedden and his department. The rivalry between the DEA and Defence is an example of those groups then vying for influence over Australian foreign policy development in Canberra. In such an environment, issues of style, processes, personality, were being coupled to strategic issues of significant substance, such as military preparedness, regional security, and anti-communism

American and British negativity towards Burton and Evatt deepened when it was revealed that classified intelligence information had found its way to Moscow from Canberra. Based on these revelations, US Naval intelligence believed that communists had infiltrated the DEA and they concluded that the Australian Labor government was a liability. Prominent sections of the US Navy objected to sharing classified information about missile technology with the Australians and later even the British, given concerns about the flows of information between governments. The issue of the leaks did little to quell concerns about Burton or Evatt, who – critics alleged – were not just soft on communism, but were undermining Australia’s vital security interests. The Americans were first alerted to a problem in Australia and elsewhere when a cryptology operation

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9 Interview by Adam Hughes Henry with Dr John Burton, Canberra, 19 February 2009.
10 Despite the severity of the American reaction only two complete classified documents (as far as I am aware) are cited as being leaked in their entirety: ‘Security in the western Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic’, Public Records Office UK, CAB 79/34/8, PHP (45) 6(0), 19 May 1945 See also NAA: A5954/1, Item 848/1 and ‘Security in India and the Indian Ocean’, PRO CAB 79/34/8, PHP (45) 15(0).
11 Sir Frederick Shedden, ‘Reports by the Secretary 1949’, NAA: A5954, 1831/5. Shedden travelled to the US in 1949 to discuss lifting the embargo with the Americans, but he was unsuccessful. He reported that Naval Intelligence and the US State Department cut intelligence because they believed that the ALP had close links with communism.
12 Peter Wright, Spy Catcher - The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, Australia: William Heinemann 1988, p.184. Venona uncovered hidden Soviet espionage in the UK, the US and Australia. Yet much of the Venona information was then incomplete and the identification of Soviet agents was a combination of code breaking, guesswork and suspicion. In Spycatcher Wright estimated at the time of publication that only 1% of the 200,000 intercepts were ever cracked. This process has advanced significantly since 1988. For an examination of Soviet penetration of ASIO in the late 1970s and 1980s See ‘Four Corners Transcript’, Trust and Betrayal, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2004 electronic version available at www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1232663.htm see also Sydney Morning Herald, ‘ASIO mole leaked secrets for 15 years: report’, November 1 2004, electronic version available at www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/11/01/1099262774657.html?from=storylhs
called VENONA began to decipher parts of encrypted KGB cables. It was found that sometime after September 1945, and before the end of 1947, two classified British documents in the possession of the DEA were leaked to Moscow via the Soviet Embassy in Canberra.

The investigation by Brigadier F.O. Chilton, an Australian military intelligence expert, revealed that a large number of people had handled the documents which leaked to Moscow, but two External Affairs officers were quickly suspected as being the likely culprits: Ian Milner and James Frederick Hill. This assessment was based on Milner and Hill’s associations with communism and opportunities for espionage as departmental officers. It is now accepted that some kind of Soviet spy ring was in operation in Australia during this period. Desmond Ball and David Horner estimated in *Cracking the Codes* that at least ten individuals, not all in DEA, were involved in an operation resulting in thousands of cables being sent to Moscow. By the time the allegations came to light, Milner was working for the UN and no longer had access to classified materials from the DEA. Individuals such as Hill, who were still working for the department, were denied access to classified materials and were closely supervised by Burton. Other officers, such as Ric Throssell, were also denied access to classified materials, in Throssell’s case he was scrutinised because of his mother, Katharine Prichard, a well-known author, Stalinist, and a long-time member and advocate for the Communist Party of Australia (CPA).

The VENONA leak prompted – or forced – the Chifley government to establish the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in 1948, to win back American trust and return the Australian, British and American security relationship to something resembling normality. Intelligence – its methods, objectives and performance

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14 An investigation stated that 31 people (including Ian Milner) had handled these documents. See Brigadier F.O. Chilton, Report, 27 February 1948 and 1 March 1948, NAA: A5954/1, Box 848/1. Perhaps likely to have been involved in some way neither Milner, despite his later defection to Prague, or Hill, who resigned from the Department shortly after coming under suspicion, were ever charged with any crime. Propensity (not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) was the cornerstone of ASIO’s attitude toward communist security leaks in the 1950s. Many reputations and careers were needlessly ruined by overzealous ASIO monitoring.
would become increasingly central to the robust politics of anti-communism and the Cold War. There was pressure for a much larger international dialogue between Washington, London and Canberra about the appropriate response to communism, and equally to ensure that all parties to this new anti-communist enterprise were suitably trustworthy. Whatever the reluctance with which the Labor government had entered into this international network of spies, the creation of ASIO involved new Australian interactions with British and American intelligence agencies. The US reaction to VENONA had been to cut off classified intelligence materials from the Chifley government, and, despite its creation of ASIO, negative British and American perceptions about the Chifley government continued. Rebuilding cooperation in ways acceptable to the US and the UK figured significantly in the ideological and policy contrast between the Labor and the Liberal views of foreign policy, and also in the ways in which politicians and officials could be held accountable for their professional actions and assessments.

The issue of VENONA certainly provided opportunities for domestic and international critics of the Chifley government to discuss, or network with each other, about their concerns. Such discussions built contact between individuals, at the highest levels. In 1948, for example, when Menzies was in London at the same time as the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, attended by Chifley, he was provided with classified intelligence assessments about the Soviets and communism in South East Asia. Yet on the surface, Labor's last years in office saw some signs of influencing the wider settings of international policy from within the British Commonwealth. The October 1948 meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, for example, saw agreement on collaborative defence planning for what later became known as ANZAM (the Australia, New Zealand and Malayan area), a concept which the United States later 'recognised' in 1951 for limited naval purposes. As Karl Hack argues, ANZAM offered the UK Chiefs of Staff a means of engaging Canberra in matters directly connected to Australia's own regional strategic priorities, and also furthering their

15 See 'Minutes of Defence Committee Meeting DO (48) 16th Meeting 13 August 1948, Minute 3 Prem 8/1406 Part 1', PRO and Russian Interests, intentions and capabilities, 23 July 1948 J.I.C (48)9(0) as cited by Lowe, Menzies and the Great World Struggle 1948-1954, p.192.
16 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1968, p. 76.
Middle East agenda. Following on from ANZAM, the Australians had committed to help the UK defend the Middle East in the event of a war against the USSR by August 1949. Yet despite Australian support for such UK strategies, the Attlee government remained privately annoyed by Australia’s attitude towards colonial territories. In addition to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, Australian support for United Nations’ trusteeship over colonies remained troublesome. In retrospect, Hack argues that Australia’s perspectives clashed with British interests. As a small nation, the liberal internationalist principles underpinning the United Nations offered Australia more opportunity of influencing foreign affairs than Britain’s balance of power approach ... the Australian Labor Party’s concern to build peace on the basis of the United Nations, and with international justice and the rights of small powers and the colonised, continued to colour Australian policy until 1949.

British dissatisfaction with the lack of direct Australian military participation at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency in 1948 was also shared by Menzies. Whether in the nature of its commitments, in its judgements about Asian nationalism, or the emerging Cold War, the British, like the Americans, found the Chifley government unsuitable. This sense of discontent about the domestic and international policies of the Chifley government was evident in the atmosphere that characterised the non-Labor Federal election campaign of 1949, not least in the calculations of those who hoped they would soon be shaping foreign policy after the election.

The Menzies Vision

As a former Prime Minister of Australia (1939-1941), Menzies was no stranger to the world of international diplomacy, but the speed of political change after World War Two, particularly in South East Asia, was deeply concerning to him. The primacy of Australia’s relationship with the UK, and the certainties of a pre-World War Two global order dominated by the British Empire, were gone. The emergence of anti-colonial movements in Asia, the ascendancy of the US and the growth of Soviet power, only confirming the final demise of the previous global order. The Chifley government’s responses to these issues were often fiercely criticised by Menzies and his party. There was, Menzies would insist, no greater challenge than the threat of communism, and on this issue he and his supporters, just like the British and the Americans, considered the

17 Ibid. The Chifley government did not necessarily agree with British assessments that the US presence in the Asia-Pacific region guaranteed Australian security.
18 Ibid, p.75.
responses of the Chifley government at home and abroad to be inadequate and even irresponsible. Both of those alleged failings – of inadequacy and irresponsibility – provided continued ammunition for the new Liberal-Country Party government, elected in December 1949. The Menzies government quickly adopted policies that re-affirmed Australia’s major alliances, particularly with the United States. The new Australian government was unequivocal in arguing that it stood firm in confronting the ‘moral’ and strategic threat of communism. There would no longer be any doubt about where Australia stood in the great ‘the struggle for the hearts and minds of men’.19 The perceived failings of the Chifley era would be corrected, in part, by building a new type of professionalism into the officials whose role was to shape and implement policy within the Cold War context. From such attitudes a new political environment, sympathetic to the dictates of the Cold War could be encouraged, an environment where individuals such as R.G. Casey came to exemplify the changing networks of domestic foreign policy expertise and practices.

The attitudes of Menzies towards post World War Two international affairs, as noted, were highly compatible with those expressed by the British and Americans. The British and particularly the Americans welcomed the defeat of the Chifley government. Menzies began by offering a much clearer commitment to the British in the Middle East and in Malaya.20 The Americans were particularly enthusiastic about the change of government in Australia. A CIA assessment from 1949 reports that the

US Ambassador Jarman in Canberra reports that the newly elected Liberal-Country government has evoked strong emergency powers to use against the current series of communist led strikes. In Jarman's opinion, this 'bold and vigorous' action indicates the new government's determination to force a showdown with Communist union leaders. The ambassador points out that the action appears to have strong popular support and predicts that the government stands a good chance of victory ... this anti-communist action is an attempt at testing public reaction in preparation to early action by the government to fill its campaign pledge to outlaw the Australian Communist Party.20

Menzies held deep-seated suspicions that the root causes of political unrest and anti-colonial ferment in South East Asia were attributable to subversion directed from

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20 This view was formalised with ANZAM and then the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain) in 1952. The FESR based in Malaya was considered a forward defence bulwark against communism in Southeast Asia.
Moscow, and later, China. This was an attitude shared by the British, and his deep personal hostility to communist influence or subversion was also shared by the Americans. In 1948 – on the same visit during which he was provided UK intelligence assessments about South East Asia – Menzies travelled to Berlin and briefly witnessed East-West tensions caused by the ‘Berlin Blockade’. Menzies’ biographer Allan Martin concludes that these experiences galvanised Menzies into action, and he returned to Australia determined to oppose communism at home and abroad.\(^\text{21}\) One of the consequences of Menzies gaining access to those UK assessments was that he had come to understand the differences between the Attlee government and Chifley government over the causes of political unrest in South East Asia, and he also came to appreciate the hostility of the Americans towards Evatt and Burton. The Liberal-Country party opposition had used rumours about the American intelligence embargo, brought about as a consequence of the secretive VENONA operation, to embarrass Chifley in the House of Representatives under parliamentary privilege.\(^\text{22}\)

After their election victory, Menzies and Percy Spender, Minister for External Affairs, expressed their new anti-communist attitude towards international affairs. By 1950, Menzies was already arguing that Australian military participation in a Third World War was almost a certainty.\(^\text{23}\) Spender was an early adherent to what has become known as the Domino Theory. This concept argued that communism in South East Asia would topple various non-communist Asian nations unless checked. The change of government also heralded ideological changes for the DEA. ‘In the 1940s’, as Christopher Waters observes, ‘the events in Malaya and Indochina were labelled revolutionary disorders, [by External Affairs] but by the 1950s they were called communist insurgencies’.\(^\text{24}\) Such changes in the language of policy were reflective of the attitudes that would now drive foreign policy formulation. The rise of Menzies,


\(^{22}\) There is certainly circumstantial evidence that news about the intelligence embargo could have been passed to Menzies or the non-Labor opposition by American, or most likely British sources. For one, the British had already supplied classified information personally to Menzies. In any fair assessment, the leaking of information to the press suggesting that the Americans were refusing to share Atomic secrets with Australia, (see the *Sydney Morning Herald* in July 1948), and subsequent questions raised in parliament (for example Arthur Fadden in September 1948), were deeply embarrassing to Chifley.


Spender and later Casey, also corresponded with the ascendency of new bureaucratic elites in tune with the changed political environment.

The first Secretary of the Department after the departure of Burton was Alan Watt. While Burton had worked well with Spender, it was becoming obvious to Burton (and perhaps others in the Menzies government) that he was increasingly at odds with the new direction of Australian foreign policy under Menzies. For example, it is difficult to imagine that Burton could have worked well with Casey, who succeeded Spender in 1951. Burton also was tired and increasingly jaded with the pressures from many often frantic years of bureaucratic service. Watt was a senior and well-established diplomat, conservative, strongly anti-communist and hostile towards Burton’s approach to foreign affairs, if not personally to Burton. Watt’s ascendancy would also herald a growing role for individuals such as Arthur Tange and James Plimsoll. Tange was a talented and highly efficient young administrator, while Plimsoll was a respected young diplomat with, what former DEA diplomat Gregory Clark called, an obvious anti-communist streak developed as a young man during his diplomatic work for the UN during the Korean War. The establishment of a new leadership group within the DEA would bring fundamental changes to the operations of Australian diplomacy and proved central in the development of often subtle linkages between itself, academia and even the media. Yet the first indications of how the Watt ascendancy would change the foreign policy culture within the Department were soon demonstrated in more overt ways.

The Pacific Division of the Department had continued to advocate the benefits of supporting the emerging nationalist movements of Asia, even after the departure of Evatt as Minister and Burton as Secretary. This type of liberal internationalist advocacy ended when Watt sent two of the division’s most prominent diplomats to overseas postings. He sent Patrick Shaw to Geneva, and Tom Critchley to South Korea.

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25 Interview by Adam Hughes Henry with Dr John Burton, Canberra, 19 February 2009.
According to David Lowe, this move effectively demoted Critchley from a more prominent posting in Singapore.\(^28\) And it sent a warning. These postings, and the increasingly bitter domestic debate about communism, signalled to Australian diplomats (and new recruits) that they should be increasingly aware of the professional risks involved in continuing to support the ideals of the Evatt-Burton era, or openly questioning the merits of the new Cold War culture of anti-communism.

In addition to these shifts in the culture of the department, there were also new strategic priorities its diplomatic work. It was constantly argued by Menzies, Spender and Casey that due to the threat of communism, it was a necessity that Australia formalise a closer military and intelligence relationship with the British and particularly the Americans. Spender was particularly enthusiastic about closer military and security ties. His priorities would effectively reconstruct something of the previous pre-World War Two British Empire model, where Australian diplomacy worked in tandem with the maintenance of a military relationship with Britain – but also laying the groundwork to shift Australian strategic priorities to the United States – in order to secure its regional security. Perhaps the most significant strategic ambition of the early Menzies era was for a Cold War alliance between Australia and the United States. This partnership was thought to be the key to guaranteeing Australia’s regional security from, rather than in, South East Asia. Spender argued that in the era of Asian decolonisation, nationalism and communism, the UN could not guarantee the ‘maintenance of our security and our [Australian] way of life’.\(^29\) Only closer military cooperation with Washington was thought to achieve the desired level of Australian regional security into the 1950s.

The first major international opportunity for the Menzies government to explore this direction in its foreign policy came with the Korean War. Relations between the regimes in the north and south of Korea had been on the verge of open conflict since the end of World War Two, when Russian and American occupation of the north and south

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\(^28\) David Lowe, ‘Percy Spender, Minister and Ambassador’ in *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats*, p.74.
\(^29\) Percy Spencer, ‘Minister for External Affairs Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates’ in *House of Representatives Vol.206*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 1950, p.635-636. This was to be achieved through the closer relations with the British Commonwealth, Great Britain and most importantly the USA.
respectively had each created client states. With US backing, a conservative southern regime had all but been engaged in an undeclared counter insurgency campaign against communists, nationalists, peasants and other opponents of its authority. Full-scale war eventually erupted in 1950 when large numbers of Northern troops crossed the artificial dividing line known as the 38th parallel. Despite the public rhetoric expressed at the time by the Menzies government, the Australian troop commitment to the Korean War in 1950 was largely designed to support its own interests by impressing the Americans. The Korean War was publicly justified in Australia on the basis that the 'peace of the world is threatened [by communist aggression and as a]...subscriber to the letter and spirit of the UN Charter, [Australia] had to respond to the UN call.' This was not the manner in which Menzies spoke to Cabinet about Australian participation in Korea where he emphasised the strategic genius of Stalin and the need to support the United States.

[Stalin] has therefore promoted Korea so that he can attract democratic forces there - the more the better because he is not using his own forces ...If Australia is committed in the Far East then it is hard to swing public opinion to the Middle East. The same is true of USA and Stalin is

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30 The period of the US military occupation of the South (1945-1948), and the brutal counter insurgency war it effectively sponsored, is forgotten in most discussions about the Korean War. During this period, the US restored the traditional Korean ruling elite, in other words traditional conservative elements that had held power under Japanese colonial rule, back to positions of power. This came at the expense of the aspirations of peasant nationalists and leftists, in other words, the majority of ordinary politically conscious Koreans who had actively fought Japanese colonial rule. A 'People's Korean Republic' had been formed 6 September 1945, and had widespread support in the countryside. This regime was undermined by the Americans in favour of the Korean Democratic Party, a group of highly anti-communist conservative politicians, formed in September 1945. From 1948, and after tens of thousands of deaths (perhaps even 100,000 according to former US diplomat Gregory Henderson), the US backed regime provoked wide scale rebellion throughout the South. Although Rhee accused the North of being responsible for the rebellion, according to Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, New York: Viking, 1988, pp.10-48. 'The cause of the uprising was refusal, on 19 October 1948, of elements of the 14th and 6th Regiments of the republic's Army to embark for a mission against the [nationalist] Cheju guerillas...' See also Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: Norton, 1997, pp.185-224. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. I ("Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947"), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. See Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p.167. See also Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, New York: Pantheon, 1968 (updated edition 1990), Chapters 21 and 24.

31 According to Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. I ("Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947"), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. xxi, xxiv that three months after liberation from Japan in 1945 fighting in the South had begun, it eventually claimed more than 'one hundred thousand lives in peasant rebellion, labor strife, guerrilla warfare, and open fighting along the thirty-eighth parallel'. Therefore, according to Cumings, the 'opening of conventional battles in June 1950 only continued this war by other means...'

32 Sir Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt, p. 174. Watt writes that it was Spender and not Menzies, who first committed Australian troops to the Korean War.

counting on this. This doesn't mean that Korea can be ignored. Korea must be won but we must decide the extent of our co-operation having in mind the overall strategic considerations ... we are pretending that Korea is a United Nations operation. But we would not be in it unless the US was in, and we are in it because they are in it.\textsuperscript{34}

The sheer expediency of the Australian troop commitment to Korea was combined with something of a greater degree of strategic caution in its own region. For example, due to a fear that the Korean situation would encourage communists elsewhere, particularly in South East Asia, the Menzies government announced at this time that Australian heavy bombers would be sent to Malaya.\textsuperscript{35} Such unswerving military and diplomatic support for the US and the UK over Korea and Malaya certainly paid early diplomatic dividends from an Australian perspective. Australian participation in the Korean War, and American fears about the future security of Japan, effectively helped to secure the Australia, New Zealand, United States treaty (ANZUS) with Washington in 1951.\textsuperscript{36} From the Australian perspective, the ANZUS treaty was perceived, or at least publicly discussed, as being in all but explicit wording, a potential American guarantee of future military protection. Yet the vague nature of the document's detail was designed by the Americans in order to provide no such guarantee. The ANZUS treaty is thus a major example of the Menzies government wanting to incorporate Australia into new international diplomatic and military dialogues. Menzies interest in building diplomatic, military and intelligence dialogues

\textsuperscript{34} Robert Menzies, \textit{Notes on Cabinet Meeting Canberra}, 25 August 1950, NAA: A11099 1/1.
\textsuperscript{35} Robert Menzies in \textit{Current Notes on International Affairs} vol.21 no.6, p.421.
This supported the intelligence estimates of the British and the Department of Defence. Menzies also concurred with British intelligence that the anti-colonial unrest in South East Asia was largely communist inspired. Therefore, it was feared that the war in Korea might inspire communist insurgencies in Malaya.
\textsuperscript{36} R.N. Rosecrance, \textit{Australian Diplomacy and Japan 1945-1951}, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1962, p.183. The war in Korea caused Washington to believe that Japan was vulnerable to possible communist aggression. As Rosecrance points out, this fact made the Americans more amenable to a Pacific security pact such as ANZUS. While the Korea policy of the Menzies government achieved a diplomatic outcome with the Americans, there is an aspect often ignored by Australian diplomatic and military histories. First, is it truly acceptable for Australian politicians to utilise the national military as a near mercenary force in pursuit of uncertain diplomatic dividends? Second, the human cost is always secondary to the pursuit of political dividends. Australian military involvement in Korea (27 June 1950 – 27 July 1953) cost 340 lives (including one POW), 1,216 wounded and 29 POWs. See \textit{Information sheets - Australians at war: casualties as a result of service with Australian units/Deaths as a result of service with Australian units}, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, electronic version available from www.awm.gov.au/research/infosheets/war_casualties.asp.

The Menzies government also seemingly benefited economically from its closer diplomatic and military relationship with Washington. It received a massive 250 million dollar loan from The World Bank, an organisation dominated by US administrative and economic oversight. From the early 1950s such seemingly positive outcomes could be used to justify the wisdom of anti-communist policies under Menzies.
between Australia and its ‘friends’ is therefore an important aspect in the construction of networks built from emerging areas of foreign policy expertise. This is crucial in understanding not only the origins and nature of ‘the Canberra Network’ of policy analysts and commentators which figures centrally in this thesis, but also the influences that helped to shape its development. Central to drawing this process together are Australian, British and American reactions to questions of promoting anti-communism at home and abroad.

**Information Warfare**

Turning now to those British and American reactions, from the late 1940s, there was a conscious effort in both powers to manufacture responses to communism utilising information management methods, or information warfare. ‘Information warfare’ reflected an attitude where the priority of anti-communist strategic actions was married to the manufacture of a domestic audience supportive of these policies. Many of the methods and practices of ‘information warfare’ eventually permeated throughout the Anglo-American foreign policy establishment. These efforts would also become something of a blueprint for the Australians as the 1950s progressed, and they would not only impact on the operations of the DEA, but on the relationship between Ministers, the DEA, academia, the media, and later even the general public. The integration of Anglo-American propaganda methods into Australian policy formation consolidated existing domestic anti-communist attitudes, and contributed significantly to a diplomatic professionalization where international priorities were now also increasingly connected with domestic political debates. Through the use of well-crafted information materials, and propaganda, as a core component of official information policies, new dialogues were now being forged into new networks of foreign policy expertise at home and abroad.

The adoption of these methods helped to plug the Australians into a global network of experts, counter intelligence agencies, academics, journalists, politicians, diplomats and of course propaganda techniques. In essence, the formation of a new Australian policy network through the 1950s and into the 1960s, largely located in Canberra, replicated many core components of the Anglo-American global network on a domestic scale. For example, this process led to contact between the Information
Research Department (IRD) of the British Foreign Office (FO), the Australian Prime Minister, the Minister for External Affairs, the Director General of ASIO - Charles Spry - and would inspire Australian efforts to cultivate similar networks with local political leaders, trade unionists, academics and journalists. To demonstrate the origins of this local foreign policy network, the early relationship between the Australians and the Information Research Department (IRD) can be examined. It is important to first briefly outline British and American developments, such as the IRD and Voice of America.

From the time of WW1, when the UK Ministry of Information was established, the British intelligence and diplomatic services were recognised for their pioneering skills with information warfare. Therefore, it is not surprising that that the first Western government to see a need for a systematic approach to post-WW2 anti-communist information warfare was the Attlee Labour government in the UK. Their initiative reflected perspectives of the Cold War, particularly in regard to its relationship with the US, their ongoing commercial relationship with South East Asia and the Middle East, and the need to manufacture domestic and international consensus around these interests. The decision in 1948 to provide Menzies with sensitive British intelligence assessments about communism in South East Asia is closely connected to such concerns. To reflect on this, it is important to briefly outline British post-war attitudes to the Soviet Union, anti-colonialism in South East Asia and British understanding of what constituted UK national interests in its relationship with Australia.

The decline of the European empires and rise of anti-colonial nationalism in South East Asia (and elsewhere) deeply concerned post-war British planners. Long standing Imperial arrangements that had guaranteed an endless supply of cheap raw materials for Britain were coming under threat. The value of cheap raw materials was recognised during World War Two when the exploitation of resources from Africa, India and other parts of the British Empire provided a financial lifeline for the British

36 See Phillip Deery, 'Covert Propaganda and the Cold War Britain and Australia 1948-1955' in Round Table, (2001), 361, pp.607-621. One of the very few examples of Australian scholarship dealing with this important issue is seen in the work of Phillip Deery. I am indebted to his detailed archival work, which provides insights into the earliest attitudes of the British and Australians towards information management and the IRD.
war effort. An example of this can be seen in the exploitation of cash export crops in Africa during World War Two. Access to raw materials, and manpower from all over the Empire made vital contributions to the economic and military survival of Britain during the war. This was not forgotten by Whitehall in the post-war period.

In Autumn 1947, Christopher Mayhew, Parliamentary under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, approached Secretary of State Ernest Bevin about the development of a British anti-communist propaganda operation. Mayhew’s vision was that British propaganda would not only attack communism, but also unrestrained capitalism. The initial approach towards its propaganda goals was reflective of the ‘Third Force’ strategy, a short-lived post-war concept that hoped to position the British between the USSR and US. Mayhew also approached Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, convincing him that an ‘aggressive, organized response to the flood of communist propaganda’ was required, both domestically and in the wider reach of British interests. The IRD was subsequently established as a highly secretive operation within the British Foreign Office (FO). Its establishment heralded a new era of professionalised information warfare that was specifically anti-communist in its objectives. The main elements of the IRD approach were

- Usage of Black and Grey propaganda techniques
- Production of briefing digests and major papers about communism;
- Disseminating information to selected governments and individuals;
- Disseminating information to radio, film, newspapers, magazines and later television;
- Safeguarding the anonymity of IRD materials and propaganda methods.

The British hoped that IRD materials could be widely distributed and utilised at home and abroad. The genius of its grey and black information propaganda was that they carried no identifying information regarding its origins and that it was designed for unattributed usage. Only the selected few within the political and diplomatic inner sanctum would be aware that this material was designed as specialised propaganda. These materials would be distributed via the FO and other trusted government sources to important individuals and organisations in the hope that they would use the information, and then circulate this information through their own networks. As this

process moved further and further away from the original point of dissemination, recipients would be in ignorance of the origin and true purpose of the documents in their possession. This process was designed to create the false impression of similar conclusions being reached independently in various parts of the UK and eventually, the world.

Based on his early discussions, Mayhew issued instructions to begin the process of setting up the IRD. A small team would be tasked with collecting and preparing propaganda ‘material under the direction of a specialist in ideological warfare’; the work needed to be overseen and supervised by a group ‘such as the Russia Committee – and also by one of the Ministers. It was also hoped that Heads of British overseas Missions ‘should be responsible for directing our propaganda’ and in Britain itself, IRD material should be provided ‘informally to the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). It was also hoped that the IRD could prepare briefs for Ministers’ speeches’; and develop an ongoing propaganda periodical for ‘the use of foreign journalists, politicians, trade unionists, who were up against Communist opposition’.

The methods of the IRD were ingeniously simple, yet deceptively clever. It also advanced pragmatic notions of national self-interest through networks largely acquiring their professional authority through mutually reinforcing bargains of privileged knowledge, trust and authority. This model would influence a good deal of Australian foreign policy information related practices well into the 1960s. All IRD materials were distributed on Ministerial instruction for non-attributable use only. According to the historians of the FO this was designed to protect the existence of an officially inspired anti-communist propaganda campaign and ensure it did not become known to the public. It was also believed that the information would

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39 Mayhew’s original intention of fighting what he called ‘Communist Imperialism’ appears quite different from what the IRD eventually became by the 1960s. In the UK, the IRD continued to be shrouded in official secrecy from its beginnings and into the 1970s, yet the secrecy of its domestic activities appears problematic. The Soviets must have been aware of the existence of the IRD from its very beginning as Guy Burgess (Soviet Spy) had worked for the IRD as a young UK diplomat. According to his obituary, Mayhew had caught Burgess ‘red handed going through his desk, [and] Mayhew sacked him; but it was only many years later that the scale of his treachery came to light’. See Michael Adams, 9 January 1997, ‘Obituary Lord Mayhew’, The Independent, electronic copy available from www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-lord-mayhew-1282313.html.

40 ‘Record of Meeting held on the 18th November 1947 to discuss a possible propaganda counter-offensive against Communism on the lines set forth in Mr. Mayhew’s paper of the 17th October 1947’ in Sir Christopher Mayhew Papers 4/1/1, London: Liddell Hart Military Archives, Kings College.
have a greater impact if it were not seen to emanate from official sources. This arrangement, under which those who received IRD materials were aware of its origin but were expected not to divulge its source, generated some confusion in the uninitiated but was understood and respected by recipients. Remarkably, a minimal number of breaches of trust occurred during IRD’s lifetime.\(^{41}\)

Once suitable journalists, academics, politicians or trade unionists were identified as willing recipients of their information, each would be sent IRD materials for personal use. These ‘first recipients’ were clearly instructed on the rules, the IRD and the origins and purpose of the papers. Yet, the IRD hoped that these ‘first recipients’ would distribute their materials on the basis of their own authority (or status) to others. ‘Second’ and subsequent recipients would not be aware of the origins of the paper, or even the existence of the IRD. They would receive instructions from the ‘first recipient’ on the need for non-attribution of the information. Therefore, if IRD material was used in a speech, article or scholarly publication, no source would be cited.

This practice offered the possibility for the IRD to establish connections with a range of individuals and institutions. For example, the International Department of the British Labour Party was identified early on as a first recipient of IRD materials. The Secretary, Dennis Healey, from its right wing faction was ardently in favour of close Cold War liaison with the US and later an admirer of the Cold War strategic thinking of the Americans, particularly of organisations such as the RAND Corporation. Later as Secretary for Defence under the Wilson government, Healey injected some of the technocratic thinking of men such as Robert McNamara into British defence planning and budgets. Healey was also an active supporter of information warfare, with personal links with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a CIA funded front for anti-communist intellectuals,\(^*\) and became a key figure in the establishment of the highly influential

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\(^{41}\) Ibid. It must be noted that this assessment of the IRD distribution method by the FO historians fails to mention other reasons that so few breaches of trust occurred. For example, cooperation from the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) began almost from the very beginning of the IRD’s existence. Sir Ian Jacob (then Chairman of the BBC) sat on the ‘Russia Committee’. This was one of the groups involved in various discussions and arrangements for constructing the IRD in the first place.

\(^*\) It might be argued that with many members of the CCF unaware of connections with the CIA, that many would have strongly rejected this association if they had known, therefore the CCF was not a CIA ‘front’, yet this is problematic assessment. At least some of these ignorant CCF members are just as likely to have accepted the association if they were cautiously taken into a relationship of privileged trust. As the work of Francis Stoner Saunders has demonstrated, knowledge of the connection was intimately understood and cultivated by the key players from the CIA and CCF, and trusted circles beyond this clique were not ignorant, or without some suspicions. The CCF organisation was specially designed to manufacture pro-
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The historians of the FO write that it was Healey who personally arranged for a 'very limited circulation' of IRD materials within the British Labour Party.42 In Australia, Casey, as Minister for External Affairs, was also a 'first recipient' and distributed IRD materials to others on his own authority with personal assurances of factual reliability. The ability of the Australians (particularly within the DEA organisation itself), to later reproduce this style of information management played its part in liaison with journalists and academics, and helped to link together a network of expertise closely connected to foreign policy analysis, but eventually in actively seeking to manufacture particular perceptions.

The American Connection

By the late 1940s, US intelligence had recognised the value of coordinating with British information campaigns against communism not only in Europe, but also throughout the world. While the IRD had commenced operations hoping to mark differences between British and American interests, and so uphold the authority of a separate British perspective, the ultimate anti-communist objectives of such practices were shared with the Americans. Not only were the methods being used by the British and Americans similar in style and method; they each shared the strategic desire to counter the negative image of them perpetuated by Soviet propaganda.43 The US fully appreciated the use of information techniques to manipulate expert opinion, and of the related need to create and maintain networks extending beyond official circles. The scale of American information warfare programs is demonstrated by such large-scale efforts as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.44 The American 'Campaign of Truth' was designed not just counter Soviet propaganda, but to specifically promote the political and cultural values of the US in Europe, South America and Asia. Two very basic strategic considerations guided US propaganda

American and anti-communist propaganda amongst intellectuals, and cultural organisations, and was funded by the CIA for this specific purpose. Ignorance of the CIA connection does not excuse the CCF from 'front' status, if anything; the deceptions associated with this ignorance, it only strengthens the merits of the description.

44 All of these specialised information warfare programs began after the establishment of the IRD.
efforts: both the need to condemn communism, and to promote American values. Equally, US propaganda efforts actively sought to undermine Cold War ‘neutralism’ – the danger of non-alignment; the erosion of legitimacy through doubt, scepticism or criticism. The US fear of the extent of neutralism among the intelligentsia of Europe, particularly in France, was one of the main CIA motivations behind funding the Congress for Cultural Freedom. These information programs were offshoots of the strategic review of US national security objectives in 1949-50, which implemented George Kennan’s policy of communist containment.45

American financial wealth enabled the ‘Campaign of Truth’ to expand into almost every area of intellectual and cultural endeavour in the Western world, drawing on strategies and tactics that had been first pioneered by the British.46 But the private and philanthropic resources of the US added a distinctive dimension to these activities. The Ford Foundation, for example, made substantial donations to the Congress for Cultural Freedom.47 The Cold War environment thus helped to construct new interactions between US government, media, academia and various foreign policy issues, and through these networks organisations such as the Ford Foundation became in themselves part of a new US foreign policy network. These interconnections, and interdependencies, would prove highly significant in later Australian interactions with the US, and – in turn – with organisations such as the Ford.

From 1950, the Anglo-American propaganda machine oversaw a massive operation designed not just to attack communism, but for the deliberate manipulation of information. The major focus of this operation was post-war Western Europe, yet the target could be flexible, and ultimately any location deemed to be threatened by left-wing or anti-Western tendencies was targeted. Cooperation between the British and the US diplomatic and intelligence services occurred regularly in Western Europe, occasionally in South America, but often in other locations such as the Middle East and

47 Ibid.
South East Asia. Although British and American information sources were highly valued by dissidents behind the Iron Curtain, notably the role of ‘Radio Free Europe’ during the anti-Soviet Hungarian uprising of 1956, many more non-European locations were considered key operational targets not for ‘truth’, but misinformation and regime change. For example, Anglo-American propaganda operations in Malaya, Indonesia, Indo-China, in South America and to a lesser extent in the Middle East, were not just sources of anti-communist ‘information’ but actively fomented political dissent. The British and Americans had worked together to instigate a coup in Iran during 1953, while the US oversaw a similar operation in Guatemala during 1954. William Blum argues that the key to the downfall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh was not communism, but the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) owned by the British. In Guatemala, the democratically elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown during 1954. Arbenz initiated economic reforms and expropriated vast tracts of land challenging entrenched US commercial interests. The United Fruit Company (UFC) owned almost half of all the land in Guatemala (including its only harbour). The UFC demanded almost $16 million US dollars in compensation; however, the Arbenz government offered the equivalent of UFC’s own tax valuation of its Guatemalan assets ($525,000 US dollars). A ruthless propaganda campaign against Arbenz was adopted and he was expertly portrayed as a communist, while Guatemala was itself under attack by Soviet subversion. The anti-Arbenz media campaign in the US, conducted through the news media, operated with the expert assistance of Edward Bernays. The impressions created by such measures were critical to the success of the

49 William Blum, ‘Iran 1953 Making it safe for the King of Kings’ in Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War Two, London: Zed Books, 2004, pp.64-72. According to Blum, John Foster Dulles was intimately involved in the organisation of the 1953 coup. Although Mossadegh was a nationalist, he was largely committed to parliamentary government. It was the desire to secure Iranian economic independence that had created the pretext for Anglo-American intervention. British and American efforts to undermine and then overthrow Mossadegh were expertly portrayed by propaganda as saving Iran from communism.
* Edward Bernays was pioneering figure in American media manipulation (or Public Relations consultancy), on behalf of the US government and American tobacco companies. See Edward Bernays, Propaganda, New York: Horace Liveright, 1928. Bernays (a trained psychologist and nephew of Sigmund Freud), was instrumental in the information campaign that gathered public support for America joining WWI on the side of the British.
operation, as it appears that the Soviet Union had no diplomatic contacts with Guatemala at all. John Foster Dulles and his brother Alan Dulles were connected to the UFC, and intimately involved in planning and execution of the June 1954 coup. In Iran and Guatemala, Anglo-American information warfare had successfully portrayed reforming nationalist governments (and anti-colonial movements in the case of Malaya and Kenya) as communist stooges. Furthermore, such operations were replicated again in the years that followed. The language that correctly condemned Soviet tyranny in Eastern Europe could now be applied (almost without qualification) against targets in South America and South East Asia (particularly Indo-China and Indonesia). While the recipients of Anglo-American propaganda materials were simply asked to accept the authenticity and accuracy of these documents, to make use of the information, and not to break the secrecy of the arrangement. The strength of this model for information management is that all recipients could continue to believe that they had always chosen their own anti-communist conclusions free from coercive influences.

The purpose of outlining this brief history of Anglo-American propaganda is that the integration of these practices in Australia, was not merely associated with the transition from Chifley to Menzies, or the abandonment of liberal internationalism, but strongly connected to the development of new foreign policy expertise, often highly sympathetic to the dictates of the Cold War.

Australia and the IRD
When the Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians were informed about the IRD and its secretive purpose in November 1948, the British held high hopes for their cooperation. Yet the Chifley government, already unpopular with London due to its policies towards South East Asia and communism, chose not to distribute IRD materials in the manner that was hoped. Deery highlights that in December 1948, the IRD were unsure about whether they should even approach Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, about the availability of their information materials. The British were also

51 Evatt was viewed with negativity in the UK. This was certainly exacerbated by his relaxed attitude toward information security, his advocacy of UN Trusteeship over colonial territories, his nationalistic independence of thought, his intelligence and brash personality. It is highly likely that Evatt would have viewed the IRD critically. In March 1949, the British were still reluctant to approach Evatt. A fear that Evatt would not cooperate with British propaganda efforts might explain subsequent British actions.
disappointed in Chifley as Prime Minister, who personally received IRD materials but did not disseminate them to others. From its inception, the IRD had been particularly interested in working directly with the Australians, but their efforts to engage the Australian Labor government were marked by frustration. After the election of the Menzies government in December 1949, however, the prospects for cooperation improved markedly.

From 1950, the British had begun making a concerted effort to build contact with the Menzies government and the Australian security services. For example, in July 1950 the UK High Commission had already discussed with the Australian government the possibility of it using IRD material.\(^{52}\) This appears to be the natural extension of the British view that believed there were mutual advantages for the Australians to be working closely with the British in South East Asia.\(^{53}\) From 1950, various IRD papers were routinely circulated from the UK High Commission in Canberra to selected individuals such as Spry at ASIO. By August 1950, Spry was commenting favourably to others about the usefulness of IRD materials.\(^{54}\) It also appears that these early connections between the Australians and the IRD had made favourable impressions. For example, on 28 May 1952 Menzies called a top-secret meeting between several high-ranking officials from the Prime Minister’s Department, ASIO, Defence, External Affairs, Labour and National Service. This meeting was convened to discuss anti-communist propaganda, the World Peace Movement and the information methods of the IRD.\(^{55}\) By 1954, Casey met Richard Peck, Head of the IRD since 1951, at a party held at

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54 ‘Charles Spry (Director General of ASIO) Memo to Allen Brown (Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department)’ 18 August 1950, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4892 as cited by Deery, ‘Covert Propaganda and the Cold War Britain and Australia 1948-1955’. According to Deery, IRD materials also reached the first Director General of ASIO (Justice GS Reed) and were apparently considered useful background information for ASIO.
the London flat of Colin Moodie, a senior Australian diplomat. At this party the potential usefulness of distributing IRD materials to ‘appropriate quarters’ was discussed. Casey would later receive and personally distribute the anonymous and unmarked IRD materials through his extensive personal as well as professional network, often with a hand written cover note assuring their legitimacy.

The use made of IRD materials may have differed between senior figures in the Menzies government. For example, Phillip Deery argues that while Menzies personally accepted IRD materials, unlike Casey, he did not subsequently accept a role as a conduit for the distribution of IRD briefing papers. In one superficial sense, Menzies’ own personal response to the IRD appears similar to Chifley’s, yet some important distinctions can be made. Given the connections between Casey, Spry and US/UK intelligence, Menzies had no need to personally distribute any IRD materials. Therefore, in full knowledge of the purpose of the IRD, Menzies did nothing to impede their use by others, particularly Casey. For his part, Casey’s impeccable personal connections with the inner sanctum of Anglo-American politics and intelligence – to be discussed further in Chapter Two - had influenced the appointment of Spry to ASIO, another regular recipient of IRD materials, and would go on to establish ASIS on the MI6/CIA blueprint under Alfred Deakin Brookes - a close Casey associate. To provide a succinct overview of the early connections between the IRD and the Australians, as outlined, the following table is provided.

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57 ‘Colin Moodie to Richard Casey 5 January 1955’, NAA: A1838/2, 563/1/4 Part 1 as cited by Deery, ‘Covert Propaganda and the Cold War Britain and Australia 1948-1955’. As well as being a senior diplomat, Moodie had previously worked in Australian Intelligence. Given Casey’s intimate connections with the British establishment it would be astonishing that he was unaware of the existence of the IRD, or had not seen or even used IRD materials, before meeting Peck at Moodie’s flat.
60 For an example of Casey’s personal distribution of IRD materials, see ‘Casey to Wentworth’, 12 August 1958. A1838/2, 563/1/4 Pt 1. Casey also distributed materials to ASIS and Radio Australia (Australian Broadcasting Commission).
Table 1. IRD, External Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Individuals</th>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Distribution/Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK/USA Intelligence and Signals Agreement (US, UK, Australia &amp; Canada 1948)</td>
<td>Intelligence estimates &amp; strategic analysis.</td>
<td>Analysis of open intelligence (communist military &amp; political developments. Communist in developing world.</td>
<td>In return for electronic and radio interceptions from Commonwealth facilities on Australian soil, information via CIA, MI5, and MI6 available to high ranking Australians.</td>
<td>To PM&amp;C from British High Commissioner via British Foreign Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIO (for Charles Spry)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Casey (Minister for External Affairs)</td>
<td>From 1954 personally requests various IRD materials.</td>
<td>Anti-communism (various themes).</td>
<td>Casey distributes IRD materials to various colleagues. See Casey to Wentworth, 12 August 1958. NAA A1838/2, 563/1/4 Pt 1, correspondence.</td>
<td>From Casey via IRD Casey distributes materials to associates (political and bureaucratic) and Radio Australia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from Phillip Deery, 'Covert Propaganda and the Cold War Britain and Australia 1948-1955' in Round Table, (2001), 361, pp.607-621.

**Conclusion**

The transition from Chifley to Menzies in 1949 was not merely a political transition, but an ideological one, and – perhaps more fundamentally – also one which ushered in new networks of developing and legitimising policy within the Cold War context.

Information warfare, and particularly the connections developed between Australia and the IRD and, later, with the activities of US equivalents, played a vital role in consolidating the processes of foreign policy manufacture associated with the change of government in Australia in 1949. The expansion of counterintelligence operations by ASIO, (often under some kind of direct mentorship from MI5) was one element of this process, as were leadership changes to the administrative culture of the DEA.

Underpinning both was the possibility of new dialogues between Australia, the British and the Americans. This contributed to the restoration of relations between Australian and US intelligence agencies in the 1950s, a relationship that had stalled over VENONA in the late 1940s. These exchanges contributed significantly to the
development of new types of foreign policy expertise connected to intelligence operations, Cold War strategy, and specialised anti-communist information warfare. The British, Americans, and then the Australians, found through the Cold War a shared dialogue that helped justify the merits of their often distinct foreign policy attitudes and strategic assumptions. They confronted their doubts about international affairs (and attacked their political enemies at home and abroad), by harnessing the power of information, and by doing so developed the framework of new anti-communist foreign policy expertise.

Such factors, along with Australia’s new military relationship with the Americans forged from the Korean War, effectively eradicated the foreign policy attitudes and liberal internationalist ideals of the Chifley era within only a short period of time. Therefore, the transition to the anti-communist Menzies government from 1949 was well in step with Anglo-American thinking, but also reflected the extent to which the Menzies government quickly recognised the usefulness of Anglo-American propaganda methods, particularly with regard to strategic assessments about Australia and South East Asia. In the early 1950s, Australian intelligence and foreign policy administrative capacity were still relatively embryonic and these interactions provided a vital blueprint for their growth. The new Cold War anti-communism of the Menzies government, and information methods that were soon being established, did not merely help to describe Australia’s foreign policy rationales, but provided frameworks for the DEA to later start actively guiding (and attempting to influence) favourable domestic coverage of Australian foreign policy, to help establish the new anti-communist orthodoxy of the 1950s, and forge connections between themselves and non-official sources. This can be seen through the establishment later in the 1950s of the DEA’s Information Bureau (IB), the establishment of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) with its close links with the British and Americans, and later the activities of Departmental Public Information Officer (PIO) in the 1960s. Furthermore, throughout the 1950s, the DEA battled relentlessly to use Radio Australia to promote official policies, and through the dissemination of briefing papers, establish connections between themselves, the media, and certain key academics, many of which would become prominent members of the Canberra Network by the early 1960s.
CHAPTER TWO
Richard Casey: Australian Foreign Minister
1951-1960

... the whole of this business of anti-subversive work is almost a virgin field — other, of course, than counter-propaganda on the Radio and otherwise. It has fascinating possibilities for the exercise of imagination. ...
Richard Casey, Memo, 'Casey to Tange, 10 January 1955', DEA file 98/6, NAA: A4311, Canberra: National Archives of Australia.

The previous chapter outlined the profound transition in Australian foreign policy thinking from the Chifley to Menzies governments, and those influences that would prove crucial in this process. This was strongly connected not just to domestic political concerns and debates, but to international collaboration in the development of new expertise and methodologies in managing the public understanding, and seeking popular acceptance, of Cold War policies. Many, if not all, of the elements of what I have termed a Canberra Network, were directly, or indirectly, influenced and inspired by this phenomenon. A crucial conduit in promoting the adoption and promotion of many of these ideas was Richard Casey as Minister of External Affairs from 1951 to 1960. Casey’s stamp was evident across the department’s work during those years, and particularly its expanding diplomatic presence in South East Asia, its central role in the creation of Australian intelligence networks, the consolidation of the anti-communist policy orthodoxy, the stimulation of domestic interest in international affairs, including new links with universities and interest groups, and also in the DEA’s changing diplomatic culture. Across these areas, Casey’s influence was in part formative, in part representative, and in part symptomatic of the major trends discussed in this thesis. From this perspective, a close study of his significance helps to anchor aspects of my argument.

This chapter analyses Casey’s social, political, professional background and network of personal connections to assess their influence on his ministerial style, his attitudes towards South East Asia, intelligence gathering, Australian security, anti-communism, and the Cold War in general. While this focus has an essentially personal dimension, it is not only complementary to the broader themes of this thesis, but seeks to demonstrate through Casey elements of background, philosophy, style and conduct
that were vital to the orthodoxy that settled in DEA. Casey was not determining this orthodoxy on his own – important though his stamp was – but he provides a useful means of understanding aspects of the power and resilience that orthodoxy achieved.

Casey has been an enduring subject of major interest for Australian scholars of diplomatic history, most notably his biographer W.J. Hudson. To provide anything new within yet another analysis of Casey’s attitudes and approaches to Australian foreign policy requires some lateral thinking. First, a theoretical model used for examining political leaders called the Operational Code will be used to frame the archival research for this case study. The 'Operational Code' concept utilises a set list of questions to provide an interpretative filter for the political and historical analysis of political leaders and decision-making. The use of the Operational Code quantifies the ways Casey personified the political and ideological transition from the Chifley era into the 1950s, and illustrates the ways in which Casey was something of a catalyst for the development of new domestic and international foreign policy connections between Australia and the world.

My introduction to the Operational Code was through the work of Ole Holsti, who applied the concept to his analysis of John Foster Dulles. Dulles was US Secretary of State throughout the entire period of Casey's tenure as Australian Foreign Minister. Casey was also a strong supporter of the Dulles' approach to anti-communism and international affairs. Casey's moral and intellectual view of world affairs remained closely aligned to those expressed by the both John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allan, who was Director of the CIA through much of the 1950s. The motivation to apply the Operational Code to Casey specifically is that Casey represents the very personification of the themes and issues that are examined throughout this thesis. Identifying them in a figure as central and as significant as Casey enables us to trace some of the core themes of policy thinking, its changing domestic and international networks and its culture, which run throughout my work.

The approach used to develop Casey's Operational Code followed the question and answer format as used by Holsti:
Philosophical issues:
1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realisation of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score? And in what respect the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

These five questions help us examine the philosophical aspects of a political leader's thinking, their outlooks and their influence. A further five questions, also based on Holsti's format, are used to examine policy related issues.

Instrumental or policy issues:
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Aspects of Casey's pre-1950 life are clearly relevant to this analysis, but my main focus here is on how these experiences contributed to his philosophical and instrumental make up by the 1950s. The answers for Casey's Operational Code are drawn primarily from the many public presentations of his views and priorities, supplemented by extracts from his diaries. Casey's public speeches and statements are not examples of modern day political spin - far from it: they are a treasure trove of information that genuinely reflects his own personal attitudes, rationale and approach to international affairs. This view is certainly supported by the contents of his own published reflections, and particularly his detailed personal diaries, which appears to have been an inspiration (or validation) for his various public statements.

Here an outline of Casey's Operational Code is provided. From this point, the chapter will outline the ways in which Casey's assumptions, thinking and style

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2 See 'RG Casey Speeches, 1948-1963' in Australian Institute of International Affairs, Box 108 MS 2821, National Library of Australia.
influenced policy thinking and administrative culture of the DEA.

Richard Casey Operational Code

a) Philosophical issues:
1. The essential nature of the political universe is one of conflict. Various political opponents at home or abroad threaten to undermine Australian (and Western) civilisation through military domination, unreliability or subversion.
2. The prospects for the realisation of fundamental political values and aspirations require the ability to influence supportive political allies at home and abroad. Despite his various difficulties, Casey's optimism generally outweighs pessimism in this area.
3. While the political future is not predictable, the motivations of domestic and international political and military opponents can be understood, or at least be subject to interpretation and speculative judgement – tasks which require a certain cast of mind.
4. Particular individuals directly influence historical development and can engineer particular outcomes – this view is particularly important to Casey's understanding of international diplomacy. Casey's ability to influence the shape of world history requires access to key British and US policy makers. Casey's ability to influence the shape of regional and domestic history rests on the prestige of associations and the uses of information, including through clandestine activities.
5. Historical development and political conflict will be decided in favour of the side that is best prepared and most determined to win.

b) Instrumental or policy issues:
1. The goals of political opponents provide the opportunity to promote counter policy debates by rejecting their goals and providing resistance to their objectives.
2. Goals of action are pursued through speeches, the media, relationships with key individuals, and by gathering secretive information. In foreign policy, objectives can also be pursued by clandestine means.
3. The risks of political actions are usually calculated, but not always. Despite Casey's certainty in his methods, there are elements of risk in his actions as will be discussed in relation to policies toward Indonesia.
4. The best "timing" of action to advance one's interest is from a position of strength, or swiftly to act when opponents appear to be weak, and to negotiate (and debate) with allies whenever an opportunity is presented.
5. The best means of advancing one's interests are through the politics of personal connections (education, personal wealth, friendships and political affiliations) and privileged knowledge. In Casey's case, this was the training and experiences of being a well-travelled engineer, ex-military intelligence officer and international diplomat.

This summary of Casey's Operational Code lends itself towards defining key aspects
of Casey's strategic thinking on peace, diplomatic and military planning, communism and the likelihood for war. Aspects of the Operational Code can also be expressed in the following diagram form. The analysis provided by the Operational Code and the Casey Paradigm provides a means through which to examine Casey and his role within the emerging Australian foreign policy community of the period.

**Casey Paradigm.**

![Operational Code Diagram]

Richard Casey (1951-1960):
Planning for peace and war?

Peace.
One must do everything to avoid war; Peace is the purpose of diplomacy;
Colombo Plan (aid program to help Asia);
Support the UN and the Charter;
Support a reduction in conventional military forces;
Promote nuclear disarmament.

Planning.
UN system is undermined by Russian veto and propaganda;
Australian security not guaranteed by UN;
Seek the 'Strongest Military Friends' (ANZUS, UK and SEATO);
Support Friends in UN;
Peking/Moscow seeks to dominate world by subversion and threat.

War.
Communist aggression will cause war with the West;
Communists deterred by threat of massive military retaliation (including atomic weapons);
USSR leads military arms race;
Need for increased military option for, and intelligence operations, in Asia (ASIS).

This interpretive diagram is generated from the speeches of Casey from 1948 to 1963 and influenced by the Operational Code method.

**Reflecting on the origins of Casey's 1950s Operational Codes**

See Figure 1 Operational codes: Philosophical issues: no. 2 and 4. Instrumental or policy issues: no. 2, 3 and 5

Casey's analysis of foreign affairs utilised the language of military strategy, information warfare methods, and forceful moral arguments. These views were often expressed with genuine enthusiasm, great purpose and a sense of sincerity. Yet, such views reflected not just Casey's intellectual position; they were also a deep expression of Casey's life experiences before becoming Minister. Along with his social background, Casey's experiences of the world beyond his own elite social and political connections made lifelong impressions. Therefore, a brief outline of these more significant experiences is required.

As the son of a wealthy Australian mining magnate, Casey was able to access
key Australian and British contacts very early in his adult life. For nearly all of his professional life he would move freely between the political, business and diplomatic elites of Australia, Britain and later the United States. This significant personal advantage was augmented by his continued accumulation of financial wealth and assets. With an exclusive educational background (a graduate of Cambridge), and a powerful network of friends, Casey developed a faith that he could achieve outcomes by cultivating personal influence with key individuals. Casey's political and diplomatic activities were never undertaken to secure financial or social gain by building a prominent political career. They were undertaken out of interest and with what might be considered an enthusiasm for the merits of official service.

Casey's introduction to official Commonwealth service during World War One as a non-front line administrative and later military intelligence officer rested on the intervention of his powerful father.\(^3\) This is not to suggest that Casey did not face danger during his military service. As a Brigade Major in France he visited the front lines under trying conditions and was recognised for meritorious army service; a Military Cross in 1917 and a Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in 1918. However, this role entailed less personal risk than a front line officer in the trenches. Casey's administrative and later intelligence officer role did not require him to lead men into battle, or to take sole responsibility for the lives of soldiers under his command.\(^4\) Casey's wartime experiences exposed him to the abstract strategic thinking behind the planning of war, intelligence gathering, military administration and even the uses of information propaganda, but tellingly without the daily psychological burdens of killing and death inherent in battlefield leadership. Such experiences of war are evidenced in the fact that Casey remained interested in the planning aspects of military strategy and intelligence methods throughout the rest of his life, particularly as Foreign Minister.

Casey also travelled and worked in the US as an engineer after the war. His personal fondness for the US, and the time he spent working and travelling

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there, was often evident in his speeches and political career. Casey's wealth also enabled him to travel extensively throughout the world before the 1950s. He continued to be an intrepid world traveller, particularly to Asia, when he was Foreign Minister. In 1924 Casey's friendship with Australian Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, saw him return to England as Bruce's personal representative.\(^5\)

Casey was easily accepted by the British social and political elite as one of their own and he subsequently acted as a conduit between Whitehall and Bruce. In effect, Casey was an executive intelligence agent for Bruce. As a supporter of the conservative side of Australian politics in the 1930s, Casey was seen as a rising political star and potentially even as a future Prime Minister. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1931, he was appointed Treasurer in 1935 by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons. This advancement fostered tensions which would re-emerge in the 1950s. Following the death of Lyons, Robert Menzies succeeded him as Prime Minister and soon shifted Casey to the lesser ministerial portfolio of Supply and Development. In 1940, Casey resigned from parliament to take up an appointment as the first Australian Minister to Washington. The perception that Casey was a potential rival to Menzies is thought to be a major reason that Casey was first demoted from his role as Treasurer and then offered a diplomatic post in the US.

Yet Casey's appointment to Washington was also significant, establishing for the first time an Australian capacity to liaise with the US government independently of the UK. The choice of Casey for this role was respected by the British, and he embraced the opportunities it provided, travelling extensively and building contacts that reached beyond the administration. Yet again, Casey was in a position to use his international connections to provide information to the Australian government. When the Australian Labor Party came to power in 1941, Casey was not enthusiastic about working under Evatt, the new Minister for External Affairs. To some surprise and criticism, he instead accepted an offer from Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, to become the UK Minister to Cairo in 1942. He continued to serve the British government when he later became Governor of Bengal in 1944, during a difficult period of political

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upheaval and terrible famine. Although he was an Australian, Casey was more than acceptable to Churchill in these specifically British roles. His personal manner and characteristics were notably British and he was once described by his friend Lester Pearson, a prominent Canadian diplomat, as having an 'old Etonian striped pants manner'. Paul Hasluck, a colleague and political contemporary of Casey, noted his 'knightly virtues [such as] service, duty, consideration for others, probity and selflessness [which] lifted him well above smarter men'.

Foreign Policy Style

Although prone to very fierce anti-communist rhetoric, Casey was most personally concerned by the strategic aspects of the global Cold War such as technology, scientific innovation, military capacity and clandestine intelligence. These preferences were evident in Casey’s public and private writings before his appointment as Foreign Minister. For example, in 1950 he wrote to The Age and Melbourne Herald to advocate the merits of increased air power. This letter was inspired by his own reading of Alexander de Seversky’s book Air Power, Key to Survival, which Casey considered to be of particular relevance to Australian foreign policy and defence planning. In his book, de Seversky urged US defence planners that the best way to deter the Soviet menace was to build an

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7 Paul Hasluck as quoted from Nicholas Hasluck (ed.), The Chance of Politics, Melbourne: Text Publisher, 1997, p.87. According to Hasluck in some things Casey was, or at least appeared to be, somewhat naive.
overwhelming air capability. This analysis tacitly accepted that the US were unable to match the manpower capacity of the Soviet Army or Navy; therefore the US should maintain these services for defensive purposes. The book also reflected US assumptions that the Soviets would wage an aggressive war of conquest against the non-communist world. Casey's support for this analysis reflected his own strategic views, namely that only greater military power from the West would deter the Moscow/Peking axis from global domination. Casey's major response to de Seversky's book was to advocate the complete integration of the Australian aeronautical defence industry into a British Empire system. According to Casey, the work of the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organization (CSIRO), full military and diplomatic cooperation with the UK on a long-range rocket project, and the development of Australia's airline networks, would all complement this process. More generally, Casey keenly advocated the close relationship between industry, science and foreign policy: such a linkage complemented his philosophy that practical knowledge was a constructive force. He once referred to industrial research as the intelligence service of Australian industry and business, and also argued that patronage of particular types of practical knowledge by administrative and political elites would assist their core policy objectives.8

Largely based on Casey's past professional experiences, personal connections and prominence within the Liberal Party organisation, Menzies selected him to replace Percy Spender as Minister for External Affairs in 1951.10

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8 For Casey's comments on the Alexander de Seversky book see Richard Casey 29 December 1950, 'Air power, key to survival' in R.G. Casey Speeches 1948-1950 Australian Institute of International Affairs, Box 108 MS 2821/6, Canberra: National Library of Australia. For Casey's comments on Australian air industry See Richard Casey 6 June 1950, 'Australia's aircraft industry must be part of Empire plan' in R.G Casey Speeches 1948-1950 Australian Institute of International Affairs, Box 108 MS 2821/6. At this time the Tadpole Wing project of the CSIRO aeronautical division were designing a new aeroplane; the de Havilland Drover.

9 Casey August 1950, 'Industrial research is industry's intelligence service' (not published) in R.G Casey Speeches 1948-1950 Australian Institute of International Affairs, Box 108 MS 2821/6; Casey to Gov. General Slim, 13 May 1957, Recruitment Systems – EOA Grade 1, NAA: A1838/300, Canberra: National Archives of Australia. Casey's fear that the Soviets might eventually dominate so called practical knowledge due to a superior technical education is reflective of this attitude. See 'The Threat of Soviet Technical Education' 22 May 1959 in R.G. Casey Speeches 1959 Australian Institute of International Affairs, MS 2821/6.

Casey was drawn to working relationships with individuals that were sympathetic to his own interests and personal style, and the world of foreign affairs encompassed almost every area that held Casey's imagination. In contrast, his previous Ministerial role as Minister for National Development, Works and Housing held considerably less appeal. In regard to an International Trade Organisation (ITO) meeting he attended in Havana, Casey confessed in his diary (7 February 1950) that while such talks were necessary, he found it difficult to be engaged with the details of dreary trade matters.

His approach to diplomacy, by contrast, was especially evident in his reputation for seeking private discussion and conversational debate with international colleagues. A style of speculative brainstorming was also an important part of his Ministerial style, and strongly connected to his belief in the merits of establishing personal networks in which ideas and common interests could emerge, seasoned by an assessment of the integrity of partners in discussion. This concern with working with the right 'type' of person, and with an assessment of character based on ease or openness in such exchanges, fitted well with Cold War calculations of loyalty and 'sound judgement' that were to figure in the staffing and culture of DEA itself. In this context, the operational code becomes not simply a personal template, but one that is symptomatic of a more pervasive cultural shift for Australian foreign policy thinking. For a rising generation of senior diplomats, such as K. C. 'Mick' Shann, who figures prominently later in this thesis, and (Sir) Arthur Tange, his long serving departmental Secretary, these aspects of Casey's style were valued, as well as his approach to the work culture and what this brought to the department.

Equally, Casey's desire to improve the responsiveness of the Department to his requests for such information was demonstrated only a short time after becoming Minister. He asked the Secretary of the Department, Alan Watt, to provide him with immediate responses to his personal enquiries 'and to mark the immediate reply tentative or the like'. He was hoping to 'get away from the long blank silences that happen in all Departments I've had to deal with until they

pp.33-34. Spender was then sent to Washington as the Australian Ambassador where he served until 1959.
work out the detailed considered answer'. Far from scientific pretence, which even then was beginning to pervade academic analysis of international affairs, Casey viewed the process of understanding foreign policy in much more personal terms. One of Casey's major claims to foreign policy expertise, outside of his personal network of foreign policy connections, was that he spent at least a quarter of his time as Minister travelling abroad, especially in Asia. As he observed:

For Australia, the 1950s was a period of getting to know not only Japan [The Free Trade Agreement between Australia and Japan was concluded in 1957] but also Indonesia and all our other neighbours. This entailed increasing concern with practically all of free Asia ... As a representative of a geographically remote country, the External affairs Minister for Australia had to spend a good deal of his time travelling outside his own country.  

Casey's British mannerisms and conservative politics did not distract him from viewing the world from distinctly Australian perspectives on international affairs. For example, Casey's interest in developing diplomatic contact with the emerging nations of South East Asia was not based on any reconstituted vision of enhancing, or propping up, lingering British Imperial influences, but a genuine belief that Canberra required its own sources of information, and indeed political agency, garnered through the establishment of independent Australian intelligence activities and diplomatic relations within its region. In this way, not only could its diplomacy become more professional, the Australians would have more to offer, in terms of regional expertise, not just for Canberra, but perhaps also to its major allies.

Yet, despite this interest in South East Asia, these new diplomatic overtures were not nearly as important to Casey as the British and American relationship. He came to view his role as Minister for External Affairs as being something of a personal conduit of information between London and Washington. While Casey often stressed that he was winning friends in Asia throughout the 1950s, he never strayed from his central belief that Australia has only two real friends; the UK and USA. 

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12 Richard Casey, ‘End Piece’ in Australian Foreign Minister— The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60, pp.337-338. As an extremely wealthy man Casey was a noted foreign traveller even before he entered public life. This tendency to travel widely continued throughout his retirement years. One must be somewhat skeptical that Casey ‘had’ to spend so much time overseas in order to carry out his job. Given the uneasy relationship between Casey and Menzies, such long absences may have suited both men.
The relationship between Australia, UK and the USA was of central importance to Casey, whose enthusiasm for a global struggle against the evils of communism neatly suited the urgency he brought to this task.

The good working relationship of Britain and of Australia with the United States was seldom out of my mind in the 1950s ... I found that I had a useful role as some sort of honest broker between Britain and the United States. In moments of dissension, each side might be prepared to accept from me a statement of the other's position in terms which would otherwise not have been readily listened to.\(^{14}\)

Equally, while Casey enjoyed building dialogues with international colleagues, he also held suspicions, like many of his non-Labor political colleagues, about the United Nations (UN) and even the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). This organisation was created on 8 September 1954 in Manila. It was initially hoped that this collective defence grouping would be able to help contain the spread of communism in South East Asia. Yet the organisation was very different from NATO as it lacked any proper military coordination, was befuddled at different times by differences between member states, and became dominated by American concerns. It terms of the strength of its collective security measures, SEATO was a white elephant for Australia. The main feature of this attitude was a view that in the Cold War environment of the 1950s, neither the mechanisms of the UN, nor SEATO, were able to provide any particular guarantees for Australian security, or indeed support, for the sort of assertive liberal internationalism pursued during the Chifley-Evatt years. The only relationship capable of guaranteeing Australian security, according to individuals such as Casey, was the Anglo-American military axis. Casey placed this, and not the UN or SEATO, at the very centre of Australia's diplomatic and security interests.

**Casey, Communism and Asia**

Throughout the 1950s, Casey sought every opportunity in the media, public speaking engagements and in the House of Representatives, to demonstrate his knowledge of foreign affairs, his personal connections with world leaders, and his command of economic and communist doctrines. This tactic was very similar to those used by Dulles as US Secretary of State, for whom Casey often expressed his admiration. This tactic also helped to validate many of Casey’s own ideological beliefs about the threat of communism. For example, Casey had great personal difficulty understanding how

any rational human being could be genuinely motivated by communist doctrines,\textsuperscript{15} as he viewed it as an irrational ideology with little connection to common sense or logic. Therefore, he often categorised global communism as an apocalyptic threat to Western democratic civilisation. This was certainly influenced by his political/social background and experiences, but it was also strongly connected to his inability to appreciate the motivations of communists particularly in Asia. Casey's diplomatic approach to South East Asia strongly reflected his philosophical attitudes on international affairs. Like, Dulles, Casey often used Soviet statements on international affairs to critically highlight what he perceived to be the always sinister intentions underpinning them.

Like his predecessor, Percy Spender, Casey effectively categorised the emerging nations of South East Asia into sub-groupings: the communist, anti-communist or the to-be-contested. There was an acceptance from the Menzies government that should Chinese communism extend its influence, or end up in control of the last two groupings, Australia itself would come under direct threat.\textsuperscript{16} It can be argued that instead of getting to know Asians, Casey's diplomacy was an attempt to convince various Asian regimes, or at least the anti-communist elites that held power, to pursue internal and external policies complimentary to their own survival, and therefore prove beneficial for Western strategic objectives. The regimes constituting Casey's so-called \textit{Free Asia} all faced varying degrees of internal political strife. While many regimes actively suppressed left-wing organisations to consolidate their authority, some others faced a major battle to survive local communist opposition. This was certainly the case in South Vietnam. It was hoped by Casey and the Menzies government that the non-communist regimes of South East Asia would be able to provide Australia with an effective security buffer against the threat of communism. Yet, there were also major contradictions in Casey's approach to diplomacy. On the one hand he argued that the primary aim of diplomacy was not the advancement

\textsuperscript{15} Here I am reminded of Casey's diary musings over the possible explanation for the fanaticism of the Viet Minh in their struggle against French colonial rule. He noted that autopsies on Viet Minh dead did not uncover any drugs in their system. See R.G. Casey, \textit{Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-1960}, London, 1972, p.26.

of ideological objectives, but to prevent war. On the other, he stated that defence policy was not determined by geography, but by ideology.

Clandestine Intelligence

Casey was enthralled by the methods and culture of Cold War intelligence, and an interest in clandestine operations remained with him throughout his political life. This interest also extended to a significant extent into his attitudes towards academia and the academic analysis of international affairs. Throughout his time as Minister for External Affairs, Casey strongly believed in the strategic and political value of intelligence networks and clandestine operations against a common enemy which drew on all available expertise. His previous involvement with intelligence work, information gathering, and friendships with high level British and especially US intelligence contacts, made him unusual among Australian politicians of his time. This type of social capital had enabled Casey to influence the appointment of the second Director-General of ASIO, Brigadier Charles Spry and oversee the establishment of ASIS in 1951, as an organisation which would provide the Australian government with its first truly professional capability to spy on South East Asia and cultivate an information partnership with US and UK intelligence agencies. The Australians and the British, for example, established the first radio transmitter station in Darwin as part of the covert Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) transmission network. This all held ramifications for Australian-Indonesian relations due to continuing concerns over the alignments of President Sukarno and the issue of the future of West New Guinea. From an intelligence perspective by 1956 (if not beforehand) ASIS carried out an

17 Richard Casey, 5 May 1952, ‘Australian representation overseas or why we have a foreign service’ in R.G. Casey Speeches 1952 Australian Institute of International Affairs, Box 108 MS 2821/6. This speech was delivered to the Liberal Club on the eve of the ANZUS meeting in Honolulu.

18 Ibid.


20 See Peter Wright, Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, Sydney: Heinemann 1988, p.66. Like Casey, Spry had experiences of British service in India. There he served as an army officer with the British army on the Khyber Pass. [Spry] had originally served in the Indian Army on the Khyber Pass in the 1930s. This common background and shared sense of what constituted an officer and a gentleman ensured him many friends in the clubbable world of British intelligence. Spry’s appointment as Director-General was also acceptable to the British and the American intelligence agencies following the controversies caused by VENONA.

21 Cain, The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation – an unofficial history, p.96
extremely detailed and ever expanding watching brief over all aspects of Indonesian political life and busily reported its information back to Casey and Alfred Deakin Brookes as the first Director of ASIS. Canberra’s ability to spy on South East Asia was fast becoming an integral part of the Australian diplomatic information network.

It is perhaps telling that the individual who was most similar to himself was not a fellow politician, but Charles Spry, with each sharing many political, professional attitudes and associations. The British gentleman’s code of knightly service, loyalty, duty, opposition to communism and a suspicion of the liberal-left wing were shared by both men. Just like Casey, Spry also formed relationships with the Americans, for example, Alan Dulles, Director of the CIA. Casey’s appointment of his close associate, Brookes, in 1951 also reflected their shared admiration for British intelligence methods and the aggressive US attitude to communism. It was Brookes who convinced Casey that ASIS should be established along the operational lines of Britain’s own overseas intelligence agency MI6, but he also built on Casey’s personal connections with Western intelligence - notably with Allan Dulles and John Foster Dulles. Casey’s Ministerial and personal vision for ASIS was that this organisation would provide vital information for Australia’s foreign policy response to postcolonial Asia.

Casey’s interest in the world of intelligence and conservative politics also had certain ramifications for his attitude toward civil liberties, domestic security and even academic scholarship within the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University (ANU), which will be discussed in later chapters. Yet at this point, it is important to note that the often unaccountable modus operandi of ASIO24 and ASIS25, ostensibly in defence of ‘freedom’ against

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22 See Charles C.F. Spry (1965–1968) Box 52, Folder 47 in Allen W. Dulles Papers, The Madd Library at Princeton University. Although a small folder (only six pages), Spry indicates a strong admiration for Dulles and the professional advice he has received from him.
23 Brookes also established close contacts with the CIA.
25 See Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins, Crows Nest New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2006, p. 105. Without any true accountability to the Department of External Affairs, ASIS operatives as a matter of course were posted to Australia’s overseas missions with full diplomatic cover until 1957.
the threat of communist subversion, was often scarcely indistinguishable from the tactics of ‘the other side’.

In 1955, Casey was formally tasked by the Menzies government to begin developing a coherent Australian Cold War strategy for Asia. This task would see Casey’s lasting creation, ASIS, playing a clandestine role in emerging nations of Asia such as Indonesia. Casey was highly enthused by the prospect of developing the capabilities of overseas intelligence gathering and contributing to Cold War intelligence operations in the region. Casey informed Arthur Tange, the Secretary of External Affairs, that

> the whole of this business of anti-subversive work is almost a virgin field — other, of course, than counter-propaganda on the Radio and otherwise. It has fascinating possibilities for the exercise of imagination. We must organise discussion groups of selected individuals to meet periodically — men who are likely to strike fire from uninhibited discussion with each other.  

As noted by Christopher Waters and David Lowe, Casey was certainly fascinated by clandestine planning, and his early relationship with ASIS reflected this interest. He was also comfortable with ASIS agents and operatives being accorded full diplomatic cover by the DEA. As Secretary of the DEA, Tange was forced to accommodate this situation until 1957.28

Indeed, Tange found Casey’s fascination with ASIS and covert planning to be somewhat professionally irritating.29 Tange’s administrative frustration with Casey was also almost certainly connected to the fact that as Minister he was unable to exert influence in the Menzies Cabinet commensurate to the high respect he commanded within DEA circles.30 Yet as highlighted by Christopher Waters, there were successes achieved by Casey which improved the employment conditions of DEA employees, ‘and during his limited time in Canberra, [that

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27 Richard Casey 10 January 1955, Memo Casey to Tange, DEA file 98/6, NAA: A4311
28 In 1955, the operations of ASIS were brought under the oversight of the Minister for External Affairs.
29 Gary Woodard, ‘Ministers and Mandarins’, pp.84-88. When concerns from the British and Americans were raised about Alfred Deakin Brookes in 1957, this threatened the continued existence of ASIS. Casey replaced Brookes with Ralph Harry, a senior diplomat from External Affairs and Tange was finally allowed to revise aspects of the ASIS charter bringing it under greater DEA oversight.
helped to encourage discussion and initiative from his officials'.

The world of spying, intelligence and foreign policy debates held a certain unpredictability and excitement for someone like Casey. It is hardly surprising that there are aspects of his Operational Code that merged diplomacy, personal networking and clandestine intelligence. For example, after 1955 Casey conceived of an Australian intelligence response that was a companion to its strategic planning and diplomacy. The Colombo Plan had been designed to not just provide economic assistance to the developing nations of Asia; it was also to provide specialist and technical education to thousands of people from the Colombo zone. Casey was often extremely conscious that the Australian government should actively seek to promote its humanitarian and educational role in the Colombo Plan throughout Asia. Yet, from 1955 the Colombo Plan could also act as a front for specifically anti-communist programmes. According to Christopher Waters, some of these measures included, the production of cheap anti-communist literature, known as the Cheap Books Scheme, financial support for Asian anti-communist organisations; financial support for anti-communist paramilitary training/operations; educational and military training in Australia; sharing information about communists with other SEATO signatories; a propaganda magazine *Hemisphere* that promoted Australian values; the possible recruitment of Asian students as counter-agents against communism; the expansion of English language education in Asia and the expansion of Asian languages in Australia. Waters argues that for Casey and his Department the Cold War in Asia was, in part, a battle of the imagination. Accordingly most of the measures which were thrown up in these discussions [about covert activities in Asia] were designed to influence elite opinion and therefore involved the fields of the media, education, culture, religion and propaganda, but they also covered internal security and counter-intelligence issues.

Casey as Cabinet Minister

See Figure1. Richard Casey Operational codes: Philosophical issues no.1 to 4 and Instrumental or policy issues: no.3 to 5.

31 Ibid. p.96.
32 Report by Joint Planning Committee 40/1953, 17 July 1953, Supply of Military Equipment to Burma, NAA: A5799, 147/1953. According to Australian Strategic Planners 'the main dangers [in the 1950s] to be guarded against are (a) the loss of Indo-China to communism and the collapse of Thailand and Burma.'
Casey's self-declared ability to moderate between the British and Americans did not translate into any comparable role in the Menzies Cabinet. It is therefore easy to condemn, and overlook his tense relationship with Menzies, ignore some of his achievements, and to downgrade his legacy in areas outside of Cabinet. Casey's personal touch and social manner were far better received with the Department of External Affairs (DEA), his interactions with diplomatic colleagues, and on the international stage than either Spender or Evatt. There has been a range of interpretations as to why Casey had such difficulties in Cabinet, but it should be noted that Casey's relationship with his Prime Minister was problematic throughout his time as Minister. Furthermore, in combination with Menzies' dominance of government decisions there was his attitude towards areas of foreign policy he considered to be something of a personal hobbyhorse. To some extent W.J. Hudson explored this possibility in his biography by hypothesising that Casey might have held ambitions to be the Australian equivalent of his British and American contemporaries, such as Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles. Yet he was thwarted in his objective because 'Menzies did not see Casey as his favourite son or as his strong right hand'.

In The Chance of Politics, a political diary by Paul Hasluck, one of the fiercest published criticisms of Casey emerged. Hasluck was a former diplomat from the 1940s who resigned in main due to his personal and professional hostility towards Dr. Evatt and Dr. Burton. He joined the Liberal Party and quickly became a prominent politician in the post-1949 Menzies government. One of the most intelligent and intellectually gifted individuals to gain Australian elected office, and later an Australian Foreign Minister in the 1960s during the Vietnam years, but Hasluck was less than forgiving of the perceived failings of others. He wrote that Casey was largely irrelevant to Cabinet and was a poor intellectual performer within his portfolio. Hasluck also took issue with Casey's Ministerial style, and his tendency to quote conversations with prominent international figures in Cabinet meetings, a trait that obviously irritated Hasluck. Yet this was entirely consistent with Casey's views on the network building nature of the decision making process in foreign relations. Casey,

36 Paul Hasluck, The Chance of Politics, pp.86-87. In retrospect it may be noted that Hasluck’s own performance as Minister for External Affairs during the Vietnam War years was hardly an intellectual triumph.
unlike Hasluck's self-conscious intellectualism, saw diplomacy as being a straightforward concept. He argued that diplomacy has a pompous sound – and pomposity is the sin against the light. But diplomacy is really no more than the conduct of any one country with another...Like most other professions or occupations, diplomacy is little more than the exercise of informed common sense.  

An apparently accomplished and confident communicator such as Casey was therefore not always able to secure passage of his submissions at cabinet meetings. It might be the case that Casey lacked the ability to negotiate forcefully when his personal charm and knowledge failed to convince his Cabinet colleagues, but it is not difficult to conclude that Menzies and his inner circle were never a reliable source of support for Casey's efforts to shine in the Cabinet room. When Casey, and indeed Tange the Secretary of the DEA, did openly attempt to put forward views and advice that challenged Menzies over Suez in 1956 they were spectacularly rolled. Menzies' personal support for Anthony Eden's ill-fated attempts to take back control of the Suez Canal from Nasser, the President of Egypt, is more than an example of political miscalculation. This support was given against the wishes of Casey, Tange, and even some members of his own Cabinet, who conveyed a range of compelling reasons not to do so, not least the potentially indifferent attitude of the Americans. Yet Menzies actively entangled himself in the Suez crisis. He ventured to London, entered domestic British debate by offering support to the British Prime Minister, and agreed to personally lead an ill-fated diplomatic mission to Cairo. His willingness to act as a proxy negotiator for Eden, and the unmitigated failure of his discussions with Nasser, has left many questions for historians of this episode. For example, was Menzies ever aware of the British plans to invade and occupy the Suez Canal zone before he went, and why did Menzies ever accept the role of putting forward British offers that could only be rejected by Nasser? These are certainly troubling questions worthy of further examination, but in the context of Casey as a Cabinet Minister, his opposition to Menzies on the question of Suez in 1956 is held to be evidence of Casey's superior but thwarted understanding of foreign affairs. Yet

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38 Hudson, *Casey*, pp. 234-235.
40 See W.J. Hudson, 'Blind Loyalty: Australia and the Suez Crisis'. See also Pierre Hutton, 'After the
it also demonstrates one of the problems encountered by him in that area, namely Menzies. This also placed Casey into an interesting position. Despite holding such strong convictions, he nevertheless dutifully provided public legitimacy for Menzies' by condemning the actions of President Nasser and offering support for Britain and France before the UN.\textsuperscript{41} Menzies’ own confidence in his ability to act free from the constraints of Ministerial and Departmental advice was also evident in his public, and bitter, blaming of the Americans for hobbling his own diplomatic mission, and for undermining British prestige, by withholding their support.\textsuperscript{42}

Yet the dominance of Menzies over various Cabinet decisions should not diminish Casey’s importance in exposing the DEA to new departmental ideas, new types of expertise, administrative reforms, and the development of networks outside of the Cabinet. Many of Casey’s efforts in this area would lay the foundations for interactions between the DEA, academia, and international organisations to be covered later in this thesis, such as the Ford Foundation of New York in the 1960s. For example, the foundations for stronger interaction between the DEA and the Department of International Affairs at the ANU, and between the DEA and the AIIA were certainly something within Casey’s orbit. This was all crucial in helping to encourage the formation of new networks of expertise and ideas connected to international affairs in Australia. It was in these areas that he therefore made his most lasting contributions to Australian foreign policy thinking. There are other examples outside the constraints of Cabinet, or even ministerial accountability, where Casey attempted to use his personal and professional networks for covert actions.

**Indonesia 1958 – The Outer Islands Rebellion**

See Richard Casey Operational codes: Philosophical issues no.1, 4, 5 and Instrumental or policy issues: no.1 to 4.

Casey could eventually claim with at least some justification before an American audience that the Australian government was much more aware and

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knowledgeable about Asia (particularly Indonesia) than their US counterparts.\textsuperscript{43} Like the Dulles brothers, Casey held a strong antipathy toward Sukarno and his belligerent non-aligned Indonesian nationalism.\textsuperscript{44} Such attitudes certainly shaped Casey's diplomacy towards Indonesia, and heightened Australian concerns about growing communist influence in that country during the later 1950s. This concern also extended into Australian diplomatic and strategic attitudes towards the ongoing dispute between the Dutch and Indonesians over West New Guinea (WNG). From the prevailing Australian strategic perspective, WNG was significant because it was the 'only foreign territory whose land frontier confronts our own'. On this basis, it was assessed that large-scale Indonesian migration into the area would have a destabilising 'influence on Australian New Guinea (that) might be disastrous'.\textsuperscript{45}

Once Sukarno began to clamour for Indonesian sovereignty over the Dutch territory in the 1950s, Casey explored almost every possible diplomatic means to prevent WNG from falling into the hands of the Indonesians. This included the deliberate tactic of stalling Indonesian claims of sovereignty over WNG in the UN General Assembly by utilising highly technical and obstructive arguments. This strategy effectively derailed Indonesia's diplomatic avenues within the UN and placed the issue into what Casey euphemistically referred to as long-term diplomatic 'Cold Storage'. Throughout the 1950s, the US government was publicly neutral on the issue of WNG and due to his close relationship with John Foster Dulles, Casey had strong reasons to believe that the Americans were well aware of Australia's sensitivity to any Indonesian takeover of WNG.

Grievances about regional representation within the governmental structures of Indonesian Republic, and the allocation of profits from non-Javanese resources to the centralised government in Jakarta, raised tensions between areas of Sumatra and Sukarno. In 1958, this manifested itself into a military

\textsuperscript{43} Richard Casey, 'The Foreign Policy of a small power' \emph{Centennial Review}, Vol. III, No.1, Winter 1959 in \textit{R.G Casey Speeches 1959 Australian Institute of International Affairs}, MS2821/6. I would argue that this statement relates to awareness of possible Asian security problems, not to widespread general knowledge of Asians and their culture.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} ‘External Affairs to Australian Counsel General (Batavia)’, 28 July 1949 in Neville Meaney (ed.) \emph{Australia and the World: A Documentary History from the 1870's to the 1970's}, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985, p. 537.
insurrection against the central government in Jakarta. Due to their hostility towards Sukarno, the US was quick to recognise an opportunity to further destabilise Indonesia and Allan Dulles and John Foster Dulles organised clandestine military support for the anti-Sukarno rebels. Casey’s reaction to the outbreak of civil war within Indonesia during 1958 is instructive. During the 1958 Permesta Rebellion, or Outer Islands Rebellion, Casey was enthusiastic about utilising a range of clandestine tactics to support these efforts to undermine Sukarno. Throughout this episode, Casey discussed various matters of high sensitivity about Indonesia with Arthur Tange, James Plimsoll and Ralph Harry, Director-General of ASIS, and sought advice from Lawrence McIntyre, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia. Casey also provided his own personal instructions to Thomas Critchley who was in close contact with the spokesperson for the Indonesian rebels, Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. In his diary (2 March 1958) Casey writes that he sent a long cablegram to Canberra following a long talk with Plimsoll, McNicholl, McIntyre, Critchley and Oldfield and that ‘we covered the whole situation of the Central Sumatran dissidents and the government in Djakarta’.

One of Casey’s suggestions was the use of economic sabotage and other military efforts to assist the Indonesian secessionists being backed by the CIA. In his diary (15 March 1958) Casey wrote that:

I telegraphed Canberra as follows this morning:
This might follow some minor alleged sabotage of their installations and or other threats to their employees. Stoppage of oil activity would substantially add to the Jakarta government’s difficulties. Danger of such action would be nationalisation by the Jakarta government and the substitution of American and other friendly operators by Russians and others ...The above suggestion might equally apply to any other commercial activities conducted by European interests in Sumatra.

Casey’s supportive attitude towards a CIA backed war against Jakarta rested on

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48 ‘Casey Diary’ Saturday, 15th March 1958, p.252. In 1958, the Australian government negotiated an administrative agreement of cooperation with the Dutch, but Casey publicly expressed that this agreement did not reflect any Australian negativity toward Jakarta.
three main foundations. He was long interested in the uses of clandestine operations. Furthermore, the desire to prevent any Indonesian takeover of WNG was a long-standing Australian policy established by Percy Spender, his predecessor. Finally, there was also the antagonism he shared with John Foster Dulles toward the politics of Sukarno.

This CIA supported rebellion ended in inglorious failure, and although the Australian government did not adopt his interventionist suggestions, Casey was still quick to distance himself from this episode in his diaries. In his diary, Casey creates a false impression about his own attitude toward the 1958 Rebellion. He implies that he was only a neutral confident for the Indonesian Ambassador (Dr. Helmi). In his diaries, Casey condemns the Americans by paraphrasing Helmi’s own criticisms. Helmi told Casey that the rebellion had been bound to fail because ‘it had been started at the wrong time and in the wrong way’. Yet, Casey himself had advocated the possibility of economic sabotage, and had personally spoken of the possibility of even letting CIA bombers utilise Australian territories. The Indonesians were aware that the US had supported the rebels, but Casey’s own attitude towards the rebellion was to remain unknown until well after his death. Yet Casey’s attitude toward the 1958 rebellion is certainly strongly connected the methods and attitudes shown in his Operational Code, and are consistent with other examples from his time as Foreign Minister.

For example, his exploration of educational propaganda within Australian aid programs, particularly in connection to Indonesia, led him to personally develop links between the DEA and the Ford Foundation of New York.

Networking with the Ford Foundation

See Figure 1. Richard Casey Operational codes: Philosophical issues no.2 and 4 and Instrumental or policy issues: no. 2, 4 and 5.

Casey’s interest in the funding and educational activities of the Ford Foundation in South East Asia, particularly concerning Indonesia, had existed since the early 1950s. Largely due to Casey’s personal interest in the Ford Foundation, the DEA compiled detailed information of its funding and educational activities within Indonesia and

50 ‘Casey Diary’, pp.45 – 47.
51 Ibid, Monday 13 October 1958, p.46.
further afield. Casey held an enduring interest in the compatibility of Australian aid programmes, as conducted through the Colombo Plan, and the activities of the Ford Foundation in South East Asia. He also sought ways to encourage Ford Foundation support for various Australian aid initiatives, but there was also an obvious interest in gaining access to Ford Foundation money.

On 2 July 1959, Casey met with Robert Elegant,52 the South East Asian Correspondent for Newsweek to discuss international affairs and the activities of the Ford Foundation. Casey was informed that ‘the Foundation had some difficulty in spending its very large annual income’.53 In response to his meeting with Elegant, Casey instructed C.T. Moodie, a senior departmental officer in the DEA, to investigate the activities and organisational structures of the Ford Foundation. Casey intended to use the information compiled by Moodie as his personal briefing paper when he visited New York late in September. Casey contacted J.P. Morgan and Chase, one of the wealthiest US banks, in order to meet its Chairman, Mr McCloy,54 and other board members of the Ford Foundation when he visited New York. These were the types of circles that would have felt very natural to an individual such as Casey as McCloy, Chairman of the Ford Foundation (1952-65), personified the very heart of the American, business, diplomatic and intelligence establishment. McCloy was chairman of so many boards [during the 1950s and 1960s] and had his hands in so many ventures that the political writer Richard Rovere once proposed that he was the informal ‘chairman of the Establishment’ a group that ‘fixes major goals and constitutes itself a ready pool of manpower for the more exacting labors of leadership.’55

It was during McCloy’s reign at the Ford Foundation that the CIA was able to freely utilise the philanthropic status of the Foundation to advance the interests of American foreign policy. James Petras argues that from 1954

52 Elegant was also a former Ford Foundation Fellowship holder.
53 C.T. Moodie to RG Casey, 3 September 1959 No. 2044/3, NAA: A11604 702/2, Canberra: National Archives of Australia. The Ford Foundation was worth about 2 billion in assets in the late 1950s.
54 Assistant Secretary of War (1941-45) under Henry Stimson. U.S. Military Governor and High Commissioner for Germany (1949-52). He later served on the Warren Commission. McCloy was a member of practically every powerful or exclusive government or non-official organisation connected to US foreign policy or the East Coast elite, for example, the Law School at Harvard University (1921); Warren Commission; Manhattan Project; Member of the Board of Chase Manhattan Bank (Chairman, 1953-60); Alfalfa Club 1947; American Council on Germany; Atlantic Institute for International Affairs Board of Governors; Council on Foreign Relations; Ford Foundation Chairman (1954-65); Salk Institute for Biological Studies Trustee; World Bank President (1947-49); Distinguished Service Medal; Presidential Medal of Freedom 1961. See John J. McCloy at http://www.nndb.com/
McCloy integrated the FF [Ford Foundation] with CIA operations. He created an administrative unit within the FF specifically to deal with the CIA. McCloy headed a three person consultation committee with the CIA to facilitate the use of the FF for a cover and conduit of funds. With these structural linkages the FF was one of those organizations the CIA was able to mobilize for political warfare against the anti-imperialist and pro-communist left.56

Casey’s own interest in Ford was somewhat less sensational than CIA intrigues, but it is difficult to imagine he was unaware of McCloy’s significance. Casey viewed his meeting with McCloy as a means to expand Australia-US connections by seeking Ford Foundation funding. Casey’s search for funds, and Ford Foundation connections, was linked to the desire of the DEA to develop local and international infrastructure connected to the study of international affairs. For example, the establishment of International Houses at various Australian universities was one area of interest. This would appear connected to the development of university infrastructure able to facilitate the development of links between Australia, international students, and perhaps even visiting scholars. Another area of interest for the DEA was connected to the types of educational diplomacy Casey had championed through the Colombo Plan. To this end, the potential responses of the Ford Foundation to Casey’s overtures were considered. For example, Moodie highlighted to Casey that the Ford Foundation may have ideas of sending us quite large numbers of students from Asia, Indonesia has been specifically mentioned. As you know, the record of the Indonesians we have taken has not been too bright. We have had to terminate quite a high proportion of their Colombo Plan awards. This is not to say that we should discourage the Foundation’s idea but we might stress the importance of careful selection and the value of spreading their awards for Australia over a number of Asian countries. You could point out that we don’t want to debase the academic currency too much — lest it lead to political questions here [in Australia].57

Moodie identified for Casey other areas where the activities of the Colombo Plan and the Ford Foundation in Indonesia, Burma, India and Pakistan were possibly compatible. Yet he also outlined for Casey that there were some major differences between Australian and Ford Foundation foreign aid activities. First, there was the sheer difference in the scale of potential funding available. Second, there was a difference in the style of the training that was provided. Much of the reason for the differences was the question of money, the Australian aid program often struggled for its funding, and in contrast the Ford Foundation was virtually a bottomless pit of funds.

57 C.T. Moodie to RG Casey, 3 September 1959 No. 2044/3, NAA: A11604 702/2.
Whereas much of Australian Colombo Plan in Indonesia effort has been the training in Australia of Indonesian students, the Ford Foundation sends teams of experts to Indonesia for specific projects and from the trainees selects candidates for Fellowships to study in the USA.58

One of the major areas of common ground shared between the DEA and the Ford Foundation was Indonesia. For example, there were consultations between the Ford and the DEA at different stages in the 1950s mainly concerned with educational programs and activities in Indonesia.

Through Casey’s initiatives, the Ford Foundation was eventually able to attend Colombo Plan Consultative Committee meetings as observers.59 Yet the main interest from the Ford Foundation in the Colombo Plan, and Australia in the late 1950s, appears to have been educational possibilities related to Indonesia and South East Asia. From Casey’s perspective there were also serious possibilities for cooperation with the Ford Foundation on the issue of the education of Indonesian students. It was hoped that these particular students could be accommodated on an individual basis at Australian universities should places be available and their accommodation privately arranged.60 There was DEA was interest in the potential benefits of such cooperation with the Ford Foundation. For example, the possibility of helping the Foundation recruit experts in Australia, or in the ‘procurement in Australia for any educational equipment [that Ford] sought to supply to Asian countries’.61

Although interested in the potential benefits of a relationship with Ford, this did not mean however that Casey or the DEA wished to turn all Australian aid projects within the Colombo Plan into joint operations with Ford. The Colombo Plan was personally very important to Casey and others in the DEA in terms of its good publicity for Australian aid efforts in South East Asia. It also afforded opportunities

58 G.T. Pretyman (Attaché) to The Secretary, 3 August 1959 Memorandum No.833. The Ford Foundation, in NAA: A11604 702/2, p.5 of Memorandum.
59 C.T. Moodie to RG Casey, 3 September 1959 No. 2044/3, NAA: A11604 702/2. See Previous Contacts with Ford Foundation, p.2. See also J. Arnott (Acting for the Secretary) Memorandum to Australian Embassy in Jakarta, 12 February 1953 File No.2086/3 Memo No. C18 Restricted Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, NAA: A11604 702/2. During a visit to the US Casey had discussions with the Ford Foundation about ‘the coordination or more properly perhaps centralised liaison’ of international aid. From these discussions came the idea that the Foundation should be represented at Colombo Plan Consultative Committee meetings. Casey suggested that if Ford made a request, the proposal would receive ‘Australia’s warm support’.
60 Ibid. See Australian Assistance to Ford Projects (Attachment III).
61 Ibid.
for the types of clandestine counter intelligence operations highlighted by Christopher Waters. Similar aspects were also being incorporated into the philanthropy efforts of Ford in South East Asia. Therefore, the Australians had little interest in being subsumed by a partnership with Ford; this would have diluted control over their own separate efforts and operations. However, interest in Ford's large sums of money and activities in South East Asia remained of interest to men like Casey. Following his meeting with Elegant in July 1959, Mr. J.A. Quinn of the Ford Foundation approached the Australian External Affairs Office in London. Quinn was about to embark on a fact-finding tour of South East Asia to 'find out what is being done in the field of educational exchanges'. Quinn indicated that the Foundation wished to explore the possibility of hundreds of Indonesian students attending Australian Universities through Ford's own education programmes. Consequently the DEA then sought to clarify from its diplomatic missions in South East Asia the exact extent of Ford Foundation activities. Given the focus on Indonesia, the overview provided by the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was particularly relevant to the issues being raised by Quinn.

The Australian Embassy in Jakarta provided to the DEA a detailed overview of Ford Foundation activities throughout Indonesia since the early 1950s, including a brief history, funding arrangements and lists of Indonesians to have studied in the United States as part of its educational programs. This information was also intended to provide background to assist Casey's New York meeting with McCloy in September 1959. The report highlighted that Ford operated in four South East Asian nations, Pakistan, India, Burma and Indonesia; it was extending activities to Africa, had representatives in Beirut and Cairo and that a 'large programme is maintained in Latin-America'. The ability of the Ford Foundation to operate this extensive and growing overseas programme of course rested on its own financial largesse. The Australian report estimated that the 'total income of the Foundation is approximately $100,000,000 per annum of which 15% is spent for overseas projects and the remaining 85% is spent in the

62 G.N. Upton (For the Secretary) Department of External Affairs, 13 July 1959 2044/3, Colombo Plan Circular Memorandum No.59 The Ford Foundation, NAA: A11604 702/2.
63 G.T. Pretyman (Attaché) to The Secretary, 3 August 1959 Memorandum No.833. The Ford Foundation, p.2 in NAA: A11604 702/2.
USA. The report detailed the Foundation’s focus on education and highlighted programmes in areas such as English language, teacher training, technical education, economics, public administration, community development and agriculture. These were all areas where, in time, the Ford Foundation would build significant influence by the mid 1960s. The high level contact initiated by Casey with the Ford Foundation brought the DEA into contact with an international network of foreign policy experts and philanthropy, yet this dialogue was also connected to dominant anti-communist Australian and US attitudes towards the Cold War. Casey’s ability to successfully establish the foundations of a new relationship between the DEA and Ford clearly demonstrates aspects of his Operational Codes, and indeed the success it could achieve outside the constraints of the Cabinet room.

Conclusions
This chapter argues through its examination of the Operational Code that Casey’s own personal approach to foreign affairs was a complicated mixture of Anglophile charm, self-assured intellect, Cold War strategy, conservative political ideology and anti-communism. This approach was framed by a generous and gentlemanly demeanour that was excited by conversational debate about foreign policy, espionage and counterintelligence matters. Although he was a noted British Empire man and Anglophile, Casey (like Churchill) always retained a great admiration for the USA and for the potential of an expanding strategic partnership between the UK, the British Dominions and America. The UK and US relationship was a preoccupation for Casey during his tenure as Minister for External Affairs. He was also realistic and must have recognised just how potentially insignificant Australia could be to the strategic planning of Britain and the United States of America. He had experienced this first hand as Australian Minister to Washington early in World War Two, yet remained adamant that the US and UK were vital to his approach to foreign affairs.

He sought close personal contacts with individuals, such as Charles Spry or John Foster Dulles, and he hoped to make Australia a ‘useful’ anti-communist

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64 Ibid. The scale of Ford’s financial resources was almost certainly known to Casey. In 1953, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta highlighted that Ford had already spent from 1947 until that time; $5375000 in India and $2000000 in Pakistan. See J.Arnott (Acting for the Secretary) Memorandum to Australian Embassy in Jakarta, 12 February 1953 File No.2086/3 Memo No. C18 Restricted Colombo Plan Consultative Committee.
ally for the US in any time of potential war. In conjunction with the two 1950s military treaties (ANZUS and SEATO), his large network of intelligence contacts provided opportunities for him to be privy to the inner sanctum of Anglo-American strategic and intelligence thinking. In this regard, the contrast between Casey and Evatt in the late 1940s is stark. Despite his difficulties in Cabinet, Casey's interventionist Ministerial style had significant influence over the officers and operations of the Department, the administrative machinery of Australian diplomacy and the development of international and domestic dialogues. As one of the major influences behind the establishment of ASIS, Casey also helped to establish a lasting institutional legacy along with the integration of espionage into the fabric of Australian regional engagement. This is clearly an example of some of those networks Casey encouraged outside the confines of the Cabinet room, and certainly reflected his deep interest in intelligence operations. This was after all a man that dared to advise John Foster Dulles on the arts of deception (through the press and radio) and the use of other analysis techniques for intelligence assessment [and] suggested the device of setting aside a man or men to take the point of view of international communism in all relevant CIA conferences or discussions.65

On issues such as anti-communism, the USA, Indonesia, clandestine intelligence, the Colombo Plan, and domestic debates about international affairs, the Casey influence on Australian foreign policy culture arguably demonstrated the fullest expression of the attitudes and influences that characterised the political and ideological transition from Chifley to Menzies after December 1949, and an important point of reference in the development of a Canberra based foreign policy network. This and the previous chapter have outlined the transitional period from Chifley to Menzies, namely a rapid shift from liberal internationalism to a comprehensive anti-communist response to international events, particularly in South East Asia, and examined the international influences at play during this time. They have examined the political context of this transition, and explored the implications this held for Australian foreign policy thinking in the 1950s. The formation of new linkages, often connected to the strategic world of Cold War intelligence, and anti-communist propaganda, would help to encourage Anglo-American intelligence cooperation. Yet

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65 See ‘Casey Diary’, p. 207. During this one and a half hour meeting he even asked John Foster Dulles if Moscow and Peking had created fallout bunkers to counter the possibility of their cities being destroyed by US nuclear bombing.
the development of Australian connections, assisted by the guiding influence of Casey, also heralded the embryonic beginnings of a Cold War Australian foreign policy network of key politicians, diplomats, spies and academics in Australia. From this point of transition in the late 1940s and into the 1950s, and the examination of Casey's Operational Code offered in this chapter, the origins and nature of the Canberra network (examined in later chapters), can be better understood.
CHAPTER THREE

Straight Thinking Men?

Initial requirement is of course a University graduate with a good Honours degree, but naturally requirements of personality, bearing and address are also of the greatest importance ...


The political and ideological transition from Chifley to Menzies heralded the beginnings of significant administrative change within the Department of External Affairs (DEA). New directions in the DEA’s internal practices were an integral dimension of the larger themes discussed throughout this thesis, both in consolidating an anti-communist orthodoxy in policy responses and in entrenching a culture that minimised any questioning of these political settings. Anti-communism became not only a premise of policy, but was reflected in the cultivation of patterns of behaviour, of preferment and professionalism in which the ‘straight-thinking man’ – pragmatic, direct, trustworthy, sound in opinion and personality, a generalist by inclination, and attuned to orderly observance of the DEA’s emerging processes and status – was favoured over the ‘crusaders’ (as Paul Hasluck characterised John Burton) that had done well under Evatt.1 Casey’s ‘operational code’, as presented in the previous chapter, helped to set much of the tone, and defined the boundaries, of these new practices.

Equally, the demands placed on the DEA itself, as it sought to meet the rapidly expanding fields of Australian foreign policy and international representation, made a priority of building an orderly, efficient and reliable department. In meeting these pressures, the DEA was in some respects little different from all other Commonwealth departments in the 1950s. William Dunk, moving from being Secretary of the DEA to Chairman of the Public Service Board in 1947, soon advised Chifley as Prime Minister that the national bureaucracy was ‘run down and out of date’ after the strains

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1 For Hasluck’s views on this era see Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-1947, Melbourne University Press, 1980, p. 36
not only of World War Two, but also of the Depression before that. Now coupled to post-war expansion, the pressures of full employment, and the increasing complexities of public policy, DEA competed against other departments for staff, resources and influence over government. But unlike other departments, DEA also devoted itself to the ideal of a distinctive diplomatic corps, a carefully selected elite of officials who would help professionalise Australian diplomacy.

Joan Beaumont, Gary Woodard, David Lowe and Christopher Waters have already examined significant aspects of the DEA’s recruitment processes in the 1950s. Beaumont in particular emphasises the extent to which the diplomatic cadet scheme, first introduced by Dr Evatt in 1943 to address the lack of officers deemed qualified for work on international affairs, built on an existing elitism in the DEA, but turned itself towards a specialised training. To her study of the procedures associated with the cadet scheme, and of the experiences of those recruited through it, this chapter adds an analysis about the ‘type’ of officer sought by the DEA as it adjusted from post-war to Cold War settings. The focus here is on the DEA’s preoccupation with the recruitment and training of a new kind of officer during the period of this thesis, and on the extent to which specialisation in training became more generalist. As Beaumont argues, for all the questions associated with its processes of selection and training, the scheme was connected to several of the figures who held senior positions in the department well into the 1980s, and who served in Australia’s ‘ever-growing diplomatic network’ from the 1950s onwards. More central to this thesis, however, is the extent to which these processes were in themselves part of the manufacturing of Australian foreign policy in itself.

The DEA’s recruitment processes helped to define the department’s sense of itself as having policy objectives and styles that were distinct from the rest of the public service, and marked out a domain of international awareness as one to be

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2 See William Dunk, They Also Serve, Public Service Board, Canberra, 1974.
4 Beaumont, ‘Creating and Elite?’ in Beaumont, Lowe, Waters and Woodard (eds), Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats, p. 44.
carefully managed and protected. The intelligence aspects, as discussed at various points in the previous chapters, were part of this wider program of activities, but so was an element of rivalry with other Commonwealth departments – such as the Department of Trade – about Australian foreign policy. This sense of a select community within, and around, the DEA, fostered new relationships which extended into wider networks of discussion about diplomacy and Australian foreign policy, connecting the department with universities, overseas organisations, and groups such as the Australian Institute of International Affairs. All of these relationships – developing in the distinctive, if insular environment of Canberra – defined the landscape of Australian foreign policy well into the 1960s. This chapter will explore these developments through the three related themes of: the expansion of the department and its priorities in recruitment; the professionalization of its officers around the generalist ‘straight-thinking man’; and the often counterproductive tendencies inherent within the cultivation of an elite.

Administration

The departure of Chifley and Evatt in 1949, and Burton in 1950 as outlined in Chapter One, signalled the effective end of a distinctive period of Australian foreign policy and diplomacy. When Burton was succeeded by Alan Watt, then one of the most senior serving Australian diplomats, public commentary noted the significance of an apparent change in DEA’s culture. Watt had held postings in the United States during World War II, the Soviet Union in 1947-50, and as the *Daily Telegraph* observed, his appointment ‘restores to the … job of head of Australia’s foreign office the orthodoxy of the traditional permanent public servant’. By temperament, Watt was judged a ‘safe’ pair of hands’: possessing, as a Rhodes Scholar, ‘brilliance and intellect’, marked by ‘calm, scholarly, old world courtesy’ and likely to foster an atmosphere in the department ‘less electric’ than his predecessor.5 During Watt’s tenure significant changes occurred: Spender, as Minister, moved on to become Australian Ambassador in Washington, locking in place that central alliance, and Casey assumed the ministry.

Like Burton, Watt was interested in South East Asia, but he had a different perspective on the region. Burton viewed Australian security as being integrated with the security concerns shared across the region, whereas Watt's interest was instead similar to that of Casey, who saw threats rather than shared interests as the inspiration for policy. Casey worked to develop independent Australian diplomatic representation in Asia not just to increase firsthand knowledge and gain access to raw intelligence, but in order to build diplomatic relationships in locations considered vital to Australian security.

One of Watt's central tasks was to be the reorganisation of the DEA itself. This was a major task: the administrative machinery of Australian diplomacy was still being developed, and not as yet properly coordinated. One of the more pressing areas of departmental reform was the coordination of Australia's expanding international diplomacy, and the need to address the existing problem of staffing shortages. Yet Watt's tenure as Secretary did not result in the transformation of the DEA, in fact his administrative efforts towards professionalization had mixed results for the department and himself. From a reading of Watt's own diplomatic memoirs, the imaginatively titled *Australian Diplomat Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt*, he found the task of departmental administration an extremely labour intensive and psychologically taxing endeavour. Certainly the pace and scale of reform under Watt was slower than had been hoped for by Casey. One suspects from the manner that Watt wrote of his period as Secretary he was always more interested in diplomacy, than the nuts and bolts of administrative responsibilities. Even his departure from the position as Secretary seemed to demonstrate this preference, but also, it showed the problematic ways in which he understood the new challenges of diplomacy for Australia's in Asia.

Encouraged by Casey's enthusiasm for a new type of diplomatic role, Watt willingly left the position of Secretary in 1953 in order to establish a role that seems largely to have been of his design, as 'Commissioner for South East Asia'. This new role may also have appealed to Casey in its particular focus on improving Australia's diplomatic presence in that area. Watt essentially wished to replicate the British diplomatic practice of a coordinating 'Commissioner' with authority over all other
Australian embassies in Asia, however such a specific power was never assigned to Watt. This position, to be based in Singapore, might have appealed to Watt in its theoretical intentions, but it begged the question of how such a role was could be exercised without clearly defined administrative authority. The British model, on which Watt had based his new role, was, in contrast to the Australians, premised on a well established diplomatic presence, and even before he left Canberra Watt was already suspicious that the British may consider him a person who concentrates too much on the Cold War and South East Asia [and that he might be going to Singapore] to make a nuisance of himself in some competitive way.\(^6\)

Given Australia’s more limited diplomatic resources, and continuing reliance on information and intelligence connections with the British, Watt could ill afford to be left out of the British loop. Yet such an outcome does not appear to have been addressed in any practical sense, either by Casey, or most importantly by Watt. For example, Watt held no accredited status in Singapore and was therefore treated by the British Colonial service in Malaya as something of a diplomatic outsider, oddity\(^7\)

Watt’s efforts to pursue a new diplomatic position in South East Asia proved to be short lived, as his authority, or even the purpose of his new position, remained unclear. Yet this unhappy outcome was in most respects well in keeping with other aspects of Watt’s departure from Canberra.

Prior to Watt’s departure as Secretary of the DEA he weathered commentary from, *Inside Canberra*, which observed Watt’s departure in unfavourable terms. It wrote that he had previously been ‘demoted to Moscow [and was now being] demoted to Singapore because [he allegedly] confessed to Public Accounts Committee that the Department had disobeyed a Treasury instruction to cut expenditure’\(^8\). Despite this characterisation, Watt had given careful consideration to the finer details of his succession as Secretary – corresponding with Richard Casey, and Arthur Tange, a

\(^6\) ‘Personal and Secret Watt to Tange’ 26 October 1953 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/4 Box 4, Canberra: National Library of Australia.

\(^7\) The British were not the only ones who saw Watt’s role critically. In a 1996 interview, his eventual successor as Secretary Tange assessed Watt’s move to Singapore as a ‘disaster’ and a ‘non-job’.

\(^8\) ‘Interview with Sir Arthur Tange, Canberra, Thursday 11 April 1996, MS 9847/2/4 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/4 Box 4, p.6.

‘Personal and Confidential Watt to Tange’ 24 November 1953 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/4 Box 4.

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young rising star within the DEA noted for his administrative skills. Watt proposed to Casey that the DEA should appoint a new Secretary from ‘two or three’ approved possibilities suggested by him, but this was not to be done immediately. He suggested that in the time before a final replacement could be appointed that a senior Head of Mission be brought back from overseas. Watt envisaged that the administration of the ‘Department [could] largely [be done] through Assistant Secretaries’. Despite Watt advising a more measured transition, Casey did not hesitate to appoint the 38-year-old Tange, one of three replacements suggested by Watt, as Secretary.9 However, his Minister largely ignored Watt’s cautious advice, and was in no mood to wait. Casey had clearly identified Tange as the individual to succeed Watt. While Casey’s ‘operational code’ can be seen to have influenced many assumptions in DEA policy thinking through the 1950s, Tange would provide the organisational culture capable of putting such thinking into practice.

A Short History of Tange

Arthur Tange’s appointment as Secretary established a new and unmistakable administrative influence for the DEA during the mid-1950s. No examination of the DEA in the 1950s and early 1960s could be considered complete without some examination of Tange. In this regard, Peter Edwards’ biography Tange: Last of the Mandarins does much to illuminate his life and the significance of his administrative influence. In bureaucratic terms, Tange maintained from his appointment an almost unsurpassed administrative influence from the 1950s until the late 1970s; first as Secretary of the DEA, and later as Secretary of the Department of Defence. He was one of a new generation of university graduates that had been drafted into the Commonwealth Public Service (CPS) from the private sector due to manpower shortages caused by World War Two. Noted for his attention to detail and dedication to efficiency Tange was well skilled to carry out the task of administrative reform as Secretary of the DEA.

9 Ibid.
Tange considered his rise to Secretary to be due to a lack of strong competition. Yet he was clearly an intelligent and capable individual, indeed these characteristics had been recognised by Sir Alfred Davidson of the Bank of New South Wales in the 1930s. The Bank was one of most significant training grounds for many figures who would go on to long careers in commerce and the CPS. Davidson recruited Tange, his long-time friend and future DEA colleague and Secretary, James Plimsoll, Leslie Bury, later an Australian Federal Treasurer, Brian Fleming, later an Australian Treasury Representative to London, D.H. Merry, later the Chief economist of Australian New Zealand Bank (ANZ). Manpower shortages in the CPS had occurred from the earliest stages of World War Two, and required the Australian government to search for new expertise from the private sector. Many individuals like Tange, who came from an economics background, found themselves suddenly thrust into new bureaucratic roles. While these specialised skills were valued during the time of war, and later in relation to the Labor party program of post-war reconstruction, by the time Tange assumed the secretaryship at the DEA this, along with the government, had indeed changed. Figures such as Tange were no longer involved in the advancement of domestic policy programs, but were effectively helping to consolidate the authority of the new government. Under Tange and Casey, the DEA in the 1950s would seek a less specialist and more generalist type of diplomatic recruit. Walter Crocker, an Australian academic and senior diplomat through the period, noted that the ‘galloping expansion’ of the DEA in the 1950s came at the expense of specific expertise.

From 1931 to 1941, Tange’s tenure with the Bank of NSW provided him with various stints as a legal researcher, economic policy advisor, a supervisor of an economic department and as a foreign exchange officer in Fiji. When he was seconded from the Bank of NSW to the CPS in 1942, he became a Research Officer in

10 'Interview with Sir Arthur Tange' Canberra Thursday 11 April 1996 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/1 Box 4.
11 This became known as Davidson’s Kindergarten. The name is presumably borrowed from Sir Alfred Milner – Milner’s Kindergarten. Alfred Milner, 1st Viscount Milner (1854—1925) was a British statesman and key figure in regards to the Anglo-Boer War of 1899—1902. As High Commissioner in South Africa, he mentored members of the South African Civil Service. This became known as Milner's Kindergarten. Many became noted administrators within the British Empire.
the Department of Labour and National Service. This was the beginning of a succession of positions that saw Tange reach Acting Secretary of the DEA from 2 – 30 January 1951. His rise could have occurred more quickly than it did. In 1950, Percy Spender had chosen Alan Watt as Secretary over Tange after each had been recommended to him by Paul Hasluck. Unlike Watt, Tange’s diplomatic experiences were not extensive: his most significant individual appointment to this stage was as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Australian Embassy Washington, and this appointment was later cut short by his promotion to Secretary. His only other noted overseas diplomatic experience was as part of the Australian Mission to the UN during 1946-48 in the USA. When Tange assumed the position of Secretary, it was not as a seasoned diplomat but as one who could be expected to effectively address that central task of reorganising the Department and making it capable of meeting its growing range of administrative responsibilities. Casey gave Tange great freedom over the reorganisation of the Department. According to Phillip Law, a former DEA officer, the Department had been badly run under Watt in the early 1950s. In 1995, Law recalled by letter to Tange his impressions of the DEA.

[There was] poor old Frank Weight and mediocre George Hartley, and later, lazy, cynical Charles Kevin. There was a great improvement when you [Tange] became Secretary. I have always admired your administrative competencies. And I very much enjoyed working with Keith Waller, David Hay and Ralph Harry.

Tange also had critical concerns about administration of the DEA under the leadership of Watt. Although he believed that the origins of this situation to be caused by a DEA expansion in 1946 under Evatt, he believed the failure to implement

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13 ‘Statement by A.H. [Harold] Tange in Support of provisional promotion of 8th March 1951 to Counsellor Assistant Secretary’, UN, Economic Relations and Technical Assistance Division – Dept. External Affairs in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/4 Box 4. Tange’s academic achievements are listed as: 1937 BA in Arts [Economics Major]; 1937-38 Post Grad Economics First Class Honours in Economics. Tange and ‘Nugget’ Coombs had studied economics together under Professor Shann in Western Australia. Shann was very influential in Australian economics and in the establishment of the University of Western Australia – and a vice chancellor in 1920-21. Tange later also married Shann’s daughter.

14 After only a year in the CPS Tange was promoted to the position of a Senior Researcher [1943-46] in the Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction. He was in charge of its International section and was liaising with the DEA. By 1944, he was appointed to the DEA as a temporary replacement to John Burton during his absences overseas. A position in charge of Economic Relations under First Secretary [John Burton] was created for Tange in 1945.


16 ‘Letter from Phillip Law to Sir Arthur Tange 15/2/95’, MS9847/2/10 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS9847 Box 5.
necessary reforms in the early 1950s was because Watt had been a mediocre administrator. In his late retirement, Tange reflected that his years in charge of the DEA were mainly spent bringing administrative discipline into the department’s operations. As highlighted by Edwards, Tange was well organised, very hard working and intelligent. In many respects, he was the perfect complement to Casey, who was often interested in abstract strategic assessments and clandestine intelligence operations. Tange placed great value on the establishment of clear procedures, the chain of authority, obedience and efficiency. These factors were important in the consolidation of DEA stability, and indeed its expansion, under a government demanding ongoing policy formation supportive of its anti-communist world view. While his work ethic and administrative skill generated great respect, he was certainly an intimidating Secretary often inspiring more fear than love: his volcanic outbursts of temper and pique were part of his mystique. Throughout his bureaucratic career, Tange remained forthright in his thoughts and instructions to the point of extreme rudeness and this was often reflected in his written and verbal communications.

Diplomatic Recruitment
As already noted, the history of recruitment into the DEA before Tange had been chequered. The provision for graduate entry was introduced before World War Two, but due to manpower shortages during the war, it was relaxed as a prerequisite in favour of high school matriculation. The original diplomatic recruitment scheme introduced by Evatt and was designed to develop a 'reserve of trained men from which regular [diplomatic] posts can be filled and extra staff provided to meet expansion'. The introduction of graduate recruitment into the DEA was unique. This was the first occasion that a systematic intake into the CPS of tertiary educated officers had taken place. Yet despite the robust diplomacy of the Curtin and Chifley era, the DEA was still something of an amateur administrative proposition. According to Burton, the DEA by 1949 remained small, sometimes unorganised and still lacked its own distinctive philosophy toward international affairs. Despite Burton’s desire to

17 See H.V. Evatt, Press Statement 25 Jan 1943, NAA989/1 43/300/1/29/1 part 1, Canberra: National Archives of Australia.
18 Interview by Adam Henry with Dr John Burton, Canberra, 19 February 2009.
transform this administrative culture, including recruitment,\textsuperscript{19} by the mid-1950s – as in many government departments - many of these administrative concerns remained yet to be resolved.

Post-war Australia was a nation often struggling to come to terms with the changing social and political conditions of a new international environment.\textsuperscript{20} Along with the new Menzies government, the fledgling DEA responded to what was perceived to be a new and threatening world. The changing attitudes of the DEA were clearly reflected in the diplomatic recruitment process itself. The questions set for examination during the selection process, for example, covered areas such as communism in South East Asia, the future role of Japan, international economics, the British Commonwealth and US foreign policy.\textsuperscript{21} Yet at the core of nearly all of DEA thinking about foreign policy was the issue of communism in South East Asia.

As already noted, one of the most pressing administrative concerns facing Tange was that the DEA had entered the 1950s badly understaffed and little had changed by the 1950s. The deliberate expansion of Australia's overseas diplomatic missions in the 1950s under Casey was important, but this also encouraged increased administrative responsibilities and burdens. This situation only continued to exacerbate the pre-existing staffing problems in the mid-1950s, and the DEA had many more vacancies than they could possibly fill under prevailing conditions and procedures.\textsuperscript{22} This administrative conundrum was one of the major reforms that needed to be taken under Tange.

The question of major staffing shortages in the DEA required a specific and detailed response from Tange. Yet, there were concerns that the pressures for new staff could result in a lower standard of recruit. There was a strong belief within the DEA that it was superior to other CPS departments, and the determination to maintain

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} One of the contributing factors to this uncertainty was the Cold War international order and decolonisation in Asia. For a detailed examination see Nicholas Brown, \textit{Governing Prosperity: Social Analysis and Social Change in Australia in the 1950s}.
this sense of elitism remained evident in its recruitment practices. This attitude was certainly shared by Casey and Tange. While there was a preference for academic excellence, this did not diminish their desire to seek what was deemed to be the right personality type. Individuals were ultimately chosen and rejected by the DEA as much for their demonstrated abilities as they were for character attributes. These attributes marked these recruits as being capable or incapable of assimilating into a changing, but still highly elitist professional environment, that was also increasingly conservative and Cold War orientated. Spender and Casey believed in the importance of certain personal characteristics for any potential diplomat. This attitude would contribute to an enduring tension within the DEA recruitment process. For example, despite bemoaning its staffing woes, there actually had been no shortage of individuals interested in working for the DEA. Between 1953 and 1956, and before the abolition of the original diplomatic cadet recruitment scheme in 1957, there had been 418 applications, 242 interviews but only 23 appointments.

Tange’s first steps towards addressing DEA staffing concerns occurred in 1955 when he ordered a full review of the situation.

Please give me [Tange] a general appreciation of our recruitment position. Without having it, I know that our position is shocking. Therefore, do a check list of things to be done — or tried with Public Service Board [PSB] — to get an improvement.26

Before issuing this instruction, Tange had contemplated that the existing cadet recruitment system established in 1942 would need to be completely changed. The DEA were disappointed by what they considered the lack of quality, or the suitability, of those applying for positions with the department. It was also thought that in order to attract the very best candidates, the working conditions of the DEA would need to be improved. The improvements considered included the creation of specialist positions, the abolition of the cadet probation period, classification schemes with

25 ‘For the Secretary, Recruitment EAO’S Grade 1’, 24 April 1957 in Recruitment Systems EAO Grade I. For Rhodes Scholar opinions about a career with the Department of External Affairs see ‘Letter to J.K. Waller (Dept. of External Affairs) from Jim McIntyre Australian External Affairs Office’, Australia House, 23 December 1955, in Recruitment Systems EAO Grade 1. Amongst the numbers who were originally successful applicants, four Rhodes Scholars and two others had declined appointments with the DEA.
26 ‘A.H. Tange Secretary 19 October 1955 for (Division 3) Assistant Secretary’ in Recruitment, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1.
better pay rates, more diplomatic positions in what Tange called 'agreeable' and 'disagreeable' countries, and a major DEA recruitment drive throughout the Australian universities. While all these options had their strengths and weaknesses, the fundamental problem was stark. When Tange received the answers in response to his request for information, it was revealed that in 1955 only three diplomatic cadets were due for advancement, while between only six and nine cadet applicants were under consideration for future employment with the DEA in 1956. There were eighteen vacancies at Grade 1 in the DEA, five in the Overseas Pool (Division 5) and thirteen in Canberra. This situation would leave a continuing number of vacancies at the lowest point on the DEA scale: Grade 1, as the existing DEA officers were promoted up the ranks. From 1955 until 1961, it was initially assessed that the total intake requirement by the Department would need to be sixty-one. This would require a cadet intake of ten per year from January 1956.

These staffing calculations formed the basis of a forceful submission Tange made to the Public Service Board (PSB) in November 1955, then headed by a previous DEA Secretary, William Dunk. The PSB was the body which examined all issues relating to employment in the CPS with the power to alter employment conditions. Tange pointed out that the employment situation in the DEA was ‘far from good’. Not only was it failing to attract enough cadets, there was now a ‘gestation period of 27 months between selection of cadets and their entry into Grade 1 rank’. At present recruitment is not easy. This year the department made a strong effort to attract suitable university graduates, but the quality of the applicants in general was rather disappointing, an increased intake to 10 a year could only be made by reducing our standards to a level which would ultimately affect detrimentally the efficiency and quality of the external service. I [Tange] am opposed to doing this. We differ from other departments in that we are very much bound by the quality of staff inherited from earlier recruitment at the bottom. [DEA has not had] the same opportunity to unload and replace through interdepartmental transfer as do other departments. I must attract more good-quality cadets and, to do this, the job must be more attractive.

27 ‘For The Secretary’, Departmental Establishment 18 October 1955, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1
A note written in 1955 for Tange pointed out that

[It] is difficult to see at this stage how the vacancies will occur as all Grade 2 and Grade 3 positions are filled. However, five Grade 1 officers will be due for promotion at the end of 1956 and, assuming it is possible to make these, there will be 20 vacancies and six cadets to be advanced. This position will continue for the next 5 years unless there is a sharp increase in the cadet intake.

29 ‘A.H. Tange (Secretary of External Affairs) to The Secretary (Public Service Board)’, 28 November 1955 in Recruitment Position – Diplomatic Officers, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1.
The PSB accepted Tange's submission proposals, but it counselled him 'that the [diplomatic] cadetship, as such, be abandoned for the time being rather than shortened.' It also recommended 'that the Department operate instead on a system of fairly frequent advertisement of vacancies of positions of EAO Grade 1 [that were] open within and without the public service'.\(^{30}\) The PSB had agreed that employment conditions in the DEA needed to be improved, but its suggestion that the DEA should frequently advertise in the *Public Service Gazette* and to the general public certainly challenged entrenched notions of DEA elitism.

Tange held fears about some of the implications of possible PBS recommendations resulting from his submission, such as abolishing the cadet scheme altogether. While Tange had himself considered abolishing the cadet recruitment scheme, there was one advantage in keeping it alive, albeit in a modified form. He concluded that a cadet scheme held advantages for the dismissal of those thought to be unsatisfactory. For instance, a diplomatic cadet (or Grade 1 Officer) found to be unsatisfactory could be removed after one year by being transferred to another CPS department. The end of the scheme would hinder DEA control over its dismissal processes. On receiving a response from the PBS, Tange sought Keith Waller's advice before drafting his next submission. Waller was one of a small group of well-established senior diplomats and he was knowledgeable about recruitment operations. Tange was seeking specific advice from Waller about how the department could maintain control over its staffing practices within the framework of new PBS guidelines. Waller advised that there were certain methods that could be utilised to maintain that control, and he provided a selection methodology designed to achieve such an outcome.

6) Procedure - After studying this, I think the procedure would be as follows –
   a) [Another bureaucrat] and I [Waller] see all applications. We have in the past seen all public service applicants so we should be no worse off here.
   b) Panel set up in each state consisting of Tucker, Public Service Inspector [PSI] and Waller for preliminary interviews.
   c) Department then acts on the short list by seminars or other methods. PSI Canberra might profitably be associated here. This and a) are not in section 47 [CPS employment] procedures.

\(^{30}\) 'Memorandum to the Secretary, (Department of External Affairs) from Public Service Board (Canberra)’ 6 January 1956 in *Recruitment of Diplomatic Staff*, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1.
Due to the unique authority of the PSB over issues such as CPS staffing and salaries, Tange took on board their suggestions, but he was quick to qualify his acceptance. Armed with Waller's private advice, Tange wrote back to the PBS in 1956 hoping that within the terms of the Public Service Board notice No.1955/10 of 3rd June, 1955, the Board will be able to give the Department [of External Affairs] as much scope as possible to use its own selection techniques.

Maintaining Standards?
The belief that the DEA was the natural environment for the very best and brightest was central to its own self-image. Waller noted with some concern in 1955 that there was a 'belief among some promising Rhodes Scholars that promotion in our Department is likely to be too slow'. Therefore, the efforts made to change recruitment practices in the DEA during the 1950s were as much about maintaining self-perceived standards of departmental elitism, as it was about rectifying serious manpower shortages. The DEA was deliberately elitist in its attitudes towards prospective employees. In the correspondence between Waller and Tange on the issue of staff shortages, Waller described Gordon Low - by that stage a well-established bureaucrat in the Department of Treasury, who would go onto senior positions and overseas appointments – as a DEA cast off. Waller told Tange that he didn’t 'think that unwanted in [D]EA will necessarily be a stigma. It hasn't proved so in the past and other [CPS] departments have gobbled up our rejects, for example Gordon Low to Treasury'.

The DEA also excluded new Australian migrants from employment with the department. Virtually all migrants, particularly from Eastern European backgrounds,

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31 J.K. Waller, 6 February 1956, 'For the Secretary (on return) Recruitment', NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1. It appears that Tange was not completely convinced by Waller's plan and he annotated the memo with the words 'think you are optimistic'.
32 A.H. Tange (Secretary of External Affairs) to The Secretary (Public Service Board), 16 February 1956 in Recruitment of Diplomatic Staff.
33 'Letter to J.K. Waller (Dept. of External Affairs) from Jim McIntyre Australian External Affairs Office', Australia House 23 December 1955, in Recruitment Systems EAO Grade 1. Waller thought that this view was because 'the appreciable size of the post-war intake at the bottom' meant the higher echelons of the Department were still quite young.
34 J.K. Waller 6 February 1956, 'Letter for the Secretary (on return)' in Recruitment Systems EAO Grade 1, NAA: A1838/300.
were considered security risks by ASIO\(^{35}\) because it was alleged that they would be liable to communist subversion. There were also more superficial concerns about the ability of new migrants to properly represent Australia overseas. These concerns ranged from fears that they would not have sufficient knowledge of ‘the Australian way of life’, or that it would be odd for an Australian diplomat to ‘speak English with a heavy accent’.\(^{36}\) This sense of blanket exclusion was also applied to applicants that had been previously rejected by the DEA. When W. Whelan of the Australian Legation to Rio de Janeiro heard about the question of staffing shortages, he was somewhat surprised and wrote to Tange.

My Dear Secretary,
I was a little surprised to learn from your letter of 24 January 1956, file 1260/1, that our Foreign Service is failing to attract sufficient of the right type of applicant. I know that other countries are experiencing difficulties in maintaining the standard of pre-war years, and it would seem that the attractions of their foreign services have not the same appeal in this post-war period as they had in the past. It is difficult to visualise however, how a new service like ours should develop this trend. I was under the impression that in previous years the competition was extremely keen and a rigorous elimination test was necessary before a final selection could be made. This might be true of the candidates who presented themselves in 1953 (for training in 1954) ... I make the suggestion, therefore, that the Department may be able to meet the deficiency, wholly or partly, from a review of the applications of those who just failed to be included in the final five. This may also apply in respect of other years.\(^{37}\)

Wheelan’s suggestions were highly pragmatic, but they also inherently undermined the exclusivity of the DEA.

By 1956, it was decided no longer to advertise new positions as ‘cadets’, but as External Affairs Officer (EAO), Grade 1 (Third Division) and with a higher starting salary. The advertised description of a Grade 1 level DEA position in 1956 emphasised the importance of certain kinds of academic achievement and skills.

**Qualifications** - university degree in arts, economics, law ... preferably at Honour standards. Knowledge of French language desirable.
A special selection board will examine final candidates.\(^{38}\)

**Duties** - collation of information, research, drafting reports and submissions; correspondence and other assistance as directed in regional and technical branches. Postgraduate study if


\(^{38}\) Waller headed the special selection board. This board scrutinised the personal characteristics, background and general demeanour of every applicant.
necessary and general experiences in all aspects of External Affairs work preparatory to
transfer abroad to an Australian diplomatic mission or consular post.39

By 1957, Tange had abolished the original cadet recruitment scheme. None of this
could have occurred without PSB support, but the DEA had carefully manoeuvred in
order to remain in control over its own selection process.

Finding New Recruits
The DEA, and Tange particularly, were often sensitive to accusations of elitism, but
they were also alarmed that they were not attracting the very top graduates as a matter
of course. This anxiety extended to the fact that Australians studying at Oxford,
particularly. Certain senior administrators were in fact dismayed that efforts to recruit
Australian students from Oxford were failing to reap rewards. The situation at Oxford
was repeatedly reported back to Canberra at various stages of the 1950s. Far from
viewing DEA as the creme de la creme, Australian Rhodes Scholars, and some other
Australian students at Oxford, actually held negative opinions about career prospects
in the DEA.

Casey was so concerned by the state of staffing that he began to advocate the
need to target independent secondary schools such as Geelong Grammar School
(GGS) for recruitment purposes. It was his belief that students at GGS, a school of
first choice for children of the Australian elite, were made of the right stuff. This
conclusion rested on its socio-economic exclusivity, its progressive educational
reputation and the personal association between J.R. Darling, the Headmaster, with
powerful individuals such as Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of
Defence, and with politicians, such as Casey himself. Unusual amongst many of his
peers, Darling encouraged his students to see careers in the CPS as a noble and
prestigious vocation in service of the nation. It is therefore no coincidence that
significant numbers of ex-GGS students went onto various careers in the CPS,
particularly with the DEA. Yet, it was never possible that schools such as GGS could
ever provide any guaranteed recruits to the DEA. These students would need to
matriculate and then go onto tertiary studies at various Australian universities. In this

environment, careers in academia, private finance, banking, law, science, medicine or even teaching competed strongly with the CPS for all graduate recruits.40

Casey’s own view was that the right type of candidate would emerge from schools such as GGS is strongly connected to the idea that certain personal characteristics and background were actually more important than top tier academic excellence.41 In 1956 he wrote to Darling to seek advice and assistance about DEA staffing concerns

I have been giving some thought to the problem of keeping up the regular flow of manpower for External Affairs. We have suffered in more recent years from a decline in the number of those coming forward. No doubt one of the reasons is the growing interest [from] private industry ... the department maintains close liaison with universities about likely candidates, but I feel that we should work through the secondary schools as well. Our approach will have to be reorientated, putting the idea of External Affairs service for students as being a vocation to think about and plan for. We have always had persistent correspondence with youngsters in the final stages of their secondary school asking for information about the diplomatic service, but if we can do more to encourage this and guide them, then I think it would be worthwhile. I had thought of enlisting the support of the Headmaster’s conference, perhaps addressing the next session, but if it meets only once a year then it might be better for me to write to individual Headmasters. Knowing how heavily External Affairs is already indebted to Geelong Grammar School, I should value your advice.42

Casey's letter is revealing in that it argues that the potential diplomat (even a curious secondary student from GGS), needed to see diplomacy as a ‘vocation’. This would seem to imply in Casey’s view that such a mindset would set them apart from other potential candidates. In response to Casey’s letter, Darling advised him to write to C.H. Gilray, Secretary and Treasurer of Headmaster’s Conference, and place the issue of recruitment into the DEA on the agenda at the next Conference. Casey later wrote to Gilray outlining that he wanted a University graduate with a good Honours degree, but naturally requirements of personality, bearing and address are also of the greatest importance ...Naturally we do not wish to recruit exclusively from the [Greater] Public schools but experience has shown that this is one of the best recruiting grounds.43

41 Waller, A Diplomatic Life: Some Memories, p. 2.
Gilray asked Casey if someone from the DEA could address their next meeting in May 1957 at Geelong Grammar. There was some hope that Casey himself might have addressed the meeting, but D.A. Hay, himself a GGS Old Boy, eventually addressed the Headmasters Conference on behalf of the DEA.

On recruitment – as on so many aspects of his portfolio – Casey was tireless in building networks and garnering advice and support. Although his letter to Gilray indicated his desire to recruit Honours level graduates (typically in Law, Economics and the Arts), he confessed in a 1957 letter to Sir William Slim, the Australian Governor General, that ‘in actual fact we are not very particular about what degree they take’. Given his own background, Casey valued technical degrees such as engineering, pure science and agricultural science highly. He wrote to Slim that it ‘is going to be the practical professions and occupations that are going to represent the constructive force that is going to strengthen Australia – not the law or the other polite professions’. Casey was in fact generally alarmed by the fact that the Russians were producing far more technical graduates in science and engineering than the West, and he feared the consequences of future Soviet domination of these particular professions. Casey’s attitude towards graduate recruitment into the DEA might appear at first somewhat contradictory. Yet he was seemingly assured in his personal assessment that Geelong Grammar, a bastion of Australian ruling class privilege, naturally produced the right type of person for the DEA, whatever the degree they went on to take at university. His acceptance of both propositions would appear to be almost mirror reflections of Casey’s own privileged background, and educational experiences. Despite Casey’s concerns about the Soviets, his own efforts to address staffing concerns only encouraged a more formalised if sometimes contradictory marriage of elitist notions, personality and technical skills. Any open shift in the selection criteria towards recruits with technical degrees might have been considered counterproductive to the image that the DEA wanted to project.

45 Ibid.

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DEA recruitment missions and university fact-finding tours ultimately focused on specific areas of departmental interest; the top Australian universities, Oxford and Cambridge, and the Australian independent school system. In 1956, H. Neil Truscott, Assistant Secretary Administration, visited all the Australian universities in order to make contacts with academic staff and potential recruits. The results of this university tour offer insights into the recruitment problems facing the DEA. Truscott wrote that:

Between 20th and 29th June I visited all Australian Universities, except the New England University, and interviewed faculty members, student counsellors and students to keep before them the fact that the Department offers worthwhile career opportunities. I drew attention to the new recruitment system which carried a higher commencing salary than had previously been the case ….. At present over half the students in some Arts faculties are under bond to the State Education Departments, and many others are committed in some way. The total number of good and uncommitted students is very small and with competition keen from private industry we cannot hope for much increase in our recruitment in the immediate future.46

Truscott also confessed that Law students from Sydney University would be far more interested in the opportunities offered in local private practice than working for the DEA. He also noted that the starting salary offered by the DEA was virtually identical to that being offered by the Ford Motor Company.47

In a 1958 letter to Casey, Frederick Alexander, Professor of Modern History at the University of Western Australia, bemoaned in some detail the negativity and reluctance of his most promising graduates to consider employment with the DEA. Many of these graduates had specifically sought him out for careers advice and were resistant to the idea of the DEA. As a prominent member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), Alexander had a keen interest in the operations of the DEA.

The overall situation worries me a good deal. I myself believe that the substantial development in Australian foreign policy over the last twenty years owes a great deal to the quality of the work done by officers of the Department of External Affairs. I have, indeed, done my best to emphasise this in my own writings – in the introductory chapter of the recent AIIA *Australian in World Affairs 1950-1955* volume, for example, and I should be extremely unhappy to think that any falling-off in the quality of recruitment might prejudice continuation of this.48

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47 Ibid.
The DEA was not just struggling to compete with the private sector; it was not able to provide superior employment conditions likely to attract those graduates still deciding their future careers. Despite these revelations, men such as Waller retained their interest in potential recruitment from Oxbridge.49

Selection Criteria
The selection criteria used in DEA recruitment attempted to establish the professional qualities of the potential applicant, but as previously outlined, this process also sought to maintain what were considered to be high and distinctive standards. By 1962, the questionnaire form sent to nominated referees outlined what the Department was seeking.

The qualifications for which the Department is looking and on which your comments would be helpful include:

a) Character
b) Intellectual attainments and capacity, including applicant’s ability to express his/her thoughts clearly.
c) Judgement – the ability to analyse a problem clearly and reach a sound conclusion.
d) Initiative – the ability to get things done.
e) Leadership and willingness to accept responsibility.
f) Ability to get on well with people of different nationalities.
g) Organising and administrative ability.
h) Interest in current domestic and international events and their historical background.50

Tange provided more specific criteria to the selection committee. The following can be thought of as being hidden criteria for any applicant attending selection interview with the DEA in 1962.

1. General: Please look for men or women in whom you can see evidence of the following qualifications –
   a) Integrity and strength of character which included qualities such as reliability, determination, sense of purpose and moral courage;
   b) A basically sincere approach to government service and to a career in the Department of External Affairs.
   c) Intellectual capacity. Prime facie, a good honours graduate should have preference over a pass graduate. Pass or honours, we seek persons who have clear minds and enquiring minds, who can analyse the problem excitedly; who can originate ideas and express his or her thoughts with clarity and relevance, orally and in writing; and to show intellectual interest going beyond their compulsory curriculum;

49 'J.K. Waller (Assistant Secretary) Memo to Senior External Affairs Representative (London)’ Recruitment of External Affairs Officers, 4 January 1957, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1. See also O.L. Davis (Senior External Affairs Representative, Australian External Affairs Office, Australia House) to The Secretary (Department of External Affairs), Recruitment of External Affairs Officers, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1. In 1957, Australia House in London was aware of only one individual that had contacted them about potential employment with the Department. This was Mr. R.R.C. de Crespigny from Clare College, Cambridge.
d) **Judgement**: the ability to offer a sound conclusion on matters where facts are unclear and where consideration conflict, making it necessary to distinguish the important from the unimportant, the relevant from the irrelevant;

e) Initiative, energy and perseverance; the ability to see what needs to be done and do it without waiting to be told;

f) A sense of humour (not an essential and not as a test of social affability, though some indication of the equanimity in the absence of pomposity and conceit);

g) The ability to get on with, and communicate successfully with, people of different nationalities which requires among other things, the representational qualities of an agreeable personality and acceptable manners;

h) Leadership in organising and administrative ability;

i) Interest in current domestic and international events from the Australian point of view;

j) Good health - physical and psychological.

Tange also instructed the selection committee that applicants should be excluded if they lacked emotional nervous balance, or were thought to have a chip on their shoulder. Clearly, applicants were to be under close observation – any wavering or uncertainty on their part, was to be detected as a matter of priority. Although the preference was for applicants under 25 years of age, Rhodes Scholars, language students, Doctors or Members of the Armed services could all be considered beyond this age limit. When Tange issued these instructions in 1962, the special skills being sought were economists and language speakers (French, Spanish, Russian, Indonesian, Chinese or Japanese). Yet, the selection process with DEA also reflected Departmental self-perceptions. For instance, in 1962 Tange also instructed the selection committee that

[Care] should be taken not to give undue weight to the quality of good manners and address in relation to other stipulated qualities which cannot be acquired by experience. It is important to verify that there is more seriousness of purpose in [an] applicant than in the selection of diplomacy as a career which fits his social and educational background. A well mannered dilettante is no more desirable than an insensitive roughneck.51

Tange’s instructions show that the DEA considered the importance of personal qualities, but they also suggest that he had faith in those from the department sitting on the selection board would not only recognise the characteristics he was highlighting, but know when an applicant should be rejected. Such wide powers of discretion were important in an environment such as the male dominated and conservative DEA. First, it allowed refusal on grounds related to Cold War concerns, second, it enabled the DEA to keep out individuals they considered at odds with their departmental culture, for example, migrants, or young single women. Tange and the

51 A.H. Tange (Secretary Department of External Affairs), Restricted - Recruitment of External Affairs Officers Grade 1 1962 Directive to Selection Committee File No. 1260/1, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1.
selection panel clearly understood what they were seeking and what they were not. For instance, in 1958 the DEA rejected Jill Ker Conway, subsequently a successful historian and feminist intellectual in North America. Conway was considered intellectually aggressive, and due to her attractiveness, the DEA selection panel thought she would be married in a year. The almost complete absence of female diplomats in the mid-1950s reflects other dimensions of this cultivated professionalism. Those women who did successfully gained employment in the late 1940s and into the 1950s certainly faced a sexist environment. In late 1949, Coral Bell was being considered for a posting to New York, but Keith ‘Mick’ Shann resisted this.

Coral Bell is more experienced and balanced ... but women do not fit in here. To begin with, they are usually overawed and bad in committees, and secondly they do present a very real problem personally in New York. It’s no place for the single female non-glamorous type.

This sexism gives a strong impression that women were largely unwanted by the Department and would be marginalised even if they were employed. It must be highlighted that Jill Ker Conway was rejected in spite of the fact that she had received a university medal.

Other applicants to the DEA satisfied the explicit and hidden selection criteria with little tangible effort. When Gregory Clark attended a short interview at Australia House in London, Keith Shann and Keith Waller interviewed him. According to Clark, he could not recall being asked any questions about foreign affairs by either of these senior Australian diplomats. However, Shann and Waller were very interested in the fact that Clark was an Oxford graduate. He recalls that after leaving his interview he was in no doubt that he was considered a desirable applicant. Ironically, Clark was not greatly enthusiastic about a career in foreign affairs and his decision to apply for a position with the DEA was motivated by the desire to leave the UK and return home to Australia.

A check with Australia House in London told me there were two positions I could apply for and get accepted for while still in England. One was with the Melbourne Tramways Board. The other was with the Australian Department of External Affairs. The choice was not as easy as it sounds. I had little interest in foreign affairs, even though I enjoyed languages and travel.

54 Ibid, pp. 41 - 42.  
55 Ibid.
Apart from anything else, the Queensland farm upbringing had given me a strong dislike for office work – a dislike that remains with me.56

The 1962 criteria and Tange’s supplementary instructions to the selection committee appear to be quite specific, but most of these traits were intangible. This enabled the selection committee to include those that fitted their mould and exclude other applicants, even those with first-class honours and language skills.

The Chosen Few

The DEA selection process did not end after being interviewed. In 1962, after short lists were compiled ‘two days further [of] selection processes’ took place in Canberra.

The number of finalists varies according to the number and standard of applicants but it is usually about 20 including 3 to 4 women. Finalists are given about a week’s notice of the subjects [for] three seminars, dealing with aspects of International affairs, in which they are required to participate in three separate groups. As the majority of candidates [are] final year undergraduates they are told they are not expected to disrupt university studies in view of the impending final examinations, by doing a lot of preparation for the seminars. Members of the selection committees observe [the] candidate’s performance at the seminars which are conducted by Assistant Secretaries of the Department. In addition, candidates are set written papers dealing with an analysis of statistics and a précis exercise, further personal interviews are held if necessary.57

Roger Holdich’s experiences illustrate some of the contradictions of the recruitment practices. Holdich worked in the department from 1959 to 1976, and later served as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 1975 to 1976, then headed the International Division of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and from 1989 to 1995 was the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. In 1959, he attended the second phase of recruitment in Canberra. He recalled significant sections of the process that involved detailed written responses. Yet, he also remembered that all candidates were expected to attend a cocktail party as part of the selection process, under the observation of psychiatrist.58 If a candidate was eventually offered a position with the DEA, they were indeed fortunate. For example, in 1959, one thousand applicants were culled back to one hundred by a second interview; only 30 of these 100 candidates were invited to attend the Canberra based selection process.59

58 Interview by Adam Henry with Roger Holdich, Canberra, 16 March 2009.
59 Ibid. Holdich indicated that he was somewhat unsure as to why he was selected over other applicants, but believed that presentation and personality seemed important to the overall process.
If a candidate was chosen after attending the Canberra selection process, they were then expected to undergo a year of training. By 1959, this training programme had been modified following the abolition of the original cadet scheme in 1957. Before this time a specialised diplomatic course had existed at Canberra University College (CUC), where diplomatic cadets took classes in subjects such as Economics, Australian Studies, French, Political Science and International Relations.\textsuperscript{60} Despite the professional exclusivity of the DEA, the life of a young Australian diplomat in Canberra was not glamorous. The Australian capital city during the 1950s was not very appealing to recruits from places such as Sydney or Melbourne. In 1957, Gregory Clark recalled his training period and lamented that Canberra

\begin{quote}

in those days was a town of sheep fields, a few scattered monumental buildings and about 30,000 people...Most of our first year was spent in a fairly useless round of Departmental training trips, in-house work rotation, and desperately laboured hostel parties where the men outnumbered the women by about five to one ...Fortunately we also had the chance to do some courses at the local Canberra University College.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

Geographical isolation, social monotony and spartan living conditions made lasting impressions on recruits such as Clark who had come to Canberra in order to begin their diplomatic careers.

Once selected the new recruits undertook twelve months of diplomatic training. It was only after completing this year that they could expect to start their first DEA assignment at home or be posted overseas. In 1962 the following courses were in operation:

1) \textbf{Induction course}. This occupies the first week and is designed to introduce the trainee to the functions of the Department and the place of the External Affairs officer as a member of the public service.

2) \textbf{International economics}. 17 weekly lectures each of one hour duration.

3) \textbf{International law}. Nine weekly lectures each of 1 1/2 hours duration followed by an examination of two hours.

4) \textbf{Diplomatic practice}. 15 weekly lectures and written exercises followed by specialised exercises at intervals throughout the year.

5) \textbf{Academic course}. Normal university lectures and tutorials in international affairs and a language with usual annual examinations. The selection of a

\textsuperscript{60} Many of these subjects were continued in one form or another after the cadet scheme was abolished in 1957. Some of the lecturers at CUC during this time were individuals such as Heinz Arndt (Economics); Finlay Crisp (Australian Politics); Alan Watt (International Relations); and Manning Clark.

language depends on the trainee's previous language study and the department requirements.

6) **Administration.** Short courses in financial procedures and communications practice.

7) **General.** An educational tool of industrial, agricultural and scientific organisations occupies three weeks and familiarisation visits are paid to certain allied government departments in Canberra.

8) **Diplomatic procedure.** Throughout their first year, the trainees work full-time except when required to [attend] lectures, [on] a desk in regional and functional branches of the department, under [the] close supervision of their section and branch heads. Experience is gained [in various] branches during the year.62

Despite the technical nature in some areas of study, there was a strong probability that most of these skills would not be required to any significantly high degree in future diplomatic careers. Yet success in the designated courses was one way to impress senior Departmental figures and pave the way for the first overseas postings. While the procedures of academic rigour were seemingly important to the DEA, individual academic failure could be accommodated if the person concerned had other merits. For example, when two recruits failed the course *Economics B* taught by Professor Heinz Arndt, he sent an angry letter to the DEA. Arndt complained about the slack efforts made by these two students. There was a prospect that both trainee diplomats could face serious consequences for their academic failure. First, they could have been asked to resign or made to retake *Economics B*. Second; there was also the possibility of postponing their first overseas posting, delaying future promotion and placing negative assessments on their permanent file. The reaction to Arndt’s letter of complaint displayed a rather ambiguous attitude toward academic achievement and even Arndt’s course. D.O. Hay wrote to James Plimsoll (then Acting Secretary) that

> [o]ne may question whether the Economics B course is a useful one. My own impression is that it is not and I am sending a separate note on its future. But this is hardly relevant. The point appears to be that neither Richie nor Ride has made any serious attempt to get a pass. Others have made the attempt and we don't have bad reports of them. The alternatives seem to be: a. Insist that Ride and Richie pass economics before being posted, by making them sit next year; b. If they fail this year, to delay further posting for another year as an indication of the Department's displeasure, but don't make them sit again;

> c. Content ourselves with a powerful blowing up and a notation on their assessment reports, but give up the attempt to make them pass economics and let them be eligible for posting in the normal course.

---

You might like to see both men before deciding on what to do. I have not yet seen them and would not make a recommendation without doing so.\textsuperscript{63}

James Plimsoll (the Acting Secretary) seemed aware of the major reasons for the academic failure of these two young recruits. Although concerned that neither were taking their training particularly seriously, he was prepared to largely overlook the root causes of such behaviour in hope of future improvements.

Mr Hay,

Richie has never been able to get to grips with the economics course - he does not seem to understand the language. I have some sympathy with him, but he obviously should have talked to someone sooner in the Department about it, and get some guidance. Both Ride and Richie seemed to have rather a playboy life and to have done little work on their study courses. It is not their failure alone that worries me, but their attitude, which does not bode well for the future. I would like to see Richie put for a few months under Charles Kevin (who is willing to take him) and made the subject of a report on how he's shaping up in political work. Richie seems to me to need constant encouraging and babying from above, but he cannot expect that forever. I would post Ride, but tell him his future promotion will probably be delayed.\textsuperscript{64}

While the issue of Ride and Richie did at least spark some Departmental soul-searching, it was not exactly unusual for new diplomats to fail aspects of the compulsory training course. Apart from isolated cases, academic failure (particularly in economics) posed no obstacle to a future diplomatic career (See Table 2.)

Table 2: Academic Failure and Promotion.\textsuperscript{65}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W.D. Pritchett</td>
<td>Failed economics (passed second attempt)</td>
<td>Promotion delayed 10 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.E. Ryan</td>
<td>Failed economics</td>
<td>Promotion delayed 7 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss R.P. Thompson</td>
<td>Failed economics (passed second attempt)</td>
<td>Promotion delayed 10 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Rogers</td>
<td>Failed economics (passed third attempt)</td>
<td>Promotion delayed 12 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.O. Goldsmith</td>
<td>Failed all subjects</td>
<td>Compulsory transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. T. Battersby</td>
<td>Failed all subjects</td>
<td>Resigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Hill</td>
<td>Failed one subject</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Fernandez</td>
<td>Failed one subject</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Parkinson</td>
<td>Failed one subject</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Handmer</td>
<td>Failed one subject</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Brady</td>
<td>Failed one subject (passed on second attempt)</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Nicholson</td>
<td>Failed one subject (passed on second attempt)</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss P. Williams</td>
<td>Failed one subject</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Hickey</td>
<td>Failed one subject</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Woodward</td>
<td>Failed one subject</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Ashwin</td>
<td>Failed one subject (passed on second attempt)</td>
<td>Promotion not delayed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arguably, those that failed a subject or subjects had one great advantage; they had been chosen by the DEA in the first place. They exhibited the x-factor personality that the selection committee had liked in the beginning and that singled them out as a

\textsuperscript{63} D.O. Hay, 4 November 1957, In confidence for Acting Secretary (James Plimsoll), Ride and Richie - Economics B, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid. See Annotated note by 'Acting Secretary (James Plimsoll) for Mr. Hay', 11 November 1957.

\textsuperscript{65} H. Neil Truscott (Assistant Secretary Administrative Branch) for The Secretary, 14 November 1957, In Confidence Recruits who have failed in university examinations, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1.
potential diplomat. If being a diplomat requires the ability to learn standard skills, engage with people and carefully follow instructions, failure in a training course might not be particularly important. The life of a diplomat like any other bureaucrat is not one of individual intellectual pursuits; they needed to adhere to authority, follow instructions and implement government policies.

Diplomatic Life and Departmental Attitudes
Once the twelve-month training course was completed, the young diplomats moved onto their first placement with the Department. The main ambition of any new diplomat was to secure their first overseas placement. Given its chronic staffing shortages and a refusal to fill positions at the expense of diminishing elite (if self-perceived) standards, the administrative workload of the Department and its staff throughout this period was increasing. By the late 1950s, ongoing concerns about relations with South East Asia had inspired an expansion of Australian diplomatic representation into the region. Tange argued that this occurred because Casey had a ‘single minded idea that our future lay with Asia’.

With these growing administrative responsibilities, the expectations of Departmental performance were also increasing despite the fact that the resources to achieve this remained relatively modest. The DEA under Tange remained a work in constant progress. From the early 1950s, overseas diplomats faced communication barriers that hampered their efforts. For one, the DEA lacked resources, overseas infrastructure, independent sources of information and even established procedures. Pierre Hutton, a young diplomat in the early 1950s recalled that

no system of Ministerial directives to posts setting down Australia’s goals in bilateral relations yet existed. For many more years, the broader challenge of engaging Heads of Mission in dialogue on foreign policy developments and priorities would remain intractable. A post did not yet send to the Department an annual review reporting on a year’s activities, making

66 Interview by Adam Hughes Henry with Gordon Murphy, Canberra, 31 September 2008. Murphy is a former Deputy Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) and Military Attaché to India and Indonesia.

67 ‘Interview with Sir Arthur Tange’, Canberra Thursday 11 April 1996 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/1Box 4, pp.2-5

suggestions for improving the bilateral relationship and, hopefully, drawing guidance from Canberra for future work.\textsuperscript{69}

The daily operations in some of Australia’s overseas diplomatic missions were also potentially difficult. Pierre Hutton reminisced about a young and inexperienced colleague who found himself the sole Australian representative on the UN mediation group for the Balkans. Forgotten by his superiors and fearing the consequences of making a mistake, Hutton's colleague ‘asked by cable for either instructions [from Canberra] or a crystal ball’.\textsuperscript{70} Australian diplomats overseas were expected to act on the instructions of their Head of Mission. Even within posts, it was unlikely that the Head of Mission would be in regular contact with the DEA Secretary. The possibility of enthusiastic junior diplomats inadvertently overstepping their authority was actually high. Hutton recalled that a tendency to engage in too much independent thought was dangerous to one’s career. He reminisced that the opinions of one particular young diplomat saw him recalled to Canberra to receive a personal dressing down from then Secretary, Alan Watt.

[Having] ...incurred the wrath of his first Head and Deputy Head of Mission ...He was sent back to Canberra to receive the stern reproof of the Secretary of the Department, Watt, who was shaken enough to refer to the episode in his memoirs.\textsuperscript{71}

Australian diplomats also faced austere living conditions in postings such as Thailand, Burma or the Philippines. When Hutton complained in 1952 that he had not the means to furnish his household in Thailand, a ‘paper wrapped parcel was sent by sea [from Australia] … containing cheap steel cutlery and glass tumblers. The later [arrived] in sharp pieces’.\textsuperscript{72}

Although Tange worked to develop a professional diplomatic service, he faced significant structural obstacles in addition to ongoing staffing shortages. In terms of its overseas infrastructure and administrative processes, the Department inherited by Tange from Watt was still primitive. Despite its claim of superior foreign affairs knowledge and expertise as evidenced in its recruitment concerns, the DEA also faced

\textsuperscript{69} Pierre Hutton, ‘After the Heroic Age and Before Australia’s Rediscovery of Southeast Asia’ in Hugh Dunn (ed.), \textit{Australians in Asia Series No.20,} Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations Queensland: Griffith University November 1997, p.14.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, p.15. Hutton was originally set to be posted to Indo-China in 1952, but his French Christian name saw him sent to Thailand.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, p.18. This is reminiscent of W. MacMahon Ball’s unhappy pleas from Indonesia in November 1943 regarding a shortage of government stationary and the dire financial situation he faced.
competition on the international stage from the Department of Trade. Tange considered Sir John Crawford, its Secretary, to be a ‘trail blazer’, due to the completion of Australia’s 1957 trade treaty with Japan. Yet he resented the rivalry, particularly in relation to Trade’s activities in Asia, and Tange attributed total blame for this situation on the competitive nature of John ‘Black Jack’ McEwen, Minister for Trade, and Crawford’s own non-cooperative attitude. Tange’s rather stinging personal assessment also reveals another factor contributing to the perceived rivalry, for example, we see strong tension between the specialist and tightly defined economic focus of the Department of Trade, and the more generalist tendencies of the elitist and Cold War conscious DEA, each wanting to be preeminent in guiding Australia’s international interests.

Yet the clever, ambitious, ill-tempered and often controlling Tange was in charge of a fledgling diplomatic corps lacking overseas clout, and holding barely disguised notions of superiority over other CPS departments such as Trade. The Department of Trade could boast of successful direct contact with the Japanese and Chinese that resulted in significant economic relations; the DEA had no such comparable triumphs. Trade might have had some very genuine reasons for not seeking assistance from Tange and the DEA. While the Cold War, communism in South East Asia, the UN, relations with the US or UK preoccupied the DEA; the Department of Trade was preoccupied with increasing national wealth. If the Department of Trade did not appreciate the true nature of international diplomacy in the Cold War; the DEA did not appreciate or understand the reality of Australia’s international commerce. Certainly, a significant aspect of the tensions between Trade and the DEA stemmed from differing perceptions about elitism. While Trade might have believed that those that worked for the DEA were perhaps more refined in their approach to diplomacy, they certainly did not accept that they were inferior. Despite their ability to get things done, the DEA still would have looked down on those

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73 'Interview with Sir Arthur Tange', Canberra, Thursday 11 April 1996, p.2-5 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/1Box 4.

74 Interview by Adam Hughes Henry with Stuart Harris, Australian National University, August 2008. Harris was the first Secretary (1984-88) of the combined Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) not to have come through the ranks of the DEA. He recalled in the 1950s that Trade had a more direct and blunt approach to the way it conducted itself on the international scene. It is likely that DEA looked down on this attitude and any interference from Trade in its own diplomatic activities.
working within the Department of Trade. This was also something of a bureaucratic turf war between Tange and Crawford. It also reflected the construction of new approaches to Australian international diplomacy shaped by a small network of emerging elites in Canberra.

Tange argued in 1996 that Australian diplomacy in the 1930s and immediate post-war period was nothing more than glorified trade policy. By 1964, Tange felt he had guided the Department to new heights of administrative structure and discipline. This would appear to be an accurate assessment supported by many former diplomats and scholars. The rise of the professional career diplomat from this time onwards certainly indicates a changed administrative culture. When Waller was appointed to Washington in 1964, it was suggested that it marked the coming of age of Australia's fledgling diplomatic service ... Mr. Waller is the first Australian career diplomat to gain this post - now rated as important as the High Commissionership in London.

Tange also boasted that after he was appointed as Secretary the DEA 'developed what can be labelled a uniquely Australian diplomatic style'. The merits of this assessment are somewhat ambiguous. Even with the rise of the professional career diplomats to ambassadorial positions overseas, young diplomats entering this new era of Australian diplomacy faced a new professional world. In this world they needed to be mindful of politics and ideology, and where many senior administrators and Departmental officers during the period, such as Waller 'were, instinctively, traditionalist and conservative'.

In 1964, Tange ordered a detailed study into the educational backgrounds of diplomatic recruits within the DEA. This study is remarkable for three reasons. First, it occurred nine years after Tange had first begun efforts to improve employment conditions for new recruits. Second, the study largely confirmed that accusations of

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75 'Interview with Sir Arthur Tange' Canberra Thursday 11 April 1996 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS 9847/2/1 Box 4, p.4.
76 Wallace Crouch, 'They Make our Voice Heard all over the Globe', *Daily Telegraph* 9 June 1964 in Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS9847/2/10 Box 5, p.14. Arguably, Keith Officer was the first Australian career diplomat. He was Australian Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington in the 1930s.
77 Ibid.
78 Pierre Hutton, 'After the Heroic Age and Before Australia's Rediscovery of Southeast Asia' in Hugh Dunn (ed.), *Australians in Asia Series No.20*, p.15.
elitism were not without merit. Third, the study revealed that the DEA continued to experience issues, such as high staff turnover, well into the 1960s. The study revealed that there had been 213 graduates recruited between the years 1943-1964. Of the 189 recruits that were educated in Australia, 135 were from selective NSW-Victorian and wealthy fee paying independent secondary schools. The study also revealed that the chances of rapid promotion for the 213 diplomatic cadets recruited between 1943-1964 were slim.\textsuperscript{79} This essentially confirmed many of the suspicions held by Rhodes scholars about the slowness of promotion within the DEA in the mid-1950s were correct. By 1964, only seven individuals recruited as cadets had become Heads of Mission, two had achieved Grade 7 and only five had achieved Grade 5.\textsuperscript{80} All of these cadets were recruited during the period of 1943 to 1948.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Territory</th>
<th>Numbers of Schools Producing DEA Recruits</th>
<th>EA Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When these figures are broken down into the types of schools and the locations producing the largest amounts of recruits, certain trends emerge. In NSW there is a general trend favouring high fee paying Independent Protestant, Independent Catholic and academically selective secondary schools. In Victoria, a trend favours high fee paying Independent Protestant schools.

\textsuperscript{79} 'Diplomatic Cadet Scheme', 21/12/64 in \textit{Sir Arthur Tange Papers} MS9847/3/2.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid
The study also revealed that by December 1964, only 158 of the 213 recruits offered positions with the DEA had been accepted. The remainder either not accepting their offer of employment, or being unable for some other reason to take up the DEA offer. There was also the difficulty of retaining diplomatic talent that they did attract. Only 48 DEA recruits had by 1964 completed 1 to 7 years in the department, while only seven had completed 10 to 16 years. From this group of 55 cadets, 21 had resigned due to personal circumstances, 27 accepted 'improved positions' or higher paid positions outside of the CPS. Only four left the DEA for improved positions elsewhere in the CPS, while the unfortunate deaths of three other cadet recruits were added to those that had resigned.81

While seven cadets had indeed managed to become Heads of Mission, two achieved Grade 7 and five achieved Grade 5 by 1964, they had all been recruited in the period 1943 to 1948. According to Tange’s study, the reality of recruitment into the DEA was that career advancement and promotion remained a very slow process. By 1964, twenty cadets recruited in the period 1943-50 had reached Grade 4, while 45 cadets recruited in the period 1943-57 had reached Grade 3. Amongst the ranks of this Grade 3 group was a cadet recruited in 1943. By 1964, thirty-nine cadets recruited in the period 1955-61 had reached the rank of Grade 2. Amongst this Grade 2 group was a cadet recruited in 1948. Of those recruited in the period 1960-64, thirty-nine held the rank of Grade 1. While working conditions such as pay had indeed been

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81 This was statistically tabulated under the heading of 'wastage'!
improved, by the mid-1960s, the question of staffing remained a thorny issue for the DEA and certainly the process of reorganisation begun in the mid-1950s had not resolved it. Yet, the process of reorganisation had also allowed the DEA to effectively entrench perceptions about itself into the recruitment process itself.

Conclusions
Tange’s changes introduced to address dire staffing shortages were premised on the need to make the Department a more attractive employment prospect for young graduates. By the late 1950s, many of the concerns which had forced the new recruitment regime in the first place had not diminished. As the 1950s moved into the early 60s, the issue of staffing and recruitment remained a core administrative concern of the DEA. Yet, many of the reasons for not considering a career with the Department in the mid-1950s were almost the same in 1964.

1. Students are deterred from applying by –
   a) Statistics of numbers rejected;
   b) Emphasis on first class honours;
   c) State school products “need not apply”;
   d) Disgruntled ex EA people who say ideas are suppressed …
   e) Tedium of paper work (e.g. ETA) which caused resignations last year (Cordell);
   f) The large number who are bonded – some just “drift” into teacher bonds;
   g) Among some politically active students the idea of working for the government’s policies would bring scorn upon one’s head.82

The changes introduced to address staffing concerns never plugged the gap between numbers of recruits and empty positions. Departmental enquiries into its recruitment situation consistently illustrated the incompatibility of its elitist self-perceptions and this reality. The reluctance to reconsider candidates that had been narrowly rejected, or that employees in other CPS Departments had useful professional skills comparable with the DEA, were connected to this elitism. There were clear limits to what the DEA would actually do to correct its dire staffing problems. At all stages, the notion of the right personality and background remained firmly entrenched into all departmental thinking about staffing shortages. Ironically, staff shortages enabled the DEA to improve employment conditions such as pay, but also protect its departmental culture by controlling offers of employment to only the right types of applicants. The maintenance of Departmental standards meant that staffing shortages could never really be corrected. In effect, its continuing recruitment focus on very narrow pools of

82 A.H. Tange (Secretary), Comments by Cadets 5/2/64, NAA: A1838 1260/1/15 Part 1.
potential talent in Australia and overseas (and the infatuation with personality and background), actually made certain that staffing shortages would continue throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s.

The selection process effectively excluded large numbers of highly capable applicants and many diplomatic recruits were ultimately chosen because they were considered compatible with an elite Departmental ethos, or thought to be from the right sort of background. They entered a department where career advancement was likely to be slow, and the positions of Departmental power were dominated by an entrenched circle of senior diplomats and administrators. Those who entered this environment were expected to accept not only the attitudes of these senior diplomats, and those ideas dominating Australian Cold War thinking, but also the idea of being an elite within the CPS. While the Department did take certain steps to redress its recruitment concerns such as improving salaries, it never abandoned the belief that only certain individuals were fit to work for External Affairs. As a result, the Department endured ongoing staff shortages, but this situation was ultimately tolerated due to a determination to protect themselves from what they considered to be second-rate candidates. Most importantly these recruitment measures were part of the consolidation of a new DEA culture established under Casey’s guidance. While administrative reform was undertaken during this period due to staffing shortages, and the expansion of Australian diplomacy overseas, it is also very much connected to ways in which an emerging network of Canberra elites believed that DEA recruits needed to not only satisfy a new type of professional elitism, but also to be reliable cogs within the new Australian foreign policy culture. These recruits, and the process that they all underwent, also exemplify the ways in which a new professional elitism worked closely within the policy limitations, and new networks, of the 1950s anti-communist environment. Therefore, the appointment of Tange, the administrative architect of 1950s DEA reforms, is not exempt from this dimension. Despite occasional reservations he privately expressed about policy during the 1950s, he exemplified all Casey could have wanted from the Secretary of the DEA: a consummate bureaucrat who was trustworthy, publicly discrete, well organised, and able to carry out official policies within the existing political environment. Casey’s
desire for new professionalism, his interest in the creation of new ideas, changing methods, and the formation of new networks connected to foreign policy required administrative cultivation, and the faithful Tange became its most important policy gatekeeper, as such he was Casey’s most trusted ‘straight thinking’ man.
CHAPTER FOUR

A Thinking Man: W.D. Forsyth

I kept this copy of my draft because it was later butchered and the remains 'integrated' with contributions from other services – the usual process.


This chapter continues exploring those themes of transition in Australia’s foreign policy thinking, formulation and networks, through an examination of the professional experiences of W.D. Forsyth. This chapter will therefore further highlight the changing culture, and nature, of the Department of External Affairs during the pivotal 1950s. In looking closely at Casey, as Foreign Minister, and Tange Secretary of DEA, as Casey’s straight thinking man, the previous chapters have highlighted factors which shaped a new approach to policy and Australian diplomacy. In turning now to examine Forsyth, my work seeks to explore the other side of that transition – for example, what departmental practices established in the 1940s were discarded or marginalised in the process of transition. Forsyth is not one of the dominant, or revered, figures of Australian foreign policy, or diplomatic history, but this is not meant to demean his talents, had the circumstances been amenable, Forsyth could easily have been just such a figure. Instead, he is perhaps better seen as one of the professional casualties of the transitional period, not so much as a career abandoned, (a view that might be taken of John Burton, for example), or subject to suspicion and political scrutiny, (as in the case of Ric Throssell), but as an active member of the DEA who experienced in often subtle ways, the strictures and expectations of the new anti-communist orthodoxy. In changes of style, analysis, collegiality, patronage and professional conduct, Forsyth experienced the consolidation of what became the ‘usual process’ of policy development in the period covered by this thesis.
Table 2. Career with the Department of External Affairs

1942-44 Research on South East Asia and the Pacific
1944 Adviser at Australian /New Zealand Conferences (Anzac Pact)  
   First Head of Pacific Section
1945 Adviser at United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO)  
   San Francisco  
   Political Adviser to Australian Force Commander, Portuguese Timor  
   Adviser at Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC), Washington DC
1946 Leader of Australian delegation FEAC at Tokyo (consultations with General MacArthur)  
   First Secretary, Pacific Division  
   Assisted Dr Evatt in Washington DC in talks on Pacific Islands Bases negotiations  
   Australian Representative at United Nations Population Commission (New York) (September)  
   United Nations General Assembly, New Guinea Trusteeship Agreement
1947-48 South Seas Regional Commission (became South Pacific Commission)  
   Special Mission to Indonesia (May/June)  
   Counsellor, Australian Embassy, Washington DC  
   United Nations General Assembly
1948-51 First Secretary-General, South Pacific Commission, Noumea
1951-56 Australian Permanent Representative, United Nations, New York  
   Delegate to United Nations General Assembly and Representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council
1956-59 Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs
1959-61 Ambassador, South Vietnam, Minister, Laos (1959-60)
1962 Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs
1963-66 Second term as Secretary-General, South Pacific Commission
1967-68 Ambassador, Lebanon
1969 Canberra, sick-leave, retirement October 1969


Arguably, without a change of government in 1949, Forsyth could have become one of the towering figures of the DEA in the 1950s. His own liberalism, and intellectual capacities, had certainly brought him rapid professional rewards, and career advancement, during the 1940s. With the election of the Menzies government, he instead gradually became a peripheral and marginalised figure within the Australian foreign policy establishment during the 1950s. Forsyth was very representative of the philosophies of the previous era, a personal beneficiary of its own particular networks, a purveyor of specialist knowledge connected to his years of academic study, and believer in the liberal internationalist ideals of the period, in
short, Forsyth embodied the administrative culture, and diplomatic spirit, of Evatt’s department. Yet his professional perspectives contrasted with the experiences of the new diplomatic recruits whose careers would bloom during the 1950s. By examining Forsyth’s experiences, his career offers a valuable perspective not only about the transition from Chifley to Menzies, but the suffocating death of liberal internationalism within the Cold War orientated DEA, and in the wider networks being established at this time. Increasingly ill at ease with the DEA during the 1950s, particularly the later period of the decade, Forsyth battled to find the balance between the liberalism that served him well during the 1940s, and the more rigid Cold War environment of the 1950s. By exploring the administrative aspects of Forsyth’s diplomatic experiences, his often problematic attempts to be incorporated into the dominant departmental networks of influence, and his often self-conscious efforts to influence to internal DEA policy debates, many of the themes and issues raised in the proceeding chapters can be seen in action. The transitions already identified – ideological, organisational, professional and political – had to be navigated by DEA officers, and Forsyth’s carefully preserved records of this period indicate the extent to which he was aware of the significant rupture between new priorities and old.

In examining Casey and Tange, I have identified the measures that were taken to shape and bring coherence to the new orthodoxy of foreign policy design and administrative culture in the 1950s, emphasising the links between each and the transition to a strident Cold War policy that was at once a genuine expression of domestic anti-communism, as espoused by Menzies, and highly sympathetic to Anglo-American attitudes. There was also a strategic dimension to these core concerns, particularly in regard to Australian perceptions of regional security, or more precisely, the perceived lack of security, in the South East Asian region. A valuable perspective is therefore provided by the professional experiences of those officers who had relative seniority in the department of the 1950s, and who had to adjust to these changes in fundamental ways – not just in new government policy agendas, but new styles of bureaucratic practice. As the 1950s progressed there were individuals who sometimes struggled within this changing world, and whose experience testifies to how marked these changes were. Forsyth was one such figure. While many of the
personal accounts of DEA officials in these years focus primarily on their diplomatic experiences, for example, the challenges and opportunities of representing Australia overseas, there are relatively few accounts that enable us to understand the process of policy development, and the ideological atmosphere, within the department. From this perspective, too, Forsyth is a revealing, and a worthy figure of closer examination.

The Rise of a Liberal View

W.D. Forsyth exemplified aspects of a recognisable intellectual liberalism that had informed Australian engagement with international affairs up to the 1940s. Born in 1909, son of a Ballarat stock and station agent, Forsyth benefited from the supportive patronage that characterised academic and research opportunities in the small Australian universities of the inter-war years. While working as a high school teacher, he attracted the patronage of Ernest Scott, Professor of History at the University of Melbourne. Scott’s interests were connected to the study of the British and European colonisation, but they also extended into the new fields of international affairs marked out by the League of Nations Union, the Round Table and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, of which he was an active member and a prominent and respected publicist. Scott’s patronage assisted Forsyth to complete and publish an MA thesis on the paradoxes of colonial authority under Sir George Arthur’s governorship of Van Diemen’s Land. Forsyth also benefited from further patronage by Douglas Copland, Professor of Economics in Melbourne, who helped him secure a Rockefeller scholarship in 1936 to study the connections between immigration and national development at Oxford University. This research was the basis of Forsyth’s second book, The myth of open spaces; Australian, British and world trends of population and migration, published in 1942. After Oxford, Forsyth took up a research fellowship in Melbourne, and in 1940 he became editor of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, a journal which sought to articulate a fresh Australian perspective on social and economic change in the Pacific region. Forsyth considered that his education through those years had ‘provided a substantial background for the understanding of
the national, imperial and revolutionary histories comprising the international relations of our tumultuous century'.

These connections, and his time as a serious scholar marked Forsyth as being from a different world to the later diplomatic recruits, or straight thinking men, that were sought by the DEA in the 1950s. His own experiences of patronage, and of the necessity of maintaining the linkages it established, are important. For example, they occurred within a professional context where formal opportunities and paths of advancement for Forsyth in the 1930s and early 1940s were in fact few. This in itself stands in stark contrast to the challenge of attracting diplomatic recruits from a graduate cohort whose professional and economic opportunities expanded rapidly with post-war Australian prosperity. Forsyth's own liberal perspectives about the forces vying to shape the world, are equally important, particularly in contrast to the highly polarised ideologies of the 1950s. Drawn quickly into wartime government and policy innovation during the 1940s, the 1950s heralded significant changes to the style career Forsyth had previously enjoyed. The post-1949 career pattern – especially for those based in Canberra - would be marked by increased administrative responsibilities, and less of the excitement of the 1940s.

In 1941, W. MacMahon Ball, Professor of Political Science at Melbourne and another early commentator on international affairs, having been placed in charge of radio services for the new Department of Information – established to manage the morale of a total war economy – invited Forsyth to coordinate the Department’s ‘background service’. Forsyth collected and compiled secret and confidential intelligence information. In 1942, he was recruited into External Affairs, serving in the Pacific Branch, rising to its head and attending several conferences relating to the early work of the United Nations. He served as Counsellor at the Australian Embassy in Washington (1947-48) and as Secretary-General of the South Pacific Commission (1948-51). Reflecting on this experience, Forsyth would resist what he saw to be the

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fashionable emphasis on the failings of Evatt as (an admittedly ‘very difficult’) minister), identifying instead his ‘high achievements’ in carving out a new international role for Australia.  

Forsyth came to the transitional period of the DEA after the election of the Menzies government in 1949 with intellectual and diplomatic ‘baggage’ that would ultimately find itself well out of step with the new regime. His experiences to this point had already fostered a series of expectations about what the career of an officer of his seniority might look like, but these were not to be fulfilled in the years of his service to his retirement in 1969. While he rose to the rank of Assistant Secretary (Second Division), his administrative responsibilities and heavy workloads took a toll and by the later 1950s he seemingly longed for the intellectual stimulation of Evatt’s department, or for the challenge and refreshment of a significant overseas posting. In this, he not only faced the almost inevitable narrowing of opportunities for leadership in a department undergoing sustained reform under figures as dominating as Tange, or as skilled in political influence as Plimsoll, but also the frustration of expectations of status that carried over from a much smaller, and much less professionalised corps of diplomats, and a much less diverse field of diplomatic representation. He also saw a significant, and related, recasting of the networks of research and advice that had characterised his move into the public service from the AIIA and the university sector in the 1930s. More significantly, however, he also experienced a change in the character and purpose of the policy formation and advice functions of his department. Forsyth’s own personal papers reveal his efforts at engaging with the strident Cold War environment of the 1950s, the frustration of his efforts to communicate his ideas with colleagues, and the terms in which professional reputations had to be maintained through this period. They also illustrate advice and policy development dominated not necessarily by the innovations of a minister, but by the political expectations of a prime minister.

Communication: Negotiating the Cold War
With his background in research, reflection, and those big ideas and histories of the inter-war and wartime years, Forsyth was accustomed to a form, and test his hypothesis, and consider possible policy options. Meticulous by personality, he had been strongly connected to a pre-1949 academic and diplomatic network, and into the 1950s remained proactive in his efforts to cultivate the development of his ideas within the DEA. Forsyth, as the NLA curator of his papers at the National Library of Australia observes,

kept carbon copies of all his personal letters, typed and handwritten, as well as file copies of official memoranda, reports and so on. He was adept at the use of unofficial channels of communication via handwritten or personally typed letters marked 'personal and confidential' which were not usually destined to form part of the official record. Forsyth not only kept copies of his own 'off the record' letters, he also kept 'personal and confidential' letters he received from colleagues.3

These habits make an invaluable historical record, but they also reveal the experiences of a man who came to understand the potential benefits and pitfalls of circulating ideas among departmental colleagues. External Affairs in the 1950s would prove less receptive to the speculative, reflective approach Forsyth favoured, not just on questions of style but also on political matters closely connected to the needs of the Menzies government.

One clear example of the changing departmental environment within which Forsyth worked in the 1950s is provided by a series of exchanges in 1956, arising from Forsyth being tasked by Tange to write a briefing paper for use by Menzies at the London Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in July.4 At the time, the continued tensions between the Soviets and the Americans showed few signs of subsiding. There was Western concern with developments in Asia, the Communist Party of China now entrenched, and - following French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1955 - communism and Asian nationalism evidently gaining ground. The decline of the old mechanisms of exploitative European colonial control and influence also challenged long established economic relationships, the UK viewing continued control and access over resources and raw materials as being vital for their continued

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3 Ibid.
4 This meeting took place shortly before the Egyptian government (under President Nasser) declared Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
global influence. In Egypt, a new secular Arab nationalism had emerged, demanding economic and political independence from European, primarily British domination. Menzies himself was greatly concerned by developments in Egypt and implications for British prestige should it lose access to the Suez Canal.

Within the British Commonwealth serious tensions over discrimination existed between the UK, the white settler Dominions such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, and the non-white nations of the ‘new’ Commonwealth such as India. On all of these issues, Menzies was conservative, often deeply resistant to changing trends, sympathetic to British and American assessments, and unwilling to compromise on the question of opposing communism. To produce a briefing paper for the Prime Minister was an assignment befitting a diplomat of Forsyth’s rank and experience, but it was not without its potential problems. Given Menzies’ convictions, and the general state of international affairs in 1956, Forsyth’s paper needed to find a careful balance between affirming Menzies personal values, and outlining possible challenges arising in the context of British Commonwealth-based discussions.

Forsyth’s efforts to write this paper reveal the ways in which his more reflective assessments of the international scene were ultimately incompatible with its intended purpose. The paper’s development also illustrated how the DEA hierarchy filtered Forsyth’s ideas and analysis in efforts to make his work acceptable for Menzies. Twenty years later, this process still held significance for Forsyth, as indicated by the annotations made on the documents held in the National Library. On one of his drafts he wrote:

As a record of my own thinking after 4 and a half years at the UN I kept this copy of my draft because it was later butchered and the remains ‘integrated’ with contributions from other services – the usual process.5

Forsyth’s draft entered what he dubbed ‘butchering’, or filtering process, as soon as his work reached the desk of Tange, who then sent the draft to his close friend and colleague, James Plimsoll. Their initial concern was that Forsyth’s draft was too long.

Tange annotated Forsyth’s briefing draft with, 'I have not read [Forsyth's draft]: but it would have to be drastically truncated'.

Yet one major reason why Forsyth had developed such an extended analysis was that he had seized the opportunity to offer a range of reflective, and intellectual themes, relating to the state of the Cold War and international affairs. Many of the themes he explored were connected to communism and suggested Western responses that were reminiscent of the pre-1949 era. Forsyth wrote in one of the most intellectually poignant sections of the briefing draft that fundamental weaknesses [of communism] include the denial that the desire for individual freedom is an essential and natural part of the human personality. This is perhaps the Achilles heel of communism. We cannot too often or too strongly stress the vital difference between the West and the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This is the foundation of our faith and unless it is vigorously renewed and cultivated the West is endangered, even lost. Nor can we afford to deny this in our own dealings whether with our own people or others. Forsyth’s draft suggested that if the West opted only for realist expediency in its fight against communist tyranny without renewing its commitment to core democratic beliefs, it was ‘endangered, even lost’ in offering its political vision to developing nations. As Forsyth noted in conclusion, the vision was not only necessary in dealing with the developing world, but crucial in building domestic support for foreign policy priorities: As Forsyth explained, ‘Nor can we afford to deny this [emphasis on freedom] in our own dealings whether with our own people or others’. Forsyth’s

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6 Ibid.
musings on the universality of individual freedom were not considered appropriate for the briefing draft. Plimsoll later removed the last sentences

Yet it was perhaps not only the reflective nature of Forsyth’s observations that were concerning to his superiors, but the lack of a hard-edged political analysis capable of directly engaging with contemporary questions about communism and Australian regional security. In his draft, for example, Forsyth wrote that it was not the stereotypical conservative capitalists that were most reviled by the Soviets in their propaganda. Instead, the Soviet target was the democratic socialist parties of the West, which – Forsyth judged – posed for them the greatest threat due to the continuing appeal of democratic socialism for the Western working classes. According to Forsyth, it was precisely because such political parties attempted to provide answers to the problems of maintaining human dignity, improving working conditions and maintaining worker satisfaction within the framework of the Western capitalist system, that they were the subjects of Soviet derision. Their very existence, and continued relevance, was seen by the Soviets to dilute the appeal of their revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Such nuanced analysis, however, seemed beside the point of the paper – and hardly necessary for Menzies, who had often expressed deep personal and intellectual antagonism not just towards the ALP as a rival party, but towards democratic socialism itself. Plimsoll editing instantly made a harder edged point, not so much with Forsyth’s analysis of ideological currents, but about the DEA hierarchy of analysing such issues. The nuances of Forsyth were neither required, nor wanted in this particular instance, and Plimsoll annotated Forsyth’s paragraph with:
I think the point is rather that these parties [social democratic parties] blur the distinction between the appeals of communism and the alternative. It is easier for communism to fight an extreme because the line is clearly drawn.\footnote{See W.D. Forsyth, 'Draft Prime Minister's Conference June 1956 I. General Survey – World Politics and Australia's Situation' (Marked Top Secret in red pencil), Policy Papers 1956 in W.D. Forsyth Papers MS 5700/9/5. See also W.D. Forsyth, 'Draft Prime Minister's Conference June 1956 I. General Survey – World Politics and Australia's Situation', Policy Papers 1956.}

In adapting Forsyth's paper to its purpose, so many sections were re-written and their emphases re-qualified that it would have been far more time effective for Tange and Plimsoll to have jointly written the brief themselves.\footnote{Ibid.} In most cases these additions, edits, changes of emphasis and tone significantly altered the final message. Where, for example, Forsyth wrote that:

in Vietnam the position is much stronger than was foreseen at the Geneva conference of 1954. The move to the left in Indonesia in the past six months is not a disastrous one...

Tange recommended to Plimsoll a 'better' formulation, one that certainly reflected the attitudes of Casey towards Indo-China, but also Menzies' political attitudes:

In Vietnam Diem brought energy and courage to lead the resistance to communism and gave his people a confidence that they could survive as a non-communist state. What were the weakest points in South East Asia have been strengthened. But points of weakness remain. Indonesia, where the communists have suffered recent setbacks, nevertheless remains, a source of disquiet to us because of the inefficient and inadequate administration and the unrealistic and muddled policies...\footnote{W.D. Forsyth, 'Draft Prime Minister's Conference. June 1956 I. General Survey – World Politics and Australia's Situation' (Marked Top Secret in red pencil), p.42 of draft.}

The divergence from Forsyth's more liberal interpretation of the Cold War, certainly a genuine expression of views far more consistent with the pre 1949 DEA spirit than afterwards, is contrasted by the careful gate keeping of Tange and Plimsoll. Their efforts to reorganise Forsyth's work is not merely a typical example of bureaucratic practice, but in the content introduced, removed or added, illustrates the generational and professional divide contributing to these obvious differences.\footnote{In retrospect, Forsyth's liberal sentiments were also ill timed in regards to Menzies in 1956. Shortly after the conference in London, the Suez Crises started. As outlined earlier in Chapter Two, Menzies ignored the advice of Casey and the DEA on Suez.}
Examples of editing by Tange and Plimsoll
Forsyth’s language and analysis are confident and often eloquent, but the gulf between his work and the objectives of the intended paper, were wide. The fate of this paper is just one example, among Forsyth’s records, of the difficulty he found with the DEA’s new style.

Forsyth’s difficulties can also be seen in his attempts to engage with the harder-edged strategic aspects of the Cold War by developing conversations with departmental colleagues. Circulating papers and personal notes, he hoped to enter into and generate exchanges over the strategic issues facing Australia. In a paper drafted earlier in 1956, on the question of policies in relation to Singapore and Cyprus, both of which raised questions over self-determination within the context of the British Commonwealth, Forsyth argued that Cold War strategic considerations should at times be given preference over notions of Western liberalism. In ways seemingly at variance with his later paper for Menzies in July, Forsyth argued that to maintain its own freedoms, the West was obligated to hold ‘certain strong points’ no matter what the ‘immediate political reactions’ might be. Singapore and perhaps even Cyprus, he considered, were examples of strong points that ‘must be held’ against communist expansionism no matter what, and in ways that meant local populations may have to forego their specific freedoms in order for the West to theoretically safeguard its own.  

The question of atomic weapons and communism in Asia was another area of reflection for Forsyth. In another paper, drafted around the same time, he attempted an uneasy marriage of his own liberalism with the Cold War mindset. Forsyth’s central ideas on the issue of atomic deterrence were explored through the use of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Atomic weapons and long range bombing deter communist territorial expansion;
Hypothesis 2: The denial (or obstruction) of independent self-government to other nations (particularly in Asia) illustrates that the western concept of democracy and freedom is hollow.

In regard to Hypothesis 1, Forsyth theorised that the H-bomb was so destructive that ‘it deters us [the Western powers] from using it’. Limited violence, such as guerrilla

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11 W.D. Forsyth Assist. Secretary Division II, Singapore (and Cyprus) 30th April 1956 ‘To: The Secretary, Mr Plimso, Mr Shaw, Mr Kevin’, Policy Papers and notes 1956-58 in W.D. Forsyth Papers MS 5700/9/6 Series 9 Box 29.
warfare, could then be used against the West 'with impunity'. Forsyth labelled this the 1st paradox. He wrote that

[t]errorism in restricted areas will not call down the horrors of the bomb either in the area concerned or where it would do most good. [Communists] can make local headway and bit by bit eat away our hold on area after area ... if we yield these bases [such as Singapore] whole areas around them fall into Soviet hands ...

In Hypothesis 2, Forsyth wrestled with Western philosophical notions of the universality of individual freedoms. Here he considered the possibility that this not be applied universally in the strategic fight against global communism. Forsyth wrote that

[i]n order to save freedom some people have to forgo it......In a global situation in which the freedom of many millions - indeed of the whole race - is at stake, the liberty of some thousands in particular vital places must be sacrificed to the extent necessary to the security of that place...

Forsyth labelled this situation as the 2nd paradox.

Clearly, there are contrasts between the sentiments expressed in these papers. Whether they reflect elements of pragmatism, inconsistency, or an honest attempt to meet prevailing expectations and priorities, they show the difficulties Forsyth faced in his engagement with the new dynamics of policy making in the 1950s. This was not a successful intellectual enterprise from Forsyth's perspective, and it was obviously proving difficult for him to find what he perhaps wanted most: an intellectual middle ground, and an open discussions of various ideas. In his briefing for Menzies, Forsyth wrote that should the Western powers treat other nations in ways that were not consistent with core democratic beliefs; these same Western powers might 'be lost'. Only a short time before, he had toyed with the opposite idea. The circulation of these positions among colleagues might suggest either he that was not particularly convinced by his own conclusions, or was uncomfortable with their implications. In 1977, after some years of retirement, Forsyth annotated his note on Singapore and Cyprus. He noted that on major international issues he had been more often wrong than right, and he cited the Singapore/Cyprus note as an example.13

12 Ibid.
13 Forsyth's written annotation is dated 4/7/77.
As with that personal note from April 1956, when Forsyth circulated unsolicited papers to colleagues and superiors he stressed the confidential nature of his reflections, inviting comments to ‘assist his thinking’. This was a trait that had obviously served him well in the pre-1949 era, and it was a method that he continued to use in order to maintain professional contacts with key colleagues and experts. With the decline, if not outright eradication, of the pre-1949 liberal internationalism of the DEA in the 1950s, Forsyth encountered setbacks in continuing to pursue this approach. He was someone who seemingly had difficulty in negotiating a balance between intellectual and departmental interpretations of the Cold War, and in courting the views and opinions of superiors and colleagues who increasingly, as the 1950s progressed, might not agree with his analysis. Frederick Blakeney, one of Forsyth’s peers, recollected that more junior members of the DEA were in the 1950s made to ‘endure a series of trials’ before they could be entrusted with the ‘greater responsibilities’ of diplomacy and policy development, Forsyth’s own experience suggests that even more senior officers were not immune from these tests.14

There were also other questions as to how Forsyth could tap into the new networks of information, research and public relations being established in the 1950s – all of which were increasingly alien from the personalised links with which he had been associated in the 1930s. In 1956, for example, he sought to be closely involved in the development of Australia’s position in relation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), beginning with the circulation of a letter to a wide-range of interested parties, seeking their input:

> [a]s we will very shortly be preparing our [official] brief for the delegation to the Conference on the statute of the Agency (New York September 20 to October 24) the earlier your comments can conveniently be made [on his draft] the more helpful they will be. I would have no objection to you referring the paper to any person with special knowledge in whom you have complete confidence.15

The report he prepared secured him recognition: in 1958 he was sent as an Australian representative to the IAEA conference on ‘The Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy’,

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held in Geneva.14 But the actual drafting of his paper showed tensions between the soliciting of information from senior scientific experts, such as Professor Marcus Oliphant at the Australian National University (ANU), or from the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and a desire to make use of the input from others, including a detailed response from Sir Percy Spender, (Ambassador to USA), when he had initiated the exchange as private correspondence.17 For Forsyth, it would seem, it was hard to reconcile those aspects of his work which relied on personalised insight, with those that were premised on professional objectivity, however, this was strongly connected to the shift in the culture of Australian policy and diplomacy.

Taking its Toll
In the previous chapter, the recruitment process of the DEA revealed notions of an elitist administrative culture as it was applied to expectations of diplomatic cadets. The young diplomat entering the expanding administrative culture of the DEA in the 1950s was expected to conform to a new regime without question. For senior diplomats such as Forsyth, whose careers encompassed the period of transition from the 1940s, the length of their own diplomatic service offered opportunities to reflect on the changing nature of their own careers. By the mid to late 1950s, Forsyth had international experience and widespread personal connections, yet he was becoming dissatisfied with the nature of his administrative responsibilities and even his status within the DEA. He still commanded the gravitas to fill some important roles, but his career, like the DEA itself, was in transition, and in ways that were an increasing physical and psychological burden for him. In 1952-55, as Australian Representative to the UN in New York, he was increasingly distressed by a combination of long work hours and insomnia. In November 1956, he wrote to Tange about his health.

I have had medical advice and I am glad to say that there is nothing wrong constitutionally; the trouble has been a very bad case of fatigue following lengthy periods of overwork resulting in hypertension and phases of exhaustion.17

* Forsyth was nearly a decade older than the Secretary, Arthur Tange. Younger men like Tange and Plimsoll showed no inclination of abdicating their established positions of DEA power.
17 ‘Forsyth to Tange, 30 November 1956, Confidential Personal’ in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57. Forsyth indicated that his condition did not require sedatives, but he used the opportunity of this letter exchange with Tange to put forward a series of unofficial suggestions and recommendations about staffing issues at the Australian Mission to the UN and the Australian Consulate.
The younger Tange advised Forsyth that

[i]n my own experience, anxiety and sleeplessness are the two most destructive ailments that one can suffer, apart from physical disability. I often find it essential to take some kind of sedative in order to get the restorative benefit of sleep. You are wise to do the same.18

While Tange’s advice might appear empathetic, it also revealed expectations that senior DEA officials should work across many areas, and through long days. Fatigue, insomnia or anxieties were professional obstacles to be managed, if necessary by sedatives: perhaps this too, was part of the ‘trials’, or ‘tests’ of character, that DEA officers were required to pass.

Within the archival materials there are other indications of Forsyth’s weariness with the officious nature of bureaucracy. After years of hard work, Forsyth believed himself undervalued by the DEA. Even the management of expenses and personal items, the ongoing detritus of a diplomat’s mobile life, caused frustration: for example, when he left his position as Secretary General of the South Pacific Commission (SPC), his furniture was placed into a crate and returned to Australia. The furniture was returned, but the empty crate itself remained in storage and was eventually sold by the DEA on behalf of the Commonwealth. Once Forsyth was aware he protested that the crate was not Commonwealth property, and he wrote repeatedly to Keith Waller that it had been his personal property and he should be reimbursed. Forsyth even sought written clarification from the SPC that it had been his personal crate and was provided with an approximate value. He also complained about a DEA colleague, George Hartley, who authorised the sale of the crate for failing to personally contact him.19 There is a sense of obvious grievance and frustration that the DEA had not taken the time to clarify this issue with him, but the issue of the crate seems to be connected to the earlier refusal of the DEA to reimburse Forsyth for expenses incurred in French Polynesia on his voyage home from New

18 'Tange to Forsyth 7 December 1956 Personal' in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57.
19 See ‘Forsyth to Waller, Lift Van Confidential 31 October 1956’ in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57. In 1956, Hartley was First Secretary (Administration) at the Australian Embassy in Washington. The sale of Forsyth's crate occurred in 1954. See 'Harry Vincent (for Secretary) South Pacific Commission to W.D. Forsyth (Dept, of External Affairs) 25 July 1956' in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57. The estimated value of the item was 80 Australian pounds for construction and 1,010 Australian pounds for insurance. See 'H. Neil Truscott (For Secretary) to W.D. Forsyth (Assistant Secretary, Division 2), 7 June 1956. As of 12 January 1956, Forsyth was rated as EAO Grade 6 (Division 2) at 3150 Australian pounds per year.
York in January 1956. As a former Secretary of the SPC, Forsyth had received a warm official welcome in French Polynesia, and he felt it to be appropriate to reciprocate the hospitality towards the French. He wrote to the DEA that ‘a bad impression would be left if I were to depart without making a gesture of appreciation of the hospitality shown to a visiting Australian official’.

Forsyth’s dissatisfaction increasingly extended into his work in the department itself. By 1956, he was openly irritated by the level of his DEA salary and wrote to Keith Waller that

I wish you to know that I regard my remuneration as inadequate having regard to my seniority and qualifications, to the remuneration of other members of the Public Service of comparable seniority, experience and responsibilities ...

One aspect of the CPS culture within the small Canberra community was a general awareness of competing salaries and status amongst its network of bureaucrats. This was certainly evident within the changing DEA itself, and for an individual whose career pre-dated the 1949 changeover, any sense of a declining status within this new departmental hierarchy was important. Forsyth perceived a significant difference between the level of seniority he had achieved, and the remuneration he felt he deserved. By 1957, he requested an official reclassification of his pay and salary, arguing that ‘the volume and degree of importance of the work of Division II of this Department [where he was the Assistant Secretary] warrant a higher status and scale of remuneration for the Assistant Secretary in charge of it’. His request took the form of a detailed document outlining every facet of his expertise in foreign affairs, every major appointment he had held, and even the issues he had personally handled in the same week he made the reclassification request.

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21 W.D. Forsyth to Secretary 2 March 1956, ‘W.D. Forsyth – Entertainment Expense’ in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57. Forsyth attached a receipt for the luncheon of 31,210 Francs and an official guest list. On the back of the receipt is a written note that Forsyth had paid ninety (presumably US) dollars.
22 W.D. Forsyth (Assistant Secretary Division II), to J.K. Waller (The Assistant Secretary, Administration), 14 August 1956 in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57.
23 W.D. Forsyth (Assistant Secretary Division 2) to Assistant Secretary (Division 3), Request for Reclassification 8 July 1957 in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1957-59 MS5700.
24 Ibid. Forsyth’s written request for Reclassification was twelve A4 pages in length.
Yet this slighting contrasted to the continuing recognition of some areas in which Forsyth had developed respected expertise, and which to some extent offered a respite from his dissatisfaction with DEA’s ‘mainstream’. He had been the first Secretary-General of the South Pacific Commission (SPC), had overseen its establishment, and by all accounts, had been popular and effective in this position. He retained association with the SPC’s development, leading the DEA’s 1957 delegation to a SPC conference, and later returning to Noumea for another term as Secretary-General in 1963-64.\(^{25}\) His knowledge was taken seriously by Casey, who confidentially circulated Forsyth’s notes about the political importance of the SPC to Australian newspapers on the eve of the 1957 conference.\(^{26}\) It is notable that in this area, one not directly connected to Cold War politics, Forsyth’s skills and experiences corresponded strongly with Casey’s own sense of diplomatic style, and his desire to seek out imaginative expertise from his diplomats. His skills, and this recognition, would lead him into being engaged with the nomination of Australians for SPC administrative positions. In this role, however, he again faced the question of integrating personal and professional interests with the changing priorities. An exchange of confidential letters in 1957 highlighted the extent which even the small SPC could be drawn into fears of communist infiltration – heightened with salacious rumours of sexual misconduct.\(^{27}\) And in 1958, the small world of South Pacific affairs made it necessary for him to carefully distance himself from any association

\(^{25}\) ‘Delegates to South Pacific Conference’, *The Canberra Times*, 17 April 1957, in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57.


\(^{27}\) R.W. Robson to W.D. Forsyth 16 October 1957’ in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57; ‘English Translation of a letter to the Editor in Chief (Pacific Islands Monthly) Noumea, 29 September 1957’ in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57. In September 1957, a letter from Noumea was sent to RW Robson, managing Director of Sydney-Melbourne Publishing and Pacific Publications of Sydney. Robson could have published the letter in the *Fiji Times and Herald*, but he was not convinced that this was wise. Instead, he sent the letter to the DEA expert who would be involved in helping choose the next Secretary-General of the SPC, WD Forsyth. This letter came soon after John Ryan, (former Deputy Secretary General), had resigned from the SPC after experiencing personal friction with the Secretary-General, Dr. Bedell. The letter vividly outlined that the SPC was becoming a hot bed of lustful sexual conduct and even communist infiltration. The most damaging allegation made in the letter was that the son of the British Consul in Noumea was receiving sexual favours from a female employee of the SPC, Miss Salem. Miss Salem was also accused in this letter of being linked to allegations of communist infiltration.
when the British nominated his brother, Christopher, for a role with the Commission.28

The Limits of Bureaucracy

The combination of these experiences, and his life as a diplomat in the late 1950s, left Forsyth deflated. The breadth of his diplomatic responsibilities on paper was impressive, but by the late 1950s he was feeling intellectually unfulfilled by his DEA role. For example, in 1958 he was ready to take leave without pay from the DEA to return to the world of academic study.29 Despite his desire for intellectual freedom from the DEA, the topic he proposed to develop for research purposes - 'The Commonwealth in the UN' - was originally inspired by DEA considerations. His proposed research project had begun life as a paper he circulated for comment among colleagues, eventually becoming a confidential memorandum. Forsyth then sent this paper outside of the DEA to a (now Sir) Douglas Copland, then Principle of the Australian Administrative Staff College, seeking advice about how he could pursue research on the topic in the USA.29 As a previous recipient of a Rockefeller Fellowship in 1936, he also sought advice from American academic acquaintances about the possibility of financial assistance to support his proposed research.

Contacts at Tufts University were immediately interested in securing Forsyth's services, but it would seem that he considered the financial assistance it could provide him was insufficient. Forsyth's original preference for a six month period of study leave in the US was also thwarted by the unwillingness of the Rockefeller Foundation to fund his work without endorsement and some assistance from the Australian National University (ANU). He also encountered problems with the ANU, which

28 'W.D. Forsyth, Most Personal and Confidential For the Secretary SPC – Appointment of Principal Officer (Administration)' in W.D. Forsyth Papers Series 8-9 Box 28 Personal Correspondence 1956-57. On 20 May 1958, his brother Christopher informed Forsyth, that the British Colonial Office had nominated him for this role. His brother indicated that he had not solicited this nomination, having in fact retired, but he was asked to respond promptly. Christopher had been instructed 'to keep the matter confidential as a UK government matter', thus helping to explain the way in which this caught W.D. Forsyth by complete surprise. C.R. Forsyth had a long career as a civil servant in Malaya, (he had been the Head of Treasury), before returning to Melbourne to retire.

29 Douglas Copland (Principal) Australian Administrative Staff College, 20 March 1958, letter to W.D. Forsyth, 'Personal Correspondence' (Canberra) 1958 in W.D. Forsyth Papers. Copland advises Forsyth to try approaching Duke University in North Carolina which had a research interest in Commonwealth Affairs.
believed that even a whole year would be inadequate to produce a major scholarly study. In a written note for his personal reference, Forsyth stated that his study proposal had been ‘unrealistic’ declaring that ‘seeking 18 months or 2 years leave [was] not [his] intention’.30 Yet, in a private and confidential letter in December 1957 to Dean Rusk, then Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, Forsyth indicated a willingness to study for at least 15 months.31 His personal papers reveal that Forsyth was potentially content to seek an absence from the DEA with outside funding for a period longer than the six months he had indicated to superiors.

The negotiations to secure financial funding for his studies also proved irritating for Forsyth. Increasingly, various institutions wanted to place stipulations and conditions on his period of study that did not suit his needs. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation was willing to provide $U10,000 if the ANU was prepared to assist Forsyth with all other funds and academic matters. After months of written correspondence and meetings, he finally achieved ANU support, but was not happy with what the ANU required from him. He had to be based at ANU for at least 5 months, he had to produce a book and participate in various university activities. Having finally secured the financial basis for his period of study, Forsyth abandoned these arrangements and returned to the idea of six months of intellectual refreshment in the USA and UK.32

Forsyth’s earlier experiences in academia were all within the more liberal environment of the 1930s and 1940s, and his attempt to re-open previous academic associations, particularly in the US, was problematic not just in terms of getting leave from the DEA, but given much that had changed over the previous decade. The infusion of US government, and indeed philanthropic interest from organisations such as the Ford Foundation, in promoting certain kinds of academic and educational expertise, was a vital factor within the development of new networks of international

30 W.D. Forsyth RE: Study Leave 9 April 1958 Note as aid to memory ‘Personal Correspondence’ (Canberra) 1958 in W.D. Forsyth Papers.
31 ‘W.D. Forsyth to Dean Rusk’, December 30 1957 ‘Personal Correspondence’ (Canberra) 1958 in W.D. Forsyth Papers.
relations expertise, not just in America, but globally. While his topic and experience might be of interest to certain universities, his project was largely disconnected from the core US concerns framing (and indeed funding) these new academic networks. Should Forsyth have proposed to study from Australian perspectives about communism in Indo-China, Indonesia, the educational diplomacy of the Colombo Plan, or diplomatic and strategic measures designed to counter Asian communism, one suspects he could have tapped into a range of new relationships, not to mention, funding. Within the networks developing between the DEA, ANU, AIIA and Ford Foundation to be outlined later in this thesis, Forsyth did indeed contribute articles and chapters to various publications. But, while respected, he was not at the centre of this new network, and his subsequent writing remained almost exclusively connected to his South Pacific affairs and experiences.

Forsyth’s appointment as Ambassador to South Vietnam in 1959, following Blakeney — who had cultivated close relations with the Ngo Dinh Diem’s government — seemingly rescued him from the administrative monotony he had endured. Resuming the life of an overseas diplomat, he regularly sent confidential correspondence about the tumultuous political situation to Casey, Tange and others. However, in 1962 (the same year as the first Australian military advisers were sent to South Vietnam), Forsyth concluded his appointment to Saigon. Among his successors in this post, H.D. Anderson, a 1944 diplomatic cadet, would be noted for seeking to persuade the South Vietnamese government to consider American (and Australian) intervention, and for carrying out sensitive and often controversial DEA diplomatic instructions in his dealings with the South Vietnamese government. There is no suggestion that Forsyth’s leaving of Vietnam was unusual, but there is clearly a sense that a different cast of diplomat would be needed in the post. Back in Canberra, and appointed an Assistant Secretary, and later Ambassador to Lebanon, Forsyth held multiple areas of responsibility, produced significant research, but — as the annotations to his papers suggest — the story he most recollects is that of discontent, and of humility and self-reflection, about the ups and downs of his career. The sense of Forsyth’s personal drift from the core concerns of the DEA during the 1950s, and the

33 See ‘Series 10 Vietnam and Laos 1959-61’ in W.D. Forsyth Papers MS 5700.
incompatibility of his more liberal sensibilities with these concerns, can be succinctly summarised by using a modified Operational Code, drawn from his papers, and which might be contrasted to that Casey, as presented in Chapter Two.

**Figure 1. Forsyth 1950s Operational Code**
1. The "essential" nature of political life is the need to balance, and to encourage liberalism, within the intellectual, political and diplomatic scene. Therefore, while professional threats are considered, the political universe remains one of philosophical balance. Departmental colleagues (and perhaps) political and ideological opponents of this vision are dealt with within the established and accepted structures of professional dialogues.

2. The prospects for realising one's fundamental political values and aspirations are by dialogue with colleagues and superiors. These are normally conducted through established structures, in Forsyth's case, the DEA. Failure to realise aims through these structures can soon turn optimism to pessimism if these overtures are ignored.

4. Forsyth appeared frustrated by a lack of "control" or "mastery" over his own career development in the 1950s, let alone his diminishing ability to influence the development of Australian foreign policy. To influence policy during this time, Forsyth was forced to negotiate the political boundaries of Australian Cold War thinking, and his own well-established notions of liberalism.

**Instrumental or policy issues:**
1. The best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political or professional action is through personal communication with colleagues and superiors. Forsyth is a prolific memo author and seeks out correspondence, both official and non-official.

2. Forsyth's goals of action are pursued within Departmental, and semi-official structures, connected to his status as a senior DEA officer and former academic.

3. The risks of advancing intellectual, or liberal concepts within the framework of the DEA in the 1950s, is gradual marginalisation. Forsyth seemingly accepts, if at times with some personal frustration, this professional reality as being his lot.

4. Forsyth seems to advance his interests at various stages, as and when the opportunities presented themselves. In the later 1950s this was undertaken often when only a narrow window of opportunity existed, if at all, for Forsyth ideas and objectives. This appears strongly connected to his official and semi-official memo writing and personal correspondence.

**Conclusion**
This case study of Forsyth cannot pretend to be a definitive account of what was after all a long and respected career. Its focus has been on some of the issues that he encountered in the 1950s, in adapting from the liberalism of the 1940s to the impact of Cold War ideologies on departmental analysis, the communication of ideas, and to
the monotony of administrative workloads, stress and health issues, the battle for recognition, professional dissatisfaction, the social rewards of status and professional prestige. In contrast to Menzies and Casey, Forsyth's liberalism and reflective analysis prevented him from being a true Cold War warrior, and unlike Plimsoll or Tange, he was too catholic in his thinking to ever be the gatekeeper of official DEA ideas on behalf of the Menzies government. As such, Forsyth represents a transitional bridge between the Chifley era and the new professional era of the Cold War in the 1950s. As such, while Forsyth's is a personal story of disillusion, it is one that also reflects on a new culture within the DEA of the 1950s, and the careers, and networks, established, or modified, by that process.
Personal and Confidential

For the Secretary.

I request your earnest consideration of what follows and especially in view of its very great personal importance to me, that you will defer any definite conclusion until we have been able to discuss the proposal fully on a confidential basis.

For a considerable time I have been feeling the need to refresh myself intellectually. For several years I have been engaged in duties of a representative character and latterly in a combination of policy and supervisory duties. Throughout these years the pressure of work has been such that there has been little opportunity for me to pursue any sustained reading, thinking and discussion. My time and energy have been almost wholly absorbed in day-to-day problems. What thinking I have been able to do has usually been done under pressure and “against the clock”. It is not necessarily the worse for that, up to a point - that point is reached however when mental energy and intellectual “capital” begin to run out.

This is not an unfamiliar experience among senior administrative staff and I believe the problem is beginning to be recognized in our own public service. In the United States, is is not only a recognized problem, but practical measures have been taken to deal with it in some degree. It is a problem which has been assuming more general importance with the steady rise in life-expectancy.

In my own case, I have now completed sixteen years of continuous service. (I include my 24 years as Secretary-General of S.P.C., this having been officially accepted by the Public Service Board as equivalent to service in the Commonwealth Public Service). During this lengthy period I have had no interval to devote to study and reflection. I have before me, in all probability, sixteen more years in which I would expect to continue in public service.

It is my strong - and long-standing - conviction that in order to make a contribution in these future years commensurate with my past opportunities and experience, I need a pause in which to reflect, refresh my reading, engage in some analytical thinking and recharge my mental capacities. It could be said that such a period is a necessary investment of time. I believe that my value to the service is likely to be substantially greater in the years ahead if this investment can be made now.

After a great deal of anxious thought I have concluded that I should seek long leave for the purpose of study in the field of international relations, and I desire that consideration be given to my release with this object for a period of about a year.

It would be necessary of course for me to make arrangements which would permit me to devote this period wholly to the purpose envisaged. Preliminary confidential inquiries have encouraged me to believe that suitable arrangements are possible.
CHAPTER FIVE

Networks of Knowledge: Forming the Canberra Network

... the name [ANU] smacked of nationalised knowledge, a nexus between state and university that was alien to educational history. Dr David Rivett was more forthright, complaining to W.K. Hancock that the name was awful and that, whenever he heard it, he wanted to add Pty Ltd.


As you would have heard, I have just succeeded John Hodgkin as the President of the Canberra Branch of the [AIA]. I hope that it will not be long before I make direct contact with you [and] discuss the best way in which this branch can contribute to the work of the Institute ...


The previous chapters have examined how the transition from Chifley to Menzies was connected to a domestic, and indeed a larger international dialogue, about the Cold War, diplomacy and the creation of new networks of analysis connected to the world of international affairs. These connections helped to establish the new parameters of analysis, not just about Australian foreign policy thinking, but in the various ways in which the associated policies and ideas could be pursued, for example, through information management techniques inspired by the UK and the US, through clandestine intelligence operations, and through the radical administrative overhaul of the DEA during the 1950s. Such an environment encouraged the development of contacts between the Australian government, the DEA and a range of individuals and organisations, at home and overseas. To this point my work has been primarily focused on the origins of this process from DEA, or at least official, points of view. This and the following chapters expand this discussion from purely political and bureaucratic dimensions to examine how such developments contributed to the formation of a Canberra based network of academics, diplomats, politicians and academics – a new network, whose formation was inspired by the new foreign policy agenda, and once established, an integral part of legitimating the policy orthodoxy discussed in this thesis..

Interactions between academics and government had taken place in Australia during the 1930s and 1940s, but in the 1950s a new Australian foreign policy
community had emerged, one which by the 1960s was defined by a professionalised,
institutionally interconnected framework. Through this post-war period the number of
Australian academics recognised as experts and actively involved in teaching, writing
and researching in the field of foreign policy expanded. Yet in the Australian context,
this group of experts was small when contrasted with other comparable academic
communities in the United States or United Kingdom, this in itself contributed
significantly to the authority it eventually commanded. By the 1960s this group would
be dominated and influenced by key individuals, and – given the extent to which this
community was concentrated in Canberra – it was characterised by intimate contacts
between academia and government. But, like the Americans and British, a relationship
between officials, academic specialists, and beyond them a wider circle of interest
groups, provided the vital oxygen for the work of all partners, and strengthened their
respective authority.

As evident in previous chapters, Canberra itself was proving to be a distinctive
context for these evolving relationships. The isolated administrative city which seemed
to be an empty and dispiriting place for many early diplomatic cadets, was gradually
developing throughout the 1950s into a more integrated, sophisticated environment in
which policy making, specialist research and commentary, and the cultivation of
political influence, moved hand-in-hand. In this environment, the Canberra University
College (CUC) and the Australian National University (ANU) became intellectual,
organisational and non-government institutions that complemented the work of the
DEA. The relationship between these institutions and the DEA was in most respects a
precursor to the development of international dialogues with other organisations that
shall be discussed in subsequent chapters, as they developed in the later 1950s, for
example, the Ford Foundation of New York, whose foreign policy objectives were
largely defined by US Cold War considerations. In Australia, organisations such as the
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), provided the catalyst in linking

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foreign affairs. The new Australian foreign policy community of the early 1960s therefore developed, based on active collaboration and discussion between official and non-official groups of individuals and organisations seeking mutual benefits and professional connections.¹ The focus of this chapter, however, is on establishing the crucial academic component of this network, and also the intellectual and institutional influences they reflected.

The CUC and the ANU

Before the establishment of the ANU, the CUC was the only tertiary institution in Canberra. The College had been established in 1929 as an extension of the University of Melbourne in order to provide tertiary education for public servants transferred to the small capital city. As noted in Chapter Three, from 1943, the CUC provided training for DEA diplomatic cadets. Yet despite connections to the Commonwealth Public Service (CPS), the early decades of the CUC were difficult, not least in terms of its institutional standing in academia, and its relationship with government, where it was often viewed as being merely as a service-provider for the professional development of bureaucrats. These difficulties were not eased when, in 1946, the Chifley Labor government established the ANU, in partnership with the core priorities of post war government, to build research-based academic expertise in selected fields such as medicine, the physical and social sciences, and the study of the Pacific. When the ANU opened its doors in 1947 as a research-only institution, the CUC faced the unwanted prospect of being permanently overshadowed by the ANU and it battled to retain academic relevance, and to maintain its relationship with government.² By 1950, the CUC had come to fill a niche role for Canberra based bureaucrats seeking further educational training, but the dominance of part-time enrolments, inadequate funding, and ongoing disagreements about its relationship with the ANU, were all problematic for the administrators of CUC.

Under the leadership of Professor Joe Burton, its inaugural principal, a range of intellectual talent was attracted to CUC after 1948. The appointments of Manning

¹ The nature of this cooperation in the early 1960s is closely examined in the following chapters.
Clark, Finlay Crisp, A.D. Hope and Heinz Arndt meant that the College acquired a potent intellectual armoury of its own, both in academic standing and in wider public prominence. The recruitment of first-class talent was certainly something that the CUC needed to undertake, particularly in regard to its relationship with the ANU. An ongoing dialogue about the future relationship between two universities functioning in the still small national capital was inevitable. By the early 1950s, the ANU demanded that the academic status of the CUC needed to be raised and maintained in order for it to consider any possibility of a future merger of the two institutions. In 1953, Professor M.L. Oliphant (Acting Vice Chancellor of the ANU) conceded that after 1950 the CUC had ‘made great strides forward and has added to its academic body members who have the highest qualifications’, but highlighted that it was CUCs lower standing in comparison to ANU that prevented amalgamation. Among certain figures recruited to the CUC, resentment of the claims of the ANU meant that opposition to possible amalgamation was maintained until effectively forced by government in 1960.

The education of diplomatic cadets based in Canberra was taken very seriously by the CUC, and it also meant it maintained connections with the highest echelons of DEA. Moves to establish a ‘School of Diplomacy’ at the College reflected a desire to consolidate this role. Yet, its reliance on enrolments from the CPS became a serious issue in late 1953, when – in the spirit of the administrative reforms outlined in Chapter Three, the DEA decided to provide its own training for their cadets. Without these guaranteed enrolments, the School of Diplomacy was no longer viable. In its place, the CUC was forced instead to concentrate on the provision of a range of ad hoc courses such as foreign languages – Asian languages, Japanese and Chinese especially. This was the only way in which the CUC could retain the necessary support from the CPS.

In providing these services, however, the CUC entered into a new phase of managing

7 See letter from M.L. Oliphant (Acting Vice Chancellor) 12 May 1953 to The Secretary, Dept of the Interior (Mr McLaren) RE: Canberra University College in Canberra University College – Future Purposes and Objectives NAA: A431/1.
6 Joe Burton (Principal of CUC) to Arthur Tange (Secretary of the Department of External Affairs), 27 February 1954, NAA: A1838 1260/1 Part 2.
8 Summary of Informal Discussions Between the Vice Chancellor of the ANU, The Principal and the College Supervisor of Studies for External Affairs Cadets, Professor Herbert Burton Papers, Australian National University Archives ANUA43 Box 3 Subject 4
professional and academic expectations, both of the CPS and also of the ANU. This next phase of its relationship revealed some of the emerging issues in the coupling of academic expertise to the needs of government in a Cold War context.

As the Director of the Commonwealth Office of Education noted in 1952, the primary reason for its interest in the CUC was that it would organise elementary ‘ad hoc courses to suit the special needs of Defence and the Services’. With an interest both in higher education as well as improving the skills of the public service, Prime Minister Menzies also hoped that bureaucrats and defence personnel could utilise Canberra based language training and that the CUC would develop other complementary courses. In response, the School of Oriental Studies was established at the CUC. It was thought that this new program of Asian language studies would benefit from its proximity to the Research School of Pacific Studies at the ANU, although this in itself raised problematic questions about the appropriate balance between training, and traditional academic teaching, a tension that continued to beset the CUC throughout the remainder of its existence.

When the CUC was finally amalgamated with the ANU, it had fulfilled its role in the eyes of government and was acceptable to the ANU but not as an equal: it therefore became the School of General Studies. It brought with it its own particular expertise, particularly in the teaching of undergraduates, and lessons about the implications of close connections between academia, the influence of government and the development of certain kinds of expertise acceptable to both. A striking example of this phenomenon can be seen in the selection process for early appointments to the School demonstrated the problems of satisfying expectations of high-level scholarship and fulfilling ‘service’-provision capacities. This precarious balancing act is demonstrated by selection of the first CUC Chair of Oriental Languages. This process would see ongoing consultations between the CUC council, the ANU, the DEA and the

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9 See W.J. Weeden (The Director, Commonwealth Office of Education) to T.M. Owen (Registrar CUC) 21 Nov 1952 in Oriental Studies – CUC. Policy and General, NAA: A1361/1.
11 Ibid. This was thought to be of possible assistance in the growth of relevant ANU post-graduate courses within future MA and PhD programs.
Department of Defence.\textsuperscript{12} Despite the practical need to teach colloquial Chinese, the selection committee had total resistance to appointing any native Chinese speaker capable of teaching at university level. The late application from Mr Ho, Curator of the Chinese collection at the ANU Library, was immediately rejected because the committee agreed that there were the same objections to Mr. Ho’s application as to all applications from Asiatics, namely their lack of Western sinological training. Mr. Ho’s application was, therefore, not considered further.\textsuperscript{13}

Ho was able to provide what was desired by the DEA in native Chinese language competence, but was rejected for not being trained in those forms of Chinese history and language that characterised the Western approach to its academic study. In essence, Ho did not possess the academic cultural capital to become a western expert on China in 1950s Australia. Preference instead was given to western educated sinologists\textsuperscript{14} even if their actual training was in studying and researching classical Chinese history and classical language. The three top candidates for the first Chair were:

1) H. Bilenstein (a Swedish sinologist);
2) M.J. Meijer (a Dutch sinologist);
3) D. Wilson (an Englishman working as a librarian at the University of Malaya).\textsuperscript{15}

Each of these candidates was judged on their written and spoken Chinese skills and also on an assessment of their personal knowledge of China – a criterion never applied to Ho, he was rejected before interview. For example, Meijer was criticised by the selection panel for having never travelled to China, and Wilson was criticised for his lack of teaching and research experience. All involved in the selection process were very impressed by Bilenstein’s classical Chinese training. Bilenstein had spent only a year in Peking studying modern Mandarin before his CUC application. This was still considered enough to demonstrate his firsthand knowledge of contemporary China. The selection committee for this position comprised Burton as CUC Principle, Professors Hope and Clark, and Mr C.P. Fitzgerald. Burton was an economist, Hope taught English

\textsuperscript{12} See W.J. Weedon to TM Owen (Registrar) CUC, 21 Nov 1952 Chair of Oriental Languages in Oriental Studies – CUC. Policy and General NAA: A1361/1.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Some sinologists (or China experts) were called upon by Australia’s Defence and Intelligence community throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s to provide analysis and comment about the allegedly menacing intentions of Communist China.
\textsuperscript{15} See ‘CUC Chair of Oriental Languages Agendum No F67/1952 Attachment A’ in Oriental Studies – CUC. Policy and General NAA: A1361/1.
literature and Clark was an historian. The designated China expert on this selection panel was Fitzgerald. Although a published British expert on China when appointed to the ANU as Reader in Far Eastern History, he was without any university degree. His appointment rested solely on highly regarded publications and his reputation as a Westerner able to speak Chinese with firsthand knowledge of China in the 1930s and 1940s. It is almost inconceivable that Ho actually did not have a greater knowledge of China, (not to mention the many flawed perceptions that characterised Western perceptions about China) than Fitzgerald, but it is telling that his rejection rested not on testing these abilities, but on western notions of expertise and professionalism. This selection process revealed the terms in which the CUC continued to navigate a path between the expectations of those who wished it to build its academic standing, and those who were mainly concerned that it provided the required technical training to government employees. In the rejection of Ho, the selection process was enforcing those professional prerequisites that would be acceptable to both the academic community, and government. The School of Oriental Studies continued to sit awkwardly between being little more than a language school for the DEA, and the Defence department, and a department of classical Asian studies.

Although it was confident in its own academic credentials, the ANU needed to be mindful of changing attitudes after the election of the Menzies government in 1949. The establishment of a research-based university, with fields so closely mapped together by the priorities of the then Labor government, was concerning to those holding particularly strident anti-communist views for a range of reasons, including the prospect of the ANU becoming an ongoing source of criticism about public policy, its potential capacity to influence public debate, and possible challenges to domestic security. The very concept of the ANU was also challenging to those holding more ‘liberal’, or traditional views, about the role of universities in society. By 1950, the Australian sandstone universities such as Sydney and Melbourne were well-established institutions, founded under ‘the traditional English, Scottish and Irish view of a university’. Academic freedom and non-interference from outside agencies such as the

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16 Folder 9 Copies of ANU notices and Agenda papers 1953’, Sir Walter Crocker Papers, Australian National University Archives ANUA88 Box 1 Items 8-10. In a press release regarding his appointment to ANU, it was stated that during his time in China that Fitzgerald undertook secret work [presumably spying], on behalf of the British Foreign Office (FO).
government were considered intrinsic to the independence of university research and the vitality of intellectual rigour. From its inception, the ANU was a prominent project within Labor’s post-war nation building programs, and accordingly – from both the liberal and the more conservative perspectives – it met with criticism not just for its location in Canberra, but also for its designated mission. The purpose of the ANU was not just to establish a world-class academic research capability, but where appropriate to be of direct assistance to the Australian government. The academic capacity of the ANU would be achieved by providing greater opportunities for specialist research work at the postgraduate level within its unique Research Schools.18

Academic critics of the ANU believed this mission statement to be a distinctly different philosophy from other Australian universities. The perceived tensions between the ANU and the supposedly ancient traditions of British universities also extended to its name. The Australian National University was considered by some critics to be insulting to other well established Australian universities.19 Perhaps due to those critical of its establishment, supporters of the ANU were careful to publicly espouse its usefulness to Australian society whenever possible. In 1952, the Governor General heralded the ANU as being a bold new university venture as far as British communities were concerned.20 This rested on the notion that with its Western standards of living, industry and the consequences of World War Two, Australia was now positioning itself, in so far as the future development of academic knowledge at the ANU, as an important bridge between East and West. Political criticisms of the ANU were expressed even before its establishment. In the late 1940s, some Labor politicians questioned its long-term construction and ongoing maintenance costs to Australian taxpayers. On the non-Labor side of Australian politics, the ANU represented entirely different concerns. After their victory at the 1949 Federal election, the Liberal-Country Party inherited the nation building policies of the Chifley government, but this did not mean that there were not ideological suspicions about the ANU. As Foster and Varghese note:

Two Ministers in particular, Richard Casey and Wilfrid Kent Hughes, made no secret of the fact that they regarded the ANU as a waste of government money and did their best to pull it into

18 S.G. Foster and M.M. Varghese, The Making of the Australian National University, p.10
The social sciences were at once the intellectual engine room driving new understandings and approaches to the modern world, and at the same time an arena of competing ideological influences. In the US, the government essentially moved into partnership with various universities, academics and institutions in areas connected to core foreign policy concerns from the late 1940s. This held strong implications in setting the boundaries of intellectual debates and scholarship within Cold War settings. In Australia, the concerns of men such as Casey about the social sciences were an early effort to define the same boundaries in an Australian context. The final stages of this consolidation are evident in ways in which the Canberra Network had been established by the early 1960s.

Many such concerns were connected to explicit expressions of anti-communism. The incoming Menzies government had pledged to ban the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), and in this context the ANU, due to the political alignments of staff employed by the various research schools, was a frequent target of ideological concern. In this regard, the Research School of the Social Sciences, (RSSS) was a particular problem. The possible appointment of communists, left wing democratic socialists, or liberal intellectuals, raised the ire of men such as Richard Casey. This issue also concerned Menzies and Charles Spry, the Director General of Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Menzies was publicly conscious of not being seen to trample the traditions of the academic independence, declaring that ‘the university must be a custodian of mental liberty and the unfettered search of the truth’. Unlike Casey and Hughes, Menzies had cultivated a public reputation ‘as a defender of academic freedom’. Yet privately, his attitudes were not very different to theirs.

In the early 1950s, a series of appointments caused outrage amongst anti-communist critics. R.A. Gollan, who became an ANU Research Fellow in History in 1953, made no secret of his communism. In contrast, most of the other appointments were held to be suspicious because of past political associations and activities. Relations

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22 Ibid.
between the CUC and the DEA had already been marked by such concerns, as when Manning Clark had been removed from any involvement in the training of diplomatic cadets due to suspicions about his politics. Such scrutiny and action were increasingly consistent with the practices of the Australian domestic intelligence services. For example, by 1952 ASIO was compiling profiles on suspicious academics throughout the entire Australian tertiary system.

In March 1952 Spry ordered his regional officers to vet all academics at Australian universities. Staff lists were then compared to ASIO's dossiers and a list of academic subversives drawn up. As part of the check particular attention was paid to the new Labor initiated Australian National University. On 9 April, [Charles] Spry wrote to Menzies about the special problems of the Australian National University.23

ASIO activities were conducted on the basis that university students could be subversively indoctrinated by left wing academics with secretive communist agendas. Spry kept a detailed ASIO watching brief over Australian academia for many years, often in consultation with Menzies.24 With regard to the ANU in particular, Foster and Varghese observe:

In Australia too, anti-Communists looked for a fifth column. Some thought they had found evidence of one at the ANU. Richard Casey remarked privately that the Social Science schools were full of long-haired communists. In Parliament the Chief government Whip, Henry Gullett, suggested that the university was becoming more famous for left-wing politics than its research and made pointed comments about taxpayers having to pay the salaries of Communist sympathisers. From the opposition benches, S.M. Keon, one of the Victorian Right wingers who would soon split from Labour to form the Democratic Labor Party, declared that the ANU had become, according to a planned scheme, a nest of communists who were dedicated to destroying the country's institutions.25

This negative attitude towards the ANU was reflective of a generalised anxiety about the attitudes of the left-leaning Australian intellectuals towards the Cold War and policies of the Menzies government. Anti-communist advocates took critical comments about Australian foreign policy, when they rarely emerged in public debate, very seriously. When Manning Clark was joined by the Anglican Bishop of Canberra, E.H. Burgmann, C.P. Fitzgerald and J.W. Davidson, a Professor of Pacific History at the ANU, in issuing a statement on French Indo-China during 1954, they generated immediate controversy. Their statement argued that the war in Indochina was not an

24 For a summary see David McKnight, *Australia's Spies and their secrets*, pp.145-170.
anti-communist crusade, but a nationalist uprising against French colonialism. Casey condemned any suggestion that the Viet Minh were mere nationalists as ‘wholly and absolutely untrue’. The Liberal MP William Charles Wentworth, an ardent anti-communist, argued that the purpose of this joint statement was deliberately to ‘paralyse Australian policy in regard to Indochina’. Their statement did not just arouse the ire of anti-communists, but posed questions relating to the division between public opinion and academic expertise. Michael Lindsay, the Acting Head of the Department of International Relations at ANU, saw factual problems with one claim made by their statement:

One paragraph in this [public letter] stated that there was no evidence that Viet Minh was communist controlled and not simply a nationalist organisation. This letter produced a strong reaction and attacks on the ANU by some Members of Parliament. I [Lindsay] wrote to The Canberra Times pointing out that this paragraph was certainly untrue and citing some of the evidence. In conversation, Professor Davidson admitted that he had composed this particular paragraph and defended his denial that the Viet Minh was Communist controlled with the argument that he believed that the Indo-China crisis to be such a serious danger to world peace that it was essential to rouse the Australian people to protest against the risk of American intervention. This was an almost explicit admission of belief in the expediency theory of truth.

The Lindsay interlude was also an example of another type of intellectual expertise, connected to international affairs, that did not fit within the emerging dialogues, or parameters, of emerging foreign policy thinking in Australia. For example, Lindsay neither impressed anti-communist critics of the ANU, rival academics within the ANU willing to submit to the growing ideological orthodoxy of anti-communism, nor those few individuals openly opposed to such concepts. Lindsay had obviously believed that Viet Minh could be communist, nationalist and anti-colonial simultaneously, a purely factual position that has been borne out as correct by the judgement of history. Lindsay’s comments on this issue were strongly connected to his own belief that the

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28 Ibid.
29 Lord Lindsay, ‘A Study in Academic Standards, International Relations at the Australian National University’, p.102, Lord Lindsay Papers, Australian National University Archives ANUA8 Box 1-8 1955-61. Despite his contribution to IR at the ANU, this contribution has been largely erased from official history, accept in a negative sense. For an attempt to rectify this see James Cotton, Working Paper 2010/2 International Relations in Australia: Michael Lindsay, Martin Wight, and the first Department at the Australian National University, Canberra, August 2010, Department of International Relations, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.
discipline of International Relations should be based on empirical scientific method, not ideology or abstract theory, and certainly not politics. Therefore, the core characteristic of Lindsay’s academic enterprise was empiricism and scepticism about other approaches, not just about the anti-communist project itself, but, as shown in his criticism of Davidson, even about the other side. This certainly isolated him from those at the ANU strongly connected to government, and those that saw their academic role as providing opportunities to advance political points of view, but it also isolated him from potential left wing academic allies. For a significant part of his time at the ANU, Lindsay faced professional obstacles, and criticism of his scientific approach to his discipline. Many of his colleagues at the ANU, including Davidson, had strongly opposed Lindsay being appointed to the Chair of International Relations, even though Lindsay had been Acting Head of IR in the absence of an appointed Chair. This dispute was particularly bitter for Lindsay, and he fought what he perceived to be the undermining of academic standards and academic integrity at the ANU. In pugnaciously resisting an often secretive and punitive attack on his personal character, intellectual abilities and academic credentials from colleagues and hierarchy of the ANU, the possibilities for any ongoing career in Australia rapidly diminished. Whatever the merits of his intention, Davidson’s decision to ignore Lindsay’s more factually nuanced approach to the Viet Minh, did little of course to calm ASIOs concerns about various people at the ANU. Davidson and Fitzgerald were after all major contributors to the Australian study of history, politics and culture of the Asia Pacific region within the Research School of Pacific Studies during the 1950s. Their views were carefully monitored when it came to engagement with public debate. For his part, Lindsay’s concern was only to raise the discipline of International Relations – at the ANU and more generally – to the standards of an empirical scientific method rather than ideology or abstract theory.

The surveillance of ASIO was but one of the consequences for cultivating a perception of critical dissent. From an official point of view, due to their past actions, those like Manning Clark were placed permanently outside the small circle of Australian academics that maintained close connections with the DEA through the 1950s. Clark – in an excursion in short-story writing in those years – was to offer some
sharp characterisations of the ‘men in black’ that watched and judged the conduct of one-time colleagues and friends, in Canberra’s small circles and networks.\textsuperscript{30} In building a more acceptable corps of academics, the government took an active role in attempting to influence the selection process for various positions at ANU. Throughout his tenure as Minister for External Affairs, Casey remained interested in areas of academic study that were associated with politics and foreign affairs. When Walter Crocker resigned from the Chair of International Relations at ANU in 1955, Casey raised his concerns directly with the Prime Minister.

\begin{quote}
My Dear Bob,

The professorship of International relations in the Canberra National University is vacant - by the resignation of [Walter] Crocker. They have advertised the post and applications close at the end of April. I telephoned [Vice-Chancellor Sir Leslie Melville] today and he tells me that they have received a number of applications largely from overseas, although a few from within Australia. He has agreed privately to let me know those that they believe are in the running. I stressed with him the importance of qualifications other than professional. I know you appreciate the importance of getting the right type of man. I think a word from you to Melville and others concerned, would be useful.

Yours,

Dick.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

Casey’s personal interest in the Chair of International Relations at the ANU was not an isolated case. In 1952, Raymond Firth resigned as Adviser and Acting Director of the Pacific Studies School. Such were Casey’s concerns over Firth’s possible replacement that in late 1954 and early 1955, he saw fit to write directly to Keith Hancock about the vacant role of Director of the School of Social Sciences.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{quote}
Although there are a number of good people there, there are a number of others who create considerable apprehension in my mind. I know that Melville is quite aware of this - and it is no doubt this reason that he is making efforts to get you.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

In minds of men like Casey or Spry, the war with communism at home and abroad was also a war of ideas. They saw it as a confrontation of two incompatible views of human civilisation and each shared ‘a sense of responsibility to preserve in Australian society,
as well as in Asia, the necessary features of stability. Yet, government also held certain expectations about the role that Australian academics should play in society. TB Millar, one of the foundation academic appointments of the Strategic Studies Centre at ANU, built his entire academic career around his close connections to the Australian foreign policy establishment. His academic work, mainly concerned with strategic analysis of the Cold War, is certainly reflective of the priorities established by the influence of the anti-communist orthodoxy discussed in this thesis. Millar assessed that government expected Australian academics to teach and to do a little research, to serve government on request but preferably not to criticise it publicly. Governments of all persuasions - and indeed senior public servants - have fairly consistently attempted to denigrate the critical academic.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the historical connections between government and tertiary institutions such as the CUC and the ANU in the early 1950s. It has highlighted how an almost co-dependent relationship was shaped by the connection between government requirements, and the types of knowledge and training required to meet official expectations. At the CUC, the expectation that it should serve government dictated how diplomatic cadets in the early 1950s were taught diplomacy and the subjects considered useful. This same attitude forced the School of Diplomacy to give way to the School of Oriental Languages. The ANU, a government driven project from the start, maintained close relations with official sources from its inception. This did not mean that it was always well received, or not viewed with considerable suspicions by certain people. The administrative hierarchy of the CUC and ANU were made aware in various ways of the attitudes and expectations that government held towards their operations and the academics they employed. The ways in which academic expertise was viewed in terms of its ideological implications, as in the case of Clark, Fitzgerald and Davidson, held clear connections to foreign policy and other intellectual attitudes about international affairs. Those academics that failed to meet the narrow professional and ideological expectations of government, and anti-communist critics, risked

34 Ibid.
35 T.B. Millar, Working paper No. 42 The Role of the Academic in Defence and Foreign Policy, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra: 1981, pp. 3-4. For someone such as Millar, who cultivated exceedingly close relations with government throughout his career, and with few exceptions who fulfilled these expectations throughout his career, his statement is insightful.
alienating themselves from any potential patronage and acceptance amongst official circles, and be denied the rewards that came with playing within the accepted boundaries observed by Millar.
CHAPTER SIX

Intersections

The previous chapter highlighted the connections from the early 1950s that had developed between government, the CUC and the ANU, noting in particular the increasing interdependence between them in establishing methodologies and practices that responded to the emerging core concerns of Australian foreign policy thinking. These connections did not necessarily influence the implementation of government policy, but they set – and cultivated – the terms in which such policies could be presented, discussed and justified. The greatest value of this process being that it satisfied two distinct professional expectations from those it involved. First, the government found through these connections a network of key individuals inclined not merely being interested in close linkages, but willing to accept government information and present official policy in ways that were most often positive, or at the very least cautious, in its analysis. This did not mean that suspicions of left wing academic bias amongst senior government figures and officials had receded. Yet it did not prevent cooperation between government and certain sections of academia from developing shared interests in areas ranging from the development of appropriate technical expertise (whether in language training, as discussed in the previous chapter, developmental economics, to be discussed later in this chapter), to the reputations built from professional commentary and strategic assessment. This chapter now examines the phenomenon just described, first the cultivation of networks for the public discussion of international affairs, focussing on the relationship between the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) and the Department of External Affairs (DEA), before turning to examine coordinated efforts to attract overseas financial support to help establish new networks and expertise in Australia.

The AIIA was an intellectual meeting place for politicians, academics and diplomats since the 1930s. The foundations of this relationship were gradually enhanced in the 1950s, and as will be outlined in this chapter, by the early 1960s had expanded to
encompass international organisations such as the Ford Foundation of New York.\(^1\) In turn, the Ford Foundation considered the connections between the AIIA, the ANU and government in Canberra to be a major asset in its objective to promote overseas educational and academic programs seen as complimentary to key US foreign policy objectives, or at least, they were consistent enough with an American world view, to be funded. Ford also viewed the small size of Canberra as being to its advantage. The presence of the key players and organisations almost exclusively situated in this one concentrated location was looked on favourably, and as such, was thought to provide a potential blueprint for similar developments elsewhere in Australia.

The general context for this new 1960s Canberra network traced its development back to the establishment of foreign policy-related tertiary study at Australian universities in the early 1950s. The 1950s saw the emergence of a specialist tertiary interest in contemporary foreign affairs. Australian historian John Legge has noted that this new academic interest in Asia and foreign affairs was largely driven by a desire 'to understand a new and seemingly dangerous world [and] it sprang, that is to say, from considerations of policy and was heavily policy orientated in character'. This was ultimately a type of academic framework that would prove appealing to the DEA. Legge writes that

> with some exceptions, the approach to the study of Asia in Australian institutions [from the mid 50s to 60s] was modern and not classical, social scientific in temper, not orientalist...The language was the language of conceptual schema. It used such generalised categories as [economics], patrimonial states, bureaucratic elites, patron/client relationships, status systems, social stratification and so forth.\(^2\)

By the early 1960s, if not earlier, the AIIA itself was also proving to be increasingly of interest to the DEA and government for similar reasons.

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\(^2\) John Legge, ‘Asian Studies in Australian Perceptions of Asia’ in *Australian Cultural History* No.9 UNSW: 1990, pp.96-97. Legge argued that this new emphasis contrasted the foundation years of Australian Asian research and teaching in the 1940s, which emphasised ancient Asian societies, and classically inspired academic approaches.
The International Context
The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) was established in 1924. It was a non-political and non-profit organisation seeking to promote interest in the then new field of study of international affairs. Its various branches affiliated into a national body in 1933, emulating the structures of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), later the British Institute of International Affairs. The establishment of the AIIA was also following trends from the US. Organisations such as the RIIA, or Chatham House, and the American Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), established after World War One, maintained links with each other which in turn corresponded with the emergence of international affairs as a new area of academic study. The fundamental characteristic of the RIIA model as adopted by the AIIA was that it was supposed to be an independent, non-political, organisation with no political agenda to distract from its robust intellectual analysis, indeed for many years it operated free from much government interest.

Starting in the late 1940s and then expanding throughout the 1950s, the Cold War encouraged new types of engagement in America and Britain between government and organisations such as the CFR and the RIIA. These relationships held implications for the role that some within the AIIA would begin to want for the organisation in Australia from the late 1950s. From the late 1940s, for example, money from the State Department, US military, the CIA and large donations from the Ford and Carnegie Foundations, the philanthropic and cultural ambassadors not only for the US establishment, but eventually for American foreign policy during the Cold War, had elevated the discipline of International Relations (IR) to a prominent position in American universities. The analysis of the CFR was also heavily influenced by its wealthy East Coast establishment connections to politics, the US intelligence community, and business links with oil money in major New York banks. William Engdahl writes that the membership of the increasingly influential New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) during the 1950s also reflected this concentration of financial and economic power. The CFR chairman was the Wall Street lawyer John J. McCloy, also chairman of Chase Bank and a former lawyer for the Rockefeller Standard Oil interests.³

The Americans, through the CIA and these foundations, also began to turn their attention towards similar organisations in other countries which were considered compatible with the CFR, for example, the RIIA in the UK.

This consolidating interest in domestic and international think tanks dedicated to the analysis of foreign affairs was a natural extension of well-established US government connections with various universities and the media since the late 1940s. There was a systematic and deliberate effort by the US government (particularly the CIA), to establish networks of sympathetic journalists and academics willing to assist (and work clandestinely for) the US government as analysts, researchers, consultants and even spies. As Donald Brandt observes:

In 1948, the CIA recreated its covert action wing called the Office of Policy Coordination with Wall Street lawyer Frank Wisner as its first director. Another early elitist who served as Director of the CIA from 1953 to 1961 was Allen Dulles, a senior partner at the Wall Street firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which represented the Rockefeller empire and other trusts, corporations, and cartels. Starting in the early days of the Cold War (late 40's), the CIA began a secret project called Operation Mockingbird, with the intent of buying influence behind the scenes at major media outlets and putting reporters on the CIA payroll, which has proven to be a stunning ongoing success. The CIA effort to recruit American news organizations and journalists to become spies and disseminators of propaganda was headed up by Frank Wisner, Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and Philip Graham (publisher of The Washington Post).  

The main focus of these campaigns was to plant black, grey and white propaganda that supported US government policies into news reports, academic books and magazines. Such activities were conclusively documented by the 1975 Church Senate committee investigation into the CIA during the 1970s. According to US journalist Carl Bernstein, this exercise amounted to a massive effort to infiltrate the heart of the US media establishment. Many of the most prominent American journalists of the 1950s and 1960s were often willing participants in the operations of the CIA. Bernstein argues that:

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5 White Propaganda is factually slanted towards particular conclusions, but has an author.

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In 1953, Joseph Alsop, then one of America's leading syndicated columnists, went to the Philippines to cover an election. He did not go because he was asked to do so by his syndicate. He did not go because he was asked to do so by the newspapers that printed his column. He went at the request of the CIA. Alsop is one of more than 400 American journalists who in the past twenty-five years have secretly carried out assignments for the Central Intelligence Agency, according to documents on file at CIA headquarters. Some of these journalists' relationships with the Agency were tacit; some were explicit. There was cooperation, accommodation and overlap. Journalists provided a full range of clandestine services — from simple intelligence gathering to serving as go-betweens with spies in Communist countries. Reporters shared their notebooks with the CIA. Editors shared their staffs. Some of the journalists were Pulitzer Prize winners, distinguished reporters who considered themselves ambassadors-without-portfolio for their country. Most were less exalted: foreign correspondents who found that their association with the Agency helped their work; stringers and freelancers who were as interested in the derring-do of the spy business as in filing articles, and, the smallest category, full-time CIA employees masquerading as journalists abroad. In many instances, CIA documents show, journalists were engaged to perform tasks for the CIA with the consent of the managements America's leading news organizations.

As highlighted in Chapter One, these efforts were far from unknown on the other side of the Atlantic. For example, in Britain there were efforts by the Information Research Department (IRD) to also establish similar linkages. For instance, the IRD had interest in the respectable publications such as The Economist, and also attempted to exert influence on emerging academic disciples such as Strategic Studies. One example of this phenomenon is shown by Australian born Brian Crozier, a former journalist for The Economist (1954 -1964), BBC commentator, academic and Cold War propagandist. During his time at The Economist, he developed close links with the CIA (through the then US Ambassador to the United Kingdom), and later worked for the IRD researching KGB subversion activities. He continued to maintain close links with American and British intelligence for the remainder of his professional life. To establish the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Crozier was assisted by Sir Peter Wilkinson, then Head of IRD, while its academic journal Conflict Studies was funded by sources with close CIA links. In 1977, a break and enter at Crozier’s Institute for the Study of Conflict office

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*He was a quintessential member of the so-called Georgetown Set. An elite within the American foreign policy (largely East Coast) aristocracy. It encompassed the State Department, the CIA, journalism and big business. This group included Frank Wisner, George Kennan, Dean Acheson, Richard Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, Stewart Alsop, Tracy Barnes, Thomas Braden, Philip Graham, David Bruce, Clark Clifford, Walt Rostow, Eugene Rostow, Chip Bohlen, Cord Meyer, James Angleton, William Averill Harriman, John McCloy, Felix Frankfurter, John Sherman Cooper, James Reston, Allen W. Dulles and Paul Nitze.

revealed that he had a number of IRD publications, and that he was the editor of *The Economist Confidential Blue Series*, much used by foreign diplomats, and largely composed of IRD material.\(^7\)

It is in the area of infiltration into the media and also into the universities that the powerful sinews of the Anglo-American Cold War propaganda were often very influential. This style of analysis gained increasing legitimacy through these processes, and were an example of how the marshalling of civic, economic and political resources was considered important during the Cold War.

In the case of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and its flagship publication *The Strategic Balance*, for example, a pioneering academic think tank effectively created an entire academic and journalistic genre built on Cold War speculations about the comparative military power of the communist and non-communist world. The IISS was established and maintained by US money, sourced through organisations like the Ford Foundation, and had connections with British and American intelligence. The relationship with the IISS later was often far more subtle in comparison to efforts to influence the media, but as demonstrated by Crozier’s highly anti-Soviet Institute for the Study of Conflict, this was not always so. Yet black or grey, even white propaganda could easily infiltrate the work of respected academic institutions and publications. As will be shown, the IISS was a model with considerable interest, and of considerable influence, for the Strategic Studies Centre at the ANU.

Founded in 1958, the IISS was formed with the closest links possible with Anglo-American officials. The ethical concerns of its founding members regarding the consequences and indeed the morality of atomic weapons, soon gave way to more conventional Anglo-American Cold War analysis such as nuclear deterrence and arms control. According to the IISS it was founded in 1958 in the UK by a number of individuals interested in how to maintain civilised international relations in the nuclear age. Much of the Institute’s early work focused on nuclear

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\(^7\) Reddaway was a long serving stalwart of the IRD. See Norman Reddaway, Letter from Norman Reddaway, 28 August 1996 in *Sir Christopher Mayhew Papers 4/1/1*, London: Liddell Hart Military Archives, Kings College.
deterrence and arms control and [the IISS was] hugely influential in setting the intellectual structures for managing the Cold War.8

The emergence of the IISS was made possible by ongoing Ford Foundation funding and support from the British and American defence and intelligence establishment. The original IISS group had emerged from Chatham House in 1955 in response to an article by Denis Healey, later Defence Secretary in the Wilson Labour government of the 1960s. Healey wrote an article about atomic weapons and European neutrality in the magazine ‘Encounter’.9 Healey had personal links with the International Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office and held associations with the RAND Corporation. Healey’s article lamented European apathy regarding defence issues and the threat of the Soviet Union, but it was mostly concerned about European neutralism e.g. non-alignment with both the Soviets and Americans. This was also a major concern of the US government. The CIA and US government certainly used their connections with the Foundations to advance American interests and counter neutralism. The CIA and the Ford Foundation also provided large-scale funding for anti-communist political and cultural propaganda operations, notably, the ‘Congress for Cultural Freedom’.10

The International Division of the Ford Foundation saw great value in organisations as the IISS and it was strongly supported by two key employees - Joseph Slater and Shepherd Stone. Both of these men had previously worked in the American High Commission in Germany during the 1950s under John McCloy, later President of the Ford Foundation. According to John Krige of MIT, the driving motivations of US, and by implication Ford Foundation philanthropy, into international, cultural and scientific affairs was to consolidate the Atlantic alliance, above all by abolishing the weak link in the West’s armoury – the neutralists, those intellectuals who were disaffected by the Soviet Union but who were unwilling to align themselves with the United States.11

8 'About Us' electronic copy available at www.iiss.org/about-us/.
9 Dennis Healey, ‘The Bomb that Didn’t Go Off’ in Encounter July 1955.
10 Encounter was funded by the Congress for Cultural Freedom who was in turn funded by the Fairfield Foundation, a CIA created front organisation. Encounter was designed to deliberate attack and undermine ‘The New Statesman’ magazine. The later was seen by the Congress and the CIA as an information warfare target due to its standing as a leading magazine of the British Left and its tendency towards so called neutralism, in other words it lacked a clearly pro-US editorial philosophy.
After consulting with Shepherd Stone, Dennis Healy submitted an application for $US150,000 to the Ford Foundation for the establishment of the IISS in 1957. Although the IISS had emerged from Chatham House, by this time, Ford was also heavily funded this institution. The IISS itself was initially concerned by the ethics of atomic weapons, but such founding concerns quickly dissipated. According to Michael Howard, it was apparently impossible to ‘sustain [their] obligation to study both the political and moral dimensions of our subject, as had been our [original] intention’. The main publication of the IISS from the 1960s was ‘The Strategic Balance’. This was an East vs. West strategic analysis produced from non-attributed statistics that were supplied secretly by official sources. In his memoirs, Howard wrote of the ‘shadowy figures who furnished us [the IISS] with the information that made it possible to provide the statistics.’

From the Anglo-American Cold War perspective atomic weapons, and the arms race with the Russians, became something to be managed, examined and assessed, and presented in a detached academic manner. Yet it is difficult to sustain any argument that either those supplying the IISS with intelligence information, those who used it, and those that earnestly footnoted IISS materials in their own research work, were themselves impartial, detached and objective observers, they were in fact participants. The potential destruction of the human race could therefore be later rationalised away in terms of academic and strategic jargon such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), or by experts assessing the strategic implications of slight reductions in stockpiles of thousands of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). This attitude legitimised atomic weapons, the arms race, and the Cold War as an ongoing, if somewhat distasteful, necessity through a narrow intellectual analysis that effectively eliminated major ethical questions. Some of the attitude can certainly be attributed to the temper of the times, but other aspects can certainly be attributed to the active cultivation of false

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12 The doyen of British strategic studies and founder of the Strategic Studies Centre at Kings College London. The Ford Foundation also originally funded this centre. Today the Strategic Studies Centre (or Department of War Studies) remains closely linked to the IISS and organisations such as NATO.
14 Ibid, p.162.
perceptions. The most influential academic contribution to this type of strategic attitude towards atomic weapons was of course by the IISS. Yet UK and US intelligence sources often supplied the statistics used by the IISS as non-attributed information within publications like *The Strategic Balance*. The dangers of non-attribution, the hallmark of grey and black propaganda methods become self-evident when it is recognised that without footnotes the evidence cannot be examined, or tested in any meaningful manner. The implications of such an approach are significant. For example, in 1960-1961, *The Strategic Balance* estimated that the USSR had 50 to 100 ICBMs. As pointed out by Kim Beazley, currently Australian Ambassador to the US, this was part of

a habit of worst case assessments of Soviet capabilities as a driver [for] the structure of American forces ... sad, when it is contemplated that in 1961 the Soviet Union had only four operational ICBMs.\(^\text{15}\)

**The AIIA and the new Canberra Network**

The size, influence and financial scope of organisations such as the Ford Foundation, the CFR, and even the RIIA, far exceeded local Australian resources. The Australian academic and journalistic culture of international affairs was comparatively small, and a close network inevitably developed among its parties. This small network was recognised by the Ford Foundation when it considered the prospects of funding activities in Australia by the early 1960s. Given the status of the ANU, and its relationship to government, Ford viewed Canberra as a potential blueprint for their overall Australian programs. Given Australia's location in the Asia-Pacific region, its close diplomatic relationship with Washington, and the development of genuine Australian based expertise on Asia-Pacific issues within the universities, also interested Ford. This perception made Canberra seem central to the development of a new Australian foreign policy community in the early 1960s. There was also scope for Ford to make a significant impact in a relatively short period of time, for example, given the relatively small-scale of Australian universities in the inter-war years, funds from the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations had come largely to individual Australian

scholars working on specific projects. It was also the case that AIIA - unlike the RIIA or CFR - did not possess a full time Director, centralised headquarters and lacked the funds to exert any comparable domestic influence in Australia. Yet new relationships were actively being sought by the end of the 1950s, and the small AIIA branch in Canberra was beginning to become in itself, something of a microcosm of the new model. By that time, the AIIA was also benefitting from the support and encouragement of Richard Casey as something of an unofficial patron. On this basis, key individuals at the ANU, the DEA and within the AIIA itself were convinced that the AIIA should seek to expand its operations by seeking international funding from the Ford Foundation.

Beyond Canberra there were other influential AIIA figures keen to make these changes to the structure of the organisation. The main impetus for this direction came from Professor Gordon Greenwood, who served as AIIA president in 1961-65, and Professor Norman Harper, concurrently chair of its research committee. Both men had built their academic and public standing in the field of Australian international affairs over the previous decade. As a Professor of History at the University of Queensland from 1949, Greenwood brought his own particular interests to the department, for example, a combination of history, political science and international affairs, the latter encompassing research interests in Asia, the UK, the British Commonwealth and the United States. As an Associate Professor of History at the University of Melbourne, Harper was a scholar of the United States, but also worked to develop the study of Asia in Australian schools, universities, he was also involved in public commentary about foreign affairs, and educational programs within the Colombo Plan. Their relationship with the AIIA was of deep professional reciprocity: they brought to it their particular style of academic standing while gaining prestige from this association far beyond their own university campuses, especially though their inauguration of the five-yearly collection of essays Australia in World Affairs, which they co-edited from 1955 to 1970. Harper – as Allan Johnson noted – ‘frequently interrupted classes with a polite request that students leave the room because ‘the Minister’ [of External Affairs] or ‘the Department’ was on the phone’.16 Together, Greenwood and Harper marked a transition

in academic expertise in international relations from one of informed commentary to increasing degree of specialisation. And it was from this perspective that they sought to expand the operations and profile of the AIIA, in particularly its research and publication output. In their view, this would require the AIIA to seek significant funding from an outside source. In 1962, aware that the Ford Foundation had forged funding and research contacts with international foreign affairs elites by donating very large sums of money, Greenwood mooted that the AIIA should seek direct funding from the Ford Foundation to achieve these objectives.

This emerging model did not sit easily with all members of the AIIA, some of whom remained wedded to an older mode of collegial discussion. The minutes of the AIIA meeting in August 1962 reveals this divergence of views on how AIIA expansion should progress. Mr H.A. Manning from the NSW Branch of the AIIA – and its president in 1963-66 - proposed an alternative model of expansion for the organisation to consider. Manning suggested that the AIIA could expand by conducting more local conferences and seeking increased local donations. He proposed that a major seminar called ‘Living with China’ could assist this process, especially if it included invited speakers from the Asian region, including if possible the Chinese, to discuss and debate this topic. This proposal, and the possibility of inviting to Australia a delegation from mainland China, found no favour with Greenwood and Harper. Nor did Manning’s idea find favour from members of the AIIA who also worked in the DEA. Manning was opposed by Greenwood who advocated that only the Ford Foundation could provide the desired level of capital for the expansion into the research-driven directions he envisaged. Crucially, the Canberra Branch of the AIIA was highly supportive of Greenwood and Harper’s proposals. This branch had the most highly concentrated network of connections with government of any AIIA group in the country. It was made up of serving senior members of the Defence forces, the DEA and prominent academics from the ANU. Its access to the corridors of political, bureaucratic and academia was therefore unique in the AIIA. It was within this group that Greenwood and Harper found very strong support for their expansion plans.

Not only did the formal meetings and discussions of the AIIA in Canberra provide support for such initiatives, but they also fostered more selective, informal channels of exchange. The ability of the AIIA to be the catalyst for such an outcome is reflective of its style. Although the AIIA promoted itself as an independent organisation, its membership and the local realities of Cold War politics meant, perhaps not surprisingly, that it was never a natural forum for alternative ideas or controversial debates. Crucially, the AIIA provided opportunities for its membership to form extended networks and contacts. In 1962, for example, Professor J.D.B. Miller, who had recently been appointed to the Department of International Relations at the ANU, worked with Tange to forge close ties between their respective organisations. Miller had come to his ANU position believing that unnecessary tensions had been caused between the government and the ANU.* As he reflected,

It seemed to me that this had created a situation in which public servants no longer talked to academics (if they had ever done so in any measure), contrary to what I had experienced in London and New York. I constructed a dining club consisting of half academics and half senior public servants in those fields concerned with external relations—Defence, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, Trade and Treasury—and put the proposition to Crawford in the first instance, and then with his support to Arthur Tange. It worked. With these two major figures in Public Service eyes, it lasted for ten years, month by month, a talk from either side of the table—or, increasingly, from the person next to you—followed by a vigorous discussion.17

The idea of a regular discussion group over dinner—the Third Monday Group—was borrowed by Miller from the Institute of War and Peace Studies (SIA) at Columbia University.* The group was designed to facilitate intellectual discussion and also to establish professional networks connected to the analysis of international affairs that expanded over time. Accordingly, Miller added:

When a new Minister for Defence appeared, we asked him along too. Hedley [Bull] fitted in as by nature to this environment. He was an Australian academic, he had worked in the [UK] Foreign Office, he was fully aware of the importance of officials in formulating policy, and he proved to be an acceptable interlocutor to all those he met. Like our other departmental members of the Group, he found the senior officials easy to deal with, and perhaps more able than ignorant

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* Some of these unnecessary tensions were apparently caused by some academics at ANU who criticised the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation and the granting of an honorary degree to the King of Thailand. 17 J.D.B. Miller, ‘Chapter 6 Hedley in Canberra’ in Coral Bell and Meredith Thatcher (Eds.) Remembering Hedley, Canberra, Australian National University E-press, 2008, p.77 available from http://epress.anu.edu.au/hedley_citation.html.

* Colombia had maintained connections with the heart of the US foreign policy from 1946 well before the School of International Studies (SIA) had been founded. In the 1950s, the SIA complimented the major interests of the US foreign policy planners and intelligence community.
academics had previously thought. Hedley managed the Group when I was away, and I am sure he enjoyed it.\textsuperscript{18}

Tange and Miller each saw value in maintaining such mutual contact,\textsuperscript{19} Miller conceding to Tange that he could not have got the Third Monday Group started, and it would not have been able to carry on ...

Without your assistance, I could not have established such happy relations with the staff of External Affairs. This has been of the greatest benefit to our department; I hope that we sometimes contributed something in return.\textsuperscript{20}

And such trust generated other initiatives of professional support between the DEA and the AIIA. Following the AIIA meeting in August that endorsed Greenwood’s interest in Ford support, on 18 September 1962, Ralph Harry, then first Assistant Secretary in the DEA, wrote to Greenwood, seeking – as the recently appointed president of the AIIA’s Canberra branch – a first opportunity to make contact with Greenwood as AIIA national President about official business, and particularly the Ford Foundation.

As you would have heard, I [Harry] have just succeeded John Hodgkin as the President of the Canberra Branch of the [AIIA]. I hope that it will not be long before I make direct contact with you [and] discuss the best way in which this branch can contribute to the work of the Institute. I am writing to you at this time to ask your views as to the line we should adopt in talking with Mr. Slater, Assistant Director of the Ford Foundation, who arrived in Canberra on Friday 16\textsuperscript{th} September.\textsuperscript{21}

Behind this introduction, wheels were turning. Harry, to a large extent, was an ideal product of several processes covered by this thesis. A former Rhodes Scholar, who had served as an Australian intelligence officer during World War Two, Harry had joined the DEA in 1945 and become well known in British and American diplomatic and intelligence circles. His own professional relationship with Arthur Tange, Secretary of the DEA until 1964, dated back to 1947, where both men worked together in Evatt’s


\textsuperscript{19} Letter from Arthur Tange to Professor J.D.B. Miller, 10 February 1965, Sir Arthur Tange Papers MS9847 Box 5, MS9847/2/10.

\textsuperscript{20} J.D.B. Miller to Tange, 29 January 1965 in Sir Arthur Tange MS9847 Box 5, MS9847/2/10.

\textsuperscript{21} Ralph Harry, ‘Letter to Norman Greenwood 18\textsuperscript{th} September 1962, Canberra Branch File’ in AIIA Papers MS2821/7/50, Canberra: National Library of Australia. Harry’s letter was directly related to AIIA business and did not use official Department stationary, but his return address for Greenwood was care of the DEA. Slater was a former chief economist of the Creole Petroleum Corporation in Caracas, Venezuela, which was connected to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey owned by Nelson Rockefeller.
Australian Mission to the UN. From 1957 until 1960, Harry was the Director General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). Outside of ASIS itself, his service as the second Director General of ASIS was unknown to all but a handful of high-ranking individuals from the government and the DEA. Harry’s involvement with ASIS was only widely exposed in 1989 by the book Oyster. His obituary stated that not even his family had been aware of his involvement and he kept no records of ASIS in his personal papers, unlike Casey, who maintained an extensive political diary of his intelligence involvement.

Harry indicated in his letter to Greenwood that he would raise AIIA business in his discussions with Joseph Slater, the Assistant Director of the Ford Foundation. He also advised Greenwood and Harper that they too should seek a meeting with Slater. When Greenwood wrote to Casey’s successor as Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, on 31 October 1962, he took the opportunity to outline an ambitious programme of AIIA expansion; including a funding application to the Ford Foundation, increased networking with Australian universities, stronger contacts with similar international organisations and a campaign for tax exempt status. And when Harry wrote again to Greenwood on 2 November 1962, he offered advice and a Treasury contact to Greenwood to assist AIIA efforts to secure tax exempt status for any such funding, clearly, a coordinated initiative was in train.

From Harry’s perspective, an expanded and better-resourced AIIA could play a central role, alongside the DEA, in Australian foreign policy research and analysis. He even wrote to the official DEA historian, J.S. Cumpston, exploring ways in which the DEA could assist the research work of the AIIA. While also sympathetic to Harry’s vision, Cumpston pointed out that DEA officers could not provide documents to the AIIA without contravening the Public Service Act. Yet, he still believed there were measures that could be implemented by the DEA to assist the AIIA in its research.

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activities. It thought desirable that when the AIIA conducted research into international relations, this research should be based on sources of information and analysis that were acceptable to the DEA.\textsuperscript{27}

**Consequences of Expansion**

While the AIIA application to the Ford Foundation, and its efforts to attain tax-exempt status were ultimately successful, a $US75,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, secured in 1963, transformed the work of the Institute – as did a second Ford Foundation grant of $100,000 in 1967.\textsuperscript{28} This first grant, to run over three years, was described by the Ford Foundation as developing ‘an expanded program of research on international relations’.\textsuperscript{29} And the Foundation was explicit in its stipulations for that funding. As Greenwood and Harper were informed in September 1962, the AIIA was to focus its research more exclusively on Asia, and particularly Indonesia. This priority accorded with the strategic objectives Ford shared with other bodies, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, in serving the US’s evolving regional priorities. As Bradley Simpson notes, between 1950 and 1964 the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations:

> alone disbursed nearly $US20 million for education, agriculture, medical and technical assistance in both the US and Indonesia. These philanthropic institutions not only facilitated a dramatic expansion of social scientific research on Indonesia but also funded participant and education exchange programmes for Indonesian technicians, economists, teachers, agrarian specialists, military personnel and engineers – what US Ambassador to Indonesia from 1958 to 1964 Howard Jones termed a long term ‘struggle for the Indonesian mind’.\textsuperscript{30}

The Ford Foundation also stipulated that the AIIA would need to hold local fundraisers, would need to modify its organisational structure and appoint a full time Executive Director to coordinate such research. Funds from the original US$75,000 were made available to help pay the salary for this new position. When Sir Alan Watt was appointed the AIIA’s first, full-time salaried Executive Director in 1963, these networks grew even closer. A former Secretary of the DEA and recently retired diplomat, Watt

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{28} A timeline of the Ford Foundation Grant was discussed at length during an AIIA meeting in Canberra (2 March 1963). The original Ford grant was a considerable contribution indeed when it is considered that $US75,000 in 1962 = $US33,632.68 in 2008.


was a visiting fellow at the ANU before his appointment. The personal and professional connections that already existed between section of the DEA, the AIIA and the ANU were thus strengthened and enhanced by Ford Foundation funding.

With this funding in hand, the lines of expansion undertaken by the AIIA in the 1960s were reminiscent, albeit on a less significant scale, of the CFR in the US. The AIIA grant assisted the early work by scholars including the Indonesianists Herbert Feith and Jamie Mackie, both Australians would become pioneering and well respected authorities on Indonesian history and politics with each establishing lasting research legacies within the Australian university system. Like Mackie, Feith was a tireless advocate of closer Australian diplomatic relations with, and understanding about Indonesia, throughout his life. Unlike Mackie, Feith used his Indonesian expertise to also advocate for human rights causes at odds with the politics of the Suharto regime, such as East Timor. In general, the overall published works of the AIIA at this time were often strikingly similar in style and substance to that of the DEA. Similarities with the analysis of the DEA are seen in the major AIIA publications; *Australia in the World* and the booklet series; *Australia's Neighbours*, in which the sources referenced are often parliamentary statements and the published resources of the DEA. In many respects, this approach seems to indicate that Harry's vision of the AIIA as an auxiliary office of the DEA was being fulfilled. Written within a mainstream climate of rather limited critical debate over foreign policy in Australia, these texts presented themselves as the semi-official chronicle of Australian policy, its objectives and justifications. As J.D.B. Miller conceded, the AIIA's worked with virtual dependence on official sources of information such as the *Current Notes on International Affairs* series published by the DEA itself.  

31 'Interview by Adam Henry with Professor James Cotton and Professor Bruce Miller', Canberra, 11 March 2010.
under its auspices is hard to find in the early 1960s, and became even more elusive through the decade, particularly in relation to issues such as military involvement in Vietnam.  

What then were the defining aspects of the relationship between the AIIA, the ANU and outside organisations such as Ford? There is a sense that like the CUC and the ANU before it, by the beginning of the 1960s the AIIA was expected to be an unofficial arm of research and analysis on foreign affairs, and to provide commentary and publications that did not actively promote ideas contrary to the dominant policy orthodoxy, yet were promoted as being independent. Members of the AIIA – like Greenwood and Harper – became respected public commentators and the smoothness of the AIIA relationship with government was one of the reasons Ford money came with such apparent ease.

Crucially, when the AIIA received its first grant from the Ford Foundation, the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the ANU also received $US200,000 from Ford, as a first payment to develop a range of research programs that were effectively companions to Ford Foundation priorities. The RSPAS was then headed by Sir John Crawford, also a long-time member of the AIIA and a towering figure of post-war Australian economics, including as Secretary for the Department of Trade from 1956 to 1960. With Crawford, and with the expanding field of development economics, the links in policy development became even closer. The original Ford grant to the ANU, was, Crawford noted,

made in January 1963 for a three year period .... These funds were used primarily for salaries of new staff and for library, travel, seminar and publication costs of over a score of projects including economic studies of Soviet Asia, seminars on linguistic problems in Papua – New Guinea, a joint research project with the Indian Planning Commission on factors [like] the use of new food grain varieties, and an active research, seminar and publication program within the Universities Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.  

33 See ‘AIIA Canberra Branch’, NAA: MS1505/1.  
34 According to this newspaper report, this was 89,000 Australian pounds and thirty three thousand of this Ford Grant went directly to the Research School of the Pacific (RSPAS). See Ford Foundation Annual Report 1963, p. 135 electronic copy available from http://www.fordfound.org/archives/item/1963. According to the Ford Foundation Annual Report of 1963, this money was for the Department of International Relations.  
35 Sir John Crawford quoted in Kit Miller to Eugene S. Staples, July 2 1971 Inter Office Memorandum Information on A and P Australian Grants in Grant File Programme Action No. 63-126A. The ANU received another grant for $US191,200 in 1971. Other recipients of Ford Foundation monies connected to
Under Crawford’s leadership the ANU continued to secure strong support from the Ford Foundation for the development of programs in the Department of International Relations and Department of Economics. The establishment of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in 1966 is one major example of this relationship. Crawford also supported the work of Professor Heinz Arndt and advocated to the Ford Foundation on his behalf. Arndt was appointed Head of the Department of Economics in the Research School of Pacific Studies in November 1963. In 1966, Crawford's correspondence with the Ford Foundation strongly supported Arndt’s interest in developmental economics particularly on the Indonesian economy. This advocacy by Crawford laid the foundations for ‘The Indonesia Project’ at the ANU, an economic analysis and research unit devoted to the principles of developmental economics and its application to Indonesia.

The similarities between the ANU’s Indonesian Project and other well-established area studies programmes at Harvard, the University of Chicago, the University of California at Berkley, MIT, Johns Hopkins University and Cornell University are striking. Such US institutions were essentially responsible for the ‘construction and dispersal of social scientific thinking about political and economic development in the developing world and in the production of relevant policy knowledge’. The Indonesia Project fitted neatly with this style of thinking and activities in Australia were the Asian Broadcasting Union ($US200,000 in December 1966), the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEADA) received $US75,000 in 1963 and the Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific ($US25, 000 March 1969) headquartered in Sydney. This was the official bar association of the ECAFE region. The project (The Philippines: Study of legal framework for the supply and security of credits for financing development Asian Development Bank) was for the Asian Development Bank.

The origins of Arndt’s later funding are connected to the original Ford grant to the AIIA (1963). He was noted by the AIIA as an ANU expert on foreign aid with connections to CEDA (the Committee for Economic Development of Australia). Sir Douglas Copland founded CEDA in 1960. Crawford also had significant connections to CEDA. See ‘AIIA Files 1962-64’, MS2821/7/46.

Selwyn Cornish, Heinz Wolfgang Arndt (1915 – 2002), School of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Canberra: Australian National University electronic copy available from http://hetsa.fec.anu.edu.au/review/ejournal/pdf/36-A-12.pdf. Arndt’s ‘Indonesia Project’ is considered a great contribution to the ANU and Australian-Indonesian studies. As well as the recruitment of an impressive corps of academic staff, PhD students were attracted in considerable numbers to work on Indonesia. A journal – the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies – was launched, which Arndt edited for seventeen years.

approach. An established principle of American foreign policy from 1949 was that Indonesia was ‘a lynchpin in Washington’s strategy of regional economic integration and as a line of containment against the expansion of Soviet and later Chinese Power’. On the same lines, Arndt’s work was not merely economic analysis; it was Indonesian economic analysis compatible with US concerns. It was connected to the hope that the impact of Sukarno’s non-aligned foreign policy on the Indonesian economy, which effectively placed it beyond the influence of US financial influences as embodied by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, could be eventually rectified by a particular style of economic development as advocated by individuals such as Arndt. Arndt himself proved enthusiastic about the reorganisation of the Indonesian economy from 1966-67, and became a supporter of the Suharto regime thereafter. It would be the Indonesian economists, known as the ‘Berkeley Mafia’, which helped solidify Suharto’s rule by reintegrating the Indonesian economy with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western, primarily American multinational companies. Many of this so-called ‘Berkeley Mafia’ were trained at US universities in a style of economics not dissimilar to Arndt’s.

Alongside Arndt’s economic analysis, there was also a noticeable growth of military or strategic analysis both conventional and nuclear at the ANU examining Western responses to the Soviet Union. The development of the Strategic Studies Centre at ANU in 1966 was therefore strongly connected to US perceptions of what information would be produced and the contacts such an organisation would make. This also followed an already established pattern of US funded development in the UK, where the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) had quickly become the intellectual voice of independent Western Cold War analysis. In this Cold War context, a Strategic Studies Centre at the ANU based on the IISS model, was obviously quite acceptable to Ford. Joseph Slater, who oversaw Ford grants to the AIIA, is therefore as a central link between the common Ford motivations for funding the IISS, Chatham House, International Relations at the ANU including the Strategic Studies Centre, and the AIIA. The similarities between the IISS model, and the Strategic Studies Centre of the ANU, was also reflected in the connections the later established between itself, the

Australian Defence Department, the DEA and with certain academics from the ANU. For some founding figures in the Strategic Studies Centre, these connections extended back to service in the armed forces, military intelligence and personal associations with the IISS itself, or the British Foreign Office. For example, T.B. Millar, the first Executive Officer was a former Australian army officer who held membership of the IISS. During 1968-69, Millar even took leave from his ANU duties to be a ‘Senior Research Associate at the IISS’. During his absence from Australia, Hedley Bull took over as Executive Officer. Ford was particularly impressed by Bull’s academic pedigree which connected him to the heart of the British strategic and defence establishment including the IISS and the FO. Ford described Bull as

formerly Reader in Strategic Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science and then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit at the British Foreign Office.\footnote{Ibid, p.4.}

The Strategic Studies Centre at the ANU also built on the already established AIIA, ANU and Ford relationship. Various members of the original ANU Strategic Studies advisory demonstrate this reality. For example, J.D.B. Miller, Chair of the Department of International Relations, was closely connected to the DEA through the AIIA; Sir Alan Watt, a former DEA Secretary and Honorary Fellow of ANU, was closely connected to the DEA, the AIIA and the Ford Foundation; H.W Arndt (Economics) was supported by Sir John Crawford, Vice-Chancellor of the ANU, and significantly funded by Ford money; Sir Earnest Titterton, Dean of Research School of Physical Sciences, had a long personal association with the Australian government on various defence issues such as atomic weapons; T.H.R. Rigby (Political Science) was a former British diplomat previously serving in Moscow and a specialist in Soviet studies; Sir John Crawford was not only Vice-Chancellor of the ANU, and towering figure of Australian economics, he was also a former Secretary of the Department of Trade; B.D. Beddie was a Professor of Government at the Royal Military College Duntroon. Other members of the advisory committee included Professor Spate, Director of the Research School of Pacific Studies, Professor W.E.H. Stanner (Anthropology), Professor WD Borrie, Director of the Research School of Social Sciences, Professor

\footnote{See ‘Employed and Associated Staff’ (of Strategic Studies Centre, ANU), p.2 in Grant File Programme Action 63-117.}
A.L. Burns (Political Science) and Professor P.H. Partridge (Social Philosophy - Research School of Social Sciences).

The comparison with the IISS model, the origins of its funding and its methods of analysis are strikingly similar in the case of the Strategic Studies Centre at ANU, but there is one notable philosophical difference. The IISS did begin with founding membership from various Churchmen and individuals concerned about moral questions about atomic weapons. From a religious or liberal philosophical perspective, the ethical and moral legitimacy of such weapons of mass destruction was rejected then and remains rejected today. The Strategic Studies Centre at the ANU was in essence founded on a different attitude and never needed to abandon any moral basis, however fleeting, to its intended research purpose. By 1967, the Strategic Studies Centre had established its fortnightly seminar series. According to the Ford archives, ‘they have been open to members of the University (faculty and students) as well as government officials, officers of the armed forces, members of parliament and other interested persons.’ Topics being presented during 1967 included:

Professor Hedley Bull - Nuclear Proliferation and Anti-Missile Defence;
Professor A.L. Burns - The Chinese H-Bomb and its complications for Australia;
Mr. J.L.S. Girling - The Insurgency in North East Thailand.

Although the Ford archives record that these seminars were all open to the public and members of the university, this was not always true. A series of discussions conducted by the Strategic Studies Centre about the Vietnam War during 1967 were by invitation only, and presumably held under Chatham House rules. By 1967, there were

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2314 “Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation.” A danger of modern warfare is that it provides the opportunity to those who possess modern scientific weapons especially atomic, biological, or chemical weapons - to commit such crimes.
2315 The accumulation of arms strikes many as a paradoxically suitable way of deterring potential adversaries from war. They see it as the most effective means of ensuring peace among nations. This method of deterrence gives rise to strong moral reservations. The arms race does not ensure peace. Far from eliminating the causes of war, it risks aggravating them. Spending enormous sums to produce ever-new types of weapons impedes efforts to aid needy populations; it thwarts the development of peoples. Over-armament multiplies reasons for conflict and increases the danger of escalation.
43 See ‘Employed and Associated Staff’ (of Strategic Studies Centre, ANU), p.5 in Grant File Programme Action 63-117.
also opportunities for the Strategic Studies Centre to engage directly in military planning with the Australian army, this was pleasing to Ford.

Late in 1967 the Centre was invited to assist the Australian Army’s Directorate of Combat Development in forward planning for the period 1980-90. To this end the Centre organised a number of seminars between November 1967 and May 1968 attended by senior army officers as well as selected academics from a range of disciplines. The results of this cooperation between defence planners and independent academics through the mediation of the Centre appear to have been significant.44

Rounding out the networks Ford funding secured, the Foundation also approved a grant of $US75,000 to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) in 1963. Douglas Copland, a prominent Australian economist with major links to the ANU (he has been its first vice-chancellor), wrote to Joseph Slater on 22 February 1963 seeking help to transform CEDA into an organisation of national significance. In 1961, an application to Ford from CEDA had been rejected in part because of its emphasis specifically on Australian development. As an internal Ford memo then noted:

Our view has been that any help we give in Australia would not be for the development of Australia but to stimulate political ties and to stimulate Australia to give help to the underdeveloped countries.45

The 1963 application seems to have successful because it now included not only an analysis of ‘Australia’s economic growth potential’, but also an undertaking to embark on a ‘South East Asian project as soon as possible’ – a project envisaged as building the ‘cooperation of the United States and Japan in a study of the Economic Development of South East Asia on a basis of international cooperation’.46 Corporate and individual membership of CEDA was a veritable who’s who of big commercial interests, top banking executives and economists. Yet connecting CEDA and the ANU was the crucial presence of Sir John Crawford on the proposed ‘South East Asian Trade and Aid

44 Ibid.
45 Mr. F.F. Hill to Waldemar A. Neilsen, 23 February 1961 Memorandum in Grant File Programme Action No.63-453.
46 Ibid. See also ‘South East Asian Trade and Aid Project Objective of Proposal’ in Grant File Programme Action No.63-453. The Ford Foundation approved its funding of the South East Asia project on 22 July 1963 and payment in full by August provided that CEDA had tax-exempt status in Australia and that ‘no part of the grant is to be used for general CEDA overhead expenses or to cover the costs of any of its domestic projects’. See International Affairs, 22 July 1963, File No. D-907 Programme Action No. 63-453. See also Douglas Copland CEADA to Joseph Slater (Ford Foundation), 22 February 1963 Received February 1963 in Grant File Programme Action No.63-453, New York: Ford Foundation Archives.
Committee’. The Ford Foundation viewed CEDA as being ‘similar to the Committee of Economic Development in the US’, but more importantly, it was compatible with their ‘limited objectives’ in Australia. The presence of Crawford, and close liaison with Copland another ANU stalwart, would ‘ensure close cooperation between the proposed CEDA project and the Foundation supported efforts in this field at the ANU’. The project was primarily viewed in terms of its alignment with Foundation objectives and Asian economic considerations.

The proposed project is related to the Foundations limited program objective in Australia i.e. to bring Australia closer together with the Atlantic nations on the one hand and with the Pacific community, including Japan, on the other. As a small nation with no colonial past and an advanced level of technological competence, Australia has gained acceptance throughout the non-communist world, particularly in development assistance. There exists a desire in Australia to play a larger role in free world programs.

In assessing the Ford Foundation grants it is tempting to produce a detailed analysis of just how the various studies it funded could have influenced Australian attitudes and approaches towards the study of foreign affairs and area studies of Asia. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it remains important to keep in mind the motivations that Ford had for providing funding. These objectives aimed at funding research activities not only consistent with US policy objectives in the academic and educational fields, but to build a network of international expertise linked to the US through the Ford Foundation. The success of these 1963 grants in addressing these

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47 Ibid. See CEDA’S Participation, p.6. The proposed committee for the South East Asia research project: Sir Douglas Copland, Chairman CEDA, Executive Committee Sir John Crawford, Director, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU (the only non-company member of the Committee)

Sir Maurice Mawby, Chairman Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Ltd.
Mr. R.L. Cooper, Executive Director Finance, Ansett Transport Industries
Mr. G.S. Coleman, General Manager, The Australian Estates Company Ltd
Mr. R.F. Holder, Economist, Bank of New South Wales
Mr. J.G.W. McIntyre, Managing Director, Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd.
Mr. D.L. Hegland, Managing Director General, Motors-Holden Pty Ltd.
Mr. D.W. Finley, Techno-Commercial Manager, ICIANZ Ltd.
Mr. R.C.G. Parry-Okeden, Chairman and Managing Director, John Lysaght Australia Ltd.
Mr. J.S. Smith, Managing Director, Personnel Administration Pty. Ltd.
Mr. F.G. Weller, Economist, The Shell Company of Australia Ltd.
Mr. G.W.E. Barraclough, Chairman, Unilever Australia Pty. Ltd.
Mr. T.G. Crane, Managing Director, Monsanto Chemicals Australia Ltd.
Mr. D.H. Merry, Chief Economist, Australia New Zealand Bank Ltd.
Mr. A.V. Jennings, Chairman and Managing Director, AV Jennings Industries Ltd.

48 To Mr. Henry T. Heald via Mr. Joseph M. McDaniel from F.F. Hill, 24 Jun 1963, Request for Grant out of Appropriation in Grant File Programme Action No.63-453.

49 Ibid, p.2.
objectives is perhaps best assessed in the light of a second package of Ford funding made available later in the 1960s. By then, increasing sophistication had been brought to the networks being nurtured.

In early 1967 Ford made a second grant, this time of $US100,000, to the AIIA. In seeking this second grant, Norman Harper outlined to the Ford Foundation the central role he saw the AIIA organisation had come to play in Australian debates about international affairs and South East Asia.

It is clear that the area of greatest tension and difficulty in the world at the present moment is Asia. The growing war in Vietnam and the inability of the United Nations to deal with it, the Cultural Revolution in China, the coup and counter coup in Indonesia, centrifugal forces in Malaysia, economic problems in Singapore, food deficiencies in India, Communist pressures in the North Eastern Provinces of Thailand, colonial problems in the South Pacific – all of these developments and the effects which flow from them require urgent study, analysis and publicity which governments alone cannot provide.60

Harper also highlighted Australian government engagement with South East Asia, its role as a member of the ‘Commonwealth of Nations and as an ally of the United States in dealing with these problems’.61 Harper boasted of the by then central role that the AIIA occupied in the dissemination of information about international affairs in Australia.

It [the AIIA] has developed close relations with the DEA and other government departments, with specialised bodies like the Institute of Political Science, the United Nations Association and the Council on New Guinea Affairs, with the Press and the Australian Broadcasting Commission, and with universities, business groups, secondary schools and youth organisations.62

According to Harper, the development of university departments studying international affairs particularly of Asia within Australia offered growing opportunities for the AIIA. The relationship between this increased pool of research expertise and the AIIA demonstrated clearly how readily competent writers co-operate with the Institute, whether they hold official or university positions or special business experience. Any grant to the Institute, therefore to widen its research and publication programme is spread effectively through the relevant Australian community as a whole.63

60 Norman Harper (President of AIIA) to Joseph Slater (Ford Foundation) May 22 1967 Received May 25 1967 in Grant File Programme Action No. 63-126A.
61 Ibid, p.2.
62 Ibid, p.3.
63 Ibid.
From the perspective of the Ford Foundation, the descriptions being offered by Harper were pleasing. They were consistent with their core objective of creating a worldwide network of institutions devoted to the study of international affairs and working within the framework of Ford funding stipulations.\(^{64}\) This included significant funding for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York, and Chatham House in London. In 1967, at the time of the AIIA’s second funding application, the Ford Foundation was satisfied with the progress being achieved.

In addition to financial assistance, the Foundation has helped these institutions [such as the AIIA] to establish meaningful relations with each other through the exchange of staff, materials and ideas. Certain countries which did not have such institutions were not members of the “club” and lacked the broader outlook of those who were actively in touch with each other.\(^{65}\)

Ford money had helped establish an active Institute of International Affairs in Italy under Altiero Spinelli, and they were considering ‘modest support to help strengthen the German Institute and possibly to help establish one in Spain’.\(^{66}\) The funding of an Australian institute was part of the process of establishing a worldwide network of institutions sponsored by Ford funding. From Ford’s view, the Australians and the Canadians were similar in their operations and were increasingly becoming part of the Ford “club”. Due to Foundation funding

the two institutes (Australian and Canadian) are stronger and are becoming integral members of these growing worldwide cooperative efforts. Their membership includes persons of various political persuasions drawn from public, professional, business and academic circles. Both are organisations with programs of nationwide scope ... The activities of each institute are similar to those of the US Council on Foreign Relations and the UK Royal Institute of International Affairs.\(^{67}\)

In assessing the merits of providing second grants to the Australians and Canadians, the Ford Foundation were clearly pleased with the transformation of each respective institute under the initial Foundation grant.

Both [the Australian and Canadian] institutes have helped build effective international affairs programmes in the universities in their countries and have themselves become contributors to the international network of foreign affairs institutes. Each has helped to break the previous monopoly government had on foreign affairs expertise. Both institutes have been enabled to attract and keep first class people on their staffs. Each has emerged as an organisation of independent national stature on foreign affairs. The Foundations grants directly helped in this transformation.\(^{68}\)

\(^{64}\) Request No. ID-40 Background and Justification in Grant File Programme Action No. 63-126A, New York: Ford Foundation Archives.

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

\(^{66}\) Ibid.

\(^{67}\) Ibid. Background and Justification p.3.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.
And it was clear that on the Australian side a sense of improved access to American expertise, or influence, might be associated with such funds. For Harper and Greenwood, who had already forged close contacts with Australian government, the continuing association with Ford appeared to offer opportunities to forge new relationships with the American foreign policy establishment. In 1966, Greenwood wrote to Ford hoping to arrange a meeting with Ford President McGeorge Bundy when he visited New York in February and March 1967. Bundy’s appointment to the Presidency of Ford in 1966 was an extension of his long association with the Council on Foreign Relations from the 1950s, and certainly connected to his previous role as the US National Security Advisor first under Kennedy and then Johnson. Joseph Slater, who had overseen the initial process of funding the AIIA, politely received these overtures but there are some revealing attitudes in the Ford archives. When Bundy eventually responded to Greenwood’s letter, he cited that his diary commitments would preclude a possible meeting, but he advised that Slater was free to see him. Prior to his repose Bundy had sought clarification from Slater about meeting Greenwood. Slater wrote to Bundy that

Gordon Greenwood is a thoughtful, solid scholar. He has played a leading role in the AIIA for some time. The Foundation made a grant of $US75,000 to the Institute in early 1963 to revitalise the Institute, to give it national status, and to put it in touch with similar institutes around the world. Based on our grant, we were able to get Sir Alan Watt (former Australian Ambassador in Moscow and Washington) to serve as its national director. Substantial progress has been made. I will see Greenwood when he comes regarding program matters. In my opinion, it would probably be interesting and useful, but certainly not important, for you to take time to see him.

As in 1963, a companion grant to the ANU was also approved in 1967 – with a partnership between them being more openly taken into account. The ambitions of the AIIA and ANU were interpreted by the Ford Foundation as being particularly compatible to their objectives. Australia is attempting to strengthen her own resources to develop foreign policy which reflects her new position, particularly Vis a Vis the UK. The Institute wishes to reinforce its role in response to this need...The fields chosen are central and are related to the Foundation’s objectives, particularly in the Atlantic area. The Institute's work would also be carried out in

70 ‘McGeorge Bundy to Gordon Greenwood’, December 19 1966 in Grant File Programme Action No. 63-126A.
71 J.E. Slater to Mr Bundy, December 2 1966 Memorandum Your Enquiry RE: Professor Greenwood in Grant File Programme Action No. 63-126A.
close collaboration with that of the Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies for which IA [International Affairs Ford Foundation] is requesting a companion grant.

Even by the later 1960s, the Ford Foundation assessed that funding and research opportunities in Australia, particularly in the Social Sciences were, as in New Zealand, rather limited. Due to the concentration of expertise in Canberra, and the close connections between the AIIA, DEA and academia, the ANU once again became the natural choice for additional funding. The international affairs research programmes at the ANU were considered by Ford to be far more concentrated than at any other Australian university. With several individuals maintaining prominent roles and membership in the AIIA and the ANU, the Ford Foundation saw merit in providing funding to both. Around such individuals clustered a large number of academic research projects that analysed alliance security with South East Asia from Australian and Western perspectives, or economic or strategic studies of the region. One specific example of such Ford funding was obviously the establishment of the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in 1966, to draw on the Foundation’s second grant. This centre solidified connections between government, the Department of Defence, intelligence and academia in particular ways. The establishment of a centre concerned primarily with strategic analysis, the use of military force, alliances, regional security and a fascination with weaponry, all placed military considerations firmly at the epicentre of most if not all of its thinking about international relations. This replicated the style of cooperation shared between the US government, US universities and the Rand Corporation from the late 1940s. In this model of cooperation the university department, or think tank, became an adjunct member of the foreign policy and defence establishment which enabled fluid associations and shifting memberships. The establishment of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre was also part of the already established relationship between AIIA, the ANU and the Ford Foundation. It also legitimated military strategy within Australian international affairs in a manner consistent with American thinking; it replicated developments in the US universities.

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72 Ibid, p.4. [Final page incorrectly marked as 3.]
73 See (c) Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in Proposals for Expenditure by Ford Foundation on Research To be Conducted by The Research Schools of Social Sciences and Pacific Studies and the Department of Forestry, School of General Studies, Australian National University, Canberra in Grant File Programme Action 63-117. It should be noted that it was also established during the Vietnam War. It would have been most unlikely that Ford would have funded any centre likely to become a hotbed of anti-war sentiment or intellectual dissent on Cold War international affairs.
and like the AIIA, forged political links with similar international organisations. Prior to the official establishment of the centre, Crawford informed Ford that

we have been greatly encouraged in our efforts by interest and offers of practical support from the Institute of Strategic Studies in London and the National Security Studies Program at the University of California, Los Angles. Other institutions, including the Harvard Centre for International Affairs and the Stanford Research Institute have also expressed interest.\textsuperscript{74}

Crawford and the Ford Foundation were both pleased by the results of the relationship between the ANU and Ford money. Crawford confessed that while the Ford grants were ‘marginal financially’ to the total costs of running the Research School of Social Sciences at the ANU, their effect even by 1965 had been very significant. The grants, Crawford assured Ford, had

a disproportionate effectiveness in establishing the School as an important and acceptable centre of research and public education in the area of concern to it – Asia and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{75}

By 1966, when the Ford Foundation approved its second grant to the ANU of $US300,000, they considered the International Relations program of the ANU to be ‘the leading centre of international relations graduate research in Australia – perhaps the strongest in Asia’\textsuperscript{76}. The Foundation credited Crawford’s leadership for the ‘strength and reputation’ of ANU international studies, but the role of Foundation funding was of course highly advantageous for the ANU. The ANU was pioneering a crossover style of ‘Australian’ research that satisfied researchers such as Arndt, and the distinct objectives of Ford. The ANU could inform Ford that

among the new projects the university either has under way or in the planning stage are: new and more general studies of foreign aid, an analysis of diplomatic machinery in new nations, studies of contemporary China and of the Soviet Far East, and more extensive work involving Indonesia. A Strategic and Defence Studies Unit is also being established. The Unit will carry out strategic problems of Asia and the Pacific. Its work is expected to be of considerable value not only to Australia but to her allies. Finally, the new program includes a further strengthening of cooperation with Japanese scholars, and the sponsoring of international conferences of professors of international relations. The objective of the University in carrying out all of the projects mentioned above is to gather detailed knowledge concerning two general aspects of international relations: the development of international order, especially the evolution of multilateral solutions to problems and the problems of power blocks and their impact on Asian countries.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} ‘Sir John Crawford to Mr. J.E Slater’, 8 November 1965, p.2 in Grant File Programme Action 63-117, p.2 of letter.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, p.3 of letter.
\textsuperscript{76} ‘Board of Trustees Meeting 12-8-9-66 Australian National University International Research and Training in Australia’ in Grant File Programme Action 63-117, p.1 of report.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p. 2 of report.
The AIIA, ANU and even CEDA had come to recognise that projects with no basis to interest the Americans would not gain Ford funding. This reality is demonstrated by Ford's rejection of the CEDA funding application of 1961. The second funding grant to the ANU was not provided for the expansion of unfettered knowledge related to international affairs. In supporting continued funding for the ANU Ford concluded that its support [for the ANU] is considered to be central to the [International Affairs] program [of the Ford Foundation] in the developed Pacific. The Australian National University is looked upon as a significant resource both in that area and increasingly in other parts of the world. It is helping to define a new role for Australia and to increase the effectiveness and size of her contribution to both development aid and security arrangements. The Canberra program is also serving as a model for other Australian institutions. In brief the proposed grant would build on known strength and permit a quality program under recognised leadership to increase the effectiveness and scope of its activities.

Conclusions

While the money of the Ford Foundation actively shaped the construction of networks of foreign policy expertise in the 1950s and 1960s, they were also connected to ideological aspects of the Cold War. Ultimately, the development of this knowledge did not merely satisfy the objectives of the Ford Foundation, they also cooperated with officialdom in ways that complimented dominant interpretations of the Cold War in Australia, the UK, and particularly the US. This was of course a core objective of Foundation funding for all its international projects, from English language instruction, educational exchanges, universities or strategic think tanks. The basis of a Canberra Network in the 1960s rested on foundations established by connections between the DEA and other non-government institutions, and on a shared intellectual and ideological meeting place for a small Australian foreign policy community which greatly valued connections to government, and sought the exclusive professional benefits by creating dominant networks of international foreign policy patronage.

78 Ibid.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Selling the Drama in 1965: The First Australian Military Deployment to Vietnam

My argument throughout the earlier chapters has been related primarily to the influences that progressively laid foundations for Australian foreign policy formulation, and indeed advocacy throughout the 1950s. The immediately preceding chapters have extended this phenomenon into the 1960s where the Canberra Network was in full operation. The features of this network can be seen in those connections and cooperation between the DEA, AIIA and the ANU built around shared professional benefits, expectations, and appreciation about the centrality of the anti-communist orthodoxy not just to Australian foreign policy thinking, but in a broader international context, for instance, the Ford Foundation of New York. This chapter, and the next, turn to case studies of how these networks contributed to Australian responses to two major international issues of the mid 1960s, the first being the original Australian military deployment to Vietnam, and the second being diplomatic reactions to political strife in Indonesia during 1965-66, and particularly, the widespread massacres associated with the transition from Sukarno to Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime. These two episodes have been chosen to highlight the extent to which a recognisable and cohesive Canberra Network, outlined in preceding chapters, had risen to professional prominence. Within this network key players attempted to shape certain perceptions about the pursuit, and analysis of foreign policy, while consolidating reputations, expertise, associations and outlooks, all of which was intimately connected to the core concerns of the anti-communist orthodoxy driving Australian policy. Certainly, this orthodoxy, and aspects of these networks, can be seen in relation to earlier policy responses, for example, the issue of West New Guinea, the ‘Malayan Emergency’, ‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia, the sending of Australian military advisors to South Vietnam in 1962, or in the dominance of Menzies in cabinet over the various foreign policy deliberations of his government. However, the military deployment to Vietnam, and response to the 30 September coup in Indonesia during 1965 reveal the Canberra Network in full formation and effectiveness, and for this reason, they warrant particularly close attention in the context of this thesis. By examining Vietnam and Indonesia, we
observe in their final form almost every aspect of the political, professional and
historical processes outlined in the preceding chapters, furthermore, these two events
offer an examination of how the anti-communist orthodoxy underpinning this network
helped to drive its analysis, and discipline its professional culture.

Each of these events is a major example of Australian foreign policy thinking
about South East Asia. Each demonstrates its concerns about Australian security and its
response to anti-communism. Yet they also reveal how components of the Canberra
Network responded to these events, and how their responses reinforced, or reflected, the
anti-communist foreign policy orthodoxy progressively established from 1949. In
regards to the original Australian military deployment to South Vietnam, the
Department of External Affairs (DEA) and the government not surprisingly worked
closely together to present the Australian deployment in ways consistent with their
security policy priorities, but in ways designed to manufacture the parameters of public
and intellectual debate. This phenomenon held implications not only for the nature of
Australia’s military engagement in South Vietnam, but also in terms of how domestic
debate about the war was managed, and potential dissent sidelined, in its responses to
those developments.

This chapter is not then a detailed re-examination of the Australian road to the
Vietnam War, a subject in itself with a range of scholarly perspectives. The work of
David Lee, David Goldsworthy, Gregory Pemberton, P.G. Edwards, John Murphy and
Michael Sexton, among others, has highlighted the inconsistency between official
public statements which provided justification for the original Australian deployment,
and with what is revealed in the documentary record. It is clearly beyond the scope of
this thesis to cover again the many issues raised by their analyses. Yet there is one
hypothesis, namely that the Menzies government had something of an inevitable road to
the war in Vietnam, perhaps most notably connected to Michael Sexton's War for the
Asking and Gregory Pemberton's All the Way – Australia's Road to Vietnam, that
deserves brief discussion here. It is beyond doubt that the Menzies government had long
looked favourably on the possibility of a major US military presence in South East Asia,
and were keen to support Washington in actions designed to suppress communism in
South East Asia. This hypothesis is certainly supported by former high ranking
Australian diplomats, and by implication men closely associated with the culture of the
Canberra Network identified throughout this thesis, for example, Alan Renouf's *The Frightened Country*, and Malcolm Booker’s *The Last Domino* in the 1970s. However, this chapter focuses on the presentation and management of information related to the first troop deployment, how this process permeated throughout the Canberra Network, and how this was connected to portrayals of the war from those sections of the Australian media and academia most closely linked to the network. Such a context is a natural extension of the core business of this thesis – dealing as it does with the manufacturing of a policy orthodoxy.

Now we turn to the background to the presentation of the first Australian military deployment to South Vietnam. On 29 April 1965 at 8pm, Menzies, by then Australia's longest serving Prime Minister, announced to the House of Representatives that the

Australian government is now in receipt of a request from the government of South Vietnam for further military assistance. We have decided - and this has been after close consultation with the government of the United States - to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam.¹

Two hours after Menzies made his announcement, the South Vietnamese government issued this public statement.

Upon the request of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, the government of Australia today approved the dispatch to Vietnam of an infantry battalion together with logistical support personnel to assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in its struggle against aggression. This contribution of the Australian Armed Forces is a continuation of the assistance in other fields which the government and the people of Australia have been giving to the people of Vietnam. The Australia infantry battalion will arrive in Vietnam in the near future and, together with the forces of the friendly countries already in Vietnam, will contribute to the defence of the ideals of freedom not only for the Vietnamese people but also for all the other freedom loving nations of the world.²

This South Vietnamese public statement corroborated the parliamentary statement made by Menzies. Such a sequence of cause and effect also complimented the existing chronology of Australian policy announcements about South Vietnam. For example, the initial commitment of Australian Special Forces personnel in 1962, known as military advisors, was publicly justified as being undertaken in response to official requests from the South Vietnamese. This presentation of Australian decision-making was repeatedly

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² Ibid.

* The analysis in this chapter then does not rely on acceptance or non-acceptance of the 'inevitability' thesis. Whether it was inevitable, or even strategically necessary, that Australian troops would find themselves fighting in South Vietnam, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Yet clearly, the Australians were not forced into South Vietnam, without potential options, or without agency etc.
used to legitimate the public rationale of government policies and support the original troop deployment. Yet at the time the factual shortcomings of this process of government announcements was known to the higher echelons of the DEA. In regard to the military advisors sent in 1962, Gordon Jockel, Head of the DEA South East Asia Section, wrote in 1964 that in

[a]nnouncing the government's decision to send an army training team to Vietnam, the Minister for Defence in a statement on 24 May 1962, said that the team was going at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to assist that government in its struggle against communist armed insurgency by providing instruction in jungle warfare, village defence and other related activities... although we have stressed the fact publicly that our assistance was given in response to an invitation from the Government of Vietnam, our offer was in fact made following a request from the United States government that Australia provide some military assistance to Vietnam in the form of a Services presence.

The first archival examination into Australia's participation in South Vietnam occurred in 1975 under the auspices of the Whitlam Labor government. This was of course still well within the working life of the diplomats and politicians who were closely associated with implementing and carrying out these policies. The purpose of this parliamentary investigation was to compare the public justifications provided by the Menzies government about the original deployment to South Vietnam with documentary records from the DEA. According to the 1975 parliamentary investigation there was a gap, if not chasm, between public statements and secret documents about South Vietnam. At various stages after the original deployment, it was argued by those in favour of the policy, particularly the Australian Foreign Minister during this period, Paul Hasluck, that Australian membership of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was not just an important factor in Australian thinking, but provided a range of technical justifications for the Australian decision. There were of course other justifications offered for the original troop deployment linked to well-established aspects of Australian anti-communism. For example, Hasluck used anti-Chinese rhetoric and argued repeatedly in various public statements that the North Vietnamese were puppets of Peking. This type of rhetoric argued that the security of Australia was threatened by any downward thrust of Chinese communism. Menzies specifically used this argument in his parliamentary announcement of 29 April. He stated that the

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4 Gordon Jockel (Assistant Secretary – Head Southeast Asian Division of External Affairs), 12 August 1964 as quoted by Sexton, *War for the Asking*, pp. 53-54

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takeover of Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.5

According to Trish Payne, this spectre of the Chinese threat to Australia was drafted by Sir James Plimsoll, the DEA Secretary 1965-70, a noted advocate of anti-communism, and at other stages, about the southwards thrust of communism towards Australia. Therefore it is not surprising that China formed part of Government threat assessments about Vietnam.6

The 1975 documentary investigation concluded that neither SEATO, nor any South Vietnamese request for military assistance, had played any part in the original decision to send Australian troops to South Vietnam.7 It also concluded that the documentary records actually showed that the DEA and Hasluck had alerted Washington before April 1965 of their support for an anti-communist war in South Vietnam, and that the Australians were sympathetic to sending combat troops. The documentary investigation also revealed that when Menzies had made the original deployment announcement of Australian troops, neither he, or the DEA, possessed any independent request for military assistance from the South Vietnamese. Menzies was certainly judicious in his presentation of the facts. He deliberately misled the House of Representatives about the chronology and rationale for the Australian troop deployment.

The diplomatic reality of the deployment was different from its public presentation. For example, once Washington had agreed to the premise of an Australian military commitment to South Vietnam, the Menzies government and the DEA were determined that this decision should appear to be in response to South Vietnamese request for military assistance. The communications between Phan Huy Quat, the short-lived President of South Vietnam, and H.D. Anderson, the Australian Ambassador in Saigon, demonstrates this reality.

Dear Mr. Ambassador,
I have the honour to refer to your letter of today's date confirming the Australian government's offer to send to Vietnam an infantry battalion of 800 men, with some hundred personnel and logistic support to serve the United States forces in assisting in the defence of the Republic of Vietnam. I wish to confirm my government's acceptance of this offer and request the dispatch of this force on the basis which we discussed.8

The 1975 documentary investigations provide significant insights into the inner sanctum of the diplomacy of the Menzies government towards the US and South Vietnam. They also demonstrated another aspect, for instance, the manner in which facts about South Vietnam would be presented to the Australian public. That is, through the closest support from the highest echelons of the DEA, the Menzies government manufactured a robust argument that there was a moral and strategic legitimacy, if not a necessity, in the original deployment of an Australian battalion to South Vietnam. This not only effectively laid the groundwork for any future expansion of Australia's military commitment, but also greatly influenced the style of debate about South Vietnam.

**Shaping Debates**

As Minister, Hasluck, and the DEA produced additional information in support of Australian military involvement in South Vietnam, and indeed the war itself. While this would naturally be expected, the nature of this additional information was closely related to the types of Cold War propaganda used by the British and the Americans from the late 1940s. Increasingly this had become well integrated into the fabric of Australian diplomacy during the 1950s through the creation of the Information Bureau (IB). In itself, the creation of the agency reflected the growing entrenchment of an anti-communist orthodoxy within the DEA in the 1950s and then into the 1960s.

In regards to South Vietnam, Hasluck and the DEA worked closely together in the manufacture of reference materials about the topic. For example, information booklets such as *The Legality of Australian Participation in the defence of Vietnam*, were produced and distributed.9 The booklet reasserted claims about the original Australian deployment, yet it expanded into other areas of justification by providing selective legal and technical arguments in support of the US, and by implication Australian, military intervention. It argued that under international law, and as a

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8 Phan Huy Quat (President of Republic of Vietnam) to H.D. Anderson (Australian Ambassador to Vietnam), 29 April 1965 cited by Sexton, *War for the Asking*, p.204. According to Sexton's research this communication occurred shortly before the parliamentary announcement of Menzies.

signatory of SEATO, Australia had an independent legal basis to provide military assistance to the government of South Vietnam. It asserted that Australia could effectively act independently under the terms of its SEATO obligations, theoretically, with or without any official request for assistance from Saigon. The use of these methods was designed to influence debate about the war in South Vietnam. Further, it demonstrates how Hasluck could use the prestige of his ministerial position, and the resources of the DEA, to produce propaganda style materials. Hasluck issued another booklet *Vietnam: Recent Statements of Australian Policy* for distribution on his own ministerial authority. It consisted of various quotes, including those made by Hasluck, outlining the official justifications for the war in South Vietnam. He instructed the DEA to produce more publications about Vietnam for the *Select Documents on International Affairs Series*. The information presented in *Select Documents* about South Vietnam is thick with analysis and footnotes, but the individual authorship of the material is anonymous and not surprisingly, favours the anti-communist military option for South Vietnam.

These public information efforts are evidence that those professional influences on Australian diplomacy, such as the Information Research Department (IRD) outlined in Chapter One, had been effectively integrated into Australian diplomatic practices in support of the anti-communist orthodoxy. As argued earlier, the seeds of this phenomenon are connected to the development of new types of professional expertise in the field of foreign affairs and international diplomacy from the early 1950s. Therefore, the methods utilised by Hasluck and the DEA in their information efforts were not sudden developments, but were the result of the cultivation of this new expertise in Australia over a number of years.

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10 Of notable mention here is that the South Vietnamese made no requests for SEATO military assistance to the United States, and certainly not to the Australians. South Vietnam was not actually a member of SEATO. See Dean Rusk (US Secretary of State) in Arthur Schlesinger Jr, *The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1966*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1967, p.19. Rusk stated that US actions in South Vietnam were not connected with US membership of SEATO, or the SEATO treaty.

11 'Vietnam: Recent Statements of Australian Policy' in *Personal Papers of Prime Minister McEwen, 29 Apr 1965 - 28 Apr 1966*, Vietnam Series NAA: M58 393 PART 2, Canberra: National Archives of Australia. This publication was stylistically reminiscent of the *Why Vietnam?* booklet issued by the Whitehouse on the authority of President Johnson.

12 For examples of Select Documents see *Personal Papers of Prime Minister McEwen, 29 Apr 1965 - 28 Apr 1966*, Vietnam Series NAA: M58 393 Part 2. The disclaimer states that this booklet was produced under Ministerial direction.
The IB replicated many of the British and American information techniques, particularly the methods of the IRD, one obvious example being the deliberate exclusion of Dr. Evatt, Leader of the Labor Opposition throughout the 1950s, from IB distribution lists. The IB distribution lists in the late 1950s were strongly anti-communist, including to organisations such as the Australian Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF), while others on the lists were less extreme. For example, Arthur Calwell was a prominent Labor politician and Evatt’s leadership rival in the ALP. Another recipient of information materials from the IB was the Australian Council for Trade Unions (ACTU), a powerful peak union organisation holding significant potential influence within the mainstream trade union movement. Other recipients such as the Director of Australian Military Intelligence appear self-explanatory, but the inclusion of certain academics, and even the Federal parliamentary librarian, highlight that the development of connections in information management were of importance to the DEA. As was the case in the UK and the US, certain academics and journalists were considered to be ideal recipients of secretive information. Yet other equally qualified academics were excluded from the IB distribution lists because

some Professors and Lecturers—e.g. Professor Fitzgerald of ANU—may use the information we [the IB] supply in ways of which we would not approve, or attempt to discover the source of the material.

This negative attitude did not apply to prominent members of the Australian Institute for International Affairs (AIIA), such as Professor Norman Harper or Professor Fred Alexander. Phillip Deery writes that

according to a contemporary, Professor A. G. L. Shaw ... Harper was [also] on friendly terms with Spry [Director General of ASIO] and would have been 'favourably disposed' towards information sent by ASIO.

13 See ‘Unattributed “Grey” Material—Distribution List’, 27 August 1958 and ‘Distribution by Information Branch, Department of External Affairs, of Non-Classified and Confidential Material Outside the Department’ [8 February 1959], NAA A1838/2, 563/1/4 Pt 1. The list of individuals and individuals to be included were: Australian Council of Trade Unions, Australian Committee for Cultural Freedom, Zelman Cowen, Bishop Burghman, Arthur Calwell, Frank McManus, Editor of the Launceston Examiner, Editor of Sydney Bulletin, Director of the ABC Talks Department, Director of Military Intelligence, Professor Fred Alexander, Professor Norman Harper, Harold White (Parliamentary Librarian, Canberra).

14 This group was instrumental in the establishment of the anti-communist current affairs and literary journal *Quadrant*. Its members were a who’s who of Australian anti-communism (including academics, politicians and literary figures). Some, but by no means a majority, in this group had come from migrant backgrounds with terrible first hand experiences of communist tyranny in Eastern Europe. The ACCF were funded by the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

15 ‘Malcolm Booker (Head of Information Branch) to James Plimsoll’, 5 July 1955, NAA A1838/2, 563/1/4 Pt 1.

16 *Conversation between Professor A.G.L Shaw and Phillip Deery*, 4 February 2001 cited by Phillip Deery in ‘Covert Propaganda and the Cold War Britain and Australia 1948-1955’. 

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In receiving materials from the IB (and presumably by other sources such as ASIO), Harper personified some of contradictions inherent to a network of close expert associations. For example, he conceded that the materials he received ‘would be more valuable if one knew their source’, but nonetheless he still considered them ‘very useful’ resources.17

Moving at pace with the modernisation of Australian diplomatic operations in the 1950s, the operations of the IB progressed into areas such as providing advice for the Foreign Minister on stage managing public ministerial statements and liaising with the Australian media. These developments were important in the cultivation of contacts with the mainstream media, academia and the AIIA. Through this growing role of information liaison, the DEA was positioning itself as an intermediary (or gatekeeper) for official government policies. This was important for the DEA in its dealing with local media outlets that had international and domestic capabilities, such as the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC). The DEA also maintained strong interest in Asia based correspondents from various Australian newspapers, built connections with the Public Information Branch of South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and as will be highlighted in the following chapter about Indonesia, repeatedly interfered in the editorial operations of the ABC’s Radio Australia, which broadcasted directly into South East Asia. The information output of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) became of interest of the DEA due to the potential of the SEATO organisation as a conduit of anti-communist publications and media broadcasts. For example, the DEA actively involved itself in contributing to the information operations of SEATO, and monitoring the scale of SEATO’s publication output. On the Australian scene, the DEA also forwarded press releases from SEATO to various academics and regular ABC journalists such as Professor Norman Harper, Denys Jackson, Creighton Burns, Professor Derek van Ebbe, Dr Peter Russo, Professor MacMahon Ball, Mr John Andrew, Dr George Zubryzcki, Dr Jon Perkins, E.M. Higgins, Professor Zelman Cowan, Professor Julius Stone.18 The emergence of this type of DEA liaison between itself and government in the 1950s, and continuing into the 1960s, with the media and academia was also designed to influence perceptions and

17 'Harper to Malcolm Booker (Head of Information Branch, External Affairs)', 21 November 1955, NAA A1838/2, 563/1/4 Pt 1.
18 'Ian Hamilton (Public relations officer), 12 November 1957 to AH Carmichael (Director of Talks, Australian Broadcasting Commission)', NAA: A1838/2473/7.
analysis about the Vietnam War. By 1964, the DEA had appointed Richard Woolcott as its first Public Information Officer (PIO), and he played a vital role for the Department during the 1960s, particularly on the issue of Vietnam. Therefore, supporting the justifications provided by Menzies’s announcement of the original Australian deployment, and arguments in favour of the war such as the booklets requested by Hasluck, were central to the PIO’s ongoing activities.

News Coverage

The mainstream media presentation of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War was generally favourable, particularly at the start. Unlike the United States, where high profile journalists such as Walter Cronkite later turned against the war on ethical grounds, the Australian mainstream media remained cautious in their own observations. Throughout, editorial content about Australian foreign policy in the Australian newspapers and news media outlets were monitored by the PIO, who in turn acted not just as a point of contact for the local media, but for government ministers. When William McMahon, Minister for Labour and National Service, was preparing a speech on South Vietnam, he contacted Woolcott. This request was made only a short time before Menzies himself announced the Australian military deployment to South Vietnam; the DEA document outlining the response to McMahon’s request is dated 27 April 1965, the deployment was announced 29 April 1965. Paul Hasluck, the Foreign Minister, was notified that the

public information officer, in consultation with South and South East Asia Branch, is providing Mr. McMahon with some notes and is drawing his attention to the interesting article on South Vietnam in the April issue of Foreign Affairs. We are also giving Mr. McMahon a copy of Washington Savingram 549 (Unclassified) outlining some useful points on third country support made by Mr. Unger — in place of William Bundy — in a speech on Vietnam given in Detroit on the 19th April.

The small size and limited resources of the Australian mainstream media made access to international and government sources of information particularly important for its news reporting. This offered advantages to the DEA as the PIO could personally promote official policies to almost every individual of significance, from a government

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19 Richard Woolcott (Public Information Officer) to the Minister (Copy to Mr. Waller), ‘Visit to South East Asia – Guidance to the Press, 15 May 1964’, File no. 558/4/3 Confidential/Restricted, in Public Information Office – Special Topics of Press Interest – Indonesia, NAA: A1838/273.Richard Woolcott was the first specifically designated Public Information Officer from 1964.

20 To Minister for External Affairs (Paul Hasluck) from James Plimsoll (Secretary of EA) 27 April 1965, ‘Speech on Vietnam by Minister for Labour and National Service File No. 558/1/1’ in Activities of the Public Information Officer in NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1.
perspective, in the Australian media, and academia. When contacted by Bruce Grant - a journalist and author held in high regard by DEA (later appointed as an Australian High Commissioner to India), in July 1965 to speak to students at the University of Melbourne, Woolcott was enthusiastic. He wrote to Grant that the DEA were drawing up a programme of visits to editors, leader writers and journalists specialising in foreign affairs in the capital cities and I would hope to be able to arrange it so that I can be in Melbourne on a suitable day, probably a Thursday as Parliament will be in session during the period you suggest.21

The invitation from Grant had to be cleared with the DEA Secretary, James Plimsoll (who succeeded Tange), but from Woolcott’s perspective this was an opportunity to build networks of contact. He informed Plimsoll that the chance to speak to university students about international relations was an opportunity to inject departmental views into any questions or discussion which follows the talk and it might also be useful from the recruiting standpoint. Subject to your views, I would like to accept the offer as I could easily combine the talk with routine discussions with the News Editor of Radio Australia and with other journalists and leader writers in Melbourne.22

The relationship between the DEA, the AIIA, the ANU, and even the Ford Foundation of New York, was built on the convergence of common purposes, and the progressive emergence of new types of expertise connected to the Cold War. Therefore, it is not surprising that while Woolcott continued to build these contacts in his own PIO role, he also continued to examine Anglo-American propaganda methods. For example, the ‘News Department’ of the UK Foreign Office was of interest to his own work in Australia, and the close relationship between the FO and the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) also caught his attention. Woolcott informed Plimsoll that the UK Foreign Office attaches considerable importance to maintaining close relations with the BBC, especially the overseas service and with British diplomatic correspondents and foreign journalists. In so doing it attempts to maintain close liaison with the Foreign Secretary. Care is of course taken not to say things which could be interpreted as attempting to commit the Foreign Secretary to any line of policy or action unless he has approved such a line publicly or in private

21 Richard Woolcott to Mr. Bruce Grant (Dept. of Political Science, Melbourne University), 22 July 1965, NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1.
22 Richard Woolcott to The Secretary (James Plimsoll) through Mr. Hay, Request to Speak at Melbourne University, NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1.In this note for The Secretary, Woolcott outlined that Bruce Grant ‘formerly The Age South East Asian and subsequently Washington Correspondent, made the approach personally to me on the basis of interest expressed by Prof. McMahon Ball in the article which I contributed to the March issue of ‘World Review’. Woolcott had been invited to write his article by Prof. Gordon Greenwood through his prominent role the Queensland Branch of the AIIA. In Woolcott’s advisory letter seeking permission to write this article he suggested not only that this was a ‘serious publication’ but that given that World Review was ‘circulated among university students, especially in Queensland’ there was ‘possible value from the recruitment standpoint’. See Richard Woolcott to R. and Mr. Brennan 16 October 1964, Request for Article in NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1.
He also noted that the role of media liaison was a specialised role for ‘well informed career officers’ who would hone their knowledge of official policies ‘in the face of often unpredictable and determined press questioning’. Woolcott noted the coordination between the ‘News Department’ and various FO Departments, the anticipation of potential topics of media interest, the use of on and off the record briefings with particular journalists, and the ability to filter direct media enquiries through a dedicated phone switchboard. This approach reflected two approaches to information management, the use of official information guidance, and the other more in keeping with the methods of the IRD. Woolcott noted that in the afternoon a series of separate briefings are conducted [by the FO] for different English and overseas newspapers and agencies. Mostly this deals with material which is for background but not for attribution. There is also a meeting of the ‘3 O’clock Group’ at 3pm every afternoon in which selected and trusted diplomatic correspondents are given ‘off the record’ briefing as background against which to frame their own reports.

Woolcott thought the lack of ‘sufficient specialisation’ in the Canberra press gallery negated the need for daily briefings, he did indicate to Plimsoll that weekly briefings ‘and occasional open briefings for foreign correspondents should be held by the Public Information Officer’. Woolcott recommended to Plimsoll that the PIO, and his section, should be a ‘floating unit’ able to cooperate with various sections of the DEA as the need arose. This recommendation was based on the apparent flexibility of the FO ‘News Department’ which coordinated its activities as required with the Heads of various FO sections. Woolcott noted that the News Department is quite separate in the Foreign Office organisation from the Cultural Relations Department and the Information Research Department which work to an Assistant Under-Secretary of State.

In regards to his own activities in Australia, Woolcott and the DEA had some advantages over their British and US counterparts. The size and composition of the news media in Australia were far smaller and geographically concentrated within major cities, particularly Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne. In Australia, it was actually possible for one individual with DEA support to maintain individual relationships with

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23 Richard Woolcott to The Secretary (James Plimsoll) through Mr. Hay, *Visit To News Department of The Foreign Office – Implications for Public Information Section*, NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
nearly all the major journalists, editors and media organisations central to the national presentation of foreign policy news. As Woolcott noted on taking up his appointment as the first PIO, the

Secretary [of the DEA] has asked me to devote considerable time to developing further contacts with the representatives of the press and other news media and to keep myself fully briefed on the main aspects of our external relations and policies and our attitude to current international issues.\(^{28}\)

The Australian media environment, just as it was between the DEA, AIIA and ANU by 1965, was far from resistant to official contact. When the PIO position was created Arthur Tange (DEA Secretary) personally wrote to editors of major newspapers ‘dealing with foreign affairs’ informing them that Woolcott would be visiting ‘State capitals for talks on this subject’.\(^{29}\) Woolcott himself saw himself as an information specialist carrying out an important DEA task; he argued that his responsibilities during sitting weeks of Parliament would require additional assistance from a Grade 2 DEA Officer so that he could ‘continue to improve guidance to news media’.\(^{30}\) In terms of his personality and suitability for this role, Woolcott appeared made to order. His charisma and charm was noted in the early 1950s as a diplomatic cadet at the Canberra University College (CUC). There Professor Manning Clark assessed Woolcott as being socially skilled, intelligent and sophisticated with an ability to ‘manage other people’ without their ever knowing that they were ‘being managed’.\(^{31}\) Clark also noted that if taken into confidence, Woolcott was, in his opinion, silent as ‘the grave’.\(^{32}\) As the ‘authorised [DEA] point of contact between the Minister and the Department’ and for the ‘Australian overseas news media’,\(^{33}\) these were certainly formidable skills to possess.

Woolcott was also adept at anticipating, or handling reports in the media, critical of government policies. Woolcott’s attitude towards Vietnam in August 1964 was that there were no viable alternatives left, only war. He wrote to the editor of The Sunday Daily Mirror that the war in Vietnam seems to me [Woolcott], now as before, to be part of the global, cold war

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\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.


\(^{32}\) Ibid.

confrontation. It stems essentially from Peking’s and Hanoi’s attempt to impose a political system of government sympathetic and docile to themselves on South Vietnam. Without the assistance it has requested and received South Vietnam might have been by now a forcibly communised state. Until militant communism is checked in Asia, until the fighting has largely ceased, the basis for any real economic growth and peaceful progress in South Vietnam which we would all like to see does not really exist. This is simply a fact of the situation and if one examines the alternatives to the present policy which have been canvassed – neutralisation, cease-fire, a conference, recourse to the United Nations – I do not think any of them can at this stage withstand critical analysis.34

Before the announcement of the Australian battle battalion for South Vietnam in April 1965, Woolcott was already advising the DEA, and actively monitoring press coverage about Australian government policies towards communism and Indo-China. Woolcott argued in October 1964 that

from the point of view of [his] guidance to the press, we [the DEA] should be in a position to foreshadow to reliable journalists any impending United States change in policy [towards Vietnam] so that it does not appear that we are simply following United States policies a day or two later. The public presentation of Australia’s attitude to any United States decision to take action against North Vietnam in order to create the conditions for a negotiated settlement would also need careful consideration in advance.35

Woolcott’s actions as PIO reveal strong sensitivity to critical Australian media reportage about South Vietnam. When pictures of South Vietnamese troops torturing a captured Viet Cong prisoner were published in the *Sydney Morning Herald* in May 1964, Woolcott informed the DEA Secretary that this depiction of a man tied to an armoured troop carrier and dragged through a river was the ‘third [he’d] noticed in *The Sydney Morning Herald*’. Woolcott informed the Secretary that publication of these pictures was ‘contrary to the *Sydney Morning Herald’s* own editorial line on Vietnam’. He noted that the

damaging effect of such pictures is obvious and, especially at this time, when the government has under consideration additional aid to South Vietnam, their publication is undesirable. This is one of the growing list of matters which I believe could be usefully discussed with editors – and photographic editors – when I visit cities in which the major newspapers are published.36

Woolcott later wrote to the editor of every major Australian newspaper about South Vietnamese atrocity stories arguing that North Vietnamese atrocities should instead be emphasised. Woolcott wrote that

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36 Richard Woolcott to The Secretary, 26 May 1964, *Press Photographs of South Vietnamese Atrocities*, NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1. Therefore, the question was not apparently that the atrocity had actually occurred, but that the publication of South Vietnamese atrocity pictures was problematic for the Australian government at this particular time.
atrocities and acts of terrorism and intimidation have been widely adopted by the Viet Cong and
greatly outnumber any similar activities carried out by the South Vietnamese. It would therefore
seem to me to be more balanced and objective to publish pictures of North Vietnamese atrocities
rather than of South Vietnamese atrocities, if such pictures have to be published at all, especially
as editorial policy in Australia generally supports efforts to check the forcible communisation of
South Vietnam.\(^3\)

In making such assertions, particularly within an appeal for journalistic objectivity and
balance, Woolcott exhibits the skills that made him an ideal PIO. Furthermore, he also
had strong opinions about the legitimacy of influencing media, and public opinion, in
support of official policies. He argued in May 1964 that the

try to influence public opinion in broad support of a government’s foreign policy is now
generally accepted as a function of diplomacy. This function has become increasingly important
due to the development of rapid communications, the growing use of propaganda by some
nations, especially those in which communications media are government controlled, and by
the regular airing of foreign policies in forums such as the UN where policy announcements are
under continuing and often critical review. In the UK, US and many European countries the
press is used in a variety of ways in the exposition and testing of policies. Conditions in
Australia are obviously different but I consider that in time we should look towards not only
promoting an accurate and sympathetic press, but to ways in which we might make more
effective use of the press in seeking support for our national policies.\(^3\)

Woolcott also suggested ways to help improve, or maintain media support, by utilising
subtle levers of official influence over the journalists themselves. In May 1964, he

\(^3\) Richard Woolcott, February 1965, \textit{Personal – Not for Publication} in NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1. This
quote is from a letter Woolcott sent to the Editors of all major Australian newspapers. Woolcott provides
no sourced evidence for this claim. In a later meeting with the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} and \textit{Daily Mirror}
that discussed the issue of ‘atrocity photographs’ and other issues, Woolcott stated that ‘in 1965 the Viet
Cong had assassinated 1500 civilians and nearly 500 local officials and civil servants [and that this] had
not been emphasised in the Australian press’. See Richard Woolcott, April 1965, \textit{Public Information
Officer – Visit to Sydney Morning Herald and Daily Mirror} in NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1, p.4. While the
Viet Cong were certainly guilty of war crimes, the depiction of South Vietnamese atrocities was certainly
newsworthy and appropriate to cover. According to official assessments published in 1995 by the
Vietnamese government, Vietnamese-American Historian Ngo Ving Long points out that just between
May 1956 and January 1959, hundreds and thousands of communist political cadres had been executed,
imprisoned and tortured. In May 1956, the Diem government announced that hundreds and thousands of
communists had rallied to the Southern government; tens of thousands had been executed or sent to re-
education camps. By 1959, 90\% of communist party members had been killed. To appreciate the scale of
this killing in the Mekong Delta, seventy thousand had been killed and ninety thousand local inhabitants
were arrested, tortured and imprisoned. In the central Southern provinces 40\% provincial political cadres
were killed; 60\% of all District Cadres killed; 70\% of all village cadres killed. In some provinces only
‘two or three cadres remained’. In the combined provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien only 160 of
23,400 cadres survived. See Ngo Ving Long and Noam Chomsky, April 30, 2005 \textit{Vietnam Remembered
[Lecture]}, Massachusetts Institute of Technology electronic copy available from
http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/287

\(^3\) Richard Woolcott to The Secretary, 27 May 1964, ‘Conclusion’ in \textit{Work of the Public Information
Section – Possible Improvements}, NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1. These views parallel the rationale of the
IRD. For example, Woolcott saw propaganda from a Western government, effectively directed against its
own media and citizens, as having no parallels with the activities of the communists. Further, such
activities were only used \textit{in response} to Communist propaganda activities directed against Western
nations, that is, they were somehow a defensive measure. Ironically, in terms of their methodologies, the
activities of someone such as Woolcott, were far more sophisticated in their manipulations then the crude
propaganda methods of the commissar. Physical coercion, torture, and gulags, were not possible in
Australia in 1964, therefore other more imaginative methods of influence needed to be used.

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suggested that accredited representatives of the press gallery should have press cards which facilitate their easy identification when they visit the Department. [The Press cards] would be issued by this Department and could be withheld if a correspondent proved himself dishonest or untrustworthy. This could be valuable in the case of off the record briefings. Some form of security check might also be considered desirable for journalists invited to attend background and off the record briefings. 39

Interaction with the PIO was, by every fair indication of the archival documents, welcomed by the journalists and editors. There is no indication that anyone took particular offence, or exception to the overtures, advice and influence being brought down on them by Woolcott and the DEA. The few exceptions to this rule were hardly examples of dissent about government policy, but rather laments that those policies did not go far enough. In June 1964, Denis Warner bemoaned the ‘delinquent’ state of Australia’s defence policies and belittled Australian aid to South Vietnam as little more than ‘token assistance’. Warner wrote to Woolcott stating that

God help us [Australia] if we become seriously involved in South East Asia on our own account at some later date and get in return this sort of ‘substantial’ help from the US. As for Canberra’s appreciation of the situation in Vietnam, I took the unusual course of submitting the manuscript [of an article he had written] to my principal source, who is, I assure you, in a position to have a pretty good idea. He found no errors in fact or emphasis. 40

Another exception was Colin Bingham, of the Sydney Morning Herald, who was openly hostile to Sukarno, and the threat posed by Indonesia’s Confrontation to Malaysia and Australia. Yet Woolcott’s concern with Bingham was that his tone was critical of the government. Therefore, the Herald’s editorial line on Sukarno treated the Australian government unfairly because it made it look weak in its diplomatic dealings with Jakarta. 41 A notable source of actual tension between the DEA and the Australian media was its attitude of near entitlement towards the editorial content of Radio Australia (RA). This was an ongoing issue throughout the 1950s, continuing into the 1960s. As will be outlined in the following chapter, this did not necessarily involve the rejection of DEA media guidance by Radio Australia, but repeated DEA interference in the editorial content of its broadcasts into Asia. This was connected to ongoing efforts by the DEA

40 ‘Denis Warner to Richard Woolcott’, June 10 1964 in NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1. Warner annotated his letter to Woolcott: PS – As for my own views expressed in The Herald on Vietnam, surely there is no requirement that they should be consistent with Canberra’s!
41 Richard Woolcott, April 1965, Public Information Officer – Visit to Sydney Morning Herald and Daily Mirror in NAA: A138 558/1/1 Part 1, p.3. The views expressed by Bingham about Sukarno being an ‘Asian Hitler’ were in reality not greatly different in terms of hostility from those privately held by many in the Menzies government and DEA.
to make Radio Australia broadcasts into South East Asia a fully-fledged conduit for Australian government foreign policy information.

The emergence of Woolcott's specialist role, the methods he routinely utilised, and the skill he exhibited in carrying out these tasks, are evidence of how new foreign policy expertise since the 1950s had been incorporated into the Australian scene. However, it also illustrates the ways in which the anti-communist orthodoxy had been neatly incorporated into these new structures, particularly the construction of new networks of professional experts. The PIO's activities cannot then be divorced from the story of the Canberra Network itself, that is, the very same powerful forces of professional and ideological influence cooperated together for perceived mutual benefits.

Objectivity
The media management and public analysis of the original Australian military deployment, and indeed the ongoing official rational for the war in South Vietnam, corresponded with the emergence of new social scientific methods designed to measure public attitudes. Yet this did not indicate a growing diversity of interpretations about Australian foreign policy. As shown by the operations and methods of the PIO, and the concentration of expertise in Canberra closely connected to the DEA, AIIA and the ANU, the Australian pond was much smaller than in the UK and US. According to the work of Murray Goot and Rodney Tiffen, the Vietnam War was the first to be measured by a variety of Australian opinion polls. They highlight that, 'the Vietnam War coincided with a boom in the social sciences'. The use of surveys amongst academic social scientists examining the Vietnam War 'covered a wider range of issues with more sophisticated techniques than would be ever attempted in polls designed for the press'. In contrast, the only opinion poll for Australian public consumption during the years 1965-1966 was the Morgan Gallup Poll.

In the 1960s Australia's only national opinion poll was the Morgan Gallup poll, affiliated to Gallup International and produced for the Herald and Weekly Times group of newspapers.

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43 Ibid.
Conducted five to eight times a year and based on interviews with some 2000 voters, each poll covered a dozen topics with one question, occasionally two. Between 1965 and 1970, questions touching on Vietnam, conscription or Australian attitudes to South East Asia formed part of nearly every survey.  

According to Goot and Tiffen, there were certain questions about the accuracy of the Morgan Gallup Poll. They argue that Roy Morgan cannot be considered an impartial arbiter on either communism, or events in Indo-China. This was connected to Morgan’s own sources of professional expertise, and Cold War political sympathies. Goot and Tiffen write that 

although Australian born, Roy Morgan was a champion of American interests. An honorary member of the Princeton University Class of 1948, he named his second son, born in the US, after Cordell Hull, Secretary of State under Roosevelt. When a Professor Goldman from Princeton, was appointed Special Consultant to President Kennedy, Morgan wrote in vain pressing his services and his [US and Princeton University] connections ...  

Where Morgan could use his interpretation of polling data in a headline, or provide analysis, largely sympathetic to government attitudes or anti-communism, he willingly obliged. Where the data did not clearly support his conclusions they were either largely ignored, or his methodology in assessing responses altered.

Morgan’s media role, the PIO, and the Canberra Network itself, reflect not only the convergence of the anti-communist orthodoxy within new professional settings, but the small degrees of analytical diversity within these structures. This issue can be seen in Australian media coverage of the Vietnam War. The Australian media experience of the war in South Vietnam was different from their American cousins. Rodney Tiffen writes that this was in large part due to a question of resources, access, and level of interest.

Although some papers sent correspondents for lengthy periods, none ever had a permanent Vietnam correspondent. For most of the period, The Melbourne Herald, Australia’s largest press group, and The Age each had a Singapore based correspondent whose extensive commission included Vietnam. Similarly, the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) had several correspondents based in Singapore who were able to cover the war when required. The Melbourne Herald and Sydney Morning Herald also used the roving freelance correspondent Denis Warner.

Apart from Warner, there were few Australian reporters actively writing about South Vietnam, from Vietnam. There was the young John Pilger, a strong critic of the war,
and Wilfred Burchett, whose reporting was gathered through lonely and intrepid travels throughout North Vietnam, and was regarded by many Australian anti-communists as being little less than a traitor. Most Australian mainstream media content continued to be reliant on the ‘international news agencies’. The use of material syndicated from the UK and the US was reflective of our politically subordinate role and relatively tiny military presence were matched by a disproportionately smaller contingent of journalists. More intangibly, Australian editorial decision makers adopted a less serious, less probing interest than their US counterparts.

Yet just as it was in the US, news coverage was viewed by the Australian government as playing an important role in helping to shape opinions favourable about its foreign policy decisions. The Menzies government, and Johnson Administration in Washington, liaised closely with the media to promote official policies. This was possible because the news was deeply influenced by the media’s relations with officialdom. The most direct form of influence was the reporting of government statements and actions. Occasionally news became simply a conduit for government views, for instance during the Tonkin Gulf crisis, and in the official reports of bombing missions to which journalists had no access. Governments can exploit their news producing initiative in the timing and staging of dramatic announcements. Official releases of information are the most prolific and routine source of news, and few journalists can afford to ignore them. Even though widespread scepticism led to the Saigon daily briefings being dubbed the ‘five o’clock follies’, they were always heavily attended and resulted in the filing of countless stories without further checking.

The US government presentation of events in Vietnam throughout the 1950s, and into the 1960s, often expected support from the US news media. The positive presentation of Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South Vietnam, and his regime throughout the 1950s was echoed in the Australian press, and by Australian politicians such as Casey. The many failings of the Diem regime were known, yet critical accusations seemingly only

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49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, p.169. Richard Casey strongly defended Diem’s refusal to hold elections in 1956. Diem was supported in this action by the US. The Americans feared that the communists would defeat Diem at the ballot box. According to Ngo Ving Long, this attitude was particularly unfortunate. He argues that official North Vietnamese sources finally admitted in 1995 that during the 1950s, Hanoi had issued instructions that political cadres in the South should refrain from military activities against the Diem regime. This was due to a hope that US influence elections would be held to unify the country in accordance with the Geneva Accords. From 1956, the military arm of the Viet Minh returned to the north taking with them most of the guns, weaponry and seasoned soldiers. This was a time when a great slaughter of communist cadres, and suspected sympathisers, took place in the South. Not until May 1959 did Hanoi finally issue orders that supporters in the South could defend themselves, ‘but only if absolutely necessary’. According to Ngo Ving Long, the reluctance of Hanoi to acknowledge this historical fact stemmed from the orders it issued at the time, and the scale of the anti-communist slaughter in South Vietnam between 1956-1959. See Ngo Ving Long and Noam Chomsky, April 30, 2005 Vietnam Remembered [Lecture], Massachusetts Institute of Technology electronic copy available from http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/287.
emerged in 1962 and 1963. While some of this negative publicity was connected to the Buddhist protests of May 1963, Rodney Tiffen offers an alternative explanation, namely, that Diem and US authorities had been ‘heavy handed’ in responding to critical media reports prompting journalists to turn on the Diem regime. Tiffen writes that news coverage of the Diem period is notable for the initially glowing accounts of his rule, and for the pivotal role of the Saigon press corps in later tarnishing that image and possibly acting as a catalyst for his overthrow in 1963.52

The Australian government’s desire for positive media representations of its military involvement in South Vietnam had other areas of synergy with the Americans. For example, the public pretexts for military intervention, in Australian and in the United States, were not true.53 There are, however, some important differences that should be noted. In the later 1960s, when significant sections of the US media became openly critical of the war in Vietnam, particularly during and after ‘The Tet Offensive’ of 1968, the Australian mainstream media remained relatively cautious about the war. One part of the explanation, as outlined earlier, was that the range of Australian correspondents working in Vietnam for major Australian newspapers and media was limited. Bruce Grant, Creighton Burns and Michael Richardson were sent to Vietnam by The Age newspaper, but according to Rodney Tiffen the paper’s coverage ‘was consistently coloured by the strong hawkish views of its Washington correspondent Roy Macartney’.54 The Herald in Melbourne utilised the services of Denis Warner, ‘one of

52 Rodney Tiffen, ‘News Coverage of Vietnam’, p.168. The fact that the Saigon Press corps turned against Diem is significant, but it does not mean that it was also turning against the US government at this early stage. Arguably, this reflected dissatisfaction with its allies, the strategies and the methods of US efforts, rather than any outright ethical opposition to the US military presence in Vietnam. This fits with what Chomsky calls the noble US intentions undermined by ‘strategic blunder’ hypothesis. One of the only ‘acceptable’ mainstream media criticisms of the US war. See ‘Interview by Adam Hughes Henry with Professor Noam Chomsky’ at MIT Boston, 14 October 2010.

53 For example, Johnson’s claims about Tonkin, and Menzies’ claims about receiving a request for military assistance from South Vietnam. As early as 1966, American politicians such as Senator William Fulbright and sections of the US domestic press revisited Tonkin by probing the truthfulness of the statements made by the Whitehouse and Robert McNamara, Secretary of State. Fulbright had been instrumental in gaining President Johnson US Senate support for the ‘Gulf of Tonkin resolution’. This gave the President almost unlimited powers with which to deal with alleged North Vietnamese provocation. Johnson took the opportunity to use the resolution to escalate towards full-scale war in South Vietnam on Presidential authority bestowed by the resolution. Fulbright later believed that he had been deceived by Johnson into giving his support for the ‘resolution’, and conducted Senate hearings into the Gulf of Tonkin incident. No such parliamentary enquiry, or press reports questioning the validity of the original Menzies announcement, ever took place in Australia.

54 Rodney Tiffen, ‘News Coverage of Vietnam’ in Peter King (ed.), Australia’s Vietnam – Australia in the Second Indo-China War, p.184. In 1971, it closed its Singapore office for 6 months. The previous correspondent John Bennetts took up a position with the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO). Bennetts saw combat zones in South Vietnam and Laos during 1967. According to Tiffen it was widely believed by other journalists that Bennetts had worked for ASIO while employed by The Age. See Footnote 32, p.216. See Jack Waterford, ‘Richard John Bennetts’ (1925-1978) in Australian Dictionary of Biography,
the most vociferous [pro-US] partisans', for its reports on Vietnam. There were few other significant Australian reporters covering Vietnam, for example Peter Arnett, worked for the Associated Press, and John Pilger, Chief Foreign Correspondent for the London Daily Mail, neither worked with Australian newspapers. Others working in Australian television such as Tim Bowden, Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) and Mike Carlton, an ABC correspondent, have reflected on their experiences in Vietnam. Bowden noted the ‘sameness’ of the ABC television coverage, and that it was hard to secure ‘combat footage’, while Carlton recalled aspects of ABC censorship and attitudes towards journalistic objectivity. Jim Revitt, a correspondent for television news and radio, was at one stage the only ABC reporter in South Vietnam. Access to international media reports, and official information from the Australian government was therefore essential to the operations of the Australian media. To remove this information from Australian reports would mean erasing large sections of copy from all local media reports about the war. The lack of resources and access provided opportunities for the Australian government to present official views almost in isolation from alternatives.

Woolcott’s complaints about South Vietnamese atrocity photographs in 1964 were reflective of an overall official attitude towards presentation of the war. Once the Australian army was engaged in combat after April 1965, deliberate efforts were made to sanitize photographs of the Vietnamese battlefield. Robert Hall writes that for the most part, the [Australian] Army succeeded in preventing unfavourable images reaching the [Australian] media. Official photographs and other published photographs of the war are almost devoid of images of the bodies of the dead and wounded, whether Australian or VC. There seemed to be no similar constraints during World War Two, when official photographs often showed the bodies of the dead and wounded. Images of badly wounded Australians being helped along jungle paths seemed to capture a sense of the cost of the national struggle. In

Volume 13, Melbourne University Press, 1993, pp.169-170. Bennetts denied the charge of working for ASIO during his lifetime, and according to Waterford, these allegations only explicitly emerged ‘after his death’. Waterford does concede that ‘he was more politically conservative [than his peers in the press gallery] and had little sympathy for the Vietnam protest’. Despite Bennetts extensive journalistic career and brief periods of academic employment at the ANU, Waterford fails to explain how Bennetts shifted seamlessly, and so quickly, from being a political correspondent for The Canberra Times in 1970 to a high ranking position with JIO, Australian Defence representative in Port Moresby 1974-75, back to JIO, JIO Attaché to Washington in 1976 and then appointed Head of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) in 1977, Australia’s peak intelligence analysis organization.

Rodney Tiffen, ‘News Coverage of Vietnam’, p.184. As Cold War Warrior and pro-US protagonist, he was resolute in his strategic assessments. As one confidential Canberra source quipped to me on Warner, ‘Just because he might have worked for the CIA, does not mean he was always wrong’.


Ibid.
Vietnam, the political sensitivities were different. Mindful of political opposition to the war, the Army sought to downplay graphic evidence of the nasty reality of combat. The war, as it appeared in official photographs, was to be bloodless.

Such sanitized presentations about Vietnam had not of course suddenly begun in the jungles of South Vietnam with the Australian army. They started in Canberra. Gregory Clark, a former Australian diplomat who became an ardent critic of Australia's foreign policy towards South East Asia, argues that there was a secretive information relationship between strong pro-US supporters within the DEA, and their counterparts in Washington. Clark writes that this

information was a powerful aphrodisiac, and the US agencies used it to good advantage. A small group of Hawks in Canberra had consistent advance information on US bombing and other strategies against North Vietnam and used that information to bolster their bureaucratic positions.

Clark notes that well established contacts with local academic experts, as outlined elsewhere in this thesis, were augmented by connections to journalists reporting on South East Asia. Clark writes that

the record of ASIO/ASIS penetration of the universities, particularly the ANU International Relations Department, is already partly known. A similar and successful effort was made to influence media commentators on foreign affairs. Material from bogus news services such as Forum World Features found ready access to Australian newspapers. As a desk officer in 1962 [Clark] was surprised by the way we [the DEA would] be asked to file intelligence requests in advance of Asian visits by ‘friendly’ foreign affairs commentators. Most of such cases were journalists from the Fairfax Group ...

Forum World Features (FWF), originally called Information Bulletin Ltd, was funded by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which in turn was funded by the CIA through the administrative auspices of the Ford Foundation. When the Congress was exposed in 1966-67 as being a CIA funded organization, ‘Forum World Features’ was created. This was undertaken ‘after the Congress's lead magazine Encounter had come under suspicion’. In a 1976 essay, Steve Weissman wrote that through the FWF, the

59 Gregory Clark, ‘Vietnam, China and the foreign affairs debate in Australia’ in Peter King (ed.), Australia’s Vietnam – Australia in the Second Indo-China War, see Footnote 8, p.198.
60 Ibid. See Footnote 9.
61 See ‘Forum World Features’ in Powerbase, electronic copy available at http://www.powerbase.info/index.php/Forum_World_Features#cite_ref-13. This operation was tied to a worldwide network of CIA information warfare outlets, but also had close connections to British intelligence and conservative elements within the UK press. Brian Crozier was appointed Chairmen and wrote often for the FWF. On the question of Vietnam, the FWF provided materials strongly in favour of the war in Vietnam and US foreign policies in general. The FWF was also a conduit to pay ‘foreign journalists working for the CIA’. See Steve Weissman, 'The CIA Makes the News', in Philip Agee and Louis Wolf (eds.), Dirty Work: C.I.A. in Western Europe, New York: Dorset Press, 1978, p.206.
CIA could easily slip in straight American propaganda, especially when it came to the war in Vietnam, or the campaign against the Allende government in Chile. The Agency could also use Forum to send almost anyone anywhere as "a journalist," and to give research and other backup to good friends such as Sir Robert Thompson, the former British security chief in Malaya, and a key advisor to the Americans on Vietnam. Control, of course, remained with the Americans, who had at least one "case officer" in the Forum office — a career CIA man named Robert Gene Gately, who was last seen as a member of the CIA Station in the American Embassy in Bangkok.62

Influence

If the parameters of debate about Vietnam established in Australia were narrow, the reliance of the Australian media on international reports, and official sources of information, merely consolidated this trend. Those who questioned official policies at the earliest stages of its public presentation, such as the academic turned Labor politician Dr. Jim Cairns, were still forced to negotiate the narrow parameters of mainstream debate, as established by the government and the DEA.63 This also worked in reverse, for example, official government justifications for the original deployment were welcomed by established Australian anti-communist advocacy groups such as B.A. Santamaria’s National Civic Council (NCC), and the Australian Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF) and its published journal Quadrant.64 In the mid 1950s, the right-wing Catholicism of anti-communist crusader Santamaria divided the Australian Catholic community, and was one of a number of important factors contributing to splitting apart the ALP, and the creation of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). In the 1960s, the threat of Chinese communism moving southwards towards Australia resonated strongly with Santamaria and the NCC, and this featured in their anti-communist advocacy. The ACCF had advocated its anti-communist agenda since the early 1950s, and through its journal Quadrant,65 various articles and commentaries were

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63 For a straightforward challenge for evidence about Vietnam see Dr Jim. Cairns ‘Vietnam is it truth we want?’ in Personal Papers of Prime Minister McEwen, 29 Apr 1965 - 28 Apr 1966, Vietnam Series NAA: M58 393 PART 2, Canberra: National Archives of Australia.
64 Founded by Richard Krygier, the ACCF was funded by the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a CIA funded organisation. See Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters, New York: The New Press, 2000. Quadrant magazine was founded in 1956 by Krygier and James McAuley, a right wing Catholic poet. See also Cassandra Pybus, The Devil and James McAuley, University of Queensland Press, Queensland: 2001. McAuley also had a long-standing personal association with Santamaria who seems to have occupied the role of an intellectual mentor to McAuley.
65 See Cassandra Pybus, ‘The CIA as Culture Vultures’, Australian Book Review, August 2000 Issue No. 223. In 1966, the New York Times reported that the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was funded by the CIA. It also emerged that Quadrant magazine (and the ACCF) had been an ongoing recipient of CIA funds. Research by Pybus demonstrates that without this financial support the Quadrant magazine would have been unable to operate.
published in favour of the war in South Vietnam in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{66} Both the NCC and the ACCF utilised official justifications, and other official information sources, to augment their robust anti-communist arguments. Used skilfully, such as the detailed reference materials from the DEA, or media reports influenced by DEA guidance, they enabled non-government groups such as ACCF and NCC to independently advance the legitimacy of the Vietnam War, and Australian involvement. If used ruthlessly, close contacts between government sources and such organizations helped to denigrate the motives of their political opponents. For example, it is now known that \textit{Quadrant} had a history of utilising its connections with conservative politicians, and ASIO for this purpose.

Clem Christensen, the editor of \textit{Meanjin}, was well aware of the hostility toward him from the ACCF and deeply suspicious of its financial backing. In 1954 he claimed in an editorial that the Congress for Cultural Freedom was funded by the CIA, a view he had privately expressed in concerned letters to Sir John Latham [a highly prominent member of the ACCF]. Outraged, Krygier intensified his determination to destroy \textit{Meanjin}. On Krygier's behalf Bill Wentworth [a conservative MP] made persistent requests of ASIO for the file on Christensen during 1955 and demanded that ASIO do an analysis of \textit{Meanjin}'s contributors to assess their left-wing connections. In Krygier's report to Josselson [of the Congress for Cultural Freedom] in July 1956, he passed on documents which Colonel Spry from ASIO had pushed under his door one night, naming communists and fellow-travellers at Melbourne University, notably Christensen and his wife, Nina.\textsuperscript{67}

This politicised domestic environment continued into the 1960s, and it was into this social context of well-entrenched anti-communist orthodoxy, that the Australian government justified its deployment to South Vietnam, and the PIO engaged in his media liaison with the Australian press. Clearly the Australian media, the NCC, and the ACCF were influenced by officialdom, but they were not alone. Many of the factors encouraging the acceptance of official influence, and the professional and ideological influences driving their thinking, are also reminiscent of the Canberra Network phenomenon. Yet none of these entities had anything like intellectual prestige of the AIIA or the ANU, a scholarly community of foreign policy experts, yet due to its own official associations, the Canberra Network was not immune from official influences, on the question of the Vietnam War.

\textbf{The AIIA}

To consider the question of official influence on scholarship, I have chosen to examine

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. In 1965, this included reprinting an article by George Carver (a serving CIA agent), 'The Real Revolution in South Vietnam'.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
the flagship AIIA publication, *Australia in World Affairs 1961-65*, which had prominent members of the Canberra Network analysing the issue of Vietnam and Australian defence and foreign policy, and the academic work of Sir Alan Watt, Director of the AIIA. Gordon Greenwood, one of the major Australian figures behind the Canberra Network, contributed the long chapter ‘Australian Foreign Policy in Action’ to *Australia in World Affairs 1961-65*. It examines Australian foreign policy, including communism and the Vietnam War. Greenwood’s chapter is one hundred thirty three pages long and presents as a detailed scholarly survey of the topic. Of the 227 endnotes, only 35 originate from non-government, and non-DEA sources. Many of Greenwood’s sources are quotes from key politicians, Garfield Barwick, Paul Hasluck and Robert Menzies, sourced from Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD). He writes in detail about the philosophical and intellectual basis of Australia’s foreign policy, and praises the ‘bold’ personal characteristics of Paul Hasluck, the Minister for External Affairs. Writing about the original Australian deployment to South Vietnam, Greenwood synthesises his sympathetic observations within the established framework of official justifications for Australian involvement:

> On 29 April 1965 the Prime Minister announced the decision to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam; *this followed upon a request from the Government of South Vietnam for further military assistance* [author’s italics]. This was not a decision suddenly arrived at but was, from the Government’s point of view, the logical outcome of its international policies. Throughout 1963 and much of 1964 the attention focused upon the immediate problems of Indonesian confrontation… [placing] the developing crisis in Vietnam into the background. Vietnam was not completely obscured; there was an awareness of danger ahead from this disconcerting trouble spot, but for Australia the problem belonged to the future rather than to the present. Yet by 1962, and even more by 1963, the government attitude was not in doubt. It fully supported both American interpretation and American action. Beyond this, there was a belief that the outcome of the Vietnamese struggle could prove vital to the stability of South East Asia and therefore to Australia. In Barwick’s words in August 1963, ‘Our security depends on turning back the Communist thrust in South Viet Nam’.

By using official sources in such a manner, Greenwood’s scholarly analysis is, not surprisingly, preoccupied with outlining official views. While his chapter is of course an overview, with so little else to acknowledge in terms of information, Greenwood’s own views are in fact indistinguishable from the official assertions he cites so exclusively. For example, the assertion that the Menzies government actually believed Australian security depended on the outcome in South Vietnam is unexplored and untested. Nor does Greenwood provide any evidence of a cogent and coordinated Chinese communist military strategy to ‘thrust’ southwards; not even a possible US source that may well

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have supported such a view, it is enough for Greenwood to reiterate official opinions [In conjunction with a sympathetic attitude towards government policies, and his reliance on official references, Greenwood’s scholarship establishes a favourable impression of Australian foreign policy decision making.

In the same *Australia in World Affairs* edition T.B. Millar wrote the chapter ‘Australian Defence, 1945-1965’. Millar was the first Director of the ANU Strategic Studies Centre in 1966, and a Fellow of the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS), as outlined in the previous chapter. He built his entire academic career writing about defence, intelligence and strategic issues connected to the Cold War. His chapter surveyed twenty years of Australian defence policy including of course, the 1965 Vietnam deployment. Millar writes that the legal basis of the Australian position rests upon the invitation of the government of the Republic of Vietnam to Australia to make a contribution to their security and its willingness to accept what Australia has been in a position to provide. The status of Australian instructors and other personnel in Vietnam is covered by technical bilateral arrangements between the [South Vietnamese] government and the Commonwealth government [of Australia]. As pointed out by the Prime Minister in his statement in the House of Representatives on 13th August, 1964, the Australian commitment in Vietnam flows from the general obligations assumed under the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty to resist armed attack and counter subversive activities within the treaty area.69

Like Greenwood, Millar was content to reiterate almost every official justification made by the Menzies government without further scholarly explorations.

There are other areas in Millar’s scholarly treatment where it is narrow, for example, on the question of increased Australian military spending, and the introduction of a National Service scheme during 1964. Millar writes that the Prime Minister’s main justification for this expanded [defence] activity was in terms of containing communism. We were in SEATO for this purpose: ‘The further communist powers are kept away from us, the more secure we will feel’. We wanted Malaysia preserved for the same reason. It was important for Australia that Indonesia should not become Communist, nor uses its influence to weaken resistance to communism in South East Asia.70

The Menzies government justified the National Service scheme in 1964 in order to boost the number of Australian military personnel. On the National Service scheme, Millar writes that

Various groups in the community, including the Returned Serviceman’s League, had long

70 Ibid, p.295. Therefore, this official explanation argued that increased Australian defence spending, and membership of SEATO, was designed to keep Asian communism far ‘away from us’. Yet without actually considering using its increased military capabilities in South East Asia, it is difficult grasp this logic.
advocated a return to National Service, and in his Defence Review in Parliament on 10
November 1964, shortly before an election for portion of the Senate, Sir Robert Menzies
announced the introduction of such a scheme. It was to be very different indeed from the
previous National Service programme, different indeed from anything Australia had seen in
peace or war. Young men would be called up selectively, on the basis of a birthday ballot,
for two years of full time service in regular units, and would be obliged to serve anywhere
overseas if required.  

As a former Australian army officer, and academic defence expert, there are areas of
scholarly importance where Millar could have considered adding his own additional
expertise. For example, the National Service scheme legally enabled the Australian
government for the first time in history, to send conscripts to serve anywhere, including
overseas. Millar could have considered possible connections between increased
Australian defence spending, the National Service scheme, the Australian attitude
towards SEATO, and communism in 1964. The absence of an expert scholarly analysis
addressing these important logistical questions, particularly by a specialist academic
chapter, does make it appear to the reader that increased military spending, introduction
of a National Service scheme, ongoing military operations against Indonesian
confrontation in Borneo, and then a much larger military commitment to South Vietnam
in the following year, were something of a strategic coincidence. The importance of
addressing some of these questions, even in a limited and perhaps speculative form,
would have been useful. For example, it is now known that in December 1964, an
Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee report outlined their expectation that Australia
would make a military commitment to South Vietnam in the very near future. The
Chiefs of Staff report also noted that the reintroduction of national service would assist
military planning by maintaining the required levels of military manpower. According
to David Lee, in late 1964, the Menzies government, and the DEA, were also offering
support to Washington should it expand the ground war in South Vietnam. He notes that
by early 1965, the Australians had even indicated to Washington their willingness to
accept a military role in Vietnam.

A final example of Canberra Network analysis about Vietnam comes from Sir

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71 Ibid. The RSL, a traditionally conservative veteran’s organization, were naturally supportive of
schemes which benefited the military.
72 Meeting by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 16 December 1964, Top Secret No.137/1964: Aid to South
Vietnam.
73 Meeting by the Chiefs of Staff Committee 16 December 1964.
Alan Watt, the Executive Director of the AIIA, and a former Secretary of the DEA. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Watt’s personal and professional connections were pivotal from the perspective of Norman Harper, Gordon Greenwood and the Ford Foundation, in his appointment to the Directorship of the AIIA. In 1967, Watt published the book, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965*. This was a major publication for Watt, and it began during his period of fellowship at the ANU prior to becoming Director of the AIIA. This scholarly analysis of Australian diplomatic history was the culmination of Watt’s post-DEA retirement research. In his analysis of the deployment of Australian troops to South Vietnam, Watt utilises aspects of the statement made by Menzies in April 1965, but avoids any specific reference to its claims of responding to calls for military assistance from the South Vietnamese. Watt writes that

> On 29 April 1965 Sir Robert Menzies announced in Parliament the government’s decision to commit a battalion of troops to South Vietnam as ‘the most useful additional contribution which we can make to the defence of the region at this time’.

Rather than acknowledging Menzies’ claims of responding to South Vietnamese requests for military assistance in April 1965, Watt draws the reader’s attention instead to earlier official justifications. Watt wrote that

> He [Menzies] reminded members of the House of Representatives that the [Australian] government, as early as 1962, had sent 32 military instructors to South Vietnam at the request of the government of that country, later increased to 100; that six Caribou aircraft had also been sent; and that economic aid to South Vietnam amounted to about 1 million pounds a year ... The decision to commit a battalion had been taken after the closest attention to defence priorities.75

As a retired senior diplomat, and former Secretary of the DEA, Watt must have maintained personal contacts with former colleagues and associates; perhaps he had even discreetly discussed the sending of military advisors in 1962, and the first military deployment to South Vietnam in 1965. Whether Watt was aware that Australia had not in fact ‘sent 32 military instructors to South Vietnam at the request of the government of that country’, and had not responded to official requests for military assistance from Saigon in 1965, is beyond the scope of this research, but it does raise legitimate questions about Watt’s scholarly perspectives. For example, in a second monograph, *Vietnam: An Australian Perspective* published in 1967, Watt again excludes any

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75 Alan Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p.183. As noted earlier in this chapter, the sending of Australian Special Forces in 1962 as military advisors to South Vietnam had not been in response to any request from Saigon, but from the Americans. This was certainly known to high-ranking members of the DEA and the Menzies government. See Gordon Jockel (Assistant Secretary – Head Southeast Asian Division of External Affairs) as quoted by Sexton, *War for the Asking*, pp.53–54.
specific reference to the request for assistance from Saigon in 1965 as claimed in Menzies’ parliamentary statement on 29 April.

In *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965* Watt also ventured into providing analysis of the political opposition to the Vietnam War. He wrote that opposition to the Vietnam war was to be ‘found amongst [Australian] voters who could not simply be written off as communist or extreme left wing’. While acknowledging that the original deployment to Vietnam was criticised, Watt does not provide even an outline of the actual nature of this criticism. For example, after the 29 April announcement by Menzies, 513 Australian academics signed a joint petition that provided quite specific details of their opposition to Australian government policy towards South Vietnam.76 Watt’s expert analysis does not mention, even briefly, any reasonable argument against the Vietnam War, or Australian involvement. In contrast, Watt gives significant space to ‘impressive’ publications from the DEA about Vietnam, that according to Watt, demonstrate the many failed ‘efforts’ of non-communist nations, specifically the US, to secure a peaceful outcome in South Vietnam. Watt writes that the

Department of External Affairs published in its May 1965 issue of *Current Notes* a substantial background article on Vietnam and subsequently issued two sets of documents on Vietnam, the first of which (Information Handbook no.1 of 1965) included an impressive summary of various unsuccessful efforts which had been made by non-Communist countries or organisations to secure a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem ...

Like Gordon Greenwood, Watt also highlighted the personal qualities of Hasluck as minister, and emphasised that the failure to secure a peaceful outcome in South Vietnam lay with the North Vietnamese.

Sir Robert Menzies’ press conference in London on 27 June, after the Prime Minister's Conference and in Canberra on 13 July were all well-publicised, while Paul Hasluck, who succeeded Barwick as Minister of External Affairs on Barwick’s appointment as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, boldly accepted an invitation to discuss Vietnam at the ‘teach in’ held at Monash University in Melbourne on 29 July. Gradually criticism of the government policy was weakened by the rigidity of the Communist refusal to negotiate save on unacceptable terms, particularly after American bombing of North Vietnam had been discontinued for a period of 37 days in December 1965 and January 1966 and President Johnson had instituted an elaborate diplomatic peace offensive ...77

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76 See ‘Statement signed by 513 academic members of Australian Universities between May 7 and August 15 1965’ in *Personal Papers of Prime Minister McEwen, 29 Apr 1965 - 28 Apr 1966*, Vietnam Series NAA: MS8 393 PART 2.
The sources Watt described as ‘impressive’ were *Current Notes on International Affairs* and the *Information Handbooks*. The *Current Notes* series was a collection of Ministerial statements and DEA articles outlining various issues from official perspectives. The *Information Handbooks* on Vietnam, as noted early in this chapter, were produced by the DEA. Watt argues, as shown by his previous quote, that criticism of the Australian government about the Vietnam War weakened because of the ‘Communist refusal to negotiate save on unacceptable terms’. Watt also fails to explain what the ‘unacceptable [Communist] terms’ might be. Yet Watt’s analysis connects discontinuation of *large-scale US bombing* of North Vietnam to an ‘elaborate diplomatic peace offensive’ initiated by US President Johnson. The cessation of a massive US bombing was aimed at forcing the North Vietnamese to the negotiation table. Yet if this principle had been accepted by the North Vietnamese, the resumption of large scale US bombing campaigns would have loomed over all negotiations. This would appear to undermine any genuine concept of bi-lateral peace talks. Yet Watt’s scholarly analysis certainly suggests that this type of ‘peace offensive’ is an appropriate and reasonable strategy to deal with ‘warlike’ Communists. Watt’s failure to examine the implications of the US ‘peace offensive’, or outline the arguments of those Australians opposed to the war, do not seem, in any fair assessment, connected to scholarly considerations. Instead, they appear more connected to his own personal support for the war in South Vietnam.

The adoption of professional information management techniques by the DEA, and indeed the Australian government, was designed to influence opinions and debates on a variety of levels. The closeness of the associations between the DEA, the PIO, and the Australian press, as demonstrated in this chapter, should not be considered separately from the Canberra Network itself. In many ways, the very foundations of these relationships were built from common threads, often utilising many of the same methods. The official presentation of the original Australian deployment to South Vietnam resonated throughout a range of connected networks of foreign policy expertise, as demonstrated in this chapter; the Canberra Network was not immune from official influence, or the ideological constraints of the established anti-communist orthodoxy. Critical dissent from within the 1960s foreign policy establishment, the Canberra Network, or those closely connected to both, criticising such issues was rare,
but some published examples did emerge.

Diplomatic Hindsight

In the 1970s two books emerged as an antidote to the Australian foreign policy thinking of the Vietnam era; Malcolm Booker's *The Last Domino* by Alan Renouf's *The Frightened Country*. Each author was a high-ranking diplomat who served throughout that period. Renouf had become Secretary of the DEA (1974-1977). Therefore, their personal testimony is worthy of some consideration within the scope of this thesis.

These publications were received coldly by the Australian establishment, and in some official circles, they were considered almost treacherous. By the time of publication in 1976, Booker had enjoyed a long and distinguished career trajectory in the DEA. His book was a very personal critique of Australian foreign policy thinking and the Vietnam War. On the issue of Australian policy toward Vietnam, Booker writes that Vietnam

> was an American dilemma, not ours. Australia no longer had a stake in sustaining a non-communist government in Vietnam, especially a venal and incompetent one. The likelihood was already emerging that a communist Vietnam would not be a mere puppet of China; and in any case the rest of South East Asia had shown itself resistant to communism.  

Booker also admitted that the Australians had pressed the Americans hard in early 1965 'for strong military action in Vietnam' but argued that only *after* President Johnson had decided to take a plunge [that the] Australian government found itself in the position of being under a clear moral obligation to make a supporting contribution'.

> Despite the *mea culpa* of Booker’s stinging critical assessments and admissions, these words were written when it was clear that the war would likely end in a North Vietnamese victory. Yet Booker was a senior diplomat during the Vietnam period, well connected to internal DEA information sources, therefore his critiques of the period are important. Booker provides no information about Australian discussions with the Americans prior to 1965, and suggests that the Australian military commitment to Vietnam in 1965 was a moral obligation to support the US. Yet we now know, Hasluck, and the DEA, encouraged the US towards escalation of the war before April 1965.

The Australians had also indicated willingness to contribute military support well *before* any final US decision to increase ground troops had been made. It is difficult to imagine

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78 Ibid.
that Booker did not know, or have heard through senior secondary channels, of such information. Booker also writes that Vietnam was not Australia's 'problem', that Saigon was a 'venal and incompetent' regime, that a unified 'Vietnam would not be a mere puppet of China', and that 'the rest of South East Asia had shown itself resistant to communism'. These again are powerful words, breaking with the coherence of professional and bureaucratic solidarity generated by the anti-communist orthodoxy of the 1960s. Yet in regards to the original Australian troop deployment in April 1965, as already noted, Booker wrote that once the US had committed to its expanded ground war, the Australian government had a moral obligation to send troops. That is, Australia's moral obligation was not to the South Vietnamese, but to the Americans. This impression is augmented by the fact that on these particular pages Booker makes no mention of protecting the people of South Vietnam from communism as playing any part in the decision to send troops.81

For the serious falsehoods contained in the parliamentary statement of 29 April 1965, he faults Menzies for only blurring

the distinction which previously had been carefully maintained between giving defence aid and direct military intervention. He [Menzies] spoke of the dispatch of a combat battalion as it were merely an extension of existing policy.82

This still fails to explain why from 1962, the presence of Australian Special Forces as military advisors in South Vietnam at the request of the Americans, did not in itself blur distinctions between aid and military interventionism, particularly if such a training role brought advisors into any potential frontline contact with the enemy. Booker's criticisms of Menzies are mild, but he is very critical of Paul Hasluck.

Unfortunately none of [Hasluck's assessment of 26 October 1965) was true. It was not altogether Hasluck's fault that he misled parliament. The only intelligence the Australian government received was from American sources, and although it was conveyed with impressively high classification it was inevitably selective.83

82 Booker, 'Counter Subversive' in The Last Domino, p.193.
83 Ibid, p.194. It should be noted that specific claims made by Menzies in his speech, such as being in receipt of an official request for military assistance from the government of South Vietnam, did not rest on any connection with so-called faulty US intelligence. According to Booker's assessment, Hasluck repeatedly misled the Parliament about Vietnam due to a reliance on highly classified, but faulty US intelligence. These US reports, or at least some of them, surely also found their way to senior levels of the DEA, ASIS, ASIO, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister, Hasluck was not Robinson Crusoe on Vietnam. Booker certainly presented his critical reflections strongly, but he is still selective about where he assigns blame. As a senior diplomat throughout the period, why was there not more of an
Like Booker’s monograph, Alan Renouf’s *The Frightened Country* published in 1979, is scathing of Australian foreign policy on Vietnam. On the issue of government policy toward Vietnam in the 1960s, Renouf goes further than Booker in his assessments. He writes that the ‘inexplicably’ justifications provided by the Menzies government for the original deployment misled the Australian parliament and the public. The refreshing honesty of Renouf’s expert assessments should be applauded, but as outlined in this chapter, significant information efforts were made to present official views on Vietnam, and actively influence opinions in support of these policies. Yet neither *The Last Domino* nor *The Frightened Country* explore the close associations between politicians, the DEA, the media, or certain academics, which effectively (deliberately or inadvertently), perpetuated these misrepresentations of fact. Neither critique seems to acknowledge that the Menzies government’s policies towards South Vietnam could not have been pursued without the strong support of the DEA. As a senior Australian diplomat in Washington during the Vietnam period, Renouf fails to explain to the reader the actual scope and scale of the ‘inexplicable’ deception. As outlined in this chapter, DEA knowledge that misrepresentations of fact were used to justify the deployment of Australian military forces to Vietnam was known from the beginning. As a matter of DEA procedure, copies of important cables about Vietnam, before the deployment and afterwards, were circulated to senior DEA diplomats, for example, Pat Shaw, Keith Shann, Gordon Jockel, Walter Crocker, Malcolm Booker and Alan Renouf himself (based in Washington at that time). While *The Last Domino* and *Frightened Country* utilise aspects of ethical language in their criticisms of Australian foreign policy, these criticisms are still limited by the weight of the professional orthodoxy each one served. For example, it is not conceivable that Booker and Renouf were unaware of the DEA’s own role in assisting government misrepresentations about Vietnam during the 1960s.

Michael Sexton’s *War for the Asking* quotes Renouf as saying that he never believed military action in Vietnam could succeed. This seriously suggests that Renouf

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* For example, Robert Menzies, Prime Minister, Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs, James Plimsoll, DEA Secretary, Arthur Tange (DEA Secretary prior to Plimsoll), H.D. Anderson, Australian Ambassador to Vietnam, and Keith Waller, Ambassador to the US.
* See Sexton, *War for the Asking – How Australia invited itself to Vietnam*. 205
was opposed to Vietnam in strategic terms, but judging by his book *The Frightened Country*, also in ethical principle. Sexton also quotes Renouf as pointing out that dissenting behaviour by an Australian diplomat over Vietnam could have jeopardised their public service pensions. This was no doubt a legitimate *personal* concern, yet the pragmatic elevation of financial and indeed professional concerns over ethical considerations is reflective of those professional concerns, and strength of community, Renouf had long shared within the Australian foreign establishment. For example, dissenting DEA behaviour over Vietnam during that time was virtually non-existent.

Booker and Renouf broke with convention by airing their criticisms in public, and for this, they should be commended, for they have added to the historical record in ways their colleagues and associates did not. Yet having broken with the conventions they shared with the Canberra Network outlined in this thesis, Booker and Renouf might have gone further. If each aired their criticisms, while acknowledging and explaining their personal own role as senior Australian diplomats over the issue of Vietnam, profound insights could have been gleaned from their accounts. The hindsight analysis of Booker and Renouf is still important, but as outlined, it also remains incomplete.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the first Australian military deployment to South Vietnam in 1965. This example has been used as a vehicle to explore how official influences permeated through political debates into the Australian media and academia by way of established networks. It has also examined the ways in which the presentation of official policies were manufactured and presented by the Menzies government, and the DEA, not only to frame the narrow parameters of the national political discourse, but also to influence media reportage and scholarly analysis. This was never a question of conspiracy, but a clear consequence of the close professional associations between

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86 Although they were presumably unaware of the misleading assertions of Menzies’ April 29 statement, Gregory Clark and Stephen Fitzgerald were the only Australian diplomats to resign over Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. Although it is not uncommon for bureaucrats, and a range of other professions, to find themselves in similar situations, Canadian political philosopher John Rawlston Saul provides another framework to assess this predicament. He suggests in *The Doubters Companion* that ‘immorality is doing something wrong of our own volition. Amorality is doing something wrong simply because a structure, or an organisation, expects us to do it. See John Rawlston Saul, *The Doubters Companion – A Dictionary of Aggressive Common Sense*, Toronto: Penguin, 1995.
official and non-official entities such as the DEA, the AIIA and the ANU, and the Australian media, framed by the dominant structures of the anti-communist orthodoxy. The techniques utilised by the DEA, and Menzies government, by Paul Hasluck (Minster for External Affairs), and Richard Woolcott (the Public Information Officer), show that Anglo-American propaganda and information management had come of age in Australia by the 1960s. Official perspectives permeated themselves throughout the political discourse, the Australian mainstream media, and the Canberra Network. These structures, closely connected to officialdom in their own various ways, were openly, or at least cautiously, supportive of the war and the anti-communist orthodoxy that linked each to the other.

The justifications used to promote and defend the original Vietnam deployment implied that a sense of moral urgency and strategic necessity demanded that the Australian government send combat forces to help defend South Vietnam from communism. One implication of this manufactured public presentation was that it would have been unethical, even cowardly, for the Menzies government to ignore a request for military help from Saigon.87 P.G. Edwards, who has written extensively on Australian involvement in South Vietnam in the role of official historian for the Australian War Memorial (AWM), argues that the Menzies government might actually have placed itself into a position of publically defending policies, or at least strategic assessments about South Vietnam, it privately did not believe.88 He has also argued that the Australian Department of Defence never endorsed the view that there was any Chinese threat in South Vietnam threatening to Australia.89 Yet the information efforts of the government, and the DEA, to sell their policies about South Vietnam, were hardly half hearted. They were robustly carried forward. If we accept Edwards’ assertions, we are left to conclude that in 1965 it was thought acceptable to utilise false assertions in order to deploy Australian troops to a war.90 As Edwards notes, the Menzies statement of April 1965

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87 Sir Robert Menzies (Prime Minister of Australia), 29 April 1965 ‘Statement to the House of Representatives’.

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was a gravely misleading interpretation of the policy-making that had led to the decision [to send Australian troops to South Vietnam], and one that would distort the debate on Vietnam for the next decade.

This chapter has highlighted through its analysis of the Australian media, the role of the Richard Woolcott (PIO), and scholars such as Greenwood, Millar and Watt, how official information, and influences, infiltrated public debate and scholarship. Yet there was little resistance to the official associations and official influence. In fact, they were welcomed in the case of the Canberra Network, and for the most part, actively accommodated by the Australian mainstream media. In selling the drama of Vietnam during 1965, the Australian government and the DEA engaged in a campaign to sell a manufactured version of their policies. The power of expert networks, so closely associated with each other by 1965, and the dominant influence of anti-communism, created support for official policies, or at least, as demonstrated even by Renouf, a captious professional silence. Renouf’s *inexplicable* deception about Vietnam, was therefore not inexplicable, it could occur precisely because political considerations, professional associations, ideological obligations, and the anti-communist orthodoxy, demanded that this course of action was a necessity.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Selling the Drama in 1965: The Indonesian Massacres

The Australian deployment to South Vietnam – discussed in the previous chapter – and its ongoing commitment to the Vietnam War would prove, in the now almost unanimous verdict of history, to have badly miscalculated the benefits that could be accrued by cultivating an anti-communist military relationship with the United States in South East Asia. From the early 1960s the Australians desired to utilise military engagement with the Americans in South Vietnam to effectively enhance its Cold War security posture of regional forward defence. In presenting such policies, the government drew on a new professional expertise, characterised by the official, academic and public relations aspects of the ‘Canberra Network’, often willingly assisted by broader sections of the mainstream media. Yet to leave the analysis at South Vietnam, would be minimise the extent to which the anti-communist orthodoxy infiltrated Department of External Affairs (DEA) practices, and notions of diplomatic professionalism within the Cold War setting. The professionalism, pragmatism, and interpersonal foundations connected to this orthodoxy were applied in numerous contexts during the period. To make this point, this chapter examines Australian reactions to the Indonesian coup of 30 September 1965, and the subsequent Indonesian massacres.

In turning to Indonesia in 1965, it is useful also to reprise another of the approaches this thesis has sought to develop by examining a specific individual as they negotiated the policy process, and sought to adjust to its new norms, networks and served its core priorities. In Richard Casey, we had a figure whose intellectual and personal outlook – as demonstrated in his operational code – left a marked imprint on the conduct of Australian foreign policy: its methods, culture, priorities, and an enduring enthrallment with Cold War politics. In W.D. Forsyth, we had a figure who demonstrated how substantially, and how quickly, departmental methods and priorities
shifted during the transition from the 1940s into the 1950s. In this chapter, in Keith 'Mick' Shann, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia during the massacres, we have an official who figures within post-war Australian foreign policy history as among the most ‘able’ of the new generation of officials who came to define the DEA in the 1950s and 1960s.¹

A Brief History of Shann
Shann was amongst the early university graduates recruited into the Australian Commonwealth Public Service (CPS) prior to World War Two. Like many of this group, his early experiences in the CPS were enduring. First in Treasury, then in Labour and National Service, he encountered considerable hostility from an older generation of bureaucrats who resented intrusions on their established seniority. Further, there was little to no respect within the CPS at that time for academic training in itself. Yet Shann found his new home in Canberra an exciting place during World War Two, and into the later 1940s, given its growing role as the emerging centre of Australian government coordinating a new age of national policy. As he noted in an interview in 1985, ‘practically everyone in Canberra knew everyone else’, and in time those links would prove valuable.² Like Forsyth, he benefitted considerably from academic patronage–especially from D.B. Copland – a well respected economist, academic, and later Vice Chancellor of the Australian National University (ANU), who served as Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister during the war. Copland’s expertise was brought into the government fold in response to a growing awareness that the settings of policy, and the processes of policy formation, needed to change, and in turn he used his influence to place ‘good men’ in appropriate places to effect such change.

When Shann was transferred from the Labour and National Service and into the Department of External Affairs in 1946, he began one of the more notable Australian diplomatic careers of the era. In his 1985 interview, Shann offered a range of insights into that career. He found his professional home during the Casey and Tange period, having considered John Burton to have been a poor secretary because he was too

inexperienced, and too involved in the political processes going on around him. Shann thought that Alan Watt, conversely, was ‘very, very cautious’, and ‘terrified of the press’. It was under Tange as Secretary and Casey, as Minister, that Shann felt himself to be part of a new department engaged in the development of a new approach to Australian foreign policy, building new networks of expertise, and increasingly conscious of Australian-Asian relations within the Cold War context. Shann also welcomed the transformation of the diplomatic cadet and selection process, as outlined in chapter three, as an important part of this period of departmental rebuilding and transition.

Fundamental to all of this – the emerging networks, the new departmental culture, the growing power of the anti-communist orthodoxy – was the perception that Australia had a unique perspective on Asia. In his 1985 interview, Shann argued that he did not ‘think the Americans [had] the same feel for this part of this world as perhaps we do’. He insisted that in dealing with the dynamics of Asia, ‘we’ve got to think terribly carefully … [and] get ourselves into a close and sensible relationship with our neighbours’. When Shann was sent to Indonesia as the Australian Ambassador in 1962, he understood that his role was to ensure that Australia’s relationship with Indonesia was ‘close’ and ‘sensible’.

The Problem with Sukarno

By at least 1957, as the work of Stuart Doran demonstrates, the Menzies government, and the DEA, held growing political fears about Sukarno and Indonesia. This fear was connected to the serious possibility that the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) might legitimately win power through constitutional means, Sukarno would permanently orientate Indonesia into a new diplomatic relationship with China, and an Indonesian takeover of Dutch West New Guinea. To outline the ways in which Sukarno was problematic in the eyes of the Australians, British, and Americans, it is necessary to provide a brief overview.

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3 For a detailed analysis of Australia’s growing anxieties about Indonesia see Stuart Doran, Western Friends and Eastern Neighbours: West New Guinea and Australian Self-Perception in Relation to the United States, Britain and Southeast Asia, 1950-1962 PhD, Division of Historical Studies, Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra: Australian National University, 1999.
In February 1957, Sukarno, with the support of the Indonesian army, adopted Guided Democracy. This was Sukarno’s attempt to bring stability to Indonesian governance, and cement the centrality of his Presidential authority, by blending together traditional Javanese customs of discussion and consensus, but within a more limited parliamentary process. Part of the explanation for this attitude was Sukarno’s conclusion that Western style parliamentary democracy was not suitable for the Indonesian Republic. Guided Democracy was also designed to appease the major political factions, for example, the PKI, religious groups, and the Indonesian military. Therefore, Sukarno proposed that Guided Democracy, and nasakom – a fusion of nationalism, religion and communism – would create a new national parliament. One of the major factors providing military and religious support for Sukarno’s shift was a strong possibility that the PKI could emerge victorious from any national parliamentary elections. The adoption of Guided Democracy meant that planned Indonesian elections during 1959 were abandoned. With their inclusion into the core of national government, the PKI political strategy from this point onwards was to come to power through state institutions, rather than through elections.4

The period from 1957 proved to be volatile as Sukarno’s attitude towards the western powers hardened. In December, Sukarno nationalised 246 Dutch companies which remained central to the Indonesian economy, expelled remaining Dutch citizens, and confiscated all Dutch owned estates. These actions were justified on the basis of the continued Dutch refusal to negotiate over West New Guinea. During this period there was also increasing dissatisfaction about Guided Democracy from key non-Javanese elites associated with the independence struggle against Holland. For example, when the Indonesian Vice-President, Mohammad Hatta, rejected the concept of guided democracy, and resigned in December 1956, many non-Javanese ethnicities were alarmed. Guided Democracy brought the PKI, and also the Indonesian military, into the inner sanctum of national government, but was not popular amongst anti-communist critics. From December 1956, colonels in North Sumatra, Central Sumatra, and South

Sumatra provinces mutinied against Jakarta. In March 1957, a further military mutiny occurred in North Sulawesi. These dissident groups demanded the removal of the PKI from the government, a fairer distribution of government revenues, and the return of Hatta. This military and political unrest laid the groundwork for the outbreak of a short lived civil war. From February 1958, anti-Sukarno hardliners from Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi declared the Permesta Movement. This rebellion was quashed by the Indonesian army by the end of 1958, but not before the US government, and the CIA, had provided substantial monetary and logistical support to the rebels. As discussed in Chapter Two, Richard Casey supported the rebellion and covert US intervention.

From August 1960, Sukarno continued to press Indonesian territorial claims over West New Guinea, breaking off diplomatic relations with the Dutch. In April 1961, the Dutch announced their intention to create an independent self governing Papua, drawing sharp criticism from Sukarno. By December, Sukarno announced the commencement of an ongoing campaign of military confrontation against the Dutch over West New Guinea. Although the military campaigns themselves were unsuccessful, Sukarno’s belligerence eventually convinced the Kennedy Administration to remove their support for the Dutch. Under the terms of the New York Agreement, the Dutch territory was effectively handed to Indonesia by 1963.

Despite Indonesia’s significant foreign aid relationships with the US and the USSR, Sukarno railed against what he saw as new types of imperialism, or nekolim. Within the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) – initially a group of five European, African and Asia developing state formed in 1961 – Indonesia took a leading role, Sukarno arguing for closer ties between what he termed New Emerging Forces in order to combat nekolim. This attitude would later have significant impact on Indonesian relations with the Americans, the British, and Australians. For example, from 1963, Sukarno opposed the British plan for the Federation of Malaysia which he viewed as being a neo-colonial enterprise. With dissidents in British Borneo opposed to their inclusion within this Federation, and the Malaysian Federation being proclaimed later in 1963, Sukarno officially adopted a policy of confrontation against the British within the jungles of Borneo. The British, and Australian troops, were effectively obligated to open ended sporadic warfare against the incursions of Indonesian forces in defence of Malaysia.
By 1964, all British owned businesses within the Indonesian Republic had been nationalised. In combination with strong anti-British sentiment, culminating in the burning of the British Embassy, growing anti-American sentiment against the Johnson Administration became increasingly evident when various US concerns were similarly attacked. In response, the US closed its Indonesian aid program, leaving Jakarta largely dependent on the Soviets and Chinese for continued injections of foreign aid money. Despite his sometimes spectacular rhetorical belligerence, Sukarno’s suspicions about the Western powers, particularly the US and UK, was not mere nationalistic paranoia. Sukarno was aware, even during 1958, that the US had supported the Permesta Rebellion in an effort to undermine him, and break apart the Indonesian Republic. The post-independence economic and political influence of the UK over the Malaysian Federation also indicated, from Sukarno’s perspective, the new methods that would be utilised to secure continued Western economic privileges from former colonies. By the mid 1960s, having faced, and continuing to face, significant internal tensions, Sukarno balanced the most powerful entities in Indonesian politics – the Indonesian army and the PKI – under his Presidential authority. Such an achievement was part of the charisma, and risk taking, of Sukarno’s Presidency during this period. Yet all of these political developments were observed with increasing ambivalence by Western diplomats from Australia, the UK and the US. Concern at Sukarno’s non-aligned foreign policy crucially extended into the economic sphere, where nationalisation undermined foreign investment, particularly large-scale Dutch, British and American investments.

Keith Shann recalled in the 1985 interview his good personal relations with Sukarno, and personal respect for what Sukarno had achieved in ‘making a united republic possible’ through a creative and clever personal and political synthesis. Sukarno had, as Shann recalled, ‘incredible charisma’, and ‘he had an immense capacity to talk, and talk well, and be interesting’. The Australian-Indonesian relationship, even in the 1960s, still had some memories of the late 1940s, where many Indonesian leaders

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5 For an example of a rather muted US media reaction to the release in 1994 of a 600 page US State Department history documenting CIA covert operations against Sukarno during the 1950s. See Jim Mann, October 29, 1994, ‘CIA’s Covert Indonesia Operation in the 1950s Acknowledged by U.S’, The Los Angeles Times.

valued Australia's diplomatic support for their independence struggle against the Dutch. Even while Indonesia confronted British and Australian forces in Borneo, Shann recalls Sukarno's telling him that 'the others will go away, you won't. We'll have to get on with you'. Yet, reflective of the Cold War context driving Australian foreign policy thinking at that time, even in 1985, Shann observed that Sukarno 'tried to mix the unmixable politically. I mean you can't mix nationalism, religion and communism'.

The nature of relations between Australia and Indonesia, even during the period of Confrontation, were somewhat different than that of the US or UK experience. For example, even while Australian military forces were fighting the Indonesians, the Menzies government continued to provide its own economic aid to Jakarta. Former Australian diplomat, Gary Woodard, has characterised this Australian approach as carrot and stick diplomacy. Unlike the British or American experience, there were no mob attacks against Australian indentified targets such as the Australian Embassy. By 1964, with the Indonesian economy suffering badly from debt, the political tensions between the PKI and the army were increasing. Perhaps as an acknowledgement of the tightrope that Sukarno, and Indonesia were about to walk, he christened 1965 'The Year of Living Dangerously'.

Coup

To effectively highlight the response of Shann, and his British and American counterparts, to the coup of September 1965, a basic historical outline needs to be provided. On 1 October, six senior Indonesian Generals were kidnapped, and later murdered by coup supporters. Under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, the coup group contained numbers from the Presidential Guards, and soldiers from the Brawijaya, and Diponegoro Divisions, of the Indonesian army, and was known as the 30 September Movement. Following their capture of the national radio station, they broadcast to the Indonesian nation that they were protecting President Sukarno, and thwarting a planned coup attempt by anti-communist Indonesian Generals. On 1-2 October, soldiers supporting the 30 September Movement also seized Yogyakarta and Solo in Central Java. In response, Major General Suharto, commander of KOSTRAD (an elite group of Indonesian army reserves located in Jakarta), re-established army control over the national radio station, and Merdeka Square, where the 30 September
Movement had been entrenched. The Indonesian army then turned their attentions to the Halim Air Force Base, where leaders of the 30 Movement, along with Adit (the PKI Chairman), and Air Marshall Dhani, were present. The presence of Sukarno at the base only added complications to the earlier events. On 1 October, Suharto ordered the President to vacate the air base. Sukarno obliged, and later took up residence at the Bogor Palace. On 2 October, Suharto’s army forces took control of the base, but Adit and Dhani remained at large.

In the following weeks, the Indonesian army, with the assistance of various anti-communist civilian militias, organised a coordinated massacre that would ultimately claim the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, on the basis that they were either members of the PKI, or suspected sympathisers. A former Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) journalist, Phillip Koch, and author of the novel *The Year of Living Dangerously*, was working as a correspondent in Jakarta during this period. He noted that anyone that was deemed PKI was being slaughtered. And this was a tragedy in itself. A lot of the peasants signed up as PKI members in the belief that this would help them. It would help them get a better life. Now at that level they had no idea of the doctrine of communism or who Stalin was or anything like that. You're dealing with peasants who are just struggling to feed their families. But they were signed up as PKI and they died for it. They were slaughtered.7

In 1968, the CIA history of these events concluded that in terms of the numbers killed the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s. In this regard, the Indonesian coup is certainly one of the most significant events of the twentieth century, far more significant than many other events that have received much more publicity.8

From 30 September 1965, Shann began to relay to Canberra the sensational news of the coup and the other unfolding political events in Jakarta. Although the available information was sketchy, sources difficult to verify, and hearsay was rampant, Shann quickly began to forcefully advise the DEA on the ways in which these events should be reported, particularly by Radio Australia. In his 1985 interview, Shann argued

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8 *Indonesia 1965 – The Coup that Backfired*, Central Intelligence Agency, 1968. p.71. The official figure provided by the Indonesian army was 87,000.
that for all his closeness to the Indonesian government, and Sukarno, he was unable to get clear information about the coup. Yet, as this chapter will demonstrate, Shann’s advice to the DEA, and Radio Australia, was not based on, and did not require clear, or accurate, information about Sukarno, the PKI, or the coup. Shann stated in 1985, that he also relied heavily on the British intelligence, given their ‘high quality’. As will be outlined, Shann, and his British and American counterparts, including various intelligence services, would quickly engage in a range of information activities specifically designed to undermine Sukarno, and destroy the PKI. This propaganda campaign was undertaken in spite of having no specific knowledge to confirm their correctness of their assertions. According to Karim Najjarine, the

Dutch diplomatic assessments of the coup thought it was unclear what exact role the PKI organisation had played in these events, but they concluded that the Indonesian army ‘were ensuring that they [the PKI] received most of the blame’. David Easter writes that

evidence for PKI involvement in the coup was not clear-cut. Communist transport and communications unions helped [Colonel] Untung on 1 October by cutting communications in and out of Jakarta and the next day a communist newspaper endorsed the action he had taken. The coup attempt was centred on the Halim Air Force Base and made use of communist cadres being given military training there. But the PKI did not try to mobilize its massive party membership behind the coup and an American ‘clandestine source’ reported that the PKI central committee only decided to give Untung military support after hearing his radio broadcast on 1 October. After the coup had failed the PKI denied any involvement and claimed it had been an internal army matter, with junior officers attacking senior officers.

9 Sir Keith Shann, interviewed by Ken Henderson, 3 March 1985, NLA TRC 1857. p.85. Despite Shann’s important admission of having access to British intelligence information during the period, we are left wondering about his relationship with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). The ASIS station in Jakarta was arguably, the most important and perhaps largest, of Australia’s overseas spy operations. Indonesia remains one of the highest priority targets of ASIS. There is almost a complete absence of any detailed information about ASIS activities within Indonesia during 1965, its relationship with the DEA, cooperation with the British and Americans, within the Australian archival records. One of the few examinations about this particular topic, undertaken by Karrim Najjarine as part of his PhD, only confirms the barren nature of the archival records. Until these records are released, historians (and others), are doomed only to speculate as to why this remains the case in the 21st Century.


Neither the British nor the Americans initially ascribed full blame to the PKI during the immediate period following the coup. The US State Department, for example, was privately hypothesising about the extent of PKI involvement, and Sukarno's possible links to these events. This attitude would quickly change. According to Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador to Washington, statements emerging from the PKI after 30 September in support the coup influenced the US State Department to believe that the 'communists felt that they had to get on board once the movement began'. This contrasted the views of the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), who concluded in December 1965 that 'evidence of actual PKI involvement – that is of prior planning by the Central Committee – is largely circumstantial'.

To demonstrate the character, and true intent, of the information campaigns against the PKI, initiated by the Indonesian army, the Australians, the British and the Americans after 30 September, it is important to highlight the complexity of 30 September. In this way, we can better judge these information campaigns. Due to the almost mysterious nature of the events of 30 September 1965, and the staggering scale of the subsequent massacres, it has remained a source of specialist interest to journalists and scholars ever since 1965.* Speculation about its various motives have made 30 September 1965 fertile academic ground. The initial academic analysis of the coup focused intently on puzzling questions of individual and organisational involvement, but there has been a gradual shift in focus to its potential motivations and strategic intentions. Harold Crouch, a prominent Australian Indonesianist, wrote in 1973, that

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* The ongoing interest in 30 September is evident in the work of Harold Crouch, Ben Anderson, George and Audrey Kahin, John Roosa, Brad Simpson, and the National Security Archive at George Washington University. Noam Chomsky, Edward Herman and John Pilger have examined Western reactions to the massacres and the rise of Suharto regime. Others such as Robert Cribb and Kate McGregor have focused on the specific nature of the mass killings that took place after September 1965, but have also examined aspects of the coup. For an excellent example of this continuing interest, featuring a number of the individuals mentioned here, see 'Accomplices in Atrocity. The Indonesian killings of 1965', *Hindsight*, Radio National, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 7 September 2008 transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/hindsight/stories/2008/2356330.htm. See also John Roosa and Joseph Nevins, November 5, 2005, '40 Years Later: The Mass Killings in Indonesia' in *Counterpunch.*
the evidence that the PKI leaders were indeed deeply involved in the coup attempt seems overwhelmingly strong, conclusions commonly drawn on the basis of the trial evidence in regard to the nature of its involvement and its motives seem open to question. The trial evidence in fact suggests that it is quite likely that the idea to purge the top Army leaders originated among middle-level officers in the Diponegoro Division and their colleagues in Djakarta. The Army's claim that it was the PKI, through Sjam, which initiated the movement is not proven in the trials. The PKI's involvement only commenced when Aidit became convinced that the delicate balance of Djakarta politics was in danger of being upset by the demise of the President. While Sjam [a key member of the PKI] may have played a dominant role in formulating the movement's plans in Djakarta, there is little to show that the PKI's influence was substantial in Central Java. The basic aim of the movement was to arrest the generals who were believed to be plotting against the President, in the hope that he would then be able to take action against them.  

Robert Cribb, another prominent Australian Indonesianist, wrote in 1987 that although many aspects of the coup remain uncertain, it appears to have been the work of junior army officers and a PKI 'Special Bureau' answering to the party chairman D.N. Aidit. The aim of the coup was to forestall a predicted military coup planned for Armed Forces Day (5 October) by kidnapping the senior generals believed to be the plotters. After some of the generals were killed in botched operations, however, and after Sukarno refused to support the Movement, the plotters went further than previously planned and attempted to seize power. Unprepared for such a drastic action, the Movement floundered and was defeated within 24 hours by the senior surviving general, Suharto, who was commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve, KOSTRAD. There was no clear proof at the time that the coup had been the work of the PKI. Party involvement was suggested by the presence of Aidit at the plotters' headquarters in Halim air force base, just south of Jakarta, and by the involvement of communist-affiliated People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat) members in some of the operations, but the public pronouncements and activities of the September 30 Movement gave it the appearance of being an internal army movement.

Apart from outlining chronological aspects of the events, these two quotations demonstrate another important point, that is, it was only decades after 1965 that specialist understanding of what may have actually occurred has unfolded, and this process is as yet, far from conclusively settled. Therefore, in returning to 1965, and in examining the guidance provided by Shann, the UK Ambassador Sir Andrew Gilchrist, and the US Ambassador Marshall Green, about the coup and the PKI, there appears to be no real concern about what actually had happened, but rather, in how these events could be presented in media reports, both to the Indonesians, and the outside world, in order to further anti-communist political objectives. To support their objectives, they provided unequivocal advice, that is, specific ways that events could be presented by the media to hold the PKI solely responsible for the coup, that impugned Sukarno's leadership, and also promoted a sensitive, if not supportive, editorial line about the

Indonesian army. Despite the absence of evidence at the time that 30 September was a coordinated PKI effort, the diplomatic response largely endorsed the actions of right-wing elements in the Indonesian military, headed by General Suharto, in seizing control, and taking the opportunity to eliminate not just the PKI leadership. Yet this process of liquidation did not end there, or with known members of the PKI employed by the government, but extended into a coordinated effort to eliminate almost everything, and every person connected to it, right down to the local village level. Within days of the coup, Cribb writes that Indonesian military propagandists had reshaped the name of the coup Movement to construct the acronym GESTAPU, with its connotations of the ruthless evil of the Gestapo. They concocted a story that the kidnapped generals had been tortured and sexually mutilated by communist women before being executed and they portrayed the killings of October 1 as only a prelude to a planned nation-wide purge of anti-communists by PKI members and supporters. In lurid accounts, PKI members were alleged to have dug countless holes ready to receive the bodies of their enemies and to have been trained in the techniques of torture, mutilation and murder.18

The involvement of the PKI was presented by the Indonesian army, (and indeed by the Australians, British and Americans), as fact rather than conjecture. Not only the party as a whole, but also its political allies and affiliated organizations were portrayed as being guilty both of the crimes of the September 30 Movement and of conspiracy to commit crimes on a far greater scale. At the same time, President Sukarno was portrayed as culpable for having tolerated the PKI within Guided Democracy. His effective powers were gradually circumscribed and he was finally stripped of the presidency on March 12, 1967...In this context, the army began a purge of the PKI from Indonesian society...And within about two weeks of the suppression of the coup, the killing of communists began.19

From mid-October, approximately two weeks after 30 September, the army, under the authority and control of Suharto, and with the assistance of armed Muslim militia, began to systematically round up and kill PKI members, suspected members, and suspected sympathisers, in a wave of mass killings that moved across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, into Bali, and by December, to Timor, Flores and Lombok. With knives, machetes, bayonets, guns, beheadings, and mass graves, anywhere between half a million and a million people were massacred by the Indonesian army, and its civilian militia's supporters, while hundreds of thousands of others, perhaps as high as a million, would be imprisoned.

19 Ibid.
Manufacturing the Message

During the approximately a two-week gap between September 30 1965, and the commencement proper of widespread anti-PKI massacres, there was a grave possibility of violence. Explosive mass violence had certainly occurred before at various times in Indonesian history, and following 30 September, there was a very serious possibility that it would occur against the PKI. It was within this powder keg atmosphere that the Australians, Americans and the British all produced anti-PKI propaganda almost identical to that of the Indonesian army. The Australians, British and Americans also all worked within a tightly controlled information environment in which foreign media were impeded by army restrictions, and where the Indonesian military had seized control of the Indonesia media apparatus after the coup. On 2 October 1965, Shann informed the DEA that the

army [had] closed down the communist press while ensuring the continued publication of military newspapers such as Angkatan Bersendjada, Berita Yudha and the English language Jakarta Daily Mail. It took control over Radio Indonesia and the Antara news agency, which was the main supplier of news carried by Indonesian radio stations and newspapers.

Shann's message, as shown throughout the available Australian archival documents about the coup, for the DEA and for the editorial content of Radio Australia, was unmistakable: the PKI should be held responsible for the coup; media reportage should be sensitive to the Indonesian army leadership and critical, or at least dismissive, of Sukarno's ongoing leadership prospects. Shann’s message preceded the first Indonesian army initiated trials against the coup plotters which did not even begin until February 1966. The guidance and information Shann provided to Paul Hasluck, as then Minister for External Affairs, and to the department, helped to shape not just official responses, but the Australian government presentation of the coup itself. From 1 October, daily guidance from the DEA was provided to Radio Australia in regards to

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20 ‘Interview between ‘Adam Hughes Henry and Professor Robert Cribb’, Australian National University, 2011.


22 See ‘Telegram 800 Jakarta to Washington’, 1 October 1965, DDRS, Retrospective Collection, Item 605D; Telegram 1149, Jakarta to Canberra, 1 October 1965, NAA: A6364/4 JA 1965/07; See also ‘Gilchrist to Foreign Office’ (FO), 3 October 1965, TNA FO 371/180317.
the content of its broadcasts. This guidance, owing much to Shann, promoted the anti-PKI line through Radio Australia, whose broadcasts were heard throughout Indonesian archipelago. In conjunction, the British and Australians also took the opportunity during this two week period to make contact with the Indonesian army about Confrontation against Malaysia. Despite the instability caused by coup, Sukarno’s policy of Confrontation still officially existed. Following the coup, the British took the opportunity to assure the Indonesian army that it

would not escalate [UK resistance] to the [policy of] Confrontation while the [Indonesian] army was dealing with the communists ... With the approval of London, on 14 October [General Nasution’s aide was informed] that the British did not intend to start any offensive military action.

Australian forces were also involved in fighting against the Indonesians in Borneo, and Shann, personally amplified these UK assurances to the Indonesian army. He informed the Indonesians that its army ‘would be completely safe in using their forces for whatever purpose they saw fit’. Assurances such as these effectively freed the Indonesian army from any defensive obligations against the British and Australians, and left them free to concentrate on post-30 September activities against the PKI.

When Richard Woolcott, Public Information Officer (PIO), briefed his superiors about Indonesia on 12 October about the state of official departmental guidance being given to Radio Australia, this all strongly reflected the influence of Shann

a) Radio Australia should, by careful selection of its news items, not do anything which would be helpful to the PKI and should highlight reports tending to discredit the PKI and show its involvement in the losing cause of the 30th September movement.

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* This also negated the British (and Australians) from potentially costly and politically risky, forward military operations against Indonesia. Yet there is clear and detailed evidence that planning between the Australians and British had produced plans to use their combined air and naval power against the Indonesians. Darwin would have been used as an operational base for British and Australian bombers. This attack would be justified as curbing Indonesian territorial aggression, but the operational desire to destroy the Indonesian air force, if not all of Indonesia’s main defence capabilities, is self evident in the Australian declassified documents. See David Jenkins Asia Editor, 02/01/1995 *The 1964 Cabinet Papers: Britain’s grand schemes to block Indonesian aggression*, Sydney Morning Herald. See also David Wilson, ‘Operation Handover– Darwin, September 1964’ in *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* electronic copy available at http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/darwin.asp#3.
3. [Woolcott also noted that] the most recent briefing given to Radio Australia, yesterday afternoon, was to the effect that what to be emerging was a struggle between the army and the PKI with the former holding the initiative and the later somewhat discredited because of its involvement in the 30th September Movement. Whether or not Sukarno had acquiesced in the Untung coup, his political power and prestige had been undermined to a degree which made it unlikely that it could be restored to its former level even if his health lasted.26

Some of Shann’s editorial guidance for the DEA, and Radio Australian, even came from contact with the Indonesian army itself, and he reported that to the DEA that Radio Australia should not imply that the army was pro-western or rightist.27

Throughout the 1950s, there was constant DEA pressure, and interference, in regard to Australian foreign policy related editorial content in Radio Australia broadcasts. When Radio Australia produced reports that were considered to be adverse to the foreign policies of the Menzies government it led to strong personal protests from Casey, the Australian Foreign Minister during most of the period. The DEA targeted Radio Australia aggressively, and this extended to ABC reporters who had upset the government. According to Douglas Wilkie, a former reporter on Radio Australia, disagreement with the DEA ‘always ended in a compromise in their favour or in my surrender’.28 According to Karim Najjarine and Drew Cottle, several Radio Australia reporters resigned or were dismissed between 1960-1965 because of direct DEA pressure. The tendency for Radio Australia to buckle under DEA pressure seems only to have further encouraged DEA efforts designed to influence Radio Australia’s editorial themes. Official interest in Radio Australia was connected to its popularity, and large listening audience in South East Asia. It was considered to be the most popular foreign radio broadcaster into Indonesia, where its signal strength, its programme content, including contemporary rock music, was said to be exceptionally

27 See Telegram 1340 Shann to Canberra, 5 November 1965, NAA: 6364/JA1965/10. This was not the only example of this, for example, in March 1966, Shann outlined to the DEA, a series of recommendations about Radio Australia media reportage, again passed to him by the Indonesian army. The army propagandists asked that Radio Australia ‘should not concentrate on them too much’, and again requested not to described as being pro Western, or being right wing. Shann explained to the DEA that ‘I can live with most of this, even if we have to be a bit dishonest for a while’. See Karim Najjarine and Drew Cottle, ‘The Department of External Affairs, the ABC and Reporting of the Indonesian Crisis 1965-1969’ in Australian Journal of Politics and History: Vol 49, No.1p. 53.
popular with Indonesian students, and listened to by the political and military elite. Following the 30 September coup, the DEA repeatedly made efforts to shape Radio Australia’s editorial content, as already noted, on an almost daily basis, and at one stage, the DEA even attempted an official take over of the organisation.

This [DEA] attempt to control [Radio Australia] was spurred by events in Indonesia and the realisation of the Australian and western governments that RA’s high signal strength and massive listening audience in the archipelago...was a resource that should be exploited wisely and cooperatively.

The emergence of this attitude during 1965 was not, as noted, a sudden manifestation. In fact, it might be considered that it was for this purpose that Radio Australia, from an official perspective, was established in the early 1950s.

Shann’s information guidance for Radio Australia reports, his personal assurances to the Indonesian army that there was no need to fear any British or Australian offensive operations in response to Confrontation, and his contact with the Indonesian army propagandists, need to be considered in a larger international context, that is, in conjunction with the international network of Cold War expertise in which he operated. Chapter One has noted the influence of Anglo-American intelligence methods on the operational practices of Australian diplomacy and foreign policy thinking. By the 1960s, the Australians had developed the required expertise to operate effectively on the home front, this is highlighted in the previous chapter about Vietnam, but they had also developed the necessary capacity to operate within the international environment. One of the most important factors in allowing this cooperation in Indonesia between the Australians, and their British and American cousins, was the compatibility of their anti-PKI propaganda message, and their desire to see the end of the PKI itself. Therefore, a brief outline of British and American responses can be highlighted, before examining the ways in which the Australians, British and Americans effectively worked together.

On 5 October 1965, during the two week gap between the coup and the

commencement of the massacres proper, Marshall Green, the US Ambassador to Indonesia, informed Washington of his attitude. John Pilger writes that Green cabled Washington [advising] on how the United States could 'shape developments to our advantage'. The plan was to blacken the name of the PKI and its 'protector', Sukarno. The propaganda should be based on [spreading] the story of the PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality. At the height of the bloodbath, Green assured General Suharto: 'The US is generally sympathetic with and admiring of what the army is doing.'

Green's clear advice to the US State Department was that that PKI should be held solely responsible for the coup. After 30 September, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in various clandestine activities and Green, almost certainly coordinated these secret operations. There is also evidence that the US embassy itself, with the cooperation of the CIA, compiled lists of various Indonesians, and provided these to the Indonesian army. American journalist Kathy Kadane of *The San Francisco Examiner* questioned Robert J. Martens, a former US political officer at the US Embassy in Jakarta, about these allegations in 1990. He was quoted as saying that the Indonesian army

probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment.

Whether Martens role in 1965 was as central as he implies in this quote, this is certainly evidence of direct US involvement. Howard Federspiel, formerly of the Bureau of

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34 See *The San Francisco Examiner* May 20, 1990. Martens claimed that all the names he supplied were compiled from publicly available sources. Therefore, one presumes that the Indonesian army could have undertaken this grisly task by itself. This certainly begs the question as to why Martens compiled the lists in the first place. Martens later retracted any inference that the US embassy, and Marshall Green, had officially approved of his actions in compiling the list. It must be noted that Green holds a certain reputation for conducting clandestine intelligence activities in countries where he was posted as Ambassador. Examination by the National Security Archive of the volume dealing with Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, Volume XXVI (FRUS), Indonesia, highlights that even the official historians of the US State Department concluded that lists of names were indeed passed to the Indonesian army. Marshall Green not only authorised the passing of a list of top communists to the Indonesian army, he also authorised on December 2, 1965, a 50 million rupiah covert payment to fund the Kap-Gestapu movement, a group deeply involved in the anti-communist repression.

35 For details about the difficulties encountered in gaining access to declassified materials pertaining to Indonesia, See George Washington University's National Security Archive, 27 July 2001, ‘CIA Stalling
Intelligence and Research in the US State Department, was quoted saying that ‘no one cared [about the massacres], as long as they were communists ...No one was getting very worked up about it’. During the period of the massacres, the Americans supplied logistical communication equipment, which assisted in coordinating the mass killings, they supplied weapons to Indonesian army (and by implication, the various army-aligned militias).

The response of Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the British Ambassador, towards the coup and the PKI is also instructive. Gilchrist advised the UK Foreign Office that propaganda measures should be adopted to undermine the credibility of the PKI. He advocated for the deliberate use of specialist propaganda techniques, whose methods had been pioneered by the Information Research Department (IRD) of the UK Foreign Office (FO) as early as the late 1940s. On 13 October 1965, Gilchrist advised the FO that British propaganda could explore

PKI brutality in murdering Generals and [General] Nasution's daughter . . . PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign communists . . . But treatment will need to be subtle, e.g. (a) all activities should be strictly unattributable, (b) British participation or co-operation should be carefully concealed.

Within a fortnight of advising the FO of the need for propaganda measures against the PKI, and with the massacres of civilians well underway, the IRD, under the direction of Sir Norman Reddaway, was operating from Singapore. According to Reddaway, the IRD was sent to do all in its power to undermine Sukarno and the PKI because Sukarno's Confrontation of Malaysia and Singapore was costing us [the UK] about 250 Million Pounds a year in the early 1960s. Under Ministerial Patronage (Denis Healey) and Ambassadorial pleas (Sir Andrew Gilchrist), I was sent to Singapore in late October 1965 to 'do anything I could think of to get rid of Sukarno'.

Operating from Phoenix Park, Singapore, then MI6 Headquarters in South East Asia, Reddaway expertly created propaganda for newspapers and radio using information

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State Department Histories', electronic copy available at www.nsarchive.org


38 See ‘Telegram 2679 CRO to Canberra’, 13 October 1965, TNA FO 371/181455.


supplied by British intelligence, and directly from Gilchrist in Jakarta. Radio Malaysia, Voice of America, Radio Australia, the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC), and the print media all carried these IRD reports about the situation in Indonesia. David Easter writes that the

British and Americans recycled reports from Radio Jakarta or the army newspapers by broadcasting them back to Indonesia. For example, on 5 November the Jakarta Daily Mail claimed that on the day of the coup 100 women from Gerwani had tortured one of the Generals by using razor blades and knives to slash his genitals before he was shot. In December an Information Research Department official noted that this atrocity story would be included in the South East Asia Monitoring Unit’s propaganda output.41

According to former South East Asian BBC news correspondent Roland Challis, such was the consistency of the anti-PKI line that emerged after 30 September, that he believed that information from the British Embassy in Jakarta was being reported back into South East Asia almost word for word by the BBC network.42 The personal assessments of Challis are not fringe assessments of the propaganda situation in Indonesia. According to Reddaway himself, the role of the IRD in Indonesia was one of his proudest professional achievements. In 1996, Reddaway gloated over his role, and the influence of the IRD in shaping false perceptions about 30 September 1965.

Reddaway writes that

[Sir Andrew] Gilchrist would send to Singapore regular early morning cipher telegrams about the duplicity of Sukarno and Sabradnrio. These would be offered exclusive to the BBC man in Singapore [by the IRD] and form the core of his midday report to Bush House [Headquarters of the BBC]. Their content would come pouring back into the region in the Overseas’ Service’s evening bulletin and be relayed to Radio Australia and [Siaran] Malaysia. Sukarno threw all the Western correspondents out of Indonesia. He hadn’t a clue. The final blow came when the story of his [Sukarno’s] duplicity over Aidit came out as a traveller’s tale from the AP man in Hong Kong – straight into the worldwide plumbing of the news machine.43

The placement of this story with Associated Press, Hong Kong, would be a classic IRD manoeuvre, that is, it is almost certain that the story was created by the IRD itself in order for it to be published in Hong Kong. Once published, this ‘independent’ ‘traveller’s tale’ could be used by the BBC, British government and FO as a story, from a non-UK source, critical of Sukarno.

So far, this chapter has highlighted, that the Australians, the British and the Americans, all adopted a near identical anti-PKI line in their information guidance for the media, this was almost the same line being adopted by Indonesian army propagandists. We cannot consider this to be a media briefing in any journalistic understanding of that practice. This was a deliberate and well coordinated propaganda effort. This propaganda effort was adopted because Shann, Green or Gilchrist believed it could specifically undermine the PKI, and further their own particular national interests. These operations, including those US clandestine activities that can be confirmed, were undertaken in an explosive social environment. For example, the possibility of violent army retribution against the PKI following 30 September was assessed by the Australians, and the British to be likely. Shann reported to Canberra that the Indonesian army was quite ‘determined to do over the PKI’. On 8 October 1965, Shann wrote that ‘if ever there was a time for the army to act to smash the PKI as an effective political force, it is now. But will it happen?’ This attitude was virtually identical to that of Gilchrist, who informed the FO that, ‘I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective [political] change’. Therefore, there was knowledge that the situation in Indonesia after 30 September 1965 could turn violently against the PKI. Crucially, this possibility did not hamper, or indeed modify, their propaganda efforts before, or even during the massacres.

The anti-PKI line of British, Australian and American propaganda also cannot be considered to be merely parroting the Indonesians. As early as March 1965, the CIA had already decided that it would actively work against Sukarno and the PKI with psychological warfare techniques to assist Indonesian non-communists. Official

47 See ‘Political Action Paper’, 19 November 1964; Memorandum for 303 Committee, 23 February 1965, FRUS, Indonesia, pp.181–84. This intention is clearly indicated by ‘Memorandum for 303 Committee’, 23 February 1965, FRUS, Indonesia, pp.234–7, which states that the Americans would ‘develop black and grey propaganda themes for use within Indonesia and via appropriate media assets.
discussions about the coordination of information resources between the US, UK and
Australians, in regards to Indonesia, also took place. In August 1965, there were
discussions between the Australians and Americans about radio broadcasts into
Indonesia. Other discussions held in November 1965, were concerned directly with
reporting the situation in Indonesia. For example, Australian delegates in these
discussions with the UK, US and New Zealand, were under no illusions as to the
purpose of their presence. As the wave of mass killings was consuming the Indonesian
archipelago, the Australians had other priorities.

Agenda Item V – Other ways in which the situation might be influenced or exploited to Western
advantages.
The meeting might consider radio broadcasts to Indonesia and examine the sort of treatment
which should be given to news items and commentaries in order particularly to avoid the
possibility of compromising the Generals by associating them with [Sukarno’s] neo-clim.49

This attitude reflected the Australian, British and American desire, also shared by the
Indonesian army, that it should be presented in media reports as acting independently,
and not with the support, of foreign powers. Official advice provided to Shann for use at the
November 1965 meeting, provided nothing new to the Australian Ambassador. The
advice he received is virtually identical to the advice Shann himself had been providing
to the DEA for Radio Australia following the coup.

On 5th November Shann was passed a message about Radio Australia from the Joint Services Staff
Information Section. The main points in it were:
i) Radio Australia should not give the impression that the army alone was acting against the
PKI. Civilian organisations should be mentioned as often as possible
ii) News items critical, by implication or otherwise, about Subandrio should be used
iii) Reports on Singapore should always give the impression that the whole purpose of the [UK]
naval base was defensive.
iv) Reports should suggest that over the years some Indonesians at least (by implication
Indonesian army figures or prominent civilians supporting the army) had tried to make
progress towards economic development.
v) Reports should never imply that the army or its supporters were in any way pro-western or
right wing.50

The Americans, Australians, British and New Zealanders also held other secret
discussions about the coordination of their information efforts on 1-2 December 1965.

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48 See ‘Overseas Broadcasts to Indonesia. Discussions with United States’ Officials’, Canberra
3-4 August 1965, not dated as cited by David Easter, *Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling*.
49 See ‘Quadripartite Discussions on Indonesia Brief for Australian Delegates’, NAA: A1838/280,
3034/2/1/8 Part 2.
50 Ibid.
The Cold War Hypothesis

The diplomatic actions of Shann, Gilchrist and Green were of course undertaken with the support of their respective governments. There was a clear consensus as to what actions they felt appropriate to undertake in order to further their respective national interests in Indonesia after 30 September, 1965. Bradley Simpson argues that

Though they [the British and Americans] reacted to the events of 1 October with surprise and confusion, western officials, including US Assistant Secretary of State, George Ball, immediately recognised that 'If the Army does move they have [the] strength to wipe up [the] earth with [the] PKI and if they don't they may not have another chance.' The CIA warned that the army might only 'settle for action against those directly involved in the murder of the generals and permit Sukarno to get much of his power back'. Since no Western intelligence agencies argued that PKI involvement in G30S extended to the rank and file, one can only conclude that their greatest fear was that the army might refrain from mass violence against the party's unarmed members and supporters.51

Therefore, in the context of this thesis, we need to account for the ideological discipline guiding the type of calculating professionalism shown by the Australian, British and American diplomats. Shann, Gilchrist and Green, as was the case with their respective governments, required a narrow and ideological discipline which guided their responses to the coup. These professional responses, in essence, are constructed within the Cold War context as being a defensive measure against communist influence within Indonesia. To consider this interpretation of foreign policy thinking, and diplomatic professionalism, we should briefly explore, what can be labelled, the Cold War justification hypothesis.

First, a convergence of strident Cold War anti-communism, individual strategic and financial concerns had all influenced the Australian, British and American attitude towards Sukarno and the PKI. This had often featured in their diplomatic relationship with Jakarta throughout the 1950s, and into the 1960s. The importance of Indonesia to nations, such as the Australians, to the British in regards to creation of Malaysia, and particularly to US strategic planning in Asia, should not be underestimated. From the US perspective since 1949, Indonesia had easily been the most significant strategic concern for Washington in South East Asia. Such was this importance, that events in Indonesia during 1965-1966 had effectively altered the strategic balance of the region in favour of anti-communism. Noam Chomsky notes that

McGeorge Bundy, who was national security advisor for Kennedy and Johnson, reflected that the United States should have pulled out of Vietnam in 1966, after the slaughter in Indonesia. It was very much like what just happened in Rwanda. The army either killed or inspired the killing of about half a million to a million people within a few months, with direct US support and encouragement. Crucially, it destroyed the only mass-based political party in the country. The slaughter was mostly of landless peasants. The slaughter was described by the CIA as comparable to those of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao. It was greeted with undisguised euphoria here, across the political spectrum, and very much in public. It has to be read to be believed. 52

To continue the Cold War hypothesis, such was the importance of Indonesia, it was necessary to take advantage of the situation in Indonesia after 30 September 1965, even though this was an environment where mass killings directed against the PKI, were likely. This would be achieved through propaganda activities laying blame for the coup with the PKI, initiating contacts with the Indonesian army, and other clandestine activities in support of the army. Once the massacres were underway, they discussed with each other their ongoing information activities, aware that the purpose of these meetings was to develop further anti-PKI propaganda. This effectively promoted General Suharto, and the Indonesian army, as a post-Sukarno government in waiting, that is, the very same people carrying out and coordinating massacres across the Indonesian islands. The Cold War hypothesis argues that given the importance of Indonesia, the actions of Shann, Gilchrist and Green contributed to a notable anti-communist victory. In this hypothesis, Shann, Gilchrist and Green might only be characterised as acting on an unpalatable, yet understandable, higher strategic principle of professional diplomacy within the context of Cold War power politics. To this style of diplomacy, the mass killings becoming largely irrelevant, or of secondary concern, to the successful prosecution of their vital anti-communist strategic objectives. Yet the ability to act in this manner belied, at least in the case of Shann and Gilchrist, personal squeamishness about the massacres. In December 1965, Shann informed Canberra that in many cases the massacre of entire families because one member spoke to the communists, has occurred. Some of the methods adopted are unspeakable... [It has been] a bloodbath of savage intensity, remarkably unpublicised and locally regarded with a ghoulish cynicism. 53

There was also knowledge that the use of knives, machetes, mutilation, stabbings, burning, bayonets, shooting and beheading during the killings were common place.\textsuperscript{54} In February 1966, Shann described to Canberra that in

\begin{quote}
all of these places the army was taking the lead, with apparent widespread popular support, in the methodical slaughter of PKI prisoners. The pattern was one of nightly mass executions, by beheading, of PKI people, ranging from groups of two or three to as many as forty or fifty. Arriving in Flores, for example, the embassy officer happened across the spectacle of two severed heads on public display in the main park. Everywhere he went the story was the same. It was necessary, people said, to exterminate the PKI thoroughly; thoroughly meaning wives and children as well, as some sort of guarantee against future reprisals. As of last week the prisons in the area still contained adequate numbers of PKI detainees, including women, for the grisly process to continue for weeks if not months to come.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

The British Ambassador, Gilchrist, was also aware of the nature of the killings. In February 1966, he wrote to Sir Norman Reddaway asking

\begin{quote}
what have we to hope from the [Indonesian] generals? 400,000 people murdered, far more than total casualties in Vietnam nobody cares. They were communists. Were they? And are Communists not human beings?\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

Gilchrist also noted that

\begin{quote}
The [Swedish] Ambassador and I had discussed the killings before he left [on his fact-finding tour of Indonesia] and he had found my suggested figure of 400,000 quite incredible. His enquiries have led him to reconsider it a very serious underestimate. A bank manager in Surabaya with twenty employees said that four had been removed one night and beheaded \ldots A third of a spinning factory's technicians, being members of a Communist union, had been killed \ldots The killings in Bali had been particularly monstrous. In certain areas, it was felt that not enough people had been killed.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

Gilchrist and Shann were certainly confronted on personal levels by the killings, but, as noted, this did not alter the\textit{ professionalism} of their Cold War diplomacy, as defined by the Cold War hypothesis. In the case of Marshall Green, and the CIA, there appears to be no evidence suggesting any moral discomfort, either about the killings, or their anti-PKI diplomatic and clandestine activities. Irrespective of the moral discomfort of Shann and Gilchrist, or Green's apparent lack of any, the supreme objective of all three men, and the governments they represented, was to undermine Sukarno, and help destroy the PKI. Considered collectively, and with all due balance, the activities of the Australians,

\textsuperscript{54} 'Record of a conversation with Marietta Smith', 9 November 1965, NAA: A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 5.
\textsuperscript{56} See 'Gilchrist to Reddaway', 9 February 1966, TNA FO 1101/30.
British and the Americans might not have created the *impulse* to carry out retributions, the impulse might have existed for sometime, but they did nothing to discourage the potential explosion of unspeakable violence, or modify it once it began.

Despite a lack of photographs, or graphic film, reports about the Indonesian massacres did reach the US media. *Time* magazine reported, as early as December 1965, that

> according to accounts brought out of Indonesia by Western diplomats and independent travellers, communists, red sympathisers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of communists after interrogation in remote rural jails. Moslem's, whose political influence had waned as the communists gained favour with Sukarno, had begun a 'holy war' in East Java against Indonesian reds even before the abortive September coup. The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in East Java and northern Sumatra, where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travellers from those areas tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies; river transportation has at places been impeded.58

The *Time* report at least demonstrates that there was some, if muted, appreciation in the US of what was occurring in Indonesia. Yet in general, the destruction of the PKI was greeted with enthusiasm by major newspapers and commentators in the United States. As Noam Chomsky points out, leading American journalists such as James Reston called the aftermath in Indonesia, namely the destruction of the PKI and the rise of General Suharto, a ‘gleam of light in Asia’, while *The New York Times* praised the US government for not publicly ‘taking credit’ for the demise of Sukarno.59 When the Australian Prime Minister, Harold Holt, was visiting the US during 1966, he was asked about events in Indonesia, he stated that ‘with 500,000 to a million communist sympathisers knocked off …I think it is safe to assume a reorientation [in Indonesia] has taken place’.60

**Conclusions**

The general indifference towards the deaths of anywhere from 400,000, to 800,000

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59 ‘Interview by Adam Hughes Henry with Professor Noam Chomsky’ at MIT Boston, 14 October 2010.

60 Harold Holt as quoted by *New York Times*, July 6, 1966. Despite being considerably higher than the estimation of the CIA in 1968 (250,000), there is a view that even 500,000 could be an underestimation. The official Indonesian government estimate at the time was 87,000. See also Robert Cribb, ‘How many deaths? Problems in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia 1965-1966 and East Timor 1975-1980’ in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhöfer (ed.), *Violence in Indonesia*, Hamburg: Abera, 2001, pp. 82-98 available at: [http://works.bepress.com/robert_cribb/2](http://works.bepress.com/robert_cribb/2).
human beings, and the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands, perhaps as many as one million more, was not, as this chapter shows, based on Australian, British or American ignorance of the facts, then, or today. Bradley Simpson concluded, that the British and US did ‘everything in their power’ to encourage the destruction of the PKI and support the Indonesian army. Yet, as shown by the actions of Shann, the British and the Americans were not alone. While they might not have been able to stop atrocities from occurring, they clearly exploited the situation for their strategic ends. Such is the power of the Cold War hypothesis, and this style of diplomatic professionalism, that it might be considered almost inconceivable that these men, or their governments, might have done anything to prevent these massacres, or try to moderate them, once they began. Instead, within this Cold War hypothesis, it becomes appropriate for the Australians, British and Americans to do quite the opposite, that is, to actively support those orchestrating mass atrocities, even while these very atrocities were occurring. To have done otherwise, within the professional framework of the Cold War hypothesis, would have been considered unprofessional, perhaps even treacherous, and would have undermined the underlying anti-communist political and strategic objectives, not to mention self-interests, driving Australian, British, and the US foreign policy thinking towards Indonesia.

In his 1985 interview, Shann argued that under the circumstances of the post-30 September instability, in conjunction with the need for good relations with Indonesia, and in awareness of the popularity of its broadcasts within Indonesia, the role of Radio Australia was not to contribute to political instability in Indonesia. He argued that it ‘is the proper role for Radio Australia to develop and maintain friendship with our

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61 See Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S. Indonesian Relations*, 1960-1968, Stanford University Press, 2008. Simpson notes that a very particular economic development model, built on the precepts of military control, had become central to US strategic, and eventually US social scientific thinking about Indonesia. With the rise of Suharto to the Presidency, the entire Indonesian economy was re-structured by US trained Indonesian technocrats supportive of this economic model. Suharto’s Indonesia became a model project for so called neo-liberal globalisation polices, as promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Washington and multinational corporations. In 1967, all of these elements were re-incorporated by Suharto into the Indonesian national economy. It must be remembered that supporters of neo-liberal economic policies would continually praise Suharto for the stability and order he had brought to Indonesia for decades to come. In Australia, developmental economist Professor Heinz Arndt, and The Indonesia Project at the Australian National University, would effectively assume this role from 1967.

62 Ibid.
neighbours, rather than criticise our neighbours. Shann thus indicated that the question of stability was at the core of his approach towards 30 September 1965, and after. From this, we might conclude, that if Sukarno could have maintained stable government, there would have been no need for the diplomacy Shann subsequently adopted. If, as Shann suggests in 1985, Sukarno’s authority was doomed, then Shann’s diplomatic priorities merely altered accordingly. Yet if we take Shann’s explanations seriously, fundamental questions arise about the exact type of stability Shann, Gilchrist and Green, believed to be appropriate for Indonesia, and what measures were thought acceptable in its creation, and maintenance. If it was merely a question of political stability, and it was so obvious that Sukarno’s Presidency was doomed after 30 September 1965, Shann’s responses in 1985 seemingly contradict the archival materials now available. The question then must be asked, why was there any need for Shann himself to contribute to the political instability facing a doomed Sukarno by utilising Radio Australia for a propaganda campaign designed to undermine his leadership, and the PKI? Any examination of the Australian, British, let alone American archival documents, reveal that Shann, and his diplomatic colleagues, as highlighted by the Cold War hypothesis, adopted their actions precisely because they were not in fact certain that Sukarno, or the PKI, were indeed finished after 30 September 1965.

Unlike Gilchrist, Shann did not have the assistance of a specialised propaganda unit based in Singapore, or in the case of Green, access to the clandestine activities of the CIA. Instead, he reported directly to the DEA. Shann’s cables to the DEA, as are

64 Australian diplomatic materials about the Indonesian coup were not released until 2008. This was twenty three years after Shann’s oral history interview for the National Library of Australia (NLA). See Indonesia political- Coup d'état of October 1965, NAA: 1838/280, 3034/2/1/8. Throughout these NAA documents, Shann is seemingly most concerned with the possibility that Sukarno might somehow recover his authority, and whether the Indonesian army would take the opportunity to deal with the PKI, in the period immediately after the coup. Examples of Shann’s thinking in this regard were highlighted by ‘Accomplices in Atrocity. The Indonesian killings of 1965’, Hindsight, Radio National, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 7 September 2008 transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/hindsight/stories/2008/2356330.htm
* There is undisputed archival evidence that the IRD were operating from Singapore at MI6 SEA Headquarters, Phoenix Park. There is undisputed archival evidence that Marshall Green, and the CIA, were undertaking clandestine operations within Indonesia after the coup. Clearly UK and US intelligence were present in Singapore and Indonesia. Shann himself also confirmed in 1985, that as Australian Ambassador, he had access to British intelligence assessments. Within the Australian archives we have no specific ASIS documents, or reports connected to the Indonesian coup, about the PKI, Sukarno, operational cooperation with the UK and US, its own intelligence operations, or is relationship with the Australian Embassy. As noted earlier in this chapter, perhaps the largest and most significant of all of the
evident through the released Australian archival documents dealing with the coup, are mainly concerned with a hope that Sukarno’s Presidency would be destroyed, and whether the Indonesian army would take the unique opportunity provided by 30 September 1965, to destroy the PKI. The deliberate blackening of the PKI by Shann, and his British and American counterparts was undertaken in the hope that this could contribute to Sukarno’s fall from power, and the end of the PKI. The justification for their actions, as outlined by the amoral\(^6\) Cold War hypothesis, was that the Australians, British, and Americans seized their opportunity to help destroy the PKI and Sukarno after 30 September 1965. The political reorientation of Indonesia back towards the west being of far greater strategic and political significance than the methods utilised to achieve this result.

While the subsequent Indonesian massacres had some connection to the events of 30 September 1965, this was only made so explicit because, as noted by John Roosa,\(^6\) Suharto, the Indonesian army, and Western propaganda, made it the most important justification and explanation for what occurred. Yet the idea that hundreds and thousands of poor landless peasants and suspected sympathisers, without any knowledge, let alone any connections to the events of 30 September, can be hideously tortured, killed, imprisoned, and consigned to the dustbin of Cold War history, is a staggering proposition. Yet as noted, superiors never questioned Shann’s actions. Shann, Gilchrist, Green and Reddaway were all considered to be highly professional diplomats who made extremely valuable contributions to the anti-communist cause. Yet like those of his British and American counterparts, Shann’s actions are also evidence of intimate connections with one of the most significant mass atrocities of the 20\(^{th}\) Century.

Keith Shann in almost every respect personified the new professional style of

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\(^6\) See John Rawlston Saul, *The Doubters Companion – A Dictionary of Aggressive Common Sense*, Toronto: Penguin, 1995. Saul provides one of the best, and succinct, definitions of ‘amoral’ modern professionalism. He notes that ‘immorality is doing something wrong of our own volition. Amorality is doing something wrong because a structures and expectation of the organisation we work for demand us to do it. Therefore, amorality reduces individual ethics, with the full consent of all those involved, to being, in a professional sense, worthless.


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diplomacy that had been developing in Australia since the early 1950s. He was a consummate bureaucrat, sympathetic and supportive of the dominant strategic attitudes and political trends influencing official thinking, comfortable in dealing with new domestic and international networks of professional and diplomatic expertise, and able to confidently manufacture policy guidance not only compatible with official objectives, but also the anti-communist orthodoxy. He stands in contrast to not only the more liberal internationalist diplomacy of the Chifley era, but therefore to individuals such as Forsyth, who struggled with aspects of the new post Chifley regime. As the diplomat trusted to guide Australian interests with Jakarta, and liaise with his British, American and Indonesian counterparts, as our man in Jakarta, Shann can be considered to be a shining example of Richard Casey's ideal diplomatic type, or straight thinking man. His diplomatic role in Indonesia was not then built on the premise of following the leads of others, particularly the British or Americans, but to be proactive in his objectives, the methods used, and the networks utilised. Therefore, in guiding the DEA about Radio Australia reportage after 30 September 1965, Shann never required any evidence that the PKI organisation was solely to blame. As this chapter has outlined, evidence was never needed in order to conduct the propaganda campaign against the PKI, and Sukarno, through the medium of Radio Australia, the most popular foreign radio broadcaster throughout the Republic of Indonesia at that time.
Conclusions

We made speeches at the UN and we made diplomatic representation in various capitals, at American behests, and at times in the very phrases concocted in Washington. Our assiduity and docility have been paralleled only by Russia’s tamer, or most cowed, satellites.1 Walter Crocker, ‘Foreign Policy for Australia’ in Institute of Public Affairs Review, Vol. 25, No.4, 1971, p.92.

The thesis argues that the development of a new network of Australian foreign policy thinking, expertise, and information management, owed its existence to the changing intellectual contours of Anglo-American and Australian foreign policy thinking towards the Cold War during the period 1950-1966. The network extended from the world of government officials and bureaucrats, and moved into the world of academics and the universities, (especially the Australian National University). The network also encompassed intellectual organisations devoted to the analysis, and public discussion about foreign policy issues, such as the Australian Institute for International Affairs, and later, American-based funding bodies such as the Ford Foundation of New York. The operations of this network, as a whole, did not determine the core strategic assessments and national interests that informed Australian foreign policy during this period. Yet it did fundamentally seek to shape the extent to which this policy acquired its public and intellectual legitimacy, particularly in relation to Australian responses to the Cold War. This network carefully cultivated its own professional connections, and associations, and was extremely conscious about its own role in the public presentation, research and analysis of Australian foreign policy, as such, it contributed significantly to the extent to which an ‘orthodoxy’ came to characterise Australian foreign policy in the Menzies years.

The network outlined in the thesis is an important, and overlooked, intellectual companion to the established Australian foreign policy history. For example, it operated in those spaces between the policy debates, most often the focus of the established scholarship, yet they are historically important in their own right. The members of this Canberra Network were not puppets of Australia’s ‘great and powerful friends’; they

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1 Crocker (a Professor of International Relations) was one of Australia’s more senior diplomats throughout the period of my study.
had their own agency, made clear choices, and utilised the types of methodologies, attitudes and expertise, that characterised Australian diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s, and Australian contributions in academic areas such as 'International Relations'. In re-discovering, or re-claiming this particular story, this thesis has adopted a mix of diplomatic, intellectual, biographical and political approaches, each of which has its own perspective to offer on the foreign policy orthodoxy highlighted throughout this work. My argument is that from the 1950s and into the 1960s, extensive, and multi-dimensional resources, were progressively established that were effectively devoted to the legitimation of an orthodoxy that came to characterise Australian Cold War diplomacy. This was gradually entrenched in all levels of its practice, for example, from the recruitment of new diplomatic cadets, to the development of discussion and analysis in the universities. No account of the Australian anti-communist orthodoxy in this period, can adequately explain its sheer intellectual resilience, unless the processes outlined in this thesis are closely considered.

Inevitably, a personal perspective explains aspects of the approach I have taken in this work. As a child, and then a teenager, of the late Cold War period of the 1980s, I still vividly recall apocalyptic depictions of a nuclear holocaust in films like The Day After in 1983, totalitarianism in the film adaptation of Orwell's 1984, a cartoon adaptation of Orwell's Animal Farm, the fierce anti-communist policies and rhetoric of President Reagan, and lonely pleas for common sense, if not for the preservation of the human species itself, in songs like 'Russians' by Sting. Throughout these years the Chinese, and particularly the USSR, remained an aggressive enemy of Western freedom. According to the Americans, the might of the Soviet military continued to menace the world, while the communist Chinese continued to crush internal dissent as demonstrated by Tiananmen Square in 1989.

It never occurred to me as a teenager in 1988 or 1989 that the Cold War would ever end. As it turned out I was in good company. This view was apparently also shared by the CIA, and other Western Intelligence agencies, which not only failed to predict such developments, but also were stunned by the speed of communism’s collapse in Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the ‘evil empire’, the USSR, itself. With the Cold War over certain issues could not be ignored. The Soviets or Chinese never made
any directly threatening military moves against the Australian continent during the Cold War, nor did the North Koreans or the North Vietnamese before or after 1975. This is not to imply that it was illegitimate to hold concerns about any or all of these nations, but perceptions of concern are no substitute for empirical evidence. There is no evidence that any of these nations ever dreamt of intimidating Australia by any potential scenario of conquest or blockade. Ideological and ethical opposition to communism in Eastern Europe, or any form of tyranny and injustice is quite legitimate. Many of the fiercest anti-communist advocates within groups like the ACCF and Quadrant had firsthand experiences of communist tyranny in Eastern Europe before coming to Australia. Yet an ethical Australian opposition to communism could have been maintained in international forums, in conjunction with ending all economic and diplomatic links with communist regimes in protest. This did not occur. Instead very significant Australian economic trade continued throughout the period with the tyrannical communist bloc regimes which apparently threatened our very existence and way of life. They were not worth official diplomatic recognition but the Chinese were worthy buyers of Australian agricultural produce from the mid-1950s. Trade links were also continued with the Soviets throughout this period. The narrative of communist threats and subversion dominated foreign policy debates making genuine objectivity difficult. The narrative acted as filter of information, particularly information that ran contrary to the preferred interpretation. As a young diplomat on DEA’s China desk, Gregory Clark closely examined the border conflicts between India and China during 1961 and 1962.

When the fighting broke out one needed only to look at the maps to realise that Indian troops had moved north of even the most ambitious Indian claim line, and that this had sparked a Chinese retaliatory attack. Beijing had finally decided on firm action to put an end to constant harassment by Indian forces along the disputed border. But few were interested in such details. It was much easier to brand China as the aggressor and peaceful, democratic India as the innocent victim.

Clark was unable to interest his superiors in such facts because this information, even when obvious as in this case, they were not compatible with the anti-communist narrative that had come to dominate the Australian foreign policy establishment.

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2 Interview by Adam Hughes Henry with Stuart Harris, Australian National University, August 2008.
3 Gregory Clark, Life Story at http://gregoryclark.net/lifestory/page14/page14.html. Clark provides a range of personal experiences and stories outlining such episodes during his diplomatic career.
Yet from the early 1950s, a strident Australian military, diplomatic and intelligence alliance, particularly with the Americans, was justified on the basis of there being a legitimate communist threat to our regional security, if not literally to our very way of life. Desmond Ball’s research⁴ has demonstrated that by the 1980s, the US intelligence and military installations established by negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s had become instrumental to the logistics of American intelligence and nuclear strike options. This actually made Australia a potential, and indeed legitimate, strategic target of the Soviet Union in the event of a nuclear exchange. The Australian government had actually created, where it had not previously existed, one of the very scenarios which justified the idea of US installations on Australian soil in the first place. Therefore, the consequences of Australian policy and thinking, in regards to anti-communism, require careful consideration.

Most of the relevant policy responses attempted to maximise the advantages Australia could gain through its diplomatic manoeuvring. This was achieved by remaining resolutely pragmatic in their responses to global events. Michael Wesley, a prominent Australian International Relations specialist, has identified pragmaticism as one of three cornerstones in the Australian tradition of so called ‘realist’ foreign policy. He defines this ‘pragmatism [as] a predilection for understanding the essential attributes of the situation itself, rather than using the situation to inquire into the general nature of the international system’.⁵ The exact meaning of Wesley’s definition is somewhat camouflaged behind its wording,⁶ but it suggests some degree of opportunism. Yet the term pragmatic also has had an easily understood meaning, by the twentieth century being summarised as the ‘art of the possible, meaning only shrewd, manipulative

⁵ Michael Wesley, ‘The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism’ in Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 55, Number 3, 2009, pp. 324-334. The other two foundations apparently are experiential (Australia’s size, isolation, wealth, population, culture) and systemic pessimism (apprehension about global stability).
⁶ See the essay by George Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language’ in Horizon, Great Britain: London, April 1946. In my view, Wesley, as does much academic writing, deliberately complicates and obscures its true meaning. The reader is left to decipher what is really implied. There is little doubt a much simpler wording could be utilised as per Orwell’s advice. Wesley’s definition could be rewritten as: Pragmatism: defined by actions aimed at maximising advantages as opportunities present; not limited by strict adherence to the international system.
calculation...'. Accordingly, the term \textit{pragmatic} 'has been useful as a dignified alternative to unprincipled or timeserving positions, especially in political movements which profess a set of beliefs and which decide, under pressure, to neglect, discard or betray them, but with a show of skill and intelligence'.

Repeated throughout the archival records consulted in the preparation of this thesis is the strongly anti-communist rhetoric of Australian politicians and diplomats. Again, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of their fears regarding the Soviet, or Chinese, system. Yet, this legitimate, and perhaps genuinely noble opposition to the realities of Soviet tyranny in Eastern Europe became something unique in Australia. It did not, or would not, make critical political, cultural and strategic distinctions, particularly about South East Asia. This attitude would also filter its way into Australian media reportage, and into the scholarly analysis of prominent academics. In Australia, ASIO monitored known and suspected communists, but it also compiled intelligence files on an unknown number of ordinary working citizens, academics and post-war migrants on the basis of what can only be politely described as trivial hearsay. In contrast, ASIO was certainly aware of post-World War II migrants from fascist, and war criminal backgrounds, living in Australia. They were seemingly classified as being no security threat; they would after all be a source of information about local communists. In Asia, the connection between centuries of ruthless colonial exploitation by Europeans, and post-war Asian nationalism, was incompatible with the Australian Cold War narrative. Therefore, major anti-colonial unrest in South East Asia could be attributed, often without qualification, to clandestine Sino-Soviet subversion or secret aggression, but never in any way indicating the true depths of anti-colonial, and eventually anti-American, feeling. Diplomatic and military links with corrupt and often brutal right-wing Asian regimes such as Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, or the Philippines were maintained during this period simply because they too

\begin{footnotes}
8 See Charles Spry, Director-General of ASIO, \textit{Letter To The Secretary Of The Department Of Immigration, January 1965}, NAA: A6119/82 Item 2157 (Jaroslav Stetsko). Charles Spry, \textit{Memorandum For The Secretary Of The Immigration Department 4 July 1956}, NAA: A6980 T1 Item 250215 (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). \textit{Minute Of P.R. Heydon, Secretary Of The Immigration Department, July 21 1959}, NAA: A1838/1 Item 83/2/6 (Eastern Europe, Former Nazis and Fascists).
\end{footnotes}
were hostile to communism. In 1961, Gregory Clark accompanied Senator John Gorton, a member of the Menzies government, to Taiwan. When Chiang’s regime was criticised for corruption and militarism, Gorton replied, ‘I know they are gangsters. But these gangsters are on our side. The ones over there [pointing to China] are not on our side.’

The question as to how such a state of affairs could exist is very much connected to how ideological attitudes towards Asia permeated the political sphere, and then the Australian media and academic community. Nicholas Brown highlights that Asia symbolised a loss of certainty and this was particularly relevant for men like Richard Casey and Robert Menzies. Brown stated that

Asia was then a powerful symbol in domestic political rhetoric, in the shape of a foreign and defence policy, and perhaps even more pervasively, reflecting the ways in which Australians comprehended their own modernity.

Therefore, the international rivalry between communism and the West challenged everything men such as Casey or Menzies took for granted, including the continued global hegemony of Western nations.

Nothing made clearer that all political certainties, such as the inherent appeal of liberal democracy, of industrial progress and the supremacy of the West, were opened to question than the pace of change in Asia. There was a basic sense of Australian isolation in a region no longer ruled by Europe, coupled now to a fear that the defeat of Japan did not necessarily mean that the war itself, of Asia against the white man, was over ... the struggle in Asia, Menzies proclaimed in 1954, was a moral contest, and so intervention might be justified since Asia symbolised the shared condition of history, tradition and wise tutelage being threatened by ideological extremism.

Like the British, the Menzies government did not view Asian nationalism as a legitimate social and political reaction to centuries of European tyranny; it was reduced to being little more than a midway point toward communism. This made Asia a strategic prize, and the views of ordinary Asians, largely irrelevant. This tendency was first evidenced in Australian military involvement in the Korean War. This involvement had nothing to do with the South Koreans, and everything to do with the Americans.

10 Gregory Clark, *Into Taiwan* at gregoryclark.net.
Being from a generation that witnessed the unexpected end of the Cold War, it might be suggested that I simply fail to understand the atmosphere during the period of my study. Yet, this criticism could be levelled at almost any historian examining a period before their birth. It is simply impossible for any historian to feel firsthand the atmosphere of such a place, yet it is certainly possible for me to appreciate and acknowledge that such a foreboding anti-communist atmosphere did exist during the period of this thesis. However, the idea that anti-communism in the 1950s was only connected to the fear generated by the Cold War, seems somewhat two-dimensional. My interpretation of Australian anti-communism does not suggest that Australia had no reason to be cautious of the Soviets or Chinese, but what I do suggest is that the domestic anti-communism, then in existence, gained a remarkable new sophistication after 1949, in areas that were invested with unprecedented authority and influence in managing public debate.

This thesis also examined the extent to which the DEA viewed itself as an elite institution quite apart from other Commonwealth Departments, and with academic and international connections peculiar to itself, and largely self-perpetuating. For example, the narrow parameters of the DEA's recruitment regime – its focus on personality, practicality, appearance and background as equal to, or even more important, than intellectual capacities – were a part of this ideological enclosure.¹⁴ So, too, was the deferential world in which academics such as Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper forged connections with government gaining prominence and influence as experts on foreign policy in this period. The existence of relationships, and networks between government, media and academia made debates over foreign policy debates in Australia particularly exclusive. This exclusiveness was exacerbated by the fact that the size of the Australian foreign affairs community was never large, and many were close to sources of policy formation. When tiny pockets of dissent did take place, notably John Burton in 1950, over the extent of anti-communism driving government policy, and Gregory Clark, over China and later Vietnam, they came from individuals who abandoned diplomatic careers out of a necessity to move beyond the DEA culture. Further, the impact of international issues, bureaucratic attitudes and Cold War thinking

on the public and private conduct of Australian academics, particularly at the CUC, and later the ANU exemplifies a characteristic highlighted by T.B. Millar, that politicians and bureaucrats expected Australian universities, and perhaps academics, to serve the interests of government. The point of intersection in the late 1950s and 1960s between the ANU, the DEA and the AIIA might have been considered problematic for any organisation claiming to conduct objective and balanced research into international affairs; yet there was, it would seem, for men such as Heinz Arndt, JD. Miller or T.B. Millar, great professional incentives to embrace, and of course foster, this relationship. It was only the years following 1970 that saw the diminishment of the particular network outlined in this thesis, especially following Sir Alan Watt's retirement from the AIIA, and the end of its Ford Foundation funding. In conjunction with decreasing DEA interest in the AIIA, and a brutal and increasingly unpopular war in South Vietnam, the beginning of the 1970s saw a different world, and different relationships.

Here it is proper for me to acknowledge certain areas of ethical concern that troubled me at various occasions during this project. It was not initially envisaged that my work would delve into such prickly questions, but the evidence and case studies examined has made this unavoidable. The words and information used to justify the original deployment to Vietnam in 1965 demonstrates how the Menzies government, with DEA's assistance, misled the Parliament and the Australian people. In regards to the Indonesian massacres of 1965, the DEA through Keith Shann was well aware of the brutality of the massacres, yet promoted propaganda that effectively contributed to political tensions within Indonesia, undermined Sukarno, blackened the name of the PKI, and assisted the Indonesian army, the perpetrators of the massacres. The actions in these examples are in my view, not merely ethically unacceptable, but have possible implications under domestic, and international law. To follow through on these points, the writers of Australian foreign policy history certainly need to develop a stronger dissenting academic tradition, and should look to the work of Chalmers Johnson, Gabriel Kolko, Eduardo Galeano, Noam Chomsky or Mark Curtis for inspiration. When individuals such as John Burton, Gregory Clark and to a lesser extent even Desmond

15 See AIIA Canberra Branch, NLA: MS1505/1, Canberra: National Library of Australia.
Ball\textsuperscript{16} produced critical work, they have often been intellectually marginalised, treated as security risks, maligned as irresponsible or all of the above. Even the critiques of men like Malcolm Booker and Alan Renouf in the 1970s were met with suspicions. It is high time that this pattern was addressed by practitioners within the field.

There is nothing in the Australian diplomatic archival records examined during my research that demonstrates that any purely factual and objective approach was seriously applied to questions such as communism, and to what extent, particularly in regard to South East Asia, Australian security was truly threatened. Yet repeatedly expert academic opinion, media reports, political statements knowingly and unknowingly utilised black and grey propaganda in their work, effectively filtering official fears into a credibly presented hypothesis of communist apocalypse. Ultimately, like Malaya or South Vietnam, it was Australia’s attitude towards communism, and its security and defence arrangements with the UK and the Americans, which were important, not freedom and democracy in Asia. It might have been comforting to suggest that Australian troops were fighting for the freedom of the South Vietnamese, and to a limited extent they were, but that was never why Australian troops were sent, and to pretend that they were is a travesty of the official record. Words such as ‘freedom’ and ‘defence’ were comforting descriptors in the public speeches of politicians, but it was Australia’s hard-edged interpretation of its own national security interests that saw its troops sent to South Vietnam. This was precisely the same style of real politic that had also guided Shann, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, during the Indonesian massacres.

The thesis provides a unique intellectual history of the progressive formation of an Australian foreign affairs network, located in Canberra, during the period 1950-1966. This history has highlighted the intricacies, contradictions, methods, objectives, ideas, key individuals and organisations by examining the archival records and continually asking the critical questions why and how. It has outlined how political, academic and bureaucratic networks of shared professional interest helped to establish certain types of

\textsuperscript{16} For an account of Ball’s relationship with ASIO see Meredith Thatcher and Desmond Ball (ed.) \textit{A National Asset Essays Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre}, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.165, Australian National University, 2006, pp.75–77.
expertise, analysis, and a spirit of ongoing cooperation with international allies. The influence and implications of such networks can leave large footprints. The thesis examines what has driven and motivated Australian foreign policy thinking in the recent past. It aims to provoke new approaches, lively discussions and re-examinations and assist a better understanding of aspects of the present.
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