Civilising Violence:

the 'courtisation' of the military and police.

A case study of military and police officers in Australia at the turn of the twenty first century

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University.
A case study of militia and police officers
I certify that this thesis, in its entirety, is my original work.

[Signature]

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Abstract

This thesis is based on two periods of participant observation, one conducted as a 'military cadet' at the Australian Defence Force Academy, the other as a 'police recruit' at the Australian Federal Police College. The thesis attempts to provide an answer to the question of what, in pacified 'civilised' societies, shapes and motivates individuals to join state institutions of violence. It answers this by exploring the habitus of the individuals and groups involved in these figurations, as well as the development of the broader figurations within which modern military and police institutions originate, particularly processes of state formation.

The thesis builds upon Norbert Elias's influential work on the historical transformation of violence, as well as his connection of the development of individuals' sense of self and the structures of everyday interaction to large scale, long term social development.

In order to explore how state institutions of violence develop and are maintained and populated in 'civilised' societies where social violence has been increasingly 'confined to the barracks', particular attention is paid to processes of distancing, disciplining, nationalising, gendering and professionalising violence.

The thesis concludes with an outline of a possible future shaped by cosmopolitan politics, in the context of contemporary violence.
... our descendants, if humankind can survive the violence of our age, might consider us as late barbarians

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This thesis is based on two periods of participant observation. The first period was conducted in 1998 as a ‘military cadet’ during induction into the Australian Defence Force at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Australia’s tri-service officer Academy that combines military training with a university education. The second period of participant observation was conducted in 2002 as a ‘police recruit’ during induction into the Australian Federal Police at the Australian Federal Police College (AFPC), where training for all new Australian Federal Police officers takes place. The primary research question is: in pacified ‘civilised’ societies, what shapes and motivates individuals to join state institutions of violence?

This thesis argues that this question cannot be answered satisfactorily without a broad historical analysis of the development of military and police institutions, as well as the development of the habitus of the contemporary individual. Norbert Elias provides a framework for examining this issue, not only with his analysis of civilisation, but by connecting the development of individuals’ sense of self and the structures of everyday interaction to large scale, long-term social development. However, as Elias’s focus is on the gradual pacification of ever larger numbers of the population, including warriors and their evolving habitus, he does not account for how the state’s institutions of violence, the military and police, are maintained and populated as violence becomes increasingly ‘confined to the barracks’.

In Australia, as in other Western countries, the military covers a diverse range of roles and is split into three services with distinctive cultures: the Army, Navy and Air Force. Similarly, police tasks range from federal investigation to paramilitary police
and general duties policing within each Australian state and territory. The focus in this thesis in terms of the military is the Army. While ADFA is a tri service Academy, it is Army culture that is dominant because of the higher proportion of Army cadets, the proximity and influence of the adjacent Army Royal Military College and the unique influence the Army has had on the Australian psyche. For similar reasons, the focus in this thesis in terms of the police is on general duty policing. The AFPC recruits I conducted participant observation with had all signed contracts agreeing to stay in the ACT and undertake general duty police work.

While the ‘data’ utilised in this thesis is primarily narrative generated during two six week periods of participant observation at ADFA and at AFPC, secondary sources are then used to contextualise this data, in order to understand how the present came to be: in other words, to provide a ‘history of the present’ (Foucault 1977:30). Elias (1987) was critical of what he called the ‘retreat of sociologists into the present’ that became the dominant trend in the development of sociology after the Second World War resulting in the long-term transformations of social structures, and therefore of personality structures, being lost to view, and argued that as habitus and figurations were deeply connected and evolved slowly and irregularly, they could be understood only over long periods of time.

While Elias used the notion of a ‘correspondence’ between habitus and social structure in The Civilizing Process, he later adapted his position to accommodate the possibility that social habitus might change more slowly than broader figurations. Our ‘whole outlook on life’ Elias (1995:35) explains, ‘continues to be psychologically tied to yesterday’s social reality, although today’s and tomorrow’s reality already differs greatly from yesterday’s’. As will be shown throughout this thesis, this is an important insight in terms of the habitus of many military and police personnel who retain strong connections with historical emotional and ideational figurations.

**Violence and The Civilising Process**

The organisation of violence, particularly the extent to which it is monopolised by the state, permeates social relations and the habitus of contemporary people to an extent not explored in much social theory. The term violence in this thesis is restricted to
physical violence, in the same way Elias’s use of violence is concerned with physical violence, or, as he sometimes calls it, ‘physical force’ (Elias 2000:372). Elias’s *The Civilising Process* contains one of the most influential social theories of the historical transformation of violence demonstrating how, as violence comes to be monopolised by specialist groups within society, it becomes increasingly excluded from the rest of society. As a result, fewer individuals are involved in acts of violence than in previous eras and people have become more adverse to perpetuating and witnessing violence. Elias argues that the monopolisation of violence has played a decisive role in shaping individuals. In Elias’s (2000:375) words:

> Through the interdependence of larger groups of people and the exclusion of physical violence from them, a social apparatus is established in which the constraints between people are lastingly transformed into self-constraints. These self-constraints, a function of the perpetual hindsight and foresight instilled in the individual from childhood in accordance with his integration in extensive chains of action, have partly the form of conscious self-control and partly that of automatic habit. They tend towards a more even moderation, a more continuous restraint, a more exact control of drives and affects in accordance with the more differentiated pattern of social interweaving.

While Elias’s theory of civilising processes is modelled most centrally on developments in France, as well as England and Germany for comparative purposes, Elias derives more general conclusions concerning the development of social habitus throughout Western European societies (Fletcher 1997:177). I would further argue that Elias’s theory regarding the development of social habitus is relevant not only for Europe, but also for those societies that emerged from European empires, including Australia.

Norbert Elias’s influential work, *The Civilizing Process*, was first published in German in 1939, and subsequently in English in 1969. The first volume of *The Civilizing Process, The History of Manners*, traces how European standards regarding violence, sexual behaviour and other bodily activities have gradually transformed since the Middle Ages, in concert with a curbing of emotions and increasing
thresholds of shame and repugnance. Volume Two of *The Civilizing Process, State Formation and Civilization*, examines the processes causing this transformation and argues that it is related to the increasingly centralised modern state with its monopoly of violence and its associated processes of internal pacification and people’s increasing interconnectedness. Although there was considerable geographical difference in terms of the dynamics of civilising processes, the overall trend was towards increasing restraint.

As outlined in *The Civilizing Process*, by the middle of the seventeenth century, increasingly pacified states became the most prominent ‘survival units’ in Europe. Linked to this development was the social process of ‘courtisation’ where knights and warriors, and then ever expanding circles of the population, were increasingly incorporated into networks of social interaction that demanded the strict regulation of their emotions and impulses. As these internalised controls on individual behaviour became more ingrained, they increased people’s sensibility towards violence. Just as other animalistic aspects of individual behaviour come to be concealed behind the scenes of social life, so too did physical violence. Particularly important to civilising processes was the emerging distinction between the state’s military and police forces, with the military’s violence directed outwards and the police’s much more restrained violence being directed internally.

As with any influential work, Elias’s work has not been without critics. The main criticisms that have been raised in relation to Elias’s theory of civilising processes can be loosely grouped within the following areas: Elias’s coverage of civilising processes as being unilinear and ethnocentric, Elias’s neglect of religion as an influential factor in civilising processes, processes of informalisation in recent decades undermining Elias’s argument and Elias’s theoretical neglect of ongoing barbaric behaviour.

Contrary to criticism that Elias is a unilinear evolutionist, Elias claims that social processes are neither inevitable nor irreversible, stressing that social development involves diverging movements as well as movements which represent regressions and progressions. Elias argues in *The Civilizing Process* that civilised conduct, for
example, could rapidly crumble if danger was again to become as incalculable as it once was.

The claim that *The Civilizing Process* portrays an ethnocentric view of the world with Western civilisation at the top is also inaccurate. Blok, for example, has argued that as the concept of civilisation is strongly bound up with Western prejudices and feelings of superiority, Elias’s use of the term serves to legitimise the dominance of the powerful (Mennell 1989:230). When outlining the civilising processes apparent in Western societies, Elias uses the term ‘civilisation’ as a sociological construct, representing broad sweeping social and psychological change, rather than implying a value judgement in terms of the superiority of contemporary civilisation. Indeed, as quoted in the beginning of this thesis, Elias considers that our descendants may refer to us as: ‘late barbarians’.

Elias is aware of the historical connotations of the term civilisation and takes care to contextualise it sociologically. The term ‘civilisation’ was invented and conceptualised in France in the second half of the eighteenth century. Mirabeau the elder, father of the famous orator of the French Revolution, used the term to designate a society in which civil law had replaced military law, as well as to describe a group of people who were polished, refined and mannered. In the highly developed European societies between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, ‘civilisation’ changed from a concept referring to a process into a concept referring to an unchanging state (Elias 2008). Elias outlines how the concept of ‘civilisation’ expressed the attitudes, feelings and modes of behaviour that came to seem natural to members of the upper classes over the lower orders in Western societies, as well as to Western nations as a whole in relation to people in other parts of the world, leading to a sense of superiority (Elias 1996:xiv). Adam Ferguson (1995 [1767]:7), for example, was convinced that Western European history revealed a progression of the human species from a state of ‘rudeness’ to that of ‘civilisation’.

Another criticism of Elias’s theory of civilising processes is that it neglects to provide an adequate part for the role religion has had in controlling violence. Turner (2004:261), for example, argued that religious institutions need to be included in any adequate account of civilising processes. Fletcher (1997:20) adds that Elias’s
arguments would be strengthened with more explicit reference to Max Weber’s work on the Protestant Ethic. As Elias argues, however, religion’s influence is subject to historical circumstances:

Religion, the belief in the punishing or rewarding omnipotence of God, never has in itself a ‘civilizing’ or affect-subduing effect. On the contrary, religion is always exactly as ‘civilized’ as the society or class which upholds it (Elias 2000:169).

A further argument critiquing Elias is what Mennell (1989:228) labels the ‘permissive society’ argument. This involves an argument that the societal wide relaxing of manners during the twentieth century either disproves Elias’s theory that manners gradually become more proscribed or is a sign that the civilising process has gone into reverse. Wouters (1977) referred the trend of more informal, ‘natural’ behaviour, as ‘informalization’ and argued that it is a recent development in the civilising process, which started at the end of the nineteenth century and gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than reflecting a reversal of overall processes of civilisation, the relaxation of manners is only possible in societies in which a high degree of restraint is taken for granted.

The final criticism countered here is the one that Elias’s theory of civilising processes displays a naive estimation of modern society, as it neglects the barbaric dimensions. For Bauman (1989), for example, Elias’s theory of civilising processes fails to provide an adequate theory of the Holocaust because it places violence at the margins of modern society rather than at its centre. Leach further argued that at the very time Elias was formulating his theory: ‘Hitler was refuting the argument on the grandest scale’ (Mennell 1989:247). Not only was Elias intimately aware of societal violence and its impact, having fought in the First World War, experiencing the rise of Fascism in German and losing his mother at Auschwitz, a large part of his motivation in writing The Civilizing Process was to gain a better understanding of this violence. As he argues: ‘one cannot understand the breakdown of civilized behaviour and feeling as long as one cannot understand and explain how civilized behaviour and feeling came to be construed and developed in European societies in the first place’ (Elias 1996:444).
As Elias outlines in *The Civilising Process*, while violent impulses within state-societies have decreased, violence in relations between states has persisted. The same countries that dramatically reduced frequencies of homicide, assault, and violent struggles for local political power simultaneously built the world’s greatest and most destructive military forces. In aggregate terms, the twentieth century was more violent than any century in documented human history (Tilly 2003:61). For example, the period between the outbreak of World War I and the collapse of socialism, including the subsequent wars in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe, resulted in an estimated 187 million violent deaths, making it ‘the most murderous century of which we have record, both by the scale, frequency and length of the warfare which filled it’ (Hobsbawm n.d.).

The nature of this violence, however, has changed. Elias illustrates how the general trend since the Middle Ages has been for individuals to react to violence more negatively. The venting of aggression has become much more disciplined, circumscribed and impersonal, without the same degree of immediacy and intensity of the affective discharge of the Middle Ages. War, for example, has become more structured and rationalised and, compared to the ‘battle fury of Abyssinian warriors’ or the ‘frenzy of the tribes at the time of the Great Migrations’, ‘the aggressiveness of even the most warlike nations of the civilized world appears subdued’ (Elias 2000:161). Nuclear weapons epitomise this change in the nature of violence for while they have the power to violently destroy entire civilisations, they do so impersonally without the affective intensity displayed during earlier eras.

Even with the changing nature of violence, reluctance to partake in violent behaviour can be evidenced with the enormous effort required by the state to obtain support for violence from the population generally, and particularly to encourage and recruit the manpower required to fight its wars.

**The state’s institutions of violence and the problem of manpower**

The only thing which no state, not even the Leviathan, can do is to force people to kill and be willing to be killed (Hobbes, paraphrased by Hobsbawm 2000:33).
The ‘extraction-coercion cycle’: the process in which taxes were extracted by the state to purchase armies, whose coercive leverage allowed the extraction of higher taxes which paid for more troops, in a continuous cycle, meant that war increasingly demanded the involvement and activity of larger and larger numbers of people. A critical issue for the military, and later the police, became the acquisition of ‘manpower’: literally men for the most part.

There are deeply ingrained cultural assumptions in Western societies that explain why the issue of why men fight is not one that has traditionally been seen as needing much explanation. The assumption that men are naturally aggressive is deeply rooted in Western culture. Freud, for example, claimed in *Civilization and its Discontents* that man has an ‘inclination to aggression’ and is: ‘a savage beast to whom consideration to his own kind is something alien’ (1949:58). While men are stereotyped as naturally aggressive, however, women are stereotyped as naturally passive and peaceful, gendered cultural assumptions Elshtain (1987) refers to as ‘just warriors’ and ‘beautiful souls’.

However, as instinctive theories of aggression came to be increasingly ridiculed in the course of the twentieth century and issues around attracting and retaining military and police personnel became more of a science, research has been conducted into why individuals choose to join these institutions. The vast majority of this research is centred on the extent to which those joining the police, and particularly the military, are motivated by traditional ‘institutional’ reasons such as patriotism or are increasingly motivated by ‘occupational’ reasons such as job security (see, for example, Moskos 1986, Segal 1986).

While the civilising process has no doubt made it increasingly the case, there is much historical evidence indicating that compelling men to fight is difficult. Despite allegations such as Bourke’s (1999:80) that ‘prior to the twentieth century, the professional military had regarded the stimulation of murderous aggression in soldiers as a relatively simple matter’, there is ample historical evidence that it has not, in fact, been quite so simple. Throughout history, men have attempted various means of evasion, including flight, prison, self-mutilation, feigning illness, insanity or sexual deviance, hiring surrogates, deserting and even committing suicide. Often
when men have fought they have done so under the influence of mood-altering substances or under threat of lethal violence from their superiors (Kovitz 2003:5). In the fourth century special sanctions had to be introduced against families who cut off their sons’ thumbs to invalidate them (Drake 2001:76).

With the end of conscription and the development of the all-volunteer force in Australia, as elsewhere, the military has had to compete with the civilian sphere in seeking to attract and retain personnel. Demographic changes such as Australia’s ageing population and declining fertility rates (Lynch 2005), together with a growing reluctance by young people to commit themselves to institutions such as the military and police have made it increasingly difficult for the military and police to attract members.

One of the most fundamental shifts in recent decades has been a widespread withdrawal of loyalty from public authorities. As Hobsbawm (2000:37) outlines, the individual’s readiness to accept a higher authority can no longer be taken for granted. One of the most influential theories offered to explain this cultural change in contemporary societies is Inglehart’s ‘value shift’ theory. Inglehart (1990:5) argues that there has been a movement from an ‘elite-directed’ to an ‘elite-challenging’ outlook whereby individuals with post-materialist values are less likely to accept orders from authorities which do not permit their participation in decisional processes. This suspicion of existing authority has especially strong anti-military overtones (Janowitz 1976:200). By its very nature military service, and to a lesser extent police service, restricts many of the individual freedoms that liberal societies place a premium on.

Today’s citizen is frequently described by what has been called the ‘unencumbered self’: individuals who are not tied to family or community commitments (Morgan 2003:379). Radical dissent, beginning in the 1960s, has led to the unprecedented embracement of values such as independence, individualism, equality, and self-expression at the expense of values such as loyalty, obedience, discipline and responsibility. Surveys indicate that, compared to previous young generations, the generation commonly referred to as ‘Generation X’, an age cohort in which all but a handful of my research subjects fall, tends to be less engaged politically or civically,
more materialistic, exhibit less social trust or confidence in government and show a weaker allegiance to their country (Bachman, Freedman-Doan et al. 2000:265). This age cohort has experienced the breakdown of the nuclear family, the legacy of the unpopular Vietnam War, and the absence of war or any other major social or political upheaval that could have formed a collective outlook. In addition, Generation X have experienced enormous economic prosperity juxtaposed against the growing uncertainties of globalisation and the erosion of traditional bases of identity (Bachman, Freedman-Doan et al. 2000:265).

Identity and motivation to serve in the state’s institutions of violence

With God, Caesar and the certainties of Kant’s categorical ethics swept away, the onus is on us to forge our own subjectivity (Lash and Friedman 1992:5).

Given the increasing distaste for perpetrating expressive violence that has accompanied the civilising process, as well as the disincentives outlined above, the concern of this thesis is to outline the motivation involved by those who do join these institutions, as well as to illustrate how that motivation is shaped. Motivation is taken to mean the factors that lead individuals to express aspirations, make choices, and assume behavioural attitudes and is fundamentally linked to the construction of identities (Battistelli 1997:464). Understanding motivation is one of the most interesting and challenging issues facing the social sciences.

The following chapter summaries outline the key themes identified during my research as relevant in attempting to understand the motives and processes of identity construction that unfolded in the narratives of ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits.

Thesis structure

Chapter One: Situating violence

Chapter One begins by situating the study of the military and police within social theory. The chapter then moves on to outline the figurations that will be utilised in this thesis to explore the issue of state violence, including situating the individual, the
nation state and the military and police historically as well as in relation to each other. The gendered embodied nature of contemporary individuals is outlined as these identities are particularly pertinent in analysing the military and police.

*Chapter Two: Methodology: analysing figurations*

Chapter Two outlines the figurational approach this thesis takes to the study of the cadets and recruits at ADFA and AFPC. Historically and theoretically contextualising the narratives that I gathered during participant observation enabled an analysis of the nature of the figurations of which my research subjects are part of. This chapter explains the characteristics of the research settings, the characteristics of my research subjects, my own vantage point and the resulting fieldwork roles I was able to take on in each setting and outlines the impact this had in terms of issues of involvement and detachment and therefore, the type of ‘data’ I was able to glean from each setting.

*Chapter Three: Distancing violence*

Chapter Three refutes the idea that people who join organisations such as the military or police are either naturally aggressive or attracted to violence. This chapter traces how the civilising process effects an increasing distaste for affective violence and how the connected processes of state formation lead to a decrease in violence within state territories and an increase in violence external to its borders. The argument presented is that the state’s agents of violence remained ‘civilised’ members of their states by distancing themselves from the violence inflicted and the people it is inflicted on. It is technological and social developments and the distancing effect they have for the agents of state violence that have enabled them to inflict the scale of violence they have, despite the increasing empathy people generally have for each other as a result of civilising processes.

*Chapter Four: Disciplining violence*

In a similar fashion to the courtisation of the warrior nobility that Elias outlines during the Middle Ages, cadets and recruits are ‘courtised’ during induction into ADFA and AFPC. ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits increasingly exert control over their emotions, monitor their own actions and those of others, and internalise a detailed set of rules about what constitutes appropriate behaviour in their new
environment. Chapter Four argues that it is the disciplined structure in institutions such as ADFA and AFPC that is one of the attractions for new members.

Chapter Five: Nationalising violence

Nationalism, one of the most powerful social beliefs of the twentieth century, came to play a crucial part in individual identity-formation of individuals and provided ample motivation for millions of people to risk their lives for their nation. Chapter Five traces the development of nationalism, particularly its linkages with concepts of citizenship and modern mass warfare, originating with the French Revolution, and argues that despite the challenge that various global processes pose to the significance of the nation state for contemporary individuals, a motivating national 'we' identity can still be found among ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits.

Chapter Six: Gendering violence

In order to encourage soldiers to fight, a diverse array of cultures have developed gender roles that link masculinity to the warrior-hero and femininity to roles supporting this concept. One of the central images of masculinity in the Western cultural tradition is the warrior-hero; from Achilles to James Bond. Chapter Six argues that the warrior role still holds an attraction for many men as evidenced, among other ways, by intense opposition to the introduction of women. The warrior identity can be seen to play a motivational role in desires by predominantly male, but increasingly female, cadets and recruits to be part of military and police institutions.

Chapter Seven: Professionalising violence

Professional groups develop a sense of organisational identity that contributes to their members' self conceptions. Chapter Seven outlines the development of the military and police profession and illustrates the motivations ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits have for committing to these institutions, including: the security provided, the unique lifestyle involved, the camaraderie in evidence as well as the perceived desirable identity provided by such institutions. As will also be demonstrated; to the extent that processes of professionalisation have threatened to undermine the heroic nature of the role of military and police personnel, they are heavily resisted.
Conclusion: Cosmopolitan violence

Chapter Eight introduces the concept of cosmopolitanism, with a view to consolidating the different concepts explored throughout the thesis. Through investigating the identities of ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits in the context of military and police identities and processes of state formation and the monopolisation of violence as these processes impact on individual identity, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that there is nothing inevitable about the present structures in society or the individual identities that structure society.
Chapter One: Situating Violence

This chapter begins by situating the study of the military and police within social theory. The argument presented is that much of social theory, including sociology, has neglected to analyse state violence, particularly its 'productive' aspects. The chapter then moves on to outline the figurations that will be utilised in this thesis to explore the issue of state violence. This includes situating the individual, the nation state and the military and police historically as well as in relation to each other.

As Elias illustrates, despite the increasing tendency of individuals to perceive themselves as separate from other individuals, they can only be understood in relation to each other, as part of broader figurations. The gendered embodied nature of contemporary individuals is outlined as these are particularly pertinent aspects of identity in analysing the military and police. The state is then examined in terms of the development of its monopolisation of physical violence, including the impact this monopoly of violence has had on the individual’s capacity for self discipline, as well as the development of the state’s institutions of violence, the military and police.

The obscuration of the military and police in the social sciences

A curious oversight

A scrutiny of school textbooks on social studies or introductions to sociology must give the impression that the societies we live in have neither armed forces nor police (Joas 2003:29).
While war and military developments have had a massive impact on society and have had a major influence on other institutions in society, the importance of these aspects of social life is only beginning to be analysed within sociology.

There is an enormous amount of general literature on war and militarism, far greater than that dealing with policing. As Hackett (1986) outlines, ‘war, men fighting other men, has been more written up in verse than any other topic in the history of man’s civilisation’. However, despite assertions such as Van Doorn’s (1975:vii) that the study of the military is at the heart of the analysis of macro-sociology, it has been largely neglected in scholarly analysis.

Weber recognised the historical significance of military institutions, drawing upon the Prussian Army in his general model of bureaucratic organisation and argued that ‘no special proof is necessary to show that military discipline is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory, as it was for the ancient plantation’ (1968:1153,1156). However, as a very small proportion of Weber’s work is devoted to military themes, the multitude of Weber’s disciples failed to explore this issue (Janowitz 1976:188).

Marx also recognised the role that military models had for later industrial capitalist forms, as demonstrated by the frequent use of military analogies when describing industrial processes: ‘masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants’ (Marx and Engels 1979 [1848]:87,88). However, because Marx did not believe that workers in different countries would ever go to war against each other, he neglected a full analysis of one of the principle activities of most capitalist states (Hacker and Hacker 1987:747).

Policing is a subject that has also been highly visible in society. Since the eighteenth century, crime and its control have had a high public profile and police practices have regularly made the news. There has, however, been a relative neglect of the systematic study of police in the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century (Rawlings 2002:4). Studies of the police focus mainly on their treatment of offenders, or the impact on the liberty of the rest of society, and the focus tends to be on the
violent behaviour of individual criminals or individual police officers rather than the origins of state violence (Finnane 1987:7).

An optimistic theory of pacific capitalism

The primary reason for the underdevelopment of theoretical discussion of state violence is that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ‘civilisation’ has generally had a normative dimension that opposes it to war, associating it instead with commerce, science, technology and intellectual progress, leading to what Mann (1984:25) has called ‘an optimistic theory of pacific capitalism’. In this liberalist world view, wars and violent domestic conflicts appeared as relics of an age that had not yet been replaced by a commercial, peaceful society. Early liberals regarded contemporary wars as either the product of the aristocratic military spirit or the uncontrolled whims of despots which, as recently as the First World War, were viewed as relics of primitive stages of humankind (Joas 2003:30). Sociology, a product of the rise of industrial capitalist society in the West in societies with a strong liberal tradition, similarly tended to view industrial society as an inherently transnational order in which inter-state rivalry and warfare would disappear. Further, some sociologists have believed that to study and analyse military institutions might have the objectionable consequence of strengthening the role of military leaders and militaristic forces (Cumming 2002).

Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer perpetuated the peace-orientated thinking of the Enlightenment by attempting to prove the peaceful character of the nascent industrial society. Spencer (1897) argued that a warlike ‘military society’ was being replaced by an inherently pacific ‘industrial society’. Durkheim asserted that: ‘War except for some passing setbacks ... has become more and more intermittent and less common’ (Durkheim 1957:53). Durkheim’s theory of social evolution allocates little importance to military power in either traditional or modern societies. Marxism, similarly, is a descendant of this liberal world-view in relation to its faith in a peaceful future, envisaging that after the violence required for the worldwide revolution, a social order in which violence would no longer be an issue would emerge.
There was resistance to this optimistic thinking from anti-liberals like Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, who stressed the continued vitality of militaristic currents in contemporary society and argued that a peaceful civilisation and the disappearance of warlike virtues would lead to a general decline in morals and a rise of softness and effeminacy (Joas 2003:31). Ironically, as these theorists belonged to the defeated powers of the two world wars, their work was largely suppressed (Mann 1988:126). In their analysis, as with much analysis on the subject, the contention was that as war and conflict within and between groups has always existed because it corresponds either to innate aggressive tendencies in human beings or inevitable clashes of interest between them (Giddens 1985:30).

The mainstream of sociological writing has tended to retain this idea of a basic opposition between militarism and industrial capitalism. This view is exemplified by the political scientist Fukuyama, who argues that we have reached the ‘end of history’ and that contemporary European/American political institutions are the desired endpoint of human development. Fukuyama argues that the battle of Jena in 1806, when Napoleon defeated the Prussian monarchy, marks the consolidation of the liberal-democratic state, and that ‘the principles and privileges of citizenship in a democratic state only have to be extended’ (Katsiaficas 2003:347).

**The current state of military and police theory**

One academic discipline in which the military does occupy a central place is International Relations which is founded in part on the assumption that war is a natural phenomenon. International Relations is dominated by a ‘Realist’ paradigm in which the world is characterised as an international state of anarchy, controlled only by balances of power and by threats and acts of war (George 1994:222). Since Elias, recent historical sociology has also emphasised the state and conflict as important determinants of human history. This includes the work of sociologists such as Michael Mann (1986) and Charles Tilly (1992). However, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, like International Relations, Historical Sociology tends to take for granted that armies serve as instruments of their governments.

Academic military history has experienced tremendous growth since the 1960s resulting in what is referred to as ‘the new military history’. This history has gone
beyond the analytic-utilitarian tradition of lessons and principles and the narrative-memoir tradition, and instead is 'directed by human curiosity about wider issues and by a sense of its relevance to the nature and development of society as a whole' (Travers 1992:35). However, there have been few studies of the values and role of the professional soldier, of the sociology of the military or of relations between the armed forces and society at large. The armed forces themselves have tended to regard navel-gazing as an unproductive activity and even as potentially counter-productive (Smith 1988a:ii).

Military sociology emerged as a viable academic field in the 1960s. Janowitz is commonly described as the field’s founder, with his analysis of the military in The Professional Soldier helping to legitimate the study of military personnel, institutions and society. However, military sociology, like military history, has tended not to incorporate aspects of gender into its analysis. Despite Moskos’s (n.d.:9875) observation that ‘between 1995 and 2000 more books were written on gender than on any other topic on armed forces’, gender remains a marginal concept in the dominant traditions of military sociology. De Pauw (1998:xiii) argues that feminist historians find military history unattractive, preferring instead to focus on women as nurturers and peacemakers. Much of the analysis that has occurred involves discussions of the presence and role of women in the military and their right and capacity to fight. That said, even this level of analysis has failed to occur in Australia. Much literature on military and war, if it mentions women at all, contains only brief references to their marginal involvement rather than involving any systematic analysis of the impact of gender on the military and war.

Traditional theorising on the police has been dominated by consensus historians who imply that policing is part of the natural order of things or those who take the police to be the unquestioning instruments of a capitalist state or of dominant economic interests and therefore focus on the instrumental and repressive functions of the police (Finnane 1987:7). These analyses neglect the historical construction of policing in modern societies as well as the ‘productive’ aspects of the power operating through policing.
The sociology of policing began with the pioneering efforts in the 1960s of theorists like Skolnick and Westley (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:41). Interest in the area of policing was assisted by the adolescence of the ‘baby boomers’ and their rebellious, crime-prone years which led to the injection of large sums of money into the criminal justice system and a rapid increase in the numbers of police officers. As a result, policing suddenly became much more visible as an academic topic requiring examination. In studying policing theorists operating within the Western liberal tradition have tended to take the side of the underdog; the ‘victims’ of the exercise of overwhelming power and authority wielded by the state (Loader and Walker 2007:28). As a result, the application of concepts of ‘culture’ to an understanding of police behaviour and misbehaviour has been a distinctive component of this scholarship. James and Warren (1995:3) argue that few social control agencies have been subject to quite the same degree of cultural analysis as the police have in recent years.

The neglect of sociologists in examining the important roles that war, militarism, and militarisation have played in the development of society and the state has meant that criminologists have neglected the pervasive influence that the same paradigm has had on the police (Kraska 1999:205).

Habitus, figurations and the civilising process

The individualisation of individuals

‘Cogito ergo sum’. What can be more absurd! (Elias 2007:15).

The relationship between social structure and agency has been highlighted as one of the central problematics of sociology. Marx (1955:141), for example, provided a powerful argument for the significance of structure in social life: ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness’, Thomas and Thomas (1928:572) argued for the significance of the subjective in social life: ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. It is this duality apparent in much social theory that Elias critiques, explains and overcomes.
When Descartes wrote his famous sentence ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ – I think therefore I am – he was the initiate of a growing shift of emphasis in the human self-image, a shift towards an image of the individual as separate from society (Elias 1991:197). Elias (1991:104) suggests that Descartes’s anxiety over the ability to know the ‘self’, expressed in his argument that there was nothing certain about the self except that one exists, was a reflection of fading religious certainties about the self and the world. With the disruption of medieval Catholicism by the spread of Renaissance secular culture and the Protestant reformation, long-established and powerful ideals were also disrupted. The new emphasis on individuality of expression and on each person’s unmediated relationship with God helped in the creation of the concept of an autonomous individualised self (Connell 1995:188).

The civilising process itself, Elias argues, produced a capsule or wall around individual experience leading to a division between the inner individual world and the external social world. This division was reproduced within sociological theory itself. Social theorists increasingly abandoned holistic conceptions of society, and instead began focusing on new ideas of political and economic individualism. The impact of these ideas was profound, with political individualism at the basis of the American and French revolutions, and economic individualism providing the ideological foundation for the Industrial Revolution (Reus-Smit 2002:138).

The image of the individual as a free, independent being, a ‘closed personality’ separate from all other people is something Elias (1978:119) calls ‘homo clausus’. Although Elias does not question that the sense of the self inside its container looking out at society is very real as a mode of self-experience in modern societies, he argues that it is an illusion (Mennell 1989:193). Elias demonstrates how this dual aspect of the human self-image arises in a world where state pacification enables people to be part of more complex networks of social interdependence, thus needing greater powers of foresight to plan and coordinate their activities in order to orientate themselves more effectively to the conduct of other people. This in turn makes people more aware of themselves as objects of observation and thus as individuals who are separate and distinguishable from those around them (Burkitt 1994:17).
In the course of state pacification, with functions of protection and control transferring from the local level to the centralised state, traditional *Gemeinschaft* relationships are undermined, ‘freeing’ individuals to make their own decisions. In traditional societies, identities were received automatically through ritual practices which connected people to the reproduction of long established social positions whereas in contemporary society self-identity is more deliberative (Shilling 1993:181). The era in which Descartes emphasised the individual basis of perception and formulated his famous theory of existence is the same era in which national states and collective identity were first emerging. It is around this time that many compound words in English that begin with ‘self’ first made their appearance, including; ‘self-interest’, ‘self-conscious’, ‘self-respect’ and ‘selfish’ (Braudy 2003:163). Elias (1991:120,139) argues that people in the West no longer ‘think and act primarily from the ‘we’ standpoint’ as they did in earlier ‘closely knit communities’, where the individual was in ‘the constant presence of others and had ‘the knowledge of being tied to others for life’, and this has led to a process he calls the ‘individualization of individuals’ (Elias 1991:140).

An alternative way of conceptualising the relationship between individuals and society is by linking changes in personality structure to changes in the broader societal structure. It is this conception, that Elias calls ‘homines aperti’ – ‘open people’ – that underlies *The Civilizing Process*. Rather than seeing individuals as having separate identities which then interact with each other, Elias argues that individuals can only be understood in their interdependences with each other, as part of networks of social relations, or what he refers to as ‘figurations’.

**The relationship between habitus and figurations**

Sociological theory can be seen as an inquiry into the relationship between three dichotomies: nature and culture, the individual and society, and that of mind and body (Turner 1986:2). The work of Norbert Elias can be used to help overcome what Elias calls ‘the either-or approach’ to considerations of the individual and society, as well as the dichotomous split between nature and culture and the mind and body found in much social theory, as outlined in the next section.
Social figurations form the basis of Elias’s work. While figurations have a relative independence of particular individuals, they are not independent of individuals. Their shape is constantly changing as a result of the fluctuating relations of interdependence people enter into. The nature of the modern subject’s ‘way of seeing’ emerges out of the figurations they interact within. It is the increased tendency of people to mould themselves and others more deliberately than in the Middle Ages that makes the study of people in figurations increasingly vital (Elias 2000:67).

The word ‘habitus’, by which Elias means ‘second nature’, is a Latin term that gained currency among academics in the Middle Ages. Habitus can be described as embodied history, internalised as second nature and coming to feel so natural that its historical contingency is forgotten. In Volume I of The Civilizing Process Elias, basing his evidence on European manners books from the Middle Ages to the Victorian period, outlines how changing habits of eating, spitting and defecating, for example, came to be hidden behind the scenes of social life, becoming second nature. In a similar way, the states’ means of violence came to be confined to barracks, despite continuing to exert a ‘civilising’ pressure on the habitus of people within its borders (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998:16).

It is the concept of identity that will be used in this thesis, rather than the closely related term habitus. This is because it is a more commonly used concept and one more consciously employed to refer to perceptions people share on the basis of group membership (Mennell 1994:177). Identities are highly valued fictions that have consequences for the interactants and the course of the interaction. As Gecas and Burke (1995:43) outline, identity categories:

- enable us to put names to ourselves and to others, form some idea of who we are and who other people are, and ascertain the place we occupy along with other people in the world and in society. Lastly, as a means of recognizing the members of a particular group ... identity provides the framework for interpreting, predicting or managing our behaviour or that of other people.
Identities are formed reflexively through the continual reordering of self-narratives by drawing on a myriad of social identities, including embodied and gendered identities, as outlined in the following section.

**Civilised sexed bodies and gendered embodied figurations**

The nature/culture dichotomy is the underlying problematic of much sociological debate, especially with respect to the issue of unpacking the concept of 'gender' (Turner 1986:2). Gender, as feminist scholars have amply demonstrated, is a pivotal feature of social life and one of the central organising principles around which modern subjectivities revolve. The mind/body dichotomy is also central to sociology, despite being the most underdeveloped topic of meta theory, with social science only developing a focus on embodiment late in the twentieth century. Social theory is still predominantly based on Descartes's conception of a sharp split between the knowing, reasoning mind and the mechanical, unreasoning body (Turner 1996:9).

Elias (1986:269) acknowledges that sociology is a discipline replete with patriarchal assumptions, giving the example of Comte who saw women as 'intellectually inferior' to men and believed that the family was necessarily based on the dominance of the husband. Although aware that these assumptions continued to pervade sociology, Elias's focus was also on men and the violence perpetrated by men, usually against other males, in processes of state formation (Fletcher 1997:48-50). While it is interesting to note that Elias was interested in gender – a typescript of a book he wrote on the subject of the changing balance of power between the sexes was accidentally destroyed (Mennell 1989:131) – the 'individual' in Elias's theory is implicitly male (van Krieken 1990).

Prior to the eighteenth century, women were regarded as different from men in the sense of being incomplete or inferior examples of men rather than as having qualitatively different characteristics. This conception accompanied the bourgeois ideology of 'separate spheres' in the nineteenth century (Connell 1995:69). In *Making Sex*, Laqueur (1990), drawing on the writings of anatomists, physicians, biologists and philosophers, describes how a single-sex model of male and female came to be superseded by a double-sex model sometime in the eighteenth century. The concept
of gender is critical to any analysis of the military and police as these institutions are deeply associated with masculinity.

The term ‘masculine’ is developed from the conception of individuality that developed in early-modern Europe with the growth of colonial empires and capitalist economic relations. Individualism and the concept of an autonomous self was a cultural prerequisite for the idea of masculinity defining a type of person whose gendered character was the primary reason for his actions (Connell 1995:186). An example demonstrating the development of the principle of individual masculinity being defined by an individual’s actions in England is the response given to the Duke of Orleans’ inquiry during his regency into the distinguishing characteristics of European nations. The Duke was told that while in France it was a question of whether a man was known at court and in Holland a question of what property he possesses, in England it was a question of what sort of man he was (McGregor 2003:152).

Masculinity is relational to the concept of ‘femininity’. Whatever the variation by race, class, age, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, being a man meant not being like a woman. This notion of anti-femininity continues to lie at the heart of contemporary conceptions of manhood (Kimmel 2005b:31). Conceptions of masculine identity have only recently been recognised as important themes in Australian cultural history. Lake (1986:116), for example, argued that men in Australian history have been treated as ‘sex-less’ universal subjects, rather than as pursuing particular ‘masculinist’ gender interests, along with class and race concerns. Lake’s primary contention is that ‘gender-blind’ historiography has ignored masculinity as a social and political construction that requires any type of historical explanation.

The body is critical to the conceptualisation of the ways in which gendered identities are formed and performed. It is an object laboured over in order to conform to idealised views of appropriate masculinity or femininity. The body has traditionally be seen as an aspect of nature, a ‘given’ governed by processes only marginally subject to human intervention. The triumph of rationality, belonging to the soulful essence of thought, over the emotions, belonging to the automatic responses of the body, was characterised during the Enlightenment as the victory of civilised humanity.
over the physical order of the animal kingdom. Adam Smith, for example, claimed in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* that people should not express strong desires of the body. Reason then came to be experienced in opposition to emotions and the mind in opposition to the body (Burkitt 1994:18).

While social constructionists, such as Robert Connell, identify how major inequalities within society are based on socially determined criteria without foundation in the body, they have little to say about how bodies have become what Shilling (1993:125) refers to as ‘reflexively organised projects’. The body as central to the lives of embodied subjects is prominent in the work of both Foucault and Goffman. As Foucault (1977:136) explains:

> The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power ... the great book of man the machine was written simultaneously on two registers: Descartes’s anatomico-metaphysical and the techno-political ... which was constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the Army, school and hospital for controlling or correcting the operations of the body.

However, Foucault’s epistemological view of the body means that it can tend to disappear as a material phenomenon (Shilling 1993:87).

Goffman demonstrates how individuals use their bodies as a resource in exercising agency to control and facilitate social interaction. He outlines how the body enters into the maintenance of social relations of dominance and subordination such as, for example, when men open doors for women. As Goffman (1974:196) argues, ‘men often treat women as faulted actors with respect to ‘normal’ capacity for various forms of physical exertion’. However, Goffman tends to see biology as a given and fails to link the body management of individuals to broader macro social processes.

Elias’s view of the body as simultaneously social and biological, and requiring extensive education before being accepted into society, illustrates the increasing importance of the body to people. His civilising theory contains a theory of the development of what Shilling (1993:150) refers to as ‘civilized bodies’. Within civilising processes, as individuals become more aware of themselves and others as
separate entities, they exert more control over their bodies. While the ‘uncivilised’ body of medieval times was only weakly demarcated from its social and natural environment and gave immediate expression to emotions, the ‘civilised’ body places greater focus on manners and conduct and has a greater control over its functions (Shilling 1993:164).

It is with the greater control of the body that there also emerges a demand for people to treat themselves as objects of reflection, to look at themselves more objectively and to plan their actions and responses with greater foresight. From the intensified control of the body emerges the mental processes of foresight and planning alongside the growing importance of the body to people’s sense of self-identity (Burkitt 1994:21).

Just as Elias’s study of ‘court society’ and Foucault’s study of the ‘Panopticon’ are paradigmatic case studies that highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question, similarly military and police settings provide paradigmatic case studies for illustrating the importance of gender and embodiment to the development of contemporary subjectivity. Being such masculine institutions, the military and police provide ideal arenas for studying how gendered subjectivities are perpetuated and forged. The body is central to this process. It is through the body that the transformation from civilian to military or police officer is experienced and expressed, with a key issue in this socialisation process being the way in which the individuals involved control their bodies while they are being controlled by others. As military and police power is produced in the exercise of bodies, the bodies of military and police personnel become, quite literally, tools of their trade.

**Obedience, discipline and state institutions of violence**

**Obedience and discipline**

We do not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the ‘will to govern’ (Rose and Miller 1992:191).

As Aiwa Ong (1999:50) argues, ‘we have paid very little attention to the ethnography of the state as an institution of government producing society’. Neglect of this type of
systematic theorisation has impacted on research in the area of the military and police. How human beings are constituted into individual subjects by the state is a crucial aspect in any consideration of the motivation of police and military personnel to be willing to place themselves in harm’s way. Historical sociologists such as Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, while emphasising the importance of military force and warfare in the process of early modern state formation, tend to accept that armies served as instruments of their governments.

De la Bôetie first pursued the problem of how men could be persuaded to fight and die in his *Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*, originally published in 1577, amidst the French Wars of Religion, by asking, not how domination could be achieved, but why obedience was achievable (Drake 2001:3). The problem of obedience in early modernity was general, rather than specifically military, as is evidenced by the level of violence and number of civil wars.

The concept of ‘police’ is useful for understanding the underlying aspects of civilising processes. While the concept of police was supplanted by that of civilisation, which came to be linked to liberalism, the components of police are readily apparent in ‘civilised’ societies. From the early sixteenth century, the notion of ‘police and good order’ became prevalent. The rationale for this ‘art’ of government was that the pursuit of the health, wealth and well-being of society required the efficient regulation of areas of social life by an exhaustive policy of investigation, supervision and control by authorities invested with the power to carry out such functions in order to ‘produce a well ordered civic or territorial community’ (Oestreich 1982:156). As Foucault (1977:169) argues, the eighteenth century was shaped by a military dream of the perfect society, a dream which consisted of the ‘meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine’, ‘permanent coercions’, ‘indefinitely progressive forms of training’ and ‘automatic docility’.

The purpose of the state has ostensibly been increasingly tied to the interests of citizens and the protection of their civil and political rights. As the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen declared, ‘The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man’ (Reus-Smit 2002:138). To make sense of the processes of the formation of contemporary
liberal democratic political communities, it is important to examine the practices seeking to shape political subjects, their capacities and attributes, as well as those seeking to guarantee their rights and liberties (Dean 1994:163).

Elias and Foucault are useful theorists for pursuing the issue of obedience and discipline as, despite their vast theoretical differences, they share a similar concern with the social history of subjectivity. Both theorists illustrate how the power in play in modern societies is rooted not externally, but in identity formation mechanisms. Foucault examined the role played by disciplinary techniques on individual subjectivity, highlighting the importance of the regulation of subjectivity and the production of ‘docile bodies’ for our understanding of the early modern state. As he outlines when talking about the concept of discipline: ‘There are two meanings of the word, subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ (Foucault 1982:206). Foucault traces the transition from a social order based the former meaning; that of external constraint, to one based on the latter meaning; one that is dependent on the internalisation of constraint. In a similar vein Elias (2000:478) argues that from the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance on, ‘there was a particularly strong shift in individual self-control – above all, in self-control acting independently of external agents as a self-activating automatism’.

Foucault outlines how forms of governmental power link together the disciplinary strategies of various organisations, including the knowledge produced about people by the social sciences as well as the independent strategies of individuals and groups, and links this form of governance with liberal and neo-liberal political thought. The workings of this type of governmental power is dependent on those over whom power is exercised as possessing agency, which then opens up ‘a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions’ (Foucault 1982:220). Foucault explains that power is ‘always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (cited in van Krieken 1996:204).

It is processes of individuation, which grew with the growth of universal citizenship, that make this technique possible. Individuation refers to bureaucratic practices and
disciplines which individuate citizens for the purposes of exact taxation, social regimentation and political surveillance (Turner 1986:10-12). As outlined above, Elias argues that one of the main attributes of the state, is its capacity to ‘individualize’, in other words to create separation between people and their family, tribe or other ‘pre-state units’ (Elias 1991:180) and treat them according to the state’s own rules and categories. Power in institutions and organisations is thus not the cause of human actions and subjective identities, but its consequence.

Elias emphasises that self-discipline in industrialised countries constitutes one of the most important paradigms of the direction of development characteristic of the civilising process (Elias 1984: xxxiv-xxxvii). What is established with the monopolisation of physical violence in the pacified social spaces is a dispassionate self-control. The controlling agency forming itself as part of the individual’s personality structure corresponds to the controlling agency forming itself in society at large (Elias 1998:58).

The state and its monopoly of violence

The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory ... the state is considered to be the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence (Weber 1948b:78).

Despite its representation as timeless in some strands of social theory, the state is a comparatively recent form of political community, generally dated from the 1648 treaty of Westphalia. Max Weber was one of the first theorists to explicitly define states in terms of their relationship to violence. The monopoly of physical force that Weber refers to in the above quotation describes the result of the processes involved in the seventeenth to the nineteenth century where the modern state wrested the ‘right’ to use violence from dispersed centres of power and authority and consolidated for itself the institutional resources required to secure its external borders and internal population.
While Weber explores how nation states came to be seen as legitimate holders of force, Elias focuses on the organisation and nature of violence more broadly, including the increasing importance of the state in the organisation of that violence. While Weber’s focus, in his widely accepted definition of the state quoted above, is on ‘the state’, as is much of social theory, Elias traces the process of state formation in the development of the monopoly over the means of violence by a centralised state authority. As will be outlined further on in the thesis, while Weber defined the state as an organisation which successfully upholds a claim to binding rule-making over a territory by commanding a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, Elias places an equal emphasis on the significance of taxation for the state in enabling it to organise violence.

It was with the development of large scale agricultural establishments tying the fate of entire groups to a common site that survival came to depend upon the ability to remain in a single place, thereby increasing people’s sense of territoriality (Gabriel 1990:31). The production of a food surplus then enabled the emergence of a specialist class of warriors who took no direct part in the production of food, and instead provided the physical security necessary for the regular production of a food surplus (Mennell 1990:360-361). States then formed around this territorial dependence with armed forces, and then police forces, emerging alongside state development.

Between the seventeenth to twentieth centuries, people inhabiting ‘national’ areas came to be known as a nation (Mann 1988:140). International recognition that nationhood and the nation-state had become the norm was an outcome of World War I, with the enshrinement of the ‘nationhood’ of states as a global principle in the post war congress (Giddens 1985:232).

The processes of state development that Elias outlines have led to an increase in the power of states. The contemporary state can assess and tax income and wealth without consent, store and recall a massive amount of information about people and penetrate everyday life in a way not possible in previous eras (Mann 1988:6). It was predominantly the military imperatives of the twentieth century that dramatically increased the surveillance capacities of the modern state, particularly during the two World Wars of the twentieth century. The state subjected society to detailed
regulation, for example, in the requisition of manpower for the armed forces, the registration and allocation of the adult population to priority sectors of the war economy, the regulation of the production and distribution of goods and services, and the surveillance of domestic public opinion (Dandeker 1994a:357).

As a result of military techno-science, policing agencies have been able to augment their surveillance capabilities, including the use of satellite reconnaissance, for example, during the 1990 drought in Southern California when this technology was used to identify lawns that were being watered too much. In more recent years, associated with anti terrorist efforts there has been a strengthening of state security institutions, an extension of cross-border surveillance activity and information sharing, an enhanced role for networks of police and intelligence agencies (Loader and Walker 2007).

The degree of surveillance that is now possible is greater and more penetrating than ever before in history. Underlying this immense power is, of course, the development of the military and police: the state’s instruments of violence.

**Military and police figurations**

**Violence and the military and police**

The military profession, are 'managers of the instruments of violence' (Janowitz 1971:xiv).

The police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society (Bittner 1990:123).

Both the military and police are generally defined by their relationship to ‘legitimate’ violence. Despite the twentieth century being one of ‘unmitigated, ceaseless and unprecedented state-sponsored violence and terrorism’, the social sciences largely construe violence as something done by ‘just about everybody except government and their agents’ (Watts 1995:156).

Much social theory, particularly when focusing on the police, distinguishes between force and violence with the former portrayed as ‘legitimate’ damage attracting legal
protection and the latter portrayed as non legitimised ‘barbaric’ violence. Canovan (1996:104) claims that as liberal theorists are often unwilling to acknowledge the exclusionary violence used to develop and sustain states, they redefine state violence as something other than violence. State violence is thus often represented not as violence but force and the normative connotations of violence and force are quite distinct. This distinction between violence and force is true not only of research published in English but in other languages as well (Brodeur 2003:218).

It is increasingly argued that the management of violence by the military and police represents only a portion of their task. Moskos et al. (2000) for example, argue that ‘postmodern’ militaries have moved away from their modernist war-oriented mission and are now more multi-purpose with missions including tasks such as law enforcement and peacekeeping. As Stevenson (1996:14) outlines, military officers, during the course of their career, will assume many roles, including those of leader, counsellor, advocate, teacher, manager and administrator.

Similarly, police forces have historically been associated with considerably more physical violence than they currently are and contemporary policing involves a wide range of jobs, including law enforcement, crime prevention, social work, clerical work and therapy (McElhinny 1994:161).

Despite these changes, however, both the military and police retain a focus on violence as central to their task and identity and as differentiating them from other occupations. Despite being a tri-service academy, ADFA’s military culture is predominantly an Army one which privileges the combat role of the military forces, and perceived associated personal requirements, above all others. As will be illustrated later in this thesis, there are many examples where the ultimate reason given for various tasks is combat related. As will also be outlined later in this thesis, at the AFPC, the police officers’ capacity to use violence was emphasised repeatedly as a key feature of their role.
Converging military and police figurations

The job of the soldier is to kill the Queen’s enemies in war-time; that of a policeman is to protect the Queen’s subjects in peacetime (Sieghart 1978:841).

Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing (United States President George Bush 2002:31).

Since the formation of the nation-state and the creation of police forces, the military and police have operated under different philosophical principles. The military’s primary purpose has been to kill external enemies by the use of overwhelming force whereas the police’s primary purpose has been to use minimum force in the maintenance of internal law and order. The Australian Constitution, for example, contains provisions which delineate clearly between the military and police. The Commonwealth has responsibility for external defence and the military, and the States have responsibility for internal security, or law and order. Section 119 of the Constitution maintains State sovereignty over domestic security by providing that the Commonwealth not intervene in cases of ‘domestic violence’ without the invitation of the State concerned. However, as Andreas and Price (2001: 32) outline, ‘one of the most important blurring of traditional boundaries occurring in the post-Cold War era is that between an internally oriented domestic police sphere and an externally oriented military sphere’. This blurring involves both a militarization of policing and a domestication of soldiering (Andreas and Price 2001:31).

Despite the relatively clear distinctions that are made between the official roles and missions of the police and soldiers these distinctions are less clear cut in practice and are becoming increasingly blurred. Both organisations are hierarchical, bureaucratic and authoritarian and demand obedience from their members. The members of both the armed forces and the police wear uniforms, use specialist language and codes, are overwhelmingly male and tend to consider themselves as somewhat separate from the rest of society. As well as comprising the basis of the state’s coercive power, police and soldiers share many aspects of a common culture and history, including some overlap in personnel and training. Joint counter-terrorist exercises involving state and federal police and the military are common in contemporary Australia.
Since the late 1970s, commentators in Australia, Britain and the United States have noted, usually with concern, a growing consolidation in the functions of the military and police. Police involved in high-risk operations frequently wear Australian military pattern camouflage uniforms and carry automatic weapons which make them appear very similar to military personnel. Likewise, military training for short warning conflict operations in northern Australia and counter-terrorism include the study of aspects of civil law such as powers of arrest and search which are traditionally police responsibilities (Wing 1996:33).

In Australia, police historically have been a repressive force, used first to overcome Aboriginal resistance to dispossession, and later to put down agitation by independent miners, small farmers, workers, and others opposing government policy (McCulloch 1998:57). In the late nineteenth century an increase in strikes by trade unionists led to an increasing use of the military by colonial governments. On most occasions soldiers were called out in anticipation of violence that did not occur, but in the maritime strike of 1890 in Melbourne, as reported in the Silver Age on 26 September, Colonel Tom Price infamously addressed a parade of the defence force as follows: ‘if the order is given to fire, don’t dare let me see one rifle pointed up in the air. Fire low and lay them out’ (cited in Crowley 1980b:304). The military’s influence on the Australian police forces has been considerable. In particular, military men have been appointed to head police forces at critical periods, when reorganisation was deemed necessary due to low morale, corruption or the absence of suitable officers for promotion from within (Encel 1970:469). During the interwar period in Australia, for example, a large number of a police forces were led by experienced war-service soldiers (Finnane 1994:135).

The creation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 meant that the colonies’ military forces came under the centralised control of the Federal Government. While Australian states continued to seek military help against strikers, the federal government preferred to restore law and order by using, not the military, but special constables, who happened to include many returned servicemen, led by military men (Beaumont 2001).
In recent years, Anglo-American governments have taken steps to remove legal impediments to using the military against civilians. In Australia, since the much publicised call-out of troops after the 1978 bombing at the Hilton Hotel – the venue for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting where three people were killed and eight injured – and the establishment of joint training between the military and police, legislative amendments include those in 2000 that made it easier for the Commonwealth to use the military domestically if a decision was made to do so (McCulloch 2001:62). Major Peters (1995:14) outlined how the ‘domestic employment of the military appears an inevitable part of our own future’ … ‘we are living in a terribly changed and rapidly changing world where illegal immigrants, terrorists, drug lords, and organised crime are among the most serious security threats’ (cited in Andreas and Price 2001:44).

While the military is increasingly prepared to take on ‘internal security’, police are simultaneously becoming more like the military. Police are increasingly dealing with the impacts of organised and transnational crime where criminal syndicates are beyond the jurisdiction of the country in which the crime is committed. As it is widely accepted that transnational crime poses a serious threat to national security, military resources are being deployed in the fight against organised crime (Jiggins 2004:31). A report from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, for example, calls organised crime the ‘New Evil Empire’ and concludes that the ‘dimensions of global organised crime present a greater international security challenge than anything Western democracies had to cope with during the cold war’ (Andreas and Price 2001:37). The AFP has increasingly focused on national security and the vulnerability of Australia’s borders, as well as traditional law enforcement. In 1997 it was noted that the ‘AFP’s emerging jurisdiction is between Australia and the rest of the world’ (Pickering 2004:226).

During the 1880s, Victoria Police moved away from paramilitary policing, becoming an unarmed force. However, by the 1980s operational police were routinely carrying revolvers and by the 1990s, official policy required all operational police to be armed. In 1997 the New South Wales Police Minister announced that police in that state would be exchanging their Smith & Wesson handguns for Glock 9 mm semi-
automatic pistols (McCulloch 2001:185). The Glock 9 mm pistols were also the weapons we were trained on at AFPC.

In the late 1970s paramilitary counter-terrorist squads were established throughout Australia. Victoria’s Special Operations Group’s motif, until it was banned in 1995, was a telescopic rifle cross-hairs superimposed over a balaclava-clad head, vividly illustrating the group’s orientation towards the soldier’s task of killing (McCulloch 2000:204). These paramilitary groups are based on the army’s commando unit, the Special Air Services (SAS). They train with the SAS, include former members of the SAS and other army units, conduct regular exercises with the military, as well as use a range of military equipment (McCulloch 2000:204).

Although paramilitary policing units were officially set up to counter terrorism, they are used in a wide range of police operations. Paramilitary policing has been evident during the policing of global justice protesters where police in riot gear used chemical weapons and live ammunition against protestors (McCulloch 2004:315). During the 2002 protest at Australia’s Baxter refugee detention centre police were armed with machine guns for the first time in Australian history. Victoria’s Special Operations Group has been responsible for a significant proportion of Victoria’s fatal police shootings (McCulloch 2001:85).

Since World War II, armed forces have increasingly adopted a peace-keeping role involving a shift in emphasis from defence of the nation to multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. These tasks have been referred to as ‘operations other than war’, ‘other military operations’ and ‘sustainment and stability operations’. Janowitz (1971:xiv) called these tasks ‘constabulary’ tasks as they involve the military being ‘committed to the minimum use of force, and seeking viable international relations rather than victory’.

The affinity between a peacekeeping and a constabulary role can be seen with the increasing number of police officers that also serve as peacekeepers. The issue of police officers undertaking peacekeeping duties at AFPC was introduced to us in the form of a role playing exercise:
one of peacekeepers told me that the [Australian] Government was now using police more and more because they were cheaper than soldiers ... police officers were being armed (for the first time) in Timor (Friday night, week 4, recruits were invited to pretend to be refugees in a role playing session to train AFP peacekeepers, AFPC field notes).

Police officers from Australia have served as peace keepers in Cambodia, Haiti, Mozambique, Bougainville and Timor. As well as its involvement in peacekeeping operations, the Australian Defence Force has undertaken a number of constabulary roles. The Navy, for example, is involved in monitoring foreign fishing vessels, apprehending refugees seeking to enter Australia by sea, and maintaining surveillance against smuggling, drug-running, and quarantine infringements (Smith 1995:537).

Sharing resources both within and between nation-states is becoming increasingly prevalent in an environment where jurisdictional boundaries are becoming less and less relevant and the cost of maintaining well equipped military and police personnel continues to increase. As a result of increased international exchanges between police forces, between military forces and between police and military forces, police and military forces around the world are becoming similar (McCulloch 2001:220).

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter has been to situate the study of the military and police within social theory, as well as to introduce and situate the figurations that will be used in this thesis to explore its topic of state violence and the military and police personnel involved in this dynamic.

Not only is Elias an exemplary exception to the neglect of the analysis of state violence in much of social theory, but he is an exceptionally useful theorist for analysing the figurations pertinent to the study of contemporary military and police personnel. The next chapter will outline the figurational methodology used to do just this.
This chapter outlines the methodology used for this study, namely the method of participant observation, which is then contextualised theoretically in order to grasp broader figurational dynamics. Participant observation was used at both ADFA and the AFPC as it is the most suitable method with which to understand the dynamic subjective emerging nature of the world of ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits, and thereby what shapes and motivates individuals to join these institutions.

As the researcher is a medium of participant observation, the role the researcher adopts, particularly in relation to concepts of attachment and detachment, has a decisive impact on what the researcher is able to learn, this chapter will outline what that role was in each setting. This involves an outline of the characteristics of each research setting including the organisational, physical, social and political environment, as well as characteristics of the research subjects. Also included is a discussion of my own vantage point and the cadets’ and recruits’ perceptions of me and my presence. The chapter concludes with a discussion of my role in terms of its fluctuation between ‘participant as observer’ and ‘observer as participant’ in each setting.

**Figurations and participant observation**

Both in the formulation and in the execution of the research task, the researcher is confronted with the relationship between theory and evidence (Elias 1978).
The central concern of this chapter is to outline the methodology used to analyse the dynamic figurations of the research subjects of this thesis. As Elias outlines, figurations, like dances, are ‘relatively independent of the specific individuals forming it here and now, but not of individuals as such’ (1982:214). Participant observation seems the ideal methodology for allowing the sociologist to analyse the patterns that people form together and the nature of the figurations that bind them to each other. As Goffman (1989:125) outlines, participant observation is the technique of:

getting data by subjecting yourself, your own body and your own personality, and your own social situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate their circle of response to their social situation.

Participant observation has a long and established history in sociology as a means of gathering data and is conducted within a variety of theoretical perspectives that all emphasise the dynamic and emergent character of social life. These perspectives include ethnomethodology, phenomenology and symbolic interactionism.

There are several theoretical objections to the method of participant observation for studying societal groupings. These objections predominantly relate to the effect of the presence of the researcher on the group being studied and the data being gathered relying upon interpretation by the researcher, who imposes their own framework onto the data (Haralambos and Holbom 1990:745). Phenomenologists like Alfred Schutz, influential in sociology since the 1960s, discuss the problems which arise from sociologists’ objects also being subjects, and Giddens (1987:20) has outlined the ‘double hermeneutic’ that is involved in sociological research. As illustrated in Chapter One of this thesis, the tendency of people to perform such a ‘double hermeneutic’ is itself the result of a long-term structured process and is unavoidable in any social research.

As Elias argues, process theories in the social sciences go one step further than those in the natural sciences by adding the dimension of experience. While these experiential aspects are not directly accessible to observation in the same way as bodily movements, they are nevertheless accessible to human observation through the
examination of linguistic and other symbols carrying meaningful messages from one person to another (Elias 1987:116). To successfully study any figuration, it is useful to place oneself within the world of experience of the various groups of people who make up the figuration. As the researcher’s participation and involvement is one of the conditions for comprehension, it is not desirable for them to attempt to adopt a completely detached role. The detached stance, previously advocated by Robert Park and others, has been broadly rejected as researchers came to recognise that intimate involvement and sympathetic emotional connection were essential to ethnographic work (Sanders 1999:669).

Elias (1987) argues that one of the most important qualities for the figurational sociologist is to recognise that as knowledge is always both involved and detached, the research act is dependent upon the researcher finding a balance between both involvement and detachment. Many of Elias’s detractors are critical of what they see as a value neutral stance, with one prominent sociologist dismissing Elias’s book, *What is Sociology*, as ‘a load of Comteist garbage’ (cited in Mennell 1991:186). While Elias did insist on the need for the social sciences to engender a greater degree of detachment, he does not advocate a Weberian stance of value-neutrality. Elias explains how the ‘scientification’ of human knowledge involves the same movement towards greater foresight as that displayed in the social constraint towards self constraint. As critical processes increasingly play a significant part in the growth of human knowledge, they enable individuals to observe the relations of elements in the process with a measure of detachment. In contemporary scientific societies, the concepts which all individuals use in thinking, speaking and acting represent a relatively high degree of detachment. When undertaking research such as participant observation then, the quality of detachment is important in terms of the adoption of a ‘not knowing’ stance, as well as the capacity to ‘stand back’ in order to grasp longer-term figurational dynamics and developments (Elias 1987:xxxviii).

In recognising the mutual interaction of theory and evidence, Elias argues that conducting research requires a constant interplay between mental operations directed at theoretical synthesis and at empirical instances. The need for simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis is not dissimilar to the methodology of
grounded theory, originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and perhaps the approach most frequently employed where the social researcher is attempting to capture the world of individuals or groups as they see it.

The issues outlined above are heavily dependent on the role a researcher has while undertaking participant observation. Because the researcher is so clearly a medium of this technique, it follows that the particular role of field researchers during the course of their field work is an important determinant of what they are able to glean from a particular social setting. The main factors that contributed to the ongoing formation of my role in my two research settings are outlined below, after a brief examination of the scientific value of the case study. These factors include: the characteristics of the research setting, my vantage point and the cadets’ and recruits’ perceptions of me. My role in the field is then defined utilising Junker’s (1960) widely used field work role typologies, in particular the ‘participant as observer’ and ‘observer as participant’ roles.

**ADFA and AFPC as case studies**

It seems well-nigh unethical at the present time to allow … theses or dissertations … involving a single group observed at one time only (Campbell and Stanley 1966:6).

From Socrates to Donald Campbell, quoted above, aspersion has been cast on the scientific value of the case study as a single example. It is interesting to note, however, that Donald Campbell later altered his view on the issue, becoming a strong proponent of case study methodology. Similarly, Hans Eysenck, originally regarding the case study as merely a method of producing anecdotes, later argued that ‘sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases – not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something’ (as cited in Flyvbjerg 2001:73).

Case studies often contain a substantial element of narrative. As Drummond (1998) argues, we understand our world and create our realities through narratives. Historical narratives combine with contemporary, and even fictional, narratives to influence our identities. Knowledge about the identity of an institution and the proper way to be a
member are conveyed to new members through narrative. It is the unfolding of these
narratives that I attempted to capture while undertaking participant observation with
the officer cadets at ADFA and the police recruits at AFPC.

Factors contributing to my role in each field

Characteristics of the research setting

The context – ADFA

ADFA was built to function as the academic arm of the Australian Defence Force.
The idea of a tri-Service Defence Academy, catering for the Australian Army, Navy
and Air Forces, was first raised as early as the 1920s, shortly after the establishment
of the Royal Military College Duntroon and the Royal Naval College at Jervis Bay,
with various senior officers identifying the benefits of combined training and possible
reductions in operating costs (Stevenson 1995:26). However, strong inter-Service
rivalry prevented any serious consideration until the introduction of a single
Department of Defence under one Minister in 1973 (McAllister and Smith 1988).
ADFA’s role is to provide the ‘cream’ of Australia’s youth with a ‘balanced and

Upon arrival at ADFA cadets undertake an intensive 6 week induction into the
Academy designed to familiarise them with the military. This induction period
includes training in discipline, military customs and traditions, rifle training, drill and
ceremonial activities. The induction period is then rounded off with the Chief of the
Defence Force Parade when first year cadets are formally welcomed into the
Academy. Alongside their three or four year degrees, cadets continue to undertake
military training.

The early 1990s were an unsettled time for Australia’s Military with numerous
Boards of Inquiry, public courts martial, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission investigations, Federal Senate probes and internal audits undertaken to
respond to sexual misconduct in the Australian Defence Force. ADFA was a popular
target of such scrutiny, with Parliamentary interest arising predominantly from the
financial feasibility of ADFA. In addition, 1997 media attention raised questions
about the degree of success the Defence Academy has achieved with regard to
integrating women into its Corps of Officer Cadets. The Chief of the Defence Force gave the order to commission research into the structures and conditions at ADFA, leading to the Australian Defence Force’s *Report of the Review into Policies and Practices to deal with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy* (1998). As part of this review, I was employed as one of two observers placed at ADFA to ‘observe’ the induction of first year cadets into the Academy. As can be seen from the field note excerpt below, some of the members of the ADFA staff hierarchy had clear ideas on what my role at ADFA should be:

My initial introduction to ADFA was at a board meeting in the ‘military command building’ with members of ADFA staff, where X [the other, male, observer] and I were assigned the role of honorary first year cadets and were pretty much told that if we didn’t go the ‘full monty’ and be complete participants with the other first year cadets we would incur their resentment and miss out on valuable insights into the academy culture, not to mention becoming ‘better people’ for it anyway (excerpt from notes, based on my ADFA field notes, made for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3).

The context – AFPC

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the newest of Australia’s police forces. It came into existence in 1979 following Hilton bombing in 1978. After the bombing, the Government commissioned Sir Robert Mark, a former head of Scotland Yard, to review Australia’s ability to deal with terrorism at a national level and report on how Australia could best meet its national policing needs.

Sir Mark found that ‘Australia’s Commonwealth and State police system was hopelessly outmoded in dealing with modern crime such as terrorism, bombing and hijacking’. In response to his report, the Government incorporated the Commonwealth Police and ACT Police into the new AFP on 19 October 1979. The AFP is Australia’s international law enforcement and policing representative and primary adviser to the Australian Government on policing issues. The majority of AFP officers are detectives based in State capitals and other cities.
Training for new AFP officers is conducted at the AFPC in Barton, Canberra. The AFPC has been described as the 'heart and soul' of the AFP (Butler 2003:12). New police members undertake extensive training in law, evidence, procedure, investigation techniques, police powers, the intelligence process, defensive skills, firearms training and driver training. This training is generally conducted over a 12 month probationary period, with the first 16 weeks of training undertaken at the AFP College. The college is also responsible for the provision of learning and professional development opportunities for all AFP employees.

In recent decades in Australia there has been a succession of inquiries into police corruption, including several Royal Commissions. These investigations have highlighted structural problems within the police and this, along with increasing demand for public accountability, had led to police accepting more scrutiny from both internal and external sources. My access to AFPC was facilitated by the Director, People Strategies, AFP who agreed to allow me to live at the college with new recruits, participate in all of their activities and be treated in the same manner as them during their induction into the AFP. This allowed me to attempt to duplicate the role I had had at ADFA.

The environment

ADFA, and to a lesser extent AFPC is ‘a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life’. In other words, it is a ‘total institution’ (Goffman 1961:11).

Every minute of the ADFA first year cadet’s day is highly structured and tightly scheduled through control and surveillance by the third year cadets, whose job it is to do the inducting. The pressure both to perform and strictly conform is tremendous:

(orientation week is) an exhausting confusion of many formalities and rituals, one of the hardest tasks probably being to memorise well over 50 names, ranks and titles, as well as the squadron’s history, the Academy’s vision and mission and basically everything else we were taught, and no time set aside in which to do it. Because of this, most cadets admitted to
‘fairy bogging’; learning it after lights out using a torch under their bed sheets (lights out being, of course, strictly patrolled by the third years). The pressure to learn everything was enormous as the third years tested us continually in periods of up to 40 minutes at a time. What this involved was standing at attention while the third years walked between us loudly questioning each of us. The answer must then come out in the form ‘excuse me please underofficer Smith, the answer is ... excuse me please underofficer, Smith’ while staring straight ahead, and any deviation from this standard would incur a severe reprimand ... Communication and surveillance were a one way process as we weren’t allowed to look at the third years, and certainly weren’t allowed to speak out of turn (excerpt from notes, based on my ADFA field notes, made for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3).

While the AFPC was not an externally enforced total institution to the same extent as ADFA, all needs were met on site and because of the workload recruits did not tend to leave AFPC during the week, except to go to the local pub with each other, a known police hang out. As two excerpts from my field notes illustrate, AFPC became a self imposed total institution to the extent that external relationships tended to be effected:

During dinner conversation people were discussing how earlier that day, one of the senior staff members had told some of the female recruits that out of eight females in the last course who had been in serious relationships, none survived by end of training ... apparently the explanation that had been given was that the females had gotten too assertive for their male partners and the men couldn’t handle it (Friday, Week 4, during dinner in the mess, AFPC field notes).

I was invited to the pub to catch up with the recruits during their physical response training ... the latest goss seems to be that one of the female recruits officially left her husband and two kids yesterday to be with a police officer she met during the course ... the recruits are amazed at how
many relationships have already broken up, just in their class (Friday, Week 8, AFPC field notes).

The Physical Environment

**ADFA**

As outlined in *Architecture Australia* (1986:36), the brief provided to the architects responsible for building ADFA required that the building should evoke a military character and have an appropriate quality of formality, suggesting tradition from day one. As my field notes suggest, this task had been successfully accomplished:

My initial impression of ADFA is that (despite its existence only stemming from 1986) it is solid, traditional and old. This is due mainly to the blocky formality of the buildings, enhanced by their uniformly dull whitish tone. As one 'outsider' commented; ‘this place could certainly do with a new paint job’ (Saturday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

Most cadet needs are catered for on campus with its academic schools central lecture theatres, a library, a bank, a bookshop and a coffee shop. However, during the induction period the first year cadets world is centred around three buildings; the ‘lines’ (accommodation) the ‘mess’ (dining hall) and the ‘military command building’.

**ADFA Accommodation**

the ‘lines’ consisted of 23 brick u-shaped buildings thrown together on a hill ... Symbolically more than physically, these buildings were grouped into groups of 4 to convey each ‘squadron’, each of which apparently contained a very distinct spirit ... each building, or division, contained two towers, with three levels, or sections, in each ... each accommodation block has three floors of eight rooms with a recreation room, out of bounds for first years, of course, that included a television, lounges and a kitchen ... within each section there were generally a few first years, a couple of second years and one or two third years ... while the third years were in the same section with the same sized room, their status was
physically marked by having their rooms down the far end of each corridor, the least easily surveyed (Saturday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

The Mess at ADFA

The Cadets’ Mess, adjacent to the Parade Ground, is one of the key buildings at ADFA and provides the dining facilities and social focus for cadets. The social focus, however, is intentionally lost on cadets during the induction period:

the foyer of the ‘mess’ is all formal polished timber with display cases packed with military paraphernalia … the ‘mess’ for first year cadets consists of a hat room and then downstairs a very large dining area filled with long tables, with a kitchen off to one side. While the mess is supposed to be somewhere to relax, one of the first lessons consists of ‘mess etiquette’ which is fairly strict, governing nearly all behaviour in the mess, from how to properly address people in the mess to the exact angle the plate and cutlery should sit at … dress is strict in the mess and the tables must be filled from the bottom to the top so even where you sit and who with is dictated by how long it takes you to get your food …

… behaviour is fairly formal and not once while I was in the mess did cadets attempt to jump the queue, sit where they wanted or not clear away everything they had used … While the mess does consist of a number of smaller, more intimate areas, such as the bar and the billiard room, cadets were very aware that they were not to use these until after the induction period (Saturday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

The military command building at ADFA

Within the military command building (the one with a whopping great cannon out the front) the architecture is more directly involved with conveying the system of authority … this building is ‘across the road’ for cadets, next to the mess and contains staff … chaplains, for example, are found downstairs in the ‘no saluting’ area, while DOs (Divisional Officers) etc are up the stairs, with each squadron’s staff physically separated in offices off to the sides of a main corridor. Most cadets are
very aware that there are files, records and case-histories being kept on them and that this is where this information is contained (Saturday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

AFPC

The physical environment of AFPC had a much more relaxed feel to that of ADFA:

The AFPC is like a mid range hotel (except for the library, offices and classrooms on one side of the building), inclusive of a dining room and bar … my room is on the third floor at the top of the stairs – nice room; clean, newish looking, ensuite – nice! – single bed, television, fan, bible (like a hotel room!) … old black and white photos in the hallway where our rooms are, of ‘policey’ type things; men in old uniforms standing next to horses and old cars, old graduation ceremonies etc, attempt to give the college an atmosphere of tradition and history (Saturday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

There was the capacity for AFPC to be a total institution as basic needs were catered for:

there is a large dining hall downstairs that provides all meals and has tea and coffee supplies … a gymnasium … a lounge area in the foyer with tea and coffee facilities and, of course, the bar decorated with all sorts of police type memorabilia (Saturday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Despite the more relaxed feel of ADPC, there were aspects that brought back familiar memories, such as the proscribed dress code. This included a list of dress do’s and don’t’s such as acceptable dress in the dining or lounge room of the College at all times, including restrictions on such items as thongs, shorts, singlets, dirty or torn clothing. These dress code were explained in several places, including one of the induction brochures:

The AFP’s corporate standards and community expectations require that employees maintain high standards of grooming and personal appearance. Extreme hairstyles and unnatural hair colours or a combination of colours,
for example, is not permitted (Saturday, Week 1, AFPC field notes, copied from an AFPC induction brochure).

**Cadet / recruit characteristics**

ADFA cadets tend to enter ADFA between 17 and 19 years of age, a highly impressionable stage of personal development (Force 1998). They are mostly male (70%), with significant numbers coming from rural communities or from families with some previous or continuing connection with the military. There are very few from non-English speaking backgrounds and, as in the past, significant numbers come from private school backgrounds and have relatively conservative views on a range of political issues (Smith 1988a). An ADFA cadet survey in 1996 showed that the socioeconomic backgrounds of cadets was predominantly middle to upper class. This is not dissimilar to the socio economic status of the officer class outlined by Janowitz (1971:100) who were predominantly from ‘upper-middle class’ occupations, closely followed by professional men, such as company directors and managers. My field notes confirm this tendency:

The division I am a part of consists of 16 first year cadets, 12 males and 4 females. These first year cadets are fairly representative of ADFA cadets generally in that they are all white and, with a few exceptions, had come straight from (mostly single sex) private high schools. Judging from their parents’ occupations (from school teacher and small business manager through to high level public servant and company director), their backgrounds are firmly middle class (excerpt from a report prepared for the Department of Defence Review team, compiled from interview data in which I asked each cadet what high school they attended and what their parents did for a living, Week 5).

According to the media release that came out the week I started my participant observation at AFPC, the 40 men and 12 women I was undertaking training with came from varied and diverse backgrounds and were ‘representative of the wider community’. Their ages ranged from 20 to 44 years. Since the 1980s police services in Australia consciously changed their recruitment strategies to ‘ensure that applicants selected reflect the ethnic composition of the community ... that an
increasing proportion of recruits are women, [and] that applicants with the highest possible academic achievements are attracted to the Service’ (Chan 2003:79).

Contemporary police tend to hold higher levels of educational qualifications than their counterparts in the 1970s and 1980s. A key aspect of the various reform programs is the move towards making policing a more professional occupation with clearly articulated competencies and mandated tertiary qualifications and training (Jiggins 2004:71). As also outlined in a national media release:

The 52 new recruits bring with them an impressive range of tertiary qualifications, which include degrees in Justice Studies, Commerce, Law, Applied Science, Psychology, Information Technology and Education ... between them, they are fluent in a wide range of second languages including, French, Italian, Spanish, Japanese, Arabic and sign language (25 January 2002).

The AFP then, is far from being solely composed of the working class, white male traditionally associated with policing. This trend could easily be overstated, however, and the police have their own agenda in overstating it. Fitzgerald, for example, recently found the Queensland police force that he was charged with evaluating an ideal medium for the perpetuation of the negative culture that he had identified. He noted that police are drawn from the lower to middle socio-economic sections of the community and have no more than average intelligence and education (Freckelton 2000:166). This assessment is probably close to the mark with my interview material, in which 12 males and 4 females were interviewed, showing that all recruits had attended co-educational public schooling with their parent’s occupations ranging from unemployed through to manual labourers, a receptionist, a personal assistant, two housewives, a child care worker, several school teachers, a police officer, an army officer, several public servants, a manager, a lecturer and a professor. The recruits themselves had a range of work backgrounds, including: the dole, a failed landscaping business, mining, security, university, nursing, the public service and various trades. Three of the recruits interviewed had also spent time in the military.

As demonstrated by my field notes, AFPC recruits were certainly a diverse group:
I walked past a group of what I (correctly) assumed were new recruits sitting apprehensively on couches in the foyer ... what struck me was the incredible diversity, huge variety in terms of class, gender, ethnic background, cultural background, age and physical shape ... I had determined to get really fit before embarking on my participant observation with the police which, of course, didn't eventuate to much ... I felt quite reassured upon seeing a couple of the larger (female) recruits ... as a group they looked scruffier than I'd envisaged ... one of the girls had more body piercings than I could count ... one of the guys was wearing hemp pants ... off to one side stood the 'laterals' [sworn officers at the College for further training] who looked like they'd undertaken their grooming and shopping in the same place. They were all wearing dark coloured polo shirts and slacks (Monday, Week 1, first day of induction for police recruits, AFPC field notes).

Went out with three of the guys [three male recruits] to dinner and then Aree bar [a bar in Canberra's central business district]. One of them had a friend in a band he had invited us to go and see – there was a $5 cover charge that went to Community Aid Abroad to support advocacy work on behalf of refugees. X [one of the recruits], looking around, said: ‘oh, my god, some of these people need a haircut – is he wearing a tea towel on his head?’ A few people in the bar were wearing ‘free the refugees’ badges. Y [another recruit] read it out as one of them walked past. X said; ‘they’re not refugees, they’re fucking illegal immigrants’ (Saturday, Week 13, appendix to AFPC field notes).

The 1996 survey of ADFA cadets found that 28% of cadets’ fathers and 3% of cadets’ mothers had a military background and that 39% had been involved in some form of military cadets, scouts or guides, seeming to confirm Secretary of the United States Navy Lehman’s (1994:24) argument that: ‘we have created a separate military caste’. My interview data on this issue confirmed that the vast majority seemed to have personal experience with someone that had been in the military, even if it was limited to: ‘one of my mates’ brothers went to ADFA’ (male cadet, late teens, ADFA
interview). Others had had experience with scouts, cadets, the army reserves, with
one of the cadets having had previous experience in the Navy as a general entry
sailor.

There was also a link between a military background and the AFPC recruits. The link
between the military and the police was one that was pointed out to me on several
occasions:

I was approached in the mess by couple of ‘blue badges’ (the course that
had started a few weeks before us) who’d been looking over during lunch
and pointing at me, they said they just wanted to inquire about my
‘observer’ badge … told them about my research, including the military
aspect … one of them said he was ex-army and asked if I’d noticed the
cross over … I asked why he thought that was, he explained that: ‘I think
they’re both public spirited organisations interested in helping people’
(Wednesday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

*My vantage point*

The man who enjoys marching in line and file to the strains of music falls
below my contempt; he received his great brain by mistake—the spinal
cord would have been amply sufficient (Einstein, as cited in Dixon

Part of recognising the mutual interaction of theory and evidence means
acknowledging that the ‘vantage point’ of the researcher will impact on everything
they do, from what they identify as a suitable research topic through to how they
relate to the people they are researching and what they then report on. ADFA was
offered to me as a research arena because a certain issue, primarily that of sexual
harassment, had been identified as a ‘problem’ requiring study. It is because of
decades of feminist argument, arguments I have some sympathy for, that a thing such
as ‘sexual harassment’ has been problematised in this way. Similarly, while my
research at AFPC was chosen because of my interest, piqued at ADFA, in agents of
the state’s monopoly of violence my access was facilitated by senior AFP personnel
because they had identified cultural ‘problems’ they were interested in investigating.
These problems were primarily related to integrating ‘lateral’ police officers with new recruits at the College.

More pertinent to my role at ADFA and AFPC, though, are the implications that my particular identity and sensibilities had on my ‘vantage point’ and thereby its effects on conceptualising, formulating and filtering everything I observed and experienced. Having both feminist and pacifist leanings, I did have doubts about whether I was the most suitable person to study a military institution, and later a police institution. Adler and Adler (1987:23) argue, for example, researchers should ‘avoid studying settings where they have pre-existing emotional conflicts or moral judgements’ and Douglas (1976:99) adds that ‘if he is too deeply committed to a feeling, ideology or pattern of practical action, his research will merely be a projection of his inner commitments’.

Like Einstein, quoted above, I did have particular notions about the sort of person that might join the military and police, particularly the military. However, I decided that ADFA and AFPC as institutions are hardly powerless and easily exploitable communities and agree with Klatch (1988:73), who has studied people with a world view very different to her own, that, ‘we develop empathy each time we do a study, even if we initially think of the group as unlikable’.

Before entering ADFA and AFPC I had assumed, correctly, that being a ‘civilian’ and a female would be the most salient aspects of my identity in these settings. An example from ADFA illustrates this well:

... he [the training Corporal] continually got excited when it was clear that one of the females was beating all the males and proceeded to taunt the males with this information ... then when I started dismantling the weapon quicker than the others, he got even more excited because not only was I female but a civilian; ‘guys, a civilian’s beating you, a female civilian’...
(Tuesday, Week 3, ‘out bush’ at Mt Majura for field training, ADFA field notes).

While gender at AFPC seemed to be a lot less salient than it was at ADFA, it was never irrelevant:
... we were at morning tea and I was standing talking with a group of guys, when one of them stated that he believed I was in the wrong place and pointed out that all the females were sitting at a table together and joked that only the males were allowed to stand ... (Monday, Week 3, in the mess, AFPC field notes).

Similarly, at AFPC the differentiation between recruits and civilians was markedly less. However, it was still apparent and distinctions were often drawn between the recruits and myself, a 'normal citizen', by both instructors and recruits.

**Cadet / recruit responses to my presence**

**ADFA**

The military, and to a lesser extent the police, bear some resemblance to what Daniels (1967:278) refers to as a 'secret society'. Members of both groups are set apart from the general public because of their uniform and their unique responsibilities. In joining the military and police, cadet/recruits are not just joining an occupation requiring commitment and long working hours. The demands and expectations placed on those in the military and police are unique. This is particularly true for personnel in the military who are expected to be prepared to lay down their life for their country. Upon being accepted into the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police, members swear allegiance to Queen and country.

As Hertz and Imber (1993:3) outline, few social researchers study groups such as these because they are by their very nature difficult to penetrate. The manner in which I gained access to the settings of ADFA and AFPC set the tone for the reaction of the cadet/recruits to me and what they perceived as my purpose there. When entering any research setting, fieldworkers must negotiate with 'gatekeepers', individuals with the authority to control access to a particular setting (Neuman 1991:345).

My access to ADFA was progressed with the full knowledge of all senior staff and all cadets had also ostensibly been informed. Upon arriving at ADFA, however, it did not take long to discover that first year cadets had no concept of the presence of two observers among them, raising, of course, interesting ethical questions about the issue of consent within a hierarchical academy, and I found myself having to inform
everyone I talked to. Wearing an 'observer' brassard at all times made it less necessary to tell everyone with whom I had contact who I was and why I was there. The initial reaction from the cadet body as a whole to the presence of two observers was one of extreme suspicion about what kind of observers we were and for whom, aptly captured by a male second year:

When we were first told there’d be ‘observers’ here, and that they weren’t here to spy on us, or see ‘the skeletons in the closet, just the closet’, we all thought ‘yeah, bullshit’ and expected you guys to have ‘spy’ tattooed on your foreheads (Friday, Week 6, cadet bar, ADFA field notes).

While having ‘observers’ at ADFA seemed to remain a ‘hot topic’ the entire time we were there, reactions were not always negative. First years continually approached me in the Mess to inquire into what the ‘observer’ patch meant. I quickly learnt that playing down the report side of my presence and emphasising my thesis was a useful tactic for gaining cooperation. Taking the emphasis off being a ‘spy’ for the institution and passing as a sympathetic, interested student led to a response of genuine interest and curiosity. A common response was that I must be mad to put myself through the induction period without getting a career out of it. Interestingly, towards the end of the six weeks not many people approached me and asked what my impressions of the Defence Academy had been, but rather the common question was ‘how do you think it's changed you as a person?’ Another common reaction was that of the novelty value of being observed:

was approached again this morning by the same annoying [first year] blonde girl. Today she wanted me to ‘observe’ how much breakfast one of the other male first years could eat (Tuesday, Week 1, the mess, ADFA field notes)

on my last night at the Academy, I went down with a group from my Div [Division] to Sporty’s [the mess bar] and wondered why I was getting more attention than usual; groups of guys from three tables kept coming over and chatting … apparently they were having a competition about
who could get ‘the observer’ into bed and ‘really give her a warrie [war story] to write about’ (Saturday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

I was reasonably successful in negotiating fairly trusting and open relationships with ADFA cadets to the extent that on occasions there seemed to be almost a kind of collective forgetting that I was not really a cadet. However, this is not to gloss over the difficulties I had gaining rapport with the cadets. The main difficulty I had was opposition from one of the first year male cadets who emerged as a self-appointed leader almost immediately within our division, ensuring I did not gain complete acceptance with any of the ‘in’ group of males he had gathered around him:

a tactic he used and a visible manifestation of this were his use of nicknames. As he showed an acceptance of other individuals in the group he would give them a nickname. When, towards the end of the week one of his sidekicks attempted to give someone else a nickname, he intervened and said that that person hadn’t yet ‘earned’ one. Part of his popularity with his ‘in’ group stemmed from his attempt at overt masculinity, which included continually putting women in their place ... it didn’t take long for the males in his ‘in’ group to learn what was expected from them and continually try to impress him. They’d be sitting chatting with me, for example, but the minute he came over, they’d stop and become extremely distant (excerpt from notes made for the Department of Defence Review team, based on ADFA field notes, Week 3).

However, his influence was not all-pervasive, judging from the feedback I received on what the first year cadets in my squadron thought of me:

... friendly, easy going, sensitive, talkative, funny, quiet, intelligent, introvert, thoughtful, bubbly, independent, confident, legend, relaxed, extrovert, inquisitive, very observing, brave, deep, intellectual, caring and (my favourite) bewildered ... (Wednesday, Week 2, writing from a piece of paper handed around the first year cadets in my division with my name at the top in an exercise where we were to write ‘the three adjectives that best described’ each other).
While these adjectives should not be accepted at face value as they were done in a
cosy ‘team building’ atmosphere, as illustrated by the unrealistic lack of negative
adjectives, they are the most ‘concrete’ feedback I received on the first year cadets’
perceptions of me. The use of apparently contradictory adjectives such as talkative
and quiet, and introvert and extrovert reveals the very different relationships I built
with different cadets.

AFPC

My access to AFPC was facilitated by the Director, People Strategies, AFP who
wrote a letter that was copied to all police recruits. The letter explained who I was
and what I was doing, repeating what I had requested to do, that is, study the
identification of culture, how it was transmitted, as well as its impact on those being
inculcated into it. The letter added that recruits were encouraged to consider the
proposal favourably and complete the form of consent. The consent form was a form
I had drafted outlining that recruits were welcome to raise any ethical concerns or any
issues they had with the research, and attaching information about ethical standards
that covered my research. The consent form also assured the recruits on issues of
privacy and confidentiality. My initial introduction to the recruits went as follows:

we were sitting in the lounge, as the initial briefing was supposed to start
at 1400, however didn’t commence until 1500 … people were waiting
around not knowing what was going on … no one knew who I was so at
the beginning of every conversation I took pains to explain so people
knew who I was, awkward and difficult in a social situation where nobody
knows anybody and people keep leaving and joining the conversation …
who’d have thought there was such a fine line between trying to avoid the
appearance of covert observation and appearing self important? … three
staff members were standing off to one side of the room smugly holding
up the wall and I had no idea if they knew who I was or whether there
would be a researcher in their midst. I played with the idea of going over
and introducing myself but thought better of it … we were finally escorted
into a lecture theatre and officially welcomed … The Director, People
Strategies, arrived, introduced me and left, the main speaker, an obviously
disapproving gruff Hitler look alike in uniform tried to promptly move on to much more important, useful things, forcing me to beg for a couple more minutes to hand out my consent forms ... they were all given back to me signed this afternoon (Monday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Only a minority of staff and recruits at AFPC seemed suspicious about my intentions and the vast majority appeared to enjoy the novelty of being researched and were encouraging of my research:

We all put in for pizza for lunch ... on noticing that I was having pizza too, one of the officers responded ‘hey, good for you, you are getting into police culture’ (Tuesday, Week 6, Tuggeranong police stations during ‘observer’ week, AFPC field notes).

after asking where the promised name badge with ‘observer’ written on it was on the first day, I finally got it today – it’s bright yellow, you can’t miss it – I am instantly more self conscious. The recruits also seem to be reacting to it with concern ... ‘are they really making you wear that?’, ‘do you have to?’, ‘isn’t it going to ruin your research?’ (Monday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

There was, however, some suspicion and questioning of a place at the AFPC for an outside researcher:

again, after he’d finished addressing the class, (the member of staff) turned to me and said scathingly; ‘are you going to put that in your thesis, observer?’ (Monday, Week 7, AFPC field notes).

AFPC recruits, like ADFA cadets, also seemed to enjoy the novelty of being observed:

I have a lot of comments in jest about the real nature of my research, particularly from recruits; ‘are you really from ASIO?’, ‘no, she’s from IA’ etc etc (Monday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).
The main difficulty I had in gaining rapport with a small group of females at AFPC was hostility from one of the older females who seemed to perceive herself as more of an insider than the other recruits as her partner already worked for the AFP:

as I approached their [a small group of females'] table it was clear that they were (again) bitching about the other female recruits. I started talking to one of them but conversation soon died once the ringleader glared at her, presumably for daring to converse with the 'observer spy' (Tuesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

Fieldwork roles: from ‘participant as observer’ to ‘observer as participant’

While many academics have theorised various typologies of fieldwork roles, for example, Schatzman and Strauss (1973) and Adler and Adler (1987), Junker’s (1960:35-61) will be briefly described and utilised as his are probably the best well known. His four main fieldwork roles, which vary depending on the extent to which the researcher both ‘participates’ and is ‘known’ to be an observer in the setting, are the ‘complete participant’, the ‘complete observer’, the ‘participant as observer’ and the ‘observer as participant’. In the role of ‘complete participant’, the researcher participates fully and is not known to be an observer, while in the role of the ‘complete observer’, the researcher solely observes at a distance and tends to be known as a researcher. The ‘participant as observer’ role involves the researcher being an active participant whose observer activities are not wholly concealed while the ‘observer as participant’ role involves participation with all observational intent publicly known from the outset.

While Snow et al. (1986:378) argue that the utility of these classical typological distinctions is fairly limited because they sketch only the broad contours of ‘ideal-typical’ roles thereby leaving each role relatively empty, they are useful for providing a rough outline of the perspective I was able to gain in the field. While a single, simple, immutable role did not exist, it is useful to broadly locate my position within existing fieldwork roles in order to more easily convey how what I gleaned from ADFA and AFPC was influenced by it. The more derived role I performed was that of a ‘controlled sceptic’; a combination of ‘controlled eliciting’ and deliberate
scepticism (Snow, Benford et al. 1986:381,2). ‘Controlled eliciting’ is a methodological technique aimed at getting members of a group or setting to verbally manifest their frame of reference, shifting the focus of the research from the perspective of the researcher to the discovery of the member’s point of view. This was a valuable technique because, given my particular vantage point, my own experience of the situation from a cadet/recruit’s point of view was fairly artificial. My professed sceptical stance with respect to cadet practices and beliefs, while mostly genuine, assisted in coaxing cadet/recruits into explaining the reasons behind their beliefs and practices.

There occurred a traceable shift during my time at both ADFA and AFPC from a predominantly ‘participant as observer’ role to an essentially ‘observer as participant’ role, and this shift had a significant influence on the type of research I was able to do. The role of ‘participant as observer’, for example, was indispensable for experiencing the first year cadet/recruit’s ‘world of meanings’ and gaining their trust, but not so useful for finding time and space to take notes or analyse what I was observing. However, by becoming more of an ‘observer as participant’, a new set of difficulties arose. The main one probably was that by ceasing to fully participate as a first year cadet/recruit, my ‘legitimate’ position at both institutions was further eroded, threatening my rapport with the cadet/recruits.

Because there was a widespread effort made to ensure that my presence as a researcher in both settings was overt, the role of a ‘complete participant’ was not really an option. However, there were occasions when I could arguably have been in this role as people did sporadically take it for granted that I was just another cadet/recruit and it was not always practical to inform them otherwise, as an excerpt from my AFPC field notes illustrates:

I went on a tour of police stations with a group of recruits. We were escorted through and handed around from one tired looking police officer to another (it was very late evening) and although I began trying to make an effort to inform everyone we met that I was not a real recruit, it became a bit ridiculous interrupting everyone, particularly as it was apparent that
recruits are expected to show deference and not speak out of turn (Tuesday, Week 3).

As an illustration from my ADFA field notes conveys, it also was not always tactical to inform people that I was not really a cadet/recruit:

[I was] standing just outside the mess after lunch with my hands in my pockets when I heard a bellowing voice behind me ranting about sloppiness, tax payers money and bad civilian habits. I turned around, ready to feel sympathy for whichever poor cadet was getting a hammering when I realised he was talking to me; ‘Who do you think you are?’ [I was] extremely tempted to tell him exactly who I was, but being in front of other first year cadets I merely stiffened to attention and, ‘Yes, sir’ed’ (Tuesday, Week 1, second day at ADFA).

Most of my time at ADFA and AFPC was spent alternating between the roles of ‘participant as observer’ and ‘observer as participant’. One of the main reasons for this was that it was not entirely clear whether or not I was a ‘legitimate’ participant. On the one hand, I was not a ‘legitimate’ cadet/recruit in that I was only, for the purposes of doing research, pretending to be one. On the other hand, I was participating among the cadets/recruits, ‘legitimately’, having gained permission to be there and, in any case, I was not much more of a ‘stranger’ to either the military or police than any of the ‘real’ cadets/recruits, as is illustrated by an excerpt from my field notes:

one of the labels for police recruits, used often by sworn officers, was ‘jafo’, an acronym for ‘just another fucking observer’ ... today one of the ‘jafo’s started calling me ‘jafoo’; ‘just another fucking observer’s observer’ (Friday, Week six, end of observer week, AFPC field notes).

The other main reason for the fluctuation between being a ‘participant as observer’, and an ‘observer as participant’, is the extent to which my research could be said to be ‘known’. On the one hand, the purpose of my presence at both institutions was explicitly overt and cadets/recruits had some idea, to varying degrees, of the type of research I was doing, placing me squarely into the ‘observer as participant’ category.
On the other hand, however, as Roth (1962:283) argues, ‘all research is secret in some ways and to some degree – we can never tell the subjects ‘everything’’. In both institutions I began as more of a ‘participant as observer’ and moved slowly towards more of an ‘observer as participant’.

Schwartz (1964:105) points out that immersion in and identification with the life and view of ‘the other’ is indispensable for assimilating ‘the other’s’ experience and for gathering significant data. This was certainly true of my experience in the ‘participant as observer’ role in that fully participating enabled me access to the ‘world of meanings’ of a cadet/recruit. Direct experience in this way was essential for developing empathy with the first year cadet/recruits, because, as Goffman (1989:125) puts it: ‘you’ve been taking the same crap they have’, which in turn is important in gaining their trust. Developing trust was probably the hardest but most necessary thing I had to do, particularly at ADFA. Members of any setting are unlikely to welcome in their midst for long anyone who threatens them, but perhaps even more so in a setting as enclosed as the cadet corp. While the cadets probably could not have physically barred me from the setting, there was nothing to stop them ostracising me. By attempting to fit in, I not only became less strange, but less of a threat. By not gaining the acceptance of the self-appointed ‘leader’ of the first year cadets in my division, I was cut off from an interesting, important and extremely misogynistic aspect of cadet culture. Given that I was defined by them as a ‘female civilian spy’, though, and there was no identity I could negotiate to allow me access to this group, I resorted to a tactic Neuman (1991:354) calls ‘selective inattention’. This meant casually eavesdropping on their conversations and observing events not meant for me to see. In other words, I resorted to behaving like a female civilian spy.

Perhaps because of the way I was introduced into the setting as well as the very different nature of the setting, the recruits at AFPC seemed to be more accepting of my presence. Again though, I was not universally successful in establishing acceptance and rapport with all members of the setting:

I was warned today by male recruit to be careful, apparently ‘they’d’ jump on any chance to throw me out. I asked who ‘they’ were and he explained that a member of staff had been bitching about my presence to some of
the recruits and saying that it shouldn’t be allowed to happen (Thursday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

I started interviewing the recruits today. My first guinea pig was [X] who started by explaining to me: ‘I was told not to talk to you. I’m going to but I was told not to’. Apparently one of the other recruits told her that one of the staff had said for recruits not to talk to me or answer any of my questions (Wednesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

Direct experience is also an important vantage point for making observationally available the ‘backstage fabrication’ behind the ‘front stage lamination’ (Snow, Benford et al. 1986:391). This is important because, as Douglas (1976:75) points out, field-workers should expect obstacles such as misinformation, evasions, lies and ‘fronts’ from research subjects. An example of a ‘lie’ within the cadet corp at ADFA that might be difficult to access or understand without direct experience was:

we were all about 4 minutes late for another ridiculous deadline set by the third years to improve our punctuality; change into cams [camouflage] and boots and be back downstairs, together, formed up in the breezeway in exactly 9 minutes, with a water bottle, pen and paper. One of the first years got a bleeding nose on the way out to the breezeway and quickly asked another first year for a tissue to stop the bleeding so he could brace up without blood running everywhere. After we’d braced up, excused ourselves, and been told off: ‘you’re 4 minutes late first years, it’s not good enough’ etc etc, another of the third years asked up why we were so late (a common ritual to which the expected answer is usually; ‘because we didn’t communicate properly, Underofficer X’, ‘because we didn’t show enough discipline, Underofficer Y’ etc). This time, however, one of the first years decided to blame it on the bleeding nose: ‘we were all trying to help him’. One of the third years went around asking other first years if this was true, knowing very well it was not, but the expected and received reply, of course, was ‘yes’ at which point everyone was happy; the first years stopped getting yelled at (for 5 minutes, anyway) and the third years were happy that the first years had learnt not to ‘jack on their
Pretending to be a first year cadet/recruit was not only physically and emotionally draining but having to constantly deal with the paradox that while my presence would have an impact on the setting, a failure to act appropriately would also change the scene was a constant source of tension. This was particularly the case at ADFA. Trying to be an ‘average’ cadet by not standing out was actually not that hard as this is the aim of most cadets. This was because trying to better each other gets read as ‘jacking on your mates’ in the same way that not being up to standard does. It was also true to some extent, however, at AFPC:

this morning the Sarg [Sergeant] was asking questions in our class … the second question [that] he asked me, after two females had already got wrong. It was an easy question but I thought most tactical thing to do was to shake my head and say I don’t know. I’d already overheard a snide comment for doing well in the first test the week before: ‘she’s not even a recruit and she’s already doing better than us’, from one of the guys who had to stay back for stuffing it up (along with about a quarter to a third of the class) … I’m pretty sure the Sarg (Sergeant) knew I knew the answer and looked amused but he moved on and didn’t say anything (Tuesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

What was also frustrating, particularly at ADFA, was continually withholding my opinions, evaluations, and judgements, particularly when my actions were blatantly misrepresenting my position:

the Corporal started going on about his mission being to get me to sign up for the Army because I was so good with the rifle. I was standing there, Steyr in hand, feeding live rounds into a magazine and waiting for my turn on the firing range. I decided it would probably not be appropriate to tell him I thought guns were immoral (Wednesday, Week 3, ‘out bush’ at Mt Majura for field training, ADFA field notes).
Further, the impulse to respond to actions or comments I found offensive or inappropriate was something I had to constantly contend with in both settings, which pretty much meant that ‘going native’ was never a concern.

As Goffman (1989:129) points out, during field research it is important to control your associations: ‘if you get seen in any formal or informal conversation with members of a superordinate group, you’re dead as far as the subordinate group is concerned’. What this meant was that by being aligned with the cadets/recruits as a group, I was cut off from any obvious interaction with the third years and staff at ADFA and staff at AFPC. When, for example, I wanted to sit in on the third year’s debriefing, I had to wait for the first years to be in bed, then sneak off to the meeting. However, in the position of a recruit/cadet, there was little I could do to control the behaviour of the staff, as an excerpt from my ADFA field notes shows:

from the outset it was impossible to try to be simply another cadet because COs [commissioned officers] and NCOs [non commissioned officers] of all ranks were continually approaching me and even pulling me out of rank to ask how it was going and generally treating me like a human being ... As one of the other cadets said: ‘Wow. I wish the dcomdt [Deputy Commandant] would come and talk to me like that’ (Friday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

After every such incident the first year cadets’ attitude towards me would change quite dramatically and they would become more distant.

However, when the situation was reversed and I was reprimanded and treated like a first year cadet, the first year’s attitude towards me would change again:

arrived back at ADFA after the two week SST [single service training] break about 6pm to the sound of the third years yelling at the first years trying to get them to ‘switch on’ again, feeling of dread ... braced up as I walked past, which can be very awkward with a heavy suitcase, said ‘good evening’ and strolled into the building. ‘Miss Johnson [my maiden name], get back out here, aren’t you going to excuse yourself?’ etc etc... ‘Go and find one of your first year mates and find out what to do, Miss
Johnson’ ... did so and immediately on finding some, they started checking me over and cutting off threads, fixing the angle of my name badge, making sure my pants were tied properly etc etc, all the while very aware that I had just been told off too and saying empathetically; ‘its good to be back, isn’t it... not’ (Friday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

Similarly, at AFPC being singled out by senior AFP staff was a reminder to AFPC recruits that I was not a real recruit:

X [Director, HR, AFP] and Y [A/g Director, AFPC] had been looking for me to have lunch and catch up … I went down late, as I’d gone for a jog around the lake with a couple of the guys, and X and Y had eaten but they joined me anyway, [we sat] just outside the main mess … talked to them about how it was going, mentioned I was having a ball, the people were all really nice … Z [the female recruit that didn’t think I should be there] walked past and glared at me … they asked me to have lunch with them again next Wednesday; conflict! But I don’t really have choice … there was curiosity by the other recruits about the meeting. I didn’t sense suspicion but you never know; recruits had briefly been introduced to them and knew they were high up. I tried to palm it off; ‘they’re just checking up on me ‘cause it’s their heads on the line if I’m a loose cannon’ but it was certainly a reminder to recruits that not only wasn’t I really one of them but that I had easy access to their superior officers (Tuesday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

In a similar way to that outlined for ADFA, when AFPC recruits perceived that I was being singled out or undermined, my camaraderie with them seemed to increase, even if the singling out was a reminder to everybody of my different role:

… ‘police officers deal with drunks and shitheads all the time, you can become very blasé … you may have a problem with the way they (police officers) deal with people but towards the end of a shift if they’ve done a couple of arrests etc; that’s just how you become, it’s a culture thing’ … as he left the room, he turned to me and made a snide comment ‘did you
get all that down?’ … a couple of recruits over other side of room were laughing sympathetically and came over to joke with me about it …

(Monday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

The considerable advantage of direct experience did not come without disadvantages. The main ones were that in sharing the same time and space restrictions of the cadets and recruits, my own movements and behaviour were restricted and I was left with little time to write adequate notes or analyse what I was observing. These disadvantages were particularly an issue at ADFA where, during the induction period, every minute of the first year cadet’s day is highly structured and tightly scheduled and controlled, and surveillance by the third year cadets, whose job it is to do the inducting, is thorough.

The only time we had a chance to sit down and relax at ADFA was during meal times in the mess, where writing materials were forbidden. I was ‘allowed’ extra time after lights out to scribble a few notes. By this time, however, to recall, for example, the exact words of a conversation, was impossible, let alone construct the ‘thick’ description Geertz (1973:5) outlines as desirable, that is, description that presents detail, context, emotion, and the webs of social relationships that join people to one another. Further, because I was constantly tired, after being up half the night scribbling illegible notes, I was stressed that I might not be being sufficiently observant and in fact much of the time I am pretty sure I was simply present, barely registering what was happening around me. All this led to a personal crisis about not doing my job adequately, which I sought to resolve by gradually withdrawing from full participation. At AFPC, while time was not nearly as externally regulated, there was a lot of after hours exercise, study and socialising to partake in.

At AFPC my slow withdrawal from full participation was more imposed than chosen, as there was more and more I could not participate in. For example, recruits were spending more and more time using the AFP Intranet and exploring the AFP database, neither of which, for obvious security reasons, I had access to. Also, the closer recruits got to perceiving themselves as legitimate police officers and the more they started behaving like ‘real cops’ the more obvious it was becoming that I was not one of them:
apparently the guys went out drinking last night ... the first time they haven’t invited me ... I asked them where my invitation was; ‘oh, we thought you’d gone to bed’; ‘how can we pick up with you around?’ ... this coincides with their second day observing the ‘real’ police officers they are aspiring to be (Wednesday, Week 6, ‘observer’ week, Civic police station, AFPC field notes).

While withdrawing from full participation left me a lot more time and space to analyse what I was observing, this deviation from the norm threatened my rapport with the cadets/recruits, as I was seen as having a less legitimate position. Further, as Gold (1971:260) cautions, an ‘observer as participant’ is more likely to misunderstand the situation than either a ‘complete participant’ or a ‘participant as observer’. It became essential at this stage to maintain personal contacts and to continue to develop as much rapport as was possible with the cadet/recruits. This was made easier than would otherwise have been possible because of my initial experience as ‘one of them’, which provided both a springboard for asking informed questions and a common ‘jargon’ to communicate with.

Bourdieu (1977:37) argues that the interview is one of the weakest research methodologies because the interviewee is likely to provide the interviewer with the ‘official account’, an explanation of what ought to happen rather than what actually does happen. I think this limitation was minimised by my direct experience as one of the cadet/recruits when interviewing each of them. My direct experience with the cadet/recruits also enabled ‘a relationship of mutual trust, a necessary foundation of any interview’ (Oakley 1981:56). While I had a rough outline of the topics I wanted to cover, the interviews mostly entailed encouraging cadet/recruits to talk about whatever issues and events they had in mind in order to discover what knowledge was necessary for them to talk, reason and act the way they did. As an excerpt from my field notes demonstrates, I had no problems getting cadet/recruits to talk:

I am currently attempting to interview all the cadets in my division ... they jump at the chance to open up about themselves, the only problem I’m having is getting them to stop (I keep running out of tape) (Thursday, Week 7, ADFA field notes).
As Daniels (1967:285) defines it, the main problem really was ‘to be sufficiently friendly and interesting so that they would want to squander their free time with me’. Sharing something of myself with them involved a constant balancing act between building trust and gaining acceptance while not misrepresenting my own position. It would undoubtedly have been counterproductive, for example, to interact with them by objecting to their accounts and challenging their statements, as was occasionally tempting.

Towards the end of my time at ADFA and AFPC would be the closest I came to being a ‘complete observer’. This was the stage that I was starting to fully withdraw from participation for practical and emotional reasons and also because the pretence of being a cadet/recruit was getting ridiculous. I no longer had the same costume as them because at ADFA they started wearing their single service uniforms and at AFPC they’d been issued with their police uniform, neither of which I had been issued with.

Because of this, at ADFA particularly, I noticed a lot of resentment and annoyance from other first year cadets when I did march around with them, as I was spoiling the perfect uniformity they had come to aspire to. Stepping back and being a ‘complete observer’ was an interesting experience and gave me a very different vantage point from which to view the cadet/recruits.

In a demonstration of the extent to which role and placement in the power structure determines perspective and outlook, at ADFA for example, by viewing the first year cadets en masse I felt my perspective shift to that of the third years:

as much as I struggled being a first year, I now imagine being a third year would be even worse … they’re still quizzing the first years for the standing orders test; ‘Name 4 places at the Academy that are out of bounds for cadets?’, lots of flustered confusion in response. For Christ’s sake, even I know this one by now (Sunday, Week 7, ADFA field notes).

As Elias (2006) outlines in *The Court Society*, power is a structural characteristic of human relationships and the King is just as caught up in webs of interdependence as the courtiers. This thesis, however, is very much written from the perspective of the
relative powerlessness of the cadet/recruit as that is where I was placed in the structure of each institution.

**Conclusion**

As has been outlined above, the methodology utilised in this thesis is that of figurational sociology. What this chapter has attempted to illustrate is the nature of my research role in terms of attachment and detachment. Participant observation by its very nature includes the involvement of the researcher with their research subjects although, as outlined above, I was at no time a complete participant and my involvement slowly decreased during my time in each setting. While a reasonable amount of detachment is necessary in order to grasp long term figurational dynamics, I would argue that given my involvement in each research setting, I was at no time a complete observer; more detached than attached.

The rest of the thesis will now situate the data I was able to gather at both ADFA and the AFPC within broader theoretical figurations.
As Elias outlines in *The Civilising Process*, the occurrence of violence in everyday life has declined since the Middle Ages, however, aggregate levels of violence have not reduced, while violence within states has reduced, violence between states persists. While violence has persisted, its nature has shifted from expressive to more instrumental forms. Rather than civilising processes reversing in the enclaves where violence occurs, as this chapter will argue, contemporary ‘warriors’ remain, for the most part, ‘civilised’. Contemporary attitudes towards violence are complex, however, there has been a steady rise in repugnance towards expressive violence. Violence has not lost its attractiveness completely, however, and there are plenty of narratives upon which contemporary institutions can draw to make violence appear both justifiable and attractive. As will be illustrated, this includes narratives that justify state violence as a necessary and desirable response to certain external and internal categories of dangerous people that pose a threat to the rest of ‘society’.

After outlining how tendencies towards violent acts for the most part stem not from inherent characteristics of individuals, but from the situational characteristics in which they find themselves, this chapter outlines the nature of those figurations. Processes of state formation are particularly important in the process of what Elias refers to as the ‘pacification of the warrior’. States increasingly monopolised violence and taxes which lead to the internal pacification of larger and larger territories and the increasingly disciplined and circumscribed expression of violence. The emerging distinction between the state’s military and the state’s police as being responsible for domestic law and order was also crucial in the process of internal pacification. As part of this process, the daily lives and activities of populations within states came
under the increasing surveillance and disciplinary control of the state. Military and police personnel were both agents and subjects in this process. As a result of these processes these agents, and subjects, of state violence became progressively estranged from affective displays of violence by increasingly sophisticated weaponry and increasingly bureaucratically rationalised violence, as well as by distancing certain categories of people through notions of the ‘thin red’ and ‘thin blue’ line.

**The civilising process and perceptions of violence**

A profound ambivalence to war, and warriors, is embedded in our culture (White 2005:70).

There is deep societal ambivalence towards police violence (Goldsmith 2000:111).

It was the ancient Greeks who first developed the idea that warfare ennobled the human spirit and that it was only in combat that valued traits such as courage, bravery, endurance, skill and sacrifice came to the fore. The Greek notion of war as the ennoblement of the human spirit had its roots in the Homeric sagas and their tales of heroes who performed feats of military valour (Gabriel 1990:86). The Greek idea of war entered the mainstream of Western civilisation and remained the main intellectual force that continued to shape perceptions of war (Gabriel 1990:95). The devastation of the Napoleonic Wars, and the frequency with which war and its aftermath were more often experienced by individuals as loss rather than gain, was countered with a sense that war was the source not only of individual and national honour but also of political and cultural regeneration, a source of camaraderie and fellowship that would build a bridge to a new world and a new society (Braudy 2003). The military leader, wrote Thomas Carlyle (1993) in 1841, was ‘the greatest of great men’, and such greatness could never be achieved in peace.

Particularly in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, war was promoted as a universal tonic for restoring order and instilling national as well as personal pride (Braudy 2003). Theodore Roosevelt commented prior to World War I, for example: ‘I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one’ (cited in Boggs 2003:2). *Patton* (1970), an epic tribute to General
Patton, dramatised the exploits of heroic combat groups and appealed to audiences longing to bask in military glory. This film was reportedly President Richard Nixon's personal favourite and he kept a White House copy to show friends and visiting dignitaries. Filmed during the far less popular Vietnam War, Patton was reminiscent of the glories of World War II, when combat was unambiguous, noble, heroic, and decisive (Pollard 2003:318). While crime has some potential for the kind of populist mobilisation that war does, it does not forge the bond of community and acceptance of political leadership in quite the all encompassing way that war can. Mann (1988:159) describes wars such as the Falklands conflict or the invasion of Grenada as not qualitatively different from the Olympic Games. However, because life and death are involved the emotions stirred up are even deeper and stronger.

Developing religious perspectives from Hussites and Anabaptists, together with the development of pacifism, led to war and its morality becoming the subject of debate around the fifteenth century. The most influential contemporary mode of thought on the subject of war is liberalism which tends to oppose war as inhuman and fundamentally irrational as it is wasteful of lives and resources and destructive of moral, economic and social progress. Liberal theorists such as Rousseau, Kant and Bentham all advanced arguments against war. While the 1899 peace conference in the Hague saw the signing by representatives of twenty-six countries of a convention limiting arms and promising to make warfare more humane, it was not until after the First World War that the idea of the illegitimacy of war began to gain widespread acceptance. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 renounced war as an 'instrument of policy' except in self-defence. This prohibition was reinforced by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in which German and Japanese leaders were prosecuted for 'planning aggressive war' and was subsequently codified in the UN Charter (Kaldor 1999:28).

The Vietnam War encouraged the development of a broad-based coalition based on an 'anti-war' theme. From a handful of nuclear disarmament protestors in the 1970s, an enormous peace movement developed and changed world history in the 1980s, helping end the Cold War and alter the global balance of power (Katsiaficas 2003:354). Movements grew from years of grassroots initiatives in a variety of arenas, spreading rapidly and bringing hundreds of thousands of people into the street...
in protest. In Australia, the peace movement drew hundreds of thousands of disparate individuals into public action, for instance during the Vietnam Moratorium marches and the anti-nuclear campaigns of the 1980s (Birmingham 2005:4). Movies like *MASH* and *Catch-22*, appearing at the height of the Vietnam War, portrayed war as barbaric and something that could no longer be defined as ‘just’. While there were efforts like *The Green Berets* that attempted to legitimise Vietnam as a righteous war, critics and audiences generally rejected these messages (Pollard 2003:320).

Conversely, the last decade has witnessed a dramatic resurgence of Hollywood films focusing on the great patriotic triumphs of World War II and attempting to recapture the concept of noble war. Despite the ongoing portrayal of war as ultimately destructive in movies such as *Three Kings*, as Pollard (2003:340) argues, the ‘Hollywood War Machine’ has stepped up attempts to invoke past military glories and victories in order to legitimate America’s recent involvement in war with movies such as *The Thin Red Line*, *Saving Private Ryan* and *Pearl Harbor*.

Contemporary attitudes to violence are complex, including negative elements such as death, suffering, futility and waste, as well as positive elements such as courage and nobility of purpose, decisiveness and group solidarity. The relative strength of these images fluctuates, partially dependent upon context and presentation. Anti-military views in Australia can be evidenced in the relatively early legal acceptance of conscientious objectors, rejection of conscription referendums and the ongoing struggle the Australian Defence Force faces recruiting and retaining members. On the other hand, the Australian War Memorial attracts more visitors than any other museum or gallery in the country, Anzac Day has seen a resurgence of support and the market for books on Australia at war shows no sign of diminishing (Oliver 1997:13).

Elias (2000:375) argues that violence has not lost its attractiveness altogether, rather the ‘battlefield is ... moved within’. As individuals have been moved from aggressive expressions of pleasure, they have created a substitute in dreams, books and art. Just as Elias’s courtised knights read novels about chivalry, people now take pleasure in entertainment with violent themes. Van Meter (2004) discusses how, while the hundreds of works on war and hundreds of war films he has seen generally profess to
be anti-war, there is a fetishism often associated with these war narratives. He concludes that people are ‘turned on’ by the visceral thrills associated with war stories. The media in contemporary information society have done much to glorify killing and war. Characters such as James Bond, Luke Skywalker, Rambo, and Indiana Jones remorselessly kill off men by the hundreds (Grossman 1995:35).

Crime is also a theme that seems to hold a fascination for people. This is particularly true of violent crimes, both real and fictional. A consistent finding in media studies is that the media over-reports crimes of violence against the person while under-reporting other types of crime (see, for example, Jiggins 2004:108). Public executions and floggings have always attracted spectators, violent court trials always attract attention, and certain criminals, particularly outlaws such as Ned Kelly, have always been popular. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the popular press was full of the grisliest details of crime (McGregor 1994:246).

In line with Elias’s theory on the civilising process, however, there has been a general trend since the Middle Ages to react to violence more negatively. A significant transformation associated with the taming of expressive aggression has been a rise in the repugnance threshold with respect to witnessing or perpetrating violence expressively (Dunning 1986:228).

Over this general period there is evidence of an increase in sensibility towards the suffering of the victim:

the spectacle of punishment, even if it was inflicted upon the guilty, was ... becoming unbearable. By the end of the eighteenth century some of the audience could feel the pain of delinquents on the scaffold ... inter-human identification had increased (Spierenburg 1984:184).

As Elias (1996:26) argues, conscience formation has changed in the course of the twentieth century: ‘the feeling of responsibility which people have for each other is certainly minimal, looked at in absolute terms, but compared with before it has increased’.
This trend is also evidenced in the enormous effort required by the state to obtain support for violence from the population generally, and particularly to encourage and recruit the manpower required to fight its wars. As Elias (2000:170) explains:

immense social upheaval and urgency, heightened by carefully concerted propaganda, are needed to re-awaken and legitimize in large masses of people the socially outlawed drives, the joy in killing and destruction that have been repressed from everyday civilized life.

Cahill (2005:82) describes the extent to which the mythologising of Australia’s military history has been socially and politically driven by a range of groups, including politicians and defence personnel, intent on rebuilding Australia’s armed forces after the Vietnam War. Violent fiction, from Tarzan to Rambo to James Bond, is produced on a massive and continuous scale and provides an important arena for sustaining the link between violence and masculinity necessary to generate manpower (Connell 1992:180). The link between violence and masculinity is one that will be examined in detail in Chapter Six. Military authorities frequently finance and encourage the production of combat narratives. For example, more than one third of all Hollywood feature films produced between 1942 and 1945 were war movies, largely due to the War Department, Navy Department and the Office of War Information (Boggs 2003:13). Images are then used for recruiting purposes, for example, the Navy’s use of scenes from the 2001 film Behind Enemy Lines in their recruitment advertisements.

Wars are also controlled in an effort to make them more palatable to the general population. While the Vietnam War, dubbed the first ‘living room war’, displayed the horrors of combat in vivid form, later conflicts were more tightly monitored.

**Violence as situational**

It is not aggression which triggers conflicts, but conflicts which trigger aggression (Elias 1996:461).

Many social commentators point to acts of violence by the police and military and conclude that people who join such organisations and commit such acts must either
be naturally aggressive or attracted to violence. In The Authoritarian Personality, for example, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) sought the explanation of Nazi rule and ensuing atrocities in the presence of a special type of individual. There is certainly documented evidence of a propensity for violence, including lethal violence, by military and police personnel. In Australia, for example, as well as participating in the major wars of the twentieth century, military personnel have inflicted violence against convicts and the indigenous population, as well as against unarmed citizens. In 1854, at Eureka, troops opened fire on a stockade erected by miners on the Ballarat gold fields in Victoria killing at least two dozen miners. Likewise, Australian police personnel have shown a preparedness to use violence to resolve issues. In 1919, police in Townsville fired into a crowd attacking a lock-up and wounding seven men. In 1928, Melbourne police fired into a demonstration of strikers, killing one and wounding three others. In 1929 in Rothbury, police fired over eighty rounds into a crowd of miners, killing one miner and wounding forty others. More recent examples can be found in Victoria where police have shot and killed just over twice as many people between 1984 and 1995 as all other police forces in Australia combined.

There is also substantial evidence to support the notion of men enjoying combat and killing. Australian soldiers in twentieth century conflicts have declared themselves ‘mad for gore’, explaining that ‘the screaming shells and sputtering machine guns’ were ‘music dreamt of since childhood’ and describing emotions such as: ‘the bloody gorgeousness of feeling your bayonet go into soft yielding flesh’ (cited in Howe 1983/84:20). There are also many cases of violence by units composed of volunteers who have not been subjected to any selection process of any kind. An example is the Reserve Police Battalion 101 that was made up of hundreds of ‘normal’ men who were too old for the German Army. Their orders were to hunt down Jews in Poland, single out men who were still fit for work, and shoot the others; the old, the sick, the women and the children. Before commencement, the battalion commander offered to reassign anybody who preferred other duties and only 12 men out of 500 stepped forward for reassignment (Kummel and Klein 2003:182)
While early contributions to the study of police and violence suggested that policing was particularly attractive to working class authoritarians, accumulating psychological evidence has made this portrayal of police officers difficult to sustain (Waddington 1999a:97-99). Despite the evidence described above, in the vast majority of situations the military and police do not exert violence unless ordered to do so. It is far more often the case that police officers, in particular, restore order by applying interpersonal skills to gain compliance and resolve conflicts (Chan 2003:35).

While instinctive theories of aggression generally came to be ridiculed between the two world wars by academic psychologists and anthropologists, they still hold a strong attraction for many. In an article published in 1965 an Australian Army Captain, for example, notes that the resolve of the army leader could be weakened by a feeling that his task was ‘unnatural and immoral’ because he had to convert a ‘peaceful being into ways of violence’. The author explained that this was not the case, rather that: ‘killing was part of every man’s natural inheritance … the polite bank-clerk strips down, not to a peaceful individualist, but to a soldier born’ (cited in Bourke 1999).

Alternatively, a number of writers argue that within most men lies an intense resistance to engage in violent behaviour. This issue has become particularly prominent in twentieth century mass warfare where most military personnel have not been ‘socialised warriors’. Concern about passive combat personnel peaked during the Second World War, when it became increasingly apparent that many men simply would not kill (Bourke 1999:72). Marshall (1947:79) studied this issue during World War II and concluded that thousands of soldiers did not fire at the enemy:

the average and healthy individual ... has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility.

Similarly, Grossman (1995:5) argues that resistance to killing is so strong that, in many circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can overcome it.
Elias’s position is that there is no such thing as pre-social human nature and that emotion and desire are themselves socially constituted. While Hobbes, following Descartes, took the individual as his point of departure in theorising his ‘war of all against all’, Elias points out that people have always lived together in what he calls ‘survival units’ (Mennell 1989:219). In relation to aggression, for example, Elias argues that in the Middle Ages violence was ‘inscribed in the structure of society itself’. Thus, in the elimination contest of medieval Europe, even a person inclined toward peace would be compelled to compete for territory because as their neighbours gained territory, their military potential would increase correspondingly (Elias 2000:263). Similarly, warfare, whether between the many small territories of Europe around the end of the first millennium AD or between states in the modern world, does not stem from any inherent aggression in people as individuals but rather from the structure of figurations in which they exist.

Twentieth century social psychological experimentation increasingly reaffirms that it is the circumstances in which people find themselves that dictates their behaviour, rather than any innate disposition. Two of the most famous experiments in the twentieth century that demonstrate this are Milgram’s experiment on obedience and authority and Hanley, Banks and Zimbardo’s ‘prison’ experiment. In Milgram’s experiment, research subjects dealt out electric shocks to people when instructed to do so by an authority figure, despite believing the recipients to be in great physical pain as a result. Interestingly, a recent study replicating Milgram’s study, albeit with certain ethical restrictions such as a reduction in the level of volts research subjects believed they were administering, found that people in the twenty first century are just as willing to administer what they believe are painful electric shocks to others when urged on by an authority figure as the research subjects in Milgram’s study (Burger 2009:9). In the Stanford prison experiment, randomly selected students acted as either ‘guards’ or ‘prisoners’, with research subjects, especially the ‘guards’, behaving in such an extreme manner that the experiment had to be prematurely concluded for ethical reasons (Hanley, Banks et al. 1973).

Figurational approaches to the phenomenon of ‘football hooliganism’ help to illustrate the importance of situational characteristics in the ready resort to violence.
by certain groups of people. These situational characteristics include early masculine socialisation as well as adolescent socialisation on the streets where violence is used to acquire membership of, and status within, groups that are held together by the principle of 'ordered segmentation'. As a consequence, these young males 'learn to associate adrenaline arousal in fights and physical confrontations with warm, rewarding and thus pleasurable feelings, rather than the anxiety and guilt that tend to accompany the performance and witnessing of violence' (Bairner 2006:587).

The next section shows how the civilising process has impacted upon the habitus of cadets and recruits at ADFA and AFPC in relation to violence.

**The civilising process and contemporary agents of violence**

In line with the hypothesis that civilising processes have led to the pacification of the warrior, apprehension about the potential to inflict violence upon other people was particularly apparent at the Australian Federal Police College (AFPC). The awareness by AFPC recruits' of their increased capacity to use violence was the subject of much police humour, as the following excerpts from my field notes demonstrate:

there were numerous cracks about Victorian police ... this afternoon our instructor explained to us that 'many things can be tested out in the field, except things like target practice, unless of course you're the Victorian police'. Everybody laughed but the laughter may have been a tad nervous ... there is a bit of trepidation about the responsibility of having to carry a firearm and what it might lead to (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

The instructor littered his lecture with 'warries' ... he told us how a kid had smashed police car windows with a brick (after being questioned about his identity) ... one of the recruits asked if it was an accident ... [the instructor replied that:] 'it wasn't an accident when he fell down the bloody steps' ... everybody laughed but there was a hint of uncertainty to it (Tuesday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

talking about observer week with a couple of male recruits and how different things might be in practice to the theory we had been taught at
the College … [the recruits said that:] in practice they [sworn police officers] ‘probably do throw the book at them if they ask for a lawyer’ (i.e. literally hit them over the head with a telephone book) (Tuesday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

The instructor was explaining interview procedure; ‘it’s not like NYPD Blue where you grab someone and shake it out of them’, one of the police recruits pretended to be horrified; ‘what?!’ and everybody laughed appreciatively … the instructor explained that you have to ask the interviewee ‘was this interview made of your own free will?’, and a recruit asked ‘what do you do if they say ‘no’?’, another answered ‘shoot them’ to which there was more laughter (Monday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

While the same degree of apprehension was also in evidence at ADFA, it had a decidedly gendered quality, an issue explored further in Chapter Six:

the Sergeant was talking about how to shoot a man and was holding up a picture of a man and explaining what to do if he was trying to run away i.e. you would have to lift your rifle sights until just above his head at 200 metres away in order to hit him in the centre of his body mass etc etc. … some of the first years were looking decidedly uneasy, particularly a couple of the females (Tuesday, Week 4, during weapons training at Mt Majura, ADFA field notes).

The Sergeant was telling us all that; ‘you’re not a good infantry soldier unless you kill one living thing a day’ … a couple of the females looked at each other with the facial equivalent of rolling their eyes … that afternoon a few of the guys sat around comparing football scars and talking about torturing cats and, in graphical detail, the best way to kill them (Wednesday, Week 4, ADFA field notes).

a few of the males nicknamed their Steyrs … one was particularly proud of his rifle that he had named ‘bleeder’ (Tuesday, Week 7, ADFA field notes).
The remainder of this chapter outlines the major figurations that have impacted upon the habitus of military and police personnel, beginning with a process Elias calls the ‘taming of the warriors’. Then, after a look at how the state’s contemporary monopoly of violence developed, the issue of cadet and recruit perceptions of state violence will be explored.

**The taming of the warriors**

In a process Elias calls ‘the taming of the warriors’, an upper stratum of warlords who, in the early European Middle Ages ruled over their own territories almost unrestrained by any outside authority, were gradually transformed into a courtly aristocracy, subject to the constraints of life at royal court (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998). From the Renaissance on, courts gained increasing importance in almost all European countries (Elias 2006:39). Elias (2000:344) outlines how once the monopoly of physical force has passed to central authorities the pleasure of physical attack is reserved to those legitimised with this power by the central authority. However, even within these temporal and spatial enclaves in civilised society physical force becomes more impersonal, and leads less and less to an affective discharge having the immediacy and intensity of the medieval phase. The restraint and transformation of aggression cultivated in the everyday life of civilised society is not simply reversed in these enclaves. The venting of aggression comes to be highly disciplined and circumscribed and a shift occurs in the nature of violence from expressive forms towards more instrumental forms (Fletcher 1997:51-3).

Elias begins his historical theory of the civilising process with an analysis of violence in the Middle Ages when centrifugal forces dominated, creating a cellular social structure where free knights and their serfs lived a largely self-sufficient existence. Historians who study the Middle Ages find innumerable indicators for very high levels of violence (Wimmer 2003:7). Elias argues that the social structure of the Middle Ages meant that chains of interdependence connecting people together were short and violent threats to existence were ever-present and unpredictable. The release of the affects in battle in the Middle Ages were less uninhibited than in the earlier period of the Great Migrations, and more open and uninhibited than they are now (Elias 2000:161).
Elias (2000:161-172) describes how the early Middle Ages consisted of ‘unimaginable emotional outbursts’ in which, with rare exceptions, everyone who is able abandons himself to the extreme ‘pleasures’ of ferocity, murder, torture, destruction, and sadism. The general behaviour of medieval knights is captured with the example of Bernard de Cazenac who, along with his wife, spent his days plundering churches, attacking pilgrims, oppressing widows and orphans, and taking pleasure in ‘mutilating the innocent’. ‘I tell you’, says a war hymn of the time, attributed to the minstrel Bertran de Born:

that neither eating, drinking, nor sleep has as much savor for me as to hear the cry ‘Forwards!’ from both sides, and horses without riders shying and whinnying, and the cry ‘Help! Help!’ , and to see the small and the great fall to the grass at the ditches and the dead pierced by the wood of the lances decked with banners (Elias 2000:162).

Knights in the Middle Ages had a greater opportunity of direct pleasure, as well as a greater chance of direct fear; ‘He had less control of his passions; he was more controlled by them’ (Elias 1998:59).

In the West, the transformation of the warriors proceeds very gradually from the eleventh and twelfth centuries until it slowly reaches its conclusion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As money circulation grew and commercial activity developed, the bourgeois classes and the revenue of the central authority rose and the relative income of the entire remaining nobility fell. While some knights were reduced to a wretched existence, a good part of the nobility entered the service of the kings or princes who could pay. These were the options open to a warrior class that was not connected to the growth in money circulation and the trade network (Drake 2001:192).

Knights then began to live together at court and serve the prince. At court, as individual knights were dependent on the monopoly ruler, they had to behave towards each other in exact accordance with rank. The direct use of force became largely excluded from the competition among the nobility and the means of struggle instead became refined or sublimated (Mennell 1989:80).
When Jean de Bueil dictated his life story to his servant in 1465, it was no longer as a free, independent knight, but someone in service:

> War is a joyous thing … seeing our friend so bravely exposing his body to danger in order to keep and fulfil the commandment of our Creator, we resolve to go forward and die or live with him (Elias 2000:165).

While this sentiment, like the earlier one, expresses the joy of battle, it was no longer the direct pleasure in the excitement of seeing adversaries lying with their bodies torn open, but pleasure in the closeness to friends and the enthusiasm for a just cause (Elias 2000:165).

De Montluc, in Calvinist Geneva, for example, rationalised the effects of war by arguing that it was necessary to be cruel to frustrate the designs of the enemy. Though the Huguenots were enemies, he argued that his slaughter of captured townsfolk was purely instrumental:

> so as to strike terror into the country, that they dare not make head against our army … severity (call it cruelty if you please) is requisite in the sense of a resolute opposition (cited in Drake 2001:276).

The next section provides an overview of the broader figurations that led to ‘the taming of the warriors’.

**The development of the state’s monopoly of violence**

*From centripetal to centrifugal forces*

In *The Civilising Process* Elias outlines how, after the fall of the Roman Empire in Western Europe, centrifugal forces prevailed for a long time. For many centuries, centripetal forces were too weak to sustain a stable central power over a large territory for any considerable period. By the ninth and tenth centuries social structures had ‘disintegrated’ to the extent that each small estate was under its own rule, a ‘state’ in itself, and every knight his own lord and master. It was during the twelfth century that centripetal forces once more gradually became dominant and the long-term trend was one towards growth in the power of kings and their central authority.
Earlier stages of state formation had involved a series of ‘elimination contests’ between rival territorial magnates, a violent competition with a compelling sequential dynamic through which successively larger territorial units had emerged. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the whole movement underlying this transformation, the differentiation of functions, the increasing interdependence and integration of ever-larger areas and classes, accelerated (Elias 2000:263). A process of state-formation set in and by the middle of the seventeenth century, increasingly pacified states were the most prominent survival units in Europe (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998:16).

A strong central authority was able to function effectively within increasingly differentiated societies, by the operation of a process Elias describes as the ‘royal mechanism’. The royal mechanism operates where power between important groups, such as the nobility and bourgeoisie, the Church, peasants and artisans, is distributed so evenly that there can be neither a decisive compromise nor a decisive conflict between them. Kings then allied themselves with the second most powerful group in order to maintain their own power (Elias 2000:320). In France and England kings gave powerful positions at court and in the royal administration to men of bourgeois origin during the Renaissance period in order to tame the old warrior class and to deprive it of its independent military capacity (Mennell 1989:76).

As England, even in the Middle Ages, was relatively stably settled, with state and judicial authorities claiming a monopoly of violence, struggles revolved around who should control that monopoly rather than around its existence and, unlike in France, a successful alliance between land-owning nobility, gentry and urban interests were too strong for the King to combat. As Britain was an island and did not need a large regular army to defend itself, its Parliament was able to resist royal centralism. Charles I did attempt for twelve years to govern without Parliament, but was eventually forced to call it again, setting in train the events leading to his defeat in the Civil Wars (Mennell 1989:76). It was in this way that social survival within England came to depend on skills of persuasion and compromise, rather than skills with a dagger or sword (Elias 1986:37).
Centripetal forces that did rely heavily on violence were processes of colonisation during the expansion of the British Empire. Australian settlement by Britain is increasingly recognised as an ‘invasion’ that resulted in war with Australia’s indigenous inhabitants. Broome (1988:120), for example, describes it as the only full-scale war on Australian soil. In Elias’s view, colonisation was part of the expansion of Western civilization as Western styles of conduct and institutions were spread to the colonies. In terms of the ‘uncivilised’ people encountered in the British Empire, Australian Aboriginals were regarded as a particularly primitive social order:

they certainly rank very low, even in scale of savages … how inferior do they show when compared to the subtle African; the patient watchful American; or the elegant timid islander of the South Seas … a less enlightened state we shall exclaim can hardly exist (Tench 1973:253).

While European settlement/invasion of Australia is often explained by the need for somewhere to keep the growing number of British prisoners, historians have recently come to recognise that it was more the result of British strategic and military concerns at the end of the eighteenth century (Grey 1988:1). An important imperative was the need for a naval base in wartime (Grey 1999:5-9). As Governor Phillip explained to Lord Sydney, they ‘had the satisfaction of finding the finest harbour in the world, in which a thousand sail of the line may ride with the most perfect security’ (Hughes 1987:87).

Unlike European states that underwent long term centrifugal processes, Australia was ‘born modern’ and was populated by people who did not identify individualism with a strictly limited government (Rosecrance 1964:309). The Australian colonies were directly ruled by the colonial office until the 1850s and British control of defence and foreign policy lasted into the twentieth century.

In the post colonial era rather than centrifugal forces setting in, military cooperation within the British Commonwealth continued, and as these loosened, ties with another powerful country, the United States, were developed. Following World War II, the United States joined with Australia and New Zealand in a formal defensive alliance.
Menzies announced on 4 April 1957, that ‘Australia will standardise as far as we can with the Americans’ (Spencer and Wollman 2002:61).

Centripetal forces were also evident within Australia with its Federation in 1901 and subsequent shifting of power from the states and territories to the Commonwealth. One of the main catalysts for Federation was concern about Australia’s defence capabilities. In 1889, Major-General Edwards of the British Army inspected the military forces of the Australian colonies and argued that a federation of the military forces was essential for a proper national defence system (Crowley 1980b:279). As reported in the South Australian Register on 2nd August 1895, the President of the Australasian Federation League of South Australia argued that:

we should have more efficient and less costly defence. Federate now, and these Asiatic realms might do us homage. Postpone it, and we might wake up with the whole of Eastern Asia thundering at our gates, and we would federate when perhaps it might be too late (cited in Crowley 1980b:459).

With the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, the six self-governing colonies transferred their naval and military forces to the Commonwealth. Since then, centripetal forces in Australia have been increasingly evident. Not only do recent intensified security measures in many Western countries in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, including Australia, mark an ongoing power shift from the subject to the state, as well as from the states to the Commonwealth, but legislative amendments like those passed in September 2000, allow the Commonwealth to unilaterally call out the troops in cases where ‘domestic violence’ is occurring or ‘likely to occur’, rather than requiring a request from a state government to the Commonwealth.

Centripetal forces are also evident in terms of developments in policing. British policing, for example, has moved closer towards national control from the Home Office. Various pieces of legislation have changed the structure of police authorities, limiting their size, requiring that a proportion of their members be subject to Home Office nomination and encouraging compliance with Home Office national policing priorities (Enders 2001:19).
Similarly in Australia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, policing arrangements in the colonies were removed from local authorities and built around a single, centrally directed police force in each colony. In 1917 the Commonwealth Police was formed, becoming the Australian Federal Police in 1979. The Commonwealth Police Force originated in an incident at Warwick in Queensland when the Prime Minister was struck by two eggs while addressing a public gathering. As published in *The Courier* on 30 November 1917, the Prime Minister sent the following telegram to the Premier of Queensland:

> I ordered the police to immediately arrest the two most prominent ringleaders ... they refused to do so. Senior Sergeant Kenny replied that he recognised the laws of Queensland only, and would act under no other


Although the Queensland Premier wrote back explaining that the boys responsible had been made to drop their remaining eggs and one had been arrested, within a month of the incident the Prime Minister had established the Commonwealth Police.

The Commonwealth Police, however, is limited in its ability to intervene in state matters and police forces remain state responsibilities. The inability of the Federal Government to coerce, only to persuade, state governments over crime and policing matters was seen, for example, in the wake of the Port Arthur massacre, when the Prime Minister undertook to deliver more restrictive legislation on the possession of firearms. To keep this undertaking, agreement had to be negotiated with the various states on the principle of tighter gun control with each state agreeing to draft new, but distinctly different, firearms legislation (Edwards 2005).

However, numerous recent interventions by the Australian Federal Government demonstrate its increasing willingness to intervene into areas of government traditionally managed by the states and territories. These include the recent Northern Territory National Emergency Response to child sexual abuse and neglect in Northern Territory Aboriginal communities.
The extraction-coercion cycle

It is the military power concentrated in the hands of the central authority which secures and increases his control of taxes, and it was this concentrated control of taxes which makes possible an ever-stronger monopolization of physical and military power (Elias 2000:355).

The feudal system in England was one of personal obligations that avoided the necessity of a central taxing authority. In theory, the king granted large blocks of land to a group of lords in return for their obligation to supply a specified number of soldiers for a specified length of time when the king called for their services. These great lords, in turn, sub-infeudated most of the lands to lesser lords in return for military services (Bean 1973:217). In general, mercenaries were hired for an immediate need and were discharged when that need had passed. At the end of major wars, unemployed bands of mercenaries throughout Europe frequently became brigands and this problem was the likely cause for the creation of the first standing army in Europe in the Middle Ages (Moskos, Williams et al. 2000:1). The maintenance of a standing army, however, requires considerable resources.

Elias stresses the significance of taxation to processes of state formation. The importance of taxation and the apparatus required to collect taxes in the development of the state in terms of its connection to the state’s monopolisation of violence is also clear in the work of Tilly and Mann. According to Tilly (1975:73), ‘the formation of standing armies provided the largest single incentive to extraction and the largest single means of state coercion over the long run of European state making’.

Attempts to collect taxes have historically been strongly contested. The classical Greeks looked upon direct taxes as tyrannical (Hudson 2000:10), Karl Knutsson was deposed in 1457 for trying to introduce new taxes (Bean 1973:215) and French kings faced continuous rebellions by the nobility and had enormous difficulty regulating tax collection (Kaldor 1999:19). In England, the Tudors and then the Stuarts failed to establish a royal right to levy taxes directly, and the attempt by Charles I to bypass Parliament in raising revenue was the direct cause of the English Civil War (Bean 1973:215). The failure by the British kings in the seventeenth century to lay their hands on sufficient money for the maintenance of a standing army to enforce the
collection of taxes played a central part in their inability to win their battles with the estates. This inability primarily rested on the defence of Britain not depending on a standing army on land, but rather on a navy (Elias 1996:165).

That the state’s primary reason for raising money was for warfare is demonstrated by Mann (1988:111) who outlines that for over seven centuries, up to the early nineteenth century, somewhere between 75 per cent and 90 per cent of its financial resources were almost continuously deployed on the acquisition and use of military force. The reason the Commonwealth Government of Australia introduced federal income tax 1915, the first challenge to the financial resources of the state governments, was the need to finance the war effort (Crowley 1973a:240).

**The internal pacification of the state**

The internal pacification of territories facilitated by the growth of military power in turn facilitated trade, fostering the growth of towns and an increasing division of labour. This helped to generate taxes which were used to support larger administrative and military organisations, which in turn facilitated the internal pacification of larger territories. This cumulative process was experienced as a compelling force by the people caught up in and contributing to it (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998:17).

The gradual disarmament of the civilian population included the general seizure of weapons at the ends of rebellions, the prohibitions of duels, controls over the production of weapons, the introduction of licensing for private arms and restrictions on public displays of armed force (Tilly 1989:69). The incidence of interpersonal violence such as murder and assault has reduced significantly in recent centuries. In terms of homicide, for example, estimates for the Middle Ages range from 20 to 40 homicides per 100,000 population, in contrast to rates of between 0.5 and 1 per 100,000 in the mid twentieth century (Mennell 2007:124). In most Western European countries executions were, after being moved behind prison walls during the nineteenth century, abolished in the twentieth century.

The passing of more stringent gun laws in Australia following the Port Arthur massacre, where a semi-automatic rifle was used in a killing spree by an individual in
1996 that claimed the lives of 35 people, demonstrates the Australian state’s willingness to intervene to control the means of violence internally. In the United States alternatively, the right to own a firearm leads to frequent armed challenges to the state’s monopoly of violence and contributes to a homicide rate far higher than that in Australia (Nichols 1996:17). Interestingly, despite the absence of a bill of rights in Australia, it was the ‘right’ to bear arms that was cited as one of the arguments against the 1996 tightening of gun restriction laws by the pro-gun ownership lobby in Australia (Buttsworth 2003:161).

An array of legislative amendments in Australia in recent years has focused on the carrying of offensive weapons, knives in particular, in public places. In New South Wales, the *Crimes Legislation (Police and Public Safety) Act 1998*, for example, extends the range of offences in relation to custody of knives in public places or schools, and empowers police to conduct electronic or frisk searches of people, their bags or other personal effects where they reasonably suspect the person has unlawful custody of a knife, firearm or prohibited weapon. Similar legislative provisions have also emerged in other states (Goldsmith 1999).

**The emergence of public police**

The differentiation of internal police surveillance from a predominantly external facing military power is a novel administrative achievement of the modern nation-state (Dandeker 1990:65).

Particularly important to the civilising process has been the emerging distinction between the military and civilian police responsible for domestic law and order. Concentrating the legitimate use of violence into the hands of a public institution accountable to an elected parliament has been a significant step in the process of internal social pacification. The modern police is the last of the basic building blocks in the structure of modern executive government (Bittner 1990:102). The office of Constable was introduced into British common law following the Norman Invasion of the British Isles in AD 1066. The Constable occupied a number of roles, including serving as an enforcing agent for the king, as well as being in charge of military affairs for the king. However, the foundation of the modern public police in the
nineteenth century can be seen as part of a general movement to minimise the state’s use of physical violence against its own citizens.

The establishment of a strong government police force was strongly resisted. As the philosopher William Paley argued at the time, even if many people were hanged, this was better than a police system which would reduce the ‘liberties of a free people’ (Rawlings 2002:107). Much of the resistance to the establishment of a public police force stemmed from observations of the French system which, following the French Revolution, had become detached from the people in order to create an apparatus to protect them from further revolution. As a result, it was considered that the people spent all their time evading the police, which meant ‘no room was left for conscience, a sense of shame, or the cultivation of moral principles’ (Rawlings 2002:108).

However, societal changes encouraged the acceptance of a strong government police, include the widespread perceptions that crime was inexorably rising. From the last quarter of the eighteenth century through to the 1820s, problems of crime and order maintenance were regarded as particularly acute (Rawlings 2002:88). The industrial revolution had caused many major social changes which were in large part responsible for the recognition of a need for policing in the growing cities and towns. Another contributory factor to the need for police, especially in Britain, was the civil disorder caused by returning soldiers and sailors from the Napoleonic wars who were largely homeless, unemployed, and often disabled by wounds. The numbers of soldiers returning was not insignificant and their impact on society was problematic, particularly when combined with grievances, such as being discharged unpaid (Drake 2001:294).

A series of events exposed the lack of any acceptable means of keeping the peace as military interventions were often both bloody and ineffective. The Gordon Riots of 1780, for example, a protest against a 1778 act permitting Catholics to enlist in the Army, showed the need for a means of maintaining order. The ‘Peterloo massacre’ in Manchester in 1819, where 11 people were killed and 400 wounded, led to a public outcry about the practice of using the army to keep the peace. (Roberts 1977:535).
When Sir Robert Peel established the Metropolitan Police Force in London in 1829, the lower ranks were drawn from the lower working classes while the upper ranks were drawn from non commissioned officers. Police officers were instructed to be cautious in their dealings with the civil population and instructions provided that police officers were to be unarmed, courteous at all times and refrain from the use of violence (Enders 2001:23). The General Instructions issued to the London Metropolitan Police outlined, for example, that the police officer:

will be civil and attentive to all persons of every rank and class; insolence or incivility will not be passed over ... he must be particularly cautious, not to interfere idly or unnecessarily (Waddington 1999a:20-23).

Peel had considerable difficulty in persuading parliament of the need for a police force in London and it took a further 27 years before every town and county was forced, by law, to implement the new policing (Enders 2001:14). However, as the police force became accepted, a particular view of the non-threatening ‘bobby’ prevailed, and was subsequently perpetuated in fact and fiction (Edwards 2005).

The same perception was not held of the first public Australian police forces. Immigrants arriving in New South Wales from Britain, for example, found that there were marked differences between the two countries in respect of the powers and conduct of the police. Travellers wrote of being subjected to tyrannical and over-zealous policemen. For example, one travel writer commented in Twelve Years Wanderings in the British Colonies: from 1835 to 1847 that Australian police: ‘are but too frequently happy at the opportunity it gives them to molest free persons’ (cited in Crowley 1980a).

Rather than being based on police in England, the colonies’ police forces were based on the Royal Irish Constabulary, a pervasive and bureaucratic police whose primary role was the maintenance of order. The Royal Irish Constabulary provided not only the structural model for Australian policing, but also provided a significant proportion of the personnel for colonial forces, with approximately half of the force being former members of the Royal Irish Constabulary. Chief Commissioners in Australia up until the beginning of the 1880s were either military men or proponents of the Irish model.
In many senses Australia's police forces were little more than armies of occupation.

From the moment of Australia's white occupation, force was applied against convicts as well as the indigenous population. As Connell and Irving (1980:32) outline, while Governor Phillip may have been short of everything else in the First Fleet, coercion had been carefully provided for. It was the military that carried out security and other acts of violence: from the First Fleet's Marines of 1788, the 'Rum' Corps raised specifically for New South Wales and their replacements, the Royal Marines and British Regiments of Foot in 1809 (Blackler 2000:43). The British garrison infantry performed guard, escort and provost duties and, from 1825 to 1850, also provided officers and men for a military mounted force deployed in a civil police role. Twenty-seven different British regiments served in Australia to 1870 and until the 1860s there were usually several thousand imperial troops in the colonies (Belich 2009:272). Military personnel played an enormous role in the first century of white settlement and were prominent in practically every walk of life in Australia's first hundred years (Walsh 1988:59). British naval and military presence continued to be important until the final removal of the garrison in 1870.

It was not until the 1850s that the role of the military forces in Australia altered from being predominantly directed to meeting actual internal threats to being primarily concerned with potential external threats. This reorientation was not without some resistance. When, in 1848, the British colonial secretary informed Australian governors that their troop strength would be determined by their exposure to external danger, Australian colonists protested that the garrison should be maintained to combat the 'crime wave' New South Wales was ostensibly encountering (Stanley 1988). Further, when Lord Kitchener visited Australia in 1909 to advise on matters of defence, he concluded that Australia's defence force was inadequate in numbers, training, organisation and weapons. He argued that Australia's military was important not only because of Australia's isolated position, but 'to defend Australia from the dangers that are due to present conditions that prevail in the country' (Oliver 1997:16).
Perceptions of the military and police

Societal perceptions of the military and police have historically fluctuated wildly, depending on social conditions and the perceived need for these institutions. A significant proportion of society seems to admire bravery and be grateful for protection, while at the same time disliking the authoritarianism, potential threat and enormous cost of the military and police. According to popular myth, dating from colonial times, the ‘typical Australian’ displays a marked dislike of authority; particularly of soldiers and police (Coulthard-Clarke 1996:203-205). The Australian idealisation of bushrangers such as Ned Kelly and the negative representation of the police involved in pursuing these outlaws is a demonstration of the extent of the police force’s alienation from the community (Enders 2001:201).

As Bittner (1990:94) outlines, police work has traditionally been a tainted occupation. Medieval watchmen, recruited from among the ranks of the destitute and subject to satirical portrayals, were perceived to belong to the world of shadows they were supposed to contain. As outlined above, the introduction of constables into England was met first by anti-police riots, and later by frequent mobbings and assaults. They were the ‘Jenny Darbies’, a corruption of the French ‘Gens d’armes’, a traditional symbol for the English of despotism (Rawlings 2002:61).

However, by the early twentieth century, policemen in England had become ‘the nurse of national morality’ and the defence against an invasion of ‘vice and crime’ (Rawlings 2002:153). Policemen were featured in full dress uniform on postcards and souvenirs, standing for what was noble about the community and the nation state. In all these manifestations the police simultaneously reproduced and represented order. They came to embody central authority as peace, order and good government (Jiggins 2004:31). A famous music hall song with the lyrics ‘if you want to know the time ask a police man’, originally about asking policemen the time because they had probably stolen your watch, came to be interpreted as illustrating the trust placed in policemen by the public (Mawby 2002:10).

During the anti Vietnam War demonstrations, however, police were experienced as violent and over reactive and came to be known as ‘pigs’ and ‘the fuzz’ rather than ‘bobbies’ and ‘cops’. The introduction of paramilitary policing techniques involved a
reactive, ‘fire brigade’ response and, along with the utilisation of new technologies, reduced routine contacts with the public and meant that the majority of interaction between the police and the public occurred only in formal situations, often at the point of complaint or arrest. The legitimacy of police forces in Western countries, including Australia, came under serious question throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In recent decades, the police have increasingly been subject to public scrutiny, scandal, and complaint.

On the other hand, when Australia began to produce its own television shows in the mid sixties, it was police drama which became the national genre. In 1964, for example, a new Australian drama series, a show called Homicide, was screened and ran for 11 years. In the years that followed police shows like Division 4, Cop Shop, Hunter and Matlock Police consistently made the top ten most popular shows (McGregor 1994:246). Contemporary police drama continues to be regularly screened on Australian television, including shows like Blue Heelers, The Bill and NYPD Blue. The growing genre of reality television, capturing ‘real life’ action as it happens, also consistently delves into the world of policing. While not necessarily raising the status of police officers in society, it could be argued that these shows assist in ultimately reinforcing the concept of policing as being at the very least necessary. Further, recent surveys show that social confidence in the police remains high in at least some quarters of the community (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:35).

The professional soldier in Australian history has similarly been held in relatively low esteem. This is partly the result of the historical reliance on citizen soldiers in Australia, as well as the domestic role played by military forces in Australian history, such as during bitter strikes that gripped several colonies in the latter decades of the nineteenth century (Coulthard-Clarke 1996:203-205). Further, the unimportance of Australia as a military power meant that even citizen solidering was not popular. An Australian who made the militia a hobby was likely to be regarded by his acquaintances as a ‘peculiar fellow with an eccentric taste for uniforms and the exercise of petty authority’. During drill in the nineteenth century volunteers ‘could not go through the street in their uniforms, without being laughed and scoffed at’ (Wilcox 1998:13).
The founding of civil police forces as the enforcers of state authority helped improve the army’s reputation. In Australia, not only were soldiers transformed from gaolers to guardians but there was a change in the perception that the colonies’ enemies lay outside, rather than within, colonial society. Soldiers who took up military service then came to be perceived as exemplary citizens.

The status of service personnel, particularly in recent decades seems to have increased, no doubt partly due to the positive presentation of them on film and television, such as in box-office hits like Saving Private Ryan and The Thin Red Line (Andrews 1988:390). Commitments to UN sponsored peacekeeping operations also help to improve the image of the military, as do easy victories, such as in Iraq in 1991. The Australian Army’s role in East Timor in 1999 further improved the military’s image in Australia with the Army regaining its place as a central national institution. The Australians who fought in Afghanistan in the early years of this decade did so with near universal support (Birmingham 2005:4). While Australia’s more recent military commitment in Iraq has not enjoyed universal support, condemnation has been aimed at the Government that sent them rather than at the military. In April 2005, for example, in the face of continued opposition to Australia’s involvement, opinion surveys continued to find the Australian Defence Force the most trusted and respected of all Australian public institutions (Birmingham 2005:5).

The monopoly of violence and social control

The monopoly of violence by the state led to an extensive expansion of its surveillance capabilities, transforming the relationship between the state and society and enabling the state to closely control the daily lives and activities of subject populations (Giddens 1987:176,177). The expansion of the state’s surveillance capabilities and internal pacification enabled a dramatic reduction upon the actual exercise of violence. The distinction between the military and civilian police is the symbol and material expression of this phenomenon (Giddens 1985:192).

In the The Well Ordered Police State Raeff (1983) highlighted how the aim of the numerous and diverse police ordinances issued by both local and central authorities from the sixteenth century onwards was to ‘civilise’ the lower orders, to instil a

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rational and disciplined approach to work and life, and to wean them away from a ‘traditional’ lifestyle based on irrational beliefs and customs and a pre-industrial sense of time. The ordinances dealt with the size of crowds at regular events such as betrothals, weddings, funerals and christenings, as well as their location and timing, with the aim of restricting the wasteful consumption of resources and otherwise productive labour time.

In Australia, the police played a critical role in the struggle to secure discipline in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In New South Wales, for example, urban police forces rapidly acquired a range of regulatory as well as coercive functions, laying down and enforcing rules relating to the demarcation, organisation and use of public and private space. A wide variety of tasks was assumed as the century progressed, including traffic control, various licensing responsibilities, the administration of maintenance payments and old-age pensions, together with the enforcement of legislation on weights and measures (Hogg and Golder 1987:70). As the power of the state regulated, controlled and encroached into all aspects of the community’s existence, the civil police assisted and supervised this transformation (Saunders and Taylor 1987:145). By 1902, the Inspector-General of the New South Wales Police commented that:

> It is difficult to fix the precise limits within which it is proper that (the police) should act, but it is certain that by indefinitely multiplying their duties we run a (risk) of undermining the popularity of the force by exhibiting its members before the eyes of the people as universally interfering and censorious (Connell and Irving 1980:214).

The police role as an agent in the community to enforce the state’s power intensifies during times of war in Australia. During World War I, the activities of police were directed towards those in opposition to the war and the debate over conscription. Offences for which convictions were obtained included making statements prejudicial to recruiting, such as: ‘these men in khaki are hired assassins and murderers’, exhibiting disloyalty or hostility to the British Empire or making statements likely to cause ‘disaffection to His Majesty’ (Crowley 1973a:303). In World War II, the
primary role and the varied functions of the civil police were enlarged by the National Security Regulations.

As will be further examined in the final section of this chapter, just as the daily lives and activities of the subject population came under the increasing surveillance and disciplinary control of the state, so too did the agents of state violence.

**The state’s monopoly of violence, technology and adiaphorisation**

*Violence and the distancing effect of technology*

Elias (2000:170) argues that if direct physical combat between people had not given way to a mechanised struggle demanding a strict control of the affects, the transformation in the nature of affective violence may not have been so evident. Not only has increasingly sophisticated weaponry substituted firepower for manpower, it has also created more distance between combatants.

These developments did not occur without resistance. Weber (1948a:256) outlines, for example, how in the early period of the Hellenic Hoplites attempts were made to exclude long range weapons as unchivalrous, just as were attempts to forbid the cross-bow during the Middle Ages. In Homer’s *Iliad*, for example, the bow is presented as being the weapon of cowards or men of evil character as it killed from a distance and was less likely to kill than to wound, providing no opportunity for a heroic death. As a result, Greeks of the classical period did not developed its use in combat to any great degree (Gabriel 1990:91). However, by Elizabethan England the bow has become a symbol of valour in debates about replacing it with firearms that were, by contrast, considered a coward’s weapon. Consequently, England was one of the slowest of the European powers to adopt firearms (Francisco 2001:9).

While in the classical world cavalry was virtually unused as a tactic as it was considered a dishonourable way to fight compared to the foot soldier, the calvary came to enjoy a high status. In the 1930s, while Germany was amassing weaponry, the British War Office vetoed any expansion of the Tank Corps as tanks conflicted with a belief in the virtues of horsed cavalry (Dixon 1976:116). The legend of a mythical German artillery officer who single-handedly destroyed a group of tanks...
gained significant impetus from those who believed that artillery and cavalry would always prove superior to tanks (Dixon 1976:91).

Despite this resistance, however, since the turn of the century military technology has developed on such a scale that it is often referred to as revolutionary. With the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles, the military has become a ‘giant engineering establishment’ (Janowitz 1971:27). Technological advances have meant that progressively fewer men are required to actually engage in killing. During World War I, for every soldier in combat, there were eight additional soldiers in combat support roles. The ratio of rear-area support troops to combatants was twelve to one by World War II and by the Vietnam War, of the 2.8 million men who saw service in Vietnam less than 0.3 million faced battle (Bourke 1999:17). As Winston Churchill put it, modern warfare has consisted of the massing of ‘gigantic agencies for the slaughter of men by machinery’ (Bourke 1999:6). The Holocaust, as Bauman (1989:13) explains, arrived ‘in a factory-produced vehicle, wielding weapons only the most advanced science could apply, and following an itinerary designed by scientifically managed organisation’. Most perpetrators during the holocaust did not see their victims, but rather sat at desks, calculating logistics (Mennell 1989:249).

Since World War II, American military policy has been defined by a commitment to maintaining technological superiority (Haggerty and Ericson 1999:237). This enables United States forces to inflict large-scale casualties without sustaining the same when they fight a technologically less-developed enemy (Hancock 2002). The Gulf War, for example, was referred to as, ‘Nintendo warfare’ to the extent that Baudriliard was able to make his infamous claim that the war did not take place. The fascination with technology led to ‘orgasmic excitement’ as night time explosions were watched on television by people around the world (Morgan 1994:173).

Technology has also had an enormous impact on all aspects of policing. By the 1930s, vehicle patrols commenced using motor cars and by the 1960s the abandonment of almost all foot patrols and the use of communications technology removed officers from ‘dangerously’ close contact with the community (Edwards 2005). With the assistance of technology, including the police helicopter and CCTV
surveillance, local, visible service oriented policing has given way to remote, reactive, 'fire-brigade' policing (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:28).

The technology developed for military application is increasingly used for police application. A Law Enforcement Technology Centre has been set up in the United States, for example, to apply advanced war fighting technology to crime fighting (Andreas and Price 2001:39). Some examples of the adaptation of military technology for the police includes: the North American Aerospace Defense Command, built to track incoming Soviet bombers and missiles, refocusing on tracking drug smugglers, the night vision technology used in the Gulf War now being used for law enforcement, and x-ray technology designed to detect Soviet missile warheads in trucks being adapted to find smuggled goods in cargo trucks. The end of the cold war provided increasing impetus for lawmakers and law enforcers to promote the use of military technology as a key weapon for law enforcement Andreas and Price (Andreas and Price 2001:38).

*Violence and the distancing effect of adiaphorization*

A process Bauman (1995) calls adiaphorization, that is, the making of certain actions, or certain objects of action, exempt from the category of phenomena suitable for moral evaluation, is an important factor in the processes evident in military and police habitus. There were two ways this process was evident in the justification narratives for violent action by the cadets and recruits. The first was that of distancing certain categories of people from the rest of society and the second was that of cadets and recruits distancing themselves from the ultimate effect of their coordinated moves by reducing themselves to the status of merely obeying orders.

*Distancing certain categories of people from the rest of society*

[sans Leviathan there would be] ... no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes 2002 [1651]:96)

Within the liberal tradition, violence tends to be associated with nature, with society then conceived of in order to ameliorate the negative effects of nature. The classic formulation of liberal thinking on the subject is Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* in which
he argues that in order to avoid a ‘war of all against all’ people willingly cede sovereignty to a supreme power in order to increase their chances of survival. Although liberalism mostly aligns with an anti-war sentiment, liberal theory accepts that the state has a necessary role in defending the population. The premise in liberal theory tends to be that, as violence is an attribute of barbarism, violence by civilised states can be explained as a reaction to uncivilised states or uncivilised people. While theorists such as Spencer defined the practice of colonialism as ‘re-barbarization’ (cited in Battistelli 1998:13), John Stuart Mill (1962:369), for example, argued that while civilised nations had no right to intervene in the affairs of other civilised nations, there were no such restrictions in their dealings with ‘barbarous’ nations.

The state within modern civilisation, with its emphasis on technology, bureaucratic efficiency, and rationalising judgement has become what Bauman (1989:13) has termed the ‘gardening state’. This metaphor aptly conveys the modern state’s interest in the pursuit of a ‘social order conforming to the design of the perfect society’ (Bauman 1989:91). The modern state’s concern to weed out ‘pests’ forms part of the everyday continuum of routine bureaucratic procedure and is the ‘necessary condition’ of genocides such as the holocaust. While Hiroshima got rid of the barbarians ‘out there’, Auschwitz and the Gulag got rid of the barbarians ‘in here’ (Bauman 1995:144). This desire to give order to disorder emerged from the Enlightenment, however, there is evidence that many people strongly believe that life is becoming increasingly dangerous and uncertain (Lupton 1999:308), leading to increased support for strong intervention by military and police forces.

The traditional image of policing, held by police themselves as well as mainstream fictional portrayals of the police, is of a ‘thin blue line’ (Waddington 1999a:6), protecting society from Hobbes’ vision of society without the Leviathan. Similarly, the traditional image of military forces is that their purpose is to defend the nation-state from external threats. Interviews with ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits confirm this view of the world. When asked how they perceived a society without the military and police, as well as what the role of the military and police in society was, their answers were as follows:
‘Otherwise you’d have anarchy and chaos. You need order’ (female, mid twenties, AFPC taped interview).

‘It’s a really long story starting back at the year dot because if you don’t have rules, you don’t have order, you just have anarchy’ (male, early twenties, AFPC taped interview).

‘otherwise society would fall apart. If everyone’s going around not giving a rats about each other and doing whatever they want it’s going to go to hell in a hand basket’ (male, mid twenties, AFPC taped interview).

‘to defend our way of life from those who want to harm us’ (female, late teens, ADFA taped interview).

‘to protect Australia from enemies’ (male, late teens, ADFA taped interview).

Related to the view of the world that the military and police are the ‘thin red’ and ‘thin blue’ lines, separating society from violent anarchy, is widespread dichotomous thinking about the ‘them’ that the ‘us’ need protecting from. A group of Loader and Walker (2007:12) call the ‘security lobby’ connects with and articulates public insecurities about crime, or disorder, or terror in terms that institutionalise anxiety as a feature of everyday life and link security to a conception of political community organised around binary oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

As Zur (1987:132) points out, the ‘split of good and bad, holy and evil, and ultimately us and them, lies at the root of modern war’. A new ‘dangerousness’ discourse emerges which is consumed by violence and sexual offending. Property based risks have almost disappeared from the dangerousness concept. Against this, the risks posed by those offenders who endanger the human body, particularly the bodies of women and children, have been considerably magnified (Pratt 1997:136).

During the twentieth century, each nation at war used new processes of cheaper newsprint, faster presses, colour printing, telegraphy, radio, motion pictures to demonise the enemy. In the age of mass war and citizen soldiers revenge was encouraged as an explicit political motive. National hatreds were whipped up by
propaganda that made whole countries, including all inhabitants, into monsters. This propaganda of the evilness of the enemy aimed to create the climate of emotional opinion believed necessary to strengthen civilian will (Braudy 2003:461). Dwight Eisenhower helped reinforce the apocalyptic rhetoric that permeates American foreign policy: ‘Forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history. Freedom is pitted against slavery, lightness against dark’ (Braudy 2003:487). Just as in the military the enemy becomes a ‘kraut’, ‘slope’ or ‘rag head’ in times of war, this division of the social world is widespread in modern policing. This version of society is fuelled by the media’s focus is on sensational violence and its representation, for the most part, of innocent victims suffering at the hands of deliberate violent acts by barbaric individuals.

Australia’s national identity was ‘discovered’ in circumstances in which Western European Christian civilisation was conceived to be fighting traditional enemies of Christianity and the West. Patsy Adam-Smith, for example, describes the movement of the Anzacs toward their destiny at Gallipoli:

Not only do the Anzacs symbolize the Greek ideal of civilization they are its defenders against the Turks. The Turks in Western romantic conceptions of the time were until recently the oppressive dominators of the Greeks and thus the enemies of Western Christian civilization (cited in Kapferer 1988:127).

The ongoing relevance of this dichotomous thinking in war was evidenced during Australia’s most recent war when US President, George W. Bush, proclaimed that the post September 11 military action was a ‘monumental struggle of good versus evil’, declaring to the world that ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’ and later dubbing Iraq, Iran and North Korea, along with the ‘terrorists’, as an ‘Axis of Evil’ (Solomon 2003:246).

As well as the obvious racial characteristics of the ‘enemy’ portrayed at ADFA, the enemy was portrayed as distinctly gendered:
the enemy on the target and in notebooks was represented as large and threatening, always male, generally of Asian appearance (Thursday, Week 4, ADFA field notes).

there’s an ongoing assumption that the enemy is a he; the infantry motto that one of the corporals at Majura made us memorise, for example, begins with ‘to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him’ … When asked (by one of the female cadets) whether the ‘him’ includes female enemies the corporal’s reply was: ‘oh, with a female it’s very different, under the Geneva convention you have to have another person present when you search her’ (Wednesday, Week 4, ADFA field notes).

A similar way of dividing the social world is evident with the police. Reiner (1992:129) points to the remarkable degree of congruence in different countries in terms of the sharp distinction between ‘good’ guys and ‘bad’ guys that police personnel adopt. Images of warfare that reflect this division are evident in much policing imagery, from the ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ programme with its assumption that the criminal comes from outside, to the ‘invasion’ imagery used for immigration and general policing efforts to ‘drive out, destroy, eradicate’ (Steinert 2003:283). As a policy of ‘total policing’ would be costly and politically objectionable, class and race biased policing tend to be the predominant strategies in modern policing (Waddington 1999a:24-30).

As Hogg and Brown point out, complaints that we are in the grip of a crime wave can be found in the Australian media as far back as the 1840s, and have continued ever since (as cited in Jiggins 2004:12). Fear of the ‘otherness’ of the indigenous, the homeless, the mentally ill and other visible ‘threats’, fuelled by concerns for personal security and community orderliness, makes violence by police towards those groups more acceptable.

That policing was more restrained when dealing with some members of society than others was evident at AFPC, despite efforts by policing agencies in recent decades to curb the stereotyping tendencies of police officers:
'You follow these basic rules, whether it be Joe Citizen, or the shithead you’re locking up' (Friday, Week 5, instructions from one of our instructing Sergeants prior to ‘observation’ week, AFPC field notes).

‘where’s the scum?; see, I’m into equality; I treat crooks all the same’ (Wednesday, Week 6, in the watchhouse of Civic Police Station during ‘observation’ week, AFPC field notes).

The instructor responded: ‘crooks are dumb but they’re not that dumb. They’re not going to tell you they’re going to reoffend’ (Friday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

the instructor was relaying a warrie: ‘He was tall, skinny, bad hair cut, home made tattoos, have I got suspicion?’ (laughter from the recruits) (Tuesday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

We were driving along eating our half price McDonalds [companies like McDonalds give the police and emergency service workers a discount] when X [the police officer in the driver’s seat] noticed a car speeding … we followed it up a few suburban streets in Ainslie … X exclaimed ‘you’ve got to be kidding’ as the car did 80km/hr through a 40km/hr zone … the sirens went on and the car pulled over … after speaking briefly to the driver, X decided not to give her a ticket, stating to us that she had passed the ‘attitude test’ (the ‘attitude test’ seemed to be code for pleasant/apologetic/deferential and middle class) (Wednesday, Week 6, during ‘observation’ week, AFPC field notes).

Waddington (1999a:212-220) argues that police persuade themselves that those against whom they exercise violence are contemptible and ‘deserve it’ because of the taint that would otherwise accompany the exercise of coercive authority over fellow citizens. A not uncommon perception by many police encountered while undertaking participant observation at AFPC was that the people they were tasked with exercising violence against were intrinsically ‘criminal’:
X [one of the sworn officers:] ‘apparently in America, they’re uncovering some x gene/chromosome that is apparently a criminal gene, that’s the way to go’ (Tuesday, Week 6, during ‘observer’ week at Tuggeranong Police Station, AFPC field notes).

‘Canberra’s a small town; nearly all the crooks here have been before a judge or a magistrate at least once’ (when explaining the ‘tendency rule’) … (Thursday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

‘I wish everyone who committed crime would be put on an island somewhere and just let law abiding people get on with it’ (AFPC male, mid twenties, taped interview).

The speed with which police recruits adopted a readiness to stereotype the typical offender was also evident at AFPC. Prior to ‘observation week’ when the recruits spent time with sworn police officers, there was some protest in response to stereotypical comments by instructors, but once recruits had completed observation week, protest dissipated, as some of my field note excerpts illustrate:

‘you have to remember something; as a police officer you want to nail someone but you have to be fair to the ‘crook’” (don’t interview them drunk, on drugs etc) … one of the recruits asked ‘what happens if they’re a normal educated person; you know like ‘normal’?’. The question was met with an ‘oooh’ from the other recruits (Monday, week 4, AFPC field notes).

one of the recruits was explaining the new method of proactive policing and mentioned stopping dodgy looking people. One of the recruits asked ‘what’s a ‘dodgy’ person?’ and was told ‘you know, like roots, stonewash jeans ….’. The same recruit asked ‘were you hassling any suits or just ‘dodgy’ persons?’ (Friday, Week 6, feedback session at the end of ‘observer’ week, AFPC field notes).

Giving feedback on how they’d gone during ‘observer week’:
terms like ‘gutter slut’, ‘piece of shit’ and ‘toe rag girlfriend’ were thrown around … one of the recruits approached me and asked me what my hypothesis was so far, I asked him what his would be and he laughed and said ‘we’re going to be stereotypical cops’ (Friday, Week 6, feedback session after ‘observer’ week, AFPC field notes).

Just as the enemy is gendered male in the military, the criminal is gendered male in the police. Further, in every example given the victim is gendered female, as shown by the following examples:

We walked into the shooting range and one of the recruits joked: ‘I’m scared already’; there were three big pictures of clichéd male ‘baddies’ running at you (Monday, Week 7, at the gun range for weapons training, AFPC field notes).

‘It’s a smash and grab; he hits a victim on the way out and her dress gets caught on the car, the fibres are forensic evidence’ (Thursday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

‘if she has been a public servant for 20 years and her demeanour is expressing that, there may not be any need to remove her belt’ … ‘Mrs Jones’ house has been burgled’ (Friday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

The view of the world as being divided into ‘us’ and ‘them’ informs the justificatory basis for using violence against other people. While interviewing cadets and recruits, I asked them what would prompt them to use violence against other people and how comfortable they would be doing it. A representative sample of responses is as follows:

if it comes to it I’m just going to basically treat it as a situation where it’s them or me (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

basically someone has to do it, basically I’ve joined the forces so I know that’s what’s going to happen and what it comes down to is basically either they kill me or I kill them, if there’s a major war or something I’ve
had the training and that and I'll have a couple of head starts and that
(Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

It's not something you really think about. It comes to the stage where its
him or you or its him or your mates and its going to be you and your
mates all the time. The thing is we haven't joined the tree hugger's society
(Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

if someone gives me any reason to shoot them I will ... if it's me or him,
it'll be him (Male recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

**Distancing actions from morality**

As well as the sheer superiority of weapons, it was the social technique of
bureaucratically rationalised violence, a central feature of state formation, that made
European states and settlers almost invincible in the colonial wars of the nineteenth
century. As Weber outlined, rational bureaucratic organisation is one of the
distinguishing features of 'modern' societies. The monopolisation of force was
ultimately achieved through bureaucratisation. It has long been recognised that the
military is a classic example of the ideal-type bureaucratic model, the characteristics
of which were identified and described by Weber (1968:221). Barnett (2002:110)
points out that 'bureaucracy was the real winner in war'. The state's bureaucracy
expanded exponentially during war-time and rarely dissipated after war termination.
Expanded bureaucracy made possible the collection of the new revenues that enabled
the development of bureaucratised military and police forces.

In Dr Stanley Milgram's (1974:133) summation of his famous experiment on
authority and obedience he argued that a 'person entering an authority system no
longer views himself as acting out of his own purposes but rather comes to see
himself as an agent for executing the wishes of another person'. This process is
particularly explicit in institutional bureaucracies such as the military and police and
plays a large role in enabling these agents to morally distance themselves from their
actions. The Nuremberg trial of major Nazi war criminals conducted by the
International Military Tribunal illustrates the role obedience plays in making large-
scale atrocity possible. Nuremberg stressed the principle that individual soldiers and
bureaucrats were required to exercise independent moral judgment about commands given to them, as well as consider the interests of ‘humanity’ whose standards of behaviour overruled the views of particular nations and particular leaders (Braudy 2003). However, all of the Nuremberg defendants insisted that it was their duty to obey orders, despite knowing that the court would not accept obedience-to-orders as a defence. By ‘merely obeying orders’, people act in ways they would otherwise find unacceptable (Bourke 1999:17).

Weber outlined how bureaucracies, with their insistence on rule-following, impersonality, uniformity of behaviour and increasingly abstracted processes require fluid and disassociated ethical identities and standards (Watts 1995:163-167). People have been rendered homeless, unemployed, incarcerated, dispossessed or dead by bureaucrats who are required to act as though they are not exercising power, but instead serving others. In fact, the presentation and acceptance of these claims is critical not only to their legitimacy but to their power (Barnett 2002:108). Bauman (1995:150) argues that the splitting of action from its moral significance has never easier or more complete, leading to a tendency for responsibility in contemporary bureaucracies to ‘float’ as never before.

The impact of this ideology was evident during formal interviews with ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits. I questioned them about dealing with the violent situations they may be confronted with and included controversial situations to try and get responses beyond the initial automated ‘I would do as I was told’ response. Examples I gave them to common on included historical examples of particular wars and the killing of non combatants through to the removal of indigenous children from their families and the breaking up of protests about issues they had sympathy with.

A representative sample of responses from ADFA cadets is as follows:

‘it’s not my job to believe in the war or not. I’m loyal to the Australian Defence Force now’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘You get told what to do and as long as it’s not unlawful you do it … they drill that into you in the Army’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview)
‘I’d do everything I could to avoid [a war they didn’t believe should be fought] but if I was called out to go to war, I’d go to war’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

[me: If there was a war are you completely prepared to go to fight?];
‘Yep, yep, yep definitely’; [me: even if you didn’t agree with it?]; ‘well, I hadn’t really thought about it like that before ... if it’s serving the country, I think I’d be so proud to get out there and serve the country’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

A representative sample of responses from AFPC recruits is as follows:

‘the minute you start to get passionate with them [criminals] is the minute you cease to act rationally so it’s very important to do what you’re told’ (Male recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

‘it’s just your job, you’ve just got to do it’ (Male recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

‘It’s your job, it’s what you’ve got to do ... I’m very conservative, I agree with a lot of what the Government does’ (Female recruit, early twenties).

Out of the 32 interviews conducted with cadet/recruits, there were only two respondents, both police recruits, who appeared to struggle with their response:

‘if it was something I felt really passionate about, I would ask not to be involved and be rational about it. I’d try not to be at the forefront of it, just stay a little more at the background, it would depend on the sergeant of the day, I guess, as to whether they’d be understanding or by the book’ (Female recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview).

‘Terrible! That’s my biggest worry about joining the police force. I’d hate to be pulling my friends out of a protest – I might be there on my day off … everyone compromises themselves every day in lots of ways. You can maintain self respect cause you didn’t beat the protester too hard or you did it in as humane a way as you could. Or if you enjoyed it, that’s how
you justify it, I’m sure ... someone’s going to do it, if it wasn’t me it’s
going to be someone else, so I might as well do it nicely ... I’m not going
to be super nice to druggies or anything’ (Male recruit, early thirties,
AFPC interview).

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the shift in the centralised means of violence and the
impact of these processes on the role and habitus of the agents of state violence. The
chapter has argued that, rather than civilising processes reversing in the enclaves
where violence does occur, the technological and organisational rationalisation of
violence means that the contemporary ‘warrior’ remains, for the most part, ‘civilised’.
One AFPC recruit summarised the issue succinctly:

‘There’s obviously a higher purpose. We’re obviously cogs in a bigger
machine’ (Male recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

It is analysing the processes involved in transforming the agents of state violence into
cogs and the ideological process involved in propagating a ‘higher purpose’ that is
the subject of the following chapters. Specifically, the aim of this thesis is to outline
the civilised, disciplined, nationalised, gendered, embodied and professionalised
nature of these ‘cogs’.

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Chapter Four: Disciplining Violence

Military discipline gives birth to all discipline (Weber 1968:1155).

‘disciplines’ ... had as their principal aim an increase of the mastery of each individual over his own body (Foucault 1977:137).

This chapter will focus on the historical transformation of discipline and its impact on cadets and recruits at ADFA and AFPC. The transformation of discipline from a negative to a positive force has been a significant change in the history of civilising societies since the Middle Ages. Discipline evolved from having an external role of harsh punishment, predominantly inflicted on the body, to having a more ‘positive’ role of retraining the mind through bodily discipline. The disciplinary changes traced by Elias in court societies came to impact on the rest of society, having a particularly influential impact on the military and in turn, policing. Foucault will be used to illustrate how discipline came to be exerted through a continuous, uninterrupted process of supervision of the activities of the body according to arrangements that involved the partition of time, space and bodily movements. As Foucault often takes the power techniques developed within military institutions as examples to develop his argument of a disciplinary society, the techniques operating, particularly at ADFA, resemble a distilled version of what Foucault describes as a disciplinary society. More recently, however, as can be seen particularly at AFPC, an increasingly nuanced version of discipline is coming to dominate in the military and police; that of ‘managerialism’.
Foucault is used to analyse the disciplinary techniques utilised at ADFA and AFPC and the extent to which cadet and recruit re-socialisation techniques are enforced through the activities of the body. In particular, how cadets and recruits are arranged individually in space and time in the context of hierarchical surveillance and normalising judgement, with the aim of inducing internalisation. The issue of police and military uniforms is then used as a case study to illustrate re-socialisation processes apparent at military and police institutions and their implication for discipline, body presentation and identity. As will be illustrated, the aim of re-socialisation is to incorporate individuals into the larger collectivity by encouraging self discipline through a new identity. Many cadets and recruits are attracted to the disciplined structure of ADFA and AFPC and actively embrace it to the extent that there was often disappointment expressed at both institutions that induction was not more disciplined and challenging.

**Defining discipline**

As Elias argues, the ‘courtisation’ of warriors, and then increasingly larger numbers of the population, is central to the transformation of discipline. In *The Court Society*, Elias traces how the development of court society was structured around precise body protocols and statuses, roles and rituals, that gradually placed increasing demands on the individual’s capacity for self discipline. Foucault (1980:152), similarly, examines how the ‘micro-physics’ of power come to operate ‘through progressively finer channels, gaining access to individuals themselves, to their bodies, their gestures and all their daily actions’. Rather than merely being a means of preventing looting, desertion or failure to obey orders among the troops, as Foucault argues, power actually came to play a productive role in its interaction with individuals:

> It is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated within it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies (1977:217).

The meaning of ‘discipline’ in this context is the consistently rationalised, methodically trained and exact execution of the received order (Giddens 1985:105). The role of the military in these changes is of particular significance and, as Weber
argued, the concept of ‘discipline’ originates in a military context and had continued to have special significance in the military. Speier adds that the rise of modern military discipline originated in Protestant countries and was so closely related to Protestant religious beliefs that it became known in Europe as the Protestant discipline (cited in van Doorn 1975:8).

The state’s institutions of violence prior to modern discipline

I don’t know what they’ll do to the enemy; but, by God, they frighten me

(statement about English soldiers by the Duke of Wellington)

Under feudal and post feudal arrangements from the Renaissance to the neo-Classical age, military formations were officered by the nobility and the lower ranks were comprised mostly of mercenaries and men impressed into service (Janowitz 1976:190). The military faced continual issues with recruitment in terms of both quantity and quality, particularly as Europe became more prosperous. Numbers for the Parliament’s New Model Army, for example, fell short and half the New Model’s foot soldiery were involuntarily impressed under an Act of 1645 (Drake 2001:296). Parliament had to rely upon the county authorities both to apprehend deserters and to provide it with levies, with the result that ‘most counties press the scum of all their inhabitants, the king’s soldiers, men taken out of prison, tinkers, vagrants that have no dwelling’ into service (Drake 2001:296).

Militaries of this composition meant that there was a tendency for the troops to desert if unsupervised by officers or NCOs, thereby restricting the size and mobility of armies. The primary goal of military discipline was to prevent the high desertion rates (Caplow and Hicks 1995:115). In the New Model Army, for example, half the 1646 quota had been enlisted by March of that year, but half of those deserted within a few weeks (Drake 2001:296). Desertion was also an issue in early policing. The initial policing of criminal justice involved a practice of imposing police obligations upon unpaid, part-time officials who rotated in office. In theory, all householders were supposed to participate in local police institutions but many wealthier householders hired replacements. Consequently, when crowds assembled to express popular
sentiments or make demands supported by local residents, police often faded into the crowd rather than controlling it (Hanagan 2003:129).

Just as discipline in the criminal justice system consisted of punishments primarily inflicted on the body, military personnel were kept under control by ferocious physical discipline. Hanging was awarded for a range of offences, but the most common punishment for several centuries was flogging. The major innovation in terms of the ordinances of the Hundred Years War was the ‘Devil’s Article’, which provided commanders with discretion to summarily punish ‘all other offences and acts that may tend to disorder not comprised in these articles ... as if it had been specially expressed and set down’. Death in various forms is the most frequently cited sanction (Drake 2001:292). De Pisan considered soldiers to be their commander’s ‘dogs’, and explained that ‘obedience of the dogs of war has become a natural function of the bodily maintenance of the dog’ and that soldiers must be more afraid of the threat of physical punishment from their commander upon their bodies than they were of death (Drake 2001:195).

Military officers were no more disciplined that their men. Many officers were frequently absent from their regiments, often insubordinate, and frequently drunk. Their attitude to their military duties was casual, and administration and training was very largely the province of NCOs. Admission to officer status was almost wholly confined to aristocrats and the concept of individual honour that fuelled many of these combatants had the potential to undermine the common goal. In one of the sieges of the Hundred Years’ War, for example, an officer assigned to be in charge of the English army’s rear guard refused because he believed that this represented a smirch on his honour (Braudy 2003:81).

While the establishment of a permanent infantry and regular pay did assist as devices for ‘securing the control of armed force by the state’ (Keegan 1993:14), it was the integration of individuals in a new system of discipline that decreased mass desertion and panic dramatically.
The military revolution and modern discipline

The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power (Foucault 1977:136).

Changes in the practice of war and the relationship of war and the rest of society in the years between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were so dramatic that theorists such as Roberts and Parker have referred to them as a ‘Military Revolution’. During this period, military policy emerged as a subject of experiment and rational discussion. The Military treatises of the Romans were studied as models of organisation, mathematicians and engineers joined command staffs and intellectuals, such as Machiavelli, drew up proposals for reform (McNeill 1982:126).

Augustin Ehrensvard was one of the first officers in Sweden to receive a ‘modern’ military education built on scientific principles. As well as revealing its gendered nature, he conveyed the new directions that military training and discipline had begun to take:

Arithmeticks, Geometry, Meckanicks &c should be learnt by Demonstrations; so that the Lad always is kept at a habit of considering all Circumstances and accordingly to draw sane Conclusions and Inferences. Hereby, he is turned off from old Women’s tales, Prejudice, Trust in fortuitous Chance, and other effeminate Fancies (cited in Sunesson 1984:202).

‘Arithmeticks, Geometry and Meckanicks &c’ combined with various power techniques in order that soldiers could become, in Foucault’s (1977:135) words:

something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inept body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it; making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has ‘got rid of the peasant’ and given him ‘the air of soldier’.
Weber (1948a:260) stressed the importance of discipline in these developments and pointed out that the person principally responsible for developing modern routines of army drill was Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, the captain-general of Holland and Zeeland from 1585 until his death. Maurice of Nassau initiated the reduction of human labour into its components of movement in order to arrive at the most efficient performance (McNeill 1982:126). As Foucault (1977:135) argues, by the eighteenth century military discipline had attained a level at which the extension of power relations with the exercise of social control over bodies in social space, and a corresponding growth of systematic knowledge in the form of military science, regularly reinforce each other in a circular process.

Maurice set up the first military academy in Europe, and his teachings became standard practice throughout the Continent. The modern senses of ‘uniform’ and ‘discipline’ can be traced to their spread (Giddens 1985:114). The success of the Dutch system was demonstrated when it rapidly became the school of choice for a generation of Western European military officers and serving in the Dutch army became a conventional part of the education of the Western European gentry. Descartes, for example, was one of many youngest sons of the French nobility who came to study the military profession under Prince Maurice. Descartes, in joining the Dutch army, was especially interested in studying the ‘various customs of man in their most natural state’ (Feld 1975a:429).

The Maurician reforms also became the subject of many books published throughout Europe which assisted in constituting warfare as a science and transmitting knowledge in a systematic way, especially in Protestant areas. Between 1575 and 1600 roughly fifty military treatises, including original works and translations of classical and continental texts, were published in London and several went through multiple editions (Cahill 2000:9). ‘Moderne warre, is the new order of warre used in our age’ wrote Robert Barret in his 1598 paper; The Thearike and Practike of Moderne Warres (cited in Cahill 2000:9). These books prescribed elaborate rules for choosing soldiers, codifying army hierarchies, expounding on the relevance of classical military history to contemporary questions and explicating principles of training, tactics, drill, gunnery, fortification and battle array.
In 1596 Maurice’s cousin and close collaborator, Johannes II of Nassau, commissioned an artist to produce engravings illustrating each of the postures required by the new drill. Thus *Wapenhandelinghe – The Exercise of Arms* – was published in 1607, perhaps the first instructional text ever printed. The importance and novelty of this work lies in the arrangement of the plates and the comprehensiveness of the accompanying text. A full folio page was devoted to each posture, together with the appropriate words of command. An apprentice drillmaster or common soldier could thus see with his own eyes just how to perform the drill (McNeill 1982:134). Rather than being treated as ‘craftsmen’, skilled in the use of weaponry, recruits were regarded as having to be drilled to acquire the necessary familiarity with handling military equipment. In succeeding years, the book went through several editions and was translated and adapted for local use in France, Germany and England (Feld 1975a:425).

Continuously repeated drill meant controlling and predicting the individual movements of soldiers when firing and marching in an unprecedented fashion. Within the context of a rigid drill system and under the direction of a specially trained and greatly enlarged officer corps, soldiers could be enlisted at random and systematically made into effective fighting units. The use of the counter march is an indication of the degree to which the Dutch system broke with the past in both ideology and technique. The counter march violated the principle of maintaining an unbroken mass army at all costs. To allow soldiers to leave the front ranks was, in other armies, regarded as an invitation to panic and retreat and that the Dutch could do so proved the effectiveness of the new drill (Feld 1975a:427). That a whole sequence of large-scale movements in space and time could be designed and executed without the fear of mass desertion enabled much more ambitious military strategising.

Drill exercised an intensive micro-political technology of the body that utilised every bodily part to positive effect. In Foucault’s (1977:138) words:

> what was being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it.
As Elias argues, the long-term trend towards greater demands on emotional control and the rise of differentiated codes of rational body management is at the centre of the development of court societies. There is gradually a stricter control over posture and correct positioning. While in the Middle Ages, for example, strength was usually the first quality stressed with a powerful chest and shoulders more highly valued than beauty, by the sixteenth century style had become more highly valued than strength. Court society demanded of its actors a constant awareness of their posture and movements. All spontaneity was erased and etiquette became the ultimate reference to ‘carry your body properly’ (Vigarello 1989:149).

Much of the military literature printed in the sixteenth century took great pains to describe the ideal soldier as a vision of manhood and masculinity. The power that came to target the male body is evident, for example, in Gyles Clayton’s *The Approved Order of Martial Discipline*, in which Clayton describes a captain who controls the movements of his men’s legs, faces, arms, hands, and even fingers (cited in Cahill 2000:12).

**Resistance to modern discipline**

Officers were not heavily involved in the military’s progression to a rationally planned and instrumental organisation. The formation of an officer corps began during the military revolution, however, for centuries officers, particularly those in the higher echelons, still acted either as mercenaries or aristocrats, or both. As officers actively resisted the transformation from powerful, independent patrons into bureaucratic employees the subordination of officers to a bureaucratic chain of command was not completed until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Dandeker 1990:65).

In England an attempt was made in 1679 to establish a military academy to provide officers with a basic military education, but due to officer resistance it was quietly shelved. Officers in the seventeenth century were recruited primarily from the rural gentry or lesser aristocracy and considered themselves gentlemen first and officers second. As recently as the Boer war, for example, officers were so busy being gentlemen, they had little time for their men and their welfare. According to Sir Evelyn Wood, commanding officers did not know the whereabouts of the soldiers’
latrines, much less their condition, an attitude contributing to thousands of deaths from disease (Dixon 1976:53). One of the factors which slowed military movement in the Boer War was the quantity of the baggage with which officers went on active service, which could include pianos, long-horned gramophones as well as iron bathrooms and well-equipped kitchens (Dixon 1976:91).

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, all of the European states, together with the USA and Russia, had set up schools of training for officer corps associated with bureaucratised systems of recruitment and advancement. By 1901, the British army was firmly convinced that only training could convert raw material into good soldiers, as its ‘well-trained, rock-firm squares of British red’ had been able to defeat hordes of ‘undisciplined savages’ in the Boer War (Gammage 1988:149).

However, such thinking continued to be resisted in Australia, partly as a result of its limited resources and partly because of strong opposition in Australia to the notion of a large standing army commanded by ‘gold-laced officers’.

Australia’s colonies had followed the British structure design of small professional peacetime military forces, supplemented by citizen soldiers. Australia’s citizen soldiers were volunteers, men who gave up their free time to learn to be soldiers. They did not sleep in barracks or endure military discipline and they could not be ordered overseas to fight (Wilcox 1998:146). Even as the weight of patronage shifted from communities and private individuals to governments and paid experts and drill and uniforms were increasingly enforced, the image of the amateur citizen soldier remained. Wintringham’s popular article New Ways of War asserted the supremacy of the truly amateur soldier over the professionally trained one. It urged that the Home Guard did not need conventional training or even conventional weapons because:

intelligence, courage, knowledge of one’s local area and a supply of homemade grenades would stop an invader in street fighting, even destroy his tanks. Rank and discipline were not only pointless but harmful. You do not make a people’s war by ordering people to do things (cited in Wilcox 1998:130).
By 1907, however, fear of invasion spurred on by rapid advances in the development of fast, reliable steamships putting Australia within closer reach of potential attackers persuaded many Australians to accept the concept of military training. The principle of compulsory peacetime training was made law by the Defence Act of 1909. In 1914 British general, Sir Ian Hamilton, inspected Australia’s military forces, describing the Australian soldier as ‘very amenable to discipline’ but with little respect for authority and as reluctant to salute. Sir Hamilton added that although the bullet would straighten out many training errors, Australian soldiers would need to outnumber picked regulars from overseas two to one to fight them on equal terms (Gammage 1988:164).

The proposal that Australia should have its own military college in order to train its professional army officers originated during the latter part of the nineteenth century, about the time that Major-General Bevan Edwards reported on the lamentably poor condition of colonial defences. The Royal Military College at Duntroon was opened on 27 June 1911, with an enrolment of forty-one ‘future generals’ (Crowley 1973a:174).

Australian soldiers, however, continued to deny the need for discipline. Despite the first division of the Australian Infantry Force in World War I having trained for eight months before the Gallipoli landing, a more intensive course of training than most troops received, what Australians had done at Gallipoli was explained in terms of their ‘natural ability’ (Gammage 1988:149). What was celebrated about the Anzac ‘digger’ was their individualism and their lack of regard for authority and military discipline. According to Partridge, the word ‘bull’ was coined by Australian soldiers in 1916 as a word to describe what they perceived as the excessive spit and polish of the British Army (cited in Dixon 1976:176). Australian soldiers were notorious for their refusal to salute British officers while not on duty, causing numerous incidents during World War I (Encel 1970:433).

Even among the commandants there was a tendency to think that in the event of war training defects might be compensated for by natural ability, and many pointed with pride to the excellent raw material in their ranks. In New South Wales, Major General Hutton spoke in 1896 of Australians as capable of surpassing the British army’s finest
and most heroic deeds. It was supposedly the continuous fighting with men and with nature that made the Australian male ‘as fine a fighting man as exists’ (cited in Gammage 1988:150).

According to the British war correspondent, Ashmead-Bartlett, ‘the notion of race had allowed natural ability to triumph over training: the AIF was an Army of citizens, not soldiers’ (cited in Gammage 1988:164). It became common for both Australians and the rest of the empire to think of Australians as fighters rather than soldiers. The Australian is not a soldier, but he is ‘a fighter, a born fighter’, an Australian Sergeant remarked: ‘his separate individuality and his priceless initiative …[make him] infinitely better than the clock-work soldier’ (Gammage 1988:164).

By the Second World War, however, the notion of military discipline was slowly becoming entrenched and it was the training and discipline that was celebrated in the Second Australian Imperial Force as they set off for overseas service, as described in the Sydney Morning Herald on 5 January 1940:

> The superb bearing of the men, their smart appearance, and the precision of their marching excited universal admiration. The marching was magnificent. Company followed company in perfect formation. The lines could have been measured with a ruler (cited in Crowley 1973).

**From modern discipline to military managerialism**

In the twentieth century, the balance both Elias and Foucault identify between responses to external constraints and self constraints is shifting increasingly towards self constraints. Growing work complexity, along with the increasing decentralisation of organisations have impacted upon this shift. A military journal in 1895 described an essential component of discipline as ‘rigid adherence to rules, regularity, subordination’. Only a decade later, in the same journal, the factors of discipline are described as ‘self-respect, leadership, efficiency, motivation, productivity, loyalty, morale, esprit de corps and conceptions of mission’ (Janowitz 1971:43). With the development of academic disciplines like psychology, discipline became increasingly nuanced, shifting from authoritarian domination toward a greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, including explanations of the purpose
of the organisation (Janowitz 1991:108). General Monash, for example, described leadership as ‘psychology all along the line’ (as cited in White 1981:132).

Moskos and Wood (1988) have outlined the need to recruit more flexible, intelligent soldiers able to cope with the varied and ‘sensitive missions of these New Times’. Lind, Nightengale et al (1989) have argued that each generation has brought about a shift towards a battlefield of disorder and that it is inappropriate to attempt to combat terrorism, for example, with traditional military culture; a culture of order. The result of attempts to do so can be shown in examples such as at Biddulphsberg, during the Boer War, where a handful of Boers defeated two British Guards battalions that fought as if on parade (Lind, Nightengale et al. 1989:25).

A 1995 article in an Australian military journal describes ‘a paradigm shift’ in officer education in Australia. The authors explain that the paradigm in which obedience to authority transcended all other imperatives in the military had been challenged because of the military’s requirement for soldiers who can ‘use their brains, can deal with a diversity of people and cultures, who can tolerate ambiguity, take initiative and ask questions, even to the point of questioning authority’ (Toffler and Toffler 1995:75).

There is a trend in many formal organisations towards smaller, more flexible structures that de-emphasise hierarchy and rigid adherence to formal procedures and this trend is impacting on the military. However, this trend was not in evidence during the induction period at ADFA which remains for first year cadets a highly formal, hierarchically structured organisation, as will be demonstrated below. The more nuanced subtleties of military managerialism were not apparent during this induction phase at ADFA.

**From military discipline to police managerialism**

The writings of Henry Fielding, John Fielding and Patrick Colquhoun provide an important part of the genealogy of police science (McMullan 1998). John and Henry Fielding developed the idea of modern policing, including a full-time paid police, arguing that it was necessary to construct a bureaucracy in order to control the flow of information on crime. Patrick Colquhoun, a disciple of Jeremy Bentham,
promulgated the argument that Londoners required a rational form of police to achieve a civil society. Traditional, decentralised arrangements amounted to an absence of organisation and ‘prevented the full operation of a proper system of vigilance and energy’ (cited in McMullan 1998).

Almost all police forces adopted the organisational technologies of the military, including uniforms and the basic hierarchical rank organisation of the military system. The first uniforms for the South Australian police, for example, were modelled on the 6th Dragood Guards (Clyne 1987). As Rawlings (2002:153) outlines, it was the desire to control the constables in early modern police forces that led to the adoption of a military model of organisation and drill became virtually the only form of training they received. As in the military then, early police forces placed a strict reliance on rank based authority, an expectation of unquestioned acceptance of direction from a senior officer, and one-way communication. The policeman’s life was rigidly proscribed. In Queensland in the early twentieth century, for example, policemen were forbidden to wear non police clothing in public without permission (Finnane 1994:135). Rigorous discipline was intended to restrict the opportunity for police officers to exercise discretion with a view to gaining the respect and cooperation of the policed population (Rawlings 2002:181).

The impression of beat policing as low-skilled work was reinforced by the lack of any training beyond drilling. The first sign of police training that came in Hull, for example, was in 1883 when each officer was issued with a booklet describing his duties. In many forces the combination of military drill and reading a manual was the only formal training provided at the end of the First World War (Rawlings 2002:184). Drill was thought to prepare constables for coordinated responses in crowd control, as well as being regarded as character forming. The police inquiry in Victoria in 1906 stressed the importance of ‘systematic drill’ for probationers and reminded police that their work necessarily meant they must be regarded as ‘quasi military bodies’ subject to the strictest discipline (Finnane 1994:140).

Discipline in contemporary police forces is a controversial issue. Many commentators, including many police officers, defend discipline based on the command-control management model that prevails in police organisations, while
others consider it outmoded. Justice Lusher, for example, in 1981 presented a wide-ranging report to the NSW Parliament criticising police training’s strict discipline:

such an approach … is very foreign to the modern high school graduate and cannot be expected to encourage individual initiative. Nor will it produce police who adopt a thinking, analytical approach to police problems (cited in Devery 2003:85).

Beginning in the 1970s, police organisations in Australia began a process of reform which included an emphasis on ‘police management’ (McMullan 1998). Discipline remained paramount but was to be maintained more by persuasion, consultation and encouragement than by enforcing blind obedience to authoritative commands. Two of the most commonly identifiable reforms along these lines are community-oriented policing and team-policing. Common to these new forms of policing is the placement of a high priority on the assumption that police organisational structures ought to change from a paramilitary and hierarchical model to a much more decentralised and participatory model. In a relatively short period of time, these managerialist techniques came to dominate public, including police, administration in most English speaking countries (Fleming and Lafferty 2000).

There are a growing number of civilian managers and executives in police organisations. Police organisations are also dropping the description police ‘force’ and calling themselves a police ‘service’. These changes emphasise the intellectual content of the police role and aim to treat police officers as thinking, judging and acting professionals and to eradicate the view of the police officer as a mere agent carrying out the orders of superiors (Murray 2000). As was explained to us during AFPC induction:

‘Policing is 99% grey … that’s why we give you discretionary powers … you have to use your brains and common sense’ (Monday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

While there were vestiges of military-style discipline at AFPC, the College was far from the sort of military-style organisation described in early literature on police organisations. AFPC was certainly not like the kind of authoritarian environment that
was evident in early British police training, as criticised by a NSW report, where there had been ‘a systematic attempt to deconstruct recruits as persons and rebuild them as instruments of policy’ (cited in Chan 2003:35). Processes of re-socialisation for police recruits were far more subtle, involving a heavy reliance on the ideology of professionalism, as will be outlined in more detail in Chapter Seven.

**Disciplinary techniques at ADFA and AFPC**

As outlined in Chapter Two, ADFA, and to a lesser extent AFPC, are total institutions in which:

all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority ... each phase of the member’s daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together ... all phases of the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. Finally, the various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfil the official aims of the institution (Goffman 1961:6).

As Goffman (1961:12) argues, such institutions are ‘forcing houses for changing persons’. As a result of the influence military discipline has had not only on the police, but on schools and bureaucracies generally, cadets and recruits had already internalised a general ability to conform with relative ease to the institutional requirements of ADFA and AFPC. ADFA and AFPC resemble in many ways court societies. As Elias (2006:152) explains, in court society there exists more openly and on a larger scale many of the same phenomenon that exist below the surface of highly bureaucratised organisations. Within ADFA and AFPC, just as in court society, people live together in constant close physical contact in a hierarchical structure, under the eyes of a central person and, as a result, particularly at ADFA, a cadet must:
adjust his gestures exactly to the different ranks and standing of the people at court, to measure his language exactly, and even to control his eyes exactly (Elias 2000:182).

The disciplinary techniques utilised at ADFA and AFPC in the process of cadet and recruit re-socialisation are exerted through the activities of the body. Firstly, by arranging people individually in space and time, they individualise. Secondly, by providing training with the intention of producing homogeneity, they arrange individuals around a norm. Thirdly, by providing constant surveillance, they induce internalisation. This produces groups of cadets and recruits that are judging themselves, and each other, in terms of a norm presented to them at the Academy and College. These issues will be discussed in terms of Foucault’s themes of: ‘the distribution of individuals in space’, ‘the control of activity’, ‘the means of correct training’ and ‘internalised surveillance’.

The distribution of individuals in space

In the first instance, discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space (Foucault 1977:141)

The three techniques employed to distribute individuals in space are ‘enclosure’ in the institution, ‘partitioning’ of the individuals within it and social relations being replaced by interactions of ‘rank’.

Enclosure

The first technique employed to achieve the distribution of individuals in space is enclosure. As Goffman (1961:24) illustrates, the barrier that a total institution places between its inmates and the outside world marks the first curtailment of self. The purpose of this enclosure is to cut off interaction with the outside and remove any cues of the inmate’s former status, thus making them more receptive to identity transformation (Dornbusch 1955:256).

While ADFA is lacking a ten feet outer wall, a physical as well as symbolic boundary is strictly enforced:
Just before lights out at 2300 I met the new arrival in the next room. She was very upset as she had been accused of trying to go AWOL [away without leave] when she had gone to her car to get another load of her stuff and as a result had had her car keys confiscated (Monday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

During the induction period, particularly orientation week, the first year cadets’ world is physically centred around three buildings; the ‘lines’ (accommodation), the ‘mess’ (the dining room) and the ‘military command building’ (mainly administration). We have no time, and are not allowed anyway, to watch any TV, read newspapers or listen to the radio and so have no idea what is going on in the ‘real world’ (excerpt from notes made for the Department of Defence Review team, elaborated from ADFA field notes, Week 4).

While police recruits must live at the College and all needs are provided for within the College, recruits are permitted to leave the College in their ‘spare time’ and have a telephone and television in their rooms to maintain contact with the outside world. For the most part however, as outlined in more detail in Chapter Seven, enclosure did come to be self enforced for many recruits.

**Partitioning**

Each individual has his own place; and each place its individual (Foucault 1977:143).

Partitioning involves dividing up the general enclosure into as many self-contained locations or ‘cells’ as there are bodies to be distributed, making it possible to know, master and make useful each and every individual:

We were divided into our respective services in order to be issued with uniforms and heaps of other service specific stuff including rank slides, sewing kits, sunglasses, various bits of brass, gloves, clothes brush, toothbrush, hairbrush ... then we were directed into different squadrons labelled; alpha, bravo, charlie, delta, echo and foxtrot ... then we were
escorted to these squadrons and divided into two towers within these
squadrons labelled alpha and bravo ... then we were divided into different
sections within these towers labelled alpha, bravo, charlie, delta, echo and
foxtrot ... then we were shown to our little cell-like rooms within these
sections (Monday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

The numbers involved in the recruit course at AFPC are far smaller and partitioning
was far less precise:

the recruits are in rooms along both sides of the corridor on the first floor
... copies of their photos have been circulated amongst the staff and other
recruits, listing their names, telephone and room numbers (Wednesday,
Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Rank

The third technique employed to distribute individuals in space is by ranking them in
order to ensure that everyone knows their place within the general economy of space
associated with disciplinary power.

At ADFA, not only are first year cadets fairly dramatically deprived of their pre-
existing social identities, they are also constantly reminded of their low rank within
ADFA. There is a rigid hierarchy with a strong emphasis on status difference. Rank
awareness is continually reinforced through physical and verbal displays of
defERENCE. Communication across ranks, for example, is formally prescribed:

shown to our rooms where the formalities immediately started in the form
of appropriately addressing the third years. This basically meant 'bracing
up' (to 'brace-up' is to stiffen rigidly as a sign of respect to an officer of
senior rank: feet must be firmly together, arms straight down the side of
the body with thumbs perfectly in line with the seam of the trousers) and
saying ‘excuse me please underofficer so and so’ every time a third year
entered or left the room and before and after addressing them (Monday,
Week 1, ADFA field notes).
some of the third years, however, were to be called ‘sir’ or ‘maam’... some of the staff were also to be referred to as ‘sir’ or ‘maam’, others by their rank, others by their name and their rank ... all of this we were supposed to work out by examining their rank slides and insignia (Thursday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

before taking a seat in the dining room, mess etiquette required that we ‘brace up’, stare straight ahead and excuse ourselves to the highest ranking person at the table (Tuesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

before entering the recreation room we had to line up along the hallway, count that everybody was there, take our hats off, ‘brace up’ and the person closest to the rec room had to salute and excuse us all to the highest ranking person in the room (Friday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

While not as ritualised, rank structure was also apparent at AFPC:

X [the Sergeant] gruffly warned us that the AFP is a paramilitary institution and titles and rank structure are important: ‘you’re safe with ‘sir’ or ‘maam’ or ‘federal agent’ (Monday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

There was also, a general awareness of the rank structure and the recruits’ position in it:

‘He might need medical attention to get the heroin bag out of his body before it bursts. Generally speaking, it will be the junior officer who gets to go through it [whatever bodily waste is surrounding the evidence] with gloves and a paddle pop stick’ (Thursday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

there was an argument about whether Temptation Island was best choice of television (it was quiet at the front desk). The Detective said to put it on; the female police officer said: ‘no, anything but that’. One of the male police officers said: ‘now, I see numbers on your shoulder and none on his, hmmm I think we’re watching Temptation Island’ (Tuesday, Week 6, during ‘observation’ week at Tuggeranong Police Station, AFPC field notes).
JAFO ['Just Another Fucking Observer', used by sworn police officers to describe recruits] is a name used to make sure you know that you are the lowest of the low and put you in your place (Friday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

One of the female recruits said; ‘we’re [recruits] are just dirt down the bottom’, and as my boyfriend (in the Army) says: ‘shit always rolls downhill’ (Wednesday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

However, the rank structure at AFPC was far more relaxed than at ADFA, as illustrated by the following:

‘I expected a bit more like military discipline. Like, I expected to salute every time I passed a Sergeant, but that’s not the case. You can say ‘G’day’ to them’ (Male recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

A booklet I found at AFPC: *Transformation of the Australian Federal Police*, (1996) summarised the process of change the AFP had embarked upon:

In 1995, a new operations model was introduced which led to the replacement of the AFP’s paramilitary hierarchical structure with a flexible, empowered teams-based approach to all AFP functions … the abolition of all ranks below deputy commissioner in 1996 and the introduction of the title federal agent.

The ACT Chief of Police reinforced the AFP’s transformation in a presentation he came and gave the recruits: ‘there is less emphasis on rank and authority, and more on links with community and providing a great service to the ACT’ (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes). The Deputy Commissioner of the AFP also reinforced this when he gave the recruits his mobile number, stating that they could call him at any time and telling them: ‘don’t be put off by this stuff (patting his pop up shoulder paraphernalia)’ (Monday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).
The control of activity

The second stage in disciplining individuals, according to Foucault, involves the tight control of all their activities. The two techniques employed to do this are the ‘timetable’ and the ‘temporal elaboration’ of activities.

Timetable

The timetable is the first stage in disciplining time. As Foucault (1977:150,151) argues, by counting time in ‘quarter hours, in minutes, in seconds’, the timetable defines a time ‘without impurities or defects; a time of good quality, throughout which the body is constantly applied to its exercise’.

At ADFA, every second of the first year cadet’s day not rigidly scheduled for formal activities, such as lessons or drill, was informally scheduled by the third years:

‘bogging’ was a favourite activity for the third years to make us do between lessons. This involved giving us, on average, 15 minutes to run up to our sections which included 2 bathrooms, 2 toilets, 2 laundries and 2 hallways, clean them thoroughly and be back downstairs, together, standing at attention with our paper, pen and water bottles, at the exact time 15 minutes was up … a few seconds late or early would have us ridiculed by the third years on various grounds: ‘lack of communication’, ‘lack of discipline’, ‘jacking on our mates’, ‘lack of teamwork’ etc etc. We would then be ordered back up to our sections to stand at attention and wait for one of the third years to come and inspect it. The usual verdict was that it was a ‘shittfight’ because there were: watermarks on the taps, flies in the light covers, grease in the window ridges, a hair under the toilet bowl, water on the floor, sink, shower, curtains, benches, walls etc, dust on top of the doors, behind the heaters or in the storage cupboards, power residue in the washing machine, fluff on the carpet, more or less than two spare toilet rolls in the toilets, asymmetrical arrangements of toiletries in the bathroom and laundry cupboards (excerpt from notes 1 made for the Department of Defence Review team, elaborated from ADFA field notes).
This type of patently useless ‘make-work’, particularly apparent in military institutions, can make inmates feel their time and effort are worthless, further breaking them down (Goffman 1961:31). However, ‘bogging’ and other similar rituals were justified by the third years on the grounds that it was all about better ‘time management’:

the reason given for bogging was that it was better to have it down pat now than struggle during accas [academics] when time management would become a huge issue (Thursday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

Time during the induction period took on a distorted dimension becoming a precious commodity that the first year cadets are never given enough of:

the third years were constantly timing us and we were constantly having to synchronise our watches to the second in order to comply (Thursday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

between reveille at 0600 and lights out at 2300, the only ‘free time’ for writing letters or making phone calls to friends or family is in the evening for about 20 minutes. However, most first years have to use this time for ironing or desperately trying to memorise stuff we are taught and will be tested on such as the charter of the defence academy, the history of the squadron and the cooc (core of officer cadet) hierarchy (Friday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

by the third day two girls were complaining they hadn’t washed their hair for three days because 15 minutes in the morning was not long enough to wash it and dry it, as well as get dressed, make their beds with perfect military corners and clean their room. People were saying on Saturday they hadn’t brushed their teeth all week. A couple of the guys were telling everyone just to run through the water in the shower and bragging about who could do it in the shortest time (Sunday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

First years are also denied knowledge of what was coming up next, giving the third years even more distance from and control over them:
we were often kept waiting, a reminder that we were subordinate first years, but also intensely frustrating, time became incredibly valuable, we were often kept waiting longer than the ridiculous amount of time we’d been given to complete a task and more often than not, we were kept ignorant of how long must wait and what we were waiting for (Friday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

There was also a perception at AFPC that recruits were not entitled to know what was going to be done with them:

we’ll just walk around like sheep; do you know where we’re going?; I’ll just follow you (Female recruit, Tuesday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

all we seem to do is wait … just a sheep mentality; they (the staff) don’t let you think here, they tell you when to have brekkie, have dinner, what to do and when to do it etc (Female recruit, Tuesday, Week 2, AFPC field notes)

However, it did not seem to be done as systematically as at ADFA and the real reason for it was probably captured by one of the first year recruits:

‘the AFP is not nearly as regimented as I thought it would be, in fact, staff don’t seem to know what’s going on half the time … they are all a bit confused’ (Male recruit, Thursday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Not only was there no watch synchronisation at AFPC, there seemed to be more flexibility in timelines generally:

we were given another assignment at the last minute; it’s due tomorrow. One of the recruits made a fuss about how much we had to do already and explained that he’d already made dinner plans with his girlfriend. The response from staff was sympathetic and it almost looked like we’d get a time extension; a tight shake of the head from X (the senior officer in the room) soon put everyone in their place (Wednesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).
Temporal elaboration of the act

While the timetable specifies at what moment an activity is to be performed and defines the general framework for this activity, the ‘temporal elaboration of the act’ goes further by specifying the precise way to perform the activity. Foucault points out, for example, the steps involved in controlling marching troops which had developed by the mid eighteenth century:

The length of the short step will be a foot, that of the ordinary step, the double step and the marching step will be two feet, the whole measured from one heel to the next; as for the duration, that of the small step and the ordinary step will last one second, during which two double steps would be performed; the duration of the marching step will be a little longer than one second. The oblique step will take one second; it will be at most eighteen inches from one heel to the next ... The ordinary step will be executed forwards, holding the head up high and the body erect, holding oneself in balance successively on a single leg, and bringing the other forwards, the ham taut, the point of the foot a little turned outwards and low, so that one may without affectation brush the ground on which one must walk and place one’s foot, in such a way that each part may come to rest there at the same time without striking the ground (Foucault 1977:151).

By breaking an act into its elements in this way and defining the exact movement and position of the body’s limbs, ‘time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power’ (Foucault 1977:151). This is most obvious at ADFA during drill, similar in detail and intent to the military ordinance outlined above.

Not only do individuals have to manipulate their bodies in a very specific way during drill, but this manipulation also has to be done in a synchronised way with many other individuals. Durkheim (1995) outlined how ritual performances, with their close physical proximity, kindled strong emotions in participants, evoking a collective energy. McNeill (1995:1) similarly, argues that the effect of drill is the welding of a collection of men into a coherent community, resulting in what he calls ‘muscular bonding’.
While there was some token formal drill performed by a small number of recruits at the graduation ceremony, drill is no longer performed routinely by AFP police officers:

had a talk with X [Detective Sergeant] who explained somewhat nostalgically: ‘it isn’t like it used to be; they’ve taken all the discipline out; we used to parade three times a week; now the parade ground out at Woden is a car park; we don’t do it in the AFP anymore … the AFP is not disciplined any more’ (Thursday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

There were similarities with the temporal elaboration of the act of training on the weapons at both ADFA and AFPC, however:

rifle training on the F88 Steyr … cadets body movements were broken down into series of movements to get one norm, even to facial expressions. The aim was a very masculine aggressive stance; the Corporal was overjoyed when one female ‘got it’ and needed to show her off to everybody else … even the breathing cycle is regulated; ie every time you fire – 4 normal breaths, then deep breath, and half way through the exhale, you fire a shot (Wednesday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Firearms training with the Glock 9mm semiautomatic pistol … Breathing had to be regulated; including when and how much to inhale and exhale. Instruction was provided on grip and stance; the ‘Weaver stance’, however it was explained that: ‘locking the shooting arm straight is an acceptable personal variation’ (Monday, Week 7, AFPC field notes).

However, unlike at AFPC, the temporal elaboration is also apparent in every other activity at ADFA. Not a single dimension of a first year cadet’s personal bearing, or even personal belongings, is left untouched. A few examples illustrate this:

‘Reveille’ the next morning at 6.45: a bizarre ritual where you come out to the section landing at the end of the corridor with your bed sheets over each shoulder, where the underofficer is already waiting, impeccably uniformed. Etiquette is very strict – matter of remembering and shouting
exact words and co-ord with rest of squadron: ‘excuse us please, underofficer (X). Charlie section first years’ then as soon as you hear the cadets at alpha level yell out ‘alpha section on parade’ at the top of their lungs, then ‘bravo section on parade’, you yell out; ‘Charlie section on parade’ so if one person in one section is not present no one else in the entire squadron can continue (Wednesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

when standing still, the position was either at ‘attention’ or ‘at ease’. Either way, every limb was to be held precisely in the prescribed manner and exactly the same as every other first year. We all had to be lined up in perfect rank and file. Standing at ‘attention’ meant that heels were together, toes at a 45 degree angle, arms straight down sides with the thumbs lined up with the seam of the trousers, stomach in, chest out, shoulders back, body straight, head up and eyes forward at all times, no swaying, scratching or brushing away flies ... everywhere we went we had to march in perfect formation swinging our arms wide and making sure we were always the required distance from the cadet in front, behind and on either side (Wednesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

posture, demeanour and motion become the subject of control and critical surveillance by superiors. Errors bring ridicule, both on the drill square and off. Even facial movements are now subject to control: ‘did I give you permission to smile? Get rid of it’ (Thursday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

on the night of arrival, we were all given an information handout containing, among other stuff to memorise, a picture of a ‘standard squadron room layout’ detailing exactly where various personal and military items were to be placed. Throughout the week, this information is expanded upon and every possible dilemma the first years may have in arranging their room is answered, items have to be folded, rolled or arranged in specific shapes, positions and sizes. For example, after folding their socks into ‘smilies’, they must then be positioned in neat lines so that the smile is facing upright when the drawer is opened, and also that
clothes must be colour organised, from dark to light (Sunday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

At AFPC alternatively, such attention to detail was not apparent:

we were told that tomorrow morning the Commissioner and the media would be coming out for the official welcome: ‘you’ll have to sit at the right time, stand at the right time, deal with a bit of officialdom; we’ll get it over with and then get on with the real work’ (Monday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

The means of correct training

The success of the above techniques in precisely structuring individuals and controlling their every activity derives from the use of hierarchical observation and normalising judgement.

Hierarchical observation

in the perfect military camp all power would be exercised solely through exact observation; each gaze would form a part in the overall functioning of power (Foucault 1977:171).

Total institutions provide an environment in which a high degree of direct surveillance can be exercised. In this way all the cadets are perpetually supervised, leaving ‘no zone of shade’ (Foucault 1977:177). ADFA’s architecture contributed to the ability to develop internal, detailed observation:

the third years were divided evenly throughout the squadron so that they could keep an eye on the first years ... while the third years were in the same section with the same sized room, their status was physically marked by having their rooms down the far end of each corridor, the least easily surveyed (Friday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

Within the military building the architecture is directly involved with conveying the system of authority. This building is ‘across the road’ for cadets, next to the mess, and contains staff. Chaplains, for example, are
found downstairs in the ‘no saluting’ area, while DO’s (Divisional Officers) etc are up the stairs, with each squadron’s staff physically separated (Monday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

This architecturally structured hierarchical observation is complemented by the constant actual, as well as potential, surveillance of the first years around the clock. Just as in court society, there was no split between the public and the private and ADFA cadets’ bodies were almost permanently on display, requiring constant vigilance and management. As Goffman (1961:32) outlines, because of the lack of a ‘back-region’ for escaping the public, the boundary that the individual normally places between themselves and their environment is destroyed and their sense of autonomous, embodied self is profaned:

we were instructed by the third years that we were not to look at them when they were talking to us but must stare straight ahead. Surveillance, like communication, was to be a one way process (Tuesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

particularly during orientation week, first year cadets feel constantly visible … the only times we weren’t being directly supervised was between ‘lights out’ at 2300 and ‘reveille’ at 0600. Even then, there were jokes made about hidden videos in each room, as well as in the toilet; ‘how else would they know if we wiped our bum properly?’ (excerpt from notes I made for the Department of Defence Review team, elaborated from ADFA field notes).

lights out was strictly patrolled by third years who roamed around looking for cracks of light under doors and yelling at first years if they could see light (Tuesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

From the first year cadet’s perspective, any member of ADFA had a right to discipline them and not only was the probability of being surveyed and sanctioned high but an awareness of being surveyed anywhere and at anytime was deliberately enhanced:
one of the third years approached me on my second last day at ADFA: ‘it was reported to us that your hair was messy at the coffee shop today. Fix it up in future’ (Friday, Week 8, ADFA field notes).

Tactics of hierarchy were used many times, a reminder that many people were surveying the first years’ performance; the Divisional Officer says things like: ‘I don’t want to have to go back to (someone of a higher rank) ... and have them ask ‘how are your first years?’ and have to tell them you’re all terrible’ (Tuesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

As well as direct supervision, surveillance also refers to the accumulation of ‘coded information’ on the daily lives of individuals, such as statistics and case histories, which is then used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered (Giddens 1985:14). Each person becomes not only completely known, but completely ‘written’:

I asked a first year male cadet about why he didn’t take a complaint to the Divisional Officer: ‘I’ve got three years of living with her, and what she says about me’s going to follow me for the rest of my career ... they write reports ... everyone writes reports on me’ (Wednesday, Week 7, ADFA field notes).

At AFPC, attempts were made to remind recruits that their performances were being surveyed but it was nowhere near the scale and effectiveness of ADFA:

Team leaders were appointed within the two recruits classes to ensure recruits got to class on time etc etc ... the team leader was giving a handover to the next team leader and gave us a little spiel about not taking a 10 minute break when we’d been given 2 minutes; ‘cause team leaders get kicked in the backside for it; you all will when you’re team leader’ (Monday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

We were told again today that: ‘your reputation that you make here will be with you for the rest of your career’ (Friday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).
it was emphasised that the AFP is a ‘very, very aware little organisation’ and that the college particularly is a ‘fish bowl’ to the rest of the AFP; ‘don’t leave your door open, it will be noticed who goes in and out’ (in response to one of the recruits who introduced himself as single and explained that he had an open door policy to women – and men, he jokingly added) (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

There was certainly a perception among recruits that infringements would be picked up on:

I’d be paranoid to do something ... I’d be petrified of getting caught and having my arse thrown out, just this whole email thing [AFP intelligence leaks] ... they’ve hammered into us that they can see everything we do (Female recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview).

[recruits were] talking about cheating on the test ... ‘big brother is always watching’ one of the recruits said, pointing to the video camera on the ceiling (Tuesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

AFPC recruits are certainly aware, however, that not only does coded information get collected and stored on them, but that it is an integral part of their job to collect and store the state’s coded information. A handout we were given on the rules for the use of official notebooks and diaries stated that ‘every member of the AFP is issued with an official notebook, and investigators with an official diary. Members are required to record accurately in these books, details of their duties and incidents that come to their attention while on duty’. The importance of this was reiterated on many occasions:

It’s important that you’ve got your notebook with you and that you use it all the time, like a trauma teddy (Thursday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

all you want to do, especially on night shift, is go out in your car and look at yourself in the mirror and play around, but your partner will get the shits with you as they’ve got heaps of paperwork to do ... it will snowball if you don’t get on top of it (Tuesday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).
Normalising judgement

The idea of hierarchical surveillance encompasses a notion of constant assessment or judgment around a proscribed norm (Foucault 1977:179) as well as a system of ‘normalizing sanctions’. These disciplinary sanctions, as Foucault emphasised, were basically corrective. Systems to punish, rank, sanction, promote and demote were integrated into a cycle of complete knowledge about individuals. As Goffman (1961:18) outlines, the very act of dealing with a group of people lends itself to conditions in which one person’s infraction is likely to stand out in sharp relief against the visible, constantly examined compliance of others. One of the prime effects of disciplinary power then, is to highlight individuality by emphasising difference.

Observation at ADFA certainly occurred in a normalising context, where the norm was spelt out by the third year cadets in the form of ‘correct’ and ‘functional’ ways of looking, thinking and acting:

resentment was growing when we spent more time forming up and displaying our brass polishing progress to the third years than we were given to polish it. What this involved was standing at attention with our brass in one hand while the third years walked between us examining the brass, loudly comparing the quality of different first year’s brass polishing skills as well as judging our progress as a group (Thursday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

the pressure to learn everything was enormous as the third years tested us continually in periods of up to 40 minutes at a time. What this involved was standing rigidly at attention while the third years walked between us loudly questioning each of us. The answer must then come out in the form ‘excuse me please underofficer X, the answer is ... excuse me please underofficer, X’ and any deviation from this standard would incur a severe reprimand (Wednesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

[I] arrived back after the SST (single service training) break about 6pm to the sound of the third years yelling at the first years, trying to get them to
switch on again; feeling of dread, thank goodness I’m not a ‘real’ cadet. I had no idea of the identity of one of the third years was so I just braced up, which can be very awkward with a heavy suitcase, said ‘good evening’ and strolled into the building. ‘Get back out here. Aren’t you going to excuse yourself?’ I walked back outside, braced up again and gambled that the unknown quantity was a female third year with no official rank ‘excuse me please, ladies and gentlemen’, response; ‘Get up to your room, get into your dceu’s [form of military dress] and get back down here’. Sigh of relief; if the unknown quantity had been a rank from a DCC or higher, it would have been ‘excuse me please maam’ and getting it wrong guarantees at least a minute of ridicule in which you are certainly not allowed to laugh off your own mistake or the situation. I did as I was told and went back down to the breezeway and excused myself again: [one of the third years replied:] ‘Go and find one of your first year mates and find out what to do’. I did so and immediately on finding some of the first years, they started checking me over and cutting off threads, fixing the angle of my name badge, making sure my pants were tied up properly and the uniform was sitting flat and telling me I needed a water bottle, writing paper, that I was wearing the wrong hat and that we had to be out on the breezeway in 50 seconds for yet another inspection (Friday, Week 5, ADFA field notes).

There were also moments of normalising judgement at AFPC:

the exams were handed back. X [one of the senior ranking officers] was pacing up and down the back of the room looking over people’s shoulders and explaining where we could have done better on the test; ‘do you understand? Are there any questions?’ we very much felt watched and judged. Half a dozen [recruits] who didn’t do so well were asked to stay back: ‘don’t let it happen again, next time you will fail – you need to give fuller answers, do you understand? Are there any questions?’ (Thursday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).
However, there was no evidence of normalising judgement on the scale of that evident at ADFA. Alternatively, at AFPC, in the words of the AFP Director of People Strategies, who negotiated my access to AFPC, when outlining the difference between the military and police: ‘unlike the military, we don’t do bed checks. We’re civilised’.

**Internalised Surveillance**

In institutionalising detailed codes of body management, court societies led to a heightened tendency among people to observe and seek to mould themselves and others. Just as Elias argued that court society promoted increased self-observation and self-discipline, the most important element in Foucault’s argument is that the disciplines outlined above do not seek merely to control bodies externally, but to induce self-surveillance. Constant visibility induces the inhabitants into a power situation of which they themselves are the bearers:

- he who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (Foucault 1977:202).

In the process of re-socialisation, even if an individual’s acts are initially coerced and do not reflect the sentiment or attitude that is desired by the socialisers, the appropriate behaviour often eventually instils the intended psychological response (Gecas 1981:196). It was noted in the ADFA Report (ADF 1998:1.16) that by about the eighth week of induction the average first year cadet looks like, thinks like and to a great extent ‘passes for’ an ordinary Defence Academy cadet. The impact of re-socialisation on the first year cadets can also be understood in light of their age. The vast majority of first year cadets were between 17 and 19 years of age, commonly a transitional period between adolescence and adulthood. The following field notes help to illustrate the success of re-socialisation amongst the first years in terms of internalised surveillance:
a group of first years were sitting around talking about what they ‘used to be like’. One male talked about previously having three holes in his ears and long hair, when asked ‘were you a bum?’, he answered thoughtfully: ‘I guess I used to be a bit of a weirdo’. Redefinition was beginning already (Monday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

by the time accas [the university semester] started for the first years, I no longer had the same ‘costume’ as them because they had started wearing their single service uniforms, which I didn’t have. I unintentionally then created something resembling an ethnomethodological experiment by wearing a different uniform or just a different cap when marching around with them. This attracted a lot of attention. No interest or amusement, just puzzlement bordering on horror, particularly from my fellow first years who seemed to have been successfully conditioned to automatically respond negatively to any break with conformity (Friday, Week 7, ADFA field notes).

The willingness by ADFA cadets to accept and justify the various activities they were instructed to undertake can also be seen to demonstrate the first year cadets’ internalised commitment to ADFA rituals:

‘its all about time management. We have to get changed really quickly during accas and we have to have bogging down pat because we won’t have much time out of class during the semester’; [me: ‘Aren’t you doing an arts degree?’]; ‘well, yeah, but the engineers won’t have much time’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

[Taped interview with a cadet about the strict room layout, the underwear drawer in particular:] ‘They’ve got a valid reason for it... they don’t want bugs and germs floating around the div’; [me: ‘How do smiling socks – socks folded in a way that makes them look like they are smiling – avoid germs?’]; ‘I suppose if everything’s neat, it gives that aura of clean’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).
[taped interview with a cadet, talking about a fake terrorist attack the third years had staged, an incident leading to disciplinary action against the third years involved:] 'Yeah, we had a terrorist thing ... one person lost their key so one of our suo’s (Section Under Officer) took the key, unlocked the door, unlocked the safe, took keys to the rifle and came out all cammed up [camouflage face paint and camouflage gear on] with the rifle... [we were] all in breezeway standing at attention ... they yelled, pointing the rifle at us: ‘get down, get down’... I think it was a good thing ‘cause it showed us what could happen’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

[me: ‘What do you think about all the little rituals?]; ‘I’ve just basically done everything I’ve been told to do. I haven’t questioned that because I know that everything I’ve been told will be done for a reason’; [me: ‘Do you know what those reasons are?’]; ‘I’ll be told sometime ... everything’s got a reason’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

the dcc (Divisional Cadet Captain) was briefing us on how to act in front of our parents when we bought them up to the lines after the big parade. We were told we didn’t have to ‘brace up’ in front of our parents. One of the first years: ‘they just wouldn’t get it’, followed by knowing looks (from field notes, 27/2/98, pm).

AFPC recruits were far more diverse than ADFA cadets in terms of age, ethnicity and experience. Because of the collegial nature of the College, when recruits were confronted by the type of hierarchical discipline similar to that outlined in relation to ADFA, such as when training on weapons and learning defensive tactics, they reacted negatively:

they [weapons and defensive tactics trainers] wouldn’t explain it, they just tried to shut you up. It was like, ‘who do you think you are?’. They just like to put people down and stuff. Whereas here [College], they’re fantastic and they want you to understand everything about it (Male recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview).
I would have thought it would have been a little bit more regimental: ‘Do this and this’; and: ‘This is what needs to happen’; and: ‘If you don’t do it right we’re going to have problems, [but] you’ve got lots of support and all the support you have around and all the information provided to you, it’s just fantastic’ (Male recruit, mid thirties, AFPC interview).

**Discipline and the uniform**

The history of uniform ... deserves our attention since it is at the heart of the encounter between appearances and social discipline (Roche 1994:222).

The military and police uniforms at ADFA and AFPC are taken as an example to illustrate further how the disciplinary techniques outlined above are utilised at ADFA and AFPC. Uniforms are particularly pertinent to military and police re-socialisation and have significant implications for discipline, body presentation and identity. As Elias illustrates, over time, clothing-body relations became key elements of court society and then gradually, civil society. Originally an adjective, the term ‘uniform’ became a noun as the wearing of standardised clothes grew to be the norm in the military.

Goffman (1961:29) outlines how, on admission to a total institution, the individual loses their ‘identity kit’ by being stripped of their usual appearance, as well as the equipment and services they need to maintain it, thereby and suffering personal defacement. A change in dress enables a change in identity as costume is a ‘magical instrument’ for establishing a link between appearance and the self (Stone 1962:101). Being deprived of choice over clothing thus prohibits expression of self and increases the speed of transition into the institution. As Goffman (1961:25) argues, new arrivals allow themselves to be ‘shaped and coded into an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the establishment, to be worked on smoothly by routine operations’.

This is demonstrated at ADFA:
for the first few days we were all told to wear tracksuits. Then we gained the privilege of wearing ‘cams’ [camouflage gear]. Neither of these outfits is terribly flattering or very distinctive and stand in stark contrast to the ‘dod’s’ [Dress of the Day: the service specific military uniforms] worn by the third years (Wednesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

While there was a concern at AFPC around the issue of losing control over the guise in which they appear before others, it certainly did not come to fruition during my time at the College:

[female recruit]: I’ve heard that if you can’t get your hair into a bun in 30 seconds, they cut it straight off at the collar. My hair’s really thick, I’m going to have to learn; I don’t want to cut it. You lose enough of your identity with the uniform and stuff, I want to be able to take my hair out and still be me (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Appearance generally at ADFA was subjected to a great deal of attention:

the males were all made to stand at attention and remove their caps. Their hair was closely examined and any male with even slightly long hair was sent down to the hairdressers ... the females were ordered to stand at attention and their hair was examined for neatness ... we were told to wear hairnets the same colour as our hair and lots of clips to keep it all in place (Tuesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

There are endless lists of ‘do’s and ‘do not’s regarding clothing set out in various dress and grooming regulations ... ‘do not’s in the mess include: ‘short socks with shorts’, ‘denim jeans of any kind’, ‘court shoes without stockings’ (Wednesday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Cadets must also comply with a dress standard while on leave, as set out in formal Officer Cadet Standing Orders:

two male first years apparently got into heaps of trouble for wearing ripped jeans to the football on Friday night, where they ran into a member of staff, prompting a message appearing in the ‘Academy tattoo’: ‘based
on what I saw on Friday evening, the message on dress standards is not
being received. You are training to be officers – dress accordingly’
(Monday, Week 8, ADFA field notes).

There were comprehensive instructions on how to wear the uniform uniformly at
AFPC, for example:

members in uniform wearing tunics, jackets or summer shirts will wear an
approved name tag located centrally above the right breast pocket with the
bottom of the badge along the top flap edge of the pocket. Name tags will
be worn on issue jumpers on the side opposite and in line with the word
‘police’ (Thursday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

While uniforms were not issued for the first few weeks, there were attempts at AFPC
to enforce minimum dress standards in the meantime:

the Sergeant read us an excerpt from the AFP standards on uniform and
standards of dress: ‘I haven’t read the ladies’ bits but you know where
they are now, you have been warned and you will get jumped on’ … there
has been no public humiliation so far re dress! (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC
field notes).

a ‘minimum neat/casual dress standard’ applies to all persons on the
college premises, including after hours and on weekends … means things
like thongs, running shorts, singlets, dirty or torn clothing are not allowed
(Wednesday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

The Sergeant explained to me that staff had been very slack with policing
dress standards; ‘Like, I’m going to the bar now and if someone’s there in
shorts and runners, I’ll send them straight back to their room but during
the day it’s hard, a lot of people have come straight from uni and don’t
have any money to buy clothes, it’s not a lot they’re on. It’ll be easier
when they’ve got uniform’ (Thursday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

However, even these minimum standards were resisted by some recruits:
one recruit was arguing about whether the AFP could make her take out her tongue ring. She was told that anything people can grab is a no go and that this was why guys, for example, wear attached, easily removable ties. One of the females asked whether that meant they couldn’t wear earrings and was told ‘yes, females can wear earrings, it is right and appropriate’ but for guys it was not (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

One of the recruits told me she had been told off for coming down to breakfast on Saturday morning barefoot and was appalled she had been told to go and put shoes on: ‘it was a bloody Saturday morning; I never wear shoes at home and I got told off!’ (Wednesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

A male recruit whispered to me as the Sergeant walked past ‘I don’t like him’, I asked him why and he explained that X [another recruit] had his collar up in the bar and he had come over and said ‘fix it and don’t let it happen again ... He had a go at a couple of others in the bar too; just really regimented’ (Thursday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

At AFPC uniforms seemed to be about public presentation, rather than internal discipline:

before the ceremony, the guys were told to take their jackets off and get comfortable and that they only needed to put them on for the actual ceremony (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

The uniform restricts and shapes the body into particular postures and configurations. As Virginia Woolf, in Orlando, suggests, ‘It is clothes that wear us and not we them; we may make them take the mould of our arm or breast, but they mould our hearts, our brains, our tongues to their liking’. The Napoleonic era was the crowning glory of military uniforms, turning the upper torso into a peacock-like display of colour and power, composing ‘the most elaborate display of pomp in the whole history of the military dress’ (Klessmann, as cited in Craik 2005:33). However, in the second half of the sixteenth century, soldiers’ dress changed along with the new approach to military tactics. As discipline, drill and formal procedures replaced the individualistic
‘cavalier’ approach to soldiering, infantry dress became plainer. Uniforms not only shape the body’s external form, but how the body is experienced:

the first time the first years tried on their service specific polyester uniforms just before SST, they mistook each other for third years, there was lots of ‘Excuse me please, sir’, lots of strutting around with heads held up high: ‘I can’t wait to be saluted at on SST’. The uniforms certainly aid in elitist attitudes: slouch hats, for example, must be worn way forward so that the peak is two finger widths from the nose which forces cadets to walk around with their head held ridiculously high (Saturday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Uniforms also serve as a symbol of group membership, to the point that the uniform becomes the group, for example, when the uniform is referenced instead of the wearer, as in the expression ‘disgracing the uniform’ (Daniel 1996:43). By suppressing individual idiosyncrasies and facilitating group cohesion, deviations in the appearance and behaviour of the wearer become more visible:

we were told exactly what to wear and how to wear it, from the number of buttons done up on our polo shirts to the angle of our caps ... we all got yelled at today because one first year’s name badge was sloping at a different angle to everybody else’s (Tuesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

The military uniform emerged as a means to readily identify opposing sides in battle and hinder the common propensity to change sides at times of acute danger (Aho 1979). The introduction of the uniform also expressed the dependence of the soldier on the supplies provided by the state, ensuring that the soldier subsumed his identity beneath that of the military organisation (Dandeker 1990:65), as well as enforcing a strict separation between the soldier and the civilian, as Roberts puts it, ‘the soldier became the King’s man for he wore the King’s coat’ (Roberts 1966:18).

Uniforms are also used to differentiate those with the authority to use violence on behalf of the state and those that are not. The Royal Irish Constabulary’s deliberate replication of the smartly maintained, dark green military uniform of the British Army’s Rifle Brigade, compared to the semi-civilian dress of England’s ‘mainland’
police of the period, reflected the distinction the administration sought to draw between the police and the policed (Blackler 2000). As Craik (2005:41) argues, 'clothes literally are authority ... authority is literally part of the body of those who possess it'. An example from AFPC illustrates this point:

one of the male recruits was talking about the uniform: 'yeah, like when you [me] came out (wearing the uniform), I thought 'ooh, am I doing anything wrong?’ (Thursday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

**Discipline as a motivating factor in joining the military and police**

To be effective, discipline requires obedience rather than automatically securing it, as Foucault (1982:221) argues ‘power is only ever exercised over free subjects’. For this reason it is important to differentiate between those who are forced into an institution and those who volunteer. As Goffman (1961:50) argues, social arrangements must be ‘read’ by the individual for any meaning they may hold: having one’s head shaved, for example, may enrage a mental patient but please a monk. Processes of discipline were successful at ADFA and AFPC because cadets and recruits were not only willing participants, but, for the most part, actively engaged in the re-socialisation process to mould themselves into ‘better people’. For some cadets and recruits, the desire to be a part of the military and police originated at an early age:

I initiated a conversation with two guys on the coach on the way to ADFA from the airport to see if I could gauge what they were feeling and if the sexist jokes in very blokey voices were a put on. They seemed genuinely to be blokes and talked about how they had always wanted to join ADFA, both coming from a ‘military family’. One of them compared ADFA to Christmas, saying that while he may have found out that Santa Claus doesn’t exist, nothing had changed with ADFA (Monday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

'I’ve wanted to do it since I was 12 years old. I think it was like Cops [television drama] or something like that and I thought ‘I want to do that’’ (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).
While traditionally religion has provided people with a shared vision of the world, the body and self-identity (Shilling 1993:179), an increasingly secularised, individualised society has heightened the anxieties inherent in personal decision making. As Elias (1996:25) argued, the century just gone was one of increasing status uncertainty. With the transformation of power relations such as between men and women, older and younger generations and European societies and their former colonies, the challenge of social identity has become explicit. Giddens (1991:13) points out that people have never been freer to ask the question ‘how shall I live?’ which then has to be answered every day in constant decisions such as how to behave, what to wear and what to eat. This chapter argues that as many of these questions are answered for cadets and recruits in institutions like the military and police, this forms part of the attraction. As Elias (1996:297) argues, ‘it is easy to find one’s way in a landscape where there are only proscriptions and prescriptions’.

Individuals drafted into the army, for example, often found themselves in a simpler society than the one they knew in civil life, losing almost all personal responsibility as ritual and routine took care of nearly every waking hour and elaborate rules of etiquette and ceremony governed all personal relations. Particularly in times of rapidly changing social conditions, institutions such as the army were often experienced as liberating (McNeill 1982:255). McNamara has suggested that police officers are also attracted to the disciplined structure provided in police forces (cited in Waddington 1999a:99). The structure and discipline provided at ADFA and AFPC did seem to be part of the attraction for some ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits:

I enjoy physical activities, the idea of drill, I liked … [it] instils self discipline and stuff, my dad’s big on that (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I’m actually a lot happier being in the army anyway’ [after explaining how he didn’t get into the Air Force]; [me: ‘how come?’]: ‘the Air Force is made out to be civvies in uniform, as you would know by now … they’re a bit slacker than what I wanted’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).
‘[I was attracted to] the whole idea of being in uniform. I’ve always liked
the idea of structure. I’ve worked in places where there is no structure
 whatsoever and you sort of fend for yourself and I didn’t like it’ (Female
recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

With the development of positive discipline, the military promoted itself as physically
and morally improving those that joined. Both the military and police continue to
reiterate this claim, driven by the continual need to recruit new members. The
introduction of the AFPC guide provided to new recruits, for example, states that:
‘the result of that work and application will be a sense of real achievement and an
even greater sense of pride in who and what you are’. Both ADFA cadets and AFPC
recruits reflect this sentiment:

‘I’ll be able to handle myself better ... I mean, you should be able to notice
looking at civilians and looking at the officers here, the way people walk,
talk and act’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

the way you got to look at it is like, I lived the last 18 years of my life a
certain way, I now have 6 weeks to change that way into a different way
and so the best way to do that is like this, and I mean, you’re a better
person for it’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

[on explaining why he joined the military:] ‘when you go out in the
community, you notice how upright military people are’ (Male cadet, late
teens, ADFA interview).

‘it instils self discipline and stuff... you learn how to cope under extreme
pressure and stress’ (Male recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview).

As Marshall (1947:173) explained, the real value of the discipline of the road march
was not that it hardened muscles but that it was the best method of separating ‘the
men from the boys’. Particularly at ADFA, the idea that the military is ‘special’ and
contributes to making participants better people is continually reinforced through
forms of etiquette and ceremony. As Janowitz (1971:51) identified, ceremonialism
can contribute to a sense of self-esteem and organisational solidarity:
the third years presented us with rank slides to corny music, meaning that the civilian ‘first years’ now officially became ‘cadets’; they were accepted into the fold. The ceremony was fairly emotional and there were even a few tears. It was evident the first years really felt that something great had been achieved (Friday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

Induction and military orientation for first year cadets is completed after six weeks with the Chief of Defence Force parade when cadets are symbolically accorded full organisational membership … the parade takes place in front of hundreds of other family, friends and dignitaries … there was enormous pride experienced by the cadets who felt they’d achieved something great (Saturday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

The severity-attraction hypothesis predicts that the more severe the initiation, the stronger the tendency of group members to rate the group more favourably, as a way to reduce dissonance (Lodewijks and Syroit 1997:278). Alternatively, if initiation is not severe, the initiate may be disappointed and rate the group less favourably. At AFPC particularly, there was disappointment expressed that induction was not more disciplined and challenging:

I thought it was going to be more military, it’s more relaxed, I think it’s a bit too relaxed (Male recruit, mid twenties, AFPC field notes).

‘it wasn’t nearly as disciplined or tough as I expected … bit of a let down’ (Male recruit, late twenties, AFPC field notes).

‘I was hoping it would be a little bit tougher’ (Male recruit, mid twenties, AFPC field notes).

**Conclusion**

Thinking bayonets can never be subordinated by the routine methods of a discipline which is based largely on mechanical procedures (Marshall 1947:173).
As illustrated in this chapter, the processes of modern discipline, apparent at AFPC and even more overtly at ADFA, are far more sophisticated than the ‘routine methods’ and ‘mechanical procedures’ alluded to by Marshall. Further, the aim of modern discipline is not to ‘subordinate’ but rather to incorporate individuals into a larger collectivity by encouraging self-discipline through a new identity. Their aim is one of positive utility, rather than negative and externally punishing.

However, in conjunction with modern discipline, it was the military and police officer’s increasing emotional identification with their country and fellow citizens, the subject of the next chapter, that led to the scale of warfare and surveillance that was possible in the twentieth century. The development of national loyalty assisted in leading to a shift in the basis of enlisted recruitment from the negative grounds of social and economic alienation to the positive ones of political and ideological commitment.
Chapter Five: Nationalising Violence

The image of these state societies, represented, among others, by symbols such as ‘nation’, form an integral part of the we-images and the we-ideals of the individuals who form with each other societies of this type (Elias 1996:20).

It is nationalism that engenders nations, and not the other way around (Gellner 1983:55).

Serving the Nation (The Australian Army motto).

The rise of the ‘nation’ as a we-ideal arose during the increasing involvement of highly differentiated mass societies in conflicts with other similarly differentiated mass societies. As Elias argues, in the process of subordinating individual needs to the collective to the extent that people were prepared to risk their lives for the collective, individuals were compelled by ideals they exercised upon themselves. This motivation was provided with the development of nationalism, which constitutes one of the most, if not the most, powerful social beliefs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Elias 1996). What Smith (2001:116) refers to as the ‘middle-class Anglo-French national model’ of nationalism commenced in the last quarter of the eighteenth century during years of revolution, including the French and American revolutions, subsequently spreading throughout the globe. This chapter traces the development of nationalism, particularly its linkages with concepts of citizenship and modern mass warfare, originating with the French Revolution.
A particular focus of this chapter is on Australian nationalism and its gradual evolution from loyalty to the broader empire to loyalty to the Australian nation state. As will be demonstrated, the military has played a particularly prominent role in this process. Alongside the challenge that various global processes pose to the significance of the nation state for contemporary individuals has been a ‘new patriotism’, originating in the 1980s, where again the focus for patriotic inspiration seems to be the military. Despite arguments that the military has evolved from one oriented by patriotic and community values to one dominated by market place conditions and self interest, there is plenty of evidence, including among ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits, that nationalistic concepts are resilient and continue to be motivational factors for joining the military and police.

The development of nationalism and citizenship

With the development of the modern state, the exercise of military power became an instrument of foreign policy in the name of the state, rather than the unrestrained ‘clash of societies’ that had previously been characteristic of warfare (Dandeker 1990:83). By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries almost all states came to legitimise themselves as ‘nation-states’. States assumed the characteristics of nation states in connection with specific changes in the distribution of power between governments and governed, a process Elias describes as the move from a private monopoly to a public monopoly over societal resources. Control over centralised and monopolised resources passed from the hands of individuals to those of ever-greater numbers, finally becoming a function of the ‘interdependent human web as a whole’ (Elias 2000:276). The French Revolution is a decisive event in this phase, as Bryson outlines: ‘In post-Revolutionary France the state is no longer figured in the king, but in the male body itself, and the body’s destiny for glory or defeat is that of the nation as a whole’ (cited in Dudink and Hagemann 2004:13).

Prior to the French Revolution the conduct of war was a matter for nobles and career officers, along with those soldiers derived from the lower orders of society. Until the eighteenth century, the ‘we-feeling’ between the upper classes of Europe was stronger than any ‘we-feeling’ these upper classes had with the lower classes in their own country (Elias 1996). Social identity tended to be provided by class, locality and
religion rather than by ethnicity or state membership, such as the aristocratic code of valour and honour that was common to the ruling classes in European states. As the middle classes began to identify their own economic, political and cultural progress with the achievement of national citizenship and the working classes they, despite the transnational rhetoric of socialism, became steadily more national and increasing numbers of the population became more aware that they were part of a broader sovereign collective, creating national ‘we-images’ (Elias 1996). As more and more middle-class men rose to positions of power within their states, between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a general trend away from humanist and moral ideals and values applicable to people in general towards nationalist ideals which placed an ideal image of country and nation above general human and moral ideals. The emotional satisfactions derived from looking forward gave way to emotional satisfactions derived from looking back on their nation’s ancestry or on seemingly unchanging national achievements, characteristics and values (Elias 1996:135).

With the development of nationalist sentiments, values and beliefs, nationalism came to play a crucial part in individual identity-formation, with the value attached to an individual’s nation being central to their perception of their personal self-worth (Elias 1996:151). The goal of ‘nation-building’ involves developing an ‘imagined community’ by inventing traditions and symbolically constructing community (Anderson 1983:7). Traditions, myths, history and symbols grew out of the existing, living memories and beliefs of people and were compose to have popular resonance (Stokes 1997:10). Although the discourse of the nation has never been the sole preserve of the state, it is clear that the state was often able to impose an authoritative definition of the nation and play a leading role in defining the cultural identity of the nation (Jones 2003:302).

National imaginings were made possible in the nineteenth century by improved communication networks, in conjunction with the extension of education and literacy in the second half of the century, that enabled national populations to be unified across space and time (Dandeker 1990:65). The story of nations was developed in history books and works of fiction, as well as through various symbols, rituals and
other elements of popular culture. Through accounts of national triumphs and disasters, individual citizens began to feel connected with the past and future of their nation. In most national descriptors, there is an emphasis on ‘origins, continuity, tradition, timelessness’ (Spencer and Wollman 2002:49). Architecture, for example, was involved in framing historical consciousness and collective memories. In Britain from the beginning of the Victorian Age to the start of the Great War, a large number of public buildings such as universities and museums were constructed in a conscious attempt to reflect ‘national’ sentiments and aspirations (Jones 2003:303).

The principal means by which the nation forms institutionalised structures of integration is through national citizenship and the constitution of the subject as an individual member of the national polity. A ‘citizen’ is a member of a state, an enfranchised inhabitant of a country, as opposed to an ‘alien’. The term ‘civilisation’ is closely linked to citizenship, originating from the French *civis*. Defined as ‘civilised condition or state’, ‘civil’ means of or belonging to citizens; orderly, well governed, educated, refined, polite (Hancock 1993:100). The two great eighteenth-century revolutions – America in 1776 and France in 1789 – helped transform the relationship of the individual to the state from one of subjection to one of citizenship, promoting an international citizenship revolution. The French revolution, in the process of developing the nationalised citizen-soldier, was particularly explicit about the new rights and obligations developing between the individual and the state.

The citizen-soldier concept had its origins in the Greek city-state and early Rome and some of the central leaders of the French Revolution explicitly referred to these ideas and practices (Janowitz 1976:190). Machiavelli, an influential theorist on the virtues of the citizen-soldier in the early period of the nation state, produced a theoretical vision that forms the origins of what Pocock (1975) refers to as ‘the Atlantic republican tradition’ that culminated in the American and French Revolutions. Machiavelli argued that citizen-soldiers were superior to hired mercenary forces because of their personal investment in the defence of the state.

Faced with a foreign invasion that the leaders of France had themselves provoked through ‘nationalist lunacy’ (Murray and Knox 2001:8), in 1793 the French people and their possessions were placed at the disposal of the state for the purposes of war.
The revolutionary principle that everyone owed military service to the nation was described as follows:

From this moment, until our enemies have been driven from the territory of the Republic, the entire French nation is permanently called to the colours. The young men will go into battle; married men will forge weapons and transport supplies; women will make tents and uniforms, and serve in the hospitals; children will make old cloth into bandages; old men will have themselves carried into public squares to rouse the courage of the warriors, and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic (cited in McNeill 1982:192).

Prior to the French Revolution, as noble descent was regarded as a guarantee both of heroic leadership and loyalty to the crown, all officers were noblemen (Feld 1975b:195). To exclude those considered unsuitable and keep commissions in military families, the French Ministry of War had decreed in 1781 that to qualify for infantry and cavalry commissions, candidates must prove four quarterings of nobility. One of the earliest acts of the Constituent Assembly was to abolish these restrictions to the higher ranks of the military (Feld 1975b:197).

In 1789, French revolutionaries proclaimed that all men were citizens and by 1793, because all men were citizens, it was claimed that all men should be soldiers. Soldiers, as citizens, were no longer social outcasts. The aim was, according to the Revolution’s Minister of War, ‘not the obedience of slaves, but that of free men’ (Feld 1975b:197). As Keegan (1993) explains, the identification of equality with the bearing of arms launched into European consciousness the idea that to serve as a soldier made a man more, not less, of a citizen. This ideology can be seen at the opening of Australia’s first Royal Military College in 1911 when Senator MacGregor announced, to cheering from the audience, that:

The sons of the citizens of this country could, by competitive examination, obtain entrance into this college, and they would then be trained and fitted for the highest duty of any citizen, the intelligent
defence of their country (reported at the time in the Sydney Morning Herald, as cited in Crowley 1973a:174).

Citizen soldiers deserted less than their Old Regime counterparts and desertion mattered less, as replacements were readily available. As evidenced by the rates of desertion and draft evasion from the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies, in reality citizen soldiering was always partly state-enforced, particularly after the introduction of conscription in 1798. Nevertheless, the concept of fighting voluntarily because it is an individual’s responsibility as a citizen was a powerful ideological tool. The French *levee en masse* was able to raise an army of 700,000 in 1794, while Napoleon conscripted more than two million men between 1800 and 1814 (Mortimer 2004:4). However, even these numbers pale in comparison to the 65 million men mobilised during World War I and more during World War II (Mortimer 2004:4).

As wars became more costly and demanding and more people were drawn into preparations for war and war-making, rulers had to work hard to win the support of their subjects and more people became aware of their membership in a political community and the rights and obligations such membership should confer (Held 1995:57). In Britain, for example, demands for the extension of male suffrage were couched in the language of patriotism, a language that large segments of the nation had been taught during the preparation for war against France (Dudink and Hagemann 2004:14). The development of bureaucracy, taxation as well as welfare services such as education and health were in one way or another originally bound up with the desire to make people more willing, and able, to fight on behalf of their state (van Creveld 1999:336). In Britain, for example, the state assumed increasing responsibility for the health of the population as a result of the realisation that many of the young men fighting in the Boer War and subsequently in the First World War were physically unfit for military duty (Poggi 2003:256). The creation of national flags, national symbols and national music originated with the need to turn inhabitants into citizens and persuade them that they owed some debt to the nation, to be discharged through taxes and soldiering (Braudy 2003:136).

As Marshall (1950) argued, with his tripartite distinction of citizenship development, British citizenship developed in roughly three phases: civil citizenship in the
eighteenth century, political citizenship in the nineteenth century and social citizenship throughout the twentieth century. The degree of resistance to the development of a centralised modern police outlined in Chapter Three shows the degree to which the civil element of citizenship had taken hold in England by the nineteenth century. However, the creation of a public police force, by separating the state’s monopoly of violence into civil and military realms, is also an expression of this development of citizenship (Waddington 1999b:307). As police forces were integral to the state’s monopolisation of violence, they were involved in processes of nation formation and, along with the military, played a key role in forging the boundaries and identities of nation states. As Loader and Mulcahy (2003:45) argue, policing is a ‘means by which membership and recognition within political communities are claimed, accorded or denied, a vehicle through which communities are styled, represented and imagined’. Further, recent developments in police forces, shown by the change in their descriptor ‘police service’ rather than ‘police force’ demonstrate the extent to which the police have moved from having a solely repressive function to being integrated into the welfare state with the aim of enhancing social citizenship (Edwards 2005).

**Australian nationalism**

A nation is never a nation
Worthy of pride or place
Till the mothers have sent their firstborn
To look death in the field in the face.

*(Australian poem written during the Boer War, as cited in Cahill 2005:83)*

While Australian colonies federated in 1901, it was not until 1939 that Australia attained the status of a nation-state, separating Australian nationality and citizenship from Britain. This occurred with the retrospectively introduced *Westminster Adoption Act 1942*. With its passing Australia attained ‘international personality’ as a state among states (Davidson 1997:102). In 1940, Australia opened its first diplomatic posts overseas, and in 1941 Australia declared war on Japan in its own right. By the time the United Nations Organisation was established in 1945, Australia’s identity was as an independent sovereign state (Hudson 1988:28). What made Australia a
nation to many Australians, however, was the landing at Gallipoli by Australian soldiers during World War I (Crowley 1973a:552). Australia’s official World War I historian, Charles Bean, was one of the first to state that on 25th April 1915 that ‘the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born’ (White 1981:136).

Australian nationalism was slow to develop partly because American nationalism had been so successful. Since the Colonial Office, as a result of its experience with America, was itself an agent of reform there was no need for the consolidation of an Australian nationality to force issues which Britain would not concede (Rosecrance 1964:292). The busts of the 1880s and 1890s assisted in tightening colonial relationship with Britain and the associated privileged access to British money, migrants and markets (Belich 2009:462).

Until at least the end of the nineteenth century, Australian national feeling coexisted with imperialism. Celebrations of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of Australia included contingents from each Australian colonial military force alongside a large Indian military contingent and representatives from famous British regiments. When the first Australian naval fleet arrived to large crowds at Farm Cove, the Prime Minister received loud cheering from the assembled crowd to the following statement:

May I stress for one moment the words ‘his Majesty’s Australian ships’. The ships are none the less Australian because they are his Majesty’s ships. They are none the less his Majesty’s ships because they are Australian ships (Crowley 1973a:200).

In 1914, according to the Australian Prime Minister: ‘Australia today is as truly British as Britain itself’. According to yet another Australian Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, Australians were actually: ‘more British than the people of Britain’ (Belich 2009:464). In both world wars the Australian Government assumed that if Britain went to war, Australia would follow. As Prime Minister Menzies, explained in a national radio broadcast in 1939:
We are therefore, as a great family of nations, involved in a struggle ... there can be no doubt that where Great Britain stands, there stands the people of the entire British world (Crowley 1973:1).

As Australia’s military structure was derived from the British model, Australia’s early military history involved a heavy reliance on citizen-soldiering. In introducing Australia’s first Defence Bill, Sir John Forrest, outlined the focus on citizen soldiers:

The measure recognises that the military and naval forces of the Commonwealth shall be constituted almost entirely of citizen soldiers, and that the primary duty of such forces is to defend Australia from invasion or attack (Crowley 1973a:46).

While Australian colonies continued to remain loyal to the Empire, there were also attempts to encourage a sense of Australian nationalism. Australian police forces undoubtedly played a role in the forging of Australian nationalism. There exist numerous documented studies of the role played by police bodies in the formation and reproduction of European sovereign states and their national cultures (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:46). Emsley (1993:88), for example, details the instrumental and symbolic part played by various police forces in forging the boundaries and identities of European nations in the nineteenth century, marking out national territory and ‘turning peasants into Frenchmen, Italians, Spaniards and Russians’. In Britain particularly, police officers were not merely looked up to as the embodiment of order, authority, discipline and community, but regarded as symbols of national pride. In the 1950s particularly, the British bobby ‘came to stand for a (largely mythical) national culture of order, harmony and restraint’ (Reiner 1992:779).

However, in Australian national mythology, it is the military that plays a much larger role in the formation of Australian nationalism. In 1870 when the colonists were told to take care of their own military defence, the *Sydney Morning Herald* reported that ‘the circumstance is important as marking an event in the history not only of this colony, but of Australia, it is the first step towards nationality’ (cited in Crowley 1980a:573). In 1885 when the colony of New South Wales sent a contingent of troops to support Britain during the Sudan crisis, a NSW politician expressed his hope that military
involvement would act as a social cohesive, overcoming the colony’s class and religious tensions, and ‘cement the people in this community of all classes and creeds in one common feeling’ (Cahill 2005:83).

From the early 1900s there was increasing mention of the need for patriotism. However, the need for loyalty often focused on Britain and her empire rather than Australia. The increased emphasis on national and imperial loyalty from the start of the twentieth century permeated all spheres of education. The Victorian Education Department’s Regulations and Instructions of 1905, for example, included the following instruction:

It is the duty of all teachers employed in State schools to foster in the minds of their pupils the sentiment of love of country ... It should be impressed upon pupils that the greatness and stability of the Empire depend upon the production of a fine type of citizen, fit of body, fit of mind, and fit of soul. They should be so directed and encouraged as to fit them for the part they have to play (cited in Crotty 2001:24).

School syllabuses were ‘filled with imperial geography and history, with British Empire patriots and heroes, stories of white explorers in darkest Africa and arid Australia bringing civilisation and Christianity to the ignorant and often savage natives’. Empire Day was developed as an occasion to inculcate children with ideals of patriotism and imperial loyalty, with ceremonies such as the saluting of the flag, lessons in geography and the recital of patriotic poems (Crotty 2001:24).

The wave of patriotism that swept through Australia on the outbreak of World War I was unprecedented. A school newspaper, the Quarterly, reprinted a poem from London Punch which concluded that it was ‘Magnificent to die!’ going on to explain that while ‘serving one’s nation was glorious’, the ‘most manly thing an old boy could do was give up his life for the cause’ (cited in Crotty 2001:90). The dead were glorified with elaborate memorials and their heroism was held up as an example for future generations.

There was a clear feeling in Australia in the lead up to the First World War that it would be a test of the nation. As Gammage (1988:57) explains, it was a time of
‘national insecurities’ and ‘adolescent doubts’ about whether the newly federated
nation was capable of performing credibly on the world stage. On April 1915, Anzac
soldiers, soldiers of the Australian Imperial Forces and New Zealand troops, landed
on the shores of Gallipoli in the Dardanelles. Their slaughter and that of the
defending Turkish forces continued through the ensuing eight months as the Anzacs
attempted to hold on to the tiny piece of Turkish territory. While soldiers from New
Zealand were a part of the campaign, they rarely receive more than a passing mention
in Anzac mythology, overshadowed by the construction of Anzac as a legend which
defines Australian nationhood, as well as Australian manhood. As McGregor
(1994:129) outlines, it was a campaign which was ‘doomed from the start, achieved
nothing, wiped out 8,500 young men and wounded another 20,000’. However,
Gallipoli was probably all the more attractive because it was a disaster, as it proved to
the world that Australians, as men and soldiers, could withstand the severest possible
test of their fibre (Caplow and Hicks 1995:130).

Upon returning from his tour as a war correspondent in South Africa in 1900, ‘Banjo’
Paterson had welcomed the young Australian nation: ‘Partaker of my power and of
my glory, To the Sisterhood of Nations, enter in’. However, Paterson later realised
his claims about Australia’s nationhood were premature and withdrew them. It was
events at Gallipoli that convinced Banjo Paterson that: ‘We’re All Australians Now’
(cited in Gammage 1988:148). Similarly, an Australian Archbishop remarked that
Australia had had ‘her birth and her baptism in the blood of her sons’ at Gallipoli
(Shute 1995:39) and an official Returned Services League of Australia historian
describes the Gallipoli landing as denoting ‘the irresistible entry of Australia among
the nations of the world – an entrance welcomed with admiration by other great
nations’ (Encel 1970:473).

The experience of war and the contrasts between the Australian Imperial Force and
the British Army assisted in distancing Australia from Britain because of. Australian
officers and servicemen realised that they looked different from the British, that they
had a distinct demeanour and different accent and that whereas British officers were
selected on the basis of schooling and hereditary family connections, Australian
officers were promoted from within the ranks.
Australian and British political leaders were diligent in their praise of the splendid gallantry and military prowess of the Australians in their first encounter with the enemy. As Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, the war correspondent who was chosen to represent the British Press at the Dardanelles, printed in the *Argus* on 8 May 1915: ‘these raw colonial troops in these desperate hours proved worthy to fight side by side with the heroes of Mons, the Aisne, Ypres, and Neuve Chapelle’ (cited in Crowley 1973a:236).

Wartime and post-war propaganda, designed to promote a strong Australian national identity and cut across social division in Australian society, conferred on the Anzacs the status of extraordinary heroic figures and the legend was subsequently protected, enshrined and sanctified. The first Anzac march in London in 1916 was organised in the wake of the Dardanelles disaster. Public recognition of the heroism of the surviving Anzacs was regarded by Australian and British authorities as essential to counteract the resultant drop in morale.

Acting in the interests of veterans and their dependents, the politically influential Returned Services League encouraged the idea that the Australian soldier; the ‘digger’, was the true defender and interpreter of what it meant to be Australian. In 1921 the word ‘Anzac’ was protected by an act of parliament, which forbade its use as a title or for commercial purposes. Between 1921 and 1927, all states made Anzac Day a statutory holiday which developed widespread observance, complete with a semi-religious ritual, liturgy and hymnal (White 1981:137). Annual school Anzac Day services also helped to inculcate the Anzac stereotype in the minds of Australian school children.

Most towns and cities in Australia have a memorial that becomes the focus of the annual Anzac Day ceremonies held in remembrance of Australians who have served in war. Anzac Day gradually replaced Empire Day as the main national day for a large number of Australians, arguably being more important as a day of national commemoration than Australia Day, which marks the landing of the First Fleet and its cargo of convicts at Botany Bay in 1788. Kapferer (1988:121) argues that while Australia Day is the day of the state, Anzac Day is the day of the nation. In a similar fashion, the idea of the English ‘bobby’ continues to exercise a powerful, affective
hold over at least some sections of the English populace (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:69).

**We-images and the contemporary nation-state**

It is not uncommon for social commentators to argue that intensifying global processes are challenging the significance of the nation-state for contemporary individuals, an issue with an obvious impact on individuals’ ‘we-images’. These processes include the growing autonomy of world capital, the numbers of people migrating globally as well as the increasing perception of social problems as global problems requiring a global response. Such processes have led theorists to proclaim the decline of the state, and argue that nationalism is a ‘spent force’ (for example, Boene 1998). However, there is much evidence that the nation-state remains the pre-eminent form of social, political and economic organisation in the world today and that the nation-state as a type of human community remains robust. After a look at how global processes have impacted upon the nation-state and its monopoly of violence, the issue of individual identity and the contemporary relevance of nationalism will be explored.

While many theorists acknowledge that there is nothing new about globalisation as from their inception systems such as capitalism have always been global phenomena, theorists such as Kaldor (1999:72) argue that changes in recent decades represent a qualitative deepening in the process of globalisation. These developments include, for example, the relocation of political authority to supranational political agencies such as the European Community on a regional level and the United Nations at a global level. While the member states of the European Union have ceded a large number of their sovereign rights to the broader entity and the European Union does restrict states’ sovereignty, the European Union has stopped short of dealing conclusively with the monopoly of violence and does not currently reduce the capabilities of states to deploy the means of violence. The European Police Office, for example, was set up to promote cooperation in police matters and is not a police force with the right to directly apply coercive measure against citizens of Member States. However, a civilian (police) peacekeeping force to manage crisis situations in conflict zones
Beyond European Union borders was recently established by the European Union (Loader and Walker 2007:21).

While peacekeeping as a military activity has been multinational since the days of the League of Nations, as a result of political, cost and technological considerations the transnational organisation for war has increased since World War II. While these multinational forces are contributing to the internationalisation of military life, they do not detract from the ultimate political authority of contributing states. Similarly, rather than indicating the transcendence of the nation-state, international organisations such as the United Nations derive their power from existing states, as well as contributing to the international arena in which the universal scope of the nation-state is established (Giddens 1985:264).

The neo-liberal movement; the application of neo-classical economic principles to political relationships, has grown in influence in Anglo-American societies since the 1970s. This doctrine accords primary political standing to individuals, eliminating the concept of the 'public good' and 'community' and replacing it with 'individual responsibility'. This ideology has impacted on people's 'we-image' as well as influenced increasing moves within nation states to privatise state functions, including military and police functions. This has led to the increasing use of private military companies and private security companies.

In line with the neo-liberal assumptions state military and police forces have attempted to become more efficient through the privatisation and outsourcing many of their functions. In the Australian military, this has included the transfer of thousands of military positions to the public sector, and the contracting-out of jobs, services and functions to the private sector. As Smith (1988b:8) outlines, 'I was initially surprised some years ago to see private security guards at RMC Duntroon but on reflection the greater surprise was that the Army had contracted out the education of its officer cadets to a civilian university'. Similarly, in recent decades police officers have been increasingly moved from non-operational to operational duties and their non-operational roles have been filled with unsworn staff, including: civilians, special constables and auxiliary police (Enders 2001:32). As Howard (2000) points
out, ‘the first person whom one encounters upon entering the headquarters of the Australian Federal Police in Canberra is a private security guard’.

An undoubtedly related trend has been an increase in people’s perception that public police are inadequately staffed to provide their security needs. Just as people paid retainers to protect them and their property before the state established a police force, in the last two decades there has been a return to private security. The sharp increase in private security includes, private security guards protecting businesses and personal property, as well as maintaining urban order and policing gated communities. As in other Western countries such as Britain and the United States, the private security industry is larger than the Australian states’ police forces, with private security guards outnumbering public police almost three to one (Grabosky 2002:1).

Similarly, just as European states hired armies until the seventeenth century, since the end of the Cold War there has been a proliferation of private companies offering military services. Private military companies, often recruited from retired soldiers from Britain or the United States, are hired both by governments and by multinational companies (Kaldor 1999:95). Particularly notorious examples of private military companies are the South African mercenary company Executive Outcomes and the British company Sandline International. The challenge of fighting the recent ‘War on Terror’ placed such an enormous strain on the United State’s military, whose size had been cut by approximately one third since the Gulf War, that the United States made heavy use of Private Military Companies. The heavy reliance on Private Military Companies in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, for example, led to it being dubbed the first privatised war (Kennedy 2006:14).

There has also been a spread of military armaments to the population at large. For the first time since the emergence of the nation state, more military weapons are in the hands of private citizens than in the hands of national governments. While in the past ‘guerrillas’ were armed with rifles and machine guns, they are now armed with rocket launchers and anti-aircraft weapons. This is a product of the Cold War in which the capacity for producing arms greatly increased (Hobsbawm 2000:12). This trend is
further reinforced by the wealth that is available to private entities who can now possess as much money as states (Hobsbawm 2000:14).

Despite the increase in global economic, cultural and political connections increasing, the nation state has prevailed as a prime form of human organisation. The state’s police forces, for example, retain a very real presence in the life of modern societies, continue to be proposed as the solution to the problem of order and continue to loom large in the social imagination of nation states (Loader and Walker 2007). Further, new state security agencies are being created, existing ones have seen their powers and budgets swell and forms of surveillance against the public have intensified globally. However, the trends outlined above do seem to undermine the state’s monopoly on violence as well as people’s perception of their security as being intrinsically tied to their membership within the nation state. Theorists such as Moskos et al (2000:4) have argued that contemporary individual’s sense of identity with and loyalty to the nation-state has been ‘decomposed’ in postmodern society. New social identities that have been developed include broader global identities, as well as increasingly individualised identities. However, as Giddens (1998:134) argues, ‘today, national identities must be sustained in a collaborative milieu, where they won’t have the level of inclusiveness they one did, and where other loyalties exist alongside them’.

The ‘new’ social movements that developed in most Western countries in the mid 1960s not only raised consciousness of broader identities, such as gender and sexuality, but by ordering political activity around these identities, created difficulty in sustaining an experience of common citizenship (Morgan 2003:382). The concerted efforts of indigenous people within postcolonial countries have further exposed that a group’s inclusion within what is accepted as the national identity is the outcome of a political rather than a natural process (Turner 1997:189).

Not only has the rate and flow of migration, since World War II particularly, become more rapid than ever, but most migrants do not take out a new nationality. Davidson (1997) argues that an increasing proportion of the residents of the late-capitalist countries of the world no longer expect to treat any one nation as their exclusive home, much less as the grounding source of their identity. It was estimated that in
1986, for example, there were three million dual citizens in Australia (Davidson 1997:139). The diversity of contemporary nation states is made clear during times of conflict when the leaders of Western nations struggle to make clearer distinctions between who is the enemy and who is ‘one of us’. Examples of this could be seen in the aftermath of September 11 with United States President Bush’s plea for there not to be retributions against Arab-Americans and Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s diplomatic visits to mosques.

Perhaps the most fundamental shift of the post war decades, however, has been the widespread withdrawal of loyalty from constituted public authorities which has given way to multiple allegiances and identifications favoured by a self-governing and individualised cosmopolitan subject (Dean 2003:181). Citizens are less willing to acknowledge the authority of state laws than those of previous generations. The New Left, for example, acted as though they no longer recognised the fundamental principles that uphold the conduct of public affairs, previously considered the duty of every citizen (Hobsbawm 2000:33).

However, despite these above trends there is substantial evidence that people’s habitus is still focused on identification with sovereign states (Goudsblom and Mennell 1998:223). As Braudy (2003) argues, for example, the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the European Union has probably emphasised the specifics of British culture and history even more strongly. A glaring example of the resilience of people’s continuing identification with their nation state is the United States soldier who was convicted for failing to obey a lawful order by refusing to wear the United Nations blue beret and patch as part of a peacekeeping task force. The soldier explained that wearing the United Nations insignia symbolised a shift of allegiance from the United States, whose constitution he had sworn to defend, to the United Nations whose charter, in his opinion, was at odds with the United States constitution (Volker 2000:178).

That Western democracies can still generate a strong sense of national interest for which people are prepared to risk the lives of soldiers was evident after the terrorist attacks on the United States. Public opinion seemed ready to accept high numbers of military casualties, with polls indicating 60 to 80 percent support for military action.
that might cost the lives of large numbers of troops; with 5,000 deaths being acceptable, according to one poll (Smith 2005:495). In the United States particularly, public demonstrations of patriotism, including the frequently displayed practice of waving the national flag, demonstrate the extent to which the individual’s sense of security is still intimately dependent upon the nation state. This was a sentiment United States President George Bush was quick to promote: ‘we are reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to our country and to history’ (Bush 2002).

New patriotism

In the 1980s, the anti-military images of Vietnam war films began to give way since to the first wave of what is now being called the ‘new patriotism’, exemplified by movies such as *Top Gun*, *Pearl Harbor*, *Black Hawk Down*, *We Were Soldiers*, *The Thin Red Line*, *U-571*, *Pearl Harbor*, *Schindler’s List*, *The Patriot* and *Saving Private Ryan*. These movies, by furnishing positive images of military operations and their supposed struggle between good and evil, are the source of much patriotic inspiration.

In Australia, the resurgence in interest in the Anzac legend can be seen in a similar light. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s there was open speculation as to whether Anzac Day would die, stigmatised as an irrelevant day of drunken memory and critiqued by feminists, pacifists, Aboriginal and gay activists, by the 1990s it was clear that it had gained a new legitimacy as the pre-eminent day of national identity and ritual. The Anzac legend reaches a heightened point in consciousness during the observance of Anzac Day and on the days immediately surrounding it. National newspapers, for example, routinely using colour supplements on war anniversaries to boost their sales (Kapferer 1988:123). There has been an increase in the consumption of films and books on the subject, as well as increasingly large and enthusiastic crowds attending Anzac Day ceremonies. There have also been increasing numbers of visitors to the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, the central symbol of the Australian nation, which is currently the most visited place of national symbolic importance in Australia. As Cheeseman (2005:78) observes, Australians are engaging in flag-waving and other patriotic displays that would have been unthinkable in the not-so-distant past.
In 1965 on the fiftieth anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, a few hundred of the original 'diggers' travelled to Anzac Cove courtesy of the Australian and Turkish governments and were met by 'a grand total of four hippies from Australia' (Birmingham 2005:52). That number has now swelled to thousands. Similarly, Anzac Day ceremonies in Australia, once attended by a few hundred, have swelled to tens of thousands of observers in the state capital cities each year (Cahill 2005:83). By 1984 the estimated numbers of spectators at Anzac marches was about 50,000 across Australia, reaching peaks of 200,000 after 1995 (Davidson 2003:80).

This revival has been marked with increasingly orchestrated public commemoration. Historians and publishers, politicians, bureaucrats and museum curators are the main creators of this 'memory industry'. Politicians at all levels use Anzac Day for political leverage. At a ceremony in Port Moresby in 1992 to honour the seventy-seventh anniversary of Gallipoli, for example, Prime Minister Paul Keating spoke of 'the indissoluble [relationship between] Gallipoli and the history of the Australian nation' and of the ways in which 'legends bind us together' stressing that the tradition of Anzac provides 'an enduring Australian faith' for new generations (Foster 1995:10). In the 2003 NSW State election Opposition Leader John Brogden announced that, if elected, all schools in NSW would be required to hold Anzac Day lessons before the day itself because 'Anzac Day sums up the national character [and was] not given the full recognition it deserves'. The Minister for Education John Watkins was quick to ridicule this plan, stating that: 'any 11 year old could have told Mr Brogden they have already learnt about the great sacrifice at Gallipoli. Presently all NSW government school children must study the origins and meaning of Anzac Day in both primary and junior high school' (Wainwright 2003).

The efforts to revive Anzac Day have succeeded because they found resonance within popular sentiment. There does seem to be a consensus that the global changes taking place, as outlined above, as well as within Australia itself, including the dismantling of the 'Australian Settlement' – that is, the destruction of the five great pillars of Federation: state paternalism, industry protection, wage arbitration, White Australia and the Empire (Kelly 1994) – have precipitated uncertainties, resulting in growing
numbers of young Australians seeking comfort in the legend of Anzac and of belonging to the nation-state.

Inglis, for example, writing in The Age after Anzac Day 2005, credited the revival and endurance of the Gallipoli commemoration with the appeal of a higher faith and ‘ancient certainties’ to young people who are in search of ‘nourishment for the spirit’. Stanley argues that Anzac Day was ceasing to be a day of mourning and becoming a vaguer celebration of nationhood, explaining that ‘it’s definitely filling a vacuum for young people’ (cited in Davidson 2003:80). Similarly, Saulwick states that ‘young people are increasingly looking for ritual to enrich and give meaning to their lives and there is not much around’ (cited in Davidson 2003:80).

**Contemporary citizenship and nationalistic motivation**

What it is to be an individual is bound up with what it is to be a citizen (Turner 1986:6)

In the aftermath of the Great War, the link between citizenship and military service weakened and citizenship became more a matter of rights than of duties. Questions arose about individuals’ relationship to the nation state and their willingness to serve in the military. In Britain, for example, the decision to end conscription followed the unpopular Suez intervention in 1956. The White Paper that recommended ending conscription stated that ‘as the values and conditions of society have evolved, the importance of military service as an obligation and duty of citizenship has declined’ (cited in Cumming 2002:16). In Australia conscription, which included service overseas for the first time in Australia’s history from 1964, aroused considerable opposition and was abolished by the Whitlam Government in 1970. The renewed interest in citizenship in Western countries, evident since the 1990s, generally defines citizenship almost exclusively in terms of individual rights and interests and does not include discussions of military service as one of the central obligations of citizens (Carter 2000:174).

One of the major debates in military sociology since its inception has been the argument proposed by Moskos (1977) that the military has evolved from an institutional military to an occupational military following the creation of the all
volunteer force in the post Cold War era. The argument is that while the institutional military was oriented by tradition, patriotic values and sense of community, the occupational military is oriented to marketplace conditions and gives priority to self-interest over group cohesion. Evidence in Australia for the growth of an occupational approach to the military can be found with the establishment of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia by serving personnel to independently represent their interests, as well as by examples such as the payment in 1988 of a $70,000 cash bonus to pilots who re-enlisted for a further six years (Smith 1988b:30). Other evidence of a shift toward occupational practices can be found in the way in which the ADF advertises for recruits. Whereas once the idea of a military career was predominant, the term ‘job’ is now just as likely to be used in military advertising. Advertising for ADFA, for example, stresses the value of the degree that it offers through a civilian university, one recent example pointing out that the degree will ‘look good on your CV’ (Smith 1995:537).

Just as the introduction of pay offended middle-class citizen-soldiers in Australia in the nineteenth century who took it as a slur on their patriotism (Wilcox 1998:24), contemporary service personnel have expressed disappointment in recruitment advertising that portrays the ADF as a ‘job’ rather than appealing to national pride (Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs October 2001:7). As Marx points out, markets strip of their ‘halo every occupation honoured and looked up to with reverent awe’ (Marx and Engels 1998:101). Letters of protest such as one published in the Letters to the Editor section of The Canberra Times in response to the bonuses being paid to the military forces serving in Afghanistan are not atypical: ‘This changes their status from that of professional service men and women to that of mercenary ... it is not the Anzac spirit’ (Antony 2001:30).

Rather than the dissipation of institutional values in the military, however, it appears more likely that institutional and vocational values have not changed greatly over time but have been increasingly overlaid by occupational and labour market attitudes. As Janowitz (1977:53) argues, consideration of institutional and occupational dimensions is not necessarily a ‘zero-sum game’. There seems to be plenty of evidence that both institutional and occupational values currently co-exist in
militaries in the West and that service personnel score high for both factors (see, for example, Boene 1998:297). Further, Padilla (2002), who has examined military recruitment in America over the second half of the twentieth century, found that the United States Army continued to attempt to interest potential recruits using themes other than economic incentives to a greater extent than it used economic lures.

Many social theorists have suggested that the appeal of nationalism lies in its ability to provide a sense of closure and stability. Adorno, for example, suggests that nationalism mobilises narcissism, and provides comfort to those unsettled and destabilised by modernisation or capitalist development (cited in Spencer and Wollman 2002:62). The ability of nationalism to inspire and resonate among millions of people in every continent is similar in many ways to the hold religion has had (Smith 2001:2). The Durkheimian approach to religion is useful for developing an understanding of nationalism, with its focus on sacralisation, rituals and symbols. As in religion, people’s own lives may be made more significant by the deeper purpose and meaning attached to the collectivity of the nation. While social relationships, commitments, attachments and identities might tend to wane over time, in order to endure and reproduce itself, society must continually renew its bonds of solidarity and affirm its collective identity (Langman 2003:225). Anzac Day conforms with Durkheim’s argument about religion as society worshiping itself (Kapferer 1988:169). People may then be able to think of themselves as having died for some purpose and living on in a sense after they are dead, achieving a kind of immortality.

Nationalism approximates to the types of belief and ethos which Max Weber called ‘inner worldly’ and, as Weber (1948c:335) argues, the modern state, like religion, has the ability to give meaning to death: ‘War does something to the warrior which ... is unique: it makes him experience a consecrated death in war’. In a variety of ways, such as through parades and public speeches, the state uses the imagery of the heroic death to encourage young men to fight on its behalf. Further, processes used to facilitate the encouragement and acceptance of killing include constant praise and assurance to soldiers from peers and superiors that they ‘did the right thing’, the awarding of medals and decorations as well as affirmation and acknowledgement of the gain and accomplishments made possible by their sacrifices, including parades and monuments (Grossman 1995:264).
However, as outlined above, the link between nationalistic motivation and military service is becoming less clear. Woodward (2008:378), examining narratives written by British soldiers about British Army experiences in recent decades, finds that within these accounts, military participation in terms of service to Queen, country and the nation is mostly absent. Given the ambiguities surrounding the use of violence by the nation state outlined earlier in this thesis, perhaps this is not surprising. In the Vietnam War particularly, idealistic and patriotic talk was unfashionable and the wider civilian society was uninterested or even resistant to the sacrifice by military personnel (Goldstein 2001:278).

Despite the apparent reluctance to explain military service in terms of the concept of nationalism, however, studies continually find that it is patriotic motive and the ideal of being able to serve one’s country that is more important than any other single reason for enlisting (see, for example, Burk 1984:229). The Survey of the Military Profession, used to study officer cadets at all of Australia’s officer-training institutions since 1987, shows that in 1987 72% of respondents ranked as very fairly important the ‘desire to serve one’s country’ and in 1992 78% of respondents ranked this factor as very or fairly important (Smith 1995:537), suggesting not only that patriotic motivation is still important but that there may have been a slight increase. The 2001 Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs also found that numerous personnel openly expressed pride in their uniform and the fact that they were serving their country (Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs October 2001:7). Interviews with ADFA cadets seem to reflect this attitude:

‘I’ve never wanted to do anything else besides joining the Defence Force and I’ve never even considered another job. It’s the urge to make something of your life worthwhile, save your country, make something which is not based around yourself but around other people’ (Male recruit, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I’m not obsessively patriotic but I do believe in saving my country and making something useful of my life and I reckon saving my country is a good way of making good use of my life’ (Female recruit, late teens, ADFA interview).
'I can’t wait ‘til the first time I go home and step off that plane and my friends are at the airport, wearing that uniform ... because there have been much better men than me who have fought for this country in that uniform (Male recruit, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘For me the big thing about joining the Army was ... contributing to the big picture, doing something that mattered, something in the larger scheme of things ... serving my country (Female recruit, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I’m pretty proud to be Australian. You’ve got that tradition behind you and that’s part of the reason. I’ve joined the Defence Forces because you think of the Anzacs and like just the general perception overseas and that, they’re known as class soldiers and generally good blokes. If you can be part of that I really would like to do that’ (Male recruit, late teens, ADFA interview).

Rituals of patriotism are important in the military, further cementing and celebrating the centrality of the nation to its mission. National flags, for example, are treated with an awe and deference that marks them as sacred. This is demonstrated in my ADFA field notes:

The Sergeant described an incident in which a cadet walked back into the building to avoid paying compliments at the raising of the flag; i.e. instead of standing still once the whistle was blown and saluting in its general direction until the whistle was blown again: ‘he handed over $400 in fines ... it is considered an act next to murder’ (Wednesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

We were getting a lesson on flag folding, which commenced with ‘many an Australian soldier has died under this flag. It is everything to do with what the country is about. What does it mean to you?’; the cadets yelled out ‘the best country in the world’, ‘patriotism’, ‘freedom’, ‘worth fighting for’ etc etc (Tuesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).
The type of nationalism on display at AFPC seemed similar, if more subtle, to that at ADFA, however, partly due to the fragmented nature of Australia’s police forces, seemed to evolve around the concept of ‘community’ rather than ‘nation’:

‘I originally wanted to get into ADFA, so I applied but I fucked that up … yeah, I wanted to serve my country’ (Male recruit, mid twenties, AFPC interview).

[on why he wanted to join the police:] ‘I’m definitely patriotic, but not full on like Americans or anything’ (Male recruit, late twenties, AFPC interview).

I could make a lot more money in the business world as a stock broker but in business, who actually wins? Who benefits from it? … I do consider it [the police profession] to be a relatively noble profession in the scheme of things, similar to sort of the Defence Force, you’re protecting the community (Male recruit, late twenties, AFPC interview).

‘one of the motivational factors is knowing, well hopefully, knowing you can make a difference to the lives of people in the community and protect them’ (Male recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview).

I was approached by couple of ‘blue badges’ (the recruit course that started a few weeks before the one we were on) who’d been looking over all through lunch and pointing at me; ‘we just wanted to inquire about your ‘observer’ badge; we’re doing observer week now’ … I explained my purpose at AFPC and explained that I had also done research at ADFA; [one of them said:] ‘I’m ex-Army; have you noticed the cross over? [the movement of personnel between the military and the police]’. I asked why that was; [one of the ‘blue badges’ said:] ‘I think we’re both public spirited; you know helping people, protecting the community’ (Wednesday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

Just as the sacrifice of Australia’s military personnel is celebrated with parades, National Police Remembrance Day is commemorated around Australia in September
each year, accompanied by marching and attended by politicians, as a way of remembering police officers who have made the ‘ultimate sacrifice’, as it is described on an Australian police website (WA police website). Further, in a similar fashion to the many memorials dedicated to Australian military personnel that died while ‘serving their country’, a National Police Memorial was unveiled by the Australian Prime Minister in Canberra in 2006, which includes the placement of plaques on the commemorative wall to bring focus to the identity of each individual police officer who had died while on duty in the history of policing in Australia (Anonymous 2007:20). As Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty explained during its construction: ‘The memorial will also recognise the unique nature of police service, and the special men and women who face danger in their daily lives for the protection of the Australian community’ (AFP 2004).

**Conclusion**

Australian experience in the two world wars has little to teach the modern serviceman, and it is of some concern that RMC Duntroon, for example, should base its current recruiting campaign around old battles and old generals – and in some cases citizen soldiers at that! Gallipoli, that central myth of the Australian military tradition, is largely irrelevant to the Australian Defence Force as it enters the 1990s (Grey 1988:7).

In the above statement, Grey demonstrates a lack of appreciation for the continued attraction that the broad ideology of citizen-soldiering, and the Anzac tradition more specifically, continues to have for contemporary service personnel, as well as the community more broadly. The concept of the citizen-soldier which, after the French Revolution, led to a growth in the British armed forces faster than any other European nation remains robust in Australia. Anzac, the foremost legend of Australian national identity, has remained a powerful means of defining the national character.

As can be shown in the above examples from ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits, the nation state, far from ‘withering away’ as Marx prophesied, has remained resilient, particularly as a continuing source of people’s ‘we’ identities. The focus of the next
Chapter Six: Gendering Violence

Chapter is on another particularly resilient identity; that of gender and its motivational impact on military and police recruits.
Women are created for the purpose of giving life, and men to take it
(Quote from a popular WWI pamphlet, as cited in Bourke 1999:136)

[the integration of women into the military:] threatens to leave the
American military no more disciplined, no more efficient, no more
fearsome, no more military than the United States Postal Service (Mitchell

As Elias observed, where a warrior class is dominant, male dominance and male
culture are also firmly established. In contrast, pacified societies offer the chance for
greater equality between the sexes: ‘wherever men are forced to renounce physical
violence, the social importance of women increased’ (Elias 2000:248). The nation
state’s institutions of violence, where physical violence is still deemed important,
remain dominated by a male ‘warrior’ culture. While civilising processes have
encouraged a greater equality between the sexes generally, the maintenance of a
gendered warrior culture means that violence remains deeply gendered. While men,
rather than women, have been expected to fight in all types of societies, the formation
of nation states consolidated male dominance in the organisation and conduct of war.
In an effort to organise and encourage ‘manpower’, nation states have promoted
elaborate gender ideologies and social structures where ‘real’ men are prepared to
fight and ‘real’ women to stay home and require protection.

Despite far reaching social and technological changes that have in many ways
undermined the warrior concept, the warrior, foremost among male archetypes, has
remained resilient. In Australia, it is the Anzac soldier, canvassed in the previous
chapter, that epitomises the male warrior. The extent of resistance to the inclusion of women in the state’s institutions of violence, particularly those areas most directly linked to violence and the ideology of the warrior, shows just how gendered violence continues to be within the contemporary nation state. That concepts of the warrior, and its associated characteristics such as toughness, enter in as motivational factors for joining the military and police can be seen in the narratives of male ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits, as well as some female ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits.

Illustrating gender

Elias illustrates how with the civilising process people come to control their behaviour and mould their affects and manners more closely, however, he does not elaborate on how they do so in the context of an awareness of gender assessment. Goffman (1977:102) describes how, ‘from the start, persons who are sorted into the male class and persons who are sorted into the other are given different treatment, acquire different experience, enjoy and suffer different expectations’. As a result, gender is produced as a socially organised achievement, exhibited or portrayed through interaction, while simultaneously being seen as ‘natural’. As no one in contemporary society escapes being declared male or female, individuals always ‘do’ gender. This dichotomous difference, however, does become more or less salient in different contexts. Military and police institutions, with their close association with violence, provide a context where masculinity is valued and gender becomes highly relevant and visible.

Mobilising manpower

If warfare is as old as history and as universal as mankind, we must now enter the supremely important limitation that it is an entirely masculine activity (Keegan 1993:76).

I believe that the real reason why war exists is because men have always liked war, and women, warriors (van Creveld 1999:337).

Contrary to the claim that perpetuating violence has been the exclusive domain of men, there is considerable evidence of female participation in acts of violence. A
vivid example of this is Elias' (2000:163) illustration of the wife of Bernard de Cazenac who had women’s ‘breasts hacked off or their nails torn off’. However, with the development of the nation state, women were increasingly excluded from formal acts of aggression. In the Aboriginal war in Australia, for example, it was not uncommon for women on both sides to be involved in fighting. However, the white shooting expeditions and the black war parties were the preserve of men.

Throughout history the apparent absolute masculine monopoly of war and soldiering has often been breached. Within nation states however, until very recently, women who have participated in combat have usually done so disguised as men. An Englishman joked in 1762 that ‘so many disguised women were serving in the army that they ought to have their own regiments’ (Goldstein 2001:106). With the increasing dichotomisation of gender, to dare to dress as a man became increasingly regulated. Joan of Arc, for example, was condemned to burn at the stake for idolatry as well as for wearing men’s clothing (Goldstein 2001:116). While throughout the eighteenth century women were able to avoid the recruiter’s attention, put on uniform, and pass themselves off as male, with the institution of regular pre-enlistment medical examinations in the nineteenth century, conducted by qualified physicians, this became more difficult.

Women who do undertake soldiering often get either ‘written out’ of official histories or ‘written in’ differently. An example of this is the story of ‘Molly Pritcher’, one of the best known folk heroes of the American Revolution who was renowned as a heroic camp follower. According to legend, she loaded and fired field artillery after her gunner husband collapsed from wounds. However, historical research has uncovered quite a different history: ‘Molly Pritcher’ was in fact not one woman, but hundreds who were deliberately organised by George Washington to serve in combat as members of army gun crews (Enloe 1983:122). On the other hand, the exploits of women fighters can be embellished. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union exaggerated the glorious exploits of its women fighters to symbolise the mobilisation of the whole population for the war effort, even though women formed only a very small fraction of all Soviet military personnel and the vast majority of these served in administrative positions or as nurses (Goldstein 2001:13).
Traditionally, young males have been lured or drafted into the military with the promise of achieving manhood with slogans like 'Join the army, Be a man' and 'The army will make a man out of you' being particularly common in the twentieth century (Snyder 2003:269). A paratrooper in the British Army in the latter part of the twentieth century explained that 'to put it plainly and simply, my reason for joining up was that I wanted to become a ‘real’ man'. In some pre-modern cultures a man cannot be called a man or marry until he has proven himself in battle (Goldstein 2001:274).

Both Athenians and Spartans agreed that participation in war was not only an obligation for male citizens but also a public stage on which masculine virtue could be fostered and emulated. That the practice of citizenship and war continues to be centred around the male body was demonstrated when the Menzies Government reintroduced military conscription in Australia in November 1950 and the Minister for Labour and National Service explained that the aim of ‘national service’, as well as improving Australia’s defence preparedness, was to ‘improve the physical fitness – using that phrase in the widest sense – of our young manhood’ (cited in Crowley 1973).

Not only is Machiavelli’s citizen-soldier exclusively male, the entire structure of Machiavelli’s civic republicanism is erected upon the denigration of femininity, with ‘effeminacy’ being his most frequent derogatory descriptor (Snyder 1999:24). Women must be kept apart from combat in order to fulfil their feminine roles in the war system and reinforce soldiers’ masculinity (Goldstein 2001:301). When von Clausewitz’s widow, Marie von Clausewitz, posthumously published her husband’s book *On War* in 1832, she begins with an introduction stating that bewilderment at the fact that a female had dared to preface a work of such nature was entirely justified.

As Virginia Woolf (1977:35,36) put it, women serve as magnifying mirrors ‘reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size’ and such mirrors are ‘essential to all violent and heroic action’. The images of women, for example, prostitutes, wives, mothers, widows, social workers and nurses, found at the sidelines of the domain of warfare, play an important part in defining the domain and confirming the
social order and its values. Recruiting posters in World War I, for example, informed young men that their women would reject them if they were ‘not in khaki’ and informed young women that men who refused to fight and die for them were not worthy of their affections (Goldstein 2001:272).

War films helped create for the first time a truly mass audience for the staging of both war and wartime masculinity (Braudy 2003:57). The portrayal of men as protector and women as protected was shown more recently in the sentimentalised media depictions of the rescue of United States Army Private Jessica Lynch from a hospital in Nasiriya in 2003. Jessica’s portrayal as slight, blonde and girlish contrasted with the heroic masculine strength of her male rescuers. The emphasis on economic motives as the reason for her enlistment in the military, along with her role as a supply clerk, further juxtaposed her from the ‘real’ soldiers (Buttsworth 2003:316).

That violence is deeply gendered can also be shown through statements such as General Chafee’s: ‘Let war cease altogether and a nation will become effeminate’ (cited in Janowitz 1971:223). Britain’s self-definition as a masculine nation was often made in relation to the victories that occurred through war and was, after victories in battles with France, contrasted in the British press with French forms of masculinity that were derided and represented as feminine (McGregor 2003:152). The idea before 1914 that a Great War would be invigorating for participating nations was explained in gendered terms. An Irish example includes: ‘the nation which regards [bloodshed] as a final horror has lost its manhood’ (Goldstein 2001:275).

The co-founder of the British League of Nations Society, Leonard Woolf, contributed to wartime discussions of how problems of international relations were to be resolved in the post-war by comparing the competition between nations to that of men fighting over women:

Thus two men may each desire exclusive sexual relations with a single woman … or two national groups may each desire exclusive control of a single portion of the material earth (cited in Slugga 2004:247).

Woolf outlined the need for an International Court of Arbitration by likening the ways in which ‘stags’ ‘fought for the exclusive possession of a female’, to the manner
in which contemporary nations fight to ‘impose their wills’ upon one another. Following the analogy through to its logical conclusion he argued that just as in modern society courtship was regulated by custom or general social rules, international relations could be remade to operate on principles of arbitration rather than force; a more ‘gentlemanly’ option (Slugga 2004:247).

Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, intervened in Nicaragua in the 1980s because he thought that ‘America has to show a firmness of manhood’ (Goldstein 2001:278). More recently, the masculinity of the American has been set against that of the Muslim. In a comment to the Arab television network Al Jazeera, for example:

Our brothers who fought in Somalia saw wonders about the weakness, feebleness and cowardliness of the U.S. soldier. We believe that we are men. Muslim men must have the honour of defending [Mecca] – We do not want American women soldiers defending [it]. The rulers in that region have been deprived of their manhood (cited in Kimmel 2005a:428)

**Gendering Australia**

We acknowledge that historically we are a misogynistic society. The warrior ethos is strong (statement by the Chief of Naval Staff to the Committee Commonwealth of Australia 1994:52).

As masculinity in Britain became increasingly subject to rationalisation actual, as well as symbolic, violence was pushed out to the colonies. The violence was symbolic in that, as Mennell (2007:138) has argued, much of the social basis of the appeal of the myth of the frontier can be sought after the closing of the frontier and the imposition of industrial and bureaucratic discipline. This violence, along with a dramatically imbalanced sex ratio, contributed to the cultural masculinisation of Australia (Connell 1995:194). By the end of the nineteenth century, the dichotomy between the manly Australian and the effeminate Englishman was a common theme in Australian culture. Rudyard Kipling (1940:578), in poems such as ‘If’, idealised the outposts of the empire as a place for ‘real men’, contrasting it with the effeminacy of the metropolis:
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it, and – which is more – you’ll be a Man, my son!

Such idealised notions of masculinity were inculcated during the imperial period through formal education and training as well as through reading and leisure activities. The state assumed a greater role in defining ideals of manliness and in controlling the socialisation of boys towards these ideals through legislation, schooling and military training (Crotty 2001:17). In a period when commentators were increasingly concerned at the apparent feminising of the Anglo-Saxon race, adventure stories offered some solace, an escape, and a ‘fantasy of masculine and Anglo-Saxon supremacy’. Boys’ adventure stories were consumed as avidly in Australia as they were in England (Crotty 2001:135). In the *Empire Annual for Boys*, for example, ‘manliness’ included upright conduct and a rejection of effeminate behaviour (Kanitkar 1994:172). The myths about the frontier men who battled with the land and elements were a ‘warrior’s story’ (O'Dowd 2002:4).

Part of the reason for the success with which the Australian middle class in particular was able to convince itself that it was not degenerating through over-civilisation lay in perceptions of the Australian bush. The Australian bush legend was formulated not in the bush, but as an imaginative retreat by people living in the city, such as by the poets Banjo Paterson and Henry Lawson. The development of the Australian legend was ‘not the transmission to the city of values nurtured on the bush frontier, so much as the projection onto the outback of values revered by an alienated urban intelligentsia’ (Crotty 2001:21). The ‘real’ Australian was male, and anything which did not fit the stereotype of the bushman and his qualities, such as the city, urban life and intellectualism, was categorised as feminine. Writing in 1907, Bean equated the bush life with the Australian male’s talent for fighting: ‘All this fighting with men and with nature, fierce as any warfare, has made of the Australian as fine a fighting man as exists’ (Crotty 2001:26). Bean held that the values of the bush permeated the towns and cities, thus getting around the issue of Australia being one of the most highly urbanised countries in the world in 1914 (Grey 1999:85).

Notions of masculinity were becoming more secular, physical and militarist by the end of the nineteenth century. These developments were linked with changes in
Britain and the rising importance of nationalism (Crotty 2001:12). Boys were drilled in school cadet corps, taught as boy scouts to ‘Be Prepared’ and from 1911 took part in compulsory military training (White 1981:127). By World War I the soldier had been firmly established in Australian ideology as the embodiment of all that was manly. In their churches, schools and homes, through rhetoric, honour boards and compulsory compositions, boys were taught to look up to the figure of the Australian soldier as a model to be emulated. Propaganda in World War I defined masculinity in terms of heroism and violent aggression while femininity was defined as ‘motherhood, maternity and sacrifice’ (Bridges 2005:192). White Feather Leagues were established in cities around Australia and men who did not enlist faced public disapproval (Oliver 1997:32).

Militarist and nationalist constructions of manliness peaked with the idolisation of the Anzac soldier. Poetry and the media in Australia presented Australia’s defeat at Gallipoli not only as a milestone of battle, but as the victory of masculinity. ‘Thrilling deeds of heroism’ was the headline of Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett’s first despatch from Gallipoli (cited in Davidson 2000). Australian war historian Charles Bean (1933:48) similarly portrayed the Anzacs as heroes in the tradition of Marathon and Thermopylae. The focus on the perfection of the Australian male body contributed to the casting of the soldier into national monument. The novelist MacKenzie, for example, wrote of the Australian troops at Gallipoli:

Much has been written about the splendid appearance of those Australian troops ... Their beauty, for it really was heroic, should have been celebrated in hexameters not headlines ... There was not one of those glorious young men I saw that day who might not himself have been Ajax or Diomed, Hector or Achilles ... shapes of heroes (cited in Pringle 1997:97)

Similarly, the British ‘bobby’, particularly in the 1950s, became an archetypal English hero, the very embodiment of the ‘ideal male character’ (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:3). It was the sheer physical presence of the English local bobby that is apparent in commonly expressed images. Loader and Mulcahy (2003:135) outline how during the past century, the policeman has been a model of the ideal male
character: ‘possessing more strength than he ever has to call into use except in the gravest emergency’.

The Anzacs, as well as being heroes were of course, warriors, as the Australian Minister for Defence stated: ‘In that war were some of England’s most noted generals, some of the greatest warriors ever England possessed, one of whom – Lord Roberts – says the Australians excelled all others’ (Crowley 1973a:52). The war established a set of social rituals around Anzac Day and reinvigorated mateship rituals. As outlined in the previous chapter, both sets of rituals are seen as central to the Australian ethos and largely exclude women.

White (1981:136) argues that the ongoing celebration of the digger myth illustrates an Australian ‘obsession with masculinity’ and Cheeseman (1998) argues that despite the size of the female population now dominating that of males, Indigenous people’s increasingly prominent place in society and expanding multiculturalism, the collective Australian psyche has managed to maintain its connection to the warrior culture of the Australian military. The next section will explore the warrior concept in more detail.

The warrior

It is natural for men to be warriors. Men are by nature physically and psychologically better equipped for fighting than women (Smith 2000:10).

Masculinities are historically and culturally contingent. As Braudy (2003) outlines, the difference in definitions of manhood between the time of Homer or the crusaders and today is nearly as great as the difference between a tomahawk and a Tomahawk missile. However, the warrior, foremost among male archetypes, has been the epitome of masculinity in many societies. The warrior code is one that attaches glamour to physical violence and values traits of physical courage and masculine solidarity (Watts 1995:161-163). One of the necessary characteristics of the warrior is flight from the feminine. The warrior learns to ‘deny all that is ‘feminine’ and soft in himself” (Goldstein 2001:266).
Not only is much of military culture characterised by its combat, masculine-warrior paradigm (Dunivan 1994:533), but the ‘warrior’ has also been an important identity model for police. The assignment of the policing role exclusively to men was a logical extension of the existing division of labour in society, as traditionally men have borne responsibility for the physical protection of the herd (Watts 1995:161-163). As Waddington (1999a) outlines, the culture of police forces glorifies violence and crime ‘fighting’ and promotes a ‘cult of masculinity’. It is not surprising that Victoria’s Special Operations Group that does not include women, is considered superior amongst police whose culture places a high premium on masculine/warrior values. This group is almost always described as elite in police publications and elsewhere (McCulloch 2000:204). The warrior paradigm is particularly explicit within the military, however, as one Vietnam veteran indicates: ‘In combat I was a respected man among men. I lived on life’s edge and did the most manly thing in the world: I was a warrior in war’ (cited in Grossman 1995:251).

It is not an uncommon argument that long-term trends have contributed to the erosion of the warrior image and its association with masculinity. These trends include the changes in technology and organisation outlined earlier in the thesis. Weber (1948a:253) outlines how ‘of all those powers that lessen the importance of individual action, the most irresistible is rational discipline’. Contemporary theorists seem to agree arguing that as a result of these transformations, there has been a ‘decline of the traditional warrior ethic’ (Giddens 1985:230), followed by the current ‘post-heroic’ era (Keegan 1987:311). McNeill (1982:129) also states that, with troops being drilled in the Maurician fashion, as described in Chapter Four of this thesis: ‘the old irregular and heroic patterns of military behaviour withered and died, even among the most recalcitrant officers and gentlemen’.

It is argued that developments in technology have reduced the requirement for warrior skills, greatly reducing the link between violence and masculinity. However, this argument underestimates the extent to which emerging scientific reason was constructed as male and explicitly promoted as superior to, and exclusive of, that which was designated female. As outlined earlier in this thesis, Augustin Ehrensvard, one of the first officers in Sweden who received a ‘modern’ military education built
on scientific principles, disclosed the new directions that military training and discipline had begun to take: ‘Hereby, he is turned off from old Women’s tales, Prejudice, Trust in fortuitous Chance, and other effeminate Fancies’ (cited in Sunesson 1984:202). The gendering of science and war as masculine looks unlikely to change in the near or distant future. Higate (2003:208), for example, is sceptical about whether the pinnacle of technological advance, the missile defence system proposed by George Bush, could ever have been called the ‘daughter’ of star wars.

Another trend also ostensibly undermining the warrior ethic includes the shift in emphasis in the military and police towards peacekeeping, with its accompanying emphasis on skills traditionally regarded as feminine, such as communication and interpersonal skills. Images that stood out from the Australian military’s recent mission in East Timor, for example, were those of female Australian soldiers in combat rig comforting victims of the Indonesian Army-backed militias (Birmingham 2005:41). A British Army recruiting advertisement in the late 1990s links the integration of women in the armed forces to the growth in the Army’s peacekeeping role. The advertisement shows a woman cowering in the corner of a building with the commentary: ‘She’s just been raped by soldiers. The same soldiers murdered her husband. The last thing she wants to see is another soldier – unless that soldier is a woman’. The advertisement concludes with an armed female soldier entering the room (cited in Hopton 2003:118).

In multinational United Nations peacekeeping operations, women are found increasingly in combat units and gender does appear to be becoming less visible, literally as well as symbolically. In Bosnia in 1997, for example, with US peacekeeping troops wearing protective gear almost all the time, it took one infantry Colonel a week to realise that some of the MPs protecting him in the field were female (Goldstein 2001:100). However, while on the surface the fuller integration of women into the armed forces and the increased emphasis on using the military in peacekeeping roles and humanitarian interventions could seem to indicate a weakening of the links between masculinity and militarism, at the same time, public focus tends to remain on the warrior. For example, just as the Victorian public was
obsessed with its military heroes, the public during the Gulf wars was fascinated with the Special Air Services ‘warrior supermen’ (Hopton 2003:120).

Despite far-reaching social and technological changes, the warrior has remained an enduring symbol of masculinity. In statues, paintings, comic books and popular films, the stance, facial expressions, and weapons clearly suggest aggression, courage and the capacity for violence (Morgan 1994:165). By symbolically linking present-day heroes, real and fictitious, with their counterparts in the past, the construction of the warrior embraces the rhetoric of continuity, and hence an ideology of unchanging masculine virtues and strengths. Connolly (1998), for example, examines representations of masculinity during the period in which the introduction of firearms was revolutionising the practice of warfare in England to analyse how English society, used to imagining heroic men as warriors, reacted when technological and social change undermined the capacity of its warrior elites, particularly when traditional modes of understanding male accomplishment and heroism had been so militaristic. Connolly (1998) argues that despite the fact that the actual practice of war was changing, military prowess and individual heroism remained one of the primary ways of imagining masculine achievement.

Bourke (1999) analyses twentieth century narratives of combat in Australia, as well as in Britain and America, and finds evidence of men envisaging themselves as heroic warriors and linking modern warfare with historical conflicts in which it was almost a duty to conquer another race for the sake of ‘civilisation’. The ability of combatants to imagine themselves as displaying valour and individual prowess was crucial to their sense of pride and pleasure and, since refusal to tell such stories might throw into doubt a man’s status and virility, Bourke argues that few men could resist the temptation to conform to the warrior stereotype (Bourke 1999:72).

The importance of a warrior self conception also explains why the bayonet remained so central to military training despite awareness that modern technologies and rapid-fire rifles had greatly limited its usefulness. Even before the Boer War, it was acknowledged that modern armaments meant that hand-to-hand fighting would no longer ‘play a very prominent part in the battles of the future’. However, the dominant method common to training in the twentieth century continued to be
bayonet drill (Bourke 1999:89). In the interwar years, threats by military command to strip bayonets from corps such as the Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Army Ordinance Corps, Royal Army Pay Corps, Army Educational Corps and the Army Dental Corps on the grounds that these corps were never in a position where the bayonet could be employed, were met with hostile opposition (Bourke 1999:57).

Despite less than one half of one per cent of wounds being inflicted by the bayonet, bayonet charges were a central motif in war stories during the first few decades of the twentieth century (Bourke 1999:52). Warrior fictions rejoiced in extraordinary feats of strength with the bayonet; in particular, in the act of ‘pinning’ and then ‘tossing’ the foe. Such fanciful accounts of tossing corpses over shoulders were so pervasive that an official manual published in 1915 advised instructors to discourage soldiers from this activity, outlining that ‘it is very difficult and quite unnecessary to cast your opponent over your shoulder like a sheaf of corn on a fork’ (Bourke 1999:52).

Books by Gulf War veterans have played a significant role in promoting the public obsession with the Special Air Service as national heroes, as ‘warrior supermen, capable of taking on overwhelming odds to accomplish the most dangerous of tasks in the most inhospitable terrain’ (Hopton 2003:118). In Britain, tales of elite combat adventure are the norm in war narratives by veterans, where action-adventure is celebrated in stories of soldierly skill and technical competence (Woodward 2008:369). The cinema has assisted in celebrating the importance of individuality to the masculine warrior in constructing and celebrating individual heroes. Fantasies drawn from a wide range of combat literature and films have enabled combatants to refashion themselves as heroic warriors. Recent films such as Pearl Harbor and Black Hawk Down chronicle the exploits of males engaged in dangerous combat missions (Pollard 2003:316). Military authorities, recognising how crucial it is to foster such fantasies, finance and encourage the production of such combat narratives. During World War Two, for example, more than one third of all Hollywood feature films produced between 1942 and 1945 were war movies, largely due to the help of the War Department, Navy Department and the Office of War Information (Goldstein 2001:282).
Not only has the warrior concept remained resilient, theorists have pointed to a trend towards the promotion of an increasingly caricatured version of the warrior in contemporary Western democracies, particularly America, in response to broader social changes such as the Vietnam war defeat and women’s increasing participation into male dominant spheres. Jeffords (1989:185), for example, outlines a process she refers to as ‘remasculization’ where the aim is a redefinition of masculinity and femininity in firmer more exclusionary terms in order to ensure that women are effectively eliminated from the masculine narration of war. A similar trend can be evidenced in the representation of male police officers, in movies such as *Dirty Harry* and television series like *The Shield*.

Gibson (1994) explores the paramilitary culture that arose in post-Vietnam American culture, arguing that warriors like Rambo epitomise a ‘new’ warrior culture, explaining that ‘these warriors fight with a savagery lacking in their predecessors’. The new warrior ‘radiates’ male power: ‘He is the embodiment of the masculine ideals of autonomy, integrity, physical courage and competence’ (Youngman 2000:39). The ‘new warrior’ is often depicted as having specialised training in violence but operating outside of the conventional military or police. In the first *Rambo* movie, for example, the former Green Beret John Rambo destroys a small town and its police authorities single handed, partly as a result of flashbacks he experiences from the Vietnam War. While Tom Cruise’s character in *Top Gun*, a movie produced with massive Pentagon assistance, laid claim to the collectivist masculinity of World War II based on teamwork and self-sacrifice, it actually promotes the overtly individual masculinity associated with the ‘new’ warrior (Goldstein 2001:282). While Rambo, and to a lesser extent Tom Cruise’s character in *Top Gun* are not ideal men for winning wars, since they reject the control and discipline of authorities, it is these characters that appeal to modern conceptions of individually achieved masculinity (Goldstein 2001). *Dirty Harry* Callahan is also a classic police example of the type of rebelliousness that is necessary if a man wants to do his job properly. There is a whole subgenre of cop-movies, including movies like *Above the Law* and *Die Hard*, that have developed in which the cop acts like a one man army in a situation of warfare (Steinert 2003:283).
A brief excerpt from my ADFA field notes highlights that the habitus of some male cadets are influenced by the concept of the heroic warrior, specifically in this case the all-male enclave of the fighter-pilot community of *Top Gun* and the physicality of Rambo, who, using his body as a weapon, can kill any number of human beings he wishes:

both ‘Hale’ and ‘Pace’ [first year male cadets], despite failing the flight screening test, fancied themselves in the Air Force as ‘top guns’ … on receiving their ‘aviation’ issue sunglasses they excitedly produced a camera and requested that I take their picture while they posed Tom Cruise style … it was obvious that they had even more respect for ‘hard core’ infantry stuff. They seemed to idolise one of the male cadets they’d nicknamed ‘Rambo’ and would continually talk about his manliness in admiring tones. For example, when in class talking with a psychologist about relaxation techniques they’d gush: ‘Rambo sits there in his room listening to gun shots’ and ‘Rambo likes to shoot people’ etc etc (excerpt from notes I developed for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3, based on ADFA field notes).

The reinforcement of traditional gender roles can also be seen in the recent terrorist attack on the United States and the reaction whereby men were cast as the protectors and women as the protected. Al Queda is an all male terrorist group and the perpetrators of the attacks were males, attempting to symbolically recover Islamic manhood from the emasculation of globalisation (Kimmel 2005a). The reactionary revival of traditional male values was exemplified by the focus on male New York fire fighters which entailed not just appreciation of their chivalry and self-sacrifice but also of their physical courage (Noonan 2001). Bowman argued that after the symbolic ‘emasculcation’ of the United States by the destruction of the twin towers, the United States had to symbolically be ‘re-masculated’ (cited in Hancock 2002). In order for the paradigms of remasculinisation to operate effectively, the rescuer must be coded as masculine, the rescuee as feminine. Following the destruction of the World Trade Centres, the rhetoric of rescuing the women and children of Afghanistan was widely argued in order to justify the
subsequent military action. Laura Bush, the First Lady of the United States, for example, delivered a radio address in November 2001 in which she claimed that the ‘brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists’ (Anonymous 2001).

It seems that the warrior is a resilient identity and, as will be shown in the next section, the active opposition to the admission of women into the police and military can be seen as a reaction to the challenge to the image of the warrior as a male whose duty it is to fight to protect women. As Smith (2000:10) argues, ‘men enjoy, and perhaps need, the social status, the prestige in the eyes of women and the self-esteem that goes with being a warrior’.

**Manpower requirements and women**

In the twentieth century, and especially since the Second World War, the participation of women in the military and police has increased and has even, to some extent, been normalised. In 2004, 13.3 per cent of the Australian Defence Force were women (Woodward and Winter 2007:15). In 2003, one fifth of all sworn police officers in Australia were women (Boni 2005:2). The extent and range of women’s involvement in the military and police varies considerably between countries however, it has generally not extended to the higher echelons of power or to those units most explicitly associated with violence. Combat forces in the world’s state armies, for example, are 99.9 percent male (Goldstein 2001:7). The increased participation of women in the military and police has not proceeded without considerable controversy, illustrative of the continuing framing of conceptions of masculinity and femininity around violence.

As Elias (1996:42) points out, of all the changes in the balance of power between the generations this century, one of the most marked and significant is the growth in the power of young, unmarried women, the type of females that make up the vast bulk of female cadets and recruits. This growth in power is closely connected to the growth of the liberal state and its reliance on concepts of citizenship. The extension of liberal principles such as equality of opportunity has impacted upon all areas of public life, including the military and police. From the beginning of the twentieth century various women’s organisations, recognising that members of groups excluded from military
service can potentially be treated as lesser citizens, advocated for the equal participation of women in the military. Herbert Spencer, for example, had argued that women should not have the vote until they furnished contingents to the Army and Navy (Inglis 1997:43). However, it is the impact of ‘manpower' shortages within the military and police that has had a far greater influence on increasing women’s participation than arguments about citizenship and equality.

One of the primary reasons for the increased participation of women in the military and police has been the growth of support services. The proportion of workers in non-combat roles in the military, including, for example: transport workers, administrators, technicians, maintenance workers and cooks, has grown markedly over the past century and a half. Further, as mentioned above, there has also been an expansion in military and police functions from fighting wars and fighting crime to include roles such as peacekeeping.

From the turn of the nineteenth century women were increasingly accepted into auxiliary roles such as nursing, administration and communications in the armed forces of many countries. In most cases women in the military were allocated to all-female units or corps. Similarly, the new police matrons that took over the role the wives of police officers had previously played were involved in support roles, including clerical work and engaging in the supervision, searching and escorting of women and children in custody at the turn of the nineteenth century. Female activists, to justify the employment of female police officers claimed, for example, that women’s inherently compassionate nature would make them better than men at performing some police duties, such as preventing crime, handling female and juvenile cases, and protecting the moral and physical safety of women and girls in public (Doran and Chan 2003:283). No effort was made to define the duties of police women in the same way that the Police Code defined them for men, and upon the appointment of two women to the Victorian police in 1917 it was decided that their duties would be to:

- undertake enquiries and take action in cases which women and children are immediately concerned and generally to supervise public places
with a view to the protection of women and children and the prevention and detection of offences by or against females (Haldane 1986:163).

Government recruitment campaigns emphasised that ‘policewomen naturally specialize in work with women, children and young people’ (cited in Rawlings 2002:197).

The argument that women should be included in the military and police forces to do gender specific work still prevails. In relation to women’s participation in police forces, for example, van Creveld (2000:431) argues that:

police forces that specialise in crowd-control now often include a handful of helmeted, baton-carrying, women not because they are really needed – when hard comes to hard they are nowhere to be seen – but because they may be used against other women. In a world where any man who so much as touches a woman is likely to be accused of ‘sexual harassment’, it is helpful to have a few of them around.

That some police personnel would agree with this sentiment, is outlined in an excerpt from a taped interview at AFPC:

‘if you had to apprehend someone you know, you don’t want some female whipper snipper coming along who’s not going to be able to help you out … but again, in saying that, if it’s a domestic violence issue, women are going to be much more comfortable in dealing with women, so that works in their favour’ (Male recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview).

The first female to head up a police force in Australia, Chief Commissioner of Police for Victoria, Christine Nixon, emphasised the female traits she brought to the job:

I will not be abandoning or compromising the other positions and statuses that I occupy … What are those roles and influences? Well, first, I am a woman. The female gender has … helped to nourish the caring and compassionate values and ideals that have always been embedded in the core of good policing (Nixon 2001:5).
The femininity of women working in the military and police has been continually emphasised, as demonstrated by the attention given to their appearance. In England, the first women attached to the military, in support activities, wore feminised uniforms, including ankle-length skirts. When they were first admitted, policewomen wore long skirts and buttoned bodices, decorated with a police badge, and carried their gun in their handbags (Craik 2005:88).

During both World Wars, stress was placed on the femininity of females serving in military roles. Commentators stressed that female recruits to the war could remain ‘pretty and feminine, as well as well-groomed and well-dressed, and as concerned with complexion, manicure, and hair-dressing as any other woman, in or out of uniform’ (Craik 2005:95). Popular literature also reflected this uneasy accommodation of women, describing boot camp and basic training as a process of ‘transforming women from civilians to Lady Marines’. Authors were employed to counter fears about the defeminisation of service-women. One such author, for example, placed great emphasis on the girlish charms of women in the Women’s Royal Naval Service. He explained how they donned ‘very feminine saucy style’ hats while servicing machine-guns on board motor torpedo boats. Another author outlined that women in the Women’s Volunteer Reserve were neither ‘a pack of Amazons’ nor were they ‘cranky’ (cited in Bourke 1999:325).

In 1955 a widely distributed career guidance book examined almost exclusively the supposed problem of women in the military. Responding to the need to demonstrate the femininity of women in the armed forces, it pointed out that women marines were issued ‘marine greens ... in the form of softly tailored, two pieced suits. They are distinctly feminine and chic ... and black calf pumps and a purse are part of every women marines uniform’ (cited in Timmons 1992:23). The issue of the femininity of service members was still an important issue when the first female cadets entered West Point in 1976 and classes included teaching cadets how to use make up (Buttsworth 2003:255). At ADFA, females were required to dress in a ‘feminine’ way:

female cadets are required to dress as females. This is regulated by strict mess rules as well as the issuing of single service uniforms which are cut
in a feminine way and include skirts, dresses, high-heeled shoes and the compulsory wearing of stockings (Tuesday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

Similarly at AFPC, police women are issued with gender specific uniforms:

the little dress hats that females are issued with don’t quite compare to the big authoritative dimensions of the males’ hats’ (Wednesday, Week 6, AFPC field notes).

The demands made in terms of manpower during the two World Wars were unprecedented. In the police forces, it was the two world wars that provided the impetus for the recruitment of women police. Initially there were two entirely separate forces and while a few forces kept on small numbers of women police during the inter-war years, most had none. In World War I, while women in the military and police were largely confined to gender appropriate roles, reminders of what those roles were was occasionally deemed necessary. As the *Brisbane Courier*, outlined following the establishment of a women’s rifle club to assist in ‘home defence’ in 1914: ‘Whatever glamour may surround the woman shootist, it must be remembered that war is a man’s game, fighting is the man’s way of settlement’ (cited in Buttsworth 2003:41).

During World War II particularly, women’s labour was formally organised on an extensive scale in order to free up as many men as possible to fight. There was strong opposition, however, to women wielding weapons and women who joined the services in any capacity other than nursing were not allowed to serve overseas until May 1945. However, women were handling anti-aircraft guns, running communications networks, mending aeroplanes and flying them from base to base (Goldstein 2001:321). Similarly, during the Second World War police forces not only had to open their doors to both regular policewomen and the Women’s Auxiliary Police Service, they also had to give them what had previously been seen as men’s work. In 1940 the Australian government proposed that women be admitted to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The inherent contradiction between the need to mobilise women as soldiers and the supposed manhood of war was resolved by the notion that the recruitment of women was only ‘for the duration’.

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The demobilisation of women received top priority at the end of the war. When the war ended, one Navy commander declared: 'I want all the women off this base by noon' (cited in Goldstein 2001:92). Enormous effort was expended after both wars to reconstruct gender. After the First World War, women's military activities were reconstructed as minor and the ideology of motherhood was reinvigorated (Goldstein 2001:320). During the wars, femininity was defined in terms of heterosexual desirability and after the Second World War, women were not so much pressured to return to old, traditional roles, but invited to step into an alluring, exciting future. In place of the adventure of economic independence, women were offered the adventure of sexual romance (Lake 1997:123).

It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that the numbers of women in Western armed forces began to increase in any significant, long term way. Growing administrative and technical complexity made high levels of qualification and specialisation increasingly necessary and military and police forces in many countries could no longer exclude women, a highly skilled group within the labour force (Addis, Russo et al. 1994:xiii). In the 1970s, it was the shortage of men willing to serve in the military that triggered the expansion of women’s role in the military of several countries, including Australia. Similarly, in the late 1960s despite massive recruitment campaigns, police departments faced a growing shortage of qualified applicants (Martin 1980:39). Over the 1970s and 1980s, there was a gradual expansion of employment opportunities and an equalising of pay and conditions of service in militaries. In Australia, the Air Force was the first to provide for women’s admission into its primary service in 1977, the Army followed in 1979 and the Navy in 1985. The opening of ADFA in 1986 was a major step forward in the incorporation of women into the military (Smith 1990:133). Twenty eight percent of ADFA’s officer cadets were female during my period of participant observation there (ADF 1998).

Heated opposition to women’s encroachment into this male territory highlights the continuing importance of these occupations to the masculine identity of many men. The incursion of women into traditionally ‘male’ occupations has been opposed, resisted and undermined wherever it has occurred. In few other occupations,
however, has their entry been more vigorously fought, on legal, organisational, informal and interpersonal levels, than in the military and the police. Opposition is based on numerous grounds that essentially boil down to the introduction of women threatening to devalue the social status of both occupations, disrupting group solidarity and threatening the self identity of many male members which is based around the warrior code, as outlined above. It is thus not surprising that within the military, it has been the Army, as the most combat oriented service, that has been the most resistant to the idea of opening up of combat oriented positions to women. Similarly, it is sworn female officers that experience higher levels of harassment than any other group of police personnel (Boni 2005).

**Social status, warrior culture and male bonding**

Much of the opposition to the entry of women into the military and police, as in other male dominated occupations, stems from a belief that it undermines men’s social prestige and self identity. As Van Creveld (2000:831) points out: ‘when women penetrate male preserves, prestige and income collapse’. Police and military men resist the entry of women into their territory as they feel that this will encourage an emphasis on service work within their professions, which represents a loss of status. The presence of women threatens to undermine the emphasis on strength, danger, violence and crime/war fighting and the masculine self image that accompanies it. The police force has traditionally been an arena to reinforce men’s sense of masculine identity and the inclusion of women upsets this dynamic. Similarly, when war became the activity of large numbers of male citizens they were offered, in exchange for their participation, the privileges and status of warriors. Participating in war confirmed their masculine identity, with women excluded on the basis of their feminine identity. In the words of the Director of Personnel Services when considering women’s entry into the Army: ‘How was the Army going to teach women to shoot without tears?’ (cited in Bourke 1999:338).

If men join the military and police to prove their masculinity, the job loses its usefulness as a proving ground for masculinity if women are also allowed to join. As one United States Sergeant put it, having females perform masculine soldiering roles ‘sort of makes the man feel like – I’m not really the man I thought I was, I’ve got a
female who can do the same job’ (Goldstein 2001). Proposals to create a women’s auxiliary army corps in 1942 provoked the following protest from one United States’ Congressman: ‘Think of the humiliation! What has become of the manhood of America?’ (Goldstein 2001). A United States General testified in 1979 that: ‘No man with gumption wants a woman to fight his nation’s battles’ (cited in Goldstein 2001:283). Similarly, in the police, in order to preserve their manliness, male police officers need females to be in need of their protection (Martin 1980:93).

The greatest opposition to the greater incorporation of women in the military and police, particularly explicit in the military, has been by advocates of the warrior and warrior culture. The desired characteristics of the warrior are masculine and women, by definition, lack these characteristics. Many men relate to themselves and to other men as masculine because of the work role they perform and identify with (Connell 1995). Analyses of soldier identity stress the need for the rejection of feminine traits from the soldier and the promotion of bonds of all-male companionship, for a coherent masculine warrior identity (see, for example, Theweleit 1987).

The exhibition of emotion, for example, in the military and police continues to be frowned upon:

I made a comment about how cold it was when we were standing outside with goose bumps in PT shorts and a t-shirt before sunrise at 0600 for roll call. I was immediately labelled a whinger by one of the [male] cadets (Wednesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

one of the guys cut his finger pulling the Glock apart and started bleeding, he said ‘look, I’m bleeding’ … the Instructor replied, very scathingly: ‘find some materials, build a bridge and get over it’ (Monday, Week 7, AFPC field notes).

However, being able to ‘take it like a man’ is particularly prevalent in military settings:

just before our passing out parade, the third years circulated a photo of a soldier whose body is completely rigid, his nose millimetres short of
colliding with the ground ... this was apparently how you were supposed to fall if you needed to faint while standing rigidly out on parade in the hot sun for hours, rather than going down on one knee ... some of the (male) first years were very impressed (Tuesday, Week 8, ADFA field notes).

A frequent argument by those opposed to women in the military, particularly in combat units, involves that of male bonding. The word for cowardice in Greek literally means 'unmanliness' (Braudy 2003:30). Numerous theorists studying men in combat argue that ultimately what drives men in war is the fear of appearing unmanly, like a coward, in front of other men. Keegan (1978:71) outlines that this explains the importance of the provision of an audience, the wider network of group relationships, in the face of the enemy. Ardant du Picq (1946) referred to it as 'mutual surveillance' and considered it to be the predominant psychological factor on the battlefield. Marshall's studies of the World Wars convinced him that the most important motivator during combat was to avoid looking like cowards to their comrades. As he explained, a soldier values 'his reputation as a man among other men' more than his life (Marshall 1947:71). Charles Bean, explained the Anzac's motivation:

To be the sort of man who would give way when his mates were trusting to his firmness ... to have the rest of his life haunted by the knowledge that he was set his soldier's task and had lacked the grit to carry it through – that was the prospect that those men could not face. Life was very dear, but life was not worth living unless they could be true to the idea of Australian manhood (quoted in Kapferer 1988:123).

An ADFA cadet explained the gendered nature of cadet's motivation to perform:

'you've got your male ego thing, keep doing it until you've got tears running down your face, whereas girls are more sensible and are more like; 'why the hell am I doing this?'; the guys will go 'yes Sergeant!' (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

The presence of women soldiers in a warrior culture supposedly undermines the 'male bonding' necessary to sustain unit cohesion (Youngman 2000:58). This was
apparent at ADFA where some of the male’s ideas on male-bonding seemed to reflect Lionel Tiger’s (1969:85) belief that ‘men tend to draw together in social groups from which women are excluded’:

One Captain explained his philosophy. Among the things he said that spurs you on in battle is looking after your mates. Having women in the military did not fit with this because: ‘you can be friends with women, but not mates with them’ (Monday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Females are seen as disruptive of this male bonding:

‘I fuckin’ love my school ... an all boys school ... I think you work a lot better ... [otherwise] guys are always trying to impress girls ... real boys club type of thing’... [he then goes on to name a whole lot of football coaches that had been to his school with a great deal of pride] (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

That females were disruptive of male bonding was also apparent at AFPC:

recruits were diverted to where they would hang out for the day by the sworn officers supervising us: males were sent out on the road; females were sent to the front office ... told by the guys that went out on the road that there was much joking about us [females] back at the station making cups of tea ... X [one of the male recruits] told me they spent the afternoon driving around the back of Civic pool so they could perve at women sunbaking (Monday, Week 6, AFPC field notes).

Combat, of course, is the ultimate signifier of manliness and women’s entry would symbolically ‘castrate’ the armed forces (Bourke 1999:338). In 2001 Australian Defence Force Chief Chris Barrie, prompted by the recommendations of an internal Department of Defence report, announced that he supported placing women in frontline combat if they met the physical and mental requirements, Major-General Peter Phillips, national president of the Returned Services League of Australia, responded by stating that Australia must be ‘morally bankrupt’ to consider using women in its Defence Force for combat duties, adding that women lack the strength,
endurance and brutality to engage in the dirty business of war, of killing or being killed (Cauchi 2001:2). In the words of General Barrow, Commander of US Marines until 1983:

War is a man’s work. Biological convergence on the battlefield would not only be dissatisfying in terms of what women could do, but it would be an enormous psychological distraction for the male, who wants to think that he’s fighting for that women somewhere behind, not up there in the same foxhole with him. It tramples the male ego. When you get right down to it, you have to protect the manhood of war (quoted in Zalewski and Enloe 1995:291).

General Barrow’s added at a congressional hearing in 1991:

combat is uncivilized and women cannot, do it ... the very nature of women disqualifies them from doing it. Women give life, sustain life, and nurture life; they do not take it (cited in Schjolset 1988:21).

**Masculine resocialisation**

Leadership boils down to three fundamentals: Know your stuff, Be a man, Look after your men (Marine Officer’s Guide, quoted in Timmons 1992:23).

We know how to train young men to be men. We don’t know how to train young women to be men (Public Relations Director for The Citadel, 1994, as cited in Snyder 1999:137).

If women, like men, are intended to assimilate into the subculture of the military and police, they are being asked to share an experience and history that is male centric (Herbert 1993:48). As ADFA and AFPC are masculine institutions, not only are new recruits required to shift their frame of reference from outsider to insider, but females are required to shift their frame of reference from female to male. The most explicit examples of the norm being male can be found at ADFA:
After being warned by an NCO that out in the bush I wouldn’t have time to give my hair the 150 strokes each night like my mother had always taught me, I started to suspect that the culture at the Defence Academy might be as masculine as my preconceptions had led me to believe (excerpt from notes I made for the Department of Defence review team, Week 3, developed from ADFA field notes).

The rifles we trained on were certainly weapons that were delegated as masculine if the training corporal’s comments were anything to go by. He continually got excited when it was clear that one of the females was beating all the males and proceeded to taunt the males with this information. ‘How do you feel, guys? A lady’s beating you.’ ‘Do you feel small knowing the ladies are better than you?’ ‘How do you feel?’ When one of the cadets said, ‘It doesn’t really bother me, Corporal’, he replied ‘Tell you what, it would bother me’ … When I later approached him about why he harped on gender differences so much, he said that it tended to be a very successful tactic after which males’ performance invariably ‘improved by 300 per cent’. He said that he didn’t mean to be sexist and found that females were often better than males with the Steyr, and that ‘it must be (because of) all the housework they do’ (Wednesday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

That ADFA portrays the male soldier, particularly the combat soldier – a position females are officially barred from entering – as an ideal type can be demonstrated through many examples:

In every single example given of officers throughout the Academy, the officer is a he who has to control his men and it doesn’t appear that the use of ‘he’ and ‘man’ is generic … The average soldier we were told walks about 5 km/hr. When one of the females asked if that was the same for males and females, she was told that it would ‘obviously’ be slightly less for females (excerpt from notes made for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3, elaborated from ADFA field notes).
There seems to be a very definite idea of what it takes to make a good leader, such as having balls. Out at Majura [the weapons training site], for example, when one of the female cadets, taking her turn at being 2IC [second in charge], was asking the others to please clear the garbage up, she was promptly told by the corporal, ‘Don’t say please; it shows you’ve got no balls’ (excerpt from notes made for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3, elaborated from ADFA field notes).

That the norm was male was explicitly emphasised during drill:

one of the drill sergeants explained during drill, ‘My pet hate is giggling. In case you hadn’t noticed, girls, this is not a girly institution’. Similarly, one of the sergeants called everyone lads, ‘C’mon lads’ occasionally throwing in pejorative comments such as; ‘you all sound like a bunch of girls’ (Friday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

Reminders that policing is traditionally a masculine occupation are more subtle at AFPC but they are there:

walking down the corridors … old black and white pictures on the wall of previous graduating classes give the place a sense of history … (the police officers in the photos are) without exception, all male, white, clean cut (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

the Sarg [Sergeant] was telling recruits about his second case on the job when he had to break into a house and found a dead grandmother; and gave graphic description of the smell and flys and gore etc … [he] reacted harshly to the resulting groans from the recruits ‘don’t be such princesses, what kind of job do you think you’ve joined?’ (Tuesday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

The established reacting

In The Established and the Outsiders, Elias and Scotson illustrate their study of a small community near Leicester in the middle of the twentieth century. Elias and Scotson (1965:149) explain how the established residents of this estate resisted the
arrival of newcomers because they felt that newcomers were reducing the prestige of their neighbourhood and impairing the pride and satisfaction they gained from this prestige. The very existence of these outsiders is perceived as an attack on the we-image of the established, as they share neither the fund of common memories nor, ostensibly, the same norms of respectability (Elias and Scotson 2008:30).

The established, in a similar way to most established groups feeling threatened including men in the military and police, fought for their superiority, as well as their standards, status and power, using discrimination and prejudice, including gossip and stigmatising beliefs about the newcomers, modelled on observations of its worst section (Elias and Scotson 1965:158). Elias and Scotson (2008:6) point out that one group can effectively stigmatise another only as long as it is well established in positions of power from which the stigmatised group is excluded. As the established group, men in the military and police have a shared history, a relatively strong collective ‘we’ identity, as well as control over flows of communication due to their monopoly of key positions.

The reaction of males to the presence of females at ADFA and AFPC is pronounced. Not only are they able to draw upon the broad cultural assumptions about gender outlined in this chapter, but the deprivation of status and powerlessness that new members in total institutions feel may result in exaggerated processes of in-group and out-group formation. Male prisoners, for example, complain of being ‘treated like a woman’ by being made to be quiet, compliant and obedient (Faith 1994:56). Recruits being inducted into the military often describe it as a process of being deprived of their ‘manhood’ (Shatan 1977:598). In the process of searching for a positive sense of self, persons compare their group with relevant other groups and act to create a favourable distinction between their groups and other groups (Gecas and Burke 1995:46). Processes of in-group and out-group formation tended to form along gendered lines, particularly at ADFA, assisted no doubt because males who enter military settings tend to be more politically conservative and conventional in their attitudes toward the social order compared with their non-military peers (Hanna 1994:62).
Gender harassment – the attempt to push women back into their ‘natural’ roles – is prevalent in male dominated settings such as the military and police and as has been publicised in numerous cases of unacceptable behaviour and regular scandals at military and police academies in most Western countries in recent decades. During the first widespread use of women in the United States, for example, rumours circulated that women in the services were all sluts or lesbians. The rumours were so insidious that Roosevelt ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate their origin, fearing they were the result of enemy propaganda. It was discovered that American servicemen had started the rumours in retaliation to women’s ‘invasion’ of male territory (Timmons 1992:21).

That the dominant culture at ADFA is gendered can be supported through many examples:

Within the first few days of orientation, one of the male cadets emerged as a leader and established around himself an ‘in’ group. A tactic he used and a visible manifestation of this were his use of nicknames. As he showed an acceptance of other individuals in the group he would give them a nickname. When, towards the end of the week, one of his sidekicks attempted to give someone else a nickname, he intervened and said that that person hadn’t yet ‘earned’ one. Part of his popularity with his ‘in’ group stemmed from his performances of overt masculinity, which included continually putting women in their place (excerpt from notes made for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3, elaborated from ADFA field notes).

In the lounge a group of first year males and two first year females was sitting around polishing their boots. One of the males was teaching the other males an ADFA song: ‘We’re the boys from ADFA ... we’ve come to rape your women ...’. The two females in the room were sitting there looking uncomfortable but trying to laugh it off (Tuesday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).
the first real picture of cadet culture was presented to us in the form of a video, titled ‘Earls Back’, featuring the division mascot; ‘Earl of Echo squadron’, and his four male bodyguards. The Earl was dressed as a cliched comic hero, cloak and all, while his 4 protectors were in tuxedos running frantically around pretending to listen to their ear pieces. After leaving the main entrance at ADFA, they are kicked out of Mooseheads (a pub in central Canberra) rolling drunk and a little battered. They then show up at Fyshwick (the red light district of Canberra). The next shot is of the Earl dragging two of the body guards out of the Magistrate’s Court by the ears, shaking his head resignedly. The clip then ends with them strutting around ADFA to Sinatra’s ‘I did it my way’. Many (male) first years are ecstatic after watching the video. As one male put it: ‘this is what we’re here for’ … The next night ‘Earl’ drove up on the back of a truck to where we were all standing to give all the first years a motivational talk. He was flanked by his 4 male bodyguards and two female cadets in tight, revealing dresses who escorted him to his throne and then stood at his side looking awkward and self conscious while he gave his talk (Friday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

One of the ways men ‘manage’ women’s presence in their workplace is to position them within a sexual context, as was evidenced at ADFA:

In a team work exercise, X [one of the male cadets] said to Y [one of the female cadets] in a patronising way; ‘you’ll have to move your feet over for it to work, darlin’’ and when she replied ‘don’t call me darlin’’ he groaned, rolling his eyes at the other guys. He’d then follow her singing songs with lyrics like: ‘if I was a truck and women were holes I’d drive along and dump my load’, in an attempt to put her in her place ... This practice was not restricted to female cadets, it applied equally to authoritative female figures. At dinner one night, for example, a female officer asked for a serviette because: ‘I don’t want any of you to see mousse on my face, it might undermine my credibility with you’. X said, just out of her ear shot: ‘it’s too late for that, babe’ and when Y, another
tag along, asked him what he’d said, Z [another male cadet] interrupted with; ‘he said get down on your knees and bark like a dog, bitch’ (excerpt from notes made for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3, elaborated from ADFA field notes).

While the culture at AFPC was far less obviously gendered, gender was occasionally prominent:

‘Out at the station, five males and one female were standing around and one of the guys said: ‘Oh, why don’t you make us a cup of tea love?’’ (Male recruit, mid thirties, relaying a tale from ‘observer’ week, AFPC interview).

‘They were heckling X [one of the female recruits] in front of her, just sort of mucking around and talking about washing dishes and stuff’ (Female recruit, mid twenties, AFPC interview).

I played chess with a male recruit to pass time; there was not much happening and comms [communications] staff kept insisting that this wasn’t the norm. When I won, one of the male operators: ‘don’t tell me you were beaten by a girl, mate’ and kept telling X that he’d never live that down (Thursday, Week 6, out at the AFP communications centre, AFPC field notes).

Females in both institutions were continuously reminded by their colleagues that they were female:

one of the first year males pointed out poking one of the female’s chest: ‘the cam top is actually supposed to sit flat here’ (Tuesday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

‘the instructors comment on wearing high heels and stuff like that and ask me if I’ve got room for my makeup pouch in my utility belt and stuff like that’ (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).
out at Majura, (the corporal) asked if anyone minded his swearing because he didn’t want to offend anyone. Everyone said they didn’t mind except one of the male cadets who explained that he didn’t like swearing. The corporal went ahead and swore anyway, but every time he did, he’d turn and apologise to the females (Sunday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

during morning break one of the male recruits was saying: ‘it’s so boring, such a wank ... sorry, I can’t say that in the presence of ladies’ (Wednesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

Female cadets at ADFA failing to ‘do’ gender appropriately were often criticised by male cadets:

a comment made by a male first year, after getting told off by one of the female third years: ‘She needs a good root’ (Tuesday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

[first year male cadet talking about two female third years]; ‘I think they’re trying to prove there should be women in the military ... ‘look, we can handle the toughness’... [they’re] trying to be men ... women should be women’ ... when they go; ‘Do I look like a man to you?’ [in response to one of the first years getting their name mixed up with one of the male third years] ... I almost go ‘yeah’” (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

Cadets and recruits at ADFA and AFPC used a phenomenon Kanter (1980:468) calls ‘boundary heightening’; an exaggeration of the male bond to emphasise to women that they are outsiders. As Elias (1986:282) explains, some men responded to the increase of power of women relative to men that accompanied the civilising process by establishing male only enclaves such as rugby clubs. In these arenas men could symbolically mock, objectify and vilify women who now, more than ever before, represented a threat to their status and self-image. One of the arenas used to exaggerate the male bond and emphasise to women that they were outsider at both ADFA and AFPC was the game of rugby:
Another domain which seemed to become a site for displaying purely masculine behaviour without any ‘chicks’ around to interrupt male bonding was football. From the beginning it was delegated as a ‘male’ arena. Most of the males were asked at some stage or other which football they played or supported, and many sat around comparing footy scars. As one of the (male) first year cadets explained, the exclusion was justified: ‘There’s nothing worse than a bunch of femmos running around a football field trying to be men’ (excerpt from notes made for the Department of Defence Review team, Week 3, elaborated from ADFA field notes).

This afternoon we went to the park to play touch (football) … only a few females played, most of them after having expressed their desire to play any sport but football and being ignored/overruled, sat on the sidelines … it didn’t take long for it to turn into a competitive game of tackle between the boys … the hierarchy stood by a bit apprehensive about how rough it was getting but obviously proud of ‘boys being boys’ … one guy got elbowed in the face and cracked his front teeth (Friday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

It is the physicality central to the game of rugby which helps cultivate perceptions of violent behaviour as peculiarly masculine, the subject of the next section.

**The established, the outsiders and physical differences**

In the police, as in the military, there has traditionally been an assumption that being physically strong was a pre-requisite for policing and the emphasis in training was subsequently focused on fitness and developing upper body strength (Jiggins 2004:77). That physicality is seen as an important aspect in the military and police can be seen in recruit and cadets motivations for joining ADFA and AFPC:

‘I wanted to get here and become physically challenged’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).
‘I’ve always been an outdoorsy sort of person and I thought in terms of a career this stuff would kick arse compared to sitting at a desk all day’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I like more of a physical challenge’ (Male recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

‘I enjoy physical activity’ (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

The importance placed on physicality can also be seen in the disappointment by cadets and recruits when expectations around physical development are not met:

‘I expected to come here and be doing PT [physical training] for six hours everyday, running 2000 km and doing push ups off the roof … then I got here and have done very little PT … I wasn’t expecting to spend the whole day in lecture rooms … disappointing’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I want to get here and become very physically challenged and really develop myself physically, but we haven’t done much of that at all’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘It seems to me that a lot of the teaching is focused on not hurting the bad guy. If someone’s going to hurt me I want to know how to defend myself. I don’t feel we’ve been given enough defence tactics’ (Male recruit, late twenties, AFPC interview).

‘In the end your life and your partner’s life could be in danger and if we don’t have the physical training, we could be in trouble’ (Male recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

At ADFA, particularly, there was a continual focus on physicality:

we were given a talk during the first weeks of Accas (Academic year). The ACC [Academy Cadet Captain] and the ASM [Academy Sergeant
Major] stood on the ‘power box’ and addressed the whole corps ... during the talk the third year males behind me made constant comments on their physical size ... about the ACC: ‘He only got the job because he’s so big’... about the ASM: ‘I’m bigger than him for sure’ (Thursday, Week 7, ADFA field notes).

one of the male third year cadets commented to a fellow cadet that they didn’t have to take any notice of their female SUO [Section Under Officer] any longer: ‘cause I saw her getting hammered at PT the other day. She couldn’t do push ups for shit’ (Tuesday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Similar to ADFA, there seemed to be an admiration of upper body strength at AFPC:

I sat with the guys [male recruits] at brekkie ... they were talking about some ‘big unit’ at the gym admiringly: ‘his pecks were sticking out the sides of his top!’ (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

As true masculinity is typically conceived of as proceeding ‘naturally’ from men’s bodies, many arguments against women in the military and police tend to centre around physical differences between men and women. Van Creveld (2000:832) for example, describes in detail the female morphological characteristics that make them ill-adapted to violence, including: thinner skulls, lighter bone ridges, weaker jaw bones, as well as, ‘large, pendulous breasts that impede movement and require special attention’. However, it is the need for physical strength and women’s lack of it that is probably the most commonly cited reason for women’s disadvantage in the military and police. General Lewis Hershey, a former Selective Service Director, captures this sentiment:

There is no question but that women could do a lot of things in the military services. So could men in wheelchairs. But you couldn’t expect the services to want a whole company of people in wheelchairs (cited in Willaims 1989:45).
Similarly, the New South Wales Police Commissioner John Avery (1981:81) argued that women were neither aggressive nor muscular enough to be ‘effective or ... helpful in various areas of police work’. It was physical strength that was cited for the reason two females were not allowed to go out on patrol together at AFPC:

‘they don’t let two females go out together because of OH&S [Occupational Health and Safety] reasons’ ... [me: what OH&S reasons?] ... ‘maybe I should have said safety reasons; males are stronger’ (Thursday, Week 6, conversation with a sworn female police officer during ‘observer’ week, AFPC field notes).

The alleged physical inferiority of females fuels resentment among males who believe that attempts by females to claim equality resulted in favourable treatment for women who are unable to meet the same standards as males:

‘females are physically smaller etcetera, they’re going to be doing the same jobs and I don’t think its fair in such a professional organisation – or what should be a professional organisation. You can’t make allowances for things like that cause everybody has to do the same job. I mean failure shouldn’t be tolerated in something as important as defending the country’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

The production of ‘women’ and ‘men’ as separate and unequal categories operates by converting average differences into absolute differences, particularly physical differences, and is a practice that is particularly widespread and explicit within military and police institutions. In this way men, the established, were able to stigmatise women, the newcomers, by basing their own group charisma on the best minority of their own group, and disgrace the outsiders using the worst minority of their group.

Females are reminded, sometimes in fairly explicit ways, as at ADFA, that they are physically ‘inferior’:

the favourite pastime of one of the bigger male first years was picking up one of the smaller females with one hand under her jaw bone and dangling
her, asking her: ‘how does it feel being completely helpless?’ (Friday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

Comparisons between men and women would continually be on the basis of the minority ‘best’ males and the minority ‘worst’ females:

X [one of the male recruits] was talking about one of the smaller females:
‘I’m looking forward to watching her trying to tackle a 6 foot Maori guy’
(Tuesday, week 3, AFPC field notes).

When females did not emulate the male norm, this was portrayed as typical:

the whole squadron visited supply for a uniform issue ... marching back up the hill, carrying very heavy plastic bags, one of the girls dropped hers ... one of the guys yelled out at the next rest break ‘every male, help a female with her bag’ ... [this] created much resentment from some of the females and much embarrassment from the males who were barely coping themselves (Tuesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

However, when females did meet the male standard, they were regarded as exceptional individuals:

During rifle training on the F88 Steyr, cadets’ body movements were broken down into a series of movements to get one norm, even to facial expressions. The aim was a very masculine, aggressive stance. The corporal was overjoyed when a female ‘got it’ and needed to show her off to everybody (Tuesday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Just as in Elias and Scotson’s case study a good deal of what villagers habitually said about estate families was vastly exaggerated or untrue, a good deal of the claims about women by men in the military and police are untrue or grossly exaggerated. To gain a true sense of the power dynamics at play it is useful to outline why these misrepresentations often go unchallenged. Elias and Scotson (2008:233) describe how because the villagers were more united than the estate people, their unity lent strength and veracity to their statements about the estate people however out of tune they were in relation to the facts. The estate people were unable to effectively
retaliate because they lacked the power to do so. As well as the organisational aspects affecting the power differential noted earlier, villagers’ own conscience was on the side of the detractors. Even if none of the various reproaches about them as a group could be applied to themselves personally, they knew that they did apply to some of their neighbours. As Elias and Scotson (1965:159) argue, established groups often induce outsiders to accept the image of themselves that has been modelled on the ‘minority of the worst’ and the image of the established that is modelled on a ‘minority of the best’. As a result, the established are often able to impose on newcomers the belief that they are inferior to them by ‘nature’. As they explain, newcomers, after a while, accepted with a kind of puzzled resignation that they belonged to a group of lesser virtue and respectability, which in terms of their actual conduct was found to be justified only in the case of a small minority (Elias and Scotson 2008:2).

The internalisation by outsiders of the disparaging belief of the established as part of their own consciousness and self image, in turn, powerfully reinforces the rule and sense of superiority of the established group. The dichotomous ideology about men and women’s differing physiques and its relevance in the military and police seems to be accepted by females in the military and police. In conducting research at the Australian Federal Police, for example, Niland (1996:3) found that both men and women agreed there were disadvantages in hiring women because of women’s physical ‘limitations’. Similarly, it is not unusual for women in the military to doubt women’s ability to serve in combat roles (Elshtain 2000). That this was the case at ADFA and AFPC can be illustrated with the following field notes:

‘because I’m smaller that puts me at a big disadvantage [in police work generally]’ (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

‘what are you going to do if you’re with X [names the smallest female recruit], she’d have to stand back, but if Y [names the largest male recruit] was there, you’d feel more safe and secure. If your heart’s racing and there’s fairly big guy in front of you, you’re going to be more comfortable if Y is there (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).
[explaining why women shouldn’t be in combat:] ‘I would hate to be a woman in the field and place any of my male mates at risk because I wasn’t as good physically ... and just didn’t have what it takes’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

talking to one of the first year female army cadets about women being excluded from combat. She explained that while she didn’t like it she understood the practicalities as: ‘females are never going to be up to the same standard as males ... they are never going to be as good as males in the physical strength area’ ... I found this strange as she was easily bigger, stronger and fitter than many, if not most, of the male cadets (Tuesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

Female military personnel that obviously did meet the required standard seemed to internalise the established ideology in perceiving themselves as exceptions and not like ‘typical women’:

the female drillie [drill instructor] explained how difficult her job was for females: ‘you’ve got to be hard. Women just don’t like doing that and being hard and yelling at people’ (Wednesday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

There is a price to pay for the reward of participating in the established group and sharing in its unique group charisma and that price is submitting to group specific norms. That is, individuals must subject themselves to specifically proscribed patterns of affect control (Elias and Scotson 2008:245). As Elias and Scotson (1965:151) point out, if a black sheep occurs among the established group, families are expected to disapprove of them and perhaps cast them out. When males at ADFA and AFPC failed to reach the expected standard, they were judged as individual failures at the level of masculinity and informed as such, often using gendered connotations:

I asked why one of the third year cadets was so unpopular with the others, apparently it was because: ‘He’s such a little pansy’ (Tuesday, Week 8, ADFA field notes).
They [sworn police officers] were choosing recruits to go out on the road with them and once again chose the male recruits, leaving the female recruits to sit at the front desk ... one of the male recruits graciously offered to stay behind to give one of the females a chance to go out on the road ... [he] was asked [by on the sworn male police officers] ‘you want to be switch bitch, do you?’ (Wednesday, Week 6, AFPC field notes).

‘I don’t think I’m going to fit in terribly well. I’m not the sort of person who’s going to join in the rugby etcetera. I’m dead against rugby and AFL and contact sports. I mean where it’s within the rules of the game that you’re going to knock someone down and I mean with AFL they don’t even stop the game half the time when someone’s injured ... they [two first year male recruits] twisted my name to sound like [a part of the female anatomy] and then spent all night calling it out and laughing hysterically’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

As a result, males often monitor their behaviour accordingly:

[talking to a male first year about why he joined the Army:] ‘When I first told my friends about it, I was thinking of joining the Navy, they sort of went ‘Navy faggot’, you know, the stereotype of Navy in tight pants ... I joined the Army’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

**Newcomers’ motivation for joining**

Given the apparent strength the motivation of aspiring to a warrior ethic still holds for many males, an interesting question is whether this motivation holds any appeal for women joining the military and police. I would argue that for some it does. As well as a revival of the new male warrior, the post-Vietnam era has also seen an ascendancy of a female warrior hero in popular culture. The female warrior has been propagated on both small and large screen, including the television series such as *Buffy The Vampire Slayer* and *Xena Warrior Princess* and movies such as the *Alien* series, *GI Jane* and *Courage Under Fire*. Jeffords and Gibson have both questioned the extent to which arming women has changed the power dynamic represented by the hyper masculinity of warriors such as *Rambo* and conclude that the female warrior does not
disrupt the potency of masculine warrior identity but rather mimics it. The appeal of the warrior ethic for women in policing can be seen in a recruitment advertisement for the Hertfordshire constabulary in a United Kingdom’s women’s magazine which invites women to ‘find out if you’re a wobbler or a warrior’ by taking a quiz to find out if they have what it takes to be a police officer (SHE 2002).

In an analysis of police women, Martin (1988) divides police women into policewomen and policewomen, the former emphasising their identity as women and the latter emphasising their identity as police officers. The defeminised woman seeks to overcome barriers to being treated as a peer by doing more than is expected of men and of other women. In a policing setting they do so by ‘seeking to be more professional, aggressive, loyal, street-oriented, and macho than the men’ (Doran and Chan 2003:283). On the other hand, policewomen tend to be more accommodating to pressures to behave according to sex role norms and act as a junior partner, embracing more of a service-oriented approach to police work (Martin 1988). This continuum of behaviour by women was apparent at ADFA and AFPC, with examples of those emphasising their femininity as follows:

Two of the females didn’t take offence to his [one of the male first years] attitude and when he did things like hand them empty cups or dirty dishes he’d finished with, with a ‘thanks sweetie’, they’d respond by giggling and often clean up after him (Thursday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

I asked one of the females what she thought about being graded out of 10 by the males [male first years who had graded all the females on appearance:] ‘I don’t mind, I got an 8 [self conscious giggle] ... they’re just kidding around’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

[male sworn police officer] said to [the female sworn police officer] who was wearing bright pink nail varnish: ‘I like your nail polish, it’s a good feminine touch’. [The female police officer] started bitching about not being allowed to wear pink matching lipstick ... [the male officer] explained to me approvingly that: ‘they’re [female officers] not really supposed to [wear coloured nail polish] but she thinks it’s important to
convey some femininity on the job’ (Wednesday, Week 6, during ‘observer’ week with Civic Police Station, AFPC field notes).

I would argue that the warrior image held appeal for those female cadets and recruits that emphasised their military and policing identities and played down their gender identities:

being shown defensive tactics ... instructor: ‘see this is how you do it and if they start to struggle, you grab their thumbs and push them down like this’; X [female recruit], sitting next to me said: ‘oh, this is the cool stuff, this is what I want to be able to do’ (Thursday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

one of the options cadets had to choose from for their adventure training was ‘survival’ where first years go out to the desert for about seven days and kill, cook and eat whatever they can get their hands on, including goats, emu eggs, snakes etc. Two cadets that had done it the previous year got up to convince the more dubious cadets of its good side. The male talked about how they could brag to all their friends who had done nothing but drink a lot of booze for 7 days: ‘they’ll turn around and think you’re a real he man’. The female cadet’s sales pitch was similar: ‘you’ll get the jealous response; ‘wow, you must be soooo tough’ (Thursday, Week 6, ADFA field notes).

‘if girls want to be here they’ve got to get tough’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘Masculine? Yeah, the AFP is definitely masculine but I’ve always worked in male dominant organisations. It’s very much focused on strength stuff and fitness stuff ... I could beat half the guys here in a fight (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

a female police officer was telling me about a patrol that her and another female were on. I expressed surprise that two females were on patrol together and she said (with much pride): ‘my old OIC was always
Conclusion

Official Australian World War I historian Charles Bean was able to resolve his qualms about the Australian digger's lack of discipline by explaining that there were no problems as long as the officer was the right type: 'a man in every sense of the word' (White 1981:132). That the prospect of achieving masculinity is a motivational factor in joining the military and the police can be seen particularly explicitly in the narratives of ADFA cadets. As Luttwak, a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies explains: 'demasculinize an Army and of course rape will stop; But is that what we want? Men who have that inadequacy join the armed forces. If you take away that motivation, you're in trouble' (cited in Youngman 2000:40). As this chapter has demonstrated, including through describing the vehement opposition to the incorporation of women in the military and police, the warrior role still holds enormous appeal.

Part of the reason men in the military and police resist the entry of women is the notion that this will undermine the masculine self image that accompanies this work. A further concern is that the increasing access of women to these institutions will serve to encourage an emphasis on service work within these professions which, with respect to the warrior ethic, represents a loss of status. The attachment of the military and police to an ideology of crime/war fighting is developed in the next chapter, the focus of which is the motivational role played in the military and police by concepts of professionalism.
Chapter Seven: Professionalising Violence

Professions, stripped of their gear and apparel, are specialized social functions which people perform in response to specialized needs of others; they are, at least in their fully developed form, institutionalized sets of human relationships (Elias 1950:291).

One of the characteristic features of the occupational structure in contemporary society is a tendency towards professionalisation. The concept of professionalism is increasingly used in a wide variety of occupational and institutional contexts, including the military and police. The most widely accepted sociological description of a profession is that it is a self-regulating community that has the power, usually backed up by the state, to train and admit new members, practice its specialty according to its own standards, have a code of ethics, and claim its work is in the service of humanity (Collins 1979:132). Professionalism, described as the ‘third logic’ for organising and controlling work, after the market and bureaucracy, values specialised knowledge and quality service (Freidson 2001). Weber saw processes of professionalisation, along with processes of bureaucratisation, as expressions of the increasing rationalisation of Western civilisation. It is the social origins of the development of contemporary ‘professional’ military and police forces and subsequent perceptions cadets and recruits have of these organisations, as well as the impact they perceive joining such organisations will have on them, that this chapter explores.

A profession is more than a group performing special skills that have been acquired through training. Professional groups develop a sense of organisational identity that
contributes to their members’ self conceptions. The successful re-socialisation of ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits involves them taking on the self images considered appropriate for military and police personnel and committing to these organisations. Kanter (1972) outlines six commitment processes that are commonly used to build commitment in communal groups. These commitment processes – sacrifice, investment, renunciation, communion, mortification and finally transcendence, whereby the individual surrenders to the group’s higher meaning – are illustrated in relation to processes evident at ADFA and AFPC. The motivations ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits have for committing to institutions like the military and police are related to these processes and include: the security provided, the unique lifestyle involved and the desirable identity provided by such institutions.

As the routine, systematic body of knowledge professions profess to specialise in can undermine the privileges of a group by laying the basis for de-skilling through the fragmentation of tasks within the division of labour, professions tend to be characterised by an opposition between technical and routine knowledge, and an ideology or mystique surrounding their profession (Turner 1987:138,155). As is outlined in the final section of this chapter, attempts to emphasise the role of peacekeeping in the military and police are often packaged as a move towards ‘professionalisation’ and are actively resisted in the military and police as they threaten the warrior mystique that surrounds these professions. To the extent that expected changes in the role from an emphasis on physical aggressiveness to instrumental rationality, changes associated with the civilising process, have threatened to de-heroicise the role of military and police officers, they have been strongly resisted.

**The origins of military and police professions**

*Military professionalisation*

As outlined earlier in this thesis, up until the nineteenth century there was little possibility of introducing an effective program of professional socialisation to the officer class. Officers were recruited primarily from the rural gentry or lesser aristocracy, considered gentlemen first and officers second and took long periods of leave to enable them to fulfil the social obligations of their class (Harries-Jenkins
1980:684). After obtaining their commissions, officers did not take part in any kind of training, but reported directly to their regiments (Harries-Jenkins 1975:477). Not only were officers considered gentlemen first and officers second, but any learning in terms of the technical aspects of the military was a risk to their status as gentlemen. In his study of the seventeenth century British Navy, for example, Elias (1950:294) explained that ‘one of the gravest practical problems confronting the Navy was that of overcoming the ethical difficulties associated with requiring gentlemen officers to acquire some mastery of the art of sailing and navigating ships’. Technical limitations imposed by respecting the ethos of the gentleman were regularly part of governmental calculation in terms of military policy. In the early twentieth century, for example, after a fifty-year campaign to integrate the engineers and executive officers, the First Lord of the Admiralty noted, in the face of the paradox of executive officers who lacked technical knowledge and engineer officers who lacked ‘character’, that: ‘if I had to choose I would rather retain the [Navy as a] school for character, than run the risk of losing it by unwise attempts to improve the Navy as a machine for acquiring knowledge’ (cited in Smith 1998:78).

The armed forces themselves sought to delay or reject the demands made on them by technological developments within their own society and strongly resisted professional innovation, consistently emphasising the need for military leaders to be, above all, officers and gentlemen. The subsequent lack of specialists, when the technology and logistics of war became more complex, quickly revealed deficiencies, particularly during the Crimean and Boer Wars. It was these defeats that stimulated external demands for improved military professionalism and, by the end of the nineteenth century in a process of forced professionalisation imposed by the state, the abolition of the purchase system for commissions and the establishment of training schools (Dietz 1975:160). Members of the officers corps slowly became incorporated into the bureaucracy.

A professional military, as opposed to the existence of a small number of military professionals, is a recent phenomenon in Australia, dating from the Second World War. Military history in Australia is, for the most part, dominated by citizen-soldiering, part time military activity that began in colonial Australia as a community
initiative. Citizens trained in their spare time ‘for hearths and homes’, as the motto of one of their units described their purpose (Wilcox 1998:xii). However, patronage gradually shifted from communities and private individuals to government and paid experts. As Clausewitz outlined early in the nineteenth century, in an age of increasing technological complexity, only professional soldiers could master the intricate tasks of modern warfare. It was the threat from the Japanese in 1942 during the Second World War that led Australians to accept the need for a professional military establishment. In 1947, the Minister for Defence in the Chifley government, Mr Dedman, announced the establishment of a regular Army (Encel 1970:444).

In the early 1970s, the Kerr-Woodwood committee recognised that male officers constituted a ‘profession of arms’ and their salaries should therefore be ‘kept in harmony with the salaries of Commonwealth Public Service professional groups’. This extension of professional status to officers in Australia was of considerable significance both materially and in terms of standing in the community (Beddie 1979:422).

The concept of professionalism is increasingly used in a military context to describe the motivation of military personnel. For example, in attempts to transform the identity and allegiance of military personnel from the nation state to international forms of authority, such as the United Nations, appeals are made to professionalism, rather than nationalism. Further, women in the military are portrayed to be ‘doing a job’ as professionals. In the Gulf War in the early 1990s, for example, even women reservists and enlisted women, many of whom were not professionals in the sense of intending a military career, were portrayed as ‘professionals’ (Enloe 1993:99).

**Police professionalisation**

Policing has traditionally been regarded as a vocation, a ‘craft’ relying on militaristic principles where skills are learned ‘on-the-job’. In the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, police recruits were poorly paid, came predominantly from a working-class background and were mostly males with large physiques and a basic education (Enders 2001:201). Police work was often chosen as an alternative to semiskilled labour by people content with an occupation that was thought to consist of simply obeying orders (Bittner 1990:6). Traditional preparation for policing relied
upon entry into a short training regime in police academies at a young age, where physical skills and rote learning of the law were emphasised. Recruitment, training and disciplinary processes were conducted internally, with little regard to merit or aptitude (Fleming and Lafferty 2000).

For much of the nineteenth century there was a high turnover rate among police officers. This was, at least partly, because of the rate at which constables were dismissed, mainly for disciplinary offences related to drink. It was mainly intemperance that led to the dismissal of half of the London constabulary within two years of its formation (Sturma 1987:20). Similarly, in Australia in 1854 over one-quarter of Sydney’s constabulary was dismissed for drunkenness (Sturma 1987:20). The high turnover was also because police work tended not to be considered as anything more than a job, and one which was not particularly attractive at times when other jobs could be found because of the relatively low pay, the military discipline, the detailed intervention in an officer’s entire life and the exhausting demands of beat work. In nineteenth century Port Phillip, constables wages of 2s 3d a day compared unfavourably to clerks wages of 5s a day and customs officers wages of 11s a day (Haldane 1986:10). Economic boom times made it increasingly difficult to retain police. Clyne (1987:107), for example, notes the problems the attraction of the Victorian goldfields in 1851 caused for the South Australian police.

While the earliest recruitment of police in Australia was relatively informal and included the recruitment of escaped convicts (Clyne 1987:23), by the late nineteenth century, entry into the police was controlled by scrutiny of the capacities of applicants. The Desborough Committee, formed in 1919 by the British Government to look into all aspects of police organisation, made recommendations seeking to standardise many aspects of police organisation, including pay and conditions, and started to see policing as a career (Rawlings 2002:185). By 1975 in Britain, it was noted that:

I suppose you could sum it all up by saying that in Britain certainly, and I have no doubt elsewhere, the time has come when the police are abandoning their artisan status and are achieving, by our ever-increasing variety of services, our integrity, our accountability and our dedication
to the public good, a status no less admirable than that of the most learned and distinguished professions (Holdaway 1983:161).

In more recent decades, there has been a conscious drive to transform the traditional blue-collar environment of policing by attempting to elevate the occupation to a profession. As noted in the AFP’s (AFP 1997/98:5) Annual Report, for example, ‘A decade of continuous change has brought the AFP from a blue-collar environment to one appropriate to a professionally-oriented law enforcement organisation’.

Moves to professionalise the police include: enhanced training and education, promotion by merit rather than seniority, the ongoing development of a specialised body of policing knowledge, the development of evidence based decision making and policy formulation and the recognition of national core policing competencies (Enders 2001:24). However, police professionalisation has predominantly been achieved through increased training and certification of the workers, a process Collins (1979) calls ‘credentialism’. Crime studies and policy studies, for example, proliferated in the early 1990s and several Australian universities now offer a full degree in police studies. However, the police have not yet reached the level of integrated relationship of the Australian military with universities (Mahony and Prenzler 1996:291), a level of integration epitomised at ADFA.

The numerous scandals that have threatened to undermine police legitimacy in recent decades have intensified efforts by police forces to engage in promotionalism, which includes using the term professionalism to promote their power and authority. According to Manning (1977:127), the police use the term professionalism as their most important ‘presentation strategy’ in order to ‘defend their mandate and thereby ... build self-esteem, organizational autonomy, and occupational solidarity or cohesiveness’. The enlisting of professional image makers attests to the importance the police place on seeking to manage their image and securing public consent (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:47). Since 1990, the AFP have conducted regular half-yearly surveys of public perceptions of, and attitudes to, crime and contacts with police with the objective of improving public relations (Boni 1995:25). The majority of police forces now have proactive media and public relations departments run by journalists and marketing specialists (Loader 1999:379).
That the importance of the AFP’s ‘professional’ image was evident at AFPC, can be seen in the following field note excerpts:

‘the issue of professional image is very important to us’ (Tuesday, Week 1, statement by an instructor in the context of discussions about police conduct, AFPC field notes).

The AFP uniform policy states that: ‘The AFP’s corporate standards and community expectations require that employees maintain high standards of grooming and personal appearance’ and specifies that: ‘AFP appointees shall dress in a manner which is suitable to their duties with consideration given to professionalism’ … On one of the numerous occasions we were being warned about appropriate dress, we were told ‘jeans and stubbies just don’t cut it; we are a professional organisation’ (Friday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

**Processes of commitment**

The military and police use socialisation processes, both formal and informal, to (re)structure the outlook of new members. Successful socialisation involves individuals taking on self-images that are considered appropriate for military and police personnel and committing to these organisations. As New Haven Police Chief Ahern (1972:3) pointed out with regard to police recruits: a recruit after joining the police begins renegotiating his sense of self-identity through interaction with others, so that eventually ‘he leaves society behind to enter a profession that does more than give him a job, it defines who he is’.

As Kanter (1972:71) argues, to some extent a person’s identity is composed of their commitments as commitment is the identification of the self with a group which is essential for self-realisation. A person is committed to a relationship or to a group to the extent that they see it as expressing or fulfilling some fundamental part of themselves. The investment of the self in communities, such as those found in military and police organisations, includes an acceptance of their authority and a willingness to support their values and is dependent in part on the extent to which these organisations can offer new members identity and personal meaning. As Kanter
outlines, the commitment processes of sacrifice, investment, renunciation, communion, mortification and transcendence are commonly used to build commitment in communal groups. The next section will outline the impact on cadets and recruits of the processes of commitment evident at ADFA and AFPC, using Kanter’s six commitment processes.

**Sacrifice and investment**

As Kanter (1972:76) outlines, sacrifice is important to building commitment as not only do things become more ‘valuable’ the more they ‘cost’, but because groups bond together in adversity. Processes of investment then work to enhance commitment building by providing individuals with a stake in the fate of their community.

The sacrifices made by cadets and recruits include having to move out of their homes into an unfamiliar environment and giving up certain luxuries, including a certain amount of autonomy as has been outlined earlier in the thesis. The military and police provide a complete style of life and career service members have a tendency to develop powerful emotional attachments, something Larson (1977) has called ‘radical professionalism’, where they consider themselves in uniform twenty-four hours a day. As we were told at AFPC:

> 'Remember, by joining the AFP you’ve chosen a lifestyle not a job'

(Wednesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Military service is particularly unique in terms of its members’ commitment to unlimited service, extending to the risk of life itself. As well as liability for 24 hour service availability and subjection to military discipline, military service includes extended tours, a fixed term of enlistment and the inability to resign, strike, or negotiate over working conditions (Moskos 1977:42). While obviously more extreme at ADFA, the expectation of the sacrifice of autonomy was also continually reinforced at AFPC:

one of the recruits was asking if he could go home between his shifts in Tuggeranong during ‘observer’ week rather than come back to college as
he lived in Tuggeranong. He was promptly told: ‘this is your home’ (Monday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

some of the recruits were talking about which station they would prefer to be posted to; they were quickly informed [by the Sergeant] that ‘the Commissioner has absolute power to decide where you work; you can jump up and down as much as you like; it’s our choice ... the bottom line is you are a number just like me’ (Friday, Week 5, AFPC field notes).

Recruits were asked to sign a forms and one of them asked ‘what am I signing?'; the response [by the instructor] was: ‘Just bloody sign it’ (AFPC field notes).

The security provided by these ‘greedy’ institutions, the pay off for the sacrifice and investment members of these institutions undertake, is part of the attraction for cadets and recruits. A Senate Committee in 2001, for example, found that the offer of secure employment was one of the most important reasons for enlistment in the military (Report October 2001:7). Cadets at ADFA included security as a reason when explaining why they joined:

‘great security’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘it’s really important to me that I have a stable career’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘... and you’re also guaranteed a job’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

Similarly, AFPC recruits included security when explaining their reasons for joining the police:

‘good opportunities, good career, stable’ (Male recruit, late twenties, AFPC interview).

‘I wanted to work for a government entity with benefits such as training and pay’ (Female recruit, mid twenties, AFPC interview).
‘Job security and all that sort of stuff sort of came into it’ (Female recruit, mid twenties, AFPC interview).

‘There’s a good wage and good conditions, a stable career’ (Male recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview).

The unique lifestyle provided by the military and police also held a strong attraction for cadets and recruits:

‘I get really bored if I’m in the same place for long’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘just kind of the general way of life, I guess’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I just enjoy the way of life of the Navy … it’s a way of life, I guess you’d say. Like, its a whole different cultural difference’ (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I know what the military life is like to a degree and I prefer it a lot more better than civilian life, it’s more of a challenge’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘love the whole lifestyle in general’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘I spent my whole junior life moving around the place as a son of an officer, basically it’s just something I’ve grown up with. I can’t think of any other job, wouldn’t want to do that, it’s really boring, whereas the Army you’ve always got an opportunity, you’re always moving around and it’s a really good lifestyle’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

‘Just the thought of not being tied to the desk all the time, unpredictable about what you’re going to do and it’s pretty exciting the whole lifestyle’ (Female recruit, mid thirties, AFPC interview).
‘Imagine getting up everyday and not knowing what you’re going to do. I mean in the first five minutes there could be a major incident ... just the whole lifestyle of the police is attractive’ (Male recruit, mid thirties, AFPC interview).

**Renunciation and communion**

Renunciation involves giving up competing relationships outside the community. As mentioned above, one of the major sacrifices by cadets and recruits involved moving away from home, a major step in minimising competing external relationships. At ADFA, not only were cadets removed from their families, they were provided with alternative military ‘families’:

> interestingly, as well as controlling every movement of the cadets for the first 6 weeks, a military foster family living in Canberra was also on offer and strongly encouraged for the duration of the cadet’s stay at the Academy ... the cadets dressed up, excited about meeting their new families ... on the way back there was some bragging about the rank of their ‘new family’ (Friday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Similarly to the military, the police officer’s friendships and socialising centre around other police officers (Martin 1980:82). Talk of the ‘police family’ is not uncommon, as outlined on the Western Australian police website:

> ‘All officers and their families know that policing can sometimes be a dangerous job but when a life is taken, the ‘police family’ pulls together to support and care for one another’ (Police n.d.).

At the AFPC, the impact of renunciating past identities was evident:

> ‘I feel like I’m living a double life. I can’t invite my partner out when we go for drinks because it feels too surreal. I feel like when I go home, I feel like, I’ve got to go back, I’ve got to go back ‘home’ to College’ (Tuesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).
‘I’ve started calling the College ‘home’. I have to be careful in front of the kids not to say ‘home’’ (Sunday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

‘I can’t believe how many police officers don’t seem to have social life outside the police, they rely on the police as friends and family’ (Male recruit, mid twenties, AFPC interview).

[Sergeant:] ‘I’m very proud to call the AFP my home’ (Monday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

As well as renouncing external relationships, as outlined in detail in Chapter Four, renunciation of certain mannerisms was enforced, particularly at ADFA:

the Sergeant was continually making a point about hands on hips, hands in pockets and folded arms, anything in fact that was comfortable. He absolutely boomed: ‘lose those bad civilian habits’, and continually made examples of cadets to drum home the point (Thursday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

‘lose those nasty civilian habits’ was constantly barked at us by the drillies [drill Sergeants] (Friday, Week 5, ADFA field notes).

A considerable amount of research indicates that the primary factor that motivates soldiers to be prepared to kill and die in combat is a powerful sense of accountability to their comrades on the battlefield. Gabriel, for example, notes that ‘in military writings on unit cohesion, one consistently finds the assertion that the bonds combat soldiers form with one another are stronger than the bonds most men have with their wives’ (Gabriel 1987). It is no accident that the military deliberately fosters collective identity amongst its recruits. For similar reasons, the police have historically drawn upon military models of collective identity. Facilitators of communion evident at ADFA and AFPC include communal dwelling and dining halls, collective participation in group rituals, and constantly reinforced processes of in group and out group formation.

Communion firstly involves bringing members into meaningful contact with the collective whole, so that they experience the fact of oneness with the group and
develop a ‘we-feeling’. As Kanter (1972:93) outlines, communion is accomplished by ‘regularising arrangements and activities that bring the individual into continual contact with the group as a whole’. The relatively small amount of time left for being alone at ADFA and AFPC enhanced a feeling of oneness with the group. The institutional completeness of ADFA and AFPC, including communal dwellings and dining halls assisted with group contact, as did group tasks and the constant presumption and reinforcement of group efforts.

As illustrated earlier in this thesis, every second of every day at ADFA was timetabled and every activity was performed as a group and collective punishment for individual infractions was the norm. The most commonly used jargon at ADFA involved concepts describing the extent to which individuals were seen as team players:

she [a second year cadet] explained that our aim should be to ‘go grey’ which meant ensuring that we didn’t attract attention from staff or other cadets by under or over performance (Tuesday, Week 5, ADFA field notes).

cadets on sick parade were called ‘squeezers’, a derogatory term used to describe cadets who were not performing adequately physically ... it was also used to describe under performance in other areas (Friday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

Although less imposed, attempts to foster a sense of group cohesion were continually in evidence at AFPC:

the class Sergeant explained that ‘we’ve broken you into groups so you can support each other and not just in College. Get a bit of esprit de corps going in your class (Monday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

one of the recruits sat at a table by himself at lunch. The guy I was sitting next to at another table muttered to me that that sort of behaviour wasn’t going to do much for his career (Tuesday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).
Distinctive language and dress assist to create insulating boundaries around communities (Kanter 1972:82). Even when not wearing uniform, identifying ADFA cadets in town is not difficult. As Leonard (2000:32) outlines, ADFA cadets are:

young, clean shaven, similar hair styled males and females, walking in groups – generally walking in step or at the very least with a ‘purpose’, all wearing similar clothing, generally jeans, a collared shirt and leather shoes – and using a vocabulary usually saved for war movies.

Similarly, extreme hairstyles and unnatural colours are not permitted in the police and groups of off duty police are visible in public, particularly as they often hang out in groups at the same hangouts. That cadets and recruits are eager to embrace the attire of the community they are aspiring to be identified with, can be shown with the following field note excerpts:

the excitement was palpable at the first kitting-out … we were divided into our respective services, measured and issued with a large bag to carry all our bits and pieces … they were very excited about getting to wear a military uniform (Tuesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

the first time first years tried on their single service uniforms just before SST (single service training), they pretended to mistake each other for third years etc. There was lots of ‘excuse me please, sir’ and lots of strutting around with heads held up high: ‘I can’t wait to be saluted at on SST’ (Wednesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

when we finally got to go out for ‘uniform fittings’, there was a real buzz … I was part of the last lot who felt they were being processed in and out [rushed through the uniform fitting] rather than being allowed to take pride in their uniform. They were very disappointed (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

The most common form of knowledge transmission in both the military and police: ‘warries’, or war stories, were embraced by both cadets and recruits:
One of the third years asked the first years ‘do you want to hear a warrie?’ The first year cadets sat up in enthusiastic response (Tuesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

In a consistently successful technique to get the recruits’ full attention, the instructor said ‘I’ve got a warrie that goes with it’ and went on to describe the investigation of an alleged murder when a group of police officers only had five (bullet proof) vests between them. To resolve who was going to wear them, the senior said ‘put your hand up if you’re married, keep your hand up if you’re married with children’ (Thursday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

We were jogging by the lake when the truck in front of us narrowly avoided smashing into the overpass ahead by squealing on the brakes and blocking every traffic lane. We had to help stop traffic and assist the driver to back up the road ... (the two male recruits I was with) were very excited: ‘our first warrie!’ (Friday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

With the conduct of warfare being considered a science and the development of military professionalism, the separation of the military from civilian society was reinforced. The contraction of the armed forces following the end of the Cold War meant that once again the military was removed from mainstream society, with the offspring of military households entering the military at a much higher rate than the general public (Betros 2001:503). Police officers are similarly set apart from mainstream society, relying on their occupational community for support, solidarity, and social identity. Despite the liberal democratic mythology of police as ‘citizens in uniform’, the reality is that they are set apart by the authority that they wield (Waddington 1999a). The vision of a ‘thin blue line’ not only places the police in the position of valiant protectors of society, but the remainder of the population as either criminals or naive ‘c Civvies’ – civilians – who do not fully understand the danger being kept at bay.

An isolated social life coupled with a strong code of solidarity with other police officers and an ‘us/them’ division of the social world are key characteristics of police
culture (Reiner 1992:111). As a consequence, police often find social encounters with non-police friends, acquaintances, neighbours and others difficult (Waddington 1999a). As shown by a field note excerpt, the process started relatively early:

‘I swear I’m starting to think everyone’s guilty. At the childcare when I pick my kid up I swear the man there’s guilty of something. He has dreadlocks though, so that doesn’t help’ (Sunday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

The development of an ‘us-versus-them’ attitude to the rest of society is a consequence of renunciation (Kanter 1972:83). This is assisted by the development of self identity involving what we are not at least as much as what we are. The us/them mentality is enhanced when institutions like the military and police withdraw from participation in general society because of a ‘siege mentality’ whereby they perceive that there is little support or understanding from the broader community of their role and the sometimes unpopular tasks they are called upon to undertake. During the Vietnam War, for example, a particularly unpopular war, it was common for people to yell abuse at military personnel in the street. Similarly, nineteenth century bushranging in Australia that turned the police force into a laughing stock, as well as unpopular tasks such as issuing speeding tickets, have helped to sustain a differentiation between the police and the community (Gordon 2003:21).

As Waddington (1999a:97) outlines, the police are a notoriously insular occupational group, often regarding the public as hostile. The police often view the community suspiciously, as perhaps out to get them. Examples at AFPC include the following:

The medic came and gave us a talk … main point was explaining ‘what’s the difference between your job and others?’ … apparently the difference was that a police officer’s power to use violence puts them at risk of violence from the community (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

‘it does scare me a little bit wearing the blue uniform ‘cause people are going to attack you, but it goes with the job’ (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).
everyone’s interested in what you [police officers] say and do ... if someone can stick something on you, they will. They see you no longer as [names some of the recruits], they now see you as a police officer’ (Friday, Week 2, talk from the chaplain, AFPC field notes).

An example of the police’s us/Them mentality is the reference to members of the general public as ‘civilians’. The term is used even though the police, as opposed to the military, are civilians themselves (Wing 1996:33). ‘Civilian’ as a word specifically meaning ‘non combatant’ originated in English in the middle of the nineteenth century. The military, in particular, picked up the word to apply to those they wished to be distinguished from. As the London Daily Telegraph noted in 1864, ‘All over the world military men view any civilian interference with dislike’ (Braudy 2003:459). Within the short induction period at ADFA, first year cadets were expressing contempt for civilians in quite striking ways:

a distinction is regularly made between ‘us’ [military personnel] and ‘civvies’, or ‘long-haired tree hugging civvie hippies’ (Monday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

as well as constantly barking ‘lose those nasty civilian habits’, there were continual disparaging comments about civilians, for example, a comment by the instructing Sergeant that; ‘there’s not one reason to talk, you’re in a class. This is not a bloody civvie lecture’ (Monday, Week 5, ADFA field notes).

one of our leadership lessons involved pretending that we were out in the middle of the ocean with only one lifeboat and only enough room, food and supplies for all of us minus one. We then had to decide who we were going to leave to drown ... The first argument given by one of the first years was that I should be left behind because I was only a civilian. When one of the other first years said it was actually their job to protect civilians, the initial cadet looked very perplexed and said something about civilians being the least useful (Tuesday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).
Anticipating the effects of processes of renunciation and communion forms a strong motivating factor for cadets and recruits. As Snyder (1999:152) outlines, becoming part of something larger than oneself can also be very pleasurable. The Survey of the Military Profession surveying officer cadets at all of Australia’s officer-training institutions found that 74 per cent of officer cadets in 1987 and 77 per cent of officer cadets in 1992 ranked as very important or fairly important the ‘desire for comradeship’ (Smith 1995:537). A 2006 advertising campaign for the British Army focuses on the attraction of camaraderie, advertising the benefits of Army enlistment as constituting membership of a bonded group: ‘Stand shoulder to shoulder’. Similarly, a survey conducted at the NSW Police Academy revealed that a common response to the attractions of joining the police revolved around camaraderie (Chan 2003:272). The desire for comradeship appeared to be a desirable factor at ADFA and AFPC:

‘just the mateship, I mean we’ve been here what, a week and a half and the friends we’ve made already is just unbelievable’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview)

‘you really get to bond and everything with your div mates so quickly. It’s just great’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview)

as you know you make heaps of friends and they’re just like life long friends and it’s just the best job in the world I reckon’ (Male cadet, late teens, ADFA interview)

‘I enjoy mateship; that’s sort of the best thing’ (Male recruit, early thirties, AFPC interview)

‘definitely camaraderie [as one of the highlights of joining the police so far]’ (Male recruit, mid thirties, AFPC interview).

**Mortification and transcendence**

Mortification and transcendence assist in promoting evaluative, moral commitments to a community. Mortification is a detaching process and involves the submission of private states to social control and the foregoing a former identity. Transcendence is
an attaching process whereby an individual attaches their decision-making prerogative to a power greater than themselves, surrendering to the group's higher meaning. While mortification causes a person to 'lose' themselves, opening them up to new identity formation, transcendence defines the direction of that identity formation, enabling an individual to find themselves in something larger and greater (Kanter 1972:110).

Mortification techniques render cadets and recruits amenable to developing their new identity based on the meaningfulness of membership in their new group. Erving Goffman called the process of mortification, the 'mortification of the self', and outlined that it operates by removing the individual's sense of self-determination and uniqueness by making them acutely aware of the presence of others as well as by de-individuating them. As outlined in Chapter Four, processes of mortification include enforcing uniform styles of dress and manner in the context of communal living with little opportunity for privacy (Kanter 1972:111).

At both ADFA and AFPC, the cadets' and recruits' induction was often conceptualised as the beginning of their new persona. At AFPC, for example:

"we're always going to caution aren't we? I mean, that's drummed in from birth" (Thursday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

The malleability of new inductees was also referred to by the instructors at ADFA and AFPC. Again, an example from AFPC illustrates:

[a senior instructing member] was explaining to me that the police force was the most conservative organisation in the country, more so than the military. I commented that the police recruits seemed very diverse and not necessarily that conservative. He replied: 'we'll have to teach them then. They'll learn' (Monday, Week 7, AFPC field notes).

Cadets and recruits have an ambiguous status while they are in training to be military and police officers. Their interest in the profession and the amount of training they have completed differentiates them from ordinary citizens. However, they are not yet officers and are frequently reminded of this:
While being reminded of their place within the hierarchy, cadets and recruits are continually reminded of their potential and that they have joined an elite, desirable group and that their lowly status is only temporary:

first on the agenda on the first day in O week [observer week], was the Commdts [Commandant’s] and Rector’s address where it was, in a manner that was to be repeated ad nauseum for the next week, stated that everyone in the room had done the hardest part just to get there and they were all exceptional people and could feel very proud etc etc ... it is continually emphasised to cadets just how good they are: the top 10 per cent in the country etc etc (Friday, Week 1, ADFA field notes).

Various practices at the Academy reinforce to cadets that they are learning how to enter a superior class, such as the strong emphasis on etiquette, including table manners etc, and descriptions such as that in the Cadet Handbook that outlines how much higher standards in the military are compared to 'the civilian world' ... A few of the NCOs [non commissioned officers] have commented to me that ADFA cadets leave the Academy arrogant and elitist (Friday, Week 3, ADFA field notes).

the guest speaker emphasised that the opportunity to work with the AFP was a privilege (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Part of the process of cadet and recruit transcendence involved the formation of stereotyped boundaries between what they perceived to be their own group and other groups and the promotion and internalisation of flattering myths of themselves as well as the perpetuation of negative stereotypes of out groups, the process of established and outsider relationships outlined in the previous chapter. The low status of cadets and recruits may contribute to the denigration of out groups as, as Tyler and Smith (1997:146) argue, when people’s self esteem is reduced, the normal desire for
‘positive distinctiveness’ is enhanced. The denigration of out groups was readily apparent at both ADFA and AFPC:

the first years talked down to non commissioned officers, especially those in supply and had to be warned not to on numerous occasions (Friday, Week 2, ADFA field notes).

there had apparently been a bit of trouble between recruits and CHUBB security, the private security guards at the College. Recruits were reminded that they were not above being told what to do by the security guards and that they were to do what they were told (Friday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

the Sergeant explained that ‘we were hoping to have uniforms ready to show off to you, we were promised them last Friday, but they still haven’t arrived. Civilian contractors!’ followed with a knowing shrug (Monday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

According to social identity theory, people prefer to belong to positively valued groups or social categories, because positive social identities contribute to general feelings of self-worth (Moghaddam and Taylor 1994:77). As Janowitz (1971:177) outlines, the military cannot compete with the private sector in monetary rewards for its elite members and professional commitment comes to depend on the persistence of a style of life and a belief in the superiority, or at least worth, of that style of life. Just as battlefield distinction prior to the eighteenth century was a primary means of climbing within the hierarchy of status (Barker 1978:450), many cadets and recruits regard their chosen occupation as a way of increasing their status, while at the same time allowing them to form a desirable social identity. This belief was evident at both ADFA and AFPC, as shown in two AFPC examples:

there was apparently tension between the 000 operators and sworn police officers on the road. Many of the phone operators seemed to be considering undertaking sworn training and becoming sworn officers. The recruits talked about it in a way that left no doubt that they believed that
being a sworn officer was obviously superior (Thursday, Week 6, during ‘observer’ week in the AFP communications centre, AFPC field notes).

a lot of recruits and staff inquired about whether I was going to join the AFP. The response when I explained that I was not was often confusion about why I wouldn’t want to if it was open to me (just as had been apparent at ADFA) (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

Goldschmidt (1990:2) argues that individuals are motivated to pursue a sense of self which involves the attainment of social worth, or prestige, in the context of community values. Employment in contemporary society provides a key context in which prestige is pursued and the military and police specifically provide two contexts where prestige might be sought. As Van Doorn (1975:35) points out, the influx of commoners into the officer class meant that armies came to serve as ‘the social escalators of the age’. In Australia, the officers of the original settlements imported a sense of their own status as gentlemen, which was maintained by a ceremonious code of interaction, and a constant display of deference from social inferiors (Connell and Irving 1980:51). General Hackett (1986), in a public address at ADFA, outlined his hopes for making the public more aware of what they owed ‘the man-at-arms ... for ... offering a reservoir of moral virtues’. The professionalism of the military and police has encouraged the development of an internalised and self defined expertise among military and, more recently, police personnel. As Conti (2006) outlines, police recruits view being a police officer as a means of raising their status. Chan (2003:59) further points out that police recruits regarded policing as a highly prestigious occupation with police officers perceived as ‘top-rate’ in terms of professionalism.

Just as people often join communes seeking ‘personal growth’, the identity change involved in mortification and transcendence is part of the motivation for joining the military and police. One of the most identifiable slogans in advertising history, the United States Army’s slogan, created in 1980, ‘Be all you can be’, appeals to this desire, as does its more recent replacement, ‘An Army of One’ where the starring Corporal explains ‘with technology, with training, with support, who I am has become better than who I was’ (Bachman, Freedman-Doan et al. 2000:265). The
cadets' and recruits' perceptions of the positive impact their chosen profession would have on them was readily apparent:

one of the recruits said he caught his reflection in the mirror out of the corner of his eye and said, 'oh yeah, there's a cop in here, oh my god, it's me!'. I can see where he's coming from. When we graduate, we're going to be like 10 feet tall (Male recruit, early thirties, in the context of a discussion about the attraction of being a police officer, AFPC interview).

'to be of good moral character and integrity’ (Male cadet, late teens, explaining why he joined the military, ADFA interview).

It is for this reason, as Bourke (1999:338) argues, that making institutions like the military, and it could be argued the police, more representative is perceived to be damaging as this makes them less elite and therefore less attractive.

**Contemporary military and police organisations**

The central and essential feature of the Army of the 21st century will be its ability to exploit information (General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff, US Army, as cited in Haggerty and Ericson 1999:233).

Information is a critical feature of modern societies and it is the essential and central feature of policing (Manning 1992:352).

The growth of the modern bureaucratic state in the nineteenth century required a change in the normative patterns of behaviour from physical aggressiveness to technical rationality and calculation. Contemporary society is often referred to as the 'information age' where there is an increasing emphasis on knowledge-based, as opposed to manual-based work. These developments have greatly affected the military and the police who have increasingly become instruments of governance preoccupied with generating and disseminating information for the state.

Military and police personnel have resisted the professionalisation of their professions to the extent that this process of professionalisation involves the increasingly routinised nature of the surveillance and peacekeeping aspects of their
work. Military and police personnel prefer to emphasise the heroic action-based mystique that surrounds their respective roles.

**The military, the police and peacekeeping**

**Military officers as combat focused**

Not only have peacekeeping and humanitarian actions increasingly entered the mainstream of military missions, but state concern for national survival has given way to concern about lower-intensity threats such as terrorism. As conventional combat operations are replaced by ‘operations other than war’, ‘stability and support operations’ and ‘peace operations’, the task for the military is to ‘protect, help and save’ (Dandeker 1999:60). The Australian Defence Force has been increasingly structured, trained and utilised in peacekeeping and other ‘security’ operations which are focused around humanitarian assistance, confidence-building and conflict resolution rather than combat (Cheeseman 1998).

To the extent that these developments have called into question traditional ideals about what it means to be a soldier, they have been highly resisted. A central debate within military circles is the degree to which ‘operations other than war’ detract from the ‘warrior’ capabilities of the armed forces (Moskos 2000:17). Despite arguments that the military’s increasing engagement in constabulary tasks is a challenge to the traditional warrior conception of military personnel (for example, Janowitz 1971) the self perception of military and police personnel as combat ready specialists in violence continues to permeate their self image. The military typically resists identifying itself with the constabulary concept as police activities are regarded as ‘less prestigious’ (Reed and Segal 2000:58).

The notion of combat as the central military value does not appear to be being challenged in military academies. In a recent study of US Military Academy cadets that measured attitudes toward the warrior ethos, patriotism and globalism, Professor Franke found that during their four years at the Academy, cadet support for warrior values increased significantly. West Point socialisation seemed to instil and strengthen those values that characterise the traditional professional military ethos, including conservatism, patriotism, warriorism and service before self, loyalty, and
group cohesiveness (Franke 2001:100). Franke found that a commitment to peace operations and an appreciation of global institutions had not been incorporated into the military program or the academic curriculum.

The language and terms used in the ADF are symbolic of a range of attitudes and understandings, based on the dominant paradigm that has the male warrior at centre stage (Burton 1996:99). In Burton’s analysis of the cadet community at ADFA, she found ‘a military environment, where men and their ‘physical prowess’ and ‘warrior’ status are revered’ (Burton 1996:63). Similarly, at ADFA I found that:

All the examples about why attention to detail was so important when bogging [cleaning], memorising names or turning out perfect military corners on the bed, more often than not were about soldiers on the front line. For example, a soldier in the heat of battle whose Steyr [rifle] didn’t shoot straight because he hadn’t cleaned every part of his Steyr properly, could lose his life (excerpt from notes I made for Department of Defence Review team, elaborated from ADFA field notes).

In a study of soldiers undertaking peacekeeping missions, Segal et al (1998:632) found that soldiers interpreted the reality of their peacekeeping situation in terms of war-fighting. For example, when Israeli naval vessels fired their weapons out to sea in offshore, gunnery practice American soldiers wrote home and told their wives that they had been under naval fire.

It appears that women are more willing to accept a changing role for the military. Miller and Moskos (1995) noted the striking differences, for example, during the humanitarian mission Operation Restore Hope in attitudes toward the Somali people exhibited by male combat soldiers, particularly white males, and noncombat soldiers, disproportionately women and black men. Women and black men were more likely to adopt humanitarian strategies than warrior attitudes. However, ultimately it is the all-male Australian SAS that is considered ‘elite’ amongst army units, and ordinary soldiers tend to view SAS soldiers as ‘super-grunts’ or ‘super-soldiers’ (McCulloch 2001:82). During the ADFA induction period, the focus was firmly on conventional war fighting at the expense of the other modern military tasks mentioned above. As
outlined in Chapter 3 in discussions and interviews with cadets about the role of the military, including consideration regarding their motivation for joining, the role of peacekeeping was not mentioned once.

**Police officers as focused on crime fighting**

The absence of crime will be considered the best proof of the complete efficiency of the police (1845 South Australian Police Manual, cited in Clyne 1987:83)

To fight crime and win (AFP’s motto)

Since the early 1980s particularly, there has been a representation of the police as deliverers of a professional service, with many police organisations changing their name from ‘police force’ to ‘police service’. Part of this shift included an increasing focus on peacekeeping activities and includes the introduction of various community policing initiatives including Neighbourhood Watch, the reintroduction of foot patrols and various forms of consultation with the local community. Bittner (1990:10) argues that these activities reflect, in part, an attempt to re-establish the police’s loss of legitimacy with the public. The NSW Commissioner, John Avery, for example, when discussing the NSW Police Service’s change of emphasis towards community policing, explains in the 1984-85 Annual Report that the NSW Police Service must develop ‘a basic commitment to serving the public in a manner which meets its general satisfaction’ and that the police’s ‘success will always depend on the active support given by individual citizens’.

Police officers are engaged in what is commonly referred to as peacekeeping and order maintenance, activities in which arrests are extremely rare. The bulk of police work is about order maintenance, service, and conflict resolution, rather than physical confrontation and crime fighting, all of which require a range of interpersonal and problem-solving skills. Studies of the police repeatedly show that upper body strength is required in relatively few instances and that with higher intellect and good communication skills there is less likelihood of conflict situations developing (Jiggins 2004:77). Kleinig (1999) argues that police ought to be seen not as law-enforcers or
crime-fighters, but as social peacekeepers as their primarily concern is preserving order.

Police officers are found to spend an extraordinarily small amount of time dealing with crime and capturing criminals. For example, among the patrol officers assigned to a high-crime area in one study of New York City, 40 per cent did not make a single felony arrest in a year. Arrests that do occur are for the most part peacekeeping measures rather than measures of law enforcement of the sort employed against thieves, rapists or perpetrators of other major crimes (Bittner 1990:8). Not only is police work not confined to crime fighting but police officers do not make particularly effective crime fighters. A significant amount of research indicates that police have little impact on crime rates, are responsible for discovering few crimes and do not spend much duty time on crime-related tasks. Instead, it is the public who tend to discover offences and detect offenders (Waddington 1999a:6).

Along with moves toward community policing were changes in recruitment policy such as the loosening of previously stringent physical fitness requirements and the encouragement of a greater diversity of applicants, including more women. The police increasingly recognised that the key skills required for police officers were intellect and good interpersonal skills (Jiggins 2004:77). As the police officers’ role expanded to include social mediation and the provision of services, it was expected that police orientation would shift away from that of the narrowly focused ‘crime fighter’ (Zhao, Lovrich et al. 1995:153).

A study in the United States over ten years examined attempts to transform police organisational culture from one focused on crime fighting and traditional law enforcement to a broadened conception of a role for the police that emphasised partnership with local community residents. The study found that the views of police officers were virtually identical to what they had been a decade earlier, continuing to reflect traditional law enforcement and crime fighting ideas (Zhao, He et al. 1999:157).

Police officer’s resistance to change is evidenced in the widespread tendency for induction training, where attempts are made to instil ‘professional’ attitudes, to be
overridden by occupational socialisation. Recent longitudinal studies of police recruits in Queensland and New South Wales found that as officers became socialised into the policing occupation, their attitudes became more conservative and more ethnocentric (Chan 2003:11). Many police academies have attempted to subvert traditional policing models and values. The curriculum recently introduced at the NSW Police Academy, for example, was instituted explicitly as part of an agenda to sweep away traditional ‘crime fighting’ models of policing and establish community-based policing predicated on a ‘full professional’ model of community policing (Chan 2003:44). The available evidence suggests that regardless of the content of training programs, however, once recruits come face to face with the realities of operational police work, they fall under the influence of the ‘street cop’ culture that undermines professionalism (Chan 2003:5). This can be shown with the overt rejection of anything learned during induction. Chan found at the NSW Police Academy, for example, that the Academy was dismissed as ‘Bullshit Castle’ and its curriculum as ‘Alice in Wonderland stuff’ (Chan 2003:11). Similarly, at AFPC, the following warning to police recruits from sworn members was not uncommon:

‘it’s very different out here; College is just Disneyland’ (Monday, Week 6, Tuggeranong police station, first day of ‘observer’ week, AFPC field notes).

At AFPC, there did appear to be some acceptance for the community based policing model. This support was strongly gendered. As Doran and Chan (2003:283) have found, women are significantly more likely to rate working with people as an important reason for joining the police. Some examples from my field notes illustrate the gendered nature of support for the community based policing model:

I’m happy with the ‘mussy’ stuff, the Constable Kenny stuff (Female recruit, early twenties, AFPC interview).

I think you can still sort of be helping people. When I said that on my interview, one of the old guys on the panel said ‘we’re not bloody welfare officers’ but that’s just their point of view (Female recruit, mid thirties, AFPC interview).
Having something to do with people and talking to people interested me. When I said that at my interview one of the guys on the panel said policing is not about helping people, you want to lock them away. It was really interesting because in my three day observation, we didn’t lock anyone up and the sorts of stuff we did was warm, fuzzy stuff (Female recruit, mid twenties, AFPC interview).

the sworn female police officer instructing us said ‘you get to break up fights and help them [members of the public] to resolve differences that they don’t have the skills to resolve themselves; [you encounter lots of] low income working class, uneducated people. You can choose how you do it; you’re not there to judge them; you’re there to reach a resolution. People say the job is not rewarding, it’s just locking up bad guys who hate your guts, that’s so not true, it’s the best job in the world. You have this wonderful thing called discretion, that’s why I love this job’ (Friday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

While community policing rhetoric is strong and has been a success from a public relations perspective, it does not enjoyed a high status amongst police officers and has not been integrated into operational policing, with community policing squads not considered ‘real’ police (McCulloch 2001:1-5). Further, despite evidence of some female officers embracing the model of community policing, as outlined above, there is much evidence that policewomen as a group do not have starkly different views of policing to their male counterparts (Waddington 1999a), accepting the crime-fighting, masculine image of policing that celebrates physical prowess and devalues interpersonal skills and emotional support (Chan 2003:35). Disdain for the move towards a community policing model was apparent in the field at AFPC:

The Sergeant was discussing the change in emphasis from force to service and explained scathingly that ‘now we’re the caring sharing service’ (Monday, Week 6, during ‘observer’ week at Tuggeranong Police Station, AFPC field notes).
the female police officer explained that she had a social work degree and attracted a lot of flack because of it and was known as ‘constable care bear’ … I witnessed some of it [the flack] at morning tea (Wednesday, Week 6, during ‘observer’ week at Civic Police Station, AFPC field notes).

It is paramilitary units, modelled upon military units and considered elite, that provide the role model for most police, who tend to admire macho action oriented methods of policing. At AFPC it was evident that there was admiration of the military:

I picked up the police magazine [*Platypus* 2001; the ‘magazine of the AFP’] hoping to find insights into police culture ... in an article entitled ‘Balance and leadership are essential for value-for-money organisations’, it was noted that ‘the AFP finds itself on common ground with the ADF in needing to demonstrate that it is a ‘value-for-money’ organisation and that its leadership is in tune with 21st century thinking’; the comparison seemed to be an excuse to include lots of pictures of men in camouflage gear with rocket launchers, war ships and fighter planes; including a ‘fully armed’ FA-18 (Friday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).

we were talking about the fitness standards recruits had to pass ... there was talk of the 2.4 km run being the ‘same as in the Army’ with much pride (Thursday, Week 4, AFPC field notes).

That the police consider themselves a quasi-military institution with a war-like mission in fighting crime still plays an important part in the structuring of police work as shown, for example, in the aim of police work that was occasionally emphasised at AFPC:

the instructors split us into two groups, everybody who believed that winning is everything was to go to group A and everybody who believed that the main thing is to participate was to go to group B. The vast majority of the group went to group B. The instructors were obviously disgusted and demanded that the group think about the AFP motto:

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really, what do you think if it was ‘to fight crime and participate’ ... ‘it’s a danger if we go in there to participate without the aim to win’ (Tuesday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

The core of the police’s oral tradition lies in the glorification of violence over which they hold the legitimate monopoly. Canteen conversation continues to perpetuate the myth that policing is centrally concerned with searching, chasing and arresting criminals and police officers relish telling ‘war stories’ that glorify violent encounters (Waddington 1999a:97). Police officers take every opportunity to participate in anything that offers the promise of, or excuse for, excitement. For example, patrol car drivers will speed to calls that do not require an urgent response just for the thrill of driving at high speed. It is the common experience of researchers who accompany officers during hours of boring patrol to be told the tour of duty was unduly quiet and one should have been present earlier when it was busy (Waddington 1999a:99). The focus on violence and the danger police officers got into was emphasised throughout training at the AFPC:

we were invited to comment on team work activities; the lateral [sworn officers at AFPC for further training] explained to one of the recruits (who complained that no one had listening to her when she had had the answer and had allegedly told everyone but no one had heard) ‘you’ll have to learn to speak up, mate’, then added, directed to everyone: ‘better you learn now; if you and your partner are in a tight situation and you don’t communicate, you could end up with a trigger in the back of your head’ (Thursday, Week 1, AFPC field notes).

The mass media and police organisations continually seek to convince the public that police work centres around the apprehension of criminals. The internal organisation and division of labour within police organisations reflect categories of crime control. The public record of its accomplishments and failures is expressed in crime statistics. Recognition for meritorious performance is given for feats of valour and ingenuity in fighting crime. The most popular and enduring icon of the police officer is the courageous crime fighter, in the frontlines of the war against crime, upholding society’s law and morality by outsmarting criminals. For most police officers,
fighting crime alone is ‘real police work’ (Bittner 1990:21). In a policing review, it was found that police officers believed that responding to emergencies, detecting and arresting offenders, and investigating crimes were far more important than any other police tasks (Waddington 1999a:99).

The appeal of crime fighting as a legitimating symbol is compelling as criminals exclude themselves from the moral community of citizens by their actions, as well as representing a threat to other citizens. The police can then be depicted as heroic; the ‘thin blue line’ that protects citizens from the criminally inclined. The NSW Police Commissioner, for example, applauds what he terms as the ‘many heroes in the service’ (cited in Vickers and Kouzmin 2001:20). The motivation of heroically fighting crime was apparent in many of the recruit’s responses to the question of why they had joined the police:

- to get rid of bad guys that annoy me ... stop people doing bad things, you know breaking into people’s houses and doing drugs (Male recruit, mid twenties, AFPC interview).
- the idea of getting paedophiles off the street appealed to me (Male recruit, late twenties, AFPC interview).

That the apprehension of offenders is regarded as a major source of gratification and excitement for police officers, with the act of making an arrest the central act of ‘good policing’, was often evident at the AFPC:

- this morning’s lesson was boring ... I want to be out catching the bad guys (Wednesday, Week 2, AFPC field notes).
- one of the instructors asked: ‘have you all put in a kitty yet to compete for who gets the first arrest?’ (Tuesday, Week 3, AFPC field notes).

There is evidence that some police officers see professionalisation as an academic exercise that is not relevant to the practice of ‘locking up crooks’ (Chan 2003:11). This was particularly apparent at AFPC during training with experienced sworn police officers outside the College:
in a chat with a Senior Constable with 27 years experience, he explained that it was ludicrous that new police officers have to have degrees nowadays when they are just going to go out and lock up crooks: ‘They have to be really intelligent and get hand picked. All they need is big knuckles’ (Monday, Week 6, during ‘observer’ week at Tuggeranong Police Station, AFPC field notes).

X [the experienced sworn police officer] was mocking about our educational attainments [myself and one of the female recruits] ... We were warned by a couple of police officers that a guy was being brought in that might get toey as he had made threats about the police. X yelled out: ‘don’t worry I’ll get these two to go and hit him over the head with their diplomas’ (Monday, Week 6, during ‘observer’ week at Tuggeranong Police Station, AFPC field notes).

Conclusion

As long as there are dangerous and irksome tasks to be done, an engineering philosophy cannot suffice as the organizational basis of the armed forces (Janowitz 1971:35).

Plato argued that the professional soldier cannot fight effectively because that requires moral qualities and a commitment to the community, while the professional primarily has, at best, a soulless technical skill and, at worst, a penchant for showing off (Braudy 2003:49). As outlined in this chapter, it is the transcendental desire for prestige and the commitment processes involved in joining institutions like the military and police that play a large role in motivating and shaping the cadets and recruits that join these professions.

As has also been illustrated, to the extent that processes of professionalisation have threatened to undermine the heroic nature of their role in terms of the ‘thin red’ and ‘thin blue’ line, they are heavily resisted. As will be argued in the concluding chapter, if the monopoly of violence is to develop to the extent that all citizens in the globe are more secure, these deeply embedded identities need to be challenged.
Conclusion: Cosmopolitan violence

This thesis takes an Eliasian approach to the study of those groups of people that join the state’s institutions of violence and explores the habitus of these military and police personnel. This approach has predominantly been based on Elias’s theory of civilising processes, as well as including the key elements of an Eliasian approach to sociology. These elements include: the interweaving of empirical and theoretical material, an emphasis on long term processes, the inextricable relationship between habitus and broader figurations and an understanding of power relations being frequently organised around distinctions between established and outsider groups.

This thesis builds on Elias’ work by examining an aspect of the civilising process not covered by Elias: the habitus of the agents of state violence. In focusing on the Australian military and police, this thesis also contributes to research on civilising processes outside Western Europe, an under examined area of study. This thesis also makes a substantial contribution to the topic of the state’s institutions of violence, an area that has been neglected in much social theory, precisely because it has been increasingly hidden behind the scenes of social life. Not only do the military and police not feature heavily in much of social theory but direct access to these social settings by researchers is notoriously difficult to negotiate.

In outlining the ‘courtisation’ of police and military personnel in Australia, what this thesis has traced is processes of emotional management from external to self constraint. This process is reflected, for example, in the transition from discipline as inflicted on the body through to bodily discipline imposed on the mind through to the ever more nuanced versions of discipline through ideologies such as professionalism.
The foresight involved in generating self constraint has been brought about by increasing social divisions and competitive forces generated within societal figurations. In contrast with knights in the Middle Ages where there was little to compel foresight, for recruits and cadets it is another matter entirely. As this thesis has illustrated, very broad long term social developments have impacted upon military and police figurations which have in turn impacted upon the development of military and police habitus. The social processes involved include the processes of distancing, disciplining, nationalising, gendering and professionalising violence that have been outlined in this thesis.

As Elias (1986:31) outlines, the tightening of controls over people’s behaviour entailed a loss of the pleasurable satisfactions associated with simpler and more spontaneous forms of conduct. Just as sport is perceived by Elias and Dunning (1986) to assist in solving this problem, so can the social settings of the military and police be seen to. As has been illustrated throughout this thesis, participation in the military and police can be seen to be less routine and more emotionally rewarding than other employment options. However, as this thesis has also demonstrated, the tension between the decontrolling of emotions and its control is particularly pronounced in the military and police. The controlling of decontrolled emotional controls is particularly apparent in Chapter Four.

Further, as outlined in Chapter Five, while inductees to the military and police are required to inflict violence, upon instruction or when they deem it to be necessary, it is not expressive violence they are required to inflict, in fact careful recruiting processes are aimed at screening out applicants prone to such violence. Rather, violence has been ‘civilised’ and the agents of the state’s institutions of violence are expected to respond in a much more instrumental manner.

Elias argues that when people study the problem of violence, they often ask how it is possible that people can harm others when what they should be asking is: how is it possible that so many people can live together peacefully without fear of being struck or killed by stronger ones? As Elias explains:
it is all too easy today to overlook the fact that never before in the
development of humankind have so many millions of people lived
relatively peacefully with each other, with physical attacks mostly
eliminated, as they do in the large states and cities of our time (Elias
1996:174)

As has been illustrated in this thesis, more people live peacefully in pacified Western
societies without immediate pervasive threats of violence than at any time in human
history. This is a direct result of processes of civilisation, specifically processes of the
state’s monopoly of violence and subsequent high levels of individual self-discipline
within these structures.

**Contemporary Global Violence and Civilising Processes**

Covenants, without the sword, are but words (Thomas Hobbes 2002 [1651])

When asked what he thought of Western Civilisation, Ghandi is famously quoted as
replying: ‘I think it would be a good idea’. What Gandhi captures with this sentiment
is not only that the West was, and is, uncivilised but more importantly, that
civilisation is a desirable goal. While people in the West are no longer quite as
confident of the superiority of their own civilisation as they were in the nineteenth
century, as Elias (1996:302) argues, in spite of all the doubts which have been cast on
the belief in progress, the self-image of people in the Western world remains
permeated by it. While numerous experiences, such as mass wars, totalitarianism and
genocide encourage doubts about how civilised Western societies are, other
experiences convey to Westerners that they are highly civilised. This can be shown,
for example, in the widespread readiness to speak of events such as Hitler’s genocide
as a ‘breakdown of civilization’ (Mennell 1989:227).

However, as Elias explains, on an international level we are basically still living
exactly as our forefathers did in the period of their so-called ‘barbarism’ (Elias
1996:176). Security, including security from violence, is a precondition for the
enjoyment of democratic rights and freedoms and the foundation stone of civilisation
(Loader and Walker 2007:10). The protection of its citizens from internal and
external threats stands as the primary and defining priority of the state. A monopoly
of violence that serves the interests of all humankind needs to be structured at the global level.

Not only can a monopoly of violence not be found on a global level, but the carefully constructed segregations between armies and civilian populations, war and peace, international and civil war and lethal and non-lethal applications of force appear to be collapsing. As outlined in Chapter One, for example, increasingly there are more differences within police forces and military forces than between them. This is a reflection of these collapsing separations.

Traditional inter-state war has been replaced by civil wars and ethnic, tribal and regional conflicts that cross state boundaries (Tilly 2003:59). Behaviours that were objectionable according to the classical rules of warfare and codified in the laws of war in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, such as atrocities against non-combatants, are now regular components of contemporary warfare. At the turn of the twentieth century, the ratio of military to civilian casualties in wars was 8:1. In the lead up to the turn of the twenty first century this was almost exactly reversed, with the ratio of military to civilian casualties approximately 1:8 (Kaldor 1999:8).

This recent type of violence has been variously identified as ‘low-intensity conflict’, ‘privatised war’, ‘informal war’, ‘asymmetric warfare’, ‘post-modern war’ and ‘new war’. Kaldor (1999:2), for example, argues that recent modes of violence fundamentally differ from previous modes and labels it ‘new war’. These ‘new wars’ blur the distinctions between war, organised crime and large-scale violations of human rights. The violence prevalent in the inner cities of many Western countries, for example, is included in the definition of new wars.

In *The Civilising Process*, Elias (2000:446) did acknowledge faint traces of alliances and supra-state units of various kinds: ‘the prelude of struggles embracing the whole globe, which are the precondition for a worldwide monopoly of physical force, for a single central political institution and thus for the pacification of the earth’. While there is still no substantial monopoly of violence on the international level in the
same way as there is within Western states, the traces of such processes have deepened considerably since Elias wrote *The Civilising Process*.

In recent decades, theorists have begun to recognise that all human beings in the world are increasingly interdependent with each other. As Beck (2000:83) states, risk communities 'create a moral space of mutual commitments across frontiers' and individuals become citizens of the global community through their exposure to common risks. There has been a reinvigoration of a cosmopolitan ethic that supports the notion of a global responsibility to actively protect individuals from deprivation of their rights and to aid them when that protection has failed. Cosmopolitanism implies the existence of a human community with certain shared rights and obligations.

As Kant argued, in 1795, the global community had shrunk to the point where a 'right violated anywhere could be felt everywhere' (cited in Kaldor 1999:20). The Kantian notion of cosmopolitanism was based on the assumption of a federation of sovereign states. Similarly, the aim of modern cosmopolitans is not to phase out national institutions, but rather see the operation of a set of accepted rules and standards of international behaviour as being 'embedded in the existing pattern of political relations and processes' (Held 1995:286).

In some senses, a cosmopolitan regime already exists. International organisations such as the United Nations, like its predecessor the League of Nations, help to create a system of surveillance in the international arena. More recent examples of what can be described as 'cosmopolitanism from above' are the growing myriad of international organisations, a few of which, most notably the European Union, are developing supra-national powers and imposing rules and self restraint on their members.

Examples of 'cosmopolitanism from below' include new forms of activism, from emerging social movements concerned with issues such as peace and development, and non-government organisations, such as Amnesty International, monitoring abuses of individual and group rights in the international sphere (Kaldor 1999:88). The electronic revolution has enhanced communication on public opinion on a global
scale, leading to what has been termed the ‘something must be done’ trend, which has provided additional pressure on governments to become involved in humanitarian and peacemaking activities.

At the beginning of the 1990s, particularly, there was optimism about solving global problems and the term ‘international community’, implying a cohesive group of governments acting through international organisations, entered into common usage. The emphasis was on proactively addressing security, rather than stereotyping and reacting to ‘them’, as has been illustrated throughout this thesis is the norm within nation states. The *United Nations Human Development Report 1994* introduced and sought to mobilise opinion behind the concept of ‘human security’, aiming to urge governments to address chronic threats as hunger, homelessness, disease and ecological degradation. A similar argument on the domestic level would be that crime control dissolves into questions of economic and social policy generally (Loader and Walker 2007). As Bittner (1990:133) argued, a community can no more wage war on its internal ills, which includes crime, than an ‘organism can ‘wage war’ against its own constitutional weaknesses’.

One of the missing elements in efforts to improve the security of all humankind has been the development of a substantial international monopoly of violence to enforce cosmopolitan goals, or laws. As ‘new wars’ are a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations, Kaldor (1999:10) argues that the agents of cosmopolitan law-enforcement would need to be a mixture of soldier and police officer. Some of the tasks that these international agents may be asked to perform fall within traditionalambits, including separating belligerents and maintaining ceasefires, while others could include tasks such as the protection of safety zones or relief corridors, ensuring freedom of movement, guaranteeing the safety of individuals and capturing war criminals (Kaldor 1999:125). In a similar fashion to the rules of conduct that have conventionally guided police officers in the Peelian tradition, the use of force by agents of international violence would need to be proportionate: the minimum force necessary to achieve a specific end.

As outlined throughout this thesis, however, there remains strong resistance in the military and police towards any move away from a traditional focus of warriors
fighting war/crime on behalf of the nation state. The leap in terms of processes of identity formation that these personnel would require in order to adapt to being cosmopolitan law enforcers on behalf of humanity would not be insignificant.

This thesis has outlined wide ranging social and technological changes with the potential to affect the role of the male warrior fighting war/crime on behalf of the nation state, including: new technologies that render individual action almost irrelevant and greatly reduce opportunities for heroism, the courtisation of military and police officers, the impact to the nation state of increasingly global processes, the greater participation of women and the increasing definition and use of the military and police in a ‘peacekeeping’ capacity. However, as has also been illustrated throughout this thesis, each of these changes has been actively resisted. New technologies that threatened the warrior role were strongly opposed with military officers continuing to act as ‘gentlemen’ resisting learning technical aspects of the military and integration into its bureaucracy for centuries, the participation of women in the military and police has been vehemently opposed and the ‘core’ role of the military and police to fight war and crime steadfastly defended. Further, mythology that actively undermines these developments has been eagerly promoted. Elias (1991:212) describes a process called the ‘fossilization of the social habitus’ which outlines the persistence of forms of habitus appropriate to earlier stages of social integration well into entirely different social figurations. As has been illustrated throughout this thesis, contemporary agents of state violence still tend to envisage themselves to an extent as heroic warriors, drawing on historical and fictional narratives prevalent in Western culture to assist them in doing so. As illustrated, an example of this is when soldiers engaged in peacekeeping explain their situation in terms of war-fighting.

A further impediment to the development of cosmopolitan agents of violence is the increasing individualisation of individuals. As outlined in this thesis, the United States Army’s campaign ‘An Army of One’ epitomises the increasingly individualised warrior. There is some evidence that issues of individual self preservation may even be a factor for ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits joining the military and police:

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[if there was a war ... how do you feel about going into battle and killing people?:] ... 'I guess that's part of my job and well, my reasoning when I joined was that if there was another big war then I'd probably be better off fighting it than you know ... having to die anyway' (Female cadet, late teens, ADFA interview).

However, as this thesis has also demonstrated, ADFA and AFPC cadets continue to be concerned with pursuing identity formation processes involved in belonging to broad figurations.

One of the most substantial impediments to the development of cosmopolitan minded identities is the resilience of nationalism. While a sense of identification with common humanity is growing for many, it does not appear to be the most important, and certainly not the most affectively charged, component of habitus influencing individual conduct (Mennell 1994:179). Intellectuals like Kant were perceiving humanity as a whole all-embracing unity in the eighteenth century, before a national 'we identity' was firmly established in the habitus of individuals (Mennell 1994:179). Centuries earlier, Socrates is alleged to have said 'I am not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world'. With the development of the nation state, however, came the development of a nationalist, inegalitarian code of norms that contradicted the more egalitarian humanistic code whose highest value was the human individual (Elias 1996:155). As outlined in Chapter Five, when men of middle-class descent rose to power in European states, the nation moved to the highest place in the public scale of values.

It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that the 'inevitability' of the nation-state become apparent in Australia. In 1860, for example, West, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald, claimed that the common interests of mankind always took precedence over those of nationality because national feeling was only 'sentiment'. West believed that the progress of civilisation would detach men and women from their feelings of clanship, arguing that there were no essential racial differences. West's contemporary, Harpur, went further attacking 'that blood-drinking Juggernaut – National Glory'. However, little more than a generation later most Australians
were exalting the claims of nationality and neglecting the importance of humanity (Melleuish 1997:50)

As was outlined in Chapter Five, military personnel are particularly motivated to serve their nation state. The example used of the American soldier who refused to recognise the authority of the United Nations highlights this allegiance. It would seem that an identification with the nation state continues to be fostered in military academies with cadets being even less committed to the ‘world’ as a reference group after four years in a military academy (Priest, Fullerton et al. 1982:640). This is an issue that extends further than the habitus of military and police personnel, with national governments generally reluctant to commit national resources to complex interventionist strategies that are unlikely to produce quick solutions in the short term, or risk the lives of their armed forces for goals that cannot be clearly tied to core national interests (Lawler 2002:167). The experience of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces in Kosovo, for example, demonstrates the reluctance of militaries and their governments to sacrifice soldiers’ lives to protect strangers.

However, as this thesis has attempted to show, the military and police and the identities of the agents of state violence, are contingent on the structure of state authority and both are being shaped by global processes. As outlined in this thesis, the reality of the police role is that it does involve, for the most part, peacekeeping practices that require the exercise of discretion and empathy; useful skills for the international cosmopolitan agent of violence. The affinity between a peacekeeping and a constabulary role can be seen with the increasing numbers of police officers that serve as peacekeepers. Despite evidence of resistance by police personnel to accept this definition of their role, there appears to be a growing willingness by police organisations to define it in these terms.

Similarly, while many militaries continue to actively resist identifying with the constabulary concept, the emergence of cosmopolitan oriented militaries, including Australia’s, has occurred. Activities which signal an intensification of the international cooperation of the military include multinational peacekeeping and various joint military exercises (Kaldor 1999:139). Military forces world wide are performing a range of non traditional security tasks and their activities are being
constrained, particularly in peacetime, by the expectations of global social movements and the growing body of global norms and conventions. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and the Australian Defence Force have each begun to represent themselves as a ‘force for good’ and the New Zealand Army presents itself as ‘Kiwis armed to make a difference’ (Elliott and Cheeseman 2002:50).

The primary purpose of this thesis has been to enable people to better understand themselves and others which, as Elias points out, is the primary task of sociology. This thesis has undertaken to investigate the identities of ADFA cadets and AFPC recruits in the context of military and police identities more generally and even more broadly, processes of state formation and the monopolisation of violence as these processes impact on individual identity. Although highly embedded, there is nothing inevitable about the present structures in society or the individual identities, fossilised or otherwise, that structure society. As neither barbarism nor civility is embedded in human nature, there is every possibility that our descendants may fare better at structuring a monopoly of violence that serves the interests of humankind ... if we survive the violence of our age, of course!
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