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This thesis is my own original work

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TNI-AU Indonesian Air Force
TPNG Territory Papua New Guinea
UKUSA United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Agreement)
UN United Nations
USAF United States Air Force
USAMIN United States, Australia Ministerials (meeting)
USMC United States Marine Corp
WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium
ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the Australian Labor government’s (1983–1996) security policy is best explained from within, what I describe as, a liberal-realist framework. This framework challenges the mainstream views in the International Relations (IR) literature that security policy can be explained by either realist or liberal conceptions of security and most commonly by realism and that Labor’s policy is essentially realist.

The liberal-realist perspective is derived from three schools of thought in the IR literature which suggest that both liberalism and realism are required to provide a comprehensive explanation of security policy and that such a combination is not necessarily a contradictory approach. These schools—comprising Grotian, neoliberal institutionalist and the ‘new security’ school—share the belief that the international system is characterised by both anarchy and society and by both competition and cooperation. Assumptions about anarchy/competition and society/cooperation are the intellectual foundations of realism and liberalism respectively. If anarchy and society co-exist then the insights of both realism and liberalism are required to explain the security problematique.

The thesis draws out the security implications of these assumptions in detail and concludes that the liberal-realist perspective orientates scholars towards a more sensitive and complex conception of security for explaining the basis of security policy. This argument is based on an examination of Australia’s security policy during the Labor government, policy makers’ views of security policy obtained from a survey and interviews, and the IR theoretical literature.
I am deeply indebted to many people, especially my family, friends and colleagues in the Department of International Relations at the ANU, for helping me to complete this doctorate.

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And to Paul, Jane and Johnny, ‘this’ is for you with my love.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to show that an examination of the Australian Labor government's security policy reveals a weakness in mainstream academic theoretical analyses that adopt a one-dimensional, usually realist, explanation of security policy. In addition the thesis aims to demonstrate that the International Relations (IR) literature also includes a theoretical perspective that can give a better explanation of Australia's security policy, though this potential has not been adequately shown by scholars.

Like its predecessors, the Labor government (1983–96) sought to maintain a relatively self-reliant defence of Australia policy while remaining in an alliance with the US; indeed both self-reliance and the alliance relationship were considerably strengthened under Labor. But the new Labor government differed from previous governments in introducing novel policy concepts and unprecedented levels of security cooperation with the states in South East Asia. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) not only developed confidence-building and transparency measures with other military forces in the region, but also helped them to increase their operational and combat skills. Labor actively sought to increase Australia's security through arming itself against regional states ('security against') while also dramatically increasing cooperation with them ('security with').

On the face of it, a policy that significantly strengthens self-defence capabilities and the alliance relationship and at the same time pursues such extensive regional cooperation with possible adversaries is contradictory. The same could be said of the key policy concept,1 'cooperative security', introduced by Labor to guide regional security policy. 'Cooperative security' embraced an extraordinary amount of practical military assistance to other military forces in the region. Yet the ADF still declined to share the skills and information considered vital for the defence of Australia and gathered intelligence during cooperative activities with the regional military forces that it was training to be better warfighters.

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1 The term 'policy concept' refers to concepts used in policy statements. Some of these concepts, like 'common security', may or may not share the same meaning as the 'theoretical concept' by the same name in the IR literature. Both the declaratory and practical levels of policy are analysed.
Realism and liberalism, the two dominant IR theory security paradigms, reflect the two different approaches taken by Labor. Realism, the dominant theory for explaining security, posits that self-help strategies and alliances enhance security. Liberalism suggests that states may improve their security through cooperation with potential adversaries. The mainstream academic theoretical analyses of security policy, however, rarely embrace both approaches at the same time.\(^2\) The convention is to adopt a one-dimensional approach—overwhelmingly a realist one.

The architects of Australia’s security policy disagree that there is anything contradictory about both cooperating with, and even enhancing the military capabilities of, potential adversaries while also building up a military capability to possibly use against them. For example, Hugh White, Deputy Secretary of Strategy and Intelligence in the Department of Defence,\(^3\) notes that ‘[t]here is an instinctive feeling that [regional engagement and defence of Australia]...must conflict, or be contradictory; that they cannot be dealt with together’.\(^4\) But White is emphatic that this ‘instinctive feeling’ is misplaced and that ‘the overall structure is [not] contradictory’\(^5\). If White is correct then attempts to explain Australia security policy in terms of *either* realism *or* liberalism—which are based on competition and cooperation respectively—must fail. Paul Dibb, one of White’s predecessors, has argued repeatedly that academic theories are of little use to policy makers.\(^6\)

\(^2\) Possible exceptions are some analyses by scholars, for example Joseph Nye, who have been either practitioners or closely connected to policy making. However, even these scholars usually fail to systematically link the policy with the range of possible underlying theoretical assumptions about security. See Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘The New National Interests’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No.4, 1999, pp.22–35.

\(^3\) The position of Deputy Secretary of Strategy and Intelligence is second in importance only to the Secretary of the Department of Defence.


Australian scholarly writing on Labor’s security policy generally reflects the tendency in mainstream analyses of security to adopt a one-dimensional approach and asserts that the security policy is realist. However, very few scholars examine either the assumptions behind the policy or the theories in depth and try to relate one to the other. In other words, few have taken the advice given over thirty years ago by two respected American IR academics, that scholars should try to systematically match the assumptions behind policies ‘with assumptions… contained in theoretically orientated literature of international relations’. No study has surveyed policy makers’ views about the security assumptions that are behind the policy. And no scholarly analyses start from the proposition which is central to this thesis, namely that the policy comprises ‘security with’ as well as ‘security against’ elements, that it embraces cooperation as well as competition and that the former is based on liberal assumptions about the nature of the international system.

This thesis seeks to answer three questions. First, what are the security assumptions that underpin Labor’s security policy? Second, how can they be explained? Third, what does this tell us about the adequacy of mainstream IR approaches to explaining Australia’s security policy in particular and security policies generally? The first question is addressed in Part One of the thesis, which examines the different elements of Labor’s security policy from 1983 to 1996. The second and third are covered in Parts Two and Three of the thesis, which, respectively, examine the assumptions which underpin the two mainstream theoretical literatures on security and the extent to which each on its own can explain the assumptions behind Australia’s security policy.

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8 Among the few who at least attempt to do this are several contributors to the book by Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), *Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, Sydney, 1996. These scholars provide a critical theory perspective and confirm the arguments of most other scholars that the policy is realist.

Introduction

From this analysis the thesis concludes that both liberalism and realism can best explain the assumptions about security (and therefore the conception of security) that underpin Australia’s policy. What I call a ‘liberal–realist’ perspective is derived from a largely unexplored field of IR scholarship (at least with respect to security studies) which assumes that anarchy and society—the intellectual foundations of liberalism and realism—co-exist in the international system and that the means for achieving security include both competition and cooperation. This argument challenges the conventional scholarly explanations that rely on either realist or liberal security theories to analyse security policy.

The argument is developed as follows. Chapter One describes the official policy concepts and practices that support defence of Australia and the alliance with the US. Chapters Two and Three describe the policy concepts and practice of regional security policy. This first part of the thesis confirms the proposition that Labor’s overall security policy is based on the assumption that security is enhanced by adopting strategies against states, on the one hand, and, with them on the other hand. I also argue that Australia’s ‘security against’ policy contains several strategic dilemmas that give rise to tensions within the policy. In a similar way there are tensions within the cooperative ‘security with’ policy.

The second part of the thesis asks how the different theoretical traditions address security, in particular the classic questions: security of what, from what, and with what means? Chapter Four examines the assumptions which the two main theories—realism and liberalism—make about security and the extent to which each is driven by the logic either of competition or cooperation. A logical consequence of this argument might seem to be that the original hypothesis, that Australia’s security policy is contradictory, is valid—since it too is based on principles of ‘security against’ and ‘security with’.

Chapter Five reviews other theoretical literatures that might support the policy makers’ claim that a policy that embraces both arming against and cooperating with potential adversaries is not contradictory. I argue that three schools of thought—Grotian, neoliberal–institutionalist, and what I call the ‘new security’ school—suggest that both theories are needed to explain the security behaviour of modern states. The key assumption of each of these schools is that anarchy and society co-exist and that each is
important for understanding the nature of the international system. However, these latter literatures do not systematically explore the implication of the 'anarchy and society assumption' in ways that are helpful for policy analysis. Therefore I draw out these 'hidden' implications with the help of the three questions posed above and develop an analytical framework which draws on the three schools and which I label the 'liberal–realist' perspective. I propose that it is a more coherent framework for describing Australia's security policy than either liberalism or realism on its own.

The third part of the thesis moves from the general to the particular and examines the extent to which Australia's security policy can be explained from the three different perspectives—realism, liberalism and liberal–realism. Chapter Six examines the documentary evidence, described in the first section, in the light of the three approaches. This chapter concludes that the documentary evidence shows that no single theory can satisfactorily explain the policy. However, if both theories are invoked then the policy can mostly be explained within the liberal–realist framework.

In Chapter Seven I examine additional evidence, obtained from a survey/questionnaire and interviews with security policy makers, from the three theoretical perspectives. The data also show that policy makers' assumptions about Australia's overall security policy are most comprehensible in terms of the liberal–realist framework. The worldview of policy makers—which assumes that the international context is one of competition and cooperation and assumes that 'friends today could be enemies tomorrow'—embraces both liberal and realist assumptions. In the Conclusion I show how the liberal–realist conception challenges some commonly held views in the literature about security in general and Labor's security policy in particular.

Finally, a word or two about methodology. The thesis takes Labor's security policy as a single case study to illuminate the conventional conception of security that relies on either of the two mainstream theories, realism (the most common approach) or liberalism to explain security policy. An historical and qualitative account of the policy—based on official documents and declaratory statements and practice—as well as quantitative evidence obtained from a survey of policy makers' views, is subjected to a theoretical analysis using an analytical framework that includes both realist and liberal conceptions of security as the basis for explaining security policy. This sensitising
Introduction

A conceptual framework is developed from three schools of thought whose security assumptions have received little attention and have to be made explicit. The aim is to see if the security assumptions underpinning the policy can be related to the assumptions and conceptions of security contained within the framework.
PART I

THE POLICY
Chapter One

LABOR’S ‘SECURITY AGAINST’ POLICIES:
DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA AND THE AUSTRALIA-US ALLIANCE

The relative peace in Asia may not last. Australia’s security environment could deteriorate, perhaps quite seriously in the future.1
(Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994)

Australia is doing more with the United States than ever before and benefiting more from it. The country’s defence posture depends on that alliance, and will keep depending on it for many years to come. 2
(Hugh White, Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence, Department of Defence)

One of the most enduring features of Australian strategic perceptions is the presence of direct and active threats to Australia’s security and well-being—a perception made only the more remarkable by the almost complete absence of such threats throughout Australia’s history.3
(Professor Desmond Ball, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU)

Throughout Australia’s history, governments have assumed that defence against other states was the highest priority for Australia’s security. At various times Australia had been perceived to be under threat from Russia, France, Germany, China, Japan and Indonesia. With hindsight these ‘threats’ were shown to be illusory. Nonetheless, the strategic documentation during most of the post-war period was replete with assessments of anticipated threats. And, in more recent times, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the overwhelming perception has been one of increasing strategic uncertainties in the region. The official record also shows how governments have responded to such assessments4 in terms of doctrine, operational strategy, defence

4 It is assumed that the governments’ responses were not determined exclusively by perceptions of the strategic environment and its strategic implications but also by political and budgetary factors.
planning concepts, force structures, practice and, equally importantly, military arrangements, most obviously the alliance with the US.5

When the Australian Labor Party (ALP) won the general election on 5 March 1983,6 one of the first undertakings of the new government was to put a new codified defence policy in place which would make Australia even more secure against other states. Labor further refined the plans and concepts, which had been evolving during the previous decade, for the defence of Australia. Special attention was given to developing a strategy for ‘defence-in-depth’, a doctrine of ‘self-reliance’ and defence planning concepts such as ‘warning-time’, ‘lead-time’, ‘force-in-being’, ‘expansion base’ and ‘technological edge’ (over other regional military forces). Several of these elements continued to evolve over the period that Labor held office and a number of dilemmas, which had vexed defence planning in the past, persisted. Nonetheless, under Labor, Australia was better prepared than at any other time in the country’s history to fight against other states using its own resources.

Integral to the formulation of a codified defence of Australia policy was the Australia–US alliance. Despite the strong emphasis on a doctrine of self-reliance, the alliance grew in significance under Labor. The US was important, not as the provider of military force for the defence of Australia as it had been presumed in the past, but as the continuing source of intelligence and military technology. Paradoxically the alliance supported self-reliance. As a consequence, long-standing dilemmas about how much emphasis should be given to defence of Australia, on the one hand, and to the alliance on the other, continued to underpin Labor’s policy. Nonetheless, both these policies, which supported ‘security against’ other states, were significantly strengthened during Labor’s period in office.

To demonstrate the above claim this chapter will examine Labor’s ‘security against’ policies in some detail. Defence of Australia will be analysed in terms of its: (a)
Defence of Australia and the Australia-US Alliance

strategic assessments of threats, uncertainty and levels of conflict; (b) responses in terms of doctrine, strategy, defence planning concepts, force structure, and practices; and (c) responses in terms of alliances and other defence arrangements. In the first section of the chapter the development of these elements of defence of Australia will be discussed from an historical perspective (when ‘forward defence’ and the alliance were dominant) using official sources that have rarely been publicly referenced before. In the second section the key strategic documents produced by Labor—the 1986 Dibb Report, the 1987 White Paper and the 1994 White Paper—will be examined at much greater length. In the final section the nature and purpose of the alliance is explored, historically and under Labor. Finally, the three sections of the chapter will discuss the strategic dilemmas that characterised defence planning during this period.

‘SECURITY AGAINST’: PRIOR TO LABOR’S ELECTION IN 1983

On 5 September 1983, some six months after Labor came into office, Defence Minister Gordon Scholes submitted the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1983 to Cabinet for endorsement. The two recommendations made by the Minister were that first, it should be:

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6 The ALP had been the federal opposition to the conservative Liberal/National Party Coalition for the previous seven years.

7 This historical analysis is based on classified documents from the 1960s and 1970s known as the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy papers. The rare public references to these documents have usually omitted direct quotations and details such as page numbers. According to official sources, ‘[t]he “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy” (SB), [is] prepared by the Defence Committee (DC) about every three years, [and] deals with circumstances and trends affecting Australia’s security. It advises the Minister of Defence, and through him the government, on how the government might counter prospective risks and exploit opportunities to promote our security’.

8 See Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1983, Background, Department of Defence, Canberra, 5 September 1983, p.3. The Defence Committee consisted of the permanent heads of the departments of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister and Cabinet and Treasury, the four service chiefs of staff and secretary of the Department of Defence. The Defence Committee’s last recorded meeting was in November 1985. Defence planning is now predominantly an in-house process.

Labor's defence policy... to develop a more self-reliant strategic posture... based on the principle of developing independent national defence capabilities to deter conventional attack on Australian Territory.\textsuperscript{12}

And second, that the Cabinet endorse \textit{Strategic Basis 1983} 'as guidance for [the] forthcoming review of defence planning and for the development of...defence planning'.\textsuperscript{13} Together the two recommendations amounted to a significant evolution in Australian defence thinking. However, although Labor is correctly given most credit for this advance in defence policy, the genesis of its plans was to be found some decades earlier.

\textbf{The historical context: from threats to strategic uncertainties and dilemmas about means}

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Australia's strategic assessments and responses focused on anticipated Asian threats both to regional stability and directly to Australia's security. Defence planners were most concerned about Japanese remilitarisation, communist regimes in North Korea and North Vietnam, communist insurgencies in many areas of Southeast Asia and, above all, the communist regime in China. Closer to home the major and direct threat to Australia was perceived to be Indonesia. As \textit{Strategic Basis 1968} stated:

\begin{quote}
[It is from or through Indonesia that the possibility of hostile action against Australia or its Territories is most likely to arise.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

However, by this time defence planners were in a dilemma about the most appropriate means for enhancing Australia's security.\textsuperscript{15} Doubts were raised in \textit{Strategic Basis 1968} about Australia's traditional responses, namely 'forward defence' and reliance on alliances. Defence planners suggested that Australia's current defence policy concept of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item This is not to suggest that dilemmas about how best to ensure Australia's security were not evident in earlier \textit{Strategic Basis} papers.
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‘forward defence’ with big-power alliance partners, the British and Americans, ‘hardly...represents...an independent strategy of our own’. Rather, they argued that:

[It has] been the case that we deliberately, doubtless in our own interests and perhaps inescapably, tied Australia to the strategy of others. We have had such a tradition, first to fit comfortably into British strategy and more recently into that of the US.

This tradition had led decision makers to deploy troops alongside those of alliance partners in several Asian wars and to plan Australia’s force structure with these contingencies in mind. Tellingly, Strategic Basis 1968 noted that:

[As a result [of not having an independent strategy] we find ourselves involved in situations not of our choosing and in the formation of which we have negligible, if any, influence.

Discontent with the lack of an independent strategy and its consequences for Australia’s security was only increased by a growing awareness that Australia’s traditional dependence on alliance partners was hardly prudent in the light of recent developments. Britain had already announced plans to withdraw East of Suez by the mid-1970s and the US commitment to continuing the war against Vietnamese communists was becoming uncertain. The US was also signaling to allied governments in the region that they would have to take more responsibility for defending their own territory. President Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, made known the year after Strategic Basis 1968 (on 25 July 1969 in Guam) officially confirmed that US combat support was unlikely in future regional conflicts.

As a result of changing perceptions of the regional environment Strategic Basis 1968 announced that Australia should aim for ‘strategic flexibility’, by which it was meant that:

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18 Australia became involved in the Emergency (between British and Malay government forces against indigenous communist Malays), in Confrontasia (between Malaya and allegedly communist forces from Indonesia), the Korean war (between communists in North Korea—supported by China and Soviet Union—and UN forces led by the United States), and the Vietnam war (between indigenous communist Vietnamese, supported by China, and the US-led coalition with the South Vietnamese government).
[O]ur forces would have to be organised, equipped and trained so that they would have to the maximum possible extent a dual capability i.e., for effective deployment in South East Asia as well as for the direct defence of Australia.\(^{20}\)

'Strategic flexibility' amounted to little more than some rhetorical modifications to 'forward defence', which shifted the focus from distant theatres to counter-insurgency operations in Southeast Asia. The Australian territory of Papua New Guinea was also thought to be vulnerable to Indonesian forces in neighbouring Irian Jaya. As already mentioned, the assessment at that time was that 'it is from or through Indonesia that the possibility of hostile action against Australia or its Territories is most likely to arise'.\(^{21}\)

This perception of Indonesia as a threat was a major reason why the alliance with the US was seen as necessary for Australia's security. The view in *Strategic Basis 1968* was that Australia 'could expect assistance under the ANZUS Treaty in the event of a major threat developing or in the case of limited war with Indonesia'.\(^{22}\) The alliance was also a critical source of intelligence for Australia. Without this intelligence Australia's ability to sustain its declared dual strategy—'forward defence' in Southeast Asia and direct defence of Australia—was doubtful. In *Strategic Basis 1968* it was made clear that Australia:

[M]ust do all [it] can to sustain the present arrangements which ensure two way exchanges with the US, UK, New Zealand and Canada of intelligence data.\(^{23}\)

All these countries were members of the secret UKUSA intelligence agreement (see below) under which the US provided invaluable information to Australia.

The *Strategic Basis 1968* illustrated clearly the dilemmas for Australian defence planners. The disadvantages of alliances were clearly understood, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, there was the judgment that Australia still needed the US; in particular for defence against major attacks, for limited war with Indonesia and for intelligence. It was believed that Australia had few choices other than to rely on the alliance with US since at that time direct defence of Australia was an aspiration with no matching capability. But at the same time little was done to reduce this dependence: that


\(^{22}\) Defence Committee, *Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1968*, p.60.

is, to develop doctrine, strategy, defence planning concepts, or force structures for the independent and self-reliant defence of Australia. There was no discussion in Strategic Basis 1968 that indicated the forces required for the different elements of the policy of ‘strategic flexibility’ were different and that it was necessary to have a coherent strategy (either for choosing between them or for allocating resources).

Strategic Basis 1971

In subsequent strategic assessments the perception of threat to Australia was modified and refined.24 The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971 stated that ‘the likelihood of Australian combat involvement outside Australia is less than we assessed in 1968 and is not great’.25 ‘Indonesia’, it was argued, ‘is the country from or through which a conventional military threat to the security of Australian territory [TPNG] could most easily be posed’. However, the critical change in threat perception in Strategic Basis 1971 was that ‘[i]t is very unlikely that any Indonesian Government in this decade would develop a capability or intention to mount a serious and sustained attack on the Australian mainland’.26 These kinds of judgments indicated that for the first time defence planners were canvassing ‘the prospect of varying levels of threat developing over increasing time-scales’.27

The Guam doctrine was reflected in the statement that the ‘maximum degree of self-help...and the responsibility for handling significant insurgency problems in South East Asia lies primarily with the countries in the region’.28 And, as the Strategic Basis 1971

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24 According to Desmond Ball, apart from Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, two other important documents were produced during 1971 that attempted to describe and assess Australia’s changing strategic environment. See Ball, ‘The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia’, pp.14–18. The first of these, The Environment of the 1980s (NIC 2 (71)), ‘was a very general document, eschewing discussion of the question of threats to Australia’ (p.15). The second document, the Environment of Future Australian Military Operations (EFAMO), was intended to ‘fill the gap between the general review of the environment and the more particular requirements of the Services with respect to force structure planning’ (p.16). According to Ball, writing in 1979, ‘EFAMO remains the most valuable piece of Australian documentation from the point of view of force structure planning’ (p.18). Neither document was available to the author.

25 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, Department of Defence, Canberra, March 1971, p.57. Nonetheless, it was suggested that although counter-insurgency operations involving combat troops were unlikely, ‘Australian policy should provide for an Australian capability to deploy air and naval support’. See ibid.

26 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.57.


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put it, in Australia’s case it meant that ‘a higher level of uncertainty, especially in relation to United States military action, will obtain’.29 But it was still thought that if there was a major threat to Australia from a big power, for example China or the USSR, ‘the ultimate United States commitment to Australia under ANZUS is not in doubt’.30 Australia now hosted US defence and space facilities at North West Cape (1963), Pine Gap (1966) and Nurrungar (1971) and according to the 1971 Strategic Basis paper ‘United States’ strategic interest in Australia is enhanced by [Australia’s] growing importance to the United States for defence and space purposes’.31

Other statements in Strategic Basis 1971 also indicated that Australia’s commitment to defence of Australia remained largely declaratory. For example, there was little detailed discussion about planning for the direct defence of Australia and, with regard to force structure, there was just the general comment that:

[I]increased emphasis on the defence of Australia itself in the long term will almost certainly call for a blend of offensive and defensive naval and air forces supported by highly mobile and hard hitting army forces.32

Clearly ‘a blend of offensive and defensive naval and air forces’ was a very limited defence planning concept. As it happened, the strategic assessments and responses in Strategic Basis 1971 were discarded as official guidance for defence policy when Labor replaced the Liberal–Coalition government in the March 1973 election.

Strategic Basis 1973

The new assessment of Australia’s strategic environment in the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973 paper, carried out under the new government, repeated many of the judgments in Strategic Basis 1971 but it also added some new ones. ‘Australia is at present one of the more secure countries in the world’33 the Strategic Basis

29 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.11.
32 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p.68.
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_Basis_ paper noted, and 'the present likely trends identified have not indicated any likelihood of threat of direct attack'. With regard to Indonesia it was stated that:

In the twenty years since achieving independence, Indonesia had never threatened Australia nor sought to acquire the capability necessary for it to launch significant military operations against Australia. Indonesia has never politically attacked Australia.

This perception of Indonesia was even more sanguine than that in _Strategic Basis 1971_ and quite remarkable given previous threat assessments.

Furthermore, in _Strategic Basis 1973_, it was stated that the nature of future conflict would most likely be 'low-level' and that the 'forces in being' should be determined by this fact. Self-reliance was also endorsed in stronger terms: Australia, it was said, 'must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defence against any neighbourhood or regional threats'. Moreover, this was underpinned by some modest conceptual developments, for example, the argument that:

'This need for greater self-reliance and the capability to act independently call for the maintenance at all times of defence strength which is adequate for immediate purposes and may be expanded if necessary.'

This thinking was supported by several defence planning concepts such as 'warning-time and lead-time', 'in being forces', and an 'expansion base.' Finally, the difficulties and dilemmas involved in developing a defence policy in the absence of a direct threat were acknowledged. The paper noted that 'the improbability of threat or direct military action'...
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pressure against Australia...poses difficult problems of judgments for Australian defence force development'.  

In what appeared to be an important initiative, with regard to these ‘difficult problems’, Strategic Basis 1973 announced ‘that a comprehensive study should be initiated on continental defence’ and that indeed, ‘these studies have been started’. However, according to Desmond Ball, the studies in question, which were referred to as the ‘Defence of Australia Studies’, had not in fact started and it was quite some time before work began. When The Defence of Australia 1974 study was finally completed and circulated within the defence establishment it became clear that ‘the bureaucracy was not willing to seriously examine continental defence’. Among the reasons for this, according to Ball, were that direct defence of Australia was, ‘contrary to the tradition of dependence, would cause change and require strong decisions, and would probably be expensive’.

It was evident, as Ball indicates, that despite a growing conviction that Australia required its own defence strategy, in practical terms defence planners continued to adhere to the view that:

Australia’s alliance with the United States is an assurance of ultimate security against pressure backed by overwhelming force in the unforeseeable circumstances of the more distant future.

Other justifications for the alliance continued to emphasise that it provided ‘valuable intelligence associations’; that for Australia ‘there is no comparable alternative sources of advanced technology...open to us’; and that ‘[Australia’s] association with the United States is welcomed in the region’. Overall, in Strategic Basis 1973 some conceptual

40 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, pp.5-6.
46 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.89.
47 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, p.89.
advances were made towards direct defence of Australia but in practice there was little progress.

**Strategic Basis 1975**

The next strategic assessment, the *Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975*, challenged previous claims about threats to Australia in the strongest terms yet. It argued that ‘Australia has been free of any major threat of attack on our country since the defeat of Japan thirty years ago’.48 In keeping with previous judgments, the likelihood of limited war with Indonesia was now assessed to be highly unlikely. Indeed, according to defence planners:

> It is most important that Australian Defence thinking should not see Indonesia, because it is a near neighbour from which these contingencies could arise, as a menace to Australia.49

Indonesia was even considered to be a strategic advantage to Australia: ‘a friendly Indonesia could be expected’, it was suggested, ‘to deter or least impede a conventional assault on Australia’.50

With regard to anticipated levels of conflict, the *Strategic Basis 1975*, like the 1973 *Strategic Basis*, focused on ‘low-level contingencies’. Moreover, Australia’s operational environment concerned Australia’s own physical environment and national geography. As Ball points out, ‘the policy guidance...restricted the operational environment essentially to the Australian continent, Australia’s island territories, and Australia’s maritime resources zones’.51

Another important judgment made in *Strategic Basis 1975* concerned the purpose and nature of defence policy in the current no-threat strategic environment. In the absence of imminent and serious threats to Australia, defence policy was now intended to:

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50 Defence Committee, *Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975*, Chapter 4, p.32.

This notion of 'uncertainty' about the future strategic environment now formally underpinned Australia's plans for direct defence of Australia. The defence planning concepts in *Strategic Basis 1975*, such as 'warning-time', 'lead-times', 'a technological advantage' and a 'core force', were developed with this strategic context in mind. As a result of there being uncertainty, rather than direct threat, *Strategic Basis 1975* emphasised that low-level contingencies were the most likely form of conflict and that a 'core force' should be planned. This force should be able to undertake peacetime tasks and be sufficiently versatile to deter or cope with a range of low-level contingencies but would provide an 'expansion base' that would enable Australia to expand its forces rapidly in response to emerging threats. The 'core force' was to be guided by a strategic concept that took account of the nature of Australia's sea and air approaches, however, a major problem was that *Strategic Basis 1975* only attempted a 'sketch [of a] a long-term strategic concept'.

The task of planning a defence force in the context of uncertainty presented new dilemmas. As the 1975 *Strategic Basis* paper noted, '[t]he lack of a palpable or likely threat complicates the task of planning the defence of Australian territory'. Although advances were being made towards an independent defence policy, uncertainties about the strategic environment meant that the alliance was still important for access to US intelligence data and technology. Indeed, the alliance continued to be stressed in *Strategic Basis 1975* in the improbable event of a major threat and in the light of the nation's inadequate capabilities. As it was stated, 'Australia would for the foreseeable future, require external support [and] the alliance with the United States should therefore be preserved'. But at the same time, defence planners continued to stress their doubts about the 'credibility of United States alliance commitments' and the

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53 For example, in 1975 *Strategic Basis* attention was drawn to other determinants of Australia's force requirements such as geography (e.g., the sea and air approaches), population size and distribution, civil infrastructure, and so on, as well as the need for doctrine which addressed joint operations by the three services in defence of Australia.
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‘uncertainties about an effective US response where vital US interests are not engaged’.57

The defence establishment undertook more ‘Defence of Australia Studies’, but, like previous efforts, these became stalled for the same reasons noted above, and thus little eventuated in practical terms to doctrine, strategy, or force-structure. In any case, Strategic Basis 1975 was never given approval by Gough Whitlam’s Labor government. In November 1975 the Prime Minister was sacked by the Governor-General and in the subsequent election Labor lost office to Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal–Coalition party which called for another strategic assessment.

ASADPO 1976 and the 1976 White Paper

The Liberal government’s new assessment, the 1976 Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence Policy Objectives (ASADPO), reportedly ‘refined the concepts of the 1975 paper’.58 For example, ASADPO redefined ‘warning-time’,59 discussed ‘lead-time’ in greater detail and examined the ‘Defence of Australia Studies’ proposal that two levels of conflict should be stressed—the notion of ‘low-level conflict’, which had featured in earlier plans, and the more recently introduced concept of ‘escalated conflict’.60 The ASADPO concluded that:

[M]ajor assault against Australia was the least conceivable contingency, and [the] capability related to it should command a low priority in force structure (subject to the requirements of the expansion base).61

57 Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1975, Chapter 2, pp.4–5.
58 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.25. (Reference to this document is from commentary that does not give reference details.)
59 According to an official report, the definition of ‘warning-time’ in the 1976 ASADPO, ‘accepted that the actual emergence of a threat and Government recognition of it “would be a late stage in a series of developments and Governments would need to act well in advance of it”. Defence planning and preparations needed, therefore, to “be responsive to any strategic change perceived as having potential for harming Australia’s interest”. This might involve “shaping and expanding the force structure, developing defence facilities and other infrastructure, security of supply lines, and other external support”’. See Department of Defence, ‘Key Elements in the Triennial Reviews of Strategic Guidance since 1945’, submission to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, April 1986, Senate Hansard, 17 February 1987, Australian Parliament, Canberra 1987, p.314.
60 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.25.
61 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.25.
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Many of the themes in the 1976 report were further developed in the 1976 White Paper, presented to Parliament in November 1976.

The 1976 White Paper retraced familiar ground but it also advanced defence thinking. It noted that, ‘[d]espite the major changes in Australia’s circumstances in the last thirty years, we have been free from threat of military attack since the end of World War II’.62 It also claimed that ‘[f]riendly relations between Australia and its major neighbour Indonesia have prevailed for thirty years’63 and that ‘Chinese support for insurgencies in South East Asia appears now to be lower in level than for many years’.64 But the 1976 White Paper dealt somewhat obscurely with the levels of conflict that might be anticipated with little mention of ‘low-level’ or ‘escalated low-level’ conflict that had featured in the 1975 Strategic Basis paper. Instead, ‘shorter-term’ contingencies were stressed, though the responses that were suggested were similar to those required for dealing with ‘low-level’ conflict: for example, sea-control, detection and response, and maritime surveillance.65

Like the Strategic Basis 1975 paper the 1976 White Paper stressed that ‘the basic principle of [Australia’s] defence planning’ was ‘[i]nsurance against uncertainty’.66 The planning concept that was at the centre of the policy was ‘a substantial force-in-being’.67 Along with the elevation of ‘a substantial force-in-being’ defence planners also decided that it was necessary to redefine the meaning of ‘warning-time’. Now it was no longer related to ‘Government acceptance of a perceived threat’ as it had in the 1973 and 1975 White Papers. The 1976 White Paper stressed that such acceptance would likely be ‘a late stage in a series of developments’ and that it was therefore important that

63 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.7.
64 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.6.
65 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.13.
66 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.12. The policy was guided by five defence planning elements, among them several concepts from the past that were given a different emphasis and meaning. See ibid.
67 A ‘substantial force-in-being’ had to be capable of several important ‘current and foreseeable tasks’: for example, the maintenance of a training base; the ability to deal with shorter-term contingencies; the conduct of surveillance operations and exercises with allies; independent operations; the demonstration of ‘Australia’s serious attitude to defence matters’; and the capacity to operate with the US. Department of Defence, Australian Defence, pp.12–13.
governments ‘act well in advance of it’. Defence planners were very concerned that governments would not act quickly enough and hence the redefinition. It is more than likely that the same concern led to the perceived need to create a ‘substantial force-in-being’. As the White Paper put it, ‘a capable and versatile “force-in-being” would substantially reduce the time necessary to organise an effective defence response’.

As far as doctrine was concerned the 1976 White Paper stated that ‘a primary requirement...is for increased self-reliance’ and that:

[O]perations are much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and...our Armed Services would be conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defence Force.

But beyond this there was little elaboration on ‘increased self-reliance’. With regard to the ADF’s operational environment, the 1976 White Paper described the ‘areas of Australia’s primary strategic concern’ as follows:

For practical purposes, the requirements and scope for Australian defence activity are limited essentially to the areas closer to home...These are our adjacent maritime areas; the South West Pacific countries and territories; Papua New Guinea; Indonesia; and the South East Asian region.

As Ball points out ‘[w]hile the Australian continent was clearly central...it was also clear that greater attention was again paid to the areas adjacent to Australia’. Indeed a short time later, according to Ball, the Liberal government:

Actually viewed the possibility of external operations as being sufficiently likely and important to Australia’s security interests as to even require the acquisitions or development of specific capabilities. [Emphasis added.]

68 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.12.
69 See footnote No.122.
70 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.12.
71 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.10.
72 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.10.
73 The paper did note, however, that ‘Australian self-reliance would enable us to contribute effectively to any future combined operations with the US’. Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.11.
74 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.6.
75 Ball, ‘The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia’, p.47. However, as far as very distant defence was concerned it was categorically stated in the 1976 White Paper that ‘[e]vents in distant areas such as...Northeast Asia...are beyond the reach of effective defence activity by Australia’. See Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.6.
The dilemma for the Liberal government was where to draw the boundaries of the operational area to Australia’s strategic advantage.

The 1976 White Paper proposed capabilities and force structure that were centred on intelligence collection, maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, offshore patrol, strike, reconnaissance and deterrence. The idea that Australia should aim for a technological superiority over its potential regional adversaries was not explicitly raised. What was needed was ‘suitably’ high technology and for Australia to ‘maintain its present relatively favourable position and be prepared to increase [it] selectively’. The alliance was described as an arrangement that ‘greatly assist[ed] Australia’s defence capability’ and Australians were assured that ‘in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia’s security, US military support would be forthcoming’. But even though Australian security might be ultimately dependent upon US support, ‘we owe it to ourselves to be able to mount a national defence effort’. These views, like others in the 1976 White Paper, indicated that cautious, albeit mostly rhetorical, progress had been made towards endorsing ‘self-reliance’ but there was still some way to go.

1979 ASADPO

Later strategic announcements, in particular, the 1979 ASADPO, ‘built selectively on the foundations of the documents of 1975 and 1976’. This paper ‘attempted to give more focus to defence planning through an examination of credible contingencies’ and it ‘attempted to set out—for the first time—a summary of defence policy objectives and

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77 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, pp.15–29.
79 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.11.
80 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.10.
81 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p.11.
82 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.25.
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capabilities requirements’. Some parts of the ASADPO drew on the ‘Defence of Australia Studies’ that were finally nearing completion.

By the early 1980s the process of developing concepts and plans for the defence of Australia via self-reliance had made progress. Exercises that concentrated wholly on the defence of Australia (the Kangaroo series) had started in the early-mid 1970s. The Liberal government had in principle recommended a ‘more self-reliant’ policy and the Defence Minister Ian Sinclair had endorsed it. However, the policy had still not adequately overcome the shortcomings which Ball had highlighted in 1979, namely that:

The strategic documentation does not address itself in any clear or comprehensive way to the fundamental questions of Australian defence planning. Most critically, there is little positive guidance as to the operational concepts and strategies to be pursued for the defence of Australia...There is still no conclusive official study of the specific defence requirements and actual force structure for defending continental Australia against foreign attack.

It was not until Labor came to office in March 1983 that these problems were addressed in a clearer and more comprehensive way, though again, as we shall see, several dilemmas continued to vex defence planners.

‘SECURITY AGAINST’ UNDER LABOR: DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

The first Strategic Basis paper presented by the new Labor government appeared in 1983. It reiterated and consolidated earlier proposals for the defence of Australia and recommended, for the first time, ‘the development of military strategy and operational concepts for the defence of Australia’. These objectives became the centrepoint of the two major statements on defence that followed, the 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities and the 1987 White Paper.

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83 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.25.
84 At least one reason why the Defence of Australia studies were finally completed was that the defence establishment had been criticised strongly by the Katter Sub-Committee of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence for its failure to produce adequate strategic guidance. See Ball, ‘The Politics of Defence Decision Making in Australia’, p.23.
85 Interviews with Defence Department officials, Canberra, November 1998.
88 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities.
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Many of the security assumptions from the past continued to underpin the two policy documents whose focus was the military capabilities needed to defend Australia without outside assistance. As the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, stated in the preface of the 1987 White Paper:

The first aim of defence self-reliance is to give Australia the military capability to prevent an aggressor attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on any part of our territory, or extracting concessions from Australia through the use or threat of military force.90

As the Minister stated, ‘defence self-reliance’ was now the specific approach or doctrine for security. In both documents defence planners judged that no potential threat to Australia could be identified and that while Indonesia was not an enemy, the border between PNG and Irian Jaya was a possible source of friction. The dominant view was that there was no specific threat that could give practical guidance to policy and the purpose of defence policy was thus to plan against the unknown, to provide an insurance against uncertainty. There were however differences in the rhetoric of the two documents about how much uncertainty pertained to the region and what the policy responses should be, particularly in terms of force structure and defence strategy.

‘Security against’ in The Review of Australia’s Defence Capability

The Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities91 was an important step towards developing an Australian defence policy for use against others. Indeed, in comparison to subsequent strategic documents, it was the most defensively oriented ‘security against’ approach proposed during the Labor government. It avoided worse-case thinking and, as stated in the Report, ‘any tendency to prepare for unrealistically high levels of threat’.92 As the author, Paul Dibb, later argued it was aimed at ‘planning a defence force without a threat’.93 The Dibb Report, as it was known, also attempted to determine the capabilities required for the defence of Australia.

91 The Dibb Report, as it became known, was written by Paul Dibb, an academic at the Australian National University, at the request of the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley.
93 See Paul Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p.18. This small book was written some ten years later and explains some of the thinking that supported this view of defence policy.
A core assumption was that 'Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world' but that 'it would not be prudent to assume that we will always be able to conduct our affairs without challenge'. ‘Australia faces no identifiable military threat and there is every prospect that our favourable security circumstances will continue’, it stated. Moreover, invasion by another state would ‘take at least ten years’ and there would be ample ‘warning-time’ for Australia to prepare.

**Anticipated levels of conflict, doctrine, strategy, force structure, and planning concepts**

The prospect of major confrontations was unlikely but the Report emphasised that 'there are possibilities for lower levels of conflict—some of which could be very demanding—arising within shorter warning-times'. The two lower levels of conflict discussed in the Dibb Report were low-level and escalated low-level conflict. It was the judgment of the Report that 'priority should be given to more credible low-level conflict, which would be limited because of limited regional capabilities'.

The Dibb Report had provided, for the first time, a comprehensive blueprint for the defence of Australia that consisted of a distinct doctrine, strategy, force structure, operational areas and defence planning concepts. The Report argued in doctrinal terms that Australia could provide for its own defence against the most 'credible military situations' and that this could be achieved through a 'strategy of denial'. The strategy amounted to 'a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest'. It was 'essentially a defensive policy' and it would 'force an aggressor to consider the ultimate prospect of fighting on unfamiliar and generally inhospitable terrain'. This articulation of a clear defensive 'strategy of denial' marked a major—and controversial—departure from conventional defence thinking.

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99 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.5.
100 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.5.
101 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.5.
The capabilities and force structure required for a strategy of denial generally supported defence, not offence: for example, the assets were mainly for intelligence and surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures and counter-offensive strike and interdiction. Importantly, during the most probable contingencies, the strike and interdiction capabilities were designated to a deterrent rather than combat role. The Report stated that strike and interdiction assets ‘would not play a significant part in low-level contingencies, except for display and patrol purposes to inhibit escalation’.102 (Emphasis added.) Moreover, to support the defensive nature of the strategy, it was proposed that ‘preference should be given to strike against maritime targets...[and] the development of land-strike is a lesser priority’.103 Again in support of a defensive strategy, the Report recommended that the ‘enhancement of the land-strike capacity of the F-111 force is not required at this time’104 and that ‘acquisition of any strike capabilities with ranges greatly in excess of 1,000 nautical miles from our northern coastline could not be justified’.105 (See Map 1.1 ‘Australia’s region’. ) Most importantly, the operational area that was to guide capability-acquisition was the area of ‘direct military interest’ and it comprised continental Australia and the sea-air gap. This area was distinct from a sphere of ‘primary strategic interest’, which encompassed South East Asia and the South Pacific.106 The overall force structure requirements of the Dibb Report consisted of offensive and defensive elements, but the strategy for using those assets, including offensive platforms like the F-111, was oriented towards defence rather than offence. Offensive platforms could perform defensive tasks. They could also react to aggression with counter-offensive strikes.

The main defence planning concepts in the Dibb Report—‘warning-time’, ‘lead-time’, ‘an expansion base’, ‘a force-in-being’ and ‘a technological edge’—were for the most part supportive of a defensive approach. These concepts had been discussed in previous

104 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p.7. According to Desmond Ball, ‘Mr Dibb’s view is that if the F-111 aircraft were not already in the inventory, the strike capabilities which they provide could not be justified’. See Desmond Ball, ‘Notes on Paul Dibb’s Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities’, Reference Paper No.143, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1986; p.10.
reports\textsuperscript{107} but the Dibb Report drew out their force structure implications. For example, the force structure was mostly concerned with a strong ‘force-in-being’ which maintained a technological edge over other the military forces of regional countries. In this regard, the Dibb Report recommended that, ‘it should be Australian policy to maintain an advantageous position in technology and operational skills in critical capabilities’.\textsuperscript{108} The concept of ‘warning-time’ was given particular attention because it addressed Australia’s military responses to ‘future uncertainties’. The Report noted that ‘like any other nation, Australia faces some uncertainties’ but that ‘no country could undertake a large conventional attack on Australia...in less than ten years’.\textsuperscript{109} In other words, the Dibb Report was confident that the contentious concept of ‘warning-time’

\textsuperscript{107} The Dibb Report concluded that the ‘concept of a core-force does not provide an entirely satisfactory basis for force structure decision-making’. Dibb, \textit{Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities}, p.35.

\textsuperscript{108} Dibb, \textit{Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities}, p.175.
was valid and provided a reliable way to address future uncertainties and the nature of an expansion base (see below). Indeed, ‘warning-time’ provided a rationale for limitations on the expansion base. As Dibb later pointed out:

[T]he concept of warning assumed a salient role in Australia’s defence planning: without it, Australia’s politicians would have had to accept military arguments for an expansion base force structure at the higher end of the capabilities scale.  

Overall, the emphasis on ‘warning-time’ and a restricted expansion base supported a defensive approach which anticipated that high levels of threat did not have to guide immediate defence planning, and that such threats could be detected and prepared for in sufficient time.

The defence budget required for implementing the recommendations in the Dibb Report amounted to some $25 billion over ten years—the largest capital expenditure in post-war years (see Table 1.1). The focus was on capital assets for intelligence and surveillance (e.g., the Jindalee over the horizon radar network (JORN) and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD); strike and interdiction (e.g., new submarines); anti-submarine warfare, surface maritime forces (e.g., new frigates); mine countermeasures; maritime air defence; continental air defence; and ground forces. With regard to the new replacement submarines, the Report considered that they were a ‘desirable rather than an essential increment’ to the existing force structure and that the need for them ‘is dictated primarily by expansion base considerations of the need to develop submarine skills’. Equally interesting were those recommendations not to proceed with certain existing assets: for example, not to modernise and replace the F-111s and not to introduce specialised ground-attack aircraft or helicopters for close air support. There were also recommendations not to automatically replace some assets: for example, it was suggested that the role of the Army’s tanks be reviewed and that limits on the Army’s use of artillery should be examined. Even more interesting was what the Report

110 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.18.
111 Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992, p.1.
113 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.65.
### Table 1.1 Defence expenditure/outlay as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product and Commonwealth budget outlays

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>GDP %</th>
<th>Cwh outlays %</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Cwh outlays %</th>
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Source: *Defence Budget Brief 1996-97, Resources and Financial Programs Division, Department of Defence, August 1996.*

Notes:
1. Outlays are only available from 1964–65. Data prior to this date uses expenditure from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. All figures are in a historical price basis.
2. Starting in 1914–15, Defence expenditure was appropriated under a 'War and Repatriation' classification. Figures relating to WWI exclude the War and Repatriation elements of interest, payment to sinking funds, war pensions and other repatriation payments.
3. Figures from 1973–74 are adjusted to remove superannuation contributions/refunds to make them consistent with Defence Function Outlays from 1993–94.
did not recommend: for example, the acquisition of airborne early warning and control (AEW& C) systems, in-flight refueling and extra amphibious forces. In effect, these procurement recommendations supported intelligence and surveillance and a force structure that leaned towards defensive assets.

**Criticisms of the Dibb Report approach to 'security against'**

The Dibb Report was without doubt a major step towards creating a coherent policy for the direct, self-reliant defence of Australia, and in particular the development of a strategy and force structure to support that policy. But getting to this point had been a highly politicised process. For example, the position that the Report adopted on the probable levels of conflict that should guide defence planning took a middle road between two differing perspectives. As Dibb pointed out, 'the Department and the ADF do not agree on the appropriate level of conflict against which we should structure the Defence Force'. As a result the Report took a position which:

[Accepted] the priority need to prepare for credible contingencies below the level of major assault—but not at as low a level as the Department argues for, nor at the higher level supported by the ADF.

Given these kinds of tensions it was not surprising that the conclusions of the Dibb Report were the subject of considerable debate. Some wanted the Report modified, others called for it to be rejected completely. The former group maintained that several changes were required to make the Report acceptable. The strategic assessment in the Dibb Report, it was suggested, while basically correct, had different implications for defence planning. In this vein, Desmond Ball, for example, argued that

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115 The political aim of the Dibb Report was to resolve or at least manage the entrenched and historical tensions over the means to security between the military and civilians in the Department of Defence and between the three services.


119 Most of these suggestions are derived from Ball, 'Notes on Paul Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities', pp.1-20, and various chapters by other authors in Desmond Ball (ed.), *Air Power. Global Developments and Australian Perspectives*, Pergamon Press (Australia) Pty. Ltd., Rushcutter's Bay, 1988.
'it would be a mistake...to over-emphasise the low-level contingencies at the expense of the more unlikely but much more consequential higher-level contingencies',\textsuperscript{120}

Ball argued that the strategy of denial was inadequate and needed to be supplemented with a more counter-offensive strategy and more offensive capabilities, including long-range land strike capabilities.\textsuperscript{121} Ball claimed that it was therefore necessary to modernise and then replace the F-111 strike capability; that there should be greater flexibility regarding the operational environment; and that there should be more caution about the reliability of the defence planning concepts of 'warning-time and lead-time'. Recognising threats early enough and persuading governments to respond to them was more problematic than the Dibb Report had portrayed, critics suggested.\textsuperscript{122} From this critique it followed that the 'force-in-being' had to be stronger than the Report suggested (e.g., it should include the F-111 upgrade, AEW&C, and close air cover for the Army). The critics won many of the arguments. While most of the Dibb Report's recommendations were retained, the White Paper that was published the following year diverged from its analysis and prescriptions in a number of significant ways.

‘Security against’ in the 1987 White Paper (Defence of Australia 1987)

The 1987 White Paper was less sanguine than the Dibb Report in its strategic assessments. The differences between the documents reflected several dilemmas about what type of responses would best enhance Australia’s security—with the White Paper taking a more combative stance than the Dibb Report.

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\textsuperscript{120} Ball, ‘Notes on Paul Dibb’s Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities’, p.5.

\textsuperscript{121} Ball, ‘Notes on Paul Dibb’s Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities’, pp.1–20

\textsuperscript{122} Warning-time had been a contentious concept for many years. Its usefulness for defence planning was examined in several extensive in-house studies. See, A.T. Ross, Threat Recognition and Response, Volumes I and II, CSE Note 53, Central Studies Establishment, Defence Science and Technology, Department of Defence, August 1986. The fundamental concern within the defence establishment was that CSE Note 53 'postulates an arbitrary and excessively rigid model of warning and threat and shows little awareness of the difficulties of subjecting these concepts to analysis and measurement'. The Department concluded that 'the concepts and situations with which the study attempts to deal are far more complex and difficult to analyse than its approach, methodology and detail would suggest'. Department of Defence, 'SIP/FDA Comments on the Study', CDS (CP3-4-37) Department of Defence, 13 July 1987.
Anticipated levels of conflict

Although endorsing the judgment that there were no direct threats to Australia, the White Paper gave greater emphasis than the Dibb Report, not to future uncertainties but, to existing uncertainties which could result in ‘escalated low-level conflicts’ rather than simply ‘low-level conflicts’. Regional states already had the capabilities, it was argued, to conduct low-level conflicts: or to ‘harass remote settlements and other targets in northern Australia, off-shore territories and resource assets and shipping’.123 But greater emphasis was given to the next level, escalated low-level conflict, which anticipated that Australia could be subjected to:

[I]increased levels of air and sea harassment, extending to air attacks on northern settlements and off-shore installations and territories, attacks on shipping in proximate areas, mining of northern ports and more frequent and more intensive raids by land forces.124

Indeed, it seems that the emphasis on escalated low-level conflict justified changes to the ‘force-in-being’ (see below).125

Neither low-level or escalated low-level conflict posed a threat to the survival of Australia, but each could ‘demonstrate Australia’s vulnerability and...force political concessions over some disputed issue’.126 The final level of conflict discussed in the White Paper was ‘more substantial conflict’. It included ‘high-level intensive military operations against Australia’ but it did not include invasion. Although the prospects of ‘more substantial conflict’ were not high the consequences were direr. The obvious dilemma for defence planners was which level of conflict should be used to guide defence planning and capabilities: the unlikely but more serious conflicts or the more likely but less serious ones. The White Paper’s endorsement of the more open-ended notion of escalated low level conflict provided a middle road between the two other levels and provided a justification for a ‘force-in-being’ which maintained the F-111s.

125 Interviews with senior defence officials, Canberra, November 1998.
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**Doctrine and strategy**

The assessment in the 1987 White Paper, implying that there was a less sanguine strategic environment, justified responses that had a different emphasis than those in the Dibb Report. Self-reliance continued as doctrine, but the 1987 White Paper proposed a military strategy for defending Australia which specifically stated that self-reliance was a ‘wider concept’ which ‘reject[ed] the narrow concept of “continental” defence’. In effect the Dibb Report proposal for a defensive ‘strategy of denial’ and layered defence—which supported a more ‘defensive policy’—was rejected. It was replaced with a strategy of ‘defence in depth’ which gave greater emphasis to counter-offensive operations for interdicting and striking foreign forces in more distant areas of the sea–air gap and particularly on foreign territory. As the White Paper made clear, ‘[t]he strategy on which self-reliance is based establishes an extensive zone of direct military interest’. (Emphasis added.)

The change from a strategy of denial to one of defence-in-depth indicated that ‘security against’ in the 1987 White Paper had several characteristics. Defence-in-depth was seen to enhance Australia’s security because, in strategic terms, it provided an option to terminate low-level and particularly escalated low-level conflict to Australia’s advantage. According to Desmond Ball, too little attention had been given to the positive role of counter-offensive capabilities for resolving escalation from low- to high-levels of conflict. The remarks of several senior defence officials, however, indicate that, although this was indeed a strong strategic argument, it usefully supported political arguments for maintaining certain ‘sacred cows’ in the force structure, in this case the F-111s. The change in strategy also suggested that defence planners assumed that a strong declaratory strategy—emphasising strike capabilities and ambiguous target plans—would enhance Australia’s security through offensive deterrence; that is more

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129 For example see Ball, ‘Notes on Paul Dibb’s Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities’, pp.3–4.
130 Other ‘sacred cows’ included the Army’s tanks and heavy artillery. Interviews with defence officials, Canberra, November 1998.
than one that stressed deterrence via a defensive strategy of denial.\textsuperscript{131} And finally, the change indicated that Australian defence planners considered it was prudent to accommodate the concerns expressed by the US about the Dibb Report: namely that a strategy of denial and continental defense necessarily excluded operations with the US further afield (see below).

\textit{Force structure}

The force structure requirements prescribed in the 1987 White Paper put more emphasis on a highly capable `force-in-being', that could be deployed immediately and with effect in escalated low-level conflicts, and less emphasis on an expansion base for future uncertainties. As Dibb commented some years later, the 1987 White Paper `gave less emphasis to an expansion base and it focused the priority for Australian defence planning squarely on the notion of credible, lower level threats'.\textsuperscript{132} The specific capabilities required for a `force-in-being' should, it was argued, focus on maritime surveillance, strike, interdiction and protection tasks, including mine countermeasures—all of which appeared to be similar to the Dibb Report's recommendation. However, the elevation of the land-strike force of F-111s, first for modernisation and then replacement, indicated that land targets were a far more important option in the 1987 White Paper than the Dibb Report. The latter had anticipated the removal of the F-111s when they became obsolescent in the mid-1990s. Moreover, in the 1987 White Paper, the wider set of platforms designated to perform strike and interdiction—the F-111s, the FA-18s and new replacement submarines—were considered a central element of the `force-in-being' for active use in low and escalated low-level conflict. The Dibb Report had suggested that strike and interdiction capabilities 'would not play a significant part in low-level contingencies, except for display and patrol purposes to inhibit escalation'.\textsuperscript{133} (Emphasis added.) And, that in `escalated low-level' contingencies, '\[o\]ur


\textsuperscript{132} Dibb, \textit{Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat}, p.16.

\textsuperscript{133} Dibb, \textit{Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities}, p.66.
strike operations would concentrate on the approaches to Australia in a campaign of forward interdiction'.

Like the Dibb Report, the 1987 White Paper judged that platforms and other elements of the defence force, particularly intelligence and surveillance assets, should be technologically superior to other regional capabilities. As it was stated in the 1987 White Paper, 'the ability to apply advanced technology effectively provides the only real solution to many aspects of defending our vast continent and our interests in surrounding maritime areas'. The intention was, '[not] to rely completely on imported technology and off-shore technological support', but rather, to support 'the policy of self-reliance [which] calls particularly for the enhancement of our own capabilities'.

Defence planners were becoming concerned that Australia's military technological edge was being eroded and had judged that strategic advantages were best sought by being selective and focusing on intelligence and surveillance. However, as Paul Dibb later argued, the 1987 White Paper provided inadequate guidance for priorities and means:

> [W]hilst intelligence and surveillance were given first priority...command, control and communications came last and there was little attention to the details of how Australia was to retain a technological advantage.

In subsequent strategic documentation the issue of how to maintain Australia's advantage in C³I technology was pursued in greater detail.

**Operational areas**

The operational environment for Australian forces described in the two documents appeared at first glance to be similar, since both stressed that 'the area of direct military interest includes Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua

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134 Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, p.65. The Dibb Report also argued that 'there would be fewer constraints on the Australian military response as the enemy used more of his limited capabilities. This may include the use of Australian submarine interdiction operations against the opponent's naval ships, and offensive mining'. See ibid., p.65.


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New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South-west Pacific'. However, putting more emphasis on land strike by the F-111s implied that areas beyond the stated zones might also be targeted. Indeed, the 1987 White Paper stated that the area of direct military interest 'does not...mark the limits or our strategic interests nor of our military capabilities'.

Planning concepts

In addition to the concept of a 'force-in-being', the key defence planning concepts in the 1987 White Paper and the Dibb Report were 'warning-time', 'lead-time' and 'an expansion base'. However, the White Paper was more circumspect about the value of some of these concepts for defence planning, though it did recognise their political value. As already indicated, as a result of the greater emphasis on escalated low-level conflict the 'force-in-being' was to be enhanced, with the consequence that there would be less need for force expansion. The 'warning-time' and 'lead-time' concepts suggested that Australia would both detect emerging threats early on and respond to them in a timely matter. However, neither claim was universally accepted in Defence or the ADF. The result was that the 'force-in-being' proposed in the 1987 White Paper was more than capable of addressing the most plausible low-level conflicts and was stronger than that suggested in the Dibb Report. For example, the F-111s were to be 'refurbished' and AEW&C and in-flight refuelling were firmly endorsed. Shortly afterwards the government also made the decision to replace the Oberon submarines with the highly sophisticated Collins class submarine which went far beyond the recommendations of the Dibb Report that the replacement should be guided by 'expansion base considerations...to develop submarine skills'. The idea that a
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combination of reliable early warning and rapid expansion provided for Australia’s security was not well received by some in the military.

The alliance

A final difference between the Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper approaches to ‘security against’ concerned the emphasis on the alliance. In general both envisaged that Labor’s formulation of defence self-reliance did not in any way exclude the alliance with the United States. The Dibb Report emphasised the ‘practical benefits of the ANZUS relationship for our defence effort’ and acknowledged that:

We would not have the same access to intelligence information, logistic support arrangements, weapons acquisition programs, and defence science and technology transfer from any other country.145

The Dibb Report made it clear, however, that Australia’s involvement with the US was limited and already sufficient.146 The White Paper, by contrast, elevated the importance of the alliance stating that, ‘defence self-reliance is pursued within the framework of alliances and agreements’147 and that such arrangements ‘makes self-reliance achievable’.148 The 1987 White Paper was more open-ended than the Dibb Report about Australia’s perceived obligations under the alliance. It stressed Australia’s role in the ‘Western community of nations’ and directly reassured the US that ‘options will always be available to Australian governments for assistance to allies’.149

In important respects the 1987 White Paper foreshadowed that Australia’s dependence on the alliance would increase, albeit in different ways from the past. On the one hand, it showed that it was certainly the intention of defence planners to make Australia less dependent on US combat support for defending Australia and to provide more options for Australian foreign and defence decision makers to act more independently. There

145 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.4.
146 The Dibb Report stated that ‘there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for global war. The presence of the joint facilities, together with the access we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through Australia of B-52 bombers, are sufficient tangible contribution to the alliance’. See Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p.4.
149 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, p.3.
was no assumption of automatic involvement in US conflicts that did not affect Australia’s interests. On the other hand, the White Paper demonstrated that self-reliance required US assistance, at least for the foreseeable future. Defence of Australia still required US support to acquire and develop the assets for self-reliance, especially high-tech military platforms and technology, logistics, resupply of stocks and transfers of technology for domestic research and development programs. Indeed as technology and maintaining a technological edge became more important, dependence on the US was bound to grow. The emphasis which self-reliance put on ‘warning-time’ clearly depended on intelligence, much of which was gained from US technical means, including that from the facilities at Nurrungar (which processed information about ballistic missile developments from satellites) and Pine Gap (which provided satellite SIGINT). Any question of Australia being independent in these ways was assumed by defence planners to be strategically and financially unrealistic. Given that a key judgment in the 1987 White Paper was that conflict—be it low-level, escalated low-level or more substantial conflict—was always possible and that the best response was to develop more sophisticated technological assets for intelligence and combat than any likely potential adversary, then it was obvious that the alliance had to be central to Australia’s security.

In terms of defence procurements, the 1987 White Paper introduced several changes but also retained many of the recommendations in the 1986 Dibb Report. In both documents capital spending focused on C^3I, six new submarines, eight light ocean patrol frigates, six minehunters, as well as Seahawk and Blackhawk helicopters. However, as already mentioned, the 1987 Paper decided that the F-111s would be upgraded and that AEW&C systems and in-flight refuelling would be confirmed. And later the Labor

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Because of this Andrew Mack argues that the main difference between the Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper was rhetorical and not substantial. Obviously the argument in this chapter stresses the differences in declaratory policy between the two documents. However, it gives more weight to the decision in the 1987 White Paper to maintain the F-111s in the force structure for foreign land targets and considers that to be a difference of substance. Another substantial difference concerns the practical implications of the different views of Australia’s obligations under the alliance in the two documents. If the Dibb Report view, stating specific limits to Australia’s obligations, had been policy at the time of the Gulf war it would have been much more difficult for the government to justify its participation in the war, notwithstanding its support of UN collective security. Clearly Mack’s argument does not detract from the other argument being made here that Labor’s ‘security against’ policy evolved and built upon existing positions and that the dilemmas about means continued. See Mack, ‘The 1986 Dibb Review: Offence Versus Defence’, pp.1–32.
government decided that the highly sophisticated and very expensive Collins class submarine would replace the existing Oberon submarines. The expected cost was some $25 billion over twenty-five years.\textsuperscript{151} There were few differences in terms of practice. Defence cooperation with regional countries remained much the same and the Kangaroo series, which had started in the early-mid 1970s, continued to be the main exercises for the defence of Australia. Moreover, the exercises continued to be conducted in the far north of the country and in the sea–air gap, and to be focused on ‘reactive’ strategies.

Overall, the 1987 White Paper emphasised a more outwardly combative approach to ‘security against’ than the Dibb Report. Its emphasis on self-reliance rather than reliance on allies appeared to resolve the earlier dilemma about how Australia’s security would be achieved but in many respects self-reliance depended on the alliance. As critics were quick to argue, this undermined the objective of self-reliance. The contradiction between claims of self-reliance and increasing technological dependence became more obvious in the next White Paper published in 1994.\textsuperscript{152}


\textsuperscript{152} Three other documents, related to the discussion but not discussed in this chapter, were published before the 1994 White Paper. The first was the \textit{Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP90)} endorsed in 1989 but not published until 1992. See Department of Defence, \textit{Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s}, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992. Until September 1992, ASP90, or rather a version of it, was a classified in-house document which set out some directions for moving beyond ‘protection’, or defence of Australia, and towards ‘promotion’ of Australia’s security interests in the region. According to Stewart Woodman, it marked the realisation by the Department of Defence that apart from the ‘narrow confines of the direct defence of Australia…a no less important aspect of effective planning was a more proactive role aimed at promoting stability within Australia’s immediate region and ensuring that the prospects of a military threat emerging in the future was even more remote’. See Woodman, ‘Unravelling Australia’s Strategic Dilemma’, p.10. The second document published before the 1994 White Paper was the \textit{Force Structure Review}. See Department of Defence, \textit{Force Structure Review}, Report to the Minister for Defence, May 1991, Defence Publications 35/91, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1991. According to Woodman, the \textit{Force Structure Review} was the Department’s response to the declining defence budget and it ‘introduced a number of significant but subtle changes to the existing program. These included creation of a new Ready Reserve Force in lieu of two understrength Regular Battalions, a move to two rather than three tiers of surface combatants, delays in the purchase of some lesser priority capabilities, reduced operational usage of combat aircraft to extend their life-of-type, rationalisation of defence bases in the south and consolidation of many training and support functions on a tri-service basis’. See ibid., p.12. The third document, published by the Department of Defence, was the \textit{Strategic Review 1993 (SR93)}. See Department of Defence, \textit{Strategic Review 1993}, Defence Publications, Canberra, December 1993. This document addressed regional security policy and introduced the concept of ‘strategic partnership’ which embodied Labor’s new emphasis on seeking ‘security with’ Asia. This approach contrasted with the other two parts of defence policy, the defence of Australia and the alliance, which sought ‘security against’ others. As such \textit{SR93} will be discussed in the next chapter examining Australia’s
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‘Security against’ in the 1994 Defence White Paper

The next White Paper, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994,153 offered the most pessimistic official formulation of ‘security against’ during Labor’s time in office. Like previous strategic documents it judged that Australia was not directly threatened and that uncertainties, not threats, should guide Australia’s defence planning. But unlike the assessments from the past two decades and the 1987 White Paper, the 1994 White Paper stressed that the end of the Cold War had introduced ‘new uncertainties’, which suggested ‘the relative peace in Asia may not last’ and Australia’s ‘security environment could deteriorate, perhaps quite seriously in the future’.154

Anticipated levels of conflict

The 1994 White Paper anticipated that there would be an ‘increasingly demanding range of conflict’ and that ‘short-warning conflict’ was the most likely contingency. Furthermore, it was implied that the ‘range of conflict’ would include higher levels of conflict since it was anticipated that ‘the nature and scale of forces that could be brought to bear against Australia...will increase steadily’.155 This strategic assessment contrasted quite dramatically with that in the Dibb Report and, notwithstanding the qualifications above, with that in the 1987 White Paper. The emphasis that these last two papers gave to low- and escalated low-level conflict as the most likely form of conflict had been replaced with more dire predictions about ‘short-warning conflict’ and higher levels of conflict.156 Defence planners were far more pessimistic about the regional environment than their predecessors in recent decades, certainly since Labor had been in office.157

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153 Department of Defence, Defending Australia.
154 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.4 and 7.
155 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.9–11.
156 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.24–25.
Pessimism about Australia’s strategic environment was based on several strategic developments since the end of the Cold War. Defence planners stressed that the rapid economic growth which most countries were experiencing would enhance their ‘strategic potential’, that is, their ‘capacity to develop and support military forces’. Of particular concern in this regard were the major powers in the region, China and Japan (and outside East Asia, India). Changing regional defence balances, it was argued, had implications for global and regional power relations. While the Paper noted that these developments were not necessarily destabilising it also argued strongly that regional ‘military developments over the next fifteen years will...add to the scale and intensity of combat’. Indeed, although these perceptions of uncertainty were based on several sources there is little doubt that a major cause was the expanding military capabilities of regional states. According to Paul Dibb, ‘[t]his focus on capabilities rather than threats enabled the ADF to give priority to the demands of so-called short-warning conflict’.

If pessimism about the possible relations between the major powers in Northeast Asia was a cause of uncertainty in the 1994 White Paper, then optimism about Australia’s relations with Indonesia—its nearest neighbour and the biggest power in Southeast Asia—was equally pervasive. The White Paper stated that Australia’s ‘defence relationship with Indonesia is our most important in the region and a key element in Australia’s approach to regional defence engagement’. The argument, that had been made in previous strategic assessments, that ‘Australia’s security is enhanced as

158 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.9.
159 The 1994 White Paper predicted that China’s economy would be the second largest in the world within fifteen years. Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.9.
160 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.9.
161 Defence planners also referred to ‘other problems’ which could ‘produce an unstable and potentially dangerous strategic situation in Asia’, such as ‘ethnic and national tensions, economic rivalry, disappointing aspirations for prosperity, religious or racial conflict, or other problems’. See Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.8.
162 In November 1993, Paul Dibb, then Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, argued that a particular cause for concern was the arms acquisitions of regional countries and that in combination with other issues, ‘the Pacific age could end in major Asian wars two or three decades hence’. See Paul Dibb, ‘Key Strategic Issues for Asia and Australia’, in S. Bateman and D. Sherwood (eds), Australia’s Maritime Bridge into Asia, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1995, p.24.
163 Dibb, ‘The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge’, p.3.
164 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.87.
Indonesia develops its capacity to defend its territory' was repeated and for the same reason—'because', according to defence planners, 'this makes it less likely that in the future any hostile third power could mount attacks from or through the archipelago across our sea and air approaches'.

In keeping with this argument the 1994 White Paper endorsed Indonesia's capacity to defend itself through the continuing development of its capabilities and professionalism, and with Australia's help. (This approach appears to diverge with other judgments in the White Paper that the military capabilities of other states should be a key determinant of Australia's defence policy.)

**Doctrine, strategy, force structure and planning concepts**

Many issues remained unresolved in the 1994 White Paper. There was the question of how much defence of Australia via self-reliance should depend on information technology and intelligence derived from the US to provide a strategic advantage in information warfare. Second, there was the issue of how much the intelligence the US gained from the joint facilities in Australia could—and did in fact—support self-reliance (see below). Third, there was question of whether the US would require a quid pro quo in the form of Australian participation in coalition operations for the technology and intelligence it provided Australia. And fourth, there was the issue of whether or not plans for defence of Australia required distant operations in the region and US support. Answers to these questions clearly had implications for decisions about doctrine, strategy, force structure and defence concepts.

With regard to defence doctrine, self-reliance was endorsed but with less vigour than in the Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper. As stated in the preface of the 1994 White Paper:

> While the fundamental precepts of self-reliance remain valid, the approaches we take to developing and sustaining our defence capabilities and strategic relationships will need to continue to evolve.

What such evolution might mean in practice was not spelled out.

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165 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia*, p.87.
166 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia*, pp.86–87.
167 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia*, p.iii.
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Strategy in the 1994 White Paper adopted what could be called ‘defence in depth plus’: that is, operational areas were more distant and defence operations were more outwardly offensively orientated, relative to the 1987 White Paper and certainly to the Dibb Report. According to defence planners, the 1994 strategy was ‘fundamentally defensive’ although, like the 1987 White Paper it was ‘not limited to defensive operations’.168 However, while both papers agreed about the boundaries of Australia’s area of ‘direct military interest’ and that operations could take place outside it, the 1994 White Paper went even further. It stated that the ADF would ‘take the operational initiative within that area, and in some circumstances beyond it’.169 (Emphasis added.) The strategic rationale was that ‘[t]he range at which engagements can occur is increasing’,170 as a result of the increasing military capabilities in the region. It was not clear in the 1994 White Paper just what type of ‘operational initiative’ was envisaged: that is, did it amount to surveillance or combat or both; or was it to be offensive or even pre-emptive or simply counter-offensive? Neither was it clear just how far ‘beyond’ extended: that is, how far north.171 But without doubt the strategy was more ambitious in terms of geographical scope than had previously been suggested. It also gave greater priority to maritime and air assets than to capabilities for defeating land attacks.

In practical terms, however, applying a ‘defence in depth plus’ strategy was difficult for the ADF to sustain over any length of time. According to senior defence officials, the ADF had too few ‘deployable packages’ or self-sufficient air and maritime assets, and certainly no land forces, which could operate independently in distant areas for any length of time.172 A related ‘problem’, for distant operations, was that over the past decade the ADF had become tied to operations for near defence of the north of Australia and the sea–air gap (with the exception of land strike counter-offensive operations). The

170 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.25.
171 The difference between Labor’s 1994 White Paper and the Liberal–Coalition 1997 strategic review is probably more a matter of degree than kind. As suggested by Paul Dibb’s comments regarding military trends in the 1994 White Paper these ‘potential regional capabilities were emphasised even more in the new Government’s 1997 Defence policy document’. Dibb also argued that ‘as in the 1994 Defence White Paper these trends [in the 1997 paper] were seen as having an impact on the scale and intensity of combat’. Dibb, ‘The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge’, p.4. See also Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy, Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997.
172 Interviews with senior defence officials, Canberra, November 1998.
major exercise series, Kangaroo, was designed for reactive tactics to address escalated low-level conflict. As Kim Beazley pointed out, the exercise was designed to ‘allow an enemy to come to us, and only attack them when they came onto our territory’. In functional terms operations for near defence depended increasingly on ‘the skills and capabilities within the Australian community’ and ADF had, by the early-mid 1990s, transferred several key elements to private companies. In other words, the ADF’s dependence on civil infrastructures and support constrained the prospects for many operations to be conducted away from Australian shores for sustained periods. More distant operations could of course be sustained but only with the US. But this is the antithesis of the much-vaunted claim in the 1994 White Paper that ‘the fundamental precepts of self-reliance’ were in fact ‘remain[ing] valid’.

The 1994 White Paper focused less on major platforms and weapons systems and more on information technology and C³I. (See Appendix 1 ‘Major Operational Elements in the ADF, 1994’.) This was because the region’s growing military capabilities which had been emphasised in the 1994 White Paper had cast doubt on the aim of Australian defence planners to have a technological advantage in platforms. As Paul Dibb argued, ‘[s]eeking...to sustain a technological edge over the full range of capabilities that could be brought to bear against Australia is no longer feasible’. More importantly, Dibb argued, ‘[t]his poses a serious challenge for Australian defence planning’. In response the 1994 White Paper argued that Australia would need to become more selective ‘about identifying those areas in which we need to maintain a decisive lead, and give priority to them’. (Emphasis added.) The key areas would be intelligence collection evaluation and distribution; surveillance and reconnaissance; command and control; key weapons

175 For example, catering, medical care, maintenance of military platforms were increasingly the domain of private companies within Australia.
176 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.iii.
177 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.18–19.
178 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.18–19.
179 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.27.
and sensors; and electronic warfare'. In contrast to the 1987 White Paper, the 1994 White Paper emphasised that command, control and communications assets (C³) were particularly critical. They would serve as potent force multipliers for a relatively small defence force. The White Paper also set the stage for greater focus on technologies derived from the US-led revolution in military affairs (RMA).

The 1994 White Paper’s emphasis on the region’s growing military capabilities also implied that many of the defence planning concepts previously emphasised were of doubtful value. Confidence in long-term ‘warning-time’ with respect to future threats became less relevant as regional capabilities grew and the debate shifted to tactical warning to address ‘short-warning conflict’. As Paul Dibb pointed out ‘stealth, deception, secure communications, and more sophisticated electronic warfare measures are all combining to reduce military warning’. And, as a result, there ‘now is a new doctrinal debate about the nature of short-warning conflict, its scale and durability, and the warning that might be expected’. The logic of ‘short-warning conflict’ was that the ‘force-in-being’ had to be capable of meeting existing threats and be ready for a range of contingencies. The fact that regional capabilities were growing meant that the ‘force-in-being’ had to be robust, it was argued. Development of an ‘expansion base’ received even less attention than it had in the 1987 White Paper. In effect, most of the defence planning concepts from previous decades, which were aimed at preparations for conflict in the future, were downgraded in importance.

The implications of the strategic assessment underpinning the 1994 White Paper for the alliance were significant. Defence planners were unequivocal that self-reliance meant that Australia ‘should be capable, without combat assistance from of other countries’ of defeating any attack that could be credibly be mounted against it. But as with the 1987 White Paper this did not mean that the alliance was any less relevant. Indeed, the increased focus on C³I and information warfare made the US, as the most technologically advanced military in the world, even more desirable as an alliance partner. The two militaries’ interest in interoperability, especially in C³I, had also

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180 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.27.
181 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, pp.18–19.
182 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, pp.18–19.
183 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.14.
increased, if for somewhat different reasons. The ADF, especially the RAAF and RAN, wanted to increase their exercises with the most sophisticated forces in the world to improve levels of readiness, particularly in C3I. The US sought interoperability with the ADF as preparation for possible coalition operations.

The practical responses in the 1994 White Paper were several. The Kangaroo series was continued, but there was growing discontent with the design, expense and outcomes of the exercise. The last straw was the Kangaroo '95 exercise when the 'enemy won' because the defending forces could not predict where and when the raids would occur.184 The Kangaroo exercise was subsequently canceled and planning began for a new series called Crocodile. This series would focus on 'an Australian Army task force operating independently offshore, or as part of a combined force with an ally'.185 A preparatory exercise, Tandem Thrust, took place in 1996 and the first Crocodile scheduled for 1999 is expected to involve the US and be 'absolutely huge'.186 In other words, exercises for defence of Australia via self-reliance had now moved away from defensive and reactive responses to attacks on the mainland towards off-shore task force defence 'somewhere in the sea–air gap'187 involving US forces. This suggested at the very least that the dilemmas about means to Australia's defence were well and truly alive.

Overall, the 1994 White Paper presented a much more pessimistic strategic assessment than either the Dibb Report or the 1987 White Paper. It still left many questions unanswered. How would it be decided exactly where Australian forces would meet future threats? How would the balance between dependence and the needs of self-reliance be resolved, and so forth. In the 1994 White Paper, dependence on the US increased because the best counter to the growing military capabilities in the region was judged to be an Australia advantage or an edge in US-derived information warfare and other technologies, and later US-led RMA technology. This trend continued until Labor

184 Interview with senior defence officials, Canberra, October 1998.
185 Max Hawkins, 'Army Learns to Fight Smart', *The Australian*, 20 November 1998 (a special Report on Defence Update '98). The Crocodile '99 'is expected to be carried out with US forces and commanded by a senior Australian officer'. See ibid.
186 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998.
187 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998.
lost office in March 1996 and increased in intensity when the new Liberal/National Party Coalition took office.

**Expanding ‘security against’ post-1994**

In the time between the publication of the 1994 White Paper and the end of Labor’s period in office in March 1996, several of the arguments that had been made in the White Paper were expanded. Huge White, the influential Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence, in the Department of Defence, argued that ‘Australia needs to redefine self-reliance’.

Self-reliance should be extended, he said, to ‘cover the defence of Australia in higher levels of conflicts than have been envisaged so far’. According to White, ‘Australia’s capability planning will shift away from...low-intensity conflict’ because of the growing military capabilities in Asia-Pacific. Self-reliance now required ‘increase[s] in defence capabilities so that Australia could defend itself with its own force’. White argued for a greater emphasis on maritime capabilities and less on ground forces. He also argued that self-reliance required pro-active strategic options not just reactive strategies that had mostly guided strategy and the major exercise series, Kangaroo.

In White’s judgment, ‘it may be necessary to focus more on options which would allow Australia to seize the initiative early in a conflict, and use its assets more efficiently, both to dictate the development of the conflict and to increase an opponent’s costs’. Whether or not ‘seizing the initiative’ meant pre-emptive operations was not clear. Finally, White argued that ‘the focus on a narrowly defined concept of the defence of Australia as the determinant of its defence planning’ should be expanded so that ‘forces chosen for the defence of Australia are those which provide the government with the widest possible range of options to contribute forces to operations elsewhere in the region’. Quite clearly the key partner for such operations was the US. Despite these

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189 White, ‘New Directions in Australian Defence Planning’, p.23.
190 White, ‘New Directions in Australian Defence Planning’, p.23.
191 White, ‘New Directions in Australian Defence Planning’, p.23.
192 White, ‘New Directions in Australian Defence Planning’, p.23.
196 Department of Defence, *Australia’s Strategic Policy*. 48
Table 1.2 Evolution of ‘security against’ under Labor, 1983–96

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<td>No direct threat but stronger emphasis on existing uncertainties</td>
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<td>RESPONSES: Doctrine</td>
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<td>Self-reliance is ‘a wider concept’ which ‘rejected the narrower concept of “continental defence”’.</td>
<td>‘Precepts of self-reliance remain valid [but]...the approaches...continue to evolve’</td>
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<td>Emphasis on ‘pro-active strategy’ and ‘seizing the initiative’</td>
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<td>Operations area</td>
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<td>Near defence of sea-air gap and foreign land ‘targets’</td>
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<td>The sea-air gap and ‘beyond’</td>
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<td>Force structure</td>
<td>Strike and interdiction assets for defensive ops (phase-out land attack F-111s) + surveillance and other assets</td>
<td>Strike and interdiction assets for counter-offensive operations for near defence of sea-air gap plus foreign land targets; + surveillance</td>
<td>Strike and interdiction assets for areas ‘beyond’; + C-1</td>
<td>‘Increase in capabilities’; focus on C-1 derived from RMA</td>
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<td>Defence planning concepts</td>
<td>‘Warning-time’; ‘lead-time’; ‘expansion base’; ‘force-in-being’; ‘technological advantage’</td>
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<td>Alliance arrangements</td>
<td>Practical benefits...of ANZUS; ‘no requirement for Australia to be involved in US contingency planning’</td>
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<td>The alliance ‘supports the capabilities that Defence maintains for the self-reliance of Australia’; ‘Australia stands by its obligations under ANZUS to cooperate with the United States to meet common dangers in the Pacific’.</td>
<td>Australia’s ‘defence posture depends on [the] alliance’; ‘forces for defence of Australia provide the widest possible range of options to contribute to operations elsewhere in the region’.</td>
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<td>Exercises</td>
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<td>Kangaroo series-reactive</td>
<td>Planning for Crocodile series - ? proactive</td>
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arguments made by White some two years after the 1994 White Paper, there was little
evidence that significant changes to practice were underway, apart from plans for the
new Crocodile exercise series.

In sum, over the thirteen years of Labor government the strategic assessments and
responses indicated that ‘security against’ through defence of Australia evolved quite
considerably. (See Table 1.2 The evolution of ‘security against’ under Labor, 1983–96.)
What had started as a largely defensive project in the Dibb Report had evolved, in the
1987 White Paper, into an approach that focused on counter-offensive operations and
capabilities. By the time the 1994 White Paper was published the approach included the
proposal for ‘taking the initiative’ in areas ‘beyond’ Australia’s direct area of military
interest. Finally, if the 1987 White Paper had appeared to resolve a key dilemma by
emphasising self-reliance then the reality was that many aspects of self-reliance
depended on the alliance.

SECURITY AGAINST’: THE AUSTRALIA–US ALLIANCE UNDER LABOR

Labor’s defence of Australia policy was clearly connected to the Australia–US alliance
policy. As the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, had stated in the 1987 White Paper,
‘defence self-reliance is pursued within the framework of alliances’.197 And as the
Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence, Hugh White said at the end of Labor’s
time in office:

Australia is doing more with the United States than ever before and benefiting more from it.
The country’s defence posture depends on that alliance, and will keep depending on it for
many years to come.198

These accounts suggest that the relationship between the two policies is straightforward
and symbiotic. But, as argued in the previous section, there are tensions and dilemmas,
not least of which is the fact that Australia’s self-reliance policy depends heavily on the
US. Furthermore, the alliance sustains ‘security against’ other states, not only because it
supports a policy of self-reliance, but also because it is an arrangement which anticipates
that the US and Australia will form political and military coalitions against other states.

198 White, ‘New Directions in Australian Defence Planning’, p.17.
A closer examination of the alliance, historically and under Labor, shows more precisely how the connections between the two policies confirm this argument.

**Historical context**

The Australia–US alliance was originally intended to enhance each country’s ‘security against’ other states. For Australia, the original aim was to enlist US military combat support in the event of conflict. During the Pacific war Australia had turned away from Britain to seek US protection in a wartime alliance against the Japanese. As the Prime Minister, John Curtin, stated some two weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor and some weeks before the fall of Singapore:

> Without inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.\(^{199}\)

A significant component of that wartime alliance was intelligence cooperation which included SIGINT (signals intelligence). Cooperation was later formalised as the UKUSA Agreement in 1947–48.\(^{200}\) The secrecy that surrounded the arrangement and continues to the present day obscures how important intelligence exchanges are to the strength and continuation of the alliance.

The most public manifestation of the post-war alliance, the ANZUS Treaty, signed on 1 September 1951, was intended to secure US combat support in the event of Japanese re-militarisation and an attack on Australia. Ironically, whilst Australia sought ‘security against’ Japan, the US agreed to the treaty because it facilitated a ‘soft’ peace treaty with Japan which would set the foundations for the US to establish ‘security with’ Japan against what was perceived as a growing communist threat. Later, as the Cold War divided most of the world into the Western alliances and the Warsaw pact, ANZUS became the vehicle for the US to engage Australian support for ‘security against’ Soviet and Chinese communism and associated versions in North Korea and North Vietnam. Australia’s unquestioned support for the alliance and for US security policies against

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200 See Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries—the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1985; Desmond Ball and David
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communism was based on the perception that if Australia supported the US, it would give Australia combat support in the event of attack.

So focused were Australian defence planners on maintaining the ‘security guarantee’ from the US via the alliance that the main focus of Australian defence policy was preparedness for operations with US combat forces. All three military services, the RAN, the RAAF and the Australian Army, aimed for interoperability with their US equivalents rather than with each other. Operational concepts and plans for Australian personnel and military forces to defend Australia together as an integrated force were virtually non-existent. Defence planners also hoped to encourage the US to provide a security guarantee by agreeing to host several US communications and intelligence facilities on Australian soil.201

When it was finally recognised in Strategic Basis 1975, that ‘Australia has been free of any major threat of attack...since the defeat of Japan thirty years ago’ and the US was most unlikely to provide combat support to Australia, the original justification for the alliance no longer was credible. But the alliance had other rationales. One was that it enhanced global security, or rather ‘security against’ the Soviet Union, because it was a part of the broader Western alliance. Australia’s agreement to host the US facilities was said to improve the prospects for ‘stable deterrence’ between the two nuclear superpowers. But the most important justification for the alliance by the mid-1970s was, somewhat ironically, the expectation that it would provide the main means for Australia to develop its own self-reliant defence policy. This policy was itself directed against, if not overt threats, then future uncertainties which could result in various levels of conflict. However, the exact role of the Australia–US alliance in the defence of Australia had yet to be determined. When Labor became the government in 1983 and developed a detailed and comprehensive policy for direct defence of Australia via self-reliance that role became much clearer.


The evolution of the alliance under Labor

When Labor first came into office in March 1983, domestic factors played an important role in the Australia–US alliance.\textsuperscript{202} Within the three main factions of the Australian Labor Party there were differing views about the value of the alliance: the left were in the main sceptical; the right were generally supportive. Given the devastating electoral consequences of previous factional fights about security and defence policy in the ALP the Labor leadership felt it was imperative that a new Labor government find a way of accommodating these views. In addition, Labor had to consider the widespread public support for the alliance and try to engage US support for the upcoming defence policy which would stress self-reliance, and which the Americans had some concern about (see below). Hence, one of the first tasks the new government set itself was a review of the alliance which predictably sought to publicly address the concerns of all factions. Nonetheless, the strongest conclusion made in the review was that the alliance remained central to Australia’s security.\textsuperscript{203}

Factional politics within the ALP continued to influence the government’s handling of the alliance during much of the 1980s. In February 1985, Prime Minister Bob Hawke precipitated a mini-crisis when he agreed to a US request for USAF aircraft to use air bases in Australia when monitoring tests of the first-strike MX nuclear ballistic missiles which were due to splash down in waters off Australia. The Left faction, which opposed US nuclear warfighting strategies, objected to the tests. The Right faction, to which the Prime Minister belonged, was aware that support for the Prime Minister’s position would divide the party in the upcoming ALP conference. Resolution of the issue, without further acrimony was made possible when the US Secretary of State, George Schultz, withdrew the request. A second request from the US to Australia to participate in another nuclear-related program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was also refused by the Labor government. To accept the invitation would have raised questions about Labor’s public support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was strongly supported by the Left faction. The Left’s opposition to the hosting of US facilities in Australia at North West Cape, Nurrungar and Pine Gap, was also

\textsuperscript{202} See David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds), \textit{Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy}, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1997.

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instrumental in the government’s plans for renegotiating the terms of the bases with the US in 1986. Australia was accorded a ‘joint’ role in operating the facilities. Although the Left may not have accepted the argument that, on balance, the bases supported arms control and stable nuclear deterrence, they were not prepared to make a major stand on the issue. Factional politics in these cases largely explained why Labor in the first years of being government appeared to have qualified and not always supportive positions on the alliance.

However, notwithstanding these domestic political considerations, Labor not only endorsed the alliance as a sensible ‘security against’ insurance policy, but also sought to strengthen it. For the US, the alliance was a means to militarily, but more particularly politically, engage Australia on America’s side in a number of regional conflicts. The US had made that point unambiguously when Australia introduced the new defence policy of self-reliance in the Dibb Report. The US argued that the Report’s proposed continental and defensive strategy gave Australia few options for participating in operations with US forces, or for operations against others. According to the Minister of Defence, Kim Beazley, ‘[f]or CINCPAC...a central rationale for the alliance’s existence appeared challenged’. The Pentagon concurred with CINCPAC that the Australian strategy and force structure could become a military concern for the US. As Beazley pointed out, ‘[t]he 1986 meeting of ministers in San Francisco, saw detailed exchanges on the questions of Australian strategy and force structure’. The Labor government had to work hard at persuading the US that ‘a central rationale for the alliance’, US coalition operations against others, was not in danger.

Various arguments were employed by Australia to reassure the US. The government pointed out that the Dibb Report was about force structure requirements, not strategy. The Americans were persuaded that, as Beazley put it, ‘the force structure would include elements that would serve purposes beyond the defence of Australia’s


The other argument which helped to reassure the Americans was that Australia's commitment to the Western alliance was unswerving and clearly stated in the 1987 White Paper, the key defence policy document. According to Beazley:

They accepted our argument that Australia had fundamental and unambiguous support for the Western Alliance and our readiness to take tough, and sometimes politically unpopular, decisions to support that commitment.\(^{208}\)

The Americans were persuaded, in other words, that Australia understood that the alliance was intended, not just to assist with preparations for the defence of Australia, but, if necessary, to support political and military actions against other states.

The US apparently 'tested' Australia's commitment to this position on several occasions.\(^{209}\) President Reagan's administration made it clear that it expected Australian political support in the Gulf during the late stages of the Iran/Iraq war. As a result Australia volunteered to send a mine countermeasures team to assist the Royal Navy escort shipping in the area. According to Beazley, 'it was made evident that non-participation would be seen as a pretty decisive turn away from shared interests' and a "worst case" interpretation of Australia's White Paper.\(^ {210} \) Australia's participation was rewarded with 'privileged access to much information and important technologies and to more joint scientific projects'.\(^ {211} \)

**Intelligence and military technology**

Access to advanced US intelligence and military technologies had always been important to development of self-reliance and it became increasingly so from the early 1990s.\(^ {212} \) As discussed in the previous section, the 1994 White Paper sought to acquire C\(^3\)I technologies which would give Australia a 'knowledge edge' over the growing military capabilities of regional states. This emphasis on advanced C\(^3\)I technologies from the US became part of a broader focus on technologies derived from the US-led

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\(^{207}\) Beazley, 'Australia–United States Relations', p.55.

\(^{208}\) Beazley, 'Australia–United States Relations', p.54.

\(^{209}\) Beazley, 'Australia–United States Relations', p.57.

\(^{210}\) Beazley, 'Australia–United States Relations', pp.57–58.

\(^{211}\) Beazley, 'Australia–United States Relations', p.58.
revolution in military affairs (RMA).\textsuperscript{213} As Desmond Ball points out, from Australia's perspective, 'the...RMA is dependent upon the US alliance'.\textsuperscript{214} Therefore, it is more than likely, as Ball also argues, that 'exploitation of the RMA over the next couple of decades will involve a closer and stronger Australia–US alliance.\textsuperscript{215}

The Joint Defence Facilities are another source of intelligence which are linked to the alliance and which assist with the defence of Australia. In the Labor government's view not only were Nurrungar and Pine Gap critical for global stability, because they supported nuclear deterrence and verification of arms control treaties, but both were growing in importance for Australia's own defence of Australia policy. As Beazley states:

\begin{quote}
[T]he facilities were beginning to support direct Australian defence needs [and indeed] the balance of the direct value of the facilities has shifted more heavily to Australia.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

The Joint Defence Facility at Nurrungar potentially has a role in the tactical defence of Australia, in addition to supporting theatre missile defence systems for countering intercontinental or submarine launched ballistic missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles. According to the military analyst Jeffrey Richelson, the US Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites can also be used for 'detecting aircraft flying on afterburner, monitoring the movements of other spacecraft and providing data on events such as explosions at weapons depots and airplane crashes'.\textsuperscript{217} The first class of sightings—detection of aircraft flying on afterburner—is performed by the SLOW WALKER Reporting System (SWRS) and the JOGGER reporting system.\textsuperscript{218} These programs have been a permanent part of the DSP since the early 1980s. And since mid-1985, they have

\textsuperscript{212} Just over a year since Labor lost office, the new Liberal–Coalition government published their first strategic document which stated that '[o]ur highest capability development priority...is the "knowledge edge"'. See Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy, pp.56–57.
\textsuperscript{213} The Liberal/National Party Coalition government decided at the annual 1997 AUSMIN meeting between Australia and the US to 'intensify interaction between Australian and US military units exploring the ramifications of the information revolution'. See Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations 1997 Joint Communiqué, 8 October 1997, p.8.
\textsuperscript{216} Beazley, 'Australia–United States Relations', p.58.
\textsuperscript{218} Richelson, America's Space Sentinels, pp.105–106.
been supported by a US Navy contingent based at Nurrungar—known as the Naval Space Surveillance Centre (NAVSPASUR) Detachment Echo.219

In 1992, a test to determine the value to Australia of using DSP’s SLOW WALKER aircraft detection capability was conducted by the Department of Defence in conjunction with the US.220 Designated Hairpin-3, it tested the use of Mobile Ground Terminals (MGTs) for such purposes.221 It followed a joint US–Australian exercise, designated Anchor Ready 92-1, and announced by Defence Minister Robert Ray on 17 July 1992, which was designed to test the ability of Mobile Ground Terminals (MGTs) to take over Nurrungar’s mission ‘in the event of unforeseen circumstances such as natural disaster’.222 The results of the Hairpin-3 Trials were the subject of discussion between the US Air Force Space Command (USAFSPC) HQ and DSTO on 5 May 1993 and 30 April 1993.223

These new DSP surveillance capabilities had a clear potential to contribute to the defence of Australia. As Richelson points out:

DSP’s ability to monitor aircraft and spacecraft, and to provide measurement and signature intelligence on a variety of events in addition to missile launches, [makes] it a valuable asset to additional consumers in the military services and intelligence community.224

It is reasonable to assume that if these additional capabilities of the DSP are further developed then some of them will become part the existing trend towards combining various C³I assets belonging to the US and Australia for the defence of Australia.

This is already underway at the level of R&D. The potential role of the Joint Defence Facilities in combination with other US and Australian C³I assets is indicated by the statement in the Defence Department’s annual report for 1996–1997 that:

220 Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels, pp.155–156.
221 This was of course in addition to the capability of the main ground station at Nurrungar to perform SLOW WALKER functions.
222 Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels, pp.155–156.
224 Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels, p.235.
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The potential of using satellite, aerial and ground based sensors for maritime surveillance and for ballistic missile detection has resulted from the development and use of simulation models and the staging of several trials.225

Work which had started under the Labor government has culminated in several recent trials involving the US and Australia. During 1996–97, research between Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and the US Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation, under Project Dundee, included firing of US Terrier ground-to-air missiles off the north-west coast of Australia. The project aims to enhance the missile detection capability of Jindalee, whose ‘viewing area’ includes the north-west coast. According to the then Defence Minister, Ian McLachlan, ‘the aim of Project Dundee is to investigate the possibility of detecting missile launches in their boost stage immediately after the launch’.226 Thus, R&D programs were already seeking to combine US and Australian C3I for the defence of Australia.

Indeed, there is already a high degree of C3I operational interoperability between the US Navy and the RAN. For example, the RAN’s Maritime Command Headquarters in Sydney is the C3I centre for US carrier battle groups (CVBGs) in-transit in the sea–air gap.227 Overall, it appears that there is increasing cooperation between the US and Australian research and military establishments on technologies which have relevance for defence of Australia. And part of it concerns the Joint Defence Facility at Nurrungar. In interviews, senior defence officials, although not willing to discuss the various programs, confirmed that such programs underscored the value of the alliance for defence of Australia.

The changes that are planned for Nurrungar in the future are unlikely to diminish its potential role in Australia’s defence.228 The transition from DSP satellites towards a newer satellite system, the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), will mean that the US will close the ground station at Nurrungar around 2000-1 and establish a Relay Ground

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227 Interviews with retired senior defence official, Canberra, November 1998.
Station at the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap. This means that the processing and analysis activities conducted at Nurrungar will be relocated to the Mission Control Station (MCS) at Buckley. However, these developments will be unlikely to alter the potential role of the DSP/SBIRS satellites in defence of Australia.

Importantly, Australia’s hosting of the facilities is the quid pro quo for technology for defence of Australia via self-reliance. According to Desmond Ball:

[H]osting the facilities...represents Australia’s most meaningful contribution to the alliance, in return for which the US provides the sophisticated technology necessary for Australian self-reliance in credible contingencies.

And this situation will continue for the foreseeable future. As it was stated in the 1994 White Paper, Pine Gap, for example, ‘will remain a central element in our cooperation with the United States into the next century’.

Because the alliance, and the access it provides to intelligence and military technology, was so important to Australia’s own plans for defence of Australia it grew substantially during the Labor period. Several examples illustrate the point. In the first place Australia unhesitatingly supported the US-led coalition against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Second, there was increased cooperation with the US military. According to Beazley, he was ‘staggered...to look at some of the objective measures of cooperative activity [between the two militaries] and find that they have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War’.

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229 Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels, p.224.
230 Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels, p.224.
233 The argument that Australia’s decision was not so much a sign of commitment to the alliance with the US and more an indication of support for the UN’s new role in the post-cold war period to establish collective ‘security against’ a clear aggressor, whose tactics also had global consequences, has to be taken seriously. On the other hand, so too are the arguments that even support for the UN operations should be constrained to regions of direct interest to Australia. However, given Beazley’s comments above, that the US suspected that Australia’s doctrine would have restricted support for US operations, it would have been almost impossible to stand aside and jeopardise the assistance which the US gives to Australia for intelligence and technology for defence of Australia.


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the number of visits by two-star and more senior officials in 1995 was six times that of the last year of the Fraser government in 1982—48 against eight

the number of exercises conducted with the United States and the number of service personnel and aircraft involved increased by about one-third

Australian/US exercise planning was raised from the previously tactical operational level to include greater strategic focus

the ability of Australia and the US military forces to exercise together was enhanced by the move from a three- to a four- exercise planning cycle which aligns with the CINCPAC's cycle

military exercises were also enhanced by the redrafting of the 1978 ANZUS Planning Manual (APU), which provides strategic guidance and more detailed exercises and contingency planning. Some 250 legal arrangements and agreements on defence related matters now function between Australia and the US

a 'willingness [from both the US and Australia] to continue to explore and if possible develop...elements of the United States ballistic missile defence program' was confirmed. The first experiments were conducted in 1995 and preparations for 'further activity' arranged

a joint security declaration and 'additional access for US forces to training facilities in Australia, and the Joint Defence Facilities' was agreed upon in 1995.

Moreover, these developments in the alliance took place with very little comment from the critics of the alliance. As Beazley remarked, the fact that his successor, Defence Minister Robert Ray, could offer in 1994 to support research with the US on ballistic missile defences without causing criticism was in 'stark contrast' to the 'extensive

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agitation’ which Beazley would have expected when he was the Defence Minister in the early days of Labor’s office.238

From the US perspective Australia’s commitment to the alliance—in terms of its political and operational coalitions against others—was confirmed by Labor. As a result the US was content to support the formulation of self-reliance which Australian Defence planners had developed. According to Beazley a new generation of American leaders concurred with the proposition that:

[A]s a close ally of long standing and a major buyer of United States defence equipment, Australia would continue to receive preferential access to United States intelligence and military science and technology so as to assist Australia in maintaining defence force readiness and capability at the level of sophistication envisaged in Australia’s defence policy.239

Under Labor the purpose of the alliance continued to support Australia’s ‘security against’ policy, the defence of Australia, and as that depended more and more on information technology from the US so too did the alliance grow stronger and closer. According to senior defence officials, from the US perspective, the alliance under Labor became the closest in the region.240

CONCLUSION

During the thirteen years of Labor government both defence of Australia and the alliance with the US evolved in significant ways and each policy enhanced Australia’s ability to defend itself against other states. Defence of Australia via self-reliance clearly expanded from a more defensive approach to ‘security against’ to one that anticipated operations against sophisticated maritime and air military assets much further afield. Certainly the reactive elements first elaborated in the Dibb Report gave way to ones which took ‘the initiative’. Even some of the more defensive concepts such as ‘core

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force’, ‘expansion base’ and ‘warning-time’ which allowed for minimal force structures were either dropped or questioned.

Paradoxically the alliance became more important for self-reliance. Although the Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper had officially resolved those dilemmas it was evident that defence of Australia via self-reliance would depend in many respects on the alliance. The 1994 White Paper, however, exposed that dependence and increased it. Notwithstanding these serious and unresolved questions about means, policies for ‘security against’ under Labor increased significantly.
LABOR'S 'SECURITY WITH' POLICY:
THE POLICY CONCEPTS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Instead of seeking security from Asia, we should seek security in and with Asia.¹
(The Prime Minister, Mr Bob Hawke)

In this model, traditional elements of realpolitik...are replaced by new forms and
institutions of multilateral cooperative behaviour.²
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans)

During its time in office from 1983 to 1996, the Labor government significantly
enhanced Australia's 'security against' policies. Concurrently, the government pursued a
regional security policy based on 'security with' other states, which went beyond
previous efforts to develop security, based on cooperation with Southeast East Asian
countries.³ Indeed, never in Australia's history had 'security with' other states been
pursued so vigorously.

To support this claim this chapter describes the evolution of Australia's regional
security policy under Labor. The first and second sections examine the policy and the
changing regional context while Bill Hayden and then his successor Gareth Evans were
the foreign ministers. The key policy concepts formulated by Evans,⁴ namely 'common
security', 'comprehensive security' and the umbrella concept of 'cooperative security'
are examined. So too is the strong opposition to the policy from the US, regional states

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¹ Bob Hawke, 'Australia's Security in Asia', address to the Asia–Australia Institute, Sydney, 24 May
1991, p.3. Also quoted by the Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans in ' Managing Australia's Asian
Future', address to the Asia–Australia Institute, Sydney, 3 October 1991, The Monthly Record,
October 1991, p.660. (Unless otherwise indicated all speeches by Foreign Minister Evans are
published in the 'Minister for Foreign Affairs Speech Series', published by the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade).

² Gareth Evans, 'The Asia Pacific in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation?', address to the

³ Australia had been a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) from
September 1954 to June 1977. However, unlike the 'security with' focus of Labor's policy,
SEATO was a security arrangement directed against communist expansion in Southeast Asia
and only Thailand and the Philippines were members. Furthermore, the extent of Australia’s military
cooperation with these states was limited because both had small and unsophisticated forces. See
Lezek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy, Singapore University Press,
Singapore, 1983.

⁴ Most of the policy concepts were developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and
to a lesser extent the Department of Defence.
and the Liberal/National Coalition Opposition and, in the face of this criticism, Labor’s continuing commitment to pursuing a policy of ‘security with’ others. The final section examines the limitations and apparent contradictions in the policy.

SECURITY COOPERATION UNDER FOREIGN MINISTER BILL HAYDEN (1983–88)

When Labor won the election in March 1983 many in the ALP were acutely aware that the party’s previous attempts to acquire and hold government had been seriously undermined by factional fights over foreign and security policies.\(^5\) Thus when the inaugural Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, explained Labor’s security philosophy he was careful to give a balanced account of future policy directions:

As democratic socialists we advocate and seek to practice non-military appraisals of power problems. We are averse to military interventions and solutions...[b]ut...we are not a pacifist party...[w]e are sober realists and certainly we would aim at a sufficiently capable defence force structure to look after this country’s interests in the event it was subjected to some sort of threat or attack.\(^9\)

Hayden’s comments indicated that the government was committed to a strong defence posture and at the same time rejected interventionist military means for regional security policy. For many in the Labor Party the failure of past Australian military policies in Asia had been painfully demonstrated by the Vietnam war.\(^7\) Hayden felt a personal obligation to find a settlement to the continuing conflict in Indo-China, even arguing in a statement to the parliament, which endorsed the sacrosanct ANZUS Treaty, that:

Much more important to the future peace and security of Australia than any treaty... must be the achievement of a stable [and] harmonious...Asia-Pacific region.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Criticism from the ALP was not so obvious when Australia first became involved in Vietnam but increased as the war went on. Many members of the ALP became leaders of the anti-Vietnam movement. When Gough Whitlam became the Prime Minister in 1972 he immediately withdrew Australian troops from Vietnam. For accounts of Australia’s role in Vietnam see Peter King (ed.), *Australia’s Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War*, George Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1983; Gregory Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1987.
The government saw regional issues as providing an avenue to 'strongly assert [its] regional interests and to present and pursue [its] own distinctive policies' for regional security.9

**Early set-backs for Labor's regional security policy**

Labor's intent to develop 'distinctive policies' for regional security, in this case for Indo-China, underpinned one of the first cooperative initiatives taken by the government. Although at that time Labor had formulated very few policy concepts to guide the policy it was founded on the idea that cooperation with states enhanced security. For example, at the 1983 ASEAN-PMC, Hayden informed regional leaders that Australia sought to change its policy and to engage the communist regime in Vietnam.10 In a period some called the Second Cold War the Foreign Minister's intention to visit Hanoi, resume bilateral aid and to end Vietnam's isolation from the region was not well received by the ASEAN countries or the US.11 As a result not only were Australia's efforts to cooperate with ASEAN foiled, but its attempts to introduce security cooperation in Indo-China and the region more generally were unsuccessful. It became clear that if Australia were serious about exercising some influence on security matters in the region its 'distinctive policies' would have to accommodate ASEAN interests more sensitively.

Labor's approach to regional security even at this early stage was distinctive for its emphasis on cooperation—in this instance by 'engaging' Vietnam and seeking to lessen its dependence on the USSR by enmeshing it in the region. The policy stressed the importance of cooperative measures, such as dialogue, multilateralism, regional institutions and economic interdependence. Some time later when Hayden sought to improve the security situation in the North Pacific (see below) some of these ideas were further developed. This general emphasis on cooperation also informed Australia's 1990-91 initiative for Cambodian self-determination that brought in the UN as the transitional organisation to 'govern' and provide for 'fair and free' elections in

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11 Berry, *Cambodia From Red to Blue*, pp.5–7.
Cambodia. This time Australia’s initiative was well received by the region, partly because the bigger powers’ relationships with Cambodia and Vietnam had diminished in importance and partly because Australia had learned to work with the ASEAN countries.\footnote{12}

**From economic cooperation to security cooperation**

If in the mid-1980s the Labor government had little to show for its cooperative approach to regional security, it could nevertheless point to progress in regional economic cooperation. Over time this exercise in economic cooperation not only facilitated Australia’s subsequent attempts to boost cooperative security but also, many would argue, enhanced security both within and between states in the region.

From the beginning the Labor government recognised that there were synergies between its economic and security policies. Economic issues had dominated the election that had brought the ALP into office and the new government’s reputation depended heavily on an economic recovery. That recovery was seen to have two dimensions. The first depended on economic reform at home, which included drastic reductions to tariffs and other traditional protectionist measures. The second was economic engagement with East Asia. Australia’s trade with the region was increasing—Japan continued to be Australia’s main trading partner and other Northeast Asian states, such as South Korea and Taiwan were growing in importance.\footnote{13} But to ensure its economic future Australia needed greater access to markets in East Asia. Stronger economic cooperation with Asia was critical to Australia’s future and Labor’s re-election.

From Australia’s perspective, a regional economic environment that operated on the cooperative principles of free trade and open regionalism made both economic and political sense. Apart from the obvious economic gains, Hayden also argued that increasing economic development in the region would enhance Australian security, ‘the

\footnote{12} Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, ‘Strategic Involvement and International Partnership: Australia’s Post 1975 Relations With Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam’, *Australia–Asia Papers* No.68, Centre for the Study of Australian and Asian Relations, Griffith University, Queensland, pp.1–14; Berry, *Cambodia From Red to Blue*.

most successful contribution which can be made in our region...comes from, those sorts of commercial activity providing...social and political cohesion'.

Australia worked at both the international and regional levels to further economic liberalisation. But increasing scepticism about the likelihood that negotiations in the principal liberal trading institution, the GATT, would address Australia’s economic concerns convinced Australian officials that a regional approach to GATT and the establishment of another organisation to promote intra-regional economic cooperation was necessary. In November 1989, Australia took the lead in establishing an intra-regional organisation, APEC, that was to become the key regional body supporting trade liberalisation.

These official attempts to increase economic cooperation had been preceded and greatly helped by considerable cooperation at the non-official level, involving business people, officials and academics. Several organisations had been established: the main ones were the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967; the Pacific Trade and Development Conferences (PAFTAD) in 1968; and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) in 1980. These second-track activities (as they became known) were instrumental in showing that regional cooperation and multilateralism was possible

and in making the intellectual case for cooperation. Although economic and political concerns were uppermost, the links with security were also emphasised. Then Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Stuart Harris, argued that:

[T]he multilateral, non-discriminatory and liberal world trading and economic system... [was] constructed...for common economic gain and as a fundamental and necessary basis for world peace.18

From Australia’s perspective, the assumption that there was a positive link between cooperative economic arrangements and security was another factor that justified cooperation.

But Harris also argued that the nature of economic cooperation might need to adapt to particular conditions in the Asia–Pacific. Some aspects of Australia’s approach—those based largely on European examples of economic cooperation—did not necessarily apply to the region. Formal institutions, Harris suggested, may be less suitable than ‘various informal institutional arrangements’.19 In the Asia–Pacific region the economic, cultural, social and historical differences required a ‘pluralistic approach’, Harris argued. These kinds of considerations required Australia to adopt a distinctive approach to regional economic cooperation.

Indeed, Australia’s willingness to adjust its policy, at least in principle, to regional conditions was one reason why Labor’s attempts to foster economic cooperation were more successful than its initial attempts to introduce security cooperation.20 In addition, economic policy was guided by widely accepted principles—the stress on free trade for example—and was supported by strong second-track forums. Australia’s regional economic involvement gained it sought-after and needed recognition as a regional player, notwithstanding some criticism from other regional states.21 This proved useful

20 According to Foreign Minister Evans, getting the ASEANs to accept APEC ‘involved countless rounds of senior official and bilateral ministerial consultations, with an emphasis throughout on exploration and consensus rather than prescription and pressure...we had to be acutely sensitive to the desire of ASEAN not to be subsumed, and institutionally overwhelmed, in the wider regional processes’. See Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, p.124.
21 The ASEAN countries initially opposed the APEC idea because they argued there was no need for a new regional forum and that the ASEAN-PMC could coordinate regional economic cooperation.
The Policy Concepts of Regional Security

when later, in 1987, the government proposed a number of guidelines for security cooperation in the North Pacific.

By this time important changes in the strategic environment were underway, most notably the slow but steady decline of Cold War tensions and bipolar divisions and the concurrent elevation of arguments that security was enhanced by military cooperation and undermined by military competition. While these events were felt most dramatically and seen most obviously in Europe they also resonated in the Asia-Pacific region.

Gorbachev’s initiatives

The push for a new security dialogue in Asia was led by the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, no doubt seeking to reduce the American military presence in the North Pacific, and especially the United States Pacific Seventh and Sixth Fleets. But Gorbachev had become convinced that the USSR’s interests were better served by cooperation than military competition, in part because the USSR simply could not afford to do otherwise. In a major speech at Vladivostok in 1986, Gorbachev, argued that confidence-building measures (CBMs), including a ‘Pacific conference along the lines of the Helsinki conference’, should be initiated to reduce the risks inherent in the superpower military confrontation in Northeast Asia. The following year, during a visit to Jakarta, under pressure from regional countries and continuing rejection from the US, Gorbachev re-framed his earlier proposal saying that the Helsinki analogy was ‘a sort of a working hypothesis or, better to say, an invitation to discussion’. Gorbachev now claimed that:

The ASEANs then proposed another regional arrangement, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) which excluded Australia. See John Ravenhill, ‘From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia’s Relations with ASEAN’, Working Paper No.1997/8, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1997, pp.1–27; East Asia Analytical Unit, ASEAN Free Trade Area: Trading Bloc or Building Block?, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.

22 For an interesting account of the evolution of this thinking see Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Perestroika: Implications for Australian–USSR Relations, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990.


The only reason I referred to Helsinki is that so far the world community has had no other experience of the kind. This does not mean, of course, that the European experience can be automatically transplanted to Asia and the Pacific.25

In September 1988, during a speech in Krasnoyask, Gorbachev proposed discussions ‘at any level and in any composition’, but perhaps beginning with the USSR, PRC and USA ‘as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council’.26 The talks would discuss ‘the question of creating a negotiating mechanism to consider Soviet and any other proposals pertaining to the security of the Asia–Pacific region’.27 He also suggested ‘a meeting of foreign ministers of all states concerned (or those who wish) to discuss the first approached to building new relations in the Asia–Pacific basin’.28 In September 1990,29 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed a meeting of Asia–Pacific foreign ministers to be held in Vladivostok in 1993. Then during his visit to Japan in 1991, President Gorbachev suggested a ‘five-sided’ conference of the USSR, US, China, India and Japan to discuss Asia–Pacific security.30 During this speech to the Japanese Diet Gorbachev said that ‘[w]e do not mean some kind of multilateral cooperation or institutionalisation of the process. What is meant are consultations, joint spotting and discussion of common problems and the timely prevention of common dangers’.31 All through this period other Soviet officials pursued and attempted to develop (sometimes quite disingenuously) various arms control and confidence building measures. Soviet initiatives of this kind were strongly opposed by the US and particularly the US Navy, which viewed any negotiated arms control measures, dialogues and most confidence-building measures as calculated Soviet attempts to undermine deterrence and US naval superiority.

31 ‘Soviet President Michail Gorbachev’s Speech in the Japanese Diet’, p.5.
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Australia's initiatives

Around the time that Gorbachev made his initiatives for security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific the Australian government, while keeping a distance from the Soviet proposals, began to build on some of its earlier arguments in favour of security dialogue and confidence building for the region. In August 1987, Hayden warned of the risks inherent in the provocative strategies of the superpowers in the North Pacific. He urged measures which would dampen, 'the "arms race" instability in military equations in the North Pacific' and dismissed US Navy arguments in support of some of the more provocative elements of the US maritime strategy as 'unworldly armchair strategic reasoning'. Hayden went on to argue for a 'superpower dialogue on security perceptions and concerns', for greater 'transparency' on military issues, and a variety of CBMs similar to those which had emerged in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the CSCE, negotiations in Europe. In June the following year, speaking to an American audience, Hayden argued that, 'we have to start a dialogue going among regional and other interested countries about specific problems in the security environment of the region'.

This view of security differed quite radically from other states in the region. Indeed, the government's policy was severely criticised by its alliance partner, the United States.


34 Hayden, 'Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific', p.5.

35 Hayden, 'Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific', p.5.

36 The first CSCE was held in Helsinki in 1975.


38 At the non-official level, academic institutions, including the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University, Stanford University in California, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, were all arguing in favour of CBM regimes for US and USSR forces in the North Pacific. See Barry M. Blechman, 'Confidence-Building in the North Pacific: A Pragmatic Approach to Naval Arms Control', in Mack and Keal (eds), Security & Arms
States, for undermining security in the region. US officials argued that CBMs risked undermining deterrence of the USSR. ‘Transparency measures’, they suggested, did little to increase confidence while providing free military intelligence to the enemy. Limiting the scope of naval exercises and other ‘constraint’ CBMs prevented the US Navy from practicing its offensive Maritime Strategy effectively and thus reduced US war-fighting efficacy. This in turn undermined deterrence and thus increased the risk of aggression. Adoption of even modest CBMs was risk-prone because it could tip the US down a ‘slippery slope’ which would lead to ‘constraint’ CBMs and naval arms control. From this perspective CBMs could actually increase the risk of war.

Such arguments failed to persuade Bill Hayden and his successor, Senator Gareth Evans that cooperation did not enhance security. Evans not only continued to support the idea but also introduced strong intellectual and philosophical arguments as the basis for several policy concepts.

‘SECURITY WITH’ UNDER FOREIGN MINISTER GARETH EVANS (1988–96)

Gareth Evans’ attempts to develop ‘security with’ regional states were greatly assisted by several concurrent developments, notably the further and dramatic reductions in Cold War tensions, the stabilising effects of economic growth on the region and the Labor government’s broader policy of ‘engagement with Asia’ in virtually every sphere of economic and political activity. This context provided fertile ground for the evolution of

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Control in the North Pacific, pp.203–224. See also Michael Harris, ‘Stanford Peace Plan’, San Francisco Chronicle, 7 November 1987. In 1987, ISIS Malaysia ran the first in a series of annual regional security roundtables in Kuala Lumpur. Many of the CBM proposals currently under consideration were first put forward at ISIS Roundtables. See the annual publication of the Roundtable proceedings published by ISIS Malaysia. If news reports are correct then one of the few other regional countries pursuing a similar approach to security as Australia was Malaysia. It was reported in the New Straits Times, 19 June 1989, that Prime Minister Mahathir endorsed the idea of CSBMs for Asia—including an Asian Helsinki.

40 These arguments are well represented in an exchanged of letters between the US Secretary of State, James Baker, and the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans leaked to The Australian Financial Review (hereafter The AFR), 2 May 1990.

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Australia's policy of cooperative security. Evans' ministerial statement in December 1989 was the first major articulation of the new line.42

The 1989 ministerial statement: 'multidimensional' means to achieving security

The '89 Statement, as it became known, revealed a peculiar mix of new and old security thinking and reflected a number of peculiarly Australian political and historical sensitivities.43 The stated objective of the statement, 'protecting Australia's security', meant protecting Australia's 'physical integrity and sovereignty...from armed attack or the threat of armed attack'.44 What made this quite traditional argument different, however, was the stress on multidimensional means for achieving security:

The instruments available to protect Australia's security are *multidimensional*. They go well beyond strictly military capabilities, essential though these are. They also embrace traditional diplomacy, politico–military capabilities (in the border-zone between defence and diplomacy), economic and trade relations, and development assistance. And they extent to immigration, education and training, cultural relations, information activities, and a number of other less obvious areas of government activity.45

The stress on multidimensionality also underpinned the statement's two other policy concepts: 'comprehensive engagement' (for Southeast Asia) and 'constructive commitment' (for the South Pacific). Comprehensive engagement in Southeast Asia involved Australian support for economic development and military linkages: the first through trade and economic organisations like APEC; the second through defence cooperation programs, regional security arrangements and military assistance. With regard to the latter the Minister suggested a number of cooperative measures, including 'maritime surveillance...bilateral exercises and [broadened and intensified] exchanges'.46 Moreover, he argued that Australia wanted to develop 'a regional security community framework based on a sense of shared security interests'.47 Notably absent

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45 Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security', p.2.
47 Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security', p.44.
from this was a developed discussion or understanding of common security and such measures as confidence-building and transparency.

Although Evans had argued for ‘multidimensional means’ to achieve security that would go ‘beyond strictly military capabilities’, the ADF’s historic attachment to military deterrence was also endorsed. Deterrence was to be provided not just by Australia’s defensive military capability but also by ‘long-range strike aircraft...F-111s and submarines’ for ‘offensive tactics to achieve defensive goals’. Evans claimed that what was needed was:

[A] combination of capabilities...to carry out this defensive strategy...and [a] sufficient capacity for offensive tactics...so as to constitute a strong message of deterrence against any attack on Australian territory.

In this respect the Foreign Minister’s views of security at this time were quite similar to those of the Department of Defence, except that the means were multidimensional.

At that time the Department of Defence had virtually no policy concepts to guide regional security, apart from the decades-old notion of ‘defence cooperation’ (see next chapter). The 1987 White Paper had largely ignored regional security and focused on the ‘security against’ strategy of defence of Australia. Following the release of the White Paper, Defence Minister Kim Beazley, visited Southeast Asian states to ‘explain’ Australia’s defence posture. Beazley sought to reassure neighbouring states that ‘self-reliance requires rather than precludes active defence relations with...neighbours’. However, the arrangements that he announced were little more than up-dated versions of those already in place.

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52 Beazley, ‘Self-Reliance and Cooperation’, p.188.
53 The Minister said these would include: rotational deployments of F-111 long range aircraft and the new F/A-18s to Malaysia and Singapore (the latter for about sixteen weeks of the year) to replace the removal of the outdated Mirage aircraft which had been based at Butterworth and Singapore; the continuation of a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) presence in the region which allegedly ‘would be substantially increase[d]’ with ‘the continuous presence of a major combatant’; and the
Beazley also claimed during his visit to Southeast Asia that Australians often discussed regional security too negatively, particularly with respect ‘prospective threats to Australia’. Yet, by the end of that year the Minister was arguing that ‘in Southeast Asia, the strategic environment is becoming increasingly complex’, and that there had been ‘[s]ignificant change to Australia’s strategic environment’. ‘Security policy is not simply about direct military threat, but the ability to manage the strategic outlook’, Beazley argued. In subsequent statements he continued to argue that ‘there are uncertainties in the region which, could, if not carefully managed generate concern’.

For academic sceptics the argument about increasing uncertainty in need of management indicated a certain alarmist assessment of regional threats which showed that the government’s position was reminiscent of ‘forward defence’. This view gained credence for some when, in May 1989, retired Indonesian ambassador, Lt General Hasnan Habib argued that:

Australia is developing itself into a formidable military power, perhaps one of the strongest in the region [and that] such a hawkish military posture is obviously out of place and may cause misgivings as to the real motivation and intentions of Australia. Viewed from the military point of view such a military posture cannot be regarded as defensive, as acknowledged by the Defence Minister himself.

continued presence of P3C long range maritime patrol aircraft and the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) at Butterworth in Malaysia. Overall, Beazley argued that Australia’s current capabilities and its modernisation program for defence of Australia provided the foundation for expanded security cooperation and ‘the capability to play our part in maintaining regional security’. See Beazley, ‘Self-Reliance and Cooperation’, pp.189–191.


A concern to avoid the potentially destabilising consequences of this sort of ‘worst-case’ thinking was one of the factors that prompted Evans to seek new ways of addressing the rapidly changing strategic landscape.60 While the Evans’ ‘89 Statement was the first serious attempt to address this problem his most significant arguments were yet to come.

The CSCA proposal for regional security dialogue and ‘common security’

Just three months after the ‘89 Statement, Evans, in a speech on 22 March 1990 to a domestic audience, cautiously introduced some aspects of a common security philosophy and emphasised the importance of security dialogue for the region. The Minister began by saying that:

It should not be assumed...that changes can be introduced at any comparable rate in...Northeast Asia [which had] more complex security relationships...lacks Europe's institutional framework...[and] has no real tradition of multilateral dialogue on security issues.61

But Evans also suggested that, ‘the time may be approaching for a similar process to commence in the Asia region’.62 Some four months later, on 19 July, when the Minister addressed another domestic audience he took the idea further, proposing a specific framework for the Asia–Pacific and giving it a name similar to the European institution, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE):

I don’t think its too early...to be looking ahead to the kind of wholly new or institutional processes that might be capable of evolving in Asia just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems.

Why should there not be developed a similar institutional framework—a ‘CSCA’—for addressing the apparently intractable security issues which exist in Asia?63

Evans made the same argument for a Conference for Security Cooperation Asia (CSCA) the next week to the gathering of regional foreign ministers at the 1990 ASEAN PMC and again in article in the International Herald Tribune on 27 July 1990.64

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60 Discussion with senior DFAT official, Hawaii, 1990.
61 Gareth Evans, address to the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), Melbourne, 22 March 1990, p.13.
62 Evans, address to the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), p.13.
64 International Herald Tribune, 27 July 1990.
At the same ASEAN-PMC, the Canadian External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, had also argued that: ‘the time has come to develop institutions of [security] dialogue in the Pacific’.\(^6^5\) The Canadian approach, which focussed on the North Pacific, was likewise strongly influenced by European security thinking. ‘We might consider’, Clark suggested, ‘a Pacific adaptation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’.\(^6^6\)

Three months after the ASEAN-PMC and the *International Herald Tribune* article, on 9 October 1990, Evans told an American audience at the University of Texas that there was a need for the Asia-Pacific to adopt a ‘common security approach’ and a ‘sub-regional’ approach to a ‘security dialogue’.\(^6^7\) He went on to say that:

> While it is quite premature at this stage to contemplate any kind of specific new security architecture for Asia or the Asia-Pacific, it may be that one day some kind of all embracing Conference on Security in Asia—built on some way on the still-evolving Helsinki CSCE model in Europe—will be seen as timely and appropriate. If it should be, it will be because a process of dialogue has begun to build confidence, and patterns of cooperation, around the Asia-Pacific region.\(^6^8\)

The Minister added that in the move ‘towards a common security approach in the Asia-Pacific region the present framework of United States alliances in the region can and should remain, for the foreseeable as a solid base for that transition’.\(^6^9\) US decision makers were decidedly unimpressed with the Australian and Canadian suggestions and began to make their views public.

**Labor persists with security cooperation despite criticisms**

On 30 October 1990, just two weeks after Evans’ address in Texas, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard Soliomen, made the US position quite clear. Although he did not refer to Australia specifically, he revealed US doubts about ‘calls for a system of collective security in Asia...inspired by the European

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\(^6^6\) Clark, ‘Canada and Asia Pacific in the 1990s’, p.8.


\(^6^8\) Evans, ‘Alliances and Change in the US Relationship’, p.697.

\(^6^9\) Evans, ‘Alliances and Change in the US Relationship’, p.697.
experience of a region-wide conference on security and cooperation'. 70 Solomon argued that: 'the nature of the security challenges we anticipate in the years ahead—do not lend themselves to region-wide solutions'. 71 Solomon's opposition was also based on the failure of past multilateral institutions such as Cento and SEATO to deal with security problems. The US position would continue to be based on 'forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements'. 72

Solomon's general criticisms were followed in the next month by a direct attack on Australia's specific proposal for a type of CSCA arrangement for the region. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, in a classified letter to Senator Evans on 19 November 1990, expressed his concern about 'the concept of a “regional security dialogue” or a Helsinki-type process for Asia'. 73 Baker wrote that he had 'serious doubts about whether such a dialogue or process is really in either of our interests'. 74 'The current network of bilateral arrangements and agreements', he said, 'has served both of us—and the region—extremely well, and we should think long and hard before casting aside a proven success'. 75 From the viewpoint of the US Secretary of State, new economic structures such as APEC should be pursued, but 'the notion of a region-wide security dialogue is a different problem altogether'. 76 The stated objection to a common security approach was that it 'provided the wedge [the Soviets] need to achieve their long-held goal of naval arms control in the Pacific'. 77 Baker's advised strongly against allowing the Soviets to set 'the framework of the agenda for the security of Asia'. 78

Richard Solomon, later reiterated his criticism of Evans' approach saying that the region's problems were 'addressed more appropriately through existing institutions or ad hoc coalitions of states rather than through a large and unwieldy region-wide

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73 The AFR, 2 May 1990. The exchanged letters were leaked to the AFR and printed in full.
74 The AFR, 2 May 1990.
75 The AFR, 2 May 1990.
76 The AFR, 2 May 1990.
77 The AFR, 2 May 1990.
78 The AFR, 2 May 1990.
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collective security forum'. The US ambassador to Australia, Melvin Sembler, argued against the need for any change in the existing framework of bilateral alliances with Japan and Australia. 'If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’, he said. The Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific Command in Honolulu, Admiral Charles Larson, also ruled out region-wide security approaches. Again the US rejection was based on its perceptions of the Soviets’ political intentions for the region and the capabilities of the Soviet Far East navy. According to Larson, ‘the Soviet military force in the Far East and Pacific region is more capable today than it was four or five years ago’ and it was attempting to expand its influence in Asia and the Pacific. From the Australian government’s perspective these views betrayed a lack of understanding of the evolving military realities. But the government’s advocacy of multilateral regional dialogue was under attack from within Australia as well.

Domestic opposition

The Liberal/National Party Opposition in Australia joined the US rejection of Australia’s security plan. The Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Robert Hill, criticised the government’s approach on a number of points. In Hong Kong, on 6 April 1991, he argued that the plan was premature and unworkable. Lack of regional cohesion, evidenced by suspicions about ‘potentially militarily powerful countries such as Japan and China’ were barriers to formal common-security arrangements, he said. Even the Asia-Pacific’s participation in wider global security was doubtful, according to Hill.

In another speech in Washington DC, Hill endorsed the US approach of ‘cooperative vigilance’ for the region. Although not denying the need for security dialogue within this structure he raised doubts that the ASEAN-PMC would be an appropriate forum:

83 Robert Hill, 'Security in the Asia-Pacific Region—Order or Disorder?', address to International Democrat Union Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 6 April 1991; Craig Shehan, ‘Opposition Rejects Asian Security Plan’, Canberra Times, 8 April 1991.
84 Hill, ‘Security in the Asia-Pacific Region—Order or Disorder?’, p.4.
General region-wide security discussions undoubtedly need to take place...but it is
doubtful whether the expansion of the concerns of the existing PMC would fulfil this...
it may be premature to turn PMC into a security conference addressing wider security
issues.\textsuperscript{85}

But perhaps the strongest argument made by Senator Hill was that the government’s
approach was ‘offensive’ to the United States\textsuperscript{86} and undermined the existing alliance
structures, which were the foundation of security in the region:

Not only is this relegation of our major security partners offensive—and to call the
alliance transitional undermines its importance—but Senator Evans proposition
currently lacks foundation in reality. Australia’s interests lie in a clearly defined defence
alliance with more powerful states of shared values, particularly the US.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{Regional criticisms}

Regional governments did not support either the Australian or Canadian proposals.
However, their reasons were different from those of the Americans and the opposition
parties in Australia. Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng, argued that ‘there
has to be common ground before security issues can be discussed’.\textsuperscript{88} Ali Alitas, the
Indonesian Foreign Minister, said that ‘we have to be careful not to think that certain
things that work in one region ought to be transplanted to another...we would be rather
cautious in proceeding too fast to an overall security conference’.\textsuperscript{89} Japanese Prime
Minister Kaifu, reportedly said that such ideas were ‘premature’.\textsuperscript{90} Overall, Australia’s
attempts to develop a cooperative basis for regional security were soundly criticised by
the key international, regional and domestic players.

\textsuperscript{85} Robert Hill, ‘Security in the Asia-Pacific: Alliances and Dialogue, address to the International
\textsuperscript{88} ‘ASEAN Cool to Pacific Security Proposal’, \textit{New Strait Times} and \textit{Business Times}, 8 October
1990.
\textsuperscript{89} ‘ASEAN Cool to Pacific Security Proposal’, \textit{New Strait Times} and \textit{Business Times}, 8 October
1990.
\textsuperscript{90} The \textit{Toronto Star}, 25 July 1990. Japanese foreign Minister Nakayama had a slightly different
response saying that Tokyo was interested in new security frameworks and envisaged a larger
grouping of states than that in the Canadian proposal. See Edith Terry, ‘Canadian Proposal Pacific
Security dialogue reworked

Responding to this barrage of criticism Australia reworked rather than abandoned its argument for regional security. Evans, in an address to the influential Trilateral Commission in Tokyo, reiterated his previous argument that the CSCE process could not be recreated in the Asia-Pacific. However he continued to stress that although:

Institutional processes can't be translated half a world way, that is not to say that the relevant habits of mind cannot be translated either...Greater degrees of transparency can be introduced into military arrangements, and confidence building measures like joint exercises can be devised.91

Moreover, Evans made the point that CSBMs could be adopted without ‘stepping over the precipice of naval arms control or succumbing to any of the other horrors that policy makers in some high places keep worrying about’—a thinly veiled criticism of the US position at that time.92

The following month Prime Minister Hawke acknowledged the criticisms of Australia’s position, but argued that:

We cannot translate the emerging European security architecture into our region. The mosaic of cultures, cleavages and conflicts in Asia is too complex for that. Rather... the shape of a regional security system will gradually emerge through an increasing pattern of bilateral and multilateral informal discussions...multilateral security dialogue...can best be done by building on existing multilateral regional forums. ASEAN meetings, including the post-ministerial conferences have recently begun to provide excellent opportunities for such discussion.93

Like Evans, Hawke noted the different approach taken by the US and suggested that ‘the evolution of the US role in the region will need to reflect the development of the region’s own ideas about security’.94 Notwithstanding all the criticisms the substance of Australia’s policy changed very little.

93 Bob Hawke, ‘Australia’s Security in Asia’, address to the Asia–Australia Institute, University of New South Wales, 24 May 1991, p.10.
Regional acceptance of security dialogue and Australia’s continuing efforts

Several developments took place in 1991 that indicated that the idea of cooperative security was beginning to gain support among regional governments. The annual ASEAN post-ministerial meeting (PMC) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, was a significant milestone in the evolution of regional security thinking towards the kind of vision promoted by Australian officials. Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Taro Nakayama, cautiously proposed adopting the annual PMC meetings as a forum for security dialogue:

If there is anything to add to the mechanisms and frameworks for cooperation in the three fields of economic cooperation, diplomacy and security, the first would be a forum for political dialogue where friendly countries in this region could engage in frank exchanges of opinion on matters of mutual interest.95

Naturally, Australia supported the Japanese proposal, indeed Evans took the opportunity to again push Australia’s views on regional security.96 He argued strongly for a variety of confidence building measures, giving credit to a number of regional activities already underway.97 He also suggested more specific measures including: incidents at sea agreements; greater transparency through exchange of data on military budgets, doctrines and future forward projections; observers at exercises and joint exercises; measures to prevent proliferation; security of sealanes and sealines of communications/maritime surveillance; agreement on environmental security issues.98

But the ASEAN ministers were far more cautious about the Japanese proposal. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alitas noted that ‘we would perhaps prefer to move the way ASEAN used to move—don’t institutionalise too quickly’.99 ASEAN ministers were reportedly fearful that the proposed security forum could dilute other issues,

97 Evans referred to activities ‘such as the conferences and seminars hosted this year in Bali, Manila and Kuala Lumpur, with another soon in Bangkok...the workshop series on the South China Sea being sponsored by Indonesians...[and] because of the level of representation present...this ASEAN PMC’. He suggested the latter should be extended to a ‘Post Ministerial conference retreat—a well established way of achieving frank and private exchanges between political leaders’. Evans, ‘6 plus 7 Session’, pp.8–9.
including trade and investment. More fundamentally, the ASEAN countries had a broader understanding of security or what they called 'comprehensive security'. As the Malaysian Foreign Minister Abudulla Badawi pointed out, for his ASEAN dialogue partners:

Security has to be viewed in a comprehensive manner. We do not underestimate the importance of the military element of security. But, focusing only on the narrow aspects of security would distort national perceptions on relations between nations.100

The approach, he said, 'should be to find security by enhancing interdependence and confidence thorough economic cooperation and other regional endeavours, as well as through commitment to solve problems through peaceful means'.101 Nonetheless, the ASEAN ministers agreed to study the Japanese proposal.

Meanwhile, as Cold War tensions continued to subside, US opposition to Australian proposals had reportedly become less strident. At the same PMC meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, that Evans had spoken at, the US Under Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, said that the US and regional countries should develop closer relations. 'This means adjusting alliances to new strategic realities and making our defence relationships more reciprocal so as to reflect the successes of our allies and friends', he said.102 The US, he concluded intended to 'operate with you bilaterally and collectively'.103

Back in Australia, Evans continued to stress Australia's plans for regional security, with even more confidence following the 1991 ASEAN-PMC.104 He noted that:

Suggestions that were not much more than a year ago perceived as radical, and even in some quarters as having the potential to undermine security to the extent that they cut across familiar bipolar ways of thinking, are now more likely to be regarded as boringly commonplace.105

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104 In August 1991, Evans said that regional powers should start exchanging information on military budgets, doctrines and plans. See David Lague, 'Evans Calls for More Regional Alliances', The AFR, 1 August 1991.
Furthermore, he argued that some traditional approaches such as alliances based on security against others should be retained but supplemented with cooperative arrangements:

It has come to be fully accepted that what I and others have talking about is not some dramatic overturning of existing security arrangements in the region—in particular the existing series of bilateral alliance relationships with the United States in the western pacific, with Japan and Australia as the northern and southern anchors respectively—but rather the supplementation of those relationships with additional layers and strands of cooperation, mutual assistance and ultimately mutual dependence. It is not a matter of cutting holes in any existing security net, but rather strengthening existing trends, weaving in additional threads and extending the net’s coverage.106

Evans by this time had further refined the security arguments for dialogue and confidence building:

Dialogue is both process and outcome, facilitating progress and at the same time cementing it. Dialogue partners can exchange views on threat perceptions, for example, and in doing arrive at shared assessments which, optimally, reduce their sensed insecurity and check any trend to competitive arms acquisition. Dialogue in this way builds general confidence.107

But the sophistication of this argument hardly impressed the US, which contrary to expectations, had reportedly once again rejected Australia’s plans. Dr Richard Solomon, claimed during a visit to Canberra that US policy had been misinterpreted.108 He emphasised that the argument given by Mr. Baker in his letters to Senator Evans, that a CSCA was inappropriate for the region, remained. However, Baker had earlier made some concessions. In an article published in the prestigious *Foreign Affairs* journal he argued that security policy in the region could take on ‘a stronger multilateral component’, but that this was in no sense an endorsement of institutionalised multilateral security dialogues. Rather, Baker was referring to *ad hoc* multilateral cooperation on specific security issues—like Cambodia or the North Korean nuclear issue.109

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The ASEANs endorse security dialogue (the 1992 ASEAN summit; the 1993 ASEAN-PMC; and the 1994 and 1995 ARFs)

Six months after the Japanese Foreign Minister’s proposal for security dialogue at the 1991 ASEAN-PMC, the ASEAN heads of states agreed, despite their earlier reluctance, that, ‘ASEAN shall seek avenues to engage member states in new areas of cooperation in security matters’. It would also ‘intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC)’. The next significant step was taken at the twenty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on 23–24 July 1993 when it was agreed that the security component of the PMC dialogue would be known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with eighteen members—the six ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei), their seven major trading partners (the United States, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the European Community), and the five ‘guests’ and ‘observers’ at the ASEAN meeting (Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea).

The first ARF meeting, held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, was a significant milestone in the evolution of regional security dialogue and one that Australia planned to build upon. Australia agreed with the Thai hosts and other regional states that a very modest agenda was prudent for the first meeting. As the Singaporean Defence Minister, Dr Yeo Ningi Hongi noted, it was ‘a significant achievement’ that eighteen countries ‘at different levels of development and with different views on how to achieve regional stability and resolve security issues’ can meet to discuss sensitive security matters. Nonetheless, it was also the Australian view that it was necessary to set directions for future meetings. With that in mind Senator Evans insisted that a communiqué be issued that commemorated this ‘historic event’ and suggested that an agreed agenda be

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proposed that would focus on particular CSBMs for the region. These would relate to nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping cooperation, exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime issues, and preventive diplomacy. Many of these CSBMs were contained in a paper tabled by Australia at the meeting and indeed the same paper had been presented previously at ARF Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) held in May in Bangkok to prepare for the foreign ministers July meeting in Bangkok.115

The Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation

Australia's paper, The Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation,116 set out a comprehensive set of measures for fostering regional cooperation (see Table 2.1). To accommodate differences in the region about the pace, priority and type of trust-building measures and institutions, Australia replaced its previous undifferentiated lists of cooperative measures and immediate time frames with a 'graduated approach to trust-building' and 'no time frames'.117 As Table 2.1 illustrates, Australia's practical proposals were graded into three categories and time frames.

Even though these various proposals for CSBMs tabled at the May SOM118 and the 1994 ARF received little consideration at the time (the meetings were taken up with the

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115 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, paper commissioned by the 1993 ASEAN PMC SOM and submitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) SOM, Bangkok, April 1994. For the public version of this set of proposals see Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994. Australia’s tabling The Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation was ambitious under the circumstances. Prior to the ARF meeting, most of the regional states, and especially Thailand the host country, had seen the meeting primarily as an opportunity for former antagonists to get to know each other. One Thai official cautioned that ARF was ‘an essential step towards trust building and...far too important to be held as hostage to the controversy of the regional agenda’. See Asda Jayanama, 'Prospect of ASEAN Regional forum (ARF)', paper presented at the Second United Nations Disarmament Conference on Transparency in Armament, Regional Dialogue and Disarmament, Hiroshima, 14–17 May 1994, p.5.
116 Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region.
118 See CSCAP Pro-temp Committee, The Security of the Asia Pacific Region, Memorandum No.1, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, April 1994; the Australian Department of
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protocol and organisational aspects of the first ARF) the Australian proposals nevertheless influenced regional agendas. The ARF-SOMs, held by Brunei in May 1995, adopted a similar approach\(^\text{119}\) and the next ARF meeting, in August 1995, issued a ‘Chairman’s Statement’ which included an agenda divided into three stages with different goals, i.e., confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms.

### Table 2.1 A graduated approach to trust-building measures for the next decade

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Consideration of more formalised trust-building measures; for example, collaborative environmental security arrangements, the establishment of zones of cooperation in contentious geographical areas, and regional maritime safety and surveillance cooperation agreements.

Source: Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p.13.

The 1995 ARF Chairman’s Statement pointed out that:

The ARF process is now at Stage I, and shall continue to discuss means of implementing confidence building. Stage II, particularly where the subject matter overlap, can proceed in tandem with Stage I. Discussions will continue regarding the incorporation of approaches to conflicts, as an eventual goal.\(^\text{120}\)

Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, paper commissioned by the 1993 ASEAN PMC SOM and submitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) SOM, Bangkok, April 1994; Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region.

Discussions at the May SOM benefited not just from the Australian paper tabled the year before but also from three earlier inter-sessional meetings on CSBMs, held in Canberra, Seoul and Tokyo, and the formulation of a document called The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper. An important step taken in this paper was the definition and prioritisation of three ‘baskets’ of CSBMs for implementation in the immediate, short-term (the next 1–2 years) and longer-term time frames. See The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, paper prepared by the ASEAN-SOMs, May 1995. A public version is attached to ‘Chairman’s Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’, 1 August 1995, Bandar Seri Begawan. See also Ignatius Stephen, ‘ARF Focus on Asian Security’, Borneo Bulletin, 23 May 1995.

‘Chairman’s Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’, pp.3–4.
Further refinements were made to support the development and implementation of proposals within the three stages. An Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on confidence-building measures, co-chaired by Indonesia and Japan, was convened and Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) to discuss future cooperative activities were established.121

Australia actively supported these moves towards what amounts to an impressive degree of institutionalisation at the working level and in the Senior Official Meetings and the Inter-Sessional Meetings. For example, in November 1994, Australia sponsored a seminar for officials and non-officials in Canberra that addressed measures for building confidence and trust,122 But even before this Australia supported developments for an institutionalised infrastructure to support the ARF at both the official and the non-governmental levels.123

While Australia has made considerable efforts towards establishing security dialogue and an agenda for transparency and confidence-building measures, it nonetheless

121 The first of the ISMs, co-chaired by Malaysia and Canada, examined peacekeeping operations. The second, co-chaired by Singapore and the US, addressed search and rescue cooperation and coordination. The ISGs and the ISMs meet between ARF-SOMs. It was hoped that these meetings together with the annual SOMs would become the most important mechanisms for the development and implementation of regional confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). See ‘Chairman’s Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’, p.4.

122 See Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region.

123 In June 1991, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies had proposed that there be instituted a ‘senior officials meeting [SOM] made up of senior officials of the ASEAN states and the dialogue partners’ to support the ASEAN PMC process (e.g., with respect to the preparation of agenda and meeting arrangements. See ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, A Time For Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit, 4 June 1991, p.5. The first of the PMC-SOMs was held in Singapore in May 1993, and involved extensive discussion of multilateral approaches to regional peace and security: for example, preventive diplomacy and conflict management; non-proliferation (both nuclear and non-nuclear); UN peacekeeping activities; the UN Conventional Arms Transfer Register; the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); exchanges of information among defence planners; prior notification of military exercises; and the concepts of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPPAN) and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The 1993 PMC-SOM agreed to undertake further research on: non-proliferation regimes and their application at the regional level; conflict prevention and management, including peacekeeping; possibilities for security cooperation in Northeast Asia; and confidence-building measures applicable to the region. See Chairman’s Statement, ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, Senior Officials Meeting, Singapore, 20–21 May 1993, paras. 8 and 10. For further discussion of the role of SOMs, see Nakayama, ‘Statement to the General Session of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference’, pp.12–13; and Jusuf Wanandi, ‘Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region’, paper prepared for a symposium, The Changing Asia-Pacific Scene in the 1990s: Security, Cooperation and Development, China Center for International Studies, Beijing, 10–12 August 1991, p.27.
considered ASEAN to be the key regional player in this process. Although Australia’s initiative at the 1990 ASEAN PMC in Jakarta was an important impetus for the ARF,\(^{124}\) as the above discussion shows, several factors, and in particular the role of the ASEAN countries, were central to its establishment.\(^{125}\) As the regional leader, the collective of ASEAN states had considerable influence over the agenda for security dialogue.

Indeed, Labor’s approach reflected some Asian perspectives on security. The language and to some extent the conceptualisation of cooperative measures was modified to reflect Asian conditions. As Evans points out in the introduction of *The Australian Paper On Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation*, ‘[t]he terminology differs from the traditional arms control language...the concept of trust-building rather than confidence-building is used to convey the idea of a less formal approach, built on a base of personal political contacts and relationships’.\(^{126}\)

*Endorsement of the second-track process*

The emphasis on personal contact and informality was also reflected in the government’s support for the second-track process. One purpose of such activities was to provide a forum for officials acting in a non-official capacity to become familiar with the security perceptions of regional counterparts and to informally explore possible solutions to various problems. Another purpose of the second-track was to support the established official infrastructure, such as the SOMs, ISGs and ISMs, with additional

\(^{124}\) See Gareth Evans, ‘Australia and the Emerging Asia Pacific Community’, the Edward ‘Weary’ Dunlop Asialink Lecture, Melbourne, 14 October 1994, p.8. Here Evans claims that, ‘the development of the ARF is generally acknowledged to have begun with a proposal made at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Jakarta in July 1990 by Australia (to some extent Canada)’.

\(^{125}\) Among the factors that led to the establishment of the ARF were the following. First, there was pressure from the non-official organisation, ASEAN-ISIS, on the various ASEAN governments to establish such a regional security forum. Second, the ASEAN-PMC was the only sub-regional forum that had the potential to host a security dialogue and, as discussed earlier, it had agreed in 1992 to include security discussions. The next step was to extend the forum to countries previously not directly part of ASEAN PMC, in particular Russia and China. Third, since ASEAN was keen for the regional security architecture to be shaped as much as possible to suit ASEAN interests, such as ‘national resilience’ and ‘regional resilience’, it took the lead. Fourth, although the Australian and Canadian proposals for a CSCA type dialogue had been rejected earlier, both these states continued to add pressure for a regional dialogue forum of some kind, albeit in more subtle ways. Fifth, the position of other states was fortuitous. South Korea was supportive. Japan was supportive, although politically it could not be seen to be providing leadership for a security forum. The US was originally opposed to multilateral security dialogue, later supportive but not innovative; and China, while not strongly supportive, went along.
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analyses, research and practical suggestions. Australia has been one of the most active participants in these activities and was instrumental in establishing the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia–Pacific (CSCAP) in 1993.127

CSCAP has contributed to the ARF process in a number of ways. For example, the CSCAP Steering Committee submitted a comprehensive memorandum on security issues and CSBMs in the Asia–Pacific region to the ARF-SOMs in April 1994, prior to the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 1994.128 The Australian CSCAP Committee has been one of the energetic of the regional groups129 and co-chairs the Maritime Cooperation Working Group with Indonesia. In addition to the formalised second-track activities there are numerous centres and programs within Australia which foster regional security and cooperation.130

Official explanations of the policy concepts

The policy concepts that guided Labor’s regional security policy evolved from within the context just discussed. According to the Foreign Minister, the key concept, was 'cooperative security'. It was a multidimensional concept that encompassed other security concepts like 'common security', 'comprehensive security' and 'collective security'.131 Evans explained that 'common security' denotes a generally more

129 See the AUS-CSCAP Newsletter, published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.
130 In addition to the ‘second track’ activities there are centres and programs within Australia which study and foster regional security and closer regional interaction. Most are sponsored by academic institutions, private or semi-private security institutes and government departments, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Some examples include: the Air Power Studies Centre; the Maritime Studies Program; the Joint Services Staff College; the Australian Defence Studies Centre at the Australian Defence Force Academy; the Australian Defence and Strategic Studies Centre; the Centre for the Study of Australian and Asian Relations at Griffith University; at the ANU, the Department of International Relations, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the until recently the Peace Research Centre. These centres are just some of the many which conduct research, provide educational services and organise conferences and workshops on regional security and defence planning for Australian and regional participants.
131 These concepts were discussed in numerous policy speeches and statements. See for example, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Speech Series, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra.
preventive, rather than a deterrent approach to security and applies mostly to inter-state rather than intra-state security and military measures.\(^{132}\) ‘Comprehensive security’, is a more general approach which emphasises that security is ‘multidimensional in character’, and is not only concerned with political and diplomatic disputes, but also with factors such as ‘economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, unregulated population flows, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism and human rights abuses’.\(^{133}\) And finally, ‘collective security’ is the UN security community’s collective response to threatened or actual aggression. Hence, as Evans put it, ‘cooperative security [is] a multidimensional concept [that goes] beyond traditional concerns with threats of an overly military nature’.\(^{134}\) ‘Cooperative security suggests’, he said, ‘consultation rather than confrontation; reassurance rather than deterrence; transparency rather than secrecy; and interdependence rather than unilateralism’.\(^{135}\)

**Table 2.2 Cooperative security: matching responses to problems**

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<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
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<th>Disputes</th>
<th>Armed conflicts</th>
<th>Other major security crises</th>
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<td>International regimes</td>
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<td>Pre-conflict</td>
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<td>Post-conflict</td>
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<td><strong>Maintaining peace</strong></td>
<td>Preventive diplomacy</td>
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<td>Peacemaking</td>
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<td><strong>Enforcing peace</strong></td>
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<td>Peace enforcement</td>
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<td>Cross-border aggression</td>
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<td>Support of peacekeeping</td>
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<td>Support of humanitarian objectives</td>
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Evans also expounded on ‘cooperative security’ as a policy concept for global security. Here he argued that it is associated with a wide range of strategies: from non-military

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\(^{132}\) See Gareth Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper delivered to Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn, 6 July 1994.

\(^{133}\) Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.6 (since the title of the speech is the same as the book published by the Foreign Minister the term ‘paper’ will be added).

\(^{134}\) Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.3.

\(^{135}\) Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.6.
peace building to peace enforcement using military means. These strategies are explained in a publication, *Cooperating for Peace*[^136] produced in 1993 by Evans and his department. The book was compiled as an Australian contribution to the debate generated by the United Nations publication in same year, *An Agenda for Peace*.[^137] The key strategies discussed in *Cooperating for Peace* include ‘peace building’, ‘peace maintenance’, ‘peace restoration’ and ‘peace enforcement’ (see Table 2.2). Although these strategies were elucidated with the aim of revitalising the UN, some of them were also germane to Australia’s regional approach. For example, regional security policy included ‘preventive diplomacy’ (which comes under the general category of ‘peace maintenance’) and ‘peace building’ which emphasised ‘international regimes’ and dialogue. Some of these strategies were included in the Australian paper tabled at the first meeting of the ARF in Bangkok in 1994 and the subsequent 1995 ASEAN Concept Paper which set the ARF’s agenda.

However, Evans hesitated to apply some his arguments about ‘cooperative security’, within the context of the UN, to the region.[^138] In particular, Evans was reluctant to extend ‘cooperative security’ to the level of the individual, as opposed to the level of the state, as he had in the UN context. He had argued there that ‘security...is as much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defence of territorial integrity of states’.[^139] ‘Human security’ according to Evans is ‘prejudiced by major intra-state conflict as it is by inter-state conflict’.[^140] However, having raised a substantial challenge to traditional definitions of security, the Foreign Minister was reluctant to put his argument into practice in the regional context and continued to refer to ‘human security’ in association with human rights rather than security. This suggested that Evans did not wish, for political reasons, to challenge regional views that human security was a state, not international, concern, despite his convictions about ‘cooperative security’. Nonetheless,


[^139]: Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.7.

[^140]: Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.7.
his position leaves open the question of whether or not human security was an element in Australia’s declaratory policy (see Chapter Six).

‘COOPERATIVE SECURITY’: ITS LIMITATIONS, TENSIONS AND APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS

The effort extended that Labor expended to argue the case for the security enhancing effects of ‘cooperative security’ was unprecedented in Australia’s security history. Indeed, as we have seen, the intellectual case continued to be made in the face of considerable political pressure from the US, regional governments and the Liberal/National Party Opposition within Australia. Labor was committed to the view that ‘cooperative security’ enhanced security.

Nonetheless, Labor’s exposition of ‘cooperative security’ had its limitations, both intellectually and practically (the latter will be discussed in the next chapter). The first observation about ‘cooperative security’ is that despite endorsing ‘comprehensive security’, or the argument that security goes beyond military dimensions, most of the proposals for cooperation were of a military nature. This was evident as early as 1991, when at the annual ASEAN-PMC, Evans, although arguing for a broad concept of security, proposed measures which were all related to military problems.141 This was also evident in The Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation that Australia tabled at the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in 1994. One repercussion was, as the next chapter shows, that the main actor in implementing ‘cooperative security’ was the Australian Defence Force.

A second observation is that comprehensive security, and its associated ‘web’ of means, did not clearly explained why or how confidence-building in non-military matters or ‘small s’ security actually built confidence in other military matters. For example, it is not clear how cooperative arrangements between Australia and Indonesia for monitoring illegal fishing and patrolling the Timor Gap boundaries acts to improve security

142 Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region.
relations overall: or at least it is yet to be demonstrated that there is a cause and effect from the local to the general.

Third, even though ‘cooperative security’ is focused largely on military issues it does not address some critical military developments in the region. Of all the destabilising developments in the region none was more potentially dangerous than the burgeoning arms modernisation programs in regional countries—particularly acquisitions of submarines and strike aircraft. In addition there were inadequate C³ measures to cope with a conflict that involved these capabilities. ‘Cooperative security’ effectively bypassed any arms control or crisis management measures—the UN and regional arms registers being no exception.¹⁴³

Fourth, the relationship between ‘cooperative security’ and traditional security arrangements in the region was not clearly explained. There was no explicit explanation why these different approaches, when applied concurrently, did not amount to a policy based on contradictions. For example, Evans argued that ‘cooperative security’ was a supplement to existing ‘security against’ strategies, such alliances. He claimed that a new approach to regional security:

[W]ould see not the abandonment of traditional alliance relationships, but their supplementation by multilateral dialogue processes and the evolution of a real network of new bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements.¹⁴⁴

However, if Australia saw its own alliance as a deterrent to would-be aggressors then for some that could appear to conflict with one of Evans arguments for ‘cooperative security’, namely that it stressed ‘reassurance rather than deterrence’.

An argument can also be made that at times there is an apparent contradiction between the Foreign Minister’s statements, which advocate ‘cooperative security’, and those which endorse the balancing principles of a regional balance of power. For example, Evans argued that given that nature of the regional security environment that:


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We [should not] assume that cooperative approaches are the whole answer to regional security problems, or that we will ever be able to use them without at least a nod in the direction of traditional power balances. No one can sensibly deny the continued application of at least some traditional realpolitik considerations and the United States’ role as a ‘balancing wheel’ in the region is more or less universally accepted (albeit more often in private than in public) in this respect. And no one, least of all Australia, is about to tear up familiar bilateral alliances.¹⁴⁵

On another occasion Evans argued that the Asia–Pacific is a region where ‘the idea of power-balance retains considerable resonance’ and that:

[T]here may be much to be said...for working over time to unite the lesser countries in the region—including those of South East Asia, Indochina and Australasia—into a more cohesive grouping of their own.¹⁴⁶

The argument here for ‘a more cohesive grouping of their own’, could be suggestive of a preparatory stage for a balance of power arrangement. How that relates to his other argument that Australia and ASEAN countries should develop a ‘security community’ or a ‘community of shared security interests’ is difficult to explain without suggesting there are contradictions. Overall, the question of how ‘cooperative security’ was to operate in a region which, according to Evans, was characterised by states seeking to balance power was not explicitly addressed or intellectually justified in public statements.

Fifth, as indicated above, Evans was also never clear about the nature of the suggested ‘cohesive grouping’. He often proposed that Australia and Southeast Asia should form some kind of regional security group: for example, ‘a cohesive grouping’ of countries, a ‘security community’ or a ‘community of shared security interests’. Yet the intellectual distinctions between these and other security arrangements, for example, an alliance or a Deutsch type security community, was never made clear.

It is possible that at least some of the limitations of ‘cooperative security’ can be explained by Labor’s historical and political sensitivities about how best to enhance security in the region. The emphasis on military measures reflects Australia’s historic concern about the military causes of insecurity. Hence the proposals for CBMs and

incidents at sea agreements and so on. Yet Labor’s concern did not manifest itself in proposals for arms control measures which sought to limit and control the numbers and types of military platforms. Perhaps Labor’s hesitation reflected domestic political interests: in the ADF, the right faction of the Labor government and perhaps the electorate. It certainly reflected the interests of regional states to continue substantial modernisation programs that often started from an antiquated baseline.

Labor’s vagueness about definitions, of ‘cooperative security’, security groupings and the place of traditional arrangements for regional security, may well be explained by the real difficulty of making definitions clear. And, from a scholar’ perspective, the apparent contradictions may be the result of shortcomings in IR theoretical explanations which adopt single and opposing frameworks, that is either realism or liberalism to explain security policies (see Chapters Five and Six). On the other hand, vagueness had a number of advantages. For example, a security community of any depth was in fact implausible among Southeast Asian states—in the present as it had been in the past—so it made little sense to push hard for it. As for Evans’ reference to alliances and regional balances of power, both arrangements could claim domestic support—the electorate in the case of the alliance and ‘China threat’ proponents in the case of the regional power balancing.

CONCLUSION

Labor came into office in 1983 determined to overcome past difficulties among the party factions about security and foreign policy. With respect to regional security Labor pursued a policy which was based largely on cooperative principles across a range of issues—in economics, politics and security. In the early period of Labor government, when Bill Hayden was the Foreign Minister, Australia’s attempts to implement a regional security policy based on cooperation were not well received by regional countries or by the US. Australia’s efforts to establish an open and cooperative economic approach for the region, however, gained the respect of many regional

147 The ASEAN states retained security suspicions about each other and none were willing to contemplate a arrangement that looked like collective security.
countries and provided the government with a degree of prestige and experience that helped its later efforts to pursue security cooperation.

The government’s efforts were also assisted by the security changes taking place in Europe, by proposals made by President Michael Gorbachev for a new security dialogue in Asia and by the final end of the Cold War. All these events provided a security environment, which was receptive to the ‘security with’ approach so vigorously pursued by Hayden’s successor, Senator Gareth Evans.

Despite initial opposition to Australia’s approach from regional countries, the US and the Opposition at home, the Labor government continued to be highly instrumental in setting the pace, intellectual framework and institutional basis for regional security cooperation. However, notwithstanding Labor’s intellectual commitment to ‘security with’, a number of the policy concepts had limitations and the policy appeared to contain tensions and contradictions. Nonetheless, under Labor, ‘security with’ other states was enthusiastically embraced. The intent was to establish cooperation as a regional norm, exercised via multilateralism and regional institutions. Labor believed that such approaches enhanced security and helped to engage Australia economically and politically in the region. But did Labor pursue practical cooperative activities with the same vigour it showed towards developing policy concepts? Did these policy concepts in fact guide practitioners; and what were their limitations? This is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Three

LABOR'S 'SECURITY WITH' POLICY: THE PRACTICE OF REGIONAL SECURITY


Only direct and personal contact, the sharing of experiences and perceptions can...prise open the doors of conservative military establishments...in the end, the trust and confidence that really matters is between defence organisations.  
(The Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, 1995.)

From the late 1980s onwards, Labor's Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, and his department, made significant steps towards a new regional security policy based on 'cooperative security' and 'security with' other states in Southeast Asia. Particularly strong efforts were put into establishing multilateral arrangements and especially a regional institution for security dialogue. Most of the other practical measures that supported 'cooperative security' were, however, undertaken by the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force (ADF)—the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Australian Army.

Since in practice 'security with' became strongly associated with defence cooperation this chapter describes in detail how this situation evolved. The first section reviews defence cooperation between Australia and regional countries prior to Labor's election in 1983. The second looks at the Department of Defence's general approach to regional cooperation under Labor and the third, fourth and fifth sections examines the particular practical measures that were implemented by the Department and the ADF with their

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2 Robert Ray, quoted in David Jenkins, 'Defence Links Only So Strong: Expert', Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) 17 July 1995. Ray’s successor (from the new Liberal/National Coalition government) Ian McLachlan, was no less enthusiastic about the value of military cooperation, saying that "...quite often the deepest point of international contact between nations is in the military". See Florence Chong, 'Defence Ties With Australia Move to a Deeper Level', Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 19 October 1996.
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military counterparts in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The sixth section describes some of the problems that arose when the policy was applied—such as the absence of bilateral structures to coordinate cooperation and the shortcomings in defence directives and operational guidelines for practitioners—as well as some of the limitations that ‘security against’ policies imposed on cooperative activities. And the final section describes some of the tensions within the policy and between it and Australia’s other foreign policies, such as human rights.

In brief I will show that the expansion and strength of defence cooperation between Australia and the armed forces of ASEAN during the 1990s were quite extraordinary. To convincingly argue this requires that the bilateral activities be analysed in as much detail as possible. The conclusion this leads to is that never before had Australia cooperated so closely with so many ASEAN countries. The number of ASEAN personnel being trained by the ADF increased considerably. For example at the beginning of 1990 there were no Indonesians being trained by the ADF and by 1996–97 there were 258. The number of exercises between all the military services increased dramatically (see Appendix 2). For example, whereas in the late 1980s there was one naval exercise series between the RAN and Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), by 1996–97 at least six series were underway. Perhaps most importantly, over the 1990s the exercises became more complex, in terms of planning, combat and operational skills, and thus the warfighting skills of all the parties involved were enhanced as a result of cooperating. For example in 1992, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) joined the USAF–RAAF air defence exercise Pitch Black as an observer and by 1996 the RSAF was participating in live-combat and war scenario routines that involved more than 50 aircraft in the air at any one time. By any measure this exercise was highly sophisticated and a significant advance on previous series. Furthermore, during the 1990s, defence cooperation between Australia and ASEAN became more formalised and better coordinated with the introduction of new bilateral structures, policy directives, working groups and operational guidelines. Indeed, plans for defence cooperation between Australia and Indonesia were set in place for the next ten years and the Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) were given access to training facilities in

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3 Australia’s defence cooperation with Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei is described in Appendix 3, since there is much less activity with these three countries.
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Australia, in some case for up to twenty-five years. Furthermore, the main multilateral arrangement for defence cooperation, the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA), was considerably strengthened and a new naval 'Fleet Concentration', called Kakadu, involving most of the ASEAN navies was started by the RAN.

The second argument that results from this detailed analysis of defence cooperation is that it was guided by several objectives that arguably created tensions in the policy. Without doubt the main intention was to establish a policy of 'security with' the region and to establish the norm of regional cooperation. The previous chapter showed how deeply committed Labor was to this approach to security. One of the most important measures adopted to build confidence and introduce transparency was security dialogue. But equally important were the numerous military exercises and training programs. These particular activities also served another objective, which was to develop interoperability between the ADF and the armed services of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The final objective driving defence cooperation was Australia's desire to shape the regional environment to mirror its security interests. In addition to the possible tensions that these different objectives created the policy was also constrained by the ADF's aim to enhance its 'security against' policies through cooperation. For example, the ADF gathered intelligence on regional counterparts during cooperative activities and, moreover, did not share those military skills that provided advantages for the defence of Australia. For many ordinary Australians, however, the greatest tension in the policy was that its objective to improve the military skills of regional armies ran the risk of compromising Australia's human rights policy, for example in Indonesia. Finally, what this detailed analysis of the practice of 'security with' shows is how, in most respects, it could be seen to conflict with the principles and practice of 'security against'—defence of Australia and the Australia-US alliance.

REGIONAL SECURITY BEFORE LABOR

In practice Labor's policy of 'cooperative security' was different to the regional security policies of past Australian governments. Whereas Labor sought 'security with' the region, previous policies had been based on the perception that the region was a, if not the, major source of threat and therefore most cooperation had been with some countries against others. Australia had previously 'cooperated' with several regional
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governments—or more precisely it had joined with the UK and the US governments which backed these regimes—to counter perceived regional threats and, as a result, it became involved in several Asian wars (see Chapter One).

Australia’s embroilment in these conflicts had often begun with the provision of military aid, which started with training, materiel and advisers, and then grew to involve Australian combat troops and equipment. For example, in the case of Vietnam, Australia’s assistance started with training and materiel, then progressed to sending thirty advisers in May 1962 (later seventy more advisers were dispatched). Finally, on 29 April 1965, Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced that 1 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), comprising some 800 combat and combat support troops, would be deployed to Vietnam. Additional Army deployments of some 8,000 troops, as well as naval and air deployments, were made until 1969.

Australian military aid was coordinated by the Department of Defence and in the early 1960s a formal organisation, the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP), was established. The first arrangement under the DCP, which was announced by Defence Minister Paul Hasluck on 17 March 1964, provided assistance to the Malaysian government in its conflict, or Konfrontasi, with Indonesia. The main elements of the program were help

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4 See Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crisis and Commitments. The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, in association with the Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1992. Australia was also instrumental in developing other means to counter social and ideological threats. The Colombo Plan, for example, was instigated in 1950 to provide civil aid to de-colonising countries in Southeast Asia which were seen to be vulnerable to communist movements. Nonetheless, the purpose was to assist some states to resist others, particularly those with communist ideologies that had indigenous followings.


with training and materiel and ‘a secondment of a small number of officers and men of the Australia services’.7 Over the next two decades Australia initiated DCP arrangements with several other regional countries, for example Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and various South West Pacific states.8 Indonesia also received assistance under the DCP following the end of Konfrontasi in 1966 and the fall of President Sukarno, who had allegedly been supported by Indonesian communists.

Australian defence cooperation at that time was guided by the view that assistance to particular regional states for development of their own ‘security against’ strategies could be given in ways that benefited Australia’s security and influence in the region. Collective military arrangements between Australia and several other states were another aspect of defence cooperation. Between 1954 and 1977 Australia was a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which aimed to keep the US engaged in Asia and to counter the spread of communist insurgencies in the region. SEATO failed as an alliance strategy.9 A more enduring association aimed against others was the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA had been established in response to the British government’s announcement in July 1967 that it would withdraw East of Suez (including Hong Kong in 1997). Several governments, namely the UK, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand, considered it prudent to establish a defence arrangement that could be used against Indonesia, should Indonesia threaten Malaysia as it had during Konfrontasi. The FPDA was signed in 1971.10

But around the same time, support for further collective defence cooperation arrangements aimed against others began to diminish. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, approved by the Defence Committee in March 1972, stated for the

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9 See Lerek Buszynki, S.E.A.T.O: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1983. The other members of SEATO were Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, the US, France, New Zealand, and Britain.
first time that any threat of overt military aggression by China into Southeast Asia or by Vietnam beyond Indochina was unlikely. As a result ‘the likelihood of Australian combat involvement outside Australia’ was ‘not great’ and was receding and therefore ‘Australia must pursue her own security interests by her own efforts more than was necessary before’. Nonetheless, even if formal defence arrangements and participation in active combat against other states became less relevant for Australia’s security in the minds of defence planners then, there was little evidence that they also endorsed the idea of ‘security with’ others as the basis for Australia’s regional security policy. This view of security continued in the Department of Defence for some time after Labor came to office.

‘SECURITY WITH’ UNDER LABOR

When Labor came into office in 1983, defence planners were more concerned with putting in place a ‘security against’ defence of Australia policy than examining the prospects for a new regional security policy. The view held by the Department of Defence was expressed succinctly in the 1987 White Paper:

[T]he best contribution [Australia] can make to the continued stability of our region [is] an Australian defence force able to deal effectively with the most credible challenges to the nation’s sovereignty. 12

It was clear from the 1987 White Paper that Australia’s defence cooperation with regional states was to continue within the policies developed during past decades. This state of affairs persisted for some years.13 Although in the latter half of the 1980s ‘the emphasis moved away from materiel aid to joint training and exercises to Southeast Asian countries’,14 these changes were hardly reflections of a new orientation towards security in the region. Indeed, it was partly because the Defence Department’s approach

13 An indication of how little was happening in defence cooperation activities was that in 1983 the RAN conducted one naval exercise with Indonesia and two with Malaysia and Singapore. The RAN did not conduct any formal exercises with Indonesia after 1983 until 1991. See Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996, pp.133–142.
14 Inspector-General’s Division, Defence Cooperation, Chapter 2, pp.2–5.
to regional policy had still not reflected the changes in the strategic environment, which followed the easing of Cold War tensions, that Gareth Evans, the Foreign Minister, began in late 1989 to introduce arguments and proposals for a new regional policy.\textsuperscript{15}

These efforts by Evans to establish a new policy were endorsed by Kim Beazley’s successor as Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, although the latter received much less public attention.\textsuperscript{16} By the early 1990s, the Department of Defence was taking a much more vigorous approach to regional security. One of the first documents that addressed security in the region was \textit{Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP90)}.\textsuperscript{17} Until September 1992, ASP90, or rather a version of it, was a classified in-house document which argued that Australia should move beyond defence of Australia towards ‘promotion’ of Australia’s security interests in the region. As it stated:

\begin{quote}
The strategy described in this document goes beyond the \textit{defence of the nation} against direct attack to include \textit{promotion} of our security interests. The term as used here encompasses the nation’s defence goals, the principles and priorities for providing the means of achieving them, and the uses to which these defence capabilities should be put, both to \textit{defend and promote} the nation’s security interests.\textsuperscript{18} (Emphasis added.)
\end{quote}

According to Stewart Woodman, \textit{ASP90} marked the realisation by the Department of Defence that, apart from the ‘narrow confines of the direct defence of Australia’:

\begin{quote}
[A] no less important aspect of effective planning was a more proactive role aimed at promoting stability within Australia’s immediate region and ensuring that the prospects of a military threat emerging in the future was even more remote.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Another document to address regional security was the \textit{Strategic Review 1993 (SR93)}.\textsuperscript{20} It argued that:

\begin{quote}
The challenge is to expand and accelerate our strategic engagement with the region as a major new emphasis in our defence posture, alongside our primary commitment to developing our self-reliant capacity for the defence of Australia.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Correspondence with DFAT official, 1990.
\textsuperscript{17} Department of Defence, \textit{Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s}, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992.
\textsuperscript{18} Department of Defence, \textit{Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s}, p.20.
The Defence Department endorsed some of the Foreign Minister’s initiatives for regional security and introduced some new policy concepts to guide defence cooperation.

‘Common security’ and ‘strategic partnership’

The Defence Minister, Senator Ray, like Foreign Minister Evans, endorsed the arguments for a policy concept of ‘common security’. He argued that:

[T]he end of the Cold War is [directly associated] with the re-emergence of the notion of common security. This process can best be characterised as step-by-step building of military confidence between nation, achieving security with them not against them.22

[Emphasis added.]

Defence planners writing The Strategic Review 1993 applied this thinking to Australia’s regional security policy proposing that: ‘[i]creasingly, [Australia] will need to seek... security with Asia’.23 [Emphasis added.]

Although emphasising the importance of cooperation, Ray, like Evans, did not underestimate the continuing need for military responses under some circumstances. Neither did he doubt the capacity of ‘common security’ to encompass these traditional requirements:

As my colleague Gareth Evans has pointed out, common security is not a policy for wimps. Nothing in the idea implies passivity or appeasement in the face of a security threat. It does not involve emasculating military forces, it is not about removing the capability to respond to direct threats.24

Indeed, for Ray, military forces were central to ‘common security’ and underpinned the very idea of ‘security with’ others. In his view the military would provide the means for both defence self-help and regional cooperation. Australia’s force structure for defence of Australia helped, it was argued, to engage Australia in the region. Military engagement and cooperation would consist of both traditional defence links, e.g., naval visits, personnel exchanges, high level military visits, combined exercises, in-country

training and formal ties (such as FPDA) and also ‘new forms of engagement’. New forms of engagement would seek a ‘more integrated approach to defence relationships’ and they could include, in the first instance, collaborative industrial ventures, providing a defence industry support base for regional forces and also defence exports. Over time, engagement could lead to deeper integration that ‘improve[d] the compatibility of Australian and regional forces and increase[d] the degree of interoperability with and between regional forces’.27

Ray’s argument, that strong military forces supported regional stability, was applied not just to Australia but to other Southeast Asian countries. According to the Minister, ‘[m]odernisations...will provide a basis for...nations to be self-reliant in their defence [and] this will assist regional security’. Moreover, it would be part of Australia’s policy of security cooperation to assist the armed forces in the region to achieve this objective. According to Ray, Australia would ‘[contribute] to regional security by enhancing the capacity of regional countries to provide for their self-defence’.29

The most comprehensive official exposition of the Defence Department’s objective to increase defence cooperation with regional countries was provided in The Strategic Review 1993. The key concept in the document, ‘strategic partnership’, had several aims, including:

- ‘to enhance the capacity of our nearer region to exclude potentially hostile influences that could also threaten Australia’s security’
- ‘to reduce the potential for misunderstanding and tension by promoting sound strategic assessment and force structuring processes through an increased security planning dialogue’

26 Ray, Opening Address to the ‘Australia’s Maritime Bridge into Asia’ conference, p.4.
27 Ray, Opening Address to the ‘Australia’s Maritime Bridge into Asia’ conference, p.4.
28 Ray, Opening Address to the ‘Australia’s Maritime Bridge into Asia’ conference, p.3.
29 Robert Ray, keynote address to the RAAF air power conference ‘The War in the Air’, Canberra, 29 March 1994, p.2
30 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993. To reinforce Australia’s commitment to building regional confidence, several officials, responsible for the Strategic Review 1993, visited Southeast Asian governments to explain the contents of the paper.
• 'to assist the development of effective self-defence capabilities, including through cooperation in defence science and technology’

• 'to move towards interoperability in key areas such as communications with the ASEAN nations’.

Another aim of 'strategic partnership' was to move the defence relationship between Australia and many regional countries away from the tradition of aid/dependence towards partnership/equality, not least because some regional states, like Singapore, could now afford to pay a fee-for-service (see below). Clearly the Defence Department under Minister Ray had now developed an agenda for regional security policy. As the subsequent review of defence cooperation, undertaken by the Inspector General Division, stated:

The Strategic Review 1993...emphasises that for the rest of the 1990s, enhancing the security of the region will become an increasingly prominent theme in defence policy.

And, indeed, significant developments were already taking place with each of Australia’s major partners in Southeast Asia.

DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA

Indonesia has been and continues to be Australia’s most important Southeast Asian neighbour. During the 1990s, the relationship became much stronger than it had been in the past with defence cooperation being a major element. In the first place, contact between the two military communities increased substantially. Initially, the respective military chiefs led the way but soon links were established across the three services and at many levels—to the point that by 1993 Indonesians were being accommodated and trained at HMAS Coonawarra in Darwin to be stewards for the Indonesian armed

31 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, p.23.
33 Inspector-General’s Division, Defence Cooperation, Chapter 2, p.6.
34 See the section in Chapter One which discusses inter alia the history of defence planners strategic assessments of Indonesia during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
forces. Second, the number of Indonesian personnel attending staff training programs in Australia and being trained in Indonesia by ADF staff increased dramatically. Third, both the number and sophistication of unit-level military training and exercises conducted by the ADF with the Indonesian services increased significantly. Fourth, the level of intelligence exchanges was upgraded and a wider range of topics was discussed. Fifth, formal structures were introduced to coordinate the wider military relationship and a comprehensive agenda for defence cooperation was developed. And finally, an historic Agreement on Maintaining Security signed in December 1995, indicating 'a fairly high level of intimacy and confidentiality', was concluded. Without doubt, in comparison to any previous period, cooperation increased and the defence relationship between the two countries during the 1990s was characterised by unprecedented closeness.

The drive towards this situation had begun in the very late 1980s and at the most senior levels of government. On the Australian side the task of improving security relations between Australia and Indonesia at this time was pursued by key foreign affairs and defence officials. The Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), General Peter Gration, and his successors Admiral Alan Beaumont, and General John Baker were all strongly involved. On the Indonesian side, the main officials concerned were the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno. Evans, Gration, Alatas and Sutrisno were responsible for initiating a series of visits and talks in 1988 and 1989, which were aimed at overcoming the historic swings in the Indonesian–Australian security relationship and which over the preceding three years had been on a downward slide.

36 Interview with ADF personnel, May 1997, Darwin.
38 During Indonesia’s attempts in the 1940s to remove the Dutch colonial administration Australia has supported the nationalist movements. But by 1963 the Menzies government had decided to purchase the long-range, strike bomber the F-111 because it could penetrate Indonesian air defences and strike key targets in Java. Moreover, according to cabinet documents, although the
There were a number of reasons for this. The Indonesian government had been highly irritated with Australia for ‘interfering’ in their internal affairs, most notably with the publication of an article by the *Sydney Morning Herald* newspaper in 1986 that claimed members of President Suharto’s family were involved in corrupt business practices. To the Indonesian government this public allegation was a particularly egregious insult. Defence Minister General Benny Moerdani froze ministerial visits and Australia’s long-standing ‘defence aid’ program to Indonesia. At the beginning of 1988, Australia ‘called a formal halt’ to the materiel-based projects conducted under the Defence Cooperation Program and in March 1988 the Australian parliament was informed by the Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, that defence ‘cooperative activities with Indonesia... [had] decline[d]’.

The poor state of official defence relations was particularly unfortunate given a perception among quite a few Australians that Indonesia was a possible threat. Notwithstanding their qualms about the Indonesian regime’s record of human rights abuse, Evans and Gratlon believed the security relationship had to be repaired. The relatively moderate Alatas and Sutrisno agreed.

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40 In the author's interviews with Indonesian defence officials (serving and retired) and intellectuals in Jakarta during June 1997, the point which was constantly made was that the insult was not that the President was being accused of corruption since that was already been privately alleged within Indonesia but that it was made public and by a foreign journalist and such an event 'shamed' all Indonesians.
44 Even during the new high in security relations between the two governments in the early 1990s the public remained sceptical. A paper analysing public opinion in the 1993 Australian Election Study concluded that “[t]he proportion of Australians who perceive Indonesia to be a threat is growing”.

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In April 1988, Australian defence officials began a series of visits to Jakarta to seek to put the relationship on a better footing.\textsuperscript{45} This was followed in November by a meeting between General Gration and President Suharto and General Try Sutrisno. Gration proposed ‘new forms of cooperation’—ones, he said, that moved away from materiel-based activities towards the transfer skills and expertise and exercises, training and personnel exchanges.\textsuperscript{46} Australian officials were so determined to establish the relationship on a cooperative basis that when the Indonesian military, without prior warning, closed the Lombok and Sunda Straits for military exercises their response was muted.\textsuperscript{47} Despite being concerned for a number of political, security and economic reasons, the government’s views were calmly ‘delivered [in] a note’ to the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{48} General Gration’s November visit went ahead and the new Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, went to Indonesia to pay his respects to Ali Alatas who had just become the Indonesian Foreign Minister. All the meetings were positive and within three months both sides had made some important policy decisions about the future of the relationship. These were made public when Ali Alatas came to Canberra in February 1989 to make the first visit by an Indonesian Foreign Minister for over three years.\textsuperscript{49}

Both sides agreed to a number of measures to improve the relationship, among them the establishment of the Australia Indonesia Ministerial Meetings to be held each year or more often if required.\textsuperscript{50} Evans and Alatas said that the recent rift in relations had been made all the more difficult to resolve because there had been no regular and formal consultations for over two decades.\textsuperscript{51} The discussions would be aimed in part at

\textsuperscript{49} The Timor Gap Treaty, which was concluded on 1989, became an important arena for cooperation, notwithstanding some legal differences between the two sides. See Geoff Gardiner, ‘The Security Treaty With Indonesia’, Research and Analysis, Newsletter of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, No.6, April 1996, p.3.
\textsuperscript{50} Mark Bruner, ‘Re-establish a Close Relationship’, The Age, 4 March 1989. Other measures included the establishment of an Australia–Indonesia Institute that would administer a variety of cultural, scientific, and educational organisations.
\textsuperscript{51} In the early 1970s trade talks between Australia and Indonesia broke down and the two countries ceased regular discussions.
reducing misperceptions about 'cultural differences',\textsuperscript{52} for example on human rights, as a basis for a stronger relationship. Many Australian observers, however, were suspicious that this approach downplayed human rights in order to improve the security relationship. Reducing misunderstandings was a central theme in subsequent talks between military leaders some five months later.

This meeting in July 1989, was the first visit to Australia by the head of the Indonesian Armed Forces for almost two decades.\textsuperscript{53} The Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno, met with the Australian Defence Minister, Kim Beazley and CDF General Gration. According to General Gration, the first objective was 'better consultation'.\textsuperscript{54} That is, he said, '[s]imply talking to each other so that there is less room for misunderstandings and we understand what they are doing and they understand what we are doing'.\textsuperscript{55} Both sides, it appeared, harboured misperceptions about each other's defence and security policies.

Comments from a number of senior Indonesians suggested there were 'misunderstandings' about Australia's defence policy. In May 1989, retired Indonesian Lt General Hasnan Habib had told a seminar in Canberra that Australia's 'hawkish military posture is obviously out of place and may cause misgivings as to the real motivation and intentions of Australia'.\textsuperscript{56} Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had also commented that Australia could do more to explain its defence policy to Indonesia, saying that 'I think Australia has tried to explain, but there is more room for further discussion and seminars to air each other's perceptions'.\textsuperscript{57} A leading academic at Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Yusuf Wanandi, agreed and said that while Australia may have explained its defence policy to Jakarta, 'the strategic, diplomatic and political

\textsuperscript{52} Alatas said that as far as the Indonesian government was concerned, 'what we ask is a greater sensitivity to the differences, a greater willingness to understand developments and policies in Indonesia in their own right, in our own culture'. See Louise Williams, 'Visit Sets Scene for Jakarta Meetings', \textit{SMH}, 27 February 1989.

\textsuperscript{53} 'Indonesian General's Visit to Improve Neighbour Relations'; AFR, 10 July 1989; Andrew Fraser, 'Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties', \textit{Canberra Times}, 10 July 1989.

\textsuperscript{54} Fraser, 'Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties', \textit{Canberra Times}, 10 July 1989.

\textsuperscript{55} Fraser, 'Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties', \textit{Canberra Times}, 10 July 1989.

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objectives have not been explained'. And finally, a senior analyst at the Indonesian Institute for Sciences in Jakarta said that Australia’s posture ‘could be interpreted as provocative and offensive...and might be perceived as a threat to Australia’s neighbours’.

These comments were dismissed by some Australian defence officials and scholars as unrepresentative of mainstream Indonesian views on Australia’s defence policy. However this dismissal missed several points. The first was that the Indonesians have a broader notion of security and some actions by Australia seemed threatening to it. Even if the particular views expressed above were not widespread among the Indonesian military elite, many of them still worried that human rights groups within Australia might undermine the Indonesian government’s ability to maintain internal cohesion. Second, there were also concerns among some Indonesians that if the Australian government could not control these domestic groups and the anti-Indonesian press reports then by the same logic it might not be able to check public opinion that was concerned that Indonesia was a security threat (see fn 44). While senior Indonesian officials knew that most of their counterparts in the ADF were not concerned about Indonesia in this way they also knew that Australia was a democracy that had to respond to the electorate’s views. Third, for many Indonesians, there was a link between Australia’s values and the defence policy it pursued. As Peter Hastings argued:

‘The feeling that Australians are fundamentally racist about Indonesia, believing it to be a potential threat, and that its ‘aggressive’ defence build up is the result of fear...is more widely spread in the Indonesian establishment than [Australians] commonly believe.’

57 Fraser, ‘Defence Chief Calls for Closer Indonesian Ties’, Canberra Times, 10 July 1989.
61 Interviews with General Hasnan Habib (ret.), General Moerdani (ret.), Rear Admiral Sunardi, First Admiral Yuswaji, Jakarta, June 1997.
62 For example, on his visit to Indonesia in November 1988, General Gration had said that ‘Australia does not regard Indonesia as a threat’. See ‘Australian Security Tied to Indonesia, Army Chief’, Reuters News Service, 14 November 1988. Some in the ADF, however, were not so sanguine about Indonesia. The Australian Army Chief, General Laurie O’Donnell, said around the time of Sutrisno’s visit in 1989 that Australia would not stand by if there was conflict between Indonesia and PNG. See ‘Indonesian General’s Visit to Improve Neighbour Relations’, AFR, 10 July 1989.
Fourth, again as Peter Hastings argued, many Indonesians could not accept the strategic logic expressed in the 1986 Dibb Report that Indonesia was the area ‘from or through’ which a threat may come.\textsuperscript{64} ‘From’ Indonesia ‘evokes an unacceptable image of a belligerent Indonesia which is contrary to Indonesia’s self image’.\textsuperscript{65} For some Indonesians to agree, as Hasnan Habib did later, that Australia’s defence posture was appropriate given its geography, did not mean that they had no concerns that Australia might be a potential threat to Indonesia. Moreover, for Australia to assume that its actions and rhetoric were non-threatening underestimated the culture within ABRI, which was deeply suspicious about any internal or external security matter. For all these reasons, Australia needed to adopt an approach that reassured the Indonesians. Finally, from an entirely different angle, many ordinary Australians with the views above needed to be reassured that their own government’s security policy would not undermine the human rights of ordinary Indonesians.

In a joint statement following General Sutrisno’s visit to Australia in July 1989, he and General Gration addressed some of these security concerns. They determined to improve relations through defence activities, such as senior level military visits, military exercises, staff college exchanges and defence industry contacts.\textsuperscript{66} Following the visit by General Sutrisno, further visits and discussions took place between ministers and senior officials. If some of these early and subsequent cooperative measures for improving security relations between the two countries were aimed at ‘simply talking’ to reduce tensions caused by various cultural and security misperceptions then many of the later measures pursued in the 1990s went well beyond this goal. The two areas where close cooperation developed were in individual staff training programs and unit level training and exercises. The measure of that closeness was the extensive assistance that the ADF gave to ABRI for development of combat and operational skills.\textsuperscript{67}


\textsuperscript{65} Hastings, ‘A Boom in Ties with Jakarta’, \textit{SMH}, 26 June 1989. According to Lt. General Hasnan Habib, this account in the Dibb report also insulted Indonesian mythology that described the waters around Indonesia and Australia as ruled by the peaceful and caring sea goddess. Interview, Jakarta, June 1997.


\textsuperscript{67} Interview with ADF personnel, Canberra, November 1998.
**Individual personnel training programs**

The number of Indonesian personnel trained in Australia and in Indonesia by the ADF increased significantly during the 1990s. Whereas in 1988–89 there were no Indonesian military personnel being trained in Australia, by 1996–97 there were 147. In 1991–92 there were no Indonesian personnel being trained in Indonesia by the ADF, but by 1996–97 there were 111, making a total of 258 Indonesians trained by the ADF in that year. ADF personnel also attended Indonesian staff colleges and participated in civilian based language training.

During this period Australia had become the most important foreign country supplying military training to the Indonesian armed forces. It had replaced the United States,

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68 At a more general level Australia is seen as the biggest single destination for Indonesians seeking education overseas. See Glenda Korporall, 'A Testing Time for Friends', *SMH*, 22 July 1995.

69 *Senate Hansard*, Question No.1695, 10 October 1994, p.1386.

70 The Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia and ASEAN: Managing Change*, Parliamentary Paper No.54 of 1998, March 1998, p.194. In 1989/90 there were five Indonesian personnel being trained by the ADF (*Senate Hansard*, Question No.1695, 10 October 1994, p.1386); and by 1993/94 there were 120 (*Senate Hansard*, Question No.1752, 31 January 1995, p. 166). According to Patrick Walters the figure was higher, amounting to more than 300 in 1994. See Walters, 'Indonesian Forces Expand ADF Links', *The Australian*, 22 March 1994. In March 1994, a senior delegation of army officers, reportedly the most senior concerned with training Indonesian personnel ever to visit Australia, toured training establishments around the country. In the same year the Australian Defence Minister, Senator Robert Ray, proposed that Australia should offer the 'full gamut of training' to Indonesians ('Ray Offers to Boost Indon. Military Aid', *The Age*, 3 August 1994). Indonesians were trained at ADF establishments such as Staff College HMAS Penguin, HMAS Cerberus, HMAS Creswell, Command & Staff College Queenscliff, Cunungra Land Warfare Centre, School of Artillery Manly, School of Army Aviation Oakey, School of Infantry Singleton, Army TAFE Bonegilla, Special Air Services Regiment Swanbourne, Staff College RAAF Fairbairn, RAAF Wagga Wagga, RAAF Sale and at educational institutions such as the Australian Defence Force Academy, Joint Services Staff College, Peacekeeping School RAAF Williamtown, Language School RAAF Williams, ADF Warfare Centre Williamtown. See *Senate Hansard*, Question No.1752, 31 January 1995, p.166.


72 Department of Defence, *International Policy Division*, submission 55 to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade enquiry into matters relating to East Timor, 31 March 1999, annex A. In 1992/93 there were 56 Indonesian personnel being trained by the ADF in Indonesia (*Senate Hansard*, Question No.1626, 19 September 1994, p.958); in 1993/94 there 143 (*Senate Hansard*, Question No.1626, 19 September 1994, p.958); in 1994–95 there were 140 (Jenkins, 'Australia's Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', *SMH*, 4 December 1995); and in 1995–96 the number had risen to some 240 (Tim Huxley, 'Pointers: Defence Links With Indonesia Growing', *Janes Defence Weekly*, p.10, Reuters News Service, 1 February 1997). The type of instruction covered such topics as electronic warfare, flight safety and infantry instructional techniques (Huxley, 'Pointers: Defence Links With Indonesia Growing', p.10). Australia also helped with Nomad aircraft maintenance, survey and mapping. In 1994 for example, there were some four ADF personnel assisting the Indonesians with these projects.

73 David Jenkins, 'Australia's Helping Hand in Indonesia's Military Muscle', *SMH*, 4 December 1995.
which under pressure from Congress had canceled the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in June 1992.\footnote{74} Indeed, if one of the objectives of Australian defence officials was to reduce misperceptions by exposing Indonesians to Australian military thinking through training programs then it was also the case that one of the Indonesians’ aims was to fill the gap left by the cancellation of US military aid.

**Unit level training and exercises**

An even stronger indication of the Labor government’s intent to implement a policy of cooperation with Indonesia was the ADF’s assistance to ABRI with unit training and exercises. Unit training involves the three armed services—the Army, Navy and Air Force—of both countries. As a consequence of unit training provided by the ADF, the Indonesia armed forces were able to improve combat and operational skills.

**Navy to Navy cooperation**

Navy-to-Navy activities such as ship visits\footnote{75} and exercises increased in frequency during the 1990s and the relationship between the RAN and the TNI-AL, the Indonesian Navy, became one of the ‘closest’ among the three forces.\footnote{76} In 1990, there were no scheduled naval exercises but by 1996–97 two series, the Ausina and New Horizon/Cakrawala Baru, were taking place regularly. Each series involved several separate exercises; for example in 1994, three Ausina Passexs and two Ausina Patrolexs (the latter was later renamed Cassowary) took place. The first series involves major fleet unit combined passage exercises and smaller scale passexs while the second involves patrol boats and P3C maritime surveillance aircraft. By 1993, these patrol and communications exercises had reached strong levels of cooperation: for example, in Ausina ‘93 Australian personnel flew with Indonesian personnel on their Navy Searchmaster (Nomad) aircraft.

\footnote{74} Jenkins, ‘Australia’s Helping Hand in Indonesia’s Military Muscle’, SMH, 4 December 1995. The US House of Representatives voted in June 1992 to cut $2 million military aid after Indonesian troops were involved in the November 1991 massacre of East Timorese in Dili.

\footnote{75} In July 1989, some five RAN ships visited Indonesia (Hastings, ‘A Boom in Ties with Jakarta’, SMH, 26 June 1989); during 1993–94 there were between 16 to 20 RAN visits to Indonesia (Peter Fray, ‘Comrades in Arms’, The Bulletin, 5 April 1994, p.18). In October 1993, a training cruise by Indonesian warships to Sydney took place and young Indonesian officers participated in shore training programs. By 1996, in the month of July, seven RAN vessels made port visits to Indonesia (Walters, ‘Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in South China Sea’).

and Indonesian personnel had flown on Australian P3C Orion aircraft during surveillance operations in the Timor Gap.77 The other series, New Horizon, which usually takes place biennially, is a major combined exercise and bigger than the Ausina series. The New Horizon VII, held near Darwin in 1993, was the largest held to that point and involved eight RAN ships, RAAF aircraft, six Indonesian ships and a Nomad. In subsequent New Horizon/Cakrawala Baru exercises Indonesian officers and sailors routinely came aboard Australian navy ships and, according to Navy personnel, by then 'the level of comfort' between Australian and Indonesian officers and sailors was very strong.78

A major step taken by the RAN in 1993 was organising the first 'multilateral exercise', or rather what was called Fleet Concentration Kakadu, in Darwin harbour. The aim of the Kakadu series, according to the RAN, is to bring regional navies together with the objective to 'enhance stability and security through graduated ship work-up programs designed to improve preparedness and interoperability'.79 The Indonesian Navy and other regional navies from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, New Zealand, Hong Kong were invited. On this occasion the Indonesians sent observers but at the second Kakadu, held in 1995, the Indonesian Navy participated in the harbour phase of the Fleet Concentration but not the sea phase. The planning and evaluation (or 'wash-up') procedures of Kakadu are multilateral and the sea phase routines are bilateral.80 Kakadu Two involved a harbour phase, which included landing drills and tactical planning, and a ten-day sea phase, which involved maneuvers to simulate a conflict.81 Some twenty-four warships and 5,000 personnel participated from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Hong Kong. Naval observers from the Philippines also attended. There was also an air component that consisted of Australian F/A-18s, F-

78 Interview with RAN officer, Darwin, May 1997.
80 Interview with RAN officer, Darwin, May 1997.
111s, P3Cs and helicopters and other strike aircraft came from Singapore and Malaysia.82

Apart from increasing in frequency and closeness, exercises with the Indonesian Navy are also growing in complexity and the planning for them is becoming more sophisticated.83 As one Australian defence source pointed out, the relationship is showing 'real sign[s] of maturity'.84 Now, he said, 'you can argue tooth and nail with your Indonesian planners about the detail of the exercise'.85 An indication of the growing sophistication is that interoperability between the two navies across a range of combat skills is increasing.86 As the Defence Annual Report for 1996–97 stated:

New Horizon VIII-96...enhanced mutual cooperation and improved interoperability between Australian and Indonesian maritime and air forces in anti-air warfare, EOD, and MCM.87

According to a senior RAN officer involved in developing plans for cooperation with TNI-AL, 'the RAN has been key' to development of the Indonesian Navy's operational and combat skills.88

Two events in the last few years suggest that the Indonesian Navy is gaining confidence in its operational and combat abilities. The first, in March 1992, involved 8–9 ships from the Indonesian Navy which sought to prevent an aging Portuguese car ferry carrying protesters from entering Indonesian waters near East Timor.89 The passengers,

83 In 1996, the exercise New Horizon VIII/Cakrawala Baru, four RAN ships, a RAAF P3C Orion (flying for the first time to Juanda naval airbase in Surabaya) and RAN clearance divers participated. RAN and Indonesian naval staff had previously 'sat down together to plan the exercise in minute detail'. See Patrick Walters, ‘Indonesia to Stage Huge Exercise in South China Sea’, The Weekend Australian, 24–25 August, 1996.
86 Interview with senior RAN officer, Canberra, November 1998.
88 Interview, senior ADF officer (ret.) Canberra, November 1998.
Australians, Portuguese and other nationalities, were planning to land and place wreaths at the Dili cemetery to commemorate the killing of East Timorese in November 1991 by Indonesian troops and thereby focus international attention on the event. The Indonesian Navy flotilla included Van Speijk frigates recently acquired from the Netherlands and reportedly fitted with 'state of the art electronic surveillance equipment'.\(^9\) According to one report it was 'one of the largest exercises since [Indonesia's] confrontation with Malaysia in the 1960s'.\(^9\)

The second time the Indonesian Navy demonstrated its strength was in September 1996. Then the Navy held its biggest combined exercise in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea.\(^9\) Some 20,000 armed forces and police personnel took part and most of ABRI's primary weapon systems, including 54 F-16s, F-5 and Hawk 100/200 fighters, and some twenty-seven ships were involved.\(^9\) Previous tri-service exercises had been held on Java but this exercise was seen as a test of Indonesia's logistical capabilities for defence of maritime waters and island territory.\(^9\) According to some commentators, the exercise was intended to show China that Indonesia would defend its claims to the gas fields around the Natuna Islands.\(^9\) A week after the exercise the Navy Chief, Vice Admiral Kushariardi, announced plans to increase patrols and deploy more corvettes and missile patrol boats in the area.\(^9\)

**Army to Army cooperation**

At beginning of 1990 there was virtually no contact between the Australian Army and the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD). It was often suggested that language differences

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\(^9\) Huxley, 'Indonesian Armed Forces Face up to New Threats', pp.36–42.


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prevented interaction between the two ground forces. In 1993, CDF Beaumont said that the next forward is to see if we can get some army-to-army exercises [between Australia and Indonesia]. That is proving more difficult, principally because of the language problems. In June 1993, CDF Beaumont said that ‘the next forward is to see if we can get some army-to-army exercises [between Australia and Indonesia]. That is proving more difficult, principally because of the language problems’. See Martin Daly, ‘RAAF to “Attack” Indonesia’, The Age, 9 October 1993. To address this issue the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General John Grey introduced a policy in April 1993 aimed at improving the language skills of army officers. It stated that from 1 January 2001 ‘officers with a regional language skill will be preferred for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Those without the necessary aptitude to attain language proficiency will be encouraged to undertake complementary studies in Asian culture’. Quoted in Colonel Brian Hewitt, ‘The Australian Army and Regional Cooperation—Security Through Partnership’, in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.90.

Army parachute exercises were an important area of army defence cooperation. In 1994, following the release of the 1994 White Paper, CDF Beaumont, said that Australian troops were to train and exercise more often with Indonesian paratroops. According to the CDF, paratroop dropping was a fundamental military skill, and the training would build up understanding between the two forces.

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Barker, ‘White Paper Maneuvers Fail to Address Human Rights Abuse’, AFR, 12 December 1994. In November 1994, a platoon from the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), flew to Malarg, East Java, to take part in the first ever combined airborne exercise with an Indonesian parachute unit, the Battalion 502 of the green beret Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) (see David Jenkins, ‘Australia’s Helping Hand in Indonesia’s Military Muscle’, SMH, 4 December 1995. According to Jenkins, the Battalion 502 was the same unit which, twenty years ago, been involved in the invasion East Timor). On 6 March 1995, Indonesian troops arrived in Australia to participate in exercise Canopy Swift, prior to their participation in Kangaroo ’95. Some 50 Indonesian paratroopers from the Army Strategic Reserve joined Australian paratroops from the 3RAR in a training exercise at Shoalwater Bay in Queensland for two weeks. The exercise included the RAAF’s long-range F-111 fighter-bombers in supporting air strikes. See Jenkins, ‘Australia’s Helping Hand in Indonesia’s Military Muscle’, SMH, 4 December 1995; David Lague, ‘Timor Question Clouds Exercise With Indonesia’, SMH, 6 March 1995. In August, when Kangaroo ’95 was being conducted, some 160 Indonesian paratroopers and two Hercules transport aircraft participated (David Lague, ‘New Top Gun Wants to be Neighbourly’, SMH, 13 July, 1995). The paratroopers joined 3RAR in a combined parachute jump drop on Wyndham (Jenkins, ‘Australia’s Helping Hand in Indonesia’s Military Muscle’, SMH, 4 December 1995). Some useful background to Indonesian participation in Kangaroo ’95 is the following: Indonesia was briefed on Kangaroo ‘89 during General Sutrisno’s visit in July 1989; Indonesian observers were invited to Kangaroo ‘92; Indonesia was invited to join in the planning of Kangaroo ’95 exercise and participated for the first time. See above sources plus David Lague, ‘Forces Chief Denies Indonesian Press Story’, SMH, 23 September 1995.
Special forces cooperation

The Australian Army’s Special Air Service (SAS) developed strong links with its Indonesian equivalent, Kopassus. In May/June 1993, a unit of some twenty-nine SAS troops went to Bandung, Java, where a Kopassus regional HQ is situated. In the past individuals had visited Bandung but this was the first time a unit had been sent. In the same month, some thirty Kopassus troops, visited SAS Headquarters at Swanbourne, in Perth Western Australia. According to defence sources, the objectives of special forces exchanges in 1993 were familiarisation and cross-training. The Indonesians participated in small arms range practice, communications, water, rappelling out of helicopters and rope work and medical training. In March/April 1994, in another troop exchange, counter hijack training took place. The special forces exercises are called Night Mongoose, Night Komodo and Kookaburra.

Training between SAS and Kopassus continued during 1995–96. The level of training reached during this period is difficult to assess given the sensitivity of special forces

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100 Cooperation between the SAS and Kopassus was a sensitive domestic issue because Kopassus was connected with human rights abuses in Indonesia. See Barker, ‘White Paper Manoeuvres Fail to Address Human Rights Abuses’, AFR, 12 December 1994; Harold Crouch, ‘Defence Aid Should be Defence Aid’, The Canberra Times, 4 August 1994. For a brief history and description of Kopassus see Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996, pp.85–89. The Department of Foreign Affairs initially objected to the suggestion that exchanges between the units should take place on these grounds but was later persuaded that the training routines would concentrate on anti-terrorist training which was legitimised by Australian and Indonesian support for international agreements against terrorism. The argument made by the Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, was that ‘we don’t train anyone specifically in the skills that are involved in being deployed for internal rather than external purposes’. See Ian McPhedran, ‘Views of Arms Trade Differ’, The Canberra Times, 5 September, 1994. Ray’s view was arguably supported by the fact that the special forces of any country are divided into different specialised units: for example within Kopassus there are units for counter-terrorism, counter urban guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, amphibious operations and fighting in built-up areas. See ‘Indonesia to Expand Special Forces’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, November–December 1996, p.38; David Jenkins, ‘SAS Dares but do we Win?’, SMH, 15 July, 1993.

101 ‘Australia, Indonesia Swap Elite Troops’, Reuters News Service, 23 June 1993. Kopassus is divided into three groups each of about 1,000 personnel and based at Serang (West Java), Bandung (West Java) and Solo (Central Java). Two more groups were formed in 1996, one of which will be based in Jakarta. See ‘Indonesia to Expand Special Forces’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, November–December 1996, p.38; Jenkins, ‘SAS Dares but do we Win?’, SMH, 15 July, 1993.


104 Exchanges between the two special forces continued until June 1998 when an SAS visit to Indonesia was deferred. Special forces exercises were again deferred in November 1998. According to news reports, Defence sources in Canberra acknowledged that the decision had been motivated by concern over ‘political risks’ of being seen to be too close to Kopassus. See Don Greenlees, ‘Army Abandons War Games’, The Australian, 29 October 1998; Robert Garran, ‘Moore Denies War Games Cancelled’, The Australian, 30 October 1998.

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training. On the one hand, the official account in the Defence Annual report for 1995–96 is quite vague simply stating that, for example, the ‘outcome’ of the 1996 Night Komodo was:

[A]n increased awareness of the level of SF capabilities and individual skills... gained through individual and low level collective tasks across a range of Special Forces skills conducted with the Indonesian Kopassus.105

On the other hand, according to a senior ADF officer, SAS–Kopassus training ‘at times has exceeded the usually accepted limits’ but that ‘more than that I will not say’.106

Air Force to Air Force cooperation

At the beginning of 1990 there was no formal contact between the RAAF and TNI-AU, the Indonesian Air Force.107 A few months later, however, Australia and Indonesia agreed that the RAAF would begin visits to Indonesia for airman-to-airman talks when F/A-18 aircraft were transiting to or from FPDA exercises.108 By November 1991, RAAF aircraft were landing in Indonesia on return from Butterworth and the FPDA and Churinga exercises.109

The two air forces also began airlift and drop training exercises in 1991.110 Before long there were rotating visits between Australia and Indonesia on an annual basis.111

106 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, November 1998.
107 Apart from the preference of the RAAF to exercise with the more sophisticated USAF, there may have been some sensitivity that Australia’s long-range fighter-bombers, the F-111 aircraft, had been ordered from the US in 1963 with Indonesian targets in mind. See fn 38.
111 Chris Spence, ‘No.86 Wing and the Air Training Process’, in Keith Brent (ed.) Regional Air Power Workshop RAAF Richmond, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996, p.71. During Rajawali Ausindo ‘94, the main series for air lift exercises, RAAF C-130s and a platoon from 3rd Battalion worked with TNI-AU to provide tactical air transport training (Waters, ‘Regional Air Power Cooperation—an RAAF Perspective’, in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.185). In October 1995, an Indonesian C-130 transport plane and 55 air and ground crew arrived at Richmond in Australia for air transport training exercise. According the Defence Annual Report for FY1995–1996, the Rajawali Ausindino for that period consisted of ‘tactical air transport operations [which led] to an increase in interoperability between Australian and Indonesian air
Maritime air surveillance exercises involving RAAF P3Cs and TNI-AU Nomads became another important arena for cooperation.\textsuperscript{112} By November 1993, air defence exercises were taking place between the RAAF and TNI-AU, showing that a wider range of operational activity and greater complexity in exercises was developing.\textsuperscript{113} According to the CDF, Admiral Alan Beaumont, these exercises were ‘a major step forward’ in cooperation.\textsuperscript{114} Moreover, there were plans for more air defence cooperation with Indonesia. According to Flight Lt Pulford of the RAAF’s No.3 Squadron, ‘we are planning to do more with the Indonesians under the framework of the security cooperation agreement. We have... been given the heads-up that we should prepare for upcoming exercises’\textsuperscript{115} Apart from expanding the new Elang Ausindo series that was already underway, there were plans for another air defence series, the Albatross Ausindo, to begin in 1997.\textsuperscript{116}

**Intelligence exchanges**

Coordinating Board (BAKIN) formally began in 1971.\textsuperscript{117} By 1974, there had been five rounds of regular meetings—an average of two each year (this was changed to annual meetings after 1974). At the March 1974 meeting the discussion covered such subjects as China’s international posture, ASEAN, Asian collective security, Papua New Guinea and international terrorism.\textsuperscript{118} In 1974, a Foreign Affairs officer was appointed to the Jakarta embassy as a National Intelligence Committee (NIC) Liaison officer to BAKIN to ensure continuity to the relationship\textsuperscript{119} and in 1977 an ASIS Liaison Officer was appointed to BAKIN.\textsuperscript{120} By the 1976 meeting, the closeness of the intelligence relationship was indicated by the statement from the head of the Defence Department’s Joint Intelligence Organisation, Gordon Jockel:

The intelligence relations with Indonesia were extremely valuable and important to Australia. They were the closest intelligence relations Australia had in South-East Asia. Australia’s intelligence relations with Indonesia could be used as a precedent for the development of intelligence cooperation with other South-East Asian countries, but Australia’s intelligence contacts with Indonesia would remain by far the most important.\textsuperscript{121} The warmth of the relationship is all the more remarkable given that the statement was made just a year after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975.

During the 1990s several new elements were added, not just to the ASIS-BAKIN connection but also to the wider intelligence relationship between Australia and Indonesia. In the first place, Prime Minister Bob Hawke announced on 24 May 1991 that increased exchanges of intelligence between Australia and other regional countries would assist confidence building in the region.\textsuperscript{122} In the early 1990s talks between BAKIN and its Australian equivalents concluded that the quality of intelligence

\textsuperscript{117} See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement; Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries, Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1985, p.172. Apparently ASIS had conducted covert operations in Jakarta at least since 1954.
\textsuperscript{118} Department of Defence, Joint Intelligence Organisation and National Intelligence Committee, Fourth Annual Report 1974, Canberra, November 1974, p.25. Confidential.
\textsuperscript{119} Department of Defence, Joint Intelligence Organisation and National Intelligence Committee, Fourth Annual Report 1974, Canberra, November 1974, p.25. Confidential.
\textsuperscript{120} See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p.65; Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, p.172.
\textsuperscript{122} R.J. Hawke, ‘Australia’s Security in Asia’, Asia–Australia Institute, Sydney, 24 May 1991, p.11.
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exchanges would be up-graded.123 Second, the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 provided an opportunity for the two countries to share information about prospective maritime threats in that area.124 Third, following in-house discussions about the role of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), CDF General Baker announced on 22 May 1997 that Australia would provide the Indonesian government with information from JORN.125 General Baker said that it was part of a 'joint surveillance' operation that the two countries were undertaking.126 It was suggested that much of the information would focus on illegal fishing and piracy rather than military activities. Fourth, in 1996 exchanges of information were potentially facilitated by a secure communications link between NORCOM, Australian Maritime HQ in Sydney, and the Indonesian naval command in Surabaya and ABRI HQ in Jakarta.127

Strategic planning

Australia provides important advice to Indonesia about strategic planning, particularly the processes and procedures required to establish Indonesia's strategic requirements

123 Interviews with senior officials from foreign affairs and trade, defence and intelligence organisations, Canberra, November 1998.
127 Don Chalmers, ‘Regional Engagement in Practice: Implementing Policy—a View from the Field’, in Jack McCaffrie and Dick Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996, p.70; Stuart Harris, ‘Regional Security Dimensions’, paper presented to the joint Northern Territory/CSIS Seminar on Progress and Challenges of the Indonesian–Northern Territory MoU and the Australian Indonesian Development Area (AIDA), Jakarta, 3 April 1997; interview with RAN officer (ret.), Darwin, May 1997. During proceedings at the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee in June 1999, Air Vice Marshall Nicholson, made the following statement about the history and current status of the communications links between Australia and Indonesia: 'It began with as a commercial grade secure link between maritime headquarters and the headquarters of Eastern Fleet Surabaya. That was successfully operated for a couple of years. It was then extended to operate between Headquarters, Northern Command and the headquarters of KODAM 9, the 9th military region, based in Denpasar, Bali. The intention was to extend it between Headquarters ADF, here in Canberra, and MABES TNI—MABES just means headquarters. I am not sure that that last link has actually been put in place. The other two links are used occasionally, infrequently. It is an off-the-shelf, commercial cryptographic set to enable security telephone and secure fax, using the normal telephone system'. See Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, 'Consideration of Budget Estimates', p.196.
and acquisition programs.\textsuperscript{128} For example, the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) undertook, at the request of the Indonesian government, a project to establish the logistical capabilities for defending island territory, in this case the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{129} An important aspect of this project is wargames to establish how best to sustain a force in such environments. In these ways Australia has become an important source for intellectual advice on defence planning to Indonesia.

\textit{Defence industry, science and technology cooperation}

Little in the way of defence industry cooperation took place during the early-mid 1990s between Australia and Indonesia. Several issues continued to overwhelm the prospects for cooperation in this area, even though it was proposed in most regional agendas. For example, discussion about exports of the Steyr rifle to ABRI raised, once again, concerns in some quarters that such arms sales could undermine Australia’s foreign policy and human rights principles. Nonetheless, some progress has been made and in June 1996 Australia and Indonesia signed an agreement to increase collaboration within the aviation industry.\textsuperscript{130}

By 1995–96 more than twenty research and training collaborative activities were underway or planned with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{131} Oversight of these programs is provided by the newly established Australian–Indonesian Defence Coordination Committee and in particular its Defence Science and Technology Working Group (see below). Collaborative activities between DSTO and its equivalents in Indonesia include research on high frequency propagation and synthetic aperture radar and composite repair of metallic aircraft structures.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{128} Interview with ADF personnel, Jakarta, June 1997.
\textsuperscript{129} Interview with ADF personnel, Jakarta, June 1997. Also see Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, ‘Consideration of Budget Estimates’, p.191.
\textsuperscript{130} Greg Earl, ‘Air Deals With Indonesia’, AFR, 1 July 1996.
\textsuperscript{132} Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995–1996, p.169. During proceedings at the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee in June 1999, it was claimed by a member of that committee, Senator Hogg, that ‘the current areas of cooperation [between Australia and Indonesia] are stated to include integrated communications technologies, chemical analysis and detection, GPS accuracy HF propagation and aircraft investigation techniques’. Hogg
Outcomes

From the Labor government’s perspective, Indonesia was the most important regional country for Australia. As Admiral Alan Beaumont said when he was CDF, ‘more than any other regional nation, a sound strategic relationship with Indonesia is of greatest importance for Australia’s security’. And indeed a sound strategic relationship was achieved. In part this was due to the personal friendships which were developed between key political and defence individuals: for example between Generals Gratton and Sutrisno, between General Baker and Admiral Beaumont and their equivalents in ABRI, between Foreign Ministers Evans and Alatas and between Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating and President Suharto. These friendships helped to resolve several potential political problems: for example when a diplomatic row looked imminent following the nomination in 1995 of a new Indonesian ambassador in Australia who had supported the 1991 Dili massacre in East Timor; and when Australia nominated an ambassador for Jakarta who had been critical of the Indonesian regime.

The sound strategic relationship was also the result of defence cooperation between the military establishments that had enhanced trust and confidence and had also helped to ameliorate potential political tensions. Some indication of this occurred in August 1995, when demonstrators in Australia burned the Indonesian flag in protest about the 50th anniversary of Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor. Given ABRI’s dual political and security role (dwi fungsi) it was not surprising that ABRI officials were highly offended. ABRI’s chief spokesman, Brigadier-General Suwarno Adiwijoyo, made it clear that he deplored the act. However, he also warned against tit-for-tat responses which had been characteristic of both sides in the past, saying that ‘[i]f [Indonesia does] similar things—burning their flags—we’ll be the one who losses’ [sic]. This reaction noted that ‘we are engaged in cooperation in areas of communications, electronic warfare and information technology’. The Defence Department representatives at the Committee asked that their reply to these observations be presented as a written statement. See Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, ‘Consideration of Budget Estimates’, pp.195–196.

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contrasted with calls from other officials within Indonesia to sever the relationship. The Australian Defence Minister, Robert Ray, like the Indonesian military, was also highly critical of the incident and suggested that 'the [Australian] government long-term will have to look at outlawing this, making it illegal to burn another country's flag'.137 The incident took place while Indonesian and Australian military forces were participating in Kangaroo '95 for the first time and presumably both militaries considered this exercise and the continuation of other defence cooperation activities to be more important than reacting adversely to the flag burning incident.

The contribution that defence cooperation had made to the improvement in the security relationship was stressed by Australian officials. For example, the CDF, Admiral Beaumont, said in 1993 that exercises were an important part of long-term relationships in the region and provided a basis for rebuilding relationships that might be damaged by diplomatic problems.138 The Defence Minister Senator Ray told the Indonesian press that more military exercises would reduce misunderstandings and increase friendship.139 And defence staff in the Australian embassy in Jakarta confirmed that the Indonesian–Australian relationship was expanding and maturing and that 'at the centre of the relationship is an understanding on both sides that it is through mutual contact and cooperative activities that the relationship is developed'.140 Quite clearly, by this time the tensions between the policies for defence cooperation and human rights had been successfully disregarded by defence officials.

From the Indonesian perspective not only was the relationship much stronger but as a result of defence cooperation the combat and operational competency of all three services was enhanced. As an Indonesian navy spokesman said, the main purpose of exercises between Australia and Indonesia was to increase combat capabilities of both navies and forge closer friendship and cooperation.141

138 Daly, 'RAAF to "Attack" Indonesia', The Age, 9 October 1993.
141 'Indonesia and Australia Stage Naval Exercise', Reuters News Service, 9 August 1994. The argument that defence cooperation makes a significant contribution to the relationship continued to be made by the Liberal Defence Minister, Ian McLachlan. McLachlan also claimed that the
DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND SINGAPORE

Under Labor, defence cooperation between Australia and Singapore expanded significantly. Some cooperative measures grew out of the existing multilateral structure—the FPDA—while others were the result of new bilateral arrangements. Several of the new arrangements were based on novel contracts permitting the Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) to train, exercise and store equipment at Australian military facilities for periods up to twenty-five years.

The FPDA has been the linchpin for defence cooperation between Singapore and Australia for over two and a half decades. Defence cooperation through FPDA had been regular but uneventful for most of the 1970s and 1980s. After the publication of the 1987 White Paper, which set down directions for establishing the defence of Australia, the Defence Minister Kim Beazley claimed that Australia would continue to focus its contribution to regional security through the FPDA. The focus of FPDA, he said, would be to ‘help...develop [regional countries’] military capabilities’. However, few changes were made to the FPDA during the late 1980s. When, in the early 1990s, the Australian government began to stress that regional cooperation would be the basis of regional security policy, the FPDA became an obvious site for expanding cooperation between Australia and its partners. This coincided with Singapore’s interest in expanding the FPDA in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In September 1994, when Singapore hosted the biennial meeting for FPDA defence ministers, the respective ministers agreed with the two proposals suggested by the Minister for Defence, Dr Lee Boon Yang. The first was that the existing organisational structure should be modified to ‘strengthen decision-making processes’; and the second was that it was necessary to ‘further raise the level of sophistication of FPDA

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142 See the earlier discussion in this chapter about the formation of the FPDA.
144 The Chiefs of Staff meet every year and the Defence Ministers meet every three years.
145 ‘FPDA Defence Ministers’ Conference’, 20 September 1994, transcript issued by the Department of Defence, Canberra, p.3.
exercises and to increase the efficiency of the integrated air defence system'. As a result the two previous councils were replaced with a single one which allowed for greater integration between the air, land and sea components of FPDA. The two main FPDA exercises—the IADS ADEX (or Integrated Air Defence System Air Defence Exercise) involving the five air forces, and the exercise Starfish involving the five navies—continued during 1995 and 1996. In 1997, a third exercise, Flying Fish, was introduced, the first time combined naval and air exercises were performed. It was held off Malaysia’s Tioman Island in the South China Sea and was the biggest FPDA exercise ever conducted. And for the first time both the Maritime Component Commander and the Air Component Commander participated, showing the successful integration of maritime and air commands. According to the Malaysian Defence Minister, Datuk Syed Hamid Albar, it was an ‘historical incident’. ‘Interoperability’, he said, is ‘the key factor that will ensure effectiveness of the countries in the new

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146 ‘FPDA Defence Ministers’ Conference’, p.3.

147 According to the Singaporean Defence Minister, ‘Under the revised structure, a new consultative council to be called the FPDA consultative council (FCC) will replace the existing joint consultative council (JCC) and the air defence council (ADC).’ See, ‘FPDA Defence Ministers’ Conference’, p.3.

148 The Integrated Air Defence System has its headquarters at Butterworth in Malaysia. The commander is traditionally a two-star RAAF officer. Under Labor the RAAF replaced a squadron of Mirage fighters stationed at Butterworth with rotational visits of F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft. P3C Orion surveillance aircraft operate from Butterworth throughout the year under the Gateway Operation, which conducts ‘surveillance patrols of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean’. See Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995–1996, p.103.

149 The Starfish series started in 1980. Since then more exercise segments have been added: for example, in 1989 surface-to-air training was introduced to the traditional surface and sub-surface routines and during Starfish ’95 conventional and nuclear submarines exercised. See Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995–1996, p.65; and ‘FPDA Exercise to Have Surface-to-Air Combat Training’, Business Times (Singapore), 1 July 1989. According to Captain Jack Macaffrie, Director General of the RAN’s Maritime Studies Program ‘[t]he Starfish series has become bigger and more complex over the years’. See McCaffrie, ‘Regional Cooperation—a RAN Perspective’, in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.101.


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security environment of the region'. Moreover, the Malaysian Defence Minister flagged further changes involving the armies of FPDA members saying that that 'in future we will have to see if there is a need to get the army involved'. Without doubt the FPDA grew in sophistication during the 1990s, in terms of the nature of the exercises and the arrangements for tactical command and decision-making. Apart from deepening and widening their cooperative activities through the FPDA, Australia and Singapore also introduced several new exercises and arrangements.

Individual training

The number of Singaporean personnel training in Australian increased during the 1990s. Most of this was conducted through the DCP and the average annual number is about 100. Australia also provides in-country training to Singaporean personnel.

Unit level cooperation

The three services in both countries increased the number and sophistication of bilateral exercises during the 1990s. Interoperability expanded and the Singaporean Armed Forces gained enormous operational and combat benefits from the assistance given by the ADF and from the arrangements for elements of the Singaporean Army and Air Force to train in Australia.

Navy to Navy cooperation

The RAN now conducts more exercise series with the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), than any other of the ASEAN navies. Whereas in the late 1980s the main

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155 Andres, ‘First FPDA Joint Naval, Air Exercise’, New Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 1 April 1997. The FPDA army element started in 1981, initially being hosted alternatively by Australia and New Zealand but later by Malaysia and Singapore. Suman Warrior is the major land exercise. The seventh of the series was held in Queensland in October 1996 and involved 40 Singaporeans—part of total of 300 troops from FPDA countries. See Leong Chan Teik, ‘Dr Tony Tan on 7-day Visit to Australia’, Straits Times, Reuters News Service, 18 October 1996.

156 In addition to agreeing to upgrade the FPDA in these ways, some members also pressed for an expansion of the geographic area covered by the Agreement. Malaysia has suggested that Sabah and Sarawak should be included and that as a consequence Brunei could become a member. In March 1990, Brunei attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the FPDA countries as an observer. For Australia’s cautious response to this suggestion see Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, pp.96–97.
series was Tasman Sea, a combined maritime operations in a multi-threat environment, in the 1990s there are at least six series. These include:

- the Harpoona series, starting in 1992, and described as a ‘war at sea exercise’.  

- the ASWEX series, starting in 1993, and aimed at ASW procedures and tactics. 

- the Axoloty series, starting in 1993, and aimed at RAN/RSN interoperability in diving and explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine countermeasures (MCM) operations. 

- the Singaroo series, starting in 1996, and aimed at interoperability in combined maritime procedures and tactics. 

- the Hunter series, starting in 1996, and aimed at MCM interoperability between RAN and RSN. 

In addition to expanding the number and sophistication of bilateral exercises the RAN invited the Singaporean Navy and Air Force to the multilateral Kakadu series in 1993 and 1995. (See above for a description of the aims of this series.) The Tricrab series, sponsored by the USN, and aimed at MCM and EOD, now involves both the RAN and RSN.

Through these activities the RAN has made an important contribution to the development of the RSN’s operational and combat skills. As Rear Admiral Don Chalmers, then Maritime Commander Australia, points out, the RAN and particular individuals have made important contributions to the RSN:

157 Conversation with Singaporean Defence Adviser, Canberra, 5 August 1999. 
158 This does not include those exercises conducted under FPDA. 
159 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p.139. 
160 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p.140. 
Our [RAN] participation in exercises in their [RSN] tactical trainer and the fine work that Commander Ted Walsh has undertaken in the damage control and firefighting areas has been and will continue to be important.166

And, as Chalmers also predicted, the RSN, in exercises with the RAN, will seek to 'move onto the next level of complexity'.167 One recent indication that this is well underway is that there is now a 'formal set of Standard Operation Procedures' which was ratified during Singaroo '96 and then signed in Singapore by the Maritime Commander Australia and Fleet Commander RSN prior to Singaroo '97.168 As the Defence Annual Report for 1995–96 repeatedly states, exercises between the two navies now demonstrate 'improved interoperability'.169

**Air Force to Air Force cooperation**

Air exercises between the RAAF and Republic of Singapore Air force (RSAF) grew in sophistication during the 1990s. This occurred in the already established Churinga series under FPDA170 and in the two new series: the Nulla Nulla air defence missile exercise starting in 1989 and the exercise Western Reward beginning in 1992.171

But the most significant development in the RSAF's combat and operational skills air exercises occurred as a result of Singapore's involvement, beginning in 1992, in the Pitch Black series which Australia conducts regularly with the USAF.172 The exercises grew in sophistication and the RSAF steadily increased its participation in combat

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170 The FPDA now involves deployments of F-111s, F/A-18s, C-130s and B-707 tankers to Singapore and Malaysia for over four weeks.
171 Western Reward 1992 involved some 125 Singaporean personnel and some 14 aircraft: eight F-5 interceptors, four F-16 fighters, one E2C early warning aircraft and one C-130 air-to-air refueling tanker. See 'Singapore, Australia Air Forces Start Exercise', Reuters News Service, 5 October 1992.
scenarios. By 1996, Pitch Black had become ‘Australia’s largest air defence exercise’ and there was growing interoperability between the three air forces. The purpose of the exercise is to test Australia’s northern air defences and it was reportedly:

The first exercise involving airborne early warning aircraft on both sides and [tested] Australia’s long term strategy of introducing airborne early warning and control (AEW & C) aircraft into its air defence system.

The wargames were designed to give aircrews ‘realistic air combat experience in a joint/combined training environment’. At times there were more than fifty aircraft in the air together and the forces took part in ‘comprehensive air defence battle with missions flown day and night’. Clearly, such exercises are designed to increase the combat capabilities of all participants. As Flight Lt Liam Pulford from the RAAF pointed out, ‘on the first day of the war scenario’ all available assets [were] used including dropping live weapons on Delamere tactical air weapons range. According to RAAF officers, the Singaporean pilots were ‘ecstatic’ with the level of the combat activities undertaken during the exercise.

Other areas of cooperation between the two air forces are either underway or being discussed. In 1994, Canberra agreed to the RSAF conducting remotely piloted vehicle

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173 The 1994 Pitch Black series involved RAAF F-111s, F/A-18s, a C-130 and a B-707; USMC AV-8s, F/A-18s and EA-6Bs; and RSAF F-16s, F-5s and E-2Cs. See Waters, ‘Regional Air Power Cooperation—an RAAF Perspective’, in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.182. The 1995 Pitch Black exercise was subsumed into Kangaroo 1995. See Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995-1996, p.104. Singapore participated in the Kangaroo ‘95 (ibid., p.125.).


180 Interview with RAAF officers, Darwin, May 1997.
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(RPV) training in Australia.\(^{181}\) And in October 1996, during Dr Tony Tan’s visit to Canberra, the two countries signed a memoranda for air-to-air refueling exercises.\(^ {182}\)

**Army to Army cooperation**

Apart from the FPDA series of Army to Army exercises (namely, the brigade level command post exercise Suman Warrior) several new exercises were introduced during the 1990s. One was the Flaming Arrow series, which started in 1992, and is held in Singapore and aims to improve interoperability between infantry units of the Australian and Singaporean armies.\(^ {183}\) And the other is the Matilda series, which started in 1991, and is a triennial company level exercise held in Singapore aimed at interoperability between ADF and SAF.

**Special Forces cooperation**

The SAS and the SAF Special Forces (SOF) have been participating in bilateral exercises annually since 1993.\(^ {184}\) The main series is called Night Lion.

**Singaporean deployments in Australia**

During the 1990s Australia became the most important training location for the Singaporean Armed Forces.\(^ {185}\) The two countries agreed upon several arrangements. In 1992, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) provided for deployments of the Republic of Singaporean Air Force (RSAF) to Australia for up to ten months.\(^ {186}\) RSAF units were deployed at RAAF bases at Darwin and Tindal in the Northern Territory.

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183 Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 1996–1997*, p.100. According Singaporean report the 1997 Flaming Arrow series was held at the SAFTI live-firing area in Pasir Laba in Singapore. It was the fifth in the annual series and involved 110 Australian soldiers from the Rifle Company, Butterworth (RCB) and 400 Singaporean troops from 1 SIR. According to a MINDEF press release on 18 March 1997, Flaming Arrow ‘is an opportunity to develop interoperability between Australia and Singapore through an exchange of knowledge of each forces’ tactics and operational staff procedures’. Media Releases, MINDEF Internet Webservice, www.mindf.gov.sg/midpa/media.htm.
184 Correspondence with the Singaporean Defence Adviser, Canberra, 2 August 1999.
185 Singaporean personnel are also trained in Taiwan, Brunei, United States, France, Israel, Thailand, Indonesia, Israel and Bangladesh.

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Amberley in Queensland, at Williamtown in Victoria and at Richmond in New South Wales. Arrangements were also made for the RSAF to use the Delamere electronic warfare range in Northern Territory and the Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) in Queensland.187

Apart from air force training in Australia, the Singaporean Army has also significantly increased other training in Australia. The main site where this takes place is the SWBTA, a largely forested terrain twice the size of Singapore. The two main exercises conducted there, the Wallaby and Wallaroo exercises, are held annually and focus on armoured, combined-arms and joint service operations. At the October 3/96 Wallaby exercise some 3,900 SAF personnel and 150 armoured vehicles were involved.188 RSAF A-4s, F-5s, C-130s and Super Pumas supported army units.189 A major storage facility for SAF equipment (e.g., armoured vehicles) in SWBTA was opened at the Rockhampton airport in December 1995.190

Apart from arrangements for short term deployments of the Singaporean military to Australia, other agreements were signed which allowed the Singaporean Armed Forces to establish several ‘semi-permanent’ facilities for training in Australia. The first of these, established by a MoU in 1993, was set up at Pearce Air Base in Western Australia, just north of Perth. Pearce became the site for the relocation of Singapore’s Air Force’s Flying Training School.191 The MoU is for fifteen years in the first instance with an option to renew for another ten years.192 The first sixteen aircraft and 150

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personnel arrived in late 1993 with further arrivals bringing the number to thirty aircraft and 400 personnel, including dependents.\textsuperscript{193}

Provision for a second ‘semi-permanent’ facility at the Australian Army’s Aviation Base at Oakey, was signed in October 1996.\textsuperscript{194} This arrangement will extend until 2012 and involves up to twelve Super Puma helicopters and about 250 Singaporean personnel and their dependents.\textsuperscript{195} According to the Department of Defence ‘[t]he squadron’s main role is maintaining flying skills and operational capabilities’.\textsuperscript{196}

Two other training facilities for the SAF are under discussion. In March 1995, talks began about basing the Singapore Air Force jet trainer squadron at Amberley in Queensland. Some twenty A-4 Super Skyhawk aircraft and up to 280 support personnel and their families would be involved. Eventually this project would involve some 700 Singaporean nationals. Amberley however was ruled out following an environmental study that predicted unacceptable levels of noise.\textsuperscript{197} Discussions about a new site for the project continue.\textsuperscript{198} The other facility being discussed is reportedly a new training area.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{193} Waters, ‘Regional Air Power Cooperation—an RAAF Perspective’, in Waters and Lax (eds), \emph{Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin}, p.182.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Department of Defence, ‘Singapore Helicopter Training in Queensland’, Media Release, Office of the Minister for Defence, 21 October 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Department of Defence, ‘Singapore Helicopter Training in Queensland’, Media Release, Office of the Minister for Defence, 21 October 1996. According to the press release ‘Singapore is expected to pay $30 to $35 million for the construction of dedicated facilities’. According to newspaper reports some $5 million a year in maintenance and $10 million in annual wages will benefit local communities. See Roy Eccleston, ‘Racism Claims Touch Off Concerns for Foreigners’ Helicopter Base’, \emph{The Australian}, 31 October 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Charles Miranda, Secret Air Base Search: Foreign Jets Seek Australian Home’, \emph{The Daily Telegraph}, 7 February 1997.
\end{itemize}
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three times the size of Singapore, which Singapore would help the Australian Defence Department to develop.\textsuperscript{199} A final decision had not been taken in the period under study.

Australian training facilities are invaluable to the Singaporean Armed Forces for developing combat skills. An indication of the value attached to these arrangements is that in June 1995, CDF Admiral Alan Beaumont, became the first Australian to receive Singapore’s highest military award.\textsuperscript{200} It signaled Singapore’s acknowledgment of Beaumont’s ‘outstanding service in promoting defence relations between Australia and Singapore’ and his ‘personal commitment and enthusiastic support [which] greatly eased the move of the Republic of Singapore Air Force’s Flying Training School to Pearce Air Base in Western Australia’.\textsuperscript{201} In February 1995, CDF Beaumont also supported an agreement to allow SAF army training at the Shoalwater Bay Training in Queensland.\textsuperscript{202}

\textit{Intelligence exchanges}

Australia and Singapore have long standing intelligence links. In April 1965, ASIS established formal liaison arrangements with the Singapore Special Branch. Later in 1970, when the Security and Intelligence Division (SID) of the Ministry of Defence was established to concentrate on external intelligence, ASIS helped the new organisation by bringing two research officers in Australia and training them in such areas as carding, filing, and registry work.\textsuperscript{203} Apparently, the level of standard of intelligence exchanged during this period was not high quality but some useful contacts were nonetheless established. ASIS also exchanged intelligence with the Internal Security Division (ISD), including information about international terrorism. During the 1990s the quality of intelligence exchanges between the two countries was apparently increased, though the nature of the material is difficult to assess given the extreme secrecy surrounding this


\textsuperscript{203} See Richelson and Ball, \textit{The Ties That Bind} and especially p.172.
area. The general intelligence relationship, however, had periods of tension. In early 1996, for example, Australian defence and intelligence officials claimed that, following an unspecified ‘incident’, Canberra became alarmed over apparent Singaporean efforts to collect intelligence on Australian defence capabilities.

Strategic planning

Australia does not provide any assistance to Singapore in strategic planning. According to official sources the high level courses that SAF personnel attend in Australia have generic strategic subjects as part of the curriculum but there is no dedicated training.

Defence industry, science and technology cooperation

Little in the way of defence industry cooperation developed during the 1990s between Australia and Singapore. One project, the Nulka, a missile decoy system, is being seen as a test case for the future cooperation. Australia does provide industry support for Singaporean military aircraft and armoured vehicles located in Western Australia and Queensland respectively.

In the areas of science and technology, the DSTO worked with Singapore on ‘F404 aircraft engine performance modeling’. Under a MoU for Collaboration in Defence Science and Technology potential areas for additional cooperation include ship survivability and shock testing, land operations technology, and integrated communications. Overall, there is little evidence of much activity in these areas.

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204 Interviews with senior officials from Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence and intelligence organisations, Canberra, November 1998.
206 Correspondence with Singaporean Defence Adviser, Canberra, 2 August 1999.
207 For such issues as security concerns and intellectual property.
208 Wylie, ‘Regional Engagement and Defence Cooperation—the Thrust into Asia’, in MaCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, p.79.
Outcomes

Singapore, perhaps more than any other country in the region, has mixed motives for defence cooperation with Australia. On the one hand, Singapore unequivocally advocates security cooperation as a means for underwriting a stable region. On the other hand, Singapore’s political and geo-strategic vulnerability ensures that any opportunity to advance operational and combat skills through training and exercises and use of Australian facilities will be pursued vigorously. From Australia’s perspective, given the growing technological sophistication of Singapore’s armed forces, there is an increasing affinity between the two countries as exercise partners and the relationship is mutually beneficial. For example, Singapore’s AEW&C capabilities have helped Australia to develop these skills at a time when Australia lacks a similar capability.

Moreover, apart from developing combat skills through cooperation with Australia, Singapore’s military and political elite also consider Australia’s alliance with the United States another attraction for defence cooperation arrangements. As indicated above, the RSAF now participates in the highly sophisticated Pitch Black air exercise series, involving the USAF and RAAF. But equally importantly the connection between Australia’s membership both the FPDA and the alliance is seen to be a valuable deterrent from the Singaporean perspective. As Lee Hsien Loong, the Second Minister for Defence, said some time ago:

[T]he core of FPDA [is] political and psychological deterrence...the very presence of forces belonging to an FPDA—e.g., Australian aircraft squadron—must raise the possibility of a response from that partner...[and] some sort of reaction from the partner’s allies, linked to it through other alliances.212

The degree to which Australia’s security cooperation with Singapore, especially in the heady days of the early 1990s, took account of these various motives for defence cooperation is arguable. What is clear is that both parties’ operational and combat skills are undoubtedly stronger as a consequence of defence cooperation.

DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND MALAYSIA

The defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia, like the one between Australia and Singapore, largely revolved around the FPDA during the 1970s and for most of the 1980s. And, as also occurred with Singapore, during the early 1990s the FPDA became the site of increased cooperation between Australia and Malaysia. However, with the exception of extra special forces exercises, there were very few new exercises introduced. Individual training and study visits on the other hand did expand.

Individual training and study visits

During the 1990s the number of Malaysian personnel visiting Australia for study and training went from 114 in 1993–94 to 138 in 1996–97. These visits took place under the DCP and personnel were located at a wide range of military establishments. Australians were hosted at Malaysian military establishments: for example, RAN officers served at Lumut Naval Base. In addition Australia provided short, in-country training programs to Malaysian personnel.

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213 As discussed in Chapter One, Australia has had a long defence relationship with Malaysia, going back to the 1950s and Konfrontasi.

214 Malaysia like Singapore and Indonesia participated in Kangaroo '95 for the first time.


216 For example; the RAN hosted personnel at HMAS Albatross, Cerberus, Creswell, Penguin, and other establishments; the Army hosted personnel at Fairbairn, Richmond, Bandiana and other establishments; and the RAAF hosted personnel at Richmond, Amberley and other establishments. In addition educational organisations such as Australian Defence Force Academy, the Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies, the Australian Defence Warfare Centre, the Joint Services College and RAN Maritime Studies Centre also hosted personnel.

217 For example, in 1997 there were some 16 Australian personnel in Malaysia for this purpose. Interviews with defence personnel, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997.

218 For example, in 1993/94 there were some 439 Malaysian personnel trained by the ADF in Malaysia *Senate Hansard*, Question No.1830, 31 January 1995, p.178. The establishments where this training took place included the Malaysian Command & Staff College and the instruction was conducted by among others the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, the Maritime Studies Program and the Air Powers Study Centre. One such in country program which started in 1992, involved Australian personnel from the RAN Maritime Studies Program and the RAAF Air Powers Studies Centre who presented a two week module to the Armed Forces College and lectures to officers at the Staff College and Royal Malaysian Naval Base at Lumut. The arrangement, which came under the auspices of the 1992 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program (see below), was aimed at giving 'students a good understanding of the principles underpinning the use of maritime and air power in peace and war so that those principles can be applied in a Malaysian context'. See
Unit training

As indicated above, much of the expansion in unit training took place as a result of the improvements in the FPDA series (which have already been discussed). Given the less sophisticated nature of Malaysia’s air and naval capabilities, relative to that of the other FPDA partners, it is likely that cooperation with Malaysia will be less advanced than it is between the others. Nonetheless, the RAN in particular has provided important assistance with operational and combat skills.219

Navy to Navy cooperation

Apart from the naval components within FPDA there appears to be no new bilateral naval exercises introduced during the early 1990s. Lumutex, a formalised passage exercise and harbour training is one of the few bilateral exercises outside of the FPDA.220 Ship visits took place regularly and more often; for example, RAN ship visits went from eight to twenty-three in 1993–94.221 The RAN also invited the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) to the multilateral Kakadu Fleet Concentration series (see above).

Air Force to Air Force cooperation

Again, cooperation between the RAAF and the RMAF (Royal Malaysia Air Force) was under the auspices of FPDA.222 For example, No.36 Squadron and AMTDU (Air Movements Training and Development Unit) participated with RMAF C-130 for tactical

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219 According to a senior RAN officer, ‘Australia may have been too generous’ with its assistance. Interview, Canberra, November 1998.
220 McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, Annex, p.57.
operations and airdrop training at Richmond, Australia. The RAAF also conducts
navigator training for the RMAF.

Army to Army cooperation

Traditionally, Army to Army exercises have been an important area of cooperation
between the two countries, originating during the Emergency in the 1950s and
Konfrontasi during the 1960s. A long-standing Army to Army exercise, the
Haringaroo series, involving the Australian Rifle Company based in Butterworth, had
several elements added to it in the 1990s. And, the battalion level exercise, Southern
Tiger, was started in 1992.

Special forces

Special forces exercises between the two militaries were taking place in the 1980s under
the Pernburn Rusa series. During the 1990s special forces exercises were formally
increased. The 1990 Night Tiger series was followed by Tiger Moon in 1993 (which
focused on ‘war roles’ for special forces) and Day Tiger in 1994. In October 1996,
Malaysian special forces visited Australia for Kokoa Tiger. According to the Defence
Annual Report for 1995–96, the ‘outcome’ of the exercise was ‘an increased awareness
of commando capabilities’.

Intelligence exchanges

Intelligence links between Australia and Malaysia are long-standing. In 1964, ASIS
established formal liaison arrangements with both the Malaysian Special Branch (MSB)

227 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, pp.133–142.
228 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 1995–1996, p.100. If this is correct then Australian–Malaysian special forces cooperation is close since many ‘commando’ activities are restricted.
of the Malaysian Police and the Malaysian External Intelligence Organisation (MEIO).\(^{229}\) Intelligence exchanges between ASIS and the MSB were originally concerned with the internal issue of communist insurgency, especially since Australia supported Malaysia during Konfrontasi with Indonesia. ASIS also assisted MSB, with, for example, a number of technical operations. Initial cooperation between ASIS and MEIO was limited (due to a number of organizational and political issues) but after 1972 it apparently improved. During the 1990s, as was the case with Indonesia and Singapore, the quality of intelligence exchanges was apparently enhanced, though exactly in what ways is difficult to know.\(^{230}\) As with Singapore, there have been tensions in the general intelligence relationship. On one occasion in 1995 Australia was the alleged offender in an ‘incident’ that reportedly involved ‘bugging’ of the Malaysian embassy in Canberra.\(^{231}\)

**Strategic planning**

The ADF has provided extensive assistance to the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces with the development of its doctrine and strategic plans for the defence of Malaysia. According to some sources, notwithstanding each country’s different defence requirements, there is a remarkable similarity in the wording of Australian and Malaysian doctrinal documents.\(^{232}\)

**Defence industry and science and technology cooperation**

For much of the first half of the 1990s, Australia and Malaysia were involved in extensive negotiations about a joint development plan for a patrol boat program.\(^{233}\) Indeed, as Bob Wylie observed, there was such an extraordinary amount of momentum that the project appeared to be the ‘touchstone of the overall relationship between the

\(^{229}\) Richelson and Ball, *The Ties That Bind*, p.172.

\(^{230}\) Interviews with senior officials from Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence and intelligence organisations, Canberra, November 1998.


\(^{232}\) Interviews with defence personnel, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997.

two countries'. At the end of Labor's time in office the arrangement had not been finalised but in October 1997, it was terminated when the Malaysians announced that a German tender had won the contract.

With regard to science and technology cooperation, some collaborative projects had been established between the two countries by 1995–96. Under the Malaysian–Australia Joint Defence Program (see below) signed in 1992 and its associated Defence Science and Industry Working Group, the DSTO and the Malaysian Defence Science and Technology Centre instituted collaborative research into military vehicle instrumentation and food science. In addition several visits between the organisations took place.

**Outcomes**

The overall defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia is the longest and, some would argue, the closest of all regional relationships. Nonetheless, there are long-standing and current political sensitivities, a number of which came to the surface during Labor's time in office. The most protracted issues between the two countries arose because of differences about regional economic arrangements. It was in this context that Prime Minister Paul Keating commented about Dr Mahathir's refusal to attend the APEC Summit in Seattle in 1993, saying that:

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234 Wylie, 'Regional Engagement and Defence Cooperation—the Thrust into Asia', in Macaffrie and Sherwood (eds), *The Navy and Regional Engagement*, p.79.


237 The reasons usually given are Australia's assistance to Malaysia in the 1950s and 1960s, especially during Konfronatsia, and the closeness of the two navies. Apart from attending the same Royal Navy training institutions as RAN personnel, the Chief of the RMN until the late 1960s was a high-ranking RAN officer.

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I couldn’t care less, frankly, whether he comes or not...APEC is bigger than all of us—Australia, the US and Dr Mahathir and any other recalcitrants.239

The new bilateral dispute was particularly vicious.240 It prompted an unusual visit by an 18-member Australian delegation of mostly ADF personnel to Malaysia some two weeks after Mr Keating’s comment. The team spent a period of over two weeks trying to find common ground and ways of resuming normal relations. For many observers it was this visit and the intervention by the Australian Defence Minister Robert Ray that finally brought the incident to an end, rather than diplomatic ties or negotiations.241

Notwithstanding the historic relationship and the demonstrated strength of defence ties, cooperation between Malaysia and Australia requires continuing sensitivity. As one senior Australian defence official points out:

[W]ith Malaysia, perhaps more than with any other country in the region, it is important that we come quickly to understand their culture and how even the smallest indiscretion on our part can affect the relationship.242

For all the sensitivities between the two countries, defence cooperation flourished during Labor’s time in office, and the Malaysian Armed Forces gained considerable combat and operational skills through this cooperation with the ADF.

STRUCTURES, PRACTICAL DIRECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR COOPERATION

When Labor’s Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, began in earnest to establish a new regional security policy in 1989–90 there were few structures, practical directives or operational guidelines to support the policy. Officials in the Department of Defence and military practitioners were often confronted with policy concepts and proposals, such as ‘cooperative security’ and ‘confidence building’, and ‘transparency’ without knowing exactly what that meant in practice.243 Military practitioners found the existing

240 See Camroux, “‘Looking East’...and Inwards”, pp.44–47.
241 Interview with ADF officer, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997.
242 Chalmers, ‘Regional Engagement in Practice’, in McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, p.72.
243 Interview with ADF officer, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997.
operational guidance was often inappropriate for the new policy.\textsuperscript{244} Some of the guidance was derived from outdated arrangements such as SEATO; some from the FPDA, which did not allow the guidelines to be applied to third parties (e.g., Indonesia) and focused on air defence more than maritime operations; and some was designed for activities with formal allies, like the US and the UK, and was not to be used for interaction with non-NATO militaries.\textsuperscript{245} Overall, much of the operational guidance appeared suited to previous periods, when ‘cooperation’ was directed against other states, rather than the present situation, which stressed ‘cooperation with’ others.

Until the late 1980s Australia had few compelling reasons to revise this situation. The force structures and doctrines of most regional states were designed for internal use and were usually underdeveloped with respect to operational cooperation with other countries. However, as regional states began military modernisation programs\textsuperscript{246} and Australia moved in the 1990s to a regional policy based on cooperative rather than competitive activities the existing structures and directives became inappropriate for the task ahead.

The near absence of suitable formal defence cooperation directives led to several developments. Some practitioners embraced the new policy with enthusiasm, took the initiative and developed measures that they saw as being good cooperative practice. The SAS, for example, were instrumental in establishing cooperative measures with Kopassus. Some senior members of the SAS well before this had supported the idea that cooperation with Kopassus was an important objective. Colonel Chris Roberts, for example, when Commanding Officer of the SAS in the early 1980s, had argued that exchanges and contact between the two groups would enhance security.\textsuperscript{247} Kopassus was the most important security and political group within ABRI and, many argued, within Indonesia.\textsuperscript{248} For many, like Colonel Roberts, unless the military elite in

\textsuperscript{244} Interview with RAN officer, Kuala Lumpur, June 1996.
\textsuperscript{245} Interview with ADF officer, Canberra, May 1997.
\textsuperscript{247} Interviews with ADF officer, May 1997, Darwin.
\textsuperscript{248} Interview with ADF officer, Darwin, May 1997.
Indonesia was known, understood and encouraged to participate, then Australia was unlikely to develop a sound strategic relationship with Indonesia. Previous attempts by the SAS to establish closer contact had been unsuccessful, largely because of political opposition within Australia to cooperation because of alleged involvement of Kopassus in serious human rights abuses in Indonesia. When the Labor government began to promote a policy of security cooperation, the SAS took the opportunity to follow-through on earlier efforts.

In 1992, a new position of army defence attaché was established in the defence section of the Australian embassy in Jakarta. Colonel Jim Molan, an Indonesian speaking infantry officer, was appointed and given a broad directive from Army Chief of Staff, General John Gray, to establish better army to army relations at a pace comfortable to both sides.249 On arrival in Jakarta, Colonel Molan developed several strong personal contacts with senior Kopassus officers250 that set the tone and pace of the relationship. After several rounds of negotiation exchange visits were agreed on, and in May and June of 1993 the first visits took place (see above).

In the absence of detailed official guidance, particular individuals were able to influence the development and pace of cooperative activities. The visits were also to demonstrate how essential personal relationships were to be in this process. By 1993, the pace of the relationship was progressing so quickly that Defence staff at the Australian embassy in Jakarta believed the resources to plan, coordinate and implement cooperative measures were beginning to be strained.251 Likewise, on the Indonesian side it was reported that the ‘desire to expand the nature and scope of cooperative activities tested their ability to plan and coordinate their participation in them’.252 The advice of the Defence staff in Jakarta to the Defence Department was that ‘greater efficiency in planning and coordination can be had by adopting more formal procedures’.253

249 Interview with ADF officer, Canberra, April, 1997.
250 Interview with ADF officer, Canberra, April, 1997.
If the absence of clear practical directives sometimes advanced cooperation at other times it appeared to work against it. One example of this was the Australian–Singapore arrangement for servicing the RSAF Machetti training aircraft that were based at Pearce. The two parties had agreed that an Australian company would provide repair facilities to the SAF. However, the Singaporeans appointed a Singaporean company with a shop-front in Australia and shipped the parts back to Singapore for maintenance. Although the event suggested that Australia was commercially naive, it also underlined how unguided enthusiasm for cooperation could go astray if the practical directives were inadequate.

If some practitioners were keen to develop cooperative measures then others were, for a variety of reasons, content to go slow and not press for precise directives. For example, the RAAF was the last to develop cooperative arrangements with the Indonesian Air Force. Many senior RAAF officers were ‘operators’ who were more interested in spending their limited budgets on exercises with the USAF—the RAAF’s most sophisticated and technologically advanced exercise partner—than on activities with less sophisticated regional air forces. The initial advances that the RAAF made towards cooperation with Indonesia were due not to any conviction that cooperation would benefit the RAAF’s operational skills, but rather that it was politically useful and certainly the wish of their political masters. Much of this cooperation was due to just a few senior and well-placed RAAF advocates of the idea, such as Air Vice Marshall Nicholson when he was the Commanding Officer (CO) of NORCOM during the early 1990s.

For other practitioners the undeveloped nature of practical directives caused confusion and frustration. In 1991, the absence of new Navy directives meant that the RAN spent more hours in the Southern Ocean than it did in the sea–air gap or cooperating with regional navies. In 1992, the Navy’s port visit schedule was in disarray and the

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255 The CO was particularly interested in developing better security relations with Indonesia, spoke Indonesian, traveled to the country and established personal friendships with Indonesian officials and in this way helped to get the RAAF involved in cooperating with the Indonesian air force.
objectives and guidelines for such visits, apart from the undefined policy goal of ‘cooperation’, were far from clear. As one naval officer argued:

The RAN has become a key instrument in the practical implementation of the government’s policy of regional engagement...[y]et RAN cooperation with regional navies has often been ad hoc, poorly focused and sometimes even half hearted.

Some practitioners were frustrated because, they argued, lack of precise directives and operational guidelines could undermine Australia’s own security. According to one naval officer:

Substantial technological, operational and training ‘edges’ are essential in achieving the RAN’s prime directive of maintaining ‘defence of Australia’ capabilities. In particular, capability margins in the entire array of targeting technologies, combat C3I, EW, ASW, and MCM must not be compromised by engagement in CNAs [cooperative naval activities]. Combat orientated cooperation should only be tailored to specific mission areas with particular countries who have a demonstrable need for it, or where a direct long-term benefit to Australia exists.

The arguments made by these practitioners were supported by the general conclusion of an official review of the Defence Cooperation Program, which stated that the rationale for some objectives in the DCP, even those in the key defence document the Strategic Review 1993 (see above), were not readily apparent. As the review of the DCP argued:

Much of the Defence Cooperation sub-Programs range of activities reflects a commonsense approach to achieving objectives that are in broad agreement with policy guidance. However, the rationale for these activities and the relevance of the strategies being followed is not always obvious. Indeed there is some inconsistency in the development of objectives for Defence Cooperation. There is room for clarification and restatement of the underlying framework for cooperative defence activities.

It became more and more obvious that implementing Labor’s cooperative regional security policy would require considerably more attention.
New structures, practical directives, and operational guidelines

To overcome the problems above, several new structures and directives were developed with Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia during the 1990s. Some pertained to the FPDA, as discussed earlier, but most addressed the bilateral relationships.

Indonesia

As discussed above, by 1993 the Defence staff at the Australian embassy in Jakarta was now concerned about the rapid pace and ad hoc nature of bilateral defence activities. To address these kinds of problems, several new structures were put in place over the next few years. These included committees for formulating and coordinating the policy; five working groups to oversee implementation (1995); a ministerial task force (1996); and a ‘Future Directions Plan’ (1996).

1. The Ministerial Task Group (MTG)

As a result of the MTG there are now annual meetings between the two Defence Ministers on a broad range of security issues. The MTG is seen as one of the measures that gives substance to the 1995 Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Maintaining Security.260

2. The Australian–Indonesian Defence Policy Committee (AIDPC)

The AIDPC (originally called the Bilateral Defence Discussions) is co-chaired by the Australian Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the Indonesian equivalent KASUM ABRI. The AIDPC brings together defence personnel from both countries ‘to consider the development of the relationship’.261

260 For a copy of the agreement see Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, Appendix 5, pp.143–144.
261 Inspector-General’s Division, Defence Cooperation, pp. 4–14.
3. The Australia–Indonesia Defence Coordinating Committee (IADCC)

The AIDPC also sponsors the IADCC which ‘acts as the executive committee (at one-star level) to the AIDCP with responsibility for coordination, directing and implementing all aspects of the relationship’. 262

4. The Australia–Indonesia Secretariat (AIDSEC)

The Australia–Indonesia Secretariat (AIDSEC) is situated in the Directorate of Indonesian Regional Cooperation (DIRC) in the Strategic and International Policy Division. Among its responsibilities is the coordination of the following five working groups that are responsible for the key parts of the defence relationship.

5. The five working groups (and their respective areas of responsibility)

i) Operations and exercises

ii) Education, training, exchanges and attachments

iii) Logistics

iv) Communications, electronics warfare and information technology

v) Science and technology

The members of the working groups on the Australian side are civilians and defence officials (e.g., SIP officials and three of the defence attaches in Jakarta are members of working groups 1, 2, and 3 while the head of the defence section in Jakarta, a Brigadier, sits on the AIDCC). On the Indonesian side only military officials from KASUM ABRI participate (there are no civilians in KUSUM ABRI). 263

6. The ‘Future Directions Plan’

A significant achievement for the defence cooperation relationship between both sides occurred in 1996 when a ‘Future Directions Plan’, 264 was signed by the Chief of Staff of KASUM ABRI and the Vice-Chief of the ADF. 265 This document, which establishes the

262 Inspector-General’s Division, Defence Cooperation, pp. 4–14.
263 Interview with ADF officer, Jakarta, June 1997.
265 This paper then informs the CDF Operations Directorate (CDFOD)—see below.
future directions of the total defence relationship until 2005, is the most detailed, structured and far-reaching that Australia has with any country in the region.\textsuperscript{266} Apparently it is now seen as a model not just for Australia's military relationships with other regional countries but also one that regional states are keen to implement among themselves, with some adaptation of course.

**Singapore**

The FPDA provides a structure, objectives and guidelines for cooperation between Australia and Singapore. In addition to FPDA, several new bilateral structures were agreed upon during the 1990s.

*The Joint Australia–Singapore Coordination Group (JASINCG)*

Established in 1992, the JASINCG provides a bilateral framework for coordinating cooperative activities. According to the Defence Department, "'Defence Cooperation' is becoming a relatively small element of broader activities' between the two countries and increasingly Singapore undertakes fee-for-service arrangements for military training in Australia.

In January 1996, the Prime Minister Paul Keating agreed to an arrangement, titled the Singapore–Australia New Partnership, for closer political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.\textsuperscript{267} In October 1996, a 'treaty-level agreement' covering the conduct of bilateral activities was signed with Singapore.\textsuperscript{268}

**Malaysia**

As with Singapore, the FPDA provides a structure for coordinating Australia–Malaysia defence cooperation. During the 1990s several other structures were implemented which addressed the bilateral relationship.

\textsuperscript{266} Interview with ADF officer, Jakarta, June 1997.
The Practice of Regional Security

The Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program (MAJDP)

Established on 17 February 1992, the MAJDP provides a framework for ‘all bilateral cooperative defence activities conducted between Malaysia and Australia’.269 The oversight of policy and management of the MAJDP is exercised by the MAJDP Review Committee. This committee is supported by three sub-committees whose tasks are to: review ongoing projects; as required to issue directives relative to ongoing projects; to assess and, as appropriate, endorse new project proposals; and to report to the MAJDP Review committee.270 The responsible parties on the policy side in Malaysia are the Under Secretary Policy, in the Ministry of Defence and in Australia, the Assistant Secretary Asia Branch, International Policy Division (on behalf of the Deputy Secretary Strategic and Intelligence). Implementation is under the direction of Headquarters Malaysian Armed Forces Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations and Training) who is assisted by an Australian officer.271 According to one ADF officer, ‘this program...is designed to ensure that our Defence Cooperation proceeds within the bounds of mutually agreed priorities’.272 Additional agreements were formulated during 1996-97. For example, in February 1997, a ‘treaty level agreement’ covering the conduct of bilateral activities was signed with Malaysia.273 Also in 1997 a handbook for implementing the Administrative Arrangement of Joint Logistics Support between the Department of Defence, Australia and the Ministry of Defence Malaysia was published.274 This arrangement ‘increased the potential for greater interoperability and compatibility of logistics systems and procedures between the two countries’.275

Operational guidelines

The inadequate operational guidelines for directing regional cooperation were also addressed by the Defence Department and the ADF and with some success The existing

269 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program, 17 February 1992.
270 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program, 17 February 1992, Annex A (no page numbers provided on original document).
271 Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program, 17 February 1992 (no page numbers).
operational guidelines, which were generally unhelpful for the new regional policy, had been listed in what was called the Overseas Activities List. In 1995–96 this list was replaced with a new document—the Chief of Defence Force Overseas Activities Directive (COAD)—which attempted to provide more detail about the nature of cooperative activities to be conducted.276 By 1996, the Defence Department claimed that in that year:

Overseas guidance was developed and issues setting out regional engagement objectives and levels of interoperability to be established with each of our regional neighbours and alliance partners [were addressed].277

Subsequently, further improvements were made to the COAD and it was renamed the Defence International Engagement Policy (DIEP).278

However, the formulation of practical measures to support a policy of ‘cooperative security’ continued to challenge officials in Defence. In the first place, as a senior defence official recently pointed out, the Department is still trying to ‘match activities to the “outputs” stated in the Department’s corporate plan’.279 In other words, it is often difficult to formulate and implement measures that achieve the official expected policy outcome. In the second place, decisions are often made on the basis of what was done last year rather than on an analytical assessment of their effect on the security relationship; or decisions are made to implement new measures without detailed analysis of their possible effects on the relationship. And, finally, the guidelines rarely set explicit priorities that are set down in formal documents. Apparently, priorities can be arbitrary and informal. As a recently retired senior officer from the ADF commented, although improvements have been made, there is still some way to go with the development of satisfactory operational guidelines.280

Australia has also been active in setting some general guidelines for multilateral cooperative operations. The RAN, for example, was instrumental in establishing the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in 1988, which now takes place every two

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276 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, December 1998.
278 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998.
279 Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, December 1998.
280 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, December 1998.
years.\textsuperscript{281} The WPNS has produced a Maritime Information Exchange Directory, a WPNS Tactical Signals Handbook, a WPNS Replenishment at Sea Handbook and is planning a for Command Post Exercise (CPX) to assist development of a common doctrine and publications.\textsuperscript{282} Other forums where Australia has been instrumental in setting guidelines are the CSCAP Maritime Working Group that in 1997 produced a publication, \textit{Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation},\textsuperscript{283} and the series of Sea Lanes of Communications conferences.\textsuperscript{284} And finally, the RAN has been the main instigator, originally in 1993 through the then Maritime Commander Rear Admiral Robert Walls, of the multilateral Kakadu Fleet Concentrations (see above).

Overall, during the 1990s, the Department of Defence and the ADF made significant efforts to address the problems in applying the Labor’s government’s regional security policy that was based on the principle of ‘security with’ other states. The new structures, directives and operational guidelines that were introduced certainly helped to advance this enterprise.

\section*{OLD AND NEW TENSIONS IN THE POLICY}

Despite the attempts to improve the coordination and conduct of regional security policy, several tensions remain. The first concerns the degree and nature of cooperation between the ADF and the other armed forces in the region. Notwithstanding the emphasis on ‘security with’ states in the region, the ADF, like other regional military establishments, does not share certain operational and combat skills with its regional neighbours. This is because, the ADF aims to have a military advantage over others. The RAN’s Allan Hinge states emphatically that the Navy’s ‘capability margins...must not

\begin{thebibliography}{99}


\bibitem{282} See Bateman, ‘Prospects for Naval Cooperation’, in McCaffrie and Hinge (eds), \textit{Seapower in the Next Century}, pp.203–204. Bateman suggests the WPNS is ‘limited by its “first-track” nature and the inherent conservatism of naval forces’.

\bibitem{283} \textit{Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation}, CSCAP Memorandum No.4, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 1997, pp.1–12. Commodore Sam Bateman (RAN ret.) is the co-chair of the Maritime Working Group (with an Indonesian Navy rear admiral) and was a key figure in formulating the guidelines.


\end{thebibliography}
be compromised by CNAs [cooperative naval activities]. Some important tactical procedures, for example, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine counter measures (MCM) are shared with others but only those parts which do not jeopardise Australia’s advantages for conducting defence of Australia. According to Hinge, among the activities that should not be compromised in any way during cooperative naval activities are targeting technologies, combat C³, and electronic warfare (EW). Similarly, the SAS does not share some categories of training: for example, intelligence gathering, which could reveal methods. The ADF, like the other military establishments in the region, also carefully guard the levels of combat readiness and preparedness of their military forces. According to many practitioners, all the armed forces in the region accept this situation as a given and do not see it as any obstacle to cooperation. As one naval officer put it:

We know how to do business together without expecting a complete osmosis of minutiae, and we accept in a pragmatic sense, without too much suspicion, that each is keeping its own secrets.

Nonetheless, according to some sources, in reality the situation is often more complex and there have been a number of instances when the ADF has ‘given too much away’ in the course of defence cooperation with regional countries.

Underpinning this issue is the question of criteria for judging what is a cooperative and what is a competitive activity. Although some activities may be clear-cut others are not. For example, it is not necessarily self-evident that, on the one hand, training in basic skills such as damage control at sea is a cooperative measure which unequivocally does not undermine Australia’s security, while on the other hand, target training is an activity which does. It is also not clear that the intellectual assistance which Australia

288 Interview with former SAS officer, Canberra, July 1997.
289 Interview Army officer, Jakarta, June 1997.
291 Interview with senior ADF officer, Canberra, November 1998.
292 The RAN has assisted the Singapore Navy for example to train for damage control while under attack at sea. Interviews with RAN officers, Canberra, May 1997 and November 1998.
provides, for example with development of doctrine and force structures, is simply and only a cooperative measure without detrimental strategic implications for Australia.\textsuperscript{293} If claims by senior defence officials\textsuperscript{294} that these issues are not difficult to resolve in practice are to be accepted, then the criteria on which such decisions are made should be publicly available and explained.

The second tension within the policy is that the ADF, like the other armed forces in the region, uses cooperative activities to gather intelligence. As one senior ADF officer stated, 'cooperative activities enhance opportunities for intelligence gathering'.\textsuperscript{295} And moreover, he claimed that 'this is widely understood' among cooperative partners and there is an unwritten understanding that it 'is done discreetly'. Although such statements are no doubt a good description of the situation, they are undermined to some extent by the strong reprimand issued by the ADF to the Singaporean Air Force in 1996 when the latter collected intelligence while flying (presumably indiscreetly) in Australian air space.\textsuperscript{296}

The third problem with the policy is that there appears to be some confusion about its means and ends. Certainly the major objective is to establish cooperation as a 'norm' for security practice in the region, on the grounds that cooperation enhances security. But many of the measures adopted by the ADF enhance the combat and operational skills of the armed forces in region. Although this may well build trust and transparency between Australia and other countries it also strengthens the warfighting capabilities of the armed forces in the region. This may at some point in the future undermine Australia's own security if currently friendly relationships deteriorate radically. Assisting the armed forces in the region in this way is supported by the ADF on the grounds that strong military forces help to make the region secure and may well insulate Australia from possible threats (see above). Another reason cooperation is pursued is to increase the levels of interoperability between the ADF and other regional forces. Again, although this may well build trust it may also support collective defence arrangements, or

\textsuperscript{293} Australia assists most regional militaries with defence planning. Indeed, in many instances the doctrine of regional countries is taken verbatim from Australian documents. Interviews with ADF officers, Kuala Lumpur, June 1997.

\textsuperscript{294} Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, September 1998.

\textsuperscript{295} Interview with retired senior ADF officer, Canberra, November 1998.

\textsuperscript{296} Interviews with senior ADF officers, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, June 1997.
strategies for ‘security against’ others and therefore does not necessarily support the ‘security with’ objective of the policy. Another purpose of defence cooperation is to establish Australia’s ‘access and influence’ in the region.297 This objective was evident in speeches made by the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley in late 1988,298 in the ministerial statement made by the Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in 1989,299 in the Defence Department’s document *Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP90)* published in 1992,300 and in the recent views of Defence officials.301 The general goal of cooperation in these statements is to ‘shape’ the regional strategic environment to Australia’s interests. Some officials have even gone so far as to claim that the purpose is ‘power projection’, or as a senior ADF officer stated, ‘it’s Australia’s own Monroe Doctrine’.302 It is clear from these statements that there are several answers to the question ‘cooperation for what?’. As the review of the Defence Cooperation Program concluded:

[T]he rationale for [defence cooperation] and the relevance of the strategies being followed is not always obvious. Indeed there is some inconsistency in the development of objectives for Defence Cooperation. There is room for clarification and restatement of the underlying framework for cooperative defence activities.303

The different objectives behind cooperation raise questions about what type of security framework is being pursued by Australia (see Chapters Six and Seven).

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297 Interviews with senior ADF officers, Canberra, November and December 1998.

298 In December 1988, Beazley stressed that, ‘security policy is not simply about direct military threats, but the ability to manage strategic developments in a way that reinforces our favourable strategic outlook.’ See Kim Beazley, ‘Australian Defence Policy’, in Desmond Ball (ed.), *Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.69, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990, p.348.

299 In December 1989, Evans emphasised that, ‘we have the capacity to creatively set the regional agenda, defining issues in terms that suit our interests and in a way that leads, hopefully, to action in directions that profit Australia’. See Gareth Evans, *Australia’s Regional Security*, Ministerial Statement, Management Information Processing, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989, p.41.

300 In ASP90, it was stated that, ‘because we need to shape our own security environment, there are fundamental national security reasons for our playing an active and constructive role on regional strategic issues’. See Department of Defence, *Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, p.43.

301 In interviews with senior Defence Department officials it was stated that a major rationale for defence cooperation was to ‘shape’ the regional environment to ‘mirror’ Australia’s view of regional security. Interviews, Canberra, November and December 1998.

302 Interviews with senior ADF officers, Canberra, November and December 1998.

In addition to the tensions, which are inherent in the policy, there are others that ironically, have developed as a result of the new arrangements to enhance and coordinate cooperation. First, Australian training contracts with Singapore to host personnel and equipment from the Singaporean Armed Forces could undermine Australia’s own political neutrality and indeed security, if Singapore became involved in a crisis with some other regional countries. Second, in the same way, Australia’s commitment to the restructured FPDA and its increased focus on operations in the South China Sea\textsuperscript{304} may involve the ADF in a conflict that is not in Australia’s interest.\textsuperscript{305} Third, although the new committees and working groups have greatly improved policy coordination and, in the case of Indonesia, formalised an agenda for defence cooperation for at least the next ten years, they have also produced some new issues. The Indonesians involved in these new arrangements are from KUSUM ABRI, which is the equivalent to the Australian Department of Defence, but which is staffed only by military personnel. The latter, it is claimed, are very uncomfortable with the presence of Australian civilians from the Department of Defence in the various committees and working groups.\textsuperscript{306} Another example of new tensions, according to some Australian defence officials, is that the new structures have hindered rather helped cooperation because now the procedures have become ‘overly bureaucratic’ and ‘produce more minutes and fewer measures’.\textsuperscript{307}

Apart from these issues there are continuing in-house problems within the Department of Defence about the coordination of cooperative arrangements. For example, as one senior naval officer points out, ‘[t]here is still room for better liaison between Navy Office, Headquarters ADF (HGADDF), International Policy (IP) division and DFAT in considering policy initiatives which advance our wider interests’.\textsuperscript{308}

Finally, despite the various justifications given by Defence that the military skills provided by defence cooperation do not necessarily undermine the human rights of some

\textsuperscript{304} Interview with recently retired senior ADF officer, Canberra, December 1998.

\textsuperscript{305} See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, pp.94–97.

\textsuperscript{306} Interview ADF officer, Jakarta, June 1997.

\textsuperscript{307} Interview with senior defence official, Canberra, November 1998.

\textsuperscript{308} Shackleton, ‘Naval Cooperation’, in McCaffrie and Sherwood (eds), The Navy and Regional Engagement, p.53.
domestic groups in ASEAN countries, it remains the case that many ordinary Indonesians continue to be seriously threatened by elements within TNI.

CONCLUSION

Labor's regional security policy was not only based on strong policy concepts that supported cooperation but also on a remarkable degree of practical cooperation. As the CDF General Baker, said in 1995, Australia was leading the way in regional defence cooperation.\textsuperscript{309} By that time, Australia was conducting more exercises with ASEAN militaries than ever before and more than each ASEAN country conducted with each other.\textsuperscript{310} These exercises were aimed at building confidence and trust with others. As CDF Baker said in September 1996, 'there is no better demonstration of trust than to invite countries in the region to our country for training and exercises'.\textsuperscript{311} The ADF also helped the other armed forces in the region to develop operational and combat capabilities and interoperability with Australian forces. These activities were further supported by the development of several structures aimed at coordinating security cooperation and new practical directives and operational guidelines. Notwithstanding several flaws in Australia's policy and some confusion about its ends and means it was nonetheless guided by the sentiment expressed by the Defence Minister, Senator Ray that:

\begin{quote}
Only direct and personal contact, the sharing of experiences and perceptions can...prise open the doors of conservative military establishments...in the end, the trust and confidence that really matters is between defence organisations.\textsuperscript{312}
\end{quote}

In practice, Labor developed a regional security policy which went well beyond any previous efforts to cooperate with the armed forces in the region and was firmly based on the view that 'security with' other regional states enhanced Australia's security. This of course contrasted with the principles and practice which guided Australia's 'security against' policies—defence of Australia and the Australia-US alliance.

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\textsuperscript{310} See Ball and Kerr, \textit{Presumptive Engagement}, p.64.
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PART II

THREE THEORETICAL LITERATURES FOR EXPLANATION
Chapter Four

REALIST AND LIBERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY

_structural realists are pessimists about the prospects for international cooperation; they believe that competition...is the normal state of affairs._¹

(Charles L. Glaser, Realist Theorist.)

_The heart of liberalism is cooperation._²

(David Long, Liberal Theorist.)

This second part of the thesis examines the theories in the International Relations literature that seek to explain security. The two main traditions of international security studies—liberalism and realism—will be explored. The first section in the chapter will discuss the worldview of realists and liberals by examining their respective views about human nature, the state and the international system. The second will examine the security assumptions of realists with the help of three questions: what is the object of security; what is security being sought from; and by what means. The third section will examine the security assumptions of liberals using the same three questions.

I argue several points. The two traditions are based on different assumptions about security. Despite these differences all variants of realism—classical realism, neorealism/structural realism and its sub-variants of offensive and defensive realism—share some security assumptions with the variants of liberalism—republican, commercial and institutional liberalism. But the differences between realists and liberals have significant implications for security policy. Moreover, any policy that incorporates both realist and liberal strategies could, from the perspective of either realism or liberalism on its own, be seen to be contradictory.

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REALIST AND LIBERAL WORLDVIEWS

Two traditions of thought—realism and liberalism—have dominated the literature in international relations since the discipline was first established in the inter-war years. Some scholars may want to qualify this generalisation but most will still agree that it is appropriate to talk about a liberal or realist worldview. Realists tend to have a pessimistic view of the world, the reasons for which, they claim, are readily observable in the empirical world. For Hans Morgenthau, the pre-eminent 'classical realist', the reason is man, or rather human nature. For Kenneth Waltz, the acclaimed father of 'structural or neorealism', it is the anarchic nature, or the lack of a centralised authority, in the international system of states. For Stephen Walt, a 'defensive realist', it is the anarchic system and the nature of particular kinds of states (those which threaten others with offensive military power and demonstrable aggressive intentions) which are the problem. Most realist scholars will agree that ultimately the reason for their pessimism is that states compete, be it for power, survival or position in the international system.
Realist and Liberal Assumptions About Security

and this can undermine their security. For example, Morgenthau’s oft quoted dictum and self-acclaimed theory is that:

International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.

Furthermore, this competitive behaviour is recurrent, fixed, timeless, and universal. The only change that is possible is a re-ordering of states in the international pecking order, according to who has more or less power. For the realist Robert Gilpin, ‘the nature of international relations has not changed fundamentally over the millennia’.

The liberal’s worldview

Liberals are cautiously optimistic about the nature of humans, the state and the international system. In general liberals agree with the worldview of the liberal political philosopher John Locke, whose writing informs the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. According to Locke:

All men are created equal, in that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among them are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

As this assumption implies, liberals are more confident than many realists that life isn’t always brutish and short. In addition, many liberals are guardedly optimistic about human nature, if only because humans possess the faculty of reason. Immanuel Kant argues that ‘the...prospects of perpetual peace’ rest not so much on a continuous high

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8 Most realists also agree that the state is the most important actor in international politics; that it is a sovereign unit and a rational actor; and that external factors are more important than domestic factors for explaining the security behaviour of states. For discussion about the assumptions of realists see Robert O. Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics’, pp.163–169; and Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, pp.304–305, in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics. For a useful collection of realist views see special issues of Security Studies, winter 1995 and Spring 1996.

9 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed. p.31.


standard of ethical behaviour but on the human faculty of reason, or as he puts it, even on ‘devils, so long as they possess understanding’.12

It is the human capacity to reason and recognise an inevitable trend towards positive social evolution which gives rise to the variants of liberalism labeled ‘cognitive liberalism’ and ‘sociological liberalism’.13 The first of these has spawned a large literature on whether reason, learning and knowledge can affect and even change the interests, values and policies of states.14 The second variant has fostered another modern literature on the impact of social interaction, international communications, transnational actors, cultural patterns and globalism on states.15 Both these variants suggest that states can interact positively and that other actors are important in international politics.


Indeed, the distinguishing feature of the liberals’ worldview is their cautious optimism that states will cooperate. For liberals cooperation can take place across a range of issues and involve a variety of actors including states. Immanuel Kant, who is best known for another variant of liberalism called ‘republican liberalism’, suggests that certain types of states are more likely to cooperate than others. Republican liberalism proposes that states, which adhere to certain governing principles such as democracy, are inclined to be peaceful towards other like-minded states. As Michael Doyle argues, democratic states will be ‘indeed peaceful’ towards other liberal states. Republican liberals are also optimistic that these like-minded states will cooperate to form ‘zones of peace’.

Scholars from another variant of liberalism, ‘commercial liberalism’, are also optimistic that the prospects for peace can be improved as a consequence of trading and economic activities between states. The nineteenth-century liberal, Richard Cobden, argued that free trade would ‘promote cooperation and friendship among nations, paving the way to peaceful relations’. Another variant of liberalism, ‘liberal institutionalism’, which has its roots in functional, neofunctional integration and interdependence theories, is particularly optimistic that states can cooperate rather than pursue competitive strategies. These liberals propose that international institutions and regimes can

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16 Michael W. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics Revisited’, in Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory*, pp.83–106. Doyle emphasises that Kant’s argument rests on the ‘three “definitive articles” as each necessary conditions and only together a sufficient condition for establishing a pacific union’ (see p.101). This issue is discussed further below.


establish expectations of behaviour, norms, rules and procedures which can guide interstate transactions in a variety of issue areas.

**Liberals’ differences with realists and each other**

If the liberals have a more optimistic worldview about the nature of man, states and the international system than do the realists then it is also the case that what often distinguishes them from realists is also the cause of tensions among liberals. With regard to cooperation, liberals differ with realists not just about the prospects for cooperation among states but also about the nature of cooperation (see below). Liberals also disagree with each other about cooperation. For some liberals cooperation is concerned with common interests and for others it is concerned with collective self-interests. As David Long points out, ‘there is a tension in liberalism between individual interests and the common good’.\(^{21}\) From Long’s perspective, ‘without the notion of the common good the defence of individual or group interests is not recognisably liberal’.\(^{22}\) For liberals like Long, cooperation based on an aggregation of individual interests does not reveal the common interest and thus does not fit his definition of liberalism.

Another cause of disagreement among liberals but not realists concerns the actors in international relations. Unlike realists, liberals accept that there are other key actors in international politics besides the state,\(^{23}\) but they disagree among themselves about which actors—individuals, society or the state—are the most important. Those scholars who privilege the individual consider that those who don’t, for instance those who focus on the state, are not fulfilling the liberal project of greater freedom for individuals in society. David Long argues that there is ‘a significant narrowing of the liberal tradition’ by the so-called ‘Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory’\(^{24}\) and its neoliberal institutionalist scholars. These scholars, Long argues, have ‘emasculated liberalism’. They have, he insists:

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23 The seventeenth century philosopher and laissez-faire liberal, John Locke, is hostile to the absolute state but regards the state as such as being necessary for protecting property and for private groups to operate. Zacher and Matthew, ‘Liberal International Theory’, in Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory*, p.111.

[Shorn it of] its normative concerns with the liberty and well-being of the individual [by] focusing on economic variables, using utilitarian discourses and theories of liberal economics, and making states the agents in international relations.25

While he accepts that other early liberal theorists and practitioners, like Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson, had a 'degree of statism' in their writings, Long argues other liberals, like the functionalist, David Mitrany, did not take the state as the given actor. Mitrany, Long argues, discussed the 'sort of institutionalist form that might be required, if individual and group interests cannot be represented by national territorial states'.26 Many liberals appear to be sensitive in principle to Long's objections and few would disagree with Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew that, 'all [the] strands of liberal international theory are ultimately about enhancing the security, prosperity, and human rights of individuals'.27 There is however, a tendency among many liberals to collapse the interests of individuals with the state. For liberals like Long, 'state-persons' misses the point of liberalism.

Long also argues that liberals who focus strongly on the economic variant are dubious members of the liberal camp. For many liberals the commercial variant of liberal economic theory is the heartland of liberalism and its distinguishing feature vis a vis realism. Although realism does not neglect economic issues, the discussion is state-centric and confined to concerns about mercantilism, economic-power politics and the importance of economic wealth for military power.28 The scope and purpose of liberal economic theory are by contrast much more varied. But even so, for liberals like Long, the focus on commercial liberalism has resulted in excesses, such as imperialism, and neglect of the bigger liberal project, which is anti-privilege and emancipatory. As Long argues, 'economic factors are only a part of liberalism, indeed arguably a subsidiary part, subordinate to individual liberty and well-being'.29

25 Long, 'The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.496.
29 Long, 'The Harvard School of Liberal International Relations Theory', p.495.
Another matter which concerns liberals and not realists and which creates tensions among liberals is the role of ‘society’ in international relations. The term society is used to refer to both material and ideational factors such as institutions, regimes, international law, and norms which involve cooperation. Realists view liberal claims about regimes with deep scepticism, seeing them simply as examples of states seeking power and pursuing self-interests. Realists often explain the participation of hegemonic states or strong states in multilateral institutions and norm-creation in these terms.30 Liberals by contrast tend to support institutions, regimes and norms as means for facilitating security, preventing market failure, preserving the rule of law, and expanding welfare internationalism, for example. But Long argues that liberals should only defend those institutions, both domestic and international, which ‘improve the conditions for the individual or social group’.31 He sees neoliberal institutionalists, a la the Harvard School, as defenders of institutions not because they improve the conditions of people but because they ‘address the situations of the agents [i.e., states] in the international system’.32

A final difference between liberals and realists, although not a cause of great tension among liberals, is the role of power. Most realists, as we have seen, make power the central focus of their inquiry. Liberals generally eschew power politics, but power is also central to their investigation. Laissez-faire liberals worried about the power of the state upon individuals. Conservative liberals in eighteenth-century Europe worried about the power of the masses vis a vis the state. Rarely though do liberals consider the conditions when the use of power may be required. As we will see below, republican liberals are some of the few liberals who explicitly consider the use of military power, not just to protect their democratic values and interests but also to advance them abroad.33 Other variants of liberalism, however, do not directly address situations when the use of power may be required even as a measure of last resort. This difference

30 For discussion relating hegemonic stability theory to security issues see Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
between liberals and realists has implications for how each tradition approaches security and the following questions: security of what, from what and particularly, how.

**REALISTS’ ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY**

It is clear from the worldview of realists that the state is the referent object of security: in other words the answer to the question ‘security of what’ is ‘the nation state’. And, if Morgenthau claims that ‘international politics...is a struggle for power’ and that ‘armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation’, then logically this suggests that the main threat to the power of the state is another state’s military might. How and by what means states address the struggle for power is, from Morgenthau’s perspective, quite complex and it is possible to find at least two answers in his writing.

**Two readings of Morgenthau’s means to achieving security**

One reading of Morgenthau is his argument that the state’s security is best achieved within a balance of power in the international arena:

> [I]nternational peace and order are a function of the balance of power—that is, of an approximately equal distribution of power among several nations or combinations of nations, preventing any one of them from gaining the upper hand over the others.37

Morgenthau’s assumption that ‘an approximately equal distribution of power among several nations’ is the most satisfactory way to balance power is an important classical realist position. So too is his assumption that ‘[a]lliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system’. However, given the ever present struggle for power among states, alliances are not permanent arrangements for...

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34 Realists usually assume that the nation state is a unified nation, at least with respect to security.
38 Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations*, 6th ed., p.201. Morgenthau argues that ‘Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armament race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances’ (see p.201).
enhancing security. According to Morgenthau, ‘alliances are typically of temporary duration and most prevalent in wartime’.39

Morgenthau is adamant that security is not achieved through cooperation between states. International institutions and even international law are, he thinks, weak means to achieving security, for at least two reasons. The existence of the state depends on the principle of sovereignty (by which he means the accepted political fact that the nation is the supreme law maker and giver and that this provides it with an ‘impenetrability’, vis a vis any other law maker, which it will not compromise).40 The second reason is that as a consequence of sovereignty there is a decentralised international environment. For these reasons ‘collective security’, the institutional means to achieving security provided originally by the League of Nations and later the United Nations, is a weak means of achieving security. This reading of Morgenthau, which stresses the competitive nature of states and their ‘desire to maximise power’,41 provides a common understanding of the security assumptions underpinning classical realism.

But while common, this view misses some of the finer points about Morgenthau’s position. Morgenthau’s argument is in fact more nuanced and qualified than is often recognised. Morgenthau’s conception of power is complex. Power is derived from ‘elements of national power’, that is, it is nationally based, and multidimensional (political, economic and military). Importantly, as Mastanduno et al argue, ‘the state’s external power position cannot be divorced from its internal situation and capabilities’.42 Furthermore, a state’s power is never static and is always relative, especially to another nation’s national power. Morgenthau explicitly warns against errors when evaluating national power and lists three common mistakes: ‘not correlating the power of one nation against another...not correlating actual power at one time to possible power at some future time...and not correlating one power factor to others of the same nation’.43 When discussing this final error he warns against ‘militarism’, or ‘the conception that

the power of a nation consists primarily, if not exclusively, of its military strength, conceived especially in quantitative terms'.\textsuperscript{44} Morgenthau also distinguishes between types of power—between for example, legitimate and illegitimate power.

Morgenthau’s underlying acknowledgment of the destructiveness of unrestrained illegitimate power leads him to establish conditions for the proper workings of the balance of power. For Morgenthau:

\begin{quote}
[T]he equilibrium...the dynamics of the arrangement are embedded in a moral framework without which, in the long run, it cannot operate.\textsuperscript{45} [Emphasis added.]
\end{quote}

This is an important argument in Morgenthau’s work because it indicates that, despite his claim that nations’ ‘desire to maximise power is universal’,\textsuperscript{46} he explicitly acknowledges that his main arrangement for achieving security requires a moral undertaking for it to operate. From that it can be argued that the moral framework which Morgenthau invokes to ensure an equilibrium also indicates that he implicitly assumes that states will engage in passive cooperation out of self-interest. This second reading of the security assumptions of classical realism has both similarities and differences with neorealism.

**Assumptions about security in neorealism or structural realism**

Much of the ‘new’ realist, or neorealist, literature written over the last two decades endorses the classical realist view that the state is the object of security and that military threats are the main source of insecurity. Neorealism also adopts Morgenthau’s extreme pessimism about inter-state relations, though the reasons for this are different. As discussed earlier, neorealists or structural realists understand international relations from a structural perspective. This structure, or system, is amoral, ahistoric and apolitical and most importantly it is anarchic or without government. Indeed, for structural theorists or neorealists, ‘anarchy is...the single most important character underlying international

\begin{footnotes}
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Realist and Liberal Assumptions About Security

relations'. This external condition or structure of anarchy determines state behaviour with dire consequences for all.

The original and best known structural realist is Kenneth Waltz. Another contemporary neorealist scholar is John Mearsheimer. Excerpts from a number of their works will illustrate neorealist beliefs about the most effective means of achieving security. The most important neorealist assumption is that the condition of anarchy encourages competition and discourages cooperation. Mearsheimer claims that 'international relations is...a state of relentless security competition'. According to Waltz, in such an anarchic system 'states...must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves'. Waltz calls this self-help and claims that 'self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order'. 'In any self-help system', he says, 'units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behaviour'. As a result 'threats or seeming threats to...security abound...[r]elations remain tense: the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile'. Mearsheimer shares Waltz' view that anarchy requires states to seek self-help for security. For Mearsheimer 'each state living under anarchy faces the ever-present possibility that another state will use force to harm or conquer it'. Hence:

50 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', p.10.
Realist and Liberal Assumptions About Security

Each state must guarantee its own survival since no other actor will provide its security. All other states are potential threats, and no international institution is capable of enforcing order or punishing powerful aggressors.56

Given this assumption and Mearsheimer's view that 'offensive military action is always a threat to all states in the system'57 the most important dimension of self-help is the military aspect. And given the competitive nature of the international context and the dynamic of relative gains, states will, if they can, seek to be stronger in military means than their competitors.

The structure of anarchy also conditions states to balance power as a means to achieving security. Waltz and Mearsheimer both argue that of the two principal arrangements of power, multipolarity and bipolarity, the latter is 'more peaceful'.58 Mearsheimer considers hegemony as 'a third possible distribution' of power but argues that it is rarely achieved because 'threatened states have strong incentives to band together to thwart an aspiring hegemon'.59

Alliance formation, a key means for obtaining security in neorealism, is considered to be a dimension of power balancing in the international system. As Charles Glaser argues, alliances are a form of competition, and balancing in the form of an alliance 'is probably the most prominent and widely accepted prediction of structural realism'.60 Since Mearsheimer assumes that 'anarchy guarantees that security will often be scarce'51 the prospects of alliances continuing when security is plentiful is of course not addressed. Hence, the conditions under which alliances operate are confined just to balancing and

58 Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', p.13. Mearsheimer argues there are three main reasons why a bipolar system is more peaceful: 'the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculation of relative power and of opponents' resolve are fewer and less likely' (see p.14). See also Waltz, 'The Stability of the Bipolar World', pp.881-909; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 8. For other works on bipolarity and multipolarity see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization, Vol.44, No.2, 1990, pp.137-168; Richard N. Rosecrance, 'Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.10, No.3, September 1966, pp.314-327.
60 Glaser, Realists as Optimists', fn 4, p.124.
61 Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', p.45.
therefore both the classical and neorealist explanations of alliance formation are narrow and undeveloped.

The neorealist assumption that competition is the normal state of affairs\(^62\) implies that states will not, or are most unlikely to, cooperate to enhance security. Waltz argues that 'the condition of insecurity—at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions—works against their cooperation'.\(^63\) The self-help systems, he says, 'make the cooperation of parties difficult...Rules, institutions, and patterns of cooperation...are all limited in extent and modified from what they might otherwise be'.\(^64\) A useful summary of the standard neorealist view about cooperation is given by Charles Glaser:

[C]ooperation is difficult because states are sensitive to how it affects their current and future relative capabilities; moreover, cooperation is often impossible because states find military advantages to be especially valuable and thus compete to acquire them. Making matters still worse, falling behind in this competition can carry extremely high costs: it invites war and, in the worst case, a major power can lose its sovereignty.\(^65\)

The assumption about the dire effects of anarchy upon cooperation between states has become the hallmark of neorealism and is the standard structural realist argument. There is a vast North American literature focused on the concepts of ‘relative and absolute gains’ which neorealists claim underpin their argument about cooperation.\(^66\) The impetus for much of this literature is the neorealists’ debate with their critics the neoliberal institutionalists.

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65 Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists’, p.129.
The neorealists' debate with neoliberal institutionalists about cooperation and competition

At the centre of this debate is the disagreement between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists about the meaning of anarchy and its consequences for cooperation between states. This issue of course has implications for the means to achieving security. Neoliberal institutionalists, like Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod, probably have fewer differences with neorealists than many other liberals (see discussion above for the liberal David Long's criticism of the neoliberal institutionalists). Keohane and Axelrod agree with the neorealists that the state is the object of security, that anarchy characterises the international system and determines state behaviour and that states are unitary-rational actors. Nonetheless, they disagree with the neorealists' argument that the logic of anarchy is that states seek relative gains.

Grieco argues that neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists have different meanings for anarchy. For both the neoliberals, and the neorealists, anarchy means 'the lack of a common government in world politics'. But for the neoliberals, the major effect of anarchy is that individuals or states believe there is no agency that can enforce rules. Anarchy therefore ‘means that states may wish to cooperate, but aware that cheating is both possible and profitable, lack a central agency to enforce promises’. The neoliberal institutionalists' response is that the problem of cheating can be largely overcome by regimes and institutions which can establish rules, norms, principles and procedures.

As has already been discussed, for neorealists, anarchy means more than the absence of central agency to enforce promises. It means that 'states recognise that...there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them'. According to Kenneth Waltz, under anarchy, wars can occur

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70 Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation', p.160.


'because there is nothing to prevent them' and therefore 'in international politics force serves, not only as the *ultima ratio*, but indeed as the first and constant one'.73

The debate now seems to have reached a stalemate over the meaning and implications of anarchy and relative and absolute gains for states' security.74 As Robert Powell points out the debate is narrow and 'suffer[s] from internal weaknesses and limitations'.75 Powell concludes that where the debate does contribute is to highlight the importance of:

[T]he absence of central authority, the potential for joint or cooperative gains, the distributional conflict these potential gains engender and the roles of coercion and institutions in realizing and allocating these joint gains.76

These and other points raised by Powell suggest some directions for research on cooperation, which is a crucial concept in the literature, but one needing much more elaboration.77

**Realists' 'passive' cooperation**

The debate between the neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists about cooperation implies that realists assume that virtually no form of cooperation is possible or meaningful for security. Yet, clearly realists assume that there is active cooperation between states in an alliance, albeit against other states and temporarily. It is not clear why, if cooperation is possible in an alliance, it should not be possible outside an alliance framework. Moreover, as noted above, classical realists *implicitly* introduce

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76 Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory', p.344.
77 That agenda might also include the fundamental question about why cooperation in security matters actually enhances security. As Robert Jervis points out, 'nonrealists have been slow to develop and test arguments about the conditions they consider conducive to peace'. Another important issue which Jervis raises is that we know very little about 'the psychological processes of attitude change' which, for example, explain the transition from antagonist relations to security communities where war is rejected, as it is currently between the major developed states. See Jervis, 'Realism in the Study of World Politics', pp.985–987. Also See James Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-Building Measures: A Skeptical Look', Working Paper, No.85, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990, pp.1–32; Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia–Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996, pp.91–92.
'passive' cooperation into their arguments. The way Morgenthau addresses the puzzle of stability and peace in a world where states eternally and universally seek to maximise power is to argue that the equilibrium arises because balancing behaviour takes place 'in a moral framework'. It would appear that Morgenthau accepts that without this passive form of cooperation, power balancing 'cannot operate'.78

A similar argument can be made about neorealists who 'smuggle in' the logic of cooperation as a 'circuit breaker' to counter the potentially destructive logic of relative gains. Grieco argues that, 'survival is [the] core interest' of states'.79 Seeking survival has a different security logic to that of pursuing relative gains. In this era of weapons of mass destruction the logic of survival directs states away from constantly and universally seeking relative gains. The curious point is that in this context both logics, relative gains and survival, come from the same structure, that is anarchy. So that even within the terms of neorealism, anarchy has two logics and the latter, survival, supports a form of passive cooperation—for example, not to undertake certain activities, such as pursuing relative gains in destabilising weapons.

Thus, both classical realism and structural realism introduce additional explanations to account for the fact that the pursuit of military gains in an anarchic world does not lead to perpetual conflict. Acceptance that cooperation of one type or another exists in the international system is actually essential if realist theory is to explain why the majority of states, which the theory says are locked in permanent military competition, have peaceful relations with each other most of the time.80 Nonetheless, both main variants of realism continue to evince profound scepticism about inter-state cooperation.

**Developments in realism**

Over the last decade, however, realist thinking has undergone several developments, which have major implications for security theory and policy. According to Stephen Walt, '[t]he most interesting conceptual development within the realist paradigm has

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80 Some periods of history which are generally well explained by realism have involved passive cooperation. For example, during the cold war the US and Soviet agreed to a range of measures, such as the ABM Treaty, which supported the current military balance of power.
been the emerging split between the “defensive” and “offensive” realist strands of thought’. The worldview of offensive realism is based on several assumptions, some of which were discussed above. Offensive realism assumes that international anarchy is generally Hobbesian and security is scarce. Offensive realists, like Mearsheimer, argue that anarchy forces great powers to compete and he predicts that in the future Europe will once again be the site of intense competition. Offensive realists assume that ‘to understand why a state is behaving in a particular way...one should examine its relative capabilities and its external environment’.84

Defensive realism retains many of the standard structural realist assumptions above but claims that different implications can be drawn from them. Defensive realists assume that anarchy is the condition of the international system but that, in contrast to offensive realism ‘that security is often plentiful rather than scare’. Defensive realists, like Stephen Van Evera, George Quester and Jack Synder, for example, assume that states have ‘little intrinsic interest in military conquest and...that the costs of expansion generally outweigh the benefits’. The view that international anarchy can also mean that ‘security is often plentiful rather than scarce’ is partly derived from defensive realists’ concept of the ‘security dilemma’.91

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85 For a constructivist critique of structural realism which makes a similar point see also Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, pp.391–425.
86 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, pp.144–172.
The concept of the security dilemma was formulated succinctly by Robert Jervis back in the mid-1970s. Jervis describes the security dilemma as a situation in which 'the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others'. Other defensive realists make the same argument, saying that states are purely 'security seekers' who try only to be secure but their actions fuel competition which can decrease security. Jervis has also claimed that the magnitude and nature of the security dilemma depended on two variables: the offense-defense balance and the offensive-defense differentiation. As Charles Glaser points out:

As a result, the security dilemma can vary over space and time...there can be significant variation in the attractiveness of cooperative and competitive means, the prospects for achieving a high level of security, and the probability of war.

This argument, stressing 'significant variation' in the security dilemma, helps to explain why defensive realists have a more benign view of international anarchy than do offensive realists who, as Glaser points out, do not focus on the security dilemma and anticipate 'a consistently more competitive and dangerous world'.

Glaser, whose work builds on the original article by Jervis, concludes that many of the issues which Jervis raised back in late 1970s remain unresolved and are the basis of the current debate among offensive and defensive realists. For example, following along the

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the 'security dilemma' have had a significant impact on international relations theory and security policy. See pp.172–73 for a list of the literature which, Glaser claims, draws on this thinking.


98 Glaser argues that in addition to the two variables which Jervis emphasises, there are two others which influence the magnitude of the security dilemma: namely, 'the extent of the adversary’s greed (that is, motives beyond security) and of the adversary’s unit-level knowledge of the state’s motives'. See Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', p.174.
lines of John Mearsheimer’s arguments, the most recent work by offensive realists, such as Randell Schweller, Eric Labs, and Fareed Zakaria, argues that because of anarchy ‘no state can ever be sure when a truly revisionist power might emerge’. This is a critical issue for defensive realists since, as Glaser states, ‘whether a theory posits only security seekers or instead posits some greedy states is a pivotal choice’. The choice is difficult because there can be great uncertainty about the goals of states.

Hence a number of scholars belonging to a strand of neorealism labelled ‘motivational realism’, have examined the role of uncertainty in the offense-defense distinction. Andrew Kydd argues that ‘[u]ncertainty over state motivation is an essential element of any structural realist explanation of conflict’. He suggests that a security-seeking state may experience two types of uncertainty: uncertainty about current motivation of other states and uncertainty about the future motivation of other states. Offensive realists, like Mearsheimer, of course argue that states can never be certain either now or in the future that other states will not attack them. From this perspective, states’ motivations are unknowable. Even some defensive realists argue that states that are security seekers now could possibly become greedy revisionist states in the future. As Jervis puts it:

No matter how much decisionmakers are committed to the status quo, they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same path. Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise.

In response to these kinds of arguments Schweller has claimed that status quo states will always be able to signal their motivations. Glaser is more cautious and argues that the

offense–defense distinction sometimes provides opportunities for states to send reassuring signals to each other, but that they do not always do so.\footnote{Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists’, pp.50–90.} Kydd, like Schweller, argues that uncertainty about motivations can ‘usually be overcome’, not just because of the offense–defense distinction as Schweller suggests, but also because there are other avenues that states can convey their motivations.\footnote{Kydd, ‘Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing’, p.117.} In particular Kydd argues that ‘the transparency of the democratic process facilitates cooperation’ in this way.\footnote{Kydd, ‘Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing’, p.153.}

The real problem, Kydd suggests, is not the difficulties that security-seeking states may have with signalling their status quo intent, but rather aggressive, expansionist or greedy states. These kinds of arguments add important qualifications to realist thinking and could have implications for defence planners.

Stephen Brook’s work re-examining realist views of state behaviour\footnote{Stephen M. Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, \textit{International Organization}, Vol.51, No.3, Summer, 1997, pp.445–477.} claims that ‘realism does not have a unified set of assumptions about state behaviour’.\footnote{Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, p.473.} Neorealists, he claims, ‘view...the international system as a relentless competition for security’. In contrast, ‘postclassical realists’, like himself, are ‘agnostic regarding security competition in the international system’. Like other defensive realists, Brooks assumes that there is considerable variation in the nature of security and competition under anarchy. This is because postclassical realists include factors other than capabilities. As Brooks argues:

\begin{quote}
[T]he strength of security pressures fluctuates according to a variety of material factors besides the distribution of capabilities, namely technology, geography, and international economic pressures.\footnote{Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, p.472.}
\end{quote}

In other words, Brooks acknowledges that security conditions vacillate and depend on other material factors than system-level capabilities. As a result he can avoid the neorealist assumption, which Mearsheimer makes, that the pursuit of security involves a relentless competition and requires worst-case forecasts about state behaviour.\footnote{See Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, pp.144–172.}
Brooks argues that there is an important intellectual distinction between neorealism and his notion of postclassical realism. Neorealists assume that ‘the mere possibility of conflict’ conditions decision making whereas postclassical realists assume it is ‘the probability of conflict’ that does [emphasis added].116 These different assumptions have both theoretical and practical implications for security, among other issues. At the theoretical level, Brooks argues that the ‘worst-case/possibilistic assumptions—and not the condition of anarchy—performs the bulk of the explanatory work in the Waltzian neorealist framework’.117 This suggests that realists may be pessimistic regardless of the context. At the practical level, the ‘worst-case/possibilistic assumptions’ leads decision makers towards worst-case planning. The less dire ‘probability of conflict’ assumption suggests that security is more plentiful and it provides a broader range of options for defence planners to choose from.118

Defensive realists also canvass more varied approaches to military action. Offensive realists ‘believe offensive military action often contributes to security’.119 Defensive realists by contrast consider that acting, and being prepared to act, pre-emptively is provocatively risky and only justifiable under certain conditions: that is, when there is a rising power which is thought likely to become aggressive in the future and when the ‘prevailing modes of warfare favour the offensive’.120 As Brooks argues, ‘defensive realists have a much more conditional view than aggressive realists as to whether offensive action enhances security’.121 Offensive realists are also inclined towards the view that expansionism is a major aspect of the security behaviour of states and even that security requires expansionism.122 Defensive realists by contrast emphasise that security relations are part of a more complex security dilemma. As Jervis points out,
'disagreement over the prevalence of expansionism' is one of the major issues between 'offensive' and 'defensive' realism.123

The realist notions of the balance of power and alliances have also been examined from a defensive realist perspective.124 Stephen Walt re-examines and modifies the common realist argument that power and capabilities explain why states balance and bandwagon and argues that:

> Although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the only one. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat.125

States are motivated to balance in response to a perceived threat126 or, as Walt says, 'states which are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them'.127 His argument suggests that the 'balance of power' argument is an insufficient explanation for state behaviour and should be supplemented with calculations about the 'balance of threat'. These calculations are based on such factors as a state’s 'aggregate power' but also 'geographic proximity, offensive power and aggression intentions'.128

Walt’s analysis has important policy implications. As Michael Mastanduno points out:

> In a world in which balancing behaviour is the norm and balancing is a response to threat, it is often rational for states to pursue policies that signal restraint and reassurance.129

As Walt recommends, ‘foreign and defence policies that minimise the threat one poses to others make the most sense in such a world’.130 He also argues that 'the precise level of US power is probably less important than the way in which it is used; and the domestic situation of the United States may be more important than anything else'.131

Although Walt’s work adds to realist thinking, his argument about alliances, like that of

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123 Jervis, ‘Realism in the Study of World Politics’, fn 34, p.982.
128 Walt, in particular pp.21–49 and the Conclusion.
130 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p.27.
other realists, implies that alliances will disintegrate in a non-threatening strategic environment. Yet alliances have flourished in the post-Cold War period in Asia Pacific and Western Europe where threats are generally low or negligible and despite the fact that their original rationale has disappeared.

To sum up, the developments in realism have important theoretical and policy implications. In the first place, the worldview of defensive realism continues to assume international anarchy, but also assumes that the nature and extent of competition is not as dire as offensive realists say it is. Importantly, defensive realists explicitly assume that under certain conditions cooperation between states enhances security. This is different from the implicit assumption about cooperation made by early neorealists like Waltz (see above). In the second place, although defensive realists continue to assume that the object of security is the nation state and security is sought from military threats, the means they prescribe to enhance security are more varied than those envisaged by either classical or standard structural realists. In particular, the means involve cooperative measures to stabilise the offense-defense balance through arms control measures. As Kydd argues, arms control should ‘play an important role in establishing cooperation by reducing the severity of the security dilemma and shifting the world towards to a defense-dominated status’.132 The military means to achieving security, from a defensive realist’s perspective, are also more varied. As discussed above, defence planners have other options other than preparations for worst-cases. Defensive realism can also mean that defence planning is more complex. Finally, defensive realists consider domestic factors as an important part of explaining state behaviour.

However, some of the modifications to realism made by defensive realism need further clarification. Several examples illustrate the point. The nature and extent of cooperation is unclear. Glaser defines cooperation as ‘coordinated policies designed to avoid arms races’133 but he does not envisage institutional cooperation and in fact considers his notion of ‘contingent realism’ as a challenge to neoinstitutionalists.134 Kydd endorses arms control measures but he is vague about implementation—only suggesting that

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132 Kydd, ‘Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing’, p.120.
multilateral treaties could be useful. These defensive realists discuss cooperation in functional terms, not as a norm. There is no evidence that ideational factors, as opposed to material factors such as offensive/defensive capabilities, are considered as means to enhancing security. As Robert Jervis argues, 'realism cannot explain deeper forms of cooperation'. Furthermore, in defensive realism there is no discussion about the balance between cooperative measures and self-help. And, with respect to the latter, there is little indication of how different assumptions underpinning self-help (e.g., Brook's possibility/worse-case versus the probability assumptions) can be translated into doctrine, strategy, force structure and defence planning concepts. Finally, with regard to alliances, there is little discussion about the continuation of alliances under any other conditions than the very few which realists stipulate i.e., as responses to power or threat balancing. Defensive realism has added refinements to realist thinking but it needs to go further, and, for example, explore the nature of cooperation which underpins it.

Summary

In sum, this examination of the realist literature suggests that several points can be made about its underlying security assumptions. The two main variants of realism—classical and neorealism—assume that states compete to be secure and that cooperation is either too difficult or dangerous. Both variants hold pessimistic worldviews and dispositions. The state is the referent object of security and self-help, alliances and balance of power arrangements are the prescribed means for achieving security. In both cases the latter may involve a degree of passive cooperation despite realists' arguments to the contrary.

Recent realist writings, especially those stressing the offensive–defensive division, have refined realist thinking about competition and cooperation, the reasons for alliances, the underlying assumptions for self-help and the relevance of domestic factors for understanding security. But clarification is still needed in a number of areas, particularly the nature, extent and purpose of cooperation.

In conclusion, realism remains the major tradition in international relations for explaining both the continuing focus on state competition and the pessimistic view that

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135 Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', p.120.
136 Jervis, 'Realism in the Study of World Politics', p.985.
security relationships between states is often one of ‘tragedy’.\textsuperscript{137} The liberal tradition is by contrast based on a more positive set of assumptions about relations between states.

**LIBERALS’ ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY**

As discussed earlier, the worldview that underpins the liberal tradition is more optimistic than that of the realist tradition. All liberals assume that cooperation between states is possible and beneficial for security. Liberals also differ among themselves on a range of issues. Their differences have some interesting implications for the answers that they give to the questions ‘security of what, from what and by what means’?

**Republican liberalism**

Republican liberals, such as Immanuel Kant and his modern successor Michael Doyle, are interested in the connection between particular types of states and security. Michael Doyle’s thesis that democratic states tend not to go to war with each other bolsters long-held liberal arguments about the positive relationship between peace and democracy. Doyle’s research is more rigorous and better empirically based than earlier work on the subject and is distinct from the more philosophical lines of reasoning, such as Kant’s.\textsuperscript{138} Indeed, Doyle’s finding and other work claiming the practical absence of war among democracies is, according to Jack Levy, ‘as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations’.\textsuperscript{139} The revival of the general argument about peace, democracy and capitalism has certainly been the cause of much excitement in the liberal camp and, according to Zacher and Matthews, the relevant studies since the early 1980s ‘have breathed more life into liberal international theory than any body of scholarly


\textsuperscript{138} Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics Revisited’, in Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory*, pp.83–106. Doyle refers to some earlier scholars who addressed empirically the tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, see note 3 on p.88.

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writings'.140 Although many scholars support the correlation between democracies and peace (despite some contention over the meaning of democracy and peace) there is less agreement about the causal explanations.141

The democratic peace argument raises questions about the meaning of state-to-state security: between liberal states within the zone of peace; between liberal and nonliberal states (the latter being outside of the zone of peace); between nonliberal states; and the transition of nonliberal states to liberal status.142 The different security situations that the democratic peace argument encompasses may suggest that there are several answers to the questions 'security from what and how'?

According to Doyle, Kant's theory of perpetual peace depends upon the combination of three 'definitive articles': namely, a domestic republican constitution, which guarantees restraint; international law, which garners respect; and cosmopolitan law, which signifies the spirit of commercialism and adds material incentives (e.g., wealth) to moral commitments. It is important to note that Doyle also adopts the same argument when he states that:

[N]o single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but together (and only together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace.143

If these are the requirements for liberal states to function with each other in perpetual peace then there is still the question of how liberal states relate to other states which do not adhere to these principles, that is nonliberal states.

Security between liberal and nonliberal states is apparently much more tenuous. Liberal states are not necessarily less aggressive than nonliberal ones. Michael Doyle argues (as did Kant) that while liberal republicanism challenges many aspects of realism insofar as it assumes that 'liberal states are different' because '[t]hey are indeed peaceful' he

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stresses that ‘they are also prone to make war’.\textsuperscript{144} Doyle argues that ‘[l]iberal states, as Kant argued they would, have created a separate peace. They also, as he feared they might, have discovered reasons for aggression’.\textsuperscript{145} In effect, Doyle argues that, ‘in their relations with nonliberal states, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system as a whole’.\textsuperscript{146} If this is the case then liberal states will seek ‘security against’ nonliberal states using traditional realist means. Moreover, liberal states can be threats to nonliberal states. As Doyle points out:

\textit{[T]he very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflicts in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.}\textsuperscript{147}

If Doyle’s argument describes the basis of the liberal republican approach to security then clearly this does not eschew the use of force as a means for achieving security.

That some liberals are prepared to use force, not just to protect themselves but to further their own values and interests, comes as no surprise to some scholars. E.H. Carr’s critique of liberalism, or what he called utopianism, makes this very point.\textsuperscript{148} Carr argued that:

\textit{[T]he bankruptcy of utopianism resides not [only] in its failure to live up to its principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs.}\textsuperscript{149}

Carr argued that utopians were likely to present or ‘cloak’ their interests as ‘a universal interest for the purpose of imposing it upon the whole world’.\textsuperscript{150} To demonstrated his point Carr recounts Woodrow Wilson’s assurance to the world after the American

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
  \bibitem{149} Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis}, p.88.
  \bibitem{150} Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis}, p.78.
\end{thebibliography}
bombardment of Vera Cruz in 1914, that 'the United States has gone down to Mexico to serve mankind'.151 Carr’s argument that utopians usually fail to expose their standards for conduct, for example the use of force, may apply to many liberalisms but not to republican liberalism, which is quite open about the role of force.

Apart from indicating the role of force in liberalism, liberal republicanism also informs liberal thinking about security in two other ways. The first is that, if liberal republicans see republicanism as a goal for the domestic realm and the international system, then in Doyle’s interpretation of Kant’s international liberalism, peace among all states does not require a world state or state of nations. Sovereignty remains in-tact in the international system, and this is not necessarily a bad thing. For Doyle (and he says, Kant), ‘national sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a state of nations: [and] a world state destroys the civic freedom on which the development of human capacities rests’.152 And second, Doyle also points out that in Kant’s liberal republicanism, the pacific union between liberal states is not necessarily a formal institutionalised one.153 Doyle supports his claim with the observation that, ‘liberal states have behaved for the past almost 200 years as if such a Kantian pacific union and treaty of perpetual peace had been signed’.154 He suggests that Kant may have had in mind something less formal such as ‘a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the cosmopolitan law’.155 That security can be enhanced without institutional forms is an interesting argument for liberal institutionalists to consider (see below).

Several observations about liberal assumptions of security follow from examining liberal republicanism. Among the most important are that: security of the state is central; liberal states are peaceful among themselves under certain conditions i.e., under Kant’s three principles; liberal states justify the use of force against nonliberal states for

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151 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p.78.
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protecting and extending their values; sovereignty is valued and a world state is not recommended; and formal institutionalised security arrangements are not necessary to ensure peace. The underlying assumption is that under certain conditions states will cooperate with each other. Another variant of liberalism, commercial liberalism, puts more emphasis on Kant’s cosmopolitanism, or commercial spirit, as a basis for peace.

Commercial liberalism

There are a number of strands of commercial liberalism which, while concerned primarily with trade and commercial relations between nations, have implications for security. At the centre of most arguments for economic liberalism is the claim that commerce, trade and economic interactions in general have pacific consequences for security relations between nations. Commercial liberals are less concerned about issues of sovereignty, power and anarchy than some of their political sisters. Indeed, it claimed by such liberals that:

[T]he key to world order is less the balance of military power than it is the form of economic exchange and balance of fiscal power, for the latter operate at the superstructural level to shape the former.156

Like other liberals, commercial liberals assume states are rational actors and concerned with interests. Some earlier commercial liberals even argued that there existed a ‘harmony of interests’ among nations. But there are also differences among commercial liberals, about other such issues as the role of the state and institutions in commercial and peaceful activities.

In what might be called the Cobden strand of commercial liberalism, after the nineteenth century economic philosopher Richard Cobden, security is a consequence of the state taking a particular role. In the first place, governments should be constrained and contact between nations should be unrestricted. As Cobden puts it, for ‘as little intercourse as possible between governments [and] as much connection between nations

According to F.H. Hinsley, such nineteenth century liberals were of the view that:

[W]hen international relations became relations between nations of peoples—war which was materially profitless and absurd and morally wrong, would be replaced by free and peaceful economic competition and such sources of dispute as still remained would easily be settled by judicial procedure.\(^{158}\)

Governments were seen to be the problem for several reasons. At the international level they often pursued balance of power interests, which the liberal John Bright referred to as the ‘foul idol’ and condemned for the ‘recorded...sufferings which [it] has entailed’.\(^{159}\) And at home, governments often imposed barriers to commerce and trade, usually to accommodate vested interests. Another view held by these early economic liberals was that ‘the use of force...had no role in bringing about a liberal world order’.\(^{160}\) Instead a natural order, peoples’ rationality, economic incentives and judicial procedure would overcome most of the obstacles to security.

In a similar vein the liberal philosopher Jeremy Bentham emphasised utilitarian liberal values and economic processes as the basis for international peace. Bentham is accredited with adding two important concepts, economic utility and the harmony of interests, to the liberals’ conceptual roll-call of equality, rationality, liberty and property.\(^{161}\) Bentham, like the political economist Adam Smith, saw a connection between self-interest and the good society. On Bentham’s calculation, if each person individually pursued their self-interest in happiness, by ‘maximising pleasure and minimising pain’, then when aggregated, this would be to the good of society. This rather mechanistic process was driven by self-interest: not by moral principles or lofty views about the nature of people, although it was assumed that people did seek happiness. When applied to commerce, which unlike politics was a private activity, a natural equilibrium would operate, which, if governments kept their distance, would have the consequence of ameliorating conflict, or so the argument went.

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\(^{159}\) Cited in McKinlay and Little, \textit{Global Problems and World Order}, p.176.

\(^{160}\) McKinlay and Little, \textit{Global Problems and World Order}, p.176.

\(^{161}\) Knutsen, \textit{A History of International Relations Theory}, p.134.
World War I challenged the early liberal emphasis on the pacific consequences of commerce on nations, when European states engaged in a long and savage war despite high levels of commercial interdependence. The rise of fascist and communist governments, it was argued, were also a threat to peace since they rejected the liberal precepts of rationality, individual self-interest in commercial contacts and the free market. Or, if governments did allow such elements to develop then they would participate as state units in the market and use their wealth to accumulate power to threaten the very existence of liberal states. The latter prediction was made by mercantilist economic thinkers who, like political realists, argued that national economic wealth (plenty, as some put it), power and war were closely connected. In any event, confidence faded in the Bentham, Cobden, Bright strand of commercial liberalism, so-called laissez-faire liberalism, and as a result modifications and additions were made to the commercial liberals’ argument.

One of the major modifications made by early twentieth century commercial liberals concerned the nature and role of the state. Now states were seen as being more benign than the early commercial liberals had portrayed them and capable of contributing positively to commerce and peace. More attention was given to the particular nature of the state, to state-to-state cooperation, and to intervention, or, as some would prefer to say, facilitation by the state and other institutions in economic issues. J.A. Hobson and Norman Angell were two early twentieth century commercial liberals who argued for democratic states, interstate cooperation, economic interdependencies between states, and free trade, not least because it created interdependencies that reduced the incentives for war.

Later in the century, and particularly after the Second World War, commercial liberals endorsed liberal economic institutions that had the effect of supporting the security of the state. The operation of the Bretton Woods system, the GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank were seen to indirectly benefit state security: for example, through provision of economic/political welfare that gave citizens a stake in the system and, as a consequence, enhanced internal security. Support for inter-state economic cooperation

162 Hobson, Imperialism: A Study.
also enhanced the state’s external security relations because, it was thought, there would be powerful economic incentives for preventing or resolving conflict.

The contemporary international relations literature on commercial liberalism pursues both old and new themes. There is renewed interest in the assumption that economic interdependence reduces the prospects for conflict. But, as Susan McMillan concludes from her review of theoretical propositions and twenty empirical case studies, ‘interdependence, conflict and the relationship between them are more complex than has generally been assumed’. Her work shows that more research is needed to ‘explain how both the costs and benefits of interdependence are related to international conflict’.

Overall, several points can be made about the connections between security and economics discussed by commercial liberals. All agree that commerce and peace are positively correlated. Not all agree on how this comes about. For nineteenth century liberals peace was more likely to take place if the state had minimal involvement, indeed states were often seen as the cause of conflict especially those which sought unrestrained political power and balance of power arrangements. Later liberals were more sympathetic to the state and encouraged them to support economic interdependencies, cooperation and institutions to manage economic relationships.

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166 McMillan, ‘Interdependence and Conflict’, p.56. McMillan argues that ‘Liberalism has emphasised the benefits of interdependence and realism has emphasised the costs, but neither theoretical
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Commercial liberals stress the costs, both economic and social, of conflict and support other liberal arguments about the obsolescence of war in the modern period. Institutions not weapons are the preferred means for preventing conflict. Commercial liberals are also confident that the security of individuals within states is enhanced by improving economic conditions and that this reduces the prospects of domestic issues becoming the cause of conflict between states. These liberals seem to be less concerned about the negative effects of international liberal economics on liberal values at the domestic level. Material values precede the social and political values of other liberals or rather they provide the base on which other liberal values develop.

Liberal institutionalism

The neoliberal institutionalists’ argument that cooperation is central to security was discussed earlier. But their particular argument about cooperation is a relatively recent one that belongs to a wider and older genre called liberal institutionalism. The main theories that comprise liberal institutionalism, at least since the early 1940s, are functionalism, neofunctionalism, integrationism, transnationalism, complex interdependence, and regime theory. As Robert Cox points out, these theories:

[C]entred attention on multilateralism, endeavouring to discern in it the emergence of institutions that would transform world order by progressively bringing the state system within some form of authoritative regulation.

framework had developed an argument that explains how both the costs and the benefits of interdependence are related to international conflict’, p.56.


See for example, E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Haas, Beyond the Nation State, Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964.


The concept of multilateralism is clearly integral to liberal institutionalism but it appears to have several meanings. Liberals such as John Ruggie argue multilateralism is an institutional form distinctive from other organisational forms,

[W]hat is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, which is something that other organisational forms also do, but that it does so on the basis of certain principles or ordering relations among those states.174

The principles to which Ruggie refers add a qualitative dimension to multilateralism and focus on three properties: indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.175 Hence, Ruggie argues 'multilateralism is a highly demanding institutional form'.176 He critically notes that many other liberals, including the neoliberal institutionalists, are not so demanding and they endorse the argument that multilateralism is mostly concerned with the coordination of national policies.

Liberal institutionalism, or at least its integrationist dimension, also differs from neoliberal institutionalism in that it leaves open the prospect that the state as an institution will be superseded. The integrationist theorist, Karl Deutsch, for example, held out the hope that 'nationalism and...the growth of nations may recede into its proper historical perspective'.177 Neoliberal institutionalists, by contrast, assume that the state is the central actor and will remain so. Deutsch also argued that sociological factors, such as cross-national communications and cultural networks, would help to ameliorate the divisions between states and result in what he called 'pluralistic security communities'. Indeed, Deutsch considered the North Atlantic area exemplified this development.178 Deutsch’s view of security communities differs from the more recent

175 Ruggie, 'Multilateralism', in Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters, pp.3-47. According to James Caporaso, 'indivisibility can be thought of as scope (both geographic and functional)...Generalised principles of conduct usually come in the form of norms exhorting general if not universal modes of relating to other states...Diffuse reciprocity [emphasises] that actors expect to benefit in the long run and over many issues, rather than every time on every issue'. See James A. Caporaso, 'International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations', in Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters, pp.53-54.
177 Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p.166.
views about the nature of security communities, such as those proposed by Barry Buzan, which do not necessarily imply that there is social integration but still suggest that conflict is highly unlikely.\textsuperscript{179}

Underpinning liberal institutionalism is the assumption that norms, habits, values, expectations and beliefs are important dimensions of the international system and provide a basis for cooperation. Along with rules, laws, and regulations these elements form what many liberals refer to as ‘international society’. Liberals assume that increasing interdependence between groups and states will consolidate and expand shared values. Some liberals extend the argument to claim that ‘global citizenship’ and cosmopolitan values are increasing.\textsuperscript{180}

The emphasis which liberal institutionalism places on norms, values, institutions and society has been the inspiration for further investigation by constructivist scholars. Though not necessarily liberal in other senses these scholars have sought to explicate the role of non-material factors, like ideas and norms, in determining state behaviour. Ted Hopf, for example, argues that a constructivist approach can show how social practices and norms construct the identities and interests of states and how, in the case of democratic states, these intersubjective meanings help to explain the liberal peace.\textsuperscript{181}

Liberal institutionalism provides a number of different answers to the question of ‘security of what’? The main division are between those institutionalists who claim that individuals and groups are the proper referent objects of security and those who suggest that it is the state (the latter claim the state provides for the security of individuals and groups). Liberals who focus on individuals claim that institutions, such as human rights

\textsuperscript{179} Barry Buzan, who cannot be called a liberal, makes a similar argument to Deutsch and claims that security communities exist when ‘disputes among all members are resolved to such an extent that none fears, or prepares for either assault or military attack by any of the others’. However, Buzan doesn’t address the relationship between security communities and the state and just makes the statement that ‘[b]eyond security community lies regional integration, which ends anarchy and therefore moves the regional issues from the national and international to the domestic realm’. See Barry Buzan, \textit{People, States and Fear}, second edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991, pp.218–219.


regimes, are required to protect individuals from repressive states. Other liberals focus on institutions, or regimes, which facilitate state-to-state cooperation. It appears that liberal institutionalists agree that institutions based on shared expectations and values are central to cooperation and security, but they are concerned with different referent objects and causes of insecurity.

**Liberals and military issues**

Although many liberals are concerned with establishing the conditions for peace, few address situations where liberal approaches have been tried but failed, or cannot be applied in the first instance. They also have little to say about what might constitute military policies during periods of peace; for realists these issues are central. Nonetheless, there is a liberal military security literature that provides further insights into liberals’ security assumptions.

First, for many liberals the nuclear age and the fact of mutual assured destruction capabilities in the hands of the major powers had shown that security is interdependent. What is needed, according to these liberals is a policy of ‘common security’. The argument is clearly expressed in the 1982 Palme Commission, which stated that:\textsuperscript{182}

\begin{quote}
States can no longer seek security at each other’s expense; it can be attained only through cooperative undertakings...A doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. [Emphasis in original.]\textsuperscript{183}
\end{quote}

The critical point made by the Commission was that security must be achieved ‘not against the adversary but together with him’.\textsuperscript{184} For many liberals, this means that the crux of common security is that military technology and particularly nuclear, chemical and biological technologies have made states interdependent or dependent on each other for security—and therefore cooperative approaches are essential.

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\textsuperscript{184} Palme, Common Security, p.xiii.
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Second, for many liberals security involves much more than military security for defence of the state. These liberals assume that security is comprehensive and support the argument in the 1980 Brandt Report that:

An important task of constructive international policy will have to consist in providing a new, more comprehensive understanding of 'security' which would be less restricted to the purely military aspects. In the global context true security cannot be achieved by a mounting up of weapons defence in the narrow sense—but only by providing basic conditions for peaceful relations between nations and solving not only the military but also the non-military problems which threaten them.\(^{185}\)

Those liberals who claim that solutions to economic problems are a key to resolving security problems especially endorse this assumption that security is more comprehensive.\(^{186}\) For these liberals 'a direct link is drawn between security and prosperity so that the promotion of economic development becomes indistinguishable from the promotion of common security'.\(^{187}\) Many liberals claim that in addition to economic security, comprehensive security involves a broader conception of 'human security' which includes freedom from repression, hunger and disease.\(^{188}\)

Third, for many of these liberals the individual is the referent object of security. Security must be comprehensive because the individual is subjected not only to military and economic threats but other types of threats as well. Hence for Ken Booth, 'security means absence of threats'.\(^{189}\) He argues that the purpose of security is the liberal project of emancipation of the individual because 'emancipation, not power or order, produces security'. By emancipation Booth means 'the freeing of people (as individuals and

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186 Some of these liberals argue that individual security also requires that governments do not privilege military technology and military power because this causes economic and social insecurities. Privileging the military security of the states undermines the welfare of the individual and society and moreover such preparations may not even enhance a state’s security. On the latter point some liberals, like Robert Johansen, argue that the realist's maxim, 'if you want peace prepare for war' is difficult to substantiate historically and that in the light of such uncertainty it should be discarded in favour of the argument that 'if you want peace, prepare institutions to keep peace'. See Robert Johansen, 'Swords into Plowshares: Can Fewer Arms Yield More Security', in Kegley, *Controversies in International Relations Theories*, p.253.


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groups) from...physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do'. For Booth 'individual human beings are the ultimate referent'. This is because states, although 'important features of world politics' are 'unreliable, illogical and too diverse in their character to use as the primary referent objects'.

Several observations follow from the liberal concern with military issues. First, the object of security is the individual. Second, security is sought from a variety of threats and the hence the means for achieving security are also varied. The basic argument is that security is best achieved through cooperative rather than competitive means. The notion of 'cooperative security' captures the liberal policy approach. Insofar as this concerns state-to-state security, from the liberal institutionalists' viewpoint, this of course involves multilateralism, institutions and regimes. For other liberals, formal institutions may not always be appropriate or possible and cooperation takes place in a variety of ways, through for example, dialogue, military or non-military means and along bilateral and multilateral lines. Republican liberals are some of the few liberals who leave open the option of the use of force to protect and further their liberal values.

A final observation is that although liberals have traditionally supported peaceful means for achieving security and have criticised military intervention, those (at least in the West) most concerned about human security and gross violations of human rights have in the 1990s increasingly supported so-called humanitarian intervention i.e., the forcible intrusion into the internal affairs of other sovereign states in order to save individuals from repression, often by their own governments. Liberals have supported such interventions even when, as in the case of Kosovo, they were clearly in contravention of traditional international law.

Overall, liberal scholars, unlike their realist counterparts, do not articulate detailed and comprehensive security strategies to support their various positions. The realists dominate the discussion about security and particularly the means to achieving it.

Although the divisions between the two main traditions may be fewer than is commonly recognised much is justifiably made of the differences between them.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the security assumptions underpinning the two main traditions of international relations, liberalism and realism. It argued that there are variants within these traditions which provide different understandings of security. In some instances these differences indicate that there are similarities between the two traditions. For example, all the variants of realism make the state the object of security and likewise some variants of liberalism. Similarly, all realisms consider that the main threat to security is the military power of other states and so do some liberalism. However, despite these and other similarities there are considerable differences.

The main differences concern firstly their worldviews, with realists having more pessimistic dispositions and liberals more optimistic attitudes. Realists are pessimistic about the prospects of cooperation between states; liberals are cautiously optimistic. With regard to security assumptions, realism assumes that the state is the object of security while the variants of liberalism assume there are different objects of security, though overall the emphasis is on individuals rather than states. Since liberalism identifies different objects of security then, as would be expected, the threats its proponents perceive to security also vary. For example, individuals can be made insecure by the state, economic deprivation, and by threats to their human potential, the absence of which Booth calls emancipation. Realism assumes the main threat to security is competition between states, especially with regard to military power. Finally, the means to achieve security envisaged by each tradition vary from each other and between the different variants of realism and liberalism. Realists endorse competitive strategies involving self-help, alliances, and balance of power arrangements while liberals support cooperative arrangements involving institutions, regimes and multilateralism and military measures such as transparency and confidence building.

The different security assumptions of each tradition have important implications for policy. While liberals and realists share a number of assumptions about security, in one important area their assumptions are antithetical. Liberals believe that cooperation enhances peace and military competition undermines it; realists believe that cooperation
is not only extraordinarily difficult but in some cases may undermine deterrence. Realists believe in pursuing policies of ‘peace through strength’ rather than peace through cooperation. They seek security against other states not with them. Clearly these liberal and realist policy approaches are antithetical, if not contradictory. Because Australia’s security policy embraces both liberal and realist policies—‘security with’ as well as ‘security against’ it would be seem to follow that its overall policy is contradictory as well. This raises the question of whether or not there is an international relations literature that could explain this apparent contradiction. The next chapter will further examine the literature with this objective in mind.
Chapter Five

LIBERAL–REALIST ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY

"The two-schools analysis is not adequate... the more it is made the basis for a general international theory the more untrue it seems to be."¹
(Martin Wight, Political Theorist.)

"The element of international society is real, but the elements of a state of war and of transnational loyalties and divisions are real also, to reify the first element, or to speak as if it annulled the second and third, is an illusion."²
(Hedley Bull, Political Theorist.)

"Eclecticism may not be the route to theoretical precision, but sometimes it is the only route available."³
(Robert Gilpin, Political Theorist.)

If, as the previous chapter has argued, the two main traditions in international relations (IR), realism and liberalism, are based on contradictory assumptions about security this in turn suggests that if a policy was claimed to be based realist and liberal assumptions it would also be contradictory. From this it would seem to follow that if Australia’s security policy can be shown to be based on both liberal and realist assumptions, then it too must be contradictory. Yet, as we have seen, policy makers reject this claim.

This chapter will continue to examine the IR literature for other possible theoretical explanations, and in particular one that may explain the assumptions behind Australia’s security policy. The first section of the chapter will review the recent literature, which followed the end of the Cold War and which calls for an assessment of the roles and the relationship between the two traditions of liberalism and realism. The second will examine three antecedents to this literature, namely the Grotian school, the neoliberal institutionalists and that of the ‘new security’ group of scholars. The third section will investigate these last three literatures, in terms of its worldviews and the assumptions

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about security which are prompted by the three questions posed earlier, ‘security of what, from what and by what means’?

I argue several points in this chapter. First, that the IR literature does in fact include scholarship that embraces more than one theory to explain the relations between states and that this literature provides some foundations for explaining security relations. Second, that the three schools of thought—the Grotians, the neoliberal institutionalists and the ‘new security’ school—are the most useful in this respect. More importantly, the assumption they all share is that anarchy and society co-exist in the international system and that both are important for explaining security. Anarchy and society are concepts that are based respectively on realist and liberal assumptions about security. Third, that from the worldviews and security assumptions of the three schools it is possible to construct an analytical framework, which could be called a liberal–realist framework, and which can be used to examine the security policies of states. Finally, from the perspective of a single theory explanation the liberal–realist framework is one that incorporates contradiction and paradox. This ‘paradoxical’ approach distinguishes the liberal–realist perspective from the other two traditions: from realism which privileges the state, anarchy, competition, power-politics, relative gains, self-interest; and from liberalism which privileges the individual, society, cooperation; and common interests. I suggest that the liberal–realist framework provides another approach for explaining Australia’s security policy.

ANOTHER LOOK AT THE IR LITERATURE

The ‘first great debate’ in the discipline of international relations, back in the 1920s, highlighted the divisions between realism and idealism. Consequently much of the IR literature thereafter focused on the differences between liberals and realists and on single frameworks—either realism or liberalism—to explain states’ behaviour. Security relations were dominated by realist explanations. Recently, however, scholars have started to re-assess both the relationship between liberalism and realism and single theory explanations.

This current re-assessment of the two traditions has come from several directions. One argument claims that the collapse of the Cold War was a turning point in international relations and confirmation that ‘the dominant realist framework...may have become
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inadequate to account for current realities'.4 According to some scholars, the time had come for a new approach that was rigorous, coherent and idealist not least because many realist tenets are being undermined by 'a revolution [of democracy]' which is 'sweeping the world'.5 This idealist framework is, according to Stanley Kober, one which understands the 'the harsh realities of power'.6 Indeed, the problem in the past has been that realists have 'oversimplified the concept of power'.7

From another direction there is the more cautious argument that although the post-Cold War period is different from previous eras it is also characterised by uncertainty and complexity and therefore 'it may be premature to judge whether realism's paradigmatic axioms no longer fit'.8 Charles Kegley, suggests that scholars should search for 'a theory that integrates the most relevant features of both traditions' or, he suggests, 'an altogether different theoretical framework which transcends them'.9 A number of scholars, addressing the first of these tasks, now claim that the two traditions can indeed be 'melded', can be seen as 'hybrids', or 'fusions', 'that realism and liberalism can be synthesised', that 'realists and liberals need each other'.10 The implicit assumption held by many of these scholars is that liberalism remains the more important tradition.11

A third argument, often made from a modified realist position, suggests that a synthesis of the two traditions is less useful than an approach that involves both traditions, separately and equally. From this perspective the post Cold War realities show that the tenets of realism remain relevant, but need to be supplemented, for example, with liberal and other insights. Fred Riggs, for example, argues that the state-centric focus of realism

5 Stanley Kober, 'Idealpolitik', Foreign Policy, No. 79, Summer 1990, p. 9.
6 Kober, 'Idealpolitik', p. 16.
7 Kober, 'Idealpolitik', p. 16.
8 Kegley, 'The Neoidealistic Moment in International Studies?', p. 133.
10 Most of these terms are excerpts from the authors in Kegley's edited volume above, Controversies in International Relations Theories.
11 See for example, Kober, 'Idealpolitik', pp. 3–24.
needs to include the growing problem of ‘inter-nationality warfare’. Riggs proposes a ‘new brand of realism’, one which would combine ‘both realist and idealist points of view’: a realist view to address the problems of violence, power and external factors and an idealist view to address the internal political/economic and institutional factors. In Rigg’s ‘new realism’, realism and idealism are not conflicting theories, rather they are ‘essentially complementary’ since both are needed to make sense of a ‘complex reality’.

A fourth line of argument is that international relations, and the location of liberalism and realism within it, is best addressed by bringing in other paradigms. Michael Banks discusses international relations with the help of three paradigms, realism, pluralism and structuralism. Michael Donelan suggests international relations theory consists of five ‘strands’: natural law, realism, fideism, rationalism and historicism. Terry Nardin and David Mapel suggest that the history of international relations shows twelve ethical traditions. One effect of introducing these additional paradigms is that the distinctions between realism and liberalism are often blurred and the relationship is changed.

A fifth set of arguments comes from scholars who have reassessed the roles and the relationship between liberalism and realism from a critical perspective. David Long’s argument, which has already been mentioned, is that the neoliberal institutionalists have accommodated realist tenets, to the point, he claims, that they have ‘shorn [liberalism] of its normative concerns with the liberty and well-being of the individual’. Then there are some post-modernists and critical theorists who argue that realism and many


liberalisms share several characteristics including: flawed epistemological and ontological foundations and methodologies. These theorists claim that in most instances both traditions incorrectly assume that it is possible to make a clear distinction between the subject and object, both privilege the state, and both embrace positivism. But not all critical theorists are so dismissive of the two traditions. Andrew Linklater, for example, argues that 'a critical theory of international relations ought to preserve the main strengths of the realists and rationalist traditions'.

This current re-assessment of the relationship between the liberal and realist traditions has some precedents in the international relations literature. Some established sub-disciplines of international relations, such as peace research, implicitly assume that the liberal notion of cooperation between states is possible in security matters. However, this assumption is often derived from game theoretic/psychological assumptions about cooperation rather than from IR traditions or theories. And finally, other disciplines, for example history, either ignore the traditions or dismiss their antithetical positions. For example, Christopher Hill argues that changes in ideas and policies:

[U]sually involves the overlapping of competing paradigms, either as one set of assumptions is gradually superseded by another, or as separate issue-areas are governed by distinct, even contradictory principles.

In addition to these precedents there are at least two well-established schools of international relations that also acknowledge relationships between the two traditions.

20 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism, London 1990, p.32.
The Grotian school

Scholars from the Grotian and neoliberal institutionalist schools argue that single framework explanations are unsatisfactory. The Grotian scholar Martin Wight claims that one of his two 'conscious aims' is to show that:

[T]he two-schools analysis is not adequate...the more it is made the basis for a general international theory the more untrue it seems to be.

Moreover, Wight argues 'the greatest political writers in international theory almost all straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions'.

This Grotian literature suggests that international relations are better explained if several frameworks are used. Wight finds it useful to adopt 'three traditions of international theory': realist, rationalist and revolutionist, which represent Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian thinking. Even so, he remains wary of such classifications, warning that, 'the purpose of building pigeon-holes is to reassure oneself that the raw material does not fit into them' (emphasis in the original). He counsels that his three traditions:

[A]re not like three railroad tracks running parallel into infinity. They are not philosophically constant and pure like three stately, tranquil and independent streams....They are streams, with eddies and cross-currents, sometimes interlacing and never for long confined to their own river bed. They both influence and cross-fertilise one another, and they change, although without...losing their inner identity.

Thus when Wight discusses the importance of the three traditions for understanding diplomacy and foreign policy, he concludes that:

22 The Grotian school is also known as the English school and apart from Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, whose work will be discussed here, the other main members included C.A.W. Manning, John Vincent, Adam Watson, Gerrit Gong and James Mayall. See the bibliography for publication details of the last five scholars.
23 Wight, International Theory: the Three Traditions (eds), Gabriel Wight and Porter, pp.266–267. Wight's second aim is to demonstrate that 'there is very little, if anything, new in political theory, that the great moral debates of the past are in essence our debates', see p.268.
25 Wight's three traditions, realist, rationalist and revolutionist, represent his three ways of thinking about the components of international relations: international anarchy (the multiplicity of sovereign states acknowledging no political superior); habitual solidarity (expressed in the institutions of diplomacy, international legal rules, commerce) and moral solidarity (the communion deeper than politics and economics, expressed in such phrases as 'the society of states', the 'family of nations', 'world public opinion'. See Martin Wight, 'An Anatomy of International Thought', Review of International Studies, No.13, 1987, p.221 and pp.221–227.
Liberal–Realist Assumptions About Security

[T]he Grotian and Kantian dove-tail in their idealism and their theory of history, whereas the Grotian and Machiavellian share a certain realism. The Machiavellian and Kantian agree on the origin of politics, on (the absence of) international society, and on the criteria for international morality. Broadly, the Grotian and Kantian approximate over ideals, the Kantian and Machiavellian over methods.28

Wight’s approach, according to Claire Cutler, ‘emerges from an inability to embrace any one single formulation’.29 As Wight states above, this is his ‘conscious aim’. Nonetheless, Wight does identify most closely with his middle ‘stream’, the rationalist tradition, based on the works of the seventeenth century Dutch jurist, Grotius. The main rationalist argument is that international relations takes place within a ‘society of states’. Indeed, for Wight the ‘most fundamental question you can ask in international relations theory is, What is international society?’.30 In a Grotian society the essential actors are states, but individuals and non-state actors are also important.31 Wight’s society is characterised by constitutionalism and moderation: constitutionalism is apparent in the moral and legal limits on the exercise of power32 and moderation is evident the choice of a middle way, or a via media, between the two extremes of realism and revolution, between Machiavelli and Kant.33 International society, according to Wight, is:

[M]anifest in the diplomatic system; in the conscious maintenance of the balance of power to preserve the independence of the member communities; in the regular operations of international law...in economic, social and technical interdependence and the functional international institutions established to...regulate it.34

According to Cutler, in Wight’s society these common practices are maintained through positive institutions and practices and not through the ‘transcendent principles of natural law’ argued for by Grotius.35 Clearly then the Grotian society assumes cooperation

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28 Wight, International Theory, p.162.
33 Wight International Theory, pp.158–163.
34 Wight, ‘Western Values’, in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, pp.96–97.
35 Cutler, “‘The Grotian Tradition” in International Relations’, p.53. If Cutler is right that institutions and social practices are important in Wight’s society then whether these processes had an effect on the institution and on state interests is unclear. It is also not clear if the actions/processes that are conducted, in themselves, constitute part of the identity and interests of these states, as constructivist scholars suggest.
between states. Equally important, the Grotian society assumes that anarchy continues to be present in the international context and to co-exist with society. Grotians are most concerned therefore that "the problematic [is] the phenomenon of war and conditions of peace and order...reflecting the belief that war is inevitable".36

Hedley Bull was strongly influenced by Martin Wight and is a well-known member of the Grotian school. As R.J. Vincent, points out, Bull:

[I]nterposed the idea of international society between, on the one hand, the Hobbesian rejection of the possibility of a society of states (because states existed together in a state of nature which was a state of war) and, on the other hand, the Kantian view of a cosmopolitan or world society of individuals (which was, at the same time, a more fundamental fact than international society, and a productive fiction foretelling the end of mere inter-state society).37

Clearly then for Bull, like Wight, there is a 'society of states'. According to Bull:

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relationship with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.38

Bull's society is state-centric, that is it is defined by the common interests and values of states, expressed in formal treaties and customary law rather than in state norms based on natural law or the norms of individuals and non-state actors, as Grotius had suggested. Thus Bull's society is limited, to the formal relations between states.

Bull, like Wight, also acknowledges the co-existence of society with anarchy. As Bull cautiously argues:

The element of international society is real, but the elements of a state of war and of transnational loyalties and divisions are real also, to reify the first element, or to speak as if it annulled the second and third, is an illusion.39

For Bull then, international society, the state of war, transnational loyalties and divisions all co-exist. It is not surprising that the title of Bull's most famous book is The

36 Cutler, "'The Grotian Tradition" in International Relations', p.50.
Anarchical Society⁴⁰ and that, as Stanley Hoffmann, points out, it ‘showed that anarchy was compatible with society’.⁴¹

Again like Wight, Bull assumes that, because anarchy is constantly present within the international context, the problem of war between states, the conditions of peace, and in particular, international order, were absolutely critical components. Whereas Wight asks ‘what is international society’, for Bull the central issue for international relations is ‘that of identifying and strengthening the foundations of order’.⁴² ‘Order’, he says, ‘is part of the historical record of international relations...modern states have formed...not only a system of states but also an international society’.⁴³ Various institutions are necessary to maintain order: in particular international law and the balance of power. The latter is seen by Bull to be quite precarious but the best arrangement under some circumstances. Overall, although Bull and Wight emphasise different issues, their arguments provide explanations that take account of the co-existence of anarchy and society and of competition and cooperation between states. Their arguments also demonstrate that single frameworks are inadequate for explanation.

Neoliberal institutionalists

A second school of thought that also acknowledges the co-existence of anarchy and society and refers to more than one theory to explain international relations is that of neoliberal institutionalism. Scholars of this school regard both realism and liberalism as complementary and provide an analysis of international relations which, they claim, integrates them. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye analyse the liberal concept of economic interdependence from a realist ‘power-orientated’ perspective and with the insights of bargaining theory.⁴⁴ According to Keohane and Nye, their analysis ‘linked

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⁴¹ Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Hedley Bull and His Contribution to International Relations’, International Affairs, Vol.62, No.1, 1986, pp.179–195. Hoffmann follows this statement with a question, ‘but how much society...is likely to flourish in an anarchical society?’
realist and neorealist analysis to concerns of liberals with interdependence'. As they say, 'rather than viewing realist theory as an alternative to liberal “interdependence theory” we regarded the two as necessary complements to one another'. The authors claim that an analysis of power and interdependence shows that:

[T]he key point [is] not that interdependence made power obsolete—far from it—but that patterns of interdependence and patterns of potential power resources in a given issue-area are closely related—indeed two sides of a single coin. Thus we sought not merely to place realist and liberal perspectives side by side, but to link them together in an integrated analysis.

The authors also argue that the liberal concept of regimes provides the ‘governing arrangement’ for relationships of interdependence and that a proper understanding of the nature of regimes, their formation, change and maintenance, requires an integrated approach of realist’s focus on power and the theory of bargaining.

Keohane and Nye argue this integrated approach is ‘analytically justified’. They claim that realism and liberalism share some common assumptions about the state’s political action:

Realism and liberalism both have their roots in a utilitarian view of the world, in which individual actors pursue their own interests by responding to incentives. Both doctrines view politics as a process of political and economic exchange, characterised by bargaining. Broadly speaking, both realism and liberalism are consistent with the assumption that most state behaviour can be interpreted as rational, or at least intelligent, activity. Realism and liberalism are therefore not two incommensurable paradigms with different conceptions of the nature of political action.

For, Keohane and Nye, although there are distinct differences between the two traditions, for example regarding the nature of the international environment and the goals of actors, this does not preclude common intellectual processes and state actions based on rationality.

Further analytical justification for an integrated approach is provided by Keohane’s and Nye’s examination of liberal notions of process and realist notions of structure when examining economic interdependence. Indeed, the authors argue that ‘adding the process level to the concept of structure in defining international systems enriches our ability to theorise’.50 This is because the emphasis:

(O)n process as well as (rather than instead of) structure moves us towards a synthesis of, rather than a radical disjunction between, realism and liberalism. Neorealism is appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory; liberalism is most fruitful at the process level. We aspire to combine them into a system-level theory that incorporates process as well as structure.51

It is important to note that, although Keohane and Nye stress that ‘neorealism is appropriate at the structural level’ and ‘liberalism is most fruitful at the process level’, their understanding of the type of anarchy which exists at this structural level allows for cooperation between states. As shown in the previous chapter, this is a major point of difference between the neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists and the latter believe that norms, regimes and institutions are important: the former see them as epiphenomenal. In other words, neoliberals assume there is society, as well as anarchy. Interestingly, the focus on process, which Keohane and Nye pursue to investigate the practice of interdependence, led them towards the study of domestic and internal factors, particularly those that initiated and maintained the processes.52 In his more recent writing Keohane appears to point to the effects of institutions and regimes on state interests and thus not only underscores the direction of the connections between systemic and domestic factors but also shows the effects of society on the latter.53

It seems that from the neoliberal institutionalists’ perspective, analysis of international relations requires a ‘synthesis...rather than a radical disjunction between realism and

52 As Helen Milner, another neoliberal institutionalist scholar, points out, the neorealist notion of structure notwithstanding, analysis of the domestic realm is significant for understanding international relations. Milner also argues that a proper analysis of the international system combines anarchy and interdependence. See Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: a Critique’, Review of International Studies, Vol.17, No.1, 1991, pp.67–85.
liberalism'.\textsuperscript{54} Keohane and Nye's study of a key liberal tenet—interdependence—using realists' tools, provides a strong analytical framework, perhaps one that is stronger than a single theory under most circumstances.

`New security' school

Although less developed than the two schools discussed, there is a third group of scholars who assume that anarchy and society co-exist. This literature, which for convenience will be called the 'new security' school,\textsuperscript{55} developed during the mid-1980s when the first signs of the end of the Cold War were evident.\textsuperscript{56} The main assumption underpinning this work is that, 'anarchy does not preclude security'.\textsuperscript{57} As Ken Booth, argues:

\begin{quote}
We can predictably expect to live in an anarchical world, but "anarchy" need not have the pessimistic connotations it invariably does have.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

New security, he argues, is 'both...realistic and utopian' and 'sophisticated and strategically literate'.\textsuperscript{59} Empirical evidence for this argument is found, it is claimed, in the development of 'security communities'. Booth argues that security communities do not change the anarchical character of the international system but 'confront the analysis and prognosis of pessimistic Hobbesian realism'.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{54} Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', p.747.


Another scholar who could be included in this latter school is Barry Buzan. Buzan, rather like the neoliberal institutionalists, examines the 'interplay between anarchy and interdependence' and argues that it is 'the major framework within which thinking about international security has to take place'. Buzan claims that:

The prospects for international security have to be located within the complex dialectic that results from the dividing tendencies or anarchy interacting with the binding ones of interdependence.

This argument and others indicate that Buzan endorses both anarchy and society. Buzan argues that 'security communities' are 'micro-demonstrations of what mature anarchy looks like' and indicative of the fact that some useful 'norms are emerging as major elements of international society'. In this case it is the norm that 'amongst major powers...wars...are no longer a desirable or fruitful way of settling differences'. Buzan's argument about 'security communities' and 'mature anarchy' rests on the assumption that there is an international context which consists of both anarchy and society—a society which, as he indicates, involves positive norms of behaviour based on cooperation between states.

In a later work Buzan makes an implicit argument that is very similar to one explicitly made here, namely that 'the logic of structural realism [shows] how international society can emerge as a natural product of the logic of anarchy'. Hence although the purpose of Buzan's argument in this case is to show how international society can evolve from anarchy, his analysis indicates the co-existence of each is an important characteristic of the international context.

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61 Buzan claims he is a realist but his arguments go well beyond traditional realism. For Buzan's defence of his realist position see Buzan, 'The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International Theory.


Muthiah Alagappa also argues against single theory explanations saying that 'the reality of international politics is complex and changing [and]...No single existing theory can adequately capture and generalise about all of reality'.67 For Alagappa, 'the realist paradigm provides a good starting point for analysis' because some of the core assumptions, such as that 'anarchy is the ordering principle', are highly relevant.68 But, he says that, 'in crucial ways, analysis and explanation [of realism] must be modified by insights provided by other theories'.69 In an edited volume on contemporary Asian security practices Alagappa concludes that '[i]nternational politics in Asia is now characterised not only by competition and conflict but also by cooperation and interdependence'.70

This examination of the works of these three schools—Grotian, neoliberal institutionalism and the ‘new security’ school—affirms two arguments: that explaining security often requires reference to more than one tradition; and that international security relations involve the co-existence of anarchy and society and competition and cooperation. These three literatures share enough in common to be described generically as a liberal–realist perspective. The notion of international society is based on liberal assumptions about cooperation. Grotians conceptualise society in terms of liberal notions of constitutionalism and international law. Neoliberal institutionalists see it in terms of liberal notions of norms, rules and governing arrangements like regimes and institutions. And the new security school consider that society is found in ‘security communities’ and ‘mature anarchy’. In all these cases the idea of society assumes that there will be cooperation between states.71

The notion of anarchy, which all three schools share, is based on realist assumptions. Grotians conceptualise anarchy as a situation where there is always potential for warfare

71 As Ian Clark argues, in the Grotian society, 'cooperation...is manifested in the institutions of international society such as diplomacy and international law'. See Clark, ‘Traditions of Thought and Classical Theories of International Relations’, in Clark and Neumann (eds), Classical Theories of International Relations, p.5.
and where order is problematic. Neoliberal institutionalists see anarchy present in the
dynamic of absolute gains and the use of power. And, the ‘new security’ thinkers
assume that the continuing need for military force confirms the presence of anarchy. In
all cases the idea of anarchy assumes that there will be competition between states. The
next step in the argument is to establish the extent to which, in addition to these views,
these scholars have developed a broader worldview which may help to reveal their
assumptions about security.

THE LIBERAL–REALIST WORLDVIEW

From the literature discussed so far, it seems that a liberal–realist worldview has several
characteristics. The first two have already been made above but are reiterated for the
sake of completeness.

- **Complexity.** The first assumption is that international relations, and any analysis of
  them, is too complex to explain from a single perspective. Martin Wight, according
to Hedley Bull, was attracted to the Grotian tradition because it ‘was better able to
accommodate complexity because it was itself a compromise that made concessions
to both the Machiavellians and the Kantian points of view’.72

- **The assumption of the co-existence of anarchy and society.** The second charac-
teristic, indeed the defining feature of a liberal–realist worldview is the argument by
Grotian, neoliberal institutionalist and ‘new security thinking’ scholars that the
international environment is characterised by anarchy as well as society. This is a
different view from that held by realists and liberals who tend to privilege either
anarchy or society.

- **Power/competition and common interests/cooperation.** As a consequence of anarchy
and society, a third characteristic of a liberal–realist worldview is that the use of
power and competition co-exist with cooperation and common interests. Even E.H.
Carr, famous for being a realist, argued that both power and utopian thinking were
necessary in international politics and in this way he too adopts a liberal–realist

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Theory*, p.xiv.
position.\textsuperscript{73} His critique of utopianism was based largely on his argument that utopianism failed, especially during the interwar period, because it did not take account of power. Moreover, Carr argued that even utopians, ignorantly or knowingly, incorporated power into their practices. Like Carr, a number of neoliberal institutionalists make the study of power a central focus of their analysis.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, provide a qualified but firm endorsement of the centrality of power in international relations. To exchange realism, they say:

\begin{quote}
[F]or an equally simple view—for instance, that military force is obsolete and economic interdependence benign—would condemn one to equally grave, though different errors.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

Nonetheless, Keohane and Nye remain cautious about the resort to military power on the grounds that, 'the use of force has become increasingly costly'.\textsuperscript{75} They also argue that 'that military power dominates economic power' and disagree with those commercial liberals who claim that strong economic interdependence impedes war.\textsuperscript{76} But again they emphasise the risks of using military power.\textsuperscript{77}

As mentioned above Keohane and Nye also point out that power and interdependence are connected. As neoliberal institutionalists, their key point was that:

\begin{quote}
[N]ot that interdependence made power obsolete—far from it—but that patterns of interdependence and patterns of potential power in a given issue area are closely related—indeed two sides of a single coin.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

Indeed, they say ‘interdependence would not necessarily lead to cooperation...or that its consequences would automatically be benign’.\textsuperscript{79} In summary, their position in their major work, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, was that:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{73} Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years Crisis}, p.95–145.
\textsuperscript{74} Keohane and Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, p.5.
\textsuperscript{75} They suggest four conditions which explain why this has come to be: 'risks of nuclear escalation; resistance by people in poor or weak countries; uncertain and possibly negative effects on the achievement of economic goals; and domestic opinion opposed to the costs of human costs of the use of force'. They conclude that such conditions have 'erode[d] the hierarchy based on military power'. See Keohane and Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, p.228.
\textsuperscript{76} Keohane and Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, p.16–17.
\textsuperscript{77} Keohane and Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, p.16–17.
\textsuperscript{78} Keohane and Nye, \textit{'Power and Interdependence Revisited'}, p.730. According to the authors, their widely discussed concept of 'complex interdependence' was liberal one: but it was a hypothesis, an ideal type which contrasted with an ideal type of realism, and was not intended as an accurate description of world politics, see p.737.
\end{flushleft}
We were cognisant of the realities of power, but did not regard military force as the chief source of power, nor did we regard security and relative position as the overriding goals of states.\textsuperscript{80}

That liberal–realists are serious about ‘the realities of power’ is further shown by the fact that some neoliberal institutionalist scholars argue that power is not constrained to the international domain. Helen Milner argues that power is a feature, not just of interdependence between states and a common feature of international politics but also, of domestic politics. That power politics characterises both realms is for Milner an indication that the two realms cannot be easily separated—an argument many neorealist scholars would reject.\textsuperscript{81} As Milner puts it, ‘politics domestically and internationally is about balancing power’.\textsuperscript{82}

Barry Buzan goes even further. He argues that there is no reason ‘why the logic of power, self-interest and conflict cannot run in other sectors, nor indeed why the state should be seen as exclusively political’.\textsuperscript{83} Buzan finds the ‘multi-sectoral part of the realist tradition represented by Carr has more to offer to the future than that represented by either Morgenthau or Waltz’.\textsuperscript{84} Thus for Buzan, realism’s privileging of ‘the military/political sector as opposed to the economic, societal or environmental ones’ does not capture essence of international relations.\textsuperscript{85} In effect Buzan’s and Milner’s arguments extend realist tenets into sectors traditionally seen as liberal territory.

But, while power is fundamental to number of relationships and entities, from the perspective of the liberal–realist framework, it is usually exercised within limits. As Wight argues, in a Grotian society there are ‘moral and legal limits on the exercise

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} Keohane and Nye, ‘Power and Interdependence Revisited’, p.730.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Keohane and Nye, ‘Power and Interdependence Revisited’, p.733.
\item \textsuperscript{81} As Milner argues, ‘the radical separation between domestic and international politics [which neorealists have invoked]’ is an oversimplification. See Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory’, p.85.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory’, p.80.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Buzan, ‘The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?’, in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, p.52.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Buzan, ‘The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?’, in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, p.52.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Buzan, ‘The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?’, in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, p.52.
\end{itemize}
of power’ provided, he says, by constitutionalism.\textsuperscript{86} Power in a liberal–realist framework is considered a factor rather than the factor which explains the way states behave: that is, while examining power is necessary it is not sufficient to explain how states behave.

- \textit{Mixed-motives}. A fourth characteristic of a liberal–realist worldview which can be implied or derived from the assumption that anarchy and society co-exist is that states may have a number of motives. As some as security scholars, like Thomas Schelling, have argued the relations between states is often characterised by ‘strategic interdependence’ and that as a result of this they exhibit ‘mixed-motives’.\textsuperscript{87} Neoliberal institutionalists, like Helen Milner, have made this observation that states having mixed-motives, a core element in theorising about economic interdependence.\textsuperscript{88}

- \textit{Shifting interests}. If the international context shifts between degrees of anarchy and society, then this suggests that a fifth characteristic of a liberal–realist worldview is that state interests also shift. While anarchy ensures that security achieved via military means is a major interest, so too is the expansion of society needed to ameliorate anarchy. For example, for Grotians, writing during the Cold War, the maintenance of sovereignty, through international law and diplomacy and the balance of power, was an important interest (not least for the perpetuation of society). By the time neoliberal institutionalists were publishing their theories, sovereignty appeared to be less threatened and thus relatively less important. It was evident to the neoliberal institutionalists that ‘dense’ economic transnational processes were taking place across state borders and hence they stressed that state interests were concerned with liberal economic reform, via cooperation, regimes and institutions. These neoliberal scholars considered regimes in terms of mutual self-interest, and win-win outcomes. It appears that for liberal–realists, what constitutes self-interest and the way it is constituted is far more problematic than it is for strict

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Wight, ‘Western Values’. in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, pp.104–105.}
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.}
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{See Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory’, pp.82–85.}
realists and liberals. As Keohane argues, 'the notion of self-interest is so elastic [that] we have to examine what the premise means rather than simply taking it for granted'. As other scholars, from the constructivist school, have argued, the extent to which international and domestic processes constitute the identities of actors and influence self-interests, rather than interests being determined just by structures, remains unclear in much of the literature.

- **Material and ideational factors.** The sixth characteristic of the liberal–realist worldview is that both material and ideational factors are important for understanding world politics. As Hedley Bull argues with regard to sovereignty: '[t]he sovereignty of states, both internal and external, may be said to exist at a normative and a factual level'. Liberal–realists emphasise that it is not just material elements, like military capabilities and trade, which help to determine and explain state behaviour but also shared norms. As Bull's definition of international society indicates 'common values', 'a common set of rules', and 'common interests' are all critical. Muthiah Alagappa is emphatic that 'ideational factors together with material ones determine social reality'.

- **Moderation.** The seventh assumption of a liberal–realist worldview is that, in general, it is necessary to achieve a degree of balance between contending theories. The Grotian theorists adopt a middle way or 'golden mean' between extremes of

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89 Many strict realists assume the prime, constant and universal interest of states is power maximising and relative gains in military capabilities. Many strict liberals assume a prime, constant and universal 'harmony of interests' among states, at least in some issues like commerce, or at some point in time.


91 See Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996. Katzenstein, examines the social, as opposed to material, construction of national security. He acknowledges that '[s]cholars [in the Grotian tradition] have not focused very explicitly on how norms construct states with specific identities and interests. But sociological imagery is strong in their work; it is not a great leap from arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are constructed, partly or substantially by these norms.' See p.15 and chapter on 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security'. Also see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996.


Machiavelli and Kant or between the realist and revolutionist traditions and they support the rule-of-law. The neoliberal institutionalists steer a way between realism and liberalism and support a range of social arrangements, ranging from informal ‘expectations of behaviour’ to formal rules, which are administrated by regimes and institutions. The implication is that practitioners should be encouraged to ‘balance’ competing interests and in security areas, to cooperate within ‘margins of safety’ (see later reference to Tit for Tat strategies).

- **Apparent contradictions and paradoxes.** Finally, if the liberal–realist worldview involves anarchy and society, then from the perspective of single theory proponents, it must also be seen as embodying contradiction and paradox. Indeed, many of the ideas and terms used by the scholars grouped as liberal–realists seem to acknowledge that there are ‘apparent’ contradictions between the two points of view they embrace: for example, there are many references to notions such as ‘via medias’, ‘middle ways’, ‘golden means’, ‘straddling’, ‘faltering between’, ‘synthesising’ and ‘integrating’. All these terms point to a worldview which takes account of apparent contradictions and paradoxes. In essence it is a worldview which, as Wight suggested (see above), straddles the frontiers of different theories and entities: for example, between realism and liberalism; anarchy and society; competition and cooperation; enmity and amity; pessimism and optimism, rational interests and passions, interdependence and sovereignty; uncertainty and certainty; and unpredictability and predictability.

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95 The first four terms are used by Wight and the last two by Keohane and Nye. “Faltering between” is used by Andrew Wyatt-Walter who considers, *inter alia*, the ‘complex view of human nature’ held by Adam Smith (usually seen as a ‘commercial liberal’) to explain that in fact Smith ‘falters between realism and liberalism’ and provides ‘a bridge between economic liberalism and the realist and mercantilist traditions of thought’. See Andrew Wyatt-Walter, ‘Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.22, No.1, January 1996, p.17.
96 As Wyatt-Smith’s study of Adam Smith work shows, ‘citizens have passions as well as economic interests’. See Wyatt-Walter, ‘Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition’, p.17. This was an argument underlying Adam Smith’s claim that ‘neither democracy nor commerce might ensure peace’.
LIBERAL–REALIST SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS

What then are the implications of the broad liberal–realist worldview for security? In particular, what might be the answers to the questions: security of what, from what, and by what means? Although it is being argued here that there is a liberal–realist worldview, scholars in the three schools have not explicitly examined the answers to these questions. Providing these answers is one the tasks of this thesis.

Security of what?

All the liberal–realist scholars discussed so far appear to assume the state is conditionally the primary object of security. Several points need to be made about the conditionality of the state in liberal–realist thinking. First, most scholars assume that the purpose and justification of the state as a political unit is grounded in individuals, and that its duty is to represent the collective of individuals within its frontiers. Bull argues that:

[T]he ultimate units of the great society of all mankind are not states (or nations, tribes, empires, classes or parties), but individual human beings which are permanent and indestructible in a sense which groupings of them of this or that sort, are not. This is the moment of international relations, but the question of world order arises whatever the political and social structure of the globe.

Martin Wight, has a similar view and approvingly quotes Westlake’s argument that, in the society of states ‘states are its immediate, men its ultimate members. The duties and rights of states are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them’. And, as Cutler points out, Wight ‘subject[s] the primacy of the state to the moral and legal restraints embodied in international society’.

For the neoliberal institutionalists, states are the key elements in regimes, but neoliberal institutionalists’ understanding of the relationship between the state and the individual citizen is often unclear. According to Cutler, regime theorists like Puchala and Hopkins

98 Barry Buzan, it is argued by some, has recently moved from emphasising the state to stressing society as the object of security. See Bill McSweeny, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', Review of International Studies, Vol.22, No.1, 1996, pp.81–93.
100 Quoted in Wight, ‘Western Values’, in Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, p.102.
note that 'individuals as bureaucratic units are often the real players in regime creation and maintenance'.

Nonetheless, Cutler argues that regime theorists, 'do not suggest that subnational units or individuals are recognised as having any special status or holding any special rights in international relations.' But other regime scholars seem to support the view that individuals provide the ultimate purpose of states and regimes. Keohane, for example, makes the general argument that, 'the analysis of social reality...begins with individuals as the relevant actors' and it 'seeks to understand how organisations composed of aggregations of individuals interact'. From these accounts of both the Grotian and neoliberal institutionalists scholars it seems clear that from a liberal–realist perspective, the primacy of the security of the state, particularly from external anarchy, is not perceived as being, in principle, at odds with the security of the individuals within it. Although the assumption of an identity of interest between state and citizen assumes that states are in some sense answerable to their citizens, which is often not the case.

Although most of these scholars see states as representing individuals few of them have explored the consequences of taking the individual as the equal referent object of security. Bull, for one, seems to side step the implications of referring to the individual. He is in fact unconvinced that individuals should be entitled to address their insecurity through claims for 'human rights'. Bull believes that the pursuit of human rights—the security of the individual—vis a vis the state is dangerous because it risks subverting the state. He argues that:

[Clarried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organised as society of states.]

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102 Cutler, 'The Grotian Tradition in International Relations', p.61.
103 Cutler, 'The Grotian Tradition in International Relations', p.61.
105 The argument here is not that strict realists and certainty not strict liberals do not consider the individual. Rather it is that the realist starts with the state and goes backward to the individual while the liberal starts with the individual and ends with the state. The liberal–realist tries to balance the interests of the individual and the state and is influenced by the context rather than universal principles.
Bull seems to assume that the security of individuals is best assured by maintaining the society of states.

Wight is more receptive than Bull to a conception of international law that recognises individuals and non-state actors. But he too still seems to see individual human security best achieved in the society of states. Having made the state the referent object of security on the grounds that it represents the individuals within, many of these scholars fail to address the question of states that are illegitimate in the eyes of their citizens. That is, they fail to address those situations when states do not merely fail to protect their citizens, but may actively oppress them.

Muthiah Alagappa, a third wave liberal–realist, grapples with this issue. He argues that the ‘political community—presently the nation-state—is the primary security referent’, but that any conceptualisation of security, in Asia at least, has to take account of the ‘problematic nature of the state and the presence of other security referents, some of which may compete with the existing state’. Overall then, the liberal–realist literature suggests that the state is the referent object, conditional upon it performing the task that legitimises it, namely protection of the individuals within.

**Security from what?**

The liberal–realist approach to security is state-centric in that it assumes the most serious threat to the state is from external military violence. The first wave of liberal–realists were most concerned about the risks of conventional and nuclear conflict, particularly in Europe. However, the third wave of liberal–realist security scholars, writing in the 1990s, assume that the threat of war, at least between major powers, is decreasingly probable. In other words, that society not anarchy is the dominant characteristic between the major powers. This latter view has several implications for liberal–realist assumptions about security.

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Liberal–Realist Assumptions About Security

The first is that the most devastating but yet the most remote threat to the state’s survival, nuclear war, still has to be addressed. That is, unless nuclear weapons are eliminated, nuclear deterrence must still be supported. The second implication is that, although external military violence and the use of military force remains the key threat to the state, other threats to the survival of the state may be more probable. Fred Riggs points to the internal domain of states, where there is organised armed violence between the state and its citizens and between groups of citizens within the same state boundaries. Other scholars point to additional causes of conflict. For Buzan the state’s survival is not just concerned with power politics, self-interest and conflict in the military/political sectors outside and inside the state but also in the economic, social and environmental sectors. Nonetheless, like many scholars making this argument, Buzan does not make it clear whether or not insecurity in such ‘sectors’ is indeed a potential cause of military conflict between or within states, or whether it is another type of insecurity which could threaten the state, or whether it is both. For example, is economic insecurity a cause of military conflict or is it a another type of threat to the survival of the state or both? Buzan’s argument requires further conceptualisation of the notion of threat.

Another third wave liberal–realist, Muthiah Alagappa, has made some progress in this respect. He too argues that security goes ‘beyond the concern with international military threat to the political survival of the state’, He also suggests that the content of political survival should be ‘deepened and broadened’ to accommodate ‘contested and multiple referents and a broad range of values, threats and coping strategies, and must


112 Alagappa, ‘Conceptualising Security. Hierarchy and Conceptual Traveling’, in Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice, p.677. For Alagappa, security is concerned with the core value of political survival, comprehensively defined, of the community. In addition, Alagappa, argues that although ‘political survival constitutes the nucleus’, conceptions of security ‘must also accommodate serious challenges to the well-being of the community’ (p.697).
include both the internal and international levels'. Importantly, Alagappa attempts to establish some criteria for judging 'threats' to the political survival of the community. He argues that if any factor, for example an 'ideational challenge', is considered by the 'authoritative decision makers' of the community to be a value that is vital to the survival of the community and, in addition, an 'urgent' challenge to its survival, then this is what constitutes a threat to security.

Although this argument clarifies what can be considered a threat it too has problems, which the author acknowledges in part. Unless the notion of a threat can be defined without reference to what is deemed to be an urgent and vital value to the survival of the community by those in charge then it is a relative and circular definition. By this account, if the authoritative decision makers considered health to be a vital value for the survival of the community, and it was being challenged urgently (by, say, an AIDS epidemic), then this would constitute a security threat. Furthermore, if health/AIDS is a security threat then the means to achieve it, e.g., safe-sex and/or sexual abstinence, are also a security matter. Intellectually this seems unsatisfactory. Hence this characterisation of 'threat' might be improved not just by moving away from relative definitions but also by considering the practical measures for addressing security problems. It appears from this discussion that third wave liberal–realists have 'deepened and broadened' the notion of threat but have yet to give convincing reasons for its new boundaries. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily weaken their status as liberal–realists since they still give priority to the state and to external and internal political violence, whereas many others who seek to re-conceptualise security do not (see fn 56).

**The means to achieving security?**

If for liberal–realists the external context is one of anarchy and society, of enmity and amity, then logically the security of the state must involve both military and non-military.

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measures. Wight argues that in an international society of states 'the distribution of power is the central preoccupation...but it is not possible to say that concern for the social and moral order are excluded'.\(^{117}\) As a first wave scholar writing when military threats were not only the most devastating but also perceived to be the most likely threat to the survival of the state the measures which Wight stresses are, the distribution of power or the balance of power among the major states and self-defence. But he also emphasises that diplomacy and international law and norms are equally important.

**Balance of power**

With respect to the balance of power, Wight argues that it is an arrangement which is embedded in a society where 'the majority of states can agree on a broad comparative estimate of international power, and can co-operate in a common policy to maintain it'.\(^{118}\) In this version of balance of power the highly competitive aspects of 'offensive realism' are modified because the arrangement is embedded not just in anarchy but, more importantly, explicitly in society. Wight’s balance of power expressly requires cooperation and a distribution of power which appears to resemble a concert of power.

Hedley Bull, contends that the balance of power is a term we cannot do without, but that power balancing in practice is far from being an inevitable tendency among states, as many realists would maintain.\(^{119}\) Bull indicates that balance of power arrangements may be conditional rather then inevitable and he is cautious about their security enhancing effects. He, like Stanley Hoffmann,\(^{120}\) argues that in a context that consists of bipolarity, nuclear weapons and economic interdependence, attempts to balance power are of dubious value and are of little use to states which are not great powers.\(^{121}\)

In general the third wave security scholars do not have developed views on balance of power arrangements, or for that matter alliances. Barry Buzan seems to take a *fait
accompli attitude to the balance of power. He makes the observation that the 'anarchic structure can only be maintained by a balance of power' and that 'the two are effectively opposite sides of the same coin'.\textsuperscript{122} His view that 'the balance of power will by definition last as long as the international anarchy' suggests that power balancing is inevitable and in this respect is different from Bull's.\textsuperscript{123} However, Buzan thinks that the type of polarity is important and that whether or not the international system is bipolar or multipolar affects important strategic issues like deterrence, alliances, and arms control.\textsuperscript{124}

It would seem that, given the liberal–realist assumption that anarchy and society constitutes the international environment, an argument can be made that prescriptions for a balance of power arrangement would depend on the conditions at the time. In such a context evidence of overt aggression could be the only motive for establishing a balance of power arrangement. If a state seeks more military power than others because it is fearful of attack but this fear is misplaced then the best response from other states is give reassurance that that fear is unwarranted. Reassurance could be given via political and military means, such as common security approaches, particularly transparency and confidence building. If on the other hand a state seeks military power because it has aggressive intentions, manifest as offensive doctrine, declarations, and military capabilities and general mobilisation, then this state is not insecure and will not respond to reassurance measures. In this case it may be necessary to balance the power of the would-be aggressor with power. For liberal–realists the balance of power is a conditional arrangement. As Bull argues it is not an inevitable tendency.\textsuperscript{125}

\textit{Alliances}

Balance of power arrangements may sometimes involve alliances. However Wight, unlike the realists, emphasised the varied forms and utility of these arrangements. According to Wight:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{121} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, pp.101–126.
  \item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{122} Buzan, \textit{People, States and Fear}, p.165.
  \item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{123} Buzan, \textit{People, States and Fear}, p.165.
  \item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{124} Buzan, \textit{People, States and Fear}, pp.165–166.
  \item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{125} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, p.112.
\end{itemize}
Alliances are as various as friendships in their character, their purpose, their occasion, their duration, the relative position of those who make them. The oldest classification is into equal and unequal, according to the relative status and power of the allies. They can be wartime or peacetime, offensive or defensive, political or economic, permanent or temporary, bilateral or multilateral.126

Clearly, Wight’s notion of alliances is not necessarily linked to balance of power arrangements. However, like many other scholars, including Bull, he did not fully develop his idea of alliances as means to achieving security.

As indicated above third wave scholars have little to say about alliances. For Buzan, the establishment of an alliance policy is usually part of the balance of power. Given his views above about the inevitability of balance of power arrangements under anarchy it’s likely that he sees alliances in the same way. However, the concern he has about alliances is that they are ‘more in line with the national security strategy of increasing strength and reducing vulnerability than they are with an international strategy aimed at reducing threats’.127 For liberal–realists then it is likely that alliances, like balance of power arrangements, are measures to be taken under specific conditions.128 But importantly, as Wight indicates, the uses of alliances extend well beyond security guarantees.

**Self-help**

Apart from conditional support for balance of power and alliance arrangements as means to achieving security, liberal–realists support self-defence and the use force, though again there are several qualifications. Wight argues that:

> [I]nternational society has a right of self-defence and of coercion. If its common standards are challenged, they may be defended and reimposed by force; and if the distribution of power is threatened it may be restored by force.129

Furthermore, with respect to self-defence he suggests that:

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128 This contrasts to the approach in realism, or at least offensive realism, which considers balance of power and alliances as the prime and perhaps only measures for ensuring security: since anarchy is the constant and dominant condition which always requires some form of power balancing approach. For the realist the costs of attempting to balance of power and establishing alliances appear to be less than the costs of anarchy.

Liberal–Realist Assumptions About Security

[T]he exercise of this self-defence and coercion is most fully justified when it is undertaken by the members of international society collectively, or by a majority of them, or by any one of them with the authorisation of the others.130

Wight’s emphasis on self-defence is a major theme of third wave security scholars from the ‘new security’ school. For some, like Ken Booth, self-defence is seen as an element of ‘common security’. In this context, self-defence can provide reassurance that pre-emptive offensive strategies will not be undertaken and that uncertainty, arising from the difficulty of knowing if weapons and platforms are ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’, is reduced. As Buzan argues, common security:

[S]eeks to combine the self-reliance, self-preservation imperatives of anarchy with the idea that the only rational approach to security under contemporary political, military, economic and environmental conditions is through the logic of interdependence....Its advocates are realist in that they accept the need to work within the existing anarchic political framework, and the idealist in that they see plenty of room for improving international security within the limits set by the prevailing conditions in the system.131

Self-defence within common security contrasts with those realist-only approaches that purposely or inadvertently make states insecure.132

Collective security

Collective security is another approach to security conditionally supported by liberal–realists. Wight makes it clear in the quote above that the use of force is ‘most fully justified when it is undertaken by members of international society collectively’. Wight locates collective security as a means to achieving security within a discussion about power and considers it to be the ‘institutionalisation of the balance of power’.133 As he argues, with respect to the League of Nations, ‘the possibility of collective security constantly came back to the balance of power on which the League was based.’134 It is likely that for liberal–realists the idea that threats are indivisible to a collective of states, that an attack on one is an attack on all and calls for a collective response, is only

132 Deliberately by declarations, force structures and deployments which support ‘peace through strength’ strategies: i.e., offensive strategies to attack pre-emptively and/or attack home territory. And inadvertently, either as a consequence of seeking relative strength and creating a security dilemma, or as a result of unintended escalation during a crisis.
133 Wight, International Theory, p.277.
plausible under clear cut empirical conditions (as was the case in the Gulf War). The cost and benefit analysis is too difficult to make in advance and in the abstract to unconditionally endorse collective security.135

Security regimes, security communities, multilateralism, security cooperation

Apart from the competitive and military means discussed above the other critical means involved in a liberal–realist approach to security are those based on cooperation with other states. The aim behind these means is to further develop elements of society. Buzan argues that such arrangements as, ‘cooperative regimes’, can indeed, ‘form new perceptions of the national security problems’.136 Security regimes take account of the interdependence between states and aim to provide a governing arrangement which is based on norms and rules—which will hopefully increase the prospects of society and thereby decrease anarchy. The 1970–80s security regime literature originally focused on the interdependencies which made nuclear deterrence possible and on the development of common rules and conventions which would potentially improved stability.137 Scholars applied these regime principles to analyse a range of practical arrangements for improving security:138 such as the Conference on Security and Confidence in Europe (CSCE), Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Incidents at Sea Arrangements (INCSEAs), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Some of the principles underpinning regimes, such as norms, underpin another liberal–realist approach to security, that of ‘security communities’ among states. Barry Buzan,
Liberal–Realist Assumptions About Security

uses this term to refer to groups of states where there is ‘a norm that wars between them are no longer a desirable or fruitful way of settling differences’. The United States and Canada, the Nordic countries, the European Community, and, with qualifications, ASEAN, are given as examples.

Multilateralism is of course inherent to regimes and institutions. Grotian scholars, like Bull, tended to consider states as the prime institution needed for international order but he clearly endorsed international institutions like international law. Other types of multilateral institutions, like the UN and the International Monetary Fund are discussed by the Grotian scholars in a fairly an agnostic way, though they were critical of the UN’s role in collective security. The important point that Bull stresses in these discussions about institutions is that they provide not just an organisational and administrative machinery but ‘a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’. This view, underpins the neoliberal institutionalists argument that institutions are ‘persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behaviour’ and facilitate cooperation. In effect the liberal–realists support both the machinery and the norm of multilateralism, though they do not go as far as the liberal scholar John Ruggie (see the previous chapter).

Cooperation is without doubt an important aspect of the liberal–realist approach, though the mechanisms underpinning it are not well explored by most scholars. One group of scholars, located among the regime theorists, who do examine the process of cooperation are the game theorists. An important concept in the game theory literature is ‘reciprocity’ and it is the central feature of the strategy Tit for Tat in the game Prisoner’s Dilemma. Work done by Robert Axelrod on Tit for Tat shows, according to Charles

139 Buzan, ‘Is International Security Possible?’, in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, p.50. Buzan also refers to ‘security complexes’ which are regional security sub-systems where there are ‘patterns of amity/enmity that are substantially confined within some particular geographic area’. See Buzan, People, States and Fear, Chapter 5 and p.190. ‘Security communities’ suggest groups of states where amity more than enmity is evident.


141 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.146.


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Lipson, that 'if the time horizon is long enough, then the best strategy for individual actors is some initial generosity (that is, cooperating unilaterally on the first move), followed by tough-minded reciprocity' or retaliating each time the other player defects.\textsuperscript{145} Axelrod and Keohane argue that:

\begin{quote}
[T]his argument suggests that governments may have incentives to practice reciprocity in a variety of situations that are characterised by mixtures of conflicting and complementary interests.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

A major benefit of Tit for Tat strategy is that it allows for cooperation to take place within 'margins of safety': that is, without a state becoming vulnerable. It appears to be a classic liberal–realist approach in that it involves both cooperation and coercion.

**Cooperation and competition**

The liberal–realist means to achieving security obviously involves both competition and cooperation and this is seen to enhance security. As Muthiah Alagappa argues:

\begin{quote}
Competition, cooperation and community building are relevant in the pursuit of security. Cooperative strategies can be useful in mitigating the international security dilemma under certain conditions and possibly even overcoming it, leading to the formation of pluralistic security communities...

But self-help is not unimportant. Often a combination of approaches and instruments will have to be deployed.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

The key to understanding the means to achieving security in liberalism-realism is, as Alagappa argues, 'a combination of approaches and instruments'.

Finally, although the emphasis in this discussion has been on both the competitive and cooperative military aspects of security, a liberal–realist framework incorporates non-military measures which support and expand society. Regimes, both globally and regionally, have already been mentioned and so has norms and multilateralism, but equally important is international law and diplomacy.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Charles Lipson, International Cooperation, in Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, p.65.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
CONCLUSION

What then does a liberal–realist analytical framework contribute to efforts to explain the security assumptions underpinning state security policy? What has it achieved that the other approaches have not and where are the gaps and tensions? (See Table 5.1.) To reiterate an earlier point, the literature examined in the last chapter showed that assumptions about security are derived from two different, single theories—realism and liberalism. The dominant explanation of security is based on realist assumptions—a single perspective, albeit with variants. On the rarer occasions that security explanations are based on liberal assumptions it is, again, from that single perspective. But since each theory is based on different approaches to security this means that an explanation that involves both theories would be contradictory from the perspective of either theory.

It is argued that the literature examined in this chapter suggests an approach that incorporates both theories and is not necessarily contradictory. The assumptions about security that underpin this literature have not previously been investigated, or at least not from the perspective of the three questions which are used in this thesis to explore realist and liberal assumptions. It is also a literature whose assumptions have not been previously examined in a systematic way and organised into a framework that could be used to analyse security policies. The liberal–realist framework, which is constructed for this purpose, provides a different approach to explaining security. Although it appears to be paradoxical from a single theory perspective it overcomes the narrowness and presumably the inadequacies of single theory explanations.

The liberal–realist perspective is based on two concepts—anarchy and society—and both are needed to explain the international context in which states operate. Anarchy and society are the key concepts in realism and liberalism respectively. In this context the state is the primary object of security, but it is assumed that it provides for the security of individuals. Indeed, the society of states is seen as the best arrangement for the security of individuals. Thus the liberal–realist perspective privileges both the state and the individual, though, as discussed above, not without some difficulty. Most Grotian first wave scholars assumed the ideal state was a one based on Western notions of statehood that represented the interests of, and was based on, the consent of individual citizens. Although the state and individuals are both to be protected, the first wave scholars did not examine the security of individuals from the state, only from
Table 5.1 Explanatory literatures simplified

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<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>THE LIBERAL-REALIST FRAMEWORK</th>
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<td>Society</td>
<td>Anarchy and society</td>
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<td>Cooperation is possible between states</td>
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<td>Constant competition between states</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Enmity and amity</td>
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<td>Relative gains</td>
<td>Prospects for progress</td>
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<td>Pessimism</td>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>Optimism and pessimism via medias, straddling, middle ways</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defensive realists have more modified worldviews</td>
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<tr>
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<th>The state and territory</th>
<th>Individuals, society, state</th>
<th>The state and individuals</th>
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<td>SECURITY FROM</td>
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<td>Depends on the variant of liberalism</td>
<td>Military threats to the state; political violence towards individuals within the state; non-military threats to the state</td>
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external threats. Most of these scholars were uncritical of the sovereign state as a unit within the international context and its internal relation with individuals—indeed they seemed to have assumed a unitary and liberal nation state. Nonetheless, even though they failed to examine the security of individuals within the state, the important relation between the state and individual was acknowledged.

The third wave, or the ‘new security’ scholars, took a more critical view of the state and examined its internal dynamics: in particular, those situations where organised violence between the state and its citizens and between groups of citizens within the state occurred. Many took the view that more people are killed by their own governments than by wars between states. In comparison to single theory explanations the liberal–realist framework emphasises that both the state and individuals are the referent security objects, notwithstanding the difficulties above.
The focus on two referent objects means that threats are more varied. The first wave scholars looked mostly at the international political/military dimensions of state security and the second and third wave scholars extended the idea of anarchy to other sectors, for example, to security issues in the domestic realm, economic relations and the environment. Notwithstanding, these forays into other sectors, the main threats were seen to arise from the effects of anarchy: on the one hand, military competition and the threat or the use of force between states; and on the other hand, violent competition and the organised use of force within the state, either by the state or between groups within the state. The liberal–realist framework adds to the analysis of security issues by focusing on the threat or use of force from both external and internal sources.

The means proposed by a liberal–realist framework include military and non-military means and involve competitive and cooperative measures. Thus the means involve both realist and liberal strategies. The objective, survival of the state through management of anarchy and building society, often means that ‘contradictory’ strategies are advocated. To summarise the means advocated by liberal–realists. The first wave of Grotian scholars stressed societal norms, rules, international law, institutions and diplomacy as well as the use of force for self-defence and conditional balance (equilibrium) of power arrangements. The second wave of neoliberal institutionalists examined the conditions under which cooperation, as a means of building society, was possible and the extent to which power was involved. They found webs of interdependency between states, which involved both power politics and cooperation. They argued that the security of states was improved through building regimes of rules and norms and institutions, to ameliorate the effects of anarchy. Cooperation could be facilitated, they said, by reward/punishment Tit for Tat strategies—a classic liberal–realist strategy mixing both cooperation and coercion. The third wave of liberal–realists advocated both competitive and cooperative means to achieving security. On the one hand, self-help strategies which did not undermine the security of non-threatening others and, on the other hand, cooperative security measures, such as CBMs and transparency. Liberal–realist means can be distinguished from other strictly liberal or realist prescriptions by the fact that they could be combined, that no one approach was privileged, but is determined by the context. The ongoing intention being to build societal elements, albeit within margins of safety, to counter anarchy.
To summarise the main points about the liberal–realist perspective:

- it assumes an international context of anarchy and society
- the state is the object of security, but, since this is conditional on its relation with individuals within it means that both the state and the individual are the objects of security
- the state and individuals within seek security primarily, though not exclusively, from the effects of anarchy, and particularly from the use of force by other states and by the state against its citizens
- the state’s survival depends on managing the effects of anarchy and sustaining the ameliorating effects of society on it
- the means to achieving security involve both competition and cooperation. On the one hand, self-help, alliances, the use of force, balancing power and on the other hand, cooperative measures, norms, multilateralism, and institutions. These means are often applied concurrently
- the liberal–realist perspective appears to be paradoxical from a single framework perspective
- this apparent paradoxical approach distinguishes the liberal–realist perspective from the other two traditions: from realism which privileges the state, anarchy, competition, power-politics, relative gains, self-interest; and from liberalism which privileges the individual, society, cooperation; and common interests
- this approach is an advance on single theory explanations but has yet to be applied empirically

In conclusion, the liberal–realist perspective makes a substantial contribution towards the meaning of security. Notwithstanding the flaws in the framework, it will, I hope, provide another option for explaining the security assumptions that underpin Australia’s security policy.

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148 The liberal–realist perspective needs to further develop the intellectual justification for some of its assumptions. For example, the relation between the state and individuals needs to be developed to show the theoretical justification for why states and individuals are equal as referents of security. And, if this is the case, why threats seem to be limited to those that concern violence. After all, some argue that, ‘security threats’ to the survival of the state and individuals involve such issues as environmental degradation and AIDS.
PART III

EXPLAINING THE SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPINNING LABOR’S POLICY IN THEORETICAL TERMS
EXPLAINING LABOR'S SECURITY POLICY IN THEORETICAL TERMS:
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

[T]he greatest political writers in international theory almost
all straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions.¹
(Martin Wight, Political Theorist, 1965.)

You are always trying to sandwich yourself between the lessons of the past, which
shows the world is a very dangerous place and you need a lot of armed forces to keep
yourself safe, and hopes for the future that you might be able to construct an
international order in which armed force isn't necessary.²
(Hugh White, Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence,
Department of Defence, February 1999.)

Two main arguments have been made in Parts One and Two of this thesis. First, that
under Labor Australia adopted a security policy which was based on principles of, on
the one hand, 'security against' and competition, and on the other hand, 'security with'
and cooperation. And second, that a review of the IR security literature suggests that
there are three different theoretical literatures—realism, liberalism and the liberal–realist
perspective—for explaining the security assumptions of the policy.

This third part of the thesis examines which of the three can best explain Australia's
security policy. It consists of two chapters. This chapter examines the documentary and
empirical evidence discussed in Part One. The next chapter canvasses the non-
documentary evidence obtained directly from policy makers through interviews and a
questionnaire.

In brief, I will argue in this chapter that neither liberalism nor realism alone cannot
explain Australia's overall security policy. Australia's mainly, but not exclusively,
realist policy of defence of Australia and the alliance, is juxtaposed with the liberal–
realist policy of regional cooperation with its strong emphasis on liberalism. The

¹ Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions* (eds), Gabriella Wight and Brain Porter,
² Quoted in Geoffrey Barker, 'Smoke Horizon', *The Australian Financial Review Magazine*,
liberal–realist framework that incorporates both realism and liberalism best explains Labor’s overall security policy.

EXPLAINING AUSTRALIA’S ‘SECURITY AGAINST’ POLICY: DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

As Chapter One has shown, several points can be made about the defence of Australia policy under Labor. First, that security policy should concern the military defence of territory and its people (as was the assumption, shown in Chapters Two and Three, that regional cooperation enhanced security).³ Second, in keeping with the strategic outlook since the mid-1970s, that it was highly unlikely that there would be direct threats to the survival of Australia over the next 10–15 years. And third, that there were strategic ‘uncertainties’ within the Southeast Asian region—which constituted Australia’s zone of direct military interest—and beyond. As Paul Dibb noted, ‘the idea of “threat” is no longer a useful construct’ for defence planning and the task now was ‘planning under uncertainty’. ⁴

Concern about uncertainty appeared to increase dramatically during Labor’s time in office. The judgment in the 1986 Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper was that current uncertainties justified defence preparedness for low and escalated low-level conflict. But when the next White Paper was published five years later in 1994, defence planners warned that ‘new uncertainties’ had developed after the end of the Cold War and that ‘the relative peace in Asia may not last’.⁵ As a consequence, defence planning was now be guided by the prospect of ‘short-warning’ conflict.

Realist theory explains much of the Australian strategic outlook during the Labor period. The assumption that security is state centric and concerns the defence of territory via military means is mainstream realist. However, many other assumptions are better


⁴ Paul Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p.1.

explained by looking at the variants of realism, particularly defensive and offensive realism. Indeed, it is argued here that the assumptions underpinning the strategic outlook in the 1986 Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper derive from a defensive realist perspective. With the publication of the 1994 White Paper, however, the security assumptions can be better explained from the viewpoints of defensive plus offensive realism.

The assumptions behind the strategic outlook in the Dibb Report are similar to those of defensive realists. The view of defensive realists is that ‘security is plentiful’ whereas offensive realists claim ‘security is scarce’. Offensive realists, such as Mearsheimer, claim that ‘international relations is...a state of relentless security competition’.6 They would be wary of judgements in the Dibb Report such as, ‘Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world’7 and ‘any tendency to prepare for unrealistically high levels of threat should be resisted’.8 Offensive realists would also be suspicious about the judgments in the 1987 White Paper, which although less optimistic than the Dibb Report, also did not envisage any potential direct threat in the next ten years. Like the Dibb Report, the 1987 White Paper was concerned about low-level and particularly escalated low-level conflict rather than anticipating that there would be high levels of conflict in the future. Australian defence policy in these two earlier documents is not based on the assumption that regional states were relentlessly seeking relative gains in military capabilities and constantly trying to maximise power—as offensive/neorealists and classical realists respectively would suggest. Neither is the policy based on the offensive realists’ assumptions that ‘offensive military action often contributes to security’ and that expansionism is a major aspect of the security behaviour of states.9 If Australian defence planners had held that assumption then declaratory policy would have anticipated much more than low-level conflict; the force structure most likely would have had many more offensive capabilities; and action policy, in terms of

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9 See Chapter Four.
exercises, would not have been based on the reactive and defensive exercise plans that the ADF practiced during the regular Kangaroo series.

The notion of uncertainty in the strategic outlook of Dibb Report and the 1987 White Paper is also best understood from the perspective of defensive realism, which assumes that there are many different levels of uncertainty that have to be assessed and that defence policy should respond to the situation, rather than always anticipate a bleak future, as offensive realists tend to do.

The strategic outlook in the 1994 White Paper reflected defensive realist plus some offensive realist assumptions. Paul Dibb argued that, 'the reasons for...strategic caution if not pessimism' concern 'important new uncertainties' about 'changing relations among the major powers and the development of...a new strategic balance' in the post-Cold War period. Another cause for 'new uncertainties' was the 'expanding military capabilities throughout Asia'. The Paper noted that the 'nature and scale of forces that could be brought to bear against Australia...will steadily increase over the next fifteen years' and it stressed that Australia's planning 'focuses on capabilities rather than threats' (underlined in the original). As Dibb points out, 'the most striking aspect of this White Paper...is its hard-edged realist treatment of the long-range strategic outlook from an Australian perspective'.

This newly pessimistic strategic outlook reflects some of the concerns of offensive realism. First 'changing relationships among the major powers' were noted. This implied greater uncertainty than in the simpler Cold War bipolar structure. As noted earlier, the offensive realists Waltz and Mearsheimer both argue that bipolarity is 'more peaceful' than multipolarity. Second, the narrow focus on 'capabilities rather than

10 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.12.
11 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.11.
12 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.11.
13 Department of Defence, Defending Australia', p.22.
14 Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat, p.12.
15 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.7–8, p.22.
Discussions of military capability alone for some time been more concerned that the survival of Australia...will steadily increase over the next fifteen years. Despite the increasing military capabilities of regional states making themselves more secure (see Chapter Three), military modernisation does not necessarily imply hostile intent. Discussions of military capability alone are insufficient and need to be coupled with analysis of other factors such as logistics and training since problems in these areas can constrain the external use of power. Australia also endorsed modernisation as a way of regional states making themselves more secure (see Chapter Three).

Despite the increasing military capabilities in the region and the judgment in the 1994 White Paper that the ‘nature and scale of forces that could be brought to bear against Australia...will steadily increase over the next fifteen years’ another judgement was that the survival of Australia was not threatened. Whereas offensive realists assume that ‘survival is [the] core interest’ of states, Australian defence policy, by contrast, had for some time been more concerned with a much less dire problem than survival. As the

17 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, New York, 6th ed. 1985, p.33. As indicated in Chapter Four, Morgenthau’s view of power can also be seen to be more complex than the above quote suggests. In this reading he considers power to be multidimensional and warns against having a ‘militaristic’ conception of power which is narrow or ‘consists primarily, if not exclusively of...military strength, conceived especially in quantitative terms’ (p.174).


19 Interestingly, Indonesia was not seen as a threat because these factors and domestic issues were factored into the analysis and other factors, such as its rapidly growing economy, a developing military, and the fact that it was Australia’s nearest neighbour (another key neorealist tenet), were given less attention (pp.86–88). But China, which arguably had more domestic constraints than Indonesia and was more distant, was viewed with much more caution. See Department of Defence, Defending Australia, pp.7–11.

20 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, p.11.

1987 White Paper had made clear it was that some regional state could 'demonstrate Australia’s vulnerability and...force political concessions over some disputed issue'.\(^{22}\)

This position supports Dibb’s argument that Australian planning should be guided by credible threats and not the most extreme and implausible threats—such as the offensive realists’ fear about state survival.

These judgements show that the nature and level of uncertainty in the 1994 White Paper can also be explained in defensive realist terms. Furthermore, although there is no detailed evidence that the ‘new uncertainties’ described in the 1994 White Paper derived from the kinds of calculations which defensive realists make about the offense–defense balance and the offense–defense differential,\(^{23}\) it was stated that, ‘while the military capabilities are expanding no country is currently acquiring the range and scale of forces necessary for...[major conflict]’.\(^{24}\)

Overall, the discussion above shows that the strategic outlook in the 1994 White Paper can be explained in terms of the variables stressed by both defensive and offensive realists. As shown in Chapter One, the strategic outlook of the last two years of Labor government had become even more pessimistic about the possible outcome of these ‘new uncertainties’.

**Defence doctrine**

Australia’s notion of self-reliance is based on self-help, which is a core neorealist assumption about the way that states seek security in the international context. Waltz’ assumption that for states ‘[t]o achieve their objectives and maintain their security [they]...must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make...[to] compensate for the uncertainties and threats of the international environment’\(^{25}\)

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\(^{23}\) Defensive realism assumes that security contexts vary and that there will be different levels of uncertainty and threats and for this reason may help to explain the ‘new uncertainties’. The concept that supports the defensive realist’s assumption about differences in security contexts is the ‘security dilemma’. The two factors that explain why there are variations in the nature and magnitude of the security dilemma across time and space are first, the offense–defense balance and the offense–defense differential. On the basis of calculations based on these variables defensive realists anticipate that there will be different security situations.

\(^{24}\) Department of Defence, *Defending Australia*, p.23.
The Documentary Evidence

for themselves'\textsuperscript{25} is similar to the assumption underpinning Australian self-reliance policy. As Dibb argues:

\begin{quote}
[T]he first priority of Australian defence policy...is to have forces which are capable, without help from the combat forces of other countries, of resisting any attack which could realistically be mounted against Australia.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

The Dibb Report argued strongly that, ‘independence and self-reliance should be a central theme in our national defence effort’\textsuperscript{27} because, ‘[t]he exercise of authority over our land territory, territorial sea and airspace is fundamental to our sovereignty and security’.\textsuperscript{28} But despite this apparent statement of principle, defence planners also believed that self-help was necessary because the alliance with the US explicitly did not assure combat assistance if Australia were attacked, unless US interests were involved. Self-reliance in the Dibb Report was so clearly focused on self-help and independence that the US military establishment became concerned that Australia might not provide political and military support for US policy. It was not until the Labor government had unequivocally stipulated in the 1987 White Paper and AUSMIN meetings that Australia’s notion of self-help was compatible with support for the US that the Americans were reassured.\textsuperscript{29}

There were other modifications to the doctrine of self-help that made it into a more pragmatic policy. Australia’s self-help strategy continued to depend on US technology to establish elements of the force structure, for intelligence assessments of the region and particularly for strategic ‘warning-time’. In the highly unlikely event of there being threats to Australia’s survival Australian defence planners continued to hope that the existence of the alliance with the US and the presence of joint facilities would convince the US that their interests were indeed at stake. Moreover as Dibb put it, ‘there are clear limits to our defence capacity’.\textsuperscript{30} In later formulations of self-reliance—in the 1994 White Paper and during 1995–96—self-help was further modified. By then defence planners expected that the end of the Cold War and the ‘new uncertainties’ in the region

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{26} Dibb, \textit{Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat}, p.13.
\textsuperscript{27} Dibb, \textit{Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities}, p.44.
\textsuperscript{28} Dibb, \textit{Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities}, p.3.
\textsuperscript{29} See Chapter One.
\end{flushright}
might require more military operations with the US in areas beyond Australia’s direct zone of military interests but which affected the security of Australia’s region. Nonetheless, the aim throughout was self-help for most contingencies which is both a defensive and offensive realist assumption about the means for achieving security.

**Strategy**

As argued in Chapter One, there are two main dimensions to Australia’s defence strategy: one is defensive, involving military action close to Australia in the sea-air gap and on Australian territory (this could involve counter-offensive strikes in the sea-air gap); and the other is offensive, involving military action some distance from Australia (either for offensive or counter-offensive attacks on land or maritime bases).

The Dibb Report supported a strategy of ‘denial’, which was strongly defensive since it sought simply to repel attacks and gave little support to the option of striking foreign targets. Although the 1987 White Paper gave more emphasis to this option, it was still mainly defensive. In terms of practice, for example, the major Kangaroo exercise series was focused on near defence. However, by the time the 1994 White paper was published there was a further strengthening of the option for distant operations and for Australia ‘taking the initiative’. This indicates that at the very least some changes in rhetoric had occurred. In addition, plans were in process to replace the reactive and defensive Kangaroo series with a more pro-active series called Crocodile, which would involve an offshore task-force exercise with US forces.

Although these developments seem to be moving Australia towards a more offensive strategy, they are not incompatible with the defensive approach as well. Defensive realists assume that a defensive strategy is the most stable arrangement if other states are security seekers; but if they are ‘greedy’\(^{31}\) states then it may be necessary to adopt an offensive strategy. Offensive realists, by contrast, assume that greedy states are the rule rather than the exception and thus ‘believe offensive military action often contributes to security’.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{30}\) Dibb, *Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities*, p.3.

\(^{31}\) The term ‘greedy’ is used by defensive realists and is discussed in Chapter Four.

The force structure developed for self-reliance can also be explained in terms of realism and the offensive/defensive distinction. The original formulation of self-reliance in the Dibb Report and 1987 White Paper incorporated a force structure which included both defensive and offensive capabilities: the latter consisted of F-111s (with in-flight refueling) and FA-18s. The Dibb Report however, was more clearly based on defensive realist assumptions insofar as it put limits on the offensive elements. It proposed that the F-111s should undergo only minimal upgrades, which therefore de-emphasised the option of land attacks, and that their place in the force structure be reviewed later. In Dibb’s view the aircraft were only included in the force structure because they were already in it, not because they should be there or were needed.33 Indeed, a major criticism of the Dibb Report was that it did not call for a force structure with sufficient strike power. The 1987 White Paper retained the F-111s as an integral part of the force structure. Nonetheless, overall the force structure remained defensive and in particular it eschewed capabilities that could be used for invading or holding territory.

Throughout Labor’s time in office defence planners insisted that the ADF should retain a ‘technological edge’ and subsequently an ‘information edge’ over other regional militaries. This is consistent with the offensive/neorealist assumption that states seek relative gains, particularly in military capabilities. However, the desired ‘technological edge’ was not specifically focused on offensive capabilities and was not concerned with advantages in capabilities to invade and hold territory. Therefore, the sought-after gains can also be understood from a defensive realist perspective.

Defence planning concepts

Despite the attention given to the idea of ‘warning-time’ in the Dibb Report the arguments associated with it were always controversial within defence planning circles in Australia.34 Interpreting the arguments about ‘warning-time’ from a theoretical perspective.

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33 See Chapter One.
34 See Chapter One. As Desmond Ball, for example, points out, historically the ‘warning-time’ prior to major conflict has been too short for adequate military preparation. Ball refers to a 1975 study entitled An Analysis of Warning Periods Associated with Major Conflict produced by the Central Studies Establishment in the Department of Defence which concluded that most of the 23 major conflicts examined had ‘Defence Preparation Times’ considerably less than one year and only one had over two years. See Desmond Ball, ‘Analysis and Australian Defence Decision Making’,
perspective is difficult and perhaps the best that can be done is to reflect upon the broad assumptions about security that may underpin the idea. ‘Warning-time’ in the Dibb Report seems to be based on assumptions similar to those of defensive and motivational realists (see Chapter Four) who assume that, at least in the present context, security is plentiful rather than scarce. The logic of the motivational realists’ view of security for ‘warning-time’ is that it is possible: first, to detect and interpret the intentions/motivations of states (in conjunction with capabilities); second, to distinguish security seeking states from greedy states; and third, to respond to the aggressive intentions of greedy states in enough time (that is, to mobilise the country for substantial levels of conflict). ‘Warning-time’ is also understandable in terms of the optimistic/probability assumption described by Brooks (see Chapter Four), which like defensive realism, is based on there being more rather than less security. ‘Warning-time’ seems to sit uneasily with the thinking of offensive realists, who assume that states are relentlessly competitive and that it is necessary to maintain strong and large forces, if not for deployment then for deterrence.

Reference to ‘warning-time’ in the 1994 White Paper was minimal in contrast to the Dibb Report\(^{35}\) and the 1987 White Paper,\(^{36}\) which had stressed it. Defence planning in the 1994 White Paper was guided by the concept of ‘short-warning conflict’\(^{37}\) rather than by the prospect of conflict in the future. The judgment was that:

> We need to maintain forces to deal with short-warning conflict because we would not have enough time to develop additional capabilities within the relatively short notice we might receive of the development of motive or intention to attack Australia.\(^{38}\)

The elevation of short-warning conflict as the key defence planning concept had the effect of downgrading some other defence planning concepts, such as ‘core-force’ and ‘expansion base’ which had featured in either the Dibb Report or the 1987 White Paper. Like ‘warning-time’, these planning concepts were relevant to conflicts with long ‘warning-times’ rather than immediate, short-warning conflicts. The demise of these

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Reference Paper No.94, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1979, pp.1–39 and especially pp.18–21.


38 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia*, p.24.
ideas, which were already contentious, coincided with the view that security in the post-Cold War was not a plentiful as it had been.39

EXPLAINING AUSTRALIA’S SECOND ‘SECURITY AGAINST’ POLICY: THE AUSTRALIA–US ALLIANCE

The 1951 ANZUS Alliance between Australia and the United States can be partly explained by realist assumptions, but with some important qualifications. As discussed in Chapter One, the original purpose of the alliance, from Australia’s perspective, was to enhance its security by enlisting US power and military capabilities against the perceived threat that Japan might remilitarise. Australia’s intention was to engage the US in a balance against anticipated Japanese military power. Morgenthau’s assumption that ‘[a]lliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system’40 throws light on Australia’s motivation for an alliance at that time. However, that assumption does not explain US motivation. The US was not in any way trying to balance Japanese power, since it no longer had any. And the US did not anticipate that Japan would become a military threat to Australia or any other state because the treaty US wanted to install with Japan would make it unnecessary for Japan to have an offensive force structure. The US went along with Australia’s request for the ANZUS Treaty because it facilitated Australian support for a ‘soft’ peace treaty due to be discussed at the post-war talks in San Francisco. This in turn was part of a broader US design to enmesh Japan in the global alliances against communism. However, Morgenthau’s explanation does partly inform US motivation for the Australia–US alliance once the Cold War started and Soviet and Chinese communism was considered a threat.

The post-war division of most of the world into the Western alliance and the Warsaw pact was a bipolar balance of power and the main focus of the Australia–US alliance

39 The demise of these concepts could also have occurred because, as critics argued, they were conceptually flawed. See Ball, ‘Analysis and Australian Defence Decision Making’, pp.1–39 and especially pp.18–25.

40 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations. p.201. Morgenthau argues that ‘Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armament race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances’. Ibid., p.201.
became the nuclear balance of power. Australia supported US nuclear policy through hosting of the US facilities. North West Cape, for example, provided communications to US Polaris submarines armed with nuclear SLBMs and aimed at targets in the Soviet Far East and in China. Nurrungar and Pine Gap supported the nuclear balance in other ways. The Australia-US alliance was an important element in the balance of power and can be explained by both classical and neorealist thinking.

The US invoked balance of power arguments, which Australia agreed with, to engage Australian political and military support for several wars in Asia against communists in North Korea and Vietnam. From Australia’s perspective its commitment to the US was akin to paying an insurance premium and served to increase the chance of US combat support in the event of direct threats to Australia. Over time the rationale for the alliance changed and by the time Labor came into office explanations for the alliance solely in terms of balance of power considerations were less convincing.

The continuation of the alliance under Labor is somewhat problematic in terms of realist arguments about alliances. As noted above, according to classical realists 'alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power'. And according to neorealists states seek to balance the preponderant power, often through forming alliances. Yet most theorists would agree that the US is now the dominant power. According to Waltz, this will provoke other states to try to balance US power. But as Michael Mastanduno has pointed out this has not happened. As he argues, 'a main security concern for many countries in...Asia is not how to distance from an all-too-powerful United States, but how to prevent the United States from drifting away'. According to Mastanduno, Japan and China, the two states which neorealists expect to balance the US, show few signs of trying to balance the US. Japan actively seeks to ally with the US and although China’s record is not as clear as Japan’s it does not suggest it is trying either to balance the US or become a hegemon. In other words the Australia-US alliance continues in the absence of states trying to balance power. The neorealist response, that balancing is inevitable and will occur in the future could explain why the alliance continues—rather like an insurance policy for the distant future. But as critics of neorealism point out, this

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42 Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', pp.49–88.
is an unsatisfactory explanation because it means that neorealism is at risk of trying to explain everything (even the absence of balances of power) and therefore in the end explains nothing.

**Balance of threat?**

Can the continuation of the alliance be explained by the other main realist explanation that claims that the motivation for alliances is still to balance, but more as a response to threat than against the power of other states. Stephen Walt argues that 'states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them'. Yet this can hardly explain why Australia continues the alliance since the official judgment is that there is no direct threat to Australia. Again some realists will say that, given the nature of the international system and states, there will be inevitable and direct threats to Australia's security. Yet again this runs into the same criticism as earlier, that explaining everything explains nothing. Walt's argument, however, may explain why the US continues the alliance.

According to Mastanduno, Walt's balance of threat logic can partly explain US behaviour in the post-Cold War period. As he says 'in a world in which balancing behaviour is the norm and balancing is a response to threat, it is often rational for states to pursue policies that signal restraint and reassurance'. US grand strategy, which is aimed at preserving US primacy, has pursued a security policy via such means, according to Mastanduno. He states that:

> US officials have sought to preserve the United States' dominant position through efforts to convince the status quo states of Japan and Germany to remain partial great powers, and to integrate the undecided states of Russia and China into an US-centered international order.

Moreover, US officials, Mastanduno says 'have emphasised multilateral coalitions and decision-making processes, particularly in cases of military intervention'. In the case

44 Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.59.
45 Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.66.
46 Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.66.
of Japan, he argues ‘[t]he bilateral security treaty remains the key to the relationship’\textsuperscript{47} and that ‘US strategy is designed to convince Japan that the United States will deter possible threats from Russia or China’.\textsuperscript{48} Could this also explain why the US continues the alliance with Australia?

The balance of threat argument does not explain why, from the US perspective, the alliance with Australia persists because of course Australia is not a potential challenger to US primacy. The US doesn’t need to reassure Australia, as it may China, that it is not a threat. However, if as Mastanduno argues, the US seeks ways to be regionally engaged to show that it is not a threat to states like China, then the alliance with Australia does provide that kind of avenue. Australia certainly encourages the US to preserve its primacy in the region and in a non-threatening manner. Indeed, one of the key arguments made during the Labor period was that the alliance helped to keep the US engaged and the region stable.

Other realists suggest that Mastanduno’s reference to the balance of threat theory to explain US policy in the post-Cold War period is misplaced and that hegemonic stability theory provides a better explanation.\textsuperscript{49} In that case does this theory explain why the alliance continues? It could be argued, from the US perspective, that the alliance is a public good which supports US hegemony, while for Australia, US hegemony provides regional stability and that the alliance is a means towards that end. The problem with the hegemonic stability theory is that the framework is itself flawed. As Mastanduno points out, the hegemonic framework addresses both the behaviour of a hegemonic power and a declining hegemonic power and as such it is all encompassing. Like the neorealist arguments above, it risks explaining everything and therefore in the end it explains nothing.

\textsuperscript{47} Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, p.66.
\textsuperscript{48} Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, p.66.
\textsuperscript{49} According to Mastanduno, hegemonic states supply public goods like international security and international economic order and act as balancers and lenders of last resort. But when a hegemonic state is in decline it tries to reduce the cost of providing public goods, forcing burdens on other states and look out for their narrow, particularistic interests even at the risk of system stability. See Mark S Sheetz and Michael Mastanduno, ‘Correspondence: Debating the Unipolar Moment’, \textit{International Security}, Vol.22, No.3, 1997–98, p.172.
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The fact remains that the alliance not only continues but also grows and the main realist arguments about alliances are only partly helpful in explaining why. Realist assumptions that alliances are responses to power balances and direct threats does not apply in Australia’s case. Indeed, as Australian defence planners repeatedly point out the strategic context in which Australia is placed is one of uncertainty, not of power balances or threats. The question is, does uncertainty explain the existence of the alliance?

Other explanations of the alliance

Several arguments can be made that perceptions of uncertainty help to explain the alliance and that realist thinking either directly or indirectly underpins such perceptions. First, from the perspective of Australian defence planners, uncertainty about regional security compels Australia to pursue defence of Australia through self-help. Ironically the alliance provides much of the intelligence and technology for self-help. As Hugh White, Deputy Secretary of Defence, unambiguously states:

The country’s defence posture depends on that alliance, and will keep depending on it for many years to come. 50

Second, again from the perspective of defence planners, the perception that there is growing regional uncertainty increases the prospects that defence of Australia will require operations beyond the sea-air gap. Sustained operations beyond the sea-air gap would be very difficult if not impossible for the ADF to conduct without assistance, for example, transport, logistics and intelligence, from the US. As argued in Chapter One, Australia does not have ‘deployable units’ for this notion of defence of Australia. Moreover, to the extent that defence of Australia requires technology derived from the RMA then again the US alliance is critical.

Third, defence planners continue to hope that in the event of a major attack, which threatens Australia’s survival, the alliance will increase the prospects that the US will provide combat support. The presence of Pine Gap is thought to increase US incentives for that support.

50 Hugh White, ‘New Directions in Australian Defence Planning’, in Helen Hookey and Danny Roy (eds), Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No.120, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p.17.
From the US perspective, uncertainty about security in the region and elsewhere, means that allies have to be kept on side in the event that US interests need to support by US-led political and military coalitions. As discussed in Chapter One, when the US thought that the Dibb Report put this plank of the alliance in doubt they reacted strongly.

These justifications for the continuation of the alliance all relate to uncertainty about the future and can be partly explained by realist thinking. Seeking self-help is unequivocally a realist assumption. That Australia relies partly on the alliance, or on US intelligence and technology, as the practical means to self-help does not detract from the fact that the ultimate goal is self-help. The alliance, in other words, supports the realist assumption of self-help. The second and third justifications for the alliance, distant operations in defence of Australia and a major attack, obviously anticipate future threats. The US justification also anticipates future threats. Such views of the future are based on realist assumptions about the nature of security. In other words, in a general sense this level of uncertainty is based on pessimism or a worse case assumption that there will be a realist future, even if there is little evidence in the present. Even so, uncertainty is a vague concept and it is necessary to differentiate between levels of uncertainty for defence planning purposes. But, despite the vagueness of the concept its existence seems to be enough for Australia to want to perpetuate the alliance.

There may also be another approach to explaining the alliance. As discussed in the previous chapter, Martin Wight argues for a much broader understanding of alliances. His argument is that:

Alliances are as various as friendships in their character, their purpose, their occasion, their duration, the relative position of those who make them. The oldest classification is into equal and unequal, according to the relative status and power of the allies. They can be wartime or peacetime, offensive or defensive, political or economic, permanent or temporary, bilateral or multilateral.51

But although Wight seems to open up other avenues for understanding alliances he does not elaborate. His exposition would need to be further developed if it was to be useful for explaining the Australia–US alliance.

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EXPLAINING AUSTRALIA’S ‘SECURITY WITH’ POLICY OF REGIONAL SECURITY

The third and final dimension of the Labor government’s approach to security was its regional security policy. As shown in Chapter Two, in 1984 the new Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, publicly announced that Australia would seek ‘non-military appraisals of power problems...[and was] averse to military interventions and solutions’ in the region.52 This approach to regional security reflects liberal assumptions about security, which are discussed in Chapter Four. Efforts by the government to persuade the ASEAN states and the US to adopt a cooperative approach to Vietnam, through dialogue in the first instance, are also best explained in terms of liberal assumptions. Hayden’s failure to convince the other states to engage Vietnam in this or any other way was an early setback for the government. On the other hand, Australia’s attempts to base regional economic relations on a more cooperative basis were gaining ground among regional governments.

Regional security and economics

Labor’s regional economic policy was only indirectly based on assumptions about security. Although Australia’s domestic and regional economic policies were firmly based on liberal economic principles,53 this approach was primarily directed at improving Australia’s own economic development, as well as the region’s. It was also assumed that a consequence of this approach would be greater stability in the region. As the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Stuart Harris, pointed out, ‘the multilateral, non-discriminatory and liberal world trading and economic system... [was] constructed...for common economic gain and as a fundamental and necessary basis for world peace’.54

53 With respect to the latter, free trade, open regionalism, global and regional multilateral institutions—like GATT and APEC—were the foundations of the policy.
Harris acknowledged that traditional liberal prescriptions for building economic institutionalism and multilateralism in the region would need to be modified. Conditions in the region were different from those where liberal institutions had first developed, namely Europe and North America. In the Asia Pacific the economic, social and cultural differences between states appeared greater and so Harris advised that Australia and other countries should adopt a ‘pluralist approach’ to economic arrangements—one which did not lose sight of liberal goals but was flexible enough to accommodate the current conditions in the region.55

When APEC was established in November 1989, largely as an Australian initiative, its institutional base was small.56 As Andrew Elek argued, the differences among the regional countries meant that, ‘region-wide economic cooperation could not be built on formal inter-governmental structures’.57 Instead, it was agreed that the process would imitate the model of cooperation and ‘institutionalism’ pioneered by ASEAN. Some five years later it was still the case that, as Elek pointed out, ‘[APEC] decisions [were] made by building consensus rather than formal negotiations’.58 An APEC secretariat was purposely avoided in these early years and when it was formed in 1993, it was to act as a ‘support mechanism and a fund to finance APEC’s activities’ rather than as a conventional institution.59 The Bogor Declaration of APEC Leaders on 15 November 1994 was a milestone in regional economic cooperation and set the policy agenda for dismantling ‘all policy-based obstacles to trade and investment among the APEC economies during the next 25 years’.60 Nonetheless, as Elek points out, ‘the preferred approach for most APEC participants’ remained one that ‘coordinated decisions on economic policy by building consensus and the voluntary adherence to non-binding


59 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation: Briefing Notes’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, August 1995, p.20.

undertakings'. Overall, the level of institutionalism by liberal standards remains low and there were only indirect links between Labor's liberal economic policy and its view of security (as indeed is the case in many liberal theories).

**Policy concepts for regional security**

Apart from advancing liberal economic principles in the region, Labor introduced a new regional security discourse towards the late 1980s that reflected liberal assumptions that cooperation enhanced security. As discussed in Chapter Two, in 1987 Foreign Minister Hayden proposed that the US and the USSR pursue security dialogue and confidence building measures in the North Pacific. The rationale for cooperation, which underpinned the new security discourse, were adopted and developed by the next Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans.

**Multidimensional means**

As shown in Chapter Two, Foreign Minister Evans and his Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade developed several policy concepts to guide Australia's regional security policy. In his landmark 1989 ministerial statement on 'Australia's Regional Security', Evans argued that '[t]he instruments available to protect Australia's security are multidimensional' [emphasis in the original]. This view became a central plank in Australia's regional security policy throughout the 1990s, or at least while Labor remained in office.

The stress on 'multidimensional' means is best explained within the liberal–realist framework. Liberalism assumes that there are multiple instruments that may be used to enhance security. By contrast most realist theories emphasise military means. The classical realist Hans Morgenthau may appear at first glance to be an exception. As was pointed out in Chapter Four, Morgenthau also considered that the means to security were multidimensional. But, when Morgenthau discusses diplomatic, economic and military means he sees them as multiple sources of power that are part of the bigger equation of power balancing against other states. By contrast, when liberals talk about

multidimensional means to security it is generally to avoid the use of military power and power balancing. Liberals believe that under some circumstances military power can undermine security while cooperation enhances security. In other words, resort to multidimensional means is compatible with both liberal and some realist assumptions.

The conception of security in the ministerial statement is based in part on protection of the state using military means. According to Evans, military capabilities are ‘essential’ instruments to protect Australia’s security. However, his reference to other instruments, such as ‘traditional diplomacy...economic and trade relations, and development assistance’, is very much in line with liberal thinking on security since each of these involves cooperative means to reduce the prospects of conflict. Additional instruments which, as he puts it, ‘extend to immigration, education and training, cultural relations, information activities, and a number of other less obvious areas of government activity’, also seek to enhance security via cooperation. The extent of cooperation in these areas does not, however, amount to a ‘security community’, in the sense that is used by Karl Deutsch. Evans provided no developed discussion or understanding of common security or such measures as confidence building and transparency in the ministerial statement.

Common security

The security logic behind Australia’s regional security policy was, according to Evans, that of promoting ‘security with’ other states. The policy concepts, which supported this approach, were ‘common security’, ‘comprehensive security’, ‘cooperative security’ and ‘strategic partnership’. As indicated in Chapter Two, official explanations of these concepts has been ambiguous and without much conceptual clarification. All however are explicable within the liberal–realist framework.

As explained by the Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, the policy concept of common security denotes a generally more preventive, rather than a deterrent, approach to

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63 Evans suggests that Australia ‘[participate] actively in the gradual development of a regional security community framework based on a sense of shared security interests’. See Evans, *Australia’s Regional Security*, p.44.

64 See Chapter Two.
security and applies mostly to inter-state rather than intra-state security. Evans’ understanding was somewhat idiosyncratic. The concept had emerged in Europe and its primary concern was to reduce the security dilemma risks. But clearly the concept is based on the general liberal assumption that cooperation is both possible and advances security relations between states.

Evans’ conception has little similarity with Booth’s recent argument that privileges individuals above states as the referent object of security and emphasises that ‘emancipation’ is the end goal. It does however resemble the liberal–realist conceptualisation that is evident in Booth’s earlier work. Here Booth argues that common security:

[D]oes not mean that states reject military...[it] involves acceptance of the argument that military capabilities, doctrines and postures should be so organised as to maximise mutual rather than unilateral security. As a result reciprocity, defensiveness, transparency, crisis stability, arms restraint and confidence building are emphasised, while at the same time offensive capabilities, surprise attack potential and escalation and retaliation strategies are eliminated as far as possible.

This understanding of common security, which emphasises the continuing relevance of military means but ‘eliminate[s]as far as possible’ the use of offensive capabilities and tactics, seems to be in accordance with the Australian policy concept. Evans’ argument in the ministerial statement that Australia maintained the ‘long-range strike aircraft... F-111s and submarines’ for ‘offensive tactics to achieve defensive goals’ also appears to be based on a similar understanding. So too is the argument put forward by the Defence Minister, Robert Ray, that:

Common security is not a policy for wimps. Nothing in the idea implies passivity or appeasement in the face of a security threat. It does not involve emasculating military forces, it is not about removing the capability to respond to direct threats.

This account of the meaning of common security in Australian regional security policy raises the question of whether or not it could be understood from a defensive realist perspective. Defensive realism also focuses on offensive/defence capabilities and

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differentials. Indeed, this is the theory’s main focus and, as a result one, of the key means to security involves arms control measures. Common security, by contrast, goes well beyond arms control and includes numerous other cooperative approaches. Common security is aimed, as Booth argues above, at maximising ‘mutual rather than unilateral security’. As it was shown in Chapter Three, in Australia’s case, common security in practice involved extensive military cooperation between the ADF and its regional equivalents which was aimed at establishing mutual security. For these reasons defensive realism does not capture all the elements of common security. The policy concept of common security is best understood from the liberal–realist perspective, which is based on the assumption that security is enhanced by military means and extensive cooperation across a wide range of military (and non-military) issues.

**Comprehensive security**

In most respects the policy concept of comprehensive security is based on liberal–realist assumptions. According to officials, comprehensive security, is a more general approach which emphasizes that security is ‘multidimensional in character’.69 Security is, by this account, not only concerned with political and diplomatic disputes, but also with factors such as ‘economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, unregulated population flows, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism and human rights abuses’.70 Defined this way, comprehensive security could have two meanings. One could be that the factors described are potential causes of military conflict and require cooperative approaches to ensure that conflict does not eventuate. The second meaning could be that the factors are not causes of insecurity conventionally defined but are in themselves different types of insecurity which threaten the state and the individuals within. Official statements are vague and give no guidance as to what is meant. What can be said is that both meanings of comprehensive can be explained from a liberal–realist perspective, though the criteria for the inclusion of some of the factors above as insecurities would require more clarification.

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69 Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.6.
70 Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.6.
Cooperative security

Cooperative security is the quintessential liberal–realist concept since it embraces both liberal and realist approaches to security. According to Foreign Minster Evans, cooperative security is a multidimensional concept which encompasses other security concepts like ‘common security’, ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘collective security’. As Evans puts it, ‘cooperative security [is] a multidimensional concept [that goes] beyond traditional concerns with threats of an overly military nature’.71 ‘Cooperative security suggests’, he argues, ‘consultation rather than confrontation; reassurance rather than deterrence; transparency rather than secrecy; and interdependence rather than unilateralism’.72 (Emphasis added.)

It is important to note that Evans’ argument is that cooperative security suggests consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence and so on. In other words, he is not arguing that confrontation or deterrence or any other of the realist assumptions are irrelevant to regional security. Cooperative security implicitly accepts there is a role for military force. In practice the concept did not have the effect of discouraging states from pursuing force modernisations and did not involve proposals for conventional arms control measures. And, as was shown in Chapter Three, when the measures for cooperative security were put into practice they often involved exactly the contrasting elements which Evans described: that is, transparency and secrecy, reassurance and deterrence and so on.

Evans also argued that ‘cooperative security’ was relevant to global security, particularly in the UN context, and suggested that some UN policy options were relevant to the regional agenda. For example, attention was given to ‘preventive diplomacy’ (which comes under the general category of ‘peace maintenance’) and to ‘peace building’, and especially to one of the measures which support it, ‘international regimes’ (which includes dialogue). Some of these strategies were mentioned in the Australian paper tabled at the first meeting of the ARF in Bangkok in 1993 and then again in the 1994 ASEAN Concept Paper that set the first agenda of activities for the ARF.

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72 Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.6.
Human security

The Foreign Minister also introduced the idea of ‘human security’ as a dimension of global security. He argued that ‘security...is as much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defence of territorial integrity of states’. Human security, according to Evans, is ‘prejudiced by major intra-state conflict as it is by inter-state conflict’. These arguments are similar to those made by some liberal theorists that the referent object of security is the individual rather than the state. Evans’ idea of human security does not go this far. As he argues above ‘security...is as much about the protection of individuals as it as about the defence of territorial integrity of states’ [emphasis added]. Evans’ argument is well described by the liberal–realist framework that, as was argued in Chapter Five, privileges both the individual and the state as the referent objects of security.

However, Evans rarely referred to the policy concept of human security in regional security policy statements. Human security issues were addressed in Australia’s human rights policy. From the Australian viewpoint this was the most diplomatic approach given regional sensitivities about human rights and outside intervention in domestic security issues. It was claimed that Evans later stated that his argument about human security had not been Labor policy. But it remains the case that he expounded upon the idea in numerous official statements in Australia and overseas and discussed it at length in a book which he authored with the help of officers working in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

73 Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.7.
74 Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.7.
75 Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, Vol.17, No.4, 1991, pp.319–320. As Ken Booth argues, the individual is subjected to many types of threats and thus, ‘security means absence of threats’. He argues that the liberal project of emancipation of the individual should be the basis of security since, ‘emancipation, not power or order, produces security’. This liberal argument is supported by the idea that security requires, as Booth argues, ‘a comprehensive approach’. Moreover, in Booth’s comprehensive theory of security, states, while ‘important features of world politics’ are ‘unreliable, illogical and too diverse in their character to use as the primary referent objects’.
76 Interview with an official from Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, December 1998.
Strategic partnership

The assumptions underpinning the policy concept of strategic partnership are best explained from within the liberal–realist framework. The concept is emphasised in the Strategic Review 1993 which claims that '[i]ncreasingly, [Australia’s] defence relationships...will be characterised by the concept of partnership'\footnote{Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, Defence Publications, Canberra, December 1993, p.22.} and that 'we will seek a stronger strategic partnership with Southeast Asia'.\footnote{Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, p.59.} The objectives of strategic partnership were described in Chapter Three and they are: 'to enhance the capacity of the region to exclude hostile influences that could threaten Australia’s security'; 'to reduce the potential for misunderstanding'; 'to assist the development of effective self-defence capabilities...through cooperation'; and 'to move towards interoperability'.\footnote{Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, pp.22–23.}

On the one hand, strategic partnership can be explained from a realist perspective since it is partly based on a concept of security that involves self-help and military capabilities. It is also realist in that, as was argued in Chapter Three, strategic partnership provides opportunities for Australia to improve its own self-help strategy by collecting intelligence about the military capabilities and professionalism of other states. But it is not easy to see how strategic partnership can be explained by realism in other ways. It is neither an alliance, nor part of a balance of power arrangement, nor a response to an immediate threat. One element of strategic partnership makes absolutely no sense from a realist perspective, namely Australia’s extensive role in helping regional states to improve operational and combat skills. From a realist perspective this has the effect of reducing Australia’s allegedly all-important competitive edge while increasing the military capabilities of possible adversaries. One conceivable way such a policy would make sense from a realist perspective would be if, as is sometimes argued, Australia believes Southeast Asian states provide geographical and military buffer zones from threats further north. But even here cooperation that results in improving others’ warfighting skills might still be self-defeating. Australia could not be sure that regional neighbours would not choose to bandwagon, accommodate, or be neutral when faced with an outside aggressor. If it is the former then the skills or intelligence gained from...
training with Australia could be used against it. Or another possible explanation for Australia’s providing extensive military training to regional states could be that it is aimed at addressing future unknown threats to both Australia and ASEAN which require that middle/small states *informally* band together now in preparation. However, as in the case above, Australia could not be sure that at some time in the future, against some as yet unknown enemy, ASEAN would act in Australia’s interests.80

Finally, strategic partnership and the high levels of military cooperation that it entails are particularly difficult to explain from a neorealist perspective. If Waltz’s argument is that, ‘the condition of insecurity—at least, the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions—works against their cooperation’,81 then he would be hard pressed to explain why Australia has adopted an approach which involves the extent and type of cooperation that it does. Neorealists would find it difficult to explain why, outside of an alliance arrangement, Australia assumes that increasing the military strength of regional states will reduce the level of uncertainty, especially as such moves contain security dilemma risks. Neorealists would especially question the two judgments of the Defence Minister, Robert Ray, that, '[military] modernisations...will provide a basis for...nations to be self-reliant in their defence [and] this will assist regional security’;82 and that, '[Australia]...contributes to regional security by enhancing the capacity of regional countries to provide for their self-defence’.83

If strategic partnership can only be partly explained by realist assumptions then can any of the variants of liberalism help with the task? Cooperation with other states is obviously a distinguishing feature of strategic partnership and indeed, as has been argued many times before, the level of military cooperation between the ADF and other regional militaries was quite extraordinary and appeared not to be directed against any other state. This aspect of strategic partnership is consistent with general liberal

80 Moreover, under the present circumstances, a strategic partnership would be highly unlikely to eventuate. ASEAN states are reluctant to develop multilateral military arrangements among themselves since this is perceived as being de-stabilising for the region and in addition they do not trust each other enough.


assumptions about cooperation. But at the same time even the extraordinary amount of cooperation and the emphasis on a ‘security with’ approach does not approach the closeness of a ‘security community’ of the Karl Deutsch model. Deutsch’s security communities are far more ‘dense’ or characterised by more like-mindedness about a range of security issues and other matters such as human rights than is presently the case between Australia and its neighbours. Moreover, Deutsch’s security communities were aimed ultimately at subsuming the state: a goal that strategic partnership certainly does not embrace.

In a similar way, Kantian notions of security do not explain Australia’s policy concept of strategic partnership with ASEAN states. Republican liberals stress that zones of peace are possible among states that adhere to Kant’s ‘three articles’. But Australian democratic institutions appear to be quite different from most regional governments’ practice of democracy. Indonesia, Australia’s closest and most important partner had a decidedly authoritarian regime under President Suharto. In short, liberal thinking, like realist thinking, can explain some but not all parts of strategic partnership.

Strategic partnership is an unusual policy concept from the perspective of either mainstream theory. In the first place, it appears to incorporate two time frames, which potentially involve two different strategic circumstances—the present in which there is not a serious threat, and the future, where there might be. As the Defence Minister, Robert Ray, said, the great challenge under the current strategic circumstances is to construct a defence policy and ‘write a White Paper without an enemy and that’s not... easy’. Thus strategic partnership is intended to embrace two different strategic circumstances: the present ‘without an enemy’ (which requires cooperation to enhance security) and the future which is uncertain (and requires the option of using military means). Such a strategic context assumes anarchy and society and competition and cooperation. As was argued in Chapter Five, the liberal–realist framework also involves these assumptions.

83 Robert Ray, keynote address o the RAAF air power conference ‘The War in the Air’, Canberra, 29 March 1994, p.2
84 See for example Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison and Garry Rodan (eds), Southeast Asia in the 1990s, Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1993.
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Multilateralism, regional forums and institutions

As shown in Chapter Two, Labor was a strong advocate of the liberal notion of multilateralism as a means for enhancing security. The government was one of the important players in efforts to establish the ASEAN-PMC and then later the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as organisations for security dialogue. There is little doubt that Evans’ original goal in the early 1990s was to establish a regional security forum based on the CSCE (now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation, Europe) which by that time had become quite institutionalised. In response to regional and US criticism Evans moderated his rhetoric though not his original goal. When the ARF was established in 1994 it had little similarity to the CSCE or to theoretical descriptions of institutions in the IR literature. It was simply an informal meeting without any set agenda. The goal was to seat regional foreign ministers around a table for the first time. However, despite that being the agreed objective, Evans tabled *The Australian Paper On Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation*86, which provided guidelines for the ARF agenda and some degree of institutionalisation. By 1996, the ARF had achieved many of the goals set out in that paper, including stronger levels of multilateralism and institutionalism. Australia actively supported all these moves towards what now amounts to an impressive degree of institutionalisation of the ARF at the working level, that is in the Senior Official Meetings and the Inter-sessional Meetings.87

The ARF is an institution that is clearly based on several liberal assumptions. Its central function is to promote dialogue and cooperation, it is inclusive in membership, it embraces potential adversaries, it is directed against no external enemy, it will never form a defence pact and it stresses the importance of non-military means of promoting


87 For example, as previously mentioned in Chapter Three, in November 1994, Australia sponsored a seminar for officials and non-officials in Canberra that addressed measures for building confidence and trust. But even before this Australia had supported moves for an institutionalised infrastructure to support the ARF at both the official and the non-governmental levels. In June 1991, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies had proposed that there be instituted a ‘senior officials meeting [SOM] made up of senior officials of the ASEAN states and the dialogue partners’ to support the ASEAN PMC process (e.g., with respect to the preparation of agenda and meeting arrangements. The first of the PMC-SOMs was held in Singapore in May 1993, and involved extensive discussion of multilateral approaches to regional peace and security. As
security. The importance of sociological factors in enhancing security may also help to explain elite interaction that is so much part of the ARF. There is a strong emphasis on personal interaction and elites ‘getting to know each other’; and this includes foreign ministers, defence representatives and senior officials. The term ‘golf-course diplomacy’ illustrates the importance of informality and personal contact as ways of building links. At the same time this interaction takes place only between state officials at the elite level and, unlike any Deutschian model, it is not aimed at superseding the state.

Furthermore, the ARF’s apparent liberal concerns do not stretch to cover either individual security or human rights issues or conventional arms control measures. The ARF is distinctly state-centric and in no way do its members want to curtail efforts to modernise military forces deployed for the defence of the state. There have been no proposals for addressing destabilising platforms, such as submarines and strike aircraft and (yet to be introduced) strike weapons such as cruise missiles. Neither does the ARF propose measures for addressing the impact of such weapons on crisis management. On the other hand the ARF encourages openness and transparency about such military acquisitions through the publication of White Papers and other military CBMs.

Finally, the conceptualisation of multilateralism that underpins the ARF does not meet the particular liberal standards set by John Ruggie. As argued in Chapter Four, there are tensions between liberals about the meaning of multilateralism and according to Ruggie’s definition it concerns three properties: indivisibility, generalised principles of

described in Chapter Two Australian officials were closely involved in all the efforts to further institutionalise the SOM process.

88 Originally only foreign ministry officials participated in the ARF meetings since involving military personnel was seen to be too sensitive. However, even from the beginning there were arguments for the military to be involved and in June 1997 at the Langkawi SOM military officers began formally participating in the ARF.

89 Operations involving these weapons and platforms are destabilising for several reasons: for example, there are inadequate standard operating procedures within and between some regional militaries and a near absence of C3 assets to control the use of such capabilities during a crisis. Hence there would be a strong imperative to ‘use ‘em or loose ‘em’in a crisis.
conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.90 There is little evidence that these principles apply to the ARF or that Labor sought to apply them.

The neoliberal-institutionalists provide the best explanation of the assumptions underpinning Labor's policy towards the ARF. Australia's emphasis on state-centric approaches involving multilateral institutions and regimes as the basis for regional security is very much in line with neoliberal institutionalist theory. The neoliberal institutionalists' approach, which combines both liberal and realist tenets, corresponds to a major element in the liberal–realist framework.

Military cooperation

The assumptions underpinning the military activities between the ADF and other military forces in the region are best explained from within the liberal–realist framework. As it was shown in Chapter Three, the extent of military cooperation between the ADF and regional militaries increased dramatically during the 1990s. One of the intentions behind the ADF's efforts was to establish cooperation as a norm for regional behaviour and to set the standard by practical example. Exercises, visits, training and educational programs were the key activities conducted by the ADF.

The ADF also sought to establish cooperation as a norm through non-military measures. Sometimes called 'small “s” security', to distinguish them from full-strength military activities such as exercises and training, these measures are intended to build confidence through interaction within a particular area. It was assumed that confidence in one area would enhance security in another.91

There was also a very strong assumption among senior defence personnel that personal contact between the militaries would enhance the prospects of peace. As Defence Minister Ray argued:


91 Some examples of the organisations supported by the ADF which pursued small ‘s’ security activities are: the Western Pacific Naval Symposium or WPNS (the RAN was a key player in establishing the first WPNS meeting in 1988); the Maritime Studies Program (MSP), often referred to as the RAN think-tank and a leading institution for developing naval cooperation among
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Only direct and personal contact, the sharing of experiences and perceptions can...prize open the doors of conservative military establishments...in the end, the trust and confidence that really matters is between defence organisations.92

These kinds of assumptions can readily be explained by liberal arguments about the security enhancing effects of cooperation. Liberal arguments about the benefits of socialisation between groups and the view that progress is part of the human condition could also help to explain this view. So too could another related liberal argument, that states can learn to adopt new norms of behaviour. As will be shown in the next chapter, interviews with senior defence officials confirmed the conviction with which these assumptions are held.

The second intent of military cooperation was to help regional militaries improve their operational and combat skills. As discussed above this was guided by the policy concept of strategic partnership which was neither a realist alliance nor a liberal security community but which nonetheless was in other ways based on liberal–realist assumptions. The realist assumptions are best demonstrated by the fact that during those cooperative military activities the ADF gathered intelligence to enhance their own measures for self-help. And, that the ADF restricted the access of regional military forces to certain operational and combat skills which it deemed necessary for the defence of Australia. These latter measures support strategies based on ‘security against’ others and in this respect can be explained by realists who seek competitive edges against the ever present potential enemy. Overall, the assumptions underpinning the military activities are best described as liberal–realist. Having examined the three components of Labor’s security policy the question is, if they are put together then, can the overall policy be explained in terms of the three explanatory options under discussion.

CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING LABOR’S OVERALL SECURITY POLICY: DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA, THE ALLIANCE AND REGIONAL SECURITY

The first section of this chapter examined whether or not the assumptions that underpin defence of Australia could be explained by the theories of realism and liberalism or the

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The documentary evidence
liberal–realist framework. I have argued that, with some qualifications, realism provides the best explanation. Defence of Australia is based on realist assumptions that security is required against other states, that states have to compete to be secure, and that security concerns the military defence of the state and territory against the military forces of other states. The means to security in defence of Australia are based on the realist assumptions that security is best achieved through self-help; advantages in military technology, offensive and defensive capabilities, and a strategy for near and distant defence.

But these are very broad and general realist assumptions and reference to the variants of realism, in particular to defensive and offensive realism, give a more accurate explanation of defence of Australia. Defensive and offensive realists qualify their understanding of many realist assumptions and have different worldviews and practical policies. As it happens, the theoretical refinements made by the defensive realists appear to provide a better explanation of defence of Australia than do those of the offensive realists. For example, the defence of Australia is better explained by the defensive realist assumption that security does not involve relentless competition as offensive realists claim. The assumptions of defence of Australia, that the security context is one of uncertainties rather than threats and that variations in the level of uncertainty affect defence planning, are better explained by defensive realism rather than offensive realism. Similarly, the assumption of defence of Australia that self-help is best implemented through a mainly defensive doctrine, strategy, force structure and defence planning concepts is also understandable from a defensive rather than an offensive realist perspective. However, the term ‘mainly’ is used advisedly to indicate that some of the elements above involve offensive assumptions. For example, seeking a technological edge is an offensive realist assumption. But since the edge is only partly focused on offensive capabilities, partly on C³I, and not at all on capabilities for invasion then it also based on defensive assumptions about security. With qualifications of this type it can be argued that the assumptions underpinning defence of Australia are best explained by defensive realism.

The qualifications are important to note because they indicate that in some ways both the realist theories and the policy are problematic. On the one hand, defensive realism assumes that states can be both security seekers and greedy. Ultimately, this creates tension in the theory because defensive realists avoid making the choice that, as Charles
Glaser claims, demarcates offensive and defensive theories. As Glaser states, 'whether a theory posits only security seekers or instead posits some greedy states is a pivotal choice'. On the other hand, the policy is difficult to explain because it too has tensions and dilemmas. Ironically, one reason for this is that it is based on both defensive and offensive assumptions about the security behaviour of states. Glaser’s statement might also read, 'whether a policy posits only security seekers or instead posits some greedy states is a pivotal choice'. As a consequence, defence planners, like defensive realists, oscillate between the choices. But nevertheless, the choices are between different notions of realism.

The second section of this chapter examined the extent to which the Australia-US alliance can be explained by liberalism, realism or the liberal–realist perspective. It concluded that some aspects of the alliance can be explained by realist theories but others are more difficult to explain. The realist literature on alliances cannot explain why the alliance continues in the absence of states trying to balance power and given the claim by officials that Australia has no identifiable threat. However, it can be argued that one reason the alliance continues is that Australian defence planners want to be well placed in the future if the current strategic context changes.

The more convincing explanation for why the alliance continues concerns the practical fact that Australia depends on the alliance for assets for self-help or self-reliance, particularly intelligence and high military technology. Realist explanations in the literature do not seem to adequately address those states that have realist self-help aims which require practical assets that can be acquired through alliance arrangements at an affordable strategic and financial cost.

The third section of this chapter examined the extent to which the regional security policy can be explained by IR theories. It argued that on the one hand, many aspects of Labor’s regional security policy can be explained by liberal theories that claim cooperation between states is not only possible but that it enhances security between

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94 As Jim Richardson has usefully pointed out, the discussion about realist alliance theory should give more attention to unequal alliances and to the issues raised in this chapter about uncertainty and dependence on ally’s assets.
them. All the policy concepts developed by Labor are based on these assumptions and likewise the practical measures conducted by the ADF. On the other hand, it was argued that some aspects of the policy can be explained by realist theory. In practice regional security policy involved extraordinary levels of cooperation but nonetheless included some activities, such as intelligence gathering, and excluded some other activities, which benefited the realist self-help strategy of defence of Australia.

Overall, the assumptions underpinning regional security policy are best explained from within the liberal–realist framework. This argument is further confirmed by examining several other aspects of the policy which are difficult to explain from a single theory perspective. For example, from a single theory perspective i.e., from either realism or liberalism, Foreign Minister Evans often adopted a contradictory position on regional security policy. As was discussed in chapter two, he frequently argued that ‘cooperative security’ was a supplement to existing ‘security against’ strategies;\(^95\) and that ‘cooperative security’ co-existed with ‘traditional balances of power’.\(^96\)

Perhaps one of the best demonstrations of the value of a liberal–realist explanation is the key policy concept ‘cooperative security’ which, as explained by Evans:

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\text{[S]uggests consultation rather than confrontation; reassurance rather than deterrence; transparency rather than secrecy; and interdependence rather than unilateralism.}\(^{97}\)
\]

In other words, cooperative security, while emphasising liberal notions of security, does not reject realist means for achieving security. Hence, the liberal–realist explanatory framework best explains Australia’s regional security policy.

In conclusion, this chapter has argued two main points. First, that Australia’s approach to security cannot be explained by a single theory. Australia’s predominantly, but not exclusively, realist policy of defence of Australia and the alliance, is juxtaposed with the liberal–realist policy of regional cooperation which nonetheless emphasises liberalism. To explain Labor’s security policy requires both theories.


\(^{97}\) Evans, ‘Cooperating for Peace’, paper, p.6.
Second, a liberal–realist framework is the most useful to explain Labor’s security policy as a whole for the following reasons. The worldviews that underpin Australia’s security policy (in public documents) correspond with the worldviews encompassed within the liberal–realist framework. Both the policy and the framework are based on the assumption that the international system involves inter-state competition and cooperation. The worldviews depicted in the framework are often expressed in abstract terms but many of these concepts can be recognised in the practical terms of policy. For example, the elements of anarchy and society can be understood in practice as competition and cooperation; amity and enmity can be understood as cooperation and competition and as the policy view that ‘friends today could be enemies tomorrow’.

The assumptions about the object of security in both the policy and the framework are very similar. Both assume that the state is the object of security and that security of the state is synonymous with the security of the individuals within it. While an argument can be made that much of the documentary evidence for Australia’s policy discussed in this chapter puts more emphasis on the state than on the people within, it would be misleading to infer this indicates that one is rated higher than the other. The Defence Department makes it clear that its mission is ‘To promote the security of Australia, and to protect its people and interests’.98 Another indication of the fact that security of the state and individuals are seen to be synonymous is Evans’ statement that ‘security...is as much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defence of territorial integrity of states’.99 In his view the state was remiss if it did not ensure ‘human security’ and that he felt the UN could legitimately intervene in such situations.100 Finally, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the questionnaire and interviews confirmed that policy makers do not differentiate between the security of the state and of its individuals.

The assumption that security is sought from military threats is a common element in both Australian policy and the liberal–realist framework. The framework, however, makes an additional assumption: namely that there are other external and internal threats

100 Gareth Evans, ‘Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict’, Foreign Policy, No.96, Fall 1994, pp.3–20.
to the state (and the individuals within). The difficulty with this argument is that it is not clear if these additional threats are potentially the cause of military threats of if they cause the state to be insecure in another way. This aspect of the framework requires further clarification.

In both Australia’s security policy and the liberal–realist framework it is assumed that the means to security comprise military and non-military measures. Indeed, the measures are remarkably similar. The military means consist of self-help, alliances and conditional balances of power. There is however, a qualification to be made about the reasons for the continuation of alliances. Whereas Australian policy is based on the assumption that alliances continue to enhance security even when there is no threat, the framework is based on the assumption that alliances may well dissipate if the international context is not threatening. However, another assumption underpinning the framework is that, as Martin Wight indicates, alliances come in many forms and have multiple purposes. This understanding of alliances could perhaps help to explain Australia’s continuing support for the alliance in the absence of threats. Apart from this clarification the other military means in both the policy and the framework are the same. Likewise, the non-military means to security in both the policy and framework are very similar. For example, in both it is assumed that cooperation, institutions, regimes, multilateralism, norms, CBMs, diplomacy and international law will all enhance security.

For all the reasons given above the documentary evidence on Australia’s overall security policy is best explained from the liberal–realist perspective. The next question to answer is whether or not the non-documentary evidence obtained directly from policy makers through interviews and a survey/questionnaire can be explained by the liberal–realist perspective.
Chapter Seven

EXPLAINING LABOR’S SECURITY POLICY:
THE NON-DOCUMENTARY SURVEY EVIDENCE

I consider myself a realist and a liberal—and that's not a contradiction.
(Interview with senior official from the Department of Defence, Canberra, December 1998.)

The previous chapter examined the assumptions underpinning the three parts of Australia’s security policy from three perspectives, realism and liberalism and liberal-realism. I argued that the latter provides a better explanation of the overall policy than do single theories. Australia’s predominantly, but not exclusively, realist policies of defence of Australia and the alliance, are juxtaposed with the liberal–realist policy of regional cooperation, which in fact emphasises liberal tenets. The documentary evidence for Labor’s security policy is best understood in terms of the liberal–realist framework.

In this chapter I examine which theoretical framework best accounts for the non-documentary evidence i.e., information obtained directly from policy makers in a survey/questionnaire and/or interviews. A questionnaire was sent to senior policy makers involved with formulating or implementing Labor’s security policy (see Appendix 4). Interviews were conducted with some of the same people and with others who preferred to be interviewed rather than complete the questionnaire. The results of these surveys are reported and then analysed in terms of the three previously identified perspectives.

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1 As explained in the Introduction, one reason for examining this kind of evidence is that it is a source of information which is potentially less politicised than policy statements and documents designed for the public forum. When speaking off the record policy makers can, if they wish, speak frankly, personally, reflectively and in more detail and depth about their security assumptions. A survey on these matters does not appear to have been conducted in the past and hence an analysis based on the findings will provide an original contribution. Another reason for the questionnaire and the interviews is that policy makers can be directly asked about ways to explain policy and the role of theoretical perspectives.

2 In brief, the questionnaire asked policy makers to describe their general assumptions, if any, about security and their particular assumptions, if any, about the three main elements of Australia’s security policy—defence of Australia, the alliance and regional security. The format posed questions about each issue, provided options for answers, and finally, gave policy makers the choice of explaining the reasoning behind their answers. The questionnaire also asked policy makers to address other issues including why, in their view, the policy was not contradictory and what they believed the sources of their security assumptions were.
My argument starts with a caveat. Conclusions drawn from the data will be suggestive not definitive. Some forty senior policy makers were approached and just over half participated in the questionnaire and/or interviews. Despite the relatively small size of the sample there is no reason to assume that the respondents’ answers were not representative of senior policy makers’ assumptions more generally. The survey evidence strongly supports my contention that policy makers’ assumptions about Australia’s overall security policy are, like the documentary evidence, best explained from within the liberal–realist framework.

I also argue that the data shows that policy makers do not consider the liberal–realist framework (and of course the policy) to be contradictory. And, finally I argue that because there is much similarity between the policy makers’ assumptions and the liberal–realist framework, policy makers’ assumptions about security are indeed theoretical, despite their claims to the contrary.

**POLICY MAKERS’ GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE MEANING OF SECURITY FOR AUSTRALIA**

To establish policy makers’ worldviews and general assumptions about security the questionnaire posed several questions about the object of security; what security was being sought from; and the means which best enhanced it (see Figure 7.1). With regard to the object of security the data showed that respondents emphasised the ‘nation-state and its institutions’. Respondents then stressed that ‘individuals within the state’, ‘territory’, and ‘core values’ (in that order) were objects of security. One comment made by a senior defence official that ‘the object of strategic policy is the people, and then possessing land, and by extension the territory and government’ was similar to those made by many other policy makers.

When respondents were pressed further during interviews, it became clear that they assumed that the object of security was ‘multifaceted’. One defence official said this

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3 Many of the participants were very senior officials e.g., Foreign Ministers, Chiefs of Defence, and Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade Deputy Secretaries.
FIGURE 7.1 POLICY MAKERS' GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY

The object of security

Data

Nearly 3/4 of the respondents consider the object of security is the ‘nation-state and its institutions’. The next most important objects were ‘individuals within the state’ and ‘territory’ followed by ‘core values’. Respondents were given the choice of omitting any of the suggested objects of security (see questionnaire in appendix) and interestingly 1/2 of them omitted ‘the government’. Respondents’ comments about their reasoning

A number of respondents qualified their answers with statements such as: ‘the object of strategic policy is the people, and then possessing land, and by extension the territory and government’; ‘there is no precedence to people, territory and interest’; ‘it is difficult to separate the collective of people (the nation), institutions and territory’. Several respondents suggested that the object of Australia’s security policy also concerns the security of the region and shaping the regional environment.

Security from what

Data

Over 3/4 of respondents stated that Australia’s security policy was in the first instance directed against external military threats (respondents were not asked to specify the level of threat in the questionnaire). Over 1/2 said that in the second instance it was directed against low-level incursions, such as illegal immigrants. About 3/4 of respondents chose to omit other external factors, such as economic, environmental and health issues, as security threats. About 3/4 of all respondents omitted internal factors, such as ‘political violence between domestic groups’ and ‘political violence perpetrated by the state on individuals’, as threats to Australia’s security.

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning

A small number of respondents (less than a 1/4) said there were other types of threats to Australia, including terrorism and external military threats to friendly regional countries which could disrupt the security and stability of the region. One important point which the questionnaire did not clarify adequately, and which several respondents noted, was that there was a strong difference between military threats and low-level incursions. This issue was addressed during interviews and is discussed below.

The means to achieving security

Data

Half of the respondents said that in Australia’s case the prime means to achieving security was military capabilities; slightly less than 1/2 said the second most important means was diplomacy; and nearly 3/4 said the third means was the alliance. The fourth most mentioned means related to cooperative activities—multilateral institutions, military CBMs and cooperative security. Nearly 3/4 of respondents chose to omit balance of power arrangements as a means.

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning

Several respondents (about 1/4) suggested that means other than those suggested in the questionnaire were also important and these included regional arrangements, particularly bilateral security dialogues and regional defence arrangements (such as the FPDA and the Indonesia–Australia Agreement on Maintaining Security). Several respondents said it would be misleading to rank the means available to Australia because specific circumstances dictated what means were appropriate in what context and for this reason in practice governments did not have to choose between the different means.

* Interestingly none of the respondents suggested that other types of threats should include transnational crime.
assumption was reflected in the mission statement of the Department of Defence, which was ‘To promote the security of Australia, and to protect its people and interests’. Realism tends to emphasise the state and territory as the referent objects of security; liberalism tends to emphasise the nation and individual over states. The liberal–realist perspective, like that of Australian officials, tends to include both. This finding differs only slightly from the documentary evidence where more emphasis appeared to be given to ‘territory’ as the object of security.

With regard to the question ‘security from what’, the data showed that respondents assume that the most important threat to Australia’s security is external and military threats—a traditional realist assumption. However, as will be seen in later parts of the analysis, policy makers added several qualifications that suggested that defensive realism, rather than the variant of offensive realism, provided the best explanation. For example, the data shows that most respondents consider the prospects of military threats developing in the next five years to be ‘unlikely’ and beyond that period, most ‘did not know’ what the risk was. As I will argue later, this indicates that the assumption commonly made by offensive realists—that security is best ensured by adopting ‘worse-case’ thinking—is of little relevance in Australia’s case. The data also shows that policy makers assume that other types of external and internal threats are of little important to Australia’s security. This tends to be an assumption held by realists from all the variants of realism. These findings from the non-documentary evidence about what security was being sought from showed no significant difference with the documentary evidence.

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5 See Chapter Five for discussion about some unresolved issues concerning states and individuals in the liberal–realist framework.

6 Another related piece of evidence, which supports the view held by policy makers that the object of security is both the state and the individuals, is that Australian defence policy also includes intra-state peacekeeping activities. Missions have been undertaken in Namibia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Somalia. In addition the ADF supports a regional peacekeeping training program at Williamstown in New South Wales.

7 During interviews, policy makers frequently made the point that other issues, such as illegal immigration and fishing, were important but that they did not constitute threats to Australia’s military security.
With regard to policy makers’ assumptions about the means to achieving security, the data again showed that the liberal–realist framework provided the best account. Half of the respondents assumed that military means were the prime means, followed by diplomacy, then alliances, and then cooperative security measures, in that order. Several senior officials, from the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade, stressed that Australia’s security was based on three legs (defence of Australia, the alliance and regional cooperation) with each leg having its own means. Several respondents commented that it would be misleading to rank the means that Australia used to achieve its security goals because their importance would vary in accordance to circumstance. In terms of theory, this mix of means across the overall policy again suggests that policy makers assumptions about means are best understood in terms of the liberal–realist framework.

POLICY MAKERS’ ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA POLICY

Questions addressed the following issues: the threat perceptions underpinning the policy; the role of offensive capabilities in the force structure; and the relevance of power to security policy (see Figure 7.2). The responses showed that policy makers’ assumptions about defence of Australia policy can be explained in realist terms, but with some important qualifications. In general the data confirmed the documentary evidence. The assumptions that Australia will always require a military insurance, which all respondents held, and that threats could at some stage develop to Australia’s security, which over 3/4 of respondents held, are both traditional realist assumptions. However, as was argued in the previous chapter, these are broad realist assumptions that do not always explain important elements of policy.

The policy is better explained with reference to defensive and offensive realism, and in particular the former. Defensive realism helps to explain the pervasive belief among respondents that, while threats could develop at some stage, they were unlikely to over the next five to ten years. And it also helps to illuminate the answer given by some respondents that they simply did not know if threats might come into being. Respondents are clearly not as anxious about Australia’s security as previous
FIGURE 7.2 POLICY MAKERS’ ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA POLICY

Threats

Data

Over 3/4 of respondents ‘agree’ with the assumption that underpinned the policy of defence of Australia, namely that ‘threats to Australian territory could develop and require a military response’. However, between 1/2 and 3/4 disagree (i.e., either ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’) that threats to Australia will increase in the next five years and the rest ‘did not know’. Over 1/2 of respondents ‘did not know’ and the rest either ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ that threats will increase over the next 10 years. All the respondents agree that ‘Australia will always need a military insurance’ (i.e., just under 1/2 ‘agree strongly’ and just over 1/2 ‘agree’).

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning
Respondents stressed that uncertainty rather than threats underpinned the defence of Australia.

Technological edge

Data

All but one of the respondents agree that the ‘ADF needs a technological edge over other regional militaries to be secure’ (i.e., 3/4 ‘agree strongly’ and the rest ‘agree’).

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning
More than 1/2 of the respondents gave practical reasons to explain why Australia required a technological edge over other regional militaries. For example, it was stated that Australia had ‘a very small and very low density population’; ‘large land area and sea and air approaches’; ‘small-size defence forces’, ‘relative economic wealth’; and ‘technological sophistication’. According to several respondents such factors meant that maintaining a technological edge is a sound assumption because it is economically plausible and militarily effective (the latter because it provides a ‘credible deterrent’ and ‘the ability to win’).

Offensive capabilities

Data

All but two of the respondents agree that “offensive” capabilities (e.g., the Collins submarines and FA-18 and F-111 aircraft) are a necessary component of [Australia’s] forces’ (i.e., over 1/2 ‘agree strongly’, the rest ‘agree’, and 2 others omitted answers).

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning
There were many explanations given for this assumption. Several respondents emphasised the practical military advantages including: ‘the ability to strike at an enemy homeland gives a strong deterrent effect’; ‘the ability to strike an aggressive enemy’s bases and forces far from Australia’s shores gives valuable additional options in mounting an offensive strategy’; that is was ‘hard to see any other way of acquiring some capacity for proactive defence strategies’; ‘it increases our options and earns us respect’; ‘it just might save us’; ‘we must have the ability to project power beyond our shores unless you want to fight on our own territory’; ‘it helped to overcome Australia’s strategic disadvantages’; ‘it was insurance against uncertainty’, ‘it provided not just the kit but the skills which take years to acquire’; ‘it was a deterrent’. Several respondents had difficulty with the term ‘offensive’, saying it was the ‘wrong premise’, that it was misleading to simply name weapons as being offensive.

Power and Australia’s defence policy

Data

Nearly 3/4 of respondents ‘agree’ with ‘Hans Morgenthau’s assumption that politics is a struggle for power’. The rest either ‘disagree’ or ‘did not know’. However, 1/2 said Australia’s defence policy is not based on this assumption, 1/4 said it was; 1/4 omitted an answer.

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning
Several respondents said ‘Australia did not seek power but rather security’; ‘Australia does not seek power but certainly regional influence’; others said ‘there are limits to Australia’s defence capacity and influence’ and that ‘Morgenthau’s assumption is more complex and complicated’.
generations were depicted to be in several scholarly analyses, and therefore the concerns of classical and offensive realism are less salient. Respondents seem to share the view held by Stephen Brooks (see Chapter Four) who claims that defence decision making is conditioned more by the more benign notion of 'the probability of conflict' rather than by the more dire worst-case notion of 'the mere possibility of conflict' (that epitomises offensive realists). All this suggests that the respondents' perceptions of threat/ uncertainties and their rationale for defence of Australia is better explained by defensive realism rather than by offensive realism. As the discussion in Chapter Four indicates the former assumes that security is 'plentiful' and the latter assumes that it is 'scarce'.

All but one of the respondents believed that, to be effective, the defence of Australia required the ADF to have 'a technological edge over other regional militaries'. This assumption appears to be best explained by a realist belief that security is enhanced by a relative advantage in military capability. Although many policy makers pointed out that their support for Australia having a technological edge was a practical response to geography, demography and the country's economic standing, this view is still based on realist assumptions. However, in practice the technological advantage was not unduly focused on offensive platforms and not at all on capabilities for invading and holding territory. Hence it could also be explained in terms of defensive realism, which advocates a balanced offensive/defensive force structure when security is plentiful.

All but two of the respondents assumed that "offensive" capabilities...are necessary' for the defence of Australia. This assumption, however, can be explained in terms of defensive realism rather than offensive realism. The latter assumes that offensive capabilities are always required and should comprise the major part of the force structure; and the former assumes that such capabilities are sometimes required but should be balanced or constitute the minor portion of overall capability (unless it is clear that a 'greedy' state aims to change the status quo). Since the size of Australia's offensive strike capabilities and the number of amphibious landing craft and transport helicopters are insufficient to support sustained offensive strikes or invasions, it makes

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little sense to describe the force structure as being determined by the requirements of offensive realism.

Respondents' assumptions about the relevance of power to Australian defence policy can be partly explained by realist thinking. Some 3/4 of the respondents concurred with Morgenthau's belief that politics is a struggle for power. But about 1/2 of the respondents also assumed that Australia's defence policy is not based on this assumption. According to several senior defence officials, Australia seeks to be secure and does not seek power per se. Moreover, many officials stressed the point that there are clear limits to Australia's defence capacity. In other words, given Australia's particular position, the kind of power which offensive realists aspire to is not even an option for defence planners.

The survey data strongly suggest that Australia's defence policy can be understood mostly in realist terms and that the variant of defensive realism is the most appropriate. The final point to make is that the respondents' answers in the questionnaire about threats appear to based on the more benign view of the region that characterised the pre-1994 White Paper period. In interviews however, the overwhelming view of policy makers was that, since the end of the Cold War, 'new uncertainties' had developed and that defence planning should be guided by short-warning conflict. In other words, policy makers supported the judgments in the 1994 White Paper. Whether or not this suggested that policy makers assumed that security was becoming scarce, as offensive realist assume, is an open question, as discussed in the previous chapter.

POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE AUSTRALIA–US ALLIANCE POLICY

To determine policy makers' views of the Australia–US alliance policy, questions were posed which addressed the alleged strategic benefits of the alliance for Australia and the role of balance of power arrangements for Australian security (see Figure 7.3). The data showed that all the respondents held the assumption that the alliance conferred strategic benefits.10 This assumption can be understood in broad realist terms. However,

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10 Interestingly, respondents had different views about the meaning of a balance of power (see Figure 7.3): nearly 3/4 assumed it did not mean a situation in which there was a roughly equal balance of power among important regional states and about half assumed it did mean a situation which avoided a preponderance of power by any one state. In other words policy makers like many theorists had varied meanings.
Policy makers were asked if the alliance conferred certain strategic benefits and if so did they include the following.

1) 'The likelihood of US military support should Australia be threatened sometime in the future'. All respondents, except for two agree (i.e., over 3/4 of respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree').
2) 'Privileged access to US military technology'. All respondents agree (i.e., 1/2 of the respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree').
3) 'Privileged access to US technical intelligence'. All respondents agree (i.e., over 3/4 of the respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree').
4) 'An element of deterrence against potential enemies'. All respondents except for one agree (i.e., over 3/4 of the respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree').
5) 'US engagement in the region to balance the power of other states'. All respondents agree (i.e., less than 3/4 of the respondents 'agree strongly' and the rest 'agree').
6) 'The provision of nuclear umbrella'. About 3/4 of the respondents agree (i.e., about 1/4 'agree strongly'; 1/2 'agree'; and the rest 'disagree').
7) Other strategic benefits: Several respondents suggested that there were some other strategic benefits provided by the alliance, for example: the alliance meant that less money [was] required for defence spending; the alliance provided 'easy access to American thinking in doctrinal and organisational areas that is truly valuable'; the alliance provided 'limited opportunity to shape US outlooks and policy prescriptions'.

Respondents' comments about their reasoning
Some respondents stressed that the US would not assist Australia with combat forces but with intelligence and re-supply.

Balance of power

Respondents were asked if 'Australia's security would be enhanced by participating in a balance of power arrangement with other states'. About 3/4 'disagree'; less than 1/4 agree; and the rest either 'did not know' or the answers were unclear.

Respondents' comments about their reasoning
Respondents commented that balance of power arrangements did not assist Australia's security for the following reasons: 'it denies the flexibility needed in a dynamic region'; 'freedom of action may be better than being party to an arrangement'; 'regional states would not participate'; 'it was not an appropriate arrangement for the foreseeable future or had been for the recent past'; 'the target of balance of power would be China and it would be counter-productive. Constructive engagement with China would be better'.

When respondents were asked what they understood by a balance of power the following responses were given.

1) 'A descriptive term which explains the actual distribution of power (e.g., military, economic, political) among important regional states'. About 1/2 said 'no'; about 1/4 said 'yes' and others did not answer.
2) 'A situation which involves a roughly equal balance of power among important states in the region'. Nearly 3/4 said 'no' and the rest did not answer.
3) 'A situation which avoids an apparent preponderance of military power which favours any one state'. Over 1/2 said 'yes', a 1/4 said 'no' and the rest did not answer.
4) 'A policy prescription which seeks to establish 2 or 3'. Nearly 3/4 said 'yes' and the rest did not answer.

respondents endorsed a very wide range of strategic benefits, some of which are difficult to understand in terms of the traditional realist arguments about alliances in the literature. As discussed in Chapter Six, classical and neorealists realists, like Morgenthau and Waltz, assume that alliances are a consequence of the balance of power. Defensive realists like Stephen Walt assume that alliances form to counter
The Non-documentary Survey Evidence

threats. Yet the US–Australian alliance continues even though neither of these conditions is present. But putting aside that issue for a moment, respondents endorsed the alliance primarily because, in their view, it enhances Australia’s security by providing intelligence and technology for defence of Australia and self-help. In other words, paradoxically the alliance supports self-reliance or self-help. The interviews with policy makers showed that there was universal support for the alliance for this reason.

That said, some of the reasons why respondents endorsed the alliance were based on pessimistic views about Australia’s future security environment. For example, support for the alliance was based on an expectation that it may provide *a security guarantee for the future*, in the unlikely event that Australia was seriously threatened. There was also the view that ‘US engagement in the region [helped] to balance the power of other states’ but again, from the interviews, this seemed to be directed more towards the future. This concern about the future is of course reflected in policy makers’ reference to increasing uncertainty in the region. But to explain the alliance as a preparatory arrangement for the future when the present circumstances, by realist theory, do not support its existence is unsatisfactory. As discussed in Chapter Six, it means that realism can explain everything (even periods when the usual explanations are not relevant) and therefore it explains nothing in particular.11

The perceived wide-ranging strategic benefits provided by the alliance, which all respondents affirmed, may be better explained by Martin Wight’s view of alliances, which is part of the liberal–realist perspective. As discussed in Chapter Six, Wight has a much broader understanding of the nature and purposes of alliances. He argues that, ‘[a]lliances are as various as friendships in their character, their purpose, their occasion, their duration, the relative position of those who make them’.12 Unfortunately Wight’s discussion of alliances, rather like that of the realists, is not fully developed. Nonetheless, in so far as it goes, Wight’s exposition of alliances is useful and an element in the liberal–realist framework. In addition to this more flexible approach to alliances the liberal–realist framework assumes that the formation of alliances is

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'conditional' rather than being a universal and an automatic outcome of the balance of power.

It is interesting to note that, given its centrality in realist thinking, that balance of power arrangements were omitted by most respondents as a means to achieving security. A former CDF commented that with respect to balance of power arrangements: 'it was not an appropriate arrangement for the foreseeable future or had been for the recent past'; '[that] the target of balance of power would be China and it would be counter-productive. [And that] constructive engagement with China would be better'. When policy makers were asked to comment in the interviews, about the questionnaire's finding, several of them qualified their original response by saying that a balance of power arrangement could become necessary under particular circumstances. This view is similar to the liberal–realist assumption that balance of power arrangements are 'conditional' rather than universal or permanent. Obviously policy makers have mixed views about the value of balance of power arrangements though the trend is towards scepticism.

The survey evidence, while not greatly different from the documentary evidence, reinforced just how strongly policy makers' were committed to the alliance as a means of assisting self-help and self-reliance. They were, however, unwilling to comment on the argument made in Chapter One that the Joint Defence Facilities were becoming more important to defence of Australia, not just with respect to possible theatre missile defences, but in tactical defence.

**POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

Questions addressed the following aspects of the policy: the 'security with' logic of the policy; the role of multilateral institutions and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the practical measures that support strategic partnership; intelligence and cooperation activities; and economic interdependence (see Figure 7.4).

The data showed that respondents' assumptions about the regional security policy can be understood in terms of the liberal–realist framework, though liberal tenets are the most useful. The most fundamental assumption is that cooperation enhances security and that 'security with' regional states will enhance Australia's security. According to many
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FIGURE 7.4 POLICY MAKERS’ ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ‘SECURITY WITH’

Data

All except one respondent agree that ‘Australia’s policy of “security with” enhances Australia’s security’ (i.e., 1/2 of the respondents ‘agree strongly’ and the rest ‘agree’).

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning

Many of the respondents made favourable comments about Australia’s ‘security with’ approach. Some examples are: ‘we are here, they are here, none of us is going anywhere so let’s establish modes and habits of cooperation that lead us to a shared view of a peaceful future’; ‘a security relationship provides access and some transparency which should enhance overall security in the region’; ‘to an extent [it provides] us transparency and advance warning—but also more concretely its, sensible and cheaper’; ‘lessens the likelihood of threat developing from regional countries, provides opportunities to influence their security policies, enhances intelligence opportunities, develops the habit of partnership with Australia’.

Multilateral institutions

Data

All except two of the respondents agree that ‘multilateral security institutions enhance security’ (i.e., over 3/4 of the respondents ‘agree’ and the rest ‘agree strongly’).

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning

Responses were varied: ‘I agree but they are limited in what they can do at the present—and this is unlikely to change markedly for many years’; ‘agree, but irrelevant as regional countries will not enter multilateral arrangements’; ‘agree, but should not be overstated—these institutions are weak and will remain so for years’, ‘they take decades to mature but they reinforce “security with”’; ‘they can be useful but are best suited to a situation of clearly recognised common threat e.g., NATO vs Warsaw Pact. This does not apply in our region. There is therefore the risk of precipitating the situation you are trying to avoid by isolating one or more nations, or of creating a meaningless organisation if everyone is included’.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Data

All respondents except one agree that the ASEAN Regional Forum enhances regional security’ (i.e., over 3/4 of the respondents ‘agree’ and the rest ‘agree strongly’).

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning

‘Any regional dialogue is a positive’; ‘it has done much better than its fumbling beginnings suggest’; ‘only as a CBM’; ‘agree, but not yet an institution—very weak’; ‘a useful forum for focusing collective attention on security issues and perhaps for bringing moral suasion to bear’.

Economic interdependence

Data

About 1/2 of the respondents agree that ‘interdependence and enmeshment of the economies of Australia and regional states enhances security’ (i.e., that 1/4 of respondents ‘agree’, about 1/4 ‘agree strongly’, and the rest did not answer).

Respondents’ comments about their reasoning

‘Nations historically do not fight where interdependent economies are established firmly’; ‘habits of cooperation are developed that benefit mutual understanding and a shared view of the future’; it could be made effective in enhancing security if the will of member states was there—at present its not; ‘can’t realistically be avoided—alternative is economic fortress Australia which will be weaker’, ‘makes it harder for differences to overwhelm common interests t the extent necessary to provide the calculated use of force’; ‘gives incentives against conflict and vested interests against war—on balance’; ‘perhaps, up to a point would tend to enhance security. However, there is too much disparity to push this too far and there is potential at least for reduced security - perhaps from reaction to disappointed expectations’.

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respondents cooperation establishes modes of behaviour and habits, for example transparency, which enhance security.

Respondents also assumed that the particular institutional and practical measures that support 'security with' enhance Australia's security. Nearly all assumed that the liberal notion of multilateral security institutions benefited security. However, the comments from respondents indicated that many policy makers are still cautious about regional institutions. Many stressed that there are limitations at the moment and that it will take decades before such institutions will mature. With respect to the key regional security institution, the ASEAN Regional Forum, all respondents agreed that the ARF enhances regional security. Some cautioned that the ARF is still a weak institution and others claimed it is doing well under the circumstances.

Respondents' assumptions about the alleged security enhancing effects of economic interdependence were difficult to assess. The data showed that about 1/2 of the respondents agreed that 'interdependence and enmeshment of the economies of Australia and regional states enhances security' (i.e., that 1/4 of respondents 'agree', about 1/4 'agree strongly') and the rest did not answer. The comments from the questionnaire were also mixed. For example, some of the different representative comments were: that 'nations historically do not fight where interdependent economies are established firmly'; that 'it could be made effective in enhancing security if the will of member states was there—but at present its not'; and that, 'there is too much disparity to push this too far and there is potential at least for reduced security—perhaps from reaction to disappointed expectations'.

As for the particular cooperative activities which constituted 'strategic partnership', all the respondents assumed that all the measures listed in the questionnaire enhanced Australia's security (see Figure. 7.4 cont.). The one activity where responses varied concerned the provision of 'training facilities in Australia'. Interestingly the main argument here was that this measure did not allow for enough personal contact between the ADF and the regional personnel who were using the training facilities. Indeed, the importance of personal relationships and contact between Australian and regional personnel for enhancing security was repeatedly emphasised by defence officials. The assumption that personal contact enhances security because it helps others to learn, not
FIGURE 7.4 POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 'SECURITY WITH' cont.

Practical measures supporting 'strategic partnership'

Data

Policy makers were asked if the following practical measures associated with 'strategic partnership' enhance Australia's security.

1) CBM transparency measures (e.g., white papers, dialogue). All respondents agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly').
2) 'Personal contact among military personnel'. All respondents except one agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly').
3) 'Training and exercising'. All respondents agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly').
4) Educational exchanges between military establishments'. All agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly').
5) 'Training regional militaries to improve their own operational and combat skills'. All respondents except two agree (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents 'agree' and the rest 'agree strongly').
6) 'Providing training facilities in Australia for regional militaries (e.g., Pearce Air Force Base to the Singaporean Air Force)'. About 3/4 of respondents agree (i.e., 1/2 of respondents 'agree', a 1/4 'agree strongly' and 1/4 'disagree').

Respondents' comments about their reasoning

'I agree all these help—some more than others. That too varies over time and with specific nations. With training, we have the opportunity to instill not only techniques but also values and in particular notions of military professionalism. With training facilities, the benefits are not as great because the contact is less direct and the Australian Defence Force input in minimal. However, the experience of living in a functional liberal democracy with all its warts must be a benefit; 'if we are serious about security with the region anything that improves their capability is to our advantage'; 'the contact provides/allow access to knowledge which improves transparency'; 'providing unilateral training facilities does not provide the necessary interaction'; 'provides transparency and early warning but also the most practical possible demonstration of 'security with'; 'avoids stereotyping, reduces risk of underestimating or exaggerating military capabilities, breeds sense of community, shared interests and responsibilities, exposure to how the ADF itself, government and society, and how the ADF defines 'professionalism' which can rub off to our advantage over time'; 'Australia's security is much enhanced if we are in a secure and stable region. A necessary precondition is capable and sufficient but non-threatening regional military forces. Each of these forces should be sufficient to avoid its country appearing to be an easy target that might attract aggressive military action from ambitious neighbours. This desirable end is helped by professional Australian military assistance. We have by a long way still the most professional military forces in the region. The measures described also provide opportunities to ensure our own policies are clearly understood, to influence regional strategic concepts and forces structures and to develop interoperability between forces and perhaps to market Australian products. Importantly they also foster personal relationships that may prove invaluable in future crises where the parties are in senior positions. They also provide opportunities for intelligence gathering.'

Intelligence and cooperative activities

Data

Policy makers were asked to explain, in their own words, the security assumptions that underpinned the activity of collecting intelligence during cooperative activities.

Respondents' comments about their reasoning

'It's good sense'; we do not assume that we could never end up in conflict with any states in the region, except the US and NZ; 'I do not comment on intelligence'; 'no comment'; 'we must have secrets to enhance security. If we can successfully learn about others' capabilities (and not get caught) we stand to gain in security terms'; 'as you approach a condition of genuine partnership and conceivably formal collective security arrangements these instincts should weaken. We still are some way from this with Southeast Asia and a layer of mystery and uncertainty about how good the ADF would really be remains appropriate'; 'We should always continue to collect intelligence (discreetly) as others do to us. Cooperative activities are an effective way of doing so and this is widely understood. Indeed, it is a measure of the confidence between countries that they conduct such activities. There will always be some operations and combat tactics, particularly involving key technical capabilities that we will not share. All countries do this and it reflects the judgment that some things are so sensitive to the national interest that the considerable benefits of cooperative activities are insufficient to risk putting them in jeopardy. However, there is still a great deal that can be shared and the benefits of doing so are not lessened by the fact that we hold back on a small percentage'.

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just how to cooperate but also, to appreciate Australian values, democratic institutions and human rights was universally accepted. This reflects the liberal belief in the value of socialisation and liberalism's optimistic view of human nature (as opposed to the pessimistic view that realists hold about human nature, see Chapter Four). Indeed, the assumptions underpinning these cooperative activities for strategic partnership can be explained in liberal terms. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, there are still aspects of strategic partnership that are best explained from within the liberal–realist framework that includes realist assumptions.

For example, during interviews several respondents argued that one the purposes of regional cooperation was 'shaping' the regional environment to 'mirror Australia's long term strategic and defence interests'. If shaping failed, then the other dimension of defence policy, 'hedging', which directly related to defending Australia could be adopted. According to one senior defence official shaping and hedging were reflected respectively in the terms 'promotion' and 'defence', which were used in Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP'90).13 Shaping/promotion was conducted, it was argued, through cooperation and developing interoperability 'across nearly everything—operations, combat, tactics, doctrine, communications, frequencies and high level dialogue'. One official made the important observation that, over time, shaping often supported the development of other states' warfighting skills. Trying to explain this element of regional security policy with the standard theoretical models is difficult: it involves liberal notions of cooperation, but, as it was argued in the previous chapter, the intention was not to build a security community on the Deutsch model and it was not to establish an alliance to use against others. This amalgam of shaping/promotion is probably best understood in liberal–realist terms.

Some aspects of strategic partnership and regional cooperation are better explained in realist terms, notably the cooperative activities that are used to gather intelligence (see Figure 7.4 cont.). As one senior defence official emphasised, these activities continue

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13 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Departmental Publications, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992. ASP'90 stated that: 'The strategy described in this document goes beyond the defence of the nation against direct attack to include promotion of our security interests. The term as used here encompasses the nation’s defence goals, the principles and priorities for providing the means of achieving them, and the uses to which these defence capabilities should be put, both to defend and promote the nation's security interests'. (Emphasis added.) Ibid., p.20.
because 'we do not assume that we could never end up in conflict with any state in the region'; and according to another official, 'we must have secrets to enhance security...If we can successfully learn about others capabilities (and not get caught) we stand to gain in security terms'. Another senior official pointed out that it is widely understood among cooperative partners that each will collect intelligence during cooperative activities and that no country shares knowledge of operations and combat tactics that are considered sensitive to national interest: 'we should always continue to collect intelligence (discreetly) as others do to us. Cooperative activities are an effective way of doing so and this is widely understood...Indeed, it is a measure of the confidence between countries that they conduct such activities...There will always be some operations and combat tactics, particularly involving key technical capabilities that we will not share...All countries do this and it reflects the judgment that some things are so sensitive to the national interest that the considerable benefits of cooperative activities are insufficient to risk putting them in jeopardy...However, there is still a great deal that can be shared and the benefits of doing so are not lessened by the fact that we hold back on a small percentage'. The belief that gathering intelligence during cooperative activities reflects realist assumptions about the importance of self-help and relative gains.

POLICY MAKERS’ ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL POLICY

The analysis of the data on respondents’ specific assumptions about the overall policy—defence of Australia, the alliance and regional security policy—is best explained within the liberal–realist framework. The assumptions about defence of Australia are mostly, but not always, realist. The assumptions about the alliance can be partly explained in realist terms, though realism does not adequately account for all the reasons why Australia continues to pursue the alliance. Finally, support for regional security policy can be explained within the liberal–realist framework, though here liberal theory explains more of the policy than realism. The overall policy then, is both liberal and realist and is best described by the liberal–realist framework.

General assumptions about security

Policy makers’ general assumptions about security can also be explained within the liberal–realist framework. To briefly reiterate and expand upon some of the arguments
already made. First, from the perspective of both Australian defence policy makers and the liberal–realist framework the referent objects of security are both individuals and the state. (In fact the framework does not adequately address the issue of those states which fail to protect their own citizens but this does not affect the analysis of Australia’s security policy because policy makers do not consider this factor applies in Australia.) Second, Australian views on ‘security from what’ are more difficult to understand in terms of the liberal–realist framework because the latter assumes the possibility of future military threats (even if the timing is unclear) and that of course is strongly based on realist assumptions. In addition, policy makers do not consider other types of threats (environmental, societal, and economic) are security problems for Australia. The framework, on the other hand, assumes external military threats are the most important (though it is ambiguous about whether or not threats are imminent or just potential). Some liberal–realists, however, particularly those from the ‘new security’ school, include other types of external threats and some internal ones. But, as argued in Chapter Five, the discussion of threats by the ‘new security’ school is not very clear: particularly on such issues as whether or not poverty and/or environmental degradation should be considered as security threats. In any case, this ambiguity in the theory does not affect the analysis of Australia’s security policy because policy makers assume that military threats matter the most and other threats are hardly relevant.

Policy makers’ assumptions about the overall means by which security is achieved can also be understood in terms of the liberal–realist framework. The assumption that security requires a variety of strategies: self-help and ‘other-help’; self-help and CBMs; self-help and alliances; deterrence and reassurance; secrecy and transparency; alliance and cooperative security; unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism are consistent with the liberal–realist assumptions about the need for both self-help and cooperation.

Worldviews
The survey data also make it possible to construct the security worldviews of policy makers which are focused on the region and which are based on a number of shared assumptions including the following: that the region is a realm in which states both compete and cooperate; that although Morgenthau’s assumption of power politics may apply generally, in Australia’s own case, given its geographic position, demography and limited economy, there are real limitations on Australia’s ability to exercise power; that
distinctions have to be drawn, on the one hand, about current relations with states, which may be benign and cooperative, and on the other, future relations, which may be hostile and conflictual; that the present strategic environment is one where there is no direct threat to Australia but that there are ‘uncertainties’ which may have a negative impact on Australia’s security future, though not to the point where Australia’s survival is threatened.

At the end of Labor’s time in office the trend in worldviews was towards a more pessimistic view of regional security developments based in part on the realist assumption that the growing military power of regional states could pose future threats. This view is of course quite inconsistent with the frequently reiterated claim that enhancing regional capabilities also enhances Australian security. Notwithstanding this development, when asked about their general disposition towards security over 1/2 of the respondents said ‘yes’ to being ‘optimistic’ and about 1/4 said ‘no’ and remainder said neither ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (see Figure 7.5).

When the assumptions that underpin the worldview policy makers are examined from the perspective of the liberal–realist worldview, there is remarkable similarity. Although the framework contains abstract notions such as anarchy and society, enmity and amity, it is not difficult to relate these to the more practical and focused assumptions of policy makers. For example, apart from the similarity between anarchy and competition and society and cooperation, the assumption that friends today may be tomorrow’s enemies is close to the notions of enmity and amity. Indeed, these assumptions of policy makers inform (and perhaps should modify) the framework in a practical way by emphasising temporality: or distinguishing between the present and future for the purposes of defence planning. Another worldview assumption of policy makers that can be understood from a liberal–realist perspective is that power is important but that in Australia’s case there are strong constraints. The mix of pessimism and optimism is also characteristic of the liberal–realist perspective.

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14 If the framework did emphasise temporal factors it would also support and refine the other assumption that state’s interests change over time: as is suggested by the shift from the Grotians emphasis on the threat of nuclear war to the new security school emphasis on conventional and other external threats and internal threats.
**FIGURE 7.5 POLICY MAKERS’ GENERAL DISPOSITIONS ABOUT SECURITY**

**Optimistic or pessimistic assumptions about security**

*Data*

Policy makers were asked if their own assumptions about security have generally been optimistic, pessimistic or neither: About 1/2 said yes they were optimistic; less than a 1/4 said they were pessimistic; less than a 1/4 said neither; the rest said they were both optimistic and pessimistic.

*Respondents’ comments about their reasoning*

‘But you have to be both optimistic and pessimistic when developing security policy’.

**Competition and cooperation in Australia’s security policy**

*Data*

Policy makers were asked if Australia’s overall security policy consists of approaches which are both competitive and cooperative (i.e., on the one hand, defence of Australia and the alliance are based on ‘security against’ others; on the other hand, regional cooperation is based on ‘security with’ others). Three-quarters of the respondents agreed that ‘Australia’s overall security policy consists of approaches that are both competitive and cooperative. The rest either ‘disagreed’ or ‘did not know’, or did not answer.

Policy makers were then asked “if you think that Australia’s overall policy incorporates both competition and cooperation do you think this is because the policy’:

1) ‘is planned to take account of the present and the ‘unknown’ future security environments’. All respondents agree (i.e., about 1/2 ‘agree’ and the rest ‘agree strongly’).

2) keeps ‘Australia’s options open’. About 3/4 of respondents agree (i.e., less than 1/2 ‘agree’; about 1/4 ‘agree strongly’; another 1/4 ‘disagree’).

3) ‘assumes that regional states which are friends now may not be always be our friends and we have to plan on the basis of this’. Nearly all respondents agree (i.e., about 3/4 ‘agree’; less than a 1/4 ‘strongly agree’; and the rest did not answer).

4) aims to train personnel and modernise force structures in the present time-frame to prepare for long term’. About 3/4 of respondents agree (i.e., about 1/2 ‘agree’; less than 1/4 ‘agree strongly’; less than 1/4 ‘disagree’; and the rest did not answer).

5) ‘assumes that the regional context is currently one in which there are conflicting trends i.e., there is evidence of both cooperation and competition and thus Australia’s policy should be planned on the basis of this’. About 3/4 of respondents agree (i.e., about 1/2 ‘agree’; less than 1/4 ‘agree strongly’; less than 1/4 ‘disagree’; and the rest did not answer).

6) ‘assumes that regional states have mixed motives i.e., they may want to cooperate and compete’. About 1/2 ‘agree’ and the rest are divided between ‘disagree’, ‘strongly agree’ and ‘don’t know’.

**Contradictions in the policy**

Policy makers were then asked ‘if Australia’s policy contains both competitive and cooperative approaches’ does it mean the policy is contradictory’. All agreed that the policy is not contradictory (i.e., about 1/2 ‘disagree’ and the rest ‘disagree strongly’).
Competition and cooperation

Apart from examining policy makers’ specific and general assumptions as well as their security worldviews the questionnaire also sought to establish if policy makers had other security assumptions about the overall policy and if they too might be understood in terms of the liberal–realist framework.

Respondents were asked if ‘Australia’s overall security policy consists of approaches which are both competitive and cooperative (i.e., on the one hand, defence of Australia and the alliance are based on ‘security against’ others; on the other hand, regional cooperation is based on ‘security with’ others). (See Figure 7.5.)’ The data confirmed that respondents’ assume that Australia’s security policy is both competitive and cooperative. This is a key assumption of the liberal–realist framework.

Moreover, the framework can also explain the reasons why policy makers think the policy is both competitive and cooperative. The data shows that: the three main assumptions are numbers 1), 3), 5): the policy ‘is planned to take account of the present and the ‘unknown’ future security environments’; the policy ‘assumes that regional states which are friends now may not always be our friends and we have to plan on the basis of this’; ‘assumes that the regional context is currently one in which there are conflicting trends i.e., there is evidence of both cooperation and competition and thus Australia’s policy should be planned on the basis of this’.

Finally, three other security assumptions held by policy makers that are similar to those within the framework are that: the policy assumes different time-frames, that is, the relatively benign present and the ‘unknown’ future; that the policy assumes that present friendships may not last, that cooperation today may be replaced by competition; that the policy assumes a regional context that is characterised by conflicting trends, that is by both competition and cooperation.

To establish policy makers’ views about whether or not the incorporation of competition and cooperation meant that the policy was contradictory, the questionnaire posed the

15 Less emphasis was given to the other three assumptions 2), 4), 6): that is, to keeping Australia’s options open; training personnel in the present to be prepared for the future; and that states have mixed motives.
question: ‘if Australia’s policy contains both competitive and cooperative approaches [does] it mean the policy is contradictory’ (see Figure 7.5). The response overwhelmingly showed that respondents did not think the policy is contradictory: all agreed that the policy is not contradictory (i.e., about 1/2 ‘disagree’ and the rest ‘disagree strongly’).

The reasons why policy makers said the policy was not contradictory, despite being both competitive and cooperative, are the ones above, which can be understood in terms of the liberal–realist framework. The framework assumes a strategic context that consists of ‘contradictions’, such as anarchy and society, and competition and cooperation and that the means to achieving security need to address that context.

THE RELEVANCE OF THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING POLICY

If, as has been argued throughout the thesis, the liberal–realist framework helps to explain policy makers’ security assumptions, and if the answers which policy makers give in the questionnaire and interviews confirm this argument, then it is interesting to ask policy makers if they think the framework is useful and to investigate in more depth, their claims that theory is of little use to them for explaining policy.

Possible sources of policy makers’ security assumptions

Policy makers were asked about the sources of their security assumptions. The data showed that respondents were ambivalent at best about the value of theories. When asked to rank the various sources in order of importance about 1/2 of the respondents put ‘contemporary events’, about 1/4 put ‘historical events’, and the remaining 1/4 were divided between ‘theories’ and ‘individual philosophies’ about security (see Figure 7.6).

Other factors, apart from security assumptions, which determine security policy

The ambivalence about the relevance of theories for security policies appears to be based on two claims: one that security policy is based on other factors not just on
assumptions about security; the second is that, as Paul Dibb states, the theories are themselves problematic when it comes explaining Australia's security policy (as indeed the discussion above sometimes shows). To explore the first claim, respondents were asked the question: 'Some people think that Australia's security policy reflects different kinds of considerations...which have a different logic to those of security'. Half of the respondents said 'yes', that security policy does reflect different considerations, and the other half said 'no' it did not (see Figure 7.6 cont).

The data (see Figure 7.6 cont.) showed that policy makers, contrary to their own claims and to popular wisdom, are far from convinced that other factors are highly relevant to formulating security policy. To be more precise, although these factors were relevant they were less relevant than assumptions about security. The possible exceptions to this finding were: Australia's economic engagement in the region, which respondents said was 'equally important' as security assumptions (i.e., 3/4 of the 1/2 that agreed); and competition between the services, which respondents said was 'equally important' as security assumptions (1/2 of the 1/2 that agreed).
FIGURE 7.6 POSSIBLE SOURCES OF POLICY MAKERS' ASSUMPTIONS (cont.)

Other considerations in security policy

Data

'Some people think that Australia's security policy reflects different kinds of considerations...which have a different logic to those of security'. Half of the respondents said 'yes', that security policy does reflect different considerations, and the other half said 'no' it did not.

Other factors, apart from assumptions about security, which are 'more', 'equally', 'less' relevant for explaining security policy

Data

1) competition between bureaucracies: 3/4 of respondents said 'less' important the rest did not answer
2) competition between the services: 1/2 of respondents said 'equally important'; 1/4 said 'less' rest did not answer
3) competition between political parties: Over of respondents 3/4 said 'less'
4) competition between elite personalities: 3/4 of respondents said 'less' and rest did not answer
5) Australia's economic engagement: 3/4 of respondents said 'equally' important and the rest did not answer.

External and internal factors

Data

Policy makers were asked: 'Some people argue that external events are generally more influential determinants of Australia's security policy than are domestic issues'. About 1/2 'agreed', and the rest did not answer.

Importance of policy makers own assumptions for policy

Data

Policy makers were asked: 'With respect to Australia's security policy during 1983–96 do you think that assumptions about security similar to yours were 'important', 'very important', 'not important', 'don't know'. All said they were important (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents said assumptions similar to the ones they held were 'important': less than 1/4 said they were 'very important'; and the rest did not know or did not answer).

Finally, since it is often claimed that domestic issues are more important for explaining security policy than the external factors on which many security theories are based, policy makers were asked a question about that (see Figure 7.6 cont). In answer to the question, 'Some people argue that external events are generally more influential determinants of Australia's security policy than are domestic issues', the data was difficult to assess since about 1/2 'agreed', and the rest did not answer. Collectively this data, about other possible assumptions and factors that explain security policy, indicates that, in their view, other factors were of less significance than security assumptions.

Moreover, when respondents were asked 'With respect to Australia's security policy during 1983–96 do you think that assumptions about security similar to yours were
‘important’, ‘very important’, ‘not important’, ‘don’t know’ the data showed that all said they were important (i.e., about 3/4 of respondents said assumptions similar to the ones they held were ‘important’; less than 1/4 said they were ‘very important’; and the rest did not know or did not answer). (See Figure 7.6.) This suggests that security assumptions are important to formulating policy.

Several points can also be made about the common claim that is made by policy makers that they do not refer to theoretical thinking when formulating policy. The data shows that policy makers do think and reason in ways that are compatible with, though not necessarily the same as, theoretical discourse. Most policy makers and theorists use the same language: for example, threats, uncertainty, cooperation, CBMs and so on—all of which are either or have become every day terms. Most share the meanings of these terms: for example, with regard to security cooperation there is the common understanding that as one policy maker argued ‘it avoids stereotyping, reduces risk of underestimating or exaggerating military capabilities, breeds a sense of community, shared interests and responsibilities’. Most share similar thinking and reasoning patterns. Most policy makers generalise and assume that there are patterns in state behaviour: why else, for example, do all policy makers claim that Australia will always need military insurance.

The fact that the thesis shows that policy makers have unstated assumptions that can be explained from a theoretical perspective does not of course show that policy makers think that theory is relevant. But showing that their assumptions can be explained in these terms has the effect of making explicit what they often assume implicitly. Stephen Walt is right when he argues that, ‘[e]ven policymakers who are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do’.17 Being clear and explicit about possibly unclear and unstated ideas is a help to policy makers as well as scholars.

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Policy makers’ views of the liberal–realist framework

In view of the fact that respondents are so cautious about the relevance of theory, and presumably this applied to the conventional theories in the literature, they were asked if an explanatory framework which takes into account and reconciles apparent ‘contradictions’ like the co-existence of cooperation and competition would help to explain Australia’s policy (see Figure 7.7). The data indicated that there was cautious endorsement: over 1/2 said ‘yes’, 1/4 said ‘possibly’, and the rest either said ‘no’ or did not answer.

Respondents were then asked which assumptions should be taken into account in such a framework. Here, as can be seen in Figure 7.7, the answers endorsed the liberal–realist framework.

![FIGURE 7.7 POLICY MAKERS’ VIEWS ABOUT THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORKS](image)

**Data**

Respondents were asked which of the following assumptions should be taken into account in explanatory frameworks:

1) international relations are complex and require several theories i.e., liberalism and realism to explain the behaviour of states. Over 1/2 said ‘yes’, 1/4 said ‘no’ and the rest did not answer

2) the international system includes both competition and cooperation: Over 3/4 said ‘yes’ the rest did not answer

3) states have mixed motives i.e., they cooperate and compete Over 3/4 said ‘yes’ the rest did not answer

4) both the state and the individuals within are the objects of security. 1/2 said ‘yes’ and 1/2 said ‘no’

5) politically motivated violence, either externally or internally, is the main concern of security. About 1/2 said ‘no’ and the rest did not answer

6) the means to achieving security involve both cooperation and competition. Over 3/4 said ‘yes’ and the rest did not answer

Respondents were asked for their own suggestions for conceptual frameworks to explain security policy. Only one person volunteered an answer: he said that development of a framework for a no-threat environment is ‘an idea that would be workshopped effectively if you get the right mix of people’

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter examined the non-documentary evidence about the security assumptions underpinning Australia’s security policy (see Table 7.1). Mindful of the earlier caveats, about the small sample size of participants involved in the survey/questionnaire and interviews, I have argued several points that in effect confirm the arguments made in the previous chapter. In other words, the liberal–realist framework provides a better account
## Table 7.1 Explaining the security assumptions behind Labor's security policy, 1983–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIBERAL-REALIST FRAMEWORK</th>
<th>DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE</th>
<th>NON-DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worldview</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anarchy and society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition &amp; cooperation</td>
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<td>Enmity and amity</td>
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<td>Power &amp; interdependence</td>
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<td>Sovereignty &amp; interdependence</td>
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<tr>
<td>via medias, straddling, middle ways</td>
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<tr>
<td>Optimism and pessimism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security of what</strong></td>
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<td>State and individuals</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>within</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security from what</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grotian: external military force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLI: less concerned about military threats because of the declining utility of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS: external military threats (with qualifications) + internal threats (with qualifications), + other threats e.g., economic insecurity</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security means</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Military means</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grotian: Self-help, conditional balance of power, collective security</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NLI: Military force with limitations on what it can achieve</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS: Self-help through defensive approaches</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-military means</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of society+diplomacy+international law+regimes+institutions</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>*NLI=neoliberal institutionalists</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>*NSS=new security school</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Worldview**

- Competition & cooperation
- Security against & with
- The specific regional outlook stressed a 'no-threat' environment but after the '94 White Paper there was greater pessimism about 'new uncertainties' and 'expanding military capabilities throughout Asia'.

**Security of what**

- Explicit territory, implicitly the individuals within and the state

**Security from what**

- Possible future external military threats, effects of regional uncertainty, low- and escalated low level conflict. The '94 White Paper stressed 'new uncertainties' and 'higher levels of conflict'.

**Security means**

- *Military means*
  - Self-help
  - Alliance as a means to achieve intelligence and technology for self-help
  - Other-help i.e., extensive military cooperation with military forces in the region
  - Secrecy and transparency
  - Unilateralism, bilateralism & multilateralism

- *Non-military means*
  - Norms of cooperation
  - Multilateral institutions (the ARF)
  - CBMs, transparency, small 's' security activities

**Security means**

- Self-help
- Alliance as a means to achieve intelligence and technology for self-help
- Other-help i.e., extensive military cooperation with military forces in the region
- Secrecy and transparency
- Unilateralism, bilateralism & multilateralism

**Comments**

- Common theme of anarchy and society, competition and cooperation
- Common theme of military threat but not in the near future. Strategic uncertainty in the region is stressed in the empirical evidence
- Strong common theme of means including competition and cooperation, military and non-military measures
of the documentary and survey evidence than either liberal or realist theories on their own. What variation there is between is more one of emphasis than of substance.

The most significant finding was that the policy can be explained from a liberal–realist perspective and that policy makers think about security in these terms. The data suggested that these assumptions about security were more important than other factors, such as competition between the different elements of government, for explaining the policy. And, also that external factors, on which many security assumptions are based, are more important than domestic factors. Finally, when policy makers were asked what kind of assumptions should be taken into account in explanatory frameworks none of them disagreed that the major elements should include those that constitute the liberal–realist framework.
CONCLUSION

There is a stage where realism is the necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as in other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism...

Mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis.¹
(E.H. Carr, Political Theorist, 1939.)

The global system's evolving character encourages considering how a reconstructed theory that integrates the most relevant features of both theoretical traditions might be built, or alternatively if an altogether different theoretical framework that transcends them needs to be constructed.²
(Charles W. Kegley Jr, Political Theorist, 1995.)

This thesis began with three questions about the Australian Labor government's security policy from 1983 to 1996. First, what are the security assumptions that underpin it? Second, how can they be explained? Third, what does this tell us about the adequacy of mainstream International Relations (IR) approaches for explaining Australia's security policy in particular and security policies generally?

Australia's policy comprises three main parts—defence of Australia, the Australia-US alliance and regional security—and is based on different security principles, which embrace competition and cooperation respectively. Conventional theoretical explanations in the IR security literature—realism and liberalism—are, as single theories, insufficient to explain the policy's assumptions. Since each theory is based on different security assumptions—realism stresses competition and liberalism emphasises cooperation—any explanation that encompasses both appears to be contradictory.

There are, however, three schools of thought in the IR literature which suggest that explanation of security relations requires both liberalism and realism and that the two approaches, far from being contradictory, are complementary. The Grotian, neoliberal institutionalist and 'new security' schools (hereafter the 'Grotian plus' perspective) hold that the international system is characterised by both anarchy and society and by both competition and cooperation. Assumptions about anarchy/competition and society/cooperation are the intellectual foundations of realism and liberalism respectively. If anarchy and society co-exist in reality then the insights of both realism and liberalism are required to explain the security problematique.

From the foregoing analysis I argued that it is possible to construct what I have called a 'liberal–realist' analytical framework, which encompasses the insights of the three schools noted above. I further argued that this framework illuminates the assumptions that underpin Labor's security policy better than any single theory. Labor's policy is liberal–realist in that Labor's defence planners believed that the international security environment is characterised by both anarchy and society, and competition and cooperation. Moreover, the policy incorporates other liberal–realist assumptions: namely that the object of security is both the state and the individual; that security planning must primarily take into account both military threat and strategic uncertainty; and that the means for achieving security involve both military and non-military means, or, in more concrete terms, self-help strategies, alliances, extensive military cooperation, multi-lateral arrangements and institutions.

In conclusion I will argue that the liberal–realist perspective challenges commonly held views in the literature—to the effect that security can be understood in terms of a single (usually realist) theory and that Labor's security policy can be explained solely in realist terms. The liberal–realist framework also enables Australian policy makers to articulate a coherent rationale for security policy, in addition to the ad hoc reasons that are so common in policy statements. It also helps to make explicit the implicit security assumptions and worldviews of policy makers. And finally, the framework provides a coherent structure for debate about Australia's security policy.3

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIBERAL–REALIST PERSPECTIVE FOR IR CONCEPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF SECURITY

The argument that security policy, in this case Australia's security policy, cannot be explained solely in terms of one of the two mainstream theories challenges conventional academic wisdom. The claim that both theories are required for a comprehensive explanation challenges it more radically. Although it is sometimes maintained that

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3 I'm grateful to Andrew Mack, Jim Richardson and Wynne Russell for advice on fine-tuning some of the arguments in the Conclusion, though of course I remain responsible.
several theories may be required to explain relations generally between states\(^4\) this claim has rarely been made about security relations between states.

The assumption usually made in the national security literature is that, of the two theories, realism is by far the better explanation of security relations. Indeed, it is frequently argued, realism is both a necessary and sufficient explanation. Liberalism’s role, in this account, is relegated to explaining broader definitions of security, for example economic security. But, as this thesis has shown, liberalism can be used to explain some traditional understandings of security too. Liberalism, like realism, has answers to the three questions—security of what, from what and by what means? Liberalism offers a different set of answers to these questions from those of realism and in particular it stresses that the means for achieving security should be based on cooperation. However, some variants of liberalism, for example republican liberalism, do not exclude military means. Liberalism therefore offers not just an explanation of broader notions of security, but an alternative to realism. Whatever the notion of security being used, bringing liberalism into the picture is justified.

Integral to the challenge that the liberal–realist perspective poses to commonly held views in the literature is the argument made in Chapter Five that its two key concepts— anarchy and society—are not only the key concepts of realism and liberalism respectively, but also, that both characterise the international environment and that each is important for explaining security relations. As shown in Chapter Four this argument is often neglected in the literature or is a ‘hidden given’. Highlighting the co-existence of anarchy and international society should help to correct or, in other cases, clarify the assumptions behind many other explanations of security. For example, offensive realists argue the case for offence-dominant force structures and strategies because they frequently overemphasise the pessimistic implications of anarchy and underemphasise (and sometimes ignore) the existence of international society. The reality of society/cooperation is also neglected by classical realists but covertly used by them to conceptualise how alliances and some balance of power arrangements (both of which of course require cooperation) are possible in what they describe as an overwhelmingly anarchical system (see Chapter Four). The existence of society and the potential for

\(^4\) See Chapter Five.
cooperation is implied in the defensive realist argument that ‘security is plentiful’ but ignored as a theoretical explanation for why security is plentiful and why limited cooperation is possible (see Chapter Four). As structuralists, defensive realists should be explicit that they assume a structure of both anarchy and society. Liberals also fall short since they often overemphasise the society/cooperation elements in their security prescriptions and underemphasise the constraints which anarchy imposes (see Chapter Four). Even scholars who examine the Grotian school—the intellectual wellspring of anarchy and society—often neglect the Grotian assumption about the co-existence of anarchy and society (see Chapter Five). Many of these scholars portray the Grotians as belonging to either the realist school or the society of states school. That the Grotians embrace both is not widely recognised.

Although Martin Wight rejected single theory explanations of international relations, he, like other Grotian scholars, did not spell out the implications, of either this rejection or the assumption that anarchy and society co-exist, for theorising security. The thesis draws out these implications by illuminating what is usually ad hoc or ‘hidden’ in the Grotian conception of security and systematically developing these elements into an analytical framework. In other words, the implications of the Grotian assumption, that there is both anarchy and society in the international context, provide a [re]conception of security that is the basis for the liberal–realist framework. Although the liberal–realist perspective shows the need for greater complexity, than realism or liberalism on its own, and is hardly parsimonious, it is still confined by the three questions, security of what, from what and with what means?

Focusing attention on the co-existence of anarchy and society may also help to clarify the assumptions underpinning some other sub-theories in the IR security literature. Like liberal and realist theorists, other scholars assume that anarchy and society co-exist without making their assumption explicit. For example, unless the assumption is made that both anarchy and society are elements of the international system, then how else can

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5 One example, which is discussed below, of how the Grotian school (or English school) is seen to be realist is from Jim George, ‘Quo Vadis Australia? Framing the Defence and Security Debate Beyond the Cold War’, in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards Sydney, 1996, pp.10-48. For an example of how the school is seen to be focused predominantly on society see Alan James, ‘System or Society?, Review of International Studies, Vol.19, No.3, 1993, pp.269–288.
foreign policy theorists suggest that coercion and collaboration, for example carrot and stick tactics, actually work?6 And how else can constructivists, like Alexander Wendt, argue that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’?7 These arguments implicitly assume that there is a dialectic between anarchy and society that legitimises and facilitates strategies of competition/coercion and cooperation/collaboration, and, in the constructivists’ case, that allows for different understandings of anarchy.

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO IR EXPLANATIONS OF LABOR’S SECURITY POLICY**

Arguments about the liberal–realist challenge to conventional conceptions of security in the IR literature are the basis for a particular challenge to the main scholarly treatments of Labor’s security policy which assume that it is best explained from the single perspective of realism. Both realist and liberal thinkers agree on this; the former approvingly and the latter disapprovingly. Paul Dibb, despite writing the Dibb Report which takes a liberal–realist perspective, acknowledges and endorses the ‘hard-edged realist treatment’ taken by the 1994 White Paper.8 Graeme Cheeseman, a liberal security analyst, argues that the justification for a book that he and others published and called *The New Australian Militarism*9 was ‘the trend, evident in government policy documents and ministerial statements...towards emphasising and even encouraging military solutions to political and strategic problems’.10 Jim George, a critical social theorist, argues that in Australia ‘the great majority of policy analysts and practitioners...have “systematically ignored” all other representations of the world but the power politics Realist one’.11 George claims that ‘Defending Australia, and the

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11 Jim George, ‘Quo Vadis Australia?’, in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), *Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers*: p.12. Other scholars in the volume claim that the security community, which seems to include selected scholars and presumably practitioners (since the argument includes the claim that these scholars are too close to policy makers) is dominated by realist thinking. For
Australian security and defence literature generally, are best understood as reflecting a traditional power politics idiom. Roger Bell, a security scholar, argues that 'official Australian strategic planning clung to Cold War assumptions during the early 1990s, despite dramatic shifts in global and regional power'. Quite clearly the view among scholars is that, as Graeme Cheeseman and Michael McKinley argue, 'the dominant paradigm within which Australia's overall security policies are articulated...is essentially realist'.

From a liberal–realist perspective these analyses suffer from several shortcomings. First, most do not examine the three parts of Australia's security policy together. Although it is perfectly justifiable to examine just one part of the policy it is unwise to generalise about the whole policy on the basis of any one part. Second, partly as a result of this the realist elements of the policy are over-emphasised and the liberal elements are under-emphasised, dismissed or ignored. Jim George, for example, dismisses the argument that the policy has liberal elements saying that there is a 'false distinction between Realism and neoliberalism' and that elements of Australia's security policy are a 'fairy-tale scenario' of "liberalised" neo-Realism. However, as was shown in Chapter example, David Sullivan claims that: 'commentary of defence and security is conducted within a discourse which legitimises and normalises an approach to security committed explicitly to realism and resists alternative discourses on security'. See Sullivan, 'Sipping Thin Gruel: Academic and Policy Closure in Australia's Defence and Security Discourse', p.79. Michael Sullivan, argues that 'the claims of neo-liberalism never go so far as to question the hegemony of neo-realism's concepts of national security and the integrity of the existing interstate system' [emphasis in the original], p.216. In a similar vein to George and to David Sullivan, Michael Sullivan also refers to the 'artificial divisions between neoliberalism and neo-realism which sustain debate within the defence and strategic studies communities', (p.201). See Michael Sullivan, 'Australia's Regional Peacekeeping Discourse: Policing the Asia–Pacific'.

12 George, 'Quo Vadis Australia?', in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p.16.
13 George, ‘Quo Vadis Australia?’; in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p.16.
16 George, ‘Quo Vadis Australia?’; p.33.
17 Moreover, again at the empirical level, George’s criticism of neoliberal elements in the policy as actually being neorealist appears to follow from his focus on economic issues and not from a close examination of regional security policy. Even his discussion of the former does not include an
Five, neoliberalism assumes both anarchy and society, and not just anarchy as George infers. If anarchy were the only assumption underpinning neoliberalism then the cooperation required to make regimes and institutions plausible would have no theoretical basis. George's citation of a quote from Keohane, which ostensibly supports his argument that neoliberalism is really neorealism is misleading. Despite some similarities between the two approaches, which Keohane acknowledges, Keohane's argument is that, for neoliberals, anarchy has a different meaning than it does for neorealists, such as Waltz and Mearsheimer (as was discussed in Chapter Four). George may be right that neo-liberalism and realism share common epistemological assumptions about the world. But he fails to note that fundamentally different practical policies flow from the two worldviews. If one assumes anarchy and the struggle for power then self-help and alliances are all that makes sense, with very real risks that security dilemmas will emerge. Once we assume that the international system has societal as well as anarchic characteristics, cooperation becomes a real possibility.

Third, most other scholarly arguments also ignore the liberal elements in the regional security policy. As was shown in Chapters Three and Six, despite its realist elements, the policy aimed to establish cooperation as a regional norm both through institutions and through defence cooperation.

Fourth, most explanations of Australia's security policy fail to distinguish between the different variants of realism, in particular between offensive and defensive realism. Many scholars seem to assume that the policy is based on offensive realist assumptions, which assumes that 'security is scarce', when in fact, as was shown in Chapter Six, it is closer to defensive realism, which assumes 'security is plentiful'. The different variants have different policy implications, as was shown in Chapter Six.

Finally, we have seen from the data presented in Chapter Seven that policy makers' views about the assumptions behind Labor's policy are best understood from the examination of economic policy. Rather it is based on the statements of two well-known economic commentators who, according to George, '[invoke] the correlation between neo-liberal free market prosperity and peaceful (democratic) coexistence as the keystone of an Australian future in the Asia-Pacific without seriously questioning such a correlation' (see p.31).

George quotes Keohane as saying that neo-liberalism does 'not call into question the core of the realist model of anarchy'. George, 'Quo Vadis Australia?', in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p.32.
Conclusion

liberal–realist perspective. This data helps to overcome the problem that analyses of Labor’s policy have not included any studies that formally survey the views of policy makers. In sum, the liberal–realist perspective challenges both the theoretical and empirical bases of mainstream arguments and it provides a different explanation of Labor’s security policy.

QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDITIONS

Having argued that the liberal–realist perspective challenges both the conventional conceptions of security in the literature and academic explanations of Labor’s security policy it is important to point out what claims I am not making. As was pointed out in the Introduction, the claim that the assumptions behind the policy can be ‘explained’ in terms of a liberal–realist perspective is different from the task of explaining the particular causes of the policy. What the thesis offers is a way of explaining the policy’s unstated assumptions about security from an IR literature that comprises three schools of thought (Grotian plus) and whose security assumptions have to be made explicit. Drawing out these assumptions opens up different and more complex considerations for theorising security, than one-dimensional approaches based on either realism or liberalism. The Grotian plus perspective, in embracing assumptions from both realism and liberalism, provides a richer understanding of reality in comparison to the partial view of the world that each tradition offers by itself.

The second point is that if scholars want to use the liberal–realist perspective to explain Australia’s security policies in earlier periods and other countries’ security policies they will need to consider what generalisations can be drawn from this single case study. Although the liberal–realist perspective reveals the assumptions behind policy during the Labor period, security policy then was different from what it had been. As argued in Chapter Three, never before had Australia cooperated so closely with so many of its regional neighbours. However, since most countries are at peace with each other, security cooperation with others is becoming more common. Only in a few cases, on the Korean peninsula for example, are security relations so hostile that cooperation is all but absent. But, given that we live in a world of change, few states have been prepared to follow the example of Costa Rica and reject realist prescriptions by eschewing any military capabilities completely. In other words, the world for most states has a Grotian
image and this suggests that the liberal–realist framework will be a useful tool of analysis in most cases.

The liberal element in the liberal–realist framework will be least relevant in situations characterised by suspicion and hostility, in bi-polar contexts and in cold wars, and more relevant for the post-Cold War period. As argued in Chapter Two, the improvement in international relations at the beginning of the end of the Cold War gave Foreign Minister Bill Hayden the opportunity to pursue the idea of security dialogue and CBMs. The final end of the Cold War brought more changes and gave Australian decision makers further opportunities to advance security policies stressing cooperation—multilaterally and bilaterally—with other governments in the region. Furthermore, all the regional governments, including Australia’s, were already increasing economic cooperation. It may be that the post-Cold War context, which shows greater interdependence and increased transnational relations across a range of issues, provides conditions suited to liberal–realist conceptions of security. The final consideration for a wider application of the liberal–realist framework is that Australia enjoys some unusual security attributes. Compared with many other countries Australia starts from a position of great security. Its geographic position—a moat-continent surrounded by an extensive sea-air gap to the north, south, east and west—affords it great physical protection and inhibits contests with others over land and maritime borders. Unlike many other countries Australia has no real or imagined enemies, despite the findings in public opinion polls that Indonesia is perceived to pose a threat (see Chapter Three). It is a wealthy middle power which threatens no one and which is not threatened from within its own borders by violent dissidents. Australia is already secure and usually has been. The future is another matter.

The final qualification is that while providing a corrective to simplistic theorising the liberal–realist perspective also raises more questions for scholars to answer. The liberal–realist perspective assumes that there is competition and cooperation, but it does not tell us under which conditions it will make sense to pursue one rather than the other. As implied above, it would be difficult to be unequivocal about the required conditions because Australia’s policy was developed under unusual circumstances. The framework
also does not provide much help with theoretical and practical criteria for allocating resources to different elements of security policy. And, like the existing literature, it does not indicate precisely how competition and cooperation interact to enhance security.\(^20\) But other conceptions of security are equally plagued by such unanswered questions. The further research needed to develop the liberal–realist perspective will at least start from a more sensitive set of considerations about security than is commonly presented in the literature.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

Despite these various qualifications, the liberal–realist perspective makes several other contributions. The liberal–realist conception of security offers policy makers a coherent rationale for Labor’s security policy. As shown in the Introduction to the thesis and in the answers to the questionnaire, policy makers were adamant that the policy was not contradictory but they did not explicitly or adequately explain why it was not. To recall Hugh White’s statement, ‘the overall structure is [not] contradictory’.\(^21\) Yet White and others gave only ad hoc reasons for their view. White, for example, argued that ‘friends today may be enemies tomorrow’.\(^22\) Likewise, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans did not say why he could indeed argue that ‘we should not assume that cooperative approaches are the whole answer to regional security, or that we will ever be able to use them without at least a nod in the direction of traditional power balances’.\(^23\) There has been almost no discussion in the official literature on the nature of the relationship between cooperative and competitive elements of security policy. The liberal–realist framework, by focussing attention on precisely these relationships and the tensions that may exist

\(^{19}\) Nonetheless, on a practical level, barring radical changes in the region, regional states can be confident that Australia will continue to pursue security in this way.

\(^{20}\) For example it does not address the recent claim by Lawrence Freedman that ‘latent military power...can allow political relations to develop without violence’. See Lawrence Freedman, ‘Power and Political Influence’, *International Affairs*. Vol.74, No.4, 1998, p.780.


between them, may help policy makers to articulate a more coherent rationale for policy than currently exists.

Furthermore, just as the liberal–realist perspective makes explicit the implied security assumptions of the Grotian plus school of thought, so too it makes explicit the implied security assumptions and worldviews of policy makers. This may be useful for scholars and to those policy makers who are not self-conscious of their worldviews. The liberal–realist framework provides the latter with a checklist of their assumptions that helps them to know and explain why, for example, it is important to balance competition and cooperation, beyond simply asserting that doing so is a good thing. The old dictum of ‘know thyself’ should be as helpful to policy makers as it is to rest of us. Finally, the framework provides both scholars and practitioners with a structure for further debates on Australia’s security. These contributions of the liberal–realist perspective may help to address Paul Dibb’s recent claim that ‘the two different worlds of international relations theory and policy prescription rarely come together in Australia. This is a serious deficiency given the strategic challenges ahead’.

But the most substantial contribution that the liberal–realist perspective makes to Dibb’s claim is that it orientates scholars towards an approach to security that canvasses more complex considerations than are found in the generally one-dimensional theories that dominate the literature. Importantly, this approach is the basis of security policy under Labor. Perhaps the liberal–realist perspective will be a step towards bringing the two worlds of theory and policy together.

24 As two respected IR scholars argued many years ago, ‘the statements of policy makers...should be analyzed to develop a checklist of assumptions which guide their thinking on policy...[and] an effort should be made to match such assumptions...with assumptions and policies contained in theoretically orientated literature on international relations’. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations, J.B. Lippincott Company, New York, 1971, p.394.

25 As Jim Richardson points out, the work done by Thomas Schelling and others in the 1960s on ‘theory of strategy’ and ‘theory of conflict’ is an example of an analytical framework that provided a structure for responsible debate on US security policy at that time. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, New York, 1968.

Appendix 1

MAJOR OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE ADF, 1994

MAJOR NAVY OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

- 11 destroyers and frigates (3DDGs, 6 FFGs and 2 River Class destroyer escorts)
- 4 Oberon Class conventional submarines
- 15 Fremantle Class patrol craft
- 7 mine countermeasures vessels (2 inshore minehunter and 5 minesweepers auxiliaries)
- 1 heavy landing ship and 5 heavy landing craft
- 2 underway replenishment ships
- 16 S70B2 Seahawk multi-role helicopters
- 7 Sea King medium utility helicopters
- 6 AS330B Squirrel and 3 Bell 206B Kiowa light utility helicopters
- 2 HS748 electronic warfare training aircraft
- 2 hydrographic survey ships, 4 survey motor launches and 1 F27 hydrographic survey aircraft
- 2 clearance diving teams

Developments in progress will add a number of important assets, notably eight ANZAC frigates, six Collins class submarines, six Huon Class Coastal Minehunters and two heavy ships which are to be modified, while some older ships will be decommissioned.

At 30 June 1994, Navy had a strength of 14,776 permanent service personnel, 4,957 Reserves—including 108 Ready reserves and 3,528 Reserves with no training obligation—and 4,248 civilian staff.

MAJOR ARMY OPERATIONAL ASSETS

- 103 Leopard 1A3 tanks
- 771 M113 armoured vehicles
- 15 LAV-25 armoured vehicles
- 246 M2A2/L5 105mm Howitzers
- 104 Hamel 105mm Howitzers
- 33 M-198 155mm medium guns
- 31 Rapier surface-to-air missiles systems
- 19 RBS-70 surface-to-air missiles
- 22 N22 and N24 Nomad light transport aircraft
- 38 S70A-9 Blackhawk helicopters
- 45 Bell UH-1H Iroquois helicopters
- 18 AS-350B Squirrel helicopters
- 4 CH47-D Chinook helicopters
- 15 Medium Landing Craft

Regular

- 1 Divisional and 2 Brigade Headquarters
- 1 Armoured Regiment Headquarters and 1 Leopard Tank Squadron
Appendix I

- 1 Reconnaissance Regiment with M113 and LAV-25 armoured vehicles
- 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles
- 1 Field Artillery Regiment with 155mm Howitzers
- 1 Medium Artillery Regiment with 155 guns
- 1 Divisional Locating Battery (Integrated with Ready Reserves)
- 1 Air Defence Regiment (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with RBS70 surface-to-air missiles
- 1 Air Defence Battery (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with RBS70 surface-to-air missiles
- 2 Combat Engineer Regiments and Workshops
- 2 Construction Squadrons
- 4 Signals Regiments
- 8 Independent Signals Squadrons
- 4 Infantry Battalions
- 1 Special Air Service Regiment
- 1 Aviation Regiment with Iroquois, Kiowa and Nomad aircraft
- 1 Aviation Regiment with Blackhawk, Iroquois and Chinook aircraft
- 1 Army Survey Regiment

Ready reserve

- 1 Brigade Headquarters
- 2 Ground Reconnaissance Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles
- 1 Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks
- 1 Field Artillery Regiment with 105mm Howitzers
- 1 Combat Engineer Regiment and Workshop
- 1 Independent Signals Squadron
- 3 Infantry Battalions

General reserve

- 1 Divisional and 7 Brigade Headquarters
- 1 Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks
- 2 Reconnaissance Regiments with M113 armoured vehicles
- 1 Reconnaissance/APC Regiment with M113 armoured vehicles
- 1 APC Regiment with M113 armoured vehicles
- 1 Reconnaissance Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles
- 2 APC Squadrons with M113 armoured vehicles
- 3 Field Artillery Regiments with 105mm Howitzers
- 4 Independent Field Artillery Batteries with 105mm Howitzers
- 1 Medium Artillery Batteries with 155mm guns
- 1 Field Engineer Regiment and 1 Engineer Support Regiment
- 2 Construction Regiments
- 3 Field Engineer Squadrons and 1 Divisional Engineer Support Squadron
- 1 Signals Regiment
Appendix I

- 5 Independent Signals Squadrons
- 14 Infantry Battalions
- 3 Regional Force Surveillance Units
- 1 Commando Regiment

The total personnel strength of Army at 30 June 1994 was 26,147 Regulars, 2,462 Ready Reserves, 24,450 General Reserves—including 3,608 with no training obligations—and 5,571 civilian personnel.

MAJOR AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

Tactical fighter group
- 3 Tactical Fighter Squadrons with 52 F/A-18 aircraft
- 1 Tactical Fighter Operational Conversion Unit with 18 F/A-18 aircraft
- 1 Lead-in Fighter Training Squadron with 16 Macchi MB326H and 2 PC9A aircraft
- 1 Conversion Training Squadron with 14 Macchi aircraft
- 1 Air Defence Radar Wing
- 1 Aircraft Maintenance Wing

Strike/reconnaissance group
- 2 Strike/Reconnaissance Squadrons with 17 F111C, 15 F11G and 4 RF111C aircraft, including operational level maintenance

Maritime patrol group
- 2 Maritime Patrol Squadrons and 1 Maritime Patrol Training Squadron with 19 PC3 aircraft
- 1 Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

Airlift group
- 1 Long-range Transport/In-flight Refuelling Squadron with 5 Boeing 707 aircraft
- 2 Medium-range Transport Squadrons with 12 C130E and 12 C130H Hercules aircraft
- 2 Special Transport Squadrons with 5 Daussault 900 Falcon and 10 HS748 aircraft
- 2 Tactical Transport Squadrons with 14 CC08 Caribou aircraft
- 1 Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

Operational support group
- 2 Airfield Defence Squadrons
- 1 Operational Support Unit
- 1 Air Transport Telecommunications Unit

At 30 June 1994, the Air Force comprised 17,807 Regular personnel, 4,419 Reserves—including 199 Ready Reserves and 2,967 with no training obligations—and 2,232 civilian staff.

## Appendix 2

**EXERCISES INVOLVING THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE (ADF) AND ASEAN DEFENCE FORCES, 1980–96**

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<td>Minor air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA.</td>
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<td>Kiwi Connection</td>
<td>FPDA Exercise in New Zealand, with Malaysia and Singapore, “to further develop interoperability”.</td>
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<td>Air defence and strike training exercise with tactical air units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.</td>
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<td>Haringaroo 16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-18 Sept</td>
<td>Day Tiger Special forces exercise with Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 Sept</td>
<td>FPDA ASWEX 94 ASW exercise with Malaysia and Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sept-13 Nov</td>
<td>Churinga 94-2 Air defence exercise with Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-16 Sept</td>
<td>Thai Boomerang</td>
<td>Air defence exercise with Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-24 Sept</td>
<td>Starfish 94</td>
<td>To practise and develop operational procedures and tactics with FPDA units in a joint and combined maritime exercise (RAN ships and RAAF aircraft).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-21 Sept</td>
<td>Rajawali/Ausindo 94</td>
<td>Air defence exercise with Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sept-16 Oct</td>
<td>Malalee Bull 94</td>
<td>To develop interoperability between the Australian Army and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-30 Sept</td>
<td>IADS ADEX 94-4</td>
<td>IADS air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-22 Oct</td>
<td>Suman Warrior 5/94</td>
<td>To exercise army elements of the FPDA in combined operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct-18 Nov</td>
<td>Matilda 94</td>
<td>To train and confirm the interoperability of the ADF and the Singaporean Armed Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Oct-14 Nov</td>
<td>Night Leopard 94</td>
<td>Special forces exercise with Brunei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Nov</td>
<td>Ausina Patrolex 942</td>
<td>Maritime exercise with Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30 Nov</td>
<td>Haringaroo 31/94</td>
<td>Land exercise with Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-14 Nov</td>
<td>Elang Ausindo 94</td>
<td>Air exercise with Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-30 Nov</td>
<td>Haringaroo 32/94</td>
<td>Land exercise with Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30 Jan</td>
<td>Axolotl</td>
<td>Maritime exercise with Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan-22 Sept</td>
<td>Kangaroo '95</td>
<td>Land, air and maritime exercise with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb-3 March</td>
<td>Day Panther</td>
<td>Special forces exercise with Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-23 Feb</td>
<td>Flaming Arrow</td>
<td>Land exercise with Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Swift Canopy '95</td>
<td>Exercise at Shoalwater Bay training area with Indonesian Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-13 March</td>
<td>Indonex</td>
<td>Land exercise with Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-31 March</td>
<td>Kakadu 2</td>
<td>Fleet concentration period with ships from Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia (and New Zealand and Hong Kong).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 March-7 April</td>
<td>Day Tiger 95-1</td>
<td>Special forces exercise with Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-23 April</td>
<td>Night Lion</td>
<td>Special forces exercise with Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April-2 May</td>
<td>Chiringa 95-1</td>
<td>Air exercise with Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-19 April</td>
<td>Haringaroo 33/95</td>
<td>Land exercise with Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 April</td>
<td>Ausina 95-1</td>
<td>Maritime exercise with Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-21 April</td>
<td>IADS ADEX 95-2</td>
<td>Air defence exercise with Malaysia and Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April-19 May</td>
<td>Night Panther</td>
<td>Special forces exercise with Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 April-3 May</td>
<td>Austhai 95</td>
<td>Maritime exercise with Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-27 June</td>
<td>Night Komodo</td>
<td>Special forces exercise with Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June-3 July</td>
<td>Penguin 95</td>
<td>Maritime exercise with Brunei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10 July</td>
<td>Cassowary</td>
<td>Exercise for interoperability in maritime surveillance between MPG/RAN/TNI-AL (Indonesian Navy). Held in Darwin and Timor Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-22 Sep</td>
<td>Starfish 95</td>
<td>FPDA joint and combined exercise. Starfish 95 was the largest exercise yet conducted under FPDA and for the first involved the participation of both conventional and nuclear submarines and exercised realistic rules of engagement. Held in South China Sea (hereafter SCS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 Sept</td>
<td>IADS ADEX 95-4</td>
<td>Postponed until FY1996-97 at request of Indonesians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9 Oct</td>
<td>Singa roo 95</td>
<td>FPDA exercise to test, evaluate and validate the IADS procedures and equipment. Held in SCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Haringaroo 95</td>
<td>Exercise between RAN/RSN to improve interoperability in combined maritime procedures and tactics. An Army air defence element also gained insight into FPDA procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Southern Tiger 95</td>
<td>Exercise between Australian and Malaysian infantry forces to practice interoperability. Held in Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-26 Oct</td>
<td>Rajawali Ausindo</td>
<td>An Indonesion C130 deployed to Richmond and carried out tactical air transport operations with the RAAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dissimilar air combat missions to improve mutual understandings of procedures. Held in Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-25 Nov</td>
<td>Elang Ausindo</td>
<td>Exercise between RAN/RSN to develop and evaluate interoperability in diving and EOD and MCM operations. Held in Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11-22 Mar</td>
<td>Axolotl 96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Exercise Name</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-29 Mar</td>
<td>IADS ADEX</td>
<td>FPDA exercise to test, evaluate and validate the IADS procedures and equipment. Held in Singapore, Butterworth and SCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16 Apr</td>
<td>Tricab 96</td>
<td>Exercise between RAN/RSN/USN to improve interoperability in surface and shipboard EOD procedures. Held in Guam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-17 June</td>
<td>Cassowary</td>
<td>Exercise for interoperability in maritime surveillance between MPG/RAN/TNI-AL (Indonesian Navy). Held in Darwin and Timor Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-17 June</td>
<td>Cassowary 96</td>
<td>Exercise between RAN/TNI-AL to improve interoperability in maritime surveillance. Series of three combined patrol boat exercises held in the Arafura Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug-13 Sept</td>
<td>Starfish 96</td>
<td>FPDA joint and combined maritime exercise to improve interoperability between RAN/RAAF/RNZAF/RSN/RSAF/RMN/RMAF/RN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug-Sept</td>
<td>Chapel Gold 96</td>
<td>RCB deployed to Hua Hin for unit level field training with RTA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-21 Sept</td>
<td>IADS ADEX 96-4</td>
<td>FPDA exercise involving RAN/RAAF/RMN/RSN/RSAF/RMAF/RN to test, evaluate and validate the Integrated Air Defence System procedures and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Suman Warrior 96</td>
<td>FPDA brigade to unit level exercise. Held in South East Queensland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Kokoa Tiger 96</td>
<td>Exercise involving Australian and Malaysian special forces practising commando capabilities and individual skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-Nov</td>
<td>Mallee Bull 96</td>
<td>Exercise involving Australian and Royal Brunei Armed Forces in an infantry sub-unit exchange.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the RAN conducts regular 'passage exercises' (PASSEXs) with all navies of the region.

Appendix 3

SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THAILAND, AND AUSTRALIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

Australia's defence cooperation with Thailand, and the Philippines is on a smaller scale than with Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, during the period that Labor was in office, defence cooperation increased with all these countries: in particular individual training programs expanded and new exercise series were introduced.

Individual training and study visits

As was the case with the other ASEAN militaries, personnel from Thailand, and the Philippines were involved in training and study visits organised by the ADF. Indeed, the numbers, in many instances, are similar. For example, in 1993–94 some 119 Thai personnel trained in Australia and some 130 were participants at in-country training program organised by the ADF, making a total of 249 personnel trained by the ADF. For the same year 120 Indonesian personnel attended Australian institutions and 32 in-country programs, making a total of 153 or less than the number of Thais.

1 Efforts to acquire information about Australia–Brunei cooperation were largely unsuccessful. Navy to Navy exercises take place under the Penguin series involving patrol boats. The main army exercises between Australia and Brunei are the Mallee Bull series, an infantry company exchange, which takes place in both Australia and Brunei and the New Footing series held at Canungra in Queensland. Special forces operations between the ADF and the Brunei Armed Forces apparently began in 1989 with the Night Hawk series and expanded in 1991 to include the Night Falcon and in 1993, the Night Leopard series. There is little defence industry cooperation with Brunei.

2 Thailand and the Philippines are a long distance from Australia, making transit times more expensive for the ADF. Both military establishments have been more focused on internal and border security than on cooperation with other countries. Brunei, like Thailand and the Philippines have limited defence forces with which to cooperate.

3 For an account of the wider relationship and a detailed account of training and study visits to Australia by Thai personnel during 1989–95 see The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Thailand, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, pp.113–114.

4 Senate Hansard, Question No. 285, 4 December 1996, p.6717.
In FY 1994/95, personnel from the Philippines Armed Forces attending Australian military institutions numbered 99 and in FY1995/96 there were 125. In-country numbers for the same two periods were 20 and 30 respectively making total 119 for FY 1994/95 and 155 for FY 1995/96. On average, during 1990 to 1996, some 167 Filipino personnel per year were trained in Australia.

**Unit level training**

Unit training between the ADF and the militaries of Thailand and the Philippines is less than that with the other ASEAN militaries, nonetheless it often started from an extremely low or zero base line.

*Navy to Navy cooperation*

The RAN began the Ausiam series with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) in 1990 (later renamed the Austhai series in 1991). The latter involves the RAN and RAAF with P3Cs and Thai Nomads. The main purpose of the exercise is combined ASW training, maritime surveillance and developing standard operating procedures. RAN ship visits to ports such as Songkhla, Phuket and Sattahip take place. The Royal Thai Navy also participates in the Kakadu fleet concentration series. The RAN conducts theAusphil exercise series with the Philippine Navy that focuses on patrol boat routines. From 1990 to 1996, the RAN and the Philippine Navy conducted some 16 Passing Exercises, (PASEXs). Another exercise, Extendex, an ASW training exercise with the Philippines Navy apparently began in 1990. The Philippine Navy sent observers to the 1995 Kakadu fleet concentration.

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5 Senate Hansard, Question No. 285, 4 December 1996, p.6717.
6 Senate Hansard, Question No. 285, 4 December 1996, p.6717.
7 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998.
9 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998.
10 Another exercise, called Lambas, was held in 1998. Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998.
Air Force to Air Force cooperation

The RAAF, when deployed in the region for the FPDA Churinga exercises, conducts Thai Boomerang with the Royal Thai Air Force (RTF). The first exercise took place in 1992 when F/A-18s were deployed to Korat with the objective of practicing dissimilar air combat tactics at the Thai air combat maneuvering instrumentation range. The RAAF also conducts air navigator training for the RTF and supports joint special operations during the Night Panther series with tactical air transport missions.

The RAAF conducted Cope Thunder, an air warfare training exercise with the Philippine Air Force (PAF), during the 1980s but its current status is unclear.

Army to Army cooperation

Most contact between Australia and Thailand is army-to-army. Training programs with Australia focus on skill and professional development courses, basic officer training, NCO military skills and technical training. Temple Jade is one exercise series and is a company level of about 100 personnel. Chapel Gold is another exercise, between the RTA and the Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB), usually held in Hua Hin in Thailand.

The ADF observes the large scale Cobra Gold between the US and RTAF and the Thais have observed the Pitch Black series between Australia, the US and Singapore.

There were no exercises between the Australian and Filipino Armies during 1990-96. However, some 34 junior officers from the Philippines were sent to Australia for training with the Australian Army under the program called the Junior Officer Close Country Instructors Training (JOCITT) from 8 March to 3 April 1996.

References:

12 Waters, 'Regional Air Power Cooperation—an RAAF Perspective', in Waters and Lax (eds), Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin, p.185.
15 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Relations with Thailand, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.113
16 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998.
17 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998.
Appendix 3

Special forces

Thailand was one of the first countries in the region that Australia established special forces exercises with. A major focus of these exercises is counter-terrorism and especially the command and control of a terrorist event and disposal of explosive devices.\textsuperscript{18} The special forces exercise Night Panther was first recorded in 1990 and has continued notwithstanding the February 1991 and March 1992 military coups.\textsuperscript{19}

Special forces exercises with the Philippines appeared to take place in 1994 with the Night Caracha series.

Quite clearly, an important development has been the introduction of formal series of bilateral special forces operations between Australia and all the regional countries as an additional element of defence cooperation.

Intelligence exchanges

Australia maintains intelligence exchanges with Thailand and the Philippines. In the case of Thailand, ASIS established formal liaison arrangements in July 1974 with the Thai Department of Central Intelligence (DCI).\textsuperscript{20} At that stage discussions ranged from regional problems to Thailand's internal security arrangements. ASIS assisted DCI with training programs in counter-intelligence.

In May 1967 ASIS established a relationship with the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) and this was extended in to include the Joint Intelligence Staff (J-2) of the Philippines Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{21} Later NICA adopted the title National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) and its discussions with ASIS covered internal and external issues.

\textsuperscript{18} The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, \textit{Australia's Relations with Thailand}, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.113.
\textsuperscript{20} Richelson and Ball, \textit{The Ties That Bind}, p.172.
\textsuperscript{21} Richelson and Ball, \textit{The Ties That Bind}, p.172.
Strategic planning

Early in 1993, two teams of Thai officers visited Australia as part of the preparation for Thailand's first defence White Paper,\textsuperscript{22} which was subsequently published in 1994.\textsuperscript{23} Australia also provides advice on strategic guidance to Thai officers during annual visits by some 30 Thai officers.\textsuperscript{24}

To assist the modernisation program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) a three-day workshop on force development was conducted in August 1995.\textsuperscript{25} In the latter quarter of 1996, a six-man delegation from the Philippines participated in a workshop organised by the Australian Defence Force Academy that discussed the formulation of White Paper for the AFP.\textsuperscript{26}

Defence industry, science and technology cooperation

Like the other ASEAN countries, Thailand, and the Philippines have little in the way of defence industry cooperation with Australia. Discussions about sales to Thailand of the Steyr rifle and possible imports from Thailand of 155mm ammunition were ongoing during the period under study. During a visit to Thailand in February 1994 by a high-level Australian delegation it was agreed by both countries that defence industry cooperation should be broadened.\textsuperscript{27} With this aim in mind the Department of Defence now helps to fund a Defence Trade Commissioner in Bangkok.\textsuperscript{28} Discussions with the

\textsuperscript{22} The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, \textit{Australia's Relations with Thailand}, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.114.


\textsuperscript{24} The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, \textit{Australia's Relations with Thailand}, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.114.

\textsuperscript{25} Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. The workshop was organised by Dr Ralph Neumann, former Assistant Secretary in the Australian Department of Defence.

\textsuperscript{26} Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998. The delegation was headed by Commodore Artemio Arugay (ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs J5, AFP. The first Republic of the Philippines White Paper was officially approved in May 1998.

\textsuperscript{27} The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, \textit{Australia's Relations with Thailand}, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.114.

\textsuperscript{28} The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, \textit{Australia's Relations with Thailand}, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995, p.114.
Philippines and an acquisition seminar were held in February 1996. Science and technology collaboration between DSTO and its Thai equivalents was established under the Joint Australia–Thailand Defence Coordinating Committee Defence Science and Technology Cooperation Working Group (see below). Collaborative activities included high frequency communications and ionospheric research, surface wave radar, propellant surveillance and military clothing and footwear.

According to the Defence Department’s annual report for FY1996/97 ‘a number of useful initiatives with the Philippines’ were established with regard to defence science and technology but the relationship is considered to be at a ‘very early stage’.

Outcomes

Cooperation between Australia and Thailand is long-standing, going back to the period when the now defunct SEATO was in operation. However, there have been periods of tension between the two countries, including during the Labor period. Following the 1991 military coup relations were downgraded then restored. The following year, after the March 1992 coup Australia again invoked a similar response but within three months had resumed activities including special forces training. Indeed, special forces operations were one of the main advances during this period.

Likewise, with the Philippines, special forces operations were an important aspect of cooperation.

33 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Relations with Thailand, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, October 1995.
STRUCTURES FOR POLICY COORDINATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THAILAND, AND THE PHILIPPINES

During 1995–96 consultations between Australia and Thailand resulted in a new Joint Australia–Thailand Defence Coordination Committee.34 (See above for activities conducted by the Science and Technology Cooperation Working Group.) Consultations continued with Thailand in 1996–97 ‘to review arrangements for managing bilateral relationships and cooperative defence activities’.35

On 29 August 1996, the Republic of the Philippines and the Australian Government signed a MoU on Cooperative Activities.36 The MoU established the Philippine–Australia Joint Defence Cooperation Committee that provides broad policy direction and initiation, co-ordination and monitoring of the different activities.

36 Correspondence with the embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Canberra, 3 June 1998.
Appendix 4

THE ASSUMPTIONS POLICY MAKERS HAD ABOUT
AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY POLICY UNDER LABOR, 1983–96

This questionnaire aims to establish the assumptions that were behind Australia’s security policy during the Hawke-Keating government’s time in office (1983–1996).

Since you were a policy maker/adviser during this period I would like to ask you some questions about your own security assumptions and the extent to which you think assumptions similar to yours underpinned Labor’s security policy.

The questionnaire is in five parts. It is designed to elicit:

(i) your own general assumptions about Australia’s security policy during this period
(ii) your own assumptions about three specific aspects of Australia’s security policy—defence of Australia, the US-Australia alliance and regional security—during this period
(iii) your own views during this period about the relationship between these aspects
(iv) if your own assumptions were similar to those which underpinned policy and if so how they were derived
(v) your views about ways to improve existing explanatory frameworks

The format for the questionnaire is as follows. Most questions state the security assumption which underpins a particular aspect of policy and ask you whether you would agree/disagree with such an assumption i.e., you are not being asked if the assumption underpins policy but rather whether you would agree/disagree with it.

Some questions are multiple choice, others require a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. Some ask you to give a brief answer in your own words but many of these questions are optional. This is because, although my analysis would benefit enormously from your written answers, I am concerned that you may find this exercise too time consuming.

The information collected will be kept confidential and will not be attributed to you (the analysis will be in terms of patterns, e.g., most, less than half of the policy makers answered that...etc).

Thank you in advance for participating in this research project.
Part A: Your own general views in relation to Australia’s security policy during 1983-96

Q. 1 In the literature there is debate about the meaning of security. What, in your view, is the meaning of security in Australia’s case

What, in your view, is the object of Australia’s security policy:
1) the nation-state and its institutions; 2) territory; 3) the government;
4) individuals within the state; 5) core values (e.g., democracy, rule of law);
6) other, please specify:

Please give your answer in order of choice 1-6 1* .......................... □□□□□□□
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer 2*

What sort of threats, in your view, is Australia’s security policy directed against:
1) external military threats to the state/territory; 2) low-level incursions, boat people, etc; 3) political violence between groups within the state; 4) political violence perpetrated by the state on its own individuals; 5) other threats to individuals posed by economic, environmental, health issues; 6) other, please specify:

Please give your answer in order of choice 1-6 .......................... □□□□□□□
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer

Via what means, in your view, is Australia’s security policy pursued:
1) military force/capabilities; 2) diplomacy; 3) a balance of power arrangement; 4) alliances; 5) military CBMs; 6) multilateral security institutions; 7) cooperative security; 8) economic aid; 9) other, please specify:

Please give your answer in order of choice 1-9 .......................... □□□□□□□□□□
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer

1* For example, if ‘territory’ is your first choice then put 2 in the first box starting on the left hand side and then continue in order of choice.

2* For example, if you think security has nothing to do with keeping ‘core values’ secure then omit the number 5.
Page 2a: additional comments for questions in Part A:

Q. 1

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**Part B: Your own views about Australia's security policy—defence of Australia, the Australia-US alliance and regional security—during 1983–96**

**Defence of Australia**

**Q. I** Most people think that the doctrine of defence of Australia assumes that threats to Australian territory could develop and require a military response

Do you agree with this assumption [ ] Yes [ ] No Please [ ] the box giving your answer

If your answer was 'no' then please indicate your reasons briefly:

PTO for more space →

Some people argue that military threats to Australia will increase in the next five years

Do you [ ] agree strongly [ ] agree [ ] disagree [ ] disagree strongly [ ] don't know

Some people argue that military threats to Australia will increase in the next ten years

Do you [ ] agree strongly [ ] agree [ ] disagree [ ] disagree strongly [ ] don't know

Some people argue that Australia will always need a military insurance

Do you [ ] agree strongly [ ] agree [ ] disagree [ ] disagree strongly [ ] don't know

**Q. II** Many defence planners assume that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) needs a technological edge over other regional militaries to be secure

Do you [ ] agree strongly [ ] agree [ ] disagree [ ] disagree strongly [ ] don't know

Please explain your reasoning (optional)*: PTO if you require more space →

**Q. III** Some defence planners assume that the inclusion of 'offensive' capabilities (e.g., Collins submarines and FA-18 and F-111 aircraft) is a necessary component of our forces

Do you [ ] agree strongly [ ] agree [ ] disagree [ ] disagree strongly [ ] don't know

Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space →

**Q. IV** The political theorist Hans Morgenthau assumed that politics is a struggle for power

Do you [ ] agree strongly [ ] agree [ ] disagree [ ] disagree strongly [ ] don't know

Do you think Australia's defence policy is based on this assumption [ ] Y [ ] N

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* *My research on policy makers'/advisers' assumptions about security will benefit from understanding the reasons why, in security terms, you gave the answer you did i.e., in this case why/why not you agree/disagree that offensive capabilities are a necessary component of our forces. However, questions which ask you to 'explain your reasoning' are optional, given your time contraints.
Page 3a: additional comments for questions in Part B

Q. I ............................................................

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Further comments for question Q. II

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Further comments for Q. III

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The Australia-US alliance

Q. V The Australia–US alliance is often said to confer certain strategic benefits. In your own view do the following factors constitute strategic benefits:

1) the likelihood of US military support should Australia be threatened sometime in the future
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

2) privileged access to US military technology
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

3) privileged access to US technical intelligence
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

4) an element of deterrence against potential enemies
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

5) US engagement in the region to balance the power of other states
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

6) the provision of a nuclear umbrella for Australia
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

7) other strategic benefits. Please specify: PTO if you require more space →

Q. VI Some officials assume that Australia’s security would be enhanced by participating in a regional balance of power arrangement with other states
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓
Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space →

If you agree or agree strongly that Australia should participate in such an arrangement, then which countries might be involved: 1) the US; 2) Southeast Asian countries; 3) Taiwan; 4) South Korea; 5) Japan; 6) China

Please give answer in order of choice 1-6 □ □ □ □ □ □
Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer
Page 4a: additional comments for questions in Part B cont.

Q. V

Further comments for Q. VI
What do you understand by a ‘balance of power’:  
1) a descriptive term which explains the actual distribution of power  
   (e.g., military power, economic power, political power) among important regional states  
   □ Y □ N ✓
2) a situation which involves a roughly equal balance of military power among the  
   important regional states  
   □ Y □ N ✓
3) a situation which avoids an apparent preponderance of military power which  
   favours any one state  
   □ Y □ N ✓
4) a policy prescription which seeks to establish 2 or 3  
   □ Y □ N ✓

Regional security

Q. VI Many officials assume that Australia’s policy of ‘security with’ regional countries enhances Australia’s security  
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓
   Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space →

Q. VIII Many officials assume that multilateral security institutions enhance security  
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓
   Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space →

Q. IX Many officials assume that the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) enhances regional security  
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓
   Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space →

Q. X Many officials assume that interdependence and enmeshment of the economies of Australia and regional states enhances security  
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓
   Please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space →
Page 5a: additional comments for questions in Part B cont.

Q. VII

Further comments for Q. VIII

Further comments for Q. IX

Further comments for Q. X

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Q. XI  Many officials assume that Australia’s strategy of ‘strategic partnership’ with regional militaries through the following practical measures enhances Australia’s security:

1) CBM/transparency measures (white papers, dialogue) enhances Australia’s security
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

2) Personal contact among military personnel enhances Australia’s security
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

3) Training and exercising with regional militaries enhances Australia’s security
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

4) Educational exchanges between military establishments enhances Australia’s security
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

5) Training regional militaries to improve their own operational and combat skills enhances Australia’s security
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

6) Providing training facilities in Australia for regional militaries (e.g., Pearce Air Force Base to the Singaporean Air Force) enhances Australia’s security
   Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

Where you agree or agreed strongly, can you explain how and why these practical measures, and especially 5 and 6, enhance Australia’s security: PTO if you require more space →

If you do not agree that some of these practical measures enhance security then please explain why they do not: PTO if you require more space →

Q. XII  Some commentators suggest that Australia should continue to collect intelligence on its regional partners during cooperative activities and most agree that certain operational and combat tactics should not be shared. Please comment and explain what assumptions about security this suggests: PTO if you require more space →
Page 6a: additional comments for questions in Part B cont.

Q. XI

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Further comments for Q. XII

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Part C: Your own views about the relationship between the different aspects of Australia’s security policy

Q. I Which aspect of Australia’s overall security policy is the most important: 1) defence of Australia; 2) the Australia-US alliance; 3) regional security cooperation

Please give your answer in order of choice 1-3

Q. II Some people argue that Australia’s overall security policy consists of approaches which are both competitive and cooperative (i.e., on the one hand, defence of Australia and the alliance are based on ‘security against’ others; on the other hand, regional cooperation is based on ‘security with’ others)

Do you agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know if we have both approaches

Q. III If you agree that Australia’s overall policy incorporates both cooperation and competition do you think this is because the policy:

1) is planned to take account of the present and the ‘unknown’ future security environments i.e., the short and the long term

□ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know □

2) keeps Australia’s options open

□ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know □

3) assumes that regional states which are friends now may not always be our friends and we have to plan on this basis

□ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know □

4) aims to train personnel and modernise force structures in the present time-frame to prepare for the long term

□ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know □

5) assumes that the regional context is currently one in which there are conflicting trends i.e., there is evidence of both cooperation and competition and thus Australia’s policy should be planned on the basis of this

□ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know □

6) assumes that regional states may have mixed motives i.e., they may intend to cooperate and compete

□ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know □

7) if other, please explain: PTO if you require more space →
Page 7a: additional comments for questions in Part C

Q. III
Q.IV Some people think that if Australia’s policy contains both competitive and cooperative approaches it means the policy is contradictory. 
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓

Q.V If you agree or agree strongly that the overall policy is contradictory is it because:
1) it appears to be a policy which is preparing us to fight against the very states we cooperate with □ Y □ N ✓
2) in conceptual terms it is a policy which incorporates both competition and cooperation, in other words it incorporates opposing security logics □ Y □ N ✓
3) other, please explain your reasoning (optional): PTO if you require more space

Q. VI Do you think that Australia’s security policy reflects different kinds of considerations: i.e., apart from being based on assumptions about security it is also based on other factors (e.g., the government’s desire to stay in office) which have a different logic to those of security concepts □ Y □ N ✓

Q. VII If your answer is ‘yes’, then which of the following factors are ‘more’, ‘equally’, ‘less’ important determinants of security policy than assumptions about security (e.g., assumptions about threats) for explaining that policy:
1) competition between bureaucracies e.g., DFAT & DoD, is □ a more important determinant than assumptions about security □ an equally important determinant as assumptions about security □ a less important determinant than assumptions about security ✓
2) competition between the services e.g., navy, army and air force, is □ more important □ equally important □ less important /than assumptions about security ✓
3) competition between political parties is □ more important □ equally important □ less important /than assumptions about security ✓
4) competition between elite personalities is □ more important □ equally important □ less important /than assumptions about security ✓
5) Australia’s economic engagement in Asia is □ more important □ equally important □ less important /than assumptions about security ✓
6) if you think other factors are important, please explain: PTO if you require more space

Q. VIII Some people argue that external events are generally more influential determinants of Australia’s security policy than are domestic issues
Do you □ agree strongly □ agree □ disagree □ disagree strongly □ don’t know ✓
Page 8a: additional comments for questions in Part C cont.

Q. V

Further comments for Q. VII

Q. I With respect to Australia’s security policy during 1983-96 do you think that assumptions about security similar to yours were:

☐ very important ☐ important ☐ not important ☐ don’t know ☑

Please explain (optional): PTO if you require more space →

Q. II Do you think your own assumptions about Australia’s security were influenced by:

1) historical events (e.g., the Pacific war, Indonesia’s history) ☐ Y ☐ N ☑

2) contemporary regional developments (e.g., the end of the cold war) ☐ Y ☐ N ☑

3) your knowledge of theories about security (e.g., realism and liberalism) ☐ Y ☐ N ☑

4) your own personal philosophies about security ☐ Y ☐ N ☑

5) other …………………………………………………………………………………………….

Please briefly illustrate your answers (optional): PTO if you require more space →

Q. III Which of the factors above are the most important for understanding your own assumptions about security

Please give answer in order of choice 1-5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Omit any numbers you consider irrelevant to the answer

Please briefly explain: PTO if you require more space →

Q. IV Do you think your own assumptions about security have generally been:

Optimistic ☐ Y ☐ N ☑

Pessimistic ☐ Y ☐ N ☑
Page 9a: additional comments for questions in Part D

Q. I

Further comments for Q. II

Further comments for Q. III
Part E: Developing explanatory frameworks for security policy

Q. I Do you think an explanatory framework which takes into account and reconciles apparent 'contradictions' like the co-existence of cooperation and competition would help to explain Australia's security policy

☐ Y ☐ N ☐ Possibly ✔

Q. II Which of the following assumptions should be taken into account in such a framework:

1) international relations is complex and requires several theories i.e., liberalism and realism to explain the behaviour of states

☐ Y ☐ N ✔

2) the international system includes both competition and cooperation

☐ Y ☐ N ✔

3) states have mixed motives, i.e., they cooperate and compete

☐ Y ☐ N ✔

4) both the state and individuals within it are the objects of security

☐ Y ☐ N ✔

5) politically motivated violence, either externally or internally, is the main concern of security

☐ Y ☐ N ✔

6) the means to security involve both cooperation and competition

☐ Y ☐ N ✔

Q. III If you have suggestions for conceptual frameworks to explain security policy please specify (optional): PTO if you require more space →

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* The three documents above are referred to in commentary by other authors but were not seen by the author.