The Rise and Fall of Minor Political Parties in Australia

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A thesis submitted to satisfy the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy

School of Politics and International Relations
The Australian National University Canberra
August 2017

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Declaration

I declare this thesis is the product of my own independent research. It contains no material that has been accepted for any other degree or diploma, or any copy or paraphrase of another person’s material except where due acknowledgement is given.

Thomas King

August 2017
Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my wife Maureen for her love and support in this venture and for tolerating my many absences and early morning starts to the day at ANU or elsewhere in the pursuit of knowledge.

I would like to acknowledge and thank my supervisors. Professor Linda Botterill of the University of Canberra supervised me while she was at ANU. I have much respect for Linda’s enthusiasm and knowledge. Professor John Wanna of the Australian New Zealand School of Government at ANU took Linda’s place when she was promoted to a professorship at the University of Canberra. I thank John for his interest in my research and his guidance.

Professor Wanna also invited me to contribute a chapter on minor and micro parties to the book he edited on the 2014 Federal election. The planning weekend that John organised for that book allowed me to work closely with some of the leading lights in the study of Australian politics – it was an unforgettable and most enjoyable weekend! I would like to thank John for that valuable opportunity.

There are other people I would like to thank for their guidance and support including the members of my supervisory panel who were at ANU at the start of this venture, but now have moved to other universities. They include Dr Wayne Errington of the University of Adelaide and Dr Lindy Edwards at the Australian Defence Force Academy (University of New South Wales). I am very grateful to Emeritus Professor John Warhurst of ANU, who read and critiqued the DLP chapters for me. I would also like to thank most sincerely Dr Thuy Do of the Academic Skills and Learning Centre at ANU, for her assistance and guidance in the art of academic writing – she was indeed a tower of strength. Hans-Jorg Kraus of the Information Literacy Program at ANU assisted me in the layout and formatting of this thesis and I am most grateful to him.

I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Australian New Zealand School of Government (ANZOG) for their generous support and interest in my work – I only hope I have reciprocated! I would like to thank Prof Andrew Podger, Sam Vincent, Marija Taflaga, John Butcher, Tanja Porter, Isi Unikowski, Ram Ghimire, Mansur Chisni, Stephen Darlington, Emily Millane and Val Barrett for their support and for the many useful and wide ranging discussions that we had.

I wish to thank the librarians at the various ANU libraries and the librarians at the University of New South Wales (ADFA) for their cheerful assistance and support. The Librarians of the National Library of Australia were most helpful in locating for me relevant records from the National Library’s extensive manuscripts collection and I thank them sincerely.

In a similar vein, the staff of the National Archives of Australia assisted me in tracking down many useful papers and files relating to the DLP and the Australian Democrats. Likewise, the staff at the University of Melbourne archives were most helpful in locating relevant records for me and suggesting further avenues of enquiry.

My brother and sister in Victoria and my sister in London have taken a keen interest in my research from the beginning. I thank them for their interest and encouragement.

Having seen the power of minor parties in the Australian Senate, my former colleagues in the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs suggested minor Australian political parties as a useful research topic. I thank them for that suggestion and for their continual professional interest. In the twenty or so years I spent in that department they
were a terrific group of people to work with. Their professionalism is to be both admired and respected.

My fellow members of the Australian Political Studies Association and the New Zealand Political Studies Association have been very approachable at annual conferences and at other times when I sought their guidance and advice. The professionalism and collaboration I have experienced at those conferences and at other times was outstanding. During my candidature, I presented three papers at various APSA conferences on the rise and fall of the DLP, the rise and fall of One Nation and the lifespans and second preferences of minor parties. I also presented a paper to the NZPSA in December 2014 on minor parties and the mass media.

I have also benefitted from ANU’s membership of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). I was on the way to present a paper at the ECPR joint sessions at St Gallen in Switzerland in 2011 when I broke my ankle in London. My paper arrived at the conference but I did not.

However, I did present in 2012 at the ECPR student conference at the University of Bremen in Germany and I wish to thank Professor Kris Deshouwer and his colleagues for that opportunity.

Finally, I would recommend the MPhil and the PhD programs to anybody like me who has retired from the Australian Public Service. You are never too old to learn and contribute, and it is very satisfying to be able to prove your detractors, such as those from secondary school days, wrong!

This research is supported by an Australian Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.
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(Note there is no table 6 in this thesis)
Abstract

This thesis contributes to the political science literature by exploring why minor parties arise and decline. This thesis explores the rise of Australian minor parties in Australia from the time of the Labor ‘Split’ in 1955 that led to the formation of the DLP through to the rise and continuing rise of the Australian Greens in the 1990s and beyond. In that time the Australian Democrats emerged in 1977 and in 1996 and 1997 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation first appeared. The thesis goes behind these parties to explore and analyses the underlying factors that caused these parties to be established in the first place and succeed electorally, before, in the case of three of the parties, meeting their decline. The Australian Greens have not declined to any significant degree and One Nation has experienced a political resurrection. The four parties considered in this thesis were the minor parties that were in the Federal parliament as at 1 January 2009 or had being in the Federal parliament and had lost all of their seats in parliament before that that date.

The appearance of this thesis is very timely given in very recent times the rise of a number of minor parties in the Australian Senate over the last four years, some of which have met their demise. Undoubtedly future research will explore the successes and failures of those parties.

This thesis uses Pedersen’s typology on the life spans of minor parties to graph diagrammatically the life span of each of the parties considered in this thesis. The thesis has put forward a number of changes to Pedersen’s model to take account of Australian conditions and to make the model more empirically accurate.

This thesis explores dissatisfaction with the policy priorities and the sense of relevance of the major parties as being major causes in the the rise of minor parties. I argue that because major parties tend to become oligarchic and over time show less attention to the concerns and interests of the electorate (including constituents, vested interests, and their own party members, as a result other voices are encouraged to establish new attentive parties. Another cause for the rise of minor parties is a move towards post-materialism and this is noted in the rise of both the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens.

The thesis also adds to the scarce stock of literature on the fall and demise of political parties by researching the reasons for the fall of the DLP, the Australian Democrats and in 1998, the fall of One Nation. The thesis concludes that the reasons for a party’s fall or demise is largely caused through irrelevance in terms of policy and divisions and splits that are often very public, within the party. Divisions and splits along with major problems make for good stories to sell newspapers and boost the listener ratings. The role of the media in a party’s rise and fall is a very significant one.

I argue that structural weaknesses in the party organisation can contribute to the demise of a minor party. Structural issues considered include the usage of various companies within the party that can serve to hide the real operators of the party at the expense of the party membership. Participative politics is another structural issue that can create problems for the party when it is used for voting for the parliamentary party leadership.

The research for this thesis was conducted by interviewing members of the minor parties analyzing the records of these minor parties held in the manuscripts collection of the NLA and the NAA, as well as some private collections of papers on those parties.
I also analyse the reasons for the sudden resurrection of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation at the 2016 double dissolution election.

I conclude that minor parties emerge for a specific reason or set of reasons. The minor parties that gain seats in parliament usually do so because the party is led by a high profile and well known leader. To remain in existence and not meet their demise, minor parties must remain united and have policies that the electorate sees as relevant.
Chapter One: Thesis Overview

Introduction

This thesis appears at a very opportune time. The amendments passed by the Federal Parliament in early 2016 relating to the introduction of a partial optional preferential voting system relating to the elections of Senators did not prevent a number of candidates from smaller parties from being elected, or some cases re-elected, at the July 2016 double dissolution election for the Senate. That election also saw the ‘political resurrection’ of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party with four candidates elected to the Senate including Hanson herself and another PHON Senator from Queensland.

The finishing touches were made to this thesis just as Senator Cory Bernardi announced his resignation from the Liberal Party and his representing his new party the Australian Conservatives, in the Senate.

Minor parties are a perennial part of Australia’s political system, yet are much understudied as a recurring phenomenon. This thesis builds on and contributes to the research into the politics of minor parties, by considering the role minor parties play in Australian politics using historical trajectories. This chapter provides the background, explaining why this thesis was written in the light of the power a minor party can wield. The main concern of this thesis is why minor parties emerge in the first place, often holding significant power and influence, but later through various reasons, declining in power and influence and often meeting their demise.

The impetus for this research came about after a career of 30 years in the Australian public service. Much of that time was spent in various policy areas across two departments, the Australian Taxation Office and the Department of Social Security. In terms of getting the resultant legislation through parliament, a significant group of players in the parliamentary process were the various minor parties, such as the Australian Democratic Labor Party (DLP), the Australian Democrats (ADs) and later the Australian Greens (AGs), all three holding the balance of power in the Senate at various times.

Although scholarly studies of party politics have occasionally examined the operations of individual minor political parties, there has been not been so much research in why minor parties in general, commence operating and the factors that cause these parties to fall and disappear altogether. In this thesis, I study four Australian minor parties which have had at least two candidates elected to the federal parliament. In this thesis, I have chosen to study the four Australian minor parties that were in the Federal parliament as at 1 January 2009 or had being in the Federal parliament and had lost all of their seats in parliament before that that date. In addition each of these parties had at least two candidates elected to the federal parliament. The
thesis considers these parties in chronological order from the DLP in 1955 to the Australian Greens of more recent times. My thesis provides additional insight into the reasons why minor parties exist and prosper as well as examining how the actions of the major parties tend to encourage this fragmentation of party identification.

This analytical focus on minor political parties provides another contribution to Australian Politics. This thesis analyses not only why new minor political parties come into existence, but also explains the reasons for their demise. It also attempts to determine the indicators that may lead to a minor political party declining in significance and even disappearing.

Although numerous studies have identified and classified minor political parties (for example Smith 2006), little analytical attention has been paid to why they meet their demise. This issue is addressed in this thesis by taking four minor political parties in Australia, the Australian Democratic Labor Party (DLP), the Australian Democrats (ADs), Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) and the Australian Greens (AGs). The central area of focus is the Australian federal parliament but some comparisons are made with the performance of minor parties in state parliaments.

The thesis explores the reasons why two of these more historically dated parties met their demise, while in respect of the Australian Greens, why that party continues to survive and as part of this survival, the thesis poses the question, has the Australian Greens learnt the lessons from the demise of those two parties? Additionally, the thesis explores the reasons for the rocky initial history but also the ‘political resurrection’ of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party.

The essential test for a minor party is to achieve representation in the parliament and many minor parties in Australia have failed to achieve this fundamental goal. This thesis considers the minor parties that have gained representation in parliament and explores the reasons for this successful achievement. Empirically, it is easier for minor parties to gain a representational foothold in Australia’s various upper houses of parliament, apart from Tasmania, with single member upper house electorates and the ACT with its much smaller multi-member electorates. Proportional representation, the voting method introduced in 1948 for the Senate is regarded as a very significant factor in assisting the rise of minor parties after 1949. Some favorable coverage by the media is also an advantage. Another key reason for gaining parliamentary representation is the cultivation of charismatic leadership from a well-known and popular high profile leader.

The thesis explores the myriad of diverse reasons for the decline of previously significant minor parties in Australia. The interactions of these reasons for decline and disintegration are also considered. These factors of decline are often a combination of administrative and electoral shortcomings. I maintain that these reasons for the rise, decline and disintegration of minor
parties are also applicable to other countries and show that for minor parties, decline and disintegration are possible and can happen quite suddenly.

The rise and fall can be the same factors and different reasons can interact. They do not operate in watertight compartments. For example, a minor party might begin with very good effective leadership and remain relevant. But as time goes by the leadership of the party changes and the former leader may be unhappy losing leadership and publicly show that unhappiness, further the party ceases to remain relevant to policies that people can identify with - in other words the party fails to resonate with voters. The party’s new leader could also be ineffective in leading the party.

In the course of writing this thesis a number of party members were interviewed in person or by email. In addition, a number of party officials provided access to party records and papers in their possession. The National Archives of Australia and the National Library of Australia were consulted for various political party records and papers in their holdings.

The major reason a new party emerges is that a group of voters, who may or may not be members of one of the major parties, strongly considers that their voices are being ignored by both the major parties. To resolve this situation they either set up a new party or join an existing party other than one of the major parties. If they were only ignored by one of the major parties, then their vote or support would ‘swing’ to the other major party.

Therefore, minor parties fill a distinct void which is caused when the major parties fail to pay attention to policy areas that are of concern to party members, party supporters and other voters. A distinct cause of this neglect is the cartelisation of the major parties whereby the major parties interact primarily with the leaders of the corporate world who for significant monetary contributions, gain membership of exclusive party forums that guarantee exclusive access to party leaders and ministers for policy discussions and input.

As a consequence, ordinary rank and file members of the party are not been listened to by the party leadership and party hierarchy. Feeling neglected and not getting value for their party membership they are very receptive when a newly formed party announces that it will listen to their concerns and indeed has policies that resonate.

Minor parties have been able to gain representation in the Senate due to the electoral changes for the Senate which were enacted just before the 1949 Federal election. These changes made it much easier for minor parties to get elected to the Senate. They could gain election to the lower house with its preferential system but this would mean the party would have to concentrate its vote in one area, which the National Party has been able to do effectively over its lifespan. This is in vast contrast to the USA where minor parties have not been able to get candidates elected to the Congress.
Having the necessary finance to operate a political party and contest elections is another problem area for minor parties. For example, the DLP had continual problems with finding the necessary finance to fight an election, having to rely heavily on ‘silver circles’ and similar fund raisers to finance election campaigns. This impacted on the DLP’s ability to employ staff and be able to campaign effectively in elections. In the early days, the Australian Democrats had similar financial problems. The situation changed significantly from the 1984 federal elections when public funding became available to political parties if they polled greater than 4 per cent of the first preference vote in an electorate, state or territory. Currently that funding, which is indexed twice yearly, is 262.7 cents for each first preference vote that the party receives.

This public funding that the party receives is a ‘war chest’ to fight future elections. However, if the party’s support falls below 4% or even if the party’s vote falls, the party is left with a shortfall in funding and this makes it much harder for the party to fight the next election. The party then has to find the finance from other sources such as internal party fundraising or ‘scale down’ the election campaign which can impact on getting the message out to the electorate and the resultant level of electoral support. Therefore, monetary problems can also impact heavily upon a minor party’s lifespan leading eventually to its demise.

Holding the balance of power in the Senate, at various times, has given the DLP, the Democrats and the Greens, much influence and the ability to insist upon various amendments to legislation before they would support its passing through parliament. The parties grew ultimately to hold the balance of power, but in the case of the DLP and the Democrats, both suffered big defeats and lost the balance of power going from being a key player to being insignificant. Their level of support from the voters was very small at the end of their lifespan. Their second preferences were not decisive in determining the winning candidate in any electorate.

The Structure of this Thesis

Chapter two reviews the literature in relation to political parties in general and in respect of the four minor parties that make up this study. It is significant that while there is much literature on the rise of minor political parties there is a paucity of literature on the decline and demise of minor parties.

Chapter three discusses the theory of political parties with reference to minor parties and explores where the power of minor parties lies. The chapter also analyses the other factors instrumental in the success or failure of a minor party and these include the electoral system and voting behavior and the role of the media and its power. Finally, I discuss Mogens Pedersen’s concept of political party lifespans and suggests some modifications to Pedersen’s model (Pederson 1982).
Chapter four empirically explores the rise of the Australian Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which was the product of the third split in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in 1955 primarily over the issue of the rise of Communism in the unions. The party was led by former members of the Australian Labor Party who had split from that party to join the DLP. Those who formed the DLP considered that both the ALP and the Coalition parties were not doing enough to curtail the threat of Communism to Australia. The DLP in 1955 was encouraged and actively supported by the Catholic hierarchy in Victoria and by Mr. BA Santamaria and his National Civic Council. Throughout its lifespan, the DLP was largely concerned about the threat of Communism, foreign affairs and the defence of Australia.

Over its lifespan, as well as showing that minor parties could be elected to the Senate thanks to proportional representation, with the preferential electoral system for the House of Representatives, the DLP used its second preferences to keep the ALP out of office from 1955 until 1972 when the DLP’s preferences to the Coalition parties was insufficient to prevent the ALP from winning government.

Chapter Five goes on to consider the reasons for the decline and demise of the DLP. After a spectacular performance in the 1970 Senate election, where the DLP polled its best ever Senate vote thanks mainly to voter disillusionment with the major parties, the DLP started to unravel. In 1972 when the DLP failed to keep the ALP out of government, communism had ceased to be the threat it was in the 1950’s and an increase in defence spending was no longer a priority. In that environment of change, the DLP ceased to remain relevant to the electorate, preferring to still champion defence spending, warn of the spread of Communism and promote moralistic policies with a much more liberal Catholic church, whose stance on ‘the evils of communism’ had vastly changed and indeed had become much less emotional in its tone.

The party’s change of leadership in the Senate was very poorly handled with one old Senator being replaced by another old Senator instead of a younger one. The former leader quite publicly showed his resentment in losing the leadership. In early 1974 amidst great controversy and total surprise, the former leader accepted from the Labor government the ambassadorship to Ireland, a role to which he was totally unsuited.

After the demise of the DLP, the ‘new DLP’ came into being. This party which was formed by some members of the old DLP, had differences from the party that was wound up in 1978. Notwithstanding that the new DLP was able to have a Senator (Madigan) elected for a six year term, a discussion of the new DLP is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Chapter six empirically reviews the rise of the Australian Democrats, a party that was founded in 1977 following the resignation of Don Chipp from the Liberal party. Chipp was a former minister and a prominent and well liked member of that party. He was considered to be
progressive and trendy in his political outlook and thinking. The Australian Democrats came into being as a result of the amalgamation of the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement.

Chapter seven discusses the reasons for the decline and demise of the Australian Democrats after many years of holding the balance of power in the Australian Senate and negotiating a number of changes and amendments to key legislation.

The Australian Democrats faded away in 2004 and 2007 after the party decided to support the very unpopular GST legislation. In addition, after the retirement of the very popular Don Chipp, the party had numerous changes of leaders. These numerous leadership changes largely came about because of the party’s strict following of participatory democracy where firstly party members could vote for the parliamentary party leadership and secondly if they were dissatisfied with that leadership, party members could organise a petition of at least only 100 party members to have parliamentary party leadership positions declared vacant and a ballot of the entire membership of the party would then take place to elect new parliamentary party leaders.

Chapter eight considers the colorful rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) in 1997 following the withdrawal of Hanson’s endorsement as a Liberal candidate for the Federal seat of Oxley in the 1996 Federal elections. Hanson went on to win the seat and sit in parliament as an independent prior to forming PHON.

Chapter nine discusses the factors that lead to the demise of PHON after a very short lifespan from 1996-97 to the defeat of its Queensland Senator in the 2004 Federal elections. None of the major parties Liberal or Labor second preferred PHON, in fact these two parties chose to second preference each other before preferencing PHON.

In 1996 in her first speech to the Parliament, just before she set up the One Nation party, Hanson stated that Asians in Australia were moving around in ghettos and failing to assimilate. Hanson offered no proof to support this allegation. In fact, she lost her seat in the House of Representatives at the next election. Her party’s Senator lost his seat after one term. In addition to having one Senator elected for one term, One Nation and Hanson had also tasted initial electoral success in Queensland with the election of 11 members of the Legislative assembly and over 24 per cent of the vote. After this honeymoon period the party virtually imploded, with numerous resignations of the One Nation members in the Queensland parliament. Hanson however continued to contest elections under her own name.

With the success of its ‘political resurrection’ Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party is a very good example of a party resonating with the voters and remaining relevant. In the 2016 election Hanson became relevant to elector’s concerns when she campaigned not on Asian immigration and Aboriginals, but on three main issues, namely fear of multi-culturalism, political
correctness, and the impact of globalization. Spectacularly in 2016 she returned to the federal parliament with four senators. In her party’s election to the Senate in 2016 Hanson moved on from 1996 when she was first elected to parliament. She did this by ensuring that she and her party were relevant to the issues that resonated with electors in 2016.

Chapter ten considers the rise and persistence of the Australian Greens. Very significantly, the Greens have been able to have a member re-elected to the lower house and none of the other parties in this study have been able to do this. However, while the Greens have become a major player in the Senate, they have struggled to secure representation in sub-national jurisdictions and especially in the lower houses of parliament. The chapter also discusses whether the Australian Greens learnt from the fall of the other minor parties discussed in this thesis.

Significantly, like the Australian Democrats, the Australian Greens also practice participatory democracy. However, unlike the Australian Democrats the Australian Greens elect their Parliamentary leaders with a ballot of the Parliamentary party and not the entire party membership as the Democrats did. In fact, the Greens have had two leadership changes with the leaders on each occasion voluntarily stepping down and not being voted out of the leadership. The former leaders actively supported the new leadership team, ensuring a smooth transition. This change in leadership is in stark contrast with both the DLP and the Democrats.

The Australian Greens have managed to keep themselves relevant in the eyes of the electorate as well as embracing environmental and green policies, the Australian Greens have also heavily embraced social policies. The Australian Greens can be described as a post-materialistic party.

Finally, chapter eleven presents some conclusions to this study and analyses common reasons for the rise and fall of a political party as opposed to reasons that are unique to one party. It discusses if it is possible to forecast the possible emergence and later the forthcoming fall of a minor political party.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

The central underlying research question of this thesis is firstly, what are the underlying factors that enable a minor political party to emerge and gain representation in parliament? Secondly, what are the factors that might cause a minor party to decline and lose its seats in the parliament? In that light, this chapter explores the literature relating to political parties in general and specifically to minor parties in terms of why these parties rise and fall and where the support for minor parties comes from. It also reviews the literature on minor parties in terms of electoral performance and leadership. The chapter then examines the existing literature relating to the four Australian minor political parties discussed in this thesis.

From the outset, it is apparent that the literature on minor political parties provides some reasons for the rise of the party but provides very little in the way these reasons interact with each other. In terms of the decline of minor parties there is a scarcity of extant literature. For example, the literature on the fall of the DLP is small in quantity and largely very dated mainly around the middle of the 1970s for example Henderson (1975) and McManus (1977). The only exception is Lyons (2008) which is the most recent. In the eyes of many Australians the rise and fall of the DLP is a subject that should be confined to the discipline of Australian history and not politics. However, this thesis shows that there are many valuable lessons to be learnt in today’s political climate from the split of the ALP in 1955 which gave birth to the DLP up to the demise of the DLP in 1974 through division and a lack of relevance in the modern world.

The literature on the more recent decline of the Australian Democrats is also very scarce, with only preliminary writing in this area. For example, Madden (2009) provides a list of reasons for the party’s demise while Ghazarian (2015) provides some preliminary reasons, namely the party’s structure and reliance on participatory democracy in a very formal sense. Floyd (2014) only provides anecdotal information on the rise and fall of the Democrats. Fortunately, the records of the Australian Democrats are housed in the National Library of Australia and those records were consulted in the preparation of this thesis.

Popular literature on the spectacular rise of One Nation is a useful resource (often written by adherents but see Leach, Stokes and Ward (2001)). However, the literature on the decline and resurrection of One Nation is almost non-existent. Although many writers have explored the reasons for the rise of One Nation, most of this literature discusses the party’s policies, with a strong emphasis on the immigration and guns policies.

In terms of the rise of the Australian Greens, a variety of literature discusses the party’s policies and the party’s rise into the Australian parliament. But there is very little written on whether the
Greens have learnt anything from the demise of the other minor parties, taking on board the lessons learned. There is very little written on the strategies adopted by the Greens to ensure that the party remains both relevant and united. This thesis has been able to draw conclusions by comparing the Greens with the other minor parties. For example, the Greens have remained relevant by not restricting their policy appeal solely to green issues and the environment, as they have also concentrated their focus on broader social policies. The party has adopted some elements of participatory democracy but not in a pure sense. Party state and federal conferences are used as instruments of policy development and not solely as a means of keeping the rank and file party members up to date. Finally, the Greens do not employ participatory democracy to elect the parliamentary party leadership; that election is solely in the hands of the parliamentary party members.

This chapter argues that while there is literature discussing the rise of these parties, there is little or no discussion about what factors also contributed to the fall of these parties. In relation to the demise of the parties the available literature is extremely scarce.

**Political Parties in Context**

Political parties can either be major or minor political parties. A major political party can be defined as a political party that stand candidates for election to parliament and has enough candidates elected to either form or join government or the party of opposition and alternative government depending on the number of candidates elected.

A minor party can be defined as a party that is relatively smaller in support or elected members than the larger established (or major) parties. A minor party can stand candidates in a few or all electorates (or list variable numbers of candidates) for election. The minor party’s size in the legislature will be numerically small. Its power and influence may be immense or negligible depending on the circumstances of other political outcomes and alignments.

In Australia, there are two major party blocks, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Coalition between the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party of Australia (the Nationals). In addition to these major parties, many other groups in society, for various reasons, form minor parties. These parties are considered to be minor because of their small size compared to the major parties and are unlikely ever to be considered a party able to form majority government.

Some of these minor parties such as the DLP were the result of a split occurring in a major party, in that case the ALP. Other parties have emerged as the result of a transition from a social movement to a political party. For example, social movements concerned with the environment transitioned to a political party structure in order to stand candidates for parliament.
The Categorisation of Minor Parties

Australia’s two party system consisting of the Liberal-National Coalition and Labor parties has never existed unchallenged in absolute terms; minor parties have regularly arisen and appealed to the electorate and therefore complicated the prevailing two party model. Examples include protectionists, free traders, country progressive parties, Lang Labor, the Australia Party, the Liberal Movement, the Shooters and Fishers Party, various communist parties etc.

Key (1964:254ff) has categorised minor parties into three groupings;

- secessionist (these parties form when there is a split in a party and one section of the party breaks away to form a more pure version of the original party),
- aggrieved minority (these are parties of mainly economic interests but there could be other or even alternative interests. The party forms because of some resentment regarding these interests be they economic or other interests; and
- doctrinal (these minor parties promote a particular doctrine both in season and out of season, examples include communist, Nazi and socialist parties.

Richmond (1978:331) has attempted to categorise minor parties in Australia according to the Key typology. Richmond’s categorisation appears as follows:

Table 1: Categorisation of Minor Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secessionist</th>
<th>Aggrieved Minority</th>
<th>Doctrinal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>New State</td>
<td>Communist Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia Party</td>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>Nazi Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Movement</td>
<td>Australian Conservative Party</td>
<td>Social Credit Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Liberal Movement</td>
<td>Defence of Government Schools</td>
<td>The Australian Greens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberal</td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significantly, Richmond’s table does not include two very significant minor parties, as they were formed after 1978. These parties are the Australian Greens and One Nation. One Nation would largely fall into the doctrinal grouping: its doctrine was primarily no additional Asian immigration to Australia; while the Australian Greens would typically come under the ‘aggrieved minority’ category. In the view of the Australian Greens, no other party seems to be very concerned about the environment and other ‘green’ issues. However, as Richmond notes (332) no categorisation method is absolutely perfect and the DLP could also fit into the
Aggrieved Minority category. Likewise, a case could be made to include One Nation in the Aggrieved Minority category and the Greens could also be described as a doctrinal party, in that the issues of environmentalism could be seen as a doctrine.

Minor parties may be seen to be successful in gaining representation in parliament by having well known high profile leaders and this factor certainly contributes to their recognition and relevancy.

While this basic classification may be useful for classifying minor parties, it gives no indication as to why some minor parties rise to the extent that they gain parliamentary representation, even to the extent of holding the balance of power in the Senate.

Significantly, Wear (2012:1) considered that third or minor parties depend for their success on voter disillusionment with all major political parties. Therefore, when popular resentment is directed overwhelmingly at one side of politics in a bipolar party system, there is little scope for a significant populist third party to emerge. This is because the voter would ‘swing’ or change their vote from one major party to the other.

Jaensch (1994:8-9) has identified four different types of minor parties. These types are, Doctrinal, Issue Parties, Secessionist or Fragment parties and Protest parties. Jaensch defined issue parties as emerging ‘on the basis of a specific issue’. He considered ‘the proliferating Green parties’ being among the ‘classic examples of issues parties.’ This thesis considers the Greens to be a part of the aggrieved minority or protest categories. The chapter on the Greens in this thesis shows that the Green’s policies are concerned with the issue of the environment, but the Greens are concerned with other policy areas as well. Social issues and integrity of the parliamentary system being two such policy areas.

Jaensch defined protest parties as having been ‘based on a reaction to a specific economic, social or even religious trend or event.’ In Jaensch’s view, protest parties may show: -

- a concern with, say, the environment, cultural issues, social issues . . . education or religious issues – but they may also be an electoral aspect of an economic division, for example unemployment.

A protest party could also be an electoral aspect of another division such as the environment or social issues. Thus, the Greens easily fit into the category of a protest party that is seen as relevant in Australia and this is shown by that minor party’s electoral successes.

A fragmentary party is a party whose founders have split from another party usually a major party. Ghazarian (2015) explored Australian minor parties, primarily examining their performance in the Senate. Ghazarian considered the rise and fall of these fragmentary parties in a quite general way without exploring in any detail the various factors that led to the rise and fall of the various parties. Ghazarian however provided another classification for more recent
minor parties. Using a two-part classification Gharzarian (2015:12) divided fragmentary parties into either issues-based, or issues-competitive parties. He argued that the older minor parties that won seats in the Senate were fragmentary parties. These parties were the DLP, the Liberal Movement and the Australian Democrats. The more recent successful minor parties that won seats in the Senate were issues-based parties, such as the Australian Greens and One Nation. These parties arose to promote an issue or issues that that the new party believes the major parties have ignored. Issue competitive parties, such as the Australian Greens, go further in the parliamentary environment; these minor parties compete with the major parties in order to get their policy concerns onto the government’s policy agenda. This can be done by the issue competitive minor party playing a tactical role in the parliamentary committee system or making deals in the usage of the balance power in the upper house.

Analysing the rise and fall of a minor party

As a means of viewing minor and micro parties overall, Weeks (2010:481) has put forward the following schema for analysis of minor and micro parties:

- The electoral performance of the minor party;
- Influence – what has the minor party achieved?
- Why did the party emerge and disappear?
- What is the source of their electoral support?

The emergence and disappearance of the party are two distinct events and should be considered separately and not together. Often these two events can be twenty or more years apart as they were with both the DLP and the Australian Democrats. Leadership is another important factor in any political party. A well-known charismatic leader is a vote winning asset for a minor party. On the other hand a poor performing leader can be a disaster for a minor party. As an example the leadership of the DLP by Gair ended up as a disaster with poor media performances and a divisive change in leadership, the electoral fortunes of the DLP suffered as a result.

Therefore, Weeks’ schema should be recast in the following way

- Why did the party emerge?
- What is or was the source of the minor party’s electoral support?
- What was the overall electoral performance of the party?
- How well was the party led?
- Influence what did the party achieve?
- Why did the party disappear?
The individual points in this schema are not watertight compartments but interact with each other. A significant fact is these parties do not move beyond their minor status. The various points of Weeks’ model, as recast, are considered throughout this thesis.

**Electoral Machinery**

Minor parties have benefitted from the changes, enacted by the federal parliament in 1949, to the method used in voting in elections for the Senate, as well as an increase in the number of Senators from 36 to 60 or from six for each state to ten from each state and then 12 from each state.

This very significant change is discussed in some detail in the next chapter. Under the 1949 Senate voting changes a party only had to win a quota under a proportional voting method. Under the previous pure preferential voting system, the result was distorted as a party could win most of the 36 seats that were in the Senate prior to 1949. As an example, after the 1946 election the ALP held 33 Senate seats, with 52 per cent of the vote, to the Coalition’s 3 seats with 43.3 per cent of the vote.

Electoral dynamics are crucial to the party system. For instance, McAllister (2011:1) has commented that:

> A country’s electoral institutions – which form what is often referred to as ‘the rules of the political game’ – are perhaps the most visible of all the political institutions in how they shape the manner in which politics is conducted. In particular, the rules will dictate how political parties approach the business of attracting the support of voters, and how voters go about responding to the appeals made to them by parties and politicians.

McAllister goes on:

> The institutional context of an election therefore determines how and in what manner electoral competition takes place. Institutional rules and individual voter behaviour interact in subtle and systematic ways to shape electoral outcomes. To ignore the rules of the electoral game is to miss one vital part of the equation that shapes the voting decision.

Federally the ‘rules of the electoral game’ are largely responsible for the success of minor parties in the Senate with its proportional representation voting system, and very minimal success in the House of Representatives with a preferential voting system. In the next chapter, this thesis examines the interaction between minor political parties and the electoral system. In fact, Weeks (2010:491) considered that the electoral system is the ‘primary institution affecting minor parties.’ This thesis reflects Weeks’ finding that there is a very strong relationship between minor parties and the electoral system in terms of the minor party’s performance and its allocation of second preferences and the impact of those second preferences on the final result in the electorate.

Another factor in Australia is the fact that voting is compulsory. Hill (2002) and (2002a) along with Pringle (2012) discuss voting as a duty with voting in Australian being compulsory. This
thesis carries on their work to argue that in the light of a duty of voters, with an electoral system with a distinct voting mechanism, minor parties have been legitimately elected to parliament and as such take their place in parliament legitimately and are not in parliament with some sort of ‘nuisance value’.

While electoral machinery may be considered to be merely ‘an institutional factor’, the electoral machinery provides an environment or avenue for a minor party to contest an election, such as a Senate election, and have some chance of success or influencing the outcome through preference allocations.

## The Role of the Media

Media coverage is highly important to the plight of minor parties. McNair (2003:21ff) suggests five functions of the media in advanced democratic societies and these functions are:

- inform citizens (a surveillance or monitoring function);
- educate as to the meaning and significance of the facts;
- provide a platform for political discourse, including the provision of space for the expression of dissent;
- Give publicity to government and political institutions - the watchdog role of journalism; and
- serve as a channel for the advocacy of political viewpoints.

Each of these five functions is significant for a minor party. A minor party provides an alternative perspective in the polity and often a significant channel of dissent from the major parties. This thesis considers that just as advertising has a significant impact on demand curves in economics, in a similar way, the press with its potential for influence on voters has an impact on the success or failure of minor parties.

However, while much has been written about the role of the press in covering party politics (Lloyd 1988, Flint 2005, Clarke 1962) very little has been written about the interaction of the press with minor parties. What factors attract the press towards minor parties and what factors drive the press away from minor parties to the point of ignoring a minor party altogether? One Nation has also claimed bias by the press in its reporting of that party and likewise the DLP was very critical of the role of the press in that it largely ignored the DLP and its policies. This thesis will test the allegation that the press is biased towards minor parties. This raises a further question, do minor parties understand and appreciate the role of the press in modern society and how could their understanding of the press could be enhanced? Social media is now a way for minor parties to bypass the mainstream media and get their message out to the voters directly.
Pedersen’s typology of Party Lifespans

Pedersen (1982:1-16) put forward a typology of party lifespans and minor parties with various thresholds of as a means of ‘mapping’ political parties in terms of their strength and influence.

Pederson (1982:9) considers that political parties have distinct lifespans which pass through various thresholds and in doing so, ‘parties, as mortal organisations, are born, parties live and parties die.’ These thresholds are the declaration, authorisation, representation and relevance phases and these phases will be discussed later in this chapter. The party’s lifespan can be graphed overtime passing through or even failing to pass through one or more of these thresholds. The determinant for passing though the various thresholds is the level of electoral support which is shown as a lifespan curve. Therefore, any event that has influence on the level of electoral support will influence the party’s progress through these thresholds.

Pedersen’s model can be applied to both federal and state parliaments and both upper and lower houses of parliament. Pedersen’s model is useful for showing the rise and fall of a party and for provoking an analysis to explain the reasons for the rise and fall of the party.

Pedersen’s work is instructive in that he poses and answers the question, how can the rise and fall of a minor party be mapped or graphed over a period of time? Pedersen’s model can be used to illustrate the potential ‘drivers’ or causes that influence the party’s rise and fall.

Pedersen’s model is shown below (Pedersen 1982:8).
The first threshold is *declaration* in which the party declares its intention to participate and stand candidates for election and thus becomes a party in accordance with Pedersen’s definition and not an interest or pressure group. The second threshold is the *authorisation* threshold, in which the party satisfies any legal requirements under the Electoral Act to set up a party and contest elections. Crossing this threshold at the very least allows the party to nominate candidates for election.

In Australia, the declaration and authorisation phases tend to fuse into one. While any party is free to form and contest federal elections in Australia, there are big advantages in going through the authorisation phase. This phase involves an application for registration of the party, to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). Authorisation or approval of registration from the AEC provides big advantages to a party, for example the party’s name appears alongside the name of the party’s candidate on the ballot paper and the party can have a group of candidates on a senate ballot paper allowing its supporters to vote in one box only above the line (a black line at the top of the ballot paper.) In this way, a voter only has to fill in one square on the ballot paper and not all squares below the line. In this way, the order of preferences is determined by the party voted for, and not by the voter.

But perhaps the most important advantage of all is that authorisation allows the party to qualify for public funding if certain conditions are satisfied. The main condition is that the party’s candidate in an election must achieve at least 4% of the formal first preference votes.

Many minor parties in Australia reach the authorisation threshold and go no further; they eventually fade from the political scene altogether. However, in contesting an election using preferential voting, a minor party’s preferences can be crucial to the outcome, assuming that the minor party allocates preferences to a given party and leakages of preferences are very small as to be insignificant to the final result.

The third phase is the *representation threshold*. In crossing this threshold, the party is successful in having one or more candidates elected to the parliament. The level of effective representation can vary and indicators include performance in parliament and on parliamentary committees. The representation threshold is crossed by the party at an election when the party wins seats in the parliament. The big test for a minor party is to get representation in the parliament. Many parties in Australia are formed (declared) and pass through the authorisation stage, but never make it to the representation stage.

The final threshold is *relevance*. Relevance in this sense means relevance in terms of making or affecting the decisions and/or the operations of the legislature. In his definition of a party, Sartori discusses relevance ‘with power in mind, he deals only with winners’ (Herzog 1987:318). However, this paper argues relevance can also include holding the balance of power.
or sharing the balance of power with another party or parties, as well as being a party of
government or alternative government (opposition). Relevance also includes the sole member
of a minor party joining the government party as a minister with a portfolio in that government.

There are two criteria of relevance: A minor party is discounted as irrelevant when it remains
superfluous over time as it is not needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority. But it
is relevant (regardless of size) if it is in a position to determine over time at least one of the
government majorities for example coalition potential or utilisation of support in return for
concessions (Sartori 1976:22-23). However, in the Australian Senate, a minor party can make
itself relevant in work on various parliamentary committees and by attracting the attention of the
press in a positive way.

Pederson considers that it is the goal of any minor party to pass the threshold of relevance and
become an influential at best a ruling party. However, he considers these thresholds to be not
just markers on a continuum, but the thresholds divide up the history of the party in discrete
phases, each with its own dominant and different quality.

Hardly ever is the lifespan curve perfectly bell shaped, with the point of culmination in the very
centre of the lifespan curve. More often than not however, the lifespan curve is not a neat
uniform curve and the point of culmination is not right in the centre of the graph. It would
appear that Pedersen drew a bell-shaped curve to provide a ‘base point’ for comparison or to
show a ‘neutral’ setting.

Pedersen suggests four different dimensions of a party’s life span curve, these dimensions are:

- Modality;
- dispersion;
- flatness; and
- skewness.

About modality, Pedersen considers that a party will only reach one culmination point in their
lifespan, in other words, claims Pedersen, ‘parties will only normally pass the thresholds up-
bound once in their lifespan.’ However, Pederson (1982:12) cites the Danish Communist Party
as one party that suffered a defeat of all of its candidates in 1960, and made a comeback in
1973, which was a long 13 years later. In Australia, the Family First party has managed to cross
the representation threshold twice. The first time with the election of Senator Steve Fielding
from Victoria in 2004 and his defeat in 2010 and again nine years later in 2013 with the election
of Senator Bob Day a Family First Senator from South Australia, who was re-elected at the
2016 double dissolution election.
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation has also crossed the representation threshold for a second time. The first time was in 1998 when Len Harris was elected to the Senate, Pauline Hanson herself was a dis-endorsed Liberal Party candidate when she won in 1996. Hanson was defeated in 1998 and Harris in 2004, after one term in the Senate. Eighteen years later at the 2016 double dissolution elections, Hanson herself won a seat in the Senate for the state of Queensland, joining three other One Nation Senators in the new parliament. The One Nation ‘resurrection’ from the politically dead is considered in the chapter on the demise of One Nation in this thesis.

In terms of a party’s lifespan dispersion, a party’s life span can be very short, ranging over only a few years, or the lifespan could be longer, ranging over a few decades or even centuries. ‘Minor parties are frequently short lived and tend to be led by small cadres of elites’ (Mack 2011:14). Compared to the major parties, the minor parties in this study are short lived with the life or dispersion of the lifespan ranging from seven years up to 30 years. A large lifespan is largely due to the elites leading the party, these elites are often former well known members of one of the major parties, for example Don Chipp.

Pedersen offers no reasons for a party’s lifespan curve coming to an end. This thesis explores the reasons for a party’s demise and for its commencement. The reasons for commencement and demise are the drivers that influence the party’s path along the lifespan curve.

A party’s life span will exhibit flatness when it reaches a point, such as just above the representation threshold and stays at that point for a noticeable period of time. In Pedersen’s view flatness, can distinguish ‘two polar categories of parties’. These are firstly, parties with a long dispersion who in a shorter time period appear to be stable or showing only moderate trends up or down. The second polar category is a party with a short lifespan, reaching its point of culmination quickly and then vanishing of the lifespan graph altogether.

The final dimension skewness, shows ‘the degree of symmetry of the curve.’ From this dimension, Pedersen considers that there are three distinct categories of lifespans and these are:-

- The suddenly appearing but gradually disappearing party (positively skewed Lifespan curve);
- The gradually appearing, but suddenly disappearing party (negatively skewed Lifespan curve); and
- Parties with symmetrical lifespans.

This thesis will consider these four dimensions in terms of four Australian minor parties, the DLP, the Australian Democrats, One Nation, and the Australian Greens. Pedersen (1982:6) considers parties to be ‘mortal organisations’. He goes on to comment that ‘seldom will a party disappear by disintegrating or dissolving itself’. Minor parties in Australia
have eventually disintegrated, for example the DLP and the Australian Democrats and a
discussion on the life spans to the Liberal and Labor parties is beyond the scope of the thesis.

Minor parties have disintegrated through becoming irrelevant in their policies and thus not
appealing to the electorate. While other minor parties have suffered from poor leadership often
of a very divided party. A divided poorly lead party is not appealing to the electorate. These
factors causing the fall of minor parties are explored in subsequent chapters.

However, while Pedersen’s typology is a useful idealised ‘graph’ of a party’s progress, this
thesis argues that the thresholds of representation and authorisation are very broad and need to
be reworked in order to present more detail in terms of the party’s actual power and influence.

When a party reaches the point of culmination, the party finds it difficult to maintain its current
level of support and influence to the extent that it had done. For example, after an election, the
party no longer holds the balance of power in its own right or its level of representation falls,
resulting in more work for its remaining members. The diagram above, shows some examples
of Pederson’s life spans (Pederson 1982:8).

There has been no evaluation or critique of Pedersen’s typology in any of the literature. In the
interests of greater accuracy, Pedersen’s typology is more accurate when it is presented on
graph paper instead of blank paper.

Pedersen was not the first to use the concept of party ‘lifespans’. Rawson (1969:313)
introduced the concept of party life-spans, but in Pedersen’s view Rawson’s ideas were not
utilised by students of political systems (Pedersen 1982:15). Rawson was concerned with
various Labor Parties and their relationship with ‘sponsorship’ such as trade unions, in a number
of countries.

The next chapter evaluates Pedersen’s typology and considers that while Pedersen’s lifespans
and associate thresholds are useful, they do not accurately reflect the lifespans of minor parties
in the Australian Parliament. This thesis proposes additional thresholds in order to more
accurately map a minor political party’s influence and power in the context of the Australian
Parliament.

A lifespan curve is an historical trend which picks up and presents a pattern that does not apply
to all parties.

The Australian Democratic Labor Party

There is a variety of literature on the formation and rise of the DLP, but there is a scarcity of
literature on the demise of the DLP. Much of the literature on the rise of the DLP covers only
limited areas as a result there is absence of discussion on the interactions of the various reasons for the rise of the DLP.

Murray (1970) is an historical account of the Labor split that resulted in the formation of the DLP. Murray discussed the rise of the influence of Communism in the unions and the setting up of the industrial groups by the ALP to counteract this influence. He also gave a detailed account of the split. However, he did not discuss what exactly the role of the DLP was to be or whether the better course of action would have been to stay in the ALP and fight Communism without forming another party with all of the associated uncertainties.

Reynolds (1974) discussed the DLP in terms of its rise and the various organisations that played a role in that rise, such as the Catholic hierarchy and the industrial groups. Reynolds also discussed the influence of communism in the formation of the DLP. Reynolds’ final chapter was a very speculative discussion on the future of the DLP and Reynolds’ publication appeared in bookshops the week the 1974 double dissolution was announced. Therefore, Reynolds did not consider such events as the ‘Gair affair’ and the results of the double dissolution election and their impact on the DLP’s lifespan.

Strangio (2012) discussed the Split and the rise of the DLP in terms of their effect on the ALP. He discussed Santamaria and his approach in his anti-Communism mission. Strangio presented the Split as an event that happened only after much division and hostility with in the ALP. In Strangio’s view this division and hostility reached a point where reconciliation and unity were impossible. Furthermore, Strangio believed that a major influence in the Split was sectarianism.

Mayer (1960) was a very factual account and a review of the DLP from its founding in 1955 to mid-1960. Mayer considered the membership numbers of the DLP and the party’s finances. Mayer also discussed the divisions in the Catholic hierarchy which dispelled the idea that the DLP was a ‘Church party’. Mayer also commented on the divisive 1959 Victorian State Conference. However, Mayer drew no conclusions nor did he explore the interactions between the different ‘players’ that either made up the DLP or were responsible for its formation.

Wertheim (1960:3) examined only the issue of what was the role and purpose of the DLP. Was the DLP the true Labor Party or was the party a third force in Australian politics? Wertheim concluded that primarily the DLP was an anti-communist party.

Duncan (2001) viewed the DLP from the perspective of the Catholic Church and the anti-Communist struggle in Australia. Duncan’s discussion commences at the time of the origins of Catholic Action to a divided Catholic church in the early 1960s. Duncan’s account discusses the ALP split from the position of BA Santamaria, the National Civic Council and the Catholic hierarchy.
Mackerras (1970) explored the DLP’s second preferences strategy from the view point of how the preferences were distributed by the voters. Mackerras considered that the position of the DLP candidate on the ballot paper was of some significance. However, Mackerras did not discuss the reasoning behind why the DLP in all elections refused to second preference the Labor candidate.

Duffy (1967:334ff) considered the origins and operations of the DLP as a political party. He explored the role and influence of the industrial groups. He considered that the major policies of the DLP were in terms of defence and foreign affairs. The DLP’s main support came from the state of Victoria and the party was advantaged by the Senate electoral system which saw the election of DLP Senators. While in the House of Representatives the DLP’s preferences had a strong influence on the Liberal Party’s electoral successes. Duffy questioned whether the DLP was a veto or ‘nark’ party. Much of Duffy’s paper explored the future of the DLP. This thesis explores the issues that Duffy raised with the benefit of hindsight and in greater depth.

Strangman (1975:204ff) who had spent some time as the DLP leader’s private secretary, discussed the DLP in terms of power; the power of second preference allocation and the balance of power in the Senate. He explored the DLP’s power from the discovery of power, the exercise of power and finally the loss of power in 1972 and 1974. Strangman argued that the DLP learnt from its experiences such as the importance of tightly disciplined second preferences in the 1961 election, in which ‘DLP preferences went wild’. This thesis examines and comments on Strangman’s claims using the research of others who have written on the DLP.

Duffy (1987:435ff) discussed the DLP in the seventies. He claimed that the DLP entered the 1970s ‘with some valuable assets and some large-scale problems’. In its favour according to Duffy was ‘a solid if narrow electoral base, the balance of power in the Senate, and a strong bargaining power with a non-Labor Government’. Duffy considered that the DLP’s difficulties ‘were in getting a clear definition of what it wanted to be – a minority third party or a coalition partner of one or more parliamentary groups’

Costar, Love and Strangio (2005) in the 50th anniversary of the Split, published a collection of papers. The majority of these papers deal with the origins of the DLP, with perspectives from the State level in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia. The next two sets of papers deal with ‘the prelude and protagonists’ and ‘religiosity and the split’. ‘The prelude and protagonists’ section contains two papers that in part consider Dr HV Evatt’s role in the split. This thesis considers Dr Evatt’s role in the split in some detail and critically discusses his leadership abilities in the light of events leading up to, and after the split.

Recently Coleman (2016 forthcoming) has written about the rise of the DLP in a biography of his grandfather, the late Les Coleman, a member of the Victorian parliament and a founder of the DLP in Victoria. Coleman strongly emphasis the role of the Catholic Church in the Split as
well as the leadership of Dr Evatt. As this work is primarily a biography, there is not the detailed explanation for the rise and fall of the DLP that a reader would expect in a contemporary work on the DLP.

This thesis considers not just a few but a number of reasons for the rise of the DLP. In addition, this thesis discusses and then analyses the interactions between these reasons and the role of organisations such as the Catholic hierarchy, Santamaria and his National Civic Council and the parliamentary Labor Party.

Only three writers have discussed the demise of the DLP, in chronological order they are Henderson (1973 and 1975), Reynolds (2005) and Lyons (2008). This thesis provides and analyses further reasons for the demise of the DLP.

Henderson (1973:75-80) commented on the DLP’s performance in the 1972 Federal election in which the DLP failed to keep the ALP from government by its second preference allocation to the coalition parties. Henderson concluded after reviewing the DLP’s performance in the 1970 Senate election that the Party’s Senate vote was ‘holding tight’. However, with regard to the 1972 House of Representatives elections, the DLP vote continued to decline.

Henderson went on to discuss the issues that had a bearing on the DLP’s performance in 1972. These issues included a softening on communism and the recognition of Communist China by the USA. Henderson also considered that the DLP’s 1972 election campaign had some crucial errors. The DLP ran a campaign on ‘permissive issues’ in other words moral or religious issues.

Three years later Henderson made a more in depth analyse of the DLP’s declining fortunes (Henderson (1975:77-89). Henderson believed a major problem was the DLP considered its support was its Senate vote but its real support was shown in its slowly declining vote in the House of Representatives over the years.

Henderson went on to examine the proposed merger between the DLP and the Country Party which was discussed between the two parties in 1973. Henderson observes the merger was not universally supported by either party and showed the poor decision making within the DLP on national issues.

Henderson went on to give an analysis of the DLP’s leadership transition from Gair to McManus in 1973. Henderson believes the transition in leaders was poorly handled being allowed to drag on through 1973 with mounting damaging speculation from the DLP’s political opponents and the press.

Finally, Henderson considered the 1974 double dissolution and subsequent election. He questioned why the DLP would want to vote to block supply given the uncertainty of re-election
of its Senators. In Henderson’s view in 1974 the electors saw the DLP as irrelevant and incapable of changing with the times.

As the DLP finally wound up in March 1978, Henderson’s account is more an account of the state of play of the party in its dying stages. In other words, Henderson gives a warning to the party that it had to find solutions and improve its performance if it wanted to survive and find its way back into the Parliament.

Reynolds (2005:290) provided a discussion on the demise of the DLP in Costar, Love and Strangio (2005). Reynolds account is very broad. After discussing where the DLP’s support came from, he went on to discuss the DLP second preference strategy. He then discussed the general role of minor parties in the Senate.

The most recent discussion of the demise of the DLP was Lyons (2008:426) In Lyons’ view the DLP became irrelevant with its overwhelming focus on foreign affairs and defence issues and this irrelevance played a large part in its failure as a political party – in early 1970s its strident anti-communism was incompatible with mainstream community opinion.

Overall the literature on the rise of the DLP only considers one or two of the organisations responsible for the rise of the party, with very little discussion on the interactions between those organisations. There is only a small volume of literature on the demise of the DLP. This thesis adds to the literature on the demise of the DLP and explores the interactions between the organisations and reasons responsible for the rise of the DLP.

The Australian Democrats

The Australian Democrats resulted from a merger of two previous minor parties, the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement in South Australia. Literature on both these parties is very scarce. However, various records relating to these parties were tracked down in the manuscripts room at the National Library of Australia. These records have been consulted in the writing of this thesis and they have provided a valuable insight into the reasons why these parties emerged and then started to decline. An examination of other records detailed the early attempts to merge the two parties and then seek out Don Chipp who recently resigned from the Liberal Party as a leader of the merged party. At the time Chipp was very well known and had a reputation for modern and progressive thinking.

Warhurst (1997) has amassed a collection of papers discussing the rise of the Australian Democrats. One of the papers discusses the Australia Party (Warhurst 1997b:23-36), while another discusses the Liberal Movement (LM) (Jaensch 1997:37-48). These papers discussed the rise of those two parties, but did not consider their individual decline and transition into the Australian Democrats. With a publication date of 1997, the GST and its debate were some three
years away and the wrangling and lack of voter support that heralded the party’s demise were yet to come.

This thesis argues that both the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement emerged, but then started to decline. The two parties arrested that fall by agreeing to amalgamate into one party and at the same time successfully finding a high-profile leader, the ex-Liberal Don Chipp, to lead the new party.

Reviewing the very scarce literature on the Australia Party, Blackshield (1972) gave a history of its founding and early days. This party was founded by Gordon Barton. In fact, the party’s founding was a reaction to a newspaper advertisement Barton placed in The Australian newspaper in 1966 protesting about Australia’s involvement in Vietnam. The reaction was a number of people contacted Barton asking what could they do. The result was a hastily formed party which fielded candidates in the 1966 Federal election.

Warhurst (1997b:23) considered that the Australia Party was founded in the mid-1960s when the ‘political party contest’ changed from the influences of the 1950s Cold War politics demonstrated by the DLP’s ‘ensuring office’ for the Coalition parties. At that time the ALP was ‘struggling to emerge from the split’ and ‘the Liberal Party was at odds with itself’ and finally ‘the Country Party was little changed’ with the times.

As a consequence, Warhurst argued, there was considerable animation in the electorate in the form of challenges to settled Australian ways of doing things. Warhurst listed as examples, the Vietnam War, conservation of the environment and women’s rights among others. The Australia Party was part of that challenge.

The Liberal Movement was a breakaway group from the Liberal Country League in South Australia. The Liberal Movement was led by the former Premier of the State, Steele Hall. Jaensch and Bullock (1978) provided the first scholarly account of the rise of the Liberal Movement and the reasons behind the splitting of the Liberal Party which brought on the Liberal Movement. Jaensch and Bullock also explain the New Liberal Movement and the start of the merger that formed the Australian Democrats. Jaensch and Bullock’s account of the Liberal Movement was written at the time it happened. This thesis explores the rise and fall of the Liberal Movement and the merger that formed the Australian Democrats in hindsight after nearly 38 years.

Jaensch (1997:37) gave an account of the formation of the Liberal Movement (LM) in South Australia. The Liberal Movement was at first a mere faction of the Liberal Country League, but later became a party in its own right. Jaensch listed the reasons for the rise of the Liberal Movement, the major one being the ‘Playmander’. The ‘Playmander’ was the aligning of South
Australian electoral boundaries in the 1930s, by Premier Sir Thomas Playford, to significantly advantage the Liberal Country League and markedly disadvantage to Labor Party.

Jaensch (1997:42 traced the transition of the LM as a faction into a political party in its own right, after the 1973 State election in which members associated with the LM did very well. In Jaensch’s words ‘the party within a party was clearly a potent force’. As a consequence, the LM was declared ‘an outside political body’ to which LCL members could not join. Hall retaliated by resigning from the LCL and setting the LM as a separate political party.

The Liberal Movement fell after the Liberal Country League commenced merger talks in 1976 (Jaensch 1997:44). The LM was ‘deeply in debt’ and Hall had acknowledged that the LM had ‘dramatically changed the LCL (Jaensch 1997:46).

Robin Millhouse and some others refused to re-join the ‘reformed’ LCL and responded by forming ‘the New Liberal Movement.’ It was this party that merged with the Australia Party to form the Australian Democrats.

Some of the earlier Democrat Senators were members of one of the two formative parties, for example Siddons was a member of the Australia Party, Evans and Haines were members of the New Liberal Movement.

With regard to the literature on the rise of the Australian Democrats, Warhurst (1997a:3-22) considered the first 20 years of the party, up to 1997. Warhurst mentioned the ructions in the party with six leaders over 20 years, three of which were short term leaders. Warhurst also discusses the Democrats participatory ethic which also caused the party problems, which were increased by the party’s shrinking membership base. This thesis explores in some depth the leadership problems of the Democrats and argues that these problems were exacerbated by the party’s adherence to participatory democracy in a very pure form. The thesis goes on to argue that this pure form of participatory democracy was a major cause in the party’s eventual demise.

Gauja (2010:486-503) firstly evaluated the Democrats long term electoral impact. She then evaluated the party’s unique organisation and its impact on Australian political culture. Thirdly she analysed the party’s parliamentary role and its contribution in promoting the Senate as a house of review. However Gauja did not explore the lack of an ideology in the Australian Democrats and the resultant ability to attract a distinct group of voters. Nor did she discuss the more significant policies of the Australian Democrats and their impact, for example the decision to support the goods and services tax.

Floyd (2014) who was a member of the Australian Democrats, discussed the rise and the fall of the Australian Democrats. Commenting on the rise of the Democrats, Floyd discussed the role and influence of Don Chipp. According to Floyd, in early days of the party:-
the media spotlight was on Don Chipp. To many it must have seemed if he was the Australian Democrats. From its inception and through 1977 he was its voice and spirit – and he drove himself relentlessly through gruelling feats of endurance to publicise its aims (Floyd 2014:12).

With regard to the demise of the Australian Democrats, in Floyd’s view leadership of the parliamentary party and resignations of Senators were significant factors. However much of the blame can be attributed to the debate within the party and the ultimate support for the GST. In addition, Floyd considers the negotiations with the Liberal leadership of Howard and Costello was poorly conducted resulting in much negative publicity for the Democrats. (Floyd 2014:188).

As with the DLP, there is a scarcity of literature on the decline and fall of the Australian Democrats. Madden (2009) listed several reasons for the demise of the Democrats, but she provides little more than a list with no in depth discussion of those reasons. Economou and Ghazarian (2008) considered the main reason for the fall of the Democrats were the rules and the structure of the party. They saw the parliamentary party’s decision to support the GST legislation in 2000, as a catalyst to the party’s decline and demise. This thesis provides an in-depth study of the reasons behind the fall of the Democrats and identifies a number of other reasons for the party’s fall.

Ghazarian (2015:90ff) considered that the usage of participatory democracy was a major reason for the demise of the Australian Democrats, as it ‘allowed leadership tensions to perpetuate.’

This thesis has explored other reasons for the demise of the Democrats and has explored the reasons given by Madden along with Economou and Ghazarian in greater detail.

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation

There is a significant amount of mainly journalistic literature on the rise of One Nation, given the short time span of the party and the short period of time that the party was represented in the federal and Queensland parliaments. This literature mainly explores the policies of One Nation and in particular the party’s immigration policy, with scant regard to the party’s other policies on such areas as gun control, taxation and citizens initiated referenda. Due to its very recent occurrence, there is no literature regarding One Nation’s rise again, or in other words its ‘resurrection from the political dead’ at the 2016 federal election in which the party won four seats in the Senate. This thesis provides an analysis for this ‘political resurrection’.

Grant (1997) contains an edited collection of 14 papers. This collection of papers is primarily an exploration of the policies of One Nation and the implications of those policies if implemented. In Grant’s words, the book analyses ‘specific aspects of the Hanson phenomenon
in the context of Australian politics’ (Grant 1997:7).’ This book was published in October 1997 at the very early stages of the One Nation party which at the time was yet to contest an election.

However, one paper makes an attempt to examine the future of the party. Hughes (1997:129) made an attempt to peer into the future in an attempt to discover what would happen to Hanson and One Nation at the next election, in 1998. Hughes discussed three possibilities, firstly that Hanson would run as a candidate for the House of Representative in her own seat of Oxley. Alternatively, she would run in another seat (which she ended up doing, running in neighboring Blair). Finally, Hughes considered that Hanson might run as a candidate in Queensland for the Senate. In his discussion, Hughes considered that Hanson might run as a candidate in Queensland for the Senate. In his discussion, Hughes discussed some of the weaknesses in One Nation. For example, David Ettridge the Executive Officer of One Nation ‘openly admits, he knows, or understands, little about politics’. Another problem that Hughes noted, was Hanson’s tendency to dump advisers, ‘once they displease her’, so much for ‘frank and fearless advice’! Furthermore Hanson ‘attracts supporters with little or no political acumen.’ All of these factors in their own way, helped to contribute to the quick demise of the party. This thesis discusses those factors in some depth.

Leach, Stokes and Ward (2000) is a collection of papers on the rise and fall of One Nation. Many of the individual papers consider the rise of One Nation, however few consider the fall and demise of the party. The fall of One Nation is discussed in the book’s introduction and in Reynolds (2000). Reynolds pointed out some of the factors, but not all, that led to or aided the demise of One Nation. One example he gave, was the seating of the One Nation members at the far end of the Queensland Legislative Assembly chamber. This led to the party being referred to by the Deputy Premier as ‘that mob down the back’ (Reynolds 2000:172). Reynolds also showed the tactlessness and inexperience of One Nation parliamentarians (at page 173). Leach, Stokes and Ward (2000) did not present an in-depth account of the demise of One Nation, referring to it only briefly in passing.

At the time this collection of papers was prepared, One Nation had been in existence for about three years and the party had contested the 1998 Federal election and the Queensland state election earlier that year. Arklay and Wanna (1999) provided an initial analysis of One Nations electoral performance in the 1998 Queensland and federal elections. They commented that One Nation emerged by accident over 1996-97 and not by ‘a premeditated act of astute political calculation and from her election in March 1996 until her first speech in the parliament six months later in September. This thesis explores this ‘accidental rise’ in some detail. By the year 2000, Hanson had lost her seat in parliament and the approach of the major parties was clear, preference One Nation and Hanson last. In addition, the parliamentary One Nation party in the Queensland parliament was unravelling at a fast rate. However, One Nation was yet to contest the 2001 election and One Nation retained a presence in the Queensland parliament for some years after 2000.
Gibson, McAllister and Tami Swenson (2002:823ff) analysed the performance of One Nation in the 1998 Federal election, using the 1998 Australian Election Study, conducted at ANU in Canberra. In their view, Hanson’s vision was the ‘Fortress Australia of the 1950s: self-sufficient, united and ethnically homogenous’.

Gibson, McAllister and Tami Swenson concluded that the results for the election study would appear to show that individual level characteristics determine the One Nation vote rather than any contextual effects apart from living in a rural area. In other words, the individual makes a conscientious decision to vote One Nation without any external influences except living in a rural area as opposed to an urban or metropolitan area.

Goot and Watson (2001:157) posed the questions; what sorts of people vote for PHON and what distinguishes these voters from those who have voted for other parties? In addition, what does the nature of PHON’s electoral support say about PHON as a party of protest, its chances of survival and its place in the Australian party system?

They found that support for PHON was much stronger in Queensland than in other states. Support for PHON was higher outside metropolitan areas. It was the Nationals rather than the Liberals or the ALP vote that PHON put at risk. PHON’s base vote was higher the smaller the town or city. Goot and Wilson’s research again showed that minor parties have one state in which they are particularly strong while being weak in the others. In the case of One Nation this state was Queensland, while with the DLP for example, the state of greatest support was Victoria.

There was also an ‘urban fringe’ effect with PHON’s vote rising dramatically to a peak in the outskirts of a city, the urban fringe effect was noticeable if these areas contained unskilled workers in blue collar industries, few indigenous Australians or people born overseas and a high number of home owners or people saving to own their own home. However, in inner city areas with a high multicultural population with high incomes, PHON was likely to fare poorly. Therefore, the party depended on voters with no tertiary education, blue collar workers, mainly men, albeit with no distinctive age profile.

Goot and Wilson concluded that there is little evidence that PHON voters are ‘quintessentially petit bourgeois’ that is, coming from small business backgrounds. Nor does PHON support represent a working-class revolt against policies that have abandoned tariff protection. This is a little surprising because in the lead up to her first speech and in the formation of PHON, Hanson advocated strongly for an abandonment of ‘market forces’ economic policies which includes the lowering of tariffs and dismantling of industry protection. In her first speech to parliament this issue was overshadowed by her comments on Asian immigration.
Turnbull and Wilson (2001:512) disagreed, arguing that economic security was a factor in PHON’s support. This, they argue, was shown by the importance that Goot and Wilson place on the city country divide in PHON’s support. Goot and Wilson responded (Goot and Wilson 2001A:512) expressing their disagreement.

Forrest, Alston, Medlin and Amri (2001:167) also found that the Nationals were the losers in voter support with the entry of PHON in the 1998 federal election. They state that PHON was characterised as the party of ‘old Australia’, that is those least able to cope with the pace of recent social and economic changes, such as rationalisation and centralisation of services and the movement of people from the rural and regional areas to urban areas. Forrest, Alston, Medlin and Amri use as their case study the electorate of Farrer in NSW.

In his discussion of One Nation, Ghazarian (2015:113ff), considered that Hanson, a ‘right populist party type’ was the critical driver of the party. She received the support of voters and not One Nation. Ghazarian believes that the combination of Hanson’s background, charisma and message was a potent mix (at p 119).

Ghazarian (2010:6), argued that the structure of One Nation gave Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield extensive powers, including automatic expulsion of members based on a suspicion that they were somehow working against the party. In Ghazarian’s view the structure of One Nation was one of the major reasons for its demise and the rise in Queensland of the City Country Alliance in 2000. The One Nation parliamentarians in Queensland rejected the structure of One Nation. Disputes followed in One Nation along with the resignation of Hanson, while Ettridge and Oldfield removed themselves from the day to day operation of the Party. Ghazarian also notes that One Nation also ‘deliberately sought to exclude its members from the decision-making processes.’

Ghazarian (2015:128ff) commented on some of the reasons for the demise of One Nation. He noted that the party’s policy formulation was poor, for example ‘printing money’ and the ‘easy tax’ were poorly thought through and thanks to media publicity turned the party into a joke. In the Western Australian state election of 2001, One Nation decided to preference all sitting MPs last regardless of party as a response to One Nation not receiving second preferences from either of the major parties. This response seemed rather childish and an example of sulking. It is surprising that Ghazarian did not comment on One Nation’s unwillingness to at least negotiate with ether of the major parties for second preferences.

Ghazarian has described the decline of One Nation, but has not explored the reasons why the decline happened. In the rise of One Nation, Ghazarian did not mention the role of the ‘Pauline Hanson Supporters Movement’ and the poor utilisation and management of this movement by Hanson and her advisers. This thesis explores the role of the ‘Pauline Hanson Supporters Movement’ and how it could have been better used and managed by Hanson and her advisers.
This thesis explores the rise of One Nation with the benefit of some hindsight. It takes the various reasons for the demise of the party and considers these reasons in greater detail considering how many of these reasons together caused the party’s decline. Finally, this thesis explores the reasons for the ‘political resurrection’ of One Nation at the 2016 federal double dissolution elections.

The Australian Greens

The Australian Greens are different to the other parties considered in this thesis. The Australian Greens were not a ‘break away’ party, but evolved from environmental social groups such as the ‘Lake Pedder Action Committee’ in Tasmania. The Australian Greens appear to be on the ‘rise and rise’. This Party is not on a decline leading to an eventual demise. This thesis explores why the Greens have been so successful. This thesis poses the question is the Australian Greens a party that has learnt the lessons from the demise of other minor parties and avoided the pitfalls?

Considering Green parties in general, much of the literature has a European focus, but with lessons for Australia and indeed some similarities to Australia. Rootes (2002) considered that environmental awareness may have been a precondition for the rise of Green parties, but the prevailing electoral systems such as proportional representation, and the conditions of political competition determine whether potential is translated into votes. With regard to Australia he observes that the Greens breakthrough in 2001 came in elections to upper houses elected by proportional representation but not in lower houses where majoritarian systems prevail. However, since then the Australian Greens have been successful gaining one House of Representatives electorate and a few lower house seats in various state parliaments.

Rootes (2002:78) commented that Green parties are seldom grown automatically out of environmental movements. He considered that the anti-nuclear movements and campaigns of the 1974 were also factors in the rise of the Green parties. Rootes also considered that the Greens parties’ greater success has come from being also seen as a protest party.

Rootes (2002:79) noted that the Greens were, in many countries, pioneers of making the environment a central political issue. Furthermore, once they had put environmental concerns on the agenda and demonstrated it was not merely a passing fancy but had a relatively stable constituency, other parties in varying degrees and for varying reasons, also embraced environmentalism at least rhetorically.

He went on to comment that the result is the Greens no longer have the environment issue to themselves. However, because more mainstream parties do not attend to the environment as convincingly or as consistently, so as to ‘follow the barometer of public opinion’, Green parties continue to be the most closely identified with, and trusted, on environmental issues.
Muller-Rommel (2007:149) also considered that proportional representation ‘has indeed been shown to facilitate the development of new parties while majority electoral systems hinder the electoral prospects of these parties unless they are regionally concentrated.

Muller-Rommel (2007:146) spoke of a new politics culture which has strongly supported the rise of the collective identity mood among socially or politically marginalised citizens. The adherence to new political issues provide three options in voting behavior: exit, loyalty or voice. Exit means the voters no longer participate in politics. Regarding loyalty, the voters vote for the established parties although as voters, they are dissatisfied with the party’s policy making. Muller-Rommel noted that these voters are usually the older voters who have a strong historically rooted party identification. Those voters who choose voice can do this in two ways: either inside or outside the party system. Outside the party system, the discontented voters have established new social movements. Inside the party system the discontented voters have found their parliamentary arm among the green parties.

Muller-Rommel (2007:146) considered that there are at least three characteristics of Green parties. Firstly, most of these parties follow the basic ideas of the ‘new politics’ concept. In short, these parties hold a general left-wing utilitarian position and introduce programmatic and ideological thinking which is less consistent with the traditional left-to-right dimension. They also advocate a set of alternative values that differ significantly from those of the established parties. Secondly, Green parties have a much stronger preference for participatory party organisation than any established party. This thesis has found that while the Australian Greens have adopted a participatory politics approach, it differs from the participatory politics model used by the Australian Democrats. The Australian Greens parliamentary party chooses its leadership team in the parliament and not the rank and file. Secondly the Australian Greens like other Australian parties use party state and federal conferences for policy formulation. The Australian Democrats used those conferences primary as ‘training sessions’ on various subjects for the party rank and file.

Thirdly Green party voters differ significantly from voters who support established parties. Greens voters are mainly younger, highly educated, and occupy white collar and government jobs with traditional class conflict being virtually non-existent. This thesis notes that this characteristic is also true of the Australian Greens.

Muller-Rommel (2007:148) commented that the characteristics of the political and the economic setting of the country are responsible for the electoral strength of Green parties. He also considered cartelisation to be significant in the Green party’s success.

Muller-Rommel (2007:150) expanded the concept of the cartel parties thesis and its influence on the rise of Green parties. He argued that large established parties are losing sight of their electoral support base in society and this is has led to the foundation of new challenger parties.
such as the Greens and a decline in electoral support for the established parties. As a reaction against this decline and in order to maintain their commanding position, the main established parties rendered their relationship with state structures much closer, by means of control of the mass media; of the spread of party patronage and the level of state support received. In other words, a cartel type arrangement exists when all major established parties collectively cooperate with each other successfully in linking themselves with state structures and in resisting the programmatic and organisational challenges from newly found parties such as the Greens. This thesis has found this situation to be a key factor in Australia.

The cartelisation of the major parties has resulted in a rise in the number of minor parties in Australia along with an increase in the level of their electoral support. The Australian Greens have benefitted in terms of cartelisation helping to ensure their continuity and their current level of overall support. In fact, attempts by the major parties to change the rules to make it harder for minor parties have not been successful in terms of the Australian Greens. The Greens have qualified for significant sums of electoral funding from the public purse and the recent changes to the voting rules in respect of Senate, which were supported by the Greens, has not significantly lessened the number of Greens in the Australian Senate.

The major piece of Australian literature regarding the rise of the Greens is Jackson (2016). Jackson explored a number of aspects of the Australian Greens, however he did not consider if the Australian Greens have learnt from the demise of the other parties discussed in this thesis and whether or not the Australian Greens have put in place mechanisms to ensure the party does not suddenly meet its decline.

Lohrey (2002) provided an historical account of the rise of the Australian Greens. She traced the Greens from the first Greens organisation in Australia, the United Tasmania Group, up to 2002 when the Australian Greens held seats in the Federal parliament and a number of State parliaments.

Lohrey’s account is very general. Lohrey made some comparisons with the Australian Democrats but no other Australian minor party. Her main concern was the Australian Democrats refused a number of requests to amalgamate with the Australian Greens. There is no mention or acknowledgement in Lohrey’s writing of the Greens learning any lessons from the Australian Democrats’ usage of participative democracy or the Democrats numerous changes of party leader.

The Greens are an organic party in the sense they have evolved over a lengthy period of time and out of several community campaigns organised at the grass roots. Overall their support has grown steadily. The Greens were not founded through the personal fiat of one individual as was the Australian Democrats and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. It has evolved in to a real
constituency, something more than just a broad-based protest vote. The Greens are not based on individual policy items but on a new paradigm or grand narrative of what politics is all about the ecological. (Lohrey 2002:2)

In Lohrey’s view the problem facing the Australian Greens is ‘not having too narrow a focus or being marginal or fringe’. Rather the Party’s difficulty will be ‘in keeping up with the complexity of expansion within the ecological constituency and in maintaining a balance of forces within their own movement’ (Lohrey 2002:82)

However as with Jackson, Lohrey has not considered what the Greens have learnt from other minor parties to ensure the Greens will not meet a sudden demise.

Conclusion

This literature review has considered the literature relating to minor parties. It has found that while literature on the rise of the various minor parties is both plentiful and diverse, literature on the demise of minor political parties and the demise of, or a lack of electoral support for three of these parties along with the electoral resurrection of one of them is almost nonexistent.

Most minor party literature concentrates on the origins and emergence of the minor party rather than considering the changing political environment and threatening factors both within the party and externally that could jeopardise the party’s survival, or lead to its eventual demise.

Notwithstanding Rawson’s reference to political party lifespan curves, no literature to date has political party lifespans as depicted in Pedersen’s model in an Australian context and suggested enhancements to Pedersen’s model.

The next chapter considers minor political parties in general in terms of their leadership, structure and roles, along with the voting systems that either enhance or inhibit their successes in elections.
Chapter Three: Minor Political Parties in General

Introduction

This chapter begins by exploring what is a ‘political party’, then extending the analysis to examine what is a minor and a micro party. The chapter then goes on discuss the expected functions of a political party, including those of the minor or micro parties. The chapter also discusses the voter behavior that supports a minor party. The electoral system including the voting system for the House of Representatives (preferential voting) and the Senate (proportional representation) are explored and discussed. The methodology used to explore the rise and fall of a political party is discussed and the question is posed: how can a political party be usefully categorised? The chapter also analyses the role and expectations of leadership and the implications of a change of leadership of a minor party.

This chapter briefly considers the implications for minor parties of the changes in early 2016 to voting in elections for the Senate. Apart from the political resurrection of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, this thesis considers events that took place prior to those changes in Senate voting.

Parliament amended the Commonwealth Electoral Act in early 2016 to abolish group voting tickets which allowed parties themselves to allocate preferences to other parties, the voter only had to vote for one party. The preferences were then allocated by the Electoral Commission as detailed by that political party. This voting method allowed some candidates to be elected to the Senate with a very small first preference vote which could be as low as two percent of the vote. It also allowed some electoral strategists to ‘game the system’ by negotiating very secretive preference deals between parties.

The amendments to the electoral act abolished the system of voting for one party and preferences allocated in accordance with that party’s instructions. Under the new system, a voter had to mark at least six squares above the line a vote for the parties, or at least twelve squares below the line, a vote for candidates. In sponsoring the legislation, the government considered the amendments were prevent the secretive deals and preference allocations and as a result make winning a seat in the Senate much harder for minor parties.

What is a political party?

A political party can be defined in many ways. Firstly, a political party can be defined as an organisation (political, military, class, community etc) that seeks to govern. Rose (1964:36) for example saw a political party as ‘a large scale organisation whose purpose is to control the
personal and policies of the government’. In addition, Janda (1970:83) defined political parties as ‘organisations that pursue goals of placing their avowed representatives in government positions.’

A political party could also be defined as an organisation that aims and campaigns to have its candidates elected to public office that is holding seats in the parliament. In that light, Smith (2006:11) defined a political party as ‘an organisation that aims to influence public policy in favour of an ideology or set of interests, primarily by attempting to gain and retain control of public offices.’ Smith went on to note that Australian political scientists ‘have struggled to produce a sensible basis for distinguishing minor from major parties’.

In the standard political science literature, Sartori (2005:64) defined a political party as ‘any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing though elections, candidates for public office’. In Sartori’s view, ‘parties which fail to win seats in parliament should be discounted’. But ‘minor parties must be counted, no matter how small they are, if they either have “coalition potential” or “blackmail potential”’ (Sartori 2005:122.-23). Herzog (1987:318) bluntly observed that. ‘Sartori examines relevancy (of a political party) with power relations in mind; he deals only with the winners’. In respect of Sartori a minor party can have “blackmail potential” in the allocation of its second preferences without it winning any seats in the legislative chamber, the DLP in House of Representative elections is a good example. Janda and Rose’s definitions also dealt only with ‘winners’ namely ‘representatives in government positions’.

The concept of political power is an important element of a political party. In Australia, this political power can include making a decision as to which major political party should be preferred over the other. In that light, Forell (1995:41) defined a political party as ‘an organisation of people of broadly similar ideas or interests, whose aim is to gain political power.’

A more encompassing definition of a political party can also include an organisation that declares its intention of nominating its candidates for election to parliament. Pedersen (1982:5) offered the broader definition of a political party as, ‘an organisation – however loosely or strongly organised – which either presents or nominates candidates for public elections, or which, at least, has the declared intention of doing so.’ Unlike Sartori and Janda, Pedersen has widened the definition of a party to include a political organisation before it has contested its first election, it has only ‘declared its intention of doing so’.

Such largely restrictive definitions may fit the larger parties but largely exclude minor parties with their emphasis on power and strategies, which may be motivated by balance of power strategies and the power of questioning and reporting in parliamentary committees.
So, what is a minor political party and what distinguishes it from a major party? A minor party simply is a party that is relatively smaller in support or elected members than the larger established (or major) parties. A minor party can stand candidates in a few or all electorates (or list variable numbers of candidates) for election. The minor party’s size in the legislature is numerically restricted. Its power and influence may be immense or negligible depending on the circumstances of other political outcomes and alignments.

For example, in a hung parliament where no major party has a majority in the house of government, the lower house, a minor party’s ‘balance of power’ position is a very powerful one. On the surface, a minor party could obstruct the legislation of the major party in government. Alternatively, the minor party could negotiate with the major party for passage of the legislation, ensuring that various demands of the minor party are incorporated in the legislation before it gains the support of the minor party.

Gauja (2010:489) believed that the Australian Democrats were regarded as a minor party for the following reasons:

- the party had not participated in government (although this is not a fundamental exclusion);
- The party had a relatively small size and vote share; and
- It had not been historically regarded as part of Australia’s two party system

Gauja’s definition can be readily applied to all the four minor parties which are the subject of this thesis. None of them had participated in government at a federal level and none of them, unlike the National Party, had ever been regarded as part of Australia’s two party system. Finally, all four parties have a small size and vote share. The size of the parties has ranged from two members of parliament up to 11 members or Senators. Their share of the vote has never exceeded 15 per cent nationally in either house.

Smith (2006:11-12) quite simply defines minor parties by inclusivity and influence as ‘parties that consistently fail to achieve inclusion in the government of the day’, a definition that would not fit European multiparty systems where minor parties often do join coalition governments. Smith goes on to develop that definition by stating that:

One common sense Australian approach to distinguishing minor and major parties is that minor parties are any parties other than the Labor, Liberal and (usually) the National (or country) parties.

Richmond (1978:317) also defines minor parties in the negative as the ‘other parties’ not included in the major parties grouping. In Richmond’s view activities, such as holding the balance of power in the Senate, ‘illustrates the position of a successful minor party’. The key part of this success for a minor party is gaining representation in the parliament.
Considering minor parties in general Mayer (1980:345) commented that: -

Minor parties in Australia are often seen as a nuisance and obstructionist. A new party would require special efforts from its supporters and would compete for electoral support and would want its share of scarce parliamentary resources. To survive it must in some way differentiate itself from the established norms and it will be seen at the very least a nuisance if not a threat.

... major parties see minor ones as irrational and impractical or potentially obstructive and dangerous splinters.

This would be true where the minor party has elected representatives in the Australian Senate and in addition the party holds the balance of power in that chamber. Under a balance of power situation conflict will arise where the minor party refuses to support a key piece of the government’s legislation. The minor party in that situation could be seen as ‘obstructionist’ both by the major party and the mass media as well as any interest group that has a strong interest in the legislation in question.

This thesis considers the rise and fall of minor political parties from an Australian perspective. Pederson’s (1982:8) ‘lifespan bell curves’ (Ls curves) for political parties is utilised as a means of mapping or modelling a party’s lifespan. However, this thesis proposes a number of changes to Pedersen’s model in order to make it particularly more relevant to minor and micro parties and to the Australian political scene.

What are the core functions of a political party?

Reynolds (2007:95) comments that political parties perform a number of functions which include, policy formulation and articulation, recruitment of political activists, training for leadership through internal party mechanisms and parliamentary service, operating as electoral machines and finally demarcating differing ideological positions within the polity. A further function is providing for and facilitating the circulation of political elites via the transfer of power.

A minor party has all of the above roles. It formulates and then articulates policy as a part of developing and promoting its party platform or manifesto as an alternative to the major parties. Minor parties also hold annual state conferences and from time to time, federal conferences. These conferences can provide an opportunity to discuss and debate the party’s policy over the next few years and importantly assist in keeping the party relevant to the needs and desires of the electorate. A minor party, as a political party also attracts and recruits party activists who believe in the party’s ideology and policies. Some of these people could in time, stand as candidates for the party at a parliamentary election or as a senior office bearer in the party.

Operating as an electoral machine can be a very significant function for a minor party, even for a party that is not represented in parliament. The minor party’s allocation of its second
preferences can be a major determinant as to which major party gains government. In fact, the DLP played this role quite decisively. Although it was a ‘labour party’ in name, it did not preference the Australian Labor Party from which it had split, but rather the Liberal Party. In this way, the DLP helped keep the Liberal Party in government from 1955 to 1972, denying government to the ALP for all of this time.

As well as initiating legislation, a minor party’s role can be expanded to include a watchdog role and if the party has sufficient members in the Parliament to either hold or share the balance of power in the parliamentary chamber. It is misguided to say that a minor party can do absolutely nothing in the chamber. In fact, the operation of the Australian Senate is very conducive to members of minor or even micro parties. Senators can take part in Senate committee hearings as ‘participating members’ without being members of the committee. This opportunity can be useful to a minor party and its Senator(s) at contentious hearings such as departmental estimates.

Richmond (1978:319) considered another function of a minor parties is to show the major parties that the issue or issues that the minor party campaigned on is important and a vote for the minor party is therefore, not a wasted vote. This is evidenced by the number of votes that the minor party won and such a result serves as a reminder to the major parties that the issue in question is important to the electorate. This would be true where a minor party campaigns on one or two major issues and attracts a significant vote for doing so. That argument would not be convincing if the minor party ran on a number of issues and attracted a very small percentage of the vote. Minor parties can often ‘drag’ major parties in their direction through electoral competition (for example the Greens siphoning off Labor votes has caused Labor to become ‘greener’.)

**Growth of Support for Minor and Micro Parties**

Election to the House of Representatives is difficult for a minor or micro party due to the requirement to win a majority of the votes to be elected in a preferential system. The following table shows the level of support at Senate elections for the major parties (the Coalition and Labor) compared to minor parties over a 60-year period. The Senate is significant for its proportional representation voting system which can assist minor and micro parties to have candidates elected to the Senate.
Table 2: Growth of Support for Minor and Micro Parties in Australian Senate elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Minor Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>13.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>19.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>17.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>14.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>14.70</td>
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<td>42.2</td>
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<td>18.30</td>
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<td>42.8</td>
<td>42.0</td>
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<td>38.4</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>19.60</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>13.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>23.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>18.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>19.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>26.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>33.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>29.79</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>35.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AEC and Parliamentary Library

The highest and lowest level of support in each decade is **bolded**.

The rise of the DLP in 1955, coupled with a fall in support for the ALP, is reflected in the doubling of support for minor parties in that year. The credit squeeze of 1961 is responsible for a fall in support for the coalition and increases in support for the ALP and minor parties. In the 1970 Senate election, strong dissatisfaction for the two major parties is evident with a 19.60 level of support for minor parties.

Support for minor parties slumped in the double dissolution elections of 1974 and 1975 as those elections were very presidential with leader versus leader rather than party versus party. In the 1977 election support for the minor parties jumped up to 17.70 percent with the rise of the Australian Democrats lead by the popular Don Chipp. As the Australian Democrats started to
fall, the Australian Greens support level rose with the level of support for minor parties staying well over ten percent. In fact, at a number of elections crossing over the 20 per cent threshold.

However, the real indicator is table three which shows an increasing trend in the level of support over the seven decades covered by table one. While both the lowest level of support fluctuates very slightly, the overall trend is a steady increase over time in support for the minor parties. In the same period support for the two major parties has declined. There are a number of possible reasons for this. One reason is the policies of the minor parties are seen to fill a void which has not been addressed by the major parties. Another reason is minor parties lead by well-known charismatic leaders such as Pauline Hanson, Don Chipp and Bob Brown.

Table 3: Minor Party vote percentage by decade highest and lowest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Decade Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>12.0 (1958)</td>
<td>4.4 (1951)</td>
<td>8.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>13.20 (1961)</td>
<td>9.7 (1964)</td>
<td>11.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: extracted from data provided by the AEC and the Parliamentary Library

The categorization of minor parties

Ghazarian (2015:17) considers the DLP to be a ‘fragmentary party’ because it arose as a result of fragmentation with a major party, the ALP. He also considered the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement as fragmentary parties as they arose from fragmentation with the Liberal Party of Australia. He also believed that the Australian Democrats commenced as a fragmentary party Ghazarian (2015:90). He considered that:

The rise of the Australian Democrats was the result of the coming together of the three manifestations of fragmentation of the Liberal Party: The Australia Party, the Liberal Movement and Don Chipp.

Ghazarian (2015:x) claimed around 1984 the Democrats attempted to ‘reposition itself’ from a fragmentary party to an ‘issues competitive party’. Green-Pedersen (2007:609) defines an issues competitive party as a party which forces ‘political opponents to pay attention to issues they would rather see disappear’ and pay attention to issues that are not necessarily attractive in electoral terms.” Ghazarian however considered that the Democrats failed in this transition through firstly its participative democracy structure and secondly competition from another issues competitive party, the Australian Greens.
He also regarded Pauline Hanson’s One Nation as another ‘issues competitive party’ Ghazarian (2015:113). Hanson was competing with the major parties for the issues of immigration, aboriginal affairs and globalisation to be placed on the policy agenda.

There is much pessimism about the longevity of minor parties. For instance, Warhurst has argued ‘The conventional wisdom has been that most minor parties have no success at all, but that if they do they flare up quickly and briefly before fading into oblivion’ (Warhurst 1997:4). Given that the DLP had a lifespan of 19 years, the Australian Democrats 30 years and One Nation a lifespan of around eight years, there is validity in Warhurst’s comment. However, the Australian Greens are still going strong after 20 years and when one minor or micro party fades away from the Senate, it appears another quickly springs up to take its place.

The DLP faded away in May 1974, the Democrats won seats in the Senate in December 1977, a little over three years later and as the Australian Democrats were starting to fade, the Australian Greens were starting to dominate the minor party spectrum. With its very few members in the parliament in a very brief time, One Nation could be described as no more than ‘a flash in the pan’ at that time.

However, One Nation experienced a political ‘resurrection’ at the 2016 double dissolution election with the election of Pauline Hanson to the Senate along with three other additional candidates from that party being elected to the Senate. However as argued in chapter nine, the One Nation party was reconstituted under a more professional management team.

Papadakis and Bean (1995:97) considered that minor parties are:

- Politically vulnerable on two important fronts: they lack a distinctive clientele in the form of a consistent appeal to well-defined social groups and they face institutional arrangements such as electoral systems which favour entrenched interests.

They go on to argue that

Both of these factors make minor parties susceptible to sudden changes of fortune (even if they enjoy a run of success for a time) and constitute major challenges to their longer term political prospects.

This is true of the DLP; it lacked a distinctive clientele after the fading away of those who remembered the fear of communism in the 1940s and 50s. As will be seen in the Chapter on the demise of the DLP, the leaders of that party also alienated young university students, some of who could have been seen as a part of the DLP’s future support base.

A quick study of the recent changes of additions and deletions to the Australian Electoral Commission’s register of political parties will show that while many parties are being deregistered, others are being successfully added to take their place. So, while minor parties spring up and fade away, they are quickly replaced on the ballot paper by new minor or micro parties for the voter’s consideration.
The Electoral System

Weeks (2010:491) has noted that ‘The primary institution affecting minor parties is the electoral system’. Majoritarian electoral systems arguably discourage the proliferation of minor parties, while generally proportional systems encourage their proliferation. In the House of Representatives, the electoral system is preferential voting, while in the Senate the voting system is one of proportional representation using a preferential system to allocate preferences. In both Senate and House of representatives, voting is compulsory.

Exhaustive preferential voting predates the introduction of compulsory voting. Under this system, a vote is valid only if all the candidates on the ballot paper are ranked; importantly, those who vote for a minor party ultimately have to express a preference for one of the major parties on the ballot. Where no candidate enjoys a majority, preferences are distributed until one candidate prevails. Occasionally, this changes the plurality result (Goot 2006:191).

The main argument in support of preferential voting is that under first past the post voting, a candidate could easily be elected without winning greater than 50 per cent of the primary vote. Carter (2002:133) notes that majoritarian electoral formulae in which the winner takes all, discourages multipartyism, promotes parliamentary majorities and reflects a concern for the stability of the political system. By contrast, the proportionality formulae allow votes to be translated into seats. Seats are distributed in some proportion to the votes cast for individual parties or candidates.

Where preferences are likely to be distributed - and in federal politics this is increasingly the case - minor parties have a base from which to bargain (Farrell and McAllister 2003:296-97).

Minor parties are able to negotiate with the major parties for an exchange of second preferences. This can result in changes in the policies of a major party in order to gain the second preference votes of a particular minor party. Thus, a vote for a minor party is not in itself a wasted vote. Minor parties are in a position of power in deciding which major party will receive the minor party’s second preferences at an election.

However, some degree of multi-party competition can take place in the Australian House of Representatives where a minor party concentrates its vote in select regions of a state. A persistent example in Australia is the National Party which concentrates its votes in certain rural areas of various states. In recent times the Australian Greens party has concentrated enough of its voting support in the State of Victoria to have a Greens candidate elected for the House of Representatives electorate of Melbourne. Significantly both the DLP and the Australian Democrats were unsuccessful in this area, while One Nation only had a member in the House of Representatives through its member being a dis-endorsed Liberal party candidate.
Tavits (2007:113) commented that:

the emergence of new parties and their electoral success hinders the stable link between parties and voters. . . . Large scale redistribution of votes, in turn, prevents parties from making long term policy commitments.

While that may be applicable to countries with a ‘first past the post’ method of voting, the outcome can be much different under a preferential or proportional system of voting. Both of those systems operate on the allocation of preferences and established parties can negotiate or bargain for those preferences. Part of that process can, and often does, include the realigning of major policies by a major party to satisfy at least in part the demands of the minor party providing the second preferences. A strong example of this is the allocation of the DLP’s second preferences to the Liberal Party and in return the Liberal Party increased defence spending and the defence presence in South East Asia.

As McAllister (2011:5) noted, following a preferential block majority with compulsory preferences, the Senate voting system was changed to one of proportional representation with compulsory preferences beginning at the election of 1949. This voting system eventually made it much easier for minor parties to compete and win a seat in the Senate and thus become more persistent and powerful. They did not have to win an absolute majority as in the single member electorates of the House of Representatives. They only had to win a quota (14.28 per cent of the vote).¹

Thompson (2000:20) commented that:

The change to proportional representation in 1948 meant that electoral discontent with the major parties could be reflected institutionally because proportional representation gave new parties and independents the chance to be elected – groups of a reasonable size (able to gain at least seven per cent of the vote in a state) stood a reasonable chance of gaining representation in the Senate.

Thompson went on to observe that seven years later in 1955 that voting system resulted in the election of a senator from a minor party, the DLP and in 1977 this same system resulted in the election of Senators from another minor party, the Australian Democrats.

¹ The quota for the Senate election is determined by dividing the number of candidates to be elected plus one, into the total number of formal votes, and adding one to the result. For example, there are six candidates to be elected and 700,000 formal votes have been cast. (700,000 / 7 (six candidates plus one) gives 100,000 and 1 giving a quota for election of 100,001). If the party wins more votes than the quota, the surplus votes are transferred according to their preferences, but only at a fraction of a full vote. The transfer value fraction is obtained by dividing the elected candidate’s total surplus votes by his or her total preference votes. In the example above if the first elected senator won 200,000 votes their transfer value would be 100,000 / 200,000 giving a transfer value of .5 of a vote. However, if a candidate is eliminated, the number of votes they received is transferred according to their preference at full value. The reason being those votes had not already elected a Senator.
Crisp (1955:219) stated that the change to proportional representation was introduced: -

to avoid the grotesque results of two previous systems of election to the Senate whereby
one side or the other had often swept all of that half of the Senate seats. . . (that were up for
re-election)

An example of what Crisp was referring to was the Australian Senate after the 1946 elections
comprised 33 ALP Senators but only 3 Coalition Senators. The change to proportional
representation certainly prevented a recurrence but at the same time made election to the Senate
much easier for minor and micro parties.

Richmond (1978:321-22) echoed a similar point, by explaining that: -

The voting and electoral system can be most important in assisting the growth and
determining the role of minor parties.

He went on to comment that: -

Minority parties tend to perform well in Senate elections. Their success is attributable to
the Senate electoral system: Multi member electorates (the states and territories) and the
use of the proportional representation (PR) system of voting.

Compulsory voting

Voting in Australia in all federal and state elections is compulsory, with fines issued to those
who fail to vote without a valid excuse. Thus, parties do not have to ‘persuade electors to cast
their vote by organising and managing ‘turnouts’. Under compulsory voting, the turnout of
electors to vote is very high (often in excess of 90 per cent.) Organising turnouts for a political
party is very time consuming and is, put simply, persuading electors to vote and if necessary
transporting those electors to the nearest polling booth and home again.

Minor parties also benefit as they do not have to spend time and money in persuading voters to
actually go and vote in the election. As the electors have to attend the polling booth to vote, if
they are dissatisfied with the major parties, the minor parties would gain the vote of those
electors, unless the voter for whatever reason decided to vote informal.

Hill (2002:437-8) has argued that ‘the state –enforced compulsion to vote is a reasonable
imposition on personal liberty.’ She goes on to defend compulsory voting ‘on the grounds that
voting is a public good and therefore a problem of collective action which can be resolved only
by collective means’. In this context ‘collective action’ can be defined as action by the
community or society and not solely by an individual. In Hill’s view voting is a collective
action because it ‘yields a number of clear and important benefits to society and individuals.’

In considering the ‘important benefits’ Hill (2002:438) argued that compulsory voting:-
serves to protect the democratic desiderata, such as representativeness, legitimacy, accountability, political equality and minimisation of elite power. In this way, compulsion could be said to engender good or at least better government.

Legitimacy in the context of this thesis means that minor parties are elected in an election where a majority of electors vote, due to the fact that they are legally required to do so. Voting is not the preserve of those citizens with property or citizens who are enthusiastic enough to make the effort to go out and vote. Parties themselves are not required to actually persuade voters to go and vote. Electors do not vote because they have been ‘herded up’ by party workers and transported to the polling booth. Minor parties win seats in the legislature because they were elected in an election where the majority of electors vote, not just the opportunistic few.

Kleppner (1982:5) stated that:

Voting is the participatory act most accessible to the largest number of citizens and the political act in which most citizens engage than in any other. Voting remains the mechanism that most believe to be the only one available to them for influencing what the government does.

In an environment of non-compulsory voting, Lijphart (1997:1) considered that low voter turnout was ‘a serious democratic problem’ because ‘unequal turnout is systematically biased against less well to do citizens’ and also ‘unequal turnout spells unequal political influence’.

In most countries voting is voluntary. Australia is one of the very few countries in the world to have compulsory voting. Hughes (1966:81) constructed a cumulative list from the parliamentary debates (Hansard) giving the reasons for and against compulsory voting. The reasons given for compulsory voting include:

- voting is an important civic duty with a very light burden, once or twice very three years;
- voting is analogous to other civic duties such as giving evidence in court and jury service;
- democratic government means majority rule and the expression of an opinion by a majority of electors; and
- the right to vote has been fought for, and therefore should be used.

The reasons against compulsory voting include, compulsory voting cannot ensure a formal vote or an intelligent vote and further, compulsory voting is an infringement of liberty.

Hill (2002:438) argued that:

voting itself does not appear to be compulsory; instead it is registration and attendance at a polling place that is really compulsory. In this way, it is the opportunity to participate rather than the participation itself that is being actively sought.
In the minds of many electors having had to make the effort to participate, the next logical step then is to in fact participate and make a valid vote.

In that light, the electoral rules in Australia (compulsory voting) significantly account for the success of third parties by restraining the behavior of disaffected voters. Further, major established parties may come to be perceived as unresponsive – increasingly detached from their electoral bases and from the population in general (Belanger 2004:1056). Compulsory voting means that a dissatisfied voter who does not wish to vote for either of the major parties still must vote, possibly for a minor or micro party as a ‘protest vote’ secondly as all squares on the ballot paper have to be filled out the voter must allocate preferences often from a minor or micro party to one of the major parties. In a marginal electorate, such an allocation of preferences can decide the final result. This situation, or the possibility of it, places a minor party in a powerful position in deciding which major party to preference above the other.

Without compulsory voting those dissatisfied with the major parties might be inclined to sit out the election, however with compulsory voting, they might choose to vote for a minor party instead (Mackerras and McAllister 1999:229). Rather bluntly Hill (2002A:81) commented that ‘aside from its few critics, compulsory voting has never, apparently, bothered Australians.’ Pringle (2012:428) claimed that ‘the duty to vote requires electors to mark their ballot papers’. Pringle went on (at page 429) to observe that the focus should be on ‘voting as marking ballots, rather than on turnout, in measuring democratic vitality.’ As with the impossibility of ensuring that a formal vote is made, enforcing voters to actually mark their ballot papers and not leave them blank is an impossibility given the secrecy of the ballot. Perhaps the real offence is publicly inciting voters to place their ballot papers in the ballot box unmarked.

Pringle (2012:429) observed that the focus should be on ‘voting as marking ballots, rather than on turnout, in measuring democratic vitality’. Like providing a formal vote, enforcing voters to mark their ballot papers is very much an impossibility, given the secrecy of the ballot. The real offence would seem to be the inciting of voters to place their ballot papers in the ballot boxes unmarked.

A voter dissatisfied with the major parties can send a message to those parties by voting for a minor party. This message is largely lost by voting informal or not voting at all. An informal vote or not voting at all, could occur through dissatisfaction with the major parties. But informal voting is more likely occur, and indeed seen to occur, through negligence in numbering the ballot paper or an ignorance of the correct method of voting. There are numerous reasons for not voting at an election.
Voter Behaviour

Electors vote for minor parties for various reasons. The first quite obvious reason is that the elector believes in what the minor party stands for; the minor party’s policies and ideology both strike a chord with the voter. Another reason closely associated with party loyalty is the ‘cartelisation thesis’, which will be considered later in this chapter. Many minor parties start life as a split-off from existing parties that disillusion some supporters. Put simply a voter who supported one of the major parties and was possibly a member of that party, resigns from the party and no longer supports it. This is because the voter considers that the major party has become non-responsive to the voter and former party member. Major parties can become aloof and establishment orientated. They can form relationships with and then dialogue with groups of business people and corporations in exchange for significant donations to their party. This is usually in the form of membership payments to a ‘policy forum’ which gives the person not party membership but privileged access to the member and other parliamentarians through such means as ‘briefing sessions’ and corporate breakfasts and dinners. From this style of relationships flow both policy ideas and campaign funds. This leaves party members feeling very redundant except for handing out ‘how to vote’ cards on polling day.

A new minor party releases its policies to the general public, its policies appeal to the former member of the major party and the person supports the new minor party by voting for it and often contributing to the minor party’s campaign funds as well.

However, another important reason is that the minor party serves as a protest vehicle for the voter to express this temporary disapproval against the major party that they normally vote for. This was the case in the Senate elections in both 1967 and 1970 in Victoria where the lead DLP Senate candidates won quotas for election in their own right. In 1967, much of the DLP’s support in Victoria came from electors who normally voted Liberal, who used the Senate election to show their disproval of the then Holt government. In 1970 the protest was against both major parties. A protest vote in the Senate does not impact on a party losing government, government is formed and lost in the House of Representatives only.

However, in the protest vote situation, the question usually is which party gains the second preference vote? If it is the major party that the elector usually votes for, then in reality the voter has still voted for the usual major party that they support but in a deviated manner. Mackerras (1972) commented that DLP supporters with their very tight second preference flow to the Liberal party were in effect defacto Liberal voters.

Another reason for support for a minor party is the ‘donkey vote’. Electors vote for a minor party candidate who is at the top of the ballot paper and in a donkey vote, numbering the ballot paper sequentially from top to bottom, the minor party candidate gets the number one vote.
Second Preferences and their Power

Jaensch and Mathieson (1998:12) contended that ‘parties with low levels of support, that is parties which do not win seats, are unimportant and not justifiable’. That may be true in a ‘first past the post’ method of election, however Australia’s preferential method of voting empowers voters of minor parties, allowing them to cast second and third etc preferences (ultimately electing the least unpopular candidate).

Richmond (1978:320) explained that:

A more pragmatic party such as the DLP . . . campaigns with the express intention of allocating preferences to a major party with which it is aligned on some major policy. In elections, all squares on the ballot paper have to be filled in, therefore voters for minor parties, like all voters, have to distribute preferences to other candidates. Political parties aid in this process by publicly announcing how they would like their voters to allocate their preferences. This information is significantly communicated to the voter through the party’s how to vote card. As this thesis shows, this preference allocation from minor parties can be very significant to major parties by providing preferences to get their candidate elected and in some cases to get their candidate elected from behind the other major party’s candidate. This preference allocation gives the minor party additional power, as the minor party can demand policy changes and other concessions in exchange for this preference allocation. Therefore, a minor party can have a significant influence on the election outcome without itself winning any seats in the legislature.

Sharman et al. (2002:548) have categorized the different preference trading relationships and they are shown in the following table.

Table 4: Preference Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference Type</th>
<th>Bargaining Relationship</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Maintenance</td>
<td>Bilateral: large party with small party</td>
<td>Liberals and Nationals since 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Unilateral: small party against large party</td>
<td>DLP from 1955 to 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Influence</td>
<td>Bilateral: small party with potential governing party</td>
<td>Defence of Government Schools (DOGS) 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishing</td>
<td>Bilateral: small party against particular candidates</td>
<td>Shooters Party 1988 also RTL Victoria 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference Type</td>
<td>Bargaining Relationship</td>
<td>Example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group</td>
<td>Unilateral: interest group in favour of political candidates</td>
<td>Women’s Electoral Lobby 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological similarity</td>
<td>Bilateral: small party with another small party</td>
<td>Aust Democrats with Greens Parties, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory</td>
<td>Multilateral: all other parties against an insurgent party</td>
<td>All parties against the One Nation Party 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Bilateral: large party with small party</td>
<td>ALP ‘Green Strategy 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No allocation</td>
<td>Unilateral: small party</td>
<td>Australian Democrats 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross institutional</td>
<td>Bilateral: large and small parties</td>
<td>Green Parties in Senate elections since 1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The preference types in **bold** relate to the parties discussed in this thesis.

A minor or micro party is not obligated to allocate preferences in its ‘how to vote’ ticket. The party could choose to have an ‘open ticket’ where the party does not direct preferences, but instead leaves the decision of preference allocation to the voter. Sharman et al describe this scenario as ‘no allocation’. The Australian Democrats used that scenario in the early years of the party in the late 1970s.

A voter is not legally required to follow any party’s ‘how to vote’ card and the voter can allocate preference to which ever candidate they please. A preference allocation not in accordance with the parties how to vote card is a preference leakage and this thesis argues that although there always will be some leakage of preferences to at least a small degree, a significant leakage weakens the power of the minor party in terms of its power and influence in terms of preference allocation to other parties. This thesis acknowledges with minor parties, the preference allocation is usually adhered to quite strongly with over 80 or 90 per cent of second preferences following the how to vote card and going to the designated party. For example, Mansfield (2012:151) reported that in 1955 in the electorate of Corio in Victoria, 82 per cent of DLP candidate’s preferences flowed to the Liberal candidate, as directed on the DLP ‘how to vote’ card. An examination of preference flows from the Australian Greens show the party’s second
preferences flow as directed to the Labor Party very frequently at a rate greater than 80 per cent with a few exceptions.

**Table 5: House of Reps Elections Greens Preferences to Major Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>79.21%</td>
<td>20.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>77.13%</td>
<td>21.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>79.89%</td>
<td>18.62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AEC – note figures do not sum to 100 per cent due to a small percentage of preferences being allocated to other minor parties.

A problem with Pedersen’s party lifespan model is that *this* power of minor party preferences cannot be shown on the model.

**Leadership of Minor Political Parties**

One reason for the rise of a political party into parliament is the party’s leadership, with a high-profile leader who is popular and well known in various quarters and even charismatic. A party leader with a high profile can appeal to the press and media.

This thesis will explore the role of such leadership in the rise of minor parties and the effects on minor parties when party leadership becomes divided or non-existent.

Mayer commented on the hardships that he considered minor parties faced in making an impact (Mayer 1980:345), however he does not consider the role of party leadership to bring about these special efforts and to articulate to the electorate what the new party stands for and what it would do if it was elected.

Power (2004:11) commented that a leader needs to be recognisable – not as an individual, but as (paradoxically) ordinary. A leader should fit in with the crowd. In other words, they should be ‘one of us’. A key ingredient of leadership is character and that can be defined as a person’s inner self. That is the why the party leader orients him or herself towards life – not for the moment but endurably. A leader has to use ‘rhetoric in a powerful way – simple, clear and plain messages which reached over and beyond the day to day mechanical management of government and indeed parliament’.

Power’s comments give a perspective of the requirements and role of a party leader as a key spokesperson for the party. Cunningham and Jackson (2014:498) observed that: -

Hierarchical leadership has been perceived as ‘normal’ during the last century in Australia, when the major parties . . . have dominated parliament and played the politics of power and leadership, ruthlessly. In this party-government world view, party leaders manage their
parliamentary colleagues to attain solidarity for Cabinet decisions and parliamentary party
room.

However, this solidarity only comes about by a vote on a particular issue and after robust debate
in the party room. Party leaders cannot be total dictators as they are voted in and out of office
by their parliamentary colleagues.

Leadership is important to a minor party, but leadership is not the main subject of this thesis.

Change of leadership

At the federal level, all four of the minor parties analysed in this thesis had a change in
leadership over their respective lifespans. Both the DLP and the Democrats changed leaders
frequently, and more recently the federal Greens have witnessed leadership transitions. One
Nation leader Pauline Hanson lost her seat in the House of Representatives, but the party won a
single senate seat. The new Senator, Len Harris, therefore became the leader of One Nation.

Bynander and t’Hart (2006:707) comment that:

However good and powerful they may be, all leaders have a limited “sell by” date. They
get old, weary and sick. They get out of tune with the times or anesthetized by their own
power. Sooner or later they become an embarrassment to the people who put them in office
or those who kept them there. A leader who stays on for too long provides a painful
spectacle.

With the other minor parties there have been leadership changes. Some of these leadership
changes were quite seamless for example the two leadership changes in the Australian Greens,
after the retirement of the incumbent leader, and again the leadership change in the Australian
Democrats after Don Chipp’s retirement.

It is clear that Chipp and the two Greens leaders Bob Brown and Christine Milne, wanted to quit
the leadership role before their ‘sell by date’ and thus avoiding a ‘painful spectacle’ by
becoming an ‘embarrassment’ to their parliamentary party colleagues and supporters.

However other leadership changes have not gone at all smoothly, the leadership change in the
DLP from Gair to McManus is a good example. Gair deferred any leadership show down for a
long as he possibly could. He was getting old in years and performed poorly on television, his
best days were clearly behind him, he was ‘old weary and sick’ and ‘out of tune with the times’.
The Gair leadership will be discussed in the chapter on the demise of the DLP.

Another example is the large number of changes of leadership in the Australian Democrats
which did not go smoothly. Leadership shortcomings in the Democrats was a major reason for
the party’s demise. A significant factor in that party’s leadership trouble was the heavy reliance
on participatory democracy and the ability of party rank and file members to launch a ‘leadership spill. The Democrats’ leadership problems will be explored in the chapter on the demise of the Australian Democrats.

Bynander and t’Hart (2006:713) present the following model showing the role choices for the incumbent leader in a succession context:

---

**Role Choices for the incumbent leader in succession contexts**

- **a. Deny exit** → (unconscious) use of psychological defense mechanisms in order to avoid facing the prospect of impending loss of office/power
  - proactive: trying to rebuild political support by ‘trying harder’ to ‘do better’
  - reactive: hoping that succession issue will blow over

- **b. Resist exit** → consensus-seeking → proactive: open and covert ‘warfare’ to silence critics and eliminate contenders
  - reactive: retaliate attacks made by critics and contenders

- **c. Accept exit** → consensus-seeking
  - proactive: instigating successor selection process without pushing own candidate
  - reactive: non-interfering in ongoing successor selection process and accepting its results

---

As the model shows the leader has three strategic role options, denial, resistance and acceptance. As can be seen from the model Gair’s choice was ‘deny exit’ by hoping that the leadership issue in the DLP would blow over after a few months, it did not and in fact quite painfully for the DLP, it persisted. Gair then resisted an exit from the leadership by being reactive, hoping that the succession issue would ‘blow over.’

The Greens leadership on the other hand seems to fit more in the acceptance category. Two federal leaders have accepted their exit (and they themselves announced it) then the party sought consensus to find the new leadership of the party.

**From Social Movement to Minor Party**

One of the minor political parties considered in this thesis emerged out of a social group. That party is the Australian Greens which did not evolve from a split in another party but from the
formation of a political party by various social groups as means of getting candidates into parliament.

The Australian Greens party had its origins in Tasmania with the ‘Lake Pedder Action Committee’. This group was an environmental social group that had its beginnings in the anti-dams movement in Tasmania. In 1972 after the flooding of Lake Pedder by the Tasmanian Hydro-electric Commission, the Action Committee convened a meeting which carried the following motion: -

In order that there is maximum usage of a unique political opportunity to save Lake Pedder now, an issue of national and global concern and to implement a national, well-researched conservation plan for the State of Tasmania, there be formed a single Independent Coalition of primarily conservation-orientated candidates and their supporters.

Vromen, Gelber and Gauja (2009:264) state that ‘social movements often emerge during times of political and social upheaval’. Environmental social groups such as the anti-dams group sprung up in the time when pollution and environmental impacts were starting to be of concern to a growing number of people in the community.

Mass Media

Media coverage is a key issue in a minor party gaining popular recognition and relevance. Media and the press are far less interested in a party with outdated policies and limited relevance. Once a minor party appears to lose its relevance the media and the press are no longer interested in the party and its leaders. This loss of interest by the media can be accelerated by a minor party showing lack of leadership or division. In fact, a division and disunity in a minor party will attract press publicity, but publicity of a very negative value which can only damage the party, or if serious media outlets run critical campaigns against the party.

The media - its role and power

Tiffen (1989:7) quite bluntly noted that ‘the centrality of the news media in political communications makes them a strategic arena in the struggle for power.’

Griffiths (1973:654-655) believes that there are six characteristics of the mass media and its power. Firstly the mass media is crisis orientated and this means that the news coverages tends towards conflict sensationalism, drama and violence. Secondly according to Griffiths the mass media avoids the consequences and meanings of acts and events because dealing ethical questions would challenge the system which is the source of the journalist’s power and status.

Thirdly Griffiths also acknowledges that the mass media are increasingly subject to commercial pressures or economic considerations. Fourthly the information entertainment mix in the mass media has an ideological role. Entertainment neutralizes information. In other words the
television news is watched and the newspapers are read more for entertainment value than analysing the news of the day.

Errington and Miragliotta (2007:42) have noted that ‘the sneaking suspicion’ is that ‘the rationality of the human mind is inherently fragile, and that individuals have the potential to absorb messages and ideas uncritically and can be easily swayed by media content. In short emotionalism and drama play a major role in the presentation of news.

Griffith’s fifth point is that the mass media are personality orientated in that the more an event can be seen in personal terms, due to the actions of specific individuals, the more probable it will become a news item. A result of this is scapegoatism, which is blaming for example blaming minor parties for being obstructionist in the Senate, blaming minor party leaders for being a nuisance and wasting time.

Griffith’s final point is the mass media are cultural arms of industrial systems and as such, reinforce the cultural norms and discourage nonconformity and they also structure and define the agenda of public discourse. The mass media in this role also provide dominant perspectives from which priorities, actions and policies might be viewed.

Errington and Miraglia (2007:3) commented that the power of the media is seen to be held in check by three key factors: -

- A belief that adults are self-selecting and rational with different needs and wants;
- The media’s power to influence the individual is thought to be diluted by powerful economic considerations; and
- Power in society is effectively defused in that there is no permanent power elite that is capable of exacting its influence over society

These three factors are compromised by the fact that mass media has to sell its products in order to survive. In addition a story about personalities such as a party leader and divisions within a party attract the attention of the mass media because news about such events and people is eagerly followed by readers and viewers.

A minor party’s concern is successfully attracting media attention and coverage of the minor party’s positive events such as policy launches and the rebuttal of the major parties and their leaders. Negative events such as party disunity and resignations of key players in the party, quite easily attract media attention because as noted above ‘everyone enjoys a crisis’ and the reporting of such events sells newspapers and boosts television ratings. An example is the DLP who in the 1974 and 1975 double dissolution
elections received very scant media attention but the winding up of the party in 1978 was widely reported in the media.

Is the media a friend to minor parties or a foe? The media as a friend can be defined as the serious press dutifully publishing or broadcasting the informative news press releases of political parties and giving the party a lot of publicity of a positive nature that recognises the political party (the party’s ‘brand name’) and its policies. On the other hand, the media could be described as a minor party’s foe or biased towards the party if the press and the media deny the party any publicity and/or and give no publicity for the party’s policies. Media can also be a foe if the party’s only publicity is big and prominent write ups for conflict and division or resignations in the party.

In this thesis, the media includes newspapers and other printed material such as magazines and journals as well as radio television and the newer forms of media via the Internet such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and email. Errington and Miragliotta (2007:3) comment that: -

the ‘media’ refers to an instrumentality that is capable of communicating information, facts, opinions, and ideas via a number of different platforms such as, but not limited to, newspapers, books, DVDs, radio, television, video cassettes, telephones, magazines, cinemas, the internet and MP3 players.

Meadows (1997:89) comments that ‘our attention should focus on the media, rather than on the individual, for the media become the agents of power in legitimising some statements by giving them greater prominence than others’.

This involves not concentrating on an individual journalist, but rather the publication or program that he or she worked for and in turn, concentrating on the media as a whole. What is significant is not what one journalist or newspaper does, but what the media as a distinct entity does. For example, in the mid-1990s the majority of the mainstream media appeared to ‘duchess’ Pauline Hanson because she was different, she seemed relevant to a complaining electorate and she made ‘news’ that readers and viewers wanted to know about. Later on, it was the media as a whole that shied away from Pauline Hanson and One Nation, the novelty effect soon went and One Nation’s policies such as the ‘easy tax’ and citizens initiated referenda, were seen by many to be meaningless.

There is no doubting the power of the media. This includes a ‘gate keeper’ function of determining what does and does not make into the newspaper or onto the television news or current affairs program. However, at times this power can be expressed by way of interference. Young (2006:17) comments that ‘the most obvious type of interference—the one most people worry about—is when media proprietors use their print or broadcast outlets to push a political agenda. This happens, and some outlets are even willing to brag about it’. The examples Young provides are the 1972 and 1975 Australian elections. In 1972 Murdoch in his papers played an
active role in Labor’s election campaign, but by 1975 Murdoch had fallen out with the
government. His papers then supported the anti-Labor parties.

Some minor parties allege quite openly that they have been the victims of media interference by
way of not reporting any information about their political party except for news that is adverse to
the minor party’s interest. Both the DLP and One Nation assert in no uncertain terms that the
media were hostile towards them. But a major thrust of this section of the chapter is exploring the
question were the minor parties guilty or subject to media interference or was the lack of media
coverage due to the party’s own incompetence and ignorance of the press and the media and its
requirements.

Relevance

In the environment of intense competition for media space, minor parties can struggle to find or
maintain relevance. In other words, minor parties have to be able to provide the media’s readers
and viewers with what they want and what is topical for them because it is the readership and the
viewers that ultimately determine the circulation of the media and its advertising revenue. A party
has to articulate clearly what it stands for in a more competitive political arena and to get its
message heard.

A party also has to ensure that its policies remain relevant to modern society and not some
bygone era. In Australia that is a key test of a party’s relevance to the electorate and to the
parliament.

In that light, by the time of its demise the DLP with its fascination for moral issues and anti-
communism was no longer seen to be relevant. As the chapter on the demise of the DLP shows,
those issues were no longer relevant as Australian society had changed as had the international
scene. One Nation was relevant to a section of society in terms of immigration and
globalisation issues, but met its demise through a lack of support by way of second preferences
from the major parties. The major parties decided as One Nation was perceived to be a racist
organisation, it should be preferred last. The Australian Democrats had policies that were of
relevance to modern society, in terms of nuclear power, the environment and social issues. But
the Democrats were beaten in the competition for voter support by the Australian Greens who
were more united and attracted second preferences from the Australian Labor Party. The
Australian Greens are still quite relevant in modern Australian society.

Incumbency Advantages

Members of Parliament have incumbency advantages (Kelly 2006:3). Although these
advantages have increased in recent years with increases in postage and printing allowances,
they have always existed. A member of parliament has always been able to utilise the
institution of parliament to make their views known and to question ministers, both in the chamber and in parliamentary committees. These advantages are not open to the aspiring non-member.

It is questionable whether or not those members of the ALP who split from the party in 1955 to form the DLP concerned themselves with the inevitable loss of incumbency and its advantages. Pauline Hanson never had any incumbency in parliament in the first place, however Don Chipp did and when he resigned from the Liberal Party in March 1977, he was careful enough not to resign from the parliament itself. Therefore through 1977, during the discussions that lead to the formation of the Australian Democrats and in the lead up to the federal election later that year, Chipp was never out of federal parliament and could use the facilities of the House of Representatives to the advantage of the newly formed Australian Democrats.

Bob Brown did not have the advantage of incumbency when he stood for the Tasmanian Legislative Assembly, but in the small state of Tasmania, he was well known as a medico and as a passionate demonstrator against what he saw as desecration of wilderness areas. In addition, his willingness to get arrested at anti-logging and other demonstrations made him well known as a sincere advocate of the Greens cause. He resigned from the Tasmanian Parliament in 1993 to contest a seat in the House of Representatives election but failed to get elected. Winning election for a lower house seat is always difficult for a minor party having to win a majority of votes and preferences and not one of a number of quotas as in the Senate. Brown was elected to Senate as a Greens Senator for Tasmania in 1996.

**How Pedersen’s Typology could be more relevant and more accurate**

The previous chapter introduced and explained Pedersen’s Typology of party lifespans. Pedersen’s typology would be more informative if it was presented on graph paper; this would make the distance between the thresholds easier to see and to measure. Also party officials and candidates could plot the life span curves (including projected curves) with more accuracy than a blank piece of paper would provide. The declaration and authorisation thresholds are quite straightforward. Much of the activity leading up to the declaration phase would be carried out away from the public eye and the detailed requirements of registering a political party with the electoral commission are beyond the scope of this paper.

However, the thresholds of relevance and representation each cover a wide area in terms of performance within the parliamentary chamber. For example, when a minor party crosses the representation threshold do the party’s parliamentary members or sole member just sit in the chamber making speeches rarely and writing to ministers when required by their constituents or
does the member or do the members make frequent and strategic use of question time and committee membership?

It is significant that in the Australian Senate, a Senator, while not a member of a committee can be a ‘participating member’ of that committee, and thus attend public hearings of the committee and ask questions of witnesses. A strong performance on committees identifying issues and asking searching questions on those issues can give a parliamentarian a strong reputation and valuable publicity.

This thesis considers relevance and representation purely from the perspective of performance of the minor party and its parliamentary members within the chamber using the facilities and opportunities provided in that chamber. These facilities include question time and membership of and performance in parliamentary committees. A party’s performance in connecting to the electorate and interactions within interest groups are beyond the scope of this thesis.
The representation threshold could be shown as a ‘ladder of representation’ which I have drawn up the ladder starts at the top and progressively works its way down. The further a party moves down the ladder the greater is its impact in terms of representation. The ladder has the following phases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contest and win the election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represent constituents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Represent constituents and champion their concerns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask searching questions of ministers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make hard hitting speeches in parliament and elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have a publicity strategy that gets results</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get involved in parliamentary committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crossing the threshold of representation and merely representing constituents to a minimum level and speaking in parliament only when necessary (the first non-bolded two rungs on the ladder) would be weak representation with a minimal parliamentary performance. Another threshold should be inserted above the representation threshold, ‘representation – strong’, this would indicate that the party and its members were capitalising on the opportunities for asking searching questions and a showing a strong performance in committees and making itself known. (This would represent the remaining **bolded** rungs on the ladder of representation.) These rungs of the ladder of representation show the criteria for determining whether a party’s representation is strong or weak.

Having crossed the threshold of representation, the next hurdle for a minor party is to cross the threshold of relevance; sub thresholds would make the level of relevance much clearer. Just crossing the threshold would indicate sharing the balance of power. A threshold above that would be ‘balance of power’, in other words the party holds the balance of power in its own right. Two other thresholds would go above that namely ‘opposition’ and above that, ‘government’. These two thresholds are self-explanatory and would be used to chart the major parties and coalition partners.
These thresholds could also be shown as a ladder, ‘the ladder of relevance’. That ladder which I have drawn up is shown below (again starting at the top and working down).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threshold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share the balance of power with another party or parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold the balance of power – in the party’s own right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main opposition party or coalition – the alternative government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a minor party member, be a minister in the cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of government – junior or senior coalition partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be in government in the party’s own right</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The revised party life-span diagram, without any party lifespans graphed, is shown below:

The various factors discussed in this thesis that cause the rise and demise of a minor political party are the influences or drivers that move the party along the party lifespan curve up through thresholds while the party is emerging and attracting support and
downwards when the party is experiencing its demise through such factors as losing
support at the ballot box and relevance in its policies.

In this thesis, the chapters that discuss the rise of the four parties discuss the various
factors that caused the particular party’s lifespan curve to rise up through the thresholds.
The chapters that discuss the demise of the parties explore the causes for the party’s
lifespan to crash down through the representation threshold to remain at a point above
the authorisation threshold.

In Conclusion

This chapter has defined minor parties as parties that have less support and representation than
the established major parties and have not largely participated in government. Although minor
parties are smaller they can grow and an analysis of voting figures over a number of federal
elections shows support for minor parties is increasing, now rising to 23.23 per cent of the
House of Representative vote in 2016 and 35.03 per cent for the Senate.

These parties do not just ‘spring up’ but rather a number of contextual factors affect their rise.
These factors include the cartelisation of the major parties. As a result of this cartelisation with
its movement towards big business, big unions and the like, major party members feel their
party no longer listens to them and they join a newly formed minor party that caters for or
listens to their needs and or ideas.

Many minor parties, in their formation, identify a need or even needs that present as being
neglected. This identification can take place through the work of a social groups or groups
concerned about an issue. Social group activity and not the split from another party saw the rise
of the Australian Greens. The DLP came into being through the third major split in the
Australian Labor Party, with the underlying issue being the feeling that the ALP was not anti-
Communist enough.

The Australian Democrats was the product of the merger of two existing but fading minor
parties, the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement which both split from the Liberal
Party. Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party was formed as a result of dissatisfaction with the
major parties’ immigration and Aboriginal policies. An additional area of dissatisfaction was
the movement of the major parties in adopting globalisation and economic policies that
emphasised ‘market forces’ with minimal or no government intervention. The cartelisation
thesis had at least some role in the formation of One Nation, with One Nation members feeling
deserted by the major parties, some of the One Nation members were former members of either
of the major parties, ALP, Liberal or National. The current Katter Australia Party presents as
another One Nation party, but minus the Aboriginal and immigration issues. An analysis of the
Katter Australia Party is beyond the scope of this thesis.
All of these parties were commenced and indeed enhanced by high profile leadership. Former members of the ALP were involved in the formation and leadership of the DLP. The well-known and modern thinking Don Chipp was the first leader of the Australian Democrats, while Bob Brown was a household name in Tasmania, the foundation state of the Australian Green movement. Pauline Hanson quickly gained publicity and recognition through being an outspoken disendorsed liberal candidate and a humble fish and chip shop operator.

This chapter has also shown that a favourable electoral system coupled with effective second preference trading strategies and compulsory voting has helped minor parties. ‘Sitting out’ the election is not an option for an Australian voter, they have to vote and they have to allocate preferences which can and do make a difference to the final result in lower house electorates. An examination of the recent changes to the voting method for the Australian Senate is beyond the scope of this thesis.

A number of factors can lead to the demise of a minor political party. These factors include a lack of relevance in the party’s policies. This lack of relevant policies coupled with image problems causes the party to appear as anachronistic and out of touch.

Leadership including the transition to a new party leader, is a major cause of the demise of a minor party. A leader is very much the ‘public face’ or principal spokesperson of the party. A leader also has to keep the party united and take a main role in the resolution of conflict. A change of leadership is a major event for a minor party. From the circumstances that brought about the leadership change to the transitioning of the party to the new leader, conflict and disunity can arise and destabilise the party.

Most if not all minor parties have experienced money problems. Most minor parties that cross the representation threshold are able to win the required percentage of first preference votes to receive public funding for each first preference vote. Problems have arisen in parties prior to the introduction of that funding, the DLP was a prime example. With the availability of public funding money problems arise for the minor party contesting its first election as public funding is provided on the basis of prior results and not potential ones. Likewise, the party fails to qualify for any public funding because it is in decline and fails to have candidates elected or its candidates are elected in the Senate on low first preferences votes and large numbers of preferences. That was the position the Australian Democrats found themselves in throughout their demise.

A party can also resort to other forms of funding such as donations, ‘silver circles’ and other forms of raffles. In fact, some parties have been able to set up arrangements with such businesses as travel agencies and insurance brokers to receive commissions from business provided by party members and supporters.
The role of the media is another impact on the success or failure of a minor party. Minor parties are successful when they can gain the attention of the media for the promotion of their policies and activities. However, a minor party does not want to attract the media over matters of disunity and other adverse situations.

Finally, this chapter analysed Pedersen’s typology of the lifespans of minor parties and made improvements to the typology in order to make it more applicable to Australian conditions with compulsory voting and the balance of power held by minor parties in the Senate.

Introduction

This chapter analyses the reasons for ‘The Split’ in the ALP and the formation of the DLP in 1955. It initially analyses the threat of Communism, particularly in the union movement. The Labor Party’s ambivalent response to the threat of Communism and the formation of the Industrial Groups is then analysed. The instability of the parliamentary Labor party from the death of its leader Ben Chifley in 1951 up to and beyond the Labor party split of 1955 is identified as another significant factor in the formation of the DLP.

The Catholic Church and its unwavering stand against Communism was another major influence in the formation of the DLP. However, the Catholic hierarchy across Australia was deeply divided and this meant that while the DLP was strong in some states, in others it was weak. Another significant player was BA Santamaria and the Movement that was formed through the influence of Archbishop Mannix. This chapter argues that Mannix and Santamaria gave their own meaning to ‘Catholic Action’ to suit their own political ends.

This chapter also discusses the workings and growth of the DLP through the 1950s and 60s. Of particular significance is the allocation of the DLP’s second preferences which were not directed back to the ALP but to Labor’s traditional rival the Liberal and Country Party coalition.

Critical to the DLP’s influence was its usage of the balance of power in the Senate. This chapter argues that the DLP principally used the balance of power as a ‘veto’ instrument. The DLP seemed unable or unwilling to negotiate changes to legislation, particularly in the Party’s dealings with the ALP government after 1972.

This chapter uses Pederson’s (1982:8) representation of party life spans and discusses the various influences and drivers that caused the DLP to move around the party life span curve through the thresholds of declaration, authorization, representation and relevance.

The chapter argues that a number of factors, organisations and key individuals, and not some single catalyst, were responsible for the DLP coming into being. The DLP’s demise will be considered in the next chapter. This chapter will firstly consider the precursors to the DLP that in fact influenced the beginning of the DLP.
The Unions from post-Depression to World War 2

In the 1940s the ALP was not the only party to represent unionists, the Communist Party of Australia also represented unionists. During the depression of the 1930s, the Communist Party began to make advances in the unions; it gained influence through its strident militancy and the apathy of fellow unionists. It did this by ensuring that all of its members, who were members of a union, attended union meetings and voted at union elections. In both their involvement and voting, these members were able to advance the cause of the Communist Party.

Henderson (2015:142) comments that the communist strategy of the era was to seize control of various unions and then amalgamate them. Amalgamation along with abolition of the secret ballot, made the amalgamated union harder for the members to control. The amalgamated union would then support communist leaders, policies and tactics, such as militancy and general strikes.

The rise of communism in the unions presented problems for the Labor party with affiliated unions being invaded by Communist members – a feature regarded by the Catholic Church as an alarming rise of ‘godless communism’. Reynolds (1974:3) considers that two organisations formed in the 1940s led to the formation of the DLP in 1955. Firstly, the establishment of the Catholic Social Studies Movement (the Movement) in 1942; and then the establishment in 1945 of the Industrial Groups (the Groupers) sponsored by the ALP. Both of these organisations will be considered later in this chapter.

ALP and Communism

By the mid-1940s, the Communist Party’s union strategy was starting to raise concerns in the Australian Labor Party, through its attempted takeover of various ALP affiliated unions. The Communist party was also of concern to the Christian Churches, in particular the Roman Catholic Church given the Party’s non-belief in God and Christianity.

However, the exact meaning of Communism in the Australian context was never very clear. Tennant (1981:313) suggests that

Communism could mean anything from advocacy of state ownership of various enterprises to a mild protest against militarism.

Yet whatever the meaning of implied policies, the fear of Communism was increasing. Henderson 2015:201 noted that 1951 saw the publication of ‘A Call to the People of Australia’ (The Call) drafted by the Adelaide based Catholic writer Paul McGuire who was a friend and associate of BA Santamaria. Signatories included the Anglican Primate of Australia, the Moderator General of the Presbyterian Church, the President of the Methodist Church, the head of the world Council of Churches in Australia and Cardinal Norman Gilroy (in his capacity as
Catholic Archbishop of Sydney). Some senior judges such as the Chief Justice of Victoria, Sir Edmund Herring, were also signatories.

Henderson commented that

The call begins, pompously, with the signatories declaring that ‘there are times in the histories of people when those charged with high responsibilities should plainly speak their minds’. Then it gets worse; ‘Australia is in danger. We are in danger from abroad we are in danger from moral and intellectual apathy, from the mortal enemies of mankind which sap the will and darken the understanding, and breed evil dissensions. Unless they are withstood, we shall lack moral strength and moral unity sufficient to save our country and our liberties’. The call ends with the exhortation: fear God, honor the king.

We are in danger from abroad’ and ‘mortal enemies of mankind’ can be taken to mean or include Communists and Communism.

Mannix was quick to use ‘The Call’ in the Catholic Church’s fight against the Communists. Henderson 2015: 202) comments that:-

Mannix urged all Australians to work within key organisations of society to ensure they did not fall into the hands of evil or incompetent men. The first category-evil men-clearly included the communists.

In addition, the attack on Communism was very emotive for a number of Catholics and their Bishops. Probable reaction to ‘red terror’ in the Spanish Civil War. Noone (1993:3) recalled that when nuns came in around 1952 to console his mother after his sister’s death, the nuns advised his mother:-

Your daughter, Mrs Noone, is better off, because the Communists are going to take over very soon here in Australia and things are going to be very bad and there are going to be, you know, people strung up from lamp posts and so on.

Noone went on to report that his mother ‘certainly did not believe’ this. However, Noone went on to comment that people ‘certainly were influenced’ by similar comments from the clergy. As a child growing up in a Catholic DLP family in Victoria, the author can also remember similar dire predictions.

Tennant (1981:313) has commented that ‘capturing the ALP for the Faith was considered part of the Catholic duty to do battle against Communism. It was a convenient pretext applied to anything of which the speaker disproved.’ As will be shown later in this chapter, the Santamaria forces had ambitions going well beyond cleansing the ALP of Communist influences, to ridding the ALP of anyone who they considered was not sufficiently anti-Communist.
The Formation of Industrial Groups in the Unions

The setting up of the Industrial Groups became the ALP’s solution to the rising influence of the Communists in the trade unions and through the unions the ALP itself. In 1945 the ALP State Conference in NSW decided to form ALP Industrial Groups. In 1946 Vic and SA agreed to do likewise and QLD formed Industrial Groups in 1947.

Rigg (1997:9) defined an Industrial Group as:-

An organised body of workers engaged in a particular job, but usually in scattered locations, who band together to combat organised Communist efforts to use unions for political purposes.

In the Australian Railways Union, the members of the Industrial Group may come from every section and location, but meet regularly to organise themselves, both for the anti-Communist fight and to decide and push industrial policies towards the improvement of wages and working conditions.

The Industrial Groups were formed because of the alarm at increasing militancy of communists. Furthermore, there were doubts that non-Communist forces could alone control the 1945 ACTU biennial conference. It was also considered by the ALP that Communists could infiltrate the ALP and could also instruct the delegates from their controlled unions on how to vote at state conference.

What was the role of the industrial groups? Rigg (1997:9) advised that Industrial Groups were formed to:-

Combat Communist disruptions and subversive activities, through political strikes (such as the 1949 coal strike.)

Reynolds (1974:7, 8) commented that the formation of the Industrial Groups was a practical solution to a pressing problem – Communist influence in the unions. However little consideration seems to have been given in the early years of their formation as to what would be their eventual role, should they be successful in their immediate objectives. This failure to define any such long-range plans or even identify a continuing role for the Industrial Groups meant that a potential source of friction within the ALP had been created.

The ALP seemed to have little if any control over the Groups. Campbell (1961:61) commented that the only effective control by the NSW State Branch of the ALP over the Industrial Groups was the State Branch Executive who had two nominees on the Central Executive of the Groups. However, the Party Central Executive was ‘reluctant to interfere in the day to day workings of the Groups’.

An additional problem was the issue of ‘unity tickets’. A ‘unity ticket’ is ‘a how to vote advice or other material in which members of the ALP are coupled with non-members so that members
and non-members do not oppose each other for individual positions. . . . most such tickets coupled ALP members with Communists’ (Stephens 1983:55). However, unity tickets were against the Party rules and ‘led to automatic expulsion’. (Murray 1970:25).

Cameron 1987:120) considered the unity tickets were successful because:-

Candidates for union office will always place industrial aims ahead of Party political considerations.

Tennant (1981:317) observed that Labor initially supported the Grouper organisations until they decided that the Groupers were dangerous, some key Labor supporters included Dougherty in NSW, Cameron in SA, and Bukowski in Qld.

Lloyd (1968:2) recalled that many Labor figures displayed ‘a soft spot for those Industrial Groupers, who with little public recognition or support, have fought against great odds to prevent the Communists and their contemptible stooges from wrecking the trade union movement.’

Yet by the 1950s concerns over the growing influence of Groupers caused the ALP to curtail their activities. The ALP in SA through the strong influence of Clyde Cameron, was the first State to disbanded the Groups. Cameron (1987:119-120) advised that the Industrial Groups in South Australia were disbanded at the 1951 ALP State Convention. He advised delegates that the Industrial Groups were operating outside their charter. However, the abolition of the Groups in SA caused some angst within the Parliamentary Labor Party. Cameron (1990:92 -93) remarked that at the first Caucus meeting after the Convention, John Mullens, a strong supporter of the Groups:-

Became quite hysterical and pointing his finger at me, began shouting, ’Judas Iscariot Traitor, Judas, you Judas.’ I was dumbfounded and asked him if he was all right. I did not at first connect his outburst with my success in abolishing the Groups.

However, the ALP made a major mistake in not disbanding the Industrial Groups in all of the other States when the Communist Party’s influence in the Unions started to wan sharply. The Groups started to look at other areas in the ALP where they could exert their power.

Reynolds (1974:7) comments that little consideration appeared to have been given as to what would be the role of the Groups should they be successful in defeating the Communists in the unions. In fact, in the early to mid-1950s members of the Groups started to question and publicly attack members of the ALP who were considered to be not sufficiently ‘anti-communist’. This activity presented the ALP as a publicly divided party and was very damaging (Daly 1984:110). This was also the era of McCarthyism in US politics.
Murray (1970:26) commented that:-

In a party beset by personal and ideological rivalries, the creation of the Industrial Groups and commitment of the Party as a whole to a war against Communism caused an internal upheaval. The Groups created new centres of power and new issues, with bitter factional strife as the result.

Party support for Industrial Groups was withdrawn at the 1955 ALP Federal Conference in Hobart. The motion withdrawing ALP recognition of the Groups read in part:-

We are of the opinion that any form of industrial organisation designed to combat Communist activity in the unions should be a matter for the sole determination of the union concerned. (ALP 1955:41).

Church meets the State - The Australian Catholic Hierarchy

The relationship between the Church and the State, is a very uncertain area with very poorly defined boundaries. The Australian Catholic Church leaders in the 1950s and 60s were very much the Archbishops and Bishops (the Hierarchy). They were divided on the problem of Communism in Australia and the best solution to the problem.

The Catholic Church in Australia was ‘naturally concerned about the social destructive and anti-Christian forces of Communism’ (Vodola 1997:69). In 1955, at the height of the split the Hierarchy issued a ‘pastoral letter’ to all Catholics regarding Communism. They regarded Communism as ‘atheistic’, as well as ‘aggressive and ruthless’ in its operation (Catholic bishops 1955:1).

The Australian Catholic Hierarchy is significant in the rise of the DLP because of the amount of influence the Hierarchy had over the lay members of the Church (those not ordained to the priesthood). A number of members of the hierarchy were not averse to publicly commenting on political issues. In the 1950s and early 1960s a number of Catholic lay people questioned the religious appropriateness of political sermons from the pulpit on Sundays, along with an admonition of the evils of voting Labor.

Calwell (1972:144) commented that when Archbishop Simonds became Archbishop of Melbourne in 1963, the Archbishop received 17 letters of protest from Catholic people who named priests as having ‘offended by using their pulpits for political purposes’. According to Calwell, Simonds told his priests that he ‘intended to forget these incidents, but if it happened again, he would deal with the matter severely.’

Santamaria (1981:24) described the Irish-born influential Archbishop of Melbourne, Daniel Mannix was an ‘open unabashed nationalist’. He was proud of his church and considered himself very loyal to his country of birth and also to the country he migrated to. He saw himself as a citizen of the state with the right to comment on state and political issues as the opportunity arose.
The most controversial series of incursions into political issues were the various comments from Mannix. In 1916, he publicly opposed conscription. Mannix was of course not the only person to oppose conscription, many in the Labor Movement were against it and so were the trade unions. Through opposing conscription Mannix became quite well known, both in Melbourne and beyond. From the end of World War One, Mannix went very quiet politically until the rise of Communism in the mid-1940s.

Later during a television interview with Gerard Lyons, Mannix was questioned on his involvement in political issues. Mannix commented:

When a man becomes a bishop, he doesn't cease to be a citizen, and as a citizen and a responsible man he has the right to make up his own mind and his own conscience and to follow it. . . .

I have been always protesting that I was speaking not as an Archbishop but as a citizen, and that's my attitude down to the present day. I don't want anybody to take my view because I'm an Archbishop. . . . in matters that are not solely religious, when I'm speaking as a citizen I expect to be listened to as a citizen and to be taken at my citizen value (Murphy 1972:234).

In his response Mannix is clearly speaking as an ‘open unabashed nationalist’. What Mannix failed to realise was he was well known and recognized as the Archbishop. As such whenever he spoke publicly his words carried significant prestige to influence the thinking and views of his followers.

Mannix in a message to the National Civic Council stated that:-

The enemy (namely ‘atheistic’ Communism) you were – and are – fighting has never been equaled in the hatred he bears for Christ and his Church (Mannix 1955:2).

Mannix went on to comment:

The seizure of political power was only a means as far as the Communist was concerned. His real end was to use that power to destroy freedom and religion. You would defend freedom as citizens and religion as Christians.’

For Mannix then, his opposition to Communism was primarily of a moral or religious nature. In his comments, Mannix had no qualms in mixing religion and politics.

Allen (1988:28) considered that other historical reasons were part of the reason for the formation of the DLP. Catholics were not very effective at using existing political parties for specifically catholic purposes. Irish Australian Catholics never succeeded in making the ALP an ethnic party – the ALP has remained fearful that too many concessions for particular ethnic minority groups (especially for Irish Catholics) might provoke an electoral backlash. Poor working class Irish Catholics in Australia turned to the ALP because the ALP supported them as
an ‘out group’ in Australian society. Furthermore, Archbishop Mannix’s leadership was able and an important catalyst for political action by Catholics even after Mannix’s death.

The Catholic Church of the 1950s has been described as having a ‘most unforgiving orthodoxy’ which ‘bound’ a few members of the ALP right at that time (MacCallum 2001:37). However, the Catholic Hierarchy’s role in formation of the DLP is further complicated because the Australian Catholic Hierarchy was by no means united, it was very divided regarding Santamaria’s Movement and the DLP and this division was both very public and quite noticeable. Its members can be broadly divided into two groups. The group in favour of the DLP and the NCC and its operations included Mannix as its leader and chief spokesman, along with the other Bishops from Victoria.

Those against included, Cardinal Gilroy from Sydney, his auxiliary Bishop James Carroll, Archbishop Justin Simmonds who was Mannix’s Coadjutor in Melbourne and Bishop Mathew Beovich the Archbishop of Adelaide.

Simonds who was to succeed Mannix in 1963 in Melbourne commented after the 1958 Federal Election, over the involvement of the church in bitter political controversy, ‘whenever the church’s ministry and spiritual mission becomes befogged with political issues the cause of religion always suffers.’ Molony (2010:152) reports that in a conversation with him in the early 1950s in Rome, Simonds told him that ‘it was fatal for the church to allow itself to be used in the political arena.’ The Simonds approach to the Church and politics seemed to be a very minimal involvement in politics, a sharp contrast to the Mannix style.

With regard to the divisive nature of the Australian Catholic bishops, Mayer (1960:16) drew up a list of the Bishops in office in 1960 of those who were for Mannix with his support for the DLP and those who were against.
Chart 4.1 The Australian Catholic Hierarchy – Pro and Anti DLP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro-DLP (Mannix Line)</th>
<th>Anti-DLP (the Gilroy Line)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victoria</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Mannix (Melbourne)</td>
<td>Justin Simonds (Melbourne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Fox (Melbourne)</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Lyons (Sale)</td>
<td>Norman Gilroy (Sydney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Stewart (Sandhurst) (Bendigo)</td>
<td>James Carroll (Sydney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James O’Collins (Ballarat)</td>
<td>James Freeman (Sydney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New South Wales</strong></td>
<td>South Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Doody (Armidale)</td>
<td>Mathew Beovich (Adelaide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Henschke (Wagga)</td>
<td>James Gleeson (Adelaide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Queensland</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Brennan (Toowoomba)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Tynan (Rockhampton)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tasmania</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilford Young (Hobart)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Mayer listed those Bishops who could be regarded as ‘fluctuating’. They were Redmond Prendiville of Perth who changed support to being rather anti-DLP and Bryan Gallagher of Port Pirie in South Australia. Prendiville went so far as to ban an issue of his Archdiocesan Magazine which urged support for the DLP. Other Bishops aimed to be neutral in their approach and these Bishops included Archbishop James Duhig of Brisbane and the scholarly Archbishop Eris O’Brien of Canberra Goulburn.

Mayer also believed that this division in the Catholic Hierarchy was also reflected in the Catholic press. In Victoria, *The Melbourne Advocate, Tribune* and *Light* in Ballarat were pro-DLP, *The Catholic Weekly* in Sydney was neutral or hostile to the DLP, refusing to publish DLP election advertisements. *The Southern Cross* (SA) and *Catholic Record* (WA) ignored the DLP altogether.
Easson (2012) comments that when in 1955 the ALP split occurred:

There were two factors that weighed with the men and (some) women in the party: the strong support of the NSW Catholic hierarchy for the ALP - “stay in and fight” - and the memory of the numerous debilitating splits in the 30s during which Lang and Ben Chifley, who hated each other, ran candidates for different Labor parties to unseat each other.

In late 1955, at St Paul’s Seminary at Kensington, Bishop James Carroll gathered the NSW Movement’s luminaries and announced the cardinal’s wish that they stay in the Labor Party. The leaders of the Catholic Church in NSW and Victoria were publicly divided in terms of their support for the DLP. It is therefore, no surprise that Catholic support for the DLP was far from unanimous from the Catholic Bishops, Priests and lay people.

**Santamaria, Catholic Action and the Movement**

Bartholomew Augustine (Bob) Santamaria was born in Melbourne in 1915 in Brunswick a Melbourne suburb to Italian immigrant parents who operated a fruit shop in that suburb. Santamaria was educated by the Christian Brothers, he then went on to Melbourne University to study Arts and graduating in Arts and Laws. Santamaria was a member of the Campion Society, which was a small association of study groups made up mostly of university men. (Santamaria 1997:14).

In the early 1930s the concept of Catholic Action began to come to prominence in Australia. Catholic Action can be defined as:

The principle espoused in papal directives in the 1930s. Catholic Action meant that lay members of the Church ought to engage in social activities aimed at spreading the principles of their religion into the workplace and into recreation (McConville 1987:158).

Mannix, as an influential member of the Catholic Hierarchy, approached Santamaria in 1937 to help in the formation of the Australian National Secretariat of Catholic Action (ANSCA). Santamaria was appointed assistant director, becoming director in 1947 after the original director was subtly deposed while overseas. ANSCA was the coordinating body for Catholic Action throughout Victoria and then Australia. It was headquartered in Melbourne. The ANSCA involvement was Santamaria’s first position.

Under ANSCA a number of constituent bodies were established e.g. YCS (Catholic Action in Schools) which Santamaria did not control– and the National Catholic Rural Movement (NCRM) which Santamaria did control. ANSCA was dissolved by the Bishops in 1954.

Santamaria’s second position was Secretary, and driving force, behind the NCRM from its founding in 1939 up to 1960. The NCRM supposedly was to bring catholic action and ideas to
rural areas, it was in fact the Movement in rural areas. In the words of Kevin Peoples (2012) Santamaria ‘pressed the NCRM into acting as his anti-communist arm in rural Australia’.

Blaxland (2015:116) reported that although Santamaria was the ‘public face of both the NCC and the DLP’ and a ‘prolific writer and commentator’, ASIO management saw Santamaria’s views as ‘unremarkable’. As one ASIO officer commented on one of Santamaria’s pamphlets:-

Simply expressed it is the old conspiracy theory modernised. The plot is simplified by reducing it to a simple black and white issue . . . there are some very serious defects in the whole thesis.

Molony (2004:129) defines Catholic Action as ‘simply those things officially done by the laity, men and women, in the name of the Church. That definition clearly excluded political action.’ However, as events unfolded it was quite clear that Mannix and Santamaria intended Catholic Action in Australia to include political action where they thought it appropriate.

The Catholic Social Studies Movement (The CSSM or The Movement) began in 1941 ‘as a loose Melbourne network’ (Morgan 2007: xiv). It was set up by BA Santamaria and Bert Cremean to combat communism in the unions. Cremean was a Labor member of the Victorian Parliament. ‘It was Cremean who first suggested the co-ordination of Catholic trade union groups to combat communism; from this idea 'the Movement' emerged’ (Geoff Browne 1993). The Movement’s existence was not announced and it was not part of Catholic Action. The Movement assisted and supported the industrial groups. Santamaria was described as the liaison officer between the CSSM and the Bishops – this was his third position. However, Santamaria was seen as the de facto head of the CSSM (Morgan 2007:xiv). It was the Movement that Evatt denounced in 1954.

Members of the Movement became heavily involved in the Groups in the fight against the Communist influence in the Unions. Movement members who were engaged in that activity were known as ‘Groupers’, and some observers such as SA’s Clyde Cameron (1990:86, 92) believed that the Movement was the driving force ‘behind the Groups’.

McManus (1977:35ff) discussed the Movement’s involvement with the Industrial Groups. He put forward the view that the activities of Santamaria’s Movement were not secret and that the ALP members in the Victorian Trades Hall knew of Santamaria’s activities. Santamaria’s interactions with the Victorian Trades Hall and ALP members was facilitated by HM Cremean who was both Deputy leader of the Victorian Parliamentary Labor Party and Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union.

To be eligible to be a member of the Movement a person had to be a Catholic. The Movement though not formally linked to the Industrial Groups, provided a considerable part of their muscle. The term ‘Grouper’ was applied to both groups.
Bramble and Kuhn (2011:65) comment that ‘as the Groupers prospered, the Movement expanded its influence within the ALP which started to sound alarm bells. The ALP officials were happy to help the Groupers to get rid of their Communist opponents but were not so pleased when the Groupers began to move against Labor union leaders and politicians labelled corrupt or insufficiently anti-communist.’

Movement members joined the Industrial Groups and contributed to their activity. Ormonde (1996:62) claimed that the Movement operated behind the cover of the officially sponsored ALP Industrial Groups – ‘and the term Grouper ultimately became almost synonymous with being pro Movement.’ Similarly, Allen (1988) claimed that ‘without Movement support the Industrial Groups would probably not have achieved most of their successes’.

Morgan (2007:75) indicated that a letter written by Santamaria to Mannix dated 11 December 1952 showed that Santamaria’s ambitions went well beyond ridding the ALP of Communist influence. Santamaria wrote:-

The Social Studies Movement should within a period of five or six years be able to completely transform the leadership of the Labor movement, and to introduce into Federal and State spheres large numbers of members who possess a clear realisation of what Australia demands of them, and the will to carry it out. Without going into details, they should be able to implement a Christian social programme in both the State and Federal spheres, and above all, to achieve co-ordination between the different states in so doing.

This is the first time that such a work has become possible in Australia and, as far as I can see in the Anglo-Saxon world since the advent of Protestantism.

In addition, Dalziel (1967:138) reported that in the Bombay Examiner (the newspaper of the Catholic Archdiocese of Bombay), Santamaria was reported as speaking of ‘permeating and penetrating organised Labor which was allegedly under the threat of takeover by Communist infiltrators’.

Santamaria’s letter to Mannix shows an agenda that went much further than merely ridding the Labor party of communists. The Santamaria agenda including hijacking the ALP’s policies in order to put in place a ‘Christian social program’. Significantly Santamaria does not define what a ‘Christian social program’ means or who will decide if the social program is ‘Christian’ or not.

Ormonde (1996:62) claimed exposure of the Movement was also supported by prominent Catholics amongst others because of a ‘powerful conviction’ that Santamaria had a quasi-religious as well as a political vision for the Labor Party, both being pursued by the process of ‘secret permeation.’ This process would cleanse the Labor Party of not only its ‘crypto communists’, but also of its political liberals and agnostics.
Murray (1970:56) commented that:

Santamaria as well as being a militant anti-communist also had the politician’s instinct for a good issue, soon made ‘the threat from the North’ into a high priority issue for the Movement.

Santamaria did much to paint China, Vietnam and Indonesia as threats to Australia’s security and very much ‘unknown quantities’ as near neighbours to Australia.

After the 1955 split in the ALP the Catholic Bishops were divided over the Movement – it had ceased to be a unified organisation. In July 1956, most Movement officials had resigned and formed a new body the Catholic Social Movement (CSM). Santamaria was head of the CSM, which was his fourth position. About half the Bishops supported the CSM. The CSM was short lived, as following a ruling from the Vatican that the Catholic Church should not be involved in political activity, the CSM was dissolved.

Most of the CSM officials joined a new body the National Civic Council (NCC) formed in 1957, which was, and still is today, a private secular organisation, with very little or no involvement by the Australian Catholic Hierarchy. This was Santamaria’s fifth and final position.

The National Civic Council spelt out its strategy with regard to the DLP in 1959 (Morgan 2008:316-17). Its basic policy included creating a second Labor party – the DLP with disciplined preferences. Then to divide the ALP into two sections – the Left and the Right creating unity between the Right and the DLP resulting in the majority Labor party which will endorse industrial groups that will fight in the Communist unions

These objectives show a plan to reunite with the ALP, but only to the right wing of the party and not the left. It seems there was to be no compromise at all in respect of the left wing of the ALP. Further the dividing of left and right in the ALP seems a very ambitious objective with no certainty of success. What would the left of the ALP do? Forming a new party would not be out of the question. The end result could still be a divided Labor movement with a very vocal left wing party.

Molony (2010:308) commented that Santamaria followed where Mannix had led and betrayal of the divine mission of the Church . . . had been taking place since the late 1940s in Australia and primarily in Melbourne. That Mannix must be regarded as the principal actor in the betrayal rather than Santamaria is unquestionable.

Santamaria was seen in some quarters as a person who saw threats and enemies everywhere. He was a ‘behind the scenes man’ rather than operating in public forums (McCallum 2001:38). He was also one who was not amenable to party discipline (McManus 1976).
Interaction of the DLP and the National Civic Council was complex, secretive and religious not political in nature (Brennan 1972:11). The interactions of Santamaria and his various organisations add a level of complexity to the DLP. Given that Santamaria was never a member of the DLP. Santamaria was pushing for an ALP free of communist influence. However, he went much further than that. As previously mentioned in this chapter, Santamaria was engineering towards a ‘takeover’ of the ALP.

The 1949 Election and the change of leadership from Chifley to Evatt

In 1949 the Chifley Labor Government was defeated and Chifley led the ALP in opposition until his death in 1951. The Parliamentary ALP in the early 1950s was much divided over the issue of Communism. In fact, the Liberal Party whip Jo Gullett (1974) reported that in 1950 Chifley confided in him that the Labor party was divided over the issue of Communism, but Chifley was confident that he could keep the Party together, but he doubted that after he ‘went’, the new Leader would be as successful, and a split would be inevitable (Gullett 1970).

The 1949 Federal election saw the election of three Labor members who were the spokesmen for the ALP Industrial Groups and for Catholic Action in the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, namely Stan Keon in the electorate of Yarra, Jack Mullens in Gellibrand and William Bourke in Fawkner. The left and right of Caucus differed on the stand on Communism. This was also the time of the Korean War which saw Australia at war again.

On 23 March 1950 Chifley the Leader of the Labor Party spoke in the Parliament and Keon in following him as the next Labor speaker in the debate, publicly disagreed with Chifley. The Menzies Government being aggressive anti-communist, sharpened the divisions in Caucus. The Communist Party Dissolution bill and secret ballots legislation forced members of Caucus to take sides. On March 15 1951, Keon criticised Evatt in a caucus meeting and this was reported in the Sydney Morning Herald the next day.

After Chifley died the Deputy Leader Bert Evatt was elected by Caucus as Leader of the ALP and Leader of the Opposition. Evatt’s style of leadership was in marked contrast to that of Chifley. Daly (1984:109) described Evatt as ‘intellectual, controversial, Machiavellian, egotistical, unorthodox and unpredictable.’ Whittington (1964:54) commented that Evatt ‘had an inordinate vanity, an ego that brooked no opposition and no criticism.’

In Crockett’s view (1993:279) Evatt should have accommodated the diverse views and high emotions of ALP members. Crockett (1993:279) describes Evatt as intrusive, at times disruptive, as a leader he lacked flair for compromise, integrity in dealing with Caucus and facility with people and party groupings. Crockett went on to comment that ‘Evatt presented his
leadership as inspirational - for others to admire, but not to induce them to follow his example of repeatedly working outside party structures.’

Evatt was accused by the ALP Senator Allen Fraser of acting with ‘unpredictable individualism’, Evatt’s excuse being that ‘it was essential to act quickly in the Party’s interest’ (Crockett 1993:279).

Fitzgerald and Holt (2010:105-106) comment that attempts to get rid of Evatt as leader, consolidated his position. He was the embodiment of anti-Santamaria orthodoxy in the Party. In other words, Evatt was one person in the Labor Caucus who could and would stand up to Santamaria and no doubt also to those in Caucus who openly supported Santamaria.

Tennant (1981:317) suggested that ‘staunch Labor men’ held the view that by accusing the Groupers and bringing them out into the open, Evatt could defeat their tactics of preferred secrecy. ‘Labor rank and file were impatient at the arrogance of the Groupers and their assumption that they could pretty well do what they pleased and dictate as they wished.’ As ‘the state of Catholic Action was not malleable to compromise, the split in the ALP was inevitable and unavoidable’ (Tennant 1981: 324).

Crockett (1993:279) comments that the ‘principal cause of the ALP’s internal problems lay in long standing differences of opinion about how to deal with the influence of Communism in the ALP’s political and industrial wings (the unions).

Crockett (1993:295) considers that Evatt was ‘ill-equipped to unify and lead’. Evatt also failed to consult the party about vital matters’ and was also ‘mistrustful of his colleagues’ (Crockett 1993:281-282).

Crockett (1993:279) also noted that :-

Party members had long objected to their leader’s neglect of party procedure, especially when he did not consult colleagues before releasing contentious public statements

Murphy (2016:343) claimed that Evatt:-

had little grasp of what was happening and little control over events in the deeper struggle in the Labor movement, it is hard to see his hand at work. . . . The powder keg . . . (Evatt) touched off was already in place.

A significant cause of the split was Evatt’s very erratic style of leadership with his failure to consult and lack of tact and very communication skills. He was a brilliant legal mind with little or no leadership skills.
The 1954 Election and the Defection of Petrov

Just before the dissolution of the House of Representatives for the 1954 election, held on 29 May, Menzies made a statement to the House of Representatives advising that the Third Secretary of the Russian Embassy Vladimir Petrov had defected to Australia and that a royal commission enquiring into espionage would be set up.

Whittington (1956:95) claimed that ‘there is little doubt that the Menzies government exploited the Petrov case for political purposes.’ Whittington goes on to claim that ‘there is very definite evidence for instance that the Prime Minister knew most or many of the facts at least six months before he announced them to parliament on the eve of the 1954 elections.’ In addition, Whittington goes on to claim ‘that first announcement with its solemnity, its underlying note of urgency, made a profound impression on the electorate.’ Thus, Communism was a major issue in the election campaign.

Evatt expected to win the 1954 election and in fact the ALP won 50.1 per cent of the vote and the Coalition 47 per cent of the vote. However, the majority of the votes that comprised the swing to Labor were cast in safe seats and not in the marginal seats that Labor needed to win government. Consequently, the coalition was returned to government with a majority of five seats (59 Labor and Coalition 64 seats). Evatt was bitterly disappointed.

Faulkner and Macintyre (2001:213) claim that Labor lost the election due to a botched 1949 redistribution of electorates and ‘Evatt’s extravagant campaign promises’ along with ‘Menzies opportunism’ and the ‘conveniently timed defection’ of Petrov.

Buckley et al (1994:382ff) also considered that the Petrov affair was a catalyst for a major split in the ALP. The ALP faced two threats, the first was the Communists ‘who sought to have themselves accepted as part of the ALP’. The second was the Industrial Groups and their ‘alter ego’ the Movement, which was remarkably successful in infiltrating the Industrial Groups.

In the view of Buckley et al, the Movement went beyond its original aims. However, Evatt’s intervention prevented Santamaria from achieving his aims.

Had Labor won the 1954 Federal election, it is likely that the 1955 split of the Labor Party would not have happened and there would have been no DLP and the long reign of the Menzies government might have never happened. Australian history could have been much different.

As could be imagined, the troubles and divisiveness in the ALP did not escape the attention of the research staff in the Liberal Party Secretariat. In November 1954, this group submitted a confidential ‘appreciation’ to the Liberal Party hierarchy. The ‘Appreciation’ (Document No 1) claimed (at page 1) the ALP was:-
split into three main camps. These were ‘a small aggressive right wing, an equally aggressive left wing and a large middle group which has striven to avoid a split in the party

As to a likely outcome, the Appreciation considered that:-

a complete victory for the right wing may be ruled out. Although the anti-Evatt Group in Federal Caucus is large, the right-wing faction is small. With Keon, Mullins and Bourke of Victoria ‘being the hard core’ and are ‘definitely regarded as the mouth pieces of Catholic action in Caucus.

The Appreciation went on to note:-

hostility to the groupers has been increasing in ALP branches for some time. More important is the trade union hostility to the Groupers and to Catholic Action.

The appreciation then notes (on page 2) that the Keon faction entered Parliament in 1949 and:-

since that time the Victorian Executive and the ALP Groupers are increasingly unpopular with the Labor rank and file for these reasons:-

- They are regarded as a party within a party;
- They are branded as the instruments of Catholic Action;
- Catholic Action is criticised as a secret society within the Labor movement;
- The right wing is blamed for the confused thinking in the ALP today, it is said that the anti-red fanaticism of the right wing has transformed the Labor Party from a socialist to a reactionary party.

Compromise seems out of the question because of the bitterness on the issue is so deep. The left and the right wing are irreconcilable and compromise will not solve the problem. .

. a victory for the left depends on the line of votes at the ALP Federal Conference in Hobart, the signs are the left will have a majority.

The appreciation went on to note that:-

Dr Evatt and his supporters in the left would prefer a “root and branch purge”, which would result in the destruction of the Victorian ALP executive and the Keon faction, ‘which is the strongest prop the ALP Groups and Catholic Action possess.

Already Evatt’s supporters have isolated the Victorian Executive from the most powerful trade union backing in Victoria.

The ‘appreciation’ and its approach shows that the Liberal Party secretariat was very mindful that a waring and divided ALP would ensure the Liberals and their coalition colleagues the Country Party, would enjoy increased support from the voters at the next election. What was not known at the time of the Split was the decision of the new party, the DLP, to second preference not the ALP but the Coalition parties. The DLP’s strategies regarding preference allocation will be considered later in this chapter.

Evatt’s Reaction to the loss of the 1954 Election

Evatt looked for a scapegoat for the election loss and he found one in the Groupers, who he personally blamed for the defeat of Labor. On 5 October 1954 Evatt released a press release. In that press release Evatt commented on the federal election that was held in May. He observed that the ALP ‘made gains in every state except Victoria’. He went on to say:-
But in the election, one factor told heavily against us – the attitude of a small minority
group of members, located particularly in the state of Victoria, which has, since 1949,
become increasingly disloyal to the Labor movement and the Labor leadership.

Adopting methods which strikingly resemble both communist and Fascist infiltration of
larger groups, some of these groups have created an almost intolerable situation –
calculated to deflect the Labor movement from the pursuit of established Labor objectives
and ideals.

Whenever it suits their real aims, one or more of them never hesitate to attack or subvert
Labor policy or Labor leadership (quoted in Murray 1970:180).

He went on to say;

It seems certain that the activities of this small group are largely directed from outside the
Labor movement. The Melbourne News Weekly appears to act as their organ. A serious
position exists.

The people Dr Evatt was referring to were BA Santamaria and his supporters in the Catholic
Social Studies Movement and the groupers in various unions.

Reactions to Evatt’s statement came very quickly. First the press reported Evatt’s statement.
The Argus of 6 October on page one reported ‘Evatt Denounces Victorian MP’s Group –
Traitors’, the Sydney Morning Herald followed on 9 October reporting that ‘Victorian ALP
Executive condemns Evatt’ and went on to report that; ‘the Executive declared that Dr Evatt’s
attack had damaged the Party and was unworthy of a Federal Leader of the ALP.’ The Sydney
Morning Herald reported again on 21 October with an account of a stormy ALP party meeting
in Canberra. These press comments would not have assisted the ALP as a party instead
highlighting in a damaging way, disunity in the party.

The Federal Secretary of the ALP Mr J Schemella received a letter dated 3 November 1954
from the Amalgamated Engineering Union in Melbourne congratulating Dr Evatt on his stand
‘against disruptive and disloyal elements within the ALP who we consider were responsible for
Labor’s defeat in the (1954) Federal election.’ A similar letter dated 21 October was sent by the
Maryborough Trades and Labor Council. Gwen Stahl a Victorian wrote to the Federal
Secretary on 27 October, informing him ‘that the actions of Keon, Mullens, and Bourke etc.
have only confirmed their anti-Labor sympathies’. She went on to ‘urge the Federal executive
to support Dr Evatt on his stand against these elements’. Mr LR Cotton of Bentleigh wrote on 9
November 1954 supporting Evatt and accusing the industrial groups of ‘a misuse of power’.

However, the Ballarat District Council of the Victorian Branch of the Federated Clerks’ Union
in a letter dated 26 October criticised Evatt for his attack ‘without making specific charges’ and
‘pledged their support to the Victorian Executive of the ALP’ as well as the Industrial Groups
‘in their fight against the critical menace of Communism.’
It is significant that all of these letters came from party members and Labor organisations in Victoria. The letters show that support for the Victorian executive of the party was not universal throughout Victoria.

The Federal Executive of the ALP met on 27 October 1954 and through November to investigate ‘a number of press statements by members of the party, including . . . Evatt’. However, the Federal Executive investigated under four headings.

- Disunity and lack of discipline in the Federal parliamentary Labor Party;
- Charges and counter charges involving individual members of the Party;
- That in effect, the Central Executive of the Party in Victoria is dominated and/or influenced by an outside body referred to as the ‘Movement’ to the detriment of the Labor Party’s basic principles;
- That Industrial group organisation has developed away from its original purpose and is being used as a vehicle to further the political aims of an outside body referred to as the ‘Movement’.

The Federal Executive stated that ‘it is not intended to critically examine all those factors. Sufficient for the purpose of the Executive is to say that it is accepted as a fact.’ The Executive went on to make a finding that ‘the charges preferred against Dr Evatt are not sustained’.

With regard to ‘Central Executive of the Party in Victoria being dominated and/or influenced by an outside body referred to as the ‘Movement’, the Federal Executive made a number of decisions. These decisions included ‘all officers and members of the Victorian Central Executive . . . shall be declared vacant’. For administrative purposes, there were a few exceptions.

The Executive ordered the Victorian Branch of the Party to hold a Special State Conference. The Victorian Central Executive refused to give effect to that decision, therefore the Special Conference was convened by the Federal Executive on 26 and 27 February 1955. The Federal Executive also directed that the rule that delegates to the conference had to be members of the ALP for two years ‘shall not be observed for the purposes of the Special Conference’. This meant, according to McManus (1977:67), that ‘delegates from unions need not be members of the Labor Party.’ Furthermore, disaffiliated unions could affiliate and send delegates to the Special Conference.

As well as electing the officers and members of the Victorian Central Executive, the Special Conference was also empowered to elect the delegates to the Federal Conference to be held in Hobart in March 1955 notwithstanding that these delegates had been elected previously. Those six delegates were FP McManus, JP Horan, J Riley, R Saker, J Neill and D Woodhouse. McManus (1977:72) explained that the last three delegates (Saker, Neill and Woodhouse) were
elected later, in place of Lovegrove, Carey and one other, who were ‘elected on both conferences, but notified that they would be representing the ‘new’ Executive.’

The Special Conference elected as delegates to the Federal Conference, JV Stout, JP Brebner, HO Davis, W Divers, PJ Kennelly and D Lovegrove.

With regard to the ‘Industrial Group organisation’, the Federal Executive held that pending a determination by the Federal Conference in Hobart, regarding Industrial Groups, these groups would not be recognised by the Victorian Branch.

Buckley et al (1994:389) argued that Evatt ‘was fundamentally concerned about the integrity of the ALP’, which was threatened by a subversive group whose aim was to ‘deflect the Labor movement from the pursuit of established Labor objectives and ideals.’ However, Crocker (1993: 279) adopted a different view on Evatt. He described Evatt as:-

Intrusive, at times disruptive, as a leader he lacked flair for compromise, integrity in dealing with Caucus, and facility with people and party groupings.’

In other words, Evatt was tactless and not a diplomat and lacking a flair for compromise.

Hayden (1996:79) commented that Evatt’s October 1954 statement was made without consultation (presumably with Caucus) ‘in a desperate and inexcusably selfish effort to save his flagging leadership. Not for the first or last time in his career Evatt put his personal ambitions ahead of any other interests, such as those of the Labor Party.’

Howard (2014:187), himself a former party leader has commented on Evatt and his leadership with the advantage of hindsight spanning 59 years. On the issue of a party leader Howard considers that:

It is a truism that the leader of a political party has greater influence on the perceptions and behaviour of that party than anyone else. More than any other person, the leader has the authority and power to bring people together, to articulate what the party stands for, and to appeal to the party’s common interests, above the interests of individual persons or factions. For these reasons, the leader also has the capacity to inflict more damage on the party than anyone else.

The 1955 ALP Federal Conference in Hobart

The final act that brought the DLP into existence was the ALP Federal conference of 1955 in Hobart. Both of the delegations from Victoria went to the Federal Conference, both claiming to be the legitimate delegation. The Federal Conference had to decide which one was the legitimate delegation. Strangely the delegation elected at the Special Conference in Victoria was allowed to join the conference on the first day and vote on which delegation was legitimate. The delegation chosen after Federal intervention was then declared the bona fide delegation.

McManus (1977:73) observed that:-
In desperation, Chamberlain and Stout decided not to accept the traditional Labor practice of having the other five states decide when there was a conflict on credentials; they decided to seat the six delegates of the ‘new’ Victorian Executive, and so make them judges on their own case.

The delegation composed of delegates chosen before Federal intervention was excluded. That delegation comprised mainly Groupers and their supporters. That delegation then decided to split from the ALP and thus the DLP was formed, it originally named itself the Australian Labor Party Anti-Communist (ALP-AC).

Writing in The Australian of 6 November, Evatt’s Deputy Arthur Calwell (1965) described the 1955 split of the ALP as ‘Evatt’s last great fight’. In Calwell’s view, it was a ‘gross distortion of history to say that Dr Evatt caused the split.’ Calwell considered that the split was the result of protective action by the Labor Party against a powerful move for outside control and the introduction of philosophies quite alien to its nature and traditions.

The Labor Party split was fueled on one side by the non-Labor member Santamaria’s attempts to take over the Labor Party and expel any member who was not sufficiently anti-Communist. On the other side was Dr Evatt with his leadership style, together with Calwell his deputy who had a hatred for Santamaria and the Groupers and their parliamentary supporters. Others who distrusted Santamaria and the groupers were, the unionists Stout, Chamberlain, Schemella and the Labor Member of Parliament, Pollard. The anti-groupers were able to rearrange the rules to allow favourable delegates from disaffiliated unions and even non-Labor members who were unionists that were also anti-movement and anti-groupers to attend the special conference.

The consequences of the Split was the banishment of Labor to the opposition benches until 1972 federally and 1982 in the Victorian parliament. The chance of a Labor government was severely restricted by the DLP flow of preferences to the Liberal and Country parties. Thus, the Split caused much damage to the ALP as the DLP never became a third party or alternative Labor party; the real winners from the split were the Liberal and Country parties.

The split in the ALP was not uniform throughout Australia. In fact, it was far from uniform. The DLP’s main strength came from the State of Victoria. Victoria was the home of Santamaria with Mannix, and the Bishops of the three other Catholic dioceses, and their influential support for the DLP.

After the split in Queensland in 1957 over annual leave for workers, Queensland was the second strongest state for the DLP returning two DLP Senators in 1964 and in 1967, one of those Senators was the former ALP Premier of Queensland, Vincent Gair.

In the early years from 1955, the DLP got enough support in Tasmania through the efforts of the former ALP Senator George Cole who also switched to the DLP in 1955 during the split. However, in the early 1960s Cole’s health started to suffer and his level of support started to fall
as a result. He lost his Senate seat at the 1964 Senate elections and he died a few years later. The DLP’s support in Tasmania never recovered from that slump and the DLP failed to get any other candidate elected to the Senate from Tasmania.

In New South Wales the Catholic Archbishop Cardinal Gilroy and his assistance Carroll were very open in their opposition to Santamaria, Mannix and the DLP. In their view the dissatisfied members of the parliamentary Labor Party should have remained in the ALP and fought the Communist influence from that vantage point.

However, the DLP was somewhat persistent in New South Wales to the point that John Kane who was involved in the Split was elected to the Senate for a three-year term in 1970. Two reasons were the cause of Kane’s success, one was six senators were up for re-election and not five, thus the quota was lower. The second reason was that the ALP in its allocation of preferences, favoured Kane and the DLP over some other parties. Kane claimed he was aware of the preference allocation on polling day and actually thanked the ALP booth workers and other Labor officials for helping him and the DLP in such a way (Kane 1989 173:174).

In Western Australia, the DLP’s support was always fairly weak but not as weak as in South Australia. In Western Australia, the DLP had finance problems in maintaining and running a state office and thus the party relied heavily on donations from business interests and individual supporters. In fact, in 1958 the DLP State President commented on ‘the grim struggle to survive in Western Australia’ (Clarke 1971:79). Furthermore, Clarke found evidence in the DLP files in Perth of support from members of the Liberal Party to the DLP (Clarke 1971:82).

In addition, the DLP in Western Australia was very prone to run an election campaign on morality issues such as abortion, the right to life and censorship. In 1970 when the DLP in other states benefitted from the swing away from the two major parties, this swing did not translate to the DLP’s results in Western Australia. An independent senator SA Negus won the fifth Senate seat, campaigning solely on the abolition of estate and gift duties, which were two very unpopular taxes - estate duty being levied on the capital value of a recently deceased person’s assets! Negus’ victory was totally unexpected. The DLP polled a disappointing 5.6 per cent.

Finally, in South Australia the DLP from 1955 polled very poorly. Two reasons were the cause; the first reason was the dissolution of the Groups in South Australia in 1954. The second reason was Mathew Beovich, the Catholic Archbishop of Adelaide switched his allegiances from Santamaria to an apolitical stance. He did not approve of Santamaria’s policies and methods.

What Actually Caused the Split?

Murray (1970:5) believed that the Split was about:-
Power and personalities rather than ideology, but it was nevertheless ideology which formed the tense background against which this most complex and damaging of Australian Schisms opened. Where ideas were discussed, they tended to become weapons in faction fights – in a political tradition that spread far beyond Australian Labor.

Murray’s comments provide an accurate assessment of the Split, given Evatt’s authoritarian leadership, the fiery nature of Keon and the attitude of Calwell in not forgiving or forgetting those who he and his followers considered had ‘ratted’ on them or let them down in other ways. This was in an atmosphere of being accused of being a Communist merely through association or simply not being sufficiently ‘anti-Communist’.

Three prominent reasons for the ALP split, were the perceived spread of communism, the quality of Dr Evatt’s leadership of the Labor Party and the influence and activities of Mr BA Santamaria. However, Howard (2014:185) goes into more detail. He claimed that there are four ‘versions’ or explanations regarding what caused the ALP split of 1955. The first version was that the Split ‘was the culmination of a long dormant but slowly building, philosophical division’ in the Australian Labor Party between an anti-Communist right wing and a left wing ‘which was less alarmed about the threat of Communism both domestically and international and had an almost child-like faith in the efficacy of the United Nations to solve mankind’s problems’.

The second version was that the Split was predominantly sectarian in character. For many years, the ALP was the ‘party of choice for the great bulk of Australian Catholics’. Howard goes on to comment that ‘zealots amongst active Catholics in both the ALP and Catholic lay bodies saw this demographic circumstance, combined with the threat of Communism as a vehicle in which the ALP could be made even more ‘Catholic’ (anti-communist?) This produced a protestant or anti-Catholic backlash, which ultimately lead to the Split.

The third factor was a clash of priorities between keeping the Communists at bay in the unions and those who ‘saw Labor’s supreme mission as gaining and then holding Government both nationally and at a state level’.

The fourth version Howard provided was that Dr HV Evatt the Leader of the Labor Party was to blame for the split, given the divisiveness of his October 1954 statement and that fact that he went from ‘flirting with the industrial groups and Santamaria to using them as scapegoats after he lost the 1954 Federal election and his leadership ‘had hit a new low’. It is significant that Howard does not consider the role of Santamaria in the reasons for the split.

Howard later suggested that any assessment of the Split includes elements of all of those explanations.
The Australian Labor Party (Anti Communist) (ALP (AC))

When Parliament resumed on 1955, the members of the ALP who had joined the ALP-AC sat as a group on the opposition cross benches in the House of Representatives. Those who split from the ALP to Form the ALP (AC) are shown in the following table:-
Table 6: Federal Parliamentary Members of the Australian Labor Party (Anti Communist) (ALP (AC)) 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andrews TW</td>
<td>Darebin VIC</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourke WM</td>
<td>Faulkner VIC</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryson WG</td>
<td>Bourke VIC</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cole GR</td>
<td>Tasmania (Senate)</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1949-1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sitting ALP Senator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>who held his seat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>after split</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cremen JL</td>
<td>Hoddle VIC</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Vic State 1945-49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua R</td>
<td>Ballarat VIC</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1951-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keon SM</td>
<td>Yarra VIC</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Vic State 1945-49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullens JM</td>
<td>Gellibrand VIC</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1937-1946 Vic State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McManus FP</td>
<td>Victoria Senate</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1956-1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(former Secretary of Vic ALP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1965-1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)

At the Federal election, later that year all members of the ALP-AC in the House lost their seats. However, in the Senate Coles’ term did not expire in 1955 and McManus, the former assistant secretary of the ALP in Victoria, was elected to represent the new party in Victoria.

In the State of Victoria, a number of ALP State parliamentarians split from the Party to join the ALP (AC). Their details are shown in the following table.
Table 7: Victorian State Parliamentary Members of the Australian Labor Party (Anti Communist) (ALP (AC)) 1955-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barry WP</td>
<td>MLA Northcote Member of Cain Ministry</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1932-1955 Leader of ALP (AC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman PL</td>
<td>MLC Melbourne West</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1943-1955 Leader of ALP (AC) In Leg Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrigan ST</td>
<td>MLA Port Melbourne</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1952-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayes T</td>
<td>MLA Melbourne</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1924-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones P</td>
<td>MLC Doutta Galla</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1938-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little JA</td>
<td>MLC Melbourne Nth</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1954-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Carroll JP</td>
<td>MLA Clifton Hill</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randles PJ</td>
<td>MLA Brunswick</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scully FR</td>
<td>MLA Richmond</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1949-1958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Victorian State Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)

McManus (1977:74) recorded that Cain the Victorian Premier was ‘ordered by Stout to recast his ministry and drop any who supported us.’ As a consequence, the Liberal opposition moved a motion of no confidence in the Labor government. The motion was carried and at the subsequent election, a Liberal government was elected and remained in office, winning elections, until 1982. At the same election, most of the ALP (AC) members lost their seats. However, three were able to survive and serve another term. They were Jack Little MLC and P Jones MLC, whose six year terms had another three years to run, expiring in 1958 when they did lose their seats. The third member was Frank Scully MLA, who was also defeated in 1958. In the Cain ALP government, Scully was an Assistant Minister as well as Secretary to Cabinet from December 1952 to March 1955.

In 1956 the party changed its name to the Australian Democratic Labor Party (ADLP shortened to DLP). In 1962, the Queensland Labor Party (QLP) merged into the DLP.
Table 8: DLP Members of Federal Parliament 1955-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
<th>Highest Education Level</th>
<th>Paid Work before Parliament</th>
<th>Year Joined DLP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gair, Vince</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1964-1974</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>QLD Premier</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little, Jack</td>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1968-1974</td>
<td>Post Grad</td>
<td>ALP State Member, Trade Unionist</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)

Who voted for the DLP?

Although the Party’s support varied from state to state, given the policies of the DLP, it would be fair to assume that the typical DLP voter and long term supporter would be strongly anti-Communist, support increased defence spending as a result and support strict moral values such as no divorce, strict censorship and be anti-abortion and ‘right to life’. A strong possibility is that they would be regular church going Roman Catholics.

In addition, some of the DLP leaders such as McManus in particular (with the catchy slogan ‘vote Mac back’), and Gair did enjoy a strong personal following. George Cole the Party’s senator in Tasmania also enjoyed a strong personal following until ill health impeded his parliamentary representation and his lost his seat as a result, dying a few years later.

Aitkin (1972:6) commented that
The DLP is not such a small group, nor are its members concentrated – with the important exception that they are much more numerous in Victoria than elsewhere.

The DLP voters were not concentrated as they were with the National Party, thus the National Party today gets candidates elected to the House of Representatives with a similar percentage of the vote as the DLP once achieved even though it could not get candidates elected to the House of Representatives as its vote was more dispersed. Hence the Senate was the only place DLP candidates were likely to be elected. The party’s main source of strength was Victoria, with the support of Santamaria and Mannix along with most of the parliamentary members who split from the ALP.

Aitkin also commented that (page 7)

There seems to be general agreement that the DLP has managed to attract as voters some non-Catholics who agree with its emphasis on foreign policy, defence and anti-Communism or who vote for it in response to a temporary disaffection with their own party.

Aitkin (1972:9) concluded that:

The DLP has a solid core of committed voters who are regular church going Roman Catholics; they make up around three per cent of the electorate and about half of those who vote for the DLP.

Regarding the other half Aitkin concluded that:

Most of the other DLP voters are Liberals and Protestants, and it is likely that their choice of the DLP as a first preference is temporary only. Such an analysis of the DLP vote is consistent with the known very high second preferences of DLP voters for the non-Labor parties and it is consistent also with the clear downward trend in which the DLP vote at elections is set.

Aitkin’s comment is significant in that in Victoria at both the 1967 and 1970 Senate elections the DLP was the beneficiary of a sizable swing from the major parties. In 1967, the Holt government was very unpopular and in the 1970 elections both the Liberal Party under the then Prime Minister Gorton and the ALP were both very unpopular. In the same period, support for the DLP in House of Representatives elections continued to decline from previous elections.

It is significant too that Mackerras (1972:3) considered DLP voters in House of Representatives elections to be in effect Liberal voters. Mackerras argued that those voters who vote DLP, make a ‘nominal vote only’. Those voters knew only too well, that the DLP candidate had almost no hope of being elected, so their real vote flowed straight through to the Liberal Party. The DLP voters’ main aim was to keep the ALP out of government and this strategy worked until the 1972 House of Representatives election.

Many of the DLP candidates were Catholic and a number had been around at the time of the Split although not necessarily in parliament. Some of the DLP candidates were young and in
Victoria some were also members of the Young Democratic Labor Association (YDLA) the Party’s youth wing. Many DLP candidates were professional and some were primary producers.

Proportional Representation

Two aspects of the Australian electoral system enhanced the DLP’s appeal to its supporters and the electorate. The first was the introduction in 1949 of a predominantly proportional representation method of voting for senate elections. The other was the allocation of second preferences.

The change in the voting method used in the Senate allowed the DLP and later minor parties to gain some representation in the Senate. In 1948 the Chifley Labor government amended the Electoral Act to alter the existing method of counting the Senate vote which had traditionally rewarded the majority party with a disproportionately large share of Senate seats. Labor itself had a Senate majority of 33 seats to 3 held by the Liberal Party after the 1946 election.

According to Daly (1984:51-52), Arthur Calwell the then Minister for Immigration strongly advocated proportional representation for Senate elections. Calwell argued that the ALP would retain a majority in the Senate after the next elections, due in 1949, and probably into the future. Daly reports that Chifley was personally opposed to PR and may well have voted against it in the cabinet. But Calwell ‘won the day by convincing sitting senators that they would be re-elected in 1949 and that the new voting system favored them in the future’.

Proportional representation allows minor parties to win seats in the Senate and the DLP was the first minor party to take advantage of proportional representation for election to the Senate and in 1968 to hold the balance of power in the Senate. In the Australian Senate proportionality, can be distorted to some degree through ‘preference deals’ between a number of minor parties to the extent that a minor party can receive around two per cent of the vote and get a senator elected by receiving the second preferences from a number of minor parties after their votes had been excluded.

In the 1970 Senate elections, the DLP required 16.7 per cent of the vote in a state to gain a quota, which they did in Victoria and Queensland. In NSW, the party only required 14.3 per cent for a quota as there were six senate vacancies and not the normal five. In the 1974 double dissolution election, the DLP required 9.1 per cent of the vote in a state to gain a quota which they were unable to do in any state including Victoria which had been their power base.
Allocation of Second preferences

The preferential voting system is used in electing members of the House of Representatives. A minor party therefore has to decide which other party should receive their second preference votes and issue a how to vote card reflecting that decision.

After the Split in 1955 the DLP made the spectacular and disloyal decision to second preference Labor’s traditional enemies the Liberal and Country Party coalition. This surprising allocation of preferences ensured victory to the coalition in a number of electorates at the expense of the ALP and also ensured continued re-election of Coalition governments and banishment of the ALP to the opposition benches for many elections.

Sharman et al (1991) classed the DLP second preferences as ‘hostile’ - that is a small party consistently preferencing against a large party.

Commenting on the 1955 Federal election in the seat of Corio, Mansfield (2012:149) commented that the ALP (AC) candidate achieved his immediate objective when he persuaded thousands of ALP voters to consider abandoning the ALP. Mansfield goes on to comment that the leader of the ALP (AC) Joshua said that the defence of Australia was his party’s priority ‘but most people remained convinced that the ALP (AC) hatred of Evatt was its primary motivation.’

Chart 4.5 Flow of DLP Preferences in Corio and Ballarat Electorates

Corio 1954 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dedman (ALP)</td>
<td>21,487</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opperman (Lib)</td>
<td>22,703</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corio 1955 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loader (ALP)</td>
<td>16,632</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opperman (Lib)</td>
<td>19,959</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>57.2% (82% of ALP (AC’s) prefs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singleton (ALP AC)</td>
<td>3,929</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the neighbouring electorate of Ballarat (in later redistributions renamed Ballarat)

Ballarat 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joshua ALP</td>
<td>20,482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1955

Erwin (Lib)  15,763
Dowling (ALP)  15,686
Joshua (ALP AC)  9,757

Second Preference Allocation

Erwin (Lib)  23,852 (+8,089)
Dowling (ALP)  17,354 (+1,668)

The Liberal candidate, Erwin, received 83 per cent of the DLP preferences while the Labor candidate Dowling received 17 per cent of the preferences.

Of significance in the Ballarat Electorate was the 1961 election where the Menzies Liberal Government suffered big swings against it, the Liberal, Erwin actually improved his position and the DLP preferences to him were even tighter.

Ballaarat 1961

Erwin (Lib)  18,379
Keane (ALP)  16,224
Joshua (DLP)  7,557

Second Preference allocation

Erwin (Lib)  25,240
Keane (ALP)  16,920

The DLP candidate’s vote was down from 1955, but the DLP second preferences were even more tightly delivered to the Liberal Party in this electorate, only 16 of Joshua’s 7,557 votes leaked to the ALP! It is also significant that in this electorate the DLP candidate was last on the ballot and thus could not provide a donkey vote second preference to the Liberal candidate.

The Liberal Party took some time to recognise its good fortune. According to Howson (1973:4/1/10), the Liberals were not at all certain that they would get the second preferences of the DLP at the 1955 election. As Howson explained, ‘we hadn’t seen how effective the split
was going to be in our favour’. One person in the Liberal Party who was quick to see the benefits of DLP second preferences was the senior Liberal, Richard Casey MP.

On 13 June 1958 (Casey 1958A) wrote to Menzies advising that Casey had been in touch with ‘a responsible and relevant source’ about the DLP’s prospects at the next (1958) election and the effects of DLP preferences to the Liberal Party. These ‘effects’ were that in Victoria for example the DLP vote and preferences decided the result in 16 seats in favor of the Liberal Party and the percentage of preferences flowing to the Liberals was around 90 per cent, never falling below 80 per cent. In NSW the DLP was weaker and in Qld the vote to the then QLP was quite high. Limited results only could be obtained from other states.

On 25 June 1958, Menzies replied through his private secretary to Casey (Menzies 1958). Menzies merely observed ‘I think the DLP secures quite a lot of normal Liberal votes. The Victorian elections showed this. It is a point to be considered.’

On the 8th of July 1958, Casey responded (Casey 1958B). Casey advised that he had spoken to his ‘responsible and relevant source’ who advised that the DLP vote in the 1955 elections for the Senate in Victoria flowed from the ALP and not from the Liberal Party. Casey also advised that he had asked his ‘source’ that if the DLP did not exist would the DLP vote go to the Liberal Party? The ‘source’ considered that around one third of the DLP votes and no more would go to the Liberal Party. The balance, around two thirds, would be a swinging vote with a ‘distinct tendency to go to the ALP.

In 1970 Malcolm Mackerras did a study of the DLP preferences and their flow from the 1955 to the 1969 election (Mackerras 1970). Mackerras’ results have been updated to 1972 for the purposes of this thesis. He was particularly interested in the ballot paper position of the various candidates. It is important to realise that during the effective life of the DLP ballot paper positions were decided alphabetically by surname and not by draw from a hat which takes place today.

Mackerras in his study came up with a number of types of ballot papers:-

**Table 9: Mackerras model - Ballot Paper Types**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>DLP on top, followed by coalition with ALP in third place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>DLP on top, followed by the ALP with the coalition in third place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>DLP not on top and thus did not have the ‘donkey vote’ advantage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mackerras considered that type Z ballot papers give the truest distribution of DLP preferences as there is no ‘donkey vote’ to distort the preference flow. In allocation of type Mackerras disregards independent or micro party candidates above the DLP on the ballot paper, therefore a ballot paper with candidates in the order of Independent, independent, DLP, Liberal, Labor would be a ‘Type X’ ballot paper, notwithstanding the DLP is not at the top of the ballot paper.

He found that once ballot paper position was taken into account over a third of distributed DLP preferences from 1958 to 1969 leaked to the ALP in those cases where the DLP candidate was on top followed immediately by the ALP candidate. However, where the DLP topped the ballot paper and the coalition was second on the ballot paper with ALP third, Labor got only 11.1% of DLP preferences, however where the DLP came first and the ALP in second place, followed by the coalition, the leakage to Labor jumped to 36.3% on average.

In the state of Victoria, the DLP’s traditional power base, the leakage to Labor in seats where the DLP was on top followed by Labor was less - just under 30% and this is compatible, Mackerras believes with two different hypotheses either in Victorian there are DLP voters who believe more strongly in the official DLP ideology or there are special Victoria-based factors, possibly related to the origins of the split, the nature of the Victorian ALP, the local influence of sections of the Catholic Church and the presence of Mr BA Santamaria which account for these two hypotheses which are not mutually exclusive, it is not possible without a complex survey to say any more.

Mackerras (1970:2) went on to note that the DLP spokesmen usually claim to have delivered to the Coalition all seats in which the Coalition needed any DLP preferences at all for a win. Which was 19 seats in 1958, 22 in 1961 etc. However, in many cases, the Coalition candidate was close to an absolute majority and needed only a small proportion of DLP preferences. Mackerras considers this to be a very poor way of determining how many seats were affected by DLP preferences even if it sounded good in DLP propaganda.

Mackerras claims a better measure is those cases where a Labor candidate with a first preferences lead failed to win the seat as a result of the distribution of DLP preferences. That is the allocation of DLP preferences results in a change in leadership from ALP to Coalition and as a result the Coalition wins the seat at Labor’s expense.
Table 10: DLP Preferences Allocation Leading to a Reversal of Labor’s Primary Vote
Lead 1955-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 (by-elections)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strangely in preferencing the Liberal National Coalition, the DLP never seemed to demand anything in return except for a strong anti-communist defence policy. There was no demand for support for decentralisation or the indexation of social security payments, which were two other key aspects of DLP policy.

Cain (1995:8) soberly observed that:-

The astonishing thing was that the DLP demanded so little in return for what it was able to deliver; apart from a little patronage and assistance to non-government schools, the political price that the . . . (Liberal) governments paid was a small one indeed. The DLP is perhaps unique in Australia history in being there only for purely ideological reasons.

The Balance of Power in the Senate

The meaning and significance of the balance of power was discussed in chapter three of this thesis. This part of the chapter examines how the DLP excised the balance of power. This exercise of the balance of power in the Senate is significant because the DLP was the first party to be able to exercise this power.

Until 1964 the DLP did not hold the balance of power in the Senate. The best it could do was to negate a motion of the Senate from 1955 to 1958. It shared this role with an independent from 1961 to 1968, so the DLP with the support of the independent Senator could use its numbers to negate a motion moved in the Senate. The motion could be merely procedural or it
could be legislative. A tied vote in the Senate, for example 30 ayes and 30 noes, results in the motion being defeated.

From 1 July 1968 until its massive defeat at the 1974 double dissolution election, the DLP held the balance of power in the Senate. It improved its position further in late 1970 with the election of the Party’s fifth senator. Having five senators made the DLP an ‘official party’ whereby it got more resources and could institute debates on ‘matters of urgency’. Also by this stage it was represented on just about every Senate and joint committee.

Often the DLP supported the Coalition government in divisions in the Senate. There were times however when the DLP voted with the Opposition. For example, the 1970 States Receipts Duties Legislation and voting in this way, helped the DLP immensely to win Gair’s seat in the Senate elections that year.

As the DLP soon learnt, for a minor party to exercise the balance of power it had to have the support of one of the major parties. From time to time DLP Senators would propose amendments or measures and not get the support of either major party and the divisions lists in the Senate show the DLP Senators voting on one side (having four or five votes) and the Liberal and Labor parties voting on the other side (55 or so votes.)

An example was the DLP’s amendment to the Address in Reply in early 1970. In the Address in Reply debate both the ALP and the DLP proposed amendments to the government’s legislative agenda. The DLP moved an amendment first and the ALP followed a while later, both amendments were very similar. The ALP refused to support the DLP amendment because in their view a minor party such as the DLP had no right to instruct the government as to what should or shouldn’t be in its legislative program for the parliamentary session. The DLP in turn did not support the Labor amendment when it was voted upon, resulting in neither amendment succeeding in the Senate. This action showed the hatred between the ALP and the DLP was still very strong some 15 years after the Split.

Another example was the DLP proposal to appoint a royal commission into primary industry in Australia. This proposal, when debated, only gained the support of the DLP Senators. Labor and Coalition Senators all voted against the proposal.

After the Labor Party was voted into government in December 1972 with a majority of nine in the House of Representatives, the DLP still held the balance of power in the Senate, where the party line up was ALP 26, Liberal Party 21, Country Party 5, DLP 5 and Independents 3. Therefore, assuming the DLP voted with the Country Party and Liberals on a motion, the combined vote would 31, compared to a combined vote of 29 for the ALP and independents. Therefore, the Opposition could win divisions with a majority of two.
This situation could affect the government’s legislative agenda. Furthermore, this would be the state of affairs until 1 July 1974 – just over 18 months away. At that point in time a senate election would have taken place and the government’s situation may have improved.

However, as Jim Odgers (1991:44) notes ‘the Senate was soon to show its resolve and independence.’ It did this by defeating a number of pieces of legislation that were designed to enact key points of the Government’s 1972 policy speech. The Government claimed it had a mandate from the people, which Senators elected two or five years before that should have recognised and respected.

The end result was the Labor government was able to gain a double dissolution of both houses and the DLP senators all lost their seats. Thus, the DLP went from holding the balance of power to having no representative at all in the Parliament.

Just as with the allocation of second preferences, to the Liberal and National Parties coalition, the DLP never seemed to demand anything for using its balance of power to support legislation or other motions before the Senate. This is yet another example in what Cain (1995:8) noted as the DLP demanding ‘so little in return for what it was able to deliver’. This is very true in 1973 and early 1974 with the DLP and the Labor government. The DLP’s approach to the Labor government was defeat and not negotiation or compromise with the usage of the balance of power. This is particularly significant with regard to the balance of power and key items from the government’s policy speech.

The DLP used the balance of power as a ‘veto power’ and not as a tool of negotiation or compromise. Henderson (1975:78) has commented that:-

\[\text{The DLP seldom took the initiative in the Senate – especially after 1972 when Labor came to power. Indeed in 1973 and early 1974 the DLP’s position became blurred with that of the other opposition parties in the Senate.}\]

The DLP and its Lifespan

The lifespan of the DLP is shown in the following diagram and the DLP’s lifespan is far from bell shaped. The DLP had a gradual rise, up to the ‘relevance’ threshold from 1955 to June 1968. It remained above the ‘relevance’ threshold from July 1968 until May 1974 when it crashed back to the basic ‘authorisation’ threshold where it stayed until the party decided to disband in early 1978 where it crashed further to below the ‘declaration’ threshold to its demise.
A number of the DLP Senators had the advantage of being former members of parliament. Gair was a former Premier of Queensland, Little was a former member of the Victorian parliament and McManus was a former state secretary of the ALP. While Kane was a former ALP state organiser and Byrne was a former Queensland public servant, ALP Senator and ministerial adviser to Gair, Cole was a former ALP Senator.

Thus, a minor party with a leader and or candidates with a high public profile would increase to some degree, the probability of being elected. This would offset the cost of entry to parliament and the end result would be holding parliamentary office with possibly the balance of power in the upper house and or even allocating very decisive second preferences. These would be some very significant payoffs (Tavits 2006:102). The DLP was purely only a Senate based minor party.

In Conclusion

The DLP was a product of the Labor Split of 1955 and initially some experienced sitting members of parliament formed the basis of its representation. But these parliamentary assets were soon lost although the DLP managed to have six senators elected and in three cases re-elected. Looking back Howard (2014:186) noted that writing in 1979 Neville Wran bluntly said of the split:-

It is difficult to see that there was any inevitability about the split of 1955. . . . Splits may be inevitable and may even be necessary if deep and insoluble issues of principle arise, although skillful leadership should always strive to limit or avoid the final tragedy. But splits which involve no fundamental issue, but merely reflect an excess of factionalism, can never be condoned or justified.
From Wran’s advice ‘skillful leadership’ from Evatt the parliamentary leader, striving ‘to the limit or avoid the final tragedy’, was clearly lacking. By way of negotiation and compromise the split should have been avoided. The end result being a united Labor party with a real chance of being elected back into government. The split in the ALP had the result of many more years in opposition and talented Labor members such as Keon and McManus cast out of the party into the political wilderness.
Chapter Five: The Demise of the Democratic Labor Party

Introduction

This chapter discusses and analyses the reasons for the DLP’s demise from the federal political scene. The manifestation of the demise led to the total wipe out of the entire DLP parliamentary team at the May 1974 double dissolution election. In the previous month, one of the five DLP Senators had resigned in quite controversial circumstances. The former leader, Vince Gair accepted the Labor government’s offer of the ambassadorship to Ireland. The leadership change from Gair to McManus was poorly handled with embarrassing consequences for the party.

The DLP’s misguided electoral strategy which placed importance only on the Senate results was also a key factor in the party’s demise. The party’s true level of support was reflected in its House of Representatives vote which had steadily declined at each election. Many voters used the DLP vote in the Senate merely as a means of protest against the two major parties. This was very much the case in the 1967 and the 1970 Senate elections.

Although the proportional representation system of voting for the Australian Senate allowed the DLP to survive and grow in numbers and hold the balance of power in the Senate, the proportional representation voting system by itself, did not guarantee the DLP its continual existence. Arguably the DLP failed to stay relevant to the world of the late 1960s and 1970s. Much had changed since 1955, defence was no longer the major strategic and emotional issue that the DLP made and continued to make of it. Communism was not the big threat it once was and the attitude of the Catholic Church to communism had softened considerably. Members of the Catholic hierarchy, such as Mannix, who supported Santamaria, had died. As a result, BA Santamaria and his National Civic Council were voices crying in the wilderness, with little or no support from the Catholic Hierarchy.

The DLP senators, all of whom experienced the events of 1955, were getting much older and sounding like a time warp. Many young voters in Australia did not remember the events of 1955. The Australian Labor Party had reformed both at the federal level and a state level in Victoria. The party under Whitlam was starting to act like a united alternative government and not a divided opposition party. Furthermore, opposition to the Vietnam War was growing stronger by the early 1970s. This was evidenced by the strong following for the Jim Cairns inspired Vietnam ‘Moratorium’ demonstrations in 1970.
In addition, the DLP blamed the media for its declining relevance and lacklustre performance and by the late 1970s the Party had serious financial viability problems in an era before public funding of political parties.

This chapter considers these issues and their impact. The chapter concludes that the DLP’s decline and disappearance was not due to any one single factor but rather the combination of several reasons. The most important was a lack of relevance and appeal to younger voters. In the 1970s a lack of unity and leadership also became major reasons for the demise of the DLP.

**Party Identity and Image Rhetoric**

The party’s identity was problematic from the start. A fundamental issue from the early days of the party was the exact nature of its role and purpose. Was it a ‘third party’ in the Parliament to rival the major parties in terms of policy? Was the role of the DLP to be a ‘replacement’ Labor Party for the ALP? Some members of the DLP saw the party as a ‘temporary arrangement’ until the ALP reformed itself. The DLP members then could ‘re-join’ the ALP after that party ‘reformed’ itself by becoming more anti-communist. In that light, was the sole purpose of the DLP not so much parliamentary representation, but with the allocation of second preferences to the Coalition parties, the means to deny the Labor Party victory in the election and government?

As mentioned in the last chapter Santamaria had other ideas. His aim was to ‘takeover’ the ALP along with left wing unions and ‘transform the leadership’ and have the ALP ‘implement a Christian social program’ (Morgan 2007:75).

Murray (1973:71) posited the view that a weak Labor vote in Victoria (from 1955 to 1970) would be conducive to forcing reconciliation with the ALP; this was a possibility although a remote one. The 1972 election with strong Labor gains in Victoria eroded some of the DLP’s ‘muscle’ in being able to force some sort of reconciliation with the ALP.

Wertheim (1960:3) claimed when the DLP was first formed, some members of the party saw themselves as the true Labor Party, while others saw themselves as a third force in Australian politics. Yet a third group in the DLP were the members of the National Civic Council headed up by BA Santamaria who himself was not a member of the DLP.

From its inception, there was angst in the ranks of the DLP and indeed confusion regarding the role and influence of BA Santamaria. This angst and confusion impeded the DLP’s image as a political party in the eyes of the voters at elections. In voting for the DLP were they also voting for Santamaria and where exactly did he fit into the DLP? This concern was more problematic given Santamaria was not a member of the DLP. This situation led to conflict within the DLP.
Truman (1960:238) commented that ‘the DLP so fond of talking about the quarrels of the ALP is having its own internal dissentions’. The internal dissentions that Truman was referring to, were the conflicts between Santamaria and his National Civic Council (NCC) on one hand and the DLP on the other. In the words of McManus (1976) ‘Bob could never be a follower he had to lead.’ Peoples (2012:22ff) considered that Santamaria ‘was more interested in ideas than people. . . . His habit of acting was authoritarian.’

The conflict concerning the DLP-Santamaria relationship soon became openly public. As Crisp (1983:222) reported, matters came to a head at the party’s Victorian State Conference in 1960. At that conference, WM Bourke, former ALP Member for Fawkner, claimed:

The DLP is being branded as a Santamaria or a church party. Mr Santamaria is trying to get control of the DLP. It is everywhere, straddles our shoulders, stopping us from making progress. We should be completely independent and not be operated from behind the scenes.

Bourke was supported in that view by the high-profile S M Keon. For his troubles, Keon was stripped of his positions of delegate to the DLP Federal Conference and State Senior Vice President (Truman 1960:238).

At the 1960 Victorian State Conference of the DLP, the Melbourne University DLP Society put forward a ‘supplementary item’ seeking to ban Mr BA Santamaria’s National Civic Council. Truman (1960:239) reports that the DLP Society for its actions was expelled from the State conference after a ‘Moscow Trial’.

Declining Relevance

A decline in relevance was a principal cause of the demise of the DLP – being strongly anti-Communist and seeing Communism as a ‘perceived threat’ to Australia and defence being the major item of expenditure of government. The DLP failed to keep pace with a changing Australia and a changing world scene. In addition, the Vietnam War was becoming unpopular with enforced conscription at home and accounts of American atrocities. The unpopularity of the Vietnam War was shown in the strong support for the Cairns inspired Vietnam War ‘Moratorium’.

Lyons (2008:426) considered that the DLP’s overwhelming focus on foreign and defence policies played a large part in its failure as a political party – in early 1970s its strident anti-communism was incompatible with mainstream community opinion. He reported that ‘in fact back in 1963 the Liberal Peter Howson considered the DLP to be ‘an enigma’ and ‘it is probable that it will decline in significance.’

To compound its image problems, the DLP was strongly against the permissive society. The party’s policies were very much ‘thou shalt not’, to the point that the DLP presented as little
more than a very stern custodian of morals. The problem of a party preoccupied by moral concerns will be discussed later in this chapter; however, the fixation with public morality in a permissive society shows again just how out of touch with society the DLP had become.

In the Senate, the DLP Senators offered nothing new or exciting to mainstream Australia. This was particularly the case after 1972 to 1974 with the Labor government in power. Henderson (1975:79) considered that the DLP seldom took the initiative in the Senate especially after 1972, in 1973 and early 1974, the DLP’s position became blurred with that of other opposition parties in the Senate – in Henderson’s view that ‘blurring’ contributed to the party’s disastrous decision to push for a double dissolution.

In addition, Henderson (1975:80) argued that ‘by the end of 1973 it was evident that the DLP was in the process of becoming irrelevant in Victoria’, finding its members ‘preferred myths to realities.’ Victoria had been the party’s strongest State in terms of voter support. Henderson considered the party’s irrelevance was reflected in its falling voter support in the 1973 Victorian State election. However, according to Henderson, the DLP considered its fall in support in Victoria was due to lack of ‘voter sophistication’ and ‘voter misunderstanding’.

In considering the DLP in WA Hal Colebatch (1972:174) considered the 1970 Senate campaign in WA in which the DLP polled poorly. In WA, it polled 5.6% of the WA vote which was about half of the party’s national average. In Colebatch’s view a major reason for this was the DLP’s poor choice of a campaign issue, opposition to the liberalisation of abortion. The DLP campaigned on this issue very strongly, which in Colebatch’s view turned away potential young non-Catholic voters who the DLP would have had to attract, in order to survive. In any case the campaign ‘would have won the DLP no votes it would not have had anyway’ (1972:175).

The Evaporating Threat of Communism

In his PhD thesis, Stevenson (2007:451) observed that in the mid-1950s, Communism appeared monolithic on all fronts, but in spite of the fragmentation of Communism, both domestically and internationally, the DLP had not updated its viewpoint and was still calling for the need for strong defence against the Communist threat, even after the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s and the palpable easing of tensions after Nixon’s visits to China and Russia.

Stevenson goes on to observe that the fragmentation of the Communist Party of Australia into three factions coupled with its miniscule support at the polls (after 1955 the Communist party never scored more than one per cent at a Federal election again), did not lead to an easing up of the anti-Communist rhetoric either. Communist influence in Australian unions was also declining and more white collar unions who were apolitical were coming on the scene.
The Vietnam War - a Divisive War

The threat of Communism also lead to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War from 1962 to 1972, which the DLP eagerly supported. As well as the fear of Communism with ‘perceived threats’ to Australia, the West’s attitude to Asia, was premised on ‘The Domino Theory’. The ‘Domino Theory’ considered that a communist victory in one nation would quickly lead to a chain reaction of communist takeovers in neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia such as Laos, Cambodia and Thailand and quite possibly other countries in the region India, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and even Australia and New Zealand. Significantly when South Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese forces in 1975, ‘The Domino Theory’ failed to materialise.

Many Catholic bishops and NCC leaders eagerly subscribed to the domino theory and supported Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. However, Australia’s involvement in Vietnam was increasingly not supported by the Australian Labor Party.

The last chapter on the rise of the DLP described the Catholic Hierarchy and the divisions within it regarding Santamaria and the DLP. The Vietnam War was to see the Catholic laity divided on Australia’s involvement in Vietnam. While a number of Catholics particularly in the DLP’s power base (the State of Victoria), supported the DLP and Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, as a solution to the threat of Communism, The Catholic Worker and those Catholics who supported it, strongly opposed Australia’s involvement in Vietnam. From the mid-1960s, Catholic opposition to the Vietnam War started to build up through various factors. In October 1965, Pope Paul VI in a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations took as his theme ‘no more war never again.’ In September 1966, the Pope in his Encyclical ‘Christi Matri Rosarii’ (the Rosary of the Mother of Christ) spoke of his concern regarding the Vietnam War and the possibility of atomic conflict.

Protestant churches had been turning against the Vietnam War for some time before the Pope’s statement. As a response to the Pope’s encyclical, the Catholic peace group Pax was formed in 1966 after an advertisement was placed in The Advocate the weekly Catholic newspaper in Melbourne. The advertisement carried the endorsement of some of Victoria’s leading Catholic laymen for example, Max Charlesworth, Owen Potter and Niall Brennan.

Pax was described as an association of Catholics pledged to the quest for peace, with justice and freedom for the whole family. Pax was anti-nuclear weapons and anti-violence and worked for international and internal understanding and for the development of a true community of nations. Significantly, the fact that Pax was anti-nuclear meant that no member of the DLP could join Pax because the DLP was in favour of the usage of nuclear weapons.
The last chapter discussed the divided Catholic hierarchy, but with the formation of Pax a pronounced anti-DLP feeling spread from a divided Catholic Hierarchy to the DLP’s core constituency the Priests and the Catholic laity.

Russians in the Indian Ocean

On 14 August 1969, the then Minister for External Affairs Gordon Freeth MP presented a ministerial statement ‘The Soviet Union in Asia’, Freeth (1969:311-12) said:-

During the past year or so, there has been increasing interest and activity by the Soviet Union in the Asian region. Examples are the movements of ships of the USSR Navy in the Indian Ocean.

Freeth then went on to tell the Parliament, that in the view of Russia, events are putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.

Freeth then told the Parliament:-

Australia has to be watchful, but need not panic whenever a Russian appears. It has to avoid both facile gullibility and automatic rejection of opportunities for cooperation.

Freeth went on to advise:-

The Australian government at all times welcomes the opportunity of practical and constructive dealings with the Soviet Union. . . In principle, it is natural that a world power such as the Soviet Union should seek to promote a presence and a natural influence in important regions of the world such as the Indian Ocean area.

Significantly it later transpired that Freeth’s statement was prepared for him by officers of his department but it was not cleared through the Cabinet. Freeth himself had cleared the statement and then sought and received approval from the Prime Minister Gorton.

In 1969 Freeth’s own department in a question time briefing note advised that Russia had ‘maintained a virtually constant presence in the Indian Ocean over the last eighteen months.’ Furthermore, Russian presence in the Indian Ocean was no more than ‘the normal exercise by a maritime power of the freedom of the high seas.’ In other words, the Russian presence did not involve trespass into any country’s (including Australia’s) territorial waters.

For the strongly anti-Communist DLP the Freeth statement was a red rag to a bull. The DLP accused the government of maintaining ‘a soft line on Russia’ (Farran 1972:51). The DLP used the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean merely as a fear tactic to exaggerate the importance of defence and foreign affairs issues in the lead up to the 1969 election.

Marr (1978:26) reported that Gorton stated that he:-

Had Freeth float the idea that Australia should not get all tangled up in a knot because the Russians have got a ship in the Indian Ocean. . . This idea caused enormous dramas and the DLP turned against us.
Andrew Farran (1972:46) considered Freeth’s Indian Ocean announcement was a ‘short lived attempt’ at presenting foreign policy issues ‘frankly and objectively’. Farran posits that the DLP performed ‘incredible feats of political bluff’ with ‘a lack of political maturity.’ Farran, on secondment from the Department of Foreign Affairs, was Freeth’s private Secretary in 1969.

It was a popular misconception among some DLP supporters that the DLP refused to second preference Freeth in the 1969 elections because of his attitude to the Russians in the Indian Ocean. Freeth lost his seat at that election. The results are shown below.

**Table 5.1 House of representative Election 1969 – Electorate of Forrest WA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freeth (Lib)</td>
<td>19,955</td>
<td>42.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirwin (ALP)</td>
<td>22,149</td>
<td>47.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery (AP)</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan (DLP)</td>
<td>3,332</td>
<td>7.15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the primary vote, Kirwin (ALP) had a large swing to him or over 6,000 votes and the DLP candidate had a loss of support of over 800 votes.

**Second Count**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freeth (Lib)</td>
<td>20,255</td>
<td>43.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirwin (ALP)</td>
<td>22,542</td>
<td>48.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan (DLP)</td>
<td>3,745</td>
<td>8.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Australia Party candidate has been eliminated and his preferences distributed.

**Third Count (final)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freeth (Lib)</td>
<td>22,744</td>
<td>48.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirwin (ALP)</td>
<td>23,798</td>
<td>51.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the DLP candidate was eliminated 2,489 preferences went to Freeth and 1,256 to the ALP candidate. This indicates preferences were directed by the DLP to Freeth notwithstanding the issue of the Russians in the Indian Ocean. However, at the same time there was a significant leakage of DLP preferences to the ALP candidate.

Marr (1978:24) reported that Gorton in speaking of the DLP some years later, commented that if the Coalition government withdrew Australian troops completely from Vietnam in 1970, ‘when in retrospect it probably was time to do so, the DLP would have turned handsprings.’
Gorton then went on to comment that ‘all the DLP cared about was defence, defence, defence . . . they would have gone on until they had the whole population in khaki.’

A Catholic Party?

At the DLP Victorian State conference of 1960, Stan Keon, the former ALP member for Yarra, claimed that:-

The DLP cannot win an election because many Australians regard it as a Catholic Party. Mr Santamaria’s attempts to gain control of the DLP are responsible for that label being attached to the DLP. Mr Santamaria has no right to usurp the role of spokesman for the DLP as he has often done in Television interviews nor to attempt to use his supporters to turn the DLP into a specifically Catholic party for which there is no place in Australia (Crisp 1983:222-3).

Allen (1985) has argued that Jack Little the ALP parliamentarian who joined the DLP, was preferred as a DLP candidate because he was not a Catholic. The DLP was popularly regarded as a Catholic party, and a non-Catholic candidate had electoral attractions.

The Catholic issue was raised by Skinner the retiring Victoria State President of the DLP in 1969. Speaking at the Annual State Conference, Skinner commented:-

The image of the DLP depicted by our adversaries and by the grace and favour of the press, is a sectarian one. But there is a great deal of difference between a Catholic party and a party which includes many Catholics in its ranks – a difference quite discernible to those who examine, but indiscernible to those who do not wish to see. (DLP Vic 1969:4)

However, the vast majority of DLP candidates were members of the Catholic Church and DLP policies were in very close sympathy with the Catholic Church and its teachings. For example, the DLP was very anti-communist and very anti-permissive with regard to the ‘permissive society’ of the 1970s.

Calwell (1972:146) commented that ‘the Catholic church in Australia thanks to the activities of the Movement, has had its theology perverted by the National Civic Council and the DLP.’ However, a more accurate description would be that the policies of the DLP were influenced by the teachings of the Catholic Church. What Calwell would appear to mean is that the Catholic Church after the rise of the DLP and the NCC operated more politically. In fact, Calwell goes on to complain about the number of ‘political sermons’ delivered by Catholic Priests of Melbourne in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In a similar vein, Colebatch (1972:174) spoke of ‘clerical fascism’.

A Moralistic Party Motivated by Hate and Revenge

The DLP was quite vocal as a party in its opposition to abortion, divorce and euthanasia along with its vocal support for very strong censorship laws. The DLP ‘was an almost explicitly
Christian party in a post Christian nation, a very largely Catholic party incapable of accepting the implications of Vatican Two’ (Mackerras 1973:85).

A moralistic approach to policy formulation was another cause of the fall of the DLP. For example, in the 1972 election it campaigned on morals and a range of ‘anti’ issues (anti-pornography, anti-permissiveness, and anti-abortion).

The DLP could have campaigned on other issues in its platform. It could have campaigned strongly on decentralisation, industry policies, support for farmers and trade unions, but these policies were ignored. Ignoring these other policies was a poor decision in the DLP’s election campaign planning.

Being seen as a hate or revenge party was another cause of the fall of the DLP. The DLP was absolutely consumed by its hatred of the ALP, in fact its raison d'être was keeping its former colleagues, the ALP out of office. In other words, it was a ‘nark party’. For the DLP winning seats in the Senate and holding the balance of power wasn’t what really mattered (Kane 1980:2:1/61.)

A Lack of Finance

During the life of the DLP, public funding to political parties based on their performance at elections was not available. Therefore, all political parties running election campaigns and maintaining state and federal offices had some very big expenses to cover, including rent and advertising.

McManus (1976:192) highlighted the DLP’s ‘inability to finance necessary staff and organisation, particularly in the smaller states.’ The lack of finance question was also taken up by Clarke (1971:79). He considered the financial difficulties of the DLP in Western Australia. The question of finance and a political party is always a sensitive issue and Clarke admitted his analysis was ‘sketchy though broadly correct’. Clarke considered the DLP’s attempts at fund raising, such as raffles and art unions. He believed that the DLP was assisted by different business groups. They saw in the DLP a party which could assist in the defeat of the ALP. In fact, the DLP found ‘big business to be most generous.’ He also considered that the combination of the various sources of revenue brought the DLP in WA just enough money to survive on. (P83)

In the State of Victoria, the DLP’s best state in terms of support, finance was also a problem. In 1969 the Victorian State Secretary, Frank Dowling, (1969: 10/1969) advised all branches that ‘the executive is still carrying past debts and we are approaching a period of elections which will test our finance raising ability to the limit.’ The elections that Dowling was referring to
were the 1969 House of Representatives election, the 1970 Victorian State election and the 1970 Senate election.

On 6 November 1969 Dowling reported to the branches that ‘although our central campaign was kept to a minimum on this occasion (the 1969 Federal election) rising costs made it quite expensive’, Dowling then followed with an appeal to branches to ‘forward any available money to assist in reducing our large Federal election accounts’. He went on to note:-

> We are required to pay a substantial number of debts incurred in the October election before the end of the year.

For a number of years in Victoria the DLP raised much of its finance from an annual ‘silver circle’. This activity was given wide publicity among DLP members and supporters. In 1971 the DLP in Victoria also ran a ‘phone-a-thon’ in an attempt to raise a target of $56,000. This was necessary because income from the silver circle, which was known as ‘the DLP Gift’, was down by some $17,000 (DLP Vic 1971:2). The method of the ‘phone-a-thon’ was that over a two-month period DLP supporters would contribute a fixed amount to the Party. A ‘six-star sponsor’ would give between $500 and $1,000 a month, while a ‘one star sponsor’ would contribute between $10 and $20 a month, with varying amounts and corresponding ‘stars’ in between for the sponsors. In its first circular for 1972, dated 21 February (DLP Vic 1972B) the DLP advised that the ‘phone-a-thon’ had been a success with $54,319 promised or pledged and ‘just under $50,000 actually received’ from 200 committee members and 1,600 sponsors (DLP Vic 1972B:2).

The financial position of the DLP would undoubtedly have been very different, if the modern public funding of political parties was available during the lifespan of the DLP. While the DLP never made the exact amount of its debt public at any one time, as shown above, the party did have significant debt to pay off and continually appealed and looked for novel pays to pay off this debt.

**Media Coverage and the Lack of It**

The DLP itself blamed the hostile press for its decline. For example, in his interview with the National Library of Australia, McManus was quite scathing of the press. He commented that after 1970 the DLP:-

> got a very poor deal from the press and the media . . . we had become a danger to the established parties. I haven’t got any doubt at all that this freeze was due to the fact that we had done so well and they started to become scared of us.

But it was not just McManus who was critical of the press. Other former DLP members were also highly critical of the press (Curtis, Rigg, Launder and Evans (2010) also expressed strong
criticism of the press. In the final issue of its journal, *The Democrat*, the DLP in Victoria devoted quite a bit of space to the press ignoring the DLP (Brosnan 1978:3).

In their defence, the press raised the issue of relevance and fresh ideas and not the same old story (McCallum 1973). The DLP in its later years did not change with the times, showing irrelevancy in many of its policies along with a sense of priorities that no one else seemed to share. This detracted from the Party’s newsworthiness.

In retrospect, it is surprising that in its parliamentary lifetime, spanning the 1950s, to 1970s, that the DLP did not employ qualified journalists who had been members of the parliamentary press gallery as press secretaries. It could be argued that the DLP did not make any attempt to understand the press and its requirements. As McCallum indicated, the press are simply not interested in being served up the same old rhetoric.

Allen (1988:32) suggested that the press applied an almost complete censorship to the DLP after 1972 thus reducing the DLP’s vote.

**The DLP’s Electoral Performance Federally**

With the DLP’s electoral performance, there was a continual difference between the party’s results in the Senate which were higher than the results for the party in House of Representatives elections. A possible reason for this is voters voted DLP in the Senate because the party had a strong chance of getting a candidate elected, whereas there was no such chance in the House elections. A further reason was that voters voted DLP in the Senate elections as a protest against the particular major party they normally voted for. Governments are formed in the House of Representatives and not the Senate, thus a voter could vote against a major party in the Senate as a protest, without denying the party government in the House.

The following table shows the DLP’s performance in Federal Senate and House of Representatives elections from 1955 to 1975.

**Table 11: The DLP Vote in Federal Elections 1955 – 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>House of Reps</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Senate Vote</td>
<td>House of Reps Vote</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was no noticeable decline in the DLP Senate vote until after 1972 and the election of the Labor government. Arguably its true level of support was in its House of Representatives vote which had steadily declined over the years. By contrast, the party highlighted its vote in the Senate elections which had risen, particularly in 1967 and again in 1970 as voters protested against the two major parties. The DLP ignored its results in the House of Reps which was in steady decline and which gave a more accurate picture of its real support. The DLP considered that the electorate had put its trust in the DLP senators and would continue to do so (Henderson 1975).

An example of the trust placed in the electoral appeal of DLP senators was included in a memorandum dated 2 February 1971 in which the DLP in Victoria enthusiastically told its supporters that:

- There exists in the community now a splendid climate of goodwill towards the DLP.
- The re-election of Frank McManus last November was ensured by the support of more than 300,000 Victorians. One adult in every five not only voted DLP on this occasion but voted DLP with enthusiasm. Some prominent personalities were publicly saying with pride in the days following the election that they also ‘Voted Mac Back’ (DLP Vic 1971:1)

However, what the DLP failed to recognise in that comment, was that a significant proportion of the 300,000 votes would have been protest votes against the major parties, other votes would have been from swinging voters, and others would be strategic voters who supported the DLP in the Senate where there was a strong chance of a candidate being elected, but not in the House of Representatives where there seemed to be no such chance. The reader is not told who the ‘prominent personalities’ are, or how it could be ascertained that voters voted ‘DLP with enthusiasm’.

There was also the very sharp falling away of electoral support at the respective party’s parliamentary demise. For example, with the DLP the very steady decline in support in the House of Representatives vote from 1958 to 1966 is quite evident, as is the very sharp decline in support from 1966 to 1975, the House vote falling from 6 per cent to 1.3 per cent, this decline is oblivious to swings for and against each of the major parties, clearly the DLP was never a beneficiary of these swings. It is also significant that the DLP very rarely won representation in the State parliaments.
The DLP never fully appreciated the serious problem that it polled much higher in the Senate than in the House of Representatives. The DLP tended to regard the Senate vote as the true indicator of its support in the electorate – the House of Representatives vote represented its hard-core support base and this had been steadily declining since 1958 especially in Victoria.

Speaking on the 3KZ Labor Hour on 25 October 1970, Whitlam saw the 1970 Senate election as providing

an unequalled opportunity of displacing the DLP candidate McManus. The consequences of such a success would be far reaching indeed. Nothing would do more to return Australia to a two party democracy and to end the distortions of democracy which have occurred as a result of the interventions of a third party.

In the Senate election, the DLP peaked at 11.1 per cent in 1970, following a result of 6 per cent in the 1969 House of Representatives election. The vote for the DLP then fell to 5.3 per cent in the 1972 House of Representatives elections, falling further to 3.6 per cent in 1974. Significantly, in 1974 and 1975 in respect of the House of Representatives the DLP only stood in Victoria, with a vote of 5.2% and 4.9% respectively.

Newton (1970:272) considered the DLP to be a major force after the 1970 Senate election and not part of a transitory stage. Newton went on to claim that the DLP’s national vote of 11.4 per cent was not far short of doubling its showing of 1955 when it first contested an election. Newton went on to claim that the DLP ‘must now be rated as a major political force.’ For Newton, the election of McManus on a straight quota after Senator Jack Little was also elected on a straight quota in 1967 was a very significant factor.

In the 1967 and in the 1970 Senate elections, the DLP attracted votes because of the unpopularity of both major parties. The 1967 and 1970 results were fortuitous and should have been viewed in that light by the party leadership. In 1967, the Holt government was unpopular, with Holt’s leadership seen as the main reason. In 1970, the Gorton government was unpopular as was the ALP. In protest many voters voted for the DLP. In Victoria in the seat of Murray, the DLP actually outvoted the Coalition. However, this result did not flow through to the Murray by-election which was held early the next year.

Donovan (2000:478) comments that when the size of the Federal Parliament increases or when there is a double dissolution, the quota for election to the Senate becomes lower. However, that did not help the DLP in the 1974 double dissolution election where the party lost all its seats in the Senate despite the lower quotas. A smaller quota by itself does not cause a minor party to win seats in the Senate. The minor party still needs a platform and supporters of a doctrine or protesters against a major policy or an aggrieved minority. As Donovan notes (2000:478) minor parties have to respond strategically to the incentives created by institutional forces that affect quotas.
In other words, the quota as opposed to an absolute majority is merely an added incentive for a minor party to contest the election. A minor party such as the DLP still has to present creditable candidates and policies in order to fight an election and win seats in the parliament.

**Allocation of Second Preferences as a Blocking Tactic**

The DLP preferred the Coalition at all times even if the candidate was a ‘trendy Liberal’ (a group of Liberals who were opposed to most of the DLP policies on censorship and similar social issues). The DLP would never preference a Labor candidate even if he or she had strong family values, was anti-abortion and supported a strong defence force. The DLP preferences were very decisive in close electorates; a significant number of marginal seats were won by the Liberal Party with DLP second preferences.

This allowed the Coalition to take DLP preferences pretty much for granted - the usage of second preferences is a very powerful weapon for a minor party especially a party such as the DLP that does not have parliamentary representation in the lower single member chamber. Poor usage of the very powerful second preference vote allocation also led to the DLP’s demise. (Kane 1987)

A DLP press release of 17 November 1972 (DLP Vic 1972D) proudly announced for the forthcoming election, ‘the allocation of DLP preferences in Victoria will follow the same pattern as in previous elections for the past 17 years. All sitting Liberal and Country Party MPs . . . will receive DLP preferences as usual.’ Maintaining the idea of hate or revenge for the ALP the press release went on to state that, ‘the DLP is more determined than ever that ALP candidates should receive no help from DLP preferences because a wide range of ALP policies are dangerous and even more unacceptable than in the past.’

This was in spite the Victoria DLP sending a letter dated 6 November 1972 to all candidates and campaign secretaries advising that preferences will be discussed by the Party’s Central Executive at its next meeting on 10 November. The letter went on to request any views as to the allocation of preferences. The second preferences decision however appeared to be a foregone conclusion (DLP Vic 1972C).

**Table 12: The Power of DLP Federal Preferences 1955-1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Election</th>
<th>Seats where some or all preferences Distributed</th>
<th>Seats Won after DLP Preferences Distributed</th>
<th>Seats where First preferences lead reversed by distribution of preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Won by Coalition</td>
<td>Won by Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4 (4 Vic)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Second Preferences</td>
<td>Liberal Country Party</td>
<td>ALP Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8 (4 Vic, 1 Qld, 3 WA*)</td>
<td>7 (3 Vic, 2 NSW, 1 QLD, 1 WA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8 (2 Vic, 1 NSW, 2 QLD, 2 WA**, 1 Tas)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5 (2 Vic, 1 NSW, 2 QLD)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12 (3 Vic, 3 NSW, 3 QLD, 2 WA, 1 Tas)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9 (6 Vic, 1 NSW, 2 QLD)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1 (1 Vic)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 1977 the Australian Democrats contested the election for the first time and their second preferences helped elected a number of candidates. The second preferences of the Australian Democrats will be considered as part of the discussion on that party. In that election, the DLP only contested seats in Victoria.

Table 14 shows the power of DLP second preferences. The Liberal Country Party coalition won the close 1961 and 1969 elections with small majorities thanks to DLP preferences. In the 1972 elections, the ALP majority would have been greater if the DLP second preferences were not a decisive factor in the 23 electorates won by the coalition in that election.


‘Out of touch’ DLP Senators were perceived as old male ‘fuddie duddies’

At the later stages of the DLP’s life, DLP Senators were often referred to as a group of old ‘fuddie duddies’ because of their respective ages. The following table shows the ages of the DLP senators over selected years. All of these senators were actively involved in the split of the ALP in 1955.

Table 13: DLP Senators Age at specific years of DLP’s life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senator</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Age 1955</th>
<th>Age 1964</th>
<th>Age 1970</th>
<th>Age 1973</th>
<th>Age 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gair</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McManus</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cole</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kane</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrne</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note Cole lost his seat in 1964 and died in 1969 at the age of 61.

Table 15 shows in the first part, the age of the DLP Senators in 1955, the year of the Split and in 1964, the election of Gair and McManus. In this part of the table the ages of the Senators looks quite respectable, in 1955 they were all under 55, Little being 41 and in 1964 they were all under 65, with Little and Byrne in their early 50s.

In the second part, the table shows the ages of the DLP senators in 1970 which was the election of Kane and the Party’s best Senate result. The table then shows the ages of the DLP Senators in 1973 when McManus replaced Gair as leader of the party and finally the table shows the ages of the Senators in 1974 when the Party was wiped out in the double dissolution election. At this point in time the DLP Senators were showing their age, in 1970 Gair was still leading the party and running for the Senate at the age of 69.

As a group, the DLP Senators and senior party officials could be seen as ‘out of touch’ old men – grand dads in grey suits and this presented an image problem for the DLP. The party was not seen as a party for young people.

An example of how far ‘out of touch’ from the younger generation was the party’s continual attack on university students. The impression from these attacks was that university students were a group of left wing radicals who spent their entire time involved in violent demonstrations. The state president of the DLP (Victoria) in his opening speech to the state conference advised delegates that the ‘university battle as a whole is not over yet’ (DLP Vic 1972A:2). He went on to advise the delegates, that in universities:

A bunch of spoilt kids, who have never known deprivation or want are seeking to enjoy the new thrill of imitation poverty, by copying each other’s uniform outfits of tattered jeans and bare feet, which are supposed to distinguish and set them apart from the law-abiding ‘squares’ who support them.

For good measure, he added;

And it becomes sickening in the extreme, when these tertiary delinquents are urged on and encouraged by some middle-class academics, who themselves have always been cradled in the security and comfort they now profess to despise (DLP Vic 1972A:3).

This outburst was made in August 1972 notwithstanding that not quite four months later, a Federal election was to be held in December. A number of those ‘tertiary delinquents’ being over 21 would have been enrolled to vote, as would have been the ‘middle class academics’.

The rather emotive outburst ignores the fact that the majority of students would even back then have been at university to gain qualifications and graduate. It is difficult to see how the dress standards of those students would have added any value to the debate. This shows the inability of the DLP to relate to young people, many of whom would not have remembered the ALP split of 1955 and the fear of Communism that then prevailed.
As Gerard Henderson observed:

Age also played its toll – the Senators aged as did the voters. The Party could not inspire any significant support among the young (Henderson 1975:88).

If the best the DLP could do was to refer to young people as ‘tertiary delinquents’ and ‘spoilt kids’ it is not surprising that young people did not take to the DLP.

This ‘agedness’ of the DLP senators also had an impact on the Party’s leadership and electoral prospects. These issues will be discussed next.

**Leadership and Failed Leadership**

In his PhD thesis on Gair, Stevenson (2007:452ff) identified poor leadership as a cause of the DLP decline and demise. He assessed that after the 1970 Senate election that, ‘Gair was starting to show evidence of his age, he was a very poor performer on Television, he could not handle the probing style of interview that was a feature of current affairs programs such as Monday Conference’. In short Gair was a poor leader, who was a liability for the party that he led.

Gair was a heavy drinker and a ruffian who got into fights. For example, in May 1972 in the Senate Gair provoked the Labor Senator Doug McClelland into an ugly confrontation in the Senate (Senate CPD 1972: 9 May:1453-1454). Gair was not a modern cleanskin politician being very much a person and politician of a previous era.

Significantly Gair was considered by the DLP rank and file as a very poor platform speaker on the hustings and a poor performer on Television, Gair was an old man with relational problems. For example McCallum (1973:1:2/44) commented that ‘Ansett planes . . . as the result of continued complaints by air hostesses . . . got instructions never to seat Gair in an aisle seat because he continually goosed and groped etc, the air hostesses.’

Stevenson (2007:499) reported that a very senior ALP figure who knew Gair well from the 1950s onwards observed that ‘Gair’s cavalier behavior towards young women dated back to his days in the Premier’s chair.’ Such an attitude towards women is hypocritical of the leader of a party that quite publicly adopts the high moral ground.

However, the replacement of Gair as parliamentary leader by McManus in 1973 after a drawn out struggle to get his resignation caused much controversy. Gair had first mentioned his resignation in January 1973 (McManus 1977:94). However, Gair continually delayed his resignation which had the effect of building up speculation in the ranks of the Labor Senators and in the press regarding Gair’s impending resignation. Such speculation had a destabilising effect on the parliamentary DLP.
Gair expected his Queensland counterpart, the younger and very capable Condon Byrne to be elected as the new leader of the DLP. Byrne was a very skilled orator and debater, he commanded respect. Nevertheless McManus, who was a mere four years younger than Gair, was elected leader. Gair immediately saw the leadership exercise not as a chance to give the DLP a younger leader, but merely to transfer the leadership to McManus. Byrne ‘the gentleman barrister’ declined to run for the leadership allowing McManus to win the leadership unopposed.

Byrne’s concern was that although he had Gair and Kane’s support, as well as his own, the two Victorians Little and McManus would split the party if McManus was not elected leader, Rank and file members of the DLP in Victoria considered themselves to be the DLP and for them it was only proper that their man be the leader of the DLP. (Henderson 1975:82)

Gair took the loss of the leadership of his party badly. McManus (1976:96) commented Gair ‘did everything he possibly could to make things unpleasant and difficult for everybody.’ ‘He (Gair) was continually complaining that he had been treated with gross treachery.’ Gair procrastinated over the change in leadership; it became a long drawn out affair from the start of 1973 until late that year. However, the balance of the blame belongs to the remaining Senators who instead of electing a younger more vibrant and dynamic Senator Byrne, elected a Senator who in the eyes of the electorate was a mere Gair facsimile (namely old and of a bygone era and lacking in relevance.)

When McManus took over as leader he also had the disadvantage of having a fear of flying, travelling by train where ever possible. Kane (1989:218) testifies to McManus’ fear of flying and in fact hatred of air travel. Kane went on to note that ‘this left him out of touch for a long period at a time when party leaders had to be quick to respond to developing situations.’

The DLP Senators had no succession plan as to who was going to replace them, when they retired from the Senate for even unexpected reasons such as sudden illness or even death in office.

**Chronic Loss of Appeal - The 1972 Election**

The election of the Whitlam government in Dec 1972 effectively destabilised the DLP as a party. In that election, the DLP failed to keep the ALP out of government which was one of its key aims.

Murray (1973:72) commented that in the lead up to the 1972 Federal election, the DLP had three distinct choices to decide from. These choices were:-

- Say that the ALP was still not ‘safe’ enough to govern because of left wing influence;
• Emphasise its own ‘positive’ policies on issues, for example, decentralisation or family assistance

• Campaign on a sensational, attention getting new issue

In the 1972 Federal election, the DLP chose the third option. It switched its main campaign issue from the threat of communism to the permissive society (Stevenson 2007:128)

Murray (1973:71) reports that ‘there had been a general turning away in the past year from the party even among its own young members, let alone supporters. In fact, many said they would be voting for, even joining, the ALP. In Murray’s view the DLP seemed to consider that a love of prohibition was seen as the solution to problems. Yet another group alienated by the change in campaign issues were non-Catholics and lapsed Catholics who had supported the DLP for its defence policies or its stand against the communists or indeed its opposition to the pre-1970 Victorian ALP. The sudden change in policy and raison d’etre would have appeared to have turned many of these voters from the DLP.

Another group would be, in Murray’s view, the swinging voters looking for a means to protest against the ALP or the Liberal Party. Once the DLP ‘became the party of fierce, hard line Catholic morality’ their support dwindled. In the past polling had shown this Liberal Party protest group was a significant source of support for the DLP.

Amalgamation a strategy of survival for a declining party?

In early 1973, the DLP outside Victoria seriously considered amalgamation with the Country Party as a means of survival.

The DLP started to realise that it was running into serious difficulties and attempts were made to come up with solutions. One proposed solution was a merger or an alliance with the CP. The DLP saw this as link up with two parties with similar problems. Kane (1989:184) stated that:

Two weeks after Whitlam’s election victory, I began talks with Doug Anthony the Country Party’s federal parliamentary leader. Queensland Senators . . . were enthusiastic. At the end of January 1973 the DLP federal executive unanimously endorsed the principle of a DLP-Country Party merger.

However, in the midst of negotiations the Bulletin, a weekly magazine, leaked the story which made negotiations much more difficult. Some Country Party members saw the proposal as a chance to urbanise the party. Kane (1989:184) observed that the DLP in Victoria opposed the whole idea. After the DLP’s poor showing in the 1973 Victorian state election the idea died because the DLP had too few votes to offer the Country Party overall (Henderson 1975:80-81).

This merger exercise indicated that the DLP had no structure in order to make an effective decision on the merger proposal. The DLP was a federal party, one in which the state branches
were autonomous in theory and in practice. The extra parliamentary organisation had no formal powers over the parliamentarians (the five senators) thus the senators ran the party at both federal level and at the respective state levels (Vic, Qld and NSW). On the amalgamation with the CP the Victorians who opposed the whole idea simply refused to play ball.

Henderson saw a problem with the DLP’s decision making structure at the federal level, and he quoted the issue of the proposed merger between the DLP and the CP as an example. In fact, Henderson posits another view for the DLP’s demise. He claims that through its history – and especially in recent years – there has been considerable interstate rivalry and personal animosity within the party. He claims that very few of the political journalists were aware of this ill feeling. However, he offers no proof or examples of this ill feeling or interstate rivalry.

This attempted amalgamation exercise showed that a powerful state can pose a major threat to the decision making of the federal council of the party. The DLP’s very powerful Victorian State Council was strongly opposed to such a merger, while the NSW and QLD State Councils were all for a merger. The proposal was never put to a vote of the Federal council of the DLP because it was feared that a merger could split the Party, with the two Victorian Senators splitting from the two Senators from Queensland along with the one from New South Wales.

**The Final Scandal - The Gair affair**

The replacement of Gair as leader by McManus in 1973, lead to the Gair Affair in April of the next year. The Whitlam government realised that if Gair could be persuaded to resign, the ALP would very probably win his Senate seat at the next Senate elections. The bait the ALP Government dangled in front of Gair to get rid of him was the Ambassadorship to Ireland and Gair eagerly accepted. Gair’s Senate term was due to expire on 30 June 1977 which was three years away. However, if the Labor government could persuade Gair to resign at the time of the 1974 half Senate election, his seat would be vacant thus Queensland would have six Senate vacancies and not five. The Labor Party considered it could win three and the Liberal Country Party coalition the other three.

The offer of the appointment as Australia’s Ambassador to Ireland would have been a great temptation for Gair to accept and take up. He was a devout Roman Catholic and he had recently lost the leadership of his party in circumstances not of his liking.

However, two train of events gave the Gair Affair a sense of notoriety and publicity. These factors were the quick actions of the Queensland Country Party Premier Joh Bjelke Peterson and the actions of Gair himself.
Bjelke Peterson was advised by his fellow party members in the Senate very early on that Gair would be resigning. Bjelke Peterson reacted immediately by issuing writs for a Senate election for five vacancies only and not six on 2 April 1974. At the time of the issue of writs, neither the Premier nor the Governor of Queensland had been formally advised by the Prime Minister, or the Senate President of the vacancy caused by Gair’s resignation. This would mean that the DLP nomination for Gair’s replacement would sit in the Senate filling the casual vacancy until the next Senate election three years away.

Dr Peter Wilenski one of Whitlam’s senior advisers wrote to the Secretary of the Attorney General’s department regarding the issue of writs for the Senate election. Clarrie Harders the Secretary of the Department, responded on 18 March 1974 advising that under section 12 of the Australian Constitution, the power to issue writs for Senate elections rests with the Governor of the State in question and not the Governor-General.

The second issue was equally significant in respect of Gair’s actions; that is the timing of his resignation from the Senate. His appointment as ambassador was made public on 2 April 1974.

On 3 April 1974, Gair wrote a letter the President of the Senate, in that letter, Gair noted that he had publicly announced on the previous day that he had accepted the appointment as Ambassador to Ireland and it was an office of profit under the Crown. Gair in his letter did not actually resign his seat in the Senate on a given day, in that respect, the letter was vague, perhaps deliberately so.

The President considered that it was up to the Senate itself to determine whether Gair had resigned his Senate seat and if so, when. On 8 April 1974, the Senate resolved that on 3 April 1974, Gair had not resigned his Senate seat.

The government failed to obtain from Gair a letter addressed to the President of the Senate resigning his seat and from a given date. However, the question of five vacancies or six, and whether or not Gair had resigned only helped to give the whole affair more publicity and put the spotlight on a member of the DLP being ‘bought’ and lured from the Senate by an ambassadorial appointment.

Significantly Gair was paid as a Senator up to and including 11 April 1974, notwithstanding that in the view of the Solicitor General, Gair ceased to be a Senator from 14 March 1974. However, his ambassadorial salary commenced from 22 April 1974 through the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The Gair Affair caught the remaining DLP Senators by complete surprise and they all expressed great outrage that Gair would accept what they saw was no more than a very cunning bribe. More importantly many of the DLP’s traditional supporters considered that the Gair affair
severely damaged the party’s credibility, portraying DLP Senators as people who could be ‘bought’.

Samuel (1974) observed that ‘the greatest warrior of this party of principle that had sacrificed so much for the sake of its beliefs had been bought off by their deadliest enemy.’

With regard to the Gair Affair, Fairbairn (1976:133) comments that the appointment of Gair as Australia’s Ambassador to Ireland was ‘a most dishonourable move to take out a man who was elected with support from the right wing and replace him with a Labor supporter.’ Fairbairn went on to comment that with six vacancies in Queensland, ‘there almost certainly would have been three from each side returned’ Labor ‘could have had a controlling majority in the Senate.’

As ambassador, Gair was something of a disaster. Stevenson (2007:503) comments on Gair’s very poor grasp of the art of diplomacy. Gair was not averse to commenting publicly on Australian political events and politicians. Little wonder then that on coming to power in late 1975, the Liberal coalition government wasted no time in having Gair recalled from the Ireland post. In Ireland, Gair’s very familiar approach to women was well known (Stevenson 2007:500-501). In fact, in a ‘non-official personal’ letter dated 9 June 1975 from Mr Tom Holland in the Australian Embassy in Ireland to Mr AL (Tony) Vincent in the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra, Holland complains strongly about Gair’s tactlessness and undiplomatic behavior, he kept his contacts to himself, ignoring any of the contacts of his predecessor in the role. Holland also commented on Gair’s appalling behavior towards young ladies.

**Defeat and a Total Wipe Out – the 1974 Double Dissolution Election**

The DLP supported the Coalition parties in blocking the Labor government’s budget legislation in the Senate in April 1974. Whitlam as Prime Minister responded by recommending and gaining a double dissolution of the Parliament and elections for both Houses of Parliament. This caught the DLP by complete surprise and unprepared. The party was expecting only a half Senate election to be held before 30 June 1974.

McManus was under the impression that Snedden, the Leader of the Liberal Party, had agreed to the Liberals running a joint Senate ticket with the DLP, which would have guaranteed McManus a winnable Senate spot. But this joint ticket did not eventuate.

Wanting to run a ‘joint ticket’ with the Coalition parties showed that going into the 1974 election, the DLP had no distinct identity or separate policies from the Coalition parties. Instead the DLP was content to make an attempt to ‘tag along’ with the Coalition parties. This attempt
failed. But in making the attempt the DLP damaged its sense of a being a separate political party with distinct policies.

The DLP was so short of funds leading up to the 1974 election that it only stood candidates for the Senate and not the House of Representatives. However, in Victoria the party stood candidates for both Houses. A sure sign that a party is fading out and declining, is the party moving from endorsing candidates for all, or nearly all, electorates to endorsing candidates for only a handful or no electorates.

At the elections in May 1974, the DLP lost all of its five Senate seats, the DLP polling only 6.4 per cent of the Senate vote in Victoria. This was notwithstanding the high level of support for the DLP at the 1970 Senate elections and the election of the Labor government in December 1972.

Minor parties usually do not want to give the electorate the impression that they are being purely ‘obstructionist.’ However, in supporting the double dissolution election and voting against the ALP which had only been in government a little over 12 months, the DLP showed it was obstructionist. The DLP’s actions yet again showed it was a party of hate and revenge.

Commenting on the results of the election, Santamaria (1974:1) commented that ‘Defence is not currently regarded as an important issue, perhaps by as high a proportion as approximately 90 per cent of Australians.’ The reason he gave for this view was not because of ‘careful consideration’ by the voters but ‘lack of education of the electorate’ by the leaders of the major parties. This raises the question, if the electorate does not see defence as a major issue, why campaign on it? Santamaria also gave as reasons for the DLP’s poor showing the ‘weak position of the opponents of communism’ with the international relations policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’. The second reason Santamaria gave for the DLP’s wipe out was the ‘catholic party’ tag applied to the DLP by its opponents.

In making that comment Santamaria acknowledged that the Catholic Church’s attitude regarding many issues, including communism, was ‘softening’ with ‘little stomach for identification with ‘hard’ positions’. Santamaria’s remarks show that the DLP entered the 1974 election with irrelevant polices and failing to notice that the world around the DLP was rapidly changing.

The DLP showed in the 1972 federal election that it could no longer keep the ALP out of government, which was one of its major objectives. What the DLP should have done in early 1974 was to allow the ALP government’s budget through the Senate. In this way, the DLP would have shown respect for the ALP’s mandate to govern which it had received from the electors in December 1972. However, the DLP was so tied up in its hatred of the ALP that it
could not let that happen. Thus, it supported a new election when it was given the chance and in doing so was rejected by the electorate, falling below the representation threshold.

The DLP After 1974

McManus ran for the Senate again at the 1975 election following the fall of the Whitlam government, but was not elected, his vote falling to 5.8 percent. In 1976 he resigned as leader.

In providing his fellow members of the DLP with some thoughts on the future of the DLP, Curtis (1976:5) considered that ‘a long hard look must be taken at the DLP and what it can hope to achieve. A searching examination of worldwide social trends is necessary and then some conscious decisions must be taken and followed through. In his opinion in 1976 the DLP had five options. They were:-

1. Complete disbandment;
2. Incorporation into another political organisation;
3. Aimless or half-hearted continuance;
4. To become a grass roots pressure group, rather than a political party; or
5. To rebuild itself from the bottom up and to adopt a purposeful strategy’

In terms of Pederson’s lifespan curves, options one and four would mean the party’s lifespan ceasing altogether while option two would see the DLP moving into another party’s lifespan and being subject to the party’s rises and falls in electoral support. Aimless or half-hearted continuance or even rebuilding from the bottom up would mean the party’s lifespan most probably remaining below the representation threshold, bearing in mind it is very hard for a party that has fallen below the representation threshold to cross over it for a second time. With no representation and a lack of high profile leaders, how could the DLP successfully adopt ‘a purposeful strategy’ and regain its representation?

Ironically complete disbandment was to be the DLP’s fate a little under two years later in early 1978. Incorporation into another political organisation was considered in 1973 with the proposal to merge with the then Country Party. That proposal, as noted previously in this chapter, came to nothing for a number of significant reasons.

If the party was to become a grass roots pressure group, it would be in competition with other such similar groups, such as the Defend Australia League, and possibly the RSL on defence issues. Santamaria’s National Civic Council could also be seen as a pressure group, given its newspaper ‘News Weekly’ and its television segment ‘Point of View’ all headed up by B A Santamaria with his contacts with numerous parliamentarians and cabinet ministers.
Various churches were also vocal pressure groups on what they saw as moral issues on such issues as abortion, marriage and censorship. If the DLP was to give up contesting elections and operated as a pressure group, it would be competing strongly for attention.

End of the DLP March 1978

In 1978 after the party’s defeat in the 1974 double dissolution election and its failure to win any Senate seats in 1975 or 1977 and with no success in the various State parliaments, the DLP in all States decided to disband. The process was the most spectacular in the State of Victoria which had provided the party’s strong point. The motion to disband the party was put at a special State conference of the Victorian DLP in March 1978. The conference was very emotional and the motion to disband was only just passed, 110 votes for and 100 votes against. (Brosnan 1978:1)

As a result, the DLP terminated its rental lease on its party headquarters in Victoria and presented all of its files and records to the State Library of Victoria, as historical records. However, in order to protect the names and details of its members, supporters and other financial backers, it destroyed its financial records. It also held a special finance appeal amongst its members for finance to payout its party officials and pay off its debts. (Curtis 2010)

Many of those who voted against the party disbanding in Victoria in 1978 set up a new party the Democratic Labor Party of Australia (the full title of the disbanded party was the Australian Democratic Labor Party.) Over the years, the party contested various Federal and Victorian State elections winning a very small number of votes. In 2010 federal election the party won a seat in the Senate with John Madigan as its candidate. (Curtis (2010) pointed out that the ‘Madigan DLP’ was very much different to the old DLP that was dissolved in 1978. In Curtis’ view the Madigan DLP was a totally different party altogether. The Madigan DLP is not considered in this thesis.

With regard to the members of the DLP after its demise, few seemed to have remained actively involved in the Party. McManus ran again in 1975 and 1977, Little returned to his previous occupation as a newsagent. Dowling the Victorian secretary of the party and Senate candidate died in unexpected circumstances in November 1974 some six months after the Double Dissolution election which saw all DLP Senators defeated. In Queensland Gair was expelled when he accepted the diplomatic posting while Byrne returned to the QLD Bar and resumed practising as a barrister, while in NSW Kane set up an industrial relations consultancy.

In Conclusion

The demise of the DLP can be attributed firstly to its very negative image and rhetoric. It was hampered by the presence of BA Santamaria and his organisation, Santamaria was not ever a
member of the DLP. The DLP’s image was also in jeopardy because the exact role of the DLP was not clear. Was the DLP’s purpose to be a third party, a replacement for the ALP or to eventually re-unite with the ALP? The DLP’s poor parliamentary leadership was another factor with its Senators in the late 1960s onwards, seen as old ‘fuddy duddies’.

The DLP also was handicapped by its declining relevance in a rapidly changing world. Its policies centred around a perceived continual threat from invading communist forces and the need for increased defence spending. The ‘perceived threats’ of concern to the DLP included the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean which merely involved Russian vessels in international shipping lanes and not in the territorial waters of any country.

The final reason for the DLP’s demise was seen in the shrinking percentage of the vote for its House of Representatives candidates. This was coupled with an allocation of second preferences to the coalition parties for no continual real return apart from defence spending. The DLP also second preferred Liberal candidates regardless of the candidate’s views on moral issues that were so dear to the DLP.

The DLP failed to attract a primary Senate vote in the years before Senate Group preferencing. Had the DLP hung on until 1984, it may well have survived due to the new electoral rules.

The DLP’s image of being a moralistic party together with poor relationships with the press did not enhance the Party’s election prospects.

A better alternative to the split of the ALP would have been to stay in the ALP and fight from within as other parliamentarians such as Fred Daly and Arthur Calwell had done. The split was a significant reason for the ALP remaining on the opposition benches for 23 long years. The ALP had the image of a divided party in the early stages of the split and was denied government by the channeling of DLP second preferences to the Liberal and Country parties, allowing them to win government.

The rise and fall of the DLP both serve as a useful lesson for other minor parties to monitor such decisive factors as leadership and relevance if they wish to survive.
Chapter Six: The Rise of the Australian Democrats

Introduction

The formation of the Australian Democrats was in fact a fusion of two existing minor parties, the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement. Some of the earlier Democrat Senators were members of one of those two parties. For example, John Siddons and Sid Spindler were members of the Australia Party and Jack Evans was a member of the New Liberal Movement. This chapter explores the formation and then the decline of the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement before going on to discuss the fusion of these two parties and in effect, rise again with the rise of the Australian Democrats.

Gauja (2010:488) notes that

Hailed as a party of the new politics movement, the Democrats tried to differentiate themselves from the major parties by offering progressive policies to the electorate and by adopting an internally democratic structure that presented novel opportunities for political participation.

This chapter firstly traces the formation, rise and then decline of both the Liberal Movement and the Australia Party. These two parties did not meet their demise but rather merged in 1977 to form the Australian Democrats along with people who were never members of one of those two parties.

The main catalyst for the formation and rise of the Australian Democrats was the former Liberal Party minister, Don Chipp, who in 1977 had been a member of the Federal parliament for 17 years. Chipp had a very high profile as a man with progressive ideas in such areas as censorship. Chipp’s image was clearly not an ‘old fuddy dudy in a boring grey suit’, and his philosophy was principally ‘small l Liberal’ (Allison 2006:42).

This chapter discusses the factors that lead to the successful rise of the Australian Democrats, which include the adoption and use of participative democracy and the adoption of a ‘watch dog’ role with the catch cry ‘keep the bastards honest.’ The Australian Democrats in the beginning saw themselves as a ‘centralist party’ located in between the Liberal National Party Coalition on the one hand and the ALP on the other. The parliamentary party grew in numbers until it held the balance of power in the Senate. In the course of support for legislation, armed with the balance of power, the Democrats were able to negotiate a number of changes to various pieces of legislation.
This chapter concludes that while the rise of the Australian Democrats promised great future achievements with the usage of the balance of power in the Senate, there were possible problems on the near horizon for the party. Holding the balance of power in itself presented problems, as did the functioning of the parliamentary party after the retirement of Don Chipp. These problems will be discussed in the next chapter.


The Australia Party started up in a somewhat unique way. On 22 October 1966 Gordon Barton, a leading Sydney businessman placed a full page ‘open letter to President Johnson’ of the USA, in *The Australian* newspaper protesting about Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. In that open letter, Barton commented that the Vietnam War was a dirty war and civil war. He went on to observe that the government in South Vietnam was unstable inefficient and corrupt. Further, that a number of Vietnamese resent and oppose Australia’s intervention in their affairs. Barton concluded that:-

> People all over the world are tired of military solutions and power politics. They are tired of anti-Communism as a substitute for common sense (Everingham 2009:108-109).

Barton advised, that he wrote the letter out of ‘personal conscience’, ‘as one having no connection or influence with any political party’ (Blackshield 1972:35). Within days Barton was inundated with support.

Everingham (2009:109) went on to comment that ‘Barton’s letter was published when disappointment with, and alienation from, the major parties was high’.

At a subsequent public meeting the Liberal Reform Group was formed. In the 1966 Federal election, in which the major issue was conscription, the party ran candidates. The Liberal Reform Group gave its second preferences to the ALP. Warhurst (1997:24) comments in relation to the coalition’s 1966 election win that:

> The political party contest was still shaped by the 1950s Cold War politics. The DLP was still ensuring office for the coalition parties and was holding the balance of power in the Senate. The ALP was struggling to emerge from the trauma of the Split. The Liberal party was at odds with itself. The Country Party was little changed.

In 1967 the Party’s name was changed to the Australian Reform Movement and in 1969 the name was changed to the Australia Party. Members of the new party highlighted the policies and inactivity of the major parties in terms of the Vietnam War and other issues. Blackshield (1972:37) noted the name change from Liberal Reform Movement to Australian Reform Movement came brought about because in 1966, the name Liberal Reform had apparently embarrassed the Liberal Government. Blackshield went on to comment that:-
By 1967 the word ‘Liberal’ tended rather to embarrass the reform group. To use the word ‘Australian’ instead was to widen the Movement’s aims and its professed electoral base; though it also tended to emphasise the oddly short strain strand sometimes found in the Movement’s thinking.

Blackshield (1972:37) noted that the name ‘The Australia Party’ was chosen by telegram ballot from a short list of options submitted by post to 800 actual or potential members.

The Australia Party only ever had one representative in the Federal Parliament. Tasmanian Senator Reg Turnbull who was a medical practitioner and won his seat as an independent in the Senate. As the table below shows, he joined and led the Australia Party for a short period. In fact, he led and campaigned for the Party during the 1969 Federal election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 14: Australia Party Members Australian Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RJD Turnbull</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What did the Party Stand for?

The party’s major policy interest was in reconceptualising Australia’s defence policy. Their emphasis could be seen as a response to the other third party, the DLP, with its anti-communism and strong involvement in the Vietnam War with National Service. In a move away from the influence of the Cold War, the Australia Party’s original policy was opposition to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War and opposition to National Service. With also ‘cultivation of the American alliance to a degree consistent with the preservation of an independent Australian foreign policy’.

On domestic policy, the Australia Party’s policy was ‘general adherence to Liberal Party principles with special emphasis on the preservation of private enterprise and free competition’. Other policies included ‘a complete revision of Australia’s welfare legislation, with particular emphasis on the problems of the aged’. The party also proposed the abolition of the social security means test.

Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy basically meant involving the party members in decision-making in relation to the party’s policies, rather than party state and federal conferences. It can also include other decision making such as voting for the parliamentary leaders of the party, instead of only the members of the parliamentary party having the right to vote in those ballots.
Australia Party Councillor Geoffrey Loftus-Hills (1980:4) believed that:

The very important political legacy which the Australia Party bestowed on this Nation was the demonstration that it was practical to determine party policy by a fully democratic method in which all the members had an equal say by direct secret postal ballot.

Cole (1975:223) comments that ‘the Australia party has a dual basis. The first is the party journal ‘Reform’ and the second is the Branch structure.’ Both were important vehicles to encourage grass roots participation.

The fledgling party was structured with a national executive, state executives and a branch of the party in each federal electorate. Cole (1975:223) comments that ‘branches range from very strong and very active to fairly small and weak’. According to Cole, the functions of the branches were to

- Promote interest in the Australia Party in the area;
- To nominate and select candidates for elections (in co-operation with the State Executive);
- To raise funds; and
- To run local election campaigns

Cole notes that in addition some Branches had developed ‘special interest areas’ relevant either to the local area or of wider interest.

The journal ‘Reform’ was started in 1969 in the aftermath of the party’s poor showing in the 1967 Senate election. The results of that election left members of the party in a ‘somewhat demoralised state’ (Cole 1975:225). The objectives of ‘Reform’ were to ‘pull together the scattered and demoralised membership and to facilitate more active membership participation in policy debates and decisions’.

The introduction of participatory democracy into the Australia Party was sponsored by the first editor of ‘Reform’, Laurie Hull. ‘His principal interest lay in the concept of participatory democracy’ (Cole 1975:225). In 1968 Hull produced his Treatise on participatory democracy ‘The Way Ahead’. He used ‘Reform’ to guide a participative democracy environment.

According to Cole (1975:223) members had the right to publish opinions and ideas and to debate policy issues. In addition, ‘ballot papers are distributed via . . . (Reform) so that all members may participate in the policy making process.’

Siddons (1990:143) noted that the Australia Party had a broad policy base and as such the concept of participatory democracy came to the fore. He went on to comment that:-

Being made up of people who whose overriding concern was to protest against the Vietnam War, the party had a very diverse range of opinions on other political issues. The only way it could speak with a common voice was that was supported by the majority of its members was to initiate a process that arrived at a consensus.
Tony Blackshield (1972:47) stated that:

The point is not that other parties contain no men of initiative and integrity, but the parliamentary party structure has tended to damp their effectiveness. The party machine has shut out and stifled individual views; or party dogma, vote buying expedients, and the drive to score off one’s opponents, have become effective substitutes for any real views at all. The Australia Party seeks above all to counteract that sort of tenancy. It sees itself as giving its members an organisational instrument, not a straitjacket.

However, Blackshield also went on, sounding a warning about participatory democracy. That warning was, as voting by the members was not compulsory, apathy set in with a disappointingly few members brothing to vote on the various policies.

**Electoral Performance**

The party contested seven elections from its founding in 1966 to its merger and transition into the Australian Democrats in 1977.
Table 15: Australia Party – Electoral Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Senate percentage vote</th>
<th>House of Reps percentage vote</th>
<th>Number of Seats Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966 (Reps only)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 seats NSW, 10 in Vic plus casual senate vacancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 (half Senate)</td>
<td>(2.3 6NSW, 0.66 Vic)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 in NSW and 2 in Vic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 (Reps only)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>37 seats, plus two casual Senate vacancies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 (half Senate)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 (Reps only)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 (double dissolution)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 (double dissolution)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table, it can be seen that the party’s overall share of the vote was minuscule.

Blackshield (1972:35) observed that:

. . . In 1972, as in the past, the greatest difficulty . . . was people who have never heard of the Australia Party; for whom it has not the wrong image, but simply no image at all. Party leaflets urged the public find out about the Australia Party. But the Party’s main growth mechanism is word-of-mouth and the process is a slow one.

Second Preference Allocation

At the 1966 Federal elections, the party decided to second preference the ALP due to the ALP’s strong opposition to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. It continued to give its second preferences to the ALP into the 1970s. Loftus-Hills (1980:3) claimed that:

The Australia Party grew in political strength for two federal elections, and its preferences directed to the ALP in 1972 and 1974 were responsible for that Party’s election to government.

However, Sid Spindler in a draft ‘letter to the editor’ after the 1972 election commented that:

The Australia Party dislikes having to recommend preference allocations. We regard both the major parties as innately handicapped by their obligations to trade unions and big business respectively. But one evil can be less than another (Spindler ND).

In federal elections, voters had to allocate preferences by filling in every square on the ballot paper and candidates and their parties were free to recommend by a how-to-vote card as to how this allocation should be done. The allocation of preferences is not about a party’s weaknesses but which party is preferred over another. Furthermore, the allocation of preferences
particularly by a minor party can be traded and be the subject of negotiation with any of the major parties. Spindler could have also borne in mind that in marginal seats preferences from minor parties can be decisive in determining the eventual winning candidate in the electorate.

The Decline of the Australia Party

Siddons (1990:147) stated that ‘a few months after joining the Australia Party and seeing what kind of an organisation it was:-

I thought I had made a big mistake. I found myself among people are shifting commitments and fluctuating enthusiasm. The administration and organisational structure of the party was based on voluntary labour. I could admire the spirit and the principle of the people with whom I become involved, but as someone who had come from the business world where organisational efficiency was the name of the game . . . I felt the unpredictability of the party machine rather frustrating.’

Warhurst (1997:35) comments that the Australia Party:-

did not ever fully come to terms with the tension between . . . (their) new ideas and competing as a political party in the Australian competitive electoral system. . . . For most of its members the ultimate aim was parliamentary representation. (After Turnbull) . . . the Party was searching for another ready-made parliamentary leader, whether it be Hall, Gorton or ultimately Chipp.

The Party also suffered a perception of ‘being male dominated’, notwithstanding that 45 per cent of the party members were women, which was higher than in the other political parties (Blackshield 1972:41). Warhurst (1997:35) commented that ‘The Australia Party remained largely a male party, at least in the upper echelons and among the Parliamentary candidates.’

The Australia Party had attracted high profile members and candidates but in the 1970s was still searching for a high profile acceptable leader. In addition, the 1975 election saw polarisation between the two major parties. In other words, a battle between two leaders rather than between two parties. Loftus-Hills (1980:3) considered that in respect of the Australia Party:-

In the fiery contest between Liberal – NCP and ALP in 1975 its support largely vanished, the voters concentrating on the struggle. The Australia Party lacked a political front-man, since its founder, Gordon Barton, did not stand as a candidate.

Blackshield (1972:49) in attempting to see a future for the Australia Party claimed:-

slow slogging remains –either the Party share of the vote will slowly increase until ten years hence? – it becomes an effective force; or, losing momentum, it will fall back (at best) to a ‘pressure group’ role.

Above all in spite of high profile candidates and party members, the Australia Party was hampered by disappointingly low levels of support at successive elections and no candidates being elected. If the party wanted candidates elected to Parliament and become a force in the Australian party system, it desperately needed a well-known leader with a high profile to get the party’s message out into the electorate.
The Liberal Movement (1972-1977)

The Liberal Movement was formed in the aftermath of the ‘Playmander’ in South Australia. The Playmander caused the SA electoral system to be ‘heavily weighted in favour of the rural areas of the State, was strongly partisan in its political effects and provided a government with a clear majority of voting support for most of the period’ (Jaensch 1970:96).

By way of background, in 1933 at the South Australian State elections the conservative Liberal Country League defeated the Labor government. The LCL went on to win the next nine elections from 1938 to 1962, finally being defeated by Labor in 1965. A major cause of that long period of success was an elaborate gerrymander (the Playmander named after the Premier Thomas Playford). The Playmander was put in place at the electoral redistribution of 1936, ‘modified slightly in 1955 and finally replaced in 1969’ (Jaensch 1970:96).

After its defeat in 1965, the LCL elected a ‘new “young image” leader’ Steele Hall, possibly to counter Don Dunstan the rising Labor leader who was the deputy leader of the parliamentary Labor Party. In the State elections of 1968 the LCL was returned to power ‘on the shoulders of the sole independent’ (Jaensch 1970:97) as both LCL and Labor had won 19 seats each.

A redistribution of electorates took place in 1969. That redistribution which was a compromise that retained some bias to rural areas. However, it was seen by Labor as a step in the right direction (Jaensch 1970:97). The redistribution saw the end of the ‘Playmander’. Hall’s government had ‘reduced rural overrepresentation in the lower house . . . Rural overrepresentation had grown with the expansion of urban populations to the point that the smallest rural seat contained about 10,000 electors and the largest urban seat 100,000’ but despite this imbalance, ‘right wing LCL politicians opposed democratisation’, that is “one vote one value”. However, Hall ‘remained determined to complete electoral reform by democratising the upper house’ (Adamson 2009:2-3). In the 1970 election Labor returned to Government winning 27 of the 47 seats.

The Liberal Movement came into being as a faction of the Liberal Country League (LCL) on 15 March 1972. On that day in the South Australian Parliament, Steele Hall the leader of the LCL resigned his leadership of the party and announced the formation of the Liberal Movement of which he was the leader. The final straw for Hall was the carrying of a motion earlier that day in the Liberal Party room which required the election of members of the Liberal party front bench or parliamentary executive. Hall held the strong view that a party leader must have the right to hire and fire his ministers, if he is to assert and maintain proper discipline in his cabinet. A number of Liberal members of the upper house, the Legislative Council, considered that they were not being considered for front bench positions, principal amongst them was Reginald De Garis a very high profile and popular member.
In his statement, Hall said:-

‘Our party . . . has publicly acknowledged the fact that it will not follow me in my endeavours to govern and legislate for the broad section of the South Australian community. It prefers to bind itself tightly to a few individuals who will put party before state. This I cannot accept and it provides the background and reason why I have vacated the leader’s seat.’

Adamson (2009:2) notes that the Liberal Movement’s formation was announced in March 1972. However, the Liberal Movement did not decide to become a political party in its own right until 31 March 1973. Adamson goes on to comment that:-

The Liberal Movement was intended to reform the Liberal and Country League (LCL) by creating with in the League a group of pro-democratic progressives who would by persuasion and taking control of branches, bring about fundamental changes to party policy. The critical objective was to persuade the LCL to pursue democratic electoral reform of the Legislative Council. When he was Premier from 1968 to 1970, Steele Hall had reduced rural over representation in the lower house the House of Assembly.

In April 1972 Hall advised that the Liberal Movement:-

Is a response to the demand from many people in South Australia who want involvement in political change. It is not for the apathetic. It is for that group of people who are disenchanted with existing political parties. The Liberal Movement is committed to the fulfilment of the Liberal concept. It is for those who are looking for dynamic democracy rather than political catch-cry.

Steele Hall stood for the Senate in the 1974 Double dissolution election and won a seat. On 4 July 1974, in a letter to the then Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, Hall was able to say:

I represent a party with a well organised base in South Australia which supports three members in the state Parliament as well is me as a senator. Its electoral support is currently increasing as evidenced at the Senate election, and in the following state by-election for the seat of Goyder.

In addition, the Liberal movement intends to establish branches outside of South Australia before the end of the year.

Policies of the Liberal Movement

The Liberal Movement held its first policy convention on 2 June 1972 while still a group within the Liberal Country League. The Liberal Movement’s policies were grouped around the policy areas of Agriculture, Censorship, Education, the Environment, Health, including social welfare and South Australian Constitutional reform. Later policies included state aid to independent schools and local government council amalgamations.

In his policy speech for the 1974 double dissolution elections, Hall stated ‘we are not another DLP. We intend to eventually merge with other Liberal Forces in Australia’, but not according to Hall, with the Liberal Country League, ‘which is so obviously redundant in South Australia.’ (Hall 1974:3).
Hall also claimed that:

Too many people see the LCL as a party tied to conservative traditions. We must show voters that we can move with the times, we are ‘with it.’ (Jaensch 1997:39)

The Liberal Movement was primarily concerned about electoral fairness, or the lack of it, in South Australia in the light of the ‘Playmander’. Doing something about such a significant electoral rort such as the ‘Playmander’ would certainly show that a party was ‘with it’ in terms of fairness and equity. At the same time, it is hard to see ‘gerrymandering’ as a part of ‘conservative traditions’.

**Electoral Performance**

In the South Australian State election in 1975, the party won 18.27 per cent of the vote in the Legislative Assembly and 18.18 per cent of the vote in the Council. This resulted in the Movement winning two seats in each House. The parliamentary membership of the party is shown in the following table.

**Table 16: Liberal Movement Members South Australia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robin Millhouse MP</td>
<td>1955–73 Liberal</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Cabinet Minister in LCL Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITCHAM</td>
<td>1973-76</td>
<td>Liberal Movt</td>
<td>Founded the New LM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>New Lib Movt</td>
<td>Resigned to become</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977-82</td>
<td>Aust Dems</td>
<td>Supreme Court Judge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steele Hall MP</td>
<td>1959-1973</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOYDER</td>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>Lib Movt</td>
<td>Resigned to run for the Senate (successfully)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Boundy Goyder</td>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td>Liberal Movt</td>
<td>Won by-election in Hall’s electorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>Re-joined Libs Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Carnie MLC</td>
<td>1975 – 1976</td>
<td>Liberal Movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976-1982</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Cameron MLC</td>
<td>1971 -73</td>
<td>LCL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973-76</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976-90</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A significant feature of the above table is the significant number of members who did not chose to join ‘the New Liberal Movement when it was formed in 1976, instead joining up with the
Liberal Party in 1976. This is to be expected as the Liberal Party provided the Liberal Movement with electoral fairness in terms of electoral boundaries. With the ‘Playmander’, this was the Liberal Movement’s major difference with the LCL.


Table 17: The New Liberal Movement Electoral Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House of Reps</th>
<th>Seats Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>9.8% (SA) 1% (Nat)</td>
<td>8.2% (SA) 0.8% (Nat)</td>
<td>Reps SA 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6.5% (SA) 1.1% (Nat)</td>
<td>6.2% (SA), 3.3% (ACT) 0.6% (Nat)</td>
<td>Reps SA 12, ACT 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table, it is clear that the party’s strength was in its home state of South Australia. In fact, South Australia provided the party with its sole member in the Federal parliament, namely the high-profile Steele Hall. Hall’s election to the Senate was also aided by the fact that the two elections in question were double dissolution elections, meaning the quota for election was a lot less than a normal senate election for only half of the Senators. As can be seen in the table below, Hall also joined the Liberal Party in 1976. He did not associate himself with the ‘New Liberal Movement.’ In fact, Hall served in Federal Parliament for a number of years as the member for the electorate of Boothby.

Table 18: Liberal Movement Members Australian Senate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steele Hall</td>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>Did not contest 1977 election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>Later Liberal MP for Boothby in House of Reps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second Preference Allocation

At the 1974 Federal elections, the Party decided to second preference the Coalition parties over the ALP, notwithstanding that the Coalition parties chose to punish the Liberal Movement by allocating second preferences the ALP over the Liberal Movement. In the 1975 Federal election, the Liberal Movement again second preferred the Coalition parties.
The Decline of the Liberal Movement

Originally the Liberal Movement was formed as a faction of the Liberal Country League (LCL) but later became a party in its own right. A few years later the Liberal Movement re-joined with the LCL and the merged Party renamed itself the Liberal Party of Australia (SA Division).

Steele Hall led the Liberal Movement in the South Australian Parliament from 1972 until May 1974. He then ran for the Australian Senate as a Liberal Movement candidate for South Australia in the 1974 double dissolution election and was elected. He was re-elected 1975 for the Liberal Movement, but did not recontest his Senate seat in 1977. In 1976 he re-joined the Liberal Party of Australia.

However, a segment of the Liberal Movement refused to re-join with the LCL and this group renamed itself ‘the New Liberal Movement’ and it was this party faction that combined with the Australia Party to form the Australian Democrats under Don Chipp’s leadership.

The Australia Party and the Liberal Movement Lifespans

The Lifespan curves for both the Australia Party beginning in 1966 and Liberal Movement beginning in 1973 are shown in the following graph.

![Graph showing the lifespan of the Liberal Movement and the Australia Party](image)

Each party rose sharply as they both came into existence in a very short time frame. They met their demise at the same time in 1977 when they both became part of the Australian Democrats. The Lifespan of the Australian Democrats is discussed at the end of this chapter. The Australia Party crossed the representation threshold briefly in 1969 1970 when the independent Senator
Turnbull agreed to be the Party’s leader. However, the Liberal Movement by comparison enjoyed a much longer period above the representation threshold. The Liberal Movement included high profile Liberals such as Steele Hall and Robin Millhouse who were instrumental in the Movement’s formation. The Australia Party’s point of culmination was the period of Turnbull’s leadership and the Liberal Movement’s culmination point was in 1975 at the height of its representation in the South Australian Parliament and in the Australian Senate.

The Australia Party and the Liberal Movement Enter Into Negotiations

West (1977:105) claims attempts to merge the Australia Party with the new Liberal Movement were not so successful. However, Loftus-Hills’ papers give a different picture. Loftus-Hills was on the Council of the Australia Party. His records give a very strong impression that the Australia Party was all for the merger with the New Liberal Movement and it was the New Liberal Movement that had reservations and misgivings about the idea of a merger of the two parties. Loftus Hills (1977:1) explained that:-

The New LM in South Australia, the only State where it operates, comprises those members of the original Steele Hall Liberal Movement who refused to return with him to the Liberal fold. The policies of the new Liberal Movement were very close to those of the Australia Party. While Steele Hall finally chose to go with the strength, and many followed him, including some state members of Parliament, a resolute group, including Robin Millhouse, chose to stick by their principles and policies. Thus, on performance as well as on platform they are good people to have with us.

However, in fairness to West, Loftus-Hills’ remarks are in sharp contrast to those of Siddons (1975:6) who, not two years prior, had advised voters that:-

The Liberal Movement is a peculiarly South Australian phenomenon. It has flourished in that state because the Liberal Party there is controlled by reactionary, almost feudal elements. Make no mistake, the Liberal Movement is part of the mosaic of the right. Like most other minority parties which have sprung up in Australia in the last two decades it funnels its preferences straight back to the Liberal Party. Because it directs all its preferences to the Liberal Party, a vote for the Liberal Movement could not even be considered a protest vote.

Loftus-Hills’ remarks set the stage for the ensuing talks leading to the amalgamation of the two parties followed by the leadership of Don Chipp. Siddons (1990:159) commented that ‘it became clear that the media were never going to take the Australia Party seriously until we attracted some well-known political figure. Then along came Don Chipp.’ Who was Don Chipp and what was his background?

Don Chipp and his background

Don Chipp had been a Liberal member of the House of Representatives since winning a by-election in 1960. According to Whittington (1964:132) Chipp:-
Had few, if any, academic interests or pursuits, and was essentially a young businessman with more than average ability and a particular flair for publicity and organising. . . . he impressed his party leaders . . . with his energy and application

Whittington went on to note that Chipp was eager to ‘tackle any job in the party interest.’

Chipp had been Minister for the Navy and later Minister for Customs and Excise. He was a minister in the McMahon ministry which in late 1972 lost government after 23 years to the Labor Party led by Gough Whitlam. However, as Minister for Customs and Excise, Chipp was very popular with a very broad section of the community. The reason was simple, Chipp had a very broad and progressive approach to censorship, and was seen as ‘trendy’. In 1972 Chipp incurred much angst from the DLP Senators and various moralistic groups over his decision to allow the import of the publication ‘The Little Red Schoolbook’. This publication aimed at secondary school students aimed to give the students some direct advice on such issues as sex, abortion and censorship. Significantly when the Liberal Nationals Coalition returned to government in late 1975 under Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister, Chipp was not included in the Fraser Government’s ministry. This was a big disappointment for Chipp and he remained a Liberal Party back bencher for just over 12 months before announcing his resignation.

Don Chipp Resigns from the Liberal Party

Don Chipp announced his resignation from the Liberal Party in a statement to the House of Representatives on 24 March 1977. In a well-structured statement, Chipp after some introductory comments stated that:-

I feel that my continual membership of the Liberal Party, as it is now led, managed and structured, would be incompatible with my beliefs and would constitute an act of hypocrisy.

Chipp did not draw any comfort from the current attitudes and policies of the ALP opposition, accusing it of mismanaging the economy when it was in government and not learning from its failures. Chipp concluded his statement by commenting that perhaps it was time to test the proposition for the emergence of a third political force.

Chipp’s resignation came as a shock to both the Liberal Party and the general public. However, Loftus-Hill was very keen to seize upon both Chipp’s resignation and the reasons for it. In a report to Members he stated:-

Those members of the Australia party who heard Don Chipp’s magnificent speech in the House (of representatives) on March 24 in which he announced his resignation from the Liberal Party may well have felt, that when he spoke of policies, that he was speaking for the Australia Party (Loftus-Hills (1977:1)).

Loftus Hill went on to comment that:-
It was . . . a tremendous source of satisfaction to all of us for him to say that there was a need in Australia for a third political force in the middle ground, that if existing groups could come together (and he referred specifically to the Australia party and the New LM) to form the basic organisational structure for such a party, he would certainly consider joining it.

In early 1977, the Australia Party approached Chipp to see if he would be interested in joining. Chipp responded by saying he always admired the Australia Party and could be interested in joining them. In Siddons’ view Chipp was not interested in joining the Australia Party unless the move made a big political splash, Chipp wanted to advance his cause and at the same time, the Australia Party wanted to advance its cause.

Loftus Hills (1980:4) recalled that:-

After 16 years in parliament Chipp was prepared to give the game away, but was prevailed upon to agree that if the two parties in the middle ground, the Australia Party and the new Liberal Movement could come together, he would consider joining this united party.

The two parties did come together, adopting and further developing the ultra-democratic methods of the Australia Party. The members decided that the new party would be called the ‘Australian Democrats’.

In fact, the new party took on the participative democracy mantle of the Australia Party and from the Liberal Movement the party adopted the principle of the right of a parliamentary member of the party to vote against the party line if they saw fit to do so.

Don Chipp’s resignation from the Liberal Party came at an opportune time. According to Siddons (1990:163) less than a fortnight after Chipp’s speech, the national executive of the Australia Party met and Siddons successfully moved a motion which provided for the formation of ‘a new political force’ with Don Chipp as its parliamentary leader and that this new force consist of the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement with a new name. Members of the Australia Party came up with a suggested name for the new political force, ‘the Australian Democrats’.

West (1977:101) commented that:-

Many small parties have been sparked into existence when a charismatic leader splits a major party to create a new one. The Australian Democrats formed around just such a man Don Chipp, who resigned from the Liberal Party on 24 March 1977.

Don Chipp did not split the Liberal Party when he resigned from it in 1977 – he was the only one who resigned from the party and did not take other members with him. However, his later entry into the new Australian Democrats party certainly enhanced that party’s electoral successes. This is readily seen when the Australian Democrats results in the 1977, 1980 and 1983 Federal elections are compared to the results of the Australia Party at the 1969, 1972 and 1974 Federal elections.
After Chipp’s resignation from the Liberal Party and the move to form a new party which would include both the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement, public meetings were convened around Australia. These public meetings were very well attended. For example, in Perth Chipp along with Siddons held a lunch time press conference ‘which was very well attended and the Perth town hall that evening was packed’. Chipp spoke for ‘over an hour’, the audience ‘believed he was the man of the hour’ (Siddons 1990:164).

A poster advertising one of those public meetings is reproduced below.

The Australian Democrats (1977-2010s)

The Australian Democrats were mostly anti-sectional and anti-material (existing parties were seen to be dominated by sectional interests.) The Australian Democrats became a third political force representing middle of the road policies that owed no allegiance to any outside pressure group and they appealed to voters’ spirit and not their hip pocket. The Democrats talked the language of ‘soft sentiment’ (honesty, tolerance and compassion and they strongly believed in
no cynicism, sectional pork barrelling and polarising confrontation). (West 1980:343-4). The Australian Democrats were described as ‘a party of new ideas’ (Warhurst 1997:23).

In its policy papers, under its objectives, the Australian Democrats advised it was a party to be beholden to no group or groups in the community to serve the best interests of all Australians. The party also advised that its aim was to use its position as a party in the middle ground even-handed to capital and labour, to reconcile their real interests by encouraging industrial democracy and all other forms of cooperation.

The new (as yet unnamed) party wasted no time in communicating with its newly found supporters. A ‘National Journal’ was commenced in June 1977. The first issue posed the question ‘what shall we be’ in other words what will be the name of the new party? The name was to put to a ballot in the third issue of the National Journal. In that first issue Don Chipp hinted ‘I like the name “Australian Democrats”’. In that issue the National Steering Committee members were named. They included Don Chipp, Robin Millhouse, John Siddons, Jack Evans, Colin Mason, ‘plus a representative from each Division’ (a State).

In the third issue of the National Journal some of the suggested names for the new party were published. They included, ‘Dinkum Democrats’, ‘Members Independent Democrats’, ‘Democratic Centralists’, ‘Peoples Participative Association’ and ‘The United Democrats Party’. That issue of the National Journal also included the ballot paper for members to vote upon the new name for the Party. Members could make their choice from 56 possible names!

The name finally chosen by the members in that ballot and announced in the fifth issue of the National Journal in September 1977 was ‘The Australian Democrats’ which was the ‘interim’ name for the party.

In that first issue Don Chipp in an article titled ‘Getting into our stride’ commented about what was required in setting up a new party. The steering committee according to Chipp, set down an ‘interim constitution and adopt a ‘provisional name’ and ‘set down at least as thought promoters, some bare bones of the kinds of policies which could arise from the principles I have talked about since resigning from the Liberal Party’.

Chipp went on to remind the new members that:

A distinguishing feature of our party is that policies are determined and voted upon by you and other members, not dictated to you from some outside source. I ask you therefore . . . to work hard on policy. The doors are wide open for your ideas to come forward.

In his reminder Chipp was stating that the Australian Democrats would operate under a system of participative democracy – just as the Australia Party had done. Blackshield had pointed out that a big problem with participative democracy in the Australia Party was many people were apathetic and therefore did not both to vote on the various policies. Had Chipp and the
Australian Democrats learnt from the problems experienced by the Australia Party? This question will be addressed under the participatory democracy in the next chapter which addresses the demise of the Australian Democrats.

Chipp also suggested to the members as well as using the ‘bare bones’ policies that they also ‘get a hold of’ some Australia Party or New Liberal Movement policy material. This was a very smart idea in that way the former members of those two parties could feel a stronger ‘empathy’ with the new party. Chipp also counselled the members to be ‘forward looking in policy development’. Chipp spoke of a policy framework in which:-

Kindness, generosity and wisdom can compete on better than equal terms with the greed, materialism and mere cleverness which characterises so much of our present society.

In the second issue of the National Journal, issued on the fourth July 1977, the reader was advised that the ‘provisional name of the new party was ‘The Australian Democrats’. Furthermore, the journal would be published ‘every three weeks’ which sounded very ambitious.

In that issue Chipp was able to report that ‘we are going like a rocket’. In just over eight weeks the party has 133 branches operating in five states and one territory. The party would be launched in Tasmania on 7 July and in the Northern Territory on 27 July. This would make the party truly national, operating in all states and territories. Chipp went on to advise that he was receiving ‘over 100 letters a week requesting details of membership’. He went on to state that:-

The media, both public and private have been magnificent in their co-operation and impeccable in their fairness.

Chipp went on to encourage the members to build up the party’s finances, have preliminary discussions on ‘what we might do with preferences’ and consider ways to increase membership.

Finally, Chipp encouraged the members to respect differences in opinions. Chipp counselled the members:-

Diversity of view and personality can cause divisiveness among human beings – however, diversity can also be a source of enormous strength to the Australian Democrats because one of the most exhilarating and satisfactory experiences a human being can have is showing tolerance to a different view and being big enough to agree to disagree with another person and still maintain a close relationship. In doing this we all grow a little taller and with us the party grow to a greater strength.

However, Forell (1994:41) defines a political party as:-

Not merely a group of like-minded members of Parliament. It is an organisation of people of broadly similar ideas or interests, whose aim is to gain political power

In his encouragement, Chipp seems to be far too simplistic and idealistic. Conflict and strong differences of opinion are inevitable in a political party. The challenge that Chipp ignored in his
comments was that it is important to keep any such conflicts within the party and not relayed to the press. Secondly, party members have to show strong support for the party. A party member might not get all that they want in a policy area, but with strategies such as ‘win win negotiating’ they can achieve a good outcome.

In the third issue of the *National Journal*, the Editor reminded members that as a ‘centre party’:

> Because we are even handed to capital and labour, neither the trade unions nor big business are going to pay us to look after their interests. Money will be a perineal problem. . . . for the immediate future we are going to have to (a) put a lot of our time and energies into money raising (b) keep digging into our own pockets.

The editor was highlighting a significant problem for minor parties, namely; money. The DLP also had money problems in terms of fighting elections and employing office and field staff as well as rental of office space. At least for the Australian Democrats the problem was lessened with the payment from the public purse for each first preference vote when the party polled greater than four per cent. The editor also advised the members that on 30 July 1977, the Australian Democrats were truly a national organisation with over 5,000 members.

In the fifth issue of the *National Journal* dated 5 September 1977, the party structure was explored. The structure was portrayed in the following diagram.

The national steering committee explained that it did not want ‘filters’ for the exchange of ideas between groups of the party. Therefore, in the opinion of the National Steering Committee ‘any
member may have direct contact with either state or national executive or any other body established by these executives.’ A branch is ‘the focal point of getting people together to discuss policies campaigning and other responsibilities contained in the constitution. Branches are not precluded from putting motions to either the National or State Executives should they so desire.

The model shown above may look good on paper, but in practice it would have some annoying problems. Under that model a branch of the Australian Democrats could communicate with the National Executive and bypass the State Executive. Would the National Executive or the Branch ‘copy’ the State Executive into any communications? From the above diagram, it seems keeping the State Executive ‘in the loop’ is not a requirement. The model is about ‘the exchange of ideas between groups in the party’, therefore it would seem an individual member of the party would have to at least go through their branch in order to communicate with the State and Federal executives and any subcommittees of those two bodies.

In the sixth edition of the National Journal dated 26 September 1977, the editor excitedly reported the election of Robin Millhouse to the South Australian Parliament for the Legislative Assembly electorate of Mitcham. Millhouse had originally entered the SA Parliament in 1955 as an LCL member holding the safe LCL electorate of Mitcham. He became Attorney-General and Minister for Social Welfare in Steele Hall’s government. In 1973 Millhouse joined the Liberal Movement. But while other break away members, such as Steele Hall later re-joined the Liberal Party, Millhouse formed ‘The New Liberal Movement’ which along with the Australia Party, formed the Australian Democrats. Millhouse with his vast parliamentary and ministerial experience was like Chipp a valuable acquisition for the Australian Democrats.

In the eighth issue of the journal dated 14 November 1977, Don Chipp commented on the forthcoming Federal election on December 10. Chipp claimed the only thing the party lacked was money- ‘because of our principles of honesty.’ Chipp also commented that:-

The old parties are at it again, fighting, name calling, smearing and remaking those false promises which they have broken time and time again. We must walk taller than they do.

In making that comment Chipp appears to be very sanctimonious. The old parties, being the two major parties and the National Party, would be fighting in terms of alternative policies and name calling in terms of highlighting any perceived weaknesses in the other party’s policies. In fact, the same fate could await the Democrats in an election, when that party’s policies are being debated and when the Democrats debate or analyse the policies of the other parties. As for ‘false promises’, ‘broken time and time again’, all parties in government make promises that in government they cannot keep for some reason or other, such as the economic conditions not being conducive to the policy in question. In making those remarks Chipp is merely attempting to appeal to the average person in the street who was prejudiced against politicians.
That election saw the election of Don Chipp to the Senate for Victoria and Colin Mason in the Senate for New South Wales. They took their places in the Senate on 1 July 1978. However, in South Australia, with the retirement of Steele Hall from the Senate and his election to the House of Representatives as a Liberal, Janine Haines was nominated by the South Australian Parliament to take Steele Hall’s place in the Senate. Hall was a Liberal Movement Senator, as the Liberal Movement was a part of the make-up of the Australian Democrats. The new Senator was chosen from that party. Haines sat in the Senate until 30 June 1978. She returned to the Senate as a Democrat senator in July 1981 for a six-year term.

In the first issue of the National Journal for 1978 issued on 13 February, Chipp encouraged the members to:

> Work hard to quickly erase the debts we had to incur, to obtain new members, to look forward to a bright and indeed glorious future, and to firmly consolidate the marvellous foothold we have gained.

In the second issue of the National Journal for 1978 the editor warned members that

> Our biggest enemy is . . . ourselves. If we indulge in any petty internal arguments about the less important things we will not achieve our fantastic potential . . . we have no executive and no person who can impose policy on our members. The members have the ultimate say.

The editor then went on to point out the distinction between, ‘the policy formulation function’ of the party, and ‘the administrating campaigning function’ of the party.

The editor made a very timely point which is applicable to all parties. These two functions are quite distinct. In other parties ‘participative democracy’ is displayed in annual party state conferences to formulate policy which is presented to the State conference by way of motions carried at meetings of the respective party’s branches and electoral councils.

In fact, the Democrats put this forward as the ‘legislative function’ of the party, ‘through an organic system based on the principle of direct democracy’. The responsibilities of this function are:

- Election of an executive;
- Purpose and constitution;
- Policies;
- Strategy in relation to other parties (e.g. preferences);
- Major decisions affecting finance; and
- Selection of candidates

The party saw the executive function as not policy decisions but administration and campaigning to win elections. These functions can also involve branches of the party. Administration includes:
Recruitment of new members;
Co-ordination;
Finance; and
Communications (within the party and to the public).

This division of responsibilities is a very good breakup and division of responsibilities in any political party. In fact, the Chapter on the fall of One Nation will show that One Nation suffered much embarrassment about ‘printing money’ and cheap loans when the officer responsible for administration, barged into the policy debate, making a very poorly thought out public contribution.

Siddons put forward the view that people join a Branch of the Australian Democrats for a variety of reasons, for example:

- To stand up and be counted;
- To have a say in running the party;
- As a protest against the older parties;
- To support the leader;
- Because they believe in a third force;
- To be a candidate;
- To help their fellow man;
- Participate in Australian politics; and
- Promote democratic ideals.

Siddons finally warned members of the party that new members ‘come to us with high hopes – don’t disillusion them!'

The reasons Siddons gave would be the reasons any active member would want to join a political party. However, a member of a major party would not join ‘because they believe in a third force’! Many people join a political party by paying their annual membership fee and that is the extent of their involvement with the party. Siddons’ comment that new members come to the Australian Democrats with high hopes and not to disillusion them is very important. Some of the new members would have joined the Democrats because they were disillusioned by party politics in general or with a particular party they had previously supported.

A key source of disillusionment among the traditional parties would be if party members were treated as a handy source of labour to address envelopes or hand out how-to-vote cards, rather than contribute to policy debates and formulation. The Democrats strong emphasis on participatory democracy would give new members an involvement in policy formulation and debate as well as voting on the parliamentary leaders. However, in other parties branch meetings and state conferences of the party should give members the chance to contribute to and debate policies of the party.

Chipp in this early stage was really steering and guiding the party very closely and had a strong formative influence on the fledgling party.
Participatory Democracy

Like the Australia Party, the Australian Democrats adopted a participative democracy structure, which ultimately created problems for the party. These problems will be discussed in the next chapter.

Drawing from the participatory foundations of its forerunner the Australia party, the Australian Democrats embraced the ideals of consensus, rational debate, and citizen participation in political decision making (Gauja 2005:73).

Policy formulation by the Australian Democrats under participative democracy was a complex process with many stages. The overriding purpose was to give every member of the Party the opportunity of an equal and direct say in determining policy. The process utilised the following steps.

- State divisions were asked to nominate ‘national policy conveners’ for the 26 or so policy areas. These conveners would have knowledge in the policy area.
- The national policy conveners were then selected with a wide a national scatter as possible. These conveners assembled a working group of 5 to 7 people and engaged in intense discussion and research in the policy area, taking into account contributions and suggestions from other members of the party. They then prepared a draft policy paper of around 2500 words.
- The draft policy paper was then published in the Democrats monthly National Journal for comment and discussion by members. These contributions were all published. Even members of other political parties, relevant associations appropriate to the subject matter and interested citizens were invited to criticise and comment on the drafts.
- After an appropriate time, usually three months the policy was then put to the direct postal vote of members. They were asked to approve or reject the general approach policy paper and to then approve or reject each policy item including all those which party members had suggested in the discussion, to choose between alternative suggestions where these have come forward, and to approve or reject changes of wording. Two thirds of those voting must have approved before a policy paper or policy item is adopted.
- Finally, the policy papers were rewritten to accord with the results of the ballot.

Siddons the national president advised that while other parties are combinations of state organisations, the Democrats from the beginning have been organised on in Australia wide basis. The policies presented have been formulated with the help of contributions from members in all parts of Australia.
He went on to advise that the vital democratic principle of the Australian Democrats is the right of every member to have a direct and equal say in all the legislative affairs of the party-policies, Constitution, office bearers, allocation of preferences, selection of candidates. These are unique and precious rights.

The operations and implications of participatory democracy will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The 1977 Federal election

The Party’s first major electoral test was the 1977 federal election for the House of Representatives and half of the Senate.

At the 1977 Elections in the Senate Chipp from Victoria and Colin Mason from New South Wales were successful in being elected to the Senate, taking their places on 1 July 1978. On the first sitting day of the Senate, Le Grand (2015:2) reports that Mason stated that ‘the reception from MPs from both major parties was frosty. . . Both Labor and Liberal felt we were intruders that we shouldn’t be there.’

West 1977:108) concluded that the Democrats had emerged ‘as a political party to be taken notice of’. West went on to observe that the Democrats ‘cannot remain political virgins forever. The new Senators, Chipp and Mason will have to choose sides in the Senate and the party must ultimately face the problem of allying or merging itself with one of the major parties.’ West went on to remind his readers that neither Lang Labor nor even the DLP were able to retain supporters forever.

What West was saying was that given the Australian Democrats ideas of being a watchdog and ‘keeping the bastards honest’ along with not being beholden to any one party, the Democrats will still have to side with one party instead of the other when it comes to voting on legislation that one major party supports and the other one opposes.

Usage of the Senate Balance of Power and Longevity

The Australian Democrats first won enough seats to hold the balance of power at the 1983 double dissolution election. The Australian Democrats adopted a ‘negotiating style’ in their usage of the balance of power. With respect to the Labor government, the Australian Democrats used the balance of power lever to successfully negotiate amendments to legislation. When the Labor government accepted the Democrat amendments, the legislation passed through the Senate with Democrats support. They were then able to claim the credit both for the amendments and for getting the legislation through the Senate. The Democrats did not view the balance of power as an instrument of veto.
The Party's Second Preference Allocation Strategy

When the Australian Democrats formed in 1977, the party made a tactical decision not to direct its preferences to any of the major parties. This decision is consistent with the remarks of Chipp’s resignation speech in the House of Representatives in March 1977 when he said:

‘The parties seem to polarise on almost every issue, sometimes seemingly just for the sake of it, and I wonder whether the ordinary voter is not becoming sick and tired of the vested interests . . . and yearn for the emergence of a third political force, representing the middle of the road policies which would owe allegiance to no outside pressure group.’

Sharman et al (2002:548) call this approach ‘no allocation’ of preferences, meaning Democrat voters were not directed but given a split how-to-vote alternative.

In subsequent elections, the Australian Democrats continued to issue a ‘split how-to-vote card which directed voters on how to direct their second preference to either the ALP or to the Liberals Nationals Coalition. Given that the Australian Democrats were appealing to both disillusioned Liberal and Labor supporters, disciplining the Party’s second preferences to a single party would have been very difficult.

However, this policy was abandoned by the mid-1990s as the Australian Democrats started to look upon preference allocation as a useful strategic device, not to be ignored and ‘the party went on to use preference allocation ‘as a way of influencing the political process, signaling their place on the political spectrum and securing partisan advantage in both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament.’ (Gauja 2010:492), (Sharman et al:2002). This approach included using an ‘ideological similarity’ approach (Sharman et al 2002:548), whereby preferences were given to Greens parties in 1990.

In the 1998 Federal election, the Australian Democrats preferred a number of minor parties ahead of both the Labor and Liberal Parties. The Democrats second preferred the Australian Greens, with third preferences directed to the Nuclear Disarmament Party. Parties that were at opposites to the Democrats, such as the Fred Nile Group, were preferenced after the two major parties. The complete Senate preference allocation by the Democrats at the 1998 Federal election was as follows:

Table 19: Australian Democrats – Preference allocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferences to Labor Party</th>
<th>Preferences to Liberal/National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>Greens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Disarmament Party</td>
<td>Nuclear Disarmament Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Aircraft Noise Party</td>
<td>No Aircraft Noise Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Law Party</td>
<td>Natural Law Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td>Liberal/National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/National Parties</td>
<td>Labor Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This preference allocation chart is instructive for a number of reasons as well as the provision of a how to vote card in respect of each of the major parties. Firstly, the Democrats have preferred One Nation Last and the other anti-immigration party Australia First, second last. Also of note the ‘ungrouped candidates’ were preferred ahead of a number of parties. Ungrouped candidates are usually unknown and a diverse group of candidates and parties.

Later on, the Democrats feeling the threat from the rise of the Australian Greens began trading off their second preferences in the House of Representatives in return for receiving second preferences in the Senate. This was done primarily with the ALP (Gauja 2010 492). The interactions between the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens will be explored in the next chapter.
Table 20: The Australian Democrats in the Senate 1977 – 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year new Senate appointed</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>Lib/NP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>ADs Balance of Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>shared/negate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983#</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987#</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shared/negate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
- # Double dissolution election.
- In 1975, the number of senators increased from 60 to 64 with two senators being elected for each of the two territories.
- From 1985 the number of Senators increased from 64 to 76.

The above table shows the rise of the Australian Democrats from their formation in 1977. The rise continues up to 30 June 2002 where the party had nine senators in the Senate. The reasons for the fall in the number of Democrat senators at subsequent elections will be considered in the next chapter.

The party’s strongest point was the period from 1983 to 30 June 1990 when it held the balance of power in its own right. The party’s second strongest point was the period straight after that from 1 July 1990 to 30 June 2002 when with between seven and nine senators it shared the balance of power.

In respect of longevity, in January 1997 the then leader Cheryl Kernot was excitedly able to report to the Party members:-
This January we mark another milestone. We eclipse the DLP’s nineteen years and one month of parliamentary representation. We’ve now had continuous federal representation since Janine Haines’ appointment as our first Senator in 1977 (Kernot 1997:3).

Kernot went on to advise the members ‘1996 was a golden year for our party’.

It was the year that we came from behind to win, with a model election campaign. Unfortunately, we were very reliant on my own image (and stamina). It was sometimes a little confronting to see myself plastered on posters and super-size billboards around the country. Luckily, I was too busy to ever see our television advertising, although it was widely remarked upon.

As leader Kernot carried a certain amount of prestige and as leader attracted additional support and votes. It is natural therefore for the party to rely upon its leader. In a minor party the leader is often the most well-known of all of the candidates and in some cases the only known candidate. So of course, the party was ‘very reliant’ on Kernot’s ‘image’. Kernot went on to advise the members that with the election result the major achievement ‘was to secure a future for the party’. Kernot concluded with the comment:-

I hope that more and more people come to see the Democrats as being more than Cheryl’s party, because it is. It is a vibrant professional and compassionate team of progressive politicians. A team of which we can all be proud.

The Party’s Lifespan

The lifespan of the Australian Democrats is shown in the following graph.

The Australian Democrats crossed the representation threshold very early in its existence with the appointment of Janine Haines to a casual vacancy following the resignation of Senator Steele Hall in South Australia. Haines held office until 30 June 1978 (the balance of Hall’s
term). On 1 July 1978 Chipp and Mason came into the Senate for a six-year term following their election at the 1977 elections. Not holding the balance of power at this point the Democrats have not crossed the threshold of relevance. From 1 July 1981, the party shared the balance of power with an independent Senator, thus the party has crossed the threshold of relevance. From the double dissolution election of March 1983, the party held the balance of power in the Senate. When the Democrats reached the balance of power, the life-span curve slopes upwards because of the rise of both Chipp’s influence and the Democrats usage of the balance of power. The lifespan then slopes downwards because of the departure of Chipp and the rapid change of leaders after that. Leadership problems and the attempts to solve them, robbed the Democrats of stability and authority. In addition, future leaders did not have Chipp’s political skills, personality or high profile.

The party held the balance of power for a decade until 1 July 1993, from when they shared the balance of power. This loss of the balance of power in its own right was the Democrats first point of culmination. From 1 July 2005, they lost half of their Senators and the balance of power and slipped below the threshold of relevance. Its remaining senators seemed to be shell shocked and without high profile leadership and on environmental issues it had strong competition from the Australian Greens. From 1 July 2008, having lost all four remaining Senators in the 2007 elections, the party fell below the representation threshold.

Until the Australian Greens entered the political spectrum, the Australian Democrats pattern of representation and relevance was the strongest pattern that any minor party had achieved. Only the Greens managed to exceed this achievement by mobilising the youth environment lobby in the 1990s and beyond.

The revised party life-span clearly shows the Democrats Life-span with a dispersion over 30 years and skewing to the left. This indicates that the party rose quickly and suddenly appeared, but disappeared over a six year period from the lead up to the 2004 election until the last Australia Democrat Senators retired from the Senate in 2008, after their defeat at or not contesting the 2007 federal elections.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the rise and fall of the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement. These two parties in fact rose again by amalgamating to form the Australian Democrats led by the high profile and charismatic Don Chipp, a former Liberal.

The Australian Democrats got off to a strong and prominent start with good press coverage and the leadership and guidance of Don Chipp. However, in the Party’s structure and method of operation there were threats to the Party’s unity and stability lurking below the surface that could impede the Party’s progress and even very existence.
The interactions of these threats with the party and the outcomes will be discussed in the next chapter which explores the demise of the Australian Democrats.
Chapter Seven: The Demise of the Australian Democrats

Introduction

This chapter will consider the factors that led to the decline and demise of the Democrats including leadership problems and unity of the party, the party’s brokerage role in the Senate and problems with the operation of participatory democracy particularly its associated time lags. A significant issue in the demise of the party was its decision to support the introduction of the Howard-Costello Goods and Services Tax (GST) legislation. In addition the party’s problems of unity lead to some very public and damaging arguments by party officials and members.

The Democrats had a significant turnover of leaders with only two leaders in the first 14 years, while the next 17 years saw nine leaders of the party. A number of these leaders resigned from the party in bitterness at the end of their leadership. To make matters worse, the parliamentary party also experienced some very public disputes and conflicts, which did not help its public image of a united party. The party’s leadership rivalry within the parliamentary wing along with the party’s inability to deal with this problem because of its organisational arrangements, which were designed to empower the membership, was the major reason for its poor performance at the 2004 and 2007 elections. (Economou and Ghazarian (2008)). Other reasons for the Democrat’s decline and fall include the single member electoral system, the lack of finance and the party’s small membership base (Warhurst 1997:6). However, the party’s decision to support the GST was the real catalyst for the party’s decline. (Economou and Ghazarian (2008)). The party voted for the introduction of the GST, after gaining some concessions, but the parliamentary party split on the vote. Many rank and file members of the party were not happy with the parliamentary party for supporting the GST legislation.

Gauja (2010:488) commented that

In 2001, following a period of turbulent leadership and what proved to a largely unpopular negotiating strategy with government over taxation reform, the Democrats vote began to decline steadily. Leadership and internal party tensions, the increasing popularity of the Australian Greens as another alternative to the major parties and the return of the Senate to government control from July 2005 to 2008 were all regarded as factors that contributed to the Democrat’s electoral demise.

The interactions of the Australian Democrats with the rising Australian Greens Party is also another reason for the Democrats demise. The impact of the Australian Greens on the Australian Democrats is considered later in this chapter.

A nagging problem for the party and its followers was what role was the party fulfilling? Was its role to be a watchdog or as a third force in politics putting forward the party’s own policies?
For some reason, many saw those two roles as inconsistent with each other. However, this chapter argues that these two roles are in fact compatible, if handled properly.

Gauja (2010:488) observed that the Australian Democrats, membership never exceeded 8,000 members and the party never polled higher than 11.3 per cent in the House of Representatives and no more than 12.6 per cent in the Senate. Both results were in the 1990 federal election (Gauja 2010:489).

The Democrats also had problems with apathy amongst its members. This was shown in the operation of participatory democracy with often very low voting responses to the various votes on party policy. Apathy was also a factor in the doomed ‘Ambassadors Program’ that the party attempted to set up. This chapter also discusses the Ambassadors Program and questions its efficacy.

This chapter concludes that like the DLP there was no single reason for the demise of the Australian Democrats but several. The Party itself, with some strategic planning and decision-making, could have solved many of the problems that ultimately lead to the Party’s demise.

**Recognition Factor - What Was the Role of the Democrats?**

Throughout the lifespan of the Australian Democrats, there was much confusion over what role the Australian Democrats chose to play. Was the party a ‘watchdog’ in the Senate ‘keeping the bastards honest’ or was the role of the Democrats to provide alternative policies to the major parties and to use the opportunities provided in the Senate to put forward these policies by way of private members legislation or amendments to government legislation?

Lewis (2004) claimed that no one knew who the ‘bastards’ were. At first glance the ‘bastards’ were the two major parties. In fact, in his resignation speech from the Liberal Party, Chipp expressed dissatisfaction with the major parties along with the vested interests who attempted to influence the major parties.

Cassandra (1999:9) put forward the view that:-

> keep the bastards honest’ . . . doesn’t really mean a whole lot except, hey look at us we’re the referees.

Undoubtedly, if a party holds the balance of power in the Senate it could function as a referee, deciding which of the two major parties to support. In addition, there are other ways a party could ‘keep the bastards honest’ such as by skilful use of the parliamentary committee system. A party who has the ‘referee role’ of holding the balance of power could introduce its own private member’s legislation into parliament and negotiate support for the legislation from one of the major parties.
Siddons (1990:231) recalled that:-

At the time of writing, Chipp was still saying publicly he hoped the Democrats would never become a major party, because if it did it would not be able to maintain its principles.

Madden (2009:2) noted that the dichotomy between keeping the bastards honest and the drive for more left wing policies and be an active partner in government, produced tensions within the party and possibly led to voter disillusionment. This led to a perceived inability of the party to clearly articulate what it stood for in a more competitive political arena and to get its message heard. In addition, the party had a brand recognition problem. In other words, ‘who were the Australian Democrats and what did they stand for?’

It is very hard to pinpoint the party’s ideology or its central platform.

From the outset, West (1980:343) identified the dilemma:-

Looking forward from the 1977 election, the basic problem for the Democrats was that they had secured their initial electoral success as a movement; yet to protect and expand this success, they had to recognise the accepted requirements for a political party.

West went on to state that:-

While the whole thrust of their campaign had been against the current party system, the Democrats themselves had become part of it – whether they liked it or not – with the election of two senators of their own and one Lower House member in South Australia. Now that they had become a parliamentary party, it was no longer enough for the Democrats to project themselves as the nation’s political conscience by preaching the politics of vague goodwill.

At the 1977 Federal election, the Democrats became part of the party system to which they had been so opposed. Therefore, the party would find reforming that party system to be a very hard and demanding task. Put bluntly, vague comments by themselves do not constitute reform.

West went on to observe:-

They also had to have something concrete to say about a wide range of specific policy issues. The continuing risk for the Democrats was that precise policy stands would lose many votes previously won through ambiguity and through an emphasis on the values and style of the political environment.

West’s comments are significant. A party’s policies need to give the general thrust of the policy and not join up all of the dots – that is the role of the public service and not a political party. The influence of interest groups and peak industry bodies will come into play and be influential at the time the legislation is introduced into parliament and not so much if at all, beforehand. By providing too much detail or ‘over explaining’ the Democrats ran a very big risk of getting potential supporters off side. Hewson made the same big mistake with his ‘Fightback!’ package, which also got the press in on the act of asking minute policy detail questions.
By siding with one of the major parties in relation to legislation being debated in the Senate, the Democrats would undoubtedly offend some electors who had supported the party at the previous election. In voting on legislation in the Senate, the Democrat Senators had to make a choice to support the Labor Party or the Coalition and in making that decision, offending some of the party’s supporters would be inevitable.

Organisational Structure of the Party and Participatory Politics

The previous chapter gave a description of participatory politics as practiced by the Australian Democrats, namely polling of all party members on policy issues and leadership of the party, including the parliamentary party. However, with regard to the Australian Democrats, it can be argued that the party’s ‘participatory ethic’ (Warhurst 1997:10) was another reason for its demise.

While participatory politics looks good on paper is it almost impossible in practice. The Australian Democrats found that it slowed down the decision-making process that other parties left to their parliamentary party, such as the election of the leadership of the parliamentary party. This slowing down caused a sense of uncertainty in the broader community and even division within the party. For example, the election of the parliamentary leader and deputy leader of the Australian Democrats being open to all financial rank and file members of the party and not just the parliamentary party, meant that a leadership ballot could last for over a month or more. While in other parties with only the parliamentary party members voting, the ballot could be completed in less than a few hours. Therefore, election of the parliamentary leaders became a long and drawn out process. Furthermore, the leader elected by the rank and file members could be a member with whom none of the other parliamentary members could work. Again, the new leader could have had poor leadership skills, which were known to the parliamentary party members well before the leadership ballot.

Incredibly, a petition of the membership of the Australian Democrats, with a minimum of only 100 signatures could declare the leadership of the parliamentary democrats vacant and elections called to fill the leadership. This petitioning process was another long drawn out process that reflected uncertainty in the leadership of the parliamentary party.

Other parties in Australia usually leave the election of the parliamentary leaders of the party up to the members of the parliamentary party\(^2\). Members of the parliamentary party are in fact accountable to the rank and file members of the party at party conferences and more significantly through the party electoral councils. It is these councils that preselect the party’s

\(^2\) Since the Rudd reforms of 2013, the Federal Labor party now jointly elects its leader by a vote of party leaders and caucus
endorsed candidate for the particular electorate and a number of members of parliamentary parties have been defeated when they have come up for preselection, sometimes in the party’s ‘blue ribbon or safe electorates’.

Gauja (2010:491) argued that leadership of the party was ‘crucially important’ to the Party’s electoral success. She goes on to note that ‘the strong electoral effect of leadership is not uncommon to minor parties’. Given the effects of leadership and the change of leadership in the Democratic Labor Party and the high-profile leadership style of Pauline Hanson, that is a very true statement.

Gauja (2010:494) commented that:

The Australian Democrats were considered to be the most democratic party in Australia during its time, at least on paper. A party of the new politics movement, embracing the ideals of consensus, rational debate and citizen participation in politics.

That is true but other parties including the minor parties embrace these ideals through party membership and interaction with interest groups and community bodies including local government in terms of city, town and shire councils.

Yet Gauja (2010:495) went on to note that ‘participation in intra party activities remained very low throughout the party’s history’. ‘While party members liked the idea of participating, actually exercising it was another matter.’ In other words, like the Australia Party apathy was a major problem with a participatory democracy model.

West (1980:343) had earlier made the telling comment about the Australian Democrats version of parliamentary democracy:

the most practical parliamentary policy would not necessarily be arrived at by the kind of commitment that the Democrats had originally expressed to policy making by rank and file postal ballot.

Later events in the lifespan of the Australian Democrats proved West correct in her analysis of participatory democracy.

Gauja (2010:495) later reflected

Intra party democracy tends to create debilitating internal tensions when divergent opinions are encouraged, yet need to be reconciled. The strain on the party was most acute when the parliamentary party was forced to make difficult and contentious decisions in exercising its balance of power position.

Intra party democracy was never unique to the Australian Democrats. In fact, other parties exercise intra party democracy at branch meetings and state and federal conferences of the party. With regard to exercising the balance of power in the Australian Senate or a state upper house, parliamentary parties that have been in that situation were empowered by their party rank
and file to make a decision on which way to vote. This was on the understanding that the parliamentary members could be called to account by the party rank file to explain and justify their decision.

Siddons (1990:231) bluntly argued that:-

If the Democrats had nurtured the principle on which they were founded - the principle of participatory democracy – instead of bypassing it as the parliamentary wing of the party has done so repeatedly, there is no way the Democrats could lose their integrity.

Siddons’ comment neglects to realise that the Australian Democrats failed to restrict participative democracy to policy development, as the Australian Greens have done. The Australian Democrats did not allow the parliamentary party to elect its own leaders instead insisting that the parliamentary leaders be elected by the membership of the party. This meant that the parliamentary leaders were elected by party members who did not know the candidates that well and had little if any idea of either their ability to lead a parliamentary party and work with other members of the parliamentary party.

West (1980:343) also noted that:-

In 1977, the typical Australian voter still saw politics in terms of conflicting vested interests and was loyal to whichever established party seemed best to represent whatever interest was most personally relevant.

An example of a ballot paper used in the Australian Democrats is shown below. Some of these ballot papers were one page others were two pages and some were four pages. The ballot paper would be enclosed with the monthly copy of the Australian Democrats National Journal as an insert. Some discussion of the issues being balloted would appear in that copy of the Journal.

The size of the ballot paper was big, not only could a member vote on the policy as a whole, but the member could vote on the policy section by section. This could be a time-consuming task. It also meant members were freely invited to vote of the details of a policy area they knew nothing about or were totally disinterested in.
From the above ballot paper, it can be seen that as well as voting on general approval for the aboriginal affairs policy a member was also asked to consider and vote on 52 separate policy items. Other political parties vote on policy issues at party annual state and federal conferences. Policy issues are raised as motions sponsored by various branches of the party. At a party conference as a policy motion is being debated, the party delegates, usually in groups, can hear firsthand the reasons both for and against the motion and then they decide how they will vote.

West (1980:344) concluded that
In theory, of course in the light of the 1977 result, the Democrats' best electoral hopes seemed to lie in an ineffective government and an unacceptable opposition. Such a situation would have provided the ideal opportunity for the Democrats to ‘keep the bastards honest’. However, like all minor parties some of the support for the Democrats would have been protest votes, from voters who normally voted for one of the major parties voting for the Australian Democrats instead as a form of ‘protest’. A protest vote in the Senate elections would not defeat the government. The support from a protest voter is by no means guaranteed at the next election. The approach West presents could also lead to a professional ‘balance of power party’ which the Australian Democrats ultimately became. This a big difference to the operations of minor parties in the Senate at this point in time, where the balance of power is shared between a number of minor and micro parties.

**Electoral Performance as an Indicator**

A major problem for the Australian Democrats was that the party’s vote was very widely dispersed throughout the Australian states and thus the party could not concentrate its vote in a few areas and thus gain representation in the House of Representatives. Bartlett (1998:3) stated that ‘redoubling our efforts in Lower House seats is the only opportunity for our party to continue to grow.’
Table 21: Australian Democrats Electoral Performance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reps Percentage of vote</th>
<th>Senate Percentage of vote</th>
<th>Variation from Reps vote</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Total Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983*</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987*</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(note: * double dissolution election)

Source Madden (2009:5) (modified)

Significantly, unlike the DLP, the party was able to win seats at the 1983 and 1987 double dissolution elections and in addition, increase its number of elected Senators.

Unlike the DLP in 1967 and 1970 and later the Australian Greens, the Australian Democrats were never able to win a Senate quota in their own right in a half Senate election. In a half Senate election, the Democrats have always had to rely on preferences to get a candidate elected. In the 1983 double dissolution election with reduced quotas for the election of twice the number of Senators, the Australian Democrat candidates Don Chipp from Victoria and Janine Haines from South Australia won a quota of the votes on first preferences. In Victoria, the Democrat’s second candidate John Siddons lost out on the final Senate vacancy for Victoria.
In the other states, Colin Mason was re-elected in NSW winning the final Senate vacancy for that state, in Queensland Michael Macklin was elected in the ninth spot and in WA Jack Evans was elected in the final Senate vacancy. In the 1987 double dissolution election, seven Democrat Senators were elected with two from SA and one each from NSW, Vic, Qld, WA and Tas. The lead Democrat candidates in NSW, Victoria and South Australia won quotas in their own right, not requiring a flow of preferences.

The Democrats gained from the advantages of the lower quota in a double dissolution election. This was beyond the DLP at both the 1974 and 1975 double dissolution elections.

Table 22: Australian Democrats Primary votes and Quotas gained in three elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>Vic</th>
<th>QLD</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>Tas</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2001</strong></td>
<td>240,867</td>
<td>228,212</td>
<td>143,942</td>
<td>122,195</td>
<td>64,773</td>
<td>14,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td><strong>2004</strong></td>
<td>87,377</td>
<td>55,867</td>
<td>49,898</td>
<td>23,118</td>
<td>22,603</td>
<td>2,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td>37,193</td>
<td>52,596</td>
<td>45,584</td>
<td>8,908</td>
<td>12,604</td>
<td>Did not contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source AEC data

In the 2001 election after the allocation of preferences, the Democrats were successful in having four candidates elected to the Senate. In Tasmania where the Democrats were unsuccessful in getting a candidate elected, the Australian Greens obtained 42,568 votes (13.79 per cent of the vote) and 0.88 per cent of a quota. In that election, the Australian Greens in Tasmania only had one candidate, the high profile Dr Bob Brown who was elected to the Senate. In 2001, competition from the Greens was starting to impact on the Australian Democrats.

The sharp decline in the Democrats vote in both the 2004 and 2007 federal elections is quite evident. The Democrats’ vote in 2004 more than halved from its 2001 result of 7.2 per cent in the Senate. The four Senators up for re-election all lost their seats in the Senate as did the remaining four Senators in 2007. In Victoria in 2004, the ‘new’ DLP outpolled the Democrats. In 2007 the slightly higher results in Victoria and Queensland, (011% and 0.13%) resulted from serving Democrat Senators contesting the election, both lost their seats in the Senate.

In the 2004 and 2007 elections, the impact of the Greens increased. Two Greens Senators were elected in 2004 and three in 2007. After the 2007 election, the Greens had four Senators while the Democrats had no candidates elected to the Senate.
As well as a decline of votes in 2004 and 2007, the Democrats did not attract large numbers of preferences from other parties. For example, in Victoria, the Democrats received 54,925 primary votes. At the point in the count where the Democrat lead candidate was eliminated, the number of votes had increased by only 7,819. In both elections, the Democrats supported the Family First Party over other parties. This seems as a strange choice for a post materialist party such as the Democrats with its policies supporting a very conservative and moralistic party. However, in WA in 2004 the Democrats preferred the Australian Greens.

In South Australia in 2004, the lead Democrat Senator won 22,472 votes. By the time the candidate was excluded he had picked up 12,502 votes in preferences. After exclusion, 26,917 preferences went to Family First, 2,593 to the Greens and 1,472 to the ALP. This was a similar result to that of Victoria for the Democrats.

In 2007 in South Australia the lead Democrat candidate Russell, won 8,758 votes. At the time of exclusion, the candidate managed to acquire a meagre 1,561 votes in preferences. Most of the Democrat preferences, 9,568 went to the Greens with 851 preferences leaking to other candidates.

In both the 2004 and 2007 elections, the Democrats suffered from a large slump in their primary vote and an inability to attract preferences from other political parties.

Table 23: Senate electoral performance by state – the Australian Democrats 1977-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>77</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>83*</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>87*</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>07</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Vote</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like all minor parties, the Democrats had their areas of strength. The Democrats polled strongest in Victoria, the home state of Don Chipp and in South Australia, the home state of the Liberal Movement. Tasmania was a weak state for the party caused largely by competition from the independent Harradine and later the rise of the Australian Greens. Given that NSW was the home state of Gordon Barton and the Australia Party, it is surprising that the Democrats did not poll stronger in that state.

Table 24: The Australian Democrats in the Senate 2002 – 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>Lib/NP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>ADs Balance of Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shared/negate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: # Double dissolution election. In 1975, the number of senators increased from 60 to 64 with two senators being elected for each of the two territories. From 1985 the number of Senators increased from 64 to 76.

Table 26 shows the last years covered in table 22. These years show the sharp decline in the party’s support. In the later years, the increasing threat from the Greens to the longevity of the Democrats can be seen. The Greens had two Senators to the Democrats eight in 2002. However, in 2005, the two parties had equal representation in four senators each. However, this also spelt a reduction of the Democrats representation in the Senate by half. Finally, the Democrats in 2008 had lost all of their representation while the Greens had five Senators and shared the balance of power with an independent. The experiences of the Australian Greens and the balance of power will be discussed in the next chapter.

Second Preferences and Kernot

The Australian Democrat’s second preference strategy was discussed in the previous chapter. When Cheryl Kernot abruptly resigned from the Australian Democrats to join the ALP, the Democrats made the decision not to second preference Kernot in her House of Representatives electorate. As a result, Kernot only narrowly won her seat and lost it at the next election. This preference allocation by the Australian Democrats was an act of reprisal against Kernot.
In fact, MD Fisher (1998:11) considered that while considering Kernot to be ‘an opportunistic politician’, the Democrats were wrong in not giving her second preferences, claiming ‘we are undemocratic in not having preferences on how to vote cards decided by branch memberships in an open manner.’

As mentioned previously, at the end in 2004 and 2007, there seemed to be little if any logic in the Democrats preferring strategy, with preferences being allocated to the Family First Party.

Leadership

Leadership is a very significant issue and one that is readily noticeable by the electorate. The leader of a minor political party needs to be well known with a high profile and be able to stimulate and enthuse his or her listeners and in addition, be able to solve problems, conflicts and disputes.

With respect to the Democrats party room in May 1990 the role of the leader was seen as having:-

- Lighter portfolio load/no committee load, but do more press conferences by holding joint press conferences/releases by portfolio holder; backing up colleagues in the chamber; protection and protection monitoring tactics; coordinating role; supervisory role; public face of leadership should allow responses regardless of the subject matter but always in consult with portfolio holder.

The leader of the Democrats was seen by the party as its public face and an aid in its recognition among journalists and the voting public. Another important role of the parliamentary leader was to ensure that the Democrat Senators worked as a team.

The Democrats had a significant turnover of leaders. In the first 14 years of its existence, the Democrats had two high profile leaders. However, over the next 17 years the party had nine leaders, many of whom, unlike Kernot and Stott Despoja, had no profile. In addition, the defection of Kernot to the ALP in 1997 left the Democrats in a leadership vacuum. Also, the party experienced public and at times divisive battle between Lees and Scott-Despoja over leadership and the direction of the Party. Warhurst (1997:5) considered that ‘the ructions in the parliamentary party have been one cause for the debilitating splits’.
Table 25: Leadership – The Australian Democrats 1977-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Departure</th>
<th>Means of election</th>
<th>Other Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don Chipp</td>
<td>1977-1986</td>
<td>retired</td>
<td>Foundation leader</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janine Haines</td>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>Election loss (Hof R)</td>
<td>Elected by membership (ratification)</td>
<td>No other candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Macklin</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Six weeks later</td>
<td>Interim leader while membership poll conducted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janet Powell</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>No-confidence party room - loss in membership ballot</td>
<td>Elected by membership (ratification)</td>
<td>No other candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Coulter</td>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Loss in membership ballot</td>
<td>Elected by membership</td>
<td>Meg Lees, Janet Powell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheryl Kernot</td>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>Defected to the ALP</td>
<td>Elected by membership</td>
<td>John Coulter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meg Lees</td>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>Loss in membership ballot</td>
<td>Elected by membership (ratification)</td>
<td>No other candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natasha Stott-Despoja</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Resigned leadership</td>
<td>Elected by membership</td>
<td>Meg Lees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Greig</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Six weeks later</td>
<td>Interim leader while membership poll conducted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Bartlett</td>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>Resigned leadership</td>
<td>Elected by membership</td>
<td>Brian Greig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyn Allison</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>Election loss (Senate)</td>
<td>Elected unopposed (ratification)</td>
<td>No other candidates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source Economou and Ghazarian 2008)
Although in some leadership elections there was only one candidate, under the rules of the Australian Democrats, that candidate had to be ratified by the membership before taking on the leadership role.

The first leadership change came with the retirement of the party’s founder Don Chipp. Following his retirement, Janine Haines was elected leader of the Democrats. Chipp admitted Haines was his preferred successor to take over the leadership. (Chipp 1987:101). Don Chipp was the only leader of the Australian Democrats who led the party for almost a decade (nine years.)

Leadership changes also spelt a change in policy emphasis in addition to leadership style. For example, Powell and Coulter emphasised radical environmentalism, while Kernot presented an economic and industrial emphasis, while as a leader, Lees could be considered a deal-maker (Madden 2009:14). Lees ‘deal making was evidenced in part by her willingness to negotiate with the coalition government over the GST legislation’.

Economou and Ghazarian (2008) consider that the party’s leadership rivalry within the parliamentary wing along with the party’s inability to deal with this problem because of its organisational arrangements (which were designed to empower the membership) was the major reason for its poor performance at the 2004 and 2007 elections.

Siddons (1990:220) has provided a telling perspective of this issue. He believed that Chipp set up a party structure that provided that all paid staff of the parliamentary party report directly to the leader of the parliamentary party and not any other member of the party. These staff relied on the leader for their jobs and thus their loyalty to the leader was assured.

Siddons also pointed out that the parliamentary leader’s principal private secretary was also the Victorian State president of the party. In Siddons’ view, this arrangement allowed Chipp to have influence over the Victorian State President. In addition, the Principal Private Secretary could campaign for re-election for that role in strong position being able to meet members and influence than compared to a person who campaigned for State President and who at the same time had to hold down a job to earn a living.

Siddons 1990:167) commented that when Chipp became a Senator ‘he seemed to lose a lot of interest in the administration and what was going on in the party . . . it was a great pity he did not make a greater effort to maintain closer links with the party administration because he had enormous influence with the members’.

There is also evidence that Don Chipp was nursing a vengeance against Meg Lees. Floyd (2014:118) noted that Don Chipp did not support Meg Lees. There was history between them
and Chipp was not one to forget a rebuff. His subsequent support for Stott-Despoja almost
guaranteed her success in a ballot.

In addition, Floyd (2014:118ff) reported that Stott-Despoja needed to reunite the party under her
leadership but five of the eight senators were not happy with the way things had been handled.
To add fuel to the fire in the first months of her leadership, Floyd (2014:120) reported that the
allocation of staff members by Stott-Despoja caused friction. Some new staff members were
insufficiently aware of the way matters had been handled previously and had stepped on toes.
Furthermore Floyd (2014:120) went on to report that while she was good at self-promotion and
communication, Stott-Despoja couldn’t find a way to deal with tensions in the party room. Her
presidential style grated with others in the team and she was difficult to contact. Her schedule
was hectic, her phone was often in silent mode and had no voicemail and when messages were
received she did not always return calls.

The retirement of Don Chipp who was also a steady guiding hand, with a wealth of experience
in parliamentary and government matters was a big loss to the party. Chipp was also capable in
resolving conflicts within the party and thus keeping the party united. However, Chipp failed
by not grooming future leaders in a structure way in the long term as John McEwen had done in
the Country Party.³

Kernot the Party Leader Defected to the ALP

Likewise, the defection of Kernot to the ALP turned out to be a significant death knell of the
Australian Democrats in that her defection turned them into ‘just another party’. By defecting,
Kernot destroyed the ‘Democrat brand’ further there was no obvious leader to take over (Van
Onslen 1998:np). The defection of Kernot destroyed the image of trust and unity within the
parliamentary party.

For quite a while it was clear ‘to a lot of good judges’ that Kernot was ‘wasted as a leader of a
minor party, she was a natural who was charismatic. However, Kernot had enemies within the
ranks of the Democrats, these included Chipp, Coulter and Janet Powell’ (O’Reilly 1998:387).

Floyd (2014:118) reported that:-

Some thought the departure of Cheryl Kernot in 1997 and the surrounding media frenzy
was the beginning of the end of the Australian Democrats. Liz Oss-Emer, president of the
National Executive between 2001 and 2002 told me that that was not so:

³ By comparison, a former leader of the Country Party, John McEwen took three of the younger members of his
parliamentary party and groomed then for future leadership (Reid 1969:101). Two of these members ultimately led
the Party; one of them in fact replaced McEwen when he retired. At that stage, the Country Party had a history for
retaining its Parliamentary leaders for many years.
I think the time when Cheryl actually left was an event that brought everyone together, tightly together. I remember the first National executive meeting happened to be in Brisbane after she left, and the feeling of cohesion was very strong there. Everyone was very focused on making sure that we stabilised and Meg came in as leader then and she was a very good leader—she worked very hard to keep everything together.

While the Kernot defection might not have harmed the unity within the Party, it damaged the standing and image of the party in the eyes of the general public.

Following the Kernot departure, at the 1998 federal election Meg Lees led the Australian Democrats and nine Democrat Senators were returned to the Senate.

**Resignations of Senators**

The resignation of a number of Democrat Senators was another factor in the decline of the party. These resignations being of a sitting member of parliament were very public and attracted much publicity. The leadership of the party seemed unable to prevent these resignations. For example, Siddons resigned from the Australian Democrats on 26 November 1996, the decisive issue was the decision of the Australian Democrats or more particularly its leader Haines to vote against the government legislation to abolish the subsidy paid to farmers for the purchase of imported agricultural fertilizers. In the vote on the legislation in the Senate, the Australian Democrats split, with three of its seven members crossing the floor and voting with the other side.

The Victorian Division met on 14 December 1996 at a ‘special general meeting’ to consider Siddons resignation. The minutes read in part:

> Senator Janet Powell stated that the four senators who voted against the government’s fertilizer bill did not act against party policy (but under our rules would have been free to do so if their action had been against party policy). In substance, it was a decision between reducing costs for farmers (the position the 4 senators took) or providing support for manufacturers. In general Australia will need to face the challenge of gradually reducing protection of our industries in the process of making us more competitive in the world’s markets.

David Vigor a Senator from South Australia was a founding member of the Liberal Movement and in 1977, a founding member of the Australian Democrats.

Vigor resigned from the Democrats on 5 June 1987 joining Siddons in the Unite Australia Party, the party that Siddons had founded. Siddons in January of that year in a statement described the Democrats as a ‘stinking decaying compost heap from which any self-respecting individual should escape’. Along with Siddons, Vigor lost his seat in the Senate at the 1987 double dissolution election. He then attempted to re-join the Australian Democrats, having moved from South Australia to Canberra to live. As a matter of course, the Democrats enquired into his membership of the Unite Australia Party. Vigor argued that he moved parties so that preferences from the Unite Australia Party would flow to the Democrats and bring about the
election of Senator John Coulter in South Australia. Vigor claimed this would not have been possible if he was not the Unite Australia Party candidate. However, his argument did not convince the National Executive of the Democrats who voted to expel him from the party in 1988 (NLA Schneider Papers series 3 Folder 10).

Vigor’s actions, honorable as he may have seen them, did not enhance the unity and stability of the party. In addition, his colleagues saw him as being a bit ‘wacky’. He was impractical and did not appear to think issues through. As a Senator, Vigor asked lots of questions in parliament often tying up resources to research the answers but he never bothered to read the answers to his many questions in fact he would be interested in an idea one week and completely lose interest in it the next.

Table 26: Australian Democrats Resignations from the Party to another Party or Independent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Elected to the Senate for ADs</th>
<th>Resigned from the Party</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vigor, David</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>1 Dec 1984</td>
<td>June 1987</td>
<td>Unite Australia Party from June 1987 Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean, Paul</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coulter, John</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernot, Cheryl</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>1 Jul 1990</td>
<td>15 Oct 1997</td>
<td>Joined ALP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodley, John</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lees, Meg</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>4 Apr 1990</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>Ind from July 2002, Australian Progressive Alliance from April 2003 to 30 Jun 2005 Defeated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only member of the Australian Democrats who resigned from their seat in the Parliament, and not from the Democrats as well, was Don Chipp. All of the other resignations from the
Senate were also resignations from the Party. Some resigned from the Parliament as well while others stayed in the Parliament either as independents or as members of other parties in most cases parties that they founded and were its sole parliamentary member.

In the 1990s an unfortunate moniker stuck to the party. The Labor Senator Peter Walsh the then Minister for Finance, used the unflattering title the ‘fairies at the bottom of the garden’ to describe the Democrats on 28 October 1987 in the Senate. He was responding to a question from Senator Jenkins, a Democrat Senator from WA. Walsh seemed to be determined that the title stuck to the Democrats as showing them as a party out of touch with reality. In the Senate on 25 November 1987, Walsh in answer to a question from Senator Powell, again referred to the Democrats twice, as ‘the fairies at the bottom of the garden party’ (Senate Hansard (1987:2384). Later in that question time, Walsh in response to a question from Senator Coulter again referred to the Democrats as ‘fairies at the bottom of the garden’. For good measure in that response Walsh referred the Democrats ‘agricultural wing’ as ‘Lygon street farmers’ (Senate Hansard (1987:2391-2). ‘Lygon Street’ is a Melbourne street renowned for its trendy and up market coffee shops and eateries.

As can be seen from the following cartoon from Geoff Pryor of the 1 August 1992 edition of the *Canberra Times*, following the resignation of Senator Janet Powell in 1992, the press took up ‘the fairies at the bottom of the garden’ description of the Democrats. The cartoon also highlighted two major problems in the Party, namely frequent leadership changes and numerous resignations.
Resignations of Party Officials and Members

The Democrats were also plagued with some very public and well-publicised resignations by party officials. Resignations in four states stand out, South Australia, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia.

**South Australia**

In the lead up to the State election of 1985, the Democrats candidate for the Legislative Council, Mr Don Chisholm was ousted from the number one spot on the party ticket. As a result, Bob Tripp the party’s ballots officer resigned from the party and other members including Lance Milne MLC, disassociated themselves from the party’s Legislative Council ticket (Abraham 1985). In the final week of the election campaign, the retiring leader of the parliamentary party, Lance Milne MLC resigned from the party stating that the party was now controlled by the Left and had swung away from the middle of the road course.

The News of 4 December 1985 in an article titled ‘Democrats split highly possible’ reported Bob Manhire Port Adelaide branch deputy chairman as saying ‘a split was looming, but most of us are hoping to hold on until we can work out some kind of compromise’. The Adelaide Advertiser in its editorial for 2 December 1985 counselled-

> it would have been better to work for change from within the party, rather than for Mr Milne to turn his back in what could be construed as a destructive move.

Manhire went on to authorise and place an advertisement in the Adelaide Advertiser of 4 December 1985, which was a ‘statement in support of Lance Milne’. The statement reiterated ‘Lance Milne’s public warnings against the dangers of the changed direction of the party and its alliance with a limited spectrum of special interest groups.’ The statement concluded:-

> Finally, we wish to record publicly our firm belief that there is a continuing role for the original concepts of the Democrats. We pledge to do all that we can to see that these ideals and practices do not fade into obscurity.

> Mr Milne has done that and we publicly applaud his stand.’

It seemed that Manhire wanted to work for change within the party as the advertiser suggested. If so why not do it quietly and not in such a publicly divisive way?

In the Adelaide Advertiser of 2 December 1985, in an article entitled ‘Conservative Wing of Democrats plans to counterattack’, it was reported that ‘conservative forces’ within the Democrats supported Milne in his resignation and attacked the leadership of the Democrats in SA. The spokesperson for this group was Jo Bailey a. member of the Australian Democrats in SA a state council representative and a campaign manager for the 1985 state elections.

The article reported that the conservative group claimed that:-
The party’s power structure has been perverted, with control now coming from the top rather than grassroots.

The Democrats were supposed to be different from the other parties in the way decisions were made; that is no longer the case in South Australia.

At a meeting of the National Executive of the party on 5 6 July 1986 an attempt was made to expel Bailey from the party for ‘acting against the interests of the party (section 4.2 of the Party’s National Constitution) this motion was later amended to a ‘severe reprimand’ and carried by the meeting.

Section 4.2 provides that the National Executive may expel from the party any person who is found by three quarters of the National Executive to have acted against the interests or objectives of the party.

Victoria

The Victorian division also had resignation problems. On 21 May 1986, three members of the Victorian division announced their resignations at a press conference. These three members were:

- Mr Jim Cockell, vice president of the Victorian division;
- Mr Michael Nardella, the division’s representative on the national executive of the Democrats; and
- MK Capon president of the Casey branch of the party.

The three members put out a press release announcing their resignation (NLA Schneider Papers - series 3, folder 4). In the press release, they gave as a reason for their resignation:

The Australian Democrats especially in Victoria have moved so far from the stated aims and aspirations of the party, that they should no longer use the name ‘Democrats’.

They went on to claim that:

The Australian Democrats are fast becoming only the political arm of the ACF, PND, NDP (sic) and radical splinter groups who are disillusioned with the conservative actions of the ALP. Lip service only is paid to other issues.

They also claimed that ‘the decline and non-renewal of membership, and resignations have taken their toll of ‘moderate’ democrats’.

In the subsequent press conference elaborating on their reasons for resigning, they blamed poor communication and that membership views had not been taken into consideration. They also highlighted falling numbers in Democrat branches. Cockell also claimed many members had joined the party on single issues. However, all political parties experience both falling numbers and the fact that people join the party on a single issue, such as social welfare, the environment or even defence.
This round of resignations was very public complete with press conference with questions from the journalists who attended.

*The Age* of 22 May 1986 in an article titled ‘Democrats in turmoil over election row’ quoted Cockell as saying ‘unless something is done, the Democrats will be a spent force’. *The Age* went on to comment that, ‘the resignations were the latest in a series of internal ructions within the Victorian Branch’ (Carney 1986:3).

Such resultant adverse publicity did not help the party, which had been in existence for just on nine years. Furthermore, these resignations were just before Chipp’s resignation as parliamentary leader of party. It is surprising that Chipp did not have a role in this episode of conflict. In any political party, conflict of some sort is to be expected. It is surprising that the three unhappy Democrats did not seek out Chipp as a sounding board and source of advice. Alternatively, as a leader of the party it is surprising that Chipp did not intervene as a mediator. It is quite possible that the first any party member, including Chipp, heard about the resignations was the issue of the press release. If that was the case, it would strongly indicate that the three who resigned from the party either wanted to inflict damage on the party or even destroy it.

**Queensland**

In Queensland in August 1985, three senior members of the party publically resigned. The three members were:

- Mike West, a Queensland delegate to the party’s national executive;
- David Dalgarno, state director of the Democrats; and
- Stan Stanley the state director of the party.

Betty Stanley the wife of Stan Stanley also resigned. These very public resignations of such senior officers of the party, and the reasons for the resignations, attracted the attention of the press. *The Courier Mail* proclaimed ‘Four top Democrats leave state branch’ . . . ‘the reason was a negative attitude among the membership’ (Hammond 1985).

In a letter dated August 1985 to Democrat members in Queensland, Senator Michael Macklin described the resignations ‘followed by press comments’ as ‘undoubtedly a blow to the party in Queensland’ (Macklin 1985:1). Macklin went on to claim that ‘the resignations were caused by the excessive criticism which exists in the party of those who get out and do the work.’

*The Sydney Sun* of 28 July 1985 reported Cheryl Kernot, the then Queensland state secretary of the party commenting that the resignations of the four senior party members as a ‘temporary hiccup’ which ‘would have no long-term effect’. The reason for the resignations according to Kernot was ‘a difference of opinion over management style.’
However, the *Telegraph* of 26 July 1985 reported Mike West, the party’s delegate to the national executive as blaming a ‘feminist faction’ which was ‘destroying the party in Queensland’ for the resignations. In the article, West went on to claim that the party was ‘by nature, wide open to infiltration to sectional groups.’

The *Courier Mail* of 27 July 1985 carried a headline, ‘Parties say Democrats finished.’ And in the *Sunday Sun* of 28 July 1985, in an article titled ‘Democrats poll hopes grow thinner’ Malcom Farr commented that Queensland ‘has been too cleanly divided between Liberal/National conservatives and the ALP to allow room for a third group to really grow.’

Farr went on to note that the ‘pioneers’ of the Australian Democrats have often been depicted as Volvo owners with a social conscience and little else.’

Finally, Macklin warned the party members in Queensland:-

> We said we were starting a different party, but for some time now, State Council and management committee have begun to look very much like the corresponding groups in other parties. Now is the time to take stock and admit that this was not what we want for this party of ours (Macklin 1985:2).

**The Western Australia Conflict**

The party experienced major conflict in Western Australia in July 1993 as a result of the WA division annual elections for office holders in the division. On 25 July near the end of the afternoon session of its meeting, after advising delegates that there ‘was a crisis in WA’, the national executive carried a motion that in effect requested five members of the Western Australia division namely, David Churches, John Samuel, Huw Grossmith, Brian Jenkins and Jean Jenkins to:-

> withdraw any nomination they may have made for positions in the WA division current ballot, and asks that they refrain from nominating for or gaining party office for a period of two years

In the absence of the members withdrawing, the national executive intended to take action under regulation 6.7.1 of the party’s constitution, which provides that if the national executive:-

> believes that it would be of significant benefit to the Party to do so it may without prejudice prohibit a member from nominating for or gaining election to a party office for a period not exceeding two years, reopen nominations for a ballot which is underway and take control of such a ballot.

Significantly, regulation 6.7.1 had only been inserted into the party’s constitution that morning.

The divisional council meet in an emergency meeting on 29 July. Keith Lees was the delegate from WA at the national executive meeting and he advised the emergency meeting that with regard to:-
where the national executive obtained the ‘perceptions’ on which it based its choice of people to ban, he referred to general gossip (described as communications between people), a poor media coverage and a low electoral vote. He did not refer to any formal reports and could not explain why no questions had been asked of divisional council or its officers before the relevant decisions were made.

When asked why the membership could not decide by national ballot on such far-reaching powers as regulation 6.7.1 or decide by the normal divisional ballot process who to exclude and who not to exclude, Lees responded by stating:-

This was a participatory democracy model, and participatory democracy went out with the ancient Greeks.

This seems a very curious statement considering that Australian Democrat party objective 11 stated in part:-

To achieve and defend effective participatory democracy and open government.

When Lees was asked by the divisional council to ‘name Jean Jenkins’ offence’ Lees responded that:-

Jenkins was a ‘prominent member of the WA division and the ban was merely a ‘circuit breaker and not a sanction or indicating that the five members had done anything wrong.

In his statement printed in the WA Division Newsletter Lees noted that the five members could not hold a ‘party position’ for a period of two years, they could however hold a ‘public position’ in other words they could be preselected as a candidate for the Democrats in a Senate election. He also commented that:-

the feeling of the national executive was that ‘serious problems’ within the WA division were retarding the development of the party in the west and therefore nationally.

Later in 1993, the motion against those members of the party in WA was withdrawn by the party. However, on 30 and 31 August 1994 the national executive of the party again expelled various members of the party’s WA state executive. These members included Mr David Churches and Mr John Samuel. These expulsions were designed to rid the party of those two men. However, the expulsions were very public, leading to litigation in the Supreme Court of WA.

Finally, in 1996 Hughes (1996) was able to report that:-

After years of bitter infighting, expulsions and a long and confusing battle with a rival group, the West Australian branch of the Australian Democrats claims to be back on track. Hughes went on to state that Andrew Murray acknowledged that, ‘infighting has cost the party West Australian votes in the past.’
However, the aftermath of this rather damaging public dispute carried on for a number of years including an unsuccessful application by Churches to the High Court of Australia on 24 October 2002 for special leave to appeal.

The Party and the Press

The Australian Democrats were also critical of the press. But in 1977-78 when the Australian Democrats were becoming established one could not help but notice the difference in the press treatment compared to the DLP. All of Don Chipp’s rallies and speeches received significantly more coverage that the DLP press releases and electoral events.

However, the Australian Democrats claimed the media did not give them the same amount of attention that was given to the two major parties (Madden 2009:15). As a result, the Party’s work in the Senate was not publicised – the media only paid attention to the Party in times of leadership tensions or party disagreements. The Party’s problems with what was its real role; policy making or a third force with a balance of power function and the tension this caused within the party along with getting its message heard was discussed earlier in this chapter. The Australian Democrats as a political party was not one of the major parties, thus it would be unreasonable to expect the same level of media attention as the party in government or the party in opposition (the alternative government.)

In the Australian Democrats changing leaders frequently and splits in the party attracted press coverage that damaged and did not help the party increase its share of the vote. Cassandra (1999:9) detailed the problems the Party had with the press when Stott-Despoja came into the leadership of the Party. From the beginning, she attracted attention because of her gender and her age, she entered parliament at age 25, the same age as Paul Keating and Malcolm Fraser. In April 1999, Stott-Despoja travelled to Albania to visit the Kosovo refugees. Cassanda stated that:-

‘a series of strategic leaks lead to reports in the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Mail alleging that she had variously:-

- Travelled to Albania for 24 hours and then spent weeks shopping in Rome;
- Travelled to Albania without advising the Senate;
- Travelled to Albania without properly advising her party;
- Travelled to Albania whilst the GST debate was on.

According to Cassandra what really happened was that Stott-Despoja stopped over in Rome only between connecting flights for a few hours. Her trip to Albania was not a secret in fact it was well known and she had all necessary approvals from her Party, the Senate and the Government. As for the GST debate, it began in the Senate the day before she returned to Australia. Stott-Despoja was not even the Democrats’ tax spokesperson! Cassanda commented
that during the GST debate there had been ‘at least 30 Members absent from Parliament for various reasons.’

The ‘Ambassador Program’

In 1985, shortly after the Federal election, Senator Sid Spindler from Victoria wrote a paper ‘An Agenda for Reform’. In that paper, Spindler considered that the Party needed to build up electoral support in ‘a determined and carefully planned way’ (Spindler 1985:4). In that paper, Spindler drew up a plan for what he termed ‘The Ambassadors’ Program’.

Freeman (ND:2) defined the ‘Ambassador Program’ as a scheme whereby: -

Each Australian Democrats Senator will have an ambassador in each State who will liaise with groups working in key areas which the Senator is spokesperson for.

In getting started with the Ambassador’s program party members were instructed to find at least four to six members to form a task group and then ‘examine the Democrats’ record in your particular area’. The next stage was to list any current or possible future issues, define Government and opposition positions. One would have thought a member of parliament and a shadow minister in particular would have carried out this stage as a matter of course.

The next stage was to:-

- make contact with relevant interest groups and leading advocates or experts; ascertain their objectives and compare with Democrat policies and objectives; offer assistance and co-operation to achieve common aims.

The final stage in getting started was to:-

- Develop a political action program in consultation with the Senator’s office and relevant interest groups/activists.

On an ongoing basis ambassadors, and presumably the party’s Senators, were instructed to:-

- Maintain political action in accordance with the program, i.e. organise letters and articles to both general media and specialist publications, press statements, telephone campaigns, functions and meetings, further research, parliamentary action – i.e. Questions, Notices of Motions, Speeches, Amendments, Private Members Bills; arrange for Democrat members to join relevant interest groups and take part in public activities.

Ambassadors were also to ‘suggest new initiatives to Senator (sic) and his/her staff.’ One would have thought that this task would be a role for any party member or branch of the Party.

The purpose of that program was for members of the party (ambassadors) to operate on behalf of a specific senator with respect to one of that Senator’s shadow portfolios, for example health. The ambassador would move around his or her state and meet up with interest groups and peak industry bodies relation to health (for example in this case such groups as the Australian Medical Association, the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons and the Australian Nurses
Federation and put these bodies in touch with the Democrat shadow minister for health. In addition, the ambassador would draw the details of these organisations and the principal spokespersons to the attention of the shadow minister.

This was another proposal from the Australian Democrats that looked and sounded impressive but that was about all. In other parties, a shadow minister would have had a pretty fair idea of who were the relevant interest groups and peak industry bodies and their spokespersons (a minister in government would have that service provided by his or her department). In addition, most peak industry bodies and interest groups would be rather keen to touch base with a shadow minister – particularly if that shadow minister’s party held the all-important balance of power in the senate!

The ‘Ambassadors Program’ folded because of a lack of ‘ambassadors’ from the Australian Democrats. Members were just not interested in and rather apathetic about taking on the role. So once again, apathy made its presence strongly felt in the Australian Democrats.

A problem common to many Minor Parties - Money Problems

When the Party rose up in 1977 it relied heavily on donations for its funding and did so until payment for first preference votes from the public purse became law. In those early years, the party was able to receive commissions from insurance policies taken out with a certain insurer. The same arrangement was in place for travel arranged by a specific travel agent. For many years, the National party used this funding raising method with insurance brokering. The party received a commission for every policy negotiated by the broker on behalf of a party member. Interestingly the DLP had no such arrangement relying instead in a yearly ‘silver circle’.

Although for quite a bit of its lifespan the Australian Democrats benefited, if their vote was high enough, from public funding for each first preference vote the party received. The party had to receive greater than four per cent of the primary vote in each state to be eligible for this payment from the public purse.

Ghazarian (2015:107) reported that:-

By the 2004 election, the infighting and instability had taken its toll on the Democrats. The party’s membership had fallen and it struggled to find the human and financial resources necessary to mount an effective election campaign.

This infighting was reflected in the Party’s falling vote at elections, which resulted in a greater reliance on donations to the Party and increased general fund raising.
Grass roots Members versus the Parliamentary members

Bennett (2011) commented on the state of play in the Democrats towards the end of the party’s parliamentary life in 2007.

Bennet considered that the majority of the party’s membership was from the hard left. The issue was should the ‘hard left’ have the right to dictate to the parliamentary wing of the party how they should vote and conduct their internal affairs. Bennett went on to note that this issue of external control over the Australian Democrats parliamentary wing is one which now threatens to destroy the party because the Australian Democrats claim to political legitimacy has historically rested on its parliamentarians being free from (and being perceived to be free from) external control, when exercising their parliamentary votes. Since their emergence in 1977, a founding principle was that a parliamentarian’s conscience vote could take precedence over party policy.

Conscience voting came from the New Liberal Movement – participatory democracy from the Australian party. By comparison, the Liberal Party allows its members to ‘cross the floor’ on matters of conscience. However, the Liberals would not tolerate crossing the floor on a major issue such as supply or a confidence motion. In the ALP, a party decision made in the party room is binding on members when they vote in the parliament.

If a Senator ‘crossed the floor’ and voted against his or her parliamentary party colleagues, then that Senator would be accountable to the Party for his or her decision to cross the floor. The ultimate test would be the Senator’s accountability to the Party members when the Senator faced pre-selection. In fact, if ‘crossing the floor’ was really unpopular it would not doubt encourage party members to challenge for pre-selection either by forcing a preselection meeting for the Senator’s position or by standing as a candidate when pre-selection next took place.

Members versus the parliamentary members may have been a reason for the demise of the Democrats but it is certainly not the main reason. In fact, differences between the parliamentary party members and the rank and file party members happens in other parties and it is usually resolved at party meetings and party state and federal conferences.

Supply, Retrospective Legislation and the Balance of Power

The Australian Democrats were determined that there would be no repeat of 11 November 1975 with the denial of supply by the Senate. In 1981 in the Budget, the Liberal Fraser government introduced legislation to impose sales tax on printed materials such as book and newspapers along with building materials. This proposal created much opposition, with the Labor opposition prepared to vote against the imposition of sales tax on what was seen as ‘the necessities of life’.
The question for the Democrats would the voting against the Sales Tax legislation be a ‘blocking of supply’? Don Chipp as leader thought such an action would in fact be an act of ‘blocking supply’. However, Siddons Chipp’s fellow Victorian Senator considered such a move was not an act of ‘blocking supply’.

Siddons (1990:172) noted that the Party’s policy was one of no sales tax on the necessities of life. Siddons went on to argue that supply was the appropriation legislation ‘which appropriated money to pay ordinary annual services of government; in other words, the money to pay the salaries of the civil service’. In fact, Siddons was correct in his thinking. It was this legislation that was blocked in 1975, not any taxation legislation. The concept of ‘supply’ is the approval by parliament for the government of the day to spend money. ‘Supply’ in itself is not where the money comes from or how it is raised in the first place. Siddons (1990:173) commented that Chipp ‘was very nervous about interfering with any budget bill’.

In the end, Chipp was admitted to hospital with a heart attack before the legislation was voted on in Parliament and Mason was the acting leader. The other Senators agreed with Siddons’ stance. They also considered the legislation was both unpopular and most unfair. In the end the Democrats voted against the legislation and it became one of the ‘triggers’ for the 1983 double dissolution election that saw Fraser’s government defeated and the start of the Hawke Prime Ministership.

Retrospective tax legislation was another issue that caused conflict in the Democrats party room. The Fraser government introduced legislation into the Parliament to outlaw certain tax avoidance schemes. The starting date for this legislation was backdated to well before its announcement or in other words the legislation was made retrospective. Siddons and Mason supported the retrospective legislation, while Chipp, Haines and Macklin intended to vote against the retrospectivity of the legislation. Siddons (1990:177) commented that ‘at the time the issue rose in parliament the Democrats had not laid down a position on retrospectivity’. In Siddons’ view what should have happened in that situation under the principles of participatory democracy, the members of the Australian Democrats should have been polled in order to vote for or against the usage of retrospective legislation.

**Supporting Unpopular Legislation - The GST**

Supporting a significant measure that is clearly unpopular to the vast majority of the party’s members and supporters is another factor that could cause a lasting decline in the party’s support. An example is the Australian Democrat’s decision to support the Goods and Services Tax (GST) legislation.

Gauja (2010:495) considered that
disagreement as to whether the outcome of the negotiations by the Democrat parliamentarians in accepting a goods and services tax actually reflected or contravened party policy caused irreparable ructions both within the membership and the parliamentary party and resulted in two separate attempts to remove the leadership. The party never recovered from this fundamental breakdown in its democratic processes and the Democrats’ dysfunctional organisation.

Gauja (2005:75) reports that the Australian democrats draft taxation policy was officially balloted in June 1998. Although the policy did not specifically mention the GST, it did contain a proposal ‘for tax to be levied on the provision of services as wells as on the production of goods’ (item 7(b); National Journal June 1998. The party all along supported a tax on services but not on essential food items.

Prior to the 1998 election Prime Minister John Howard announced his intention to legislate for a goods and services tax and the Australian Democrats prepared by sending teams to each state division to discuss the issues. A membership policy ballot took place to determine Democrat policy on the GST. The question on the ballot paper was difficult to interpret (Floyd (2014:111).

In an interview with Floyd (2014:111) Liz Oss-Emer (President of the Democrats) stated that:-

> It wasn’t just their vote in the Senate that was really the issue that caused a lot of division. It was actually the policy ballot that preceded that. It was the most confusing thing designed not actually to elicit a clear result. I think there were pockets of members from that time that just didn’t accept that it was the right way to go. I remember when the GST was being debated at a Queensland state council meeting which is about 30, 40 or 50 people Andrew Bartlett just took a straw poll of the room to get a (and this is branches from all over the state) feeling of it, and it was split one third accept the GST as it was proposed, one third oppose under any circumstances and one third modify. So I think that it was pretty indicative of how members were feeling.

The result was that the Democrats would pass the tax reforms of whichever party won the 1998 Federal election but would support the GST only if food and other necessities of life were exempted.

When the Tasmanian independent Brian Harradine refused to vote for the GST in the Senate, the focus then turned to the Australian Democrats.

Floyd (2014:111) comments that Meg Lees John Cherry and Andrew Murray met with John Howard and his Treasurer Costello to negotiate terms on which the Democrats might support the bill in the Senate. The angst and disillusionment regarding the GST was added to by the fact that the Party’s parliamentary leaders showed very poor negotiating skills and a lack of preparation for the very serious negotiations involved. They also failed to consult with the rest of the parliamentary party before committing the party’s support to the government.

Lees and the team achieved many but not all the concessions she wanted. The bill passed in June 1999 (prior to Ridgeway and Greig taking up their position in the Senate) after Lees agreed
to support the legislation the Democrat Senators Stott Despoja and Bartlett crossed the floor to vote against it.

Gauja (2005:75) commented that:-

The decision to subvert the standard process by publicly releasing the Democrats taxation position before releasing the results of the policy ballot to members may have alienated and angered many of the party’s rank and file, creating the impression that the taxation policy was being hijacked by the parliamentary wing.

The party voted for the introduction of the GST, after gaining some concessions – but the parliamentary party split on the vote. Many members of the Democrats were not happy with the parliamentary party for supporting the GST.

Embarrassingly for the party when the GST legislation was being voted on in the Senate the Democrat Senators divided, with two of the Senators voting with the Labor Party to vote against the GST. Meg Lees resigned the leadership of the party.

The party membership elected Stott-Despoja as the new leader. A major task for Stott-Despoja was to urgently reunite the Democrat parliamentary party. However, she was hampered by her problematic leadership style which was discussed earlier in this chapter.

Ghazarian (2015:105) comments that after the change of leader to Stott-Despoja in 2001:-

The party continued to be embroiled in internal bickering between the supporters of Stott-Despoja and Lees. . . the party had spent the period since the last election squabbling of the position of the party in the senate, manifesting in the GST debate, and resulting in the leadership change

Stott-Despoja’s leadership continued to be marred with internal conflict. This spilled over and into the public domain. She resigned the leadership of the Democrats after only 16 months as leader. The party room won out against the leadership vote of the membership of the party. The election of Stott-Despoja as parliamentary leader by the membership instead of the parliamentary party highlighted problems in this method of leadership election. An inexperienced leader was elected who could not work harmoniously with the other parliamentary members.

Floyd (2014:156) reports that:-

Senior party members saw Natasha as the future of the party. She was young and vibrant and was attractive to the media, but was she ready?

However, Floyd (2014:156) went on to note that:-

Allan Ramsay did not share that view and wrote, ‘she was all about herself . . . she paraded herself . . . it wasn’t about politics, anything she could get her hands on particularly, television . . . She was the leader, and you thought, hang on, what about the Democrats? . . . What about the party; what about policy?
Working with the Australian Greens

Competition and from a party that had views similar to the Australian Democrats occurred very early in the lifespan of the party with competition from the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP). In the 1984 Senate election that party was successful in getting a Senator elected from Western Australia.

In giving his report at the Democrats national executive meeting held on 10 February 1985, Chipp advised with respect to the NDP senator – The Australian Democrats will be ‘nice to her and helpful.’

Chipp went to observe that the net result of what the NDP did was to split the anti-nuclear vote. If it had not entered the field, the Australian Democrats would now have six long-term senators. Three years from now (1988) six Senators will be retiring and therefore by 1988 Australia could be devoid of any anti-nuclear voice.

Chipp also noted that ‘the media only wants a two-party system so gave NDP extraordinary amount of publicity’.

The chapter on the demise of the DLP explored a possible amalgamation with the Country Party (now the Nationals). In that light, could a possible amalgamation with the Australian Greens have allowed the influence of the Democrats to survive in parliament?

A major problem for the Australian Democrats in their relationship with the Australian Greens was while the two parties had much in common in their respective environmental policies and other polices, they have a distrust for each other.

Spindler (1989:1) reported that in 1989, Bob Brown of the Australian Greens:–

agreed in principle that greater co-operation between the Democrats and Greens is desirable and stated that it should go beyond a mere exchange of preferences. . . .

He made two other relevant comments –

1. That he was rebuffed in no uncertain terms when he approached Don Chipp in 1984 with the suggestion of an alliance of some sort.

2. That this negative attitude of the Democrats also came across during Janine’s visit to Tasmania during the last campaign.

Wright (1989:3) comments that Janine Haines leading the party in 1989 at a National Press Club speech, called for:–

Green candidates to exchange preferences tightly with the Democrats at the next federal election, warning that conservation and peace candidates could be wiped out. . . . the Democrats has always directed their preferences to candidates with similar values, and all she was asking for was reciprocity.
In 1991 according to a *Canberra Times* report of 10 April, the then leader of the Democrats Janet Powell supported ‘a merger of the Australian Democrats and an as yet unformed national greens party’. ‘Such a merger was proposed by independent Tasmanian MP Bob Brown’.

This was the time of the Gulf War and the Australian Democrats along with the various green groups were the parties that opposed Australia’s involvement in the first Gulf War. Ghazarian (2015:98) commented that:-

> Janet Powell seem to be quite willing to see a merger between her party and the general broader environmental and disarmament movements including its party manifestation the Greens WA.

> Two newly elected Senators, Meg Lees and Cheryl Kernot were not so enamoured with the idea of a Democrat-Green merger.

The end result was a challenge to Powell’s leadership and her subsequent defeat by the uninspiring John Coulter from South Australia. Powell’s sense of timing for amalgamation negotiations was very poor. She was in effect attempting to amalgamate with six different state green parties or at best with a federated green party that was still very much in its gestation. Amalgamation talks should have taken place with the federated green party when it was formed.

A possible amalgamation strategy was for the Democrats to merge with the Australian Greens with the high-profile Bob Brown as party leader. That amalgamation could have produced difficulties as the Democrats were the larger of the two parties and its members would have expected the leader to come from that party. Further would the high-profile Bob be happy after the amalgamation being led by a leader that was a member of another party prior to the amalgamation.

In the end, the Democrats suffered at the hands of the Australian Greens a party free from infighting and squabbles. In addition, there were continual negotiations regarding preference allocation, such as in 2004. These negotiations flowed smoothly at least in NSW with an agreement between the two parties to preference each other in the 2004 Senate election in that state (Jackson and Wheeler 2004:1).

However, Brown (2000:1) as leader of the Greens warned Meg Less as Leader of the Democrats:-

> The Australian Greens is a confederated party. The directioning of preferences is decided at electorate level for the House of Representatives and at state level for the Senate.

The ‘confederated’ nature of the Greens would make negotiations with the Democrats harder with most of the preference decisions made at the federal level.

Distrust of the Greens did not stop, for example in August 2006 in a letter to the editor of *The Victorian Democrat*, a member, Don Walters, claimed:-
The Greens voting record also shows, that at the federal level, if they are faced with making anything like a difficult decision, and if it is not a conservation issue, they have no policy. So, they turn to Bob Brown to make policy on the run. If they are still stuck, they turn to the Democrats for guidance.

For good measure Mr Walters concluded:-

The Greens holding any balance of power is frightening.

In reality, the Democrats and the Greens were two different styles of party. As Ghazarian (2015:90) notes the Democrats were a fragmentary party, that is a party that was a fragment that split off a major party. While Chipp split from the Liberal party in 1977, the Liberal Movement split from the Liberal Country League in 1973. The Australian Greens on the other hand were, in Ghazarian’s view, an issue competitive party attempting to increase the importance of environmental and peace issues in policy making by government Ghazarian (2015:13).

The End is Nigh!

Wanna (2005:278) reported that at the 2004 Federal election:-

The Democrats were virtually wiped out, losing all three positions up for election and reducing their numbers to just four (all facing re-election in 2007. The Democrats changed leader after the election from Bartlett to Senator Lyn Allison.

Three years later Wanna (2008:294) speaking of the 2007 Federal election, commented that:-

The big losers in the Senate were the Australian Democrats (a party that had often enjoyed holding the balance of power) which was wiped out after so much internal discord and leadership problems. They had gone into the election with four sitting senators but finished with no senators in the new Senate that would commence sitting in July 2008.

Wanna (2008b:616) reviewing events in the Federal sphere from 1 January to 30 June 2008, noted that:-

The last four remaining Democrat Senators gave their valedictory addresses to the Senate in June. Their departure brought to an end the representation of the Australian Democrats in the parliament after 30 years of continuous representation.

By comparison, the DLP were represented in the Senate for 19 years, One Nation for eight years and the Australian Greens are still in the Senate after 20 years.

Wanna went on to comment that:-

At their heyday, the Democrats had held nine senate seats (1999 to 2002) and regularly held the balance of power with seven to eight senators. There were many reasons given for their demise: lack of policies, political vacillation, leadership inaptitude, infighting and boorish behaviour, but another reason was that the major parties stopped preferencing them at elections.

Hawker (2001:28) noted that:-
Tasmania has had no Democrats senator since Robert Bell’s defeat in 1996 and the fear in the party is that the pattern established there will recur elsewhere – that is, the Greens will take over the Democrat’s old constituency.

Subsequent events proved Hawker correct

In Conclusion

The Australian Democrats started off on a high note having a high profile and well-liked leader in Don Chipp. The party played the honest broker role well and gained much from the profile. The party outlasted the Democratic Labor Party in the Senate. However as noted in this chapter the Democrats had issues with the operations of participative democracy. In the end, this style of operating hindered the party more than it helped it. In addition, the Democrats went through a number of leaders in a very short period of time. Potential leaders of the party were not identified and groomed for leadership. They were just voted into the position and then left to fend for themselves and learn from their own experience.

The support for the GST was a significant cause in the demise of the Democrats. The concept of supporting a GST but not on the necessities of life, such as food, was very poorly articulated to the electorate. Even in the vote for the GST as apart of participative democracy, the GST issue was poorly polled with the members of the party. Furthermore, in the negotiations with the Prime Minister and Treasurer, Meg Lees as leader along with the party’s treasury spokesperson were poorly prepared for the negotiations.

The ‘Ambassador Scheme’ folded through a lack of interest, but arguably it never should have been set up in the first place because it attempted to do the work any effective shadow minister should be doing, namely circulating around the relevant industry leaders and peak industry bodies and other groups relevant to the shadow portfolio.

Gauja (2010:500) concludes that:-

Somewhat ironically, it appears that as though those features of the party that contributed to its success (distinctive organisation, legislative influence and electoral performance) also brought about the party’s decline.’

The usage of participative democracy certainly added to the Democrat’s problems, given that participative democracy also entailed a vote of the membership for the parliamentary leader and deputy leader. Another annoying factor was that only 100 votes were required to force a leadership spill of the parliamentary party. It is amazing that only 100 members could throw the party into uncertainty in the federal parliament as the decision to replace the parliamentary leader was made by persons outside the parliament (the faceless persons) and further, the replacement process could take a month or more to be completed.
From another perspective, the Democrats largely used state and federal conferences as informational and training purposes. While other political parties use these conferences to convey information in such opportunities as the leader’s address to conference, time is also set aside to debate policy motions submitted by branches and electorate councils of the particular party. The submission and debate of those motions are both exercises in participative democracy. In those parties, participative democracy does not extend to areas such as the election of the leader and deputy leader of the parliamentary party, where it would be a hindrance and cause problems for the party down the track.

In the end, the party made some very poor decisions and compromised their role. Also, the party lost both the support of the electorate and preference flows from the major parties. As with the DLP, the major parties became tired of having to preference the Democrats, ‘another minor party’ with a list of demands. Other minor parties sprung up that attracted major party preferences were the Greens in respect of the ALP and Family First in the case of the Liberal Party. The ‘gaming’ of preferences in elections for the Senate was also starting to make an impact at the time of the Democrat’s demise, with the election of a Family First candidate.
Chapter Eight: The Accidental and Meteoric Rise of Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party

Introduction

This chapter explores the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party (PHON or One Nation) beginning with Pauline Hanson’s campaign for and election to federal parliament in 1996, followed by the formation of the Pauline Hanson Support Movement (PHSM), and then the formation of PHON as a formal entity. The chapter then explores the fledgling party’s twin debut in the Queensland and federal elections held in close proximity in 1998. The chapter argues that One Nation moved through a number of key phases; from an accidental start when Pauline Hanson was unexpectedly elected to parliament as an independent in March 1996, after which she managed to enhance her profile and build some popular support. This was followed closely in February 1997 with the establishment of the political party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON). In the Queensland state election in July 1998, One Nation received over 22.6% of the state-wide vote and managed to get 11 members elected to the Queensland Legislative Assembly. Immediately after, at the federal election of October 1998, One Nation won almost one million votes (936,621) in the House of Representatives and over one million (1,007,439) nationwide in the Senate. Despite this level of popular appeal, Hanson as party leader lost her seat in the House of Representatives, and only a single One Nation Senator was elected in Queensland. The candidate won a full quota with a small surplus (1.04).

Why was Hanson so spectacularly popular in such a short time frame, and why did she make it into parliament and go on to form a political party? In Paul Kelly’s view Hanson’s power and appeal was in ‘her racial chauvinism, isolationist purity and opposition to economic rationalism’ (Kelly 2009:365). Duffy (2004:198) reports that the former leader of the Labor Party Mark Latham said of Hanson:-

   Voters wanted the raw edged convictions politician. . . No airs and graces, no tricky news grabs. I think that’s why Pauline Hanson was the clear example of someone who just cut through all the sophisticated bullshit and went straight to the people. She hit a raw nerve. . . She was able to cut through.

This chapter concludes that the party’s representation in parliament was thwarted by the cartelisation of the major parties, in particular the refusal of both major parties to give their second preferences to One Nation. In addition, with Hanson losing her seat, the party was then without its main player in parliament, and its most significant vote winner.
In the Beginning

Pauline Hanson, who was a fish and chip shop owner in Ipswich Queensland, was the Liberal Party’s endorsed candidate in the federal electorate of Oxley for the 1996 federal election, which saw the election of the Howard Government. Hanson joined the Liberal Party in August 1995. She had served on the Ipswich City Council until she lost her seat at the Council elections earlier that year.

In the midst of the election campaign, but after the close of nominations for candidature, Hanson sent a letter to the editor of the *Queensland Times* on 6 January 1996. In that letter, Hanson stated:

> I would be the first to admit that, not many years ago, the Aborigines were treated wrongly but in trying to correct this they have gone too far. I don’t feel responsible for the treatment of Aboriginal people in the past because I had no say but my concern is for now and for the future. How can we expect this race to help themselves when governments shower them with money, facilities and opportunities that only these people can obtain no matter how minute the indigenous blood is that flows through their veins and that is what is causing racism.

She next wrote a letter to the Brisbane *Courier Mail* in February 1996 in which she stated that Australia is subject to ‘reverse racism’ in which Indigenous people were being advantaged at the expense of white Australians.

Some of Hanson’s supporters such as John Pasquarelli regarded Hanson’s letter to the *Queensland times* in Ipswich as ‘clumsily constructed’ but ‘totally innocuous’ (Pasquarelli 1998:31). However, one of Hanson’s fellow councillors in Ipswich, Cr Paul Tully of the ALP, ‘made a great song and dance about the letter’ and Tully’s reaction turned the letter into a ‘cause celebre’ (Pasquarelli 1998:33).

This letter gained much unwanted and embarrassing publicity for the Liberal Party. On Howard’s insistence, the Liberal Party dis-endorsed Hanson as a Liberal Party candidate on 14 February 1996. However, as the dis-endorsement took place after the close of nominations at 12 noon on 9 February 1996, Hanson nevertheless appeared on the ballot paper as a Liberal Party candidate. As a result of a massive swing against the lacklustre ALP candidate and a popular endorsement from electors who sympathised with her strident views, she was elected to parliament and quickly developed a high recognition becoming a household name throughout Australia. At the time, Pasquarelli (1998:33) claimed that Hanson’s election was attributable to the poor performance of her Labor predecessor, Les Scott, as the local member. Pasquarelli argued that Scott was a poor replacement for Bill Hayden, as he was a smug and complacent performer who took his loss to Hanson hard (Pasquarelli 1998:33).
Pauline Hanson’s instantaneous high profile came from the fact that she was prepared to speak out on controversial topics, speaking her own mind in plain, blunt language against the prevailing orthodoxy of political correctness. She drew attention to many (populist) touchstone issues and rallied people to her cause. Scott (2009:25) has commented that in retrospect ‘Hanson’s emergence was partly a backlash against multiculturalism and Aboriginal reconciliation; but it was also in part a backlash against market liberalism’. She was largely speaking out against the conformity of the major parties appealing to old-style Queensland populism. In Kelly’s assessment, Hanson was elected entirely by accident and, having been thrown out of the Liberal Party, became a vociferous opponent of the newly-elected Howard Government (Kelly 2009:367).

**How did Hanson win Liberal Party endorsement in the first place?**

Pauline Hanson’s interest in politics came from the fact that she was a local business owner who had some local government experience. Running her fish and chip shop for the locals allowed her to gauge community sentiments. Indeed, ‘customers would come and order . . . and gripe about the whole place going to the dogs. Hanson was all ears’ (Lesser 1996:20). Lesser (1996:21) claimed that a ‘local Liberal heavyweight’, Steve Wilson, was instrumental in Hanson winning Liberal Party pre-selection over two other candidates. According to Lesser, Wilson was a ‘staunch church goer, fierce advocate of corporal and capital punishment, as well as opponent of homosexuals and ‘anyone else morally wanting’. In Wilson, Hanson had a strong supporter and advocate for her pre-selection. Wilson considered Hanson as ‘a good bit of gear at the beginning of the race’, she was a small businesswoman who worked hard, had her fair share of the knocks and had a genuine concern for the people. A classic Liberal . . . she was pick of the bunch’. Hanson’s pre-selection speech to the Liberals, however, was all about unemployment and the pain of working class families. There was no mention, it seems, of immigration, Asians or Aborigines.

Hanson was somewhat photogenic and actively courted controversy, emerging as a charismatic leader for her largely elderly and regional constituencies. Her populist views and blunt style of expression made her appealing to a large number of voters in Oxley in 1996. She managed to win electoral appeal as ‘an ordinary person who had by a series of accidents slipped through the fine mesh net that is supposed to stop ordinary people from getting elected’ (Duffy 2004:157).

After the national notoriety gained from her letter-writing to local newspapers, the *Gold Coast Bulletin* (4 March 1996) reported that Hanson herself believed ‘she was not a racist and simply wanted a fair go for all Australians, but held firm to her view there was community resentment about the benefits received by Aboriginal people’ (which was a potent sentiment in certain sections of the community).
In retrospect, stripping Hanson of Liberal Party endorsement over her comments about Aboriginals seems to have been an overreaction by the Liberal Party. The act of taking party endorsement from her as a Liberal candidate immediately gave her the status of a political martyr, in that she could claim that she was treated unjustly by the Liberal party simply for writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper. Her divisive views together with her very visible public dis-endorsement immediately assured her valuable nation-wide publicity, not least because Howard had question marks over his attitudes towards other races and could not be seen to condone racially-inspired statements from endorsed candidates without taking action to dis-endorse the offender.

Had she won the seat as a Liberal candidate, she would be subject to the decisions of the Liberal’s party room, but at the same time have some freedom to speak her own mind. Other Liberals had some independence in their remarks such as Billy Wentworth and Kevin Cairns in the House of Representatives and Ian Wood and Reg Wright in the Senate. None of those four were ever stripped of their Liberal Party endorsement. In fact, all four were re-elected on a number of occasions and two of them, Wentworth and Cairns served in the McMahon Ministry in 1971-72.

**Hanson the new Member for Oxley**

Reactions to Hanson’s surprise victory in Oxley were swift. Letters to the editor of the Brisbane *Courier Mail* on 7 March 1996 regarding Hanson’s recent win were mixed, with some writers considering her as racist and anti-Aborigines, while others praised Hanson for having the courage to stand up and reflect community views. The former Liberal Senator Neville Bonner claimed that Hanson ‘had hurt a lot of people in her electorate’. Bonner went on to comment ‘picking on the blacks is a sure winner for an election campaign . . . they have been doing it for years’. Bonner went on to say that Hanson was ‘ignorant of Aboriginal issues’. He concluded by saying ‘it was clear that whatever Ms Hanson’s power might be in Canberra as an independent, she did not carry Aboriginal goodwill’.

On winning the seat, Hanson sought political advice and turned to maverick advisers with some political experience to assist her in the transition into a federal member. During the election campaign itself, Hanson’s campaign manager was a local insurance salesman, Morrie Marsden, but according to Pasquarelli (1998:12) Hanson soon came to consider him ‘not qualified for a senior officer’s position’. Marsden’s role ended once the election was held and Hanson looked to others for assistance.

When she entered parliament after the 1996 election, John Pasquarelli became Hanson’s ‘senior political adviser’. Pasquarelli had been employed in the office of Graeme Campbell, the former Labor MP for Kalgoorlie in WA. Campbell had resigned from the ALP but was re-elected to
parliament in March 1996 as an independent. At this time, Pasquarelli was in the process of leaving Campbell’s office. He was watching Hanson on the television where he said, ‘the media were all over the top of her and hemmed her in’ and ‘she looked extremely strained and had almost lost her voice’ (Pasquarelli 1998:8).

It seemed initially that Pasquarelli’s move to join Hanson’s staff was not so much to assist Hanson but to strengthen Campbell’s support in the parliament. During discussions over lunch, Pasquarelli suggested to Campbell that ‘he would need an independent ally in the parliament to second motions and private members’ bills and that Hanson seemed to be generally in tune with him on the Aboriginal issue’. He ‘put it to Graeme (Campbell) that it would be chivalrous and politically sensible to offer Pauline Hanson advice and support during a politically stressful time’ (Pasquarelli 1998:8). Campbell suggested that he make contact with Hanson. Hanson accepted Pasquarelli as a staff member to ‘help her with the media and the very important job of setting up her electorate office’ (Pasquarelli 1998:9). In Duffy’s opinion, neither Hanson nor Pasquarelli had much experience in research (Duffy 2004:157).

But others saw darker motives at play. *The Australia Israel Review* (1996:1) described Pasquarelli as ‘Pauline’s puppeteer’. In fact, the journal posed the question: ‘you’ve seen her on your TV, but who is Pauline Hanson really? And who is pulling her strings?’ The *Review* added ‘she markets herself as a simple working woman from Ipswich who talks from the heart. But her appeal to the Far Right is increasingly disturbing and she has polarised a nation with her intolerance and racism’ (1996:6).

Speaking of Pasquarelli in particular, *The Australia Israel Review* (1996:7) commented rather emotionally that ‘he runs . . . Pauline Hanson’s office and by all accounts he runs her too’. Yet, a major role of a senior adviser in a parliamentarian’s office is to run the office and give considered advice to the member and as such the adviser would have almost limitless access to the member and be somewhat influential in guiding the member’s thinking.

It turns out that Pasquarelli drafted Hanson’s first speech to parliament, presenting it to her ready to deliver. It seems surprising that Hanson did not have much of a role in any of the drafting of such an important and significant speech, although she would have spoken to Pasquarelli many times in the lead up to it.

Most of Hanson’s first speech was concerned with the issues of Aboriginals and native title, along with immigration and multiculturalism. Other issues received passing attention in the speech. These issues included unemployment and job creation projects, the reintroduction of national service, family law and the child support scheme and the promotion of Australian industry and businesses.
Surprisingly in some ways, Hanson did not mention guns legislation or access to firearms in her first speech. But even at this early stage in her political career, Hanson had a reputation for not reading material put in front of her (Balson 2000:19; Pasquarelli 1998:112) and Whiteside (19QQ:LL). In Duffy’s view her maiden speech contained a ‘number of wild statements and incorrect facts’ (Duffy 2004:138).

**The Maiden Speech – Outside the Conformist Box – Venturing Where Others Feared to Travel**

Some members give their first speech to parliament in the first sitting week of the new parliament while others wait a while. Hanson waited, giving her first speech on 10 September 1996, just after Joe Hockey gave his first speech. Hanson’s first speech was an eagerly awaited event. It raised many racial and xenophobic issues as its major themes, including the abolition of both multiculturalism as a policy framework and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), along with a criticism of Aboriginal privileges. Hanson also spoke about foreign ownership of Australian businesses and resources and various inequalities. However, it was immigration, particularly of Asians, that gave the speech enormous publicity. Hanson said:

> I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. . . . They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate. Of course I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country.

Hanson did not provide evidence to support her provocative claims regarding ghettos and failure to assimilate. In the media over the next few days it was her attack on Asians and immigrants that received most attention. For example, *The Sydney Morning Herald* reported her speech under the heading: ‘MP Debuts with Attack on Asians’, and reported a comment from her speech: ‘I believe that we are in danger of being swamped by Asians’. *The Australian* reported that ‘Hanson targets blacks, immigrants’ and said that Hanson ‘launched a scathing attack on Aboriginal welfare and multiculturalism’. *The Australian* also reported the ‘swamped by Asians comment’ and the claim of forming ghettos and not assimilating. While the *Daily Telegraph* reported that parliament was ‘treated to the Gospel according to Pauline’. The *Daily Telegraph* concentrated on Hanson’s comments on the ‘special treatment of Aborigines’.

Significantly Hanson’s comments on Australian manufacture and small business received very scant attention by the press.

Reactions to her first speech were immediate. The mainstream media tended to publicly portray Hanson as some sort of energized racist bigot. This portrayal did not assist Hanson; in fact it was a major reason why neither major party gave their second preferences to One Nation in the subsequent Federal elections in 1998. However, her entire speech was essentially compromised
by her comments on Asians and Aborigines. Her other messages from her first speech, of being a ‘real Australian’, not being listened to and the problems of small business did not get the publicity she would have hoped.

Lesser (1996:21) reports that Dr Stephen Fitzgerald, the former Australian ambassador to China, commented that Hanson’s claims were without foundation; ‘Asians do not form ghettos anymore that people from Europe did. . . . in the first stage of immigration, people concentrate in a particular area, but once they get established they start moving out’.

In Queensland, the National-Liberal Party coalition government felt compromised by Hanson’s growing reputation and would soon move to direct their preferences to her One Nation party. By contrast, the state Labor party opposition in Queensland were immediately vocal critics of her stance. Very soon after Hanson’s maiden speech, Stephen Robertson, Labor Member of Sunnybank gave a notice of motion which commenced with the sentence ‘that this Parliament condemns the disgraceful and racist comments by the member for Oxley, Mrs Pauline Hanson, during her maiden speech to the Federal parliament’ (Robertson 1996:2710)

On 9 October 1996, Henry Palaszczuk, the Labor member for Inala gave the following notice of motion:

In view of the concerns raised by the Queensland Canegrowers Association, the Tourism Taskforce and the Tourism Council of Australia, this House calls on the Premier to show moral leadership and disassociate his Government from the anti-Asian comments of Mrs Pauline Hanson, the member for Greenslopes, and the public show of support for Ms Hanson by the Minister for Emergency Services and the Government Deputy Whip (Palaszczuk 1996:3137).

The Queensland Parliament, then, reacted critically to Hanson’s first speech, but how did the Howard government react to the sentiments Hanson vented in her first speech? At the time, Howard’s silence as leader of the government was quite noticeable. Kelly (2009:363) reported that ‘Howard’s initial approach as prime minister was an equivocal response’. The foreign minister, Alexander Downer on the other hand, took a strong stand against Hanson as did the treasurer Peter Costello and the deputy prime minister and Nationals leader, Tim Fischer, the latter branding Hanson as ‘dumb and divisive’. Nevertheless, Howard remained reluctant to confront Hanson, preferring to ignore her in the hope that the lack of publicity and recognition would destroy her. At this point in time Howard was advised by his political adviser (and soon to become chief of staff) Grahame Morris who perhaps (mis)calculated that not engaging with Hanson would deny her oxygen, and ensuring her meteor burned out faster.

By late 1996 Hanson had developed a strong presence in the Australian media. In Asian countries too her comments had been noted and this was observed by Downer’s department. Kelly (2009:363) commented that the diplomatic service was in shock at Howard’s behaviour in ignoring Hanson altogether. The secretary of Downer’s department, Phillip Flood, attempted to
bring his department’s concerns to Howard’s attention, however he claimed he was ‘stonewalled’ by Grahame Morris who was Howard’s principal adviser. Morris apparently did not want ‘Howard’s domestic strategy disrupted by such ripples’. Fischer believed that Morris was loading Howard up within the ‘softly, softly’ tactic’ (Kelly 2009:364, 365). Ashton Calvert, who succeeded Flood as DFAT Secretary commented that ‘the Hanson issue was damaging because it was seen as an example of the way Howard thought. He saw Hanson in narrow domestic terms, not in foreign policy terms’ (Kelly 2009:365).

Howard’s reaction to Hanson will be further discussed in the next chapter.

The Ascendancy Begins – The Pauline Hanson Support Movement

Hanson’s maiden speech soon came to the attention of Bruce Whiteside, a retired businessman who lived on the Gold Coast and who has earlier campaigned against foreign ownership in Queensland. Eight years prior to Hanson’s election, Whiteside organised a public meeting at the Miami Great Hall to protest about the high level of foreign, mainly Japanese, ownership of Gold Coast properties. Some 1500 people attended that meeting in support of Whiteside. As a result, the media branded Whiteside a racist, although ‘the embers of his movement continued to burn and provide the initial impetus for his latter-day support movement for Hanson’ (Balson 2000:12).

Whiteside was so impressed with Hanson and what she stood for, that he hired the Gold Coast Albert Waterways Convention Centre at his own expense and convened a public meeting on 28 October 1996, - almost two months after Hanson gave her first speech to parliament. Having decided to act, he phoned Pauline Hanson before the meeting, making contact with her for the first time.

I felt that as a matter of good manners I owed her the courtesy of informing her of my reasons for holding a public meeting in support of what she was doing. It was a strange conversation. There was neither enthusiasm nor reproof; if I thought Hanson would be over the moon, then I was disappointed. In fact, she seemed stuck for words. I gathered from her hesitancy that she was not sure how to respond, to not knowing I guess, how to gauge the effect it might have on her position. This was a natural enough reaction, but after assuring her that she had nothing to worry about, I terminated the stilted conversation (Whiteside 2011:3-6).

At that meeting, Whiteside spoke to a meeting of 800 people and 122 immediately joined the newly created Pauline Hanson Support Movement (PHSM) that night. The meeting went largely unreported in the national media, but it received coverage in Queensland, especially over the radio (Balson 2000:QQ).
In the course of his speech entitled ‘Pauline Hanson Giving Government Back to the People’ Whiteside said with regard to Hanson’s first speech to parliament:-

She voiced the thoughts of the man in the street. She gave him a voice. . . . She has ventured where weak men have feared to tread and lifted the pall of social inequality that has bedevilled Australians for too long (Whiteside 1999:6).

With regard to the proposed support movement, Whiteside stated:

So it is we come here tonight to help form a national support movement for a lady who strangely for a politician has put the interests of people before herself.

He continued . . .

This proposed organisation will not speak for Pauline Hanson; rather it speaks in defence of her. . . . The Pauline Hanson Support Movement is an independent expression of the people’s appreciation for an honest politician, one who stands up for the people, not the dictates or demands of a party, but the logic of common sense, not racism but pragmatism (Whiteside 1999:8).

According to Whiteside, the initial aspiration was to establish a Pauline Hanson support movement across Australia, with the movement’s objectives being to:

1. lend practical and moral support.
2. actively participate in the spreading of Pauline’s concerns.
3. respond individually or collectively to all adverse criticisms.
4. negate the accusations of racism, redneck etc.
5. go onto the offensive in the publicity sense where this is possible.
6. consciously wear down the climate of political correctness.

Whiteside intended that the organisational structure of PHSM would require the movement:

1. To set up an organisational structure nationally.
2. Register and incorporate the name.
3. Allow local autonomy in other groups within limits.
4. Initially all practical participation in administration will be voluntary (Whiteside2011:4-2, 4-3).

Whiteside’s objectives and organisational structure were very general, providing the support group with much latitude. He was (naturally) elected as spokesperson for the Support Movement by those attending the meeting.

But relations between Hanson and Whiteside soon broke down. Just before Christmas 1996, Hanson paid a visit to the PHSM. In Whiteside’s opinion:-
her intent was clear; she did not want me as the founder and Chairman of the PHSM speaking to the press. There was a very animated clash between us, so much so that some threatened to walk out if I did not back off and fall into line with this lady who at that time was championing free speech. What Hanson did not realise is that I was spokesperson, media officer and public relations officer, democratically elected (Whiteside 2011:2).

Looking back and writing about the PHSM and the launch of PHON, Whiteside (2011:3) stated that ‘I had a clear-cut view as founder of what I wanted for the movement that bore Hanson’s name. My idea was to form an army of support behind Pauline. That support was detailed in a set of objectives, which expressly stated that we were apolitical’. It is strange and indeed contradictory that Whiteside considered the Movement to be ‘apolitical’. The very fact that it was actively supporting Hanson in what she stood for made the PHSM political from the outset.

However, Whiteside gave as his reasons for forming an apolitical movement,

Hanson’s controversial stand was going to polarise the press against her. I knew there were thousands of people ‘out there’ who silently endorsed much of what she said, but that was never going to help her, unless it could be converted to a visible groundswell of support that the media could not dismiss. But as I have indicated Australians are much more comfortable keeping their opinions quiet, talking about them at barbeques or among the boys at a pub, than standing out front and saying ‘Look I think this woman is talking common sense’.

Whiteside may have believed that ordinary Australians (the ‘silent majority’) could become supporters of PHSM and even join but that they would not want their support readily known. Therefore the Movement must be apolitical. However, many people join a political party and contribute money to it without publishing their membership or their financial support. In fact, the formation of a political movement with a large number of members could also ‘be converted to a visible groundswell of support that the media could not dismiss’.

Whiteside went on to say that:

I told Pauline once that we did not aim to become a political ‘party’ organisation, nor a platform for such… The idea was to build up the movement to and past the next Federal election, where I believed that we could have amassed anything from 100 to 200,000 people. This great push behind Hanson, would be difficult for other politicians to deal with and would cause any government great difficulty in quantifying the real impact… I suggested to Pauline that she should ‘cut her teeth’ in the Parliament for the first three years, work hard in her electorate for re-election and AFTER the election begin looking at the membership for likely candidates to form a ‘loose association of independents’. I told her that ‘these people would come under the Hanson umbrella but not necessarily embrace all that she articulated. These people will answer first of all to their electorate’.
Whiteside remembered that:

The PHSM that I formed was always going to be independent of Hanson, open to people of all political persuasions ...as indeed it proved ...and act as a protective shield against attacks from the media. It was never formed to 'mould' her political views, nor to influence her.

What Whiteside appears to be saying in the above paragraph is that the PHSM would be no more than a type of interest group and quite separate from a political party. But surely a support group would be ‘the eyes and ears’ out in the broader community and as such it would be reporting on the feelings and attitudes of that community. Which in turn would influence or mould in some way the ‘political views’ of the member of parliament and his or her political party? All Whiteside was doing was sowing the seeds for the formation of a Pauline Hanson based political party, which was indeed what finally happened.

Pasquarelli expressed alarm to Hanson about the rise of a ‘support movement’. He feared the ‘sudden appearance of groups created no doubt with all of the best intentions in the world, that could act as vehicles for all sorts of people wishing to promote their own agendas’ (Pasquarelli:1998:242).

Hanson’s take on the Support Movement is in sharp contrast to that of Whiteside. After Whiteside advised Hanson that he wanted to set up a Pauline Hanson Support Movement, Hanson (1997:113) claimed that:

I thanked him but told him I was not interested in a support group, and was happy to remain as an independent. Due to . . . (Whiteside’s) persistence I told him they could start up a Pauline Hanson Support Movement but told him nobody was ever to speak for me, or on my behalf. He agreed and that’s how the support movement was established in late September 1996.

In fact, Ettridge (2004:18) commented that ‘Pauline had not sponsored or initiated this Support Movement . . . But the support group was useful at this early stage as a measurement of the strong effect Pauline was having on Australians’. For the Support Movement to have ‘attracted such a large crowd was indeed an ominous warning to the major political forces in Australia’. Ettridge went on to describe the Support Movement as ‘the soon to become defunct Support Movement’ (Ettridge 2004:25).

At this time, Hanson was attracting support from various letter writers. For example, Mr Sab Bonelli from Canberra wrote to Hanson and she responded to him. She informed him that ‘the politics of economic rationalism and political short-sightedness are a very real danger to this country’s future’ (Hanson 1997A). She went on to advise him that:

You can rest assured that I will be doing everything I can to make sure the Government – regardless of the Party in power – thinks more about us and less about the wishes of the minority and special interest groups that have had its ear for too long.
In her letter to Mr Bonelli Hanson made no reference to Asians or immigration, but instead her
care was economic rationalism and ‘political short-sightedness’ which could be defined as
governments governed week by week for the very short term and paying no attention to the
long-term future and its problems and concerns. The reference to ‘special interest groups that
have had its ear for too long’ is significant. Hanson in her own way seems to be making an
oblique reference to the cartelization of the major parties.

On 26 October 1996, Noel Crichton-Browne, a right-wing Liberal Senator from WA wrote a
letter to Hanson. In that letter, Crichton-Browne stated: ‘what [do] you wish to achieve from
politics? You currently have a great groundswell of support which obviously extends beyond
Oxley into many parts of Australia. However, it is the type of support which will dissipate over
time’. He told her she had two options to capitalise on her present level of support: ‘diverting it
into votes for your re-election in Oxley, or to mobilise it into Australian wide support through
candidates in the Senate and in strategic seats in the various State elections. . . In other words,
the voter support in Oxley in the long term will very much equate to the national media
coverage you are able to attract’.

Crichton-Browne then went on to advise:-

It is not desirable for you to have a branch structure. The danger is that you will attract
people into office bearing positions in the branches who may be thoroughly undesirable and
over whom you will have no control. You most certainly will not have the resources to vet
and monitor them.

A much more desirable system is to have a national membership controlled directly by you.
Candidates who run under your banner should be vetted and checked by people whose
judgement you can completely rely on. One or two people with political nous are required

These initial attempts to form a stronger movement soon saw others get on board and form an
eponymous party. Pauline Hanson with her well-known name and smart dress sense was the
Party. Supporters flocked to her and they identified with her and her policies.

Pasquarelli (1996:236) states that on 4 November 1996, following strong support for Hanson
candidates in a recent public opinion poll, that she only had two options; thank her supporters
but limit her activities to her electorate of Oxley, or embrace the support and convert it into a
‘political institution’ to win seats in the Senate at the expense of the Greens and the Australian
Democrats.

Pasquarelli then advised Hanson:-

To retreat to Oxley would simply result in her electoral death by a thousand cuts . . . to be a
force in Australian politics she had to try and win the balance of power in the Senate. It was
the most effective strategy to adopt.
That advice to Hanson would indicate that Pasquarelli was advising Hanson not to recontest the lower house seat of Oxley but instead run for the Senate in Queensland at the next Federal election. Pasquarelli (1998:237) recalled that Hanson responded:

Well I suppose I could just go back to be the little old Member for Oxley and do the best job I can or… I can try and do something to get this Country out of the mess that it is in.

As it turned out, Hanson chose to re-contest the House of Representatives, but standing for the new electorate of Blair instead of running for a Senate seat, or possibly even securing two Senate seats.

After the formation of One Nation as a formal party where did the support movement fit in? Hanson (2007) clarified that:

After the launch of the Party . . . a meeting was held with the executive of the support movement in October 1997 and it was agreed to wind it up as memberships had expired.

Sutter (1998:186) observed at the time that:

For many ‘working class or rural Australians’ Hanson was a welcome change from the slick politicians who dominate the main parties. It is clear she (was) closer to mainstream Australia than the people who would like to shut her up. The Hanson phenomenon is the Australian manifestation of the politics of anger.

With such a feeling in working class and rural Australia, the transition from independent member to heading Pauline Hanson’s One Nation came as no surprise. The Pauline Hanson Support Movement had a very short life in which it at best, garnered some extra support for Pauline Hanson. It was very clear that the best way forward was as a political party in the parliament and not a series of independent members who would have voted any way they pleased. The party on the other hand would work as one, meeting in the party room to determine whether or not the party would support the legislation of the major parties and in the parliament putting forward a united and consistent point of view in parliamentary debates.

Rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the two Davids

Around the same time as ‘Pauline Hanson Support Movement’ was formed by Bruce Whiteside, Hanson was herself engaged in setting up ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’ (PHON). She was assisted and advised in this task by the ‘two Davids’ – David Ettridge and David Oldfield. Oldfield at that time was working for Tony Abbott but Hanson (2007:109) recalled that by November 1996 Oldfield had:

Encouraged me to start a political party, justified by the support I had received after making my maiden speech. After further talks, he told me of a long-time friend of his who would be very good at organising, structuring, managing and marketing the party.
That ‘long-time friend’ was David Ettridge. Thus, on the advice of the two Davids, Oldfield and Ettridge, Hanson decided to establish her own political party. One Nation was born, with the new party coming into existence in April 1997.

Ettridge first met Hanson in November 1996, and discussed the potential for a new party. Much of David Ettridge’s working life to that point was involved in ‘sales, sales management and shopping centre promotions’ (Ettridge 2004:5). Ettridge’s first reaction to Hanson’s first speech in Parliament was ‘she delivered a stunning maiden speech’. He considered her speech had three major themes: multiculturalism, political correctness and globalisation. On globalisation Ettridge claimed that it ‘was fuelled by greed’ and ‘produced a loss of industry and employment for Australians’ (Ettridge 2004:15). Ettridge (2004:17) believed that a new political party would:

- Be more responsive to the needs of the majority of Australians who agreed with Pauline’s views and who were becoming victims of political correctness and the effects of globalisation.

In Ettridge’s view, at that time business was suffering and jobs were no longer plentiful (Ettridge 2004:17). It would appear that Ettridge was attracted to Hanson primarily over her stand against globalisation and the Liberal government’s unbridled support for ‘market forces’ to dominate economic policy – a philosophy which also captured the thinking and policies of the National Party, particularly its then federal parliamentary leader John Anderson.

Ettridge (2004:17) acknowledged that he, Hanson and Oldfield all agreed that:

- A new political party was needed to represent the will and interests of many Australian voters. Pauline advised she was enthusiastic about a new party.

Ettridge saw his role in supporting Hanson, given his commercial background as administering and developing the new party. Hanson and Ettridge agreed that David Oldfield would lie low, given that Oldfield was still working in Tony Abbott’s office and Ettridge would take the preliminary steps in getting the new party up and running. (Ettridge 2004:18).

Oldfield was a self-employed businessman who had an interest in politics and had been elected to the Manly Municipal Council as alderman in 1991 (holding the position until 1998). He had stood as an unsuccessful Liberal candidate for the state seat of Manly at the NSW state election of 1995. By early 1996 Oldfield worked for Tony Abbott as his private secretary – a job he held until late 1997. Abbott (2010:51) described Oldfield as:

- Capable and intensely ambitious but had . . . a brutal way of expressing views that were teetering over the edge of respectability . . . working for me might have turned him into more of a team player. Instead he began secretly moonlighting for Hanson.

One Nation (PHON) was launched on 11 April 1997, in Ipswich by Hanson. Her speech at the launch contained many platitudinous statements but injected a strong sense of injustice and
defiance, for example she retorted that ‘by dis-endorsing me they thought they could finish me. They were wrong’. In the course of her speech, Hanson commented on high unemployment and the removal of tariff protection, she said:–

The government’s enthusiastic removal of tariff protection has forced manufacturers overseas. Asia . . . manufacture(s) our goods to their benefit and at the cost of our jobs. One Nation’s internal objectives immediately caused some confusion, suggesting the party was cobbled together rather expediently. Balson (2000:44) commented that when he joined PHON and examined his membership ticket, ten bullet points were listed on the back of the ticket, five were Hanson’s political goals and five were former goals of the Support Movement. The fifth point read ‘to remain a non-political organisation which exists only to support Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’.

Significantly at the same time as One Nation was launched, the youth wing of the party was also launched, it was known as ‘Young Nation’. This was undoubtedly a strategy of the party’s executive group to appeal to and attract the support and membership of young people.

The principal party members of PHON were just three people, Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield, who together formed the party’s executive. Anyone else who supported PHON was not a formal member of the party but merely a ‘supporter’ and a member of ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (Membership) Incorporated with no power in the party’s decision making or party conferences. This incorporated entity organised its supporters and selected candidates for election. This entity also had responsibility for fundraising. Having overarching control was ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Limited’ which comprised Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield along with a few others.

At the time the internal party structure of One Nation was not widely known and the shareholders in Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Limited did all they could to conceal the exact structure of One Nation. The reason Hanson decided on this structure was in order to prevent the right-of-centre party being ‘taken over by extremists’. While it may have achieved that aim, it was questionably legal and could hardly be called a democratic structure in a democratic country.

Arguably Hanson and her advisers should have considered an earlier legal ruling on party infiltration – namely the case of Barker v Liberal Party of Australia (SA) 1997 68 SASR 366. In that case, Mrs Barker (a Shooter’s Party advocate) applied to join the Liberal Party and filled in an application form. However, her application for membership was rejected by the Liberal
Party in South Australia. The Liberal Party in South Australia had put out a press release on 24 June 1996, titled ‘Membership Applications from Shooters’ that stated:

The State Executive of the Party has expressed the firm and unanimous view that it would not tolerate any single-issue group, particularly one directed by an outside organisation, attempting to take over a section of the Party.

In fact, the State Executive unanimously agreed to reject approximately 500 applications for party membership of the SA Division that had been lodged by the Combined Shooters and Firearms Council of SA.

Under the Liberal Party’s constitution, the State Executive could decline to admit a person to membership without giving any reason. Any rejection must be effected within one month of a membership application being received.

The applicable sections of the Constitution of the Liberal Party read as follows:-

**Eligibility for Membership**

5.1 Any person who is over the age of 16 years and who supports the Objectives of the Division and who agrees to be bound by this Constitution may apply to become a member of the Division. Application for Membership

5.2 A person applying to become a member of the Division shall submit an application to the State Director in the form prescribed by the State Executive accompanied by the appropriate membership fee.

**Commencement of Membership**

5.3 Membership shall commence one month after the State Director receives an application unless:-

(a) the State Executive in the meantime acting upon the recommendation of a Branch or upon its own motion, declines to admit a person to membership which it may do without giving any reason therefore

(b) the State Executive gives special permission for an earlier commencement of membership.”

In the course of his judgement, the judge said:-

Mrs Barker has no contractual right to membership (of the Liberal Party) and as an applicant for membership has no proprietary interest in the funds of the Liberal Party. Mrs Barker has sought membership of an incorporated body which happens to be a political party and had her application declined. No question of contract, of unilateral contract, or election through invalid rejection arises. The Liberal Party acted according to its constitution. No relationship known to the law was ever established between Mrs Barker and the Liberal Party, of one with the other. She had no ‘special interest’ entitling her to any order from the Court. She was merely, along with many others, a disappointed applicant. It all would have been different had Mrs Barker been admitted to membership and then had her membership purportedly cancelled that is been dismissed or struck off. The question of natural justice would have arisen. All that has happened here is that a
person has sought to join a political party and been denied admission.

The original membership application form a person would complete in order to join One Nation was in the following format.
What is significant about the above application form is there is no mention of the word ‘party’ anywhere on the form. An applicant would be joining ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’, but were they joining a political party or merely a support group? In fact, the organisation is referred to not as a ‘party’ but as a ‘movement’. The application form is very confusing as to what type of organisation one was joining.
The subsequent revised application form, which came out in 1997 and was used until 2001, followed the following format:

Form 8.2: Pauline Hanson’s One Nation – 1999 Application form

![Application Form Image](image)

This later application form had some improvements compared to its predecessor. The applicant was still joining ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’, but there was now a commitment to ‘loyalty to the Party’ and commitment to ‘working to achieve the objectives of the Party’. The lack of the word ‘party’ in the title was not new; a previous party was ‘The Australian Democrats’.

The next application form, which came out in 2001 was in the following format:
This latter form appears to have been designed and put into use following the round of court cases that brought about Hanson’s imprisonment and court order to repay money to the
Queensland Electoral Commission. On this 2001 membership application form, there was absolutely no doubt the applicant was joining a political party. The word ‘party’ has even been worked into the title.

Once One Nation was formally launched it is interesting to gauge how the major parties responded. Of particular interest were the responses of the leaders of the two major parties, the Liberal Party and the Australian Labor Party to the rise of a new competitor. In May 1998 John Howard was interviewed for the *Australia Israel Review* ‘in light of Anxiety over the Government’s handling of Pauline Hanson’. In the course of that interview Howard stated supporters of Pauline Hanson were middle aged to older people, predominately from rural and regional areas. Many of them have felt the impact of economic change, but these supporters were not racist. He considered Hanson’s economic and political comments to be ‘a mixture of inaccuracy and harebrained economics. She is a narrow, backward looking person who would cost this country jobs and cost us markets in the rest of the world’ (1998:11).

Three weeks later, the *Australia Israel Review* interviewed Kim Beazley the Leader of the Labor Opposition. In the course of that interview, Beazley commented that ‘Hanson stands for things on race relations which are simply wrong, simply wrong and that has to be pointed out to her supporters’. Beazley went on to warn that ‘Hanson’s attitudes to race relations cannot be adopted without a penalty flow on to the nation’. Beazley also commented that ‘as well as damage to the ALP vote and damage to the Nation the real damage from Hanson is to the National Party’ (Kapel and Greason 1998B:8-11).

Kelly (1998:89) explained that the rise of One Nation was as ‘a protest movement with populist targets – Asians, Aboriginals, banks, international capital, immigrants, multiculturalism’. In his view, Hanson made three claims: ‘the political system is not working, the elites have betrayed the Country and its values and Australia has been on the wrong track for the last 25 years’. He commented that ‘Almost anybody will agree with some of these sentiments and this is her appeal’.

Brett (1998:26) considered that Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’s rise was:-

> Due to the failure of the established political parties . . . to give the people what they want. Many Australians had lost confidence in politicians, the parties and the political system generally, Australians and their political institutions have been drifting apart. Nearly two decades of economic liberalism have left many people worse off.

**The Party’s Policies**

This section of the chapter provides an overview of the policies of One Nation in order to show the main issues that were of concern to the party. The next chapter will discuss a number of the policies of One Nation in some detail and show the shortcomings of those policies. That
chapter then argues that these shortcomings in various policies became yet another reason for the demise of One Nation.

George J Merrit (1997) published a tributary paperback book entitled ‘Pauline Hanson the Truth’. The publication was in two parts. Part one contained copies of Hanson’s maiden speech and other key speeches, including the speech launching the party in 1997. Part two of the publication was a series of papers on such topics as ‘In Defence of Pauline Hanson’, ‘Surrendering Australia’ and ‘The Gun Debate’. The preface advised that the publication was assembled by Pauline Hanson’s support team, including members of the Pauline Hanson Support Movement (1997:iv). As this publication was published in 1997, with a second printing in May 1997 (after the launch of the Pauline Hanson One Nation party) the ‘support movement’ would have been Ettridge’s support movement and not the original Whiteside support movement.

The publication contains many general and broad sweeping statements, but no real suggestions for any policy changes or indeed future directions. The chapter on the gun debate for instance provided a good example; it speaks emotionally of a restriction of freedom to own certain guns and the need for compensation. However, there is no mention of what an alternative policy on gun ownership ought to be.

At that early stage in the party’s development, a clearer indication of its policies and vision for the future may have given the party additional recognition and credibility building into extra support leading into 1998 with elections in both Queensland and federally.

In the lead up to the Queensland state and federal elections in 1998, the new party set about formulating policies. Kelly (1998:90) commented that ‘Pauline Hanson’s speeches and One Nation’s policies have assumed a unity based on an assembly of grievances’. While immigration and aboriginal affairs would be two significant areas, in the light of the events at Port Arthur and the Federal government’s subsequent guns legislation, the party also formulated a policy on firearms. That policy was announced on 16 May 1998. The policy preamble stated ‘firearms legislation should provide for safe and responsible ownership and use of firearms’. The guns policy proved to be very popular in Queensland and provide much support for PHON in the final weeks of the Queensland state election. Reynolds (2000:179) commented that ‘the gun lobby found ready champions in the ranks of ONP.’

The 1998 Queensland State Election

The first electoral test for PHON was the Queensland state elections held on 13 June 1998. In that campaign, the National-Liberal coalition decided to exchange preferences with One Nation whereas the Australian Labor Party refused to give One Nation any preferences (which effectively meant ALP preferences would flow to Coalition candidates ahead of PHON
candidates). In the state campaign One Nation captured enormous attention and arguably set the agenda. It stood candidates across the state and won 11 seats with a vote of 22.68 per cent state wide. Coalition preferences to One Nation helped the minor party win eight of the 11 seats that they won at the election.

In the election, much of One Nation’s support came from the rural, regional and outer-metropolitan areas of the state. In those areas of Queensland One Nation won 29.8 per cent of the vote, mostly at the expense of the National Party, who with 27 per cent of the vote suffered a large swing of 23.1 per cent (Newman 1998:4). Overall across the whole of Queensland, One Nation won 22.68% of the vote.

In fact, Coalition preferences on average flowed 60 per cent to One Nation and 15 per cent to the ALP with the remaining 25 per cent of the vote being exhausted. Six seats were won by One Nation from Labor and five from the Nationals. In July and August 1998 soon after the state election and before the Parliament sat, the One Nation parliamentarians received assistance and advice from the former premier Sir Joh Bjelke Petersen.

Significantly, Heather Hill, the state leader of the One Nation team of candidates failed in her attempt to win the seat of Ipswich from the ALP. The very self-confident and articulate Hill was one of One Nation’s better performers. It is very possible that One Nation’s subsequent performance in the Queensland could have been much more impressive and beneficial for the party’s supporters with Hill as their parliamentary leader.

Table 27: One Nation Members of the Queensland Parliament after the 1998 State Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Won from</th>
<th>Former Occupation</th>
<th>Term of Membership in PHON</th>
<th>After Quitting PHON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dalgleish, David</td>
<td>Hervey Bay</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Truck Driver Sole Parent</td>
<td>13 June 1998-14 Dec 1999</td>
<td>CCAQ Defeated 2001 state elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Electorate</td>
<td>Won from</td>
<td>Former Occupation</td>
<td>Term of Membership in PHON</td>
<td>After Quitting PHON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Dolly’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28: One Nation Members of the Queensland Parliament after the 2001 State election.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Won from</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Term of Membership</th>
<th>After PHON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flynn, Bill WB</td>
<td>Lockyer</td>
<td>CCAQ</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>17 Feb 2001-7 Feb 2004</td>
<td>Defeated 2004 State elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1998 Federal Election

Following the astounding success of the party’s first outing in Queensland state election, the party’s second electoral test was later that same year in the federal election held on 3 October. Again, at this election, the Labor Party refused to give its second preferences to One Nation. However, significantly at this election the Liberal Party and the Nationals also did not allocate preferences to One Nation, instead giving them effectively to Labor. Thus, One Nation was in the position of having to allocate its preferences to one of the major parties but receiving none in return.

One Nation stood candidates in almost every electorate in Australia as well as for the Senate in each state and territory. The implications of Hanson’s pre-selection methods will be discussed in the next chapter. Pre-selection was quite often done over the phone without Hanson even knowing the potential candidate or their background. Hanson’s major aim seemed to be having a candidate for the party in every electorate in Australia.

Margo Kingston (1999:107) saw One Nation’s election campaigning in the federal election as:

> Trying to establish a new political alignment by leaching support from all three major parties. Hanson wanted Labor battlers suffering the squeeze on blue collar labour. From the Nationals, she wanted family farmers watching the disintegration of their independence and way of life through the relentless momentum towards big corporate holdings, and rural workers rendered jobless with the introduction of new farm technology. From the Liberals, she wanted struggling small business people, especially in the regions, and older, socially conservative self-funded retirees.

An examination of the results of the Queensland state and the federal elections as shows much of One Nation’s support coming from dissatisfied Liberal and National Party voters.

Abbott (2010:50) commented that ‘the impact of the Hanson party had been to take votes away from the only conservatives who were ever likely to be in power. . . . voting for Hanson would not produce a more hard working conservative movement but a more divided one.’
Nationally, in the 1998 federal election PHON as a new party received 8.43 per cent of the vote, while the Coalition suffered a swing of -7.73 per cent. The Labor Party had an increase in support of 1.34 per cent. In the state of Queensland, which was PHON’s strongest state, the party enjoyed a level of support of 14.35 per cent. The Coalition suffered a swing of -14.36 per cent and the ALP a swing of -2.94 per cent (Bennett, Kopras and Newman 1999:14 and 17).

In the Queensland state election, Newman (1998:3) comments that ‘the three major parties all suffered a decline in voter support with the advent of One Nation’. Newman goes on to observe that One Nation received 22.7 per cent of the vote, while the Nationals suffered a swing of -11.1 per cent, the Liberals -6.7 per cent and the ALP -4 per cent.

At the federal election of October 1998, One Nation followed an ambitious lower house strategy. Its aim was to capture as many lower house seats as possible, hoping perhaps to hold the balance of power in the chamber where governments are made and unmade. The party operated with a groundswell of enthusiasm but with little or no organisation.

One Nation announced a number of key policies, such as immigration restrictions, relaxed gun control, low interest loans for business, curfews for youths and citizen initiated referenda. These policies will be analysed in the next chapter.

In that election, Hanson received 35.97 per cent of the primary vote in her own electorate, but without any formal preferences she lost to the Liberal candidate who won just 21.69 percent of the primary vote (securing also the Nationals and Labor preferences). Consequently, she lost her seat in the House of Representatives. However, One Nation candidate Heather Hill did win a Senate seat in Queensland, defeating the National Party Senator, Bill O’Chee. But after a court decision voiding her qualifications to stand, her seat in the Senate was taken by the second-placed One Nation candidate on the Queensland Senate ticket Len Harris, who served one full term. Nationally, One Nation polled 8.48 per cent of the vote.

Davey (2006:391-2) reports that the Nationals weathered the One Nation onslaught better than many expected, despite some enormous swings in heartland seats. For example, One Nation won 26.33 per cent of the primary vote in the electorate of Wide Bay, the Nationals’ primary vote going from 59.55 per cent in 1996 to 31.46 per cent in 1998. In New South Wales, in the electorate of Gwydir, One Nation polled 20.77 per cent, while the Nationals vote went from 62.32 per cent in 1996 to 46.14 per cent in 1998.

In the NSW Senate election, the voting preference flows of One Nation resulted in the loss of a Nationals Senator, Sandy McDonald, to the Australian Democrat candidate Aiden Ridgeway. Paradoxically, One Nation was responsible for the reducing the representation of the Nationals and increasing the representation of the Australian Democrats.
Warhurst (2004:164) has commented that ‘the entry of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation from the 1998 election onwards further weakened the major parties and complicated the flow of preferences’.

The state by state break down of the One Nation vote at the 1998 federal election is shown in the following table.

**Table 29: 1998 Federal election - One Nation vote state break down**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>One Nation % Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>14.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>9.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>9.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONWIDE</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AEC

It can immediately be seen that One Nation’s main support was in Hanson’s home state of Queensland with 14.35 per cent; this phenomenon is common to other minor parties that tend to have their main strength in one state. One Nation also polled a higher percentage of the vote in SA, WA and the NT, while the party’s results poorest in Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT.

A comparison of One Nation’s performance compared to other right wing parties in the 1998 election is shown in the following table.
Table 30: Senate vote for PHON and other right-wing parties 1998 election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>One Nation % Vote</th>
<th>Australia First</th>
<th>Citzs Elect Cncl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>14.66</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>9.77</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONWIDE</td>
<td>8.42</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AEC

One Nation convincingly out polled both the Citizens Electoral Council and Australia First. One Nation’s major impediment was the lack of second preferences following from the two major parties.

Table 31: One Nation members of the Federal Parliament 1996 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Electorate or State</th>
<th>Terms of Office</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hanson, Pauline</td>
<td>Oxley</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>Lost seat – (ran for Blair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill, Heather</td>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Election declared void by Court of disputed Returns (did not renounce British citizenship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris, Len</td>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>1999-2005</td>
<td>Lost seat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Rise of One Nation in other states

The following tables show the parliamentary representation of One Nation members in the states of WA and NSW. The table very clearly shows these members were very few and lasted only one term in the parliament.

### Table 32: One Nation Members of WA and NSW Parliaments (upper houses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>House</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Term of Membership</th>
<th>After PHON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In Conclusion

The result for the fledgling One Nation party in the Queensland 1998 state elections was most spectacular and surprising with 11 members elected. For those members to succeed and make an impression in Queensland politics, they faced a very steep learning curve, especially in terms
of being confident with parliamentary procedure and working together as a political party. However, for the new One Nation parliamentarians internal conflict and disunity was not far away and this would soon have a devastating impact on the party, along with an inability to be taken seriously by the rest of the parliament and the press.

The prospects of any significant growth in the party’s representation in the federal parliament was thwarted by the refusal of both major parties to give their second preferences to One Nation. In addition, the party was without its main player in the federal parliament once Hanson lost her seat, becoming the de facto leader of the party from outside parliament. If that wasn’t enough, the party was without its keen and energetic elected Senator, Heather Hill, who was replaced through an eligibility technicality by the number two candidate Len Harris. A fumbler and a poor speaker, Harris was no match for the drive and general tenacity that Hanson had shown in the previous parliament.

The way ahead after the initial electoral baptism was shaping up to be very uncertain and problematic for the new party. The decline of One Nation, equally as sudden and spectacular as its rise, will be explored in the next chapter.

The next chapter will also analyse the political resurrection of One Nation at the 2016 Federal election. In that election One Nation rose from the death of electoral wilderness to sharing the balance of power in the Australian Senate with four senators, including Pauline Hanson herself.
Chapter Nine: The Fall of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation

Introduction

This chapter explores the demise of One Nation as a political party. The seeds of destruction of Pauline Hanson’s confected party seemed virtually assured from the outset. She was politically inexperienced but ignited a firestorm of protest and popular outrage; she established a ‘company-model’ political party which was meant to protect her from infiltration but which was legally problematic; she attracted a variety of supporters and people prepared to be One Nation candidates but did not vet them carefully and soon found she was losing influence over these representatives; splits occurred in the party causing electoral damage; the public funding she received was not ploughed back into party development or strategic advertising; the policies outlined by One Nation were often ill-conceived or incoherent and nothing more than populist sentiments; and she made some poor tactical decisions such as choosing to stand for the lower house seat of Blair in 1998 instead of running for the Senate. Although in parliament for approximately three years (1997-1999) the reverberations her crusading party made were felt for many years to come.

During 1998, triumph soon turned to tragedy for the new party. After achieving national notoriety, and capturing 11 seats in the Queensland parliament and a quarter of the state vote, the party was soon brought back to earth, confronted with the problems of building on this success. From late 1998 the party spectacularly began to implode under its own internal difficulties. While Hanson and her candidates secured relatively strong regional electoral support, One Nation’s parliamentarians were virtually ineffective in the legislature (and she herself only managed to hold an elected office for a little over two years). Her main influence, nonetheless, was on the major parties themselves (especially the Coalition parties) who gradually made some policy accommodations to One Nation’s constituency while ruthlessly moving to isolate her political impact by denying her party any preference flows at the ballot box. If One Nation was a major player in the federal arena from 1997-98, by 2004 with the defeat of its only Senator, it was a spent force; and at the state levels its representation gradually dwindled away and by the end of March 2009 no One Nation representative sat in any Australian parliament. The last One Nation representative, Rosa Lee Long, who was also One Nation’s longest serving MP, was defeated at the 2009 QLD state elections.

Shortly after the party’s demise, one observer argued:

Many political commentators regarded the party as an expression of political atavism, the last screaming gasp of a style of politics that would be lucky to see the turn of the
millennium. And sure enough, lacking anything resembling party discipline or effective organisation, the whole thing self-combusted after some initial successes in Queensland and New South Wales, at State and Federal levels (Arena 2006:81).

This chapter argues that that the demise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation can be traced back to its unstable origins, its identification with one polarising leader, and the swift reactions from the major parties who contrived to protect their cartelisation of Australian politics.

Early Tensions with the Pauline Hanson Support Movement

With hindsight, it appears that the failure to manage and control the Pauline Hanson Support Movement was the One Nation Party’s first real big mistake – it magnified impressions of a rocky start to the party’s existence. From the start, both David Ettridge and John Pasquarelli were concerned about the unsupervised activities of the Support Movement and its growth. They were determined that the PHSM supporters would not become formal members of the party. They conceded that a support movement was an appropriate boost for an Independent MP, but that there were dangers in messaging and branding. Support members were simply enthusiasts who were not subject to party rules or discipline of the formative One Nation.

It was strange, if not totally incongruous, that PHSM’s leader, Bruce Whiteside, considered that he could speak on behalf of Pauline Hanson. This matter quickly came to a head, when Ettridge wrote a letter to Whiteside on 6 February 1997, praising him for his work but at the same time advising Whiteside that ‘our own ambitions can only be achieved within a well-managed organisation. There is no other way’. He went onto say (Ettridge 1997:1):

Pauline is very strong and very clear on what she wants to say and do and no one will speak for her . . . your concern for being gagged is unfounded. You have never had any right to speak on Pauline’s behalf, a restriction which is placed on everyone.

Whiteside’s days of heading the Support Movement were numbered. On 1 April 1997, Ettridge again wrote to Whiteside, dating his letter ‘April Fool’s day 1997’. Ettridge commenced his letter by saying (EttridgeA 1997:1):

Today you lost the respect and admiration of many people who only ever knew who you were because you were part of a popular and important movement for change... You destroyed the position you created for yourself as one of the initiators of an organisation that was never yours to own and certainly never yours to destroy.

---

4 The relationship between One Nation and the Pauline Hanson Support Movement may superficially seem similar to the relationship between the DLP and the National Civic Council, with its leader Bob Santamaria (like Bruce Whiteside) not being a member of the DLP and thus not subject to the party discipline of that party. However, the DLP and NCC had a fairly institutionalised relationship backed by the resources and influence of the Catholic Church, whereas PHSM was much looser congregation of supporters resembling something of a rabble.
Ettridge concluded the communication with a blunt warning:

If you have any dignity, you will now withdraw and have nothing more to do with our organisation and we will have nothing more to do with you. We will move confidently forward as any fallout from today’s incident will last only for a day. The media will have other stories tomorrow, however your day of media notoriety will harm you and your reputation for years.

Hearing of the dispute, the *Sydney Morning Herald* ran a story on 1 April 1997 stating: ‘Hanson suffering delusions: sacked worker’. In the article, Whiteside was reported as accusing Hanson of ‘hijacking’ the National Support Movement and of suffering delusions about her importance. Whiteside was also reported as claiming that he ‘was asked to stand aside’ as the Support Movement’s convener. He was quoted as saying: ‘you support her (Hanson) and she turns around and kicks you in the teeth’.

A few days later, Ettridge sent a copy of the *SMH* article to Whiteside with a handwritten endorsement: ‘Dear Bruce now that you have got this off your chest, please do us all a favour and resist any more damaging media interviews. You only serve to feed our media opponents who desperately need this sort of dissent. You will harm everything we want for Australia’.

On 3 April 1997, Ettridge wrote to Paul Trewarta who was the National Vice President and Gold Coast Branch President of the Support Movement regarding Whiteside. Ettridge suggested disassociating the Support Movement from Whiteside but not in a ‘public way’, ‘as such would only create further negative media. We will simply cease all contact, and reject any correspondence or dialogue from Bruce’ (Ettridge B 1997:1). The same day, Ron Paddison, the Secretary of the Support Movement’s Steering Committee, wrote to Whiteside informing him that his membership of the Support Movement had terminated (Paddison 1997:1).

However not to be outdone, Whiteside wrote to the Secretary of the Support Movement on 8 April 1997, stating that his letter was ‘not so much of a letter of resignation, but rather one of separation’. Whiteside went on to complain that the main issue for many supporters was not Pauline Hanson herself, but the intricacies of the workings under a committee, ‘working on the constitution’ while worrying about ‘dotting the ‘i’s and crossing the ‘t’s . . . [and] running like hell when there was any work about’ (Whiteside 1997:1).

Whiteside had a conversation with Trewarta on 1st May and asked for the reasons for his dismissal from the Support Movement. Trewarta responded in writing the next day advising Whiteside that the reasons were ‘inability to constructively co-operate with Pauline’, ‘disregard for the Committee’s opinions and decisions’ and ‘inability to leave all major media comments to Pauline’. The letter concluded by requesting the return of all Support Movement property as soon as possible (Trewarta 1997:1).
The Party’s Peculiar Structure and the Two Davids

A little explored but key factor in the decline and disintegration of One Nation was the peculiar structure of the party. A two-tiered membership/supporter arrangement was internally imposed whereby three full members of the party were shareholders in a company called Pauline Hanson One Nation Party, consisting of Hanson, Oldfield and Ettridge, who together formed the Party’s National Executive. Others who wanted to join PHON did so not as formal members of the party but merely as ‘supporters’ linked to ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (Membership) Incorporated’ with no power in the party’s decision making or party conferences.

At its establishment, the National Management Committee of the Pauline Hanson Support Movement resolved, on 24 May 1997, that there be two levels of membership in the party:

1. One Nation members who have full voting rights; and
2. Pauline Hanson One Nation supporters who have all rights of membership other than voting rights.

Hanson and the two Davids decided on this structure in order to prevent the Party being ‘taken over by extremists’ and to some extent it achieved that aim. But the unusual structure allowed critics to claim ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation was never a political party, merely a fan club’ (Balson 2000:iii). Tony Abbott (2009:50, 51) also described One Nation as ‘a private company masquerading as a political party’ and as ‘a company owned by three directors rather than a political party democratically controlled by its members’. This issue could also have a bearing on whether or not One Nation was entitled to any government funding for federal elections.

The internal party structure was not widely known and the shareholders in Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Limited did all they could to conceal the exact structure of One Nation (Balson 2000:314). Supporters who applied to join One Nation filled in an application form which implied they were joining ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’ party, but which instead gave them a $5 membership of the support organisation. The form also stipulated that to be elected to hold office in a support movement branch, the person needed to be a ‘One Nation member’. The various membership forms for PHON were shown in the previous chapter. Later membership application forms made it very clear that the applicant was joining ‘the party’ but decision making was almost exclusively in the hands of the three-person National Executive and as mentioned later in this chapter this was a major cause of the walkout from the Party by five members of the Qld Parliamentary Party.

Rutherford (2001:192) interviewed a number of One Nation MPs and former MPS and reported that one, Jack Paff, advised:
It was very autocratic the way it was run. You would do as you were told or get out. Or you were called a white ant and you were rubbished. It was a disgrace.

Another One Nation elected representative, Heather Hill, complained to Rutherford that the party’s constitution:

Basically implanted three people into positions of absolute power . . . what we’ve got isn’t a party for the people it’s very top heavy . . . Freedom of speech was there until someone said something that was disagreeable to a few people . . . you literally had to agree . . . they were shooting the messengers.

Rutherford (2001:193) also commented that Brett (1998:33) anticipated the upcoming problems One Nation would face, by arguing that ‘One Nation lacked ideological unity, organisational structure and political skills necessary to unify a disparate collection of individuals into a modern political party’. In Rutherford’s view the three members of the Party’s National Executive ‘purged all voices of dissent and created a fundamentally unstable party’.

One Nation was simply not established as a democratic party. It was directed by the powerful National Executive who would not entertain alternative points of view to their own. When the Queensland Parliamentary Party requested elections for the National Executive, Pauline Hanson was ‘elected’ on the basis of the following statement made by David Oldfield to the party’s conference: ‘is there anyone present who doesn’t want to vote for Pauline Hanson?’ (Rutherford 2001:198), whereas Oldfield and Ettridge were also elected unopposed abruptly closing off the nomination of any other challengers for a position on the executive. As time soon showed, One Nation ‘members’ soon became exasperated with this structure and their inability to express their own points of view without being considered to be ‘white ants’.

Hanson as Party Leader

From the outset, Pauline Hanson had a lot of personal support. For example, (Balson 1998) reported that at the commencement of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (Queensland) state conference in Townsville on 28th and 29th November 1998:

The agenda item to drop ‘Pauline Hanson’ from the title ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’ party was overwhelmingly defeated with the voting recorded as 129 against the motion 1 vote for the motion and 4 delegates abstained from voting. All delegates voted to give Pauline Hanson their unanimous support and to retain Pauline Hanson as the National President.

Regarding the leadership style of Pauline Hanson in One Nation Balson (2000:iii) has commented that:

. . . she can lop off long term friendships with good friends or dedicated supporters without batting an eye lid, without missing a beat and without considering the consequences. Deep
down she is a heartless woman who many believe has used and discarded countless good men and women. She takes no prisoners.

As Power (2004:11) has observed, a leader needs to be recognisable – not as an individual, but as an ordinary person. A leader should fit in with the crowd - be ‘one of us’.

Hanson certainly was one of the people, as she said in her maiden speech:-

I come here not as a polished politician but as a woman who has had her fair share of life’s knocks.

My view on issues is based on common sense, and my experience as a mother of four children, as a sole parent, and as a business woman running a fish and chip shop.

Hanson was wooed by the media, who had shown boredom with the new Prime Minister John Howard and uninterested in Labor who were soundly defeated in the 1996 federal election. Hanson did the unbelievable in winning a safe Labor seat with a swing of 19.31 per cent. She was not a university graduate but a fish and chip shop owner and a battler. Savva (1996:24 commented that Hanson had ‘mega star treatment from the minute she rose in Parliament to deliver her maiden speech.’

Hanson clearly had novelty value. Kelly (1998:100) commented that Hanson ‘was made a celebrity (by the media), she was a fresh commodity; and she drew confrontation like a missile searching for a target.’ Drawing confrontation in this way and not running from it ensured Hanson of continued media attention, at least until for some reason the media tired of her.

Unlike the leaders of minor parties without a seat in parliament, Hanson had the advantage of incumbency as a member of the federal parliament in making her maiden speech and setting up the One Nation party. Thus, she could speak with the added authority as a member of parliament and use the resources of parliament in spreading her message. These resources would have included travel, secretarial support and research support. For a party that had not crossed the representation threshold, these resources would have had to have been provided at the party’s expense.

**One Nation’s Populist Policy Appeals**

One Nation was principally formed as a protest movement motivated as a party more by what it opposed than what it advocated; but gradually the idiosyncratic pieces of a policy jig-saw were put in place as the party fought to be taken seriously. During the 1998 Queensland state and federal elections, One Nation released a number of policies that were aimed to secure the support of its core constituencies. These policy commitments were often symbolic statements or headline pronouncements meant to catch the media’s attention and give the party added traction amongst disaffected communities. Having said that, many of these pronouncements were plucked from unorthodox sources (and some from cranks), often driven by nostalgia or
conspiracy theories. Accordingly, many of One Nation’s policies were considered impractical or insufficiently thought through by the mainstream political establishment. It was often very easy to find fundamental flaws or overlooked defects in the party’s policies. Examples include: the ‘easy tax’ taxation system, citizen initiated referenda and ‘printing money’ for cheap loans to farmers, as well as the idea of imposing youth night-time curfews to reduce petty crime. This section of the chapter analyses six announced policies of the party: two economic policies (the ‘easy tax’ and low interest business loans); two law and order policies (namely its guns policy and youth curfews); and finally, two populist policies (the idea of introducing a citizens-initiated referenda and reduced immigration quotas).

Economic Policies

i. The ‘Easy Tax’

The ‘easy tax’ system proposed replacing all existing taxation such as income tax, sales tax, fringe benefits, capital gains tax and withholding tax with a comprehensive sales/transfer tax on economic activity. A skeletal description of the ‘easy tax’ and its purported benefits was contained in the party’s national policy document on taxation in 1998.

A 2% tax is applied to the sale price at each change of ownership of property, goods and services and . . . on wages. There are no exemptions or thresholds. In the case of wages, the employer pays the 2% tax on the take home pay. The current take-home net pay of employees will be preserved at present levels and any pay rises or additional income earned, for example overtime, will be taxed at only 2%. In the case of business, the 2% tax on gross sales turnover is collected at the point of sale and in addition, the wages drawn (their net profit) by businesses operated by sole traders or partners are taxed at 2%. In the case of imports, the 2% tax is collected by the importer. In the case of exports, the 2% tax is collected by the exporter.

In its taxation policy document, One Nation clearly saw the ‘easy tax’ as a solution to all of Australia’s economic problems. The party claimed the easy tax would ‘reduce the cost of government and there will be increased economic activity, and a reduction in social security costs.’

However, commentators soon criticised the easy tax policy as having a number of fundamental flaws. For example, the tax was based on ‘gross sales turnover’ rolling forward, meaning that businesses would receive no taxation deductions for business inputs such as the purchase of raw materials. The tax was to be levied on exports as well as imports, therefore the cost of exports to Australia’s trading partners would be more expensive. The policy was also based on a number of assumptions, such as ‘employees and the self-employed will increase productivity willingly’, they might not, they could for example, choose to work less hours. The policy speaks of
decreased costs, taxation might decrease but there is no mention in the policy of wages, salaries and other commercial costs decreasing.

ii. Low Interest Business Loans - Printing Money

One Nation also proposed a policy to offer low interest loans to businesses through a ‘people’s bank’. In June 1998, Hanson’s adviser, David Ettridge, proposed that the government ‘print money’ to fund those low interest loans. His proposal quickly received stern criticism from various quarters. For example, economist Chris Richardson claimed such a policy ‘would send us broke fast’ and it was an invitation to corruption, would help inflation and stunt economic growth as well as diminishing purchasing power (*The Australian* 19 June 1998).

As a result, One Nation quickly disowned Ettridge’s comments. According to AAP (18 June 1998), Oldfield advised that it was not party policy and that Ettridge had been banned from ‘commenting on party policy’. According to The Advertiser of 19 June 1998 Oldfield accused Ettridge of ‘misrepresenting party policy’…’he issued the national director (Ettridge) with a humiliating dressing down, banning him from making further comments on any policy issues. Mr Ettridge is the national administrator and he has no position to really be discussing either policy or economics or anything else, or politics relating to One Nation Mr Oldfield said’. Oldfield’s comments would suggest a degree of conflict and public disagreement between Oldfield and Ettridge. Hanson told Ettridge, ‘David, don’t do that again’ an action she described as a reprimand, at a press conference.

Law and Order Policies

iii. Relaxation of the Firearms Policy – Liberties Under Attack

Under the One Nation guns policy, legislation would be provided for ‘safe and responsible ownership and use of firearms’. Measures would be introduced to ‘to control and apprehend those who illegally or irresponsibly use firearms’. However, such legislation would not ‘be used as tools to obstruct, harass or penalise legitimate law-abiding firearm owners’. Licences would be issued ‘on a lifetime basis with a nominal fee’ and licences would ‘be subject to review in the case of an offence’. Once the licence had been issued, the licence holder would be ‘free to obtain a firearm of the type suitable to their purpose’. The granting of a firearms’ licence would require mandatory theoretical and practical firearms’ training by the applicant.

The policy was based on the following principles:

- Shooting is a legitimate sport and pastime and participants should be treated accordingly.
- Australians have the right to defend themselves and their families in their own homes.
Disarming law abiding Australians is not in the national interest and will do nothing to reduce crime.

This policy announced on the eve of the Queensland state election gave One Nation support from the Queensland electors as the policy was in direct contravention to the Howard government’s gun buyback policies and the firearms policies of the ALP. ‘The gun lobby, while failing to elect any candidates in their own right nevertheless found ready champions in the ranks of One Nation’ (Reynolds 2000:179). After the Port Arthur incident, Howard’s guns buyback was controversial in regional Australia. Many primary producers were critical of the National Party’s support for the Howard gun policies and gun buyback scheme.

iv. Youth Curfews

Hanson had long advocated youth curfews as a result of her Ipswich experiences as a local shop-keeper. Her proposal was to enforce a complete curfew on young people 16 years of age or younger being out on the streets at night-time. If the police caught a young person on the streets during the curfew, the young person would be returned by the police to their parents.

The youth curfew policy was designed to attract the support of homeowners who were worried about localised crime of youths wandering their streets, but it was in some ways a surprising policy given the party’s stated desire to attract young people to One Nation as members of ‘Young Nation’.

As Senator Natasha Stott Despoja (1999) pointed out at the time, a youth curfew was at best a band-aid solution which would do nothing to address why young people were out on the streets after dark and possible reasons could include homelessness and difficulties faced in the home. The policy painted young people as criminals simply because they were out at night, which then also placed young people in a conflict situation with the authorities, to say nothing of doing little if anything to foster respect for the police among young people. It was furthermore suggested by professional experts that existing laws could adequately deal with young people who actually offend when they were out after dark or any other time.

Populist Policies

v. Tighter Immigration Controls and resisting the ‘Asianisation’ of Australia

The One Nation Party considered that ‘inappropriately high levels of immigration combined with the policy of multiculturalism had led to a serious breakdown in the social cohesion of Australia’. Essentially the thrust of the policy is that, with ‘all due fairness, Australia must have an approach to immigration that will benefit not burden the existing population’. The party advocated for the abolition of multiculturalism. One Nation wanted immigration levels to be based on a zero-net gain. The immigration policy, according to One Nation, was non-discriminatory. According to the One Nation policy document for the 1998 election, ‘genuine refugee numbers would be maintained at the current level, and if possible, refugees will return
to their own country when the unrest in their homeland had been resolved’. Furthermore, ‘illegal migrants would not have access to taxpayer-funded legal aid and the appeal process’.

With regard to multiculturalism, One Nation believed that while there is ‘an understandable desire’ for migrants to maintain their culture in Australia, ‘the desire Australians have to maintain their culture, history and traditions must take precedence.’

One Nation believed that the end result of the federal government’s policy of increased immigration would lead to the ‘Asianisation of Australia’. It also believed that the major parties both concurred with the policy of increased Asian immigration and that they did so without providing any justification or defence of their stance. One Nation believed that:

70% of our immigration program is from Asian countries. Consequently, Australia will be 27% Asian within 25 years, and as migrants congregate in our major cities, the effect of Asianisation will be more concentrated there. This will lead to the bizarre situation of largely Asian cities on our coasts that will be culturally and racially different from the traditional Australian nature of the rest of the country.

With this ostensibly populist policy One Nation challenged the need for, and the legitimacy of, multiculturalism, and the need for increased immigration from Asia in particular. However, the party did not define in its policy statement what it understood multiculturalism to mean or what would be implied if it were abolished. Although the party’s immigration policy sought to appeal to traditional nationalistic values, the Party arguably did a very poor job of marketing this policy to the electors and using the press effectively as part of the process of selling these ideas.

vi. The citizen-initiated referenda proposal

The citizen based referenda idea was adopted as a One Nation policy at both the Queensland and the federal elections of 1998. ‘Proposals’ for referenda questions would come from the people. Simply put the policy would work as follows:

• a sponsoring committee of 12 electors would collect a minimum of 44 signatures in support of a proposal;
• if ‘the electoral commission’ assesses the proposal as being able to be given legal effect, the sponsoring committee then has 12 months to gather the signatures of two per cent of electors on the roll from more than 50 per cent of the electorates;
• Legislation would then be drafted. The legislation would then be presented to Parliament, who could pass the legislation or make recommendations for its improvement;
• if parliament does not pass the legislation, it is automatically referred for a referendum at the next election;
• however, if the number of signatures equals five per cent of electors, the proposal must go to a referendum in three months;
• if the proposal is approved by a majority of voters in more than 50 per cent of electorates, the proposal is ‘presented to the government for assent’ following assent the proposal becomes law.
This ‘ultra-democratic’ policy appeared as an example of a policy that looked good on paper but was questionable in practicality. It had a number of flaws and short comings. The proposal would be costly to implement and time consuming during which key factors in the referendum issue could change dramatically. However, the proposal also circumvented the operations of parliament and elected governments. Significantly there would be no consideration of the possible interaction of a successful referendum proposal with other legislation.

Prime Minister John Howard enters the Fray... (at last)

One Nation’s influence in federal politics was severely diminished in 2001 when the Liberal Prime Minister John Howard decided to adopt One Nation’s hard line approach to asylum seekers, which rendered the maverick party redundant as a protest movement (Henderson 2002:42). *Arena* (2006:3) observed that:

> While One Nation drew the rough sketch, it took a more sophisticated set of hands and more refined style to fill in the nuance and details.

Howard chose his timing well (immediately after 9/11) and employed rhetoric to evoke nationalistic sentiments (‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come’). As Howard oozed reassurance after the attack on the World Trade centre, his election speech in October 2001 effectively cut the ground from under One Nation as a force of disaffected mobilisation. By contrast, Hanson began to reinforce the image that she was out of her depth as a political leader, a risky and inexperienced alternative on the cusp of the ‘War on Terror’, and continued to appear a little tactless in media interviews.

According to *Arena*, from 2001 the Howard government pushed the Hanson agenda much further than even she could have anticipated – ‘thus guaranteeing One Nation political marginalisation’.

The Major Parties Collude and Refuse to Allocate Second Preferences to One Nation

The major parties soon came to the uncomfortable conclusion that the best way to defeat One Nation was to refuse to give the party any second preferences at each of the subsequent federal and state elections. Labor was the first to make this decision, and federally announced their intentions in a letter dated 24 June 1997, issued by the then leader of the parliamentary Labor Party Kim Beazley, who advised that:

> (Hanson) is not about making things better for Australians – she is simply about race and division. This short sighted and discriminatory view can only damage our future and is utterly rejected by the Australian Labor Party. We will not support Pauline Hanson, the One Nation Party or their objectives in any way.’ (Beazley 1997)
The conservative Coalition was slower to come to the same decision (and some resistance was expressed by some Nationals in regional electorates), but following the Victorian Liberals and then the confirmation of the federal party the Coalition locked in behind Labor.

This tactical decision was one of the major reasons for the decline in One Nation support. Starved of oxygen, with no flow of preferences from other parties, meant that One Nation had to win seats purely on its primary vote alone. In effect, in most lower house seats, One Nation candidates were second preferencing another party but receiving no support in return. For the two major parties in Australia, their uncomfortableness meant that to effectively deal with the threat of PHON, they had to effectively preference swap with each other before One Nation, and deliberately put PHON last on their preference distribution list. Usually at elections the two major parties gave each other the last preference on the ballot paper and preferred all variety of minor parties or independents first. But by preferencing against PHON the two major parties were able to stymie the development of the minor party and frustrate its chances of gaining representation.

In the 1996 federal election Pauline Hanson’s performance is shown in the following table. Note that this was before the formation of PHON and she ran as a disendorsed Liberal candidate.

**1996 Federal election Results for the electorate of Oxley**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Swing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WYLES, Carl</td>
<td></td>
<td>765</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTT, Les</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>27,497</td>
<td>39.36</td>
<td>-15.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANSON, Pauline</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>33,960</td>
<td>48.61</td>
<td>22.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PULLEN, David Roy</td>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>4,248</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBB, Victor</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKEON, John Robert</td>
<td>GRN</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPMAN, Bill</td>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>....</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>....</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>....</td>
<td>QG</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Exhausted votes are ballot papers which show no further valid preference for any candidate and must, therefore, be set aside from the count.

In the next federal election in 1998, Pauline Hanson ran as a PHON candidate in a neighbouring electorate (Blair) as an electoral distribution had taken place. Her performance is shown in the following table.

**1998 Federal election Results for the electorate of Blair**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Swing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McKENZIE, Neal</td>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>3.64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE, Brett Ian</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>6,989</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>-6.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASSINGTHWAIGHTHE, Owen David</td>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLARKE, Virginia</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>17,239</td>
<td>25.29</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONNORS, Libby</td>
<td>GRN</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>HANSON, Pauline</td>
<td>HAN</td>
<td>24,516</td>
<td>35.97</td>
<td>35.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># THOMPSON, Cameron</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>14,787</td>
<td>21.69</td>
<td>-24.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBERTS, Lee</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Swing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOAN, Mark</td>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>AWP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>AIP</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>AFI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>OAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>OTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>68,164</td>
<td>96.41</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,541</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>70,705</td>
<td>95.28</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Distribution of Preferences</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Swing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HANSON, Pauline</td>
<td>HAN</td>
<td>31,766</td>
<td>46.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOMPSON, Cameron</td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>36,398</td>
<td>53.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in spite of leading on primary votes, Hanson lost the seat and her place in parliament. The important thing to note is the flow of the preferences of the excluded ALP candidate (Clarke) 73.8 per cent of her second preference votes flowed to the Liberal Thompson, and only 26.2 per cent of her votes ‘leaked’ to Hanson.

This strategy of allocating second preferences by both of the major parties against a minority party could happen again against another minor that both major parties want to either defeat or seriously weaken.

A number of other strategies, however, would have been open to One Nation regarding the allocation of preferences. One Nation could have refused to allocate preferences to any one party, which is what they did in the end. They could have made more of an impact with other strategies, for example, preferencing a given minor party. On their how to vote cards One Nation could have left the choice of preference up to the voter, showing how to second preference both parties. One Nation in safe seats could have preferred the other major party, for example in a safe Labor seat preference the Liberal candidate and vice versa. In marginal seats force a ‘bidding war’ for PHON preferences. This could show that PHON preference were not to be taken for granted and treated lightly.
However Wanna and Arklay (2001:554) recorded that in relation to the 2001 Queensland state election, One Nation advised it would adopt a ‘spoiler role by preferencing against every sitting member – on the grounds that they were all part of an establishment elite who acted against the interests of the local electorate.’ This was assumedly done as a protest to the major parties for not allocating second preferences to One Nation.

The Aftermath of the Queensland State Election and Terry Sharples’ Litigation

Not long after the Party’s spectacular Queensland debut, cracks in the party’s unity began to surface. One of the unsuccessful PHON candidates in the Queensland state elections was Terry Sharples, who stood for the seat of Burleigh. He originally intended to stand as an independent candidate, but after meeting with Paul Trewartha (who Sharples believed was national vice president and national secretary of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation), agreed to join the new party and stand as the endorsed candidate for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. Trewartha at the time held only his positions in Pauline Hanson Support Movement Inc. Sharples’ agreement was conditional on his controlling the giving of preferences, and his recovering 75 per cent of his personal campaign expenditure from Electoral Commission refunds passed on to the party after the election.

Disagreement over Sharples’ allocation of preferences led, however, to a withdrawal of One Nation’s support for him just before the election. He was not elected, although he received more than 4 per cent of the valid first preference votes, which bears upon the entitlement to electoral funding reimbursement. He had personally spent more than $11,000 on the campaign, and sought reimbursement from Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, but this was not forthcoming. As a result, Sharples started investigating One Nation to determine what entity to sue to recover his electoral expenses.

In Canberra, Tony Abbott MP (then a junior minister in the Howard government), viewed the rise of One Nation with some alarm. He had two concerns, the first was that he employed David Oldfield as his private secretary and while employed in that role, Oldfield was planning the formation and rise of One Nation. The second concern was One Nation was attracting members and supporters, not from the ALP, but from the Liberal Party and the Nationals, this weakening of the conservative vote could result in a long-term Labor government. Abbott commented that ‘Having unwittingly helped to give birth to One Nation, I felt a personal duty to stop people from being taken in by it’. (Abbott 2010:51).

Sharples, with the encouragement and assistance from Abbott, sued both the Queensland State Electoral Commissioner (O’Shea) and Pauline Hanson as a representative of PHON in the Supreme Court of Queensland, before Justice Atkinson. In mounting his claim for
reimbursement, Sharples requested the court review the decision to register One Nation as a political party. Justice Atkinson handed down the Court’s decision on 18 August 1999.

Sharples argued that the ‘party’ did not have 500 members who were enrolled as electors in the state of Queensland; that it did not have as one of its aims and objectives the election of candidates to the Queensland Legislative Assembly; and thirdly, that the person who signed as secretary of the party was not in fact the secretary of the party. Sharples claimed he believed he had joined the political party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, and he had stood as a candidate for it in the state election held on 13 June 1998. The name of the party, Pauline Hanson's One Nation appeared next to his name only because it was a registered party and he was endorsed by that party. His expectation of a refund of his electoral expenses was based on his expectation that the political party was registered and would receive electoral funding from which his expenses or a part of them would be reimbursed.

The judge ruled that at the time of being granted registration Pauline Hanson’s One Nation did not have 500 members although the evidence shows that it had more than 500 people who believed themselves to be members. Furthermore, she found that Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield knew that the political party did not have 500 members and knew therefore that it was not entitled to registration.

The Judge found that after reviewing the decision of the Electoral Commission, that its decision to register Pauline Hanson’s One Nation under the Queensland Electoral Act was induced by fraud or misrepresentation. Accordingly, One Nation was not entitled to registration as a political party in Queensland as it did not satisfy the requirement of s.70 of the Electoral Act 1992.

The Director of Public Prosecutions then became involved and Hanson and Ettridge were charged with fraud. In October 2001, Hanson began her court appearances for fraudulently registering her party (and then receiving electoral funds). Appearing with fellow accused David Ettridge, she was charged with illegally obtaining $500,000 from the Electoral Commission, which she had to repay before the subsequent state election in 2001 (Wanna 2002:265).

The committal hearing was heard in the Magistrates Court in April and May 2002, with both pleading not guilty to the charges. Ettridge told the Magistrate that ‘Hanson was not capable of putting together the structure of One Nation, and had relied on him for the advice (Wanna 2002:561). In May 2002 police laid further charges of for misappropriation of funds from Hanson’s ‘fighting fund’. The Magistrate ordered that they stand trial by jury over the charges that Hanson conspired to claim electoral funds dishonestly.
At their trial in the Queensland District Court, they were found guilty and sentenced to prison. Hanson and Ettridge then appealed to the full bench of the Queensland Supreme Court. In their judgement, the three Justices of that Court found that a separate organization, namely the political party Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, was constituted, by a resolution of Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield on 23 February 1997. That organization was registered federally as a political party on 27 June 1997 and in Queensland on 4 December 1997.

The Court held that that the applicants for membership became members of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, the political party or more probably, of both that political party and the support movement. The Judges quashed the convictions of Hanson and Ettridge and entered verdicts of acquittal.

These well-publicised bouts of litigation instigated by Sharples caused no end of embarrassment to Hanson and her newly formed party. To add to her trouble her party in the Queensland Parliament with its inexperience and lack of guidance was starting to unravel and a rapid pace.

**The Implosion of One Nation in the Queensland Parliament**

In the lead up to the 1998 Queensland state elections, Hanson had no idea or knowledge about her nominated candidates. In particular, she did not know anything about their particular backgrounds. Notwithstanding, she sent to these prospective candidates membership and candidate kits. There was no vetting or scrutiny of the individual candidate and no knowledge by Hanson or her office staff of the candidates’ experience of politics, public office or debating skills. Importantly the all-important question for a candidate, - ‘is there anything in your past life, if it became known, could cause embarrassment to the party?’ was not asked.

Significantly, the One Nation parliamentary party had advice from Sir Joh Bjelke Petersen at a party meeting, before taking their seats in the parliament. It is surprising that One Nation did not seek further advice from former parliamentarians and even parliamentary officials on life and strategies as members of the Queensland parliament.

Wanna (1999:575) claims that ‘the parliamentary members of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation did not know each other before they sat together in parliament as a cross bench party. The strain of working together with equally inexperienced strangers began to take its toll on personal relations with in the party’. Fairbrother (2001:3-4) also reflected that, ‘One Nation had a very tempestuous entrance into the (QLD) parliament… One Nation’s entrance into politics changed the face of parliament dramatically.’ Fairbrother offered as examples the usage of a parliamentary conference room for a party meeting and secondly and more significantly, the maiden speeches of the One Nation members, which Fairbrother stated ‘amazed and surprised many people’.
A maiden or first speech is a pivotal moment for a new member of parliament. It is the new member’s chance to inform parliament of their visions for the future and their priorities. It is parliament’s first glimpse of the new member’s speaking and debating styles and why they support the party they represent. The maiden speech is an occasion that calls for a well-researched carefully worded speech that makes a positive contribution and not for an exhibition of negativity, emotionalism and half-baked ideas as the new PHON members exhibited.

When the One Nation members started to give their maiden speeches a number of the speeches contained some strange and fanatical comments. For example, the member for Burdekin, Jeff Knuth, in a very emotional speech claimed that Prime Minister Howard’s reaction to the Port Arthur massacre was a knee-jerk reaction. In Knuth’s opinion:

Port Arthur had nothing to do with it. That was only the excuse to slug Australians with extremist laws long hidden away in the files . . . awaiting the day when Australian law makers could be scared into passing laws hatched in a faraway foreign capital to better fit Australians into their glorified international mould (Knuth (1998:1470ff).

He went to accuse federal politicians of ‘fiddling the books’, and also claimed without providing any evidence that, ‘the Premier is more interested in communist Vietnam. The Prime Minister is more interested in building palaces in Africa’.

While Charles Rappolt, the PHON member for Mulgrave, claimed that:

It must be the duty of this parliament to get the firearms out of the ground and back on to the walls… so that Queenslanders can again hold up their heads in public and shout, “I am proud to be a militia man or reservist in the patriotic sense (Rappolt 1998:1454).

Bill Feldman the leader of the PHON parliamentary party, also raised the spectre of communism by alleging that there were communist forces in Queensland schools and that they were creating ‘hate and division’. He called on the Labor government to stop ‘this particularly nasty form of political child abuse’ (Courier-Mail 6 August 1998).

In such a short space of time, Hanson and her party officers had selected a great many candidates to contest the Queensland and federal elections who were weak and inexperienced and likely to be poor parliamentary performers. One such candidate was the ‘young bumptious member for Tablelands, Shaun Nelson, the ‘enfant terrible of ONP’ (Reynolds (2000:173).

Nelson had a harsh tactless style of debating, for example:

. . . we will see how many Aboriginal children lying drunk in the gutter we stumble over. We will see how many Aboriginal children are standing outside pubs waiting for their parents to come out (Nelson 1998:1916).

This was a strange statement from a member who advocated ‘equal rights, not extra rights’ or ‘treat unequals equally’. It is hard to see how the above statement by Nelson is supposed to empower aboriginal children and give them a sense of pride. Then on 5 August 1998 in a speech
complaining about the Ipswich City Council, Nelson challenged a Labor member to ‘step outside’ (Nelson 1998:1617) which is the usual challenge to go and sort out the differences physically.

Much of the parliamentary performance of the One Nation members indicates poorly thought out speeches with no sense of strategy only knee jerk reactions.

For example, on 25 August 1998 in the Qld Parliament, the leader of One Nation, Feldman moved a motion that five members of the Labor Party be ‘collectively charged with admonition, contempt of the House, and have committed criminal offences . . . and they be expelled from Parliament forthwith’ (Feldman 1998:1869).

Jack Paff, the member for Ipswich West and a former policeman, was appointed as the One Nation member on the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee (PCJC). At a reception at Government House on 28 September 1998, Paff spent some time speaking with a member of the Queensland police force. In the course of the conversation, Paff made a series of serious allegations against serving police officers, all of whom strenuously denied Paff’s allegations. The specific officer to whom Paff made the allegations, considered Paff to be very indiscreet in raising the allegations in the circumstances in which he did (PCJC 1999:2). Paff admitted that the allegations were ‘a total lie’. Paff claimed he made the comments to the policeman merely in order to ‘shock him and get a reaction from him’ (PCJC 1999:4). The committee found that Paff’s conduct was unacceptable and inappropriate and the committee condemned Paff’s conduct (PCJC 1999:15). Paff resigned from the committee on 3 March 1999.

The activities of Paff show how inexperienced he was as a parliamentarian. The PCJC is a very high profile committee and its members have serious obligations regarding their conduct and what they say about the activities of the committee. Being an MP requires a high standard of conduct in terms of people’s reputations. In addition, misleading the House in any form is a very serious offence. At this point in time the One Nation members were Members of Parliament for less than 12 months.

The Party’s Divisions Start to Deepen

On 4 October 1998, the QLD PHON MP Charles Rappolt the member for Mulgrave, suddenly resigned from the Queensland parliament, citing health problems and media pressure as the reasons. He later committed suicide. The resultant by-election was won not by PHON but by the ALP from the Nationals after a close contest. In fact, PHON with 15.6 of the vote was the first party eliminated from the count. One Nation went from eleven members to ten in the parliament.
In the Queensland parliament on 5 February 1999 three One Nation MPs resigned from the party after their demands for the One Nation directors Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield, who were the members of the party’s National Executive, to step down and face democratic elections were not met by the party. They had issued a challenge to One Nation on 3 February 1999 by lodging ‘a ten-point set of demands with the members of the party’s National Executive’. These points were ‘not negotiable, nor will any discussion be entered into’, apparently the members of the parliamentary party were not interested in any form of negotiating such as ‘win-win’ negotiations! The points included ‘MPs must be allowed to attend National and State Conferences with full voting rights’. Point seven was curious, it read:

All minor newspapers that are willing to support PHON should be given approval by an elected committee who will also examine all literature prior to print (Background Briefing 1999:1).

Point seven indicates an attempted form of censorship of the press by the party. Furthermore, if a ‘minor newspaper’ wishes to print an article about PHON, they would hardly seek ‘approval’ to do so instead just going ahead and printing it.

Once again, the parliamentary party showed a lack of thought and planning instead giving way to emotionalism and anger which detracted from their real concern which was the control and closed shop nature of the National Executive of PHON.

In a letter to One Nation members, dated 18 January 2000, Pauline Hanson stated:

Over the years lies and innuendos have been spread about the two Davids. It has come to a stage where dealing with perception is an endless battle. People are too often easily swayed by gossip and lies, and only hear what they want to. I have always tried to be honest and accountable to the members of One Nation and have worked to the best of my ability for our country. David Oldfield has been accused for years of wanting to take over the party as leader, and along with David Ettridge was said to be controlling me. David is a fine Parliamentarian and has worked tirelessly to help me achieve my goals. The people, who have accused him of this, are now actually the ones who have done the dirty deed. For the first five months after launching the party David Ettridge fully funded the National Office, paid the wages and worked to establish branches throughout the country. David Ettridge has been accused of misappropriation of monies over the years, yet no evidence to support these cowardly rumours has been produced.

Miscalculations in the 1998 Federal Election

The Party’s second electoral test occurred later that same year in the federal election held on 3 October 1998. Again, at this election, as with the Queensland State election, the Labor Party refused to give its second preferences to One Nation. Significantly, however, in the federal election the National Party and the Liberal Party changed their second preference allocation and also did not give their second preferences to One Nation, instead giving them to Labor. Thus
One Nation was in the position of having to give second preferences but receiving none in return.

Hanson personally polled well in the election but still lost her seat in the House of Representatives. Hanson made a tactical mistake in running for the House of Representatives seat of Blair. Due to the recent federal electoral redistribution in Queensland, Hanson’s seat of Oxley had been split into two by the Electoral Commission and the new Oxley would have been harder for Hanson to retain. She then decided to contest the neighbouring electorate of Blair instead. In winning Oxley in 1996, there was no Liberal candidate but there was a Liberal candidate in Blair in 1998. Many Liberals voted for Hanson in 1996 because they did not have a replacement endorsed Liberal candidate. In an article headed ‘Hanson heads for the exit’ Richardson (1998:32) commented that Hanson was defeated in Blair the moment the Nationals decided not to second preference her. In his view the only way she could have won was either on the primary vote or with ‘substantial preference leakages’. Richardson went on to argue that if Hanson had run for the Senate she would have only needed 14 per cent for a quota and not 51 per cent for an absolute majority and may have been able to secure two quotas. If Hanson had contested for a Senate seat (or two) this would have meant the whole state would have been her electorate and she would have been easily elected.

The one positive for the party was that One Nation candidate Heather Hill did win a Senate seat in Queensland, defeating the National Party Senator, O’Chee. Nationally One Nation polled eight per cent of the vote or close to one million votes.

Ironically the One Nation preferences in the NSW Senate election ensured the loss of the Nationals Senate Candidate (Sandy McDonald) and the election of the Australian Democrats candidate Aden Ridgeway. Thus One Nation preferences ensured the loss of a candidate who would have at least had some sympathy with One Nation’s viewpoint, with a candidate who was very strongly opposed to One Nation and all it stood for.

The refusal of the major parties to second preference One Nation was also the case in each of the subsequent elections. This could be considered a major reason for the decline in One Nation support.

After the mixed showings in 1998, One Nation operated on a Senate and states upper house election strategy. The party realised the significance of Graham Richardson’s advice that it would be much easier to win a quota of votes in the Senate rather than an absolute majority in the House of Representatives.
Further problems befell One Nation – leading to more legal challenges and resignations

On 1 December 1998, Chuck Hong, a Sydney businessman, launched a High Court challenge against One Nation’s Heather Hill, questioning her eligibility to sit in the Senate due to her failure to renounce her British citizenship. On 23 June 1999, the High Court of Australia (sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns) held that Heather Hill was unable to take her seat in the Senate as she failed to renounce her British citizenship before the federal election (as had some other parliamentarians who had been elected). In her stead, Len Harris took her place in the Senate. Harris had health problems, and in addition he came across to the electorate as lacking in self-confidence as a parliamentarian and was very uncertain of himself in Senate committee hearings.

PHON was officially deregistered in Queensland on 19 August 1999. The Queensland Electoral Commission (QEC) immediately promised to recover the $500,000 in electoral funds paid to PHON after the 1998 state election. Four months after that on 13 December 1999 the Queensland One Nation leader, Bill Feldman announced that he and four of his fellow parliamentary party members had registered One Nation Queensland as a separate, state based party. However, on 22 December 1999, Feldman announced the Party’s name would be the City Country Alliance of Queensland (CCAQ), following a legal threat over the usage of ‘One Nation’.

Table 34: The Dramatic Decline in One Nation’s Vote 1998-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>House of Reps</th>
<th>No of Candidates</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>No of Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the 1998 election, in which both major parties did not second preference One Nation, the vote for the party in the House of Representatives and the Senate is almost identical which would indicate that those who supported wholeheartedly the policies of One Nation voted for it. In other words, the ‘doctrine’ of One Nation was supported. There seems to be very little if any indication of a protest vote, where a voter will vote for a major party in the House of Representatives and for a minor party such as One Nation in the Senate. This result could be an indicator that One Nation is very much a ‘doctrinal party’.

Abbott (2010:52) commented that ‘Most One Nation voters eventually returned to the Liberal and National Parties partly because they saw through Hanson and partly because the economy started to improve but also, I suspect, because the Howard Government became better at demonstrating its conservative as well as its liberal credentials’.

The Next Queensland State election of 2001

Commenting on the policies of One Nation in the 2001 Queensland State election, Fells (2001:32) commented that:

The policies presented by One Nation were non-specific and general, often seen to be motherly and mere catch cries which included little detail. The election favourites of law and order, education, employment and health were trotted out. One Nation forget me nots of indigenous issues and firearms were also covered.

In the election PHON received 8.69 per cent of the first preference votes a swing against the party of minus 13.99 per cent. PHON fielded 39 candidates. Significantly, the CCAQ only managed 2.39 per cent of the first preference votes, fielding 25 candidates. One Nation was ‘runner up in 12 seats after the distribution of preferences’. One Nation had ‘prominent support in Queensland’ (Wood and Rosenblum: 2001:60).

All was not lost for One Nation. The Party did manage to win three seats. It captured the seat of Gympie because according to O’Hara (2001:39) ‘the National Party failed to protect the primary and agricultural industries of the region from the effects of decentralisation’. The successful One Nation candidate was Elisa Roberts, a former soldier. However, on 18 April 2002 she resigned from the party and sat as an independent until she was defeated at the 2006 state elections. In addition, the party also won Lockyer from the CCAQ, with Bill Flynn as
candidate. Flynn was defeated at the next state election in 2004. Finally, the party won Atherton from an independent who formerly represented One Nation. The candidate was Rosa Lee Long who was a grazier and small business owner who held the electorate until the 2009 state election when she was defeated.

The 2001 Federal Election

PHON failed to have a second senator elected in QLD, a warning sign for Harris that his campaign in the 2004 federal election would be a hard and difficult campaign (and Harris did in fact lose his Senate seat at the subsequent election). In 2001 no PHON candidate was elected for either the Senate or the House of Representatives. The party’s vote in both houses had almost halved with 125 candidates running for the party in the House, a reduction of 16 from the 1998 election and 21 candidates for the Senate a reduction of two.

One Nation’s Tumultuous Relationship with the Media – Novelty Value Turns to Disdain

Pauline Hanson initially attracted a large amount of press coverage but did not effectively capitalise on it with strategies such as well-prepared press conferences and press briefings on a one to one basis to get the message ‘out there’. It is surprising that One Nation did not employ qualified journalists who had been members of the parliamentary press gallery as press secretaries for Hanson and then Harris in the Senate. It can be argued that One Nation and its parliamentarians and senior officers did not understand the press nor did they make any real attempt to so do.

Hanson received a lot of free media publicity because in the eyes of the media, she had a certain celebrity and novelty value. She attracted attention to herself in the press with her combative personality and her direct speech. She welcomed and used the free publicity, which initially was a smart strategy for a small, new party that cannot afford much paid advertising and had to rely on free media publicity. Her antics and controversial views ensured that she received much media publicity, she capitalised on this. As her first speech to the federal parliament has indicated, Hanson often began her messages and speeches with: ‘I am a real Australian and we real Australians are not being listened to’, ‘I am a battler’, ‘I am not a politician, I am a parliamentarian’. Her gender and appearance were also important in generating attention; from her cat-like eyes to her dress codes. As McPate (2001:52 ff) commented, ‘the media had a field day analysing Hanson’s wardrobe rather than . . . (her) policies’.

Ward (1998:241) has commented that during July 1997, One Nation held a series of recruitment rallies in several states. The result, according to Ward, was ‘crowds of protesters as well as
supporters and a number of rallies ended in violence’. This allowed Hanson the oxygen of publicity and an opportunity to cast her opponents as political terrorists’.

One Nation’s relations with the press in Queensland were not helped by the leader of the party, Bill Feldman (QLD MP) who, when speaking on a condolence motion for the late Charles Rappolt attacked the Murdoch press in the Queensland parliament on 17 August 1999.  Rappolt was a former member of One Nation in the Queensland parliament, elected in the 1998 state elections, He resigned on 4 November 1998, citing the pressure of political life and the Queensland press as reasons. He committed suicide on 2 August 1999.  Feldman said:

The Murdoch press achieved what 45 years of hard work could not do Charlie – pushed him not just to the edge but over it. It is here that we should note the ethics of journalism, not just to pursue a man but to pursue him to death. There is blood on the hands of some journalists in the Murdoch press today, and that stain will not be erased.

These were strong words from a party leader, whose party needed all the positive press coverage it could get.

The One Nation Party had a strong dislike for the Murdoch Press.  Balson (2014) advised that ‘the media in Australia is controlled by Murdoch. Once a year Murdoch gets all his editors together and discusses HIS agenda. He is a sick power freak – look at phone tapping in the UK’. Balson went on to mention that, ‘One Nation never got a good run in the press – the press is the anchor behind the two-party system which hinges on media support. Murdoch loves power and a third political power would have taken that power away from him’.

However, Wear (1998:256) presents a different account.  She observed that in the 1998 federal election campaign:

The travelling press contingent subjected Hanson… to hostile questioning. Ms Hanson found the pressure difficult to cope with and on a number of occasions had members of the media ejected.  This early confrontation set the tone for One Nation’s relationship with the media culminating in the eviction of journalists seeking costings of the Party’s campaign promises three days before the poll. What was left of One Nation’s campaign after that was “media free”. When it became clear on election night that Ms Hanson had lost Blair, the media were once again asked to leave.

One Nation and its lifespan

The party lifespan of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in the federal parliament and in the Queensland parliament is shown in the following diagram
The first noticeable point is the very small dispersion of the lifespan above the representation threshold of 12 years. The election of a senator for a six-year term and a member of the QLD Legislative Assembly for 9 years accounts for most of that life-span. In terms of flatness, One Nation falls into the second polar category namely short lifespan, quick appearance, a quick apex and then disappearance, in this case very slowly over some years.

After being elected in the federal election of 1996 as an independent, the party was formed and registered in 1997. As the party already had representation in the federal parliament, namely Hanson, the party immediately crosses the representation threshold. In the 1998 Queensland state election, the party’s strongest state in terms of support, the party won 11 seats in the Legislative Assembly. A federal election was also held a little later in that year, and Hanson lost her seat in the House, but the party won a Senate seat in Queensland. This result ensured the party continued above the strong representation threshold with their membership was widely reported in the press and there was a sense of anticipation of what this new party could do with such a strong Queensland result, notwithstanding one member had resigned from the parliament in October 1998 and his seat was won by Labor at the subsequent by-election.

However, the storm clouds of party disunity soon gathered. In March 1999, four members of the party resigned to become independents. Their major grievance was the high level of control they saw over their activities from the leaders outside parliament namely Hanson Oldfield and Ettridge. The new Senator took his seat in the Senate on 1 July 1999 in an atmosphere of party disunity and uncertainty of what would happen next. At that point, the party dropped down into
the representation weak threshold, due to the disunity and resignations but the One Nation’s troubles were not over. In December 1999, the remaining five One Nation Members resigned from the Party, forming the new Party, the City and Country Alliance Queensland (CCAQ), this left only their Senator as a member of the parliamentary party. The lifespan slipped again to be just over the representation weak threshold. That Senator’s vote had no impact on the balance of power in the Senate and in addition the Senator was a very poor speaker and Senate committee performer with a very limited impact on the performance of the Senate. The one glimmer of hope was at the 2004 Queensland state election in which a single One Nation member was elected to the Legislative Assembly.

In the 2004 federal election, One Nation lost its seat in the Senate. The party never enjoyed holding or sharing the balance of power in the Senate due to its short time span and its very small numbers.

Fisher (1980:611) argued that ‘minor parties . . . serve as a testing ground for potential vote getting issues.’ This was true of One Nation and a significant cause in its decline. One Nation was strong in its opposition to Asian immigration and queue jumping refugees trying to enter Australia. In the lead up to the 2001 Federal election, Prime Minister Howard said that ‘we will decide who enters this country and the circumstances under which they will do so.’ In saying this, he copied and took on a major policy of One Nation and reduced that Party’s influence.
Table 35: The Power of PHON Preferences 1998-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Election</th>
<th>Seats where some or all preferences Distributed</th>
<th>Seats Won after PHON Preferences Distributed</th>
<th>Seats where First preferences lead reversed by distribution of preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Won by Coalition</td>
<td>Won by Labor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12 (12 QLD)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10 (10 Vic)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that second preferences in 1998 from One Nation were only decisive in one state, its home state of Queensland, with respect to 12 electorates. In 2001, surprisingly, the impact moved to another state, Victoria, with 10 electorates relying on One Nation preferences for Liberal victory.

The short-term future looked bleak for One Nation?

One Nation disappeared from the parliamentary scene due to it being a divided party especially in the public forum of the Queensland parliament. The Party’s policies were in many cases not attractive to the electorate and the party was not second preferred by either major party, who instead exchanged preferences. Nation still officially existed and endorsed candidates in recent elections for example the 2013 Federal election and the 2015 QLD State election. The few One Nation candidates received a very low percentage of the total vote, 0.17 per cent in the federal election and 0.92 per cent of the vote in QLD with 11 candidates. However, Hanson herself unsuccessfully contested the seat of Lockyer at the 2015 QLD state election winning 26 per cent of the primary vote and outpolling the ALP candidate, but losing the election on preferences. That result shows that Hanson herself attracted a significant personal following.

Suter (1998:189) has insightfully warned that:

It is important to distinguish between Pauline Hanson and Hansonism. Ms Hanson may have a short career in politics… but Hansonism as the Australian manifestation of the politics of anger will long exist. The conditions which brought it into being will not change for many years. The politics of anger has three sources: economic and social change, the level of anxiety in the community, and a frustration with politicians.

The significance of Suter’s remarks was borne out at the 2016 federal double dissolution election.
The Political Resurrection of One Nation – the 2016 Federal Election

At the 2016 Federal election One Nation once again crossed the representation threshold with the election of four of its candidates to the Australian Senate. One of these candidates was Hanson herself. In the state of Tasmania, One Nation’s candidate failed to become the party’s fifth Senator by a mere 141 votes. The election of that candidate would have further enhanced One Nation’s party status in the Senate, with additional staffing resources and other benefits for the party. The revised party lifespan graph for One Nation is shown below.

In chapter three of this thesis, it was mentioned that crossing the representation threshold after falling below it, is extremely rare. The above diagram shows the second crossing above the representation threshold by One Nation. In the new Senate, the party shares the balance of power with a number of other minor parties including the Australian Greens.

The composition of the Senate is shown in the following table.

Table 36: Composition of the Australian Senate following the 2016 Double Dissolution Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Greens</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nick Xenophon Team | 3  
Lambie Network | 1  
Hinch Justice Party | 1  
Family First | 1
Liberal Democrat | 1  
Total | 76

However, if the Greens and ALP vote together on one side and the Coalition and all other minor parties vote on the other side, One Nation would be in a balance of power situation. If the ALP, the Greens and Xenophon vote on one side and all other minor parties including One Nation vote on the other side with the Coalition, the vote would be tied at 38 each and the motion before the Senate would be defeated. In its political resurrection, One Nation enjoys a powerful and influential position.

The political resurrection of Hanson and One Nation was quite unpredicted because Hanson was seen and treated as a ‘serial candidate’, a minor party candidate that contests elections one after the other in a faint hope her candidature would make some sort of difference in terms of preference allocation or even that she would somehow get elected.

A significant difference was firstly the 2016 election was a double dissolution election and therefore a much smaller quota was required for election; the second difference was that Hanson received valued publicity. Errington and van Onselen (2016:114) bluntly observed that Hanson ‘was paid for a regular spot on ‘Sunrise’ when she should have been paying for the publicity.’ ‘Sunrise’ is a popular early morning Australian television program hosted by the very high profile David Koch. A third factor was her capitalisation on current fears. In 1996 Hanson was concerned about Asians in Australia, while in 2016 her concern was Muslim immigration into Australia with its associated culture of dress and halal certification.

**One Nation Policies**

In the election campaign, One Nation’s policies included banning Australian companies and businesses from paying the ‘Halal certification tax’ on food and other items, and in addition, banning the burqa and any other full face coverings in public. One Nation also proposed the holding of an inquiry into Islam to determine whether it is a religion or totalitarian political ideology.

One Nation also supported a zero net immigration policy where those who leave Australia are replaced with immigrants who are ‘culturally cohesive’ with Australia and will ‘assimilate’. One Nation also opposed ‘full foreign ownership’ of Australian land and assets. Another One Nation policy was a review and revocation of any free trade agreements that were not in Australia’s best interests.
One Nation also continued to support citizen initiated referenda and ‘responsible gun ownership’, as well as a referendum on same sex marriage.

Relevance

A key reason was that One Nation was seen to be relevant by those who supported and voted for the party. Those supporters who were small business owners would have concerns about foreign ownership free trade agreements and globalisation. Other supporters would have been concerned about immigration issues and halal certification of their products. All of these supporters would consider One Nation to be relevant in the modern political environment, in terms of the party’s policies. For other voters, One Nation served as a very convenient vehicle of protest against the major parties in an election that came very close to giving Australia its second hung parliament in six years.

One Nation was ideally placed to act as a voice in the Senate for other far right parties, such as the Australian Liberty Alliance party, who have similar policies on such issues as Halal certification.

Has One Nation learnt from its mistakes of the past?

The rise of One Nation in the late 1990s had the involvement of ‘the two Davids’; neither David Ettridge or David Oldfield had much if any experience in the operation of a political party or an election campaign. In the lead up to the 2016 election One Nation and Hanson had significant assistance from James Ashby. Ashby was a former political staffer, with much strategic experience, to a former Liberal federal parliamentarian. Ashby made his knowledge and experience available to One Nation.

The previous chapter of this thesis which dealt with the rise of One Nation presented and discussed three application forms to join One Nation that appeared between 1997 and 1999 inclusive. In the lead up to the 2016 election, One Nation produced a new membership form for the party. That form appears on the next page.

In examining the 2016 application to join the party, it can be seen that as with the 1999 application form there is no doubt that the applicant is joining a party, ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation political party’. The five questions on the 1999 form have changed on the 2016 form to a ‘declaration’. The first three question on the 1999 form have been fused into one question on the 2016 form, ‘I/we believe in the values of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party. The question about special skills and talents does not appear on the 2016 form while the question regarding membership of another political party remains, with an additional question regarding previous membership of another political party. Additional questions on the 2016 form relate to the
applicant ever having being refused membership of or being expelled from another political party. A further question asks if the applicant has ever nominated as a candidate in an election.

In the 2016 election campaign, candidate selection seemed to be much more stringent than it was in 1998. Candidates were required to disclose previous party membership and state why they wanted to be a candidate for One Nation. They also had to provide some background information about themselves. But surprisingly, they were not required to advise One Nation whether, if they had been selected, there would there be anything in their previous history if known, will could cause the party or themselves, embarrassment.
What of the future?

Following the double dissolution election, the first question on people’s minds was, ‘will the One Nation Senators serve for three year or six year terms?’ The Senate voted to use the ‘order of senators elected’ method in determining the terms of the Senators elected at that election, therefore Hanson as third senator elected for Queensland will serve a six-year term, the three other One Nation Senators being elected in either 11th or 12th position will serve for three years before facing re-election.

One Nation received $1.6 mil from AEC in election funding, that funding will put onto a sound footing, the party’s finances for the next federal election. Therefore, finance should not be a crippling problem for the party.

The challenge for Hanson will be to keep One Nation united as a party in the Senate and not have mass resignations as was seen in the Palmer United Party and indeed in One Nation in the Queensland Parliament in the late 1990s.

In Conclusion

One Nation eventually imploded, but not before Pauline Hanson had cast her shadow over Australian politics (Warhurst 2004:166). One Nation imploded because it failed to secure preferences from either of the major parties which would have given it majorities in some electorates and quotas in the Senate elections.

The party was very young and inexperienced having a high-profile member of the House of Representatives and 11 members of the Queensland Parliament. It grew too big too quickly and could not manage an effective relationship between its parliamentary wing and its organisational wing, leading to conflict. It was also outmaneuvered by a wily Prime Minister who ran with its key immigration policy, couching it in more subtle and respectable terms and seizing the right time to announce such a policy.

After its wipe out from parliament in the late 1990s, the 2016 federal election saw One Nation experience a spectacular resurrection from the political graveyard with the election of four Senators. In that election 35.04 per cent of the electors voted for a minor party in the Senate and not one of the major parties. One Nation came back in to the federal parliament through Pauline Hanson’s persistence, she kept on being a candidate election after election and therefore stayed in the public arena and got valuable press exposure in doing so.

The rise of One Nation along with its decline and re-entry into the parliament was not so much the work of a select group of elites. It was due to Pauline Hanson and her personality. She presented to the electorate as an ‘ordinary Australian’ who was not born with a silver spoon in
her mouth. Hanson tapped into issues that were of concern to a significant group of voters – significant enough to get her into parliament in 1996, a Senator three years later, and the large reemergence at the 2016 federal election.

In the 2016 election the change in the Party’s policy emphasis from Asians and Aboriginals to Islamism gave One Nation a suite of policies that appealed to certain areas of the electorate that had a fear or concern regarding the perceived rise of Islamism.

In returning to the federal parliament after a total wipeout of parliamentary members, One Nation achieved something that both the DLP and the Australian Democrats were never able to do.
Chapter 10: The Rise of the Australian Greens

Introduction

This chapter explores the rise of the Australian Greens in the federal parliament. Unlike the DLP and the Australian Democrats discussed in previous chapters, the Australian Greens have not yet faced their decline or met their demise. In addition, in contrast to the DLP, Australian Democrats and One Nation, the Greens have won seats in the House of Representatives in their own right. Pauline Hanson represented One Nation in the Lower House in 1997-98, but she was not elected as a member of that party but as a dis-endorsed Liberal Party candidate. She has managed to have Senators elected at the 1998 election and again at the 2016 election. The Greens won Cunningham in NSW at a by-election in 2002, which the party then lost at the next federal election. The Greens then won the seat of Melbourne contested by the Greens candidate, Adam Bandt, at the 2010 federal election and held the seat with an increased majority at the next two federal elections. The Greens have also won lower house seats in Victoria where they won two metropolitan seats at the last election and in New South Wales where the party won two metropolitan seats and one country seat in the north of the state.

The Australian Greens are fundamentally not a ‘break away party’. The Greens did not split from another party to form a new party. The Australian Greens originated as a social movement, and grew out of several wilderness and environmental movements. Elements of the environmental movement restructured into a parliamentary party structure in order to contest elections and gain seats in parliament. In this way, the Australian Greens is an ‘issues competitive party’ (Ghazarian 2015:56), attempting to force environmental and social issues to the forefront of the political agenda not merely within the Greens party itself but also changing the positions of the major parties themselves.

The chapter discusses the origins of the Australian Greens and the party’s transition from social group to political party and the factors that brought out that transition. The chapter also considers the change in leadership from the high profile Dr Bob Brown to Christine Milne, who were both Tasmanians, and then to the current party leader Senator Richard Di Natale, a moderate from Victoria. It is very significant that each of these two leadership changes took place relatively seamlessly and without much overt conflict that could harm the party in the future. This is in stark contrast to the DLP’s one leadership change and the several leadership changes of the Australian Democrats.
In addition, the Australian Greens party is a member of the Global Greens, a worldwide grouping of Greens parties. The Greens membership of the Global Greens network and the advantages from that membership are considered. These advantages include an international perspective on Green politics as well as a mechanism to remain relevant. It is significant that none of the other minor parties considered in this thesis were members of a global network. The Australian Democrats’ attempt to join the world wide liberal movement was unsuccessful due mainly to apathy of the Democrat party members who for whatever reason failed to complete and submit the relevant paperwork.

The Greens have put in place strict disclosure requirements for donations made to the party. These disclosure requirements are stricter than those of the Australian Electoral Commission and are discussed in this chapter.

Finally, the chapter questions whether the Greens learnt any lessons from the demise of the other three minor parties that have been discussed in the previous chapters. It concludes that the Australian Greens have indeed learnt lessons from the demise of the DLP and the Australian Democrats.

In the beginning

The Australian Greens had their genesis in a social movement, namely the United Tasmanian Group which came into some prominence during the 1972 Tasmanian State elections. An increased concern for environmental issues saw an emergence of environmental groups in other states such as Western Australia with the Nuclear Disarmament Movement in that state and sections of the industrial left in New South Wales. The Franklin Dam issue in 1982-83 with its associated High Court decision made a big impact on environmental groups around Australia. In the early days, the Australian Greens were in fierce competition with another environmental party, the Australian Democrats.

Barry and Doherty (2001:588) posit that the Green movement was a social movement, insofar as the various kinds of Greens share certain characteristics. The first of four characteristics that they put forward was ‘a collective identity’ that is ‘some sense of solidarity and common purpose’. The second characteristic of a social movement was ‘that the groups and individuals involved within it are linked in a loose network’. The third characteristic consisted of ‘involvement in protests and challenges to opponents’. Barry and Doherty (2001:590) argue that ‘a protest forces others to take sides’. Dr Bob Brown’s involvement in and usage of protest movements as a strategy will be discussed later in this chapter. Finally, the fourth characteristic was ‘Posing a challenge to existing forms of power’. Along with other challenges to elites and the bureaucracy, ‘the power of large business in their opposition to wasteful and unjust forms of trade and consumption’ is challenged by a ‘call for major redistribution of wealth’. This
challenge has been also used by the Greens to seriously question waste and duplication along with curbing the problems of pollution and damage to the environment through various forms of mining.

Turnbull and Vromen (2004) believed that:-

The Greens’ identity lies with their social movement base, the party developed from a range of social movements, most importantly the environmental movement.

Turnbull and Vromen (2004) go on to observe that:-

These movements and the values they encapsulate, are reflected in the Charter of the Australian Greens and in the party’s four pillars: economic justice and social equality, grassroots democracy, peace and non-violence and ecological sustainability.

Turnbull and Vromen (2004) concluded that:-

Building on their social movement foundations the Greens institutionalise a model of party organisation that supports participatory democracy in the forms of local decision making structures, consensus decision making and an active membership.

Jackson (2016:34) placed the Australian Greens between a ‘movement’ party and an ‘electoral professional’ party. For example, in terms of leadership and structure, Jackson described the Greens as ‘elected charismatic, mixed voluntary and professional’. In terms of decision-making, Jackson described the Australian Greens as ‘participatory with some centralised features’ such as the election of the leader and deputy leaders by the parliamentary Greens members, not the party membership.

In 1989 the Greens won five out of 35 seats in the Tasmanian House of Assembly and Brown became their leader. The Tasmanian House of Assembly is elected under a multi-member proportional representation electoral system. The Greens agreed to support a minority Labor government, on the basis of a negotiated ‘Accord’ which was signed by Brown and the Premier Michael Field. Under the accord, the Green independents agreed to support the budget but not ‘motions of no confidence’. The ALP made a number of agreements with the Greens including a more open parliamentary process and national parks protection along with public disclosure of bulk power contracts and royalties from mining companies. This agreement, however, broke down over forestry issues in 1992. The Tasmanian Greens were from the beginning, very much a single issue, pristine environmental party.

Table 37: Greens Members of the Tasmanian Parliament (Including Prior to the Australian Greens Party)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
<th>Highest Education Level</th>
<th>Paid Work before Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Birth Year</td>
<td>Term in Parliament</td>
<td>Highest Education Level</td>
<td>Paid Work before Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates Gerry</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1986-1995</td>
<td>LLB PhD</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milne Christine</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1989-1998</td>
<td>BA(Hons) Cert Ed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putt Peg</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1993-2008</td>
<td>BA(Hons)</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foley Mike</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booth Kim</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2002-2015</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris Tim</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2002-2014</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKim Nick</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2002-</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Connor Cassy</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2008-</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Halloran Paul</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>BSc Dip Ed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawkins Andrea</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>2015-</td>
<td>Dip Mgt</td>
<td>Alderman Business woman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NG – not given or provided.

The number of Greens in the Tasmanian Parliament’s House of Assembly, over the years, is shown in Table 40. The number of Greens in the Parliament has ranged from one to five. This means in a chamber of 25 members, at its peak the Australian Greens held 20 per cent of the seats in that chamber.

**Table 38: Number of Greens in the Tasmanian Parliament**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Bob Brown on a countback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Independent, Green</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Independent from Dec 1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tasmanian Greens from August 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tasmanian Greens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tasmanian Greens</td>
<td>Decrease in number of members of Legislative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Election</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tasmanian Greens</td>
<td>Resurgence in popularity over building of pulp mill at Wesley Vale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tasmanian Greens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tasmanian Greens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tasmanian Greens</td>
<td>Greens suffered swing in light of Liberal landslide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the federal parliament, the Greens presence was very small from the beginning. This is shown in the following table.

**Table 39:** Greens Members of Federal Parliament (Pre the Australian Greens)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
<th>Highest Education Level</th>
<th>Paid Work before Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valentine, Jo</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Teaching Quals</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margetts, Dee</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>BA(Hons) Dip Ed</td>
<td>Teacher Librarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jo Valentine was a former member of the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) which was formed in 1984. As can be seen, all of the above members came from Western Australia. The West Australian Greens were more a ‘peace movement party’ than an environmental party.

**The State Parties Federate – the Australian Greens**

The Australian Greens grew out of the various state-based embryonic Green parties. The confederated party was formed in August 1992 and is now part of the ‘Global Greens’. Norman (2004:157) reported that:-

In a café in the Sydney suburb of Newtown in 1992, a meeting of environmental and peace activists from Tasmania, New South Wales and Queensland resolved that the time was right to establish the Australian Greens as an official political party.
The confederate party was not the result of an automatic process, but rather a drawn-out reaction to a series of events such as the influence of economic rationalism on both major parties, and their disregard for environmental issues.

Prior to the various Greens parties coming together, Miragliotta (2012:411-12) observed that regarding green politics, ‘in the 1980s, Australian activists were diffused and localised and struggling to consolidate parties at both the local and regional levels’. Furthermore, claimed Miragliotta, the various Australian Green parties ‘were divided and squabbling about the terms and conditions under which they would unite’. In addition, there was also a fear ‘that a national structure would stifle much of the energy of the local green groups and handing too much power to a small circle who might monopolise the real decision making.’

In addition, opposition to the establishment of a national green party ‘was initially nurtured by the absence of a political and policy space that a dedicated green party vehicle could colonise.’ This ‘space’ was originally taken up by the Australian Labor Party and its environmental policies which included opposition to the building of the Gordon below Franklin dam in Tasmania, as well as building networks with various environmental interest groups Miragliotta (2012:411-12). At that point in time, the Australian Democrats saw themselves as an environmental and green party. The Nuclear Disarmament Party also had representation in the Senate as a peace and also environmental party.

Jackson (2015:37) commented that:-

The history of the Australian Greens is one of different strands intertwined: of broad social movements acting to save environmental treasures; of individual political actors such as Bob Brown and Drew Hutton welding together disparate party units to found a modern political party; of a politics founded in localities; that has spread to encompass a nation; and of the highs and lows of political competition.

A major turning point for the establishment of a national structure for the Greens was the defeat of Bob Hawke as Prime Minister in late 1991 and his replacement by Paul Keating.

Ghazarian (2015:57) observed that:-

Keating’s approach to environmental policy contrasted sharply with that of Hawke, and the conservation movement’s ability to influence government policy declined as a result. The conservation movement responded to this marginalisation by mobilising to create the Australian Greens. By doing so the movement aimed to exert influence on the government in the electoral and legislative spheres since it no longer has a direct avenue to influencing government decisions outside parliament.

Keating was seen by the Greens as an economic rationalist. Ghazarian (2015:66-67) reported that as a result of the rise of Keating, Bob Brown and his parliamentary colleagues in Tasmania ‘transformed the Green Independents into the Tasmanian Greens in 1992.’ Ghazarian (2015:66-67) goes on to observe that Brown went further in his attempt to create a ‘broader national
Greens party’. Brown led a series of meetings with representatives from Green parties in QLD and NSW and ‘it was agreed that these parties would form a new, confederated party: the Australian Greens.’

The turning point for the green movement in other states was Keating, as Prime Minister, going on to win the 1993 Federal election. That election was billed as the ‘unlosable election’ for the Liberal National coalition after 10 years of Labor government. But thanks to the unpopularity of the Coalition policy document, ‘FightBack!’ the Keating Labor government was re-elected.

After its re-election, the Keating government moved to devolve Commonwealth influence over environmental issues. In addition, the Keating government dismantled the Resource Assessment Commission and it ‘wound down’ the ecologically Sustainable Development debate which was a major forum for environmental groups.

As a result, the Keating government’s actions in the environmental area left environmental groups with a reduced capacity to be involved in government decision making. The Keating government’s actions influenced the decision of green movements in Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory to join the confederated Australian Greens Party (Ghazarian 2015:66-67). One can only wonder that if Keating was a little more receptive to the conservation movement, we may never have seen an Australian Green political party or, if so, one not as successful as the Australian Greens.

It took time for the Greens in WA to join the Australian Greens. Jackson (2016:59) commented that it took three separate votes before the Greens in WA finally agreed to join the Australian Greens in 2003. The Australian Greens party was originally perceived by the WA Greens as ‘an eastern states entity’. The WA Greens had lost their two Senate seats in 1996 (Chamarette) and in 1998 (Margetts). The Greens in WA had to wait until the 2004 election to win a seat in the Senate as part of the Australian Greens. The Australian Greens now have two Senators from WA with both being returned at the 2016 double dissolution election.

In NSW Jackson (2016:21-22) reported that NSW delegates still use ‘blocking consensus’ in Greens federal meetings and conferences. In the usage of ‘blocking consensus’ NSW Greens delegates will ‘withdraw’ their consent for a motion or proposal, if the delegates believe that there has been inadequate discussion of the proposal at state level. In NSW the Greens will also withdraw their consent if it is considered that local branches have not had sufficient time to discuss issues. With the principle of ‘blocking consent’ there is no ‘rushing through’ of motion or proposals through the voting process. But it does in the federal scene that NSW being the only state to use ‘blocking consent’ is at odds with the other states and this can lead to conflict and division.
Middleton 2017:4) reports that NSW was also the home state of the Party’s splinter group, the Left Renewal Group which wanted to see the Australian Greens shift sharply to the left away from the conservative ‘tree tories’. A major player in that group was Senator Lee Rhiannon whose involvement had ‘reignited a longstanding hostility’ with Bob Brown. It was the Left Renewal Group, who was according to Middleton, known as the ‘watermelons’ ‘for being green on the outside but essentially red within.’ Middleton has also noted that candidates from Rhiannon’s group were defeated in two party preselections in the previous 12 months indicated a lack of support for that group and its members. Since that time Rhiannon herself has lost Greens endorsement for her seat in the Australian Senate.

Miragliotta (2012:418) also saw the electoral law changes of 1983 as a catalyst to the creation of a national Green party. For a political party to receive formal recognition and registration it had to have at least 500 members. If the party could not meet the requirements for registration, then the party could not have its name printed on the ballot paper and not receive any public funding if it received the required number of first preference votes. These requirements and benefits gave the various green movements a significant incentive to move towards unity. The green movements could request recognition as a ‘related party’, but that would mean having to comply with policy requirements of the green party that actually held registration.

Miragliotta (2012:419) noted that:

- The National structure adopted was a decentralised model that preserved much of the autonomy of the regional chapters, posing relatively little threat to the independence of the constituent bodies. The adoption of a confederal rather than a strongly centralised structure that awarded significant powers to a national executive body was inevitable.

Lohrey (2002:2) claimed the Greens were an organic party in the sense they had evolved over a lengthy period of time and out of several community campaigns organised at the grass roots. Overall their support had grown steadily. The Greens were not founded through the personal fiat of one individual, as was the Australian Democrats and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. They have evolved into a real constituency, something more than just a broad-based protest vote. The Greens were not based on individual policy items, but on a new paradigm or grand narrative of what politics was all about, the ecological. In this context the ‘real constituency’ is a party with its own policies and visions for the future and not merely a protest group of negativity in regard to the policies of major parties.

Lohrey (2002:40) argued that ‘the environment will always return as an issue because it has to’. The environment impacts right across the policy spectrum, because many policy areas impact on the environment, areas such as mining and manufacturing but also in areas such as recycling and policies to encourage greater care of the environment. In this way concern with the environment has always kept the Australian Greens relevant.
With this concern for the environment, Lohrey (2002:69) considered that the Australian Greens had a ‘rusted on’ core constituency unlike the Australian Democrats or the DLP.

The Greens can be categorized as a ‘post materialist party’. Post materialism was coined by the American political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1971) as a description of younger Europeans ‘who were more likely to value political liberties’, while their elders were more likely to be ‘acquisitive’ (Abramson 2011:1). A post materialist is more concerned about ‘belonging, self-expression and the quality of life’ rather than being concerned about ‘physical sustenance and safety’ (Inglehart 1981:880). Safety would include defence and deterrence, while physical sustenance includes the earning of money and the acquisition of assets such as a house, motor vehicles and investments. The quality of life includes policies relating to environmental issues such as mining and pollution and social issues such as same sex marriage and health care.

In their policies, the Australian Greens are moving the policy emphasis from wealth and material goods to environmental issues and social policies such as same sex marriage and freely available health care.

As a Greens party member Barham (2011:521) stated:-

I joined the Greens because they represented a world view, a global set of principles that define a better future, which later was encapsulated by the early slogan for the Greens New South Wales, ‘Our Future, Vote Green’. The Greens are often misunderstood as many take the colour as a representation of only the natural world rather than of life itself. All aspects of life and society are our responsibility, hence the four principles of peace and non-violence, social and economic justice, ecological sustainability and grass roots democracy.

Barham’s comment also highlights that the Greens are more than an environmental party. The Greens are also concerned with social issues such as world peace and economic justice. Thus, the Greens could not be described as a sectarian party only concerned with environmental issues.

The International Network of Global Greens

The Australian Greens party is a member-based party and was in fact a driving force in the formation of the Global Greens network, which was formed in April 2001 in Canberra. The Global Greens is an international network of Greens parties from a number of countries including Australia. Currently the Global Greens has 75 full member parties, seven observer parties and two candidate member parties. The primary role of the Global Greens is to implement the Global Greens Charter.

Parties to the Global Greens Charter commit themselves to a global partnership and six guiding principles. Those principles are:-

- Ecological wisdom;
- Social justice;
- Participatory democracy;
- Nonviolence
- Sustainability; and
- Respect for diversity.

The Global Greens are organised into four federations across the world and these are the Federation of Greens Parties of Africa, the Federation of the Greens Parties of the Americas, the Asia-Pacific Green Network (of which Australia is a member) and the European Green Party.

Each of the four Greens federations elects three members to the Global Greens Coordination (GGC). The GGC makes decisions on behalf of the Global Greens in between the periodic congresses. Working by consensus, the main roles of the GGC are, facilitating global communication and networking, developing common views and campaigns, encouraging joint action, exchanging skills and support and finally, promoting Green ideas and values.

The editor of *Green Magazine*, Chris Harris (2001:18) stated that:-

*The Global Greens Charter* recognises that planet Earth is inter-connected – many issues just do not recognise political borders. Like economic globalisation, like climate change, like genetic engineering.

He went on to comment that:-

Indeed, only a truly global-thinking and globally structured Green politics can realistically respond to this age of globalised ransacking.

Seven years later looking back on the Global Greens, Blakers (2008:5) stated that:-

It is self-evident that if every nation puts its own interests first, we will not solve the climate crisis . . . global issues . . . need concerted action in the global interest. The global interest is not a national interest interpretation of global imperatives.

The quotations from Harries and Blakers give some justification for a global network – considering global issues in a global context. For the Australian Greens membership of a global network brings a number of advantages. Through this network, as well as through sharing ideas and tactics, the Australian Greens have the means to draw on a wide range of international experience. This international experience would be useful in keeping the party relevant in Australian society and providing advice in resolving conflict.

The results of the Global Green Network for the Australian Greens are at best very subtle. This is understandable because like any political party, the Australian Greens would not want to give the impression that the Party is controlled or strongly influenced by any external forces or influences.
Green Leadership in Australia

In terms of stability, the Greens have had success with both high profile leaders and a very smooth succession to a new leadership team.

Robert James ("Bob") Brown was the first leader of the Australian Greens. As ‘a father figure’ of the party after his resignation from the leadership, Brown still holds a lot of influence in the party as a high profile and well known former leader. He was born in 1944 and after leaving school he qualified as a medical practitioner. As a medico, he achieved a certain degree of notoriety and fame at the Royal Canberra Hospital, when he and other senior medical staff took a pacifist stance by refusing to certify young men who did not wish to fight in the Vietnam War as fit to be conscripted.

He moved to Tasmania in 1972, working as a general practitioner. He became involved in the state's environmental movement, in particular the campaign to save Lake Pedder. He was a member of the newly formed United Tasmania Group, which could be described as Australia's first ‘green’ party.

In 1978 Brown became director of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society. In the late 1970s he emerged as a leader of the campaign to prevent construction of the Franklin Dam, which if successful, would have drowned the Franklin River valley as part of a hydroelectricity project. Brown became well known before his parliamentary career, being frequently arrested at demonstrations. By being arrested in this way, Brown was able to show the voters he was passionate about his causes, not against testing the law and importantly, willing to back his words up with actions. In fact, Brown was among the 1500 people arrested while protesting during the campaign and as a result was sentenced to a prison term. On the day of his release in 1983, he became a member of Tasmania's parliament for the House of Assembly seat of Denison after the Democrats MP Norm Sanders resigned to successfully stand for the Australian Senate; Brown was elected to replace him on a countback.

In 1993 Brown resigned from the House of Assembly and stood unsuccessfully for the federal House of Representatives. He entered the federal parliament at the 1996 federal election when he was elected to the Senate on the Tasmanian Greens ticket, joining with sitting Greens Western Australia Senator Dee Margetts to form the first group of Australian Greens senators. Brown became the national parliamentary leader of the Australian Greens from 1996 to 2012, enjoying a high profile.

Brown and Singer (1996:83) commented that the influential German Green, Petra Kelly in a visit to Australia in 1984 urged the ‘various Greens in Australia (to) develop a national identity’.
The power of protest to Brown (1990:177) was an important political strategy to maintain momentum. He considered that:

Without protest, without minorities causing trouble, without illegal or illegitimate foray by women or men bucking the system, our world would be a worse place than it is. . . . Universal education for children would be out: they would still be working in the mine. Women would not have the vote. Workers would have no rights. There would be no parliaments.

Brown however went on to note that ‘to be used as a successful political weapon in Australia, direct action as protest is the last resort’.

Brown (1990:178) stated that ‘a protest campaign will have some basic ingredients’.

- Appeal to the public’s sense of fair play;
- A well-researched economic and employment, as well as an environmental, case;
- A determination not to get caught in personal slander and mudslinging;
- Respect for the populace at large;
- All conventional avenues of getting the right decision needs to be worked through;
- Keeping the media well informed;
- Lobbying of politicians, newspaper editors . . . business groups and so on;
- The campaign must run on openness;
- No one should be written off; and finally
- Stay positive

These ten principles of protest campaigns give some indicator of the Greens’ method of operation and strategy. For instance, Bearup (2011) reported that the Labor powerbroker Graham Richardson claimed that ‘Brown’s big failing is that he has an “insatiable appetite”’. After negotiating for three days, Richardson got Cabinet to agree to 23 per cent of Tasmania being declared world heritage. Richardson then told Brown of that success, Brown’s response was ‘it’s not enough.’

Norman (2004:173) reported that on the 19 February 1996, Business Review Weekly in a cover story titled ‘The Green Menace’ the article’s author David Fordham described Brown as ‘a master of political brinkmanship’ and went on to say:-

Brown is an evangelist for the environment and . . . he and the Green movement are there to literally save the world. This means compromise is out of the question.

The ‘Banyan’ columnist in the Economist of 18 April 2012 commented about ‘Brown’s commanding political presence’, stating that, ‘he has often managed to make opponents seem like midgets about sticking to their convictions’.

McMahon (2013:22) commented that:-
The Greens also contain more than their fair share of energetic and aware activists, some of whom are proud of their isolation from the mainstream and will find it hard to subordinate their ideals to political necessity.

In 2011, media speculation stated to arise regarding the leadership of the Australian Greens. At the time, Bob Brown was turning 66 and as the *Canberra Times* pointed out, ‘few politicians elect to stay in parliament once they turn 70 and there is little reason to suppose that Mr (sic) Brown will be an exception to that rule.’ He resigned in April 2012 from both the leadership of the Australian Greens and from the Senate. Brown was replaced as leader by his fellow Tasmanian Christine Milne. Phillips (2012) commented that Bob Brown’s leadership was ‘one of calm reassurance.’ In interviews Brown ‘seemed to emphasise the reasonableness of his views’. However, in Phillips’ view Milne on the other hand ‘seems always lecturing and peevish.’

The leadership transition from Brown to Milne was smooth, although there was a fierce contest to be her deputy. The deputy’s position was contested by Sarah Hanson-Young and Adam Bandt, with Bandt being the winner. Brown left at a time of his own choosing and Milne was the accepted leader of the parliamentary party. This can be sharply contrasted to the conflict in the change of leaders in the DLP from Gair to McManus, where Gair relinquished the leadership of the DLP most reluctantly. It can also be contrasted to the many changes of leadership in the Australian Democrats. A number of those changes did not solve conflict but rather increased conflict within the parliamentary party.

Both the Australian Greens and the Australian Democrats utilised participative democracy. The major difference was that while the Democrats used participative democracy to elect the leadership of the parliamentary party, the Greens did not. Therefore, the Greens parliamentary party did not have a leader thrust upon it by the membership that the party could not work with as leader nor one who was quite inexperienced for the role.

In commenting on leadership of the Australian Greens, Cunningham and Jackman (2014) noted that:-

> When the confederation of state and territory Green parties joined together as the Australian Greens in August 1992 they were informed by arguments against the hierarchical structuring of existing social democratic and conservative parties, and explicitly worked to counter Michel’s (1915) famous ‘Iron Law’ proposal that all parties tend towards an oligarchic structure. Essential AG structures were enshrined in its constitution (Australian Greens 2010) recognising and fostering horizontal leadership structures and alternative decision making processes. These were coupled with a mode of participatory politics that emphasised inclusion and thus excluded the idea of a party with a leader, or at least with leaders with party-endorsed positional authority.

Thus, unlike other parties, the Australian Greens were attempting to steer away from a purely hierarchical leadership structure, which could lead to an oligarchy in which decision-making and policy formulation are left to the select few in the higher echelons of the party (Michels
Such a structure would impede a rank file party member’s interaction with the party leadership and other groups within the party, such as the parliamentary party. Important to the ‘horizontal leadership structures and alternative decision making processes’ was a system of participative democracy, but not to the extent of the party members electing the leadership of the parliamentary party. Extending participative democracy to the election of the leadership of the parliamentary party was one of the causes of the demise of the Australian Democrats.

In 2015 the leadership of the parliamentary party changed again. On 6 May 2015 Milne, without warning, announced her resignation from the leadership of the Greens. She also announced she would be retiring from the federal parliament at the next election. Milne was effectively pushed, as she had lost the petrol excise vote. Denholm (2015) noted that:

After 25 years in public life, she felt reluctant to commit to another six years in the Senate as the party sought pre-selections for the election due next year.

The new surprise leader was not a Tasmanian but a moderate Victorian, Senator Richard Di Natale. In addition, there was not a deputy leader of the party under his leadership but two deputy ‘co-leaders’, Senator Scott Ludlam from Western Australia and Senator Larissa Waters from Queensland. The co-deputy leader system was new in Australia but the NZ Greens had used that system in New Zealand with some success.

The election of each of these three Senators to leadership positions in the party appeared a wise choice. Waters, a young Senator with degrees in Arts and Law, represented Queensland unquestionably the party’s weakest state. Ludlam, a trained graphic designer, was a cool, calm and collected individual evidenced by his adjournment speech in the Senate in February 2014 in which he challenged the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott. Ludlam’s softly spoken but hard hitting speech went viral on social media.

Cunningham and Jackman (2014) go on to observe that ‘today Green leadership theory and parties’ practices are a more contested terrain.’ Global Green parties have moved to a leader, or president or national secretary from such leadership structures as three co-Speakers (rotational), Collective (Green commission) or again three co-spokes-persons.

The Australian Greens party has always been led by one parliamentary leader and until the last leadership change, one deputy leader. The current leadership of the Australian Greens in federal parliament of leader and two co-deputy leaders appears to be operating satisfactorily.

Party Finance

The fact that in the 2013 federal election the Greens vote dropped in both houses means the Greens received reduced funding from the public purse, as funding is provided on the basis of the number of votes received and is paid at so many dollars per vote.
Rootes (2014:169) argued that:-

The Greens remain the third party both in seats won and share of the vote, but will have to operate with greatly reduced resources. Because public funding of political parties is proportionate to the votes they secure at elections, the Greens funding falls from $7.1 million in 2010 to $5.4 million. This will make it more difficult for the Greens to defend the six Senate seats - one in every state – won in 2010.

This raises the question of what are the party’s alternative sources of funds? A strategy of any party should include provision for the fact that funding from the public purse is not static – if the party suffers a swing against it, the amount of that funding will fall and alternative sources of funding have to be considered. The only other result would be a reduced campaign, and as Rootes argues above, with six senate seats to defend, a reduced campaign is out of the question.

In the lead up to the 2010 election, a multi-millionaire, Graeme Wood, gave $1.6 million to fund the Greens campaign in that election. According to Manning (2011), Wood stated that he was disappointed with ‘Labor and Coalition policies on climate change and the environment.’

In the same article, Wood and Senator Brown both claimed there was no personal gain for Wood nor had he looked for any ‘favour’. The Greens have also experienced other problem areas with related controversy, for example their support for the ANZ share saga which had significant but brief impact on the share market (see below). However, the support for the Greens has not suffered as a result from either the problem areas or the stricter funding disclosure rules.

The Greens have put in place strict disclosure requirements for donations over an amount of $1,500 made to the party. In Victoria, the amount is $1,000. The actual amount of those donations, along with the person or body making the donation are listed on the Green’s website. The details remain on the website for a 12 month period up to the end of the last quarter.

The Greens advise on their website that the purpose of this disclosure is to ‘uphold public transparency of the party’s funding’. The Greens also highlight that this disclosure is stricter than the Australian Electoral Commission, where the threshold is $13,000.

The Greens advise donors that:-

In making this donation you are confirming that:

- you accept that your name and the total amount of your donations during the last twelve months will be included on our public donor list should the donations accepted by the Party from you during this period total $1,500 or more, and;

- you have every reason to believe that your donation will not give rise to public criticism of the Party’s integrity and that our acceptance of the donation will not be contrary to the Party’s internal donations policy.
Thus, potential donors are clearly warned by the Greens of the lower disclosure threshold. It would also follow that like the Wood donation, there would be ‘no personal gain’ or ‘favours’ given to the donor by the Greens.

Green Policy Positions

The idea of a ‘Green’ party immediately brings up notions of a party solely concerned with environmental issues. However, the Australian Greens are also concerned with other major policy areas particularly social policy. This is notwithstanding that it could be argued that environmental policies impact on just about every other policy area. Barry and Doherty (2001:587) consider that:

When people think of the green movement they think principally of groups that are concerned with protecting the environment. Yet greens have always been concerned with broader political, social and economic issues, too.

The following information on the party’s policies come from the party’s official policy documents.

Environmental issues

In terms of ‘ecological sustainability’, the Greens:-

Seek to cultivate a global, ecological consciousness based on a long-term perspective in order to safeguard the interests of both existing and future generations and species.

The Australian Greens believe that:-

The scale and impact of climate catastrophe can be lessened by reducing our dependence on non-renewable resources and ensuring sustainable use of renewable resources.

The Australian Greens recognise:-

The interdependence between humanity and the rest of nature as we seek to move to an ecologically sustainable path.

In relation to climate change the Australian Greens consider that:-

The climate challenge is an opportunity to transform Australia into a carbon-neutral economy that creates new jobs and a healthier planet.

In the view of the Greens:-

An ecologically sustainable future relies on stable and enduring social, political and economic systems based on equity, justice and the support of human rights.

The Greens believe that ecosystems-based management is the most sustainable and appropriate model for the management of Australia's marine territories. In terms of waste management policy, the party has a zero-waste goal to conserve natural resources for future generations. In regard to natural resources the Greens consider that resources should be managed taking into
account intergenerational equity, biodiversity conservation and respect for traditional ownership.

Social Issues
The Australian Greens believe that all people have equal economic, social and cultural rights, regardless of gender, age, race, ethnicity, class, religion, disability, sexuality or membership of a minority group. Everyone should have the opportunity for personal development and be able to fully participate in society without discrimination. A more equitable distribution of resources should eliminate poverty.

Australia’s diversity is to be respected and reflected in our social institutions. The Greens recognize that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have a unique relationship with the land, and their rights and obligations as custodians must be respected.

The Australian Greens aim to develop a culturally rich, participatory and equitable society that enables the flourishing of progressive change and the promotion of an ecologically sustainable future.

Moral issues
The Greens are predominantly an anti-moralistic party, in that the policies of the party are not influenced directly or even indirectly by any one religion of group of religions. The Australian Greens Policies document (2012) states as policy aims:

**Sex, Sexuality and Gender Identity**

*The Australian Greens want:*

The legalisation of marriage between two consenting adults regardless of sex, sexuality or gender identity. . . .

Equal access, regardless of sex, sexuality and gender identity and marital status to adoption and fostering and assisted reproductive treatment.

**Women**

*The Australian Greens want:*

All women to have access to legal, free and safe pregnancy termination services including unbiased counselling.

The above extract from the Greens’ policies document indicates that the Greens policy supports abortion. Other parties do not bind their members on that policy issue. The Australian Greens’ stand on that issue, along with same sex marriage and euthanasia, is the complete reverse of the DLP, which as was shown in chapter five, to be a very moralistic approach. This stand by the Greens regarding these personal issues could be a potential cause for a decline in popular support, especially with those motivated by environmental concerns.
Just as being seen as a morals party can cause a decline, being an anti-moralistic party could also lead to a party’s decline.

It is significant that a policy of supporting same sex marriage caused problems in support for the Katter Australia Party in the 2013 federal election.

Economic policies

In a policy paper titled ‘New Economy’ The Greens saw reforming negative gearing and the capital gains tax, progressive superannuation, banking and financial reform and taxation reform as key policy issues. They considered the negative gearing, capital gains and superannuation tax breaks as being unfair, and propose reforms in these areas of taxation, including ‘removal of the Capital Gains Tax Discount’.

In the view of The Greens:-

- In order to provide for the needs of present and future generations, economic management should prioritise improving the quality of life rather than the production and consumption of material output. The pursuit of continuous material-based economic growth is incompatible with the planet’s finite resources.

- Measures of national progress should include indicators of ecological sustainability and social wellbeing.

Other policy areas

In relation to asylum seekers, The Greens plan to:

- Create a safe way for people to seek asylum in Australia, giving them a better option than a boat journey and under cutting the people smuggler’s business model.

The Greens policy on foreign aid is to:

- Commit our fair share toward poverty alleviation and development by increasing our overseas aid contributions to 0.7% of GNI (Gross National Income) over the coming decade.

In terms of defence and foreign affairs, The Greens approach is to:

- Take a diplomacy-first approach to defence and foreign affairs, emphasising nonviolent global cooperation.

The Greens also support Australia becoming a republic, the setting up of a ‘national anti-corruption watchdog’ and putting ‘the freedom back into our Freedom of Information laws’.

In terms of policy development in the Greens, Jackson (2016:154) reported that the party’s:-

- need for a clearer basis for parliamentary decisions precipitated an eighteen-month review of party policy, beginning in 2002. The review used a staged approach involving all the states and territories and concluded in a national party conference before the 2004 election.

Jackson’s comments indicate that the Greens were prepared to use party conferences for policy making, and unlike the Australian Democrats, not solely for the dissemination of information by
way of numerous speeches and training of party members. The Greens not only use state and federal conferences for policy development, but also as a means of robust debate. In fact Jackson (2016:154) goes on to speak of an:

extended and heated debate at the 2005 national conference which pitted Bob Brown and (future senator) Richard Di Natale, both medical practitioners, against each other.

**Electoral Performance**

In terms of who votes for the Australian Greens, King (2015:315) reported that Gerard Henderson, commented in an interview that:

Greens voters in the cities are a well-educated, articulate and vocal group and they project their ideological agenda much farther than any other group in the country because of their largely professional and well off background.

Rootes (2002:146) commented that in the 2001 federal election ‘without the power to set the political agenda, the Greens were soon shaded’. However, the Greens were the only party to oppose the Howard government’s policy on asylum seekers in the light of the Tampa issue. That election was dominated by the immigration of asylum seekers and international affairs, meaning ‘the environment was, for most voters, a minor issue’ (Rootes 2002:148). However, Brown was re-elected and in NSW Kerry Nettle, the Greens NSW Senate candidate, was the last elected Senator from that state. Nettle’s victory in NSW occurred with just 4.1 per cent of the primary vote. With such a low primary vote, Nettle’s reliance on preference flows from other parties was very significant. Until near the end of the count, Nettle had around half a quota. She then received a large number of preferences from the No GST party, followed by the majority of votes from the excluded One Nation candidate. The One Nation votes gained Nettle a quota.

It is debatable whether Nettle’s very radical maiden speech was an asset or liability to the Greens. Nettle was very critical of the alliance between Australia and the United States of America. Nettle took an active role in various issues. Apart from being an environmentalist like other members of the Greens, Nettle was also a very strong supporter of gender equality, including women’s reproductive rights. To show her support for women’s reproductive rights, during the debate on the abortion drug RU486, Nettle wore a t-shirt bearing the slogan ‘Mr Abbott get your rosaries off my ovaries’ into the Senate. Tony Abbott was the Minister for Health responsible for the classification of the RU486 drug at the time. Catholics considered Nettle’s t-shirt to be both tactless and in very poor taste. The t-shirt did not do anything to increase Nettle’s support in the electorate. Nettle joined with Brown in publicly making her opposition the treatment of US military prisoners known to President Bush by interjecting during his speech when he addressed both houses of parliament in Canberra.

In her first speech to the Senate, Nettle observed that in her view:-
Final decisions that affect our basic services will be made in the cabinet room – or perhaps in the corporate boxes – but not in this parliament.

That remark indicated a loss of confidence in the role and working of the parliament and it is an odd remark from a person who has newly arrived in the parliament and who is yet to observe and participate in the accountability measures of the parliament. To date Kerry Nettle has been one of two members of the federal parliamentary Greens party to lose their seat in the parliament.

In the 2001 election, the Greens were out-pollled by the Australian Democrats. But as noted in the last chapter that situation was to change in the 2004 federal election.

Manning and Rootes (2005:403) noted that in the 2004 federal election the Greens increased their share of the vote by 50 per cent and doubled their representation to four Senators, while the Australian Democrats lost all four senate seats that were up for re-election. In the new Senate, the Greens did not command the balance of power in the chamber, in fact the Howard government won control of the Senate for the next three years. Manning and Rootes (2005:405) believed that the Greens lacked ‘luck and political guile’. In addition, they believed the Greens came out ‘almost empty handed’ from the preference deals. In fact, the ALP and Democrats preferred the Family First party ahead of the Greens. This cost the Greens a Senator from Victoria as the Family First candidate Fielding won a Senate seat.

In 2004, after the federal election, Bob Brown commented that:-

We have grown to 8,000 members... and in 2004 won the support of 916,000 voters in the Senate. We garnered over 20 per cent of the vote in two House of Representatives seats, double figures in a great many more and a significant vote in every seat in the country. With the demise of the Democrats, and right wing religious parties notwithstanding, we are clearly the third force in Australian politics. We have leapt to a new level and must adapt to grow further.

Manning and Rootes (2005:408) considered that the 2004 federal election ‘confirmed the Greens as the third force in Australian politics.’

In the 2007 Federal election, the Greens won 10.4 per cent in Victoria and 8.7 per cent of the federal vote in NSW, but did not win a Senate seat in either state. However, in South Australia with only 6.6 per cent of the vote (the party’s lowest) the Greens won a senate seat. In NSW and Victoria, the Labor vote in the Senate was down and therefore the end result was insufficient Senate preferences flowing from Labor to the Greens to elect Greens senators in the more populous states of NSW and Victoria. As a result, in NSW Nettle lost her Senate seat.

In the 2007 federal election Bob Brown won a quota in Tasmania in his own right with over 18 per cent of the vote.
Commenting on the Greens performance in the 2007 federal election, Rootes (2008:476) noted that during the campaign, support for the Greens ‘firmed.’ A high point for the Greens was Labor’s decision to exchanges preferences with the Greens. This included in Victoria, where ‘animosity between Labor and the Greens was acute.’ Rootes went on to note that:-

Labor’s best hope of achieving a workable Senate was by developing cooperation with the Greens. Moreover, if the election were close, Labor would need Greens preferences to win sufficient House of Representative seats to form a government.

Rootes (2008:478) made the claim that:-

Commentators compare the Greens parliamentary performance unfavourably with that of the Democrats: the Democrats, it is said, achieved so much because they were willing to negotiate; the Greens achieved little because they were not. If the commentators are right in blaming Brown for the Greens’ intransigence, it seems hardly likely to diminish in the wake of his impressive re-election.

In the 2010 Federal election, up to that point the Greens ‘enjoyed their best electoral results on record, increasing their vote by some 50 per cent’ (Rootes 2011:410). In addition, as well as having an all-time high of nine Senators, the Greens won a seat in the House of Representatives for the first time at a general election and not a by-election.

Rootes (2011:412) put forward the view that in the 2010 election, the major parties engaged in ‘sandbagging’ the seats the party held with the smallest majorities (the marginal seats) and hopefully as a result retain government. As such, minor parties had the opportunity to shine and standout. Rootes also went on to comment that the leaders of the major parties, Gillard of the ALP and Abbott for the Coalition, were both new to their jobs and consequently ‘exceptionally risk adverse and avoiding any commitment to a reform agenda’. In this environment of uncertainty, the minor parties benefitted.

For the first time The Greens had a Senator elected for each state. In Tasmania and Victoria, the Greens won a quota on the primary vote, without having to rely on preferences and being elected in the fifth or sixth spot. The overall result was that the Greens held the balance of power in the Senate in their own right.

In the 2013 election, the Greens suffered a swing in the Senate vote of -4.5 per cent with Senators elected in four states only. However, all of their sitting Senators were re-elected with an additional Senator voted in from Victoria. With the re-election of the party’s candidate in Melbourne and the Victorian Senator, the Greens had 11 members in the federal parliament an all-time high. The downside was that the Greens went from holding the balance of power in their own right to sharing it with a number of minor and micro parties such as the Palmer United Party.

Rootes (2014:168) observed that:-
The gap between the Party’s performance in the Senate and the House which widened markedly in 2010, disappeared in 2013. This suggests that the Green’s 8.6 per cent may represent the party’s new core level of support.

Miragliotta (2013:712) suggested that it was possible that the number of ‘Green identifiers’ in 2013 was actually greater than the 5.9 per cent who identified with the party in 2010.

In the 2016 double-dissolution federal election, the Greens polled 10.09 per cent of the vote in the House of Representatives and 8.33 per cent in the Senate. This was an increase of support in the House of almost 1.5 per cent, but a decrease in the Senate vote of 0.32 per cent. Thus, the Greens level of support made no movement back to its all-time high levels of the 2010 election.

In fact, in the Senate, support for the Greens had fallen by almost 5 per cent between 2010 and 2016. In the final result the Greens managed to have nine of their ten Senators re-elected as well as their sole member in the House of Representatives. The reduction of funding that Rootes (2014:169) spoke of will continue through to the next Federal election. The Greens continue to share the balance of power in the Senate, with a number of minor parties.

To make a protest vote against the major parties, many voters will swing away from a major party to a minor party in a Senate election. In this way, the voter can make a protest vote against the major party without impacting on the major party’s ability to form government in the lower house. It is important for minor parties looking to become the third party, as is the case with The Greens, to realise that such votes are only protest votes against one or more of the major parties and not votes ‘rusted on’ to the minor party in question.
Table 40: The Australian Greens Federal Elections Primary Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>House of Representatives Per Cent</th>
<th>Senate Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>7.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>9.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>13.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>8.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>10.09</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AEC

The Greens Second Preference Allocation

The influence of the Australian Greens second preferences over three elections is shown in the following table.

Table 41: House of Representatives Elections The Australian Greens and their second preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General election</th>
<th>Seats won by Labor on Green Preferences</th>
<th>Seats where First preferences lead reversed by distribution of preferences</th>
<th>Liberal Win on leakage of Greens Preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>25 Seats (NSW 4), (Vic 6) (QLD 7) (SA 2) (Tas 3) (WA 3)</td>
<td>9 Seats (NSW 3) (Vic 2) (WA 1) (Tas 2) (NT 1)</td>
<td>13 Seats (NSW 2)(Vic 2) (QLD 4) (SA 2) (WA 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>25 Seats (NSW 10) (Vic 5) (QLD7) (WA 3) (Tas 4) (ACT 2) (NT 1)</td>
<td>7 Seats (NSW 3) (Vic 3)(QLD 1)</td>
<td>10 Seats (NSW 2) (Vic 1) (SA 1), (QLD 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Seats (NSW 8) (Vic 8) Qld (WA 2) (SA 2) (Tas 1) (ACT 2) (NT 1)</td>
<td>8 Seats (NSW 2) (Vic 3) (QLD 3)</td>
<td>4 Seats (NSW 2) (Qld 1) (WA 1) (Tas 1) (NT 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source AEC data – the data for the 2016 election was not available at the time this thesis was finalised.
The Greens preference flow to the Labor party was very tight, with preferences flowing to the Labor party in excess of 75 per cent in many seats. The Australian Greens preference strategy, according to the table of Sharman et al shown in chapter three, could be categorised as ‘policy influence’. The party second preferred the ALP very strongly because the ALP’s environmental policy could be seen as close to that of the Greens.

Generally speaking, for a leakage of Greens preferences to elect a Liberal candidate, the Liberal vote would need to be around 45 per cent to 49 per cent, thus requiring only a small leakage to elect the Liberal candidate. For example, in the 2013 federal election, in Macarthur (NSW) the Liberal candidate polled 49.38 per cent. Significantly, in some electorates in that election, the Greens preference leakage was surprisingly high. For example, in Swan (WA) the leakage was 30 per cent and in Hinkler (Qld) it was 38 per cent.

The Greens in the Senate

The following table shows the number of Australian Greens in the Senate from the 1990 election to the 2014 election compared to the other parties in the Senate. The final column of the table indicates if the Greens held the balance of power and if so, if they shared it with another party or parties.

**Table 42: Party Composition of the Australian Senate from 1990 to date**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>Lib/NP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Greens Balance of Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shared with Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shared with Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shared with Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shared with Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shared with cross bench</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Shared with cross bench</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table shows the rise of the Australian Greens over a 24 year period to the present time. The table also shows whether the Greens held the balance of power or if they shared it with another party.

At the 2010 federal election, the result was a ‘hung parliament’ with neither of the major parties being able to form a government in their own right. To ensure stability until hopefully the next election, a working relationship had to be formed with one or more of the minor parties in the lower house. An additional problem for the major parties in government was the ability to get their legislation through the senate, where again neither major party had a majority.

The Australian Greens and the ALP entered into a written agreement covering the term of the Prime Ministership of Julia Gillard over the life of the parliament. The agreement ensured that the Greens would support the government in a no confidence motion and in the granting of supply. In return for this support from the Greens, the government would support a reform of funding of political parties and election campaigns and in addition improve the processes and integrity of the parliament and establish a parliamentary budget office and a parliamentary integrity commissioner. Significantly, the agreement required that the Prime Minster meet with the leaders of the Greens each sitting week to ‘discuss and negotiate any planned legislation’. In the areas of policy, the agreement spelt out proposals for climate change, dental care, high speed rail and the war in Afghanistan. The ‘hung parliament’ gave the Greens as the largest minor party in the Senate, an unprecedented level of influence and power.

This agreement meant the government would give a priority to key policy areas of concern to the Greens. It also assured the Greens of a guaranteed access to the Prime Minister, other ministers and key public servants – such access was not normally made available to opposition or minor parties.

It is significant that in spite of gaining an extra Senator in 2013, the Greens fell from holding the balance of power in their own right and had to share it with the crossbench. Instead of sharing the balance of power with only one other party, the Greens share the balance of power with a number of minor and micro parties. The end result for the Greens is a weakening of the party’s influence in the Senate.

Table 43: Changing Composition of the Australian Senate between 2014 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Senators 2013 election</th>
<th>Number of Senators 2015</th>
<th>Number of Senators 2016 election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This degree of sharing the balance of power makes the conduct of negotiations regarding support for legislation much more difficult and complex.

A similar situation exists in the Legislative Council of Victoria which has a very similar voting system to the Senate, with the State of Victoria returning the same number of members for each province. The table below shows a high number of minor parties with few representatives with none holding the balance of power in its own right.

Table 44: Composition of the Victorian Legislative Council of Victoria 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of MLCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooters and Fishers Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote 1 Local Jobs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lower House Representation

In the 2010 federal election, the Greens saw their first electoral victory at a general election in the lower house with the election of Adam Bandt in the electorate of Melbourne. Melbourne had been held by Labor for over 100 years.

The following table compares the results in Melbourne for the last three federal elections (2007, 2010 and 2013).

Table 45: The electorate of Melbourne electing an Australian Green Member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>43,363</td>
<td>49.51</td>
<td>34,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>19,967</td>
<td>22.80</td>
<td>32,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>20,577</td>
<td>23.49</td>
<td>18,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Parties</td>
<td>3,676</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>4,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>2,521</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3,356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AEC

The first point to observe from the above table is the significant swing to the Green candidate in 2010, mainly from the Labor vote. This was the election that elected the ‘hung parliament’, where The Greens benefitted from significant disillusionment with the major parties. A second factor was the retirement of the high-profile Labor member Lindsay Tanner, who was highly regarded in the electorate and beyond as Minister for Finance. In 2013 the Greens again benefitted from a further significant swing (seven per cent), again taken from Labor, and which put the Greens within ‘striking distance’ of an absolute majority with almost 43 per cent of the primary vote.

Over the six-year period the ALP primary vote in Melbourne has fallen from 49.51 per cent of the primary vote to almost half with 26.60 percent of the primary vote. Significantly, the rusted-on vote for the Liberal candidate has remained fairly constant, around 22 per cent, which suggests support for the Greens is at the expense of the Labor Party.

Table 46: Australian Greens Members of the NSW Parliament
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>House</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
<th>Highest Education Level</th>
<th>Paid Work before Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ian Cohen</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>1995-2011</td>
<td>BA Dip Ed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Rhiannon</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>1999-2010</td>
<td>BSc</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvia Hale</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2003-2010</td>
<td>BA LLB</td>
<td>Local Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kaye</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2007-</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cate Faehrmann</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Shoebridge</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>BA LLB</td>
<td>Local Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Barham</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2011-</td>
<td>TAFE</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Buckingham</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2011-</td>
<td>Advanced Diploma</td>
<td>Stone Mason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehreen Faruqi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2013-</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenny Leong</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>2015-</td>
<td>BA(hons)</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamie Parker</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>2015-</td>
<td>BSc MPoI Econ</td>
<td>Stone Mason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamara Smith</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>2015-</td>
<td>BA LLB Dip Ed</td>
<td>Solicitor Teacher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 47: Australian Greens Members of the Victorian Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>House</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
<th>Highest Education Level</th>
<th>Paid Work before Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greg Barber</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2006-</td>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>Local Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleen Hartland</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2006-</td>
<td>Dip Community Development</td>
<td>Community development worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue Pennicuik</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2006-</td>
<td>M Env Sc</td>
<td>Project officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samantha Dunn</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2014-</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Financial controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nina Springle</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2014-</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Hibbins</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>2014-</td>
<td>Grad Dip Policy and Research</td>
<td>Public Servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellen Sandell</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>2014-</td>
<td>BA BA Sc</td>
<td>CSIRO researcher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Likewise, since the 2014 State elections, the Greens have representatives in the Victorian lower house, representing the electorates of Melbourne and Prahran. The results in these electorates from the 2014 State election are shown in the following table.

Table 48: The Australian Greens - results in Melbourne and Prahran - 2014 State elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Melbourne</th>
<th></th>
<th>Prahran</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>29.27</td>
<td>9,586</td>
<td>25.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>15,333</td>
<td>41.44</td>
<td>9,160</td>
<td>24.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>8,913</td>
<td>24.09</td>
<td>16,582</td>
<td>44.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Parties</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After Preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>17,599</td>
<td>47.56</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>19,401</td>
<td>52.44</td>
<td>18,640</td>
<td>50.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18,363</td>
<td>49.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Victorian Electoral Commission

From the above table, it can be seen that the percentage result in Melbourne is almost a carbon copy of the result for the federal seat of Melbourne in the federal election in 2013.

However, in Prahran the results were much closer. The final result was between the Greens and the Liberal candidates. On the primary vote the Greens candidate was in third position, trailing the Labor candidate by 426 votes or 1.16 per cent. After preferences of the minor parties were distributed and only the three parties remained, the Greens were in second position and the ALP was in third, thus the ALP candidate was eliminated.

At the 2015 NSW State election, the Australian Greens won three seats in the Legislative Assembly. It is significant that in NSW the electoral system is optional preferential voting, which means that although preferences are distributed, an elector does not have to number every square on the ballot paper. In fact, the elector, only has to number the square of the candidate for whom they wish to vote for.
Table 49: Results in three NSW Electorates won by the Greens in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Ballina</th>
<th></th>
<th>Balmain</th>
<th></th>
<th>Newtown</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>11,738</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>14,930</td>
<td>31.80</td>
<td>13,978</td>
<td>30.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>12,824</td>
<td>27.02</td>
<td>17,556</td>
<td>37.39</td>
<td>20,689</td>
<td>45.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>17,392</td>
<td>36.65</td>
<td>11,682</td>
<td>24.88</td>
<td>8,074</td>
<td>17.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Parties</td>
<td>5,504</td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>5.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After preferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>16,557</td>
<td>45.27</td>
<td>15,532</td>
<td>40.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>21,528</td>
<td>53.12</td>
<td>20,019</td>
<td>54.73</td>
<td>22,605</td>
<td>59.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>18,996</td>
<td>46.88</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the electorate of Lismore, which like Ballina is also in northern NSW, the results were as follows.

Table 50: Results in NSW Electorate of Lismore 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>12,056</td>
<td>25.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>12,435</td>
<td>26.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>19,975</td>
<td>42.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Parties</td>
<td>2,581</td>
<td>5.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After preferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>19,309</td>
<td>47.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>21,654</td>
<td>52.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significantly in Lismore, the Nationals candidate polled over 40 per cent of the first preferences, with other parties preferencing against that candidate. Therefore, a preference leakage gained the candidate an absolute majority of the votes after preferences. The Greens candidate led the Labor candidate by less than one per cent (0.80%) of the first preferences votes, which means the Greens candidate was close to being eliminated and the Labor candidate close to being the
runner up in the electorate. A final observation is the significance of exhausted votes in an optional preferential voting system. When should a party, such as The Greens, encourage its votes to allocate preferences and when should the voter be encouraged to ‘just vote 1’?

The Greens in Parliament – Federal and State

For a minor party the Greens are well represented in State parliaments as well as the federal parliament as shown in the following table.

Table 51: Number of Australia Greens in Australian Parliaments August 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Upper House</th>
<th>Lower House</th>
<th>Total Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Greens are strongest in NSW, Vic and Tas, medium in SA and weak in QLD, SA, ACT and NT. In two of the three strong states Vic and NSW along with the federal parliament the Greens have their biggest representation to date. In some states and territories Green representation has declined (ACT, SA and Tas). For example, in the ACT the Greens had four members in the Legislative Assembly in one parliament. That number has now been reduced by three members losing their seats to leave one Greens member in the Assembly.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Term in Parliament</th>
<th>Highest Education Level</th>
<th>Paid Work before Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandt, Adam</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Barrister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Rep)s</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Bob</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>1996-2012 Leader</td>
<td>Post Grad</td>
<td>Tas MP, Medico, Greens campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Senate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Di Natale, Richard</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>Post Grad</td>
<td>Medico, Farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson-Young, Sarah</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>2007-</td>
<td>Post Grad</td>
<td>Social scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margetts, Dee</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>1993-98</td>
<td>Post Grad</td>
<td>NGO campaigner, WA Parlt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKim, Nick</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>2015-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Guide, Gardener Tas Parlt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milne, Christine</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>2004-2015</td>
<td>BA(Hons) Cert Ed</td>
<td>School teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nettle, Kerry</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>2001-08</td>
<td>BSc(Hons)</td>
<td>NGO Campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organ, Michael</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>BSc(Hons)</td>
<td>Academic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice, Janet</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>2013-</td>
<td>BSc(Hons)</td>
<td>Climate Scientist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhiannon, Lee</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>BSc</td>
<td>Radical Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siewert, Rachel</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>BSc (AgSc)</td>
<td>Research Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simms, Robert</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>2015-2016</td>
<td>BA LLB(Hons)</td>
<td>Local Govt /Academic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waters, Larissa</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>BSc LLB</td>
<td>Solicitor (Freehills)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whish-Wilson, Peter</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>2012-</td>
<td>M Econ</td>
<td>Banker/Broker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright, Penny</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>2011-2015</td>
<td>BA LLB</td>
<td>Solicitor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is significant to note that to date, in the federal parliament, Kerry Nettle and Robert Simms are the only Senators to have lost their seats. Overall it can be seen that Greens parliamentarians are well educated professionals, and on the average young.

Table 53: House of Reps elections - Highest DLP, Aust Dems and Aust Greens vote by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>DLP</th>
<th>Aust Dems</th>
<th>Aust Greens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>7.9 (1958)</td>
<td>8.6 (1990)</td>
<td>16.82 (2010)</td>
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</table>

Source: AEC and Parliamentary Library

The Australian Greens shortcomings and blunders

A minor party’s shortcomings and blunders can seriously impact on its ability to survive, and poll well and get candidates elected at the next election. The Greens have experienced some well publicised blunders and shortcomings, however these seemed to have very little if any impact on the party’s performance. This is in contrast to the DLP and the Australian Democrats.

On 7 January 2013, a media release on ANZ Bank letterhead announced that the ANZ bank had withdrawn its $1.2 billion loan facility to Whitehaven Coal. The media release went on to advise that:

- The decision is related to volatility in the global coal market, expected cost blowouts and ANZ’s Corporate Responsibility policy.

The media release went on to quote the ANZ’s Group Head of Corporate Sustainability, Toby Kent, and also advised that the withdrawal of the loan facility became effective on the afternoon of 6 January, the day before the media release. The media release was very quickly exposed later on 7 January to be a forgery, put out by Jonathon Moylan, who was a 26-year-old translator from Newcastle in NSW. In the meantime, the value of Whitehaven Coal shares dived nearly 9 per cent on the stock exchange, before regaining their value later that day after a trading halt (Cubby and Ker 2013).

When Moylan was asked why he performed the hoax he said his:-
Primary concern is the impact of this mine on the environment at the end of the day. A lot of people were taken in by it, but when you compare the cost of that to the health of our forests and farmlands, it justifies it (Hamilton 2013).

However Spence (2013) commented that:-

Moylan engaged in identity theft by creating a false identity for ANZ Bank and then falsely impersonated one of the ANZ employees. Stealing someone else’s identity for whatever misguided reason for whatever ends is ethically wrong.

Spence went on to suggest that:-

Moylan, a self-described environmentalist, chose to corrupt that environment is ironic and paradoxical. For the informational environment, our shared info sphere is just as valuable and indispensable as our natural environment. . . . the use of unethical and nefarious means destructive to the integrity of our informational environment to promote concerns about the natural environment is not justified.

Against this public outcry, some of the Greens Senators were quick to show their support for Moylan and his fake press release. Senator Lee Rhiannon wrote on Twitter:-

Congrats (sic) to Jonathan Moylan, Frontline Action on Coal for exposing ANZ investment in coal mines (Jacob 2013).

Swan, Ireland and Bright (2013) reported that the leader of the Greens, Senator Milne endorsed Moylan’s actions by saying his actions were:-

Part of a long and proud history of civil disobedience, potentially breaking the law, to highlight something wrong.

Cullen (2013) reported that:-

Senator Milne says that she is ‘really surprised’ investors were duped by the fake press release because ANZ has been ‘quite happily’ investing in coal for a long time.

And she backed the actions of Mr Moylan saying ‘the world’s facing a climate emergency’.

‘Yes there are investors in Whitehaven Coal who may be affected, but everyone is affected by accelerated global warming,’ Senator Milne told ABC News.

However, Milne neglected to acknowledge that Moylan used a false and deliberately misleading media release to express his viewpoint. As Spence commented above, that media release also jeopardised the reliability of the information network. What Milne was doing was attempting to justify an illegal and misleading act.

Swan, Ireland and Bright (2013) commented that Milne and Rhiannon’s comments ‘come as the Greens try to appeal to new constituencies and recast themselves as less extreme in an election year’ and further, ‘last month the party revealed a new platform of policies aimed at presenting a smaller target.’

Kerr and Main (2013) reported that Labor Member of Parliament Joel Fitzgibbon ‘labelled the Greens’ actions as ‘extraordinary’ and ‘outrageously reckless’.
While the public support by Milne and Rhiannon for the fake ANZ bank media release was a rash act in that it supported an illegal activity, the Greens did not suffer any long-term damage or setbacks from it. In fact, at the election later that year, the Greens increased their numbers in the Senate by one and retained their seat in the House of Representatives with an increase in the percentage of votes won.

Rhiannon had a colourful past before joining the Australian Greens, eight ASIO files exist covering her involvement with various left wing and radical movements. Yet her past has proved a significant problem. Indeed, her presence in The Greens could be seen as an asset, given her involvement and ability to organise within those movements over the years. This is to say nothing of her appreciation and knowledge of those organisations, many of which operate in an international or global setting.

An area of concern for the Greens is their weaker states, in terms of electoral support, of NSW and Qld. At the peak of the party’s support, while other states had two Greens Senators elected, those two states only managed one Senator each. In respect of NSW, Faehrmann (2011) a Greens member of the NSW Legislative Council, commented that the 2011 NSW elections should be fought on local issues and not foreign affairs. The basic problem was ‘bridging the gap between those who vote Green and those who agree with our values but don’t vote for us’.

A problem for the Greens in SA is the level of competition for votes from the Nick Xenophon Team (NXT) a party very popular in its home state of SA. A possible solution is for The Greens to be active in the areas that NXT is already very active in, namely gambling with particular concern for the impact of poker machines.

An issue that frequently arises for minor parties is how to keep radical and fringe dwellers from joining the party and taking it over. Like other parties, an applicant wishing to join the Greens is required to sign a declaration. To apply to join the party in the ACT, that declaration reads:-

I am not a member of another political party and will not join another political party while I am a member of The Greens. I agree to abide by the Charter and Constitution of The Greens, and the Constitution of the ACT Greens. I acknowledge that my membership is subject to approval by the ACT Greens.

All other states and the NT have a similar declaration for prospective members to read and sign. The approval or ratification process allows the party to vet or screen potential members to determine background and any membership s of organisations with aims at odds with those of The Greens. Joining the party in a state or territory also includes membership of the party on a federal level.
The Australian Greens and their detractors

King (2015:315) reported that Gerard Henderson predicted ‘that the increasing support for the Greens Party among inner-city voters has the potential to stifle economic reforms in the future.’ Henderson went on to state that the ‘economic reform process’ is ‘restricted’ by:-

The emergence of the Greens and the tendency of the Labor Party, in order to preserve parts of its own inner-city base, to go with the Greens.

The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) and the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) have been two strong critics of the Australian Greens.

Bennett (2012:30) in an article titled ‘Looking Behind the Green Façade’ in Policy, the journal of the CIS stated that:-

The real challenge for society that arises from any polluting activity, including the extraction and use of fossil fuels, is to weigh the benefits we enjoy from the activities that involve pollution against the costs of those actions. And one such cost is the damage done to people’s wellbeing from the pollution.

For good measure Bennett then went on to put his thoughts another way.

Another way of looking at this trade-off is to consider the balancing act that society faces between the costs of controlling pollution and the benefits enjoyed from having less pollution.

Bennett’s comments are typical of the cries often heard about ‘the costs of compliance’ with various requirements such as environmental impact statements and pollution control requirements. It is very doubtful that people in the street would dismiss ‘the damage done to people’s wellbeing from the pollution’ as a mere ‘cost’, but rather a health and environmental problem over time and a problem that is not easily solved after it has arisen. Increasingly modern society is not dismissing such environmental damage as a ‘cost’.

The Greens party life-span

The Greens party life-span is shown in the following diagram.
This diagram tracks the Australian Greens since the party went national in 1992 with one Senator. Therefore, the dispersion of the life-span stands at 22 years. Before that time various state Greens Parties, such as Western Australia has one or two Senators with Greens credentials and some of these Senators were in the Senate when the Party went national and became a part of the Australian Greens Party. Therefore, upon formation the party immediately crossed the representation threshold. In 1994 the Party shared the balance of power and they did this until 2005 when they lost it and fell back below the relevance threshold. From 1994 to 2002 the life-span sloped upwards, indicating the Party’s growth in power, its prestige and its recognition factor through the media coverage it received.

At this time the Greens were overshadowing their rivals the Australian Democrats in terms of representing environmental policies and issues.

In 2008 the Greens regained the shared balance of power and again crossed that relevance threshold. In 2011, the Greens won the balance of power in their own right in the Senate and thus their life-span again moved upward. However, it fell again on 1 July 2014 when the Greens lost the balance of power in their own right and shared it with a number of other minor parties, including the Palmer United Party.

The life-span has skewed to the right and this indicates that the party won the balance of power in the Senate some years after it was started and not in its first years of life.
The point of culmination for the Greens was 1 July 2014. That day, the party lost the balance of power in the Senate in its own right, having to share it with other minor parties. The Greens did not regain the balance of power in their own right at the 2016 election. An objective for the Greens at the next election in 2019 will be to regain the balance of power in the party’s own right and not have to share it with other parties. In fact, that should be the party’s major goal at that election.

**In Conclusion - Have the Greens learnt anything from the demise of the other minor parties in Australia?**

In conclusion, this chapter of the thesis has considered the Australian Greens as a minor party in terms of its rise and indeed continual rise.

In its continual rise, has the Australian Greens party learnt the lessons from the demise of the other three parties considered in this thesis? The short answer to this question is yes. The Australian Greens have been able to move from one party leader to another without conflict and assorted ‘teething problems’. In addition, the party has remained relevant concentrating on key issues of the environment and various social issues that are of concern to the wider Australian community. With its membership of the Global Greens, the party has been able to maintain an international footing, something none of the other three minor parties has been able to do. This international footing has assisted in keeping the party relevant and in highlighting threats and problem areas in the Green movement.

The party has been able to successfully weather any setbacks such as the support for a fake press release and conflict over environmental policies and their implications for mining and development. Other minor parties considered in this thesis have suffered irreparable damage from setbacks from both the policies they have adopted and the resultant conflict.

At this point in time, the Australian Greens are a successful minor party and appear to be here to stay because the policies of the party have retained relevance to its support base. Its policies are not just about environmental issues but various social issues such as health services and education. The party’s leadership for example Bob Brown and Christine Milne has enjoyed a very high profile in the media, and this high profile of the Greens leadership has assisted in the recognition factor by the mass media. The party also appears to be able to effectively resolve its differences and divisions.

The Greens

Party finance and the unions

*Divisions in the party*
NSW versus the rest

Watermelons versus the deep greens
Chapter 11: In Conclusion

The overall argument of the thesis is that minor political parties rise up through dissatisfaction with both of the major parties. Those behind the formation of a minor party consider that the only solution to this satisfaction is the formation of another political party that in its policies and leadership will resolve this satisfaction. A minor party meets its demise through one or more of a number of factors such as divisions in the party, poor leadership and policies that have not kept up with changing needs in society and are as a result irrelevant.

This chapter draws out the empirical findings from the previous chapters as to why minor parties form and compete for office and then usually at some later date meet their decline. I have used the heuristic device of a party lifecycle to explore the formation, development and maturation of minor parties.

As Pedersen (1982) has pointed out all parties have a lifespan that moves up through various thresholds. This lifespan can last for hundreds of years or on the other hand, only a few years as in the case of many minor parties in Australia. In fact, John Warhurst commented that:-

The conventional wisdom has been that most minor parties have no success at all, but that if they do they flare up quickly and briefly before fading into oblivion (Warhurst 1997:4).

This thesis has modified Pedersen’s lifespans model to more accurately reflect the political climate of minor parties in Australia. Federally, minor parties have power in the Australian Senate in voicing concerns to the parliament and asking questions of ministers, but even more so in parliamentary committees as ‘participating members’ of those committees. This means that they can attend committee hearings (including Senate estimates hearings) question witnesses without being voted onto the committee.

This chapter ties together the various issues considered in this thesis.

The importance of electoral dynamics and the voting system

In Australia, voting is compulsory. For most electors, deciding not to vote because of dissatisfaction with the major parties is not an option as it is in numerous other countries (although a proportion of Australian voters do vote informal or not cast a ballot). Therefore, minor parties have a captive audience to appeal to at the ballot box. In addition, the compulsory nature of voting in Australia can also lead to some disillusionment of traditional voters with the mainstream parties, thus making them more attracted to minor party overtures. In the lower house elections fought over individual constituency territories, the second (or third) preferences of minor parties can ultimately be decisive in determining the eventual winner in the electorate.
This is especially true in marginal seats or where sitting members retire, where seats routinely 'go to preferences' before they are finally determined.

In the Australian Senate, minor parties are advantaged by the proportional voting system. Since the 1949 federal election, the minor party only has to win a quota of votes to gain a seat in the Senate and not an entire electorate.

With the use of that voting method for the Senate, the DLP was able to get a maximum of five senators elected over its lifespan, holding the balance of power in the Senate. Exploitation of the new Senate voting system did not happen at the 1949 election but six years later at the 1955 election after the rise of the DLP following the ALP ‘Split’. But for many in the DLP their greatest success was not getting candidates elected to parliament but keep the ALP out of government! Hatred can run strong in some political parties!

The Formation of Minor Parties

The reason minor parties are formed in the first place is usually because of divisions in one of the major parties, internal strife leading to a breakaway new party. This was the case in the rise of the Democratic Labor Party in 1955. Those members of the ALP who split from the party to form the DLP were dissatisfied with the ALP’s reaction to the rise of Communism in Australia. Communism rose up as a threat in Australia in the 1940s. Communists were active in the trade unions as the Communist members exploited the apathy of the non-Communist members who were often so apathetic they would not attend meetings of the union or vote in elections for office bearers in the union and this included delegates to the ALP state conference.

The anti-Communist crusade of the original DLP members was very actively supported by other groups including the Catholic church in Victoria under the controversial and high profile Archbishop Daniel Mannix. Mannix was also instrumental in teaming up with BA Santamaria to set up the Movement as a supposed instrument of Catholic Action. The Movement then teamed up with the ALP’s industrial groups to fight union elections and defeat any communist office bearers and candidates.

However, the Movement and its grouper members of the industrial groups under Santamaria’s guidance over played their hand. Not only did they seek out and defeat communist candidates they then turned on Labor members who they considered were not anti-communist enough. This was extremely subjective and very judgemental. It was an unauthorised expansion of the role of the Groups and an abuse of power.

In addition, Evatt the leader of the ALP was a poor leader could not cope with all of the conflict and division. He was also suspicious and would not trust anyone making wide accusations. Evatt also allowed the mounting conflict to spill out into the public often through the
proceedings of the House of Representatives. Grouper members such as Keon and Mullins would turn on other Labor members and even Evatt himself during sittings of the House of Representatives. At the same time the motives of Keon and Mullens and their supporters should have been called into question by the leadership of the ALP, as a divided party loses support. The Liberal Country Party coalition benefitted greatly from such conflict, it kept them in government throughout the fifties, sixties and into the seventies.

Looking back, the ALP should never have allowed ‘the Split’ to happen. The Split kept Labor, a party blinded by hatred for the DLP, in opposition for the next 17 years. Reconciliation between the two parties was right out of the question. When the Labor party returned to the treasury benches in 1972, the party was very poorly equipped to govern with no real experience of leading and running a government.

The disgruntled members who split from the ALP to form the DLP should have stayed in the ALP and aired their differences subtly within the party – not in public and in parliament. Many Labor leaders, for example Calwell, were consumed by hate could not work with anyone with whom they disagreed with or who they thought did them a wrong. The ALP split of 1955 shows that the major parties have to work hard to preserve unity and resolve conflicts and parties need a good and effective leader to do that.

The rise of the Democrats was not technically due to a split in the party but the creation of an alternative brand to the two major parties. Its formation was more contingent on fusions of different political fractions. Firstly, the Australian Democrats emerged because Don Chipp had major political disagreements with the Fraser government and looked to form a new centrist party. Secondly, the Democrats gained traction because it was composed of the union of two other minor parties, the Australia Party which was set up largely as a response against Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War and the New Liberal Movement that was a small scale split from the Liberal Country League of South Australia. As such, this party was largely confined to South Australia. In fact, most members of the Liberal Movement re-joined the Liberal Country League. The New Liberal Movement remained divided mainly over electoral reform. When these two parties fought federal elections, they received only a small percentage of the vote. Steele Hall the former South Australian Premier was however, successful in getting elected to the Senate. He later re-joined the Liberal Party in South Australia.

One Nation was also formed by a breakaway movement from the Liberal Party (and to some extent from the Nationals). Pauline Hanson started her federal election campaign as an endorsed Liberal candidate, having some previous local government experience. However due to some seemingly intertemperate remarks about Aboriginals and Asians, Hanson was stripped of her Liberal Party endorsement, but only after nominations for the seat had closed. Therefore, Hanson’s name and Liberal party affiliation remained on the ballot paper. Howard the Liberal
leader, was strongly tipped to win the 1996 federal election and he did not want another
distraction like he had in the 1987 federal election with the infamous ‘Joh for Canberra’ push.
The Liberal Party and political commentators believed Hanson could not win such a safe Labor
electorate. Hanson did in fact win the electorate with a high swing in her favour.

She took her place in the parliament as an independent and later in 1996 she gave her first
speech to parliament. After her first speech, the question was would Hanson form a new party
and if so what would it be called? The press gave Hanson much coverage and she even had a
support movement, the Pauline Hanson Support Movement (PHSM), headed up by an admiring
citizen of the Queensland Gold Coast. In early 1987 Hanson announced her new party, Pauline
Hanson’s One Nation (PHON).

The Australian Greens provide an example of a minor party that did not originate inside one of
the major parties. The Greens did not ‘break away’ or split from another party to form a new
party. Instead, The Greens originated as an environmental social movement, and grew out of
several wilderness and environmental campaigns against development. Elements of the
environmental movement restructured into a parliamentary party structure in order to contest
elections and gain seats in parliament. In addition to the environment, The Australian Greens
have also embraced other policies such as social policy. The Greens have also won seats in the
single electorate lower house in the Federal, New South Wales and Victorian parliaments.

The Australian Greens party is the only party considered in this thesis that is a member of a
global network of parties. The Australian Greens are a member of the Global Greens, a
worldwide grouping of Greens parties. The Greens membership of that network provides
significant advantages and these include; an international perspective on Green politics as well
as a mechanism to remain relevant.

Generally speaking, people join a political party to make a contribution at branch meetings and
state and at party conferences, both state and federal. If members of a political party feel that
the party has neglected them, they will often resign from the party. Such disillusioned former
members provide an ideal source of members or supporters for a fledgling minor party. This
neglect by the major parties often occurs through the party embracing cartelisation for financial
support and policy input.

**High Profile Leadership Assists Minor Parties**

Leadership is crucial to the fortunes of minor parties. The leaders of the DLP in 1955 namely
Senator George Cole and Bob Joshua, came from the Senators and members who split from the
ALP. All members of the DLP in the House of Representatives lost their seats in the 1955
election and from that time, no DLP candidate gained election to the House. In the Senate Cole
continued as leader of the parliamentary party until he lost his seat in 1964. At that election
Gair, the former Queensland Premier, was elected to the Senate and the other DLP Senator McManus, a well-known political activist in Victoria, became his deputy. Thus, the party continued to be led by high-profile and well-known leaders. McManus succeeded Gair and led the Party until its defeat in 1974.

At its beginning, the Australian Democrats party was led by the charismatic Don Chipp, a high-profile former Liberal minister who announced his resignation from the Liberal Party in March 1977. He sat in the parliament for the rest of that term as an independent. Throughout 1977, Chipp spoke at numerous Australian Democrats membership rallies. He stood as the Party’s number one candidate in Victoria at the 1977 elections, easily winning a Senate seat. The Australian Democrats had a big advantage with the high-profile Don Chipp with his broad liberal views, leading the new party.

Chipp accepted the invitation to join the new party and at the end of that year the new party was successful in having two senators elected to the Senate. Chipp’s leadership was successful in ensuring the party’s early growth. At the 1980 election, the Party got another three senators elected and shared the balance of power. In 1983, the double dissolution election where all senators were up for re-election, the party got a total of five senators elected and held the balance of power in their own right in the Senate.

Pauline Hanson, who continues to lead One Nation after its resurrection in the Australian Parliament, has enjoyed a high national profile, if somewhat controversial in nature. She originally owned and operated a regional small business in Ipswich through which undoubtedly enjoyed many conversations with customers regarding local issues and politics as the fish and chips were simmering away. She came across to the electorate as an everyday person and one of life’s battlers. She has regularly been a smart dresser and is photogenic which helps her to connect with the press. Pauline Hanson’s instantaneous high profile came from the fact that she was prepared to speak out on controversial topics, speaking her own mind in plain, blunt language against the prevailing orthodoxy of political correctness. She drew attention to many (populist) touchstone issues and rallied people to her cause.

Throughout their continuing lifespan, the Australian Greens have had success with both high-profile leaders and a very smooth succession to a new leadership team. The Australian Greens’ first leader was Dr Bob Brown, who was well known in Tasmania and beyond as a high-profile campaigner for green issues and as a protester who was quite prepared to be arrested, if need be, for his protest activities. This preparedness to be arrested for his beliefs made Brown come across as both sincere about green issues and as one of the people. This made him well known and respected. By the time Brown led the Greens both in Tasmania and in the Federal Parliament, he had accumulated a wealth of experience in a long involvement in green politics and environmental issues. Other factors that have continued to enhance the lifespan of the
Australian Greens was the party’s policy development in social policy issues and on two occasions a very smooth transition to a new leadership team in the parliamentary party. The Greens have not faded away.

Why Do Minor Parties Tend to Lose Influence and Often Decline

Not all minor parties have declined; their decline is not inevitable or decreed. The Australian Greens show no signs of being near their demise and besides their upper house presence have in fact had candidates elected to seats in the lower houses of parliament. The party can very easily remain relevant with policies in place that relate to, and provide suggested solutions to problems confronting Australia at this time. These problems include global warming and greenhouse gas emissions, a prominent concern for environmental issues and matching policies, will keep the Greens relevant. Likewise, The Australian Greens’ attention to social issues is also assisting the party in remaining relevant in the eyes of the electors. It is also significant to note that environmental issues very often impinge on just about every other policy area of government from taxation incentives for caring for the environment to environmental concerns for defence training on crown lands. Indications are that the Greens concentrate strongly on remaining relevant and organising a seamless conflict free change of leadership. The policy relevance is in stark contrast to the DLP which locked itself in a 1950s policy time warp of irrelevance. The One Nation party policies reflect the party’s concerns with multiculturalism, political correctness and globalisation, these concerns resonated with significant areas of the electorate, resulting in the election of four One Nation Senators at the 2016 elections.

One Nation’s purpose was portrayed as being an advocate of racism, anti-Aboriginal and anti-Asian. As well as immigration, the party had quite prominent policies on such issues as gun control and economic policies such as counteracting ‘market forces economics’ and its impact on farmers and small business people. One Nation had, and continues to have, a concern about the Australian lifestyle and freedom in Australia and it was these concerns that led in some way to the party’s resurgence at the 2016 federal elections.

One Nation experienced a massive decline in the late 1990s with the loss of its sole federal representative in the Senate. In addition, it experienced massive resignations of its members in the Queensland parliament due to the structure of One Nation with its external control of its parliamentary members. Significantly many of those members went on to form their own micro parties, a move that caused the One Nation party both electoral discomfort and much embarrassment. However, these micro other parties have declined and have not experienced the political resurrection that the main One Nation Party has achieved. The resurrection of One Nation at the 2016 federal election indicates that the party had not lost relevance.
The loss of relevance is a major risk to a minor party and can be a significant cause in the demise of the party. This was the case with the DLP which faced a major problem keeping in tune with social attitudes. In the mid-1970s the party was still stuck back in the mid-1950s preaching anti-communism and increased defence spending. The DLP took that attitude not withstanding that the Vietnam War with its supposed Communist threat, with the domino theory, was in its dying stages. Furthermore, the party seemed unable to attract younger supporters given that the voting age had in 1973 lowered from 21 years to 18 years. This change was in the pipeline for some years before 1973. The DLP had a fixation with university students seeing them as no more than mindless rabble. This attitude seemed to be based upon the activities of students at universities such as Monash in Melbourne demonstrating against conscription and the war in Vietnam two issues very dear to the DLP.

The Australian Democrats faced a similar problem in its relevance to the political scene, especially over the question of the exact purpose of the party – what it stood for. Were the Democrats elected to Parliament merely as a watchdog to indeed ‘keep the bastards honest’ or were they in parliament as a third party to formulate policy and present that policy to the parliament by way of private members bills or amendments to the government’s legislation. Some thought the two roles were incompatible.

However, it could easily be shown that the two roles went hand in hand. Part of being a watchdog surely would be to amend legislation to make it fairer or to remove problems or potential abuses. To do this would require a party to have polices in most if not all areas. In addition, voters vote for a party in terms of the policy it presents, in other words what it will do if it gets into parliament. Nobody votes for a party that simply claims to be a ‘watchdog’ and nothing more. To vote for a party voters expect the party to do something or some things for them not for a distant group of others or to serve as a type of quality assurance unit.

The Australian Democrats operated under a system of participative democracy where the party’s rank and file were empowered to engage in the party’s policy making and leadership elections. To be successful such a system requires a keen interest from the party membership in policy making and policy analysis. Unfortunately, apathy amongst the party membership was a significant problem for the Australian Democrats. Turn outs to vote on party policy was very poor, often under ten per cent. The Australia party who embraced participative democracy also found this problem. Nevertheless, the Democrats expected its members to dutifully vote on policy measures using a ballot paper that more resembled a university ‘fill in examination paper’ than a ballot paper and this thesis includes some examples of such ballot papers which often extend to four pages. To fill in such a ballot paper was a very time consuming exercise and there was no real guarantee that the party member had the interest or the expertise to be across all of the policy issues.
Other parties had alternatives to participative democracy. The major parties acknowledge that they all have members who do no more than pay an annual membership fee and have party literature mailed to them, quite possibly left unread and discarded. For those parties, policy is voted on at state conferences by delegates elected from their respective branch. The state conference is a quick way to determine party policy – motions are included in an agenda and are debated at the conference delegates can speak for or against and as part of the debate, delegates are told the reasons for and against the policy motions.

The Risk of Poor Leadership

The age of the five DLP Senators was also an issue, they were portrayed as the old ‘fuddy duddies’ in boring grey suits – this was a serious image problem for the DLP as was Vince Gair’s abject skills on television and his very poor speaking style. When Gair was finally replaced as leader he did not cheerfully accept the change. This made him very amenable to the ALP: government’s offer of the ambassadorship to Ireland, where he was a total disaster as a diplomat.

His replacement McManus was only four years younger than Gair. McManus was soon seen as more of the same, an old man with outdated moralistic views. In addition, as leader of the party, McManus hated flying, preferring to travel from Melbourne to Canberra and back by train. Thus, a trip that should have taken a little over one hour, took several. In addition, traveling by train it was very hard for journalists or anybody else to contact McManus.

The better alternative to replace Gair was his fellow Queenslander Condon Byrne who was around 10 years younger than Gair. Byrne took a very low profile within the DLP. A lawyer by training, Byrne was a very accomplished speaker, preferring to analyse the issue and not personalities. This made him highly regarded amongst Senators from other parties.

Under the Australian Democrats participatory democracy model party members were entitled to vote for the leader and deputy leader of the parliamentary party. In addition, the members who did not have confidence in the parliamentary leadership, for whatever reason, could have the leadership positions re-balloted with a petition to the National Executive with as few as 100 votes. A poll of all of the party members for these two very important high profile positions was very time consuming, especially when it is remembered all of the other parties, minor and major, determine leadership of the parliamentary party in the party room. A party room election results in a very quick result with very little if any delay. In fact, often notice to move a spill of leadership positions and the resultant meeting and ballot of the parliamentarians happen on the same day. Parliamentarians would also be able to ensure in the balloting and indeed in the nomination that they were voting for a potential leader that they knew they could work with.
By contrast, in the Australian Democrats, the time from the presentation of the petition with at least 100 signatures to the declaration of the membership ballot could take well over a month. The Australian Democrats solution to that problem was to appoint an interim leader which only provided more uncertainty and instability. In addition, the result from the membership ballot could be a leader inexperienced in the ways of leading a parliamentary party and or a leader that could not work with the rest of the parliamentary members. Overall then, this was both a cumbersome and time consuming operation and it also cost the party dearly.

The retirement of Don Chipp was a big blow for the Australian Democrats. Chipp came into the party with a very profile and a very liberal approach to policy areas. But he also had almost 20 years of service in parliament and with his wealth of experience, was able to gently guide and mentor the new party. This became very obvious from reading his many contributions to the party’s national journal and at meetings of the National Executive of the party where Chipp would be called upon to give a report. These reports were more often presented as very strategic pieces of advice. This advice and indeed style of writing was missing after Chipp resigned from the leadership of the party. Chipp had obviously learnt a lot from his time as the Liberal member for Hotham in the House of Representatives and he shared this knowledge and experience with his fellow Democrats. After Don Chipp resigned as leader of the Australian Democrats, the party went through many leaders and interim leaders in very few years and this was very destabilising for the party.

Unlike other minor parties discussed in this thesis which have for one reason or another had to change leaders, the Australian Greens have twice successfully changed leaders seamlessly. The change from Bob Brown to Christine Milne in 2011 caused no conflict within the party. Likewise, the change from Milne to Richard di Nattale in 2014 also took place without any conflict. Also in that leadership change the party also elected not one deputy leader but two co deputy leaders. Each co deputy leader being responsible for leadership in respect of different broad policy areas.

Second Preference Strategies

As this thesis has stated, minor parties in Australia have significant power to determine other political outcomes in their choice of allocation of second preferences. A minor party can exchange preferences with a major party and those second preferences can have the power to determine which major party ultimately gets elected in a marginal electorate. A responsible second preference strategy can help and minor party, while a poorly thought out allocation of second preferences can harm a minor party’s credibility.

For example, after the Labor split in 1955 until the party’s winding up in 1978 the DLP did not preference the main Labor party, the ALP, but instead the traditional enemy of Labor, the
Liberal Party of Australia and its coalition partner the Country Party. This tactic kept the Coalition in government for a total of 23 years and the ALP languishing in opposition for the same period. Many observers saw this action by the DLP as being very provocative to say the least. But it illustrated quite clearly the power and strategic implications of a minor party’s second preferences. Surprisingly the DLP asked very little in return for its allocation of second preferences, requiring little more than continual increased defence expenditure and foreign policy that was anti-communist. There were no discussions on increased pensions or other social security measures, for example. This was in stark contrast to the preference allocation strategies of both the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens, were negotiations and trade-offs were and still are very much commonplace.

A second example is provided by the Australian Democrats. That party’s second preference policy started off with no preference allocation at all and then a split ticket one side showing second preferences to the Liberals and the reverse side showing second preferences to the Australian Labor party. The Australian Democrats seemed to be ignorant of the power they had in the decision of where to allocate second preferences which could decide the results in many seats and indeed change the leading candidate after the allocation of second preferences. To its credit, the Australian Democrats later learnt to trade preferences for policy concessions and as a result the Australian Democrats second preferred the Australian Labor party in exchange for very favourable environmental policies. But the decision not to allocate preferences in the early years did not help the Australian Democrats credibility. In fact, the split preferences ticket was ineffective because preferences often flowed around half to the Labor Party and half to the Liberal Party – thus the preferences cancelled each other out and could not be used as a method of bargaining with one of the major parties.

What of the Future?

Future studies on Australian minor political parties will be able to consider another group of minor parties that have risen and in some cases fallen. For example, the rise and rapid fall of the Palmer United Party, along with the rise and growth of the Nick Xenophon Team. Significantly these two parties’ strength came from a single state, Queensland in the case of Palmer United and South Australia in the Nick Xenophon Team’s case. While undoubtedly the future of One Nation and the Australian Greens will be observed and researched with great interest. The Australian Senate does not have one minor party holding the balance of power, but a number of minor parties sharing the balance of power. An area of interest in the future will be what action, if any, the major parties take to reduce the support for minor parties. This reduction if it happened, would need to go much further than electoral reform of the Senate voting system. For a start the parliamentary members of the major parties have to listen to the party’s rank and file or grass roots members and listen to problems and issues and bring them
before parliament. Party rank and file members cannot be taken for granted or used merely as a
labour force to hand out ‘how to vote’ cards on election day. In addition, the major parties have
to be seen to be actively considering the policy concerns that have helped the minor parties get
members elected. These policy concerns include the environment, globalisation and its impact
as well as political correctness along with multiculturalism with its associated issues.

Contribution of the Thesis

This thesis has added to the body of knowledge by showing that for a minor party to survive, it
must remain united and relevant and to gain support its leader must be well known with a high
profile and recognition factor. A divided party particularly one that has irrelevant policies that
show it cannot, or is unwilling to, move with the times will find it very hard at the next election
to gain the required support to have its candidates re-elected.

Minor parties emerge for a purpose such as disagreements with an existing party or to advocate
a particular policy. Entry into parliament is made much easier if the party is well lead and by a
leader who is well known with a high profile.

In this thesis, I have contributed to the research on minor political parties by an empirical and
historical analysis of four Australian minor political parties. I have discussed the circumstances
that brought these parties into being. In fact, some of those circumstances, such as the
cartelization of the major parties, is a factor in the success of some of the modern day minor
parties. I have analysed the various factors that cause minor parties to lose voter support to the
extent that the party just fades away. These factors include relevance, unity of the party and
quality of leadership and the transition of the leadership to another leader.
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