The Role of Multilateralism and the UN in Post-Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy:
The Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina

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This is to certify that this thesis, in accordance with (Sub-rule 15(2)), is entirely the product of my own original work.

Shona Elizabeth Helen Dodds
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I acknowledge with much, much gratitude, all the people who assisted, supported, and encouraged me throughout the process of finishing this dissertation. Doing this would have been impossible without them.
Abstract

The focus of this dissertation is the U.S. experiment in expanded UN based multilateralism that took place immediately after the Cold War ended. The study examines the different variables that led to this experiment and then uses the same variables to explain why the experiment failed and to describe the policy that eventually developed as a result. The overall goal is to test the hypothesis that the U.S. interest in promoting the principle of multilateralism not only survived the failed post-Cold War experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism, it was actually strengthened by it. It was through their failed experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism that U.S. policy makers learned how to effectively manipulate the benefits and constraints associated with acting within the multilateral framework in the post-Cold War world.
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“In the United States, some people ask, “Why should we bother with the UN? America is strong; we can go it alone.” Well, we will act alone if we have to. But my fellow Americans should not forget that our values and our interests are also served by working with the UN.

The UN helps the peacemakers, the care providers, the defenders of freedom and human rights, the architects of economic prosperity, and the protectors of our planet to spread the risk, share the burden, and increase the impact of our common efforts.”

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Introduction

When the Cold War first ended, instead of immediately using the new status of the U.S. as the sole remaining superpower in an attempt to exercise unilateral power in the pursuit of narrowly determined national interests, U.S. foreign policymakers attempted to reinvigorate the role of the UN as a global multilateral framework of action. They did so because they believed that the end of the Cold War had ushered in a new opportunity for U.S. led global multilateral co-operation that would be favourable to U.S. values and interests.

This belief was based on two assumptions. U.S. foreign policymakers assumed that the end of the Cold War had signalled a convergence of state interests and the wider adoption of liberal ideas and values that had long been held by the U.S. They believed that many states now recognised the depth of military, economic, and value-based interests that they shared with the U.S. and that they would be willing to co-operate through the UN in the pursuit of these common interests. Policymakers also assumed that the U.S. would be able to exert a much greater level of influence and leadership in an effort to shape this co-operation in a manner that was consistent with U.S. interests. This new found capacity for influence would derive from the strength of the U.S. position in the wake of the Soviet demise, and also from the strength of its liberal principles and ideas.
Within only a few years it became clear to policymakers that, as far as they were concerned, the U.S. experiment in expanded UN-based multilateralism had failed. The UN had proved a disappointment to policymakers for a variety of reasons that will be explored throughout this thesis. Essentially though, the UN experiment failed because the two key assumptions that influenced the experiment proved to be false. Interests had not converged to the extent that policymakers had first believed, and the U.S. was not as unfettered in its leadership as had first been expected.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the different variables that led to the experiment in expanded UN-based multilateralism and to then use these variables to explain why the experiment failed. The results of this analysis are then used to describe the policy that was 'left over' from the experiment and to account for this policy within the context of the same set of variables. The overall goal is to test the hypothesis that the U.S. interest in promoting the principle of multilateralism not only survived the failed post-Cold War experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism, it was actually strengthened by it. It was through the failed experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism that U.S. policymakers learned how to effectively manipulate the benefits and constraints associated with acting within the multilateral framework in the post-Cold War world.

The central question addressed throughout the dissertation, and within each of the case studies, is why U.S. policymakers chose to pursue U.S. national interests within a particular framework of action. The case studies focus on the perceived advantages and disadvantages of operating through different frameworks of action, within the context of the study's independent and intervening variables. These variables will be discussed in detail within Chapters Two and Three.

*The Focus of the Study*

The study begins with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in mid-1990 and concludes with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in late 1995. The immediate post-Cold War
period is of the most interest to this inquiry because it is when the most rapid and
dramatic shifts in U.S. policy took place. It was during this early period that the U.S.
experimented with an expanded policy on U.S. participation in UN peace operations
and then, based on its experiences, pulled back to a more limited policy. Examining
the mix of variables that led to these policy changes promises to reveal much about
both the potential of, and limits to, the role that the UN and multilateralism in general
can play within U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

The decision to focus on the U.S., rather than an alternative UN member state, relates
to the apparent paradox embedded within the concept and practice of multilateralism.
This paradox, or dilemma, relates to the question of why sovereign states would ever
voluntarily submit to the constraints involved in operating within a formal
multilateral framework of action. This paradox is even more pertinent in relation to
the U.S., which, as the pre-eminent global power, has the most potential to
unilaterally influence the actions and behaviour of other states in a manner that is
favourable to its own interests. ¹

Given its preponderance of both military and economic power, the temptation for the
U.S. to avoid the constraints of any form of multilateralism completely and at least
try to pursue its immediate short term goals unilaterally would be great. It is in
this context that the U.S. decision to pursue its foreign policy goals within the formal
multilateral framework of the UN can be represented as being particularly
paradoxical. This is even more so the case given that the UN Security Council
includes four other member states with the power to veto outright the proposals put
forward by the U.S.

While any state, including the U.S. is going to be constrained to some extent by the
views and interests of other states in the system, their actions are much more

¹ For a concise discussion of the use of power in this way see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State:
constrained when they take place within a formal multilateral framework. Within a formal multilateral institution such as the UN, state’s actions are not only constrained by the divergent interests of other states which have been expressed formally through the voting system of the institution, they are also constrained by the formal procedures and mechanisms of the particular institutional framework. In this regard, the U.S. makes an important case study because, as Duncan Snidal notes, analysing the ability of international institutions to influence and sometimes constrain the American agenda “underscores their potentially greater impact on smaller, more interdependent states.”

It is crucial that we develop a better understanding of the role that multilateralism as an ordering principle of international action, and the UN as the formal global expression of this principle, plays in the foreign policy of a hegemonic power such as the U.S. As Edward Luck notes, the transnational character of global threats and their volatile and unpredictable nature, “compels an unprecedented degree of multilateral co-operation.” This co-operation, the web of institutions that support it, and the norms which underpin it, do not just play a key role in shaping the relations between states in the post-Cold War world. They increasingly play a key role in facilitating economic, political, and social development within states. With strong and reliable support from hegemonic powers such as the U.S., a multilateral international order has the potential to bring about a more peaceful and stable world where more resources are focused on development and less are focused on winning military conflicts.

This study focuses on the use of U.S. military force in the period following the end of the Cold War and the development of a new policy regarding the use of force in what

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the Clinton administration referred to as ‘multilateral peace operations.’ This focus was selected because the paradox of multilateralism is most acute in regard to issues where the costs and risks associated with international action are the highest, such as, actions that involve military security interests and/or the commitment of political prestige and military personnel. In this context, the deployment of U.S. force is the variable that is held constant throughout the study.

In choosing to focus on the use of U.S. military force, the specific units of analysis for the study become apparent. At the constitutional level, the debate between the executive and legislative branches of U.S. government about the authority to deploy force remains unresolved. By convention, however, the authority to use force has resided with the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief that holds authority and control over the decision to use military force. It is the President and his senior advisers who are, therefore, the specific focus of analysis within the case studies. Senior advisers are also included because they have a direct influence on the decisions made by the President and also because, in many instances, the policies pursued and actions taken in the case study contingencies are a direct result of their decision-making. While it is the President and his senior foreign policy team that have been selected as the focus of analysis, this is not meant to signal the assumption that the executive branch of government makes foreign policy in a vacuum. Various

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4 Perhaps in reflection of the timing of his presidency, Bush used ‘peacekeeping operations’ to refer to all types of UN multilateral peace operations including peace enforcement. Clinton administration officials seemed to use the terms ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peace operations’ interchangeably. When Presidential Decision Directive-25 was released its title referred to “multilateral peace operations” without specific reference to the UN. The terminology used in this study reflects the terminology used in each administration. When discussing Bush administration policy the term ‘peacekeeping’ is used, while the term ‘multilateral peace operations’ is used in the discussion of Clinton administration policy.


6 See discussion in Wittkopf and McCormick, Domestic Sources, 109-121.
domestic actors and interest groups compete, often quite doggedly, for influence over executive decision making and they can have a direct influence over decision outcomes.  

Structure of the Dissertation
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part One is comprised of three chapters that all deal with different aspects of the study’s framework of analysis. Chapter One aims to establish, at a theoretical level, an understanding of the key concepts and processes that help explain the conditions under which international co-operation is most likely to occur in an anarchical international environment. Chapter Two draws these theoretical insights into a discussion of the U.S. interest in multilateralism and the UN. At the same time, these insights are used to explain the selection of the independent and intervening variables that provide the structure to the case study chapters that make up the bulk of this study. In Chapter Three, the logic and insights provided in the previous two chapters are used to explain key aspects of this study’s research design including, for example, a number of assumptions about the causal relationships between the variables that are then tested within the case studies.

Parts Two and Three are made up of case studies. Part Two focuses on the Republican administration of George Bush, while Part Three focuses on the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton. The case studies are divided into two sections in an effort to capture the role that ideology and political party may have in shaping the development of U.S. policy toward multilateralism and the UN.

Part Two focuses on the administration of George Bush Senior and begins with a brief introduction to the Bush administration’s world-view prior to the Gulf conflict. Chapter Four explores U.S. leadership of the 1991 international intervention aimed at reversing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the impact of this action in renewing U.S.

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interest in UN-based multilateralism. Chapter Five discusses the Bush administration’s internal review of UN peacekeeping. This review was motivated by the perceived successes of the intervention against Iraq and was aimed at identifying the ways in which the role and capacity of the UN could be enhanced. Chapter Six explores the rationale underpinning the U.S. decision to lead an unprecedented humanitarian intervention in Somalia. This chapter is also used to explore some of the difficulties encountered in the effort to operate within the military operational framework provided by the UN. Chapter Seven examines the Bush administration’s struggle to define and balance U.S. national interests when dealing with the break up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Part Three of this study focuses on the first three years of the administration of Bill Clinton and begins with a brief overview of the assumptions underpinning his worldview upon entering office and explains how these shaped the administration’s expectations of the UN. Chapter Nine explores how the administration’s interest in promoting UN-based multilateralism affected U.S. policy toward the Somali intervention and how the difficulties experienced in this operation shaped overall U.S. policy in regard to participation in UN peace operations. Chapter Ten examines the administration’s inter-agency review of U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations. This chapter focuses upon the difficulties experienced within the administration in its attempt to define a role for multilateralism and the UN within U.S. foreign policy. Chapter Eleven deals with the U.S. led intervention in Haiti and shows how the administration applied the lessons it had learned in Somalia in an effort to more effectively optimise the benefits of operating within the UN framework while minimising the constraints. Chapter Twelve explores how senior foreign policy officials struggled to balance U.S. value interests and material interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout 1993 and how this began to alter their perceptions of the role of the UN. Chapter Thirteen examines this struggle as the conflict continued through 1994 and into 1995, with a particular emphasis on the reasons why the administration shifted its policy focus away from the UN framework of action.
Finally, the study concludes by drawing upon the insights provided in the case studies to assess the assumptions that are outlined in Chapter Three regarding the conditions under which the U.S. interest in multilateralism and the UN is most likely to be strong. This assessment will then provide the basis for proving or disproving the hypothesis presented at the beginning of this chapter. Of key interest throughout this discussion, are the ways in which decision makers gradually learned how to manipulate the benefits and constraints of operating within the UN and other multilateral frameworks, in order to optimise U.S. national interests.
Part One

Framework for Inquiry
Chapter One

International Co-operation

Introduction

The overall aim of this chapter is to set out the logic of the theoretical framework used to explain the conditions under which international co-operation is most likely to occur in an anarchic international environment. Once this logic has been established in the abstract, it will then be applied in Chapter Two, to a more grounded discussion of the U.S. interest in multilateralism and the UN in the post-Cold War era. The insights gained through both these chapters will then be used to formulate a number of assumptions regarding the causal relationships between the study’s variables, which are outlined in Chapter Three.

This chapter begins with a brief theoretical discussion of the concept of multilateralism that is followed by a more lengthy discussion of the theoretical debates regarding the role that international institutions play within the international arena. The subsequent section then approaches the question of international co-operation from two different perspectives. It begins with an examination of economic theories of collective action that explore the need for leadership in the provision of public goods. This includes a brief overview of the role that leadership plays within groups of different size and with different characteristics, and also how and where the UN, NATO, and multilateral peace operations fit in with collective action theories. Also included here is a discussion of the different types of hegemonic leadership and international co-operation.
This leads into the second part of the discussion, which examines how assumptions of reciprocity and the introduction of \textit{a priori} value preferences can affect the outcomes of Prisoner's Dilemma games. This discussion uses some of the insights provided by the constructivist school of thought to demonstrate how, at a theoretical level, the introduction of self-perceptions and \textit{a priori} value preferences can reduce the need for leadership in the collective provision of a public good. The role that \textit{a priori} values and self-perceptions play in shaping U.S. preferences and national interest perceptions will then be explored in the following chapter.

\textbf{Multilateralism Defined}

The U.S. interest in multilateralism has very strong ideational as well as material components.\footnote{James March and Johan Olsen offer a useful analysis of these two aspects in terms of the ‘logic of expected consequences’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness,’ in James March and Johan Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” \textit{International Organization}, 52, 4, Autumn, 1998, 943-969. Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons also offer a useful summary of material and ideational based theories relating to multilateralism when they outline four theoretical approaches to the study of regimes, these are, structural, game theoretical, functional, and cognitive. Haggard and Simmons suggest that combinations of these approaches, rather than any single approach, are the most useful for explaining regime development and change. Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” \textit{International Organization}, 41, 3, Summer 1987, 491-517.} John Ruggie suggests that, at its core, multilateralism refers to “coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.”\footnote{John Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in John Ruggie, (ed.) \textit{Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form}, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 8.} This involves, Ruggie suggests, two assumptions on behalf of the members of a collective; indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. An assumption of indivisibility, regardless of whether it relates to concepts such as peace, or something more tangible such as transport and communication systems, is essentially just an idea. It is a social construction rather than a material condition. Something \textit{is} indivisible if it \textit{is believed} to be so and if states act accordingly. Diffuse reciprocity, on the other hand, relates to an expectation of tangible benefit and can be defined as
being when an arrangement is "expected by its members to yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time." 3

James Caporaso combines Ruggie’s assumptions about what multilateralism is and the properties it possesses when he defines multilateralism as “an organizing principle that is based upon three properties; indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.” 4 Within this definition, multilateralism can be considered to involve a set of beliefs, or ideology, as well as a framework of formal or informal practices. This is the definition of multilateralism that is accepted within this study and is reflected in the approach used within the case studies.

Both Caporaso and Ruggie make a clear distinction between what is collective action and what constitutes multilateralism. The term multilateralism does not only refer to the number of states involved in an action, it refers also to the nature of that collective action. Ruggie explains the difference between what is simply ‘collective’ and what is ‘multilateral’ action when he separates ‘institutions’ from ‘multilateral institutions.’

Ruggie begins with a definition first provided by Keohane, in that, institutions are understood to be “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” 5 As Ruggie points out, there is no inclusion, within this definition, of assumptions regarding the nature of the relationship between the members of the institution. Such a definition could incorporate imperialistic, discriminatory, or exploitative forms of co-operative action that would not be included within a definition of multilateralism.


To be multilateral, rather than simply collective, an institution must be underpinned by a set of principles that shape the nature of the relationship between its members. As such, John Ruggie defines multilateral institutions as being:

... an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.  

This is the definition of multilateral institutions that is adopted within this study.

**The Role of International Institutions**

Questions relating to the principles that underpin international institutions essentially serve as the root of debates regarding their potential role in the international arena. Disagreements over this role relate back to core debates within international relations theory about the role of the state and state power. This section explores these debates within the context of a discussion of theories relating to international institutions.

**A Realist View**

A realist perspective suggests that the first international institutions arose by the design of the major powers as a means of preserving the status quo and ensuring order and stability after the Napoleonic wars. The United Nations was created for similar reasons by the victors of the Second World War. As such, realists believe that international institutions are simply a reflection of the common interest of great powers in preserving their own power status. In this sense, they will continue to exist only as long as they continue to reflect these common power interests.

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Fundamental to the realist view, is the assumption that states are more sensitive to relative power gains, rather than absolute power gains. Realists believe that the actions of states within an anarchic international system are dominated by the competition for power. This makes the establishment of a genuinely peaceful world based on mutually beneficial co-operation not just unlikely, but impossible. Both realists and neorealists recognise that, under some circumstances, states may be motivated to co-operate in order to obtain mutual benefits.\(^8\) They argue, however, that this co-operation is severely constrained by underlying concerns about any relative power gains that may threaten to alter the balance of power.\(^9\)

As John Mearsheimer points out, the realist international system is inhabited by states that “look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and therefore have little reason to trust each other.” In such a world, the potential for co-operation is inhibited by the uncertainties that are inherent to the anarchical international system and, more specifically, by concerns about cheating. In a self-help world, where there is no higher authority to protect states from danger, they have no choice but to depend only on themselves for their own survival. The only rational behaviour for states in such a world is to constantly seek to gain a greater level of power and influence than other states in the system. States in a realist world have no choice, therefore, but to act according to their own self-interest.

In a realist world, international institutions play only a marginal role because they do little to diminish the relative power concerns of states.\(^10\) As such, they have little effect in terms of reducing uncertainties or decreasing the risks of co-operation. In this regard, it is very dangerous for states to place too much hope in the role that these institutions play in mitigating the conditions and consequences of anarchy. For

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\(^10\) Ibid. 21.
decision makers to assume that international institutions have more than a marginal impact on the behaviour of other states in the system, is to risk a state's very survival.

A Liberal View

As an alternative, liberal theorists assume that international institutions can have a significant impact on state behaviour because they do more than just reflect the distribution of power and provide an alternative forum for power politics. As liberal theorists relax the realist assumption that states are motivated solely by a concern for relative power gains, they introduce the possibility of co-operative state action that results in mutually beneficial absolute power gains.11 Similarly, relaxing realist assumptions regarding the rational and unitary nature of state action allows liberals to presume a potentially greater influence of economic and other national interests.

While liberal theorists agree with realist theories regarding the anarchical nature of the international system, they suggest that international institutions can play a significant role in reducing the level of uncertainty and insecurity resulting from this anarchy. They assume that international institutions contribute to the co-ordination of state behaviour and, in doing so, facilitate a greater level of predictability in the international arena. This includes a greater level of predictability in regard to the distributional and relative gains issues that realists see as a barrier to co-operation.12

Material Interests

The various strains within neoliberal thought accord different roles for international institutions. Some theorists retain states as the focus of international action. They retain the assumption that the role of international institutions is tied to state interests and suggest that specific institutions will only remain operational as long as their

12 Keohane and Martin, "Promise of Institutionalist Theory," 45.
major member states have an interest in maintaining them. Within this stream of thought a state’s commitment to an international institution is linked to a pragmatic expectation of material and diplomatic gain, rather than a deep-seated ideological or value-based commitment to liberal world order.

As John Ruggie notes, realist critics often miss the point when they suggest that strong support for international institutions stems from a “mushy idealism” and not an accurate understanding of the motivations for state behaviour. U.S. support for international institutions, for example, often stems from a pragmatic interest in projecting its military power into regions of strategic interest, such as Europe, without over stretching its capacities or entangling it in alliances. U.S. power can be extended further if it is embedded within a more general security alliance embodied within a multilateral institution.\(^\text{13}\)

*Managing Interdependence*

Some liberal theorists also suggest that international institutions enjoy a potentially expanding role in the process of co-operative goal seeking because they reduce the transaction costs associated with international co-operation as well as the levels of uncertainty involved.\(^\text{14}\) Regime theorists, such as Robert Keohane, argue that they do this by providing formal mechanisms to regulate and maintain international regimes.\(^\text{15}\)

An expanding role for international institutions may also be attributed to an increasing recognition that developments in such areas as technology, world population, and patterns of political representation, have fundamentally altered the


\(^\text{14}\) Caporaso, “International Relations Theory,” 61. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of acquiring information, bargaining, enforcement, and also the opportunity cost involved in organising these activities. Also see the discussion of a functional theory of international regimes in Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 85-109. See also Keohane and Martin, “Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” 42.
nature of the international environment.\textsuperscript{16} States are increasingly confronted by issues and problems that they are neither able to isolate themselves from, nor resolve alone. Similarly, there is a growing recognition that states share certain core interests that may be most cost effectively met through international co-operation.\textsuperscript{17}

Such realisations are associated with an increasing awareness that not all relations between states, and issues confronted by states, are dominated by relative power concerns. While military security interests remain the basic concern of all states, other interests and goals now compete for attention as well. In an international environment where the military security of states is not constantly under immediate threat, an environment that Stanley Hoffman refers to as moderate, these other interests, and goals that are derived from them, are able to receive greater attention.\textsuperscript{18} Again, this branch of thought suggests a pragmatic material based interest in international institutions that does not necessarily require an ideological or value-based commitment.

\textit{The Global Economy}

Many neoliberals also argue that international institutions are able to gain a certain amount of autonomy in the international arena because they maximise the benefits of economic co-operation between states. Indeed, theorists such as Harold Jacobson, William Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, argue that economic benefits are the primary


\textsuperscript{17}Ernst Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," in Young, \textit{International Political Economy}, 144-146.

reason why states create and join international institutions in the first place. These authors argue that the trend towards the extension and deepening of political participation, along with developments in technology have combined since the nineteenth century to provide the impetus for increased participation in international institutions.

These arguments are based upon the assumption that the spread of democracy, and increased levels of citizen participation in domestic political processes, makes public welfare a priority for governments. With increased awareness of the realities of economic interdependence and the impacts of globalisation, international cooperation is often perceived as the most effective method for governments to meet this welfare priority. International institutions may, therefore, gain an element of autonomy from issues of power politics because states are reluctant to allow interstate disagreements to escalate into overt conflicts that not only hinder economic development, but also risk the co-operative institutions that facilitate it. Richard Cooper takes this line of argument even further when he suggests that extensive international intercourse actually threatens national autonomy.

Alternatively, it is also possible that the bureaucracy created to serve international institutions may add another set of interests and ambitions to the international political arena and that these will also influence and possibly even constrain states. In some instances, senior international public officials may act to serve the interests and

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20 Ibid. 57-58.
21 See discussion in Andrew Linklater, Key Concepts in International Relations: Competing Perspectives on the State, National Interest and Internationalism, Occasional Paper Number 8, Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs and Deakin University, 1991, 23-26. Susan Strange takes this argument even further when she suggests that interstate competition for power defined in territorial terms has been largely replaced by competition for world market shares. Susan Strange, “The Name of the Game,” in Nicholas Rizopoulos, (ed.) Sea Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1990, 238-273.
goals of the institution they represent, rather than the specific interests of member states in regard to a given contingency. In some instances this institutional interest may conflict with the goals of rationally self-interested member states. An example of this would be the UN Secretary-General who is largely perceived as being the embodiment of the UN organisation and its interests, but is ultimately answerable to UN member states. The role played by the UN Secretary-General in this regard is explored within the case studies.

Ideas, Identity, and Value Preferences

An alternative stream of neoliberal institutional thought places a greater emphasis on the ideational, rather than material, aspects of states’ interest in international institutions. John Ruggie, for example, argues that the tendency toward international co-operation often stems from a deeply embedded liberalism rather than a material calculation of national interests. Some of the works within this school have leaned in the direction of world society theorising through their suggestion that international institutions play a substantial role in transforming international relations. As such, they argue that international institutions represent an integral component of the evolutionary process toward a world society.

In 1997, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie argued that the growing tendency to focus on international institutions only as the formal arrangements constructed to organise the behaviour of states and co-ordinate expectations of behaviour, ignored the potential of these institutions to influence state behaviour and expectations. What is needed, they suggested, is an approach that could provide a comprehensive link between perceptions of national interests and the formal mechanisms through which they are expressed at the international level. A combination of these insights would offer a recognition that international co-operative mechanisms are effectively driven by the material interests of their members, whilst allowing that the

mechanisms themselves may gradually impact on how these interests are both determined and pursued.\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{Linking Positivism and Constructivism}

Just such a link is being developed through efforts to combine the insights provided by rational, or utilitarian, approaches to the study of international institutions with efforts to elaborate upon the processes through which perceptions of national interests are collectively constructed.\textsuperscript{25} In their discussion of recent trends within the study of international institutions, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner suggest that the end of the Cold War "...opened up space for cultural and sociological perspectives, often referred to as "constructivist," that had been neglected by both realists and liberals."

Constructivist approaches to the study of international relations differ from both the realist and the liberal schools of thought in that they problematise the whole process of determining national interests. As Martha Finnemore notes, realists and liberals are not incorrect when they assume that all states seek "power, security, and wealth," they just do not tell the whole story. Some of the most interesting questions, from a constructivist perspective, are what kind of power do states want and what do they want it for? Similarly, what sort of security do they seek and how do they aim to obtain it? Or, if wealth is their goal, how do they aim to get it and who is it for? Realists and liberals cannot answer these questions because the answers do not


emanate solely from the power struggle that defines the international system.\textsuperscript{26} National interests are, rather, determined by a whole variety of factors that emanate from within the international system, from within the state itself, and also through the ways in which the two interact.

There are various streams of constructivist thought, but they all rely on two key assumptions.\textsuperscript{27} They all see the environment in which states act to be social as well as material, and they all view this environment as playing a key role in shaping how states understand their interests.\textsuperscript{28} In this respect, a state’s understanding of its environment, both domestic and international, helps constitute the interests that are derived from that environment. In one respect, a state’s interests are socially constructed based on a sense of self-identity that is derived from that state’s history, culture, ideology, values, and aspirations. In another respect, these interests are also constructed based on that state’s sense of its own identity in relation to the rest of the world. How does a state perceive its role relative to the rest of the world and how does it want that role to be perceived by the rest of the world?

This latter point moves well beyond the realist or liberal recognition that a state’s interests are constrained by the material conditions of the international system. Constructivism suggests that the international system does not just simply constrain states it can actually change what they want. The international system, and the international organisations that inhabit it, are constitutive and generative in that they help create new interests and values for states.\textsuperscript{29} They do this through a process of social interaction and the generation of shared understandings about what the material conditions of the international environment actually mean. Continual social

\textsuperscript{27} For a survey of the different streams within constructivist thought see discussion in Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism in International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, (eds.) \textit{Handbook of International Relations}, London: Sage, 2002.
interactions, along with this shared understanding of the material world, also generate social norms, which can be defined as shared expectations of standards of behaviour.\textsuperscript{30}

From a constructivist perspective, international organisations such as the UN play a key role in generating international norms. They argue that the very experience of interacting within the framework of an international institution serves to shape the international system because the process of interacting alters state preferences.\textsuperscript{31} As state preferences alter, so too does the nature of the international system. In this context, international institutions could be considered as having both a reciprocal and complementary interaction with the international environment. They help to constitute state interests, and in doing so they not only consolidate patterns of state behaviour but also their own role within them. Even the most powerful states modify their interests and intentions with respect to international institutions as a consequence of participation in them.\textsuperscript{32}

In their work, Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner also suggest that one useful approach to combining rationalist and constructivist insights within the study of international co-operation and its supporting institutions involves revisiting Prisoner's Dilemma games. Much of the criticism directed at the use of these games when exploring the logic of international co-operation has related to their need for \textit{a priori} value preferences and payoff values that favour co-operation. The development of these \textit{a priori} preferences and values are, however, the very focus of constructivist

\textsuperscript{29} Finnemore, \textit{National Interests}, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{31} For a more liberal interpretation of the same process see Hoffman, "International Organisations," 101.
\textsuperscript{32} Many liberal theorists also acknowledge the potential of international organisations to alter perceptions of national interest, see Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" \textit{Foreign Policy}, Spring, 1998, 110, 87 and Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, "The Framework for Inquiry," in Diehl, \textit{Politics of Global Governance}, 1997, 77. For a discussion of the shared understandings between the constructivist and liberal schools of thought, see Alexander Wendt,
theories. By combining constructivist insights, gained through the problematisation of value preferences, with the utilitarian logic of game theorists such as Mancur Olson, Michael Taylor, and Robert Axelrod, Prisoner’s Dilemma games can contribute greatly to an analysis of international co-operation.

The Logic of Collective Action

To understand the role that a priori value preferences may play in promoting international co-operation, it is useful to first gain a general understanding of the logic that explains why co-operation might occur at all under conditions of anarchy. To this end, this discussion begins with an examination of economic theories of collective action as they relate to the role that hegemonic leadership plays in the provision of public goods. Expectations of reciprocity and a priori value preferences are then introduced to the discussion to demonstrate how constructivist insights explain how state preferences might help to reduce or even eliminate the need for strong leadership in the provision of a public good.

Public vs Collective Goods

Public goods can be characterised by their possession of two key properties. They are both non-excludable and non-rival. They are non-excludable in that once any amount of a public good has been provided, any member of the public can benefit from it regardless of whether they have contributed to its provision. A public good “can not be appropriated by a particular individual and enjoyed exclusively by him.” A public good is also non-rival in that any amount of consumption by one or more individuals does not reduce the amount available for consumption by others. No individuals are competing for the use of a public good.

33 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, 26.
A useful example of a public good is international peace and stability. A peaceful and stable international environment benefits all states regardless of whether they have helped to establish it. In addition, when one state enjoys peace, this does not limit the amount of peace that is available for others to enjoy.

At a theoretical level, it is in no individual's private interest to contribute to the provision of a public good. If the good is neither exclusionary nor rival, and will be made available to an individual whether it contributes or not, then it would not be rational for that individual to bear the costs of contributing to its provision. Even if the public good is such that the individual's contribution would increase the benefits received from it, these increased benefits may still not justify the additional costs involved. It is in the interests of every individual, then, to attempt to free-ride; to enjoy the benefits of a public good that has been provided by others.35

If this theoretical logic held true in the real world, public goods would either never be provided or never be provided enough.36 Yet, in the real world individuals do cooperate within groups to provide public goods, and if this is considered to be 'irrational' behaviour, then how can it be explained?

One of the reasons why collective action occurs in the real world is that there are few purely public goods. The nature of most goods falls somewhere between the extremes of public and private and can more usefully be described simply as collective. In many instances a collective action will result in the provision of joint goods. That is, the collective action will yield multiple outputs that vary in their degree of publicness. Some outputs may be purely public or they may be completely private.

36 Ibid. 4.
They may also be *impure public goods*, which are partially excludable and/or partially rival.\(^{37}\)

Collective action can and does occur in real life because, in many cases, one or more members of a group will have a strong enough private interest in a collective good to be willing to undertake the leadership necessary to ensure that the good is provided.

*The Role of Leadership*

Mancur Olson argues in *The Logic of Collection Action*, that this type of leadership is crucial in order for collective action to take place.\(^{38}\) He argues that, without such leadership, rational, self-interested individuals will not co-operate within groups to achieve common or group goals because groups do not pursue goals in the same way that individuals do. Even when there is unanimous agreement about what the group’s goals are and the most effective method of achieving them, rational individuals will not work towards these goals. This is because groups cannot act in their own self-interest in the ways that individuals do, unless, Olson argues, there are other factors influencing the members of the group. These other factors would either have to be some form of coercion to enforce certain types of behaviour, or separate incentives offered to the individual members of the group to encourage certain types of behaviour.

Olson bases his logic of co-operation on an economic analogy of the market place. All producers in a market place may recognise that they will benefit from stable prices, but no one producer will be willing to bear the costs associated with maintaining this stability. In order to ensure stable prices some form of interference with the market, by a government for example, is required.

The Role of International Institutions

While it could be argued that the fundamental function of international institutions is the provision of public or collective goods, such organisations are not the international equivalent of government. International institutions rely mostly upon voluntary compliance and support. National governments, on the other hand, have both the capability and the will to wield powerful sanction mechanisms (e.g., imprisonment) in order to gain compliance with their regulations. They also have the capacity to provide, or withhold, specific goods from particular individuals when so motivated (e.g., electricity). They can persuade individuals to co-operate through both the threat of sanction, and the promise of individual benefits. International institutions do not have the independent capacity to pursue either of these strategies.\(^{39}\)

In the context of international institutions, some other entity must provide the coercive and incentive elements that a government does within the state. Major states, such as the U.S., or coalitions of states may serve in this role and, if they do so, co-operation is possible and a collective good may be provided. In this sense, a collective goal may be pursued if and when a major state or coalition has enough of a private interest in that goal being achieved that it is willing to pay the additional costs associated with leading a collective action. These states may lead the collective action by providing additional inducements to each individual group member in order to encourage their co-operation in achieving the group goal.

Privileged Groups

When a single powerful state or coalition of states within a group perceives the net benefits of a collective action to be greater than the associated costs and is willing to act to ensure that the public good is produced, even if no other states are willing to contribute, the group is referred to as being privileged.\(^{40}\) Todd Sandler defines privileged groups as being when “at least one individual derives sufficient net

\(^{38}\) Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 2 and 51.

\(^{39}\) Ibid. 15.
benefits from a collective action to go it alone.” He offers the U.S. provision of a nuclear deterrent in NATO as an example of a privileged group.41 The U.S.-led, UN-based, multilateral interventions in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and the NATO led intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina could arguably be considered to represent privileged groups. This is one of the questions that will be explored in more detail throughout the case study chapters.

The Impact of Group Size

Mancur Olson suggests that the level of individual inducements necessary to ensure co-operation often depends on group size. In small groups there is a possibility that all members will be able to recognise their own private interest in a collective good and will contribute to its provision voluntarily. John Oneal supports this line of thinking when he suggests that the issue of free-riding in small groups is complex because the behaviour of individual members is more easily observed, communication occurs more easily, and there are greater opportunities for strategic interactions and explicit bargaining.42

Olson also argues, however, that collective action in small groups is not likely if the group is privileged. If the group is privileged then the other members of the group will likely hold back on their contributions in the hope that the powerful state with the greatest private interest in the good will act by itself to ensure its provision.

In large groups, Olson suggests that collective goods are even less likely to be provided enough, if at all, without the addition of individual incentives. The lack of exclusiveness of collective goods erodes the incentive of group members to collaborate in order to provide the maximum amount of the good. The greater the amount of a good that a member can access without directly contributing to it, the

40 Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 49-50.
41 Sandler, Theory and Applications, 35.
less incentive there will be for that member to provide more of the good at its own expense. Thus, the larger the group the greater the number of its members that may attempt to free-ride on the assumption that other group members will pay the costs of providing the good. There is also a possibility, in larger groups, that the rational attempt to free-ride will result in no good being produced at all.\footnote{Olson also argues that larger groups are less likely to be privileged than smaller groups. This view is based on the assumption that the individual benefits derived from co-operation decline as group size increases. Each individual translates the marginal benefits of providing a good with the costs associated with providing it. In other words, they will calculate their individual share of a collective good in terms of their own private benefits. If private benefits decrease as the group size increases, it is less likely that any one individual or coalition will calculate that the net benefits to be gained from acting alone outweigh the associated costs. Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 33-34 and Sandler, Theory and Applications, 66.}

Todd Sandler argues that the relationship between group size and co-operation is not this simple. He suggests that collective action problems cover such a wide variety of issue areas, and are directed at the provision of so many different combinations of joint goods, that the relationship between costs and benefits can vary greatly. It is also the case that the relationship between costs and benefits, and the degree of publicness of supply, can be manipulated. This is where international institutions can play a key role. They can improve information regarding state behaviour and also provide for a more structured allocation of costs.\footnote{Sandler, Theory and Applications, 61-62.} At the same time, institutions may facilitate a linkage between the private and public benefits of collective action and may help make it possible to make a collective good more exclusive. International institutions can also provide the monitoring and sanction mechanisms through which free-riders can be identified and punished.

**Club Goods**

When it is possible to make an impure public good more exclusive, collective action may occur without the need for a powerful leader or coalition. When the outputs of a collective action are excludable, and possibly partially rival as well, they can be considered to be *club goods*. A club is a “voluntary collective that derives mutual
benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members' characteristics, or an impure public good characterized by excludable benefits.  

One of the core benefits of a club-like arrangement is that it can serve to reduce the level of free-riding within a group because individuals who do not contribute to the provision of a good can be excluded from using it. Within club groups, the free-riding issue does not necessarily disappear but the question can shift from whether a state is contributing, to how much a state is contributing. Again, this is where international institutions can play a useful role because they can be used to facilitate the allocation of costs and the monitoring of payments. The UN and NATO, for example, both play a role in allocating the costs of multilateral peace operations in an effort to reduce free-riding.

The UN and UN Peace Operations

State support and or participation in UN peace operations can be considered to be a club arrangement because these operations yield a mix of joint goods (both public, impure public, and private), some of which can be denied to non-participating or non-supporting states.

Several purely public goods are provided by UN peace operations, most importantly, international peace and stability. Successful UN peace operations provide this public good for all states, including non UN members, regardless of whether they have contributed to any specific peace operation. The humanitarian benefits of UN peace operations, such as that which took place in Somalia for example, can also be considered to be purely public goods. The same is true for the capacity of any

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45 Ibid. 63.
successful UN peace operation to enhance the overall effectiveness of the UN as a global international institution dedicated to the pursuit of peace.\(^4\)

UN peace operations also provide a range of impure public and private goods as well as a number of goods that are at least partially rival. Member states that are in close proximity to the conflict or have strong economic interests in the area are likely to have a private and immediate interest in ensuring the restoration of peace.\(^5\) It is also the case that some medium sized states are often motivated to participate in UN peace operations because it is a useful way to enhance their international standing.\(^6\) Similarly, other states may choose to make substantial financial contributions to UN peace operations in an effort to improve their international prestige. In addition, states may contribute or participate in UN peace operations because it represents one of the few ways for them to be seen to be playing a major role in international events.\(^7\) There are also some financial benefits associated with participation in UN peace operations that can be described as partially rival. These would include the rewarding of post-war reconstruction contracts on the basis of the level of contribution made to the peace operation.

The UN organisation is, itself, a purely public good in that it is a global mechanism designed to ensure international peace and stability. Some realist critics may argue, however, that the UN does not produce peace and stability so much as ensure the status quo of the major powers. They argue that states only actively support the UN


\(^{49}\) Bobrow and Boyer, “Maintaining System Stability,” 726.


\(^{52}\) Some states may receive clear private benefits from their participation in UN peace operations because they are reimbursed for the cost of their troop participation. Smaller states can often enjoy relatively substantial financial benefits as a result of their troop contributions. Bobrow and Boyer, “Maintaining System Stability,” 729.
and contribute to its peace operations if they have a private interest in maintaining the status quo and their position within it.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{NATO and the U.S.}

NATO could also be considered to be an example of a club arrangement because deterrence and mutual defence is only guaranteed for the organisation's membership. Non-members are excluded from the benefits of such a guarantee.\textsuperscript{54} NATO also represents an example of a privileged group in that the U.S. has such a strong private interest in ensuring Western European peace and stability that it is willing to absorb all the costs associated with providing the nuclear deterrence upon which the alliance is based.\textsuperscript{55}

For its members, the NATO organisation is itself a purely public good in that it is a regional institution designed primarily to deter attacks against the Western European alliance and ensure the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. For the NATO membership the continuation of the NATO alliance is a purely public good. As a privileged group, the question of free-riding is likely to be an issue within the NATO membership although the level to which this occurs may be reduced by the

\textsuperscript{53} See discussion in Laura Neack, "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interests of Community or Self?" \textit{Journal of Peace Research}, 32, 2, 1995, 181-196

\textsuperscript{54} It is often argued that the deterrence based collective security provided by NATO is a purely public good. Some would argue, however, that changes in strategic doctrine, the development of new technologies, and alterations in diplomacy have changed the nature of the goods that the organization provides. They would argue that an increased recognition of the costs of nuclear war have led to a decline in the utility of NATO's nuclear deterrence and an increase in the role played by conventional forces within the alliance. While deterrence is a purely public good, the defence that is provided by conventional forces is not. Defence is an impure public and, in some circumstances, a private good. In general, while overall deterrence can still be considered to be a public good, the role played by a post-Cold War NATO has expanded beyond its founding vision and the organization now produces a range of joint products. See discussions in Sandler, \textit{Theory and Applications}, 35 and 99-105; Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhouser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," \textit{The Review of Economics and Statistics}, 48, 3, 1966, 267. This argument is also supported in John Oneal and Paul Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," \textit{Political Research Quarterly}, 47, 2, June 1994, 373-396 and; Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free-ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," \textit{International Organization}, 49, 1, Winter 1995, 39-71.

small size of the organisation.\textsuperscript{56} If NATO is a privileged group, then the U.S. as its privileged member has so great an interest in ensuring its continuation that it will be willing to act by itself to ensure its survival. This assumption becomes important to this study within the case study discussion of the U.S. response to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

\textit{Free-Riding}

Free-riding is a potential problem for NATO because it is rational for states to attempt to free-ride in privileged groups. Free-riding occurs when a state contributes less than its marginal share towards the provision of a collective good. It is rational for states to attempt to free-ride in the provision of a collective good if they think it is likely that some other state or coalition of states will provide the good, and they will be able to enjoy its benefits for free. The tendency toward free-riding increases, the more the provision of a collective good is known to be of significant national interest to a major state or coalition. The tendency for free-riding is the strongest when a group is privileged, that is, when a major state or coalition wants the good enough that they would be willing to act alone to ensure its provision.

\textit{Hegemonic Co-operation}

It is the strong tendency toward free-riding in privileged groups that leads Duncan Snidal to suggest that hegemonic co-operation is more likely than collective action when a hegemonic state has a keen interest in the provision of a collective good.\textsuperscript{57} Theories of collective action are similar to theories of hegemonic co-operation and stability in that they both deal with the question of leadership in the provision of collective goods, international peace and stability in particular. The difference between the two theories is that collective action theories attempt to describe and

\textsuperscript{56} The issue of free-riding within NATO has been the subject of much debate. See, for example, Olson and Zeckhouser, "Economic Theory of Alliances," 266-279; Oneal, "Testing the Theory of Collective Action," 426-448; Sandler, \textit{Theory and Applications}; Oneal and Diehl, "NATO Defense Burdens," 373-396; and Goldstein, "Discounting the Free-ride," 39-71.

explain the conditions that need to exist in order to ensure that states co-operate in the provision of a collective good. While, hegemonic theories focus more on the hegemons themselves, the peace and stability that they provide, and the reasons why other states acquiesce to their leadership.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define hegemony as a situation in which “one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and is willing to do so.”58 As Keohane notes, hegemony and co-operation can be symbiotic because successful hegemonic leadership depends upon the co-operation of weaker states in the system. The hegemonic state uses its power and influence to provide an element of peace and stability to the international system in return for deference from the weaker states. What makes hegemonic stability different from imperialism, is the level of consensus upon which this arrangement is based.59

The Foundations of Hegemony

The source of hegemony is power, including military power. In most instances, however, a hegemon will gain co-operation from other states without the use, or threat, of overt force. Hegemonic co-operation is based, as Robert Gilpin notes, on a process of bargaining among states in which the outcomes are primarily determined by the relative prestige of the parties involved.60 It is based more on the manipulation of opportunity sets and the provision of positive incentives rather than the explicit threat of force or sanction.61 Hegemony depends upon the “subjective awareness by elites in secondary states that they are benefiting, as well as on the willingness of the hegemon itself to sacrifice short-term benefits for intangible long-term gains.”62

59 Keohane, After Hegemony.
62 Keohane, After Hegemony, 45.
The provision of peace as a public good is a fundamental component of hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability is most likely to occur when a single state has a strong enough private interest in ensuring peace, and is sufficiently larger than the other states that it captures a share of the benefits from peace that are larger than the entire cost of providing it. The two key conclusions that can be drawn from this assumption are that the presence of a dominant actor will lead to peace and stability, and that the other states in the system will find this to their advantage because they can enjoy the benefits of this stability without having to pay for it. When hegemonic states provide the public good of peace and stability, the rational response of the other states in the system is to attempt to free-ride on what has been provided.

It may be the case, however, that the hegemon will not allow other states to free-ride on its efforts to provide and maintain international peace and stability. It may instead be the case that the hegemon will ask other states to co-operate in the provision of these collective goods and solicit contributions from them.

**Beneficial and Coercive Models**

Duncan Snidal proposes two models of hegemonic leadership which both involve the provision of public goods and both predict that co-operation will occur making all states better off than they would have been had the hegemon not existed. In the first model, a benevolent hegemon is taken advantage of by the other smaller states in the system when they free-ride on the hegemon's interest in providing a public good. The hegemon is taken advantage of by the other states because it is neither able to induce them to contribute to the cost of providing the good, nor able to exclude them from its benefits. In the second model, the hegemonic state resolves the free-riding problem by establishing itself as a centralised authority and coercing states to contribute in a manner similar to the government imposition of taxes. Within this latter model, the

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focus of theory shifts from a hegemon's ability to provide a public good, to its ability to coerce other states into contributing to it.

In some instances, the hegemon may not need to take specific action to coerce co-operation from other states. There are, in fact, several reasons why a state might automatically be willing to volunteer to co-operate with the hegemon and follow its lead. It may be the case that a state co-operates simply because it recognises the benefits of maintaining the status quo and wants to avoid the uncertainties of change. Or it may be that a state is willing to forego independent action for the sake of coordination or a sense of being linked to the hegemonic network. The potential advantages of being linked to such a network may be enhanced by perceived linkages between otherwise unrelated issue areas, such as military co-operation and trade agreements. Joseph Nye refers to this as the 'manipulation of interdependence.'

It may also be the case that if a state receives net benefits from the hegemon's leadership, the state may not only recognise this leadership as legitimate but also perceive itself as having a private interest in supporting the hegemon and reinforcing its position within the system. This may in itself represent a very powerful motivation for a state to volunteer co-operation with a hegemon.

When states are not automatically forthcoming, a hegemon can target individual states with both positive and negative incentives in an effort to secure their co-operation. Positive incentives could include, inter alia, the promise of closer diplomatic ties, military co-operation, backing for international loans, forgiveness of bilateral loans, or direct development assistance. Negative incentives, or punishments

66 Gilpin, War and Change, 30.
for not co-operating, could include a threat to weaken diplomatic ties or block international funding through international monetary institutions. Alternatively, negative incentives could include a threat by the hegemon to withhold or generally reduce existing levels of diplomatic, military, and economic support. A very powerful hegemon may also be in the position to threaten states with isolation from their extensive hegemonic network. If there is a single dominant hegemon, and given the interdependent nature of international relations, this could effectively mean isolation from most of the international system as a whole.

*Whose Public Goods*

In adopting the assumption that hegemonic states may use negative forms of coercion (such as a threat to reduce or even cancel foreign aid) to secure co-operation from other states it is no longer possible to retain the assumption that such co-operation is necessarily mutually beneficial. By using strong negative forms of coercion to secure co-operation, a hegemon may determine the appropriate level of contribution from states without clear regard for the level of benefits that will be enjoyed by those states. The hegemon can, and most likely will, manipulate the relationship between costs and benefits to suit its own national interests. As Robert Keohane notes, hegemonic stability is likely to involve a certain amount of constraint and exploitation. For why would a rational, purposeful, hegemonic state use its power only in the pursuit of public goods and not at least try to obtain some level of private benefit from a collective action, at the expense of others?  

Multilateral action in the pursuit of collective goods is not always going to be based on a mutual recognition of identical or even shared interests. Nor can it be assumed that the existence of co-operation means an absence of conflict. Multilateralism is not necessarily based on harmony, it is more likely to be based on a process of bargaining and compromise that is aimed at avoiding the consequences of conflicting interests.  

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It is not realistic then, to automatically assume that an act of hegemonic co-operation is not also an example of multilateralism. An action can still be considered to multilateral if there is the \textit{a priori} recognition by all parties to the bargaining process that the hegemon’s interests are going to carry the most weight.

Hegemonic co-operation may not depend upon identical interests or an absence of conflict but it does, at least at a theoretical level, rely on the principles of free choice and voluntary deference. Whatever the relative power of a hegemon, maintaining a co-operative order through the use of force would be a very costly and, some would argue, self-defeating adventure.\textsuperscript{72} This means that unless a hegemon has imperial ambitions, it has a long-term interest in self-restraint in terms of its capacity to manipulate the costs and benefits of collective action. Hegemons have a continuing interest in creating an international order that others perceive as acceptable. States are more likely to volunteer co-operation, or provide it at a reasonable cost, if they view the hegemonic international order as being beneficial to their own interests and do not see it as being grossly exploitative.

A hegemonic state also has an interest in attempting to solidify and protect its position of power within the global architecture. It has an interest in trying to influence the ‘rules of the game’ in a manner that reflects and supports its own interests.\textsuperscript{73} This can translate into a long-term interest in establishing global international institutions that reinforce its powerful position and reflect its own national interests.\textsuperscript{74} Once again, however, to be sustainable over the long term these rules and institutions would need to be perceived as mutually beneficial and could not be seen by other states as simply the instruments of domination and exploitation.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. 45.
\textsuperscript{73} Gilpin, \textit{War and Change}, 36.
A Question of Legitimacy

Even when hegemonic states resort to the use of negative incentives in an effort to induce co-operation, and even if they manipulate the rules of the game to suit their own national interests, other states may still choose to follow their lead. States will continue to recognise hegemonic leadership as being legitimate as long as they remain net beneficiaries under this leadership.\textsuperscript{75} States will continue to co-operate with a hegemon as long as the benefits of doing so continue to outweigh the perceived costs of challenging the hegemon in an attempt to alter the system.\textsuperscript{76} The more powerful a hegemon is, the more costly a leadership challenge would be, and the more likely it is that states will choose to co-operate with the hegemon in a specific collective action even when it is not to their immediate benefit.\textsuperscript{77}

As soon as the subordinate states within the system start to question the benefits of continued co-operation with a hegemon, then the costs of ensuring that co-operation begin to escalate. The more a hegemon attempts to exploit states, and the more often it acts to coerce their co-operation in narrowly self-interested collective ventures, the more the subordinate states will chafe against the hegemon's lead.\textsuperscript{78} Eventually, and if the hegemon increasingly resorts to the use of negative forms of coercion and punishment, the costs of maintaining a hegemonic order could escalate to the point where the hegemon finds itself facing the prospect of having to militarily defend its own version of international order and stability. When this happens, co-operation can no longer be considered to be multilateral. Deference can no longer be considered voluntary, and the international situation can no longer be described as one of hegemonic stability. It has, instead, become a situation of imperial domination.

Freedom to Follow

\textsuperscript{74} Keohane, \textit{After Hegemony}, 40-45. See also, Nye, \textit{Bound to Lead}, 32-33.
\textsuperscript{75} Snidal, "Hegemonic Stability Theory," 593.
\textsuperscript{76} Gilpin, \textit{War and Change}, 51
\textsuperscript{77} Keohane, \textit{After Hegemony}, 53-54.
\textsuperscript{78} Snidal, "Hegemonic Stability Theory," 582.
When a particularly powerful hegemon exists, some would question the assumptions of free choice and voluntary deference that underpin hegemonic stability theory. These assumptions may be questionable even when the hegemon does not resort to the use of overt military force. When the hegemon enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of power, and particularly if there is only a single hegemon within the global system, are the weaker states in the system genuinely free to reject its leadership?\textsuperscript{79}

While a powerful hegemon may be reluctant to engage in overt military threats in order to secure a co-operative attitude from states it may not be so cautious when it comes to wielding its powerful economic sword. For a smaller state in the international system the withdrawal of bilateral economic support from the U.S. could, for example, have a devastating impact on its economy and be seriously detrimental to the welfare of its people. The impact of such an action at the bilateral level could then be compounded by a threat to block efforts to obtain alternative economic support through global financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. Given the interconnected nature of the existing international system, and the senior position of the U.S. in the web of institutions that help facilitate international interaction, some would argue that it would be nearly impossible to escape the reach and wrath of the U.S. without withdrawing from the international system altogether.

While hegemonic stability may be predicated on the theoretical assumptions of free choice and voluntary deference, in the real world less powerful states are so constrained by the power of a global hegemon that deference could arguably signify only the reluctant recognition of an unavoidable reality.

\textit{In the Real World}

\textsuperscript{79} Keohane, \textit{After Hegemony}, 71.
In attempting to analyse hegemonic co-operation as it occurs in the real world among sovereign, but largely interdependent, states it would not be productive to try to characterise hegemonic leadership as either complete dominance or selflessness. In the real world hegemonic leadership provides a mix of pure and impure public goods along with a whole range of joint products and this is done on the basis of a mixed range of motivations.

In the real world, hegemonic leadership conforms exclusively to neither the beneficial nor the coercive model. Nor do hegemons tend to use their power only in the selfless pursuit of public goods without attempting to maximise their own private benefits in the process. It is rational for any state to attempt to maximise the private benefits to be gained from a collective action and hegemonic states are not exempt from such rationality simply because they are leading the action.

It is in fact the manipulation of this rational effort to maximise the private benefits of collective action that forms the very basis of Olson’s collective action theory. According to this theory, international co-operation can only occur under conditions of anarchy if a powerful state, or coalition of states, undertakes a leadership role and manipulates the private benefits for other group members in order to gain their cooperation. Without this leadership, co-operation without some form of overarching government would not occur and public goods would not be provided.

Assumptions about Reciprocity and the Introduction of Values

Both Michael Taylor and Robert Axelrod disagree with Mancur Olson’s assumption of the need for leadership in the collective provision of a public good. They do not agree that leadership is essential because they deny the need for individually targeted,

80 Ibid. 138.
or private, inducements in order to ensure group co-operation in the pursuit of collective goals.\textsuperscript{82}

To counter Olson's assessment Taylor and Axelrod introduce the issue of reciprocity and expectations to their analysis of international co-operation and the institutions that support it. Within their work they also re-introduce the idea of \textit{a priori} value preferences and non-tangible forms of coercion that emanate from a system of interactions. In doing so, Taylor and Axelrod provide an opening within Prisoner's Dilemma games for the input of constructivist theories in regard to the role of values and the impact of international norms. Both Taylor and Axelrod build upon the logic of co-operation by exploring iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.

\textit{The Prisoner's Dilemma}

To explain why co-operation under anarchy is very unlikely, theorists use the logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. This game assumes that two prisoners are faced with two possible strategies when they are confronted by a guard's questioning in regard to their secret escape plan (the collective good).\textsuperscript{83} Within the game, each prisoner is interrogated separately and told that she (or he) will receive no punishment if the guards can not prove that there is an escape plan. She will have only one year added to her sentence if she admits that there is a plan to escape, but two years will be added if she says that there is no plan and then her fellow prisoner admits that there is one. Under such a schema, both prisoners will have no extra time added to their sentence if they co-operate with each other and conceal the escape plan. If one defects and blows the whistle, and the other does not, the whistle blower will only have to serve one additional year while the prisoner that continued to co-operate and kept the plan a secret will face two additional years. If both prisoners defect and admit to the plan, they will both receive only the one additional year punishment.


\textsuperscript{83} This is only one of several variations of the game that all use the same payoff matrix and aim to establish the same logic.
According to Olson’s logic, without any certainty about what the other prisoner will do, it would not be rational for either of the prisoner’s to continue to co-operate and keep the escape plan a secret. In doing so they would risk the maximum two-year punishment. Instead, it would be rational for both prisoners to defect and admit to the plan in an effort to avoid the maximum punishment. They will do this even though they know that neither of them would have been punished if they had both continued to co-operate and kept the plan a secret. At the same time, if the plan had been kept a secret, the ultimate payoff would have been that they could have gone ahead with it and both escaped (the collective good would have been provided.)

Reiterated Games
According to Taylor, when Olson’s assumptions about the need for some form of leadership to ensure co-operation are applied to Prisoner’s Dilemma games, they only hold true when single rounds of the game are played and when future games are not considered. In a single game the choice of a strategy, defection or co-operation, is a static one, in multiple round games this is not the case. In iterated, or multiple-round, games there is both a past and a present, and players have both memory and expectations. Both Taylor and Axelrod argue that iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games are a more accurate reflection of the real world in which the future can influence present choices in terms of the expectation of reciprocity and future benefits.

The Impact of Reciprocity
The importance of reciprocity is based upon the durability of the relationship between the individuals involved in the interaction. There must be an assumption held on both sides that continued interactions are highly likely. This assumption of continued interaction influences the choices made in current games because individuals may choose to co-operate based on an expectation of reciprocal behaviour in future encounters with the other members of the group. Taylor and Axelrod suggest, then,
that it is this expectation of reciprocity, rather than a question of trust, that influences decisions regarding co-operation.\textsuperscript{84}

Both Taylor and Axelrod recognise that the impact of a concern for reciprocity is not only dependent upon a certainty of future interaction but also on the value given to the payoffs associated with these future interactions.\textsuperscript{85} If individuals place a high value on the expectation of future reciprocity, co-operation becomes more likely. This is because individuals will be more likely to pay the costs associated with the current co-operative action, even when they have little direct interest in the specific goal sought, in an effort to ensure reciprocal co-operation from other group members in the future. The logic here is that individuals will co-operate with other group members in the pursuit of collective goals that these members value highly, in the hope that this action will be reciprocated in the future in relation to their own highly valued collective goals. This logic is based on the assumption that all group members share a rational aim to utilise the collective efforts of others in the seeking of collective goals. That is, they all have a desire to share the burdens of achieving a collective goal.

\textit{The Value of Co-operation}

Taylor and Axelrod also distance their discussion of co-operation from Olson’s work by introducing the concept of \textit{a priori} value preferences. They do this by according the highest scores to mutually co-operative strategies within their Prisoner’s Dilemma games. This scoring system implies that the co-operative provision and maintenance of international peace is the maximum payoff of international co-operation. Taylor ties his scoring system to the real world with the value-laden, but largely unexplained, premise that ‘men prefer peace.’\textsuperscript{86} He also criticises Olson’s assumption

\textsuperscript{84} Axelrod states this explicitly, \textit{Evolution of Co-operation}, 175-176.

\textsuperscript{85} For a similar but more contemporary discussion see Bennett and Lepgold, “Reinventing Collective Security,” 213-235, especially page 221.

\textsuperscript{86}Taylor, \textit{Anarchy and Co-operation}, 102.
that additional individual inducements are necessary to ensure co-operation as being too deeply grounded within a Hobbesian world view.

In rejecting a Hobbesian world view and adopting the assumption that peace is preferable, Taylor is then able to suggest that there are many additional payoffs provided by the act of co-operation itself. In other words, co-operation is considered to be valuable because it is a method of achieving peace. If peace is highly valued, and co-operation is considered to bring peace, then co-operation itself can be considered to be a goal. So too can the establishment of a co-operative international order. This is consistent with a liberal institutionalist view of international order.

Socialisation and Self-Restraint
Taylor also suggests that a government or hegemon is not needed to coerce co-operation from states because the international system of interactions can provide its own form of coercion. He argues that in the real world, actors operate within a system of internalised restraints provided by public pressure that has been ritualised in conventional methods of public rebuke. He argues that Hobbes had also allowed for the impact of such factors on the behaviour of individuals, although he assumed that they would not be strong enough to have much impact. Taylor does not expand upon this issue any further, but his arguments are consistent with the constructivist assumption that national interests are partially defined in terms of self-perceptions of national identity and role.

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87 Ibid. 7.
88 W. David Clinton agrees that questions of international order, such as those relating to co-operation, may be understood in the context of goals but he argues that these types of 'rules of the game' goals are distinguishable by their procedural rather purposeful nature. In this sense, he argues that international co-operation is a means to achieving other, more purposeful, foreign policy goals. W. David Clinton, “Global Goals and American Foreign Policy,” in McGhee et al, National Interest and Global Goals, 111-116. See also Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 68-70.
89 Taylor, Anarchy and Co-operation, 114.
90 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, 13-35.
Within the constructivist school the international structure is not considered to be objective. It is instead considered to be a social structure that is derived from the mutual understanding of constitutive and procedural norms and beliefs on the part of its members. Within this context, the impact of international regimes and norms is considered to have a significant influence on state behaviour. This influence stems from the fact that national interests and perceptions of national identity are not only constructed internally within a state, but also externally through continuing processes of international interaction. Policymakers’ assumptions about what would be considered to be appropriate international behaviour for their state are constructed around ideas and beliefs about their own state and the role of that state within the international system.

Conclusion

The different material and ideational factors that shape policymakers’ understanding of U.S. national interests and the role that multilateralism and the UN can play in their pursuit, is the focus of the following chapter. The aim of the present chapter has been to set up this discussion using insights drawn from various schools of intellectual thought regarding the circumstances in which co-operation is likely to occur among sovereign states operating in an anarchical international environment. These insights relate to the potential role of international institutions in the international arena, the logic of collective action, and the role of hegemonic leadership, and the potential influence of liberal value systems on a policy maker’s preferences for a co-operative international system.

In the following chapter, these theoretical insights are used to help explain competing domestic perceptions regarding an appropriate role for multilateralism and the UN within post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. These insights also provide the theoretical basis for the selection of U.S. national interests as independent variables and the influence of the executive world view, Congress, and the senior military leadership as intervening variables. They also provide the logic upon which this study draws its
assumptions regarding the causal relationships between the variables and through which it attempts to prove its overall hypothesis relating to the role of multilateralism and the UN within post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy.
Chapter Two

U.S. Interests, Multilateralism and the UN

Introduction

The chapter begins with a brief explanation of why it is important to combine insights from competing schools of intellectual thought when trying to gain an understanding of U.S. national interests in the post-Cold War world. These competing insights are then used to elaborate upon a framework for analysing U.S. national interests that is used throughout the case study chapters. To help gain a more in depth understanding of how different national interests compete for the attention of policymakers, this chapter is used to draw the theoretical insights provided in the previous chapter into a discussion of domestic U.S. foreign policy debates. Of key interest here, is how competing conceptions of the nature of international relations, and differing interpretations of American exceptionalism and the U.S. international role, have influenced perceptions regarding the U.S. interest in multilateralism and the UN.

It is a fundamental tenet of this study that foreign policy decisions, particularly when it comes to matters involving the possible use of force, are made primarily within the executive branch of government in response to international factors. At the same time, however, it is also recognised that there are several key variables that can generally intervene in the executive’s decision making processes and serve as a constraint on its response to international events. These variables are discussed in the penultimate section of this chapter.
A Combined Theoretical Approach

Several recent works within the study of international relations theory have highlighted the need to reconnect the role of norms with positivist assumptions about rationality.1 Similarly, several scholars have argued against the tendency to place constructivist assumptions about the role of ideas and norms in opposition to neorealist and neoliberal assumptions about the role of power and economic interests in shaping state behaviour.2 It is not the case that either a realist, liberal, or constructivist interpretation of state interests and behaviour can best explain state action, so much as some form of combination of the three. In this respect, the national interests of states are not only derived from policymakers’ perceptions of the material conditions of their domestic and international environments they are also constructed from their ideas and expectations about these environments.

This said, this dissertation does not aim to deconstruct U.S. national interests. What it seeks instead is to incorporate a discussion of how policymakers’ perceptions of U.S. values, identity, and role in the post-Cold War world served to influence their perceptions of the role of UN-based multilateralism within post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. This relates to how values and self-perceptions of identity and role have not only shaped the goals sought within U.S. foreign policy but also the means chosen to pursue them.

A Framework for Analysis: U.S. National Interests

Each of the case studies presented in this thesis, is structured around an examination of how senior administration policymakers believed a particular conflict to affect a number of key independent and intervening variables. The independent variables are represented by four categories of U.S. national interests.

1. The protection and promotion of military security
2. The protection and promotion of economic security
3. The protection and promotion of favourable value systems
4. The protection and promotion of a favourable international order.

The independent variables are general categories of interests, rather than specific interests, in recognition of the fact that there are enduring characteristics to U.S. national interests, along with elements that are fluid and open to interpretation and change. The framework is aimed at providing the ‘material and ideational setting’ for the analysis of each case study. It makes it possible to not only explore specific contingency based material goals and policies within each case study situation, but

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also the broader ideas, perceptions, and values that shape them.\textsuperscript{6}

All four categories of interests will combine to influence policy-making. They will shape the formulation of specific foreign policy goals and priorities, which will alter and evolve as each contingency proceeds and its perceived impact on U.S. national interests changes. The amount of influence that each national interest has in terms of shaping specific foreign policy goals will also depend upon a number of domestic factors that can intervene in the decision making process. These factors include the world view of key executive officers and also the views of Congress and the senior military establishment. These intervening variables will be discussed in more detail below.

\textit{To Protect and Promote Military Security}

The protection and promotion of military security is the most crucial of U.S. national interests. When military security interests face an immediate threat, or potential exists for a high level threat to develop, this will serve as the primary, if not sole, influence on foreign policy decision making. The protection and promotion of military security involves the protection of the territorial and political sovereignty of the U.S. and its key allies. Also included is the protection of U.S. citizens both inside the continent of the United States and abroad. The U.S. has an interest in defending these interests when directly threatened and also in taking measures to prevent potential threats from developing.

The U.S. seeks military security in two ways.\textsuperscript{7} The U.S. will always seek power in order to maintain its ability to defend itself within an anarchical and inherently


\textsuperscript{7} Hans J. Morgenthau describes the two sources of peace as being the self-regulator mechanism of the balance of power that manifests itself in terms of the struggle for power, and also the normative limitations that are placed on this struggle in the form of international law, international morality, and world public opinion. Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations}, 26. Also see discussion of these two aspects of U.S. national security see von Vorys, \textit{American National Interest}, 149-159.
insecure international system. To this end, the U.S. will promote an international order that solidifies and strengthens its preeminent position within the balance of power. This aspect of U.S. military security involves a hegemonic U.S. that maximises its power and is willing to use it unilaterally in the pursuit and defence of its own interests. Within this vision the U.S. not only uses its military and economic power, but also the influence that accompanies it, to shape the actions of other states in a manner that is consistent with its own interests.

The other way in which the U.S. seeks to protect and promote its military security is by reducing the level of uncertainty that emanates from the anarchical international system. The U.S. does this through establishing and promoting international institutions that attempt to recreate, on a global scale, the type of liberal order upon which the U.S. itself is based. This aspect of U.S. military security will be elaborated in more detail within the discussion of U.S. international order interests below.

To Protect and Promote Economic Security

There are also two facets to the protection and promotion of U.S. economic security interests. Realists would argue that the pursuit of economic prosperity is inextricably linked to military security because it facilitates the pursuit of power. As such, an extreme threat to U.S. economic interests, such as the denial of access to

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8 Lincoln Bloomfield suggests that the essential difference between military security and world order visions of international order relates to the time frame over which U.S. security is considered. An emphasis on military security reflects a short-term view while a focus on world order demonstrates a longer-term perspective. Lincoln Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960, 32.

9 W. Michael Reisman, “The United States and International Institutions,” Survival, 41, 4, Winter 1999-2000, 65. James Mayall argues that the international order that was established in 1945 was based on a rough domestic analogy but that this order was based on social democratic rather than classical liberal values. See James Mayall, “Nationalism and International Security After the Cold War,” Survival, 34, 1, Spring 1992, 28. See also, discussion in Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism,” Foreign Policy, 60, Fall 1985, 148-167.

global supplies of raw materials, would be considered to be a threat to military security.\(^{11}\) While liberal theorists would agree that economic strength serves to enhance the power and security of a state, they would also argue that the primary objective of economic activity is to serve the interests of individual consumers.\(^{12}\)

The protection and promotion of U.S. economic security includes both these aspects; maintaining the economic strength of the state, and promoting the economic prosperity of its citizens. The U.S. has a strong interest in securing access to foreign markets and natural resources, maintaining the value of the U.S. dollar in international finance markets, and in providing for the economic well being of its citizens. Many of these specific interests are reflected in the broader U.S. interest in maintaining an open, principled and stable global system of international trade and investment.

While U.S. economic security interests form a component of U.S. military security, they are nonetheless secondary to these latter interests. While economic and military interests are often served by the same foreign policies and objectives, when the two sets of interests conflict, military security interests are given priority.

*To Protect and Promote Favourable Value Systems*

Again, there are two aspects to the U.S. interest in protecting and promoting favourable values systems. This interest relates not only to the types of goals the U.S. pursues within its foreign policy, but also the method in which it chooses to pursue them. The link between these two aspects will be discussed in the following section relating to U.S. international order interests. This current section of the study focuses only on U.S. value systems as they relate to the goals of U.S. foreign policy.

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From a constructivist perspective, John Ruggie suggests that American core values are overwhelmingly liberal and that they consist of "intrinsic individual as opposed to group rights, anti-statism, the rule of law, and a revolutionary legacy which holds that human betterment can be achieved by means of deliberate human actions, especially when they are pursued in accordance with these foundational values." This generally liberal interpretation of U.S. values began with the nation's founding documents and it is, in the main, not contested among foreign policymakers or within any of the major schools of intellectual thought.

What does shift between schools of political and ideological thought, however, is the choice of emphasis within this general definition. A liberal theoretical interpretation may focus more on the economic aspect of American values and, for example, suggest that the country's founders viewed America as "a new form of political community, dedicated to the Enlightenment principles of the rule of law, private property, representative government, freedom of speech and religion, and commercial liberty." Whereas a realist may choose to instead emphasise U.S. independence from external control and its freedom from the entanglements of European power politics.

Arising out of the debate over emphasis, is a long running dispute that questions the extent to which the protection and promotion of U.S. value systems should be

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translated into the pursuit of specific value-based foreign policy goals. George Kennan, for example, is often quoted as having complained about the American tendency to view “tough foreign policy choices through ‘legalistic-moralist’ lenses” which he saw to be a complication to the “straightforward pursuit of national interests.” Constructivists would argue, however, that this ‘legalistic-moralistic’ bent to U.S. foreign policy represents a fundamental component of U.S. national interest that is derived from collective self-perceptions of American identity.

During the Cold War, the link between the value-based components of U.S. national interests and the nation’s foreign policy was primarily expressed in terms of the struggle against Soviet communism. At this point in time, America’s sense of self-identity was derived, to a very large extent, from the context provided by this struggle. This served to generate consensus within the foreign policy making community because it tied U.S. value interests to the goal of defeating the Soviet threat.

When the Cold War first ended, a whole new debate opened up about how great an interest the U.S. holds in regard to the pursuit of value-based goals such as the alleviation of human suffering, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of democracy. This question was very closely related to the early post-Cold War search for an appropriate role for the U.S. in the absence of an overarching threat to its security. To a large extent, policymakers explored both these questions within the context of the U.S. response to the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. How policymakers attempted to balance the pursuit of value-based humanitarian goals with material goals derived from U.S. military and

economic security interests is a key feature of the case study discussions presented in the following chapters.

To Protect and Promote a Favourable International Order

An enduring interest in protecting and promoting a favourable international order is based upon both the material and ideational aspects of U.S. interests. An international order that would be considered favourable to the U.S. would facilitate the protection and promotion of U.S. military and economic security and value-based interests, in a manner that is on the whole consistent with self-perceptions of U.S. identity.

There are two, sometimes competing, aspects to the U.S. interest in protecting and promoting a favourable international order. One aspect involves the maximisation of U.S. power and freedom of action in order to maintain the independent capacity to defend U.S. interests against potential threats. The other vision involves the establishment of a more peaceful, ordered, principled, predictable, and less threatening international environment based on the same types of liberal values and institutions that have brought relative peace to the U.S. at the domestic level. The two alternative views of a favourable international order reflect a realist and a liberal institutional world view respectively.

A Realist Vision

Within a realist vision of a beneficial international order, the ability of the U.S. to protect and promote its interests derives from its position of power within the international system. A favourable international order under this vision, would require that the U.S. maintain, if not, increase its position of power relative to the

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19 Alvin Rubinstein argues that when policymakers focus on U.S. value interests they tend to overestimate the level of importance of international institutions. See discussion in Rubinstein, America's National Interest, 58.
other states within the system. Furthermore, as security under such a system depends upon the U.S. capacity to use its power in defence of its interests, this security depends upon the U.S. fully retaining its freedom to exercise its power and influence.

Within such an international order the U.S. would maintain a unilateral stance and avoid the potential entanglements and constraints associated with multilateral institutions such as the UN. What the supporters of a unilateral foreign policy argue, is that the range of options open to the U.S. should not be subjected to the constraints imposed by a multilateral framework of action. The U.S. should not be constrained from using its preponderance of power in the pursuit of its own national interests.

This unilateral view is not the same as isolationism. Isolationism means an inward focus and an aim to protect the U.S. from the dangers of the international system by withdrawing from it. In contrast, a unilateral foreign policy can still be very international, if not, interventionist. Nor does a unilateral foreign policy preclude the possibility of pursuing value-based or humanitarian goals in the absence of material U.S. national interests. What it means instead, is that the U.S. should act alone to promote these goals in the manner and to the extent that it sees fit. The U.S. should not bind itself up within a multilateral or institutional effort that has been forced to accommodate the views and interests of others states that may have very different agenda’s to that of the U.S. Nor should the U.S. risk being restrained by the lowest common denominator decision making that often results from the consensus seeking process that takes place within multilateral institutions. When a consensus is not possible, the U.S. should not be bound by the rules of a multilateral institution to the point where it is unable to take action unilaterally in the pursuit of value-based interests.

**Liberal Vision**

Within the alternative, liberal, vision of a favourable international order the U.S. would work to protect and promote its military and economic security and value-based interests through internationally recognised frameworks of laws and agreements, and not solely through its ability to project its power and influence.\(^{21}\)

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the faith in America’s universal mission had evolved into the conviction that the key to international well-being resided in extending to the rest of the world the achievements underlying the American success story.\(^{22}\)

This approach to international order is underpinned by Immanuel Kant’s assumptions about the relationship between liberal institutions and peace. Kant argued that liberal institutions characterised by the rule of law, the respect for human rights, the nonviolent and compromise oriented resolution of domestic conflicts, and participatory opportunities for its citizens are a necessary condition for peace.\(^{23}\)

In 1992, the U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, described a ‘democratic peace’ as being “… a peace based on the same values upon which our own great nation is founded: responsible representative government, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and private property.”\(^{24}\) He stated that “Shared democratic values can ensure an enduring and stable peace in a way the balance of terror never could. Real

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22 Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy*, 240.
democracies do not go to war with each other.”

Baker also made explicit the link between a democratic international order and U.S. economic interests when he went on to state that “…while democracy will support our security, the free markets that go along with it will support global – and American – prosperity.” Linking a ‘democratic peace’ to U.S. economic prosperity assumes that a reduction in the level of military insecurity would allow the U.S. to focus more of its resources toward protecting and promoting economic security interests. It also assumes that U.S. economic interests would be more likely to flourish in an international system in which individual and state investments and financial interests were protected by an accepted framework of rules and regulations.

The U.S. has a strategic interest in both visions of international order. It has what is considered to be a vital interest in maintaining its [now pre-eminent] position within the international power hierarchy. At the same time, it has an interest in shaping the ‘rules of the game’ that suit its own interests and values. The U.S. also has an interest in establishing and supporting global institutions that organise the relations between states in a manner that reflects its own liberal democratic values.

**U.S. Hegemony**

To ensure the sustainability of its powerful position, the U.S. has a strong interest in protecting and promoting an international order that is not only conducive to its own national interests but is also perceived to be acceptable, if not beneficial, to other states. By promoting an international order that is based on rules and laws that are congenial to U.S. values and interests, and then itself practising self-restraint and acting in accordance with them, the U.S. aims to legitimate its use of power within

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the international arena and in doing so limit resistance to it.\textsuperscript{27} This can, as Joseph Nye notes, simply be motivated by a pragmatic 'self interest in an interdependent world, rather than a desire to improve the world or an ideology of collectivism.'\textsuperscript{28} By entrenching its own values and principles within global institutions, the U.S. is simply attempting to promote their universality and enhance their legitimacy and, in doing so, ensure the longevity of its hegemony.

While the tendency to impose its own values and perspectives on subordinate states often makes the U.S. a target of complaint, many critics recognise that this aspect of its foreign policy is not to be unexpected from a hegemonic power.\textsuperscript{29} As William Wallace notes, the stance of the European Union to its dependent neighbours displays many of the same tendencies.\textsuperscript{30} In this context, the U.S. can be described as having a pragmatic strategic interest in maintaining a favourable international order based on mutually beneficial hegemonic co-operation.

\textbf{American Exceptionalism: Competing Tendencies in U.S. Foreign Policy}

As the above discussion of the four categories of national interests has started to demonstrate there are a number of competing and potentially contradictory tendencies within U.S. foreign policy. These contradictory tendencies are rooted in U.S. perceptions about its own liberal identity and also its sense of exceptionalism. It is this sense of exceptionalism, particularly, that pulls the nation in two different directions, encouraging both an urge to "go it alone" and a desire to "go it with

From a constructivist perspective, self-perceptions of U.S. identity are not only constructed internally, they are also defined externally through the nation’s relationship with the rest of the world. It is here that the sense of American exceptionalism becomes evident, because perceptions of this relationship often reflect a sense that the U.S. holds a special place in the world because of the ‘righteousness’ of its foundational values. Stewart Patrick provides a revealing interpretation of American exceptionalism when he describes it as being “a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, immutability, and superiority of the country’s founding liberal principles, accompanied by a conviction that the United States has a special destiny among nations.”

This sense of exceptionalism is evident across the ideological spectrum. In describing the Founding Father’s views of the American tradition, the relatively conservative thinker Henry Kissinger admits that:

...Americans then and now viewed their nation as motivated by higher principles than those of the Old World, which they imagined reflected the basically selfish aspirations of monarchs. By contrast, the American republic was viewed as operating according to the dictates of enlightened rationalism... America’s actions could therefore never be purely selfish: by its very nature, America constituted a universal cause.

John Mearsheimer offers a similar recognition when he complains that Americans would reject a foreign policy based only on raw realist power politics because it “clashes with their basic values” and is “opposed to how most Americans prefer to think about themselves and the wider world.” Americans, because of the

32 Ibid. 7.
33 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy, 237-238.
circumstances of its founding, want to see their nation’s foreign policy as moral, generous, and just.

This sense of exceptionalism is often referred to by both foreign policy officials and analysts in an effort to explain a whole range of U.S. foreign policy goals. It is particularly evident when backing up claims that the U.S. not only has an interest, but a special moral responsibility, to actively pursue humanitarian and value-based goals within its foreign policy.\footnote{See discussions in Rubinstein, \textit{America’s National Interest}, 51 and Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, \textit{The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America’s Purpose}, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, 24.}

\textit{American Individualism}

Critics of U.S. foreign policy suggest that the sense of American exceptionalism, coupled with its growing hegemony, has led to a tendency for U.S. policymakers to assume that American values and value-based goals are universal. What makes this particularly problematic, even for U.S. allies who share a general liberal ideology, is that the American liberal tradition is not the only one. American liberal democracy places an intrinsic emphasis on individual, versus collective rights. This contrasts to the social democratic model, prevalent in Western Europe and also many parts of the developing world, which places a much greater level of emphasis on collective rights.

In an effort to protect individual rights and freedoms, American liberalism has emphasised the need to limit government interference in the affairs of its citizens. As Michael Bolton notes:

\begin{quote}
[T]he entire history of the United States, from the first colonists through the Revolution, and forward until today, has been infused with a distrust of government and a belief in individual liberty. The United States is a land of lower taxes, more private property, less government regulation and subsidy, greater freedom of speech and press, more toleration of
\end{quote}
diverse religious expression, and on and on.\textsuperscript{36}

Edward Luck suggests that the American preference for limited government is also derived from its history and its sense of self as having an "...independent, pioneering, and self-reliant spirit." This predisposition towards a 'self help' system also makes Americans inherently adverse to socialistic welfare models of government, regardless of whether they contain elements of authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{37}

A singular emphasis on individual freedoms and the desire to minimise government interference at the domestic level would translate into unilateralism and a desire to minimise multilateral constraints at the international level. From this perspective, U.S. national sovereignty is considered to be a precious and somewhat fragile commodity that is to be protected from interference, particularly by international institutions such as the UN.\textsuperscript{38} This perspective would be in strong contrast to the predominant view held by the governments and publics in many other market economies around the world, particularly in Western Europe. Citizens within many of these countries have already become accustomed to the idea of a gradual erosion of sovereignty in certain respects, as well as the need to 'pool' sovereignty in others.\textsuperscript{39}

The American liberal emphasis on individual rights is, arguably, in direct contrast to the equally powerful American belief in the value of liberal democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is within this latter context that John Ruggie suggests, "A multilateral vision of world order is singularly compatible with America's collective self-concept as a nation. Indeed, the vision taps into the very idea of America."\textsuperscript{40} This aspect of American values, along with its self-perception of having a unique role to play in human history, have sometimes combined into what Stewart Patrick calls a

\textsuperscript{39} Patrick, “Multilateralism and its Discontents,” 17.
“crusading zeal to recast international society in the U.S. domestic image.”

The UN and NATO

Towards the end of World War Two the U.S. enthusiasm for a liberal world order based on democratic institutions and the rule of law, led to the creation of the United Nations. This effort was underpinned by the recognition that, as the U.S. was unable to isolate itself from the international system, its interests would best be served by attempting to shape this system. As such, the U.S. worked towards ensuring that its own values and interests were reflected in the purposes, structures, and governing principles of the UN. In the UN, the U.S. achieved its goal of creating a global international institutional to reflect its own values and its own version of a favourable international order. The UN is underpinned by the principles of state sovereignty, international law, and a respect for individual human rights. Further the UN, at its very core, aims to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Yet, in helping to create the UN, policymakers were not completely rejecting a power focused realist vision of a favourable international order. One of the core military security benefits offered by the UN was that it institutionalised and solidified the post war position of the U.S. as a major global power. This position is institutionalised through the U.S. possession of veto power over the decisions of the UN Security Council.

It is the Security Council that is charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability and it is the only organ within the UN system which makes decisions that are binding on all member states. At the same

40 Ruggie, Winning the Peace, 25.
42 It was the U.S. Department of State that, in fact, prepared the original draft document that later became the Charter of the United Nations. Peter Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, 16.
time, however, the U.S. is only one of fifteen Security Council members. Of this fifteen there are four other permanent members that have also been afforded the power of veto over Council resolutions. This means that the potential of the U.S. to influence and shape the decisions of the UN Security Council is constrained significantly by the interests of other Council members, particularly the four other permanent members.

In an effort to ensure that that the U.S. would be able to side step the potential of the UN Security Council to constrain its foreign policy freedom, policymakers supported the creation of a regional collective security institution in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The establishment of NATO, which was consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter, served to institutionalise the U.S. commitment to the protection of Western European security.\textsuperscript{44} NATO also set in place a regional multilateral arrangement that would allow the U.S. to act “within the Charter, but outside the [Soviet] veto” in order to protect its European security interests.\textsuperscript{45}

The U.S. and Global Leadership

Institutionalising the U.S. power position within the UN Security Council did not just reflect a realist concern for the U.S. relative power position. Ensuring a special leadership role for the U.S. within the UN also sat well with domestic perceptions regarding the nation’s unique identity. The sense that the U.S. is special, that it is different from the rest of the world because of what it stands for, has helped contribute to a self-perception of the nation as a global leader rather than a follower.

\textsuperscript{44} Chapter VII, Article 51, of the UN Charter protects the rights of states to act individually, or collectively, in self-defence against an armed attack on a UN member state.
Self-perceptions of the nation’s global leadership role have been strengthened by its perceived victory over Soviet communism and its elevation to sole superpower status. Not only does the U.S. have the moral capacity to lead the world, it now has the economic and military power to do so. This rationale has the support of unilateralists, who use it as ammunition to fire in the direction of formal multilateral institutions such as the UN. If the U.S. has both might and right on it side, why should it allow itself to be constrained by the interests and views of others?\textsuperscript{46} This unilateral view is in the minority, however, and it conflicts with numerous opinion polls that suggest the U.S. general public is much more supportive of a shared international leadership role.\textsuperscript{47}

Critics suggest that the U.S. foreign policy making and academic communities do not share the general public’s preference for shared leadership. They suggest that within these two communities, the whole idea of U.S. global leadership is an almost automatic assumption that is rarely questioned.\textsuperscript{48} Jonathan Clarke, for example, notes that “There is so much intellectual and emotional capital invested in the concept of ‘America as number one’ that any questioning of it is usually dismissed as hangdog or unpatriotic.”\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Nye, Paradox of American Power, xiv.
International commentators also complain that this domestic belief in U.S. global leadership is too often accompanied by an assumption that U.S. leadership is not only considered to be acceptable, but preferable, by other states in the post-Cold War international system. They suggest that within the U.S. foreign policy making and academic communities, there is a prevalent notion that other states recognise U.S. hegemonic leadership as being beneficial, if not essential, to the maintenance of international peace and stability. During the Cold War, the U.S. legitimated its international leadership role by undertaking a larger share of the burden of containing Soviet communism. When liberalism triumphed over communism in the Cold War, U.S. policymakers assumed that this pragmatic recognition of the need for U.S. leadership would now be joined by a deeper, more widespread, desire for this leadership because of the universality of the liberal democratic values and principles that the U.S. promotes.

Other great powers often resent America's leadership, but their preference is for the U.S. to lead because they trust the U.S. more than they trust each other. America's indispensable role is based both on its power and its purpose, and no other state is yet able to compete with it on either ground, much less both at once.

Despite these assumptions, the U.S. leadership role is in fact regularly questioned, to varying degrees and for a variety of reasons, by practitioners and analysts outside the U.S. As Fareed Zakaria noted in regard to his adopted country's foreign policy, "One reads about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States. Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism."

The exercise of U.S. power in general, has arguably become more problematic in the post-Cold War world.\(^\text{54}\) During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union kept each other in check. The demise of the Soviet threat at the end of the Cold War removed this check on U.S. power and opened up new possibilities for U.S. global leadership. At the same time, it also introduced a much greater level of opportunity (or temptation?) for U.S. policymakers to pursue parochial and private interests.\(^\text{55}\) As a single global hegemon, the U.S. found itself in a position to play a much greater role in defining public goods. As an unrivalled hegemon, it was now in a much stronger position to (at least attempt) to unilaterally decide what actions were required to maintain a peaceful and stable international order. This is one of the issues that will be explored within the framework of the case studies.

**U.S. Multilateralism: In Principle and Practice**

Some would suggest that the competing aspects of America’s foreign policy combine to make it a strong supporter of multilateralism in principle, but a questionable multilateralist in practice. This ambivalence in practice, has resulted in a policy that has been described by some European critics as ‘unilateral multilateralism.’\(^\text{56}\) In this respect, America’s sense of individualism, righteousness, and both the need and desire for leadership are perceived as contradictory to the collective sense of solidarity that provides the foundation for multilateralism. Critics charge that the U.S. vision of a multilateral international order is, in reality, simply a hegemonic international order with the U.S. firmly ensconced in the paramount position. What the U.S. engages in, could not be described as genuine *multilateralism* because it much more closely resembles *coercive hegemonic co-operation*.\(^\text{57}\)

Defenders of U.S. policy offer an alternative interpretation. They suggest that while hegemonic theories can go a long way to explaining Western stability during the Cold

\(^{54}\) Ikenberry, “Getting Hegemony Right,” 17.

\(^{55}\) Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony,” 114-118.


\(^{57}\) Lebow and Kelly, “Thucydides and Hegemony,” 607.
War, the neorealist version of this theory is incomplete. As G. John Ikenberry notes, such views do not take into account “... the remarkably liberal character of American hegemony and the importance of international institutions in facilitating co-operation and overcoming fears of domination and exploitation.” While analysts such as Ikenberry agree that the U.S. version of co-operation may be hegemonic, they see it as a benevolent rather than coercive form of hegemony. In this respect, they view U.S.-led hegemonic co-operation as being consistent with the principles of multilateralism. These two views will be explored in more detail within the framework of the case studies.

**Domestic Foreign Policy Debates**

Debates over the role and purpose of U.S. foreign policy are, to a great extent, the international extension of domestic debates between competing liberal and conservative ideologies. The following discussion is aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of how competing ideologies and debates about U.S. national interest have shaped contemporary domestic debates regarding an appropriate role for multilateralism and the UN in U.S. foreign policy.

Eugene Wittkopf has suggested that domestic foreign policy thinkers can be grouped into four categories based on their attitudes to U.S. foreign policy: hard liners, internationalists, isolationists, and accommodationists. The four categories are divided on the basis of attitudes to internationalism. Hardliners support a militant form of internationalism and oppose cooperative forms. Accommodationists oppose

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militant forms of internationalism and support cooperative forms. Internationalists generally support either form of internationalism and isolationists oppose any form.\(^{61}\)

All three authors suggest that an isolationist perspective reflects an ultra conservative ideology. The hardliner view tends to reflect a conservative or Republican perspective, while liberals and Democrats tend toward the accommodationist perspective.\(^{62}\) All three authors also agree that the differences between the foreign policy beliefs of government leaders are relatively moderate and are related more closely to ideology than party affiliation.\(^{63}\) This may help explain why the internationalist foreign policy perspective, which supports a combination of unilateral or multilateral policies, draws its proponents from both political parties.\(^{64}\)

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61 Holsti and Rosenau, “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes,” 94.
62 This general assessment was also put forward by Morton Halperin, Senior Vice President, The Century Foundation, Washington, D.C. Former Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for Democracy on the staff of the National Security Council. Interview with Author, Washington, D.C., 8 April 1998.
64 Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 153.
Taking the four-type classification, along with the authors’ assumptions regarding the role of ideology, it is possible to make several generalisations about early post-Cold War debates regarding the role of multilateralism and the UN within U.S. foreign policy. Broadly speaking, these debates were shaped by those who either had an ideological aversion to multilateralism (conservative/isolationist and hardliners), an ideological predisposition toward multilateralism (liberal/accommodationists), or had adopted a more pragmatic, case by case, approach to multilateralism (conservative or liberal/internationalists).

Neo-Isolationism

After the Soviet communist threat receded, a small minority (less than five percent according the Ole Holsti)\(^65\) of opinion leaders called for a return to complete isolationism. The ultra conservative Patrick Buchanan suggested, for example, that:

> With the Cold War ending, we should look, too, with a cold eye on the internationalist set, never at a loss for new ideas to divert U.S. wealth and power into crusades and causes having little or nothing to do with the true national interest of the United States. ... How other people rule themselves is their own business. To call it a vital interest of the United States is to contradict history and common sense.\(^66\)

Total isolationism was, however, discredited as an appropriate foreign policy stance after the U.S. was drawn into World War II.\(^67\) It was replaced by a neo-isolationist view that is still associated with an ultra conservative minority viewpoint.\(^68\) Neo-isolationism is also less common among government leaders than the general

\(^{65}\) Ibid. 104.
\(^{66}\) Patrick Buchanan, “America First – and Second, and Third,” The National Interest, 19, Spring 1990, 81.
\(^{67}\) Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 25.
\(^{68}\) Ole Holsti puts opinion leader support for isolationism at 5% in 1992 and suggests that there is limited support for some aspects of isolationism. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 104, 110.
The majority of foreign policy debates assume an international U.S. role. These debates tend to focus on determining the range and extent of foreign policy goals and the appropriate method of their pursuit. As a general rule, liberal thinkers tend to consider the U.S. to have a keener interest in a wider range of goals than do their conservative or realist counterparts. This relates back to their perceptions of the U.S. role in protecting and promoting value-based goals as well as its role in shaping international order. As Charles Krauthammer notes in his provocative 1990 Foreign Affairs article:

> Isolationism is the most extreme expression of the American desire to return to tend its vineyards. But that desire finds expression in another far more sophisticated and serious foreign policy school: no isolationism but realism, the school that insists that American foreign policy be guided solely by interests and that generally defines these interests in a narrow and national manner.\(^{71}\)

**Unilateralism**

Hardline unilateralist thinking is also a minority view and, according to Holsti’s 1992 analysis, it reflects the perceptions of less than ten percent of U.S. opinion leaders.\(^{72}\) Unilateralists adhere to a realist view of the world in which the pursuit of power is the only national interest that matters in an anarchical and inherently insecure international environment. In a self-help international system, the only thing that states can rely on to ensure their protection and survival is their own capacity to exercise power and influence over other states. As such, it is crucial that they avoid any form of foreign entanglements, institutional or otherwise, that would curtail their

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\(^{69}\) Holsti and Rosenau, “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes,” 103.

\(^{70}\) Holsti states that at no point since polling began, has there ever been less than a three to two ratio of support for an internationalist foreign policy among the U.S. general public. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, 84. See also discussion in Kegley and Wittkopf, *Pattern and Process*, 286.


\(^{72}\) Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, 104.
freedom of action in any way. Supporters of this line of thinking translate a domestic liberal emphasis on the need to protect individual freedoms from government interference into a distrust of international institutions, particularly global ones.

In a similar context, unilateralists vehemently deny the UN Security Council a role in legitimating U.S. action. They say that to afford the UN such a role would be an attack on U.S. sovereignty and that the only body with the capacity to legitimate U.S. action is the American people.73

Some unilateralists are particularly suspicious of the UN because they see it as being dominated by social democratic ideologues bent on redistributing global wealth in the direction of the developing world.74 They see the UN as the “center of agitation against the democratic order” and an advocate of global socialism. The conservative thinker, Doug Bandow, once suggested that UN staff have discarded the appearance of neutrality and become, in effect, “union organizers for the Third World” who have “helped implement indigenous policies and reflecting the international collectivist ideology.”75

The proponents of a truly unilateral view are arguably in the very small, although often quite vocal, majority.76 Most conservatives are willing to admit that at least some level of multilateralism is helpful, if not necessary, to combat the myriad nature of foreign policy challenges that characterise modern international relations. Even the self-proclaimed unilateralist Charles Krauthammer admits that multilateralism can be useful under certain conditions and in the pursuit of certain objectives. He remains, however, extremely wary of the potential constraints involved.77 He warns against the

73 Helms, “American Sovereignty,” 32.
74 Luck, Mixed Messages, 98-104.
76 Nye, Paradox of American Power, 134 and Luck, Mixed Messages, 102.
U.S. ceding to these constraints because he does not believe that other states will necessarily cede to theirs. It is for this reason that he sees multilateralism as a having little long term promise as a reliable and sustainable solution to the challenges of U.S. foreign policy making.

I ideological Multilateralism

Many foreign policy thinkers, and a fifty two percent majority of opinion leaders, are ideologically opposed to this realist interpretation of U.S. rational interests in an anarchic international environment. In rejecting the realist source of national security, multilateralist thinkers focus instead on mitigating the conditions of anarchy. They try to do this by promoting international institutions that serve to consolidate at the international level, the same types of liberal democratic institutions that have brought peace and relative prosperity to the U.S. at the domestic level. Proponents of this view share an aim to solidify the role of liberal values and a respect for the rule of law by embedding them within a web of formal multilateral institutions. In this regard, they place a great emphasis on the legitimising function of the UN Security Council. Representatives of the Democratic party are more likely to have an ideological predisposition toward multilateralism and will place a greater emphasis on the legitimating function of the UN Security Council.

An ideological predisposition towards multilateralism is predicated on the assumption that U.S. liberal democratic values are morally correct and worthy of promotion universally. It is linked to domestic assumptions about the need for a foreign policy that reflects the nation’s foundation values, and relates to a desire for the U.S. to be seen to be acting in a manner that is consistent with these values. A U.S. foreign policy that is informed by an ideological commitment to the promotion of U.S. value systems is not only linked to a preference for multilateralism, it also tends to favour a

78 See Holsti and Rosenau, “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes,” 101-102 and Holsti Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 104. It is also worth noting that public support for the UN peaked at 77% in October 1991. U.S. Information Agency, Internal Memorandum, 2.
79 See discussion in Ruggie, Winning the Peace, 1996.
foreign policy that more actively defends these liberal values internationally. This again relates back to the sense of American exceptionalism and the belief that the U.S. has a special moral responsibility to defend and promote liberal democratic values around the world whenever and wherever possible.

**Pragmatic Multilateralism**

According to Ole Holsti, one third of opinion leaders had adopted a pragmatic approach to multilateralism by 1992. Proponents of this perspective can have either an ideological predisposition for or against multilateralism in principle, but have adopted an ad hoc utilitarian approach to the question in practice. That is, their preferences are flexible and will depend upon what they believe to be the most effective and efficient approach when faced with a given contingency.

Pragmatic multilateralists recognise that there are several material benefits to be gained by pursuing specific U.S. foreign policy objectives multilaterally. The multilateral framework can, for example, serve as a ‘foreign policy multiplier.’ In sharing the costs and risks of international action the U.S. would be able to pursue a greater number and broader range of goals than it would if it was only able to rely on its own resources. Sharing these costs through the multilateral framework could allow the U.S. to expand its foreign policy to include various value-based goals. In addition, by reducing the costs and risks associated with international action, the multilateral framework may alter the perceived balance between value-based goals, such as humanitarian intervention and the protection of human rights, and other U.S. national interests such as military and economic security.

The multilateral framework can also be beneficial to the U.S. because it facilitates the pursuit of goals that require co-operation from other states. Such goals could not be achieved unilaterally no matter how great an interest the U.S. has in them. This also relates back to Ruggie and Caporaso’s suggestion that an assumption of ‘indivisibility’ is a core component of multilateralism. This refers to issues such as
support for the institutions of global governance and, more specifically, such goals as environmental protection, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, and the containment of ‘rogue’ states or actors.

There are a large number of conservative thinkers who still adhere to a realist interpretation of the role of state power but admit, sometimes reluctantly, that an unwavering policy of unilateralism would be unable to defend the U.S. against the myriad of challenges that characterise contemporary international relations. Richard Haass explains why a traditionally conservative thinker might have a pragmatic interest in multilateralism when he notes that:

On its own, the United States can do little to promote order. Too many of today’s challenges – protectionism, proliferation, genocide – cannot be solved by one nation alone, either because cooperation is necessary to combat the problem, resources are limited, or both. The benefits of multilateralism outweigh its tendency to constrain American means and dilute American goals. In addition to distributing the burden of promoting order, multilateralism can restrain the impulses of others, reduce opposition to U.S. actions, and increase chances of foreign policy success.\(^8^0\)

Conservative supporters of multilateralism are likely to recognise that the exercise of U.S. power is going to be constrained to a certain degree regardless of whether it takes place within the multilateral framework.\(^8^1\) They recognise that operating multilaterally, and through the UN, can in fact extend the range of policy choices open to decision makers because it helps to reduce international resistance to U.S. action. In reducing resistance to the U.S. exercise of power, multilateralism can help prevent a backlash against this power and, in doing so, facilitate and prolong U.S. hegemony.\(^8^2\) Conservatives are, however, more likely than their liberal counterparts

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\(^{80}\) Haass, “American Primacy,” 43-44.


\(^{82}\) Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” 22-35.

\(^{82}\) Haass, “American Primacy,” 37-49
to place stringent conditions on their support for the multilateral framework of action. This is particularly the case when U.S. military security interests are concerned.\textsuperscript{83}

Conservatives are more likely than their liberal colleagues to retain strong concerns about the constraints imposed by formal multilateral frameworks such as the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{84} While they might agree that UN-based multilateralism confers a greater level of legitimacy on international action than any other multilateral framework. They are also keenly aware that the formal structures and procedures that are codified within the Charter of the UN exert a much greater level of constraint on U.S. policy action. These constraints are increased even further if a multilateral action takes place under the explicit authority of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{85}

It is in recognition of the additional constraints imposed by the UN Security Council that conservative thinkers who generally support the principle of multilateralism, express caution about placing too great an emphasis on the UN framework of action.\textsuperscript{86} They particularly warn against elevating the role that the UN Security Council plays in legitimating international action because, they argue, this risks the associated counter effect of ‘de-legitimizing’ action taken without the explicit approval of the Council.\textsuperscript{87}

Liberals who support a pragmatic case by case approach to multilateralism still aspire

\textsuperscript{83} Alan Tonelson quoted in Luck, Mixed Messages, 172.
\textsuperscript{84} See for example, the points of caution outlined in Paul Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” Foreign Affairs, 73, 1, January/February, 1994, 28-43. Charles Krauthammer also warns of the dangers of placing too great an emphasis on the desirability of the multilateral framework of action because this may compromise the pursuit of narrowly defined U.S. national interests. See discussion in Krauthammer, “Can America Stand Alone,” 96.
\textsuperscript{86} See, for example, Robert Tucker, “Alone of With Others,” Foreign Affairs, 78, 6, 1999, 15-20.
\textsuperscript{87} Haass, Interview, 1998.
to a Kantian peace based on shared liberal values. They recognise, however, that until this type of world actually exists, the U.S. must retain both the strength and freedom of action necessary to defend its own national interests. They recognise that in an anarchical self-help system the U.S. interest in multilateralism, and the institutions that support it, must be firmly grounded within a concern for its core military and economic security interests. By extension, this means that the U.S. must continue to retain the right and the capacity to act alone to defend its interests whenever it is necessary.

Based on the above discussion it is clear that multilateralism is a regular feature within the foreign policy vision of an overwhelming majority of U.S. policymakers as well as the general public. Given this reality, the key problem underpinning this thesis relates not to a question of whether multilateralism and the UN feature within post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy but how much they feature.

**Intervening Variables**

Policymakers will decide whether to pursue specific U.S. foreign policy goals within the UN or some other multilateral framework of action based on their assessment of all four categories of U.S. national interests. There are, however, several other key factors that can intervene to play an influential role in this decision making process and that must be considered within any case study analysis. 88 These include: the views of an active and vocal Congress, the views of key military personnel, and also the general worldview of the President and his senior advisers held a priori to each contingency. While these three factors have the capacity for strong influence over the executive decision making process, their actual influence (if any) will be contingency based. It is for this reason that they are considered to be ‘intervening’ variables and not independent variables within this present study.

A key point to consider within any discussion of the role that these intervening variables might have in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy is the distinction between activity and impact. Vigorous activity on the behalf of key domestic actors, such as Congress, does not automatically translate into a traceable influence on foreign policy decision making. Assumptions regarding the conditions under which the intervening variables are most likely to influence the executive decision making process and how, is discussed in the following chapter which outlines this study's research design.

*Executive World View*

Alexander George suggests that an individual decision maker’s foreign policy beliefs “…serve as a kind of prism or filter that influences the actor’s perception and diagnosis of political situations and that provides norms and standards to guide and channel his choices of action in specific situations.” Such a statement does not argue a direct link to decision outcomes. What it suggests is that an individual’s values and beliefs that are held prior to an international contingency can play a key role in shaping how that individual responds to the contingency. These *a priori* values and beliefs help determine the ‘parameters’ of suitable action from which foreign policy decisions are derived.

Constructivists argue that the very concept of national interest is only given form and substance through its interpretation by decision makers. They emphasise the importance of a socially constructed understanding of the material environment. As

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90 George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy*, 45.

such, they elevate various socially constructed variables, including, commonly held philosophic principles, identities, norms, or shared terms of discourse, to the level of causal variables.  

While the structure of the international environment will provide foreign policymakers with both the international and the domestic setting for their decisions, it is often his or her own frame of reference that determines how they perceive this setting and how they will choose to respond to it. To a considerable extent, it is the values and beliefs of the decision maker that serves to legitimise their foreign policy choices in their own eyes. In addition, decision makers often refer to these same values and beliefs in their efforts to legitimate their foreign policy choices to the domestic public and the international community.

The executive world view can play a key role in shaping U.S. policy in regard to the decision to operate multilaterally through the UN framework of action. In this respect, a key aspect of the executive world view relates to how they interpret the intentions and actions of other states and what they perceive to be a favourable international order (realist or a liberal institutionalist perspective). Another key factor will be their perceptions of what would be an appropriate role for the U.S. in the world and what represents suitable foreign policy goals and methods for achieving them (internationalist, isolationist). This will relate back to how they interpret the
American sense of exceptionalism and which foundational values they deem to be the most important. Tied into these perceptions, will be their abstract views and assumptions regarding multilateralism as an organising principle of international action and the UN (ideologically opposed or in favour, or pragmatic support).

The Role of Congress

In a speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1998, Democrat Senator Lee Hamilton described the behaviour of Congress in regard to foreign policy making as erratic and unsophisticated. He said that, “Sometimes Congress goes too far, acting unilaterally or pushing unwise initiatives. Other times, the Congress does not go far enough, failing to take responsibility for its constitutional obligations.”

This level of inconsistency is possible because the division of responsibilities between the executive and legislative branches of government was not delineated explicitly within the U.S. constitution.

Under the constitution, the president is vested with the executive power of government. He is also Commander in Chief, which many take to mean that he is intended to control the use of military force abroad. On entering office, the president also undertakes an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” which many interpret as implying that he has responsibility for protecting national security.

100 This is generally considered to be the predominant view and it is reflected, Crabb and Holt argue, in the position of the U.S. Supreme Court. Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, 1. See also Lindsay, Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy,147. Some suggest, however, that by making the president the supreme commander the founding fathers only meant to ensure that a civilian stays in charge of the military. See, for example, Charles Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign Presidency: The Bush Administration’s Strategy for Governing Without Congress, Boulder: Westview, 1994, 22.
101 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, 11.
The constitution also confers a number of relevant powers to the Congress. Most importantly it is this institution, rather than the president, that is embodied with the power to declare war and also to grant “Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”  

When the Senate agreed to support U.S. membership in the UN and later NATO, its representatives made absolutely sure that there was no wording in either the charters or these organisations or their acts of ratification, that would diminish congressional war powers. As Ryan Hendrickson notes, Senate support for U.S. membership in both these organisations was conditional upon an assurance from the president that membership would not in any way challenge the authority of Congress over the use of force. 

Despite its constitutional role Congress has, for the most part, played a back seat role in U.S. foreign policy making. This has been even more so the case since the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War. Up until the Vietnam War at least, the Cold War served as the basis for widespread and bipartisan consensus over the purpose of U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, the urgency of the fight against communism also generated a significant degree of congressional deference to the president in regard to foreign policy making in general, but most particularly, in relation to the use of military force. 

After the perceived failure in Vietnam, Congress introduced legislation that would

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reassert its constitutional role and force the president to seek congressional approval for the deployment of military force. The War Powers Act of 1973, states that unless war is declared, or if the U.S. is attacked directly: the president must consult Congress, “in every possible instance” before introducing U.S. forces into a situation where hostilities are imminent; report to Congress if and when troops are introduced to such a situation; and withdraw those troops after sixty (may be extended to ninety) days if instructed to do so by Congress.105

Many critics suggest that the War Powers Act has had very little real effect in reining in unilateral presidential initiatives. This is partly because no president has ever recognised the constitutional authority of the war powers resolution.106 Another, perhaps more salient reason, is that members of Congress do not appear to be willing to take responsibility for the outcomes of any military operation that does, or does not, take place because of their actions.107

Even if Congress is willing to play an active role in the foreign policy process, its capacity to alter executive behaviour is only limited. Even if Congress votes against a military deployment, for example, it can neither prevent the president from going ahead with the action nor induce him to pursue an alternative course. Congress is not in the position to even ensure that the president consults with it in regard to any potential or ongoing deployment. The body can, as James Lindsay notes, “urge, request, and demand” that the president consult on a key foreign policy issue, but if Congress is known to be hostile then it is unlikely that he will.108

One alternative that is open to Congress is to refuse to fund a troop deployment.109

108 Lindsay, Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, 151.
109 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, 161.
While Congress is often depicted as having a powerful influence over foreign policy because it holds ‘the power of the purse,’ it is not actually able to wield this power with a free hand. Cutting troop funding would succeed in forcing the president to bring troops home if they were being deployed over a long period of time. But once Congress has failed to prevent such a deployment from taking place, it would be a very dangerous move politically to cut funds with troops already in the field and risking their lives to protect U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{110} In addition, Congress generally recognises that an effort to force the president to shift positions mid-field would risk damaging the reputation of the U.S. internationally.

Despite its limitations, Congress can have a significant impact in terms of shaping the president’s decision making environment. Congress can make its concerns known through congressional hearings and debates, critiques through the media, non-binding resolutions, and letters and statements from groups of senators.\textsuperscript{111} In addition, Congress has strong indirect influence over foreign policy decision making because of the role it plays in supporting or obstructing the president’s domestic agenda. While U.S. military security interests will always be the overriding concern of presidents, they may be more willing to compromise on less critical foreign policy questions. They may wish, for example, to protect their relationship with Congress so as not to impede the pursuit of their administration’s domestic objectives.

\textit{The Military Influence}

The foundational desire to contain the exercise of military power by dividing its control between Congress and the President also underpins the separation of the military and political arms of government. This separation was thought to be necessary in order to avoid the ‘reckless’ use of force that was made more likely when the power to declare war and wage war were invested in the one office.\textsuperscript{112} The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Lindsay, \textit{Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy}, 151.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Zoellick, “Congress and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy,” 34.
\end{itemize}
framers of the U.S. constitution made it very clear that their intention was to create a
new sovereign entity in which civilians ruled supreme and in which the military were
to play a subordinate role. Civilian supremacy was institutionalised in the
constitution by making the civilian president the commander in chief of all U.S.
military forces.

Unlike their political counterparts, senior military leaders are not required to concern
themselves with the need to balance competing or conflicting military, political,
economic, or social objectives. Traditionally, the military establishment has been
narrowly driven by its primary goals on the battlefield and the development of
specialised military skills. To enable this level of focus, the military has been
expected to remain aloof from the processes of political decision making and not
attempt to exert its influence over them.

The isolation of the military is not only aimed at ensuring civilian control of the
military. It is also part of a deliberate effort to ensure that the U.S. retains a highly
effective and efficient fighting force that is not contaminated by the vagaries of day to
day political life. Just as military leaders are expected to refrain from political debate,
political leaders are also expected to refrain from interfering in matters of military
strategy and tactics. It is assumed that military leaders possess a range of highly
specialised skills and experience that (most) political leaders do not.

The distinction between military and political affairs is much more convincing at the

theoretical level than it is in practice. In the real world, the line of demarcation between the two is not easily discernible and politicians regularly interfere with even detailed military decision making. For many senior military leaders this is perceived as troubling because civilian interference is often viewed as being one of the most significant factors leading to the U.S. failure in Vietnam. As a result of this failure, military sensitivities regarding potential government interference in the actual conduct of warfare have heightened. This is particularly the case in regard to the issue of the utility of military action, the hazards of limited engagement, and the question of matching political and military objectives. The senior military establishment is also much more keenly aware of the need to participate in the political processes that determine both the objectives that it is asked to achieve, and the circumstances in which it will be asked to achieve them.

The importance of coherent, professional, and reliable military advice is reflected in the U.S. under the existing national security system. Under this system the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council as a whole. The role of the chairman is to unify the military advice emanating from each of the services and channel it effectively to the civilian political leadership. Institutionally, this is carried out through the chairman’s role as an adviser on the National Security Council.

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121 In both the Bush and Clinton administrations the National Security Council consisted of the president and vice-president, the secretaries of the departments of State and Defense and the national security adviser. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency were required to participate in council meetings as advisers.
and his participation in council meetings.\textsuperscript{123}

\textit{The Indirect Influence of Public Opinion and the Media}

Public opinion and the media are not treated as intervening variables in this study for several key reasons. The most significant reason being that unlike the executive world-view, Congress, and the military, public opinion and the media do not have a direct influence over foreign policy decision making. They have neither a constitutional role in the decision making process nor direct access to the decision makers.

James Rosenau and Richard Sobel and others, suggest that while it would be difficult to trace its direct influence over policy formulation, public opinion can be described as serving as a general constraint on policymakers.\textsuperscript{124} That is, it provides decision makers with the outer limits of acceptable policy action and then allows them a great deal of discretion within these limits.

It is generally agreed that while the president and his senior foreign policy advisers will be driven primarily by their perceptions of U.S. national interests, its military security interests particularly, they do take public opinion into account. In addition to the obvious desire to retain electoral support, any presidential administration is also concerned about its overall popularity levels throughout its term in office. This is because popularity is a key factor in determining how easily an administration will be able to achieve its objectives. Several domestic actors, particularly Congress, are much more likely to co-operate with an administration’s initiatives when they are


dealing with a popular president.\footnote{Kegley and Wittkopf, \textit{Pattern and Process}, 243.}

\section*{Conclusion}

The aim of this chapter has been to identify and discuss the independent and intervening variables which influence the executive decision making process in regard to the use of force within a unilateral, ad hoc multilateral, or formal multilateral framework of action. In the following chapter this discussion is combined with the logic and insights provided in Chapter One, regarding the conditions under which international co-operation is most likely, to formulate a number of assumptions regarding the relationships between these variables and the U.S. decision to use force within the UN framework of action.
Chapter Three

Research Design

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to set up the discussion that takes place in the case studies, by outlining the key aspects of the research design. In general, a research design can be understood as "the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions."\(^1\) The research design used in this study is Alexander George's *Structured Focused Comparison*, which aims contribute to theory development by identifying the many different qualitative variables and conditions that affect certain historical outcomes, and establishing generalisable causal links between patterns of variables and certain outcomes.\(^2\)

In this study, assumptions about the relationships between the variables are generated by combining the insights provided in the previous two chapters. They are drawn from the theoretical discussion in Chapter One regarding the conditions under which international co-operation is most likely to occur. They are also drawn from the more specific discussion in Chapter Two, about how and where an interest in

multilateralism and the UN might be located within a general framework of U.S. national interests. The insights provided within the previous two chapters are also used in this chapter to help explain other key aspects of the research design, such as case selection, sources of evidence, and analytical strategies.

Why a Structured Focused Comparison?

A structured focused comparison is useful when only a limited number of case studies are available for analysis and comparison in the process of theory development. Essentially, this research design attempts to draw the greatest possible amount of information and insight from each case study by combining historical and social scientific analytical approaches. It combines in depth historical analysis, which aims to identify and explore the unique aspects of a single case, with the formulation of generalisations that are based upon a framework of independent, intervening, and dependent variables. This makes it possible to draw out the idiosyncratic aspects of each case, while providing a common theoretical framework for comparison between cases.\(^3\) It is through the structured comparison of different cases, using the same framework, that hypotheses regarding the causal relationships between different patterns of variables and certain historical outcomes can be explored and tested.

A controlled comparison based design has been selected here because it is particularly well suited to the specific research goal of this thesis.\(^4\) This goal is to develop a set of contingent generalisations about the different conditions under which the U.S. uses force multilaterally and/or within the UN framework in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. With this aim in mind, the study compares different examples of


\(^3\) As outlined in George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 44.

\(^4\) The structured focused comparison is a useful design for investigations, such as this, which seek to identify the conditions under which each distinctive type of causal pattern occurs. It is not as useful when research attempts to determine the frequency of outcome or causal pattern. Similarly, while the controlled comparison research approach makes it possible to establish causal links between variables
the use of U.S. force throughout the early post-Cold War period in an effort to identify the many conditions and variables that led to the decision to deploy military force and whether to use this force within a unilateral, ad hoc multilateral, regional multilateral, or UN multilateral framework.

In summary, the case studies are aimed at exploring how any changes in perceptions of U.S. national interests (independent variables), along with the particular world view of the President and his senior policy advisers, or the position of Congress or the military leadership (intervening variables), will influence the president’s decision to use military force (constant variable) and within what sort of framework (dependent variables). The analysis presented in each case study is structured around an examination of how senior administration policymakers believed a particular conflict to affect these independent and intervening variables.

Underpinning this analytical framework is the assumption that the specific goals of U.S. foreign policy will be derived from policymakers’ attempts to balance, if not optimise, what are sometimes perceived to be conflicting national interests within each of the case study situations. This process will be conducted within the setting provided by the intervening variables. As these variables have already been discussed in detail within the previous chapter, they will not be examined again here. The chapter will focus instead on explaining how the variables have influenced this study’s research design and also the formulation of assumptions about how the variables affect each other.

**U.S. National Interests and the Interests of Other States**

Given this study’s focus on international co-operation the interests of other key states, particularly the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council, are an important part of each of the case studies. The structure of the case studies is and outcomes, it would be of little value if the research aim were to establish a statistical correlation between them.
underpinned by the assumption that policymakers’ perceptions of the interests and concerns of U.S. allies, along with the views of other key states involved in each conflict, will shape their assessment of U.S. national interests.

The interests of other key states are not treated individually as variables within each case study but rather as integral components of the independent variables represented by the four categories of U.S. national interests. This is because the U.S. relationship with its key allies, and with all other states in the international system, is a core component of its overall national interests. The U.S. relationship with its NATO allies is, for example, a crucial component of its military security interests in Europe, as is its relationship with the Russian Federation. For similar reasons, the case studies also assess the institutional influence of the UN, both through the person of the Secretary-General and also through the body of the Security Council, within the broader framework of U.S. national interests.

Because the interests of other international actors are not treated as whole variables, but rather as influences on U.S. national interests, no attempt is made within the case study analyses to deconstruct, justify, or explain them. They are described and examined only to the extent required to understand how they affected administration policymakers’ perceptions of U.S. interests.

Case Selection
As the purpose of a theoretical framework is to state the conditions under which a particular outcome is likely to occur and also the conditions under which it is not likely to occur, it is necessary to include two types of case studies when exploring the assumptions and propositions that underpin the framework. It is important to select case studies in which similar outcomes can be predicted based on the study’s theoretical propositions, and also cases in which contrasting outcomes are produced for predictable reasons. The cases selected for this study have elements of both.

Yin, *Case Study Research*, 46.
The case studies selected to explore the hypothesis are the U.S. responses to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the civil conflicts in Somalia and Haiti, and the protracted conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While each selected case study is complex and unique, each one at some time elicited some form of military deployment from the U.S. (constant variable). Kosovo is not included in the study because it is considered to be beyond the time frame of interest to this dissertation. The Kosovo conflict escalated after the U.S. had already stepped back from its experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism. In this sense, the U.S. response to this conflict can be considered to be both a reflection and a continuation of a policy on multilateralism that had its key elements already in place by the end of 1995.

While each of the case study conflicts is similar in that it involved the use of U.S. force, each case involved the use of U.S. force within different frameworks of action at different points in time. The reason for this is that, as each conflict progressed it was perceived to affect different U.S. national interests in distinct ways and to differing degrees. What is particularly interesting about all the cases is that the U.S. response to them changed over time in reaction to these shifting interest perceptions.

In analysing each case within the framework of U.S. national interests it is possible to compare and contrast the U.S. response in each case when different interests, and combinations of interests, were perceived to be at stake. For example, how did policymakers respond when U.S. military security interests were threatened? Or, what role did multilateralism and the UN play within policymakers' attempts to reconcile conflicting military and value based interests? At different times, there were elements of similarity between the U.S. response to each crisis and, at other times, the

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6 Even though the case studies are limited to the instances in which U.S. force was actually deployed, the decision not to intervene militarily in Rwanda is also considered to be a revealing one. As a consequence, this decision is examined very briefly within the context of the other cases studies and within a discussion of the overall development of the Clinton administration's policy toward multilateral peace operations.
responses varied greatly. In addition, policymaker's assessments of U.S. national interests in each case were also influenced by their experiences and expectations in regard to other cases. The wide diversity in policymakers' responses makes it possible to test some of the causal links that are established and discussed below.

In addition to the conflicts discussed above, this analysis includes the interdepartmental review process that was initiated by each administration to review U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations. An examination of the review processes undertaken by each administration is aimed at adding to our overall understanding of how policy developed in response to changing assumptions about U.S. national interests in the post-Cold War world and the role that multilateralism and the UN could best play in their pursuit. An analysis of each review is also aimed at demonstrating how policy was being influenced by the intervening variables of executive world view, Congress, and the senior military establishment. In this sense, the review processes are explored from within the same framework of independent and intervening variables that is applied to the case study conflicts.

**Reliability of Evidence**

One of the key challenges in designing a qualitative research study relates to the need to ensure that the evidence gathered is reliable. The most effective method to ensure this reliability is to use as wide a range of resources as possible. Thus, in order to claim validity a research project such as this one must utilise all the available evidence from a diverse range of primary and secondary sources. Collecting evidence from a wide range of sources is particularly important for conducting structured focused comparisons. This type of research is focused on a limited number of cases and draws its validity from the depth of its analysis. A structured focused comparison is very different from the types of research designs that depend on breadth rather than depth and that aim to draw inference from a limited data set relating to a large number of cases.
Within this particular study, drawing upon the widest possible range of resources has an additional advantage in terms of establishing research validity. Relying upon a wide range and variety of resources makes it possible to cross-reference between sources in an effort to take account of inevitable inaccuracies, omissions, and biases. The capacity for cross-referencing is particularly important to a study such as this, which deals with highly topical and inherently contentious political issues.

The secondary resources used within this study include monographs, edited volumes, academic journals, media reports (both television and print), and the autobiographies of key individuals. The secondary literature also includes the analysis that is provided by various U.S. government bodies such as the Departments of States and Defense, the Government Printing Office, and the Congressional Research Service, and also various foreign policy think-tanks. The primary resources include the documents provided by official sources within the U.S. government and the UN, and to a lesser degree the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These include a variety of reports and event updates, speeches by key officials, press releases and the verbatim texts of press conference held by senior officials, and congressional testimonies and debates.

The practice of gathering first hand input from key informants plays a significant role in enhancing the validity of any study. With this factor in mind, this thesis also benefits from the insights provided by unstructured, open-ended, personal interviews with a number of mid-level and relatively senior representatives of each administration, Congress, the U.S. military, and the UN. These interviews were conducted face to face, via E-mail, and by telephone. They were particularly useful not only in establishing the substance and sequence of events within each case study, but also for providing feedback on the study's assumptions regarding the causal links between the variables within each case. The personal interviews also proved to be extremely useful in terms of clarifying disparities among the available secondary, and occasionally primary, resources. In addition to the interviews conducted with key figures involved in each case, the study also benefits greatly from the unstructured
discussions that were held with several academics that have long been involved in either the study of U.S. foreign policy or the UN.

*Analysing the Evidence*

The other key challenge associated with a qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, research design relates to the handling of the variables. No specific attempt is made within the case studies to provide a detailed quantitative measurement of the variance of the variables. This approach has been adopted mainly in an effort to take account of the subjective nature of policymakers' perceptions when it comes to assessing potential risks and threats. The point of interest within each case is not the actual extent to which certain nationals interest were effected or threatened, so much as how policymakers' attempted to balance several interests that they *perceived* to be present and which they believed to be *important*. In this respect, the variance in the variables is only determined in a very general sense in terms of being low, moderate, and high or immediate. Any additional detail about the variance of the independent variables is provided within the specific context provided by each case study.

A similar approach is taken to the intervening variables. The primary goal with regard to the analysis of the impact of these variables is to determine what they were, judge their intensity on the basis of how forcefully they were expressed, and examine whether they had any traceable influence over policy decisions.

*Theoretical Assumptions and Expectations*

The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the U.S. interest in promoting the principle of multilateralism not only survived the failed post-Cold War experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism, it was actually strengthened by it. To achieve its aims, the study relies upon a number of theoretical assumptions regarding the particular circumstances and conditions under which the U.S. interest in multilateralism and/or the UN would be greatest.
A U.S. interest in multilateralism becomes evident when policymakers demonstrate a willingness to accept constraints, and compromise on stated interests, in order to retain a particular multilateral framework of action. As Robert Keohane notes, "co-operation requires that the actions of individuals or organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as policy coordination." In the international context this means that international co-operation is not so much based on shared interests, but compromise reached through a process of bargaining. A key indicator, therefore, of the level of U.S. interest in any particular multilateral framework of action, is the level to which policymakers are willing to bargain and compromise in order to retain that framework of action. This is one of the key questions that underscores the narrative within the case studies explored in this dissertation.

There are two factors that play a key role in determining how much the U.S. will be required to bargain and compromise on its stated interests in order to maintain a particular multilateral framework of action. These are: how great a leadership role it plays (how much influence it can exercise over the other states within the framework), and the extent to which the specific goals of a collective action are genuinely shared by other states within the framework.

When U.S. decision makers consider the possibility of pursuing U.S. national interests within a given multilateral framework, their primary concern will be how great a constraint it may turn out to be on their freedom of action and whether this level of constraint is outweighed by the potential benefits to be gained. The framework poses the least risk of constraint if the U.S. can exercise clear leadership over other states working within the framework and control the direction of the co-operative action.
For policymakers to be confident that a framework will not represent a constraint on their actions they would need to be sure that other states recognise U.S. leadership, in that particular instance at least, as being legitimate. They would also need to be reasonably confident that this situation would remain the same throughout the duration of a multilateral action. Other states may consider U.S. leadership to be legitimate if they stand to gain net benefits from at least acquiescing to the U.S.-led collective action. That is, if they perceive there to be greater benefits to be gained from co-operating with the U.S. than there would be from challenging it. Policymakers would be more certain that other states would continue to recognise U.S. leadership as legitimate if these states share a genuine interest in achieving the goals of the particular multilateral action.

How flexible U.S. decision makers will be in relation to the need for leadership and shared interests will depend on what categories of interests are at stake, and how greatly they are threatened. Decision makers will assess the potential level of constraints that are likely within different formal and informal multilateral frameworks before they commit to acting within a particular framework. They will then constantly reassess the costs and benefits of continuing to work within that framework as the co-operative action progresses. Their assessments will alter in response to developments within the particular contingency being addressed. They will also alter in response to any changes in the domestic and international environments, such as a divergence of interests among key co-operating states.

Military and Economic Security: Shared Interests and Hegemonic Leadership

The protection and promotion of military security is the most important U.S. national interest under any conditions. Policymakers will be willing to use force to protect the U.S. from a high level threat to its military security interests. All other national interests are subordinate to these interests, and policymakers will be willing to absorb all the risks and costs of acting unilaterally to defend them from attack. When economic security interests are threatened to such a great degree that this also
constitutes a threat to U.S. military security, policymakers will also be prepared to use force, unilaterally if necessary, to defend them. Foreign policymakers will accept little if any constraint on the freedom of the U.S. to defend itself from high-level threats to its military or economic security interests.

For the U.S. to act multilaterally in defeating a threat to its military security would be inconsistent with realist assumptions regarding the nature of international relations. Realists would argue that it would not be rational for policymakers to face the risks of acting multilaterally in the protection of U.S. military security interests. This argument is made on the assumption that co-operation on military issues is constrained too greatly by relative power concerns and by the uncertainties that define the anarchical international system. One of the key aims within this study is to prove that this blanket realist assumption is not always correct. That, under certain conditions, states will be willing to defend themselves against an urgent threat to their military security interests within a multilateral framework of action.

While U.S. policymakers would be willing to act unilaterally to defend the U.S. from a high-level threat to its military or economic security interests, they will still be interested in trying to gain the benefits associated with operating within a multilateral framework of action. If policymakers believe the U.S. to be providing a public good in the process of defeating a threat to its own military interests, they will attempt to prevent other states from free-riding on this effort. They will try to reduce the level of free-riding by operating within a multilateral framework of action. U.S. policymakers will, however, demonstrate very little flexibility in order to retain the multilateral framework of action when they are acting to defeat a perceived threat to U.S. military security. In this respect, they will only operate within a multilateral framework in which the U.S. can play a clear leadership role. When military interests are threatened, policymakers will also be very sensitive to the need for a genuine convergence of interests among co-operating group members. A genuine convergence of interests will reduce resistance to U.S. leadership, because the U.S. will be
perceived as providing a collective or public good.

Alternatively, some critics may suggest that the sort of hegemonic co-operation in which the U.S. is prepared to engage in defence of its military interests cannot be considered to be genuine multilateralism. They would argue that such instances represent the actions of powerful hegemon dominating and exploiting the weaker states in the system for its own private gain. This assumption is an inaccurate description of the type of collective action that took place in the case study situations. The type of hegemonic co-operation in which the U.S. engaged in each of the four case studies examined here can still be considered to be an example of multilateralism.

As Robert Keohane notes, hegemony and co-operation, in general, are not mutually exclusive. They are in fact "symbiotic" because hegemonic leadership depends upon the voluntary co-operation of weaker states in the system. Similarly, according to Mancur Olson, this type of leadership on behalf of the U.S. can be the critical ingredient for collective action. For co-operation to occur under conditions of anarchy, Olson's logic suggests, a single state or coalition of states must be willing to provide individual incentives to other members of the group in order to secure their co-operation. They do so on the basis of a strong private interest in ensuring the provision of a public good.

U.S.-led hegemonic co-operation can also be considered consistent with James Caporaso's definition of multilateralism as long as it exhibits the three properties upon which multilateralism is thought to be based. It can be considered to have indivisible properties if it is aimed at the provision of a collective good. It can be considered to possess diffuse reciprocity if states are co-operating with each other on the reasonable expectation of mutual material gain. Finally, it can also be considered to be based on generalised principles of conduct if it relies, at least theoretically, upon the voluntary co-operation of states and is consistent with international law. It is
assumed here that U.S.-led multilateralism, as it was conducted in each of the cases explored, does fit within these parameters, although this assumption will be put to the test throughout the case study chapters.

Operating Under the Direct Authority of the UN Security Council
While U.S. policymakers will still be interested in operating multilaterally in the defence of U.S. military security interests, when these interests are threatened they will be very reluctant to act under the direct control of the UN Security Council. When military security is at stake, the risk of the Security Council acting to constrain the U.S. freedom of action will be perceived to be too great.

If policymakers believe that a consensus of interests exists within the Security Council, what they will attempt to do is gain a one off resolution that provides a blanket authorisation of the use of force. They will then ensure that the U.S. retains complete leadership and control over the application of that force. This allows the U.S. to solicit international support on the basis of the UN authority and legitimacy while protecting it from burdensome, some would say dangerous, institutional restraints. In conducting a UN authorised, U.S.-led multilateral military operation, the U.S. is seeking to provide international legitimacy for its hegemonic leadership while at the same time ensuring that that hegemony is not reined in by the organisation’s mechanisms and procedures.

Value Based Goals and Increased Bargaining Flexibility
If there is strong domestic support, the U.S. may use the threat of force to protect and promote value based interests if they face a high level threat. To actually use military force to defend these interests would, however, represent an unnecessary threat to U.S. military security interests. Value based interests alone are not considered to be important enough to risk damaging U.S. military security interests to protect them. The U.S. may deploy force into a situation in order to alleviate large-scale humanitarian suffering, but this is done on the assumption that the threat of force will
be sufficient to obtain the desired result and actual force will not be required. If forces are deployed in what is considered to be a low risk security situation, and this situation later deteriorates, the troops will be withdrawn. This will be the case unless the international situation has changed to the extent that other, more material, U.S. interests are now perceived to be under threat.

While the U.S. will not actually use military force to defend value based goals alone, it may use force if their protection is linked to a high level threat to U.S. military or economic security interests. Similarly, if U.S. international order interests are threatened to the point where it constitutes a threat to military security, the U.S. will use force to defend them. For example, policymakers will use military force to protect the U.S. from threats to its hegemonic position within the international power structure.

U.S. policymakers will be very keen to share the burdens of pursuing value based and low level international order interests through the UN framework. This is because value based interests and low level threats to international order are not considered to be vital to U.S. survival in the way that military and economic security interests are.

In regard to the pursuit of value based goals alone, policymakers will be willing to bargain and compromise in order to retain the benefits of operating within the UN multilateral framework of action. As such, they will be much more flexible with regard to the need for U.S. leadership and shared interests. Policymakers will, in fact, be much more reluctant to exercise U.S. leadership in the collective pursuit of value based goals. This type of co-operation is not hegemonic in that it is centred on a goal that is of strong private interest to the U.S. It is instead a multilateral action taken in pursuit of shared values and interests that are considered to be moderately important to several or all states. As the U.S. is unwilling to play a privileged leadership role in the pursuit of value based goals, it relies heavily upon the formal UN framework to facilitate and co-ordinate the required co-operative action.
Conflicting Interests and the Role of the UN

When military security and value based interests conflict, military interests will take priority but this does not mean that value based goals are forgotten. In an effort to overcome any apparent conflict of interest in this regard, policymakers will turn to the UN. In effect, what they do is separate valued based U.S. interests in a crisis from its more material military and economic interests. They then rely on the UN to absorb a great deal of the costs and risks associated with pursuing the value based goals, so that U.S. resources and attention can be more narrowly focused on defeating the threat to U.S. military security. This means that they can share the costs of pursuing U.S. value based goals, while maintaining a greater level of policy freedom with regard to U.S. material interests.

The Intervening Variables: Executive World View, Congress, and the Military

In general, all three intervening variables will have a much greater impact in relation to foreign policy issues that are not tied to national security or are considered in a crisis situation. When the U.S. faces an immediate threat to its security, domestic actors suppress their differences in order to unify around the goal of national survival. When this threat recedes, differences of ideology and method resurface.

In each of the case study situations, the world view of the President and his senior policymakers provide a large part of the background setting from within which each administration approached the case study conflicts. The policy influence of these world views will be very quickly overshadowed, however, whenever an immediate threat to U.S. military or economic security interests develops. It is also the case that the world views of key policymakers, and the assumptions which underpin them, will often alter in response to ongoing developments within the case study conflicts. Furthermore, the world view of senior administration decision makers, including the president, will have a dramatically more significant influence over executive decision making in the absence of a high level threat to U.S. military security interests.
When there is no over-arching military security threat uniting the nation, it is also more likely that the ideological and partisan differences among congressional members will have a much greater influence over executive decision making. When the nation is not facing a threat to its military security, congressional members are also more likely to attempt to score domestic political points through their support or rejection of executive foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, with no over-arching security threat to serve as a distraction, national attention tends to return to the domestic agenda, particularly the economy. It is also during these more moderate times that the already increasing overlap between domestic and foreign policy becomes even greater and this automatically raises the profile of Congress.

When the Cold War first ended and the over-arching threat to U.S. security receded, several commentators suggested that this opened up new possibilities for Congress to play a more assertive role in foreign policy making. What was not certain, however, was whether this prediction should be accompanied by a caveat regarding the use of force. Uncertainty existed on the question of whether the pattern of congressional deference on the use of force issue was now a firmly entrenched norm that would survive the end of the Cold War.

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9 Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing argue that congressional deference on the use of force question could no longer be taken for granted once the Cold War ended. See Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing, “The Presidency and U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War,” in Scott, After the End, 29-56.
Most students of executive/legislative relations would now suggest that the caveat holds true, that congressional deference on the use has continued into the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{10} If this assumption is indeed accurate, then this study will show that Congress played a much greater role in regard to the two inter-agency reviews of U.S. peacekeeping policy than it did in the case study conflicts. This question will be explored within the following chapters that deal both with the inter-agency reviews and with the case study conflicts. What will also be explored is the impact of the 1994 shift in the congressional power balance on this question of congressional deference.

As with the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government, the relationship between civilian and military leaders was shaped greatly by the Cold War. During this period, the role of the military was relatively clear and was in a sense legitimated by the need to guard against and defeat the Soviet communist threat.\textsuperscript{11} This situation changed, however, as Cold War threats receded and the nation lost its consensus regarding the role and purpose of its foreign policy and, by implication, the appropriate role and purpose of its military forces.

As with Congress, it is assumed that the end of the Cold War encouraged the senior military leadership, particularly the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to play a more influential role in shaping strategic defence decision making and the development of broader long term policies. It is also assumed that, as with Congress, the military leadership will defer clearly to executive authority when military security interests are perceived to be at stake. That is, the military will seek to influence the


decision to use force in the lead up to the decision being made, but once the executive has decided upon a course of action the military leadership will fall into line regardless of its views.

While Congress and the senior military leadership will defer to the president on use of force decisions they are both extremely sensitive to any effort to dilute their, in principle, role in the use of force decision process. This means that both groups will be very wary of any perceived attempts to divert authority and control over the application of military force to international institutions such as the UN.

**Public Opinion and the Media**

In general, public opinion is an important part of the decision making environment in which policymakers approach a particular crises, yet it exerts little direct influence over specific policies. If anything, the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy is the reverse. As Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf suggest, it is the decision makers who seek to influence and manipulate public opinion in support of their desired objectives rather than the other way around.

The same is true with regard to the role played by the U.S. media. While general perceptions of the role of the media suggest that this medium has a significant impact on the formulation of foreign policy, several recent studies have suggested that this influence is actually quite limited. If policymakers are dealing with threats to U.S. military security interests, then the media will have very little impact on decision making. In regard to the more moderate issues, such as humanitarian crisis, the media can at least play a role in putting issues on the public agenda. Policymakers will try to


13 See, for example, Andrew Kohut and Robert Toth, “The People, the Press, and the Use of Force,” in *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era*, An Aspen Strategy Group Report,
generate strong media support for any decision to undertake a humanitarian intervention, but they will not undertake such an intervention just because there is strong media support. Yet, if they have determined that a particular intervention is not in the U.S. national interest, there is nothing the media can do to change their minds.

In recognition of this reality, the media will try its hardest to influence policy debates when there is absence of consensus and an absence of clear political leadership. That is, media representatives will try particularly hard to influence the president if they think he has not made up his mind yet. In this respect, the conditions under which the media is most influential in the executive decision making process are the same as the intervening variables although the media’s influence is much less, and also much less direct.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the key aspects of the general research design that serves to guide the case study investigations. This has included a very brief outline of the variables and a discussion of related issues such as case selection, sources of evidence, and analytical strategies. The concluding section of the chapter has sought to draw the insights of the previous two chapters into the formulation of a range of assumptions regarding the conditions under which the U.S. is most likely to demonstrate a strong interest in UN-based multilateralism. These assumptions have been presented within a framework of causal relationships between independent and intervening variables. It is this framework that provides the general structure to the case studies that will be explored throughout the remainder of this thesis.

15 Ibid. 212.
Within each case study, the available evidence is used to create an historical narrative establishing a chain of evidence leading up to a particular outcome. This historical outcome is then examined within the context provided by the framework of independent and intervening variables in an effort to test the apparent causal links between the relevant variables. By using the same framework of analysis within each case study it is possible to compare the outcomes in each case based on what would have been predicted based on the assumptions about the variables. If the case study outcomes could have been predicted using assumptions from the framework of analysis, a causal inference can be made about the relationship between the variables. To ensure that these causal inferences are accurate, the case studies will also include an effort to rule out other possible explanations of the outcome that could be provided by alternative hypotheses regarding the relationship between the variables.

The remainder of this dissertation is comprised of case studies and is divided into two parts. Part Two deals with three case studies that occurred under the administration of George Bush. These are, the U.S.-led operations in the Persian Gulf and Somalia, and also the international community's response to the civil conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also included for examination, is the Bush administration's review of U.S. participation in UN peace operations. Part Three of the dissertation is also comprised of three case studies. It deals with Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina under the administration of Bill Clinton and also the U.S.-led intervention in Haiti. Also included in Part Three, is an examination of the Clinton administration's review of U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations.
– Part Two –

The Bush Administration
Introduction

When George Bush was elected president of the United States in November 1988 the world was entering into a period of swift and dramatic change. While in his Inaugural Address the new president acknowledged the potential forces for change that were sweeping the world, there was no way he could have envisaged the eventual scope of these changes, nor their ramifications for the U.S. or the UN.1 Before his term in office would be complete the Soviet Union would collapse, the Berlin Wall would fall, and the United States would gradually emerge as the most powerful nation on earth. Under President Bush’s watch, the U.S. would lead an international coalition of extraordinary size and scope in order to defeat aggression in the Persian Gulf and defend the principles of the UN Charter. Under his watch, the U.S. would also volunteer to lead and implement an unprecedented humanitarian intervention in an almost unknown famine ravaged nation in the Horn of Africa. George Bush may have realised on entering office that he might well be the last Cold War president of the United States, it is unlikely that he realised he would spend the last half of his presidency serving as the first post-Cold War president.

By the time Bush took office, the permanent members of the UN Security Council were already beginning to demonstrate a new willingness to co-operate in the name of peace and stability with their efforts to bring a close to the war between Iran and Iraq.2 Yet it was not until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 that the

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2 In 1983, the UN Security Council embarked on an even-handed, but lack lustre, effort to bring an end to the hostilities that had been raging between Iran and Iraq since 1980. In early 1997, as the Cold War gradually began to show signs of thaw, Security Council members began to co-operate in the drafting
president was motivated to genuinely reassess his ideas about what U.S. foreign policy, and the post-Cold War world in general, might look like with a more active United Nations.³

A Conservative World View

Bush was primarily considered to be politically moderate and also very much a product of the Cold War foreign policy establishment.⁴ He had seen active service during World War II, served two terms in the House of Representatives, and been appointed by Nixon to several key foreign policy positions including Ambassador to the United Nations (1971-1973) and Ambassador to Beijing (1974-1975). By the time he was elected to the office of president, after serving eight years as vice-president to Ronald Reagan, he was well into the process of formulating his own vision of the world and this vision did not reserve a significant role for the United Nations.

In March 1990 the Bush administration outlined its vision of the post-Cold War world in the National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991. Within this strategy a new, more moderate, international environment was anticipated. It was hoped that, in this more moderate environment, the U.S. and its friends and allies would be able to more evenly share the burden of maintaining international peace and stability. The general tone of the strategy document was underpinned by an optimism about the potential benefits of such selective multilateralism, but it was a far cry from the level of optimism required for what Bush was later to term the 'new world order.' Along with the traditional goals of protecting the immediate security of the U.S itself, the strategy incorporated an emphasis on the pursuit of common goals such as

³ In their memoir George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet empire, the Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, and the Gulf War, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998, President Bush links the 'sometimes awkward' superpower co-operation in the Persian Gulf as being the 'moment that marked the threshold of an era of possibility and hope.’ xiii.

disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the protection of shared values such as freedom, democracy, and a respect for human rights. Incorporated within the Bush administration’s vision, was the assumption that the U.S. could better defend these values and pursue these goals in co-operation with its friends and allies.

What was missing from this vision was any mention of the role of the UN in terms of maintaining international peace and security or facilitating the envisioned increase in international co-operation.\(^5\) The reason for this omission was that the potential for co-operation between states was still conceived in a Cold War context. The administration conceived this new potential for international co-operation in terms of a network of U.S.-led alliances based upon traditional patterns of amity and enmity. In this sense there was a recognition that the U.S. and its traditional allies would now be in a better position to co-operate in the pursuit of their own shared values and objectives, while the increased potential for international co-operation at the global level was yet to be realised.\(^6\) The conservative President Bush would later reveal a strong pragmatic interest in promoting multilateralism and the UN in the post-Cold War world. At this early stage, however, he had yet to fully grasp the potential benefits to be offered by this framework of action.

**Post-Cold War Assumptions**

U.S. policymakers assumed that with the demise of Soviet communism, the bipolar Cold War international system would be superseded by a unipolar structure with the U.S. at the centre. Such changes in the structural balance of the international system would mean that the U.S., and its allies, would be operating in an international environment no longer defined, and constrained, by an over-arching military security threat. With the removal of Cold War constraints the range of U.S. national interests,

\(^5\) The strategy does list the goal of making “international institutions more effective in promoting peace, world order, and political, economic and social progress.” The UN is not mentioned specifically, nor are any practical measures outlined for achieving such a goal.

as well as the possible methods of pursuing them, could now be expanded. More resources could now be used to protect and promote economic security, favourable value systems, and a more favourable international order. In the absence of the Soviet communist threat the opportunity cost, as well as the risk, of pursuing other national interests decreased. It would, therefore, be possible to pursue non-core interests with less of a concern that this would adversely impact on, or compete with, military security interests. These changes also had an influence at the domestic level, in that they were translated into the expectation of a ‘peace dividend’ in which scarce U.S. resources could now be focused toward pressing domestic and economic problems.

While the president and his senior foreign policy officials recognised quickly that the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to expand the range of interests the U.S. could now pursue in the international arena, they were comparatively slow to consider expanding the range of new foreign policy instruments now available to pursue them. In his September 1989 address to the UN General Assembly, George Bush outlined the range of collective international goals that the U.S. was now willing to pursue. Yet, the president’s conception of the potential role of the UN in helping the U.S. to achieve these goals was still limited. While outlining each of these new post-Cold War collective goals, the president’s emphasis remained focused firmly on the actions the U.S. would be undertaking unilaterally, bilaterally and regionally in order to achieve them. The U.S. vision of the post-Cold War did not include a significant role for the UN within the protection and promotion of U.S. military security interests, nor did it envisage a reinvigoration of the collective security function of the organisation. The relevance of the UN in the post-Cold War

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7 This argument is also explored at a theoretical level in Stanley Hoffman, “International Organizations and the International System,” in Oran Young, (ed.) The International Political Economy and International Institutions, Cheltenham: Elgar, 1996, 90-112.

8 See National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991. Prior to the Gulf War, the president’s conception of the potential role of the UN in helping the U.S. to achieve its expanded post-Cold War goals was limited. While outlining each of these new goals in his rational security strategy, the president’s emphasis remained focused on what the U.S. was doing unilaterally, bilaterally and regionally in order to achieve them. Where the UN was deemed to have the most relevance, and the
foreign policy of the U.S. was limited to what were considered to be low-priority issues such as the environment.  

The limited perceptions regarding the potential role of the UN may be attributed to the fact that the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar international structure did not require policymakers to let go of many of the theoretical assumptions about international action and state behaviour that had been relevant during the Cold War. Nothing had, so far, occurred that would require Bush officials to move beyond the traditional realist conception of U.S.-led, alliance based, cooperation.  

In addition, the UN had so far failed to live up to the expectations of its founders and was, at least in relation to the pursuit of military goals, perceived as being an essentially ineffective instrument of U.S. foreign policy. This ineffectiveness had stemmed from the fact that so many of the specific foreign policy goals that had been derived from U.S. military security interests over the last forty-five years had been rooted within the realities and rivalries of the Cold War. Thus the threat of the Soviet veto in the Security Council had rendered the Council and, at that stage, the UN generally, an unacceptable constraint on U.S. freedom of action.  

The Bush administration’s perceptions of the potential role of the UN in post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy altered dramatically soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Changes to policymakers’ perceptions did not, however, occur swiftly. While the president’s public rhetoric may have suggested, from the outset, that the administration intended to respond to the invasion within the UN framework, this was not the case. How U.S. policy toward the UN and the Security Council in

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particular altered throughout the course of the Gulf conflict is explored in the following chapter.
Chapter Four

The Bush Administration and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Introduction

When the Iraqi leader ordered his troops to cross the border into Kuwait in the early hours of 2 August 1990, there was no way that he could have anticipated that his actions would have such profound repercussions for the post-Cold War international order. Saddam Hussein could not have anticipated that, less than six months later, his actions would lead his nation into a stand off against the forces of nearly thirty different countries, and the most awesome display of military power ever assembled.¹

Saddam Hussein found himself pitted against this massive international coalition because U.S. President George Bush chose to act within the multilateral framework of the UN in responding to the invasion of Kuwait, rather than act unilaterally. This decision was made because Bush and his senior advisers believed that a response within the UN framework could provide the U.S. with substantial political, military, and economic benefits. They believed that with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. was in the position to take advantage of these benefits, as never before. This belief was based on two assumptions. First, that the majority of UN member states genuinely

¹ Twenty-nine states contributed military force to the coalition against Iraq and a further eight supplied non-military support. *House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, U.S. Congress, Washington D.C., 14 May 1991.
shared the U.S. interest in reversing the Iraqi invasion (i.e. that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was perceived as being a collective good). Second, that as the self-proclaimed victor of the Cold War the U.S. could now play a much greater leadership role within the UN and shape any co-operative action in a manner that would be consistent with its own specific national interests.  

With a Soviet veto in the Security Council no longer a certainty, the UN offered U.S. policy makers a new and relatively unexplored foreign policy tool. As the crisis in the Gulf progressed, and with each additional diplomatic success within the UN Security Council, the administration’s enthusiasm for the UN framework of action increased. At the same time, policy makers remained acutely aware of the need to avoid any formal constraints on the U.S. freedom of action. To this end, senior administration officials endeavoured to maintain explicit UN Security Council authorisation for U.S. activities undertaken in response to the Iraqi invasion, but were careful not to place these activities under the direct control of the Council. In this respect, within the broader multilateral response to the invasion, administration officials maintained a unilateral framework of action with regard to both the use of U.S. military force and the right to defend U.S. military security interests. This is consistent with the assumption put forward in this study’s research design which predicts a greater need for unilateral leadership and control when U.S. military security interests are threatened.

This chapter focuses upon the Bush administration’s first experiment with expanded UN based multilateralism, which took place within the context of the U.S. led military effort to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The key aim is to examine how the administration gradually explored the benefits and constraints of conducting this military operation within the formal multilateral framework of the UN in an, as yet untested, post-Cold War international environment, and how this shaped the broader

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The chapter will explore U.S. efforts to provide the leadership necessary to ensure that the international coalition of states continued to act together in response to the Iraqi invasion, and examine how the U.S. attempted to shape this co-operative action in a manner that suited its own specific foreign policy goals. The discussion begins with a brief outline of the initial U.S. response to the invasion and an examination of how policy makers perceived the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to affect the four categories of U.S. national interests. This is followed by a narrative based discussion of how administration policymakers exercised U.S. leadership in an effort to manipulate the benefits and constraints of operating through the UN framework. Their aim was to minimise the potential constraints on U.S. policy freedom, particularly in relation the defence of its military security interests, while at the same time maximising international legitimacy and ensuring the widest possible level of international co-operation.

The chapter concludes with an exploration of the broader implications of U.S. leadership within the context provided by the framework of variables and the assumptions that have been outlined in the previous chapter with regard to the causal relationships between them. A key aspect of this discussion is the question of whether, from a U.S. perspective the UN sanctioned, U.S. led, military intervention in the Persian Gulf represented a useful model for future UN based peace operations.

Initial U.S. Response to the Invasion: Keeping Their Options Open

U.S. condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was both swift and unreserved. The Bush administration responded with three separate actions at three distinct levels. At the unilateral level the president issued two executive orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act aimed at freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti...
assets in the U.S. and prohibited transactions with Iraq. At the informal multilateral level, the president directed the Department of State to contact other governments around the world and urge them to condemn the Iraqi act of aggression and to consult in order to determine what measures should be taken in response.

At the formal multilateral level, the president instructed the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, to work with Kuwait in convening an emergency meeting of the Security Council. At this meeting the Council adopted Resolution 660, which condemned the invasion, demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces, and called upon the two states to begin intensive negotiations to resolve their differences. Five days later the U.S. sponsored Resolution 661 which, acting under Article 51 of the UN Charter reaffirming the right of states to self-defence, committed the Security Council to achieving the withdrawal of Kuwait and imposed universal economic sanctions on Iraq.

In responding both unilaterally and multilaterally through the UN, the administration was keeping open the range of frameworks through which it could respond to the Iraqi invasion. The aim of obtaining Resolution 660 was to gain additional diplomatic support for the U.S. position. The administration would not have brought the issue to the attention of the Council if it thought that this would in any way confine its future actions exclusively to the UN framework. In his initial public response to the invasion the president welcomed the Council’s resolution but he made it clear that he was still reserving the option to possibly take action outside the UN framework either

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5 All five permanent members of the Security Council supported the resolutions, including two former U.S. Cold War adversaries, China and Russia. Yemen abstained from this first vote because the Yemeni ambassador could not obtain instructions from his government, see Paul Lewis, “UN Condemns the Invasion With Threat to Punish Iraq,” New York Times, 3 August 1990, A10. Yemen later abstained from voting on other key resolutions as well.
unilaterally or in concert with U.S. allies.⁶

**U.S. Leadership and U.S. National Interests**

The Bush administration chose to lead a multilateral military intervention in the Persian Gulf because the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was considered to be an urgent threat to vital U.S. national interests. The initial reaction to the invasion was based primarily on the threat to U.S. economic interests being so great that it represented a high level threat to its military security. As the crisis progressed, however, the president and his policy makers formulated a rationale for engagement and, later, intervention, based upon all four categories of national interests.⁷ As the crisis progressed, the president also used the four categories of national interests to explain why he thought it was so important to operate through the UN rather than act unilaterally.

**Protecting and Promoting Military Security**

The Iraqi invasion of its oil rich neighbour represented a high level and immediate threat to U.S. military security interests because of the potential for a more powerful Iraq to threaten stability in the strategically important Middle East region. The administration’s concerns centred on the apparently aggressive ambitions of the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and the potential impact that additional Kuwaiti resources would have on his capacity to realise these ambitions. As the president explained to the American public just prior to the launch of the U.S. led military action aimed at liberating Kuwait, “If Saddam corners the world energy market, he can then finance

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further aggression, terror, and blackmail." \(^8\) In this sense, it was not what Saddam Hussein could do with his additional oil supplies that concerned administration officials, it was what he could do with his additional oil revenue. In this regard, Vice President Quayle told a university audience in late November 1990 that the Iraqi leader’s goal was to,

... dominate the Persian Gulf region and use its vast wealth to become the greatest Arab hero of modern times, the leader of a new Arab superpower. To that end, he spent some $50 billion on arms imports during the 1980s alone. \(^9\)

As the president and his senior staff stated often in their public remarks, the Iraqi leader had used a large proportion of existing oil revenues to provide Iraq with what was thought to be the sixth largest army in the world. \(^10\)

We’ve seen him take his own country, one that should be wealthy and prosperous, and turn it into a poor country – all because of his insatiable appetite for military equipment and conquest. \(^11\)

Iraq was known to have acquired surface-to-surface missiles from the Soviet Union during its war with Iran, and had modified these weapons to increase their range. \(^12\)

When Iraq invaded Kuwait there was a large amount of uncertainty in terms of how successful these modifications had been, and whether or not they included the ability to deliver chemical warheads. \(^13\) U.S. intelligence estimates in regard to Iraq’s nuclear

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\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Dan Quayle, *Address at Seton Hall University*, South Orange, New Jersey, 29 November 1990.
weapons program also “varied widely.”14 Throughout the 1980s there had also been sporadic signs that Iraq was attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capacity, although there was no evidence of a clearly structured program.15 Prior to the invasion, Defense Department officials had stated that Iraq was not believed to represent a near-term nuclear threat.16 Subsequent to the invasion, and possibly in an effort to elevate the perception of military threat, the administration stated that its intelligence suggested Iraq could be anywhere between six months to one year away from developing a weapon.17

Concerns relating to Iraqi attempts to build up both its conventional and non-conventional military capacity were particularly salient given the Iraqi leader’s history of using intimidation and aggression to meet his domestic and regional policy objectives.18 According to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report, Iraq had used chemical weapons “extensively and effectively” in its eight-year war with Iran, and also against Kurdish insurgents in the North Eastern region of Iraq in 1988.19

U.S. military security interests within the Middle East were also tied to the U.S.

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interest in protecting its two key allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia. In this regard, Iraq’s substantial military capacity was an immediate concern for U.S. officials because it represented a direct threat to the military security of its two regional allies. U.S. concerns for the security of Israel had been fuelled by events earlier in the year. In March, U.S. intelligence sources discovered that Iraq was erecting SCUD missile launchers within range of Israel. Less than a month later, the Iraqi leader announced that Iraq had a well-developed chemical weapons capacity and he threatened to destroy half of Israel if it launched a pre-emptive strike against his chemical facilities.

With regard to the military security of Saudi Arabia, in the first few days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, administration officials were fearful that the Iraqi leader intended to march his troops across the Kuwaiti desert and on into Saudi Arabia. If access to oil was Saddam Hussein’s objective, their concern was that he would try to obtain access to another twenty percent of world oil reserves by gaining control of Saudi oil fields. Even if Saddam Hussein did not physically invade, he could now use positions in Kuwait to continually menace Saudi Arabia and significantly alter the balance of power in the region. The day after the invasion the U.S. issued a warning to Iraq not to continue on into Saudi Arabia. Within three days, the administration began moving U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia in what would turn out to be the

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beginning of the multinational Operation Desert Shield.25

Protecting and Promoting Economic Security

Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. had substantial economic interests in Iraq, relating to agricultural exports and contracts to assist in post-Iraq/Iraq war reconstruction.26 In 1989, U.S. exports to Iraq were valued at 1174 million U.S. dollars.27 The most crucial U.S. economic interest, however, related to the need to ensure reliable access to sufficient supplies of crude oil. In 1990 the U.S. imported 292 211 thousand metric tonnes of crude petroleum, representing nearly fifty percent of its crude oil supplies. Of this total, approximately thirteen percent was imported from the Persian Gulf region, and eight percent of this came from Iraq.28 When Iraq invaded Kuwait, this posed a significant threat to the economic security of the U.S. because it had the potential to threaten the stable flow of oil from the Gulf. Prior to the invasion, Iraq was believed to own the rights to ten percent of known oil deposits in the Persian Gulf and with the addition of Kuwaiti reserves this figure would have nearly doubled.29

U.S. economic security was not threatened so much by the potential of the Iraqi leader to withhold oil from the international community but, rather, by his increased ability to intimidate and manipulate other key oil producers in the region.30 With the

26 President Bush pointed to the need to secure reconstruction contracts for U.S. businesses as being a key factor motivating his administration’s policy towards Iraq prior to the invasion of Kuwait. See Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 303.
30 Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, is quoted expressing this concern at a National Security Council meeting two days after the invasion. See Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 323. See also, Powell, A Soldier’s Way, 463-464.
additional leverage provided by control over Kuwaiti oil supplies, Hussein would be able to exert a much greater influence on global oil prices that had a direct impact on the U.S. economy. When the secretary of state described the nature of the threat that the Iraqi invasion posed to U.S. economic security he suggested that,

... what is at stake economically is the dependence of the world on access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. This issue is really not about increases in the price of a gallon of gas at the local service station. It is not just a narrow question of the flow of oil from Kuwait and from Iraq. It is about a dictator who, acting alone and unchallenged, could strangle the global economic order, determining by fiat, if you will, whether we all enter our recession or whether even we enter the darkness of a depression.\(^3\)

The strategic importance of the Gulf region has been a recognised component of U.S. policy in regard to the Middle East since the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter proclaimed the ‘Carter Doctrine,’ which stated that,

Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital national interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.\(^3\)

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the vice president added two other objectives to this doctrine when he stated that the U.S. had continuously, “... sought to prevent any local Middle East power from achieving hegemony over its neighbors, and ... to secure the uninterrupted supply of oil at a reasonable price.”

**Protecting and Promoting Favourable Values Systems**

In regard to the Gulf crisis, U.S. value interests were linked closely to U.S. international order interests within the Bush administration’s vision of a ‘new world order.’ This vision became more developed as the crisis continued and as optimism

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regarding the potential for a UN-based multilateral response to the invasion increased.

In his Address to the Nation at the commencement of the military operation against Iraq, Desert Storm, the president told the American public that the ‘new world order’ was “a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.” The president also suggested that a ‘new world order’ would be based on the recognition that world peace was not possible without increased international co-operation.

This vision of a post-Cold War ‘new world order’ was founded upon the belief that many states had experienced a dramatic shift towards a common set of liberal principles and values. According to both the president and his secretary of state, James Baker, the entire world now recognised these values and principles and was thus poised upon the edge of a new era in which effective and meaningful co-operation was a very real possibility. In February 1991, the president announced to an audience at the Economic Club of New York, “Tonight: the world is united by shared commitments, shared interests, shared hopes.”

In a 1996 television interview, Baker was asked to clarify what the Bush administration had meant by the term ‘new world order.’ Baker stated that, “What we meant was that everybody around the world was moving in the direction of the principles and values that we in the West had always held dear.” Based on these shared principles and values it would be possible for states to now take collective action aimed at resolving shared problems such as Middle East peace, non-

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34 Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, 23 November 1990.
proliferation, and unprovoked aggression.

Protecting and Promoting a Favourable International Order

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was, according to President Bush, the first test of this 'new world order.' The Iraqi invasion had set a precedent in that it was the first time a sovereign member state of the UN had invaded another sovereign member state. Iraq’s actions had, according to President Bush, violated "every norm of international law" and the international community’s response to this violation would play a fundamental role in shaping the post-Cold War international order.37

What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.38

The administration also argued that the invasion of Kuwait was evolving into the first test of a post-Cold War United Nations. Now that the Cold War rivalries had largely subsided, President Bush argued that the UN might finally be in a position to realise the vision of collective security that had led to its founding. His enthusiasm for the organisation gradually escalated as his efforts to shape the political and military coalition within the UN framework proved to be successful. With each continued diplomatic success at the UN, the president steadily increased his emphasis on the importance of the organisation’s role in the maintenance of post-Cold War international peace and stability. In a news conference, just days before the UN deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, Bush argued that the only way the

38 Bush, State of the Union, 29 January 1991. Larry Berman and Bruce Jentleson suggest the President Bush was struggling to define a vision for the post-Cold War world until he was confronted with the crisis in the Gulf. He then used the international response to the crisis as his post-Cold War model. Larry Berman and Bruce Jentleson, “Bush and the Post-Cold-War World: New Challenges for American Leadership,” 93-94 in Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman, (eds.) The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals, Chatham: Chatham House, 1991, 93-128.
new world order was going to be enhanced was if the newly activated peacekeeping function of the UN proved to be effective.39

While the president's public comments made it clear that he was becoming more positively disposed toward the UN, they also made it clear that his enthusiasm was based on certain conditions. His vision of the future was not simply for a liberal multilateral international order, it was for a U.S. led multilateral order. This vision was founded not so much on the assumption that the U.S. would co-operate with other UN member states in the provision of global collective goods, but on the assumption that other states would co-operate with the U.S. in promoting its own vision of a favourable international order.

...my vision of a 'new world order' foresees a United Nations with a revitalized peacekeeping function. ... I think it is vital to this 'new world order' that the veto-holding members of the Security Council go along and be with us on these matters of trying to bring peace to troubled corners of the world.40

This vision of U.S. global leadership had its roots in the American sense of exceptionalism and the growing belief that the nation was destined to play a leading role in shaping the new world order. In November 1990, just weeks after the administration announced the augmentation of the coalition troop capacity in preparation for a military intervention, Bush described the Iraqi invasion as not only being in violation of the rule of law, but an attack on the very principles that form the foundation of modern civilisation.41 At the same time, and from this point on, the

41 George Bush, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters Following Discussions with President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, Cairo, Egypt, 23 November 1990. See also remarks made by the Vice President, Dan Quayle, Remarks at the Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference, Washington, D.C., 18 December 1990. George Bush states that he began to see the reversal of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a 'moral crusade' and not exclusively as a 'dangerous strategic threat' when he began to hear about the human rights abuses taking place in Kuwait. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 374.
president continued to emphasise the special role that his nation played with regard to
the defence of these principles. If the U.S. did not act to stand up against brutal
aggression, he asked, then who would? In this respect, the president argued that the
U.S. had a special responsibility to lead the international coalition against Iraq and he
justified this responsibility on both material and ideational grounds:

Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America
has both the moral standing and the means to back it up. We’re the
only nation on this Earth that could assemble the forces of peace. This
is a burden of leadership and strength that has made America the
beacon of freedom in a searching world.42

In this respect, the UN authorised, U.S. led military operation in the Gulf did not only
serve as an experiment in expanded UN based multilateralism, it also served as an
experiment in post-Cold War U.S. leadership. As the president’s national security
advisor, Brent Scowcroft, noted some time after the war:

... we tried to operate in a manner that would help establish a pattern
for the future. Our foundation was the premise that the United States
henceforth would be obligated to lead the world community to an
unprecedented degree... 43

Benefits of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the threat that this represented to key U.S. allies in
the region, was considered to pose an immediate and high-level threat to U.S. military
security. As such, the U.S. would have been willing to act alone to defeat the Iraqi
forces, defend Kuwait, and protect its allies. Rather than act unilaterally, however,
U.S. policy makers chose to act through the UN to organise and lead an international
collective action, of unprecedented proportions, in a military intervention aimed at

42 George Bush, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, Washington,
See also George Bush, Remarks at a Republican Party Reception, Rochester, Minnesota, 2 November
1990.
43 Brent Scowcroft in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 400.
reversing the Iraqi invasion. Administration policymakers chose to operate within the UN multilateral framework because they believed that it would provide the U.S. with substantial material and ideational benefits.

**Sharing the Burden**

One of the most substantial material interests in operating within a multilateral framework relates to the potential to share the costs and risks of achieving specific foreign policy goals. The UN provided the Bush administration with a universal multilateral framework through which to share the economic burden associated with resisting the Iraqi aggression. The U.S. was able to distribute a substantial proportion of the economic cost of the operation between the UN member states that supported the operation. This was the case both in terms of actually financing the deployment, and also in terms of sharing the costs of offsetting the economic burden to those states most adversely effected by the economic sanctions placed against Iraq.

While the U.S. was able to distribute much of the economic burden to other UN member states, the overwhelming bulk of the military risk associated with the operation was borne by the U.S. Even so, the military force provided by the U.S. was greatly augmented by that provided by other coalition members. This was a

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45 Over (U.S.) $70 billion in total financial contributions was raised. Twenty-six countries provided economic assistance, mostly for 'front-line' states critical to the sanctions. The remainder of the $70 billion went towards offsetting U.S. costs. The biggest contributors were, Kuwait: $20 billion, Saudi Arabia: $21 billion, Japan: $15 billion, Germany: $8 billion, United Arab Emirates: $5.5 billion. These figures only include direct contributions to the U.S. or through the GCFCG, they do not include direct assistance to other coalition states. Source: Eugene McAllister, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, *House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 14 May 1991.
46 Ibid. See also Mulford, *House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 14 May 1991.
47 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states deployed their armed forces. Egypt sent an armoured division, a mechanized division, and a Ranger regiment, hundreds of armoured vehicles, and more than 25,000 troops. Syria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, and other Muslim states put tens of thousands of soldiers in the field. Britain deployed a heavy armoured division and sent more than 70 combat aircraft, a total of over 30,000 soldiers and airmen. Eight French regiments were also deployed, along with over 130 combat aircraft. Canada and Italy sent combat aircraft and Czechoslovakia deployed a chemical decontamination unit. Turkey substantially strengthened its defences opposite Iraq and NATO approved the unprecedented dispatch of its rapid deployment units (German, Belgian, and Italian planes) to help. Figures quoted by Senator Bob Dole from a paper
significant factor, given the uncertainties relating to Iraq’s military capacities, coupled with the U.S. military establishment’s preference for approaching potentially hostile situations with an overwhelming military force.

**Increased Legitimacy**

Another of the key benefits associated with conducting the response to the invasion within the UN framework, was the international legitimacy that this offered. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the UN Security Council passed a U.S. sponsored resolution condemning the Iraqi action as being in flagrant violation of the organisation’s principles. This allowed policy makers to present the U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion as being legitimate and on behalf of the entire international community in defence of the principles embedded within the UN Charter.

The legitimacy gained through operating within the UN framework helped check opposition to U.S. policy and removed many of the political barriers to the formation of an international coalition in opposition to Iraq’s actions. The U.S. was able to elicit co-operation on behalf of an international organisation that states had previously committed to support, and in defence of principles that they had already committed to uphold. Policy makers presented the stance against Iraq in these terms in an attempt to overcome traditional patterns of interstate amity and enmity that had taken shape during the Cold War.

While the international political environment had changed dramatically in recent years it would still have been difficult, domestically, for several states to be seen to be acquiescing, let alone participating, in a U.S. led initiative. This was the case even though many of these states shared several key U.S. interests with regard to the


49 Article 2.4 of the UN Charter states that: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
invasion. Many states were just as interested as the U.S., if not more so, in protecting stable oil supplies and in defending the principle of the inviolability of international borders. Several states also held, like the U.S., a strong private interest in containing Saddam Hussein’s aggressive ambitions in the Middle East.

Several states that would have found it difficult to co-operate directly with the U.S., were able to support or participate in the operation because it was conducted through the United Nations. Some Arab states, such as Syria and Iraq, were able to overlook the entrenched antagonisms within their relationship with the U.S. in order to participate in the UN authorised response to the Iraqi action. In addition, at the time of the Gulf conflict the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, held only a tenuous grip on political power within his country and there was a very mixed domestic reaction to the possibility of using military force against Iraq. It would have been almost impossible for the Soviet leadership to be seen to be co-operating directly with the U.S. It was much less difficult for him to be seen to be participating in an action that was taken on behalf of an organisation that the Soviet Union not only helped found, but in which it held a very powerful position.

Using the UN to Reduce Free-Riding

Operating within the UN multilateral framework was also perceived to be beneficial to the U.S. because it substantially reduced the potential for smaller states to free-ride

in the U.S. provision of an international collective good.\textsuperscript{52} The temptation for states to free-ride on U.S. effort in this instance would have been strong because the U.S. had made its clear interest in reversing the Iraqi invasion obvious from the very beginning. In this respect, the UN membership was a privileged group within the context of the international community’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the United States was very clearly its privileged member.

In broad terms, operating within the UN framework furnished the administration with a great deal of additional diplomatic leverage through which it could elicit a much wider range of support. According to Special Assistant to President Bush, Richard Haass, one of the key benefits gained by operating through the UN in the Gulf was that it generally “made it easier for governments to support you, and made it more difficult for governments to oppose you.”\textsuperscript{53} This provided the administration with a greater level of confidence that the coalition could stay intact long enough to complete the operation because once states had committed their own political capital to the co-operative action, the costs associated with defecting from the coalition became greater.\textsuperscript{54}

Operating through the UN also allowed the Bush administration to present a position of opposition to the Iraqi action as being representative of the international community. In this sense, the Bush administration implicitly suggested that support for this opposition was a prerequisite for equal membership in the international community. For weaker states in the international system, struggling for international recognition, a failure to support the stance against Iraq may not have been perceived as serving their long-term interests. As the number of states that signalled their support for the UN stance against Iraq increased, it became increasingly difficult for other states to withhold their support without isolating themselves from the U.S. and

\textsuperscript{52} Bennett, Leppold and Unger, “Burden-sharing,” 42.
\textsuperscript{54} Cooper, Higott and Nossal argue that the apparent barbarity of Saddam Hussein’s actions also increased the costs of defecation. Cooper, Higott, and Nossal, “Bound to Follow?” 402.
setting themselves up as some form of international pariah.

President Bush also generated an additional motivation for co-operation in the Gulf by tapping into the post-Cold War optimism that seemed to be gripping the entire globe at the time. President Bush used his 'new world order' imagery, and the role of the UN within it, as one of the foundations of his rally cry for war in the Gulf. Support for the UN and its principles were held out as the underpinnings of a more humane world society that would be governed by democracy and the rule of law. Through his ‘new world order’ rhetoric, President Bush was able to create a vision of the future in which the entire world was invited to participate. This served as the positive counterweight to the negative aspects of the war, the need to defeat aggression, and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This rally cry for a 'new world order' also helped the administration generate domestic support for the Gulf operation.

**Congressional Support and the Use of Force Option**

While Congress as a whole had been generally supportive of the president during the early stages of the U.S. response to the crisis, significant divisions developed as soon as the administration announced its intention to build up an offensive capacity in the Gulf. In part, these related to the question of whether the U.S. had sufficient interests at stake to justify the use of military force. For the most part, however, debate centred on the traditional tug of war between Congress and the Executive over war powers.

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56 Senate Concurrent Resolution 147, Supporting the President's Actions With Respect to Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait, U.S. Congress, 136, 123, 28 September 1990, S14221. 1990 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 726-727. See also Berman and Jentleson, "Bush and the Post-Cold-War World," 93-128.

57 1990 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 727. For a defence of the President’s authority to use force in Iraq see comments by Bob Dole, *Congressional Record*, 136, 150, 27 October 1990, S17791. For comments on the need for the president to seek congressional authorisation see comments by George Mitchell, *Congressional Record*, 136, 148, 25 October 1990, S18261.
Very little debate focused on the question of whether the U.S. should be acting alone to defeat Iraqi aggression. If anything, Richard Haass suggests, the UN resolutions, and the international support that was generated by them, proved ‘surprisingly helpful’ in terms of gaining congressional support for the use of force. Even the usually cautious and conservative Republican Senator Patrick Moynihan stated that his preference, in this particular instance, was for the U.S. to act within the UN framework rather than “go it alone.” What Senator Moynihan was more concerned about, along with many other members of Congress, was the question of whether the president intended to seek congressional authorisation before he ordered U.S. troops to act to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

The president had initially attempted to avoid the question of whether he needed to gain congressional authorisation by declaring that U.S. troops were not deployed in the Gulf in the face of imminent hostilities. The president argued that the presence of U.S. troops was aimed at reducing the likelihood of hostilities and increasing the chances of a peaceful solution to the crisis. With members on both sides demanding that the President seek authorisation from Congress, the President eventually acquiesced and formally asked the body for its support just days before the military intervention was to begin. He made it clear, however, that while he was desirous of its support he did not believe that he was constitutionally required to actually seek congressional authorisation for the use of force. He argued that his authority as

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58 For a statement to this effect see comments made by Sam Nunn, Congressional Record, 136, 129, 5 October 1990, S14619-S14621. Senator Jesse Helms did, however, make a point of stating that the UN was really an irrelevant force during the Gulf War because it was the U.S. that was calling the shots. See Jesse Helms, Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 20 September 1990, 42.
60 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Congressional Record, 136, 129, 5 October 1990, S14618.
Commander-in-Chief already gave him the authority to use military force against Iraq. In the end, a constitutional showdown was avoided when both houses of Congress supported a joint resolution authorising the action against Iraq on 12 January 1990. By this late stage in the debate, and with over half a million U.S. troops poised for action in the Gulf, congressional members had little choice but to rubber stamp the president’s policy.

It is interesting to note that there was no reason why Congress could not have, if members had wanted to, debated the use of force in the Gulf before they were asked to do so by the President. That they chose not to proves the assumption that Congress, by choice, defers to the president on matters involving high level threats to U.S. military security. That Congress, as an intervening variable, has little influence over the executive decision making process when military security is perceived to be at stake, is demonstrated by the fact that President Bush insisted that he would use force in the Gulf if necessary, even if Congress voted against him.

Disadvantages of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN
For U.S. policy makers the most significant disadvantage of operating through the UN multilateral framework was the potential of this framework to represent too great a constraint on policy. Richard Haass notes that the UN constrained U.S. policy in the Gulf in three ways,

First of all, by definition, it has to slow you down a little bit. Second of all, you might get some conditions. Third of all, you might lose and if you lose, if you can’t get the votes, then clearly this constrains you. Because then it really does raise questions about the correctness of your path, the lack of international support, and it will have a domestic echo. So it’s a risk. Plus, there is a fourth risk. Now every time that you do it, you are reinforcing the norm and the expectation that it is

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one of the necessary boxes to check before you use military force.\textsuperscript{66}

As part of the administration’s attempt to garner support for its policies both international and domestically, Bush officials continually emphasised the significance of unprecedented levels of consensus within the UN Security Council. This consensus, they argued, represented a rare window of opportunity to create a more co-operative world order. Presenting the Gulf operation in this light may have proved to be a powerful additional incentive for international co-operation, but as the emphasis on the Security Council increased, so too did the need to maintain a consensus within it. Once Council consensus was established as a legitimate justification for action, U.S. policy makers were then committed to ensuring that this justification could be carried through to the completion of the operation.

Richard Haass suggests that not all members of the administration were comfortable with putting such a great emphasis on the legitimating function of the UN Security Council.

The danger in establishing the norm... that you ought not to use force without the UN’s blessing, is that it makes it more difficult to use force on those occasions that you can’t get the UN’s blessing. ... It is not an unmitigated benefit for us, to strengthen that norm, ... there will be times when we can’t get it [Security Council support] because Russia or China or someone will block us. So we have to be very careful about reinforcing that norm.\textsuperscript{67}

\textit{Avoiding the Direct Authority of the Security Council}

While policy makers were keen to gain the additional legitimacy and other benefits associated within acting through the UN, they were very wary of placing U.S. policy under the legally binding control of the Security Council. In an effort to minimise the potential of the UN framework to constrain U.S. policy options the administration operated under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which asserts the right of states to

\textsuperscript{66} Haass, Interview 1998.
unilateral or collective self-defence. This article was chosen in preference to Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, which deal specifically with the use of force in the maintenance of international peace and stability, because it allowed the administration to avoid putting U.S. actions under the direct control of the Council. 68

Article 41 outlines the diplomatic and economic steps that may be taken in an attempt to address a threat to international peace, and specifically excludes the use of armed force. Article 42 outlines the conditions and purposes under which force, including military force, may be used to address a threat to international peace. Included here is the need for the Security Council to meet to determine that diplomatic and economic measures taken under Article 41 have not been, or will not be, adequate to deal with the threat to peace. Only then can the Council, acting under Article 42 of the Charter, authorise the use of military force to deal with a threat.

If the initial economic measures taken against Iraq had been imposed under Article 41, explicit Security Council approval would have been necessary before the Council could shift to Article 42 and consider using military force. In November the administration sought, and gained, explicit Council approval for its shift to an offensive policy. Yet, in anticipation of the possibility of not gaining the necessary Security Council approval, President Bush avoided Articles 41 and 42 and instead maintained his right to take further action under Article 51 throughout the crisis. 69

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was a strong supporter of the Bush

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administration’s ‘tough’ stance, agreed with this interpretation of the UN charter.\textsuperscript{70}

She argued throughout the crisis that, regardless of whatever else happened under the Security Council, the coalition had gained the right to use force against Iraq under Resolution 661. It was this resolution that had imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in the early days of the crisis and which had committed the Council to freeing Kuwait. Resolution 661 also established Article 51 as the framework of international action, rather than Article 41, and Prime Minister Thatcher argued that this gave the international community the right to use force against Iraq without requiring it to seek any further authority from the Council.\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{Shared Interests and U.S. Leadership}

The willingness of the administration to make the commitment to work within the UN framework despite the potential constraints not only reflected, but developed along with, its optimism about being able to maintain the necessary Security Council consensus. Bush and his key policy advisers recognised early in the crisis that many, if not most, states in the international arena genuinely shared the U.S. interest in reversing the Iraqi act of aggression.\textsuperscript{72} Along with the recognition of genuinely shared interests, however, was the awareness that operating within the UN multilateral framework committed the U.S. to shoring up any shortfalls in consensus if and when they arose. If they chose to pursue U.S. policy within a formal multilateral framework, then they would need to be willing to take whatever action necessary to keep this framework workable.

Operating within the multilateral framework of the UN made the U.S. more vulnerable to the interests and actions of other states. When the interests of some states deviated, it was necessary for the U.S. to ensure that it remained in their

\textsuperscript{70} John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in November 1990.

\textsuperscript{71} “Iraq has returned to law of jungle, Thatcher tells MPs,” \textit{The Times}, Friday, 7 September 1990, 1.

\textsuperscript{72} Not as many states shared the U.S. interest in using force to reverse the invasion, but this did not become an issue for policy makers until just prior to the Security Council debate on the use of force resolution.
interest to refrain from taking any action, or even making any public comments, that would jeopardise the consensus position. This need to maintain unity was all the more relevant in relation to the other Security Council members as their votes were necessary to support the various UN resolutions that shaped the development of the operation against Iraq. It was within this context that the U.S. provided the leadership necessary to ensure that the international coalition, organised under the UN umbrella, co-operated in the pursuit of a collective good.

U.S. Leadership and the Collective Action Against Iraq

States co-operated with the U.S. in the UN authorised actions against Iraq, either actively or tacitly, for a combination of reasons. Some states co-operated with the U.S. because its stated principles and objectives were consistent with their own. In this respect, they recognised U.S. leadership against Iraq as being both legitimate and beneficial to their own interests. Many states co-operated with the U.S. even though they did not share its interests in the Gulf, because they recognised the benefits of co-operating with such a powerful global hegemon. In this respect, they either wanted to establish or maintain a position of favour, or they wanted to avoid disfavour with the U.S.73

Other states co-operated in an effort to strengthen their international standing and be seen to be an active participant in the new post-Cold War international order. President Bush promoted this rationale when he attempted to present active participation in the coalition as being a sign of legitimacy in a newly evolving more liberal world order.74 For most states, while there were several factors contributing to

74 Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal argue that several states contributed to the coalition of force in the Gulf on the assumption that active participation in the military operation would be a prerequisite for eligibility to participate in the bidding for highly profitable post-war reconstruction contracts in Iraq and Kuwait. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, “Bound to Follow?” 405.
their decision to support the coalition against Iraq, it was the additional incentives provided by the U.S. that was the deciding element.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Organising the Economic Burden-sharing Effort}

One of the key ways in which the U.S. provided the leadership necessary to maintain the multilateral effort in the Gulf, related to its efforts to ensure that the economic embargo against Iraq remained sustainable. Several states, particularly developing states and non-oil states in the Persian Gulf, suffered greatly from the financial strain of the embargo. In an attempt to keep the embargo solid, the U.S. either offered the most affected states financial compensation, or put pressure on other states to do so. At the instigation of the U.S., a Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states, the larger Gulf states, and twenty four others, was created with the aim of coordinating the response to the financial pressures caused by the oil embargo. The longer the embargo was in place, the greater the financial burden on vulnerable states and the greater the challenge to the U.S. to arrange compensation.\textsuperscript{76} Despite this challenge, the U.S. succeeded in ensuring that the embargo remained strong right up until the launch of the military intervention. Many aspects of the embargo were, in fact, maintained long after the intervention ended.

\textit{Israel: A Special Case}

Another key leadership challenge for the U.S., related to the question of keeping both Israel and the Arab states co-operating within the same framework of action. In this regard, U.S. policy makers had to maintain a very tenuous balance between the sensitivities and concerns of both parties. This task became even more difficult in

October 1990 when Israeli security forces put down a riot on the Dome of the Rock of Jerusalem. This action resulted in the deaths of twenty-one Arab civilians and the wounding one hundred and fifty. Despite its long standing policy of limiting its criticism of Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, the U.S. attempted to appease Arab outrage by supporting two Security Council resolutions condemning Israel’s actions and calling on it to receive an investigative mission by the UN Secretary-General. In an effort not to inflame Arab members of the coalition, the U.S. also postponed plans to seek the repeal of a UN General Assembly resolution equating zionism with racism.

The administration’s challenge in regard to Israel was unique in that, unlike other states, the U.S. objective involved making sure that the country did not join the coalition against Iraq. It was vital to coalition cohesion that Israel be dissuaded from engaging the Gulf situation because of its longstanding tensions with the Arab states of the region. It was also the case that, for Israel, the actual costs as well as the potential costs of co-operating with the U.S. were higher than most other states operating within the UN framework. The continued co-operation of Israel required that it effectively forego the right of self-defence. This required a significant act of faith, on behalf of the Israeli leadership, not only in the objectives of the U.S. led UN operation but also in the military coalition’s ability to achieve them.

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For the U.S. the greatest challenge in terms of keeping Israel on board began after the war had started and Israel came under attack from Iraqi scud missiles. With its military security interests so greatly threatened, Israel's commitment to the coalition started to crumble and the Israeli leadership insisted on the right to retaliate. 80 By this stage the coalition air campaign was well underway and Israel demanded the right to join in and hit Iraqi targets from the air. To prevent Israel from taking any action and derailing the coalition, the U.S. refused to give its military commanders the identification codes required to ensure that its planes would be identified as 'friendly' and not be mistaken for coalition targets. 81 The U.S. then took military action to alleviate the threat to Israeli military security, and reduce the risk of it taking defensive action. The U.S. deployed several patriot missiles within Israeli territory and the U.S. commander in the field, General Normal Schwarzkopf, was directed to divert part of the air campaign towards the location and destruction of the Iraqi scud missile launchers that had been targeting Israel. 82

The Security Council: Shared Interests

Throughout the Gulf crisis, the need to maintain a majority of consensus among Security Council members remained a key issue for administration officials because of the need for additional resolutions supporting the direction of U.S. policy. Of the Council members, it was the permanent members who possessed the power to veto U.S. proposed resolutions that caused the administration the most concern. Some members were more of a problem for the administration than others.

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On the whole, France was one of the most active supporters of the U.S. led operation in the Gulf and U.S. policy makers were not required to specifically target the state with individual incentives in order to maintain its co-operation. While President Mitterrand was initially cautious, he recognised very quickly that the benefits of cooperating with the U.S. led coalition would outweigh the costs of holding out, particularly when it came to the allocation of post-war reconstruction contracts. 83

The French were generally supportive of U.S. objectives in the Gulf, but they were initially reluctant to support a military stance against Iraq. Their attitude to the use of force began to change, however, when the Iraqi leader detained a number of French citizens in late August 1990. 84 The French began actively supporting the possibility of using force against Iraq after their embassy was stormed by Iraqi troops on 14 September. 85 In an additional deviation from the U.S. line of thinking, the French tried to keep open the option of finding a peaceful diplomatic solution right up until the launch of Desert Storm. 86 In the end, however, the French co-operated fully with the U.S. led mission and they were one of the largest military contributors to Desert Storm. 87

Of all the other members of the UN Security Council, Britain was the most ardent supporter of U.S. policy in the Gulf. 88 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had been in the U.S. when news of the Iraq invasion first broke. 89 She was with President Bush when he made his first public statement regarding the crisis and she made it very

87 France contributed nearly 18 000 troops to the war. For details see report from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 14 May 1991.
89 Paul Taylor suggests that British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, played a key role in ensuring a swift international response to the Iraqi invasion through her ‘vigorous’ efforts to urge President Bush to take action. See discussion in Taylor, International Organization, 210.
clear, very quickly, that her preference was for a strong united stand against what she described as a “totally unacceptable” act of aggression that was in “total violation of international law.”

The U.S. was not required to provide Britain with individually targeted inducements in order to secure its continued co-operation in the Gulf because its policy was already closely in line with its own. Throughout the crisis Britain remained steadfast in its support of the U.S. and, like President Bush, Prime Minister Thatcher refused quite early in the conflict to rule out the possible use of military force. Britain was the second largest military contributor to Operation Desert Storm, after the United States.

China presented the U.S administration with more of a challenge than Britain and France. While China basically shared the rest of the international community’s concerns about the blatant aggression in the Gulf, the Chinese leadership was very reluctant to use military force to eject Iraqi troops from Kuwait. China supported all UN resolutions concerning the Iraqi invasion except for the ones that authorised the use of military force against Iraq. When the use of force was involved either directly, or indirectly with regard to sanctions enforcement, China abstained from voting. In this sense, China did not actively co-operate with the U.S. in the UN so much as offer its tacit co-operation by not using its veto to block U.S. actions.

To ensure even this level of co-operation from China, the U.S. dramatically toned down its diplomatic response to the Chinese government’s crackdown on pro-

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92 Taylor, International Organization, 212-216.
democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square the year before. The U.S. even went so far as to ignore its own ban on official exchanges between the two countries and proffered an invitation for the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen to visit Washington. The official invitation was to be made public the day after the Security Council was scheduled to vote on Resolution 678, authorising the use of force against Iraq. Quichen was promised a meeting with President Bush if China actively voted for 678, and a meeting with Secretary Baker if China only abstained.

The Soviet Union: the Greatest Diplomatic Challenge

Of all the Security Council members, it was the Soviet Union that provided the U.S. with the greatest challenge. Unlike France and Britain, the Soviet Union did not share the bulk of U.S. objectives in the Gulf and unlike China, it was not satisfied with taking a back seat for the most part of the crisis. With regard to the process of bargaining and compromise that was needed to generate a sufficient level of consensus in the Security Council, it was the Soviet Union that required the most U.S. attention. The challenge for policy makers was to balance the need to compromise in order to maintain Soviet support, with the need to ensure that U.S. military or economic security interests remained protected. It is this aspect of the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union that makes it a useful focus of further investigation.


95 Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1990, 742.


97 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 413. President Bush met with Qichen, despite China’s failure to support the resolution.

98 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 345.
With regard to the UN authorised, U.S. led multilateral intervention in the Persian Gulf, the U.S.–Soviet relationship offers a revealing demonstration of the extent to which the U.S. will bargain and compromise in order to retain what is perceived to be a highly beneficial multilateral framework of action. The remainder of this section will provide a number of key examples of how and when the U.S. compromised on stated interests and objectives in order to maintain Soviet co-operation in the Council.  

While the Soviet leadership seemed to agree with the U.S. interpretation of both the specific and the broader issues at stake in the Persian Gulf, its enthusiasm for the U.S. led operation was not consistent. The core reason for this inconsistency was the Soviet domestic situation. The crisis in the Gulf occurred just as internal tensions in the Soviet Union were coming to a head and the union was speeding toward political disintegration. In this respect, the problems for the Soviet leader became increasingly more salient as the U.S. gradually led the coalition closer to war.

The problem for President Gorbachev and his foreign minister was that co-operation with the U.S. was interpreted by many internal groups, including much of the military and the more hard line members of the Communist Party, as capitulation and weakness. These perceptions were further entrenched by Gorbachev’s seeming inability or unwillingness to keep the Baltic republics’ moves towards independence.


100 Strobe Talbott notes that secretary of state, James Baker, thought that while both Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze seemed to sympathise with the U.S. position, Shevardnadze seemed more appreciative of the need to address the issue of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability, regardless of the outcome of the crisis. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 263; Soviet Union – United States Joint Statement on the Persian Gulf Crisis, Helsinki, Finland, 9 September 1990; Joint News Conference of President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Helsinki, Finland, 9 September 1990; Robert Gregg, About Face: The United States and the United Nations, Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1993, 110; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, “Bound to Follow?” 400; Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 232.
in check. The challenge for the Soviet leadership was to co-operate actively without providing its internal critics with ammunition by appearing to be a junior partner in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.\(^{101}\) The key way to achieve this was by ensuring that any U.S. led actions were undertaken within the collective global framework of the UN.

The challenge for the Bush administration was to cater to Soviet sensitivities and keep the leadership on board, without compromising in relation to the substance of its own core interests and objectives.\(^{102}\) The Bush administration was, in a sense, caught in a Catch 22 situation. American and Soviet leaders both recognised that retaining the UN framework of action was crucial to maintaining Soviet support for the Gulf operation. At the same time, maintaining Soviet support was itself crucial to retaining the collective UN framework of action.

*More Than Just the Gulf at Stake*

Both the Soviets and the Americans recognised that the establishment of a co-operative relationship with regard to the situation in the Gulf would have a tremendous impact on the shape and character of the post-Cold War international order.\(^{103}\) Gorbachev and his foreign minister also recognised that the crisis offered them an opportunity to establish an equal, co-operative, partnership with the U.S.

Whether we want it or not, history dictates that a lot is going to depend on whether the two countries can work together. ... in today's world, no single country, however powerful, will be able to provide the leadership which individual countries formerly tried to provide...\(^{104}\)

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\(^{102}\) Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 293.

Both states also had more immediate and practical motivations for promoting mutual co-operation in the Gulf. Before the crisis had erupted the Bush administration had embarked on an ambitious program of co-operation with the Soviet Union in relation to the reduction and control of both conventional and non-conventional weapons.105 Once the crisis in the Gulf was resolved, the administration wanted to continue its ambitious program. From a Soviet perspective, acquiescence to U.S. leadership in the Gulf was no doubt influenced by a desire to encourage direct foreign investment and economic aid.106 In addition, acquiescence in the Gulf was aimed at softening the U.S. response to the Soviet Union's handling of the Baltic crisis.107

A Restrained Response to the Crackdown in the Baltics

The Bush administration recognised that President Gorbachev was struggling to keep control over a country that was suffering acutely from the tensions between those who were willing to fight to pull it apart, and those prepared to fight to keep it together. One way in which the administration demonstrated its understanding of these tensions, along with its desire for the reformist president to remain in control, was its restrained criticism of the Soviet response to the independence demands of the Baltic states.108 This restraint became increasingly more difficult as it became increasingly more likely that the Soviet military would use force to put down these

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104 Mikhail Gorbachev, Joint News Conference, 9 February 1990.
105 The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in November 1990, and entered into force two years later. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed in July 1991. It is worth noting that this reduction in U.S. force levels in Europe helped to free up forces for redeployment in the Persian Gulf.
106 When asked about economic aid to the Soviet Union, Bush replied that “…given the common stand that the Soviet Union and the United States have taken at the United Nations, it seems to me that we should be as forthcoming as we possibly can in terms of economics, and I plan to do that,” and “… I think that this remarkable co-operation that has been demonstrated by the Soviet Union at the United Nations gets me inclined to recommend as close co-operation in the economic field as possible… there are many ways that we can endeavor to be of assistance to the emerging economy in the Soviet Union.” Ibid.
107 Both rationales for Soviet co-operations in the Gulf are put forward in Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, “Bound to Follow?” 400.
Although the Soviet leader had continually, and publicly, committed to resolving the issue of Baltic independence peacefully, he was clearly struggling to maintain control over the military and ensure that it followed the same path. In an effort not to exacerbate the Soviet leader’s problems, the Bush administration continually put pressure on Gorbachev to keep his military in check, but deliberately kept its language moderate. The last thing the U.S. wanted to do was aggravate the rift between the relatively moderate Soviet leader and the military and political hard liners.

When the Soviet military did eventually crack down on independence protesters in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, the president knew that continued co-operation with the Soviet Union would be dependent upon the U.S. reaction. The desire to protect the new co-operative relationship was sharpened by the fact the military crackdown took place in January 1991, only two days before the Security Council deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

The challenge for the president and his key officials was to formulate a public reaction that would not alienate Gorbachev, or worsen his relationship with the KGB, the military, or other hard liners, but at the same time satisfy their own domestic critics. As the president’s national security adviser later Brent Scowcroft noted,

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113 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 444.
The crackdown in the Baltics, coming as it did on the eve of the launching of the air war against Iraq, aroused my suspicions. I wondered if the timing might be designed to take advantage of our presumed reluctance to take harsh countermeasure at a time when we needed to maintain Soviet support in the Gulf. Whether or not that was a motivation, the authoritarian measures produced a debate in the Administration on exactly that point.114

The entire administration, from the president down, responded to the crackdown in Vilnius in mooted tones and this led to an outcry in Congress. The administration was accused of turning a blind eye to events in the Baltics and of sacrificing Vilnius for the sake of Soviet co-operation in the Gulf.115 While this criticism was harsh, it was effectively an accurate depiction of the administration's priorities. The desire to retain the UN framework of action in regard to the crisis in the Gulf, was serving as a restraint on the U.S. response to the events in the Baltics. According to Strobe Talbott, this fact was recognised by officials in both states and it was explicitly acknowledge by the newly appointed Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh in late January 1991.116

Going 'Wobbly': The First Test of Coalition Resolve

In mid August 1990, an Iraqi oil tanker attempted to violate the economic embargo imposed on Iraq under Security Council Resolution 661. Almost immediately, the

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114 Ibid. 497.
115 George Bush, Remarks on Soviet Military Intervention in Lithuanis and a Question-and-answer Session with Reporters, Washington, D.C., 13 January 1991. See discussion in Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 298-320. In marked contrast to the policy pursued by the executive, the Republican and Democratic leadership in the Congress united on a number of resolutions aimed at sending a clear message of condemnation to the Soviet leadership. Within a week of the Vilnius crackdown, both houses had passed a non-binding resolution calling on the president to consider cutting off all economic support for the Soviet Union and withdraw U.S. support for its membership in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. Several members also called upon the president to postpone his scheduled summit with President Gorbachev until Soviet forces had withdrawn from Lithuania and Latvia. See for example, Alfonse D'Amato, *Congressional Record*, 137, 11, 16 January 1991, S937 and Robert Smith, *Congressional Record*, 137, 14, 22 January 1991, S1022. The president did not respond to either of these recommendations.

116 Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 302 and 324. This rationale continued throughout the course of the operation in the Persian Gulf, and was again tested on 19 January when Soviet troops shot their way into the Latvian Interior Ministry and opened fire in the lobby of a neighbouring hotel.
Pentagon, the U.S. media, Congress, and the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher began to put pressure on the administration to take action before the tanker could reach its destination and unload its suspected oil cargo.

Key officials within the administration were divided as to whether the U.S. already had the authority to take action to halt the ship under Resolution 661, or whether it was necessary to go back to the Council to gain the specific authority to enforce the embargo. Resolution 661 had deliberately been drawn up under the authority of Article 51, rather than the authority of Article 41, in order to retain greater U.S. control over the embargo and avoid placing it under the control of the Security Council.¹¹⁷ Administration officials recognised, however, that while an argument could be made that the U.S. already had the authority to use force under Resolution 661 and on the basis of Article 51, taking such action without gaining specific authorisation from the Security Council would risk losing the support of the Soviet Union and possibly other states.¹¹８

Several Security Council members, along with the UN Secretary-General, had already objected to the unilateral U.S. decision to deploy vessels in the Gulf to begin

¹¹⁷ The president claimed that the UN Secretary-General had conferred with the U.S. claim of its authority to use force under Article 51 of the UN Charter. See George Bush, Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Persian Gulf Crisis, Kennebunkport, M.E., 11 August 1990 and George Bush, News Conference, Washington, D.C., 14 August 1990. Administration officials were very careful, when they debated whether Resolution 661 gave them the authority to enforce the embargo, not to use any of the legal terminology associated with Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. In this respect, officials avoided using the term 'blockade' to describe any possible actions they might take to defend the embargo and prevent the Iraqi tanker from reaching its destination. See George Bush, Exchange with Reporters Aboard Air Force One on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 10 August 1990. See also Clifford Krauss, “And Now the ‘B Word’ (Do Not Say Blockade)” New York Times, Monday, 13 August 1990, A8 Michael Gordon, “Bush Orders Navy to Halt All Shipments of Iraq’s Oil and Almost All Its Imports: Some Food to Pass, Word ‘Blockade’ Avoided to Sidestep question of New U.N. Vote,” New York Times, Monday, 13 August 1990, A1; George Bush, Exchange with Reporters Aboard Air Force One on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 10 August 1990.

¹¹⁸ Brent Scowcroft notes that it was secretary of state, James Baker, who was most vocal in the belief that Soviet co-operation would be lost if the U.S. acted unilaterally, and without a Security Council resolution. See Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 352. Paul Lewis, “Security Council’s Rare Unity May be Threatened Over U.S. Warships in the Gulf,” New York Times, Saturday, 11 August 1990, L7.
the ‘interdiction’ of shipping. At this point, however, these ships had not yet actually used force to prevent vessels from breaking the embargo and administration officials recognised the benefits of gaining explicit Security Council support before such actions were taken. They also realised, however, that there was a good chance that the Iraqi tanker would pass through the embargo and reach its destination long before they could get a new UN resolution passed. U.S. officials, and also the British Prime Minister, thought it was crucial that this particular Iraqi tanker be prevented from reaching port. As the first tanker to try and break the embargo, it represented the first public test of the international community’s resolve.

As a result of his meeting with the Iraqi Deputy Premier, the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, asked U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, to hold off on taking any action against the Iraqi tanker for five days. He argued that his meeting with the Iraqis had given him the impression that the Iraqi leader may be convinced to withdraw from Kuwait and live up to the terms of Resolution 660. Baker informed the Soviet Foreign Minister of the mounting pressure for the U.S. to take action with or without a resolution, and offered him three days to come to a decision about whether to support a new resolution.

During these three days the administration debated the pros and cons of waiting for Soviet support. In the end, President Bush decided that the benefits of gaining Soviet

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121 This account is based on an interview with Richard Haass who accompanied Baker when he met with Shevardnadze. Haass suggests that the U.S. agreement to postpone action in the hope of gaining a Security Council resolution represented a specific compromise aimed at retaining the UN multilateral framework of action. Haass, Interview 1998.
co-operation for a resolution explicitly authorising the use of force outweighed the negative message sent by allowing the Iraqi tanker to reach its destination. He decided that the U.S. would restrain its actions and wait to see if the Soviets could be convinced to support a new Security Council Resolution. While the U.S. was working to gain Soviet support, the oil tanker succeeded in reaching its port in Yemen and this made the administration the target of strong criticism domestically and also from key allies, including Britain.

After the crisis regarding the first embargo-breaking oil tanker had passed, the U.S. secretary of state began putting more pressure on the Soviets to support an embargo enforcement resolution. The Soviet foreign minister responded by promising to support a new resolution by 25 August, if the Iraqi leader had not complied with existing resolutions by then. At the same time, however, Shevardnadze also pointed out that while the intention of the U.S. proposed enforcement resolution was acceptable, the language contained within it was not.

The initial draft of the resolution explicitly approved the use of 'force' to ensure compliance with previous resolutions. In an effort to cater to the sensitivities of the Soviet hardliners, and not worsen the Soviet leadership's domestic difficulties, the U.S agreed to water down the wording of the resolution without actually altering its content. On 25 August, having not received a reply to any of its messages to the Iraqi leader, the Soviet Union voted to approve Resolution 665 authorising the use of "measures commensurate to the specific circumstance" to enforce the previous four

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123 See president's comments Bush, News Conference, 22 August 1990. See also Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 253.
resolutions. To ensure continued Soviet support for this resolution, the Bush administration had postponed the tabling of the draft while the Soviets consulted with Iraqi leaders, and moderated the language contained in the resolution so as not to rile the hardliners who were making Gorbachev’s life more difficult. The cost of taking these actions was the failure to halt the Iraqi tanker and, arguably, a missed opportunity to demonstrate to the Iraqi leader the extent of the international community’s resolve. In this respect, while Bush officials did not take any actions that directly placed U.S. military or economic security interests at risk, they did make substantial compromises on their stated goals in order to gain Soviet support and maintain the UN framework of action. They made a calculated decision, that the long term benefits to be gained from retaining Soviet support in the Security Council were greater than the more immediate benefits of stopping the Iraqi tanker.

“All Necessary Means” A Compromise on the Use of Force

The difficulties experienced by the Soviet leadership in the lead up to the vote on Resolution 665 were repeated in November in relation to the resolution authorising the coalition military offensive. Once the President made the decision to augment the troop deployment in the Gulf in preparation for a possible offensive action, key officials within the administration again debated the necessity of obtaining specific authorisation from the Security Council. Again the president weighed down in favour of attempting to gain the increased legitimacy of an explicit Council resolution. The perception was that such an authorisation would not only make the co-operation of the Soviets and other coalition partners more likely, but also that it would help alleviate the growing opposition to such action within Congress and some aspects of

In gaining an additional Security Council resolution, the administration was attempting to draw the Soviet Union deeper into the multilateral action. It was hoped that gaining Soviet support for the resolution would link the Soviet leadership more closely to the multilateral operation and give it a greater sense of having a stake in its success. This would, it was believed, make it less likely that the Soviet leadership would defect from the collective action and pursue its own interests unilaterally. In its attempt to keep the Soviet Union on board, the administration again had to compromise on the timing and the wording of the relevant resolution.

Again the Soviet Union objected to the term ‘force’ in the resolution and its terminology had to be adjusted accordingly. This was the case even though the Soviet leadership was aware that authorising the use of “all necessary means” was effectively the same as explicitly authorising the use of force. Its objection to explicit authorisation stemmed from its fear of a strong domestic backlash given the long standing ties between the Soviet Union and Iraq, and also a concern for the Soviet people’s anxieties brought on by the protracted Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

**Negotiating the Deadline for Withdrawal**

What could have been a more damaging consideration for the Bush administration, was the Soviet concern over the timeline to be established within the resolution for an Iraqi withdrawal. The Soviets had initially pressed for two separate resolutions. The first would authorise the use of force, and about six weeks later a second resolution would give the actual go ahead for a military offensive. The Soviets wanted to make sure that any military action was taken only after Saddam Hussein

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130 George Bush in Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 384. Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 283. The authors state that both Secretary of State, James Baker, and National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, agreed that the UN resolution was necessary to bring Congress along.

131 Gregg, *About Face?* 110; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, “Bound to Follow?” 399; and *Strategic Survey 1990-1991*, 75-76.


had provided further evidence that he was unwilling to withdraw from Kuwait. The six week period between the two resolutions, the Soviets believed, would demonstrate to the Iraqi leader that the coalition was prepared to use force and that it had the support of the international community. It would also offer him a final window of opportunity to pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis and avoid the consequences of what would effectively be a large scale war.

Bush officials were extremely wary of going to the Security Council twice. Gaining the necessary level of consensus for the first resolution would be difficult enough, gaining this support again with a more firm understanding that such support would lead directly to the military offensive would be even harder. U.S. officials also argued that the six-week period between the two resolutions would allow Saddam Hussein too much time and space to play around with the coalition’s resolve. As a compromise the secretary of state suggested that a timeframe be built into the one resolution and that the deadline be no later than New Years Day. The Soviets argued for a longer period of grace, and a deadline of 15 January 1991 was agreed upon. Resolution 678 was eventually passed on 29 November with Cuba and Yemen opposing and China abstaining.

The day after the Soviets supported the use of force resolution President Bush announced that he was considering waiving the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which barred credit guarantees to countries, like the Soviet Union, which restricted emigration. The president waived the amendment in order to allow the Soviet Union access to up to U.S.$1 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees for

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134 Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 282.
136 Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 282.
137 Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 414. Richard Haass, who accompanied Baker on his mission aimed at gaining support for the ‘use of force’ resolution, suggests that the U.S. placed a high value on gaining the resolution, but that the president was prepared to act without it. Haass, *Interview* 1998.
the purchase of U.S. agricultural products.\textsuperscript{138} The release of substantial credit guarantees represented not only a reward for co-operation on Resolution 678, but also represented a powerful incentive for further co-operation. The administration presented the Jackson-Vanik waiver as being completed unrelated to events in the Gulf or to the Soviet support of the use of force resolution.

\textit{A Risky Compromise}

Allowing for the six-week period between the resolution and the deadline for withdrawal could have significantly compromised U.S. interests and objectives in the Gulf. It represented the most substantial risk undertaken by the administration in its attempt to ensure Soviet co-operation. Reversing the invasion of its sovereign neighbour was not the only objective that the U.S. held in relation to Iraq. Within weeks of the invasion Bush and several of his key advisers recognised that the return to the status quo ante was not necessarily in the interests of long term stability of the Middle East, nor was it in the interests of the U.S.

To ensure lasting stability in the Middle East, the Bush administration believed that it would be necessary to contain Iraq’s military capacity and its potential to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction. The most effective method of achieving this, as far as President Bush was concerned, was through inflicting a decisive military defeat upon Iraqi conventional forces and forcing the Iraqi leader to forgo his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.\textsuperscript{139} It was not considered sufficient to halt this one particular instance of Iraqi aggression, it was necessary to contain his ability to threaten or use aggression in the future.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{138} The Jackson-Vanik amendment (section 402) to the 1974 Trade Act bars access to official credit guarantee programs to countries that restrict emigration. The amendment applied to the Soviet Union on the basis of its policy on Jewish emigration. When the president was questioned about the waiver he said that it was linked to changes in Soviet policy, and not to its support for Resolution 678. The president announced the implementation of the waiver on 12 December, George Bush, \textit{The President's News Conference}, Washington, D.C.12 December 1990. See also \textit{White House Fact Sheet on the Waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment}, Washington, D.C., 12 December 1990.

\textsuperscript{139} See various comments in Bush and Scowcroft, \textit{A World Transformed}, 321, 371, 383, 433, 463, and 464.}
The Soviets wanted to delay the deadline for withdrawal to give them more time to convince Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait peacefully. If the Soviets had been able to negotiate a peaceful diplomatic solution to the crisis, it would have presented the administration with what some were terming a 'nightmare scenario.' Saddam Hussein would have been able to withdraw his forces from Kuwait with both his military and his weapons of mass destruction potential intact. This might have achieved a temporary restoration of stability in the Gulf but, as many within the administration were beginning to argue publicly, it would only postpone the inevitable confrontation between Iraq and the U.S.

In addition, delaying the military showdown with Iraq would only allow the Iraqi leader more time to prepare. This meant that if the U.S. did not take advantage of this opportunity to defeat Saddam Hussein, the potential risks and costs of attempting to defeat him later down the track would only increase. It was also possible, if not likely, that the recent events in the Gulf would have encouraged Hussein to step up his weapons of mass destruction programs, further increasing the likely risks of confrontation as well as his potential to threaten his immediate neighbours and Israel.

While the Soviet efforts to bring about a peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait were a cause for concern for the administration, they did not prove to be successful. As a result, the administration’s risky compromise on the deadline for withdrawal paid off. In an added benefit, the U.S. used the extra time to complete the necessary troop build up in the Gulf.

The additional time also provided the U.S. with an opportunity to show that it too was prepared to go “the extra mile for peace.” Bush sent Secretary Baker to Geneva to meet with the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on 9 January. When Baker failed to
obtain an Iraqi commitment to withdraw the president held the failure up to his domestic and international critics as further evidence that military action was unavoidable. It was shortly after this failed meeting between Baker and Aziz that both houses of Congress passed resolutions supporting the president’s decision to exercise the military option. Only days later, on 17 January 1991, the U.S. led international military campaign began.

Conclusion
Some critics would suggest that the Gulf War does not stand as a genuine example of post-Cold War multilateralism because of the hegemonic leadership role played by the U.S. Yet, even though U.S. leadership was clearly the catalyst for the operation, this makes it no less consistent with the principles of multilateralism as they are understood within this study. States voluntarily co-operated with the U.S. in the Persian Gulf in pursuit of a public good, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, and under the specific authority of several Security Council resolutions.

From the Bush administration’s perspective, the UN authorised, U.S. led, military intervention against Iraq was a resounding success and a highly favourable example of post-Cold War multilateralism. The U.S. not only succeeded in sharing the costs and risks associated with defeating a threat to its military security, it also succeeded in maintaining a clear leadership role throughout the entire operation. This meant that the U.S. was able to use the UN to facilitate a greater level of co-operation than would have been possible within any other multilateral framework, and at the same time ensure that the co-operative action remained consistent with core U.S. interests. It is because of this success in the Gulf, that President Bush decided to conduct an immediate review of the level of U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

A Model for Post-Cold War Multilateralism?

As will be discussed in the following chapter, the terms of this ‘peacekeeping review’ were largely shaped by the perceived success in the Persian Gulf and this operation was held up as a model of UN-based multilateralism. Yet, as the remaining chapters will demonstrate, the military operation against Iraq was an inappropriate for UN-based multilateralism in the post-Cold War world. This is because almost everything about the Gulf operation was unique.141 Not only was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait an extraordinary international event, so too was the international community’s response to it.

The Iraqi invasion of a sovereign member of the UN represented a clear case of unprovoked aggression against a sovereign member of the UN. Paul Taylor, in fact, describes it as being the most clear cut case of international aggression since the end of the Second World War.142 This presented the international community with a relatively uncomplicated political scenario, despite the Iraqi leader’s attempt to link the invasion to the broader issue of Middle East peace. Iraq was perceived clearly by the international community as being the aggressor state, and Kuwait was seen as the victim.

In addition, the act of invasion presented the international community with a clear military goal once the decision was made to use force in an effort to reverse it. The military coalition in the Gulf was charged with a clearly defined objective. Its goal was to attack the Iraqi military machine, as well as its supporting infrastructure, with such overwhelming force that the Iraqi leader would have no choice but to withdraw from Kuwait. From a military perspective this task was greatly facilitated by favourable conditions on the ground in terms of weather, topography, and overall

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142 Taylor, International Organization, 209.
tactical feasibility.

The types of conflict that were already taking shape at the end of the Cold War were not as straightforward as the one that had occurred in the Gulf. They were turning out to be more complex politically and militarily, and often there was very little international consensus was forthcoming in relation to the guilt of the local combatants. Within these types of conflicts, the conditions that had made the UN a beneficial framework during the Gulf war would not easily be met. That is, there would not be a shared interest in a public good uniting UN member states, particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council. Without this shared interest, the legitimacy of U.S. leadership could be questioned and would be harder to maintain. Without clear U.S. leadership, administration policy makers would not be confident of their capacity to shape any UN-based multilateral action to suit U.S. national interests.

Many of the difficulties experienced by the Bush administration, and later the Clinton administration, in determining a useful and appropriate role for the UN within post-Cold War foreign policy were rooted in the heightened expectations generated by the success in the Gulf. These heightened expectations stemmed from the assumption that the U.S. leadership, which had been so successful exercised in the Gulf, would continue to be recognised as legitimate when it came to addressing the challenges arising in the post-Cold War era. Policy makers also assumed that the level of global co-operation in the Gulf was evidence that many states had now united around a common set of liberal principles that would generate a set of interests that would be consistent with America's own values and interests. As the following case studies will demonstrate, these assumptions proved to be false.
- Chapter Five -

The Bush Administration’s Peacekeeping Review

Introduction
The end of the Cold War and the dramatic success of the UN authorised, U.S. led, multilateral action in the Persian Gulf led President Bush and his senior foreign policy team to fundamentally reassess their view of the world. Within the framework of this broader reassessment, the president ordered an interagency review of the nature and extent of U.S. participation in UN peace operations. This review was not simply aimed at exploring an expanding role for the UN in the post-Cold War world, it was also aimed at helping determine and define a new role for the United States in light of its recently changed international status. The review was undertaken at a time when much of the world was still dizzy with optimism about what the end of the Cold War could mean for international peace and stability. At this point, policy makers were yet to fully grasp the complicated and intractable nature of post-Cold War conflict and the large-scale human tragedies that would result from it.¹

Prior to the military and diplomatic success in the Persian Gulf, neither Bush nor his senior policy advisers had considered the UN to have a significant role within U.S. national security policy. Until the Gulf experience the primary role of the UN

had been conceived in limited terms and mostly in relation to the facilitation of co-operation on low-risk non-military security issues such as the environment. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1989 the president had paid lip service to the organisation’s role in relation to more substantive issues only to then outline the steps that the U.S. planned to take, unilaterally, bilaterally, and regionally in an effort to address them. Within two years of making this address to the General Assembly a fundamental shift had occurred within U.S. thinking. By the end of 1991 the UN was being considered for a much more substantial role in the protection and promotion of U.S. national interests, including its military security interests. To successfully fulfil this new role the UN, it was thought, would need to be dramatically strengthened.

Within this chapter the Bush administration’s effort to review and expand the role of UN multilateral peace operations within U.S. foreign policy will be explored. The chapter begins by examining how the Bush administration’s view of the world and its perceptions of U.S. national interests altered as a result of changed international conditions and the recent success in the Gulf. The remaining section focuses on the interagency review process and the ways, if any, it was influenced by the views of Congress and the senior military leadership. The review process itself is a matter of strategic policy making that does not involve a high level threat to U.S. military security. An additional aim of this chapter will be to test the assumption put forward in Chapter Three that the three intervening variables (executive world view, Congress, and the military) are more likely to play an influential role in this type of strategic policy development.

**Protecting and Promoting Military Security**

The administration’s new optimism regarding the benefits of enhancing the capacity of the UN to help protect and promote U.S. military security interests in

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the post-Cold War world was accompanied by the recognition that such an expansion of the UN’s role was fast becoming a necessity. Just as the Cold War had reduced old animosities and security threats, it had created new ones. These new threats were much less predictable and less susceptible to the type of containment policies that had proved to be effective during the Cold War. Arguably, the most pressing threat to U.S. security was now instability itself, and it could manifest itself on an unknown scale, in a variety of forms, from any direction.

The president and his senior policymakers seemed to recognise quite quickly that the U.S. would be unable to meet this new type of threat to its security by relying on the types of strategies that had defined its Cold War defence strategy. As the president told a new intake at the U.S. Naval Academy in early 1992, “Where in the past we’ve relied almost entirely on established, formal alliances, the future may require us to turn more often to coalitions built to respond to the needs of the moment.” In regard to the potential role of the UN, the president said that, “Where in the past, international organizations like the U.N., United Nations, had been paralyzed by Cold War conflict, we will see a future where they can now be a force for peace.”

In the absence of a specific military threat, the administration was revisiting the liberal institutional strategy of promoting U.S. military security by using the UN to moderate the conditions of anarchy in the international environment. The difference between this attempt, and the two previous attempts that followed the First and Second World Wars, was the rapid emergence of the U.S. as the single most powerful state in the international system.

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During his State of the Union address in early 1992 the president clearly linked an emerging sense of global hegemony with a strengthened sense of his nation's exceptionalism when he told Congress:

A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and preeminent power, the United States of America. ...There are those who say that now we can turn away from the world, that we have no special role, no special place. But we are the United States of America, the leader of the West that has become the leader of the world. And as long as I am President, I will continue to lead in support of freedom everywhere, not out of arrogance, not out of altruism, but for the safety and security of our children. This is a fact: strength in the pursuit of peace is no vice; isolationism in the pursuit of security is not virtue.6

The Cold War had not just ended. As far the Bush administration was concerned, the U.S. had won it and emerged with an overwhelming preponderance of economic and military power. In this respect, the Gulf conflict had provided an opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate its massive power: not only to the rest of the world, but also to itself. Given this preponderance of power, and the apparent willingness of most other states to follow its lead, there was no reason why U.S. leadership in the Persian Gulf could not serve as a model for future UN based multilateral interventions.

Protecting and Promoting Economic Security

The Bush administration also held a strong economic interest in promoting UN based multilateralism in the post-Cold War world. For the U.S. to maintain and consolidate its new preeminence, policymakers needed to find a more efficient and effective way of utilising U.S. military and economic resources.

The success in the Gulf had shown the administration exactly how effective the UN could be in facilitating a much greater level of burden-sharing and in doing so ‘multiplying’ the effects of U.S. efforts. The Gulf operation had also shown them

that they could obtain these burden-sharing benefits without conceding direct command and control over the exercise of U.S. force to the UN Security Council.\(^7\)

In sharing the burdens of pursuing U.S. national interests and of generally countering threats to international peace and security, administration officials hoped to be able to focus more resources toward domestic priorities. This relates back to the assumption that international institutions can play a productive role in helping democratic governments achieve their public welfare priorities.\(^8\) In his remarks at the U.S. Naval Academy commencement ceremony, the president stated that “Where in the past, many times the heaviest burdens of leadership fell to our Nation, we will now see more efforts made to seek consensus and concerted action.”\(^9\)

**Protecting and Promoting Favourable Value Systems**

Seldom if ever have we been offered such an opportunity: to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals. ... More so than ever before, we have seen the United Nations play the role dreamed of by its founders.\(^10\)

The prospect of using the UN to share both the risks and costs of pursuing specific foreign policy goals also meant that the U.S. could consider expanding the range of goals it would pursue.\(^11\) Senior administration officials were hopeful that UN based multilateralism could reduce the costs and risks associated with pursuing value based foreign policy goals. This would make it less likely that the active pursuit of value based goals would conflict with the need to protect U.S. military and economic security interests. This, in turn, would mean that the range of

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\(^11\) Tucker and Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation*, 189-190.
foreign policy goals that could be pursued by the U.S. might feasibly be expanded to include humanitarian interventions and the protection of human rights.

A fundamental part of the administration’s hopes in this regard, depended on the UN developing a greater military operational capacity. It was hoped that if it possessed such a capacity, the UN would be able to organise and conduct multilateral interventions without the U.S. being required to take on a substantial leadership role. This aspiration was a key underpinning of the decision to conduct a review on U.S. participation in UN peace operations.

It is important to note here, that promoting UN institutional leadership as an alternative to U.S. hegemonic leadership represented a fundamentally different model of multilateralism that was established, and proven effective, in the Gulf. UN led multilateralism could represent a useful model of co-operation if and when U.S. national interests could not justify a full scale military or economic commitment to the pursuit of a specific humanitarian, or other, objective. Such a model was, however, essentially an abstract construct that represented a more than generous extrapolation from the model of multilateralism that had been so successful against Iraq. One of the key overall aims within the case studies presented in this thesis is, in fact, to demonstrate the ways in which the assumptions and expectations that underpinned this UN led model of multilateralism proved to be insufficiently grounded in the political realities of the post-Cold War world.

Protecting and Promoting a Favourable International Order

The assumption of a convergence of values and interests that was becoming apparent toward the end of the Cold War had already raised policymakers’ expectations about the possibility of establishing an international order more favourable to U.S. interests. These expectations were reflected in the administration’s decision to try to conduct the U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait within the global multilateral framework of the UN. The success of this attempt at UN sanctioned, U.S. led, multilateralism then served, in itself, to
further raise policymakers’ expectations about the possibility of promoting a more peaceful and co-operative order based on the principles embedded in the UN Charter.

The possibilities of such an international order had been enhanced, particularly, by the administration’s successful effort to co-operate with the Soviet Union. That this co-operation had been facilitated by the additional diplomatic leverage and legitimacy provided by operating within the UN framework of multilateral action, served to deepen the U.S. interest in strengthening this framework of action.

The Gulf War symbolized the hopeful new spirit which had developed between the United States and the Soviet Union over the preceding year. ... The two nations had cooperated on a major overseas conflict for the first time since World War II – which to me confirmed that the world had truly changed. We could now consider the possibility of a new world order, one based on U.S.-Soviet cooperation against unprovoked aggression.12

Policymakers were not only optimistic about the prospect of increasing the level of mutually beneficial global co-operation, they were optimistic about the potential for the U.S. to lead and shape this co-operation in a manner that would be beneficial to both its material and value based interests.13 This optimism was bound up in the idea that it would now be possible to turn the president’s ‘new world order’ rhetoric into a feasible representation of a future reality.

The end of the cold war, you see, has placed in our hands a unique opportunity to see the principles for which America has stood for two centuries, democracy, free enterprise, and the rule of law, spread more widely than ever before in human history. For the first time, turning this global vision into a new and better world is, indeed, a realistic possibility.14

The high level of optimism in this regard was evident in nearly all sections of the U.S. government, including Congress, and to a lesser extent the military establishment. This was a reflection of the, almost endemic, levels of optimism throughout the globe about the potential of the post-Cold War world to finally provide the structural conditions necessary for international peace and stability.\(^{15}\)

**Review of U.S. Participation in UN Peace Keeping Operations**

The administration's first step toward strengthening the operational capacity of the UN and reviewing U.S. participation in UN peace operations, actually began at the UN. At the first ever UN Security Council Summit, held in New York in January 1992, the U.S. supported a British request for the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to outline the institutional reforms necessary for the UN to play a more effective role in the maintenance of international peace and stability.\(^{16}\) The Security Council members requested that the Secretary-General prepare a report containing:

... analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.\(^ {17}\)

This outline was to be completed by the beginning of July that year and resulted in the much publicised document entitled *An Agenda for Peace*.\(^ {18}\)

After the Secretary General released his report on what he thought the UN needed to strengthen its capacity, President Bush ordered an interagency review to assess the types and extent of the contribution the U.S. was willing to make toward this effort. Under the auspices of the National Security Council, a small group was formed with the overall aim of defining an appropriate role for the UN in U.S.

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foreign policy. The purpose of the working group was to outline the rationale underpinning any changes in the administration's policy and establish an overall set of guidelines for an appropriate U.S. contribution to UN peace operations. The practical objective of the working group was to identify and outline the ways in which the U.S. could best assist the UN in taking up its new expanded security role.  

The results of the initial National Security Council review were announced in the president's General Assembly speech in September 1992. This speech bore little, if any, resemblance to the president's 1989 address to the Assembly. The president outlined what he saw as the three core challenges to the international community and to the UN. The first challenge was political and related to the need maintain peace and prevent future conflicts. To achieve this goal it would be necessary to enhance the UN's existing peacekeeping capabilities. The second, and fastest growing, challenge was strategic and related to the threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed to international peace and order. The final challenge, according to President Bush, was the economic challenge of promoting prosperity by strengthening an open, growth oriented, free market international economic order, while at the same time protecting the environment.

Within the speech the president welcomed the Secretary-General's call for a new agenda to strengthen the UN's ability to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict throughout the world. The president suggested that it would be useful for members of the UN Security Council to meet to discuss the Secretary-General's proposals, and to develop concrete responses in five key areas:

1. The development and training of national military units for possible peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief.

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These forces would be available on short notice at the request of the Security Council and with the approval of the governments providing them.

2. Coordinated command and control and, interoperability, of both equipment and communications. Multinational planning, training, and field exercises. Links between training exercises and regional organizations.

3. Adequate logistical support for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The designation, by member states, of stockpiles of the resources necessary to meet humanitarian emergencies including famines, floods, and civil disturbances.

4. The development of planning, crisis management, and intelligence capabilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

5. Adequate, equitable financing for the UN and associated peacekeeping efforts.

The president committed the U.S. to doing “its part” to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peacekeeping. He announced that he had instructed the U.S. secretary of defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. The president argued that as peacekeeping was growing in importance as a mission for the U.S. military, the training of combat, engineering, and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities would be emphasised. To this end, a permanent peacekeeping curriculum would be established in U.S. military schools and several U.S. bases would be made available for multinational training and field exercises. The president also offered UN peacekeeping operations the full support of U.S. lift, logistics, and intelligence capabilities along with other relevant aspects of its military expertise.

While the initial review had succeeded in elaborating the various steps that the U.S. could take to strengthen the UN’s peacekeeping capacity, it had avoided addressing the most fundamental and contentious issue facing policymakers. This issue related to whether U.S. troops should actively and routinely participate in the expanding number of UN peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War the U.S. contribution to peacekeeping operations had been limited to logistical support, transportation and, occasionally, the provision of observers to selected missions. With the removal of Cold War constraints, U.S. policymakers were able
to consider contributing to such operations in a much more substantial way in terms of both scale and scope.

After the president announced the results of the initial interagency review to the General Assembly, he launched a much more far-reaching formal review to examine the highly politicised issue of U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping.21 The objective of this interagency review was to determine whether the U.S. should participate in UN peacekeeping operations on a regular basis and, if so, in what capacity. At the time the review was being conducted there was general agreement within all branches of the government, and also the military leadership, that the U.S. could no longer retain its Cold War stance in relation to the UN or to peacekeeping.

A Quietly Supportive Congress
Unlike the very public debate that would surround a similar effort by the Clinton administration less than twelve months later, the Bush administration’s review of U.S. participation in UN peace operations remained a mostly internal interagency process. As Ambassador Frank Wisner, who later played a key role in the Clinton administration’s peacekeeping review notes, such a review is essentially an internal process aimed at generating an internal policy guideline. The Bush administration was under no obligation to consult with Congress regarding the review.22

Another reason for the lack of congressional attention to the review is that the process had only been underway a matter of weeks when President Bush lost the election and it was put on hold. The lack of congressional attention could also be attributed to the fact that there was bipartisan support for the review. While the president’s own party remained moot, the Democratic leadership in Congress

21 The following section discussing the review process, particularly regarding divisions within the administration, is based primarily upon the insights provided by Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No”, 37-39.
made it clear that it supported any effort the U.S. could make to strengthen the capacity of the UN to maintain international peace and stability. Senator Carl Levin captured this sentiment when he told the Center for Naval Analysis that:

... we should be working out new collective arrangements to prevent emerging threats from developing and to eliminate threats where they do develop. The U.S. should take the lead in building the institutions that can carry out these tasks, and we should shape our own military forces to support these new goals.23

Congress has the greatest potential to shape policy when it involves long term debates over strategy rather than immediate threats to military security. Thus it is quite possible that interested Congressional members could have had a strong influence over the review process had they been given the opportunity to engage it. As it was, however, the review process was supported by Congress in principle and was never actually debated.

Active Military Opposition

When it came to discussing the specifics of an expanded U.S. role, the administration was divided about whether the U.S. should participate in the entire range of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. There were elements within the administration, particularly in the State Department and on the National Security Council, who strongly supported participation in the full range of operations. This view was also shared by some elements within the middle ranks of the military.

On the whole, however, senior officials within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of the Office of the Secretary of Defense were vehemently opposed to such a dramatic shift in U.S. policy. The Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, clearly supported his senior military officers including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, when they argued for a much more limited

level of participation. They argued that the U.S. should contribute only its unique capabilities such as those relating to airlift, command, control, communication, and intelligence. Other UN member states, they suggested, could provide the ground troops and equipment necessary for an expanded UN role.

Another key issue addressed within the review related to the type of capabilities the U.S. should declare available for UN peacekeeping. Officials within the National Security Council supported the creation of what would effectively serve as a stand-by peacekeeping force. This would involve at least one brigade sized unit at a time being stationed at a U.S. military base for peacekeeping training. This unit would be held available for operational deployment, at short notice, at the request of the UN Security Council. While such a proposal would have fallen short of the Secretary-General’s request for a standing army, it would have provided the UN with a small rapid reaction force. In this respect, it represented an unprecedented step in U.S. military history and would have meant a fundamental development for the UN.

The proposal was greeted with skepticism from many parts of the administration, and flatly rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result of this opposition the proposal was dropped and in its stead the U.S. offered to make available to the UN its unique military capabilities for peacekeeping purposes. This essentially meant a continuation of existing peacekeeping policy although it was embedded within a much more pro-active overall policy stance. The Joint Chiefs also bluntly opposed the prospect of U.S. troops serving under a UN commander in the field and, as a consequence, no decision was made on this issue within the review.

The review process generated National Security Decision Directive – 74, the first policy document ever to be solely dedicated to U.S. participation in and support for UN peacekeeping. Most of the substance aimed at addressing the ways in which the U.S. could better support UN peacekeeping operations. The directive actually clarified little in relation to the nature and extent of U.S. military

participation in these operations. The most fundamental and contentious issues were deliberately left unclear. This was partly because of the lack of agreement within the administration and the military’s opposition to a substantial change. It was also because the review process came to an abrupt conclusion before any of the issues could be fully dealt with. The review process was ended when President Bush lost the presidential election in November.

This failure to provide a clear outline for U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations at the formal policy level had a significant impact when it came to the more practical task of determining the role of the U.S. military in specific UN peace operations. The failure to establish clear guidelines for U.S. participation in such operations meant that there were no clear limits imposed on this participation. As these limits were not defined a priori, policymakers risked the possibility of their being determined under the more volatile and politically charged conditions provided by the urgency of an international crisis.

**Conclusion**

When officials began the process of reforming U.S. policy in relation to UN-peace keeping operations, the Gulf experience was their most recent and most significant practical guide. For this reason a large part of the reform process was based upon an abstract conception of UN based multilateral action that was informed mostly by the ideas and beliefs of senior policymakers in regard to what was going to be possible in the new international environment. Similarly, the reform process was undertaken at a time when officials were only just beginning to appreciate the complex nature of post-Cold War conflict. While Somalia presented them with an opportunity to provide U.S. leadership in the alleviation of what was perceived as an avoidable humanitarian emergency, the equally horrific humanitarian crisis caused by the break up of the former Yugoslavia had policymakers turning to the UN for cover rather than a workable framework of action.

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Tuesday, 22 September 1992, A15.
As the reform process demonstrated, senior military officials were more wary than their civilian counterparts in regard to making policy on the basis of, what they saw as, abstract notions of a 'new world order.' It was the military that provided the most vocal, and the most specific, note of caution throughout the reform process. This caution was revealed on several levels and related to the potential range of circumstances in which the U.S. military would be used. The military leadership had concerns in regard to the types of interests it would be called to defend, the nature of tasks it would be asked to undertake, as well as more practical operational issues of command and control.

What the political leadership saw as an opportunity for the U.S. to expand its leadership role in the international arena, the military saw as a threat to mission clarity. The structure, even the very nature, of the military machine is task oriented. In Vietnam the military leadership had witnessed what could happen when political objectives were ambiguous and the military task not clearly defined. What was being proposed by the civilian agencies within the peacekeeping review only served to detract from mission clarity and was perceived, by the military, as a threat to its ability to achieve its primary goal of defending U.S. national security.

The difficulties experienced by administration officials within their attempts to review the role of UN based multilateralism within U.S. policy were closely related to the problems they were having in terms of defining a role for U.S. in the post-Cold War world. A large element of uncertainty stemmed from the fact that policymakers were uncertain as to the policy implications of the recent changes in the international environment. While policymakers were generally optimistic, they were still unclear as to how much the end of Cold War rivalries would impact on their ability to protect and promote both the material and the ideational aspects of U.S. national interest. Additionally, policymakers were uncertain as to exactly

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25 It is worth noting that by the end of the nineteen nineties this attitude on behalf of the military establishment had dramatically altered. It is now generally accepted that military participation in multilateral peacekeeping missions is routine business. Colonel Paul Hughes, Senior Military Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Telephone Interview with Author, Perth, 17 September 2003.
how useful multilateralism, and the UN in particular, were going be in terms of enhancing the capacity of the U.S. to meet its specific foreign policy goals and objectives.

If the UN framework proved to be as useful as officials hoped, this would significantly reduce the costs and risks of pursuing various goals within the international arena. This meant that the potential range of goals and interests to be pursued could be expanded and the U.S. would be able to act to promote and enhance its value based national interests rather than limit its actions to the protection of U.S. military and economic security interests.

One of the first opportunities for U.S. policymakers to explore the possibility of acting to promote U.S. value interests was provided by the humanitarian emergency emerging in Somalia. The U.S. decision to lead a multilateral humanitarian intervention in Somalia is examined in the following chapter. Particular emphasis is placed upon how senior Bush administration officials attempted to put many of their beliefs about the new role for the U.S. within UN based multilateralism into practice, before many of the practical aspects of this new role had been examined and clarified fully within the internal review.
Chapter Six

The Bush Administration and the Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia

Introduction

The Bush administration abandoned its review of U.S. participation in UN peace operations after Bill Clinton’s victory in the October 1992 election. This did not, however, prevent President Bush from using the humanitarian crisis in Somalia as an opportunity to put some of his new ideas about the ‘new world order,’ and America’s role within it, to the test. In this respect, the situation in Somalia presented U.S. policymakers with the chance to at least attempt to fulfill some of the promise that had been generated not only by the end of the Cold War but also the recent success with UN-based multilateralism in the Persian Gulf.

A humanitarian intervention in Somalia was perceived by the administration as being a perfect example of how the U.S. could expand its foreign policy to include the active pursuit of value-based goals by operating within a more co-operative UN-based multilateral framework of action. In November 1992 President Bush made the decision to send U.S. troops to Somalia to defend value-based humanitarian interests even though the U.S had no military or economic national interests at stake within the crisis. He did so because his key defence advisers believed that they had found a UN-based framework of action that could reduce the costs and risks of conducting a
humanitarian intervention in Somalia to the point where it would not conflict with the need to protect U.S. military and economic security interests.

This chapter focuses on the lead up to the U.S. decision to lead a military humanitarian intervention in Somalia in late 1992. The influence of the study’s three intervening variables: executive world view, Congress, and the military are given particular attention because they played a key role in shaping this decision. They were able to play a significant role because the decision to intervene was based on value-based humanitarian and international order interests rather than the need to fend off a high level threat to military or economic security. An additional focus of the chapter is the role that the UN played within the administration’s attempts to reduce the level of conflict between competing material and ideational interests and how this influenced the views of key U.S. military advisers.

As the U.S.-led operation was only deployed in Somalia for a matter of weeks before the Clinton administration took over the reins, an analysis of the operation itself is left until Chapter Eight. What this current chapter aims to do is examine the key decisions that took place under the Bush administration, some of which turned out to be major contributing factors to the problems experienced later by the Clinton administration. For the most part, these relate to crucial questions of command and control and also the need for clear limits to be placed on the extent of the U.S. military involvement in a multilateral operation prior to its deployment in the field.

The Somali intervention is a particularly important case study because it was an example of the kind of U.S.-led, UN-based, multilateral humanitarian intervention that President Bush envisaged within his ‘new world order.’ This mission is also important because its failure had a dramatic impact on the development of U.S. policy toward UN-based peace operations.
Early 1992: Congress Sets the Tone

For the first few months of 1992 the Bush administration supported the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the civil war that had been wreaking havoc among the civilian population in Somalia for nearly a year. The president was extremely cautious, however, about the prospect of establishing a UN presence in the country.¹ In light of the newly established UN operations in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, the Bush administration thought it unlikely that Congress would be willing to support another costly peacekeeping operation within the same year. At that point, the Somali issue had not yet made it to the world’s headlines and the only foreign policy issue that was getting a high level of attention from Congress was the disintegrating Yugoslavia.²

In April 1992, the UN Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that fifty unarmed military observers be sent to Somalia to monitor a recently signed ceasefire, along with a lightly armed force of five hundred infantry to provide the necessary security for humanitarian relief operations.³ While the Bush administration supported the deployment of the unarmed military observers, it objected to the proposed deployment of five hundred armed peacekeepers to protect relief operations.⁴ Because the administration did not think that Congress would be willing to pay for the deployment, U.S. officials attempted to stall it.⁵ They insisted that the UN Security Council water down the language of the resolution authorising the ‘immediate’ deployment of the armed peacekeepers.⁶ The Council instead adopted an

² Nancy Kassebaum, Interview with Author, Tokyo, Japan, 29 May 2002.
ambiguously worded resolution that only authorised the immediate deployment of military observers, while the armed force was to be deployed “as soon as possible.”

Within a matter of months, the administration’s reading of Congress was to dramatically change. Deteriorating conditions in Somalia prompted U.S. Senators Paul Simon, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Nancy Kassebaum to step up their calls for some form of armed intervention in Somalia. Both Senators had brought the Somali issue to the attention of the public and Congress as early as April 1991 and had been pushing for the administration to take a more active position.

During hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations in March, Senator Kassebaum had argued that the failure of the UN to deploy peacekeeping forces in Somalia was effectively condemning thousands of civilians to death. In early July she made a short trip to Somalia to gain a first hand view of the situation on the ground. On her return, she and Senator Simon introduced a non-binding resolution calling for the deployment of UN forces in Somalia even if this had to be done without gaining the approval of the warring factions.

The Role of the Media

Once Congress started paying more attention to the Somali issue, the mainstream media followed suit. Throughout the earlier part of the year the major newspapers had carried several minor stories about the how the civil war, coupled with a worsening

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famine, was turning into a massive humanitarian disaster in Somalia. The story was not considered to be frontline news though, until Congress started paying attention to it. It was only then that the pictures of starving mothers and babies started to appear regularly on the front pages. Once the press took up the issue with more vigour, domestic pressure for some form of action began to escalate rapidly. As Senator Nancy Kassebaum later noted, the tragic pictures of starving mothers and babies had a profound impact on members of Congress and they immediately began to ask why the U.S. was not doing something to help.

The relationship between the media and the Bush administration in regard to the African crisis was reciprocal in nature. It was not simply the case that both Congress and the administration were responding to media led domestic pressure. The humanitarian and UN bureaus within the State Department had worked hard all year, mostly without success, to provoke and then maintain the media focus on Somalia. Once the media did start paying attention to this issue, this then became an additional source of general pressure on the whole administration. Once the senior members of Bush’s cabinet, and the president himself, started to lean towards the possibility of a military intervention, this pressure was welcomed because it helped to generate broader domestic support.

Every step of the way the media followed the lead of Congress and the administration. It was not the other way around. From the media’s perspective the Somali crisis became more press worthy whenever it generated action from either

11 Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, notes that it was in July 1992 that he began a concerted effort to court the attention of the media. He credits the increase in U.S. action in regard to the Somali crisis directly to the increase in media pressure. Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1994, 9.
12 Kassebaum, Interview, 2002.
13 Robert Gallucci suggests that the “television argument” does not hold because Bush had already lost the election and could not gain from the action politically. Robert Gallucci, Interview with Author, Washington, D.C., 11 May 1998.
14 Africa Watch, No Mercy in Mogadishu.
branch of government. As such, media coverage escalated dramatically after Congress passed the resolutions in August calling for some form of military intervention. The level of coverage increased again later in August when President Bush announced the U.S. intention to conduct a humanitarian airlift into Somalia, and then again after the National Security Council Deputies Committee began debating policy in November. Media attention reached its peak once it became apparent that the administration was seriously contemplating some form of U.S.-led intervention.

Additional Pressure: The UN and International Relief Organisations

A key source of pressure on both the government and the media throughout the entire year were the international and U.S. humanitarian relief organisations operating in Somalia. These organisations had been active in Somalia long before the impact of the fighting and famine had been brought to the attention of the UN Security Council. Their efforts to lobby for a more activist international response to the famine intensified as the crisis worsened throughout the year. They focused their efforts on the administration, Congress, and the UN, and to a great extent their efforts to gain the attention of all three occurred through the media.

In its attempt to galvanise the U.S. media, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) organised and paid for a trip to Somalia by New York Times journalist, Jane Perlez. The trip resulted in a front-page story in the New York newspaper accompanied by a graphic photograph taken in Baidoa. This photograph caught the attention of several members of Congress and helped to stimulate a greater level of interest in the crisis.

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17 The Perlez visit to Somalia and her subsequent article in The New York Times is often cited as a contributing factor in the administration’s mid-year change of attitude toward the Somali crisis. See discussions in Sahnoun, Missed Opportunities, 9 and Lyons and Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, 31.
19 Kassebaum, Interview, 2002.
While the humanitarian relief and human rights organisations kept up steady pressure on the administration this pressure in itself was not a direct influence over the executive decision making progress. As Human Rights Watch noted in its 1993 World Report, the Bush administration not only ignored the pleas of well-established international organisations, such as ICRC, for the U.S. to take on a greater leadership role in Somalia, it actively took steps to prevent the UN from taking on a more vigorous role. Human Rights Watch attributes this action directly to the administration’s belief that Congress would not be willing to pay for another peacekeeping operation.

What these international organisations did achieve, and this had a profound impact on the eventual U.S. response to the crisis, was to gain the attention of Senator’s Kassebaum and Simon. Once these two senior Senators, who both had the power to influence the congressional agenda, took up the Somali issue it became a matter of domestic relevance that was followed more closely by the media. The media did not initially pay attention to the Somali issue; they paid attention to Congress paying attention to the Somali issue. Once it became clear that Congress did not oppose a significant UN or even U.S. involvement in the Somali crisis, this in turn led the administration to alter its stance and become much more engaged.

As the humanitarian conditions in Somalia continued to deteriorate, U.S. officials also found themselves under increasing pressure from the UN Secretary-General to act. In July the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, very publicly admonished Security Council members for ignoring the plight of the Somali people while they were preoccupied with what he described as a “rich man’s war” in

20 Jeffrey Clarke notes that attempts by international relief organisations to bring attention to the Somali issue and their calls for immediate large-scale assistance fell on deaf ears for nearly nine months. Clarke, “Debacle in Somalia,” 116.
Yugoslavia.”22 His comments to the Security Council were widely reported in the international press and served to focus additional pressure on the administration to take decisive action.23 The Organization of African Unity, the Organization of Islamic Countries, and the Arab League were also critical of what they saw as a lack of appropriate attention by the Council.24

A Divided Administration: Caught between Conflicting Interests
By August 1992, the administration was divided in its approach to the Somali crisis along the same agency lines that were evident in the peacekeeping review process. Both the African Bureau and the Human Rights Bureau within the Department of State pushed for a greater level of U.S. involvement in the crisis.25 The National Security Council was also generally supportive of a more active U.S. stance but the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are both typically the most risk averse, were much less enthusiastic.26

Despite the increasing attention that the crisis was receiving from Congress, the media, and a number of international and regional organisations, key civilian and service defence officials were reluctant to see the U.S. military get involved in any form of intervention in Somalia. They recognised the intractable nature of the conflict within the country and feared becoming involved in a well motivated, but ill defined and open ended humanitarian operation. This desire to maintain a clear distance from the situation in Somalia extended to the point of their unwillingness to support a U.S.

airlift operation. While their concerns were partly related to the reluctance of the Department of Defense to take financial responsibility for the operation, they were also aware that the airlift could serve as a catalyst for a more substantial U.S. involvement. The possibility of conducting an airlift operation was one of the options being considered within the National Security Council Deputies Committee, which was where the administration’s debates on its Somalia policy were taking place.

In July 1992 the UN Secretary-General had proposed a UN airlift operation to supplement the ICRC airlift that was already attempting to deliver relief to inland parts of Somalia and other areas where aid was not getting through. The U.S. endorsed the plan and the UN Security Council approved Resolution 767, authorising the proposed operation, on 27 July. Also in response to the worsening crisis, a special task force on Somalia was set up in the State Department under the leadership of the deputy secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger.

Within the administration, the Deputies Committee also debated the idea of the U.S. conducting its own airlift operation to supplement the UN endeavour. This proposal ended up generating a deadlock in the Deputies Committee with critics coming from both the Departments of State and Defense. The Defense Department was reluctant to approve any type of military involvement at all, while some State Department advisers argued that air-dropping food into the worst hit regions would just serve to increase the deadly competition for food. Members of the Deputies Committee also debated a number of other options including the backing of an “all necessary means”

28 The Deputies Committee is comprised of the ‘number two’ officials from State, Defense, the Joint Staff, and other relevant agencies.
31 After his visit to Mogadishu, the director of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, James Kunder stated that airlifts would not solve the problem of ensuring that aid reached the needy. See Perlez, “U.S. Says Airlifts Fail,” A9. This view is also supported in Sahnoun, *Missed Opportunities*, 17.
resolution in the UN Security Council that would allow force to be used against those blocking the delivery of relief. The committee also considered the possibility of mounting a military rescue operation similar to Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq.32

**A Mid-Year Shift: “Operation Provide Relief”**

By mid August it was clear that Congress would not object to a greater U.S. involvement in Somalia and it was then that President Bush cleared the policy deadlock in the Deputies Committee by deciding in favour of a unilateral U.S. airlift.33 As a consequence, the Department of Defense began to airlift relief supplies into northern Kenya and Somalia on 28 August 1992. At the same time the U.S. offered to provide transport for the five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers that had been authorised in April but were yet to be deployed on the ground. Both actions were consistent with the principles that would be outlined within the peacekeeping policy review in that they involved the U.S. offering its unique lift, logistic, and transport capabilities whilst resisting a commitment on the ground.34

The combination of airlift operations amounted to a substantial increase in the amount of food and other relief supplies entering Somalia. Serious doubts existed, however, both in the State Department and also among the relief agencies operating on the ground, as to whether these airlifts would be enough to alleviate the worst effects of the famine. By this stage, estimates were putting the combined death toll from the fighting and the famine at over three hundred thousand. Several more hundreds of thousands had also attempted to flee the conflict and were now living in, or heading for, refugee camps outside the capital of Mogadishu, in Kenya, and in other neighbouring countries.35

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33 Ibid. 38-39.
34 At this point the administration, including representatives of the Department of State, were working hard to emphasise that the U.S. had no intention of deploying ground troops to Somalia. See L.M. Martin, *Somalia: Humanitarian Success and Political/Military Failure*, CSC Report, 1995, 6.
Even before the airlifts could get underway the UN Secretary-General, while applauding the additional efforts to alleviate the situation in Somalia, admitted that conditions on the ground had deteriorated to the point where such measures would probably be insufficient. According to later UN estimates, at the worst of the crisis more than one third of all Somali children under the age of five died from starvation and diseases related to malnutrition. The Secretary-General continued, along with a number of relief agencies, to exert pressure on the U.S. and other UN member states to undertake measures that would be more effective. In his 24 August report to the Security Council he highlighted the implications of the further deterioration of conditions and proposed the deployment of additional security units in four newly created operational zones throughout Somalia. The Security Council authorised the deployment of an additional three thousand peacekeepers within these zones on 28 August 1992, the same day that the U.S. airlift became operational.

A Change in Policy: “Operation Restore Hope”

In September 1992 President Bush made his annual speech to the UN General Assembly, making public his ambitions for UN peacekeeping and his willingness to expand the role of the U.S. within it. This event, coupled with a growing domestic awareness of the impact of the famine, led elements of the administration to increase their efforts to find a solution to the Somalia problem. The president had made it clear by both his decision to undertake an airlift despite the contrary advice of the military, and through his General Assembly speech, that he was prepared to support a

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36 Blue Helmets, 287.
37 Blue Helmets, 292.
39 An unnamed administration official suggested that the U.S. position changed because the administration received reports that the death rate in Somalia was rising again, quoted in Jane Perlez, “U.S. Plan to Guard Convoys is Backed by Somali General,” New York Times, Saturday, 28 November 1992, A1.
more interventionist multilateral approach to Somalia.\textsuperscript{40} In response to the president’s speech, various branches within the administration set upon the task of preparing a number of different operational options.

In October it became clear to senior defence officials within the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an ad hoc approach to the Somali crisis was proving to be inadequate.\textsuperscript{41} They recognised that it was neither appropriate to the scale of the situation nor cost-effective to establish secure points where airdrops could be made, and then waiting for the not yet fully deployed UN peacekeepers to protect the supplies from looting. As a result the Defense Department began working out operational plans that would outline the strategy necessary to address the political, security, and humanitarian issues underscoring the crisis in Somalia.

In Defense terms, planning for the Somali operation began relatively late. Usually, the U.S. military prepares a range of possible plans to cover all potential contingencies but it had not developed a contingency plan for Somalia that involved a large scale U.S. ground deployment.\textsuperscript{42} This shows not only how unlikely such an intervention was initially considered, but also how dramatically different the Somali humanitarian mission was to a traditional military mission.

It was also in October that the State Department and the National Security Council staff began exploring the alternatives for Somalia. The plans being floated all involved a dramatically expanded UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, but none offered the prospect of a U.S. troop involvement.\textsuperscript{43} This shift in favour of some form of military intervention was the result of a growing awareness of the crisis conditions


\textsuperscript{41} Hirsch and Oakley, \textit{Operation Restore Hope}, 41.

\textsuperscript{42} Colonel Paul Hughes, Senior Military Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., \textit{Telephone Interview with Author}, 17 September 2003.

\textsuperscript{43} Gallucci, \textit{Interview}, 1998.
in Somalia coupled with the administration’s newly expanded policy toward UN peacekeeping.

By mid-November the administration’s key military and civilian advisers acknowledged that conditions in Somalia made it almost impossible to ensure that humanitarian aid reached those most in need. As the amount of relief supplies entering the country increased so did the amount of looting.

Agencies were also forced to pay for “protection”, in particular for escorts of their personnel and convoys. Warehouses were looted and expatriate personnel were detained. The net result ... was that the humanitarian assistance reaching its intended beneficiaries was often barely more than a trickle.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite their efforts, large parts of the Somali population were still beyond the reach of the aid organisations. The UN put the cumulative death toll at somewhere around half a million people while the U.S. Center for Disease Control described the death toll in Somalia as “... among the highest ever documented by a population survey among famine-affected civilians.”\textsuperscript{45} The rapidly emerging human catastrophe on the ground along with the increase in pressure from the relief agencies, the UN Secretary-General, and the press combined to create a sense of urgency within the administration.\textsuperscript{46}

It was within this context that the Deputies Committee embarked upon a series of Somalia policy meetings beginning on 20 November 1992. The difference between these meetings and previous policy meetings, apart from the high level of press attention, was the attitude of the key administration officials as represented by their

deputies. It was clear that there was now a general acceptance, at the highest levels of the administration, that the U.S. could no longer stand by while thousands of innocent Somalis died of starvation each day.47

According to former assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Robert Gallucci, by November 1992 frustration was mounting within both the Departments of State and Defense because of the obvious ineffectiveness of the humanitarian airdrops.48 In response to their growing frustration, Gallucci and several of his senior advisers developed ‘hypothetical’ intervention plans for both Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and presented them to the acting secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger. Given the international political complexities involved, as well as the complicated nature of the conflict, they were not expecting the secretary to support the idea of a military intervention in Bosnia. Within the context of a heightened sense of emergency they did think it was possible, however, that he might sign off at least in principle to the idea of conducting some form of intervention in Somalia.

By the time Gallucci and his colleagues were placing hypothetical plans before their secretary, circumstances had coincided to dramatically alter the attitudes of nearly all senior administration officials. By this time, both the secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, and national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, had recognised that a U.S.-led intervention provided the best hope for Somalia.49 What was more important, however, was that by November 1992 the attitude of the president’s most senior military adviser had also changed.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Deciding Factor

President Bush made it clear during the Gulf War that he believed it was crucial for politicians to heed the advice of the military on military matters. While the president had been willing to authorise the humanitarian airlift in Somalia despite the

48 Ibid.
reluctance of his key military advisers, he was not willing to overlook their advice when it came down to the much riskier prospect of committing ground troops to the country.\textsuperscript{50} When asked about the prospect of U.S. interventions in Bosnia and Somalia during an October presidential debate in St. Louis, the president answered:

\[\ldots\text{both of them are very complicated situations. I vowed something, because I learned something from Vietnam: I am not going to commit U.S. forces until I know what the mission is, until the military tell me that it can be completed, until I know how they can come out.}\textsuperscript{51}\]

In all of the interviews conducted for this case study, the support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was considered to be the key factor in the decision to intervene in Somalia. The possibility of undertaking a military intervention only came under serious consideration by the administration once General Powell stated that it was feasible from a military perspective and threw his support behind it.\textsuperscript{52}

Until the military representative on the Deputies Committee made it clear that the military would support the proposal for a large scale U.S.-led military intervention in Somalia, such a proposal was not considered a realistic possibility.\textsuperscript{53} Two more likely possibilities were that the U.S. could support a reinvigorated UN peacekeeping mission or organise a coalition intervention without the participation of U.S. ground troops.\textsuperscript{54} The situation changed dramatically, however, when the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jeremiah, announced at a Deputies Committee

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49 Gellman, “Pentagon Sees Likely Success,” Al.
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meeting in late November that U.S. troops could be used to conduct an intervention if the committee determined that they would be needed.55

A Conditional Offer
Admiral Jeremiah presented the Deputies Committee with a concept of operations that involved the deployment of two divisions partly made up of coalition forces. Once the committee realised that the military were willing to consider the possibility of contributing U.S. troops to an intervention, the focus of the discussion shifted to outlining the size, goal, and endpoint of such an intervention.56 This resulted in the formulation of a plan that was forwarded to the president along with the other options that had been considered by the committee.

Shortly after the Deputies Committee meeting the president met with his most senior policy advisers in an effort to make a final decision on the issue of a military intervention.57 General Powell used this meeting as an opportunity to emphasise that his support for the mission had conditions. He reminded the president that a smooth hand over to the UN was crucial to the mission’s feasibility as well as its success. He also warned that establishing the necessary conditions within Somalia for a peaceful hand over might be difficult.58

The president took these words of caution into consideration and determined that the U.S. would go ahead and offer to organise and lead a multilateral humanitarian intervention in Somalia. This offer was dependent on several conditions: that the military force be under U.S. command, that it be organised as part of a broader international effort, that it be large enough to carry out the mission, and that it be

58 Hirsch and Oakley, Operation Restore Hope, 43.
backed by a Security Council resolution, and be supported by the UN Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{59}

On 25 November, acting secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, informed the UN Secretary-General that the U.S. would be willing to lead a large military operation in Somalia if the Security Council supported such an effort.\textsuperscript{60} He made it very clear, however, that the U.S. was volunteering only to establish a secure environment to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The U.S. was not willing to disarm the warring factions or participate in the type of nation building that would be necessary to put Somalia back together politically, economically, or socially.\textsuperscript{61}

After receiving the offer from the U.S. the Secretary-General outlined five possible options ranging from a withdrawal of the military element of UNOSOM, to the conduct of a nationwide enforcement operation by a UN member state.\textsuperscript{62} The Security Council authorised the U.S. to pursue this latter enforcement option when it approved Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992. Within the resolution the Council determined that the scale of the humanitarian disaster in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security and authorised member states to use “all necessary means to establish, as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.”

\textit{Military Support for a Limited Low Risk Mission}

From the outset of planning the operation in Somalia was conceived in four distinct phases. The first aimed at securing the airfield and seaport in Mogadishu with marine forces. After this had been achieved the army forces were to be deployed and

\textsuperscript{60} Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” 58.
operations expanded into South and Central Somalia. The third phase involved the
transfer from a U.S.-led peacemaking force to a UN led peacekeeping force that
would complete the fourth, diplomatic, stage of the operation. It is important to note
that the operation was to be handed over to the UN once the Joint Task Force
Commander, who was the senior U.S. military representative on the ground,
determined that a stable security environment had been established. Thus the timing
of the hand over was completely under U.S. control. Senior military and civilian
defence officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell,
estimated that U.S. troops could begin handing over authority to the UN by January
1993.

When the Somali operation was announced to the public, General Powell also stated
that some limited U.S. forces such as logistics and support units and a quick reaction
force would remain as part of the takeover UN operation. In his testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, Lieutenant General Martin Brandtner stated that
the U.S. would “probably leave a contingent of a size yet to be determined of combat
service support to enable the United Nations to continue its operation...” Brandtner
also noted that the U.S. would leave behind an amphibious ‘ready force’ that would
be available to the UN operation as a deterrent and for enforcement purposes, if
necessary.

The structure of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was generally consistent
with past U.S. policy in that it was organised under similar principles and command
and control practices as the recent operation in the Persian Gulf, as well as the Korean

63 Lt. Gen. Martin Brandtner, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington,
64 Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney, quoted in Brandtner, Senate Armed Services Committee, 9
General Says,” Washington Post, Saturday, 5 December 1992, A17. In his autobiography Powell states
that the Bush administration aimed to have the bulk of U.S. troops withdraw before Clinton was
65 Brandtner, Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 December 1992.
intervention from 1950-54. As Robert Oakley and John Hirsch note, the U.S. involvement in the Somalia operation was conducted along the lines of "... the so-called Weinberger-Powell doctrine of a clear, finite, 'doable' mission, involving the deployment of overwhelming, efficient force, with rules of engagement that allowed the expeditious use of force when necessary." In the case of Somalia this criteria was only met because of the multilateral framework of action provided by the UN. If the U.S. had been required to commit to the long-term reconstruction of Somalia, in addition to the narrow goal of securing conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid, the military leadership would have been unlikely to support the operation.

The U.S. military had also been wary about losing control over the security of U.S. troops if they were placed under UN operational or military control in Somalia. These concerns were availed by the decision to undertake a separate operation that was autonomous from the larger UN operation. By conducting a separate operation the U.S. could assure the safety of its own troops by retaining complete command and control over them. While the relationship between the U.S.-led UNITAF mission and the existing multinational UNOSOM operation was unclear, UNITAF was clearly under U.S. command and control throughout the entire course of its existence. All of the participating contingents in UNITAF reported to the U.S. force commander who maintained a close liaison with the UN operation. What the U.S. essentially agreed to in Somalia was the conduct of a very limited unilateral U.S. military operation within the broader framework of a multilateral UN peace operation.

68 President Bush' special coordinator of Somali relief and assistant administrator of USAID, Andrew Natsios, also suggests that U.S. military approval was dependent upon the limited nature of the mission and suggests that the U.S. military "wrote its own mission statement and rules of engagement" in Somalia. Andrew Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy," Washington Quarterly, 17, 1, 132-133.
The UN Framework of Action and Competing U.S. National Interests

It might seem that the decision to intervene in Somalia was made because post-Cold War perceptions of the U.S. national interest had expanded to include the possibility of using force to protect value-based humanitarian interests in addition to military and economic security.\(^6^9\) With regard to the decision to intervene in Somalia this is not necessarily the case, however. It was not simply that decision makers were willing to place U.S. military security interests at stake in order to feed the starving Somali population. Administration officials made the decision to intervene militarily in Somalia because they believed they had found a low risk framework of action that would allow military force to be deployed in the field without being exposed to a high level of risk. In operating through the UN, they thought they had found a framework of action that would help them balance the desire to promote U.S. value-based humanitarian interests without subjecting its military security interests to an unnecessarily high level of threat.

Protecting and Promoting Military Security

While the U.S. had relatively little, if any, military interests attached to the internal conflict in Somalia, this would change as soon as U.S. troops set foot on the ground. While the defence establishment shared the civilian leadership’s humanitarian concerns in Somalia, its primary concern was the need to protect the U.S. from any threat to its military security interests. In this regard, President Bush’s senior military advisers were only willing to support an intervention in Somalia if they could reduce the exposure of their troops to risk by limiting the U.S. involvement to the achievement of a narrow, definable, military objective. As a senior administration official notes:

We were told sixteen times by the military, no security operations, no mission creep. We can go in and make the ground environment secure

so that those [humanitarian] agencies can operate and then we are out of there.\textsuperscript{70}

At the same time past experiences in Vietnam in particular had taught many senior administration advisers, both civilian and military, that it was almost impossible to achieve a mission’s military objectives without also addressing the political and diplomatic aspects of a crisis. These issues were going to have to be addressed in Somalia if there was to be any hope of achieving a long-term solution to the crisis. This said, in such a messy civil conflict as Somalia a sustainable political solution was going to be difficult to achieve. It was for this reason that senior military officials did not want the U.S. to take on the responsibility of finding a political solution to the crisis. The risks involved in undertaking the messy task of restoring political stability to Somalia could not be justified in terms of the costs that this would impose on U.S. military security interests. This is where the UN could come in useful.

By acting within a broader UN operational framework the U.S. was able to limit its military objectives to the establishment of a secure environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief and then pass on the more difficult task of establishing ‘peace’ in Somalia to the UN. In addition, by operating as a limited component of a much larger UN operation in Somalia, the UN provided a built in exit strategy that guaranteed the operation would not turn into a messy open ended commitment like Vietnam.\textsuperscript{71} When Bush announced that U.S. forces were being sent to Somalia, it was made clear that a speedy hand over of responsibility to the UN was a core feature of his plan.\textsuperscript{72}

Our mission has a limited objective: To open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{70} Gallucci, Interview, 1998.
\textsuperscript{71} See discussion in Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy,” 319.
\textsuperscript{72} Oberdorfer and Gellman, “U.S. Plans Short Stay,” A29.
force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{73}

*Protecting and Promoting Economic Security*

Of the four categories of national interests, economic security had the least influence over U.S. policy toward Somalia. The total amount of trade flows between the U.S. and Somalia were very low, even when compared to other African Least Developed Countries such as Sudan or Mozambique.\textsuperscript{74} In 1989, prior to the outbreak of civil conflict, the U.S. exported only twelve million dollars worth of goods and service to Somalia. In that same year, U.S. imports were less than one million U.S. dollars. Imports were so small, in fact, that they were not even recorded in annual data provided by the International Monetary Fund.\textsuperscript{75}

The significance of the Somali conflict in regard to U.S. economic security interests was the expectation that the U.S. would be able to reduce the economic costs of intervening in Somalia through acting within the UN multilateral framework. The capacity of the U.S. to share the economic costs of intervening in Somalia was limited, however, by the refusal of the Secretary-General to allow the operation to be conducted as a UN peacekeeping mission. The operation was instead considered to be member state led with authorisation by the UN. This meant that the operation had to be funded by the U.S. and not from the UN peacekeeping account.

In 1996, the Government Accounting Office estimated that the Department of Defense had spent a total of $1.5 billion dollars on the military intervention in Somalia.\textsuperscript{76} This included the full cost of the UNITAF mission, the U.S. military


\textsuperscript{75} U.S. exports to the Sudan and Mozambique in 1989 were valued at $81 and $41 million respectively while imports for both countries were valued at $21 million. International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1990*, 420.

contribution to UNOSOM II, and also the cost of helping UNOSOM II withdraw in March 1995. It does not include the U.S. assessment for the UN led peacekeeping operations, which amounted to an additional US$388.7 million between 1992 and 1995. At the same time that the UN Security Council had voted to approve the U.S.-led mission in Somali it also established a Trust Fund that aimed to raise four hundred million U.S. dollars to reimburse the U.S. for some of the expenses incurred.\(^{77}\) As of September 1995, the UN had reimbursed the Department of Defense to a total of US$52.6 million.

The U.S. was also able to share some of the costs of conducting the mission directly with the twenty other countries who participated in UNITAF. In total, the U.S. sent approximately twenty eight thousand troops to Somalia and other member states sent a further seventeen thousand.

*Protecting and Promoting Favourable Value Systems*

The overwhelming *raison d'être* for the U.S.-led intervention in Somalia was the protection of value-based humanitarian interests. In an interview with the author, former assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Robert Gallucci, said that it would be difficult to over-emphasise the impact that the images of starving women and babies in Somalia had on members of the Bush administration. He also noted that the administration’s determination to ‘do something’ about Somali grew steadily as their frustration at not being able to do something about Bosnia increased.\(^{78}\) Similar sentiments were expressed in an interview with former U.S. Senator and Chair of the Africa Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Nancy Kassebaum.\(^{79}\)

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\(^{77}\) *Blue Helmets*, 294-295.

\(^{78}\) A much more cynical interpretation is that the administration used what it thought would be a relatively ‘easy’ intervention in Somalia to divert attention and criticism away from its inaction in Bosnia. See Patrick Glynn, “The Doable War: Somalia vs. Bosnia. Now,” *The New Republic*, 209, 7, 16 August 1993, 16.

In the lead up to the decision to intervene in Somalia there was an increasing sense, domestically at least, that the U.S. had an *obligation* to do something about the situation simply because it was *capable* of doing something. Many believed that the U.S. should intervene if it had the means to simply because it was the *right* thing to do and because the U.S. was a *righteous* nation. This sense that America had a unique moral responsibility to at least try to alleviate the suffering in Somalia was evident in the speeches of senior administration officials at the time and it has also been evident in all of the interviews with representatives of the administration, Congress, and the military that have been conducted in the course of preparing this case study.

*Protecting and Promoting A Favourable International Order*

This sense that the U.S. had a unique global responsibility to take action in Somalia was related to domestic self-perceptions of the U.S. role in the wake of the Cold War. President Bush outlined his rationale for U.S. involvement in his address to the nation the day after the Security Council voted to accept the U.S. offer to lead a humanitarian intervention in Somalia:

... In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world’s wrongs. But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.

... When we see Somalia’s children starving, all of America hurts. We’ve tried to help in many ways. And make no mistake about it, now we and our allies will ensure that aid gets through.80

Within his address the president confirmed that the massive, and almost completely unnecessary, suffering and loss of life in Somalia was an attack on the types of values that were dear to the whole world and not just the United States. At the same time, he

singled out the U.S. as being the only nation capable of leading the world in their defence. In this respect the president was linking the pursuit of value-based goals in U.S. foreign policy, emanating from a sense of American exceptionalism, with his perceptions of his nation’s new leadership role in the post-Cold War international order.

What the president was essentially saying was that the U.S. was obligated, by virtue of its global hegemonic position, to lead a collective action in Somalia in the pursuit of a public good. This being the alleviation of unnecessary large scale human suffering and the restoration of peace and stability. U.S. leadership of the world in defence of human rights and in order to alleviate human suffering was a key element of the ‘new world order’ that had been espoused by the president so enthusiastically in the lead up to the Gulf War. As was discussed in the previous chapter, another key element of this vision was a strong and active United Nations that was could help distribute the costs and risks of taking action in the pursuit of value-based and humanitarian goals.

It is in this regard that the world view of the executive played a key role in shaping the decision to lead an intervention in Somalia. The president envisioned a new world order in which the U.S. could lead the world community, through the UN, in the pursuit of a wider range of shared value-based goals such as the protection of human rights and the alleviation of human suffering. The global consensus over Somalia allowed the U.S. unopposed leadership which, in turn, allowed the president to put this vision into practice. Somalia represented a perfect testing ground. Clear U.S. leadership meant that the administration was able to play the lead role in shaping the terms of the mission and ensure that its own national interests were protected at all times.

Benefits of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN
The key benefit to be gained from operating multilaterally through the UN in Somalia was that it allowed the U.S. to limit its involvement in Somalia. Operating within the UN framework provided the administration with the middle ground between unilateral action and inaction in relation to the protection of value-based U.S. national interests. These value-based interests alone were not sufficient to warrant the U.S. taking on the unilateral responsibility for achieving a lasting peace in Somalia. By dividing up this responsibility and sharing it with the UN, policymakers were able to reduce the costs and risks to the point where a limited U.S. action could be justified on the basis of its humanitarian interests alone.

An additional benefit to be gained by conducting the Somali intervention through the framework of the UN related to the additional international legitimacy that this offered the operation. The U.S. sought explicit UN support for the operation through the Security Council and also, notably, from the Secretary-General. This provided a legitimate framework through which the U.S. could gain support and active cooperation of other states. This additional legitimacy was particularly important in terms of overcoming potential opposition from other states in the region that were wary about the exercise of U.S. force on the African continent.  

Disadvantages of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN

The most significant disadvantage to operating through the UN framework related to the administration’s commitment to leave the U.S. security units behind after the completion of the UNITAF mission. Because the administration needed the UN framework of action to make the Somalia operation ‘doable’ it was important to gain the support of the UN Secretary-General for the U.S.-led mission. It would be the UN, after all that would be providing the U.S. with its much needed exit strategy.

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When the proposal for a full-scale intervention was first put forward the UN Secretary-General had significant concerns about the capacity of his organisation to take over from the U.S.-led UNITAF operation in safety. He also had concerns about whether the UN had either the operational capacity or experience necessary to conduct the type of operation that would be necessary to restore peace and stability to Somalia. A large part of these concerns centred on the need to disarm local Somali factions before any cease-fire would hold and before political and social reconstruction could begin.

While U.S. policymakers, in their effort to keep the objectives of the U.S. mission limited, had refused to let U.S. troops take on responsibility for disarming the warring factions. Policymakers were, nonetheless, able to appreciate the Secretary-General's operational concerns about the UN's capacity to conduct a military field operation. It was in an attempt to allay these concerns and gain the support of the Secretary-General that policymakers agreed to leave behind some of the U.S. force capability for participation in the follow-up UN operation.

The need to gain the approval of the Secretary-General very clearly acted as a constraint on U.S. freedom of action because it resulted in policymakers undertaking a military commitment that they had not initially planned. Administration officials needed the UN framework of action to make the mission doable from a military perspective and the Secretary-General elicited a promise of some form of continued U.S. engagement before he agreed to give it to them.

Senior administration officials were willing to make this compromise with the Secretary-General, and leave U.S. troops behind, because they assumed that the UNITAF would be handing over to the UN in a relatively benign security environment. Even the most senior defence planners anticipated that the follow-up UN operation would be a genuine peacekeeping mission rather than a continuation of
the U.S.-led enforcement operation. The national forces to be left behind after the U.S. withdrawal were mostly support and logistical units that would be necessary to ensure the continuation of humanitarian tasks. The quick reaction force and the amphibious unit were considered only as back-up units to be kept at the ready in case a security emergency arose.

Conclusion
It was put forward in this study’s research design that the U.S. level of interest in any particular multilateral framework can be considered to be high if policymakers are willing to accept a significant level of constraint and compromise in order to retain that framework of action. It was also put forward that the U.S. interest in retaining any multilateral framework of action will be at its greatest in relation to the pursuit of value-based goals rather than the defence of military or economic security interests. Policymakers will also be more flexible and willing to compromise in order to retain the multilateral framework of action with regard to the pursuit of value-based goals. This is partly because decision makers are keen to share the costs and risks of pursuing such goals so that they can focus more of their resources on the pursuit of the material goals that impact on the very survival of their state. It is also because the need to retain unilateral control over an operation is considered to be much more essential when U.S. military security interests are at stake.

All of the above assumptions hold true in relation to the U.S.-led, UN authorised, mission in Somalia where U.S. policymakers were willing to make significant compromises in order to retain the UN framework of action. Unlike their previous experience at operating through the UN in Iraq, however, policymakers found themselves compromising with the UN Secretary-General in order to gain his support for the operation rather than other UN member states. Because the UN was going to be called upon to lead the final ‘nation building’ stage of the Somali mission, Bush

82 Hughes, Telephone Interview, 2003.
administration officials needed to gain the Secretary-General’s support for the U.S.-led mission. If he were not prepared to let the UN act as a partner in Somalia and take on responsibility for the political and diplomatic aspects of the mission, it would fail to provide the benefits that made it such an attractive operational framework. It was in an effort to gain the Secretary-General’s support for the operation that Bush administration policymakers agreed to leave a U.S. force contingent behind to participate in the follow on UN led mission.

It was also put forward in the research design that U.S. policymakers will be less flexible on the question of unilateral U.S. leadership and command and control when military security interests are perceived to be at stake. During the Bush administration’s interagency review of U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had explicitly opposed placing U.S. troops under a UN command. When the review process was brought to a close after Bush lost the presidential election, the possibility of U.S. troops serving under a UN command had not been ruled out. Instead, the review had only gone so far in its deliberations as to suggest that U.S. troops could serve under a UN command under “certain circumstances.” At the same time, the review had not yet elaborated upon what these certain circumstances might entail.  

The Bush administration’s military advisers had insisted that the U.S. exercise unambiguous command and control of the U.S.-led UNITAF operation in Somalia. UN Security Council approval was sought for the operation, but once this one-off resolution was obtained it was the U.S. that controlled the operation. It was the U.S. that determined when the deployment would begin and, more importantly perhaps, it was the U.S. that determined when it would end. There was no Security Council oversight of the mission once it began.

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The command and control arrangements for the U.S. forces left behind to support the follow-up UN led UNOSOM II operation were not as clear.\textsuperscript{86} When the administration agreed to leave forces behind no specific agreement had been reached about what military hardware was involved, no timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops had been established, and no clear command and control arrangements between U.S. troops and the larger UN operation were formulated. Without these clear guidelines directing and limiting U.S. participation in the follow-up UN operation there was nothing to prevent 'mission-creep.' There were no guidelines in place to prevent a temporary deployment of U.S. troops that was only agreed to at the last minute in an effort to gain the support of the UN Secretary-General from gradually evolving into a substantial military commitment. The failure to put clear limits on the nature and extent of U.S. participation in UN peace operations within the administration's interagency review had specific implications for the Somali mission. It facilitated the deployment of U.S. troops within a UN led peace operation under highly ambiguous conditions.

An additional assumption put forward in the research design is that the intervening variables of executive world view, Congress, and the military are much more likely to influence the executive decision making process when U.S. military interests are not involved. This assumption also holds true with regard to the decision to intervene in Somalia. Of the three variables, it was the military that had the most impact on executive decision making. The executive world view of the president, his ideas about the role of value-based interests within post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, his ideas about the potential of a reinvigorated and more co-operative UN, and his assumptions about U.S. leadership in a more liberal international order, all placed him in favour of taking some action to alleviate the suffering in Somalia. A clearly supportive Congress also provided an enabling domestic environment. Yet it was the


green light from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell that was the deciding factor in the decision to intervene.

In the absence of a high level threat to U.S. military or economic security it would have been difficult for the president to send over twenty-five thousand young American men and women to Somalia against the advice of the military leadership. Doing so would have opened him up to accusations of recklessness if the mission went wrong and U.S. lives were lost. If that happened, the president would have had a hard time justifying to Congress and the American people why he ever made the decision to put U.S. troops in harms way in the first place.

This chapter has examined how the Bush administration attempted to use the UN multilateral framework of action to reconcile competing ideational and material U.S. national interests at stake in the small African state of Somalia. While the administration faced a similar challenge with regard to the internecine conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it approached the United Nations in a very different way. How the UN helped policymakers in their efforts to balance competing national interests in the former Yugoslav republic is the focus of the following chapter.
Chapter Seven

The Bush Administration and the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Introduction

Even before the disaster in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a reality check for the Bush vision of a new world order. As early as the fall of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis was already considered in Washington to be an exceedingly complex situation that the U.S. had no interest in addressing. The conflict was, according to Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, a “tar baby”, a “no-win situation that nobody wanted to touch.” This was especially the case given that the presidential election was only a year away.2

This chapter examines the Bush administration’s response to the escalating conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a particular emphasis on the role played by the UN in helping policymakers, at least temporarily, reconcile conflicting ideational and material interests. In Bosnia, the administration was trapped between a value-based desire for justice and the need to protect military security. An inability to reconcile

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1 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Within the republic of Serbia, there were two autonomous regions: Vojvodina and Kosovo. For the most part, the country will be referred to here as Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will be referred to simply as Bosnia.

these two interests led to inaction on the political front, a focus on alleviating the worst of the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, and a very strong interest in retaining the multilateral framework of action.

The key aim of this chapter is to explain the administration's overall policy within the framework of the four categories of U.S. national interests, and within this same framework, account for the administration's strong interest in operating through the UN. Another objective is to explore the ways in which policymakers attempted to use the UN framework to help placate its domestic critics, particularly Congress, without raising concerns among key military advisers.

Like Somalia, the Bosnian case study is explored under the Bush administration and then again within the chapters that focus on the Clinton administration. As was also the case with Somalia, many of the issues raised within this chapter will be explored in much more detail in subsequent chapters that deal with the Clinton administration's policies. This is because many of the issues raised here, such as the administration's difficulty in responding to Congress while continuing to act within the UN multilateral framework of action, were only just beginning to challenge U.S. policymakers by the end of 1992. These issues became much more intense and distracting foreign policy challenges under the Clinton administration and it was only then that they came to a head.

**The Beginnings of a Bloody and Protracted Conflict**

In late 1990 it became clear to U.S. policymakers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was close to political collapse.3 The Federation had previously been held together by a powerful leader who succeeded in playing off both the external rivalries

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of Cold War adversaries and the internal rivalries of an ethnically mixed nation.\(^4\) After Marshall Tito died in 1980, the six constituent republics gradually began to fight among themselves and in June 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from what they considered to be a Serbian dominated Yugoslav Federation. Within days of declaring independence, fighting broke out in both republics.

Slovenia was the most ethnically homogenous of the former Yugoslav republics with a relatively small Serb population in comparison to the other republics. In the absence of a substantial Serb population to protect, the Serbian leadership had little reason to fight to keep Slovenia within Yugoslavia. A few days after the fighting started the Serb president, Slobodan Milosevic, ordered the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) from Slovenia. A few days after that the Dutch foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, presided over a meeting on the Adriatic island of Brioni where the two parties hammered out a deal that effectively gave the republic its independence.\(^5\)

The percentage of Serbs living in Croatia was much higher than Slovenia. UN estimates put this figure at twelve percent. It was evident from the outset that the Serbian president would not be willing to let this republic go without a fight.\(^6\) After nearly three months of continued conflict the European Community (EC) convened an international peace conference that aimed to bring together the Federal Government of Yugoslavia and the presidents of each of the republics. A peace agreement was reached, in principle, on 3 September 1991.

A few days after the peace agreement was accepted the EC convened the Conference on Yugoslavia at The Hague at which all the EC members laid out their position with

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regard to the growing crisis and attempted to establish a common set of principles to guide further negotiations. A year later this conference was replaced by the much broader International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). Throughout the next three years, international efforts to locate a solution to the Yugoslav conflict centred on the ICFY and its two co-chairs, one of whom was the EU representative and the other the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General.

Enter the UN

Toward the end of September 1992 it was clear that the new peace agreement had failed to take hold and that violence was continuing to escalate. On 25 September Austria, Canada, and Hungary requested that the UN Security Council convene urgently to consider the deteriorating situation that they feared could endanger international peace and security. At a meeting on the same day the Security Council voted unanimously to pass Resolution 713 calling for an end to the fighting. In the same resolution the Security Council implemented what would later become a highly contentious arms embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia. This marked the beginning of the UN’s direct involvement in the crisis. The UN resolution also marked the beginning of direct U.S. involvement in the international decision making process with regard to Bosnia. Once the conflict was brought to the attention of the UN Security Council it was, by virtue of its position on the Council, also brought to the attention of the U.S.

Despite the new Security Council resolution, the situation in Croatia continued to deteriorate. In late December Germany announced that it would recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia even though the remainder of the EC was opposed to such a move. The German Chancellor had argued that the international

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community would be in a much better position to address the conflict if it were internationalised by giving the republics independence. The majority of EC states and the U.S. held a different view.\textsuperscript{11} They argued that recognising the independence of Croatia and Slovenia prematurely, (before an agreement had been reached about how the different parts of the old Yugoslavia would fit together) would only lead to more conflict.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Unity First}

In an attempt to keep up the appearance of a unified stance the EC conferred its collective recognition on the republics a few days after the unilateral German announcement.\textsuperscript{13} While the U.S. had resisted recognition in the face of international pressure from various quarters as well as domestic pressure from the Croatian-American lobby, it deferred to the EC and followed suit. At the same time U.S. policymakers argued that recognition could not be conferred upon Slovenia and Croatia whilst leaving the multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina within what was left of the Serb dominated Yugoslavia. To this end, they made U.S. recognition of the two new states dependent upon EC recognition of the Bosnian republic.\textsuperscript{14} Bosnia-Herzegovina had declared independence on 20 December, a few days after the EC decided to recognise Slovenia and Croatia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most ethnically mixed of the former Yugoslav republics.\textsuperscript{15} Prior to the outbreak of conflict its population was forty four percent Muslim, thirty one percent Serb, and seventeen percent Croat.\textsuperscript{16} It was this mixed

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador,” 13. Holbrook, \textit{To End a War}, 31.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Baker, \textit{Politics of Diplomacy}, 640-641.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} For a discussion of the ethnic characteristics of the Bosnian population see Burg and Shoup, \textit{War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 116-61.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Blue Helmets}, 487.
\end{itemize}
ethnic distribution, along with the high level of integration, that led U.S. policymakers to predict that a conflict in this republic would be the most bloody of all the secessionist wars.\textsuperscript{17} This prediction proved to be accurate in that fighting broke out in the republic immediately after its declaration of independence and continued through to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. The conflict was, indeed, the most bloody of the wars in terms of its length, the number of civilians affected, and intensity.\textsuperscript{18} As the cease-fire negotiated in November gradually began to take hold in Croatia it was the war in Bosnia that became the focus of the international community as well as EC and UN negotiators.

**U.S. National Interests: “No Dog in this Fight”**

From the outset of the crisis it was recognised within the Bush administration that the U.S. did not have a strong national interest in events in Yugoslavia. In the absence of Cold War rivalries, Yugoslavia held little geopolitical importance to the U.S. although its proximity to Europe meant that it still had a key role to play in regional security and stability.\textsuperscript{19} It was for this reason that many in the administration considered Yugoslavia to be a European, not an American problem.\textsuperscript{20} They argued that Europe should take responsibility for the problem that was occurring in its own backyard and that the U.S. should take the back seat.\textsuperscript{21}

This was a view that was initially shared enthusiastically in many Western European capitals, where the Yugoslav crisis was perceived as an appropriate first example of the EC’s capacity for collective foreign policy action based on common interests and values.\textsuperscript{22} “This is...” the EC’s president declared in June 1991, “...the hour of

\textsuperscript{17} Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador,” 10.
\textsuperscript{18} The greatest number of human rights abuses were recorded in Bosnia, see Blue Helmets, 501.
\textsuperscript{19} Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador,” 2.
\textsuperscript{22} Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” 127.
Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans.”23 The Yugoslav conflict represented a particularly good first test of the EC’s capacity to deal with threats to regional stability because the organisation was much better placed than the U.S. to exert immediate economic and diplomatic pressure upon the Yugoslav protagonists.24

Protecting and Promoting Military Security

What military security interests the U.S. had in Yugoslavia were embedded, not within the country itself, but its impact on the rest of Europe. The U.S. had an interest in participating actively in the international response to the crisis in order to maintain its pre-eminent role within the European political and security environment. This was linked to an enduring interest in maintaining a viable security presence through the U.S. leadership role in NATO. The Bush administration promoted the NATO alliance as the keystone of European security and the most appropriate forum for managing security threats and potential crisis.25 At the same time, however, the U.S. had a more immediate interest in ensuring that its own forces did not get drawn into a messy civil conflict that at that stage posed little direct threat to its military security.

The tensions between these two security interests, preserving the U.S. role within the European security architecture and keeping U.S. ground troops out of Bosnia, were starting to become evident in the last six months of the Bush administration. They were not yet the ‘paralysing security dilemma’ that would later preoccupy the Clinton administration because domestic and international pressure for a forceful U.S.-led intervention in Bosnia was only just starting to build.

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25 Gow, Triumph of a Lack of Will, 204.
Another, broader, U.S. military security interest was the newly co-operative relationship that was developing with a rapidly changing Soviet Union. The Soviet interest in the Yugoslav situation was very different from that of the U.S. This could be explained, in part, by the traditionally close historical relationship between the Soviet Union and Serbia that had been magnified during World War II. The Soviet's also held a more acute interest in events in Yugoslavia because of its geographical proximity. In addition, the political implications of the Yugoslav crisis had more of a direct relevance to the Soviet Union because it involved the issue of post-Cold War secession. Handling the secession issue successfully was one of the most prominent challenges then facing Soviet leaders. They were, therefore, paying close attention to how the international community responded to the Serb leadership's attempt to hold Yugoslavia together with force.

On the one hand, the Bush administration did not want differences in opinion over the Former Yugoslavia to hinder the new co-operative relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the administration knew that its response to the secession issue was not only being watched by the Soviet leadership but also the burgeoning democracies within the Soviet Union that wanted to secede. This prompted the administration to be very vocal about its support for the principle of democracy, and its distaste for the use of force in an attempt to halt secession, even while it was refusing to commit troops to defend these principles on the ground.

The Balkan conflict was also of broader interest to the U.S. in terms of its potential to draw in its neighbours and spark regional instability and conflict. The administration's concerns were based upon two possibilities: that the conflict might

27 Gow, Triumph of a Lack of Will, 186. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 35.
29 Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 638 and Bert, Reluctant Superpower, 140.
30 Joffe, "The New Europe," 34.
spread to Macedonia and involve Greece or that it bring the Greeks and Turks into
conflict over the Serb treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Both Greece and
Turkey are NATO allies and if either or both of them became embroiled in the
Bosnian conflict the U.S. would be treaty bound to respond. It was for this reason that
the administration determined it necessary to contribute five hundred troops to the
UN effort to guard the Macedonian border and stop the conflict from spreading
south. 31 President Bush also issued a firm warning to the Serbian president that the
U.S. had a keen interest in the protection of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. On
Christmas day 1992 Bush warned that Serbia itself would face attack if it launched an
offensive against Kosovo’s Albanian population. 32

Protecting and Promoting Economic Security
As with Somalia, the primary U.S. economic interest in Bosnia related more to the
international community’s response to the conflict than any direct interest in the
country itself. The U.S. imported US$879 million worth of goods and services from
the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1989, the year before the conflict began,
and exported US$501 million. 33 Whatever economic interests were directly related to
investments in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have already been damaged severely once
the civil conflict began and would, therefore, have been an unlikely long-term
influence over policy. 34 This becomes even more apparent when U.S. trade statistics
are compared with the level of humanitarian and military resources injected into the
country each year of the conflict.

The annual assessed U.S. contribution towards the UN peacekeeping efforts in
Bosnia amounted to US$76.4 million in 1992, the last year of the Bush presidency.
This figure more than quadrupled over the next three year and by 1994 the U.S.

31 UN SC Resolution 798. 11 December, 1992. This deployment represented the first time that U.S.
troops had served under a UN command and also the first example of a preventative UN deployment.
32 Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” 137.
33 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1990, Washington, D.C.: IMF,
assessed contribution to the UN operation in Bosnia was US$459.7 million. In 1992 USAID contributed approximately US$10.9 in direct humanitarian assistance to Bosnia on top of the less direct contributions managed by the State Department. By 1994 this figure had expanded to US$116.9 million.\footnote{United States General Accounting Office, \textit{Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda}, Letter Report, 03/06/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-38.}

\textit{Protecting and Promoting Favourable Value Systems}

One of the key factors shaping U.S. action in Bosnia under the Bush administration was an interest in protecting U.S. value interests.\footnote{See discussion in Robert Jackson, “Armed Humanitarianism,” \textit{International Journal}, XLVIII, 4, Autumn 1993, 579-606.} The humanitarian and human rights aspects of the Bosnian crisis challenged the Bush administration in a similar manner to the Somali crisis. As was also the case with Somalia internal administration debates revolved not around the question of whether value-based interests were at stake but, rather, how much the U.S. should risk its military security interests in an effort to protect them. In Somalia this question had been resolved when policymakers located a low-cost, low-risk framework of action within a much broader UN peace operation. No such framework could be located to allow a similar humanitarian military intervention in the much larger and more complicated crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\footnote{Josef Joffe describes the extensive measures that would need to be taken simply to secure supply routes for the delivery of humanitarian relief to Sarajevo in Joffe, “The New Europe,” 34-35.}

The U.S. has an enduring value-based interest in defending various normative principles that underpin perceptions of American identity and which were discussed in Chapter Two. Within a Bosnian war context these values included: the right to self-determination, the preclusion of the use of violence in settling disputes; standards limiting the means by which warfare is conducted; the imperative to minimise the impact on civilians; the prohibition of torture and all forms of genocide; a respect for human rights and the desirability of ethnic and racial tolerance.\footnote{David Gompert, “How to Defeat Serbia,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 73, 4, July/August 1994, 34.}
In an effort to promote a solution to the crisis that was consistent with these values the administration insisted that any settlement between the Former Yugoslav republics be based upon democratic principles and a respect for the rights of ethnic minorities. Yet, with no clear military or economic interests in Bosnia the administration was not willing to make the level of political or military commitment that would make such an agreement possible.

Throughout the term of the Bush presidency the Serb majority in Bosnia, which took control of the Yugoslav national army at the outset of the conflict, was by far the strongest military force. The Bosnian Serbs were winning the war on the ground and were gaining territory every day. They had a greater interest in continuing to fight than they did in accepting a peace deal that would recognise as legitimate the political claims of the Muslim or Croat minorities. In such an environment, any peace agreement that provided justice for Bosnia’s Muslim minority and its Croat population would need to be imposed by force. It would require a long-term international commitment to a large-scale military intervention and at that point there was no political will in the U.S. to even participate in, let alone lead, such an action.

Protecting and Promoting a Favourable International Order

As was discussed in Chapter Two, there are two aspects to the U.S. national interest in protecting and promoting a favourable international order. One involves the maximisation of U.S. power and freedom of action in order to maintain the independent capacity to defend U.S. interests against potential threats. The other

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39 Bert, Reluctant Superpower, 70.
42 In Kelly, “Surrender and Blame,” 45, President Bush’s Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, is quoted as suggesting that they believed it would take ‘hundreds of thousands’ of ground troops to make a peace deal work.
involves the establishment of a more peaceful, ordered, principled, predictable, and less threatening international environment based on the same types of liberal values and institutions that have brought relative peace to the U.S. at the domestic level.

Throughout 1991 and 1992, the conflict in Bosnia represented a threat to this latter vision of a favourable international order, not only because of its voracity and its targeting of civilians, but also because it involved the use of force in an attempt to change internationally recognised sovereign borders. In general, just about every aspect of the war defied the principles upon which the UN organisation was founded and which the U.S. hoped to propagate in an effort to promote international peace and stability.

U.S. policy in Bosnia throughout the term of the Bush administration can be explained by the assumption put forward in Chapter Two; that the U.S. will only use force to defend its international order interests if and when the threat is so great that it constitutes a threat to U.S. military security. In its first two years, the conflict in Bosnia represented a threat to the president’s vision of a more liberal post-Cold War international order, but the level of threat was not so great that it posed a risk to U.S. military security. This explains the president’s refusal to commit ground troops to Bosnia. In the absence of a high level threat to its military security, it was considered contrary to the overall U.S. national interest to place U.S. military security interests at risk by deploying troops into an intensive ongoing conflict.

As the following discussion of U.S. policy toward Bosnia will reveal, President Bush and his senior officials may have held a genuine commitment to the provision of a just political settlement in Yugoslavia, but they held an even stronger commitment to the protection of U.S. political military security. It was this latter interest that guided the administration’s policies. In the absence of the political will necessary to enforce a peace settlement in Bosnia, the administration maintained a rhetorical commitment
to a just political solution, but the only actions undertaken were very narrowly limited to the pursuit of humanitarian objectives.

**Reconciling Competing National Interests: A Reluctance to Lead**

While the Bush administration lacked the military interests necessary to commit U.S. troops to Bosnia it did support some form of international military presence in the country. In early February 1992 this presence began in the form of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that was authorised by the UN Security Council after the Secretary-General reported that the warring factions in Croatia had demonstrated a genuine commitment to the ceasefire. In an effort to ward off potential conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR was headquartered in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo even though its focus was Croatia. Throughout 1992 both the force size and mandate were gradually expanded and the operation was extended into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR was deployed as an interim arrangement with the objective of creating the “conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.” Throughout its deployment, the UN operation remained largely unsuccessful in completing this task. Its most significant achievement related to its role in facilitating the distribution of humanitarian assistance and its efforts to relieve the worst of the war’s impacts on the civilian population.

It was this aspect of the UNPROFOR mission that served as the primary focus on the Bush administration’s involvement in the operation right up until the last few months.

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45 Blue Helmets, 521-522.
47 According to the UN's own assessment, much of the criticism directed at UNPROFOR related to its failure to... “fulfil tasks that it had not been mandated, authorized, equipped, staffed or financed to fulfil.” Blue Helmets, 523.
48 Meisler, The First Fifty Years, 313.
of 1992. Rather than committing ground troops to the operation the administration offered assistance in the form of logistics capabilities and transport. This was consistent with existing U.S. policy on participating in UN operations and did not contradict the guidelines for participation that would later be outlined within the National Security Council review. The president made it very clear that these humanitarian efforts were not a precursor to deeper political or military engagement. The U.S. involvement in UNPROFOR was to be strictly limited to humanitarian objectives.

In a news conference with foreign journalists in early July 1992 the president defended his unwillingness to allow the U.S. to take on primary responsibility for ending the Bosnian conflict. The president expressed concern lest the U.S., even for a moment, give the impression that it was prepared to take the lead in finding a solution to the crisis. In dramatic contrast to the kinds of comments he would make about Somalia only four months later, Bush attempted to explain his administration's position by stating that:

... the United States is not going to inject itself into every single crisis, no matter how heartrending, around the world. And where we try to work with the United Nations, for example, we have no apologies for that. There will be times when we have to take the lead, when we have to move forcefully, when we have a clear mission. I am not interested in seeing one single United States soldier pinned down in some kind of a guerrilla environment.

An Increasingly Engaged Congress

Up until mid 1992 Congress was a strong but rather passive supporter of the president's policy toward Bosnia. Congress as a whole supported the administration's multilateral approach and its emphasis on alleviating the worst of the humanitarian

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50 This Security Council Review was discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
impact of the fighting, but the body was split on the issue of a military intervention aimed at halting the fighting.

The administration’s relationship with the legislature began to change in June 1992 when, in the face of deteriorating conditions on the ground, congressional views began to converge around the need for some form of military intervention. It was at this time that Congress started to urge the administration to push for more forceful efforts in the UN to ensure Serbian compliance with its ceasefire agreements.52

Some members began to argue that the U.S. should “use its leadership in the United Nations” to put together a coalition of the willing that would “secure the safe passage of humanitarian aid” even though they argued against the deployment of U.S. ground troops.”53 Those who did argue for some form of U.S. military commitment insisted that this only take place within the multilateral institutional framework of the UN. There was little support within Congress at this point for a unilateral U.S. intervention.54

The United States cannot become the policeman of the world. Even with our military force, we cannot right every injustice around the globe or bring peace to every regional conflict. For this we need to reform and strengthen United Nations peacekeeping... 55

As Congressional attention began to zero in on the Bosnian problem, the media began to zero in on Congress and public debates regarding U.S. policy became more prevalent.56

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52 Both houses of Congress began debating the use of multilateral force in Bosnia in June 1992. See debates relating to H. Res. 490 and S. Res. 306.
53 See for example comments made by Senator Dennis DeConcini, Congressional Record, 138, 83, 11 June 1992, S81118.
In response to deteriorating conditions, the increase in domestic attention, and congressional urging for U.S. leadership in the delivery of humanitarian relief, the administration committed the U.S. to provide the bulk of the transport and logistics required for the UN airlift of relief supplies into Sarajevo. Despite this additional effort, the administration’s refusal to contribute troops to the UN effort in Bosnia started to come under intense scrutiny throughout the last half of 1992.\textsuperscript{57} Domestic pressure was starting to build, particularly in Congress, for a more forceful U.S. response to the crisis.

In August 1992 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution calling on the president to press for a UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief. Within hours, President Bush announced that he would push for a use of force resolution in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{58} Both houses of Congress then passed their own resolutions supporting such a move.\textsuperscript{59} Just two days later, on 13 August 1992, Security Council Resolution 770 was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorising member states to “take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary” to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{60}

Although this new move represented a much deeper level of U.S. engagement in the conflict its focus was still limited to the humanitarian realm and it did not involve the deployment of military force. As is consistent with the assumptions put forward in Chapter Two regarding the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government, the president was willing to respond to Congress on the

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. 8.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Blue Helmets}, 522.
humanitarian issue but was not responsive to growing calls for the deployment of military force.

Benefits of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN
What was also significant about the administration’s new initiative on Bosnia was that it represented a steadfast commitment to retaining the multilateral UN framework of action.

We reviewed the situation in Bosnia but with a lot of emphasis on the United Nations… we are continuing to work with the United Nations Security Council members on the substance of a resolution [Resolution 770] which would enhance our collective ability to deal with this situation...I will say that the objec: of providing humanitarian assistance is our goal. Nothing has been ruled in or out to achieve that, and we have talked about a wide array of actions we can take in co-operation with our allies. The first and primary thing is to continue to work at the United Nations.61

Separate Frameworks of Action
The Bush administration was committed to working within the UN framework because it offered many significant benefits. The most significant of these was that the UN allowed the administration to separate the pursuit of U.S. value-based humanitarian interests from the need to protect U.S. military security interests. It allowed the administration to make a distinction between its actions aimed at alleviating the worst of the humanitarian impacts of the fighting and its lack of action with regard to the actual conflict itself. All the other benefits of operating within the UN framework in Bosnia related in some way to the administration’s success in making a distinction between these two aspects of U.S. policy.

Operating through the UN allowed the U.S. to share the burdens of pursuing its humanitarian value-based goals through the multilateral framework, while retaining a

unilateral stance with regard to the protection of its military security interests. Such a policy is consistent with the assumption that the U.S. will not be willing to bear all the burdens of protecting value-based interests alone but will instead seek to share the costs and risks within the multilateral framework of action. It is also consistent with the assumption that the U.S. will seek to retain the greatest freedom of action when its military security interests are at stake. By allowing the Bush administration to separate competing ideational and material national interests the UN made it possible, at least temporarily, to reconcile them.

Operating through the UN in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives offered the administration more than just the opportunity to share economic costs.\(^6^2\) It made it possible to avoid much of the military risk that would have been involved if the U.S. had undertaken to deliver humanitarian assistance in Bosnia unilaterally. Operating through the UN allowed the U.S. to limit its role to the supply and delivery of humanitarian relief while leaving the much riskier task of ensuring that relief supplies were distributed on the ground to the UN. This made it possible for the U.S. to actively participate, and be seen to be participating, in the larger humanitarian effort in Bosnia while at the same time ensuring that this participation incurred the least level of risk.\(^6^3\)

Reassuring a Nervous Military Leadership

The U.S. provided the bulk of the financial support for the UN airlift operation as well as the necessary transport and logistics. It did not, however, contribute directly in efforts to ensure the delivery of emergency relief on the ground. Limiting U.S. action in such a way was consistent with the National Security Council review that had been shaped greatly by senior Pentagon officials. It would have been unlikely that these officials would have supported the humanitarian operation if the U.S. had been required to deploy troops on the ground to facilitate the delivery of relief. The

\(^{6^2}\) James Baker suggests that the administration had the Gulf War co-operation model in mind for sharing the costs of humanitarian assistance through the UN. Baker, *Politics of Diplomacy*, 649.
risk of American casualties would have been much higher, and the chances of becoming more deeply embroiled in the conflict great.

Several senior military officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, had demonstrated as little enthusiasm for participation in the Bosnian air lift operation as they had for the prospect of a Somali air lift. As with Somalia, the military’s primary concern was that even a limited military action on behalf of the U.S., even for humanitarian purposes, would lead onto a slippery slope toward large-scale intervention. Getting involved in an ill-defined and potentially unlimited military operation in Bosnia in the absence of a clear strategic threat, would have contravened the limitations on U.S. military participation in UN peace operations that military leaders were fighting to have accepted within the National Security Council review.

President Bush made it clear that he intended to heed the cautionary advice of his senior military leaders and was not intending to commit troops without their approval.

When you commit someone else's son or daughter to war, it's a pretty burdensome thing. And I won't do that until the military, Colin Powell, Cheney, come to me and say, “Here's what we need to do. Here's what our mission is. And here's how those kids are going to get out.” Vietnam, we didn't do it that way. We made a big mistake.

This is consistent with the assumption that the military is much more likely to intervene in the decision making process during protracted foreign policy debates that do not involve an immediate high level threat to U.S. military security.

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65 For an outline of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s perspective see Colin Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, 71, 5, Winter 92-93, 32-45.
It was partly in an effort to allay the concerns of his most senior military advisers, that the president continually emphasised the limited humanitarian objectives of the U.S. participation in international efforts in Bosnia. He stressed that a focus on these humanitarian objectives was the intended U.S. response to the Balkan problem. It was not, as some hoped and others feared, simply a prelude to a higher level of engagement.

The Multilateral Shield

Another key benefit to be gained by operating through the UN multilateral framework was that this framework could be used to shield the administration against calls for a greater level of U.S. involvement. The president defended his decision not to take a more forceful stance on Bosnia on the grounds that the only viable solution to the problem was multilateral in nature:

> It is through international co-operation, through the U.N., NATO, the EC, CSC, and other institutions, that we will be able to help bring peace to that troubled region... this really does require international action.

The president stated that his first and foremost priority with regard to Bosnia was to "continue to work at the United Nations." As long as policymakers promoted the need for a multilateral solution in Bosnia they were able to make the need for international consensus a prerequisite for action. When no such consensus existed, administration officials were able to use this as a rationale for U.S. inaction. The 'multilateral shield' against calls for a deeper level of U.S. engagement became even more important under the Clinton administration when domestic and international pressure to intervene intensified greatly.

Disadvantages of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN

The international consensus issue remained a key factor in U.S. policy throughout the crisis but it was a mixed blessing for Bush administration officials. The UN framework protected them from demands to take more forceful action, but at the same time it prevented the U.S. from taking any significant unilateral action. As one commentator notes with regard to U.S. policy on Bosnia “… following the lead of other states in a multilateral alliance is the only course available for those unable or unwilling to assume the largest portion of the burden.”

Bush administration officials feared that if the U.S. took action outside the multilateral framework on Bosnia, it would be interpreted by friends and allies as a signal that the U.S. was now willing to take the lead. The most significant disadvantage of operating through the UN in Bosnia, therefore, was that the administration had to forego any significant unilateral action, despite the pressure that was beginning to build in Congress, in order to retain the UN framework of action.

Compromising for Consensus

One example of how the administration reined in its policy in order to retain the UN framework of action is the mandate of Resolution 770 authorising the use of force. The U.S. originally pushed for a more aggressive Security Council resolution that would have offered protection for UN peacekeepers conducting military tasks aimed at maintaining peace and not just when they were attempting to deliver humanitarian assistance. This was part of the president’s promise that America would do

71 Gebhard, Adelphi Paper, 17.
72 Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 210 and Gow, Triumph of a Lack of Will, 112.
“whatever it takes” to ensure that humanitarian aid was delivered to the civilian population in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{73}

What the president meant to say, however, was that America would do all it could \textit{multilaterally} to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. The president was asked during a press conference just days before the vote on Resolution 770, whether the U.S. would be willing to act unilaterally if the Security Council failed to support the resolution. The president said that he fully expected the use of force resolution to be supported, and then went on to make it clear that he was still not willing to consider the possibility of unilateral action. “I have a lot of options open to me and I will contemplate every one seriously” the president stated, “but in conjunction with the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{74}

This commitment to the UN framework of action was put to the test when the U.K. objected to the U.S. proposed mandate for Resolution 770. The U.K., which had already deployed substantial troops to participate in UNPROFOR, objected to the prospect of using force to interfere in the balance of power on the ground because this would only end up drawing UN troops into the fighting. In response to a direct request from the U.K. and in an effort to ensure that Resolution 770 generated the required support in the Security Council, the U.S. dropped its insistence on the wider use of force to protect UN troops conducting military operations.\textsuperscript{75} The resolution was reworded to authorise only the use of force to protect deliveries of humanitarian aid.

The U.S. willingness to forego any significant unilateral action in order to retain the UN framework was continually tested throughout the last half of 1992 with regard to

\textsuperscript{73} At a July summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe the president has announced that humanitarian relief would be delivered to the civilian population "no matter what it takes." See Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” 133.


\textsuperscript{75} Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” 39, 133.
the question of militarily enforcing a no-fly zone. In August, partly in response to congressional calls for more forceful action, administration officials had started to consider the possibility of pressing for a Security Council resolution that would install a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. A no-fly zone would not only halt Serbian intimidation of relief flights coming in to and out of Sarajevo it would also help, at least partially, to redress the military imbalance between Serbian and Muslim forces.

Administration officials initially pressed for an enforcement component within the no-fly zone resolution even though they knew that such measures were not supported in Europe. France, particularly, expressed strong objections to the prospect of introducing force into what had so far only been diplomatic negotiation. The French were also nervous because they had troops deployed on the ground in the Former Yugoslavia that could be the target of a Serb retaliation against the use of force.76

The U.S. was not willing to consider the U.S. of force without explicit support in the form of a Security Council resolution. In October the Council went halfway when it passed a resolution banning all military flights over Bosnian airspace. Rather than push for a more forceful resolution the administration settled for a ban on flights and then began a separate push for an additional resolution to enforce the ban. This was the beginning of what would later turn into a showdown between the legislative and executive branches of government as the president found himself caught in the middle between a Congress that wanted stronger action and the constraints imposed by the UN multilateral framework of action.

*The Beginnings of a Congressional Showdown*

At the same time that Congress was pressing the administration to address the burgeoning humanitarian crisis in Bosnia more forcefully, it also began to press for a reassessment of the arms embargo. The Senate added an amendment to the 1993
foreign operations appropriations bill authorising the provision of up to $50 million for Bosnia if the UN arms embargo was lifted.\textsuperscript{77} The president signed the bill but no arms were shipped because of the embargo. The moral questions generated within the arms issue only became more problematic as the conflict progressed and it later placed the Clinton administration more firmly in conflict with Congress. This conflict between Congress and the president is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

The view that the Bosnian Muslims were unfairly disadvantaged by the embargo and, by effect, denied their right to self-defence was not lost on either administration. Yet, while both administrations were willing to argue the point with their European allies, neither was willing to publicly contradict the consensus position. This was particularly the case given that several European states had troops deployed on the ground in Bosnia and the U.S. did not. Again, the administration was motivated by a concern that any break in consensus between the U.S. and the Europeans would risk giving the impression that the U.S. was now willing to assume a leadership role in the crisis.

Conclusion
In the last few months of 1992, the failure of U.S. policy to fully engage the Bosnia crisis and move beyond a humanitarian focus was bringing the Bush administration increasing levels of domestic and international criticism. The failure to act to defend democratic principles and a respect for the rights of ethnic minorities was also the principle cause of protracted dissension within the administration itself.\textsuperscript{78} This was, in part, associated with the broader internal debate over an appropriate role for the U.S. in the post-Cold War world. This debate was impacting on much of the administration’s foreign policy at this time and had served as the core for debates in

\textsuperscript{76} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 55.
\textsuperscript{78} Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars," 128.
relation to U.S. policy in Somalia as well as the administration's attempts to reassess U.S. participation in UN peace operations.

As Richard Haass notes, debates over U.S. policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina tapped into core debates about American identity and role in the post-Cold War world.

The real debate was about ourselves. We were the enemy. The real debate, if you look at the people writing the letters in our newspapers, the groups calling for action ... it was an American debate. What should the United States government be doing? What should we be doing about Vance-Owen? What should we be doing about using military force? 79

The idea that the U.S. had exceptional moral responsibilities in a post-Cold War liberal international order had been promoted by the administration in an effort to garner domestic support for the U.S. leadership role in the Persian Gulf crisis and the Somali operation. It was possible then, for critics of the administration to turn its own arguments against it in relation to the Balkans. The administration's critics argued that the U.S. had a moral responsibility to act in Bosnia because it was the only state with the military, economic, and moral power necessary to actually achieve a solution.

It was in an attempt to deflect this criticism that the administration emphasised the role and responsibility of the UN in the management of post-Cold War international conflict and attempted to draw focus towards U.S. efforts to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population. 80 As had been the case in Somalia, operating multilaterally through the UN was perceived to represent the middle ground between the desire to pursue moral principle and the need to protect strategic interests.

In addition, the fact the administration could use the lack of consensus within the Security Council as rationale for inaction in Bosnia made the UN framework of

79 Haass, Interview, 1998.
action highly beneficial to policymakers. It was so beneficial, in fact, that retaining the UN framework became one of the administration’s core goals with regard to the crisis. As a consequence, president Bush and his senior administration officials refrained from confronting other key member states over differences in policy when such a confrontation could pose a threat to the framework.81 This was the case in relation to the question of recognising the former republics and also the issue of air cover to enforce the no-fly zone. The administration feared that in jettisoning the UN multilateral framework the U.S. would be committing itself to undertaking a leadership role in regard to the conflict.

The desire to operate within the multilateral framework in order to avoid leadership responsibilities is also relevant in terms of explaining the actions and policies of the European states involved in efforts to address the conflict. The result of this shared interest in avoiding responsibility for the conflict resulted in what could be referred to as lowest common denominator policies.82 In regard to the Balkans, this resulted in an operational focus upon the delivery of humanitarian relief and attempts to mitigate the impact of the war upon innocent civilians.

Thomas Weiss referred to this as ‘collective spinelessness’.83 No state, including the U.S., was willing to provide the military and political leadership necessary to address the conflict in Bosnia. Instead, the international community’s collective focus became the alleviation of the worst of the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.84 On a purely domestic level, the U.S. role in the pursuit of these humanitarian goals may

80 This point is also highlighted throughout Weiss, “UN Responses in the Former Yugoslavia,” 1-22.
82 Former secretary of state James Baker refers to the politics of consensus in relation to the Balkans in this context, as does the former Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, David Owen. See Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 644; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 377-378; and, Halverson, “American Perspectives,” 6.
have made the military nervous but it succeeded, to a limited extent, in placating a Congress that was becoming increasingly vocal in its calls for action.

During its term in office the Bush administration, the UN framework did not help policymakers locate a genuine balance between conflicting U.S. national interests in Bosnia. What it did, instead, is help administration officials postpone the need to balance them by providing with, what they perceived to be, a legitimate excuse for U.S. inaction. When President Bush lost the presidential election at the end of 1992, the difficult task of locating a genuine and sustainable balance between conflicting material and ideational U.S. national interests in Bosnia was passed on to the Clinton administration.
– Part Three –

The Clinton Administration
Introduction

During his last year in office President Bush had been keen to promote a greater level of multilateralism, and a more prominent role for the UN, in post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. His enthusiasm for the UN stemmed not only from the end of the Cold War but also, if not even more so, from the success in the Persian Gulf War. This military and diplomatic victory had demonstrated that substantial material benefits could be gained from operating within the UN framework of action now that the organisation’s security function was no longer paralysed by the Cold War.

When the Clinton administration entered office, it took this post-Cold War experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism much further than had originally been envisaged by the previous Republican administration. This was because the most senior officials within the new Democrat administration brought with them a strong set of liberal institutional assumptions about the way the post-Cold War world could work and the role that the UN could play within it. They were what was described in Chapter Two as ‘ideological multilateralists,’ that is, they had a strong ideological predisposition toward multilateralism based on their liberal value systems and their interpretation of American exceptionalism. This was in marked contrast to the previous, more conservative, administration whose interest in multilateralism and the UN was much more pragmatic.

¹ Thomas Henrikson, *Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea*, Hoover Institution on War and Peace, Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University, 1996, 9. For a critique of the Clinton administration's early attempts to define post-Cold War U.S. national interests see Paul
U.S. National Interests: “It’s the Economy Stupid!”

As the first U.S. president to enter office after the demise of the Cold War, Clinton’s domestic and international policy making was not framed by the same bipolar struggle for power that had constrained his immediate predecessors. To the Clinton foreign policy team, the end of the Cold War had created an essentially untested and undefined international environment that was initially perceived as being much more benign. These perceptions of the international environment, coupled with the administration’s strong liberal ideology, greatly affected the way senior officials prioritised and pursued U.S. national interests.

Protecting and Promoting Military Security Interests

In the absence of an over-arching political threat, the Clinton administration assumed that many states would now be united by their recognition of shared and interdependent economic interests. The Clinton team assumed that all states now recognised the benefits of economic growth and development through expanded markets and stable global economic relations. Senior officials also believed that this recognition of common economic goals and interests, together with a better understanding of the interdependence of the global economy, would create a generally more harmonious and stable international environment.

This view is consistent with a liberal interpretation of military security, which seeks to protect and promote U.S. military security by promoting formal and informal liberal institutions that reduce the level of uncertainty emanating from the international environment. This is in contrast to a realist interpretation, which would seek security through strengthening the power position of the U.S. relative to the

Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” Foreign Affairs, 73, 1, January/February 1994, 30.
3 Robert Gallucci suggests that economic globalisation and the preponderance of U.S. military power are the two most significant defining characteristics of the post-Cold War world. Robert Gallucci, Interview with Author, Washington, D.C., 11 May 1998.
other states in the international system. It is this interpretation of U.S. military security interests that initially played a significant role in shaping the administration's foreign policy decision making.

Protecting and Promoting Economic Security

Clinton made it clear right from the outset of his candidacy that his administration would have a strong focus on the domestic economy. In a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council in August 1992, candidate Clinton stated clearly his intention to emphasise economic factors within U.S. foreign policy when he announced that, if elected, he would:

... elevate economics in foreign policy, create an Economic Security Council similar to the National Security Council, and change the State Department culture so that economics is no longer a poor cousin to old-school diplomacy.4

This increased emphasis on the role of economic interests in shaping international relations led the administration, during its first few months in office, to elevate the status of economic security within their assessment of U.S. national interests.5

It was not until the end of its first year that the administration reinstated traditional military security interests as the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy and economic security was relegated to second place. The gradual reformulation of stated U.S. national interests is evident within the public policy speeches of senior administration officials and, as will be discussed in the case studies, is also evident in the foreign policy choices made by the administration.6

4 Quoted in Henrikson, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 4.
5 For speeches where economic interests were listed as the number one national interest see: Warren Christopher, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 13 January 1993; William Clinton, Address before the Diplomatic Corps, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 18 January 1993; and Madeleine Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 21 January 1993.
6 For speeches in which military security is listed as the first priority see: Warren Christopher, Address at Columbia University, co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, N.Y., 20 September 1993 and Warren Christopher, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Protecting and Promoting Favourable Value Systems

In regard to the protection and promotion of U.S. value systems, the administration’s early rhetoric indicated a strong belief that a radical transformation of the international environment had accompanied the end of the Cold War. It was believed that this transformation had led to a genuine convergence of liberal values and interests, not only between the former superpower rivals, but also between the majority of states operating within the common international arena. Under-Secretary Designate, Lyn Davis, captured the beliefs of much of the administration when he stated at his Senate confirmation hearing that “… many new states and groups are seeking for themselves the goals which Americans have fostered throughout history – freedom, self-determination, democracy, and collective security.”

In an international environment that was thought to have been somewhat pacified by shared liberal values and economic interests, it was assumed that value-based interests could be allowed to have a greater role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. This view had both material and ideological underpinnings. From a material, or strategic, perspective the removal of the over-arching security threat that had both defined and constrained U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War meant that it was now safer for the U.S. to pursue less urgent, non-military national interests. This included the


7 Peter Jakobsen suggests that most developed states shared this assumption that a transformation had occurred after the end of the Cold War. See discussion in Peter Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold War?” Journal of Peace Research, 33, 2, 1996, 212.

8 This sentiment is made evident in the both the president’s inaugural address and the confirmation statements of all senior foreign policy officials. For example, see: William Clinton, Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C. 20 January 1993; Christopher, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 1993; Albright, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 21 January 1993.


promotion of human rights and the spread of democracy. To a certain extent, this view had also influenced the previous Republican administration and it helps to explain the decision to undertake a military humanitarian intervention in Somalia in November 1992. What was different about the Clinton administration, however, was that it added a strong liberal ideology to the foreign policy equation and this greatly influenced perceptions about the lengths that the U.S. should go to in order to protect and promote its value-based interests.

The more liberal Democratic administration viewed post-Cold War U.S. national interests in a context that was not limited by the more realist, and also conservative, preoccupation with relative power distribution. As was discussed in Chapter Two, foreign policy thinkers who tend toward a liberal ideology also tend to advocate a more active U.S. role in defending liberal values throughout the world. This links back to the liberal interpretation of American exceptionalism and the belief that the U.S. has a ‘special moral responsibility’ to defend and promote liberal democratic values around the world. As was discussed in Chapter Two, this contrasts with the more conservative viewpoint that would limit the U.S. role in promoting liberal values internationally, to simply ‘leading by example’ at home.

Protecting and Promoting a Favourable International Order
When they first entered office, Clinton administration officials were very vocal in their belief that the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for melding material and ideational U.S. national interests by promoting a more favourable, liberal

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12 Another ideological distinction between the Bush and Clinton administrations related to their conceptions of democracy in the post-Cold War world. President Bush discussed democracy primarily in political terms and in relation to political freedoms. President Clinton, in contrast, discussed democracy in the post-Cold War era with a clear emphasis on its economic implications in terms of expanded markets and expectations of economic growth. It was the expansion of liberal democratic principles, in economic terms, which underpinned the policy of ‘democratic enlargement’ that competed with ‘assertive multilateralism’ as the dominant foreign policy doctrine of the Clinton
institutional, international order. Right from the outset, President Clinton also made it clear that he envisaged a significant role for the UN in the maintenance of the post-Cold War international order. As a presidential candidate, Clinton had gone so far as to suggest that U.S. policymakers should explore the possibility of establishing a “standby, voluntary UN rapid deployment force” although this proposal was dropped soon after entering office.13

Because of its strong liberal institutional leanings the Clinton administration also placed a much greater emphasis on the need to legitimate the use of military force through the UN Security Council. One of the factors explored within the following case studies is how the administration gradually became much more circumspect about the need for explicit UN Security Council approval before exercising military force. When asked about this in 2002 the president stated that “In an ideal world no state would use force unless it was sanctioned by the Security Council, but we are still a long way from that occupying that world.”14

A Liberal Institutional World Order: Pragmatism and Ideology

The Clinton administration’s early enthusiasm for the prospect of increased UN-based multilateralism in the post-Cold War world was both ideational and material. The material element within the administration’s enthusiasm for the UN had been shared by the previous Bush administration following the Gulf victory. The administration’s ideological predisposition toward multilateralism was accentuated by its pragmatic interest in sharing the burdens of global leadership so that it could focus its resources on the domestic arena. This combination of factors culminated in an administration which had such a high level of interest in promoting UN-based multilateralism that it rivaled the commitment of the organisation’s original founders nearly fifty years earlier.

administration in its early years.
14 Bill Clinton, Response to a Question by the Author, U-Thant Distinguished Lecture, Tokyo, 21 May 2002.
President Clinton and his senior foreign policy officials made it clear within their early speeches that they believed it critical that the role of UN-based multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy be increased substantially. Even before Bill Clinton’s presidential confirmation, he told a group at Georgetown University in Washington D.C. that “American cannot and should not bear the world’s burdens alone.” The topic of multilateralism also featured prominently in his inaugural speech when he stated that, “While America rebuilds at home, we will not shrink from the challenges, nor fail to seize the opportunities, of this new world. Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape change, lest it engulf us.”

The newly appointed secretary of state, Warren Christopher, made it clear during his Senate confirmation hearings that he shared the president’s commitment to a liberal institutional world order when announced that, “It will be this administration’s policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to do more of the world’s work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace.”

Of all the administration’s advocates of a liberal institutional world order, it was the president’s Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, who was by far its strongest supporter. In June 1993, the ambassador made two public addresses within which she elaborated upon the administration’s policy towards UN-based multilateralism and outlined its underlying principles. In these speeches she noted that co-operative security and the UN was one of the most pressing foreign policy issues facing the U.S. The end of the Cold War, she argued, had placed the UN at the centre of the effort to “guide and safeguard a suddenly chaotic world.” As the sole remaining

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16 Christopher, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 1993.
superpower the U.S. was in the position to have a powerful influence over how the UN approached this task.

According to Ambassador Albright, the UN was critical to U.S. national security because it represented the middle ground between “self-absorption, with ruinous consequences for the rest of the world, and hyper-activity with equally ruinous consequences for ourselves and others.” She put forward multilateral action as a third alternative that would utilise U.S. resources effectively and promote U.S. global interests in a ‘just and orderly’ world. Albright quoted Warren Christopher when she said:

> We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American intervention. The world looks to us for leadership. Thus, the alternatives boil down to how the United States will lead: alone; at the head of a coalition; or working multilaterally to share the burden with others.

In her testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Albright depicted U.S. leadership in UN-based multilateralism as the only viable alternative between “blissful isolation or costly duty as the world’s cop.” UN-based collective security would also, Albright suggested, allow the U.S. to share the burden of leadership in the effort to establish a principled international community.

*Hegemonic Leadership: Recasting the World in its Own Image*

Madeleine Albright summed up the administration’s ideological predisposition toward the UN in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations in June 1993 when she said:

> We are and will remain involved [in the international community] because we must continue to try to build an international system in which our experiment in democracy and social pluralism can continue to flourish. ... There will always be a strong ideological component to American foreign policy. We would be foolish to suppress it. It is what makes us different, and what others admire about us.
If, in fact, a more principled international community is starting to take shape, where do we fit in? Because this international community so reflects American values, ideology, and economic interests, we have a motive and opportunity to establish some “Rules of the Game.” The UN is the best repository of those rules, and the United States is their most able patron.\textsuperscript{18}

In July 1994 she expressed similar sentiments when she said, “We want the UN to succeed, because the UN Charter embodies aspirations for the world that we fully share.”\textsuperscript{19} Ambassador Albright also made it clear that promoting and strengthening the UN only served U.S. interests as long as the U.S. maintained a leadership role within the organisation. She claimed that the U.S. could now exercise just such a leadership role by virtue of its victory in the Cold War and its position as the sole remaining superpower. If the U.S. exercised its leadership within collective bodies such as the UN there was a danger, Albright warned, that multilateralism would not only fail to serve U.S. national interests but instead serve to undermine them.

These two factors together formed the crux of the Clinton administration’s policy towards UN-based multilateralism when it first entered office. Ambassador Albright referred to this policy as ‘assertive multilateralism’, which she defined as “multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership within collective bodies.” The fact that this new policy depended on the clear exercise of U.S. leadership is often overlooked by critics of assertive multilateralism. When senior administration officials advocated an increase in UN-based multilateralism in the post-Cold War they were not letting go of their ambitions for U.S. hegemony. Their vision of ‘assertive multilateralism’ rested on the idea of benign global U.S. leadership as much as it did the idea of promoting the UN framework of action.

\textsuperscript{19} Madeleine Albright, \textit{Address at the National Press Club}, Washington, D.C., 14 July 1994.
Untested Expectations

The Clinton administration came into power with what turned out to be unrealistically optimistic expectations of the UN and the role it could play in the post-Cold War era. Coupled with this, was a great deal of uncertainty about how to prioritise and balance U.S. national interests in what was perceived to be a dramatically altered international environment. As Robert Myers warns, the distinction between global goals and national goals can become blurred during periods when national interests are not easily and clearly definable.

The Clinton administration’s confusion over U.S. national interests in the post-Cold War era were, to a large extent, played out through their expectations of and experiments with an expanded role for UN-based multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. Upon entering office, the administration’s most immediate experience of UN-based multilateralism related to the U.S.-led UNITAF operation in Somalia. The administration’s attempt to use this humanitarian operation as a testing ground for its theories about multilateralism is the focus of the following case study chapter.

Through this operation in Somalia, the administration was essentially attempting to promote a new type of international order that was based upon U.S. leadership within the global multilateral framework of the UN. From a constructive perspective, administration officials appeared to be working on the assumption that it was possible to alter the nature of the international environment. By operating through the UN and vigorously promoting the UN framework of action internationally, the administration was attempting to change expectations of state behavior in the post-Cold War world. How successful they were in this effort is the focus of the next chapter.

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Chapter Eight

The Clinton Administration’s Experiment with UN-based Multilateralism in Somalia

Introduction

The Somali mission took place while the entire world was still reeling from the Cold War’s end and struggling to understand what implications this had for the relations between states. Accompanying this struggle, was the hope that the era following the Cold War would be a more peaceful and stable one. It was in this largely untested environment that the humanitarian crisis in Somalia gave the new Clinton administration an opportunity to put its liberal institutional theories about the potential of the post-Cold War international order to the test.¹

The vision of a more peaceful post-Cold War world was based, in large part, on an assumption that the UN organisation would now be able to function in the way its founders had intended and play a more active role in the maintenance of international peace and security. For many, the UN authorised operation in the Persian Gulf had proved that the world body was entering into a new phase and Somalia represented a good first example of the expanded range of material and ideational goals that could be pursued through UN-based global co-operation. In this respect, many senior

¹ It is worth noting that it was not only the Clinton administration that viewed Somalia in this light. See discussion in Brian Urquhart, “The United Nations in 1992: Problems and Opportunities,” International Affairs, 68, 2, 1992, 311-319.
Clinton administration officials believed that it was not just the U.S. that held a strong interest in ensuring the success of the UN-based humanitarian intervention in Somalia, it was the entire international community.

This chapter explores the Clinton administration’s attempt to use the humanitarian intervention in Somalia to promote an expanded role for UN-based multilateralism in the pursuit of a broader range of U.S. national interests in the post-Cold War world. This effort was underpinned by the liberal world view held by many senior administration officials.

The first section of the chapter serves to link this liberal world view with the administration’s goals regarding the Somali intervention. The following section then outlines how these goals translated into the ambitious nation-building mandate of the UN operation that replaced the U.S.-led UNITAF operation in May 1993. The next section describes how the mission in Somalia gradually expanded beyond its original mandate and the role that the U.S. played within this. This is followed by a discussion of the benefits and disadvantages involved in pursuing U.S. interests through the UN framework in regard to Somalia. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the impact of the Somali experience on policymakers’ perceptions of the benefits of acting through the UN framework in the protection and promotion of U.S. national interests in the post-Cold War world.

Throughout the chapter, a particular emphasis is placed on the process of bargaining and compromise that appeared to take place between senior administration officials and the UN Secretary-General. Also of particular interest is the role that Congress played in shaping both the administration’s policies and its rhetoric in relation to Somalia.
Somali Intervention and U.S. National Interests

When Clinton administration officials took over control of the UN authorised, U.S.-led humanitarian intervention in early 1993, they viewed U.S. military, economic, and value-based interests in Somalia in essentially the same terms as the previous administration. What was dramatically different, however, was the liberal world view of senior members of the new administration and how this affected their perceptions of how important the Somali mission was to U.S. international order interests.

A Liberal Vision of a Multilateral International Order

As was discussed in the previous chapter, many Clinton administration officials believed that U.S. national interests would best be served in an international system based upon the principles and laws embedded in the UN Charter. They also believed that such a world was more likely now that so many states had joined the U.S. in recognising liberal values and interests. Clinton and his senior officials also believed that there was no longer any single state that had the military or economic power necessary to challenge U.S. leadership now that the Soviet Union no longer existed as a single political entity.

These three assumptions; a strong set of liberal values and assumptions, a belief that the end of the Cold War signaled the global adoption of these values, and a growing (although as yet untested) confidence in global U.S. leadership, combined to give the administration a very powerful vision of what the post-Cold War international order could look like and the role that both the UN and the U.S. could play in bringing this vision into reality.

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Crucial to their vision was the assumption that clear U.S. global leadership, based on genuinely shared values and interests, would make the UN framework much more beneficial because it would be less likely to act as a constraint on U.S. policy.

... as the world’s sole remaining superpower, leading economy, and foremost democracy, as well as the biggest donor to UN peace-keeping, it is the United States that will greatly influence what security role the United Nations will take on.³

In an effort to maximise the potential benefits of operating through the UN framework the Clinton administration entered office with the intention of dramatically strengthening the UN’s capacity to conduct multilateral peace operations. The administration’s goal was to build up the capacity of the UN so that it could play a more significant role in maintaining international peace and stability. By doing so, it was hoped, the UN could help relieve some of the burdens associated with post-Cold War global U.S. hegemony and the provision of international peace and stability.

It was also anticipated that sharing the costs and risks of international action through the UN would make it possible for the U.S. to pursue a wider range of national interests than it could pursue alone. As was stated in Chapter Two, U.S. policymakers will have a greater interest in sharing the costs and risks of international action that is aimed at pursuing value-based interests or goals. This view was captured by President Clinton’s under secretary of state for political affairs, Peter Tarnoff, when he told a U.S. Senate committee that:

In a world rife with humanitarian crises caused by armed conflict, the authorization of such a force is a landmark accomplishment which it is in our interest to cultivate. UNOSOM [II] is a model worth promoting. While the costs of America’s contributions are significant, especially in these times of fiscal restraint, we should welcome the opportunity to advance our humanitarian values with limited U.S. military involvement.4

For the newly elected liberal president, the UN framework was thought to be particularly valuable because it would allow the U.S. to take more action to protect and promote U.S. value interests abroad. As was noted in Chapter Two, liberal foreign policy thinkers tend to place a greater emphasis than their more conservative counterparts on the need to actively protect U.S. liberal values abroad.

A strong interest in ensuring that the UN was able to take up a greater share of the burden of maintaining international peace and stability and protecting humanitarian values in the post-Cold War world is crucial to understanding the Clinton administration’s policies toward Somalia. It is argued within this chapter that ambitions for the UN organisation’s future held by several senior administration officials, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright in particular, skewed their perceptions of the level of overall interest the U.S. had in ensuring the success of operation. This proposition will be explored throughout the remainder of this chapter.

**A Very Limited Beginning**

At its initiation, direct U.S. troop involvement in the Somali crisis was intended to be limited both in purpose and duration. This was part of President Bush’s effort to balance the level of U.S. commitment and exposure to risk in Somalia with its limited humanitarian value-based interests. The goal of the U.S.-led UNITAF operation was limited to securing the environment for the safe and effective delivery of

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humanitarian supplies so that the starvation and suffering of the civilian population could be ended.

It was initially estimated that U.S. troops could complete this limited task within two to three months and then responsibility for Somalia could be returned to the UN. At that point, it was anticipated that the vast majority of U.S. troops would be withdrawn. Bush administration officials had been careful to insist from the outset of the operation that U.S. troops would not become involved in the broader nation-building efforts to be undertaken by the UN. The Bush administration had also insisted, much to the frustration of the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that U.S. troops would not take responsibility for the crucial task of disarming the warring Somali factions.

Despite the Bush administration’s determination to limit U.S. involvement, the UN Secretary-General continued to press for an expanded and extended U.S. involvement in the country once the Clinton administration took office. The Secretary-General also attempted to persuade U.S. officials to take responsibility for disarming the warring factions. Boutros-Ghali assumed that any hope of reestablishing peace in Somalia would be dependent upon the removal of some of the vast numbers of arms that were freely available in the country. He further believed that only the U.S. possessed the military capacity necessary to achieve this task.

Disagreements over the role of U.S. forces in Somalia created tensions and misunderstandings between senior officials of the U.S. and the UN. These tensions only increased as the UNITAF operation progressed. A large part of the tension stemmed from the Secretary-General’s reluctance for the UN to resume responsibility for Somalia without some progress being made in regard to the disarmament issue. The Secretary-General also expressed a serious concern that the U.S. withdrawal

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would leave the UN operation grossly underprotected and vulnerable to attack. Both these factors led the Secretary-General to delay making the necessary plans for transition to UN control. These planning delays frustrated U.S. officials who believed that Boutros-Ghali was deliberately stalling in the hope that this would force a change in U.S. policy.

An Interest in a Speedy Transition Back to the UN

There were several reasons why the administration was keen to end the U.S.-led UNITAF intervention and return the Somali mission back to the UN. One of the primary factors related to the question of financing, UNITAF was not a UN operation, it was a U.S.-led mission that was authorised by the UN Security Council. This meant that the UN was not involved in preparing the budget for UNITAF and it was not financed from the UN peacekeeping account.

The U.S. was responsible for financing its own contribution to the operation and also covered the participation costs of various developing countries. The Security Council established a Trust Fund for Somalia – Unified Command to help the U.S. recoup some of the costs of UNITAF but this money was not used to reimburse the U.S. for the cost of its own participation. The purpose of the Trust Fund was to support the participation of several developing countries that could not afford to finance their own operations. The U.S. was reimbursed only for the costs of transport and other

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10 UN Security Council Resolution 794
support services that it had provided for these countries during the operation and was not reimbursed for expenses associated with its own troop deployments.\textsuperscript{11}

Under this arrangement the U.S. paid approximately seventy five percent of the total cost of the UNITAF operation.\textsuperscript{12} While it is true that no other industrialised countries were reimbursed for their participation in UNITAF, the scale of their participation was much more limited than the U.S. As the lead member state taking responsibility for the mission, the U.S. military and financial contribution to UNITAF was much greater than that of any other UN member state.

At its peak, UNITAF consisted of approximately thirty seven thousand troops, and of these, twenty-eight thousand, or seventy-five percent, were from the U.S. The remaining nine thousand troops were drawn from twenty different countries. The U.S. billed the UN for US$27 million to cover the cost of support provided to developing countries participating in UNITAF, and was reimbursed to the full amount. The U.S. was not eligible for reimbursement of the US$1 billion of its own costs towards UNITAF because this represented a voluntary contribution that was not requested by the UN.\textsuperscript{13} In total, the total cost to the U.S. of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 was US$2.2 billion.\textsuperscript{14}

The administration was keen to hand the operation back to the UN because this would also mean a return to normal peacekeeping arrangements. Once UNITAF was concluded and the UN mission, UNOSOM II, began, the U.S. share of the financial costs would return to its normal peacekeeping assessment of 30.4\% of operational expenses.\textsuperscript{15} That U.S. policymakers wanted to return normal peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{12} Hirsch and Oakley, \textit{Operation Restore Hope}, 109.
\textsuperscript{13} Peter Tarnoff, \textit{Statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate}, Washington, D.C., 19 October 1993.
arrangements is consistent with the assumption that U.S. policymakers will have a strong interest in sharing the burdens of pursuing value-based interests through the UN framework.

Clinton administration officials were also motivated by the simple desire to bring the humanitarian operation to a successful conclusion. By March 1993 UNITAF had, arguably, met its primary objective of halting the starvation of the civilian population and it was time to declare the mission a success and bring the troops home.\(^\text{16}\) The administration’s military advisers were particularly keen to conclude the operation and return responsibility to the UN. If any lesson had been brought home from the U.S. experience in Vietnam, it was that getting out of a military entanglement often presented a more significant challenge than getting in. For the military, returning the operation to UN control represented their exit strategy and they were keen to implement it as soon as possible.\(^\text{17}\) The desire to withdraw was made even more pressing by the impending need for a troop rotation that would have been expensive and difficult to justify given that limited U.S. interests had essentially been served.\(^\text{18}\)

**UNOSOM II: An Ambitious Post-Cold War Experiment**

The UN controlled UNOSOM II was authorised under UN Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. Under this resolution, Security Council members voted unanimously to expand the existing UN operation in Somalia into a broader peace operation with much larger political and military objectives. This new resolution resulted in the first ever UN peacekeeping operation established under

16 The Congress had also urged the administration to return the operation to UN control at the earliest opportunity when it, belatedly, authorised the Somali deployment in its February joint resolution. S.J. Res. 45, *Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia*, 4 February 1993.

17 Although chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, stated that it was more important to ‘do it well and do it right,’ than meet the 1 May deadline for a U.S. withdrawal. Quoted in Keith Richburg, “Powell, in Somalia, Says U.S. Pullout Date Unclear,” *Washington Post*, Tuesday, 6 April 1993, A15.

Chapter VII of the Charter. That the U.S. was now participating in a much more ambitious mission with a substantial enforcement component was not made clear to Congress or to the American public.\textsuperscript{19} If the dramatic change in the nature and scope of the operation had been made clear, Congress may have chosen to examine the prospect of U.S. participation more closely within the context of the 1973 War Powers Resolution.\textsuperscript{20} As it was, Congress remained largely unengaged until the operation started to go wrong and U.S. casualties began occurring mid year.\textsuperscript{21}

The ambitious operational mandate for UNOSOM II was formulated mostly by U.S. policymakers, and was supported by the UN Secretary-General. Some reports have suggested that the Secretary-General supported the expanded mandate despite strong opposition from his most senior peacekeeping adviser, Marrack Goulding.\textsuperscript{22} A discussion with Ambassador Goulding suggests that this was not the case however. The Ambassador notes that to his knowledge neither he, nor any of his UN colleagues, ever expressed any concerns about the expanded mission or the fact that it was to be conducted as a Chapter VII enforcement operation.\textsuperscript{23}

The mandate expanded the UN operation substantially both in terms of geographical scope and political and military objectives. This included one of the key military objectives that neither the UN nor the U.S. had been willing to take sole responsibility for under UNOSOM or UNITAF respectively; the crucial issue of

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\textsuperscript{20} While Congress had authorised the initial UNITAF operation (after the fact) in February 1993, the U.S. involvement in the expanded UNOSOM II deployment was not debated until September 1993, after hostilities had escalated. If Congress had debated the authorisation of the UNOSOM II deployment, it is not clear whether it would have been considered to be consistent with the War Powers Resolution because it was related to a Chapter VII enforcement operation and not a traditional peacekeeping operation.

\textsuperscript{21} Nancy Kassebaum, \textit{Interview with Author}, Tokyo, Japan, 29 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{22} Stanley Meisler suggests that Marrack Goulding was replaced as Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the request of the U.S. because he had expressed objections to the new Chapter Seven Mandate. Meisler, \textit{First Fifty Years}, 301.

\textsuperscript{23} Marrack Goulding, \textit{Email Correspondence with Author}, December 2003.
disarmament. As it was outlined in the resolution, the operational mandate was wide ranging with objectives that were both vague in their wording and lofty in their intention. At a political and humanitarian level, the resolution called upon the Secretary-General, through his special representative in Somalia and with the assistance of relevant UN agencies and offices to, “provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation.”

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution emphasised “the crucial importance of disarmament and the urgent need to build upon the efforts of UNITAF” although it did not allocate specific responsibility for this task. In addition to reiterating the need for compliance with past Security Council resolutions, the resolution also requested the Secretary-General, through his special representative, to direct the force commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.

Resolution 814 was designed and adopted at a time when the untested optimism of Clinton administration officials in regard to ‘assertive multilateralism’ was at its height. In this sense, the goals set for UNOSOM II were more a reflection of some administration officials’ hopes for the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world than

24 UN Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. This rather general and undefined objective was then elaborated in the form of seven particular tasks to which the Secretary-General was asked to provide assistance:
1. The provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia;
2. The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons;
3. The promotion and advancement of political reconciliation... the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country;
4. The re-establishment of Somali police... the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;
5. The development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines;
6. The development of appropriate public information activities in support of UN activities;
7. The creation of conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes.
they were of U.S. interests in Somalia. The expanded mandate was formulated and supported without an adequate appreciation of how such an extensive mandate could be fulfilled on the ground. Thus the UN operation in Somalia, along with the U.S. role within it, effectively served as a testing ground for the administration’s new theories about post-Cold War UN peace operations.

Another factor contributing to the creation of such an ambitious operational mandate was the relative inexperience of Clinton’s foreign policy team. While several key members of the team, including secretary of state, Warren Christopher, and national security advisor, Anthony Lake, and his deputy, Samuel R. Berger, had gained valuable experience during previous administrations, the new ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright had little previous experience. It was Ambassador Albright who acted as the chief proponent of ‘assertive multilateralism’ and who appeared the most enthusiastic about the prospect of collective ‘nation building’ in Somalia.

The resolution authorising the new UN mission was voted on in the Security Council when the Clinton administration had been in office only a few months. At this time the foreign policy team was not yet complete as several key members were yet to be

28 Warren Christopher had served as President Carter’s deputy secretary of state. Anthony Lake had served on President Nixon’s foreign policy team until he resigned in protest at the decision to bomb Cambodia, and later served on President Carter’s foreign policy team. Samuel R. Berger, Lake’s deputy, had also worked in the Policy Planning Department the State Department under President Carter. While Madeleine Albright had served on President Carter’s National Security Council staff, her experience and credentials lay chiefly in academia.
29 Morton Halperin noted that the first few months of an administration are a “dangerous time” because “the new people are not confident of their own abilities” and “they don’t know how things are done.” Morton Halperin, *Interview with Author*, Washington, D.C., 8 April 1993.
confirmed by the Senate.\textsuperscript{30} This may have contributed to the fact that no cabinet level, or sub-cabinet level, meeting took place to consider the possible implications of the new operational mandate.\textsuperscript{31} The resolution was presented to the public and Congress as an opportunity for the U.S. to help the UN fulfil its new role in the post-Cold War world. That the resolution was setting a precedent as the first peacekeeping mission authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was not made clear. While Ambassador Albright’s enthusiasm for the new mandate was great, after the deaths of the U.S. Rangers in October various officials admitted that the resolution had possibly not been examined by the rest of the administration carefully enough.

\textit{Unilateral U.S. Command and Control}

The difficulties associated with implementing the new mandate related not only to the level of its ambition. When the original UNITAF mission was created the Bush administration had agreed to offer some U.S. participation in the follow-up mission.\textsuperscript{32} At this time, however, the exact nature of this participation, including the command and control arrangements, was not established. When the Clinton administration took over responsibility for the Somali mission it inherited the uncertainties relating to the specifics of the U.S. participation in UNOSOM II. As a consequence, and also because of the haste with which the new operation was put together, the command and control arrangements for U.S. troops participating in UNOSOM II were complicated and, to many, unclear.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{30} Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy," 327.

\textsuperscript{31} In Drew, \textit{On The Edge}, 319, the author asserts that no Principals Committee meeting was held in relation to UNOSOM II until after the deaths of the U.S. Rangers in October. When questioned during his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations after the deaths had occurred, under secretary of state for political affairs, Peter Tarnoff, stated that he did not know how many times the Principals Committee had met in regard to the Somali operation. The answer later supplied in writing stated that such information was classified. Tarnoff, \textit{Senate Committee on Foreign Relations}, 19 and 20 October 1993.

\textsuperscript{32} Lancaster, "Mission Duration is Flexible," A17.

When the U.S.-led UNITAF operation concluded officially on 4 May 1993 the bulk of the U.S. effort was withdrawn, U.S. decision makers agreed to provide a 1150 strong Quick Reaction Force and a significant logistics component, including 3000 troops, to support the UN operation.\textsuperscript{34} U.S. troops were not placed under the command of the UN force commander, Lieutenant General Cevik Bir. U.S. forces in Somalia, U.S.FORSOM, were under the direct command of U.S. Major General Thomas M. Montgomery who was the deputy UN force commander.

The cause of confusion with regard to command and control arrangements was that the Commander of U.S.FORSOM, General Montgomery served under the command and control of U.S. Central Command, CENTOM, yet as the deputy to General Bir he served under the operational control of the UN. The logistics component of the U.S. contingent was under the operational control of the UN and was in a sense ‘leased’ to the organisation in the person of General Montgomery, not General Bir. The Quick Reaction Force served directly under CENTCOM.\textsuperscript{35} The civilian head of UNOSOM II was an American, retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, appointed at the request of U.S. national security advisor, Anthony Lake.\textsuperscript{36}

While complicated, these arrangements were aimed at providing maximum support for the UN operation whilst maintaining U.S. operational control. At the same time, they were aimed at eliminating any misperception that U.S. forces were under the command of the UN. This is consistent with the assumption put forward in this study’s research design that the policymakers would seek to retain unilateral control over the application of U.S. force. In an effort to retain this unilateral control, U.S. decision-makers helped to create a situation on the ground where the lines of command, and also communication, were unwieldy and unclear.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Allard, \textit{Lessons Learned}, 19.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. 55-61.
\textsuperscript{36} Boutros-Ghali, \textit{Unvanquished}, 92.
\textsuperscript{37} Allard, \textit{Lessons Learned}, 55-61.
Fusing Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

The impact of military command and control problems in UNOSOM II was exacerbated by the inherent contradictions within its operational mandate. This mandate included political, military, and humanitarian goals. On the one hand, civilian officials were expected to gain the trust of the Somali people and various faction leaders in order to provide a positive negotiating environment. On the other hand, military officials were being asked to use force to disarm Somali clans and to enforce a cease-fire. Incorporating both traditional peacekeeping goals requiring the consent of the parties involved and coercive goals that are likely to require enforcement, is evidently contradictory.

There was a lack of clarity there about where responsibilities began and ended. There was lack of clarity about mission. A lot of rules were broken about how to approach things there.

This is a contradiction that also existed within the UN operation in the Former Yugoslavia and is one that the new ambassador to the UN did not appear to perceive. In testimony to a House Sub-Committee the day before the UNOSOM II took official control of the Somali operation, Albright stated that, "Increasingly, we are fusing peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations with the delivery of humanitarian assistance..." What Ambassador Albright failed to appreciate is that many of the principles that underpin UN peacekeeping are not compatible with the criteria for a successful enforcement operation.

40 Haass, Interview, 1998.
41 Madeleine Albright, Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs
Peacekeeping operations are, by their very definition, neutral. They involve placing impartial international forces between former combatants with the aim of creating breathing space for a negotiated settlement to a dispute. Forces are deployed with the full consent of the parties involved and are usually only placed after some sort of peace agreement has been agreed to. Use of force is only authorised in self-defense or to protect the mission by deterring small-scale attacks. Peacekeeping forces do not take sides and they do not engage in combat activities aimed at altering political outcomes on the ground.

A successful enforcement operation involves the “coercive use of force in an area, creating a de facto cease-fire to protect noncombatant populations and facilitate the opening of negotiations among local factions.” Troops are not necessarily deployed with the authorisation of all or any parties to the conflict, as in Somalia, but they are expected to at least attempt to be impartial. Peace enforcement differs from outright combat in that the end goal is to force a temporary halt to the fighting and convince combatants to negotiate. The goal of outright combat, in contrast, is the defeat of an identified enemy force on the battlefield. With this goal in mind, combat does not necessarily share the same limitations as peace enforcement with regard to the need to minimise casualties on all sides and limit the negative impacts on civilians.

As the following analysis will demonstrate, asking the same troop force to engage in peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities is a recipe for disaster on the ground. As soon as UN troops began to use force in a coercive manner they lost the protective shield of neutrality and they very quickly became deeply embroiled in the conflict. The situation deteriorated even further once one particular Somali faction was singled out for attention.


Peace Enforcement Turns into Combat

The UN had not been back in control of the operation very long before the contradictions in its mandate began to reverberate on the ground. On 5 June 1993 Pakistani peacekeepers were attacked while they were conducting a routine inspection of a UN sanctioned arms depot located in the same compound where the powerful factional leader Mohammed Farah Aideed had a radio station. At the same time, other Pakistani peacekeepers were attacked and killed at a feeding station on the other side of Mogadishu. A total of twenty-five peacekeepers were killed, ten were reported missing, and another fifty-four were wounded.

The Security Council responded to these attacks on 6 June 1993 with Resolution 837 condemning the action and reaffirming the Secretary-General’s authority to take all necessary measures against those responsible. By ‘all necessary measures’ the Council referred to the investigation of the attack and the arrest and detention for prosecution of those responsible. This resolution, largely drafted by the U.S., signaled a dramatic change in the course of the UN operation.

...on June 12, UN forces began a systematic drive to restore law and order in south Mogadishu, Aidid’s stronghold and the most disrupted and dangerous place in the country. The offensive continued for several days, with aerial bombardments and ground assaults on weapons sites, as well as on the broadcast facilities of Radio Mogadishu. On June 17, Howe publicly called for the arrest and detention of General Aidid pursuant to Resolution 837, and plans went forward to carry out the Security Council’s decision.

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43 Ibid. 30.
44 Lyons and Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, 57.
46 UNDPI, United Nations and Somalia, 96.
48 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 95.
U.S. forces participated in these efforts with both air and ground support. Senior administration officials attempted to play down the significance of the policy change but at the same time they made it clear that they supported it vigorously. They argued that the change was necessary to ensure that the situation on the ground did not return to one of lawlessness, and because the credibility of the UN operation had been put on the line. Peter Tarnoff linked the U.S. interest in the operation directly back to its broader international order interests when he stated that:

It is in America’s interests to preserve the gains of the humanitarian relief effort which began with Operation Restore Hope and UNITAF, and it is in America’s interest to ensure that the U.N.’s first multinational peace enforcement effort under chapter VII of its charter is a success... We have often said that we cannot always be the world’s policeman, that other nations must share the burden of peacekeeping, and that we will play a leadership role in helping make these efforts effective. We must now match our words with deeds by supporting UNOSOM’s mission in Somalia. If we succeed, the burden of deterring would-be tyrants and warlords will be an easier one. But if we fail, there is little doubt to whom the demands for relief will be directed.50

It was at this point that the enforcement operation began to turn into outright combat. In an effort to seek out and punish those responsible for the attack on the peacekeepers, a significant amount of the operation’s focus shifted to the hunt for Mohammed Aideed. This very quickly led to a dramatic increase in the level of military involvement of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force.51 In order to fulfil its expanded military role this force was backed up by armed helicopters and also Air Force AC-Gunships. As hostilities increased throughout the rest of July and into August, Admiral Howe began pressuring the U.S. to send military reinforcements.

50 Tarnoff, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 29 July 1993.
51 Some commentators have noted that the UN operation in Somalia in the latter half of 1993 bore little resemblance to a humanitarian operation because of the preoccupation with the hunt for General Aideed. See Sapir and Deconinck, “The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance,” 166.
The administration's response to this pressure was mixed. Generally, the Joint Chiefs and representatives of the Department of State and Ambassador Albright supported requests for reinforcements, while senior civilian Defense officials were more reluctant. Part of the reason for this reluctance was a desire to avoid escalating the conflict. Additionally, in the face of increasing criticism from Congress the president was presenting the U.S. participation in Somalia as winding down. Agreeing to enhance U.S. military capabilities in Somalia at this time would have contradicted the message the president was trying to send to both Congress and the American public.

Congress Re-engages as the Administration Divides

On 8 August, four U.S. soldiers were killed when a remote control mine was detonated beneath their humvee. This marked a turning point in relations between the administration and Congress. As Senator Nancy Kassebaum notes, Congress almost completely disengaged from the Somali issue once President Bush announced the decision to intervene. Up until the point where U.S. troops started dying, Congress had been preoccupied mostly with domestic issues, particularly the budget, and the only foreign policy issue that was receiving much of its attention was Bosnia. As security conditions in Somalia began to deteriorate, Congress very quickly re-engaged and several members began to question the continued value of the U.S. involvement. After the deaths of U.S. troops they became openly critical of the prospect of continued participation and some began calling for the U.S. to withdraw.

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52 Morton Halperin suggests that General Powell supported the hunt for Aideed and fully supported Howe's request for reinforcements. Halperin, Interview, 1998. In his autobiography, Powell's only comment on this issue is to suggest that the decision to hunt for Aideed was taken without any serious discussion among senior U.S. policymakers. Colin Powell, A Soldier's Way, New York: Random House, 1995, 574. See also Gellman, "U.S. Rhetoric Changed," A37, and Drew, On The Edge, 321.

53 Henriksen, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 10; and Drew, On The Edge, 3.9.

54 Kassebaum, Interview, 2002.

The deaths also signaled a turning point in the administration's handling of the Somali operation. Up until this point Clinton had allowed his senior officials and their deputies to exercise their judgment on the day to day running of the operation. They, in turn, had based much of their decision making on information and advice provided by Admiral Howe. The deaths of the U.S. soldiers brought the Somali issue to the fore for the entire administration, including the president. Further, by August, administration officials had recognised that the Somali operation was going to have an impact on their ability to gain support for a possible U.S. involvement in Bosnia.

Throughout August and early into September, the administration seemed to have trouble establishing and expressing a coherent policy towards the future of the UN operation in Somalia. In response to increasing concerns, both within Congress and the administration itself, the deputy national security advisor, Samuel Berger, directed the National Security Council, and the Defense and State Departments, to initiate an accelerated review of U.S. policy in Somalia.

On 10 August, the day after the order was given for the inter-agency review, an op-ed by Madeleine Albright appeared in The New York Times. In the article the ambassador stated:

Some criticize the UN mission in Somalia for supposedly departing from its humanitarian purpose by conducting military operations

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56 After the Mogadishu killings, national security advisor, Anthony Lake, noted that President Clinton may not have been brought into enough of the key "larger contemplative discussions," including Somalia. Quoted in Thomas Friedman, "Clinton's Foreign Policy: Top Advisor Speaks Up," New York Times, Sunday, 31 October 1993. 8. Paul Wolfowitz also takes note of President Clinton's tendency to delegate responsibility for foreign policy in Paul Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," Foreign Affairs, 73, 1 January/February 1994, 30.


against the renegade warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid... the decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or stay the course and help lift the country and its people from the category of a failed state into that of an emerging democracy. For Somalia’s sake, and ours, we must persevere. 59

Shortly after the appearance of Albright’s article, the military were prompted to weigh-in in support of Howe’s request for military reinforcements when six more U.S. troops were injured in a landmine explosion. 60 The additional deployment consisted of four hundred Task Force Rangers and Delta Force troops. 61 This Joint Task Force served under the direct command of CENTCOM and not the U.S. force commander General Montgomery, or the UN force commander General Bir. 62

Then, in direct contrast to Albright’s calls for an increased commitment to nation building in Somalia, other senior members of the administration began arguing for the opposite. In a 27 August speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, secretary of defense, Les Aspin, called for a reassessment of the UN operation in Somalia. He argued that a more realistic approach was required and that the UN should develop a detailed plan by which its economic, political, and security activities could be drawn together within a single strategy. He also called upon the UN and the Organization of African Unity to take action to bring the warring parties back to the negotiating table. 63

59 Madeleine Albright, “Yes, There is a Reason to be in Somalia,” New York Times, Tuesday, 10 August 1993, LA19.
60 Elizabeth Drew argues that no cabinet level meeting was held to discuss this decision and quotes senior administration officials as saying that the president “didn’t weigh in” on the matter. Drew also suggests that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, who had previously added a cautionary note to deliberations on Somalia had, by this stage, already started to extricate himself from administration decision making in the face of his impending retirement. See Drew, On The Edge, 321-322.
61 In Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy,” 339, the author notes that the Task Force Rangers and Delta Force began training for Somalia after the first attack on U.S. troops on 5 June 1993.
62 Allard, Lessons Learned, 55-61.
63 For additional examples of the administration’s attempts to explain U.S. policy in Somalia see: Warren Christopher, Address at Columbia University, co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, N.Y., 20 September 1993; Anthony Lake, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 21 September 1993; and Madeleine Albright, Address at the National War College, National Defense University, Fort
As the administration continued to debate its policy on Somalia, Congress quickly stepped up in an attempt to fill the leadership void and express its displeasure at the direction the operation was heading. On 9 September 1993, the Senate adopted, by a vote of 90-7, a non-binding amendment to its authorisation bill requiring the president to report to Congress by 15 October on the goals of the U.S. presence in Somalia and to seek specific authorisation for this presence by 15 November.64

On 20 September Warren Christopher visited the UN Secretary-General and conveyed to him the administration’s desire to refocus the Somali operation toward a political solution. Christopher also presented the Secretary-General with a letter requesting his co-operation in the administration’s new approach to Somalia. This letter requested that the hunt for Aideed be halted and that an effort be made to return to the original humanitarian and political objectives of the operation.65 This desire to back away from the military aspects of the Somali operation was perceived by the Secretary-General to be in direct response to diminishing domestic support.66

Reining it in Too Late

On 3 October 1993, the Somali operation turned into a military and political disaster. The operation that had been held up as an example of how post-Cold War multilateralism could be used as a low cost framework to pursue U.S. humanitarian

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64 The amendment was a watered down version of a proposal by Senator Byrd to force the administration to put an end to the mission unless Congress voted to support it within one month. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Congressional Record, 139, 117, 9 September 1993, S11157. On 28 September 1993, the House accepted an identical amendment to its version of the authorisation bill. See 1993 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 49, 1994, 489.
66 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 101. Domestic criticism was encapsulated by former U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, in “Where is Our Foreign Policy?” Washington Post, Monday, 30 August 1993, A19.
interests, had instead led to the highest casualty rate for a single military unit in combat since the end of the Vietnam war.\textsuperscript{67}

The U.S. Task Force Rangers, under direct CENTCOM command and control, and without prior approval of the UN force commander, had launched an operation in Southern Mogadishu aimed at capturing several suspected aides of General Aideed. The Rangers succeeded in capturing twenty-four suspects but as they were preparing to evacuate, two U.S. transport helicopters were downed by rocket-propelled grenades. Several members of the two flight crews were rescued by Delta Force helicopters, while the Task Force Rangers moved to protect the remaining soldiers. These troops were pinned down for sixteen hours while they waited for other peacekeeping forces to reach them. As a result of the operation, eighteen Rangers were killed, nearly eighty injured, and one was captured.

The strong domestic reaction to these events was heightened by the graphic television footage of the body of one of the U.S. soldiers being dragged naked through Mogadishu by the same Somali citizens that the Americans had gone to 'help.' Pictures of an obviously battered and bruised captured U.S. soldier were also beamed around the world shortly after the operation had taken place.

\textit{Bargaining with Congress on the Timing of the U.S. Withdrawal}

Immediately after the deaths the administration entered into an intense period of damage control. The national security advisor along with the secretaries of Defense and State were dispatched to Congress to make a closed-door briefing for members in an attempt to pre-empt any moves to force an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. This briefing was not particularly successful and resulted in the call, by many congressional members, for troops to be pulled out immediately.\textsuperscript{68} It was the\textsuperscript{67} 1993 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 490 and Barton Gellman, "Somali Options Reviewed as Discontent in Congress Grows: U.S. Lacked Strong Plan to Aid Besieged Troops," \textit{Washington Post}, Wednesday, 6 October 1993, A01.\textsuperscript{68} 1993 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 491; Ann Devroy, "Somalia Options Reviewed as
congressional leaders, from both parties, who succeeded in cooling the mood in Congress and allowing the administration time to consider its options. On 6 October the president called for an emergency meeting to review the policy options for Somalia. This meeting was attended by the president, the vice president, the entire cabinet, senior civilian and military staff, and also Robert Oakley, the former U.S. special envoy for Somalia. After considering the options put forward, the president agreed that while a deeper U.S. commitment would not serve U.S. interests, an immediate withdrawal of troops was not a viable course of action. Instead, Clinton opted to set a deadline for withdrawal by 31 March the following year and to send military reinforcements to ensure the safety of U.S. troops until their departure. The president also ordered that an end to the hunt for General Aideed be announced and that U.S. troops cease using any force in Somalia except in self-defence.

The reasoning behind these decisions was outlined in the president's address to the nation the following day. Clinton justified the continued U.S. involvement on the grounds that:

... if we were to leave today, we know what would happen. Within months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets. Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs, and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.
Within his address, the president also outlined the much more limited role of the U.S. troops participating in the operation. Essentially, this new role amounted to keeping out of harm’s way until the troops could be withdrawn, while at the same time refocusing the civilian effort toward a political solution. Consequently, General Aideed was transformed, literally overnight, from ‘warlord’ to a legitimate negotiating partner.

While many members of Congress would have preferred an earlier withdrawal date they deferred, again, to their respective party leaders when these leaders came out in support of the president’s decision. If Clinton had not established a clear withdrawal date, however, it is certain that Congress would have imposed one. Part of the reason for the administration’s swiftness in making the decision to set a March date for withdrawal of U.S. troops was to head off any attempt by Congress to impose an earlier date. The Senate endorsed the administration’s decision on 15 October, on the basis of the newly limited operational objectives and voted to cut off funding for the operation on the day of the promised withdrawal.

While the president was keen to appease Congress, particularly in light of the Mogadishu disaster, his decision to withdraw from Somalia was not made in response to congressional pressure. The president ended U.S. participation in the Somali operation because the military costs and risks had become too high in comparison to the limited U.S. humanitarian and international order interests. The U.S. had initially been willing to become involved in the operation specifically because it was perceived as posing no significant threat to U.S. military security. Once such a threat arose and U.S. troops began to die, the president belatedly attempted to rein in the mission and restore its humanitarian focus. When this failed and the eighteen army Rangers died in Mogadishu, the conflict between military and value-based U.S. national interests was just as clear to the president and his administration as it was to Congress. What the president negotiated with Congress was the timing of an orderly withdrawal, not the question of withdrawal.
Benefits of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN

When the U.S. agreed to participate in UNOSOM II the perceived benefits of operating through the UN framework of multilateral action were considered to be high. The proposed operation was not only consistent with the new administration’s vision of an expanded role for UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era, it was considered to be a low-risk, low-cost testing ground for this vision.72

Economic Burden-sharing

Operating through the UN framework in Somalia allowed the U.S. to share the financial and political burdens of conducting a military operation based on humanitarian values and the respect for human life and dignity. Without the prospect of sharing the related risks and responsibilities and without the built in exit strategy provided by the larger UN operation, the U.S. would not have undertaken such a substantial operation in Somalia. The multilateral framework represented, for the administration, the middle course between U.S. inaction and a full-fledged commitment.

Operating through the UN facilitated a much higher level of burden sharing than could be achieved by operating outside the formal multilateral framework. Under UNITAF, the U.S. had been able to share only twenty-five percent of the costs associated with the Somali intervention. As soon as the operation returned to UN control, the U.S. was able to share over sixty-five percent of the costs by operating through formal peacekeeping funding arrangements that were already in place.

Increased Legitimacy

Conducting the multilateral action through the UN also provided the Somali operation with a greater level of legitimacy which helped overcome the reservations

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72 Hoagland, “Beware Mission Creep,” A17; Henriksen, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 8-13; and, Drew, On The Edge, 319.
many states held in regard to an international intervention in post-colonial Africa. Given their sensitivity to the past, it was politically easier for many African states to support and participate in an intervention carried out by a global collective security institution of which they were a member. If the intervention had been carried out by a single major power, or ad hoc coalition of powers, many African leaders would not have been as comfortable in offering their support.

Similarly, many African states would have been less willing to participate in an intervention in Africa without the legitimisation of their actions by the UN. Many of the former colonial powers may have also been reluctant to get involved at all if not for the UN. They had learned through experience that the risks of intervening in an African conflict could be high and they may have been reassured somewhat by the prospect of sharing these potential risks with the U.S. and other UN member states.

Domestic Benefits
For key U.S. officials, including the president, the most significant anticipated benefit of operating within the UN framework was that it would free up administration resources to focus on other international and domestic policy goals. Specifically, it was hoped that acting through the UN would allow the administration to pursue its humanitarian foreign policy goals without distracting senior decision makers from their core election promise to focus on the domestic economy. Thus it was hoped that the president could turn over much of the day to day decision making on Somalia to his ambassador to the UN, other cabinet members, and their deputies. This anticipated benefit was never fully realised, however, because the president was forced to engage the operation once it got into trouble mid year and caught the attention of Congress.

When the eighteen U.S. Rangers were killed in October an unexpected benefit of operating through the UN multilateral framework came to light. Not only was the U.S. able to share the military and economic burdens of intervening in Somalia, the president was also able to share the political blame when the intervention went wrong. While President Clinton did not explicitly lay the blame for the U.S. deaths on the UN, his public statement in response to the deaths was worded in such a way as to lead many to this conclusion.\textsuperscript{75}

In his televised Address to the Nation three days after the Mogadishu incident the president announced that an additional 1 700 U.S. troops would be sent to Somalia to reinforce and protect the U.S. troops already stationed there.\textsuperscript{76} He stated that these troops would be under an American command, leaving the impression that the U.S. troops killed during the failed raid had not been.\textsuperscript{77} Further, once this erroneous impression had been established within the mind of the American public, and much of Congress, the president and his senior officials made no effort to correct it. For most members of Congress, the truth did not come to light until congressional hearings were held a few weeks later. For much of the U.S. public, this impression was never corrected.

Ambassador Albright also took a similar approach to the UN in the aftermath of the Mogadishu tragedy, even though she had been one of the administration's most ardent supporters of the mission. In February 1994, just prior to the final withdrawal of U.S. troops, the UN Security Council adopted a new resolution dramatically reducing the aims and objectives of the UN operation in Somalia.\textsuperscript{78} This resolution reduced the goals of the operation to the protection of roads, ports, and other

\textsuperscript{74} Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," 30.
\textsuperscript{76} Clinton, Address to the Nation, 7 October 1993.
\textsuperscript{77} Meisler, First Fifty Years, 308.
\textsuperscript{78} UN Security Council Resolution 897, 4 February 1994.
infrastructure, protecting humanitarian workers, and offering general assistance in the pursuit of a peace agreement between the warring factions. Further, the use of force by peacekeepers was limited to self-defence and the earlier goal of using force to create a secure environment was eliminated.

In an effort to distance the U.S. from the perceived failures of UNOSOM II, and in direct contrast to many of the ambitious statements she had made the previous year, Madeleine Albright suggested that this new resolution stated: “clearly what many of us have been saying for months: the people of Somali must bear the responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country.”

**Disadvantages of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN**

The key constraint associated with operating through the formal multilateral framework of the UN is the need to maintain a workable consensus in the Council that is consistent with U.S. national interests. In regard to the Somali operation, a consensus in the Security Council was neither difficult to generate, nor maintain. For the U.S.-led UNITAF operation, the previous Bush administration had sought a one-off Security Council resolution that allowed the U.S. complete unilateral control over its own troops and gave its force commander control over the timing of the U.S. withdrawal. For UN-led UNOSOM II mission, the U.S. was originally only meant to be a minor non-military contributor. This meant that administration policymakers were much more flexible on the need for unilateral U.S. control and the UN Security Council, was, therefore, afforded a much greater role in directing the overall operation on the ground.

This could have represented a problem for the administration once the U.S. level of military involvement in the operation escalated, but it did not. All U.S. proposed Security Council resolutions in regard to Somalia were supported unanimously. Other Council members were content to let the U.S. take the lead on the Somali issue.
because they shared its humanitarian goals and did not have a sufficient level of interest to want to take the lead themselves. When consensus did begin to break down, this was reflected on the ground in Somalia rather than in the Security Council.

When other UNOSOM II troop contributing states, such as Italy, became uncomfortable with the increasing use of military force within the operation, they began referring back to their own chains of military command and, as a result, stepped back from missions involving the use of force. During the period in which the hunt for General Aideed was at its height, other troop contributing states increasingly began to argue that they had volunteered for a humanitarian operation only and were not prepared to become involved in hostile combat.

As the goals of the operation changed, troop contributing states stopped perceiving U.S. leadership as being aimed at the provision of a humanitarian public good. As the hunt for Aideed became the focus of the UN operation its purpose was thought to have changed from being the provision of a purely public good to being aimed at providing a private good of more interest to the U.S. than anyone else. Similarly, as the nature of the operation changed, the risks to the military security of other participating states dramatically increased. Many of the states that had previously been prepared to follow the U.S. lead on Somalia were no longer prepared to do so. In this instance, the costs of acquiescing to the U.S. hegemonic leadership were greater than not doing so.

As other troop contingents backed away from participating in combat missions, U.S. troops were gradually drawn into a greater combat role. As they became more deeply

79 Quoted in Meisler, First Fifty Years, 310.
81 See discussion in Thakur, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement,” 398-399.
involved in hostilities the potential costs and risks for the U.S. began to increase on two fronts. Troops began facing greater risks to their physical safety, which represented a threat to U.S. military security. At the same time, as the U.S. became more involved in the hunt for Aideed its interest in succeeding in capturing him increased. That the much smaller and weaker Somali General was able to evade capture became a source of embarrassment for the U.S. commanders in the field and for the administration. This was linked to broader U.S. military security interests because it affected its credibility and leadership in the post-Cold War world.

A second, and related, disadvantage of operating through the UN in Somalia was the inability of administration policymakers to place clear formal limits on the level of U.S. military involvement. When Bush administration officials offered to lead an intervention in Somalia the UN Secretary-General accepted the offer on the condition that the U.S. agree to provide limited support for the follow-on UN-led operation. While Bush officials agreed, in principle, to this request they did not nail down the specifics of this support. This placed the following Clinton administration in a vulnerable position because U.S. troops were already deployed on the ground, and needed to be withdrawn, by the time these specifics came to be negotiated.

When Clinton entered office at the beginning of 1993 his senior administration officials discovered that the UN was woefully ill equipped in terms of operational capacity. Officials also soon discovered that the UN Secretary-General was far from enthusiastic about the prospect of the UN regaining control of the Somali operation. In their effort to gain the support of the Secretary-General for handing the operation back to the UN, Clinton officials agreed to allow a greater level of U.S. participation in UNOSOM II than was originally planned. In addition to leasing a significant

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82 See discussion in chapter six.
logistics component to the UN, officials agreed to allow a 1 150 Quick Reaction Force to participate in the UN operation under U.S. command.84

When the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had offered his support for the original U.S.-led UNITAF operation it had been on the understanding that the U.S. role would be limited in both scope and duration. Once the Clinton administration agreed to allow the Quick Reaction Force to participate in the expanded UNOSOM II mission these clear limits on the scope and duration of the U.S. role were removed.

As the Quick Reaction Force became more deeply involved in the efforts to disarm the Somali factions and search for General Aideed, the potential costs and risks of U.S. participation escalated. When eighteen U.S. troops were killed in the October raid the imbalance that had developed, between the costs and risks of U.S. participation and the benefits of U.S. participation, became clear and the decision was made to withdraw U.S. troops. This imbalance would not have developed if the role played by U.S. forces had remained limited in scope and if all U.S. combat forces had been withdrawn in accordance with the original timetable.

That the depth of the U.S. participation in Somalia expanded beyond the level justified by its limited interests in the crisis can partly be explained by the relative inattention of the president and the inexperience of some of his key officials. While the president exerted primary control over all foreign policy decisions he had allowed his senior cabinet members to exercise day to day control over the Somali operation. One of the key officials involved in this decision making was Madeleine Albright. As

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84 In December 1992, Powell was quoted as suggesting it may be necessary for the U.S. to leave a residual force of marines off the coast of Somalia for an undetermined time. See Don Oberdorfer and Barton Gellman, “U.S. Plans Short Stay for Forces in Somalia,” Washington Post, Tuesday, 1 December 1992, A29 and Lancaster, “Mission Duration is Flexible” A17. See also Lt. Gen. Martin Brandtner, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 9 December 1992. In February 1993, officials announced that the U.S. would leave a substantial logistics unit in Somalia that would not be involved in patrols, and also a rapid deployment force of marines offshore that would be ready to aid U.N. operations, see Auerbach, “U.N. Assailed for Delay,” A1. In April 1993, Powell stated that the U.S. was planning to leave behind a quick reaction force of a few thousand
the new ambassador to the UN, Albright had been vociferous in her optimism for an expanded UN role in the post-Cold War world, as well as a substantive increase in U.S. support for this role.

The ambassador had actively supported the expansion of the UN mandate in Somalia when the administration’s term in office had only just begun and before other key members of the foreign policy team could properly assess the implications of such an expansion. In addition, the ambassador did not begin her term in office enjoying good relations with senior military personnel, most notably the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell. She may not have been as responsive to the military’s cautionary advice as a more seasoned foreign policy official.

Being drawn into a larger role in Somalia did not only result in higher than anticipated costs to U.S. military security interests in terms of the loss of American lives and damage to U.S. military prestige. The loss of troops who were not engaged in the defence of vital U.S. national interests also imposed a significant cost on the administration itself. A significant motivation for the U.S. participation in the UN operation had been to spread the burden of humanitarian action and in doing so free up administration resources to focus on other international and domestic goals. Yet, as the U.S. participation in the multilateral intervention in Somalia began to experience difficulties throughout 1993 the operation increasingly began to take up more of the administration’s resources. Further, when U.S. troops were killed in the failed October raid, the backlash within Congress and among the American public created a major distraction for administration officials.

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85 Powell, A Soldier’s Way, 576-577.
86 See discussion in Thakur, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement,” 407.
The strong backlash from Somalia also served as a constraint on the administration's foreign policy making. In response to this backlash the administration was forced to reconsider its policy on U.S. participation in UN peace operations. It had become obvious, through the reaction to events in Somalia, that neither Congress nor the American public was ready to accept a vigorous role for the UN within U.S. national security policy. The wake from Somalia also made it more difficult for the administration, the following year, to garner the necessary support for a possible large-scale intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a result of the unanticipated cost of the Somali operation, administration officials became more wary, generally, of supporting UN peace operations. A significant case in point was the U.S. reluctance to send a large peacekeeping force to Rwanda to prevent the alleged genocide in that country in 1994.88 Similarly, the administration’s experiences in Somalia led to a reassessment of the potential role of the UN in any proposed intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Conclusion

With strong encouragement from Clinton administration officials the mandate of the UN controlled UNOSOM II included a variety of political and military goals that essentially added up to the rebuilding of the Somali nation. This ambitious mandate initially fitted well within the Clinton vision of an expanded post-Cold War framework of UN peace operations, and for the first six months the operation was held up as a model for UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era.

There was, I think, a general euphoria, that we had created a new institution here, and that the UN was really going to fix these

problems. And a kind of feeling, probably coming out of the Gulf War, that these people couldn’t stand up to the UN if we were serious... a real sense of confidence that we knew what we were doing, which turned out not to be the case.\textsuperscript{89}

By the time President Clinton ordered a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia only seven months later, the entire administration was rethinking its ideas about the post-Cold War international order and the role that the U.S. and the UN could play within it. Somalia had taught Clinton and his foreign policy team several important lessons.

One of the key lessons was that the UN was not going to be able to take up a large share of the burdens of maintaining international peace and security because it did not have the operational capacity to conduct military enforcement operations. Multilateral enforcement operations still required a credible military force backed by a state or coalitions of states with sufficient interest to lead the mission and accept the costs and risks required to ensure its success. This meant that multilateral enforcement operations in the post-Cold War world would need to be approached based on the same national interest calculations that guided U.S. decisions to conduct unilateral military operations. In addition, events in Somalia demonstrated that the UN multilateral framework did not, as had been hoped, sufficiently reduce the costs and risks of humanitarian interventions to the point where they did not conflict with U.S. military security interests.

What makes the Somali case study a particularly useful addition to this study’s discussion of the development of U.S. policy toward the UN is that it shows how U.S. officials were placed in the position of needing to bargain with an international organisation as if it were an autonomous international actor. It could be argued that the Clinton administration was willing to treat the UN as an autonomous actor because of its strong liberal ideology and its corresponding predisposition toward liberal international institutions. This argument falls down, however, in the face of

\textsuperscript{89} Halperin, \textit{Interview}, 1998.
that same administration’s willingness to damage the reputation of the UN severely by using it as a scapegoat for the mistakes made by U.S. decision makers in the lead up to the deaths of the U.S. Rangers.

It is more likely, that the Clinton administration was willing to bargain with the UN because it desperately needed to implement its ‘exit strategy’ from Somalia; and the UN was its exit strategy. While it was the U.S. force commander on the ground that had the authority to determine whether conditions were ready for a return to UN control, it was the Secretary-General who needed to sign off on the UN forces that would be replacing U.S. troops. Unless they wanted the U.S. to leave a vacuum in its wake, administration officials had no choice but to wait until the Secretary-General was ready to go before they ordered U.S. troops to pull out.

To speed the transition process up a bit, the administration agreed to the Secretary-General’s request to leave some form of U.S. military presence behind. This effectively removed the formal limits on U.S. participation that had been the reason why the U.S. military was willing to support the operation in the first place. Once these limits were removed, there were no formal or institutional checks in place to prevent the U.S. military involvement in Somalia from escalating well beyond what could be justified by its limited value-based humanitarian and international order interests.

What happened in Somalia did not end the Clinton administration’s experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism. What it did do was force the administration to rein in, quite dramatically, its expectations of the UN and take a much more cautious and pragmatic approach to the possible benefits of UN-based multilateral actions.

... I think that the commitment to multilateralism, and to relying on the UN, and relying on the building of international institutions, is growing again. ... in the longer term, what happened in Somalia, and what followed from that, will be seen as a small downward trend. It
both moved it down and slowed it down. In some ways it made it more realistic.\textsuperscript{90}

According Colonel Paul Hughes, Senior Military Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies from the U.S. National Military, the Somali mission did not poison the military’s view of multilateral peacekeeping operations either.\textsuperscript{91} What it did was teach the military that working within the UN framework was fraught with potential complications that needed to be fully addressed before any commitment to deployment is made. Mostly, these relate to issues of unity of command. Furthermore, as Colonel Hughes notes, the operation in Somalia did not sour the U.S. military on the prospect of operating under the control of foreign commander. While Congress remains generally sensitive to this issue, the U.S. military has gradually come to accept that sometimes it will be practical to have U.S. troops serve under the control of a competent foreign commander.

What U.S. force commanders will now insist upon, as a direct result of the Somali disaster, is that there is unambiguous unity of command in the field along with clearly understood and compatible rules of engagement that are derived from genuinely shared political and military objectives. Also key, is not locking the military into unrealistic timetables that are motivated by domestic political considerations. Finally, it is crucial that no assumptions are made about the nature of the security environment that will be handed back to the UN once the U.S.-led mission is complete.

In general, the U.S. experience in Somalia served to ground the elevated expectations that many Clinton administration officials had been so public about when they first entered office. Yet, Somalia was not the only contributing factor to the change in

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Colonel Paul Hughes, Senior Military Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, \textit{Telephone Interview with Author}, Perth, 17 September 2003. Colonel Hughes went on to note that the military considers there to be many significant benefits associated with
administration attitudes. The administration’s formal interagency review of U.S. participation in UN peace operations had already stalled before the U.S. Rangers were killed in October. The reasons for this will be explored in the following chapter.

operating multilaterally in the field, not least of these benefits being the chance to augment U.S. military capacity with the specialised capacities of other UN member states.
Chapter Nine

The Clinton Administration’s Review of U.S. Participation in Multilateral Peace Operations

Introduction

The keen desire to put its theories about expanded UN-based multilateralism into practice became evident as soon as the administration entered office. Within days of taking up residency in the White House, President Clinton signed Presidential Review Directive-13 (PRD-13) ordering an inter-agency review of U.S. participation in UN peace operations. The executive level review was chaired by the National Security Council and incorporated the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and the U.S. Mission to the UN. The terms of reference of the review were broad and included an examination of U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping and enforcement operations including humanitarian relief efforts. The review was considered an integral component of the administration’s attempt to enhance the efficiency, cost-effectiveness and capabilities of UN peacekeeping.  

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Before the administration’s review could be completed, experiences on the ground in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina forced the administration to rethink and rein in its ambitions for the UN. By the time the review was codified within Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) in May 1994, the administration’s policy bore more similarity to that of the previous Bush administration than it did the policy advocated by Clinton during his presidential campaign only eighteen months earlier.

This chapter explores the Clinton administration’s review of U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations and identifies the key factors that shaped the review process. The discussion examines some of the difficulties experienced by administration officials when it came to translating their theories about the benefits of expanding the UN’s role in post-Cold war U.S. foreign policy into concrete policies. Of particular interest is how the administration’s difficulties at the conceptual level reflected the operational difficulties being experienced on the ground within the three case studies.

Also of particular interest is how the intervening variables shaped the development of policy. It was put forward in Chapter Two that the intervening variables have a potentially greater role in shaping policy debates that take place over a long period of time and which focus on matters of long term strategy rather than the need to defeat an immediate threat to U.S. military security interests. It was also put forward in Chapter Two that strategic debates over long term policy will tend to bring out the partisan differences within Congress. Both these assumptions will be explored within the following discussion.

Terms of Reference for Presidential Review Directive-13
The Clinton administration’s review was intended to build upon the review that had been started under the Bush administration and was to use the UN Secretary-

General's 1992, *Agenda for Peace*, as its starting point. Its aim was to examine the role played by the U.S. in multilateral peace operations and to explore ways in which the UN capacity to conduct such operations could be enhanced and made more effective. The topics under consideration included: the overall role of peacekeeping, the role of regional organisations, the administrative and operations capabilities of the UN, financing, Article 43 of the UN Charter and command and control relationships, how the U.S. military is organised for such activities, the executive-legislative relationship, and any legislation that may require amendment.\(^4\)

Specific proposals to enhance the UN's institutional capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations were also considered within the review. These included: the establishment, with U.S. assistance, of a planning cell and twenty-four hour peacekeeping operations centre in the UN; standardising training and developing joint exercises, standardising peacekeeping doctrine and rules of engagement; adopting financial and managerial reforms; and identifying force capabilities which could be made available to the UN on short notice.\(^5\)

The most significant development under consideration in the review related to the prospect of creating a UN standing army; a proposal that Bill Clinton had supported as a candidate in the form of a voluntary UN rapid deployment force.\(^6\) The review would also continue to examine the question of placing U.S. troops under UN command and control. This was one of the key issues that had been raised during the previous Republican administration's peacekeeping review, but which had not been resolved.

\(^{A60}\)
Once the review began, the administration also unveiled a number of reform proposals aimed at addressing the UN’s budgetary problems and redressing the perceived inequity of the assessed share of U.S. financial contributions. In early May, with the strong support of Congress, the U.S. proposed the creation of a UN inspector general, or another comparable mechanism, to address problems relating to standards of accountability and transparency. The U.S. also proposed that its share of financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations be brought into line with its contributions to the general UN budget. The U.S. share of support for peacekeeping operations was 30.4%, while its scaled contribution to the general UN budget was only 25%.

A Positive Beginning

The review was fast-tracked by the administration with the first draft scheduled to be completed by April. While many of the staff working on PRD-13 had also been involved in the drafting of the Bush administration’s peacekeeping review, this review process did not suffer from the same level of inter-agency wrangling as had occurred under the Bush administration. Ivo Daalder attributes this factor to the absence of impending presidential elections and a more cooperative attitude on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Under the Bush administration, it was the Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, who had played a key role in reining in efforts to increase U.S. participation in UN peace operations.

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7 Throughout the year Republican Senators Larry Pressler and Jesse Helms unsuccessfully attempted to move a number of amendments to relevant appropriations bills that would restrict voluntary U.S. payments to the UN until an inspector general post was established. See, for example, Pressler Amendment No. 708, to Department of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1994, Congressional Record, 139, 107, 28 July 1993, S9675-9676. Pressler/Helms Amendment No. 947 and 948 to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1994, Congressional Record, 139, 126, 23 September 1993, S12311-S12319.


The first draft of the review was approved by senior departmental officials on 14 July 1993. On the same day, the under-secretary of defense for policy, Frank Wisner made a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee in which he outlined much of the draft’s contents. Wisner outlined the conditions that would have to be met before the U.S. would support and participate in a peacekeeping mission. The first condition was the existence of a compelling U.S. interest and international recognition that the situation at hand represented a threat to international peace; second, was the existence of an international community of interest and willingness to participate in the operation; third, was a clear understanding of the nature of the U.S. role in terms of peacekeeping or peace enforcement; fourth, was the availability of adequate means and the necessary finance; and finally, there needed to be clear domestic support for a U.S. involvement.

According to a Washington Post article published a month earlier, the administration was also considering the possibility of taking part in operations if U.S. participation would serve as a catalyst for the participation of other states. In an interview with the author, Ambassador Wisner confirmed that this was indeed the intention of the administration although he does not recollect whether it was ever made explicit in any of the review drafts. This motivation was not included in the official briefings offered by administration officials in July.

Wisner also outlined the types of conflicts and crises for which the U.S. would support the use of peacekeeping operations, although the type of support envisaged was not explained. It was made clear in his statement that the Clinton had a much broader definition of what constituted a threat to international peace and security than

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10 This failure to make a clear distinction between the conditions necessary for U.S. ‘support’ and U.S. ‘participation’ was rectified in the final draft of the review.
had generally been accepted by previous administrations and or within the UN Security Council.

The administration envisaged a much wider role for multilateral peace operations that were aimed at pursuing a much broader range of U.S. national interests. Not only were these operations to be aimed at defeating traditional threats to military peace and stability they were now to include three new goals: the containment of an existing conflict, the protection of democracy, and humanitarianism. This represented a fundamental shift in peacekeeping thinking because it included, as a matter of policy, the prospect of using force to protect and promote humanitarian and other value-based national interests. The three new categories of peace operations corresponded with the objectives of the UN operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Haiti, and Somalia.

A fundamental shift in peacekeeping policy was unveiled when Wisner stated that the U.S. was prepared to offer combat units to UN peace operations. Prior to this review, and excluding the experiment underway in Somalia, the U.S. had only been willing to commit to providing its 'unique' capabilities to UN operations, that is, intelligence, logistics, and air lift capacity. In regard to the command and control of U.S. combat units, the under-secretary stated that the U.S. was willing to place these forces under the operational control of a UN commander on a case by case basis. As the commander in chief, the president of the U.S. would at all times retain ultimate command of U.S. forces.

Military Objections to a UN Standing Army

The question of control over U.S. troops had been one of the most contentious issues within the review process under both administrations. Senior military advisers, most particularly the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had objected vehemently to the

14 Thomas Weiss, “UN Responses in the Former Yugoslavia: Moral and Operational Choices,” Ethics
prospect of U.S. troops routinely serving under a UN commander. This was not a blanket objection to the prospect of U.S. troops ever serving under a UN commander. What it represented, rather, was a strong objection to the prospect of losing control over the specific circumstances under which this would happen.

The question of command and control had not been resolved within the term of the previous administration's peacekeeping review. In practice, however, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, and secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, had both signed off on the idea of U.S. troops operating under a nominal UN command when they supported a limited U.S. participation in the UN controlled mission in Somalia, UNOSOM II.\(^{15}\) What had concerned senior military and Defense officials was the prospect of turning what they believed should be a case by case decision based on military advice, into an automated policy decision that would be based on an abstract criteria that had been shaped by civilians.\(^{16}\)

The military also had very strong objections to the possibility of creating some form of a UN standing army as envisaged under Article 43 of the UN Charter. Article 43 calls for member states to:

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...\text{make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security;}
\]


\(^{16}\) General Powell warned that it was sensible to ask some key questions before determining whether to use military force for humanitarian or any other purposes, but that it was dangerous to try and establish a fixed set of rules. Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, 71, 5, Winter 1992-1993, 37-38. One proposal floated as a solution to the command and control issue was a caveat that would allow U.S. troops to disobey commands that they believed to be illegal or militarily imprudent. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly vetoed this proposal because it would set a dangerous precedent. If U.S. troops were not bound to follow the orders of their UN commander, then neither would the troops of other national contingents. Barton Gellman, "Wider U.N. Police Role Supported: Foreigners Could Lead U.S. Troops," *Washington Post*, Thursday, 5 August 1993, A01, and Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No," 46. MacKinnon, *Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy*, 53.
While both Clinton and Albright had made public their support for the creation of an independent combat capability for the UN, the proposal did not make it as far as the first draft of the review.\textsuperscript{17}

As long as I am Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will not agree to commit American men and women to an unknown war, in an unknown land, for an unknown cause, under an unknown commander, for an unknown duration.\textsuperscript{18}

The Rapid Deployment Force proposal was vetoed by the military as soon as it was revealed and the administration very quickly went to great pains to make it clear to Congress that the idea had been well and truly dropped.\textsuperscript{19}

Michael MacKinnon argues that it was the inclusion of a proposal to support a UN Rapid Deployment Force that prompted the military leadership to engage with the administration on the terms of the peacekeeping review. The military had not been involved in developing the review throughout the first half of 1993 but reacted very strongly once a draft document became available and the administration’s ambitions were made clear. MacKinnon suggests that it was a military staffer within the Department of Defense that leaked a copy of the draft to the press in June 1993, a month before the administration went public with its details. The draft was leaked in the hope that it would gain the attention of Congress and that Congress would then rein in the administration.

In response to the military’s objections to UN Rapid Reaction Force, officials in the National Security Council who were drafting the review offered an alternative proposal in the form of the creation of an ‘on-call ready unit.’ This force would be


held on standby and be deployable within seventy-two hours of a UN Security Council resolution. This time it was not just the military that objected. The State Department also opposed the proposal because it was perceived as a potential threat to the department’s control over U.S. peacekeeping policy.

In the end, the compromise proposal that was accepted by all parties and outlined in final review was a much-watered down version of the concept that the president and Madeleine Albright had originally supported. The July draft of the review included plans to create a database of combat capabilities that could be made available to the UN ‘under certain circumstances.”  

The U.S., at this time, also signalled its intention to propose, at the level of the UN Security Council, that such a database be created by all potential troop contributing states.

The Review Process Stalls

Unfortunately for the administration, the details of the peacekeeping review were released to Congress and the public just as the operation in Somalia began to go wrong. Once peacekeepers started dying in Somalia Congress began to pay much more attention not only to what was going on in that country, but to the administration’s foreign policy in general, and to the role played by the UN in particular.

It was only four weeks after the outline of the peacekeeping review was released that four U.S. soldiers were killed in the UN peace operation in Somalia. Clinton officials were unable to offer a justification for the U.S. troop involvement in the increasingly hostile Somali operation and in an effort to deflect criticism away from the administration they were happy to let the finger of blame be pointed at the UN. Senior officials failed to make it clear that there was a substantial U.S. contingent in Somalia that was still operating completely under independent U.S. command and

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19 Inderfurth, Subcommittee on Coalition Defense, 14 July 1993.
20 Ibid.
control and that this contingent was becoming increasingly involved in hostile combat. This left many members of Congress and much of the public with the impression that U.S. troops were reluctantly being drawn more deeply into a combat situation by UN military and political decision makers. In reality, the deepening U.S. involvement was the result of decisions being made in Washington and by U.S. commanders in the field.

Congressional frustrations with the administration’s policy toward Bosnia were also beginning to have a negative impact on the peacekeeping review process. By mid 1993 Congress had been for more assertive U.S. action in Bosnia for some time. In response, the Clinton administration had continued with the previous Republican administration’s defence that the U.S. could not use force without the backing of a consensus in the UN Security Council. While the administration’s policies toward Bosnia will be discussed in one of the following chapters, what is relevant to the discussion here is that the administration did not win any fans for the UN in Congress when it continually blamed the organisation for restraining the U.S. freedom to exercise military force. As Republican Senator Bob Dole complained in September “… Bosnia, and Hercegovina [sic.], is being dismembered with the help of the United Nations and the United States is going along.”

Despite the fact that the key features of what was now Presidential Decision Directive – 25 were now public, including the intention to let U.S. troops serve under a UN command, Congress did not initially attack the administration’s peacekeeping policy directly. No major debates over the peacekeeping review were held on either the House or Senate floors although it was criticised within relevant committee hearings. Rather than focusing on the administration’s peacekeeping policy, Congress zeroed in on its policy failures in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia and how an over-reliance on the UN had contributed to them. Much to the administration’s frustration, the multilateral

21 Bob Dole, Congressional Record, 139, 131, 30 September 1993, S1280
22 See, for example, statement by Trent Lott, Congressional Record, 139, 133, 5 October 1993,
operations in all three countries were gradually becoming what William Hyland describes as “a three-part indictment of his [President Clinton’s] mismanagement of foreign affairs.”

Criticism of the administration’s policies was not the exclusive prerogative of the Republicans, nor was it limited to the halls of Congress. On 19 August, Democrat Senator Robert Byrd published an article in the New York Times attacking the administration’s policies in Somalia and questioning its new emphasis on UN peacekeeping. Two weeks later, a similar, if not more scathing, opinion piece was placed in the Washington Post by former Ambassador to the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick. The ambassador accused President Clinton of ceding U.S. foreign policy decision making to the UN. This was a particularly sensitive issue for a president who was already thought of as being weak on foreign policy.

Toning Down the Rhetoric

The strong reaction from the military leadership, growing criticism in Congress regarding its policies in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, and the two newspaper articles combined to put the administration on the defensive. Several senior administration officials made a number of high profile public speeches that attempted to more clearly explain the administration’s policy towards the UN. More importantly, they attempted to highlight its limits. Through their speeches, Clinton’s senior officials repeatedly denied claims that the administration was ceding control over U.S. foreign policy to the UN. They repeatedly reasserted the preparedness of the administration to act unilaterally to defend and promote U.S. national interests. Officials also emphasised that the administration’s enthusiasm for multilateral action extended only as far as such action served U.S. interests.

S13043.

26 Warren Christopher, Address at Columbia University, co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign
This series of speeches concluded with the president's first address to the UN General Assembly on 27 September 1993. During this speech, the president had intended to unveil the results of the review process. Yet, instead of outlining the measures the administration was prepared to take to enhance the role of the UN within U.S. national security policy, the president continued the trend established by his foreign policy team and outlined the limits of UN-based multilateralism in U.S. policy. Whereas Clinton and his foreign policy team had described the UN as being at the centre of U.S. national security when they entered office, Clinton now described the organisation as having only a supplementary role.27

When the president addressed the UN General Assembly in September the peacekeeping review document was in the process of being redrafted. Yet, even though the July draft of the review had proved to be unpopular, particularly with the military, the document was not sent back to the drawing board completely.28 The officials involved in drafting the review did not jettison any of the key elements that had been proposed but instead focused on eliminating the ambiguities that were causing concern in the military and which could be exploited by critics in Congress.

One of the key issues to be clarified by the administration related to the conditions under which the U.S. would support a peace operation within the UN Security Council, and when it would actually participate in an operation. A further set of distinctions also needed to be made with regard to the types of support the U.S. would be prepared to offer under different circumstances. In late September 1993, Ambassador Albright outlined what was shaping up into a two-tiered approach to UN

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peace operations. Within this approach a distinction was made between the criteria for U.S. political support for an operation in the UN Security Council, and the criteria for U.S. military support. This support was then divided into non-combat, such as logistics and communications, and U.S. combat troop participation.

Before offering its support in the Security Council for a proposed peace operation the U.S. would now ask a series of questions about the nature of the operation.

- Is there a real threat to international peace and security – whether caused by international aggression; or by humanitarian disaster accompanied by violence; or by the sudden, unexpected, and violent interruption of an established democracy?
- Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear objectives, and can its scope be clearly defined?
- Is a cease-fire in place, and have the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?
- Are the financial and human resources that will be needed to accomplish the mission available to be used for that purpose?
- Can an end point to UN participation be identified?

The ambassador noted that while the criteria for U.S. participation in UN peace operations was still under discussion, it was intended that the greatest assistance to be offered by the U.S. would be in specialised areas such as logistics, training, intelligence, communications, and public affairs. Albright also declared that U.S. troops would not participate in such operations unless certain conditions were met, including, a clear mission, competent commanders, sensible rules of engagement, and the availability of the means required to get the job done.

In an effort to further clarify any misperceptions that had arisen in regard to the recommendations made in the review, administration officials were much more

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29 Gellman, "U.S. Reconsiders Putting Gis (Sic) Under U.N.,” AI.
specific and vocal in their explanation of command and control issues. If U.S. troops were deployed in a Chapter VII operation in which hostilities were likely, they would serve under a U.S. commander. If they were deployed in a Chapter VI operation in which hostilities were unlikely, and this was reflected in the operational mandate, they could serve under a competent foreign command. This did not represent a change in the administration’s policy, nor did it represent a back down in the face of congressional criticism. The guideline was already in place within the first draft of the review that had been released in July and it remained a consistent feature of the review document throughout its drafting.\textsuperscript{30} The terms outlined in the guideline are consistent with the assumptions put forward in Chapter Three with regard to the conditions under which the U.S. is likely to be the most flexible on command and control issues.

During her speech, the ambassador also elaborated upon the limited benefits and uses of the UN in terms of U.S. national interests. She pointed out that while the U.S. commanded a great influence in the UN because of its power and the power of its ideals, the UN could not be relied upon to guarantee vital U.S. national interests. While the U.S. had a strong interest in building up the UN, she noted, America would never “entrust its destiny to other than American hands.”\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{An Increasingly Hostile Congress}

What marked a turning point both for the administration and for Congress was the deaths of the eighteen U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993.\textsuperscript{32} As was discussed in the previous chapter, Congress was outraged by this unanticipated


\textsuperscript{32} Ambassador Wisner suggests that the most unique aspect of PDD-25 was not its content but rather the level of congressional consultation that occurred. The administration had every intention of consulting with Congress with regard to the review even though it was under no obligation to do so as the review was essentially an internal process. This said, the level of consultation increased dramatically, according to Ambassador Wisner, after the deaths of the U.S. Rangers in Somalia. Close congressional consultation became an ‘imperative’ after this event. Wisner, \textit{Telephone Interview}, 2003.
loss of U.S. lives and was looking for someone to blame. Many congressional members, particularly Republicans, blamed the UN for leading the U.S. into trouble and blamed the administration for letting it.

We have allowed U.N. commanders to involve our troops in military activities far different from those outlined in the original mission. Neither the American people nor the Congress share a desire to get further involved in increasingly hostile military operations in Somalia with no clear mission and no clear end in sight. ... Secretary Christopher, wake up. It does not look like you really understand what is happening.33

Just days later, the U.S. troops participating in another UN mission of questionable interest to the U.S. when the USS Harlan County was blocked from docking at the Haitian capital city of Port au Prince by a chanting mob of demonstrators.34 This very public humbling of U.S. forces in the name of the UN only served to only further outrage many members of Congress.

By mid October the administration had signaled its willingness to take a much bigger step back from its policy of assertive multilateralism and the review was held back a second time to allow the different departments to re-examine its contents. The administration’s policy was being reviewed because of the dramatic failures in the field and in light of the increasingly hostile domestic climate.

I think it is very important for this President to understand that he has a deep, serious foreign policy crisis and that he needs to thoroughly overhaul his defense and foreign policy establishment and he needs to find a way to calmly and consistently lead Americans in a way that we can support and follow.35

Once again, however, the fundamentals of the review were left in place while the bulk of the changes related to a question of tone and emphasis. In late October, Ambassador Albright unveiled the generalities of the revamped review in a statement

33 Alfonse D’Amato, Congressional Record, 139, 133, 5 October 1993, S13078.
34 This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The review was now considered by administration officials to be complete, but it was not released until the following year. It was only released after the administration had completed a round of consultations with Congress and gauged its reaction to the new policy. Throughout this consultation period, the level of congressional hostility to the prospect of a greater UN role remained high.

According to Ryan Hendrickson, the real issue for Congress was not the UN organisation but rather a growing fear that congressional war powers were being eroded. Congress was already fearful that the liberal Democrat administration was placing too great an emphasis on the significance of UN Security Council resolutions, and that these resolutions could be used to bypass the need to seek congressional support for use of force decisions. This was a particularly salient point at the time because there was a bipartisan concern that President Clinton was about to override Congress and order a U.S. deployment in Haiti. This made congressional members from both sides very sensitive to the prospect of the administration developing a set of independent guidelines to determine whether and what type of military contribution the U.S. should make to UN peace operations. This was particularly the case given that the original drafts of PDD-25 made no mention of the need to consult Congress before any decision on the use of force was made.

Congress was not only sensitive because it feared a ill-considered deployment in Haiti. There was also a general sense in Congress that it shared a large part of the blame for what happened in Somalia because it had not been paying attention to events unfolding on the ground. Congressional hostility to PDD-25 escalated after the deaths of the U.S. Rangers as part of the body’s new determination to reassert its War Powers responsibilities. Republican Senator Robert Dole took this effort to the

35 Newt Gingrich, Congressional Record, 139, 156, 9 November 1993, H9050
37 Ryan Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers, Nashville:
extreme when he introduced the Peace Powers Act to Congress in January the following year. While the Bill was never fully debated it would have, if passed, restricted the president’s ability to deploy troops to UN peace operations without the prior approval of Congress.\(^{38}\)

In an attempt to appease its critics in Congress, the administration added a section to the review draft that committed the administration to consulting regularly with Congress prior to committing troops to a UN operation. This represented the most significant change to the policy that was a direct result of congressional pressure. Even so, it was limited to matters of procedure and did not actually represent a substantive shift in its peacekeeping policy.

*Protecting the Power of the Purse*

Despite the administration’s promise to consult more broadly with Congress on peacekeeping issues, the body as a whole continued to demonstrate its objection to giving the UN a greatly enhanced role in U.S. national security policy. Congress expressed its objections by refusing to commit additional money for such purposes. Congress also opposed measures to allocate part of the Defense budget for peacekeeping operations and blocked moves to create a new post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Democracy, which would also have had budgetary implications for Defense.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{38}\) Ryan Hendrickson suggests that the Republican leadership simply decided that it had other priorities and did not want to waste resources going up against a Democrat majority in the Senate in an effort to have the Bill debated. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars*, 61.

The Republicans also defeated an amendment to the *Defense Authorization Bill* that would have provided the Department of Defense with a thirty million dollar *Defense Response Fund* to cover the costs associated with deploying U.S. peacekeeping forces, responding to humanitarian disasters, and any other unforeseen large-scale action on short notice. Also defeated, was an amendment to the same bill that would have set aside ten million dollars to establish a peacekeeping command post and train peacekeepers from other states, and twenty three million to provide 'democracy' training for military personnel in emerging democracies.\(^\text{40}\)

It would not be accurate, however, to interpret this behaviour by Congress as representing an anti UN sentiment. All the measures put forward by the administration were aimed at gaining a secure source of funding for its expanded peacekeeping policy. The measures were all blocked by Congress, which at that point was still under Democrat control, could have been aimed only at preventing the administration from securing an independent source of funds. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the 'power of the purse' is one of the most powerful tools that Congress wields with regard to U.S. foreign policy. It is not surprising that Congress was not willing to relinquish this tool and lose its primary method of reining in the administration.

**Conclusion**

The final draft of the review was signed by Clinton at the beginning of May 1994 and became Presidential Decision Directive-25. On 5 May 1994, National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, and Lt. General Wesley Clark, Director for Srategic Plans and Policy for the Joints Chiefs of Staff, appeared before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, to explain PDD-25. Their presentations were not aimed at explaining how the UN’s role in U.S. foreign policy

\(^{40}\) H.R. 2401. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1994, and for other
had been expanded but instead focused on demonstrating how the new directive would make U.S. policy toward UN peace operations more cost effective, efficient, and selective.\(^{41}\)

All three senior officials emphasised that multilateral peace operations were only one of the foreign policy tools available to the U.S., and that they did not replace a strong system of alliances, or the traditional right of the U.S. to act unilaterally to defend its vital national interests. All three emphasised that U.S. troops would only participate in UN peace operations if such participation would serve vital U.S. national interests. Officials no longer claimed that the U.S. would take part in missions aimed at achieving objectives that were only of peripheral interest to the U.S. Wesley Clark, particularly, emphasised the administration’s policy of not relinquishing control of U.S. troops in operations where hostilities were likely.

These claims represented a dramatic turnaround in rhetoric when compared to the administration’s early claims that it intended to completely overhaul U.S. policy towards UN peace operations and place the organisation at the centre of its national security policy. PDD-25 fell far short of fulfilling the administration’s vision of the role of the UN in post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy as it was articulated during its first few months in office.\(^{42}\) Yet, in its broad historical context, and despite criticism to the contrary, PDD-25 signaled a significant change in U.S. policy toward UN-based multilateralism. For the first time ever, an administration had made it a policy to participate fully in UN peace operations under certain conditions.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{41}\) See also Warren Christopher, *Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, Washington, D.C., 23 February 1994.


\(^{43}\) Robert Gallucci suggested that many members of the administration considered PDD-25 to represent a significant ‘advance’ in policy because it opened up the possibility of full U.S. participation in UN peace operations. Robert Gallucci, *Interview with Author*, Washington, D.C., 11 May 1998.
The conditions placed on U.S. participation in UN peace operations through PDD-25 were effectively the same conditions that Casper Weinberger and, later, Colin Powell, had argued should be put in place for the use of U.S. military force in any context.\textsuperscript{44} If U.S. troops were to go into combat, they would go only to protect vital U.S. interests, with overwhelming force, an intention to win, clear political and military objectives, the support of the American people, and only as a last resort.

The final draft of PDD-25 reflected the Clinton administration's new-found realism in regard to the possibility for and benefits of UN-based multilateralism in the post-cold war world. Administration officials had learned, through practice, that many of their early beliefs and expectations were unsustainable.\textsuperscript{45} Most importantly, they recognised that operating through the UN multilateral framework did not necessarily reduce the costs and risks of pursuing humanitarian based interests to the point where they did not conflict with military security interests. This realisation dealt a significant blow to the administration's ambitions for the UN and also for its ambitions for the U.S. in the post-Cold War world.

By the time PDD-25 was signed by President Clinton, the administration had dropped all rhetoric in regard to U.S. participation in UN peace operations in any circumstances other than the defence of vital U.S. political and economic security interests. The administration had completely backed away from suggestions that the end of the Cold War had now made it possible for the U.S. to use its military force to promote U.S. value systems, or to promote a favourable international order. A threat to these latter interests would only lead to the use of force if the threat were so grave that this constituted a potential threat to vital political and economic interests.


Through PDD-25, the administration demonstrated that it had adopted a much more realistic set of expectations about the potential of UN-based multilateralism in the post-Cold War world. Through the directive the administration demonstrated: a more limited assessment of U.S. interests, a better understanding of the complexities of post-cold war conflict, a more realistic assessment of the limitations of multilateral peace operations, and a much clearer idea of the constraints associated with pursuing U.S. interests through the UN framework.  

A lot of what the administration had learned by the time PDD-25 was signed, was learned in Somalia. While the Clinton administration demonstrated caution in regard to the Bosnian crisis because of its potential impact on military security interests, this was not initially the case in regard to Somalia. Several administration officials, most notably Madeleine Albright, had been prepared to use Somalia as a testing ground for new theories about UN-based multilateralism before these theories had been explored fully within the rest of the administration and by experienced foreign policy advisers. As Barton Gellman pointed out in his September 1993 Washington Post article, the Somali operation would never have met the criteria laid down in PDD-25.

Through PDD-25, the administration codified a policy toward UN peace operations which essentially mirrored that of the previous Bush administration. Many of the most radical aspects of the administration’s proposals had been watered down during the very early stages of the process by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Departments of Defense and State. The military had, for example, very quickly vetoed proposals to create a Rapid Deployment Force and both the Departments of Defense and State had objected to the prospect of a ‘on-call ready unit.’

46 In October, Anthony Lake was quoted as describing the ideology underpinning the Clinton administration’s foreign policy as a form of ‘pragmatic Wilsonianism.’ Thomas Friedman, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Top Adviser Speaks Up,” New York Times, Sunday, 31 October 1993, 8.
By the time Congress engaged the review process the bulk of the most radical proposals had already been removed. Congress did not force the administration to alter any key aspects of the strategy any further although it did force the administration to be much clearer about how it would be operationalised. The influence of Congress was much greater with regard to budgetary questions. It played a key role in reining in the administration’s ambitions for the UN when it blocked efforts to create a source of funding for UN operations that would be independent of congressional oversight.

Given that Congress was at that point still dominated by the president’s own party, this bipartisan measure was more likely to be designed to protect the constitutional authority of the legislative body rather than to serve as a direct attack on the administration’s policies. This would be consistent with the assumption put forward in Chapter Three, that Congress will actively move to protect its own role in authorising the use of military force.

With regard to the question of whether partisan political issues are more prominent within long term debates over strategy, the Republican members of Congress did use the administration’s foreign policy to score political points. The Republican leadership did not follow through on the Peace Powers Act in early 1994 that was aimed at reining in the administration’s peacekeeping policies. This may not have been the case, however, if it had not been for the Democratic majority in both houses of Congress. The Republicans may have fought harder for the bill if they believed it had a chance of being passed.

In the end, key aspects of the Clinton administration’s review essentially represented a continuation of policies that had been set in motion by the previous Republican administration. This included the decision to support U.S. combat troop participation in UN peace operations and allow UN control over U.S. troops under certain circumstance. Both these policies had already been put into practice in the Persian
Gulf and Somalia, respectively, by the previous administration and both were the focus of its own review of UN peacekeeping.

The Clinton administration's more cautious and pragmatic approach to UN-based multilateralism, along with its narrower definition of the national interests that the U.S. would be willing to use force to defend, was reflected in its approach to the burgeoning civil crisis in Haiti. The following chapter will explore how the lessons learned in Somalia, not only by the administration but also by the military, shaped the U.S. response to the military coup in Haiti.
Chapter Ten

The Clinton Administration and Restoring Democracy in Haiti

Introduction
In July 1994, when the U.S. successfully moved UN Security Council Resolution 940, authorising ‘all necessary means’ to restore the democratically elected government of Haiti, it was a significant moment in U.S. history. It was the first time that the U.S. had sought international authorisation for the use of force in its own hemisphere. Of somewhat lesser historical import, it was also the first time the Clinton administration had taken PDD-25 out for a test run.

This chapter illustrates how the Clinton administration used the lessons it had learned in Somalia to manipulate the benefits of operating through the UN framework, while controlling and minimising the constraints, in an effort to reconcile conflicting U.S. national interests. It demonstrates how the administration used the UN framework in an attempt to reduce the costs and risks of militarily intervening in Haiti, to the point where it could justify this intervention in the absence of a high level threat to U.S. military or economic security interests. While the ongoing crisis in Haiti was not a threat to U.S. interests, President Clinton made the decision to intervene because his administration’s inability to resolve the crisis peacefully was becoming a threat to his administration’s domestic and international credibility. The Haiti issue was also
proving to be a major distraction for the president because it had his administration trapped between competing, and often very vocal, domestic critics.

As the situation in Haiti did not involve a high level military threat, it makes a useful case study for examining how domestic actors intervene in the executive decision making process. This is particularly the case with regard to Haiti because the debate over intervention was protracted and marked, for the most part, by a lack of presidential leadership and direction. As was put forward in Chapter Three, these are the conditions under which the intervening variables of Congress and the U.S. military leadership are most likely to influence foreign policy decision making.

The Bush Administration’s Response to the Crisis

On 16 December 1990, after a long period of foreign occupation, military dictatorships, and violent political instability, Roman Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti in the country’s first democratic election.\(^1\) Haiti’s first experiment with democracy was only short-lived, however, and eight months later President Aristide was overthrown by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras.

While Aristide had not been the preferred candidate of the U.S., the Bush administration moved quickly to condemn the military coup.\(^2\) The president moved just as quickly, however, to make it clear that while his administration strongly supported the democratisation process in Haiti, it would not be willing to use force either unilaterally or multilaterally to protect it.\(^3\) During the Cold War, the U.S. had

\(^1\) The validity of the election was upheld by the UN, the Organization of American States, and the Caribbean Community. UN involvement in the election was supported under General Assembly Resolution 45/3 of 10 October 1990.

\(^2\) The Bush administration had instead supported the more moderate presidential candidate Marc Bazin, who was later appointed to the position of Prime Minister by Aristide. See Morris Morley and Chris McGillon, “Disobedient” Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti,” Political Science Quarterly, 112, 3, Autumn 1997, 366.

\(^3\) The president noted that an exception would be if the lives of U.S. citizens were threatened. George Bush, News Conference, Washington, D.C., 4 October 1991.
held a keen interest in promoting stability in Haiti, even when this involved supporting the notoriously brutal Duvalier dictatorships, in an effort to contain Cuba and prevent the spread of communism. Once the Cold War ended, Haiti ceased to be of strategic interest.

In an approach that mirrored their initial response to the Bosnian conflict, Bush policymakers were content to let the regionally based Organization of American States (OAS) take the lead on the Haiti issue. At this early stage, the UN played only a background role and did not formally take up the Haitian issue because Security Council members viewed it as an internal state matter. In addition, Council members were sensitive to the concerns of Latin American member states in regard to the role of major powers in the region. They were also aware of the general sensitivity of developing countries to the possibility of a UN military intervention in the name of democracy and human rights.

Both the UN and the OAS condemned the coup on the day it took place. The OAS then passed a resolution calling on member states to freeze the financial assets of the Haitian state and impose a trade embargo on the country with only humanitarian exemptions. The organisation urged UN member states to do the same, and three days later this voluntary request was backed up by the UN General Assembly.

From the U.S. perspective, there were two key aspects to its response to the military coup; sanctions and refugees. The administration was a keen supporter of the OAS approach to resolving the Haiti crisis, which aimed to use diplomatic and economic

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6 See, for example, Bush, News Conference, 4 October 1991.
isolation to pressure the new military rulers into negotiating a return to democracy. The administration moved quickly to implement the OAS economic sanctions against the regime and then reinforced this with additional unilateral measures. The economic leg of the region’s efforts to put pressure on the de facto regime was put at risk, however, when the administration announced that it intended to offer a case by case exemption to U.S. owned Haitian manufacturing interests.9

At the time of the coup, approximately fifty U.S. manufacturing companies were operating in Haiti. These companies shipped materials and parts to Haiti where they were assembled into products that were then shipped back to the U.S. duty free.10 While critics slammed the exemption as pandering to U.S. business interests and the companies that employed cheap Haitian labour, the Bush administration justified the exemption on humanitarian grounds. State Department officials estimated that the forty thousand Haitians that worked within the manufacturing sector supported up to two hundred and fifty thousand dependants.11 Removing U.S. manufacturing as a source of income for the average Haitian, the administration argued, would make the sanctions less discriminating and only worsen local conditions.12

8 General Assembly Resolution 46/7, 11 October 1991.
For the administration, the manufacturing exemption was a win-win strategy. It could be justified on humanitarian grounds because it provided benefits to the average Haitian worker without benefiting the de facto regime (because profits returned to the U.S.), while at the same time protecting U.S. business interests. While this twin rationale was established under Bush it also appealed greatly to the Clinton administration, which continued with the case by case exemption right up until May 1994. By this time, the exemptions had essentially become a moot issue because domestic turmoil had disrupted the manufacturing sector to the point where it employed only ten percent of its pre-coup workforce.

The other key aspect of the U.S. response to the Haitian military coup, was the refugee issue. Again, the strategy that was initially adopted under President Bush was continued under Clinton. In the months immediately following the coup tens of thousands of Haitians began to flee increased levels of violence, particularly in Port-au-Prince, and set sail for the Florida coast. While the administration had already publicly recognised the dramatic increase in human rights abuses under the de facto regime, it refused to acknowledge that the large numbers of people arriving on its shores were the victims of political oppression. They were, instead, considered to be ‘economic migrants’ and were refused asylum in the U.S. and returned to Haiti. A Human Rights Watch report on the situation at the time, noted that senior administration officials simply stopped mentioning the human rights abuses that were occurring in Haiti once the refugee numbers began to escalate.

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Under the Bush administration, the U.S. response to the growing refugee crisis took place under the auspices of the 1981 Haitian Interdiction Agreement. Under this ‘aid for interdiction’ deal, the Haitian ruler agreed to repatriate all refugees that were forcibly returned to Haiti by U.S. Coast Guard officials after cursory interviews by immigration officials. In May 1992, in response to increasing refugee numbers and despite the U.S. District Court’s attempt to put a halt to forced repatriation, President Bush ordered that these asylum seekers be automatically returned without being properly interviewed.

**Enter the Clinton Administration**

This new policy of forced summary repatriation was roundly condemned by human rights groups and the media and also became one of Bill Clinton’s targets in the lead up to the 1992 presidential election. In a statement that would later come back to haunt him, Clinton announced in late May that if he became president he would drastically alter the U.S. policy towards Haitian asylum seekers.

... in the absence of clear and compelling evidence that they were not political refugees, I would give them temporary asylum here until we restored the elected government of Haiti. I would turn up the heat and try to restore the elected government and meanwhile let the refugees stay here.

These comments led many to believe that the Clinton administration, if elected, would take a more humanitarian value-based approach to the Haiti situation. This proved not to be the case, however, and by inauguration day the president was already being called upon to defend his decision to reverse his stated policy on

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refugees and continue with the forced summary repatriation practices of his predecessor.\textsuperscript{22} The new administration also deployed a flotilla of Coast Guard ships off the Haiti coast to dissuade the large group of would be asylum seekers, which had been encouraged by the president’s earlier statements, from setting sail for the U.S.\textsuperscript{23} Clinton attempted to justify his policy shift on humanitarian grounds. He argued that he had not wanted to take any action that would encourage thousands of Haitians to put their lives at risk by attempting the journey to the U.S. in unsafe vessels. The president also appealed to his constituents’ concerns about their nation’s own welfare when he pointed out that all the refugees were targeting south Florida, which was already a cash-strapped state with high unemployment rates.\textsuperscript{24}

In an effort to deflect criticism and to distinguish his policies from that of the previous administration, Clinton emphasised that he and his foreign policy team would be much more aggressive in their efforts to restore Haitian democracy.\textsuperscript{25} With this public pronouncement of the U.S. commitment to the speedy resolution of the crisis, President Clinton was not just linking his own credibility to the Haiti situation he was also, by association, putting U.S. credibility on the line.

Despite his very public declarations to the contrary, the new administration’s approach to the Haitian crisis was almost identical to that of the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{26} Throughout most of 1993, the Clinton administration continued the strategy of applying even handed pressure on both Aristide and the de facto

\textsuperscript{23} Bill Clinton, \textit{Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting}, Detroit, 10 February 1993; \textit{No Port in a Storm}, Americas Watch, 5.
\textsuperscript{25} Clinton, \textit{Town Hall Meeting}, 10 February 1993.
leadership in an effort to restore democracy, and also stability, to Haiti. This strategy involved presenting the de facto regime with a series of carrots and sticks aimed at drawing its leaders into negotiating a timetable for Aristide’s return, while at the same time pressuring Aristide to compromise. The carrots were the promise of amnesty and large amounts of international aid, including efforts to modernise the Haitian army. The sticks were the continual threat of more stringent sanctions.

Throughout its entire effort in Haiti, this strategy of engaging the Haitian military and attempting to draw it into any peace agreement under negotiation was in marked contrast to the administration’s approach elsewhere. In Somalia, key members of the Clinton administration had effectively ‘demonised’ General Aideed and, up until the deaths of the army Rangers in October, they refused to allow him to be part of any peace agreement. In a similar manichean approach to the conflict in Bosnia, the Clinton administration continually presented the Serbs as the aggressors and the Bosnian Muslims as the victims. Up until mid 1995, the administration refused to support any kind of peace deal that they believed would unfairly reward Serb aggression.

Initially, the main reason for this even handed approach to the Haiti crisis had been the desire of the U.S. military establishment to protect its ties with the local military. Many of the Haitian army’s senior officers had received their training in the U.S., and several senior U.S. officers believed that it was they, rather than the unpredictable and left-leaning Aristide, that held the key to lasting stability in Haiti.

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30 This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
By mid 1994, this even-handedness was also due to the Clinton administration’s more pragmatic approach to the resolution of messy post-Cold War civil conflicts. Even when administration officials were ready to admit that General Cedras and his colleagues would have to be removed from power in order to restore Aristide, they endeavoured to protect the stability of the Haitian armed forces. They recognised that the support of the army was crucial to any lasting solution to the country’s problems, and a commitment to strengthening and professionalising the army was included as a key component of the eventual peace settlement.

The problem with the administration’s ‘carrot and stick’ strategy, which made it not only ineffective but also morally questionable, was the fact that the ‘stick’ was only hitting the Haitian people and not the military dictatorship. If anything, there is much evidence to suggest that Raoul Cedras and his senior officers actually benefited financially from the sanctions because they controlled the black market that evolved based on the substantial sanction leaks.

As with the administration’s approach to the crisis in Bosnia, the Clinton administration highlighted its efforts to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Haitian people in an attempt to draw attention away from the lack of progress toward a lasting political solution. A key component of this effort was strong U.S. backing for the deployment of international human rights monitors in Haiti. The de facto regime had agreed to accept an OAS/UN team of civilian monitors, MICIVIH, during a visit of high level U.S. military officials to Port-au-Prince. Once their visitors


returned to Washington, however, the regime began putting conditions on the deployment, including the immediate lifting of sanctions.\textsuperscript{36} Despite these setbacks, a deal was brokered and announced to the public by UN and OAS officials on 9 February.\textsuperscript{37} In a move that set an unproductive pattern for future interactions the deal now included a partial lifting of the sanctions thus, in effect, rewarding the de facto regime for its earlier intransigence.\textsuperscript{38}

In March 1993, President Clinton appointed Lawrence Pezzullo as the new State Department adviser on Haiti.\textsuperscript{39} The new adviser believed strongly in the need for the U.S. to play a key role in professionalising the Haitian police force and supported the deployment of a five hundred-member international police presence along with MICIVIH. The UN, having had experience at deploying human rights monitors in the field, also recognised the need for some form of military presence to protect the civilian monitoring team and facilitate its work. Both the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Dante Caputo, and President Aristide were reluctant to endorse the prospect of a separate U.S. military deployment in accompaniment to the MICIVIH team. As a compromise, Caputo and Pezzullo reached an agreement that would see the U.S. deploy its troops within the framework of the overall UN operation and under the authority of the UN Special Envoy, but under a U.S. military commander.\textsuperscript{40}

The Clinton team accepted this compromise because it helped overcome potential international resistance to the U.S. deployment. It was consistent with the president’s overall concerns about opening the U.S. up to allegations that it was dictating policy in relation to its smaller neighbour, particularly given its history in this regard. The president had already made it clear publicly that his preference was for a multilateral

\textsuperscript{36} Malone, \textit{Decision-Making in the UN Security Council}, 79.
\textsuperscript{38} United Nations Focus, \textit{Crisis in Haiti: Seeking a Political Solution}, Department of Public Information, August 1993.
\textsuperscript{40} Ian Martin, "Mangled Multilateralism," \textit{Foreign Policy}, 95, Summer 1994, 76.
approach to the Haiti situation within the framework of existing UN and OAS efforts. The multilateral framework was considered to be even more important if, as the president already suspected, some form of international presence was going to be necessary to restore and maintain democracy. It is also significant that the modalities of the Haiti mission were established several months before the deaths of the U.S. rangers in Somalia. This meant that the mission was put together prior to the Somalia-induced congressional backlash against even the hint of a proposal to place U.S. troops under UN command and control.

While the compromise with both the de facto regime and the UN allowed the administration to claim that it was making some progress on the Haiti issue, this did not last long. Despite intense pressure from the U.S., the de facto regime announced in mid May that it would resist any attempts to deploy military force in Haiti. Rather than standing their ground, administration officials responded to this rebuff by announcing that they needed to rethink their strategy. Several weeks later the administration announced that it would begin sounding out its UN Security Council partners with regard to the possibility of making the voluntary OAS sanctions mandatory and universal. While this represented a concrete step forward, the delay in responding sent another powerful message to the de facto leaders regarding the administration’s lack of genuine resolve. It was also around this time that the administration’s credibility with regard to the Haitian issue started to come under scrutiny from the media.

While it was anticipated that there may be some objections within the Security Council, and among the Group of Latin American and Caribbean (GRULAC) states within the General Assembly, there was little real opposition among the UN

41 Bill Clinton, Interview with Southern Florida Media, Washington, D.C., 13 March 1993.
membership to the proposal for a sanctions resolution. On 16 June 1993, with strong support from the U.S., the Security Council, acting under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, voted to impose an oil and arms embargo against Haiti.

The threat of universal sanctions succeeded in gaining the attention of the de facto leaders and Cedras agreed, unconditionally, to meet for talks with Aristide. This meeting took place on Governor’s Island in New York harbour at the end of June. In an effort to signal new resolve and to encourage compromise by both parties, President Clinton announced a number of new carrots and sticks in the lead up to the negotiations. The administration’s strategy had the desired effect and resulted in the signing of the Governor’s Island Agreement on 3 July. The key elements of this agreement included the return of Aristide by the end of October, retirement and amnesty for coup leaders, the deployment of one thousand UN peacekeepers to help modernise and professionalise the army, and the immediate lifting of sanctions upon the nomination of a new prime minister by Aristide.

While administration officials presented the Governor’s Island Agreement as a significant positive step towards the restoration of democracy in Haiti, the democratically elected leader that they were trying to restore was far from

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45 Both China and Brazil had concerns about the wording of the resolution. China sought to see reflected in the resolution, the recognition that the Haiti crisis presented the international community with a unique situation and that the Council’s actions did not establish a new precedent in regard to its interference in the internal matters of states. Brazil was concerned about the use of the term ‘blockade’ within the resolution and other Council members agreed to have it removed from the draft text. Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, 85.


47 Immediately after the Security Council resolution was passed, he announced that he did not think that the sanctions strategy was going to succeed and that he thought that some form of multilateral peacekeeping force would be needed. Two days before the two parties were due to meet, he signed off on a multimillion-dollar reconstruction assistance package that included four million U.S. dollars for military training once Aristide was restored to power. Finally, two days into the negotiations, the president acted unilaterally to freeze the assets of supporters of the de facto regime. Bill Clinton, News Conference, Washington, D.C., 17 June 1993. Dee Dee Myers, Statement by the Press Secretary on Assistance to Haiti, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1993. Bill Clinton, Message to the Congress on Further Sanctions Against Haiti, Washington, D.C., 30 June 1993.
enthusiastic. Aristide was widely reported as having significant concerns regarding the terms of the new agreement, particularly with regard to the absence of a timetable for his return. Aristide was deeply sceptical that Cedras and his senior officers would abide by their commitment to his restoration once the sanctions had been lifted.  

These concerns did not dampen the administration's enthusiasm for the Governors Island Agreement. For a while at least, it seemed as though a workable solution had been reached and the heat was off the administration on the Haiti front. On 16 July the two parties signed a pact that committed them both to a six month truce and outlined the measures that would be taken to ensure Aristide's return. After a few delays, Aristide's nomination of Robert Malval for Prime Minister was ratified by the Haitian parliament and the UN Security Council voted to suspend economic sanctions. As a further sign of progress, at the end of August the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of an advanced unit of the UN force (UNMIH) to be deployed under the terms of the Governor's Island Agreement.

This new Security Council resolution noted that the Council was ready to withdraw the sanction suspension if the military regime failed to keep its commitments. The power to decide whether the de facto's were in breach of their agreements lay not with the Security Council, but with the UN Secretary-General based on advice from the OAS Secretary-General. In this respect, the Clinton administration had allowed the Secretary-General a significant element of control over U.S. policy. This demonstrates the high level of trust that, at that point, still existed between U.S. officials and the UN body and also reflects the absence of a high level U.S. military

security interest in the Haiti situation. Allowing the UN Secretary-General an autonomous element of control over U.S. policy did not cause the administration any problems in this instance because the Secretary-General deferred to U.S. decision makers. The administration was not so fortunate when it later found itself working under a similar arrangement in Bosnia-Herzegovina with regard to the authorisation of air strikes. 54

As time was drawing near for Aristide’s return, the administration’s policy with regard to Haiti gradually began to unravel. Various NGO and UN reports started to suggest that the de facto regime was unleashing a terror campaign in the lead up to Aristide’s return. 55 The level of human rights abuses being perpetrated on the civilian population, particularly in the capital, increased “exponentially” during this period. 56 As the situation in the Haitian capital deteriorated there was a corresponding increase in the number of refugees fleeing to the U.S. in search of asylum. The increase in refugees, along with the deteriorating human rights situation, put additional pressure on the administration to bring the crisis to a speedy conclusion.

In a further threat to the administration’s foreign policy credibility, the media began to report on the split that was opening up between key officials in regard to the nature

54 This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following case study chapter.
55 In what seemed like a deliberate effort to taunt the international community, supporters of the military regime dragged Antoine Izmery, a key Aristide ally, from a church in mid September and executed him in plain sight of human rights observers. The sheer blatancy of this act not only shocked international observers, it also sent a clear message to Aristide’s supporters, that MICIVIH could provide them with little protection. Martin, “Mangled Multilateralism,” 72.
of the U.S. military involvement in UNMIH.\textsuperscript{57} The defence establishment had concerns about the deployment on several levels, but mostly it objected to the possibility of putting lightly armed troops into an unpredictable and potentially hostile security environment.\textsuperscript{58} These fears were brought to a head in the week leading up to the UNMIH deployment when the tragic events in what was supposed to be a low-risk humanitarian mission in Somalia began to unfold. The Pentagon’s determination not to let the State Department send U.S. troops into Haiti without first establishing a robust set of rules for engagement, was strengthened as the extent of the U.S. losses in Somalia became clear.\textsuperscript{59}

With the administration already on the defensive because of events in Somalia, its efforts in Haiti were soon to be dealt another devastating blow. In an effort to contain the fallout, senior administration officials went out of their way to establish a clear line of distinction in the public’s mind between the U.S. involvement in the UN operation in Somalia and the planned involvement in Haiti.\textsuperscript{60} This task was made infinitely more difficult on 11 October, only one week after the horrific footage of


\textsuperscript{58} According the State department plan, the deployment was to consist of almost seven hundred lightly armed troops, mostly engineers, who would be involved in training the Haitian military in civic reconstruction. Warren Christopher, \textit{Statement on U.S. Response to Events in Haiti}, Washington, D.C., 11 October 1993. Defence planners were inherently adverse to any U.S. military deployment in Haiti given the negative impression left by the last U.S. intervention there. Many military officials were also reluctant to put U.S. lives at risk to restore Aristide to power because they did not believe that he was psychologically stable enough to bring lasting stability to Haiti. The Central Intelligence Agency released a report in October that described Aristide as a “murderous psychopath.” The report was later discredited. See, Mark Kehoe, “A History of Hard Feelings,” \textit{Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report}, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 52, 36, 17 September 1993, 2581; Sciolino, “Pentagon and State Dept. at Odds,” 86-87.

\textsuperscript{59} Partly, defence planners were inherently adverse to any U.S. military deployment in Haiti given the negative impression left by the last U.S. intervention there. Sciolino, “Pentagon and State Dept. at Odds,” 1 and Goshko and Lancaster, “White House Overrules Pentagon,” 1.

\textsuperscript{60} Warren Christopher, \textit{NBC News, Meet the Press}, NBC-TV, Washington, D.C., Screened Sunday, 10 October 1993.
young American troops being dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu had been plastered across U.S. television screens, when the U.S.S. Harlan County was prevented from docking in Port-au-Prince by an angry mob of protesters.

The Harlan County was carrying U.S. and Canadian troops for deployment in the UN mission in Haiti. When it was prevented from docking, it dropped anchor in plain view of the crowded port and waited for further instructions from Washington. This new stand-off with the de facto regime brought existing tensions among key members of the administration into heightened relief. In the end, President Clinton supported the Defense Department’s view that in the absence of a clear military contingency plan, the only solution to the immediate stand-off was for the Harlan County to withdraw and return to the U.S. On 14 October, without any consultation with the other key UN member states involved, or with the UN, the president ordered the Harlan County to withdraw.

The Harlan County incident was a significant embarrassment for President Clinton and his foreign policy team. This fresh defeat, when combined with the disaster in Somalia, the lack of progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the difficulties in navigating a workable path through the homosexuality in the military issue, represented a severe blow to the credibility of the new administration’s foreign policy team. It seemed to prove to his critics that the president was not capable of steering the U.S. down a coherent foreign policy path in the changed environment of the post-Cold War world.

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61 Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence, Walter Slocombe, is reported to have been highly vocal in his opposition to any form of U.S. military involvement in Haiti. His strong objections focused on the question of whether the U.S. should be acting at all to help Aristide. He was, he said, opposed to putting any U.S. lives at risk in order to restore a “psychopath” to power. Other key members of the administration, such as National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, responded angrily to the very public set back and made it clear that he now considered a military intervention to be on the table for discussion. Elaine Sciolino, et al., “Failure on Haiti: How U.S. Hopes Failed,” New York Times, Friday, 29 April 1994, 1 and Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Debate Over Risks Split Administration,” Washington Post, Sunday, 25 September 1994, 1. See also, Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, 335.

The incident also served as additional evidence, to many, that the new Democrat administration was placing too great an emphasis on the UN and UN peacekeeping within its foreign policy strategy. In this latter respect, the Harlan County incident added to the administration’s incentive to further tone down the language used in the PDD-25 document that was still in the process of redrafting. At the same time, the president strenuously reasserted the distinctions between the UN involvement in Haiti and its involvement in Somalia. As the president insisted, “[T]he Governor’s Island Agreement, which all the parties signed off on, invited the international community to come to Haiti … This is different from the other missions... This is not peacekeeping. This is not peacemaking.”

The Harlan County incident initiated a dramatic shift in the administration’s approach to the Haiti situation. The sight of a U.S. destroyer retreating in defeat from waters off the coast of Port-au-Prince was a dramatic attack on U.S. credibility to which the U.S. had to be seen to respond. The president quickly announced that the U.S. would be working towards a new UN enforcement resolution that would dramatically strengthen sanctions and increase the pressure on the de facto regime.

The decision to more forcefully engage the Haitian problem signalled that the administration understood it was no longer just its own credibility that was on the line, it was now the credibility of the U.S. that was being questioned. The president could not help but take note of this fact when he was forced to fend off media...

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65 In anticipation of this resolution, the president announced that he was deploying six destroyers off the coast of Haiti and putting an infantry company on standby at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. These troops were being put on standby, he said, to ensure that the U.S. could guarantee the safety of its citizens inside Haiti. Bill Clinton, News Conference, Washington, D.C., 15 October 1993. UN Security Council Resolution 875, 16 October 1993.
accusations that the backdown on Haiti, so soon after the decision to pull out of Somalia, was sending a message to the world that the U.S. was becoming weak.\textsuperscript{66}

From October 1993 to April 1994, the administration’s policy was in limbo. The date for Aristide’s negotiated return came and went with no sign of movement from the de facto regime. It was clear that the Governors Island Agreement was no longer viable, but the administration had nothing to replace it with. While the administration was rethinking its strategy on Haiti, and struggling to focus on other pressing international and domestic issues, senior officials attempted to remove Haiti from the Washington agenda.\textsuperscript{67} Unfortunately for the administration, the Haiti crisis was turning into the perfect focus for a lively, if not rancorous, domestic debate.

\textit{Congress is Divided}

The post-Harlan County stalemate between the de facto regime, and the U.S. and the UN, provided a pause that was filled by domestic debate over what should be done next. The absence of an administration strategy or clear presidential leadership also created a leadership vacuum that several domestic actors, including Congress, were happy to try to fill. To make matters even worse for the administration, the domestic debates with regard to the potential use of force in Haiti took place at exactly the same time that Congress was debating the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia and the final terms of PDD-25.

These debates took place at a time in which Congress was generally sensitive to the need for an active defence of its constitutional role in authorising the use of force, which many members felt, had been threatened in the original draft of the peacekeeping review. It was almost as if Congress, as a whole, wanted to make up for the mistake of not providing the type of active oversight that could, possibly, have


\textsuperscript{67} Warren Christopher, \textit{Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee}, 4 November 1993.
prevented the disaster in Somalia. If Congress had been too quick to abrogate its constitutional role and acquiesce to the Clinton team’s nation building strategy in Somalia, it was not planning to make the same mistake with regard to Haiti.

The congressional response to events in Haiti were intertwined with its response to the perceived failures of the administration in Somalia and also Bosnia-Herzegovina. Congressional members of both parties took the opportunity to vent their frustrations at the administration’s recent handling of its foreign policy challenges within the framework provided by the 1994 fiscal year defence appropriations debate. Primarily, congressional concerns centred on the possibility of the U.S. becoming militarily involved in another UN multilateral peace operation, whether it be in Bosnia or Haiti, on the basis of questionable national interests, and without the support of Congress. In this respect, several members of Congress used the defence appropriations debate to attempt to rein in the administration with regard to U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations and at the same time reassert its constitutional role in regard to war powers.68

The two Republican-led attempts to move binding amendments that would limit the president’s ability to deploy troops under a foreign (UN) command, and force him to seek congressional approval before deploying troops in Haiti, were defeated.69 In both instances the Republican vote was split evenly, while Democrats voted against the measure. In addition, both binding proposals were immediately replaced with jointly sponsored and widely supported non-binding amendments expressing the same

68 The move to rein in the president was headed by the Senate minority leader Bob Dole who had, in the past, been a strong critic of democratic efforts to ‘micromanage’ foreign policy under Reagan and Bush. Dole defended his push to place binding limits on the president’s authority to deploy troops in either Bosnia or Haiti without congressional approval, on the ground that this would later strengthen the president’s hand. Having the debate at this early stage, he said, would “...construct a political flak jacket to protect against congressional artillery once the deployment is made.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 51, 42, 23 October 1993, 2900.
69 Nickles Amendment, HR 3116, 19 October 1993 and Helms Amendment, HR 3116, 21 October 1993.
sentiments as the original Republican amendments. The bipartisan compromise on the non-binding amendments showed that while Congress as a whole was not willing to let the Haitian issue become the trigger for a showdown on the war powers issue, the majority of members from both parties were opposed to any kind of military intervention in Haiti.

While the majority of Congress opposed any form of military intervention in Haiti, there was a very vocal minority that supported a much tougher U.S. stance. This minority, led by the Congressional Black Caucus and joined by a number of prominent liberal Democrats, worked closely with Aristide to pressure the president to strengthen sanctions in order to put additional pressure on the de facto regime. The Caucus held influence over the administration for two key reasons. The forty members of the Black Caucus represented a sizeable enough Democratic voting bloc, that the president sought to keep it on side in an effort to protect his domestic agenda. In addition, some members of the Caucus sought to put additional pressure on the president by deliberately adding racial overtones to their criticism of the administration’s policies.

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72 Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars, 49.
At An Impasse

In the first few months of 1994 the administration attempted, with little success, to keep Haiti off the agenda. It was becoming increasingly clear that the economic sanctions were having little effect on the actions of Haiti’s military leaders while they were having a severely detrimental impact on the welfare of innocent civilians. Without stepping up sanctions, administration officials had to find some other way to bring the two parties to the negotiating table.

The majority of congressional members made it clear that while they wanted the president to do something to address the crisis in Haiti, this did not include the possible use of military force. The new year had opened with an unsuccessful Republican move to limit the president’s power to authorise U.S. participation in UN peace operations, and place U.S. troops under a UN commander, without the prior approval of Congress. By pushing the president to take action, but ruling out the use of military force, the Congress was leaving the president and his foreign policy team with few options.

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73 DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarianism, 96.
74 Helping to focus public attention on Haiti, was the fact that a number of prominent American celebrities took up the plight of the Haitian refugees and very publicly condemned the administration’s policies. “41 Arrested at Protest for Aristide,” San Francisco Chronicle, Tuesday, 16 March 1993, 5.
75 It is interesting to note that while all NGO’s agreed that the sanctions were having the greatest impact on the civilian population, most agreed that they represented the best chance, short of using force, of convincing the de facto government to leave power. See, for example, John Hammock, Executive Director, Oxfam America, Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., 8 March 1994 and David Rogers, Regional Manager for Latin America, CARE, Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., 8 March 1994.
76 The administration was reluctant to cede to pressure from Aristide to strengthen economic sanctions against Haiti because of concerns over the possibility of an NGO backlash.
78 Peace Powers Act of 1994, S.1803, United States Senate, 26 January 1994. Senator Dole also moved the equivalent amendments to the 1995 State Department Authorization Bill. The Peace Powers Act was never brought to the vote, and the amendments to the State Department Authorization Bill were defeated and replaced by non-binding amendments. For further detail, see Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars, 55-56.
At the UN, the membership was also split on the sanction issue and also on the question of the Haitian Parliament’s peace plan. Several GRULAC member states objected to the pressure that was being placed on Aristide to accept the new plan and they also questioned the efficacy of economic sanctions. Similarly, just as the U.S. was itself beginning to question the sanctions strategy, France began pushing for their strengthening. In a rebuff of its independent initiative, the U.S. blocked the French proposal for a new Security Council resolution aimed at strengthening sanctions, only to propose a number of similar initiatives just three months later.

By the end of March 1994, the only point of view for which a consensus could be said to exist, domestically or internationally, was that the administration’s existing policy was unsustainable. In March and April several key domestic groups made a concerted push to force the administration into changing its Haitian policy, particularly in relation to the forced summary repatriation of refugees. On 18 March, the Black Caucus sent a letter to the president stating that his administration’s policies should be scrapped because they were at best, ineffective, and at worst encouraging greater levels of torture and murder of innocent Haitians. The Caucus also demanded that the administration cease pressuring Aristide to accept a plan that he did not want. Further pressure was put on the administration when Aristide warned that he intended to use his authority as the legitimate political leader of Haiti to rescind the 1981 interdiction agreement that committed Haiti to accepting all returned asylum-seekers.

Also in April, six congressional members, including Senator Joseph Kennedy, were arrested for civil disobedience when they chained themselves to a White House fence

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80 For details, see Bill Clinton, Message to Congress on Additional Sanctions Against Haiti, Washington, D.C., 7 May 1994.
82 Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, 181.
in protest against the administration’s refugee policy. Additional pressure also emanated from Congress in the form of the Haitian Restoration of Democracy Act, introduced by Senators Dodd and Mosely Braun. This Act called, among other things, for stiffer sanctions against the regime and an end to the practice of forced summary repatriation.

What came to epitomise domestic resistance to the administration’s policy of force repatriation, for much of the American public and also the president himself, was the hunger strike of prominent anti-apartheid protester Randall Robinson. Robinson had begun his hunger strike on 12 April amid accusations that the administration’s refugee policy was cruel, discriminatory, and profoundly racist. Later in April, in an act that revealed the depth of the administration’s struggle to develop a coherent policy on Haiti, the president publicly expressed his sympathy with Robinson’s cause. Critics noted that the president acted as if he was completely removed, and had no influence over, his own administration’s policies.

The president’s comments reflected his frustration at not being able to reconcile compelling humanitarian concerns with other, more material, U.S. national interests. With no vital military security interests to warrant a military intervention, and no negotiated solution in sight, the administration was effectively stumped. As Warren Christopher admitted, as early as December the previous year, a peaceful solution would continue to elude policymakers as long as the military rulers remained in office.

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84 Also helping to focus public attention, was the fact that a number of prominent American celebrities took up the plight of the Haitian refugees and very publicly condemned the administration’s policies. “41 Arrested at Protest for Aristide,” 5.
86 Doherty, “President Broadly Criticized,” 1134-1135.
87 Sciolino, “Failure on Haiti,” 1.
A Major Policy Shift

In April 1994, Clinton caved in to domestic and international pressure and announced that his administration was conducting a review of its approach to the Haitian problem. The results of this review were revealed in early May, and they showed that the president had moved a very large step closer to the possibility of a military intervention. 89

The key aspects of the administration’s new policy came very close to the approach that had been advocated by the Black Caucus. 90 No longer would Clinton officials be placing pressure on Aristide to adopt what he considered to be an unacceptable deal with the de facto leaders. The new policy included a renewed diplomatic effort and a push to intensify UN sanctions, although the president warned that he was still wary of taking any measures that would worsen the situation for the average Haitians.

Another key measure announced by the president, was the decision to adjust the process of forced summary repatriation of asylum seekers. The president announced that the administration would no longer return potential refugees without assessing their asylum claims. When this threatened to generate a renewed influx of refugees, the president later announced that asylum seekers would be processed in neighbouring countries and not on U.S. soil. Despite this qualification, and much to the relief of the administration, this liberalisation of the repatriation process was enough to induce Randall Robinson to end his hunger strike.

89 The president outlined the key aspects of the changes in the administration’s policies in Bill Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Appointment of William H. Gray III as Special Adviser on Haiti, Washington, D.C., 8 May 1994.

90 Steven Holmes, “With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy,” New York Times, Tuesday, 14 July 1994, 10. The president also announced that William Gray III, the president of the United Negro College fund, would be replacing Lawrence Pezzullo who had resigned his position as the president’s adviser on Haiti nearly two weeks earlier.
The most important new policy shift announced by the president, was that the U.S. no longer considered it possible to restore stability and democracy to Haiti while the military coup leaders remained in office. In this regard, the president simply stated that he now recognised that Cedras and his senior military officials “had to go.” In a dramatic escalation of the security stakes, President Clinton also announced that he would no longer rule out any options in the U.S. quest to see Aristide restored to power.

*Military Planners Defer to the President*

In response to this announcement military planners in the Pentagon began to develop an intervention plan. One of the Defense Department’s own reports suggests that these preparations were put in motion even though many officials within both the civilian and military branches of the department remained extremely wary of the intervention option. While senior military planners were reported to be confident that the U.S. military could overcome Haiti’s defences relatively quickly and easily, their primary concern was what would happen after that. The *New York Times* quotes a senior intelligence official as stating, “The view of the intelligence community is unambiguous that restoring Aristide through military force would be a simple proposition, but withdrawing international forces quickly after that step would be extremely unlikely.” As another Pentagon official was later quoted, “It is not getting in that we are worried about, it is getting out.”

The Pentagon’s concerns regarding the possibility of a U.S.-led military intervention in Haiti were understandable given the recent events in Somalia. Under the Bush administration, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, had supported the U.S.-led military intervention in Somalia on the condition that the forces went in to perform a very specific, and limited, task with a clear timeline and exit strategy in

place. In early 1993, senior military officials had watched the newly elected Clinton administration and the newly appointed representative to the UN, Madeleine Albright, overturn all of these conditions and involve the military in a vague, open-ended, nation building operation in Somalia. In October that year, they also witnessed the disastrous consequences. It was not surprising then that senior defence officials were reluctant to go down the same path again.

No doubt, the military leadership’s eagerness to make an early start with planning for an intervention in Haiti was in part spurred by their desire to avoid some of the planning mistakes that had led to the disaster in Somalia. It is also interesting to note that senior military officials ceased commenting on the intervention debate as soon as the president made his announcement, while senior civilian officers continued to put forward alternative proposals. This is consistent with the assumption that as an intervening variable the military leadership will attempt to influence debate prior to a decision being made, but will defer to the executive once a decision has been reached.

**Congressional Concerns Increase**

While the senior military leadership took the May announcement as a signal to fall in line behind the Commander-in-Chief, Congress moved very quickly to show that it was not yet ready to defer to the president on his recent policy shift. Much of the discussion regarding Haiti took place within the framework of debate over the *National Defense Authorization Act*. On 24 May 1994, a ‘center-right, bipartisan coalition,’ led by Republican representative Porter Goss, moved a non-binding

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93 See also, discussion in Drew, *On the Edge*, 333.
94 Colonel Paul Hughes, Senior Military Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. attributes some of the difficulties experienced in Somalia to the haste with which the operation was planned. This was particularly the case with regard to command and control issues and the relationship between the UN and U.S.-led aspects of the mission. *Telephone Interview with the Author*, 17 September 2003.
95 For reports of the divisions within the administration see Elaine Sciolino, “Top U.S. Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti,” *New York Times*, Thursday, 4 August 1994, I. See also, Drew, *On the Edge*, 333.
amendment that required the president to seek the approval of Congress before embarking on an intervention in Haiti. While this amendment initially received strong bipartisan support, it was eventually defeated along party lines on the House floor.

These non-binding measures showed that there were still limits to the congressional effort to reassert its constitutional role in the war powers decision. It also showed, however, that while congressional members on both sides of the House were wary of stepping on the president's constitutional prerogatives, they were keen to influence the ongoing debate within the administration while they thought they still could.

**U.S. National Interests and the Decision to Use Force**

Once the president announced that he was no longer willing to rule out the possibility of using military force to restore democracy to Haiti, there was a marked change in the administration's public rhetoric. Between the May announcement and the September invasion, the president and his senior advisers gradually altered their public comments to reflect a greater level of U.S. national interest in seeing democracy restored to its small island neighbour. The way that they did this was to translate what they had initially referred to as general value-based humanitarian and international order interests, into much more specific and immediate material U.S. interests. The closer the administration got to a consensus on the use of force, the more specific and immediate these interests were depicted.

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98 In late June, in another attempt to head off the decision to use force, Republican representative Benjamin Gilman sent a letter to the president with one hundred and two signatures on it, requesting that he seek congressional authorisation before he commit to an intervention in Haiti. This letter was not a partisan republican effort to force the president's hand, so much as a non-partisan attempt to reassert a congressional role in the use of force decision. Representative Gilman had sent a similar letter to President Bush before he ordered the troop deployment in Somalia.
Aside from the president’s public commitment to bringing the crisis to a speedy end, the Clinton administration’s assessment of the Haiti crisis and its impact on U.S. national interests was essentially the same as the previous Republican administration. The Clinton administration viewed the crisis as having a negligible impact on U.S. military security and only a mild impact on its economic security interests. At most, the events in Haiti represented an affront to U.S. humanitarian value-based interests and a low-level threat to its international order interests.

The turmoil in Haiti represented an affront to U.S. value-based humanitarian interests because of the deteriorating human rights conditions and general welfare of the Haitian people. With regard to U.S. international order interests, the Haitian military coup frustrated the general U.S. goal of expanding and further entrenching the spread of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. The large number of refugees that were generated by the deteriorating human rights conditions in Haiti also threatened to generally destabilise the region.

The process of democratisation in the region was considered to be particularly important within the new Democrat administration because of its well-publicised liberal emphasis on the link between ‘democratic enlargement’ and the spread of peace and prosperity. The commitment to democratic enlargement served as a link between U.S. international order interests and its economic interests in Haiti. The administration deliberately emphasised this link within its public rhetoric in the immediate lead up to the U.S. intervention in an effort to elevate U.S. interest perceptions.

While an interest in restoring democracy to its small island neighbour was a contributing factor in the Clinton administration’s decision to use force, it was not the major factor. If it had been, it is unlikely that the administration would have linked

the restoration of democracy so closely to the restoration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. One of the reasons why Aristide was so deeply unpopular with the conservative body politic in the U.S. was his social democratic ideology and his stated ambition for large-scale wealth redistribution. He was so closely identified with a radically socialist political agenda that it is often rumoured the CIA gave, at the very least, its tacit support for his overthrow in the 1990 military coup. If the U.S. were to go to all the trouble of undertaking a military intervention to restore democracy in Haiti, surely policymakers would have manipulated events to ensure that it was a liberal democratic model that was to be reinstalled? On a more immediate level, in the lead up to the military intervention specific U.S. economic interests in Haiti were related to; the issue of development aid and humanitarian assistance, the costs of supporting and processing Haitian refugee applicants, the cost of mounting a multilateral intervention, and U.S. business interests in the local manufacturing sector. Both Bush and Clinton had found domestic political benefits could be gained from protecting Haiti’s manufacturing sector. Yet, in pure economic terms these economic interests were relatively minor given the limited amounts of money involved. This is particularly the case, when these figures are compared to the tens of millions of dollars in U.S. foreign assistance that had been pouring into Haiti each year for decades. In this respect, the efforts of

102 Morley and McGillon suggest that the Clinton administration set about “re-educating” Aristide in regard to his “leftist” policies, in an effort to make him more acceptable to Republican critics in the lead up to the U.S. intervention. Morley and McGillon, “Disobedient” Generals.
103 The cost of U.S. participation in and support for the Multinational Force and also UNMIH, up until the end of 1996 was estimated at one billion US dollars: approximately $300-600 million for UNMIH, $295 million for reconstruction assistance, and $200 million for migrant operations and sanctions enforcement. Report Enclosure, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., 13, 27, 28 September 1994, 96.
104 Prior to the military coup, total U.S. economic assistance to Haiti was averaging at approximately US$60 million annually in the year after the coup, this figure almost tripled to US$157.6 million. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants,
both administrations to protect the manufacturing sector were motivated more by a
desire to keep a group of domestic constituents happy, than a concern about how the
sector’s collapse might impact on the U.S. economy.

Overall, while the U.S. did have clear economic interests to protect in Haiti, these did
not represent a threat to U.S. economic security and they did not, by themselves,
justify a military intervention.

*Shifting U.S. Interests and the Move Towards the Use of Force*

Some critics of U.S. policy suggest that the only reason why the U.S. intervened
militarily to restore the democratically elected leader of Haiti, was the refugee
issue.\(^{105}\) They argue that, given its limited economic and military interests in Haiti,
the Clinton administration would have preferred to put Haiti on the back burner while
it focused on other, more pressing, issues such as Bosnia or the president’s domestic
agenda. This was even more so the case given the anti-UN sentiments that were
becoming increasingly prevalent in Congress along with a clear aversion to hazy
humanitarian missions.

It is true that the refugee issue served to link an abstract value-based interest in
protecting human rights and promoting democracy and the rule of law, with more
material U.S. national interests. In his address to the nation just prior to the
deployment of U.S. troops, the president highlighted the financial cost of enforcing
the economic embargo and supporting the refugees while their claims were being
processed. He also noted that the five percent of the population that was currently in
hiding inside Haiti, could well represent the next wave of refugees. He warned that
this represented the prospect of “millions and millions more being spent every month
for an indefinite period of time” unless the U.S. took action. In his speech the
president also pointed out that the continual arrival of Haitian refugees on the Florida

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coast represented a threat to U.S. military security interests because it threatened border security.\textsuperscript{106}

Yet, it is not simply the case that the Clinton administration was forced into addressing the Haitian crisis because it generated large numbers of U.S. bound refugees. What made Haiti, and the refugee issue in particular, an intractable problem for Clinton policymakers was that the domestic public and Congress were paying so much attention to it.

In an effort to promote a workable balance between competing national interests, the administration could have continued to promote U.S. value-based interests through increased humanitarian assistance and support for the international human rights monitors. Furthermore, in order to alleviate the economic burdens associated with processing the refugees and to secure U.S. borders, the administration could also have continued with the policy of in-Haiti refugee processing, maritime interdiction, and forced summary repatriation. As far at the administration was concerned, these policies would have represented an acceptable balance between competing national interests while the U.S. continued to work towards a negotiated solution to the crisis. The real problem for the administration was that it had been unable to continue with these policies in the face of mounting public pressure.

Heightened public scrutiny also meant that the administration was never able to put the Haiti issue on the back burner for very long. By mid 1994, the inability of the administration to bring the Haitian crisis to a conclusion was becoming, along with Somalia and the ongoing conflict in Bosnia, another blight on its foreign policy record. In addition, continued domestic debate not only served as a distraction to administration officials it also placed the administration at odds with a large Democrat voting bloc in Congress. The sooner the Clinton team could get Haiti off

\textsuperscript{105} See, for example, discussion in Stotzky, \textit{Silencing the Guns in Haiti}, 37.
\textsuperscript{106} Bill Clinton, \textit{Address to the Nation on Haiti}, Washington, D.C., 15 September 1994.
the agenda on Capital Hill, the sooner it could return the domestic economic agenda upon which it had been elected.\textsuperscript{107}

While the crisis itself was only of moderate interest to the U.S., the inability of the administration to resolve the crisis gradually became a serious threat to its credibility both domestically and internationally. The longer the crisis continued, the more vigorous became the questioning of the president's capacity to provide coherent foreign policy leadership in the post-Cold War environment. Every time the Clinton team stumbled in the face of the de facto regime's intransigence, this made the administration look weak and ineffectual. From an international perspective, this made the U.S. look weak, ineffectual, and unable to play a global, or even regional, leadership role.

By mid 1994, the pressure was building for some form of resolution to the Haitian crisis. In late June and early July 1994, even more disturbing reports started coming out of Haiti in regard to the level of politically motivated human rights abuses that were taking place. In addition, despite its efforts to more closely target sanctions at coup leaders, the administration was coming under increasing fire in regard to the impact of the economic sanctions on the welfare of innocent Haitian civilians.\textsuperscript{108} It was also becoming obvious that the administration's newly liberalised refugee policy was unsustainable as it was placing too great a strain on U.S. and regional resources.\textsuperscript{109} With no sustainable way to process the large numbers of refugees, the

\textsuperscript{107} See discussion in DiPrizio, \textit{Armed Humanitarianism}, 94-105.

\textsuperscript{108} For comments on how the administration was attempting to target coup leaders see Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, \textit{Statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs}, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., 20 October 1993 and Bill Clinton, \textit{NBC News, Meet the Press}, NBC-TV, Washington, D.C., Screened Sunday 7 November 1993. See also David Hendrickson, "The Recovery of Internationalism," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 73, 5, Sept/Oct 1994, 28-29.

\textsuperscript{109} After the administration caved in to domestic pressure and recommenced the processing of refugee claims, the U.S. enlisted support from neighbouring states and also UNHCR in an effort to process refugee claims. It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that this still was not sufficient to process the every increasing influx and these neighbours gradually began to protest against U.S. expectations of their continued assistance. Strobe Talbott, \textit{Address to an Ad Hoc Meeting of OAS Ministers}, Belem, Brazil, 6 June 1994. Dee Dee Myers, \textit{Statement by the Press Secretary}, Washington, D.C., 5 July 1994.
clock had started ticking on the administration’s Haiti policy as soon as the president caved in to domestic pressure and restarted the practice of processing refugees before returning them. As soon as the processing recommenced, a backlog began to develop and the number of refugees being housed in the processing centres escalated.

By the end of June it was clear that the situation in Haiti could not continue indefinitely. It was becoming equally clear, however, that the military regime was unlikely to leave office voluntarily. It was at this time that the U.S. made it clear that it was actively consulting with both the Friends and other states in the region, on the need to dramatically reconfigure the nature of the UN mission in Haiti.\(^{110}\) On 30 June the UN Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report to the Council on what sort of UN mission would be required to assist in the restoration of democracy in Haiti.\(^{111}\) The Secretary-General’s task was made even more urgent on 11 July, when the de facto regime expelled the UN human rights monitoring team, demanding that they leave the country within forty-eight hours.\(^{112}\)

On 15 July, the Secretary-General delivered a report that outlined three different possible options for the Council.\(^{113}\) Each option represented a variation of a two-stage plan that would include a large scale military operation to establish “a stable and secure environment,” followed by an expanded civilian-based operation that would restore the structures of democracy and implement the Governors Island Agreement. The first phase of the plan would require approximately fifteen thousand heavily armed troops and would need to be authorised under Chapter Seven of the Charter. The second phase would be implemented as soon as the environment was considered

\(^{110}\) A Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti, had been established as a ‘steering group’ for the international community’s response to the Haitian crisis. For the administration’s announcement of its intention to consult with the group see Talbott, *Ad Hoc Meeting of OAS Ministers*, 6 June 1994. Myers, *Statement by the Press Secretary*, 5 July 1994.


\(^{112}\) *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, 12 July 1994.

to be secure and would focus on, among other things, the professionalisation of the police force.

The first option put forward by the Secretary-General involved expanding the mandate of the existing UNMIH operation that would continue to act under the command and control of the UN Secretary-General and his special representative. The second option would be for the UN, at the request of the legitimate government, to adopt a new Chapter Seven resolution authorising a coalition of willing member states to conduct both phases of the operation. Under this proposal, the state or states leading the coalition would command and control the operation and would also be responsible for paying for it. Like Somalia, the UN-authorised, coalition-led, operation would not be financed under normal peacekeeping arrangements. The coalition would be responsible for up front financing and would then need to seek reimbursal through the voluntary donations of other states.

The Clinton administration favoured the third option put forward by the Secretary-General, which involved entrusting the two different phases of the operation to two different forces. The first, military enforcement, phase of the operation would be entrusted to a multinational coalition of the willing through a Chapter Seven Security Council resolution, and would be financed by the coalition. The second, reconstruction, phase would be entrusted to UNMIH under a revised Chapter Six resolution and would be financed under normal peacekeeping arrangements. With his experiences in Somalia firmly in mind, the Secretary-General emphasised in his report that, under this third option, it was crucial that the multinational coalition force not be withdrawn from Haiti until an agreement had been reached with the UN with regard to the specific timing and modalities.

On 31 July, acting under Chapter Seven of the Charter, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 940, authorising a multinational force under a unified command
to facilitate the departure of the military leadership in Haiti and restore the democratically elected leader to power. Three days later, President Clinton held a news conference to explain why the U.S. had put forward and supported the resolution, and why it had volunteered to lead the Phase One multinational enforcement operation.\textsuperscript{115}

The president worked hard, as he did throughout the period leading up to the September intervention, to justify the intervention within the framework provided by PDD-25.\textsuperscript{116} In doing so, the president was trying to make a clear distinction between the proposed operation in Haiti and the failed UN operation in Somalia. One of the ways in which the president attempted to establish this distinction, was by emphasising the specific negative impacts of the Haitian crisis on U.S. national interests, as opposed to the more abstract and general humanitarian interests that had been at stake in Somalia. He still emphasised the humanitarian impacts of the Haitian crisis and he made a particular effort to detail, often quite graphically, the atrocities that were being committed against women and children. But in contrast to Somalia, the president stated very clearly that this interest in the humanitarian conditions in Haiti was the result of its close proximity to the United States.\textsuperscript{117}

By mid 1994, Clinton’s senior officials, and Madeleine Albright in particular, had dropped almost all of the lofty value-based rhetoric about the role to be played by the U.S. in post-Cold War world. They were no longer espousing an expanded role for their country as the global defender of universal values in a newly liberalised world, nor were they prepared to advocate the use of force in defence of American values systems anywhere in the world. The U.S. would now only be prepared to defend these values if they were attacked close to home. It was only then that an attack on U.S. value systems would be likely to have a tangible flow on impact on more

\textsuperscript{116} The president couched much of his explanation within the specific terms of PDD-25 in Bill Clinton, \textit{Interview with Wire Service Reporters on Haiti}, Washington, D.C., 14 September 1994.
material U.S. national interests. In Haiti, it was the refugee issue that served to link the U.S. interest in protecting favourable value systems, such as a respect for human rights, with its more material need to defend its economic and military security interests.

Yet, even with the refugee flows taken into consideration the crisis in Haiti was more of an irritation rather than a threat to U.S. economic and military security. As such, the Clinton administration knew that it would have a difficult time justifying a military intervention to its domestic critics. The intervention would expose U.S. military security interests to a high level of risk in order to defend only minor national interests. In this respect, taking military action to protect limited and mostly value-based interests, would conflict with the more vital U.S. interest in avoiding any threats to its military security. In an effort to reduce the costs and risks of intervening in Haiti and, with the aim of reducing the level of conflict between conflicting national interests, the administration turned to the multilateral framework of the UN.

**Benefits and Disadvantages of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN**

The Clinton administration had both a pragmatic and an ideological interest in gaining the Security Council’s authorisation for the use of U.S. force in Haiti. The Clinton administration had a pragmatic material interest in sharing, as widely as possible, the costs and risks of intervening in Haiti. The administration also had a pragmatic interest in reducing the level of international resistance, particularly at the regional level, to the exercise of U.S. military force. Administration officials hoped that this resistance would be reduced if the U.S.-led intervention was authorised, and legitimised, by the UN Security Council. For senior Clinton officials, the need to have the Haiti operation legitimised through a Council resolution was particularly important because of their deeply held liberal ideas about the way the world operated. They had entered office with a clearly expressed ideological commitment to

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117 Ibid.
strengthening the role played by the UN in the post-Cold War world in the hope that this would lead to a greater level of global peace, stability, and prosperity.

**Burden Sharing Within the UN Framework**

There were two ways in which operating through the UN framework helped the U.S. achieve a greater level of burden sharing with regard to the Haiti operation. As in the Persian Gulf and Somalia, the UN provided U.S. policymakers with a ready-made formal global multilateral framework through which they could solicit a much wider level of support. More importantly, the administration was able to split the intervention into two sections, and only take responsibility for the section that had a direct impact on U.S. national interests. In this respect, policymakers not only used the formal UN framework to facilitate burden sharing, they used it to facilitate a division of labour between the UN and the U.S. based not only on a relatively narrow assessment of U.S. interests, but also respective operational strengths.

By dividing the mission into two phases, the U.S. was able to place a clear, formal, boundary on its level of commitment and ensure that it did not escalate beyond a level that could be justified by its limited interests. In this manner, policymakers were able to prevent the U.S. commitment from unintentionally escalating in Haiti in the same way it had in Somalia. The administration was determined to ensure that the U.S. role in Haiti would be brief and limited only to returning Aristide to power and restoring immediate law and order. This was the minimum action that was needed to put a halt to the high level of human rights abuses and resulting refugee flows, and it was the minimum the administration needed to do to remove Haiti from public scrutiny and debate.

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Somalia had also taught the Clinton foreign policy team how important it was to maintain a clear line of distinction between the Chapter Seven and Chapter Six elements of a multilateral peace operation. It is not possible, as Madeleine Albright once claimed, to ‘fuse’ the two types of operations within the one mission.\textsuperscript{119} The two different types of operations depend upon entirely distinct doctrines and rules of engagement. The success of a military enforcement operation depends upon the willingness to use overwhelming military force against an identified enemy and in the pursuit of a clearly defined political objective. The success of a peacekeeping or peace building operation under Chapter VI of the UN Charter involves a myriad of civilian and military tasks, requires the acquiescence, if not support, of the combatants and depends upon the impartiality of the multinational forces.

In Haiti, a clear line of distinction between the two types of operations was achieved by dividing up the mission in terms of time frame and responsibility. As the UN had demonstrated in Somalia that it possessed very little capacity for large-scale military operations, it was the U.S. military that was to be responsible for the enforcement phase of the operation. This was the type of mission the U.S. military was best at, and for which it was uniquely trained. Once this mission was complete almost all U.S. combat troops would leave and the UN would take over and do what it was best at, which was the more complicated process of peace building and strengthening the institutions of democracy.\textsuperscript{120} The president deliberately reminded reporters that Haiti was not going to be another Somalia when he told them just prior to the invasion that


\textsuperscript{120} It was envisaged that the UN take over mission, UNMIH, would consist of approximately six thousand troops of which no more than half would be from the U.S., and not all of these would be combat troops. Strobe Talbott, \textit{Statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs}, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., 13, 27, 28 September 1994.
the U.S. was "... not responsible in any way, shape, or form for rebuilding Haiti. This is not a nation building operation. It is not a traditional peacekeeping operation."\textsuperscript{121}

The Haiti mission provided the military with an opportunity to apply many of the lessons that had been learned through the mistakes made in Somalia. Unlike UNOSOM II, for example, the U.S.-led intervention was to be conducted along the lines of the military leadership's preferred "Weinberger-Powell" doctrine.\textsuperscript{122} The U.S. military would also be going in to Haiti knowing that they had a clear 'exit strategy' in the form of the hand over back to UN control. Again, in a further effort to avoid the mistakes made in Somalia, both the UN and the U.S. went to great lengths to make sure that the UN would be ready when it came time to make this hand over. To this end, representatives from UNMIH were deployed in Haiti only days after the U.S.-led mission began. Their role was to work with the U.S.-led mission in order to begin planning for a smooth transition back to UN control.

Somalia had also taught the military the importance of a clear and unified command structure. While the operation in Haiti was authorised by the UN Security Council, the Council did not exercise any control over the operation. David Malone, who was the Canadian delegate to the UN at the time, suggests that the U.S. was guaranteed complete command and control over the enforcement mission in a deal worked out with the UN Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{123} He suggests that the initial U.S. preference had been for a UN enforcement mission, rather than a UN authorised, U.S.-led, mission. The Clinton team preferred this option because they thought it would make it easier to solicit force contributions from other states. The Secretary-General objected to such a mission on the grounds that UN peace operations, by convention, never

\textsuperscript{121} Clinton, \textit{Interview with Wire Service Reporters}, 4 September 1994. For similar comments see also Clinton, \textit{Address to the Nation on Haiti}, 15 September 1994; Bill Clinton, \textit{The President's Radio Address}, Washington, D.C., 17 September 1994.

\textsuperscript{122} That is, the U.S.-led phase would involve a massive deployment of military force aimed at immediately wiping out, if not completely deterring, any potential resistance. The intervention would also be aimed at achieving a clear, limited, and specific military objective.

included more than thirty percent of troops from a single member state. As a compromise the U.S. agreed to head a UN authorised multinational enforcement mission, on the condition that it retained complete command and control of that mission.

That Clinton’s policymakers demanded complete military command and operational control over the U.S.-led enforcement operation is consistent with the assumption that the U.S. will demonstrate little flexibility on the question of U.S. leadership of a collective action when its military security is at stake. Their willingness to pass the mission back to UN command and control once the enforcement operation was complete could also have been predicted because the need for U.S. leadership is not so great when these interests are not perceived to be at stake.

Haiti also presented the UN with an opportunity to apply some of the lessons learned in Somalia. The U.S., as the leader of the Haiti multinational force, had unequivocal control over the enforcement operation except for one detail. This was the matter of timing with regard to the ending of phase one of the operation and the transition back to UN control. It was up to the UN Security Council to determine the timing of the transition, “taking into account recommendations made by the Member States of the multinational forces, which are based on the assessment of the commander of the multinational force, and the Secretary-General.”

Boutros-Ghali believed that a large part of the reason for the failure of UNOSOM II had been the U.S. insistence on ending UNITAF, and returning the mission back to the UN before it was fully prepared. It is not surprising then, that he insisted that he and the Security Council retain a role in determining the timing of the Haiti transition, and that it was not left solely to the U.S. That senior Clinton officials were

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124 The two key issues to be determined were whether a secure and stable environment had been established, and whether UNMIH had a sufficient force capability and structure to assume the full range of its functions.

willing to accept the Secretary-General playing such a role demonstrated their confidence in being able to ensure that the UN mission was adequately prepared for a speedy transition. More importantly, it also demonstrated their confidence in the Council’s continued deference to U.S. leadership with regard to the Haiti mission. Their confidence was not ill placed, and the Security Council voted on 30 January 1995 to return the mission to full UN control by 31 March.125

The UN Security Council and the Quest for International Legitimacy

Resolution 940 marked a significant watershed in international relations because it was the first time the U.S. had sought UN authorisation for the use of force in its own hemisphere. Less than ten years earlier, the U.S. had undertaken two separate military interventions, in Grenada and Panama, without a second glance at the Security Council. The U.S. had, in fact, been forced to use its veto to vote down Council resolutions condemning the actions. As David Malone points out, however, despite its significance the Haiti resolution received little attention either in the Council or elsewhere:

... in part because it was perceived as a logical (if debatable) step following the failure of more traditional methods in Haiti, because of limited international interest in the fate of this small country, because other issues claimed more international media coverage, and because significant casualties against the ragtag Haitian military were not anticipated.127

This lack of interest in Haiti within the Council was key in providing the Clinton administration with an easy run with regard to the use of force resolution.128 The situation in Haiti was viewed as being clearly within the traditional sphere of U.S.

127 Sebastian Einsiedel agrees that the Haiti use of force resolution had a relatively ‘easy time’ in the Security Council and also suggests that Council members were much more interested in the precedence that they might be setting, than in any specific issues relating to Haiti. Sebastian Einsiedel, Senior Researcher, International Peace Academy, Canada, Email Correspondence with Author, December 2003.
interest and influence and, at the same time, it was of little strategic interest to other Council members. In this respect, there were few objections among Council members in regard to the clear exercise of U.S. leadership in regard to the Haiti issue.

Additionally, all the Council members shared a value-based humanitarian interest in the welfare of innocent Haitians and for that reason they were keen, as they had been in Somalia, to see the country’s crisis brought to a speedy conclusion. In this regard, even China, which abstained from voting on the use of force resolution, expressed its sympathy with the objectives of the resolution, even while it noted its objections to its methods.129

An additional factor that may have influenced the voting pattern of key Council members such as Russia and France, was an aversion to the prospect of reining a major power within its own sphere of influence.130 There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that Russia, France, and the U.S. made a reciprocal ‘backroom’ deal to support each others’ attempt to gain a Security Council resolution authorising their actions in their own backyards.131 Under such a deal, Russia agreed to support the U.S. backed resolution authorising the use of force in Haiti in return for U.S. support on the Russian backed resolutions authorising Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping missions in Georgia and Tajikistan. France apparently made a similar deal with both Russia and the U.S. in return for their support for Operation Turquoise in Rwanda.

The administration officials interviewed for this study denied that any formal understanding was reached between the U.S., France and Russia.132 Just prior to the September intervention, however, President Clinton specifically used the U.S.

support for Russian peacekeeping activities in Georgia as part of his justification for the U.S. role with regard to Haiti.\footnote{Clinton, \textit{Interview with Wire Service Reporters}, 14 September 1994.}

In a more explicit demonstration of the principle of reciprocity, the U.S. did agree, at Russian insistence, to let its enforcement operation be monitored by UN observers who would report back directly to the Security Council. The Council had forced the Russians to accept a similar monitoring group when the UN had authorised the CIS led peacekeeping mission in Georgia a few weeks earlier.\footnote{Julia Preston, "U.N. Authorizes Invasion of Haiti: Resolution Adds Pressure on Generals," \textit{Washington Post}, Monday, 1 August 1994, 1.}

\textbf{The UN Security Council and the Quest for Regional Legitimacy}

The administration had hoped that Resolution 940 would help it overcome regional opposition to the U.S. intervention in Haiti.\footnote{Haass, \textit{Interview with Author}, 1998.} Argentina and Brazil were the only two South American states sitting on the Security Council when the Haiti resolution was debated. Argentina voted in support of the resolution, while Brazil abstained. In its statement prior to the Council vote, Brazil noted that there was no consensus within the Latin American and Caribbean region in regard to the proposed use of force in Haiti.\footnote{Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, \textit{Address to the United Nations Security Council}, New York, 31 July 1994, S/PV.3413} Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela, all sought leave to address the Council during the debate and they expressed deep objections to the prospect of a U.S.-led intervention. The Mexican delegate, Flores Olea, perhaps best encapsulated the reasons behind the growing concern in the region when he noted that:

\begin{quote}
... we must not forget that history – from which we still have much to learn – has shown that military intervention in our hemisphere has invariably been traumatic; it has desolated cities, harmed and demoralized civilians, aroused historical resentment and, despite its high cost, not necessarily attained its objectives.\footnote{Flores Olea, \textit{Address to the United Nations Security Council}, New York, 31 July 1994, S/PV.3413} 
\end{quote}
Resolution 940, technically, provided the Clinton administration the international legitimacy it was looking for. Yet, the obvious lack of Latin American and Caribbean support for the resolution only served to highlight the lack of perceived legitimacy at the regional level. The president and his senior foreign policy team had made it clear from the outset that they did not want the U.S. to be accused of throwing its weight around in the region in relation to the Haitian issue. The administration had made sure that the OAS was alongside the UN in every step leading up to, but stopping short of, the authorisation of the use of force.\textsuperscript{138}

Immediately after the Security Council debate, Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, headed to the region to try to lobby for its support.\textsuperscript{139} One of his first actions was to participate in a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) meeting so that he could lobby its representatives. While he was successful in gaining the endorsement of this regional organisation it offered the administration little regional legitimacy because CARICOM is a trade grouping that has little involvement in regional security issues. Still, the administration went to great lengths to obtain this regional political endorsement and, not surprisingly, it featured prominently in many official speeches from that point on.

The importance that the administration placed on gaining the seal of approval from a regional organisation, even though it already had authorisation from the UN Security Council, is significant. It shows that senior administration officials recognised that the UN Security Council was not the sole multilateral source of international legitimacy. In this respect, it is an important step in the process through which officials began to separate their conceptions of the U.S. interest in UN-based

\textsuperscript{138} On 9 June 1994, at an Ad Hoc Meeting on Haiti of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OAS, the organisation had unanimously adopted a resolution calling on all member states to support measures by the UN to strengthen UNMIH, but this resolution stopped short of explicitly authorising the use of force. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation in Haiti 1995, Washington, D.C., MRE/RES.6/94

\textsuperscript{139} Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars, 57.
multilateralism, and its interest in multilateralism as a more general ordering principle of international action.

Congress and the Use of Force
While some in the administration may have hoped that gaining international and regional authorisation for the use of force in Haiti might have helped reduce the level of opposition in Congress, they were mistaken. If anything, the administration’s efforts to seek global and regional endorsement made some members of Congress even more hostile. Some members wanted to know why Congress was being left out of the loop on Haiti when their president had sought “guidance and permission” from just about everyone else. Republican Representative Henry Hyde went so far as to accuse the administration of deliberately attempting to make Congress subordinate to the United Nations.

After Resolution 940 was passed, even the congressional members from the president’s own party moved quickly to remind him that “UN approval has nothing to do with USA approval” and that he still needed to seek congressional authorisation for the Haiti intervention. Democrat Representative Robert Torricelli, also sought to warn the president there was not a “geographical, philosophical, or partisan constituency in the United States Congress for an invasion of Haiti.”

140 Haass, Interview with Author, 1998.
141 Throughout June and into August, the Senate voted three times to ‘kill’ amendments to ongoing appropriations bills that would place binding limits on the president’s freedom to deploy force in Haiti. On 29 June 1994 the Senate rejected, 34-65, an amendment that would have required Clinton to seek congressional authorisation before invading Haiti unless it was protecting vital national interests. It voted to kill a similar amendment, 57-42, on 14 July, and then again, 63-31, on 5 August. For further details see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 52, Supplement No. 35, 10 September 1994, 68-69.
144 Jim Cooper, Congressional Record, 140, 112, 12 August 1994, H8044.
When the issue came to a head, just days before the scheduled intervention, the Democratic leadership on the Hill stalled the effort to limit the president’s freedom to deploy troops. Then, before the will of Congress could be fully tested, the president ordered the invasion to begin. This led some Republican critics to suggest that the timing of the invasion had been determined by President Clinton’s desire to head off any binding congressional effort to prevent it.\textsuperscript{146} Given that no U.S. military security interests were at stake in Haiti, it is possible that had the Republicans held the majority in Congress they would have moved to block the deployment. As it was, however, the Democrats still held the majority and both parties knew that they would not let their president be fettered regardless of any concerns they might have about the deployment.\textsuperscript{147}

**Avoiding Invasion**

On 15 September 1994, President Clinton addressed the nation on the Haiti issue. He said after three years of trying “every possible way to restore Haiti’s democratic government peacefully,” the international community had had enough and was now prepared to use force to remove the de facto regime. In his speech, the president again attempted to couch his explanation in the terms provided by PDD-25. He was willing to admit, however, that one key criterion outlined in the decision directive was missing. That is, the president acknowledged that the decision for the U.S. to lead a military intervention in Haiti was not popular with Congress or the majority of the American people. In an effort to allay domestic concerns, the president agreed that the U.S. should not try to be “the world’s policeman” but argued that it did have a clear responsibility to act when events so close to home clearly affected its national interests.

Beyond the human rights violations, the immigration problems, the importance democracy, the United States also has strong interests in not

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid. 2580.
\textsuperscript{147} Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars*, 65-67.
letting dictators, especially in our own region, break their word to the United States and the United Nations. In the post-cold war world, we will assure the security and prosperity of the United States with our military strength, our economic power, our constant efforts to promote peace and growth. But when our national security interests are threatened, we will use diplomacy when possible and force when necessary.\textsuperscript{148}

The president also demonstrated his continued wish to avoid the use of military force if at all possible. Through his address to the nation, President Clinton told the de facto leaders that it was not too late, that they still had time to leave and “reduce the chaos and disorder, increase the security, the stability, and the safety” in which the transfer back to democracy would occur. Then, in an effort to assure the de facto leaders of U.S. resolve, the president issued them with an unequivocal ultimatum: “Your time is up. Leave now, or we will force you from power.”

At the same time that the president was announcing his preparedness to use military force in order to restore democracy to Haiti, he was putting the finishing touches to the administration’s final effort to avert such an action. On 17 September, the president announced that he had sent a team of representatives to Haiti in a last ditched effort to convince the Haitian rulers to relinquish control peacefully. This three-man team included Colin Powell, the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sam Nunn, the Chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, and former Democrat President Jimmy Carter.

The composition of the team, which included two military heavy weights in Powell and Nunn, along with a former Cedras supporter in Carter, guaranteed it the strongest possible chance of reaching a deal with the Haitian military leaders. Just as importantly, however, the inclusion of a senior military figure, a congressional leader, and a former liberal Democrat president was no doubt designed to minimise domestic criticism in case the mission failed. In the end, the mission was successful and in an unambiguous example of ‘diplomacy backed by force,’ Raoul Cedras and his

\textsuperscript{148} Clinton, \textit{Address to the Nation on Haiti}, 15 September 1994.
deputies agreed to step down from power peacefully when they learned that sixty-one planes from the 82nd Airborne had already left Fort Bragg and were on their way to Haiti.149 A few days later, on 19 September 1994, 15 000 U.S. troops invaded Haiti with 'close co-operation' from the de facto regime.150

**Conclusion**

While several critics suggest that if the success of the UN authorised, U.S.-led, operation in Haiti operation were to be measured in terms of its stated objectives of restoring democracy and ending repression, it would be considered a resounding failure.151 From the Clinton administration’s perspective, however, the mission was a resounding success.

In adopting the Secretary-General’s plan for a two-phased mission in Haiti, the Clinton administration was adopting a model of UN-based multilateralism similar to that of its predecessor. This model was essentially the same operational model that had originally been proposed by the Bush administration with regard to Somalia. The aim of UNITAF model had been to limit the U.S. involvement to a very specific military mission with a clear goal and identifiable end point. The administration had been particularly careful to leave the ‘nation building’ operation, with complicated and contradictory objectives and no clear end point, to the United Nations. In this respect, the two-phase model of UN-based multilateralism proved to be beneficial not just because it facilitated a greater level of burden sharing. It was also highly beneficial because it allowed a division of labour between the U.S. and the UN-based on their respective competencies and in keeping with their vested interests.

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150 Nearly all U.S. combat troops were withdrawn by 31 March 1995 and the remaining troops, mostly army engineers, were out by February 1996. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions*, 187-189.

Operating within the formal UN framework in Haiti was particularly beneficial for the U.S. because it was able to exercise clear leadership within the framework and minimise its potential to constrain its freedom of action. U.S. leadership was considered to be legitimate by other Council members in this instance because they had no significant military or economic security interests at stake in Haiti. In addition, Council members shared with the U.S., a genuine humanitarian interest in bringing the crisis to an end. Because of its clear leadership role, and because of these shared interests, it was unlikely that the Security Council would represent an unacceptable constraint on U.S. policy freedom.

To make sure that the UN would not impose a threat on the U.S. freedom of action, policymakers sought a one off Security Council resolution authorising the U.S.-led intervention and then made sure that they retained completed command and control of that intervention. In this way, they could guarantee that the Council would pose little threat to the U.S. freedom of action in Haiti even if a conflict of interest later developed among Council members. By gaining the international legitimacy of a UN Security Council resolution, while retaining almost complete operational autonomy and leadership, the administration succeeded in maximising the benefits of operating within the UN framework, while minimising the associated constraints.

While the Bush administration had been wary about operating under the direct authority of the UN Security Council in the Persian Gulf, the Clinton administration had not been so cautious with regard to Somalia. By using the Haiti situation as an opportunity to apply the lessons learned in Somalia, the administration began to get a much clearer understanding of how the benefits and constraints of operating through the formal UN framework were different to those associated with operating within a less formal multilateral framework. These differences became even more evident to Clinton’s foreign policy team as they struggled to deal with the ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This struggle will be explored in detail throughout the following chapter.
Chapter Eleven

The Clinton Administration and the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Introduction

As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton had successfully used the lack of U.S. leadership on Bosnia-Herzegovina to criticise President Bush. He suggested that if he were elected he would take more forceful action to halt the violence in Bosnia and that he would make the U.S. serve as a ‘catalyst for a collective stand against [Serb] aggression.' The U.S., he argued, had “a moral obligation to try to stop the violence despite the risks.”

On entering office the Clinton administration ranked the conflict in Bosnia as its most pressing foreign policy issue and one its first foreign policy acts was to order an inter-agency review of U.S. policy. Despite the president’s comments in the lead up to the

election, this inter-agency review generated no significant change in policy. After considering the costs and risks of various courses of action in Bosnia and their potential impact on a range of U.S. national interests, the Clinton administration embarked upon a policy that essentially shared the same core objectives as the previous Bush administration. These three core objectives were to alleviate humanitarian suffering as much as possible, while at the same time maintaining the multilateral framework of action and avoiding U.S. leadership, and making sure that no U.S. troops were deployed on the ground.

Key to achieving all three of these goals was the retention of the UN multilateral framework of action which allowed the administration to separate its efforts to defend value-based humanitarian interests from its efforts to protect U.S. military security. As policy maker's perceptions of the U.S. interests at stake in Bosnia altered throughout 1994 and into 1995, so too did their expectations regarding the potential benefits of continuing to operate within the UN framework. Their views were influenced greatly by the growing potential of the Bosnian war to become a direct threat to U.S. military interests. The situation in the Balkans was also beginning to place the U.S. in conflict with its NATO allies, and the administration itself, in conflict with a Republican dominated Congress.

This chapter explores the process through which senior administration officials struggled to find a balance between conflicting value-based and military security interests in Bosnia. This whole process was shaped continually by events on the

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ground in combination with changes in the international and domestic political environments. The process was also shaped by a growing awareness that while the UN represented a useful framework of action if the U.S. wanted to avoid taking decisive action in Bosnia, it would not be useful if the U.S. did intend to undertake such action. This awareness was reflected in the administration’s shift away from the UN toward alternative frameworks of action that could provide the two conditions necessary to make any given multilateral framework beneficial, that is, genuinely shared interests and clear U.S. leadership.

This chapter will also be used to test some of the assumptions put forward in Chapter Three about how flexible decision-makers will be with regard to the need for U.S. leadership and unilateral control over the use of force when different national interests are at stake. It was put forward in Chapter Three that decision-makers will be much more flexible on the issue of U.S. leadership and control when value-based interests are threatened but no military security issues are involved. This flexibility will reduce dramatically as the level of threat to U.S. military security interests increases. This case study will illustrate how U.S. policymakers reacted to escalating military security threats in Bosnia by gradually casting off the very multilateral constraints that they had actively sought when only value-based interests were at stake.

Vance-Owen Peace Plan

One of the first actions required by the administration upon entering office in January 1993 was a decision on whether to support the most recent diplomatic initiative of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.  


7 On 24 July 1992, the Security Council invited the EC in co-operation with the UN Secretary-General to examine the possibility of broadening the EC’s ‘Conference on Yugoslavia’. The ‘International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia’ (IFCY) was convened in London on 26-28 August 1992. See
within a weak centralised government. Under the plan, the Bosnian Serbs would hold a majority in provinces covering 43% of the total land area in the former republic while the Bosnian Muslims would hold only 30%.  

The Clinton administration signalled very early that it was dissatisfied with the Vance-Owen plan on the grounds that it was unworkable, would place the Bosnian Muslims permanently at a disadvantage, and would reward Serb aggression. The administration also questioned the general desirability of partition as a solution to the Bosnian problem and suggested that it would only serve to deepen ethnic divisions among the Bosnian people. According to assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Robert Gallucci, the Vance-Owen plan would have served to legitimate the ethnic cleansing that had taken place when many administration officials were still hoping to reverse it. Many officials also reckoned that there was no point focusing resources on promoting a plan that was unlikely to be accepted by the combatants anyway.

The reluctance of the administration to support the Vance-Owen peace plan was deepened by estimates suggesting that a large international force would be required for its enforcement. While the president had already announced his preparedness to commit U.S. troops to a collective effort at implementing a peace plan in Bosnia, he was reluctant to commit troops to a plan that was considered to be neither just nor

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particularly practical.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, the administration had not yet ruled out the possibility of using limited force to redress the imbalance of power in Bosnia and in doing so strengthen the negotiating position of the Bosnian Muslims.

In February 1993, Secretary Christopher announced that while the U.S. was still unwilling to support the Vance-Owen plan it was willing to participate in the ICFY negotiation process using the plan as a starting point. Both the plan and the ICFY process were supported very strongly in most European capitals and also in Russia and with no workable alternative of its own on the table the administration had few options.\textsuperscript{14}

By refusing to endorse the plan but agreeing to work within the process that had created it, the new administration was already demonstrating its willingness to compromise in order to retain the multilateral framework of action.\textsuperscript{15} Instead of taking on a unilateral leadership role, what the administration did was throw its weight behind the collective ICFY process and then set about trying to influence this process so that its output would be consistent with U.S. value-based interests. With regard to the Vance-Owen peace plan, this meant putting pressure on all the parties to alter the terms of partition to make it more favourable to the Bosnian Muslims.\textsuperscript{16}

This goal of obtaining ‘justice’ for the Bosnian Muslims was a key factor shaping the Clinton administration’s policies towards Bosnia throughout its first year in office.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{14} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 107. Despite its limited support, the U.S. refused to endorse the Vance-Owen peace plan formally through a UN Security Council resolution on 30 March, see Goshko, \textit{Triumph of a Lack of Will}, 241-245.


\textsuperscript{16} This goal underpinned the administration’s strong support for an International War Crimes Tribunal to try suspected Bosnian war criminals. Christopher, \textit{News Conference}, 10 February 1993 and
The new administration had entered office expecting that U.S. values and principles would now play a much greater role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Yet, by elevating the importance of value-based goals within U.S. policy the administration only succeeded in making the challenge of reconciling conflicting military security and value-based interests in Bosnia even more difficult.

It was the tension between order and justice, and the fact that any plan you could negotiate would clearly require some rewarding of the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs. And people here were being purist about it, and were unwilling to live with any form of partition that was seen as a reward but, on the other hand, were unwilling to do anything about it. It was not a very attractive American position.\textsuperscript{18}

The way the administration approached the issue of the Vance-Owen characterised its approach to Bosnia for two and a half years. The administration was continually torn between the desire to see its own value-based interests reflected in the international community's response to Bosnia and the need to retain the security offered by the multilateral framework of action. Key administration officials stated that U.S. policy was shaped by the "expectation that Europe, which is most directly affected, will play a leading role" in the search for a "just, workable, and durable" peace in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{19} The problem for the administration was that the European version of a "just, workable, and durable" solution to the crisis in Bosnia was not consistent with the U.S. vision.

From very early on, and no doubt spurred on in large part by their geographical proximity to the crisis, the Europeans were willing to accept a less than ideal solution in Bosnia in order to restore regional peace and stability. Yet such pragmatism, and a willingness to forsake justice for the sake of a durable peace, was not a characteristic

\textsuperscript{18} Richard Haass, special assistant to President Bush and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs, \textit{Interview with Author}, Washington, D.C., 19 May 1998.

\textsuperscript{19} Warren Christopher, \textit{Intervention at the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council}, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 26 February 1993.
of U.S. policy until mid-1995 when its own military security interests came under threat. Until that time, the U.S. followed an uneasy path that aimed at maintaining a united stance with Europe while constantly trying to prod the collective framework to do more to promote justice for the Bosnian Muslims.

As the crisis wore on, this approach gradually brought the U.S. into conflict with many of its European allies. At the same time, however, whenever a dispute arose it was the U.S. decision-makers who backed down for the sake of unity. Right up until mid-1995, the Clinton administration continually put the need to retain the multilateral framework of action before its desire to promote a greater level of justice for the Bosnian Muslims. This was because, as with the previous Bush administration, the Clinton administration recognised that the UN represented its best hope of avoiding the need to put U.S. military security at risk by becoming militarily involved in the conflict.

Unity First

The two issues that brought the Trans-Atlantic allies into conflict the most were the use of force, air strikes in particular, and the question of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. Debates began over these two issues, almost as soon as the administration entered office, when the Bosnian Serbs launched a large-scale offensive on the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica. Television footage of the attack was broadcast around the globe and instantly generated a debate in the administration about what should be done about it.

Two options were on the table. One involved putting military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs either through the use of limited air strikes, the lifting the arms

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embargo on Bosnia, or through a combination of both “lift and strike.” The other option was to gain a cease-fire and then offer some form of protection to the Muslim enclaves under attack by the Serbs. This effectively amounted to the ‘safe area’ concept that was at the time being promoted in many European capitals.

Several senior officials in the administration held strong objections to the safe area proposal. Primarily, they were concerned that the U.S. would be called on to protect the areas and in doing so be drawn into a combat role. Clinton’s new secretary of defense, Les Aspin, was the administration’s only supporter of this option. Other members of the administration, most notably the president, thought that the creation of safe areas would only serve to reinforce Serb efforts at ethnic cleansing and would do little to actually help resolve the conflict. One significant benefit to be gained by establishing safe areas was that it would halt some of the worst atrocities and, even if only temporarily, remove Bosnia from the media headlines.

Anthony Lake and Warren Christopher preferred the prospect of pressuring the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo that had been placed on all of Bosnia in 1991. Several members of the administration, including the president, considered the arms embargo to be grossly unfair because of its disproportionate impact on the Bosnian Muslims. While the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were supported by their respective capitals, the Bosnian Muslims were comparatively unarmed. This imbalance was compounded by the fact that the Bosnian Serbs also had access to

much of the weaponry of the former Yugoslav military. The continuation of the arms embargo was considered by many to be morally questionable because it was perceived as denying the Bosnian Muslims the right of self-defence.\textsuperscript{28}

The proposal to lift the arms embargo was contentious within the administration. It was popular with a number of key officials and had significant support in Congress because it was considered to represent a 'cost-free' way for the U.S. to have an impact on the war.\textsuperscript{29} The administration was not considering a unilateral lift of the arms embargo but was instead considering the possibility of using its influence to urge a multilateral lift. It was well recognised within the administration that a unilateral lifting of the embargo, in direct opposition to an existing UN resolution, would represent a dangerous precedent.

... lifting the embargo unilaterally would also put the United States in clear violation of our international legal obligation to comply with U.S. [sic] Security Council resolutions taken under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. If the United States claims the right to violate binding resolutions, so too could others. Lifting the embargo unilaterally would send a signal to the Libyas, Iraqs, and North Koreas of the world that they were free to violate U.N. decisions with which they did not agree. This could lead to the general collapse of U.N. sanctions as an effective instrument of international affairs, with all the consequences that this would entail.\textsuperscript{30}

Richard Haass suggests that both the Bush and Clinton administrations had been particularly concerned about the implications of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo for the ongoing sanctions against Iraq. They saw the decision not to unilaterally lift

\textsuperscript{29} Gallucci, \textit{Interview}, 1998. See also Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 12-13 and Drew, \textit{On the Edge}, 149. See also, Senator Dole’s comments in support of lifting the embargo in \textit{Congressional Record}, 139, 81, 9 June 1993, S7018.
the embargo as a "trade off" for ensuring that the French and the Russians would not have an "excuse" to break the sanctions against Iraq.\footnote{Haass, \textit{Interview}, 1998.}

Vice President, Al Gore, and Madeleine Albright preferred the air strikes option. Just as UN-based multilateralism was viewed as a compromise between unilateral action and inaction, the use of air power was perceived as a compromise between full-scale military intervention and inaction. Air power was viewed by the civilian leadership as being a low-cost, low-risk, option that was commensurate with limited U.S. interests in Bosnia. Such views had been stimulated by the effective use of high technology bombing in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 but it was vehemently opposed by Clinton's senior military advisers.\footnote{Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 12-13; Halverson, "American Perspectives," 15. Hyland, \textit{Clinton's World}, 34. Anthony Lake, "America's Credibility Is at Stake in Bosnia," \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 13 April 1993}

We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation – more bombs, more men and women, more force.\footnote{Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 71, 3, Winter 1992/1993, 40. See also Charles Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force," \textit{Armed Forces and Society}, 22, 4, Summer 1996, 512.}

The use of air power was also vehemently opposed by Europe and Russia. They considered their lightly armed troops deployed on the ground in Bosnia almost as hostages that were extremely vulnerable and unable to deter or defend even a moderate sized military attack.\footnote{Hyland, \textit{Clinton's World}, 32. Roger Cohen, "U.S. Allies Differ on Arms for Bosnian Muslims," \textit{New York Times}, Thursday, 22 April 1993, A15; Ruth Marcus, "Clinton Considers Strikes on Serbs," \textit{Washington Post}, Saturday, 24 April 1993, A1; Daniel Williams, "U.S. Changes Approach to Bosnia as Brokered Peace Proposal Wilts," \textit{Washington Post}, Saturday, 24 April 1993, A17; and William Drozdiak, "European Allies Hurry Up and Wait on Action in Bosnia," \textit{Washington Post}, Tuesday, 27 April 1993, A12.} Many European officials argued that the use of air strikes would only serve to put their troops at risk without necessarily having any

\textsuperscript{31} Haass, \textit{Interview}, 1998.
significant impact on the course of the war.\textsuperscript{35} In a partial win for the administration, the well publicised Serb attack on Srebenica convinced both the Western Europeans and the Russians to support a U.S. proposal to start enforcing the 1992 ‘no-fly zone.’\textsuperscript{36}

"Lift and Strike"

In late April 1993, domestic criticism of the Clinton administration’s policies on Bosnia began to escalate. It had been leaked to the press that a number of senior desk officers within the Department of State had sent a letter to the president calling for the U.S. to take unilateral military action in Bosnia. To make matters worse, reports suggested that the desk officer had the support of Ambassador Albright.\textsuperscript{37} After facing a furious barrage of questions at a press conference at the end of April the president weighed in to internal administration debates about Bosnia and opted for the ‘lift and strike’ strategy.\textsuperscript{38}

Secretary of State Christopher was immediately dispatched to Europe to try to the plan to U.S. allies and to the Russians.\textsuperscript{39} Even though U.S. proposals for similar initiatives had been rejected bitterly on previous occasions, Christopher was instructed not to suggest that the U.S. had already settled upon ‘lift and strike’ but to genuinely consult with the Europeans and Russians in regard to the strategy.\textsuperscript{40} As

\textsuperscript{35} Ostrower, \textit{The United Nations and the United States}, 214.
\textsuperscript{36} Burg and Shoup, \textit{The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 250. The no-fly zone had been created under Security Council Resolution 781, 9 October 1992. A new resolution authorising NATO aircraft to shoot down any aircraft violating the ban was passed on 31 March 1993. The measures necessary to allow NATO to enforce the ban were then adopted at a North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels and the resolution came into effect on 12 April. \textit{NATO Press Release}, Brussels, 12 April 1993.
\textsuperscript{40} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 15-16. In his memoirs Secretary Christopher suggests that Clinton’s support for ‘lift and strike’ faltered while he was actually in Europe trying to sell it to the Europeans. See Christopher, \textit{In the Stream of History}, 347. See also Hyland, \textit{Clinton’s World}, 36-38 and Drew, \textit{On the Edge}, 157.
they had done on previous occasions, the Russians and Europeans rejected the ‘lift and strike’ proposal because they believed it would put their troops in danger. As an alternative they put forward the one option that the Clinton administration had previously ruled out, the creation of the ‘safe areas.’

In the face of strenuous European objections, and with no back up plan of its own, the Clinton administration offered its support for the ‘safe areas’ proposal. This meant backing away from efforts to reverse Serb territorial gains and accepting the territorial status quo in Bosnia. This not only fell a long way short of the administration’s stated goal of obtaining a ‘just solution’ for the Bosnian Muslims, it was also perceived to be quite risky because of its potential to serve as a focal point for European calls for U.S. ground troops.

In agreeing to put the ‘lift and strike’ policy on hold in favour of the ‘safe areas’ the U.S. was again putting multilateralism ahead of preferred policy in an effort to avoid taking on a unilateral leadership role. Secretary Christopher reinforced this point when he reminded a House Foreign Affairs Committee in May that U.S. policy on Bosnia was shaped by two key goals: one, that the U.S. would not act alone and, two, that the U.S. would not commit ground troops to engage in military action.

After its back down on ‘lift and strike’ the administration again emphasised the limited nature of U.S. humanitarian interests in Bosnia and stepped back from the crisis. The administration then announced the adoption of a Joint Action Program with Russia and Europe that, without any mention of the goal of reaching a peace

42 Hyland, Clinton’s World, 37-38.
44 Christopher, Statement before House Foreign Affairs Committee, 18 May 1993.
agreement, outlined a collective international emphasis on conflict containment and humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{46}

On 4 June 1993, in reflection of this new focus on mitigation rather than conflict resolution, UNPROFOR’s mandate was strengthened to include deterring attacks on the ‘safe areas.’\textsuperscript{47} The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, describes this resolution as “one of the most controversial, the most ambiguous, and most contradictory resolutions the Security Council has ever adopted.”\textsuperscript{48} He suggests that the resolution was deliberately ambiguous and was passed in the full knowledge that different Security Council members had completely divergent views about what the term ‘deter attack’ meant. This created an extremely difficult situation for the peacekeepers on the ground who were given the “…impossible task of implementing, interpreting, and applying a mandate about which there were quite different, if not opposite, understandings.”

Whatever its debated intentions, Resolution 836 had very little impact on the ground and reports began to surface in July 1993 that attacks on the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo were escalating and that conditions for trapped civilians were rapidly deteriorating. In response, President Clinton ordered his foreign policy team to re-examine U.S. options in Bosnia and consider the possibility of sending in U.S. ground troops to relieve the Serb siege of the capital.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{47} UN Security Council Resolution 819, 16 April 1993, established Sre特renica as a safe area. Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac were added to the list of safe areas under UN Security Council Resolution 824, 6 May 1993. UN Security Council Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, authorised UNPROFOR to deter attacks against the safe areas and called for member states acting nationally or through regional arrangements to support UNPROFOR in this task.

\textsuperscript{48} Yasushi Akashi, \textit{Interview with Author}, Tokyo, 22 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{49} Burg and Shoup, \textit{The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 267.
When news surfaced that the president was considering a U.S. ground deployment his senior military advisers within the Joint Chiefs of Staff weighed into the debate and attempted to remind the administration of the vast scale of the military challenge in Bosnia. They revealed estimates that approximately 70,000 troops would be needed to protect Sarajevo. The more limited task of protecting relief supplies into the city would require, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman and his deputy, approximately 25,000 troops. These words of caution hit their target and the administration backed away from the ground troop option and shifted their focus to the less risky option of air strikes. They recognised that there were still insufficient national interests at stake in Bosnia to justify such a high level of military engagement.

With the possibility of a military intervention all but ruled out, the administration made another attempt to sell ‘lift and strike’ in Europe. This time, Clinton’s representatives were instructed to take a much more forceful line. They were instructed to inform the British and French that the U.S. had already decided to use air strikes and that the Trans-Atlantic alliance would be damaged if the Europeans did not support this shift in policy. The reaction in Europe was mixed and the protracted discussions that followed have been described as “as bitter and rancorous a discussion as has ever taken place in the alliance.” In the end, the British offered their tentative support for the forceful nature of the U.S. proposal and the French reluctantly softened their objections after their UNPROFOR base in Sarajevo was shelled.

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50 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 20.
51 In July, Anthony Lake and the U.S. Special Envoy to the ICFY negotiations, Reginald Bartholomew, were dispatched on a low-key mission to consult with the French and British regarding the possibility of using air strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo.
52 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 21.
54 Quoted in Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 268.
55 Ibid. 267.
Controlling the Use of Force: The Dual Key Mechanism

As Ambassador Akashi accurately pointed out, while a reluctant consensus was forming around the use of air power there were still significant differences with regard to the question of who would control it and what exactly it would be used for. The U.S. wanted to increase its level of control by putting NATO in control over the use of air strikes. The Europeans, on the other hand, were determined to ensure that their own role in controlling the use of strikes was not diminished and they insisted that the UN be included in the decision as to when and where air strikes would be used. The U.S. was also still insisting that air strikes should be used as a way of pushing the Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiating table, while the Europeans were insisting that air strikes be limited to the protection of UNPROFOR.56

Again, the administration capitulated to all the European demands. Instead of authorising the direct use of force against the Serbs, NATO issued a statement saying only that new measures would be taken to protect UNPROFOR. In addition, the Americans were unable to convince their European allies that the U.S. dominated NATO should have sole control over the use of air strikes. This control was to be shared between NATO and the UN Secretary-General in a ‘dual key’ arrangement that required them both to authorise any request for air strikes by UNPROFOR commanders.57 Once again, the administration subjugated its own preferences in order to retain the UN framework of action and avoid the need for a unilateral U.S. leadership role. After this second diplomatic capitulation the administration again stepped back from the Bosnian issue and claimed that it was a problem for the UN and for the Europeans to fix.

When it became clear that this new flurry of diplomatic activity was not going to be as forceful as the U.S. had initially suggested, the Serbs renewed their attacks on

Sarajevo and other ‘safe areas,’ forcing the U.S. and Europe to step up their level of engagement. At this point a shift started to occur among the allies. It was now the French who were leading calls for stronger action while the U.S. started to hold back. This new reluctance on behalf of the administration was due to increasing international pressure for the U.S. to commit ground troops to the protection of the ‘safe areas’ and mounting domestic pressure for the U.S. to take on a greater leadership role. Administration officials were much more cautious with their calls for more forceful international action when they thought that these calls might be linked to an expectation of U.S. leadership.

Escalating National Interests: 1994

In early February 1994 a bomb hit the centre of Sarajevo marketplace, killing at least fifty-eight civilians and wounding one hundred and forty-two others. 58 This single action served as a catalyst for a change in the entire international community’s approach to the Bosnian war. In particular, it marked the beginning of a much deeper level of U.S. engagement that can be linked to the perception that the conflict was becoming a direct threat to U.S. military security interests.

Immediately after the bombing it became clear that the international community was beginning to link the failure to halt the war in Bosnia to a lack of U.S. leadership and the weakness of the Clinton presidency. As horrific pictures of the bombed marketplace were beamed around the world, many reacted with outrage and asked why the UN, NATO and the U.S. had not been able to halt the conflict earlier. As the self-proclaimed victor of the Cold War and the sole remaining superpower, the world community also began to ask why the U.S. had not provided the leadership necessary to catalyse a more effective international response to the conflict. Despite the best efforts of administration officials to avoid it, the conflict in Bosnia was fast becoming a U.S. problem almost by default.

57 Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary-General, Statement Following the special meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 2 August 1993.
58 Blue Helmets, 528.
The level of U.S. military security interests at stake in Bosnia were also starting to escalate because of the impact the war was having on the U.S. strategic interests in Europe. These interests were tied to the leadership role of the U.S. within NATO and also the continued viability of the alliance within post-Cold War Europe. This shift in U.S. perspectives was reflected in subsequent statements by administration officials in which an interest in protecting NATO and proving that “history’s greatest military alliance, remains a credible force for peace in post-Cold Europe” began to replace humanitarian value interests as the primary U.S. interest in Bosnia.59 This shift in emphasis was also reflected in the decision to conduct the U.S. response to the Sarajevo marketplace bombing within the NATO political and military framework rather than the UN Security Council.60

*Increasing Engagement Leads to Increasing U.S. Control*

As the administration drew the U.S. more deeply into the conflict, policymakers generally began to reassess the benefits of continuing to operate within the UN framework or action. Senior administration officials were not yet ready to jettison the protective framework offered by the Security-Council and allow NATO to take on full responsibility for the conflict. They were, however, keen to begin shifting decision making regarding the use of force away from the UN Security Council, and also the Secretariat, and toward a multilateral framework in which the U.S. played a much clearer leadership role. This gradual shift was accompanied by an effort to strengthen perceptions of the legitimacy of decisions made within the NATO framework. The more deeply the U.S. engaged in the conflict, the more obvious this forum shift became. By mid-1995, senior administration officials, including the president, were referring to NATO as not just representing the values and interests of the members of the alliance, but as being representative of the ‘international community’ as a whole.

The U.S. made it clear that it was determined to respond actively and firmly to the Sarejevo marketplace bombing, and after a lengthy set of negotiations in Europe, endorsed a French proposal to use of air power to establish and enforce a thirty-kilometre demilitarised zone in and around Sarajevo. It was then NATO, and not the UN Security Council, which issued an ultimatum for the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw all their heavy weapons from the demilitarised zone or place them under UNPROFOR control within ten days or face NATO action.

The Russian leadership shared NATO's goal of ending the strangulation of Sarajevo and offered its tentative support, in principle, for the NATO ultimatum. The Russians argued strongly, however, that a new UN Security Council resolution was required to provide explicit authorisation for the new course of action. The U.S. and the Europeans rejected this argument because they did not want to open up NATO unity to the scrutiny of the Security Council membership. As a consequence, the NATO ultimatum was issued under the authority of existing UN resolutions, including Resolution 836 calling for member states to take action nationally or within 'regional arrangements' to support UNPROFOR in its efforts to deter attacks on the 'safe areas.' The U.S. was careful to act under the authority of the Security Council but at the same time avoid direct oversight or control.

Just after the NATO ultimatum provided protection for Sarajevo the Bosnian Serbs stepped up their attack on the UN designated 'safe area' of Gorazde. While NATO

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63 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 284-288 and Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 289.
64 UN Security Council Resolution 836, 4 June 1993. While it appeared as though the Serbs were not going to comply with the NATO ultimatum they did so at the last minute with the help of Russia. A
had previously committed to helping deter attacks on the UN ‘safe areas’ it was initially unclear whether the organisation was prepared to respond to the renewed Serb offensive. The Clinton administration was also divided on the question of using air strikes. Senior officials within the State Department supported the use of air power to halt attacks on Gorazde while the Defense Department urged caution.65

In April 1994, Anthony Lake used his address at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore as an opportunity to clarify the U.S. position. He stated that neither the president nor any of his senior advisers were ruling out the use of NATO power to halt the attacks on Gorazde. This speech was followed a few days later with a number of ineffective ‘pin prick’ NATO air strikes on Serb forces around Gorazde. At this point Russia, which had protested strongly at not being consulted prior to the first round of air strikes, intervened and gained a promise from the Serbs to withdraw.66

When the Serbs failed to fulfil their promise to withdraw, the U.S. and NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner, began to pressure the UN Secretary-General to request NATO assistance in deterring further attacks on Gorazde.67 The North Atlantic Council then held an emergency meeting in Brussels in which the possibility of further NATO air strikes was debated. The U.S. pushed strongly for the use of strikes,68 while the British held back arguing that such action would be inconsistent with UNPROFOR’s current mandate. This time it was the British who capitulated and agreed to endorse the U.S. position.

deal was struck between the Russians and the Bosnian Serbs for Russian troops to replace the Serb forces that had withdrawn to the limits of the twenty-kilometre exclusion zone.


67 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, New Yor: Penguin, 1997, 332.

After a compromise was reached within NATO the organisation issued an ultimatum to the Serbs to cease fire, pull their troops back by 23 April, and withdraw their heavy artillery by 26 April. On 23 April the NATO commander on the ground asked the UN Special Representative in Bosnia to authorise air strikes against the Serbs because they had failed to meet the first condition of the ultimatum. Ambassador Akashi refused to authorise the strikes on the basis that evidence suggested that the Serbs were beginning to pull back their heavy weaponry.69

The Serb attack on Gorazde in April 1994 had a marked influence on the U.S. approach to the Bosnian conflict for several reasons. It became clear to the administration that the continuation of the conflict was, indeed, damaging the NATO alliance. The administration was also concerned by the new determination of the Russian leadership to play a key role in the international community’s response to the conflict.70 While the U.S. was still not willing to assume a leadership role in regard to Bosnia, administration officials were wary of the prospect of Russia stepping in to any leadership vacuum. This was particularly the case given the strong sympathies in some Russian quarters for the Bosnian Serbs.

A More Beneficial Multilateral Framework of Action

In April 1994, just after the NATO confrontation over Gorazde, the U.S. supported a proposal put forward by the co-chairs of the ICFY to form a Contact Group on Bosnia.71 This group, comprising the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, and Germany was an attractive proposition for all its members. For its European members, the Contact Group drew the U.S. more deeply into their attempts to address the Bosnian conflict

69 Silber and Little, Death of a Nation, 332-333 and Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 74.
and ensured that the Clinton administration’s decision making would not move too far away from the prevailing consensus. For the Russians, the group institutionalised their role as a major international player and ensured that they were not marginalised from the decision making process.\textsuperscript{72}

For the U.S., the benefits were considered to be substantial. The creation of the Contact Group promoted a cooperative approach from Russia. The inclusion of Britain, France, and Germany within the Group also removed the need to maintain consensus between all twelve members of the European Union.\textsuperscript{73} Until the establishment of the Contact Group it had been the European Union that had served as the primary European decision making body in regard to Bosnia. In addition, the Contact Group shifted collective decision making away from the complex processes of the UN where the U.S. was formally an equal.\textsuperscript{74} By taking the decision making out of the formal framework of the Security Council the U.S. was much better able to use its hegemonic power and influence to shape international policy. As was predicted in Chapter Three, decision-makers became much less flexible on questions of U.S. leadership and control once U.S. military security interests were threatened.

The perceived need for greater control over decision making, particularly with regard to the use of force, became more urgent when Ambassador Akashi refused to authorise the NATO air strikes in Gorazde. This refusal proved to administration officials that the UN now represented an unacceptable constraint on U.S. policy in Bosnia. As Ambassador Akashi himself notes, the dual key mechanism was not perceived to be particularly effective in Washington because it served as a filter on U.S. influence, but this was exactly why the UN and many of its member states believed it to be useful.\textsuperscript{75} The administration was already pushing for the ‘dual key’ arrangement to be adjusted in order to give NATO greater control over the use of air

\textsuperscript{72} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 28.
\textsuperscript{73} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 296.
\textsuperscript{74} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 28.
\textsuperscript{75} Akashi, \textit{Interview}, 2002.
strikes. The Gorazde incident reinforced the administration’s view that such a change was a necessity.\textsuperscript{76}

In short, while U.S. policymakers were not yet ready to take on the full burden of leadership in regard to Bosnia, they were beginning to lose interest in working within the formal constraints imposed by operating through the UN. These constraints had helped to protect the administration’s earlier preference for inaction, but as this preference faltered so too did the administration’s need for protection. Whereas the constraints of the Security Council had once been welcomed, they were increasingly seen to be not only unnecessary but also dangerous. Decision-makers were not willing to accept a multilateral constraint on the U.S. capacity to wield force in defence of its own military security. By refusing to endorse NATO air strikes, that is exactly what the UN Secretary-General’s representative was perceived as doing.

The Clinton administration hoped that the Contact Group would help smooth over the rifts that were developing with U.S. allies in Europe.\textsuperscript{77} The French, in particular, were becoming increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress in Bosnia and had already threatened to withdraw their troops if progress was not made towards a peace settlement.\textsuperscript{78} Clinton and his senior policymakers wanted to avoid the possibility of a European withdrawal from UNPROFOR because this would lay the responsibility for Bosnia at the foot of the U.S.

Throughout the next few months the Contact Group met several times to formulate a partition plan for Bosnia that all members would be willing to impose on the warring


parties. Observers at these meetings have noted that the main objective of participants appeared to be the maintenance of unity.

At times the driving force appeared to be the will to maintain European/Russian/American solidarity, even if this meant unwelcome compromises at the potentially crucial stages of the peace process.\textsuperscript{79}

In July 1994 the Contact Group presented a plan to all three warring parties to partition Bosnia with a 51/49% split in favour of the Muslim-Croat Federation.\textsuperscript{80} The plan was immediately accepted by both the Muslims and Croats and rejected by the Serbs. The Contact Group presented the plan to the combatants along with a threat to take stronger action if any of the parties refused to sign up. After the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan the Group met to discuss what measures should be taken next.\textsuperscript{81}

During these meetings each group member adhered to the same positions they had been promoting throughout the last two years.\textsuperscript{82} The Europeans preferred to focus on reaching a negotiated settlement and were willing to offer the Serbs an easing of economic sanctions in order to achieve this. The Russians wanted to go a step further and offer to ease sanctions on the Serbs as an incentive to negotiate. The U.S. preference was to increase military pressure upon the Serbs and the Clinton administration also wanted to lift the Bosnian arms embargo. The reason for this, was that the administration was coming under increasing pressure to do so from Congress.

\textsuperscript{79} An unnamed source quoted in Burg and Shoup, \textit{The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 301.
\textsuperscript{80} The U.S. had put forward a proposal to establish a federation between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia in an effort to isolate the Serbs and in doing so place greater pressure on them to negotiate. The agreement between the Muslims and Croats had been under negotiation for some time, but the final agreement had followed two months of intense pressure by administration officials. The Federation was established through the signing of a 'principles agreement' in Washington on 1 March 1994. William Clinton, \textit{Statement released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary}, Washington, D.C., 1 March 1994. Silber and Little, \textit{Death of a Nation}, 319-320.
\textsuperscript{81} Daniel Williams, "NATO to Study Pulling Out of Bosnia: Allies Examine Options as They Consider Possible Bombing Serbs," \textit{Washington Post}, Tuesday, 2 August 1994, A19.
\textsuperscript{82} Burg and Shoup, \textit{The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 302.
Congress and the Arms Embargo

Throughout 1993 and into 1994 congressional debates essentially mirrored the lack of consensus in the administration. The only one point of consistency throughout this period related to the arms embargo. Calls for a lifting of the arms embargo had been constant within both houses of Congress, and as the conflict wore on they gradually increased in intensity. In April 1994 both houses adopted a non-binding amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill urging the administration to sell arms to the Bosnian Muslims.83

On 12 May the Senate adopted another two measures aimed at bringing about a change in the administration’s policies. One called upon the U.S. to unilaterally end the arms embargo and the other called upon the president to convince U.S. allies to end the embargo multilaterally.84 Both measures were largely symbolic and were not taken up by the House. In June 1994, the House supported an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that would force the administration to end the embargo unilaterally.85 This bill was debated in the Senate in July and the administration used the time in between to launch an intensive lobbying campaign against the amendment on Capital Hill. As a result of the administration’s actions the amendment was narrowly defeated when it came to a vote in the Senate.86

No other members of the Contact Group supported the U.S. proposal to threaten to lift the arms embargo if the Bosnian Serbs failed to sign up to the new partition plan.87 The states with troops on the ground argued, instead, that they would withdraw their troops if the ban was lifted and that this would result in a general

83 For details see comments by Bob Dole, Congressional Record, 140, 44, 20 April 1994, S4493-4494 and Newt Gingrich, Congressional Record, 140, 45, 21 April 1994, E743.
84 For details of the two amendments see Robert Byrd Congressional Record, 140, 58, 12 May 1994.
85 Congressional Record, 140, 85, 29 June 1994, S7964-7965.
UNPROFOR withdrawal. In the face of unanimous international opposition the U.S. again backed down and instead agreed to use economic pressure to convince the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the new partition plan.

This deal with Milosevic did little to halt the pressure emanating from Congress. The June 1994 House amendment had served to put Clinton officials on notice that Congress was becoming increasingly active in its disapproval of the way the administration was handling the Bosnian issue. This presented significant problems for the administration because the growing congressional preference for increasing military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, either through air strikes or lifting the arms embargo, differed substantially from the preferences of key U.S. allies.

If the Bosnian Serbs continue to practice genocide and continue to dishonor the cease-fires, it is time to pound the Bosnian Serbs into submission. And if the Serbs continue to hit targets in Bosnia, then selected targets in Serbia itself ought to be hit in return.

Beginning in August, the administration attempted to head off any binding moves by Congress that would force the administration to break the embargo unilaterally. In October, the administration finalised the negotiation of a compromise with congressional leaders. If the UN continued to refuse to lift the arms embargo, and the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the Contact Group plan, the U.S. would cease to participate in the enforcement of the embargo on November 15. While this move

88 Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 305.


91 It was around this time that the U.S. is reported to have commenced a policy of turning a 'blind eye' to arms shipments entering Bosnia and intended for Bosnian Muslims. See Facts on File News Services, Issue date: 16 June 1994, Accessed Online, 3 January 2000, http://www.2facts.com/stories/index/1994057360.asp

92 This deal was struck only days before the Republican Party captured the balance of power in both houses of the congress.
prompted strong criticism from U.S. allies, it was generally recognised that it would have little impact on the effectiveness of the embargo.  

The Trans-Atlantic Rift Brings Military Security to the Fore

In October, a Muslim attack launched from inside the Bihac ‘safe area’ sparked a new bout of hostilities. What began as a Serb counter-offensive turned into a large-scale attack on the ‘safe area’ and NATO responded with air strikes that began on 23 November. The Serbs responded to the NATO attack by detaining approximately four hundred and fifty UN peacekeepers stationed around Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, also issued a warning to the UN that NATO and UNPROFOR would be considered an enemy of the Serbs if such attacks continued.

The European response to the Serb actions in Bosnia was to back down from threats to use force out of concern for the safety of troops on the ground. This contrasted directly with the U.S. response, which was to demonstrate an even stronger resolve to use air strikes in the face of Bosnian Serb ‘intransigence.’ Administration officials were, in fact, considering the possibility of extending air strikes to include their strategic use in an effort to break the negotiating impasse that remained after the Serb rejection of the Contact Group plan.

Given that the U.S. had committed no troops to the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia, and had just announced its intention to cease participating in the enforcement of the arms embargo, the European reaction to the U.S. push for a greater use of force was

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96 Douglas Bennet, Address before the UN Association, Princeton University, Trenton, New Jersey, 29 November 1994.
97 Madeleine Albright, Address to the Secretary’s Open Forum, Washington D.C., 28 October 1994.
hostile. The French were particular scathing in their criticism of the continued U.S. preference for raising the military stakes in Bosnia without a corresponding willingness to submit U.S. troops to the increased costs and risks. The British were also unusually outspoken in regard to the criticism of the U.S. position.

Clinton administration officials quickly recognised that the debates over a response to the Bihac offensive were placing an unacceptable strain on U.S. relations with its European allies. At a meeting of foreign policy principals in the last days of November 1994, it was agreed that U.S. policy had reached a turning point and that military security interests tied in with NATO had now replaced any interests the U.S. had in Bosnia itself.

It was not a concrete decision that the primary objective had become to preserve NATO... It was more something that ran through the tenor of the conversation, an understanding of realities. We were not going to get an acceptable use of NATO air power, so we should stop pushing for that to no avail, and straining NATO relations.

As a consequence, the U.S. stopped trying to convince its allies and Russia to use increased force in Bosnia and refocused its efforts on healing the damage done to the alliance. This lead to a significant shift in U.S. policy. In an effort to bring about a speedy end to the conflict the administration dropped its emphasis on obtaining a 'just' settlement for the Bosnian Muslims. The U.S. opened a direct line of communication with Serb president Milosevic and began efforts to negotiate a peace agreement. This signalled a pragmatic willingness to negotiate a compromise deal

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98 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33.
100 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33.
103 Anthony Lake, Address to the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Trenton, New Jersey, 30 November 1994.
that may not have been considered acceptable by the administration a year earlier.\footnote{The U.S. was now willing to consider the possibility of negotiating with the Serbs in relation to the details of the Contact Group Plan, see Warren Christopher, Opening Statement at a Joint Press Conference Following a Meeting of the Contact Group, Brussels, Belgium, 2 December 1994. See also Facts on File News Services, Issue date: 1 December 1994, Accessed Online, 3 January 2000, http://www.2facts.com/stories/index/1994058631.asp}

At the same time, in an effort to reassure Europe of the depth of the U.S. commitment to its NATO allies, President Clinton announced that the U.S. was prepared to commit roughly half the number of troops necessary to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal if it became necessary.

In December 1994, former U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, succeeded in gaining a four-month cease-fire in Bosnia that was to take effect on the first day of the new year. This success afforded the Clinton administration a small breathing space in which to consider its policy options. These ranged from a continuation of efforts to negotiate a solution while focusing on containment and mitigation, to allowing UNPROFOR to withdraw and then implementing a revised version of the ‘lift and strike’ strategy. The administration decided on the status quo option but was forced to reassess this when the Bosnian Serbs launched an all out offensive in eastern Bosnia as soon as the cease-fire ended in April.\footnote{Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 88.} This new attack launched a new round of disputes between the U.S. and the UN with the Secretary-General, tacitly supported by Europe, rejecting NATO calls for air strikes out of concern for UN peacekeepers on the ground.

The failure of NATO to prevent the Serb offensives, coupled with the hostage taking, forced a reassessment of the viability of UNPROFOR.\footnote{Stephen Greenhouse, “Quandary Over Bosnia: Crisis Exposes Contradictions in U.S. Policy Goals,” New York Times, Sunday, 28 May 1995, 112.} It became clear that a continued UN presence in its current form, and with its limited mandate, was untenable. The UN mission in Bosnia would either have to be withdrawn or
substantially reinforced, given greater military capabilities, and re-deployed to more defensible positions.\textsuperscript{107}

When UNPROFOR’s basic viability started to be questioned both the French and British went public with the possibility of withdrawing their troops.\textsuperscript{108} Facing the prospect of an UNPROFOR withdrawal, and mindful of their commitment to assist in such a withdrawal, U.S. policymakers again backed away from their push to use military pressure to force the Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan.\textsuperscript{109}

Throughout May, the different groups involved in the international community’s efforts in Bosnia all reassessed their positions.\textsuperscript{110} The UN Secretary-General ordered a review of the UN role in Bosnia and then recommended that UNPROFOR scale back its efforts and return to ‘more traditional’ peacekeeping principles.\textsuperscript{111} Just as the Clinton administration began to reconsider its own options, the new French president, Jacques Chirac, put forward a proposal to reinvigorate the international operation in Bosnia through the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force.\textsuperscript{112} While several Clinton officials were dubious about the possible effectiveness of this new force, the administration endorsed the proposal in the hope that it may serve to postpone the possibility of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. The U.S. did not commit ground troops to the new force, but offered substantial support in the form of air lift capacities, close air support, navigation systems and intelligence units.\textsuperscript{113} This was consistent with the


\textsuperscript{111} Report of the Secretary-General, 30 May 1995, S/1995/444.


administration's new peacekeeping policy as outlined in PDD-25 for 'second tier' situations that did not warrant a U.S. military deployment.\textsuperscript{114}

By June the level of fighting all over Bosnia increased dramatically. This time it was not only the Serbs who intensified their offensives. The Bosnian Muslims and Croatia were also beginning their own offensive actions in other parts of Bosnia with the tacit support of the U.S. As they began to gradually alter the territorial balance in Bosnia they created a situation in which a negotiated agreement was more likely. Despite the changing tide on the ground the Bosnian Serbs continued to hold out, even though President Milosovic was now pressuring them to negotiate.

Administration officials met several times throughout June and continued to debate whether to use force on the Serbs to make them accept a deal. The administration was divided. Warren Christopher was cautious about the prospect of placing further strains on the NATO alliance and of allowing the U.S. to become more deeply involved in the conflict. Madeleine Albright argued for a greater level of U.S. military involvement in Bosnia, as she had continuously since the administration first took office. The vice president also supported the prospect of the U.S. taking concerted action to end the conflict. Gore not only argued that the U.S. could no longer stand back in the face of the growing number of atrocities in Bosnia, but also that the Clinton administration’s failure to act was tainting its entire foreign policy.\textsuperscript{115} It was also becoming increasingly clear to the administration that the situation in Bosnia could only be resolved successfully through assertive U.S. leadership.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{116} In Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 102-105, the author states that this view was put forward by the Department of State, Madeleine Albright, and also the National Security Council.
U.S. National Interests and the Decision to Lead: 1995

In June 1995, Clinton’s national security advisor initiated a series of reviews and meetings aimed at devising an entirely new U.S. policy on Bosnia. These discussions took place within a framework of U.S. national interests that had altered dramatically since the administration first came into office two and a half years earlier. By mid-1995, administration officials recognised that the Bosnian conflict had developed into a direct threat to U.S. military security interests by way of a high level threat to its international security interests. At the same time, while U.S. value-based interests in Bosnia had not changed, it was now recognised that the costs and risks of protecting these interests, and achieving justice for the Bosnia Muslims, were too high.

Preserving the U.S. Role in Europe

U.S. international order interests in Bosnia were linked to its military security interests through NATO. Throughout the Cold War the NATO alliance had played a key role in furthering the U.S. strategic interest in promoting European order and stability. When this war ended, the NATO alliance entered a period of transition and transformation as it struggled to carve out a new role for itself in the absence of an immediate communist threat in Europe. To succeed in this task, NATO would have to transform itself from a military alliance to regional collective security organisation.

By mid-1995, most senior members of the administration agreed that the failure of the U.S. and its NATO allies to address the conflict in Bosnia was challenging the organisation’s credibility as a continued source of stability and security in Europe. NATO’s ability to deal effectively with the conflict in Bosnia was fast becoming a

117 For a more detailed account of the administration’s meetings during this period see Daalder, Getting to Dayton, and Woodward, The Choice.
119 Warren Christopher, Opening statement at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, 1 December 1994.
litmus test of the organisation’s post-Cold War role. President Clinton demonstrated his recognition of this reality when, later in the year, he suggested that if the “international community” failed to bring peace to Bosnia, “the consequences for Bosnia and for the future of NATO will be severe.”

Both the president and his senior policymakers also recognised that the reason why NATO had been unable, thus far, to deal with the Bosnian crisis was the lack of consensus between its members and a lack of leadership and direction. Disagreements between NATO members over how to approach the conflict had, according to Anthony Lake, threatened to create the most significant rift to appear in the alliance since the Suez crisis in 1956. By mid-1995, the inability of the U.S. and the Europeans to agree on a decisive policy in Bosnia represented an unacceptable threat to the future of the alliance.

By June 1995, Clinton began to view the Bosnian crisis as a direct test of U.S. leadership within the NATO alliance. The president and his senior officials recognised that the only way to overcome the paralysing lack of consensus within NATO was for the U.S. to provide the leadership necessary to generate a consensus. If the U.S. would lead, the allies would, more than likely, follow.

Bosnia was not only proving to be a test for U.S. leadership within NATO, it was becoming a test of the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world in general. This factor was at the forefront of the thinking of several administration officials when they

121 Anthony Lake, Address to the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Trenton, New Jersey, 30 November 1994.
123 Robert Gallucci suggests that it was a concern for the U.S. role in Europe, rather than the survival of NATO itself, that motivated the president. Gallucci, Interview, 1998.
debated a new strategy for the U.S. throughout June.\textsuperscript{125} The president was reportedly concerned that Bosnia was making the U.S. look weak and seriously damaging its position in the world.\textsuperscript{126}

In addition to the broader U.S. military security interests that were affected by the failure to resolve the Bosnian conflict, the administration was also faced with a more immediate threat. It was no longer just possible that UNPROFOR would withdraw from Bosnia, it was highly probable. Clinton’s foreign policy team contemplated their next move in the knowledge that the U.S. was most likely going to have to become involved on the ground regardless of what they decided.

\textit{Avoiding a Showdown with Congress}

The likelihood of an UNPROFOR withdrawal increased dramatically when Congress made a number of moves aimed at forcing the president to unilaterally lift the arms embargo. On 8 June 1995, the House had voted overwhelmingly to make Clinton end the embargo.\textsuperscript{127} This move was mostly symbolic in that it came in the form of an amendment to the Foreign Aid bill which President Clinton had already signalled his intention to veto. A far more serious call for the U.S. to end the embargo was, however, already in the works with a resolution being put together by Republican Senator Robert Dole. This new resolution fell on the backdrop of a much more hostile, Republican dominated, Congress that appeared determined to rein in the President’s commitment to multilateralism and to the UN in particular.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{125} Such sentiments were expressed in an internal administration memorandum given to the president by Madeleine Albright at a 21 June meeting of senior foreign policy officials. See Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 93.

\textsuperscript{126} Woodward, \textit{The Choice}, 261.

\textsuperscript{127} This vote came in the form of an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1996.

\textsuperscript{128} Part and parcel of this commitment was a determination to remove the influence of the UN and reinsert Congress back into the executive foreign policy decision making process. That is, the Republicans wanted to limit the president’s capacity to commit U.S. money and troops to multilateral peace operations on the basis of international treaty obligations, thus avoiding his constitutional obligation to consult with Congress. The Republican sponsored National Security Revitalization Act, if it had been passed, would have required to the president to seek congressional approval before committing U.S. troops to participate in a UN peace operation. The National Revitalization Act was
This resolution spelled disaster for the administration. Both the French and the British had threatened to withdraw their forces if the U.S. unilaterally ended the embargo. If these forces were to be withdrawn, the U.S. was committed to providing them with protection. The Senate passed the resolution on 26 July with two votes more than would be needed to override a presidential veto.\textsuperscript{129} While the president immediately vetoed it, a European withdrawal from UNPROFOR had now become all but a certainty. The president was now faced with two choices: U.S. troops could be sent to Bosnia to participate in what amounted to a failure for the UN, NATO, and the U.S., or they could be sent in to implement a successful peace settlement.\textsuperscript{130}

\textit{Victory of Defeat}

Facing the prospect of a dramatic increase in the level of the U.S. military involvement in Bosnia, the administration had two options. The U.S. could go into Bosnia, with massive force, and assist its NATO allies in what effectively amounted to a retreat.\textsuperscript{131} This option would not only call into question the credibility of NATO as a source of stability in post-Cold War Europe, but would also damage U.S. credibility as a world leader. Or, alternatively, the U.S. could commit its full military and political might to bringing the combatants to an agreement and enter Bosnia, on its own terms, to implement this agreement.

The combination of heightened U.S. military security interests, and the recent territorial changes in Bosnia which had increased the likelihood of a workable peace


\textsuperscript{130} Robert Gallucci suggests that the desire for the U.S. to be involved in a 'successful operation' in Bosnia, rather than a 'failure,' was strong within the administration. Gallucci, \textit{Interview}, 1998. See also Woodward, \textit{The Choice}, 257.

\textsuperscript{131} In February the UN Secretary-General had formally requested NATO to begin planning for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The organisation had responded with NATO OPLAN 40104, a
agreement, led President Clinton to consider a full commitment of U.S. political and military assets to the attainment of a peace settlement. Yet, the president was still not fully convinced that such a commitment was the most appropriate option or that it could be justified to Congress and the American people. The event that tipped the scale in favour of a U.S. intervention was the Serb assault on the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in early July.\textsuperscript{132} Immediate reports suggested that this was one of the most savage attacks of the war.\textsuperscript{133}

Thousands of men executed and buried in mass graves, hundreds of men buried alive, men and women mutilated and slaughtered, children killed before their mothers’ eyes, A grandfather forced to eat the liver of his own grandson. These are truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.\textsuperscript{134}

While the Clinton administration joined in with the rest of the world in its condemnation of the vicious attack on Srebrenica, it was France that first chose to transform the massacre into the international community’s ‘Rubicon.’ After the fall of Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serbs announced their plans to move on to other UN ‘safe areas,’ first Zepa, then Gorazde, Bihac and, finally, Sarajevo. The French president called upon the international community to halt the attacks on the ‘safe areas’ or admit defeat and withdraw UNPROFOR. The call included a proposal to make a

document of over one thousand pages outlining an operation requiring up to twenty-two weeks to complete.


\textsuperscript{134} Excerpt from a press release issued by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, quoted in the introduction to \textit{Report of the Secretary-General}, 15 November 1999, 6.
stand at Gorazde by deploying one thousand Rapid Reaction Force troops around its perimeters to deter the impending Serb attack.

The British Prime Minister, John Major, had called for a multilateral conference on Bosnia immediately after the fall of Srebrenica. This conference was to take place on 21 July and would be used to discuss French, British, and U.S. proposals for the international community’s response to recent events. The French put forward their plan to defend Gorazde. The British pushed a status quo proposal to reinforce UNPROFOR, relocate troops to more defensible positions, and more vigorously enforce the Security Council’s resolutions. The U.S. proposed that a large-scale strategic bombing campaign be used to defend both Gorazde and Sarajevo. The U.S. also proposed that the dual key arrangement be modified so as to give NATO control over the use of the air strikes. This plan marked a dramatic change in U.S. policy toward Bosnia and signalled the beginning of a shift toward its full political and military engagement in the conflict.

While France and Britain had significant difficulties with the U.S. proposal, they offered it their tentative support. The Russians recognised the need to protect the ‘safe areas’ but would not support a strategic air campaign against the Serbs. They also questioned whether the Europeans and the U.S. would maintain their resolve in the face of what they predicted to be heavy casualties. France and Britain endorsed a Joint Communiqué released at the end of the conference announcing the decisions made by participants. The U.S. delegation also made public what the “United States believes to be the central elements” of the decisions made.131 This led the European allies to later complain that the U.S. had ‘over stated’ the decisions made. Russia refused to endorse the Communiqué.

According to the U.S. delegation the key decisions outlined in the Joint Communiqué included:
UNPROFOR would be reinforced and remain in Bosnia

Gorazde would be defended with substantial NATO air power and the dual key mechanism would be ‘significantly adjusted’

Steps would be taken to stabilise Sarajevo

Steps would be taken to protect UNPROFOR troops, air strikes would continue even if UN hostages were taken

Further details of the use of NATO air strikes were worked out during a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 25 July and the plan was adopted officially by NATO on 1 August. The U.S. and its allies had compromised on the question of command and control of the air strikes. The Europeans had objected strongly to the prospect of having their own influence reduced by taking the UN out of the decision making process completely. It was agreed that the UN-NATO ‘dual key’ mechanism would be handed over to the military force commanders on the ground, thus removing the UN Secretary-General from the decision making process. Accompanying the U.S. step closer to military engagement, was a step up in the U.S. effort to wrest control over the use of air strikes back from the UN.

**Bringing it to a Close**

In order to protect U.S. military interests, President Clinton made the decision in August 1995 to lead the collective effort to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. By this time, U.S. national interests would have been so badly damaged by a failure to

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137 Barbara Crossette, “U.N. Military Aides Given Right to Approve Attacks,” *New York Times*, Thursday, 27 July 1995, A8. In personal interviews both former UN Secretary-General Special Representative and former UNPROFOR, Force Commander and Head of Mission, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, both suggest that in most instances the views of the civilian and military heads of mission in Bosnia worked closely together in Bosnia. Disagreements were more likely to be found between decision makers in Washington and the mission commanders on the ground. Akashi, *Interview*, 2002. Satish Nambiar, *Interview with Author*, Tokyo, 29 May 2002.
resolve the conflict that the U.S. was prepared to act unilaterally to ensure that this did not occur.

If the U.S. failed to act and UNPROFOR was forced to withdraw, NATO would have failed the first test of its viability as a post-Cold War regional collective security organisation. The relationship between the U.S. and its NATO allies would be damaged substantially and U.S. credibility as a post-Cold War world leader would be shattered. Furthermore, with an election the following year the Clinton presidency would be unlikely to recover from the inevitable backlash in Congress and among the public. As Richard Haass notes, the failures in Bosnia were, “in danger of becoming a metaphor for the administration.”\(^\text{138}\) In addition, as long-term U.S. interests prevented the president from reneging on the U.S. commitment to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal, the administration would still have to submit U.S. troops to the high risks and costs of becoming involved on the ground in Bosnia.

In the first week of August, the president instructed his national security advisor to take a proposal to Europe that the administration had termed the ‘endgame strategy.’\(^\text{139}\) The strategy, based on the Contact Group plan that had been agreed to among the allies and Russia the previous year, incorporated a number of ‘carrots and sticks’ that were aimed at gaining an agreement from the Bosnian Serbs. The allies, and Russia, were to open up the Contact Group plan to negotiation among the three warring factions and offer to relieve economic sanctions on Serbia once an agreement was reached. These negotiations would be led by the U.S. and if no agreement was reached the U.S. would then push for an UNPROFOR withdrawal. The U.S. would also provide direct assistance to the Bosnian Muslims so that they could regain some of the territory that they had lost.\(^\text{140}\)

\(^{138}\) Haass, Interview, 1998.


\(^{140}\) Specifically, the U.S. committed to: seek to end the arms embargo multilaterally, through a vote by the UN Security Council; provide arms, training, and support to the Bosnians (whether the arms embargo had been lifted or not) in order to assist in establishing a balance of power on the ground;
Anthony Lake visited seven European capitals and explained that the president of the United States had decided upon a new strategy in Bosnia and that their support and cooperation would be appreciated. Lake was instructed to emphasise that this was a decision that had already been made by the president and that the U.S. would be willing to implement this new strategy unilaterally if it had to.¹⁴¹ Lake's efforts at selling the new U.S. strategy were successful and all those consulted, including the Russians, supported the plan.¹⁴² Ten days later the newly appointed U.S. envoy, Richard Holbrooke, arrived in Bosnia to begin the prelude to negotiations.

The probability of gaining a peace agreement was increased substantially later in August when the Bosnian Serbs began shelling the centre of the Sarajevo 'safe area.' This triggered the commencement of the strategic NATO air strikes that had been agreed upon a month earlier. On 30 August, NATO Operation Deliberate Force began a sustained air campaign that represented the largest military action in the organisation's history. The campaign continued until 14 September when the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and began preliminary negotiations with U.S. envoy Holbrooke.

On 5 October, all three warring parties agreed to a countrywide cease-fire. On 12 October 1995, hostilities in Bosnia ended. The proximity talks began in Dayton, Ohio, on 1 November and all three parties initialled a peace settlement twenty-one days later.

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¹⁴¹ Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 255; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 98-112; and Woodward, The Choice, 267.
Benefits of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN

During the Clinton administration's first year, it shared the previous administration's interest in promoting a UN-based multilateral response to the crisis in Bosnia in an effort to avoid being drawn into a leadership role. Throughout this first year, while no U.S. military security interests were threatened directly by the conflict in Bosnia, the constraints imposed by operating through the formal framework of the UN were perceived to be a benefit. As long as the U.S. maintained a UN-based multilateral response to the conflict, policymakers could use the lack of consensus within the UN Security Council as a shield to defend the administration against calls for deeper U.S. involvement.

Another key benefit associated with operating through the UN was that it provided the administration with a collective framework through which it could pursue its limited humanitarian interests without putting its military security at risk. The UN framework provided this benefit in two ways. As with the case studies discussed in previous chapters, operating through the UN allowed the administration to separate actions taken in pursuit of value-based humanitarian interests from actions taken in the defense of military security. This allowed the administration to focus on its humanitarian objectives and argue that it was 'doing something' in Bosnia in an effort to deflect criticism away from the lack of substantive political or military action.143

Operating through the UN also allowed the administration to reduce the costs and risks of promoting U.S. humanitarian value interests by sharing them with the multilateral framework. The UN conducted a massive relief effort in Bosnia aimed at mitigating the worst of the humanitarian impacts of the war. Instead of mounting its own operation from scratch, the U.S. was able to feed a substantial amount of U.S. resources into this existing network and avoid having to put its own troops on the

ground. The U.S. did not have to establish its own relief networks in the conflict zone or bear the responsibility for protecting the delivery of its relief supplies. Both these tasks were conducted by a number of UN agencies and by UNPROFOR.

Disadvantages of Operating within the Multilateral Framework of the UN

Once U.S. national interests in Bosnia began to increase, subjecting U.S. policy to the constraints of the Security Council was no longer perceived to be beneficial. As U.S. military security interests in Bosnia increased the Clinton administration gradually distanced its decision making from the UN Security Council, first through the Contact Group, and then through raising the status of the NATO decision making framework.

One of the core aims of shifting away from the UN was the need to regain control over the use of force. As Robert Gallucci suggests, there was no way that policymakers would have committed U.S. force to the Bosnian operation unless the U.S. had complete military control of the operation. Both Gallucci and Richard Haass, also suggest that because of the UN being blamed for previous difficulties in Somalia and Bosnia, by 1995, the anti-UN sentiment within Congress was at such a high level that it would have been difficult to gain congressional support for a UN intervention in Bosnia.

Increasing the political and military role of NATO in addressing the Bosnian conflict and attempting to raise the international status and legitimacy of the organisation’s decision making served several purposes. NATO provided the administration with an alternative multilateral framework of action through which to respond to the Bosnian conflict. This was a framework over which the U.S. had much greater influence, and in which there was a high level of shared values and interests. As President Clinton

144 Gallucci, Interview, 1998.
noted “NATO binds the Western democracies in a common purpose with shared values.”

These two factors combined, meant that the process of bargaining that would be required to maintain the NATO multilateral framework of action would require less compromise on behalf of the U.S. This meant that NATO represented a less constraining framework of multilateral action than the UN.

NATO replaced the UN in Bosnia ... NATO is a different instrument. It is multilateral but it has much more credibility, like-minded countries who are prepared to act together. Much more comfort with that.

Replacing UN with NATO also assisted in the transformation of NATO from a Cold War military alliance to a post-Cold War regional collective security organisation. This served immediate U.S. interests in regard to Bosnia and also broader U.S. interests in maintaining European stability. As Deputy Secretary Talbott noted in mid 1995:

... while NATO will remain a collective defense pact, it will, as it expands, also serve as an inducement for democratization and regional peace. This is not an abstract hope; it is already happening.

U.S. Leadership in a Privileged NATO

By 1995, the failure of the international community through the UN, the Contact Group, and NATO to halt the war in Bosnia was not only damaging the credibility of these collective institutions and arrangements, it was damaging to the key states involved. The state that risked the most damage to its credibility was the U.S. At the end of the Cold War the U.S. had made much of its perceived victory over communism and its new role as the sole remaining superpower. This meant that, despite the absence of particular national interests in Bosnia, the U.S. was

inextricably linked to the international community’s effort to address the conflict there. A failure to address the conflict, of the magnitude that would have resulted from an UNPROFOR withdrawal, would have severely damaged U.S. credibility as the preeminent hegemon in the post-Cold War world. Thus, it was not that the U.S. had the most to gain from a successful collective effort to address the conflict in Bosnia, so much as the most to lose if these efforts failed.

Many of the states that had been the most deeply involved in efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict were also senior members of the NATO alliance. As NATO became more deeply involved in the conflict, the credibility of the organisation as a source of stability in post-Cold War Europe became tied to the success of efforts to achieve peace. An interest in protecting NATO was shared by all its member states and reflected their interest in protecting the future benefits to be gained from a standing regional multilateral framework of action. While the U.S. was motivated to take action in Bosnia for a combination of reasons, an interest in preserving the NATO framework of action was one of the most significant.

As the privileged member of NATO, the U.S. held a great enough interest in maintaining the credibility of the organisation that it was prepared to undertake the burdens necessary to lead a collective action in Bosnia. That other NATO members chose to cooperate with the U.S. in regard to Bosnia, despite the stated willingness of the U.S. to act unilaterally, suggests that the preservation of the organisation was considered to be a collective good by other NATO members. It also suggests that these other members considered it in their own interests to reinforce U.S. hegemony within NATO because this brought with it regional stability.

Promoting Multilateralism as an Organising Principle of International Action

When Clinton’s national security advisor was sent to Europe to propose the final U.S. strategy for intervening in Bosnia, he was instructed to inform U.S. allies, and Russia,

148 Strobe Talbott, Address before the City Club, Cleveland, Ohio, 9 June 1995.
that the president was determined to act but was flexible in terms of the details of the plan. Unilateral action was considered to be the last resort and it was hoped that the U.S. could convince its allies and Russia to support and participate in the administration’s proposal.

The concerted U.S. push for a peace agreement in Bosnia was conducted within the framework of existing UN resolutions, and was consistent with the peace plan already approved by the Contact Group. In proposing an initiative that was consistent with the international community’s collective approach to the Bosnian conflict the administration was attempting to gain a greater level of international legitimacy for its actions. In presenting the proposal in this way the administration attempted to remove some of the barriers to the co-operation of non-NATO states, in particular, Russia.

The proposal put forward by the U.S. effectively amounted to using force to implement decisions that Russia had previously participated in making. In this sense, the administration hoped that by presenting the initiative as being consistent with ongoing international diplomatic efforts this would make it easier for the Russian leadership to support it. This action was based on a similar rationale to that which had underpinned the previous Bush administration’s approach to gaining Soviet cooperation in the Persian Gulf. The Clinton administration shared the previous Bush administration’s sensitivity to the fact that it would be difficult for the Russian leadership to agree to co-operate with a U.S. initiative. Administration officials recognised that it would be easier for President Yeltsin to justify his support for the U.S. proposal to his domestic critics, if this proposal could be presented as an extension of the international community’s ongoing efforts in Bosnia. In his memoir, Richard Holbrookes notes that President Clinton demonstrated a keen awareness of the need to ensure that Russia participated in the efforts to resolve the conflict in

149 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 112.
Bosnia, and was seen to be doing so by the Russian people. While the administration’s efforts in this regard only gained reluctant support from the Russian leadership, they most likely contributed to the Russian decision not to actively work against the U.S. initiative.

By extending the framework of action beyond the NATO membership, the U.S. demonstrated an interest in multilateralism that was distinct from its specific interest in NATO as a multilateral institution. While the U.S. was unwilling to subject its own policies to the constraints imposed by the UN Security Council, administration policymakers were still keen promote a post-Cold War international system that would constrain the unilateral actions of other states. They were, according to Robert Gallucci, particularly interested in promoting the norms embedded within multilateralism in an effort to establish a system of constraints that would contain the unilateral actions of Russia.

Conclusion
The Clinton administration’s policy toward the conflict in Bosnia developed had two distinct phases based on changing U.S. national interests. During the first phase, the conflict affected U.S. humanitarian value interests and, to a lesser extent, U.S. concerns regarding international order. During this first phase, the conflict had little impact on U.S. economic interests and represented no immediate threat to military security. During this phase, the U.S. was unwilling to either lead, or provide ground troops for, a military intervention in Bosnia. It was only once the continuation of the conflict began to represent a threat to U.S. military security interests that the administration committed itself fully to resolving the conflict and U.S. policy entered its second phase. During both phases of the U.S. response to the conflict, a strong interest in retaining the multilateral framework of action played an important role in the development and implementation of policy.

During the first phase of the conflict, where no core economic or military interests were threatened, the UN framework helped shield the administration from calls for a greater level of U.S. involvement. By continuing to act within the constraints imposed by the UN Security Council, the Clinton administration was able to limit the U.S. involvement in the conflict to a level commensurate with its limited interests. The U.S. was able to avoid taking a leadership role in responding to the crisis, while at the same time taking action to promote its humanitarian value interests. The UN framework also served as a valuable foreign policy tool because it allowed the U.S. to share the economic, political, and military costs and risks of pursuing these limited humanitarian interests in Bosnia.

During this first phase of the U.S. response to the Bosnian conflict, the benefits of operating within the multilateral framework of the UN were perceived to be so great that U.S. policymakers were willing to compromise on several stated policy objectives in order to retain this framework. The domestic political costs of ceding to the will of U.S. allies in this regard were high. Clinton's policy choices put his administration in direct conflict with the U.S. Congress and had the potential to damage the president's ability to push through his domestic agenda.

It is interesting to note that while Congress played an increasingly vocal role in debates over the administration's Bosnia policy, the only binding measures undertaken by the body were limited to the lifting of the arms embargo. That is, even with a Republican majority in both chambers, Congress deferred to the president's authority to deploy, or not to deploy, military force. Several congressional members were, as they had been with regard to the debate over Haiti, keen to insert a great deal of rhetoric into the vacuum created by the administration's indecision and lack of

152 Jackson, "Armed Humanitarianism," 599.
153 Paul Wolfowitz suggests that while multilateralism sometimes requires states to subordinate their national interests to internationally derived goals, in Bosnia this process only led to lowest common denominator decision making and inaction. See Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," 37.
leadership. Yet the body as a whole did not move to try and block the deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia to enforce the agreement reached at Dayton. This demonstrates that the traditional pattern of congressional deference to the executive when military security interests are involved does, as predicted in Chapter Three, transcend partisan political issues.

During the second stage of the U.S. response, when U.S. military security interests were clearly under threat, policymakers were not willing to subject policy to the potential constraints of operating through the UN Security Council. As core U.S. security interests were now at stake, it was no longer in the interests of the U.S. to operate within a multilateral framework of action in which a consensus could not be established or maintained and in which the U.S. did not play a clear leadership role. The lack of consensus within the UN Security Council, coupled with the significant role played by the UN Secretary-General through his control of the ‘dual key’ mechanism, represented an unacceptable constraint upon U.S. foreign policy making.

The shift toward the NATO framework of action was not inconsistent with the Clinton administration’s earlier policy that Madeleine Albright had described as ‘assertive multilateralism.’ This was, however, a much more realistic version of the administration’s earlier policy. The U.S. has an institutionalised leadership role within NATO and a much greater influence over its actions. The organisation was also in the process of evolving from a Cold War based military alliance into a regional collective security organisation, which meant that it was well equipped to conduct a large-scale military operation in Bosnia. The Clinton administration would not have been willing to become involved in a large-scale military operation under the control of the UN.

One of the important things that happened [between 1990 and 1995] is that everybody now clearly learned from Bosnia, as well as Somalia,
that if you want to conduct serious combat, you have to rely on a resolution authorising, but not try and do it through the UN.\textsuperscript{154}

While U.S. interests had, by mid-1995, increased to the point where the U.S. was willing to act unilaterally in order to achieve a peace agreement in Bosnia, this did not diminish the U.S. interest in attempting to retain the benefits of acting multilaterally. The administration’s preferred option was for the U.S. to lead a multilateral action rather than bear the full military, political, and economic costs and risks of intervening in Bosnia alone.\textsuperscript{155} To avoid the potential constraints of acting under the authority and control of the UN Security Council, while retaining many of the benefits of multilateralism, U.S. policymakers shifted the focus of collective action to the regional multilateral framework of an expanded post-Cold War NATO.

It was not only the case that the U.S. conducted the military intervention through NATO, administration policymakers also attempted to elevate the political legitimacy of NATO within the international arena. Policymakers no longer referred to NATO as simply a security alliance created to defend Western Europe against the Soviet threat. They instead began referring to NATO as the regional collective security organisation upon which peace and stability in Europe depended. Policymakers also began to refer to NATO decisions and actions as being representative of the entire ‘international community; and not just NATO member states. Administration officials also increased their emphasis on the level of shared values and interests that existed among NATO members as well the clear leadership role played by the U.S. within the organisation.

This does not mean that the U.S. has transferred its interest in multilateralism from the UN to NATO. What it signals, instead, is an interest in locating collective

\textsuperscript{154} Mort Halperin, \textit{Interview with Author}, Washington, D.C., 8 April 1998.

\textsuperscript{155} Robert Gallucci suggests that the U.S. view was that the U.S. would bear the responsibility for much of the military burden, while Europe would contribute substantial financial support to the operation. Gallucci, \textit{Interview}, 1998. See also Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 98-112 and Woodward, \textit{The Choice}, 267.
frameworks of action that allow the U.S. to act multilaterally with minimum constraints. Within such a framework the specific interests and goals of the U.S. would be shared with other members, and the U.S. would have an unimpeded leadership role.

As the Bosnian case demonstrates well, the role of multilateralism and the UN in post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy has developed as a consequence of U.S. policy maker's attempts to balance enduring U.S. national interests in what is perceived to be a changed international environment. The result has been a policy that involves using alternative multilateral frameworks to implement peace operations that are held to be consistent with the UN Charter, even if they are not explicitly authorised by the Security Council.
- Conclusion -

Introduction
When the Cold War ended, rather than using the new status of the U.S. as the sole remaining superpower in an attempt to exercise unilateral power and influence in the pursuit of U.S. national interests, policymakers embarked upon an effort to reinvigorate the UN multilateral framework of action.1 After the Cold War ended policymakers in Washington, as well as many other capitals around the world, believed that the interests of most states had converged to a level that would be sufficient to reinvigorate the role of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and stability.2 These beliefs were partly in response to, and partly the cause of, the international community’s successful co-operation against Iraq in 1990/1991.

In response to the perceived success of the UN multilateral framework of action in the Persian Gulf, President Bush began an internal review of U.S. participation in UN peace operations. At the same time, Bush also promoted calls for the UN Secretary-General to conduct his own review of the organisation’s role in maintaining international peace and stability in the post-Cold War world. George Bush lost the presidency before his administration could complete the review process and before the Secretary-General’s report could be fully assessed.

1 Madeleine Albright put forward the options for the U.S. at the end of the Cold War as being a choice between unilateral leadership, leadership of a coalition, or leadership within the multilateral framework. Madeleine Albright, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1993.
The Clinton administration entered office with a high level of optimism regarding the potential of the UN to help it pursue its perceptions of U.S. national interests. This optimism extended much further than the Bush administration because it was based on more than just a pragmatic recognition of the material benefits of acting through the UN framework. Key members of the Clinton administration, including the president himself, brought with them a deeply held set of liberal assumptions (and aspirations) about the way international relations worked and what the post-Cold War world could look like. Many administration officials believed that the end of the Cold War had signaled the wider adoption of these liberal ideas and aspirations. They believed that many states now recognized the depth of the military, economic, and value-based interests that they shared with the U.S., and would be willing to cooperate through the UN in order to pursue them.3

Through promoting UN-based multilateralism, Clinton administration officials believed that the U.S. could share the burdens of maintaining a more peaceful and stable international order based on the same liberal principles that had brought relative peace and prosperity to the U.S. itself.4 They also believed that by sharing these costs the administration would be able to better serve U.S. economic security interests by focusing their efforts on reinvigorating the U.S. economy.5 Similarly, through sharing the costs and risks of international action with the UN, the U.S. would be able to act to pursue value-based interests that it would not have been able to pursue alone. These beliefs culminated in a policy, known as ‘assertive multilateralism’ that was immediately put to the test in an expanded UN peace

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5 For the role of international co-operation in assisting states to meet domestic economic priorities see discussion in Harold Jacobson, William Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, “National Entanglements in

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operation in Somalia. The Clinton administration’s commitment to a UN-based multilateral international order was, initially, so strong that several administration officials seemed to regard the establishment of this type of order to be a goal in itself.

To understand why this experiment with expanded UN-based multilateralism failed, and why it left in its wake an increased interest in promoting multilateralism as an organising principle of international action, it is useful to revisit the theoretical assumptions put forward within this study’s research design. It is also useful to examine the key lessons learned, by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, with regard to the strengths and weaknesses of the UN organisation and how U.S. national interests could best be served within them.

**U.S. National Interests, Multilateralism and the UN**

Robert Keohane suggests that international co-operation is not dependent upon shared interests so much as the willingness to compromise through a process of bargaining. How much compromise is required of a particular state will depend upon two factors; the level of disparity between that state’s interests and the interests of the other group members; and the capacity of that state to exercise influence over the other group members. The level of flexibility and willingness to bargain and compromise on stated interests in an effort to retain the multilateral framework of action, is an indication of the level of interest that a state has in that framework.

When the Cold War ended U.S. policymakers assumed that the UN Security Council could now serve as a useful multilateral framework of action because the interests of its permanent members had converged. They also assumed that, without the rivalries of the Cold War, the U.S. would be able to use its influence and leadership within the Council to ensure that its co-operative actions would be consistent with its own

specific national interests. This new found capacity for influence would not only be derived from the strength of the U.S. position as the sole remaining superpower, but also from the strength of liberal principles and ideas. The Clinton administration had been in office less than a year before senior officials recognised that their expectations regarding the post-Cold War international order had been idealistic and unrealistic. Interests had not converged to the extent first believed and the U.S. was not able to exercise clear and unfettered leadership within the UN.

As the most powerful and influential state to emerge from the Cold War, policymakers expected that the potential constraints of operating through the UN, and the Security Council in particular, could be minimised by clear U.S. leadership. They also hoped that operating through the formal multilateral framework of the UN would legitimise this leadership and make it more acceptable to other states. What U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate, however, was the level of sensitivity that existed within the Security Council with regard to the exercise of U.S. power and influence in the post-Cold War world.

While U.S. policymakers aimed to use the UN framework to help constrain the unilateral actions of other states, particularly Russia, events in Bosnia demonstrated that other members of the Security Council were hoping to use the UN framework to constrain the unilateral tendencies of the U.S. As a case in point, it was not just Russia and China, but also traditional U.S. allies in Europe, that were keen to ensure

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7 Madeleine Albright distinguished between these two sources of American power in her Address at the National War College, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 23 September 1993.
8 In particular, Richard Haass highlights the differences in views of, and the deterioration of, the relationships between, U.S.-Russia, and U.S.-France, as a contributing factor to the failure of UN-based multilateralism to fulfil initial post-Cold War expectations. Haass, Interview with the Author, Washington, D.C., 19 May 1998.
9 Robert Gallucci stated that it was in the long-term U.S. interest to promoting a norm requiring force to be 'legitimised' internationally, and that this interest was even more relevant in regard to Russian actions in Chechnya. Robert Gallucci, Interview with the Author, Washington, D.C., 11 May 1998. Michael Taylor discusses the potential for the system of interactions to restrain state behaviour in Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation, London: John Wiley and Sons, 1976, 114. For a more
that decisions over the use of air strikes in Bosnia were shared with the UN and not left solely up to the U.S.

**Military and Economic Security: Shared Interests and U.S. Hegemonic Leadership**

The shared control over the exercise of U.S. military force represents a significant constraint on U.S. freedom of action. Such a constraint would be acceptable when no U.S. military security interests are at stake, such as the early stages of the Bosnian crisis, but becomes much less acceptable as security interests increase. In the later stages of the Bosnian conflict, as U.S. military interests began to come under threat, Clinton administration policymakers made it a priority to remove the UN from decision making with regard to the use of NATO air power. Eventually, this resulted in moving the decision making process out of the UN framework altogether and into the NATO framework of action where the U.S. played a much greater leadership role and where interests were genuinely shared among members. This is consistent with the assumption put forward in Chapter Three, which stated that the U.S. would be much less flexible on the question of U.S. leadership, and control over the use of force, when military security interests were threatened.

Military security is the paramount U.S. national interest, and when it is threatened the U.S. will be willing to act unilaterally to defend it. In both Bosnia and the Persian Gulf, administration policymakers stated a willingness to ‘go it alone’ to protect U.S. military security interests if necessary, although their preference was for multilateral action if possible. As the Gulf case study demonstrated particularly well, policymakers are still keen to shared the economic and financial costs of defending U.S. military security interests whenever possible. They will only be willing to do so, however, if U.S. interests and goals are genuinely shared among co-operating group members, and if U.S. leadership is clearly recognised as legitimate.

comprehensive discussion of the role of international norms in shaping state behaviour see Chapter Two.
With regard to the Gulf, both these conditions were met within the UN framework of action. U.S. policymakers demonstrated their strong interest in retaining this framework of action with their willingness to compromise, particularly with the Soviet Union, on several stated interests in order to keep other UN member states onboard. Yet, at no point did they consider compromising on their core interests relating to the need to defeat Saddam Hussein militarily.

**Operating Under the Direct Authority of the UN Security Council**

In each of the four case studies, policymakers avoided placing the use of U.S. force under the direct control of the UN Security Council. If a multilateral operation involves the deployment of U.S. troops, any interference with the chain of command or control in regard to this deployment could represent a threat to U.S. military security interests. This is the case whether this interference comes from the Security Council or, as was the case in both Somalia and Bosnia, the UN organisation itself through the person of the Secretary-General.

Administration policymakers also learned very quickly that it could be dangerous to place U.S. troops and/or the use of force under the direct authority of the UN (either through the Security Council or the Secretary-General) even when no military security interests are threatened. Events in Bosnia and Somalia showed how quickly a non-threatening security situation could deteriorate and how quickly direct UN involvement in decision making could turn into an unacceptable level of constraint on U.S. policy making.

Experiences within Somalia and Bosnia also taught the Clinton administration that the decision to commit to the use of force in the multilateral pursuit of value-based humanitarian goals still needs to be considered carefully within the context of U.S. military security interests. The experience in Somalia highlighted, quite dramatically, the dangers of committing U.S. troops to a humanitarian operation without fully
considering key questions relating to their potential exposure to threat should the situation change unexpectedly.

**Value-based Goals and Increased Bargaining Flexibility**

It was also put forward within the research design discussed in Chapter Three, that U.S. policymakers will be very keen to share the burdens of pursuing value-based and low level international order interests through the UN framework. This is because value-based interests and low-level threats to international order are not considered to be vital to U.S. survival in the way that military and economic security interests are. In this respect, policymakers would be keen to reduce the level of U.S. resources needed to protect or promote these interests so that more resources can be focused toward achieving military and economic security goals.

As policymakers are keen to obtain the burden sharing benefits of operating through the UN in the pursuit of value-based goals they will be willing to bargain and compromise significantly in order to retain this framework of action. As such, they will be much more flexible with regard to the need for U.S. leadership and shared interests. They will, in fact, be reluctant for the U.S. to take on the burdens of leadership in the pursuit of value-based goals and will rely heavily on the formal UN framework to facilitate and co-ordinate the required co-operative action. This type of co-operation is not hegemonic in that it is centred on a goal that is of strong private interest to the U.S. It is instead a multilateral action taken in pursuit of shared values and interests that are considered to be moderately important to several or all states.

This assumption proved to be accurate in relation to both Haiti and Bosnia where the U.S. refused to lead any concerted action until its other, more material, national interests became involved. Somalia represented a different story, however, because the U.S. volunteered to undertake a large-scale intervention to relieve the humanitarian crisis in this country even though no other U.S. national interests were at stake. This would seem to contradict the assumption that the U.S. will not use
military force to defend value-based interests because this would conflict with the need to protect U.S. military security. On closer examination, however, no such contradiction took place.

It was put forward in Chapter Three that policymakers will not be willing to use force to protect value-based interests alone, although they would be willing to strategically use the 'threat of force' in pursuit of these objectives. In this respect, policymakers will try to locate a low-risk framework of action through which large-scale force can be threatened or deployed, with the absolute minimum of risk to U.S. military security. In Somalia, and then later in Haiti, policymakers turned to the UN to provide this low-cost, low-risk framework of action. They achieved this by separating the military aspects of the operation away from the other, more complex, political, social and economic aspects of the operation and then taking responsibility only for the military aspect.

While this formula was successful in Haiti, it was not so successful in Somalia. This was because the newly elected Clinton administration, with its ambitious liberal goals for the UN, reunited the military enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace building aspects of the operation. In an effort to get the UN Secretary-General to sign off on the UN led replacement mission the Clinton administration also agreed to the open ended participation of U.S. troops who would be engaged in a wide range of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace building activities. In doing so they removed the clear limits that had been placed on the U.S. deployment in order to ensure that it would not lead to a conflict with U.S. military security interests.

The internal contradictions within this new UN led mission led to a dramatic deterioration in security conditions, culminating in the deaths of eighteen U.S. army Rangers in October 1993. As soon as these deaths occurred, the conflict between U.S. military and value-based national interests was brought into sharp relief. As soon as it became practical, U.S. forces were withdrawn. While the U.S. had been willing to
deploy a large military force to intimidate locals and ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief, policymakers were not willing to actually use military force in a combat situation. When the security situation deteriorated, U.S. military security interests took precedence over both the Clinton administration’s ambitions for the UN and also its humanitarian concerns for the Somali people.

The crisis in Haiti represented a similar situation because Clinton administration policymakers made it clear that they would do all they possibly could to avoid actually deploying military force to remove General Cedras from power. Even as U.S. planes were in the air, U.S. diplomats were still attempting to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal leading to the restoration of democracy. This contrasts significantly with the situation in the Persian Gulf, where a peaceful solution was considered to be a ‘nightmare scenario’ because senior officials within the Bush administration believed that U.S. military security interests could only be served by a resounding military defeat of Saddam Hussein’s armies.

**Limits on UN Burden Sharing**

One of the reasons why policymakers were enthusiastic about reinvigorating the role of the UN was that they expected the UN to be able to absorb some of the costs associated with collective military interventions. In this regard, policymakers were very quickly disappointed as their experiences in Somalia and Bosnia revealed that the UN possessed no independent operational capacity to conduct the types of multilateral peace operations that were required of it in the post-Cold War world. As Richard Haass notes,

> ... the conclusion that came out of our experiences... and after the review of peacekeeping by the government... is that you don’t use the UN for force, because UN operations are not structured and don’t have the political backing to deploy force of the nature needed.\(^{11}\)

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\(^{10}\) Christopher, *Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 13 January 1993.

Building up the UN’s operational capacity had been a fundamental component of both presidents Bush and Clinton in the period immediately following the demise of the Cold War. Neither president, however, had been able to gain the support of the U.S. military or Congress for such a move. This meant that the UN was unable to take up the share of operational burden that both presidents had initially envisaged.

It also quickly became clear to policymakers that they had underestimated the complexity of post-Cold War intrastate conflict and that acting through the UN framework did not significantly reduce the costs and risks of intervening in these types of conflicts. This meant that the UN could not, as they had believed, help policymakers to reduce the costs of value-based humanitarian interventions to the point where they would not conflict with U.S. military and economic security interests. As a consequence, the Clinton administration policymakers were forced to scale back the range of goals that the U.S. would be willing to act militarily to pursue in the post-Cold War era.

As policymakers scaled back the range of foreign policy goals, the global framework of action provided by the UN lost a large part of its perceived utility. This point is underpinned by Princeton Lyman when he suggests that the “pull back” from the UN framework has been partly due to the recognition that the U.S. does not “have to get involved almost anywhere in the world unless it is vital to our national interests.”

That policymakers have become more wary about using U.S. force within multilateral interventions in the pursuit of value-based goals is also related to their general reluctance to allow the UN framework of action to interfere with the protection and promotion of U.S. military security interests.

**Conflicting Interests and the Role of the UN**

Through their experiences within the UN framework in the early post-Cold War period, U.S. policymakers learned much about how to manipulate the benefits and
constraints of operating through the UN framework. They learned, for example, that the UN could play a key role in helping them, at least temporarily, reconcile competing and conflicting U.S. national interests by allowing them to separate the actions taken in pursuit of material and value-based goals.

The U.S. was, for example, able to take action through the UN to promote its value-based humanitarian interests in both Bosnia, while at the same time resisting calls for U.S. leadership and its military participation in UNPROFOR. In this respect, the U.S. maximised burden sharing potential with regard to the pursuit of value-based goals, while at the same time retaining the greatest flexibility and freedom of action with respect to the defence of its military security interests.

The UN can also help policymakers reconcile competing national interests by allowing the U.S. to separate its participation, and leadership, of the military aspects of a UN peace operation from the other political, military, and economic aspects. What the UN made possible in the Persian Gulf, Somalia (UNITAF) and Haiti, was the creation of an essentially unilateral U.S.-led military mission inside the broader framework of a more extensive UN peace operation. The U.S. gained authorisation from the Security Council to take military action, and then retained almost complete unilateral control over that operation. Once its own national interests (private goods) were satisfied, the U.S. then handed the broader operation back to the UN for the pursuit of value-based goals (public goods). The U.S. would still contribute substantially to this latter operation, but would no longer play a leadership role.

This ‘division of labor’ with the UN represents the best way that policymakers have found to maximise the benefits of operating through the UN while minimising the risks. The Clinton administration has made it clear that it relies upon the UN as the “primary vehicle for humanitarian or refugee operations.” 13 As the U.S. experience in

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13 Lyman, Interview, 1998.
all the case studies demonstrated, the UN already possesses a substantial operational competence in terms of the co-ordination and delivery of humanitarian relief. Through a process of internal review, policymakers have opened up the possibility of a greater level of U.S. participation in these operations. Actual troop participation will be determined on a case by case policy, although it is most likely that the U.S. will limit itself to a support role. This represents a significant policy shift because prior to the Gulf War, the U.S. would not have considered the possibility of U.S. troop participation in any type of UN peace operation.

The Clinton administration also stated that it will not rely on the UN to protect ‘vital’ U.S. national interests.14 At the same time, administration officials have offered the seemingly contradictory statement that U.S. troop participation in UN peace operations will be limited to situations where ‘vital’ national interests are at stake.15 Officials have also stated that if a UN operation is likely to involve hostilities, U.S. troops will serve under U.S. command and control.16 The only way to meet all these objectives is to ensure U.S. leadership within a limited military operation that is essentially a separate component of a much larger UN-based multilateral peace operation.

**Intervening Variables**

As was predicted, the case studies revealed a greater role and influence for the three intervening variables of executive world view, Congress, and the military, when dealing with issues that did not involve a high level threat to military security or the deployment of military force. The executive world view of key decision makers particularly, but not only, the president, was much more visible in relation to long terms strategic issues such as peacekeeping policy. Senior members of both the Bush

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and Clinton administrations, for example, held strong ideas and beliefs about the potential for a more peaceful and stable world order now that the Cold War had ended and they both embarked upon a review of U.S. peacekeeping policy.

Within the Clinton administration, these ideas and beliefs were underpinned by deeply held liberal assumptions about the way the world operated and the role that the U.S. could play within it. These beliefs were reflected in the administration’s much more ambitious vision for the UN and the promotion of a liberal institutional world order. These ambitions were played out in the administration’s strong support for the ambitious nation building mandate of UNOSOM II in Somalia and its ambitious review of UN peacekeeping. Similarly, the Clinton administration initially placed a much greater emphasis on the need to obtain justice for the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To this end, senior U.S. officials effectively blocked the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, even though it was supported in Europe, because they believed that partition simply rewarded aggression and legitimised ethnic cleansing.

What the case studies also revealed, is that the world view of senior decision makers will very quickly be overshadowed by the development of a threat to U.S. military security. This was the case in Somalia, when the ambitious experiment in UN-based nation building was brought abruptly to a halt with the deaths of the U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu. It was also the case in Haiti when the administration quickly reversed its stated policies on the morality of turning back refugees as soon as it entered office and realised how great an economic impact such large refugee flows would have. It happened again in Haiti when the Harlan County was ordered to turn around and come home in the face of a chanting mob of protesters in Port-au-Prince. The administration was also forced to renege on its commitment to achieving a just and fair solution for the Bosnian Muslims when it helped negotiate the 1995 partition of Bosnia in the face of escalating military security interests.
Congress also played a much more vocal role, and had a much greater impact, on foreign policy issues that did not involve a high level threat to military or economic security and did not involve the deployment of force. Congress played a vocal role in debates leading up to the deployment of force in all four case study situations. Yet, in each case, the body deferred to the president once the decision was made to deploy U.S. troops, regardless of whether it had supported such a deployment. In each case, as was predicted in Chapter Three, Congress ‘rallied around the flag’ once it was clear that U.S. troops would be going into combat. This was particularly evident with regard to Haiti where the president even acknowledged that he was committing troops to the ousting of General Cedras despite strong opposition in Congress.

It is also worth noting that partisan issues played less of a role in debates immediately prior to the use of force decision, than they did during the drawn out debates that took place before force was a serious alternative. The Republicans, for example, used the Clinton administration’s difficulties in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia to criticise the president’s foreign policy capabilities and its perceived over-reliance on the UN. But these critics became silent once it became clear that troops were to be deployed. In some instances, such as Somalia, senior Republican leaders made it overtly clear that they deferred to the president’s authority over use of force decisions. When Congress was demanding an immediate withdrawal from Somalia after the deaths of the U.S. Rangers, it was the Republican leaders who helped calm Congress and negotiate a deal giving the president an extra five months of troop funding.

While Congress had little influence over specific decisions regarding the use of force, it still played a key role in shaping strategic matters of policy. For example, the general backlash against the UN in Congress was a key contributing factor in the administration’s backstep on ‘assertive multilateralism.’ It would not be sufficient to suggest, however, that the congressional backlash was the primary cause of the
change in administration's policy.\textsuperscript{17} Just as it was clear to Congress that the UN had failed to live up to expectations, it was also clear to the administration.\textsuperscript{18} By the time Congress engaged the issue, the administration had already started to back pedal on ‘assertive multilateralism’ simply because they had discovered that it did not work. Congressional pressure reinforced the need for a change in policy, but it was not the instigator of it.

As was predicted, the senior military leadership also played a much greater role in strategic policy debates than it did with regard to use of force decisions. In several instances, such as Haiti, and also with regard to the humanitarian air drop of relief supplies in both Somalia and Bosnia, the civilian decision makers ordered the use of U.S. force despite the objections of their military advisers. In all these instances, the military fell in line behind the commander in chief as soon as the decision to use force had been made.

The case studies revealed a number of examples where senior military advisers played a key role in shaping U.S. policy. None of these examples involve a high level threat to U.S. military security. With regard to the humanitarian operation in Somalia, for example, it was the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff who played the key role in allowing the operation to go ahead. Only once the chairman signed off on the operation from a military perspective, was the mission approved by the president. There were also several instances where military planners clearly influenced administration debates over Bosnia by providing realistic statistics about the level of military force that would be needed to break the siege of Sarajevo. The military also


played a similar role with regard to Haiti. In both instances, however, the military deferred to the president once a decision was made to use force.

The case studies have also demonstrated the limited role played by public opinion and the media in shaping key foreign policy decisions. The Somali case study showed that the relationship between the media and the executive arm of government can be complex and best described as reciprocal. Elements within the administration deliberately courted media attention for Somalia and then used this attention to help justify an intervention. The administration was not simply led by the media because the Somali issue was only considered to be newsworthy once either the president or Congress started to pay attention to it.

The Haiti case study also demonstrated the limited role that public opinion plays in shaping foreign policy decisions. Sustained public attention can make life difficult for administration officials but it is not a direct influence on specific policies. It can generate small or cosmetic changes in policy and can prevent the administration from brushing issues aside, but it cannot directly force the administration to undertake any specific action in the same way that Congress did when it forced the administration to stop enforcing the arms embargo on Bosnia. An example of the limited impact of public opinion is the administration’s decision to recommence offshore processing of asylum seeker’s claims in response to increasing public criticism. Public opinion could not actually force the administration to agree to let the refugees stay in the U.S. or allow them to be processed onshore.

Sustained public opinion can and does have a significant impact on Congress. This is what happened with regard to Haiti when Congress responded to public concern and put pressure on the administration to ‘do something’ about the refugee problem and increasing human rights abuses by the military regime. In the end, in an effort to remove Haiti from the political agenda the administration decided on a large-scale military intervention, a move that had not been supported by Congress, the media, or
the American public. Public opinion and the media had influenced policy, but not directly and not necessarily in the way that was anticipated.

A Pragmatic Approach to Multilateralism and the UN
After the Cold War ended U.S. policymakers struggled to define an international role for the U.S. outside the context of a bipolar struggle for power. Initially, policymakers attempted to define a new role that involved U.S. leadership in the collective pursuit of a wider range of material and value-based foreign policy goals that, they believed, were now shared with the international community. Policymakers held high expectations in regard to the potential of the UN, as a global multilateral institution, to facilitate this international co-operation. While the high expectations of policymakers in regard to the potential benefits of operating through the multilateral framework of the UN have largely receded, U.S. policymakers still consider multilateralism to be a more useful and appropriate framework of U.S. action in the post-Cold War world.¹⁹

The challenge for U.S. policymakers during the early post-Cold War period was to formulate a policy toward the UN that maximised the additional benefits offered by operating within this global multilateral framework, while minimising the constraints and disadvantages. This has involved an effort to distinguish more clearly between the benefits offered by multilateralism and the specific benefits and constraints associated with UN-based multilateralism. It has also resulted in an effort to separate the frameworks in which the U.S. pursues value-based and military security interests.

In their effort to gain the benefits of multilateralism, while minimising the potential constraints, Clinton officials stepped back from their emphasis on the role that the UN Security Council plays in legitimating international action. While the Republican Bush administration continually maintained wariness in regard to elevating the role of
the UN Security Council in legitimising international action, the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton did not initially demonstrate the same level of caution. Bush policymakers were cautious because they knew that it would not always be possible to establish and maintain a workable consensus in the UN Security Council that was consistent with U.S. national interests.20

An effort to publicly downplay the need for a Security Council resolution to prove that international action is legitimate does not signify a rejection of the UN’s general authority and role in this regard. This decreased emphasis on the role of the Security Council has been accompanied by an increased emphasis on the importance of acting in accordance with the UN Charter. As Princeton Lyman suggests, the U.S. still retains a strong interest in obtaining the “blessing” of the UN before it uses force. The result is that the U.S. will attempt to invoke the authority of existing Security Council resolutions when using force, but will not “test” the Council if a veto is at all a possibility.21

Despite their disappointments in relation to the UN, policymakers have continued their emphasis on promoting the values and norms that are embedded within multilateralism as an organising principle of international action. These principles are, in themselves, consistent with the purposes and principles that underpin the UN Charter. These principles are also consistent with policymakers’ perceptions of what would be considered to be appropriate international action for the U.S.22

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19 For a discussion of the material (utility) and ideational (appropriateness) aspects of co-operation within multilateral institutions see James March and Johan Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization, 52, 4, Autumn, 1998, 943-969.
20 This view is supported by Richard Haass who states that, “It is more difficult to use force without a UN resolution if you have tried to get one and failed, than it would be if you simply never bothered in the first place.” Haass, Interview, 1998.
21 Lyman, Interview, 1998.
Princeton Lyman suggests that adhering to the norms and principles underpinning multilateralism is considered to be particularly important in relation to the U.S. use of force in the post-Cold War world. This relates to policymakers’ concerns about potential accusations of unilateral aggression. By promoting multilateralism as an organising principle of international action, and acting in accordance with this principle, policymakers are able to claim that such action is ‘legitimate,’ despite the lack of explicit authorisation by the UN Security Council. Within this context it is the principle of multilateralism that serves to legitimate international action rather than any specific formal framework of action. Robert Gallucci supports the suggestion that the U.S. has a strong interest in promoting the idea that the use of force has greater legitimacy if it is used within a multilateral framework although he does so based on an alternative rationale. Gallucci suggests that the main benefit to be gained by promoting the principle of multilateralism is that it serves to constrain the actions of other states such as Russia.

As the cases explored within this study have demonstrated, within five years of the end of the Cold War, the optimism of policymakers in regard to the potential benefits of an increased UN role within U.S. foreign policy had largely dissipated. As policymakers attempted to pursue specific U.S. foreign policy goals through the UN in relation to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, they gradually rediscovered the limits and constraints imposed by the UN framework of multilateral action. These limits and constraints related to the need to maintain a workable consensus in the UN Security Council, and also to the organisation’s general lack of operational capacities. At the same time policymakers also recognised that as the UN

24 In his conclusion, David Hendrickson, “The Ethics of Collective Security,” Ethics and International Affairs, 7, 1993, 1-15, warns against the increasing tendency to associate multilateralism with legitimacy. Hendrickson notes that what is presented as U.S.-led multilateralism may sometimes simply be veiled U.S. unilateralism that is supported by states with an interest in maintaining good relations with the U.S. rather than a genuine shared interest in achieving a common goal.
26 See discussion on UN lack of operational capacities in Roberts, “Crisis in UN Peacekeeping,” 93-120.
framework did not fulfil their original expectations, they would again need to narrow the range of interests to which the U.S. would be willing to act to protect and promote.  

As Princeton Lyman suggests, policymakers now possess a more realistic recognition that there is no one over-arching multilateral framework through which the U.S. can act to address the complexities of the post-Cold War world. To this end, the U.S. now focuses on developing a wide range of instruments to deal with the challenges of the new era, including “other forms of multilateralism without the UN label.” In the broader context of U.S. foreign policy, promoting this principle represents a compromise between the unilateral, or alliance, tendencies of the Cold War era and the overly optimistic vision of a post-Cold War international order based on the global multilateral framework of the UN. This also represents a compromise between the U.S. adopting an isolationist role in the post-Cold War world and assuming the responsibilities of a ‘global policeman.’

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28 Lyman, Interview, 1998.
This dissertation was originally drafted just prior to the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. As such, neither the events nor their repercussions are included within the scope of this analysis. It is interesting, however, to explore at a very general level whether the U.S. response to the attack is consistent with the assumptions put forward in this study. In most respects the U.S. response has in fact been consistent with the assumptions put forward in this study, although the conservative Republican President George W. Bush has approached the UN with what could best be described as a very reluctant pragmatism.

The U.S. did not seek an explicit Security Council resolution authorising the use of force in Afghanistan, but instead argued that the action was taken in self-defence. The U.S. then led a military intervention in Afghanistan that succeeded in toppling the ruling Taliban regime and routing Al Qaeda forces. While this action was aimed at defeating a threat to U.S. military security interests, the Bush administration still presented the action as being in the pursuit of a public good. That is, the administration claimed that it was acting to defeat the terrorist threat to all states and not just the U.S. The administration also claimed a greater level of legitimacy for the military action on the basis that it was joined by the U.K. and an alliance of opposition groups in Afghanistan. The Bush administration presented the action as being a multilateral intervention in pursuit of a public good.

Once the military operation achieved its primary objective, the U.S. went to the UN to gain a Security Council resolution authorising a large scale peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. Thus the U.S. retained clear leadership and control over the use of force, and then shared the costs of the humanitarian and development mission within the UN framework.
With regard to Iraq, the Bush administration went to great lengths to secure the co-operation of other states in an effort to legitimate the military intervention. This effort extended as far as taking a draft ‘use of force’ resolution to the Security Council even though other permanent members of the Council had already threatened to veto it. The administration took this risky action because it was attempting to facilitate the co-operation of the U.K. In the end, the resolution was withdrawn from consideration and the U.S. argued that it had the authority to act under previous Council resolutions concerning Iraq.

Initially, the U.S. attempted to retain unilateral control over the reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath of the military intervention. The Bush administration has, however, become increasingly aware of the need to involve the UN deeply in this task. The involvement of the UN has not only become important in providing legitimacy to the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the need to share the costs of occupation and reconstruction is fast becoming an economic imperative. As international opposition to the military action against Iraq was so strong, other states are going to be much more likely to participate and contribute to a UN-led reconstruction operation than they would a U.S.-led effort.

In terms of further study it would be interesting to explore how the recent experience with Iraq, and the ‘war against terror’ in general, have influenced the long term views of a conservative Republican administration that entered office with a clear ideological predisposition for ‘going it alone.’ It may be the case, that a pragmatic recognition of the crucial role that both multilateralism and the UN play in meeting the myriad of new challenges and threats that characterise the post-Cold War world is gradually overcoming even the most ardent of their ideological opponents.


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