

**Conceptualising Legitimacy, Moral Panics and Performance
Enhancing Drugs: Crisis? Whose Crisis?**

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National University

This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any other university, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by other persons except where due reference is made in the text of this thesis.

Signed..... W Deett
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Date..... 20 March 2012

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Abstract

In the debate surrounding performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sport, academic investigation has focused mainly on why some individual athletes use PEDs while other actors refrain from doing so. In this thesis I adopt a broader social perspective and argue that the debate can be usefully reframed by considering how sports governing bodies (SGBs) maintain legitimacy and moral authority over their sporting communities. This highlights how various drug-related controversies and reports are associated with a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs.

The thesis adopts a social constructionist perspective, using a modified 'moral panic' framework based on the work of Goode and Ben-Yehuda. Situating legitimacy within this moral panic model reveals the 'multifaceted' nature of legitimacy and the way doping debate reflects the interests of elite SGBs. At the same time, elite SGBs affected by the debate can use the media to resist other elite SGBs and impose their own interpretation of reality upon the situation. Using a grounded theoretical model, I examine whether the anti-doping debate is an example of a 'moral panic,' involving PED-using 'folk devils.'

In the first part of this thesis I present a socio-historical examination of anti-doping policies and interactions between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the Australian Football League (AFL). Multiple methods were used, including a review of media coverage, an online survey and follow-up interview with sporting participants. This multi-layered approach revealed how the creation of PED-using 'folk devils' challenges SGBs legitimacy, while also providing opportunities to restore perceptions of legitimacy. A quantitative e-Survey and follow-up interviews revealed that grassroots sporting participants in Australia accepted there was a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs, even if the perceived causes of this crisis varied. Using this multi-dimensional approach, I conclude that the debate surrounding PEDs provides an example of a moral panic engineered by elite SGBs, and particularly WADA, based on a concern with maintaining the moral authority and legitimacy to control the ever-widening global sporting community.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AAA	Amateur Athletics Association (United Kingdom)
AAA	Australian Athletes' Alliance (Australia)
ABC	Australian Broadcasting Commission
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ADC	Anti-Doping Code
ADF	Australian Drug Foundation
AFL	Australian Football League
AFLC	Australian Football League Commission
AFP	Agence France-Presse
AIS	Australian Institute of Sport
AOC	Australian Olympic Committee
AP	Associated Press
ASADA	Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency
ASC	Australian Sports Commission
ASDA	Australian Sports Drug Agency
BALCO	Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative
BASA	Backing Australia's Sporting Ability
CAS	Court of Arbitration for Sport
CERA	Continuous Erythropoietin Receptor Activator
CFS	Chronic Fatigue Syndrome
CoE	Council of Europe
DHEA	Dehydroepiandrosterone
EPO	Erythropoietin
EU	European Union
FIBA	International Basketball Federation
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIMS	Fédération Internationale Médecine-Sportive
FINA	Fédération Internationale de Natation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNSP	Gross National Sports Product
GGOs	Global Governance Organisations
GSGOs	Global Sports Governance Organisations
hGH	Human Growth Hormone
IAAF	International Amateur Athletic Federation
IDP	Illicit Drugs Policy
IFs	International Federations
IHF	International Hockey Federation
IICGADS	International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport
IOC	International Olympic Committee
ISM	International Sports Movement
ISR	Department of Industry Science and Resources (Australia)
KAB	Knowledge Attitudes Behaviour model
MLB	Major League Baseball

NAD	National Anti-Doping Scheme
NADA	National Anti-Doping Agency
NDARC	National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre
NFL	National Football League (United States)
NHL	National Hockey League
NOC	National Olympic Committee
NRL	National Rugby League
NSO/s	National Sporting Organisations
OATH	Olympic Advocates Together Honorably
OMADA	Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency
OMADC	Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code
PCR	Polymerase chain reaction testing
PED	Performance enhancing drugs
PES	Performance enhancing substances
SAFL	South Australian Football League
SDCM	Sport Drug Control Model
SGB	Sport governing bodies
SSRGP	Social Sciences Research Grant Program
THG	Tetrahydrogestrinone
TODIS	Tough on Drugs in Sport policy (Australia)
TSPG	Targeted Sports Participation Growth program
TUE	Therapeutic Use Exemption
UCI	Union Cycliste Internationale
UIPMB	Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne et Biathlon
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USOC	United States Olympic Committee
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VFA	Victorian Football Association
VFL	Victorian Football League
VFLC	Victorian Football League Commission
WADA	World Anti-Doping Agency
WADC	World Anti-Doping Code
WAFL	Western Australian Football League
WHO	World Health Organisation

The Anti-Doping Debate: Crisis of Legitimacy, Moral Panics and Folk Devils?

In this thesis I examine the debate over performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sport and explore whether continued media reports of PED use can be conceptualised as creating a crisis of legitimacy for sport governing bodies (SGBs). I hypothesise that to avert such a crisis and restore perceptions of legitimacy, doping is constructed as a moral panic involving PED-using ‘folk devils’ (Cohen 1973). A sociological investigation of PEDs contrasts with other approaches that focus on changing the behaviour and motivations of individual athletes and that question why some use PEDs while others avoid doing so. My investigation widens the focus of the debate to the broader social and institutional context and, using a multi-theoretical framework, asks if the drugs-in-sport debate provides an example of a socially-constructed moral panic used to enhance the legitimacy and moral authority of SGBs.

A Weberian analysis is useful in understanding the role of legitimacy and moral authority in terms of maintaining order and stability in modern life, including in sport. From this angle, the question is whether doping reports create a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs, challenging their moral authority to govern and control their particular sporting community. Elaborating on a Weberian approach, I adopt a social constructionist perspective, drawing on the work of Becker (1973), Cohen (1973), Gusfield (1967) and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a; 2009), amongst others, to consider doping as a moral panic. I build on the moral panic literature to investigate whether the debate surrounding doping illustrates an institutionalised moral panic where doping is presented as a specific problem of particular concern that threatens sport as a social institution (Beamish 2009; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009).

To establish the context for the claims of this thesis, in the next section I briefly outline events that sparked a legitimisation crisis for the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and that affected SGBs globally. The IOC’s response

to doping is important as it has ‘in some quarters, come to be considered as being on a par with a specialised body of the United Nations’ (Boyes 2001:167). More particularly, the IOC has positioned itself as the vanguard of regulation and control of drugs in sport (Boyes 2001). As such, its efforts to identify and sanction ‘drug cheats’ have significant implications for perceptions of the legitimacy of the IOC and SGB.

Doping, Legitimacy and the International Olympic Committee

The debate over doping is not a recent development and has long centred on the activities of the IOC and its role as the dominant organisation in control of Olympic competition. The importance of legitimacy for the IOC’s leadership is evident in arguments emphasising the ideological values attached to the Olympic Games (Boyes 2001; Schneider 2000). I discuss these issues in Chapter Three, but they are summarised by Schneider (2000:225) who notes that:

When asked, the world public identifies Olympic values of excellence, dedication, fair play, and international peace as key ingredients of the Olympic Games. The Olympic Games command the sponsorship they do because the public supports the Games. The Olympic rings connote a higher set of ethics and values and this is what the public support is based on. If the Olympic Movement loses support, if the public comes to see Olympic values mocked by the practices of the IOC, then the sponsorship value of the Olympic Games will diminish. Preservation of Olympic ideals is therefore not just the right thing to do, but it is also the best way of preserving the financial success of the Games.

While emphasising values of excellence, dedication and fair play, the actions of the IOC, as ‘guardians of the Olympic Movement’, are located in a broader social context influenced by political and commercial imperatives. In this contested socio-economic space, a ‘culture of openness’ is necessary for the IOC to maintain public support and positive perceptions of legitimacy and moral authority (Schneider 2000:226). This is particularly important in terms of the IOC’s efforts to address doping, as Schneider (2000:228) goes on to point out:

The issue of doping has the potential to destroy the Olympic Movement ... If the public comes to believe that Olympic sport is systemically tainted, that no one has the power or the will to do anything about it ... the outcome will be a worldwide disaffection that will send the moral (and commercial) value of the Games into terminal decline.

Active engagement with anti-doping initiatives is integral to the ability of the IOC to maintain public and commercial support for the Olympic Games. Failure to protect the values encapsulated by the Olympic Movement has significant consequences for the legitimacy of the IOC. Although attention to doping commenced much earlier, several events in 1998 and 1999 adversely affected the legitimacy and moral authority of the IOC. These events were the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, statements by IOC President Samaranch in the Spanish newspaper *El Mundo* and the 1999 Salt Lake City Olympic bribery scandal (MacAloon 2001). I discuss these events in detail in Chapter Three; however, a brief summary follows.

The 1998 Tour de France, El Mundo and Salt Lake City

The 1998 Tour de France doping scandal unfolded as French customs officers intercepted Festina cycling team masseur Willy Voet with large amounts of erythropoietin (EPO) and human growth hormone (hGH). Voet's arrest led to police investigations of a number of Tour de France teams as well as associated medical personnel (MacAloon 2001; Voet 2001; Waddington 2000). These events challenged the legitimacy and authority of the anti-doping efforts of elite SGBs as magistrates and police took over anti-doping activism (Hoberman 2001; MacAloon 2001). Exacerbating concerns over the IOC's legitimacy resulting from the doping 'busts' by the French authorities in the Tour were Samaranch's comments in *El Mundo*. Samaranch suggested reductions in the list of banned substances and a redefinition of doping. For many, these recommendations implied a waning moral commitment on the part of the IOC to addressing PED use in sport, with significant consequences for the IOC's moral authority and legitimacy. As MacAloon (2001:206) notes, 'surrender and abandonment of the field, especially under some self-serving rationalisation, would remove any claim an organisation had to moral standing as a true social movement in sport.' International Olympic Committee members sought to counter any negative impact on perceptions of the IOC's legitimacy by claiming that Samaranch's comments were simply 'a personal opinion' and did not affect the integrity of the organisation (MacAloon 2001:214).

To demonstrate their commitment to anti-doping, the IOC responded to the Tour de France scandal and Samaranch's *El Mundo* comments by convening the 1999 Lausanne World Conference on Doping in Sport (MacAloon 2001). However, further challenging the position of the IOC as leaders in sport management and administration were accusations of bribery and corruption facing two IOC officials in relation to the Salt Lake City bid to host the 2002 Winter Olympics (Crowther 2002). The 1999 Conference was called prior to, but held after, the Salt Lake City bribery scandal, which broke in December 1998. Nevertheless, the bribery scandal contributed to perceptions that the IOC lacked effective leadership and authority (Hoberman 2001; Schneider 2000). For example, at the opening of the Conference General Barry R. McCaffrey, the Director General of the United States government's drug policy stated:

Let me sadly but respectfully note that recent examples of alleged corruption, lack of accountability, and failure of leadership have challenged the legitimacy of this institution. (cited in Hoberman 2001:266-67)

A direct outcome of the Conference was the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as a 'foundation under the initiative of the IOC with the support and participation of intergovernmental organisations, governments, public authorities and other public and private bodies' (WADA January 2009). WADA is central to any examination of the anti-doping debate, as this organisation emerged in direct response to accusations that the IOC's leadership failed to implement an effective anti-doping system that maintained order and stability in sport (Hoberman 2001). Of interest for this thesis is whether WADA, as a problem-specific organisational response to doping, provides an example of an institutionalised moral panic driven by elite SGBs' efforts to restore perceptions of their legitimacy. As much of the debate takes place in the media and as media reports can influence public perceptions (in this case ideas of the legitimacy of WADA and SGBs' anti-doping efforts), consideration of the media's role in the social construction of a moral panic is a central element in this examination.

The World Anti-Doping Agency

A principal task facing WADA is international harmonisation of SGBs' anti-doping efforts with a universally binding list of banned substances linked to a framework of sanctions as well as research and education. To achieve these goals, WADA established the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) in 2003 (Bowers 2002; Mendoza 2002; WADA July 2008; see Chapter Three). However, the relationship between WADA and SGBs is not necessarily harmonious, with some sporting bodies reluctant to pass the authority to outside regulatory organisations. For example, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) argues that neither the IOC nor WADA has the right to dictate the terms of disciplinary action or doping sanctions (Dvorak et al. 2006; Opie 1990). This would suggest that an obstacle facing WADA is the desire of SGBs to retain the authority to control their particular sporting communities. The response of SGBs, their interaction with WADA and the extent to which this can be seen in terms of issues of governance and control, will be examined using the Australian Football League (AFL) (see Chapter Four).

Nevertheless, despite the creation of WADA and the WADC, media reports of doping incidents continue. This raises questions over the ability of WADA to create an anti-doping culture, which has implications for perceptions of its legitimacy and moral authority. A consequence of this is the potential to create a cycle where dominant groups, in this case WADA, seek to continually reinforce their legitimacy. From this perspective, the question is whether WADA seeks to demonstrate that, rather than raising questions concerning their legitimacy, doping scandals justify their existence as the necessary institutional response to PED-using 'folk devils' (see also Cohen 1973; Hawdon 2001; Zatz 1987). I elaborate on the role of legitimacy using a social constructionist perspective shortly. However, I suggest that it is helpful to ask whether doping can be considered as an example of a socially-constructed moral panic in response to challenges to SGBs' organisational legitimacy.

Legitimacy, Moral Authority and SGBs

Max Weber (1969) noted the interconnected nature of legitimacy and moral authority in the organisation of modern social life. He stressed the importance

of legitimacy for legally formed and procedurally regulated types of authority characteristic of modern societies. As Weber (1969:214) stated:

Naturally, the legitimacy of a system of domination may be treated sociologically only as the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist, and the corresponding practical conduct ensue.

Any system of authority aiming to maintain social order requires that members of the community perceive claims to legitimacy to be valid. In other words, legitimacy refers to the extent to which an organisation is seen to be 'duly constituted and to have valid authority in a relevant area' (Donovan et al. 2002:276). The importance of legitimacy was also emphasised by Jurgen Habermas (1976) who argued that for any authority to be viewed as legitimate, certain conditions must be fulfilled. These conditions are 'that (a) the normative order must be established positively, and (b) those legally associated must believe in its legality, that is, in the formally correct procedure for the creation and application of laws' (Habermas 1976:98). Belief in the validity of claims is important as it confirms the authority of claim-makers to determine and control behaviour that is appropriate for the particular community concerned.

However, in modern complex societies groups constantly negotiate and renegotiate moral boundaries and evaluations of behaviour (Ben-Yehuda 1986). Consequently, gaining and retaining legitimacy, as Weber indicated, cannot be taken for granted (Ericson, Baranek and Chan 1991). This holds for all organisations, including SGBs. The current anti-doping approach focuses on changing individual behaviour and enforcing compliance through deterrence based testing programs, sanctions and education (Donovan et al. 2002). These procedural elements are premised on the intrinsic value of sport described as the 'spirit of sport,' which is:

... the essence of Olympism; it is how we play true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, and includes the following values: Ethics, fair play and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and other *Participants* [sic], courage, community and solidarity. (WADA 2009b:14)

Placing these values at the core of the anti-doping campaign creates a normative order based on a set of moral criteria that marks community boundaries and evaluates doping as undesirable behaviour fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport. For example, according to Peter Ueberroth, Chairman of the US Olympic Committee:

Doping in sport is a cancer ... It undermines the credibility of what we see. It compromises the health and well-being of those who compete. It unfairly tilts the playing field in favour of those who cheat. And it tears at the fabric of what makes sport unique and important to our society. (cited in Associated Press 2006a *The Winnipeg Sun*)

However, as we have noted earlier in this chapter, social actors, including sporting communities, constantly renegotiate community boundaries and moral evaluations of behaviour. Consequently, SGBs must actively work to maintain support for this values-based normative order and for their claims to the moral authority and legitimacy to implement enforcement procedures under the anti-doping framework. Donovan et al. (2002:277) suggest that a number of factors influence perceptions of the legitimacy of the current anti-doping model, including:

- Anti-doping laws and regulations are seen as just (that is, a valid basis for anti-doping laws);
- An appropriate agency for enforcement (that is, scientific credibility, constitutional or legislative authority);
- Testing procedures that acknowledge athletes' rights, and are fair and applied equitably across athletes;
- Scientifically accurate and effective testing processes; and
- Fair and just sanctions for breaches of anti-doping laws, applied equitably across athletes.

These elements are consistent with a Weberian perspective, which notes that establishing and maintaining legitimacy requires a belief in the legality and procedural competence of the organisation concerned (Ericson, Baranek and Chan 1987; 1991; Habermas 1976; Weber 1969). SGBs are responsible for governing and regulating their particular sport. As a result, they are uniquely situated to create an anti-doping culture centred on compliance with a regulatory framework predicated on a values-based normative order that together define the moral boundaries of the sporting community (Donovan et al. 2002; Girginov 2006). For example, according to the Vice-Chair of the Jamaican Anti-Doping Committee:

Sporting federations are mandated to set the terms and conditions for participation, and as part of that mandate, they are obliged to maintain the highest standards of professionalism, fairness and achievement. The taking of a drug to enhance performance is entirely inconsistent with the kind of achievement sporting federations are required to advance. (Vasciannie 2006 *Jamaica Gleaner*)

Successfully fulfilling this mandate requires that SGBs maintain stakeholder support for their legitimacy and moral authority to establish and monitor the boundaries of their sporting community. This includes members of the sporting community, the media, athletes and the public.

However, throughout the world, SGBs have been criticised for failing to deal effectively with doping. Some commentators claim that SGBs no longer enjoy the legitimacy and moral authority to create an anti-doping culture (Hoberman 2001; Leonard 2001; MacAloon 2001). For example, UK Athletics has been accused of undermining the fight against doping following the appointment of Linford Christie as mentor to Britain's sprinters (Agencies 2006; *BBC Sport* 2006). Christie, who won the 100 metres gold medal at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, tested positive for nandrolone in 1999 and was banned for two years (*The Age* 2006). In the year before the 2012 London Olympics, media reports described UK Athletics' invitation of Vesteyn Hafsteinsson, who tested positive for nandrolone at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, to a coaching clinic for British track and field athletes as 'the worst possible example' (Brookes 2011 *Mail Online*). The world swimming organisation, the Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA), has been criticised for failing 'to make even the most tentative gesture to keep drugs from our sport' (Leonard 2001:229). According to a media report:

There's a sense now that no matter how hard administrators, drug testers and anti-doping bodies fight it, the doping crisis is undermining any legitimacy that sport still holds. (Associated Press 2006a *The Winnipeg Sun*)

Such media reports have the potential to influence a withdrawal of support for SGBs and contribute to a crisis of sporting legitimacy. However, media reports can also restore flagging support by providing opportunities for SGBs to present a specific institutional response to doping. The media plays an important role in a socially-constructed moral panic and in the next section I

outline the role of legitimacy using a social constructionist approach to the debate surrounding PEDs.

Moral Panics and Folk Devils

The value of investigating the debate over PED use as an example of a socially-constructed moral panic is that it requires ‘studying those who impute deviance as much as studying the deviants’ (Freidson 1970:215-16). What is at issue is not the objective status of the condition, in this case PED use in sport, but the claims of stakeholders that the condition represents a social problem (Blumer 1971; McCorkle and Miethe 1998). Applying such an approach to PEDs moves the focus away from the athlete-user, which is the current approach to anti-doping research (see Chapter One). Rather, it incorporates into the analysis broader social structures, such as the media and sporting bodies. As Dingelstad et al. (1996:1830) point out in their discussion of the social construction of drug debates:

The prime explanatory variable is “interests”, namely groups that stand to gain or lose from a particular way of understanding the world, including corporations, governments, professions ... through the social constructionist approach: something becomes a social problem when relevant actors define it to be one.

In this thesis I ask which interest-groups, or stakeholders, might benefit from constructing doping as a moral panic, involving PED-using folk devils. I also explore what these groups stand to lose from continued media reports of doping. I consider whether what is at stake for elite SGBs is perceptions of their organisational legitimacy to control their sporting communities, which contributes to the social construction of doping as deviant behaviour with PED-using ‘folk devils.’ Identification of a group or individual responsible for the problematic behaviour is central to an institutionalised moral panic as it provides a focus for collective action in the form of an institution-specific regulatory response (see Chapter Two). The significance of this in the context of PEDs is that it provides opportunities for some elite SGBs to restore their legitimacy by implementing measures of social control, such as WADA, as the appropriate and necessary institutional solution to address the problematic behaviour or group.

Cohen (1973) suggests that each society possesses ideas of the causes of deviant behaviour as well as a set of images of the 'typical deviant.' In modern industrial societies, these images and ideas are received 'second hand' in that they arrive already processed by the media. This includes definitions of what constitutes 'news and how it should be gathered and presented' (Cohen 1973:7). As Cohen (1973:7) points out, media 'reporting of certain "facts" can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic.' As well as providing a 'spark' for the creation of a moral panic, the modern mass media concentrate public attention, or outrage, on a particular issue and enable audiences to 'visualise' deviance (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:90). Lever and Wheeler (1993:125) note that the media represent the 'single most dominant influence on the way in which sport is experienced' in contemporary society. This places the media in a position to exert considerable influence on public perceptions of doping as well as the legitimacy of the regulatory framework to control or eliminate PED-using athletes.

Rowe (1992) identified four different modes of writing within sports journalism: hard news, soft news, orthodox rhetoric and reflexive analysis. While acknowledging that different objectives underline these diverse modes of sports journalism, of interest for this thesis - dealing with the role of the media in the construction of doping as a moral panic - is orthodox rhetoric. Underpinning orthodox rhetoric is the explicit intention to boost circulation through the generation and promotion of controversy (Nicholson and Stewart 2005). At best, rhetorical reporting 'can forcefully reveal a problem or a conflict, but at worst can force a view on unsuspecting readers, and deny space to an alternative opinion' (Nicholson and Stewart 2005:50). Garland (2008:15) notes that the media are the 'prime movers and ... beneficiaries' of moral panics, as 'the sensation they create ... sells papers, entertains readers, and generates further news and commentary as the story unfolds, the spokesmen take sides, and the deviant phenomenon develops.'

Media reports tend to present a particular 'angle' and decide what topics or events are important and on what the public should focus attention. In other words, media reports 'frame' stories to translate or represent 'reality' in a

particular way and for a particular purpose (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:95). Using commentary and images of events, including sporting events, media presentations classify reports into broad categories. These categories give those events meaning and influence ‘perceptions of gender, race, social relations and proper behaviours and our adherence to certain values’ (Eitzen and Frey 1991:507; see also Yagade and Dozier 1990). In other words, there are political content and value-laden messages in mediated presentations of social life, including sport (Eitzen and Frey 1991). To consider the extent to which these may be apparent in the anti-doping debate requires an examination of the socio-historical context in which PED use came to be defined as deviant behaviour. This type of analysis gives rise to a number of questions, which Freidson (1970:215-16) states in the following terms:

How does a state come to be considered deviant? How does it come to be considered one kind of deviance rather than another? Is there a patterning in the way deviance tends to be imputed? What does the imputation of a particular kind of deviance do to the organisation of the interaction between interested parties?

The area of interest here is the nature of these interactions and ‘who participates in them, what is at stake, whose definitions prevail and who is affected by them and how’ (Ericson et al. 1987:7). As well as identifying stakeholders and the influence of these actors on the construction of PED use as deviant behaviour, it is essential to examine what such a course means to those groups. As Erikson (1966:11) points out:

When a community calls the deviant individual to account, it is making a statement about the nature and placement of its boundaries ... On the whole, members of a community inform one another about the placement of their boundaries by participating in the confrontations which occur when persons who venture out to the edges of the group are met by policing agents ... These confrontations act as boundary-maintaining devices ... they demonstrate to whatever audience is concerned where the line is drawn between behaviour that belongs in the special universe of the group and behaviour that does not.

These types of interactions link members together and, by marking the border between right and wrong, draw the normative contours of a community (Cromer 1978; Erikson 1966). This thesis investigates the role of the media and elite SGBs as stakeholders, or claim-makers, in the anti-doping debate and the establishment of a problem-specific ‘policing agent’ to monitor the boundaries of the sporting community. In other words, some moral panics

contribute to social change by creating 'ongoing, long-lasting organisational structures' to deal with behaviour defined by dominant groups, including the media and other elites, as problematic and threatening social stability (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:247; see Chapter One). Of interest for this thesis is whether the doping debate illustrates an institutionalised moral panic, with a problem-specific organisation, namely WADA. I also consider whether WADA reflects elite SGBs' efforts to restore their legitimacy in the face of continued media coverage of doping.

However, although modern mass media significantly influences public opinion and shares in the collective definition of social problems, audiences cannot be reduced to passive recipients of media messages. In the modern 'multi-mediated' social context, audiences receive information from a variety of sources. Further, as 'members of collectivities, socially interacting with people ... about what they have heard, seen, or read,' audiences filter these messages through complex social networks (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:91; McRobbie 1994). Media and audience interaction can be conceptualised as a 'reciprocal relationship' with 'each influencing, and then in turn being influenced by the other' (Johnson et al. 1996:183-84; Gonzenbach 1992). Nevertheless, while research suggests a 'two-way mutually dependent relationship' (Rogers and Dearing 1987:571 cited in Gonzenbach 1992:131), the media has a more immediate 'cause-effect' impact particularly when audiences have minimal alternatives or lack direct experience of an issue (Gonzenbach 1992:131; see also Yagade and Dozier 1990).

Public reliance upon media reports for information about issues and events that are not directly experienced means that access to media forums are important for dominant groups, or claim-makers, to generate support for their legitimacy and moral authority. However, Best (1999:48) notes that 'there are always many causes clamouring for the sort of public recognition and concern that only a few receive.' In such a competitive context, claim-makers seek to capture media space and public attention by participating as 'news sources to transmit their beliefs and values and also to legitimise themselves with the public' (Chermak 1997:688). This relationship and claim-makers' dominant social positions provide them with strategic and privileged media access,

enabling them to determine and generate support for particular ‘frames’ for events and issues (Chermak 1997; Welch, Weber and Edwards 2000). This allows them to advance an agenda that serves their political, ideological or economic interests. At the same time, however, media forums also provide space for voices to challenge dominant strategies, which according to Welch et al. (2000:261) suggests a ‘sense of pluralism.’ Irrespective of claim-makers’ privileged media access, media forums are contested spaces in which reporters do not ‘blindly accept’ organisational discourse (Chermak 1997:711). Accordingly, it is also relevant to consider whether media reports of doping challenge the legitimacy and authority of elite SGBs as agencies that are effectively addressing doping. I return to these issues in more detail in Chapter One.

The next section details the chapter structure for this thesis. I also outline the methodology used to investigate the hypothesis that continued media reports over doping create a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs and, in response, these organisations contribute to doping as a socially-constructed moral panic.

Methodology and Thesis Chapter Structure

This thesis uses a Weberian consideration of legitimacy complemented by a moral panic framework to investigate whether doping represents a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs. I suggest that the debate over doping can be conceptualised as a moral panic, involving PED-using ‘folk devils,’ driven by elite SGBs’ concern to restore or maintain their legitimacy. More specifically, I hypothesise that the doping debate illustrates an institutionalised moral panic, with problem-specific organisations (WADA) and a regulatory framework (the WADC) to maintain boundaries between the law-abiding ‘us’ and the deviant PED-using ‘other’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; 2009). I further hypothesise that much of the debate concerns SGBs’ efforts to maintain the moral authority and legitimacy to govern and control their particular sporting community. I present the results of the investigation of this hypothesis in seven chapters, with the following three main objectives:

- To consider the existing sociological literature discussing drugs in sport and suggest alternative theoretical lenses;
- To present the results gathered using a mixed methods research design; and

- To present implications and inferences from the data to consider whether they support or refute the hypotheses of this thesis.

First, following this introduction, in Chapter One I overview and offer a critique of the existing sociological literature on PEDs and outline alternative theoretical lenses that could further illuminate the issue. A large proportion of the current academic literature remains focused on the athlete-user and seeks to arrive at an understanding of motivations for PED use. I suggest that examining the actions and responses of SGBs to doping in the modern sporting environment provides an alternative analytical framework with which to consider drugs in sport. In Chapter Two I introduce my mixed research methodology, which used four distinct but complementary data collection tools. The research tools include socio-historical organisational case studies, a content analysis of media reports of doping, a quantifiable electronic survey (e-Survey) sent to a select group of Australian sporting bodies, followed by qualitative one-on-one interviews with members of the Australian grassroots sporting community.

The second main objective of this thesis is to present the results gathered using my mixed methods research design. In Chapter Three I commence the project using organisational case studies to overview the history of changing attitudes toward drug use in sport, with a focus on the IOC and WADA. That chapter also considers the IOC's response to growing criticism of their leadership role in anti-doping efforts. This leads to a discussion of the creation of WADA as a direct result of perceptions that the IOC had failed to maintain order and stability in the sporting community. The focus of that chapter is a consideration of WADA as a means to reinstate SGBs' legitimacy and any implications for consideration of WADA as an institutionalised moral panic. However, it also points to issues of governance and control in the sporting community as WADA endeavours to implement a globally harmonised anti-doping framework. I extend the case study methodology in Chapter Four to examine those issues based on WADA's interactions with SGBs using an Australian SGB, described as a National Sporting Organisation (NSO). The organisation selected is the AFL, based on their contentious relationship with WADA and pressure from the Australian Federal government to reform their

anti-drugs in sport policies. These chapters provide a foundation for the content analysis, e-Survey and interviews.

In Chapter Five, complementing the case studies I present a content analysis of media coverage of doping. The content analysis focuses on whether the evidence supports the claim that the debate surrounding doping illustrates a moral panic with PED-using folk devils. The important point here is that, while not all issues become moral panics, media attention can generate concern over an issue and influence the 'doings of politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement officers, social movement activists' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:90). As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:90) point out:

In short, the media are an expression of panics as well as their spark or cause. The beating heart of most moral panics can be found in the media. Not all supposed threats brought on stage by the media catch fire with the public, but the media play a particular role by presenting them to us. Singling out threats, generating alarm, and directing attention to folk devils are among the media's most important functions.

In other words, media attention can generate and 'leave behind a diffuse feeling of anxiety about the situation: something should be done about it' (Cohen 1973:7-8). The issue for this thesis is whether media reports over doping challenge the legitimacy of SGBs. However, media access also provides dominant groups with opportunities to enhance their legitimacy. The content analysis of media coverage of doping explores how SGBs take advantage of the media to 'frame' doping as problematic and present appropriate institutional solutions, namely WADA. The area of interest for this thesis, as I have noted earlier in this Introduction, is that claims to legitimacy do not go uncontested. Media forums provide opportunities for other stakeholders in the doping debate, such as SGBs and athletes, to challenge WADA's claims to legitimacy and moral authority.

The case studies and content analysis examine SGBs' legitimacy and response to doping in the context of a moral panic at the level of elite sport. To gauge public perceptions of the legitimacy of WADA and the WADC, as applied by Australian sporting bodies, I used a quantifiable e-Survey and qualitative interviews. Chapter Six presents the combined results. The relevance of investigating public perceptions of the current anti-doping framework lies in

their role as a key sporting stakeholder that is important for the commercial success of SGBs. This adds another level of analysis that contrasts with considerations of legitimacy from an organisational perspective and reinforces the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy. These chapters do not allow this thesis to state that Australian NSOs, or WADA and the WADC, are experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. However, they do highlight areas in which these organisations could take action to improve their commitment to anti-doping and, consequently, perceptions of their legitimacy.

To meet the third and final objective of this thesis, the concluding chapter draws together the evidence gathered throughout the thesis. The final chapter presents the implications and inferences from the data and the extent to which they support or refute the hypothesis presented in this introduction. The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates the multi-dimensional aspect of legitimacy. From this perspective, rather than institutional collapse, the notion of a crisis of legitimacy highlights that challenges to claims to legitimacy can contribute to social change. The complex nature of the debate over drugs in sport includes a diverse range of stakeholders making and contesting claims to legitimacy. This requires a theoretical framework that takes into account the power relationships between these groups as well as their different interests and objectives. The final chapter summarises and concludes the thesis by demonstrating the value of applying a multi-dimensional sociological framework to a contemporary social problem.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the central place of legitimacy in understanding the anti-doping debate. I have also pointed out the sociological importance of moral panics, which mark community boundaries based on a set of morally evaluated social criteria. Social groups renegotiate community boundaries based on moral evaluations of acceptable behaviour. Consequently, interest-groups cannot take legitimacy for granted and must actively seek and maintain community support for claims to authority. Throughout this thesis, I explore the hypothesis that in the context of a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs, socially constructing doping as an institutionalised

moral panic with PED-using folk devils helps SGBs keep a firmer hold on the power and rewards associated with modern sport. The approach I present in this thesis contrasts with most current methods used to discuss PEDs, which remain focused on changing individual behaviour. The following chapter presents an overview of the current literature on PED use and establishes the rationale for the theoretical approach used in this thesis.

I can be usefully conceptualised as a socially constructed moral panic, I hypothesised that media coverage of doping amongst SGBs with a crisis of legitimacy. These groups respond to this situation by contributing to the construction of doping as a moral panic with PED-using 'folk devils.' This chapter details the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis and situates the study in the wider fields of literature to which it belongs. I commence this chapter by highlighting the limited nature of the current dominant research approach to drugs in sport. Following that discussion, I critically examine the sociological literature that has been undertaken to determine how the discipline might address questions that arise from the danger surrounding PEDs. The body of literature will be studying that this chapter makes an attempt to. Whether a sound analysis of the idea of 'legitimacy' can be derived by 'moral panic' literature.

I seek to draw wider implications of the role of legitimacy and moral authority in terms of a regulatory order and stability in modern sport. The focus of this dissertation is on whether it is valuable for the literature to continue the study of doping on the legitimacy of SGBs and challenges to their moral authority to govern and control their particular sporting community. It seeks to address to further important questions of how the intent, design and how best to implement may contribute to an understanding of PEDs in sport.

Disciplinary approaches to PEDs

Explanations for the drug misuse in sport tend to draw on a number of disciplinary perspectives. Sport medicine approaches PEDs with a focus on the impact of such substances on athletes' health and strategies to improve performance with appropriate guidelines. For example, Ashenden (2002) calls for the implementation of a 'Metabolic Passport' as one strategy to

Literature Review

In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that the debate over doping can be usefully conceptualised as a socially-constructed moral panic. I hypothesised that media coverage of doping present SGBs with a crisis of legitimacy. These groups respond to this situation by contributing to the construction of doping as a moral panic with PED-using ‘folk devils.’ This chapter details the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis and situates the study in the wider fields of literature to which it belongs. I commence the chapter by highlighting the limited nature of the current dominant research approach to drugs in sport. Following that discussion, I critically examine the sociological literature that has been undertaken to determine how the discipline might address questions that arise from the debate surrounding PEDs. The body of literature within sociology that this chapter focuses on includes a Weberian-inspired analysis of the idea of ‘legitimacy’, complemented by ‘moral panic’ literature.

I seek to draw out any implications of the role of legitimacy and moral authority in terms of maintaining order and stability in modern sport. The focus of this exploration is on whether it is valuable for the literature to consider the impact of doping on the legitimacy of SGBs and challenges to their moral authority to govern and control their particular sporting community. If so, then this leads to further important questions of how this might occur and how such an approach may contribute to an understanding of PEDs in sport.

Disciplinary Approaches to PEDs

Explanations for the illegitimate use of drugs in sport draw on a number of disciplinary approaches. Sports medicine approaches PEDs with a focus on the impact of such substances on athletes’ health and strategies to improve performance within medically-sound limits. For example, Ashenden (2002) calls for the implementation of a ‘Haematological Passport’ as one strategy to

ensure that athletes compete safely (see also Savulescu and Foddy 2011). Improving and developing new testing technology is the focus of pharmacologists' efforts to remain ahead of the market. Drug testing and legal solutions are favoured by policy makers supported by resources directed towards drug testing programs (see Strelan and Boeckmann 2003).

Psychology and economics seek to identify individual personality traits, behaviours and risk factors that may influence the attitudes and motivations of athletes. For example, the economics literature applies cost-benefit models to explain athletes' decisions to dope as a rational choice analysis of risks and rewards (see Berentsen 2002; Bird and Wagner 1997; Eber 2008; Haugen 2004; Shermer 2008). Sports psychology concentrates on the cognitive or behavioural aspects of drug taking and the development of behavioural frameworks to promote compliance with anti-doping regulations (See Anshel and Russell 1997; Donovan et al. 2002; Petroczi 2007). The identification of doping risk factors tied to individual personality traits has had practical consequences and is a central theme of WADA's anti-doping research:

Understanding the fundamental differences between athletes who choose to compete clean and those who resort to doping or why some athletes decided to dope - despite being well aware of the harmful effects of doping and of anti-doping rules - will assist in ensuring that doping prevention strategies are effective and efficient. (WADA 2010f)

Reflecting its preferred research paradigm, WADA initiated the Social Sciences Research Grant Program (SSRGP). This program aims to develop doping prevention strategies based on research into factors that might predict or precipitate doping, examination of attitudes and behaviours towards doping as well as the efficacy of anti-doping education (Backhouse et al. 2007; see also WADA 2010g).

This prevailing anti-doping research approach tends to ignore broader social factors, placing the individual athlete-user outside the influence of the social structures that constitute the modern sporting context. However, as Armour, Jones and Kerry (2000) point out 'a social being cannot escape society in order to participate in sport, rather society consists of structures and agents who constitute - and reconstitute - sport.' Bette and Schimank (2001:51) support this societal lens through which sport needs to be viewed, noting that

a range of structural constraints such as ‘their biography as well as ... temptations and pressures from inside as well as outside sports’ contribute to athletes doping decisions. Connor (2009b:329) notes that maintaining a focus on the athlete-user hides the ‘real reasons for use,’ pointing to how an individualistic approach obscures the social reality surrounding sport. Stewart and Smith (2008:282) emphasise that an individualistic perspective limits its potential to inform anti-doping policy:

It assumes athlete decision making to be a rational weighing of costs and benefits and also presupposes a universal moral force that condemns drug use ... the behavioural approach implies that social and reference group pressures will discourage drug use when, in fact, we live in an increasingly drug-tolerant society where drugs are viewed as means of improving people’s quality of life.

The elevation of anti-doping to the level of an ethical choice, as research focused on changing individual behaviour suggests, diverts attention from the influence of broader political and economic structures and the way that interactions of a variety of interest-groups impact on the debate (Coakley 2007; Frost 1991). Further, the reduction of drugs in sport to individualistic explanations prevents any investigation of changing attitudes towards both PED use and sport over time. As Hollands (1984:70-71) notes the separation of sport from its developmental features ‘completely ignores the socio-historical and political dimensions of cultural life ... to link up the lived experience of human actors, and cultural meanings, texts, representations (culture as interpretation) with broader political and economic structures of modern industrial societies.’

This critique does not imply that examining attitudes, behaviour and motivations of athletes is not important. Indeed, research has shown that understanding athletes’ values, beliefs and motives is central to developing effective anti-doping policy (for example, see British Medical Association 2002; Gucciardi, Jalleh and Donovan 2010; Mugford, Mugford and Donnelly 1999). A central area of interest for this thesis is research conducted by Donovan et al. (2002) demonstrating the importance of attitudes towards the current anti-doping framework. That research suggested that deterrence and compliance with anti-doping regulations are more effective if organisations applying such strategies are perceived as legitimate. Drawing on a broad body

of literature discussing the development of anti-drug policies - including PEDs - Battin et al. (2008:23) reinforce this finding. They emphasise that to be successful, a drug management or control policy requires a framework that incorporates justice, consistency, coherence and comprehensiveness:

A just theory and policy must also be coherent, otherwise it is not really intelligible as either a theory or policy. Coherence requires not only that a theory or policy be consistent, but also that its parts all relate to each other, that they are involved in the same dialogue, and that they are mutually supporting. In other words, a coherent theory or policy hangs together in such a way that its rationale is apparent and easily evaluated. Coherence is desirable for all the reasons consistency is desirable, but developing a coherent drug policy requires a deeper inquiry into the types of rationales that should shape drug policy.

Battin et al. (2008:23) also argue that the failure of components of drug regulatory systems to 'fit together in a mutually supporting whole' reflects a lack of coherency in the overall system. In other words, literature hints at the importance of perceptions of legitimacy, which highlights that the rationale underpinning an anti-doping campaign must match, reflect or enable the attainment of the goals of that policy. Buti and Fridman (1994) also point out that the success of any regulatory system, including anti-doping regulation, is dependent upon acceptance of its underlying goals. I return to the significance of subjective evaluations of anti-doping approaches for the legitimacy of SGBs later in this chapter.

However, an approach that privileges social structure at the expense of social interaction and perspectives is equally problematic (Millham, Bullock and Cherrett 1972). Hilgartner and Bosk (1988:55) note that there are 'two critical features of the social problems process':

First, social problems exist in relation to other social problems; and second, they are embedded within a complex institutionalised system of problem formulation and dissemination.

These are relevant points, as the ability to regulate athletes' behaviour is more complex than the power to impose sanctions. What is important is acknowledging and investigating structural factors as well as the way that actors 'interpret, evaluate and give definition and meaning to the actions which they produce and which impinge on them' (Millham et al. 1972:419). The point of interest for this thesis is that a coherent, consistent drugs policy

requires moving beyond the individual athlete-user to a multi-dimensional model that incorporates the ‘interpersonal behaviour of the individual athlete with the macro orientation of sporting context, structure and culture’ (Stewart and Smith 2008:278). Recognition that sport is not isolated from the broader social context involves examining changing attitudes towards drug use in sport over time.

Placing drugs in sport in socio-historical context enables us to see the influence of social structures and institutions. This helps us explore the debate over PEDs as integrally linked to changes to the way we play, watch and engage with sport (Connor 2009b). Sport plays a central role in the lived experience of our social world (Lenskyj 1999). As Eitzen and Frey (1991 cited in Connor 2009b:330) note: ‘Sport is played at school, it dominates the media, it takes up our leisure time, sporting metaphors dominate our language and sports contests provide vehicles for the exhibition of national pride.’ With sport occupying such a central place in social life the ‘purpose of sports sociology is clear: it must study the sports/exercise person (at whatever level) as a social being in a particular social context; it must study social structures which endure and which have influence’ (Armour et al. 2000).

Shifting ideas about sport, or the transformation from playful activity for its own sake (*ludic*), to a more extrinsically-oriented view plays a central role in the debate around PEDs. Eitzen and Frey (1991:508) describe play as ‘an activity where entry and exit are free and voluntary, rules are emergent and temporary ... utility of action is irrelevant and the result is uncertain.’ The transformation from play to modern sport can be associated with the ‘development of industrialism and capitalism, the spread of liberal democracy and the growth of mass communications’ (Horne 2006:3). This transformation has also been described as the secularisation, commodification, rationalisation, bureaucratisation, quantification, commercialisation and spectacularisation of modern sport (Brohm 1978; Eitzen and Frey 1991; Guttmann 1988; Hemphill 1992; Page 1973; Whannel 2005). Also illustrating the more instrumental goals of modern sport is the development of a sports science industry primarily focused on enhancing performance (Eitzen and Frey 1991). Described as the ‘scientisation’ of sport, this aspect of modern sport

emphasises ‘strategies, technical improvement, nutritional and psychological interventions, or any technique to manipulate or engineer the athlete to perform better’ (Eitzen and Frey 1991:509). In such a modern industrial sporting complex, and in contrast to play, sport is ‘hardly voluntary’:

Rules are formal, generalisable and enforced by formal regulatory bodies; the outcome is serious for individuals and organisations not actually participating in the physical activity, and winning (the outcome) is more important than participation (the process). (Eitzen and Frey 1991:508 emphasis added)

The area of interest for this thesis is the role of the IOC and WADA as ‘formal regulatory bodies’ seeking to maintain support for their authority to determine and enforce anti-doping rules. Milton-Smith (2002:133-34) outlines three fundamental reasons that suggest examining the IOC’s role as guardians of the ideals of the Olympic Movement is warranted:

The first is that they are a unique global institution and are widely seen to celebrate ... certain values and aspirations which have universal currency and power. Second ... failure to live up to the so-called Olympic ideals has produced a number of major crises involving intense public debate on ethical issues and dilemmas ... And, third, given the increasing disparity between Olympic rhetoric and reality, the Games provide an excellent opportunity to explore fundamental aspects of leadership, market positioning and culture-building.

However, as noted in the previous chapter, the Salt Lake City bribery scandal and on-going doping scandals contributed to a perception that the leadership of the IOC was in crisis (Schneider 2000). In this context, it is possible to suggest that WADA represents a transformation of institutional authority or leadership in sports management. This includes anti-doping regulations that, using the WADC, increasingly control athletes’ behaviour (see Chapter Three). To examine this claim, I draw on a Weberian foundation, which points out that:

Theoretically, it is conceivable that such controls can actually be established, that the ends for and the ways of its exercise become *articulated in regulations* [sic], *that special agencies are created for its exercise and special appellate agencies for the resolution of questions of doubt*, and that, finally, *the controls are constantly made more strict*. In such a case this kind of domination might become quite like the authoritative domination of a bureaucratic state agency over its subordinates, and the subordination would assume the character of a *relationship of obedience to authority*. (Weber 1969:944 emphasis added)

As well as highlighting the role of legitimacy and moral authority, this Weberian approach brings issues of governance and control or power relationships between organisations into the frame. While WADA was established, in part, in an effort to manage and control PED use, relationships between WADA and some SGBs have been contentious. Some SGBs have been unwilling to allow other regulatory organisations to stipulate appropriate conduct for their sporting community (see Chapter Four). Further, the efficacy of WADA's model both in terms of regulating PED use as well as affecting the attitudes of athletes and the public remains contested (see also Breivik, Hanstad and Loland 2009).

There is considerable analysis of WADA and its anti-doping initiatives in the sociological literature. Much of the current literature offers a critique of the moral basis of the anti-doping campaign with suggestions for a greater focus on the consequences of doping as a public health issue (see for example Beamish 2009; Dimeo 2009; Kayser 2009; Kayser, Mauron and Miah 2007; Savulescu and Foddy 2011). This approach is valuable as it places the doping debate in the broader social context and questions claims underpinning the anti-doping campaign. These claims are that doping is problematic because athletes have a responsibility to provide good role models; it challenges sport as a 'level playing field;' it presents a risk to athletes' health; and is a public health issue (Jacobs and Samuels 1995; Kayser and Smith 2008; Ordway 1998; WADA 2007c). The sociological literature also applies theoretical perspectives such as figurational sociology and Elias's game models to examine doping as an institutionalised activity. Others have also considered the transformation of authority from the IOC to WADA (for example Hanstad, Smith and Waddington 2008; Miah 2002; Stewart 2006; Stokvis 2003). While considering issues of governance and control, the literature does not consider whether the doping debate can be examined using Weber's concept of legitimacy.

As I indicated earlier in this chapter, legitimacy is the focus of this thesis, linked to doping as an institutionalised moral panic. Pakulski (1986:37) points out that legitimacy is a dynamic analytical concept that is not necessarily clear or easily applied:

It may refer to social order to some parts or aspects of it. Legitimacy appears to be relative, gradational, dynamic and 'multi-dimensional.' The same rulers may be accepted as legitimate by some, and rejected as usurpers by others; validity may vary on different levels of authority and it may take different forms. Bases of legitimacy may change and they may be analysed on such 'dimensions' as credibility, prestige and deference and in such aspects as economic decisions, political activities, propaganda, etc.

Examining legitimacy in relation to doping as a moral panic provides a chance to consider the 'multi-dimensional' character of legitimacy. This 'implies that it will operate differently in different contexts, and how it works may depend on the nature of the problems for which it is the purported solution' (Suchman 1995:573). Similarly, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:247) point out, moral panics do not necessarily follow formal, specific stages consisting of a 'beginning, middle and a predictable end.' Rather, moral panics may produce different effects and take different forms leading to different outcomes under specific circumstances. Application of Weber's concept of legitimacy within a moral panic theoretical framework creates an opportunity for this thesis to make an important contribution to the body of literature on drugs in sport as well as the broader sociological literature.

Commencing with legitimacy, the next section considers whether the literature has investigated the idea that doping presents a challenge to the legitimacy and moral authority of SGBs. In this context, a prevailing focus on the athlete-user is significant as it may provide opportunities for SGBs to reinstate flagging perceptions of their legitimacy based on the ability of their regulatory approach to 'catch cheats.' From this perspective, a regulatory response defines the use of particular substances as deviant, contributing to doping as a 'moral panic.'

Legitimacy

The work of Weber provides a useful starting point to discuss legitimacy and moral authority in modern social life. Weber was concerned with identifying the basis of legitimacy and moral authority in differing modes of domination and administration, particularly in relation to their universality and stability (Cantelon and McDermott 2001; Thomas 1984; Weber 1969). While primarily considering the structure of 'political institutions and the dynamics of political life' (Spencer 1970:123, 131), he also recognised that domination can

occur in a range of relationships such as ‘a family, a business or economic enterprise, the state or a church’ (Thomas 1984:225). What is important for this thesis is that Weber (1969:953) emphasised that the ability of any social system to maintain order reflects the ‘observable need of any power ... to justify itself’ and that its claims to legitimacy must be perceived as valid. This is significant as belief in the validity of such claims confirms the moral authority of claim-makers to determine appropriate attitudes and conduct for the group. As Weber (1969:214) stated:

It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to persons in positions of power is primarily (or even at all) oriented to this belief ... *What is important is the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant degree, and according to its type, treated as ‘valid’; that this fact confirms the position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of its exercise.* (emphasis added)

Weber also argued that legitimate authority based on ‘determinate maxims or rules’ to orient behaviour and achieve social order and stability is based, in part, on the fact that ‘it has been established in a manner which is recognised to be legal’ (Weber 1954:130). Weber termed this form of domination ‘rational’ or ‘legal.’ From this perspective, claims to legitimacy are based in a ‘belief in the *legality* of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands’ (Weber 1947:328).

As Weber (1969:954) stated:

Indeed, the continued exercise of every domination ... always has the strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the principles of its legitimation ... The “validity” of a power of command may be expressed, first, in a system of consciously made rational rules (which may be either agreed upon or imposed from above), which meet with obedience as generally binding norms whenever such obedience is claimed by him whom the rule designates. In that case, every single bearer of powers of command is legitimated by that system of rational norms, and his *power is legitimate insofar as it corresponds with the norm.* (emphasis added)

Compliance based on perceptions of legitimacy requires a framework that combines rules and regulations ‘grounded’ on prescribed norms or values ‘for these are what legitimise expectations of command and obedience’ (Matheson 1987:200-01). For Weber, these represent different aspects of the same phenomenon that underpin all ordered human interaction. He classifies these

as comprised of two fundamental components: norms and authority (Spencer 1970). Spencer (1970:124) elaborates on the relationship between these:

Norms are rules of conduct towards which actors orient their behaviour. Ordered interaction is achieved when a high probability exists that a significant number of actors in a given context will orient their behaviour to the same norms. The essence of authority is a relationship between two or more actors in which the commands of certain actors are treated as binding by the others. Authority is thus a sphere of legitimate command and where authority exists ordered interaction is also possible.

Legitimacy is essential to the ability of either norms or authority to ensure social order and stability. The reference to 'actors' emphasises the subjective element in this process (Sciulli 1988; Spencer 1970). For Weber, subjectivity could be conceptualised as a function of self-interest, custom or belief in the existence of legitimate order, noting that:

Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest. Or people may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative. (Weber 1969:214)

However, Weber did not view these considerations as representing sufficiently reliable forms of compliance. Rather, he suggests that irrespective of the motivational foundation, what is important is that the claim to legitimacy is treated as valid (Matheson 1987; Weber 1954). Of relevance for this thesis is that, whether considered from the perspective of individuals' motivations or the legitimacy of authority, both require 'explanations ... which seek to "legitimate" or make rightful the behaviour in question' (Matheson 1987:200). As Matheson (1987:200) notes:

Historically, these explanations are typically encountered in the form of legitimations advanced by power-holders to convince power-subjects that command and obedience are rightful. Power-holders have an interest in securing obedience motivated by a belief in legitimacy, for legitimate authority is a less 'costly' form of authority than either coercive or reward-based authority ... Legitimate authority obviates the need for surveillance and rewards, since subordinates feel obliged to obey no matter whether there is a 'reward' for compliance or not.

As Pakulski (1986:35) points out, social stability based on legitimate forms of domination or social control are a result of 'both subjective factors (such as affectual attachment or belief in salvation) and the expectation of specific

external effects: social sanctions.’ In other words, neither fear of sanctions nor expediency alone will generate perceptions of legitimacy. Rather, it requires *subjective* acceptance by social actors based either on voluntary agreement or decisions by an authority held to be legitimate (Pakulski 1986). Perceptions of legitimacy leading to compliance require a framework of rules and regulations underpinned by prescribed norms or values (Matheson 1987). Further, irrespective of their form, the subjective component of these frameworks suggests an element of negotiation or ‘adjudicating the ‘truth,’ ‘rightness’ and ‘justice’ of propositions held by different interests’ (Holton 1987:517). Dominant groups are no longer able to impose their authority from above, or as Pakulski (1986:39) puts it, ‘sit on bayonets, buy loyalty or rely on routine submission.’ Rather, successful governance requires support, or consent, which while voluntary is nevertheless predicated on perceptions of the legitimacy of authority (Spencer 1970).

This point is relevant in gauging support for WADA’s anti-doping approach, which uses legally established rational rules (outlined in the WADC) based on doping as contrary to the values inherent in the ‘spirit of sport.’ As I noted in the Introduction to this thesis, these values are listed as: ‘Ethics, fair play and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and other *Participants* [sic], courage, community and solidarity’ (WADA 2009b:14). The incorporation of values in the WADC can be interpreted in this context as a central element in WADA’s claims to legitimacy as the institution responsible for monitoring global anti-doping regulation.

Following Suchman (1995), I apply a definition of legitimacy that includes an evaluative dimension but that is primarily concerned with perceptions of, or beliefs about, the legitimacy of elite SGBs. As Suchman (1995:574) states:

Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially structured system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.

Conceptualising legitimacy as including a subjective, evaluative component further suggests that dominant groups must actively work to generate and

maintain support for their legitimacy and moral authority, including compliance with regulatory frameworks.

Weber (1969) and later scholars, such as Talcott Parsons (1942a; 1942b; 1960), emphasised the significance of legitimacy in exploring factors that constrain or empower organisational actors (for discussion of the debate surrounding Parsons's interpretation of Weber and legitimacy see Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope 1975; Uphoff 1989). However, theoretical conceptualisation and application of legitimacy continue to be a subject of some debate in the contemporary literature.

Suchman (1995) outlines the diverse literature on organisational legitimacy, which he describes as either strategic or institutional. A strategic perspective emphasises managerial perspectives and the manner in which organisations manipulate symbols to generate community support (for example see Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). The institutional tradition stresses the influence of sector-wide cultural pressures, which can affect an organisation's ability to maintain community support (see for example DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Zucker 1987). Suchman (1995) endeavours to synthesise this literature and develops a model that identifies three primary forms of legitimacy (see also Deephouse and Suchman 2008). These are:

... pragmatic, based on audience self-interest; moral, based on normative approval; and cognitive, based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness. (Suchman 1995:571)

In his discussion of legitimacy and global governance organisations (GGOs), Koppell (2008:179) argues that part of the problem preventing the development of a robust theoretical approach to legitimacy rests in a failure to 'disentangle' legitimacy and authority. Citing examples such as Burma (Myanmar) and North Korea, Koppell (2008) points out that many political systems lack democratic legitimacy while maintaining a firm hold on authority. From this perspective, rational self-interest or self-preservation prompts submission to an authoritative regime. Critics of Weber also argue that linking legitimacy with political power reduced legitimacy to routine submission to authority (see for example Grafstein 1981). However, such an approach removes from the analysis the normative evaluation of the justness

of power embodied in the idea of legitimacy (Koppell 2008). As Buchanan and Keohane (2006:409-10) note:

So, legitimacy, understood as the right to rule, is a moral notion that cannot be reduced to rational self-interest. To say that an institution is legitimate implies that it has the right to rule even if it does not act in accordance with the rational self-interest of everyone who is subject to its rule.

The important point for this thesis is that, while critiquing Suchman's definitional approach to legitimacy, Koppell (2008:190) acknowledges that legitimacy is a 'moving target over time, geography and context.' In other words, the requirements for legitimacy are subjective both in their inclusion and their interpretation with a range of alternative accounts (for example see Bernstein 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Cashore 2002; Grafstein 1981; Hurd 1999; Koppell 2005; Koppell 2007). Connor and Kirby (2011) expand Koppell's analysis to develop an explanatory model applied to global sports governance organisations (GSGOs). This model acknowledges the monopoly position of SGBs, such as FIFA, the IOC and ICC, with their legitimacy and authority rarely questioned. They also note the subjective aspect of legitimacy, which 'takes a 'Janus faced' nature, in that it must be both asked for and received (or denied)' (Connor and Kirby 2011:8). The contribution of this thesis is that situating legitimacy within a moral panic framework emphasises the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy. I consider perceptions of SGBs' legitimacy from the perspective of the grassroots sporting community (see Chapter Six). Further, I adopt a macro organisational perspective to explore the contested nature of claims to legitimacy evident in relationships between SGBs (see Chapters Three and Four). Developing a theoretical model that applies legitimacy to the unique nature of SGBs to explore contemporary issues in sport is an area under-regarded in the current literature.

However, a recent application of legitimacy to the issue of drugs in sport is the work of Donovan et al. (2002) and their development of a Sport Drug Control Model (SDCM). They suggest that compliance with anti-doping regulations is more likely if those regulations, and enforcement agencies, are perceived as legitimate and as holding the moral authority to impose such a regulatory framework. Morality is important sociologically, as it orients social actions that mark community boundaries based on a set of social criteria, or

rules, which evaluate 'behaviour and goals as good or bad, desirable or undesirable' (Ben-Yehuda 1986:495; Lidz and Walker 1980). In modern complex societies, moral boundaries and evaluations of behaviour undergo constant processes of negotiation and renegotiation by social groups and, as a result, legitimacy cannot be taken for granted (Ben-Yehuda 1986). As Ericson et al. (1991:8) point out:

Moral authority is always subject to consent, and legitimacy is always something that is granted. There is institutional space for choice in consenting to a given moral authority and in granting legitimacy, albeit circumscribed by institutional frames and their imprints on reality and morality.

Frames include stipulating appropriate social norms and classification of certain behaviour as prohibited as well as sanctions attached to that behaviour (Entman 2004). Fligstein (cited in Lawrence and Suddaby 2006:216) notes that institutions are constituted by 'rules and shared meaning ... and guide interaction by giving actors cognitive frames or sets of meanings to interpret the behaviour of others.' However, Habermas (1976) argues that the ability of organisations to obtain consent and support for the legitimacy and authority to stipulate 'frames' hinges on two central elements. As I noted in the Introduction to this thesis, these are that organisations establish a normative order for their particular community and that rules and regulations are created in a legally correct manner (Habermas 1976). This highlights Weber's (1969:36-7) point that compliance requires a framework based on norms or values with decisions perceived as legitimate because they are derived from 'enactments which are formally correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner.' Elaborating on these points, Ericson et al. (1991) note that to maintain legitimacy and moral authority organisations must search for and sanction individuals deviating from procedural norms.

In other words, organisations must make convincing claims that their actions are in accord with existing social norms supported or enforced by appropriate procedural laws. Failure to do so carries the potential for a crisis of legitimacy to emerge. The notion of crisis is useful as, rather than a total collapse, it helps to conceptualise social change as a transformative process mediated through cultural agency and conflict (Andrews 2000; Holton 1987). For an organisational crisis of legitimacy, this may include accounts (using, for

example, socio-historical case studies as presented later in this thesis) examining how organisations institutionalise conflict and reconstruct relationships experiencing stress (Holton 1987). A holistic research approach would therefore explore processes of transformation, their origin as well as their resolution.

From this perspective, it could be argued that the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal contributed to a crisis of legitimacy for the IOC. That scandal transformed anti-doping approaches, resulting in the creation of WADA as a new institutional anti-doping response (see Chapter Three). This can be an insightful approach, as the creation of WADA transformed interactions between sporting organisations. This included strengthening existing relationships and incorporating new actors, such as the state and policing bodies, into the realm of sporting regulation (Rasmussen 2005). Examining interactions between different levels, or groups, of organisations brings issues of governance and control into the frame. These relationships are often contentious, with various groups seeking to retain the authority and legitimacy to control their sporting community (see Chapter Four).

In such a contested environment, maintaining or restoring social order and stability leads organisations to implement behaviour-defining rules and enforcement practices such as codes of conduct that define behavioural boundaries of a particular sporting community. In Weberian terms these represent a 'system of consciously made rational rules' as stabilising mechanisms to regulate the particular organisational community (Ericson et al. 1991; Stewart, Nicholson and Dickson 2005; Weber 1969:954; see Chapter Four). Enforcement practices, regulatory frameworks or procedural mechanisms are concerned with moral principles and justifications, questions of right and wrong, and must be open to public scrutiny to be seen as legitimate (Battin et al. 2008; Bok 1989). In other words, claims to legitimacy and moral authority cannot be taken for granted, as Wuthnow et al. (1984:222) emphasise in reference to Habermas's work on legitimation:

The legitimacy of the modern state no longer rests on tradition or absolute values, but is rooted in conceptions of proper procedures - procedures deemed legitimate if they have been established according to norms of legality and constitutionality and if they conform to certain conceptions of citizenship and

representation. They are intended to serve as mechanisms for negotiating policies oriented towards the common good ... They are not taken for granted as the way things simply must be, but are consciously subjected to scrutiny to determine if they in fact produce desired consequences.

While directed at modern state governance, Habermas's analysis can be extended to organisations as procedure or 'obsessive attention to detail is the defining characteristic of legitimacy in modern bureaucratic life' (Ericson et al. 1987:356). The area of interest for this thesis is the location of control, power and authority in the modern sporting environment. This could also be considered using Anderson's (1991) concept of an 'imagined community,' which includes an increasing emphasis on rules and regulations to identify and monitor community boundaries.

Anderson (1991:4) argued that the concept of an 'imagined community' could be applied to a 'variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations.' The idea of an imagined community rests on the notion of a sense of shared 'cultural imaginings of same-ness, one-ness, and we-ness' (Palmer 2001:144). Applying this concept to the early sporting context, the boundaries of the amateur sporting community, or sense of 'we-ness,' were created by the shared feeling that members adhered to an amateur ethos focused on love of the activity and its moral and physical benefits (for a discussion of sport and national identity see also Jarvie 1993). I suggest that, in contrast to earlier periods, the influence of the changing nature of sport, such as political imperatives and increasing commercialisation as well as PED use, created a new way of imagining the sporting community (see Chapter Three).

This new imagined sporting community reformulates the basis for participation, or community membership, with a greater emphasis on rules and regulations, which have come to incorporate anti-doping regulation. The intensely codified nature of modern global sport includes laws, rules and regulations to address a range of issues. In addition to PED use these include political boycotts, eligibility of athletes, commercialisation and jurisdictional disputes between competing SGBs (Nafziger 1992). To maintain support for an overarching anti-doping regulatory framework, including perceptions of the legitimacy of such an approach, requires that a diverse range of SGBs

consistently apply anti-doping procedures and sanctions (Donovan et al. 2002). In other words, the global sporting community consists of a range of stakeholder groups that bring with them diverse interests and objectives. This also highlights the multi-dimensional and contested aspect of legitimacy, as multiple claims to legitimacy overlap with one another in the global elite sporting community.

Heightening this importance of legitimacy are the significant financial rewards associated with the modern industrial sporting complex. Sport has become a global industry with a significant economic impact in terms of revenue generation. This has implications for sporting organisations, private corporations as well as state bodies. For example, in the 2004/05 financial year the income generated in Australia by organisations involved in sport and recreation was AUD\$8,820.5m. This added a total industry value of \$2,349.6m, the equivalent of 0.3 per cent of Australia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2004/05 (ABS 2006). As Connor (2009b) notes, estimates revealed that in 2000 sport added GBE9.8 billion to the British economy and employed around 400,000 people, just under two per cent of the workforce. In 1988 the United States calculated that the Gross National Sports Product (GNSP) stood at US\$63.1 billion. This placed 'sport GNP twenty-second on the list of the top 50 industry GNP, ahead of the automobile, petroleum and airline industries' (Eitzen and Frey 1991:508). Financial benefits from sport include contracts with individual athletes, clubs, venues and leagues creating sponsorship as a multi-billion dollar global industry (for example see Andrews and Jackson 2001). Commercial sponsorship of sport is not new. However, as Tomlinson (2005b:39) points out:

... it is the scale of commercial involvement that is the difference in the contemporary political economy of sport. Corporate sponsorship now targets whole sports, not just individuals; establishes exclusive rights for set periods, not just one-offs.

Added to this are lucrative new markets created by a globalised media (see also Amis 2005; Harvey and Law 2005). For example, NBC and its parent company General Electric reached an agreement with the IOC for the 2010 Vancouver Winter and the 2012 London Olympics worth US\$2.201 billion (Houlihan 2002; Whannel 2005). The significant monetary returns of global

sport illustrate the risks to SGBs of any loss of legitimacy. Further, this also raises questions concerning whether, rather than a concern with ideas such as fair play and the 'spirit of sport,' the creation of WADA can be conceptualised as a strategy to ensure ongoing support from sponsors. There is an extensive literature on the commodification of sport, from a range of theoretical perspectives (for example, see Connor 2009a; 2009b; Giulianotti 2005b; Horne 2006; McKay and Kirk 1992; McKay and Miller 1991; Rojek 2006; Stewart 1987; Turner 2007; Walsh and Giulianotti 2001 amongst others). However, WADA's role in protecting the commercial interests of SGBs as well as other stakeholders is an area lacking attention. While this is a relevant area of investigation, this thesis remains focused on exploring legitimacy linked to doping as an institutionalised moral panic.

As this section has discussed, organisations' legitimacy and moral authority rest upon their application and enforcement of 'proper procedures' (Habermas 1976; Weber 1969; Wuthnow et al. 1984:222). However, claims to legitimacy cannot be taken for granted but include the subjective, evaluative component of the social audience (Suchman 1995). In other words, observers' perceptions of legitimacy are influenced by organisational responses to particular issues or events (see Chapter Six). As Suchman (1995:574) notes, legitimacy is socially constructed in 'that it reflects a congruence between the behaviors of the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumed shared) beliefs of some social group.' Using Anderson's (1991) concept of an 'imagined community' I noted that these shared beliefs have come to include anti-doping regulations to ensure a PED-free elite sporting community. I also noted the 'multi-dimensional' nature of legitimacy, which suggests that the manner in which legitimacy operates or 'how it works' is dependent upon the nature of the problem under consideration (Suchman 1995). A failure by elite SGBs to generate and maintain support potentially creates a crisis of legitimacy. This may particularly be the case when faced with situations placing them under stress, such as continued media coverage of doping. The next section summarises the moral panic theoretical framework underpinning the suggestion that media reports of doping potentially create a crisis of legitimacy, contributing to the construction of doping as a moral panic.

Moral Panics and Folk Devils - Criteria for Analysis

The term 'moral panic' was first presented by Jock Young (1971) in 'The Role of the Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy.' However, it was Stanley Cohen's (1972) *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* that brought the concept to popular attention (cited in Behlmer 2003:224 fn; Garland 2008). Further contributions to the moral panic literature emerged in the 1990s, including the perspective adopted in this thesis which is Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (1994a; 2009) *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*, with a second edition in 2009. Critcher (2008:1129) describes Cohen's model as 'processual' and reflecting 'views about the key agents and dynamics of a moral panic, their causes and their consequences.' In contrast he describes Goode and Ben-Yehuda's perspective as 'an attributional model because attributes are the defining characteristics' (Critcher 2008:1132). Critcher argues that while these two models share considerable similarities, there are nevertheless substantial differences, which he places into three broad categories.

First, a processual moral panic model views the media as an important strategic actor in the formation of a moral panic. In contrast, an attributional moral panic model sees the media as mainly the conduit for dominant claim-makers' arguments (Critcher 2008). Second, the processual model sees claim-makers as complicit in the construction of a moral panic while the attributional model emphasises the strategies used by claim-makers to persuade public opinion. The third difference between these models concerns the use of language in a moral panic. An attributional model focuses on the rhetoric used by claim-makers to persuade their audience while the processual model takes a more macro view to look at 'ideological discourses,' such as a focus on law and order campaigns (Critcher 2008:1135). Others have also called for a more critical analysis of moral panic theory that 'widens the focus' to address the changing nature of modern social life (for example see Critcher 2009; deYoung 1998; McRobbie 1994; McRobbie and Thornton 1995; Thompson 1998). However, I suggest that the similarities between these perspectives provide an opportunity to develop a more synthesised moral panic model that can be applied to contemporary social issues.

Of particular interest for this thesis is whether the diversity of claim-makers and the contested power relationships between these groups influences the debate over doping as a moral panic. In other words, the focus is on the 'multifaceted relationships among diverse social agents, fragmented media, representation, and reality' in the social construction of PEDs as a moral panic (Hier 2008:174; see also Hier et al. 2011; Ungar 2001). Hier et al. (2011) consider moral panic theory in terms of a neo-liberal consideration of risk in modern social life. They argue that this creates a tendency for a process of 'moralization,' or moral regulation that contrasts individual responsibility to self-manage risk (for example, to drink responsibly) against a collective dimension of harm, such as the drunk driver, that requires a regulatory response. From this perspective, rather than a concern with the 'origins' or 'tipping point' that might be the focus of conventional moral panic analysis the issue is the 'implications of volatile moralization for the development of different regulatory approaches' (Hier et al. 2011:263). Drawing on ideas surrounding moral regulation, I use a Weberian consideration of legitimacy and organisational claims to authority to bring together and build on the current moral panic literature to consider the doping debate as a moral panic.

Cohen (1973:1) suggested that moral panics emerge 'every now and then' when conventional morality is challenged or during times of rapid social change. More recent moral panic literature notes that 'almost anything can spark off a panic and the trigger can range from something as serious as children killing another child (the murder, in 1993, of James Bulger) to an incident of school bullying' (McRobbie and Thornton 1995; Thompson 1998:2). Shifts in social organisation, including the economic, social or moral order, can also influence the emergence of a moral panic (Garland 2008:14):

Threats to existing hierarchies; status competition; the impact of social change upon established ways of life; and the breakdown of previously existing structures of control - these are the deep sources of surface panics most often identified.

The point of interest here is that 'threats to existing hierarchies' can lead to a moral panic. This suggests some support for my hypothesis that doping scandals potentially create a crisis of legitimacy for elite SGBs and contribute to the construction of doping as a moral panic.

Moral panics build on a fear that the well-being and fundamental values of society are under threat from a certain category of deviant individuals. This requires that ‘something must be done’ by those in positions of authority or power (Baerveldt et al. 1998; Cohen 1973). A consequence of this is that it enables dominant groups to introduce more stringent measures to regulate the deviant group. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:35) note:

A major focus of that ‘something’ typically entails strengthening the social control apparatus of the society - tougher or renewed rules, more intense public hostility and condemnation, more laws, longer sentences, more police, more arrests, and more prison cells.

I hypothesise that, in the context of this thesis, the creation of WADA including stronger measures of control over athletes using the WADC (see Chapter Three), illustrates doping as an institutionalised moral panic.

However, also of interest here is the key role of the media in generating ideas about the extent and seriousness of the threat in a moral panic. Using melodramatic vocabulary and language, described by Cohen (1973:7, 18) as the moral panic ‘inventory,’ the media create disproportional perceptions of danger by exaggerating the focus of attention and the seriousness of the event (Fritz and Altheide 1987; Hawdon 2001; McRobbie and Thornton 1995). Cohen’s (1973:20) analysis of media reports of the 1960s Mods and Rockers moral panic revealed consistent use of language such as ‘riot,’ ‘orgy of destruction,’ ‘battle’ and ‘attack.’ These accounts distorted and exaggerated the number of young people involved, the amount of damage inflicted and the social impact of the events (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2006; McRobbie and Thornton 1995). Cohen (1967:125-26) refers to the consequence of this process as ‘community sensitisation’ when, once identified, even ‘extremely small deviations from the norm became noticed, commented on, judged, and reacted to’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:22). The significance of the moral panic inventory is that it provides legitimacy to claims that seek to persuade the public that threats to social order from moral deviants are real (Victor 1998).

This highlights the subjective component of legitimacy as well as the media’s influence in shaping public perceptions and focusing attention on particular

issues. Audiences incorporate media definitions and language to frame ideas about problems and social issues. Consequently, media reports can shape debates by 'defining parameters and selecting key items for public discourse' (Welch et al. 2000:246-47). Further, as the literature shows us, media-defined categories selected as newsworthy are those often primarily concerned with deviance (Altheide 1997; Pritchard and Hughes 1997):

An enormous amount of modern 'news' is devoted to reports about deviant behaviour and its punishment ... [these reports] constitute our main source of information about the normative contours of society. (Erikson 1966:12)

Tucher (1994:148) concurred, noting that media reports on deviance perform an important normative function that 'helps audience members to mark the outer edges of their group and to reinforce their shared cultural identity.' Using authoritative voices, metaphoric language, pictures and headlines, media reports present a 'common-sense' understanding of deviance juxtaposed against the desired state of affairs to emphasise the importance of social order and build consensus about the way things should be (Ericson et al. 1987; 1991; Parenti 1986).

A significant factor contributing to the media's ability to play a central role in disseminating ideas about appropriate or inappropriate behaviour are audience perceptions that reporters are obligated to present objective accounts. Some in the media also share this view. In his research into media bias and the relationship between reporters and the newspaper hierarchy, Sigelman (1973) found that some reporters view objectivity, although difficult, as a goal to be attained. As one reporter stated: 'You know, we like to think we're doing an honest job. You have to report the full stream. You can't pick what you want and leave out the rest' (Sigelman 1973:134). However, according to Hall et al. (1978:57), rather than an objective, autonomous process of newsgathering, media groups are 'cued in' to specific news topics by those in authoritative positions. Drawing on the media's power to influence public perceptions, claim-makers participate as 'news sources' to define the situation and to transmit beliefs and values that influence public opinion and perceptions (Chermak 1997:688). This process is evident in the debate over drugs in sport. WADA takes advantage of its authoritative position

to use media reports to present doping as problematic and the WADC as the necessary response. However, and demonstrating that claims to legitimacy cannot be taken for granted, other stakeholder groups, such as other elite SGBs and athletes, also use the media to contest WADA's claims to legitimacy (see Chapter Five).

Further influencing media reporting are the complex interactions among media groups competing for ratings, circulation and readership (Ericson et al. 1987; Farnen 1990; Rock 1981). Best (1990:15) defines the media as a 'social problems marketplace' composed of 'particular public arenas,' which include 'the news media (television news, magazines, newspapers and radio)' among others (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988:58; see also McRobbie and Thornton 1995). The problem for claim-makers is that the number of problems that each 'arena' can handle at one time is limited by structural factors such as space (column inches for print media) and time (air-time for television and radio news) (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). These constraints also contribute to a reliance on decentralised sources, with those capable of providing news efficiently afforded with opportunities to influence public opinion (Boulağanis and Heltsley 2004; Chermak 1997; Cohen 1973; Sacco 1995). The ability of 'official sources' to deny access or withhold information can restrict journalists and reporters from engaging in critical analysis. This process privileges some voices over others and contributes to crowding out broader public discourse (Chermak 1997; Parenti 1986; Sacco 1995; Schneider 1985). Consequently, media reports tend to reproduce the ideological messages and goals of those source organisations:

Reporters are not likely to question officials' "bureaucratic accounts" because sources provide information consistent with their expectations ... News organizations are structured so as to ensure exposure to a limited range of viewpoints. (Chermak 1997:712)

Emphasising that ideological and political imperatives underpin media reports, Pritchard and Hughes (1997) note that by calling attention to social issues the media maintain an issue as politically important. The significance of this is that it influences audiences' attitudes and increases acceptance of more 'repressive, tough on crime policy proposals' (Pritchard and Hughes 1997:49). The issue of illicit drug use in the broader social context illustrates this point.

Media reports use dramatic examples, such as random acts of drug violence and language supporting law enforcement ‘crackdowns.’ This type of reportage enables dominant groups to frame the issue as ‘another war on drugs’ requiring more ‘law and order’ such as increased sentences and zero tolerance (Chermak 1997:712). This has particular relevance for this thesis, which examines the role of the media in legitimating WADA as a ‘special agency’ using the WADC to regulate athletes with controls that are ‘constantly made more strict’ (Weber 1969:944).

As well as identifying issues as ‘social problems,’ the media open up opportunities to demand reform, change and progress using selected key organisational spokespersons as ‘socially accredited experts’ to define the problem and its solution (Becker 1967:241; Cohen 1973; Ericson et al. 1987). This enables organisations to situate themselves as the ‘natural’ choice to maintain or restore order and is important for organisational legitimacy. The success of such a process ‘depends to a large extent on ... constructing and “selling” a problem and policy to deal with the problem’ (Boxill and Unnithan 1995:74; Ericson et al. 1987; 1991). Failure to persuade an audience can lead to perceptions that these groups are ‘incompetent, impractical or illegitimate’ (Throgmorton 1991:154). Claim-makers use the media to capture public attention, also drawing on dramatic language to persuade audiences that they are presenting ‘common sense,’ the ‘plain truth’ or ‘cold hard facts’ supported by ‘technical expertise’ (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988:61).

However, these claims to authority do not go uncontested. McRobbie (1994:114) argues that the emergence and availability of relatively cheap forms of ‘new media’ enable ‘folk devils’ to ‘fight back.’ She further notes the changing nature of ‘experts’ in some contemporary moral panics to include ‘extremely articulate and ... skilled representatives from pressure groups and voluntary organizations ... who now do the job of defending the folk devils who are the figures of fear and fantasy wielded by the orchestrators of moral panic’ (McRobbie 1994:111). The emergence of ‘new media’ carries with it the potential to create an ‘appreciably open terrain for struggles for justice’ by incorporating a diverse range of voices and influences into social debates (Ericson et al. 1991:242; McRobbie 1994; Reiner 2007;

Schlesinger and Tumber 1994). For example, social media networking sites, such as Twitter, Facebook or MySpace, have emerged as new mediums used to challenge dominant political discourses (for example see Ghareeb 2000; Kwak, Lee, Park and Moon 2010; Seib 2008). However, as Reiner (2007) notes, past experiences suggest that ‘the dice are loaded in favour of dominant interests - even if they have to struggle harder for their hegemony.’ While this is an area that warrants further research, a key point for this thesis is that the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the media and significant claim-makers remains a central element.

The media rely on a range of claim-makers, including government and other dominant groups, to ‘characterise problems so as to legitimise existing social, cultural and political relations’ (Chermak 1997:689). At the same time, based on their position in the social order, dominant groups enjoy preferential media access, which allows them to ‘define the social order, maintain cultural boundaries and reaffirm the status quo’ (Chermak 1997:689). Surette (1998:62) notes that media reports are ‘neither a pure picture of society nor a fully controlled propaganda message, but ... an organizational product’ controlled by a few key individuals.

This description of the media sits neatly within a social constructionist view that this thesis applies to the debate surrounding drugs in sport. Privileged access to the media provides claim-makers, such as elite SGBs, with opportunities to enhance their legitimacy by identifying problems, PED-using athletes for example, that threaten order and stability. More importantly, media access enables claim-makers, such as WADA, to position themselves as providers of solutions to those problems (Schneider 1985). These are primary characteristics underpinning claim-makers’ activities in a moral panic, which Beamish (2009:56-7) summarises:

First they must successfully publicize the behaviour deemed as problematic. Second ... they must also convince others that certain people or behaviours are dangerous, irresponsible, contagious, or undermine the welfare of the community ... there does not have to be a genuine basis for the claim - all the claims-makers need to do is convince others that this is the case ... third ... claims-makers want to convince people that there is not simply a general problem, there is a *specific* problem which is of *particular* concern. (emphasis in original)

Cohen's (1973) moral panic model can incorporate the work of Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) who list five criteria in the identification of a moral panic. These are consensus, concern, hostility, disproportionality and volatility, which I address in the following sections.

Consensus

Cohen (1973:xi) noted that a successful moral panic required agreement that the 'beliefs or action being denounced were not insulated entities ('it's not only this') but integral parts of the society or else could (and would) be unless 'something was done [*sic*].' Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a; 1994b) also note that consensus, or social agreement, that deviant individuals and their behaviour threaten the social order is a central element of a moral panic. However, this obscures the point that 'moral panics come in different sizes - some gripping only certain categories, groups, or segments, others causing great concern in the majority' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:157). Garland (2008) also emphasises that while consensus is important, the character, causes or consequences of the problem are subject to dispute as well as collective negotiation.

I suggest that in the case of doping as a moral panic 'consensus-making' more accurately describes the interactive processes as well as power relationships between groups that are evident in the debate. Dominant stakeholders, such as WADA, elite SGBs and the media, have diverse interests and use anti-doping policies to achieve specific outcomes that are relevant to their particular sporting communities (see Chapter Four). Further, the modern sporting context includes athletes, coaches and the public, amongst others, as stakeholders who also have an interest in anti-doping initiatives.

Consequently, consensus-making more accurately reflects the multi-dimensional and contested nature of elite SGBs' efforts to generate and maintain support for particular anti-doping responses, such as WADA.

As social reactions in a moral panic can be more or less consensual or more or less divided (Garland 2008), dominant groups must actively work to build and maintain agreement that the issue threatens social order. This includes convincing claims about the definition, legitimacy and urgency of problems as

well as ‘who is responsible ... and how they should be resolved’ (Cornwell and Linders 2002; Sacco 1995:154). As Koppell (2008:195) notes:

Any rulemaking body that is not accepted by key actors offers minimal benefit to other potential members ... Without the acquiescence of key ... organizations, an international organization will be marginalized ... If the GGO’s rules are ignored by the most significant market participants, there is little reason for the less powerful to go along. Moreover, once ignored, the GGO may even lose its substantive legitimacy as it no longer achieves the very goals it was created to pursue.

This highlights the importance of consensus-making activities as rule-making organisations, such as WADA, seek to maintain legitimacy and moral authority. The media play a key role in this process by providing a forum where dominant stakeholder groups make, and contest, claims to legitimacy. I use a content analysis of media reports to explore whether, in response to a crisis of legitimacy created by ongoing media reports of doping events, elite SGBs engage in consensus-making activities to endorse WADA as the appropriate and necessary solution to doping (see Chapter Five). The media play a central role framing and instilling ideas about issues as social problems. However, a moral panic will not emerge if public perceptions are ‘more sophisticated’ than media representations. Audiences are not ‘zombies ... brainwashed over the airwaves’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:90). Rather, audiences are influenced by their own interests, which may not coincide with those of dominant groups (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b). As a result, a successful moral panic requires that media attention touches a ‘responsive chord’ in the general public (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2006:25).

Further, it would be a misrepresentation to generalise the media simply as a conduit for dominant interests, or audiences as passive consumers of information. Audiences bring their own predispositions and interpretations to reading and viewing ‘news,’ which influence the meanings they attach to information and perceptions of media credibility. Emphasising this point, Reiner (2007:376) also notes that ‘the consequence of media images depends on how content is interpreted by different audience sections.’ Consequently, media groups seek to maintain their own legitimacy and accept information consistent with their own organisational needs (Chermak 1997; Farnen 1990;

Sacco 1995; Schneider 1985). While prepared to trade some integrity in exchange for information, Parenti (1986:239) notes that:

From the media's view there are occasions when the trade-off comes at too high a price ... Were it to follow the government (or corporate) line on all such matters the press would cast doubt on its own credibility as a news organisation and as a neutral, objective social institution. So the media go along on most stories, but not all the time and sometimes not all the way.

The relative autonomy of the media creates a contested space where journalists 'break the scandals' to which organisations respond using 'spin-doctors' and 'tailor-made' accounts to present their version of events. At the same time, the media's position as powerful agents of social control enables them to criticise and challenge these accounts (McKay, Hutchins and Mikosza 2000). Further, claims that an issue is problematic must compete with numerous other social-problem claims. In this contested environment, not all definitions can win out (Best 1999; Fritz and Altheide 1987). This is significant in terms of building legitimacy, as Rommetvedt (2005:757) notes:

Actors who are able to show, or to argue convincingly, that their viewpoints and suggestions promote the public good have better chances of obtaining general acceptance or of acquiring support from the necessary number and kinds of partners.

The moral panic criterion of consensus brings to our attention the importance of agreement, from a range of social actors, that an issue is problematic and requires action to resolve. However, as noted earlier in this section, not all stakeholder groups will agree on the causes, consequences or measures to solve the threat presented by the issue or group. I use a content analysis of media reports to explore the hypothesis that, in response to ongoing media reports of doping events, elite SGBs engage in consensus-making activities to endorse WADA as the appropriate and necessary solution to doping. I consider whether this process also acts to generate support for SGBs' moral authority and legitimacy and, in the process, construct PED-using athletes as 'folk devils' (Cohen 1973; see Chapter Five). Claims to legitimacy occur in competitive arenas comprised of a range of stakeholder groups with diverse and conflicting interests. In this context, consensus-making captures the interactive processes involved in selecting, presenting and maintaining attention and concern over issues as social problems.

Concern and Hostility

A successful moral panic requires a level of community concern that a particular issue threatens social order and agreement that ‘something must be done’ to maintain social stability. This brings us to the next elements of Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (1994a) moral panic criteria, which are concern and hostility. Media reports play an important role here, with suggestions that part of society is in crisis or that the deviant behaviour directly attacks fundamental values heightening public concern (Jones, McFalls and Gallagher 1989). According to von Hoffman (1985:10):

If a reporter finds two experts, he can turn any event into an upmarket version of the killer-bee story. For that is what trend stories really are: the announcement that something bad and goose-pimply is slouching toward the reader’s hometown and into his very own suburb.

In addition to raising public concern, suggestions that something ‘bad and goose-pimply’ threatens the audiences’ immediate social environment creates opportunities for expressions of hostility towards those perceived as responsible. This is important in the identification or classification of a moral panic, as concern alone will not generate one.

Cohen’s (1973) model emphasised that moral panics require a dimension of public concern. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2006:24-5) describe this as the ‘raw material’ with ‘latent potential’ for a public reaction to a given issue from which a moral panic emerges. Concern over an issue can be expressed through a range of channels, such as ‘public opinion polls, public commentary in the form of media attention, proposed legislation’ (Baerveldt et al. 1998:32). Closely associated with increased concern is the identification of a group or ‘folk devil’ as responsible for the threatening behaviour, creating and perpetuating divisions between ‘us’ (respectable society) and ‘them’ (outsiders) (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a:28-34). As Cohen (1973:45) notes:

Moral panics depend on the generation of diffuse normative concerns, while the successful creation of folk devils rests on their stereotypical portrayal as atypical actors against a background that is overtypical.

Defining a common enemy or ‘folk devil’ narrows the focus and provides an object against which collective action, or a solution, can be taken (Hawdon

2001). The media again play a key role in generating, or maintaining, public concern, particularly on issues with which audiences have limited or no direct experience (Gonzenbach 1992). Johnson et al. (1996:183) note that different issues have different 'issue thresholds' that require more or less media attention before the public becomes concerned. However, the more the public relies on the media for information rather than personal experience, the more effective are the media's efforts to generate concern (Johnson et al. 1996).

The significance of the media lies in their tendency to present reality in terms of only 'sensational' news (Bourdieu 1998). In the context of the doping debate, reports that a minority of athletes use PEDs are far from 'sensational' or newsworthy, and unlikely to generate support for an institutional response to doping as a specific problem of particular concern (Beamish 2009; Rasmussen 2005). In other words, as Johnson et al. (1996:183) note: 'sensational media coverage can exaggerate the extent of the problem while sparse coverage can slow the rise of concern.' The media provide a site for the framing of legitimate resolutions to problems with accounts that:

- ... visualize what happened, why it happened, what it was like to be involved in the event, what is likely to happen next, *what should be done about it*, and whether any or all of this is good or bad. (Ericson et al. 1987:4 emphasis added)

Media reports identify 'troublemakers' using morality-focused individualised language to contrast 'demon criminals' against 'responsible authorities' (Ericson et al. 1987:6-7; Ericson et al. 1991:8-9, 239). Perceptions of media objectivity give credibility to the idea that there is a reason for public concern that 'something terrible has happened.' This also reassures audiences that there are institutional solutions presented in media reports (Wagner-Pacifici 1986). Identifying the deviant group and responsible agents prepared to take action to solve the problem brings even small digressions from the norm into the public eye, enabling calls for greater regulation and control. This process 'normalises' expressions of hostility towards 'folk devils,' stresses the importance of official agents of social control and informs audiences about the community's moral constraints and values (Lull and Hinerman 1997; Sanders 1990). As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a:28-29) note:

In short, folk devils are *deviants*; they are engaged in wrongdoing; their actions are harmful to society; they are selfish and evil; they must be stopped, their actions neutralised. Only an effort of substantial magnitude will permit us to return to normal. (emphasis in original)

As part of increasing concern and normalising hostility towards the deviant group, the media and other stakeholder groups exaggerate the extent of the threat or, as Jones et al. (1989:4) describe it, ‘objective molehills have been made into subjective mountains.’

Disproportionality

This brings us to Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (1994a) moral panic criterion of disproportionality. This includes:

- Grossly exaggerated figures to highlight the extent of the problem;
- Available evidence suggests that the ‘concrete threat’ is non-existent;
- ‘Tall tales’ about non-existent harm are told and believed;
- Increased levels of attention to a specific condition that does not present a greater or lesser threat than another condition; and
- Attention to a given condition exceeds that of a previous or later time, with no increase in the objective seriousness of the issue (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:44-46).

Of interest for this thesis is whether media and elite SGBs’ representations create the idea that doping has reached ‘epidemic’ proportions, with PED-using ‘folk devils’ undermining sport as a valuable social institution. The relevance of this is that generating the idea that doping is widespread opens opportunities for SGBs, including WADA, to enhance their legitimacy by providing a regulatory solution that eliminates doping as a moral and physical danger threatening sport.

In the construction of a moral panic, claim-makers imply that considerably more individuals are engaged in the deviant behaviour than actually are. Exaggerated facts and figures create a sense that the deviant behaviour is eroding the social order (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a). Quantifying a social problem performs an important ideological function, as ‘both the media and the public have enormous respect for “the facts” ... And there is no fact so “hard” as a number’ (Hall et al. 1978:9). Large numbers imply a correspondingly large social problem and, while often exaggerated, ground intangible impressions in ‘facts’ that support consensus-making activities

(Best 1999; Blumer 1971; Jenkins 1992; Sacco 1995). Statistics play an essential role as persuasive evidence that ‘let us claim that we can measure the size of our problems and the effectiveness of our solutions’ (Best 2002:51).

Media reports contribute to disproportional claims about social problems through statements exaggerating the extent of a problem typically commanding attention rather than ‘what actually happened’ (Fritz and Altheide 1987:476). For example, Fritz and Altheide (1987) traced the role of the media in the social construction of the “missing children issue” in the United States. They found that claims from selected parents, moral entrepreneurs and government agencies concerning the extent of the problem rather than its nature were widely publicised. Some media reports frequently stated that 1.5 million children went missing each year. Other reports noted that most ‘missing’ children were more likely to be runaways or involved in custodial disputes. Later research showed that stranger abductions accounted for less than one per cent of all missing children (Fritz and Altheide 1987; Lofquist 1997). A significant outcome of the concern generated over missing children was a problem-specific institutional response:

Understanding the ‘problem’ was secondary to establishing the legitimacy and organization to ‘deal with the problem.’ The latter was accomplished by establishing the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Once the institutionalization of the problem had been accomplished, moral ‘expert’ entrepreneurs could provide routine news sources for the mass media. (Fritz and Altheide 1987:478)

One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate whether, as with the missing children case, the media play a role in the construction of WADA as a specific institutional response to doping (see Chapter Three). The missing children example illustrates a ‘spiral effect’ as media and dominant groups interact and influence public opinion. Establishing a problem-specific institution contributes to the idea that the problem is ongoing and therefore necessitates institutional control (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; Thompson 1998). Cohen (1973:66-7) described this process as ‘diffusion’ in which a number of other agents of social control, such as policing bodies, are drawn into the control system. Hall et al. (1978) describe the same process as a ‘spiral of

signification' in which each 'new twist' increases concern and anxiety (Garland 2008). To deal with new or increasing perceived threats, connections between and among enforcement agencies are either activated or strengthened, which Cohen (1973:67) described as 'escalation.' Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994b:156) summarise this process:

The police 'escalate' their law enforcement efforts, 'diffuse' them from precinct to precinct, and 'innovate' new methods of social control; they operate under the 'widening-the-net' principle.

Nevertheless, the construction of a moral panic is contested ground. The discrepancy between the number of potential problems and the public space, or media arenas, available for addressing them creates a fiercely competitive environment. Consequently, despite extensive media coverage, not all moral panics become institutionalised parts of the social environment (Best 1990; Best 1999; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). The fact that not all moral panics leave a long-term or institutional legacy was also acknowledged in Cohen's (1973:1) model:

Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives of itself.

The forms of moral panic of interest for this thesis are those that lead to institutional responses or enforcement mechanisms. These can include the 'introduction of bills in legislatures to criminalise or otherwise deal with the behaviour and the individuals supposedly causing the condition' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:152). These forms of moral panic are important for organisational claims to legitimacy. They signal to 'threatening agents' that the community is prepared for the imminent danger. Further, implementing regulatory or enforcement mechanisms tells the community that 'steps are being taken against the threat' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:138). The idea that appropriate action is being taken is also important for perceptions of the legitimacy of institutional responses to the dangerous issue or behaviour.

The issue for this thesis is whether media coverage of doping, as well as elite SGBs' responses to those reports, maintain the idea that doping in sport

remains a widespread problem, requiring ongoing institutional regulation in the form of WADA. This leads us to Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) final moral panic criterion of 'volatility,' which is significant in terms of maintaining support for the legitimacy of an institutionalised response to a social problem.

Volatility

Moral panics are also described as 'volatile', denoting a tendency to erupt suddenly and just as suddenly subside, therefore possessing similar attributes to a fad or craze (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a). Typically, moral panics are referred to as events that, whether emerging suddenly as a 'new' social problem or the re-appearance of a dormant issue, spark a sense of panic or urgency in the search for a solution. The descriptive term 'panic' implies that individuals react to these situations in extraordinary ways, suggesting havoc, disorganisation and chaos. Critics have argued that this 'under-emphasises the presence of deliberate and rational actors' and ignores complex processes involving 'active, not merely reactive, efforts by social actors' (Cornwell and Linders 2002:307-13; see also Hunt 1999). However, by following Cohen (1973), Goode (2008) and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) throughout this chapter I have taken account of the observation that moral panics are constituted by complex processes involving a range of social actors. These groups include the mass media, other organisations as well as the public that both react to and actively create an issue as a moral panic. Nevertheless, the characterisation of moral panics as volatile coupled with their failure to maintain initial levels of concern contributes to their description as fadlike.

The relevant point for this thesis is that unlike a fad, some moral panics leave a significant legacy. These events contribute to social change, acting as historical antecedents for later moral panics with informal or institutional legacies (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; Killingbeck 2006). For example, during the 1970s, heroin addiction in the United States received substantial media and political attention but was of limited initial impact as a volatile moral panic. What was significant were institutional mechanisms that 'paved the way' for subsequent drug panics in the 1980s and 1990s, including the development of a national drug strategy (Chermak 1997; Goode and Ben-

Yehuda 1994a; Wright 2000). A problem-specific organisational response is a central element in an institutionalised moral panic.

However, this also brings legitimacy into the moral panic framework. From this perspective, organisations face the potential for concern over deviant behaviour to link with community perceptions that existing procedures have failed to deal with a problem threatening order and stability. In other words, the legitimacy of institutional responses to a particular issue no longer meets community expectations or generates community support. From a Weberian perspective, these claims no longer enjoy perceptions of validity. The significance of a problem-specific institutional response is that it enables dominant groups to respond to challenges and reassert their power and values, or claims to authority and legitimacy, through a regulatory framework (Gusfield 1963; Schneider 1985). As Gusfield (1967:178) points out:

The fact of affirmation through acts of law and government expresses the public worth of one set of norms, of one sub-culture vis-à-vis those of others. It demonstrates which cultures have legitimacy and public domination, and which do not. Accordingly it enhances the social status of groups carrying the affirmed culture and degrades groups carrying that which is condemned as deviant.

There is, however, a further problem facing an institutionalised response to a moral panic that also concerns their claims to legitimacy. In her discussion of the moral panic surrounding Chicano youth gangs and crime in the United States city of Phoenix in the 1970s and 1980s, Zatz (1987:131) emphasises that organisations that compete for public funds, for example law enforcement agencies, must ‘show a problem sufficiently serious to warrant the infusion of federal money. Then, they have to manage the delicate balance between demonstrating the success of the new program ... justifying the money already spent, and showing a continued need for the infusion of additional funds.’ WADA faces a similar pressure with funding provided ‘equally by the sport movement and governments of the world’ (WADA 2010a). The challenge for WADA is to maintain support for anti-doping initiatives that, while effective, nevertheless remain necessary to control doping and ensure sporting stability.

The concept of volatility in a moral panic is, however, problematic as the initial momentum of a moral panic tends to wane over time (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009). Consequently, claim-makers cannot take for granted that the

issue will continue to be seen as problematic or that their response will continue to be seen as legitimate and appropriate. Further, in addition to competing for attention, media focus on issues tends to fade and as a result public concern also recedes (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009). As Houlihan (2009:49) notes, 'even reliance on scandal can become routine' and 'it is important that the anti-doping policy regime can embed its concerns and priorities more securely in the sustained interest and commitment of ... influential policy actors over the medium to long-term.' The moral panic criterion of volatility again highlights the media's role in consensus-making activities that draw public attention to and maintain concern over an issue as a social problem. In addition, as Hier et al. (2011) point out, 'moral panics represent episodes of contestation and negotiation that emerge from and contribute to or reinforce broader processes of moral regulation.' One of the aims of this thesis is to explore whether elite SGBs, while challenged by media reports of doping, also use the media to perpetuate concern that PED use is an ongoing problem, which justifies or legitimates WADA.

This model proposed by Cohen (1973) and elaborated upon by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) provides an important conceptual framework with which to consider the debate surrounding drugs in sport. The value of this approach is that it enables us to broaden the analysis beyond the athlete-user to consider the role of other social actors and institutions. These criteria are important characteristics of a moral panic, which could be applied to moral panics using a variety of social theories. However, they do not provide us with a mechanism with which to examine why some issues become a moral panic while others do not. Therefore, it is important to examine the value of different theories as applied to moral panics. Enhancing the analytical ability of the moral panic framework, and to address questions about why not all issues become moral panics, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) provide three moral panic theories, which I discuss in the following section.

Social Theory and Moral Panics

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) outline three 'ideal' moral panic theoretical frameworks comprising a) a grassroots model; b) 'middle level' interest-

groups, and c) an elite-engineered model. These theories provide us with the tools to answer questions such as:

Why is a social problem ‘discovered’ in one period rather than another? What steps are taken, and by whom, to remedy a given condition? Why ... take steps to remedy this condition but not that, even more harmful, one? Who wins, and who loses, if a given condition is recognised as a social problem? (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:152)

For the goals of this thesis and a consideration of organisational legitimacy, the moral panic theories help us answer the question posed by Gusfield (1981:5): ‘Who and what institution gains or is given the responsibility for “doing something” about the issue.’ I present a brief summary of the grassroots moral panic theory followed by the middle level interest-groups theory and conclude with a summary of the elite-engineered moral panic theory.

Grassroots theory

The grassroots perspective stresses popular participation and argues that moral panics are a ‘bottom-up’ event motivated by activists’ and citizens’ concerns with morality and ideology (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b). This perspective situates moral panics as a cultural phenomenon driven by a level of ‘diffuse anxiety or strain’ with ‘more or less spontaneous eruptions of concern on the part of a large number of people about a given threat or putative condition’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:161; Hunt 1997). A central element of this form of a moral panic is that public concern is based on the deeply felt attitudes and beliefs of a broad sector of society that a ‘given phenomenon represents a real and present threat to their values, their safety, or even their very existence’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:161).

The grassroots position claims that moral panics often include populist sentiment, driven by public concerns over the ability of powerful groups, such as large corporations, to ‘harm common, hardworking folk’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:57). Fine (1985:65) describes public fear and mistrust of corporate power as the ‘Goliath Effect,’ where harmful situations that happen to naïve consumers are linked to the greed and influence of large corporations. These types of moral panic are also described as having an ‘urban legend’ or ‘folklore-like’ element that contributes to public concern

(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009). Claims made in these types of accounts include, for example, that Coca-Cola puts mice in its drinks; Bubble Yum puts spider eggs in its gum; Jockey shorts cause sterility or that McDonalds adds worms to their hamburgers (Fine 1985; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009). Another example of a grassroots moral panic is the fear of nuclear energy, which while not incorporating a folk devil or sudden burst of concern, illustrates the role of the public in generating hostility to a practice or institution. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) argue that public opposition to nuclear energy is a major reason why no new nuclear facilities have been built in the United States since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979.

The appeal to populist sentiment evident in some grassroots moral panics may lead to classifying these events as simply urban legends (see also Brunvand 2001). However, Turner (1987) and Carroll (1987) note that these forms of a moral panic should not be dismissed as they reflect deep-seated anxieties over living in modern societies held by some sectors of the community. For example, Turner (1987:295) discussed the rumour that the Church's Fried Chicken franchise was owned by the 'Ku Klux Klan and that they were putting something in the chicken that would cause sterility in black male customers.' She argued that analysis of this case revealed that it remained popular amongst segments of the black community because it reflected tensions in race relations and the vulnerability felt by some individuals (Turner 1987).

The strength of the grassroots moral panic is that concern stems from deeply held feelings and are impervious to manipulation 'from above' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:163). From this perspective dominant groups, such as the media or politicians, may influence public concerns. However, if a latent and widespread concern does not already exist or if the public is indifferent to an issue, a moral panic will not develop (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009). While arising more or less spontaneously, however, a successful moral panic requires that concern is 'focused, brought to public attention or awareness, given a specific outlet, harnessed to a mechanism of expression' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:167). A central difficulty of the grassroots theory is that it does not clarify how or why an issue becomes 'harnessed to a mechanism of expression' or why a moral panic emerges at a particular time or the manner

in which local concerns shift to influence broader social views (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:167).

Interest-group theory

A theory that examines the way that concern is articulated, given direction and moves from the 'bottom of society's socioeconomic ladder,' or the grassroots, to the 'middle of society's status and power hierarchy' is the interest-group theory (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:52, 58; Hawdon 2001; Jensen, Gerber and Babcock 1991). This theory suggests that moral panics emerge 'somewhere in society's middle rungs - professional associations, the police, the media, religious groups, educational organisations - middle level associations, organisations, groups, institutions, sectors and categories of every description' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:160-1). Becker (1973:147-55) defined members of the interest-group typology as 'moral entrepreneurs' including 'rule creators' who agitate for social change with new and better rules overseen by a new 'rule enforcer.' These individuals are motivated by strong humanitarian ideals intended to 'help those beneath them achieve a better status' (Becker 1973:147-48; Gusfield 1955).

The interest-group theory, which is the most widely used perspective, notes that, for some members of this group, the driving force of the moral panic is sincerely held beliefs that a particular issue is of real concern (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009). For example, Zatz (1987) notes that the 1970s and 1980s moral panic over Chicano youth gangs in the United States city of Phoenix also reflected the fact that police officers believed that youth crime was a significant issue threatening the community. However, the interest-group moral panic theory notes that members of this group include influential claim-makers, each with their own interests and agenda (Cohen 1973; Jenkins 1992; Thompson 1998). For example, Jenkins and Maier-Katkin (1992:72) argue that the moral panic over the occult and Satanism as the 'seduction of America's youth ... terrorizing our communities' reflected the concerns of the fundamentalist religious Right in American life. The interest-group theory highlights that the superior moral position of interest-groups enhances their ability to focus media attention on and transform the slant of news stories

about particular situations (Becker 1973; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; Zajdow 2008). The interest-group model notes that:

Advancing a moral and ideological cause almost inevitably entails advancing the status and material interests of the group who expresses or works for them, and advancing the status and material interests of a group or category may simultaneously advance its ideology and morality. (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:67)

In other words, rather than a moral panic driven by grassroots concerns or by elite groups efforts to protect their interests, as in the elite-engineered model that I discuss shortly, the interest-group model argues that material interests and morality are often 'part of the same package' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:69). As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) note, in practice separating interests and morality is not clear-cut and it may be more useful to see both as operative, with one more influential than the other in the context of particular moral panics.

Elite-engineered theory

The final moral panic theory is the 'elite-engineered' model. In contrast to the grassroots and interest-group models, the elite-engineered model argues that elite groups deliberately and consciously create moral panics to divert public attention from 'real' problems, or issues that undermine elite interests (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; 2009; Hunt 1997). The elite-engineered approach does not suggest that social problems are conjured from thin air but that the focus of attention is out of all proportion to the concrete nature of the threat (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a). Underpinning the notion that elite groups have the ability to engineer a moral panic is the idea that:

Elites have immense power over the other members of the society - they dominate the media, determine the content of legislation and the direction of law enforcement, and control much of the resources on which action groups and social movements depend. (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a:135)

Elites use access to these resources to shape 'shared understandings of normality, dangerousness, acceptable behaviour, legitimacy, immorality, and the myriad other definitional components of deviance and conventionality' (Sanders 1990:4). From the perspective of elite-engineered theory rather than spontaneous expressions shaped by 'common-sense views,' public opinion is

moulded by ‘multiple elite interest-defining layers,’ with the media playing a central role (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a:135-36).

Unlike the grassroots and interest-group perspectives, the elite-engineered view takes a top-down social control approach driven by specific concerns of elite groups to protect their interests. The elite-engineered theory also enables examination of interactions between dominant groups. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:52-3) note:

The elite-engineered theory is based on the argument that elites in one institution frequently and intimately interact with those in another. Elites across institutions tend to have interests in common, and act to protect those interests; hence, their influence in matters such as the capacity to engineer moral panics.

The interaction between dominant groups, in particular the media and other elite groups, provides opportunities for these to influence public opinion. An elite-engineered moral panic is intended to protect the - primarily economic - interests of elites rather than defending ‘morality’ or ideology (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a). A significant consequence of this is that it enables the establishment of a specific institutional response to an issue constructed by elite groups as a moral panic. For example, turning to 1970s Britain, the law and order campaign in response to mugging as a moral panic ‘had the overwhelming single consequence of legitimating the recourse to the law, to constraint and statutory power, as the *main*, indeed the only, effective means left of defending hegemony’ (Hall et al. 1978:278; emphasis in original).

Orthodox application of an elite-engineered theory reduces the public to ‘puppets ... being pulled ... by strings manipulated from above, by members of the ruling elite’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:54). For example, Hall et al. (1978) argue that a moral panic around mugging in 1970s Britain was engineered by the capitalist class to ‘rescue ... an ailing capitalist society’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:165). Rather than originating with the masses, this moral panic was a mechanism of ‘elite hegemony’ achieved with the unwitting complicity of the media, legislature, police and the courts (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:165; Hall et al. 1978). Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) disagree with this conceptualisation, suggesting that it fails to acknowledge the active role of other social agents, such as the public and the media.

Elites-engineered moral panic theory

In the context of doping as a moral panic, I argue that a further problem with the elite-engineered theory is that it suggests that elite groups share a singularity of purpose. I do not suggest that elite groups do not share common goals, such as maintaining their dominant position. However, applying elite-engineered theory to the issue of drugs in sport does not sufficiently account for the diversity amongst interest-groups or the contested nature of power relationships between these social actors. For example, Palmer (2000:364) describes elite SGBs, such as the IOC, FINA or FIFA, as ‘powerful organisations which enjoy wealth, celebrity, status and global influence on a scale with few rivals.’ I suggest that ‘elites-engineered’ expands the theoretical model by acknowledging the range of elite groups with diverse and competing interests that are active in the doping debate. Further, an elites-engineered moral panic theory brings issues of governance, control and legitimacy into the analysis as factors that may contribute to the classification of doping as deviant behaviour.

I focus my investigation using a Weberian-inspired concept of legitimacy, which, as well as interactions between WADA and SGBs, includes examining public perceptions or evaluations of SGBs’ anti-doping responses. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) have also suggested that a Weberian perspective can be applied to a moral panic. They focus on the changing nature of foundations of authority in modern society and the ‘routinization of charisma’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:246; see also Cantelon and McDermott 2001; Suchman 1995). From that perspective, rather than traditional forms of authority, such as that inherited by birth or more a modern form of bureaucratic authority, obedience stems from the charisma of particular leaders. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) suggest that the ‘excitement’ of a moral panic is similar to the charisma of some leaders, which is also volatile and unstable. In this context, charismatic leaders may be more successful in transforming the initial volatile momentum, or concern, into a moral panic. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:246) state:

What we are suggesting is that, as with charismatic leaders, some moral panics are, almost unwittingly, more successful in routinizing the demands for action

that are generated during these relatively brief episodes of collective excitement.

This approach is useful in terms of sharpening the analysis of moral panics to look at whether they leave an institutional legacy to ‘do something’ about the problematic behaviour.

However, I suggest that Weber’s concept of legitimacy can enhance understanding of the efforts of elite groups to maintain authority in some moral panics. In the context of drugs in sport as a moral panic, considering legitimacy within an elites-engineered moral panic theory is useful as it expands the analysis beyond the individual athlete-user to include power relationships between organisations and the way these shape the debate. As I noted earlier in this chapter, an approach that privileges either the individual or social structures fails to adequately address the interactive processes at work in the construction of a social problem. Such approaches are particularly problematic in terms of legitimacy, which this thesis suggests underpins the social construction of doping as a moral panic. As I have discussed in this chapter, elite groups cannot take for granted claims to the moral authority or legitimacy to ‘pull the strings.’ Rather, these groups must engage in consensus-making activities to generate and maintain support for the legitimacy of an institutional response to a *specific* problem that is of *particular* concern, which is a central feature of a moral panic (Beamish 2009). This highlights the subjective nature of legitimacy. Further, members of the public are not passive ‘puppets or marionettes’ but, as we have seen, filter messages, including those from the mass media, through complex social networks and knowledge frameworks.

Situating legitimacy within a moral panic framework is useful for my purposes as it provides an effective mechanism with which to identify ‘groups that stand to gain or lose from a particular way of understanding the world’ (Dingelstad et al. 1996:1830). An elites-engineered moral panic theoretical model provides an opportunity to explore interactions between stakeholders and to consider whether the debate over doping illustrates an institutionalised moral panic.

Conclusion

As the literature reviewed in this chapter has shown, the dominant approach to PEDs remains focused on regulation and control of athletes at the individual level. This thesis tests whether a modified Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) moral panic model illuminates the doping debate. Using an elites-engineered moral panic theory helps to identify the dominant voices in the doping debate. Further, combined with Weber's (1969) concept of legitimacy, it expands the analysis to consider whether interactions between social institutions, such as the media WADA and elite SGBs, impact on the doping debate. As we have noted, while some moral panics may have limited initial impact, they can leave a significant institutional legacy (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b). Of particular interest is whether the creation of WADA is an institutional legacy of constructing PEDs as a moral panic. I also examine whether the actions of WADA perpetuate concern over, and institutionalise, PEDs as a moral panic with the objective of restoring perceptions of the legitimacy of sporting elites. Chapter Two presents the methodology used to test the validity of the hypothesis that the doping debate is an example of a moral panic with PED-using 'folk devils,' driven by a concern to restore or maintain the legitimacy of elite SGBs.

Research Methodology

The issue this thesis confronts is whether SGBs contribute to ‘doping as a moral panic’ to maintain their moral authority. Expanding on this proposition, I test a modified version of Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (2009) elite-engineered moral panic theoretical model to investigate whether this helps to illuminate the debate over PEDs. As we saw in Chapter One, although not all leave an institutional legacy, underpinning elite-engineered moral panics are efforts of dominant social actors to safeguard their interests. The area of interest for this thesis is whether, in response to challenges to their legitimacy resulting from ongoing media reports of doping, the creation of WADA represents an ‘elites-engineered’ institutionalised moral panic. The objective of this type of moral panic is the preservation of the legitimacy of elite SGBs. This chapter presents the methodology used to test the validity of that hypothesis.

I employed a mixed methods framework consisting of socio-historical organisational case studies, a content analysis of media coverage of doping events, a quantifiable electronic online survey (e-Survey) and qualitative one-on-one interviews. I begin the chapter with a discussion of data sources typically used in investigating drugs in sport and the constraints associated with those sources. I then assess the main differences between quantitative and qualitative methods and state why a mixed methods approach was suitable for this thesis. Following that section, I detail the application of my mixed methods research design.

Data Sources and Project Constraints

There are four major information sources used to investigate PEDs in sport. These are investigative journalism, including the writings and testimonials of athletes and others in the sporting community; formal investigations by governments and sporting bodies; surveys and interviews; and statistical

details of drug testing results (Anshel 1991; Waddington 2005; Yesalis, Kopstein and Bahrke 2001). Laure (2009) notes that the range of research techniques used to study doping can also include qualitative interviews, quantitative questionnaires, participant observation as well as biological sample analysis. As Mottram (1996:357) points out:

Evidence may be as diverse as statistics on positive dope tests, results of surveys of athletes on their self-reporting or perceptions of drug use through to anecdotal reports and speculation by the media. These sources of evidence are widely inconsistent, leading to speculation of levels of prevalence of drug use ranging from less than one per cent to over 90 per cent.

This thesis is more concerned with exploring perceptions of SGBs' legitimacy rather than prevalence of drug use or any individual athlete's PED use. Nevertheless, there remain significant methodological difficulties in terms of identifying relevant data sources and soliciting information.

The classification of PED use as illegal behaviour with negative social sanctions makes accessing a population for study problematic. This situation is by no means unique to drugs in sport. Accurate information is also hard to obtain for a range of activities defined as deviant or illegal, such as drug use in wider society (Goode 1997) or child or sex abuse in sport (Leahy, Pretty and Tenenbaum 2002; Waddington 2005). Further complicating investigations into doping is the tendency for individuals who may have used or know of the use by others of PEDs to project their own behaviour onto others or rationalise their drug use. This acts to create a perception that 'everybody does it' and potentially results in an overestimation of prevalence of PED use (Yesalis et al. 2001:45). However, as I am not seeking to establish prevalence of PED use, a more significant issue is the socially-located position of respondents and social expectations associated with their particular sporting community (for example see Gucciardi et al. 2010). This issue arises irrespective of the methodological tools employed. As Yesalis et al. (2001:56) point out: 'The response of athletes to the questions of journalists, drug use surveys, or even government investigations may be influenced by the athlete's desire to respond to questions in a socially desirable manner.' While making use of some of the data sources typically used to investigate drugs in sport, I am cognisant of associated methodological problems. In the next section I discuss

the primary sources used to discuss drugs in sport and the constraints associated with those sources. I then detail the research choices made in this thesis.

Investigatory Journalism, Writings and Testimonials

Investigative journalism, writings and testimonials are useful data sources as they mitigate research costs and labour intensive data collection processes. In terms of investigatory journalism, including sports writing, Yesalis et al. (2001:45) note that media reports have used 'personal observations, accounts, or opinions of self-selected informants' to chronicle drug use in sport. The methodological value of media reports rests on their ability to 'point to some general trends with a fair degree of confidence' (Waddington 2005:488). However, the tendency of media reports to 'focus on a few athletes, teams, or sports,' raises questions about validity and whether or not the results can be applied beyond the scope of the investigation. The resulting lack of generalisability limits the methodological value of media reports (Yesalis et al. 2001:45-6). The problems associated with investigative journalism can be tempered by using writings and testimonials from individuals in the sporting community. An advantage of these data sources is their ability to offer some insight into the perceptions and experiences of doping held by athletes and others in the sporting community as well as SGBs' responses to doping. Exploring the perceptions and views of members of the sporting community is one of the main objectives of this thesis. Consequently, writings and testimonials were useful for my purposes and provided valuable background information that assisted in constructing the e-Survey and interview schedule.

Writings and testimonials eliminate difficulties associated with accessing a population in which to study behaviour or activities defined as illegal or deviant. Nevertheless, there remain a number of methodological difficulties. Individuals who provide these accounts are also influenced by pressure to conform to the expectations of their particular sporting community. Athletes who have published accounts of their experiences, perceptions or suspicions of doping have experienced significant negative consequences. For example, former professional cyclists have been threatened with legal action and ostracised by the cycling community after publication of their knowledge

claims of drug use (see Kimmage 1998). Following his positive test at the 2008 Tour de France for Continuous Erythropoietin Receptor Activator (CERA), which is a third generation EPO, cyclist Bernhard Kohl openly discussed doping in cycling with the realisation that: 'I know the rules in the scene: those who really speak out do not come back. Therefore, I move on to something else, without regrets' (Kroner 2009). Other examples of negative responses to athletes' discussions of their own PED use or knowledge of doping by other individuals include *Positive* (Reiterer 2000), *Breaking the Chain* (Voet 2001), *To Be Honest With You* (Christie 1995), *Speed Trap* (Francis 1990), *Juiced* (Canseco 2005).

Reluctance to speak about doping is not isolated to athletes. Officials from sporting organisations have tended to deny that a doping problem exists in their sport, or at least to downplay the extent of the problem (Yesalis et al. 2001). Exacerbating fears of retribution and being ostracised by former teammates, officials or colleagues, are the negative financial costs from the 'loss of paid speaking engagements, endorsements; autograph signings, and induction into halls of fame' (Yesalis et al. 2001:45). Faced with potentially severe negative social as well as financial consequences, individuals may hesitate to speak of their knowledge, experience or suspicions of doping or deny either the existence or severity of doping in their sport. While this potentially results in underestimations of the extent of PED use, this thesis is more concerned with exploring the perceptions of individuals in relation to SGBs' legitimacy based on their anti-doping efforts. As I discuss later in this chapter, the methods used in this thesis investigate whether SGBs' concern to maintain legitimacy influences the debate over doping and whether an elites-engineered moral panic model helps to understand the current regulatory response to PED use. Bearing in mind the constraints associated with investigative journalism writings and testimonials, other techniques used by researchers to investigate doping are surveys and interviews.

Survey and Interview Data

As noted above, investigative journalism, writings and testimonials face the difficulty of generalising from the data, pressures for individuals to present their sport as clean and to conform to culturally expected behaviour. To

overcome these issues a survey is a valuable methodological tool for a number of reasons. Surveys may provide the only means to access information about behaviour that takes place infrequently or in private, have wide applicability and allow the collection of generalisable information. As Anshel (1991) notes, one of the advantages of surveys is that they allow 'participants to express their views freely within experimenter-derived categories.' This is particularly relevant for behaviour defined as deviant and that may attract negative sanctions, such as PEDs. Another strength of surveys is their data structuredness and ability to gather 'large amounts of data at relatively low cost in a short period of time' (Smith 1975:196-97). Surveys are also valuable methodologically when used in conjunction with qualitative interviews. Mugford, Mugford and Donnelly (1999:12) point out that a survey can 'outline key themes that can be identified in the interviews, drawing together material from those interviews, in the form of direct quotes to make each point' (see also Greig et al. 2009).

Nevertheless, the pressure for individuals to respond in culturally sanctioned ways impacts on survey and interview research. These approaches are also dependent on self-reported data about attitudes, motivations, beliefs and behaviours. This is a methodological problem not limited to the sporting context and also affects research into other behaviour perceived to be socially unacceptable, such as illicit drug use in the non-sporting community (see for example Laslett and Rumbold 1998). Despite assurances of anonymity and confidentiality, answers may be intentionally false as individuals avoid revealing personal use or knowledge of the use by others of PEDs (Crowne and Marlowe 1960; Gucciardi et al. 2010; Laure 1997; Smith 1991). This potentially leads to underestimations of the extent of PED use, as Yesalis et al. (2001:48-9) note:

Survey respondents may under-report their drug use to conceal their behaviours from the interviewer, the general public, sponsors of the survey, and other members of their households in order to present themselves, or perhaps their sport, in a way they feel is more socially acceptable. Conversely, respondents who view substance use positively may exaggerate reported use in order to impress others or to live up to a self-image they perceive in a positive light.

To overcome these issues I used an e-Survey, which assured confidentiality of responses, complemented by interviews to explore perceptions and attitudes towards SGB legitimacy in the context of anti-doping (see Chapter Six).

Although my use of a survey and interviews explored perceptions of legitimacy rather than doping prevalence, the reluctance of athletes to discuss their own drug-using behaviours or attitudes towards PEDs is a methodological constraint recognised in the existing literature.

In his research into bodybuilding in South Wales, Monaghan (2002:706) found that individuals used ‘vocabularies of motive’ to explain their steroid use, which was often concealed from those outside the bodybuilding culture due to disapproval or legal sanctions in some countries. In their research into British athletes’ attitudes to doping and anti-doping, Bloodworth and McNamee (2010:278) found that while athletes readily discussed careers and peripheral issues, ‘discussion over willingness or pressures to dope, either hypothetically or non-hypothetically, were more limited. One-to-one interviews failed to elicit anything other than staunchly anti-doping attitudes’ (see also Mugford et al. 1999). These examples illustrate that using surveys and interviews to gather data on attitudes towards PEDs can be difficult and highlight the value of a mixed methods framework.

Individuals’ reluctance to discuss their own, or knowledge of others PED use or under-reporting of doping prevalence creates difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of anti-doping policies. To overcome obstacles such as under-reporting and pressure for individuals to conform to community expectations, some researchers turn to ‘harder’ evidence in the form of drug testing statistics. These statistical measures typically focus on the number of tests carried out and the number of positive tests returned.

Statistical Analysis of Drug Testing Results

As noted above, some of the types of data typically used to investigate drugs in sport are constrained by their lack of generalisability. Statistical analysis of empirical data is a useful technique that can be applied to overcome some of these problems. The value of statistical analysis is that it enables an evaluation of the nature of the issue under consideration with measures

defined in a way that allows others to replicate the study. In other words, statistical analysis of empirical data speaks directly to issues of validity and reliability (Ragin 1994).

Empirical data that lend themselves to statistical analysis in the context of PED use can include results of athletes' self-reporting surveys, as discussed in the previous section. For example, studies have used statistical analysis of survey data to explore the extent of doping behaviour across a range of sporting populations (for example, see Laure and Binsinger 2007; Laure et al. 2004; Peretti-Watel et al. 2004; Yesalis and Bahrke 2000). To demonstrate whether current anti-doping systems are effective, studies based on statistical analysis of drug-testing results attempt to evaluate the prevalence of PED use in individual countries or sports (Mottram 2005). International sporting bodies, such as the IOC and WADA, use statistics on drug testing results to determine whether international sport is relatively drug free and whether the anti-doping framework is effective (Waddington 2005).

In the same manner, SGBs argue that a small number of positive tests suggests that their sporting communities are drug free (Waddington 2005; see Chapter Four). For example, in 1995 the British Athletic Federation claimed that test results showed that 'over 99 per cent of British athletes are not using performance-enhancing drugs' (Waddington 2005:489). However, the actual extent of PED use is difficult to gauge and the prevalence of doping is unknown. As Waddington et al. (2005:1) point out in their analysis of drug use in English professional football: 'Although there has recently been a study of drug use in amateur footballers in Cameroon, there are almost no systematic or reliable data about the extent of drug use in professional football' (see Ama et al. 2003). Waddington (2005:490) highlights the problematic nature of reliance on drug testing statistics as an indicator of the success of anti-doping efforts, pointing out that:

The most spectacular indication of the inadequacy of using positive test results as an indication of the extent of doping was provided by the 1998 Tour de France ... despite routine drug tests at the end of each stage of the Tour, *not a single rider was excluded from the Tour as a result of failing a doping control carried out by the Tour organisers*; all the riders who tested positive did so as a result of tests which were conducted following the police action, rather than as a result of tests which were carried out as part of the Tour itself. (emphasis in original)

A further issue associated with reliance on statistical analysis of doping tests concerns the use of data by interest-groups to influence the anti-doping debate. These can be applied to support existing policies or criticise a group as failing to address the issue (see Chapter Five). For example, in the debate between the American National Hockey League (NHL) and WADA regarding claims of shortcomings in the NHL's testing policy, Burnside (2007) notes:

In less than two full seasons, almost 3,000 random drug tests were carried out on National Hockey League players. One ... tested positive. Exactly what that says about the state of the game, and the role of performance-enhancing drugs in it, is up for vigorous debate. If you're the league and its players, the results reinforce the commonly held belief in hockey circles that the NHL did not and does not have a problem with performance-enhancing drugs ... If you're among the group that believes the league's policy is like Swiss cheese in the number of loopholes it provides, the results mean nothing.

Reliance on drug-testing statistics carries a further methodological challenge directly linked to drug-testing technology. As Kayser, Mauron and Miah (2007:3) note: 'Anti-doping tests are just as much limited by sensitivity, specificity and reliability as any other biomedical test and acceptable limits for certain products have to be set rather high to prevent false positives and therefore false negatives will continue to occur.' In his discussion of the Union Cycliste Internationale's (UCI) biological passport, introduced for the 2008 cycling racing season, Fouché (2009:98) emphasised the problematic nature of reliance on a 'technological fix' to doping. He pointed out that the 'production of scientific knowledge and technological instruments is a social process embedded within an ever-changing network of cultural interactions.' In sport often:

... the first response to a positive drug test is that the science/scientist or the instrument is wrong. The goal of showing the contingent nature of science and technology may have produced the idea that reality does not exist and truth is always negotiable. (Fouché 2009:98)

While there are claims that these limitations result in a 'significant under-reporting bias' (Waddington 2005:475), of more relevance for this thesis is whether members of the sporting community perceive accuracy in drug testing to be linked to SGB legitimacy. This point is highly relevant for the research of this thesis, which hypothesises that continued reports of doping present a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs. According to Donovan et al. (2002), a

significant factor linked to SGBs' legitimacy are perceptions that drug testing procedures and technology are accurate. Using the e-Survey and interviews, I explore whether members of the Australian grassroots sporting community perceive SGBs' legitimacy as 'hamstrung by significant limitations in technology' (Waddington 2005:475; see Chapter Six).

As we have noted, issues of prevalence and maintaining a 'clean' sporting environment are of primary importance in typical data gathering used to investigate doping in sport. In contrast, this thesis remains focused on the hypothesis that to avert a crisis and maintain their legitimacy and moral authority, SGBs contribute to doping as a 'moral panic,' which creates PED-using 'folk devils.' Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the methodological constraints associated with determining doping prevalence, research has concluded that since the 1960s there has been a substantial increase in PED use, including in recreational and community sport (Waddington 2005). In response to data gleaned through some of the investigatory approaches outlined above, a further response to doping aimed at reducing or eliminating PED use are government or SGB-led enquiries.

Government and Sporting Body Investigations

There have been a number of government and SGB-led investigations into doping (for example see Appendix 2.1). These enquiries have taken a legal approach, including witness cross-examination under oath, and have experienced some success in addressing doping practices. The value of government led enquiries into doping (such as the 1990 Australian government's Black Report into allegations of a PED culture at the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) or the Canadian government's Dubin Commission in response to sprinter Ben Johnson's positive drug test at the 1988 Seoul Olympics), is their 'genuinely independent' nature and ability to compel witness testimony (Waddington 2005:477). Government investigations guarantee confidentiality of witness evidence and, as a result, are well equipped to penetrate any 'conspiracy of silence' over doping (Waddington 2005; Yesalis et al. 2001). In contrast, SGB-led investigations are unable to guarantee witness confidentiality. As well as limiting the number of witnesses prepared to give evidence in this situation, such enquiries are 'by no means as

penetrating as those of Senator Black or Commissioner Dubin' (Waddington 2005:477). SGB-led investigations also face the problem of maintaining impartiality. For example, although the Coni Inquiry into British sport was initiated by the Amateur Athletics Association (AAA), this organisation was centrally involved in the administration of sports that had been the focus of doping allegations in *The Times* (Waddington 2005).

The highly profit-oriented nature of modern sport raises further doubts around the impartiality of SGB-led investigations. Bette and Schimank (2001:52) argue that this confronts SGBs with contradictory expectations, placing them in a 'double-bind.' As Connor (2009b:333) notes:

On one hand this does offer an incentive to reduce PED use, as scandals may be seen to diminish the value of the sport. However, practical experience would suggest that scandals, while damaging in the short term, have no long term impact ... Thus, as an administrator or team owner I might ask whether it is in my interests to ensure the best sporting spectacle that I can, and if this means enhancing performance, or turning a blind eye to the use of PEDs, then perhaps I will be tempted.

In this context, entrusting SGBs with the responsibility to create and enforce drug testing regimes is like 'having the fox guard the henhouse' (Voy 1991:101). Further, like survey and interview data, writings and testimonials, government and SGB-led investigations rely heavily on the 'veracity and recall of selected witnesses' and 'are generally given only by former athletes, because current athletes fear possible retribution from coaches, team-mates, or sport federation officials' (Yesalis et al. 2001:45-7). Nevertheless, these investigations are valuable methodologically as they provide information that is useful in developing an understanding of the socio-historical development of anti-doping policies.

As I noted in the moral panic literature, the hypothesis of this thesis is that an institutionalised moral panic that includes a regulatory framework - such as the WADC - might enable dominant groups, such as WADA or other elite SGBs, to restore perceptions of legitimacy and moral authority (see Chapter One). In order to test this, my use of government and SGB-led investigations contrasts with the typical use of these tools. The primary focus of government and SGB-led investigations has been a concern with identifying doping prevalence,

closing down doping distribution channels, the illegal sale of PEDs to non-sporting groups and holding to account those involved in these activities. Nonetheless, government and SGB-led investigations provided valuable information that I used to explore SGBs' presentation of doping. These data sources informed SGB case study selection and assisted in examining changing attitudes towards drug use in sport over time.

This section presented the methods and data sources typically used to investigate PEDs. While providing valuable information on doping in sport, these methods and data sources are primarily concerned with determining prevalence of PED use and implementing effective deterrence strategies. Rather than establishing or explaining the prevalence of PED use, I am investigating perceptions of the legitimacy of SGBs and whether the doping debate illustrates an institutionalised moral panic. Further, the constraints associated with each of the methods and data sources typically used to explore drugs in sport suggest that a mixed methodological model, which draws on qualitative and quantitative types of data and analytical techniques, may provide a more comprehensive approach. I next assess the main differences between quantitative and qualitative methods and state why a mixed methods approach was suitable for this project.

Mixed Methods - Quantitative and Qualitative Methods

Advocates of quantitative and qualitative research methods have vigorously debated which of these approaches provides the 'ideal' research tool. As a consequence, two 'research cultures' have developed with one professing the superiority of 'deep, rich, observational data' and the other the virtues of 'hard, generalisable survey data' (Sieber 1973:1335). As Howe (1988:10) notes, at the core of the debate is the 'chief worry ... that the capitulation into "what works" ignores the incompatibility of the competing positivistic and interpretivist epistemological paradigms' underpinning quantitative and qualitative methods. The differing epistemological foundations of mixed methods research have led some to question the compatibility and rigour of results and to suggest that some may 'simplify the situation under study, highlighting and packaging results to reflect what they think is happening' (Morse 2003; Sale, Lohfeld and Brazil 2002:47). Table 2.1 summarises the

main differences between qualitative and quantitative methodologies and Appendix 2.2 lists the strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research.

Table 2.1: Main differences - Quantitative and Qualitative research

Feature	Qualitative Research	Quantitative Research
Logic of theory	Deductive	Inductive
Direction of theory building	Begins from theory	Begins from reality
Verification	Takes place after theory building is completed	Data generation, analysis and theory verification take place concurrently
Concepts	Firmly defined before research begins	Begins with orienting, sensitising or flexible concepts
Generalisations	Inductive generalisations	Analytic or exemplar generalisations

Source: Sarantakos (1993) and Basri (2006).

In any research project the most appropriate design is that which addresses the research question and tests the hypothesis. As Trow (1957:33) notes:

Different kinds of information about man [sic] and society are gathered most fully and economically in different ways ... The problem under investigation properly dictates the methods of investigation.

Bryman (1984:79) also remarks that ‘the question of techniques of investigation is no longer whether A is “better” than B, but is A the appropriate technique in terms of a particular set of epistemological premises X’. This approach does not present ‘some sort of epistemological porridge’ as critics of mixed methods might suggest. Rather, such a methodological framework assists in revealing different aspects of the subject under investigation and developing coherent understandings and explanations (Ackroyd and Hughes 1992; Connor 2009b; Foss and Ellefsen 2002:247; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). Following Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17), I adopt the definition of mixed methods research as that which ‘mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study.’

This approach does not seek to replace either quantitative or qualitative methods. Indeed, understanding the fundamental attributes of quantitative and qualitative methods is necessary for a sound mixed methods design that

draws on the strengths of each method while minimising any weaknesses. This type of approach can provide a rich and authentic description of the issue under investigation (Foss and Ellefsen 2002). As Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17-18) point out, the logic of inquiry in mixed methods research ‘includes the use of induction (or discovery of patterns), deduction (testing of theories and hypotheses), and abduction (uncovering and relying on the best of a set of explanations for understanding one’s results).’ A mixed methods research framework is valuable as it implies that applying different approaches to an issue will reveal different aspects and help to build a more nuanced understanding of social phenomena. According to Denzin (1989:235), methods are like a kaleidoscope:

Depending on how they are approached, held, and acted toward, different observations will be revealed. This is not to imply that reality has the shifting qualities of the coloured prism, but that it too is an object that moves and that will not permit one interpretation to be stamped upon it.

This description resonates with C. Wright Mills’s (1973:235-6) likening the ‘sociological imagination’ to a ‘moving prism catching light from as many angles as possible.’ This translated into a methodology that applied quantitative and qualitative approaches to operationalise the different key concepts that form the hypothesis of this thesis.

To investigate the implications of doping for SGB legitimacy I used qualitative socio-historical case studies. The case studies established a foundation for the thesis by examining the socio-historical developments of anti-doping and identifying the core themes of the anti-doping campaign. They also provided an opportunity to consider whether the creation of WADA can be viewed as an institutional response that restores SGBs’ legitimacy in the context of doping as a specific problem of particular concern (Beamish 2009). Further, the case studies provided an opportunity to consider whether the creation of WADA can be conceptualised as an institutionalised moral panic. To explore the doping debate as a socially-constructed moral panic I undertook a content analysis of media reports. This provided a quantitative and qualitative component that enabled me to identify interest-groups actively engaged in the anti-doping debate and raised questions concerning what might be at stake for those groups in terms of doping as a moral panic (see Chapter Five).

To test ideas that emerged from the socio-historical case studies and content analysis, and to continue an exploration of perceptions of SGBs' legitimacy, I used a quantitative e-Survey in conjunction with qualitative interviews. These operationalised the research hypotheses. More importantly, these allowed me to engage with and ask questions of members of the sporting community to investigate the issues raised in greater depth. Table 2.2 lists the methods employed, the field to which they belong and the benefits for this thesis.

Table 2.2: Mixed Methodological Framework

Method	Value
Qualitative - Case studies	Provide important background data illustrating changing attitudes towards drugs in sport over time; Assist formulation of hypothesis that doping may represent a moral panic; and Inform construction of e-Survey and interview framework
Quantitative/Qualitative - Content Analysis	Provide important background data; Operationalise research hypothesis; Provide empirical data to investigate doping as a moral panic; and Inform construction of e-Survey/interviews
Quantitative - e-Survey	Operationalise research hypothesis; and Open specific forums to investigate perceptions of SGBs legitimacy
Qualitative - Interviews	Operationalise research hypothesis; and Provide opportunities to ask deeper questions and further explore perceptions of SGBs' legitimacy

While acknowledging difficulties facing any investigation associated with PEDs, I use a design that draws on approaches previously used to research issues, including PEDs, in sport. For example, Toohey and Veal (2000) used case studies to evaluate the financial costs and benefits of the 1992 Barcelona, 1996 Atlanta and 2000 Sydney Olympics. Green and Houlihan (2006) discussed the relationship between governments and sporting organisations using Athletics Australia and UK Athletics as case studies. Todd and Todd (2001) used Olympic sources and media reports to conduct a socio-historical examination of drug testing in the Olympic Movement. Waddington (2005) used media reports, formal investigations, athlete surveys and drug testing program data to examine patterns of drug use in British sport. Grogan et al. (2006) used qualitative interviews to investigate experiences of steroid use among bodybuilders in the United Kingdom. Hanstad and Skille (2008) used an example from Norwegian sport policy, including newspaper articles,

as a case study to examine relationships between stakeholders (see also Kian, Vincent and Mondello 2008; Maguire et al. 2008; Sefiha 2010).

Lamont-Mills and Christensen (2008) used discursive psychology to analyse Australian cricketer Shane Warne's press statement following his 2003 positive drug test for diuretics. Numerato (2009) used a Weberian-inspired theoretical framework and ethnographic interviews to explore the significance of sailing as a social practice in the post-Communist Czech Republic. Using qualitative interviews, Mugford et al. (1999) explored athletes' perceptions of the effectiveness of SGBs' responses to doping based on earlier work of Donovan and Egger. That research used a knowledge-attitude-behaviour (KAB) model that examined a number of factors including perceptions of legitimacy. However, Mugford et al.'s research focused on evaluating a doping deterrence program. In contrast, I am not trying to determine doping prevalence or examine issues of deterrence. I am concerned with investigating the hypothesis that to avert a crisis of legitimacy and maintain their moral authority, SGBs construct doping as a 'moral panic.'

Nevertheless, approaches used in other research into drugs in sport assisted me in constructing the mixed methods research design used in this thesis through demonstrating the value of a range of methodological tools. This led me to construct a multi-dimensional research framework that combined quantitative and qualitative elements of socio-historical case studies, a content analysis of media reports, a quantitative e-Survey and qualitative interviews to address specific aspects of my research hypothesis. The mixed methodological approach used in this thesis enabled me to shift attention from institutional actors such as SGBs (Chapters Three and Four) and the media (Chapter Five) to a grassroots perspective of legitimacy (Chapter Six). This approach effectively captured all the elements needed if we are to understand moral panics and legitimacy.

Organisational Case Study Framework

The choice of research subject and research sites as well as the specific goals of the project strongly shapes the qualitative research process. As Ragin (1994:85) points out:

When the goal of the research is to give voice, a specific group is chosen for study. When the goal is to assess historical or cultural significance, a specific set of events or other slice of social life is selected. When the goal is to advance theory, a case may be chosen because it is unusual in some way and thus presents a special opportunity for the elaboration of new ideas.

Drawing on Ragin (1994), I apply a multiple case study methodology to 'assess historical or cultural significance' of the anti-doping campaign. The case studies enabled me to examine changing attitudes towards drug use in sport and to question the socially-mediated nature of common understandings and justifications of this issue. The case studies also helped to identify interest-groups active in the debate. According to Yin (2003:30), case studies involve 'analytic generalisations' of findings to theory rather than 'statistical generalisation.' Analysis of case study data is based on a comparison of the empirical data to an existing theoretical framework (Kirk and Miller 1986; Mitchell 1983). To consider the doping debate as a moral panic, I use the theoretical framework that draws on the work of Cohen (1973), Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a; 2009) and others who have used a social constructionist lens (see Chapter One).

The case study analysis sought to capture the evolutionary nature of anti-doping policies, including changing attitudes to drug use in sport over time; and added a longitudinal and historical dimension to the study. The relevance of this is that situating the debate within its socio-historical context helps to explain the relationship of these processes to the broader social environment. As others have shown, 'both doping and the fear of doping are cultural constructs that evolve over time' (Connor 2009b; Hoberman 1992:106). Using a Weberian inspired consideration of legitimacy, the case studies tested whether contests surrounding the legitimacy and moral authority of SGBs form a central part of the doping controversy. They assisted in the exploration of the hypothesis that the construction of doping as a moral panic is driven by a concern to restore or maintain the legitimacy of elite SGBs.

From an elites-engineered moral panic perspective, the construction of a moral panic is concerned with maintaining the interests of dominant groups (see Chapter One). This is no less relevant in sport where 'owners and administrators of sporting competitions, as ... key stakeholder, have a vested

interest in maintaining the marketability of their sport to secure some of the increasing sponsorship and rights deals being offered' (Connor 2009b:333). In the commercial context of modern sport, maintaining control and demonstrating the ability to ensure a 'clean' sport is increasingly important. Bette and Schimank (2001:52-3) also suggest that continued doping scandals carry the potential to give elite sports a 'bad reputation' with the public turning away from 'a scenery of liars and inhumanity':

... without the interest of the audience, neither mass media nor economic or political sponsors are interested in elite sports. These three kinds of actors are not interested in top-class sport itself. For them, only the interest of the public is of importance which manifests itself as viewing figures, circulations, publicity value etc [*sic*]. It is these environmental actors and the audience who pays to get into the stadiums where the money comes from. Sport associations need these resources to reproduce themselves and to grow. In this way, the doping problem could result in a crisis of legitimacy which seriously harms elite sports and its associations.

However, there is currently little evidence to suggest that audiences are turning away from sport as a result of continued doping scandals. In fact, while the Olympic Games, Tour de France and professional baseball have all experienced doping scandals, they continue to attract sponsorship, broadcasting and fan support (Connor 2009b). Organisers of the Tour de France estimate that 'upwards of 18,000,000 spectators, of all ages, view the Tour from the side of the road, having picnics and camping out' (Schneider 2006:216). Mignon (2003:227-28) notes that the Tour attracts a 'publicity caravan of 250 vehicles representing 40 brands' with 'millions of television viewers' (see also Palmer 2001). Nevertheless, to ensure continued commercial gains associated with ongoing audience support, not to mention perceptions of organisational legitimacy, SGBs actively demonstrate a commitment to anti-doping. Accordingly, the case studies chosen need to provide an opportunity to investigate the claim that constructing doping as a moral panic relates to SGBs' efforts to retain the legitimacy and moral authority to govern and control their sporting communities.

This translated into finding SGBs as organisational case studies that experienced a challenge to their legitimacy and moral authority as a result of doping events. In other words, I sought case studies that would enable me to explore the role of legitimacy in the debate over doping. The case study

selection process was also valuable as it revealed the significance of examining the way that interactions between sporting bodies impact on the doping debate. This led to exploring issues of governance and control as well as whether media reports of doping challenge SGB legitimacy and contribute to the construction of doping as a moral panic.

Case study selection

The selection of the IOC as the first case study is based on the position of Olympic sport as the 'pinnacle' of sporting endeavour and the role of the IOC as guardians of the Olympic Movement (Schneider 2000:228). However, the IOC is not immune to criticism. Claims that the IOC's failure to 'live up to the so-called Olympic ideals has produced a number of major crises' (Milton-Smith 2002:34) such as the Salt Lake City bribery scandal, which raised questions over legitimacy of the IOC (Hoberman 2001; MacAloon 2001; Simson and Jennings 1992; see also Chapter Three). The creation of WADA as a new global institutional response to doping following the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, which I outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, informed its selection as the second case study (see Chapter Three).

The creation of WADA as the institution responsible for the global implementation and regulation of anti-doping policies appears to have implications for the authority of SGBs to govern and control their particular sporting community. Given its significant reluctance to incorporate WADA defined anti-doping measures, I selected the AFL as a third case study (see Chapter Four). Selection of the AFL flowed directly from ideas developed in the initial case studies and provided an opportunity to explore the multi-dimensional nature of the anti-doping debate. Drawing on the existing literature documenting drug use in sport as well as moral panic literature, these case studies enabled me to begin testing the hypothesis that the doping debate is an example of an elites-engineered institutionalised moral panic in response to a crisis of SGBs' legitimacy and moral authority. In the case of the AFL, this translates into asking whether the AFL's interactions with WADA illustrate power relationships between organisational actors as they seek to secure and maintain the legitimacy and moral authority to regulate and control sport. The AFL also provided an opportunity to explore the role of the

media and how stakeholders call on the media to make and contest claims to legitimacy and the authority to govern and control elite sport.

Methodological constraints and considerations: case studies

Qualitative case study data are attractive for a number of reasons. For example, they possess the ability to provide accounts that are ‘rich, full, earthy, holistic, real’ (Miles 1979:590). However, case study methodology is criticised as an approach that ‘cannot be expected to transcend story-telling’ with a focus on a small number of cases creating concern over the representativeness of cases chosen (Miles 1979:597-600; Ragin 1994). As Flyvbjerg (2006:219) states:

You cannot generalise from a single case ... and social science is about generalising ... the case study may be well suited for pilot studies but not for full-fledged research schemes ... the case study is subjective, giving too much scope for the researcher’s own interpretation. Thus, the validity of case studies would be wanting.

In addressing these claims, it is important to note that case studies do not imply and are not restricted to a particular type of evidence or data gathering method. Rather, case studies may gather evidence using ‘fieldwork, archival records, verbal reports, observations, or any combination of these’ (Yin 1981:58). A ‘case’ can be whatever ‘bounded system’ is of interest. These can include an ‘institution, a program, a responsibility, a collection, or a population’ with the area of interest what is, and what is not, happening within the particular ‘bounded system’ under consideration (Stake 1978:7). Strategically selected case studies enable identification of a given issue as well as clarification of its deeper causes and their consequences rather than simply describing a problem or how frequently it may occur (Flyvbjerg 2006; Stake 1978). The criticism that presentation of a typical case study report uses a narrative style lacking a predictable structure can also be avoided by building on a clear conceptual framework (Yin 1981). Placing a Weberian consideration of legitimacy within a moral panic framework, I strategically selected organisational case studies to investigate my hypothesis that doping can be conceptualised as a moral panic driven by an intention to restore the legitimacy of elite SGBs. The case studies provided an initial opportunity to test the plausibility of that hypothesis.

As noted above, case studies face the criticism that limiting the research focus to a small number of cases raises concerns around representativeness and generalisability of results. To address this common criticism, I supplemented the case studies with a content analysis of media reports of doping. The media play an important role in the construction of a moral panic (see Chapter One). Their inclusion in my mixed methods research design was therefore crucial for examining doping as a moral panic. This also provides a good example of the way that the specificity of the problem under consideration determines the research methods used.

Content Analysis

The content analysis focused on examining media reports as evidence to test the suggestion that the doping debate illustrates a socially constructed moral panic, and forms both a quantitative and qualitative element of my mixed methods research design. This was possible as content analysis includes examining how issues are ‘categorised’ as well as how these categories are used ‘in concrete activities like telling stories’:

[T]he role of textual researchers is not to criticize or to assess particular texts in terms of apparently ‘objective’ standards. It is rather to analyse how they work to achieve particular effects - to identify the elements used and the functions these play. (Silverman 2001:122-24)

Of interest for this thesis are the types of ‘stories’ about doping told by the media and SGBs as well as the functions these may play in the construction of a moral panic. My application of content analysis draws on Williams’s (2006:116) investigation of media representations of sexual assault cases in the AFL. She examined media coverage to ‘question whether, and how, a folk devil may have been created.’ I used content analysis to examine whether media sources, and SGBs use of the media, construct doping as a ‘moral panic’ that creates a PED-using ‘folk devil’ to restore or maintain the status quo (Cohen 1973; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a). The question here is whether SGBs’ use media coverage to enhance their legitimacy by engaging in consensus-making activities to support WADA as the necessary, specific response to doping (see Chapter One). However, the content analysis can also illustrate how consensus-making efforts of dominant social actors, such as

WADA, are voiced and given expression in media reports while acknowledging that these claims do not go uncontested (see Chapter Five).

The content analysis focused on the doping debate in the context of elite international sport, with online newspapers as the principal sources of data. I searched these sources using standardised 'Google Alerts' and combinations of search strings with phrases including 'doping', 'performance-enhancing drugs,' 'World Anti-Doping Agency,' and 'International Olympic Committee.' I located additional material using keywords in databases such as Australian Public Affairs, Australian Public Affairs Information Service, JSTOR and ProQuest among others. Data collection occurred between mid-2006 and mid-2009, generating a data set of over 10,000 articles. To manage the complexity of data and analysis I refined the data set by limiting inclusion to articles appearing in 2007/2008 with the words 'doping' or 'drug' in the headline.

The increasingly interdependent nature of the modern media with information regularly exchanged between wire services and newspapers complicates data collection. While increasing the speed that news flows to the public, this encourages 'a parrot-like character in which the various media segments tend to reproduce rather than examine one another's views' (Knopf 1970:21). To overcome unnecessary article duplication and produce a data set that could be more easily analysed, I sorted the data by publisher and limited inclusion to publishers with 15 or more articles.

Methodological constraints and considerations: the content analysis

The benefit of content analysis is that it provides readily accessible data that is not reliant upon access to a relevant population and associated ethical considerations. However, there are a number of constraints related to a content analysis strategy. As Silverman (2001:121) notes: 'Just as we may be tempted to treat interview responses as true or false depictions of inner "experience", so we may scan texts in terms of their correspondence to "reality."' To overcome this issue, content analysis can examine texts for categories or themes using central concepts or statements, as well as the 'communicative context' in which those statements appear and assign these to relevant research categories (Flick 2002:194). Cohen (1973:7,18) described

the media's use of melodramatic language as a 'moral panic inventory' that exaggerates the extent of a problem (see Chapter One). To test the hypothesis that media coverage contributes to the construction of doping as a moral panic, I examined media reports for evidence of a 'moral panic inventory' that emphasised the moral dimension of doping (see Chapter Five). I searched for words classifying PEDs as a moral problem or social danger requiring action to resolve, such as WADA's reference to the 'fight against doping in sport' (WADA 2008a).

As I noted earlier in this section, one strength of content analysis is its ability to examine how issues are 'categorised' and used in 'telling stories' (Silverman 2001:123-24). Accordingly, I examined the context surrounding instances of moral panic language to explore the types of 'stories' presented concerning PEDs. This enabled me to test the hypothesis that media reports, and SGBs' use of media reports, contribute to the social construction of doping as a moral panic driven by a concern to restore perceptions of SGB legitimacy.

However, as I was interested in identifying the voices evident in the anti-doping debate, I also examined the context surrounding athletes' use of moral panic words. This is significant as athletes are often 'routinely relegated to the margins of the debate,' based on SGBs' assumptions that athletes' interests correspond to their own. Independent athletes associations are rare (Houlihan 2004:421). For example, a group of Olympic athletes, including Mark Tewksbury, Dawn Fraser and Zola Bud amongst others, launched Olympic Advocates Together Honorably (OATH) in 1999 to campaign for athletes' rights. The organisation experienced financial collapse within two years (AthletesCAN 1999; Houlihan 2004; OATH 1999a; OATH 1999b). As Houlihan (2004:421-22) notes:

Sport policy is generally made for, or on behalf of, athletes, rarely in consultation with athletes, and almost never in partnership with athletes. In the UK, with the exception of professional football and, to a lesser extent, professional cricket, rugby union and rugby league, there are few sports where athletes have an organized and independent voice.

However, 'talk about athletes permeates our newspapers, magazines, television programs and the internet' where athletes lives are 'described,

held accountable and evaluated' (Lamont-Mills and Christensen 2008:251-52; see also Rowe 1994). Paccagnella and Grove (1997:180) also note:

The public is constantly being presented with images from sport, and high-profile elite athletes are continuously being scrutinized because of their exposure in the visual and print media. Our knowledge and perceptions of these sport stars are shaped by their constant presence in the media.

As well as athletes' personal characteristics and behaviour, a significant area of interest for sports consumers is whether the way in which athletes achieve success complies with culturally-defined norms. This includes classifications of PED use as unacceptable (Fairchild 1989; Paccagnella and Grove 1997). I explore athletes' responses to allegations of PED use and their 'stories' of doping as presented in media reports. This is an important area of investigation for this thesis because, as Hoberman (1992:101) points out:

This conflict, with sports bureaucrats and journalists arrayed against the athletes who practice doping and attempt to avoid detection, is the visible core of the 'doping problem' in high-performance sport.

Although athletes are a key stakeholder in modern sport, the anti-doping framework centres around regulating these individuals irrespective of whether or not PED use has been alleged or proven to have taken place. In other words, the current anti-doping approach assumes that all athletes are potential 'folk devils.' The danger that this presents to the stability of sport necessitates, and legitimates, strict surveillance. Accordingly, I examined media reports in the content analysis to explore how athletes discussed doping, either in terms of accusations of PED use made against them or in relation to their views on the current anti-doping framework.

Further highlighting the value of a mixed methods research design, the main themes of the content analysis - whether media reports contributed to the social construction of doping as a moral panic driven by elite SGBs' concerns to restore legitimacy - emerged directly from the case studies. The content analysis, in conjunction with the case studies, enabled initial data collection and analysis. They also assisted in the construction of a framework for the online survey and interviews, which I used specifically to explore perceptions

of the legitimacy of SGBs held by members of the sporting community in Australia.

Quantitative Methods - the e-Survey

The socio-historical case studies and content analysis provided useful tools to test the hypothesis that media reports challenge the legitimacy of SGBs and contribute to doping as a moral panic. To test the suggestion that doping presents sporting bodies with a crisis of legitimacy, I sought the perceptions of members of the Australian grassroots sporting community using a quantifiable e-Survey (see Appendix 2.3). I defined grassroots sporting community as organised club level sport, which distinguishes these individuals from those participating in recreational sporting activities. As Cantelon (2005:84) notes, 'high performance' sport is not restricted to elite or Olympic participation and includes 'elite minor league competition in the local community.' The target audience included athletes, support staff, medical staff and sporting administrators. The objective of the e-Survey was to examine the views of members of the grassroots sporting community of NSOs' legitimacy using Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria. I listed those criteria in the Introduction, however, in summary they are:

- That anti-doping laws and regulations are morally right, fair and just (that is, there is a valid basis for anti-doping laws);
- There is an appropriate agency for enforcement which enjoys scientific credibility as well as constitutional or legislative authority;
- Testing procedures acknowledge athletes' rights, are fair and applied equitably across athletes;
- Testing procedures are scientifically accurate and effective;
- Sanctions for breaches of anti-doping law are fair and just and applied equitably across athletes. (Donovan et al. 2002:277)

I segregated the data collected in the e-Survey across four key areas. These were identified as central elements of the anti-doping campaign based on the socio-historical case studies and content analysis. Those topic areas are:

- Information and Education - perceptions of NSOs' provision of information and education about permissible substances;
- The Current Framework: Testing and Sanctions - including scientific accuracy of testing as well as equity and consistency of sanctions;
- WADA and the WADC - including values in anti-doping; and
- Athletes and PEDs - perceptions of factors influencing athletes' doping decisions, including strict liability and NSOs' responsibility to athletes.

These topic areas are linked to central elements of the current anti-doping approach. For example, consideration of the IOC and WADA as case studies revealed that education as a tool to change athletes' behaviour has a historical foundation, commencing with the IOC and remaining a central part of the WADC (see Chapter Three). Consequently, I used the e-Survey and later interviews with members of Australian NSOs to investigate whether there was any relationship between the provision of anti-doping education and perceptions of legitimacy. The case studies also highlighted that SGBs are required to adopt a WADC-aligned anti-doping framework including testing protocols and sanctions, such as the strict liability principle (see Chapter Three). The AFL case study illustrated the debate surrounding application of strict liability (see Chapter Four). Consequently, the e-Survey explored views of the testing and sanctions framework as applied by Australian NSOs and the implications for perceptions of legitimacy. The e-Survey focused the investigation primarily on perceptions of legitimacy.

I structured the e-Survey into six sections. The first section collected demographic details of respondents' roles in the sporting community, levels and types of sporting participation. The e-Survey respondents identified as athletes, administrators, coaches and officials at club level, medical and support staff, doping control officers, team managers, sporting event promoters and parents of athletes. They also identified their minimum current level of sporting activity as club level (see Appendix 2.4). Determining respondents' levels of participation was relevant as it demonstrates that the research participants' views were based on their experiences and knowledge of the current anti-doping model as applied by their NSO. In other words, respondents did not simply engage in recreational sport but had some awareness of their obligations under their NSOs' regulatory framework. In the final section I invited respondents to participate in a qualitative interview and, if they did, to provide their contact details. Sections two to five collected data concerning the legitimacy criteria, as listed above.

Section two of the e-Survey canvassed respondents' views of NSOs' efforts in terms of distribution of anti-doping information and education. This was relevant as the case studies highlighted the importance of education, which

form a central part of WADA's and the AFL's anti-doping approach (see Chapters Three and Four). The content analysis also showed that sporting bodies use the media to emphasise the importance of education to prevent the emergence of PED-using 'folk devils' (see Chapter Five). Accordingly, section two of the e-Survey asked individuals to indicate if NSOs distributed information and education concerning whether different substances and medications are permissible or banned. The main area of interest here was whether members of the Australian grassroots sporting community felt that their NSOs provided effective and appropriate anti-doping education and any implications for perceptions of NSOs' legitimacy.

Concentrating on perceptions of legitimacy, section three operationalised Donovan et al.'s (2002) criteria for organisational legitimacy, which they suggest is important to ensure anti-doping compliance. I used a Likert scale to determine respondents' levels of agreement with each of the criteria, which I listed earlier in this section. Section three of the e-Survey also explicitly asked respondents '*Do you think that NSOs are facing a crisis of legitimacy because some athletes continue to use PES and/or methods?*' I cross-tabulated the responses from this question with responses from other questions throughout the e-Survey. This enabled me to compare the responses of research participants that indicated a crisis of legitimacy with those that did not and identify whether any factors influenced their attitudes towards NSOs' legitimacy.

Questions in section four were informed by WADA's claims that sporting organisations adopting the WADC 'stand a far greater chance in terms of safeguarding their sports' and anti-doping programs' integrity and credibility' (Pound 2007:1). Section four of the e-Survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with that statement as well as with the central themes of WADA's anti-doping campaign. These are that doping is a risk to athletes' health, is unfair to non-doping athletes, provides a bad role model for youth, is increasingly a public health issue and is morally wrong and against the 'spirit of sport' (WADA 2009b). From a Weberian perspective, the WADC represents a form of legally established rational rules premised on 'promoting and instilling the values inherent in the Spirit of Sport' (WADA

October 2009; see Chapter Three). Agreement would suggest support for the moral authority and legitimacy of WADA's current model of rules and regulations based on shared values of the significance of sport as a social institution.

The purpose of the questions in section five was to investigate whether respondents identify structural pressures as influencing athletes doping decisions. This contrasts with the dominant approach to investigating PED use, which focuses on individual personality traits or predispositions as responsible for doping behaviour (Donovan et al. 2002; Jalleh and Donovan 2008; see Chapter One). The main objective of Section five was to establish a foundation for the later interviews, which explored views of WADA's strict liability principle (see Chapter Three) and NSOs' responsibilities to athletes.

In contrast with the content analysis, which considered international sport, the e-Survey focused on the Australian sporting context. Although I approached a number of International Federations (IFs) with a request to distribute the e-Survey, the lack of response within the timeframe available for fieldwork limited its distribution to Australian sporting organisations. This prevented me from making any generalisations beyond the Australian context. There have been a number of surveys that investigate issues such as perceived prevalence of PED use or factors that may influence athletes' doping behaviour. For example, Hanstad and Loland (2009) conducted an electronic survey of athletes' attitudes towards WADA's introduction of new measures of athlete monitoring. Using surveys and interviews, Mugford et al. (1999:5) conducted research into elite athletes' perceptions of the 'effectiveness of the establishment's response to doping cases.' However, these surveys do not discuss their findings in the context of perceptions of SGBs' legitimacy. Consequently, a direct comparison of e-Survey design was not possible.

Rather than taking a random sample, I applied a specific set of criteria to determine organisations to approach for the e-Survey. In Australia, SGBs are classified as National Sporting Organisations (NSOs) and this terminology is used to describe organisations for both the e-Survey and the interviews. This

classification follows the Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS 2001) definition of Sports and Physical Recreation Administrative Organisations:

This class consists of units mainly engaged in the administration and/or control of sports or physical recreation disciplines and/or groups of clubs. These units may be responsible for the policies, rules and regulations governing the conduct of an individual sporting or physical recreation discipline, or may distribute funding to affiliated member organisations.

The selection criteria I used identified organisations recognised as NSOs by the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) and which receive Federal government funding through the ASC (ASC 2007a). This reflects the Australian Federal government's 'zero tolerance approach to doping in sport' with access to ASC funding dependent on implementing WADC-compliant policies (Horvath 2006; Stewart 2006; 2007; see Chapter Four). The *ASC National Sporting Organisation 2006/07 Grants and AIS Allocation* lists 56 sporting groups as receiving ASC co-ordinated Federal government funding (ASC 2007b).

To render the project manageable, I refined the selection criteria by limiting inclusion to NSOs that received a minimum of AUD\$1,000,000 in the ASC 2006/07 Grants and AIS Allocation. Sports recognised by the IOC as governed by IFs and/or part of the Olympic program were also included (ASC 2007b; IOC 2007b). This reduced the potential sample to 28 NSOs (see Appendix 2.5). I included the ASC and the AIS, based on their establishment to develop Australia's Olympic athletes and the fact that the AIS receives government funds through the ASC. I also approached the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA), the organisation responsible for monitoring NSOs' compliance with the WADC and providing doping-control personnel and anti-doping educational material to NSOs. I included non-Olympic and professional sporting codes, specifically the AFL, football (soccer), rugby league, rugby union, netball, golf and cricket. These groups were included as they receive government funding through the ASC and are consequently required to implement WADA-aligned anti-doping frameworks (ASC 2007b).

To gauge athletes' perceptions of NSOs' regulatory response to PEDs, I approached a number of Players' Associations based on their membership of the Australian Athletes' Alliance (AAA). The AAA advocates on behalf of athletes at the state and national levels and represents over 2,000 of

Australia's elite and professional athletes. The groups represented by the AAA include the AFL, cricket, rugby union, rugby league, football (soccer), netball, swimming and, from 2010, professional jockeys (AAA 2007; AAA 2010). I selected the AAA because of their stated commitment to providing a unified representative voice on issues concerning athletes, including anti-doping initiatives such as the Australian government's National Anti-Doping (NAD) Scheme (AAA 2008). At the time of my fieldwork, the AAA was a newly-formed organisation with no centrally-located administrative structure. Consequently, I approached each individual member association separately. I also contacted associations representing sporting officials connected to sports represented by the AAA, such as the AFL Umpires Association, Professional Footballers' Association Inc. and the Australian Swimmers' Association amongst others (see Appendix 2.5). In cases where these groups were incorporated into the organisational structure of NSOs, I addressed my request to the NSO only.

The initial approach to all organisations took the form of an introductory e-mail with the first point of contact being the general information e-mail address listed on the website of the relevant organisation. The introductory e-mail outlined the research project, attached the Research Information Statement, requested assistance to distribute the e-Survey and suggested a meeting to explain the project in detail (see Appendix 2.6 and 2.7). I telephoned each organisation, using the general contact telephone number listed on the organisation's website approximately one week after sending the introductory e-mail. I implemented this approach on the recommendation of a senior member of one of the NSOs, based on their knowledge of information distribution in these types of organisations. More importantly, this approach, together with a follow-up telephone call, enabled me to create a point of contact with an individual within the organisation who, while not responsible for the final decision, assisted in identifying and contacting the relevant managerial officer. This helped me to circumvent issues of gate-keeping, which may otherwise have prevented me from gaining access to these organisations.

I approached a total of 47 organisations with a request to distribute the e-Survey. These consisted of 28 NSOs from the *ASC National Sporting*

Organisation 2006/07 Grants and AIS Allocation, nine Players Associations, seven Associations representing Umpires/Officials as well as the AIS, ASC and ASADA. Of the organisations approached, 22 agreed to distribute the e-Survey (16 NSOs, ASADA, the ASC, two Players Associations and two Umpires/Officials Associations). Three of the 47 organisations (one Players Association and two Umpires/Officials Associations) did not respond and 22 (13 NSOs, four Players Associations and five Umpires/Officials Associations) declined to participate. For some groups, reasons for refusal to participate included being ‘intensely focused on the [2008] Beijing Olympic Games.’ Others were reluctant to add to the already time-intensive demands on athletes by anti-doping organisations. For example, one NSO declined to participate on the basis that:

Athletes have to advise ASADA online everyday of their whereabouts and provide a one-hour time/place where they will be so they can be tested. While athletes can nominate the time, they resent the invasion of privacy and are sick and tired of filling in on-line forms.

Other groups highlighted limited organisational resources, apologising that their ‘one man organisation’ prevented their participation.

The most significant factors that contributed to organisations’ willingness to distribute the e-Survey were that it was quick, convenient and cost effective. The e-Survey removed the necessity for NSOs and associations to engage in extra administrative work. This was particularly beneficial for smaller NSOs with athletes scattered throughout Australia and internationally. For example, some NSOs simply included a hyperlink to the e-Survey in their monthly e-Newsletter or on their website. As well as the convenience of sending the e-Survey link directly to the NSO or association, this enhanced confidentiality for respondents. All responses arrived directly in my e-mail inbox with no indication of their point of origin. While I experienced strong support for distribution and return of the e-Survey, the methodological constraints encountered further highlight the value of a mixed methods framework.

Methodological constraints and considerations: the quantitative survey

The online, confidential nature of the e-Survey helped to alleviate any pressure respondents may have otherwise experienced to conform to socially desirable behaviour or to present their sport in a positive light. However, the

direct distribution of the e-Survey by participating organisations prevented me from determining sample response rates. This was specifically due to the fact that while including the e-Survey link in their regular newsletter distribution, NSOs did not disclose the actual number of recipients to me. Nevertheless, I received a total of 232 responses that I analysed using descriptive statistics, such as frequency distributions and chi-square cross-tabulations using SPSS software.

Qualitative Methods - the Interview Process

The e-Survey included provision for individuals to confidentially supply their contact details to arrange an interview. The value of using interviews in conjunction with surveys is supported by Anshel (1991) who notes that in his research 'a personal interview ... allowed for greater probing of certain responses to gain further understanding of the issues under discussion. Thus, the interviewer could ask for specific examples or for clarification of responses.'

Most interview participants resulted from an invitation in the e-Survey. The objective of the interviews was to gain further insight into views of the legitimacy of Australian NSOs' anti-doping efforts from athletes, support personnel and sporting administrators. I provided all interview participants with a Research Information Statement detailing the background to the study and outlining the purpose of the research. In line with the requirements of the Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee (Protocol: 2007/0192) I asked all interview participants to sign an Informed Consent Form and requested their permission to record the interview (see Appendix 2.8). The Interview Schedule (see Appendix 2.9) expanded on the e-Survey, with questions designed to draw out interview participants' perceptions of the current anti-doping approach.

I used open-ended semi-structured interview questions and the four key topic areas, listed earlier in this chapter, as a framework to operationalise the interview data collection. As demonstrated in other research into drugs in sport, this format enabled me to cover relevant interview topics while avoiding control over the interview or leading respondents in any particular

direction (Grogan et al. 2006). Following transcription of the recorded interviews, I disaggregated the data into the four topic areas, supplemented with unanticipated variables that emerged from the interview data. Table 2.3 outlines the four areas of interest and the variables that emerged from the data (see Appendix 2.10 for a detailed description).

Table 2.3: Summary - Key Topic Areas and Variables

Information and Education	Testing and Sanctions	WADA and the WADC	Strict Liability & Responsibility to Athletes
Access	Testing - Science, Procedures and Application	The Role of Values	Support Strict Liability
Delivery Methods	Barriers to Testing	Preferred Focus Anti-Doping Framework	The Procedural Framework and Qualifications
Education Barriers	Application of Sanctions	Perceptions of WADC	NSO Responsibility

The variables that emerged from the interview data added depth to and enhanced the validity of the e-Survey results, emphasising the value of a mixed methods approach. As with the e-Survey, and building on those responses, I commenced the interviews with questions to further probe participants’ views of NSOs’ provision of anti-doping information and education, as one of WADA’s key goals is developing anti-doping education programs and distributing anti-doping information (WADA October 2009). As WADA (2007b) state:

While deterrence and research play an important role in catching athletes who cheat by doping, in the long term education plays a central role in the creation of a true anti-doping culture ... For this reason, educating athletes, as well as their coaches, doctors, trainers, agents, and parents, about the dangers of doping and its consequences is a top priority for WADA.

The interviews explored participants’ views on accessing anti-doping information from their NSO and the extent to which this information was made available to the grassroots or non-elite levels. Because WADA’s preventative educational anti-doping strategy includes building a WADA-aligned values system, I asked all participants whether NSOs’ provision of anti-doping information and education affected their attitudes towards the legitimacy of their NSO. WADA argue that values-based education is important

because athletes' decisions to use PEDs do not result simply from a lack of information. According to WADA's website:

Athletes who dope usually make this decision being fully aware of the necessary factual information about doping and its consequences. Those who decide not to dope will often do so based on personal convictions, of which the foundation is a strong values system. A preventive education program aimed at values development will ensure that young people, athletes and athlete support personnel have reasons to decide to avoid doping and to stick to that decision. (WADA October 2009)

I sought participants' views of the efficacy of values in an anti-doping approach as well as the validity of the WADC as a universal anti-doping code. This is in accordance with WADA's educational framework, which incorporates a values-based orientation to doping that highlights the moral and physical dangers of the practice. Underpinning these questions was my speculation that agreement with WADA's view that PEDs represent a moral and physical danger would suggest that NSOs evidencing a similar approach may enjoy positive perceptions of organisational legitimacy.

WADA's claims that the WADC is the necessary and appropriate regulatory mechanism for safeguarding sport (Pound 2007) was explored through participants' views of factors that impact on NSOs' credibility and integrity. More importantly, the interview questions enabled me to examine whether members of the grassroots sporting community supported the criteria for organisational legitimacy suggested by Donovan et al. (2002), which I summarised earlier in this chapter. To operationalise this line of inquiry for the interview process, I asked interview participants:

- Based on your experiences, how do you feel about the current anti-doping framework of testing and sanctions?
- How does this affect your perceptions of the legitimacy of your NSO, if at all?
- Do you feel that your NSO is actively working to ensure that anti-doping procedures are not only effective in deterring or detecting PED use, but is doing so in a manner that is fair and equitable to all participants?

Issues of fairness and equity are important in the context of the severe penalties under the strict liability principle that holds athletes responsible for any banned substances found in their body. The strict liability principle is a central element of WADA's anti-doping approach (see Chapter Three).

These questions are particularly relevant to perceptions of NSOs' organisational legitimacy, with research suggesting a lack of support for such an inflexible criterion. For example, DrugScope (2004:21) note that a strict liability approach may lead to a situation that 'many people will find hard to reconcile with their sense of natural justice.' I asked participants whether they felt that a strict liability approach effectively deterred athletes from PED use. This line of questioning enabled me to explore participants' opinions of NSOs' responsibility to help athletes deal with structural pressures that may affect decisions to use drugs. The value of the interview data for the central focus of this thesis is that they take account of the evaluative subjective nature of legitimacy.

Methodological constraints and considerations: the interviews

As I have noted earlier in this chapter, the pressure to conform to community expectations makes reliance on investigative journalism or biographical accounts problematic. This also impacts on interview research. Individuals may hesitate to reveal their own personal use or knowledge of others' use of PEDs, may seek to present their own behaviour, as well as their sport, in an acceptable light or deny the existence or prevalence of doping in their sport. These issues also make locating individuals willing to participate in an interview difficult. The e-Survey played a significant role in securing interview participants.

The choice of interview participants for this thesis was wholly dependent upon the willingness of individuals to participate further in the research. Thirty-three individuals who completed the e-Survey indicated their willingness to participate in an interview. However, changes in respondents' circumstances, such as paid work commitments, the hospitalisation of one respondent after a serious cycling accident, participants' overseas travel, incorrect contact details and the failure of several participants to attend the prearranged interview reduced the initial sample from 33 to 23. Despite this, I conducted a total of 28 interviews, with four female and 24 male participants, with the five additional interviews resulting from participants' introductions to others in their sporting community.

The minimum level of sporting participation for all interview participants was competitive club level sport. However, a number of participants held multiple roles in their sporting community and engaged in multiple sporting contexts. For example, in addition to club level sport eight also competed in Masters Games events, eight were retired representative or professional athletes, nine were engaged in coaching, five were involved in club administration and one participant had formerly been involved in developing anti-doping policies at the level of Australian State government (see Appendix 2.11). The phrase ‘grassroots sports community’ indicates organised club level sport, distinguished from participation in recreational sporting activities. Targeting organised club level sport is relevant to the goals of this thesis, as participation at that level requires that individuals obtain a licence from their NSO, which includes agreeing to comply with WADA and WADC-based policies. With participation dependent upon compliance with a WADA-based anti-doping framework, including testing and sanctions, individuals’ perceptions of the system have implications for the legitimacy and efficacy of the current anti-doping model.

Like the e-Survey, the interview data collection focused on perceptions of legitimacy. The interviews enabled me to reinforce my speculation that expressions of support for the current anti-doping framework, as applied by Australian NSOs, suggest that WADA and the WADC enjoy perceptions of legitimacy. I also speculated that if the data revealed qualified support for WADA and the WADC, my hypothesis that doping events create a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs would enjoy some support. The e-Survey and interviews also provided opportunities to consider whether the creation of WADA, in response to such a crisis, illustrates an elites-engineered institutionalised moral panic. The point of interest here was whether a level of pre-existing community concern that doping is problematic behaviour promotes the construction of doping as a moral panic.

Conclusion

The mixed methods research design allowed me to address issues of reliability, validity and generalisation and to ‘capture a more complete, *holistic*, and contextual portrayal of the unit under study’ (Jick 1979:602

emphasis in original). Drawing on a range of sources with a variety of methodological tools, I explored changing attitudes towards drug use in sport as well as identifying the themes of the anti-doping debate and the stakeholders active in that debate. The mixed methods research design also enabled me to investigate the views of individuals in the grassroots sporting community towards NSOs' legitimacy based on their anti-doping efforts.

More importantly, the mixed methods employed enabled me to test the main hypothesis of this study, which is that continued media reports of doping present elite SGBs with a crisis of legitimacy. By exploring SGBs' interactions with WADA, the socio-historical case studies helped to identify and explore the multi-dimensional and contested nature of legitimacy as well as issues of governance and control. The case studies also suggested that WADA plays an important role that contributes to the construction of doping as an elites-engineered institutionalised moral panic with PED-using 'folk devils.' Commencing with the IOC and WADA as the first of the socio-historical case studies, the following four chapters present the empirical material gathered to investigate that hypothesis.

The IOC and WADA - Legitimacy and a Moral Panic

In Chapter One I discussed existing research approaches used to explain illegal drug use in sport as well as the theoretical basis underpinning this thesis. The key hypothesis for this thesis is whether continued media reports of doping present SGBs with a crisis of legitimacy. Complementing this central hypothesis I apply a social constructionist lens to consider whether, driven by concerns to restore or maintain their legitimacy, elite SGBs contribute to doping as a ‘moral panic.’ The previous chapter presented my mixed methods research design, which commences in this chapter with the first socio-historical case study of the IOC and WADA.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of legitimacy in the debate over doping using the IOC and WADA as case studies (see Chapter One). As others have provided in-depth historical coverage of changes to sport over time and the political and social context surrounding the IOC, I do not intend to revisit that literature (for example, see Brown 2005; Guttmann 1984; 1992; 2004; Hill 1992; Hoberman 1986; Houlihan 1994; MacAloon 1981; 1984; 2006; Riordan 1993; Young 2005 among others). I draw on that literature to outline changing attitudes towards drug use in sport, the IOC’s response to PEDs and implications for their legitimacy leading to the creation of WADA. This enables me to place the doping debate in socio-historical context.

The next section discusses the historical basis for the moral authority and legitimacy of the IOC. I then outline the historical use of drugs in sport. This includes a consideration of the manner in which attitudes towards drugs in sport in the twentieth century affected the IOC’s legitimacy in the context of anti-doping regulation. The complexity of factors influencing the introduction of anti-doping policies has been discussed in the literature (see for example Dimeo 2007; 2009; Hoberman 1992; 2005; Houlihan 2002; Moller 2005; Wrynn 2004 amongst others). In this chapter, I draw on some key events and factors

to consider their relationship to perceptions of the IOC's legitimacy leading to the creation of WADA.

The IOC and Legitimacy

Suggestions that the IOC is in a crisis or lacks legitimacy are not recent developments and not isolated to the issue of PEDs¹. For example, Hoberman (1986:5) notes:

From Mexico City to Los Angeles, five successive Olympiads have been tarnished by political scandals, two of them involving mass murders ... there is inherent in global sport, and in the Olympic movement in particular, a moral vacuum from which political crisis derive [*sic*].

However, the IOC has long held onto idealised notions of its role as promoter of social order and cohesion. This can be traced to Baron Pierre de Coubertin's 1894 revival of the ancient Olympics. Coubertin founded the modern Olympics on values associated with the ideals of amateurism, with participation linked to 'love of sport and play' (Allison 1993; Hill 1993). For Coubertin, the important element of Olympic sport was 'not winning but taking part. The essential thing in life is not conquering, but fighting well' (cited in Donohoe and Johnson 1986:128).

We can also apply a Weberian lens to the early sporting context. From this perspective, amateur athletes competed based on shared values over the 'love of the activity and its intrinsic moral and physical benefits.' Athletes voluntarily agreed to the authority of athletic associations as 'guardians' of the amateur order (MacAloon 1981:301 n229; MacAloon 2006; see Chapter One). Legitimacy based on a framework of rational, consciously crafted rules, is also evident in the early Olympic Movement. Influencing Coubertin in his Olympic revival was the shift towards codified rules and regulations to order social life, including in sport, which took place during the Industrial Revolution. Described as a process of 'sportisation,' that period linked codified sporting contests with the introduction of more formalised rules and

¹ Riordan (1993:31) notes: 'We have witnessed a number of boycotts and drug scandals, two communist Olympic hosts (Yugoslavia and the USSR), open professionalism, the upsurge of the Afro-Asian challenge, the expulsion and re-admittance of South Africa, just to name some of the most vexing.' Other issues include political tension between China and Taiwan, the 'two Koreas,' the Tlatelolco (1968 Mexico Olympics) and Black September (1972 Munich Olympics) massacres (Berg 2008; Houlihan 2005; Nafziger 1992; Torres and Dyreson 2005).

norms to govern social behaviour (Boyes 2001; Gruneau 1993). Implementation of codified rules and regulations, or codes of conduct, required institutional foundations, such as the early IOC, which performed the educational role and championed moral values underpinning the Olympic Movement through the *Olympic Charter*. As Schneider (2000:225) notes:

From their inception, the Olympic Games and the Olympic movement have been intended as vehicles for social change. Pierre de Coubertin's grand vision was that sport could contribute to the personal and moral development of young people and that a great international sporting festival could bring the world together in peace and celebration ... The ideals and aspirations of the Olympic movement still resonate and the IOC, through the *Olympic Charter*, still expresses these noble sentiments.

The *Charter* reflects Weber's point that in modern social life claims to legitimacy and authority rest on codified rules and regulations with a foundation in shared values (see Chapter One). In the case of the IOC, the shared values underpinning the *Charter* are the ideals associated with amateur sport. Both the *Charter* and the objectives of the Olympic Movement are fundamentally political in character. From the time Coubertin revived the Olympic Movement, the IOC has represented itself as a 'quintessential expression of internationalism' (Gillen 1994/1995:6; Houlihan 2005). Reflecting the political ideology underpinning the Olympic Movement the *Charter* states:

Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the *educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles*. The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity. (IOC 2007a:11 emphasis added)

The ideals of Olympic sport and its function as a moral and educational tool to steer social change are clearly evident in the *Charter*. Emphasising this point, Schneider (2000:225) describes the Olympic Movement as a 'public trust ... established to promote the ideals of Olympism.' However, as guardians of the Olympic Movement and the ideals of Olympism the IOC's legitimacy rests on their accountability to stakeholders. In the modern sporting context, stakeholders include the public, athletes, governments and commercial interests (Schneider 2000). Accountability has implications for the IOC's

legitimacy and requires transparency on their part, with activities, including policy initiatives open to public scrutiny. As noted in Chapter One, these elements are also important for the legitimacy of anti-drug policies (Battin et al. 2008; Buti and Fridman 1994).

In the twentieth century, the claim of the IOC to legitimacy as upholders of the ethics of Olympic competition came to include anti-doping regulation. As Lord Killanin, IOC president from 1972 to 1980 (IOC 2010), commented: 'We wish to do good to the human being, the person, by creating the complete human, physically and mentally, but not by creating some artificial robot' (cited in Hoberman 1986:30). However, there are tensions here that affect the IOC's claim to legitimacy and moral authority as guardians of the Olympic Movement. As the driving force behind the Olympic Movement and with control over the Olympic Games, by the mid-twentieth century the IOC represented the 'most powerful sporting organisation in the world with global influence on the way that people understood, organised and played sport at a number of different levels' (Wamsley and Young 2005:xiii). This placed it in a position to take a significant leadership role in global sporting governance, including regulating or defining acceptable practices and behaviour (Boyes 2001). However, the IOC's strict adherence to amateur ideals - in contrast to professional sport which was argued to debase and corrupt sport - made it difficult for the organisation to recognise and take action to address doping in Olympic sport (Allison 1993; Cantelon 2005; Hill 1993; Hoberman 2005). As Guttman (1984:123) notes:

Although the IOC took the problem of drugs seriously and began to take measures against anabolic steroids and other agents ... Brundage [IOC President from 1952 to 1972 (IOC 2010)] was never as concerned about doping as he was about professionalisation. Of course he condemned the athletes who popped pills in order to gain a competitive edge over a more sportsmanlike opponent, but drugs never seemed quite the image of evil that Mammon did.

Nevertheless, as early as the mid-twentieth century other social groups such as public health reformers were expressing concern over doping and the dangers it presented to athletes' health. The next section outlines the socio-historical context surrounding drug use in sport and broader social factors

influencing attitudes towards doping as well as the changing nature of modern sport.

Overview - Drug Use in Sport

Drug and substance use in sport have a long history. Over time, a range of groups, including early Olympians, Roman gladiators, the ancient Greeks and South American Indians, used stimulants such as herbal mixtures, wild mushrooms and plant seeds to improve performance, overcome fatigue and injury and increase endurance (Birchard 2000; Buti and Fridman 2001; Woodland 1980; Yesalis and Bahrke 2005). There is no evidence describing such substance use as doping or deviant behaviour, as Ordway (1998:16) notes:

Historically it appears that no moral distinction was made between a heavyweight wrestler choosing to eat fatty meat and a Roman gladiator using non-dietary substances to enhance bravery and aggression.

Historical evidence traces the origin of doping to an eighteenth century drink known as '*dop*,' a type of South African brandy of walnut extract, xanthines and alcohol used to improve endurance in ceremonial dances. Over time the term came to refer to other stimulating drinks (WADA 2006c). The sporting connection to doping appears in the nineteenth century with a narcotic potion described as *dop* used to influence the outcome of bets by reducing racehorses' and greyhounds' winning chances (Donohoe and Johnson 1986; Verroken 2005; Voy 1991). Anti-doping policies and testing began in horse-racing at the turn of the twentieth century driven by concerns that the practice was unfair to gamblers (Ordway 1998; Stokvis 2003; Verroken 2000; Yesalis and Cowart 1998). This is not to suggest that human athletes did not use substances to enhance performance. However, as the historical evidence reveals, these practices were not labelled as contrary to sporting ideals.

Evidence from the nineteenth century reveals that growth in scientific and physiological knowledge influenced athletes' use of a range of substances. Increasing professionalisation of sport and developments in sporting technology, such as the bicycle, contributed to widespread substance use. Events such as velodrome races where 'men pushed themselves and their machines to the limit' (Hoberman 1992:129), six day cycle races and

pedestrian marathons², as well as a growing public interest in quantified records (Guttman 2004), contributed to the commonplace use of a range of substances³ (Houlihan 2002; Yesalis and Bahrke 2005). Extreme sporting events, which required ‘almost superhuman strength to survive,’ meant that substances were tools used to accomplish a difficult task (Moller 2009:14). This also meant that sport provided an ideal forum for scientific investigation, with interest focused on measuring and exploring the effects of substances on human physiology. Warnings focused on dangers to athletes’ health and not on substance use as deviant behaviour undermining the integrity of sport (Hoberman 1992).

Nineteenth century training models focused on ‘tapping the hereditary potential’ of biologically endowed athletes ‘rather than artificially manipulating the organism itself’ (Beamish and Ritchie 2005:416). With the exception of some trainers who guarded their ‘doping recipes’ (Yesalis and Bahrke 2005:443), there were no efforts at concealment to avoid sanction (Hoberman 1992). There are claims that substance use led to athletes’ deaths⁴. However, ethical or moral considerations that these practices threatened the integrity of sport or the legitimacy of newly forming sporting authorities, including the early Olympic body, did not hamper physiological experiments or lead to anti-doping regulation.

The ‘home-made’ Phase - Doping in the Early Twentieth Century

In his discussion of drug use in cycling, Mignon (2003:233) situates doping in two phases. It commenced with the ‘home-made stage,’ when doping practices resembled ‘kitchen recipes’ passed from rider to rider and from *soigneur* to rider from the late nineteenth century through to the 1960s. While Mignon focuses his discussion on cycling, in the early decades of the

² Pedestrian marathons took place over six days and nights and, with the winner decided on distance, saw some participants cover more than 800 kilometres (Yesalis and Bahrke 2005).

³ For example ether soaked sugar cubes, strychnine tablets, brandy and cocaine, caffeine, alcohol, nitro glycerine, digitalis, opium and heroin (Cashmore 1990; Donohoe and Johnson 1986; Kennedy 2000; Mignon 2003; Yesalis et al. 2001).

⁴ Some claim cyclist Arthur Linton died during the 1886 Bordeaux to Paris race. Others note that Linton won that race and, according to *The Cycling World Illustrated*, died from typhoid fever in July 1896. The British Cycling Federation notes that Linton was one of several riders trained by a particular coach and that a number of those riders were given strychnine during competition. While the cause of Linton’s death was apparently typhoid fever, it is likely that he was doped and that, in the long-term, this may have contributed to his ill-health and death (Donohoe and Johnson 1986; Ordway 1998; Sheil 1998; Verroken and Mottram 2005).

twentieth century substance use in sport generally remained more closely aligned with earlier scientific exploration into the relationship between substance use and human physiology. Moral condemnation rarely appeared in the sports medical literature, which remained focused on physiological mechanisms and their usefulness to athletes (Hoberman 1992). Athletes were not labelled as deviant individuals engaged in illicit practices. Rather, they continued to be viewed as using whatever tools were at their disposal to cope with the extreme nature of sporting events. For example, at the 1924 Tour de France the Pélissier brothers, well-known cyclists of the early twentieth century, detailed their doping practices:

You have no idea what the Tour de France is like ... We suffer from start to finish. Do you want to see what we run on? Look ... That's cocaine for the eyes, that's chloroform for the gums ... That is a cream to warm up my knees. And the pills, do you want to see the pills? ... In short we run on "dynamite." (cited in Mignon 2003:230)

Doping was associated with professional sport, which was perceived as a degraded form of sport where the rewards associated with winning were the primary consideration (Cashman 1995; Dyreson 1998). There were concerns over doping, but these were underpinned by the belief that it was counter to the high ideals associated with amateur sport or the 'spirit of sport' such as the unwritten rules of 'fair play,' especially at the Olympics (Stokvis 2003). Illustrating the importance of maintaining amateur Olympic sport as drug-free because of its role as a vehicle for social change, at a 1937 IOC meeting Count Baillet Latour, IOC President from 1925 to 1942 (IOC 2010), stated:

Since amateur sport has as its object the betterment of the human race, nothing should be neglected to combat with all possible means the use of drugs, which ruin the health and give the certainty of premature death. (cited in Stokvis 2003:6-7)

These comments suggest that IOC concerns over doping focused on the impact on athletes' health and challenges to the amateur ideals of Olympic sport.

In contrast to earlier periods when sport provided a research forum for medical and scientific investigation, social and political events from the mid-twentieth century changed the relationship between science, medicine and sport. The political imperatives of World War II were a significant influence on

the rapid development of medical and scientific technology and their incorporation into sport (Dimeo 2009; Williams 1975; Yesalis and Bahrke 2005). As Houlihan (2001:125) notes, military requirements 'boosted the scientific efforts to synthesise drugs and ... drew attention to the potential value of these drugs outside a therapeutic context.' Governments' search for new drugs to benefit troops resulted in organised and sanctioned drug use in the military. As well as contributing to rapid pharmaceutical advances, this created moral ambiguity towards drug use that 'continued into the Cold War period and entered the Olympic arena as sport emerged, along with space, as surrogates for military conflict' (Houlihan 2002:57). The post-World War II period also saw the 'pharmacological revolution' including the development of anti-bacterial drugs, the synthesis of new drugs and refinement of existing products (Houlihan 2002; Verroken 2005). Development of effective treatments for diseases previously considered fatal contributed to receptive public attitudes to a range of substances such as antibiotics and more frequent use of prescription drugs (Dimeo 2009; Laure 2009). As a consequence, drug use became normalised, as 'many of the social and moral barriers to their consumption were removed' (Stewart 2007:66).

New drugs developed for legitimate medical purposes provided a greater 'menu of choice' for post-war athletes. This enabled them to tailor drug use to meet particular training or sporting needs and removed some of the health risks associated with PED use (Houlihan 2002; Verroken 2005; Voy 1991). Also underpinning the sporting use of pharmacological discoveries was a change in understanding of the 'ontology of human performance' (Beamish and Ritchie 2005:426). This period saw significant growth in institutional support for the scientific study of sport. For example, the British Association of Sports Medicine was established in 1953 and the American College of Sports Medicine in 1954 (Beamish and Ritchie 2005; Brissonneau 2010). From the mid-1960s, sports medicine took on a new disciplinary status, becoming 'medicine for performance' (Brissonneau 2010:2; Dimeo 2007). This period saw a new type of athlete, 'the trained athlete' (Williams 1962), supported by a medical regime including 'specific treatments for specific injuries' and 'medical staff as a necessary condition of sports preparation' (Mignon 2003:233). Expanding revenue associated with sport facilitated this process, enabling the

employment of medical and support staff specifically to improve performance (Waddington 2000). Drug use in sport can most effectively be examined in a broader social context that includes this increasing significance of pharmaceutical and medical technology as well as the political imperatives of the Cold War period (Verroken 2005).

The Second Doping Phase - a New Type of Amateur Athlete

The second phase of doping was given impetus by the political climate of the Cold War. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) reconceptualised the Olympic motto '*Citius, Altius, Fortius*' (faster, higher, stronger) into an 'absolute performance principle' that became the 'reigning doctrine of world sport' (Hoberman 1986:10; Mignon 2003). Originating with Coubertin's 1894 revival of Olympic sport, this motto reflected the idea that amateur sport provided character-building lessons that promoted the 'innate human will to excel and strive for perfection' (Hill 1992; Hoberman 1986; MacAloon 1981; Moller 2010:213). In contrast to earlier periods when Olympic competition represented amateur ideals, the 'Cold War athlete trained full-time ... personifying the success and failures of capitalism and communism' (Wamsley and Young 2005:xix).

In the 1960s, athletes from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), described as 'sports diplomats in tracksuits' (Strenk 1980:36), exemplified the politicisation of Olympic sport. This included a rational, scientific approach to training and competition that incorporated PED use (see Franke and Berendonk 1997; Hunt 2007). The IOC was not aware of the extent of the GDR's state-sponsored doping program, with evidence only emerging after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Teetzel 2004). Nevertheless, the Olympic inclusion of the GDR contributed to the promotion of science to sport. For example, the United States were 'not willing to sit still, as a country the size of Tennessee passed it in the Olympic medal counts' and attempted to circumvent the IOC's anti-doping regulations by highlighting loopholes in their protocols (Hunt 2007:20). In this way during the 1950s and 1960s sport was driven by:

... strategic political objectives ... and the concomitant increased allocation of resources directed to world-class sport. Scientifically assisted, high-performance

sport systems, and not individuals, became the main agents in world-class, high-performance sport in the post-war period. (Beamish and Ritchie 2005:424)

The Soviet model became the benchmark for other nation's efforts to remain competitive. In addition, the continued development of sporting technology and scientific knowledge, now applied to the body as a 'sporting machine,' changed the way that athletes trained (Cantelon 2005). The point of interest for this thesis is that broader social changes, such as the politically-charged climate of the Cold War period, contributed to a new way of 'imagining' (Anderson 1991) elite sport. As Cantelon (2005:95) states: 'With the inclusion of the USSR in the Olympic 'family' ... the new sibling confronted the older family members with a different type of amateur competition.' A new way of imagining elite sport included a more rational approach to sports training. As Early (1998:x) notes:

... the triumph of sports in the modern world ... is the triumph of rationalism, the method, the quantification, the engineering mystique of science. Simply put, sports are about providing a context for the demonstration of the rationally engineered body.

Brohm (1978:68) described this as 'similar to production line work in a factory and involves the same inhuman work pace.' Further, potential financial rewards for athletes as 'skilled performers' meant that sport, including Olympic sport, was increasingly approached in a work-like fashion (Cantelon 2005). Nevertheless, the IOC continued to formally maintain a commitment to amateur ideals with the main threat to Olympic sport being that presented by 'perfidious professionals' (Tomlinson 2005a; Torres and Dyreson 2005:67). The IOC's continued commitment to amateur ideals failed to acknowledge the changing nature of modern sport and, as we will see shortly, hampered its ability to respond to drug use in sport.

It is important to note how the concept of amateurism was itself open to debate and influenced by broader social factors. As Cantelon (2005:84) points out:

... the concept of 'amateurism' is highly dependent upon social/historical factors that contoured the amateur/professional debates in different time periods. Further, persons in positions of authority and influence were able to maintain notions of amateurism that contradicted the lived experiences of the majority of participants involved in high-performance sport.

Illustrating the disjuncture between the IOC's claims to amateurism and the lived experience of sporting participants, professional fencers had competed in the 1896 Athens and 1900 Paris Olympics. American cyclists in the 1904 St Louis Olympics were also paid performers. To address the problem of professionalism encroaching on Olympic ideals, in 1925 the IOC had reformulated the amateur rule to emphasise the *spirit* of amateurism rather than earlier class-based distinctions reflected in Coubertin's revived Olympics. As Brown (2005:29) notes:

The sports and sporting contexts that Coubertin advocated were, for the most part, inaccessible to the working classes. Coubertin made no apologies for the inevitable class-based reality that provided the basis for his Olympic Games idea. A society divided along lines of economic wealth and inherited privilege was the reality of his era and his vision of the world ... After all, for Coubertin, the elite nature of the Olympic Games and the experiences they gave ... was always intended to serve a social function in a paternalistic or 'top-down' fashion.

The IOC's reformulation of amateurism presented a philosophical problem that concerned how to identify those who did and those who did not participate in the spirit of amateurism. To overcome this issue the IOC defined an amateur athlete as one whose occupation and source of income lay outside sport (Guttman 1984). However, the modern sporting environment rendered such ideals of amateurism problematic. Rather than constituted by the principles of amateur competition, modern sport focused on winning driven by increasing financial rewards and a record-breaking 'mania' in conjunction with appropriation of sport for political purposes. As Guttman (1984:119) points out:

When players become specialists in their play ... distinctions dissolve and categories are confounded. When the impulse to win ... and to set records ... are intensified by nationalism ... Where then is the amateur?

Nevertheless, under Brundage's presidency (1921 to 1972) the IOC maintained a strict amateur code (Espy 1979). Not only did Brundage resist any attempts to commercialise the Olympics, declaring up to his retirement that the IOC 'should have nothing to do with money,' he also viewed professional sportsmen as no better than 'performing monkeys' (Allison 1993:8; Tomlinson 2005a:180). The IOC's continuing insistence on the amateur nature of Olympic sport could not keep pace with the application of science and technology,

including PED use, or with the changing nature of how sport was 'played' influenced by both political and commercial imperatives (Beamish and Ritchie 2005; Brohm 1978; Cantelon 2005; Hoberman 2005). As we will see later in this chapter, increasing commercialisation of Olympic sport challenged the IOC's commitment to amateurism. This created a tension that transformed ways of imagining elite sport, with greater emphasis on bureaucratic rules and regulations which began to challenge the IOC's claims to legitimacy and moral authority.

As this outline has shown, a combination of political imperatives, a more rational approach to sports training, pharmaceutical advances normalising drug use and growing commercialisation facilitating the medicalisation of sport contributed to widespread 'non-medical uses' of a range of drugs after World War II (Cantelon 2005; Dimeo 2009; Mignon 2003:233). Nevertheless, as the next section outlines, there were expressions of concern over doping practices associated with their negative health consequences as well as the threat doping presented to amateur ideals.

Doping - a 'moral crisis'

In the 1950s and 1960s, increasing evidence of the negative effects of drug use in sport saw growing concern over doping as problematic behaviour. Rather than the IOC or other SGBs, mid-twentieth century concerns over doping emerged from public health reformers and members of the scientific community (Dimeo 2007; Woodland 1980). These groups shifted attention from an assessment of health risks to evaluations of doping as against values typically associated with the ideals of amateur sport. A shift to moral evaluations of doping also suggests that SGB legitimacy could be affected by their efforts to safeguard sporting ideals, including the use of regulatory mechanisms against doping as inappropriate behaviour.

The optimistic spirit engendered by successful health reforms after World War II drew attention to attempts to address other public health concerns. Initiatives such as the establishment of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1946 and the discovery of the link between smoking and lung cancer in 1950 reflected a global healthcare vision. This incorporated generic health and

lifestyle interventions, including concerns over drugs in sport (Dimeo 2007; 2009; Mignon 2003). Some public health reformers were concerned that the pressures associated with modern competitive sport influenced athletes' doping behaviour (Dimeo 2009). The points of relevance for this thesis, however, are the changing attitudes towards drug use in sport.

In the 1950s and 1960s, public health officials and members of the scientific community began to link health concerns over doping with claims that it was a moral issue. This contrasted with views earlier in the twentieth century when medical assessment of drug use in sport was limited to objective analysis of health risks (Dimeo 2007). Arguments against doping associated concerns for athletes' health with a moral view that doping contravened the purity and value of sport, including ideas of fair play and equality of competition (Dimeo 2007; Wrynn 2004). For example, in 1963 the Assistant Secretary of the British Association of Sports Medicine (BASM) stated:

[doping] is a form of moral deception in which the athlete is achieving his results not on his own merits, but artificially, and in a manner contrary to the code of sportsmanship - in short he is cheating, and persistent cheating may be the first step in the downward path to moral degradation, especially if he gets away with it. (cited in Dimeo 2007:93)

Linking health concerns to doping as a moral issue, hints at the construction of doping as a moral panic. However, public health reformers and members of the scientific community held a 'traditional, paternalistic view of sport accompanied [by] a strong faith in science as a solution to social problems' (Dimeo 2007:95). For example, during the 1950s Austrian anti-doping expert Professor Ludwig Prokop had conducted experiments on the performance benefits of drugs and led some of the early testing in European cycling. He later worked with the IOC during the 1964 Tokyo Olympics (Dimeo 2007). Although viewing doping as a danger to athletes' health, Prokop was just as concerned with equality of competition, arguing that athletes should 'start under the same conditions.' As a result, 'doping must be regarded primarily as a sporting and not a medical problem. Doping is unfair in any case, but not necessarily injurious to health. Doping may therefore also be regarded as a dangerous fraud' (cited in Dimeo 2007:94). Amateur ideals clearly continued

to play a central role in the way in which the elite sporting community was 'imagined.'

Underpinning these notions is the tendency to view amateurism as a 'free-floating concept that every person, regardless of class, gender, race, age, wealth, national origin, in fact any social category can understand and, if so desire, aspire to' (Cantelon 2005:83). In other words, the imagined sporting community was based on a belief that members of that community, irrespective of their social position, adhered to an amateur ethos (Anderson 1991; Cantelon 2005; Palmer 2001; see Chapter One). As we have noted earlier in this section, such a view neglects the socially and historically contingent context in which sport and attitudes towards drug use in sport take place.

The late 1950s and 1960s also witnessed an increased media interest in doping. Although not the first reports of doping practices, claims that the Danish rowing team used drugs to help win the 1950 European Championships saw some media reports take a 'doping-as-scandal' approach (Dimeo 2007:57; Wrynn 2004). In the United States, media reports focused on claims of widespread amphetamine use in youth sports and that linked drug use in sport to wider social concerns over narcotics (Dimeo 2009; see also Hoberman 2002). There were also media reports of a New York doctor's suggestion that sub-four-minute milers were 'turned temporarily into super-athletes' by using amphetamines (Bale 2009; Hoberman 2005). There is some debate in the literature over the significance of this issue.

Hoberman (2005) argues that this claim received some coverage in a medical journal and media reports, but that the media infrequently brought doping to public attention in the late 1950s. Dimeo (2007:65) notes that investigations into amphetamine use did lose some momentum after a 1958 AMA report contradicted earlier (1957) findings suggesting amphetamine use was widespread in youth sport. The 1958 report admitted 'little evidence' of amphetamine use in American high schools. Nevertheless, the media had uncovered 'episodic' patterns of drug use in sport, including amongst Olympic athletes. These were sufficient for the media to present doping as a 'scandal'

and engage in 'scaremongering of the doping threat' (Dimeo 2007:64). The British press of the 1960s also began to take a more critical approach to claims of drug use in soccer (Dimeo 2007). In 1964 the *Sunday People* newspaper claimed that Everton football club administrators not only sanctioned but also provided amphetamines for players' use before games as well as recreationally. The story was taken up by other newspapers. The *Daily Herald* tracked down the club's supplier and other papers linked doping to investigations into match fixing claims against Everton (Dimeo 2007; 2009). The fact that the Everton goalkeeper became addicted to amphetamines and alcohol contributed to ideas that doping was not only cheating, but linked to serious physical and mental health issues (Dimeo 2007).

This brief overview of the history of drug use in sport has revealed that in the nineteenth and early twentieth century these practices were commonplace and did not negatively affect the legitimacy of the IOC or other early sporting bodies. As the twentieth century progressed a more rational approach to drug use in sport was occurring, characterised by the increasing application of science and medicine to the sporting context.

Dying to win - the IOC, anti-doping and legitimacy

Several high profile sporting deaths heightened awareness of the dangers of doping and contributed to the introduction of anti-doping initiatives. The first high profile sporting death linked to drugs was cyclist Knud Jensen (1960 Rome Olympics). Accounts of Jensen's death claim autopsy evidence of Ronicol, with two of his team-mates also taken to hospital in a toxic condition (Donohoe and Johnson 1986; Houlihan 2002; Verroken 2005). However, Moller (2005) argues that Jensen died from a combination of heatstroke, concussion and lack of adequate medical attention. He further points out that as a list of prohibited substances was not even in the process of being compiled when Jensen died, attributing his death to doping is questionable at best (Moller 2009; see also Moller 2010). Irrespective of the debate surrounding Jensen's death, the incident contributed to the IOC's increased attention to anti-doping.

In 1960 the IOC commissioned a report headed by Sir Arthur Porritt, a well-known British doctor (Stokvis 2003), to report on doping solutions. The IOC formed a Medical Committee in 1961 and in 1962 resolved to ban doping (Dimeo 2007). At the 1964 Tokyo Olympics under the auspices of the UCI the IOC implemented rudimentary tests for amphetamines in cycling (Wrynn 2004). These efforts met with resistance however as some athletes felt that they had a right to use PEDs and 'refused to co-operate with the medical commission' (Hoberman 2005:254). Underpinning this lack of cooperation were athletes' claims that testing interfered with their rights as individuals and concerns that tests were inaccurate (Hoberman 2005).

However, although the IOC did not reach an agreement over sanctions, in 1964 they formally adopted a (modified) 1963 Council of Europe (CoE) definition of doping. That definition stated that doping threatens sport ethics by providing an unfair advantage and jeopardises athlete health (Wrynn 2004). In the same year, Porritt presented recommendations from his report finding that doping was bad for athletes' health, constituted an unfair advantage and doping sporting heroes provided poor examples for youth. Among other initiatives, the report recommended an educational program to warn against doping as well as rules in each sport to forbid its use and measures to control athletes for doping (Dimeo 2009; Stokvis 2003). Wrynn (2004:219) argues that the IOC agreed to Porritt's recommended anti-doping measures. In contrast, Dimeo (2007) argues that the IOC failed to endorse even the most basic of Porritt's recommendations. Irrespective of differing descriptions of the IOC's response, the point here is that the 1964 recommendations and a later 1966 IOC Medical Committee declaration that 'only a long-term education policy stressing the physical and moral aspects' of doping would change athletes' behaviour aimed at monitoring rather than action (Hoberman 2005:253; Houlihan 1999).

The regulation of drug use in sport was heightened by the death of Tommy Simpson in the 1967 Tour de France. Initial explanations cited heart failure from heat exhaustion, lack of oxygen and humidity. Examination later revealed amphetamines and cognac in Simpson's body, traces of amphetamine in his jersey pockets and drugs in his luggage (Cashmore 1990; Fife 2001;

Fotheringham 2002; Voy 1991; Wheatcroft 2003). Simpson's death was the first *televised* doping death. Illustrating the power of the media to focus public attention, the highly public nature of Simpson's death meant that regulation of doping could no longer be neglected (Donohoe and Johnson 1986; Toohey and Veal 2000). Rather than simply discussing doping and passing resolutions against doping, Simpson's death led the IOC to implement anti-doping measures (Dimeo 2009; Stokvis 2003). For example, in 1967 a formal Medical Commission was created and anti-doping rules were drafted by the end of that year (Hoberman 2005; Yesalis and Cowart 1998). Acting on its own earlier 1964 recommendations, the IOC introduced testing and regulations for the 1968 Mexico Olympics. These included establishing a medical centre, developing a list of prohibited substances, adopting a Medical Code, requiring Olympic athletes to pledge they would not use PEDs and agree to gender verification examinations⁵ (Bowers 2002; Giulianotti 2005a; McArdle 2001).

However, the IOC viewed its anti-doping role as primarily limited to supervision. Further, without the necessary resources they were not prepared to incur the expense or potential legal ramifications of testing (Hanstad et al. 2008; Hunt 2007). IOC President Avery Brundage had made this position clear prior to the 1968 Mexico Games:

The function of the IOC is to alert the National Olympic Committees and the international federations and promote an education campaign. The IOC has its rule and has defined dope and it should see that provisions are made by the Organising Committee for testing but the actual testing is left in the hands of others. This is a responsibility that the IOC is not prepared to take. (cited in Verroken and Mottram 2005:310-11)

⁵ The inclusion of gender testing reflected the speculation of the time that Eastern bloc men were masquerading as women or hermaphrodites and gaining an unfair sporting advantage (an idea that persisted into the 1970s) (Hunt 2007; McArdle 2001; Yesalis and Cowart 1998). According to Parisotto (2006:15), this practice was evident from the 1930s when German athlete Hermann Ratjen allegedly 'concealed his genitals and called himself Dora' (see also Aitken 2002). Eva Klobukowska is said to be the first athlete to fail a sex test at the 1967 European Track and Field Championships because she had 'one chromosome too many to qualify as a woman' (Wrynn 2004:221-22). In contrast, McArdle (2001) argues that in approximately 30 years of sex testing at athletic events no case was ever documented. After her death in 1980 Stella Walsh, who won 41 AAU titles and two Olympic medals, was found to have the sex organs of a man and a woman (Donohoe and Johnson 1986; Wrynn 2004). Despite disagreement and criticism of the IOC's use of chromatin tests on both scientific and ethical grounds, these tests were retained until the 1992 Albertville Winter Olympics when replaced by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing (Hunt 2007; Wrynn 2004).

The point to note here is that the IOC's control of international Olympic amateur sport placed them in a position of sports leadership (Wamsley and Young 2005). From the perspective of the International Federations (IFs) as well as National Olympic Committees (NOCs), this meant that the IOC Medical Commission should be responsible for controls (Boyes 2001; Hunt 2007). NOCs pointed out that other groups, and particularly the media, looked to the IOC for a more active leadership role. As Dr Daniel Hanley, chief medical officer of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), stated:

Dope control is becoming a very strong issue, and I think we should formulate some policy ... I think we can ignore it, if you want to ... but, more and more, many individuals and some important segments of our society, like the press, are looking to you for direction. (cited in Hunt 2007:21)

In this statement Hanley was pointing to the potential for the IOC's failure to take a more active role in anti-doping regulation to adversely affect perceptions of their moral authority and legitimacy. Nevertheless, despite being constrained by a poor organisational structure and lack of resources, the IOC had begun to take a more active anti-doping policy leadership role (Dimeo 2007; Stokvis 2003). Although motivated by a concern for athletes' health, the IOC was also driven by other social actors' increasing concern over doping.

Other elite SGBs and governments introduced policies, regulations and testing initiatives prior to the IOC. The International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) had banned 'stimulating substances' as early as 1928 and the Amateur Squash Rackets Association had considered doping bans in 1938. In 1962 the Austrian government had passed a law against doping, followed in 1965 by France and Belgium. In 1966 the IAAF introduced random drug checks, FIFA introduced drug tests at the 1966 World Cup and the UCI took the same step at the 1966 Tour de France (Douglas 2007; Healey 2003; Houlihan 1999; 2002; Woodland 1980). The CoE had adopted a resolution against doping in 1963, including a proposed list of banned substances and a definition of doping. Turkey and Italy followed with legislation on drugs in sport in 1971 (Beckett and Cowan 1978; Dimeo 2007; Houlihan 1999; Laure 2009; Todd and Todd 2001). From the mid-1960s the British government began to implement a

combination of sanctions and inducements to assist SGBs with the costs associated with testing (Houlihan 1999; 2002).

Governments' and SGBs' initiatives focused on protection of athletes' health and sports ethics. This was based on the idea that doping undermines equality of opportunity between competitors (Laure 2009; Mignon 2003). However, with no clear demarcation between sport and civil authorities, application of legislation was rare (Mignon 2003). Nevertheless, this political involvement reminded the IOC and other SGBs that as stakeholders in the modern political sporting context governments had an interest in anti-doping. This was also influenced by growing evidence of drug use among North American footballers, suspicions of doping by unfeasibly muscular women from Eastern bloc nations and concerns over the effect of doping on youth behaviour (Laure 2009; McArdle 2001; Mignon 2003; Yesalis and Cowart 1998).

Houlihan (2002) argues that this more active policy leadership role from the IOC was prompted mainly by a concern to maintain control of this high profile issue of PED use in international sport (see also Hanstad et al. 2008).

Houlihan's claim is consistent with the hypothesis of this thesis that SGBs' efforts to retain legitimacy is an important part of the debate over doping. This also brings interactions between stakeholder groups, such as the media, SGBs and government into the analysis. In other words, claims to legitimacy are multi-faceted and contested, reflecting organisational power relationships.

Government anti-doping legislation also reflected changing attitudes towards the restorative value of drug use, driven by safety concerns such as the 1961 thalidomide scandal (Dimeo 2007). As Dimeo (2007:88) notes, the 'paradigm ... in which drugs offered opportunities in sport and society, gave way to a new paradigm in which drugs were something to be feared and regulated.' Mehlman (2009:131) links anti-doping initiatives to the larger 'War on Drugs' (for discussions of changing community attitudes towards drug use see also Berridge 1989; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; Hoberman 1992). Olympic drug testing in 1968 coincided with changing social attitudes and political initiatives to address public concern over drug use, such as Richard Nixon's

1968 presidential pledge to suppress the youth-oriented drug culture in the United States (Mehlman 2009). Five years later the North American Congressional hearings (Committee on the Judiciary 1973) continued to reflect anxiety over social drug use including reports of athletes involved in 'traffic and abuse' of drugs, investigation of claims of doping in athletic competition and efforts to curb athletes' improper drug use (Bowers 2002; Silver 2001).

From the 1950s onwards, attitudes towards drug use in sport shifted from being a health-associated issue to 'a moral panic that played on deeper social anxieties,' such as that sport was being over-run by 'drug-crazed freaks' (Dimeo 2007:101; Mehlman 2009:131). This outline has explained how political, commercial, medical as well as scientific imperatives had generated a socially and historically new doping debate by the 1960s.

Anti-Doping - the IOC and legitimacy

Through their control of the Olympic Games, the IOC was in a position to take a significant leadership role in anti-doping initiatives (Boyes 2001; Wamsley and Young 2005). However, into the 1970s inconsistencies between IFs and the IOC in terms of banned substances and penalties created confusion and led to what some IFs perceived as unfair treatment (Hunt 2007). The IOC acknowledged that the resulting reluctance to co-operate with IOC-led anti-doping initiatives placed pressure on their legitimacy and moral authority. As head of the IOC Medical Commission, Prince Alexander de Merode, stated: 'The experience in Munich⁶ had shown the need of having strict regulations and many IFs had expressed the wish that the IOC should take a stand' (Hunt 2007:26). The need for direction from the IOC reflected the confusion resulting from the structure of the anti-doping framework at that time. The anti-doping regulatory system was a complex web of doping controls with the IOC, NOCs and IFs all playing important roles, resulting in ambiguity of

⁶ At the 1972 Munich Olympics, while the positive test of a Puerto Rican basketball player did not result in team disqualification, the entire Dutch cycling team had their bronze medal rescinded after one rider tested positive for a substance banned by the IOC, but not by the UCI (Hunt 2007). In addition, although declaring American swimmer Rich DeMont's use of asthma medication containing ephedrine to team physicians, the American swim team failed to advise the authorities in Munich. As a result, DeMont returned a positive drug test, was stripped of his medals and prohibited from participating in other events (Williams 1975). In contrast to the IOC's public accusations of misconduct addressed to the USOC, a doping scandal involving the Union Internationale de Moderne Pentathlon et Biathlon (UIPMB) did not attract sanctions (see Hunt 2007).

standards (Hunt 2007). Inconsistencies in regulations, as well as the substances banned, challenged perceptions of the IOC's moral authority and legitimacy, creating pressure for them to take a more proactive leadership stance.

Nevertheless, into the 1980s the IOC continued to see its role as essentially supervisory, such as emphasising the need for NOCs to promote drug-free sport and implement appropriate drug testing arrangements. IOC involvement in anti-doping policy primarily took the form of the publication and regular updating of lists of banned substances and practices to guarantee the integrity of the Olympics (Hanstad et al. 2008; Houlihan 1999). The IOC also advised the CoE on the anti-doping Charter, oversaw testing at IOC events, accredited testing laboratories and in 1983 created the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to deal with athletes' litigation (Hanstad et al. 2008; Houlihan 2002; 2008; Jacobs and Samuels 1995). Criticism of the IOC focused on claims of a lack of action against doping violations, a failure to detect PED use and suppression of positive tests (Teetzel 2004).

The ineffectiveness of the IOC was influenced, in part, by the lack of financial resources, a limited number of testing facilities and the medical view of the time that hormonal substances did not provide athletes with any competitive advantage (Vest Christiansen 2009). They also adhered to the widely held view that in-competition-testing would deter doping and hesitated to move to out-of-competition testing (Houlihan 1999). However, limitations of in-competition testing led to random, year round, out-of-competition testing, implemented by other institutional actors. For example, the Norwegian Confederation was the first to introduce out-of-competition testing in 1977 followed by the United Kingdom in the early 1980s (Houlihan 2002; Verroken and Mottram 2005; Yesalis and Cowart 1998). Some of the constraints limiting IOC involvement in anti-doping, such as the cost associated with testing, would be addressed by the increasing commercialisation of the Olympics, which commenced in the 1980s (Stokvis 2003). However, the commercialisation of the Olympics also increased the stakes for the IOC as moral guardians of the Olympic Movement.

The Olympic Brand, Legitimacy and Doping

As I noted earlier in this chapter, the Cold War consolidated the symbolic and political value of the Olympics as a forum for global politics. In the 1980s, a 'more explicit economic logic emerged with the realisation that Olympic events could be staged for ... an international television audience' (Tomlinson 2005a:183). Under the Presidency of Juan Antonio Samaranch, IOC President from 1980 to 2001, the Olympics became a multi-billion dollar business driven by marketing of the Olympic brand and television broadcast rights. For example, income from television rights escalated from US\$25 million for the 1976 Montreal Olympics to US\$309 million for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics (Smith and Stewart 2008; Tomlinson 2005a; Wamsley and Young 2005; Whannel 2005). The 1984 Los Angeles Games, known as the 'Hamburger Olympics' because corporations such as McDonald's paid for Olympic venues, reflected an IOC leadership that 'targeted hugely increased sponsorship strategies' (Tomlinson 2005a:185).

The IOC's increasing involvement in commercial activity during the 1980s saw it develop into an international administrative authority reliant on routine regulation. This included anti-doping regulation, under the 'authority of the *Olympic Charter*' as well as IOC Medical Code (Boyes 2001; Nafziger 1992:502). Weber's concept of legitimacy provides a useful framework to illustrate the significance of this development for the IOC's claims to moral authority and legitimacy in relation to anti-doping. The IOC used the *Charter* in conjunction with the later Medical Code to extend their claims to the moral authority over international amateur sport. According to Rule 2(7) of the *Olympic Charter*, the IOC 'leads the fight against doping in sport' (cited in Nafziger 1992:503-04). In 1989, UNESCO adopted a number of significant resolutions that, amongst others, called for national enforcement of the *Olympic Charter* and 'particularly the principles of non-discrimination, fair play ... and the rejection of harmful substances' (Nafziger 1992:493).

Highlighting the role of the *Olympic Charter*, the IOC stated:

As far as the role of the IFs within the Olympic Movement is concerned, their statutes, practice and activities must be in conformity with the *Olympic Charter*. Subject to the foregoing, each IF maintains its independence and autonomy in the administration of its sport. (IOC 2007b)

In collaboration with IFs and NOCs, in 1994 the IOC formulated the IOC Medical Code. The intention underpinning the Medical Code was to protect the spirit of fair play, to lead the fight against doping and safeguard athletes' health (Buti and Fridman 2001). The IOC's Medical Code clearly states IFs' obligations: 'It is a condition for recognition of any international federation and any national Olympic committee that its statutes incorporate the IOC Medical Code by express reference and that its provisions apply ... to all persons and competitions under their jurisdiction' (cited in Boyes 2001:169). Failure to incorporate the IOC's Medical Code renders IFs ineligible for Olympic competition, carrying potentially disastrous financial consequences (Boyes 2001). Inclusion in Olympic competition raises the profile and popularity of a sport, bringing with it a range of economic advantages. As Tomlinson (2005a:190) points out, while the various stakeholder groups engage in Olympic sponsorship in diverse ways, all 'buy a universally recognisable badge, and the guarantee of inestimable media coverage and profile during the Olympic event itself.' However, illustrating that moral authority and legitimacy cannot be taken for granted, the IOC must maintain the support of NOCs and IFs (Hill 1993):

Though the IOC has the power to withdraw recognition from NOCs and IFs, it is inconceivable that it would do so, except in cases of small and unimportant bodies which had few allies ... the IOC would never expel from the Olympic programme the International Amateur Athletic Federation ... the most powerful and richest of the federations ... The boot is on the other foot, for if the worst came to the worst the IAAF ... could show their strength by withdrawing from the Olympic movement altogether. (Hill 1993:88)

This illustrates that dominant groups, such as the IOC, must actively work to maintain stakeholder support. This also suggests some support for the claim of this thesis that power relationships between elite groups affect debates over social issues, such as drugs in sport. These contested relationships also highlight the value of consensus-making as a moral panic criterion, because claims to legitimacy in an institutionalised moral panic cannot be taken for granted.

The importance of the *Charter* and the Medical Code to regulate behaviour took on greater significance as the Olympics became increasingly commercial. As part of this process, the IOC had formally abandoned its commitment to

amateurism in 1981 (Hill 1992), effectively professionalising the Olympics. As Lucas (1992:74) notes: ‘the dissolution of the unenforceable “pure amateur code” was the first substantial and partially successful effort to blend the IOC, the NOCs, and ... international sport federations into a like-minded semi-democracy.’ It also showed how broader social factors influenced the way in which the elite sport could be imagined (Anderson 1991). In particular, it highlighted the multi-dimensional aspect of legitimacy (Suchman 1995; see Chapter One).

The more commercialised IOC could no longer rest their claim to legitimacy on assumptions that athletes, or SGBs, would adhere to amateur ideals to regulate their behaviour and prevent drug use. This does not imply that the IOC no longer appealed to ethical ideas such as equality of competition or fair play. These continued to form an important element of anti-doping policy. The significance of a regulatory approach was that it provided a mechanism to impose specific ideals about behaviour and ethics (Dimeo 2009). In other words, the legitimacy of modern sporting organisations, such as the IOC, became dependent upon a regulatory approach that while founded on the values of amateurism was measured against its ability to ensure ‘clean’ competition.

During the 1980s, greater regulatory consistency between federations and across countries became increasingly important as the globalisation of sport and elite sporting events led to athletes training and competing outside their ‘home territory’ (Houlihan 2008). In such a context, the moral authority and legitimacy of the IOC was increasingly linked to its demonstrated ability to ‘catch some drug cheats’ using the *Charter* and the IOC Medical Code (Teetzel 2004:217). The IOC used these regulatory mechanisms to maintain its status as a central actor in the anti-doping campaign and to deal with the changing nature of Olympic sport. As well as regulating sporting bodies and athletes, this placed a responsibility upon the IOC to perform that role to the highest ethical standards. The problem for the IOC was that pursuit of a strong commercial agenda potentially compromised their ability to adhere to those obligations. Critics of the IOC argue that commercialising the Olympics

created 'conditions conducive to cheating,' including PED use, for which the IOC has failed to 'assume any responsibility':

If anything, the historical evidence strongly suggests that the IOC has, indeed, profited from the long-celebrated exaggeration of the value of extreme human performance that provides the Games with much of its kudos in the first place. (Wamsley and Young 2005:xxii)

Throughout the 1980s criticisms of the IOC's approach to anti-doping revolved around inconsistencies between their public statements and the efficacy of anti-doping controls, evidenced by a number of doping scandals (Hoberman 2001). For example, Professor Arnold Beckett, a member of the IOC Doping Committee, speculated that the disappearance of nine positive drugs samples at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, after they had been sent to de Merode (head of the IOC Medical Commission), occurred to avert a public relations disaster:

It would have done quite a lot of damage if five or six ... of the positives ... had led to the medal winners, as undoubtedly it would have done. Some of the federations and IOC are happy to show that they're doing something in getting some positives, but they don't want too many because that would damage the image of the Games. (cited in Hoberman 2001:244)

In 1985 Wildor Hollmann (president of the German Association of Sports Physicians and Fédération Internationale Médecine-Sportive [FIMS]) criticised Samaranch for promoting 'a totally commercialised professional sport circus' based on the view that professionalisation of the Olympics has significantly contributed to doping (Hoberman 1992:263). From the IOC's perspective, the shift to a more commercial approach was justified as a necessary step to ensure the survival of the Olympic Movement (see Tomlinson 2005a; Whannel 2005). However, others argued that the 'almost total commercialising of the Olympic Games' transformed the Olympic Movement into an 'advertising vehicle for the multinational corporate sponsors and American television networks' (Hoberman 2001:245). One consequence of this was that it created doubt over the integrity of the IOC's anti-doping program. Underpinning these concerns was the potential for the IOC's commercial relationships to create a conflict of interest for the organisation that would jeopardise the legitimacy of the testing process. Commercialisation of Olympic sport challenged the IOC's legitimacy as guardians of the Olympic Movement using the *Olympic*

Charter and Medical Code to maintain order and stability in modern sport by catching deviant (doping) individuals.

Despite ongoing evidence of doping, the IOC actively promoted itself as a vanguard in anti-doping. At the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics Samaranch stated:

Above all such behaviour makes a mockery of the very essence of sport, the soul of what we, like our predecessors, consider sacrosanct ideals. Doping is alien to our philosophy, to our rules of conduct. We shall never tolerate it. (cited in Hoberman 2001:242)

Five days before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Samaranch again positioned the IOC as firmly opposed to 'this plague,' stating that 'Doping equals death' (cited in Lucas 1992:111). However, casting doubt on the IOC's claims as leaders in anti-doping and questioning the efficacy of doping controls, Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson tested positive for anabolic steroid use at the 1988 Seoul Olympics. This global scandal highlighted limitations in testing controls. Prior to his positive test in Seoul Johnson had been tested, and returned negative results, more than 15 times while using steroids (Buti and Fridman 2001). Illustrating the contested power relationships implicit in the doping debate, the IOC sought to deflect criticism and incorporate other IFs into accountability for anti-doping controls. As Michelle Verdier, IOC press spokeswoman, stated:

Without the IOC the Ben Johnson affair in Seoul would never have come to light. It was the first body to tackle the problem of drugs in sport, and remember the IOC only runs the Games for a fortnight every four years. Who has the control of the competitors for the rest of the time? (cited in Smith and Stewart 2008:123)

In this way, the IOC attempted to run onto moral high ground to deflect attention away from itself and onto IFs. Into the 1990s, the IOC continued to claim that it was winning the war against doping, even though evidence suggested otherwise. Criticism of the IOC continued, including accusations of haphazard supervision of doping controls, inconsistent application of sanctions and suppression of positive tests (see Kidd, Edelman and Brownell 2001). Other concerns included a failure to detect 'designer' PEDs, particularly EPO (claimed to be responsible for the deaths of elite cyclists) and hGH (MacAloon 2001; Nafziger 1992; Parisotto 2006; Teetzel 2004). Nevertheless, the IOC

continued to publicly and regularly promote a ‘rosy picture of its own efforts’ as ‘winning the war on drugs’ (Hoberman 2001:242). Hoberman (2001) suggests that underpinning these public statements was the IOC’s view of doping as a public relations issue and a concern to protect lucrative television and corporate contracts (see also Hanstad et al. 2008). As Jennings (1996:234) more bluntly stated: ‘if the public ever catch on to how dirty elite sport has become, the sponsors and TV networks will pull the plug on the billions they pay the IOC for a clean, moral event.’

The IOC’s moral authority was also undermined by claims of the organisation as a ‘plaything for corporate sponsors.’ The leadership was criticised as a ‘self-perpetuating oligarchy who travel the world like kings’ (Cantelon and McDermott 2001:33). Exacerbating doubts over the IOC’s legitimacy was the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, which led to Samaranch’s comments in *El Mundo*, and accusations of bribery surrounding the Salt Lake City bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics. MacAloon (2001:206) notes that ‘the two imbroglios were powerfully reinforcing each other, as the IOC plunged into a full-blown legitimacy crisis.’

Descriptions of these events as a ‘legitimacy crisis’ for the IOC directly reflects the central hypothesis of this thesis. The next question for this chapter is whether these doping events created a crisis of legitimacy for elite SGBs. A secondary area of analysis is whether a moral panic model helps to understand the significance of legitimacy in the debate over doping. I pointed to the significance of the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, Samaranch’s *El Mundo* comments and the Salt Lake City bribery scandal in the Introduction to this thesis because of their central role in the moral panic discourse over PEDs in sport. In the next section I elaborate on those events and their relationship to a challenge to the IOC’s legitimacy. This led to the creation of WADA.

A crisis for the IOC - legitimacy and WADA

On 11 July 1998 just days before the start of the Tour de France, a Festina cycling team *soigneur* was caught by customs officers on the border between France and Belgium with large amounts of PEDs (Voet 2001). Police searched the hotels and vehicles of several teams. Banned substances were found in

the hotels used by the Festina, TVM, ONCE and Casino teams leading to the expulsion of one team and the withdrawal of another five. Police interrogated several of the world's leading cyclists, employing solitary confinement. After the Tour, three team doctors and one masseur were charged under the French 1989 *Anti-Drugs Act* with supplying banned drugs at sporting events (Beamish 2009; Hanstad et al. 2008; Rasmussen 2005; Waddington 2000). The media reaction was scathing:

In Britain, *The Times* described the race as the Tour de Farce while in France, the daily *Le Monde* demanded 'the Tour has to stop.' *Libération* carried a front page story saying that a 'Tour that runs from police station to the courtroom is too long,' while *L'Equipe* said the scandal highlighted how the doping issue had been swept under the carpet. *Le Figaro* wrote that the Tour was simply rotten. (Waddington 2000:158)

Media coverage of the Tour focused on the doping scandals, conveying the impression that PED use was 'completely out of control' and that drug use in cycling was only the 'tip of the iceberg' of a larger problem across elite sport (Moller 2009:15; Rasmussen 2005:517). The quantity of drugs found, and the fact that the 'catch' was made by customs and police officers rather than anti-doping authorities, led to questions over whether doping controls and procedures were effective (Hanstad et al. 2008; Rasmussen 2005). Further, this scandal suggested that doping was entrenched and systematic, raising doubts over the legitimacy of SGBs and their moral authority to maintain stability and order in modern sport.

It is important to note that the IOC does not have responsibility for anti-doping initiatives outside the Olympics. However, professional cycling was an Olympic sport and the UCI was a signatory to the IOC's anti-doping agreements under the IOC Medical Code. As a result, and in conjunction with claims that the IOC Medical Commission knew of doping in cycling but ignored the issue, the Tour de France scandal raised concerns over the IOC's ability to enforce SGBs' anti-doping compliance (Hanstad et al. 2008; Teetzel 2004). Concerned by the potential for Tour de France riders to be subject to jail and police interrogation, and the possible spread of such actions to other (Olympic) sports, Samaranch attempted to diffuse the situation. However, his comments in the July 26 1998 *El Mundo* exacerbated the issue:

Doping is any product which, [sic] first damages the health of the sportsman and, second, artificially increases his performance. If it produces only this second condition, for me that's not doping. If it produces the first it is ...The current list of [banned] products must be drastically reduced. Anything that doesn't act against the athlete's health, for me that's not doping. (cited in Toohey and Veal 2000:153)

This appeared to be a reversal of the IOC's public promotion of their strong anti-doping stance and drew harsh criticism from stakeholder groups (Hoberman 2005). Media headlines such as 'Samaranch's Shock Stance on Drugs' (*The Age*, Melbourne, July 28), 'Olympics Chief Backs Drug Use' (*Daily Telegraph*, Britain, July 27) and editorials judged that Samaranch had 'capitulated in the fight against doping' (cited in MacAloon 2001:215). More significantly for this thesis, the IOC appeared to have failed to live up to its ideals. For many, the scandal suggested that the organisation had forgotten its purpose as guardians of the Olympic Movement (MacAloon 2001; Schneider 2000).

To circumvent the growing tide of criticism, the IOC issued press statements on July 27 and 28 asserting its determination to address doping (MacAloon 2001). The IOC also announced a World Conference on Doping in Sport for 1999. Suggestions for the conference included the creation of an agency to co-ordinate the 'worldwide fight against doping in sport, tentatively called the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency (OMADA)' funded from the IOC's television profits (Teetzel 2004:218). However, before the conference could take place, criticisms of the IOC's leadership were exacerbated with allegations of bribery of IOC delegates by members of the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics organising committee (Crowther 2002). In response to external pressure, the IOC established a Reform Commission but its recommendations primarily concerned internal IOC processes rather than public accountability and transparency (Houlihan 2005). The IOC's failure to respond appropriately to criticisms of its regulatory and policy frameworks created doubt over the legitimacy and moral authority of the organisation. The 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, Samaranch's comments in *El Mundo* combined with the Salt Lake City accusations contributed to a public reaction that asked 'the IOC to prove that *it* remains a part of the Olympic movement' (MacAloon 2001:225, emphasis in original).

The Tour scandal was significant as it acted as a catalyst for the institutional transformation of anti-doping regulation. According to Richard Pound, WADA Chairman from 1999 to 2008 (IOC August 2011), the 1998 Tour 'essentially led to the creation of WADA as the credibility of the IOC and the international federations had been greatly undermined' (Reuters 2007a; see also Hanstad et al. 2008). In conjunction with doubts over the IOC's commitment to anti-doping, the Salt Lake City scandal exacerbated a growing loss of faith in the moral commitment of the IOC to international sport (MacAloon 2001; Stokvis 2003).

This section has outlined the role of the *Olympic Charter* and the IOC Medical Code as regulatory mechanisms used to bolster the IOC's moral authority and legitimacy. These provided the IOC with tools to govern and control elite international sport as the foundations of the IOC's legitimacy shifted from a focus on amateur ideals to a more bureaucratic approach in an increasingly commercial environment. However, the disjuncture between the IOC's public promotion of the organisation as leaders in anti-doping in the face of ongoing doping events challenged their legitimacy and contributed to WADA's establishment. As well as highlighting the socio-historical nature of the doping debate, these events emphasise that claims to legitimacy are central elements of that debate.

To explore this further, the next section applies a Weberian framework to illuminate the role of WADA in the contemporary anti-doping debate. I also consider whether a moral panic framework helps to highlight the significance of legitimacy in the debate surrounding doping. This is particularly relevant as the doping debate occurs in contested public and policy arenas where stakeholder groups hold diverse attitudes towards PEDs (see Hanstad, Eivand and Loland 2010; Kidd et al. 2001). As well as providing an opportunity to consider the multi-faceted nature of legitimacy, this illustrates that legitimacy requires consensus-making activities from, and between, elite groups to maintain support for WADA as the appropriate institutional response to doping. In other words, I consider whether concerns to restore or maintain the legitimacy of SGBs contribute to the construction of doping as a moral panic.

The World Anti-Doping Agency

Prior to WADA's formation, the anti-doping policies of governments and sporting authorities were fragmented rather than cohesive or co-ordinated. Consequently, the primary task facing WADA was the global harmonisation of anti-doping policies between sporting organisations and National Anti-Doping Agencies (NADAs). This created a new way of imagining the global sporting community that included universally applicable sanctions, lists of prohibited substances and administrative coordination in the management of doping control (Hanstad et al. 2010; Houlihan 2004; Kayser and Smith 2008). The mechanism for WADA's harmonisation of anti-doping policy, rules and regulations is the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), first introduced in 2003 (Hanstad et al. 2010).

In contrast to the IOC, WADA's two governing boards, the Foundation Board and Executive Board, consist of representatives from the Olympic and international sports movement as well as public authorities (Hanstad et al. 2010; Houlihan 2004; WADA 2010b; 2010c). Rather than claiming political autonomy, WADA actively seeks political engagement with anti-doping initiatives, obtaining international declarations that enable governments to harmonise domestic anti-doping policies with the WADC⁷. For example, the 193 signatories to the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport agreed with the need for 'a political and moral understanding to ... recognise the role of, and support, the World Anti-Doping Agency ... [and] the World Anti-Doping Code' (IICGADS 2003:3). In addition, 130 governments have become signatories to UNESCO's International Convention against Doping in Sport (Hanstad et al. 2010; Kayser 2009; WADA 2009a; WADA 2010e).

While the IOC's main area of interest focused on doping in Olympic sport, WADA broadens PED regulation to explicitly include professional sport (WADA 2011). Under WADA's framework, both amateur and professional sporting communities seeking competitive recognition from SGBs as well as access to government funding must bring their practices in line with the WADC

⁷ WADA is a Swiss private law foundation and requires a political document to enable governments to align domestic policy with the WADC. The Copenhagen Declaration (March 2003) and later ratification of the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport (October 2005) accomplished this task (ISM 2007; WADA 2006; WADA 2009d).

(Houlihan 2002; Smith and Stewart 2008; Stokvis 2003). The incorporation of professional sport into the frame has led to contentious issues of governance and control. Some SGBs, such as the AFL, have been reluctant to pass authority to WADA (see Chapter Four). Like the IOC, which supported education on the moral and physical dangers of doping, WADA also focuses on education to change behaviour, stating that 'a long-term solution to preventing doping is through effective values-based education programs that can foster anti-doping behaviors and create a strong anti-doping culture' (WADA 2010d).

As legitimacy rests on shared norms and values, WADA's emphasis on values-based anti-doping education provides a measure to gauge perceptions of organisational legitimacy. Distribution of anti-doping information and education is one of WADA's stated aims:

... we are dedicated to advancing research, monitoring and ensuring worldwide compliance with the Code, continuing the development of anti-doping programs, and facilitating the distribution of information and education for athletes and their entourage. (WADA 2006)

I therefore consider whether NSOs' distribution of anti-doping information and education material has any impact on perceptions of their legitimacy, using the e-Survey and interview data later in this thesis (see Chapter Six).

Smith and Stewart (2008:123-24) neatly summarise WADA's characteristics:

... WADA is funded jointly by the IOC and a group of national governments. This has provided the agency with both capital and influence ... WADA has secured a series of international declarations that have commended and ratified the policy code it has developed ... These achievements have consolidated WADA's position as the central international agency for regulating drug use in sport. Currently, many sporting bodies seeking funding or competitive sanctioning from their international governing body, or national governments, must enact WADA policy.

WADA's ability to secure widespread political support suggests a strong rational-legal basis for their legitimacy. This is also significant from a moral panic perspective, suggesting consensus for WADA as the appropriate and necessary institutional response to the 'evil' of doping.

WADA is specifically concerned with implementing a new moral order in sport through the implementation of the WADC. In other words, indications of

increasing PED use required a new way of imagining the international sporting community. As we have noted throughout this chapter, over the course of the twentieth century broader socio-historical events led to new ways of imagining elite sporting communities. The influence of Cold War politics created new ideas of 'amateur' athletes and commercialisation placed greater emphasis on global rules and regulations. However, WADA's establishment entailed creating new shared systems of meaning. Doping was cast as unacceptable behaviour, a stance internalised and acted upon at every level of the sporting community (Girginov 2006). Such an approach is consistent with the Weberian ideal-type of rational-legal authority based on the implementation of bureaucratic, impersonal, all-inclusive and enforceable rules and regulations, or codes of conduct. These define the normative boundaries of a community while providing a criterion against which claim-makers' legitimacy and moral authority is measured. I next overview these anti-doping rules and regulations.

The World Anti-Doping Code

From an administrative perspective, WADA and the WADC represent important steps in reducing the complexity and inconsistency of former anti-doping frameworks. This creates a 'powerful focus for policy development and implementation' (Gilberg, Breivik and Loland 2006; Houlihan 2004; 2009:43). From a Weberian perspective, the WADC can be conceptualised as the 'proper procedures' with which to negotiate 'policies oriented towards the common good' and restore order and stability to sport (Wuñnow et al. 1984:222). The changing nature of modern sport, with increased application of medicine, science and commercialisation, required a reformulation of values with which to tackle doping. This is relevant to my argument as it highlights the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of legitimacy, embedded in broader socio-historical structures (Suchman 1995; see Chapter One). Rather than imagining the elite sporting community based on a shared amateur ethos, the WADC includes codified rules and regulations based on the 'the spirit of sport.' WADA accepts that the spirit of sport is the 'essence of Olympism.' To recall this Olympic spirit, mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis:

... it is how we play true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, and includes the following values: Ethics, fair play and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and other Participants, courage, community and solidarity. (WADA 2009b:14)

The legitimacy of WADA, as the new institutional guardians of sport, rests on the ability of the WADC as a formal, codified regulatory framework to keep the spirit and bodies of sport PED-free. Hanstad et al. (2008) suggest that rather than restoring their moral authority and legitimacy, an unintended consequence of this for the IOC was that WADA represented a complete transfer of authority to a new all-embracing anti-doping organisation. However, Miah (2002:359) suggests that rather than a 'clean break,' the IOC continues to occupy a key role. This view is partly based on the funding of WADA by both the IOC and governments. IOC members occupy key positions on WADA's Foundation and Executive Boards. Highlighting the status attached to Olympic sport, WADC-compliance is mandatory for IOC recognition and subsequent inclusion in the Olympic program (IOC 2004; WADA 2009b; 2010b; 2010c). In this way, WADA can be conceptualised as a transformation of authority to regulate the sporting community that enables elite SGBs, including the IOC, to restore or maintain perceptions of legitimacy.

In addition, appeals to the 'essence of Olympism' in the WADC point to the continued importance of Olympic competition as the moral basis on which the WADC founds its legitimacy and authority. Placing the 'spirit of sport' values as the principles of the WADC reminds stakeholders of the moral foundation of the Olympic Movement. Further, WADA argues that the 'the spirit of sport' is 'universal' and 'practiced naturally, within the rules, and free from artificial enhancements' (WADA 2006a; 2006b). Athletes found to have used PEDs are poor role models for young people with doping presented as a public health issue (Carstairs 2003; Yesalis et al. 2001). Doping is now considered problematic not simply because it contravenes these values, but because it threatens elements presented as part of athletes' fundamental rights. These are 'to participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness and equality for Athletes worldwide' (WADA 2009b:11). These ideas and values are integral elements of the 'moral identity of sport' (Robinson 2007:365). The significance of WADA's claims is that they create a particular PED-free

normative order, or a new imagined global sporting community, based on values intrinsic to the spirit of sport. The stability of the new sporting order is regulated through the WADC.

The WADC is the foundation of the current international anti-doping regulatory framework and as such incorporates a number of rational-legal requirements together with the 'spirit of sport' values. The WADC works in conjunction with five international standards⁸ (Houlihan 2004). These concern administrative details related to SGBs, which operationalise harmonisation of anti-doping policies and are mandatory for all WADC signatories (Hanstad et al. 2010; WADA 2009c). The WADC also includes models of best practice, 'model rules' or 'anti-doping rules and regulations ... developed to provide solutions in different areas of doping' (WADA 2009b:13). While not mandatory, WADC signatories are 'encouraged to use the models of best practice' (WADA 2009b:118). Any alternations by SGBs to meet the particular requirements of a sporting community must:

... conform with and be based on the Code ... contain all of the detail (including reference to International Standards) necessary to conduct an effective anti-doping program. These model rules and regulations will provide alternatives from which stakeholders may select ... All models of best practice will be reviewed and approved by WADA before they are included in the World Anti-Doping Program. (WADA 2009b:13)

As well as reflecting WADA's goal of policy harmonisation, the stipulation that adaptations of anti-doping rules and regulations require final approval by WADA reinforces their institutional authority to police doping. In addition to the model rules, which allow some flexibility in formulation of anti-doping rules, the WADC includes specific doping controls. Like the international standards, these are mandatory and must be included without substantive change by WADC signatories (WADA 2009b). My interest here is the WADC's definition of doping, which signatories are required to adopt. It contrasts with the IOC's 2000 Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code (OMADC) definition of doping as:

⁸ The international standards are: 1) The Prohibited List, 2) Testing, 3) Laboratories, 4) Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs), and 5) Protection of Privacy and Personal Information (WADA 2009c).

- The use of an expedient (substance or method) which is potentially harmful to the athlete's health and/or capable of enhancing their performance;
- The presence in the athlete's body of a prohibited substance or evidence of the use thereof or evidence of the use of a prohibited method (IOC 2000:6).

In contrast, WADA's anti-doping approach brings a wider range of behaviours under surveillance. For example, the WADC defines doping as 'the occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping rule violations set forth in Article 2.1 through Article 2.8 of the Code' (WADA 2009b:18). Appendix 3.1 details the anti-doping rule violations as listed in the WADC. While representing important administrative aspects of effectively addressing doping, the point of interest for my argument is that anti-doping rule violations increase levels of surveillance of athletes and support personnel.

From a Weberian perspective, the WADC's redefinition of doping as rule violation illustrates the tightening or strengthening of measures of social control (see Chapter One). An institutionalised moral panic framework is also valuable here, as stronger measures of social control increase the range of behaviour subject to regulation and enables progressively tougher sanctions (see Chapter One). Measures introduced under the WADC include the strict liability principle, the athletes' whereabouts ruling and the incorporation of other agents of social control, such as law enforcement agencies.

First, the strict liability principle holds athletes found with illegal substances in their bodies responsible for the presence of those substances (Miah 2002; Schneider 2004). In other words, irrespective of any mitigating circumstances, strict liability suggests that all athletes are potentially 'cheats' or 'folk devils.' The idea that athletes are responsible for ensuring that they avoid banned substances is not new. The OMADC states the 'personal responsibility of any athlete subject to the provisions of this Code to ensure that he/she does not use or allow the use of any Prohibited Substance or any Prohibited Method' (IOC 2000:5). However, the WADC's Anti-Doping Rule Violations expand the idea of personal responsibility to the principle of strict liability, which means that:

It is each Athlete's personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters his or her body. Athletes are responsible for any Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their Samples. Accordingly, it is not

necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use [sic] on the Athlete's part be demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping violation under Article 2.1. (WADA 2009b:18)

The automatic presumption of guilt under the principle of strict liability has been controversial. Some athletes have argued that positive tests have resulted from contaminated or poorly labelled nutritional supplements or food (see Mehlman 2009). For example, three times Tour de France winner, Alberto Contador, claimed that his positive test for clenbuterol at the 2010 Tour resulted from consuming contaminated meat (Gallagher 2011 *The Telegraph*). Australian triathlete Rebekah Keat received a two-year suspension for a positive drug test, which later retesting showed resulted from a contaminated nutritional supplement provided by her sponsor (Gardini 2010; Krabel 2008).

There is some provision under the WADC for modification of sanctions based on 'exceptional circumstance where a Prohibited Substance entered an Athlete's system through No Fault or Negligence or No Significant Fault or Negligence on the Athlete's part' (WADA 2009b:54-8). However, from WADA's perspective, athletes are solely responsible for what they ingest (Miah 2002). As former WADA President, Richard Pound, stated: 'if you didn't know what was in there it's your own damn fault' (cited in Mehlman 2009:129). Such an inflexible approach places athletes in a difficult position. For example, although initially reluctant to retest the supplements in the case of Rebekah Keat, later WADA retesting found contamination by norandrostenedione. Efforts to clear her name took over two years and cost Keat more than AUD\$60,000 in legal fees (Gardini 2010; Krabel 2008). Application of strict liability heightens the importance of anti-doping information and education.

This has implications for SGBs' legitimacy based on their efforts in this area. Emphasising the important role of adequate provision of anti-doping education, DrugScope (2004:21) point out that application of strict liability is 'most objectionable in circumstances where athletes lack the information or the capacity to ensure that banned substances do not enter their bodies.' I consider the implications of the strict liability principle, in conjunction with anti-doping education, for the legitimacy of SGBs, including WADA, using the e-Survey and interview data in Chapter Six. The data discusses whether

participants accept that athletes should be held accountable if they decide to dope.

Second, the WADC and the international standard for testing require sports federations to have a Registered Testing Pool of elite athletes from which random individuals are chosen for testing, both in and out of competition. To facilitate this process, elite athletes must provide whereabouts information including their 'home address, place and time of training, training camps and other plans to travel' (Hanstad and Loland 2009:167-68). Athletes are required to update this information every three months. This includes advising sporting authorities where they will be, for at least one hour per day, as well as any unforeseen changes to their schedule. Three missed tests within an 18 month period, based on a failure to be where athletes have stated they would be, incurs the risk of having committed an anti-doping rule violation with or without a positive test (Kayser 2009). The 'whereabouts rule' has been criticised on the basis that, as the rule is not applied consistently by all countries or sporting bodies, the system is unfair. It has also drawn concerns over athletes' privacy, autonomy and right to self-determination (Hanstad and Loland 2009). Concerns over the 'whereabouts rule' and principle of strict liability illustrate how support or perceptions of legitimacy for anti-doping regulations need to be seen as fair, and must acknowledge athletes' rights in terms of testing procedures as well as equitable application of sanctions (Donovan et al. 2002; see Chapter One). In other words, codes such as the WADC, which are designed to shore up the legitimacy of elite SGBs, can also severely test that very same legitimacy.

Third, processes of institutional transformation of anti-doping regulation under the authority of WADA and the WADC include expanding regulation to target not only PED-using athletes, but also those who facilitate and encourage doping. This includes the manufacture, supply and trafficking of PEDs (Houlihan 2009). Again, this is not new, as the OMADC previously included provision for dealing with the trafficking and manufacture of PEDs (IOC 2000:4, 8). WADA builds on this foundation to coordinate investigatory work with SGBs and multiple government agencies such as customs, drug and

law enforcement (ISM 2007). According to WADA's Director-General, David Howman:

We want to get to a position where an investigatory body, operating under its national laws, can work alongside and cooperate with sports authorities so that sports can proceed with the sports sanctions in a timely manner while government authorities enforce laws relating to the supply and manufacture of doping substances. (cited in ISM 2007)

For example, in November 2008 WADA and Interpol reached a Memorandum of Understanding to formalise co-operation between the two organisations (WADA 2008b). These types of initiatives that incorporate other social control agencies shift doping from a sporting infringement, with associated sporting sanctions, to classification as criminal behaviour and penalties ranging from court imposed fines to imprisonment (Moller 2009).

The relevance of these types of changes under WADA concerns the key concept of this thesis, which is a consideration of the role of legitimacy in the doping debate. These developments also illustrate the dynamic nature of legitimacy where, from a Weberian perspective, measures of control have a tendency to tighten around the individual (Weber 1969). An institutionalised moral panic theoretical lens is also useful here as it highlights the evolutionary nature of institutional responses to behaviour identified as threatening social order. A problem-specific institution implies that the issue requires a strong regulatory approach. This enables implementation of greater measures of social control or strengthening of existing measures, which can be conceptualised as processes of 'diffusion' and 'escalation' or a 'spiral of signification' (Cohen 1973:66-7; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; Hall et al. 1978; see Chapter One). As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994b:156) describe it, 'they operate under the "widening-the-net" principle.' These processes are clearly evident in the actions of WADA, using the WADC, as problem-specific institutional responses to doping to broaden the control of PEDs to a whole of society response.

Building on processes already in place under the IOC, the redefinition of doping as an anti-doping rule violation enabled incorporation of wider innovative methods of social control such as the strict liability principle and athletes' whereabouts rule. WADA's incorporation of other agents of social

control, such as Interpol, 'diffused' anti-doping regulation by including government and law enforcement agencies. This escalates doping from a sporting infringement to a potentially criminal issue. Further, WADA continually 'widens the net' by linking PED use to broader social issues easily conceptualised by the public. For example, in response to reports by Australian Customs that PEDs coming into Australia are appearing in gyms and sporting clubs, current WADA President John Fahey stated:

We really need to focus more generally and not just on elite (drug use) ... Armed with better knowledge, we can make a better case for more attention and more funding to address the health of ordinary citizens who can suffer dreadful consequences of the problems they are creating for themselves ... It comes down to the suburbs, the gyms and the schools. People will see a way of getting a short-term benefit in a way that in public health terms can cause extreme damage. (Silkstone 2008 *The Age*)

According to WADA, the necessary response to such a situation is the WADC, which 'represents a unique and unprecedented triumph of Sport and Government joining forces to address a critical problem threatening public health and the integrity of sport' (ISM 2007). Like the IOC, the legitimacy of WADA rests on the ability of a regulatory framework, in this case the WADC, which also incorporates other agents of social control to keep sport PED-free.

However, doping scandals continue despite WADA and the WADC. In 2003, the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) was implicated in a steroid distribution scandal. In 2007, three time Olympic gold medallist American sprinter Marion Jones admitted she had used PEDs before the 2000 Sydney Olympics. She later served a six month prison sentence for cheque fraud (AFP 2008a; AP 2007g; BBC Sport 2010; Kearney 2007; Michaelis 2006). The significance of these events for the legitimacy of WADA is that neither the BALCO scandal nor Marion Jones's confession resulted from the actions of WADA. Evidence of BALCO's doping involvement emerged after athletics coach Trevor Graham sent a syringe containing 'the clear' (tetrahydrogestrinone or THG) to drug testing authorities⁹ (Beamish 2009; Houlihan 2009; Nearman 2008). Marion Jones's prison term resulted from lying

⁹ Graham's actions led to a United States federal government investigation into BALCO which was identified as the source of 'the clear' (BBC Sport 2005; Magnay 2008b). It is important to note that suspicions about Graham's involvement in doping existed for some time before the

to federal investigators over a cheque fraud scheme involving her former partner and track and field athlete, Tim Montgomery, as well as lying over her involvement with BALCO (AFP 2008a). Other high profile scandals since WADA's creation include the withdrawal of the Astana cycling team from the 2006 Tour de France due to suspicions of involvement in the Spanish Operación Puerto doping scandal, which implicated 56 cyclists (Abt 2006; AP 2006b; DeSimone 2006; Kroner 2006). Ongoing doping scandals suggest that not all individuals in the sporting community necessarily share the WADCs' appeal to values encapsulated in the 'spirit of sport.'

WADA, Legitimacy and a Moral Panic

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the central hypothesis of this thesis, which is whether doping events create a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs. Secondary analysis considered whether responses to such a crisis suggest some support for doping as a moral panic. I have drawn on Weber's (1969) consideration of legitimacy as well as the moral panic literature including Cohen (1973) and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a; 2009) among others. Weber highlighted the subjective, evaluative nature of legitimacy, which suggests that claims to legitimacy cannot be taken for granted. Dominant groups must actively work to maintain support for claims to legitimacy as well as compliance from other institutional actors and stakeholders. In the case of drugs in sport this includes SGBs and athletes. Support for WADA provides opportunities for SGBs, including the IOC, to enhance or restore perceptions of their legitimacy as making a genuine effort to maintain 'clean' sport. As Miah (2002:359) notes:

... WADA is supposed to be active at ensuring transparency about anti-doping practices and its existence as an independent body could give credibility and legal strength to any individual governing body that ascribes to its conditions.

The challenge facing WADA is to generate and maintain interest and resources from influential policy actors, including governments and sporting bodies. WADA's ability to generate stakeholder support, or build consensus, speaks directly to Weber's concept of legitimacy based on a rational-legal framework and fits neatly within an institutionalised moral panic framework.

Like legitimacy, successful moral panics require that claim-makers engage in consensus-making activities, among both the public and other stakeholder groups, to secure support for institutional solutions. In a moral panic to legitimate the ongoing provision of funding as well as public support, claim-makers must manage the 'delicate balance' (Zatz 1987) between showing that their efforts are effective, or legitimate, evidenced by detection and sanctioning of deviant individuals. As Hawdon (2001:430) notes in his discussion of the role of rhetoric in the 'war on drugs' as a moral panic, claim-makers present the public with 'mixed results,' because 'if action is too successful, there is nothing left to fight. If not successful enough, public support for the crusade will likely erode.'

The challenge facing WADA is to demonstrate that they are catching PED-using athletes using the WADC. At the same time, WADA must justify their continued operation based on ideas that the problem, PED-using athletes, remains and requires ongoing regulatory attention. This is an important point as anti-doping policy has been largely reactive, driven by scandals such as the PED-related death of Simpson in 1967 and the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, which substantially changed anti-doping approaches. However, as we have noted earlier in this thesis, reliance on scandal to generate support 'is dangerous as even scandal can become routine' (Houlihan 2009:49; see Chapter One). In addition, the dynamic nature of the broader social context presents claim-makers with the difficult task of maintaining commitment and momentum based on the tendency for problems or issues to 'mutate' (Houlihan 2009:45). For instance new PEDs, such as THG, and debates over new technology, such as hyperbaric chambers or swimming bodysuits (Christie 2006; Reuters 2008) occur in policy and public arenas with competing claims for attention (see Chapter One).

This speaks directly to issues of governance and control as, while supporting WADA presents opportunities for SGBs to enhance their legitimacy, it also challenges their moral authority to control their particular sporting communities. For example, as well as broadening measures of social control of athletes, the WADC strengthens control over SGBs through access to

Gatlin, LaTasha Jenkins and Tim Montgomery (Hart 2008; Nearman 2008).

funding and Olympic participation being linked to implementation of WADC-aligned policies (AP 2007h; WADA 2009b). As Houlihan (2001 cited in Miah 2002:359) notes, a 'key test' for WADA is securing the support and commitment from 'lukewarm' sporting bodies. The problematic nature of building consensus over anti-doping approaches reflects the fact that while 'high performance sport may have become what some have called a global monoculture ... attitudes toward the use of performance-enhancing drugs remain highly particular' (Kidd et al. 2001:182). Consequently, WADA faces the challenge of maintaining support, resources and enthusiasm without 'fracturing the fragile global consensus on anti-doping' (Houlihan 2009:45). I explored this issue using the AFL as a case study in the following chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have noted the socially and historically contingent nature of the doping debate, influenced by political, commercial, medical as well as scientific imperatives. Broader social factors, such as the political climate of the Cold War and the medicalisation of sport, as well as shifting concerns over drug use from a health issue to a 'moral crisis,' influenced ideas and attitudes towards drugs in sport (Dimeo 2007:93; Wrynn 2004). Although ideally situated to take an active leadership role, ongoing doping scandals, accusations of a failure to detect new PEDs, suppression of positive results and commercialisation of the Olympics, raised questions over the IOC's commitment to anti-doping. The 1998 Tour de France doping scandal and Salt Lake City bribery scandal reinforced suspicions that the IOC had failed to fulfil its role as guardians of Olympic sport. This led to the creation of WADA. The withdrawal of support for the IOC and the institutional transformation of anti-doping authority in the form of WADA demonstrate that claims to legitimacy cannot be taken for granted. This led me to explore the way that SGBs responded to challenges to their legitimacy. The question that emerged from that examination was whether WADA can be conceptualised as a institutionalised moral panic, with a focus on restoring the legitimacy of elite SGBs (see Chapter One).

This chapter has argued that transformation of anti-doping regulation in the form of WADA in response to claims that the IOC lacked legitimacy can be

seen through a Weberian lens. From this perspective, the legitimacy of WADA is based on a combination of an appeal to shared values claimed to be inherent to sport (encapsulated in the 'spirit of sport') as well as a rational-legal foundation in the WADC. As Weber (1969:944) noted, measures of the exercise of legitimacy can be given expression in regulations and include the creation of special agencies as well as more stringent measures of social control. There is evidence of this in the context of WADA and the WADC. The reclassification of already existing measures under the OMADC, such as redefining doping as an Anti-Doping Rule Violation, brings a greater range of behaviours under surveillance. This is evident in the strict liability principle and athletes' whereabouts ruling as well as the incorporation of other agencies of social control, such as customs and law enforcement, into the anti-doping framework. An elites-engineered institutionalised moral panic theoretical framework also helps to shed light on the role of legitimacy in the debate surrounding doping.

A moral panic lens is valuable as it highlights that support for the moral authority and legitimacy to regulate the sporting community cannot be taken for granted. Rather, it is dependent upon ongoing concern that the particular issue, in this case doping, is problematic and requires a specific institutional response. Such a response includes a regulatory framework with the ability to detect and sanction deviants, which in turn enables application of increasingly strict measures of social control. Further, issues of governance arise as SGBs are also subject to greater measures of social control using the international standards, models of best practice and mandatory doping controls.

Ongoing doping scandals, such as BALCO and doping incidents in the 2006 Tour de France mentioned earlier in this chapter, raise questions about these issues. More importantly, with a range of issues demanding public and policy attention, continued scandals have the potential to lead to a waning of public interest in doping as problematic behaviour. In moral panic terms, the difficulty is to maintain the momentum generated in the initial 'volatile' phase of a moral panic (see Chapter One), such as the creation of WADA in response to the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal. WADA faces the challenge of maintaining community concern over doping while simultaneously

justifying its continued existence as the appropriate institutional solution. This requires an ongoing consensus-making process that not only identifies PED-using athletes as 'folk devils' but posits WADA and the WADC as institutional solutions. The significance of this is that it opens opportunities for WADA as well as other elite SGBs, including the IOC, to enhance or restore perceptions of their organisational legitimacy and moral authority.

The socio-historical case studies commencing in this and the next chapter highlight the importance of expanding analysis of drugs in sport beyond a focus on the athlete-user. The transformation of anti-doping approaches in the form of WADA as well as the ability to maintain support, or build consensus, for their moral authority and legitimacy has implications for other elite SGBs. With WADA situated as the central anti-doping authority, support for its initiatives provides opportunities for SGBs to enhance perceptions of their legitimacy. However, this demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy and moral authority as WADA's role as a global monitor of anti-doping polices also challenges the authority of SGBs. This raises issues for SGBs in terms of maintaining governance and control of their particular sporting communities, with the possibility of resistance to the call to align with WADA's framework. I discuss these issues in the next chapter using the AFL as an Australian NSO.

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The Australian Football League

In the previous chapter I used the IOC and WADA as case studies to explore changing attitudes associated with doping over time. The purpose of that chapter was to investigate the hypothesis that doping events create a crisis of legitimacy for SGBs. I also considered whether an elites-engineered moral panic theoretical framework helps to understand the role of legitimacy in the context of regulatory approaches to PEDs in sport. I demonstrated that in response to a crisis of legitimacy for the IOC, exacerbated by the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, the creation of WADA was an institutionalised moral panic to regulate PED-using ‘folk devils.’ That chapter also highlighted that the legitimacy of elite SGBs, as well as eligibility for Olympic inclusion and access to government funding, became linked to compliance with WADA-defined regulations under the WADC. This brings structural issues and power relationships between organisations into the analysis. From this perspective, the question is whether SGBs’ interactions with WADA affect organisations’ efforts to maintain the legitimacy and moral authority to govern and control their sporting communities.

To explore this issue further, this chapter examines the anti-doping efforts of an Australian NSO, namely the AFL, as well as their interactions with WADA and other social actors. In other words, using the AFL as a case study, the focus of this chapter is organisational legitimacy. This approach acknowledges the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy and, by including other stakeholders and media reports, examines how claims to legitimacy are made and challenged. This chapter also explores whether stakeholders’ use of the media to talk about doping fits within a moral panic framework. I begin the chapter with a brief overview of governance of Australian football up to 1998, including the AFL’s introduction of an anti-doping policy, as PED use in Australian sport became an issue of government concern. Following that I examine the interactions between the AFL and WADA, as well as the AFL and the Australian government.

Doping and Anti-Doping in Australian Football to 1998

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the professional nature, and extreme physical demands, of European sports created an environment in which substance use was well-known and tolerated (see Chapter Three). Australian football, originally known as Victorian Rules, ‘officially’ commenced in 1858 with the first formulation of codified rules and regulations associated with the founding of the Melbourne Football Club (Grow 1998a; Pascoe 1995). There is no indication that when the Victorian Football Association (VFA) and the breakaway Victorian Football League (VFL) formed in 1877 and 1896 respectively that doping was taking place in that sport (Andrews 2000; Sandercock and Turner 1981). Rather, both organisations focused on securing control of the game. As Sandercock and Turner (1981:166) point out, since the VFL formed there have been ‘problems within the Aussie Rules world about just who is running the game.’ However, Wong (2006:176) notes that the VFL quickly established ‘its pre-eminence’ over the VFA and other regional associations.

Further, and irrespective of their contested relationship, a central area of concern for the VFL and VFA was establishing the dominance of Australian football over other football codes (Collins 2005; Hess 1998). Regional Associations had formed in most other Australian states and territories by the end of the nineteenth century or early in the twentieth century (Grow 1998b; Whimpress 2008). However, while enjoying strong local support, these regional competitions lacked an overarching governance structure that would create a stable national competition. Successfully expanding Australian football beyond its Victorian base into a financially stable, competitive national league was a central issue for the administrators of the code for much of the twentieth century. There is no evidence suggesting that up to the late-twentieth century doping was taking place or challenging either the VFL or VFA’s legitimacy.

In contrast, as Chapter Three recorded, from the 1960s, the IOC and other international SGBs began to critically examine doping due to athletes’ deaths linked to PEDs, with claims that doping provided an unfair advantage to ‘cheats’ and that doped sporting heroes were poor role models for youth. In

addition to these claims, concerns over the impact of doping on athletes' health became linked to evaluations of doping as a serious moral crisis threatening the stability of sport. These claims were influenced by individuals and networks in the scientific community, illustrating the importance of broadening analysis of PEDs beyond the athlete-user (Dimeo 2007; Wrynn 2004). As I discuss later in this chapter, drug use in sport did not become an issue challenging the VFL's claims to legitimacy until towards the end of the twentieth century. The VFL did face many challenging issues prior to that time, which the literature discusses in detail (see Hess and Nicholson 2007; Hess and Stewart 1998; Marjoribanks and Capling 2004; Nadel 2008; Pascoe 1995; 1997; Sandercock and Turner 1981; Stewart and Dickson 2007; Stewart et al. 2005 amongst others). However, for the purposes of this chapter I briefly consider the impact that a 1980s financial crisis in Australian football had on the legitimacy of the VFL. This emphasises the multi-dimensional, contested nature of claims to legitimacy and the influence of broader social factors on those claims:

This financial crisis in Australian football was associated with significant social changes that took place in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, impacting on Australian football and contributing to conditions that placed pressure on the VFL's governance of the code. As Stewart (1998:190-91) notes:

In the 1970s inflation, increasing levels of unemployment and changing community values led to significant changes in the recreational practices of ordinary Australians ... The VFL now had to accommodate the growing corporate interest in the game, the ever-increasing leisure opportunities available to ordinary people, the threats of other team sports such as soccer ... players' growing disenchantment with their playing conditions ... and the rapidly rising cost of getting a competitive team on the field of play.

This financial strain contributed to major organisational change that led to a framework of rational-legal rules that consolidated the dominance and legitimacy of the VFL. The roots of a 1980s financial crisis in Australian football can be traced to large scale corporate sponsorship that commenced in the 1960s for the VFL, as well as for other major spectator sports in Australia. During the 1970s the VFL continued to pursue a commercial agenda that generated significant corporate revenue (Andrews 2000; Stewart 1998). Clubs also adopted a more commercial approach by joining with stadium

managers to introduce premium seating and corporate boxes as well as revenue-generating activities unrelated to football, such as medical centres, travel and insurance services (Andrews 2000; Stewart and Dickson 2007). However, in the 1980s increasing corporate sponsorship led to criticism of the VFL's administration of the game.

The problem for the clubs was that they had failed to consolidate the advantages of the stronger revenue base developed in the 1970s. Escalating player payments and substantial transfer fees in the 1980s outpaced clubs' income-generating ability (Stewart and Dickson 2007). The VFL's failure to implement effective regulatory processes to control clubs' costs contributed to a financial crisis with a number of clubs declared technically bankrupt (Linnell 1995; Stewart and Dickson 2007). As Stewart and Dickson (2007:80) point out:

The cause of the problem was a massive increase in player payments ... and the breakdown of League controls over player payment limits. The average club wage bill increased tenfold during the 1970s ... This wage explosion was good for players, but it was also the catalyst for a further transformation of the game.

The relevance of the financial crisis for this chapter is that it revealed limitations in the VFL's governance structure and contributed to a challenge to their authority. At the time of the financial crisis, a Board of Directors governed the VFL with delegates nominated by member clubs who sought to protect their individual clubs' interests (Linnell 1995; Nadel 2005; Stewart et al. 2005). This parochial structure restricted the VFL's ability to respond to the financial crisis. In 1984, the Carlton Football Club attempted to organise a new National Football League. The Carlton move was an attempt to control the game and alleviate the financial pressure experienced by some Victorian clubs. As well as this challenge from within the game, the VFL was confronted by the increasing popularity of other football codes (Nadel 2005). As Ian Collins, Carlton Football Club executive, stated:

At the time, of the Victorian clubs, seven or eight were experiencing difficulties ... The competition was obviously having some real difficulties with Rugby League and to a lesser extent with Rugby Union ... (A decision evolved) to try and take the game national. (cited in Nadel 2005:40)

To avert these challenges to their authority and to address the financial crisis, in 1985 the VFL Board was replaced by the VFL Commission (VFLC). While member clubs continued to elect Commissioners, these were now appointed based on their abilities in business administration rather than football affiliations (Andrews 2000; Nadel 2005; 2008; Stewart et al. 2005). The VFLC centralised decision-making and implemented 'rules and regulations (by which the clubs have to) abide,' including a salary cap, a player draft, abolishing player-transfer fees and reducing player lists (VFL 1986 in Stewart and Dickson 2005:101; Stewart and Dickson 2007). While not concerned at that time with doping, the VFLC's regulatory framework cemented the VFL's legitimate authority to control Australian football. This illustrates how dominant groups, in this case the VFL, can reinforce their legitimacy through rationally and legally enacted rules and regulations to maintain positions of power and authority.

As Stewart and Dickson (2007:84-5) note, 'the VFL was not only able to ensure that its competition would become the basis for national competition, it was also able to ensure that it would become the governing body of the sport throughout Australia.' Consolidating the VFL's position, the financial crisis reduced the VFA to a single division 15 team Melbourne competition (Nadel 2005; VFL January 2008). In the 1980s as other sporting codes, such as soccer and rugby league, began to enjoy more public support the VFL increased their focus on securing Australian football's position as the dominant sporting code in Australia (Stewart et al. 2005). Throughout this period the areas of concern for the VFL were consolidating their authority and expanding into a national competition, with no evidence suggesting doping was taking place or challenging their legitimacy. The lack of concern about doping in Australian football is perhaps not unsurprising, reflecting the complacency of the Australian sporting community at the time when 'it was generally agreed that, unlike Europe and America, Australia did not have a serious drugs in sport problem' (Stewart 2006:110). In addition, prior to the 1970s the Australian government viewed sport as a 'purely private affair' and left management primarily in the hands of NSOs (Booth and Tatz 2000:163; Green 2007). This attitude changed towards a more interventionist government approach

following Australia's poor medal performance at the 1976 Montreal Olympics (Green and Houlihan 2006).

Further, in 1978 the Australian Federal government surveyed drug use in Australian sport and found that athletes were using a variety of substances to enhance performance. This led the government to establish a National Programme of Drugs in Sport (Buti and Fridman 2001). Recognising that Australian athletes were part of a global sporting community in which doping took place, in the 1980s the Australian Federal government instituted drug testing programs. These focused on Olympic athletes at the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS), which had been created in 1981 in response to Australia's poor performance at the 1976 Montreal Olympics (Connor 2009b). Random drug testing was introduced from 1986 (Buti and Fridman 1994; Green 2007; McKay and Roderick 2010; Stewart et al. 2004). Complementing the AIS, the Australian Sports Commission (ASC), established in 1985, delivered increased funding to NSOs, consolidated sport development programmes and co-ordinated the government's National Program on Drugs in Sport (Anti-Drugs Campaign) (Buti and Fridman 1994; Stewart 2007; Stewart et al. 2004). The AIS and ASC transformed the structure and operation of Australian sport and, parallel with international sport, strengthened the application of science to sport. As Stewart et al. (2004) note:

By the end of the 1980s, the ASC had taken on a strong coordinating role, the AIS provided quality coaching and sport science advice to elite athletes ... and NSOs had come to rely on government funds to professionalise their operations through the sport development programme.

As I discuss later in this chapter, access to government funding became a significant issue in interactions between the AFL and the Australian government. However, by the end of the 1980s sport policy in Australia was an integral part of the Australian Federal government's social and economic policy framework (Green 2007; Green and Houlihan 2006; Stewart et al. 2004). The government began to frame sports policy 'strategically' by linking it to broader community welfare. For example, sport policy became tied to reducing 'the nation's health bill, contribute to economic growth and national development, promote national pride, develop community services, assist the pursuit of excellence, and expand Australia's international reputation and

profile' (Stewart et al. 2004:62). Linking sporting regulation and policy to broader social issues created a context that enabled the Australian government to criticise the VFL for taking what they saw as a lax approach to drugs in sport, which we will discuss later in this chapter.

However, allegations in 1987 by the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) *Four Corners* program of a 'PED culture' at the AIS challenged perceptions of Australian sport as drug-free. This became a major public issue as the AIS was intended to improve Australia's declining Olympic performance, believed to be caused by other nations' PED use (Opie 2004). The *Four Corners*' allegations led to a Senate Committee Inquiry and the establishment of the Australian Sports Drug Agency (ASDA) in 1990 as Australia's official drug testing body. The Australian Sports Drug Agency applied an IOC-based anti-doping model with a focus on testing, sanctions and education. NSO's access to ASC funding was contingent upon implementing an IOC-aligned framework (Stewart 2006; 2007). The Australian government's response to the AIS doping scandal had implications for the VFL's approach to drugs in sport, heralding a period of significant structural change for the organisation.

The main focus of the VFL up to 1990 was on resolving the financial crisis in Australian football and national expansion of the game. The VFLC tightened control over clubs as well as players by regulating structural elements such as a salary cap and player draft arrangements. A more stringent regulatory framework cemented the legitimacy and moral authority of the VFLC and facilitated the VFL's drive for national expansion. This was particularly important in the 1980s as Australian football consisted of a number of regional competitions apart from the VFL, such as the South Australian Football League (SAFL) and the Western Australian Football League (WAFL). While these regional leagues were successful in 'their own backyards,' they lacked national relevance (Buckley 2002:30). Reflecting a deepening corporate culture and determination to expand the game into a financially stable national competition, in 1989 the VFL rebranded the organisation as the Australian Football League (AFL). As Pascoe (1995:218) notes:

The VFL, having embarked on a corporate agenda, set the conditions in which several clubs almost went bankrupt in the mid-1980s, and by the end of the decade had metamorphosed into a national body, the AFL.

The move to an increasingly commercial approach in Australian football throughout the 1980s reflects a similar process that was taking place at that time in the IOC (see Chapter Three). Like the IOC, commercialisation of Australian football saw the VFL and later the re-branded AFL become an administrative authority with centralised decision-making processes as well as a reliance on routine codified rules and regulations. Others have accomplished the task of providing an in-depth historical coverage of the processes surrounding this organisational change (see for example Linnell 1995; Nadel 1998a; 1998b; Pascoe 1995). The point of interest for this chapter concerns the governance structure of the re-branded AFL, which consisted of a nine member AFL Commission (AFLC). Elected by the clubs, the AFLC was invested with formal authority to promote national expansion, manage and administer the league as well as the organisation of the game 'on the ground' (AFL 2001; Marjoribanks and Capling 2004:76). Using a combination of rules and financial incentives in a range of contracts and licensing agreements, the AFLC continued to centralise decision-making and formulated regulations binding on the clubs (see Stewart et al. 2005). The AFL not only achieved its goal of national expansion, but became one of the most tightly organised and internally regulated sport leagues in the world (Marjoribanks and Capling 2004; Stewart et al. 2005).

This reinforces the Weberian point that organisational change not only tends to become more bureaucratic and rational, but also that it occurs in the context of crises to legitimacy and control over resources. The AFL's use of codes of conduct and licensing agreements illustrates dominant groups efforts to exercise authority and establish legitimacy (Weber 1969). However, this regulatory framework developed out of contested claims over the VFL's legitimacy and moral authority to control Australian football. As we noted in the previous section, the VFL's response to the financial crisis, as well as the growing public appeal of other sports and challenges from within the game, all contributed to organisational change that consolidated the VFL's authority. The AFL's regulatory framework of licensing agreements and codes of conduct

came to include an anti-doping policy, influenced by the AIS doping scandal that prompted changes to the Australian Federal government's sports policy.

The policy response to the AIS doping scandal by the AFL and the Australian government is useful in illustrating the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy. This also shows that diverse objectives relevant to their particular sporting communities were influencing the responses of different stakeholders to drug use in sport. The Australian Federal government responded to the AIS scandal by strengthening Australian sport policy and linking sport to broader social benefits. This enabled them to question the legitimacy of the AFL's anti-doping policies based on the role of sport as a tool for community well-being. Also at issue for the Australian government were the implications for their global reputation as a leader in anti-doping, which I discuss later in this chapter. The AFL recognised the potential for the AIS doping scandal to challenge their legitimacy and moral authority and, as the next section points out, this contributed to the introduction of organisation-specific anti-doping policies.

The Australian Football League (AFL): 1990 - 1998

The AFL recognised the implications for their legitimacy and moral authority based on the potential for PEDs to negatively affect the code's image and appeal if the issue was 'left ... unchecked' (Stewart, Dickson and Smith 2008:58). Consequently, in 1990 the AFL introduced an Anti-Doping Code (ADC) (Stewart et al. 2005). The rebranding of the AFL, reforms to the Commission, the introduction of regulatory codes including the ADC with both in/out of season testing using ASDA and a strong focus on player education, positioned the AFL as a leader in sports governance, creating a model for other associations (Stewart 2006; 2007). Although Australian football is not an Olympic sport, the ideology underpinning the ADC closely followed that of the IOC, namely, protecting athletes' health, respect for medical and sport ethics and equality for competing athletes (IOC 2008; Nicholson 2006). The objectives of the ADC were to:

- Ensure the AFL competition is conducted on the basis of athletic prowess and natural levels of fitness and that individual performance is not enhanced by the use of pharmacologically developed substances;

- Protect players from using substances which may cause acute or long-term harm to their bodies;
- Educate players to understand the dangers and consequences of the use of performance-enhancing substances;
- Set an example for all participants in Australian Football by condemning the use of performance-enhancing substances (AFL 2006:2).

The ADC was applied to players, clubs and officials as well as ‘all persons involved in any capacity or manner in Anti-Doping Violations’ (AFL 2006:6). As one of a number of licensing agreements and codes of conduct addressing a range of issues, including racial vilification, the ADC illustrated the AFL’s concern with maintaining its legitimacy based on a clean image and providing positive role models in sport and the community (Stewart et al. 2005). These issues would play a significant role in interactions between the AFL, the Australian government and WADA. Drawing on a figurational analysis of violence in sport, Hemphill (2002:22) has also suggested that protecting the image and appeal of sport has become increasingly important in the modern sporting environment:

As the sporting marketplace becomes increasingly commercial and professional, competition for broader (especially television) audiences is forcing sport leagues to deal with the more ‘illegitimate’ rough edges of sport and make them palatable to larger, especially younger audience members.

Claims to legitimacy have become linked to sport’s commercial viability and the ability of sporting organisations, including the AFL, to attract and maintain audience support. This emphasises the subjective, evaluative aspect of legitimacy, which includes perceptions that organisations use ‘proper procedures’ to regulate acceptable forms of sporting behaviour. As this chapter will show, these procedures include the identification and sanctioning of deviant individuals (Habermas 1976; Wuthnow et al. 1984).

This also has implications for participation rates in Australian football at the grassroots level. For example, efforts to reduce violence and injury, known as the ‘mother factor,’ have come primarily from a ‘top-down’ management approach focused on maintaining the image of Australian football as family entertainment (Hemphill 2002:22-4). The AFL were concerned with the danger that parents would direct children into sports such as soccer and away from the AFL. This has been described by former AFL player and coach Ron Barassi

as the ‘gradual feminisation’ of the game (McKay 1996 *The Age*). Similarly, PEDs represent an ‘illegitimate’ rough edge that erodes the legitimacy of the code with the potential for parents to re-direct their children into ‘clean’ sports. However, AFL medical officer, Dr Peter Harcourt, has claimed that the ‘mother factor’ was not important: ‘It probably is from an injury perspective ... maybe it would have emerged eventually as an issue’ (personal correspondence). Regardless, the fear of the ‘mother factor’ once more highlighted the important role subjective evaluations of situations perform in generating attempts to shore up organisational legitimacy.

During the 1990s the AFL had secured the authority to govern Australian football in terms of national expansion and had re-established a financially stable competitive environment. Underpinning this were several AFLC reports, such as the 1991 Crawford Report that reduced clubs to the status of shareholders and authorised the AFL’s program of national expansion (see also Macdonald and Booth 2007; Nadel 2008; Pascoe 1995; Wong 2006). However, the AFL’s success at the elite level had consequences for the grassroots development of the game. Successful national expansion and increased television coverage led to a ‘serious slide in the numbers playing amateur football and attending local games’ (McKay 1996 *The Age*). Coupled with growth in the number of sporting ‘choices’ this meant that maintaining the image and appeal of the AFL was increasingly important in terms of building participation rates and developing the sport (McKay 1996 *The Age*). As reports of PED use emerged in other Australian sports, the ADC became a central part of the regulatory processes supporting the AFL’s legitimacy and authority.

In 1991 Australian cyclists Carey Hall, Stephen Pate and Martin Vinnicombe received two-year suspensions after testing positive for steroids. In 1995 Australia’s leading track sprinter, Dean Capobianco, as well as a Western Reds rugby league player tested positive for Stanozolol. An internal Western Reds investigation revealed that between six to 15 of their players had been taking steroids (Stewart 2007). Despite ongoing reports that professional and Olympic athletes were testing positive for PEDs, the AFL at this time successfully kept the appearance of Australian football as PED-free. A ‘clean’ image of Australian football was important as the AFL pursued its commercial

agenda, expanding into a 16-team national competition, raising match attendances and increasing broadcasting rights. In contrast, the VFA (renamed the VFL in 1996) was reduced to a 'feeder' competition (Andrews 2000; Pascoe 1997). Nevertheless, incidents of drug use did eventually emerge in Australian football, challenging its status as a drug-free community as well as the legitimacy of its anti-doping policy.

Doping incidents most commonly addressed in the literature are Justin Charles (Richmond Football Club) and Alastair Lynch (Brisbane Lions Football Club), the only two AFL players to appear before the AFL Tribunal for PED use (Lane 2006a *The Age*). However, as Stewart et al. (2008) note, the cases of Steven Koops (Freemantle Football Club) and Nick Stone (West Coast Eagles Football Club), which I consider in the next section of this chapter, are also significant. The relevance of these cases is that they illustrate the challenges the AFL faced in implementing a regulatory approach that sought to balance the conflicting demands of 'clubs, officials, and the media on one hand, and players, their agents, and unions on the other' (Stewart et al. 2008:59). In other words, there are competing pressures from external stakeholders as well as internal actors, such as athletes, on organisational claims to legitimacy. Donovan et al. (2002) have also noted the relationship between legitimacy and compliance. This requires that anti-doping regulatory mechanisms include, among other elements, consistently applied sanctions and equitable treatment that acknowledges athletes' rights. The incidents of drug use in the AFL highlight the importance of these elements for organisational legitimacy.

In 1997 Charles tested positive for Boldanone (a steroid). Although arguing its use was to assist in recovery from a muscle tear, he received a suspension for the first 16 premiership matches of the 1998 season (Stewart et al. 2008). What was significant in terms of the AFL's legitimacy was that inconsistencies under the ADC soon became apparent. Only days after announcing Charles's positive test, *The Age* newspaper revealed that Ilija Grgic (West Coast Eagles Football Club) had tested positive for methoxyphenamine (an over-the-counter cold remedy), resulting in a club fine (Linnell 1997 *The Age*; Stewart et al. 2008). Grgic was not the first player to test positive for a stimulant with

claims that a third player, whose identity ‘remained a mystery,’ also returned a positive test (Johnson 1997 *The Age*; Murphy 1997). In contrast to Charles’s 16-match ban, a club fine and failure to reveal a player’s identity suggested inconsistent applications of sanctions under the ADC.

These events enabled the AFL to introduce tougher controls against players as well as clubs. These stricter measures of control underpin attempts by dominant groups to maintain the legitimacy to exercise their authority (Weber 1969). The amended rules were presented as a ‘streamlined process’ to reduce complexity and provide ‘the league with greater flexibility.’ However, they also acted to increase the AFL’s power over clubs and players (Linnell 1998 *The Age*). Previously, players had been permitted to play in feeder competitions while waiting to appear before the AFL Tribunal. Under the new rules a positive test meant an automatic playing ban until their Tribunal appearance. The new provisions also meant that clubs could be brought before the Tribunal with club doctors or other officials ‘automatically deemed to have breached the code’ and ‘liable for hefty penalties’ (Linnell 1998 *The Age*). However, the cases of Charles and Grgic were not the only drug-related events in the late 1990s that highlighted inconsistencies under the ADC leading the AFL to regulatory reform.

Further inconsistencies in the ADC became apparent in 1998 when Alastair Lynch appeared before the AFL Tribunal for Dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) use. Lynch claimed that ASDA advised him DHEA was permissible to assist in recovery from chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). However, the ADC did not include therapeutic use exemptions (TUEs) and an exemption was denied. The fact that Lynch was held accountable for receiving treatment for a non-football related illness raised questions over players’ rights to legitimate medical treatments available to the wider community (Lane 2006a *The Age*; Stewart et al. 2008). As Lynch stated, ‘as there is no flexibility in the AFL drug code, all matters relating to this aspect of the game must be referred to the AFL Tribunal ... my only intention ... was to fight for my quality of life’ (cited in Rielly 1998 *The Age*).

In 1999, less than 24 hours after knee surgery Steven Koops (Freemantle Football Club) tested positive for Pethidine. This highlighted questions surrounding players' rights under the ADC to use legitimate medication available outside football. Pethidine was prohibited due to its potential to place athletes' health at risk and its restricted access in the community (Blair 2005 *The Bulletin*; Stewart et al. 2008). The AFL Tribunal did not sanction Koops. However, like Lynch, his case suggested inequities in the ADC over players' rights to make use of medication that, while restricted, was available to the wider community (Stewart et al. 2008). In response, the AFL modified the ADC. Pethidine became a restricted 'in-competition' substance and introduced rules to prevent players in circumstances similar to Koops from being tested (Duffield 2002 *The Age*; Hagdorn 2001 *Sunday Herald-Sun*; Timms 2002 *Herald Sun*). Modifications linked to the Lynch case included adding TUEs to the anti-doping policy framework and changing sanctions to a two-year suspension for a first offence for steroids, stimulants and diuretics used as masking agents. A second offence would result in a life-time suspension (Stewart 2006).

Amendments to the ADC suggest that the AFL recognised the implications for their legitimacy of an inconsistent anti-doping policy framework. The Lynch incident was particularly significant as it not only prompted changes to the ADC but also exposed inconsistencies across anti-doping policies in Australian sport more broadly. This contributed to a government review of anti-doping policy, which I discuss in the next section (Stewart 2007).

However, consideration of the Charles, Grgic and Lynch events is also useful in terms of considering the doping debate as a moral panic. After the Charles incident and details of Grgic's positive test became public, media reports suggested that drug use in the AFL was a problem of increasing proportions. One report described the Grgic incident as the 'latest AFL drug furore' (Linnell 1997 *The Age*). Another said that AFL had a 'a serious problem with anabolic steroids' with 'increasing numbers of players ... turning to performance-enhancing substances' (Schwartz and Connolly 1997 *Sunday Age*). Reinforcing suggestions that drug use was widespread in the AFL, the report also cited claims from the Victorian Director of the International

Federation of Body Builders that AFL players regularly approached him for ‘advice on how to beat the drug tests’ and that Charles was ‘the tip of the iceberg’ (Schwartz and Connolly 1997 *Sunday Age*). Reports surrounding the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal also implied drug use in cycling was symptomatic of a larger problem across elite sport (see Chapter Three). Linking cycling and the AFL, media coverage described the Lynch case as ‘the possibility of another drug scandal’ and ‘the spectre of a third scandal’ (Rielly 1998 *The Age*). These types of reports created a ‘public relations disaster’ for the AFL (Stewart 2007:70). For example, another report commenting on the Charles, Grgic and Lynch drug-related events suggested:

The rush of events last year confirmed that the drug culture that had permeated elite sport throughout the world had finally caught up with the AFL. Which is why there was mild uproar when it was revealed in March that no AFL players had been tested from the end of last year’s grand final up to this year’s Ansett Cup. It made a mockery of the AFL’s claim that its drug-testing system was among the most stringent in Australian sport. (Browne 1998 *The Age*)

The exaggerated claims that drug use was widespread in the AFL fits within a moral panic framework. Further, creating the impression that a drug culture permeated Australian football implied that the AFL’s anti-doping approach was flawed. This raised doubt over their legitimacy and moral authority to govern the game.

These types of reports also illustrate the contested nature of claims to legitimacy and stakeholders’ use of the media to respond to those challenges. The AFL used media reports to emphasise that their drug testing program was effective. To support their claim, the AFL pointed out that ‘tests in relation to recreational drugs ... show that 2 per cent of footballers showed some sort of residue - which is very low in regard to community standards’ (Schwartz and Connolly 1997 *Sunday Age*). Using statistics to respond to the panics, the AFL tried to emphasise that their anti-doping policy successfully met community expectations in relation to illicit drug use. As we noted earlier in this chapter, maintaining the image and appeal of Australian football as a ‘clean’ and safe sporting environment was an important part of building participation rates and developing the sport.

This section has suggested that the ADC was one of a range of rules and regulations that underpinned the AFL's legitimacy, which helped maintain their position as a leader in sporting administration, including drug free sport. This legitimacy had to be won in the 1980s in the face of a financial crisis that threatened the survival of the league. A consequence of this was significant regulatory change under the VFLC and later organisational change in the form of the AFL. However, in the late 1990s drug-related incidents in Australian football demonstrated that this legitimacy could not be taken for granted. We have also seen that media reports constitute a site where stakeholders' claims to legitimacy can be challenged and defended. Further, moral panic criteria, such as exaggerated or disproportional claims of the extent of drug use, are also evident in media reports discussing drug use in Australian football.

Anti-Doping Policy in Australian Football: Post-1998 Tour de France

This section considers the period after the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, with a focus on AFL's interaction with the Australian government in the wake of the creation of WADA. This approach enables me to broaden the analysis of the debate over doping to consider structural factors, such as power relationships between organisations, rather than a limited focus on the behaviour of athlete-users as deviant individuals. As much of the debate took place in the media, the remainder of this chapter draws heavily on media reports. This also enables me to consider the debate over doping in Australian sport using a moral panic framework.

In the wake of the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, the Australian Federal government strongly supported tougher anti-doping measures. For example, Australia co-chaired the International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS). This was an interim mechanism emerging from the 1999 Lausanne World Conference on Doping in Sport designed to facilitate international government support for WADA (IICGADS 1999). To address inconsistencies in Australian sport policy highlighted by the Lynch incident in the AFL, in 1999 the Australian Federal government announced a 'zero tolerance' to doping and introduced the Tough on Drugs in Sport (TODIS) policy (Stewart 2007). This policy also reflected the government's zero tolerance of illicit drug use in the community under the 1997 'Tough on Drugs'

policy. The focus of that policy was catching drug traffickers, rehabilitation and community drug prevention education (AAP 2006 *The Sydney Morning Herald*; Howard n/d). The TODIS policy strengthened the requirement that NSOs implement a government-defined anti-doping policy to access Federal funding (ASC 1999; Stewart et al. 2004). Further, the timing of the launch of TODIS in 1999 was directly concerned with ensuring that no drug scandals would tarnish Australia's anti-doping reputation at the 2000 Sydney Olympics (ISR 1999).

As the first Olympics after the creation of WADA, the 2000 Sydney Games took place during a time of heightened public and regulatory attention to PEDs. WADA attended the Sydney Games as an observer because agreements to harmonise International Federations (IFs) and national government testing programs were still being negotiated (Corrigan and Kazlauskas 2003; Schneider 2000). For the Australian government, this was an opportunity to protect the 'integrity of the Sydney 2000 Games' while promoting Australia's sports delivery systems to a worldwide audience (ASC 1999). As the TODIS policy states: 'The Sydney 2000 Games provide us with a catalyst to achieve a more united international response ... Australia will exploit this unique opportunity to push a strong "tough on drugs in sport" agenda' (ISR 1999). Then Minister for Sport and Tourism, Jackie Kelly, stated that TODIS is 'a comprehensive program of initiatives ... to provide the clearest example for the world to follow' (ISR 1999):

There is no place in Australia for cheats of any kind, especially those who try to gain some advantage by using banned drugs ... Australia is a world leader in the fight against drugs in sport and will continue to promote reforms to expose drug cheats in international competition. (ISR 1999)

By taking a proactive stance under the TODIS policy, the government exploited an opportunity to promote Australia as a world-leader in anti-doping (see also Hanstad and Loland 2009). Illustrating the political dimension of the doping debate, the Australian Federal government linked 'clean' sport to Australia's national identity. Sport is often presented as integral to Australia's 'collective identity' and 'sense of self' associated with values such as 'mateship' and an egalitarian tradition of a 'fair go' (Booth 1995; Lenskyj 1999; McKay 1986:347; McKay and Roderick 2010; Stewart et al. 2004:9;

Stoddart 1986:71). A more critical analysis reveals that these values are not unique to the Australian context and that sport in Australia, as elsewhere, is far from egalitarian (Toohey and Taylor 2009). Rather, sport can also be associated with social division and conflict as structural issues, such as socio-economic status and gender inequality, continue to restrict participation (McKay 1986; Tonts and Atherley 2010).

Nevertheless, popular presentations describe Australians as ‘the most sports-obsessed people on the planet’ and sport as the ‘opiate of the Australian masses ... to be uninterested ... is to be an outcast in the land of the unending quest for sporting glory’ (Barker 2004:62 cited in Tonts and Atherley 2010:384; Chandrasekaran 2000). Stewart et al. (2004:5, 9) note that Australians value sport because ‘they are good at it’ and ‘for a small country with only 20 million inhabitants ... geographically isolated from the rest of the world, sporting success is a highly visible and potent way of achieving global media exposure and international awareness.’ Linking the TODIS policy to qualities at the core of Australian national identity added weight to the importance of a strong stance against doping, which ‘strikes at the heart of fair play and the true spirit of competition’ (ISR 1999). However, as part of positioning Australia as a ‘clean’ sporting nation in support of the ideals of a ‘level playing field’ and ‘fair play’ meant balancing marketing of their efforts as leaders in sports technology while downplaying any reliance on ‘technologies to enhance bodily performance’ (Magdalinski 2000:307). This required the Australian government to take a strong anti-doping stance.

Further, the Australian Federal government claimed to be the legitimate representative of community expectations for ‘Australia to be seen as an achiever’ in sport (ASC 1999:8). As we will see later in this chapter, appeals to community expectations for drug-free sport formed part of the Australian government’s challenge to the AFL’s policy responses to drugs in sport. From the perspective of the Australian government, as well as providing ‘health benefits’:

Success in international sport is seen as contributing to national identity and pride. We are arguably better known internationally by our success in sport than in any other field of human endeavour ... Australia is recognised as a world-leading nation in the fight against drugs in sport ... The government has ...

developed a coherent anti-drugs policy to give clear direction and roles to the Australian Sports Drug Agency (ASDA) and the ASC ... a national policy which requires all NSOs to have an anti-doping policy as a condition of funding. (ASC 1999:8, 11, 47)

The Australian government's policy responses to PEDs highlight that structural factors, including political imperatives, are part of the wider doping debate. Importantly, maintaining Australia's reputation as a world leader against doping also had an economic dimension. As the ASC (1999:37) notes:

Sport has a significant role to play in assisting the government meet its macroeconomic goals such as increased employment and exports, improved industry efficiency and attainment of an overall economic growth rate of 4 per cent per annum over the next decade.

With sport seen as a significant contributor to the Australian economy, and the government committed to 'assisting the sport and leisure industry reach its export target of \$1.3 billion a year by 2006,' keeping sport drug-free was important (Commonwealth of Australia 2001b:iii, v). A central element of this process was the implementation of the 2001 Backing Australia's Sporting Ability a *More Active Australia* (BASA) policy. That policy linked Australia's continued sporting success to a 'thriving sport and leisure industry' and included working with NSOs to 'escalate the fight against drug cheats' (Commonwealth of Australia 2001a:1-10). Although the BASA policy aimed to increase community participation in sport with a target of 'one million more registered sport participants by the end of ... 2004-2005,' it was fundamentally concerned with maintaining Australia's status as a successful sporting nation (Stewart et al. 2004:109). As the policy states: 'The objective of our policy is twofold – to assist our best athletes to continue to reach new peaks of excellence and to increase the pool of talent from which world champions will emerge' (Commonwealth of Australia 2001a; see also Toohey 2010).

A further goal of the BASA policy was to encourage participation in organised club sports, particularly in rural communities, to build community cohesion (Stewart et al. 2004). Sport was presented as providing 'an enduring message of ... healthy, drug-free lifestyles to school children and local communities' (Commonwealth of Australia 2001a:6-7). As the BASA policy emphasised:

Our aim is to see more sport played at the grass roots level, particularly amongst school aged children and in rural areas, where sporting groups are often a vital factor in the cohesion of local communities. (Commonwealth of Australia 2001a:1)

The Australian government's approach also linked participation in sport as important for the prevention of socially unacceptable behaviour, including drug use (Cameron and MacDougall 2000; see also Smith and Waddington 2004). This reflected the Australian government's conservative approach to issues of law and order that included a 'zero tolerance' approach to illicit drugs in the community and strategies to 'stop drug dealers preying on our kids' (Department of Health and Ageing 2001; Liberal Party of Australia and National Party of Australia 2001; Mendes 2001). With a strong anti-drugs focus, the BASA policy stressed the government's zero tolerance approach to drugs and its commitment to WADA's role to 'coordinate the campaign against doping around the globe' (Commonwealth of Australia 2001a:9; see Chapter Three). Further, emphasising the role of sport in social well-being also provided a foundation for presenting drugs in sport as an issue threatening social order or, in other words, as a moral panic.

For the AFL, there were significant implications flowing from the government's approach and support for WADA. The AFL had implemented the ADC in 1990 well before the establishment of WADA with reports from ASDA suggesting they were successful. For example, the *2000-01 ASDA Annual Report* noted that of 534 tests one player tested positive for amphetamines and one for methamphetamine (ASDA 2001). In 2001-02, ASDA carried out 523 tests on Australian footballers, with no positive tests for either PEDs or illicit drugs (ASDA 2002). However, rather than PEDs dominating the AFL, the issue of illicit drugs became more problematic. Using the TODIS and BASA policies, the government linked PED-free sport to the reduction of social drug use and community cohesion. In such a context, the AFL's approach to illicit drugs created tension between the AFL and the Australian government. WADA also criticised the AFL's approach to illicit drug use as 'soft.'

Illicit drug use had emerged as a potential issue in the AFL in 2000 when Nick Stone (West Coast Eagles Football Club) tested positive to speed and ecstasy. Although accepting Stone's claim that his drink was spiked, the AFL Tribunal

banned him from any AFL matches for six weeks. However, as the suspension fell at a time when no matches were scheduled it was described by Tribunal chairman Brian Collis QC as a 'Clayton's penalty' and the ADC guidelines as 'ridiculous' (Stewart et al. 2008:61). Nevertheless, Stone was the first player held accountable for recreational drug use under the ADC, which did not at that time include sanctions for illicit drugs (Stewart et al. 2008). This is an important point because legitimacy is linked to perceptions that organisations uphold existing social norms, such as the classification of illicit drug use as unacceptable behaviour. Further, and as we have seen, the Australian government took a strong anti-drugs approach with sport playing a central role in combating such behaviour. The lack of sanctions by the AFL for illicit drug use had the potential to detract from ADC's legitimacy.

In 2002, Dale Lewis (Sydney Swans Football Club) further challenged the AFL's legitimacy as a drug-free community when he alleged that 'seventy-five per cent [of AFL footballers] have done some sort of recreational drug ... You'd have to have your head in the sand to think that it doesn't exist' (cited in Davies 2005 *The Bulletin*). AFL Chief Executive Officer Andrew Demetriou stated that Lewis's allegations were 'naïve, stupid, and an insult to the footy community' (AFANA Footy News 2002). Player managers and ASDA argued that the strict ADC and testing ensured that Australian football was one of the 'cleanest' sports (AFANA Footy News 2002). Nevertheless, claims that illicit drug use was widespread in Australian football carried the potential to damage the code's image. As we have noted earlier in this chapter, keeping the image of Australian football as drug-free was important for the AFL's continued program of national expansion and maintaining the popularity of the code. This was particularly significant as other forms of football, such as rugby league and soccer, encroached on the Australian market (Stewart et al. 2005).

Lewis's claims challenged the ADC's role in maintaining the AFL's legitimacy and media reports of illicit drug use in Australian football failed to disappear. None of ASDA's 522 tests for PEDs in 2003-04 returned a positive result. However, Dorevitch Pathology, the AFL's private testing agency, reported 31 positive tests for illicit drugs (14 in 2003 and 17 in 2004) (Albergo 2007; ASDA

2003; Barrett 2007 *Herald Sun*). There remained no disciplinary measures for illicit drug use under the ADC and testing for these substances was carried out for 'statistical purposes' only. Further, in contrast to the earlier case of Nick Stone no players were sanctioned (AFL 2007; Davies 2005 *The Bulletin*). Drawing further attention to illicit drug use in Australian football, in 2004 two Carlton Football Club players, Laurence Angwin and Karl Norman, attended training under the influence of recreational drugs (ABC Premium News 2004). Angwin was sacked from the club. While not delisted, Norman agreed to sign a 'legally-binding document' with stringent conditions including counselling and regular drug testing (Stevens 2004 *The Daily Telegraph*; Stevens and Barrett 2004 *Herald Sun*). In response to this incident, the AFL emphasised that drug use was unacceptable behaviour, stating: 'For two players or two people to turn up to a workplace in a shockingly unfit state is unacceptable and reprehensible' (Davis and Krupka 2004 *The Australian*). The AFL denied widespread drug use in Australian football. They pointed out that no more than three per cent of players had tested positive to recreational drugs in the previous year (Stevens, Phillips and Cunningham 2004 *The Mercury*).

Nevertheless, the Angwin and Norman incident had implications for the AFL's legitimacy and contributed to their introduction of a new illicit drugs policy. This was also linked to the Australian Federal government's promotion of drug-free sport, in which athletes were seen as positive role models who contributed to the elimination of illicit drug use and building healthy and cohesive communities (ASC 1999; Commonwealth of Australia 2001a). Further, the Angwin and Norman incident demonstrates that perceptions of legitimacy tend to generate regulatory mechanisms that are presented as in accordance with 'community expectations' (see Chapter One). Policy debate revolved around claims that social norms linked illicit drug use with unacceptable behaviour.

Introduced in February 2005, the AFL's *Illicit Drugs Policy 2005* (IDP 2005) dealt specifically with out-of-competition illicit drug use including cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy. Previously under the ADC, sanctions for stimulants only applied if players tested positive on match days (Davies 2005 *The Bulletin*; Stevens et al. 2004 *The Mercury*). The AFL was the first professional sporting

body in the world to introduce a separate illicit drugs code (Davies 2005 *The Bulletin*). The IDP 2005 focused strongly on player anonymity, the education of players and ‘the public at large in relation to the dangers of Illicit Drugs’ in order to ‘set a positive example for young athletes and others in the community.’ It also involved rehabilitation and counselling (AFL 2007:3; Gleeson 2006a *The Age*; Horvath 2006; Smith 2006a *The Australian*). As the AFL (2007:3) stated:

The Illicit Drugs Policy differs in some important respects from the AFL Anti-Doping Code by addressing the problem of Illicit Drug taking by focusing primarily on education and rehabilitation of Players [*sic*] and others in the AFL system ... found to have been involved with Illicit Drugs.

In line with the ADC, the IDP 2005 included testing in and out of competition as well as pre-and post-match testing. In also included what came to be described as the ‘three strike’ ruling. Under the IDP 2005, a first offence required private counselling, a second offence meant attendance at a rehabilitation program, while a third offence resulted in club notification, referral to a disciplinary tribunal and possible suspension (Stewart 2006). The AFL maintained a strong anti-PED approach with sanctions remaining at a two-year suspension for a first offence and a life-time suspension for a second offence. According to the AFL’s medical officers, after the introduction of the IDP 2005 there had been a ‘significant fall in cannabis detection and ... none in the match-day testing’ (cited in Demetriou 2005b:6).

From the perspective of the AFL, these results suggested success in keeping Australian football drug free, bolstering perceptions of their legitimacy and moral authority. However, illustrating the contested nature of claims to legitimacy, critics of the AFL, such as the Australian government and WADA, argued that the relatively small number of positive tests represented a ‘flawed policy arrangement and testing protocol’ that failed to detect ‘doping cheats’ (Stewart et al. 2008:69). As I point out in the next section, the media played an important role by providing opportunities for different stakeholders to challenge claims to legitimacy and respond to those challenges.

This section has shown that the AFL took a strong regulatory approach to illicit and PED use in Australian football. This suggests recognition of the

implications for their legitimacy if they failed to implement a framework that met community expectations. In the next section I discuss the AFL's interactions with WADA and the Australian Federal government. I consider whether there is any evidence to support the principal hypothesis of this thesis that the doping debate is implicated in organisations' efforts to maintain the legitimacy and moral authority to control their sporting community. Along with the AFL's reluctance to recognise WADA's authority to regulate Australian football for PEDs, the primary area of disagreement between the AFL, WADA and the Australian government surrounded illicit drugs.

Mediating the AFL, WADA and the Australian Federal government

Taking a punitive public naming and shaming approach, WADA applies the same penalty to illicit and PED use. This is underpinned by the view that illicit drugs are equally contrary to what is 'intrinsically valuable about sport' (Horvath 2006; Stewart 2006; see Chapter Three). In 2004 the Australian Federal government supported the WADC and agreed that both illicit and PEDs were cheating, against the spirit of sport and damaging to athletes' health (Stewart 2007). The Federal government's response to drugs in sport also demonstrated a continuing concern with maintaining their status as a 'world leader' in anti-doping. Ensuring that all local sporting codes, including the AFL, adopted a WADA-aligned model had significant implications for the Australian government's reputation, both domestically and internationally. As Davis (2005 *The Bulletin*) reported: 'With an eye to Australia's anti-drugs reputation ... the three codes [the AFL, National Rugby League (NRL) and Cricket Australia] ... will lose all federal funding if they fail to sign [the WADC].' However, all three codes disputed WADA's authority to regulate their respective codes and were reluctant to sign the WADC (Horvath 2006).

A main point of contention for these professional sports was the use of legal drugs, such as probenecid and glucocortico-steroids commonly used in football and cricket. The codes argued that these drugs were rehabilitative rather than performance-enhancing even though they were prohibited under the WADC. Heightening the debate was the WADC's sanctions for cannabis use, which the codes argued was non-performance enhancing (ABC Sport 2005;

Davies 2005 *The Bulletin*). Professional sports, such as cricket, AFL, NRL and rugby union, were also concerned over WADA's 'three-strikes and out' policy. Under that policy, players received a mandatory two-year ban if they failed to make themselves available for testing on three successive occasions (Masters 2004 *The Sydney Morning Herald*; see Chapter Three). While contesting WADA's approach to illicit drugs, the AFL publicly supported the principles underpinning WADA's framework that PEDs were unfair and unethical. Further, the AFL supported the government's zero tolerance of illicit drug use in sport (Demetriou 2005a; Horvath 2006; Niall 2004 *The Age*). However, the AFL argued that as WADA was created with a focus on countering drug-taking in Olympic sports it was better suited for sports other than Australian football, which was not an Olympic sport (Demetriou 2005a:6).

From the perspective of the AFL, not only is the IDP 2005 more appropriate for Australian football but it also complies with the spirit and intention of the WADC and, in some areas, is more rigorous (Horvath 2006). For example, testing for illicit drugs under the AFL's IDP 2005 covered a 44-week period, a timeframe that exceeds other Australian sporting codes as well as WADA's testing regime (Demetriou 2005a). Further, the WADC 'out-of-competition testing does not test for most illicit drugs, including amphetamines, cocaine, ecstasy and cannabis' (Horvath 2006:364). Despite claiming to incorporate a concern with athletes' health, the WADC does not contain any rehabilitation measures (Horvath 2006). In contrast, the AFL sees illicit drug use as a social issue requiring counselling and education rather than heavy sanctions. In addition, while continuing to view PEDs as the more 'insidious drug problem' (Stewart 2006:111), the AFL remained determined to enforce their authority to govern the Australian football community. Stating his position again, Demetriou (2005a:7) argued:

We believe it is our right to create rules and regulations - using the best of advice as we have - for the good of our competition, while being keenly aware of our social responsibilities and our responsibilities to our players; and not just players at the AFL level, but players at all levels.

These comments reveal how this debate is concerned with issues of governance and control. The AFL presented their right to authority in terms of a concern with player welfare, which is a central part of the AFL's claim to

legitimacy under the IDP 2005. Further, the AFL stressed that they took an inclusive approach to drug use in sport that did not simply focus on elite competition but incorporated all levels of the Australian football community. In other words, the AFL argued that they were concerned with building healthy communities, an element that was central to the approach of the Australian Federal government to sport policy.

The AFL's reluctance to become WADA-compliant also had implications for the Australian government's focus on building healthy communities using sport, as indicated in Backing Australia's Sporting Ability (BASA) policy discussed earlier in this chapter. Prominent AFL players, such as St Kilda Football Club captain Nick Riewoldt and Essendon Football Club captain James Hird, publicly supported the AFL's position on both the ADC and IDP 2005 (Johnson and Fuller 2005 *The Age*). As Hird stated: 'You always know that you are playing in a competition that is drug-free so I would support the AFL ... They're going to lose some money with regard to funding so they haven't made the decision lightly' (in Spokes 2005 *ABC Online*). Hird was referring to the fact that the AFL's resistance to the implementation of a WADC-aligned anti-PED framework risked losing Federal government funding for development programs. This placed grassroots sport programs, such as the AFL's Auskick scheme, at risk (AFL 2005; Horvath 2006; Stewart et al. 2008). The AFL received AUD\$1,000,000 under the ASC's Targeted Sports Participation Growth (TSPG) program for Auskick, which focused on primary-school aged children (Green 2007; Stewart et al. 2004; Toohey 2010).

The TSPG operates in conjunction with the BASA policy. As the 'cornerstone' of the ASC's junior and grassroots sports development the TSPG focuses on building participation levels in organised sport. Increased participation in sport is also important for maintaining the health of the Australian population, as levels of physical fitness decline and obesity levels rise (Toohey 2010). The BASA policy and TSPG program were underpinned, in part, by the view that successful elite sport would create a 'trickle down' effect to increase participation in recreational sport (Toohey 2010:2772). This view is not limited to Australian sport policy. For example, following their successful

bid for the 2012 London Olympics, the aim and objective of Sport England was described as:

To change the culture of sport and physical activity in England in order to increase participation across all social groups leading to improvements in health and other social and economic benefits and providing the basis for progression into higher levels of performance. (cited in Brookes and Wiggan 2009)

In terms of Australian sport policy objectives, the AFL's position in the TSPG program was important because they had a demonstrated ability to help the government achieve their policy goals of increased sporting participation (Stewart et al. 2004). For example:

From 1995 to 2001 Auskick programme almost doubled its participants from 47,402 to 94,404, and from 2000 to 2001, the year in which the AFL applied to the ASC for funding under the new TSPG programme, the participation rate increased by 18 per cent ... If the Auskick continues to grow at the rate experienced over ... 2000-2001 ... the programme will attract an additional 45,000 participants over a three-year period. The AFL demonstrated that it had the capacity to convert significant latent interest in football into active participation, as well the capacity to distribute ASC funding through its game development infrastructure. (Stewart et al. 2004:115-16)

As noted earlier in this chapter, the Australian government's focus on increasing participation levels was also associated with maintaining Australia's sporting success and identifying future elite athletes (Green and Houlihan 2006). This highlights how broader structural factors impact on the debate over doping.

However, WADA criticised the AFL for failing to sign the WADC and for the decision to adopt a separate illicit drugs policy:

If they've got such a big problem that they have to run a separate program to counsel all of those who are playing the game to be off illicit drugs, then I think they've got a big problem ... Maybe they should be addressing that in a more aggressive and more positive approach. (WADA Director-General David Howman in ABC Sport 2005)

This is a tautological statement. Nevertheless, it shows how 'a big problem' can be amplified and it challenged the legitimacy of the AFL's anti-doping framework. It was symptomatic of the production of doping as an institutionalised moral panic with suggestions that drug use in Australian football was a growing problem that required a strong regulatory approach.

Faced with the possible loss of government funding, and with both the NRL and Cricket Australia finally acquiescing to the WADC, in 2005 the AFL agreed to become WADC-compliant for PEDs for the 2006 season (ABC Sport 2005; Demetriou 2005b; Horvath 2006). Although the AFL is not an international or Olympic sport, the government linked the AFL's WADC-compliance to Australia's international reputation as a leader in anti-doping. As the Minister for Arts and Sport, Senator Kemp (2005a), stated:

The AFL now joins all major sporting codes in Australia in becoming WADA code compliant. Australia has been acknowledged as world leaders in fighting drugs in sport and will continue to pursue a sporting environment in which athletes are able to compete fairly.

The Australian government continued to strengthen policy and legislation to regulate the Australian sporting community and maintain their international reputation as leaders in drug-free sport. For example, in 2006 the anti-doping framework underwent a major restructure when ASDA was renamed the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA). This included extending powers and responsibilities to include investigation into drug trafficking and possession (Kemp 2005b; Stewart 2007). Since its establishment, ASADA has developed extensive information-sharing networks with police, customs and immigration officers (Jeffery 2008 *The Australian*; Magnay 2008a *The Sydney Morning Herald*). As well as enhancing the government's anti-doping reputation, strengthening regulation against drug use challenged the claims of other stakeholders to legitimacy, such as the AFL.

In 2006 the AFL successfully won a court injunction preventing publication of the names of three senior players who twice tested positive to illicit drugs in out-of-competition testing (Hedge 2006 *Sunday Times*; Wilson 2006a *Herald Sun*). The leaking of players' names to the media had significant implications for the legitimacy of the IDP 2005, which enjoyed player support based on the AFL's assurances of strict confidentiality and focus on player health and welfare (Cooper 2006 *AAP Sports News Wire*; *The Australian* 2006). Senior players, such as Peter Bell (AFLPA President and Fremantle Football Club captain) indicated their concerns: 'Now that the confidentiality has been undermined, the integrity of the system as a whole is seriously in question' (Cooper and Fiamengo 2006 *AAP Sports News Wire*). High profile AFL coaches

were also concerned about the AFL's policy, calling for club notification of any positive drug tests (ABC Premium News 2006; Lane 2006b *Sunday Age*).

Media reports drew on these concerns to claim that the IDP 2005 lacked public support. As one report stated: 'the fans consider it absurdly over-protective, secretive and a sham' and described (unidentified) drug-using players as 'lame-brains' (Roach 2006 *The Advertiser*). Other reports categorised the AFL's illicit drug policy as 'lame - devised purely for the protection of AFL players who have recreational drug habits ... they really treat all drug users with a feather instead of a cane' (Wilson 2006e *The Advertiser*). Some media reports criticised the AFL's policy as 'tantamount to tacit approval of recreational drug abuse - arguably the biggest problem in any elite sport full of young men earning a lot of money' (Wilson 2006d *The Advertiser*). Other reports used former players such as 'former AFL wildman David Rhys-Jones' to support claims that 'use of recreational drugs is more widespread than ever' and that the leaked tests were the 'tip of an iceberg' (Murphy 2006 *The Australian*; Pierik 2006 *The Mercury*). Several elements of a moral panic are evident in these reports. A 'folk devil' responsible for the problematic behaviour, in this case drug-using 'lame brains,' is clearly identified. These individuals challenge the stability of sport by failing in their responsibilities as positive role models for youth.

An elites-engineered moral panic framework is useful in this context as it illustrates that to enhance or challenge claims to legitimacy, stakeholder groups use media reports to construct 'folk devils.' These socially-constructed 'folk devils' took the form of individual performance-enhancing or illicit drug-using athletes as well as institutional actors. Claims that the AFL failed to implement anti-doping regulations that upheld community values and ideals associated with drug-free sport construct the AFL as an institutional 'folk devil.' The Australian government criticised the AFL's anti-doping approach as 'out of touch with community expectations' and contrasted this with their 'zero tolerance' approach to drugs in sport. This challenged the legitimacy of the AFL and put pressure on them to 'show leadership on this issue' (Magnay 2006 *The Sydney Morning Herald*). According to Senator Kemp, the Federal Minister for Arts and Sport, the AFL's illicit drug policy was not:

... seen to be rigorous enough ... I think sporting clubs want to know the names of the players, and I have called on the AFL to have another look at their code - which is in addition to the WADA code - and look more closely at how the sanctions are applied and how the reporting arrangements are applied ... and have some tougher sanctions and a more open and transparent reporting process. (Magnay 2006 *The Sydney Morning Herald*)

In a moral panic there are also suggestions that the dangerous behaviour is widespread, or as the report suggests 'the tip of an iceberg.' Further, linking the deviant behaviour to broader social issues reinforced the idea that the social order was threatened. The media reports on illicit drug use in Australian football created the idea that not only was the problem widespread and tolerated in that community but explicitly linked this to drug addiction in the wider community:

Demetriou should visit a drug rehabilitation centre. He should have a good long look at the thousands of kids who have stuffed their lives using these so-called recreational drugs ... These drugs are not okay. They are lethal and they destroy lives. It's time for the AFL to start again on its drugs policy and fall into line with other sports and codes. Defending the indefensible is starting to wear very thin indeed. (Wilson 2006d *The Advertiser*)

... the three AFL players (so far unnamed) who took illegal drugs should be matters for the criminal justice system, not just for sports administrators. ... Unfortunately in Queensland, we now lack the 'Joh Law' ... instituted by the ... Joh Bjelke-Petersen government ... in the 1980s, by which drug users were told that unless they revealed the identity of their suppliers, then they could expect to serve the same jail time as their suppliers ... this week's decision by the Victorian Supreme Court ... represents a pole opposite to Joh's Law. Not only are the drug-takers afforded complete privacy, there is almost no chance that their suppliers will be caught. (*The Gold Coast Bulletin* 2006)

There are implications here for the legitimacy of dominant groups, including the AFL and the Australian government. These types of constructions suggest that drug use in sport, which has the potential to spread to the wider community, is a particular problem that necessitates a strong anti-drug regulatory response to meet community expectations. In other words, these reports illustrate doping as an institutionalised moral panic.

The debate over policy approaches to drug use in Australian football illustrates how issues of governance and control based on particular regulatory frameworks influence claims to legitimacy. However, claims to legitimacy are both contested and multi-dimensional. The debate between the Australian Federal government and the AFL also illustrates that different

stakeholder groups pursue different agendas in terms of their anti-doping regulatory approaches. For the Australian government, it consisted of the TODIS policy, which reflected a conservative ‘Tough on Drugs’ law and order approach, and the BASA policy aimed at building participation rates in organised sport. For the AFL, participation and development of Australian football were important as they sought to maintain the image of the game as free of PEDs and illicit-drugs by using the ADC and the IDP 2005.

The AFL was also committed to retaining their authority to govern and control Australian football. They continued to apply the WADA compliant in-competition ADC as well as the separate out-of-competition IDP 2005 with a focus on education and rehabilitation: ‘We think the community expects a tough stance and that’s why we’ve implemented out-of-competition for illicit drugs’ (in Wilson 2006b *Herald Sun*). Nevertheless, the IDP 2005 drew significant criticism from a range of stakeholders, such as the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), government, media, clubs, players and others. The media and stakeholders such as the AOC criticised the IDP 2005 focus on player welfare as deflecting attention from ‘the real issue.’ They claimed that irrespective of whether it was illicit drugs or PEDs, these substances symbolised cheating and against the fundamental values of sport. For example:

Football is right and noble to be concerned about its players. But it must be run by administrators, not zealots. AFL players have \$1.5 million annually spent on education programs which include alcohol and drugs. At some stage they must take responsibility for their actions. As it stands now they are protected to such an extent the good health of the competition is at risk. The AFL’s determination to be seen as the sport with the keenest social conscience has led to bad policy ... The AFL must remember it is running a sport, not running for government. (Smith 2006b *The Australian*)

The bottom line is any drug use is cheating and putting players health at risk ... they are simply protecting the cheats ... This is the wrong message to send to children ... and trust me, this will damage our reputation around the world ... the AFL can’t have it both ways and set their own rules ... Cocaine and cannabis are illicit drugs and there are significant health and social issues with these drugs ... The AFL can’t be half pregnant on this issue. (AOC official Kevan Gospar in Wilson 2006c *The Australian*)

These challenges to the AFL’s legitimacy were based on claims that their regulatory framework failed to deal effectively with the problem of drug use

in the Australian football community. Further, these claims suggest that the AFL's tolerant approach to drug use in sport threatened the social order and challenged Australia's international reputation. As we have seen in this chapter, Australia's reputation as a successful sporting nation plays a central role in constructions of the Australian national identity.

Other stakeholders also criticised the IDP 2005. For example, the Hawthorne Football Club 'strongly requested' greater sharing of information by notifying at least one club official of a positive test. The Adelaide and Port Adelaide Football Clubs called for a reduction of the 'three strikes rule' to two strikes (Barrett and Williams 2007 *Fox Sports*). Some players also felt that the IDP 2005 contained 'loopholes' (Anderson 2007 *Herald Sun*). In 2007, the West Coast Eagles Football Club sacked Ben Cousins following a range of alcohol and behaviour related issues. The AFL banned Cousins for 12 months for bringing the game into disrepute (AAP 2009; Wilson 2007 *The Daily Telegraph*). Cousins later admitted being a 'drug addict,' although he never failed a drug test for either illicit or PEDs under the IDP 2005 or ADC. The Federal government drew on Cousins as a 'folk devil' to claim the AFL's policies were flawed and pressured the AFL to adopt the government's model of zero tolerance. For example, referring to Ben Cousins, Federal Sports Minister George Brandis stated:

... if ever you wanted an illustration of doing everything we humanly can to eliminate a drug tolerant culture in sport then you have the events of the past 24 hours ... It's not tenable for any national sporting organisation to be dragging the chain on drugs in sport. We expect all sporting organisations to be aware of the problems. We look to the AFL to come on board with the government's protocol. (cited in AAP 2007c *The Age*)

Media reports also described the IDP as a 'joke.' Cousins ability to 'get away with a drug habit, for what appears to be quite a while ... smacks of a football culture ... happy to hide behind a seriously flawed policy that gives players too many reasons to become drug users' (Wilson 2007 *The Daily Telegraph*). Other incidents of drug use in Australian sport, such as the death of former West Coast Eagles star Chris Mainwaring as a result of recreational drug use and the London arrest of Andrew Johns (former Newcastle Knights Australian rugby league player) for possessing an ecstasy tablet, led to media reports critical of

NSOs anti-drugs policies. Johns also claimed that he had taken drugs throughout his 14-year football career to help battle depression and had regularly "ran [sic] the gauntlet" with drugs testers with his drug use known by officials and team-mates (Walter 2007 *The Age*). Media reports argued that these incidents revealed that elite football in Australia was 'awash with a drug problem that authorities are struggling to counteract' (Chesterton 2007 *The Daily Telegraph*). These types of reports created doubt over the legitimacy of the AFL and other football codes to address drugs in sport.

Claims that drug use and drug using athletes threaten the sporting community situate these types of reports firmly within a moral panic framework. The AFL's refusal to 'name and shame' players contributed to doping as a moral panic by enabling media reports, and other stakeholders, to make disproportional claims of the extent of the problem. Rather than discuss the AFL's strict confidentiality approach in terms of a concern with player welfare, media reports argued that it hid the extent of the problem and protected drug-users. In other words, the AFL's policy was presented as blurring the boundaries between the law-abiding 'clean' athletes who provided appropriate role models and supported community values and a 'sea of well-known sporting heroes turned drug abusers' or folk devils (Chesterton 2007 *The Daily Telegraph*). The latter folk devils were an indispensable part of the narrative to transform the AFL's approach to drugs in sport.

Perceptions of legitimacy rest on an organisation's demonstrated ability to meet and support community expectations or social norms (Habermas 1976), such as athletes' obligations as role models to promote drug-free sport. As we have already seen, government criticism of the IDP 2005 in the media included claims that the AFL's sanctions and reporting arrangements were 'out of touch with community expectations' and that 'athletes have a responsibility as role models' (Magnay 2006 *The Sydney Morning Herald*; Masters 2007 *The Sydney Morning Herald*). The TODIS policy was presented as a contrast, stressing athletes' obligations as role models, arguing that athletes have a 'revered role' with an 'important influence on the community - and on our youth in particular - in representing courage, health, excellence,

teamwork and integrity' (Australian Government 2007:1). These are values aligned with the WADC (see Chapter Three).

From the perspective of the Australian government and WADA, the IDP 2005 lacked transparency and, as a result, 'a growing body of evidence' showed that 'social drugs is rising [*sic*] in the major football codes' (Masters 2007 *The Sydney Morning Herald*). Of particular concern for the government and WADA was that the 'three strikes and you-may-be-out policy doesn't send the right messages' of the dangers of illicit drug use to the community (AAP 2007a *The Age*; AAP 2007b *The Age*; Wilson 2006c *The Australian*). These unsupported exaggerated claims that drug use was rising in Australian football point to a moral panic. Further, critics claimed that the AFL disregarded sport's role in contributing to social well-being by not sufficiently emphasising the dangers of drug use. For example, WADA's Director General David Howman complained:

Three strikes before you're out? That's like a wet bus ticket for the first (offence) and two wet bus tickets for the second ... They just need to be a little bit more transparent and more aggressive in ensuring the players, who are well respected in this country, continue to be role models. (in AP 2007i *The Globe and Mail*)

These types of claims had the potential to erode the AFL's legitimacy. Other groups involved in anti-drugs campaigns, such as the National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre (NDARC), also felt that the AFL's policy was 'out of step with society.' According to NDARC director, Paul Dillon, 'like it or not' athletes were role models. Dillon stated that 'the number one topic ... when I visit a school to lecture on the danger of drugs is the latest drug scandal ... They see these idols behaving badly and it is an issue that the AFL's present three strikes policy doesn't properly address' (in Kogay and Read 2006 *The Australian*). Dr Joseph Santamaria from Drug Free Australia also claimed that the three strikes rule created a 'pool of infected players spreading their illness ... To simply name and shame players and abandon them would be intolerable. But merely helping an elite athlete decrease their illicit drug use ... is nowhere near what the community expects' (in Edmund and Dunn 2007 *Herald Sun*). These types of reports identified drug-using 'folk devils' as 'infected players' failing to fulfil their obligations as positive role models and threatening social order. The AFL's anti-drug policy aimed to reduce rather

than eliminate drug use, but was presented as contrary to community expectations that drug use threatens social well-being. The message was that drug use required a stronger punitive approach than the AFL mandated.

However, the AFL used the media to defend itself. Other health professionals and drug authorities publicly supported the education and rehabilitation focus of the AFL's IDP 2005. Australian Drug Foundation (ADF) chief executive Bill Stronach stated: 'AFL players are young people ... Like it or not, some will experiment with drugs. The AFL's policy is trying to ensure that this ... does not become a long-term problem ... these drugs are unlikely to be performance-enhancing, the best response is one that places player health and welfare at the forefront' (Kogay and Read 2006 *The Australian*). The AFL acknowledged players' responsibilities as role models and sought to balance the 'need for vigilance on one hand' with the civil liberties of its players (AFL 2007:2; Horvath 2006; Lane 2005 *The Age*). In other words, the AFL sought to balance conflicting demands on their legitimacy from external as well as internal stakeholders. A fundamental part of this process was the AFL's guarantee of player confidentiality for positive tests for illicit drugs (Gleeson 2006b *The Age*). As Chapter One noted, maintaining support for the legitimacy of a regulatory framework requires that dominant groups build stakeholder consensus with the underlying goals of that approach (Buti and Fridman 1994). The AFL required player support to legitimately exercise their authority over the Australian football community based on the IDP 2005 as a legally enacted anti-drug regulatory framework. The fact that the IDP 2005 is a voluntary code that enjoys player agreement with strong support for the AFL's focus on education and rehabilitation suggests that the AFL successfully established their internal legitimacy to regulate player behaviour.

This voluntary participation was significant because it suggests that players, as active social agents, recognised the potential for their conduct to influence others as well as a desire to keep the game 'clean' and uphold community expectations. For example, Luke Power (Brisbane Lions Football Club) described the IDP 2005 as 'over and above any other sporting organisation's policy' (AFLPA 2008). Player support was the 'key to the AFL policy' with a

focus on player education and rehabilitation rather than naming and shaming (AFLPA 2008). Other players also voiced their support for the IDP 2005:

We ... love this game and it is certainly something that we want the parents of young players coming into the AFL and AFL fans in general, understanding that the players are steadfast in ensuring that it's a clean sport, it's a healthy sport and it's one that everyone should be involved in. (Matthew Pavlich, Fremantle Dockers Football Club, in AFLPA 2008)

Supporters of the IDP 2005, both within the Australian football community as well as other stakeholder groups emphasised that responsibility for addressing drug use in sport should not be placed solely upon athletes' shoulders.

According to Professor Rob Moodie, the University of Melbourne's Chair in Global Health, the 'expectation that an AFL drugs policy will cure the ills of the world is totally unrealistic' (in Edmund and Dunn 2007 *Herald Sun*). This exchange highlights how exaggerated claims - such as that the AFL drugs policy had the ability to cure the ills of the world - play a role as a central identifying feature of a moral panic. These claims appeared on both sides of the debate with some stakeholders and media reports criticising the unrealistic expectations placed on athletes and sporting groups. For example:

Matthews [Brisbane Lions Football Club Coach] asks why should sport be expected to solve the problem of illicit drugs when all the billions spent in the wider society has achieved absolutely nothing. It's a good question but not one the Government wants to hear because it is "tough on drugs" and has its fingers in its ears ... now that the Government is demanding that they be named and shamed, the players have started to have second thoughts about volunteering to have tests that nobody else in society has ... the players are happy with an illicit drugs code but if the Government wants to chase votes by enacting a thoughtless zero tolerance policy ... then they might have a rethink. (Lalor 2007 *The Australian*)

So this latest rush to test sportspeople ... smacks of ... an expedient exercise to devolve all responsibility for the drug scourge in society onto the shoulders of sporting heroes. It smacks of turning a hobgoblin into a witch and then - triumphantly - hunting it. There is too much convenience here. Authorities rail against drugs because it is easy to rail against drugs. (Baum 2007 *Real Footy*)

These reports explicitly reveal how the debate over doping became a moral panic with PED-using 'folk devils.' However, they also provide evidence of an elites-engineered institutionalised moral panic, as they point out that 'authorities' have a vested interest in constructing drug-using athletes as 'witches' that are then the focus of regulatory action. The reports are suggesting that the moral panic over drugs in sport opens opportunities for

elite groups, such as the Australian government, to enhance their claims to legitimacy or to challenge the claims to legitimacy made by other stakeholder groups, such as the AFL, to control the ‘problem.’

The AFL had clearly identified using illicit and performance-enhancing drugs as unacceptable behaviour for the Australian football community. From the introduction of the IDP 2005 until February 2007 there were 28 positive tests for illicit drugs. This suggested that they had taken measures to meet ‘community expectations’ to regulate and monitor Australian football (Demetriou 2007; Slattery 2007). Nevertheless, critics continued to argue that the AFL conducted an insufficient number of tests and that a ‘narrow’ definition of in/out of competition contributed to their failure to prevent high profile cases of drug use (such as Ben Cousins) (McAsey 2007 *The Australian*). There is a parallel with the IOC here, where external stakeholders and media reports drove organisational change (see Chapter Three). Reforms to the AFL’s IDP 2005 resulted from pressure from the media as well as stakeholders such as the Australian government. The AFL recognised that addressing criticism of their anti-drugs regulations and engaging in ongoing actions to address the socially defined ‘problem’ was essential for perceptions of their legitimacy.

Consequently, in 2008 the AFL reviewed the IDP 2005 (Holroyd 2007 *Real Footy*). Under the IDP 2008, the AFL increased the number of tests for the 2009 season to 1,500. It also introduced a hair-testing trial as a preventative measure to detect illicit drug use over the off-season, which had been identified as a high-risk period for illicit drug use (AFL and AFLPA2008). As well as maintaining a strong focus on player education and rehabilitation, the IDP 2008 continued to apply the three-strike rule, with several modifications addressing club requests for increased sharing of information. Under the IDP 2008, club medical officers were now advised of all out-of-competition positive tests for illicit drugs. Clubs were also advised of any positive tests for illicit drugs for players drafted or traded to new clubs, which had previously been a point of contention (AFL and AFLPA 2008).

Under the IDP 2008, a first failed out-of-competition test meant consultation with the AFL medical commissioner to undertake appropriate education, counselling and treatment programs, with players subject to ongoing target testing and a suspended sanction of \$5,000. A second offence resulted in immediate referral by AFL medical commissioners to a more intense program of education, counselling and treatment, ongoing target testing as well as a suspended sanction of six matches. A third offence meant appearing before the AFL Tribunal, a possible suspension of 18 matches (six for the second offence and an additional 12 for the third offence) and enforcement of the suspended sanction of \$5,000 from the first test (AFL and AFLPA 2008). From the perspective of the AFL, the revised IDP represented a stronger approach to both illicit and PEDs using new drug-testing technologies. The IDP 2008 received strong expressions of support from many stakeholders, including players, clubs and ASADA. For example:

As AFL players we support being tested out of competition and holiday hair-testing because we want to make sure there is an effective intervention if a player makes a poor decision to experiment with illicit drugs. And we want to send a message to all young people that it's not ok. (Joel Bowden, Richmond Football Club veteran and AFLPA President in AFL and AFLPA 2008)

The policy was on the right path to start with. It is about rehabilitation and education and our club has supported that view ... The debatable things for us is that a club wasn't made aware early in the process, and a failed test hung around the player's neck forever. Now it lapses after four years. It's a good policy and it's transparent, and it will allow players to be role models. (Essendon Football Club Chief Executive Peter Jackson in Ralph 2008 *Herald Sun*)

The AFL has a world's best practice anti-doping program and was the leader among Australian Sports to adopt a comprehensive blood-testing program. It has a significant financial and operational commitment to anti-doping and is working in partnership with ASADA to maintain a leadership role in this critical area of sport. (Richard Ings, ASADA Chairman in AFL and AFLPA 2008)

These supportive statements emphasised the key claims underpinning the AFL's regulatory approach to drugs in sport. The AFL was concerned with maintaining public support for Australian football as a 'clean' sporting environment. Public support for their policy approach was important as the AFL sought to keep their position as the 'most popular national league in Australia with the largest television broadcast deal in Australian history' (Nicholson 2006:2). The results of the IDP 2008 suggested that the AFL had been successful in stopping the moral panic from escalating, with no players

recording a third failed test in the four years of the IDP since 2005 and a drop of 14 per cent in failed tests from 2007 (AFL 2009). Other indicators suggested strong support for the AFL's legitimacy in terms of building and regulating Australian football as drug-free. By 2007 the AFL had become a 'massive organisation' (Nadel 2008:79), with AFL revenue as well as match attendance and participation rates all increasing to record levels:

- Revenues for 2007 rose to \$278 million, a 34 per cent increase on 2006;
- Club distributions for 2007 were \$125 million, a \$29 million increase on the previous year;
- Club memberships stood at 532,697, an increase of 2.6 per cent on 2006;
- Audiences for the 2007 premiership season were 7.05 million, a jump of four per cent on the previous record year in 2005;
- Participation levels reached a record level of '638,000 - a rise of 9.8 per cent or 56,989 on people playing the sport the previous year' (AAP 2008a *Real Footy*).

Nevertheless, the IDP 2008 continued to experience criticism with media reports claiming that the new policy simply highlighted that 'Australian Rules football is dirty' and did not enjoy public perceptions of legitimacy:

... the league's persistence with the philosophy that drives the code fails in the AFL boast that it is a beacon for the broader community ... Its standard but irrelevant defence is that the best medical advice suggests that footballers be allowed to continue to play while being counselled. That advice pertains to rehabilitating players, not protecting the integrity of the game. That the players support the AFL illicit drug code is self-serving. The side effect ... is the time and cover it allows the league to manage its image ... the AFL cannot claim to be a clean sport when its rules allow for players to take myriad drugs that are potentially performance-enhancing. You cannot do one and boast the other. This is not a code, it is a catastrophe. (Smith 2008 *The Australian*)

Only 11 per cent of *Herald Sun Issues 2007* survey respondents support the AFL's much-criticised three-strikes drug policy ... More than 64 per cent want the AFL to adopt zero tolerance or a one-strike-and-you're-out policy. Another 24 per cent back a two-strike policy ... 72 per cent believe the league is out of touch with what fans really want ... And almost 80 per cent want drug cheats banned for life ... Close to 57 per cent don't think sports stars are good role models for youth ... Robert Smith, 69, from Glen Waverley, said the AFL should adopt zero tolerance on drugs. "I've got nine grandchildren and they all look up to footballers ... They're just overpaid fools at the moment, most of them. Their behaviour has been disgusting." (Kelly 2008 *Herald Sun*)

The use of numbers and the exaggerated language place these responses within a moral panic framework. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda note (1994a) statistics, or exaggerated facts and figures, are often used in the construction of a moral panic to emphasise the extent of the particular problem (see also

Chapter One). In this case, the media reports drew on statistics to question the legitimacy of the AFL's anti-doping policy and to indicate that it did not enjoy public support.

Significantly, after the Australian Federal government changed in 2007 the AFL's IDP enjoyed more political support. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated that 'the AFL knows its ... community, its culture, they can make those judgments ... the key thing is to draw some clear lines in the sand about drugs in sport, and we would support them in sending a clear message that drugs in sport are unacceptable' (cited in AAP 2008b *The Sydney Morning Herald*). Comments like this, together with increasing revenue, match attendance and participation rates suggested that the AFL managed to weather the moral panic and enjoy a high degree of legitimacy and moral authority. Further, the AFL's results for illicit drug tests in 2009 showed that positive tests continued to fall (Whitham 2010). For the AFL, these results demonstrated not only an effective policy approach but also support for community expectations concerning the regulation of drug use in sport. This bolstered its claims to legitimacy. As Adrian Anderson, AFL football operations manager, stated:

We have seen players make poor decisions with the use of illicit drugs and the community is painfully aware that illicit drug use is a major issue within younger members of society ... Over the course of the last five years, the Illicit Drug Policy has clearly shown changes in behaviour, with a drop in the numbers of failed tests despite a very large increase in the numbers of tests being conducted. The focus on education, rehabilitation and welfare, with the opportunity for players to change their behaviour, has shown to be effective. (cited in Whitham 2010)

However, claims to legitimacy remained contested and could not be taken for granted. Media reports continued to argue that the IDP did not meet its stated objective of player welfare as it failed to adequately address drug use by players struggling with mental health issues. Underpinning these claims was the media attention devoted to the 2010 case of Travis Tuck (Hawthorne Football Club) who became the first player sanctioned under the IDP. When he was found by police unconscious in his car with drug paraphernalia, it was revealed that he suffered from clinical depression. Media reports argued that penalising Tuck under the IDP illustrated that 'as a welfare policy it has failed hopelessly ... It must protect the sick and desperately ill' (Smith 2010 *The Australian*). Player welfare was a cornerstone of the AFL's anti-drugs in sport

policy framework and claims that they failed to consider issues surrounding players' mental health potentially challenged their legitimacy and authority.

The Tuck case is significant in terms of the legitimacy of the IDP. Suggesting that the policy was accomplishing its objective of player welfare, Tuck's need for treatment for depression (which he had been receiving) had come to light as a result of positive tests under the IDP (3AW Football 2010). Tuck was one of 14 positive test results for illicit drugs in 2010 and the only player to fall into the 'third strike' category of the policy framework. There were no positive test results for PEDs under the ADC (AAP 2011 *The Australian*; Warner 2011 *Herald Sun*). Further, the AFL claimed that the 2010 introduction of mandatory referrals to a drug and alcohol specialist for any player with a failed test had been successful, evidenced in a continuing fall in positive test results (McNicol 2011). Stressing the significance of education, including for other social issues such as responsible use of alcohol as well as drug use, as part of the AFL's regulatory approach, Demetriou stated:

You'll be educated from the day you walk in the door until the day you leave about racial vilification, illicit drugs, responsible alcohol, respect and responsibility with women, media. You'll be an infinitely more rounded person when you leave. This is a good story. We promote that. We're advertising that. Come and play our code! That's what we offer. We can't offer internationals, that's not us, but what we are is this code that develops you as people beside your sporting prowess. And touch wood, so far it seems to be working. (cited in Macintyre 2011)

This bolstered the AFL's claims to legitimacy and demonstrated how contested power relationships need to be considered in the debate over doping. As AFL Football Operations Manager, Adrian Anderson stated:

The policy and its achievements have attracted considerable interest from sporting organisations in North America and Europe for its cutting edge approach in **going above and beyond the WADA code** ... AFL players, as a group, continue to lead the way in showing that they seek to change behaviour around the use of illicit drugs and the testing results under the policy clearly show behaviour changes, with a drop in the number of failed tests despite yearly increases in the number of tests being conducted. The focus on education, intervention, rehabilitation and welfare, with the opportunity for players to change their behaviour, has shown to be effective. (cited in McNicol 2011 emphasis added)

Further emphasising the importance of maintaining strong perceptions of legitimacy, in 2011 the AFL signed a AUD\$1.25 billion broadcast agreement

with the Seven Network, Foxtel and Telstra (Whitham 2011). With participation rates increasing - which are important for the future development of the code - and with significant financial returns at stake, the ongoing task facing the AFL involves maintaining public support for their moral authority and legitimacy. This rests on supporting its own regulatory framework of consciously made rational-legal rules that meet and support community expectations that drug use in sport is unacceptable while also safeguarding athlete welfare. These rules, however, are under constant challenge from other authorities, such as the Australian Federal government, demanding their own rules are applied.

Conclusion

This chapter has used the AFL as a case study to test the hypothesis of this thesis that PEDs present SGBs with a crisis of legitimacy to which organisations respond with regulatory frameworks classifying and sanctioning drug use as deviant behaviour. As we have seen, the AIS doping scandal and increased government attention to drugs in sport influenced the AFL's introduction of an ADC. The AFL recognised the potential implications for their legitimacy and, using codes of conduct including the ADC, sought to protect the image and appeal of Australian football. As instances of illicit drug use emerged in Australian football, the AFL responded to these challenges to their legitimacy and moral authority. To restore order to their sporting community and address community criticism, the AFL implemented measures against drug use by introducing, refining and strengthening an illicit drugs policy. This was important for perceptions of its legitimacy, which required regulatory mechanisms that meet and support community expectations over acceptable behaviour, including identifying and sanctioning deviance (Ericson et al. 1991; Habermas 1976; Wuthnow et al. 1984; see Chapter One).

The interactions between the AFL and the Australian government, particularly in relation to the issue of illicit drug use in sport, also reveal the wider political dimensions of the anti-doping debate. The Australian government associated implementation of a WADA aligned anti-doping policy, for both illicit and PEDs, to maintaining Australia's status as a world leader against doping. Clean sport was linked to national identity, strong national economic

growth as well as community cohesion and healthy lifestyles. Along with other stakeholders, the Australian government argued that the AFL's approach to drugs in sport undermined this message and had the potential to damage Australia's international reputation as a leader in anti-doping. Of particular concern for both WADA and the Australian government was the focus of the AFL's IDP on rehabilitation, education and counselling rather than a punitive naming and shaming approach. The AFL's insistence on implementing a separate IDP in conjunction with the more WADA-aligned ADC illustrated that interactions and power relationships between organisations are important elements of the debate. The AFL's position challenged WADA's authority and legitimacy, which was based on the WADC as formally constituted rules and regulations.

The media provided a valuable site where competing claims to legitimacy were made and challenged. As we have seen, the Australian Federal government drew heavily on the media to present drug use in sport as damaging to community cohesion and a threat to social order and stability. In contrast, the AFL used the media to promote the ADC and IDP as the most appropriate regulatory response for the Australian football community. This also served to enhance their internal legitimacy and moral authority as guardians of a 'clean' code with a focus on player welfare. In other words, media reports carry the potential to create a crisis of legitimacy for organisations by constructing particular issues as problematic. However, they also provide opportunities for those organisations to enhance legitimacy as providers of solutions to the particular problem. In this way, media reports of the debate between the Australian government and the AFL highlight the value of a moral panic framework to understand the role of legitimacy in the context of PEDs.

As we have noted throughout this chapter, media reports presented drug use in Australian football, both illicit and PEDs, as widespread and increasing in severity. Like the reports over doping in the 1998 Tour de France, the media suggested that instances of drug use in Australian football were 'the tip of the iceberg.' The reports cited throughout this chapter used melodramatic language to create concern over doping and identify those responsible as 'folk

devils,' or 'lame brains.' This language normalises expressions of hostility towards individuals who by failing to provide positive role models, threaten to 'infect' the wider community. The perceived threat to the social order justifies stricter measures of social control and specific institutional responses, such as WADA and the WADC, to regulate the problem. Media reports provided opportunities for stakeholders, such as the Australian government, to pressure the AFL into compliance with WADA's global framework in order to protect sport as a social institution as well as the community more broadly.

Implicitly, this contestation involved power relationships between organisational actors as they seek to secure and maintain the legitimacy and moral authority to regulate and control sport and articulations of those claims in the media. However, this thesis is also concerned with exploring whether the debate over doping can be conceptualised as an elites-engineered moral panic, driven by challenges to SGBs' legitimacy due to continued reports of doping, and the role of the media in that process. In this chapter I have drawn on media reports to explore and illustrate this claim. To extend that discussion and investigate this hypothesis in more detail the next chapter presents a content analysis of media reports of doping.

Crisis? Whose Crisis? Content Analysis of Media Reports

So what is this debate really all about? I'd submit it's about paternalism and control. A few luddites and prudes have successfully induced a full-blown moral panic over a set of substances that for whatever reason have attracted the ire of the people who have made it their job to tell us what is and isn't good for us. (Balco 2008 Reason Online)

The two previous chapters used the IOC, WADA and the AFL as case studies to explore changing attitudes to drug use in sport over time. They also examined interactions between organisations in the context of anti-doping regulation. I suggested that the transfer of authority for anti-doping regulation from the IOC to WADA can be conceptualised as an institutionalised moral panic. Underpinning such a construction are SGBs' efforts to restore or maintain legitimacy in the face of ongoing doping incidents. The creation of WADA presents SGBs with opportunities to restore legitimacy. However, it also raises questions of governance and control as financial benefits and international prestige becomes increasingly dependent upon implementation of WADC-aligned anti-doping policies. I used the AFL and its interactions with the Australian government to explore those issues within a national context. The media played a central role in that debate and provided a forum where stakeholder groups made and challenged claims to legitimacy. Media reports also discussed drugs in Australian football in a manner consistent with the construction of a moral panic.

Using the case studies in the previous chapters I have shown the multi-dimensional and complex nature of legitimacy and pointed to a relationship between legitimacy and a moral panic. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate that relationship more explicitly. Previously I considered the role of legitimacy in driving regulatory change from the perspective of key institutional actors, identified as the IOC, WADA and the AFL. In this chapter, I use a content analysis of media reports to change the focus from organisations experiencing a challenge to their legitimacy to the perspective of the media as a key institutional actor in the doping debate. As part of my

mixed methods research design, this approach enables me to validate further the argument by looking through the lens of media reports on doping.

The moral panic model formulated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a; 2009) provides a valuable theoretical tool to consider media coverage of doping. I briefly review the central elements of this framework shortly. However, in this particular case the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy and the complex interactions between organisational actors requires a modification to that model. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) also acknowledge that moral panics can take diverse forms that produce different effects with different outcomes under particular circumstances. This chapter is based on this moral panic literature while also drawing on other analyses of the media's role in the construction of a moral panic (for example see Altheide 1997; Critcher 2003; Fritz and Altheide 1987; Hunt 1997; Knopf 1970; Lull and Hinerman 1997; Sacco 1995; Welch et al. 2000; Yagade and Dozier 1990). However, legitimacy remains the central concept underpinning this thesis, complemented with a modified moral panic framework to examine the extent to which the way the doping debate is constructed reflects the interests of elite SGBs.

The suggestion that doping is a moral panic is not dismissive of causal factors or issues of prevention and control and does not downplay the seriousness of the issue. Research has demonstrated the importance of understanding athletes' values and attitudes towards PEDs to develop effective anti-doping policies (see Anshel and Russell 1997; Mugford et al. 1999). Further, I have drawn on the work of Donovan et al. (2002) who apply a Sports Drug Control Model (SDCM) approach to the issue from a behavioural science perspective to consider factors associated with prevention and deterrence. They also suggest that legitimacy is important for encouraging anti-doping compliance and formulate criteria against which legitimacy can be measured. These criteria include anti-doping laws that are fair, an enforcement agency with constitutional or legislative authority, accurate and effective testing procedures that acknowledge athletes' rights and sanctions that are equitable and consistently applied (Donovan et al. 2002).

The next section briefly outlines the moral panic criteria and main aspects of the social theory underpinning analysis of a moral panic formulated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda as well as my modifications to that model. I then summarise the operationalisation of these elements for this chapter. Following that section, I present the results of the content analysis of media reports structured around the moral panic criteria.

Moral Panic Theory and Criteria

I discussed the moral panic criteria listed in Goode and Ben-Yehuda's model in Chapter One. In summary, those criteria are consensus, concern, hostility, disproportionality and volatility. These are, I pointed out, useful tools with which to identify a moral panic. I also outlined the social theories underpinning Goode and Ben-Yehuda's moral panic analysis: the grassroots theory; interest-group theory and the elite-engineered moral panic theory, this last being the approach used in this thesis (see Chapter One).

Commencing with consensus, I modify Goode and Ben-Yehuda's model to capture the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy in the context of the doping debate as an institutionalised moral panic.

Consensus or Consensus-making?

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) note that in a moral panic consensus extends beyond generating agreement that an issue threatens the social order to include support for particular solutions to that problem. In this chapter I examine media reports for evidence of consensus that WADA is the necessary institutional solution to ongoing doping events. Consensus alerts us to the importance of agreement from a range of social actors that an issue is problematic and requires action. However, consensus can also be fractured as not all groups will agree on the causes, consequences or solutions to the threat presented by a particular issue or group (Garland 2008). I suggest that consensus does not capture the complex interactions and potential conflicts among dominant groups or the role of legitimacy in the context of anti-doping. In the case of doping as a moral panic, 'consensus-making' more accurately reflects the interactive processes and negotiated power relationships between dominant groups, such as WADA and elite SGBs as well as the media.

Consensus-making is more appropriate in the debate over PEDs as it incorporates a range of elite stakeholder groups. These groups have diverse interests and use anti-doping policies to achieve specific outcomes and objectives that are relevant to their sporting community. For example, the AFL used anti-drugs policies as part of a regulatory framework to develop Australian football. The Australian government took a strong anti-doping stance to maintain their international status. Further, elite SGBs and governments are not the only stakeholders in modern sport. Athletes, coaches and the public, amongst others, are also stakeholders with a vested interest in sport. SGBs must generate support from these groups for the legitimacy of particular institutional responses to PEDs, as we saw in the case of the AFL and the Australian government. The media featured heavily in that debate, highlighting Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009:90) description of the media as the 'beating heart' of a moral panic capable of influencing elite groups and public opinion. Media reports also provide a forum for challenges to the legitimacy of elite SGBs. Consequently, claim-makers seek to build support from the media as another key institutional actor in the doping debate. Consensus-making more accurately describes different elite groups' use of the media to present and maintain concern over doping and PED-using 'folk devils' who are perceived to threaten social stability.

Concern and Hostility

According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) model, a moral panic includes public concern that a particular issue threatens social order. A successful moral panic requires a deviant group, or 'folk devil,' identified as threatening community values against whom community concern and hostility are directed. The media play an integral part in this process. Using melodramatic language to describe the deviant group and the consequences for social well-being, media reports can fan the flames of public concern (see also Cohen 1973). By identifying the threatening group, a division is created between respectable members of society and the 'bad guys, undesirables, outsiders, criminals, the underworld, disreputable folk' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:38). Media reports also point to the agents capable of solving the problem by introducing social control measures to restore order and safeguard community values. There are implications here for the legitimacy of claim-

makers. A perceived failure to implement necessary and effective regulatory mechanisms to identify, catch or control deviants can potentially create a crisis of legitimacy. For example, the AFL was accused of protecting players' recreational drug habits and upholding a 'lame' policy linked to drug trafficking and addiction in the wider community (see Chapter Four). These types of exaggerated claims of the extent and consequences of deviant behaviour contribute to concern and hostility in a moral panic.

Disproportionality

Exaggerated claims of the extent of deviant behaviour fall into Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) moral panic criterion of disproportionality. This criterion describes the belief of a community, or sections of a community, that a larger number of deviant individuals are engaged in the problematic behaviour than actually exist. Exaggerated claims stimulate community concern and hostility based on constructions of the problem as widespread, ongoing and demanding action. This can take the form of a specific institutional response, which can also lead to the incorporation of other agents of social control such as law enforcement authorities. The moral panic literature describes this process as 'diffusion' or a 'spiral of signification,' where connections between and among enforcement agencies are either activated or strengthened (Cohen 1973; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b; Hall et al. 1978). In the context of PEDs, WADA represents a problem-specific institutional response that incorporates other agents of social control, such as Interpol. The relevance of a problem-specific institutional response for this chapter is that it forms a basis for legitimacy, as claim-makers must maintain support for the legitimacy and moral authority of that response.

Volatility

Describing moral panics as volatile refers to the fact that the 'fever pitch' of concern or hostility generated during a moral panic tends to wane over time. This has led some to describe moral panics as 'fadlike' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:41; see Chapter One). However, Goode and Ben-Yehuda also note that irrespective of the potentially short-lived nature of some moral panics others leave a significant institutional legacy. The challenge for the generators of these moral panics is to maintain public and media attention

over time. There are implications here for claim-makers' legitimacy. The tendency for the initial momentum of a moral panic to subside means that claims to legitimacy cannot be taken for granted. Rather, dominant groups must actively work to maintain support for their particular institutional response. In the context of PEDs, WADA faces the task of demonstrating that their anti-doping framework catches 'cheats' while arguing that continued doping events mean that the need for WADA to protect sport remains necessary.

The moral panic criteria formulated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) provide a valuable model that can be applied to consider whether a phenomenon constitutes a moral panic, including doping in sport. For the purposes of this thesis and in an effort to capture the complex interactions between elite stakeholders in the doping debate I have modified that model to expand consensus to consensus-making. Consensus-making is also an important criterion for investigating the claim of this thesis that doping represents an elite-engineered moral panic.

Elite-engineered or elites-engineered?

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) point out that the elite-engineered theory argues that a moral panic is driven by elite groups. This theory is underpinned by the argument that elites frequently and 'intimately interact' with one another and, with interests in common, seek to protect those interests (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:52-3; see Chapter One). In their analysis of mugging in 1970s Britain as an elite-engineered moral panic, Hall et al. (1978) argued that elite groups 'orchestrate hegemony.' In that instance, elite groups sought to convince the population that criminal elements were the 'problem' in order to deflect attention from a crisis in British capitalism. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:66) describe the claim that elite groups orchestrate a moral panic as 'strictly comic book fare' underplaying the active role of other social agents such as the media and the public.

While acknowledging this point, I argue that an elite-engineered theory can be useful to identify what might be at stake for dominant groups in a moral panic. The difficulty with that approach is that it neglects the diversity of

interests and power relationships amongst elite groups. To demonstrate the competing needs of elite groups in the context of PEDs as an institutionalised moral panic I suggest an ‘elites-engineered’ theory. This highlights the multi-faceted aspect of legitimacy influenced by complex relationships among different elite stakeholders. It also aligns with the significance of consensus-making.

As the media play a central role in a moral panic, this chapter uses a content analysis of media reports to look for the moral panic criteria outlined above. I next outline the operationalisation of the data collection for such a content analysis.

Operationalisation and Content Analysis Data Collection

This chapter focuses on the media as another institutional actor in the debate. The principal data sources for the content analysis consisted of online reports from international media agencies. I catalogued articles for the period 2007-08 using EndNote bibliography software and selected those with headlines containing keywords ‘doping’ or ‘drug.’ I limited inclusion to publishers with 15 or more articles, resulting in a data set of 571 articles. Table 5.1 lists the media sources and number of articles from each source.

Table 5.1: Online Media Data Sources (n=571)

Publisher	Number of Articles	Publisher	Number of Articles
Agence France-Presse	59	Los Angeles Times	25
BBC	44	Reuters	39
Bloomberg	16	Telegraph	48
CBC	20	The Guardian	60
China View	27	The New York Times	52
Deutsche Welle	15	Times Online	28
International Herald Tribune	99	USA Today	39
Total			571

To test the claim that media reports contribute to the construction of doping as a moral panic I searched media reports for descriptions of PED use as problematic behaviour engaged in by deviant individuals requiring action to resolve. For example, I looked for phrases such as the ‘fight against doping’ (WADA 2008a), anti-doping as a ‘war’ or ‘battle’ and terms such as ‘cheats’ or

‘drug cheats.’ Foster (2001:181) notes that a range of social actors describe doping using a ‘language of war.’ Illustrating this point, the European Union (EU) released an anti-doping initiative entitled *Community Support Plan to Combat Doping in Sport* (Commission of the European Communities 1999). Searching media reports for these keywords also reflects the influence of Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s moral panic criteria of concern and hostility. These criteria require the identification of ‘folk devils’ responsible for behaviour that threatens social order and provides a focus for collective action. The keywords I used to operationalise examination of media reports for evidence of doping as a moral panic include:

- Battle/War
- Cheat/drug cheat
- Clean
- Crises/Crisis
- Danger
- Doping/drug scandal
- Fight
- Plague
- Scourge
- Taint

From the data set of 571 articles, there were 190 articles with headlines referring to ‘doping’ or ‘drug’ but not containing moral panic key words in the content. Such headlines influence the way that audiences receive information (Cohen 1973; Ericson et al. 1991). As Parenti (1986:223) notes:

Not only can headlines mislead anyone who skims a page without reading the story, they can create the dominant slant on a story, establishing a mind-set that influences how we read the story’s text.

The headline-only group of articles also provided insight into whether the debate over doping is constructed as a moral panic. This group of articles included those described as ‘hard news’ (Rowe 1992), which reported details of athletes and substances in doping events (for example see ‘*Acrobatic gymnast Okulova banned for doping offense*’ in AP 2007a *International Herald Tribune*). However, also in the headline-only group were articles with headlines implying that PED use was a growing problem with doping ‘cheats’ threatening the sporting community. Such headlines included ‘*Drug taking is rife in golf, claims Player*’ (Kelso 2007 *The Guardian*), ‘*WADA chief Pound*

says key players fear doping problem' (Reuters 2007b) or *'Drugs in sport: cheats go to great lengths'* (Knight 2008 *Telegraph*). These types of headlines suggest a moral panic, with claims that generate concern over doping as a significant issue, focusing attention on PED-using cheats or folk devils. The media are powerful influencers of public opinion. Consequently, I reasoned that reports classifying PED use as problematic suggested some degree of support for the claim that the doping debate could be conceptualised as a moral panic (see Chapter One).

To identify groups active in the debate, I also examined media reports for direct quotes or statements made by stakeholders as well as summaries presented by reporters. For example, a *Reuters South Africa* article reports the IAAF President's insistence that everything possible is being done to win the battle against drug cheats. In the same article the IAAF President is directly quoted as saying: 'There are cheats out there but we are doing everything we can to catch them' (Himmer 2007). The direct quote of the IAAF President represents an instance of an elite SGB's use of moral panic words, while the reporter's reference to 'drug cheat' illustrates the media's use of those terms.

Furthermore, in order to consider whether the doping debate constitutes a moral panic, the context surrounding the moral panic key words needs to be examined. The way that issues are categorised as well as how those categories are used to tell stories serve specific functions (Silverman 2001). In this case, I investigate whether the function of those 'stories' is the construction of doping as an institutionalised moral panic to protect the legitimacy of elite SGBs. I used the modified version of Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) moral panic model to examine media reports for statements that highlighted the harm or danger that PED-using athletes presented to the social order. These types of reports provide opportunities for expressions of support for an institutional response, such as WADA. This is beneficial to SGBs as it helps them to enhance their own legitimacy. However, and as I have noted throughout this thesis, this also raises issues of governance and control as SGBs are required to implement WADC-aligned anti-doping policies for inclusion in Olympic competition and access to government funding. To

consider stakeholder interactions and the multi-faceted nature of legitimacy in the doping debate I looked for reports that revealed tensions between SGBs and WADA.

I have thus far detailed the data collection process. The next section examines the context surrounding these terms and the speaker for evidence to test the claim that the doping debate forms an elites-engineered moral panic.

Analysis of Results: Drugs in Sport - a Moral Panic?

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) note that each application of a moral panic framework to a social phenomenon reveals something new. In my consideration of the doping debate, I use a content analysis of media reports to examine the role of legitimacy in the creation of PEDs as a moral panic situated within an elites-engineered moral panic theory. Commencing with consensus-making, I next present the results of the content analysis. To emphasise how media reports are used to construct doping as a moral panic with PED-using 'folk devils,' I have highlighted in bold the language employed by claim-makers in the debate over doping.

Consensus-making

If it could be shown that the media portrayed broad agreement that PED use was deviant behaviour, then the criteria consensus and consensus-making could be supported. Evidence of doping as an institutionalised moral panic also required reports that pointed to and supported a particular institutional solution, such as WADA. The content analysis revealed that the media, elite SGBs and stakeholders, including athletes, discuss PEDs in a way that suggests broad consensus that doping threatens sport and is a global issue requiring a concerted, harmonised effort to resolve. According to an IOC spokesman: 'The **fight against doping** in sport is a **daily battle**, which must be **fought in concert** by the sports authorities, sports teams, athletes and coaches, and governments' (AP 2007f *International Herald Tribune*). Athletes also indicated that anti-doping required a concerted effort by 'clean' athletes. For example: 'It's not our mess, but as people passionate about the sport and competing ... it's our responsibility to clean it up and change the way people are viewing track and field' (2004 Olympic women's 100 metre silver medallist United

States athlete Lauryn Williams in Perez 2008 *USA Today*). Governments described doping as an ‘ever-present spectre,’ emphasising the view that the danger from doping was widespread and permanent (Bowen 2007 *Deutsche Welle*). For example, a member of Germany’s NADA stated: ‘**Everybody has accepted** that there is a problem in sport, not only in cycling’ (Amies 2007 *Deutsche Welle*). As well as emphasising the extent of doping, the media highlighted the need for an effective institutional response:

The World Anti-Doping Agency will adopt a new code in the strengthening of **global efforts to combat doping** in sport ... the **core document** adopted in 2003 as the **framework for the global harmonized fight against doping** ... The process of revising the Code is intended to **fine-tune its provisions** based on the experience gained to date and to **strengthen global efforts against doping** in sport, according to the Canadian lawyer [Richard Pound, WADA Chairman]. (Xinhua 2007 *China View*)

The **magnitude of the problem is so great**, just as it is in other professional leagues ... that it’s time for Selig [Commissioner for Major League Baseball] and Fehr [Executive Director of the Major League Baseball Players Association] to wave the white flag of surrender and **allow a big-time, independent group with knowledge of the international complexities of the issue to take over** the full-time job of MLB drug testing. (Brennan 2007 *USA Today*)

This language generates support for the claim that sport is endangered and that doping destroys ‘the value of sport ... Its credibility, its function as a provider of role models and its approval by the public are being put on the test’ (Deutsche Welle 2007b). Doping, or allegations of doping, ‘taints the image of sport that is facing a crisis of public confidence’ (Broadbent 2008 *Times Online*). Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) note that in a moral panic the media provide an important site for claim-makers to construct issues as problematic based on the threat which the deviant behaviour presents to social order. In support of this, articles about PEDs both framed and provided a vehicle for claim-makers to present doping as an issue of concern not only for international elite sport, but also for the amateur sporting community. According to former WADA Chairman, Richard Pound:

“**Doping in sports is like alcoholism**. Unless people involved realize there is a problem, it’s impossible to have a cure for it.” But there is **still a pressing need to further investigate doping in amateur sports**, he warned. The **international community** needs to understand “how serious this problem is, and how important it is to **get hold of it, and turn it around**.” (CBC News 2007)

This report supports the moral panic criterion of consensus, where dominant groups present issues as a danger to social order and point to the need for community support for a strong anti-doping response. By associating doping with alcoholism, it emphasises the pervasiveness of the issue. Further, linking doping to a social issue about which audiences may already hold preconceived ideas as problematic contributes to receptive views of progressively more 'repressive, tough ... policy proposals' (Pritchard and Hughes 1997:49). These types of constructions can lead to an institutionalised moral panic, where concern is captured in 'ongoing, long-lasting organisational structures' to control or eliminate deviant behaviour (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:247). As Hemphill (2008:3) notes, anti-doping authorities talk about 'getting tough' and 'expanding the arsenal of weapons' while WADA wages a war against the 'drug cheats.' These highlight the 'righteousness' of the anti-doping campaign, which claims to voice broader community concerns to protect sport for the 'clean' honest athletes (Hemphill 2008). This moral danger presented by doping also hints at the necessity of an institutional, regulatory response. For example:

'Drug-free sport in general is Utopia. It will be naive to believe that no-one will take drugs. There are about 400 million people practising sport on this globe, there are not 400 million saints on earth. Cheating is embedded in human nature and **doping is to sport what criminality is to society**. You will **always need cops and judges and prisons and jails and rules and regulations**' (IOC President Jacques Rogge cited in AFP 2008c)

This call for a strong institutional and regulatory response to doping provides further support for the moral panic criterion of consensus-making. There is also evidence of consensus-making in media reports in comments by current WADA president, John Fahey. He argues that the 'extremely important' anti-doping efforts of WADA 'must succeed' to maintain the stability and survival of sport and values popularly associated with it: 'Otherwise, I think sport will wither and probably die if we can't get integrity back into it by fair play' (AP 2007c *International Herald Tribune*). According to WADA, the elimination of doping is essential to protect the very essence of sport. This is best accomplished by applying the ever-increasing store of anti-doping knowledge and enforcement practices that WADA are accumulating:

They (the *public*) *do not have the same confidence* they once had, but does that mean we can *return the sport to its very essence? To the fair play concept?* We must ... *If we do not, then part of the world as we've known it for all of our lives is going to leave us*, because the public will desert any sport in time that they are not satisfied has integrity in the way in which it operates ... We are smarter than we used to be and we believe that as each month goes by, *we are learning more and we're targeting, our investigations are becoming effective*. (WADA President, John Fahey in AFP 2008d)

Fahey's consistent reference to 'us' and 'we' provide evidence of consensus-making not only that doping is an ongoing and widespread issue, but that it requires a concerted and strong institutional response. Further, although claiming that anti-doping 'investigations are becoming effective' the continued threat doping presents to 'part of the world as we've known it' amplifies, and justifies, the need for WADA's continued efforts. The suggestion that the value and integrity of sport is under attack highlights the need for institutional action to 'combat' drugs in sport.

The content analysis provided evidence that elite SGBs generate agreement that doping is problematic behaviour. There is also evidence in the content analysis of consensus-making in WADA's efforts to generate support for their actions as the necessary anti-doping response. However, a moral panic will not emerge without a level of public concern. For a successful moral panic, claim-makers must focus public concern on a group identified as the 'folk devil,' who can then be controlled using a particular institutional framework.

Concern and Hostility

A moral panic builds on the fear that a particular behaviour or specific group threatens not only the well-being but the fundamental values of society (Baerveldt et al. 1998; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b). The media play an important role in this process. The content analysis looked for evidence whether stakeholders use the media to make claims that doping is dangerous behaviour threatening the integrity of sport.

Evidence of this phenomenon is present in one media report that: 'IOC President, Jacques Rogge ... sees doping for what it is: Fraud that threatens sport's credibility' (Farquhar 2008 *BBC Sport*). WADA uses media reports to present doping as deviant behaviour engaged in by individuals lacking moral

integrity, placing sport in danger of losing support from the public and sponsors. According to WADA President John Fahey:

‘We have to penetrate the world with the message that *only idiots* involve themselves in doping,’ said Fahey, who has warned that *sports tainted by doping* are at *risk of ‘moral bankruptcy’* and could *turn viewers and sponsors away*. (cited in Beck 2008 *Reuters*)

These comments illustrate the value of a moral panic framework in which elite groups generate concern that deviant individuals are threatening the sporting community. The content analysis also revealed that manufacturing concern over doping included claims that PEDs are a danger to the wider community. Stakeholders used media reports to present doping as a global danger to public health increasingly threatening youth. These constructs provided opportunities for stakeholder-generated media reports to maintain a public focus on, and support for, the preferred anti-doping initiatives. For example:

We have a *global scourge*. This is not a sports cause - it is a *public health issue* ... What is particularly worrisome is that young adults love to imitate, and now the *illicit use of performance-enhancing substances has spread into our schools and neighbourhoods*. Young folks don’t have to worry about *lurking in some back alley to buy from some pusher*. They need only sit down at their PC - and they are. (Saraceno 2007 *USA Today*)

The *public are sick and tired of cheats*. I think the opportunity we have right now is second to none ... There is *enormous public support for us to succeed* and that *leads to more assistance coming from various sources*. We have to *inculcate young people with the belief that if they want to play sport they have to play it within the rules embodied in sport, and that includes fair play* ... I would encourage all nations to *weed out the cheats* and leave them at home. If they make it to Beijing I believe we have every reason to have greater confidence in the detection of those cheats than has been the case at any previous Games. (WADA President John Fahey in Kelso 2008 *The Guardian*)

As well as illustrating the moral panic criterion of concern, these comments identify a folk devil, or ‘cheat,’ who provides a focus for collective action. Statements that PED use has spread into ‘schools and neighbourhoods’ also suggests some support for the criterion of disproportionality and exaggerated claims of the extent of doping. It also constructs a ‘vulnerable’ population - youth - that needs defending. These media comments defend the moral values ‘popularly’ associated with sport, such as ‘fair play,’ and suggest that the

education of young people towards doping is an important element of the anti-drugs campaign.

These types of comments highlight the role of consensus towards values, such as fair play in conjunction with rules and regulations that ‘detect cheats’ in securing legitimacy for anti-doping frameworks. The media also present WADA’s regulatory approach as enjoying public support, bolstering its perceptions of legitimacy. WADA uses the media to suggest that the ‘public has warmed up’ to the anti-doping campaign. PED use is associated with ‘health risks’ and linked to ‘organised crime’ that threaten social order, requiring a strong regulatory response:

... I think the public authorities have a new perspective on this, ***not only the cheating and the fact that people - including organized crime*** - are dealing with the trafficking and selling and distribution of some of these substances but that it's a ***public health problem***. It's ***not just a whole bunch of high-performance athletes*** ... it's ***millions and millions of kids*** unsupervised with stuff that they can buy on the internet. (WADA Chairman, Richard Pound in *International Herald Tribune* 2007b)

Like Pound, Fahey wants ***governments and law enforcement agencies, like Interpol and the FBI***, to support the ***battle against doping rings*** and suppliers. (Whittle 2008 *International Herald Tribune*)

Constructing anti-doping efforts as a battle necessarily implies the existence of an ‘enemy,’ or ‘folk devil,’ responsible for the threat and deviant behaviour. Identifying those responsible for the threatening behaviour normalises expressions of hostility toward those individuals (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b). Exaggerated claims that ‘millions and millions of kids’ are exposed to PED use constructs doping as a dangerous problem. An additional danger involves the manipulation of youth by criminal groups and cybercrime. This indicates further support for the moral panic criterion of disproportionality, which I discuss below. However, media reports provide opportunities to focus public concern, creating boundaries between ‘clean’ athletes juxtaposed against PED-using folk devils.

In this discourse, PED use represents a lack of morality and constitutes a ‘scandal.’ It places transgressing individuals outside the ‘clean’ and respectable community. For example: “Doping is unacceptable, a ***social***

crime” Ljungqvist¹⁰ said in Tuesday's *Times* newspaper’ (Herman 2007 *The Guardian*). This illustrates Heir et al.’s (2011:263) point that moral panic discourses can include ‘defensive group reactions’ that emphasise the harm to the social order posed by ‘irresponsible’ others who fail to engage in individual risk management by avoiding PED use. The moral value attached to ‘clean’ participation reinforces the boundary between ‘us’ - those who participate within the rules - and the deviant and dangerous ‘other.’ According to WADA, the temptation of the devil will forever be present:

... I think it's also fair to say that the ***fight against doping is a living exercise*** ... It will never ease. There will always be people out there who will break the rules. It will continue to ***require unwavering vigilance and the willingness to tackle*** those people who are the ***sociopaths of sport*** - they'll always be there. (WADA Chairman, Richard Pound in BBC Sport 2007)

Through describing PED-using athletes as ‘sociopaths of sport,’ the media creates an ever-present folk devil against whom to direct collective action. Media reports can often contrast ‘clean’ athletes with PED-using athletes in a way that creates public perception that those who are *not* doping are in the minority:

It is a ***gloomy scenario***, given the ***widespread concern*** about drugs in sport and athletics in particular. Kelly Sotherton, the Briton who finished third in the heptathlon at the World Championships in Osaka, Japan, in August, said that there was ***suspicion on every podium***. (Broadbent 2007 *Times Online*).

These media constructions bring athletes into the frontline of the doping war. Some athletes stress the importance of identifying PED-using ‘cheats’ to maintain the integrity of sport as well as emphasising that they participate ‘clean.’ Some examples generate an atmosphere of pharmacological ‘McCarthyism’:

I would definitely inform on cheats ... We are so against doping - I think that is the difference with this generation. I am very confident ***our team in Beijing will be clean***. I've been assured that ***the testing is advanced and everyone is submitting to those tests***. It's undeniable (the public) is going to be suspicious when there is a great performance. ***I think that's really unfortunate because the clean athletes are out there working hard every single day***. It's unfortunate we have to pay for the poor decisions that other athletes have made. (United States sprint star, Allyson Felix in Slater 2008 *BBC Sport*)

¹⁰ Professor Arne Ljungqvist, IOC Member (1987-2003), Chairman IOC Medical Commission (2003-), Vice-Chairman WADA Foundation Board (Hart 2008 *Telegraph*; Nearman 2008 *The Washington Times*).

Unfortunately, you can't look someone in the eye and say, 'I'm not taking drugs' ... You have to take action. ***I've really tried everything I possibly can to take action and prove that I'm clean.*** (United States Olympic swimmer, Dara Torres in Goffa 2008 *Los Angeles Times*)

In contrast to cheating 'folk devils' these types of reports create a counter image of clean athletes as 'folk heroes.' They maintain concern over doping as a significant problem and focus attention on the necessity of an effective and firm anti-doping regulatory framework.

However, it is important to underpin this with a discussion of how media reports provide athletes and other members of the sporting community with opportunities to broaden the debate beyond a focus on the individual athlete. For example:

"It was my crash course. ***A team assistant gave me a shot of EPO*** in my room," Jaksche said. ***"I did what I had to do to be better in my job. The logic behind it is that you adjust your performance level to that of the others because everyone is doing it (doping).*** You live in a parallel world in cycling. The team leadership knew everything. It was a fully installed system," he said about his Telekom days. (Deutsche Welle 2007c)

... They are not so much trying to cheat as they are trying to get the most out of their bodies. And ***the carrot held out, the gold medals and big money, drives them to push their bodies.*** (Mark Sisson, former marathon runner and triathlete (he has also been executive director of the U.S. Triathlon Federation and Chairman of the International Triathlon Union) in Dwyer 2008 *Los Angeles Times*)

While highlighting structural pressures as a factor in PED use, media reports nevertheless construe doping as deviant behaviour that requires strong regulation and control. WADA is presented as the primary mechanism to accomplish this task:

'... this task will require ***enormous energy and commitment, conviction ... It is a fight we must win,***' said Fahey ... 'This last three days has brought a ***new weaponry*** [sic] to WADA, with a ***new (Anti-Doping) Code, to progress and reinvigorate*** this ***fight*** ... I think we all have to remind ourselves that this is a worldwide effort and keep the W in WADA.' (AFP 2007a)

Support for WADA, through the WADC, to regulate against PED use is also evident in media comments of government stakeholders. For example, Dutch Health Secretary, Clemence Ross, praised the role of the WADC in 'ensuring that (doping) is combated and punished in the same way everywhere in the world' (*International Herald Tribune* 2007a). Comments such as this focus

public concern on doping as a 'fight' that requires a 'worldwide effort' and that position WADA as the good weapon.

However, there are also indications in media reports of the possibility for tensions to arise between WADA and other SGBs. The media generally support the WADC as 'far more detailed and sophisticated' (Macur 2007 *New York Times*) than SGBs' policies and consequently present it as the necessary mechanism to address the problem of drugs in sport. For example: 'The *Wada code ... is the central set of drug-testing rules across all sports and countries*' (BBC Sport 2007), which '*takes precedent over the doping controls of an individual sporting federation*' (AP 2007d *International Herald Tribune*). This implicitly hints at the potential for controversy over governance and control in the doping debate. These potential tensions emphasise the significance of consensus-making in maintaining concern and focusing expressions of hostility toward deviant individuals in addition to the issue of legitimacy of an institutional response.

As we have seen in this section, a moral panic includes constructions of deviant behaviour that maintain public concern, identify the deviant group against the public and suggest to the public a solution to the problem. The results of the content analysis of media reports in this section demonstrate that the moral panic criteria of concern and hostility are evident in the doping debate. Key institutional stakeholders, including the media, WADA, SGBs and governments all use media reports to build concern that doping is widespread, ongoing and requires action to resolve. Media reports constructing PED-using athletes as 'cheats' or 'idiots' that threaten sport and present a public health danger to the community not only generate concern but also provide a focus for anti-doping action. This need for a strong regulatory response positions WADA as the necessary solution. However, there are indications of some tension between WADA and SGBs highlighting that claims to legitimacy cannot be taken for granted and that issues of governance and control influence the debate. The moral panic criterion of disproportionality illuminates the way that dominant groups stimulate public concern and hostility towards deviant individuals as well as maintain support for their institutional solution.

Disproportionality

Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) criterion of disproportionality refers to a community's view that a larger number of individuals than actually exist are engaged in deviant behaviour. The point is not that the particular behaviour does not exist; in fact there generally is some measurable level of 'damage' caused by the particular social problem (Jones et al. 1989:342). Rather, the important point is the exaggeration of the extent of the problem, which is used to highlight the necessity of an institutional response and associated enforcement practices. Officially published statistics are an important tool employed by claim-makers to demonstrate the extent of the problem (Jones et al. 1989).

Quantification of PED use performs an important function in terms of enhancing claims to moral authority and legitimacy. For example, media reports cited figures associated with the number of positive tests from the 2008 Beijing Olympics to support claims that anti-doping efforts are succeeding, despite the ongoing nature of the problem:

With *less than a dozen positive cases compared to 26 at Athens* in 2004, the Beijing Games were held up by the IOC as *proof* that they were *winning the war on drugs*. (AFP 2008b)

This enhances perceptions of WADA's legitimacy and moral authority to control the Olympic sporting community. However, appeals to low numbers of positive drug tests does not necessary ensure that SGBs' claims to legitimacy go uncontested. As we saw in the debate over the AFL's anti-doping policy, low positive test results can provoke accusations by other stakeholders, voiced in the media, that SGBs failed to detect and sanction drug using participants. Nevertheless, to demonstrate that their anti-doping framework is effective and to enhance their claims to legitimacy, the WADA website provides statistical details and global results of the number of tests carried out and the number of adverse tests reported by each WADA-accredited laboratory. For 2007, the number of adverse tests were 2.08 per cent for non-Olympic sports, 1.93 per cent for Olympic sports, 1.86 per cent for selected IOC recognised sports, 2.45 per cent for other IOC recognised sports and 1.97

per cent for Paralympic sports (WADA 2007a; see Appendix 5.1). Other SGBs and NADAs also release doping statistics. For example:

Germany's National Anti-Doping Agency published figures showing that **62 of the 8196, or 0.7 per cent**, of the doping tests it ran in 2006 were positive. Most of the controls were done in track and field sports. The numbers were **essentially unchanged since 2005**. (Deutsche Welle 2007a)

As we noted earlier in Chapter Two, the actual prevalence of PED use is not known (Waddington 2005; Waddington et al. 2005). The statistical evidence used by the media and stakeholders that doping is a 'global scourge' appears to be exaggerated. Nevertheless, claim-makers in the doping debate call on statistical data as well as 'socially accredited experts' (Becker 1973) to stress the widespread nature of doping. For example, Dr Gary Wadler, Chairman of WADA's Prohibited List and Methods Sub-Committee (WADA September 2009) emphasised that doping is a 'silent epidemic' threatening youth:

Wadler points to a **2007 Monitoring the Future survey that said 2.2% of high school seniors admitted to using anabolic steroids at least once**. That's just a survey, not a drug test, which means that percentage likely is low. Now, compare it to the WADA percentage of positive tests for steroids and all other banned substances in Olympic sports in 2007: 1.93%, and some of those were later thrown out. **And we think the Olympics has a problem? "That's not an insignificant number, 2.2% of 12th-graders," Wadler said. "It's a silent epidemic."** (Brennan 2008 USA Today)

In other words, this suggests that doping will contaminate society, and particularly youth, 'unless something is done.' As well as indicating PED use as a growing problem, the use of statistics also illustrates that negotiated power relationships between organisations and contested claims to legitimacy need to be considered as part of the moral panic surrounding the doping debate. As the previous report states:

"Selig and Fehr are totally out of their league," **international steroid expert Gary Wadler** said ... "It's not just baseball, it's all pro sports. Sooner or later, they're going to come to the **same place the Olympics did**, saying that we can field great events and all those kinds of things, but we're not in the drug business ... **Are we serious about getting rid of the abuse of performance-enhancing drugs in sports? Are we serious about reports of 3%-4% of high school seniors using steroids because their heroes in the pros do?** If we are, it's time to bite the bullet. Baseball's approach is incremental. **They're trying to do as much as they need to do to silence the crisis of the moment**. Then they **hope the crisis is behind them. But each time, there's a new crisis.**" (Brennan 2007 USA Today)

Using Wadler as an authoritative WADA representative, the legitimacy of Major League Baseball (MLB) is called into question because of their failure to implement adequate anti-doping policies. In contrast, the report enhances the status and legitimacy of the IOC by positioning it as committed to and active in anti-doping. The consequence for other elite SGBs' failure to implement WADC-aligned policies is potential exclusion from the Olympic program (Boyes 2001; see Chapter Three). This also highlights the continued significance of the IOC as a central actor in the debate over doping. For example:

"We *suspect there is substantial noncompliance* by many of the international federations," Dick Pound told the International Olympic Committee assembly. "If a sport or a national Olympic committee is *not code compliant*, the sport in particular *cannot remain on the program of the Olympic Games*." (AP 2007h *International Herald Tribune*)

SGBs are required to align anti-doping policies under the broad framework of the WADC. This effectively operates as an enforcement mechanism not only to regulate PED-using athletes but to govern and control SGBs. As Chapter Three showed, while individual SGBs are responsible for punishing deviance in their sporting community, these disciplinary mechanisms must fall into line with those outlined by the WADC. A spokesperson from UK Sport points out: 'Punishment is down to the individual sport's governing body. They *all have to operate within the parameters of the World Anti-Doping Code*, so they have to follow the rules of the sport' (BBC Berkshire 2007). Further, tensions in the doping debate emphasise the significance of consensus-making in maintaining concern over and focusing expressions of hostility toward deviant individuals as part of an institutionalised moral panic.

From this perspective, WADA used media reports to maintain its institutional support, to argue for increased disciplinary measures and to incorporate other agents of social control to catch 'cheats.' Incorporation of other enforcement bodies is justified on the basis that drug-using athletes continue to 'skirt the system' and that: 'There will always be drugs that are undetectable ... [Pound] said, using the track star Marion Jones as an example of an athlete who ... was caught only when law enforcement intervened' (Macur 2007 *New York Times*). The incorporation of other enforcement agencies is described as

the 'necessary and inevitable evolution ... in the fight against doping' (WADA Chairman, Richard Pound in CBC Sports 2007b). For example:

On the day the British Olympic Association (BOA) announced the formation of a commission into anti-doping, the *chairman of the IOC's medical commission Professor Arne Ljungqvist* said the Government should *make doping a criminal offence*. He said stringent measures should be put in place to make sure London 2012 is a clean Games. (Herman 2007 *The Guardian*)

We need the assistance of experts on a voluntary basis ... We have to use more than one weapon and the power of governments to stop those who traffic and those who possess doping substances. (Howman in Bright 2007 *Telegraph*)

These types of comments fall within a moral panic framework that constructs doping as an ongoing problem requiring innovative methods of social control. Incorporating other agents of social control and calls to criminalise doping offences illustrate the 'widening the net' process, described in the moral panic literature as 'diffusion' and 'escalation' (Cohen 1973:67; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b:156; Moller 2009). In the context of doping as a moral panic, incorporating other enforcement agents perpetuates the view that PED use is a growing problem that requires strict control measures. This adds to concern over doping and also directs attention to a PED-using folk devil who is the subject of increasingly tough regulation.

The media reports associated with disproportionality provided further evidence to support the existence of a moral panic criterion. Suggestions that a large number of individuals are engaged in deviant behaviour contribute to the generation of concern and continue to focus attention on PED-using folk devils. Claims that a significant number of individuals are using PEDs also points to the need for an institutional response or for the need to provide opportunities to highlight the efficacy of WADA's policy framework. Claim-makers in the doping debate, including WADA, elite SGBs and the media, all use statistics and low positive test results to stress the success of their current anti-doping approach. However, it is important to note, as Cohen (1973:xii) points out: 'The slide towards moral panic rhetoric depends less on the sheer volume of cases, than a cognitive shift from "how could it happen in a place like this?" to "it could happen anyplace."' The notion that the deviant behaviour 'could happen anyplace' is important in maintaining the momentum associated with a moral panic.

Volatility

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) refer to the moral panic criterion of volatility as the difficulty of focusing concern and attention over time. Maintaining public attention is complicated by the fact that social problems, including doping, exist in complex policy and social environments. The competing demands from a range of stakeholder groups in these arenas mean that not all claims for attention are successful (Best 1990; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Houlihan 2009). Anti-doping claim-makers also face the problem of promoting the success of anti-doping campaigns while maintaining concern that doping could ‘happen anyplace.’ WADA must convince the community that doping remains a problem while demonstrating that the WADC is effective, worthwhile and legitimate, thereby warranting continued support.

Measuring the success of anti-doping efforts on the basis of ‘no major busts in MLB or the Olympics’ potentially creates a situation where ‘it’s easy for people to ignore that the problem exists’ (Brennan 2008 *USA Today*). WADA uses the media to highlight the danger of apathy towards doping. As WADA representative Dr Gary Wadler notes:

I’ve always been concerned we’d succumb to **doping fatigue** ... People say, ‘How many more stories do we need about steroids? Why don’t we get back to the sports?’ It’s **slipping off the radar screen of public concern**. (Brennan 2008 *USA Today*)

To overcome ‘doping fatigue,’ PED use is constructed as a problem not only for elite sport but one that, without significant action, could also threaten the social order more broadly. For example:

World Anti-Doping Agency president Richard Pound says **the public needs to realise** the extent to which **doping in sport is a public health problem**. Pound said ... if doping is left unchecked, younger amateur athletes risk thinking it’s necessary to use performance-enhancing drugs to compete at higher levels. **“The biggest challenge is to make sure the public understands this is a real problem,”** he said. (CBC Sports 2007a)

These reports generate concern and focus attention on PED use as dangerous behaviour, threatening community well-being. This also provides opportunities for claim-makers, including elite SGBs such as the IOC, to use the media to promote claims to legitimacy based on the idea that their anti-

doping efforts are effective. For example, after the 2008 Beijing Olympics, IOC representatives stated:

We are convinced our (anti-doping) efforts have borne fruit ... Even if doping will never be resolved of course, ***we are more credible than ever*** and it is more difficult for athletes to use drugs. (IOC President Jacques Rogge in Nebehay 2008 *Reuters*)

WADA also positions the organisation as the institutional solution to restore order and stability to the elite sporting community. As WADA President, John Fahey notes:

Looking back over the relatively brief period since WADA was established, I am amazed at the accomplishments. What began ... as an ***urgent response to a crisis in sport***, has evolved into a global network of committed sports and government authorities and individuals working together to ***protect athlete health and the integrity of sport*** ... WADA serves as the ***independent international body responsible for coordinating and monitoring the global fight against doping in sport***. (WADA 2008a)

Descriptions of WADA as an 'urgent response to a crisis in sport' with the responsibility for 'co-ordinating and monitoring the global fight against doping' fit neatly into an institutionalised moral panic framework. Positioning WADA as successfully returning stability to elite sport presents other stakeholders with opportunities to restore perceptions of their legitimacy based on a commitment to WADA's anti-doping model. It emphasises the significance of a regulatory response to address deviance, suggesting that the 'normative order is legitimate, official agents of social control are necessary' (Sanders 1990:7). Individuals may still decide to operate outside the moral boundaries of the group and 'cheat.' However, they will 'eventually' be caught and punished appropriately:

The doping admission by five-time Olympic medallist Marion Jones is good for sport because it shows that ***drug cheats eventually get caught***, IOC president Jacques Rogge said in a French newspaper interview Monday. (AP 2007e *International Herald Tribune*)

Media reports point to the eventual admission of systematic doping by Marion Jones, who consistently denied PED use over a number of years (Robinson 2007), as an example of the widespread nature of doping. Although not erupting suddenly as a volatile part of the moral panic, the report implies that 'folk devils' are always present with the potential to emerge at any time.

Notwithstanding the fact that Jones was not 'caught' by anti-doping authorities (AFP 2008a; AP 2007g), this generates concern over doping and contributes to the necessity of a strong institutional response. However, the position of the media as powerful agents of social control also enables criticism and challenges to the version of events postulated by moral panic claim-makers. For example, while a primary element used to attest to the efficacy of the WADC framework involves testing procedures and technology, these are not without their critics. The media provides a forum where other groups, including some elite athletes, criticise the anti-doping framework:

This is *not a battle for or against doping*, because *we all are against doping*. It is a *battle against the system* which does *not respect the fundamental rights of individuals*," Kashechkin's lawyer, Christian Botteman, said Friday. (AP 2007b *International Herald Tribune*)

The problem is that *anti-doping controls have nothing to do with equality*. Those who want to dope manage it without any problem at all and the *anti-doping tests are for nothing, if only to waste money and time*. (2005 World Cup champion skier Bode Miller cited in AFP 2007b)

These comments further highlight the multi-dimensional aspect of legitimacy in the doping debate. The issue raised here is not a lack of consensus, concern or hostility towards doping and doping athletes or the necessity of anti-doping regulations. Rather, the problem concerns the definition of the situation, in particular, athletes' rights to fair and equitable treatment. These types of comments indicate support for Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria, which suggest that perceptions of legitimacy are important for anti-doping compliance. Media reports reveal tensions between organisational stakeholders and lead other claim-makers, such as athletes, to challenge WADA's practices, if not its legitimacy.

The media also provide a site where other elite SGBs criticise WADA while seeking to promote their commitment to doping and maintain their moral authority to control their particular sporting community. We noted this in our discussion of the AFL as a case study. Other SGBs have questioned whether the WADC is suitable for all sporting contexts. For example, at the 2007 Third World Conference on Doping in Sport, the International Hockey Federation (IHF), International Basketball Federation (FIBA) and FIFA 'strongly objected' to changes to the WADC sought by WADA:

“The **one-size fits all approach does not work**,” said IHF Council member Murray Costello ... “My fear is that we will leave here tomorrow with a code carved in stone without some dialogue ... and a team unable to deliver on it.” (AP 2007d *International Herald Tribune*)

Sports governing bodies are careful here not to dispute the need for an institutional anti-doping response or anti-doping regulations. Rather, the point of contention is SGBs’ unwillingness to surrender their moral authority and legitimacy to WADA as the control mechanism for their particular sporting community. However, at the same time SGBs must carefully negotiate between their independence and their acquiescence in global doping regulation. Notwithstanding SGBs’ efforts to maintain their moral authority and legitimacy, media reports tend to emphasise WADA and the WADC as the appropriate, successful and necessary mechanisms with which to address the problem of drugs in sport. WADA uses media reports to question the legitimacy of SGBs in the field of anti-doping, suggesting that widespread non-compliance with WADA’s regulatory framework contributes to increasing PED use. Framing the issue as a worldwide ‘problem’ opens opportunities to stress the importance of overarching institutional solutions:

Doping by athletes **worldwide** is on the **rise** because **sports governance officials** are **unwilling** or **ill-equipped** to enforce rules, according to the World Anti-Doping Agency ... “It will **get worse before it gets better**,” ... president of the agency, said ... “We are **trying to defeat a 21st century problem with 19th century organisations**.” (Lysaght 2007 *Bloomberg.com*)

“Doping is without doubt the **greatest threat ethical sport has ever known** and has become **so pervasive** that it places **public health at grave risk**,” said WADA president ... “It is **incumbent upon the Sport Movement and Governments** of the world to continue to bolster efforts to **battle the scourge of doping ... by approving refinements to the World Anti-Doping Code**.” (Xinhua 2007 *China View*)

Reports positioning WADA as the institutional solution to doping and the adoption of a WADC-aligned policy approach as ‘incumbent’ upon other stakeholders highlights the tensions between WADA and SGBs. For example, referring to the National Football League’s (NFL) reluctance to bring their policies into line with WADA’s standards, Wadler as a WADA representative, stated: ‘They need to **get into the end zone**, which is **with WADA ... That’s the ultimate place where they need to be**’ (in Weisman 2007 *USA Today*) and ‘These are **steps in the right direction but they fall short ... They need**

to adopt the world anti-doping code as their standard' (in Kuriloff 2007 *Bloomberg.com*). These types of comments imply that a failure by SGBs to adopt WADC-based policies questions their commitment to anti-doping with implications for perceptions of their legitimacy and moral authority. Further, the examples cited above demonstrate that media reports provide opportunities to construct WADA as the necessary institution to restore stability to sport.

This section has shown that media reports provide an effective vehicle for the articulation of claims of stakeholders that construct PEDs as a moral panic and a danger to social order. Further, media reports illustrate the contested nature of claims to legitimacy and that power relationships between organisations form an important part of the doping debate.

Conclusion

This chapter used a content analysis of media coverage of doping to investigate whether the debate over PEDs can be described as a moral panic. Media reports and claim-makers' use of the media reveal the value of the criteria presented in Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) moral panic model. Media reports demonstrate consensus that doping is deviant behaviour necessitating measures of social control. These reports provide opportunities for claim-makers to fan public concern over doping and focus hostility on doping athletes as 'folk devils.' Contributing to public concern are exaggerated claims that construct doping as widespread with the potential to threaten the social order as a public health issue as well as a danger to youth. These types of constructions enable WADA, and other SGBs, to emphasise and justify a strong regulatory response.

The media reports in the content analysis also provide support for my modification of the moral panic criterion of consensus to consensus-making. In the case of PEDs, consensus-making more effectively captures the complex interactions between a range of claim-makers in the doping debate, which are underpinned by claims to legitimacy. The centrality of legitimacy in the doping debate can also be effectively explored using an elites-engineered moral panic theory, which highlights the negotiated power relationships

between SGBs and WADA. From this perspective, WADA seeks to maintain their legitimacy and moral authority as the institution responsible for anti-doping regulation while managing the competing interests of a range of other claim-makers. An important part of this process is WADA's use of the media to reinforce its legitimacy and moral authority. However, as dominant stakeholder groups in the modern sporting context, elite SGBs also enjoy privileged media access that provides them with opportunities to challenge and reassert claims to legitimacy. Consequently, while using the media to enhance their legitimacy by demonstrating support for WADA, elite SGBs seek to balance this with efforts to maintain the authority to govern and control their particular sporting communities.

I have applied this modified moral panic framework to a content analysis of media reports of doping. The evidence presented in this chapter has provided support for the claim that doping represents an elites-engineered institutionalised moral panic driven by the concerns of elite SGBs to maintain legitimacy and moral authority. Goode and Ben-Yehuda's model provides a useful analytical tool with which to examine the debate over drugs in sport.

The next chapter continues this process by using an e-Survey and interviews to investigate perceptions of the legitimacy and moral authority of WADA and the WADC as applied by NSOs in the Australian grassroots sporting community. This approach shifts from a 'top down' organisational focus on the media to consider legitimacy from a 'bottom up' perspective of the community.

The e-Survey and Qualitative Interviews

I think there's a cultural change there as well, that certainly in the sport as a whole, I think people believe that we're actively working to reduce taking of illegal substances. And that may serve as a deterrent to some practices. I think the national sporting organisations certainly can't be seen to be turning a blind eye to anything these days. I think they must feel that they're accountable. (Interview ID: 141082)

Throughout this thesis I have examined whether the debate over PEDs can be conceptualised as a socially-constructed moral panic driven by elite SGBs' concerns to restore or maintain perceptions of organisational legitimacy. The creation of WADA was used as a case study of legitimacy based on a normative rational-legal framework (the WADC) underpinned by shared values encapsulated in the 'spirit of sport.' I also suggested that WADA represented an institutionalised moral panic driven by the efforts of elite SGBs to restore their legitimacy. As a specific response to doping as a serious problem threatening sport, implementing WADA-aligned policies provides opportunities for SGBs to enhance their legitimacy. However, this also challenges SGBs' authority to govern their sporting communities. This highlights the multi-faceted nature of legitimacy and suggests that organisational power relationships are complicit in framing the doping debate.

The importance of legitimacy in the context of anti-doping was then considered in the debate surrounding the AFL's anti-drugs in sport policies. Chapter Four highlighted the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy and pointed out that different claim-makers in the doping debate use anti-doping policies to achieve diverse objectives. That chapter also revealed that the media provided a forum where stakeholders made and challenged claims to legitimacy. Although demonstrating that the media discussed drug use in sport in a manner suggesting a moral panic, legitimacy rather than a moral panic remained the focus of that chapter.

In the following chapter, I shifted the focus of the thesis to a moral panic perspective underpinned by the efforts of elite SGBs to maintain legitimacy. Using a content analysis of media reports on doping I explored the media as a key institutional actor in the doping debate. I applied a modified version of Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) criteria to test whether WADA constitutes a institutionalised response to a moral panic. The evidence fulfilled those criteria, and demonstrated support for the modified moral panic criterion of consensus-making within an elites-engineered theory. In this chapter, I return the focus to legitimacy, the central concept underpinning this thesis. Rather than a 'top-down' institutional view, this chapter takes a 'bottom-up' approach to explore the views of another key stakeholder in modern sport, namely members of the Australian grassroots sporting community. This is important when we consider the role of the public as key stakeholders in modern sport linked to the ongoing commercial viability and development of sport (Bette and Schimank 2001; see Chapter Two). Public perceptions are also relevant to the legitimacy criteria proposed by Donovan et al. (2002), with a particular focus on encouraging compliance with anti-doping regulation.

The value of this approach is that it provides an opportunity to gauge views using Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria in their Sport Drug Control Model (SDCM). As Chapter Two noted, that legitimacy criteria includes an enforcement agency that enjoys constitutional or legislative authority, fair anti-doping laws, scientifically accurate testing and equitable application of sanctions. Gucciardi, Jalleh and Donovan (2011) used a survey of elite Australian athletes to test the SDCM. That study suggested that legitimacy was less influential than other elements of the SDCM in terms of athletes' appraisals of threats and benefits associated with PED use (Gucciardi et al. 2011). However, as Gucciardi et al. note, their focus on elite athletes brings up the issue of examining whether their findings can be generalised to athletes at other levels of competition. Given the multi-dimensional and evaluative aspects of legitimacy influenced by the context in which it operates and the nature of the problem to which it is applied, such an approach needs to be explored in any well-rounded examination of legitimacy (Suchman 1995; see Chapter One).

I use Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria to explore attitudes towards SGB legitimacy from the perspective of members of the grassroots sporting community. Legitimacy rests on organisations' ability to implement 'proper procedures' accepted by communities, that define appropriate conduct for the group (Ericson et al. 1991; Habermas 1976; see Chapter One). Further, as Schneider (2000) points out in her discussion of the IOC, legitimacy and moral authority are linked to commercial viability. This also applies to SGBs. For example, the AFL's anti-doping policy was part of a regulatory framework focused on maintaining a positive image of Australian football. This was central to the AFL's commercial agenda as well as building participation rates, which are essential for continuing development of the game. Further, to secure financial resources generated by public support, such as revenue from match attendances, SGBs are also reliant on public perceptions that sport is 'clean' (Bette and Schimank 2001). To ensure participation rates, including grassroots development programs that are necessary to grow the game, as well as continued audience support more broadly, SGBs must maintain public perceptions that their anti-doping efforts are effective.

In this chapter, I use Australian sporting organisations, known as National Sporting Organisations (NSOs), to explore perceptions of members of the grassroots sporting community of the legitimacy of NSOs and WADA as institutional anti-doping mechanisms. Support for Australian NSOs' adoption of a WADA-aligned anti-doping approach would suggest not only that NSOs enjoyed perceptions of legitimacy and potentially that WADA also enjoyed legitimacy. Conversely, indications of little or qualified levels of endorsement suggest that doping incidents create a crisis of legitimacy for sporting organisations. To investigate perceptions of the legitimacy of NSOs and WADA I sent a quantitative e-Survey to 22 Australian NSOs and sporting organisations for distribution to their members (see Chapter Two). Complementing the e-Survey I used qualitative interviews with individuals from the grassroots sporting community. This enabled me to refine and sharpen my analysis of legitimacy in the doping debate as well as any implications for doping as a moral panic. The chapter commences with details of the themes and underlying objectives of the e-Survey and interviews.

Objectives and Themes of the e-Survey and Interviews

A primary aim of the e-Survey was to use Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria to examine the views of members of the grassroots sporting community towards NSOs' legitimacy. The e-Survey acted as the initial research tool. To assist in the analysis I segregated the data collection into four key areas. I selected these elements because they are associated with fundamental aspects of WADA's anti-doping approach under the WADC. As such they provide a framework against which to evaluate perceptions of claims to legitimacy by WADA and NSOs. The topic areas are:

- Information and Education;
- The Current Framework: Testing and Sanctions;
- WADA and the WADC: Rules and Values; and
- Athletes and PEDs: Strict Liability.

I briefly outline the relevance of these elements to Donovan's et al.'s legitimacy criteria and the purposes of this chapter before presenting the e-Survey and interview results.

Information and Education

The rationale underpinning inclusion of 'information and education' rests on the central role of values-based education in WADA's anti-doping campaign. For example, WADA tackles the moral and physical dangers of doping through 'effective values-based education programs that ... create a strong anti-doping culture' (WADA 2010d). Further, WADA states that it is 'dedicated' to facilitating the distribution of anti-doping information and education to ensure 'worldwide compliance with the Code' (WADA 2006; see Chapter Three). WADA's emphasis on the WADC underpinned by values-based education constitutes a measure against which to gauge perceptions of legitimacy. Further, the role of education in anti-doping has a historical foundation as demonstrated by the IOC's focus on education to change athletes' behaviour. Education is also important for perceptions of NSO legitimacy under a deterrence-based anti-doping approach that includes testing and sanctions. To be effective, and enjoy legitimacy, such a policy requires the education of individuals on the rules and their obligations under that framework. On that basis, I expected that research respondents might perceive information and education as important to anti-doping programs.

The Current Framework: Testing and Sanctions

Donovan et al. (2002) have suggested anti-doping compliance is more likely if SGBs enjoy the moral authority and legitimacy to impose testing protocols and sanctions. Accordingly, this topic area investigates respondents' attitudes towards NSO legitimacy in relation to these procedural elements. To do this, the e-Survey asked respondents to indicate their view on whether testing is scientifically accurate and applied consistently. This legitimacy criterion includes equitable and consistent application of sanctions (see Chapter Two). The issue of interest here is whether respondents view sanctions as equitably applied and if this had any impact on their attitudes towards NSOs and WADA.

WADA and the WADC: Rules and Values

In addition to procedural aspects of testing and sanctions, Donovan et al. (2002) suggest that legitimacy requires an enforcement agency that enjoys constitutional or legislative authority and that anti-doping rules are morally right and fair. Chapter Three pointed to the shared norms and values underpinning the WADC, namely that doping is a risk to athletes' health, is unfair to non-doping athletes, provides a bad role model for youth, is increasingly a public health issue, is morally wrong and is against the 'spirit of sport' (WADA 2009b). These central themes of WADA's anti-doping campaign underpin its claims to legitimacy under the WADC. Agreement with these aspects of the legitimacy criteria would suggest support for the legitimacy of WADA and the WADC. Further, a successful moral panic requires agreement that community values are under threat and that there is an appropriate institutional solution.

Athletes and PEDs: Strict Liability

The relevance of this topic area concerns whether participants believed structural factors influenced athletes' doping behaviour. The intention was to establish a foundation for later investigation of the strict liability principle using the interviews. As Chapter Three noted, the strict liability principle is a central part of the deterrence-based anti-doping framework. My aim is to see whether respondents felt that severe sanctions under strict liability place a responsibility upon NSOs to help athletes deal with structural pressures and whether this had an impact on their views of NSO legitimacy.

This section has outlined the key themes and objectives underpinning the e-Survey and interviews. The primary focus of the e-Survey was to use elements of Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria to examine the views of members of the grassroots sporting community. Sports governing bodies must actively work to maintain support, including from the grassroots sporting community, for institutional solutions to doping as a specific problem of particular concern (Beamish 2009).

Sporting Organisations and Legitimacy

To create a context within which to frame the analysis of the data I used the e-Survey to establish NSOs' central obligations as identified by respondents. Indications that respondents did not perceive anti-doping regulation to be part of NSOs' responsibilities would suggest little support for my claim that doping creates a crisis of legitimacy for sporting organisations. There were 232 responses to the e-Survey, with respondents identifying three main tasks as NSOs' central roles. These are governance and administration (33.6 per cent), education (26.3 per cent) and enforcement of anti-doping policies (21.6 per cent). Other areas mentioned were the creation of drug free sport (including prevention) (9.5 per cent), uniform anti-doping policies (5.6 per cent) and independent testing (1.7 per cent). A small percentage of respondents (0.9 per cent) indicated a lack of involvement by NSOs in grassroots sport.

A secondary question asked respondents if they perceived NSOs to be fulfilling their central role. Of the 179 responses to this question 110 (47.4 per cent) answered 'no,' 67 (28.9 per cent) answered 'yes' and 2 (0.9 per cent) were unsure. These results show that respondents have clear expectations of the responsibilities of NSOs and that these fit within Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria. This suggests that there is an opportunity to evaluate NSO legitimacy based on their efforts in these areas, which I explore using the e-Survey data and elaborate upon with the interview data. Respondents' identification of NSOs' main roles and responsibilities also provides a framework within which to explore factors influencing attitudes towards NSOs' legitimacy. The e-Survey explicitly asked respondents '*Do you think*

that NSOs are facing a crisis of legitimacy because some athletes continue to use PES and/or methods?’ Table 6.1 presents the results.

Table 6.1: Respondents’ Indication of NSO Crisis of Legitimacy (total n=232)

NSO Crisis of Legitimacy	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	154	66.4
No	78	33.6
Total	232	100

These results suggest that respondents are divided in their views of the legitimacy of NSOs, although a clear majority indicated that NSOs face a crisis. The interview data reveal similarly divided views amongst participants. Twenty of the 28 interview participants indicated the view that NSOs face a crisis of legitimacy and five answered in the negative. The remaining interview participants were unsure. The intention underpinning this e-Survey question was to create a point of comparison of respondents’ views across the e-Survey. Cross-tabulating the data from this question with data from questions relating to the legitimacy criteria allowed me to identify, and compare, groups of respondents who believed there was a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs with those who did not. From this perspective, the division revealed in the data illustrates the dynamic and contested nature of legitimacy. This is also useful for consideration of doping as a moral panic and highlights the value of consensus-making as a moral panic criterion. Given the division observed above, elite SGBs must actively work to generate agreement from the public in order to entrench the legitimacy of their institutional responses.

Commencing with anti-doping education and information, I next present the e-Survey results complemented by the qualitative interview data. The data presented in this chapter are not meant to be fully representative of views held by members of the Australian grassroots sporting community. However, it is indicative of a range of answers and views relating to issues explored in this thesis.

Information, Education and Legitimacy

As noted in Chapter Three, preventative education is a primary part of WADA’s anti-doping campaign. To establish whether the provision of anti-

doping information and education affected perceptions of NSO legitimacy, the e-Survey asked participants whether NSOs provided these materials. This raised secondary questions, which I explored using qualitative interviews, concerning whether anti-doping information is readily accessible, easily understood and advises members of their anti-doping obligations. Further, NSO licensing requirements stipulate that members comply with testing and sanctions. This implies that individuals need knowledge of their obligations under that framework.


All interview participants indicated their awareness that they are subject to anti-doping regulations under the terms of their club licenses and are willing to comply with those requirements. As one interview participant pointed out: 'Well, you do need to know because from club level upwards you can be tested' (Interview ID: 140933-R2). Another interview participant stated: 'I'm a license holder so ASADA can walk in now and even though I haven't thrown my leg over a bike to race for three years I still have to submit to a drug test, which is fine. I've got a license so I subscribe to that' (Interview ID: 141050).

The e-Survey asked respondents if their NSOs provided anti-doping informational material. The type of material could include magazines and/or brochures, DVD presentations, anti-doping information on NSOs' websites as well as official rules and regulations. Of the 224 responses 40 (17.9 per cent) indicated that NSOs did not provide anti-doping information. However, 184 respondents (82.1 per cent) indicated that NSOs *are* providing information on anti-doping rules and regulations. The interview data support this view, with one participant indicating 'I would view that the avowed or articulated anti-doping position that's the talk, the walk seems to be consistent with that' (Interview ID: 140961). In other words, there were expressions in the e-Survey and interviews indicating that NSOs did provide anti-doping information. This can be interpreted as reinforcing perceptions of legitimacy among NSO members. For example:

It validates my assumption that cycling bodies actually are doing something about it ... I mean because it's a high profile sport and it's probably that and maybe weightlifting and a few other sports got the stigma of the drug policy, certainly at an international level I think they're doing something about it.
(Interview ID: 140995)

To consider whether this influences attitudes towards NSO legitimacy, I cross-tabulated data on NSOs' provision of anti-doping information with indications of a crisis of legitimacy. Figure 6.1 presents the results.

Figure 6.1: Crisis of Legitimacy - Anti-Doping Information (total n=224)




As we can see, the vast majority of respondents indicated a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs. However, those who received anti-doping information were slightly less likely to hold this view. The data show that 25 per cent of respondents who felt NSOs did not provide information also did not feel NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy. That compares with just over 34 per cent of respondents who felt NSOs did provide information. Of the group who indicated information was not provided 75 per cent also indicated a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs. In comparison, nearly 66 per cent of respondents indicating NSOs provided anti-doping information answered yes to a crisis of legitimacy. The data suggest that receiving information makes a small positive difference in respondents' perceptions of NSO legitimacy.

The e-Survey also asked respondents whether their NSOs provided any regular anti-doping educational material. There were 187 responses to this question, with 142 (75.9 per cent) indicating NSOs did not provide regular educational material and 45 (24.1 per cent) indicating NSOs did provide education material. To consider if this had any effect on attitudes towards NSO

legitimacy, I cross-tabulated these responses with responses indicating a crisis of legitimacy. Figure 6.2 presents the results.

Figure 6.2: Crisis of Legitimacy - Anti-Doping Education (total n=187)



Respondents who felt they received anti-doping education were less likely to indicate a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs. The data show that 33.8 per cent of respondents who felt that NSOs did not provide education also did not feel that NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy. This compares with 40 per cent of respondents who felt that NSOs provided education and did not feel that NSOs faced a legitimacy crisis. From the group indicating that they did receive education 60 per cent also felt that NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy. That compares with a little over 66 per cent who felt that NSOs did not provide education and that NSOs face a crisis of legitimacy. The e-Survey results suggest that provision of anti-doping information and education has a small positive impact on attitudes towards legitimacy.

Interview Comments - Information and Education: accessibility

Most interviewees had some knowledge of their NSOs’ anti-doping requirements. Appendix 6.1 lists the indications from the interview participants concerning NSOs’ provision of anti-doping information and education. However, 13 of the 28 interviewees felt that information and educational material was not easily accessible or distributed effectively to the grassroots sporting community. For example, one participant who felt that NSOs did not face a crisis of legitimacy and did provide information noted that finding information was not difficult for those involved in administration or coaching. At issue for this participant is NSO failure to distribute that

information more broadly, with information ‘only really known by those people who have had exposure to that communication’ (Interview ID: 141082). For other interviewees a failure to use or improve existing delivery methods, such as newsletters or websites, to distribute anti-doping information affected their perceptions of NSO legitimacy. For example, one participant who held positive views of NSO legitimacy nevertheless indicated:

So, if they can email out a newsletter at regular intervals ... then what's the harm in putting in some information in there? ... I think if they did provide that sort of information on a regular sort of basis then it would give me the impression that they were really on top of it and they were really trying to overcome drug abuse from an early stage. (Interview ID: 140902)

Another participant described their NSOs’ website as ‘a nightmare ... a really shit website’ (Interview ID: 001). For this participant, such a problem could be easily overcome as in ‘this day and age you can make great websites which are really easy to get around.’ Another participant felt that a more structural approach was necessary to effectively distribute anti-doping information. This participant suggested that rather than simply sending a newsletter which ‘somebody could just ... throw it away,’ NSOs should engage more proactively by linking anti-doping initiatives to clubs’ ‘licensing renewal, that they’ve got to have talked about doping and any other thing that may have come up. But that doesn’t happen’ (Interview ID: 002). In other words, even those who had a positive view of their NSO felt that more action is required to ensure that information reaches various levels of the sporting community. This included providing information in an easy to understand format. As one participant critical of NSO legitimacy stated:

If they provide it to the clubs, nationwide, it's no good providing it to the national body or to the state bodies. It can come through them, but they need to say this must go to every [...] Club in Australia. It must. Because what happens is if the national body gets it, they'll pop it on their website. Well that's only good for those people that visit that website, that have access to Internet, and that can take a drug policy that's on the Internet and say we understand that. (Interview ID: 141410)

This comment reveals how the failure to provide anti-doping information in an easily understood format detracts from its usefulness. This was an issue seen as particularly important for those engaged in junior sport, as one participant critical of NSOs legitimacy indicated:

So unless the kid gets on the websites, and let's be honest, a word that's that long [respondent spreads arms out wide], in [...], they can't read it, they certainly can't spell it, they certainly don't have a clue what it stands for. And they wouldn't know whether it's in butter menthols or cough medicine. (Interview ID: 141050)

Some interview participants who indicated a crisis of legitimacy pointed out that although holding a sporting license indicated agreement with anti-doping policy, the lack of an accompanying 'educational process' left the policy 'open for you to interpret' (Interview ID: 140995). For these participants, without an educational process NSOs lack the legitimacy and authority to implement testing protocols and impose sanctions. As one interviewee that doubted NSOs' legitimacy despite the provision of educational material pointed out:

You've really got to come down with education and you've got to provide the resources for the education. And I think without the education, you can't impose the penalties. (Interview ID: 141131)

Other participants shared this view. For example, as one commented: 'I mean if you're going to do drug testing you have to do drug education ... so people are aware what their responsibilities are as well as what the risks are and the damages and everything else that go with it' (Interview ID: 140933-R2). These comments are representative of attitudes held across the group of interviewees and highlight the subjective evaluative aspect of legitimacy. The interview data show a clear expectation by interviewees that NSOs could make more efficient use of existing delivery methods to provide anti-doping information, including a more effective educational process. The perception that NSOs devoted insufficient attention to this area had the potential to create negative attitudes towards NSOs' legitimacy including their authority to impose testing protocols and sanctions.

Interview Comments - Information and Education: focus on elite competition

There was also a feeling that NSOs maintain a narrow focus on elite sport rather than incorporating the grassroots community. Interviewees, regardless of whether they indicated a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs, shared the view that NSOs should incorporate the grassroots community in anti-doping education. For example, one participant who felt NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy

stated: 'I'm sure for the elite sports ... they would be well aware of what they can or can't do ... But at the level I compete at, I'm not aware of what I can and can't do and then what are the penalties' (Interview ID: 141574). Another participant who was supportive of NSOs indicated that anti-doping education 'doesn't happen until they're at that [elite] level' (Interview ID: 141082).

This corresponds with other findings in the existing literature. Gucciardi et al. (2011) suggest that educational programs addressing PED use should target a range of groups, including coaches, parents and athletes. Further, they note that educational initiatives 'may be more beneficial for younger athletes in their formative years' (Gucciardi et al. 2011:6; see also Petroczi and Aidman 2008; Striegel, Vollkommer and Dickhuth 2002; Turner and McCrory 2003). Mazanov, Huybers and Connor (2010) also point to the value of more targeted educational initiatives. Based on interviews with athletes, coaches and other support personnel, they suggest that there may be 'natural intervention points' for educational initiatives. These may include transitions in athlete's sporting career path, such as in and out of sponsorship arrangements or potential team selection or de-selection. While focused on elite athletes, they suggest that 'periods of behavioural instability around transitions between stable career states ... might provoke the temptation to dope' (Mazanov et al. 2010:109). Although noting that research is required to demonstrate whether career transitions lead to doping, the implication here is that earlier provision of education may assist athletes in managing stressful transition periods. This literature indicates a level of support for the view of some interviewees in this thesis that an educational approach inclusive of the grassroots sporting community is important for building an elite anti-doping culture.

However, there was division amongst the interview participants in relation to whether grassroots education would affect athletes' doping behaviour. Some participants expressed the view that education at the grassroots level played an important role in building an anti-doping culture in elite sport. As one participant noted: 'If you educate, you train, and you teach ... if you start at grassroots level then it's going to follow you through, as long as you keep education, yes, definitely' (Interview ID: 141015). Other participants appreciated the value of increased grassroots education but doubted it would

affect individuals' doping behaviour. One participant was critical of NSOs' legitimacy but emphasised personal responsibility: 'you can do as much education as you want ... but they're a human being they're still going to make a decision whether they want to do that or not' (Interview ID: 140991). Overall respondents were divided over whether provision of anti-doping information and education would alter athletes' behaviour.

This section has considered the e-Survey and qualitative interview data in relation to anti-doping education and information and perceptions of NSOs' legitimacy. The research results indicate that most NSOs *are* distributing and making anti-doping information available. Research participants identified a range of delivery methods such as NSOs' websites, information sessions (including through clubs, seminars or orientation programs at government-funded Institutes of Sport) and coaching courses. In this way most of the grassroots sporting community members indicated they were generally aware of anti-doping information. The e-Survey data showed that individuals who felt they received information and education were slightly less likely to be critical of NSOs' legitimacy. The interview comments support those findings, with participants who felt they did not receive anti-doping information and education tending to express more negative views towards the legitimacy of NSOs.

The Current Framework: Testing, Sanctions and Legitimacy


Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria suggests that compliance with anti-doping regulations is more likely if all aspects of the model, including testing and sanctions, enjoy perceptions of legitimacy (see Chapter One).

Accordingly, this section presents the e-Survey and interview data and perceptions of NSOs' legitimacy in relation to testing and sanctions. Donovan et al.'s legitimacy criteria included perceptions that testing procedures were scientifically accurate and applied equitably to all athletes and that sanctions were fair and consistently applied. Table 6.2 presents the e-Survey respondents' level of agreement concerning testing processes and procedures.

Table 6.2: Respondent Support for Legitimacy Criteria - Testing (total n=232)

	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
The testing process is scientifically accurate/effective	2.6	9.9	39.7	34.5	13.4
Testing procedures are fair and applied equitably across all athletes	9.9	21.1	31.9	21.1	15.9

The e-Survey data shows that respondents are divided in their views on the legitimacy criteria in relation to testing, although a clear majority agree with them. As we can see 34.5 per cent agreed but only 13.4 per cent strongly agreed and 39.7 per cent were uncertain that the testing process was scientifically accurate and effective. Although 21.1 per cent agreed that testing procedures were fair and applied equitably only 15.9 per cent strongly agreed, 31.9 per cent expressed uncertainty and 21.1 per cent disagreed with that statement. To explore whether the data indicated that respondents' views of testing influenced their attitudes towards NSOs' legitimacy, I cross-tabulated these responses with data from responses to whether NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy. Figure 6.3 presents the results.

Figure 6.3: Crisis of Legitimacy - Testing Criteria (total n=232)

The cross-tabulated data indicate that respondents' views of testing processes and procedures influence their attitudes towards NSO legitimacy. Those who agreed or strongly agreed with the accuracy of testing as well as the fairness and equity of testing were more supportive of NSO legitimacy. Those who felt that testing was not accurate or that tests were not fair and equitable were more likely to indicate that there was a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs. The majority indicated a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs. I used the qualitative interviews to further investigate the views of research participants in relation to testing.

Interview Comments - testing and legitimacy

All interviewees supported the necessity of testing. However, the interview data reveal that some participants felt that testing technology failed to keep pace with doping practices or were sceptical of administrative processes. For example, one participant critical of NSOs' legitimacy felt the technology lagged 'behind ... the latest either performance-enhancing drugs or methodology of administering that drug' (Interview ID: 140961). For another interviewee supportive of NSOs' legitimacy, the fact that '200 tests went missing after the Beijing Games' (Interview ID: 140902) created doubt over administrative procedures. The results, which were all negative, were later located with the error attributed to a 'communication problem' (AP 2008; Magnay 2008c). Other participants felt that NSOs should be more accountable and transparent when positive drug tests did occur. For example, as one participant who was critical of the legitimacy of NSOs stated: 'And if the person's caught let everybody know, don't put it in the closet, don't sweep it under the carpet ... put it out for everyone to see' (Interview ID: 141121).

However, other participants who were critical of NSOs' legitimacy nevertheless indicated their support for the accuracy of testing as well as the procedural elements of testing protocols:

I have no concerns about the accuracy. I'm a scientist so the testing's the testing. In fact the testing's probably more generous in its limits than it could be because they're trying to minimise the false positives. So there's a buffer there and I'm sure there are people who get away with it all the time because they're on that margin. (Interview ID: 141530)

I think, well my perspective is that with the testing, the testing is great. I have no issues with the way they do it or the way they did it in my day. (Interview ID: 141036)

The interview data reveal that participants were divided in their views of testing technology and administrative procedures, although a majority supported the necessity of these anti-doping measures. Nevertheless, the interviews suggest NSOs need to ensure these elements of the anti-doping framework are operating efficiently in order to create positive attitudes towards NSOs' legitimacy.

Interview Comments - Testing and Legitimacy: focus on elite competition

A majority of interview participants stressed the importance of including grassroots sport in the testing framework. Of the 28 participants 21 felt that increased testing or raising community awareness of testing in grassroots sport would assist in developing clean elite sport. This was a view shared by participants who indicated a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs and those who did not. For example, one participant who did not feel that NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy indicated: 'the way to improve is actually to get physically in place seeing people getting tested at the grassroots level' (Interview ID: 140933). Another participant with a negative view of the legitimacy of NSOs also stressed: 'you can never stop the testing ... It has to be in their face, every club should have a drug tester ... if you win a club title you've got to pee in the bottle' (Interview ID: 141049). A perceived NSO bias towards testing only at elite levels had the potential to adversely affect attitudes of interview participants towards NSOs' legitimacy. For example, one participant was supportive of NSOs' legitimacy but their comment is representative of other participants' views:

I mean, considering we don't see testing for the people further down the field or for the younger athletes. Their focus is definitely on the elite athletes and whether that's a budgetary thing, whether they just don't have the funding to test as widely as they would like, perhaps that's the issue, or like with the junior athletes whether there's ethical issues there. But if there were no restrictions then, yeah, I think it would be good to see it occur at a wider range. (Interview ID: 140902)

While acknowledging that testing is 'expensive and time consuming' (Interview ID: 142013) the consequence of a lack of testing at non-elite levels

of sport can create negative views of NSOs' legitimacy. However, rather than expanding testing to include non-elite competition, which participants acknowledged was impractical, an option identified by some participants was raising the visibility and awareness of testing. Highlighting the value of a 'bottom-up' educational approach, participants proposed initiatives to increase awareness of the testing framework. These included providing opportunities at larger competitive sporting events for individuals to ask questions or obtain information on the anti-doping framework. Suggestions ranged from a 'Drug Education Pro-Shop' to banners or signage at club meets. For example, a participant with a son involved in elite sport suggested putting resources into 'a tent with a stand and all your brochures and information that you can pick up ... educating people and why not?' (Interview ID: 141410). Another participant who was supportive of NSOs' legitimacy also indicated that increased visibility in relation to testing would enhance views of NSOs' legitimacy:

It also creates, I think, more avenues so people go if I want more information, or not sure about stuff, maybe I can go and ask them because they distribute stuff in this arena, whereas, well, no, they don't, yeah, never hear anything from them. (Interview ID: 141082)

Some interviewees suggested that a greater NSO focus on raising awareness of testing in non-elite sport has the potential to influence individuals' decisions to avoid PED use. As one participant said: 'the kid that might be on the brink, he might be an A grade and I might just take this so I can win for my dad, will go oh hang on I might get tested' (Interview ID: 140933). Interview participants identified NSOs as responsible for implementing programs that increased visibility or generated awareness of anti-doping at the grassroots level. As one participant stated: 'The sport should do that, yeah ... whatever sport it is, their governing body should' (Interview ID: 140933-R2). However, the financial constraints facing NSOs highlight the government's responsibility in creating an anti-doping culture based on a strong foundation at non-elite levels. As these participants who held views critical of NSOs' legitimacy stated:

Mainly because I can't see [NSO] turning around and saying oh we're going to get ourselves a person from ASADA to monitor this situation because we just couldn't ... afford it ... and testing obviously would cost a lot of money and some

sports don't want to test. I believe it falls back to the government. (Interview ID: 142013)

I'm not sure what the average cost of a drug test is but from what I gather it's not insubstantial. So I think you would try to have as much faith as you could if it was government backed rather than Association backed. So having ASADA ... I think that's a positive thing because that's an independent body outside the organisations. So I think that gives a lot more weight. (Interview ID: 140951)

As these comments illustrate, there is support for a government backed and appropriately funded testing body independent of NSOs, such as ASADA in Australia. The commercially driven nature of modern sport creates a situation where entrusting drug testing to NSOs is problematic and emphasises the importance of an independent testing body (Connor 2009b; Voy 1991; see Chapter One). This relates to perceptions of NSO legitimacy where claims by sporting bodies to be adequately and openly testing are met with scepticism. For example a participant critical of NSO legitimacy argued:

To answer your question another way, the teams are now doing self-testing which is simply the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard in my entire life. Well, we own the team! Or we can do whatever we like with the results. Yes, and it's very, very, you know, I like your morality and you're going to stick it on a website. So what? How do you know if it's right or wrong? So, the teams putting a fence around it themselves. They're doing that because the sponsors are running a mile. They're putting that in as part of their sponsor pitch. (Interview ID: 141050)


These comments suggest that the attitudes of participants were influenced by their perceptions of the actions and efforts of NSOs in relation to testing, including administrative processes and the accuracy of testing science. For some interviewees NSOs' failure to stay ahead of doping practices, poor administration and a focus on elite sport rather than raising grassroots awareness of testing procedures resulted in negative views of NSOs' anti-doping efforts.

The Current Framework: Sanctions and Legitimacy

Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria includes fair and equitable sanctions that are applied consistently across athletes and sporting codes. The e-Survey explored this issue and revealed division amongst respondents' views of NSOs' application of sanctions. Of the 232 responses, 18.5 per cent strongly disagreed and 26.7 per cent disagreed that sanctions were applied equitably and consistently. In addition, 25 per cent were uncertain and 17.2 per cent

and 12.5 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with that statement. The issue for the thesis was whether the application of sanctions bolsters perceptions of NSOs' legitimacy and support for WADA and the WADC. Figure 6.4 presents the cross-tabulated results.

Figure 6.4: Crisis of Legitimacy - Sanctions (total n=232)



Respondents who indicated their agreement with the claim that sanctions were applied fairly and equitably were less likely to view NSOs as facing a crisis of legitimacy. These results suggest that perceptions of NSOs' application of sanctions have a weak influence on attitudes towards the legitimacy of NSOs.

Interview Comments - sanctions and legitimacy

A slight majority of interview participants expressed the view that NSOs' application of sanctions was inconsistent and 'soft.' Of the 28 interviewees, 15 indicated that inconsistent sanctions raised doubts over NSOs' commitment to dealing with PEDs. Although some sporting bodies, such as cycling, were seen as 'trying to improve,' other organisations, such as the AFL and rugby league 'do it very poorly. They're not consistent in their approach and once again I think they just paid lip service, this is a process we have to do, let's just do it' (Interview ID: 141257). Another participant stated: 'for instance you take the footballers; they get three goes at it apparently. It should be the same for everyone. If you're a sportsperson and ... you're earning money from that sport so there should be only one rule for everyone and not change' (Interview ID: 002). Other participants criticised the AFL's three strikes policy

(see Chapter Four) in comparison to severity of penalties attached to doping offences in cycling. Participants both critical and supportive of NSO legitimacy held this view, as indicated by these representative quotes:

I think someone like the AFL; I think their policy is a complete joke. The three strikes business is ridiculous. I don't know any other sport, I'm not that well informed either, but certainly in cycling you don't get three strikes. One test for a positive for a recreational substance even out of competition can land you with a ban. I think the AFL needs to lift their game. Particularly given the nature of the organisation, three strikes I think sends a bad message. (Interview ID: 141530)

It drives me nuts seeing football codes just having their own rules and believing that they're keeping the fight up against the dopers in their sport. It's an absolute joke, and the head of the AFL his comments on their three strike ... just makes a mockery of the whole anti-doping process. (Interview ID: 141155)

And when you were asking about the inconsistency and fairness again? Same kind of punishment for the same kind of issue ... if Tom over there took that drug he should get a 12 month ban and so should Peter over there if he did the same thing. Not have someone have 12 months, someone have three months, which I know that does happen too. (Interview ID: 001)

Interviewees had clear expectations that all NSOs should implement anti-doping policies that applied consistent sanctions. The interview comments support the e-Survey data and indicate that inconsistent application of sanctions and lack of fairness adversely influences participants' attitudes towards the legitimacy of NSOs.

This section has presented data on research participants' perceptions of NSOs' application of testing and sanctions under the current anti-doping framework. While not enabling this thesis to state that NSOs face a crisis of legitimacy, the data reveals a clear division in views towards Australian NSOs' anti-doping efforts in relation to testing and sanctions. Although divided in their views, participants stressed the importance of a bottom-up approach that included grassroots sport. Highlighting education as a key part of creating an anti-doping culture participants suggested initiatives to raise community awareness and visibility of the testing framework. Underpinning these suggestions were the views of the majority of participants that creating and maintaining elite competition required a strong foundation in grassroots sport. Interview participants were also divided in views over whether NSOs consistently and equitably applied sanctions. Although slight, a majority of

interviewees felt that sanctions were applied inconsistently among NSOs, some of whom were not sufficiently strict. Nevertheless, there were clear expectations that consistent application of sanctions should constitute part of NSOs' regulatory approach to doping. The legitimacy of anti-drugs policies, including in sport, appears to rest on perceptions that all elements of those policies form a cohesive and mutually supportive framework, including the elements that link education to testing (Battin et al. 2008).

WADA and the WADC: Rules, Values and Legitimacy

WADA claims that adopting the WADC is essential for sporting organisations' integrity and credibility (Pound 2007). As we have seen throughout this thesis, modern legitimacy can be based on a 'system of rational norms' grounded in shared norms and values (Weber 1969). The legitimacy of the WADC as a rational-legal regulatory framework is underpinned by a values-based component, which is that doping contravenes the values encapsulated in the 'spirit of sport' (WADA 2009b:14). WADA also argues that PEDs are dangerous to athletes' health, a bad example for youth, unfair to non-doping athletes and a growing public health issue (WADA 2007c; see Chapter Three). This corresponds with Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria, which includes perceptions that anti-doping laws are morally right and fair. The e-Survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with these claims and to indicate whether the WADC is important for the integrity and credibility of NSOs. Table 6.3 lists the results.


Table 6.3: Agreement with Anti-Doping Values (total $n=232$)

	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
NSOs greater chance safeguard integrity, credibility if accept, implement, fully comply with WADC	1.3	4.3	23.7	37.9	32.8
Anti-doping laws morally right/fair	2.6	1.7	6.5	30.6	58.6
PEDs not fair	2.6	4.7	1.7	17.2	73.7
PEDs danger athletes health	2.2	4.7	12.1	30.6	50.4
PEDs bad example for youth	1.3	2.6	3.4	20.3	72.4
PEDs a public health issue	3.0	17.2	14.2	27.6	37.9
PEDs against spirit of sport	3.0	3.4	3.4	20.7	69.4

The e-Survey data show strong support for the view that anti-doping laws and regulations are morally right and fair, with 30.6 per cent agreeing and 58.6 per cent strongly agreeing with that statement. However, respondents were more divided in their views over the statement that the WADC is important for NSOs' credibility. Nevertheless, more respondents agreed (37.9 per cent) and strongly agreed (32.8 per cent) compared to those who were uncertain (23.7 per cent) or those who disagreed (4.3 per cent) or strongly disagreed (1.3 per cent) with that view. There were also strong indications of support for the key themes underpinning WADA's anti-doping framework as well as claims that doping contravenes the values encapsulated in the 'spirit of sport.'

I expected that support for the WADC and these values would translate into positive perceptions for the legitimacy of NSOs taking a similar anti-doping approach. As the WADC is the core document of the current anti-doping framework, I cross-tabulated responses to the statement that the WADC is important for NSOs' credibility and integrity with data in response to a crisis of legitimacy for NSOs. Figure 6.5 presents the results.

Figure 6.5: Crisis of Legitimacy - NSOs and the WADC (total $n=232$)



As we can see, there is considerable division in respondents' views of whether NSOs' credibility is enhanced by applying the WADC. Further, the vast majority of respondents indicated that NSOs face a crisis of legitimacy despite application of the WADC. A small number of respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with WADA's claim that applying the WADC was important for NSOs'

credibility and integrity. This group was more likely to feel that NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy than other groups. The group who strongly agreed with that claim was less likely to indicate that NSOs faced a crisis of legitimacy. While revealing that the majority of respondents felt NSOs face a crisis of legitimacy, the results indicate that applying the WADC tends to lessen this perception and create more positive views of NSO legitimacy amongst respondents.

Interview Comments - WADA and the WADC: rules, values and legitimacy

Like the e-Survey results, interview participants were divided in their views of a values-based regulatory approach to anti-doping. However, there were slightly more expressions of support for anti-doping laws and regulations than critical views of the framework. Fifteen of the 28 interviewees expressed positive views, 11 participants were critical and two individuals were unsure. On the positive front, one participant indicated that the foundation for anti-doping sanctions was ‘morally and ethically correct’ (Interview ID: 140995). Another participant who was supportive of NSOs’ legitimacy stated:

So, by focusing on that moral, ethical side of things you might be encouraging the athletes to think about not only the effect it has physically on themselves but also the impact it will have on the sport ... And I think it probably would improve the legitimacy because it's showing the world that the country is in line with the international standard. And you would hope that the international standard would be the best one and the one to follow. So if a national sporting organisation can show the world basically that it's adopting the same policies, it has the same standards then you would like to think that it's definitely something to aspire to. (Interview ID: 140902)

However, other participants felt that a values-based regulatory approach was problematic. Comments from these participants emphasised the importance of consistently applying all aspects of an anti-doping framework to enhance perceptions of legitimacy. One participant critical of NSOs’ legitimacy noted that: ‘Oh, it would depend on what that moral-based framework was, because it doesn’t seem to be consistent. It’s certainly not consistent across let’s say the football codes in Australia’ (Interview ID: 141455). Another participant with negative views of NSOs’ legitimacy commented that the WADC ‘cuts it in a perfect world if you can start again and get ten little Johnnys, all from similar backgrounds whose parents have said, Johnny be a good boy. But the world’s not that simplistic is it?’ (Interview ID: 141050).

However, the majority of interview participants tended to identify the need for a rules-based approach along with a values-based foundation. One participant, for example, pointed out that ‘rules were rules’ by stating that ‘Just like you can’t have a bike, you know, time trial, you can’t have your handlebars any further from your seat than whatever it is 50 something centimetres’ (Interview ID: 140986). Nevertheless, this participant also recognised the complementary role of values and rules: ‘Well, you got me, because you need that values-based underpinning to discourage people from trying to push the limits all the time. Because otherwise everyone’s going to be at 4.99 per cent of the 5 per cent limit ... which is not really what you want’ (Interview ID: 140986). More strongly, another respondent emphasised the need for a rules-based approach even while admitting that values:

Makes it look friendlier on the surface, but it’s not going to deter dopers. Cheaters are cheaters and they don’t care about other people ... I don’t think it’s got any effectiveness in terms of deterring people from doping. Penalties I think are the best deterrent. But it’s risk/benefit. At the moment benefits are huge. The risks have to be huge too. (Interview ID: 141530)

This participant felt that ‘self-greed’ would invariably ‘overrule any sort of moral.’

This section has presented the e-Survey and interview results in relation to NSOs’ application of an anti-doping approach based on values in conjunction with rules and regulations. The data reveal that although there is some division amongst respondents, the majority tended to support a combination of rules and values as an effective way to approach anti-doping regulation. This suggests that there is support from the grassroots sporting community for a rules and values-based framework such as the WADC. Further, attitudes towards NSO legitimacy are enhanced by the view that those organisations are adopting such an approach. Indications that research participants support the current institutional anti-doping response is also relevant when considering doping as a moral panic. From that perspective, claim-makers must actively work to build and maintain community support for institutional solutions to particular problems. The e-Survey and interview data suggest that, in the Australian context, NSOs have successfully generated and maintained support for a WADA-aligned anti-doping model.

Athletes and PEDs: Strict Liability and Legitimacy

This section details the e-Survey and interview responses on factors that influence athletes' doping behaviour. The purpose of this e-Survey section was to establish a foundation for the later interviews to consider participants' views of WADA's strict liability principle. The interviews explored whether strict liability creates an obligation for NSOs to implement programs or initiatives to assist athletes to deal with structural pressures. I was also interested to canvass whether participants' views of the strict liability principle had any impact on their attitudes towards NSO legitimacy. The current anti-doping framework based on deterrence and sanctions holds athletes ultimately responsible for doping. Thus, to create a foundation for the later interviews, the e-Survey asked respondents for their views on factors they felt might contribute to athletes' decisions to use PEDs. I speculated that if respondents agreed with this strict liability principle they might identify factors that locate responsibility for doping at the level of the individual. Respondents provided textual answers to this question, which I disaggregated into the following classifications. Table 6.4 lists the results.

Table 6.4: Respondent Indicated Factors Influencing PED Use

Factors Influencing PED Use	Frequency	%
Competition Pride	98	42.2
Money/Celebrity	88	37.9
Performance Pressure	50	21.6
Peer/Team Pressure	30	12.9
Other	23	9.9
Injury Recovery	18	7.8
Create Level Playing Field	17	7.3
Lack Morality	17	7.3
Coach Pressure	16	6.9
Lack Education	16	6.9
Lack Enforcement	14	6
PED Culture	11	4.7

The data show that as well as individual factors, such as 'lack of morality', respondents identified a number of structural factors that influence athletes' use of PEDs. These results are significant considering that the dominant

research approach to drugs in sport remains focused on the athlete-user (see Chapter One). To sharpen the focus of this section, the e-Survey asked respondents to indicate groups that they felt played a role in creating an anti-doping culture. Respondents could select more than one group and Table 6.5 lists those identified in answer to the question *'In your opinion, who is responsible for making sure athletes do not take drugs?'*

Table 6.5: Respondent Indicated Groups Responsible for Anti-Doping (total n=232)

Group	%	Frequency
Athlete	97.4	226
Coaching/Support Staff	56.0	130
Administrators	38.8	90
Others	11.2	26
Parents	5.2	12
Sponsor	1.7	4

The data indicate that the group seen as primarily responsible for preventing doping is the individual athlete, followed by support and coaching staff and administrators. I speculated that indications that other groups as well as athletes were responsible for preventing drug use and the identification of structural factors might translate into qualifications of support for WADA's strict liability principle. This was underpinned by claims in the literature that the 'public begins to recognize that to a great extent athletes are pushed into doping by structural constraints ... as well as by temptations and pressures from inside as well as outside sports. That is why athletes cannot be blamed alone for their transgressions' (Bette and Schimank 2001:51; see also Breivik et al. 2009). These e-Survey results can also be considered from the perspective of a moral panic. They suggest a level of community concern or the 'raw material' that contributes to the ability of claim-makers to construct doping as a moral panic with PED-using athletes seen as 'folk devils.' As noted in Chapter Two, irrespective of claim-makers' efforts a moral panic will not emerge without a level of pre-existing community concern over the problematic issue. I used the qualitative interviews to explore research participants' views of the strict liability principle.

Interview Comments - athletes and PEDs: strict liability and legitimacy

To gauge levels of support for strict liability, I asked interview participants whether they perceived this to be an effective anti-doping strategy. The majority of participants supported strict liability with only two individuals indicating that they were not supportive of such an approach. One majority participant stated that ‘the encumbrances of what you do’ as a professional athlete included strict liability and individual accountability ‘for what I do, what I say, where I go, what I eat’ (Interview ID: 141574). More significantly, if the goal of stakeholder groups in sport (including athletes) is to ‘clean up sport,’ which is ‘what WADA’s trying to do’ then athletes ‘must expect that this is going to come with it’ (Interview ID: 141155). In other words, it is not an unreasonable expectation that athletes are subjected to tough regulatory measures, such as strict liability, to achieve and maintain clean sport.

However, while my interview participants supported individual accountability there were indications of misgivings over strict liability. NSOs were perceived as failing to provide appropriate support to athletes who might take PEDs and failing to investigate factors that might contribute to those decisions. For example:

You are treated like you’re invincible and you’re a superstar and that the whole world revolves around you. But if that starts crashing down, where do you go? At the end of the day it is your own responsibility. You shouldn’t be propping these people up for making their own personal choices ... But they make those choices for a reason and we don’t seem to try and find out what the reason is and then say well if it’s psychological, medical or physical, there’s nothing there to help them. (Interview ID: 140995)

I’ve always maintained that the philosophy of the administrators and everything else around that is that they jump off a sinking ship as soon as the bloody torpedo hits. They abandon the athlete, they abandon ship, and then all of a sudden the investigation goes on and then it all goes quiet again. (Interview ID: 141036)

These comments suggest that some interviewees felt that NSOs could do more to help athletes develop skills to cope with structural pressures that may affect doping behaviour. For these participants, this adversely affected their attitudes to NSOs’ legitimacy. However, other participants were uncertain over whether greater NSO involvement and provision of structural support would impact on individuals’ choices to use PEDs. As one participant stated: ‘I

don't think that would really affect the use of drugs in sport, it may affect the retention of participants in sport' (Interview ID: 141082). Maintaining participation rates is important for the ongoing commercial viability and development of sporting codes. For example, the AFL's anti-drugs in sport policies included an educational, rehabilitative and counselling component that is, in part, aimed to enhance the popular appeal of the code (see Chapter Four). The interview data show that the majority of participants supported strict liability but were divided in their views of whether greater structural support for athletes would change doping behaviour.

The e-Survey data discussed earlier in this section revealed respondents' belief that pressure to perform and peer or team pressure encourages drug use in sport. This has been described in the literature as the 'sport ethic.' The influence of the sport ethic is not unique to elite sport and 'operates at various levels of sport, from local gyms to the locker rooms of professional sport teams' (Coakley 2007:185). There is evidence of the influence of the 'sport ethic' in the interview data. One interview participant recalled her personal experience in elite sport: 'all routines of normality are excluded, you're not allowed to work. If you're seen to be working you're not seen to be dedicated, that is, me ... unless you're totally engrossed in this then forget it' (Interview ID: 141036). Supporting this view, another participant with a background in elite sport said: 'the mentality out there is unless you're winning ... you haven't made it in sport' (Interview ID: 141109). For this participant, such an attitude 'breeds the drug culture.' However, other participants involved in elite sport pointed out that not all athletes take drugs to win. Rather, for some athletes, PEDs provide an 'insurance policy ... So, my contract is worth \$100,000 a year and I need to perform at a certain level 120 times a year, therefore to do that I need to do this as an insurance policy' (Interview ID: 141050).

These views of some interview participants resonate with comments of former professional athletes. For example, Paul Kimmage (1998) a former *domestique* with the RMO cycling team in the Tour de France wrote of his experience with the pressure to use PEDs. According to Kimmage, meeting the performance

expectations of team managers was essential for riders to secure ongoing employment. Failure to meet those expectations created a situation where:

I felt like abandoning a hundred times ... I couldn't, for I felt my survival as a professional rider depended on getting to Paris ... at the end of the season the weak men would be sacked and new blood brought in ... I had a contract for two years so I was assured of my place for 1987, but already I was thinking ahead to 1988 ... In a year's time, Thévenet [team director] would remember not that I had finished the Tour on my hands and knees but that I'd finished. (Kimmage 1998:93)

Athletes' efforts to meet these types of expectations may lead to 'over-conformity' to the sport ethic and contribute to a situation where:

... as long as some athletes are willing to take performance-enhancing substances to gain the edge they need to continue playing at the highest possible level of competence, others will conclude that they also must use similar substances to stay competitive at that level, even if it's against their better judgement. (Coakley 2007:185)

These claims suggest that doping can be examined using Merton's (1968) theoretical approach to deviance. Merton (1968:186) was concerned with discovering 'how some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conforming rather than conforming conduct.' He argued that deviance is a result of structural strain or the absence, breakdown, confusion or conflict in the norms of society. Merton postulated that culturally emphasised goals, such as sporting success, form an aspirational frame of reference held out as legitimate objectives for all members of the social group. Social institutions, such as SGBs in the case of drug use in sport, define, regulate and stipulate the allowable procedures, or means, for reaching these goals. Deviance results when individuals are unable to achieve culturally emphasised goals through institutionalised means. As a result, some individuals seek alternative means to achieve the same ends and their behaviour becomes driven by technical expediency. As Merton (1968:189) stated:

In this context, the sole significant question becomes: "Which of the available procedures is most efficient in netting the culturally approved value?" The technically most effective procedure, whether culturally legitimate or not, becomes typically preferred to institutionally prescribed conduct.

Applying this sociological lens to doping, the question may be whether the instrumental nature of modern sport - where the outcome (winning) takes

precedence over the process - contributes to PED use. For some athletes, the pressure of modern sport may contribute to the perception that doping is a 'necessary' way to attain culturally ascribed goals. This view is in contrast to current research that typically attempts to identify personality traits or explain doping as a rational choice between risks and rewards (see Chapter One). Indications of structural factors in the e-Survey data such as performance and team pressure, injury recovery or creation of a level playing field as contributing to PED use suggest at least some support for application of Merton's approach to the question of doping in sport.

The majority of interviewees indicated their support for strict liability and felt that individual athletes' must bear the responsibility and consequences for their decisions to use PEDs. However, strict liability also places a responsibility upon NSOs to ensure that other components of the anti-doping system operate efficiently and equitably. This is consistent with the argument of Battin et al. (2008) and Donovan et al. (2002) that to enjoy legitimacy, anti-drug policies must be coherent, consistent and easily evaluated. Further, the respondents also revealed the evaluative and subjective nature of legitimacy through the belief that SGBs must actively work to ensure their policy approaches meet and support community expectations.

Fourteen of the interview participants stressed that procedural elements of the anti-doping framework needed to operate efficiently if the strict liability principle was to work. For example, one interview participant from this group stated that strict liability lacked legitimacy without accurate testing: 'the processes and controls ... have been proven on a number of occasions to be flawed. How do you apply strict liability to an individual when third parties can stuff up the process?' (Interview ID: 140995). Another element identified as essential for legitimate application of strict liability included due process similar to 'reasonable doubt' (Interview ID: 141109) such as in a legal setting. An 'occupational health and safety approach' was also mentioned (Interview ID: 141131). Although the majority felt athletes should be responsible for using PEDs, for some participants legitimate application of strict liability meant greater incorporation of the grassroots community through increased anti-doping education and raising awareness of testing protocols. Failure to do

so meant that there was a potential that strict liability could infringe on athletes' rights. As this interviewee stated:

So I think that certainly before the punishment is dished out there needs to be proof of guilt. That it is the person took the choice to, you know, made the choice to take it. Yeah, definitely again back to ... education ... making them aware of the consequences if they do get caught taking it and they are guilty of taking it well this is what's going to happen. (Interview ID: 001)

The discussion surrounding strict liability broadened the role of education beyond the scope of anti-doping to include programs that develop a range of skills for 'life after sport.'

Interview Comments - Strict Liability and Education: life skills and NSO legitimacy

In their research into the Australian cycling peloton, Hardie et al. (2010) note that a common theme that emerged from their interviews was the tension between entering into cycling as an all-consuming, but relatively short-lived, profession. Hardie et al. (2010:23) identified a 'certain rhetoric' in cycling where:

Professional cycling was seen as the 'be all and end all,' eclipsing any thought of longer term security or contingency plans should something go wrong. That rhetoric contained within it a suggestion that, with enough commitment to cycling, one might never need to work again. In contrast to this, many of the interview participants not only recognised this as an unrealistic expectation but actively critiqued it and were, even in the earlier phases of their careers, concerned about life post-cycling.

Some of my interviewees with a background in elite sport expressed similar views of the 'all encompassing' nature of elite sport, as we saw earlier in this chapter. Further, Hardie et al. (2010:23) found that irrespective of the amount of hard work or commitment of athletes to their sport, at some point they faced a transition into a 'more conventional workforce where most of their credentials were unrecognised.' They noted that, for Australian cyclists, there is a lack of viable 'second' career options for individuals when they leave their sport. These were issues raised by some of my interview participants as an important area for NSOs to address.

Eighteen interview participants felt that NSOs should assist athletes to develop skills for life after their sporting careers. Participants acknowledged

that ‘as part of their job’ NSOs are obligated to ‘look after the interests of their sport’ (Interview ID: 141574). However, this participant also felt that NSOs should ‘realise that it’s in the best interest of their sport to put in place traineeship programs ... or something that can help them return back into life [after their sporting career].’ These views were not limited to issues around doping, but included support for athletes who might find their careers at a sudden end as a result of injury. Further, initiatives should also include individuals ‘that have come up through the ranks, not made it, but have given 10 years of their life to try’ (Interview ID: 141574). Other participants supported this view, particularly as not all athletes ‘end up being a ... celebrity athlete but you’ve put your whole life into it up to that point, what’s there to do after that?’ (Interview ID: 001). For example:

Now to me I find that very hard to deal with because if coaches or ambassadors of their sport or administrators of their sport are doing this to young bodies and young lives, then what’s going to be the outcome for that individual in years to come? The time that you’re in a sport or that you’re at elite level is a very small window of time. So you’ve got to think about ultimately how you’re going to be in years to come and what you want to do in your life. (Interview ID: 141036)

Some saw a more holistic educational approach that included elements such as opportunities for athletes to attain academic qualifications as playing an important role in building an anti-doping culture. For example, as one participant indicated: ‘Anyway at [...] we pay you based on how many subjects you pass at University. You don’t pass we pull the money out. And clearly, in [...] we deal with that lack of education, if they’ve got what I call an employment alternative the ability to say no [to doping] is infinitely higher’ (Interview ID: 141050). These sentiments were underpinned by the view that assisting athletes to develop skills or qualifications applicable outside sport may reduce the pressure to use PEDs as an ‘insurance policy’ to prolong the financial benefits of a sporting career. In their interviews with elite Australian cyclists, Hardie et al. (2010:154) also found that their participants viewed education as a significant part of anti-doping initiatives and as ‘an important means to shifting the anti-doping bell curve.’

The e-Survey data presented in this section have shown that respondents view athletes as primarily responsible for ensuring that sport is PED-free. However,

respondents also indicated that structural factors associated with modern sport can contribute to PED use by some athletes. The interviews expanded on the e-Survey data and explored participants' views of the strict liability principle. The questions here were whether structural pressures placed a responsibility upon NSOs to support athletes and whether this influenced attitudes towards NSOs' legitimacy. The majority of interviewees supported the principle of strict liability. However, views were divided over whether structural factors placed a responsibility upon NSOs to provide greater levels of support for athletes and whether this would affect athletes' doping behaviour. Divided views illustrate the subjective nature of the concept of legitimacy and the difficult task facing organisations, such as NSOs, in formulating policy approaches to complex issues like drugs in sport that meet diverse community expectations.

Nevertheless, the interview comments discussed in this section have revealed that support for strict liability is dependent on all aspects of the anti-doping framework operating efficiently and consistently. Some participants emphasised that strict liability required more inclusive anti-doping education, such as raising awareness of testing protocols at the grassroots level. Some interview participants expanded the role of education to include initiatives that helped athletes develop skills for 'life after sport.' This was based on their belief that providing athletes with opportunities to develop non-sporting based skills removes the pressure to view PED use as a necessary part of their sporting career.

Conclusion

The previous chapters in this thesis considered institutional actors in the doping debate, using socio-historical case studies and media reports of doping events. In this chapter I highlight the evaluative and subjective aspect of legitimacy by taking a 'bottom-up' approach to consider attitudes of members of the grassroots sporting community. To do this I used Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria operationalised by a quantitative e-Survey and qualitative interviews. I disaggregated the data across four topic areas representing aspects of that criteria and central elements of WADA's anti-doping campaign. Those areas were anti-doping information and education,

testing and sanctions, WADA and the WADC and, finally, views of the strict liability principle. It is important to note that the small number of cases that comprise the e-Survey sample means that the data cannot be generalised beyond this thesis. Further, the data do not enable this thesis to claim that NSOs are facing a crisis of legitimacy. However, the data do show that a number of issues tend to have a negative effect on the attitudes of the research participants towards NSO legitimacy.

The e-Survey respondents identified governance and administration, anti-doping education and enforcement of anti-doping polices as the primary tasks facing NSOs. These areas fit neatly within the framework of Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria. The e-Survey also showed that the majority of respondents did not feel that NSOs were fulfilling these central roles, suggesting they faced a crisis of legitimacy at the grassroots level. However, the data also revealed division in the attitudes of research participants towards factors contributing to that situation. Division in the data is significant as, in addition to it emphasising the subjective aspect of legitimacy, any crisis of legitimacy involves conflicting views. However, this does not undermine the value of the concept of a legitimacy crisis. Crises provide opportunities for organisations, including NSOs, to consider how they can engage in processes of regulatory change that enhance perceptions of their legitimacy. They always provide room for manoeuvrability and change.

For the research participants, this progressive change meant ensuring that all elements of anti-doping policies form a mutually supportive and cohesive framework. This incorporated providing anti-doping information and education as well as accurate testing, efficient administrative processes and consistently applied sanctions. Despite divisions in views, the majority of the research participants tended to support a rules-based regulatory approach underpinned by values, such as the WADC, as an effective anti-doping approach. Both the e-Survey and interview data revealed that application of such an anti-doping framework enhanced attitudes towards NSO legitimacy. Members of the grassroots sporting community also demonstrated a qualified level of support for the principle of strict liability. While supporting the view that athletes are responsible for their doping decisions, support for strict

liability required equitable and efficient operation of all other components of the anti-doping system such as testing, consistently applied sanctions and greater concern for the life-chances of individual athletes.

The e-Survey and interview results are also pertinent to considerations of doping as an institutionalised moral panic. From this perspective, the e-Survey results and interview comments suggest that there is community concern and agreement that doping is problematic behaviour requiring action. The division in the data emphasises that claim-makers, namely elite SGBs, cannot take the organisational legitimacy and moral authority of anti-doping responses for granted. Rather, these groups must actively work to generate and maintain support for institutional responses to doping as a particular problem threatening sport and the social order. This chapter has focused on identifying the empirical characteristics of perceptions of the organisational legitimacy of NSOs at the grassroots level. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) note, the public cannot be considered dupes ready to consume any claim presented in the media. Claims are filtered through peoples' life experiences.

No folly is more costly than the folly of intolerant idealism. When standards of conduct or morals which are beyond the normal public sentiment of a great community are professed and enforced, the results are invariably evasion, subterfuge, and hypocrisy. (Winston Churchill, cited in Dawson and McNamee 2009:183)

This thesis has argued that the debate over doping can be conceptualised as a socially constructed moral panic. In making this claim, I have argued that underpinning this construction are elite SGBs' efforts to maintain space for their moral authority and legitimacy in the global sporting community. I have supported this claim by drawing on the moral panic literature (Cohen 1973; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009) and a Weberian analysis of legitimacy (Weber 1969). The contribution of this thesis to the sociological literature is the role of legitimacy in a moral panic framework. Consideration of power relationships between dominant groups helps conceptualise the debate over drugs in sport.

The thesis began by situating the study within the sociological literature. First, an overview of Weber's concept of legitimacy was offered, which highlighted its multi-dimensional and subjective component (Weber 1969). To ensure compliance with rules and regulations, the claims to legitimacy and moral authority of dominant groups must be perceived as valid. In modern societies, a crisis can emerge when the procedural process of dominant groups fail to support existing social norms or values. I argued that rather than conceptualising crisis as social disintegration, a more useful view is to see it as signalling the possibility of transformative regulatory change (Andrews 2000; Holton 1987). Such a process enables dominant groups to reinstate or restore their claim to legitimacy by introducing new agencies to resolve questions of doubt. Further, I noted the multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of legitimacy, which is influenced by factors and events in the broader social context as well as the particular problems to which it is applied (Suchman 1995). This provided the starting point for my argument that claim-makers must actively work to generate and maintain support for their legitimacy and moral authority in order to avert crises of legitimacy.

Chapter One also situated legitimacy in a moral panic framework. Like legitimacy, successful moral panics require support for institutional solutions presented as necessary for social stability. The moral panic literature notes that, like legitimacy, broader social factors and socio-historical circumstances influence the forms and effects of a moral panic. I suggested that Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (1994a; 2009) moral panic criteria of consensus, concern, hostility, disproportionality and volatility provided useful tools to explore the debate over doping.

This thesis modified Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) moral panic model to enhance its analytical efficacy in the context of the drugs in sport debate. The diversity of stakeholders and their claims and challenges to legitimacy in the doping debate led me to modify the moral panic criteria of consensus to consensus-making. I argued that in the context of drugs in sport consensus-making more accurately captures the multi-dimensional and contested nature of claims to legitimacy. Further, the diversity of stakeholder groups in modern sport and the contested power relationships between these social actors requires a theoretical framework that acknowledges their different interests and objectives. To more effectively consider the way that elite SGBs use the anti-doping debate to enhance or restore their legitimacy, I also modified the 'elite-engineered' theory to an 'elites-engineered' moral panic theory.

Chapter Two outlined the methodology employed for the thesis. I situated my decision to use socio-historical case studies, a content analysis of media reports of doping followed by a quantitative e-Survey and qualitative interviews in the context of a mixed methodological approach. This mitigated some of the constraints associated with methods and data sources typically used to investigate drugs in sport. More importantly for the research aim of this thesis, which was to explore the role of legitimacy in the doping debate, the mixed methodology enabled me to move between sporting communities to consider the multi-faceted aspect of legitimacy in different contexts. In other words, the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy required a multi-faceted methodological framework to capture the different aspects of legitimacy amongst a range of stakeholders in the context of drugs in sport.

There is a large literature on drugs in sport that focuses on specific sectors and the athlete as an individual rational actor. This literature includes survey information, such as recent work into the attitudes of elite athletes in Australia (Jalleh and Donovan 2008) as well as historical accounts of sporting organisations and their responses to doping (see Dauncey and Hare 2003; Mignon 2003; Reed 2003; Schneider 2006). Research to date has not combined these different methodologies to generate data that can shift the focus from institutional actors to a community perspective. This thesis successfully integrated four distinct research methodologies, namely socio-historical case studies, a content analysis of media representations of doping, an Australia-wide e-Survey and qualitative interviews.

In Chapters Three and Four I began the presentation of the empirical evidence, commencing with the socio-historical case studies of the IOC and WADA followed by the AFL. The socio-historical case studies provided a historical dimension to the thesis. They considered the influence of broader social factors on attitudes towards drug use in sport and the implications for legitimacy, with a focus on whether doping created a crisis of legitimacy for elite SGBs. They also considered the contested nature of claims to legitimacy and power relationships between sporting organisations.

In Chapter Three, I began with the first socio-historical case study of the IOC and WADA. There are three key themes that emerged from this chapter. First, the socially contingent nature of debates over PEDs demonstrated that changing attitudes towards drug use in sport had implications for the legitimacy of elite SGBs. Attitudes towards doping were influenced by broader social factors, such as the political climate of the Cold War and the medicalisation of sport as well as shifting concerns over drug use from a health issue to a 'moral crisis' (Beamish and Ritchie 2005; Dimeo 2007:93; Hoberman 1992). These factors, as well as the deaths of athletes linked to drug use, contributed to an emphasis on the necessity for anti-doping regulation (Houlihan 2002; Stokvis 2003). I argued that a consequence emerged whereby SGBs' regulatory responses to doping provided a measure against which their legitimacy could be evaluated. This was particularly the case for the legitimacy of the IOC as the guardians of the values and ideals

underpinning Olympic competition (Schneider 2000), which had been challenged by a number of doping scandals.

The second point from the socio-historical case study of the IOC and WADA was that a crisis of legitimacy for the IOC contributed to a transformation of authority to regulate the elite sporting community. In the context of drugs in sport, the IOC failed to meet and support community expectations of their responsibilities and obligations as guardians of Olympic sport. The 1998 Tour de France doping scandal, described as a crisis of legitimacy for the IOC (MacAloon 2001), contributed to the creation of WADA. This process was also driven by the more extrinsic, instrumental and global nature of modern sport that replaced the amateur ethos of participation and influenced PED use. These structural changes required a new way of 'imagining' (Anderson 1991) the global elite sporting community and placed greater emphasis on codified rules to regulate behaviour, including doping. I argued that WADA transformed anti-doping authority with a new range of 'proper procedures' (the WADC) that redefined and regulated the sporting community as PED-free.

The third key point from the socio-historical case study of the IOC and WADA was the value of situating legitimacy within a moral panic framework. As for the IOC, doping scandals challenge WADA's claim to legitimacy and create the potential for audiences to lose interest over doping. I argued that, together with the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy, this presents WADA with the challenge of generating and maintaining support from a range of social actors. The creation of WADA also raised issues of governance and control. Although support for WADA provides an opportunity for SGBs to enhance perceptions of their legitimacy and commitment to anti-doping, some elite SGBs resist WADA's imposition of authority (Dvorak et al. 2006; Opie 1990). The second socio-historical case study discussed this tension using the AFL as an Australian sporting organisation.

Chapter Four turned to a closer examination of the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy using interactions between WADA and the AFL as well as the AFL and the Australian Federal government. That chapter argued that claims to legitimacy do not go uncontested and that elite groups, which are not limited

to SGBs, manipulate the doping debate to meet outcomes relevant to their sporting community. For example, the Australian Federal government focused on maintaining their status as a world leader in anti-doping, using policies such as the TODIS policy to frame the AFL's anti-drugs in sport approach as flawed. The AFL included anti-drug policies as part of a regulatory framework to enhance the popularity and continued commercial viability of Australian football (Stewart 2007; Stewart et al. 2008; Stewart et al. 2005). That chapter also noted that the media discussed the AFL's anti-drugs policies in a manner suggesting the construction of a moral panic.

Media reports sought to generate public concern that both illicit and PED use in Australian football was widespread. Some media reports presented the issue as potentially threatening social order more broadly by linking drug use in Australian football to drug addiction in the wider community. These reports focused public concern and hostility by constructing participants in Australian football as 'folk devils' requiring tough regulatory control to protect community well-being. This created opportunities for elite claim-makers, such as the Australian Federal government and the AFL, to position their respective policy models as the necessarily strong regulatory response most appropriate to address the issue. This moral panic highlighted the contested nature of legitimacy and that organisational power relationships are part of the anti-doping debate. All stakeholder groups used media reports to make claims and challenge the claims of others to legitimacy as providers of the most effective solution to control drug use in the Australian sporting community.

I considered the role of the media in the social construction of a moral panic using a content analysis of media reports of doping in Chapter Five. This shifted the thesis focus from legitimacy to an exploration of the doping debate as a moral panic. The aim of that chapter was to explore further the suggestion in Chapter Four that doping could be viewed as a moral panic that created PED-using 'folk devils.' It was shown that the media, and elite SGBs, made claims that fulfil Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) criteria identifying the debate over drugs in sport as a moral panic. I also provided evidence to support consensus-making as a modified moral panic criterion. The content analysis demonstrated that elite SGBs, and primarily WADA, use media reports

to engage in consensus-making work in support of WADA as the institutional response to doping. The content analysis of media reports was also relevant to considerations of legitimacy and explored the way that different elite stakeholders used the media to make and challenge claims to legitimacy. This supported my elites-engineered modified moral panic theory, which illuminated the negotiated power relationships between dominant groups evident in the debate. The case studies and content analysis examined legitimacy from a 'top-down' perspective of institutional actors in the debate over doping.

Chapter Six moved away from institutional actors to consider legitimacy from a 'bottom-up' perspective of Australian grassroots sporting participants. I used a quantitative e-Survey and qualitative interviews to operationalise Donovan et al.'s (2002) legitimacy criteria. To explore attitudes towards NSOs' legitimacy I canvassed views on anti-doping information and education, testing and sanctions, WADA and the WADC as well as the strict liability principle. The data showed that across all areas a majority of participants indicated there was a crisis of legitimacy, although they varied in their views over the causes of such a crisis. The e-Survey and interview findings emphasise how stakeholder groups, in this case Australian NSOs, actively work to maintain perceptions of legitimacy. This is also relevant to consideration of doping as an institutionalised moral panic. Indications of a crisis of legitimacy and divided views over its causes highlight that elite groups must engage in ongoing consensus-making work to maintain support for institutional responses to PED use, including from the grassroots community.

This thesis has provided empirical evidence to support my claim that conceptualising claims to legitimacy as underpinning the construction of a moral panic helps to shed light and explain debates over the contemporary issue of drugs in sport. This thesis challenges discourses surrounding an individualistic analysis that tends to ignore broader social factors and focuses on the doping behaviour of the athlete-user. The dominant research approach also inadequately examined the possibility that there are linkages between SGBs' efforts to maintain legitimacy and the presentation of doping as a moral panic.

Implications and Inferences

I used a modified moral panic framework and the concept of legitimacy to broaden the analysis to examine institutional actors in the doping debate. The value of this multi-dimensional model is that it enabled the analysis to move beyond individualistic explanations to place the issue in the social realm (Connor 2009b). More specifically, I used a methodological approach that facilitates a process of theory building. In other words, the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis were revisited and refined based on the information obtained in the case studies, content analysis, e-Survey and interview process. This allowed the themes of this thesis to emerge and sharpened the analysis by encouraging a comparison between the historical evidence, media reports and accounts of individuals. I used methodologies that expanded on the current literature and offered an examination of the issue from a macro organisational perspective as well as the micro level of individuals from the sporting community.

In modern social life the legitimacy of dominant groups, in the case of this thesis sporting organisations, rests on their implementation of rules and regulations to promote social order, including apprehending deviant (doping) individuals. Perceptions that dominant groups have failed to implement 'proper procedures' oriented towards the common good can lead to a crisis of legitimacy (Habermas 1976; Wuthnow et al. 1984). The notion of a crisis of legitimacy is valuable analytically as it does not necessarily imply institutional paralysis but a myriad of responses from stakeholders who might perceive the issue differently and the stakes involved. For example, not all diverse stakeholder groups in modern sport share the same attitudes or objectives towards the regulation of PED use in sport (see Hanstad et al. 2010; Kidd et al. 2001). Examination of legitimacy in the context of stakeholder interactions and their impact on the doping debate, as well as anti-doping regulation, is an area under-regarded by the current approaches to drugs in sport.

This brings us back to the relevance of situating legitimacy within a moral panic framework. This includes consideration of the media as a key institutional actor, in particular its ability to influence debates and public attitudes. In terms of claims to legitimacy, this is beneficial for elite groups.

Their privileged access to the media opens opportunities to enhance perceptions of their legitimacy as providers of necessary solutions to restore order. The content analysis of media reports showed that elite groups use the media to keep the public's attention focused on the ongoing danger presented by the problematic behaviour, in this case doping and PED-using 'folk devils.' These claims support Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) moral panic typology.

Further, Goode and Ben-Yehuda point out that some moral panics leave an institutional legacy that contributes to social change. In these types of moral panic, institutional responses are necessary to address a *specific* issue of *particular* concern (Beamish 2009). In the drugs in sport debate, the specific issue is doping, which is of particular concern because it undermines the integrity of sport, or the 'spirit of sport' (Beamish 2009). WADA claims legitimacy as the particular institutional response and the most significant claim-maker in the debate over doping as an issue of specific concern and danger to public order and stability. These claims do not go uncontested, however, and the media provides a forum for other groups to challenge elite interpretations and to attempt to impose alternative views on the debate. Further, the dynamic social context of modern life includes a tendency for public problems, such as the emergence of new PEDs, to mutate and for the 'fever pitch' of concern or hostility in a moral panic to wane over time.

An effective explanatory model requires a theoretical framework that takes these diverse and complex factors into account. Situating legitimacy within a modified moral panic framework accomplished this task. The contested nature of claims to legitimacy and the dynamic nature of modern social life support my modified moral panic model that includes consensus-making and elites-engineered theory. Consensus-making is a valuable concept, as claims to legitimacy cannot be taken for granted but require active efforts from elite groups to maintain support for their moral authority and legitimacy amongst a range of competing claims. Elites-engineered moral panic theory brings power relationships and the negotiated nature of interactions among elite groups, such as WADA and SGBs, into the analysis as they make and contest claims to legitimacy. For example, elite SGBs seek to remain in control of their sporting community while at the same time enhancing their legitimacy by

demonstrating a commitment to a harmonised and globalised approach to anti-doping by supporting WADA.

There is considerable literature on the sociology of sport addressing PEDs and the social construction of such behaviour as deviant. An area lacking in attention is the extent to which individuals at the grassroots level support the idea that doping is deviant behaviour and perceive SGBs to be committed to addressing the issue. In other words, do individuals perceive these organisations' anti-doping efforts as legitimate? The public are key stakeholders in the modern sporting context and, as Schneider (2006) notes, are not always in agreement with SGBs' responses to doping. This highlights how claims to legitimacy for any specific institutional response to doping cannot be taken for granted. The e-Survey and interviews emphasised that, to enjoy perceptions of legitimacy, anti-drugs policies including those used in sport must be coherent, consistent and easily evaluated (Battin et al. 2008; Donovan et al. 2002). My research participants had clear expectations of NSOs' responsibilities in relation to anti-doping, and perceptions that NSOs failed to support those expectations affected their views of NSO legitimacy. In other words, without ensuring that all elements of the anti-doping framework operated coherently and consistently, NSOs face a potential crisis of legitimacy.

This thesis has not discussed issues such as public policy. Nevertheless, the research presented here suggests that NSOs should consider methods and initiatives that will build perceptions of organisational legitimacy at the grassroots level. This speaks directly to concerns over the commercial viability of sporting contexts, which was clearly an issue for the AFL and their introduction of anti-drugs policies. Community expectations that sporting bodies implement strong regulatory frameworks, including rules with a basis in shared values, is relevant here. I discussed this issue using the IOC, where I noted that preserving values associated with sport is important for maintaining legitimacy and community support (see Chapter Three). As Schneider (2000:225) noted in her analysis of the IOC's efforts to maintain their position of sports leadership: 'if the public comes to see Olympic values mocked by the practices of the IOC, then the sponsorship value of the

Olympic Games will diminish. Preservation of Olympic ideals is ... the best way of preserving the financial success of the Games.’ These sentiments are no less relevant to other SGBs (see also Bette and Schimank 2001).

Through considering the role of legitimacy, I brought organisational power relationships into the analysis and highlighted the dynamic social context in which social problems, such as doping, take place. I used the idea of a crisis of legitimacy to suggest that the manner in which claims to legitimacy are made points to a ‘socially situated beholder.’ In other words, a ‘fully-fledged’ crisis is not limited to its impact on social structures but includes a subjective element linked to challenges to ‘values, ideas and beliefs shared by members of a social group’ (Andrews 2000:226, 250). Further, the diversity of stakeholders in modern life means that there are different notions of how legitimacy operates in particular communities. The diverse range of stakeholder groups and the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy mean that any crisis of legitimacy may in fact be unresolvable. I have suggested in this thesis that the concept of a crisis of legitimacy is useful as it points to a transformative process of social change, rather than a chaotic process of organisational collapse. From this perspective, the transformative potential of a crisis provides elite groups with opportunities to restore or enhance their claims to legitimacy and moral authority.

By challenging the traditional individualistic approach to investigating drugs in sport, the thesis also develops a model that can be applied to other issues in sport as well as the broader social context. As this thesis was being finalised some sporting organisations faced a potential crisis of legitimacy based on accusations of bribery and corruption, similar to the Salt Lake City scandal that confronted the IOC (see Chapter Three). For example, FIFA faced claims that it had ‘become embroiled in the biggest bribery scandal in FIFA history, preceded by the most contentious World Cup vote in living memory’ (Warshaw 2011). The situation was described in media reports as the ‘worst crisis the game has faced’ (Homewood 2011 Reuters). Coinciding with these claims of corruption and bribery at the institutional level in sport are concerns over illegal gambling by players in numerous high profile sports. The language used

to describe these issues resonates with a socially constructed moral panic, including increasingly stringent measures of social control. For example:

We have made doping a top priority, now there is a new danger coming up that almost all countries have been affected by and that is corruption, match-fixing and illegal gambling ... This is the new fight we have to confront ... Today you can't open up a newspaper without finding examples of this so we have to fight against it and this has to be waged by sports movements together with traditional and state authorities. (IOC President Jacque Rogge in Armstrong 2011 *USA Today*)

As the league (AFL) intensifies its fight to preserve the game's integrity and protect it from match-fixing and the threat of performance-enhancing drugs, the game has employed former United Nations investigator Abraham Haddad in the new role of intelligence co-ordinator ... Haddad ... will set up the AFL's integrity database and ensure high-level security surrounding players' private details, which the AFL will use to cross-check with any unusual trends involving gambling and player performance ... A clause has been included in AFL standard playing contracts requiring players to provide telephone records, bank account details and computer hard drives in the event of any unusual or suspicious activity. (Wilson 2011 *The Age*)

The multi-dimensional model presented in this thesis has highlighted the value of adapting the moral panic framework to conceptualise contemporary issues associated with sport. This model helps to identify what interests might be at stake for elite groups in the construction of a moral panic. However, it expands the analysis beyond the somewhat limited observation that economic imperatives or issues of social control motivate elite groups. Rather, situating legitimacy within a moral panic framework demonstrates that elite interests, including the ability to pursue a commercial agenda and maintain control of their particular community, rests on perceptions that their authority is legitimate and valid. In other words, legitimacy is the cornerstone upon which rests the ability of elites to successfully achieve other goals. The model presented in this thesis contributes to the body of sociological literature by developing and expanding on an existing framework. This provides a mechanism with which to apply a holistic approach to the way debates over contemporary social issues can be conceptualised.

Appendices

Appendix 2.1: Government and SGB Investigations into PEDs

Year	Country	Description
1987	United Kingdom	Coni Report - commissioned by the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) to investigate allegations of drug use in British athletics (Waddington 2005).
1988	Australia	Black Inquiry - Senate inquiry to investigate allegations of drug use at the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) (Senate Standing Committee on Environment 1990).
1990	Canada	Dubin Report - government investigation following Ben Johnson's positive drug test at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Waddington 2005).
2003	United States	Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) - Senate inquiry followed an anonymously sent syringe containing an illegal substance arriving at the United States Anti-Doping Authority (USADA) (Knight 2006; Mackay 2006; Michaelis 2006).
2004	Australia	Anderson Report - government investigation into claims of drug use amongst young cyclists at Cycling Australia's training academy at the South Australian campus of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) (Anderson 2004a; Anderson 2004b; Kogay 2006; Marshallsea 2004; Simpson 2005).
2006	Spain	Operación Puerto - police investigation of a suspected blood doping ring and trafficking of PEDs including growth hormone and EPO, which implicated up to 58 cyclists (DeSimone 2006; Fotheringham 2006; Liggett 2006).
	Italy	Operazione Athena - police raids of homes and gyms, 22 people were arrested and evidence worth six million euro sequestered (Brown 2007).
2007	United States	Operation Raw Deal - described as the largest anti-steroid action by law enforcement ever, United States federal agents raided more than four dozen underground drug labs and arrested 124 people in 27 states during an 18-month crackdown on Chinese steroids, human growth hormone and other PEDs. The operation involved the co-operation of 10 nations and saw raids in Mexico, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Thailand (Schmidt 2007; Shipley 2007).
	United States	Operation Which Doctor (also known as Operation Phoney Pharm) - federal and state agents raided two pharmacies and found evidence that testosterone and other PEDs may have been fraudulently prescribed over the Internet. Recipients included current and former major league baseball and NFL players, college athletes, high school coaches, a former Mr. Olympia champion and another top contender in bodybuilding competitions (Armour 2007; ESPN.com 2007; U.S. Attorney's Office 2007).
2008	Italy	Oil for Drugs - resulted from the 2004 Giro d'Italia, based on riders' relationship with a doctor allegedly involved in trafficking illegal substances (Brown and Haake 2007; Maloney 2004).
2010	Italy	Cobra-Red - In September 2010 the Italian anti-doping police, NAS, carried out 40 searches between the provinces of Rimini, Forlì-Cesena, Modena, Prato, Bergamo, Reggio Emilia, Milan, Pistoia, Parma, Latin, Perugia and Bari. According to La Gazzetta Dello Sport the 35 people involved and who have been charged with the illegal trafficking of drugs used to defraud sporting contests, include a publicity agent, six professional riders, 15 amateurs, sports professionals, physicians, pharmacists and gym users (Stokes 2010).

Appendix 2.2: Strengths and Weaknesses of Mixed Methods Research

Strengths

- Data based on the participants' own categories of meaning.
- It is useful for studying a limited number of cases in depth.
- It is useful for describing complex phenomena.
- Provides individual case information.
- Can conduct cross-case comparisons and analysis.
- Provides understanding and description of people's personal (emic) experiences.
- Describes in rich detail because situated, embedded in local contexts.
- Identifies contextual and setting factors as they relate to the phenomenon of interest
- Study dynamic processes (that is, documenting sequential patterns and change).
- Uses "grounded theory" to generate inductively a tentative but explanatory theory.
- Can determine how participants interpret "constructs" (e.g. self-esteem, IQ).
- Data usually collected in naturalistic settings in qualitative research.
- Responsive to local situations, conditions, stakeholders' needs
- Responsive to changes that occur during the conduct of a study (especially during extended fieldwork) and may shift the focus of their studies as a result
- Data in words and categories of participants lends to exploring how and why phenomena occur.
- One can use an important case to demonstrate vividly a phenomenon to a reports reader.
- Determine idiographic causation (that is, determination of causes of a particular event).

Weaknesses

- May not be generalisable to other people or other settings.
- Difficult to make quantitative predictions.
- More difficult to test hypotheses and theories.
- It may have lower credibility with some administrators and commissioners of programs.
- It generally takes more time to collect the data when compared to quantitative research.
- Data analysis is often time consuming.
- Results more easily influenced by the researcher's personal biases and idiosyncrasies.

Source: Adapted from Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004)

Appendix 2.3: Quantitative e-Survey



Vanessa McDermott (U3967054)

Area: ILP

An Examination of National Sporting Organisations, Legitimacy and Performance Enhancing Substances

1 2 3 4 5 6

Questions marked * are mandatory.

Please take a few moments to read the attached Research Study Information Statement (Research Information Statement (html version)) which details the purpose of this study. If you are happy to participate in the study, please complete the following survey.

The primary aim of this study is to examine whether or not National Sporting Organisations (NSOs) are perceived as legitimate. The study is not seeking to identify any particular NSO, any individual athlete or other member of the sporting community. I am interested in your opinions and perceptions rather than your personal experiences in relation to what influences the use of performance enhancing substances (PES) or methods. While your experiences inform your opinions, I would prefer if you referred to general examples without using specific details like names or places.

Section 3. Demographic Information

Q1.* What is your role in the sporting community?

- Athlete
- Coach or coaching staff
- Medical support staff (i.e. team doctor)
- Other medical support (e.g. Physiotherapist, strength conditioning coach)
- Sports scientist
- Administrator
- Other - please specify:

	Club	State or Territory	National	International	Amateur	Semi-professional	Professional
Q2. If you are involved in sport as an administrator, coach or other support role please specify at which level you are involved in the sporting community. If you are involved in sport at more than one level, please select the relevant categories:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q3. If you are an athlete, at what level do you represent, or are you involved, with sport? Please select the relevant category or categories, if applicable.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Q4.* What type of sporting activity are you associated with? Please select the relevant category. If you are involved in more than one type of sporting activity, please select the relevant categories.

- Individual Sport
- Team Sport
- Olympic Sport
- Non-Olympic Sport
- Other, please specify

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Vanessa McDermott (U3967054)

Area: ILP

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Section 2. Support Services (Questions marked * are mandatory)

The following questions are interested in whether or not NSOs are perceived to provide appropriate information about what substances and methods are permissible. Whether you are an athlete, sporting administrator, coaching or medical support staff please answer to the best of your knowledge. If you are a sports scientist, you may find that some of these questions are not applicable to you. In this case, please move to the next applicable question or select 'not applicable'.

Where do you find out what the rules and regulations are in relation to which substances and methods are permissible in your sport? For example, if you had a question about whether a particular nutritional supplement or other substance was safe to use, who would you ask or where would you go to find the information you need?

	Yes	No	Not applicable
Q5.* Does the NSO for the sport you are involved with provide information about the rules and regulations concerning PES or methods?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If yes, please indicate how this information is provided and whether or not the information is regularly updated	Yes	No	Please specify
Q6. Is information provided in regular education sessions? If yes, please specify how regularly these sessions and/or updates are provided. For example, once a month, once a year, at the start of each season?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q7. Is information provided through educational material, such as brochures or DVDs?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q8. Is information provided by support staff, such as team doctors, physios, etc.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q9. Is information provided by other healthcare professionals, such as General Practitioners.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q10. Is information provided by the coaching staff?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q11. Do you access information using the Internet?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q12. Do you access information through the Athlete's Zone at the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority website?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q13. Do you use the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority Anti-Doping hotline?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q14.* Does this statement apply to you: I do not try to find out, or ask others for assistance, about which substances or methods are permissible in my sport.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q15.* Does this statement apply to your NSO? I do not receive regular updates from my NSO about which substances and methods are permissible in my sport.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q16. Do you access information about the rules and regulations for which substances and methods are permissible in your sport from:	<input type="checkbox"/> Friend(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Team member(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable		

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Yvonne McDermott (U3967054)

Area: ILP

An Examination of National Sporting Organisations, Legitimacy and Performance Enhancing Substances

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Section 3. National Sporting Organisations and Legitimacy (Questions marked * are mandatory)

Existing research emphasises the importance of legitimacy in terms of ensuring compliance with rules and regulations, an aspect which is at the heart of the current anti-doping approach. According to Donovan et al. (2002:376-77), legitimacy refers to the extent to which an organisation is perceived to have valid authority in a particular area. Importantly, if organisational legitimacy is high, compliance with its rules and regulations is more likely.

The following questions are specifically related to your perceptions of the legitimacy of NSOs and the current anti-doping system.

Please select the column that most closely corresponds with your level of agreement

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	Strongly Agree
Q17.* Anti-doping laws and regulations are morally right and fair	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q18.* Testing procedures acknowledge athletes' rights	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q19.* Testing procedures are fair and applied equitably across all athletes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q20.* The testing process is scientifically accurate and effective	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q21.* Anti-doping sanctions are fair and applied equitably across all athletes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q22. What do you think should be the central role of NSOs?

Q23. In your opinion, are NSOs fulfilling this role?

Yes No

Why do you think so?

Q24.* Do you think that those who have a legal responsibility (and some might argue, a moral responsibility) for the health of athletes (i.e. national and international federations and clubs that employ athletes) are taking appropriate steps to safeguard the health of their athletes?

Yes No

Why do you think so?

Q25. In your opinion, are those groups (referred to in Question 24) more concerned with protecting the image of their sport?

Yes No

Why do you think so?

Q26.* Do you think that NSOs should be regulating and testing athletes for PES and/or recreational drugs?

Performance enhancing substances Recreational drugs

Why do you think so?

Q27. Do you think NSOs help or make it more difficult for athletes to make decisions about PES?

Help Make it more difficult

Why do you think so?

Q28. In your opinion, does media coverage of doping issues help or make it more difficult for NSOs to respond effectively to PES?

Help Make it more difficult

Why do you say so?

Comments

Q29.* Do you think that NSOs should be placing greater emphasis on educating individuals about the risks that might be associated with PES or methods?

- For athletes
- For sporting administrators and support staff
- For young people, for example at school

Q30. In your opinion, should NSOs be investing more in drug testing research and increased testing?

Yes No

Q31. In your opinion, do the increasing financial rewards associated with sport influence how NSOs respond to doping?

Yes No

Why do you think so?

Comments

Q32.* Do you think that NSOs are facing a crisis of legitimacy because some athletes continue to use PES and/or methods?

Yes No

Why do you say so?

Comments

Q33.* In your opinion, who is responsible for making sure that athletes do not take drugs?

- Athlete
- Coaching staff
- Support staff, such as doctors and other medical staff
- Administrator
- Other

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Yvesica McDermott (U0967054)

Area: BUP

An Examination of National Sporting Organisations, Legitimacy and Performance Enhancing Substances

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Section 4. WADA and NSOs (Questions marked * are mandatory)

The questions in the following section are about your opinion and perceptions of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and its relationship with NSOs.

WADA was established in 2000 to institute a global response to doping. As part of this process, WADA developed - and updated - the World Anti-Doping Code in consultation with stakeholder groups, including athletes, International Federations and NSOs. The World Anti-Doping Code lists substances and methods that are currently banned and has been set as the benchmark for NSOs, including International Federations and anti-doping organisations, to effectively deal with doping (Found 2007-1).

Q34.* Are you aware of the role of WADA and the World Anti-Doping Code?

Yes No

Q35.* If yes, was this information provided to you by your NSO?

Yes No

Q36.* If this information was not provided by your NSO, please specify where you obtained information about WADA and/or the World Anti-Doping Code.

Q37.* In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, is the World Anti-Doping Code effective? Why do you say so?

Yes No Don't know

Comments:

Please indicate how you feel about the following statements by selecting the column that most closely corresponds to your opinion.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	Strongly Agree
Q38.* NSOs stand a far greater chance in terms of safeguarding their sports and anti-doping programs' integrity and credibility if they accept, implement and fully comply with the World Anti-Doping Code	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q39.* Using PES is not fair to athletes who don't use these substances	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q40.* Using PES is dangerous to the athlete's health	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q41.* Using PES sets a bad example for young people	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q42.* PES are a public health issue	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q43.* Using PES or techniques is morally wrong and against the spirit of sport.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

In 2007, the Union Cycliste Internationale introduced a Biological Passport which records the redness of riders' blood and urine tests. The Biological Passport provides a profile which will identify much more precisely what is normal and what is not, taking into account the physical peculiarities of each rider, and thus define individual limits.

Q44.* In your opinion do you think that NSOs should institute a program similar to the Biological Passport, which could be used rationally and internationally, as part of their approach to anti-doping? Why do you say so?

Yes No Don't know

Comments:

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Yvesica McDermott (U0967054)

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Section 5. Athletes and PES (Questions marked * are mandatory)

This section is interested in your opinion about what factors might influence athletes' to their decision to use or not use PES.

Q45.* What do you think are some factors that contribute to an athlete deciding to use PES or not?

Q46.* Do you think the use of PES under medical is widespread?

Yes No Don't know

Q47.* What do you think are some factors that might contribute to an athlete deciding to use recreational drugs?

Q48.* Do you think recreational drug use is widespread in sport?

Yes No Don't know

Q49.* Do you think that the increasing financial rewards associated with sport could pressure the athlete to use PES and/or recreational drugs? Why do you think so?

Performance enhancing substances Recreational drugs

Comments:

Q50.* In your opinion, does the changing nature of sport create pressure for athletes to use PES? For example, do you think factors such as faster games, the increasing use of technology and sports medicine create an environment in which athletes might decide to use PES? Why do you say so?

Yes No

Comments:

If an athlete were to use PES which of the following statements do you think might describe their reason for doing so? Please select the column that most closely corresponds to your opinion.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	Strongly Agree
Q51.* The athlete is a victim of circumstances that are beyond their control	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q52.* Using PES don't cause any real harm or injury	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q53.* Using PES is not wrong since there is no real victim	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q54.* Those who ignore the rules or regulations do not have the authority to do so	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q55.* Decided to use PES because they had to receive a stronger encouragement, for example to a team-mate or friend	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q56.* Transfer ideas and opportunity to another group or individual	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q57.* Thought their personal ability to avoid is control the situation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q58.* Using PES is no worse than other risks in sport and is strictly well-deserved by most people	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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Vanessa McDermott (U3967054)

Area: ILP

An Examination of National Sporting Organisations, Legitimacy and Performance Enhancing Substances

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Section 6. In Conclusion

Q59. Is there anything this study has missed that you feel is important and that should be considered further?

Q60. What are the three (3) things that you think are most important for future investigation into doping in sport?

Q61. What do you think are the three (3) least important things for future investigation into doping in sport?

Q62. In your opinion, are there any other approaches that would be better than the current anti-doping system to deal with PES and methods in sport?

Q63. Comments

Q64. Would you like to be more involved in this study?

Yes No

If so, please write your contact details below so the researcher can phone you to set up a time and place for an interview.

Q65. First name only

Please note that all personal information will be kept confidential to the extent that the law allows. Contact details will be destroyed after the research has concluded. Should information obtained during an interview be used in published materials, names will be changed to maintain participants' privacy.

Q66. Phone number:

Q67. Best time to call:

Thank you for your participation

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Appendix 2.4: Respondent Role, Level and Type of Sporting Activity (n=232)

Role ¹¹	Frequency	%	Level - Admin.	Frequency	%	Level - Athletes	Frequency	%	Type of Sporting Activity	Frequency	%
Athlete	206	88.8	Club	69	29.7	Club	161	69.2	Individual Sport	213	91.8
Coach or coaching staff	37	15.9	State/Territory	29	12.5	State/Territory	60	25.9	Team Sport	66	28.4
Administrator	42	18.1	National	23	9.9	National	38	16.4	Olympic sport	88	37.9
Medical staff	5	.9	International	24	10.3	International	26	11.2	Non-Olympic Sport	11	4.7
Sports Scientist	4	1.7	Amateur	22	9.5	Amateur	73	31.5	Other	3	1.3
Parent	3	1.3	Semi-Professional	9	3.9	Semi-Professional	11	4.7			
Commissar (Official)	2	.9	Professional	11	4.7	Professional	2	.9			
Doping Control Officer	2	.9	Missing data	7	3.0	Missing data	7	3.0			
Manage Team	2	.9									
Referee	1	.4									
Event Promoter	1	.4									
Event Volunteer	2	.9									

¹¹ As some respondents occupy multiple roles the e-Survey allowed selection of more than one category. For example, 28 respondents identified as athletes/administrators and 32 as athlete/coaches.

Appendix 2.5: Australian sporting organisations - the e-Survey

Olympic NOS	Funding	Olympic	Funding	Other Organisations	
Archery Australia Inc.	1,023,500	Taekwondo Australia Inc.	1,067,000	AFL Players Association	Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority
Athletics Australia	5,867,900	Triathlon Australia	1,938,200	AFL Umpires Association	Australian Sports Commission
Australian Baseball Federation	1,519,500	Australian Volleyball Federation	2,523,650	ASRF NSW Division Inc. (soccer)	Australian Swimmers' Association
Basketball Australia	4,666,500	Australian Water Polo Inc.		Australian Athletes Association	Australian Swimming Coaches and Teachers Association Inc
Boxing Australia Inc.	1,113,333			Australian Cricketers' Association	Cricket Australia Umpires
Australian Canoeing Incorporated	2,835,300	Non-Olympic NSO		Australian Institute of Sport	NSW State Referees Commission (soccer)
Cycling Australia	5,316,400	Australian Football League	486,000	Australian Netball Players' Association	Professional Footballers' Association
Diving Australia Inc.	1,555,800	Cricket Australia	769,500	Australian Netball Referees Association	Rugby Leagues Professionals' Association
Equestrian Federation of Australia	1,743,000	Golf Australia	1,122,000	Australian Rugby League Referees Association Inc.	Rugby Union Players Association
Football Federation Australia	3,093,400	Australian Rugby League	463,000	Australian Rugby Union Umpires Association	
Gymnastics Australia Inc.	2,626,200	Netball Australia	2,236,900		
Hockey Australia	5,367,900	Australian Rugby Union	463,000	Total Other Organisations	19
Rowing Australia Inc.	5,848,650				
Yachting Australia	4,265,687	Total NSOs	28		
Australian International Shooting Limited	1,632,000				
Ski & Snowboard Australia	1,547,700				
Softball Australia	2,070,650				
Swimming Australia Ltd					

Source: Adapted from Australian Sports Commission (2007b) and International Olympic Committee (2006; 2007c)

Appendix 2.6: Text of introductory e-mail

I am a PhD candidate at the Australian National University and I am undertaking a research project to explore the response of National Sporting Organisations (NSOs) to performance-enhancing substances and methods in sport. This information is being gathered for the purpose of my PhD and is an independent research project which is not funded by any sporting group, government agency or anti-doping organisation.

I am specifically interested in peoples' perceptions of the role of NSOs and the extent to which these organisations are seen to be actively and effectively addressing the issue of performance-enhancing substances and methods in sport. I am not seeking information in relation to any individuals' use, or knowledge of another's use, of these practices or with identifying any particular NSO. Rather, I am exploring whether the continued presence of doping is perceived as a problem for the legitimacy of sporting organisations.

I am therefore requesting your permission to distribute an on-line survey to athletes, coaching support staff, medical staff as well as sporting administrators in your organisation. Distribution of the survey to the groups identified is intended to ensure a systematic selection of individuals from different settings and perspectives within the sporting community. The inclusion of sporting administrators represents an opportunity for your organisation to provide input into the research goals of this project.

I would like to stress that the survey is completely confidential with the results being sent electronically directly to the researcher. All responses will be securely stored in electronic files on a password-protected computer at the Australian National University accessible only by the researcher. The survey also provides the opportunity for individuals who wish to be further involved in the study to participate in a confidential interview to elaborate upon their comments.

I have attached a Research Study Information Statement which details the nature of the research project. I will call you in about a week's time to talk further about my proposal and, if you are agreeable, arrange a time to meet with you in person.

Yours sincerely

Vanessa McDermott
PhD Candidate
Australian National University

Appendix 2.7: Research Information Statement



Canberra ACT 0200 Australia

Telephone: +61 2 6125 0323
Facsimile: +61 2 6125 2222
Email:
Vanessa.Mcdermott@anu.edu.au
www.anu.edu.au

Vanessa McDermott
PhD Candidate
School of Social Sciences
ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences
Copland Building Number 24

An Examination of Sport Governing Bodies, Legitimacy and Performance Enhancing Substances - Research Information Statement

The Researcher

This research is being independently undertaken by Vanessa McDermott for the purpose of her doctorate (PhD) degree in Sociology at the Australian National University.

Purpose of the research

This study will investigate the idea that the legitimacy of National Sporting Organisations (NSOs) is challenged by the continued use of performance enhancing substances (PES) and methods in sport. This study aims to improve understanding of the issues and factors that impact on the debate surrounding PES use in sport.

What the research involves

The initial phase of this project involves the completion and return to the researcher of a confidential survey questionnaire designed to explore individual perceptions of the role of NSOs and the extent to which these organisations are seen to be effectively addressing the issue of PES. The primary aim of the questionnaire is to examine individual's perceptions of whether or not NSOs are perceived as legitimate. Accordingly, it is important to stress that the project is interested in opinions and perceptions rather than personal experiences in relation to what influences the use of performance enhancing substances or methods.

The questionnaire will be supplied to athletes, coaching support staff, medical staff as well as sporting administrators. It is important to include as many groups within the sporting community as possible in order to achieve a systematic selection of individuals from different settings and perspectives. For example, the inclusion of sporting administrators represents an opportunity for NSOs to provide input into research goals of this project while the inclusion of athletes provides the same opportunity for these individuals. The purpose of such an approach is to identify any similarities and differences as well as any 'unique features' in terms of individuals' perceptions of the legitimacy of NSOs in various sporting contexts. The questionnaire is completely confidential and a reply-paid envelope is attached for return of the survey directly to the researcher.

Upon completion of the survey, if you wish to be further involved there is an opportunity to participate in the second phase of the research project.

In the second phase, the researcher will be conducting recorded interviews with approximately 30 to 35 participants including athletes, support staff (such as coaches and team medical practitioners), and sporting administrators. The interviews are completely confidential with participants identified only by number.

Participation in this phase of the research will take between 15 to 30 minutes. It is not anticipated that this research will involve any risks or inconveniences to participants, beyond the giving of their time. Rather, it is anticipated that the study as a whole will have a positive impact and will contribute to establishing a better understanding of the role of NSOs as well as the impact on athletes of the response of these organisations to doping.

As a participant you are invited to:

- Complete a confidential short survey Questionnaire for return to the researcher in the reply-paid envelope provided; and/or
- Participate in an interview with the researcher for approximately 15 to 30 minutes about your views regarding NSOs and their role in anti-doping (with your permission this will be recorded).

Participation is voluntary

Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to participate in any part of the research or withdraw at any time without repercussion. If you withdraw from the study you can request that any audio files and/or transcripts of your interview be deleted.

Be assured that declining participation will not impact on your relationship with any organisation or group involved in sporting administration, including your employing institution if applicable, or the sporting community.

Participants also have the right to ask questions at any time. As long as they do not involve a breach of another's confidentiality, questions will be answered.

Use of the information, confidentiality and privacy

This information is being gathered for the purpose of the researcher's PhD thesis. It may also be used for academic conference presentations and journal articles but in such a way that no information identifying participants will be published. No individuals or NSO names will appear in any of the research outputs. Furthermore, no details of individual participants' use of PES or knowledge of others use of such substances or NSOs will be detailed or identified in the research outcomes. All possible precautions have been taken to protect identities and the security of the information participants provide, to the extent that this is permissible by law.

To ensure that participants are not identified by their voices, the interview recordings will be destroyed immediately after transcription onto text files. Text files (with participant numbers only) will be stored securely in a lockable filing cabinet both during the study and for five years after completion of the project.

Any information gained from you will be kept safe and secure. The completed questionnaire(s) and any observation notes made by the researcher will be

kept in a locked office at the Australian National University. Interview details, including any information in relation to either your use or knowledge of others use of PES or experiences with sporting administrators including electronic sound files will be kept in a computer accessible only by password by the researcher.

Questions or concerns

If you have any questions or concerns about any part of this research please contact Vanessa McDermott (contact details below) or her supervisors - Dr. Alastair Greig, Australian National University (contact details below) or Dr. Jason Mazanov, University of New South Wales at ADFA (contact details below). Should you have any problems or queries about the way in which the study was conducted and do not feel comfortable contacting the researcher or the aforementioned supervisors, you may contact the Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee (contact details below).

Contact details:

Researcher: Vanessa McDermott,
PhD Candidate,
School of Social Sciences,
Building 24, Copland Building,
The Australian National University, ACT 0200
Phone (02) 6125 0323 or Email
Vanessa.McDermott@anu.edu.au

Chief Supervisor: Dr. Alastair Greig,
Head of School, School of Social Sciences,
Building 22, Haydon-Allen Building,
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Phone (02) 6125 4913 or Email Alastair.Greig@anu.edu.au

Advisor: Dr Jason Mazanov,
Senior Lecturer, School of Business,
UNSW@ADFA
Phone (02) 6268 8071 or Email J.Mazanov@adfa.edu.au

Secretary, Human Research Ethics Committee:
Research Services Office,
Australian National University, ACT, 0200
Phone (02) 6125 7945 or Email
human.ethics.officer@anu.edu.au

(For participants to keep)

Appendix 2.8: Informed Consent Form



Canberra ACT 0200 Australia

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www.anu.edu.au

An Examination of Sport Governing Bodies, Legitimacy and Performance Enhancing Substances

I understand that this study is conducted by Vanessa McDermott, a PhD candidate in the School of Social Sciences, Collage of Arts and Social Sciences at the Australian National University for the purposes of her purposes of her doctorate (PhD) degree in Sociology at the Australian National University.

Purpose and Method

I understand that the purpose of this study is to improve understanding of the extent to which the legitimacy of sport governing bodies informs the debate surrounding the use of performance enhancing substances in sport. I understand that as part of this study, the researcher will be conducting recorded interviews with athletes, support staff (such as coaches and team medical practitioners), and sporting administrators. I understand that this interview will be audio-recorded, although I can request that the interviewer use note-taking as the only formal record. I have been informed that I can switch the recorder off at any time or ask for any part of the tape to be erased.

Time, Risks and Inconvenience

I understand that I will be participating in an approximately 30 minute interview where I will be asked questions related to my opinions, perceptions and experiences as a member of the sporting community. I understand that it is not anticipated that this research will involve any risks or inconveniences to me, beyond the giving of my time.

Voluntary Participation

I understand that, should I agree to participate, I will be required to sign this Informed Consent Form. I understand that participation is completely voluntary and in no way impinges on my relationship with any organisation or group involved in sporting administration or the sporting community, including my employing institution. I understand that the primary aim of the study is to examine individual's perceptions of whether or not SGBs are seen to be legitimate. The project is only interested in my opinions and perceptions rather than any personal experiences in relation to what influences the use of performance enhancing substances or methods.

I have been advised that the participation of athletes, coaching support staff, medical staff as well as sporting administrators is being sought as part of this research project. I understand that this is intended to achieve a systematic

selection of individuals from different settings and perspectives within the sporting community. The purpose of such an approach is to identify any similarities or differences as well as any 'unique features' in terms of perceptions of the legitimacy of SGBs in a variety of sporting contexts.

I understand that, after agreeing to participate, should I wish to withdraw from the study, I have the right to do so without giving a reason. I understand that should I wish to withdraw from the study I can request that all audio recordings and/or transcripts of my interview are deleted. I also understand that I can ask questions at any time during the interview and, that as long as these questions do not involve a breach of another's confidentiality, they will be answered. Conversely, I understand that I have the right to decline to answer any question.

Impact and Outcomes of Research

I understand that it is not anticipated that involvement in interviews will have any impact on participants. I understand the results of this study will be made available in public documents, including academic conference presentations, journal articles and the researchers' PhD dissertation. I understand that all possible precautions have been taken to protect identities and the security of the information participants provide, to the extent that this is permissible by law.

I understand that the supervisors of this research will act as advisors or consultants on the research process and findings. They all have considerable expertise on the topic. They are Drs Alastair Greig and Jason Mazanov. I have been supplied with the contact details for the researcher as well as the supervisors of this project. Should I have any problems or queries about the way in which the study was conducted and I do not feel comfortable contacting the aforementioned researcher or supervisors, I am aware that I may contact:

The Secretary, Human Research Ethics Committee:
Research Office
Chancellery 10B
Australian National University, ACT, 0200
Phone (02) 6125 7945 or Email: human.ethics.officer@anu.edu.au

I am satisfied that I have been made aware of the issues covered by the consent form.

..... (Signed by interview participant)

..... Date

(Participant Number)

(To be returned to the researcher)

REVOCATION OF CONSENT FORM

I hereby wish to **WITHDRAW** my consent to participate in the research study described above and understand that such withdrawal **WILL NOT** jeopardise any treatment or my relationship with The Australian National University.

Signature:

Date:

Participant Number:

Please print name:

The section for Revocation of Consent should be returned to the researcher if you wish to withdraw from the research study. You may withdraw at any stage of the study without repercussion and without giving a reason. Your withdrawal from the study will not impact on your relationship with any organisation or group involved in sporting administration, including your employing institution, or the sporting community.

(To be returned to researcher)

Appendix 2.9: Interview Schedule

Ethics requirements:

- Provide Research Information Statement and Consent Forms
- Participation is voluntary
- Can withdraw at any time
- Details kept confidential
- May appear in conference papers/journal articles, no names will be used
- Can request audio/written files be destroyed at any time
- Can contact supervisor or ethics at ANU if not feel comfortable
- With your permission, interview recorded.

Outline the purpose of your research:

The concept of legitimacy in the context of my research is drawn from the sociological work of Max Weber (1969:214) who argued that legitimate authority requires a connection between perceptions that rules are legitimate and valid. In other words, legitimacy refers to the extent to which an organisation is seen to be 'duly constituted and to have valid authority in a relevant area' (Donovan et al. 2002:276). If organisational legitimacy is high, compliance with its rules and regulations is more likely (Donovan et al. 2002).

To establish and maintain legitimacy requires that the normative order (that is, use of PEDs is unfair to non-doping athletes, presents a risk to athletes' health and is a bad role model for children) is established - and enjoys emotional support - as well as a belief in the legality and procedural competence of the organisation concerned. Applying these concepts to SGBs or NSOs, a legitimisation crisis would be evident in the failure of these organisations to maintain or establish effective normative structures.

My research examines the possibility that the debate surrounding PEDs has more to do with SGBs efforts to maintain positions of authority and avoid a crisis of legitimacy. This has become more of an issue since the creation of WADA and the development of the WADC as the 'core document' in 'the global harmonized fight against doping in sport' (WADA 2003:1; WADA October 2008). So, I am looking at whether the debate is about maintaining power and whether there is evidence of a conflict between WADA and SGBs as they each seek to control sport.

Confirm respondents' sport and level of participation _____

Information and Education - Perceptions of NSOs provision of information about what substances and methods are permissible in their particular sport.

I would like to ask you some questions to expand upon your comments in the e-Survey in relation to the information and education provided by your NSO. In the e-Survey you mentioned that you felt that _____.
With that in mind:

- How easy/difficult is it to access anti-doping information from your NSO?
- Based on your experience and to the best of your knowledge, to what extent does your NSO provide anti-doping education at the 'grassroots' or non-elite, that is, junior and/or club or Masters, level?
- How does this affect your perceptions of the legitimacy of your NSO?

NSOs and Legitimacy - Perceptions of the legitimacy of the current anti-doping system.

Research suggests that the legitimacy and effectiveness of SGBs anti-doping policies is reliant on perceptions that these organisations will effectively and equitably address PED use. Issues of equality and equity are important as the perception that doping control measures are flawed, ineffective or inequitable increases the possibility that PED use will occur (Donovan et al. 2002:276-77). While the e-Survey revealed strong support for anti-doping laws as morally right and fair (58.6 percent strongly agreed), there was a high level of uncertainty in relation to the accuracy and equity of testing and sanctions.

- Based on your experiences, how do you feel about the current anti-doping framework of testing and sanctions?
- Do you feel that your NSO is actively working to ensure that anti-doping procedures are not only effective in deterring or detecting PED use, but is doing so in a manner that is fair and equitable to all participants?
- Can you tell me about your perceptions of any experiences you may have of testing and enforcement of anti-doping policies at your level of sporting participation/competition?
- How does this affect your perceptions of the legitimacy of your NSO, if at all?

WADA and NSOs - Perceptions of WADA, the WADC and enforcement.

WADA takes a values-based approach to doping which highlights the moral and physical dangers of the practice. This thesis speculated that agreement with WADA's view that PEDs represent a moral and physical danger suggests that SGBs that employ a similar ideological approach may enjoy positive perceptions of organisational legitimacy.

- If your NSO adopts a code that reflects WADA's value-based approach, how does this affect your perceptions of the organisations legitimacy?
- To the best of your knowledge, does your NSO adopt such an approach?
- Do you think that such a focus is effective in dealing with doping? If you had the power to change the current system, what would you make different?
- How do you feel about an approach with a focus on the morality of PED or illicit drug use?
- In your opinion do NSOs demonstrate a concern for athletes' health and welfare in the anti-doping policies? Or do you think that NSOs are more concerned with other issues such as maintaining levels of funding, image, reputation, credibility or integrity?

Building on the idea of credibility and integrity, WADA claims that organisations adopting the WADC 'stand a far greater chance in terms of safeguarding their sports' and anti-doping programs' integrity and credibility' (Pound 2007:1). The e-Survey found that 37.9 per cent agreed and 32.8 per cent strongly agreed with this statement.

- How important is it in terms of the legitimacy of NSOs that they adopt WADA's approach, including WADC-complaint policies?
- Based on your experience of your NSOs anti-doping activities, do you perceive the adoption of a WADC-complaint policy as important for the legitimacy of your NSO?
- To the best of your knowledge, what are your perceptions of the interaction between your NSO and WADA?

Athletes and PEDs - Perceptions of factors that might influence athletes' decision to use PEDs.

WADA applies a strict liability approach to anti-doping, which places responsibility primarily upon the athlete. By removing the necessity to prove intent or negligence, a strict liability approach may keep the issue of enforcing anti-doping strategies relatively simple from the perspective of SGBs. However, from the perspective of athletes, such an approach may prove problematic and may not necessarily contribute to the efforts of SGBs to establish and maintain legitimacy or to reduce PED use. Research suggests that there is no real evidence that adherence to such an inflexible criteria has been successful in eliminating PEDs from sport. In fact, such a strict approach may result in procedures and penalties that 'many people will find hard to reconcile with their sense of natural justice' (Drug Think 2004:21).

- In your view, is the application of a strict liability approach effective in deterring athletes from using PED or illicit drugs? Why do you say so?

You indicated in the e-Survey that _____ may contribute to individuals decision to use PEDs.

- What is your opinion of the responsibility of NSOs to address these issues and assist athletes to deal with the structural pressures that might affect their decision-making process?
- From your experiences, to what extent do NSOs provide this level of support?
- How do you feel about the legitimacy of NSOs in this context?

Concluding Comments:

Is there anything more generally you would like to add in relation to NSOs and the way that the issue of drugs in sport is dealt with?

Appendix 2.10: Key Topic Areas and Variables

1. Information and Education			
Access to Education/Information	Delivery Method	Education Barriers	Commence Education
Easy	Information Sessions (including Clubs and Institutes seminars and orientation programs)	Hard to understand terms	Junior all ages, levels
Easy - technical knowledge	Coaches	Structural Issues (lack professional structure, lack resources, lack community links, lack knowledge/expertise, poor quality educational materials, lack infrastructure)	Over 16 all levels
Difficult	NSO Website	Not support coaches	Unsure
Lacks Educational Process	Newsletters and Handbooks	Limited to Institutes	
Unsure			
2. The Current Framework - Testing and Sanctions			
Testing Science Procedures & Application	Barrier to Testing		Application Bans
Necessary	Lack Resources (funding, lack professional structure)		Fair
Credible/Fair	Lack Transparency (which sports are testing, types of substances tested)		Inconsistent and Soft (length of bans, variations between countries/sports for similar infractions)
Inconsistent (not credible/fair, inconsistent application of testing processes/results, inconsistent between sports/countries)	Leak to Media		Unsure
Test Earlier	Elite Focus		
Accurate Science (improved over time)	Lack Visibility at Grassroots Level		
Technology Lagging			
Support New Measures (biological passport, global whereabouts system, freezing samples for later retesting)			
Doubtful Administration (lost samples, handling procedures)			

3. WADA and the WADC			
Role of Morals and Values in Anti-Doping Framework	Areas of Focus for Anti-Doping Framework		Perceptions of WADC
Should be morals and values based	Education, Health, Rehabilitation (harm minimisation, risk management)		Agree Universal Code
Should not be morals and values based	Illicit Drugs		Unsure Universal Code Work
Should be morals and values based, but problematic	Not Illicit Drugs		Unsure WADC Best Model
	Rules Based Deterrence		WADC Best Model
	Values and Rules		No WADC (ineffective, inconsistently applied, sporting community too diverse)
4. Athletes, PEDs and Strict Liability			
Support Strict Liability	Procedural Qualifications	NSO Responsibility	Procedural Framework
Unqualified Support	Requires Accurate Testing	Yes - Responsibility to Athlete	Consultative Approach
Qualified Support (shared liability, athletes errors/misunderstandings, lack information/education)	Requires Athlete Support	Duty of Care - OH&S	Anti-Doping Education
No Support	Requires Due Process	Role of Coach	Education (diverse life after sport skills, includes life after skills not influence/prevent doping)
Support at Elite Level Only	Requires Education	Role of Government	NSO Regulation
Shared Liability		Unsure	Health (including rehabilitation and injury recovery)
			Role Athletes/Mentors
			Role of Coach
			Testing Earlier in Career

Appendix 2.11: Interview Participants Demographic Details

Female, State and National, 140902

Male, Club, Level One Coach, Junior Coach, 140961

Male, Masters and Club, State, National, International, 141131

Male, Club, Professional Team Administrator, 141051

Male, Former Professional, Veterans Competitions, Masters, 140995

Male, Club, 141574

Male, Club, 141015

Female, Club Administrator, State, National, Masters/World Championships, 141410

Male, Club, Elite Amateur, Masters/World Championship, 141049

Male, Club, School Sports Coordinator, 141025

Male, Club Level, Club Administrator, 140986

Male, State, National/Masters World Championships, Former Professional Skier, Coach Junior through to Elite Female Athletes, 141082

Male, Club Administrator, Parent Elite Junior Athlete, 141455

Female, Club & Masters, Former Elite Athlete, 141036

Male, Club, Former State Representative Athlete, 140933-R1

Male, Club, 140933-R2

Male, Former Australian Representative Athlete, 140991

Male, Club, Junior Coach, 142013

Male, Club, 141121

Male, Club, Former Coach to a Women's Olympic Team, Sporting Goods Shop Owner, 001

Male, Club, 141155

Male, Club, Skills Coach, Parent, Junior Representative, 140951

Male, Club, Coach (Junior and Adult). 141257

Female, Elite Professional Athlete, Coach, 001

Male, Club, Former Elite Professional Athlete, 141109-R1

Male, Club, Club Administrator, Former State Administrator, 141109-R2

Male, Club, International Masters, Sporting Goods Shop Owner, 002

Male, Club, Elite Amateur Athlete, 141530

Appendix 3.1: Anti-Doping Rule Violations - The WADC 2009

Article	Definition
Article 2.1	Presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete's Sample
Article 2.2	Use or Attempted Use by an Athlete of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method
Article 2.3	Refusing or failing without compelling justification to submit to Sample collection after notification as authorized in applicable anti-doping rules, or otherwise evading Sample collection
Article 2.4	Violation of applicable requirements regarding Athlete availability for Out-of-Competition Testing, including failure to file required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on rules which comply with the International Standard for Testing. Any combination of three missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month period as determined by Anti-Doping Organizations with jurisdiction over the Athlete shall constitute an anti-doping rule violation
Article 2.5	Tampering or Attempted Tampering with any part of Doping Control
Article 2.6	Possession of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods
Article 2.7	Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking in any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method
Article 2.8	Administration or Attempted administration to any Athlete In-Competition of any Prohibited Method or Prohibited Substance, or administration or Attempted administration to any Athlete Out-of-Competition of any Prohibited Method or any Prohibited Substance that is prohibited Out-of-Competition, or assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation or any Attempted anti-doping rule violation

Source: World Anti-Doping Code 2009 (WADA 2009b)

Appendix 5.1: WADA 2007 Adverse Analytical Findings Reported by Accredited Laboratories.



2007 Adverse Analytical Findings * Reported by Accredited Laboratories

Overview of Results

Table A Olympic and Non-Olympic: Adverse Analytical Findings Rate

Differentiation between Olympic and Non-Olympic Sports	A Samples Analyzed	A Sample Adverse Analytical Findings *	% Adverse
Olympic Sports	174,483	3,375	1.93%
Non-Olympic Sports	49,415	1,027	2.08%
TOTAL	223,898	4,402	1.97%

*** NOTE: The Adverse Analytical Findings (AAF) in this report are not to be confused with adjudicated or sanctioned Anti-Doping Rule Violations (ADRV).** "Adverse Analytical Finding" is defined in the World Anti-Doping Code as "a report from a laboratory or other WADA - approved entity that, consistent with the *International Standard* for Laboratories and related Technical Documents, identifies in a *Sample* the presence of a *Prohibited Substance* or its *Metabolites* or *Markers* (including elevated quantities of endogenous substances) or evidence of the *Use of a Prohibited Method*." These figures may not be identical to sanctioned cases, as the figures given in this report may contain findings that underwent the Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) approval process. In addition, some *Adverse Analytical Findings* may correspond to multiple measurements performed on the same *Athlete*, such as in cases of longitudinal studies on testosterone.

Adapted from 2007 Adverse Analytical Findings* Reported by Accredited Laboratories (World Anti-Doping Agency 2007a)

Appendix 6.1: Interview Participants - NSOs, Information, Education (n=28)

Interview ID	Crisis of Legitimacy	NSO provides Information	NSO provides Education
141109-R2	No answer	No	No
001	No answer	Yes	No
Sub-Total		1 = No; 1 = Yes	2 = No
140933	No	No answer	No answer
140902	No	No	No
141025	No	Yes	No
141082	No	Yes	No
141155	No	Yes	No
140933-R2	No	Yes	No
Sub-Total	5 = No	1 = No; 4 = Yes	5 = No
141257	Yes	No	No answer
141121	Yes	No answer	No
141574	Yes	No	No
142013	Yes	No	No
002	Yes	No	No
003	Yes	No answer	No answer
Sub-Total	6 = Yes	4 = No	4 = No
140991	Yes	Yes	No answer
Sub-Total	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0
140951	Yes	Yes	Yes
141036	Yes	Yes	Yes
141049	Yes	Yes	Yes
141050	Yes	Yes	Yes
141455	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sub-Total	5 = Yes	5 = Yes	5 = Yes
140995	Yes	Yes	No
141015	Yes	Yes	No
141109	Yes	Yes	No
141410	Yes	Yes	No
140961	Yes	Yes	No
140986	Yes	Yes	No
141131	Yes	Yes	No
141530	Yes	Yes	No
Sub-Total	8 = Yes	8 = Yes	8 = No
Totals	5 = No; 20 = Yes	6 = No; 19 = Yes	19 = No; 5 = Yes

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