Recasting the problem of self-concept change:
A self-categorization perspective

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australian National University.
ERRATA

p. 6, line 3: Change to “Using this methodology, Jones and his colleagues (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981)…”

p. 20, line 33: Add comma after “Elaborating on this idea”

p. 23, line 31: Add comma after “According to Mead”

p. 24, line 3: Change to “Over time, the child comes to see him or herself…”

p. 26, line 9: Add comma after “…the other early theorists”

p. 26, line 13: Add comma after “In his view”

p. 33, lines 9 & 14: Add commas after “In 1977”

p. 56, line 1: Add comma after “On returning”

p. 98, line 3: Change to “…must freely choose”

p. 116, line 4: Change to “Abrams et al., 1985”

p. 159, line 2: Change to “In contrast, the results for feminine traits indicate that the same behaviour (i.e., positive self-presentation) tended to have one effect on self-conception when it was elicited in an interpersonal context (i.e., it tended to produce a positive shift in self-perceived femininity here), and the opposite effect when it was elicited in an a setting that more closely approximated an intergroup context (i.e., it tended to produce a negative shift in self-perceived femininity here).”

p. 160, line 8: Change to “…in this previous research”

p. 161, line 10: Change to “The observation that self-deprecaters tended to apply negative neutral traits more strongly than self-enhancers (p = .051) can similarly be interpreted as a manipulation check.”

p. 164, line 4: Change to “In contrast, self-deprecaters women reported marginally higher group self-esteem (for men and women in general) than self-enhancing women.”

p. 166, line 24: Change to “Positive self-presentation tended to produce a positive shift in the individual level of behaviour condition but a negative shift in the group level of behaviour condition for self-perceived femininity, group self-esteem, and perceived choice over behavioural role.”

p. 197, line 19: Change to “Personal femininity depended on intragroup similarity and intergroup difference. The evidence also suggestes, albeit more tentatively, that social femininity may depend on the stereotypicality of one’s own behaviour and that of the ingroup and outgroup … That the social comparison information affected gender identity salience was also apparent at the level of social self-ratings, although the effects here were comparatively weak.”

p. 200, line 20: Change to “In judging one’s own personal femininity, what appeared to matter was behavioural similarity to the ingroup (irrespective of whether the participant and her group both behaved dependently or independently). Somewhat more tentatively, it can be concluded that in judging one’s own social femininity, what appeared to matter was normative fit at the level of own behaviour and group behaviour; thus participants who behaved dependently, or who viewed normative group behaviour, tended to report higher social femininity. Conclusions in relation to social femininity are, however, tentative due to the failure to detect statistically significant shifts.”

p. 212, line 12: Change to “The following general pattern emerges in Table 8.7 in relation to personal self-ratings: independent behaviour in males appears to confer slightly higher personal independence, particularly when the ingroup is dependent; however there is one exception to this general pattern: acting independently appears to decrease personal independence when the outgroup is dependent.”

p. 231, line 16: Add comma after “…within social cognition”

p. 232, line 15: Change to “…(among many) that”

p. 234, line 23: Change to “…male participants endorsed more”

p. 235, line 11: After “These results are presented in Table 9.2” add footnote “All reported differences in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 were statistically significant.”
DECLARATION

Aside from the normal intellectual debts inherent in all scientific endeavour, the research reported in this thesis was carried out by myself without the collaboration of others. This work has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

Rina S. Onorato
I am indebted to John Turner for the intellectual vigour with which he supervised my work. I am a better scholar for his example. His capacity for good humour and patience is the mark of a great teacher, and friend.

Many thanks to Craig McGarty, Penny Oakes, and Alex Haslam. You taught me that scholarly work cannot be undertaken in isolation. I thank you for the lively discussions which always allowed me to feel I had your support as well as your guidance.

My years of study would have been lonely and tedious but for the friendship and laughter shared with Brenda Morrison, Tricia Brown, Kate Reynolds and Angie Khoo.

The participation of literally hundreds of research volunteers is gratefully acknowledged.

I sincerely thank the Board of Fellows at University House for awarding me a University House Scholarship, which allowed me to enjoy the richness of university life and its creative energy.

For my parents, especially my number one supporter, my mum Vincenza, thank you for the warmth and love of family and the many meals that brought me so much respite and comfort. For Rosa and Angelo, Mary and Pino, you were always there for me, every step of the way; thank you for your willingness to help, your love and understanding.

Many, many thanks to my colleagues at Charles Sturt University for their support.

Mr David requires special mention for he renewed my confidence in myself and that is a very special gift indeed.

Rina Onorato
April 2000
This thesis redefines the nature of the self and the problem of self-concept change from the perspective of self-categorization theory. The emphasis is on examining the conditions that cause transitory shifts in self-perception. The relevant literature is reviewed to establish the dominant model of the self-concept, and the most important extant approach to self-concept change in experimental social psychology. It was established firstly, that the self-concept is often conceptualised as a schema – an enduring cognitive structure that comprises personally relevant trait terms; and secondly, that change is often attributed to the internalisation of new (or previously non-diagnostic) behaviour. These ideas are contrasted with an analysis of the self and self-concept fluidity derived from self-categorization theory. Self-categorization theory conceptualises the self as a flexible process of social judgement. The self-concept and self-esteem are assumed to be context-dependent properties of the perceiver, always defined in relation to others. In addition, the theory predicts that self-category content will change when the context shifts from a focus on the personal self to a focus on the collective self or group identity. What are the implications of this view for current approaches to self-concept change?

Studies 1, 2 and 3 progressively test the first primary hypothesis of the thesis, within the dominant self-concept change paradigm. The hypothesis is that the impact of overt behaviour on self-perception is mediated by self-categorization and social comparison processes. Each study provides some support for the general hypothesis. Indeed, the same behaviour was found to sometimes cause no change, a shift in the direction of the behaviour, or a shift in the opposite direction, depending on the social context of one’s actions. In Study 4, a different paradigm is adopted (one which does not focus on behaviour) to continue our examination of how social context causes change in self-category content. Study 4 re-evaluates the basic idea that the self can be treated like a personal schema. Importantly, the results indicate that the impact of a personal schema on self-perception is attenuated under conditions that make a diametrically opposed social identity salient. Furthermore, the results confirm that overt behaviour is not essential to self-concept change. Taken together, Studies 1 to 4 support the general conclusion that the self is variable, relational and context-dependent. The implications of the results for contemporary approaches to self-concept change, and for the self-schema model, are discussed and future directions for research are outlined.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and overview

I give my soul now one face, now another, according to which direction I turn it. If I speak of myself in different ways, that is because I look at myself in different ways. All contradictions may be found in me ... Bashful, insolent; chaste, lascivious; talkative, taciturn; tough, delicate; clever, stupid; ... all this I see in myself to some extent according to how I turn. (Montaigne, 1580/1967, p. 242)

For there is not a single human being ... who is so conveniently simple that his being can be explained as the sum of two or three principal elements; and to explain so complex a man as Harry by the artless division into wolf and man is a hopelessly childish attempt. Harry consists of a hundred or a thousand selves, not of two. His life oscillates, as everyone's does, not merely between two poles, such as the body and the spirit, the saint and the sinner, but between thousands, between innumerable poles. (Hesse, 1927/1963, p. 70)

1.1 Introduction

Scholars of every genre have found fascination in the psychology of the self, as illustrated by these excerpts. The essayist Montaigne and the novelist Hesse (author of Steppenwolf) each posited a multiplicity of selves that coexist, but compete for expression. In social psychology, as in popular folklore, the search for an adequate and precise conceptualisation of the self is a classic and persistent problem. It is this problem that constitutes the focus of the present inquiry. Two basic, yet fundamentally important theoretical issues will be addressed, from a social psychological perspective. Specifically the issues are firstly, what is the nature of the self, and secondly, what does the process of self-concept change entail? These questions are closely intertwined since one's definition of the self clearly sets the stage for any analysis of change.

1.2 The social psychology of the self

The social psychological literature on the self is characterised by a general acceptance of the idea that the self-concept can be treated as a stored mental structure, a cognitive "schema" or "prototype" (Linville & Carlston, 1994). This reflects the recent ascendancy of cognitive models in social psychology more generally (Markus &
Zajonc, 1985). To illustrate, Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984) define the self-concept as "one's mental representation of oneself ... a concept, not unlike other concepts, that is stored in memory as a knowledge structure" (p. 2, emphasis added). Similarly, in Markus' (1977) analysis, self-schemas\(^1\) are defined as cognitive structures that reflect the invariances people have discovered in their own personal behaviour.

In the process of delineating the structure of the self-concept, researchers have generally distinguished two facets, self-conception and self-evaluation, representing content and value dimensions, respectively. Self-conception is "a composite of characteristics associated with the individual and resulting from social interaction", while self-evaluation is "the subjective value placed upon these characteristics" (Breakwell, 1992, p. 3). The self-concept and self-esteem have traditionally been conceptualised as global and relatively stable individual difference variables. Much of the research on self-conception and self-evaluation has therefore focused on identifying the differences between high and low scorers on various personality characteristics or self-esteem scales (see Wylie, 1974, 1979).

Two popular paradigms for studying the content dimension of the self have been the Markus (1977) paradigm and the T. B. Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) paradigm. In the Markus (1977) paradigm, individuals are initially classified into groups on the basis of whether or not they have a self-schema for a specific behavioural domain (e.g., independence). Schematic individuals are subsequently compared to non-schematics on a range of cognitive tasks. This paradigm has repeatedly demonstrated that schematic individuals ascribe more schema-relevant traits to the self than non-schematics, are faster to say "me" to schema-congruent traits than non-schematics, are more confident in their endorsement of schematic traits, resist counter-schematic information, and have superior recognition memory for schema-relevant material. These findings are usually interpreted as evidence of the stable and enduring nature of self-schemata (Markus & Sentis, 1982).

In the T. B. Rogers et al. (1977) paradigm, participants are asked to rate words structurally, phonemically, semantically, or self-referentially. Incidental recall for the

\(^1\) In this thesis the terms “self-schemas” and “self-schemata” will be used interchangeably.
presented words is subsequently examined. The basic finding to emerge from this experimental paradigm is that words initially encoded with reference to the self produce superior memory to all other types of encoding. This finding is likewise often interpreted as evidence of the effective use of pre-existing cognitive structures (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984).

Research conducted within these paradigms has produced a vast literature that documents the consequences for cognition of having a self-structure for a particular behavioural domain (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). However, as pointed out by Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984), little is known about the processual component of the self apart from its role in information processing:

We have treated the self as an object of knowledge – as a mental representation of a thing that exists in the physical and social world ... We have had nothing to say about the self as knower, except, obviously, to identify it with the cognitive system that encodes, retrieves, and transforms information. But the matter of the self-as-knower is not simply a matter of information processing. Rather, it is a matter of the executive, the portion of the cognitive system that monitors and controls the rest and forms the basis for the experiences of phenomenal awareness and intentionality. We identify our ideas ... and our actions as ours. This problem of consciousness and metacognition remains the great mystery. (p. 40)

This distinction between structure and process (the self-concept as an object of knowledge or the Known, and the self as subject or Knower) is a correlate for the stability-change dichotomy that is central to this thesis. It should be noted however, that in distinguishing between structure and process, there is no intention to suggest that the issue of structure is separable from (or actually has been divorced from) considerations of process. On the contrary, the broad consensus is that the self is both a structure and a process (e.g., Gergen, 1971; Linville & Carlston, 1994; Markus & Wurf, 1987); investigators nevertheless differ in the extent to which they make structural versus processual aspects of the self their conceptual and empirical focus (Abrams, 1996).

It is conceivable that process-oriented theories of the self may more readily accommodate change in the self-concept than structural theories. At present however, the prevalence of structural models means that theorists are generally trying to account for change within cognitive-structural formulations. Consequently, even those who
explicitly state that the self-concept needs to be conceived in dynamic terms (e.g., Markus & Wurf, 1987) are constrained by their own assumptions about the self, and invariably conclude that the self-concept is minimally changeable. For example, Markus and Kunda (1986) state: "Drawing on current thinking about cognitive structures, we propose that, although the self-concept is in some respects quite stable, this stability can mask significant local variations that arise when the individual responds systematically to events in the social environment" (p. 859). However it is clear that in Markus and Kunda's opinion "This mutability or fluidity in the self-concept will be fairly subtle; it will not, under most circumstances, involve a major revision or reorganisation of significant self-relevant thoughts and feelings" (p. 859). Similarly, Deaux (1991) first suggested that the "recognition of multiplicity and of change is central" to her approach (p. 77), but subsequently concluded "Despite this flexibility in their use, identities are relatively stable self-constructions" (p. 86).

In short, there is a general consensus among contemporary theorists that despite some minimal fluidity, the self can be characterised as predominantly stable. To further complicate matters, the empirical literature is replete with examples of the self-concept's stability and mutability (see Markus & Kunda, 1986), therefore it would appear that the utility of any given theoretical perspective will depend on its ability to account for both aspects of the self and to make clear predictions about when stability or change is to be expected.

1.3 The unresolved problem of self-concept change

The problem of self-concept change has not been adequately addressed within social psychology (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Baumeister, 1998). Thus Burns (1979) concluded, "What self-concept theory lacks is an explanation of how change in self-concept, perception and behaviour can occur" (p. 11). Commenting more specifically on experimental social psychology, Hormuth (1990, p. 54) stated that "Only some isolated attempts have been made ... to understand the processes of change [in the self-concept]."

Nevertheless, to date social psychologists interested in self-concept change have invariably posited one of two mechanisms to account for variation in self-perception. The first general idea is that self-concept change involves a re-configuration of the
intrapsychic structures that constitute the self-concept. In this view the self-concept is typically construed as a conglomeration of stored mental structures, and the types of change possible include the elimination of a self-concept or the acquisition of a new self-concept, or the reorganisation of various facets of the self-structure (e.g., see Deaux, 1991; see also Markus & Wurf, 1987, p. 307). In particular the internalisation of new behaviours with the existing self-structure is considered to be a major cause of self-concept change (Tice, 1992, 1994). Indeed this mechanism is evoked to explain how self-concepts come to be acquired in the first instance, in addition to how they change (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; D. J. Bem, 1972).

The second view is that apparent changes may reflect the momentary activation or situational variability of different subsets of self-knowledge (Higgins & King, 1981; W. J. McGuire, 1984; Nurius & Markus, 1990). The basic idea here is that one’s recent behaviour and other situational cues will tend to activate self-structures that are consistent with those cues. For example, enacting extroverted behaviour can make congruent self-knowledge more accessible, and consequently, this knowledge can be weighted more heavily in subsequent self-reflections (Rhodewalt, 1998). Markus and Wurf’s (1987) notion of a “working self-concept” is one example of this type of mechanism (see also Hinkley & Andersen, 1996).

Both views assume that the self is an enduring structural entity. Both views also assume that behaviour plays a central role in producing self-concept change. To recapitulate, the role of behaviour is seen to be one of either directly causing change to the self-structure, or, of activating specific aspects of the self-structure. Either way, discussions of self-concept change are arguably premised on a reified model of the self-concept, and have tended to emphasise self-behaviour relations.

The assumption that self-concept change is due to generalisation from new (or previously non-diagnostic) behaviour has been tested in experimental studies which examine the effect of self-presentational behaviour on self-conception. In the currently dominant paradigm for studying self-concept change, the target person is induced to present him- or herself in a certain light, typically in the context of a dyadic face-to-face interview, and self-ratings are subsequently obtained. In so far as self-conception shifts in the direction of the behaviour, or alternatively, in so far as post-test self-ratings
include traits that are diagnostic of the target's self-presentational behaviour but that were not previously endorsed as self-descriptive, this is taken as evidence of self-concept change. Using this methodology, Jones and his colleagues have repeatedly observed that when participants engage in strategic self-presentation for the purpose of creating a specific impression of themselves, self-concept change occurs in the direction of the self-presentational behaviour. For instance, projecting positivity leads one to subsequently feel more positive in an unrelated context (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981). Despite the general support for the so-called "carry-over effect" from behaviour to subsequent self-conception, "the conditions under which these transformations occur, if indeed they do, and those under which the changes are maintained are unknown at present" (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984, p. 19).

1.4 Aims of the present thesis

The primary theoretical aim of this thesis is to develop an alternative theory of the social variability of the self. The theoretical framework that will guide us, and that in turn will be extended is self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). As we will see shortly, self-categorization theory rejects the assumption that the self-concept comprises fixed cognitive structures. Instead, it offers a process-oriented account of the self, one in which "change" is viewed as a normal outcome of the ongoing person x situation interaction that determines self-definition at any given time. Accordingly, the aim of the present thesis is not to study the self-concept as a relatively stable, long-term structure, or to study change in this underlying structure. Instead, the present thesis examines contextual variation (or short-term change) in the self. Our strategy will be to extrapolate from this to a preliminary analysis of long-term change, which will be presented in the final chapter of the thesis.

In addition to treating the self-concept as a relatively stable cognitive structure, previous investigators have invariably assumed that the self is always "set" or functioning at one level — the personal level (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). Thus it is not uncommon for researchers to describe the self-concept as "that individual and exceedingly personal, dynamic and evaluative picture which each person develops in his [sic] transactions with his psychological environment" (Burns, 1979, p. vi, emphasis added). More recently, Niedenthal and Beike (1997) defined the self-concept as "the mental
representations of those personal qualities used by individuals for the purpose of defining themselves” (Niedenthal & Beike, 1997, p. 106; emphasis added). Definitions such as these reflect the conventional view that self-definition is predominantly if not exclusively about individual differences. The tendency to treat the self in highly personalised or individualistic terms has meant that the notion of collective or shared identities has assumed little or no importance in many contemporary theories of the self (cf. Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Sherif & Cantril, 1947). Furthermore, the shift from personal to social identity (termed “depersonalisation” in self-categorization theory) has not previously been conceptualised as a legitimate mechanism for self-concept change by self researchers, and therefore has not been the subject of empirical investigation within traditional and contemporary self-concept paradigms. The primary empirical aim of this thesis is to fill this gap by systematically investigating the consequences for self-cognition of variation between the personal and the social level of self-categorization.

Following the social identity tradition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), self-categorization theory states that social identity, like personal identity, can be a source of self-esteem. Commenting on the social identity view, Deaux (1991) points out that “This recognition that self-esteem derives from group membership is an important supplement to the more individualistic tradition of self-esteem research, which focuses primarily on intrapsychic experience” (p. 78). The question of how self-evaluation changes when self-perception shifts from the personal to the social level of self-categorization is therefore also of theoretical and empirical interest.

Drawing the above points together, the present thesis has three primary aims; first, to highlight the limitations of the long-standing tradition of equating the self-concept with stable psychological structures; second, to examine the conditions which produce self-definition in terms of shared group membership or social identity, in addition to and as opposed to personal identity; and third, to examine the implications of this distinction between personal and social identity for current approaches to self-concept change. More generally, the thesis aims to demonstrate that there is much to be gained from bringing an intergroup relations perspective to the study of the nature and functioning of the self-concept.
1.5 Overview

1.5.1 Theoretical chapters

Chapter 2 will review early approaches to the self with the aim of examining the extent to which the early theorists viewed the self-concept as a social product. In Chapter 3, we will update the historical review by discussing the recent proliferation of social-cognitive models of the self-concept. It will become clear from this update that in many respects modern approaches have moved away from the basic premise which guided the early theorists, namely, that the self is inherently social. In particular, we will see that the view that the self and the other are mutually defining has been replaced by the popular view of the self-concept as a separate or bounded entity defined in opposition to others.

Although most contemporary self theories "comment" on the relative stability and fluidity of the self-concept, there is no major theory of self-concept change within social psychology. On the contrary, theories emphasise stability as a general rule. Nevertheless, it is possible to "extract" from the existing theories the implications for understanding change (as illustrated by Hormuth, 1990). This will be our strategy in Chapter 4, when we come to consider various social psychological contributions to the problem of self-concept change. We will also review empirical evidence of self-concept change, with a view to further distilling the current state of knowledge in this area.

In Chapter 5 an analysis of the social variability of the self which has been derived from self-categorization theory will be presented in full. At this stage it will suffice to introduce three basic points of the theory. First, self-categorization theory states that the self-concept does not exist as a latent stored cognitive structure (or set of structures), but rather, self-concepts take the form of self-categorizations that represent the perceiver in context. Second, it states that the self as part of its normal variation is not just personal – the self has more inclusive levels and this is a basic function of its variation (Turner et al., 1994). Third, it states that self-concept change is, broadly speaking, due to the flexible nature of categorical judgment rather than to the differential activation or the re-configuration of pre-existing self-structures.

To elaborate on the first point, in self-categorization theory the self is defined as "the expression of a dynamic [reflexive] process of social judgement" (Turner et al., 1994, p. 8).
It is argued that self-concepts take the form of self-categories - "cognitive groupings of self and some class of stimuli as identical and different from some other class" (Turner et al., 1994, p. 454). Thus, from the perspective of self-categorization theory, the term "self-concept" is used to refer to one's current self-categorization, the variable and context-dependent product of this "dynamic [reflexive] process of social judgement". Traditionally, the term self-concept has implied a long-term knowledge structure, which represents "me" and differentiates "me" from "not me". In contrast, self-categorization theory rejects the view that there is an enduring, one-to-one correspondence between a particular preformed cognitive structure (or set of structures) and the self-concept. Self-categorization theory should not be misunderstood as denying the existence of long-term knowledge structures in memory. Undoubtedly this complex knowledge base includes information about the self. However, a critical point from this perspective is that this long-term knowledge (like other cognitive resources, such as values, norms, and ideologies) is recruited flexibly when we come to categorize self and others (Turner et al., 1994). Sometimes one's current self-categorization will be consistent with aspects of that long-term knowledge (e.g., my current self-category may confirm the knowledge that I have behaved independently on numerous occasions in the past), but the point is: one's current self-categorization need not be consistent with stored knowledge about past instantiations of the self, because the traditional assumption of a pre-existing cognitive structure called the "self-concept" has been abandoned. From the perspective of self-categorization theory, the self-concept is fluid, and this fluidity characterises its normal functioning.

Secondly, self-categorization theory draws a distinction between the personal and the social level of self-categorization. Personal identity is said to come to the fore when the individual is implicitly or explicitly comparing him- or herself to other ingroup members, while social identity is said to come to the fore when the individual is implicitly or explicitly comparing his or her own group to a psychologically relevant outgroup. Importantly, both personal and social identity are considered to be inextricably social in terms of their origin and functioning. In addition, personal and social identity are viewed as equally valid and important expressions of self. By contrast, previous researchers have assumed that the personal self is the "true" self (at least in North American culture) and have treated personal identity as the "basic level"
of self-categorization (in Roschian terminology) (e.g., Simon, 1993; cf. Turner et al., 1987).

Importantly, the psychological group is implicated in both personal and social identities. Indeed, it will be argued (somewhat paradoxically) that a private, subjective sense of self is made possible because of the psychological reality of the social group. That is, at some level, the psychological group (in the general sense of "society" or in the more particular sense of a specific group membership) is implicated in the experience of all self-concepts, irrespective of whether they are based on global or specific judgments at the personal or group level.

Thirdly, the theory explains variation in self-conception as a function of the categorization process rather than change to cognitive structure or the activation of pre-existing structure. From this perspective, self-concept change always reflects change in the implicit or explicit psychological context at the time of judgement. In particular, the perceiver's categorization of self vis-à-vis others at any given time is said to reflect the interaction between three key variables: (a) the observed comparative relations between self and others, (b) "the social meaning of differences between people in terms of the normative and behavioural content of their actions (Oakes, 1987)" (Turner & Oakes, 1989, pp. 241-243)², and (c) the perceiver's readiness to use or apply a certain categorization of self and others, which in turn depends on his or her past experience, and current motives and values.

As well as expounding the self-categorization approach, Chapter 5 selectively reviews empirical research conducted within the self-categorization theory framework. The empirical review will mainly focus on evidence of depersonalisation, given that the empirical program of this thesis was designed to investigate this type of variation in self-category content, within dominant self-concept paradigms.

1.5.2 Empirical chapters
Chapters 6 to 9 present the formal empirical analysis. In line with the central theoretical arguments derived from self-categorization theory, the research strategy was to show

² All emphases are in the original unless otherwise stated.
that variation in self-conception and self-evaluation is mediated by level of self-categorization. The first three studies of the thesis were located within the dominant self-concept change paradigm. Thus self-presentational behaviour was elicited in an interview context, and the impact of that behaviour on self-perception was subsequently assessed.

In Study 1 (Chapter 6) self-presentational behaviour and the context of one’s behaviour were manipulated in order to test whether the effect of behaviour depends on how the self is categorized in the context of the experiment. The expectation was that self-presentational behaviour which is elicited (and therefore presumably interpreted) in an intragroup context should tend to affect personal self-conception and personal self-evaluation more so than one's self-conception and self-evaluation as a group member. Conversely, self-presentational behaviour that is elicited (and therefore presumably interpreted) in an intergroup context should tend to affect one's self-conception and self-evaluation as a group member more so than one's self-conception and self-evaluation as a unique person. In other words, where behaviour "fits" a relevant social identity, that identity should become salient. By the same token, the perceiver should come to view the behaviour as an expression of that salient identity. Study 1 provided a preliminary test of this hypothesis.

Studies 2 and 3 (Chapters 7 and 8) used more ambitious experimental designs to further examine the general proposition that self-categorization and social comparison processes will mediate the effect of behaviour on self-conception and self-evaluation. This time, participants were given an opportunity to compare their own behaviour to the behaviour of ingroup and/or outgroup members. The normative fit of others' behaviour was manipulated in these studies via stimulus videos that featured group members behaving in either a stereotypical or counter-stereotypical way. The question was whether the provision of a normative or counternormative frame of reference for social behaviour would modify the interpretation of one's own recently enacted behaviour, and hence its impact on self-definition.

Because Studies 1 to 3 were designed to extend the literature on self-concept change, they focused on the effect of behaviour on self-conception. From the perspective of self-categorization theory, however, overt behaviour has no special role to play (over
and above other situational cues) in shaping self-category content. While the question of how self-category content changes as a function of self-categorization processes remained the focus of the fourth study, unlike the previous studies Study 4 was not concerned with the role of public behaviour in that process. Instead, Study 4 (Chapter 9) investigated self-concept change in the context of the information processing paradigms of social cognition. As already noted, the Markus (1977) paradigm has traditionally been utilised to examine the information processing consequences of self-schemata for specific personality dimensions. In Study 4 however, we used the Markus paradigm to investigate whether the effect of personality on information processing is attenuated, or perhaps eliminated, when a competing higher-order identity is made salient. That is, do individuals with particular personality attributes come to describe themselves in diametrically opposed terms under conditions that make a conflicting group identity salient? Self-categorization theory argues that social identity salience should produce depersonalised self-perception relative to personal identity salience. This hypothesis was tested in Study 4 of the thesis.

The empirical program thus examines whether self-conception and self-evaluation vary in important ways as a function of the level at which the self is categorized. From the perspective of self-categorization theory, self-concept change is a much more complex matter than straightforward inference or generalisation from past behaviour. In particular, the empirical studies of the thesis aim to illustrate the role of the psychological group in shaping self-category content (including behavioural, cognitive and evaluative aspects). In Chapter 10 we will discuss the implications of the major findings for current conceptualisations of the self-concept and theories of self-concept change, and the directions they suggest for future research, not only within the discipline of social psychology, but also the neighbouring disciplines.

Turning now to Chapter 2, we trace the history of self-concept research from the writings of the early American theorists at the turn of the century to the 1970s, when social cognition came to dominate the scene. The question of whether the self is a mental structure or a psychological process preoccupied the early theorists. Its relevance to the current problem is clear – those that adhere to structural models make a fundamental assumption that automatically places constraints on the potential for cognitive change. We will suggest that the prevalence of structural models has
restricted the type of question asked by social psychologists. This may explain why knowledge about the process whereby change in self-conception is made possible is still in its infancy despite the field's long-standing interest in the self.

2.1.1 - Introduction

In 1961, C. G. Jung wrote "the essence of every experience is the helping of the soul through every painful process; every psychosomatic condition has a psychological basis." Despite the increasing understanding that our self-conception is central to contemporary psychology, the existence of the self (Conway & McEwan, 1994; Kitchener & Copping, 1994; Markus & Nurius, 1986) has only recently been discussed in relation to the development of the self. This is true despite the fact that the self is a central construct in the study of social psychology.

The study of the self can be traced back to ancient times, with early theories of the self

However, despite the term "self-conception" being used in the 21st century, the study of the self is still in its infancy despite the field's long-standing interest in the self. This is true despite the fact that the self is a central construct in the study of social psychology.

Theorists such as William James and Jean-Paul Sartre have had a profound influence on the study of the self. The concept of the self was developed by many thinkers, including William James, who argued that the self is the sum of all the experiences we have had. In contrast, Jean-Paul Sartre argued that the self is the individual's consciousness of itself. This is true despite the fact that the self is a central construct in the study of social psychology.
Chapter 2

The study of the social self: A historical perspective

2.1 Introduction

In 1943 Gordon Allport wrote "the existence of one's own self is the one fact of which every mortal person – every psychologist included – is perfectly convinced" (p. 451). Despite the consensual understanding that we all possess "a self", contemporary social psychologists continue to debate the nature of the self (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Markus & Wurf, 1987). How did the early theorists conceive of the self, and to what degree have their ideas shaped current conceptualisations? The aim of this chapter is to place the topic of the social self in a historical context.

The study of the self can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy (Harter, 1996), however the term "self-concept" (as currently used by social psychologists) is only of twentieth-century origin (Burns, 1979; Wells & Marwell, 1976). Our historical review will therefore be restricted to relevant developments in the last century. Reviews of the history of the self prior to the turn of the century are available elsewhere (Baumeister, 1987; Diggory, 1966; Hattie, 1992; Logan, 1987).

Theorists such as William James and the sociologists James Mark Baldwin, Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead had a particularly significant impact on the self literature. The perspectives of the early theorists will be presented here as a general conceptual backdrop to the thesis. In particular, we are interested in what the early theorists had to say about the social basis of the self. In what sense is the self "social"? In other words, how did the early theorists conceive the relationship between the self and the other, or the individual and society? We will see that several important ideas emerged from the early self theories, foremost among them the ideas that the self is always defined in relation to others, and that groups, society, or the collective aspect of social life, can come to be internalised and represented in individuals' minds.
In the ensuing chapters it will become clear that this understanding also constitutes the theoretical starting point of the present work.

In addition to the contributions of the early American theorists, even a brief historical account of the development of self theory such as this must include mention of the influence of the psychoanalytic theorists, the ego psychologist Gordon Allport, and the phenomenological perspectives which dominated the field up to the time of Wylie's (1974, 1979) seminal reviews.

2.2 William James

Early in the history of American psychology, there was considerable interest in the self, as highlighted by the publication of Principles of psychology by William James (1890/1950) (a treatise that was revised in Psychology: The briefer course, 1892/1961). W. James (1950) is perhaps best known for his distinction between the Me (the self as Known) and the I (the self as Knower). This distinction was critical to his analysis:

"We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, an objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought and recognised as continuing in time. Hereafter let us use the words Me and I for the empirical person and the judging Thought." (p. 371)

In other words, the Me was the structure or object of experience, while the I was the process or subject of experience. Importantly, the Me and the I were not separate but "discriminated aspects" of the same entity (Gergen, 1971; Wells & Marwell, 1976).

Elaborating on the nature of the Me self, W. James (1950) perceived it as "a fluctuating material. The same object being sometimes treated as a part of me, at other times as simply mine, and then again as if I had nothing to do with it at all" (p. 291). W. James claimed that we divide the whole universe into two halves, "me" and "not me", and in the broadest possible sense, the Me self is the sum total of all that one can call his or hers.

For W. James, the Me Self comprised three subsidiary parts: the Material Me, the Social Me, and the Spiritual Me. The material Me comprises one's body, clothes, immediate family, home, property and possessions; in short, the Material Me is everything
objective that can be called mine (Goodwin, 1965). W. James (1950) argued that on losing a possession to which we feel attached, we feel "a sense of the shrinkage of our personality" (p. 293).

Of greater interest here though, is W. James' notion of the Social Me. This is where W. James most clearly postulated the social basis of the self. The Social Me in W. James' theory is the recognition a person gets from his or her acquaintances. Social selves (like material selves) clearly serve social ends in that these selves can bring the individual honour, influence, power, and so on (Burns, 1979). Wells and Marwell (1976) made the observation that W. James almost seemed to locate this sense of self in the minds of other people, rather than the perceiver. Thus W. James (1950, p. 294) wrote:

>a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognise him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him. But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares.

Here W. James hints at the view that through identification with individuals and groups, others can become a part of the self, however he does not go further towards explicating the process which underlies this merging of "self" and "other". In addition, it is here, in discussing the Social Me, that W. James argues most cogently for the multiplicity of selves, suggesting that a different Social self exists for each audience (Schlenker, 1980):

[A person] generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups. Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. (W. James, 1950, p. 294)

W. James thus claimed that different selves are expressed in different contexts. He went on to assert that the inherent contradictions can, but need not be, a source of distress for the individual. For example, an alcoholic husband who is trying to conceal a drinking problem from his wife may well experience what W. James described as "a discordant splitting" (p. 294). However, when the contradiction is contained in distinct self-conceptions or clearly demarcated social roles, "as where one tender to his children is
stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command" (p. 294), there need not be any resultant stress.

W. James was less explicit about the exact nature of the Spiritual Me, but in general terms it referred to inner psychic qualities such as volition and the capacity for emotion or desire. In short, for W. James the Spiritual Me was the quality of seeming to be active: "The very core and nucleus of our self, as we know it, ... is the sense of activity which certain inner states possess" (1961, p. 48).

As pointed out by Harter (1996), in thus discussing the three constituents of the Me, the Material, the Social and the Spiritual, W. James paved the way for future discussions of the multidimensional and hierarchical structure of the self-concept (e.g., see Marsh, 1990). He argued that the various selves are arranged in a hierarchy according to their implications for self-esteem. W. James reasoned that the Material Me occupied the bottom tier of the hierarchy (at least for most people), while the Social Me occupied the next position in that friends and human ties should matter more than physical or material aspects of the self. The Spiritual Self was considered to be the most important tier; it should be defended at all costs. Nevertheless, there were bound to be individual differences in the worth attached to the Spiritual Me: "it is probable that individuals differ a good deal in the degree in which they are haunted by this sense of an ideal spectator" (W. James, 1961, p. 60).

W. James (1950) also dealt explicitly with the notion of self-esteem: "there is a certain average tone of self-feeling which each one of us carries about with him [sic]" (p. 306). Self-esteem was defined as the ratio of our successes (or actual achievements) to our pretensions (or aspirations). Like the "fluctuating material" of the Me self, self-esteem was similarly conceived as a barometer which "rises and falls from one day to another" (p. 307). Importantly, our self-esteem reflects where we stand in relation to others in important behavioural domains. Thus in a self-reflective passage W. James explained that his identity as a psychologist was so central to his being that he would be mortified if others knew more psychology than he; on the other hand he was content to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek, for which he had no "pretensions".
W. James (1961) acknowledged that despite its multiplicity, the self can be experienced as stable. According to W. James, the fact that the Me of yesterday appears to have a certain sameness, stability or continuity with the Me of today presents no special mystery:

my personal identity is just like the sameness predicated of any other aggregate thing. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in essential respects, or on the continuity of the phenomena compared. And it must not be taken to mean more than these grounds warrant or treated as a sort of metaphysical or absolute Unity in which all differences are overwhelmed. (p. 69)

He likewise opined that the I self is not a fixed or absolute identity at different times. He based his conclusion on the premise that the changing states of consciousness represent real change that should not be discounted:

If there were no passing states of consciousness, then indeed we might suppose an abiding principle ... to be the ceaseless thinker in each one of us. But if the states of consciousness be accorded as realities, no such ‘substantial’ identity in the thinker need be supposed. (1961, p. 69)

Thus for W. James, the sense of continuity in the self was a functional rather than a substantive aspect of the stream of experience (Goodwin, 1965). Each experiential moment “appropriates” each previous moment; the knower is thus embedded in what is known (Allport, 1955). In this way, W. James tried to avoid a homunculus view of the self, asserting that “Metaphysics or theology may prove the soul to exist; but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous” (W. James, 1961, p. 70).

2.3 James Mark Baldwin

Less than a decade after Principles, J. M. Baldwin published Social and ethical interpretations in mental development (1897/1902). In James’ theory, the Social self was just one component of the total self. J. M. Baldwin, on the other hand, considered the self in all its aspects a social and cultural product (S. Rosenberg, 1988). The social self was referred to as the "socius". Interestingly, J. M. Baldwin saw no need to differentiate personality from the social self: "I do not see ... how the personality ... can be expressed in any but social terms" (p. 27). The social self in J. M. Baldwin's theory consisted of two parts: the ego and the alter, or the self and the other. However, just as
W. James argued that the Thinker and the Thoughts are not separate entities, J. M. Baldwin made a similar argument this time with respect to the ego (self) and the alter (other). The ego in J. M. Baldwin's theory refers to the thoughts you have about yourself; the alter refers to the thoughts you have about other people you know or that you can imagine (S. Rosenberg, 1988). According to J. M. Baldwin (1902), self and other were part of a whole; together they made up a “bipolar” self (the social self or socius) with ego at one pole and alter at the other (pp. 15-16):

If it be true ... that what the person thinks as himself is a pole or terminus at one end of an opposition in the sense of personality generally, and that the other pole or terminus is the thought he has of the other person, the 'alter', then it is impossible to isolate his thought of himself at any time and say that in thinking of himself he is not essentially thinking of the alter also.

Throughout his treatise, J. M. Baldwin (1902) emphasised that the self does not develop in a social vacuum; that is, “The banks are not the river, but where is the river-course without banks?” (p. 8). The interrelatedness of the ego and the alter implies that one can not have an attitude toward the other that one can not have toward oneself, and further, that knowledge of the other is constrained by knowledge of the self (Kahlbaugh, 1993).

J. M. Baldwin provided an account of the social genesis of the self. He argued that the ego and the alter formed simultaneously in a child. Baldwin maintained than social interaction plays an essential role in this process. He went further than this though, arguing that the primary mode of social interaction is imitation; accordingly, it was through imitation that a social self developed (Kahlbaugh, 1993). Imitation is an inherently social process since it presupposes the presence of others.

The 'ego' and the 'alter' are thus born together ... My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense of myself. But ego and alter are thus essentially social; each is a socius and each is an imitative creation. This give-and-take between the individual and his fellows, looked at generally, we may call the Dialectic of Personal Growth. (J. M. Baldwin, 1902, p. 15)

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1 One limitation of the postulated “self-other” continuum would appear to be that it does not allow for the possibility that the self can be defined in terms of those outside the individual doing the perceiving. This is a point that we will return to in Chapter 5.
Paradoxically, J. M. Baldwin thus held that imitation is the source of individuality. However J. M. Baldwin was adamant that the self and other will not be exact copies; on the contrary, each imitative act becomes redefined in the context of the imitator (Kahlbaugh, 1993). The child learns through imitation that "it is he who varies the copy by trying to reproduce it; that he turns out interesting combinations which are his own peculiar property" (J. M. Baldwin, 1902, p. 113). The self which thus emerges is a perception of self as distinct from other people.

J. M. Baldwin (1902) stressed the role played by assimilation and accommodation in shaping the self, and the interplay between social influence ("suggestion") and innate propensities ("habit") in self development. The real self comprised both; it was not simply what was stored in the cognitive system:

The character which he shows actively at any time is due to these two factors in union. One of them is no more himself than the other. He is the outcome of 'habit' and 'suggestion' ... Social suggestion is the sum of the social influences which he takes in and incorporates in himself when he is in the receptive, imitative, attitude to the alter; habit is the body of formed material, already cast in the mould of a self, which he brings up for self-assertion ... when he stands at the other pole of the relation to the alter, and exhibits himself ... as master of his own conduct. (pp. 31-32)

Once the self was formed, it was not a fixed entity. J. M. Baldwin took it for granted that self varied with the situation, and consequently, could be inundated with inconsistency:

His wants are not at all consistent. They are in every case the outcome of the social situation; and it is absurd to endeavour to express the entire body of his wants as a fixed quantity under such a term of description as 'selfish', or 'generous', or other, which has reference to one class only of the varied situations of his life. (p. 31)

Another interesting idea to emerge from J. M. Baldwin (1902) was the view that the social self varies as you extend the frame of reference to include increasingly dissimilar others. In this connection, he writes: "what school-fellow among his companions, what Rob Roy surrounded by the clan has not felt the socius, the common self of the group, come in to drive out the narrower ego of his relatively private life within the group?" (pp. 35-36). Elaborating on this idea J. M. Baldwin gives the following illustration of how the "sphere" of one's personality or socius can be expanded to varying degrees,
arguing that the process of identification with one’s alter may produce assimilation at one time and contrast or differentiation at another time:

We may always say, no matter what the details of the boy’s daily life are, that there is a circle within which his socius resides ... A fellow-member of his own school may be bullied in the school ... The bullying may be deserved. At any rate, his intra-social sense gives the other and older boy in the school the right to bully the younger ... But let the bullying be done by a boy from the other school – however just it be ... he is in arms at once. The other school is outside the circumference of his present social circle.

But a little later we find that we may draw a wider line. Let him come into some sort of relationship with the street-boys who represent no school at all; and let these strangers attempt to bully his enemies of the other school around the corner, and observe how the interests of the rival school at once become his own. His general school-socius is now active. And it includes all boys who go to school. (pp. 38-39)

2.4 Charles Horton Cooley

In his publication Human nature and the social order, Cooley (1902/1922) was somewhat vague in his definition of the self – “it is that toward which we have the “my” attitude” (p. 172). Later, however, he more clearly evoked the concept of identification in defining the self, stating that “The only question is, Am I identified with it in my thought, so that to touch it is to touch me?” (p. 254)

Cooley (1922) is best known for his notion of "a looking glass self" – the idea that our sense of self is derived from our subjective interpretation of how relevant others view and evaluate our actions and attributes:

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgement of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. (pp.184)

In other words, the looking glass self arises out of symbolic interaction between an individual and his or her primary groups.

Cooley (1922) consistently avoided any clear demarcation between social and other aspects of the self: "man's psychical outfit is not divisible into the social and the non-social; ... he is all social in a large sense" (p. 47). Unlike W. James who treated the
Material and the Social self separately, Cooley maintained that even physical or material parts of the self are expressions of a social process, since that which is "mine" can only be defined relative to that which is "not mine" (Wells & Marwell, 1976).

Cooley (1922) maintained that a sense of self always necessarily involves a sense of other people, whether it is "distinct and particular ... or ... vague and general ...; but it is always there. There is no sense of "I"... without its correlative sense of you, or he, or they" (p. 182). For Cooley as for J. M. Baldwin, the self and the other were inextricably linked: "Self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive social facts" (p. 126).

In addition to the personal or I self, Cooley (1922) argued for the existence of a group or "we" self. Although he did not elaborate upon the notion of a group self, it is clear that both the "I" and the "we" were considered to be intrinsically social and relational: ""I", "me," and "mine" ... always imply social life and relation to other persons" (p. 194). Similarly, he said "The group self or "we" is simply an "I" which includes other persons. One identifies himself with a group and speaks of the common will, opinion, service, or the like in terms of "we" and "us"" (p. 209).

Above all else, Cooley's (1922) fundamental premise was the continuity of the self with society. In this connection, he emphasised the importance of the collective aspect of the self:

I know of no good reason for looking upon the distributive aspect of life [i.e. individuals] as more primary or causative than the collective aspect. The reason for the common impression appears to be that we think most naturally and easily of the individual phase of life, simply because it is a tangible one, ... while the actuality of groups, of nations, of mankind at large, is realised only by the active and instructed imagination. (p. 42)

Cooley believed that society can come to be represented and experienced in the mind: "In order to have society it is evidently necessary that persons should get together somewhere; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind" (p. 119). For Cooley, all personal ideas, including one's personal ideas about the self, were intrinsically social. Cooley thus dismissed "the vaguely material notion of personality, which does not confront the social fact at all but assumes it to be the analogue of the physical fact" (p. 124).
Another important theme to emerge repeatedly from Cooley (1922) was the idea that the self was inherently contrastive, such that it could only ever be defined in terms of relative similarities and differences to like others, a point which is reminiscent of J. M. Baldwin's "Rob Roy" example. However in Cooley's exposition, the theoretical point is more clearly articulated. Cooley states that two things can only be compared in so far as they are similar at some higher plane:

Opposition 'between one's self and some one else is also a very real thing; but this opposition, instead of coming from a separateness like that of material bodies, is, on the contrary, dependent upon a measure of community between one's self and the disturbing other. (p. 131)

2.5 George Herbert Mead

In Mind, self and society (1934), Mead developed Cooley's sociological perspective further. Mead viewed the self as a symbol-dependent process (Wells & Marwell, 1976), and accordingly stipulated that language was the medium through which the self is formed. Mead stressed the social nature of the self: "The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure, as it arises in social experience" (1934, p. 140). Like J. M. Baldwin and Cooley in particular, Mead argued for the relational nature of the self: "The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group" (p. 164). The group was vital to the evolution of a self: "The process out of which the self arises is a social process which implies interaction of individuals in the group, implies the pre-existence of the group" (p. 164). He thus emphasised "the temporal and logical pre-existence of the social process" to the self that arises from it (p. 186). Elaborating on this point, Mead highlighted the constant flux of the self:

The self is not something that exists first and then enters into relationship with others, but it is, so to speak, an eddy in the social current and so still a part of the current. It is a process in which the individual is continually adjusting himself in advance to the situation to which he belongs, and reacting back to it. (p. 182)

Like W. James, Mead defined the self as that which can be both subject and object. According to Mead the "essential psychological problem of selfhood" was the issue of how an individual can get outside oneself (experientially) in such a way as to become an object to oneself (p. 138). Drawing from J. M. Baldwin, Mead argued that as children,
we observe the behaviour of significant others (e.g., parents, siblings), and we imitate such behaviour in our play. We begin to adopt these orientations, and thus learn to "take the role of the other". Over time the child comes to see him- or herself in terms of others' behaviour towards him- or herself.

An important idea to emerge from Mead (1934) was the concept of a "generalised other". According to Mead, the individual acquires the ability to take the role not only of a specific other group member with respect to himself as an object, but also of a group of (real or imagined) others. The self is not experienced directly as such, "but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalised standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs" (p. 138).

Importantly, Mead (1934) maintained that the social basis of the self does not preclude vast individual differences. He explained the emergence of individual differences, despite the common social origin of individual selves, in the following terms (p. 201):

The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms of the social process, and are individual reflections of it – or rather of this organised behaviour pattern which it exhibits ... – is not in the least incompatible with ... the fact that every individual self has its own peculiar individuality, its own unique pattern; because each individual self within that process, while it reflects in its organised structure the behaviour pattern of that process as a whole, does so from its own particular and unique standpoint within that process.

Interestingly, Mead (1934) did not attribute the unity, structure or stability of the self to a substantive entity. On the contrary, Mead rejected psychology's tendency to treat the self "as a more or less isolated and independent element, a sort of entity that could conceivably exist by itself" (p. 164). The source of stability in the self was the organised community or social group to which the individual belonged. He thus stated:

What goes to make up the organised self is the organisation of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community ... He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the attitude of the members of the community. Such ... is the structure of a man's personality. (p. 162)
Accordingly, Mead argued that there are as many selves (or personalities) as there are social roles for the person to play (Epstein, 1980; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984).

2.6 Interim summary
The early self theorists took it for granted that the self has a social origin. Importantly, the early self theorists went beyond merely stating that the self evolves from social interaction. They argued that the social context is built into the self in the sense that the self is always defined in relation to the other. Their most significant theoretical contribution was arguably their postulate that society could be represented in the individual; in other words, the other could become a part of the self. Whether it was termed the “Social self” (W. James), the “socius” or “bipolar self” (J. M. Baldwin), the “looking glass self” (Cooley), or the “generalised other” (Mead), the early self theorists all explored the complex links between the self-concept, the other, the social group, and society in general.

2.7 Freudian psychoanalytic theory
In Freud’s writings, the term “ego” was more or less cognate with self (Goodwin, 1965). Although Freud was writing at the same time as W. James and Cooley, his views on the self did not impact immediately since in his early writings he emphasised the id rather than the ego. In addition, the term ego as used by Freud was just one part of the self; the id (an unconscious, irrational structure that demands immediate satisfaction of its sexual and other instinctual impulses) and the superego (one’s conscience or moral critic) were other component parts.

It was in his later writings that Freud gave more attention to ego functioning. Freud defined the ego as “a coherent organisation of mental processes” (1923/1949, p. 15). The ego was the rational part of personality, a mediational structure that served to synthesise inner needs and outer reality. In fact, it is the ego that keeps the whole organism in touch with reality. The ego was believed to be partly conscious and partly unconscious (Freud, 1949). The ego, caught between the demands of the id and the superego on the one hand, and reality on the other hand, is in constant conflict. It employs various “defence mechanisms” to forestall or diminish anxiety. These protective devices shape the development of personality to a considerable degree (Allport, 1955).
The superego or ego-ideal, by contrast, represents the moral and idealistic standards that have been internalised over the course of personality development. This structure thus constituted the social aspect of the self: "Social feelings rest on the foundation of identifications with others, on the basis of an ego-ideal in common with them" (Freud, 1949, p. 49). For Freud, identification had a strong affective or emotional component, indeed it was "the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person" (1921/1945, p. 60). Despite the social flavour of the construct, the superego did not correspond to what the other theorists referred to as the Social self. In addition, unlike the other early theorists Freud did not deal so much with reflected evaluations like self-esteem but with much more active and potent processes like self-hate and self-condemnation (Wells & Marwell, 1976).

Freud argued that the foundations of character are established by the age of three (Allport, 1955). In his view the basic personality structure that has formed by early childhood is not altered by later events. Thus in Freudian theory, the ego and the so-called ego defences were essentially there to maintain a steady state.

Interestingly, Freud (1945) argued for a very different relationship between the self (ego) and the group compared to his predecessors, in particular J. M. Baldwin, Cooley and Mead. Freud taught that in the group the individual loses self-consciousness; the inhibitions that are normally in place are removed, and destructive instincts come to the fore. Freud stated that "libidinal ties are what characterise a group" (p. 54). He explained the profound mental change that an individual undergoes in the context of a psychological group in terms of "suggestion". For Freud, suggestion was influence due to intense emotional or erotic ties which limit personal freedom and preclude personal responsibility for one's behaviour (see also Turner et al., 1987, pp. 9-10).

The neo-Freudians, Adler, Horney, Fromm and Maslow, subsequently rejected Freud's view that sexual energy underpinned a good deal of behaviour. Instead, they tended to emphasise social ego functions like "superiority striving" (Adler), "self-realisation" (Horney), "self-fulfilment" (Fromm), or "self-actualisation" (Maslow). In the writings of the neo-Freudians, the ego was conceived as something that could act counter to opportunistic tension-reduction (Allport, 1955); a less passive self was thus postulated.
Apart from the psychoanalysts and the symbolic interactionists (e.g., Cooley and Mead), little work was done on the self until the late 1930s and early 1940s (Wells & Marwell, 1976). This general lack of interest in self-related constructs in the second, third and fourth decades of the twentieth century was due to the dominance of the behaviourist and functionalist psychologies (Wylie, 1968). Hilgard (1949) points out that the introspectionists struggled with the notion of the self; similarly, the behaviourists found “mentalistic” constructs such as the self scientifically untenable.

In the 1940s, there were a few personality and social psychologists who, like the psychoanalysts, were concerned to preserve the self's place in psychology despite the onslaught of behaviourism (e.g., Allport, 1943, 1955; Hilgard, 1949; C. R. Rogers, 1942, 1951; Sherif & Cantril, 1947; Symonds, 1951). Gordon Allport, in particular, played a key role in this regard (Wells & Marwell, 1976).

2.8 Allport

Allport (1955) credited Freud for playing “a leading, if unintentional role, in preserving the concept of ego from total obliteration throughout two generations of strenuous positivism” (p. 37). Allport (1943) argued for the acceptability of the concept of self in psychology, on the grounds that ego-involvement, or its absence, qualitatively transforms human behaviour. However, he decided that the terms “self” and “ego” had come to assume so many, varied meanings that it was time to start over with a “fresher label”. He thus coined the term "proprium". According to Allport (1955, p. 61):

The proprium is not a thing; it is not separable from the person as a whole. Above all it is not a homunculus. Proprium is a term intended to cover those functions that make for the peculiar unity and distinctiveness of personality, and at the same time seem to the knowing function to be subjectively intimate and important.

As the core of personality, the proprium transcends specific contexts (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984). While Allport thus had no trouble dealing with the Known self, he struggled with the concept of self as Knower, initially (Allport, 1955) admitting it as a facet of the proprium, but later (Allport, 1961) consigning it to philosophy (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Linville & Carlston, 1994).
Although a complete exposition of Allport's personality approach is impossible here, two dominant themes to emerge in his writings deserve mention. First of all, it is clear that Allport equated the real self with individuality. For Allport, uniqueness or individuality was the key to understanding personality. Allport considered the relationship between the individual and the group (or society) to be disagreeable in the sense that the group places constraints on the "real self", which seeks to express its individuality (e.g., 1955, pp. 34-35). In fact, Allport so stressed individuality and the idea that all behaviour and thought are characteristic of the person that he is sometimes classified as a psychologist of the individual, and criticised for ignoring the social context of personality (e.g., Goodwin, 1965).

A second theme to emerge in his writings that is likewise relevant to the present thesis is Allport's criticism of the emphasis in personality theory on stability rather than growth, permanence rather than change; in short, he viewed the traditional emphasis on being rather than becoming as a limitation. In contrast, Allport (1955) held that "Personality is less a finished product than a transitive process. While it has some stable features, it is at the same time continually undergoing change" (p. 19).

2.9 Phenomenologists

In addition to Allport's contributions in the history of self psychology, Gestalt psychologists, notably Kurt Lewin, injected their phenomenological methods and theories into general psychology (Wylie, 1968). In a nutshell, phenomenology involves studying behaviour from the point of view of the behaving organism itself. In other words, phenomenology is concerned with the perceiver's perception of reality rather than reality itself (Burns, 1979). Wylie (1968) points out that all personality theories put forth from the 1940s to the time of her review assigned importance to self-referential constructs, and furthermore, that from the 1940s onwards both phenomenal and non-phenomenal self-aspects came to feature in personality theory (the latter referring to self-aspects which are inaccessible to conscious awareness). During this period, four important contributors to the development of phenomenological principles as they apply to the self were Kurt Lewin, Combs and Snygg, and Carl Rogers.

Lewin's (1936) field theory illustrates the phenomenological approach (see also Matarazzo & Garner, 1985). In short, Lewin argued that motivated behaviour is a
function of the totality of positive and negative forces (or vectors) operating on the individual, together with his or her perceptions of those factors. Lewin emphasised the role of the psychological environment or life space in determining behaviour at any specific time. The essential property of a field is its dynamic nature. The life space was thus conceived as being in a constant state of flux as external factors constantly enter and leave it. Lewin conveyed his ideas and hypotheses using quasi-mathematical formulae. In particular, he postulated that behaviour is a function of the interaction between the person, in his or her current state, and the environment, as perceived and conceived by the person, an idea which translated into the formula “B = f (P, E)”. In addition to its dynamic aspect, another important aspect of a field is its equilibrium. It was argued that need arousal produces disequilibrium; this in turn motivates action that is designed to restore a state of equilibrium. To illustrate, the disequilibrium brought about by thirst (a need) will give rise to tensions which encourage motoric behaviour (e.g., walking towards the sink, turning on the faucet, etc.) until equilibrium is restored. Lewin’s system thus aims to both explain and predict human behaviour, by taking into account the particular vantage point of the behaving individual.

Combs and Snygg’s (1959) phenomenological approach to the self has as its basic postulate the idea that “All behaviour, without exception, is completely determined by, and pertinent to, the perceptual field of the behaving organism” (p. 20). Snygg (1941) characterised perceptual (or phenomenal) fields as “fluid and shifting; their phenomena are continually reshaped and given new meanings by the character of the total configuration” (p. 412). Despite this fluidity, Combs and Snygg state that a basic human need is the preservation and enhancement of the phenomenal self, that is, our own picture of ourselves. The phenomenal self was defined as “the individual’s own unique organisation of ways of regarding self ... It is the individual as he [sic] seems from his own vantage point” (1959, p. 126). Once established, the phenomenal self has a high degree of stability. Our tendency towards self-preservation leads us to deny or to reject vehemently, data inconsistent with the phenomenal self.

Carl Rogers (1951) likewise argued that the self-concept must be studied from the standpoint of the perceiving individual. He defined the self-concept or self-structure as “an organised, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the “I’ or the “me”, together with values attached to these concepts”
(p. 498). Clinically-oriented in his approach, C. R. Rogers argued that a basic congruence between the perceived self and both the actual self and the ideal self characterises the well-adjusted individual. Discrepancies between the actual self and the perceived self can lead to denial, while discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal self can produce negative affect. In contrast to Freudian psychoanalytic theory, C. R. Rogers' client-centred therapy emphasised the present context and the strengths of the individual, rather than his or her past and pathology (Matarazzo & Garner, 1985).

2.10 Ruth Wylie's reviews of the self-concept literature
Prior to 1949, there was very little empirical work done on the self-concept. Wylie (1974) presented a thorough review and a critique of literally thousands of empirical studies conducted up to the early 70s (see also Wylie, 1979). For present purposes, we will only highlight two features of this early empirical work. First, this work shared the assumption that the self is a unitary thing, a concept that can be brought to mind and objectified for the purpose of evaluation. In other words, the early self-concept research treated the self as an idea or "thing" that can be described, rated, and assessed using the same processes that one might use in evaluating other objects. In addition, this early empirical literature tended to equate the self-concept with self-esteem. We will see in the next chapter that the first assumption continues to characterise contemporary theoretical and empirical work. However, contemporary work has moved beyond self-esteem to consider other aspects of the multifaceted self-concept.

2.11 Conclusions
In this chapter a historical account of certain major contributions in the psychological study of the self was presented. Of particular interest were the analyses of W. James, J. M. Baldwin, Cooley, and Mead. The early theorists all viewed the self as an inherently social and relational phenomenon; indeed, this theme emerged more strongly in each successive account. In subsequent chapters of this thesis, it will become apparent that there are some interesting links between the early perspectives and the theoretical framework guiding the present work.

Against this historical background, in the next chapter we will explore the premises that guide contemporary theorists. Beginning in the 1970s, the upsurge of interest in the social cognition tradition in social psychology produced a different emphasis in the
psychology of the self. Currently, the self is conceived as separate from the other—an intrapsychic structure representing the core of personality (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984). As we will see, the social cognition approach has led the field in fruitful new directions. Despite the progress, it will be argued that there has been one unfortunate drawback: the current preoccupation with cognitive structure has diverted attention away from the field's early focus on the social basis of the self.
Chapter 3
Contemporary perspectives on the self: Social cognition and self-maintenance processes

3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to identify current trends in self-concept theory and research, and to highlight unresolved issues in the social cognition literature on the self. Our intention is to selectively review the theory and research that is most directly relevant, rather than to attempt an exhaustive review. We will begin by characterising the mainstream ("social-cognitive") view of the self-concept in contemporary social psychology. Clearly there is not just one view, however, it is fair to say that certain assumptions about the nature of the self are widely shared in social psychology (Turner & Onorato, 1999); our aim here is to uncover those assumptions and to examine them critically. On doing this, we will be in a good position to examine, in the subsequent chapter, how contemporary theorists deal with the issue of self-concept change.

3.2 The social cognition approach: An introduction
In the latter half of the 1970s, social cognition became the dominant approach in North American social psychology (McGarty & Haslam, 1997). Social cognition is an approach that reflects the interplay between social psychology and the information-processing paradigm of cognitive psychology. More specifically, social cognition research on the self has focused on deriving a cognitive analysis of the structure and functioning of the self-concept. Although the self-concept is believed to be similar to other constructs or concepts stored in memory (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984), it is assumed to be somewhat more complex, central and affectively charged than other concepts (Fiske & S. E. Taylor, 1991). Social cognition researchers currently converge on a view of the self as "a collection of at least semi-related and highly domain-specific knowledge structures" (Fiske & S. E. Taylor, 1991, p. 182). Two critical questions for the social cognition approach have been firstly, what are the different facets of the self, and secondly, how are the different facets of the self interconnected (Linville & Carlston, 1994). Investigators have brought many promising new research
methodologies to bear on questions regarding the self, including a host of reactive (e.g., Kuiper, 1981) and non-reactive measures (e.g., W. J. McGuire, 1984).

Comprehensive reviews of the social cognition approach to the self are available elsewhere (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; J. D. Brown, 1998; Fiske & S. E. Taylor, 1991; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Kihlstrom, Cantor, Albright, Chew, Klein, & Niedenthal, 1988; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Linville & Carlston, 1994; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Sherman, Judd, & Park, 1989). For present purposes, our particular interest lies in how the cognitive revolution of the 1970s came to popularise the view that the self-concept can be treated as a "schema" or "prototype". In 1977 Markus and T. B. Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (independently) published ideas that proved to be extremely influential, bringing the issue of self-concept structure to centre-stage. Their contributions will be reviewed in the next two sections.

3.3 Self as schema

In 1977 Markus introduced self-schema theory. Her starting point was to assert that the core self comprises one's self-schemata, the fundamental or most important self-conceptions (Markus, 1977; Markus & Sentis, 1982). Self-schemata were defined as "knowledge structures developed by individuals to understand and explain their own social experiences" (Markus & Sentis, 1982, p. 45). Markus and her colleagues did not elaborate in any detail how self-schemata form, other than to say that they are "derived from the repeated categorizations and evaluations of behaviour by oneself and others" (Markus & Sentis, 1982, p. 45). It is argued that individuals will only develop self-schemata about aspects of their behaviour that are important to them in some way, for instance their characteristic behaviours, or distinctive aspects of their appearance, temperament, abilities or preferences (Markus & J. Smith, 1981). Once a self-schema has developed, it integrates all the information known about the self in a given behavioural domain (Markus, 1977; Markus & Sentis, 1982).

Importantly, these core self-structures are assumed to be the most stable self-representations. The theory further proposes that self-schemata facilitate the processing of information which is congruent with the schema, and resist information which is incongruent with the schema (Markus, 1977). Self-schemata are therefore implicated in the maintenance of the self-concept and in cross-situational consistency in behaviour.
Despite the theory's initial emphasis on stability, more recently self-schema theorists have attempted to render the model more dynamic by introducing the concept of a **working self-concept** (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987). It is assumed that at any given time only a subset of the universe of self-representations is active in the working self-concept. The working self is therefore conceptualised as a temporary structure because its contents change. Moreover, in so far as the self-system is malleable, this malleability is largely attributed to the varying accessibility of the self-conceptions that surround the core elements (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Thus the revised model retained the ideas that self-schemata are stored and that they are the most stable self-representations in the self-system. Self-schemata were now further characterised as **chronically accessible** (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982) since it was assumed that they are the most likely self-representations to be activated in the working self-concept:

Core aspects of self (one's self-schemas) may be relatively unresponsive to changes in one's social circumstances. Because of their importance in defining the self and their extensive elaboration, they may be chronically accessible ... Many other self-conceptions in the individual's system, however, will vary in accessibility depending on the individual's motivational state or on the prevailing social conditions. The working self-concept thus consists of the core self-conceptions embedded in a context of more tentative self-conceptions that are tied to the prevailing circumstances. (Markus & Wurf, 1987, p. 306)

The empirical focus in self-schema research has been to study the information processing consequences of personal self-schemata (for reviews, see Markus & Cross, 1990; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Markus & Wurf, 1987). In the dominant paradigm, a pretest questionnaire is used to identify individuals assumed to have self-schemata in a particular domain — schematics — and individuals assumed to be without schemata in that domain — aschematics. The performance of these groups is subsequently compared on a range of cognitive tasks. To be classed as schematic in relation to a specific dimension or trait, one must both consider the attribute to be highly self-descriptive and important to one's self-definition. Markus and Sentis (1982) explain that "The assumption of these studies is that differences in the response characteristics of schematics and aschematics should allow inferences about the nature of the cognitive structure mediating the processing" (p. 50, emphasis added).
The study which is most directly relevant to this thesis is Markus' (1977) study of self-schemata about independence and dependence. Individuals who consistently rated themselves as very independent on a pretest questionnaire and who reported that this was an important part of their self-concept were classified as Independent Schematics. Dependent Schematics consistently rated themselves as very dependent and rated this trait as important. By contrast, Aschematics reported moderate levels of self-perceived independence, and rated the independence-dependence dimension as moderate to low in importance. At a subsequent testing session, participants completed a "me / not me" self-rating task in which response times for self-description were recorded. It was predicted firstly, that schematics would respond in a schema-consistent way, and secondly, that they would make schematic responses rapidly. Aschematics, on the other hand, should not display differential processing of independent and dependent words.

As predicted, Dependent Schematics endorsed more dependent than independent words as self-descriptive. However, contrary to expectation, Independent Schematics endorsed just as many independent and dependent words, and Aschematics (who should look neutral) endorsed more dependent than independent words. Comparing across groups, as expected, Dependent Schematics endorsed more dependent words than Independent Schematics, and Independent Schematics endorsed more independent words than Dependent Schematics.

For response latencies, Independents were faster to say "me" to independent than dependent traits, while the opposite pattern emerged for Dependents. Also as expected, for Aschematics there was no difference in processing time for the two sets of words. However, all groups appeared to be slower to say "not me" to dependent than independent words (although the relevant significance test was not reported). This observation is at odds with self-schema theory, which predicts that schematics should be fast to make schema-consistent responses (i.e., "me" responses to schema-consistent traits and "not me" responses to schema-inconsistent traits) and slow to make schema-inconsistent responses (i.e., "me" responses to a schema-inconsistent traits and "not me" responses to schema-consistent traits).

Markus, Crane, Bernstein, and Siladi (1982) replicated the findings about independence with respect to self-schemata about gender. On the basis of a pretest questionnaire that
implicitly established how individuals personally rated themselves on the masculinity-femininity dimension, Markus et al. identified Masculine Schematics, Feminine Schematics, Low Androgynous and High Androgynous individuals. Those individuals classified as Feminine Schematics endorsed more feminine than masculine traits as self-descriptive, had superior memory for feminine than masculine traits, were faster to respond “me” to feminine than other types of traits, and were more confident that feminine traits applied to them. A parallel pattern of results was obtained for masculine traits for individuals classified as Masculine Schematics. Low Androgynous participants did not display differential processing of gender-relevant traits, and thus were considered to be aschematic with respect to gender. By contrast, High Androgynous participants appeared to be equally schematic with respect to both masculinity and femininity.

Since the theory’s inception in 1977, a plethora of studies have been reported in the literature which apply the self-schema construct to domains as diverse as body weight (Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987), sex-roles (Crane & Markus, 1982; Krahe, 1989; Markus et al., 1982; Payne, Connor, & Colletti, 1987), social sensitivity (Sweeney & Moreland, cited in Markus & Sentis, 1982), assertiveness (Bruch, Kaflowitz, & Berger, 1988), exercise behaviour (Kendzierski, 1990), self-confidence for athletic ability (J. Taylor & Boggiano, 1987), and sexuality (Andersen & Cyranowski, 1994). In addition, the self-schema construct has been applied to many clinical areas, including depression, anxiety, Type A behaviour, alcoholism, and psychopathy (see Kuiper, MacDonald, & Derry, 1983).

Combined, these studies provide a range of converging evidence in support of the self-schema model. In several studies, however, support for self-schema predictions has been equivocal. For instance, trait endorsements are not always found to be schema-consistent, leading investigators to initially suggest that response latencies may be a more sensitive indicator of self-schemata (e.g., Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986). This position was later revised however, in light of evidence that self-referential judgements can take longer for schematics than aschematics (e.g., Krahe, 1989; Markus et al., 1987; see also Mueller, Thompson, & Dugan, 1986). Thus it appears that people “usually” make schema-relevant judgements rapidly (Fiske & S. E. Taylor, 1991).
Additional concerns can be raised with regard to the classification of experimental participants. Firstly, it should be noted that the two-tiered classification system described above has not been applied consistently across all studies. For instance, Markus et al. (1982) took extremity of self-descriptions into account, but dropped the importance criterion, when classifying participants into schematic and aschematic groups. Secondly, in order to be classifiable into Markus’ (1977) preconceived categories (schematic and aschematic groups), one must exhibit a high level of consistency in self-descriptions (either in the direction of independence, dependence, or neutrality) on the pretest questionnaire. Several research reports reveal difficulties in identifying these individuals, despite wide sampling. Once again this was apparent in the original experiment, where only 47.5% of the original sample was utilized (Markus, 1977). Similarly, in a study of body weight self-schemata as much as 83.2% of the original sample was left unclassified (Markus et al., 1987).

A further criticism can be levelled at what appears to be an inherent contradiction between Markus’ conceptual position and her operationalisation of personal self-schemata. Markus appears to couple an idiographic conception with a nomothetic operationalisation. To elaborate, Markus conceives self-schemata as highly idiosyncratic knowledge structures. If self-schemata are indeed person-specific, it follows that one cannot assume that the self-schemata of all “Independent Schematics” will feature the same trait terms. Nevertheless, empirically Markus (1977) proceeded on the assumption that Independent Schematics possess a consensual knowledge structure pertaining to independence, a structure that included the descriptors “independent”, “assertive”, “ambitious” and “aggressive”. Later, when faced with the results of her study, Markus appeared to resume her original theoretical stance, relegating this apparently “shared” aspect of self-schemata to the background. Schematic processing was thus interpreted as the expression of relatively “isolated” self-concepts – “representations ... that do not require mental links to concepts of other individuals for their meaning or use” (Niedenthal & Beike, 1997, p. 114; see also M. W. Baldwin, 1992).
In short, if self-schemata are indeed person-specific, it is arguable that an idiographic approach is needed to determine the content of particularistic self-schemata. Alternatively, if personal self-schemata are derived from socially shared knowledge structures, it is arguable that a more nomothetic approach is needed when operationalising the self-schema construct. These criticisms aside, the influence of personal self-schemata on information processing is now well documented:

individuals with self-schemata in particular domains: (1) can process information about the self efficiently (make judgments and decisions with relative ease and certainty); (2) are consistent in their responses; (3) have relatively better recognition memory and recall for information relevant to this domain; (4) can predict future behaviour in the domain; (5) can resist information that is counter to a prevailing schema; and (6) evaluate new information for its relevance to a given domain. (Markus & Sentis, 1982, p. 62)

3.4 Self as prototype

In the same year that Markus published her self-schema theory, T. B. Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker's (1977) self-reference paradigm emerged as another important development. T. B. Rogers and his colleagues were very close to Markus in their conceptualisation of the self as "a superordinate schema that contains an abstracted record of a person's past experience with personal data" (T. B. Rogers et al., 1977, p. 685). As a prototype or schema the self was believed to contain general terms (e.g., personality traits) and situation-specific aspects of self-perception (e.g., memories of specific behaviours and events) (T. B. Rogers, 1981). This structure is activated "[w]hen a person encounters a situation involving personal information" (T. B. Rogers et al., 1977, p. 678).

T. B. Rogers et al. (1977) more clearly articulated a point that was implicit in Markus' writing, namely, the assumption that the self-structure comprises the context against which incoming stimuli are interpreted. They thus stated (p. 678) that:

The central aspect of self-reference is that the self acts as a background or setting against which incoming data are interpreted or coded. This process involves an interaction between the previous experience of the individual (in the form of the abstract structure of self) and the incoming materials.

1 Similarly, it is arguable that the importance criterion for schematicity may be better judged on an individual basis for each participant, rather than by applying a universal criterion (i.e., a rating of 8-11 as an indicator of schematicity) across participants.
In other words, "Making a self-referent decision involves comparing the stimulus item with the prototype to determine if it "fits" into the structure" (T. B. Rogers, 1981, p. 196). T. B. Rogers later suggested that another way to think about the self as prototype or cognitive structure is to say that it is a fixed reference point:

[the self] is thought to function as a fixed reference point for the interpretation of personal and social information. The self appears to serve as an anchor point or immobile point of reference for deciphering and interpreting personal information. This follows directly from our definition of the self as a cognitive structure. (1981, p. 199, emphasis added)

The concept of a self-prototype has been inferred from at least three types of evidence (T. B. Rogers, 1981): enhanced memory for self-descriptive words, an inverted-U effect for rating times concerning personality judgements, and a false alarms effect in recognition memory. T. B. Rogers et al. (1977) demonstrated the first of these effects. These authors used an incidental recall paradigm in which participants made different types of ratings for a set of words. Semantic ratings required the participant to rate whether a given word means the same as a target word. The same participant may then rate whether another word is written in capital letters, a structural judgement. Other words elicit a phonemic judgement, which involves deciding whether a word rhymes with a target. The self-reference rating performed on some words involved the decision as to whether or not the word described the individual. When the rating task was done each participant had rated 10 different words under each of the four conditions (structural, phonemic, semantic, and self-referential). The strength of the memory trace for each type of judgement was examined using an unexpected recall task. Following Craik and Tulving (1975), the authors predicted that words which had been deeply encoded during the rating task should be recalled better than words with shallow encoding. As found previously by cognitive psychologists, T. B. Rogers et al. found poorest recall for words that had been judged on surface features and better recall for words judged for semantic features. The novel finding to emerge from this paradigm was that self-referencing produced superior recall compared to semantic judgements, a finding referred to as the "self-reference effect". Thus it appeared that the involvement of the self during encoding produced a strong and rich memory trace. In this paradigm, as in the Markus paradigm, it is likewise assumed that a central, pre-existing self-structure mediates self-referential judgements (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; cf. Higgins & Bargh, 1987).
More recent work on the self-reference effect has aimed to verify the depth of processing, to identify other component processes, and to discover the boundary conditions for the effect (for reviews, see Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Sherman et al., 1989). For instance, Lord (1980, Experiment 2) demonstrated that when participants are asked to form a mental image of themselves or other people interacting with various concrete objects, the advantage for self-referent recall disappears, suggesting that the self-reference effect depends on verbal processing. However, J. D. Brown, Keenan, and Potts (1986) subsequently challenged these results, reporting a self-reference effect even with imagery. In his rejoinder, Lord (1987) accounted for the discrepant findings in terms of procedural differences; whereas Lord (1980) exclusively used constructed (i.e., imaginary) images, J. D. Brown et al.'s definition of “mental image” included recollections of actual events.

Although the self-reference effect has been replicated many times (for a review, see Rudolph, 1993), some researchers have failed to unequivocally demonstrate the self-reference effect (e.g., Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988). In addition, several important criticisms have been levelled at the incidental recall paradigm used by T. B. Rogers et al. (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989).

Rudolph (1993) has recently discussed one methodological limitation. After an extensive review of research on the self-reference effect, Rudolph suggested that the semantic encoding tasks used in the original research were problematic. For instance, in Study 1 (T. B. Rogers et al., 1977), the cue question for semantic encoding was “Does this word mean the same as XXX?” Only the subsequently presented word (i.e., the one being compared to the stimulus XXX) was relevant to the unexpected recall task. This operationalisation of semantic encoding may have impaired the recall of critical items because participants had to differentiate between two sets of adjectives, half of which were synonyms. By contrast the self-reference task did not have this complication. In Study 2 (T. B. Rogers et al., 1977), the problem of interference in memory was addressed by employing a new semantic encoding task, “Is this word meaningful to you?” However, this new semantic task is still problematic in that it is known to produce low recall in incidental memory paradigms (Packman & Battig, 1978; cited in Rudolph, 1993). In summary then, Rudolph argued that T. B. Rogers et al. compared a
strong self-reference condition with two weak semantic conditions; thus the conclusion that the self is a unique cognitive structure may be premature. Importantly, it was not the semantic character of the original orienting task that was called into question; rather, Rudolph questioned whether this task is a fair control for the self-reference task. Rudolph (1993, p. 352) summarised his critique as follows:

there are a number of studies in which the SRE [self-reference effect] is fostered by the selection of comparably ‘weak’ operationalisations of semantic encoding tasks ... and that – in studies using these semantic tasks – the superiority of self-referent encoding should be attributed to specific characteristics of semantic control groups rather than some extraordinary mnemonic capabilities of the self as a unique cognitive structure.

Klein and Kihlstrom (1986) also criticised the self-reference paradigm on methodological grounds. Klein and Kihlstrom argued that within this paradigm, self-reference is confounded with organisation of stimulus input. The self-reference condition always involves a judgement as to whether each word is or is not self-descriptive; in other words, the task requires one to organise trait terms into “self” versus “non-self” categories. By contrast the semantic task requires the participant to judge whether a trait means the same as another word, where the comparison word is different on each trial; this prevents categorical organisation. The question, then, is whether the self-reference effect is due to self-referencing per se, or to the organisational activity that inadvertently takes place in that condition. Klein and Kihlstrom tested between these explanations in a series of studies. The advantage of self-reference over semantic judgements was eliminated when these tasks were equated in terms of their organisational properties.

Although these criticisms should not be discounted, the self-reference effect is only one type of evidence for the “self as prototype” model. In addition, using a different paradigm, T. B. Rogers and colleagues have demonstrated what they term the “prototype effect”. By way of background, these investigators reasoned that if the self is a prototype, it follows from previous cognition research (Rosch, 1978) that one would expect an inverted-U-shaped function relating decision time to degree of prototypicality of self-congruent trait adjectives. Previous research examining decision times to decide if a given stimulus (e.g., “robin”) is a member of a category (“birds”) has shown fast decision times for both highly prototypical and highly non-prototypical stimuli, while
stimuli in the mid-range of prototypicality have shown relatively long decision times. Initially, T. B. Rogers and colleagues had tentative expectations of finding the inverted-U effect for self-relevant versus irrelevant trait decisions. On the one hand, they reasoned that it was possible that non-descriptive traits may produce the longest decision times since these items are not represented in the self prototype; on the other hand, it may be that the self prototype contains clear cut examples of what one is and what one is not. This issue was resolved after several investigations by Kuiper (1981), Kuiper and T. B. Rogers (cited in Kuiper & Derry, 1981), T. B. Rogers and Kuiper (cited in Kuiper & Derry, 1981), Breckler (cited in Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984), Lord, Gilbert, and Stanley (cited in Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984), and Mueller et al. (1986). These investigators have consistently found that self-referential judgements are made more rapidly for words extremely high and for words extremely low in self-descriptiveness, compared to adjectives only moderately like the self. These results suggest that individuals are confident about who they are and also, who they are not. Moreover, like the self-reference effect, these data lend further support to the proposition that the self functions as a prototype.

Previous cognition research has also demonstrated that when a prototype is involved in a processing sequence, the probability of committing a false alarm in a recognition memory task increases as stimuli become increasingly similar to the prototype (for a discussion, see T. B. Rogers, 1981). The question was whether a similar “false alarms effect” could be demonstrated for the self prototype. In a study by T. B. Rogers, P. J. Rogers, and Kuiper (1979) participants rated themselves on some 84 trait adjectives. Three months later, on a recognition memory task involving the initial word list, they found that participants committed more false alarms for highly self-descriptive trait adjectives. However other studies by T. B. Rogers (1977) failed to obtain the false alarms effect, thus this paradigm has yielded equivocal support for the prototype model.

3.5 Interim summary
Markus (1977) and T. B. Rogers et al. (1977) stimulated much empirical research into the structure and functioning of the self-concept. The fact that the notion of “self-concept” has practically been replaced with that of “self-schema” in the contemporary literature (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984), is testimony to their influence. These investigators were instrumental in demonstrating how individual differences in the
cognitive content of the self-concept could be empirically investigated (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). Hence, in addition to the long-standing interest in trait personal self-esteem (Wylie, 1974), in more recent times researchers have studied individual differences in self-aspects as diverse as self-concept complexity (Linville, 1987), self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987), self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), self-concept stability (Kernis, 1993), self-handicapping (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985), self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1985), and trait collective self-esteem (i.e., self-esteem deriving from one’s membership in social groups; see Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

The perspectives of Markus and T. B. Rogers et al. clearly have a great deal in common. The major difference is that Markus studied domain-specific self-schemata (e.g., independence self-schemata) and accordingly drew conclusions about the information processing consequences of particularistic self-schemata, while T. B. Rogers and his colleagues preferred to study the self-concept as an abstract mental representation containing various trait descriptors, and accordingly drew conclusions about the effects of self-referencing in general. Whether a specific schema or a general schema, both perspectives focus on delineating the structure of this individualistic construct and its role in information processing. It is in this sense that the “self as schema or prototype” metaphor captures the mainstream social cognition approach to the self (see also Onorato & Turner, in press; Turner & Onorato, 1999).

Social cognition researchers converge in many of their assumptions about the self, yet a number of issues remain unresolved. These issues, including the formation, organisation, and activation of self-structures, and various measurement issues, will be considered next. Although our discussion will retain its focus on the contributions of Markus and T. B. Rogers et al., more recent contributions to the treatment of these important theoretical and methodological issues will be referred to where appropriate.

3.6 Unresolved issues in the social cognition of the self

3.6.1 How do self-structures form?

The question of how self-structures form cannot be answered apart from the question of what forms. How do we come to develop self-schemas, and precisely what is represented in our self-schemas? It is probably fair to say that the content issue has
stimulated more interest than the origin issue. In general, social cognition researchers have set about examining the role of self-schemata in information processing, leaving aside the issue of how these structures evolve or come to be stored in the cognitive system in the first place (Onorato & Turner, 1996; M. P. Taylor & Foddy, 1996). Segal (1988, p. 148) thus states: "A complete account of the conditions under which these representations are formed and what is being represented is still lacking in the field".

What exactly is represented in the self-structure? Social cognition researchers generally agree that two types of social information are stored in memory: abstracted judgements or inferences about a stimulus domain, and secondly, exemplars, which are essentially the raw data from which summary judgements emerge (Sherman et al., 1989). Accordingly, it can be inferred that the knowledge we have about ourselves includes both abstractions and exemplars (Abrams, 1996; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein, Loftus, Trofim, & Fuhrman, 1992). An abstraction may be an overall characterisation derived from trait attributes, or trait inferences derived from past behaviour (e.g., "I am an intelligent person"). Exemplars would presumably include specific instances of behaviour that are stored in memory (e.g., "I excelled at math"). Consistent with this view, most formulations conceive of the self-schema or self prototype as a structure that contains information about one’s traits, behavioural tendencies, and specific instances of behaviour or events (e.g., Kuiper & Derry, 1981). In addition, the self-schema includes cognitive procedures or “rules” for behavioural regulation (Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1985).

Having briefly considered what forms (i.e., the content of the self-schema), we can return to the question “where do self-schemas come from?” Several general sources of self-knowledge have been identified. For instance, there is broad consensus that the development of the self-schema is affected by learning, behaviour, and repeated experience with feedback from one’s social world (e.g., see D. J. Bem, 1972; Gergen, 1965; Markus, 1977; Rhodewalt, 1986). Trope (1983) points out that direct attempts at self-assessment are likely to also be relevant to self-schema development. For instance, people prefer to do tasks that are maximally diagnostic, particularly when they are trying to establish their abilities in uncertain domains. Others have demonstrated the role of social comparison in shaping self-perception (W. J. McGuire & C. V. McGuire, 1988; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Schoeneman, 1981; Tesser, 1988). For instance, it is
known that people choose comparison others strategically, preferring to compare themselves with superior others to evaluate themselves, and with inferior others when they seek to boost their own self-evaluation (e.g., see Suls & Wills, 1991).

Markus’ (1977) analysis assumes that self-schemata are derived from the repeated observation and categorization of one's interpersonal behaviour. However a number of questions remain unanswered. For instance, how many behaviours of a given type are needed before one can infer that one is indeed independent or creative? Is each instance of independence or creativity tallied up in a straightforward, additive fashion? Furthermore, how is any conflicting evidence dealt with when self-schemas are first forming? While it appears that behaviour will feature in any analysis of self-schema formation, the field lacks a satisfactory account of its precise role in this process.

One point of contention for researchers has been whether self-schema formation is due to the affirmation of certain behavioural tendencies (e.g., “I am independent”), the rejection of certain behavioural tendencies (e.g., “I am not dependent”), or a combination of these processes. W. J. McGuire and colleagues (W. J. McGuire, 1984; W. J. McGuire & C. V. McGuire, 1988), on the one hand, are keen advocates of the view that affirmation and negation go hand in hand in self-concept articulation. These investigators have found that not being a member of a particular ethnic group or of the opposite gender can be much more prominent than being a member of the ingroup. Accordingly, people often mention what they are not in their self-descriptions. Certainly, T. B. Rogers et al.'s evidence, in particular the finding of an inverted-U function relating decision time to degree of prototypicality of self-congruent adjectives, would appear to support a similar conclusion, namely, that it is both in affirming schema-relevant traits and in rejecting schema-irrelevant traits that a self-schema comes to be well-defined. On the other hand, Rudolph (1993) suggests that the notion of a self-schema, a structure filled with descriptive rather than non-descriptive material, implies that it is primarily through the affirmation of certain features that a concept of self evolves.

In relation to this issue, Markus et al. (1982) made their own position explicit in the context of a debate with Sandra Bem, concerning the question of whether people develop schemas for gender as a whole, or for either masculinity or femininity (S. L.
Bem, 1982; Crane & Markus, 1982). From Markus et al.'s perspective, feminine males and masculine females are considered to be schematic for femininity and masculinity, respectively, while individuals scoring above the median on both masculinity and femininity (defined as androgynous and therefore non-schematic by S. L. Bem) are classified by Markus as schematic for gender as a whole. Thus, by and large, Markus et al. (1982) advocate that it is through the affirmation of traits that a self-schema evolves:

It is probably true that knowing what you are will sensitise you to what you are not, but it is unlikely that you will have a very well-developed or clearly organised understanding of the characteristics that do not describe you. We assume that one who develops a self-schema with respect to femininity becomes an expert in femininity, but there is little reason to assume that this person simultaneously becomes an expert in masculinity – no more reason, in fact, than to assume that a thin person will have a well-developed sense of obesity or that an extrovert will have a well-developed understanding of introversion. (p. 49)

As a rule, social cognition researchers have adopted a two-pronged definition of a self-schema – a self-schema is indicated by extreme self-ratings on some personality dimension, and by high importance ratings. This operationalisation suggests that the issue of self-schema development requires that attention be given to two component processes; firstly, self-schema development presumably involves the accumulation of a body of knowledge that confirms the presence of a specific trait in one's behavioural repertoire, and secondly, self-schemata presumably only develop for areas that are valued or that carry some inherent interest for the individual.

With regard to the first criterion (i.e. extremity), as previously mentioned, it remains unclear how many occurrences of independent behaviour (for instance) are necessary before one can properly be said to have developed a self-schema for this trait, and whether it is through affirmation alone that self-relevance is established. Similarly, the process by which trait importance (or centrality) is established remains unclear. One highly plausible view is that importance reflects the individual's values, which depend on the person's reference groups. In so far as importance judgements reflect these shared (ingroup) norms, this implies that self-schemata are more than individual difference variables. It is perhaps arguable that even the most supposedly idiosyncratic and private self-referential knowledge structures have an element of sharedness if their
content is shaped at least in part by the social and psychological groups that one belongs to.

Some perspectives clearly acknowledge the role of others in defining the self. For instance, as Baumeister (1998) points out, social comparison theorists assume that "Being tall or short, smart or stupid ... are not absolute properties but are relative to other people. In such cases, self-knowledge can only be obtained through interpersonal processes and indeed implicitly involves other people" (p. 23). Similarly, a popular idea to emerge from sociological social psychology is that all self-knowledge is derived from social interaction (see Chapter 2). The latter tradition, which represents symbolic interactionist notions, clearly places a stronger emphasis on the role of the other in self-concept formation than contemporary social-cognitive models (Onorato & Turner, in press).

In summary, the field is clearly some way from fully understanding self-schema formation. Interest in this issue has waxed and waned. A recent, provocative account of the possible evolutionary basis of the human self-concept may well revitalise interest in this problem (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). However, it is likely that a fully adequate treatment of this issue must await a systematic review and integration of research on attitude formation, schema and concept development, social categorization, and developmental research on personality and the self.

3.6.2 How are self-structures organised in memory?

An issue that is somewhat related to the first is the question of how content is organised or structured in memory. There is considerable debate surrounding the details of how stored self-referential information is structured and represented in memory (Baumeister, 1998; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Klein & Loftus, 1993; Linville, 1987; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Niedenthal & Beike, 1997; Reid & Deaux, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1993). Is self-referential knowledge contained in one unitary structure, or a configuration of independent yet integrated selves (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984)? Are self-representations organised as a system of self-schemata (Markus, 1977), a prototype (T. B. Rogers et al., 1977), a hierarchical category (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984), an associative network (Bower & Gilligan, 1979), a personal narrative or "polyphonic novel" (Hermans, 1996), multiple concept bins...
(Wyer & Srull, 1989), latitudes of acceptance and rejection (Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986), or as locations in multidimensional trait space (Breckler, Pratkanis, & McCann, 1991)? The prevailing theories of representation have tended to follow developments in cognitive psychology. Most recently researchers have started to apply parallel-distributed-processing (PDP) approaches to the study of the mental representation of self-categories. PDP models represent memory as patterns of activation over a highly interconnected network of units (for a discussion, see Humphreys & Kashima, forthcoming; Linville & Carlston, 1994; M. P. Taylor & Foddy, 1996).

At present, one commonly held view is that information is stored in a hierarchical fashion in memory, with the most abstract or general information at the top of the hierarchy and the exemplars, specific instances or episodes towards the bottom (Sherman et al., 1989). Some investigators have accordingly postulated a general overarching self at the top of a hierarchy of more specific selves, each defined by prototypic features and exemplars (see Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). This view is clearly reflected in T. B. Rogers et al.'s (1977) model of the self, wherein the various components of the self (both general terms such as personality traits and situation-specific characterisations) are said to be organised hierarchically, "becoming more concrete, distinctive, specific, and less inclusive, with increasing depth into the hierarchy" (T. B. Rogers, 1981, p. 196).

In delineating the organisation of the self-structure, researchers often make a distinction between the core and the periphery, or between increasingly central self-aspects (Allport, 1937; Hormuth, 1990; M. Rosenberg, 1979; Sedikides, 1995; Showers, 1992; Stryker, 1987; Swann, 1983; Tesser & Campbell, 1983). For instance, Markus and Wurf (1987) distinguished core self-schemata from peripheral self-knowledge. Similarly, in T. B. Rogers et al.'s analysis (1977), some traits were deemed to be more prototypical (or central) than others. Core selves have been operationalised in a number of ways, as "commitment" (Hormuth, 1990), "prominence" (McCall & Simmons, 1966), "centrality" (Allport, 1937; M. Rosenberg, 1979), "importance" (Markus & Wurf, 1987), "identity salience" (Stryker & Serpe, 1994), and "certainty" (Swann, 1983). All these perspectives maintain that the perceived importance or centrality of the self-conception determines its changeability; self-concepts which are central to one's identity are particularly stable (e.g., Markus, 1977). Those investigators who postulate
the existence of core self-structures thus have a ready-made explanation for stability and empirical consistency in self-referential judgements.

Discussions of the organisation of self-structures also generally converge on the understanding that conceptually related information is stored in (roughly) the same place in the self-system. Markus and Sentis (1982) discuss the connectedness of the self-structure. They state that once formed, a self-schema integrates all the information known about the self in a given behavioural domain. However in their empirical program, Markus and her colleagues have tended to focus on the functioning of one particularistic self-schema at a time, rather than on the interaction between two or more facets of the self-structure. For example, it is not currently known whether Independent Schematics are also likely to be schematic for semantically-related dimensions, such as masculinity. This represents a major omission in the empirical literature.

In addition, although a few investigators have suggested that the self may even contain inconsistent facets (e.g., Harter, 1986; Jones et al., 1981), most perspectives assume that the self-system tends towards internal consistency, as far as the organisation of self-referential material is concerned (Aronson, 1968; Cheek & Hogan, 1983; Festinger, 1957; Greenwald, 1980). For instance, it is clear that in Markus' (1977) view, one cannot be both an Independent Schematic and a Dependent Schematic. With the exception of the gender self-schema discussed above, wherein Markus et al. (1982) stated that one can be schematic “for gender as a whole”, the empirical research suggests that as a rule, one cannot be schematic for diametrically opposed domains. It is similarly implicit in T. B. Rogers et al.’s self-referencing paradigm that if independence is deemed to be a prototypical trait, dependence is likely to be a non-prototypical trait.

Furthermore, in discussing self-schema organization, most theorists appear to agree that self-structures should be differentiated from non-self structures. For instance, implicit in Markus’ model is the fact that self-structures are qualitatively different to non-self structures. The term “possible self” is used to refer to future-oriented self-aspects (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Similarly, in Higgins’ (1987) formulation, the “ideal” self (the self we aspire to be) and the “ought” self (the self we feel we should be) are non-self structures, while the “actual” self is equated with the real self.
The issue of self-schema organisation can clearly be addressed either at the level of the individual schema, or at the level of the self-system as a whole. Some researchers have attempted to assess the structure of the entire self-system. In this connection, Linville (1985, 1987) has treated "self-concept complexity" (an individual difference variable) as a structural property. Linville uses a card-sorting task to delineate the relationship between different facets of the self-structure. Participants are asked to organise traits printed on cards, into categories or clusters. The assumption is made that the trait groupings that emerge reflect underlying cognitive representation. Linville defines complexity both in terms of the number of selves that are thus constituted, and also in terms of the degree of overlap of different selves. Her research suggests that individuals with several independent selves have a good buffer against stress, whereas individuals who have a small number of selves that tend to overlap are effectively "putting all their eggs in one basket", and hence risk suffering carry-over of negative emotions from one self to another. Along similar lines, Showers (1992) examined the relationship between self-esteem and the compartmentalisation of positive and negative self-knowledge. By "compartmentalisation", she meant that positive and negative self-knowledge is organised into separate uniformly valenced categories (rather than dispersed throughout the self-system). Showers reported that compartmentalised negativity was associated with high self-esteem for individuals whose positive self-aspects were important; in this case, as long as positive self-views are activated, access to negativity will be minimised. On the other hand, compartmentalisation was not beneficial to individuals with important negative selves; by contrast, these individuals benefit from having negativity dispersed throughout the self-system. Research along these lines has contributed significantly to our understanding of the organisation of self-knowledge, and the associated implications.

3.6.3 How are self-schemas activated?

Self-schema activation, or accessibility, is a complex issue. Accessibility can be defined as "the ease with which a bit of knowledge can be brought to consciousness" (Sherman et al., 1989, p. 292). Researchers refer to the activated part of the self (the part of which we are presumably aware) as the phenomenal self (Jones & Gerard, 1967; see also Chapter 2, for a related discussion) or the working self (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987). As a particular component of the self becomes more accessible, not only does that particular self-aspect influence information processing; in
addition, behaviour becomes more consistent with that particular self-aspect (e.g., Fazio et al., 1981).

A number of personal and situational factors are known to influence self-schema activation (J. D. Brown, 1998). One personal factor that affects self-knowledge activation is the **centrality** of the attribute. Core selves are generally assumed to be more accessible than less important self-conceptions (e.g., Markus, 1977). Thus, accessibility of self-knowledge may derive from the long-term use or chronic accessibility of certain constructs (Higgins et al., 1982). Affectively charged selves are also likely to be highly accessible. Thus, for instance, our ideal self or ought self in important life domains may be highly accessible (Higgins, 1987). Mood states are also relevant to self-concept activation (e.g., Natale & Hantas, 1982). In particular mood states affect the accessibility of positive versus negative self-concepts (J. D. Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998). A third personal factor that affects self-concept activation is one’s current goals, needs or values, in specific situations (Bruner, 1957; Higgins & King, 1981; Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; Wyer & Srull, 1986). For instance, in a job interview we bring to mind all our personal strengths and emphasise the traits that apply to the position, whereas in romantic settings we access quite a different self. High self-monitors and skillful impression managers are particularly adept at activating situationally-appropriate self-views (Snyder, 1987).

Social cognition researchers have also identified a number of situational factors that affect self-knowledge activation (J. D. Brown, 1998; Higgins & King, 1981). For instance the **social role** we are currently occupying affects the accessibility of self-referential knowledge (Jones et al., 1981). Besides social roles, other aspects of the **social context** are also relevant to self-concept activation. Interestingly, even an “imagined audience” can affect self-conception (M. W. Baldwin & Holmes, 1987). In addition, individuals who are in a heightened state of self-awareness (induced by the use of mirrors) are more likely to behave in a self-consistent way, and are more likely to exhibit behaviours that are in line with the ideal self (Carver & Scheier, 1985; Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977). Along similar lines, W. J. McGuire and C. V. McGuire (1988) have demonstrated that personal distinctiveness in one’s social environment tends to activate awareness of one’s unique attributes. In one study W. J. McGuire and C. V. McGuire found that 27 per cent of very short or very tall children
spontaneously mentioned their height (compared to 17 per cent of "average-height" children) in an open-ended self-description task. Different selves can also come to the fore in different physical environments, such as home versus school (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Linville, 1985, 1987; W. J. McGuire, C. V. McGuire, & Cheever, 1986). Social context not only affects the type of self-concept that is activated; it also affects self-esteem level (Morse & Gergen, 1970; Savin-Williams & Demo, 1983). Finally, recent life events can also affect self-knowledge activation (Deutsch, Ruble, Fleming, Brooks-Gunn, & Stangor, 1988).

Social cognition researchers thus acknowledge that accessibility can derive either from priming and context, from the cognitive structure itself, or from a combination of both factors. That is, accessibility may be due to "momentary priming or ... long-term individual differences in construct usage" (Sherman et al., 1989, p. 295). Within the Markus model, the currently active or working self-concept is clearly conceptualised as a temporary structure, a product of "momentary priming". However, the readiness with which self-schemata are activated in the working self-concept is attributed to the cognitive structure itself. One limitation of past research has been its failure to articulate in precise terms the mechanism by which a specific self-structure becomes activated in the working self (M. P. Taylor & Foddy, 1996). In addition, the question of what makes a self-schema chronically accessible remains unanswered. The implicit answer appears to be "the sheer amount of information stored in a self-schema". But to suggest that the existence of the schema explains its chronic accessibility does not shed much light on the issue. Is the alleged chronic accessibility of the self-schema due to the perceiver's extreme position on the trait, to the importance of the trait, or both? The issue of self-structure activation, and the distinction between "accessibility" and "chronic accessibility", clearly need further elaboration, particularly within the Markus model (see also Sedikides, 1990; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1990).

Segal (1988) raised a similar concern, commenting on negativity self-schemata. He wrote: "It is not clear whether these schemata (a) resemble traits and as such are stable and fuel enduring information-processing tendencies or (b) remain latent until activated and then begin to bias processing" (p. 148). In addition, Segal reminds us that "momentary individual differences in construct accessibility can produce temporary processing differences" (p. 149). This reasoning can be applied to Markus' model.
Specifically, it is not clear that her data demand the interpretation she places upon it. That is, her information processing effects may reflect momentary individual differences, rather than enduring and chronically accessible individual differences in construct use.

3.6.4 Issues of measurement

In addition to the above conceptual issues, there has been some controversy over the type of evidence required to demonstrate the operation of self-schemata (Segal, 1988). The major issue here concerns whether the available evidence warrants the conclusion that the self is a cognitive structure. Since the concept of a schema or prototype was borrowed from cognitive psychology, some investigators have suggested that the criteria that normally apply to schemas and prototypes should apply when we come to examine the degree to which the self functions as a schema. Accordingly, Spielman and Bargh (1990) suggest that in order to establish the cognitive-structural properties of the self, it is essential to demonstrate the "spreading activation among component constructs" (p. 116). Along similar lines Segal (1988) suggested that in order to establish cognitive structure, it is necessary to determine whether there is a "functional relation between the individual stored elements" (p. 150). On this basis, it is arguable that the information processing paradigms of Markus and T. B. Rogers et al. demonstrate the accessibility of self-constructs, rather than cognitive structure (Segal, 1988; see also Baumeister, 1998; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989).

Higgins, Van Hook, and Dorfman (1988) used the Stroop test to study the structural interconnectedness of elements of the self-system. They reasoned that if closely-associated self-traits are linked to one another, then priming participants with one self-descriptor (e.g., humorous) should inhibit immediately subsequent colour-naming performance for another, related self-attribute (e.g., funny). They found that processing time was not increased when comparing self-related prime and target words, raising doubts about the interconnectedness of self-aspects. Bellezza (1984) similarly concluded: "Some caution should be exercised when discussing the self as a schema. Memory structures containing self-knowledge may not meet all the criteria of a schema that have been proposed by some investigators (Rumelhart, 1980, pp. 40-41)" (p. 514).
In so far as it can be established that the self-schema is different to other types of schemas, it is arguable that different criteria should apply in the assessment of the self-schema's cognitive-structural properties. In relation to this, it has been argued that the self-schema is not merely a depository of personal information; it also serves many crucial functions, including the regulation of cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioural processes in a variety of intrapersonal and interpersonal domains (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997; E. R. Smith, 1984).

Investigators clearly disagree as to what constitutes a definitive test of the cognitive-structural properties of the self-structure. Because the field lacks strong empirical tests of specific models of cognitive representations of self, the question of whether the self is a unique structure is still open (Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Linville & Carlston, 1994).

3.7 Interim summary

Despite the limitations of the current model, researchers have by and large held on to the view that a schema or prototype is an appropriate conceptual analogue for the self. Recent advances within social cognition have developed, consolidated, and refined the self-schema notion, particularly ideas about its content, structure, and functions, but the basic notion of a cognitive structure, with its associated information processing properties, has not undergone a major metamorphosis since its inception and early exploration in the 1970s. This model remains dominant within contemporary social psychology:

Social psychologists currently think of the self-concept as a cognitive structure that organises experiences and guides action. It is a dynamic structure, constantly acquiring new cognitions that are related to existing cognitions about the self and are therefore more likely to add stability to that structure. Indeed, the acquisition of knowledge that stabilises the self-concept is fostered, whereas knowledge inconsistent with a person's self-concept is likely to be rejected. This basis is common to almost all current treatments of the self-concept. (Hormuth, 1990, p. 67)

3.8 Motivational processes that maintain the self-concept

The picture of the self-concept as stable and consistent also emerges from research designed to look not so much at the structure of the self-concept but rather, its motivational implications for behaviour (Raynor & MacFarlin, 1986). In this connection, a range of self-motives have been implicated in self-concept maintenance.
In particular, the self-consistency motive has been the focus of much theoretical and empirical work. Self-consistency can be defined as "the motive to act in accordance with the self-concept and to maintain it intact in the face of potentially challenging evidence" (M. Rosenberg, 1979, p. 57). Lecky (1945, pp. 152-153) made a notable contribution when he advanced a theory of personality that centred on the self-consistency motive:

All of an individual's values are organised into a single system the preservation of whose integrity is essential. The nucleus of the system, around which the rest of the system revolves, is the individual's valuation of himself. The individual sees the world from his own viewpoint, with himself as the centre. Any value entering the system which is inconsistent with the individual's valuation of himself cannot be assimilated; it meets with resistance and is, unless a general reorganisation occurs, to be rejected.

Today, the self-consistency motive appears in many different "guises" in social psychology (Aronson, 1997). Whether it is called a need for "self-consistency" (Festinger, 1957; Lecky, 1945), "self-congruency" (Backman, 1988), "self-verification" (Swann, 1987), "self-evaluation maintenance" (Beach & Tesser, 1995), or "self-affirmation" (Steele, 1988), the basic point is in each case the same: that motivational and attributional processes play a critical role in self-concept maintenance.

There is a vast body of evidence which demonstrates people's tendency to strive for self-consistency, particularly in the face of self-discrepant feedback (e.g., Backman, 1988; Markus, 1977; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981; Tesser, 1988). Empirical studies show that people are more likely to attend to, encode, and recall self-confirming rather than self-disconfirming evidence (e.g., Swann, 1987). Similarly, people often seek out situations and adopt behavioural strategies that confirm their existing self-concepts and avoid or resist situations or feedback that challenges their existing self-concepts (Pelham & Swann, 1988; Swann, 1983; Swann & Ely, 1984).

Swann and Read (1981, Experiment 1) demonstrated one type of self-verification process: people's tendency to selectively attend to self-confirming rather than disconfirming feedback. Participants were asked to complete a range of personality measures, which included questions regarding their self-perceived assertiveness and emotionality. The experimenter then obtained the participant's permission to show his
or her responses to an individual in another room. On returning the experimenter explained that the other person had examined the participant's responses to the personality tests and had answered some questions about the participant. The participant was then shown two lists of eight questions each, ostensibly answered by the other individual. The first list contained some items which tapped assertiveness, while others tapped unassertiveness. Similarly, some items on the second list probed for evidence of emotionality while others were related to unemotional behaviours. The participant was then given an opportunity to select five questions from each list that they were most interested in seeing the answers to. The results revealed that participants sought feedback which would confirm their self-conceptions. This occurred for both dimensions of personality. That is, those participants who considered themselves to be assertive were more interested in assertive feedback, while unassertive participants sought unassertiveness feedback. Likewise, both emotional and unemotional participants sought self-confirmatory feedback. Swann and Predmore (1985) extended these findings by demonstrating that even individuals with negative self-concepts will seek out self-confirming feedback and will tend to prefer negative feedback to positive feedback.

Snyder and Gangestad (1982) demonstrated people's tendency to select situations that allow the expression of their self-concepts. They found that low self-monitors (who are assumed to have a principled self-concept) seek situations in which they can express their personal beliefs whereas high self-monitors (who are known for their impression management skills) select situations in which they will find clear behavioural norms, which serve to guide the actor's behaviour.

Research reminiscent of that of Markus (1977), but conducted outside her information processing paradigm, has also shown that individuals are more likely to seek to verify or to behave consistently with self-conceptions of which they are certain or which represent important behavioural domains. For instance, in Maracek and Mettee's study (1972), low self-esteem participants who differed as to the certainty of their self-belief were given success feedback and their subsequent performance was monitored. Those who were low in certainty did not try to verify their negative self-conceptions; they sought to elicit positive feedback by trying to perform well. Those high in certainty, on the other hand, performed poorly in an attempt to verify that they were incompetent.
Along similar lines, Mori, Chaiken, and Pliner (1987) found that bogus feedback that challenged self-perceived femininity subsequently led female participants to behave in a feminine manner; that is, they restricted their food intake in the presence of male eating partners.

The reconstruction of the past to accord with one's present self-concept can further contribute to the stability of the self-concept. For example, McFarland and M. Ross (1987) observed that dating couples' recollections of satisfaction in the relationship two months earlier were reconstructed from their current evaluations of their relationships, resulting in greater consistency in relationship satisfaction than was actually warranted.

In addition, it has been demonstrated that people sometimes create impediments to their own success if doing so allows them to sustain the self-belief that they are capable and competent. Thus, a student who fears failing an exam may stay up late the night before the test, permitting an external attribution in the event of failure, and an opportunity for self-enhancement in the event of success. Research confirms that self-handicapping strategies such as this serve a self-preserving function (e.g., Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; Berglas & Jones, 1978).

An interesting study by Kulik, Sledge, and Mahler (1986) further illustrates the role of causal attribution processes in self-concept maintenance. These investigators reasoned that behaviours which are consistent with one's self-concepts are usually interpreted as further evidence of the self-conception, even when aspects of the situation implicate external causes. On the other hand, behaviours which are inconsistent with one's self-concepts and therefore not easily assimilated, are more likely to be attributed to situational causes.

Kulik et al. also considered the relationship between one's own behavioural consistency and expectations for others' behaviour. More specifically, they asked whether the false consensus effect is moderated by one's own self-conceptions. The false consensus effect refers to the observation that individuals overestimate the number of people who would agree with them, and by inference, the number of people who would act similarly to them in a given situation (L. Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). For instance, it may be that individuals who perceive themselves to be extroverts and who exhibit extroverted
behaviour in a given context, may expect fewer others to behave that way in that context, than would introverted individuals who exhibit extroverted behaviour in the same context. For the extrovert, a dispositional attribution for (self-consistent) behaviour thus preserves current self-beliefs, while the introvert's self-concept is sustained by making a situational attribution for (self-inconsistent) behaviour.

Following Markus (1977), these investigators first administered a screening questionnaire to identify self-perceived extroverts and introverts. At a subsequent session, participants viewed videotapes depicting social situations of differential pressure to act outgoing (outgoing behaviour had been determined previously as normative or non-normative in that context). The dependent measures included participants' own likely behaviour in those contexts, whether they provided a dispositional or situational explanation for that behaviour, and percentage estimates of the number of people who would and would not act similarly to themselves in that context. In a second study, Kulik et al. ran participants through the scene depicted on the videotape to assess attributions for actual behaviour rather than anticipated behaviour. The results indicated that people are more likely to attribute behaviour which is consistent with prior self-conceptions to dispositional factors and inconsistent behaviours to situational factors. This occurred for both anticipated behaviours and actual behaviours. In addition, this pattern was not modified when the context suggested that outgoing behaviour was normative. In addition, participants expected fewer others to behave like they did when the behaviour was consistent rather than inconsistent with one's prior self-conception.

Interestingly, these findings have implications for self-concept change, which is the topic of the next chapter. Briefly, they suggest that not all behaviours will impact on the self-concept. That is, self-conceptions do not appear to reflect an "impartial tally" of each instance of consistent and inconsistent behaviour (Kulik et al., 1986). For example, evoking five introvert behaviours and six extrovert behaviours from a self-perceived introvert will not necessarily produce an extrovert. If the introvert can and does explain the outgoing behaviours in situational terms, the behaviours are unlikely to impact on the self. The inference is that inconsistent behaviours must be attributed to dispositional rather than situational causes before they can bring about self-concept change. Self-concept stability can thus be accounted for because "we are more apt to
accept consistent behaviours largely at face value as dispositionally caused and therefore as further corroboration for the original beliefs" (Kulik et al., 1986, p. 592).

In summary, empirical research conducted within a host of paradigms in the social cognition framework has generally stressed the stability of the self-concept, rather than its changeability. This research illustrates that people seek out consistency and stability and challenge any information that is incompatible with their self-conceptions (Swann, 1983, 1990). In particular, the evidence suggests that the stability of self-conceptions appears to increase as a function of: (1) their importance to the individual (Markus, 1977); (2) the certainty with which they are held (Maracek & Mettee, 1986); (3) the degree to which they are associated with self-confirmatory feedback (Swann, 1983, 1990); and (4) the perceiver's tendency to make internal attributions for diagnostic behaviours (Kulik et al., 1986). Self-verification processes, reconstruction of the past, self-handicapping, and self-confirmatory attributions all furnish stability to the self.

3.9 Conclusions
Markus (1977) and T. B. Rogers et al. (1977) were instrumental in shaping the direction of social cognition research on the self, particularly in North America (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Macrae & Foddy, 1993). In particular, their theoretical and empirical contributions popularised the view that the self-concept can be treated as a schema or prototype. The self-concept is thus currently conceptualised as an enduring cognitive structure or internally-stored representation, that comprises personally relevant trait terms, and is resistant to change.

In the second half of this chapter we considered the role of motivational processes in maintaining the self, focusing (albeit briefly) on the self-consistency motive. There is ample evidence to suggest that people prefer to be seen in a self-consistent manner, and actively try to verify their self-conceptions. Our review supports the general conclusion that both cognitive-structural and motivational factors are implicated in self-concept stability and maintenance.

Although social-cognitive models endeavour to integrate social and cognitive aspects of the self (e.g., Markus & Wurf, 1987), their emphasis is on the way that stored knowledge structures affect our understanding of social interactions, rather than on the
effect of social interaction on the construction of knowledge and thought (Kahlbaugh, 1993). Knowledge structures pertaining to the self are assumed to develop on the basis of the perceiver’s generalisations from repeated observations of his or her own past behaviour (Markus, 1977). This emphasis represents a clear departure from classical perspectives, where the focus was on the role of the other, the group, and social processes in shaping (and subsequently maintaining) the self.

The current emphasis on cognitive structure, stability and consistency raises the issue of capacity for change. To what degree is the self-concept malleable? Chapter 4 will review the experimental work done on this issue. Much of this work has emphasised strategic self-presentation and impression management (Schlenker, 1980), rather than being directly within the social cognition tradition. It can be argued that where social cognition approaches have tried to deal with change, they have been constrained by their premises about the self. This issue, and related questions, will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 4
The problem of self-concept change

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 3 we established that current perspectives do not focus on change, but rather on the structures and processes that maintain the self-concept. Yet the issue of self-concept change is clearly of tremendous theoretical and practical importance. Theorists often "comment" on the problem of self-concept change, but attempts to address the issue tend to be isolated and scattered throughout the literature (Hormuth, 1990). Comprehensive social psychological treatments are, by comparison, scarce.

Hormuth's (1990) review of social psychological contributions towards understanding the problem of self-concept change is more comprehensive than most. His strategy was to examine various influential self theories in social psychology, and to extract from those perspectives the implications for understanding the process of change. Taking Hormuth's lead, in the first half of this chapter we will illustrate, with reference to several major theories, the form that a social psychological explanation of self-concept change might take. Our review will briefly revisit six theories previously examined by Hormuth, but will also examine six additional contemporary approaches. The empirical review of self-concept change studies that is then presented in the second half of the chapter aims to summarise the major empirical findings, and to elucidate the theoretical premises that have proved most influential. Our coverage will be restricted to experimental social psychological studies that were explicitly designed to investigate the change process.¹

¹ The issue of self-concept change has of course attracted the attention of developmental psychologists (e.g., Demo, 1992), clinically-oriented psychologists (e.g., Norcross, Prochaska, & DiClemente, 1986), and personality psychologists (e.g., McCrae, 1993). Although an integration or synthesis of these various literatures would no doubt be worthwhile, this enterprise is beyond the scope of the present thesis.
4.2 Social psychological contributions to the problem of self-concept change

4.2.1 Self-schema theory

Self-schema theory was presented in Chapter 3 to illustrate social-cognitive approaches to the self. In this section we will briefly revisit this perspective, with a view to exploring the question of how this approach may account for change. From this perspective, the self-concept is said to be a relatively stable cognitive structure. This stability is, however, assumed to mask a significant amount of "local variation" which occurs in response to changes in the social environment (Markus & Kunda, 1986, p. 859). Importantly, self-schema theory states that at any given moment, only a subset of all possible self-conceptions is salient. The content of this "working self-concept" reflects what was salient just before, and what has been elicited by the current social situation.

There are two ways in which the self can change within this framework. First, new self-conceptions can be added to the self system, although once added, it is unlikely that a new self-conception will ever disappear (Markus & Kunda, 1986). The main form of self change is variation in the contents of the working self-concept; that is, variability in the degree to which self-concepts are active in thought and memory. However this "mutability or fluidity in the self-concept will be fairly subtle; it will not, under most circumstances, involve a major revision or reorganisation of significant self-relevant thoughts and feelings" (Markus & Kunda, 1986, p. 859). In short, this theory does not accommodate significant degrees of self change; the self-structure is maintained, but different self-conceptions are activated in different contexts.

A series of experiments conducted by Nurius and Markus (1990) illustrate the principle of varying accessibility of self-conceptions (see section 3.7.3, Chapter 3, for a related discussion). In one study, these investigators induced participants to think of themselves as either successful or unsuccessful in work and relationships. They then observed the effect of this situational frame on individuals' self-descriptions. Those individuals in the success condition were more likely than those in the failure condition to endorse positive attributes as currently self-descriptive, as previously self-descriptive and as feasible for the future. The working self-concepts of success participants appeared "to have been configured predominantly of positive self-conceptions" (p. 321), while those of failure participants appeared to be associated with more negative and,
interestingly, less certain, self-conceptions. This study demonstrates that situational cues can serve to make a subset of self-conceptions more accessible in working memory.

Along similar lines, Markus and Kunda (1986) induced participants to think of themselves as either very similar or very unique to others. Participants' self-concepts were subsequently examined to determine if there was an effect of experimental feedback. It was predicted that uniqueness participants would feel uncomfortably unique, and would therefore recruit self-knowledge that affirms their similarity to others. Conversely, similarity participants were expected to recruit self-conceptions that affirm their uniqueness. Contrary to expectations, uniqueness and similarity participants did not differ in either the number of uniqueness or similarity-related words endorsed as self-descriptive. On the basis of the evidence, it appeared that individuals had not been affected by the experimental manipulation, that is, the feedback pertaining to their similarity or uniqueness. They did, however, differ systematically in their latency for these judgements. As expected, similarity participants had faster "me" responses to uniqueness words and faster "not me" responses to similarity words, and uniqueness participants had faster "me" responses to similarity words; however the two groups did not differ in their "not me" latencies for uniqueness words. Once again, these authors attributed the observed effects to the varying accessibility of particular self-conceptions.

Although the latency data were interpreted as consistent with predictions, the hypothesis put forth in this study appears to be inconsistent with the logic of Nurius and Markus' (1990) studies. To reiterate, Markus and Kunda reasoned that "when people received information about themselves that threatened a certain core self-conception, they would make every effort to reaffirm that aspect of their selves" (p. 860, emphasis added). Thus people led to think of themselves as highly similar to others would experience a threat to their uniqueness, and would therefore seek to affirm their uniqueness (i.e., the threatened attribute), whereas people led to think of themselves as highly unique would seek to affirm their similarity to others. By contrast, Nurius and Markus did not predict that failure cues would lead individuals to affirm their self-conception as a successful, competent, positive individual. On the contrary, Nurius and Markus predicted that a failure context would render negative self-conceptions (i.e., conceptually-related self-
knowledge) highly accessible, while a success context would bring positive self-conceptions to the fore. There thus appears to be a degree of ambiguity associated with predictions derived from self-schema theory. From a theoretical point of view, the conditions which enhance the salience of self-knowledge that is conceptually-linked to the experimentally-induced trait (e.g., Nurius & Markus, 1990), and the conditions which enhance the salience of self-knowledge that is conceptually juxtaposed to the experimentally-induced trait (e.g., Markus & Kunda, 1986), remain unclear.

4.2.2 Self-perception theory

Daryl Bem’s (1972) self-perception theory concerns the passive inference of self-attitudes from behaviour (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). The theory is based on the assumption that people infer their internal states in the same way as do outside observers. When people are in doubt about their internal states, they consider their behaviour, much as an outsider would, and the circumstances of that behaviour: “Individuals come to “know” their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behaviour and/or the circumstances in which this behaviour occurs” (D. J. Bem, 1972, p. 5). If the behaviour appears attributable to the situation, then it does not inform the individual about the self. For instance, if everyone displays the same behaviour in a given context, the individual can not use such normative behaviour to infer anything about the personal self. On the other hand, if the environment does not appear to have constrained the behaviour, it is attributable to some unique quality of the individual (see also Kulik et al., 1986).

Self-perception theory suggests that self-referential judgements are inherently unstable, and depend on whatever subset of judgement-relevant information happens to be accessible in memory at the time that self-ratings are made (Wyer & Srull, 1989). In support of this view, studies have demonstrated that after performing belief-relevant behaviour, individuals change their belief in the position advocated; moreover, they even revise their estimates of their initial beliefs, those held prior to the behavioural episode (for a review, see D. J. Bem, 1972).

A number of points can be extrapolated from this theory for understanding change in self-attitudes or self-beliefs. The development of new self-beliefs is, of course, one form of self change. Self-perception theory clearly suggests that new self-beliefs are
acquired by performing new behaviours repeatedly, from which inferences are drawn about the nature of the self. This means that behaviour precedes the cognition about the self (Hormuth, 1990). Of course, the behaviour will only be attributable to the self in the absence of compelling situational forces. The theory further suggests that new self-beliefs are acquired at times of uncertainty. When people get exposed to unfamiliar environments or to new role models, the opportunity for new behavioural acts presents itself. If people subsequently perform certain acts repeatedly or behave in certain ways which are interpreted as self-defining, these acts become integrated into the self-concept (Hormuth, 1990). Furthermore, for a new self-concept to evolve, it is not necessary for the behaviour to be discrepant from the initial self-attitude; new self-attitudes will also emerge when an individual performs some act which is more extreme than is implied by the original self-concept (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977).

In addition, self-perception theory speaks to the conditions under which differential amounts of self-attitude change can be expected following observations of one's own overt behaviour (see pp. 31-32, D. J. Bem, 1972). Firstly, if one's initial self-attitude is made salient to the individual, self-perception theory predicts that this will diminish the degree to which the final self-rating will be based upon the new behaviour and hence will diminish the amount of self change observed. If, on the other hand, one's new behaviour is made particularly salient, this should increase the amount of self change observed, since it makes salient “the very source of evidence upon which the final attribution is to be based” (D. J. Bem, 1972, p. 32). In contrast, when both the behaviour and one's prior self-conception are made equally salient to the perceiver, self-perception theory predicts that this will be equivalent to making the original self-conception alone salient; hence self change should diminish under these conditions.

4.2.3 Cognitive dissonance theory

Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory was premised on the assumption that people harbour a preference for self-consistency. Festinger proposed that if a person holds two views that are psychologically inconsistent, that person will experience dissonance – an aversive psychological state that should in turn motivate the person to try to eliminate the dissonance. Several routes to dissonance reduction have been postulated and empirically investigated, including attitudinal and behavioural changes to achieve consistency, acquiring new information that supports one's attitude or
behaviour, and finally, trivialising or downplaying the importance of the inconsistency. In addition, researchers have examined the conditions under which dissonance is most likely to arise. For instance, some have highlighted the role of behavioural commitment in dissonance arousal (Brehm & Cohen, 1962), while others have emphasised the role of feeling personally responsible for an aversive event (Cooper & Fazio, 1984).

In the 1960s Aronson suggested a revision of Festinger's theory. For Aronson, dissonance was not the product of two inconsistent elements; rather, dissonance was aroused when an important aspect of the self-concept was violated. Aronson and colleagues have thus argued that "it is the psychological significance of a behaviour, as it reflects on the self, that carries the potential to arouse dissonance. Specifically, dissonance is generated when the full meaning of the act ... is inconsistent with the actor's self-concept" (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992, p. 594).

The classic illustration of cognitive dissonance principles at work is found in Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) experiment. Students were paid (either $1 or $20) to lie to a fellow student and state that a dull and boring task was enjoyable and fun. Subsequently, in private interviews, those students who were paid $1 for saying the task was fun (the high dissonance participants) reported that their attitude towards the task had changed; by contrast those paid $20 to lie (the low dissonance participants) did not change their attitude towards the task. The study was initially interpreted as demonstrating that dissonance about counterattitudinal behaviour causes attitude change. However, Aronson (1969, p. 28) offered a slightly revised interpretation. He argued that it was not inconsistency per se that caused counterattitudinal statements to lead to cognitive dissonance and to eventual changes in attitudes, but rather, behaviour that threatened the self-concept. That is, the dissonance involved was not between the attitude "the task is dull" and the behaviour "I said it was fun". Rather, Aronson argued that the dissonance was between one's self-concept, "I am a decent, truthful person", and the realisation "I have conned this unsuspecting individual into believing something that just isn't true".

What implications for self change can be derived from cognitive dissonance theories? This issue can be explored with the original Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) experiment in mind. Aronson postulated a central role for the self-concept, at least as an antecedent
to dissonance arousal. As Aronson (1969) points out, lying is not dissonant if you are a psychopathic liar; dissonance only arises when behaviour contradicts the self-concept. The self-concept is thus implicated in the onset of dissonance, but what of its role in dissonance reduction? Presumably one may undergo self-attitude change in an attempt to achieve consistency between the self-concept and discrepant cognitions or behaviour (e.g., the participant who told a lie may come to believe that s/he lies "only when it is necessary"; in this case it was necessary in order to help the experimenter). Thus self-concept change may sometimes be the outcome of a process designed to restore and maintain (psychological) equilibrium and to escape an aversive affective state.

Aronson's formulation further suggests that more dissonance will be aroused when one's behaviour contradicts a central or important self-conception. In addition, the theory suggests that any conditions that make one's initial self-attitude or the self-discrepant act salient will in turn increase the amount of dissonance aroused and accordingly the amount of self-attitude change possible. Furthermore, if both the initial self-attitude and the self-discrepant behaviour are made salient, this should result in the greatest self-attitude change, since these conditions maximise the amount of dissonance arousal (cf. D. J. Bem, 1972). Finally, the variables that have been shown to increase dissonance (e.g., freely choosing to engage in self-discrepant behaviour) will presumably create conditions that are especially conducive to self change.

4.2.4 Self-affirmation theory

The central tenet of self-affirmation theory is that people are motivated to maintain a global image of the self as adaptively and morally adequate (i.e., as competent, good, coherent, stable) (Steele, 1988). This affirmation system is activated whenever the perceived integrity of the self is threatened. Unlike Festinger's (1957) original formulation of dissonance theory, Steele argues that faced with dissonance, one need only affirm the general integrity of the self, even when that affirmation bears no relationship to the inconsistency. This aspect of the theory would appear to also set self-affirmation theory apart from Aronson's (1969) self-concept formulation of dissonance theory, since the latter perspective suggests that the dissonance aroused when a behaviour violates a specific component of the self (e.g., self-perceived independence) can be alleviated by eliminating the discrepancy between that specific self-aspect and the violating cognition or behaviour; presumably then, in Aronson's
view action that bears no relationship to the inconsistency should do little to resolve one's dissonance.

Utilising the forced compliance dissonance paradigm, Steele and Lui (1983) tested the hypothesis that affirmation of a valued, but unrelated, self-concept can eliminate dissonance and its accompanying changes. Individuals known to oppose a tuition increase were recruited for a laboratory study. Upon arrival, their attitudes were activated by asking them to complete a survey of student views on tuition increases. Then, ostensibly due to an oversupply of essays Contesting a tuition increase, they were asked to write essays supporting a substantial fee increase. High dissonance was evoked by giving participants ample choice to write the essay; low dissonance was evoked by giving participants little choice. This paradigm has traditionally shown that ample choice leads to substantial attitude change vis-à-vis a no choice condition.

To test ideas derived from self-affirmation theory within this paradigm, it was necessary to give individuals an opportunity to affirm a valued self-concept following dissonance induction but prior to final attitude assessment. In order to do this, Steele and Lui identified two groups within this tuition-opposing sample: individuals with a strong versus weak economic-political (EP) value orientation. It was reasoned that if self-affirmation reduces dissonance, completing the value scale should eliminate dissonance-reducing attitude change only among those individuals who hold this value. Steele and Lui found firstly, that the appropriate conditions replicated the standard dissonance effect; that is, high choice participants were significantly more favourable toward the tuition increase than low choice participants. Moreover, it was found that completion of the EP value scale caused less dissonance-reducing attitude change among participants for whom the value scale was self-relevant. This study can of course be criticised on the grounds that the affirmed component of the self (i.e., economic-political values) may be related (albeit tangentially) to the substance of the inconsistency (i.e., tuition hikes). Nevertheless, at a minimum, the study shows that the opportunity to affirm a valued component of the self can minimise change.

Self-affirmation theory thus has at least one important implication for understanding the problem of self-concept change. Specifically, this view suggests that past demonstrations of dissonance-induced changes were due to the absence of an
opportunity to affirm the self. Steele would argue that had participants in the forced compliance paradigm been given the opportunity to affirm their general self-integrity, or some valued part of the self, they would not have revised their self-concepts (or attitudes). Thus according to this theory, when it does occur, self-concept change arises from the perception that the integrity of one's personal identity has been compromised.

4.2.5 Interpersonal congruency theory

Influenced by cognitive dissonance theory, interpersonal congruency theory (Backman, 1988) postulates the existence of a general human preference for self-consistency or “congruency”. Stability is said to stem from two sources. The first source of stability consists of the reinforcement provided by institutional and subinstitutional structures that constrain social behaviour. The second source of stability consists of various intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. The theory postulates that people strive to achieve congruency among three components of the “interpersonal system”. These are: (1) some aspect of the self (e.g., a particular self-attribute), (2) the perceiver’s interpretation of their own behaviour in relation to that self-aspect, and (3) the relevant behaviours, perceptions and feelings of others. Thus for instance, if I believe that I am “creative”, observe myself displaying this trait in my behaviour, and receive feedback from others that confirms this trait, I would be in a state of interpersonal congruency. The opposite, incongruency, is experienced as threatening.

According to this view, self-concept change can stem from (a) change at the level of institutional or subinstitutional structure, or (b) change in one or more of the three components of the interpersonal system. For instance, life-cycle changes, changes in group structures, or fortuitous events (e.g., marriage, changes in employment status, relocation) can instigate self-concept change. Significant others clearly have an important role to play in bringing about change in the interpersonal system (cf. Backman, Secord, & Pierce, 1963). In support of this view, several studies have documented self-concept changes due to the establishment of new interpersonal relationships of a personal or professional nature (e.g., cognitive changes in the self have been observed following psychotherapy); also, studies of occupational socialisation document self-concept changes as the individual progresses professionally through the institutional structure (for reviews see Backman, 1988; see also Secord & Backman, 1974).
4.2.6 Self-verification theory

Self-verification processes were described in Chapter 3 (see section 3.9); here we will focus on the implications of self-verification theory (Swann, 1983, 1990) for understanding self change. This theory is based on the idea that once people form self-conceptions and become relatively certain of them, they are motivated to acquire feedback that confirms or verifies those self-conceptions. In order to verify their self-conceptions, people are assumed to draw on a variety of behavioural and cognitive strategies (e.g., displaying signs and symbols; selectively attending to confirmatory feedback). Through their social behaviour, individuals establish a self-confirmatory social environment, or "opportunity structure" for the self. For present purposes, our particular interest lies in what happens when self-verification processes fail.

According to Swann (1983), the self-concept will only undergo revision if there is a relatively permanent shift in the way that individuals are treated by significant others. This may occur, for example, in response to maturation and aging or in response to other types of physical change in the individual. Alternatively, people may themselves bring about change in their opportunity structures when a discrepancy is detected between one's self-concept and the existing opportunity structure. The self change would in this case only be complete once a new opportunity structure is established. **Intrapersonal** and **interpersonal** processes are believed to be relevant here:

At the intrapersonal level, people must reorganise their self-view: They must decide that they are not the persons that they once thought they were. This step in the process is critical, since if people harbor doubts about their "true selves" they may behave in ways that will verify and confirm their old self-concepts, thereby undermining the change process. But even if the person has completely accepted a new self-view, this view will endure only if certain interpersonal conditions prevail ... For her self-concept change to be lasting, the individuals around her must validate and legitimise her new self-view. Thus, changes in self-views will be lasting only when there is a corresponding shift in the individual's social environment or ... opportunity structure. (Swann & Hill, 1982, pp. 65-66)

In summary, self-verification theory assumes that self-concept change will only occur when self-verification processes fail. Swann and Hill (1982) illustrate the point. These investigators re-examined the traditional laboratory study in which people have been found to change their self-ratings after receiving self-discrepant feedback. They noted that one feature of these studies is that individuals are typically denied the opportunity
to refute that feedback. They hypothesised that self-discrepant feedback will produce change only when the circumstances prevent one from rejecting the feedback. Individuals who perceived themselves as either dominant or submissive received feedback from a confederate that either supported or challenged their self-conceptions. Half of the participants were then given an opportunity to interact with the confederate, while the other half were not given this opportunity. As expected, self change was negligible when individuals were given the opportunity to respond to the feedback. Swann and Hill concluded that the critical feature of the interaction opportunity was that it gave individuals a chance to observe themselves behave in a self-consistent manner; this served to reaffirm their self-concepts. On a more general note, they asserted that:

it may be misleading to regard laboratory-produced changes in people’s self-ratings as true changes in self-conceptions. It may be more appropriate to label such short-lived changes as shifts in people’s self-images, the views people have of themselves at any given moment in time, analogous to a single frame in a motion picture film ... Within this framework, it is quite another matter to speak of changes in self-concepts, that is, people’s generalized or average views of themselves, analogous to a composite of all the frames in a motion picture film. (p. 65)

Self-verification theorists clearly reject the view that the self-concept is malleable. They emphasise that “change does not occur in the cognitive structure but rather in the interpersonal environment through building an appropriate social support structure” (Hormuth, 1990, p. 55).

4.2.7 Self-completion theory

In the early eighties Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1983; Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985) proposed a theory of identity attainment, called “symbolic self-completion” theory. There are three key elements to this theory: behavioural commitment to self-defining goals, symbols of completeness, and social reality (Gollwitzer, Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982). Those personally committed to certain identities conceive those identities as goal states to be achieved and maintained. For instance, an elite athlete’s commitment to a self-defining goal (e.g., “gold” at the Sydney 2000 Olympics) implies a striving toward that goal through appropriate behaviour (such as adhering to a rigorous training regime). Associated with identities such as this are a host of symbols of completeness that serve as indicators of attainment and are readily identifiable as such by society. Since there are numerous symbols associated with any given identity (e.g., the athlete’s
uniform and runners; a doctor’s degree, white coat and stethoscope), it is always possible to keep striving for further indicators of an identity. Such identity-constructing endeavours are referred to as “self-symbolizing activities”. Within the framework of symbolic self-completion, the use of symbols as indicators of goal-orientated behaviour requires that they are recognised by others, or that their meaning exists in social reality. The social reality factor thus refers to the idea that “the sense of progress toward a self-defining goal appears to be dependent on the acknowledgment of others” (Gollwitzer et al., 1982, p. 360). In contrast to Swann (1983), who links “symbols” to strategic self-presentation, Gollwitzer and colleagues suggest that such indicators serve an important psychological function; namely, they reduce goal-striving tension, and make goal attainment, and in turn self-definition, possible (Hormuth, 1990).

Research shows that a key issue with respect to identity attainment is whether self-symbolizing efforts are noticed by others. To illustrate, in one study (see Gollwitzer, 1986) female participants who intended to one day raise a family were asked to list the personal qualities they possessed that were relevant to being a good mother (e.g., patience, an ability to cook), in preparation for an exchange of personal information with a partner. Half of the participants were led to believe that their partner would read their self-descriptions (self-symbolizing subjects); the other half were led to believe that this information would be discarded, and hence would not be seen by their partner. Participants were subsequently shown what was (ostensibly) the personality profile of “the ideal mother”. They were then asked to mark their own profiles for their interaction partner. Those who were not initially given the opportunity to self-symbolize (since their partner did not scrutinise their self-descriptions) were more likely to reproduce the ideal mum’s profile, whereas those that had been given this opportunity felt less compelled to establish their identity in this area. Gollwitzer concluded that “self-symbolizing that is noticed by others makes further striving for identity goals less necessary than self-symbolizing that remains unnoticed by others ... These findings imply that people conceive of identity goals as located on the plane of social reality” (p. 148).

In his discussion of the implications that can be extracted from this theory for self-concept change, Hormuth (1990) begins his analysis by noting that this theoretical perspective deals with processes that take place after the decision to pursue a certain
identity is taken, leaving aside the issue of how or why a specific identity came to be pursued in the first place, or the conditions under which a given identity may need to be abandoned. Symbolic self-completion or identity striving may result in failure when social reality does not support an identity. For instance, a new mother may give up her child for adoption if she reaches the conclusion that she is not capable of looking after her newborn. Similarly, a scientist who does not gain social recognition for his or her research may come to exhibit more teaching-related symbols than research-oriented symbols. He or she may display the theses supervised in his or her office more noticeably than his or her research publications. His or her behaviour may similarly be affected by this transition, or re-focusing. For instance, the scientist may agree to do more undergraduate teaching at the university and less postgraduate research supervision. This type of process, by which some symbols or indicators may come to be emphasised over others, may significantly alter the individual's course to self-definition, and may thus function as a path to self-concept change.

4.2.8 Action identification theory

Action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Wegner & Vallacher, 1990) deals with the links between cognitive representations of behaviour, overt behaviour, and interpretational processes. This theory holds that any unit of behaviour can be consciously identified in many different ways, "ranging from low-level identities that specify how the action is performed to high-level identities that signify why or with what effect the action is performed" (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, p. 3). For instance, the simple act of "painting" can be thought of as the expression of a low-level identity such as "moving a paintbrush", or a high-level identity such as "being creative" (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Likewise, the act of "getting married" can take on a host of different meanings; a month before the wedding day it may mean "expressing my love"; the day before it may mean "hiring a photographer" (Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984). Action identification theory has many applications; we will focus on the relevance of action identification principles to self-conception and self-concept change.

This perspective, like many others (e.g., D. J. Bem, 1972; Swann, 1983), begins with the assumption that overt behaviour can serve to define who we are. Further, the theory holds that "act identities at high levels hold greater potential for defining one's self than
do lower level act identities” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, p. 11). Thus, a high-level action dimension such as “creating music” is imbued with self-defining significance vis-à-vis a low-level action dimension such as “hitting the keys on a keyboard”. Moreover, whether the self-concept appears variable or stable depends on the level of identification that is prepotent for the perceiver in a given context.

If the person’s identity is at a high enough level, he or she should show stability, resisting new information afforded by the physical and social environment concerning his or her personal attributes and capacities. Under conditions that promote a relatively low-level identification, however, contextual information regarding one’s self is likely to be accepted. (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, p. 12)

What conditions promote low-level identification and hence facilitate self change? A study conducted by Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, and Dizadji (1986) is instructive here. Experimental participants were initially asked to generate five one-sentence descriptions of their behaviour, reflecting on a recent social encounter with another person. Half of the participants were instructed to describe their behaviour in this social encounter in fairly low-level terms (e.g., specific comments made, gestures); the other half were asked to describe their behaviour in higher level terms (e.g., opinions and values expressed, personal qualities displayed). These descriptions were entered by the participants themselves into a computer console. The computer subsequently generated an ostensible personality profile which informed individuals that they were either “co-operative” or “competitive”. Participants were asked to judge the validity of the feedback. They also completed a self-description questionnaire that contained measures of self-perceived co-operativeness and competitiveness. In support of action identification theory, individuals who were induced to conceive their behaviour at lower levels of identification were more accepting of the bogus feedback than were those individuals who were led to conceive their behaviour in high-level terms. In addition, participants in the “low-level” action identification condition rated themselves in line with the bogus feedback. That is, those individuals who received co-operativeness feedback rated themselves as more co-operative than those who received competitiveness feedback. In contrast, participants in the “high level” action identification condition were not affected by the bogus feedback. In line with this research, Vallacher and Wegner (1987, p. 12) explain laboratory-induced self-concept change in the following terms:
Subjects in such research are commonly called upon to do something unfamiliar ... or difficult ... and to do so in an unusual setting (a lab). Such a state of affairs is conducive to low-level identification and thus should make subjects sensitive to contextual cues regarding the larger meaning of their action. It is inevitable, then, that subjects ... should come to "discover" what they are like in accordance with self-perception dynamics. In the more routine and familiar contexts pervading everyday life, however, changes in self-concept via social feedback and self-discovery should be less frequently observed ... because people are likely to have a relatively high-level identity for what they are doing. If self-concept change is observed in daily life, it is because a crucial precondition ... has been established – a movement to low-level identification.

4.2.9 Self-evaluation maintenance theory

Self-evaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1984, 1988) is based on the premise that people are motivated to maintain positive self-conceptions. The theory begins by stating that two processes are central to self-evaluation maintenance, specifically reflection and social comparison. Two variables which are relevant to both these processes, are the closeness and performance of another person. The good performance of a close other can either raise one's self-evaluation by reflection, or lower it due to comparison. In order to predict which process will impact, it is necessary to consider the relevance of the performance dimension to one's own self-definition. If the other's performance is on a dimension that is self-relevant, the comparison process will prevail and the individual will suffer by comparison with the other's better performance. If the dimension is not self-relevant, reflection will prevail and self-evaluation will be enhanced.

From this perspective, self-concept change can be achieved by changing another's closeness, changing his or her relative performance, or changing the relevance of the performance dimension to one's self-definition (Tesser, 1984). For instance, research shows that to the extent that a close other performs well, individuals respond by rating the performance dimension as less important to self-definition; the threat from comparison is thus reduced and the potential gain through reflection is enhanced (for relevant evidence, see Tesser, 1988). This theory further proposes that different aspects of the self are differentially susceptible to change (Tesser & Campbell, 1983). Specifically, affective or emotional dimensions such as values and level of expressiveness are considered relatively stable. Because they are adopted earlier in life, they are likely to be particularly well-articulated and are likely to be consensually
validated by close others. In contrast, self-conceptions pertaining to performance dimensions (e.g., faster, smarter) are assumed to be more malleable. This is presumably because they derive more directly from the comparison process, which depends on a level of cognitive ability that is acquired later in life. Even these performance self-conceptions tend to stabilise when people make a substantial investment in the way of practice or time to developing in certain areas. In addition, performance self-conceptions are often public and involve commitment, which further attenuates change on these dimensions relative to emotional or affective self-aspects.

More recently, Beach and Tesser (1995) have considered the implications of the theory for individuals in close relationships. In this context, “self-evaluation maintenance processes place considerable pressure on couples to define relatively unique areas of competence and expertise within the dyad” (pp. 158-159). Beach and Tesser suggest that the chronicity of being outperformed by a spouse may lead one to delete certain achievement areas from one’s self-definition. In addition, in the context of a close relationship one partner can pressure the other to adopt new roles and self-definitions.

4.2.10 Self-discrepancy theory

Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 1989) focuses on the link between the self and affect. This theory distinguishes between at least three core selves: the actual self, the ought self, and the ideal self (see section 3.7.2, Chapter 3). The ought self and the ideal self are collectively referred to as "self-guides" since they are assumed to motivate action. It is argued that people are motivated to achieve a match between their self-concept and their personally relevant self-guides (Higgins, 1989). For instance, to the extent that one's actual self matches his or her ideal self, the individual will most probably enjoy high self-esteem as an ongoing attribute (see Higgins, 1987). Central to this perspective is the idea that if you perceive discrepancies between your self-concept and internal standards, you may suffer negative emotional states. Unlike cognitive dissonance theory, which purports that cognitive inconsistencies always give rise to the same emotional end state (i.e., dissonance), self-discrepancy theory proposes that different types of self-discrepancies are associated with distinct (negative) emotional states. Specifically, it is postulated that discrepancies between one's actual self and ought self will increase one's vulnerability to agitation or anxiety, while discrepancies between one's actual self and ideal self will leave one vulnerable to depression.
discrepancies are conceptualised as motivational states. They are also conceptualised in social-cognitive terms, since they reflect the interrelations between different components of the self-system (Higgins, 1989, p. 98):

Even though a self-discrepancy is assumed to represent a motivationally significant psychological situation, it is also assumed to be a cognitive structure because it involves an interrelation among the attributes in one self-state representation and those in another ... As a cognitive structure, a self-discrepancy should function like any other cognitive structure. And one property of cognitive structures ... is that they vary in accessibility.

Thus the theory would predict that the greater the magnitude and accessibility of a particular self-discrepancy, the more one will suffer the kind of discomfort associated with that particular type of discrepancy (Higgins, 1989).

Given this conceptualisation of self-discrepancies, what implications can be extracted from this theory for understanding change in the self-system? Change can presumably occur in the type, magnitude and accessibility of self-discrepancies. Through therapeutic intervention, Higgins (1987) proposes that change can occur in either the actual self, or in one's internal standards. As new standards come to be internalised, new self-discrepancies can come to motivate the individual. However, Higgins cautions that socialisation factors often prevent individuals from lowering or changing their self-guides. Finally, the relative accessibility of different self-discrepancies is likely to render them differentially susceptible to change. However, it remains unclear whether chronically accessible self-discrepancies will be more susceptible, or less susceptible, to change than less accessible discrepancies. On the one hand, self-discrepancies that are chronically accessible may be less likely to undergo revision because they represent core self-structures; on the other hand, these self-aspects may be especially motivating and hence may be more likely than less core selves to instigate processes that lead to change.

4.2.11 Social comparison theory
Wills (1992) examines how social comparison processes (as originally discussed by Festinger, 1954) are relevant to self change. Social comparison theory encompasses both upward comparison and downward comparison processes. Upward comparison (comparing oneself to similar or better-off others) should yield a more accurate
assessment of one's own position and may suggest goals for self-improvement. Downward comparison (comparing oneself to similar or worse-off others), on the other hand, can reduce subjective distress. In general, upward comparison prevails at low levels of distress, and downward comparison at high levels of distress.

Wills' (1992) first proposition is that upward comparison will be used in situations where change is perceived to be feasible, since this type of comparison permits one to set standards for self-improvement. Downward comparison is more likely to predominate in situations that are not considered changeable, since in this instance the comparison will leave one feeling better about one's current circumstances. The second proposition relates to upward comparison processes, and states that upward comparisons with people in general (i.e., universalistic upward comparisons) are less effective at evoking self change than upward comparisons with a particular individual or specific reference group (i.e., particularistic upward comparisons), since the latter provides a specific referent for self change. A third proposition concerns people's connections with multiple social networks. Different reference groups may be used, depending on the perceiver's goals. Upward comparison with highly valued groups may promote self-improvement, while downward comparison with unfavourable groups may be used for self-enhancement. A fourth proposition involves the concept of negative comparison, that is, comparison with a target that one does not wish to emulate. The point to be made here is that theoretically, self change need not be defined as moving toward a desired state or comparison other; change may also entail movement away from an undesired state. A final proposition relates to the type of stimulus for change, that is, the circumstances which stimulate change. If the stimulus for change is generated internally (e.g., by the dissatisfaction that accompanies the failure to achieve one's goals), upward comparison processes which can suggest new goals are likely to prevail. Externally stimulated change (e.g., the prospect of failing at school) is likely to evoke negative comparisons (i.e., comparing with a devalued target, e.g., the academically inclined). On the other hand, change that is stimulated by general distress and low self-esteem might yield comparison with others in a similar state for consolation (i.e., lateral comparisons), together with downward comparisons in an attempt to alleviate perceived distress. In summary, Wills' analysis suggests how social comparisons may impinge on the process and direction of self change.
4.2.12 Ecological self theory

Hormuth's (1990) ecological self comprises "others, as the sources of direct social experience, objects, as symbols and representations of social experiences, and environments, as the setting for social experiences" (p. 2). Social exchange is considered essential to self-concept maintenance and change. For instance, social interaction suggests new role models and alternative modes of conduct, which may be incorporated into the self-concept. Although social interaction is considered vital to self change, this does not mean that others need be physically present to affect self-conception; social experiences are generalized in various ways, such as rules and expectations, and in the form of physical objects which can come to symbolize the self (e.g., the pianist's piano or the hacker's PC!). Like objects, environments can also come to symbolize the self, and often are necessary before various self-conceptions can be expressed (e.g., the beach for a lifesaver). Once established, environments can come to have a stabilising effect on the self. Ecological self theory attempts to consider these three factors together:

The self-concept exists in interdependence with its ecology of others, objects, and environments. As long as the ecology of the self is stable, the self-concept will be stable and strive toward maintenance. Self-concept change, on the other hand, results from an imbalance in the ecology of the self that leads toward restabilization under different ecological conditions, a restructuring of the ecology of the self. (Hormuth, 1990, p. 3).

The notions of commitment and the centrality of a social relationship become important in explaining the conditions under which the self-concept will change. Commitment is important because one's commitment to a specific relationship simultaneously impacts on that relationship and on those linked to it. The centrality of a relationship depends on the number of other relationships that are "tied into place" by any given commitment. This network of related commitments will remain stable so long as the central commitment is maintained. When a central social relationship is terminated, however, the associated network of social relationships is destabilised and avenues for self change present themselves. This appears to be a sociological analysis of self change; however Hormuth maintains that entering and leaving social relationships has direct psychological implications for the self. The act of entering a new, central relationship or leaving an old one (e.g., following relocation) has implications for self-evaluation. More specifically, the opportunity to enter a new social relationship confers positive
evaluation and reinforces the self, while evaluations likely to result in the termination of a relationship lead to self-questioning and are thus non-reinforcing. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction results. Destabilisation precipitates attempts to restructure the ecology of the self. The individual will therefore start to look for and will try to incorporate new dimensions into the self-concept, predominantly by exposing oneself to new contexts, which may present opportunities for new social commitments. Not all aspects of the ecology of the self need be involved in this process, but to the degree that they are, self change will be maximised. The active reconstruction of the ecology of the self following destabilisation is therefore one aspect of self-concept change. As well as direct, self-initiated change, as when one chooses to enter or leave social relationships, some changes are externally imposed and indirect, such as changing environments. If the environment changes and the self-concept is neither reinforced nor questioned in the process, the self will change through adjustment, rather than the agentic process of self change.

To conclude this section, Table 4.1 summarises the key points that were extracted from the various theories considered above for their implications for change. The first column gives the name of the theory, the second column indicates the chief proponent of the theory, and the third column completes the summary statement “Self-concept change reflects ... ” for each theory in turn. Finally, in an effort to extrapolate the commonalities across these theories, the fourth column indicates whether each theory appears to emphasise person or situational (environmental) factors in self change. Most perspectives suggest a role for both person and situational factors in the change process. The most commonly mentioned person factor was one’s own personal behaviour.

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2 Aronson (1997) made the (relevant) observation that several of these “mini-theories” (namely, self-affirmation theory, self-verification theory, symbolic self-completion theory, self-evaluation maintenance theory, and self-discrepancy theory) can be considered contemporary variants of cognitive dissonance theory; to this list we could add interpersonal congruency theory. The similarity between these theories, according to Aronson, lies in the way they unite cognitive and motivational processes with a central emphasis on the self-concept (p. 29). Aronson’s comments thus suggest another way of categorizing the various theories: seven entries in Table 4.1 may well be classifiable as “dissonance theory-related perspectives”.
Table 4.1
Summary of social psychological contributions to understanding self-concept change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Chief proponent(s)</th>
<th>Self-concept change reflects …</th>
<th>Theoretical emphasis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-schema theory</td>
<td>Markus</td>
<td>Change in the working self-concept, varying accessibility</td>
<td>Situational factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-perception theory*</td>
<td>D. J. Bem</td>
<td>Acquisition of new behaviours</td>
<td>Person factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive dissonance theories</td>
<td>Festinger / Aronson</td>
<td>Elimination of negative affective state</td>
<td>Person factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-affirmation theory</td>
<td>Steele</td>
<td>Lack of opportunity to affirm the self, to maintain self-integrity</td>
<td>Situational and person factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal congruency theory</td>
<td>Secord &amp; Backman</td>
<td>Change in one’s behaviour, one’s self-view, and / or interpersonal environment</td>
<td>Person and situational factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-verification theory*</td>
<td>Swann</td>
<td>Change in one’s opportunity structure (social environment)</td>
<td>Situational factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic self-completion theory*</td>
<td>Gollwitzer &amp; Wicklund</td>
<td>Re-focusing, brought about when social reality fails to support one’s self-concept</td>
<td>Situational and person factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action identification theory*</td>
<td>Vallacher &amp; Wegner</td>
<td>Low-level identification with one’s behaviour</td>
<td>Person factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-evaluation maintenance theory*</td>
<td>Tesser</td>
<td>Change in the relevance of comparison others; adding or deleting areas to self-definition</td>
<td>Situational and person factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-discrepancy theory</td>
<td>Higgins</td>
<td>Change in type, magnitude and / or accessibility of self-discrepancies</td>
<td>Person and situational factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social comparison theory</td>
<td>Festinger / Wills</td>
<td>Strategic use of upward or downward comparisons</td>
<td>Situational factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological self theory*</td>
<td>Hormuth</td>
<td>Active reconstruction of the ecology of the self, or adjustment</td>
<td>Situational and person factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those theories marked with an asterisk (*) were previously analysed for their implications for self change by Hormuth (1990).
4.3  Interim summary

In view of the current emphasis on self-concept stability and maintenance, it is difficult to identify clear "theories" of change in the social psychological literature on the self. Following Hormuth (1990), our strategy has been to extract from major theories the implications for understanding change. One conclusion that can be drawn from the review thus far is that self-concept change is often conceived as the failure of maintenance processes to operate in an optimal fashion (Hormuth, 1990). It is arguable that perspectives differ in the extent to which they attribute the maintenance failure to some external factor that has caused a disequilibrium in the self-system. Nevertheless, they all converge on the view that change is the exception rather than the rule, such that it often occurs when something goes amiss in the self-system. In many theories then, self change tends to be viewed as the consequence of dysfunction rather than the product of normal social-cognitive functioning.

In the remainder of this chapter we will review the experimental studies that were explicitly designed to examine the changeability of the self. Empirically, how have experimental social psychologists studied self-concept change? Are laboratory demonstrations of self-concept change "trivial", or do they call on us to rethink our major assumptions about the nature of the self-concept? These are some of the questions to which we now turn.

4.4  Experimental studies of change: When do social feedback and overt behaviour change the self-concept?

Experimental social psychologists have used two closely related paradigms to study self-concept change. Early on, researchers investigated the effect of reflected appraisals, particularly self-discrepant feedback, on subsequent self-conception. Do self-beliefs change in response to feedback that challenges our current views? In general, these studies demonstrated that self-discrepant feedback does lead individuals to modify their self-conceptions in the direction of the feedback. Such changes have been shown for numerous populations and for many different attributes, including a host of personality attributes (for reviews, see Gergen, 1971; Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Wylie, 1979).
In addition, early studies set out to determine the factors that affect the magnitude of such changes (Gergen, 1971; Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Swann, 1983). It has been established that social feedback will have an impact on the self to the degree that (1) the source of the feedback is considered competent and qualified to judge (e.g., Bergin, 1962; Johnson & Steiner, 1968; Webster & Sobieszek, 1974); (2) the feedback is sufficiently at odds with one's self-concept to be considered self-discrepant yet not so farfetched that it is dismissed as beyond belief (e.g., Bergin, 1962; Johnson, 1966); (3) the feedback is directly rather than tangentially related to the salient self-attribute (e.g., Maehr, Mensing, & Nafzger, 1962; Videbeck, 1960); and (4) to the degree that the feedback does not contradict a self-conception that is supported by a large rather than a small number of significant others (e.g., Backman, Secord, & Pierce, 1963).

More recently, experimental social psychologists have extended this research by documenting the effect of self-discrepant behaviour on subsequent self-conception. In the currently dominant paradigm, the target person is induced to present the self in a certain light, typically in the context of a dyadic face-to-face interview, and self-ratings are subsequently obtained. In so far as post-test self-ratings include traits that are diagnostic of the target's self-presentational behaviour but that were not previously endorsed as self-descriptive, this is taken as evidence of self-concept change. In other words, the question is whether self-presentation affects subsequent self-conception. The current focus on public behaviour is not accidental (J. D. Brown, 1998); it is grounded in the historical notion that we come to know ourselves on the basis of how we appear to others – in terms of the publicly presented social “me” (see Chapters 2).

In one of the earliest studies, Gergen (1965) simultaneously considered the effect of controlled social feedback and of self-presentation on self-conception. Specifically, Gergen investigated change in global self-esteem. Prior to the main experiment, participants were administered a self-description task which yielded an index of the degree to which they evaluated themselves positively. The experimental design involved three manipulations. First, some interview participants interacted with an interviewer who agreed with their positive self-descriptions and disagreed with their negative self-descriptions, while others were not given any feedback. The social feedback provided was expected to change the recipients' self-concepts. Second, the interviewer's “personalism” was manipulated; that is, feedback was delivered to
participants in the feedback condition in either a personal or impersonal way, the expectation being that impersonal feedback would be less effective in changing the self. Third, the interaction goal was manipulated across participants. That is, participants were instructed to either present themselves accurately or to make a good impression.

Participants exposed to social reinforcement were found to subsequently describe themselves more positively than participants not exposed to the feedback. However, the variation in personalism had minimal impact on self-descriptions. Furthermore, as expected participants who described themselves favourably rather than accurately evidenced greater change in the positiveness of their self-descriptions. Gergen also observed that the induced self-enhancement generalized to self-ratings obtained in a different context. Gergen thus demonstrated that self-presentations that lead to positive reinforcement produce positive shifts in self-esteem (Rhodewalt, 1986).

In a subsequent experiment, Upshaw and Yates (1968) challenged the interpretation offered by Gergen (1965). To reiterate, Gergen proposed that with social approval one comes to believe that he or she actually possesses reinforced traits. In contrast, Upshaw and Yates suggested that self-esteem will increase following success at any task. For participants instructed to present themselves positively rather than accurately, the interviewer's approval may signal successful deception. The same feedback given to accuracy participants may be taken as evidence that he or she and the interviewer are communicating, again signifying success at the task at hand. Gergen (1965) predicted that participants instructed to make a good impression and given favourable feedback and will report the highest self-esteem. In contrast, Upshaw and Yates examined the possibility that individuals may experience an increase in self-esteem when the feedback they receive is congruent with the type of impression they sought to make.

Upshaw and Yates' participants were instructed to present themselves in either the best or worst possible light on an (ostensibly) objective personality test, administered in an interview context. Half of the participants in each of these groups received favourable feedback and the other half received unfavourable feedback. Self-esteem was subsequently measured. In support of their task-success hypothesis, Upshaw and Yates found that individuals' self-esteem increased when social feedback indicated that they had successfully managed an impression.
Jones et al. (1981) also focused on self-esteem. These researchers considered whether self change depends on the attributions people make about the cause of their behaviour. Research suggests, for instance, that self change is more likely to occur following dispositional rather than situational attributions for one's behaviour (e.g., Snyder & Swann, 1978; see also Kulik et al., 1986). In some contexts, therefore, one's behaviour is not likely to be self-revealing. In particular, Jones et al. considered whether the perceived legitimacy of self-presentation will affect its impact on the self. They reasoned, on the one hand, that when self-enhancing behaviour is considered illegitimate, this may cause feelings of guilt or shame, resulting in lowered self-esteem. The idea that a discrepancy between one's self-conception and behaviour may result in dissonance is derived from cognitive dissonance theory (see section 4.2.3, this chapter). On the other hand, when the illegitimacy of one's self-presentation is perceived to be minor, people may respond by bringing their private self-concept into agreement with their public self, resulting in increased self-esteem. Finally, if the self-presentation is perceived as legitimate given the circumstances, then there should be no change in self-esteem since the self-enhancing statements will be attributed to situational demands.

The question was thus whether the perceived legitimacy of the self-presentation will affect subsequent self-esteem. In Experiment 1, Jones et al. initially obtained a pretest measure of self-esteem. At a second session, an elaborate cover story led participants to believe that they were being interviewed for a position on an encounter observer team. Participants were asked loaded questions in an interview context designed to elicit self-enhancing responses. The perceived legitimacy of one's own interview behaviour was manipulated by providing consensus information which suggested that either self-enhancement or self-deprecation was the appropriate or legitimate response in the interview context. The consensus feedback took the form of a videotaped interview in which three highly self-enhancing or three highly self-deprecating interviewees (allegedly previous job applicants) individually responded to a subset of the interview items administered to the participant. As a small component of the job interview, the participant was given an opportunity to guess which of these "previous applicants" had been successful in securing a similar post; this provided a plausible context for the provision of legitimacy or consensus information. This consensus information was presented either before or after individuals participated in the self-enhancing interview. Self-esteem was then measured in what appeared to be an unrelated context.
The initial expectation centred on the consensus-post conditions. It was predicted that self-enhancing participants would not undergo a change in self-esteem if they received legitimising feedback subsequent to their own self-presentation (i.e., if others were also found to be self-enhancing). These participants were expected to ascribe their behaviour to the situation (given the high consensus) and therefore should not experience a change in self-esteem. In contrast, participants who presented themselves positively but subsequently discovered that the legitimate response was self-deprecation, should draw the inference that their self-descriptions reflected the true self. They therefore should experience self-concept change. Contrary to expectations, only preceding consensus information was found to affect interview behaviour and subsequent self-esteem measured in an unrelated context. The observation that retrospective consensus information does not alter attributions implies that self-attributions occur prior to or at the same time as self-presentation, and are irreversible (D. J. Bem, 1972).

Experiment 2 was designed to test whether these results could be replicated with a slightly different methodology (only the independent variables of interest will be described here). This time, the cover story stipulated that the study was about the non-verbal behaviour of graduate interviewers. The participant's role was to play a confederate interviewee (i.e., to role-play a job applicant). All participants were asked to try to create a positive impression on the graduate interviewer, who was allegedly unaware that the interview was contrived. The perceived legitimacy of one's own self-presentational behaviour was once again manipulated by providing information about the behaviour of three previous role-playing applicants (allegedly so that the participant could provide an independent check on the reliability of others' ratings). This time, however, all participants received the legitimacy or consensus information prior to their own interview. The results revealed that participants who viewed others being self-enhancing were self-enhancing themselves, while those who viewed self-deprecating others were self-deprecating themselves. Moreover in replication of Experiment 1, all participants displayed carry-over from self-presentation to subsequent self-esteem.

Experiment 3 compared the impact of a self-enhancing versus self-deprecating role on subsequent self-esteem. In addition, (a) the experimenter prescribed interview behaviour for half of the participants (these individuals recited scripted responses), while the other half self-referenced during the interview, and (b) half of the participants
were given choice to proceed with the interview while the others were not administered a standard choice instruction. In this study, Jones et al. similarly found that under certain conditions, participants who adopted either a self-enhancing or a self-deprecating role during an interview subsequently displayed a shift in their self-esteem in the corresponding direction. Among the self-enhancing participants, self-presentational behaviour enhanced self-esteem, unless the behaviour was prescribed by the experimenter and thus not self-referring. Among the self-deprecating participants, only those who chose to proceed with the experiment given the option to withdraw later rated themselves more negatively. Since they were given a choice, it appears that they felt responsible for their subsequent behaviour (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). Thus it appears that the self-reference variable accounts for the carry-over effect from a self-enhancing behavioural role, whereas the choice variable appears to account for the carry-over effect from a self-deprecating behavioural role. Those individuals who improvised their own self-referential responses while projecting ingratiating behaviour that was discrepant from their preferred stand but presumably still within the latitude of acceptance, accommodated the behaviour, registering enhanced self-esteem; those individuals who chose to engage in negative behaviour that would presumably normally be rejected, apparently experienced dissonance which was alleviated by bringing their self-attitudes more into congruence with their behaviour (Jones, 1990). This analysis, which emerged from the results of Experiment 3, was subsequently elaborated and directly tested by Jones' colleagues, in particular Rhodewalt.

Rhodewalt (1986) observed that "In contrast to the well-structured and stable self characterised in the social cognition research, the picture of the self depicted by the self-presentation studies is one that is shifting and highly mutable" (pp. 121-122). In an attempt to reconcile this discrepancy, Rhodewalt proposed that underlying stable representations of the self should be distinguished from the currently experienced or phenomenal self:

Every person has available to them an integrated representation of who they are that may be used for the interpretation of their present behaviour ... When in awareness, the phenomenal self represents a summary statement of the self-relevant information that is currently accessible. (p. 122)

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3 For a related discussion, see section 3.7.3 in Chapter 3.
In line with Jones et al.'s analysis, Rhodewalt (1986) referred to all the potentially available self-knowledge stored in memory as the latitude of acceptance of the phenomenal self. He proposed that the process by which self-presentational behaviour affects self-perception varies depending on whether the behaviour falls in one's latitude of acceptance or latitude of rejection. If the behaviour falls in one's latitude of acceptance, it should affect the phenomenal self-concept through self-perception processes whereas if the behaviour falls in one's latitude of rejection it should affect the self through cognitive dissonance processes. It was argued that a variant of self-perception called “biased scanning” accounts for self-concept change in the latitude of acceptance. In other words, behaviour that falls in the latitude of acceptance leads to biased scanning of self-relevant knowledge; self-aspects that are congruent with one's self-presentation thus become more accessible, and are given greater weight in later private self-appraisals. By contrast self-presentational behaviour that falls in the latitude of rejection is said to arouse cognitive dissonance. Therefore, the carry-over effect for highly self-discrepant behaviour should be affected by factors such as perceived choice or responsibility.

Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986) used a procedure very similar to that of Jones et al. (1981) to directly test the prediction that self-perception accounts for positive and negative shifts in self-esteem for behaviours that fall within one’s latitude of acceptance, while cognitive dissonance accounts for shifts in self-esteem when behaviour falls within one’s latitude of rejection. Nondepressed and mildly depressed participants presented themselves in either a self-enhancing or self-deprecating manner in an interview. Half of the participants simply recited responses from a script, while the other half self-referenced when responding to the interview questions. Also, the interview was completed under conditions of high or low choice. The primary dependent measure was subsequent self-esteem, measured in a supposedly unrelated context.

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* This model was influenced by Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper's (1977) earlier work concerning the dissonance versus self-perception controversy in the attitude change literature. For a discussion of similarities and differences between these analyses, see Rhodewalt (1986).
Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir reasoned that self-deprecating behaviour falls within the latitude of rejection for nondepressed individuals, and within the latitude of acceptance for depressed individuals. Accordingly, nondepressed individuals should only experience a decline in self-esteem following self-deprecating behaviour when they are made to feel responsible for their behaviour (i.e., in the high choice condition). In contrast, low choice nondepressed participants were not expected to experience a drop in self-esteem following self-deprecating behaviour; these individuals could attribute their behaviour to situational pressure and hence avoid dissonance. On the other hand, for depressed individuals, self-enhancing behaviour falls within their latitude of rejection and is thus dissonance arousing. Self-enhancing depressed people should therefore register higher self-esteem only when they freely choose to engage in the behaviour. By contrast, self-deprecating behaviour should fall within their latitude of acceptance, therefore only those behaviours that make negative content differentially accessible (i.e., the self-referencing condition) should produce a negative shift in self-esteem (Jones, 1990). Both groups of participants showed the carry-over effect in that self-deprecating behaviour decreased self-esteem, while self-enhancing behaviour increased self-esteem. More important, self-perception and dissonance processes mediated change in the expected manner among depressed individuals and among nondepressed individuals.

In a further extension of Jones et al. (1981), Rhodewalt and Comer (1981) investigated the influence of attributions on self change, focusing specifically on the individual difference variable attributional style. It was hypothesised that self-discrepant behaviour should more noticeably impact on self-attributors – those who typically attribute their behaviour internally. Accordingly, self-attributors who are induced to perform self-discrepant behaviours should evidence change in subsequent behaviours and self-evaluations in the direction of greater self-behaviour congruence. Situation attributors, by contrast, are less inclined to make inferences about the self, and therefore should not necessarily experience a self-discrepant behaviour as an inconsistency. The subsequent self-ratings and behaviours of these individuals should therefore not change.

In the context of a study allegedly dealing with “links between personality factors and jury decision making”, Rhodewalt and Comer first identified two groups: self-attributors and situation attributors. Participants then defined themselves on a trait dimension
lenient-harsh). They subsequently performed a behaviour relevant to this trait (i.e., sentencing a criminal). At a second session, experimental participants received social comparison information which indicated that their behaviour contradicted their self-image along the critical dimension. Specifically, they were led to believe that their judgements were harsher than other people's, contradicting all participants' self-perceived lenience. Individuals were then given an opportunity to re-rate themselves on the lenient-harsh dimension, and to sentence a second person for a similar crime.

Contrary to initial expectations, both self-attributors and situation attributors were found to modify self-ratings along the critical dimension (i.e., they rated themselves as more harsh) after receiving social comparison information. However, as expected, only the behaviour of self-attributors changed (i.e., they behaved more leniently) as a result of social comparison information. Although they did not fully support the hypothesis, the results are nevertheless consistent with the general idea that the impact of self-discrepant feedback is greater for those with a self-attributional style. This study also illustrates the impact of social comparison information on the self.

Fazio et al. (1981) examined whether self-discrepant behaviour can produce a corresponding change in self-perceived extroversion. At the start of the experiment, the experimenter engaged in a brief conversation with the participant in an attempt to ascertain how extroverted the participant was. The experimenter's initial ratings yielded a pretest measure of extroversion. The participant was then assigned to either the extroverted or the introverted condition. An interview followed in which the participant was asked questions designed to elicit introverted or extroverted responses, respectively, depending on the condition. The participant's behaviour in a new context was then unobtrusively monitored. Specifically, the participant's tendency to initiate conversation with a stranger was observed, as well as the participant's chair placement in relation to the confederate. On a subsequent self-description questionnaire and in the interaction with the confederate, participants displayed evidence of having internalised the disposition elicited by the experimenter.

Fazio et al. explain their results in cognitive terms. Specifically, when extroversion was made salient, participants' past extroverted behaviour was made highly accessible. This led participants to consider themselves as more extroverted in the context of the
experiment, and to behave consistently with that self-conception. Likewise, when introversion was made salient, participants focused on past instances of introverted behaviour, and experienced a shift in the self-concept in the introverted direction. Fazio et al.'s data imply that the specific content of self-conceptions is highly variable: "A series of biased questions that increase the salience of certain behaviours can alter such self-definitions ... These findings are consistent with the suggestion that self-conceptions are relatively malleable" (p. 241).

Fazio et al. further suggested that self-concept change (where it occurs) may represent the last of a five-step perception_interaction cycle (see also Darley & Fazio, 1980). In their view, the following sequence of events may lead to self change: (1) the perceiver develops an expectancy regarding the target person; (2) the perceiver directs behaviour which is congruent with the expectancy toward the target; (3) the target responds; (4) the perceiver interprets the target's response; and (5) the target simultaneously interprets his or her own behavioural response (see p. 240). These researchers suggest that the modified self-concept may maintain itself via this sort of cycle until some subsequent event or behaviour implicates other self-definelines.

Schlenker and Trudeau (1990) further investigated the conditions under which behavioural responses may invoke self change. They proposed that the strength of self-conceptions determines their changeability, a view shared by others (see section 3.7.3, Chapter 3). Strength of self-beliefs was operationalised in terms of participants' ratings of how consistent they perceived themselves to be on the focal dimension; namely, self-perceived independence. It was hypothesised that self change will occur when one's behaviour is only slightly discrepant from strong prior self-beliefs, but will not occur when the discrepancy is substantive. In addition, individuals with weaker self-conceptions were expected to be more likely to bring self-conceptions into agreement with discrepant self-presentations.

Schlenker and Trudeau first determined participants' self-ratings, perceived behavioural consistency, and latitudes of acceptance and rejection on the trait "independent". Latitudes of acceptance and rejection were determined by identifying the positions on an 11-point scale which the participant could and could not accept as being self-descriptive, respectively. The subsequent experimental session was introduced as an
investigation of the effects of a common drug on mental efficiency. Participants were either told that a drug would or would not create tension. Participants performed a preliminary round of tests, ingested the drug, waited for it to be absorbed, and then completed another series of tests in order to assess the drug's effects on performance. While they were supposedly waiting for the drug to take effect, they were asked to participate in a different project, a simulated interview designed to give graduate students interviewing experience (following Jones et al., 1981). The interview focused on the central trait, independence. Participants were either assigned a positive role (present yourself as independent) or a negative role (present yourself as relatively dependent). For some participants, this amounted to self-presentation in their latitude of acceptance, and for others the role-play involved self-presentation in their latitude of rejection. Self-perceived independence was subsequently measured.

The results revealed shifts in the direction of the self-presentations. Moreover, as predicted the impact of self-presentation was moderated by strength of prior self-beliefs. Participants who reported high behavioural consistency for the focal trait evidenced self-concept change when the self-presentation fell in their latitude of acceptance, but not when the role fell in their latitude of rejection (whether on the positive or negative side). In contrast, participants who reported low behavioural consistency for independence evidenced self-concept change irrespective of the latitude in which the behaviour fell; in fact, the greater the discrepancy the more their self-beliefs changed. This study did not show that strength of prior self-beliefs determines whether self-concept change will occur in the direction of the behaviour; rather, it showed that “self-belief strength influences the type of behaviour that produces maximal change ... Strong self-beliefs are most influenced by slightly discrepant behaviours that fall within the individual’s latitude of acceptance, and weak self-beliefs are most influenced by more discrepant behaviours” (Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990, p. 30).

In addition, the inclusion of trait ratings for other dimensions permitted an examination of whether the effects of the self-presentation generalized to unrelated personality traits (e.g., practical, self-knowledgeable, responsible, competent, and consistent). Self-concept change was found to be specific to the focal personality attribute. Similarly, changes in self-esteem were minor; although positive self-presentation tended to enhance self-esteem and negative self-presentation tended to attenuate self-esteem, these
effects were not statistically significant (p < .07). Schlenker and Trudeau’s general conclusions about the nature of the self accord with views previously expressed by Markus and Wurf (1987; see section 3.3, Chapter 3):

The self-concept can probably be best represented as having a relatively solid core of strong self-beliefs with a more fluid periphery of weaker, more situationally dependent self-beliefs ... When weaker self-beliefs are examined (as they often are in laboratory experiments), it might appear as if people are merely pawns of situational forces that elicit particular behaviours, which in turn easily change self-beliefs. However, stronger self-beliefs exhibit less vulnerability and dependence on transient behaviours. (1990, p. 30).

More recently, Tice (1992) considered whether self-concept change is more likely to occur following public as opposed to private self-presentation. Public behaviour is arguably more committing than private behaviour because it is more difficult to revoke. Although it is not inevitably inconsequential (e.g., see Greenwald & Breckler, 1985), private behaviour can more easily be dismissed, rationalised or forgotten. Study 1 showed that regardless of whether participants self-presented publicly or privately, those who portrayed themselves as emotionally stable later viewed themselves as more emotionally stable than those who portrayed themselves as emotionally responsive. Moreover as expected, public self-presentation consistently produced a greater shift in the direction of the behaviour than did private self-presentation. A second study generalised these findings to the extroversion–introversion dimension, and provided further evidence that self-presentation can affect participants’ behaviour, unobtrusively measured in a subsequent situation (cf. Fazio et al., 1981). A third study illustrated that the expectation of future interaction with the audience, as well as high choice and self-referencing, all resulted in more internalisation of the behaviour (cf. Jones et al., 1981). Tice’s focus on the public aspect of self-presentation points to the potential importance of the interpersonal context for producing self-concept change (see also Tice, 1994, 1998). McKillop, Berzonsky, and Schlenker (1992) extended these findings by showing that people who typically anchor their identities in external, social sources of experience, such as one’s social roles and interpersonal relationships, are more likely to be affected by public behaviour than individuals who anchor their identities in internal, personal sources of experience, such as personal beliefs and values.
Along similar lines, Schlenker, Dlugolecki, and Doherty (1994) demonstrated a carry-over effect from strategic self-presentation as a "sociable" person (in an interview situation) to subsequent self-ratings of personal sociability, as well as behaviour, in an unrelated context (Experiments 1 and 2); "independent" self-presentation was likewise found to enhance self-perceived independence (Experiment 3). Once again, public commitment to the presented self appeared to be a crucial antecedent to self-concept change. In addition, the effects of self-presentation were specific to the focal trait dimension and did not generalise to unrelated dimensions or to global self-esteem (cf. Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990).

The self-presentation studies raise the question of the durability of the observed shifts. The durability of the carry-over effect from self-presentation has not been studied over an extended time frame, mainly for ethical reasons (Fazio et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Tice, 1992). Within the self-presentation paradigm, studies conducted by Fazio et al. (1981), Schlenker et al. (1994) and Tice (1992) indicate "only that the changes are not so completely temporary that they evaporate once the person leaves the immediate situation ... these changes are sufficiently enduring to be able to elicit consistent behaviour in a subsequent situation with new interaction partners" (Tice, 1992, p. 449). Some early work on the impact of self-discrepant feedback on the self is likewise suggestive. In a study conducted by Haas and Maehr (1965) and spanning several weeks, an associate of the experimenter posing as "a physical development expert" gave participants either positive or negative feedback pertaining to their physical skills (e.g., body co-ordination, motor skills). Self-perception was assessed immediately after feedback (i.e., within one hour), as well as after one day, six days, and six weeks. The results indicated that both types of feedback affected self-conception. Moreover, although these changes did diminish over time, they were still significant at the end of the six week interval. Interestingly, immediately after the evaluation some changes were also detected in dimensions other than the evaluated physical attributes (e.g., general athletic skill and general physical fitness), however these changes were insignificant at subsequent testing intervals. In another early study, Hicks (1962) led participants to believe that their classmates judged them more favourably than they judged themselves on certain personality dimensions. Two days later, individuals were found to report higher self-evaluations on the critical traits relative to a set of control traits. This difference was no longer apparent one week later.
Thus early evidence points to the conclusion that the impact of self-discrepant feedback holds over short periods of time but tends to diminish as time passes (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979).

More recently, self-verification theorists have taken up this issue. Swann and Hill (1981; cited in Swann, 1983) found that changes in self-ratings detected immediately after participants answered "leading questions" about their extroversion or introversion, had disappeared at a subsequent testing session held one to four weeks after the experimental induction, suggesting that the laboratory-induced change was not enduring. As we saw in our earlier discussion of self-verification theory, Swann (1983) maintains that short-lived or transitory fluctuations in the self can not properly be regarded as "real" change (see also Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). In response to Swann, Jones (1990) counter-argued that the self-concept change paradigm has ecological validity. In particular, he argued that the self-presentation studies show how easy it is "to induce either uncharacteristic behaviour or new behaviour under circumstances such that the power of the induction is unrecognised or underestimated. Such occasions, I would submit, are very common in everyday life" (p. 234). Furthermore, a hidden assumption in Swann's position is his a priori model of the self, his idea being that the self-concept per se is an enduring psychological structure. Logically, this compels the conclusion that the only acceptable criterion for "real" change is "lasting or enduring change". If on the other hand one abandons the view that there is an enduring correspondence between certain psychological structures and the self-concept, then "real" change need not be equated with "lasting" change; under this new model transient shifts in the phenomenal self would automatically qualify as evidence of real malleability. One's definition of the self clearly sets the stage for an analysis of change; this becomes particularly evident when we come to consider different views on what constitutes "real" change.

Besides self-presentation, other studies have also shown the effect of social comparisons on self-conception. Morse and Gergen (1970) provide a classic demonstration. In this study, participants were in the process of applying for part-time jobs at the local University. Upon arriving at the "interview room", each individual encountered another job applicant. This other person (in all cases a confederate of the experimenter) was either immaculate and smart-looking (in the "Mr Clean" condition), or unkempt and
disorganised (in the "Mr Dirty" condition). Shortly after encountering the experimenter's accomplice, the real participant was asked to fill in some "application forms". Unbeknownst to the participant, the form contained the critical dependent measure: a measure of personal self-esteem. The investigators were interested to see if brief exposure to a competing job applicant could affect the real applicant's self-esteem. Despite the short exposure to their competitor and despite the incidental nature of their meeting, participants in the Mr Clean condition subsequently had lower self-esteem than participants in the Mr Dirty condition. This study clearly demonstrates that social comparisons, even unsolicited ones, can affect self-evaluation.

More recently, J. D. Brown, Novick, Lord, and Richards (1992) examined whether the contrast effects observed by Morse and Gergen extend beyond competitive situations. In Study 1, female participants were shown photographs of either very attractive or very unattractive women or men, and then rated their own attractiveness. A contrast effect was apparent when participants viewed female targets. That is, participants rated themselves as more attractive after viewing an unattractive female target than after viewing an attractive female target. Self-perceived attractiveness, however, did not vary after exposure to male targets. In Study 2, they examined whether the contrast effect that was observed in the first study could be reversed if participants are led to believe that they share certain attributes in common with the target other. Female participants were shown photographs of either an attractive or an unattractive female target. In addition, interpersonal similarity was manipulated such that experimental participants were led to believe that the target was either similar or dissimilar to the participant in terms of attitudes and values. Self-ratings of attractiveness were then obtained. In the dissimilar condition, the contrast effects observed in Study 1 were replicated. Here, self-ratings were higher after viewing an unattractive rather than an attractive target. By contrast, in the similarity condition, the contrast effect disappeared and there was a tendency (albeit statistically non-significant) toward an assimilation effect. Thus in this condition, self-ratings tended to be higher after viewing an attractive than after viewing an unattractive other. Subsequent studies extended these findings with a new manipulation of psychological closeness (i.e., a shared birth date). In summary, there is evidence to support the view that the nature of the social relationship between the perceiver and the comparison other determines how the other's attributes affect the perceiver's self-concept. We will develop and explore this point further in subsequent
chapters, where it will be argued that the perception of shared ingroup membership, in particular, can affect self-evaluation and self-conception.

4.5 Conclusions

The aim of the empirical review was twofold. Our first aim was to establish the dominant methodologies and to summarise the major findings. In summary, most evidence of self change comes from laboratory studies in which people have been shown to change their self-descriptions in response to self-discrepant feedback that is provided either by others’ judgements, or by one’s own overt behaviour. In particular, the empirical research reviewed in this chapter indicates that self change is more likely to occur: (1) when the actor is denied the opportunity to respond to self-discrepant feedback (Steele, 1988; Swann & Hill, 1982); (2) when the new self-conception is being reinforced or receives approval from audiences (Gergen, 1965; Upshaw & Yates, 1968); (3) when the actor's current goals and motives compel an alternative self-definition (Gergen, 1965; see also Kowalski & Leary, 1990); (4) under conditions of high personal responsibility for one’s behaviour (Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990; Tice, 1992); (5) following dispositional rather than situational attributions for one's own behaviour (Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Comer, 1981); (6) when the self-presentational behaviour is performed publicly (McKillop et al., 1992; Schlenker et al., 1994; Tice, 1992); (7) for trait dimensions that are low in self-perceived consistency (Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990); and (8) when relevant social comparisons compel a reappraisal of the self (J. D. Brown et al., 1992; Jones et al., 1981; Morse & Gergen, 1980; Rhodewalt & Comer, 1981).

In presenting this empirical review, the second aim was to elucidate the theoretical premises that appear to be most widely held among investigators with a particular interest in the change process. The most basic conclusion that can be drawn is that most investigators converge on the idea that overt behaviour can change self-beliefs. In explaining these effects, researchers have emphasised dissonance processes and a biased scanning version of self-perception theory (see Jones, 1990; Schlenker, 1986). Thus, one commonly held “theory” is that self-presentations that are consistent with initial self-beliefs cause biased scanning of compatible information in memory, which in turn causes self-perception to shift in the direction of the behaviour; self-presentations that are clearly self-discrepant may evoke dissonance, which can be eliminated by revising
one's self-beliefs to achieve self-behaviour congruence. Two conditions appear to facilitate the "carry-over" effect from behaviour to subsequent self-appraisal. Specifically, the target person must freely chose to engage in the behaviour, and they must have some latitude in determining how they play their role; thus, for instance, self-referencing instructions are more effective than scripted self-presentation (Jones, 1990).

Thus it appears that of the theories reviewed in the first half of this chapter (for a summary see Table 4.1), it is dissonance and self-perception approaches that have most directly affected the conception and design of recent experimental studies. An additional observation can be made in this connection. What has been referred to within the self-presentation literature as the "biased scanning" version of self-perception theory bears a strong similarity to a dominant explanation of self change within social cognition; specifically, the notion of varying accessibility of self-knowledge in the phenomenal or working self-concept (e.g., Markus & Wurf, 1986; see also section 3.3, Chapter 3). Thus, research cast in a social cognition light, or in an impression management framework, converges on the understanding that different environmental cues (including recently-enacted behaviours) may make some self-aspects more accessible in memory than others, and more generally, that this principle is relevant to the development of self change theory (e.g., Fazio et al., 1981; Rhodewalt, 1986; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990).

In the next chapter, an alternative analysis of the self and the problem of self-concept change will be presented. Importantly, this analysis will challenge the current emphasis on individuated self-perception, interpersonal behaviour, and intrapsychic processes which pervades contemporary approaches to the self and self change.
Chapter 5

Personal identity, social identity, and the psychological reality of the group: Self-categorization theory and research

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter we will expound the theoretical perspective that provides a framework for the empirical program of this thesis, namely self-categorization theory. Several ideas have influenced the present research program, but two are particularly central. The first idea is based on the understanding that people are both individuals and group members; accordingly, it is assumed that both individual and group aspects are represented in the self-concept. The second idea is that in order to provide an integrated social and cognitive understanding of the self, and an adequate account of self-concept change and stability, it is necessary to focus on the nexus between the psychological group and the self-concept. In line with self-categorization theory, we will argue that a private, personal sense of self is made possible because of the psychological reality of the social group, and further, that the psychological group plays a fundamental causal role in self-concept maintenance and change.

Full details of the theory, its various applications, and much relevant evidence is available elsewhere (Hogg, 1992; Turner, 1985, 1991; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997; Turner et al., 1994). The present coverage will specifically explore its application to the problem of the self and self-concept change, with a view to illuminating links and lacunae between self-categorization theory and the mainstream social-cognitive model of the self.

Like all ideas, self-categorization theory evolved within a specific historical context. We will begin by briefly considering the influence of social comparison theory and social identity theory. Festinger's views as applied by Wills (1992) to the problem of self-concept change were discussed in Chapter 4; for present purposes our specific
interest is in social comparison theory as an impetus to the development of the social identity view.

5.2 Social comparison and social identity theories

For present purposes three key points of Festinger’s (1954) analysis warrant mention. The first basic yet critical point is that social comparisons are an important source of knowledge about the self. Second, Festinger maintained that we prefer to make comparisons with members of the same group rather than members of different groups; thus the ingroup provides the context against which the personal self is evaluated. That Festinger was exclusively concerned with the impact of social comparison processes on personal self-evaluations is implicit throughout his paper, which restricts itself to a consideration of intragroup (within-group) comparisons to the exclusion of intergroup (between-group) comparisons. Third, Festinger argued that comparison processes confer stability on self-evaluations. He explicitly located these stabilising social processes within the social group. Festinger’s theory thus suggests an alternative explanation for stability in self-evaluations, one in which social groups (rather than internalised cognitive structures) play a critical role.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) elaborated and extended Festinger’s analysis in an important way. Specifically, it suggested that not only do we compare ourselves to other individuals; we also compare our group to other groups, and in the process, strive to evaluate the groups to which we belong (and by inference, ourselves) positively. The idea that social identity, or “the individual’s knowledge that he [sic] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him [sic] of this group membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p. 31), is an important source of self-esteem, was central to the theory.

For Tajfel and Turner, the concept of social identity was clearly implicated in the explanation of group-level behaviour (e.g., intergroup discrimination). In this connection, social identity theorists made a distinction between “acting in terms of self” and “acting in terms of group” (Tajfel, 1978). This distinction was then developed into the idea of an “interpersonal-intergroup continuum” of social behaviour (Turner & Oakes, 1989). Interpersonal behaviour referred to behaviour that is determined by one's unique personality characteristics, while intergroup behaviour referred to behaviour that
reflects individuals' memberships in various social groups more so than individual differences. These two poles were believed to represent theoretical extremes of a continuum rather than a dichotomy. In fact, it was acknowledged that pure forms of behaviour at either end are rare; most social interactions are characterised in part by interpersonal and in part by intergroup relations. Although the social identity view made reference to personal identity and its manifestation in the form of interpersonal behaviour, it was applied and tested primarily as a theory of intergroup behaviour.

5.3 Self-categorization theory

In contrast to social identity theory, self-categorization theory was not concerned specifically with different types of intergroup behaviour, but with the broader question of what transforms a collection of individuals into a psychological group. Thus self-categorization theorists began by addressing, at the level of metatheory, “the related problems of psychological group formation and the psychological reality of group phenomena” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 1). This perspective deals with the psychological antecedents and consequences of group membership:

Descriptively speaking, a psychological group is defined as one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values (i.e., with which they compare to evaluate themselves, their abilities, performances, opinions, etc., and from which they take their rules, standards and beliefs about appropriate conduct and attitudes), that they privately accept membership in, and which influences their attitudes and behaviour. (Turner et al., 1987, pp. 1-2)

Like its predecessor, self-categorization theory rejects the individualism that denies the distinctive psychological properties of the social group (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1986). It is based on the understanding that groups do not just exist in the physical or social sense; groups are also “real” in the psychological sense. Building on social identity theory, which stated that social identity reflects group affiliations, self-categorization theorists took the point a step further, arguing that social identity comprised social categorizations of the self that caused group phenomena (Turner & Oakes, 1989). It is important to note however, that self-categorization theory speaks as much of the personal as of the group:
it deals with the interrelation of personal and social, individual and group, and asserts the interdependence of individuality and shared, collective identity. The theory proposes that the group is a distinctive psychological process, but in so doing it reminds us that group functioning is part of the psychology of the person – that individual and group must be reintegrated psychologically before there can be an adequate analysis of either. (Turner & Oakes, 1989, p. 270, emphasis added)

From this perspective, cognitive representations of the self are said to take the form of self-categorizations, that is, cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as identical in contrast to some other class of stimuli (Turner et al., 1987). It is argued that self-categorizations exist as part of a hierarchical system of classification. That is self-categories form at different levels of abstraction such that the more inclusive the self-category, the higher the level of abstraction (Turner et al., 1987). Although levels higher and lower are postulated, Turner et al. state that "for purposes of theoretical exposition" at least three levels of self-categorization are important when considering the functioning of the self-concept: the superordinate level (self-definition as a human being in contrast to other forms of life), the intermediate level (self-definition as a member of some ingroup in contrast to some outgroup), and the interpersonal level (self-definition as a unique individual in contrast to other ingroup members). As explained by Oakes et al.:

The idea of a given level is useful to indicate a theoretical extreme, but in reality there is a perceptual continuum that never fully embodies any one level but arises from a dynamic, fluid process through which tensions between different levels of abstraction are resolved. (1994, p. 100)

For present purposes, the distinction between personal identity (the interpersonal level of self-categorization) and social identity (the intermediate level) is of particular interest. Personal identity refers to one's personality, those characteristics that differentiate individuals from one another, such as psychological traits and personal values. By contrast, social identity defines the self in social categorical terms rather than on the basis of interindividual differences. In other words, personal identity refers to "me" versus "not me" categorizations (implicitly intragroup comparisons; cf. Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999), while social identity refers to "us" versus "them" categorizations. Although the latter is referred to as "social," there is no implication that the personal, human and other levels of abstraction are any less social in terms of their content, origin or function (Turner et al., 1987; see also Turner & Onorato, 1999).
Personal identities are salient when interpersonal interactions take place, while social identities are psychologically salient in intergroup settings. The distinction between personal and social identity thus parallels the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. However, in self-categorization theory (cf. social identity theory) both interpersonal and intergroup behaviour are seen as "acting in terms of self".

Self-categorization theory states that categorization and comparison are two sides of the same coin; neither can exist without the other. That is, the division of stimuli into categories depends upon perceived similarities and differences, but stimuli can only be compared in so far as they have already been categorized as similar at some higher level of abstraction, which in turn presupposes a prior process of comparison and so on (see Turner et al., 1987). This idea is central to the theory and suggests the important hypothesis that "self-categorizations at any level tend to form and become salient through comparisons of stimuli defined as members of the next more inclusive (higher level) self-category" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 46). Hence, the way that Mary and Rose perceive themselves as individuals will depend on the intragroup comparison in terms of which they are differentiating themselves (are they comparing themselves as Australians, as women, or as accountants?) Presumably different attributes will be required to achieve self-other differentiation depending on the ingroup category which provides the context for comparison (Onorato & Turner, 1997; Reynolds & Oakes, 1999).

Self-categorization theory further postulates that self-perception tends to vary from the perception of self as a unique individual to the perception of self as an ingroup member. Self-perception is likely to occur at the mid-point of this continuum much of the time (cf. Brewer, 1991), such that individuals will tend to define themselves as:

moderately different from ingroup members, who in turn will be perceived as moderately different from outgroup members ... Personal self- and ingroup-outgroup categorizations, then, are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they will tend to operate simultaneously most of the time, but their perceptual effects are inversely related. (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50, emphasis added)

On this point, it is important to avoid confusion. Self-categorization theory argues that one level of self-categorization depends on another, implying a positive relationship.
between personal and social identity. For instance, it is likely that to a degree we infer the attributes of our ingroup from our own personal attributes, and our personal attributes from the attributes of our ingroup; hence personal and social identity are likely to be interdependent and correlated. At the same time, however, there is a negative relationship across situations between the tendency to categorise self at the personal versus the group level (Turner & Oakes, 1989). In some social situations I will tend to categorise myself as a group member (e.g., at the Sydney Olympics) while in others I will tend to categorise self as an individual (e.g., when sitting an examination).

In this connection, Turner (1982) points out that “the possibility arises that social identity may on occasions function nearly to the exclusion of personal identity, i.e. that at certain times our salient self-images may be based solely or primarily on our group memberships” (p. 19, emphasis added). This brings us to the next key point of the analysis: specifically, factors that tend to enhance the salience of ingroup-outgroup categorizations tend to enhance the perception of self as similar to or interchangeable with other ingroup members, and so depersonalise individual self-perception. Depersonalisation is not a loss of personal identity, as some developmental and clinical theories suggest (e.g., Mellor, 1988; M. Rosenberg, 1987), nor a submergence of the self in the group (see Turner et al., 1987, p. 51); rather, it represents "a cognitive redefinition of the self – from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes" (Turner, 1984, p. 528, emphasis added). This mechanism then, is seen to make all group behaviour possible, including ethnocentrism, stereotyping, collective action, and so on. In the past, it has been these applications that have piqued the interest of investigators. By contrast, our present interest in self-stereotyping stems from its conception as an important type of “change in the nature and content of the self-concept corresponding to the functioning of self-perception at a more inclusive level of abstraction” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 51, emphasis added).

Following Bruner (1957), it is argued that the salience of some ingroup-outgroup categorization (or other self-categorization) in a given situation is always a function of an interaction between the perceiver's readiness to use a categorization as the basis for perception or action, and the fit between the stimulus input and category specifications (Oakes, 1987; Turner, 1985). It is argued that individuals are predisposed to using certain categorizations of self; in particular, categorizations that have prior meaning or
significance, or that are relevant to the perceiver’s current goals, motives, values and needs, may be highly accessible (Haslam, in press). The importance or centrality of a given self-category to the perceiver is an important factor here (see also Simon, 1999).

Fit has two aspects, comparative and normative. Comparative fit is defined by the principle of meta-contrast, which states that a collection of stimuli is more likely to be categorized as an entity (or higher-order unit) to the degree that the average differences perceived between them are less than the average differences perceived between them and the remaining stimuli which comprise the frame of reference. The process of categorizing self and others is thus understood to be a dynamic, inherently comparative and context-dependent process. The principle of comparative fit predicts that when intrapersonal (within-individual) differences are less than intragroup (within-group) differences, personal identity will tend to be salient (i.e., the abstract self-representation that I refer to as “me”, or some specific aspect of that self-category, such as my traits and dispositions); by contrast, social identity will come to the fore when intergroup (between-group) differences are greater than inter-individual differences within the ingroup (e.g., when I observe the behaviour of three like-minded women, including my own, to be distinctly different to that of a group of men).

Normative fit is assessed by asking whether the instances being represented match the category label in terms of substantive content. To categorise a group of people as Australians versus Italians, as men versus women, and so on, the first group must not only differ (in attitudes, behaviour, etc.) from the second group more than from each other (this is comparative fit), but they must also do so in the right direction on specific content dimensions of comparison. For instance, “emotionality” is normatively fitting for the category Italians but not for Australians, who are by comparison, emotionally subdued. Thus this pattern of covariation (i.e., emotional Italians, unemotional Australians), represents a situation of high normative fit, since differences are consistent with my normative beliefs about the substantive social meaning of the relevant categories. By contrast, low normative fit refers to the observation of similarities and differences that conflict with normative beliefs about the substantive content of the relevant categories (e.g., unemotional Italians, emotional Australians).
Oakes, Turner, and Haslam (1991, Experiment 2) report research which illustrates how perceiver readiness and comparative and normative fit interact to determine social category salience. Their participants viewed a videotape featuring three arts and three science students discussing university life. Pre-testing had established that arts students are typically viewed as pro-social life while science students are typically viewed as pro-academic life. The manipulation of comparative fit produced three types of fit: in the consensus condition, there was complete agreement among the students; in the conflict condition, the three arts students disagreed with the three science students; in the deviance condition, the target arts student disagreed with the other five students. Normative fit was manipulated at the level of the target arts student; her attitudes were either consistent with the stereotype of arts students (high normative fit) or inconsistent with the stereotype of arts students (low normative fit). The dependent measures assessed participants' attributions for the opinions expressed by the target individual. It was predicted that high comparative fit combined with high normative fit would work for the salience of social category membership, and hence result in attributions to the target's group membership, rather than to her unique personality. By contrast, low comparative and normative fit should work for the salience of personal identity, and should therefore lead to a personality attribution. As expected, the arts/science categorization was most salient in the conflict/consistent condition. Here, participants attributed the target arts student's views to the fact that she was an arts student. Also as predicted, in the deviance/inconsistent condition participants interpreted the opinions of the target individual as an expression of her personality.

5.4 Contrasting self-categorization theory and social cognition approaches to the self
Self-categorization theory represents several key points of departure from the premises that currently guide mainstream social cognition approaches to the self (Onorato & Turner, in press; Turner, 1999; Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Onorato, 1999). Firstly, self-categorization theory does not equate the self with a particular store or depository of long-term knowledge. The emphasis in this perspective is on the dynamics of the self-system. Fluidity in the categorization of self vis-à-vis others is the rule, not the exception, whereas the opposite emphasis characterises dominant social-cognitive models. A related point is that self-categorization theory offers a process-oriented rather than a structural account of the self. This is apparent from the theory's definition of the self as "a dynamic process of [reflexive] social judgment" (Turner et al., 1994, p. 458).
This perspective maintains that there is no preformed self-structure waiting to be activated; the content and meaning of self-categories are not determined prior to their use. From this perspective it follows that what needs to be explained is the psychological process by which individuals arrive at self-categorical judgements. Although it is not denied that long-term knowledge about the self has a role to play in this process, it is assumed that cognitive resources such as long-term knowledge are deployed flexibly when we come to categorise the self. Whereas the traditional focus in self-concept research has been on delineating the content of a preformed knowledge structure called the "self-concept", self-categorization theory seeks to delineate how perceiver readiness works together with the (comparative and normative) fit between social context and specifications of some category, to determine current self-depiction. It is useful at this point to distinguish the traditional focus of self-concept research from the focus of the present work, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.

![Figure 5.1](image-url)

**Figure 5.1** Comparing the traditional focus of self-concept research with the focus of the present thesis.
Secondly, the personal self is conceptualised very differently in self-categorization theory and social-cognitive models, such as self-schema theory. Self-categories (unlike self-schemata) do not represent fixed, absolute properties of the perceiver but relative, varying properties. Two dimensions of comparative context that can influence self-category content are relevant comparison others (those that are actually present or implicitly present) and the relevant comparison dimension. These variables are critical to predicting change in self-category content.

By contrast, although it is implicit even in Markus' (1977) model that comparison with others is likely to be implicated in the formation of self-concepts (see p. 64), this realisation is lost from the theory and self-schemata are, in the final analysis, treated as absolute properties of the perceiver. Hence self-schema theorists do not interpret schema-consistent responses as contextual judgements. They fail to acknowledge the implications of the "individual" focus of their paradigm and testing procedure. What appears to be a "neutral" testing condition is on closer scrutiny implicitly individualistic in its focus (Onorato & Turner, 1997; see also K. James, 1993). Thus, when an Independent Schematic quickly answers the question "Are you independent?" in the affirmative, a self-schema theorist assumes the rapid response is driven by a stable underlying cognitive structure. Experimental effects such as schema-consistent responses are, however, always subject to interpretation. Inherent in Markus' own interpretation of schematic processing is the assumption that self-relevant judgements are unaffected by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others (cf. Allport, 1935).

A self-categorization theorist would interpret the same response as a contextual, relational and comparative judgement. Within the Markus paradigm the contextual nature of a schematic individual's response may not be evident, since the response was elicited by an acontextual prompt on the researcher's part, but from the perspective of self-categorization theory, the social context is implicit if not explicit in all personality judgements. We would argue that the judgement "I am independent" in all likelihood represents a comparison between self and the psychological group that defines this dimension for the perceiver at this point in time. Presumably, when I am 70 years of age, I may still rate myself as independent, but by that stage, this dimension may well have taken on a totally different meaning, because the implicit ingroup that serves to define this dimension will have changed. For similar reasons, Markus' (1977) empirical demonstrations of stability in self-relevant judgements at two points in time are not
surprising from the perspective of self-categorization theory, since they reflect stable testing conditions that are implicitly focused on individuality on both occasions.

There is another way of thinking about this issue — that is, about the different conceptualisations of the personal self offered by self-categorization theory and personality models of the self. In social cognition, the self is equated with stable individual differences; the emphasis in this view is on the uniqueness of the self vis-à-vis the other. In self-categorization theory, by contrast, the meta-contrast principle that is considered germane to the formation and function of all self-categories (including the categorization of self as a unique individual) speaks of relative similarities and differences. Similarities and differences are not viewed as independent, but as aspects of the same meta-contrast; furthermore, “category formation ... depends not just on ‘similarities’ between stimuli, as is usually assumed, but on relative similarities, on more similarity (or less difference) between certain stimuli than between those and others” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 47). Extrapolating from this understanding of meta-contrast to the personal level of identity, the self-categorization perspective suggests that the concept of an “individual difference variable” as traditionally conceived is misleading in that the very term implies difference in the absence of similarity. The view that an individual difference variable captures, reflects, or expresses the relative differences (or similarities) that characterise “me,” rather than absolute differences, can easily be derived from self-categorization theory. Personal identity is made possible because of some shared higher-order identity in terms of which social comparison can take place. This implies quite clearly that similarity and difference go hand in hand in defining the personal self. The term “individual difference variable” is in this sense a misnomer; in actual fact what personality researchers refer to as individual differences can be re-conceptualised as “relative individual difference” variables. Although socially shared similarities recede into the background when we come to consider the content of personal self-categories (i.e., personal identity as a product of social cognition), it does not follow that similarity has a negligible role to play in the process that makes self-definition as a unique individual possible (see Simon, 1997, p. 321, for a related discussion). Cooley (1922) expressed a similar view when he claimed that individuality arises from "the emphasis of inconsistent elements in ideas having much in common" (p. 131), implying that sociality or the collective aspect of social life is a precursor to the emergence of a personal self.
Further, self-categorization theory argues that the "me" level of self-categorization is not the basic or most fundamental level of self-categorization (cf. Markus, 1977). In other words, social identity is not a distortion of the (true) personal self. Although personal and social identity do vary in importance as a function of perceiver and situational variables (Turner & Onorato, 1999), both levels of self-categorization are considered to be psychologically valid. The self-schema approach by contrast assumes that core "me" structures are chronically primed, implying that personal self-categorizations have a privileged status in defining the self (see also Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Simon, 1993; Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990).

Furthermore, discussions of self-concept activation in the mainstream self literature focus on the role played by accessibility. Thus when primed by situational or other cues, an underlying self-schema can become activated in the working self (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Comparative and normative fit appear to play no part in their explanation of self-concept activation. By contrast, in self-categorization theory self-category salience is a function of "perceiver readiness (or accessibility) x fit," suggesting that quite a different mechanism underlies self-category salience. In this connection, it should be noted that published expositions of self-categorization theory tend to discuss the perceiver readiness x fit interactional hypothesis with reference to the salience of social identities (e.g., see Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1991; Turner et al., 1994; cf. Reynolds & Oakes, 1999). It is however, postulated to be the mechanism which explains the shifting salience of all self-categories, including shifts between one's various personal identities. Within this perspective, one area that clearly warrants theoretical and empirical attention is the examination of the perceiver readiness x fit principle (both its comparative and normative aspects) as it applies at the interpersonal end of the continuum of social behaviour.

In addition, self-categorization theory focuses on different types of self-concept change. From this perspective the focus is on the types of variation that characterise the self-categorization process, rather than on change to underlying psychological structure. At least four important forms of variation are stipulated in the theory (see Turner et al., 1994, pp. 456-458). First, it is postulated that the salient level of self-categorization can
change. In this connection it is stipulated that self-categorization becomes more inclusive of others (depersonalised) as the frame of reference is manipulated to include dissimilar others as well as similar others (e.g., see Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995; Oakes, Haslam, & Reynolds, 1999; Wilder & Thompson, 1988). Specifically, social identity comes to the fore in intergroup contexts while personal identity comes to the fore in intragroup contexts. The second type of variation may be observed within each level; specifically, different content can become salient at any given level. For example, at the personal level, I may perceive myself as independent in one context (“me” when I am healthy) and dependent in another context (“me” when I am sick). Third, the meaning of a self-category will vary to reflect the content of the diagnostic differences between individuals or groups in specific contexts. For instance, “we Australians” may perceive ourselves as hardworking compared to South Sea Islanders but pleasure-loving compared to Americans (see Simon, 1997, p. 322, for other examples). Fourth, the internal structure of self-categories (including the prototype) varies with the context in which the self-category is defined (for an illustration, see Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & Onorato, 1995). Self-categorization theory maintains that these types of change are real and meaningful, and should not be discounted as trivial:

Self-categories and in-groups can be defined in diametrically opposite ways on different occasions ... They can have opposite meanings depending on context. This is not superficial, inauthentic change but reflects the fact that category identity is derived from the context in which it is defined and hence varies with context. (Turner et al., 1994, p. 458)

Furthermore, and in contrast to previous approaches to self-concept change, self-categorization theory views recently enacted behaviour as one cognitive resource among many that may be brought to bear on the categorization of self vis-à-vis others comprising the psychological frame of reference. In this analysis, behaviour has no privileged status, over and above other cognitive resources (e.g., one's past experience with a specific behavioural domain) in determining self-category content. Furthermore, from this perspective the notion of “self-discrepant behaviour” is void of meaning until relevant contextual parameters are established. Because the self is not conceived of as a static entity, fixed at the personal level, an important consideration in determining whether a given unit of behaviour is self-discrepant will be the level at which self and others are currently categorized. For instance, dependent behaviour on the part of a woman may be discrepant with her personal identity; the same behaviour, however, may
be consistent with her identity as a woman when this identity is judged in an intergroup context involving direct comparisons with men. Similarly, behaviour which projects negativity and powerlessness may be discrepant with one’s personal sense of self but consistent with one’s self when self is defined as the member of a subordinate, low status group confronted by a dominant, high status outgroup. These examples are in fact relevant to and will be explored in the empirical program of the thesis (Chapters 6 to 9).

There is at least one more important difference between self-categorization theory and dominant social-cognitive models: namely, they offer very different accounts of self-concept stability (Onorato & Turner, 1997; Turner & Onorato, 1999). Self-categorization theory does not deny that the self can be experienced as stable. From this perspective, it is argued that perceiver readiness and normative and comparative fit provide definite constraints on self-category variation. While social-cognitive models have a ready-made explanation for stability in cognitive structural terms, self-categorization theory emphasises the interplay between internal and external factors in stability. In particular, from this perspective it is understood that social groups (in particular) have an important role to play in stabilising the personal self:

Stability in self-categorization is likely to arise from (a) the stability of the social reality that provides contexts for self-definition, (b) the higher-order knowledge frameworks used to give coherence to varying instances of behaviour, (c) the social groups, subcultures, and social institutions that provide perceivers with stable norms, values, and motives, and (d) social influence and communication processes that translate particular conceptions of self and others into social norms and validate the broader elaborative ideologies used in their construction. (Turner et al., 1994, p. 460)

Self-categorization theory clearly does not reject the view that long-term knowledge exists, or that such knowledge has a role to play in self-cognition. Likewise empirical stability in the self is not ruled out on theoretical or empirical grounds. However, stability is not explained in terms of cognitive structure; rather, it is attributed to the same processes that make change possible. More often than not, we interact with ingroup members, rather than outgroup members (Turner & Onorato, 1999). In line with Festinger (1954), self-categorization theorists would argue that our heavy reliance on self-ingroup comparisons as a basis for self-definition likely serves to stabilise the personal self (cf. Brewer, 1991; Simon, 1993).
5.5 Links between self-categorization theory and the classical view

Clearly there are some important points of departure between self-categorization theory and dominant social cognition approaches. In many respects self-categorization theory has more in common with the orientation or flavour of the early self theories than with the currently popular "self as schema" metaphor. Self-categorization theory evolved out of the intergroup relations literature rather than the self-concept literature. Its first applications were to the explanation of group-level phenomena, including stereotyping, social co-operation, group cohesiveness, and social influence (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1991). Only in the last decade has it come to be developed and tested as a theory of the self-concept (Onorato & Turner, 1996, 1997; Onorato & Turner, in press; Simon, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996; Turner, 1988, 1999; Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Onorato, 1999; Widdicombe, 1988). This may explain why researchers have by and large failed to appreciate the relevance and applicability of self-categorization theory to problems of the self and personality (e.g., see Baumeister, 1998). Similarly, this may explain why to date the strong links between self-categorization theory and the classical view have gone largely unnoticed.

The early self theorists took it for granted that the self is social and relational, in the sense that the self cannot exist apart from the other. Personality, like the self, was believed to have an intrinsically social basis (e.g., see J. M. Baldwin, 1902, p. 27, and Mead, 1934, p. 162). These theorists rejected the view that the self is a stored entity, a pre-existing thing or given (e.g., see W. James, 1948, p. 69; Mead, 1934, p. 182). On the contrary, selves did not exist independently of the social processes in which they are involved. Furthermore, the collective aspect of social life was considered a precursor to the emergence of a personal self (see Cooley and Mead in particular). Those writing at the turn of the century thus theorised about the social processes that constituted the self, rather than non-social, intrapsychic mechanisms. They argued that the collectivity played a role in all social life, such that even one's most private innermost thoughts were highly social: "The mind is not a hermit's cell ... The life of the mind is essentially a life of intercourse" (Cooley, 1922, p. 97). They advocated that social comparison is critical to self-definition, and understood that things can only be compared in so far as they are already similar at some higher plane. In particular, Cooley accepted the idea that differentiation at one level depended on identification at a higher level. The early theorists entertained the possibility that the circumference of the socius can expand to
include other persons (e.g., see J. M. Baldwin, 1902, pp. 38-39, and Cooley, 1922, pp. 209-210). Moreover, they maintained that the social group – real or inferred – serves to sustain the self; it provides the individual with a consistent way of thinking about oneself, and thus, a sense of unity (e.g., see Mead, 1934, p. 144 and p. 154).

Contemporary personality models of the self (see Turner & Onorato, 1999 for a discussion) can arguably be characterised as a retreat from the classical view (Kahlbaugh, 1993; S. Rosenberg, 1988; Scheibe, 1995). We hasten to add that any attempt to characterise "the dominant view" of the self in contemporary social psychology will unavoidably yield generalisations, which is problematic from the point of view that there will always be noteworthy exceptions. For instance, many contemporary theorists do treat the self as an interrelated construct (e.g., M. W. Baldwin, 1992; Brewer, 1991; Curtis, 1991; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Niedenthal & Beike, 1997; Ogilvie & Ashmore, 1991; Simon, 1997), some clearly agree with the general notion that the self can be socially extended to include the other (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Lancaster & Foddy, 1988), and many have demonstrated the influence of interpersonal relationships, roles and culture on self-conception (e.g., Deaux, 1993; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, Choi, Gelfand, & Yuki, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998; Tesser, 1988; Triandis, 1989). Notwithstanding exceptions such as these, it would appear that, on the whole, there has been a dramatic shift in the thinking of North American self psychologists since the turn of the century.

On the other hand, there are some important differences between the "looking glass" metaphor on the one hand, and the social self as conceived in self-categorization theory (Onorato & Turner, in press; Turner & Onorato, 1999). Cooley's (1922) looking glass self was a publicly presented and publicly perceived self; it was a personal self or a social "me" that comprised the reflected appraisals of others. As such, it remains a relatively individualistic construct. By contrast, in self-categorization theory the social "me" is the product of an act of self-categorization by the perceiver (as are all self-categories). Self-categorization theory does not reject the view that interpersonal feedback can shape self-category content in important ways, but it goes much further than this; it articulates the psychological mechanisms by which social stimuli (including
"reflected appraisals") come to be categorized as "self" or "not self". Social comparison and categorization processes are central to this analysis. Equally importantly, self-categorization theory explicitly confines those "others" that exert their influence on the personal self through reflected appraisals to "ingroup others" (Turner & Onorato, 1999). Others exert their influence primarily because they are implicitly a part of the self-category, "we" and "us", rather than the non-self-categories "you" or "them". Moreover in self-categorization theory the self is not predominantly or basically personal, but exists at different levels, including a collective level of identification. The collective self is not a personal self perceived by some external collectivity (cf. Triandis, 1989); it is a social identity in the sense of a self that is derived from group membership, shared with others, and inclusive of them. There is a public dimension to both personal and social identity, but the self in all its aspects is also a private, psychological self, cognitively represented in the form of self-categories.

5.6 Redefining the self in terms of the group: Empirical demonstrations of self-stereotyping or depersonalisation

One idea that is clearly central to the self-categorization analysis of the self is the view that individual self-perception is transformed in group contexts. Self-stereotyping, or depersonalisation, is the process "whereby people come to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). As such, it represents an important type of variation in the self. Do individuals sometimes come to perceive themselves as relatively interchangeable with others, and if so, under what conditions?

Direct evidence that a salient social identity depersonalises the perception of self and others is now quite extensive (for overviews, see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Haslam, in press; Hogg, 1992; Oakes et al. 1994; Spears, Oakes, et al., 1997; Turner et al., 1994). This research has demonstrated that social category salience: (1) leads one to ascribe to the self the characteristics of the ingroup (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996; Dion, Earn, & Yee, 1978; Hogg & Turner, 1987; K. James, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Onorato & Turner, 1996, 1997; Rosenkranz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968; Simon, 1993; Simon, Glassner-Bayerl, & Stratenwerth, 1991; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995); (2) leads one to ascribe
attitudes or values characteristic of the ingroup to the self (e.g., Abrams, Sparkes, & Hogg, 1985; Charters & Newcomb, 1952; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Salancik & Conway, 1975); (3) leads one to behave more like an interchangeable group member (e.g., Abrams, Sparkes, & Hogg, 1985; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Levy, 1996; Turner, 1975, 1978; Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1994); (4) accentuates perceptions of a self-ingroup match, intragroup homogeneity or intragroup similarity (e.g., Hardie & McMurray, 1992; Lau, 1989; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; E. R. Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996), particularly when ingroup identification is high (e.g., Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Kelly, 1989; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997); (5) produces self-ingroup assimilation and self-outgroup contrast (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; David & Turner, 1992; Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995; Wilder & Thompson, 1988); (6) accentuates perceptions of intraclass similarities and interclass differences (e.g., P. M. Brown & Turner, 1996; Hensley & Duval, 1976; Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995; Hogg, 1992; Oakes et al., 1994; Turner, 1978; Wilder, 1984); (7) heightens perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity (e.g., Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1996; Simon, 1992; Simon & R. J. Brown, 1987; Wilder, 1984); and (8) produces consensual stereotypes of the ingroup and the outgroup (e.g., Haslam et al., 1999; Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, Reynolds, & Eggins, 1996; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, Eggins, Nolan, & Tweedie, 1998).

Two broad classes of evidence of depersonalisation can be extrapolated from the above list. Firstly, there are those studies that look for an effect of self-stereotyping at the level of the ingroup only (i.e., depersonalised self-ratings, attitudes, values, or behaviour; enhanced self-ingroup match, intraclass similarity, or intragroup homogeneity). Taken together, these studies illustrate one key aspect of the self-stereotyping process: namely, intragroup homogenization. That is, they show how depersonalisation changes the perceived psychological distance between self and other ingroup members. Equally importantly though, depersonalisation has implications for perceptions of the ingroup vis-à-vis the outgroup. Accordingly, the second broad class of studies are those that simultaneously look for effects of self-stereotyping at the level of the ingroup and outgroup (e.g., accentuation of intraclass similarity and interclass contrast; accentuation of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity; the consensualization of
ingroup and outgroup stereotypes). In the next two sections, examples of both classes of research will be provided. By necessity, the empirical review will be highly selective rather than all-inclusive. The primary aim of this review is to establish the validity of the self-stereotyping notion, on a range of dependent measures, and the conditions that facilitate stereotypical rather than individuated self-perception.

5.6.1 Evidence of homogenization processes at the level of the ingroup

Dion et al. (1978) provided some early evidence of homogenization processes at the level of the ingroup. These investigators found that where participants failed at a task and could attribute that failure to the prejudice of the outgroup, ingroup members self-stereotyped more strongly in terms of the ingroup category. Specifically, Jewish participants who could attribute their failure to prejudice on the part of players categorized as Gentiles, subsequently endorsed positive aspects of the ingroup stereotype more strongly in their self-descriptions than did Jewish participants who perceived other players as individuals. These results have been replicated with other groups that possess (or arguably possess) minority-group status. For instance, female participants dealt with perceived prejudice from men by identifying with the positive pole of the ingroup stereotype. Both of these studies illustrate that conditions which heighten awareness of group membership (i.e., perceived threat from the outgroup) can increase identification and self-stereotyping; interestingly, this was the common response to perceived prejudice rather than attempts to refute the stereotype held by the dominant group.

Hogg and Turner (1987) reported the first direct test of the self-stereotyping hypothesis, as articulated within self-categorization theory. There were two experimental conditions in Hogg and Turner's study. Individuals participated either in discussion dyads in which two people of the same sex disagreed with each other (the intragroup condition) or in four-person discussion groups in which two men disagreed with two women (the intergroup condition). In the intragroup condition, the within-category differences in attitudes are greater than the within-person differences; by contrast, in the intergroup condition the between category differences are greater than the within category differences. That is, the meta-contrast makes individual differences salient in the first condition, and group membership salient in the second condition (Turner et al., 1994). Self-stereotyping was measured by examining individual's self-descriptions in
terms of stereotypical male or female traits. As predicted, self-stereotyping (the ascription of ingroup-defining traits to one’s own person) was more pronounced in the intergroup than the intragroup condition.

Building on Hogg and Turner (1987), and Dion et al. (1978), several investigators have asked whether self-stereotyping, as evidenced by greater homogenization within the ingroup, is more evident for minority or low status group members than majority or high status group members. For instance, Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) reasoned that due to status differences between men and women, intergroup comparisons would be more cognitively salient for women (whose relatively low status confers a heightened awareness of intergroup differences) than men. In support of this view, he found that women exhibited more self-stereotyping (defined as the acceptance of typical ingroup attributes and the rejection of typical outgroup attributes) than men. Lorenzi-Cioldi argued that this presumably reflects “women’s chronic accessibility of the ingroup–outgroup categorization ... [This observation] points to the fact that dominated group members tend to bind self-conceptions on collective and shared attributes, and to promote group distinctiveness, more than dominant group members” (pp. 413-414).

Lorenzi-Cioldi further hypothesised that different self-defining strategies will be prevalent in different contexts. Specifically, in a context where the focus is on the individual rather than on the group, people should be motivated to self-enhance; in a context where the focus is on the group rather than on the individual, people should exhibit self-stereotyping. He thus assumed that self-enhancement is more relevant to personal than social identity. The data provided partial support for the hypothesis. Firstly, as expected self-stereotyping was only evident in the group context. However, contrary to expectations self-enhancement was apparent in both individual and group contexts, though it was more clearly established in the individual context. Although the author framed the results somewhat differently, this finding is not inconsistent with social identity and self-categorization perspectives, which maintain that individuals are motivated to self-enhance – or to achieve a positive identity – at both the individual and group level; this implies that they will indeed do so when the opportunity arises1. Thus

1 A further implication is that self-stereotyping and self-enhancement are not mutually exclusive processes. This consideration is particularly pertinent to Lorenzi-Cioldi’s study since hypotheses were tested using individual norms of trait stereotypicality and social desirability.
the self-enhancement motive need not be conceptualised in the restricted sense, that is, solely as a property of the personal self.

Along similar lines, Simon, Glassner-Bayerl, and Stratenwerth (1991) investigated how members of a dominant majority (heterosexual men) and members of a stigmatised minority (homosexual men) stereotype themselves. When rating themselves in an intergroup context, homosexual and heterosexual participants were found to differ from each other in a stereotype-consistent way. Thus, heterosexual men tended to endorse more “straight” attributes than did homosexual men, and homosexual men tended to endorse more “gay” attributes than did heterosexual men, however this tendency was only statistically significant for negatively valenced attributes. That is, self-stereotyping was restricted to negative (rather than positive) ingroup attributes, for both majority and minority group members. Furthermore, homosexual participants exhibited more pronounced self-stereotyping on these negative ingroup traits than did heterosexual participants. Simon et al. explained these findings in terms of differential group status: “it appears that negatively valenced (ingroup or outgroup) attributes are particularly diagnostic in an intergroup context where a negatively evaluated (i.e., stigmatised) minority faces a dominant majority” (p. 264).

This research was subsequently extended by Simon and Hamilton (1994). Simon and Hamilton proposed that relative ingroup size and ingroup status are likely to be important determinants of self-stereotyping. A novel feature of this research was that three measures of homogenization within the ingroup were obtained: trait endorsements for ingroup-defining attributes, perceived similarity with one’s ingroup, and perceived ingroup homogeneity. In Experiment 1 they tested the prediction that minority ingroups would exhibit greater self-stereotyping (averaging across all three measures) than majority ingroups. The study allegedly examined individuals’ preferences for one of two artists. After a bogus analysis of painting preferences, participants were told that they had a clear preference for one artist over the other, and that their own preference was shared by many others (in the majority ingroup condition) or was not shared by

2 Outgroup homogeneity measures were also administered, mainly to control for any general effect of group size on perceptions of group homogeneity (see p. 700); however, the primary aim of Simon and Hamilton’s research was to investigate intragroup homogenization as an aspect of self-stereotyping; for this reason their research is reviewed here rather than in section 5.7.2.
many others (in the minority ingroup condition). The cover story also suggested that there was a correlation between group membership (i.e., painting preference) and introversion–extroversion. The experimenters subsequently examined degree of self-stereotyping along the introversion–extroversion dimension. Overall, minority members exhibited greater self-stereotyping than majority members. Thus it appears that group membership is more important for minority than majority ingroups (cf. Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992; W. J. McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976; Simon & R. J. Brown, 1987; Simon et al., 1991). One possible explanation is that accentuated self-stereotyping on the part of minorities is due to attempts to secure a positive collective identity, by emphasising intragroup solidarity (Simon & R. J. Brown, 1987).

Experiment 2 extended the previous experiment by examining the interactive impact of relative ingroup size (minority or majority) and ingroup status (high or low) on self-stereotyping. Simon and Hamilton reasoned that acceptance of group membership in a minority (as indicated by level of self-stereotyping) should be affected by ingroup status, whereas acceptance of group membership in a majority should be less dependent on ingroup status. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception that this time additional information was provided regarding the status of each artist, one being “a very distinguished and well-regarded painter”, the other being “not very distinguished or well-regarded”. Again, participants were led to believe that group membership correlated with introversion–extroversion. Self-stereotyping on this central dimension was subsequently assessed (averaging across all three measures). As expected, minority ingroup members exhibited more pronounced self-stereotyping when ingroup status was high rather than low. By contrast, majority ingroup members exhibited the same amount of self-stereotyping, irrespective of whether they were a low or high status group.

Levy (1996) provides a good illustration of the ubiquity of the self-stereotyping process. Specifically, she examined the implicit homogenization of attitudes and behaviours on the part of elderly participants (M = 73 years) in a context that made their group membership salient. Given the prevalence of ageism in society at large, Levy proposed that these (predominantly negative) stereotypes may be internalised into the self-image of the elderly without their awareness (i.e., implicitly), irrespective of their explicit
beliefs about old age. Study 1 demonstrated that the implicit activation of negative self-stereotypes among the elderly (using subliminally presented primes such as senile, slow, decrepit) can have a negative impact on memory performance, memory self-efficacy, and attitudes towards aging, while the activation of positive self-stereotypes (wise, learned, alert, etc.) can enhance these things. Moreover, a comparison of implicit priming (i.e., subliminal activation of the positive or negative stereotype) versus explicit priming (i.e., the provision of [fabricated] positive or negative feedback regarding one's memory performance) revealed that self-stereotypes are more likely to change if individuals' beliefs about old age are activated via an implicit rather than explicit intervention. Levy reasoned that if the results of Study 1 were in fact due to the priming of pre-existing self-stereotypes (rather than say to the negative or positive mood transmitted by the primes), the observed shifts in self-stereotyping should be restricted to individuals for whom the aging stereotype is relevant. In support of the hypothesis, the findings of Study 1 were not replicated with a much younger sample (M = 26 years). These results have been extended in more recent work by Chiu, Hong, Lam, Fu, Tong, and Lee (1998), showing that incidental exposure to gender-related environmental cues increases gender-consistent self-descriptions, or self-stereotyping, among men and women.

A number of investigators have reasoned that strength of identification with the ingroup should affect the degree to which ingroup members come to perceive themselves as relatively interchangeable (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Ellemers et al., 1997; Kelly, 1989). Spears, Doosje et al., 1997 (see also Doosje & Ellemers, 1997) predicted that when the image of a group to which one belongs is threatened, low identifiers will self-stereotype less than high identifiers. Self-stereotyping was indexed by establishing perceived self-ingroup similarity or prototypicality. In support of the hypothesis, Study 1 revealed an interaction between self-perceived ingroup status (high or low) and identification with the ingroup (high or low). In the face of an unfavourable intergroup comparison, low identifiers dissociated themselves from the ingroup, while high identifiers did not. Also as predicted, self-stereotyping levels were comparable for both high and low identifiers when the ingroup perceived themselves favourably vis-à-vis the outgroup. In a second study, a similar effect was obtained when ingroup status was manipulated by varying public perception (rather than self-perception) of the ingroup. Unfavourable public perception of one's
group led low identifiers to self-stereotype less than high identifiers. Also as expected, this difference between high and low identifiers disappeared when public-perceived ingroup status was high. Further studies (Study 3 and 4) established that when the distinctiveness of the ingroup is undermined by social comparison with a similar outgroup, similar effects emerge in terms of the differential self-stereotyping of high and low identifiers. Spears, Doosje et al. concluded that the reaction of low identifiers to group threat was essentially an individualistic identity protection strategy, whereas the response of the high identifiers was a collectivistic strategy. These studies clearly demonstrate how identification moderates the impact of group identity threat on self-stereotyping. More generally, they support the conclusion that self-stereotypes are relational constructs; in particular, self-stereotypes depend on the specific comparison group and comparison dimension.

Hardie and McMurray (1992) took a very different approach to studying links between identification and intragroup homogenization. They proposed that to the extent that women identified with a female subcategory, that is, self-stereotyped in regard to a perceived prototype, their attitudes would be more similar to the perceived norm of the ingroup category. These investigators inferred (rather than manipulated) identification with various social categories among female participants in the context of a study examining the effect of sex role ideology (SRI; i.e., prescriptive beliefs regarding appropriate male and female behaviour) on menstrual attitudes. They reasoned that if female versus male categories are salient to women completing sex role trait scales, then to the extent that respondents categorise themselves as women, they should generate stereotypical rather than individuated responses. Using a survey questionnaire, Study 1 established that attitudes varied as a function of sex role ideology (Traditional, Moderate, Feminist). Moreover in Study 2, measures were initially collected pertaining to each woman’s own sex role ideology, followed by each woman’s perception of the dominant sex role ideology among “most women”. Degree of self-stereotyping (SS) was then determined by ascertaining whether there was a match or a mismatch between one’s own SRI and the individual’s perceived prototype for women at large (e.g., a match may be “Feminist Self, Feminist Ingroup”, while a mismatch may be “Traditional Self, Feminist Ingroup”). Those individuals who matched their perceived prototype were classed as High Self-stereotypers, while those that differed were classed as Low Self-stereotypers.
It was predicted that “to the extent that a woman herself identifies with what she perceives to be the prevailing SRI prototype, her own attitudes would be similar to (High SS: matched Self-Prototype SRI) or different from (Low SS: discrepant Self-Prototype SRI) her attitudinal ratings for women in general” (p. 26, emphasis added). Study 2 yielded mixed results. Firstly, significant differences were detected between women’s personal attitudes and their ratings of most women’s attitudes, the general pattern being that one’s own views were less extreme than perceptions of the group’s views (cf. Hogg & Turner, 1987; see also Rosenkrantz et al., 1968). This main effect was not surprising given that most of the sample had been classed as Low SS (N = 118 out of 183), meaning that for the majority of participants, there was a discrepancy between self- and prototype-ratings. Moreover, it appeared that for a minority of menstrual attitude dimensions (two out of eight), women’s responses for themselves and for most women differed as a function of degree of self-stereotyping (High or Low SS) and perceived prototype (Traditional, Moderate, Feminist). For instance, as expected self- and most women-ratings tended to be more similar for High than Low SS (a) on two out of eight attitudinal dimensions for those individuals with a Traditional prototype, and (b) on one of these dimensions for those individuals with a Feminist prototype. However, it appeared that the inclusion of the Moderate prototype category may have worked against the hypothesis. While Traditional and Feminist prototypes represent polarised categories with established prototypes and norms, one third of the sample were classed as having a Moderate prototype for women at large. This subcategory may not be sufficiently differentiated to constitute a meaningful social group that inspires identification and hence self-stereotyping. The inclusion of this amorphous subcategory may therefore have clouded the issue of the relationship between self-stereotyping, SRI, and menstrual attitudes.

K. James (1993) investigated the impact of another individual difference variable – personal self-esteem – on level of self-stereotyping. Specifically, he asked whether self-stereotyping is stronger (and individual differences weaker) when the situation focuses attention on group membership rather than one’s individuality. Female participants who were either high or low in personal self-esteem, had their attention focused (via an essay-writing task) either on their unique characteristics or their gender-group identity. Their perceptions of their own levels of characteristics that correlate with group membership were then assessed. Masculinity and femininity scores on the Bem Sex-
Role Inventory (S. L. Bem, 1974) served as the dependent measures. It was expected that individual differences in self-esteem would interact with situationally-induced salience of gender identity to influence self-description on masculine and feminine traits. Specifically, it was predicted that individual differences would emerge in the individuality focus condition; by contrast these differences were expected to be lessened or even eliminated in the gender-group focus condition. As expected, in the individuality focus condition high self-esteem women had higher masculinity and lower femininity scores than low self-esteem women, but these differences disappeared in the gender-group focus condition. The group that was most affected by the gender-group salience manipulation was of course the high self-esteem women; these individuals initially diverged from the ingroup stereotype, but under conditions of a salient group identity, they self-stereotyped on gender-relevant traits.

Research has also demonstrated that given the opportunity, individuals may take advantage of the flexibility conferred by nested group memberships by selectively endorsing positive but not negative aspects of the most salient ingroup identity. Biernat, Vescio, and Green (1996) asked sorority and fraternity members to rate themselves, their own sorority/fraternity, sororities/fraternities in general, and students in general on attributes that were stereotypic of sororities/fraternities. The instructions focused participants' attention on sorority or fraternity memberships, therefore it was assumed that this ingroup identity was the most salient at the time that dependent measures were collected. Under these conditions, participants displayed “selective self-stereotyping”; that is, they endorsed positive stereotypes of their own sorority/fraternity as highly descriptive (e.g., fun loving, sociable), but rejected negative stereotypes (e.g., conforming, snobbish), for themselves and for their own sorority/fraternity. While they did not deny that there was some truth to the negative stereotypes, they displayed creativity (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979) by ascribing these negative attributes to a higher-order categorization, sororities or fraternities in general, thereby presumably diminishing the immediate relevance of these negative ascriptions to the self and their closest ingroup. The investigators thus concluded that “nested category membership may allow individuals to protect themselves against social identity threats by selectively self-stereotyping” (Biernat et al., 1996, p. 1207)
Using a response time analysis, E. R. Smith and Henry (1996; see also E. R. Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999) recently tested whether ingroup attributes can become a part of the self, as suggested by the self-stereotyping hypothesis. More specifically, the question was whether self-ratings would be facilitated for characteristics where there is a self-ingroup match, and inhibited for responses where there is a self-ingroup mismatch. This pattern of reaction time facilitation and inhibition, the researchers reasoned, would suggest that the ingroup is cognitively linked to the self. By contrast, if the self and the ingroup are represented in separate cognitive structures, no differences in reaction times would be expected between self-ingroup matching and mismatching attributes.

To address this interesting but complex issue, Smith and Henry conducted a quasi-experiment, taking advantage of pre-existing group memberships at Purdue University. Liberal arts or engineering majors were assigned those two groups as ingroup and outgroup; all other participants were assigned fraternity/sorority members or non-members as their target groups. Participants initially rated the applicability of each trait to the self, to the ingroup, and the relevant outgroup, on paper. Participants then completed the same self-description task a second time, although this time ratings were made on a computer. The self-description task was ostensibly repeated to permit comparisons between those who had previously completed the paper-and-pencil task and those who had not; in actual fact, the key hypothesis was tested using self-ratings on the computer task, which were cross-referenced with ingroup/outgroup ratings on the paper-and-pencil task. The computer randomly presented the same traits used in task one, and participants again rated the self-descriptiveness of each trait. Response times were also recorded (ingroup and outgroup ratings were not repeated on the computer). The response time analysis revealed that responses for traits on which individuals perceived a self-ingroup match were faster than responses for mismatching traits. However, responses that indicated a self-outgroup mismatch, or a self-ingroup match coupled with an self-outgroup mismatch, were not significantly facilitated. Thus it appeared that traits which distinguish the ingroup from the outgroup were not particularly emphasised; rather, it is likely that in the context of this experiment traits that define Purdue students in general (i.e., the higher-order categorization in terms of which the ingroup and outgroup can be compared) may have been particularly important. The observed pattern of reaction times (facilitation of responses for traits on
which self and ingroup match, and inhibition of responses for traits on which self and ingroup mismatch) was interpreted as evidence that the ingroup can be psychologically represented as part of the self. These results lend support to self-categorization theory, which maintains that this is precisely the mechanism that underlies self-stereotyping.

Research by Abrams and colleagues provides additional evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that social identity salience serves to depersonalize self-perception, leading one to exhibit normative behaviour and values. For instance, Abrams, Sparkes, and Hogg (1985) found that female school pupils who have many male siblings and are therefore numerically distinctive within their households in terms of gender, were more likely to choose traditional subjects in school, thus exhibiting behaviour that is normative for their group. Similarly, Abrams, Thomas, and Hogg (1990) found that conditions which enhanced the salience of female participants' gender identity (specifically, the presence of men) led participants to endorse stereotypically-feminine values.

People's stereotypic views of their own national ingroup, and how these views change in response to significant historical events, have also recently been studied. Haslam and colleagues (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Mein, 1999) were interested in the historical correlates of change in Australian students' self-stereotypes. They sampled a student population from 1992 to 1997. During this time the political scene in Australia changed dramatically. The Labor government lost the Federal election in 1996 for the first time in 13 years, and was succeeded by a more conservative Liberal-National coalition. Several significant policy changes followed, most notably a challenge to Aboriginal rights to native title. At the same time, a new right-wing political party called "One Nation" emerged in the political arena. Among other things, One Nation supporters strongly advocated an end to "special treatment" of indigenous Australians. The question was whether the new political climate had impacted on Australians' self-stereotypes. Student volunteers were asked to describe Australians (and only Australians) using the Katz-Braly checklist. As expected, domestic political conflict

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1 Many more studies illustrating the effect of depersonalisation on behaviour could be cited here. In fact, self-stereotyping is understood to be the mechanism that makes all group behaviour possible, including social cohesion, social cooperation, social influence, crowd behaviour, de-individuation, and intergroup biases (e.g., Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997; Brewer & Schneider, 1990; Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1996; Hogg, 1992; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Turner, 1984, 1991).
was associated with reduced consensus in stereotypes of the ingroup. The ingroup stereotype was also significantly less favourable in 1997, a time marked by internal social and political division. This study illustrated that stereotypes reflect perceived social reality, and are sensitive to change in intergroup and intragroup relations (see also Simon et al., 1991).

Reicher, Hopkins, and Condor (1997) similarly studied the historical correlates of self-stereotypes, this time in the context of the 1992 General Election in Scotland. A topic of much debate at this time was the constitutional question of whether Scotland should move toward independence from England. Reicher and colleagues closely analysed political discourse gathered at numerous public meetings and interviews throughout the period of the election campaign and immediately afterwards. They observed that there was very little consensus over the meaning of the identity "Scottish" at this time. The self-stereotype of "Scottishness" was highly contentious and highly variable. Different people defined Scottishness in different ways at different times, and even the same people sometimes switched between various self-definitions. Secondly, they discovered that this variability in self-stereotypes can serve a political end; used strategically, self-stereotypes can achieve social influence on a large scale. Thirdly, Reicher et al.'s analysis of the complex social and political functions that self-stereotypes serve highlights the limitations of a trait conception of a self-stereotype. Trait conceptualisations of self-stereotypes render a fluctuating, dynamic construct static and suggest greater precision than the evidence warrants. The very meaning of a trait depends on the social, political and historical context in which it is used; "to abstract traits from their argumentative context is to render them meaningless" (p. 112). Thus it was argued that trait conceptions (and operationalisations) grossly oversimplify the construct of a self-stereotype.

5.6.2 Evidence of homogenization processes at the level of the ingroup and outgroup
The studies mentioned thus far have all considered the outcome of self-stereotyping at the level of the ingroup only. Taken together, these studies illustrate that psychologically, individuals come to perceive themselves as more interchangeable with other ingroup members under conditions of a salient social identity. Additionally, research has established that perceptions of the outgroup, and moreover, the perceived psychological distance between the ingroup and the outgroup, are also affected by social
identity salience. A few illustrative examples will be briefly described in this section. Specifically, research has shown that social identity salience produces assimilation and contrast effects between the ingroup and outgroup categories, enhanced ingroup and outgroup homogeneity, and the consensualization of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes.

Brewer and Weber (1994) provide a recent demonstration of ingroup assimilation and outgroup contrast effects resulting from the heightened social identity salience that minority group membership confers on its members. The research was designed to investigate the effects of interpersonal and intergroup comparisons on self-perceived competence among minority and majority ingroup members. Brewer and Weber took assimilation to ingroup-defining characteristics and contrast from outgroup-defining characteristics as an index of self-stereotyping. Self-stereotyping (thus defined) was apparent for minority ingroups but not for majority ingroups. Majority group members exhibited contrast effects in their self-ratings following exposure to a videotape of an ingroup member depicted as either high or low in academic ability. That is, for majority group members exposure to a competent ingroup member resulted in lower self-perceived competence than did exposure to an incompetent ingroup member; however exposure to a competent versus incompetent outgroup member had no impact. In contrast, minority group members exhibited assimilation effects following ingroup comparisons and contrast effects following outgroup comparisons. Specifically, self-perceived competence increased following exposure to a competent rather than incompetent ingroup member; on the other hand, comparisons with a competent outgroup member resulted in lower self-perceived competence than did comparisons with an incompetent outgroup member. The authors explained assimilation following interpersonal comparisons within the minority ingroup in terms of the distinctiveness of minority group identity; distinctiveness "apparently promoted unit formation that reduced differentiation between self and fellow ingroup members" (p. 273). Moreover, the observed contrast effects suggested that (a) interpersonal comparisons promote self-other differentiation within non-distinctive (majority) groups, and (b) intergroup comparisons are relevant to self-definition of minority but not majority group members. A subsequent experiment revealed, however, that minority status alone is not sufficient to produce self-ingroup assimilation; assimilation effects were only observed on dimensions which in the context of the experiment, served to differentiate the minority ingroup from the majority outgroup.
Research into relative ingroup and outgroup homogeneity is also relevant to the present discussion. For instance, Simon and R. J. Brown (1987) hypothesised and found that members of numerical minorities (for whom intergroup comparisons are highly salient) tend to perceive the ingroup as more homogeneous than the outgroup, particularly on dimensions that strongly correlate with the division into social categories. Perceiving more homogeneity in the ingroup than in the outgroup presumably enhances the perceived entativity and accordingly the perceived social support and solidarity than group membership offers; the positive distinctiveness of the (minority) ingroup vis-à-vis the outgroup can thus be established (Simon & R. J. Brown, 1987). We also know from Simon and Hamilton’s (1994) results, however, that the tendency of minority members to view themselves as a collective is likely to be reversed if minority group membership is associated with low status vis-à-vis the majority.

In the context of a study about political identity, Kelly (1989) found a positive relationship between the salience of political identity, as indexed by strength of political affiliation, and level of self-stereotyping, as indexed by ratings of perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity. More specifically, British Labour Party members perceived both their ingroup and the Conservative Party outgroup to be more homogeneous than did nonmembers. Furthermore, ingroup homogeneity was more pronounced on those items that served to best differentiate the ingroup from the psychologically relevant outgroup.

Extending this work, Haslam and colleagues (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995) have argued that both ingroup and outgroup homogeneity (where they arise) are due to social identity salience. Drawing on the meta-contrast principle, Haslam et al. reasoned that as a general rule, ingroup and outgroup homogeneity should be evident on stereotypic dimensions when participants rate the ingroup in the presence of the outgroup (an intergroup context which brings group differences to the fore), while outgroup homogeneity (and ingroup heterogeneity) should be observed when participants rate the ingroup in the absence of a salient outgroup (an intragroup context which brings individual differences within the ingroup to the fore). In one study (see Haslam, Oakes et al., 1995) participants assigned traits on a checklist either to a target ingroup (Australians) or to a target outgroup (Americans). They then estimated the percentage of people in the target group alone who had the assigned traits, or
Alternatively, the percentage of people in the target group and in the comparison group who had the traits that had just been assigned to the target group. As expected, when the target group (either Australians or Americans) was judged in isolation of a comparison group, an outgroup homogeneity effect was obtained, that is, stereotypic traits were believed to apply to more Americans than Australians (75% versus 57%). In contrast, when ingroup and outgroup ratings were made at the same time, participants estimated that Australian-stereotypic traits (e.g., sportsmanlike) applied to 74% of Australians and similarly, that American-stereotypic traits (e.g., nationalistic) applied to 74% of Americans. This analysis suggests that relative ingroup homogeneity for minorities is attributable to their tendency to make more intergroup comparisons.

Along similar lines, Haslam and colleagues (see Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty et al., 1998) have demonstrated that ingroup and outgroup stereotype consensus is the product of a salient social identity. To illustrate, in one study research participants selected traits from a checklist to describe both the ingroup (Australians) and the outgroup (Americans). Half of the sample described first the ingroup then the outgroup; the other half described first the outgroup then the ingroup. Drawing on the meta-contrast principle, Haslam and colleagues reasoned that the extended intergroup context (outgroup ratings followed by ingroup ratings) would effectively highlight intergroup differences and hence accentuate ingroup identity salience relative to the restricted intragroup context (ingroup ratings followed by outgroup ratings). It was predicted and found that the ingroup stereotype was more consensual (i.e., that there was greater agreement across participants regarding trait selection) in the extended intergroup context than in the restricted intragroup context. Also as expected, the order manipulation had little effect on the consensus of participants’ stereotype of Americans; this made sense given that the outgroup was always by necessity rated in an intergroup context. Thus it appears that to the degree that social identity salience is achieved, perceptions of the ingroup and the outgroup become consensual.

5.6.3 The “primacy issue”: Is personal identity or social identity primary in self-conception?

The growing body of evidence pertaining to self-stereotyping, coupled with the growing interest in social identity as a facet of the self (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Deaux, 1996; Deaux, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995; Tyler, Kramer, & John, 1999), raises the issue of
the relative primacy or status of personal and social identity in self-definition. This debate is taking place within cross-cultural perspectives (e.g., Chen, Brockner, & Katz, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Trafimow et al., 1991; Triandis, 1989) and in the more general social cognition literature on the self (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1991; Simon, 1993; Simon et al., 1995; D. M. Taylor & Dube, 1986). Although self-categorization theory acknowledges our heavy reliance on self-ingroup comparisons as a basis for self-definition, the theory unequivocally states that personal identity has no privileged status in defining the self (see Turner et al., 1987, p. 46); the appropriate level of self-categorization (of which personal and social identity are only two) depends on social context. Other perspectives argue for the pre-potency of personal identity (Markus, 1977; Simon, 1993). For instance, Simon’s (1993) “egocentric social categorization” model argues that the personal self, or “me versus not me” categorization, is the basic level of self-categorization, at least in individualistic Western cultures. In contrast to Simon, Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness approach argues for “the relative prepotency of group identity over personal identity” (p. 478). According to Brewer, social identity is prepotent because it simultaneously satisfies one’s need for assimilation with others and one’s need for differentiation from others through intragroup and intergroup comparisons, respectively. Both Brewer and Simon present evidence to support their respective positions.

Studies have been documented which were designed to “pit” the personal self against the collective self, in order to ascertain the degree to which one or the other is primary in self-perception. One illustration of this from the cross-cultural stream is the work of Trafimow et al. (1991). North American and Chinese student volunteers (all drawn from a North American University) completed a self-description task that required them to complete 20 sentences that began “I am”. Before this task was completed, the investigators primed either the individual self or the collective self. Participants’ responses were coded according to whether they referred to the individual self (e.g., personality attributes, interpersonal behaviour) or the collective self (e.g., demographic categories, group memberships). The results were that Chinese students listed more collective selves than American students, and those individuals whose collective self rather than individual self had been primed listed more collective selves. In addition, participants generally tended to list more individual than collective self-descriptions. Trafimow et al. attributed this to the fact that all participants had spent considerable
time in the individualistic culture of North America, but other researchers have interpreted this finding as evidence of the primacy of the individual self (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1999).

A more recent illustration of research designed to "pit" the personal self against the collective self is work by Gaertner et al. (1999). These investigators conceived the individual self as "a self-definition that is independent of group membership", while the collective self was conceived as "a self-definition derived from membership in a social group" (p. 5). To establish which self is motivationally primary, Gaertner et al. have examined how experimental participants respond in the face of a threat (i.e., negative feedback) directed either at the personal or the collective self. Gaertner et al. reasoned that if the individual self is prepotent, "participants will regard a threat to the individual self as more severe than a threat to the collective self" (p. 8). The opposite pattern was expected if the collective self is prepotent. Gaertner et al. report that when the individual self was threatened, participants downplayed their uniqueness and identified more strongly with the ingroup, presumably in order to protect the individual self from the immediate threat. However, analogous effects were not observed when the collective self was threatened (i.e., participants did not highlight their uniqueness and identify less strongly with the ingroup, leading the researchers to conclude that the individual self was primary. In this research it was assumed that a threat to the collective self will evoke an individual-level response. However, this ignores previous work showing that a threat directed at the group can stimulate a range of responses (e.g., see Doosje & Ellemers, 1997), and often stimulates collective or group strategies, particularly when group boundaries are seen as impermeable and status differences are viewed as illegitimate (e.g., see Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Another interesting feature of this research is Gaertner et al.'s operationalization of the collective self. In order to tease apart collective and individual self-aspects, they controlled the information directed at the collective self such that it did not contain feedback about the individual participant (Investigation 1 and 2). In other words, the collective self was operationalised as a self-exclusive rather than inclusive category in the context of the experiment. The research can thus be criticised for diminishing the psychological relevance and significance of this social category to the perceiver. In addition, Gaertner et al.'s operationalization of the collective self did not evoke an
outgroup. Previous research has established that the collective self comes to the fore in intergroup contexts. Indeed, the most basic characteristic of intergroup situations is the presence of (at least) two salient social categories or groups (R. J. Brown & Turner, 1981) – an ingroup and an outgroup. The collective self also comes to the fore when intergroup comparison occurs in terms of a comparative dimension that correlates with social categorization; this was likewise not a feature of Gaertner et al.'s research. It can be argued that Gaertner et al. thus contrasted a strong interpersonal context with a comparatively weak intergroup context, which did not directly implicate the self. Under these conditions it is not surprising that the personal self was protected, at the expense of a relatively amorphous collective self.

In relation to the primacy issue, the position of self-categorization theory is clear. To reiterate the most crucial points of the analysis; firstly, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, this perspective is called "self-categorization theory" rather than "social identity theory" because it speaks as much of the personal as of the group level of identity. The theory makes explicit that neither personal nor social identity represents the "basic" level of self-categorization. On the contrary, the theory asserts that the issue of which self will emerge as "figure" rather than "ground" cannot be decided in the abstract, apart from knowledge of relevant contextual parameters. Secondly, the theory states that self-perception is likely to occur at the mid-point of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum much of the time, such that individuals will tend to define themselves as "moderately different from ingroup members, who in turn will be perceived as moderately different from outgroup members" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). Thirdly, self-categorization theory "asserts the interdependence of individuality and shared, collective identity" (Turner & Oakes, 1989, p. 270). That is, the collectivity is implicated in the emergence and

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4 This criticism is particularly levelled at Investigation 1 and 2, and was addressed to a degree in Investigation 3. However even in the third study, it is likely that the group condition at best achieved a low level of "groupyness" due to (a) the minimal nature of the groups (the six participants at any given session were randomly divided into two 3-person groups; each group sat in a separate room; groups were not assigned a group name or label of any sort), (b) there was no opportunity to make intergroup comparisons in terms of the critical performance dimension, and (c) the "threat" was uncorrelated with the division into social groups (cf. Spears, Doosje, et al., 1997; see also Oakes, 1987, in particular her discussion of the collective deviance condition). Unfortunately, no measures of ingroup identification were reported for Investigation 3, making it difficult to verify the assumption that individuals perceived themselves as belonging to a group. Social identification is arguably essential to psychological group formation (e.g., see Turner, 1975).

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experience of the personal self. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, tests that pit personal identity against social identity as if to suppose that one (social identity) implicates a social psychological group while the other (personal identity) does not, can be criticised for setting up a false dichotomy, one that does not exist anywhere in the theory. Self-categorization theory does not interpret personal identification as "egocentric" in the sense implied by Simon (1993) or as "acontextual" in the sense implied by Gaertner et al. (1999). On the contrary, the theory asserts that the collective self is a precursor to the emergence of a personal self (cf. Cooley, 1922); there would be no personal self in the absence of a higher-order "we" that provides the context for self-other differentiation in terms of person-specific attributes. In other words, the "me" implies the existence of the "us". From this vantage point then, empirical paradigms that pit personal identity against social identity are missing a crucial point about the psychological basis of the "individual" self; the individual self is derived (not divorced) from the collective. Along similar lines, if social identity is indeed "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255), operationalisations of the "collective" that explicitly exclude "me" (as in Gaertner et al., 1999) are unlikely to evoke a strong sense of identification or to inspire collective action.

5.7 Conclusions

The idea that social identity represents a depersonalised self-concept is central to the self-categorization analysis, and to the present thesis. This idea has important implications for personality theories of the self-concept. If it can be demonstrated that the self can come to be defined and experienced in terms of something other than individual differences, then conceptualisations which equate the self-concept with stable individual differences are clearly limited. The implications for understanding self-concept change are also clear; in particular, the self-behaviour relationship becomes more complex when we cease to equate the self with personality. Furthermore, the possibility arises that the same behaviour may have different consequences for self-conception and self-evaluation, depending on whether personal identity or social identity is salient at the time that the behaviour is performed.
Several aspects of the self-categorization analysis will be examined in the empirical program that follows. Although each study had its specific aims, one overarching theme guiding this research was our interest in illuminating the implications of a distinction between personal and social identity for current treatments of the self and the problem of self-concept change.
Chapter 6

Study 1
The distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour: Implications for self change

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter the theoretical propositions that are central to the empirical program of this thesis were expounded. In line with self-categorization theory, the self was defined as an inherently variable, social, and relational process. Importantly, it was proposed that all self-referential judgements are categorical in nature. Self-definition thus reflects the relative similarities and differences between the perceiver and others comprising the psychological frame of reference. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that the degree to which the social context captures interpersonal as opposed to intergroup relations will play an important role in determining the content of the resultant self-category. From this perspective, it is argued that a shift from the personal to the social level of self-categorization is more likely to occur as the comparative context is extended to include dissimilar others in addition to similar others. In addition, a shift from the personal level to more inclusive levels of self-categorization can under certain conditions produce diametrically opposed self-conceptions in the same individual. Such shifts represent real change; they reflect the normal fluctuation of the self-concept.

By contrast, the currently popular view conceives the self as a system of pre-existing cognitive structures (for an overview, see Chapter 3). Their form and content is determined prior to their use (cf. Turner et al., 1994). Researchers such as Markus (1977, 1990) and T. B. Rogers et al. (1977) have argued that people note the invariances in their social behaviour; these invariances then form the basis of their self-conceptions. The idea that you infer what you are like from your past behaviour is also central to D. J. Bem's (1972) self-perception theory. A number of theoretical perspectives have thus incorporated the assumption that behaviour is an important source of self-knowledge. Behaviour - particularly the occurrence of self-discrepant behaviour - has also been implicated in self-concept change. It has been argued that either through self-perception
or through dissonance reduction, people may come to infer an attribute of themselves that was previously discounted (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984).

The research that establishes an empirical link between self-presentational behaviour and self-concept change was reviewed in Chapter 4. For instance, it has been demonstrated that positive and negative self-presentation produces a corresponding shift in self-evaluation (Gergen, 1965; Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Upshaw & Yates, 1968). However, previous self-concept change research is based on the implicit assumption that the self-concept, and behaviour, is inherently personal. In Study 1 we begin to test the plausibility of the self-categorization analysis as an alternative view, one which extends previous research in important new directions.

From the perspective of self-categorization theory, behaviour is considered to be an important part of what has to be represented in a self-category. However, the assumption that discrete units of behaviour can be defined as "self-congruent" or as "self-discrepant" in the abstract is challenged on the grounds that there is not one self-category, but many, and not all self-categorizations are inherently personal. More specifically, it is argued that a distinction can be drawn between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour, and likewise, between personal and social identity as two conceptually distinguishable, yet interrelated, aspects of the self. Interestingly, the empirical work conducted within the self-categorization framework has to date focused primarily on the cognitive component of the self, as expressed in behavioural judgements. Surprisingly little work has been done on the relationship between overt behaviour and the self-concept as experienced at any given moment in time. This would appear to be an important omission, given that a central premise of the theory is that the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour mirrors the distinction between personal and social identity. The present study will allow us to examine the hypothesised link between behaviour and level of self-categorization.

The more specific aim of the present study, however, was to examine the implications of this distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour for current approaches to self-concept change. Conceptually, within the self-categorization framework interpersonal behaviour is defined as acting as an individual; this type (or level) of behaviour reflects one's idiosyncratic traits (or interpersonal differences) vis-à-
vis other ingroup members. Intergroup behaviour, on the other hand, is defined as acting as a group member; this type (or level) of behaviour expresses those attributes that are collectively shared with other ingroup members, attributes that serve to differentiate ingroup from psychologically relevant outgroup members. Social contextual factors affect whether any given unit of behaviour is likely to be interpreted by the perceiver as an expression of the personal or the collective self. In particular, the others that comprise the psychological frame of reference are likely to be an important consideration.

In order to compare the effect of individual versus group-level behaviour on self-ratings within the self-presentation paradigm, it was necessary to achieve an effective manipulation of "level of behaviour". The self-categorization framework suggested that an adequate operationalisation of this independent variable could only be achieved by replacing the dyadic interview situation with something more complex. From the perspective of self-categorization theory, the audience present at the time of self-presentation is likely to affect the interpretation of the behavioural episode; in particular, it is important to consider whether the composition of the audience renders the situation an interpersonal or an intergroup encounter. The "level of behaviour" variable was therefore operationalised by simultaneously varying self-presentational instructions and the aspects of the social context in which the behaviour was elicited. In the individual level of behaviour conditions an intragroup context was created by instructing female participants to present themselves as individuals, and by eliciting the self-presentational behaviour in the presence of an all-female interviewing panel. The presence of the ingroup in this condition reflects our assumption about what interpersonal behaviour is: it is intragroup behaviour (cf. Tice, 1994). In the group level of behaviour conditions an intergroup context was created by instructing female participants to present themselves as women and by eliciting the behaviour in the presence of an all-male interviewing panel. In this case the audience should bring self-

1 That is not to suggest that female participants cannot have interpersonal encounters with a mixed-sex audience; clearly they can (so long as the comparison dimension does not correlate with group membership, since in that case a mixed audience could render the situation an intergroup encounter). For example, males and females can compare themselves (interpersonally) in terms of the higher-order categorization "psychology students". For present purposes however, restricting the audience to same sex others in the interpersonal behaviour condition achieved the desired intragroup context for social comparison (i.e., me versus other women). In contrast, interpersonal behaviour in the presence of a mixed audience would have worked against the salience of the desired intragroup context, particularly given that the current behavioural dimension does correlate with group membership.
definition as a group member to the fore. The use of an interviewing panel (rather than a single individual interviewer) represents an innovative methodological extension of the extant behaviour paradigm, one which allows us to directly compare the effects of individual and group-level behaviour on subsequent self-conception.

An important caveat needs to be made regarding the operationalisation of this first variable. The group behaviour conditions were designed to subtly transform the psychological situation from an interpersonal to an intergroup encounter. Thus it is important to bear in mind that although the woman self-presentation conditions more closely approximate group-level behaviour than do the individual self-presentation conditions, the former cannot be considered a particularly strong embodiment of group-level behaviour since the female participants in these conditions are still behaving individually (rather than collectively) as group members. Nevertheless on the basis of past research (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987) it was expected that this operationalisation would generate qualitatively distinct psychological experiences.

In addition to the manipulation of level of behaviour, we also manipulated the valence of self-presentational behaviour through the instructions given to participants. Each female participant was thus assigned one of four possible role-play instructions: "present yourself as a positive, powerful individual", "present yourself as a positive, powerful woman", "present yourself as a negative, powerless individual", or "present yourself as a negative, powerless woman".

The present study was designed to provide a preliminary test of the hypothesis that the effect of behaviour on self-conception will be mediated by self-categorization. Any evidence that behaviour is interpreted flexibly, as a function of level of self-categorization, will therefore support the analysis. More specifically, the purpose of the present investigation was to ascertain whether behaving as a woman rather than as an individual has differential effects on subsequent self-conception. All things considered, how might different types (or levels) of behaviour impact on self-conception? Self-categorization theory suggests the following analysis. To the extent that self-presentational behaviour is elicited (and therefore presumably interpreted) in an intragroup context, the behaviour should tend to affect personal self-conception and personal self-evaluation more so than one's self-conception and self-evaluation as a
woman. Conversely, to the extent that self-presentational behaviour is elicited (and therefore presumably interpreted) in an intergroup context, the behaviour should tend to affect one's self-conception and self-evaluation as a group member more so than one's self-conception and self-evaluation as a unique individual. Simply put, the consequences of interpersonal behaviour (i.e., acting as an individual) should predominantly be seen at the personal level of identity. In contrast, intergroup behaviour (i.e., acting as a woman) should predominantly affect one's social identity or collective self-esteem, leaving the personal self (relatively) unchanged².

The reader will note that we have deliberately refrained from stating these expectations too forcefully. That is, we are not arguing that there can be no carry-over effect from intergroup behaviour to personal identity. Why not? The point is sufficiently important to warrant a minor digression. To return briefly to Chapter 5, self-categorization theory argues that "The idea of a given level is useful to indicate a theoretical extreme but in reality there is a perceptual continuum that never fully embodies any one level" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 100). As explained by Turner et al. (1987, pp. 49-50):

At the mid-point of this continuum (where self-perception is likely to be located much of the time) the individual will tend to define him- or herself as moderately different to ingroup members, who in turn will be perceived as moderately different from outgroup members. Personal self- and ingroup-outgroup categorizations, then, are not mutually exclusive [emphasis added].

Given the dependence of one level on another, we do not want to argue against the possibility that group-level self-presentation may affect the personal self. Personal identity is made possible because of identification in terms of some implicit (if not explicit) higher-order self-categorization; in terms of the present experiment, personal identity emerges in the context of implicit intragroup comparisons with other women. Given that personal identity is thus a derivative of psychological (in)group formation, or in other words, that social identity makes intragroup differentiation possible, it is quite possible that the effect of behaviour may generalise across personal and social self-

² The terms "personal identity" [or the personal self] and "social identity" are used solely for reasons of economy and readability and should not be taken to mean that there is one personal self or one social (collective) self; multiple self-categorizations are possible at each level of abstraction (for a fuller discussion of this point, see Chapter 5).
categories. In short, the relationship between personal and social identity, and between personal and collective self-esteem, is likely to be complex.

The question of whether level of self-categorization mediates the effect of behaviour will be examined by considering the impact of the role-play on post-test measures of (a) self-conception and (b) self-evaluation. Post-test measures of self-conception included self-ratings on feminine traits, masculine traits, and positive and negative gender-neutral traits. Drawing on self-categorization theory principles, feminine traits should be strongly endorsed under conditions of a salient social identity (see Chapter 5). In the context of the present experiment social identity is most salient when female participants are behaving like "typical women", or in other words, when level of behaviour and valence of behaviour are normatively fitting. There is evidence to suggest that the female stereotype is negative, vis-à-vis the male stereotype. As pointed out by Ashmore (1981), sex stereotype studies have repeatedly demonstrated that the male stereotype is evaluated more positively than that of the female, and that males / females differ on the dominance / submissive dimension (see also Antill, Cunningham, Russell, & Thompson, 1981; S. L. Bem, 1974; Drinkwater, 1979). In light of this research it would seem reasonable to expect self-deprecating women to self-stereotype on feminine traits more strongly than self-enhancing women; by contrast, we might expect participants in the two "individual" conditions to endorse feminine traits to the same degree (on average). These general expectations are consistent with a two-way interaction between valence of behaviour and level of behaviour for self-perceived femininity.

In contrast, masculine traits are not normatively fitting for women. Accordingly, these traits should not have any special significance for those participants in the group-level self-presentation conditions. For masculine traits, we might therefore expect a main effect for valence of self-presentation, such that positive and powerful individuals and women are more likely to perceive themselves as masculine than negative and powerless individuals and women. Similarly, it is likely that post-test ratings on gender-neutral positive and negative traits will reflect one's general positivity or negativity at the end of the experiment; therefore it would seem reasonable to expect self-enhancing participants to endorse positive gender-neutral traits more strongly than
self-deprecating participants, with the opposite pattern emerging for negative gender-neutral traits.

It will also be of interest to see whether the effect of positive versus negative behaviour on self-evaluation varies as a function of the social context of one's self-presentation. The impact of behaviour on self-evaluation will be assessed by measuring post-test self-esteem firstly using a traditional measure of self-esteem, the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSE) (M. Rosenberg, 1965), and secondly by obtaining measures of the social or collective self-esteem of men and women. On the one hand, it is possible that the effects of positive and negative behaviour may generalise across personal and social self-categories, producing a main effect for valence of self-presentation. On the other hand, assuming that self-enhancement, as defined in the context of the present study, is less normatively fitting for "women" than self-deprecation, something more complex may emerge. Effects for level of behaviour may or may not be detectable on a global measure like the RSE due to the possibility of generalisation; for this reason we also included a second measure that specifically focuses on group self-esteem.

6.2 Method

6.2.1 Participants
Participants were 71 undergraduate females (mean age = 21.14 years, SD = 4.79), recruited on a voluntary basis from a second-year psychology course at the Australian National University, Canberra.

6.2.2 Design
The design was a 2 (valence of behaviour: positive and powerful, negative and powerless) x 2 (level of behaviour: individual, woman) between-subjects factorial.

6.2.3 Materials and procedure
It was explained to participants at the outset that their participation in the study was optional, and that they were free to discontinue participation at any time (a second opportunity to discontinue participation was provided privately to each individual immediately prior to the self-presentational episode).
A female experimenter, and a male assistant conducted the study. It was introduced as the "Personality Projection Study". Participants were told that the study investigated "how people project their personalities in an interview context". Participants were further told that six individuals would serve as interviewers while the rest of the class would be assigned the role of interviewees. At this point the experimenter's assistant selected six interviewers. As far as possible, three female interviewers and three male interviewers were always selected so that "individual" and "woman" conditions could be run in each experimental session. The interviewers received further instructions from the assistant in an adjacent room. Meanwhile the experimenter proceeded to instruct the interviewees.

6.2.3.1 Instructions to interviewees

Participants were first issued with an identification number to assure anonymity at all times. They were then given the following cover story (adapted from Jones et al., 1981):

As I said, I am investigating how people project their personalities. To help you understand what this task involves, it may be useful to draw an analogy with a job interview. If you were applying for a job that required someone who is competent, reliable and trustworthy, you would try to project those specific traits during the interview, wouldn’t you?

Well, we are going to do something similar. I am going to assign you a personality characteristic that I want you to try to project during an interview. With your permission we will tape-record the interview for future analysis by myself and a panel of independent raters, who will rate your performance according to how well you managed to convey the assigned trait in your mood and in the content of your answers.

The experimenter then distributed a set of written materials, and explained that no talking was permitted between participants from that point on. Materials included (a) a copy of the test which would be administered during the interview (although in the interview itself the same test items were presented to participants on index cards), (b) a description of the personality type that the participant was requested to project in the interview, and (c) a section labelled "Behavioural evidence which supports assigned personality". The final section was designed to give participants the opportunity to prepare for the interview by asking them to list the occasions in the past when the assigned personality may have been personally relevant.
6.2.3.2 Personality descriptions

Each participant was randomly assigned one of four possible personality descriptions: "positive, powerful individual", "negative, powerless individual", "positive, powerful woman" or "negative, powerless woman". These personality descriptions were based on those originally used by Jones et al. (1981, Experiment 3) and subsequently used by Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986). They are reproduced below.

Present yourself as a very positive, powerful individual
During the interview you are to present yourself so as to give observers the impression that you are a very positive, powerful individual. By positive, I mean think of yourself on a day when you are really up, when you are in a good mood, you feel really good about yourself, that after all you really are a pretty decent, competent, sensitive person. By powerful, I mean think of yourself on a day when you feel that you can achieve anything you put your mind to; you set out to get the things you want from life with uncompromising determination. You are feeling strong, energetic, and have a great deal of confidence in yourself as an individual. You can be most effective in creating this impression if you really get yourself into it − You know, try to get yourself into one of those times when you really felt good about yourself. Now, thinking of yourself feeling this way, simply answer the interview questions so that your feeling is conveyed in both your mood and in the content of your answers.

Present yourself as a very negative, powerless individual
During the interview you are to present yourself so as to give observers the impression that you are a very negative, powerless individual. By negative, I mean think of yourself on a day when you are really down, when you are in a bad mood, you feel that you are a really inadequate, unloved, incompetent person. By powerless, I mean think of yourself on a day when you feel too apathetic to strive for the things you want from life; like anything that you took on you'd likely mess up. You are feeling weak, lethargic, and have no confidence in yourself as an individual. You can be most effective in creating this impression if you really get yourself into it − You know, try to get yourself into one of those times when you really felt bad about yourself. Now, thinking of yourself feeling this way, simply answer the interview questions so that your feeling is conveyed in both your mood and in the content of your answers.

In the social identity conditions, the word "woman" replaced the word "individual" in the above character descriptions.

6.2.3.3 Description of Personality Triads Test

The experimenter then informed participants that the three people comprising each interviewing panel would administer the "Personality Triads Test" (PTT; see Appendix
A) during the interview. The 10 triads comprising the PTT were in fact taken from Gergen's (1965) Self-valuation Triads Test (SVT). This is a non-obvious measure of self-esteem comprising 72 triads. Each triad comprises one positive item, one negative item and one neutral item. The SVT has been used in previous self-concept change studies (e.g., Gergen, 1965; Jones et al., 1981). It has the advantage of yielding a quantitative measure of the degree to which participants project positivity versus negativity during the self-presentation episode.

It was explained to participants that the "Personality Triads Test" involved assigning points across the three phrases on each of 10 index cards such that the phrase which best described them received the largest number of points, and the phrase which least applied to them received the lowest number of points. Participants were asked to avoid assigning zero points to any given phrase, and to use whole numbers only. Moreover, it was emphasised that their point allocations should reflect the personality they had been assigned. The experimenter then added: "There are no right or wrong answers; I want to see how you go about projecting a certain personality".

Participants were also asked to elaborate on their point allocations on at least three occasions as they moved through the test. Elaborations were requested in an attempt to maximise self-referencing during the interview. Past research has established that self-referencing instructions make the task more engaging (Jones, 1990; Jones et al., 1981; also see Chapter 4). Participants were therefore given the instruction:

When elaborating, try to generate examples from your past which are relevant to the assigned personality, wherever this is possible. The third page of your handout should help you with this task.

Point allocations and an elaboration were then made on a practice card by the experimenter to clarify the task. The practice trait was "cautious". The practice triad comprised the following self-descriptive phrases (the experimenter's point allocations are shown in square brackets): (a) Very straightforward [3], (b) Carefully deliberates important decisions [6], (c) Must have everyone like me [1]. The experimenter gave the following example of an "elaboration": "To elaborate, the second phrase really describes me well because I tend to spend a long time weighing out the pros and cons before I decide to do something. I have on occasion spent two weeks making a decision, and
recently I spent two months making a decision which will change my life, so yes, this phrase describes me well”.

Participants were at this stage given some time to prepare their answers to the interview questions. They were asked to think about how they might project the assigned personality in their point allocations, and to consider which three items they may be able to elaborate on in the interview. All participants spent at least 2 minutes generating examples on the third page of their handout, however some participants had a longer wait before they were called in for their interview (up to approximately 30 minutes). Although it would have been desirable to control preparation time, this proved logistically impossible.

Participants were interviewed individually in cubicles adjacent to (but out of sight of) the main laboratory. To minimise delay, two interviews were run simultaneously by separate interviewing panels. Immediately before participants were shown to the interview room, the experimenter administered a standard choice instruction, following past research (Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990).

Look, I realise that this task may not be easy, and you may even feel a little bit embarrassed about doing this, but I would be grateful if you would do this for me; having said that, I just want to check before you proceed that you are quite happy to do this?

Five participants declined participation; they had been assigned to the following conditions: one to the "positive individual" condition, one to the "negative individual" condition, two to the "positive woman" condition, and one to the "negative woman" condition.

6.2.3.4 Interviewers' protocol and instructions

On entering the interview room, the interviewee was invited to sit down next to a dummy card which reminded the interviewee to "project the assigned personality", and to "elaborate three times" during the interview. It was therefore clear to all parties that interviewees were projecting different personalities. Our methodology thus departed from the standard methodology in which the interviewers are ostensibly unaware that
the interviewees are managing an impression (e.g., see Jones et al., 1981). This step was taken in order to minimise any threat associated with the interview task. For ethical reasons, this was considered a priority over and above ensuring a strong manipulation of self-presentational behaviour.

The three interviewers shared the task of administering the PTT during the interview. The interviewers sat in a semi-circle around the participant. The interviewers read their respective lines from a typed interview protocol, as follows:

#1: What is your participant number?
[#3 records this on scoring sheet]
#2: In this interview we are going to administer the Personality Triads Test. This is how the test works.
#1: We will hand you an index card on which you will find three descriptive phrases. Each of these phrases could conceivably be descriptive of you at one time or another. Some phrases, however, will be more descriptive of you than others. We will read the three statements out aloud, and then, taking one triad at a time, you are requested to assign points according to how well each phrase describes you in comparison to the other two in the group. You have 10 points to distribute in each group; thus, for the phrase that most characterised you, you would assign the greater number of points. As we go through this, please elaborate on why a certain phrase in any given triad describes you particularly well; you are asked to do this for three triads. Here is the first triad.

Interviewer #1 administered the first three triads, one at a time; this involved passing each index card to the participant, and reading out the three phrases from his or her own copy of the test, while the participant considered them and then made her response. Interviewer #2 administered triads four to six in the same way, and Interviewer #3 administered triads seven to ten. The third interviewer also acted as the scorer and recorded the participant's point allocations for the entire test. The interviewers were instructed to respond to participants' elaborations with a very neutral "Thank you for elaborating". Participants' elaborations were not written down, partly to save time and partly as a rationale for tape-recording the interviews. In fact, the tape-recording was primarily made to provide a means of assessing the degree to which experimental participants' experiences were comparable, and also to render one's self-presentational behaviour "of some consequence" (Jones et al., 1981).
Interviewers were not permitted to depart from the typed protocol in any respect. The experimenter's assistant closely but unobtrusively monitored the performance of the interviewing panels to ensure that this condition was met.

6.2.3.5 Dependent measures

When each participant completed the interview, she returned to the main laboratory. The dependent measures were administered at this stage. Participants were administered the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (disguised as the "Personal Attitudes Inventory"), a self-rating questionnaire, and a short survey. The Rosenberg Scale comprises 10 statements (five positive and five negative) such as "I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others" (see Appendix A). Participants rate their agreement or disagreement with each statement on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree).

The self-rating questionnaire contained 40 self-rating scales. The instructions read as follows:

Please indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how you currently view yourself on the following scales. Please rate yourself as you see yourself now. In taking this test, please make your judgements on the basis of what these things mean TO YOU. There are no right or wrong answers, and your responses will remain strictly confidential, so please try to be completely honest. Would you agree that this trait describes you at this moment?

Participants rated themselves on each trait using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The traits comprised 10 feminine traits, 10 masculine traits, 10 positive gender-neutral traits, and 10 negative gender-neutral traits. The gender-specific traits were drawn from Oakes et al. (1991). Traits were presented in the same (randomly determined) order to all participants.

Participants were also asked to complete a brief eight-item survey in which they rated the applicability of different personality dimensions to various social groups. Two scales were relevant to the present investigation. The first assessed participants' perceptions of the level of self-esteem of women in general, and the second assessed participants' perceptions of the level of self-esteem of men in general. Specifically, participants rated how high in self-esteem women / men were in general, on seven-point
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). These will be referred to as group self-esteem measures.

6.2.3.6 Post-experimental measures
Finally, participants rated (a) how difficult they found the interview task, (b) their perceptions of how much choice they had over the type of personality they projected in the interview, (c) their perceptions of how much choice they had over whether or not they participated in the interview, and (d) the degree to which the self-presentation reflected their "true" self. All ratings were made on seven-point scales. Participants' perceptions of the purpose of the study were also recorded at this stage. Participants were then thanked for their participation and debriefed on all aspects of the experiment.

6.3 Results
Of the 66 participants who completed the self-presentational interview, four participants were subsequently excluded from analyses either because the participant did not project the assigned personality in the interview, or because the interviewers failed to strictly adhere to their instructions. Thus the results are based on a reduced sample of 62 participants. Their distribution across the cells of the design is indicated in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1
Distribution of participants across cells of experimental design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>VALENCE OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3.1 Manipulation checks
An examination of experimental hypotheses required manipulation of (a) the level of self-presentational behaviour, and (b) the positivity of participants' self-presentational behaviour. The first manipulation was achieved by instructing participants to manage an impression either as "individuals" in the context of a female audience or as "women" in the context of a male audience. It is likely that participants did recall the assigned role, given that they spent some time listing illustrative "behavioural evidence" on paper in preparation for the interview; it is also likely that the sex composition of the
interviewing panel entered participants' awareness, nevertheless it would be useful to confirm this. There was no obvious way to measure the success of this first manipulation without being reactive; any questions that directly tapped the degree to which participants were aware of group membership at the time of the interview would most likely reveal the manipulation. An independent rater who was blind to the experimental conditions of participants and to the purpose of the study listened to the audio-taped interviews and rated (among other things) whether the participant referred to herself as a woman or compared herself to other women or to men at any stage in the interview. This provided a small amount of relevant evidence. Interestingly, only four participants made some sort of intergroup comparison or explicit reference to being a woman during the interview; two belonged to the "negative, powerless woman" condition, and two belonged to the "positive, powerful woman" condition. In future studies it would therefore be useful to more directly assess participants' awareness of the audience and their recollection of the assigned role.

To assess the positivity of participants' self-presentations, a measure of self-enhancement was derived by subtracting the number of points that participants assigned to the negative phrase in each triad of the PTT from the number of points assigned to the positive phrase in each triad, and then averaging across the 10 triads. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with level of behaviour and valence of self-presentation as between-subjects variables was computed using these scores. A main effect for valence of self-presentation emerged, such that participants in the self-enhancing conditions were significantly more self-enhancing (M = 4.37, SD = 3.03) than participants in the self-deprecating conditions (M = -2.39, SD = 2.99), F(1, 58) = 78.11, p < .001.

An independent rater's judgement of each participant's interview performance was a second source of confirmation of the success of the role-play instructions. Each interview was tape-recorded (with the participant's permission) for this purpose. The rater was a 27 year old female graduate who was blind to the experimental condition of the participant and the purpose of the study. She was asked to make a relatively detailed assessment of each participant's performance. Specifically, she was asked (1) to rate the degree to which the individual presented herself as positive and powerful (1 = very negative, powerless, 4 = neither, 7 = very positive, powerful); (2) to indicate her
confidence in this judgement (1 = not at all confident, 7 = extremely confident); (3) to judge the degree to which the participant's presentation was a reflection of the participant's "true" self (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal); (4) to rate the degree to which the person self-referenced during the interview (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal); (5) to record the number of elaborations made and the extent to which each elaboration was informative of the person's negativity or positivity (1 = not at all informative of the person's negativity or positivity, 7 = very informative); and (6) to time the interview using a stopwatch.

A two-way ANOVA\(^1\) once again confirmed that self-deprecating participants (\(M = 1.43, SD = 0.57\)) were easily differentiated from self-enhancing individuals (\(M = 6.52, SD = 0.63\)), \(F(1, 57) = 1130.79, p < .001\). The coder was significantly more confident in her judgement when the participant was self-enhancing (\(M = 6.06, SD = 0.25\)) rather than self-deprecating (\(M = 5.90, SD = 0.31\)), \(F(1, 57) = 5.70, p < .05\), however the grand mean was high (\(M = 5.98, SD = 0.29\)), suggesting that the coder could in general quite confidently discern the role played by each participant. No main or interaction effects emerged for the degree to which the self-portrayal appeared to be a reflection of the "true" self (\(M = 5.77, SD = 0.67\)), or for the degree of self-referencing (\(M = 4.15, SD = 0.91\)), or for the number of elaborations made (\(M = 3.21, SD = 1.40\)). However a valence main effect emerged when the extent of elaboration was considered, \(F(1, 57) = 5.20, p < .05\), indicating that the elaborations made by self-enhancers were more informative of positivity (\(M = 5.85, SD = 0.55\)) than the elaborations made by self-deprecators were of negativity (\(M = 5.31, SD = 1.22\)). In addition the two-way interaction was significant, \(F(1, 57) = 5.54, p < .05\), qualifying this main effect. The means are presented in Table 6.2. Four pairwise contrasts were performed on the means in this table, applying Sidak's multiplicative inequality to correct for multiple comparisons. The elaborations of self-deprecating "women" were significantly less informative than the elaborations of self-enhancing "women", \(t(57) = 3.29, p < .01\) (with Sidak). The elaborations of self-deprecating "women" were also somewhat less informative than the elaborations of self-deprecating "individuals", \(t(57) = 2.35, p < .1\) (with Sidak).

\(^1\) One interview was not successfully recorded on tape and therefore could not be rated in this way, accounting for the reduced degrees of freedom in analyses of the independent rater's judgements.
Informativeness of elaborations as a function of valence of behaviour and level of behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>VALENCE OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>5.67 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>4.89 (1.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

On average the behavioural episode lasted 5.50 minutes (SD = 1.55), however participants in the social identity conditions had significantly longer interviews (M = 6.00 min, SD = 2.00) than participants in the personal identity conditions (M = 5.11 min, SD = .93), F(1, 57) = 5.07, p < .05. Given that interviewers adhered strictly to a script, it is likely that the longer interviews in the intergroup behaviour conditions are a reflection of the interviewee’s negotiation of the interview context rather than a reflection of a tardier interviewing method on the part of the male interviewers, although the latter explanation cannot be ruled out entirely.

To summarise it appears that the role-playing instructions were successful in eliciting positive and negative self-presentation. However, there is some evidence to suggest that self-deprecating women were less informative in their elaborations than the other groups, suggesting that this group in particular may have been reluctant to project a negative self-image.

6.3.2 Self-ratings on feminine, masculine and positive and negative attributes

The 40 traits in the self-rating questionnaire comprised 10 feminine traits, 10 masculine traits, 10 positive gender-neutral traits, and 10 negative gender-neutral traits. The gender-specific traits were stereotypical of women and men, respectively (Oakes et al., 1991), while the gender-neutral traits were unrelated to the femininity-masculinity dimension. Each set of traits was separately subjected to a reliability analysis to ascertain whether it was appropriate to average across the 10 items in each scale (Wylie, 1974). Where the reliability analysis suggested that item deletion could achieve a higher Cronbach’s alpha, the analysis for the improved (rather than 10-item) scale is reported.
The feminine traits were: sentimental, affectionate, emotional, talkative, flirtatious, sympathetic, appreciative, sensitive, soft-hearted, feminine. A reliability analysis of the feminine traits suggested that the deletion of two items (talkative and flirtatious) would improve scale reliability. This yielded a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of .83 and an average inter-item correlation of .38, therefore results pertaining to the revised scale will be reported (although the 10-item scale yielded the same results). When mean self-ratings for feminine traits were subjected to an ANOVA, a significant interaction emerged between valence of behaviour and level of behaviour, $F(1, 58) = 6.57, p < .05$. Table 6.3 presents the means relevant to this interaction. A cross-over effect is apparent, such that positive self-presentation tended to increase self-perceived femininity in the individual condition, with the opposite effect emerging in the woman condition. The interaction is mainly due to the fact that self-deprecating "women" self-stereotyped more strongly on feminine traits than self-deprecating "individuals", $t(58) = 2.20, p < .05$. In addition, self-deprecating "women" tended to report that sex-stereotypical traits applied to them more strongly than self-enhancing "women", $t(58) = 1.92, p < .1$.

Table 6.3
Mean femininity ratings as a function of valence of behaviour and level of behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>VALENCE OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>4.26 (0.98)</td>
<td>4.84 (1.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>5.07 (0.70)</td>
<td>4.34 (0.93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

The 10 masculine traits were: aggressive, boastful, adventurous, dominant, forceful, strong, masculine, daring, assertive, ambitious. A reliability analysis of the masculine traits suggested that the deletion of two items (aggressive and masculine) would improve scale reliability. This yielded a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of .90 and an average inter-item correlation of .54. Results pertaining to mean scores derived from the eight-item scale will therefore be reported (although the 10-item scale yielded the same results). In contrast to the pattern observed on feminine traits, masculine traits yielded a main effect for valence of self-presentation, $F(1, 58) = 6.71, p < .05$. Participants who presented themselves as positive and powerful reported that masculine
traits characterised them more strongly (M = 4.66, SD = 0.85) than participants who presented themselves as negative and powerless (M = 3.91, SD = 1.38).

The 10 positive gender-neutral traits were: alert, honest, easy-going, reliable, relaxed, friendly, optimistic, intelligent, adaptable, contented. These traits yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .86 and an average inter-item correlation of .38. The reliability analysis did not suggest the need for item deletion, therefore the ANOVA performed on mean scores derived from the 10-item scale will be reported. When mean scores on the 10 positive traits were subjected to a two-way ANOVA, a main effect for valence of self-presentation emerged, F(1, 58) = 5.15, p < .05, indicating that self-enhancers ascribed positive traits more strongly to the self (M = 5.20, SD = 0.50) than self-deprecators (M = 4.70, SD = 1.13).

The 10 negative gender-neutral traits were: inefficient, rude, confused, defensive, moody, apathetic, boring, superficial, conceited, prejudiced. For these traits, Cronbach's alpha was .74 and the average inter-item correlation was .23. The reliability analysis did not suggest the need for item deletion, therefore the two-way ANOVA was performed on mean scores derived from the 10-item scale. This analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect for valence of self-presentation, F(1, 58) = 3.97, p = .051, indicating a tendency for self-deprecators to apply more negative traits to the self (M = 3.16, SD = 0.94) than self-enhancers (M = 2.75, SD = 0.66).

6.3.3 The effect of self-presentation on self-evaluation

The Rosenberg was scored as a four-point Likert scale such that higher scores represent higher self-esteem. The 10 items comprising the Rosenberg were subjected to a reliability analysis to determine the degree to which scale items were interrelated (Wylie, 1974). Cronbach's alpha reached .87 and the average inter-item correlation was .42, suggesting that the scale was homogeneous. Table 6.4 presents mean (total) Rosenberg scores.

When participants' total scores on the RSE were subjected to a two-way ANOVA, the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect for valence of behaviour, F(1, 58) = 4.31, p < .05. Participants who engaged in positive self-presentation had higher self-
esteem (M = 32.19, SD = 4.03) than participants who engaged in negative self-presentation (M = 29.60, SD = 5.51).

Table 6.4
Mean Rosenberg scores as a function of valence of behaviour and level of behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>VALENCE OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>30.19 (5.08)</td>
<td>32.22 (4.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>28.93 (6.09)</td>
<td>32.14 (3.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Previous investigators have argued that when self-presentation in terms of positivity and negativity produces a main effect for valence of behaviour on post-test self-esteem (as was found here on the RSE), this effect has a degree of ambiguity associated with it (Schlenker, 1986; Upshaw & Yates, 1968). In particular, Upshaw and Yates (1968) have suggested that a valence main effect for self-evaluation, where it is observed, may be due to perceptions of task success rather than to self-presentational behaviour per se. That is, success at any task may confer higher self-esteem. Applied to the present study, if participants believed that they were successful at projecting the assigned personality, they may experience an increase in self-esteem. Similarly if participants believed that they performed poorly they may experience a decrease in self-esteem (although, it is also possible that performing poorly on a “rotten” task will not necessarily decrease self-esteem). Direct measures of perceptions of task performance were not obtained in the present study, however ratings of task difficulty were obtained at the end of the experiment. Consistent with this alternative interpretation, participants who projected negative selves rated the interview task as more difficult (M = 4.93, SD = 1.46) than those who projected positive selves (M = 3.44, SD = 1.76), F(1, 58) = 12.69, p < .001. Moreover, when difficulty ratings were used as a covariate in a two-way ANOVA for Rosenberg scores, the covariate did adjust the variance significantly, F(1, 57) = 5.90, p < .05, and the valence main effect disappeared, p > .2. Thus it appears that the valence effect obtained on the Rosenberg may in fact be attributable to differences in perceptions of task performance rather than to the self-presentational behaviour itself.
The effect of behaviour on self-evaluation was further examined by entering participants' post-test ratings of the self-esteem level of men and women into a 2 (valence of behaviour) x 2 (level of behaviour) x 2 (stimulus group: men, women) ANOVA\(^4\) with repeated-measures on the last factor. A significant main effect was obtained for the repeated-measures factor, \(F(1, 57) = 36.62, p < .001\), indicating that participants rated level of self-esteem to be significantly higher for men (\(M = 5.39, SD = 1.04\)) than for women (\(M = 4.41, SD = 1.12\)). A significant interaction between valence of behaviour and level of behaviour was also obtained, \(F(1, 57) = 5.60, p < .05\). Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 6.5. Interestingly, in the individual condition positive self-presentation did not appear to confer higher group self-esteem (for men and women in general) than negative self-presentation. Moreover, in the woman condition positive self-presentation appeared to have the opposite effect, producing a shift towards lower self-esteem. The interaction is mainly due to the tendency of self-deprecating "women" to report higher group self-esteem than self-enhancing "women" and self-deprecating "individuals"; however these contrasts were not statistically significant when Sidak's multiplicative inequality was applied; \(t(57) = 2.11\) and 1.92, respectively, \(p > .1\) (with Sidak).

Table 6.5
Group self-esteem as a function of valence of behaviour and level of behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>VALENCE OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>4.72 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>5.54 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

6.3.4 Post-experimental measures
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of choice pertaining to (a) the type of trait they had to emphasise during the interview, and (b) whether or not they participated in the interview (in actual fact, participants were assigned self-presentational instructions and hence had no choice over the type of trait projected in the interview, but they were free to decline participation from the study).

\(^4\)Missing data account for the reduced degrees of freedom.
Ratings were made on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (no choice) to 7 (a great deal of choice).

For perceived choice pertaining to the type of personality projected, the ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, $F(1, 56) = 5.50, p < .05$. This interaction is presented in Table 6.6. As can be seen from this table, for “individuals” positive self-presentation tends to increase choice while for “women” positive self-presentation tends to decrease choice.

Table 6.6
Mean choice ratings as a function of valence of behaviour and level of behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>VALENCE OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>1.31 (0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>2.50 (1.79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

The interaction is mainly due to the fact that self-enhancing “individuals” felt they had significantly more choice over the type of trait they were projecting than self-deprecating “individuals”, $t(56) = 2.77, p < .05$ (with Sidak). Second, self-deprecating “women” tended to feel they had more choice over the type of trait they were projecting than self-deprecating “individuals”, however this contrast was not significant when Sidak’s multiplicative inequality was applied, $t(56) = 2.13, p > .1$ (with Sidak). In contrast, when participants judged how much choice they had over whether or not to participate in the interview, no effects were significant at traditional alpha levels ($M = 5.65, SD = 1.80$).

Each participant also judged the extent to which her self-presentation during the interview reflected her true self on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). A main effect for valence of self-presentation emerged, $F(1, 58) = 35.10, p < .001$. Specifically, participants who presented themselves positively reported that the self-portrayal was a better reflection of their true self ($M = 4.84, SD = 1.44$) than participants who presented themselves negatively ($M = 2.57, SD = 1.57$). This suggests that the self-presentational

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5 Missing data account for the reduced degrees of freedom.
behaviour was self-consistent for those who projected positivity, and self-inconsistent for those who projected negativity. The main effect for valence of self-presentational behaviour that was previously observed for difficulty ratings may thus reflect the fact that it is easier to behave in a self-consistent than self-inconsistent way. However, it is also possible that in reporting that their negative self-presentation did not reflect their true selves, participants may be attempting to dissociate themselves from the behaviour.

6.4 Discussion
The present study was designed to investigate the conditions under which behaviour produces self-concept change. The basic hypothesis was that the effect of behaviour on self-conception and self-evaluation will be mediated by level of self-categorization. It was predicted that to the degree that self-presentational behaviour is elicited and therefore presumably interpreted in an intragroup context, its impact is likely to be felt at the personal rather than the social level of identity. Similarly, self-presentational behaviour that is elicited and therefore presumably interpreted in an intergroup context is more likely to affect one's social identity than the personal self. To what extent did the evidence lend support to the hypothesis at the level of post-test measures of self-conception, followed by self-evaluation?

Importantly, the predicted two-way interaction between valence of behaviour and level of behaviour emerged for self-perceived femininity. As expected, self-stereotyping on ingroup-defining traits was most apparent for female participants who self-presented as stereotypical women (i.e., as negative and powerless) in the presence of a male audience. Paradoxically then, participants came to view themselves more as women when they presented themselves as the women they do not want to be. In theoretical terms, the "negative, powerless woman" condition represents a situation of high normative fit between (group-level) behaviour and level of self-categorization (e.g., see Ashmore, 1981; Bitoni, 1992; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Williams & Bennett, 1975), thus the observation that sex-stereotypical traits were strongly endorsed in this condition lends clear support to the self-categorization analysis.

In addition to supporting self-categorization predictions, the results for feminine traits clearly extend previous work conducted within the self-presentation paradigm. In previous research, the same behaviour has consistently been shown to have the same
effect on self-conception (e.g., positive self-presentation has consistently produced a positive shift in self-esteem). In contrast, the results for feminine traits indicate that the same behaviour (i.e., positive self-presentation) had one effect on self-conception when it was elicited in an interpersonal context (i.e., it produced a positive shift in self-perceived femininity here), and the opposite effect when it was elicited in a setting that more closely approximated an intergroup context (i.e., it produced a negative shift in self-perceived femininity here). Thus it appears that the same behaviour (i.e., behaviour with the same valence) can have different consequences for self-conception, depending on whether the context of the behaviour encourages the perceiver to view her self-presentation as an expression of personal or social identity. The implication is that behaviour that conveys a "positive and powerful" disposition is less likely to define one as a woman than as an individual. These observations highlight the complexity of the self-behaviour relationship when the variables level of self-categorization and level of behaviour are taken into account.

Interestingly, female participants – particularly self-deprecating “women” – did not attempt to refute trait characterisations comprising the female stereotype in the post-test questionnaire (cf. Dion, Earn, & Yee, 1978; see also Turner, Hogg, Turner, & P. M. Smith, 1984). This observation is consistent with previous research showing that a common response on the part of females who perceive threat from the outgroup is strong ingroup identification, rather than rejection of the ingroup stereotype (e.g., see Dion et al., 1978). It also complements research suggesting that increased self-stereotyping among ingroup members may emphasise the extent of intragroup solidarity and the support which group membership offers (Simon & R. J. Brown, 1987; Simon et al., 1991; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; Simon et al., 1995). For instance, Simon and Hamilton (1994) argue that “members of a low-status minority may in fact increase self-stereotyping in order to assert their common social identity” when striving toward social change (p. 710). Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) likewise argues that “dominated group members [including women] tend to bind self-conceptions on collective and shared attributes, and to promote group distinctiveness, more than dominant group members” (pp. 412-413).

The results obtained on self-perceived femininity also supplement previous research documenting self-stereotyping for gender-relevant attributes under conditions of a salient social identity (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Rosenkranz et al.,
Indeed, there were some parallels between the present methodology and Hogg and Turner's (1987) research. Here, salience of social identity was achieved via face-to-face interaction between the participant and three outgroup members. Setting up a face-to-face interaction with three ingroup members, by contrast, evoked the individual self. Along similar lines, in Hogg and Turner's study the salience of collective identity was achieved by orchestrating a situation in which two men disagreed with two women, while the salience of personal identity was achieved by creating a situation in which two people of the same sex disagreed with each other. Importantly, in this previous and in the present research the operationalisation of personal identity makes salient the relevant psychological ingroup against which the individual self is defined and experienced (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of this point). The present study replicates Hogg and Turner by showing that self-stereotyping on ingroup-relevant (feminine) traits was more pronounced in the intergroup than the intragroup condition. Furthermore, in the present study self-stereotyping was restricted to attributes that were particularly diagnostic in the context of the experiment, namely, the feminine traits (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Kelly, 1989; Simon et al., 1991).

Hence, and in direct contrast, for masculine attributes a straightforward main effect was obtained for valence of self-presentation. Participants in the positive self-presentation conditions subsequently felt more masculine than participants in the negative self-presentation conditions. A post-hoc trait by trait analysis revealed that this main effect was due to the influence of a small subset of those traits; specifically, the positive masculine traits (assertive, strong, ambitious, and adventurous). When strongly endorsed these traits seem to capture high self-esteem, as defined in the context of this experiment (i.e., positive and powerful); in fact the word "strong" appeared in the positive personality profiles, while its opposite, "weak", appeared in the negative profiles. For this reason, the main effect can arguably be interpreted as a manipulation check on valence of self-presentation. Alternatively, this main effect may indicate that the self-presentation has generalised to self-attributes related to self-esteem. Masculinity as defined in this experiment is clearly related to feeling positive and powerful. In fact, the masculine attributes were potentially more directly relevant to the self-presentation manipulation than were the more global (or less specific) items of the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale.
The absence of a main effect for level of behaviour for masculine traits is also consistent with the self-categorization analysis. In this experiment the normative fit between masculine attributes and valence of behaviour is stronger than the fit between masculinity and level of behaviour since positive and powerful individuals are as likely to endorse masculine traits as are positive and powerful women (in fact the stereotype of powerful women is that they are quite masculine). The pattern of means was consistent with this interpretation of the data since masculine traits were endorsed slightly more strongly in the positive, powerful woman condition ($M = 4.77$) than in the positive, powerful individual condition ($M = 4.58$) (see Table A.1, Appendix A).

The observation that self-deprecators applied negative neutral traits more strongly than self-enhancers can similarly be interpreted as a manipulation check. A post-hoc trait by trait analysis revealed that the valence main effect was largely due to the inclusion of the traits apathetic and inefficient. It is not surprising that “apathetic” should emerge as an important trait since this trait actually appeared in the negative personality profiles. It is less clear why the trait “inefficient” assumed relevance to the experimental manipulation, although it is possible that participants may have considered efficiency to be relevant to their successful negotiation of the interview. Also as expected, self-enhancers were found to endorse positive neutral traits more strongly than self-deprecators. Once again, post-hoc analyses revealed that a small subset of positive traits assumed particular relevance to the experimental situation (namely alert, reliable, intelligent, optimistic, and friendly).

In addition to the above findings for self-definition, the second question raised by the present study is whether level of self-categorization mediated the effect of behaviour on self-evaluation. The impact of behaviour on self-evaluation was assessed using two measures of self-esteem: the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale, and a measure of group self-esteem. The RSE yielded a main effect for valence of self-presentation such that positive self-presentation enhanced self-esteem and negative self-presentation diminished self-esteem. Thus it would appear that the traditional carry-over effect from self-presentation to subsequent self-evaluation was replicated in the present study, on this first measure of self-esteem (e.g., Fazio et al., 1981; Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker et al., 1994; Tice, 1992). On the other hand, we cannot rule out an alternative explanation in terms of one's subjective opinion of one's success.
at projecting the assigned personality. This possibility is particularly pertinent to the present study since the instructions at the start of the experiment alerted participants to the fact that "independent raters" would assess their performance in projecting the assigned personality. As suggested by Upshaw and Yates (1968), it is ambiguous whether the main effect for valence of behaviour that has repeatedly been observed for change in self-evaluation in the self-presentation paradigm is a function of participants' perceptions of their success at creating the right impression or the self-presentational episode per se. An analysis of perceived task difficulty suggested that this alternative explanation may be applicable to the present results.

Why was the effect of behaviour on self-esteem as measured by the RSE not mediated by level of self-categorization? There are several possible explanations. Firstly, it is worth noting that the Rosenberg deals with "a general favourable or unfavourable global self-attitude" (M. Rosenberg, 1979, p. 292, emphasis added). This is reflected in scale items (e.g., "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself"; "At times I think I am no good at all"). In the context of the present study, it is possible that self-esteem as indexed by the Rosenberg may be too personally-orientated to be implicated in intergroup differentiation. Consistent with this interpretation, there is evidence to suggest that self-esteem as measured by the Rosenberg may be unrelated to group evaluations (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Biernat et al., 1996; Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Fleming & Courtney, 1984; Hogg & Abrams, 1990). On the other hand, it is also possible that in the context of the present study the Rosenberg measured general self-esteem at the end of the experiment, including its personal and group aspects. In this connection self-categorization theory does not preclude generalisation from personal to group self-aspects and from group to personal self-aspects. In fact the theory suggests that personal and collective self-aspects are likely to be correlated (see Chapter 5). Applied to the present study, it is highly plausible that as a positive woman the self-presenter is also a positive individual. Thus the RSE, as a global measure of self-opinion, may reflect one's general inferences from self-presentational behaviour. Alternatively, the task difficulty analysis suggests that the Rosenberg may have functioned more as a personal measure of perceived task success. The main effect for valence of behaviour disappeared when task difficulty ratings were entered as a covariate in the analysis of post-test RSE scores. Another possibility is that the combination of a global self-esteem scale with a not so strong manipulation of the primary self-categorization variable may
have precluded the emergence of an effect for level of behaviour. The manipulation of level of behaviour was relatively weak from three points of view: (a) the self-presentation episode was introduced as a personality projection task for all participants, (b) the group behaviour conditions involved an individual woman exercising her personal choice to proceed with an interview about her personal experience as a woman, rather than a group of women engaged in collective behaviour, and (c) the self-presentation instructions did not engage participants in the group behaviour conditions in explicit intergroup comparison in terms of the salient behavioural domain. The group-behaviour conditions therefore cannot be considered a strong manipulation of intergroup behaviour; at best they approximate an "us" versus "them" comparative context. These features of the study may explain why on this self-esteem scale, a straightforward main effect emerged for valence of behaviour.

In this connection it is worth noting that in operationalising level of behaviour, our priority was to avoid being reactive. As it stands, no participants suspected the manipulation pertaining to level of behaviour, confirming the subtlety of the manipulation. By contrast the majority of participants reported (on post-experimental measures) that they believed the experiment was concerned with the effect of the behavioural episode on one's "real" personality, indicating that this aspect of the research was apparent to experimental participants. This was not altogether unexpected since the connection between the interview task and the post-test questionnaire was not disguised in the present study (cf. Jones et al., 1981). We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that the observed main effect for valence of behaviour which emerged on the Rosenberg – the first scale administered after the interview experience – may also be due to demand characteristics.

Self-esteem measures pertaining to group identity were also collected. Specifically, experimental participants indicated their perceptions of the self-esteem levels of men and women in general (i.e., collective or social self-esteem). The observation that effects were obtained on both the Rosenberg and these group-measures is consistent with the a priori assumption that the group behaviour conditions should be interpreted as comparatively more group-focused, rather than as a strong embodiment of group-level behaviour. On the basis of participants' responses it would appear that men were generally perceived to have higher esteem than women, suggesting that as expected,
self-enhancement is counter-normative behaviour for women. In addition, the two-way interaction between valence of behaviour and level of behaviour revealed that people's perceptions of the self-esteem levels of men and women did not differ in the individual conditions. In contrast, self-deprecating women reported higher group self-esteem (for men and women in general) than self-enhancing women. This appears counter-intuitive. One possible explanation however, is that self-enhancing women have already secured positive social esteem by behaving in a self-ingratiating manner as women, therefore these participants may not need to restore their collective self-esteem. On the other hand the behaviour of self-deprecating women reflects a low level of group self-esteem, thus these participants may have been particularly motivated to achieve positive social identity by endorsing higher levels of collective self-esteem at the end of the experiment. At the same time, these participants cannot deny that men have high self-esteem. Conversely, the self-presentational behaviour of self-deprecating individuals should tend to affect their personal self-esteem more so than group self-esteem; this may explain why self-deprecating individuals appeared somewhat less motivated than self-deprecating women to redeem their group's self-esteem at the end of the experiment.

In addition to self-ratings, post-experimental measures revealed additional evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of behaviour is mediated by level of self-categorization. The findings for perceived choice over type of personality projected were particularly interesting. All participants were assigned a personality type, therefore they should all unequivocally report that there was no choice over role (i.e., a rating of one on a seven-point scale). Instead, a two-way interaction was observed. The same behaviour (i.e., presenting oneself positively) had a different effect as a function of the self-category that was evoked to deal with one's dissonance. In the individual behaviour condition, positive self-presentation tended to enhance perceived choice; in the group behaviour condition positive self-presentation tended to diminish perceived choice. One interpretation is that self-deprecating individuals tried to deny ownership of their self-presentational behaviour by reporting less choice than self-enhancing individuals. The role-play was clearly dissonant for these participants. In contrast, self-deprecating women reported relatively greater choice than self-deprecating individuals. It is likely that these participants also experienced cognitive dissonance; this view is consistent with the independent observations that (a) participants reported greater
difficulty in projecting negativity than positivity, irrespective of level of behaviour, (b) “true” self ratings implied that the negative role was perceived as self-discrepant by all participants projecting negativity, and (c) self-deprecating women made less informative elaborations in the interview than other participants, implying a reluctance to elaborate, even compared to self-deprecating individuals. Assuming therefore that these participants, like self-deprecating individuals, were conflicted by their role, it is possible that the "self-deprecating woman" condition leads to dissonance reduction through collective behaviour, resulting in greater perceived choice. Their membership in the social category “women” may have provided them with a ready-made explanation for their behaviour. Their self-deprecating presentation could be attributed to their social status as women and therefore there was no need for them to disidentify with their behaviour. This attribution was possible from a cognitive point of view because, as previously noted, the “self-deprecating woman” condition represents a situation of high normative fit between behaviour and level of self-categorization. The evidence thus points to a group-level attribution for behaviour in the self-deprecating woman condition. In so far as this interpretation of the data is correct, it would appear that (a) behaviour that is self-consistent (or normative) at the level of social identity but which confers a negative group-image can nevertheless evoke cognitive dissonance in the individual, and (b) group-level attributions that “justify” negative or unpleasant behaviour can in turn eliminate cognitive dissonance. In summary, self-discrepant behaviour in the negative conditions arouses dissonance; this is explained as “no choice” (i.e., an external attribution) in the individual behaviour condition and in terms of social identity (i.e., a group attribution) in the group behaviour condition, resulting in high choice in the self-deprecating woman condition compared to the self-deprecating individual condition. The present study thus suggests that when level of self-categorization and level of behaviour are taken into account, the role of intrapersonal processes in self-concept change appears to be more complicated than previous formulations suggest (see Chapter 4). These observations are interesting in their own right. However, in future work it would be interesting to examine the impact of group-level choice to proceed with some behaviour, and to contrast this with individual choice to act as a group member (as was examined in the present study).

The present discussion is also reminiscent of Gaertner et al.’s (1999) observation that a threat to the individual self can be experienced as more severe than a threat to the
collective self. Moreover for purposes of the present discussion, Gaertner et al. found that following a threat to the individual self, participants downplayed their uniqueness and identified more strongly with the ingroup, presumably in order to protect the individual self from the immediate threat. However, analogous effects were not observed when the collective self was threatened, leading the researchers to conclude that the individual self was primary. In contrast to the present study, Gaertner et al.'s analysis did not consider the possibility that “the same behaviour” [or in their case, the same unit of experimental feedback to research participants] can come to be interpreted and experienced very differently at the personal versus group level, depending on the normative and comparative fit between behaviour and the salient categorization. The present analysis thus emphasises the cognitive choices that a perceiver has when interpreting his or her own behaviour, or social feedback stemming from other sources.

The present study illustrates how the self-categorization analysis extends current self change theory and research. Firstly, at the level of theory, the present study suggests a role for interpersonal and intergroup processes, over and above but not to the exclusion of intrapersonal processes. In particular, the self-categorization analysis suggests the need for a more complex theory of change which takes into account that (a) the self is not just personal; it functions at multiple levels of abstraction, including social identity, and (b) behaviour is not just personal; thus intergroup as well as interpersonal behaviour is likely to have implications for self-concept change. Secondly, the traditional empirical finding is a straightforward carry-over effect from self-presentational behaviour to subsequent self-perception. In contrast, the present study demonstrates that acting “positively and powerfully” can have different effects on self-conception and self-evaluation as a function of self-categorization processes. Positive self-presentation produced a positive shift in the individual level of behaviour condition but a negative shift in the group level of behaviour condition for self-perceived femininity, group self-esteem, and perceived choice over behavioural role.

This study raises the theoretical question of whether and to what degree personal and social identity, and personal and collective self-esteem, are interrelated (see Long & Spears, 1997, for a discussion of this point). The relationship between personal and collective self-esteem is likely to be complex. In this connection, Linville’s (1994, in Linville & Carlston, 1994) research suggests that individual differences in self-concept
complexity (see Chapter 3) may affect the interconnectedness of our “multiple self-
esteems”. Her research shows, for instance, that individuals who are high in self-
concept complexity (i.e., those who maintain greater distinctions between their multiple
personal selves) show greater differentiation (less correlation) among their domain-
specific self-esteem. Whether these results have direct implications for the relationship
between personal and collective self-esteem, however, remains an important question
for future research.

In summary, level of self-categorization mediated the effect of self-presentational
behaviour on three important dependent measures: self-perceived femininity, group self-
esteem, and perceived choice to engage in the role-play. The present study extends
previous work on the effect of behaviour on self-conception by demonstrating that the
same behaviour can have opposite effects depending on the salient level of self-
categorization. In short, it appears that as expected, the self-presentational behaviour of
self-deprecating women “fitted” the salient social categorization; the behaviour
therefore probably aroused dissonance for the presenter. Ingroup identification (as
reflected in self-stereotyping on feminine traits) justified the behaviour, motivating the
enhanced assertion of general group self-esteem, and increasing perceived choice over
behavioural role.

The present study in general yielded support for the self-categorization analysis.
Nevertheless, a number of methodological problems that warrant consideration in future
studies were identified. Ideally, the same interviewers would have been used at all
sessions. Unfortunately cost precluded the employment of highly trained interviewers
for the duration of testing. The interviewers’ use of a script ensured that the interview
experience was comparable for all participants; nonetheless we acknowledge the need
for replication with tighter control of extraneous variables, such as differences in
interpersonal style across interviewers. More generally, the impersonal nature of the
interview (e.g., participants were assigned a participant number and interviewers were
reading off a script), coupled with the use of a 5 minute point allocation task (which can
be considered a minimally engaging task), and the use of familiar others as interviewers
would have minimised the potency of the self-presentation. Furthermore, the fact that
we did not introduce the post-test questionnaire as a separate study may have made the
link between the self-presentational episode and the post-test questionnaire apparent.
In the next experiment we attempted to address these methodological problems. For instance, interviews were video-taped in an attempt to make the self-presentational episode more engaging. Second, the same interviewer (in fact the experimenter) interviewed all participants, thus achieving greater control over the interview experience. Finally, an attempt was made to disguise the connection between the interview task and the post-test questionnaire by presenting the study as a series of discrete tasks dealing with different aspects of personality assessment.
Chapter 7

How do self-categorization and social comparison affect the impact of self-presentation on self-perception: Study 2

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we investigated how self-presentational behaviour is interpreted by the perceiver in one of two contexts, namely, an intragroup context (created by eliciting self-presentational behaviour as an individual in the presence of same-sex others), and an intergroup context (created by eliciting self-presentational behaviour as a woman in the presence of opposite-sex others). In so doing, we extended the existing literature on self-concept change by exploring the question: How does behaviour that is elicited in the presence of a group (rather than an individual) affect the actor's self-concept? We thus started to examine how psychological ingroups and outgroups may affect the interpretation of one's own behaviour.

The present experiment extends our analysis by considering how ingroup and outgroup behaviour may affect the perceiver's interpretation of her own behaviour. In Study 2, after eliciting self-presentational behaviour along the independence-dependence dimension from female participants, we presented information about the behaviour of the psychological ingroup (other women) and the psychological outgroup (men). The question was whether group-level social comparison information would be utilised in the process of making sense of one's own (independent or dependent) behaviour, and if so, how. Half of the experimental participants were exposed to social comparison information that confirmed normative beliefs about men and women. In this case a stimulus tape was shown which featured a group of independent men interacting with a group of dependent women. Such behaviour is normative for men and women, respectively, from the point of view that it accords with social stereotypes (Antill et al., 1981; Ashmore, 1981; S. L. Bem, 1974; Drinkwater, 1979; Gough & Heilbrun, 1983; Oakes et al., 1991; Williams & Bennett, 1975). The remaining participants were exposed to social comparison information that disconfirmed the commonly held stereotype; here the women were portrayed as strong and independent while the men were portrayed as meek and dependent.
The present investigation builds on previous work by Jones and colleagues (1981, Study 1). As we saw in Chapter 4, these investigators considered whether the perceived legitimacy of the self-presentation affects its impact on the self. Perceived legitimacy was manipulated by providing consensus information which suggested that either self-enhancement or self-deprecation was the appropriate or legitimate response in the interview context. The consensus feedback took the form of videotaped interviews with three previous participants (each individually depicted undergoing a very similar interview experience). All three (confederate) interviewees were either highly self-enhancing or highly self-deprecating in their own interviews. Furthermore, this consensus information was either presented before or after participants completed the interview themselves. Jones et al. reasoned that legitimising information presented after self-presentation would lead individuals to attribute their behaviour to the situation (given the high consensus); a carry-over effect from behaviour to subsequent self-esteem was therefore not expected here. By contrast, participants who presented themselves positively but subsequently discovered that the legitimate response was self-deprecation, for instance, should draw the inference that their self-presentation reflected the true self; in this instance, self-esteem should increase. The results indicated that subsequent consensus information had no impact on self-appraisal. Preceding consensus information, on the other hand, did appear to affect interview behaviour and in turn, post-test self-evaluations.

The present research aims to extend this previous work by exploring the role of group-level social comparison information on self-conception. In this connection, it is worth noting that in Jones et al.'s analysis, the perceived ingroup or outgroup status of comparison others was not measured nor controlled. In addition, unlike these previous investigators, in the present study we did not assume that perceivers will necessarily make a situational attribution for their behaviour upon observing high consensus between one's own and others' behaviour (cf. D. J. Bem, 1972; Jones et al., 1981; Kulik et al., 1986). In particular, if high consensus is observed under conditions of a salient social identity, the possibility of an attribution to category membership arises (Oakes et al., 1991). Category membership represents a third type of attribution, distinct from personality and situational attributions (Oakes, 1987). Self-categorization theory argues that behaviour can be attributed to the collective self, the personal self, or to the
situation. Theoretically, this view represents an important point of departure from Jones et al.'s analysis.

The present study also extends Study 1 of the thesis in several important ways. This time, we obtained pretest measures of how female participants rated themselves personally on the independence–dependence dimension, and divided the sample into Low and High Independents accordingly. In addition, the dependent measures collected at the end of the experiment included both personal self-ratings ("Think of yourself as an individual compared to other women") and social or collective self-ratings ("Think of yourself as a woman and compare yourself to men"). We could thus examine whether self-perceived independence: (a) remains stable (i.e., at pretest levels), (b) shifts in the direction of one's own self-presentational behaviour (in line with past self-presentation research), or (c) is affected by group-level comparisons; and further, whether any observed carry-over from own behaviour is seen at the level of personal identity, social identity, or both facets of the self-concept.

Our rationale for incorporating group-level social comparison information into the established self change paradigm is as follows. Thus far, self-concept change researchers have tended to focus on the role played by self-discrepant behaviour in bringing about self-concept change (see Chapter 4). But how does one define "self-discrepant"? Behaviour can be classified, in the abstract, as self-consistent or self-inconsistent if one equates the self-concept with a relatively stable knowledge structure stored somewhere in memory. As discussed previously this view is rejected by self-categorization theory. From this perspective, the existence of multiple self-categorizations, at various levels of abstraction, precludes us from defining a discrete unit of behaviour as self-inconsistent (or as self-consistent) in the absolute sense; "self-inconsistency" is defined with respect to the currently salient self-category or self-conception. This perspective then, implies that the self-behaviour relationship should not be studied in the abstract. A given behaviour may be discrepant with one personal identity but not necessarily another personal identity, or may be discrepant with a personal identity but not a social identity. For instance, an individual may behave dependently in the context of an intimate relationship, where co-dependence is normative and such behaviour is therefore self-consistent. By contrast, dependence in the context of the same individual's concept of him- or herself at work might well be
self-inconsistent. From this perspective then, the relevant question is not "how does self-discrepant behaviour work to change self-conception?" but rather, "how does one's behaviour come to be imbued with social meaning?"

A few points of clarification are in order. Our present aim is not to dispute the basic point that on behaving in a personally self-discrepant way in a given context, individuals are likely to engage in a sense-making process. We would, however, disagree with previous accounts of the nature of this sense-making process. Contrary to past investigators, we would suggest that this process is likely to take into account the normative and comparative relations between self and others comprising the psychological frame of reference. That is, the process by which personal behaviour is imbued with social meaning should at some level involve reference to one's psychological ingroup and, depending on the availability of comparisons with the outgroup, may further be affected by an implicit contrast with the psychological outgroup. In other words, we would argue that behaviour is not made sense of, interpreted, or understood, in a social vacuum. To suggest, as some investigators have, that the self-structure provides the context or background against which one's own behaviour is interpreted (e.g., Markus, 1977; T. B. Rogers et al., 1977; see Chapter 3), is to reduce a complex social psychological process to a host of asocial, intrapsychic mechanisms. Empirical research has without doubt failed to capture the rich social psychological reality that exists outside the laboratory, where the actor is constantly bombarded with information about how others are behaving, in addition to the social feedback provided by one's own recently enacted behaviour. It is likely that complex intragroup and intergroup settings are the true "contexts" against which we judge, interpret, and come to attribute meaning to our own social behaviour. The psychological ingroup is likely to be the context against which we interpret much of our interpersonal behaviour, while the psychological outgroup is likely to be the context against which we interpret our collective behaviour as group members (see Study 1, Chapter 6). One's normative beliefs and expectations about ingroup and outgroup behaviour are likely to impinge upon and influence the course of this sense-making process. In so far as these assertions are correct, or at least plausible, this would imply that a more group-based account of self-concept change is needed in place of the dominant intrapsychic explanations (see Chapter 4).
The broad aim of the present study is to explore the interplay between individual and group-level processes within the established self-concept change paradigm. This study was exploratory. That is, we did not have firm predictions about what would happen when all these variables (one's current behaviour, other people's behaviour, long-term knowledge structures, and the multifaceted self) are considered in unison. Building on Study 1, the present study tests the general hypothesis that the effect of behaviour will be mediated by self-categorization and social comparison processes. More specifically, the present study examines whether the effect of self-presentational behaviour is qualified in any way by the provision of group-level social comparison information. The self-categorization analysis will be supported in so far as theoretically meaningful interactions emerge between one's own behaviour, group behaviour, and level of self-rating. It may be, for instance, that following exposure to normative group behaviour, one's own dependent self-presentation may come to be viewed, interpreted or made sense of in terms of social (rather than personal) identity, while independent self-presentation may lead one to see oneself as less of a woman. It may be that the personal self does have some privileged status in defining us and that accordingly, we interpret behaviour in a way that protects the personal self; that is, in a way that ensures the personal self is experienced positively (see Gaertner et al., 1999; Simon, 1993). Alternatively, it may be that information about others' behaviour is ignored unless the behaviour is performed in exactly the same context as one's own behaviour, and is therefore perceived as directly relevant to the interpretation of one's own behaviour. The aim of Study 2 was to explore these possibilities, and in so doing, to commence our examination of how one's own behaviour and group-level comparisons may interact to affect personal and social identity.

7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
For the questionnaire phase of the experiment, participants were 103 female undergraduates (M = 22.2 years, SD = 7.4) drawn from the introductory psychology course at the Australian National University, Canberra. Ninety-eight of these participants subsequently participated in the main experiment. All participants received course credit for their participation in both phases of the experiment.
7.2.2 Design

The design was a 2 (personality: Low Independents, High Independents) x 2 (self-presentational behaviour: dependent, independent) x 2 (group behaviour: normative, counter-normative) x 2 (level of self-rating: personal identity, social identity) factorial, with repeated-measures on the last factor. The screening phase yielded a baseline measure of self-perceived independence (rated in the abstract; that is, no context was specified). These initial self-ratings were implicitly personal. By contrast, in the main part of the experiment self-descriptions were obtained firstly in terms of social identity and secondly in terms of personal identity.

7.2.3 Materials and procedure

7.2.3.1 Screening questionnaire

Before the initial screening procedure was administered, participants were informed that the experimenter was conducting two independent personality studies. The second study would involve a range of personality tasks, and they would be invited to participate in that study in about a month's time. Only those participants who indicated that they would be available to take part in Study 2 and were interested in participating in the subsequent study were administered the questionnaire; no participants declined.

The screening phase was introduced as the "Social Perception Study". The screening questionnaire was administered in the laboratory to groups ranging in size from one to eight. Participants worked independently and no talking was permitted between them. Individuals were required to rate themselves on the Gough-Heilbrun Adjective Check List (ACL) (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983) and on eighteen 11-point bipolar scales related to various behavioural domains, including independence (the critical trait) and several fillers. The order of presentation of rating scales and the right / left position of scale end-points was determined randomly and the same random order was used for all participants. Individuals were also required to rate the importance of each self-rating ("How important to you is this view of yourself?"), on an 11-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 11 (very important).

The screening questionnaire yielded four measures of personal independence in total. These included ratings on three bipolar scales, namely, independent-dependent, individualist-conformist, and leader-follower. These scales were taken from Markus.
They were scored so that higher scores represent higher levels of independence. Scores on the Autonomy Scale of the ACL served as another index of self-perceived independence. The Autonomy Scale is one of the ACL's 24 empirically derived scales. Autonomy is defined as the tendency "to act independently of others or of social values and expectations" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 12). Autonomy scores are derived by subtracting the number of dependent-type traits endorsed from the number of independent-type traits endorsed, such that higher scores indicate greater autonomy.

The ACL also yielded pretest measures of femininity (the Feminine Attributes Scale), masculinity (the Masculine Attributes Scale), and self-esteem (the Ideal Self Scale). The ACL was always completed first, followed by the self-rating questionnaire comprising the three bipolar scales of independence, and finally the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSE). The RSE (see Chapter 6) yielded a second measure of self-esteem at pretest.

### 7.2.3.2 Main experiment

About six to eight weeks after the screening questionnaire was administered participants individually took part in the main experiment, which was introduced as "The Personality Assessment Techniques Study". Five participants did not participate in the main experiment; they had either withdrawn from psychology and were no longer interested, or could not be contacted. On arriving at the laboratory, participants were given the following information: "This study involves a range of tasks, each dealing with a different aspect of personality assessment. The first task is a personality interview, the second task involves you making judgements about other people's personalities, and the third task is a questionnaire. I will take you through each task in turn, and will explain the purpose of each task at the end of today's session".

#### 7.2.3.2.1 Self-presentational behaviour

##### 7.2.3.2.1.1 Cover story and instructions

The interview task was once again introduced by drawing an analogy with a job interview situation (see Chapter 6). This time however, the interview was video-rather than audio-taped, with participants' permission. In addition, the same female experimenter acted as the interviewer for all participants.
As in Study 1, participants were told that the "Personality Triads Test" which would be administered in the interview involved assigning points across the three phrases on each of several stimulus cards, such that the phrase in each triad which best described them received the largest number of points, and the phrase which least applied to them received the lowest number of points. Participants were also asked to elaborate on their point allocations on at least three occasions as they moved through the test. Point allocations and an elaboration were then made on a practice card by the experimenter to clarify the task. Finally, to further encourage self-referencing the experimenter added: "I have selected traits which everyone should have experienced at some time or another, so you should be able to identify instances of the trait in your own behaviour. You may or may not feel that way most of the time, that is irrelevant, just think of the times in the past when you have felt or have acted that way".

Participants were at that stage assigned their trait. Each participant was randomly assigned either "dependent" or "independent", although no participants suspected that only two traits were in fact being assigned (this was confirmed in post-experimental interviews with research participants). Participants were further given a verbal trait description to clarify the meaning of the trait. Following the established tradition, an attempt was made to couch both traits in positive terms. To this end, participants were (verbally) provided with one of the following trait descriptions:

During the interview you are to project the trait [independent / dependent]. You can be most effective in this task if you really get yourself into it – You know, try to think of the different ways in which you are [in]dependent, whether it be financial [in]dependence, emotional [in]dependence, or any other type of [in]dependence you can think of. [Several examples were then given.] These are just examples to help you get in the right frame of mind. You may be able to relate to at least some of them personally. Now, thinking of the ways in which you personally are [in]dependent, or have behaved [in]dependently in the past, try to project this personality trait in the interview.

While the experimenter read out the appropriate trait description, the participant was asked to briefly consider the PTT items and how she might project the assigned trait in the interview. Shortly thereafter a dummy card with the participant's trait written in large letters was placed in front of the participant (but behind the video camera, for consistency with the cover story), to remind the individual that this was the trait that she
should focus on for the entire interview. When the participant was clear as to what was required, she was given a standard choice instruction (see Chapter 6). While a few people admitted to feeling nervous about the camera, no-one declined participation and no-one objected to the interview being video-recorded.

7.2.3.2.1.2 Development of the Personality Triads Test

A new form of the Personality Triads Test was developed for the present experiment (see Appendix B for a full description). The PTT used in Study 2 was constructed by pilot testing phrases from Gergen's (1965) Self-Valuation Triads Test (SVT) to identify whether any items could be classified as representative of dependence or independence. Pilot participants (a separate sample of 33 psychology undergraduates, mean age = 22 years) were presented with phrases from the SVT one at a time and were asked to indicate whether "this item definitely describes an independent person, definitely describes a dependent person, or is ambiguous". The 10 phrases which participants agreed characterised dependent people and the 10 phrases which participants agreed characterised independent people comprised the critical phrases in the PTT.

The PTT thus constructed comprised 20 triads in all. Each triad was presented on a separate index card. Within a given triad, the critical (dependent or independent) phrase was presented in a randomly determined position. The other two phrases comprising each triad were also drawn from Gergen's SVT. If the critical phrase was positive, two positive phrases were assigned to that triad; if the critical phrase was negative, two negative phrases were assigned to the same triad. The independent phrases tended to be positive, while the dependent phrases tended to be negative. This suggests that positivity may be confounded with independence in the present experiment. This problem is acknowledged and will be taken into account when interpreting results, however it was deemed unavoidable in light of the empirical evidence which confirms that the trait dependent is less socially desirable than the trait independent. For instance, Gough and Heilbrun (1983) reported that a female sample (N = 38) assigned the trait dependent a social desirability rating of 3.55 while they assigned the trait independent a social desirability rating of 5.74 on a scale ranging from 1 (very undesirable) to 7 (very desirable).
The experimenter summarised the instructions for the self-presentational interview when filming commenced (see Chapter 6). As the participant made a verbal response (which involved reading out each statement, making point allocations and the occasional elaboration), the experimenter recorded her point allocations on a scoring sheet. Whenever the participant elaborated on her point allocations, the experimenter responded with a neutral "thank you" (cf. Gergen, 1965).

7.2.3.2.2 Social comparison information: Group behaviour

When the interview was completed, participants moved straight on to the second task, which involved viewing a (supposedly spontaneous) videotaped discussion between three men and three women. The video was designed to portray men and women in either a highly stereotypical fashion (the men being independent and assertive while the women were dependent and unassertive), or in a highly counter-normative way (the men as dependent and unassertive while the women were independent and assertive). When the counter-normative tape was created, to ensure that the basic content of the second tape was comparable to the first, with only the sex of the speaker varying systematically, the three initially "independent" male actors simply swapped scripts with the three initially "dependent" female actors. At the start of this exercise, participants were instructed as follows:

In this task I am looking at whether personality traits can be inferred from social interaction. You will be shown an interaction between three men and three women. The people on the tape knew each other reasonably well, but as you may notice, some of them were pretty nervous about the camera. They were urged to discuss various issues as frankly as possible, things like family life, career aspirations etc. At the end of the tape I will ask you to rate the men and the women along a variety of personality trait dimensions.

Each participant was randomly assigned either the normative tape or the counter-normative tape. The videotape was approximately 12 minutes long. Participants were then required to rate the degree to which the three men were perceived to be pleasant, masculine, assertive, intelligent, independent and sensitive. Participants also judged the extent to which they formed a positive impression of the men, and the degree to which they were typical of men in general. Participants then rated the three women on exactly the same dimensions. Men were always rated first to enhance the salience of the intergroup context. Ratings were made on seven-point bipolar scales. On completion of
this task, participants moved on to the self-rating questionnaire, which contained the dependent measures.

7.2.3.2.3 Dependent measures
Dependent measures included 26 bipolar rating scales. Six bipolar scales related to the independence–dependence dimension (assertive, independent, aggressive, individualist, ambitious, leader), six related to the femininity–masculinity dimension (emotional, sympathetic, affectionate, gentle, sensitive, feminine), three related to self-esteem (self-confident, self-assured, self-contented), and the rest were fillers. Two frames of reference were provided for self-description. The personal identity instructions read as follows:

In taking this test, I want you to THINK OF YOURSELF AS AN INDIVIDUAL COMPARED TO OTHER WOMEN. Thinking about yourself in this way, as an individual compared to other women, please indicate by circling the appropriate number how you would describe yourself on the following scales. There are no right or wrong answers, and your answers will be kept strictly confidential, so please try to be completely honest.

The social identity instructions read as follows: “In taking this test, I want you to THINK OF YOURSELF AS A WOMAN AND COMPARE YOURSELF TO MEN. Thinking about yourself in this way, as a woman compared to men…”, and so on.

Dependent measures also included ratings on a trait check list. The adjectives that comprised the trait check list were drawn from four of the ACL's empirically-derived scales (the Autonomy Scale, the Feminine Attributes Scale, the Masculine Attributes Scale, and the Ideal Self Scale), and were randomly pooled to create a 111-item check list. Where the same trait appeared in more than one scale (e.g., "aggressive" appears on both the Autonomy and the Masculinity Scales of the ACL), it was only included once on the check list. The standard instructions normally administered with the ACL (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983) were modified to create the following personal identity condition:

Please read the following words quickly and tick each one you would consider to describe you AS AN INDIVIDUAL COMPARED TO OTHER WOMEN. Do not worry about duplications, contradictions, and so forth. Work quickly and do not spend too much time on any one adjective. Try to
be frank, and check those adjectives which describe you as you really are, compared to men, not as you would like to be.

By contrast, in the social identity condition the instruction was: "Please read the following words quickly and tick each one you would consider to describe you AS A WOMAN COMPARED TO MEN".

All measures pertaining to social identity (i.e., bipolar and trait check list ratings) were completed first, followed by measures pertaining to personal identity. Once all dependent measures had been collected, participants completed a few post-experimental checks, and were probed for any suspicions they may have had during the experiment. They were then thoroughly debriefed on the purpose of each task and thanked for their participation.

7.3 Results

Before analyses were conducted, 10 cases were deleted either because participants appeared confused about the interview task, or because they failed to self-reference during the interview. This last criterion was applied in light of previous research which indicates that self-referencing is important to the carry-over effect from behaviour to subsequent private self-perception (e.g., Jones et al., 1981). The results are therefore based on the reduced sample of 88 cases. Six of the deleted cases had been asked to project dependence in the interview, and four had been asked to project independence. The distribution of the remaining 88 cases across the cells of the experimental design is indicated in Table 7.1.

Before the main findings are presented, the following results will be reported: (a) preliminary checks on the classification system used to designate people to the low or high independence groups, (b) manipulation checks on the effectiveness of self-presentational instructions, and (c) manipulation checks on participants' perceptions of the stimulus videotapes.
Table 7.1
Distribution of participants across cells of the experimental design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORMATIVE GROUP BEHAVIOUR</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTER-NORMATIVE GROUP BEHAVIOUR</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3.1 Classification into low and high independence groups

When classifying participants into low and high independence groups, an attempt was made to incorporate all the information that was available about the perceived relevance of this dimension to the individual. The screening questionnaire contained seven relevant scales (namely, self-ratings on the independence, individualist, and leader scales, plus their associated importance ratings, and scores on the Autonomy Scale of the ACL). These scales were scored so that higher scores represent greater independence or importance, respectively. The inclusion of importance ratings is justified on theoretical grounds. Specifically, previous researchers have suggested that self-conceptions that assume a great deal of importance for the individual are particularly stable or resistant to change (e.g., Markus, 1977). We were therefore interested to ascertain how important the central dimension was to research participants.

Scores on the seven pretest measures were standardised and then subjected to a reliability analysis to determine the degree to which they hang together as a scale. This analysis yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .65, which is considered acceptable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989), and an average inter-item correlation of .21. A median split was performed on mean scores derived from the resultant scale in order to divide participants into Low and High Independents. To confirm that the classification system successfully differentiated low and high scorers, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with personality classification as the between-subjects factor was performed on mean independence scores, averaging across the seven pretest measures. The ANOVA confirmed that those classified as High Independents rated themselves as more
independent ($M = 0.45, SD = 0.37$) than those designated Low Independents ($M = -0.45, SD = 0.31$), $F(1, 86) = 147.93, p < .001$.

Separate one-factor ANOVAs were also performed on initial self-ratings on the independent–dependent, individualist–conformist, and leader–follower scales, and separately on their respective importance ratings (all 11-point scales), and finally, on autonomy scores. As indicated in Table 7.2, High Independents were clearly differentiated from Low Independents on each measure. Those individuals designated relatively low in independence nonetheless rated themselves quite highly on the independent–dependent scale. By contrast, the individualist and leader scales revealed a wider margin between the two groups. Although the central dimension was judged to be quite important by all participants, it was significantly more important to High Independents than Low Independents. In summary, these data confirm that the classification used successfully differentiated Low and High Independents.

| Table 7.2 | Summary of differences between Low (N = 44) and High (N = 44) Independents at pretest |
|-----------|----------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| SCALE | PERSONALITY | Low Indep. | High Indep. | F value |
| Independent-dependent scale | 7.61 (2.21) | 9.34 (1.98) | **14.92*** |
| Individualist-conformist scale | 6.23 (2.23) | 8.30 (1.76) | **23.33*** |
| Leader-follower scale | 6.25 (2.07) | 8.68 (1.44) | **40.87*** |
| Independent*importance | 8.05 (2.21) | 9.93 (1.53) | **21.67*** |
| Individualist*importance | 6.27 (2.87) | 8.32 (2.20) | **14.08*** |
| Leader*importance | 5.64 (2.46) | 7.80 (2.32) | **17.95*** |
| Autonomy | 49.80 (7.29) | 59.50 (9.45) | **29.08*** |

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Low Indep. = Low Independents; High Indep. = High Independents. Scores on the Autonomy Scale of the ACL can range from 0 to 144 (for females). F values are based on 86 df. *p < .001.

Having ascertained that Low and High Independents differed on the dimension of primary interest, analyses were performed to determine whether participants differed on any other dimensions that were measured at pretest. In addition to the independence scales, the screening questionnaire comprised the Feminine Attributes Scale of the ACL, the Masculine Attributes Scale of the ACL, the Ideal Self Scale of the ACL (a measure of self-esteem), and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSE). In summary, these
analyses revealed that (a) Low and High Independents did not differ in terms of femininity, $F(1, 86) < 1$; (b) High Independents were significantly more masculine than Low Independents at pretest, $F(1, 86) = 7.57$, $p < .01$; and (c) High Independents had significantly higher general self-esteem (as measured by the RSE) than Low Independents at pretest, $F(1, 86) = 4.07$, $p < .05$. The finding of a difference for masculine attributes is not surprising since the scale used is designed to "place individuals along a continuum on which higher-scorers will be described as masculine, initiative, forceful etc., by acquaintances and observers, and lower-scorers as less masculine and more dependent and unassuming" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 19), suggesting a close correspondence between masculinity and independence. In addition, the finding of a difference for self-esteem suggests that positivity-negativity co-varies with independence-dependence, which is not surprising since as already mentioned, the trait independent is more socially desirable than the trait dependent.

7.3.2 Manipulation checks

An examination of the key research question (what effect do behaviour and group-level comparisons have on self-perception?) required manipulation of (a) participants' self-presentational behaviour, and (b) the degree to which women as a collective were perceived as independent vis-à-vis men.

7.3.2.1 Self-presentational behaviour

The Personality Triads Test yielded a measure of the degree to which individuals projected the assigned personality trait during the interview. The Triads Test was scored so that the total number of points allocated to dependent phrases was subtracted from the total number of points allocated to independent phrases. Therefore the higher the score, the more independent was one's self-presentation. These data were subjected to a two-way ANOVA with personality and self-presentational behaviour as between-subjects variables. A highly significant main effect emerged for self-presentational behaviour, $F(1, 84) = 522.24$, $p < .001$, indicating that those assigned the trait "independent" projected themselves as significantly more independent ($M = 2.39$, $SD = 0.79$) than those assigned the trait "dependent" ($M = -2.93$, $SD = 1.36$). No other effects emerged. The analysis of triads data thus suggests that experimental instructions were successful in eliciting dependent or independent self-portrayal, as requested, from participants.
An independent rater's judgements of each participant's interview performance was a second source of confirmation of the success of the role-playing instructions. The interviews were video-recorded (with participants' permission) for this purpose. The rater was a 36 year old female graduate who was blind to the experimental condition of the participant and the purpose of the study. Ratings were analysed by means of a two-way ANOVA\(^1\) with personality and self-presentational behaviour as between-subjects factors (although the rater was not aware that participants had been classified). Once again, those assigned the trait "independent" projected themselves as more independent (\(M = 6.20, SD = 0.58\)) than those assigned the trait "dependent" (\(M = 1.54, SD = 0.74\)), \(F(1, 83) = 1068.06, p < .001\). No main or interaction effects emerged for the rater's confidence in this judgement (\(M = 6.07, SD = 0.82\)). A main effect for self-presentational behaviour emerged for the degree to which the self-portrayal appeared to be a reflection of the "true" self, \(F(1, 83) = 5.55, p < .05\); specifically, the performance of those projecting dependence was less convincing (\(M = 3.41, SD = 1.45\)) than the performance of those projecting independence (\(M = 4.15, SD = 1.48\)). In contrast, no effects emerged for the degree of self-referencing (\(M = 4.82, SD = 1.07\)), or for the number of elaborations made (\(M = 4.23, SD = 1.80\)), or for the extent of elaboration (\(M = 3.34, SD = 1.21\)). The positivity of each self-presentation was also assessed in order to ascertain whether positivity was (inadvertently) manipulated along with independence–dependence in the self-presentation phase of the experiment; in so far as the self-presentation also varied systematically along this dimension, we might expect effects for self-esteem as well as independence. No effects emerged for the positivity of the impression formed (\(M = 4.91, SD = 1.02\)). Finally, it was established that the behavioural episode lasted 9.79 minutes on average (\(SD = 2.08\)); this did not vary as a function of experimental condition.

7.3.2.2 Social comparison information: Group behaviour

The group behaviour manipulation was designed to vary the extent to which women were perceived as independent relative to men. In one condition, the social categorical information presented was normatively fitting with regard to each stimulus group; in the other condition, the social categorical information was counter-normative. To achieve a manipulation of social categorical information, all three women (men) were presented as

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\(^1\) One interview was not successfully recorded on tape, accounting for the reduced degrees of freedom.
independent or dependent, depending on the condition, thus keeping the meta-contrast sufficiently high to preclude individuated perception of the stimulus groups (Oakes et al., 1991). In addition, the men were always rated before the women, again heightening the salience of the intergroup comparison.

Several analyses were performed to examine the degree to which the desired outcome was achieved. First, participants' ratings of the degree to which stimulus groups were perceived as independent were entered into a four-way ANOVA with personality, self-presentational behaviour, and group behaviour (normative versus counter-normative) as between-subjects factors, and sex of target group as a within-subjects factor. A significant interaction emerged between group behaviour and sex of stimulus group, $F(1, 80) = 196.61, p < .001$. The relevant means are presented in Table 7.3. As intended, in the normative condition (dependent women, independent men), the female actors were perceived as dependent vis-à-vis the male actors; in the counter-normative condition (independent women, dependent men), the female actors were perceived as independent vis-à-vis their male counterparts.

Table 7.3
Two-way interaction for ratings of perceived independence of stimulus groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>SEX OF STIMULUS GROUP</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>2.98 (1.22)</td>
<td>5.61 (1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-normative</td>
<td>5.62 (1.10)</td>
<td>3.07 (1.24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

For ratings of assertiveness, the main effect for sex of stimulus group was significant, $F(1, 80) = 4.59, p < .05$ (males: $M = 4.55, SD = 1.86$; females: $M = 4.15, SD = 1.99$). Moreover a highly significant interaction emerged between group behaviour and sex of stimulus group, $F(1, 80) = 293.58, p < .001$. This interaction is presented in Table 7.4. As expected, the pattern of means is similar to that obtained for ratings of independence. It appears, therefore, that the stimulus tapes were successful in depicting the women as dependent and unassertive and the men as independent and assertive in the normative condition, and vice versa in the counter-normative condition.
### Table 7.4
Two-way interaction for ratings of perceived assertiveness of stimulus groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>SEX OF STIMULUS GROUP</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>2.59 (1.22)</td>
<td>6.00 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-normative</td>
<td>5.86 (1.03)</td>
<td>2.95 (1.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Ratings on scales of masculinity–femininity, sensitive–insensitive, and perceived typicality of the stimulus ingroup and outgroup others, as well as ratings of the positivity of one's overall impression of each group, were also analysed. In brief, the dependent women were perceived as less masculine and as more sensitive than the independent women, while independent men were perceived as more masculine and as less sensitive than the dependent men. Both groups of women were rated equally favourably, however the dependent men were rated more positively than the independent men. On ratings of typicality, independent men emerged as more typical than dependent men; by contrast, both groups of women were rated as equally typical of women in general. The perception of relative heterogeneity within the ingroup may reflect the fact that typicality judgements were elicited for each stimulus group separately (that is, female participants first rated the three men on this scale, and then repeated the exercise for the three women); hence, in rating the ingroup, intragroup differentiation was by no means precluded.

### 7.3.3 Major analyses

The two primary dimensions of interest in the present study are self-perceived independence (which is directly relevant to the self-presentational behaviour manipulation) and self-perceived femininity (which is directly relevant to social identity for this all-female sample). In addition, analyses are also presented for dimensions of secondary interest (self-perceived masculinity and self-esteem). Self-ratings were analysed by means of four-way repeated-measures ANOVA\(^2\) with level of self-rating (personal or social) as the within-subjects factors, and personality, self-presentational behaviour, and group behaviour as between-subjects factors. In each case, before

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\(^2\) The data can also be analysed by entering relevant pretest ratings as covariates in the analysis of variance. The main conclusions remain the same irrespective of the analysis used. In the interests of brevity, only the ANOVAs will be reported here.
preselected scale items were averaged and entered into the four-way ANOVA, a reliability analysis was conducted to ensure that the items which were to enter into a total score for a stated attribute were interrelated (Wylie, 1974).

7.3.3.1 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-perceived independence

The post-test questionnaire comprised six items related to independence. The correlation between post-test independence scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions, respectively, was .82. Reliability analyses of the six independence items revealed satisfactory Cronbach's alpha of .82 and .79 for personal and social self-ratings, respectively, and mean inter-item correlations of .43 and .38, respectively. Responses were averaged to yield a mean independence rating for each self-rating condition (personal and social identity).

Cell means for the overall design are presented in Table 7.5. As can be seen from this table, there is a general tendency for independent behaviour to produce a shift towards higher self-perceived independence; this emerges for both personal and social self-ratings. In addition personal self-ratings are consistently higher than social self-ratings, and High Independents tend to rate themselves as more independent than Low Independents. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that independent behaviour tends to produce a larger shift in Low than High Independents in the normative group behaviour conditions, but a larger shift in High than Low Independents in the counter-normative group behaviour conditions. The observation that the same pattern emerges at the level of personal and social self-ratings suggests that participants may be focusing on the intragroup aspect (rather than the intergroup aspect) of the social comparative context provided by the stimulus tape.

A four-way ANOVA conducted on mean self-perceived independence revealed significant main effects for personality, $F(1, 80) = 23.31$, $p < .001$, self-presentational behaviour, $F(1, 80) = 5.18$, $p < .05$, and the repeated-measures factor, $F(1, 80) = 59.06$, $p < .001$. Participants classified as High Independents rated themselves as more independent ($M = 8.12$, $SD = 1.26$) than participants classified as Low Independents ($M = 6.90$, $SD = 1.16$). In addition, those individuals who behaved independently rated themselves as more independent ($M = 7.81$, $SD = 1.19$) than those who presented
themselves dependently ($M = 7.15$, $SD = 1.45$). In addition, self-perceived independence was higher when participants rated themselves as individuals in contrast to other women ($M = 7.86$, $SD = 1.48$) rather than as women in contrast to men ($M = 7.15$, $SD = 1.35$). The interaction between personality and level of self-rating was not quite significant, $F(1, 80) = 3.83$, $p = .054$. The means relevant to this marginal interaction are presented in Table 7.6. The main effects for level of self-categorization and personality are apparent in this table. In addition, High Independents rated themselves as particularly high in personal independence vis-à-vis the Low Independents. No other interaction effects even approached statistical significance; hence, contrary to expectations, group behaviour appeared to have no effect on self-perceived independence.

Table 7.5
Cell means for self-perceived independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERSONAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th>SOCIAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent behaviour</td>
<td>Independent behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORMATIVE GB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>6.75 (1.75)</td>
<td>7.68 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>8.82 (1.56)</td>
<td>8.98 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTER-N GB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>6.99 (1.13)</td>
<td>7.15 (0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>7.80 (1.23)</td>
<td>8.47 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Normative GB = Normative group behaviour; COUNTER-N GB = Counter-normative group behaviour.

Table 7.6
Mean independence ratings as a function of personality and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LEVEL OF SELF-RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONALITY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>7.16 (1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>8.56 (1.32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
7.3.3.2 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-perceived femininity

Post-test femininity scores were derived from the six relevant bipolar scales. The correlation between femininity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .70. Reliability analyses revealed Cronbach’s alphas of .79 and .76, and average inter-item correlations of .39 and .36, for personal and social identity ratings, respectively, indicating that the six items did form homogeneous scales.

A four-way ANOVA performed on mean femininity scores revealed a significant main effect for level of self-rating, $F(1, 80) = 104.11$, $p < .001$. Participants described themselves as more feminine when responding in terms of social identity ($M = 8.43, SD = 1.05$) rather than personal identity ($M = 7.41, SD = 1.36$). The interaction between personality and self-presentational behaviour approached significance, $F(1, 80) = 3.74$, $p = .057$. The means relevant to this marginal interaction are presented in Table 7.7. As can be seen, independent self-presentation tended to reduce self-perceived femininity, particularly for the Low Independents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONALITY</th>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>8.48 (1.16)</td>
<td>7.43 (1.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>8.38 (0.96)</td>
<td>7.39 (1.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Moreover, a significant three-way interaction emerged between self-presentational behaviour, group behaviour, and level of self-rating, $F(1, 80) = 6.45$, $p < .05$. Table 7.8 presents the relevant means. As can be seen from Table 7.8, a cross-over effect emerged for personal self-ratings; it seems that behaving similarly to the ingroup and differently to the outgroup leads individuals to view themselves more as women. A different pattern emerged at the level of social self-ratings. Here, independent behaviour tended to produce lower self-perceived femininity. Social femininity likewise tended to be lower following exposure to counter-normative rather than normative group behaviour. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that social femininity was maximised when both
the participant and her group behaved dependently \( (M = 8.73) \) and minimised when both the participant and her group behaved independently \( (M = 8.17) \).

Table 7.8
Mean femininity ratings as a function of own behaviour, group behaviour and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th>SOCIAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP BEHAVIOUR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>7.84 (1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-normative</td>
<td>7.07 (1.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Two pairwise contrasts were performed firstly on personal self-ratings, and secondly on social self-ratings, in each case comparing the effect of dependent and independent behaviour on self-perceived femininity. At the personal level, independent behaviour in the context of normative social comparison information (i.e., a dependent ingroup and independent outgroup) significantly reduced femininity, while independent behaviour in the context of counter-normative social comparison information (i.e., an independent ingroup and dependent outgroup) significantly enhanced femininity; \( t(80) = 3.07 \) and \( 2.54 \), respectively, \( p < .05 \) (with Sidak). At the social level, the apparent shifts toward lower femininity following independent behaviour were not statistically significant.

7.3.3.3 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-perceived masculinity

Post-test masculinity scores were derived from the Masculine Attributes Scale which was presented in the form of a short trait check list. The correlation between mean masculinity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .75. The pattern of change on masculinity measures mirrored the pattern observed on independence measures. That is, the four-way ANOVA again revealed significant main effects for personality, \( F(1, 80) = 12.02, p < .001 \), and level of self-rating, \( F(1, 80) = 24.49, p < .001 \), and a marginal effect for self-presentational behaviour, \( F(1, 80) = 3.94, p = .051 \). High Independents scored significantly higher on the masculinity scale \( (M = 8.78, SD = 3.69) \) than Low Independents \( (M = 6.16, SD = 3.47) \). In addition,
masculinity scores were significantly higher when participants described themselves as individuals in contrast to other women ($M = 8.24$, $SD = 4.21$) rather than as women in contrast to men ($M = 6.70$, $SD = 3.91$). Finally, the marginal main effect for behaviour indicated that those who presented themselves as independent in the interview scored slightly higher on masculinity ($M = 8.26$, $SD = 4.06$) than those who presented themselves as dependent ($M = 6.57$, $SD = 3.31$). As with the analysis of independence, there were no main or interaction effects involving group behaviour.

7.3.3.4 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-esteem

Post-test self-esteem levels were measured using the three bipolar ratings. The correlation between mean self-esteem scores as indexed by the bipolar ratings obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .85. Reliability analyses revealed Cronbach's alphas of .87 and .86, and average inter-item correlations of .69 and .68, for personal and social identity ratings, respectively, indicating that the three items did form a homogeneous scale.

The four-way ANOVA revealed a main effect for level of self-rating, $F(1, 80) = 17.28$, $p < .001$, indicating that participants had higher self-esteem when rating themselves as individuals ($M = 6.97$, $SD = 2.20$) rather than as women ($M = 6.45$, $SD = 2.11$). The main effect for personality was also statistically significant, $F(1, 80) = 5.08$, $p < .05$, indicating that High Independents had higher self-esteem ($M = 7.19$, $SD = 1.87$) than Low Independents ($M = 6.22$, $SD = 2.17$). In addition, the ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction between personality, self-presentational behaviour, and level of self-rating, $F(1, 80) = 5.05$, $p < .05$. The relevant means are presented in Table 7.9. Table 7.9 reveals that the main effects for level of self-rating and for personality were not qualified by the three-way interaction. In addition, independent behaviour tended to enhance self-esteem.

For personal self-esteem, acting independently significantly increased the esteem of Low Independents, $t(80) = 5.79$, $p < .01$ (with Sidak), but not that of High Independents. For social self-esteem, acting independently significantly increased the esteem of both groups, but once again this was particularly true for Low Independents; Low Independents: $t(80) = 3.87$, $p < .01$; High Independents: $t(80) = 2.73$, $p < .05$ (with Sidak).
Table 7.9
Self-esteem as a function of personality, own behaviour and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th>SOCIAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent behaviour</td>
<td>Independent behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>5.67 (2.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>7.51 (2.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

7.3.3.5 Post-experimental measures

When participants' ratings of how difficult they found the self-presentation were subjected to a three-way ANOVA, a significant interaction emerged between personality and group behaviour, $F(1, 80) = 8.57, p < .01$. The relevant means are presented in Table 7.10. Low Independents reported greater task difficulty after viewing counter-normative group behaviour, $t(80) = 2.73, p < .05$ (with Sidak). Low Independents also reported slightly greater task difficulty after viewing counter-normative group behaviour than did High Independents, $t(80) = 2.33, p < .1$ (with Sidak).

Table 7.10
Task difficulty ratings as a function of personality and group behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>PERSONALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counter-normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>3.59 (1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>4.29 (1.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Participants' perceptions of choice regarding the trait they had to emphasise in the interview were also assessed, as well as their perceptions of how much choice they had with regard to proceeding with the self-presentation. When participants' ratings of perceived choice over the type of trait they had to emphasise were subjected to a three-way ANOVA, no effects emerged. Traits had been assigned by the experimenter, hence participants correctly reported that they had little or no choice over the type of trait they projected during the interview ($M = 2.48, SD = 1.70$). Similarly, when participants were asked how much choice they felt they had over whether or not they participated in...
the interview, no significant effects emerged. On average, participants reported having choice as to whether they participated (M = 6.40, SD = 1.05).

Post-experimental checks also included a question concerning the participant’s perception of the degree to which her self-presentation reflected her "true" self. A three-way ANOVA on true self ratings revealed a significant main effect for self-presentational behaviour, \( F(1, 80) = 7.18, p < .01 \). Those who had presented themselves as independent reported that their self-presentation more closely represented their true self (M = 4.60, SD = 1.31) than those who had presented themselves as dependent (M = 3.63, SD = 1.74).

Finally, ratings of interest in the study yielded a two-way interaction between personality and behaviour, \( F(1, 80) = 6.60, p < .05 \). As revealed in Table 7.11, participants were more interested in the study if they were asked to behave in a self-inconsistent (rather than self-consistent) way. This somewhat banal finding is nevertheless relevant; briefly, it is consistent with the assumption that experimental situations which potentially challenge long-term knowledge structures pertaining to the self are particularly likely to pique the interest of research participants, and to engage them in a sense-making process.

Table 7.11
Mean interest levels as a function of personality and own behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONALITY</th>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Independents</td>
<td>5.41 (1.30)</td>
<td>5.86 (0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Independents</td>
<td>6.05 (0.62)</td>
<td>5.24 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

7.4 Discussion

We know from the literature reviewed in Chapter 4 that behaviour can bring about a corresponding shift in the self. Self-enhancing behaviour has been shown to increase self-esteem (Gergen, 1965; Kowalski & Leary, 1990, Experiment 1; Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Upshaw & Yates, 1968). Besides self-esteem, carry-over effects from behaviour to subsequent self-appraisals have been demonstrated for behavioural domains as diverse as emotionality (Tice, 1992, Study 1), extroversion
(Fazio et al., 1981; Tice, 1992, Study 2), sociability (McKillop et al., 1992; Schlenker et al., 1994, Experiments 1 and 2), and independence (Schlenker et al., 1994, Experiment 3; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). On the basis of past research, therefore, we might expect that on behaving independently or dependently, one should likewise experience a corresponding shift in the phenomenal self. One commonly held view is that self-concept change is due to the assimilation of self-discrepant behaviour (Tice, 1994). Instead of asking about the role played by self-discrepant behaviour in the self change process, we suggested that a more pertinent question might be “what is the process by which behaviour comes to be imbued with social meaning?” For self-categorization theorists, the question then becomes even more specific; namely, when will I interpret my behaviour as relevant to individual as opposed to group aspects of the self-concept? That is, when will a discrete unit of behaviour say something about self as a unique individual, and when will it say something about self as a group member? In order for behaviour to inform the perceiver about personal or social identity, it follows from self-categorization theory that information about the ingroup's behaviour is likely to be utilised, at some level; the question is, how?

In posing these questions we have assumed firstly, that behaviour is an important part of what has to be represented in a self-category, and secondly that, like the self, behaviour gains meaning only when it is contextualised. It is likely that on projecting a personality characteristic in the interview (which is quite an odd task), participants will reflect on their behaviour and will want to make sense of it. The stimulus tape that followed the interview experience provided an opportunity for comparison and categorization. At the very least, it provided our female participants with an intragroup and an intergroup context against which they could anchor their subsequent self-appraisals. Does the evidence support the general hypothesis that self-categorization and social comparison processes mediate the effect of self-presentational behaviour? More specifically, did any meaningful interactions emerge between one's own behaviour, group behaviour, and level of self-rating?

Before we review the main findings, it is worth reiterating key aspects of the procedure. On the basis of our pretest measures we knew that we had a group of Low and a group of High Independents in this sample. We knew they also differed on masculine attributes, and global self-esteem, but did not differ on femininity. We subjected these
participants to a manipulation of their own self-presentational behaviour, followed by a manipulation of the behaviour of the ingroup in contrast to the outgroup. Our manipulation checks confirmed that participants did project the assigned trait, and further that the stimulus tapes were perceived in the intended way. What were the major findings for the dimensions of primary interest (independence and femininity), and for dimensions of secondary interest (masculinity and self-esteem)?

For the independence domain, we found that post-test self-ratings did vary with three of the major independent variables (personality, self-presentational behaviour and level of self-rating), however there was no evidence of an interaction between any of these variables. First, the main effect for personality indicated that High Independents reported higher self-perceived independence at the end of the experiment than Low Independents. This observation suggests a degree of stability in individual's ratings of self-perceived independence from pre- to post-test. Secondly, the effect for self-presentational behaviour was consistent with past research (e.g., Jones et al., 1981); that is, there was a straightforward carry-over effect from public behaviour to private self-conception. Thus, independent behaviour consistently produced a shift towards greater self-perceived independence. Thirdly, the main effect for level of self-rating indicated that participants described themselves as more independent when thinking of themselves in terms of their personal identities as individuals rather than their social identities as women. This observation is consistent with self-categorization theory, which predicts that self-ratings made under social identity instructions should be closer to the ingroup-stereotype than self-ratings made under personal identity instructions. Unexpectedly however, there was no evidence to suggest that social comparison information significantly modified the effect of one's own independent or dependent behaviour on subsequent, directly relevant self-appraisals.

There are a number of possible explanations for the absence of a mediating effect of social comparison information on self-perceived independence. The most obvious one (drawing on what we learned from Study 1, Chapter 6), relates to the fact that self-presentational behaviour was clearly elicited in, and therefore probably also interpreted in, what was an interpersonal setting. This can be presumed because (a) interview instructions stated "think of the ways in which you are personally [in]dependent", (b) participants role-played individually, (c) the interview experience involved dyadic
interaction between a female interviewer and a female interviewee, and (d) no reference to group membership was made at this early stage of the procedure. Assuming therefore that an interpersonal context was salient at the time of self-presentation, a straightforward carry-over effect from behaviour may not be surprising; independent behaviour leads one to feel more independent (than implicitly relevant comparison others). Not only were participants presenting themselves as “individuals”, in a fairly abstract context; in addition, the specific intergroup and intragroup context that might have affected the interpretation of their own behaviour came after the behavioural episode. The absence of an effect for social comparison information implies that self-attributions occur prior to or at the same time as self-presentation (D. J. Bem, 1972). Consistent with this interpretation, Jones et al. (1981) reported that only preceding comparison information had an effect on subsequent self-appraisals. Thus, the sequence of events may have been a critical factor. It may well be that if social comparison information is to have an effect, it needs to be provided prior to one's own behaviour, thus serving to contextualise subsequent self-presentation.

Another feature of the study, which may have contributed to the absence of an effect for social comparison information on self-perceived independence, is that the context of self-presentation was very different from the context of others' self-presentation. Hence the relevance of the stimulus tape may not have been apparent to participants. Depending on the experimental condition, independence or dependence was deliberately scripted into the dialogue of stimulus ingroups, such that where the ingroup was dependent the outgroup was independent, and vice versa. However the questions that these comparison others were discussing were very different to the items considered by the interviewee in making her point allocations on the Personality Triads Test. Consequently, the social comparative context provided by the stimulus groups may not have been the “obvious” context against which to judge one's own self-perceived independence. In line with this explanation, it is worth remembering that in the Jones et al. (1981) study on which the present experiment was based, the investigators maintained a clear link between the context of one's self-presentation and the context of others' behaviour, thus heightening awareness of the relevance of the social comparison information to one's own interview experience (specifically, the stimulus others were discussing the same items that the participant was administered in the interview situation).
In contrast, it appears that the social comparative context provided by the stimulus tapes did affect self-judgements that were indirectly relevant to the behavioural role. In particular, the results obtained on self-perceived femininity yielded better support for the hypothesis that self-categorization and social comparison processes qualify the effect of self-presentation on self-conception. The reader will recall that this is a trait on which Low and High Independents did not initially differ. Interestingly, a marginal interaction emerged between self-presentational behaviour and level of self-rating ($p = .057$). The pattern of means suggested that independent self-presentational behaviour produced lower ratings of self-perceived femininity, especially for Low Independents. Once again, this is tentative support for the idea that the effects of self-presentation may generalise to related self-attributes (see Chapter 6); in this case independent behaviour (which is positively related to masculinity but negatively related to femininity) has produced a negative shift in self-perceived femininity.

Moreover, a meaningful three-way interaction was also obtained for femininity. Femininity ratings depended on the effect of three variables: one's own behaviour, the behaviour of ingroup and outgroup members, and level of self-rating. The interaction did not qualify the main effect for level of self-rating; thus social femininity ratings were consistently higher than personal femininity ratings. Moreover the interaction revealed a different pattern at the level of personal and social self-ratings. Personal femininity depended on intragroup similarity and intergroup difference, while social femininity depended on the stereotypicality of one's own behaviour and that of the ingroup and outgroup. More specifically, at the level of personal self-ratings, acting independently tended to decrease personal femininity, except when one made personal comparisons with other independent females. Thus the same behaviour produced different effects depending on the position of social comparison others. Intragroup similarity appeared to heighten the salience of the higher-order category that makes intragroup differentiation possible, yielding higher self-perceived femininity. That the social comparison information affected gender identity salience was also apparent at the level of social self-ratings. Independent behaviour tended to diminish social femininity relative to dependent behaviour, and counter-normative group behaviour tended to diminish social femininity relative to normative group behaviour. In fact, social femininity was maximised when the perceiver and her ingroup behaved dependently while the outgroup behaved independently, or in theoretical terms, under conditions of
high comparative and high normative fit at the intergroup level. Conversely, social femininity was minimised when both the perceiver and her ingroup behaved independently while the outgroup behaved dependently; in other words, high comparative fit but low normative fit at the intergroup level works against social identity salience, producing less self-stereotyping on ingroup-defining traits. These features of the results are consistent with self-categorization theory principles.

In summary, with regard to personal femininity, a self-ingroup match (and self-outgroup mismatch) in either the normative or counter-normative direction enhanced self-stereotyping relative to a self-ingroup mismatch. It appears to be the case that having a trait in common with the ingroup (whether it is dependent or independent) leads you to apply other group-relevant traits (such as "feminine") to the personal self. Social femininity, on the other hand, tended to be higher following normative rather than counter-normative self-presentational behaviour, and following normative rather than counter-normative group behaviour. In short, the results obtained for the femininity dimension indicate that group behaviour did interact, in a meaningful way, with one's own behaviour to affect subsequent self-perception. They lend support to the general hypothesis that self-categorization and social comparison processes mediate the effect of behaviour.

Interestingly, in the present study the results obtained for self-perceived masculinity mirrored those obtained for self-perceived independence. This observation clearly supports the idea that there is a conceptual overlap between the domains of independence and masculinity (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). Moreover, it once again raises the possibility that the carry-over effect from behaviour need not be limited to the self-presentation dimension; it may spread to affect other closely related aspects of identity. Very few studies have considered this possibility (e.g., Schlenker et al., 1994; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). Schlenker and Trudeau (1990) included trait ratings for dimensions other than the central one (independence) in their research to examine whether the effects of the self-presentation generalised to other self-aspects. However, they tested the generalisability of independent self-presentation using unrelated traits (e.g., practical, self-knowledgeable, responsible, competent, consistent). Self-concept change was found to be limited to the focal personality attribute, with one exception; specifically, minor changes were detected on self-esteem ($p < .07$), which is arguably
related to independence. That is, independent self-presentation tended to enhance self-esteem and dependent self-presentation tended to attenuate self-esteem, however these effects were not statistically significant. Schlenker and Trudeau's findings are consistent with our observation of a marginal self-presentation main effect for self-perceived masculinity. The marginal main effect for behaviour indicated that those who presented themselves as independent in the interview rated themselves as more masculine than those who presented themselves as dependent ($p = .051$). The possibility that generalisation from self-presentation to conceptually related self-aspects may occur is important from the point of view that currently little is known about the interconnections among conceptually related domains of self-knowledge (see Chapter 3).

In relation to this issue, it is interesting to note that consistently high correlations emerged between personal self-ratings and social self-ratings in the present study ($0.70 < r > 0.85$). These consistently high correlations may indicate that individual and group self-aspects are interconnected and hence share similar content. The view that the collective self is a precursor to the personal self is clearly consistent with the idea of an interconnection or correlation between personal and social identity. It is likely that we infer the characteristics of the ingroup from our personal characteristics, and our personal characteristics from our characteristics of the ingroup; this may account for the high correlations between personal and social identity. On the other hand, the possibility that these high correlations may simply indicate that participants cannot differentiate between the personal and the collective self to the degree that is required by the self-report measures used in the present research, also needs to be acknowledged here. If this were correct, however, we might suppose that experimental participants would report confusion or difficulty with these measures. There was no evidence to support this view; extensive post-experimental interviews established that all instructions and materials were clear to experimental participants. Moreover, it is important to note that where different effects emerge at the level of personal and social self-ratings in the present study, they are theoretically meaningful effects.

Interestingly, personal and social self-esteem were particularly highly correlated in the present study ($r = .85$). Nevertheless, self-esteem was found to vary as a function of level of self-rating, such that female participants had higher personal than social or
collective self-esteem. In addition High Independents had higher self-esteem than Low Independents. Moreover, an interaction emerged between personality, self-presentational behaviour, and level of self-rating. The interaction did not qualify the two main effects. It did however reveal that for personal self-esteem, acting independently increased the esteem of Low Independents but not that of High Independents. Thus it appears that depending on the level of self-rating, independent behaviour may not confer higher self-esteem; in the present study it did not increase the personal self-esteem of individuals who already happened to have high self-esteem. For social self-esteem, acting independently increased the esteem of both groups, but once again this was particularly true for Low Independents.

To summarise the key findings of Study 2, independent behaviour produced a shift towards higher self-perceived independence. Unexpectedly however, social comparisons with ingroup and outgroup behaviour did not mediate the impact of one’s own behaviour on self-perceived independence. The fact that participants dismissed the social comparison information suggests that they had already interpreted their self-presentational behaviour prior to receiving it, or in other words, that the social comparison information came too late to have an impact. It did however affect self-judgements that were directly related to the focal group identity and indirectly related to the behavioural role. Importantly, self-perceived femininity varied meaningfully as a function of one’s own behaviour, group behaviour and level of self-rating. In judging one’s own personal femininity, what mattered was behavioural similarity to the ingroup (irrespective of whether the participant and her group both behaved dependently or independently); in judging social femininity what mattered was normative fit at the level of own behaviour and group behaviour since fit is essential to social identity salience; thus participants who behaved dependently, or who viewed normative group behaviour, tended to report higher social femininity. Independent behaviour clearly had different effects as a function of self-categorization and social comparison processes. Finally for self-esteem, the effect of behaviour was mediated by level of self-categorization and personality. Independent behaviour appeared to have more of an impact on Low than High Independents; presumably Low Independents had more “room to move” on this variable.
In the next study, our priority was to try to determine the exact role being played by the social comparison information. For instance, one limitation of the present study is that in presenting social comparison information about both the ingroup and the outgroup, simultaneously, one cannot discern whether it is the position of the ingroup, the position of the outgroup, or both, that underlies any observed main or interaction effects involving the variable "group behaviour". Thus, the observed three-way interaction for self-perceived femininity, although encouraging, has a degree of ambiguity associated with it. In the next study we tried to establish whether it was the ingroup or the outgroup that was responsible for the different effects observed at the level of personal and social self-ratings. Is having information only about the outgroup sufficient to produce self-stereotyping? Or is it more important to be clear about the position of the ingroup? In Study 3, we controlled the amount of information given, by providing information about the ingroup's position on the central dimension (independence) or information about the outgroup's position on the central dimension, but not both. We thus achieved tighter control over the type of social comparative context created by the stimulus tape. For half of our participants it was an intragroup context; for the other half it was an intergroup context. Equally importantly, we provided the social comparison information immediately prior to the elicitation of self-presentational behaviour, thus enabling a test of the hypothesis that a different sequence of events may have produced the expected interaction between one's own behaviour and others' behaviour for self-perceived independence.
Chapter 8

How do self-categorization and social comparison affect the impact of self-presentation on self-perception: Study 3

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to further examine how social comparison information affects the interpretation of one's own behaviour. The present study retains the focus on the general hypothesis that self-categorization and social comparison processes will mediate the effect of behaviour. As in Study 2, self-presentational behaviour was elicited along the independence-dependence dimension. Personal and social self-ratings of independence and self-description on social identity-relevant traits again served as the dependent measures of primary interest. In contrast to the previous experiment, both males and females participated in the present study. In addition, the sequence of events was different, as was the nature of the social comparison information. This time, social comparison information (in the form of a stimulus videotape) was presented prior to one's own self-presentation, in order to create a background against which the perceiver could interpret his or her own dependent or independent behaviour. In an attempt to encourage this process, we tried to link the stimulus tape to the subsequent self-presentation through the cover story. We also re-instated the context of the stimulus tape immediately prior to collecting dependent measures, again in an effort to encourage participants to consider their own behaviour in the context of others' behaviour.

In order to examine more closely how information about the ingroup, as opposed to information about the outgroup, is being used, we created new stimulus tapes which did not feature both men and women, but rather, just a group of men or a group of women. Participants were thus presented with a stimulus tape featuring either (a) a group of three dependent men, (b) a group of three independent men, (c) a group of three dependent women, or (d) a group of three independent women. Half of the participants thus received normative social comparison information about the ingroup or the outgroup, while the other half received counter-normative information about the ingroup or the outgroup.
How might information about the ingroup or the outgroup's position on the independence dimension be utilised by the perceiver? Drawing on self-categorization theory principles, we would expect comparisons with the ingroup to give the behaviour significance for personal identity, while comparisons with the outgroup should give the behaviour significance for social identity. Put simply, ingroup comparisons should be most relevant to personal self-ratings, and outgroup comparisons should be most relevant to social self-ratings. Furthermore, at the level of personal self-ratings, acting independently should lead one to rate oneself as personally independent compared to the ingroup; this should be particularly true if the ingroup is dependent. In addition, this pattern should hold for both males and females. At the level of social self-ratings, acting independently may likewise lead one to rate oneself as socially independent compared to the outgroup, particularly when the outgroup is dependent. An important caveat applies here though; specifically, the extent to which independent behaviour contrasted against a dependent outgroup will enhance social or collective independence will depend on normative fit. Thus male participants who view a dependent outgroup and then behave independently, should feel more independent at the level of social self-ratings. In this case both own behaviour and outgroup behaviour are normatively fitting in terms of the accessible social categories; this should work for the salience of group identity. On the other hand, the same combination of factors may not confer higher collective independence in females; that is, female participants who view a dependent outgroup and then behave independently themselves are less likely than their male counterparts to rate themselves as independent at the level of social self-ratings. In this case behaviour violates participants' expectations about the normative fit of the accessible social categories; this presumably makes it difficult for females to interpret their behaviour as an expression of social identity. For these reasons we would expect that the variable (normative versus counter-normative) "stimulus group behaviour" will have its effect mainly in the outgroup (rather than the ingroup) conditions, and mainly at the level of social (rather than personal) self-ratings; and further, that the impact of independent behaviour will be similar for males and females in the ingroup conditions, but different in the outgroup conditions. These were our general expectations for how information about the ingroup and the outgroup may affect post-test self-ratings. The hypothesis that the effect of behaviour is mediated by level of self-categorization and social comparison would therefore be supported by the emergence of a four-way interaction between self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, stimulus group
behaviour and level of self-rating, with different patterns emerging at the level of personal and social self-ratings.

8.2 Method
8.2.1 Participants
The sample comprised 61 male and 89 female first year psychology undergraduates with a mean age of 20.54 years ($SD = 3.37$). Participants were drawn from two comparable tertiary institutions in Canberra (the Australian National University and the University of Canberra). All participants received course credit for their participation in the study.

8.2.2 Design
The design was a 2 (sex of participant: male, female) x 2 (self-presentational behaviour: dependent, independent) x 2 (stimulus group: ingroup, outgroup) x 2 (stimulus group behaviour: dependent, independent) x 2 (level of self-rating: personal identity, social identity) x 2 (order of self-ratings: personal self-ratings first, personal self-ratings second) factorial. Stimulus group referred to the gender of the people featured on the stimulus tape, the “ingroup” being the same gender as the participant and the “outgroup” being the opposite gender to the participant. All variables were between-subjects factors except for level of self-rating, which was a repeated-measures factor.

8.2.3 Materials and procedure
On arriving at the laboratory, participants were told that "broadly speaking the study looks at how we perceive other people and how we perceive ourselves". We thus attempted to move away from the previous emphasis on "personality assessment" in the cover story (cf. Chapter 6 and 7). Participants were also told that the study involved watching a video, participating in a short interview, and filling in a questionnaire for a colleague of the principal investigator. The latter instruction was included in order to disguise the link between the behavioural episode and post-test measures (Jones et al., 1981).

8.2.3.1 Social comparison information: Group behaviour
Instructions used previously to introduce the stimulus videotape were modified slightly in the present study to remove the focus from "personality" (cf. Chapter 6):
In this first task I am looking at how we form impressions of groups. You will be shown a video, which features a group of men (women). The people on this tape knew each other reasonably well. They were given a set of questions to discuss, and were urged to discuss the various issues as frankly as possible, things like family life, career aspirations etc. At the end of the tape you will be asked a number of questions about this group.

On viewing the video, participants completed a rating sheet which required them to rate the three men or women according to how pleasant, masculine, assertive, intelligent, independent, and sensitive they were. Participants also indicated how positive their overall impression was, how typical they thought the three men / women were of men / women in general, the extent to which the three people were similar, and finally, how difficult it was for them to form an impression of the group on the basis of the short interaction depicted on the tape.

8.2.3.2 Self-presentational behaviour

In introducing the interview, an attempt was made to link it to the preceding task: "In the last task you were asked to form an impression of a group of people. In the next task I'm interested in the impression that people will form of you". Once again, the interview task was explained by drawing an analogy with a job interview situation. The point allocation task was then carefully explained (see Chapter 6). Interviews were tape-recorded, with participants' permission.

The Triads Test was not identical to that used in Study 2 (see Appendix C). In the present study, time constraints with the subject pool necessitated the development and use of a short form of the PTT administered in Study 2. This time, the Triads Test comprised 10 (rather than 20) triads. Each triad contained one phrase that characterised dependence, one phrase that characterised independence, and one neutral phrase that was unrelated to either dimension. We could thus ensure that each participant had an opportunity to project the assigned trait on each of the 10 triads, which is equivalent to Study 2 in that only 10 of the 20 triads in that study allowed self-presentation in terms of the assigned trait for any given individual.

Participants were then privately and randomly assigned either the trait "dependent" or "independent" (see Chapter 7), although no participants suspected that only two traits were in fact being assigned. Immediately before participants took part in the interview,
they were administered a standard choice instruction (see Chapter 6). To avoid delays, up to four interviews were run concurrently, each in a separate cubicle, by one of four trained female interviewers. Ideally, in order to achieve greater control over the desired intragroup context at the time of behaviour, male interviewers would have interviewed male participants; financial constraints made this impossible in the present research.

8.2.3.3 Reinstating the social comparison information
On completing their interviews, participants moved on to the next task which involved recalling the videotape presented at the start of the experimental session. The purpose of this task was to reinstate the social comparison information immediately prior to the completion of dependent measures. Participants were given the following instructions in writing:

Recall the people you saw on the tape this morning. I want to know what your lasting impression of them is. You watched the tape several minutes ago now; what do you remember about them? Describe them in your own words. Quickly summarise the things – if anything at all – that made a lasting impression. If you can't remember anything at all about them, then say so; if you can only recall a few of the comments they made, write those down. In a few sentences tell me what your impression of them was. Spend 2 to 3 minutes on this task.

8.2.3.4 Dependent measures
Dependent measures included six bipolar scales related to independence (assertive, ambitious, independent, aggressive, individualistic, leader), six related to femininity (emotional, sympathetic, affectionate, gentle, sensitive, appreciative), six related to masculinity (athletic, casual, pleasure-seeking, loud, boastful, masculine), and six related to self-esteem (self-contented, self-confident, self-satisfied, not critical of self, self-assured, secure). Half of the participants described themselves firstly as women in contrast to men, and subsequently as individuals compared to other women (see Chapter 7 for self-rating instructions); the remaining participants completed these ratings in the opposite order.

8.3 Results
Preliminary analyses established that order of completion of self-ratings (personal versus social ratings first) did not interact with any of the major dependent variables. We therefore collapsed for order, and will not consider this variable further. The
distribution of participants across cells of the $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ experimental design is indicated in Table 8.1. Unequal cell sizes and low cell counts were due to several logistical constraints, and depleted subject pools at the two universities from which participants were recruited. Given the problem of widely discrepant cell sizes across the design, data for males and females will be analysed separately in all cases, with one exception: the manipulation check of social comparison information.

Table 8.1
Distribution of participants across cells of the experimental design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STIMULUS GROUP</th>
<th>DEPENDENT</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IG</td>
<td>OG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IG</td>
<td>OG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DEPENDENT SELF-PRESENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDEPENDENT SELF-PRESENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: IG = Ingroup; OG = Outgroup.

8.3.1 Manipulation checks

8.3.1.1 Social comparison information: Group behaviour

Participants were required to rate the stimulus others on various rating scales. The two most pertinent to the present study were independence and assertiveness ratings. In addition, dimensions of secondary interest included masculinity, typicality and similarity ratings. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) required to assess the success of this first manipulation collapses across level of self-presentation, yielding reasonable cell sizes. For this reason, and in the interest of brevity, the combined analysis for males and females will be presented here.

A three-way ANOVA with sex of participant, stimulus group and stimulus group behaviour as between-subjects factors revealed a highly significant main effect for group behaviour, $F(1, 142) = 147.28, p < .001$, indicating that as intended, the independent stimulus groups were perceived to be significantly more independent ($M = 5.36, SD = 1.19$) than the dependent stimulus groups ($M = 2.79, SD = 1.37$). A
significant main effect for group behaviour also emerged for ratings of assertiveness, $F(1, 142) = 65.74, p < .001$, with independent stimulus groups being rated as significantly more assertive ($M = 5.27, SD = 1.20$) than dependent stimulus groups ($M = 3.53, SD = 1.38$).

Mean masculinity ratings were expected to reflect the degree to which the stimulus group members were categorized as men or women. A significant two-way interaction between sex of participant and stimulus group was obtained, $F(1, 142) = 19.45, p < .001$. The relevant means are presented in Table 8.2. Interestingly, irrespective of ingroup or outgroup behaviour, males judged the ingroup to be more masculine than the outgroup, $t(142) = 3.34, p < .01$, while females judged the outgroup to be more masculine than the ingroup, $t(142) = 2.78, p < .05$. In addition, the outgroup was rated as significantly more masculine by females than males, $t(142) = 4.44, p < .01$.

### Table 8.2
Mean masculinity ratings as a function of sex of participant and stimulus group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX OF PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>STIMULUS GROUP</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3.97 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.97 (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3.55 (1.35)</td>
<td>4.25 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

For ratings of typicality, a two-way interaction emerged between stimulus group and group behaviour, $F(1, 140) = 4.67, p < .05$. Moreover, the three-way interaction between sex of participant, stimulus group, and group behaviour was highly significant, $F(1, 140) = 10.55, p < .001$. The relevant means are presented in Table 8.3.

Four pairwise contrasts were performed on the means in Table 8.3, in each case comparing ingroup and outgroup ratings across the table. Females rated the outgroup as significantly less typical if it was dependent, $t(140) = 2.92, p < .05$ (with Sidak), and as marginally more typical if it was independent, $t(140) = 2.37, p < .1$ (with Sidak). On the basis of these results it appears that female participants are endorsing the stereotype of dependence for women and independence for men. For male participants, the pattern

---

1 Missing data account for the reduced degrees of freedom.

2 Sidak’s multiplicative inequality was applied to correct for the number of contrasts.
of means also suggests that men hold stereotypic views of men and women, however these trends were not statistically reliable.

Table 8.3
Mean typicality ratings as a function of sex of participant, stimulus group, and stimulus group behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEPENDENT</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INGROUP</td>
<td>OUTGROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3.73 (1.33)</td>
<td>4.35 (1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>4.59 (1.59)</td>
<td>3.39 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Participants also rated the perceived similarity of stimulus group members. Similarity ratings can arguably be interpreted as a measure of the degree to which participants perceived the stimulus others to be a group. Understood in this way, high similarity ratings would imply that the stimulus others appeared “groupy” while low similarity ratings would suggest that the stimulus others were perceived as three individuals more so than as a group. This argument assumes of course that similarity is at least one component of groupyness, although it is not necessarily the major component.

A three-way ANOVA on mean similarity ratings revealed a significant main effect for group behaviour, $F(1, 142) = 9.94, p < .01$. Dependent group members were perceived to be more similar to each other ($M = 4.65, SD = 1.16$) than independent group members ($M = 4.10, SD = 1.40$). The main effect for stimulus group was also significant, $F(1, 142) = 12.34, p < .001$. Ingroup members were rated as more similar ($M = 4.67, SD = 1.32$) than outgroup members ($M = 3.98, SD = 1.22$). However, this main effect was qualified by the significant two-way interaction between sex of participant and stimulus group, $F(1, 142) = 5.19, p < .05$. The means relevant to this interaction are provided in Table 8.4. This interaction was mainly due to the fact that females rated ingroup members as more similar than outgroup members, $t(142) = 4.00, p < .01$ (with Sidak); females also gave higher similarity ratings to the ingroup than did males, $t(142) = 3.39, p < .01$ (with Sidak). Thus it appears that females in particular have a homogeneous perception of the ingroup.
Table 8.4
Mean similarity ratings as a function of sex of participant and stimulus group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX OF PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>STIMULUS GROUP</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>4.23 (1.20)</td>
<td>4.13 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>4.92 (1.33)</td>
<td>3.86 (1.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

8.3.1.2 Self-presentational behaviour

Participants' point allocations on the Triads Test yielded a manipulation check of self-presentational behaviour in the interview. The number of points allocated to dependent items was subtracted from the number of points allocated to independent items to yield a difference score representing the extent to which participants projected themselves independently. Data were analysed via three-way ANOVA, separately for males and females. For males, a highly significant main effect for trait was obtained, $F(1, 53) = 259.01$, $p < .001$, confirming that those assigned the trait "independent" projected themselves as significantly more independent ($M = 3.85$, $SD = 1.22$) than those assigned the trait "dependent" ($M = -2.84$, $SD = 1.86$). No other effects emerged. Similarly, for females the only effect to emerge was the expected main effect for trait, $F(1, 81) = 338.14$, $p < .001$ (independent: $M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.13$; dependent: $M = -3.25$, $SD = 2.23$).

8.3.2 Major analyses

Analyses pertaining to self-perceived independence, femininity, masculinity, and self-esteem are presented firstly for males and secondly for females. In each case, before preselected scale items were averaged and entered into the four-way ANOVA, a reliability analysis was conducted to ascertain whether it was appropriate to average across the six items in each scale and to subject mean scores to repeated-measures ANOVA (Wylie, 1974). Where the reliability analysis suggested that item deletion could achieve a higher Cronbach's alpha, the analysis for the improved (rather than six-item) scale is reported.
8.3.2.1 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-perceived independence

For males, reliability analyses performed on the six bipolar ratings of independence, separately for personal and social identity instructions, suggested that the deletion of one item (aggressive) would improve scale reliability. These analyses yielded satisfactory Cronbach's alphas of .69 and .61 for personal and social identity instructions respectively, and mean inter-item correlations of .32 and .25, respectively. The correlation between independence scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .53.

Mean ratings of independence were subjected to a four-way ANOVA\(^3\) with self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, and group behaviour as between-subjects factors, and level of self-rating as a within-subject factor. A significant interaction was obtained between self-presentational behaviour and stimulus group, \(F(1, 53) = 11.93, p < .001\). The relevant means are presented in Table 8.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.5</th>
<th>Mean independence ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour and stimulus group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STIMULUS GROUP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>7.16 (0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>7.81 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

An interesting pattern emerges from Table 8.5. Independent behaviour contrasted against ingroup behaviour tended to increase self-perceived independence in males; however the same behaviour tended to have the opposite effect when it was contrasted against outgroup behaviour. Hence it appears that the traditional carry-over effect from independent behaviour applies when the ingroup is the frame of reference, but is reversed when the outgroup (i.e., women) provides the frame of reference.

\(^3\) Although some lower-order interactions are superseded by higher-order interactions, it is nevertheless useful to present them here and to comment briefly on the general patterns that emerge.
A significant interaction was also obtained between self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, and group behaviour, $F(1, 53) = 6.50, p < .05$. The means relevant to this interaction are presented in Table 8.6. As indicated in the top panel, the traditional carry-over effect from self-presentational behaviour emerged in the ingroup conditions, although it was attenuated when one's own independent behaviour was contrasted against an independent rather than a dependent ingroup. Moreover, in the bottom panel the carry-over effect appears to have reversed; specifically, independent self-presentation produced lower self-perceived independence when males encountered a dependent outgroup.

Table 8.6
Mean independence ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group and group behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Ingroup</td>
<td>6.38 (0.43)</td>
<td>8.11 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Ingroup</td>
<td>7.50 (0.95)</td>
<td>7.97 (0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Outgroup</td>
<td>8.15 (0.98)</td>
<td>6.55 (1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Outgroup</td>
<td>7.55 (1.36)</td>
<td>7.56 (0.55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

These findings were further qualified by the significant four-way interaction, $F(1, 53) = 6.71, p < .05$. The means relevant to the four-way interaction are presented in Table 8.7. Firstly, at the level of personal self-ratings, independent behaviour in males generally tends to confer higher personal independence, particularly when the ingroup is dependent; however there is one exception: acting independently tends to decrease personal independence when the outgroup is dependent. A family of four pairwise contrasts, comparing the effect of dependent and independent behaviour on personal independence, confirmed that independent behaviour conferred significantly higher personal independence in the dependent ingroup condition, $t(53) = 4.37, p < .01$ (with Sidak), and significantly lower personal independence in the dependent outgroup condition, $t(53) = 5.05, p < .01$ (with Sidak).
Table 8.7
Mean independence ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERSONAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th>SOCIAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent behaviour</td>
<td>Independent behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent IG</td>
<td>6.25 (0.53)</td>
<td>8.46 (1.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent IG</td>
<td>7.52 (1.08)</td>
<td>7.71 (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent OG</td>
<td>8.20 (1.15)</td>
<td>5.98 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent OG</td>
<td>7.35 (1.24)</td>
<td>7.72 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. IG = ingroup; OG = outgroup.

At the level of social self-ratings, the tendency for independent behaviour to produce a corresponding shift in self-perception was still apparent in the ingroup conditions, particularly when the ingroup was independent. Moreover, independent behaviour tended to have the opposite effect in the outgroup conditions, particularly when males were faced with a dependent outgroup. We had expected the opposite pattern to emerge here; that is, independent behaviour paired with a dependent outgroup was expected to enhance social or collective independence in males. A family of four pairwise contrasts, comparing the effect of dependent and independent behaviour on social independence, revealed that one contrast approached statistical significance; specifically, independent behaviour conferred marginally but not significantly higher social independence in the dependent ingroup condition, t(53) = 2.49, p < .1 (with Sidak). Thus it appears that the position of the ingroup is less important to social than to personal identity. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that social independence is maximised when both the participant and his group are behaving normatively (i.e., independently), while personal independence is maximised when one's own independent behaviour is contrasted against a dependent ingroup.

For females, reliability analyses for the six bipolar ratings of independence did not suggest the need for item deletion. Cronbach's alphas were satisfactory at .75 and .68 for personal and social identity instructions, respectively. The corresponding mean inter-item correlations were .34 and .27, respectively. The correlation between independence scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .58.
When mean ratings of independence were subjected to a four-way ANOVA, a highly significant main effect emerged for level of self-rating, $F(1, 81) = 55.18, p < .001$. Female participants rated themselves as significantly more independent under personal $(M = 7.28, SD = 1.52)$ than social identity instructions $(M = 6.24, SD = 1.32)$. No other main or interaction effects were obtained.

Cell means as a function of the overall design are presented in Table 8.8. There is a tendency for independent behaviour to produce a shift towards higher self-perceived independence, particularly at the level of personal self-ratings when independent behaviour is compared to a dependent outgroup. However a reversal emerges for social self-ratings when independent behaviour on the part of females is contrasted against an independent outgroup. This condition represents a situation of low normative and low comparative fit since one’s own behaviour (a) is counter-normative for the ingroup, and (b) matches outgroup behaviour; under these conditions female participants presumably cannot infer the position of the ingroup (i.e., social or collective independence) from their own behaviour.

Table 8.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERSONAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th>SOCIAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent behaviour</td>
<td>Independent behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent IG</td>
<td>7.01 (1.16)</td>
<td>7.87 (1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent IG</td>
<td>6.88 (1.24)</td>
<td>7.38 (2.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent OG</td>
<td>7.03 (1.71)</td>
<td>8.10 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent OG</td>
<td>7.09 (1.55)</td>
<td>7.35 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. IG = ingroup; OG = outgroup.

8.3.2.2 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-perceived femininity

For males, reliability analyses of femininity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions revealed satisfactory Cronbach’s alphas of .77 and .84, respectively, and mean inter-item correlations of .37 and .47, respectively. The correlation between femininity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .55.
A four-way ANOVA performed on mean femininity scores revealed a highly significant main effect for level of self-rating, $F(1, 53) = 113.28, p < .001$, indicating that males rated themselves as more feminine under personal ($M = 7.95, SD = 1.19$) than social identity instructions ($M = 5.96, SD = 1.66$). In addition, a significant interaction was obtained between self-presentational behaviour and stimulus group, $F(1, 53) = 4.46, p < .05$. Table 8.9 presents the relevant means. Although no pairwise contrasts were significant when Sidak's multiplicative inequality was applied, a cross-over effect is apparent, such that independent behaviour tends to increase males' self-perceived femininity in the ingroup (i.e., intragroup) conditions, and decrease self-perceived femininity in the outgroup (i.e., intergroup) conditions.

Table 8.9
Mean femininity ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour and stimulus group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STIMULUS GROUP</th>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>6.79 (0.76)</td>
<td>7.08 (1.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>7.52 (1.55)</td>
<td>6.45 (1.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

For females, reliability analyses of femininity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions revealed satisfactory Cronbach's alphas of .82 and .85 and mean inter-item correlations of .43 and .50, respectively. The correlation between femininity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .67.

A four-way ANOVA performed on mean femininity scores revealed a highly significant main effect for level of self-rating, $F(1, 81) = 34.12, p < .001$, indicating that females rated themselves as more feminine under social ($M = 8.62, SD = 1.32$) than personal identity instructions ($M = 7.93, SD = 1.39$). The main effect for stimulus group was also significant, $F(1, 81) = 7.78, p < .01$, indicating that females rated themselves as more feminine on viewing the ingroup ($M = 8.57, SD = 1.31$) rather than the outgroup ($M = 7.84, SD = 0.99$). In addition, the interaction between self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, and group behaviour approached significance, $F(1, 81) = 3.58, p = .062$. The means relevant to this marginal interaction are presented in Table 8.10. Femininity ratings tended to be higher in the ingroup than in the outgroup.
conditions (this is the main effect for stimulus group). Moreover, independent behaviour appeared to enhance females' self-perceived femininity only when the participant's behaviour was similar to the ingroup's behaviour or different from the outgroup's behaviour.

Table 8.10
Mean femininity ratings for females as a function of self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group and group behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Ingroup</td>
<td>8.67 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Ingroup</td>
<td>8.14 (1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Outgroup</td>
<td>7.67 (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Outgroup</td>
<td>7.91 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

8.3.2.3 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-perceived masculinity

For males, reliability analyses performed on masculinity scores suggested that the deletion of one item (boastful) would improve scale reliability, yielding Cronbach's alphas of .51 and .59 for personal and social identity instructions, respectively, and mean inter-item correlations of .17 and .22, respectively. The correlation between masculinity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .71.

When mean ratings of masculinity were subjected to a four-way ANOVA, a significant main effect emerged for level of self-rating, $F(1, 53) = 57.41, p < .001$; males rated themselves as more masculine under social ($M = 7.94, SD = 1.34$) than personal identity instructions ($M = 7.05, SD = 1.28$). The interaction between group behaviour and level of self-rating was also statistically significant, $F(1, 53) = 4.28, p < .05$. The relevant means are presented in Table 8.11. Males tended to rate themselves as more socially than personally masculine, particularly following exposure to dependent comparison others.
Table 8.11
Mean masculinity ratings for males as a function of stimulus group behaviour and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STIMULUS GROUP BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>LEVEL OF SELF-RATING</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>6.85 (1.18)</td>
<td>7.99 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>7.27 (1.36)</td>
<td>7.90 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

In addition, a marginal interaction emerged between stimulus group, group behaviour and level of self-rating, $F(1, 53) = 3.88$, $p = .054$. Moreover, the four-way interaction was significant, $F(1, 53) = 8.11$, $p < .01$. The means relevant to the four-way interaction are presented in Table 8.12.

Table 8.12
Mean masculinity ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th>SOCIAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent IG</td>
<td>6.85 (0.41)</td>
<td>8.00 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent IG</td>
<td>7.33 (1.48)</td>
<td>7.93 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent OG</td>
<td>7.70 (1.40)</td>
<td>8.60 (1.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent OG</td>
<td>7.20 (1.62)</td>
<td>8.15 (1.77)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. IG = ingroup; OG = outgroup.

As can be seen from Table 8.12, independent behaviour tended to increase personal masculinity in males faced with a dependent ingroup, but not in males faced with an independent ingroup. Independent behaviour also tended to confer lower personal masculinity in the dependent outgroup condition. For social self-ratings, it is interesting to note that independent behaviour tended to decrease self-perceived masculinity in the outgroup conditions. Pairwise contrasts confirmed that independent behaviour contrasted against a dependent outgroup conferred significantly lower personal masculinity, $t(53) = 4.71$, $p < .01$ (with Sidak), and marginally lower social masculinity.
\[ t(53) = 2.37, \ p < .1, \text{ in males. No other contrasts were statistically significant, or approached significance.} \]

For females, reliability analyses performed on masculinity scores suggested that the deletion of two items (athletic and masculine) would improve scale reliability. These analyses yielded (relatively low) Cronbach's alphas of .44 and .39 for personal and social self-ratings, respectively, and mean inter-item correlations of .15 and .14, respectively. The correlation between masculinity scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .55.

When means on the four-item scales were entered into the ANOVA, a highly significant main effect emerged for level of self-rating, \( F(1, 81) = 37.18, \ p < .001, \) indicating that females rated themselves as more masculine under personal (\( M = 6.06, \ SD = 1.28 \)) than social identity instructions (\( M = 5.28, \ SD = 1.31 \)). No other main or interaction effects were obtained.

### 8.3.2.4 The effect of self-presentation and group behaviour on self-esteem

For males, reliability analyses performed on self-esteem scores suggested that the deletion of one item (not critical of self) would improve scale reliability. These analyses yielded satisfactory Cronbach's alphas of .89 and .84 for personal and social identity instructions, respectively, and mean inter-item correlations of .61 and .52, respectively. The correlation between self-esteem scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .61.

A four-way ANOVA on mean self-esteem scores revealed a significant interaction between self-presentational behaviour and stimulus group, \( F(1, 53) = 4.96, \ p < .05. \) The relevant means are presented in Table 8.13. A cross-over effect is apparent in Table 8.13. Specifically, independent behaviour tended to produce higher self-esteem when the ingroup provided the frame of reference, and lower self-esteem when the outgroup provided the frame of reference.

In addition, the self-presentational behaviour x stimulus group x group behaviour interaction was significant, \( F(1, 53) = 4.04, \ p = .05. \) Table 8.14 presents the relevant means. Once again, the traditional carry-over effect from independent behaviour
appeared to be reversed when males contrasted their behaviour against a dependent group of women.

Table 8.13
Mean self-esteem ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour and stimulus group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STIMULUS GROUP</th>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>6.73 (1.55)</td>
<td>7.73 (1.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>7.46 (1.71)</td>
<td>6.86 (1.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 8.14
Mean self-esteem ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group and stimulus group behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Ingroup</td>
<td>5.83 (1.53)</td>
<td>7.53 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Ingroup</td>
<td>7.13 (1.46)</td>
<td>8.04 (0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Outgroup</td>
<td>7.80 (1.50)</td>
<td>6.34 (1.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Outgroup</td>
<td>7.20 (1.90)</td>
<td>8.02 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

These findings were further qualified by the significant four-way interaction, $F(1, 53) = 5.03, p < .05$. The means relevant to the four-way interaction are presented in Table 8.15. Table 8.15 reveals that independent behaviour tended to enhance personal self-esteem, however a reversal once again emerged in the dependent outgroup condition. For social self-ratings, independent behaviour tended to increase social self-esteem in the ingroup conditions but decrease it in the outgroup conditions, particularly in the dependent outgroup condition. At the personal level, independent behaviour significantly increased self-esteem in the dependent ingroup condition and in the independent outgroup condition; $t(53) = 3.18, p < .01$ and $t(53) = 2.85, p < .05$, respectively (with Sidak). However independent behaviour significantly decreased self-esteem in the dependent outgroup condition, $t(53) = 3.10, p < .05$ (with Sidak). At the social level, independent behaviour significantly increased self-esteem in the
independent ingroup condition, $t(53) = 2.78$, $p < .05$ (with Sidak), and marginally increased self-esteem in the dependent ingroup condition, $t(53) = 2.45$, $p < .1$ (with Sidak). A reversal of that effect started to emerge in the dependent outgroup condition, $t(53) = 2.48$, $p < .1$.

Table 8.15
Mean self-esteem ratings for males as a function of self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
<th>SOCIAL SELF-RATINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent behaviour</td>
<td>Independent behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent IG</td>
<td>5.75 (1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent IG</td>
<td>7.42 (1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent OG</td>
<td>7.83 (1.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent OG</td>
<td>6.80 (1.97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. IG = ingroup; OG = outgroup.

For females, reliability analyses performed on self-esteem scores suggested that the deletion of one item (not critical of self) would improve scale reliability. These analyses yielded satisfactory Cronbach's alphas of .92 and .88 for personal and social identity instructions, respectively, and mean inter-item correlations of .69 and .59, respectively. The correlation between self-esteem scores obtained under personal and social identity instructions was .71.

A four-way ANOVA performed on mean self-esteem scores revealed a highly significant main effect for level of self-rating, $F(1, 81) = 25.59$, $p < .001$, indicating that females had higher personal ($M = 6.71$, $SD = 2.12$) than social or collective self-esteem ($M = 5.90$, $SD = 1.95$). A marginal main effect was also obtained for self-presentational behaviour, $F(1, 81) = 3.82$, $p = .054$, suggesting that independent self-presentation conferred slightly higher self-esteem ($M = 6.72$, $SD = 1.78$) than dependent self-presentation ($M = 5.93$, $SD = 1.92$). Moreover the self-presentational behaviour x level of self-rating interaction was statistically significant, $F(1, 81) = 5.33$, $p < .05$. The relevant means are presented in Table 8.16. Two contrasts between means were statistically significant. Independent self-presentation conferred significantly higher
personal self-esteem than dependent self-presentation, \( t(81) = 5.03, p < .01 \) (with Sidak). Independent self-presentation also conferred significantly higher personal than social self-esteem in females, \( t(81) = 5.15, p < .01 \) (with Sidak).

Table 8.16
Mean self-esteem ratings for females as a function of self-presentational behaviour and level of self-rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF SELF-RATING</th>
<th>SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal self-ratings</td>
<td>6.17 (2.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social self-ratings</td>
<td>5.70 (1.98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

8.3.2.5 Post-experimental measures

At the end of the experiment each participant completed a feedback sheet in which they indicated (a) how difficult they found it to project the assigned characteristic in the interview, (b) how much choice they felt they had been given over whether or not they participated in the interview, and (c) how much their self-presentation during the interview reflected their "true" selves. All ratings were made on 7-point scales. The major findings on each dependent measure will be briefly described below.

For males, three-way ANOVAs with self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group and group behaviour as between-subjects factors revealed no main or interaction effects for ratings of task difficulty (\( M = 4.43, \text{SD} = 1.52 \)) or for perceived choice to participate in the interview (\( M = 5.67, \text{SD} = 1.45 \)). In contrast, for "true" self ratings a significant main effect was obtained for self-presentational behaviour, \( F(1, 53) = 27.52, p < .001 \); males reported that independent self-presentation was closer to their true self (\( M = 4.97, \text{SD} = 1.45 \)) than dependent self-presentation (\( M = 2.96, \text{SD} = 1.51 \)).

For females, a three-way ANOVA performed on mean difficulty ratings revealed a significant main effect for stimulus group, \( F(1, 81) = 5.32, p < .05 \). The interview task was experienced as more difficult following exposure to the outgroup (\( M = 4.25, \text{SD} = 1.44 \)) rather than the ingroup (\( M = 3.55, \text{SD} = 1.42 \)). For perceived choice to participate in the interview task, a significant main effect emerged for self-presentational behaviour, \( F(1, 81) = 12.50, p < .001 \); female participants who projected dependence
perceived significantly less choice (M = 5.13, SD = 1.69) than those who projected independence (M = 6.14, SD = 1.16). The main effect for group behaviour was also statistically significant, F(1, 81) = 4.40, p < .05; specifically, those individuals who viewed dependent stimulus others perceived more choice (M = 5.90, SD = 1.32) than those individuals who viewed independent others (M = 5.37, SD = 1.68). Finally, for "true" self ratings a significant main effect was obtained for self-presentational behaviour, F(1, 80) = 28.04, p < .001; females reported that independent self-presentation was closer to their true self (M = 4.93, SD = 1.49) than dependent self-presentation (M = 3.35, SD = 1.35).

8.4 Discussion

In the present study we set out to examine more closely the role played by the ingroup and the outgroup in determining the psychological significance of one's own behaviour. What is the relationship between one's own behaviour, the behaviour of others and level of self-categorization? In order to examine this, we created either an intragroup or an intergroup context prior to self-presentation, and subsequently obtained self-descriptions under both personal and social identity instructions. We expected that the ingroup would be the context against which the personal self will be defined. Conversely, the outgroup should provide the context against which social identity is defined. Furthermore, at the personal level, independent behaviour should lead one to rate oneself as personally independent compared to the ingroup; this should be particularly true if the ingroup is dependent. At the social level, independent behaviour may likewise lead one to rate oneself as socially independent compared to the outgroup, particularly when the outgroup is dependent. However, we were quick to add that the extent to which independent behaviour contrasted against a dependent outgroup will enhance self-perceived collective independence will depend on normative fit. Thus males who view a dependent outgroup and then project independence themselves should feel more socially (or collectively) independent; however, females who view a dependent outgroup and then project independence are less likely than their male counterparts to rate themselves as socially (or collectively) since in this case their own and the outgroup's behaviour is counter-normative. For these reasons we expected group behaviour to have its effect mainly in the outgroup (rather than the ingroup) conditions, and mainly at the social (rather than personal) level. As stipulated
previously, these expectations are consistent with a four-way interaction between self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour and level of self-rating.

To what extent did the data support these general expectations? The first thing to note is that a very different pattern of results emerged for males and females. In general, the results were more complex for males than for females. The results of the present study therefore caution one against generalising the findings of Studies 1 and 2 (conducted with all-female samples) to males. We will return to the issue of sex differences later in the discussion. First the main findings for males and females will be recapitulated.

For males, several interesting patterns emerged on post-test ratings. Because the observed effects need to be replicated in the future with a larger sample size, they will be interpreted here as suggestive of various effects rather than as confirmation of those effects. Nevertheless the consistency in the data is encouraging. For self-perceived independence, a four-way interaction emerged. Importantly, the data suggested that the straightforward carry-over effect from independent behaviour to subsequent self-conception can, under certain conditions, be reversed. At the level of personal independence, independent behaviour enhanced self-perceived independence, particularly when the behaviour was contrasted against a dependent ingroup. In fact it was here that personal independence was maximised in males. The observation that independent behaviour conferred higher personal independence particularly when comparison others were dependent, is consistent with the self-categorization analysis, which stipulates that the ingroup conditions facilitate interpersonal comparisons.

Furthermore, an interesting but unexpected finding emerged; independent behaviour contrasted against a dependent outgroup decreased personal independence in males. Thus, it appears that despite their independent self-presentation, males were reluctant to assert their independence when faced with a dependent group of women. That this reversal occurs may be due to a conflict of values; on the one hand, males do identify with their high status ingroup, and do not want to view themselves as dependent. On the other hand they may feel conflicted about that superiority; in a sense asserting their high status contributes to the subordination of women. How do they deal with this conflict of values? It appears that they downplay the significance of their recent independent behaviour in the context of a dependent outgroup. It thus appears that
males are interpreting their recently enacted behaviour in the context of intergroup relations. Although conflicted about their superiority to women on the focal dimension, they do not want to deal with their conflict by saying that they are personally dependent. In this broader (intergroup) context, the traditional carry-over effect from independent behaviour is in fact reversed. The observation that independent behaviour has opposite effects in the ingroup and outgroup conditions, particularly when comparison others are behaving dependently, is (to the best of our knowledge) the first demonstration of a meaningful reversal of the carry-over effect from behaviour to subsequent personal self-conception.

Independent behaviour also tended to enhance social or collective independence in males, but only in the ingroup conditions. These shifts were not however statistically significant, implying that the position of the ingroup was less relevant to social than personal self-ratings. Moreover, in the outgroup conditions the carry-over effect from independent behaviour tended to be reversed, particularly in the dependent outgroup condition. Again, it appears that where this is normative fit, men reject the stereotype which implicitly contributes to the ongoing subordination of the outgroup. In contrast to personal independence, which was maximised when independent behaviour was contrasted against a dependent ingroup, it appears that social independence was maximised when all males in the psychological frame of reference (including the participant) behaved normatively. On the one hand, the observation that social independence is maximised in an ingroup rather than an outgroup condition appears to contradict the theoretical assumption that the ingroup conditions will be particularly relevant to personal identity, while the outgroup conditions will be particularly relevant to social identity; it appears that a self-ingroup match in the normative direction is sufficient to produce high levels of self-stereotyping on ingroup-defining traits. On the other hand, it is also possible that males found it easier to assert their collective independence in this (ingroup) context precisely because it did not explicitly implicate the intergroup comparison, which appears to leave them, as the high status group, feeling conflicted; the notable reversal in the dependent outgroup conditions supports this interpretation.

Post-test femininity scores revealed a simpler pattern. Males rated themselves as more personally than socially feminine. This makes sense since the trait "feminine" is not
normatively fitting for the social category "men". In addition, self-presentational behaviour interacted with stimulus group. Thus for males, the effects of independent behaviour did generalise to dimensions other than independence. Independent behaviour tended to increase males' femininity when the ingroup provided the frame of reference, and tended to decrease femininity when the outgroup provided the frame of reference. Presumably the presence of the outgroup heightens awareness of group identity; independent behaviour in this intergroup context leads males to dismiss the relevance of feminine traits, which are after all characteristic of the outgroup but uncharacteristic of the ingroup.

On masculine traits, males rated themselves as significantly more masculine under social than personal identity instructions. This is clearly consistent with the self-categorization analysis, since the trait "masculine" is normatively fitting for the social category "men". Furthermore, level of self-rating interacted with group behaviour. The interaction appeared to be due to the fact that males rated themselves as more socially than personally masculine following exposure to dependent comparison others. Dependence in others (a trait that is normative for the outgroup) may have enhanced the salience of social identity, producing self-stereotyping on masculine traits. This observation reinforces the view that self-definition entails two component processes: knowing what you are, and knowing what you are not (e.g., see W. J. McGuire, 1984; see also Chapter 3). Moreover, level of self-rating interacted with self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, and group behaviour. Consistent with the results obtained for self-perceived independence, independent behaviour contrasted against a dependent outgroup reduced personal masculinity, and tended to reduce social or collective masculinity.

For males' post-test self-esteem, self-presentational behaviour interacted with stimulus group. Thus behaviour did appear to have consequences for self-esteem, as well as self-perceived independence, femininity and masculinity. Independent behaviour tended to enhance self-esteem when the ingroup provided the frame of reference; the same behaviour tended to reduce self-esteem when the outgroup provided the frame of reference. Moreover, the four-way interaction again emerged. In general, independent behaviour enhanced personal self-esteem, particularly in the dependent ingroup and independent outgroup conditions. The latter observation is consistent with the view that
a self-outgroup match (i.e., low comparative fit at the intergroup level) in terms of behaviour which happens to be counter-normative for the outgroup, works against the salience of social identity, making it possible for the perceiver to interpret his independent behaviour as an expression of the personal self; this may account for the increase in personal self-esteem in this (outgroup) condition. Moreover, independent behaviour once again reduced personal self-esteem in the dependent outgroup condition. In contrast to these results, at the social level independent behaviour tended to increase self-esteem in the ingroup conditions, with the opposite pattern emerging in the outgroup conditions. In particular, and contrary to expectations, independent behaviour paired with a dependent outgroup tended to diminish social or collective self-esteem. In fact, it was in the independent ingroup condition that independent behaviour significantly enhanced social self-esteem, or in theoretical terms, when the self-presentational behaviour of the individual was consistent with that of his group, in the normative direction.

To summarise the findings for males, the four-way interaction emerged on three types of self-ratings (independence, masculinity, and self-esteem). This interaction repeatedly demonstrated the traditional carry-over effect for independent behaviour at the level of personal self-ratings, particularly when one's behaviour was contrasted against a dependent ingroup. This observation raises the possibility that the traditional carry-over effect that has been repeatedly demonstrated in previous research may in fact reflect an implicit contrast of one's own behaviour against a psychologically present (if not empirically instantiated) ingroup. Moreover, there was consistent evidence of a reversal of the carry-over effect in the dependent outgroup condition. That is, when males viewed a dependent outgroup, independent behaviour reduced personal independence, personal masculinity, and personal self-esteem. In contrast, a different pattern tended to emerge at the level of social self-ratings. Specifically, independent behaviour tended to enhance social independence and social self-esteem in the ingroup conditions – this was particularly true for social self-esteem in the independent ingroup condition – but in general diminished social independence and social self-esteem in the outgroup conditions. The first of these observations implies that information about the ingroup's behaviour can become relevant to social identity, but that this is particularly likely when the behaviour of both the perceiver and his group is normative (i.e., independent, in the case of males). Although not predicted, this observation is not inconsistent with the
self-categorization analysis. Self-categorization theory stipulates that normative fit at the intergroup level should maximise social identity salience, however it also assumes that normative intragroup behaviour can likewise contribute to group identity salience. The finding that independent behaviour tends to diminish social independence, social masculinity and social self-esteem in males in the dependent outgroup condition, was not expected. It appears that exposure to a stereotypically dependent group of women leaves males feeling conflicted about their superiority on the independence dimension vis-à-vis females; this may account for the reversal of the traditional carry-over effect from independent behaviour, which tended to emerge in the present study at the level of both social and personal self-ratings.

A very different – and much simpler – pattern of results emerged for females. For self-perceived independence, the pattern of means suggests that independent behaviour in general tended to enhance self-perceived independence, at both the personal and social levels; thus women appeared to be asserting their independence (and rejecting dependence) as a general rule. However, there was one exception to this general pattern: a reversal was apparent when one’s own independent behaviour was contrasted against an independent outgroup. Presumably, in this condition females could not infer the position of the ingroup (i.e., social or collective independence) from their own behaviour because their own behaviour was counter-normative for women. Contrary to expectations though, there was no significant effect of behaviour for self-perceived independence. Likewise, behaviour did not have a significant impact on self-perceived femininity or masculinity. Instead, for all three dimensions straightforward effects emerged for level of self-rating. That is, female participants rated themselves as significantly more independent, as less feminine, and as more masculine under personal than social identity instructions. The present study thus replicates Study 2 by showing that females perceive themselves to be less independent when comparing themselves to men in general than when comparing themselves to other women. The observation that females ascribe more feminine and fewer masculine traits at the social rather than the personal level, while males do the exact opposite⁴, is clearly consistent with self-

⁴ The four-way interaction for males’ post-test masculinity scores did not qualify the main effect for level of self-rating, with one exception: independent self-presentation conferred slightly lower social than personal independence in the independent outgroup condition.
categorization theory, which predicts that ingroup-defining traits will be endorsed when individuals rate themselves in terms of group membership.

Females also rated themselves as more feminine on viewing the ingroup rather than the outgroup. Thus it appears that the intragroup context provided by the ingroup stimulus tape increased self-stereotyping on feminine attributes. In addition, the marginal interaction \( (p = .062) \) between self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group and group behaviour revealed firstly, a tendency for femininity ratings to be higher in the ingroup than in the outgroup conditions; presumably in these implicit intragroup contexts one becomes aware of the higher-order social categorization (i.e., "us" women) that provides the context for social comparison. Moreover, independent behaviour appeared to enhance self-stereotyping on feminine traits when one's independent behaviour was compared to either (a) an independent (i.e., similar) ingroup, or (b) a dependent (i.e., dissimilar) outgroup. Females thus appear to be rejecting the stereotype of dependence for women. This interpretation is further corroborated by the independent observations that (a) females rated the interview task as more difficult following exposure to the outgroup rather than the ingroup, (b) females reported less choice to participate when assigned the trait “dependent” rather than “independent”, and (c) females reported less choice to participate on viewing dependent rather than independent comparison others. The results of the present study thus point to the conclusion that both groups (males and females) know but reject and are conflicted by the social stereotype.

For self-esteem, the results suggested, in line with Studies 1 and 2 (see Chapter 6 and 7), that females had higher personal than social or collective self-esteem. Moreover, it was here that the only significant effect of behaviour was seen. Specifically, self-presentational behaviour interacted with level of self-rating. Independent behaviour enhanced personal self-esteem, and conferred higher personal than social self-esteem.

In summary, for females it appears that self-presentational behaviour and social comparison information were having their effect (albeit at \( p < .065 \)) on self-perceived femininity, rather than self-perceived independence. A similar observation was made in Study 2 (although in that case the effect of social comparison information on femininity was statistically significant). However, in the present study it remains unclear why the provision of social comparison information prior to eliciting self-presentational
behaviour was effective in changing males' but not females' self-perceived independence.

In this connection, three possibilities need to be examined in future work. Firstly, it has already been acknowledged that the present results need to be replicated with a larger sample of males. Assuming that the results are replicable with a larger sample such that the sex difference is robust, a second explanation may be that the different pattern for males and females has a great deal to do with the present focus on the "dependence-independence" domain. The relationship between this behavioural dimension and the social category "women" no doubt has complex political aspects that may have affected the results of the present study. It is possible that the intergroup context did impact on females as well as males (there were some signs that this in fact did happen), but that females resisted the implications of that context. There was a general tendency for independent behaviour to enhance the personal and social independence of females, implying that females refused to endorse the stereotype or the idea that they may be personally dependent. The low status group thus appeared to reject the stereotype; they also clearly dismissed the social comparison information and the significance of the role-play. If the results for females are largely explicable in terms of the political and/or ideological aspects of intergroup relations, that does not rule out the possibility that a different behavioural dimension may yield results for females that more closely mirror those obtained for males. This possibility could be examined in future studies by comparing the results of Studies 2 and 3 with those obtained when self-presentation is elicited in terms of a less politically charged behavioural dimension (or at least one that is equally politically charged for males and females) such as "femininity" versus "masculinity".

Thirdly, it is arguable that any conditions that help to leave behaviour "open to interpretation" may facilitate the emergence of the predicted interaction between own behaviour, stimulus others, group behaviour and level of self-rating. Applied to the present study, the fact that male participants self-presented before a female interviewer may inadvertently have facilitated the emergence of the expected four-way interaction. Although clearly an interpersonal encounter, dyadic interaction with an opposite-sex other may - given the substance of the behavioural episode - in fact leave the precise meaning of the behaviour open to interpretation in a way that dyadic interaction with a
same-sex other may not. Female participants, in contrast, were always interviewed by a same-sex other. For females then, the behaviour (a less equivocal expression of the personal self) may be less open to interpretation, working against the emergence of the four-way interaction. This possibility can also be explored in future studies, by comparing the impact of behaviour elicited in same-versus opposite-sex dyads, for both males and females.

By way of conclusion, it is worthwhile returning momentarily to the "alternative" perspective on the self-behaviour relationship. The alternative hypothesis is that self-concept change reflects the internalization of self-discrepant behaviour with the self-structure (Jones, 1990; Tice, 1994). Importantly, it is assumed that self change is predominantly an intrapersonal process; in particular, self-perception or cognitive dissonance processes have been implicated in self-concept change. The present data for males suggest a role for interpersonal and intergroup processes, over and above the intrapersonal processes described by previous investigators. Moreover, the present study highlights the complexity of the self-behaviour relationship, when that relationship is examined in the context of intergroup relations. Social context mediated the impact of behaviour on self-perception, leading to no effect of behaviour (i.e., for females), the traditional effect (e.g., in intragroup contexts for males), or the reversed effect (e.g., in the dependent outgroup condition for males). Further studies will clearly need to be undertaken in order to elucidate more fully the effect of self-categorization and social comparison processes on self-concept change, nevertheless the present study suggests that research into this line of inquiry may well prove fruitful.
Chapter 9

Study 4
Individual differences and social identity: A study of self-categorization processes in the Markus paradigm

9.1 Introduction

So far in the empirical program of this thesis we have investigated how psychological ingroups and outgroups impinge on the self-behaviour relationship. Working within the dominant self change paradigm we have explored how intragroup and intergroup comparisons in terms of behaviour affect subsequent self-conception and self-evaluation. Studies 1, 2, and 3 represent an important step towards unravelling the complex interaction between person factors and social processes that work in unison to define the self at any given time.

To date, experimental social psychologists interested in self-concept change have focused on strategic self-presentation. Accordingly, the bulk of the empirical work has been conducted outside the information processing paradigms of social cognition. The fourth and final experiment of the empirical program of this thesis seeks to illustrate how self-concept change can be studied within the paradigms of social cognition, which have traditionally been employed to investigate the stability and maintenance of the self-concept.

In particular, within social cognition Markus' (1977) information processing paradigm is an established paradigm for investigating stability and consistency in self-ratings. By contrast, the first aim of the present study was to utilise this paradigm to demonstrate change in self-category content. Secondly, the Markus paradigm has almost exclusively been used to study the information processing consequences of personal self-schemata – the assumption being that human information processing is related to purely individual and private aspects of the self (cf. Turner et al., 1994). By contrast, and in keeping with the overall theme of the thesis, the present study was designed to investigate the information processing consequences of social identity in addition to personal identity.
To recapitulate, self-schema theory posits the existence of self-structures called self-schemata. These are stable and chronically accessible knowledge structures about the self. The accessibility of these structures is said to be reflected in the efficient processing and confidence with which schematics process schema-relevant material. Furthermore, the individual who has developed a self-schema for some behavioural domain should resist feedback that contradicts the schema. For instance, Independent Schematics should strongly resist the idea that they maybe dependent.

Only some aspects of self-schema theory will be contested here. For instance, it is a well-accepted fact that people have knowledge stored in their memories about what they are like as individuals (although the issue of precisely how this knowledge is organised in memory is somewhat more controversial; see Chapter 3). It is also likely that some of this self-knowledge may assume a great deal of importance to the individual (when importance is measured in the abstract), and may therefore be more accessible than other aspects. These ideas are not incompatible with self-categorization theory. As we saw in Chapter 5, long-term knowledge is one cognitive resource (among many) than impinges on the self-categorization process. The theory states that long-term knowledge is deployed flexibly to categorise self and others (see Turner et al., 1994, p. 459). Thus the self-categorization approach does not deny the existence of such knowledge, or that it has a role to play in self-categorization; the theory does, however, reject the view that a particular store of long-term knowledge can be equated with the "self-concept". Self-categorization theory thus departs from the traditional view that there is an enduring or one-to-one correspondence between certain knowledge structures (even those designated "important" when judged in the abstract) and the self-concept. From this perspective, the self-concept, or current self-category, is a variable and context-dependent cognitive representation (see Figure 5.1, Chapter 5).

In this chapter, we will take issue with one key assumption of the self-schema model. Namely, we will contest the view that personal self-schemata functionally control the processing of self-relevant information (cf. Nasby, 1989) and thus govern self-conception in the schema-relevant domain. In other words, it will be argued, in line with self-categorization theory, that it is incorrect to assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between long-term knowledge about the self, measured in the abstract, and self-conception at any given moment in time (Turner et al., 1994). Knowledge
about the personal self can influence self-conception, but it should do so only under certain conditions. Specifically, under personal identity instructions (e.g., "describe yourself as an individual") it makes sense to draw on one's long-term knowledge and theories about what one is personally like. On the other hand when people are asked to rate themselves at the social level (e.g., "describe yourself as a woman in contrast to men"), personal self-knowledge becomes less relevant. Under social identity instructions individuals should self-stereotype in terms of the characteristics which differentiate the psychological ingroup from the relevant outgroup.

The idea that social identities or identifications based on group membership are as much expressions of self as personal identity is central to self-categorization theory (see Chapter 5). In contrast to social identity theory, which proposed a continuum of social behaviour ranging from "acting in terms of self" to "acting in terms of group", self-categorization theory is explicit that the latter is an expression of the former (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Consistent with this view, a vast empirical literature demonstrates that social identifications feature in people's spontaneous self-descriptions; in fact they often precede particularistic descriptors (e.g., Kuhn & McPartland, 1954; W. J. McGuire & C. V. McGuire, 1988; see Chapter 3). In addition, there is ample evidence that self-stereotyping is the outcome of a salient social identity (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; see Chapter 5). In this chapter, we will further investigate the conditions under which self-stereotyping occurs; we will also examine whether in some situations group identity has a more powerful effect on information processing than personal self-aspects.

One obvious way to proceed is to consider the situation where one's group identity conflicts with one's self-schema for a particular social domain. This occurs for example in the Independent Schematic female, where her social identity as a woman contradicts her personal self-schema for independence. The question then becomes: will the information processing consequences of personal self-schemata be attenuated or perhaps eliminated when a conflicting high-order identity is made salient?

This issue was examined by Onorato (1992; also reported by Onorato & Turner, 1996). Applying the classification scheme used by Markus (1977), individuals who were schematic for independence, schematic for dependence, or aschematic for both traits,
were identified. At a subsequent testing session, participants' social identities as men or women (respectively), and the corresponding norms of independence and dependence, were initially “primed” in the laboratory. Individuals then participated in a modified version of Markus' (1977) information processing paradigm. Specifically, Markus' personal identity condition – that is, her "me / not me" self-rating task – was replaced with a social identity condition – that is, an "us / them" self-rating task, where "us" referred to the self-inclusive category "women" for female participants and "men" for male participants. Onorato's methodology differed from Markus' (1977) in one more important respect: whereas Markus discarded those participants who did not fall into one of her three a priori categories (Independent Schematic, Dependent Schematic or Aschematic), Onorato retained these unclassified individuals in the main experiment. She considered it problematic that in past studies, a large number of individuals are invariably excluded because they do not fall into the investigators' preconceived categories (see Chapter 3).

The stimulus words presented in the us / them self-rating task included schema-relevant traits (i.e., independent and dependent words) and social identity-relevant traits (i.e., masculine and feminine words). Drawing from past research (Markus, 1977; Markus et al., 1982; Markus & Sentis, 1982), the following dependent measures were included: the proportion of traits endorsed as self-descriptive, response latencies for self-description, and confidence in self-description.

Contrary to self-schema theory, participants did not display schematic processing for schema-relevant traits; instead, social identity salience produced self-stereotyping. Irrespective of their personal self-schemata, male participants to endorse more independent than dependent traits as self-descriptive, as shown in Table 9.1. Conversely, female participants endorsed more dependent than independent traits. Table 9.1 also shows that a very similar pattern emerged for the endorsement of masculine and feminine traits.
Table 9.1
Mean proportion of independent, dependent, masculine and feminine words endorsed as self-descriptive as a function of sex of participant (Onorato, 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STIMULUS WORD-TYPE</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Masculine</th>
<th>Feminine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males (N = 55)</td>
<td>.74 (.23)</td>
<td>.29 (.24)</td>
<td>.84 (.21)</td>
<td>.33 (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females (N = 61)</td>
<td>.35 (.17)</td>
<td>.79 (.21)</td>
<td>.18 (.17)</td>
<td>.79 (.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Similarly, Onorato (1992) reported evidence of self-stereotyping on response latency data and confidence judgements. Response latencies for self-description were analysed by calculating two new measures. The first measure, consistent(i), was derived by averaging latencies for "us" responses to independent words and "them" responses to dependent words, and thus is an index of independence schematicity. The second measure, consistent(d), was derived by averaging latencies for "us" responses to dependent words and "them" responses to independent words, and thus reflects dependence schematicity. For masculine and feminine words, indices of masculine and feminine schematicity were similarly derived. These indices were entered into a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with pattern of responding as a repeated-measures factor. The results are presented in Table 9.2.

Table 9.2
Mean response latencies (sec) as a function of pattern of responding (Onorato, 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATTERN OF RESPONDING</th>
<th>Consistent(i)</th>
<th>Consistent(d)</th>
<th>Consistent(m)</th>
<th>Consistent(f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males (N = 55)</td>
<td>3.38 (1.27)</td>
<td>4.46 (2.29)</td>
<td>3.15 (1.29)</td>
<td>3.77 (1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females (N = 61)</td>
<td>3.68 (1.97)</td>
<td>3.06 (1.30)</td>
<td>4.16 (3.19)</td>
<td>2.76 (1.25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Irrespective of their schematicity, males were faster to respond in a manner that implied independence, and females were faster to respond in a manner that implied dependence. Similarly, males were faster to respond in a social identity-consistent way to masculine traits, and females were faster to respond in a social identity-consistent way to feminine traits.
Confidence ratings were analysed in a similar manner, yielding an interaction similar to that above for both schema-relevant and gender-relevant traits. Sex of participant also interacted with type of self-schemata, for both word sets. This interaction was in both cases largely due to the independent females being more confident than the independent males. In other words, the independent schematic females appeared to be a special group (cf. Endo, 1984).

Interestingly, even participants left unclassified in terms of self-schema theory displayed social identity-consistent responding which mirrored the schema effects expected from schematic individuals. Specifically, under conditions of a salient social identity, unclassified female participants behaved as though they had a self-schema for dependence (and indeed, femininity), while unclassified male participants behaved as though they had a self-schema for independence (and indeed, masculinity). By definition such individuals do not have self-schemata for independence or dependence, yet their performance on a range of cognitive tasks was suggestive of self-schemata. The results of this study have at least two important implications; firstly, they indicate that social identities can function like personal self-schemata in that they have similar information processing consequences, and secondly, they suggest that schema-type effects may be produced on the spot, rather than being the product of specific, stored knowledge structures.

The present study was designed to extend this line of inquiry. Previous research has established that men and women are readily differentiated in terms of the independence-dependence dimension (Antill et al., 1981); men are typically perceived as independent while women are typically viewed as dependent. Previous research has also established that the independence-dependence dimension can successfully be used to differentiate people into schematic and non-schematic groups (Markus, 1977).

Moreover, as noted Onorato (1992) has produced preliminary evidence that there is variation in the content of self-conceptions as a function of level of self-categorization, and evidence that under conditions of a salient social identity, self-category content can come to reflect collectively shared attributes rather than personal self-schemata. This study illustrated the relevance of the self-stereotyping phenomenon for the self-schema paradigm. However three aspects of this earlier research will be refined and examined
further here, using an all-female sample. Firstly, in the present study Markus' initial pretest measures of interpersonal independence-dependence will be supplemented by additional measures in an attempt to derive an even more powerful measure of individual differences. Secondly, Onorato’s design did not include Markus' baseline condition which would enable us to compare the information processing consequences of personal identity (i.e., me / not me judgements) with social identity (i.e., us / them judgements); both conditions will be included in the present study. Thirdly, all participants in the previous study were “primed”\(^1\) for group membership immediately prior to completing the “us / them” self-rating task. This manipulation was intended to encourage participants to think of themselves in group terms. The present study will explore the effect of this procedure by varying the extent to which people are “group-primed”. Thus for half the participants personality will be primed immediately prior to assignment to either the personal or social identity condition, while for the other half, group membership (i.e., being a woman) will be primed immediately prior to assignment to either the personal or social identity condition. This will enable us to determine whether or not the results of the previous study were a function of social identity in interaction with the group priming procedure.

Building on Onorato (1992), and in line with self-categorization theory, it was predicted that in the social identity condition, information processing will reflect the salience of a collectively shared gender identity. Female participants should self-stereotype on ingroup-defining traits (i.e., dependent and feminine words) in this condition. Secondly, it was predicted that information processing will reflect individual differences in the personal identity condition. Here, individuals who are high or low in interpersonal independence should respond in line with their respective personalities. Following previous research, these hypotheses will be examined using three dependent measures: the proportion of traits endorsed, latency for trait endorsement, and confidence in self-description. The possibility that individual differences may be more pronounced when

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\(^1\) The term “priming” is not being used here in the technical sense as it might be employed in cognitive psychology. Rather, it is a convenient term for describing a procedure whereby we bring to the forefront of people’s minds the fact of being an individual or a group member. In a sense one could think of this as a perceiver readiness or accessibility manipulation. However this term is deliberately not used in the present context because manipulations of personal and social identity are identity salience manipulations; as such, they simultaneously achieve identity accessibility and fit. Hence, we do not wish to imply an orthogonal manipulation of accessibility.
the "person-primed" and personal identity conditions coincide, and conversely that self-
stereotyping on ingroup-defining traits may be more pronounced when the "group-
primed" and social identity conditions coincide, will also be explored.

9.2 Method

9.2.1 Participants

Two hundred and three first year psychology undergraduates at the Australian National
University, Canberra, participated in exchange for course credit. Only females were
recruited. The mean age was 22.2 years (SD = 7.3).

9.2.2 Initial questionnaire (individual differences)

Participants completed the pretest measures in small groups comprising only other
females. Immediately before the initial personality questionnaire was administered,
respondents were told that the experimenter would also be conducting a second,
independent study ("The Social Perceptions and Attitudes Study") in one to two weeks' 
time, and that they would receive additional course credit for participating in the second
study. All participants were interested in participating in both phases of the research.

The questionnaire phase was introduced as "The Personality Study". Following Markus'
(1977) procedure, individuals were asked to rate themselves on eight bipolar scales
related to various behavioural domains. The order of presentation of scales and the right
/ left position of scale endpoints were determined randomly, and the same random order
was used for all participants. For each item, participants rated (a) the degree to which
the trait applied to them, (b) how important this trait was to them, and (c) how much
they varied from situation to situation on this trait. All ratings were made on 11-point
scales. These measures were adapted from Markus' (1977) original screening
questionnaire, although Markus never formally reported the variability question.
Importantly, four of the bipolar scales related to independence, including three scales
used previously by Markus to divide participants into low and high independence
groups.

In addition to the Markus measures, the pretest questionnaire contained Cialdini, Trost,
and Newsom's (1995) Preference for Consistency Scale (Short Form), and Hirschfeld,
Klerman, Gough, Barrett, Korchin, and Chodoff's (1977) Interpersonal Dependency
Inventory. Cialdini et al.'s scale contains nine items measuring the degree to which individuals prefer consistency in themselves and in other people. It contains items such as "It doesn't bother me much if my actions are inconsistent" and "I want my close friends to be predictable". The Interpersonal Dependency Inventory is a 48-item self-report inventory that comprises three sub-scales: (a) Emotional reliance on another person, (b) Lack of social self-confidence, and (c) Assertion of autonomy. A literature review revealed that this scale is widely used as a measure of interpersonal dependency. It was expected that scores on this scale would correlate with Markus' measures of independence-dependence. The inclusion of the Preference for Consistency Scale was exploratory. It is plausible that level of schematicity covaries with preference for consistency; on the other hand, schematicity for a specific behavioural domain need not imply a general preference for consistency (see p. 70, Markus, 1977, for a related discussion).

9.2.3 Design
The basic design was a 2 (personality: Low Independents or High Independents) x 2 (prime: person-primed or group-primed) x 2 (level of self-categorization: personal identity or social identity) between-subjects factorial.

9.2.4 Main experiment
9.2.4.1 Person- versus group-primed manipulation
For participants assigned to the person-primed condition, participants were brought back to the lab in groups of five on average. Experimental participants were not informed of a connection between this session and the initial questionnaire, and the second study was introduced under a different title ("A study of social perceptions and attitudes"). At the start of the session, participants were told that the study comprised a mixture of computer and paper-and-pencil tasks. Participants sat apart at small tables, and there was no communication or interaction between participants. Each participant received a response booklet that contained the following instructions:

We are interested in studying your personality. We want you to tell us what you are like, not just in the abstract, but in contrast to other women. It is true that all individuals are unique, and some characteristics will be more descriptive of you than other women, while other characteristics will be less descriptive of you than other women. We want your opinion about what you personally are like compared to the typical or average woman.
Please turn to the response booklet. On each page you will find an adjective, followed by a rating scale. Take a minute or two to think about each trait in turn. Once you have done that, please indicate on the rating scale provided the degree to which the trait is descriptive of you personally in contrast to the typical female. For each trait, you are also asked to explain in a few lines why the trait does or does not describe you personally. Three trait adjectives have been selected for you to consider in turn. You have 6 minutes in which to consider the three traits, and record your responses in this booklet.

Individuals were required to rate (a) the degree to which each of three traits was more characteristic of them personally than of the typical woman, and (b) how important each trait was to them personally, on separate 11-point scales. Individuals rated themselves on the traits tactful, cautious and dependent (in that order). These adjectives were selected because they are a part of the gender stereotype for women (Antill et al., 1981; S. L. Bem, 1974; Drinkwater, 1979), and are related to dependence (Markus, 1977); these traits could therefore be used to prime one's personal position on this trait dimension (high or low) in the person-primed condition, and the group's position on this trait dimension in the group-primed condition. The requirement that participants explain their ratings in a few lines replaced the group discussion aspect of the corresponding task in the group-primed condition.

Participants assigned to the group-primed condition were brought back to the lab for what was ostensibly a separate study in groups of two to four. Participants were told that the study comprised a mixture of computer and paper-and-pencil tasks, and that the first task was a group discussion. At each session a face-to-face discussion group was formed (on average, there were three individuals per discussion group). As far as possible, each discussion group comprised individuals who had been classified the same way, that is, either three Low or three High Independents. Each participant received a response booklet that contained the following instructions:

We are interested in studying women's attitudes to women. We want the three of you to discuss what you think women are like, not just in the abstract, but in contrast to men. While it is true that not all women are alike, in our culture some characteristics are considered to be more descriptive of women than men. We want your opinion about what the typical or average woman is like compared to the typical or average man.

Please turn to the response booklet. On each page you will find an adjective, followed by a rating scale. You are required to discuss each trait
in turn amongst yourselves, and then to indicate on the rating scale provided the degree to which the trait is more descriptive of women than men. Three traits have been selected for discussion. Please try to reach unanimous agreement on how characteristic of the typical female in contrast to the typical male these traits are. You have 6 minutes in which to discuss the three traits, and record your consensual response on the rating scales provided.

Discussion groups were required to rate (a) the degree to which each of three traits was more typical of women than men, and (b) how important each trait was to them as women, on separate 11-point scales. Once again, the traits were tactful, cautious and dependent (presented in that order).

9.2.4.2 Content and latency of personal versus social identity

For the remainder of the experimental session, all participants underwent the same procedure. Each participant individually completed a modified version of Markus' (1977) response latency task on a Macintosh computer. Before participants began the response latency task, they were given these additional instructions:

Now there are two things that I want you to keep in mind as you do this task. First, and above all, try to be accurate in using the keyboard. Don't be in such a hurry to respond that you regret your decision. At the same time, do not dwell on any one item; if you are having trouble deciding, just give me your first reaction.

These instructions were adapted from Fazio (1990), and were included to induce participants to respond as accurately and as quickly as possible, in order to reduce the noise in the latency data collected. Participants were also instructed to use their dominant hand when responding on the computer. At this stage, each participant was randomly assigned to either the personal identity or social identity condition. In the personal identity condition, the computer instructions read:

We want you to think of yourself as an individual, and we want you to think about the characteristics you have as an individual compared to other women. We are going to give you a list of characteristics and want you to tell us whether you think you as an individual have them or not. Each characteristic will be presented one at a time on the computer screen. If you think you have each characteristic compared to other women, please respond by pressing the ME key. If you think other women have each characteristic in contrast to you, please press the NOT ME key.
The corresponding instructions for the social identity condition were:

We want you to think of yourself as a woman, and we want you to think about the characteristics you have as a woman compared to men. We are going to give you a list of characteristics and want you to tell us whether you think you as a woman have them or not. Each characteristic will be presented one at a time on the computer screen. If you think you have each characteristic compared to men, please respond by pressing the US key. If you think men have each characteristic in contrast to you, please press the THEM key.

Participants were presented with 84 trait adjectives, one at a time on the computer screen. Stimulus words were presented following two practice trials. They included 12 masculine words, 12 feminine words, 15 independent words, 15 dependent words, and 30 control words. The masculine and feminine words were taken from various sex-role scales; most were drawn from the Australian Sex Role Scale (Antill et al., 1981). The independent and dependent words were all taken from Markus (1977). The 30 control words comprised the 15 creative and 15 uncreative words originally used as fillers by Markus (1977).

Each adjective was displayed on the computer screen for exactly two seconds. Two keys on the keyboard were covered with adhesive labels; depending on the condition, the m key was labelled either "me" or "us", and the v key was labelled either "not me" or "them". Both the response and the response latency were recorded (although participants were not aware that latencies were being measured). Each judgement was followed by a confidence rating on a six-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 6 (very confident). The order of presentation of words was randomly determined separately for each participant.

Participants were then administered a brief questionnaire in which they were asked to guess what the purpose of the study was, and to indicate whether they had failed to understand any of the instructions, and whether they suspected a connection between the experimental session and the initial questionnaire. Participants were then debriefed, thanked for their participation and dismissed.
9.3 Results

9.3.1 Preliminary analyses

9.3.1.1 Classification into personality types

On obtaining pretest measures, a reliability analysis was performed to determine which combination of items yielded the most powerful indicator of interpersonal independence–dependence. All scales related to independence were scored in the independent direction; importance scales were scored such that higher numbers reflect greater importance; variability judgements and the Preference For Consistency Scale were scored such that high numbers reflect greater stability and consistency, respectively.

The highest Cronbach's alpha was obtained for a 14-item scale comprising standardised self-ratings, importance and variability ratings for each of the following bipolar scales: self-confident–lacking in self-confidence; independent–dependent; leader–follower; individualist–conformist (12 items in total); and standardised scores on the Lack of Social Self-confidence Scale (reverse scored) and the Assertion of Autonomy Scale. Together these 14 items formed a scale with a Cronbach's alpha of .80 (mean inter-item correlation = .22). In order to divide the sample into high and low independence groups, we performed a median split on mean scores on this 14-item scale.

The "Low Independents" were individuals who were relatively low on the various independence scales, they said that this characteristic was not particularly important, and they reported that they vary on this trait. By contrast, the "High Independents" gave very high independence ratings, very high importance ratings, and perceived themselves as very stable on this trait. The means for each group on various pretest measures (including a self-esteem measure, total scores on the Interpersonal Dependence Scale or IDI, reverse scored, and scores on the Preference for Consistency Scale or PFC – measures which were not used in the classification of participants) are given in Table 9.3, together with the relevant inferential statistics. Low Independents differed from High Independents on all pretest measures except the Preference for Consistency Scale (PFC).
Table 9.3
Summary of differences between Low (N = 101) and High (N = 102) Independents at pretest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Low Independents</th>
<th>High Independents</th>
<th>F value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-perceived independence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.62 (.99)</td>
<td>8.72 (.99)</td>
<td>230.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of independence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.32 (1.21)</td>
<td>8.88 (1.00)</td>
<td>100.95*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of independence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.02 (1.26)</td>
<td>7.14 (1.67)</td>
<td>103.99*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-perceived self-esteem&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.85 (2.16)</td>
<td>8.23 (2.00)</td>
<td>22.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of self-esteem&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.51 (2.00)</td>
<td>5.97 (2.75)</td>
<td>18.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDI&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-49.72 (13.93)</td>
<td>-35.34 (13.27)</td>
<td>56.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.71 (1.42)</td>
<td>4.54 (1.41)</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. F values are based on 201 df. *p < .001

a. Mean scores based on four 11-point scales; higher scores indicate higher independence, importance or stability, respectively.
b. Self-esteem ratings were made on two 11-point scales, as follows: "Rate your overall level of self-opinion or self-esteem, that is, how high or low you judge your total picture of yourself to be, and how much your self-esteem varies from one situation to another". Higher scores indicate higher personal self-esteem or stability, respectively. Markus (1977) previously used this item.
c. 48-item scale; higher scores indicate lower interpersonal dependence.
d. 9-point scale; higher scores indicate a greater preference for consistency.

Although empirically derived, this classification scheme captures the spirit of Markus in that it takes into account the extremity of self-ratings, importance ratings, and perceived stability on the central dimension. This individual difference measure captures the degree to which people are independent schematic. The High Independents are schematic for independence; they rate themselves as high in independence, rate this trait as important, and report that they are stable on this trait. The Low Independents are those that do not fulfil the criterion in a unitary way; they rate themselves as relatively dependent, rate this trait as relatively low in importance, and report that they vary on this trait. This classification represents the most powerful measure of individual differences attainable for this sample, and has the advantage of capturing the natural variation in the sample. By contrast, Markus' pre-conceived classification system has the drawback of eliminating in many cases the bulk of the original sample.

9.3.1.2 Person-primed condition

One preliminary analysis was performed in the person-primed condition. Namely, we examined whether there was a difference between Low and High Independents on the three critical self-rating scales designed to make personal identity along the
independence–dependence dimension salient. More specifically, participants were asked "Assuming some appropriate context, are you personally typically more tactful or less tactful than the typical woman?", and ratings were made on a scale from 1 (less tactful) to 11 (more tactful). Participants then answered the question "Is this characteristic important to you personally?" on an 11-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unimportant) to 11 (extremely important).

Table 9.4 presents mean self-ratings on the traits "tactful", "cautious", and "dependent", and their respective importance ratings, for Low and High Independents, respectively. As can be seen from this table, High Independents rated themselves as significantly less dependent ($M = 3.09$) than Low Independents ($M = 5.04$) on the dependence scale. This finding lends support to the view that the classification of participants which was based on pretest self-ratings, continued to capture individual differences in a meaningful way at the start of the second testing session. No other differences were detected between the two groups. Although High Independents rated their own independence as very important ($M = 7.81$), they did not differ significantly from the Low Independents on this measure.

Table 9.4
Mean trait endorsements for Low ($N = 49$) and High Independents ($N = 54$) in the person-primed condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait dimension</th>
<th>Low Independents</th>
<th>High Independents</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>$F$ value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Tactful</td>
<td>6.63 (1.99)</td>
<td>6.78 (2.29)</td>
<td>6.71 (2.14)</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Cautious</td>
<td>6.82 (2.04)</td>
<td>6.31 (2.45)</td>
<td>6.55 (2.27)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Dependent</td>
<td>5.04 (2.36)</td>
<td>3.09 (1.61)</td>
<td>4.02 (2.22)</td>
<td>24.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Trait (1)</td>
<td>7.22 (1.93)</td>
<td>7.41 (2.35)</td>
<td>7.32 (2.15)</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Trait (2)</td>
<td>6.47 (1.68)</td>
<td>5.76 (2.21)</td>
<td>6.10 (2.00)</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Trait (3)</td>
<td>6.90 (2.72)</td>
<td>7.81 (3.05)</td>
<td>7.38 (2.92)</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. * $p < .001$. $F$ values are based on 101 df.

9.3.1.3 Group-primed condition

In the group-primed condition, two preliminary analyses were required. According to Kenny and Judd (1986), non-independence of observations due to groups is likely to arise if the members of groups interact during the course of the experimental session, as
was the case in the group-primed condition of the present study. It was therefore necessary to assess whether the independence assumption in the analysis of variance was violated prior to conducting the main analyses. Non-independence due to groups was assessed by a series of one-way ANOVAs performed on a subset of dependent measures, in which "discussion group" served as the between-subjects factor. There was no evidence to suggest that individuals from the same discussion group subsequently gave more similar responses than individuals from different discussion groups. Thus, it appeared that the assumption of independent observations was upheld in the present study.

Second, it was necessary to examine whether the discussion groups in fact endorsed the social stereotype that women were more dependent than men. Discussion groups were asked to reach agreement on the degree to which the traits "tactful", "cautious" and "dependent" were descriptive of women. More specifically, the question was: "Assuming some appropriate context, are women typically more tactful or less tactful than men?", and ratings were made on a scale from 1 (less tactful) to 11 (more tactful). Participants then answered the question "Is this characteristic of women important to you as women?" on an 11-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unimportant) to 11 (extremely important).

One-way ANOVAs performed on each trait (and importance rating) in turn revealed that there was no difference between Low and High Independents in the degree to which they endorsed the social stereotype of dependence for women. Mean ratings on each trait are given in Table 9.5. It is clear from these mean scores that the trait "dependent" was somewhat less strongly endorsed than the traits "tactful" and "cautious". Although the scale mid-point (i.e., 6) was not labelled, it is likely to have been interpreted as "equally tactful, cautious, or dependent". It therefore appears to be the case that the present sample tended to endorse the stereotype moderately.

The means in Table 9.5 can be compared with "Total" scores in Table 9.4. It appears that women are less inclined to ascribe the trait "dependent" to themselves personally (M = 4.02) than they are to ascribe it to their group (M = 6.07). Likewise, participants tended to endorse the traits "tactful" and "cautious" more strongly in the group context.
(i.e., group-primed condition) than in the individual context (i.e., person-primed condition).

Table 9.5
Mean trait endorsements for group discussion task in the group-primed condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait dimension</th>
<th>Mean endorsement (N = 27 groups)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Tactful</td>
<td>7.56 (.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Cautious</td>
<td>7.37 (.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Dependent</td>
<td>6.07 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Trait (1)</td>
<td>7.33 (1.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Trait (2)</td>
<td>5.70 (2.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Trait (3)</td>
<td>4.00 (2.95)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.3.2 Major analyses

Of the 203 participants to complete pretest measures, 200 individuals subsequently participated in the main experiment. The distribution of participants across cells of the 2 (personality: Low or High Independents) x 2 (prime: person-primed, group-primed) x 2 (level of self-categorization: personal or social identity) experimental design is indicated in Table 9.6.

Table 9.6
Distribution of participants across cells of the experimental design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERSON-PRIMED</th>
<th>GROUP-PRIMED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Low Indep. = Low Independents; High Indep. = High Independents.

9.3.2.1 Self-stereotyping on independent and dependent words

The first set of analyses was performed to establish whether there was any evidence of self-stereotyping on ingroup-relevant traits under conditions of a salient social identity. That is, did our female participants self-stereotype on dependent relative to independent traits under conditions of a salient social identity? Data were analysed by means of a 2
(personality) x 2 (prime) x 2 (level of self-categorization) x 2 (word type: independent, dependent) ANOVA, with repeated-measures on the last factor.

9.3.2.1.1 Trait endorsements

A four-way ANOVA was performed on the mean proportion of independent and dependent words endorsed as self-descriptive, revealing significant main effects for stimulus word type, $F(1, 192) = 93.68, p < .001$, and level of self-categorization, $F(1, 192) = 6.61, p < .05$. Individuals endorsed more dependent ($M = .69, SD = .20$) than independent words ($M = .48, SD = .24$), on average. In addition, more (independent and dependent) traits were endorsed in the personal identity condition ($M = .60, SD = .11$) than in the social identity condition ($M = .56, SD = .12$).

In addition, the level of self-categorization x word type interaction was significant, $F(1, 192) = 69.91, p < .001$, as was the personality x word type interaction, $F(1, 192) = 31.91, p < .001$. However, these interactions were qualified by the significant three-way interaction between personality, level of self-categorization and word type, $F(1, 192) = 7.97, p < .01$. The means relevant to this higher-order interaction are presented in Table 9.7.

Table 9.7
Mean proportion of independent and dependent traits endorsed as a function of personality and level of self-categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INDEPENDENT WORDS</th>
<th>DEPENDENT WORDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>.49 (.20)</td>
<td>.69 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>.33 (.20)</td>
<td>.41 (.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Low Indep. = Low Independents; High Indep. = High Independents.

As can be seen from Table 9.7, at the level of personal identity a very clear cross-over effect emerges, such that High Independents endorsed more independent traits than Low independents, $t(192) = 4.43, p < .01$, and Low Independents endorsed more dependent traits than High Independents, $t(192) = 3.54, p < .01$. Low Independents also endorsed more dependent than independent traits, $t(192) = 4.60, p < .01$, while High Independents
endorsed more independent than dependent traits, $t(192) = 3.35$, $p < .01$. In direct contrast, in the social identity condition both groups endorsed more dependent than independents words, $t(192) = 10.16$ and $7.45$, for Low and High Independents respectively, $p < .01$. Equally importantly, in this condition, Low and High Independents did not differ in the number of independent words endorsed, or in the number of dependent words endorsed.

9.3.2.1.2 Response latencies

For latency data, two summary measures of social identity-consistent responding were calculated. The first measure yields the mean latency for all responses which are consistent with an independent self-concept; it was obtained by averaging latencies for "yes" (that is, "me" or "us") responses to independent words and "no" (that is, "not me" or "them") responses to dependent words. This measure will be referred to as consistent(independent). The second measure yields the mean latency for all responses which are consistent with a dependent self-concept; this measure was obtained by averaging latencies for "yes" responses to dependent words and "no" responses to independent words. This measure will be referred to as consistent(dependent). Those participants with a mean latency in excess of 10 seconds on either measure were deleted prior to the main analysis. The 10 second cut off point was arbitrarily selected. This measure, coupled with a logarithmic (base 10) transformation of the data, was taken in an attempt to minimise the influence of extreme outliers, which may be due to distraction during the self-rating task (Fazio, 1990). Four extreme outliers were thus detected and deleted from the main analysis. For consistency across analyses, these cases were also deleted from the subsequent analysis of confidence data for independent and dependent traits.

The four-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects for social identity-consistent responding, $F(1, 187) = 25.55$, $p < .001$, and level of self-categorization, $F(1, 187) = 6.63$, $p < .05$. Individuals were generally faster to make consistent(dependent) ($M = 2895$ ms, $SD = 1010$) than consistent(independent) responses ($M = 3286$ ms, $SD = 1$

2 When these cases were likewise deleted from the analysis of trait endorsements for independent and dependent words, the same results as those reported above were obtained.

3 Missing data account for the reduced degrees of freedom.
They were also generally faster to respond in the personal identity \( (M = 2.898 \text{ ms}, \ SD = 931) \) than the social identity condition \( (M = 3.280 \text{ ms}, \ SD = 1.115) \). There were no significant main or interaction effects involving the individual difference measure\(^4\).

However, the level of self-categorization x social identity-consistent responding interaction was highly significant, \( F(1, 187) = 12.83, p < .001 \). The means are presented in Table 9.8. Participants were significantly faster to make consistent(dependent) than consistent(independent) responses in the social identity condition, \( t(187) = 5.22, p < .01 \) (with Sidak). They were also significantly faster to make consistent(independent) responses in the personal identity than the social identity condition, \( t(187) = 5.68, p < .01 \) (with Sidak).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSISTENT ( \left( \text{INDEPENDENT} \right) )</th>
<th>CONSISTENT ( \left( \text{DEPENDENT} \right) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>2 943 (1 034)</td>
<td>2 854 (1 079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>3 625 (1 518)</td>
<td>2 935 (940)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

9.3.2.1.3 Confidence ratings

For mean confidence ratings, the four-way ANOVA\(^5\) revealed significant main effects for level of self-categorization, \( F(1, 187) = 25.71, p < .001 \), and personality, \( F(1, 187) = 4.71, p < .05 \). Specifically, individuals were more confident in their responses if they participated in the personal identity \( (M = 4.29, \ SD = 0.61) \) than in the social identity condition \( (M = 3.75, \ SD = 0.88) \), and High Independents were on average more confident \( (M = 4.13, \ SD = 0.86) \) than Low Independents \( (M = 3.90, \ SD = 0.72) \).

Personality also interacted with social identity-consistent responding, \( F(1, 187) = 18.03, p < .001 \). The relevant means are presented in Table 9.9. Low Independents were

\(^4\) A marginal personality x word type interaction emerged, \( F(1, 187) = 3.12, p = .079 \). In brief, the means suggested that both Low and High Independents were marginally faster to make consistent(dependent) than consistent(independent) responses. In addition, High Independents were marginally faster than Low Independents to make consistent(independent) responses (see Table D.1, Appendix D).

\(^5\) Missing data account for the reduced degrees of freedom.
significantly more confident in their consistent(dependent) than consistent(independent) responses, $t(187) = 4.29$, $p < .01$ (with Sidak). In addition, High Independents were significantly more confident than Low Independents when making consistent(independent) responses, $t(187) = 7.21$, $p < .01$ (with Sidak).

Table 9.9
Mean confidence in social identity-consistent responses as a function of personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSISTENT (INDEPENDENT)</th>
<th>CONSISTENT (DEPENDENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOW INDEPENDENTS</td>
<td>3.78 (0.87)</td>
<td>4.02 (0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH INDEPENDENTS</td>
<td>4.18 (0.90)</td>
<td>4.08 (0.90)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Social identity-consistent responding also interacted with level of self-categorization, $F(1, 187) = 5.94$, $p < .05$. The means relevant to this interaction are given in Table 9.10. Participants were significantly more confident in their consistent(dependent) than in their consistent(independent) responses in the social identity condition, $t(187) = 3.25$, $p < .01$ (with Sidak). In addition, participants were significantly more confident in both their consistent(independent) and consistent(dependent) responses in the personal identity condition than in the social identity condition, $t(187) = 11.72$ and $7.93$, respectively, $p < .01$ (with Sidak).

Table 9.10
Mean confidence in social identity-consistent responses as a function of level of self-categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSISTENT (INDEPENDENT)</th>
<th>CONSISTENT (DEPENDENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>4.31 (0.67)</td>
<td>4.28 (0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>3.66 (0.99)</td>
<td>3.83 (0.85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

9.3.2.2 Self-stereotyping on masculine and feminine words

In addition to independent and dependent words, we would expect to see effects of self-stereotyping on masculine and feminine traits, under appropriate conditions. The next
set of analyses was designed to establish whether self-stereotyping occurred on feminine relative to masculine traits, under conditions of a salient social identity.

9.3.2.2.1 Trait endorsements
A four-way ANOVA performed on the mean proportion of masculine and feminine words endorsed revealed significant main effects for stimulus word type, F(1, 192) = 486.63, p < .001, and level of self-categorization, F(1, 192) = 10.27, p < .01. On average, our female participants endorsed more feminine (M = .80, SD = .16) than masculine words (M = .41, SD = .23) as self-descriptive. They also endorsed more of these (masculine and feminine) traits in the personal identity condition (M = .63, SD = .13) than in the social identity condition (M = .58, SD = .12).

In addition, significant interactions were obtained for level of self-categorization and word type, F(1, 192) = 79.52, p < .001, personality and word type, F(1, 192) = 9.83, p < .01, and personality and prime, F(1, 192) = 4.35, p < .05. In addition, a significant three-way interaction emerged between personality, prime, and level of self-categorization, F(1, 192) = 5.97, p < .05. This interaction did not involve trait type, and therefore is trivial from a theoretical point of view (for means, see Table D.2, Appendix D). The significant three-way interaction between personality, level of self-categorization and word type, F(1, 192) = 4.04, p < .05, is of greater interest. The means relevant to this interaction are presented in Table 9.11.

Table 9.11
Mean proportion of masculine and feminine traits endorsed as a function of personality and level of self-categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MASCULINE WORDS</th>
<th>FEMININE WORDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>.45 (.17)</td>
<td>.58 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>.31 (.19)</td>
<td>.30 (.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Low Indep. = Low Independents; High Indep. = High Independents.

As can be seen from this table, differences emerged between Low and High Independents in the personal identity condition, but not in the social identity condition.
where both groups self-stereotyped on feminine traits. More specifically, in the personal identity condition High independents endorsed more masculine traits than Low Independents, $t(192) = 3.71, p < .01$. In addition, both Low and High Independents endorsed more feminine than masculine traits; $t(192) = 9.05$ and $4.04$, respectively, $p < .01$. In contrast to the personal identity condition where individual differences emerged for the endorsement of masculine traits, in the social identity condition Low and High Independents endorsed masculine traits to the same degree. Moreover, an even stronger tendency to self-stereotype on feminine rather than masculine traits emerged in this condition, for both Low and High Independents; $t(192) = 16.33$ and $15.16$, respectively, $p < .01$ (with Sidak).

9.3.2.2.2 Response latencies
Response latency data were treated as in the analysis of independent and dependent words. That is, a logarithmic (base 10) transformation was applied, indices of consistent(masculine) and consistent(feminine) responding were derived, and any obvious outliers (mean latency > 10 sec) were deleted prior to the main analysis. One extreme outlier was thus detected and excluded from the analysis. For consistency across analyses, this case was also deleted from the subsequent analysis of confidence data for masculine and feminine words\(^6\). Whereas in the treatment of independent and dependent traits, consistent(dependent) responses were taken as an indicator of social identity salience, in the present analysis consistent(feminine) responses were taken as an indicator of self-stereotyping.

A four-way ANOVA\(^7\) with social identity-consistent responding as a repeated measure factor revealed significant main effects for social identity-consistent responding, $F(1, 189) = 34.51, p < .001$, and level of self-categorization, $F(1, 189) = 5.55, p < .05$. On average, individuals were faster to make consistent(feminine) ($M = 2518$ ms, $SD = 839$) than consistent(masculine) responses ($M = 3021$ ms, $SD = 1426$). They were also generally faster to respond in the personal identity ($M = 2605$ ms, $SD = 860$) than in the social identity condition ($M = 2932$ ms, $SD = 1118$).

\(^6\) When this case was likewise deleted from the analysis of trait endorsements for masculine and feminine words, the same results as those reported above were obtained.

\(^7\) Missing data account for the reduced degrees of freedom.
In addition, a significant personality x social identity-consistent responding interaction was obtained, $F(1, 189) = 4.05, p < .05$. Moreover, personality interacted with level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding, $F(1, 189) = 4.34, p < .05$. In addition a three-way interaction emerged between prime, level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding, $F(1, 189) = 7.98, p < .01$. These three-way interactions are presented in Table 9.12 and 9.13, respectively.

Table 9.12
Mean latency (ms) for social identity-consistent responses as a function of personality and level of self-categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSISTENT (MASCULINE)</th>
<th>CONSISTENT (FEMININE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>3 021 (1 474)</td>
<td>2 558 (944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>3 409 (1 662)</td>
<td>3 097 (1 436)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Low Indep. = Low Independents; High Indep. = High Independents.

As shown in Table 9.12, the personal identity condition revealed differences in speed of processing between Low and High Independents, while the social identity condition revealed an attenuation of these differences. Specifically, while Low Independents were faster to make consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses at the level of personal identity, $t(189) = 3.95, p < .01$, High Independents were equally fast to make consistent(feminine) and consistent(masculine) responses, $t(189) < 1$. In addition, High Independents were significantly faster than Low Independents in making consistent(masculine) responses in the personal identity condition, $t(189) = 2.80, p < .05$. In contrast, in the social identity condition both Low and High Independents were significantly faster to make consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses, $t(189) = 3.58$ and $3.62$, respectively, $p < .01$.

As can be seen from Table 9.13, the three-way interaction did not qualify the main effects for social identity-consistent responding and level of self-categorization. Consistent(feminine) responses were significantly faster than consistent(masculine)
responses in three cases. Firstly, the group-primed condition paired with social identity facilitated consistent(feminine) responses more so than any other combination of factors, t(189) = 4.82, p < .01 (with Sidak). Secondly, the person-primed condition paired with social identity also facilitated consistent(feminine) responses relative to consistent(masculine) responses, but now the size of the difference was attenuated, t(189) = 2.47, p < .1 (with Sidak). Thirdly, the person-primed condition paired with personal identity also produced significantly faster consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses for this female sample, t(189) = 3.27, p < .01 (with Sidak).

Table 9.13
Mean latency (ms) for social identity-consistent responses as a function of prime and level of self-categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERSON-PRIMED</th>
<th>GROUP-PRIMED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>Consistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(masculine)</td>
<td>(feminine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>2 928</td>
<td>2 359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1 447)</td>
<td>(704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>3 234</td>
<td>2 705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1 641)</td>
<td>(926)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

9.3.2.2.3 Confidence ratings

For confidence ratings, the four-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects for social identity-consistent responding, F(1, 189) = 66.59, p < .001, and level of self-categorization, F(1, 189) = 32.10, p < .001. On average, individuals were more confident in their consistent(feminine) (M = 4.27, SD = 0.79) than consistent(masculine) responses (M = 3.91, SD = 0.95). They were also generally more confident in their responses if they participated in the personal identity (M = 4.40, SD = 0.60) than the social identity condition (M = 3.79, SD = 0.88).

These main effects were however qualified by the significant interaction between level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding, F(1, 189) = 16.44, p < .001.

* Missing data account for the reduced degrees of freedom.
.001, and between personality and social identity-consistent responding, $F(1, 189) = 4.50, p < .05$. The prime x level of self-categorization x social identity-consistent responding interaction approached significance, $F(1, 189) = 3.58, p = .06$. Moreover, a significant three-way interaction between personality, level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding was once again obtained, $F(1, 189) = 4.34, p < .05$. The relevant means are presented in Table 9.14.

Table 9.14
Mean confidence in social identity-consistent responses as a function of personality and level of self-categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSISTENT (MASCULINE)</th>
<th>CONSISTENT (FEMININE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Indep.</td>
<td>High Indep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>4.11 (0.70)</td>
<td>4.51 (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>3.51 (0.96)</td>
<td>3.52 (1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.05 (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.06 (0.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Low Indep. = Low Independents; High Indep. = High Independents.

Table 9.14 reveals the emergence of individual differences in the personal identity condition, at least for consistent(masculine) responses, and a tendency towards self-stereotyping on feminine words in the social identity condition. More specifically, in the personal identity condition High Independents were more confident than Low Independents in their consistent(masculine) responses, $t(189) = 4.54, p < .01$. In addition, Low Independents were more confident in their consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses, $t(189) = 4.05, p < .01$. In contrast, in the social identity condition both Low and High Independents were more confident in their consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses, $t(189) = 6.19$ and 6.13, respectively, $p < .01$.

9.4 Discussion
This study was designed to investigate change in self-conception within a modified version of Markus' (1977) information processing paradigm. Previous investigators have argued that the self-concept comprises enduring personality structures that guide
information processing when stimuli relevant to one's personality are encountered. Thus when strongly independent people are presented with independent and dependent traits, they should consistently endorse self-congruent traits and reject conflicting traits. Tests of this hypothesis have, however, proceeded on the assumption that the word "self" in the previous sentence can be equated with "personal identity". By contrast, in this experiment we have attempted to show that although self-conception may be consistent with a personality variable when individual self-aspects are salient, when a conflicting self-inclusive group identity is made salient, the same individual may respond in a diametrically opposed way.

More specifically, it was predicted that female participants would strongly endorse ingroup-defining traits (i.e., dependent and feminine words) in the social identity condition, and conversely, that individual differences would emerge between Low and High Independents in the personal identity condition. In this case, Low Independents should endorse more dependent than independent words, and High Independents should endorse more independent than dependent words. Between-group differences should also be consistent with the personality variable.

For the proportion of independent and dependent words endorsed, the predicted interaction between personality, level of self-categorization, and word type was obtained. As expected, individual differences came to the fore in the personal identity condition but not in the social identity condition. At the level of personal identity a very clear cross-over effect emerged, such that Low Independents endorsed more dependent than independent traits, while High Independents endorsed more independent than dependent traits. Low Independents also endorsed more dependent traits than High Independents, and High Independents endorsed more independent traits than Low independents. Thus the personality variable emerged under appropriate conditions. In direct contrast, in the social identity condition both groups endorsed more dependent than independents words. In this condition, Low and High Independents did not differ in the number of dependent words endorsed, or in the number of independent words endorsed. Thus under conditions of a salient social identity, self-perception is depersonalised; it tends to reflect the attributes that one shares with other ingroup members, more so than interpersonal differences within the ingroup.
For response times to process independent and dependent words, the expected three-way interaction was not obtained. In addition, there was no evidence to suggest that personality affected processing times for independent and dependent words. However, a lower-order interaction did emerge between level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding, yielding partial support for the hypothesis. In the personal identity condition, groups did not differ in their speed of processing for consistent(independent) and consistent(dependent) responses. In contrast, and as expected, in the social identity condition participants were significantly faster to make consistent(dependent) than consistent(independent) responses. Participants were also significantly faster to make consistent(dependent) responses in the personal identity than in the social identity condition; this is also consistent with the self-categorization analysis.

Likewise the three-way interaction was not obtained for confidence ratings, however the two-way interaction between level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding did emerge. This interaction revealed that in the social identity condition participants were significantly more confident in their consistent(dependent) than in their consistent(independent) responses. Furthermore, participants were significantly more confident in their consistent(independent) responses in the personal identity condition rather than the social identity condition. These findings are not inconsistent with the self-categorization analysis, although a significant three-way interaction involving personality would provide better support for the analysis (in fact, this interaction was significant at p < .065). Somewhat more problematic for the analysis is the observation that participants were also more confident in their consistent(dependent) responses in the personal identity condition rather than in the social identity condition; although we expected the opposite pattern to emerge, this finding may be due to a reluctance to (confidently) endorse the social stereotype at the group level.

In addition, the analysis of confidence ratings revealed a personality x social identity-consistent responding interaction. While High Independents were equally confident in their consistent(dependent) and consistent(independent) responses, Low Independents were significantly more confident in their consistent(dependent) than in their consistent(independent) responses. This makes sense if we take into account that for the Low Independent group but not the Highs, dependence is consistent with both personal
and social identity. In addition, High Independents were found to be significantly more confident than Low Independents when making consistent(independent) responses – a difference that appears to be due to the low confidence that Low Independents had in their endorsement of independent traits.

The results obtained for masculine and feminine traits lend further support to the self-categorization analysis. Firstly, for the proportion of masculine and feminine words endorsed, a significant interaction was obtained between personality, level of self-categorization and word type. This interaction revealed a pattern very similar to that previously observed for independent and dependent trait endorsements, however the perfect cross-over effect that was observed for independent and dependent trait endorsements in the personal identity condition did not emerge as clearly here, on traits that are indirectly linked to the focal personality variable. This time, both Low and High Independents endorsed more feminine than masculine traits in the personal identity condition, however the tendency to ascribe feminine traits to the self was attenuated here compared to the social identity condition. Moreover, High Independents endorsed more masculine words than Low Independents. It was here, with regard to the endorsement of masculine traits in the personal identity condition, that the individual difference variable emerged. Assuming a conceptual overlap between masculinity and independence (see Chapters 7 and 8), it is arguable that the differential endorsement of masculine traits by the two personality groups is an expression of the individual difference variable. In contrast, the social identity condition revealed a strong tendency to self-stereotype on feminine words. Specifically, both Low and High Independents endorsed more feminine than masculine words in the social identity condition; moreover, High Independents self-stereotyped on feminine traits to the same degree as Low Independents. Taken together, these observations support self-categorization theory, which predicts that self-category content will vary systematically as a function of the level at which the self is categorized, and further, that self-categorizing can produce individual differences in intragroup contexts, and eliminate them in intergroup contexts.

For response times to process masculine and feminine words, significant main effects emerged for social identity-consistent responding and level of self-categorization; thus in all cases consistent(feminine) responses were faster than consistent(masculine)
responses, and participants were faster to respond in the personal identity than in the social identity condition. The main effect for level of self-categorization will be commented upon shortly. A brief comment can be made regarding the main effect for social identity-consistent responding. Assuming that to a degree individuals infer the attributes of their group from their own person and their personal attributes from those of their group, this may explain why as a general rule, female participants are faster to make consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses.

Moreover, and in contrast to the corresponding analysis for independent and dependent traits where a level of self-categorization x social identity-consistent responding interaction was obtained, in this case the predicted three-way interaction emerged between personality, level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding. The personal identity condition revealed differences in speed of processing between Low and High Independents, while the social identity condition revealed an attenuation of these differences. Specifically, while Low Independents were faster to make consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses at the level of personal identity, High Independents were equally fast to make consistent(feminine) and consistent(masculine) responses. The personal identity condition further revealed that High Independents were faster than Low Independents to make responses that imply masculinity. In contrast, in the social identity condition both groups were faster to make consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses. This interaction demonstrates the consequences of depersonalisation for speed of processing of gender-relevant attributes.

A second interesting interaction to emerge for response times for masculine and feminine words involved the variables prime, level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding. Interestingly, the interaction revealed that the group-primed condition paired with social identity facilitated consistent(feminine) responses relative to consistent(masculine) responses more so than any other combination of factors. In contrast, when the group-primed condition was paired with the personal identity condition, consistent(feminine) responses were not significantly faster than consistent(masculine) responses. These observations suggest that although priming group membership prior to eliciting social self-ratings can further enhance the salience of social identity, the priming procedure itself is not driving social identity-consistent
responding. Secondly, the person-primed condition paired with social identity also yielded significantly faster consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses; however it appears that in this case personal priming is working against the “us / them” manipulation, slowing down speed of consistent(feminine) responses relative to the “group-primed and social identity” combination. Thirdly, albeit to an even lesser extent, the person-primed condition paired with personal identity also produced significantly faster consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses for this female sample. Combined, these observations suggest that femininity is personally as well as socially defining for female participants, but also that social identity-consistent responding will emerge most clearly in the social identity condition.

In short, on inspecting the three-way interaction involving prime, it appears that the social identity or personal identity task which follows the prime manipulations is a better predictor of degree of self-stereotyping. It is possible that where the subsequent level of self-categorization manipulation is in conflict with the initial prime manipulation, the level of self-categorization effectively determines which identity becomes salient for the participant. In so far as this interpretation is correct, this may account for the failure to consistently observe an effect for prime. Yet the social identity condition of the present study replicates Onorato’s (1992) results; it would therefore appear reasonable to conclude that the results previously reported by Onorato (see also Onorato & Turner, 1996) were most likely not due to the inclusion of a prior group prime manipulation, but rather to the salience of group identity achieved within the social identity condition per se.

For confidence in masculine and feminine responses, the interaction between personality, level of self-categorization and social identity-consistent responding lends further support to the self-stereotyping hypothesis. At the level of personal identity, Low Independents emerged as more confident in their consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses; in addition, High Independents emerged as more confident than Low Independents in their consistent(masculine) responses. Once again assuming a conceptual overlap between masculinity and independence, the results obtained here can be interpreted as evidence of personal-identity consistent responding on the part of Low and High Independents, respectively, under appropriate conditions. In direct contrast, individual differences were not apparent in the social identity
condition; instead, both Low and High Independents emerged as more confident in their consistent(feminine) than consistent(masculine) responses under conditions of a salient social identity.

Taken together, the results of the present study yield substantial support for the key point of the self-categorization analysis. In particular, highly independent females rated themselves as dependent when their social identities as women were made salient. On several dependent measures, the effect of the personality variable on information processing was attenuated (although not necessarily eliminated) in the social identity condition relative to the personal identity condition. By contrast in the personal identity condition individual differences were apparent; in particular, the personality variable interacted in the predicted fashion with stimulus word type for independent and dependent trait endorsements in this condition.

Self-categorization theory argues that either personal or social identification can come to the fore, depending on social context. From this perspective it is not assumed that personal identity has privileged status in defining the self (cf. Gaertner et al., 1999; Simon, 1993), nor that social identity has privileged status (cf. Brewer, 1991). The relevant question, from this perspective, is not whether personal or social identification is more important in an absolute sense; rather, the question is “under what conditions will individuals come to define themselves as individuals, and under what conditions will individuals come to define themselves as group members?” Importantly, self-categorization theory argues that much of the time, self-perception involves aspects of both individual and group identity (Turner et al., 1987). Nevertheless, an examination of how self-category content changes as the conditions either facilitate or inhibit the depersonalisation of the self remains a valid empirical strategy.

Interestingly, in the present study responses made under personal identity instructions were generally faster than responses made under social identity instructions. Individuals were also generally more confident in their personal than in their social self-ratings. Some investigators may interpret these findings as support for the view that the “me” level of self-categorization is the basic level (e.g., see Simon, 1993). However, these observations alone are not conclusive of the primacy of personal identity over social identity. Any number of factors may account for generally slower social identity
responses. One obvious possibility is that social stereotypes of men and women are changing, and that consequently there is less certainty among women about what constitutes a valid representation of the ingroup. For instance, experimental participants in the group-primed condition of the present study moderately endorsed the social stereotype of dependence for women on the group discussion task ($M = 6.07$, $SD = 1.36$); by contrast in 1992 Onorato found that female participants endorsed the social stereotype more strongly on a comparable task ($M = 7.33$, $SD = 0.71$). If social stereotypes about women are undergoing revision as these data suggest, this may impinge on the speed with which group-level judgements are made, and on the confidence that one has in those group-level judgements.

The present study also explored the possibility that a group-primed condition coupled with a social identity self-rating task may best facilitate the emergence of a depersonalised self-concept, and that a person-primed condition coupled with a personal identity self-rating task may facilitate the emergence of an individuated self-concept. Interestingly, the prime manipulation did not appear to have much effect. There were no main effects for prime on any dependent measures, and only two higher-order interactions involving prime were obtained; specifically, for masculine and feminine traits, a (theoretically trivial) prime x personality x level of self-categorization interaction was obtained for trait endorsements (see Appendix D), while the analysis of response latencies revealed a prime x level of self-categorization x social identity-consistent responding interaction. In the latter case, there was some evidence to suggest that the prime manipulation did have the desired effect; for instance, social identity-consistent responding was paramount when the group-primed condition coincided with the social identity condition. However, on all other dependent measures prime did not interact with level of self-categorization to accentuate the salience of personal identity or social identity, respectively. All things considered, it is likely that the level of self-categorization manipulation overrides the prime manipulation, such that the level of self-categorization manipulation plays a more critical role than the prime manipulation in achieving identity salience for experimental participants. The level of self-stereotyping observed in the present study is already very high; perhaps it cannot be much further enhanced by prior priming of group membership. The level of self-categorization manipulation thus appears to function as a unitary manipulation of identity salience, or "perceiver readiness x fit".
Despite the encouraging results, the present study could have been improved by specifying the comparative context at the time that pretest ratings were obtained. We have argued that the context was implicitly intragroup at the time that pretest measures were collected, since participants were filling out the questionnaire with other women present in the room, and were aware that only women were being recruited for the study; by inference, therefore, participants’ responses would only be compared to other women’s responses. Despite the viability of this assumption, in future studies the ingroup should be made explicit at the time that pretest measures are elicited. To facilitate the emergence of the personality variable under appropriate conditions, in future research an explicit intragroup context should be established at the time that initial self-ratings are obtained (i.e., at pretest) and the same intragroup context should subsequently be reinstated at Time 2 (i.e., at post-test). Under these conditions, the personality variable should emerge even more strongly under personal identity instructions. Furthermore, a replication involving men is a priority for future work; Onorato’s (1992) research showed depersonalisation for men in the social identity condition, but a replication of the personalisation effects found in the personal identity condition of the present study is needed, one which extends Markus’ (1977) analysis by illustrating the role of intragroup processes in personal self-definition.

It is important to note that although we did not have Dependent Schematics (in Markus’ terms) in the present study, our High Independents did in fact resemble Markus’ “Independent Schematics” in that (a) these individuals rated themselves as highly independent and (b) they rated “independence” as high in importance. As we saw in Chapter 3, many investigators argue that centrally-defining self-aspects (i.e., those considered “very important”) are the hardest to change (see also Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). The present study provides evidence against this view. Indeed, in the present study it was the highly independent group of female participants that provided the critical test of the self-categorization analysis since Low Independents were effectively expected to describe themselves as dependent in both personal and social identity conditions. The observation that High Independents did in fact ascribe dependent traits to the self under appropriate conditions is strong evidence for the self-stereotyping hypothesis. It is also strong evidence of the changeability of the self. Moreover, the observation that High Independents self-stereotyped in the social identity condition is problematic for any theory that equates the self with stable individual differences,
including self-schema theory. Instead, the present data support the view that self-categorizing can produce individual differences in some contexts and eliminate them in other contexts. Importantly, the self-categorization theory account does not reject the notion that individual differences are an important component of self-conception, but it does offer an critical extension and qualification to currently popular personality models of the self. The extension is that group self-aspects (like personal self-aspects) are an equally integral part of the self, and the qualification is that in accepting a role for personality structures, one need not assume that these structures are stable and enduring; personal self-aspects (like social identity) can be conceived as context-dependent properties of the perceiver.

In conclusion, the present study demonstrates the information processing consequences of a salient personal identity. Additionally, it demonstrates that these effects are eliminated as self-perception shifts to a focus on social identity. The available evidence suggests that these effects were not in fact due to the initial prime, but to the identity salience achieved by the respective self-rating tasks. Effects that have previously been interpreted as evidence of stable psychological structure have been interpreted here as evidence of the dynamic nature of the self. In particular, this study shows that self-concepts can take different forms at different levels of abstraction, and further, that the effect of moving from personal to social identity is to depersonalise self-perception. In short, the present study supports the general conclusion that the self is the expression of a lawful but flexible process of social judgement.
Chapter 10
Summary and conclusions

10.1 Introduction
This thesis has examined the social psychological processes involved in self-perception. Our starting point (see Chapter 1) was to suggest that one’s assumptions about the nature of the self need to be made explicit before the dynamics of the self can be profitably examined. Drawing on self-categorization theory, a theoretical position on the nature of the self was advanced. In many respects, the self-categorization analysis proffered is radically different to the dominant social psychological model. Having thus re-defined the self, an attempt was made to specify self-categorization theory ideas in relation to the problem of self-concept change. In line with this reformulation, the empirical program of the thesis examined change in self-category content as a function of self-categorization and social comparison processes.

The specific aims of the thesis were outlined in Chapter 1. Firstly, the thesis aimed to highlight the limitations of the long-standing tradition of equating the self-concept with stable psychological structures; this was a necessary first step. Secondly, the thesis aimed to examine the conditions which produce self-definition in terms of shared group membership (social identity), in addition to and as opposed to individual differences (personal identity). Thirdly, the thesis aimed to examine the implications of this distinction between personal and social identity for current approaches to self-concept change. The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain the extent to which these aims were achieved. We will proceed by summarising the key theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis, as well as the limitations of the thesis. Finally, the implications of the research and the questions that emerge as important foci for future work will be discussed.

10.2 Theoretical contributions of the thesis
Chapters 1 to 5 of the thesis reviewed important historical and contemporary contributions to understanding the social psychological functioning of the self. Chapter 2 presented the classical view. As we saw, the early theorists conceived of the self as a
fundamentally social and relational construct. In the classical view, the self and the other were inextricably linked. Those writing at the turn of the century theorised about the social processes that constituted the self, rather than non-social, intrapsychic mechanisms. This understanding is incompatible with the view that the self is a stored entity, a pre-existing thing or given.

The dominant themes of early North American self psychology can be contrasted with the currently dominant themes in social cognition. Chapter 3 presented a summary of the social cognition perspective. In view of the significance of their theoretical and empirical contributions, the perspectives advanced contemporaneously in 1977 by Markus and T. B. Rogers et al. were expounded in some detail. In particular, these authors promoted the view that (1) the self exists as an enduring cognitive structure or internally-stored representation; (2) this self-structure comprises personally relevant trait terms; and (3) this self-structure is resistant to change. Subsequent research conducted under the ambit of social cognition emphasised the role of the self-schema in information processing.

Having established how the self is presently conceived, in Chapter 4 we turned to the issue of capacity for change. In view of the current model, it is difficult to identify clear "theories" of change. Accordingly, our strategy (following Hormuth, 1990) was to extract from major self theories (which emphasise stability and consistency) the implications for understanding change. We concluded that contemporary perspectives generally assume that self-concept change is the consequence of maintenance failure (Hormuth, 1990), rather than the product of normal social-cognitive functioning.

Chapter 4 also established the dominant empirical paradigm for studying self-concept change within experimental social psychology. Much of the relevant evidence comes from laboratory studies in which people have been shown to change their self-descriptions in response to self-discrepant feedback that is provided either by others' judgements and feedback, or by one's own overt behaviour. Empirical research has repeatedly shown that personally self-discrepant behaviour can change self-beliefs. The preferred interpretation is that either through dissonance reduction or self-perception processes, people come to infer an attribute of themselves that was previously discounted (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984).
Against this theoretical and empirical background, Chapter 5 redefined the self and the problem of self-concept change from the perspective of self-categorization theory. In self-categorization theory, change presents no special problem; it is considered a normal part of the process of self-categorization. Importantly, the self-categorization analysis challenges the current emphasis on individuated self-perception, interpersonal behaviour, and intrapsychic processes which pervades current work on the self.

There were several key points to the self-categorization analysis. First, this perspective rejects the view that the self is a particular store or depository of long-term knowledge. Instead, the self is defined as a dynamic process of social judgement. Self-referential judgements are assumed to be comparative, relational, and intrinsically social; as such these judgements are affected by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others. Thus, the social context is implicit if not explicit in all self-referential judgements.

Secondly, self-categorization theory states that the self as part of its normal variation is not just personal – the self has more (and less) inclusive levels and this is a basic function of its variation (Turner et al., 1994). In particular, a distinction is drawn between the personal and the social level of self-categorization. The self is defined at the personal level in intragroup contexts, and at the social or collective level in intergroup contexts.

Thirdly, variation in self-conception is explained as a function of the self-categorization process. Put simply, self-concept change is due to the flexible nature of self-categorical judgement. More specifically, self-conception at any given moment in time reflects the normative and comparative relations between self and others, and the degree to which the perceiver is motivated or inclined to apply certain self-categorizations. Importantly, conditions that work for the salience of social identity give rise to a depersonalised self-concept. Depersonalisation or self-stereotyping represents "a cognitive redefinition of the self – from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes" (Turner, 1984, p. 528). This shift from personalised to depersonalised self-conception (and self-evaluation) represents an important type of change within the self-categorization framework.
10.3 Empirical contributions of the thesis

The primary empirical aim of this thesis was to systematically investigate the consequences for self-cognition of variation between the personal and the social level of self-categorization. Does self-category content change when the context shifts from a focus on the personal self to a focus on group identity? The role of public behaviour and social comparisons with ingroup and/or outgroup members in shaping self-category content was the primary focus of the first three studies of the thesis. Studies 1, 2 and 3 progressively tested the hypothesis that self-categorization and social comparison processes mediate the impact of behaviour on self-perception.

In Chapter 6, we argued that self change theory and research is based on the implicit assumption that the self-concept (including its evaluative component) and social behaviour are inherently personal. In Study 1 we started to test the plausibility of the self-categorization analysis as an alternative view. The broad aim of the first experiment was to explore the implications of a distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour for self-concept change. The argument ran as follows. It was argued that a distinction can be made between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour, and likewise between personal and social identity as two conceptually distinguishable, yet interrelated, parts of the self. Accordingly, the consequences of interpersonal behaviour should predominantly be seen at the personal level of identity. By contrast, intergroup behaviour should predominantly affect one's self-conception and evaluation as a group member, leaving the personal self (relatively) unchanged. For various theoretical reasons, we deliberately did not argue that there can be no carry-over effect from intergroup behaviour to personal identity. The first reason related directly to our conceptualisation of levels of abstraction. Self-categorization theory argues that "The idea of a given level is useful to indicate a theoretical extreme but in reality there is a perceptual continuum that never fully embodies any one level" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 100). This implies that in many situations aspects of both personal and social identity may contribute to self-definition. Secondly, the theory maintains that personal self-experience is made possible because of the existence of a higher-order social categorical self that provides a context for interpersonal comparison, implying a dependence of one level on another. Hence, we could not rule out the possibility that the effects of self-presentational behaviour may generalise across personal and social self-categories.
In line with self-categorization theory, it was hypothesised that to the degree that self-presentational behaviour is elicited in what is clearly an interpersonal context, it is likely to be interpreted by the actor as an expression of the personal self; accordingly, its impact is likely to be felt primarily at the level of personal identity. Similarly, self-presentational behaviour that is elicited in an intergroup context is likely to be interpreted as an expression of one's social identity as a woman, and hence should primarily affect one's self-evaluation as a woman.

The hypothesis was clearly supported by post-test measures of self-perceived femininity. Women who self-presented as stereotypical (i.e., as negative and powerless) women in the presence of a male audience subsequently self-stereotyped more strongly on feminine traits than self-deprecating individuals or self-enhancing women. In theoretical terms, the "negative, powerless woman" condition represents a situation of high normative fit between level of self-categorization and group-level behaviour on the part of a (dominated minority) group member. Thus it is not surprising that sex-stereotypical traits were strongly endorsed in this condition.

The results obtained for post-test self-esteem depended on the scale used. Self-esteem as measured by the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale was affected by valence but not by level of self-presentational behaviour. One possible explanation is that a global scale like the Rosenberg may detect one's general inference from self-presentational behaviour, which collapses across personal and social self-categories; after all, as a positive woman the presenter is likely to also be a positive individual. The possibility that the main effect for valence obtained on this first measure of self-esteem may be due to differences in participants' perceptions of how well they performed in the interview situation was also discussed. In contrast, a two-way interaction between valence of self-presentation and level of behaviour emerged for group self-esteem. This interaction indicated that people's perceptions of the self-esteem levels of men and women did not differ in the individual behaviour conditions; however self-deprecating women reported higher group self-esteem (for men and women in general) than self-enhancing women. The following interpretation was offered: it is possible that self-enhancing women have already secured positive social esteem by behaving in a self-enhancing manner as women; these participants therefore presumably have no need to restore their collective self-esteem. On the other hand the behaviour of self-deprecating women reflects a low
level of group self-esteem, thus these participants may have been particularly motivated to achieve positive social identity by endorsing higher levels of collective self-esteem at the end of the experiment. At the same time, these participants cannot deny that men have high self-esteem.

Interestingly, the results of Study 1 further suggested that participants were attempting to come to terms with their self-presentational behaviour. In order to protect the personal self from the implications of their behaviour, participants in the negative individual condition were particularly motivated to attribute their behaviour externally, reporting less choice to engage in the behaviour than self-enhancing individuals. By contrast, self-deprecating women could attribute the same behaviour to something other than the personal self; specifically, it appears that they attributed the behaviour to group membership, alleviating their dissonance and hence reporting higher perceived choice over behavioural role. Thus, people who acted negatively either accepted or rejected the same behaviour, depending on whether they categorized themselves as individuals or as women.

In summary, Study 1 showed that the same role can have differential effects on self-perception depending on the intervening self-categorization processes. Behaving positively and powerfully sometimes produced a positive shift, and sometimes produced a negative shift in self-perception. The hypothesis that self-categorization processes mediate the impact of behaviour was supported by post-test measures of self-perceived femininity, group self-esteem and perceived choice over behavioural role.

In Chapter 7 we continued to examine the effect of social context on the interpretation of one's own behaviour. In Study 2 the analysis was extended by considering how one's own behaviour interacts with information about the behaviour of ingroup and outgroup members. Highly independent and (relatively) dependent females projected either independence or dependence in an interview context. They were then presented with social comparison information in the form of a videotaped interaction between three men and three women. The stimulus ingroup (three women) either projected dependence or independence; the outgroup (three men) always behaved in the directly opposite manner to the ingroup. The stimulus tape provided an intergroup, and also an intragroup, context against which our female participants could interpret their own
recently enacted behaviour. Dependent measures included both personal and social self-ratings on various personality dimensions, including independence, femininity and self-esteem.

Building on Study 1, Study 2 examined whether the effect of self-presentational behaviour on self-perception is qualified in a meaningful way by the provision of group-level social comparison information. It may be, for instance, that following exposure to normative group behaviour, female participants who project dependence may come to view or interpret their behaviour as an expression of social (rather than personal) identity, while independent self-presentation may lead the perceiver to see herself as less of a woman. Because the social comparison information provided in this study simultaneously made intergroup and intragroup comparison possible, we had no firm predictions at this stage about how social comparison information may interact with own behaviour to affect subsequent personal and social self-ratings.

For the independence domain, we found that post-test self-ratings did vary with three of the major independent variables (level of self-rating, personality, and self-presentational behaviour). First, in support of self-categorization theory, our female participants described themselves as more independent when thinking of themselves in terms of personal rather than social identity. Secondly, High Independents reported higher self-perceived independence at the end of the experiment than Low Independents, suggesting a degree of stability in the personal self. Moreover, the effect for self-presentational behaviour was consistent with past research (e.g., Jones et al., 1981). There was a straightforward carry-over effect from public behaviour to private self-conception; that is, independent behaviour conferred higher self-perceived independence than dependent behaviour. Unexpectedly however, there was no evidence to suggest that social comparison information modified the impact of behaviour on directly relevant self-ratings.

In explaining the absence of a mediating effect of group behaviour, we reasoned (drawing on what we learned from Study 1) that because self-presentational behaviour was elicited in (and therefore probably also interpreted in) what was an interpersonal context, a straightforward carry-over effect from behaviour is not altogether surprising. The ensuing social comparison information, which was expected to provide the critical
social comparative context for the interpretation of one's behaviour, may have come too late to be of any consequence. We concluded from Study 2 that the absence of an effect for group behaviour implies that self-attributions occur prior to or at the same time as self-presentation. Thus we reasoned that if social comparison information is to have an effect, it may need to be provided prior to one's own behaviour, thus serving to contextualise behaviour in the intended way.

Nevertheless, a meaningful three-way interaction was observed for self-perceived femininity. Specifically, one's own behaviour interacted with the behaviour of ingroup and outgroup members, and level of self-rating. The interaction did not qualify the main effect for level of self-rating; thus social femininity ratings were consistently higher than personal femininity ratings. Moreover, the interaction revealed a different pattern at the level of personal and social self-ratings. **Personal femininity** depended on intragroup similarity and intergroup difference, while **social femininity** depended on the stereotypicality of one's own behaviour and that of the ingroup and outgroup. Thus, at the level of personal self-ratings, the same behaviour produced different effects depending on the position of social comparison others. A self-ingroup match (and self-outgroup mismatch) in terms of behaviour (irrespective of the direction of that match) appeared to heighten the salience of the higher-order category that makes intragroup differentiation possible, yielding higher self-perceived femininity. The social comparison information also affected gender identity salience at the level of social self-ratings. Here, dependent behaviour tended to confer higher femininity than independent behaviour, and normative group behaviour tended to confer higher femininity than counter-normative group behaviour. Furthermore, self-stereotyping on feminine traits was maximised when the perceiver and her ingroup behaved dependently while the outgroup behaved independently, or in theoretical terms, under conditions of high comparative and normative fit at the intergroup level.

The other dependent measure that showed a mediating effect for self-categorization processes was self-esteem. Here, one's own behaviour interacted with personality and level of self-categorization. At the personal level, independent behaviour enhanced the esteem of Low Independents only. This suggests that Low Independents had more "room to move" on personal self-esteem than their highly independent counterparts. At the level of social self-esteem, both groups had "room to move" and hence both groups
experienced a positive shift following independent self-presentation; however, once again this was particularly true for Low Independents.

In Chapter 8 we set out to examine more closely the role played by the ingroup vis-à-vis the outgroup in determining the psychological significance of one’s own behaviour. We also examined whether presenting the social comparison information sooner would make a difference to the outcome. To this end, we created either an intragroup or an intergroup context prior to the elicitation of self-presentational behaviour, and subsequently obtained self-descriptions under both personal and social identity instructions. Stimulus groups either displayed normative or counter-normative behaviour. Both males and females participated in Study 3.

Drawing on self-categorization theory principles, we expected comparisons with the ingroup to give self-presentational behaviour special significance for personal identity, and comparisons with the outgroup to give self-presentational behaviour special significance for social identity. According to self-categorization theory, the provision of an intragroup context should facilitate interpersonal comparison between the perceiver and other ingroup members. In this context, independent behaviour should confer higher personal independence, particularly when the ingroup is dependent. By contrast, the provision of an intergroup context should facilitate intergroup comparison between the perceiver and outgroup members. In this context, independent behaviour may also confer higher social independence, particularly when the outgroup is dependent. However, we expected that this tendency would be moderated by normative fit. In other words, this should occur when independence is normative for the ingroup, while dependence is normative for the outgroup. This clearly applies to males but not to females. Thus, we reasoned that independent behaviour contrasted against a dependent outgroup is likely to enhance social independence in males since in this case there is high normative and comparative fit at the intergroup level, but not in females, since in this case there is high comparative fit but low normative fit between the accessible social categories. These were our general expectations.

For males, the expected four-way interaction emerged on three types of self-ratings (independence, masculinity, and self-esteem). This interaction repeatedly demonstrated the traditional carry-over effect for independent behaviour at the level of personal self-
ratings, particularly when one's behaviour was contrasted against a dependent ingroup. Importantly, we argued that this observation raises the possibility that the traditional carry-over effect that has been repeatedly demonstrated in previous research may in fact reflect an implicit contrast of one's own behaviour against a psychologically present (if not empirically instantiated) ingroup. Moreover, there was consistent evidence of a reversal of the carry-over effect in the dependent outgroup condition. That is, when males viewed a dependent outgroup, independent behaviour reduced personal independence, personal masculinity, and personal self-esteem. Male participants in this condition would undoubtedly have felt particularly attuned to the social stereotype; it appeared that they did not want to contribute to the subordination of women by endorsing the social stereotype that men are more independent than women. On the other hand, they did not want to view themselves as personally dependent either. In contrast, a different pattern tended to emerge at the level of social self-ratings. Specifically, independent behaviour tended to enhance social independence and social self-esteem in the ingroup conditions. However it generally diminished social independence, social self-esteem and social masculinity in the outgroup conditions, particularly in the dependent outgroup condition. Thus unexpectedly, it appears that exposure to a stereotypically dependent group of women leaves males feeling conflicted about their superiority on the independence dimension vis-à-vis females.

For females it appears that self-presentational behaviour and social comparison information were having their effect (albeit at $p < .065$) on self-perceived femininity, rather than self-perceived independence. A similar observation was made in Study 2 (although in that case the effect of social comparison information on femininity was statistically significant). However, it remains unclear why in Study 3, the provision of social comparison information prior to eliciting self-presentational behaviour was effective in changing males' but not females' self-perceived independence. In this connection, several possibilities were considered. In particular it was suggested that the different pattern for males and females may have a great deal to do with the present focus on the "dependence–independence" domain. The relationship between this behavioural dimension and the social category "women" no doubt has complex political and ideological aspects that may have affected the results. It is likely that the intergroup context impacted on the interpretation of their behaviour. There was a general tendency for independent behaviour to enhance the personal and social independence of females,
implying that females refused to endorse the stereotype or the idea that they may be dependent. The low status group thus appeared to reject the stereotype; they also clearly dismissed the social comparison information and the significance of the role-play. If the results for females are largely explicable in terms of the political and/or ideological aspects of intergroup relations, that does not rule out the possibility that a different behavioural dimension may yield a four-way interaction for females.

Thus it appeared from Study 3 that providing social comparison information prior to eliciting behaviour facilitated the emergence of a moderating effect for group-level comparisons on subsequent self-ratings for males, but not for females. Study 3 illustrated that intragroup and intergroup comparisons can modify the carry-over effect from behaviour to subsequent self-conception. When males came to interpret their behaviour, they appeared to take into account the comparative and normative relations between self and others comprising the psychological frame of reference. They appeared to be making sense of their own behaviour by considering it in the context of others' behaviour. This study highlights the complexity of the self-behaviour relationship. For instance, the evidence suggested that when one's behaviour matched that of the outgroup, it appeared to have less psychological significance for one's social identity than for one's personal identity. In addition, the impact of group processes on the self-behaviour relationship becomes particularly complex when group identities that have important historical, political and ideological dimensions are evoked in the laboratory. Two major limitations of this study, however, were the unequal cell sizes coupled with the small sample size; these results therefore need to be replicated in the future with a larger sample.

Empirically, Studies 2 and 3 are of interest for yet another reason. Specifically, these studies suggest how one may operationalise normative and comparative fit contemporaneously across intraindividual, intragroup and intergroup levels to maximise social identity salience. To illustrate, it would appear reasonable to suggest that social identity salience should be maximised to the extent that personality is consistent with current behaviour and with normative ingroup behaviour, and inconsistent with outgroup behaviour. In so far as individuals exhibit prototypical group behaviour, and have done so consistently in the past, they are likely to define themselves as prototypical group members; this combination of factors should heighten the salience of the “us”
category more so than the “me” category. In this case, normative and comparative fit are working together in perfect unison at all levels (the intra-individual, intragroup, and intergroup levels) to produce a highly salient social categorization in terms of “us versus them”.

To elaborate, high normative fit at the intraindividual level would stem from the consistency that exists between current behaviour and one’s initial self-beliefs (cf. Kulik et al., 1986). Further, consistency between prior self-conception, current behaviour, and the ingroup’s behaviour would represent a situation of low comparative fit between the perceiver and other ingroup members – a condition which facilitates the emergence of the self-inclusive category “us”. In addition, a stereotypical ingroup faced with a stereotypical outgroup represents a situation of high comparative and high normative fit at the intergroup level. At the intergroup level the meta-contrast between the behavioural component of the self-inclusive category “us” and the relevant outgroup is high because the behaviour of all ingroup members (including the perceiver) is uniformly different to the behaviour of all outgroup members in the frame of reference. Normative fit is also high at this level due to the association of stereotypically-ingroup behaviour with the ingroup and stereotypically-outgroup behaviour with the outgroup.

To reiterate then, when all these conditions co-occur, one should define oneself as a group member more so than as an individual, and hence should come to ascribe ingroup-relevant traits to the own person. Although self-categorization theory thus predicts that this condition (i.e., a self-ingroup match in the normative direction) will be more immediately or directly informative about social identity rather than personal identity, the theory nevertheless maintains that intragroup comparison can still occur in terms of the higher-order identity “us women”. Thus, when these conditions co-occur we would further expect personal self-ratings to correlate highly with social or collective self-ratings. Conversely, a self-ingroup mismatch in terms of behaviour should work against the salience of the “us versus them”, and should work for the salience of individuated self-perception. That is because in this case, one's own (idiosyncratic) behaviour sets one apart from the ingroup. Moreover, when high normative fit within the “me” self-category (i.e., intraindividual consistency between past and present behaviour), is coupled with high comparative fit between the self and the ingroup (i.e., interpersonal differences), personal identity salience should be
paramount. In this case the individual should define herself as an unique individual more so than as a group member.

Past research conducted within the self-categorization framework has generally involved manipulations of comparative and normative fit at the intergroup level only (e.g., Oakes et al., 1991). Extending this work, when considered together Studies 2 and 3 suggest how the fit principle can be operationalised at lower (or "nested") levels of abstraction. This analysis, which was informed by the present studies, can now be formally tested in future work, either within the self-presentation paradigm or some other empirical paradigm. No work conducted within the self-categorization framework has to date approached the issue of self-category salience in this manner; the present work would therefore appear to suggest another avenue for testing self-categorization theory principles.

The fourth and final experiment (Chapter 9) aimed to supplement the self-presentation studies by showing that although self-conception may be consistent with a personality measure when personal self-aspects are salient, under conditions of a salient social identity individuals may come to describe themselves in a schema-inconsistent way. It was predicted that self-stereotyping on ingroup-defining traits (i.e., dependent and feminine words for the all-female sample) would emerge under conditions of social identity salience, and conversely, that individual differences would emerge under conditions of personal identity salience, such that Low and High Independents display differential processing of independent and dependent words.

The expected interaction involving personality, level of self-categorization and word type was obtained for (a) the proportion of independent and dependent words endorsed, (b) the proportion of masculine and feminine words endorsed, (c) response latencies for masculine and feminine words, and (d) confidence ratings for masculine and feminine words. In addition, for independent and dependent words, social identity-consistent responding interacted meaningfully with level of self-categorization for response latencies and confidence ratings, yielding additional support for expectations (although three-way interactions would have yielded even better support for predictions).
In the social identity condition, both Low and High Independents self-stereotyped (to the same degree) on dependent and feminine words. Moreover, this pattern was clearly attenuated in the personal identity condition relative to the social identity condition; indeed, for High Independents in the personal identity condition, the pattern was reversed. Here, High Independents endorsed more independent than dependent words, and more masculine than feminine words. Thus individual differences came to the fore in the personal identity condition but not in the social identity condition, as was predicted. On several dependent measures, the information processing consequences of personal and social identity emerged in the expected fashion, under appropriate conditions.

Overall, the results of Study 4 supported self-categorization theory, which predicts that self-category content will vary systematically as a function of the level at which the self is categorized, and further, that self-categorizing can produce individual differences in intragroup contexts, and eliminate them in intergroup contexts. In addition, the observation that overt behaviour is not essential to the change process further supports the analysis, which maintains that recently enacted behaviour has no special role, over and above other cognitive resources, in determining self-category content.

The nature of the self and the related problem of its changeability represent two critically important areas of research. This thesis has proffered a radically different approach to studying the self and self change. Several aspects of the self-categorization analysis received empirical support. All things considered, it would appear that there is much to be gained from bringing an intergroup relations perspective to the study of the content and functioning of the social self. At the very least, the self-categorization analysis suggests a host of new questions that may lead researchers down a very different empirical path.

10.4 Implications and general directions for future work
The findings of the present thesis have important implications for contemporary approaches to the self and the problem of self-concept change. The self-presentation studies of the thesis (Studies 1, 2 and 3) suggest that self-concept change is not a straightforward matter of internalising behaviour in the pre-existing self-structure. Taken together, these experiments yield support for the view that the ingroup is the
context against which much of our personal behaviour is interpreted, while the outgroup is the context against which our social identity is defined. Self-ratings varied systematically with social context. Importantly, there was evidence to suggest a role for normative and comparative fit in the determination of self-category content, although this emerged on different measures for males and females. These studies make an important contribution towards illustrating the viability of a self-categorization account of variation in self-category content as a function of comparison and categorization processes. The role of group processes in self-concept change is one general area that warrants further empirical and theoretical attention within social psychological frameworks.

In addition, an important question for future work is the generalisability of the so-called carry-over effect from public behaviour to private self-conception. The present research had one notable advantage over previous self change studies. In all cases, self-perception was measured along several dimensions at the end of the experiment, rather than just the focal dimension. The present research thus allowed us to examine the degree to which change generalised to self-attributes other than the one subjected to a direct experimental manipulation. The results of Studies 1, 2 and 3 raise the possibility that the carry-over effect from behaviour need not be limited to the self-presentation dimension; it may spread to affect other closely related aspects of the self. Very few studies have considered this possibility (e.g., Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). That generalisation from self-presentation to conceptually related self-aspects may occur is an important observation from the point of view that currently little is known about the interconnections among conceptually related domains of self-knowledge (see Chapter 3). Similarly, future work will need to establish whether the results of the self-presentation studies generalise beyond self-presentation behaviour to other types of overt behaviour.

The self-presentation studies also raise the broad and critically important issue of whether and to what degree personal and collective selves are interrelated. In Studies 2 and 3, consistently high correlations emerged between personal self-ratings and social self-ratings. In Study 2, the correlation between personal and social self-ratings for various behavioural domains (independence, femininity, masculinity, self-esteem) ranged from .70 to .85 (for an all-female sample); in Study 3 the correlation between
personal and social self-ratings on the same dimensions ranged from .53 to .71 (for a sample comprising males and females). These consistently high correlations may indicate that individual and group self-aspects are interconnected and hence share similar content. Further studies are required to extend our understanding of this interdependence.

The fourth and final study of the thesis likewise has important implications for contemporary self theory. This study showed that self-perception is not always consistent with personal identity. Under conditions of a salient social identity, the self was depersonalised. That is, female participants described themselves in line with the ingroup stereotype, endorsing dependent traits as self-descriptive, even when dependence conflicted with their personal self-schema. This observation challenges the view that the personal self has privileged status in defining the individual. Future studies examining shifts between various personal identities will extend the analysis further. Specifically, if it can be shown that even at the personal level of identification, individuals can describe themselves in diametrically opposed ways when the higher-order identity that provides the context for social comparison changes, this would be strong evidence against the current model of the personal self (Onorato & Turner, 1997). The personal self is defined in a unique way within self-categorization theory. It is understood to be a derivative of some higher-order collective self. That is, the me implies the existence of the us in terms of which self-other differentiation can be achieved. Clearly, this line of work could prove influential in redefining the personal self within contemporary social psychology. In addition, the present application of self-categorization principles to personality models of the self, together with Onorato (1992, 1996) and Turner and Onorato (1999), paves the way for the development of a self-categorization analysis of personality and consistency more generally.

Two additional directions for future work warrant mention, specifically, the question of self-concept stability, and the related issue of long-term change. In relation to the first point, a self-categorization analysis of self-concept stability needs to be empirically verified in future work. To this end, the Markus paradigm could profitably be used to establish a self-categorization account of stability in the personal self (see also Onorato & Turner, 1997). In particular, in future studies it will be important to demonstrate that stability in the higher-order identity that provides the context for self-other
differentiation can yield stable self-category content at two (or more) points in time, and further, that changing the superordinate categorization can produce different content at the personal level. To the degree that this can be demonstrated, the idea that stability and change are products of the same categorization process will be supported. Moreover, such data would suggest a viable alternative to the dominant explanation of self-concept stability in terms of fixed cognitive structure.

Finally, although the scope of the present thesis was restricted to short-term fluctuations in self-category content, the question is whether we can extrapolate from the present analysis to long-term change. First it is important to reiterate that from the perspective of self-categorization theory, it is not essential to show lasting change in order to establish that change has really occurred (cf. Swann, 1983); in fact to impose such a stipulation would contradict the fundamental point of the theory. That is not to suggest, however, that an account of long-term change in self-categorization is incompatible with or cannot be derived from self-categorization theory. The theory as well as the available empirical evidence should inform such an account.

In traditional social-cognitive theory where it is assumed that a self-concept develops, there is an implicit assumption of long-term stability that is modified by new behaviour and learning. Self-categorization theory suggests a new approach to long-term change. From the perspective of self-categorization theory, there can be stability and change, continuity and discontinuity, in the categorization of self, and both outcomes are a product of the same self-categorization process. Self-categorization theory does not deny that the self can be experienced as stable; this implies that there can be lasting (or maintained) change in self-definition. While social-cognitive models have a ready-made explanation for stability in cognitive structural terms, self-categorization theory emphasises the interplay between internal and external factors in stability. It is argued that perceiver readiness and normative fit — which reflect one's motives, memories, knowledge, and habitual behaviours — provide definite constraints on self-category variation (Turner et al., 1994). These factors are therefore implicated in long-term change in self-categorization. Likewise, other aspects of the self-categorization theory analysis of stability should inform an analysis of sustained or long-term change.
In this connection, self-categorization theory stipulates that stability is conferred by four key factors (see Turner et al., 1994, p. 460). First, the theory points to stability in social reality as an important factor in maintaining the self. The same point can be made in relation to long-term change: if change is to be sustained, it must be supported by social reality. On this point the self-categorization analysis of lasting change concurs with other theories (e.g., self-verification, symbolic self-completion, interpersonal congruency and ecological self theories; see Chapter 4). Second, self-categorization theory stipulates that the higher-order knowledge frameworks that confer coherence to varying instances of behaviour stabilise the self. Presumably long-term change can take place at the level of these knowledge frameworks; the question is, how? Social influence and communication processes are without doubt important here. In particular, the self-categorization analysis suggests that “ingroup” (rather than outgroup) others are likely to play a critical role in long-term social and self change (Turner & Onorato, 1999). In relation to this, the empirical work of the present thesis illustrates the importance of one type of communication – self-presentational communications on the part of the perceiver – in bringing about short-term change in self-conception. Extrapolating from this research, it would appear reasonable to assume that interpersonal communications directed towards others have the potential to bring about long-term change in self-categorization. Although such communications are likely to be shaped by the actor’s goals and agendas, people nevertheless have a tendency to regard their own communications as genuine (Schlenker et al., 1994); herein lies the potential potency of one’s own self-presentational behaviour in driving long-term change in self-perception. Third, self-categorization theory emphasises the role played by social groups, subcultures and social institutions in stabilising the self. The empirical work of the thesis illustrated the constraining role of stable intergroup relations in short-term change (see Chapters 6 and 8 in particular); similarly, stable intergroup relations are likely to constrain the potential for long-term change. By the same token, change at the level of group memberships, or at the level of culture or the social institutions to which one belongs (in the physical and psychological sense), is likely to bring about long-term change in self-categorization. Change at this (macro-)level is likely to involve a great deal of adjustment as new forces (new norms, values and motives) come to sustain a newly acquired self-categorization. In summary, the present discussion, while far from a comprehensive account of long-term change, nevertheless illustrates the potential relevance of self-categorization theory principles to the problem of long-term or
sustained change in self-conception (for related discussions, see Breakwell & Lyons, 1996; Reicher, 1996). The fact that self-categorization theory, more so than other current treatments, focuses on the nexus between the individual and the psychological group, would appear to place it in a good position to inform an analysis of long-term change, which will no doubt entail consideration of both macro- and micro-level processes.

Jones (1990), who can be credited for drawing the attention of contemporary social psychologists to the important problem of self-concept change, was emphatic that laboratory-induced change, although transient, is not trivial. He likewise advocated that studies of short-term change can shed light on other more significant changes within the person:

If we reliably can produce changes in the laboratory, we gain insight into how such changes can occur in everyday life. One hardly needs to argue any more the general case that induced behaviour can affect attitudes. To this general case can be added the many specific cases in which behaviour constrained by the situation leads to differences in self-perception that lead to further actions that are committing or reinforced and therefore become part of a process of cumulative and an ultimately very important self-concept change. (p. 234)

10.5 Conclusions
Allport once stated "the existence of one's own self is the one fact of which every mortal person – every psychologist included – is perfectly convinced" (1943, p. 451). Despite this consensus, the question of precisely what form the self takes remains a topic of much debate. It can be argued that the cognitive revolution in social psychology has produced a dramatic shift away from the more "contextualist" perspectives of the early theorists (S. Rosenberg, 1988). The self-concept is currently conceived as a stable, separate, and bounded cognitive structure. Personality theories of the self and questions about how self-relevant knowledge is mentally organised and processed have taken centre stage. Not surprisingly then, self-concept change has come to be understood as a matter of re-configuring the personality structures that constitute the self-concept, in particular via the internalisation of new behaviour into the existing self-structure.

As a rule, theoretical models and experimental paradigms have neglected the pervasive influence of the other and the psychological group on the phenomenal self. The present
work has argued that at some level, the psychological group (in the general sense of an abstract “us,” or in the more particular sense of a specific group membership) is implicated in the experience of all self-concepts. This idea is at the forefront of self-categorization theory but has not, in our view, penetrated mainstream social cognition research on the self. In so far as attention is re-focused on the nexus between the psychological group and the self-concept, the field of social psychology will arguably be in a good position to achieve a more adequate integration of the social and the cognitive aspects of the self and to understand better the forces making for self-concept stability and change.
REFERENCES


Williams, J. E., & Bennett, S. M. (1975). The definition of sex stereotypes via the adjective checklist. Sex Roles, 1, 327-337.


APPENDIX A:
MATERIALS AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX FOR
CHAPTER 6, STUDY 1

PERSONALITY TRIADS TEST USED IN STUDY 1

- Able to express ideas
- Bothered by unpleasant events
- Exaggerates failures
- Decisive and effective in relation to others
- Very respectful to authority
- Seems vulnerable
- Does things just for fun
- Overly apologetic
- Can carry out plans
- Knows own abilities
- Touchy and easily hurt
- Occasionally sarcastic
- Inspires respect
- Can be cruel
- Readily accepts advice
- Has civilised ideas
- Appeals for sympathy
- Gives up easily
- Irritable at times
- Says the wrong things
- Expresses individuality
- Usually self-conscious
- Has a bright future
- Always meeting people I know
- Able to enliven a dull party
- Unrealistic aspirations
- Understanding of problems
- Can take criticism
- Seem insecure
- Distractible at work
ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
2. At times I think I am no good at all.
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I certainly feel useless at times.
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Table A.1
Endorsement of masculine traits as a function of valence of behaviour and level of behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>VALENCE OF BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual (N = 34)</td>
<td>3.81 (1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman (N = 28)</td>
<td>4.03 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
MAJOR FINDINGS

Two-way ANOVA:
- IVs = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour
- DV = mean self-ratings on feminine traits (8-item scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig of F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Effects</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Way Interactions</td>
<td>6.662</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.662</td>
<td>6.570</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour x Valence</td>
<td>6.662</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.662</td>
<td>6.570</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained</td>
<td>6.955</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.318</td>
<td>2.286</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>58.815</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65.770</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.078</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-way ANOVA:
- IVs = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour
- DV = mean self-ratings on masculine traits (8-item scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig of F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Effects</td>
<td>9.354</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.677</td>
<td>3.536</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour</td>
<td>.608</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.608</td>
<td>.459</td>
<td>.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
<td>8.874</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.874</td>
<td>6.709</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Way Interactions</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour x Valence</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained</td>
<td>9.357</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.119</td>
<td>2.358</td>
<td>.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>76.720</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86.077</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.411</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two-way ANOVA:

- **IVs** = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour
- **DV** = mean self-ratings on positive gender-neutral traits (10-item scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig of F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour</td>
<td>4.406</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.203</td>
<td>2.900</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
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<td>.574</td>
<td>.756</td>
<td>.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Way Interactions</td>
<td>3.916</td>
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<td>3.916</td>
<td>5.154</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
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Two-way ANOVA:

- **IVs** = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour
- **DV** = mean self-ratings on negative gender-neutral traits (10-item scale)

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Two-way ANOVA:

- **IVs** = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour
- **DV** = total scores on the RSE

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Two-way ANOVA:

- **IVs** = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour
- **DV** = total scores on the RSE
- **Covariate** = difficulty ratings

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Analysis = repeated measures analysis of variance

- Within subjects factor = group self-esteem
- Between subjects factors = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour

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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.

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Tests involving 'ESTEEM' Within-Subject Effect.

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Two-way ANOVA:

- IVs = level of behaviour, valence of self-presentational behaviour
- DV = choice ratings pertaining to the type of personality projected

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Main Effects

|                      | 7.018          | 2  | 3.509       | 1.499 | .232    |
| Behaviour            | 1.001          | 1  | 1.001       | .428  | .516    |
| Valence              | 6.017          | 1  | 6.017       | 2.570 | .115    |

2-Way Interactions

|                      | 12.876         | 1  | 12.876      | 5.501 | .023    |
| Behaviour x Valence  | 12.876         | 1  | 12.876      | 5.501 | .023    |

Explained

|                      | 19.894         | 3  | 6.631       | 2.833 | .046    |
| Residual             | 131.089        | 56 | 2.341       |       |         |
| Total                | 150.983        | 59 | 2.559       |       |         |
PERSONALITY TRIADS TEST USED IN STUDY 2

- Appears self-assured
- Very accepting and approachable
- Likes to do things with others

- Nervous and worrisome
- Very easily swayed
- Easily discouraged

- Leads an interesting life
- Efficient worker
- Able to give orders

- Afraid to try new things
- Distrusting of others
- Touchy and easily hurt

- Cheerful when situation requires it
- More strong willed than the average
- Content with life

- Can be disloyal
- Frequently hypocritical
- Dependent on the direction of others

- Uninhibited with friends
- Can complain if necessary
- Eager to get along with others

- Average childhood
- Frequently obedient
- Prefers football over cricket

- Can take criticism
- Knows right from wrong
- Tries to be frank with others
- Easily influenced
- Unrealistic aspirations
- Can't resist temptation

- Makes a good impression
- Expresses individuality
- Has good judgement

- Sometimes rude
- Emotionally distant
- Can't be alone

- Refuses help
- As changeable as the weather
- Likes to tease others

- Imitates others
- Gives up easily
- Unable to express ideas in a group

- Rather friendly and responsive
- Completely truthful and aboveboard
- More vigorous and enterprising than the average

- Lacks discrimination
- Will believe anyone
- Bears a grudge

- Affectionate with close friends
- Can take charge of things
- Usually pleasant and agreeable

- Shrinks from crises
- Has an angry look
- Easily led

- Understanding of problems
- Independent thinker
- Inspires respect

- Becomes despondent (upset) easily
- Seems insecure
- Irritates others
MAJOR FINDINGS

Four-way ANOVA:

- IVs = personality, self-presentational behaviour, group behaviour (GB); within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-perceived independence

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Tests involving 'LOS' Within-Subject Effect.

| WITHIN CELLS | 29.74 | 80 | .37 |
| LOS          | 21.96 | 1  | 21.96 | 59.06 | .000 |
| Personality x LOS | 1.42  | 1  | 1.42  | 3.83  | .054 |
| Behaviour x LOS | .12   | 1  | .12   | .31   | .579 |
| GB x LOS     | .03  | 1  | .03   | .07   | .794 |
| Personality x Behaviour x LOS | .18  | 1  | .18   | .48   | .491 |
| Personality x GB x LOS | .26  | 1  | .26   | .69   | .410 |
| Behaviour x GB x LOS | .46  | 1  | .46   | 1.25  | .268 |
| Personality x Behaviour x GB | .24  | 1  | .24   | .64   | .426 |
Four-way ANOVA:

- IVs = personality, self-presentational behaviour, group behaviour (GB); within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-perceived femininity

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Tests involving 'LOS' Within-Subject Effect.

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Four-way ANOVA:

- IVs = personality, self-presentational behaviour, group behaviour (GB); within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-perceived masculinity

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Tests involving 'LOS' Within-Subject Effect.

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Four-way ANOVA:
- IVs = personality, self-presentational behaviour, group behaviour (GB); within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-esteem

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APPENDIX C:
MATERIALS AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX FOR
CHAPTER 8, STUDY 3

TRIADS TEST USED IN STUDY 3

- Distractible at work
- Seems insecure
- Can take charge of things

- Very straightforward
- Expresses individuality
- Frequently obedient

- Easily influenced
- Does things just for fun
- More vigorous and enterprising than the average

- Tries to be frank with others
- Good and bad qualities balanced
- Touchy and easily hurt

- Can't be alone
- Can take criticism
- Bothered by unpleasant events

- Ordinary looking
- Easily led
- More strong willed than the average

- Able to give orders
- Enjoys movies
- Dependent on the direction of others

- Seeks relaxation
- Eager to get along with others
- Independent thinker

- Very easily swayed
- Appears self-assured
- Not always systematic in work habits

- Can complain if necessary
- Easily discouraged
- Average childhood
MAJOR FINDINGS

MALES:

- IVs = self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour (GB); within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-perceived independence

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Tests involving 'LOS' Within-Subject Effect.

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| LOS                 | .83            | 1  | .83          | 1.11  | .296     |
| Behaviour x LOS     | .04            | 1  | .04          | .06   | .815     |
| Group x LOS         | 2.37           | 1  | 2.37         | 3.17  | .081     |
| GB x LOS            | .06            | 1  | .06          | .08   | .780     |
| Behaviour x Group x LOS | 1.11      | 1  | 1.11         | 1.48  | .228     |
| Behaviour x GB x LOS| .03            | 1  | .03          | .04   | .850     |
| Group x GB x LOS    | 2.18           | 1  | 2.18         | 2.92  | .093     |
| Behaviour x Group x GB x LOS | 5.01   | 1  | 5.01         | 6.71  | .012     |
MALES:
- IVs = self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour (GB);
  within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-perceived masculinity

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MALES:
- IVs = self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour (GB);
  within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-esteem

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Tests involving 'LOS' Within-Subject Effect.

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| LOS                         | .00            | 1  | .00         | .00   | .997    |
| Behaviour x LOS             | .06            | 1  | .06         | .06   | .809    |
| Group x LOS                 | .61            | 1  | .61         | .57   | .454    |
| GB x LOS                    | .00            | 1  | .00         | .00   | .999    |
| Behaviour x Group x LOS     | 1.51           | 1  | 1.51        | 1.41  | .240    |
| Behaviour x GB x LOS        | .11            | 1  | .11         | .11   | .745    |
| Group x GB x LOS            | .25            | 1  | .25         | .23   | .633    |
| Behaviour x Group x GB x LOS| 5.38           | 1  | 5.38        | 5.03  | .029    |
FEMALES:
- IVs = self-presentational behaviour, stimulus group, group behaviour (GB);
  within Ss factor = level of self-rating (LOS)
- DV = self-perceived femininity

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FEMALES:

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- DV = self-esteem

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APPENDIX D:
STATISTICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 9, STUDY 4

MAJOR FINDINGS

INDEPENDENT / DEPENDENT WORDS:
- IVs = personality, prime, level of self-categorization (Self); within Ss factor = word type
- DV = trait endorsements

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331
INDEPENDENT / DEPENDENT WORDS:
- IVs = personality, prime, level of self-categorization (Self); within Ss factor = social identity-consistent responding (Word)
- DV = response latencies

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Tests involving 'WORD' Within-Subject Effect.

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Table D.1
Means corresponding to marginal two-way interaction between personality and social identity-consistent responses (i.e., Word in the above ANOVA table)

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<td>2 969 (1 075)</td>
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Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
INDEPENDENT / DEPENDENT WORDS:
- IVs = personality, prime, level of self-categorization (Self); within Ss factor = social identity-consistent responding (Word)
- DV = confidence judgments

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MASCULINE / FEMININE WORDS:

- IVs = personality, prime, level of self-categorization (Self); within Ss factor = word type
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**Tests involving 'WORD' Within-Subject Effect.**

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Table D.2
Mean proportion of masculine and feminine traits endorsed as a function of prime, personality and level of self-categorization

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Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Low Indep. = Low Independents; High Indep. = High Independents.
MASCUINE / FEMININE WORDS:
- IVs = personality, prime, level of self-categorization (Self); within Ss factor = social identity-consistent responding (Word)
- DV = response latencies

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MASCU LINE / FEMININE WORDS:

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- DV = confidence judgements

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Tests involving 'WORD' Within-Subject Effect.

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