The Nature, Trends and Determinants of Population Assistance

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Declaration

This thesis is my own work, except where indicated otherwise.

Thomas-M. Schindlmayr
20th October 1999
I wish to dedicate this thesis to my grandfather, Eduard Altmann, who sadly passed away during the course of my PhD studies.

R.I.P.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

On many occasions, I have likened this thesis to a construction site. Both require an initial vision, a blueprint, a solid foundation, major building blocks and numerous finishing touches. As the chief architect and builder I have drawn upon the skills and knowledge of many in undertaking this project. There were consultants, supervisors and construction workers – unfortunately far too many to mention them all here by name.

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I also want to acknowledge friends and colleagues working for population agencies. Without their words of wisdom this work would be lacking. I hope I have done their many valuable comments and suggestions justice. All the views expressed in this thesis are mine and should not in any way be an indictment against them.

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appreciation to my girlfriend Julia for her enduring patience and efforts in helping me face the many trials and tribulations found on the PhD construction site.
ABSTRACT

Although much has been written about the implementation of population assistance programmes in recipient states, there is relatively little research material that gives a donors’ account of the population assistance story; and virtually nothing that identifies the nature of population assistance, its long-term funding trends and determinants. This study uses a variety of archival materials, reports from donor governments, population agencies, conferences, and interviews conducted with senior officials of NGOs, bilateral and multilateral institutions to fill in these gaps. Data for assessing population assistance trends by donor commitment and geographical disbursement came predominantly from UNFPA and supplemented with OECD figures.

Donor commitments for population assistance have varied with changing political environments, shifting perceptions of the population problem and differing views of foreign aid. The widespread support for population assistance, for example, seen in the 1960s and 1970s, is juxtaposed with the nonchalance evident in the late 1990s. Yet defining population assistance is problematic for as this study shows, there has never been a consensus among all interested parties on what it is, and what it is trying to achieve.

The data reveal that nations with the highest fertility rates and lowest per capita incomes do not necessarily receive the most population assistance, while population size only partly explains why some nations receive more population assistance than others. Recipients’ perception of population issues, their absorptive capacity, graduation, and donor interests account for most of the trends.

The three coexisting arenas – societal actors, state actors and the allocation of resources at the agency level – that influence the funds available for population assistance and its geographical disbursement were examined in this study. The extent to which such societal actors as interest groups, the mass media and the research community in developed countries can influence the decision-making process is largely determined by the donor government’s decision-making autonomy. Thus, decisions on population assistance funding rest invariably with state actors, and in particular prominent officials who have an expressed interest in population issues. The motives of donor governments for supporting population assistance, however, often go beyond
their altruistic rhetoric to include such national and international security interests as the fear of migration, environmental concerns, and the political stability of developing countries. Whereas decisions on the level of population assistance funding for individual recipients from bilateral agencies are often politicised, multilateral institutions and NGOs need to be readily accountable in their disbursements.

The research suggests that in the future population agencies will need to continue reinventing themselves, in the light of changing environmental, political and socioeconomic factors, to ensure their survival and continued financial support.
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List of Acronyms

AAAS American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C.

ARHA Australian Reproductive Health Alliance, Canberra

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development, Canberra (formerly known as the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau – AIDAB)

BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Bonn (formerly known as Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit)

CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Ottawa

CFFC Catholics for a Free Choice, Washington, D.C.

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency, Hull

CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Assistance

DAC Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Paris

DFID Department for International Development, London (formerly known as the Overseas Development Administration – ODA)

DHS Demographic and Health Surveys

DSW Deutsche Stiftung für Weltbevölkerung, Hannover

ERP European Recovery Programme, 1948-1952

ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok

EU European Union, Brussels

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome

FPA Family Planning Association

FY Fiscal Year
Group of Seven leading industrialised nations (since May 1998 known as G-8 or Group of Eight with the inclusion of Russia as a member. However, the G-7 continues to function alongside formal G-8 summits).

Global Population Assistance Report


International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo 1994

International Development Association, World Bank Group, Washington D.C.

Information, Education and Communication


International Labour Organization, Geneva

International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.

International Planned Parenthood Federation, London

International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Liège

Japan International Co-operation Agency, Tokyo

Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning, Tokyo

Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice Surveys

Maternal and Child Health

Member of Parliament


Married Women of Reproductive Age

Non-governmental Organisation

National Security Study Memorandum, United States

Official Development Assistance
**ODF**  Official Development Finance  
**OECD**  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris  
**OPEC**  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Vienna  
**PAI**  Population Action International, Washington, D.C.  
(formerly known as the Population Crisis Committee – PCC)  
**POA**  Programme of Action, 1994 Cairo Conference  
**PPBR**  Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Reporting, IPPF, London  
**PPFA**  Planned Parenthood Federation of America, New York  
**PRB**  Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.  
**SIDA**  Swedish International Development Authority, Stockholm  
**UN**  United Nations  
**UNAIDS**  Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, Geneva  
**UNDP**  United Nations Development Programme, New York  
**UNEP**  United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi  
**UNESCO**  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris  
**UNFPA**  United Nations Population Fund, New York  
**UNICEF**  United Nations Children’s Fund, New York  
**USAID**  United States Agency for International Development, Washington D.C.  
**WFS**  World Fertility Survey  
**WHO**  World Health Organization, Geneva  
**WPF**  World Population Foundation, Hilversum  
**WPPA**  World Population Plan of Action, 1974 Bucharest Conference
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Sweden becomes the first bilateral donor of population assistance.</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>Ford Foundation begins supporting population activities in developing countries with a grant to the Indian Ministry of Health. Release of the Draper Report, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation forms a population programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>American Congress approves population assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td><em>Population Bomb</em> by Paul Ehrlich is published.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Earth Day celebrations</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>World Population Conference, Bucharest World Population Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>The International Conference of Parliamentarians and Development in Colombo calls for an annual target of one billion dollars for population assistance by 1984.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>The Jakarta Conference recommends donors increase population assistance to 5% of ODA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>International Conference on Population, Mexico City Reagan administration introduces Mexico City Policy and defunds IPPF.</td>
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1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall. International Forum on Population in the Twenty-first Century in Amsterdam endorses a 4% target of ODA allocated to population assistance.


1993 Clinton administration rescinds the Mexico City Policy.

1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), Cairo

1999 ICPD+5, The Hague Forum and Special General Assembly meeting
1 Introduction

Few global concerns generate debates with such emotional intensity as those focusing on world population growth and its implications. As a policy issue population has been on the international stage for several decades, frequently being a subject of contention among academics, interest groups, religious figures, bureaucrats, and politicians in both the developed and the developing world. Since the 1950s, the international community has responded to these concerns in developing countries by providing funding for population activities, otherwise known as population assistance.

This thesis focuses on population assistance by exploring its many facets and complexities, showing that it is both a dynamic and a largely politically driven concept.

1.1 The idea

During the three years that I worked in the Secretariat of a European-based population agency, it became clear to me that the operations of population assistance agencies were a relatively untold story. While innumerable articles and books have been written about population assistance and its recipients, the donors' side has only been studied in a fragmentary fashion. There is relatively little material that provides an insider's view of the mechanisms of these agencies, the decision-making processes, and the motives for such support.

Sinding (1996:159) notes that there are three "major efforts" looking at the development of the American population movement: Piotrow (1973), Donaldson (1990a) and Harkavy (1995). The first two focus on the evolution of international public policy and its implementation by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), while the third describes events since the early 1950s from the standpoint of New York philanthropic foundations. There are only a few works on other agencies offering support for population activities, including: Suitters (1973) on the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF); Finkle and Crane (1976) on the World Health Organization (WHO); Crane and Finkle (1981) and Conly and Epp (1997)

By focusing extensively on policy and programme issues, the above studies offer little insight on funding trends and what causes them. Thus, given the paucity of research on donor agencies in the population field, it was obvious that an account of the nature of population assistance, its determinants and historical funding trends was waiting to be given.

1.2 Objectives and thesis structure

From the outset it should be stressed that this thesis does not endeavour to investigate the types of activities and programmes implemented, nor to answer the question “What effect does population assistance have?" or indeed “Does it work?" These are questions which given their breadth, scope, and disputable nature, and the previous unconvincing attempts to answer them (see for example Cassen, 1994:121-2; Ness & Ando, 1984), I have chosen to ignore. Rather the aim of this thesis can be expressed in the following three objectives:

1. To examine the nature of population assistance and its relationship with foreign aid.

2. To quantify population assistance over a significant time-frame by sources and recipients, and to explain why these funding trends occurred.

3. To analyse the determinants of population assistance.

In line with these objectives this thesis consists of three distinct, but interrelated parts:
1. The nature of population assistance

The first part reviews the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and its relationship to population assistance, and why the notion of population assistance is so ill-defined.

Chapter Two presents a general survey of shifts in development assistance philosophies, foreign aid disbursements and the rationales behind ODA. The chapter evaluates these changes and notes the association between foreign aid and population assistance.

Chapter Three demonstrates that there has never been a consensus among agencies on the nature of population assistance, and argues that the term remains intentionally vague. Far from rectifying this situation, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) has only added to the confusion.

2. Population assistance trends

The second part looks at historical funding trends both globally and by geographical regions.

Using a variety of indicators, Chapter Four reviews global funding trends for population assistance over the last decades. It also gives an interpretation of these trends and highlights the salient points.

Chapter Five uses statistical data to analyse where funding has gone in terms of regions and sub-regions for the period 1969-1994. Furthermore, it offers explanations why some countries receive more population assistance than others.

3. Determinants of population assistance

Building upon the second part, the third part devises a public-policy framework to examine what determined these trends.

Chapter Six develops the framework by incorporating various aspects of public policy. The chapter looks at the role of interest groups, the mass media, and researchers in influencing the level of support given by developed-country governments.

Chapter Seven examines how the executive-bureaucratic apparatus decides the level of funding for population assistance. It highlights the role that influential officials...
can have, and suggests reasons why developed-country governments support population assistance.

Chapter Eight reviews the resource allocation procedures that determine the sums allocated by population agencies to individual recipients. It contrasts the different approaches by such agencies as UNFPA and IPPF, to those used by government agencies.

Finally, Chapter Nine summarises the findings from previous chapters and speculates on the future of population assistance.

1.3 Funding network

No study of population assistance can be conducted without a brief review of the network of donors and channels through which population assistance flows. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the principal flows between primary donors, intermediate donors and recipients and shows the three main funding channels: bilateral, multilateral and NGOs.

Primary donors are principally the aid agencies of developed countries, but may also include governments of developing countries, as well as private foundations and individuals. Through the generation of interest revenue multilateral agencies may also be primary donors.

Intermediate donors consist of the United Nations system, including the World Bank, intergovernmental agencies and international Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs). These donors perform three main functions: a programming function, an advisory function to recipient governments, and a technical function. In instances where the donor is also an executing agency a management function is also carried out.

Developing countries are the final recipients of programme funding. Programmes are executed at the national level through either a bilateral agency, a multilateral institution, a local or international NGO, or the government of the recipient country (UNFPA, 1995a:9).
Figure 1.1 Principal Flows of Population Assistance

Source: UNFPA, 1997b:9
Since the late 1960s three major channels have been available for the transfer of population assistance: bilateral, multilateral and NGOs. Development banks have also acquired a unique role in providing population assistance. In recent years other arrangements such as multi-bi and collective bilateral have become increasingly common, as donor governments strive to enhance effectiveness, improve accountability and influence resource allocation decisions.

Assistance from individual donor governments, through their aid-implementing agency, to recipients is called bilateral aid. Invariably the economic and political interests of the donor country with respect to the recipient determine the nature of this kind of assistance. As a result, some consider bilateral aid to be “limited in [its] objectives and less flexible in the transfer of resources” (Salas, 1986:18).

In the population field the main bilateral agencies include: the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID\(^1\)), the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), and Germany’s Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ\(^2\)).

Aid channelled through intergovernmental agencies is known as multilateral aid. This grouping refers to the United Nations system, primarily the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA\(^3\)). Both donors and recipients commit resources to the operations of multilateral agencies, with decisions on policies and practices taken collectively. Consequently, multilateral aid is ordinarily immune to the political and commercial pressures confronting bilateral assistance, and is perceived to be more responsive to the recipients' development requirements.

**International non-governmental organisations** are private non-profit organisations, foundations and institutions which provide support for population activities in more than one country. They are legally and statutorily independent of

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\(^1\) Formerly known as the Overseas Development Administration, Britain’s aid agency changed its name on 3 May 1997 following the electoral victory of the Labour Party.

\(^2\) In 1993, BMZ’s name changed from Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit to Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

\(^3\) The United Nations General Assembly approved a name change for UNFPA in December 1987 from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities to the United Nations Population Fund, while maintaining its original acronym.
governments, often carrying out pioneering work in the population field. Many large NGOs play a dual role as a source of funding and a channel of disbursement.


**Development banks**, including the World Bank and such regional counterparts as the Asian Development Bank, are sometimes referred to as a fourth channel because of the way they direct aid. Unlike the other three, banks provide funds as loans that bear interest and need to be repaid, and thus it is a misnomer to refer to them as donors. Nevertheless, given their increasing importance as a source of funding, they are considered as such in earlier chapters, although owing to the statistical data development banks are excluded in Chapter Five.

**Other channels** for providing assistance include: joint financing schemes with NGOs; parallel financing with multilateral organisations; and the provision of technical expertise, equipment and supplies through mutual activities with respect to research, training and information exchange (Thavarajah & Rao, 1987:31-2). The practice of multi-bi funding, where funds to intermediate donors are allocated to a set purpose, is becoming widespread (see 4.3).

Aid programmes like that of the European Union (EU), in which countries have decided to pool resources together, are known as collective bilateral arrangements. Although similar in nature to multilateral agencies, these arrangements have three main differences: first, the procurement policy favours donor countries; second, central fund contributions are not made by recipients; and third, recipients are not necessarily members of the governing bodies that decide policy and resource allocation (Browne, 1990:73). The *Global Population Assistance Report 1995* listed the European Union as a donor country rather than a multilateral organisation (UNFPA, 1997b:30).

The *Global Population Assistance Report 1993* (UNFPA, 1995a:8) counts nine multilateral organisations and agencies belonging to the United Nations system, 19 bilateral donors, and 75 international NGOs in the form of foundations, universities and private organisations.
1.4 Data sources

Data and information used in this thesis come first from secondary sources; statistical reports on population assistance such as *Global Population Assistance Reports* (GPAR); and secondly from ten in-depth interviews conducted in late 1995 with senior officials of NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies, as well as international consultants active in the population field.

Secondary data consist of archival material, agency reports, conference proceedings, newspaper and journal articles, and books. As these materials were not available in any one library, I have been fortunate to use the facilities of several institutions in America, Australia and Europe in compiling the sources found here. In addition, the archives, libraries and recent publications of development agencies provided the statistical data on population assistance flows for Chapters Four and Five.

All interviews were conducted in English on a one-to-one basis and taped with the consent of the interviewee. Each respondent received a transcript of the interview for inspection, and only one sought clarification. For reasons of confidentiality the interviewees' names have been withheld, replaced by a letter of the alphabet and an indication of what funding channel they represent (e.g. Multilateral Official A). As most respondents' first language was not English, I have opted to keep their original expressions in the excerpts found throughout this thesis.

Restrictions on access to specific data and information have prevented me from writing the type of comprehensive study that this topic deserves. As in every other bureaucracy, much of what occurs in the aid establishment is either undocumented or not in the public domain. Data, especially of a sensitive nature, are frequently only available to authorised persons, if at all, and consequently I may have overlooked certain issues. I have also been unable to trace a number of pertinent conference proceedings and agency reports and, more importantly, I have only a confined knowledge of the 'corridor politics' that occurred over time. In the absence of a qualified source, I have on occasions relied upon my experiences, when making what may be perceived as a controversial point.
Part One

The Nature of Population Assistance
An investigation of population assistance cannot overlook its inextricable association with Official Development Assistance (ODA), or what is commonly referred to as foreign aid. As it is but a diminutive portion of the larger aid picture, the same social, economic and political factors that determine aid funding will invariably impinge upon population assistance. Since the 1960s both have been showered by hope and opportunism, and plagued by political considerations and constraints. Before the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, development agencies were beset by Cold War concerns, and in the aftermath have sought to redefine their role in a changing and uncertain world.

As shifts in foreign aid philosophies, policies and programmes generally influence population assistance, it is important to review the relationship between these two constructs. This chapter gives a brief critique of ODA and its salient milestones; the changing pattern of aid funding; its geographical distribution; and the association between ODA, sectoral aid and population assistance. Although many nations have given foreign aid at one time or another, the focus will be on developed country donors as they have, and continue to be, the predominant source of funding.

2.1 Elucidation

Foreign aid can be construed as inter-societal transfers of resources that are intended by all the relevant parties, especially the provider, to serve first and foremost the recipients’ needs, interests or wants (Burnell, 1997:3).

Aid’s multitudinous character needs defining, for the term ‘aid’ has been used indiscriminately to identify several types of financial flows, that are not necessarily between developed and developing nations. Humanitarian aid, for example, provides help in life-threatening emergencies by the United Nations and other relief agencies. Transfer of defence equipment and supplies between developed and developing
countries have taken place under special arrangements known as military assistance and military support. Loans from development banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while often given at interest rates barely more favourable than those found on the open markets, are sometimes described as aid. Finally, the practice of the European Union of transferring funds to its more depressed regions is known as regional or structural aid (Burnell, 1997:2).

As a way out of this definitional impasse, the international community has accepted the following three criteria of ODA, adopted in 1969 by the guardian of official aid data, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)\(^5\) at the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD):

1. it has to be undertaken by official agencies;
2. it has to have the advancement of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective;
3. it has to be concessional in character and in case of a loan have a grant element of at least 25%.

ODA consists of funding to developing countries, multilateral institutions, and NGOs by governments and official agencies of donor countries. The OECD excludes from its definition military assistance and official export credits (OECD, 1985:171; 1998:111). Funding of a humanitarian and developmental nature on a concessional basis from private or non-voluntary sources is not included in ODA statistics. Although NGOs are not included in official aid statistics, their importance should not be disregarded. Until the introduction of this uniform definition by the DAC, following considerable debate throughout the 1960s, donors included such things as non-concessional finance and other transfers deemed inconsistent with this definition (McGillivray & White, 1993:31).

\(^4\) Throughout this thesis the terms ODA, aid, development assistance, and foreign aid are used interchangeably.

\(^5\) Members of the DAC are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Commission of the European Communities.
In the 1990s, the DAC supplemented ODA with the term Official Aid. This has the same characteristics as ODA, except that the recipients are the “Countries and Territories in Transition” of the former Soviet Bloc and the “More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories” such as Bermuda, Brunei, the Cayman Islands, Kuwait, Singapore, Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates (OECD, 1998:110, A101). The bulk of developing countries are not covered by Official Aid, and they continue to receive ODA.

ODA is the largest component of what the OECD calls Official Development Finance (ODF) which measures the inflow of official resources to recipient nations. Included under this heading are:

1. ODA;

2. Grants and concessional and non-concessional development lending from multilateral financial institutions (e.g. World Bank), and

3. Other Official Flows of a development nature with a grant component too low to be considered ODA (OECD, 1998:111).

ODA needs to be placed into context, as it is only one form of resource flow between the developed and the developing world, and its prominence in these flows has changed over time. Official non-concessional loans, and more importantly private sources such as direct investments, have gained in importance. In the 1950s and 1960s, aid was the main channel through which capital flowed. ODA accounted for 55.9% of net resource flows to developing countries in 1960-61, with private sources answering for 25.1%, and official non-concessional lending responsible for the rest. By 1980, private flows had risen to 34.9% and ODA had fallen to 38.4% (OECD, 1985:157, 165). In 1988, the figure had risen to 49.8%, but by 1996 ODA accounted for just 19.2% of net flow resources to developing countries compared to 77% from private sources (OECD, 1998:A1-2). Although the figure varies between countries, only 1.5% of GNP for all developing countries combined can be attributed to ODA (Burnell, 1997:17). As the OECD (1997:93) noted:

...development assistance is a complement to domestic resources, public and private, in developing countries and to the earnings and investments they are able to generate internationally.
2.2 Development assistance: a review

2.2.1 The first forty-five years

Foreign aid is a post-World War II phenomenon, the origins of which are intertwined with three concurrent processes during the 1940s. In the face of mass destruction and human misery, a sense of opportunity existed among the allies to undertake major initiatives in international co-operation. The idea of forming a multinational mechanism to safeguard peace that superseded the hapless League of Nations, led to the establishment of the United Nations in October 1945. Shortly thereafter, however, the standoff between the Western and Soviet blocs began, sparking the 'Cold War'. The duel for political and strategic alignments became a stimulus for bilateral aid flows. Finally, the end of the war marked the beginning of colonial territories obtaining their independence and a growing number of aid recipients (Browne, 1990:3-4).

The forerunner to the present notion of development assistance was the European Recovery Programme (ERP), or Marshall Plan, instigated in 1948. Over a four-year period, the United States transferred over $13.2 billion\(^6\), or 5-10% of the Federal Budget, to help post-war reconstruction in Western Europe, providing over 90% in grant form. By 1952, Western Europe's GNP had increased by 32%, while agricultural and industrial production rose by 11% and 40% respectively to surpass pre-1939 levels. The success of the Plan lay in four factors: the exceptional sums transferred; the fact that Europe possessed skilled human resources but lacked capital; similar ideologies of political economy and commitment to democratic principles which helped build mutual trust; and fourthly the fact that both the donor and the recipients co-ordinated disbursements. The ERP demonstrated the efficacy of large-scale capital transfers to accelerate economic growth and the mutual benefits for all. For America, the Plan not only ensured Western Europe's allegiance against the spread of communism, but also generated demand for US exports from a revitalised Europe (Browne, 1990:11-3; Burnell, 1997:87, 151; Krueger et al., 1989:3).

\(^6\) All monetary sums in this thesis are expressed in US dollars unless otherwise indicated.
The success of the Marshall Plan undoubtedly inspired the American decision to provide funding to developing countries, in part to counter the communist threat posed by the Soviet Union (Burnell, 1997:151). The fourth point of Truman's 1949 inaugural address and the subsequent passage of the 1950 Act for International Development signalled the beginning of America's official commitment to offering development assistance (Krueger et al., 1989:1). Likewise, the 1950 Colombo Plan, initiated by the United Kingdom and six Commonwealth countries, marked the beginning of large-scale development assistance to former British colonies in Asia, principally the newly independent states of South Asia (see Colombo Plan Bureau, 1976:3-4). Within a few years, both Japan and the United States had joined, and the Colombo Plan was extended to Southeast and East Asian states.

It was not until a decade later, however, that significant resource transfers occurred. American security fears in the late 1950s and early 1960s centred around the perceived threat to Asia from an expansionist China and the potential impact of the Cuban Revolution on Latin America. The Kennedy administration argued that faster development and a strengthening of political and economic institutions were the best means to address internal turmoil in developing countries. In the early 1960s the United States launched a foreign-aid initiative (Alliance for Progress) for Latin America and greatly increased aid worldwide. With a growing number of former colonies gaining independence, countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Belgium followed suit. Germany and Japan also started providing financial and technical assistance to secure new markets (Krueger et al., 1989:2).

Development assistance became increasingly institutionalised during the 1960s, as the issue took a prominent position on numerous international agendas. Development efforts were able to draw upon the considerable institutional infrastructure created since 1945. Organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank emerged early in this decade as the main source of development support in their respective fields. In addition, a number of specialised UN technical assistance and relief agencies were created during this decade, including the World Food Programme (WFP).
in 1963, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1965, and the United Nations Trust Fund for Population Activities7 (UNFPA) in 1967. Throughout the 1960s, a feeling of considerable optimism surrounded development ventures as great feats of statesmanship and economic management seemed possible with the help of large amounts of money.

In contrast, the 1970s brought a sense of realism regarding the need for aid and its effectiveness. Aid came under fire from both the left and the right as questions began to be asked on the faltering approaches to development assistance. Criticisms also came from within the donor community on the extreme reliance on large-scale capital transfers, and the effects which capital-intensive industrialisation policies were having in the widening of income distribution in developing countries. The 1973 oil crisis, and the resulting monetary recycling by members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), had a profound effect on developing countries and aid. First, OPEC states became a new and important source of development assistance (see 2.3.1). Second, as a result of high liquidity from OPEC money, Western banks lent unprecedented sums of money to developing countries (Browne, 1990:27-31).

The global recession of the early 1980s brought rapid economic growth to a halt in most parts of the world and subsequently influenced development thought and policy. For many, the 1980s was a lost decade for development. Mexico’s 1982 debt crisis paved the way for things to come, as numerous developing countries began to default on debts acquired during the petrodollar splurge of the 1970s. Huge debt servicing and structural adjustment programmes became economic reality for numerous states, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Low commodity prices throughout the decade weakened the international trade and finance outlook of many developing nations, and in several instances debt continued to grow (Browne, 1990:36; Krueger et al., 1989:6).

Structural reforms and short-term recovery programmes were replacing long-term development projects. Foreign aid’s traditional focus on poverty alleviation took on further dimensions to promote democracy and human rights. The rationale of aid

7 ‘Trust’ was dropped from the title in 1969 when the Fund was transferred from the United Nations Secretariat to the UNDP.
shifted to limiting the effects of developing-country debts on the international economic systems (Graham & O’Hanlon, 1997:96-7).

Public questioning of aid’s adequacy intensified after the large media coverage of the 1984 food emergency in Africa. People in industrialised nations felt compelled to give to famine victims by fund-raising events like Band-Aid, revealing the failures of official aid programmes to respond to this massive and immediate need. The crisis also highlighted the significant role that NGOs can play in development, encouraging donors to work more closely with them in the future (Browne, 1990:33-4).

Aid disbursements began to stagnate in the 1980s. Increased disappointment with aid, known as ‘aid disillusionment’, set in as it appeared that little ‘progress’ was being achieved despite the vast amounts of money being spent. Coupled with deteriorating economic conditions in developing countries, this led to the phenomenon known as ‘aid fatigue’ among some government and donor institutions. As the decade progressed, propositions impugning ODA for not fulfilling its key objectives appeared:

The most troubling shortcoming of development aid has been its limited measurable contribution to the reduction ... of extreme poverty (OECD, 1985:18).

It became obvious to many that change was needed. Cries for reform were heard from many quarters of the development community (see for example Hellinger et al., 1988:7; Jackson, 1990:142), as well as influential research organisations (see for example American Foreign Policy Council, 1992:31). Although the old system “may already have been running out of steam before the remarkable political developments of 1989” (Griffin, 1991:647), the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union should have given the necessary stimulus to reform.

2.2.2 The post Cold War era

In the post-Cold War era the anti-Communist rationale for giving aid has all but disappeared, and in its place came a potentially new impetus for change:

Foreign aid programmes are bound to change to reflect the new realities of global international relations (Griffin, 1991:670).

In the early 1990s, politicians, notably George Bush, predicted that the end of the Cold War would usher in a New World Order and that the peace dividend should
allow donor countries to provide increased humanitarian assistance (see UNDP, 1991:80-2). As the OECD (1994:2) pointed out:

What is at stake is an unprecedented opportunity to build human security throughout the world. Using development assistance to facilitate and reinforce this process is critical.

The experiences of the 1990s, however, show that this is far from reality, as development assistance is currently facing uncertainty. Most developed countries have scaled down their aid budgets (see Black, 1995; Brown, 1992b; Economist, 1996a; 1996c; Horne, 1993; McPhedran, 1996), often as a consequence of losing their “raison d’être and [in] the absence of a politically compelling new justification” (Griffin, 1991:670). A prolonged recession in the early 1990s adversely affected the economic situation of most donor nations, diverting attention away from the concerns of developing countries. Public and parliamentary support for development assistance in developed states waned as aid policies came under intensive scrutiny, and questions on the legitimacy of sending money abroad at a time of domestic cuts were increasingly asked. At the same time AIDS, Eastern Europe, narcotics and the environment were among the many new areas competing for funding. A paradoxical predicament existed, for as the demands placed on aid budgets grew, few donor countries were planning to increase aid expenditure.

The events of the 1990s seem to have accelerated the downward trend in ODA funding (Figure 2.1). While in current terms funding levels have risen consistently since 1960, the more meaningful indicators of funding in constant terms and ODA as a percentage of GNP show a different story. Foreign aid as a percentage of GNP has either been stagnating or on the decline since 1960. Following a dramatic fall from 0.48% in 1965 to 0.34% in 1970, funding stabilised for much of the 1970s, rising slightly to 0.35% in 1975 and 0.37% in 1980. Since 1980, the figure has been declining, with a sizeable fall from 0.33% in 1990 to 0.27% in 1995. Similarly, funding in constant terms, which considers inflation, declined in the mid-1980s after rising in both the 1960s and 1970s. Following an increase in the late 1980s, funding in constant terms has steadily declined in the 1990s. All this suggests that donor nations are no longer as generous as they once were.
The Development Co-Operation 1997 Report states that the 1996 figure of 0.25% is the lowest recorded in the nearly thirty years since the United Nations established a target of 0.7% (see 2.3.1). ODA fell by 16% in real terms between 1992 and 1996. The decline in overall ODA will continue as aid spending in some larger donor nations is restricted by fiscal adjustments (OECD, 1998:55, 75).

According to Burnell (1997:231-2) six developments in the economic and political environment in which ODA operates have had a marked effect. The first is a recasting of the world order since the dissolution of the Soviet system; the second, the rejection of Keynesian theories and state-led arrangements, and a shift towards market determined outcomes; the third, the meshing of activities in many fields of public policy between governments and NGOs and/or other hybrid organisations. Fourth, developing countries are far less homogeneous than in the past in terms of socioeconomic indicators. On the one hand are the until recently ‘booming’ emerging markets of Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, and on the other are numerous nations, predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa, which have seen their level of development fall
since the 1980s. The fifth development is the malaise at the United Nations, despite the awareness of its potentially enhanced role in international affairs. Finally, aid from most donors has undergone a shift of emphasis towards democracy, good governance and human rights. With a new millennium approaching, aid is seen as a "transitory phenomenon" of the twentieth century.

In the early 1990s, some aid officials privately questioned whether development agencies were merely monolithic remnants of the Cold War, unable to respond to the needs of a changing world. Critics noted that multilateral organisations had numerous structural weaknesses, unclear objectives and often overlapping functions. Inherent institutional problems, which were overlooked in the past, came under scrutiny. Indeed, under the guise of improving cost-effectiveness some questioned whether there were too many humanitarian, development and social justice agencies in the "aid jungle", competing for an ever smaller aid budget (Keating, 1994:15).

Private capital's love affair with emerging markets in the 1990s left multilateral development banks, particularly the World Bank and its affiliate the International Financial Corporation, on the defensive and open to speculation on their necessity. Yet after the 1997-98 financial crisis, many developing nations found funds from international capital markets all but dry up. Both governments and firms from developing countries find themselves seeking assistance from these institutions, and by offering new forms of credit the World Bank, for example, is showing that it has a constructive role to play in revitalising flagging economies (Economist, 1999c).

Changing times are likely to necessitate reform of the anachronistic mechanisms and policies of aid-giving (see for example Clad & Stone, 1993; Economist, 1998d), as well as providing an opportunity to modify and revitalise development co-operation. It is argued, however, that reforms should not stop at just restructuring bureaucracies; rather they should deal with a whole range of issues, including redefining the *modus operandi*, priorities and the resource allocation procedures of individual agencies (see for example Graham & O'Hanlon, 1997). Consensus seems to have been reached within the development profession that a common agenda of sustainable development and security, which focuses on such issues as poverty, health, migration, the environment, human rights, social and economic equity, and population, should be pursued in future (Hewitt, 1994:95; Sewell, 1991:45).
In 1996, DAC members endorsed the OECD *Shaping the 21st Century* vision of development assistance into the next century. At its core is the desire for donors and recipients to work in partnership to advance shared global interests. The strategy incorporates three sets of quantifiable goals stemming from United Nations conferences of the early 1990s. The first measure is to halve the number of people living in absolute poverty by 2015. Social development goals in the areas of primary education, gender equality, basic health care and family planning form the second set of goals. The four goals for this measure are:

1. Universal primary education in all countries by 2015;
2. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005;
3. Reduce by 2015 infant and child mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-fourths; and
4. Access to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate age through the primary health care systems by 2015.

The third measure is to incorporate national strategies on sustainable development by 2005 to ensure a reversal of environmental degradation and destruction by 2015 (Michel, 1997; OECD, 1997:12-27).

New priority announcements have been made, as agencies begin to rationalise their operations (see Chalker, 1996). Bilateral institutions in particular have sought greater clarity on their role; multilaterals too have sought a clearer sense of direction (Sadik, 1991:20). Poverty alleviation has been singled out as the main priority for most agencies (see Clover, 1992; *Economist*, 1994c; Graham, 1993; Prowse, 1993). As priorities shift, voices from the South (see for example Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues, 1990) are taken more into consideration, although the calls for increased resource mobilisation have typically fallen on deaf ears.

Differences of opinion prevail on whether the current circumstances constitute a crisis or merely a period of transition (see Hewitt, 1994; OECD, 1994:2-10; Overseas Development Institute, 1994). The present situation is certainly not the first ‘crisis’ to confront aid (see Brandt, 1980:27, 242-3; Martin, 1973; Pearson, 1969:3-6) as cries to reform aid are heard every five to ten years. It is, however, arguably its greatest thus far.
Whatever the case may be, the present climate "is one of profound transformation" (Hewitt, 1994:90).

2.3 The players

Fundamentally, there are two sets of players in foreign aid: the donors and the recipients. Over time the number of donors, their composition and willingness to fund aid has varied. Similarly, the main recipients have changed over the decades. This section briefly looks at these trends.

2.3.1 Donors

Table 2.1 presents ODA disbursements by individual DAC members in absolute amounts (current terms) and as a percentage of GNP, showing several variations in ODA funding from DAC members since the 1950s. Although the table is limited to ODA trends of DAC members, other states such as members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and OPEC have also contributed foreign aid at one stage or another.

OPEC effectively began offering assistance following the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74, although small contributions did occur before this. Aid from OPEC states peaked in 1975 and again in 1980, following oil price hikes. The main contributors were Saudi Arabia and Kuwait whose ODA/GNP ratio hovered around 5% for several years, and the United Arab Emirates which had an ODA/GNP ratio of 10.32 in 1975-76. However, with declining revenue from petroleum exports, ODA from OPEC states has fallen. In 1983-84, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait still had an ODA/GNP ratio of 3 to 4%, compared to 0.25 and 2.01% in 1994. OPEC’s share of global ODA in 1970-71 was 4.6%, 27.8% in 1975-76, 13.6% in 1983-84 and 6.5% in 1989-90. (OECD, 1985:93, 112-3; 1991a:172; 1996:118).

Even at the height of the Cold War, aid from CMEA members was relatively small in absolute terms, and at around 0.2 also as a percentage of its members’ GNP. The statistics on aid disbursements presented by CMEA states at various UN forums

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8 Member states of CMEA were: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union.
were substantially higher than OECD estimates because of the inclusion of such transactions as price subsidies, favourable maritime transport tariffs, and the transfer of technology. Numerous requests for a breakdown of these figures went unheeded. The Soviet Union was the leading source, contributing on average 80% of CMEA’s ODA. East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria made up most of the remaining 20%. The end of the Cold War, and fundamental economic and political changes, brought aid from CMEA states to an end in the early 1990s. For 1960-62, 1970-71, 1975-75, 1983-84 and 1989-90, CMEA’s contribution to global ODA amounted to 9.9%, 11.3%, 6.7%, 8.5% and 4.7% respectively (OECD, 1985:93, 112, 115, 118; 1991a:155-8, 172). Small contributions are still made by non-DAC states in the 1990s, amounting to just 3% of global ODA (OECD, 1997:119). Their continuing hegemony of ODA funds explains why the focus of this chapter in particular, and the remainder of this thesis in general, is on DAC members.

The international community has established for itself quantitative targets for both the level of funding for financial resource transfers and ODA. In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a target of 1% of GNP for net flows of international assistance and capital from developed to developing countries. This target was incorporated into the 1970 International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade to be attained by 1972 and no later than 1975. Concurrently, the 1969 Pearson Report recommended that developed states increase their ODA funding to 0.7% of GNP by 1975 or shortly thereafter, a suggestion also adopted into the Second United Nations Development Decade. With the realisation that this target was unachievable, the date for attainment shifted. In 1980, the attainment of the 0.7% target by 1985 or in the second half of the 1980s, was incorporated into the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade. The 1% target for financial resource transfers faded away from international discussions in the 1980s, replaced by the 0.7% ODA target (Browne, 1990:50-1; Burnell, 1997:2; OECD, 1985:135-7). Few countries, most notably the Scandinavians, have ever achieved this target, and in the context of the 1990s it appears anachronistic.
Table 2.1 ODA Disbursements by Individual DAC members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Member</th>
<th>Total ODA (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
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<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>SPAIN</td>
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<td>SWEDEN</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
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</tr>
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<td>DAC</td>
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<td>4,676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: West Germany until reunification in 1990. Figures for Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain are incomplete, as they were not always DAC members since acceding to OECD membership.

1996 OECD, 1998:A7-8
The OECD (1985:92-103) identified several major periods of aid flows. Significant increases in foreign aid distinguishes the first period between the 1950s and early 1960s, albeit from a small base. Between 1950 and 1955 the United States accounted for around half of the assistance, with France and the United Kingdom contributing about 30% and over 10% respectively (OECD, 1985:92). By 1960, America gave 58% of foreign aid, reaching a peak under the Kennedy administration (1961-63). French ODA amounted to 1.5% of GNP in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with most going to Algeria.

The 1960s saw a changing of the guard as ODA from the United States, France and the United Kingdom fell, while funding from several other DAC members rose substantially. In particular, the 1960s marked the beginning of America’s gradual decline from dominance over aid funding. Until 1968, the United States gave over 50% of ODA, but by 1986 its share was just over 25%. In 1995 American contributions amounted to just 12.5% of ODA and its ODA/GNP ratio was the lowest of all DAC members (OECD, 1997:95-7). In both France and the United Kingdom ODA fell as a proportion of GNP and in real terms in the 1960s. Other DAC states, however, such as West Germany and Japan, markedly expanded their aid programmes, as both nations overtook the United Kingdom as a source of foreign aid. Rapid ODA increases also occurred in Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia (OECD, 1985:99-100).

The ODA/GNP ratios of donor nations do not adequately reflect the significant ODA expansion in real terms by DAC members during the 1970s, as ODA increases did match rapid economic growth. Ambitious aid budgets saw three Scandinavian countries, Sweden (1974), Norway (1976) and Denmark (1978), reach the 0.7% goal and then substantially surpass this target. Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands greatly expanded their aid programmes during the 1970s and early 1980s. Funding from France and West Germany rose considerably in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while funding from the United States increased in absolute terms and stabilised as a percentage of GNP in the late 1970s, especially after the Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Funding from other DAC members also rose in real terms in the 1970s and early 1980s, albeit to a lesser extent and more erratically (OECD, 1985:101-3).

By the mid-1990s, Japan had replaced the United States as the largest donor in absolute terms. France and Germany also overtook America in 1995 for the first time.
Scandinavian nations remain the most generous in terms of the ODA/GNP ratio, while most other DAC members have seen their aid budgets shrink both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GNP (OECD, 1997:97). The decline of aid flows in the 1990s from DAC members is of particular interest, for it directly reduces the bilateral aid available and indirectly reduces the disbursements to developing countries from multilaterals (OECD, 1998:61).

The OECD (1985:129-34) offers three explanations for variations in funding levels between donor nations, particularly the ODA/GNP ratio: economic situation, the place of aid in national budgets, and attitudes towards aid:

1. Sustained economic growth expands government revenue and allows increased budget outlays for such things as ODA. During the 1960s and early 1970s, strong GNP growth was matched in many nations by a foreign aid enlargement in real terms, under a “generally permissible budgetary climate” (OECD, 1985:130). Between 1970-71 and 1983-84 GNP growth for all DAC members averaged 2.9% annually, compared with an annual average increase in ODA of 3.5% for the same period. These figures, however, mask discrepancies between individual members, revealing that the link between the rate of GNP growth and an increase in ODA is not compelling. Equally, variations in aid funding cannot be explained by differences in per capita income. In the 1990s, the trend towards reducing government spending has resulted in shrinking national budgets and by implication smaller aid budgets, despite GNP growth and increased per capita income. An OECD (1997:97) review revealed that in 1993 ODA fell fastest in DAC states with the largest fiscal deficits (Sweden, Italy, Finland). By contrast, those states with the smallest fiscal deficits increased their ODA in real terms (Norway, Japan, Ireland).

2. The place of ODA within the national budget is also of significance. The proportion of the national budget allocated to ODA remained relatively stable in the period to 1985, compared to the variations in the GNP/ODA relationship. This suggests that the size of national budgets has expanded over time, although not to the same extent as growth in the economy. With increasing demands on national budgets, the
proportion allocated to ODA has fallen in several DAC states in the 1990s. Aid appropriations as a percentage of the national budget⁹ fell between 1982-83 and 1994 in Australia from 1.5 to 1.19, Canada (2.1-1.36), Finland (1.2-0.96), Germany (2.5-1.93), Italy (1.0-0.49), Japan (2.2-1.27), and Norway (2.3-1.86). There were modest increases in Denmark (2.0-2.34), Sweden (2.4-2.57), Switzerland (2.6-2.96) and the United States (1.0-1.36), while the United Kingdom remained stable (1.2-1.19) (OECD, 1985:131; 1997:A19-20).

The OECD (1985:132) maintained that the ODA/GNP ratio is high in those states where the role of the government in economic life is significant. Moreover, it asserted the existence of a positive correlation between the size of domestic social expenditures and the foreign aid programme. While these statements may no longer have the same currency, a comparison between Sweden and the United States would probably still bear this out.

3. A number of complex issues may also determine the size and direction of a national aid programme. These include such things as support for humanitarian concerns by both the public and the political elite; established links to developing countries; the importance of developing countries as trading partners; national and strategic interests, foreign policy and international obligations; and the idiosyncrasies of the decision-making process in donor countries.

ODA’s continued fall from grace in the booming 1990s suggests that explanations two and three are more pertinent than the view espoused in explanation one. These three factors are appraised again among the determinants of population assistance, in Part Three of this thesis.

2.3.2 Recipients

The geographical distribution of foreign aid is rather arbitrary ... (Griffin, 1991:656).

Table 2.2 shows the regional distribution of ODA since 1960. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Asia was the main recipient region of ODA, accounting for nearly half of

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⁹ Data are not available for all DAC members.
global aid disbursements. In the 1980s Sub-Saharan Africa overtook Asia, and by 1990-91 Sub-Saharan Africa’s share amounted to 36.8% compared to Asia’s 29.6%. Funding levels to Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania, have remained steady over time at over 10% and under 5% respectively. The share of ODA allocated to North Africa and the Middle East has been erratic, probably mirroring the changing political circumstances. Finally, ODA to Europe, which had been declining since it accounted for 9.3% of ODA disbursements in 1960-61, increased markedly in the 1990s, although as a global proportion the sums that it receives remain minimal.

Table 2.2 Net Disbursements of ODA by Region from all Sources

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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Africa and the Middle East</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: Funds from CMEA, DAC, OPEC states and multilateral organisations 1960-81. DAC member states and DAC member financed multilateral organisations only 1990-95. Data refer to disbursements for 1960-71 and expenditure for all other years.

Sources: 1960-71 OECD, 1985:121-2
1980-81 OECD, 1989:240-1
1990-91 OECD, 1992:A28-9
1994-95 OECD, 1997:A62

Developed countries, through bilateral aid, have been the largest direct source of funding. Thus, it is of interest to review the main recipients of bilateral aid (Table 2.3). Clearly, larger nations have been the main recipients of bilateral ODA. India, Indonesia and several other Asian states appear consistently among the top recipients. Indeed, in terms of the number of countries represented, Asia has had the greater share of bilateral aid. The appearance of certain states, such as Israel, Nicaragua and Bosnia-Herzegovina, suggests political expediency is a contributing factor. The large sums that have gone to Egypt and Israel in the 1980s and 1990s reflect America’s interests in the Middle East.

While there appears to be no criterion that explains the aid patterns of individual donors, several considerations are found in many programmes. Back in 1968, the OECD (1968:145-6) remarked that the only consistent factor explaining distribution trends is
the population size of the recipient country. On the basis of figures for 1964-6, the OECD concluded that fitting an equation for annual bilateral aid to a recipient amounted to $21 million plus $2 per person. Related to this, the OECD noted the existence of a small-country bias in aid allocation per capita. It noted a "general tendency to give aid to nations as a first consideration and only secondarily to take into account the number to be helped" (OECD, 1968:145). Donors tended to provide a minimum sum of funds regardless of population size. As many small states lacked the staff and finance required to undertake development programmes, and because of the lack of interest generally shown by the private sector, they became highly dependent on ODA. Both Burnell (1997:28) and Cunningham (1974:6-7) confirm this phenomenon.

Other trends in the distribution of aid are offered by Cunningham (1974:6). Among them are political considerations which explain the large British aid that went to Malta, and America's support of South Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan. Similarly, political alliances with former colonies explain why most British aid went to Commonwealth states, most French aid to Francophone states, the German and Dutch supported East Africa and Indonesia respectively, and Australia concentrated on Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific. Alesina and Dollar (1998:7, Table 3.2) calculated that between 1970 and 1994 the percentage of foreign aid going to former twentieth century colonies varied, with Australia (55.5%), France (57.0%), Portugal (99.6%), and the United Kingdom (78.0%) recording the highest levels. Once a pattern is established, such as funding nations with historical links or those with a political alliance, bilateral donors find it more difficult to cease operations there, than to provide ODA to nations that have never been recipients. Because of these factors, all bilateral donors concentrate their efforts on a handful of countries of their choosing.

Several analysts have pointed out the existence of other aid allocation patterns. From their review of the literature, Jay and Michalopoulos (1989:70) assert that there is ample statistical evidence to show that donor interests (see 2.4) have dominated bilateral aid allocation decisions, and not the efficiency of developing countries or their policies and needs. Cohen (1995b:990), using a regression analysis of various explanatory variables, found that aid allocation for the United States and France was entirely dominated by donor interests, and this was so to a lesser extent for Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The analysis by Alesina and Dollar (1998:9, 22) found a strong
positive correlation between Japan’s aid patterns and recipient states voting in tandem with Japan at the United Nations; suggesting the existence of a strategic alliance.

Others have demonstrated distinct biases of donors in the aid allocation of donors. Isenman (1976) demonstrated consistent biases against poorer and larger nations, particularly by the United States. America was again singled out by a study in the early 1990s for its middle-income bias. According to the study the aid programmes of other DAC members were more focused on poorer recipients (Clark, 1992). Using bilateral aid allocations for 1969-84, McGillivray (1989) concluded that Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Norway where the most progressive donors in focusing their aid on the relative needs of recipients. France, Italy, West Germany, New Zealand, Austria and the United States were the least progressive, with America being the worst performer. In a later study looking at the relationship between aid allocation and the average income of recipients, using data for 1974-1990, White and McGillivray (1995) found a similar result. The countries which focused most on the poorest countries were Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, while Australia, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United States were the least progressive donor nations.
### Table 2.3 Main Recipients of Bilateral ODA from DAC Members in Selected Years

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<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>7.4</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Sources:**
- 1960-61 OECD, 1985:123
- 1970-91 OECD, 1992:A65
- 1995-96 OECD, 1998:A84
2.4 What's the attraction?

Security, diplomacy, commercial advantage and a genuine desire to alleviate poverty and inequality are all part of the mixed motives that characterize contemporary aid programmes (Griffin, 1991).

By definition, altruism may be thought to be the main motive behind foreign aid. Moral conviction undoubtedly drives individuals in donor countries to contribute to private and voluntary organisations operating in developing countries, especially during humanitarian emergencies. Unfortunately, the same cannot generally be said for donor governments, which are usually motivated by other interests. According to a review of several aid allocation studies by McGillvray and White (1993:2), “political, strategic, commercial and (albeit often begrudgingly) humanitarian motives offer a reasonable a priori basis for explaining patterns of aid allocation among developing countries”. For donor governments, aid is a foreign policy vehicle to foster relations with developing countries; secure political stability in countries of strategic importance; open new trade markets; secure the availability of strategic imports; and be seen as a caring and responsible member of the world community at international forums (McGillvray & White, 1993:2).

There is little doubt that self-serving political interests were the main thrust behind the aid rhetoric of donor countries during the Cold War (Alesina & Dollar, 1998:1; Black, 1968:18; Economist, 1994a:13; Hayter, 1971:15; Lappe et al., 1980:11, 15-28; Montgomery, 1962:4; 1967:7; Todaro, 1989:486; Wall, 1973:42). For the most part aid was just one of many foreign policy instruments used by Western nations to thwart the spread of communism:

It [foreign aid] is largely a product of the ideological confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union which dominated international politics for forty-five years between 1945 and 1990 (Griffin, 1991:645).

Indeed, Griffin (1991:647) contends that:

Were it not for the Cold War there would be no foreign aid programmes worthy of the name ...

Often disguised as export subsidies or technical assistance, donor governments tended to give generously to those countries whose allegiance they sought for political and
strategical reasons. This explains the large sums given to such states as Israel, Egypt, Turkey and El Salvador (Economist, 1994a:13). As Todaro (1989:486) contends:

When the balance of cold war interests shifted from Europe to the Third World in the mid-1950s, the policy of containment embodied in the U.S. aid program dictated a shift in emphasis toward political, economic, and military support for "friendly" less developed nations, especially those considered geographically strategic. Most aid programs to developing countries were therefore oriented more toward purchasing their security and propping up their sometimes shaky regimes than promoting long-term social and economic development.

Perversely, the richest 40% of the developing world received twice as much aid per capita as the poorest 40%. The countries that spent most on guns and soldiers received more aid per capita than those spending resources on health and education (Economist, 1993c:14). By far the leading protagonist of aid for political and strategic reasons has been the United States, whose "foreign aid was ... directed to ensure western influence in the third world" (Economist, 1993b:58).

Behind the revamped rhetoric of the 1990s, contends The Economist (1994d:22) lies the ever powerful national security motive:

"National security" is also now being used as an argument for giving more weight to all sorts of other goals in the drawing-up of aid budgets.

Environmentalists argue that it is in the interest of donors to minimise the risks of global warming and ozone depletion, posed by rapid economic growth in developing countries. Others maintain that aid should be used to counteract the threats to developed countries from illicit drug-trafficking, population growth and Third World poverty.

National security also means pursuing commercial interests. Graham and O'Hanlon (1997:97) maintain that supporting export markets in developing countries joins the other rationales for donor support. Japan is a case in point as "its development assistance goes mainly to countries that are most likely to become its future customers" (Economist, 1994d:22). Wright–Neville (1991:108-9) claims that "Japan has made assiduous use of its aid program" for the development of export markets and sources for raw materials, particularly in Asia which accounts for over 70% of its bilateral ODA.

Every DAC member ties some of its aid to procurement in the donor country. Tied aid is a concern, as it has the potential to distort aid and trade patterns. On average, recipients may pay 15% more than prevailing prices and often purchase goods that contribute little to their development objectives. The average proportion of bilateral aid
that was tied fell to 26% in the period 1989-91, but this reflected a growth in the untied components of bilateral aid such as emergency relief rather than a reduction of tied project aid (OECD, 1994:94). Internationally agreed guidelines on limiting tied aid have been ineffective since governments have found other ways of using aid to promote exports, as the 1994 Pergau Dam affair between Britain and Malaysia demonstrated. Whether aid agencies have the will or the desire to discard completely their ideological baggage remains to be seen.

America's attitude towards microstates like those in the South Pacific exemplifies donors' shifting priorities. Microstates receive the most ODA on a per capita basis and are often heavily reliant on foreign aid to maintain their resource-poor economies. This subjects them to international economic and political trends over which they have little control. Pacific Island states are among the most aid-dependent states in the world (Crocombe, 1983:170-1; Henningham, 1995:8) and are vulnerable to the changes affecting aid disbursements. Following considerable assistance to the South Pacific during the Second World War, support from the United States to the region declined markedly in the ensuing decades. However, the advances made by Libya and the Soviet Union towards South Pacific governments in the mid-1980s over fishing rights rekindled America's interest in a region it had taken for granted as being safe. The United States increased its presence and attempted to woo the island states (Crocombe, 1995:113; Henningham, 1995:93-4). The end of the Cold War, however, has seen the region's strategic importance decline, with the attention of the United States being diverted elsewhere (see Crocombe, 1995:129; North, 1995; Vaughan, 1995). As was noted in one Pacific regional monthly:

How does that saying go? The Cold War is over and we lost. That's the way more than a few people in the islands have been feeling as the Americans cut back their support for the region. With the Cold War over, and budget pressures in Washington, American support for programmes in the region is rapidly vanishing. Organisations like the United States Information Service, USAID, The Asia Foundation and the Peace Corps are reducing their programmes or closing their Pacific offices completely. They're concentrating instead on other parts of the globe now considered strategically more important by the Americans (Aiavao et al., 1996).
2.5 Sectoral aid – the association

Aid is disbursed not only across geographical regions, but also according to activity. ODA is frequently earmarked for such particular sectors of development as agriculture, health, infrastructure and rural development. Aid to population programmes is also a form of sectoral aid, and given that population assistance constitutes just 1.65% of ODA (UNFPA, 1996a:7) it would be nonsensical to expect it to be quarantined from the social and political factors affecting global development assistance.

According to Demeny (1993:249-50), sectoral aid is a remnant of an era when central planning and the extension of government into all social and economic sectors considered necessary for development was the orthodox thinking. Developing country governments organised their socioeconomic policies into sector-defined programme-packaged tasks, and the arrival of development assistance reinforced the role of government in promoting development. Both donors and recipients derived benefits from allocating aid to different sectors. Justifying aid expenditure to domestic constituencies in donor countries became easier when linked to a particular issue. Similarly, linking funding to a particular task facilitated control over funds, enhanced accountability and allowed funds to be used for specific goods and services. Recipient governments readily welcomed the tangible items, such as technological innovations, that development assistance provided. Thus, eager governments extended themselves into areas that traditionally had been outside their control; family planning and population activities were one such area.

There have been several other occasions where events associated with population assistance funding have been dependent upon the circumstances surrounding ODA. Like other forms of development aid, population assistance was a pawn in the ideological confrontations of the Cold War. The East-West conflicts at several international conferences are evidence of that, and population agencies faced political considerations similar to those faced by other international institutions, as the following statement affirms:

... development was moving along the way [before the fall of the Berlin Wall] ... ahh... its own traditional way, but on the assumption of this two-power relationship. And you always had that in your mind no matter where you went into development (Multilateral official A).
Ironically, hopes in the late 1960s were high that international population agencies would be free from such political ideologies:

They [international agencies] can help prevent family planning from becoming a cold-war issue involving political ideologies or a subject of disagreement between national or racial groups (Gardner, 1968:342).

Alas, this desire remained unfulfilled.

Equally, the size of aid budgets of donor nations has historically been largely dependent upon the prevailing economic conditions of the time. The United Kingdom, for example, cut back its ODA and population assistance in 1979 because of the economic recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Wolfson, 1983:120). Similarly, increases in ODA budgets usually occur during a boom period, although the sound economic circumstances of the late 1990s have not been translated into increased funding for ODA. Although the amount of funds allocated to population assistance generally varies with the size of the ODA pie, as Chapter four shows there have been several occasions when this was not the case.

UNDP (1994:73) states that less than 7% of bilateral ODA is earmarked for human priority concerns. Included among these priority issues are primary health care, basic education, nutrition schemes and family planning programmes. Indeed, development initiatives such as those presented by President Clinton, Baroness Chalker, Morihiro Hosokawa and Gordon Bilney in the 1990s have singled out population programmes as an area of importance, while the need to slow down population growth in countries where it is too high to permit sustainable development has been recognised by DAC members as a basic priority for the 1990s (OECD. Development Assistance Committee, 1990).

Overall, the proportion of total aid funding going to population assistance is minimal. Moreover, the global sums for population assistance are dwarfed by the amount developing countries themselves expend on activities such as family planning, information campaigns and data collection (World Bank, 1993:31-3). As the first executive director of UNFPA, Rafael Salas (1979:122), noted in 1977:

No credible increase in assistance provided by the international community would begin to match the amounts being spent by the governments of the developing countries themselves.
This is still the case, although, as then, the ratio between national expenditure on these activities and population assistance varies from one country to the next.

### 2.6 Retrospection

Since the Marshall Plan for Europe, aid has been at the centre of much academic and public discussion. ODA for the promotion of economic development and welfare has been criticised by a variety of groups and commended by others. Bauer (1984:38) states that foreign aid is “the source of the North-South conflict, not its solution,” while Cassen (1994:7) argues “that most aid does indeed ‘work.’” Both the left and the right have condemned aid for retarding development: the left because of the neo-imperialism that aid connotes, and the right because of the conceivable pauperisation of the populace of those countries that come to depend on international generosity (Lal, 1983:54).

While there can be no denying that serious mishaps in the execution of aid programmes have occurred, sometimes with grave implications for developing countries, this would seem to be insufficient reason to condemn the whole enterprise. A compelling case can be made for continuing with aid so long as it is used effectively, meets clearly defined objectives, and is directed towards poor countries with “sound economic management” (*Economist*, 1999b:25). Development is a long and arduous process fraught with risks and uncertainties, and under these circumstances failures will undoubtedly occur:

Aid, like most human endeavours, is far from perfect (Cassen, 1994:1).

Fifty years of experience has shown that aid can only be as effective as the political, legal, economic and administrative environment in which it operates. Calls for a complete dismantling of aid programmes, for example by Bauer (1991:17) and US Republican Senator Jesse Helms (Duffy, 1994), fail to acknowledge the vast spectrum of activities undertaken and the considerable benefits that aid has brought to such fields as food production, health, infrastructure and the promotion of institution building in numerous countries. Equally misleading, however, are over-favourable reports that have overlooked the fact that aid has often not worked well, and that the bureaucratic apparatus providing aid is frequently unwieldy in its approach. More open and frank
discussion by agencies on their fallibility would allow for a greater understanding by both politicians and the public of the successes and failures of aid.

The rest of this thesis focuses on the small fraction of ODA known as population assistance, its trends and determinants, and throughout, the inextricable association between ODA and population assistance will manifest itself.
3 The enigmatic nature of population assistance

Population assistance has an identity problem, for there is a lack of consensus not only on what it is, but also on what it is trying to achieve. This chapter places this term into context by examining its nature and what purposes it tries to serve. It highlights the complexities of addressing what constitutes population assistance by looking at changes over time, anomalies between agencies and the reasons for differing definitions.

In the wake of the 1994 Cairo Conference the term population assistance is probably more diffuse now than at any other period. After briefly reviewing the events and debates surrounding the conference, the chapter looks at three quandaries in the present significance of population assistance.

3.1 Population assistance: defying definition

Since its genesis, aid for population activities and the term population assistance have been both ambiguous and misunderstood, often reflecting the politically charged nature of the aid form in question. Ness and Ando (1984:147) draw attention to this fact, stating that there are “no standardized procedures for classifying assistance to population planning.” At fault is a lack of clarity on what population assistance encompasses and what its explicit objectives are. Wolfson (1983:9) spelt out the problem:

Population assistance defies definition – or perhaps has no need of it, being quite simply what any particular donor chooses to think it is.

This sentiment was reiterated in an UNFPA report:

There is no precise and generally accepted definition of what population assistance is in fact (UNFPA, 1989:ii).

The intellectual origins of population assistance, as an interventionist strategy to restrain population growth in developing countries, can be traced back to the work of eminent Princeton demographers Frank Notestein and Kingsley Davis. Following the
establishment of communism in essentially agrarian Russia and China, American analysts after the war began searching for ways to prevent other countries from following the same route. With most of its funding coming from the State Department, the Office of Population Research at Princeton focused its research on demographic considerations that would help guide America's relations and strategic interests. On the assumption that economic equity in developing societies was the best way to halt the spread of communism, Davis and Notestein were asked whether population had an impact on economic growth (Szreter, 1993:678-80). Between the 1940s and 1950s they altered their opinions of fertility from being a dependent variable as assumed by the demographic transition theory that they propounded, to the view that population growth impedes economic development and that policy interventions such as family planning were necessary (Hodgson, 1983:10-20). According to Szreter:

In appreciation of the desire to offer constructive advice rather than simply sit by and watch as the map of Asia turned red, the first small-step, which Davis and Notestein independently took in published work appearing in 1950, was to advocate the only thing that could be done in the short term: the initiation of family planning policies in countries such as India (Szreter, 1993:679).

Notestein's thinking began changing towards interventionism in 1947, and after a three month stay in the Far East in 1948 he started advocating birth control policies in the early stages of development (Szreter, 1993:672; see also Harkavy, 1995:21-2; Population Council, 1978:10-1). Davis' 1951 monograph argued for the implementation of family planning in India and Pakistan as a fundamental component for a liberal and democratic society (Szreter, 1993:679). By 1954, Davis' research on India convinced him that fertility reduction was achievable through a national family planning programme (Hodgson, 1983:19). Thus, by the early 1950s the leading transition theorists had accepted the need for birth control policies in developing countries to advance economic growth (see 7.3.2.1), while concurrently maintaining a liberal economic and political system. The government of newly independent India, which had established the world's first national family planning programme in 1951, was "openly receptive" to the notion of adopting birth control measures to promote economic growth (Szreter, 1993:680). However, it would take another decade before the American Congress offered support for the policies advocated by population experts.

The beginnings of large-scale population assistance in the 1960s are to be found in the fears over high fertility rates harboured by Western intellectuals and governments
(see for example Donaldson, 1990b), and the implementation of population measures by certain Asian nations. Concerns over rapid population growth in developing countries formed the primary rationale for providing aid for population activities (see 7.3.2), aimed principally at lowering fertility rates through policies and programmes. The dynamism with which the United States and other Western countries approached rapid population growth, and the priorities they attached in dealing with this issue, forged the concept of population assistance:

In principle the idea [population assistance] was a question of population growth which would have to be reduced. Therefore, it was seen as something which was a demographic problem and people looked at figures. Looking at figures they said we don’t care how it’s done provided it works (Multilateral Official B).

To maintain the global social and political status quo, the Johnson and Nixon administrations argued that massive social upheavals could be prevented by providing assistance to reduce population growth rates. Their strong conviction to this cause and the leverage used by USAID to press this view gave population assistance a distinctive American flair (see 4.4.2):

I think, generally speaking, one cannot really define population assistance unless it is viewed from an American perspective (NGO Official B).

Although conventional wisdom frequently contends that population assistance amounts to the imposition of Western values on developing countries, Ness and Ando (1984:182) claimed that:

There is a far more convincing case to be made that international population assistance is a set of values and demands that Asians have foisted upon the rest of the world than the other way around.

Several Asian nations initiated public intervention into reproductive behaviour well before developed countries began to consider providing assistance for population programmes. Through antinatalist policies and calls for assistance in fertility limitation10, Asia extended the legitimacy that “supported the mobilization of world community resources” (Ness & Ando, 1984:38). This setting made it easier for Western countries to

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10 Examples of this include the 1959 Sixth International Conference on Planned Parenthood in Delhi (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1986:43); the First Asian Population Conference, New Delhi, 1963; and Resolution 54 (XX) adopted by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1964 (cited in Symonds & Carder, 1973:136-8)).
provide assistance than might have otherwise been the case. While Asian nations may have helped the world community to legitimise population assistance, there can be no doubt that population assistance fostered the establishment of population policies and programmes in numerous developing countries.

It comes as no surprise then that the evolution of the term population assistance is as closely related to political factors as it is to acknowledged health considerations and changing socioeconomic development philosophies. Initially, the scope of population assistance was limited to supporting family planning programmes and related motivational activities (Wolfson, 1983:9). Recognising the medical link between family planning and health care, population assistance soon came to include aspects of maternal and child health. Furthermore, medical facilities offered a readily accessible means of providing services. Together, family planning and maternal and child health care (MCH) constituted the mainstay of population activities (Wolfson, 1983:9-10,89). Many recipients, however, were unhappy with this “narrow” approach, indicating that a wider concept was necessary; in part to improve their capacity to absorb aid (Hankinson, 1973:15; Marzuki, 1970:15):

The criticism made most often during the discussion [delegates from nations with national family planning programmes, and experience of aid, attending an OECD sponsored conference in April 1969] was that foreign assistance in family planning was too narrowly conceived and should be extended to include closely related activities in health (including nutrition), education and vital statistics (Marzuki, 1970:14).

Academic research into the determinants of fertility change began to show that social and economic change also had a bearing on fertility trends (see for example Davis, 1967), causing some in development circles to rethink their approach (Salas, 1976:90-2). Developing countries began to argue for broader development programmes that focused on social and economic concerns. Yet it was not until after the 1974 Bucharest Conference (see 4.4.3) that a reappraisal occurred (Wolfson, 1983:9). The ‘development is the best contraceptive’ view expressed by representatives of developing countries, and the stance taken against the narrow family planning approach by prominent advocates like J.D. Rockefeller III, subsequently forced donors to extend the scope of population assistance to include a range of demand-side activities of a social development nature (see for example Green, 1977; United Kingdom. Ministry of Overseas Development, 1976). Most donors broadened the scope of their population assistance to include other activities that addressed the causes or consequences of demographic change such as
urbanisation and migration (Wolfson, 1983:10, 89). However, the rate and degree to which donors changed to the 'development approach' after Bucharest varied substantially. Some donors were reluctant to change their ways, while others displayed so much enthusiasm that it was difficult to tell the extent to which project initiatives were coming from developing countries or from donor agencies (Wolfson, 1983:10). For nearly twenty years thereafter, development concerns remained the cornerstone of programmes provided by population agencies.

3.1.1 Agency anomaly

Historically, population agencies have been “conservative” on what they are prepared to fund, often ignoring a wide spectrum of social activities (Wolfson, 1978:23). Nevertheless, even within the self-defined parameters in which agencies operate, anomalies on what constitutes population assistance continue to exist, reflected by the types of activities carried out over time as the following examples demonstrate.

3.1.1.1 OECD

The Development Centre at the OECD was probably the first institution that tried to conceptualise population assistance. At the time it suffered from the strains of inadequate data and a failure to comprehend what population aid should encompass:

The Development Centre has tried to carry out an analysis of aid by purpose but so far adequate data is available only to distinguish the very broad categories of assistance which are: (1) demography, (2) family planning and (3) biomedical research (Hankinson, 1973:4).

The OECD classified population assistance in its 1974 report on the subject under four headings: demography, family planning, biomedical research, and others (OECD. Development Assistance Committee, 1974:Table 1). However, in later years the OECD adopted the UNFPA definition (see 3.1.1.2) in presenting data on population assistance. Of late, the OECD seems to take figures presented to it by donors at face value, without making them comparable. Moreover, it appears that the OECD does not separate Health and Population as a category, as more recent studies using OECD data have the two combined (see Michaud & Murray, 1994; Zeitlin et al., 1994), which is rather deceptive.
3.1.1.2 UNFPA

UNFPA was initially established by the Secretary-General in July 1967 as a contribution fund to finance the 1966 endorsed United Nations five-year population programme. The main elements of this modest initiative were: the training of demographers, the provision of research and information services for policy formulation by governments, and the implementation of advisory and technical assistance services. Yet shortly afterwards, Western governments, especially the United States, saw the agency as a way of involving the United Nations system in providing assistance to governments for population activities and, in particular, family planning services (Symonds & Carder, 1973:188).

As part of a deliberate policy to gain political constituency for itself as an international institution dedicated to the cause of population issues, the infant UNFPA spread its operations over a wide range of countries and activities (Wolfson, 1983:45). Its terms of reference states that:

... the Fund encompass assistance on all aspects of population which have an important bearing on economic and social development, and education, research and data gathering or any relevant factors may be supported (Salas, 1976:31).

Recipient nations, resisting the developed countries' perception of the population problem and their strategies for dealing with it, pressed for a flexible definition of the types of programmes that UNFPA would fund (Salas, 1976:8).

Facing various opposition, UNFPA sought a middle road. In its first report to the UNDP Governing Council in 1973, Salas presented the following definition:

The words 'population' or 'population activities' [are] in the United Nations ... broadly understood to include: population censuses, vital statistics, sample surveys on population, economic and social statistics related to population, related research projects, training facilities required, demographic aspects of development planning, family planning delivery systems, techniques of fertility regulation, planning and management of family planning programmes, support communications, population and family life education in schools and in out-of-school education, the World Population Year 1974, documentation centres and clearing houses on population matters, and interdisciplinary population training (Salas, 1979:1).

Surprisingly, to account for UNFPA expenditure between 1969 and 1975 Salas (1976:117, Figure 5) uses only three categories: 1. Basic data and analysis; 2. Family
planning and communications; and 3. Policy and programme development. The parallels between these three groups and the OECD clarification of population assistance at that time are obvious.

In 1977, UNFPA began defining population activities in eight broad functional categories: 12

1. **Basic data collection** (censuses, surveys, registration systems)
2. **Population dynamics** (research, institution building and the dissemination of findings on population trends)
3. **Population policy** (the development, promotion and evaluation of government population policies and programmes)
4. **Implementation of policies** (the implementation of policies aimed at influencing the size, trends, composition and distribution of population)
5. **Family planning** (the development and strengthening of family planning services)
6. **Population information, education and communication** (communication creating awareness of population issues)
7. **Special Programmes** (aimed at particular groups such as women, youth, disadvantaged communities, rural populations)
8. **Multisector activities** (training and research that cuts across the sectors)

(Salas, 1986:5-10; UNFPA, 1978:22-3; 1992:20)

Although the eight groups were later merged into the following five functional categories: 1. Population policy and dynamics; 2. Data collection and analysis; 3. Family planning; 4. Population education and communication; 5. Support activities (UNFPA, 1994c:27), the framework remained virtually intact for nearly twenty years after its conception.

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11 See UN General Assembly Resolution: 2211 (XXI), 17 December 1966
12 Known as the *Key to the Standard Classification of Population Activities* or in UNFPA-speak as the ACC classification, these categories were adopted by the United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) Sub-Committee on Population in June 1977 (UNFPA, 1977c) and subsequent documents for a breakdown of individual categories.
While these categories mirror the development thinking of the post-Bucharest era, the breadth of assistance also reflects UNFPA's exigency to conciliate those groups that disagreed with it. These broad categories, it would seem, were devised to expand the general scope of the fund to make it easier for all parties to accept its activities, an issue which UNFPA's first executive director saw as essential:

A short life had been predicted for the UNFPA because both the Catholics and the Communists were against it. That it has not only survived but flourished can be attributed, say observers, to the "diplomatic agility" of its boss, Rafael Salas, who never misses a chance to explain to objectors that the UNFPA is not exclusively devoted to birth control. ... His campaign to break down prejudices against the UNFPA has been successful enough to win the Fund entry into the three sectors that opposed it; the Catholic countries, the Socialist countries, and the Arab countries (Joaquin, 1987:3).

UNFPA is directly responsible to its member states represented at its governing council, a body that consists of both donors and recipients. Relations between these parties have frequently been far from harmonious, causing the organisation to fashion itself out of necessity to its changing political environment. Salas (1976:8) remarks on the schism between the donors wanting fast action to reduce population growth rates and the recipients who did not see reductions in growth rate as a high priority. Indeed, donors have repeatedly attempted to influence policies and directions, and have periodically reminded UNFPA that family planning should be its first priority, even though over half of its funding has consistently gone to this activity (Finkle & McIntosh, 1994:11). By maintaining such an extensive understanding of what constitutes population assistance, UNFPA has been able to accommodate not only changing development philosophies, but also the wishes of individual member states.

Figures presented in this thesis, unless indicated otherwise, correspond to UNFPA's definitions (1977 and post-Cairo see 3.3.2.) of population assistance. This decision is based upon the realisation that UNFPA is the leading source of population assistance information and that its reports are widely endorsed as the best available.

3.1.1.3 World Bank

Driven by the strong convictions of its then president, Robert McNamara, on the need to address the population problem (see McNamara, 1973:25-47, 49-50; 1981:12-4, 31-52, 140-3, 377-433), the World Bank entered the population field in 1970 by funding projects designed to limit population growth. Three main areas were identified in which the Bank could exert influence: shaping world opinion on the importance of population
questions; creating awareness of demographic issues in all phases of development; and
institution-building (Kanagaratnam, 1973).

Its 1972 population sector working paper specified its justification for designing
projects for limiting fertility that focused exclusively on assisting family planning
programmes through technical assistance, physical facilities, contraceptives and staff
training (Baldwin et al., 1973:293-6; Simmons & Maru, 1988:2). Infrastructure such as
buildings, vehicles and equipment made up the largest component of population projects
(Baldwin et al., 1973:295), while Jones (1979:231) noted that construction purposes
made up 60-70% of many projects, arguing that the Bank probably felt more
comfortable with this type of assistance.

In its 1974 Staff Report the World Bank (1974:77-8) adopted the OECD
understanding of population assistance when presenting statistics. A decade later, the
Bank (1985:138-9) stated that the two main objectives of population assistance were:

\[ ... \text{to assist governments and private organizations in providing family planning}
\text{information, and services, and to assist governments in developing population policies as}
\text{part of their overall development strategy.} \]

Organisational impediments induced Bank officials to redefine and scale down the
objectives of its population programme throughout the 1970s, thereby disguising their
unwillingness to recognise that the Bank needed to adapt itself to these new objectives.
Reluctance by the regional offices to include population on their development agenda,
and the Bank’s perceived obligation to maintain a high level of independence and control
with respect to other organisations in the population field, ensured that the Bank’s
population programme did not achieve the expected results. Responding to these
difficulties, the Population Projects Department merged in 1979 into the new
Population, Health, and Nutrition Department and in the same year lending for health
services began (Crane & Finkle, 1981:517-8, 527, 538, 548-9; Simmons & Maru,
1988:4-5).

Lagging behind other agencies, the Bank showed increased recognition of the
social sectors in the early 1980s. It began including a variety of “software” activities into
its projects by taking an integrated approach to family planning services and the social
sector. Nevertheless, family planning and associated health care activities accounted for
more than 75% of the Bank’s population programme (Wolfson, 1983:11). In 1984, the
Bank refocused its attention towards fertility reduction, and in 1987 it became one of
the driving forces behind the safe motherhood initiative (Simmons & Maru, 1988:6-7). Overall attention to population issues by the Bank, however, declined following a reorganisation at the Bank in 1987 (Conly & Epp, 1997:1-2).

In the early 1990s, the World Bank used a narrower definition of population than previously. Project components now considered population activities are family planning service delivery, population policy development, and census work and fertility surveys (UNFPA, 1995a:19; World Bank, 1992:121). While noting that the Bank has given increased importance to social investments this decade, Conly and Epp (1997:2) claim that interest in population concerns is diminishing.

3.1.1.4 USAID

Just three years after America announced its intention to support population assistance in 1965, the then Director of the Population Service Office at USAID, Reimert T. Ravenholt (see 4.4.2., 7.2.), wrote that:

... A.I.D. has emerged as the largest single resource for helping less-developed countries plan and implement population and family planning studies, action and training programs (Ravenholt, 1968:561).

USAID's strategy during the Ravenholt years (1966-79) was extensively supply-oriented, focusing on the narrow goal of contraception and fertility limitation (Jones, 1979:230; Ness & Thomas, 1989:187; Ravenholt, 1968:571; Warwick, 1982:46-7; Wolfson, 1983:135). Wolfson (1983:133) remarked that the object of US population assistance was fertility limitation through family planning, and that other activities supported by population assistance only served to enhance this purpose. For the period 1965-75 USAID funding went to six main categories: family planning services (49%); manpower and institutional development (16%); information programmes (12%); demographic data (9%); biomedical and social science research for fertility control (9%) and population policies (5%) (Jones, 1979:230; Wolfson, 1983:133).

Congress plays a pivotal role in determining the nature and extent of America's population assistance (see 7.1). Following Bucharest, it urged USAID to find new ways of integrating family planning with other development sectors, to provide activities related to poverty and to address the determinants of fertility. Over the years, America's population assistance policy has swung between a supply approach and a broader...
development view. However, contraceptive assistance remained a pre-eminent form of support. This explains why it often appears that Ravenholt’s legacy remains, despite government policies to take a broad approach to population programmes and the shifts towards demand-type activities (Wolfson, 1983:11, 135-6).

In a 1982 policy paper, USAID restated its focus on family planning service delivery. Other family planning-related activities were also supported such as: dissemination of family planning information and education; training for service providers; contraceptive research; improving delivery systems; and demographic data collection designed to improve family planning programmes and to develop population policies and programmes (USAID, 1982:1). Twelve years on, the acting director of the Office of Population, in a paper to USAID’s Cooperating agencies, stated that “family planning will remain the centerpiece and predominant component of the Office of Population’s program” (Maguire, 1994:2). She added that USAID had five priorities: maximising access and quality of care; addressing the needs of adolescents; reducing unsafe abortion; adding selected reproductive health interventions; and examining and strengthening links with related areas (Maguire, 1994:3-10).

3.1.1.5 Other bilateral agencies

The scope of activities supported by bilateral donors varies according to the aims, goals, and priorities determined by executive-bureaucratic apparatus (see 7.1). Using four examples, USAID, SIDA, NORAD, and Britain’s ODA, Wolfson (1983:10, 89, 121) shows the distinctions between American and European views of global population issues and their responses to it. Although both Sweden and Norway firmly recognised the indirect effect of economic and social development on fertility, these activities were reported elsewhere and thereby limited population assistance to family planning and MCH. NORAD included nutrition education and preventive health education. Family planning and MCH were the focus of Britain’s aid agency as well, but it would also support other activities as set out by the UNFPA definition.

In the types of activities offered there were some notable differences. USAID’s insistence on intervening in the establishment of population policies was not shared by Norway and Sweden, who viewed this as offensive. Similarly, the three European agencies preferred to offer support for construction purposes, rather than contraceptives as favoured by USAID. Only the ODA gave sizeable sums to data collection,
demographic research and training as other bilateral donors relied on UNFPA to undertake these activities (Wolfson, 1983:11-2, 121).

This division between those taking a broad view of population assistance (Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, Switzerland and France), and the stance of the United States, persisted. Gradually Australia, Britain, Canada and Germany began favouring strategies that emphasised the provision of family planning services (Conly & Speidel, 1993:28, 30). Recent definitions of population assistance by European donors have incorporated the following activities beyond those defined by UNFPA:

- France: HIV/AIDS expenditures;
- Germany: basic health care and basic education;
- Italy: primary health care, HIV/AIDS projects and nutrition programmes;
- Spain: HIV/AIDS activities, eliminating illiteracy and developing basic social services;

A Japanese study group commissioned by JICA argued that population assistance should refer to activities that help to achieve the following three goals:

1. Raising the standard of living and protecting the human rights of people in developing countries at the individual level;
2. Promoting the socioeconomic development of developing countries at the national and regional levels; and

In practice, Japan includes in its definition of population assistance such items as primary health care, including mother and child health; basic education; the enhancement of women's status in society; HIV/AIDS projects; and the improvement of the environment (UNFPA, 1994c:15; 1995a:15; 1996a:14).

3.1.1.6 NGOs

NGOs also reappraised their approach following the 1974 Bucharest Conference. The Population Council, established in 1952 as a research organisation with a view to
reducing fertility, began to include work on fertility determinants and consequences. Likewise, both Ford and Rockefeller paid increasingly more attention to the interactions between population and development (Wolfson, 1978:24, 175-8). Even organisations like IPPF and Pathfinder, whose mandates concentrate on providing family planning services support, integrated into their projects activities such as training of religious leaders, efforts to reform marriage and property legislation, and activities related to education, health and environmental sanitation (Wolfson, 1983:10).

All told, the essential function of population assistance has been to assist in modifying the demographic characteristics of developing countries. Two main difficulties arise, however, in trying to define the term: first, virtually all human activity can influence demographic variables and more importantly its inherent political nature. Assistance to such fields as agriculture, education, and industrial development can influence demographic variables. Improvements in literacy, health standards and the economic conditions of a society affect population trends. Does it then follow that these aspects should be included in a definition of population assistance? Clearly, the answer is 'no' as the primary objective of aid to these fields is not to influence demographic variables. The primary objective of education, for example, is to create a skilled, learned and prosperous society – not to lower fertility rates.

Although there are considerable disparities in views on what population assistance should encompass, it appears to consist of more than just family planning. Halvor Gille (1982:374), a former UNFPA Deputy Executive Director, affirms that:

> Although a clear-cut and generally agreed-upon definition of the term 'population activities' is not available, it clearly includes much more than demography or delivery of family planning services.

However, despite its breadth there seems to be no escaping the fact that rapid population growth rates and fears of 'overpopulation' have substantially influenced the concept of population assistance.

Population assistance was in the past defined as something trying to influence population growth rates (Multilateral official B).

Family planning has frequently been advocated as the principal means of achieving this objective. This may explain why in 1993 (UNFPA, 1995a:27) nearly 70% of total
international population assistance went to supporting family planning programmes, a figure which has remained consistently high over the past two decades: 69.7% in 1989 (UNFPA 1991:9); 64.1% in 1985 (UNFPA, 1988a:Table 5); 67% in 1980 (UNFPA, 1982b: Table 3); and 75.2% in 1977 (UNFPA, 1980b:Table 4). Such statistics have helped to sustain the widely accepted but erroneous view that population assistance is synonymous with family planning support.

3.2 Must it be like this?

On the face of it, this definition problem looks as if it could only excite an accountant or statistician. Most will probably ignore it, complacent in their belief that an examination of this nature is superfluous so long as funds continue to be transferred. There is, however, more at stake here than just a disagreement on accounting terms and procedures. Vested interests are never far away from the surface, ensuring that a vague understanding of population assistance is perpetuated.

Possibly the most decisive moment in the lack of clarity on what constitutes population assistance occurred at a 1975 OECD conference (OECD. Development Centre, 1975) when donors decided to evade definitional problems. While surely recognising that a lack of clarity was an impediment to global activities, the conference nevertheless decided that a “universally accepted and standardised terminology for population assistance would be expensive, a complex process, and presently premature”. Delegates opted instead to devise “keys” by which each agency could “translate” and “utilize” data from other agencies, and to allow UNFPA to convert data using its classification system. Since then there seems to have been little interest and political will in addressing this issue, with each agency content to do its own thing.

Referring to specialised agencies per se, Finkle and McIntosh (1994:10) assert that “the development system as a whole has been rife with territorialism, competition and overlapping mandates”. Taking a lesson from organisational theorists, they go on to argue that:

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13 Unfortunately, OECD was unable to locate this potentially enlightening document. What appears here is cited from the abstract in Popline.
Over time, each organization develops its own bureaucratic culture and organizational mission, the protection of which tends to become an important organizational goal in itself (Finkle & McIntosh, 1994:14).

Like other organizational entities, population agencies have had to be flexible in their approach, adept at reinventing themselves in light of changing circumstances and in tune with differing political situations. Arguably, population agencies keep the definition of population assistance deliberately vague for their survival, so they may appear to be responsive to changing situations within their institutional constraints and acceptable to the wider donor community.

As spokespersons for donor governments, bilateral agencies frequently fail to go beyond the public face of grand vision and vague rhetoric in clarifying the purpose, goals and objectives of their assistance. Hence, it could be contended that if a precise working definition for population assistance existed, donors might not be so obliging for fear of repercussion from certain sectors of their constituencies. This reflects the difficult balancing act of reconciling the often undisclosed agendas of donor governments (see 7.3.) with the wishes and needs of developing countries.

Multilateral agencies also have reasons for sustaining this vague understanding, concerned with guarding the 'turf' they have carved out for themselves. Between 1967 and 1969 UN agencies such as the FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank extended their mandates to include family planning and to work collaboratively on population issues. The mandates of individual agencies reflected the distinct role each was prepared to perform, but the exact tasks to be undertaken seemed unspecified (Symonds & Carder, 1973:190-1,3). In clarifying the population interests of UN agencies, Salas (1976:28) evinces the potential for overlapping, duplication and misunderstanding in the role of each agency, and over time it appears this has manifested itself. The seemingly unwritten understanding is that mandates of multilateral agencies should not clash with each other, although the activities undertaken are often duplicated. Mandates need to be ill-defined so as not to displease any party, but concise enough to ensure that the roles of agencies appear not to overlap, while simultaneously attracting funding for their activities. Competing NGOs only add to the confusion.

The way is open for friction between agencies, as they seek funding from a small group of sources. Arguably, if the definition of population assistance were clearer and
the mandates of individual agencies more precise, donor government support of one or any agency might decline:

If they [UNFPA] start including things like reproductive health, which is a possibility, then what's to prevent the World Health Organization from saying that well you know twenty percent of our work goes to that and – and there goes UNFPA's raison d'être. So everybody has to tread very carefully here, because it's a very political issue (International consultant A).

There is potential for similar dissension between UNFPA and UNESCO on education in population and family planning issues, UNFPA and UNICEF on MCH and lately UNFPA and UNAIDS on HIV/AIDS issues. Confounded mandates can only lead to confusion, duplication of projects and initiatives, and ultimately a waste of resources. Rather than complement each other, agencies often appear to act in direct competition (see for example Crane & Finkle, 1981:540-5), leaving administrators in developing countries bewildered by the multitude of conflicting directives and guidelines. Has the much-lauded Cairo Conference changed this situation?

3.3 ICPD: shedding new light?

In September 1994 delegates gathered in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, for the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the third decennial population conference sponsored by the UN. Previous conferences in Bucharest (1974) and Mexico City (1984) found a number of discords among the numerous delegates (see 4.4.3, 4.4.4) and a repeat performance was to be avoided. Following nine days of intense negotiations, that included a delay of nearly a week on the question of abortion and artificial contraception, the 180 conference delegations reached a consensus: the Programme of Action.

The Programme of Action theoretically drove out the ghost of demographic targets that had haunted population assistance, replacing it with notions of reproductive health and the empowerment of women. The Programme places the individual well-being of women and men at the centre of social development, with women in particular seen as the active agents of change and the beneficiaries of most services. It is a holistic approach that incorporates "poverty, women's status, and the structure of society as well as fertility per se" (Johnson, 1995:176), and is a clear recognition that previous population activities, which frequently failed to acknowledge individual human rights,
are undesirable. The re-emergence of concerns first advocated by Margaret Sanger, Lady Rama Rau, Elise Ottesen-Jensen and others marks the renaissance of concern for women's health and rights.

However, behind the scenes lay the same political motivations that have dogged population assistance, with most participants at ICPD pursuing their own agendas with varying degrees of vigour. The Americans, responding to the powerful influence of women's groups in the US, tried to make amends for the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations by soundly endorsing the rights and empowerment of women, and promoting the liberalisation of abortion legislation. The Holy See, on the other hand, opposed the use of language that insinuated the acceptance of artificial contraception, abortion, and any family form that contravened the Vatican's views. Numerous NGOs advocated their positions on such matters as women, family planning and the environment, and UNFPA pursued an agenda aimed at strengthening its area of responsibility and resource base (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995:224). The seasoned conference watchers McIntosh and Finkle (1995:224) concluded that:

... in addition to the serious business on the formal agenda, there were equally serious political agendas of the actors. In short, Cairo was a political conference.

Despite the initial euphoria surrounding the ICPD outcome, the Programme of Action is beset with difficulties. The Cairo Declaration gives agencies a new impetus to justify their work, but no clear consensus on priorities and agendas. Following the conference many were quick to produce details on how they viewed the document (see IPPF, 1995c; Nabarro, 1994). In the ICPD aftermath donors are trying to establish what the programme means in practice, with various gatherings and conferences (see Ashford, 1995; IPPF, 1995b) focusing on how to implement the plan. This period of inertia by donors is not without precedent, as demonstrated after the Bucharest Conference (see Miró, 1977:433). No doubt, several years will elapse before evidence of the new thinking is clearly visible at the programme level.

3.3.1 Cairo quandaries

The Cairo legacy has population agencies facing three major quandaries that make the notion of population assistance perplexing. The first problem is understanding what the new buzzwords mean in practice. The second is the status of population stabilisation
concerns and their connection to individual-centred activities, while the third relates to the uncertainty of future funding from primary donors.

3.3.1.1 Reproductive health and the empowerment of women

During the 1980s themes like population and development; population, resources and the environment; and population and peace helped to build a consensus on population. In the 1990s, bilateral and multilateral agencies and NGOs have rallied around the notions of empowering women and reproductive health:

The new emphasis on women's rights and female emancipation has led not so much to an evolution, as a revolution, in thinking about population (Johnson, 1995:28).

However, understanding what this means in practice seems a formidable task, especially given the all-inclusive ICPD definition:

Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant. In line with the above definition of reproductive health, reproductive health care is defined as the constellation of methods, techniques and services that contribute to reproductive health and well-being through preventing and solving reproductive health problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations, and not merely counselling and care related to reproduction and sexually transmitted diseases (paragraph 7.2. – International Conference on Population and Development, 1995a:202).

The activities prescribed by the ICPD document are equally numerous and as ill-defined as the scope of reproductive health itself:

All countries should strive to make accessible through the primary health-care system, reproductive health to all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015. Reproductive health care in the context of primary health care should, inter alia, include: family-planning counselling, information, education, communication and services; education and services for prenatal care, safe delivery, and post-natal care, especially breast-feeding and infant and women's health care; prevention and appropriate treatment of infertility; abortion as specified in paragraph 8.25, including prevention of abortion and the management of consequence of abortion; treatment of reproductive tract infections; sexually transmitted diseases and other reproductive health conditions; and information, education and counselling, as appropriate, on human sexuality, reproductive health and responsible parenthood (paragraph 7.6 – International Conference on Population and Development, 1995a:203).
This interpretation of reproductive health appears far too large for donor agencies to fully execute given their limited financial resources, a fact which even the Marxist feminist Hartmann (1995:137) accepts as being an impediment to providing quality programmes. Agencies will undoubtedly not want to carry out all these activities for a number of reasons. Abortion issues, for example, would cause problems for a number of agencies, while other activities go beyond the scope of many. However, by focusing on selected activities population agencies run the risk of falling into the hands of feminists who rightly fear that sexual and reproductive health components may be kept to a minimum (Hartmann, 1995:137). The key outstanding issue is trying to prioritise what aspects are important. Surely, this is the greatest problem of the document as it encompasses so much without touching upon what should be done.

Recognising the large scope, UNFPA has indicated that it will concentrate on only a handful of activities. In the words of one senior official:

So even with the ICPD, which could have easily led us in so many ways, we’ve tried to concentrate even within the reproductive health area on family planning and sexual health (Multilateral Official A).

Other agencies continue to place emphasis on providing family planning services. Is this what the delegates at Cairo had envisaged by the term ‘reproductive health’?

The international women’s movement is divided between those who view the Cairo document as a way to further their political objectives and those who wish to promote women’s health outside the scope of population agencies (Hartmann, 1995:139). If agencies are seen as working against the interests of women by limiting the range of activities then the so-called consensus is likely to falter.

3.3.1.2 The dilemma of population stabilisation

The Programme of Action acknowledges the salience of demographic goals for macro-level development but underscores that these can best be accomplished by meeting the needs of individuals and increasing the role of all groups in civil society in achieving sustainable development (UNFPA, 1995d: 2).

At international conferences before ICPD, macro-demographic issues, especially the attainment of population stabilisation, enjoyed significant attention; (see the 1989 Amsterdam Declaration - International Forum on Population in the Twenty-first Century, 1990), UNCED’s Agenda 21 (United Nations Conference on Environment and
Intensified efforts are needed in the coming 5, 10 and 20 years, in a range of population and development activities, bearing in mind the crucial contribution that early stabilization of the world population would make towards the achievement of sustainable development. The present Programme of Action addresses all those issues, and more, in a comprehensive and integrated framework designed to improve the quality of life of the current world population and its future generations (paragraph 1.11 - International Conference on Population and Development, 1995a:189).

adding that:

Nevertheless, the attainment of population stabilization during the twenty-first century will require the implementation of all the policies and recommendations in the present Programme of Action (paragraph 6.1 - International Conference on Population and Development, 1995a:199).

The population-development-environment debate appears divisive. It could be argued that the population agenda has been taken over by American feminists, whose values do not necessarily correspond with those of women and policymakers in developing countries. It appears that the population community is moving further away from its roots in the field of demography. As Johnson (1995:175) noted:

One of the paradoxes of the Cairo population conference, at least as far as the man on the Cairo omnibus was concerned, was how little of it seemed to be about population.

This state of affairs has led to disputes between the demographic and women’s rights camps of the population community (Harkavy, 1995:197-8). The demographic camp, rallying under the new banner of sustainable development, contends that population growth needs to be reduced. Numerous senior government representatives from Western countries (see Johnson, 1995:178-180; United Nations. General Assembly, 1993) have advocated the need for global population stabilisation. Protection of the environment has joined economic development and family welfare as the prime motivations. Women’s rights advocates disagree, maintaining that environmental arguments should not be used to promote population activities, and that women’s rights should not be used for achieving environmental ends. Harrison (1994:6), on the other hand, contends that feminist goals can only be achieved if environmental and economic arguments are also used to muster the necessary resources.
If stabilisation remains a primary objective then it is possible that the reproductive health approach focusing on improving women's health and welfare will be crowded out (Harkavy, 1995:194). Yet on the other side of the same coin, apprehension exists that reproductive health may not produce the desired decline in fertility rates (Kile, 1995:386-7).

As a result of these controversies, agencies find themselves in a quandary between their traditional commitments to reducing population growth and their pledges to the reproductive rights of women. The Clinton administration, for example, has committed itself to promoting:

... international consensus around the goal of stabilizing world population growth through a comprehensive approach to the rights and needs of women, to the environment and to development (United States, 1993b:403).

This point was later reiterated by USAID (1994b). Likewise, in the Children by Choice not Chance initiative, Britain's aid agency (United Kingdom. Overseas Development Administration, 1994) stated that:

The ODA is committed to improving reproductive health for people in developing countries, and enabling women and men to choose how many children they have and when they have them. Having children by choice not chance can result in substantial benefits for health, as well as helping to reduce rapid population growth.

Despite UNFPA's new line on reproductive health and empowering women, it is unlikely "to soon abandon attention to global problems in favour of a strictly women-centered agenda" (Harkavy, 1995:194). This sentiment was borne out by at least one senior official:

The numbers are still important ... growth rates do matter (Multilateral Official A).

A seemingly feasible way out of this position is offered by Sinding et al. (1994), who argue that if the unmet needs of women are satisfied through 'high-quality reproductive health services,' fertility will fall without the need to resort to targets. Nations concerned about reaching demographic goals need to take seriously measures for enhancing the status of women, as well as improving the quality of family planning services (Sinding et al., 1994:27). Implicitly, population agencies should focus their efforts on providing quality reproductive health programmes. However, there appears to be flaws in the argument, restricting the usefulness of this approach. Principally, the concept of unmet needs is questionable with regard to what it incorporates (Dixon-
Mueller & Germain, 1992), how the information is collected and what impact improved provisions for contraceptives would have on fertility levels (Pritchett, 1994:29-34). Any thesis based on such contentious data must surely find itself on less than solid ground. Yet beyond the data issue misgivings also exist in general with this doctrine.

There is nothing new in the idea that increased and improved family planning services will reduce fertility rates (see for example Gardner, 1968:335-8). Over the last three decades, much evidence has been presented to dispute this, questioning the assertion made by Sinding et al. Rehashing an idea that has been around for such a long time only invites scepticism as to why it should be true now. Other concerns with this notion come from the opposing camps of the population community. Some contend that reproductive health programmes will not bring about the substantial fertility reductions needed to prevent an ecological catastrophe. Feminists such as Hartmann (1995:62-3), on the other hand, maintain that, by emphasising ‘population control,’ family planning programmes in practice are frequently organised and implemented so “that they function in actual contradiction to the goal of individual welfare.” Indeed, she goes on to assert that in the 1990s “the sheep’s clothing is now the language of women’s rights” (Hartmann, 1995:112).

Fathalla (1994:148-9) contends that there is common ground between the two camps despite the extreme views. He maintains that the question is about means and not ends; a view shared by Johnson (1995:189). Essentially, Fathalla believes that both parties are striving to improve the quality of people’s lives, and that this can be achieved by providing more than just contraceptives.

A further question is whether or not developing countries will embrace the reproductive health notion with the same enthusiasm as donor agencies. The Cairo Declaration is little more than a statement of intent and does not bind signatories to ratify the recommendations into national law or indeed to act upon them. Statements made at ICPD (see Johnson, 1995:181-5) and other declarations make it clear that population growth remains a continuing concern in numerous countries; see Bali Declaration 1992 (Fourth Asian and Pacific Population Conference, 1992), Dakar Declaration 1993 (Third African Population Conference, 1993), and the Statement on Population Stabilization by World Leaders 1994 (Statement on Population Stabilization by World Leaders, 1994). Governments are unlikely to abandon their development priorities and demographic targets in favour of an apparent in vogue agenda, unless they
are convinced that this approach complies with their aspirations. Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than by the reluctance of governments to commit themselves to the Programme of Action before the section on principles had been agreed upon (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995:225-6). Specifically, the catchall first paragraph decrees that:

The implementation of the recommendations contained in the Programme of Action is the sovereign right of each country, consistent with national laws and development priorities, with full respect for the various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people, and in conformity with universally recognized international human rights (Chapter II – International Conference on Population and Development, 1995a:190).

While it is recognised that the principles of *jus gentium* and national sovereignty need to be upheld, it is nevertheless lamentable that many participants felt unable to sign without possible recourse to this clause. In the ‘feelgood’ atmosphere and euphoria surrounding ICPD, no country wanted to lose international credibility by refusing to take part in a consensus agreement. Delegates, however, were no doubt acutely aware that making promises at a world conference is relatively easy compared with the problems of realising those assurances at home. Lobby groups, religious factions, cultural sensitivities, social opposition and a lack of political will can all contribute to the plan not being fully implemented at the national level. Convincing politicians of the need to find funding for reproductive health, among the many other demands placed on limited domestic resources, requires clear goals and priorities. The noble objectives of the Programme of Action face numerous obstacles in generating such support primarily because “it [the Cairo Declaration] fails adequately to address the issue of rapid population growth, which many poor countries still consider the first priority” (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995:249-50).

It is thus difficult for population agencies to persuade unwilling countries to pay more than lip-service to reproductive health, especially as the above provision offers an effective safeguard when it is necessary to identify what progress has been achieved. By all accounts, the way of thinking in several countries is unlikely to change dramatically in the short run, and effective long-term change will require perseverance by the international community and committed advocates at the national level.

### 3.3.1.3 Mobilisation of resources

Unlike the two previous decennial conferences, the Cairo Declaration provides indicative figures on the resources needed for future programmes. Overall, the document

Funding the entire reproductive health package advocated by the document will be the decisive litmus test in judging the commitment of donors to their promises. Determining what now constitutes population assistance will depend on what donors are prepared to fund, and in the light of an extended and increasingly costly mandate this question is a contentious one. Given the broad understanding of reproductive health, there are fears that funds will be diluted as population assistance must now support a wider range of activities than before:

The mandate has been enlarged, but the funding hasn’t been enlarged in a proportional basis. So what we really have is in effect more family planning money going to – into health, with health money still – being used – not filtering down into family planning. So in effect some people, some cynics may argue ICPD is probably the best thing that could happen to the Vatican (NGO Official A).

There is evidence to suggest that this is the case. Germany, for example, announced that it had increased population aid by 37% in 1995, with $155 million going to family planning and another $127 million to population-related activities such as women’s programmes and girls’ education (People & the Planet, 1996:5). Previously, this latter group would not have been considered a part of population assistance, posing the question whether there has been an actual increase or not. Although total funds for population assistance doubled between 1990 and 1996, it is unclear whether this is real or only a reflection of the broadening of population assistance’s definition (Conly & de Silva, 1998:14).

Several donor governments expressed their willingness at Cairo to financially support the Programme of Action (see Johnson, 1995:199-200). Yet the heat of the moment was probably greater than their ability to keep their assurances, for there is
much uncertainty whether these pledges will be met. Without the commitment of the donor community the Cairo Plan will be nothing more than a "paper promise" (Sadik quoted in Johnson, 1995:199). Opinions on future funding commitments to population agencies vary from optimistic statements:

So we're [UNFPA] hoping to hit – you know – a billion dollar mark by the year 2000 in terms of our programming (Multilateral Official A).

to those who are indifferent:

I have no expectations on that [future funding] either hopeful nor negative (NGO Official A).

and finally to a seemingly more realistic view:

The shift in focus [to reproductive health] made sense to those who knew the problems of the third world first hand, but evidently failed to capture the hearts of western politicians or the minds of bureaucrats trying to balance budgets (Potts, 1996).

There is nothing new about the population community expressing their concern over future funding as it has been a persistent problem, justified or not (see Demeny, 1977:116; Nortman, 1987a; Salas, 1976:110-1). As with previous international population conferences it seems unlikely that the financial promises made by the donor community will be fully honoured. However, this time the outlook is potentially more bleak than before. With the persistence of 'aid fatigue' likely to continue and further cuts to aid budgets expected, few donors are displaying a willingness to fulfil their pledges.

In the aftermath of the conference funding does not seem to be forthcoming (see Conly, 1997a; Potts, 1996). Despite positive signs from Britain, Japan (People & the Planet, 1995), Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark (People & the Planet, 1996:5; Potts, 1996) in the immediate years after ICPD, recent funding cuts to population assistance agencies, particularly by America and Japan (Conly, 1997b:1; United States, 1997:213), raise questions over the willingness of the international community to meet their promises (see for example UNFPA, 1997a; 1997b:29). In 1996, donor contributions for population assistance amounted to just 35% of the year 2000 goal promised at Cairo (Conly & de Silva, 1998:4). It appears that many donors have yet to awake from the period of "hibernation" (NGO Official B) they entered following ICPD.
3.3.2 ICPD – Summary

In view of ICPD, the term population assistance has embarked on a reformation that will significantly change its concept. UNFPA has decided to follow a three-prong approach that focuses on ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive health services before 2015; the support of strategies that implement capacity-building in population programming; and advocacy of population and development issues and the mobilisation of resources (UNFPA, 1996b). In its first GPAR to take account of the changes since Cairo, UNFPA lists the following six functional categories according to ICPD paragraph 13.14. in defining population assistance:

1. Basic reproductive health services (Information, communication and education about reproductive health, diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, adequate counselling, prevention of infertility, abortion)

2. Family planning services (contraceptive commodities and service delivery)

3. Maternal, infant and child health (information and routine services for pre-natal, normal and safe delivery and post natal care)

4. Prevention of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS (mass media and in-school education programmes, promotion of voluntary abstinence, and expanded condom distribution)

5. Basic research, data and population and development policy analysis (includes support for census and survey work, and population and development research at universities and other institutions)

6. Population information, education and communication (for activities not previously listed such as population education in schools – UNFPA, 1997b:26-7)

The changes to these categories make comparisons with pre-1995 data problematic, if not impossible. Figures from 1995 onwards show an increase in population assistance (see 4.1, 4.2, 4.3), but how much of this is real and how much is due to the change in definition is unclear (Conly & de Silva, 1998:V,13; UNFPA, 1997b:1, 26).

Other agencies have also formulated their own post-Cairo vision in regard to activities and programmes. Some incorporate the new views by distancing themselves completely from the old ones:
We probably wouldn't even use population assistance any more. We would use reproductive health now I think (Bilateral official A).

Interestingly, despite the increased breadth of UNFPA's definition, the 1995 GPAR notes that the definitions used by some donor countries are still broader than the one it is presently employing (UNFPA, 1997b:33).

In the early 1980s, Wolfson (1983:9), (see also Wolfson, 1978:23) noted that:

... the range of activities that may be included under this heading [population assistance] is not only remarkably diverse, but would seem to be growing all the time.

Following ICPD the number of objectives and activities encapsulated under this term has become larger and arguably more unclear. The extremely broad Cairo understanding, while unleashing a new life for population agencies, poses the danger of losing direction by scattering aid over too wide a range of activities. Indeed, it could be claimed that in the absence of well-defined and measurable goals, donors have already lost direction as they decide on how best to incorporate the many activities that may be included under reproductive health into their programmes.

Population assistance's mandate has augmented over time as donors learnt from their faults and recognised the indisputable need to support more than just the provision of contraceptives. By accommodating political sensitivities and changing philosophies the scope of activities was forced to expand. Yet in this jumble of apparent incongruous agendas it would be fair to ask what objective(s) agencies are really trying to achieve: lowering fertility, the less certain socioeconomic development notion, or the seemingly obfuscated reproductive health argument. What started off with the relatively clear – but with hindsight politically and socially unacceptable – aim of lowering fertility rates by providing family planning provisions, now runs the risk of becoming an over-ambitious reproductive health supermarket where donors and recipients can place those objectives and activities to which they aspire into their shopping trolleys, leaving the rest on the shelves.

There can be no doubt that the status quo is unacceptable and that post-Cairo ambiguities only highlight the necessity for donors to reach a consensus on what constitutes population assistance, what the ultimate aims and objectives are, and the type of programmes that population agencies should be delivering. This is a task made
difficult by the number of donors involved, their differing priorities and a general lack of will:

And it [lack of consensus] will remain a problem until everyone in the donor community agrees on a certain definition and I don’t know how and when that's ever going to happen (International consultant A).

Like other aid establishments, population agencies are confronting new realities that demand fresh approaches. The Cairo challenge should give population agencies sufficient impetus to change their organisational culture, to discard antiquated ideas and to strive in new directions. It remains to be seen whether there will be a real shift in the types of programmes delivered or just some fine tuning to existing strategies.

No one would deny that improving the status of women through education and access to economic and political power is a desirable goal in its own right, an objective to which the entire development community should aspire, not just population agencies. Here though lies the problem. By wanting to guard their territory, population agencies are likely to be over-confident in their perceptions of what they can achieve, not admitting that what is required appears to exceed the scope of their competencies and financial capabilities. Other agencies need to become involved, but are restrained by population agencies' insistence on controlling what they see as theirs. If the Programme of Action is to be fully implemented, then it should be seen not only as a holistic approach to population, but also as a framework to which the development community can contribute to improve individuals' well-being.

3.4 Conclusion

Population assistance seems to reflect population agencies' vacillation on what they are trying to achieve and the modus operandi to realise their goals. Altering approaches because of changing perceptions of the population problem, coupled with the differing mandates and preoccupations of individual agencies, have perpetuated a lack of consensus on what the term population assistance actually means. The 1994 Programme of Action just adds to the confusion. It is no wonder that coming to grips with a concept as enigmatic as population assistance appears onerous.

Accounting may be a creative and inexact science at the best of times, but with no clear guidelines on what is being accounted for matters become blurred. In relation to defining aid for statistical purposes the OECD (1985: 171) maintains that:
It is important that bilateral and multilateral donors work with concepts and data which are internationally understood and comparable.

The same should apply for population assistance. Sound and comparable statistical information is necessary for policymakers and donors to make decisions throughout the world, for without these data there can be no certainty on the magnitude, distribution and effectiveness of population assistance. Until all parties concerned agree upon a definition, caution needs to be exercised in interpreting population assistance statistics. Bearing this in mind, Part Two of this thesis examines population assistance trends using available data.
Part Two

Population Assistance Trends

4. The how, who, what, why of global population assistance trends

4.1. How much has been allocated?

4.1.1. Funding in current and constant dollars.
4 The how, who, what, why of global population assistance trends

Whereas Part One of this thesis reviewed the nature of population assistance, Part Two investigates long-term trends by assessing donor commitments for population assistance in Chapter Four and the geographical disbursement in Chapter Five.

This chapter analyses global funding trends for population assistance by asking four questions: How much has been allocated?, By whom?, What channel was used? and Why did these funding patterns occur? The first three questions are addressed using a variety of graphs and tables to illuminate population assistance trends. Data for this chapter come from UNFPA’s Global Population Assistance Reports and articles written by the Fund’s staff. As suggested in Chapter Three, some caution should be exercised in interpreting the data; particularly for 1995 onwards when UNFPA changed the definition of population assistance in accordance with the ICPD goals (see 3.3.2).

The fourth question is examined by dissecting population assistance trends into five distinct epochs: thwarted efforts until the mid-1960s; population hysteria; 1974 Bucharest Conference; 1984 Mexico City debacle and finally the 1990s. A number of decisive events characterise each period, and together they produce an account of the most salient points for elucidating trends in population assistance.

4.1 How much has been allocated?

4.1.1 Funding in current and constant dollars

Population assistance funding until the mid-1960s was relatively negligible amounting to only $2 million in the period to 1960 and $18 million to 1965 (Johnson, 1994:101). However, by 1970 it had increased rapidly to $125 million and to nearly $350 million in 1977. Figure 4.1 shows the development of global population assistance funds in both current and constant terms.
The period of most rapid increase was between 1967 and 1972 when primary funds for population assistance grew more than fivefold from $30 million to $187 million, at an annual average increase of 36.6%. However, by the late 1970s the rate of funding increase had slowed down considerably. Between 1975 and 1985 funds grew by an annual rate of 7.5% in current terms, while in the 1980s funds population assistance rose on average by 7% per year. Funding in the early 1990s rose inconsistently. The nearly 25% increase between 1994 and 1995 can largely be explained by the change in UNFPA’s definition of population assistance (see 3.3.2).

In constant dollars (1985$) the story is similar. Between 1961 and 1967 the real annual growth rate was 24.7%, while between 1967 and 1972 funds for population assistance rose in real terms by 32.0% annually. Annual increases for population assistance in real terms levelled off from 1975 until the early 1990s, with annual increases of around 2.5%. This trend has lead some analysts to comment that:

In real terms there was no significant growth in donor contributions during most of the 1970s and 1980s (Conly & Speidel, 1993:9-10).

Between 1990 and 1994, population assistance increased by 9.9% annually in real terms. The change in population assistance’s definition help account for the over 20% jump in real terms between 1994 and 1995.

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14 Primary funds refer to the monetary sums for population assistance originating from primary donors (developed countries, multilateral and private sources), which flow to developing countries either directly or through intermediate donors. Funds are given as either a grant or a loan. Grants do not require repayment, whereas loans need to be repaid with interest. Because their primary funds fluctuate widely, owing to the allocation of block loans in a single year that are intended to be expended over several, development bank loans are not considered as primary funds in this analysis (UNFPA, 1996a:6, 10).
Figure 4.1 Global Population Assistance, 1961-1995

Sources: 1961-1970 Gille, 1979: Table II
1971-1982 Thavarajah & Rao, 1987: Table 1
1983-1989 UNFPA, 1991: Table 1
1990-1995 UNFPA, 1997b: Table 2
Note: Includes funding from development banks
The picture presented in Figure 4.1, however, is somewhat misleading as it considers development banks. Given that banks provide multi-year loans that need to be repaid, it seems sensible to separate the two. Unfortunately, the data available do not make this distinction possible before 1982. Others who have assessed these data demonstrate the disparities of including development banks into overall funding trends (UNFPA, 1992:5).

The annual average increase was around 2.5% from 1980 to 1990 in real terms. Funding rose marginally more in real terms between 1990 and 1994 from $662 million to 873 million, at an annual rate of increase of 6.9%. However, Figure 4.2 does not reveal such a dramatic rise in funding in the 1990s as in Figure 4.1, illustrating the effect of funding from development banks. Again, the large increase in both current and constant terms reflects the change in population assistance’s definition.

Figure 4.2 Global Population Assistance excluding development banks 1980-1995

Sources: 1980-1989 UNFPA, 1991:Table 1
1990-1995 UNFPA, 1997b:Table 2
4.1.2 Percentage of Official Development Assistance

Dollar amounts are not necessarily the best way of gauging the commitment of a country to population assistance, as countries differ in their available resources. A more meaningful indicator is the share of ODA going to population assistance. Moreover, this measure discounts the problems with loans from development banks.

Fluctuations in primary funds of donor countries for population assistance as a percentage of ODA are shown in Figure 4.3. The magnitude of population assistance has not kept pace with overall ODA. In the 1970s, the percentage of ODA remained over 2%; it reached its zenith of 2.3% in 1974 and 1976. In 1977 it fell under 2% and stayed so until 1995. Indeed, funding in the 1980s averaged only around 1.2% of ODA.

Funding for population assistance appears to have increased before the 1974, 1984 and 1994 United Nations organised international population conferences (see 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5) and declined in subsequent years.

**Figure 4.3 Primary funds for population assistance as percentage of ODA for all donor nations, 1961-1995**

Sources: 1961-1976 Gille, 1979: Table I
1977-1982 Thavarajah & Rao, 1987: Table 2
1983 UNFPA, 1991: Table 5

Note: Figures from 1984 onwards are for all donor countries not just the main DAC members.
4.2 By whom?

4.2.1 Sources of primary funds

Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of funds for population assistance originating from four different sources. In the period 1952-59, over 90% of funds came from private sources, with most of the funding from developed nations being channelled through NGOs. However, since the 1960s developed countries have been the main source of funding, although the relative proportion has fluctuated. In the early 1970s, the World Bank started giving funds for population activities and is now the second largest contributor of funds. Private foundations have lost their relative importance of earlier years, while funding from multilateral sources remains minimal.

Figure 4.4 Source of funding for population assistance, 1952-1995

Sources: 1952-1988 UNFPA, 1991: Table 1
1989-1992 UNFPA, 1994c: Table 2
1993-1995 UNFPA, 1997b: Table 2
4.2.2 The United States versus other DAC members

All DAC members have at one time or another contributed to population assistance. In 1995, eleven donor countries contributed 96% of funds, with nearly half coming from just one country: the United States. In descending order the major donors were: USA (48%), Germany (11%), Japan and United Kingdom (7%), Netherlands (6%), Denmark (4%), Canada, Norway and Sweden (3%), Australia and Finland (2% each) (UNFPA, 1997b: 13).

Developed countries may be the main source of funds, but there are large differences between them. Figure 4.5 shows that the United States has been the main donor country of population assistance providing more than half of all funding, although its percentage share has steadily declined. Before 1974, the US provided over 75% of all donor government contributions to population assistance, while in 1994 this figure was just under 50%. In particular, the introduction of the Mexico City Policy by the Reagan administration (see 4.4.4) resulted in a large decline in the years after 1985. Recent funding from the US has at best been mixed and usually erratic. The figure for 1994 was $430 million (People & the Planet, 1994:5); $546 million in 1995 and slashed in 1996 to a de facto level of $72 million (Potts, 1996).

Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) have historically been generous with their funding (see Figure 4.5). In recent years, Japan and Germany have increased their share, while the performance of the United Kingdom and Canada has fluctuated. Of interest is the growing size of the ‘Others’ category, which essentially consists of other DAC members.

Actual sums need to be put into perspective by assessing the allocation as a proportion of the aid budget. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6 show large discrepancies between donors. Until 1994, Norway was the most generous donor in terms of the percentage of ODA allocated to population activities, reaching a peak of 12.6% in 1976. In general, the Scandinavians have been the largest donors in terms of population assistance funding per capita. Small and mainly Catholic European states such as Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain have given the least.

Figure 4.6 also notes the years of the United Nations’ decennial population conferences (1974, 1984, 1994). Funding as a percentage of ODA increased before all three conferences, and fell in the years succeeding the 1974 and 1984 conferences. Table
4.1 shows that population assistance funding as a percentage of ODA from Australia, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States declined in the years following the 1984 conference. Evidence suggests that this pattern will continue following ICPD in 1994.

Several international conferences have recommended an increase in population assistance. The 1979 Colombo Declaration of the International Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development called for an annual target of one billion dollars for “international population assistance” by 1984 (International Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development, 1979:734). The 1981 Jakarta Conference recommended that donor governments increase their funding to 5% of ODA (Landman, 1981:68), while at the 1989 International Forum on Population in the 21st Century the donor community agreed “to increase significantly the proportion of their development assistance going to population assistance” (International Forum on Population in the Twenty-first Century, 1990:191), and to raise the proportion of ODA going to population assistance to 4%.\textsuperscript{15} As with the magical 0.7% of GNP for overall ODA objective, only Scandinavian donors have met or have come close to achieving these aims. There appears to be little willingness in most donor countries to reach these targets in the near future, highlighting a gap between rhetoric and financial pledges (see 3.3.1.3).

Except for the United States, where Congress directly establishes the level of population assistance within the annual foreign aid budget, the decision on how much of ODA flows to population rests generally with the bureaucracy, influenced by the commitment of influential ministers such as Gro Brundtland in Norway, Baroness Chalker in the United Kingdom, and Australia’s Gordon Bilney (see 7.2). According to Conly and Speidel (1993:16), the low percentage of ODA allocated to population programmes reflects on senior aid officials who often lack a “knowledge of the success and cost-effectiveness of family planning programmes.” Heightened religious opposition  

\textsuperscript{15} Although this target is frequently cited by advocates of population assistance (see for example Conly \& Speidel, 1993:7), the Amsterdam Declaration never made this recommendation. The Declaration calls for a doubling of population assistance funding from $4.5 million (1987 dollars) to $9.0 million by the year 2000 (International Forum on Population in the Twenty-first Century, 1990:190). Given that population assistance accounted for around 2% of global ODA at the time of the conference, doubling this figure gives 4%.
to family planning in some donor countries and the desire of bureaucrats to avoid the anxieties, controversies and problems linked with dealing in this culturally sensitive field may also explain the variations between nations.
Figure 4.5 Primary Funds of Donor Countries for Population Assistance, 1971-1995

Source: 1971-1981 Pierce, 1987:Table1
1982-1983 UNFPA, 1991:Table 3
1984-1993 UNFPA, 1995a:Table A1
1994-1995 UNFPA, 1997b:Table A1
### Table 4.1. Primary funds for population assistance as a percentage of ODA by donor nation 1973-1995

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* West Germany until reunification in 1990.

**Sources:**
- 1973-1976 Gille, 1979: Table III
- 1977-1982 Thavarajah & Rao, 1987: Table 3
- 1983-1989 UNFPA, 1991: Table 5
Figure 4.6 Primary funds for population assistance as a percentage of ODA by donor nation 1973-1995
4.3 What channel was used?

The channels through which donors choose to administer their commitments vary considerably from country to country. Some prefer to direct all their population assistance towards multilaterals, especially UNFPA, or through a combination of multilaterals and NGOs. Most donor governments, however, use all three available channels including their own bilateral agency.

In the 1950s, NGOs were both the principal source of funding and the main channel of assistance. Sweden became the first bilateral donor to fund population activities in 1958. In the mid-1960s, the United States and the United Kingdom began providing bilateral funds for population activities, and by the early 1970s they were joined by several other developed countries.

The involvement of donors in the domestic affairs of developing countries often led to noisy resentment in the 1960s and 1970s, and eventually people in the donor countries came to see the bilateral aid programme as the source of this hostility. Ways were sought in which the transfer of resources could continue without bilateral involvement. It comes as no surprise then that during this period support for multilateral institutions grew, especially in the US Congress where many representatives developed a distaste for bilateral involvement with recipients. The move towards multilateral institutions was favoured by idealistic internationalists and by many others who believed that ODA needed to shift away from domestic political entanglements. Recipients also welcomed the move away from dependence on a particular donor or set of donors (Wall, 1973:131-2).

While population assistance noticed this overriding ODA, there were other factors unique to it that led to increased funding through multilaterals and NGOs in the late 1960s and 1970s. With the exception of the United States, donor governments tended to channel funds through both multilateral and NGOs agencies (Hankinson, 1974:32), essentially to guard themselves against being labelled as instigators of imperialism, racism and genocide (Finkle & McIntosh, 1994:9).

In the past many people in the donor capitals were worried that population would be seen as an activity of the white man against the non-white man and that therefore it was suitable if the UN, which is I mean racially certainly neutral and which has ...er... more people from developing countries in the senior positions in the population field, that this
would show the neutrality of the activity better and therefore was a better way (Multilateral Official B).

Despite its extensive bilateral programme, the United States government also acknowledged that there were certain circumstances where it would be appropriate to use other channels. The 1975 report into global population growth and the implications for the United States and global security, *National Security Study Memorandum 200* (NSSM 200), recommended that:

In countries where US assistance is limited either by the nature of political and diplomatic relations with those countries [high and low priority countries] or by lack of strong government desire [sic]. In population reduction programs, external technical and financial assistance (if desired by the countries) would have to come from other donors and / or from private and international organizations, many which receive a contribution from AID (Mumford, 1996:502).

The wariness of donor governments over charges of genocide and neo-imperialism, and their subsequent directing of funds through non-bilateral channels, meant that organisations like UNFPA and IPPF had plenty of capital in the 1970s, as the following statements confirm:

In the seventies and eighties, early eighties funding was abundant (NGO Official A).

UNFPA’s first executive director Rafael Salas (1979:105) noted:

The Fund has grown rapidly ... demonstrating in no uncertain terms the rise in governmental uneasiness in regard to population.

And in 1973 that:

The international community is showing an increasing preference for the multilateral approach when dealing with population questions. This is to be compared to the attitude towards development assistance generally, where the emphasis has from the outset been on bilateral programmes (Salas, 1979:148).

The figures for this period are telling. In 1971, 61.5% of population assistance went through bilateral channels, compared to 13.1% for multilateral and 25.3% for NGO channels. As other developed countries joined the United States in providing funds, and as UNFPA established itself, the share directed through bilateral channels decreased. By 1975, only 45.1% of population assistance went through bilateral channels (still overwhelmingly the USA), and 37.2% and 17.7% through multilateral and NGO channels (Gille, 1979:391-2).
In 1983, Wolfson (1983:18) noted that in no other development field were donors directing so much funding through multilateral channels, in preference to their own aid programmes. In the early 1980s, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands channelled most of their population assistance through UNFPA (Herz, 1984:15). For many bilateral agencies population assistance was equivalent to family planning and, therefore, unsuitable for direct development assistance. Bilateral officials described such obstacles as a lack of "hardware" in population projects, assistance not necessarily reaching the poorest, the labour-intensity of family planning programmes and difficulties in monitoring projects, as hindrances for further bilateral aid (Wolfson, 1983:19).

By 1990, nearly one-third of population assistance still went through multilateral channels, but take the United States out of this equation and the figure was over 60% (Conly & Speidel, 1993:21). However, there has been a move away from the intermediate donors, as the capabilities of such international organisations as UNFPA and IPPF came into question in the early 1990s:

... concerns about the relative effectiveness and the real absorptive capacity of the major international population institutions have made some donors hesitant to commit significant additional funds through multilateral channels (Conly & Speidel, 1993:13).

The proportion of population assistance going through multilateral channels (see Figure 4.7) fell from 40.4% in 1984 to 21.0% in 1995. In the same period funds through NGO channels rose from 28.0% to 42.4%, probably reflecting a rise in the number of developed country NGOs involved in this field and the expanded activities of some USAID Co-Operating Agencies.

Countries that put a large share of their funding through NGOs include France, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States (UNFPA, 1997b: 30-3). A substantial proportion of America's NGO funding is directed through USAID's Co-Operating Agencies. Generally, those countries which commit small amounts to population assistance (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands), and which also lack technical expertise in this field, direct all or most of their funding to UNFPA (Sinding & Quandt, 1993:156).
Figure 4.7 Population assistance expenditures by channel of distribution, 1982-1995

Sources: 1982-1992 UNFPA, 1994c: Table 3.
1993-1995 UNFPA, 1997b: Table 3.

Note: Development banks are not included as the loan agreements are expended over several years.

Bilateral funding in current dollars from all donors grew between 1982 and 1990 at a faster pace than assistance through all channels (Harrington, 1993:167). Figure 4.7 indicates a larger proportion of funding going through bilateral channels in 1995 over previous years in the 1990s. Eleven out of the 18 donor governments used bilateral channels for population assistance in 1990 (Harrington, 1993:165), while in 1994 the figure was twelve out of 22 donors (UNFPA, 1996a:28-31). The largest bilateral contributor remains the United States, although it no longer dominates the funding scene to the same extent as it once did. In 1990, 67.2% of bilateral assistance from all donor countries came from America, down slightly from 78.3% in 1982. United States funding through bilateral channels increased substantially in the 1980s rising from 38.0% in 1982 to 63.1% in 1989 (Harrington, 1993:166-7). Ness and Thomas (1989:10) attribute the increase to the redirecting of population assistance from multilateral to bilateral channels in line with the Mexico City Policy (see 4.4.4).
Increased levels of bilateral funding reflects the donor establishments’ growing sophistication, the dissipation of mistrust displayed by developing countries and the mounting dissatisfaction with multilaterals and NGOs:

Now many developing countries are quite sophisticated and say no, no we see it in full and we have no more sort of hang-up of taking bilateral money and therefore and then – There is a general tendency in parliament to prefer bilateral over multilateral, notably in the big countries which have their own administration (Multilateral Official B).

Harrington (1993:165) contends that only the bilateral channel can accommodate the increased funding pledged by donors. The imposed ceiling set by several bilateral agencies on contributions going through multilateral channels, means that an increased amount for population assistance would only take funds away from other international organisations. Such restrictions do not exist for bilateral assistance.

In line with moves to improve accountability and efficiency, both UNFPA and IPPF are finding funds from primary donors becoming increasingly earmarked either for a specific geographical region, for a particular activity such as maternal and child health projects, or to the procurement of supplies from the respective donor country. Multi-bi funding, as this practice is called, is where the donor designates the purposes to which a part of its contribution is to be used. In the words of UNFPA:

The aim of UNFPA multi/bi is to bring together multilateral and bilateral donors to assist developing countries in their population programmes and projects. UNFPA multi-bi can be used to assist developing countries in formulating national programmes or specific projects, and enlisting the co-operation of donor agencies, to provide resources for their implementation. Or UNFPA can simply act as a ‘go-between’ in bringing together donor governments and developing countries to provide support for population activities (UNFPA Multi/bi pamphlet cited in Salas, 1979:111).

Initiated as a way to “narrow the gap between the demand for population activities and resources available to UNFPA”, (UNFPA, 1977b:13; see also UNFPA, 1975) more funds are now being allocated in this fashion as primary donors make sure that their finite resources are used for prescribed programmes in countries they see as important. Thirty-three percent of IPPF’s income in 1995 was restricted to certain types of activities or countries, up from 23% one year earlier and just 8% in 1989 (IPPF, 1990b:16; 1995a:177; 1996b:III/3). UNFPA is experiencing a similar predicament:

In addition to our core resources ... we do have a programme of extra-budgetary resources, it’s called our multi-bi programme. And we have quite a number of donors involved, 19 to be exact (Multilateral official A).
4.4 Why did these trends occur?

According to Hodgson and Watkins (1997), two social movements have been instrumental in influencing international policies on population issues: feminism and neo-Malthusianism. The neo-Malthusian thesis is that excessive population is a major cause of poverty and that prosperity will occur by lowering fertility, while the underlying belief among feminists is that inequality between men and women needs to be addressed. Focusing on the United States, the pre-eminent international policy actor in population matters, Hodgson and Watkins examine the interactions between the two movements and how both have shaped "reproductive behaviour by influencing state policy" (Hodgson & Watkins, 1997:472). They divide the population debate in the post-World War II era into four periods in which important events occurred for either or both movements, and illustrate each movement's effect on the policies of successive American administrations. In global funding for population assistance, these two movements have also had a profound effect, although by no means an exclusive one. While ignoring specific instances affecting the decision-making process in one country or another, the remainder of this chapter identifies events that had an international effect in shaping funding for population assistance.

4.4.1 Thwarted efforts: until the mid-1960s

While ancient scholars such as Aristotle, Plato (Kile, 1995:16-21; Riddle, 1992:18) and Tertullian (Holland, 1993) expressed concerns over population numbers, it was not until the twentieth century that cries for international intervention were forcefully voiced. In the early 1920s, at a time when most European states were preoccupied with depopulation, Malthusian leagues were urging the European-dominated League of Nations to study birth control questions and to limit membership to those countries that restricted birth rates to a level that avoided the need for territorial expansion. Margaret Sanger and fellow birth controllers16 organised the 1927 World Population Conference to discuss population growth and its consequences, which led to the formation of the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems (IUSSP). The

16 In the official programme, Sanger's name and those of her co-workers were removed for fear that the eminent scientists would resent a woman being responsible as organiser (Symonds & Carder, 1973:12).
pressure exerted by those opposed to birth control forced the organisers not to mention this or Malthusianism. Nevertheless, the apparent connection between these concepts and the conference dissuaded some delegates from attending. In particular, divisions among senior officials over these issues led to the League of Nations’ non-participation. With the tightening of American immigration restrictions, especially in response to the Great Depression, migration became an issue for the League as citizens from ‘overpopulated’ European states could no longer emigrate. Axis powers asserted their demands for territorial expansion, while others urged a return to the free movement of people. The tentative steps in the mid-1930s by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to establish an organisation regulating population movements amounted to little in the political climate before the Second World War (Suitters, 1973:3-4; Symonds & Carder, 1973:3-4, 11-19).

American demographers in the 1940s and 1950s became increasingly interested in developing countries, and by the early 1950s several were convinced that the adoption of birth control measures in largely agrarian societies could foster economic growth and maintain a democratic system (see 3.1). As large sums of aid were being spent to halt the communist threat, demographers found themselves sidelined as religious and societal prejudices against birth control made government support of family planning measures overseas unthinkable (Szreter, 1993:680-1). Other donor governments also expressed little interest in supporting population activities as part of their aid programme. Sweden was a notable exception when SIDA signed an agreement with Ceylon in 1958 to provide materials and training to an experimental family planning project (Michanek, 1969:95, 103-5; Wolfson, 1983:103). The United Kingdom began its bilateral support in 1964 (Wolfers, 1969:123), and Denmark followed in December 1966 with a grant to the Indian family planning programme to examine the suitability of Danish IUDs (Kastoft, 1969:117).

NGOs, on the other hand, were not as reluctant as their bilateral counterparts. Over previous decades, the planned parenthood movement had gathered momentum with the establishment of birth control clinics in the United States, Europe and India. In 1952 delegates from 14 countries attending the World Conference on Planned Parenthood in Bombay founded the International Planned Parenthood Federation as the umbrella organisation of private family planning associations throughout the world (Suitters, 1973:50-6). Stirred by the multiplicity of population questions, and disheartened by his
own foundation's inaction, John D. Rockefeller III established the Population Council in the same year, as an institute dedicated towards understanding population problems (Harkavy, 1995:20; Population Council, 1978:1,3). The Ford Foundation also entered the population field in 1952 with a grant to the Population Reference Bureau. However, over-caution meant that the Foundation did not start to support activities in developing countries until 1959, with a grant to the Indian Ministry of Health (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1986:31-2, 42; Harkavy, 1995:9, 32). And finally, after shaking off its uneasiness over birth control, the Rockefeller Foundation formed a population programme in 1963 (Harkavy, 1995:43-4). Until large-scale governmental resources became available in the late 1960s, these four non-governmental organisations were the main sources for population activities (Gille, 1979:379).

Several changes began in the early 1960s. Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) surveys suggested that a significant number of people in developing countries were willing to learn how to control their fertility, giving demographers a strong argument against their critics (Hodgson, 1983:23-4). Indeed, demographers built up a substantial arsenal of research and activities to intellectually justify the promotion of government organised family planning programmes and to advance this view (Szreter, 1993:681). Other professionals involved with the socioeconomic development of developing countries began to view population growth as a reason for not achieving development targets. They were active in wanting antinatalist policies and an enhanced role for the United Nations (Symonds & Carder, 1973:xv-xvi). More importantly, changes in attitudes and contraceptive behaviour, and wider use of contraception in Western societies, especially the United States, made discussions on birth control less fraught with disdain. Public opinion polls in America showed an increase in the percentage of people supporting aid for birth control in the decade between 1959 and 1968 (Piotrow, 1973:26-31).

Overall, five key factors (Finkle & McIntosh, 1994:6-7) helped population assistance find legitimacy among the donor community and developing countries during the 1960s. First, many development efforts were not achieving the over-optimistic results that had been envisaged. Second, following several censuses in 1960-61 there was a realisation that populations throughout the world were growing faster than initially thought. Third, some developing countries started to express the view that population growth was an obstacle to development, particularly in Asia. Indeed, a number (Pakistan
1960, South Korea 1961, Sri Lanka 1965, Singapore 1965, Malaysia 1966) introduced a range of policies and programmes. Fourth, the introduction of the IUD was seen as a safe, reversible, inexpensive, efficient and easy-to-monitor contraceptive. This led to the hope that programmes could be implemented in areas where the distribution networks and the motivation of users was weak. The final, and possibly the most important factor, was the reversal by the Johnson administration in 1965 of the "That's not our business" (President Eisenhower, December 1959 cited in Piotrow, 1973:45) position on foreign aid for birth control taken by its predecessors.

Although it had provided support for statistical activities since the early 1950s, the United Nations did not play a leading role until it instigated several committees and resolutions on population in the early 1960s. By adopting Resolution 2211 (XXI) in December 1966, the General Assembly resolved that technical assistance for population should be made available when requested as part of UN development assistance, opening the way for the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Population Activities in July 1967. Over the next decade or so Western countries "developed a vested interest in strengthening the mandate of the United Nations in population activities," and UN resolutions "had the important effect of conferring legitimacy on efforts of western donor nations to provide population assistance to developing countries through both bilateral and multilateral channels" (Finkle & Crane, 1975:107).

4.4.2 Population hysteria

The 1959 Draper Committee report into the US aid programme highlighted the link between economic development and population growth. It recommended that assistance for birth control information should be made available to any country that requested it, and that America should involve itself in formulating policies to tackle rapid population growth (Piotrow, 1973:40-1). However, during the 1960 Presidential campaign, both President Eisenhower and his challenger John F. Kennedy avoided the divisive topic of birth control to bolster their electoral chances (Piotrow, 1973:43-8).

Despite the public reluctance shown by the Kennedy administration to address the heightened concerns over world population growth, events were unfolding on several fronts. Advocates both within the State Department and Congress joined scientists, demographers and other activists in promoting the need for a policy. Congress, in particular, took leadership on the population issue and urged reluctant government
agents, including USAID, to act (Piotrow, 1973:55-65, XV). For several years, advocates such as Draper, Hugh Moore, John and politicians like Lyndon Johnson were drawn into the population field. However, supporters were frustrated by the reluctance shown by both the White House and USAID (Piotrow, 1973:64).

Floods, droughts and inattention to agricultural production precipitated widespread food shortages in many developing countries in the mid-1960s. In 1965 and 1966 monsoonal rains failed to arrive in India, and by 1965 the food deficit came to public attention in the United States. For many observers such shortages highlighted the inability of rapidly growing populations to feed themselves. This unprecedented opportunity to document a "genuine Malthusian Crisis" by statisticians helped to raise the population problem up the American political agenda (Piotrow, 1973:112). Shortly thereafter the alarming book *Famine – 1975!*, which argued that population growth and limited food production would lead to massive famines and subsequent civil unrest in developing countries from 1975 onwards (Paddock & Paddock, 1967:8), gave activists in Congress the opportunity to voice their views for massive government action (Piotrow, 1973:113).

Between 1965 and 1967 American efforts moved into "second gear" (Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters, Philander Claxton, cited in Piotrow, 1973:121) from being a passive policy of responding to requests to an active programme of persuading governments and organisations to take initiatives. By 1967, President Johnson declared in his State of the Union Address, that:

> Next to the pursuit of peace, the really great challenge to the human family is the race between food supply and population increase. That race tonight is being lost. The time for rhetoric has clearly passed. The time for concerted action is here, and we must get on with the job (cited in Piotrow, 1973:132).

Despite President's Johnson announcement in February 1967 to establish an "Office of the War on Hunger to consolidate all AID activities relating to hunger, population problems and nutrition", USAID remained reluctant to undertaking population assistance (Piotrow, 1973:127, 131). However, continuing Congressional

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17 In an ironic twist the commending words in the Foreword of Piotrow's book were written by the then US Ambassador to the United Nations, George Bush, who later as American President maintained the controversial Mexico City Policy introduced under the Reagan administration.
pressure, as well as having funds earmarked for population assistance in the foreign aid budget, ensured attitudes among senior USAID bureaucrats had to change (Piotrow, 1973:132-8). In September 1967, USAID issued a basic directive on assistance for population programmes that pronounced among other things:

>The desired action [population programmes] must be undertaken soon enough and on a broad scale to prevent a food-and-population disaster of sweeping proportions (USAID, 1968:11).

‘Population hysteria’ had arrived, bringing with it an age of apocalyptic prognostications and advocacy of rigorous population measures.

Paul Ehrlich’s *Population Bomb* became the centre of widespread interest following its release in 1968. Focusing on the “inevitable population-food crisis” (Ehrlich, 1968:17), his thesis proved to be “one of the most potent factors in creating popular support for large-scale efforts to control population growth in the Third World during the sixties and seventies” (Harkavy, 1995:16; see also Donaldson & Tsui, 1990:11; Wilmoth & Ball, 1992:650). Ehrlich (1968:166) asserted that overpopulation was the greatest threat facing humanity, and urged that “we [Americans] must be relentless in pushing for population control around the world”.

The populist approach taken by Ehrlich, and his zeal in voicing his opinions at every opportunity, helped capture the interest of the US public. American popular magazines during this period focused extensively on the consequences of rapid population growth (Wilmoth & Ball, 1992:650). Media attention of this kind did much to push population questions to new heights of communal awareness and engagement. Subsequent neo-Malthusian publications such as the 1972 Club of Rome *The Limits of Growth* (Meadows *et al.*, 1972) fuelled the debate well into the 1970s (Neurath, 1994:71). Undoubtedly such heightened public anxieties in developed countries over global population issues had a significant bearing on the actions taken by their governments (see 6.3.3).

Ehrlich’s resolve, however, should be placed into context. While being influential in its own right, his book also fitted into the wider political and ideological concerns of the time. Western policymakers and their conservative public, fearful of communism
spreading to post-colonial states, saw family planning as a safe liberal development policy. As Szreter (1993:682) points out:

The intellectual legacy of a decade of thwarted intentions, encouraged by the implications of international ideological competition in the 1960s and 1970s, resulted in an overly dogmatic and rigid commitment to family planning activism ...

America's self-confidence in being able to solve any problem was at its zenith (Donaldson, 1990a:31) and successive administrations were ready and willing to become involved in the internal affairs of other nations to deal with perceived vexatious issues.

No other person in the population field personifies this problem-solving assuredness more than USAID's first Director of the Office of Population, Reimert Ravenholt. His resolute conviction that supplying contraceptives alone was the only means of dealing with population growth stamped America's population assistance to developing countries (Donaldson, 1990a:101-2; Harkavy, 1995:47). Without his dynamism and single-mindedness, USAID's population programme might never have reached the size and scope it did in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Harkavy, 1995:48).

Others were also expressing their concern over world population growth. At a congregation at the University of Notre Dame in May 1969, the World Bank President, Robert McNamara, stated that:

The threat of unmanageable population pressures is very much like the threat of nuclear war.
Both threats are undervalued. Both threats are misunderstood.
Both threats can - and will - have catastrophic consequences unless they are dealt with rapidly and rationally (McNamara, 1981:50).

Likening the threat of rapid population growth to that of nuclear war was a theme that McNamara was to reiterate on several other occasions.

In October 1969, the widely acclaimed and highly influential Pearson Report was presented to the World Bank. The report had a significant effect on policymakers concerned with aid, trade and development, and on the public at large (Johnson, 1995:16). Undertaken by the Independent Commission on International Cooperation for Economic Development, chaired by former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, the study concluded that:

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18 Ehrlich became a regular celebrity on numerous radio and television talkshows in North America and
No other phenomenon casts a darker shadow over the prospects for international development than the staggering growth of population (Pearson, 1969:55).

and recommended that development agencies should pay more attention to population problems (Pearson, 1969:206-7).

There was a great sense of urgency about population growth in the early 1970s. The World Bank gave its initial population loan in 1970, to help expand maternity facilities in Jamaica (Harkavy, 1995:57). The Norwegian Parliament decreed the following year that approximately 10% of its development assistance should be devoted to population activities (Wolfson, 1983:89). In neighbouring Sweden the executive had a policy of allocating around 9% of ODA to population (Salas, 1979:105). Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and West Germany (Gille, 1979:389) had all started providing assistance. Moreover, the infant UNFPA provided a new multilateral agency through which donors could channel funds without being accused of conspiring with imperialist ambitions.

Like foreign aid, population assistance remained largely unquestioned during this period, as most people had been convinced that the perceived 'population problem' could be resolved through technical fixes and large sums of money. Within the space of a few years, the United States had transformed its anxieties over rapid population growth in developing countries into an American cause. It had taken upon itself the role of world leader in championing population concerns, dominating the financial resources available and giving it a distinctive American identification, thereby promoting the orthodox view (Hodgson, 1988) that had established itself within American demographic circles. A variety of UN agencies, the World Bank (Hodgson, 1988:555), the Population Council (Warwick, 1982:58-9), and other developed-country governments (see for example United Kingdom. Ministry of Overseas Development, 1969:23), were equally adamant that rapid population growth needed to be controlled, offering assistance to this end. Ironically, the marked increase in population assistance occurred at a time when the United States and others were decreasing their ODA as a percentage of GNP, thereby causing tension in their relations with several developing countries (Finkle & Crane, 1975:108).

later in Western Europe.
Developing countries frequently perceived population assistance as a vehicle through which the West could maintain global economic imbalances by diverting attention away from the real causes of poverty and development. America’s insistence on linking food aid to population programmes, as well as “a substantial amount of arm twisting in the form of political and fiscal pressure ... to promote fertility limitation in Asia” (Ness & Ando, 1984:181) helped to bring this form of aid into disrepute. This dissension between donors and recipients came to a head in 1974 at the Bucharest Conference.

4.4.3 1974 Bucharest Conference

The events of the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest were to have a significant effect on the population community. The focus of the conference changed in the opening days from population and development concerns to questions on the restructuring of the world economy. At issue was the insistence by a group of developing countries, led by Algeria and Argentina, on incorporating the principles of the New International Economic Order into the final document. For much of its two weeks, the conference was polarised by what Finkle and Crane dub the “Incrementalist Position” led by a group of Western nations on the one side and the “Redistribution Position” propagated by numerous developing nations on the other. A semblance of consensus was achieved because vested political interests wished to bring the conference to a successful conclusion, developing countries were reluctant to antagonise Western nations, explicit safeguards on national sovereignty were included, and the final text intentionally refrained from prescribing any particular population policy (Finkle & Crane, 1975:101-108). The resulting World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) stated among other things:

... that considerable expansion of international assistance in the population field is required for the proper implementation of this Plan of Action (Article 104 – World Population Conference, 1975:180).

Funding throughout most of the 1970s was more than adequate to meet demand. Indeed, developing countries sometimes found agencies competing against each other for the opportunity to assist their population programmes, particularly in such areas as institution-building and technical assistance (Crane & Finkle, 1981:540). The absorptive capacity of developing countries and their institutions was of greater concern than the availability of funding, a situation that lasted until the late 1970s. Gille (1979:381).
attributes the increases in 1973 and 1974 to the heightened interest generated by World Population Year, 1974 and a devaluation of the American dollar. While it is difficult to say whether the high levels of population assistance in 1975 and 1976 were due to the Plan of Action, by the late 1970s economic realities had overtaken these earlier commitments. Towards the end of the decade demands for assistance generated by the Bucharest conference could not be met by donor commitments (Salas, 1979:110), and from about 1980 onwards the demand for population assistance began to outstrip the available funds (Sinding & Quandt, 1993:154). Funding for projects in the 1980s became increasingly scarce as more developing countries adopted population policies and hoped to receive support, while at the same time donor governments reduced their assistance in real terms.

It took the better part of a decade for population agencies to regain a sense of direction following the Bucharest Conference. After they heard that population assistance was an imperialist plot to avoid restructuring the economic relations between the North and the South, coupled with assaults from economists and the widespread acceptance that the distribution of contraceptives by itself was insufficient to motivate women to use them (McIntosh & Finkle, 1994:271-2), some donors probably found funding population activities too controversial.

4.4.4 1984 Mexico City debacle

By the 1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico City, most donors had accepted that socioeconomic development and family planning programmes played a complementary role in reducing fertility. At the same time most developing countries had recognised that dealing with population concerns was important (Finkle & Crane, 1985:4). The position taken by the US government¹⁹, however, was a radical shift from

¹⁹ The stance of the Reagan administration at the Mexico City Conference was aimed at appeasing a powerful coalition consisting of the Right-to-Life movement, Protestant fundamentalists and the New Right wing of the Republican Party in the lead-up to the 1984 Presidential election. Despite their lack of homogeneity, all three groups shared such common values as: opposition to abortion; conservative views on women's rights and personal morality; opposition to social welfare programmes and a belief in free enterprise; and staunch patriotism. This New Right coalition was not only candidly concerned about the liberalisation of abortion policies and the involvement of international agencies in abortion-related activities, the increasing availability of sterilisation and the rising use of incentives and disincentives in family planning, but it also saw the conference as a means of furthering their domestic political agenda. First, anti-abortion recommendations at the Mexico City Conference would have added credence to their
that taken a decade earlier. American delegates argued that the effect of population on economic growth was neutral and that population issues could be solved by 'market forces'. The US policy statement for the conference spoke of a "demographic overreaction in the 1960s and 1970s" (United States, 1984:577) and repudiated the high levels of resources and commitment given by USAID to population programmes during those years (Finkle & Crane, 1985:11).

The doctrine espoused by the Reagan administration could not be ignored by the other delegations. For the last 20 years America had provided the main source of leadership and resources for population issues, and was the mainstay of both bilateral and multilateral activities. Delegates realised just how dependent they were on the United States and what the consequences to the population community would be if America decided to dissociate itself from the final declaration (Finkle & Crane, 1985:9,13). Unlike Bucharest, however, where the views of developing countries had a significant influence on the outcome of the conference, the recommendations of the Mexico City conference only partly reflected the American position (Finkle & Crane, 1985:3).

The true effect of America's new attitude was to be felt after the conference with its parallel decision to defund several population agencies. Motivated by the domestic abortion debate, the Reagan administration decreed that it would no longer support NGOs which "perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations" (United States, 1984:576). Although only 1% of its expenditure went to such activities, IPPF lost nearly a quarter of its annual budget with this single blow (Hilts, 1984; IPPF, 1985a; Keller, 1984). In March 1985, this principle was extended by withdrawing $10 million from UNFPA's annual allocation, after concluding that sufficient evidence existed indicting it of supporting China's 'coercive' family planning program (USAID, 1986). Support for country health and family planning programs

See 6.3.1.5.1. for the relationship between the Catholic Church, the New Right wing of the Republican Party and the Mexico City policy.
funded by the World Bank and regional development banks stopped in January 1986, and funding for UNFPA ceased entirely in August of that year (Green, 1993:316). Despite intensive lobbying and various legal challenges by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and other pro-choice groups, the so-called Mexico City Policy was the basis for America’s stance on international population assistance, until it was rescinded in January 1993 by the Clinton administration on its third day in office (United States, 1993a).

In the light of America’s position, Finkle and Crane (1985:22) predicted that the international population system would be “deficient in the resources, expertise, and drive that are essential to its long-run effectiveness”. Five years later The Economist (1990b:26) claimed that:

In the 1980s, after a long period of rapid growth, foreign aid to family planning programmes dropped sharply, thanks notably to the American right and President Reagan.

This conclusion is a distortion of the truth, as the shock of the American decision was probably greater than its impact on overall funding for population assistance. The US government diverted funds to NGOs in America and developing countries, as well as channelling more funds through its bilateral agency. More importantly, other donors made up the international shortfall (Donaldson & Tsui, 1990:14):

... there is no question about it that indeed other countries have made it up [UNFPA funding levels following US defunding], and not because they love the Americans to pay their debts but rather because they figure population is important (Multilateral Official B).

At the Mexico City Conference, several European governments reaffirmed their commitment to population assistance. The Norwegian parliament reiterated in 1983 that population assistance should receive at least 10% of ODA. Denmark declared that assisting developing countries to implement population policies would be a high priority. The United Kingdom confirmed its commitment to population activities and suggested that substantial funding increases were forthcoming, while West Germany announced its continued support of the IPPF and UNFPA. Even France, which historically had not supported family planning programmes, indicated its willingness to considerably extend its support of demographic research (Johnson, 1994:173-4). As the figures in the first section show, other donors softened the American decision, although the sums provided seemingly fall short of the promises made at the conference.
The ideological position advocated by the United States during the 1980s, however, did have a considerable intellectual impact, leaving many other donors, international agencies and developing countries confused and uncertain. Doubts surfaced on the continuing need for assistance if population growth did not affect economic development. What if the revisionists were right and population did not matter? As agencies faced increasing demands to justify their actions, the need to find a further reason for their programmes became obvious. They did not have to look far to 'discover' that the widely acknowledged, but essentially forgotten, women's rights and health argument would offer a way out of this difficulty.

From the early 1980s women's groups flourished and their number increased, predominantly on the American Eastern seaboard. Demographic research showed an inverse correlation between fertility and the status of women (see 6.3.1.2). This research led population agencies and women's organisations to seek common ground, with the latter seemingly seizing the initiative. A shift from a macro perspective to a micro one occurred, beginning with the Safe Motherhood Initiative in 1987 and eventually leading to the 1994 Programme of Action.

Donaldson and Tsui (1990:39) describe this change in emphasis as a shift away from a fixation with the "aggregate effects" of population and fertility to "a concern for the impact of family planning on individual users and their families." Since people and institutions from developed countries no longer guided and financed population measures in developing countries to the same extent as before, attention moved away from such things as the effect of population growth rates on savings, education enrolment and infant mortality. Prophetically Donaldson and Tsui stated that international donors "cannot sustain previous increases in funding", especially in view of other priorities such as the environment, AIDS and Eastern Europe (Donaldson & Tsui, 1990:28-9).

4.4.5 The 1990s

Population issues have experienced somewhat of a renaissance this decade by courtesy of environmentalists (Mazur, 1994:13) and political analysts. Scientific gatherings (Graham-Smith, 1994), and noted academics and environmental commentators (Ashmead, 1997; Cohen, 1995a; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1991; Hardin, 1993; Harrison, 1992; Kile, 1995; Myers, 1993) have helped to renew government and public interest in the population and environment debate. Food is no longer the dominant theme, having been replaced by
anxieties over global warming, environmental degradation and the greenhouse effect. While discussion may have intensified in recent years, the present allure of the population-environment issue pales when compared to the 'population hysteria'.

Moreover, predictions of both a decline in their relative power and threats to their national and international security interests (see for example Homer-Dixon et al., 1993; Huntington, 1993; 1998; Kaplan, 1994; Kennedy, 1987: 329-49, 514-35; 1993:21-46) have generated trepidation among politicians in many developed countries. Intrinsically, population growth in developing countries, and the potential for political instability, is viewed with uneasiness in societies where below-replacement-level fertility is the norm.

Global funding for population assistance in the 1990s can be divided into three phases: early nineties, the run-up towards ICPD, and the post-ICPD phase (Schindlmayr, 1999). Stagnating funding levels in the early 1990s, due to the economic recession, came at a time when an increasing number of countries were establishing or developing population policies and programmes that required international support. Donor assistance covered less than 60% of requests from developing countries. UNFPA, for example, estimated that in 1992 its actual programme allocation to developing countries amounted to $180 million, while requests for assistance totalled $550 million (Camp, 1994:129). Hewitt (1994:89-90) noted that a lack of donor resources, rather than a reluctance by developing countries to request funding, demonstrated a need for more attention on population.

In the run-up towards ICPD funding increased markedly both in absolute terms and as a percentage of ODA, and remained high for a short period thereafter. The increase for global funding in 1994-95 is, however, deceptive because of changes in definitions. Nevertheless, there was a substantial increase during this period. Yet in the years since, the promises of Cairo have become hollow. Section 3.3.1.3 illustrated that in the post-Cairo era there is limited likelihood of a renewed donor interest; levels of funding for population assistance will at best remain stagnant, but are more likely to decline. This is certainly a marked contrast to the swashbuckling days of two decades earlier:

Now it's different. Now sure it [a family planning organisation in India] can spend. We don't have as much money now as we had in the seventies in real terms (NGO Official A).
Moreover, with shrinking ODA budgets, the competition for funding has intensified as predicted by Donaldson and Tsui:

...it's a push and shove business now, because you have a shrinking ODA. It is obvious the pie is shrinking and therefore you have to fight within that to get the resources for the things you think are important (Multilateral Official A).

The former IPPF Secretary-General Carl Wahren maintains that donors have become nonchalant about supporting population programmes because of their success:

Successful population policies and family planning programmes in some countries seemed to provide decision-makers in other countries with an alibi for inaction (Wahren, 1991:34).

Wahren states that donor interest in population assistance began to dwindle once data confirmed the successes of national family planning programmes in developing countries, allowing donors to become both complacent and ignorant.

While this last argument is true up to a point, it only presents part of the picture. A more convincing case could be made that like ODA, donor governments in general have simply lost interest. The global disasters prophesied in the 1960s and early 1970s never came and, as fears subsided, so did the political appeal of global population issues. Projections of a doomsday scenario failed to consider the rapid decline in fertility levels in many parts of the world, thus losing their validity and rendering arguments void. By the 1980s, population no longer captured the attention that it once commanded. Thavarajah and Rao (1987:32) note that population assistance as a percentage of ODA started declining in 1977, adding that “this implies that the priority given to population assistance has diminished during the last three or four years.” With other concerns making strong claims on the national purse strings of developed countries, and widespread apathy towards ODA in general, it is not surprising that population assistance has lost priority. In spite of the new vigour generated by ICPD, it is unlikely that the reproductive health argument will attract the financial support for which population agencies are hoping. Should governments extend funding for population activities, it will be principally due to national security interests rather than for reasons of altruism (see 7.3). Quite simply, reproductive health does not have the same political appeal as the apocalyptic arguments of yesteryear.
4.5 Salient points

A number of factors have influenced population assistance trends since the 1960s, most of them will be addressed in later chapters. In view of the above discussion, it seems fitting to propound a four-point checklist against which funding trends may be explained. Although not claiming to be definitive, this checklist helps to elucidate most instances.

1. As a diminutive component of foreign aid population assistance is invariably affected by overall trends in ODA, as suggested in Chapter Two. Funding for population activities generally decreases in absolute terms when the overall amount of ODA declines. Generally, these exceptions, as shown by the various examples already mentioned, can be explained by one of the three factors listed below.

2. By finding sympathetic ears in governments, individuals and groups can have a substantial effect on government views of population assistance (see 6.3.1). Of all lobby groups and individuals interested in promoting their views on population issues, those advocating ‘extreme’ views have had the most significant influence. At one extreme, alarmists and doomsayers through widespread media attention managed to disseminate their apocalyptic predictions and radical solutions. During the population hysteria, environmentalists such as Ehrlich and Meadows were leaders in swaying both the general public and government officials. Twenty years on, environmental concerns are again prominent, not least because of the actions of such groups. Environmentalists, however, are by no means the only doomsayers as demonstrated by Kennedy and Homer-Dixon et al., who instil anxieties and security fears of what the future holds for the Western world.

At the other extreme are religious groups, who seek a cessation of population assistance in general and of support for abortion-related activities in particular. Under the Reagan administration, their views were most notably expressed through a powerful Right-wing coalition that introduced the Mexico City Policy.

3. Individuals in a position of power can have a significant effect on the levels of funding for population assistance. Reimert Ravenholt in America, Britain’s Baroness Chalker and Gordon Bilney from Australia are but a few examples of individuals with an interest in population issues who have helped increase their country’s level of funding for
population assistance. Equally, those who disapprove of population assistance, such as President Reagan and Australian Senator Brian Harradine, have used their political position to curtail funding for population activities (see 7.2).

4. Finally, world population conferences represent significant milestones, for they either confirm or reject the strategies and programmes pursued by population agencies. From the figures (see 4.1.2), it appears that donors make a special effort to increase funding both in absolute terms and as a percentage of ODA in conference years (i.e. 1974, 1984, 1994), with funding levels declining a few years thereafter. Given the global attention that these conferences attract, donors are eager to present themselves as good members of the international community, willing to demonstrate that they are fulfilling their international commitments. Once the hype is over, however, governments can cut funding without the fear of highly publicised repercussions and they frequently do (see 6.3.3).

4.6 Conclusion

Donor support for population activities has been influenced by changing views of ODA, differing political circumstances and wavering interest in population issues. This review confirms that donor commitments for population assistance can only be understood within the context of changing political environments and shifting perceptions of the ‘population problem’. These changes reflect the alternating influences on the decision-making process of political actors with differing agendas (see Part Three). However, analysing population assistance trends by simply ascertaining the monetary sums involved tells only part of the story. A study of the dispersal of funds would not only reveal whether population assistance flows to countries of greatest demographic concern, but would also shed light on donors’ considerations. The next chapter examines the geographical distribution of funds and questions why some countries receive more than others.
5 Where has it gone?
The geographical disbursement of population assistance 1969-1994

Following the discussion on sources for population assistance in the previous chapter, it is only logical that this chapter reviews its geographical disbursement. Several studies have presented periodic snapshots of where population assistance has gone by regions (see for example Herz, 1984: 16-23; Ness & Thomas, 1989: 12-17; Nortman, 1987b: 129-37; People, 1973; United States. Office of Technology Assessment, 1982), usually based on the same data used in this study. However, there does not appear to have been an assessment of these trends for a duration of more than a few years. Furthermore, none of these studies attempts to give data by subregion. This chapter fills this gap by displaying figures over a twenty-five year period by region and subregion.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses the secondary data used in this chapter and their limitations. The second section presents figures and statistics for regions and subregions responding to the questions of where population assistance has gone, how many recipients there are, who the largest recipients are in absolute and per capita terms, and through what channels it flowed. Facts and unqualified remarks made in this section refer to the graphs and tables in the appendices, where a greater insight into disbursement patterns may be found than is possible to present here. Finally, the third section examines the factors that account for these trends by asking why some countries receive more population assistance than others.

5.1 Data

Data for this chapter come from two sources, the OECD and UNFPA. Compiling the statistics found in this chapter has taken considerable effort, for the figures on which they are based are not readily available. Besides the year it took to collect and assemble them, it required extensive archival work as well as much pleading with staff members of various population agencies. Despite my efforts, I have been unsuccessful in the time available to locate data for the years 1973-1976, 1979, and 1981. Given population
assistance’s change of definition since ICPD (see 3.3.2), data for the years after 1994 are not presented as it is impossible to make meaningful comparisons.

OECD’s DAC supplied figures for the years 1969-1972 (OECD. Development Assistance Committee, 1974). Documents destined for UNFPA personnel provided data for 1977, 1978 and 1980 (UNFPA, 1980b; 1980c; 1982b), while Global Population Assistance Reports (GPAR) were the source for all subsequent years. The GPAR first appeared in 1988 for the period 1982-1985, with its first four issues spanning a number of years. Since 1994, it has covered single years, albeit for funding that occurred two years earlier. Per capita figures were calculated using the World Population Prospects: The 1994 Revision (United Nations, 1995), and the IMF provided the US Consumer Price Indices (CPI).

As is so often the case for studies based exclusively on official data (see for example Chamie, 1994: 39) there are several limitations with these sources. In particular, the following two points need to be taken into consideration when reviewing these figures: 1. commitment versus expenditure issues and 2. data problems.

5.1.1 Commitment versus expenditure

Commitment refers to the sum allocated for population assistance, while expenditure is the actual amount disbursed by a primary donor or intermediate donors to developing countries. Invariably, differences between the two are going to occur. Accounting procedures and different fiscal years explain most of the discrepancy. Usually, there is a lag between the commitment date and expenditure, because of the time needed to develop a project and delays in transferring funds (UNFPA, 1991:9-10; 1996a:10). However, political factors may also play a role.

There have always been differences between the amount committed to population assistance and expenditure. Thorp (1971:125), referring to OECD statistics, noted that DAC members allocated $80 million in 1968 and $105 million in 1969, but actual expenditure was not more than $40 million. Between 1982 and 1994 global expenditure as a percentage of commitments ranged from low levels of 63% (1993), 64% (1986) and

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20 Development banks have been excluded from these sums as their primary funds fluctuate widely. They generally allocate large blocks of loan agreements in a single year although expenditure occurs over several (UNFPA, 1996a:10).
66% (1987) to 93% (1988), with an average of 79%. The 1986-7 figures probably reflect the American withdrawal of funds for UNFPA and IPPF (UNFPA, 1992:7; 1996a:10). Similarly, Michaud and Murray's (1994:641) study of the 'Health and Population' sector found that between 1975 and 1990 the World Bank's IBRD and IDA disbursed 82% and 72% of its commitments respectively; and for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) the figure was 93%.

Both the GPAR and the OECD, on which the discussion in this chapter is based, report expenditure details only for individual developing countries. This can be deceptive for they give no indication of how much donors had initially committed to a country or project, especially since funds may be withdrawn, reduced or increased for a variety of reasons. However, appraising allocation data would be impossible as most agencies have either archived or destroyed the necessary reports. Moreover, the available data unfortunately provide no evidence on how effectively funds were used in developing countries.

5.1.2 Data problems

Behind the precise and reliable-looking figures found in these reports there are many imperfections that need qualifying. There are principally five main difficulties in obtaining sound data: definition problems; differences in accounting procedures; finding appropriate exchange rates for converting national currencies into US$; classifying multifunctional activities into one category; and the differing capacities of donors and governments for administering public accounts (UNFPA, 1991:16; 1992:2).

Given the definition issues discussed in Chapter Three, the figures here may not necessarily be compatible. Data in the OECD report were supplied directly by donors to the DAC, and while noting that they applied the OECD guidelines of the time they give no indication of how the DAC overcame definition problems. GPAR figures, on the other hand, have always been collected by a survey sent to countries and organisations providing population assistance. To the 188 surveys sent out in 1994, 118 respondents replied. Virtually all who failed to respond were NGOs. Secondary sources such as annual reports provide supplementary details. Although UNFPA advises agencies on what should be included, it frequently has to "modify" data to fit its prescribed definition of population assistance (UNFPA, 1996a:5). Ness (1989:186) remarks that despite
efforts to standardise what population assistance comprises, statistics continue to reflect what donors consider it to be.

With thousands of population projects funded annually by scores of donors using different fiscal cycles, errors are inevitable regardless of the care taken. Both sources exclude administration costs as far as possible (OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 1974:i; UNFPA, 1996a:10). However, for the period 1983-1991 administrative costs were not ascertained; so they may or may not be included (UNFPA, 1994c:21). In addition, GPAR undertakes consistency checks of internal data and responses between donors and recipients to avoid double-counting (UNFPA, 1996a:5).

A further problem relates to development banks. The OECD included the World Bank as a multilateral source, while UNFPA does not (UNFPA, 1996a:10). Given the minor sums that the World Bank gave between 1969 and 1972, its inclusion should not distort overall funding trends.

Despite the acknowledged shortcomings of both the OECD and GPAR, there are no realistic alternatives to these two sources. As with allocation data, the reports necessary to verify these figures are frequently unavailable. Questioning officials, apart from being a logistical nightmare, would reveal little because of the high staff turnover found in most agencies.

5.2 Geographical disbursement 1969-1994

The division of the world into regions and subregions is in essence a cartographic convenience, which may lead to inconsistencies. As each agency has its own administrative breakdown, I have opted for the UNFPA regional division of the world. Regions were further divided into the following subregions, according to a classification that I devised:

**Asia-Pacific:**
Central Asian States; East Asia; Pacific Islands; South Asia; Southeast Asia

**Europe:**
Eastern and Southern Europe; Former USSR

**Latin America and the Caribbean:**
Caribbean; Central America; South America
North Africa and the Middle East (Arab World):
Middle East; North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa:
Anglophone; Francophone; Lusophone; Others

A complete list of individual countries can be found in Appendix A.

Besides the regions, both sources use an additional category known either as interregional/unallocated (OECD) or as interregional/regional (UNFPA). This generally refers to funds for projects implemented in more than one country. According to the OECD, interregional pertains to general purposes such as international conferences and seminars, as well as research in the population field (OECD. Development Assistance Committee, 1974:ii). Of late, most funding for interregional activities was given to research that benefits more than one region (UNFPA, 1996a:25). Unallocated in the OECD sense is assistance given for activities that fall outside its definition, as outlined in Chapter Three. This occurred either because of a lack of data or because it referred to several subheadings (OECD. Development Assistance Committee, 1974:iv). For UNFPA, regional represents project funding going to more than one country in a region. Charts in Appendix B illustrate the prevalence of interregional/regional funding.

This category poses difficulties, for it is impossible to know where the funds went. In calculating the leading absolute and per capita recipients (Appendix C), I have had to ignore the unallocated proportion of funding going to a region. This seems to be acceptable, as in most areas the unallocated portion accounts for less than 20%, although in the past this figure has fluctuated widely. This is particularly true for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa where in the early 1970s unallocated was as high as 50%. To what extent this is real or a reflection of data quality is unclear. Unfortunately, European recipient figures could not be calculated, for in recent years up to 70% was unallocated. Although the figures in Appendix C need to be treated with caution, they nevertheless present revealing trends.
5.2.1 Global

Tables in Appendix C, as well as Table 5.1 below, display several salient particulars regarding the global disbursement of population assistance.

Table 5.1 Main recipients of population assistance 1969-1994

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14,961</td>
<td>32,848</td>
<td>40,750</td>
<td>56,168</td>
<td>72,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>India</td>
<td>38,114</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5,480</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>21,346</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>13,650</td>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3,068</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>11,553</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Korea Rep.</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>8,845</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>8,345</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>8,326</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8,305</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>7,060</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
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Predictably, large Asian nations feature prominently in absolute terms throughout this twenty-five year period, with Bangladesh the largest recipient since 1985. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, and since the 1980s China, appear with great regularity. Except for Ghana in 1971, Sub-Saharan Africa did not rate a mention in the early 1970s, but from the mid-1980s onwards both Kenya and Nigeria feature continually. Tunisia and Egypt shared the honour of being the sole representatives from the Arab World, until Morocco made its first appearance in 1994, while from Latin America, Mexico has appeared consistently alongside Brazil and earlier on Colombia. In per capita terms Caribbean, Pacific and Sub-Saharan microstates dominate the top ten (see Appendix C), as would be expected (see 2.3.2).

Yet not all instances fit the anticipated pattern seen in Chapter Two. Certain nations are surprise inclusions in the absolute top ten such as: Trinidad & Tobago and

Figure 5.1 Global distribution of population assistance by region 1969-1994

Several trends are visible in Figure 5.1. Except for 1991, more population assistance was expended in Asia-Pacific than in any other region. Yet over time the proportion of funding going to this region fluctuated, with peaks of 40% (1970), 44% (1982) and 45% (1986) to 27% in 1994. Sub-Saharan Africa’s portion, on the other hand, increased from just under 5% in 1969 to 25% in 1994. The Arab World has always received less than 10% and the share to Latin America has generally fluctuated between 15 and 20%. During the period 1993-94, Europe received a 124% increase from 0.82% to 1.84%, and all indications suggest that this region’s portion will rise substantially over the next few years.

Given the problems with unallocated/interregional data, it is refreshing for an analysis such as this to see that the proportion has declined globally. In 1969, this
category made up 47% of population assistance, but by 1994 it had fallen to 14%. The same is true for this category within most regions as well.

Figure 5.2 Number of population assistance recipients 1969-1994

The number of recipients rose markedly over this 25-year period from just 66 in 1969 to 156 in 1994 (Figure 5.2). At its peak in 1993, 173 countries were receiving population assistance. During the 1970s and 1980s the number of recipients increased as a result of three factors: the independence of former colonies; an awareness of population concerns following censuses and demographic research sponsored by international aid; and the implementation of population policies and family planning programmes in a number of developing countries (Chamie, 1994: 39-40; Picouet & Jones, 1986:3; Salas, 1979:72). While such increases are true for all regions, they are particularly evident in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. Former Soviet Bloc states account for the rise in the 1990s. Between 1993 and 1994 the number of recipients declined notably in Europe (20 to 12) and in North Africa and the Middle East (24 to 18), leading to the overall fall.
5.2.2 Asia-Pacific

Asia-Pacific is the region with the widest disparities, for within its territory lie the largest global recipients in both absolute and per capita terms. In absolute terms, Bangladesh has been the largest recipient for over a decade and the gap between it and the next recipient, India, has widened (Table 5.2). Compared to the early 1970s there are now fewer Southeast Asian nations in the top five, having been superseded by South Asian states. Pacific Island states continue to dominate funding in per capita terms. The number of recipients rose from 17 in 1969 to 43 in 1994. In the 1970s and 1980s, many new recipients were in the Pacific Islands, while the early 1990s saw an influx of Central Asian states. Despite the large number of recipients, the Asia-Pacific region has never had the most.

Table 5.2 Main Asia-Pacific recipients of population assistance 1969-1994

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>69-72</th>
<th>76-80</th>
<th>81-85</th>
<th>86-90</th>
<th>91-94</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>14,961</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>32,848</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>6,478</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>30,128</td>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5,480</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>21,346</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>13,650</td>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Korea Rep.</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>11,553</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Between 1960 and 1970 Asia received approximately $135 million, of which $102 million was committed in the last three years (Hankinson, 1972:439). More than $1.5 billion flowed to the Asia-Pacific between 1982 and 1990, averaging around $178 million annually. In 1993 and 1994 $166 million and $338 million respectively were expended in the region. Following the steep increase during the 1970s funding in real terms declined, except for the large rise in 1994 (Figure 5.3). Yet not all individual subregions followed the regional trend.
Since funding began to Central Asian states in 1993, this subregion has experienced a small increase from $2.1 million in 1993 to $4.8 million in 1994, and over the next few years the figures are likely to rise.

While China may not tower above other Asia-Pacific states in terms of expended population assistance funding, it has dominated the East Asian subregion since 1980. Before that, South Korea was the main recipient. Funding to East Asia rose dramatically after China became a recipient and levels have fluctuated ever since depending on the sums flowing to that country. Both the peak in 1988 and the trough of 1990 represent funding shifts to China. Of particular interest are the growing sums going to North Korea and Mongolia. Not surprisingly, sparsely populated Mongolia is the largest recipient in per capita terms.

Less than 1% of global population assistance flows to the Pacific Islands. Funding in 1969 was minimal and only to Fiji, but by the late 1970s there had been a considerable increase. The subregion experienced a large slump in the mid-1980s. However, funding rose steadily in the early 1990s, and in 1994 this subregion expended just over $5 million. Fiji was the primary recipient in earlier years, but as more nations received population assistance Fiji lost its prominence to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. For most of the 1980s, Trust Territory Pacific Islands was
the largest per capita recipient. Note, however, the remarkable per capita sums flowing to Tokelau in the early 1990s, amounting to $79 in 1992 and $17.5 in 1993.

Figure 5.4 Population assistance to Southeast Asia 1969-1994

Southeast Asia: Current Vs. Constant dollars

Funding to Southeast Asia fell significantly in the early 1980s and stagnated during the rest of the decade (Figure 5.4). In real terms funding declined from a peak of $78 million in 1977 to $24 million in 1993. The figure for 1994 was $37 million. Indonesia and the Philippines account for most of the Southeast Asia scene, although Malaysia and Thailand have consistently been key recipients. In recent years, Vietnam and Cambodia appear in the top five. In per capita terms, the most funds have gone to the Philippines, Indonesia, Laos and Thailand.

South Asia’s funding levels rose steadily into the early 1980s until a period of stagnation set in. The subregion fits the typical picture of large nations being the main recipients in absolute terms, with smaller nations such as the Maldives and Bhutan receiving high per capita amounts. Nevertheless, Bangladesh features conspicuously in per capita terms having been the leading recipient on several occasions.

Over this 25-year period, the Asia-Pacific region received a consistently high percentage of bilateral funding. During the 1960s more than 50% ($73 million) of funds came from bilateral sources, with Sweden ($13 million) and the United States ($57 million) being the main donors (Hankinson, 1972). For the periods 1965-70 and 1971-75, 97% and 57% respectively of funds to the ESCAP region came from USAID (Ness
In 1990 bilateral funding still accounted for 54% of funding, although this figure fell to 27% in 1994 (UNFPA, 1996a:41). However, bilateral funding was and still is not uniformly spread. South and Southeast Asia have been the major recipients of bilateral funding. In the early 1970s, both regions received over 70% of their funding through this channel and, although the figure has fluctuated, bilateral funding is still prominent. East Asia and the Pacific Islands, on the other hand, received most through multilateral and NGO channels. The mid-1980s funding dip to the Pacific probably reflects a cut by UNFPA to countries not on its priority country list (see 8.2.1.1.), for which at the time only Samoa and the Solomon Islands qualified (UNFPA, 1982a).

### 5.2.3 Europe

Despite Europe being more a donor than a recipient region, certain nations have received periodic funding. Between 1977 and 1980 Europe received minimal sums of population assistance, with Bulgaria, Portugal and Yugoslavia the largest recipients. This came mainly in the form of multilateral support for technical training (UNFPA, 1981:80). No funds were channelled to Europe during the period 1983-1988 (Figure 5.5).

![Figure 5.5 Distribution of population assistance to Europe](image)

With the change of regimes and the removal of pronatalist policies, funds were sought by several East European states. The number of recipients rose from eight in
1989 to a peak of twenty in 1993. In the first few years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, almost all funding went through bilateral and multilateral channels. Initially, bilateral funding went solely to regional activities; however, as funding through other channels increased, the relative importance of bilateral support declined. As discussed earlier a large proportion of funds is regional. Leaving this aside, most assistance goes to Eastern and Southern Europe, although states in the former USSR have had substantial increases since funding to this subregion began in 1992.

### 5.2.4 Latin America and the Caribbean

Two large nations have commanded the Latin American scene since the 1980s: Brazil and Mexico (Table 5.3). In the early 1970s, Colombia was the main recipient, with most funding coming from NGO sources. Caribbean and certain Central American states are the principal per capita recipients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3 Main Latin America and the Caribbean recipients of population assistance 1969-1994</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Colombia</td>
<td>Colombia, 1,827</td>
<td>Colombia, 8,845</td>
<td>Mexico, 8,324</td>
<td>Brazil, 10,162</td>
<td>Mexico, 13,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brazil</td>
<td>Brazil, 1,795</td>
<td>Brazil, 8,345</td>
<td>Brazil, 6,552</td>
<td>Mexico, 9,374</td>
<td>Brazil, 9,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico, 1,255</td>
<td>Mexico, 7,060</td>
<td>Colombia, 4,655</td>
<td>Peru, 6,121</td>
<td>Guatemala, 7,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Trin. &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>Domin. Rep., 904</td>
<td>4,380</td>
<td>Peru, 4,059</td>
<td>Colombia, 5,608</td>
<td>Peru, 7,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chile</td>
<td>Jamaica, 831</td>
<td>El Salvador, 2,595</td>
<td>El Salvador, 3,629</td>
<td>Guatemala, 4,945</td>
<td>El Salvador, 5,920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of countries receiving population assistance increased from 21 in 1969 to 39 in 1994. Most of the rise can be attributed to an increase in the number of Caribbean states receiving support especially in the late 1970s.
Following the increases of the 1970s, funding levels stagnated for most of the 1980s (Figure 5.6). The spike in 1988 represents a significant increase in multilateral funds to all three subregions. Following a peak in 1971 of $35 million in real terms, figures for unallocated have remained at under $20 million except for 1994. During most of this quarter century South America has been the leading subregion in absolute terms, except for a handful of years in the mid-1980s when Central America had a sharp rise in funds.

The larger Caribbean islands are the main recipients in absolute terms. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago have consistently been the main recipients. Not surprisingly, the smaller Caribbean states such as Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia expended the most in per capita terms. Funding to the Caribbean has been on the decline in real terms since it peaked in the late 1970s, despite upturns in 1988 and 1994.
Except for 1991, Mexico has been the main Central American recipient. The other two major recipients in this subregion are El Salvador and Guatemala, which also feature in the Central American per capita table. In per capita terms Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, along with the two previously mentioned nations, have been most prominent. Two noticeable spikes in 1977 and 1984 are visible in Figure 5.7. Both are years when there was a sudden large increase in bilateral funding. Both peaks were followed by a relatively sharp fall. Since 1985, funding in real terms has increased erratically.

Funding to South America peaked in 1980 at $30 million in real terms following steady increases since 1969. For most of the 1980s, except for the last three years, and well into the 1990s the level of funding plateaued in real terms at around $16 million annually. Brazil, Colombia and Peru were the main recipients in absolute terms, while Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana and Suriname feature in the per capita table.

NGOs have been the main source of support to this subregion for all but six years (1969, 1971, 1977-8, 1980, 1990). This is especially true of South America where they have been the predominant source of funding. In the 1970s, NGOs were the leading source in the Caribbean and Central America. Yet in both regions bilateral support has become increasingly more important since the mid-1980s.
5.2.5 North Africa and the Middle East (Arab World)

In a defensible simplification, it is possible to sum up population assistance to the Arab World in one word: Egypt. From Table 5.4 below, it is clear that Egypt has been the main recipient for nearly two decades and features prominently among the world’s largest recipients. Moreover, it is the main recipient of bilateral assistance.

Table 5.4 Main Arab World recipients of population assistance 1969-1994

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69-72</td>
<td>76-80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Tunisia</td>
<td>3,068</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8,305</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Egypt</td>
<td>6,271</td>
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<td></td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Israel</td>
<td>481</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2,444</td>
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<td>4 Morocco</td>
<td>426</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1,530</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Turkey</td>
<td>204</td>
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<td>967</td>
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</table>

Given the small percentage of global funds going to this region, Egypt’s status dominates the overall funding. Hence, the levels of funding going to this nation bias figures for this region. In per capita terms the main recipients have been Tunisia, Djibouti, Bahrain, Jordan and in 1994 Morocco. Remarkably, given its population size, Egypt appears regularly in the Arab World top five per capita.

In the early 1970s the number of Arab World recipients was just eight, but by 1993 the figure had risen to 24. Of those, nine were in North Africa and 24 in the Middle East. The increase in the Middle East can be explained by a growing number of Gulf States receiving population assistance. Despite having fewer countries, North Africa receives the lion’s share of funds going to the Arab World.
In real terms, funding to the Arab World has been relatively steady in the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 5.8). The fall in the early 1980s followed a period of rising levels of population assistance that peaked in 1980. Despite the funding increases in the 1980s and 1990s in actual terms, the sums in real terms have never really surpassed those of the 1970s. Excluding regional data from the calculations, a graph for Egypt would appear strikingly similar to one for the Arab World. This indicates that fluctuations in population assistance to Egypt, for whatever reason, will invariably have a significant effect on the overall funding picture for the Arab World.

In the Middle East, a period of stagnation in the early 1980s was followed by increases at the end of the decade and into the 1990s. The main recipients have been Jordan, Turkey and Yemen, while in per capita terms they were Bahrain and Jordan.

Egypt has not always been North Africa’s largest recipient. In the early 1970s, Tunisia was the principal recipient both in absolute and per capita terms. In more recent years, Morocco has seen its share increase and in 1994 overtook Egypt as the Arab World’s and North Africa’s main recipient.
For a few years at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, multilaterals were the main sources of support to the Arab World (Figure 5.9). However, as in the early 1970s, bilateral has been the main channel for population assistance from 1984 onwards. The difference between the Middle East and North Africa is not entirely surprising. In the Middle East, most funding came from multilateral and NGO sources, with a slight increase of bilateral funds from 1988 onwards. In North Africa as the above diagram suggests, bilateral has been the main channel of support with most of the funds going to Egypt.
5.2.6 Sub-Saharan Africa

The reasons for dividing Africa along language lines are twofold. First, many former French colonies had the 1920 French law banning contraceptives on their statute books long after independence. Although some governments turned a blind eye, allowing and in some cases supporting the establishment of family planning organisations, others introduced even stricter laws (People, 1979:10). Government support for population assistance appears to have been mostly non-existent in several countries. While most have now introduced legislation that renders the 1920 law inoperative (see for example Burkina Faso, 1990), some analysts believe that its continued existence poses a threat and acts as a discouragement for family planning organisations (Bouzidi, 1990; IPPF, 1997a:10).

Moreover, it seems sensible because of history, economic systems and their unique relationships with certain Western countries, for particular nations to be grouped together when considering aid funding. Being a member of the Commonwealth, a capitalist society and an Anglophone state, Ghana has had more in common with Kenya than with neighbouring Burkina Faso or Côte d'Ivoire, including large-scale British and American support. In relation to receipt of aid, French-backed African states will likewise have little in common with former Portuguese colonies. As language is a proxy for these realities, it makes sense to divide Africa linguistically.

The first impression of funding to this region is the overwhelming dominance of Anglophone nations. Not only have Anglophone countries been the main recipients in absolute terms (see Table 5.5), but they also feature prominently in the regional top five per capita table. In per capita terms, small states from all four subregions are represented among the top recipients, although large Anglophone states such as Liberia (1969-72, 1980), Ghana (1970), Kenya (1977-8, 1989), and Zimbabwe (1986-7), and Francophone Rwanda (1991) have also appeared.

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21 Introduced in France and its colonies on 29 July 1920, in response to the mortality resulting from the First World War, this law made abortion a criminal offence and prohibited the sale, advertising and distribution of all contraceptives. Breaching this law was punishable by fines and imprisonment. However, specific exemptions existed. Doctors, for example, could prescribe oral contraceptives for health reasons and pharmacists were allowed to sell condoms. It was also legal for certain groups to disseminate material on the rhythm method (People, 1979:10; Wolf, 1973: 18,22,37-8).
Table 5.5 Main Sub-Saharan Africa recipients of population assistance 1969-1994

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<tbody>
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<td>69-72</td>
<td>76-80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa grew from 20 in 1969 to 45 in 1994. Over this quarter-century the number of Anglophone recipients increased slightly from eleven to 16. In 1977, Francophone Africa replaced Anglophone Africa as the subregion with the most recipients, rising from six in 1969 to 19 in 1983. Except for 1992 when Réunion received a token sum, this figure has remained constant ever since. From 1980 onwards Lusophone Africa has had five recipients, while the number of Other Africa recipients increased incrementally from three (1969-1980), to four (1982-1992) and finally to five (1993 onwards).

Figure 5.10 Population assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa 1969-1994
Until 1985, funding in real terms was fairly static, with annual funding being under $50 million (Figure 5.10). However, unlike other regions, Sub-Saharan Africa has seen an increase in its level of population assistance over the last decade. In real terms, the figure in 1994 ($140 million in 1980 dollars) represented a 276% increase since 1985.

Most funds have gone, and continue to go, to Anglophone states. Following a peak in 1977, funding in real terms fell annually until 1983 when a steady increase began. Kenya was the first Sub-Saharan state to establish a national family planning programme in 1968, followed by Ghana in 1970 (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1987:414). This may partly explain why Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria have been the main recipients. Not only is Kenya the largest recipient in absolute terms, but it features strikingly in per capita terms alongside such relatively small countries as Botswana, Gambia, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Pronatalist governments, and the existence of the 1920 Law, meant that minimal sums flowed to Francophone Africa in the 1970s. Indeed, it was not until 1983 that more than $10 million was expended in real terms. It appears that as nations changed their legislation population assistance increased. The considerable sum of assistance going to Rwanda is probably attributable to its antinatalist stance since 1981, in contrast to the position taken by other Francophone nations who for a long time were theoretically pronatalist (Picouet & Jones, 1986:3-4). Between 1983 and 1994 funds expended increased in real terms by 290% from $11.136 million to $32.271 million in 1980 dollars.

Figure 5.11 Population assistance to Lusophone Africa 1969-1994

![Figure 5.11 Population assistance to Lusophone Africa 1969-1994](isu91d11e1.png)
Lusophone Africa essentially consists of two large countries, Angola and Mozambique, both of which have undergone civil wars since their independence in the mid-1970s. During the 1980s, funding remained relatively stagnant at less than $3 million in real terms (Figure 5.11). Following peace settlements in the early 1990s, funding increased steadily. The 1991 spike is attributable to large bilateral funding to Mozambique. Between 1990 and 1991 funding to that country rose from $1.33 million to $9.96 million, and the proportion coming through from bilateral sources jumped from only 1% to 72%. In the following year funding fell to $1.6 million and just 6% of that was bilateral. São Tomé & Príncipe has been the main per capita recipient.

Other Africa consists of states that do not fit comfortably into the three linguistic subregions. Funding in real terms to Other Africa has risen, especially since the mid-1980s, although not to the same extent as the other African subregions. Ethiopia has been the main recipient since 1977, with a large gap forming over time between it and the small nations that make up the rest of the group. In the early 1970s, Mauritius was the main recipient and with the exception of 1987 has remained in second place since 1977. In 1993, Eritrea joined this group following its independence, but so far only minuscule sums have been expended. In per capita terms, the Seychelles and Equatorial Guinea have received the most.

Bilateral aid was the main source of population assistance for much of the 1970s. However, by 1980 it accounted for less than 10% of population assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, with NGOs and multilaterals being the main source throughout the 1980s. In 1991, the bilateral channel again became the main source of population assistance. However, as with other regions of the world, the sources of funding for individual African subregions differ enormously. Bilateral aid has consistently been the main source of support for Anglophone states. Since the early 1980s bilateral funding to Francophone Africa has been steadily rising. The main source for Lusophone states was multilateral, although as noted earlier there was considerable bilateral funding to Mozambique in the early 1990s. Apart from Ethiopia in the 1990s and Mauritius in the early 1970s, no state in Other Africa received bilateral funding. Indeed, it is interesting to compare the considerable NGO involvement in Anglophone, Francophone and Other Africa states, and the lack of it in the Lusophone Africa subregion.
5.2.7 Summary of geographical trends

Over this 25-year period the number of recipients increased markedly in all regions. All regions experienced an increase in the level of funding during the 1970s, yet few regions have had a significant increase in real terms since the early 1980s. Certain large countries have captured the lion’s share of funding to their region, possibly at the expense of certain smaller nations.

Changes in international funding trends, as discussed in the previous chapter, do have a definite effect at the regional level. Static real funding at the global level during the 1980s meant stagnation for many subregions over that decade. Likewise, virtually all regions saw a decline between 1985 and 1987, probably due to America’s Mexico City Policy and the defunding of several population agencies (see 4.4.4). This was most pronounced in subregions largely dependent on multilateral and NGO sources such as the Pacific Islands, or where there was a sudden large withdrawal of bilateral support (e.g. the Caribbean, South Asia). Yet for others such as Anglophone Africa or those receiving small sums (e.g. Lusophone Africa) the effects were minimal. Furthermore, the sharp rise in both current and real terms seen in all regions for 1994 mirrors the increase of global funds due to ICPD (see 4.4.5).

Of particular interest in this analysis has been the selective use of bilateral funding to certain subregions. The “poverty group”, claims Wolfson (1983:15), was the favourite target for bilateral funding, since the first to request population assistance were among the poorest, for example India, Kenya and Sri Lanka; and because of concerns over poverty alleviation. Wolfson notes, however, that donors use funding allocation criteria apart from poverty. Harrington (1993:169) highlights the fact that in 1989/90 only 59 countries received bilateral aid. Apart from the United States, bilateral donors have supported only a handful of countries, with only Bangladesh, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe having five or more donors.

5.3 Accounting for trends

No one reason can explain why some countries receive more population assistance than others. Ness and Ando (1984:148) imply that there is no testable theory on the factors determining the level of population assistance, just a set of broad perspectives from
which to select. If reducing fertility levels is indeed the primary aim of population assistance then the most obvious indicator, it would seem, is the size of a nation's population and its related TFR. Clearly, for a given level of fertility, the larger the population the more funding a country ought to receive. Microstates, on the other hand, with their small populations, should receive the most in per capita terms. Yet according to UNFPA (1989:10) population size explains just 35% of the variance in population assistance.

A previous explication of funding patterns, albeit over a shorter period, stated that:

An examination of population aid for Africa and Asia shows that countries which receive most aid per capita tend to be small countries or those with the most recently declared population policies, and the least favoured are the larger countries and those with well-established programmes (OECD. Development Centre, 1973:2).

Ten years later Wolfson (1983:14) remarked that countries of priority for donors are "the largest in size, the poorest and the most at risk because of their high rates of population growth." While both statements carry elements of truth, they are certainly not definitive. Making full use of hindsight, it is possible to demonstrate that Wolfson's inferences do not necessarily hold. While the largest nations (in terms of population) do indeed receive the largest sums in absolute terms, the poorest and those with the highest growth rates do not. The Table 5.6 shows how the top ten recipients fare globally in terms of TFR and per capita based on data for the 1990s.
Table 5.6 How do they compare? Main recipients of population assistance 1991-1994 against countries with the highest TFRs and lowest per capita income

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>Marshall Is.</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>West. Sahara</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>Uganda/Togo</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRB, 1997

Only the Marshall Islands appear in either the absolute or per capita top ten during this period. Most of these states do not even feature prominently at a regional level. It is evident from the table that the main recipients neither are the poorest nor have the highest TFRs.

All this suggests that other issues are pertinent. In assessing trends, it would be erroneous to focus exclusively on either the demand or supply side, for both circumstances in individual countries and donor interests need to be considered. Of the following four sections three discuss demand issues in developing countries, while one addresses supply.

5.3.1 Recipients’ perception

For population assistance to flow into a country the national government must at the very least tolerate private organisations receiving foreign funds. Most developing nations are far more emphatic, having formulated population policies with donor funding as one of their pillars (see for example UNFPA, 1995c:51-3). These policies, and the extent to which they are implemented, reflect a complicated myriad of changing demographic, social, economic and political circumstances (Chamie, 1994:45). Accordingly, the demand for donor support will vary. As Salas (1979:120) observed in 1977:
Demand [for population assistance] grows quickly after governments have adopted policies and built institutions to carry out their policies. And demand changes dramatically with political changes in recipient countries.

Iran is a case in point. To achieve its goal of reducing the annual population growth rate to 1% over twenty years the Shah’s Government committed itself to improving women’s status and to a national family planning programme (Aghajanian, 1991:704, 709-10). During the 1970s, Iran was a modest recipient of population assistance, with virtually all funding coming from multilateral and NGO sources.

Kasun (1988b:4) contends that “massive rage” against the largely American-sponsored population programme helped to topple the Shah. After the Islamic Revolution population agencies were forced to curtail their activities (IPPF, 1979:12; UNFPA, 1981:52), and funding fell sharply. Indeed, throughout the 1980s little or no funds were channelled to Iran (Figure 5.12). In 1989, the government resumed providing contraceptive supplies and services, and has subsequently intensified its political and financial commitments to the family planning programme (Aghajanian, 1995:8-9). In recent years, funding for population assistance has risen steadily principally because of changes in government policy and improved relations with the international community, as indicated by large-scale commitments from the World Bank ($141.1 million 1993-99), UNFPA ($10 million 1994-9) (UNFPA, 1995b:240), and the reactivating of the Family Planning Association of the Islamic Republic of Iran as an IPPF member in 1995 (IPPF, 1996a:27).
China's attitude towards foreign support has been somewhat similar. During the isolationist Mao era China received no population assistance. Funding for population activities only began in the late 1970s, after the Chinese Government opened its doors to the world. China and the IPPF established a formal relationship in 1977, and four years later the China Family Planning Association became an IPPF associate member (IPPF, 1977b:16; Kane, 1987:99). Similarly, after signing a memorandum of understanding in 1979 (UNFPA, 1980a:41), China and UNFPA agreed the following year to $50 million worth of assistance over five years for such things as technical training, contraceptive production, demographic training and research, and the 1982 census (Banister, 1987:218; Kane, 1987:97-8; Sadik, 1984:37). Despite the controversies surrounding coercion and human rights abuses (see for example Crane & Finkle, 1989), China has been one of the largest recipients ever since.

Many government policies are less overt than those outlined above. One plausible explanation of why Bangladesh has been the largest recipient of population assistance for over a decade is its zealous enthusiasm to accept funds, in stark contrast to India. Bangladesh places relatively few restrictions on the activities of freewheeling agencies who have persistently used it as a 'laboratory' for demographic research and new contraceptive methods. Limited government accountability of these agencies seems to suggest that the government is largely interested in attracting assistance for reasons beyond those stated in its rhetoric. India on the other hand, despite its bigger population,
has been relatively reluctant to receive funds. By vetting foreign donors entering the
country, closely monitoring their activities and if the need arises terminating their
operations (see for example USAID in India, Harkavy, 1995:143-5), the Indian
Government has effectively ensured that population agencies help complement its
development plans.

In other cases, funds from certain donors or channels have been reluctantly
accepted or even refused for political reasons unrelated to population. The Mexican
Government in the early 1970s thought it unwise to accept population assistance from
USAID, to avoid a perceived link between its family planning programme and continuing
border-migration and economic disputes with America. Support from UNFPA, however,
was welcomed for it did not raise these types of domestic political issues (Salas,
1986:16-7). Likewise, in the early 1980s African states which had recently formulated
population policies saw UNFPA “as a more neutral and perhaps more trusted source for
population funding than other donor agencies” (Sinding & Quandt, 1993:157).

Many factors affect the degree to which governments make good their population
policies. Ideological differences between contesting parties on such issues as abortion
and contraceptives within a recipient nation may lead the government to postpone, scale
down or even abandon its population programmes. Equally, governments which were
pressed into formulating a population policy by donor agencies may relent once they
have received aid (Chamie, 1994:45). The resolve of the national government towards
population issues and its population programme can impinge on the demand for donor
assistance.

5.3.2 Absorptive capacity

Enunciating rhetoric for population assistance is one thing; possessing the absorptive
capacity to use funds is clearly another. Political will, infrastructure, management,
technical capacity and trained personnel need to exist before a country or organisation
can make full use of donor support. Again to quote Salas (1979:73):

A number of factors determine the ability of a country and its government to absorb
outside assistance – among them [are] its own awareness of its population situation, the
political will of the country to do something about it, its level of knowledge and
management skills in the population area, its institutional structure, and its cultural and
social background and traditions.
Of fundamental importance is the issue of political stability. Nations in the midst of conflict, either from civil strife or external hostilities, will be incapable of effectively expending funds. As the state apparatus breaks down, government services become limited or non-existent, while NGOs are effectively forced to cease operations owing to the difficult circumstances. Kuwait, for example, was unable to utilise funds in 1991 primarily because of the Gulf War, with funding only returning to a level of normality in 1993. Likewise, once-modest recipient Somalia received virtually nothing in the early 1990s as civil disputes intensified.

Thomas and Grindle (1994) illustrate how political will affects a nation’s absorptive capacity. Reviewing sixteen case histories, they note that in many countries there was a large gap between policy statements and actual implementation. Despite international pressure and the inducement of aid, many governments did not commit themselves seriously to their formally stated policy objectives. Indeed, in some instances several years elapsed between the announcement of a government policy on population growth and the launch of substantive measures to achieve these aims. Frequently, a dichotomy existed between reluctant decision-makers on the one hand, and the intellectual elite and donors on the other. Thomas and Grindle argue that the political elite was instrumental in both introducing new policies (or altering existing ones), and in gaining bureaucratic commitment. In particular, a popular chief executive, committed to limiting population growth, was often crucial to the successful introduction of measures.

Sustaining a population programme depends considerably upon bureaucratic capacity and assent. A 1972 OECD conference noted that “operation, implementation and management” (OECD. Development Centre, 1973:iii) would be the main problems facing population programmes in developing countries during the 1970s. Two decades later management issues, inadequate facilities and a lack of skilled personnel are still noted by several experts (see for example Chamie, 1994:45-6; Nortman, 1985:30-2; 1987b:136) as impeding a nation’s absorptive capacity. Governments and NGOs may not receive the funding they desire as donors may suspect mismanagement, inefficiencies and implementation difficulties. Moreover, discrepancies between decisions at the national level and implementation in the field, mirroring “the state of administrative, social and political affairs existing within a government and country” (Chamie, 1994:46), may also lead donors to ask how efficient a programme is.
Ness and Ando (1984:150) argue that where there is a strong political and administrative system favouring population activities, population assistance will allow the national programme(s) to make further resources available. Conversely, in countries where the system is less developed, population assistance may either help to rectify weaknesses by offering resources and political support, or may be used for personal gain by system leaders.

Well-established infrastructure and strong political support ensured that Asian nations were the predominant recipients of population assistance in the 1960s and 1970s (Ness & Ando, 1984:48-9; Sadik, 1984:33). To a lesser degree the same circumstances prevailed in Latin America where there were a number of private organisations headed by medical practitioners, but opposition from religious groups rendered government support weak (Ness & Thomas, 1989:14; UNFPA, 1991:15). Consequently, inconspicuous funding from international NGOs was the main source of support, as the following comments show:

And:

Back in the seventies most resources would go to Western Hemisphere, because they were the one that had the FPAs. The FPAs had the resources to be spent. We were rapidly expanding, excess capacity could actually be funded and ...er... not like that in other parts of the world.

You can see that most went to the Western Hemisphere ... It's the only place where it could be spent (NGO Official A).

A number of countries could be selected to demonstrate Ness and Ando's third point of personal gain by system leaders. They cite Pakistan and the Philippines as examples, but a more comprehensive list would also include several nations from Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific.

Generally, donors seek maximum 'bang for the buck' and are reluctant to 'waste' funds. Ness (1989:199) avers that population assistance can have a "substantial influence" in countries where political will and administrative competence are high, adding that no amount of assistance can have a real impact if both factors are deficient. Hence, 'successful' countries and projects will invariably receive more funds than those that are not. Bangladesh, for example, attracts large sums, as it has a demonstrated capacity to use them. Many other countries lack the ability for whatever reason to expend large sums of donor funding. Indeed, in some instances funds have been returned
to the donor agencies. Accountability, however, is not everything; as Finkle (1993:188) points out, donors are not always "sensitive" to the issue of absorptive capacity.

5.3.3 Level of development: 'graduation'

If the idea behind ODA is to assist developing countries with their development aspirations, then the ultimate objective must surely be to make aid giving redundant. With economic development, the level of population assistance that a nation receives should abate as fertility rates decline and local resources are found. Eventually, it becomes impossible to justify granting funds to countries whose level of socioeconomic development enables them to support their population programmes. At this point, they become 'graduates'.

Over the last few decades, several nations, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, have undergone major socioeconomic transformations, including a rapid fall in fertility. Socioeconomic development is the predominant reason for the relative decline of population assistance going to Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. Hong Kong and Singapore stopped receiving population assistance in 1994, while South Korea and Taiwan have to all intents and purposes graduated. Many others have rightly seen their level of donor support decline over time. There are exceptions, however. Given their per capita income, it is astonishing that Brunei and Macau received population assistance funding, albeit minuscule, as recently as 1993 and 1992 respectively (UNFPA, 1996a:41, 44). Likewise, until the onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (see UNFPA & ANU, 1998), it appeared unjustifiable to sanction large-scale funds for Malaysia and Thailand:

We [UNFPA] have graduated a number of countries over the years. Korea, for example, and I suspect we have others very close to graduation. If you look at the GNP of many of the South Asian countries [sic]: Thailand, Indonesia...many of them probably could be donors than receivers. That's going to take some psychology on both sides to accept that relationship (Multilateral Official A).

South Korea was one of the first countries in Asia to receive population assistance following the establishment of the government family planning programme in 1961. Donor interest and good absorptive capacity ensured that between 1969 and 1972 Korea featured among the global top ten recipients. Indeed, in per capita terms it lingered just outside the top ten. Support came from numerous sources. Population Council involvement began in 1962, peaked in 1970 and ceased in 1977 (Population Council, 1978:53; Yang, 1991:315, 321). The 1961-established Planned Parenthood

Two decades of rapid development changed Korea’s socioeconomic landscape. By the mid-1970s most international donors considered South Korea a low priority, with USAID classifying it as a “graduate country” making it ineligible for normal development assistance from the US Government (Donaldson, 1990a:147). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s funding levels steadily declined (Figure 5.13) and nowadays only NGOs receive minimal sums of assistance from their international associates (see IPPF, 1995a:85-88; UNFPA, 1995b:432-3).

Figure 5.13 Population assistance to South Korea 1969-1994

Similarly, between 1969 and 1972 Taiwan received population assistance from JOICFP, UNFPA and principally the Population Council (OECD. Development Assistance Committee, 1974:62; Yoshida, 1981:183-5). Figures indicate that funding had ceased by the late 1970s. The Population Council asserts that the success of the Taiwanese family planning programme, and the strong local commitment to it, made its continuing support unnecessary (Population Council, 1978:125), suggesting that other agencies may have followed suit. However, as Taiwan was no longer the legitimate representative of China, its claim to international development assistance became
problematic. Moreover, it disappeared as a separate entity from UN statistics. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to assume that Taiwan presently receives no funding that could be classified as population assistance.

Many more nations will see their level of support fall with improved socioeconomic development, and in time the number of graduates will undoubtedly increase. Given the financial constraints facing population agencies, it is conceivable that certain countries will experience a disproportionate decrease in their level of population assistance. Some may even be graduated sooner than might have otherwise been the case. It is hoped that recent and future graduates will become important donors despite the "psychology" that some officials perceive to be involved.

Graduation is a poignant issue for both donors and recipients, as the question of when a country becomes a graduate is open to political disputation. Convincing governments and local NGOs that they no longer require the same level of assistance as before can be equally arduous (see for example IPPF, 1997a:8). Clearly there is much room for contention. Chapter Eight reviews the procedures of population agencies in deciding how much a country should receive and investigates some of the problems involved.

5.3.4 Donor interests

Although demand factors are important, it needs to be remembered that requests for funding outstrip the amount available. This suggests that the question of supply must also be significant and, therefore, while the three previous explanations elucidate many of the trends, it would be naive to think that donors do not pursue their own agendas. Given finite resources, donors will allocate resources to programmes and countries that conform to their overall aid and foreign policy objectives. Wolfson (1983:11) notes that:

Donors do, of course, have their preferences, both positive and negative, as regards the type of aid that they will provide, to whom to provide it, in what amounts, and within what kind of aid relationship with the recipient.

Only IPPF and UNFPA provide assistance to a multitude of countries, allowing other donors to withhold it from certain areas on the pretext that they are already being covered, which enables them to focus on a selected few (Wolfson, 1983:11). From the view of rationalising resources this approach is understandable, yet it is deplorable that the criteria used in selecting countries are often not readily apparent, as Chapter Eight
demonstrates. Although there can be little doubt that donor interests play an important role, the often secretive nature of the aid establishment makes it difficult to gauge and examine this. No one readily admits that there is an agenda behind the rhetoric, despite it appearing glaringly obvious at times. In assessing population assistance UNFPA (1989:7) noted that trends “also reflect what can be called the politics and diplomacy of international assistance, in general, and of international population assistance in particular.” Donors will allow themselves the luxury of funding countries that are most deserving according to such criteria as national security, links with former colonies or potential trading partners. Nations deemed inconsequential, or where bilateral assistance is considered politically unwise, are often left to intermediate donors. There are probably numerous cases that could demonstrate these points, but it has only been possible to find a few owing to the obstacles to acquiring such information. Often the true reasons why assistance is given to a particular country are not fully discernible, disguised behind rhetoric used by both donor governments and agencies.

Donors appear to have a preference for providing bilateral funds to countries that deal in English, as the diagrams in Appendix B suggest. Given that historically the bulk of population assistance funding has come from English-speaking donor governments, it is not surprising that there appears to be a preference towards aid to “Saxophone” (NGO Official D) nations. This probably reflects the fact that most agencies work predominantly in English and hence have an obvious preference in dealing with countries with few language barriers. It is noticeable that in Sub-Saharan Africa English-speaking countries are priorities for many donors, while Francophone and Lusophone countries are generally not:

Well I mean in, say, population health work there are kind of twenty I guess what we call priority countries which tend in the main to be, you know, Commonwealth-associated South Asia, East and Central Southern Africa. Although there are a number of, you know, newly independent states included in that and some Latin American countries. But you know it’s that core group of twenty that kind of make up what we spend money on population (Bilateral Official A).

Anglophone Africa received 56% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population assistance funding in 1970. In 1990, the figure was 53% and it had fallen to 42.8% by 1994. If

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22 For an exposé on the often corrupt and secretive nature of development institutions see Hancock, 1991.
unallocated/regional data were excluded the figures would be 94%, 63% and 60% respectively.

Over the last decade, funding to Sub-Saharan Africa has increased both as a percentage of overall assistance and in absolute terms. Yet some feel that the international community is neglecting the continent, as the following comments suggest:

But then nobody really cares about Africa. At this point people are just saying let them simmer in their own juice and that's it, and let AIDS epidemic will - will solve their population problem (NGO Official B).

and:

The smaller African countries are increasingly expendable [USAID operations], which of course is a general trend (Int. Consultant B).

Part of the reason for these comments is that the share of Sub-Saharan Africa funds going to the large Anglophone recipients – Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda – has increased over time from around 30% in 1971 to 40% in 1990, an issue that has been strengthened by the large increase in funding to South Africa since democratisation in 1992. Donor governments have now changed their attitude towards this country and the figures are telling. Funding rose by 313% between 1992 and 1994 from $211,000 to $872,000 (UNFPA, 1996a:40).

International Consultant B rightly mentions that smaller countries have suffered, for they seem to have less importance than larger nations (see 5.2.6). Frequently they represent the desire to prop up regimes that Western governments deem useful. Put simply, most of Africa does not seem to be of great interest to donor governments, so multilaterals and NGOs predominate.

Equally, in the Arab World most population assistance goes to only a handful of countries. In 1970, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey accounted for 86% of Arab World funds, while in 1990 and 1994 the figure remained high at 66% and 67% respectively. Although these nations have large populations, they have also been key players in the foreign policy considerations of Western countries. These four states received, and continue to receive, large sums of foreign aid, including population assistance. Egypt, in particular, has received vast amounts since signing the Camp David Peace Accord in 1979, a point clearly visible in the figures for the Arab World, especially the substantial bilateral sums and the peak in funding in 1980.
Wider foreign policy interests of donor governments can and do have a significant effect on the levels of population assistance a country receives. Several examples show that foreign policy interests influence America's bilateral funding (see 8.2.2.1). Between 1965 and 1975 the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Korea and Thailand combined received 78% of population assistance distributed to ESCAP nations despite having only 66% of the population. As America was the major provider of population assistance to the region, Ness and Ando attribute this disparity to the central role that these nations played in America's regional foreign policy (Ness & Ando, 1984:152). Similarly, a 1983 US President's Report warned of the political and economic challenges facing Central America and called for a massive expansion of United States aid, including population assistance, to tackle the "crisis" on America's doorstep (United States. National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1983:1-2, 57, 62-3, 93). In the mid-1980s, Central America witnessed a marked increase in population funding in both absolute and per capita terms, primarily from bilateral sources to El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, at the same time as the Reagan administration was actively involved in the region's affairs (OECD, 1985:103). Likewise, Conly and Speidel (1993:45) remark that both Kenya and Bangladesh received a disproportionate share of American bilateral assistance compared to their population size.

It appears the European Union acted surreptitiously when it finally decided to offer support for population activities in the early 1990s, as large projects in the countries of the Arab World bordering the Mediterranean as well as nations of Central and Eastern Europe were among the first to receive funds (IPPF, 1993a:20, 24). No doubt this was portrayed as an act of neighbourly good-will. One senior agency official, however, said that the EU is under pressure from certain member states to provide family planning to the Arab World with a view to halting mass migration into Western Europe (see 7.3.2.3). Similar motives are probably behind donor assistance to former communist states. It is surely more than coincidental that in FY1996 USAID disbursed as much funding to "Europe/Newly Independent States" as it did to Sub-Saharan Africa (USAID, 1997:21).

Wider foreign policy issues also lead to the 'flavour-of-the-moment' syndrome. Frequently some countries are preferred to others, depending upon their current importance in the foreign policy of donor governments and the interests of donor
agencies. This can change with shifting political realities both within and outside the developing country.

Disputes in bilateral relations can result in funding cuts, as the recent case between the US and Pakistan demonstrates. During the 1980s, America was the largest donor to Pakistan’s population programme. In 1993, following a dispute over nuclear policy, the United States withdrew all development assistance to the Pakistani Government, and as a result overall population assistance to Pakistan fell substantially (Rosen & Conly, 1996: 11,33).

The interests of donors in a particular country or region are not necessarily bound to questions of population alone. Generally, wider foreign policy considerations are far more pertinent than population issues. This is not to say, however, that there are no specific reasons why funding for population assistance is given, as Chapter Seven reveals.

5.4 Conclusion

The similarities between foreign aid and population assistance disbursements are conspicuous. In terms of disbursements by region as a percentage, both demonstrate a shift over time away from the Asia-Pacific region to Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 2.2); with funding remaining relatively stable to the other regions. Likewise, large states generally receive the most ODA and population assistance in absolute terms, with microstates getting the most in per capita funding (see 2.3.2). The analysis by subregions in this chapter, however, reveals many insights that go unnoticed if focusing exclusively at the regional level. The considerable variation in the channels used for distribution to different Asia-Pacific subregions, for example, is a case in point along with the disparities in funding to Sub-Saharan Africa across linguistic lines. Clearly, both regional and subregional funding need consideration in forming a picture of population assistance trends to recipients.

No one factor alone determines the level of population assistance a nation receives. Assessing the relative interplay of the four determinants discussed in this chapter – recipients’ perception, absorptive capacity, graduation and donor interests – requires an understanding that goes beyond donor and government rhetoric. Although
they may not always be readily obvious, an appreciation of these determinants is likely to expose a fuller picture of population assistance to any one country.
Part Three

Determinants of Population Assistance
6 Making an impact?
Societal actors and the public policy process

Part Three of this thesis continues from the assessment of population assistance funding trends addressed in Part Two, by considering the determinants of these trends. This leads to two questions on resource allocation. First, this chapter and the next ask what determines the global sums of population assistance. Second, Chapter Eight examines how funding levels to individual countries are settled.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reviews the public policy process in developed countries, by examining from a theoretical perspective the main players involved in the decision-making process and the policy environment that influences their decisions. Based on this discussion, the second section devises a framework for the decision-making processes related to population assistance that forms the basis for Chapters Six to Eight. This public-policy framework displays how both societal and state actors affect the allocation of financial resources for population assistance in developed, liberal democracies, which are the main source of primary funds (see 4.2.1). The third section of this chapter canvasses the role of societal actors in determining the allocation of funds for population assistance, and considers the institutional factors affecting decision-making on population assistance.

6.1 The public policy process

The complex phenomenon known as public policy is the result of numerous decisions taken by many individuals and organisations (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:7). Comprehending it has proved difficult, with debate on how to define public policy attracting the attention of many academics. Howlett and Ramesh (1995:4-7) summarise the different schools of thought as well as their similarities:

Among the many competing definitions of 'public policy', some are very complex, while others are quite simple. Despite their variations, they all agree on certain key aspects. They agree that public policies result from decisions made by governments and that decisions by governments to do nothing are just as much policy as are decisions to do something. In other respects, however, the competing definitions differ considerably (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:4).
Taking a more pragmatic approach, Davis et al. (1993:4) maintain that:

At its broadest level then, public policy is the complex interplay of values, interests and resources. Policies express values, support or curtail interests and distribute resources. They shape, and are shaped by, the constituent elements of politics, so that policies represent victories or compromises encapsulated as programs for action by government.

The difficulty in defining the concept of public policy rests with the problem of "separating the policy process from its context" (Davis et al., 1993:4). Davis et al. (1993:4-5) consider it unrealistic to isolate public policy from its surroundings, as it needs to be understood within the values, interests and resources of society's institutions.

The number of stages involved in the public policy process is also contentious. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980:21-28) maintain that there are three functional environments: policy formulation, policy implementation and policy evaluation, each providing an arena for actors to interact. By comparison, Howlett and Ramesh (1995:50-79), whose comprehensive review of public policy forms the basis of Part Three of this thesis, argue that the policy process has five stages:

1. Agenda-setting: the course by which problems come to the notice of governments.
2. Policy formulation: the process whereby the government formulates policy options.
3. Decision-making: the process whereby the government makes a decision on a course of action.
4. Policy implementation: the implementation of those decisions.

This chapter and the next consider the first three points for population assistance. As noted in section 1.2, this thesis does not try to investigate the types of activities and programmes implemented. Thus, the other two points are not discussed as they fall outside of the scope of this thesis.

There is an ongoing debate in the public policy literature on whether only actors are pertinent in the public policy process, or whether economic, social and political institutions are also significant. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980:26) note that the primary stimuli for initiating a policy originate from the interests of powerful political...
actors, crisis situations and diffuse public concerns and pressures. Others disagree with this point. Undoubtedly, both are important in formulating public policy, but the degree to which one outweighs the other largely depends on the issue the policy is addressing. Figure 6.1 illustrates the model for the relationship between policy actors and institutions in the policy process adopted in this thesis.

**Figure 6.1 Actors and Institutions in the Policy Process**

![Diagram showing the relationship between policy actors and institutions](image)

*Source: Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:51*

Societal and state actors meet in policy subsystems to form policies. These subsystems are forums where policy actors can discuss, negotiate, and bargain in pursuit of their interests. Institutions, on the other hand, are the structures and organisation of the state, society and the international system. The way these institutions are organised internally, and their relation to each other, are of interest. The following examines the various policy actors in the policy subsystem and how their surrounding institutional arrangements impinge upon them.

### 6.1.1 Policy actors

Although any number of groups or individuals may theoretically engage as actors in the policy process, Howlett and Ramesh (1995:52) simplify policy actors into five broad categories: elected officials, appointed officials, interest groups, the research community and the mass media. The first two (state actors) form the core of the state apparatus, while the latter three (societal actors) come from the society at large.
Elected officials divide into two categories – the executive and the legislature – each performing a distinct role in formulating policy.

The **executive** is the branch of government responsible for the formulation and implementation of public policy. Essentially, there are two types of executives: the presidential executive epitomised by the United States and the parliamentary system found in such countries as Australia and the United Kingdom.

In the United States the executive consists of Secretaries, senior officials and advisers headed and appointed by the President. While the President has the ultimate say on the policies promoted by the executive, his authority is constrained by the independently elected Congress. If the rival party controls Congress then the President may face difficulties persuading legislators to accept his proposals. Likewise, the President may block policy initiatives from the Congress.

Under the parliamentary system, the legislature chooses the executive (sometimes known as the Cabinet) from its members. Individual ministers as well as a head, usually referred to as the Prime Minister, are appointed. There are few checks on the executive in the parliamentary system, so long as it enjoys a majority in the legislature. Ideally, all executive decisions are made collectively or by Cabinet committees. In practice, however, individual ministers or senior bureaucratic officials acting on behalf of the minister frequently make decisions. In such instances, selected interest groups may be invited to take part in the process.

The executive has at its disposal a wide range of resources that it can utilise to advocate its position. In particular, it has control over such crucial means as fiscal resources, the bureaucracy and the timing of laws in the legislature. By manipulating its control over unrivalled information, as well as its superior access to media outlets, the executive can enforce its position and weaken that of its opponents (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:53-4; McLean, 1996:170-2).

The **legislature** is a law-making assembly consisting of elected members of equal standing. In most countries with a parliamentary system, the legislature is bicameral as with the House of Commons and House of Lords in the United Kingdom and the House of Representatives and Senate in Australia and the United States. The bicameral
Congress is the national legislature of the United States. However, in New Zealand and Sweden, for instance, the legislature consists of just one chamber.

In parliamentary systems, the main task of the legislature is to hold the executive accountable, and not necessarily to formulate policy. However, it can influence policies by suggesting amendments to proposed legislation and government budgets to fund them. If the party of the executive holds a majority in the legislature then the bill will usually pass, but if this is not the case then compromises are inevitable. The influence of a legislator depends on whether he or she is bound by party lines or is able to speak independently.

Under the presidential system, the President needs to negotiate with the legislature as it is autonomous of the government. The considerable influence of the US Congress rests in part on its constitutional autonomy, and the various congressional committees that need to approve a bill. Much of the work undertaken by Congress is done in committees established along functional lines to review proposed legislation. The extent to which these committees have developed expertise in their area enables the Congress to influence policy.

The nature of the topic being deliberated also affects the role of the legislature. National security and foreign affairs, for example, are usually discussed in secret outside the legislature, and decisions taken in response to crises are, to save time, unlikely to involve the legislature. Policies related to the budget and the allocation of resources are likely to generate the most debate in the legislature, but have little effect on the government’s position. Yet policies such as those dealing with race, gender relations and abortion may be so controversial that the executive may consider accepting the views of the legislature.

While individual legislators may actively involve themselves in the policy system owing to their expertise or special interest in a topic, the legislature as an entity plays only a limited role in the policy process (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:54-5; McLean, 1996:99-100, 280).

### 6.1.1.2 Appointed officials

The expansion of the government’s scope and size in all Western democracies this century has resulted in the devolution of a wide range of responsibilities to appointed officials (Wilson, 1990:58), thus making them essential in the policy process and key
figures in most policy subsystems. The primary function of appointed officials, or the bureaucracy, is to aid the executive in performing its business. Howlett and Ramesh (1995:57) cite several analysts who contend that bureaucracies, consisting of specialists with comprehensive experience to deal with policy issues on a continuing basis as well as having extensive knowledge of regulatory activities, have to a large extent replaced elected politicians in the policy process.

The power and influence that bureaucracies wield rest on the following authority:

1. The law states that certain functions are to be performed by bureaucracies, allowing individual bureaucrats wide discretion to act on behalf of the state.
2. Bureaucracies usually have unmatched access to material resources to pursue their own interests. This gives bureaucrats a strong voice on public expenditure.
3. Bureaucracies command a wide range of skills and expertise that make them the leading organisation in the state. Given that they continually work on comparable problems, bureaucracies possess unique insights into societal issues.
4. Bureaucracies also possess vast access to information in the society.
5. The permanence of bureaucracies often gives their members an advantage over the executive.
6. Negotiations between the executive and bureaucrats are often in secret, denying other policy actors a say (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:56-7).

Far from being a homogeneous group, bureaucracies are a collection of organisations with their own interests, perspectives, and operating procedures. Intra- and inter-departmental disputes are not unusual and may require intervention from the executive to be resolved. Ultimately, the executive is responsible for all policies, but the level of control it exercises over the bureaucracy depends on the issue (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:56-7; McLean, 1996: 172).

6.1.1.3 Interest groups

Interest groups are independent organisations, comprising people or sectors of society that share a common interest and that try to influence public policy. They offer an institutionalised link between the state and society by advancing issues and expressing needs more divergent than those presented by political parties. However, the degree to
which groups are separate in practice from the government or a particular political party varies notably (Wilson, 1990:1.7-8).

By serving two main functions, interest groups can greatly influence state actors and thereby the policy process. First, interest groups offer a range of knowledge and expertise that may support the positions of both elected officials and opposition members. Likewise, appointed officials also seek their specialised views. Secondly, through their often considerable financial and political clout interest groups can contribute to the coffers of political parties and offer other forms of assistance. These information and power resources make interest groups prominent players in the policy subsystem, and although the government may not implement their views, they are rarely ignored entirely.

The extent to which interest groups have an effect on policy largely depends on their resources. Larger groups are more likely to be taken seriously than smaller ones. To enhance their resources, groups with similar concerns may form an umbrella association. Well-funded groups are able to hire permanent specialised staff and make donations to political parties. Moreover, interest groups may help the election campaigns of supportive candidates who they think may champion their cause in government (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:57-8).

To get maximum effect, interest groups gravitate their attention towards where the effective decision-making lies. In the United States interests focus on both the President and the Congress, while in most other nations the executive and appointed officials are the main targets (McLean, 1996:244).

6.1.1.4 Research community

The research community is composed of think tanks and university academics. Think tanks focus on providing practical solutions to issues of public concern, while much of the research of academics may take a more theoretical or philosophical view of public problems and does not necessarily offer useable advice to influence policy. The researches produced by both are of a comparable standard; however, think tanks are usually more partisan than their academic counterparts; in particular, they may have a marked effect on policy by targeting politicians of similar persuasion (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:58).
6.1.1.5 Mass media

The mass media performs a critical function between the state and society, allowing it to sway both the government and public opinion on public issues and resolutions to them. By reporting news, it combines the task of a passive reporter with that of an active analyst and advocate of solutions. In particular, the media is prominent in setting the policy agenda. By determining what is newsworthy, and by highlighting particular solutions at the expense of alternatives, the media may influence the opinions held by the government and the public at large. Issues portrayed by the media as interesting tend to be perceived by the public as more significant than might have otherwise been the case.

Other policy actors, however, who have their own interests and ideas on policy options, are not necessarily swayed by media attention. Often, they will have their own resources to counterbalance the media’s influence. Both public officials and interest groups may provide the media with selective information to enhance their cause. Those who package their case appropriately will receive more media attention than those who are unable to do so (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:59).

Policy formulation in effect frequently depends on issue networks between like-minded politicians, bureaucrats, academics, interest groups and journalists (Davis et al., 1993:5; Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:127-9). Societal actors seek liaison with sympathetic state, while state actors rely on supporting societal actors for advice and information on the policy subjects. The interactions among various government departments, elected officials and societal actors are instrumental for the formulation and development of policies (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:127).

6.1.2 Institutional factors

The prevailing institutions of society are also significant in the behaviour of policy actors (see 6.1), by shaping the manner in which they pursue their interests. These institutional factors cannot be altered without significant difficulties, and only empirical research offers insights into the relationship between policy actors and their relevant institutional factors (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:51).
6.1.2.1 Organisation of the state

The way the state is organised affects what officials can do. The ability of the state to formulate and implement policies is affected by its autonomy and capacity.

**Autonomy** is the degree to which the state is independent of self-serving and conflicting social pressures. In most democracies, policy-making bodies that are responsive to societal concerns will benefit some groups at the expense of the welfare of society generally. Thus, institutions responding to the self-serving motives and actions of societal groups may implement policies that may benefit their members, but ignore the society's overall welfare. The government can limit its exposure to such pressures by insulating itself. However, this can compromise the principles of democracies, and thus trade-offs are inevitable until an acceptable balance is found (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:60).

The state must also possess the **capacity** to formulate and implement effective policies. Such capacity requires an organisational coherence among the various levels of governments, expertise to deal with issues and the necessary resources. An executive that is consistently bogged down by negotiations with the legislature and government departments is unlikely to perform policy function. Likewise, a bureaucracy that lacks the necessary expertise to deal with issues will not serve society well.

States that promote autonomy and capacity are referred to as strong states, while those that lack such institutions are known as weak states. France and Japan are examples of strong states, whereas America is a weak state. In strong states, the executive-bureaucratic apparatus dominates policy decision-making. Weak states have legislatures at their core, and powerful interest groups that exercise considerable influence on policy-making (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:60).

6.1.2.2 Organisation of the society

The ability of the state to make policies depends upon its relationship with outside social groups, as well as other links with the electorate whose problems it is designed to resolve. To make and implement effective policies, the government needs the support of such prominent social groups as the business community and trade unions. If societal conflicts are severe, then the state is paralysed in undertaking policy function (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:65).
Policy effectiveness is lowest when the state is weak and the society is fragmented. However, if social groups are united within and among themselves, this creates a stable environment for effective policy implementation. Societal groups that focus on narrow concerns may compete with each other for their members' interests despite the effect this may have on others. Consequently, policies are frequently contradictory and may leave the vast majority worse off. This issue is most acute when either narrow sectional groups are too powerful to be ignored, or the state is so weak that it cannot ignore such societal pressures (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:65).

6.1.2.3 Organisation of the international system

International institutions are increasingly shaping the public policies of national governments. Although policies on such inherently international topics as trade and defence are most affected, factors originating elsewhere are progressively influencing policies on such domestic concerns as pensions and health. Governments may find their options in dealing with such issues as trying to protect domestic manufacturers and producers through tariffs and export subsidies, for example, limited by international constraints (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995:69). In many ways, the growing global economic and political interdependence poses the greatest challenge to national parliaments formulating their own public policy (McLean, 1996:360).

6.2 Population assistance and the public policy process

While foundations were important in the 1950s and early 1960s, and development banks are playing an increasingly larger role, developed country governments remain the preeminent source of primary funds for population assistance (see 4.2.1). Thus, at the risk of neglecting the complete picture, Chapters Seven and Eight focus on the factors in developed countries that determine the level of population assistance funding.

As the principal donor nations of population assistance are liberal democracies, there are similarities among them, regardless of whether the system is parliamentary or presidential. This allows for a comparative analysis of the factors determining population assistance funding in the donor nations. However, for two reasons evidence for the discussion in the next three chapters comes predominantly from the United States. First,
unlike those of most donor countries, the workings of democracy and related population concerns are well-documented, and second, given America's dominance in population assistance (see 4.2.2), it seems only fitting that this case is emphasised. By comparison, I have had only limited success in finding appropriate examples from other donor nations owing to the limited documentation available on population assistance.

Essentially, there are three coexisting arenas in the decision-making process for population assistance (Figure 6.2). The first involves the activities of societal actors in influencing the decisions taken by state actors in donor nations. The second arena comprises the decision-making process of state actors themselves, while the actions taken by bilateral aid agencies and intermediate population donors in deciding who are the ultimate recipients of population assistance make up the third. Recipients may request population assistance and may make representation to elected and appointed officials, but their overall influence on the global funds made available by donor governments is usually circumscribed. Recipients have somewhat more leverage in determining the share of population assistance they receive from bilateral sources and intermediate donors, based on the factors discussed in section 5.3. But demand for population assistance exceeds supply (Camp, 1994:129), so developing countries may be unsuccessful in obtaining their desired funding. By far the greatest influence recipients can exert is on the type of programmes that population agencies fund. Thus, given their minimal influence on funding levels, recipients are not considered as a separate arena in the decision-making process for population assistance. The arrows in Figure 6.2 indicate the direction of the decision-making process and not financial flows.

Figure 6.2 identifies three types of societal actors that affect the decisions taken by state actors on population assistance: interest groups, research community and mass media. These societal actors are important in agenda-setting and, moreover, in maintaining the issue on the political agenda. They will be examined in the next section of this chapter, as will the institutional factors that impinge upon the decision-making processes for population assistance in developed countries.

The second arena involves the elected parliamentary officials and appointed officials in government aid agencies, usually acting in partnership with the responsible ministry for international relations. Depending on the state in question, decisions on the amount of foreign aid earmarked for population assistance are made either by elected officials such as in the United States, after varying degrees of consultation with
appointed officials, or more commonly by the bureaucrats running the aid programme according to directives set by elected officials. Chapter Seven discusses this arena in more detail.

The third arena involves the allocation of population assistance to recipients. This occurs essentially at two places (Figure 6.2): by appointed officials in developed countries for bilateral assistance, and by intermediate donors for the allocation of multilateral assistance and support from international NGOs. In establishing geographical and programme priorities, bilateral agencies consider, among other factors, administrative directives from other state actors and requests from recipients. The governing bodies of intermediate agencies determine and approve funding levels for regions or countries, departments and programmes. Finally, for both bilateral and intermediate agencies, specialised departments with either a regional or programme emphasis allocate resources to countries or projects according to predetermined guidelines and perceived needs. This arena is discussed further in Chapter Eight.
Figure 6.2 Population Assistance: Actors in the Public Policy Process

Societal Actors

- Mass Media
- Interest groups
- Research community

State Actors

- Elected Officials
- Appointed Officials (Bilateral Agencies)
- Intermediate Donors (e.g. IPPF, UNFPA)

Recipients
6.3 Societal actors and population assistance

The remainder of this chapter looks at the role of societal actors in influencing the decisions taken by state actors on population assistance funding. This section reviews three types of societal actors: interest groups, the research community and the mass media. While there is undoubtedly a relationship between the mass media and interest groups, for example, the extent to which one affects the other is unclear. Thus, the interrelationships between societal factors are not explored here, although it is understood that they impinge on each other.

6.3.1 Interest groups

Since the 1960s, a number of active and often vocal interest groups have formed in many donor countries to push their agendas on population issues. Each would like to see government policies reflect its values and judgements on the population debate. Like social movements, such interest groups are often the initial instigators of government actions and ensure that due attention is given. This was especially true during the 1960s when many social movements and activist groups were established.

In her largely American-centred discussion, Campbell (1998) identifies the following five groups involved in the international population policy debate with the capacity to affect budgets: the population concerned community; the market preference community; the distribution community; women’s initiatives community; and the Vatican. Each of these schools of thought has tried to be influential in the continuing debate in the 1990s, but Campbell does not address their influence on population assistance funding.

Hartmann (1995:122) maintains that a range of population lobby groups “perform an important role in building a U.S. population control constituency, lobbying Congress and influencing the media”. Over time, several groups, such as Nationalists and Marxists, have voiced their opinions on population assistance, although their effect appears to be minimal. The five interest groups discussed in this section: the environmental lobby, the women’s movement, the population establishment, religious bodies and the business community, had and appear to have the most influence. There
has been a large degree of convergence among the first three groups, making the
delineation between them difficult. The business community has vested financial interests
in maintaining population assistance, while religious bodies use their influences to oppose
aid funding for population activities.

6.3.1.1 Environmental lobby

The modern environmental movement was born in the 1960s and has since gained a
prominent position in the politics of developed countries. Many concerns expressed by
environmentalists are global, demonstrating that developed countries cannot assess
environmental problems and their solutions in isolation from other parts of the world.
Global population growth has been one such topic. The neo-Malthusian view that
disasters will occur because of the destruction of the earth’s carrying capacity through
overpopulation, has been a core argument of many environmentalists, and the need for
population control has formed an integral part of their solutions (Pepper, 1996:16, 97,
276).

In the United States, a coalition of environmental groups lobbies the government
for funding, as well as promoting federal legislation. Simon (1990:40) reports that
journalists maintain that the environmental lobby is among the second or third strongest
in Washington. Environmental interest groups draw their evidence from a variety of
scientific organisations, such as the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS), whose journal Science publishes a number of environment and
population articles (Simon, 1990:41).

Some of these environmental groups focus exclusively on population issues. At
the height of the population hysteria, a number of interest groups were formed in the
United States aimed at halting population growth to protect the environment. Founded in
1968, Zero Population Growth, for example, advocates a sustainable equilibrium of
people. Also advocating increased population assistance, Negative Population Growth,
established in 1972, endeavours to “slow, halt, and eventually reverse population growth
through several extremely controversial measures …” (Switzer, 1994:349). Other groups
such as the Population Coalition and the Sierra Club in the United States, Global
Population Concerns in Canada, and Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable
Population, include on their agenda the desire to limit global population growth.
Possibly, the most influential environmental interest group that considers population matters is the Washington-based Worldwatch Institute. Founded in 1974 as a research institute to examine global environmental issues, the Institute champions the desire to build an environmentally sustainable society. Its annual flagship publication, *State of the World* (Worldwatch Institute, 1998), addresses a number of topical environmental concerns, which regularly include population issues. The publication’s findings are given worldwide publicity on its release each January. Although the Institute refuses to lobby *per se* (Enright, 1994:307), its staff, most notably its founder and President Lester Brown, are regular media commentators, as well as providing opinions to policymakers and the World Bank (Enright, 1994:308). Lester Brown has been prominent in stressing the need for the stabilisation of world population since the 1960s, advocating an increase in foreign aid that focuses on family planning and sex education to achieve this (Enright, 1994:309).

Although the neo-Malthusian arguments advocated by the environmental lobby were most widely accepted by policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s, some of the sentiments, if not the statements and figures they now produce, are incorporated by members of the population establishment (see 6.3.1.3) in their justification of further funding, adding to their influence on decision-makers.

### 6.3.1.2 Women’s movement

A discussion of the women’s movement and its involvement with population issues is a thesis in itself, as a number of diverse views and opinions, reflecting the variation in the women’s movement itself, would need examining. The feminist lobby in developed countries appears to consist of two extremes with many positions in between. At one extreme, and arguably the most influential at present, are those who have argued that population assistance can be an agent for empowering women and improving their status in society. At the other extreme, those opposed to population assistance focus on the issue of coercion and how donors use women in a ferocious drive to lower global fertility rates.

Although female activists were instrumental in the formation of IPPF in 1952 (Suitters, 1973:55-6) and family planning associations throughout the world, by the end of the 1960s economic and ecological arguments justified family planning programmes in
developing countries, not individual rights. However, in 1969 issues of women's rights captured American public attention (Piotrow, 1973:187). International publicity over the safety of oral contraceptives, highlighted the limited choice of contraception and the outdated restrictions placed on women, especially in relation to abortion. Demand for changes to abortion laws grew louder in the early 1970s (Piotrow, 1973:191-3) and in January 1973 abortion was legalised in the United States by the *Roe v. Wade* decision of the Supreme Court.

The 1975-85 United Nations Decade for the Advancement of Women encouraged academics, activists, policymakers and other interested parties to establish projects aimed at enhancing the economic and political status of women. Research on poor women collected vast amounts of data on the conditions of women in developing countries. Western women's organisations helped foster a number of similar organisations in developing countries. Overall, the decade “inspired a more profound sense of solidarity among women than had existed previously” (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995:236).

At the height of the population hysteria in the late 1960s and early 1970s, radical feminist groups expressing a Marxist critique of population control were ignored by policymakers and members of the population establishment (Hodgson & Watkins, 1997:488). Over the course of the next few decades, women's interests received prominence as the criticism that population assistance ignored the well-being of women mounted, and population agencies reinvented themselves in accordance with changing realities (see 4.4.4). The Cairo document reflects this shift in emphasis, with some analysts maintaining it is an “agenda advanced by a coalition of women's organizations and Western governments” (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995:225).

Feminist concerns grew in stature in American politics with the arrival of Bill Clinton as President in January 1993. Appealing to the pro-choice lobby and women's groups for electoral support, Clinton repaid the favour by rescinding objectionable administrative directives such as the Mexico City Policy (see 4.4.4) introduced during the Reagan-Bush era, and by championing women's issues at ICPD (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995:224, 236).
6.3.1.3 Population establishment

What we [UNFPA] try to control is how much money comes out of ODA into population (Multilateral Official A).

Since the beginning of government support of population assistance in the 1960s, the population establishment has been active in generating funding. Two interested parties lobby donor governments for their continued support of population assistance: developed country advocacy groups and population agencies themselves. What they have in common is the sentiment expressed by Multilateral Official A above. While other analysts (Campbell, 1998:490; Hartmann, 1995: 122) have included in their assessment of the population establishment some lobby groups mentioned in the previous two sections that advocate, among other things, increased funding for population assistance, this section deals with the agencies directly implementing population programmes and their supporters in developed countries. Other groups mentioned earlier appear to have other agendas in addition to those surrounding increased funding for population assistance.

By using a number of approaches, members of the population establishment present their side of the story to obtain further funding. In the 1960s agencies such as the Milbank Memorial Fund, the Population Council, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and the IPPF lobbied the US government to formulate an American policy (Donaldson, 1990b:3-4). Foundations also established such groups as the Population Crisis Committee23 and Zero Population Growth to lobby the American government for assistance to influence “demographic processes abroad” (Hodgson & Watkins, 1997:485). Much later, foundations also helped to establish, and in some cases continue to sustain, such developed-country advocacy groups as the Australian Reproductive Health Alliance (ARHA), Deutsche Stiftung für Weltbevölkerung (DSW), and the World Population Foundation (WPF), to promote support of population assistance.

To establish and maintain a policy network, the main targets of population lobby groups in developed countries are appointed and elected officials. Parliamentarians’ forums, in both developed and developing nations, are useful in generating support, as Salas (1979:59) noted in 1978:

23 The Population Crisis Committee (PCC) is now known as Population Action International (PAI).
We believe the increasing involvement of parliamentarians in issues of population and development will broaden and strengthen the efforts on population being undertaken by leaders in the executive branches of national governments.

Often, the developed-country advocacy groups were instrumental in the formation of All-Parliamentary groups on reproductive health and population and development, and have a vested interest in their continued existence.

Intermediate donors argue their case with individual donor governments for continued funding by regularly sending representatives and organising gatherings where pertinent issues are discussed:

What we can impact on as IPPF ... is to make the best possible case that over the various options that these donors have available that the most cost-efficient or one of the most cost-efficient would be through the NGO sector (NGO Official D).

Multilateral institutions and international NGOs have specialised departments aimed at fostering relations with donor governments and generating further support for their activities. Institutions use the Programme of Action, as well as strategic documents such as IPPF's Vision 2000 (IPPF, 1993b), to strengthen their claim for increased funding. Annual donor meetings, attended by representatives from bilateral agencies who primarily fund intermediate agencies (see 1.3), are an opportunity for intermediate agencies to display their achievements and argue their case for continued support. These meetings also allow bilateral representatives to question the way their money is used.

Articles in selected journals read by politicians and foreign policy analysts on population (see for example Camp, 1993) are attempts by the population establishment to disseminate information to selective readers. Likewise, briefing packs on population and reproductive health issues (see for example Australian Reproductive Health Alliance, 1998) directed primarily at politicians are produced in the hope of raising awareness among decision-makers. Other publications from members of the establishment are for mass circulation and media publicity (see for example Rockefeller Foundation, 1998) to create awareness in developed societies. Members of the establishment use both concerns of continued world population growth and the need for improved reproductive health measures in their rhetoric.

Critics have referred to the population establishment as a "goal-oriented industry" (Demeny, 1988:461). The economist Julian Simon (1990) was critical of the population establishment, referring to its system of connections between funding
agencies and research institutions as corrupt. While stopping short of calling this corruption a "conspiracy" (Simon, 1990:42), he raises many examples of dubious practices.

6.3.1.4 Business community

Consistent with the issue of tied aid described in section 2.4, manufacturers of family planning commodities and hardware have a vested interest in ensuring the procurement of their products by bilateral population agencies. Through effective lobbying, the threat of job losses, and probable donations to political parties, firms have used their financial and political muscle to maintain a favourable status for their merchandise.

Under federal procurement legislation, USAID is strongly encouraged, although not required, to purchase American products\(^2\). Supplying 90% of USAID's condom requirements, the Alabama-based Ansell Incorporated, with the help of influential senators, has effectively lobbied USAID to ensure it adheres to this policy. In 1991, USAID paid 5.3 cents per condom, which UNFPA and IPPF bought from Korean manufacturers for just 1.7 cents per condom. If USAID had purchased from international suppliers, it could have utilised up to 10% of its family planning services budget for other purposes. This raises the question whether taxpayer money is being spent on developing nations or simply subsidising jobs in Alabama. Similarly, USAID pays considerably more for IUDs than other population agencies (Family Planning World, 1992).

\(^2\) The following excerpt from the USAID's (1999) handbook on acquisitions and assistance agreements shows its obligation to procure American manufactured supplies:

312.5.3d CONTRACEPTIVES

The following policies apply to procurement of contraceptive products:

1) Consolidated Contracts - Unless otherwise authorized by the Office of Population, contraceptives and related supplies shall be procured under contracts which are managed by Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research, Center for Population, Health, and Nutrition, Office of Population, (G/PHN/POP). The same specifications shall be used for all USAID-funded program requirements. All condoms provided for HIV/AIDS programs shall also be procured under the centrally managed contraceptives contracts. Products which are currently available under centrally managed contracts are: condoms, oral contraceptive pills, IUDs, injectables, sub-dermal implants, and vaginal foaming tablets.

2) Source/Origin and Nationality - Contraceptive products shall meet the requirements for U.S. source, origin and nationality in Subpart B of 22 CFR 228 (AID Regulation 28)(See Mandatory Reference, 22 CFR 228, Subpart B) unless a waiver is approved in accordance with Subpart F of 22 CFR 228 (AID Regulation 28) (See Mandatory Reference, 22 CFR Part 228, Subpart F).
European Union funding also requires the procurement of items from within the Union, although the costs of these items are frequently higher than those on the international market. Companies such as Organon, Schering and Wyeth-Ayerst, as well as other European-based firms supplying commodities and hardware needed for a family planning, profit from such directives. Undoubtedly, it is in their interests to ensure not only that such directives are maintained in the future, but also that funding for population assistance increases.

6.3.1.5 Religious bodies

Two main religions, Christianity and Islam, have within their midst factions that oppose birth control and abortion, and, by implication, population assistance. While Islamic-based politics plays a considerable role in a number of recipient states, it is of little relevance in the predominantly Christian donor countries. For this reason, this section will look at the Christian factions and movements that have voiced religious arguments against the activities of population agencies.

6.3.1.5.1 Catholicism and the Vatican

Although some authors claim that the Catholic Church has not had such a strong influence as is often suggested (see Donaldson, 1988; 1990a:13-4; Keely, 1994), most analysts maintain it has a notable effect at both the international (see Symonds & Carder, 1973:182) and the national level (see Potts & Selman, 1979:311-2; Van-Liew, 1994), and is influential in many quarters (see Piotrow, 1973: xii, 9-11, 43-5; Symonds & Carder, 1973:xvi).

The Vatican spelt out its ideological position on the use of contraceptives and abortion in the 1968 Encyclical *Humanae Vitae*. It denounced the use of artificial birth control and condemned abortion (Catholic Church, 1968:15-6, 18-9), a position restated in the 1993 *Veritatis Splendor* which considered contraception and abortion as "intrinsically evil" (Catholic Church, 1993:124-5). The Catholic Church seeks to promote this ideological position through two approaches. The first takes the abortion debate onto the streets and into large media campaigns. The second, and probably more successful, route has been finding sympathetic elected and appointed officials in donor governments, most prominently in the United States. The Church's power rests not only
in being able to muster the support of Catholic voters, but also in its substantial institutional resources (Byrnes cited in Mumford, 1996:96).

Arguably, the impact of the Catholic Church on population assistance from donor governments has been most noteworthy in the United States. Both President Eisenhower and Catholic Democratic challenger John F. Kennedy sided with the Catholic bishops in opposing foreign aid for birth control, as recommended by the 1959 Draper Report in the lead-up to the 1960 Presidential election. President Eisenhower, however, was concerned that population growth would annul the achievements of the foreign aid programme but did not want to upset the crucial Catholic electorate, while his challenger expressed little enthusiasm for the issue (Piotrow, 1973:40-1, 43-8). Although once in office the Kennedy administration did not officially endorse the position of the Catholic bishops on birth control and foreign aid, the topic was considered "dynamite", to be best left alone (Piotrow, 1973:72):

Endorsing birth control was like endorsing the A.D.A. [Americans for Democratic Action], you lost fifty votes for every one you gained (comment by a Kennedy political associate cited in Piotrow, 1973:72).

In the 1970s, the Catholic Church thwarted the wishes of subsequent administrations to give strong support to population assistance, and with the help of political allies reduced the amount allocated in the 1980s and to some extent in the 1990s.

The stage was set, when six months before the 1972 Presidential election President Nixon, under pressure from the Catholic Church, publicly rejected the findings of the Rockefeller Commission on Population Growth and the American Future that Congress had commissioned two years earlier (Hodgson & Watkins, 1997:486; Mumford, 1993:116; 1996:21). The report outlined a national population policy that included the liberalisation of abortion, extensive family planning services including offering contraceptives to adolescents without parental consent, and a drive towards stabilising America's population (Mumford, 1996:47-57). Nixon believed he needed the support of Southern Whites and Northern Catholics to win the election, and it appears that in return for the support given by the Catholic bishops, none of the 70-odd recommendations of the Rockefeller study was implemented (Mumford, 1996:21, 96). According to former Democratic Congressman and Rockefeller Commission member, James Scheuer:

Our exuberance was short-lived. Then-President Richard Nixon promptly ignored our final report. The reasons were obvious – the fear of attacks from the far right and from the
Roman Catholic Church because of our positions on family planning and abortion. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that this obstruction was but the first of many similar actions to come from high places (cited in Mumford, 1996:97).

Similarly, the recommendations contained in the National Security Study Memorandum on world population growth and its implications for United States and global security (NSSM 200)\textsuperscript{25}, which advocated a large increase in population assistance, was approved by President Ford in November 1975 but never implemented. The Catholic Church managed to get the document classified initially for a five-year period to prepare the American public, but it was not until 1989 that the document was declassified (Mumford, 1993:118; 1996:23). According to Mumford (1996:123, 131) the Vatican needed to act against both the Rockefeller Commission and NSSM 200, as it not only contravened the Vatican's view of contraceptives, family planning and abortion, but also threatened both papal authority and ultimately the existence of the institution of the Papacy.

The former director of USAID's Office of Population, Reimert Ravenholt (1994:9-12), maintains that Jimmy Carter yielded to the pressure of the Catholic Church to reduce family planning funds at a meeting with 15 Catholic bishops in August 1976, in the lead-up to the presidential election. This, according to Ravenholt, helps to explain why a Catholic became USAID's administrator, and underlies the appointment of a Catholic opponent of the population programme to the USAID position responsible for the selection of political appointees. The appointed assistant administrator for population and humanitarian assistance, in Ravenholt's (1994:12) opinion, "discombobulate[d]" the population programme and was responsible for the ousting of staff.

Under the Reagan administration, the Vatican was able to muster the support of Catholics within the Republican Party and the Right-to-Life coalition (see 4.4.4) to

\textsuperscript{25} Commissioned by the Nixon administration in April 1974, this inter-agency study was undertaken by the National Security Council, the CIA, the Defense, Agriculture and State Departments, and USAID. The Report found world population growth to significantly threaten America's and global security, claiming "... there is a major risk of severe damage to world economic, political and ecological systems and, as these systems begin to fail, to our humanitarian values" (Mumford, 1996:70). Among the recommendations, NSSM 200 advocated that: the United States play a leadership role in population growth control; that family planning information be made available to all citizens of developing countries by 1980 and to achieve global replacement level fertility by 2000; and that the United States reach population stability by 2000, requiring it to introduce a one-child family policy (Mumford, 1996:24, 73).
advance its position on birth control. In his analysis of the alliance between the Vatican and the Reagan administration, Bernstein reported:

In response to concerns of the Vatican, the Reagan Administration agreed to alter its foreign-aid program to comply with the church's teachings on birth control. According to William Wilson, the President's first ambassador to the Vatican, the State Department reluctantly agreed to an outright ban on the use of any U.S. aid funds by either countries or international health organizations for the promotion of birth control or abortion. As a result of this position, announced at the World Conference on Population in Mexico City in 1984, the U.S. withdrew funding from, among others, two of the world's largest family planning organizations: the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities.

"American policy was changed as a result of the Vatican's not agreeing with our policy," Wilson explains. "American aid programs around the world did not meet the criteria the Vatican had for family planning. AID [the Agency for International Development] sent various people from [the Department of] State to Rome, and I'd accompany them to meet the president of the Pontifical Council for the Family, and in long discussions they finally got the message. But it was a struggle. They finally selected different programs and abandoned others as result of this intervention" (Bernstein, 1992).

This was, of course, the Mexico City Policy discussed in section 4.4.4. Mumford (1996:163) asserts that Catholic bishops succeeded in getting Reagan and Bush elected as "the two most Catholic Presidents in American history", although ironically neither was in fact Catholic. Under these two administrations, government appointees were extensively recruited from the religious right. Indeed, Mumford (1996:164) maintains that during the Carter-Reagan-Bush years:

... the bishops directed an infiltration of every U.S. government office and agency that has anything to do with family planning, abortion, immigration and population growth control, including those that produce information that would point to a need for national or international population growth control. The Vatican seeks to undermine the effectiveness of the population and family planning related missions assigned to the various government and government funded agencies as directed by Congress.

In the 1990s, the Catholic Church continues to make its presence felt in American politics with the continued support of evangelical Protestants. According to Mumford (1996:3) a 1994 Presidential Decision Directive presenting a policy on global population issues "simply disappeared", which he attributes to the actions of the Vatican and its allies. The American defunding of UNFPA in October 1998 for fiscal year 1999 (Dewar, 1998; UNFPA, 1998), activated through a small but vociferous number of abortion opponents and isolationists who mistrust the United Nations system in the Congress, seemingly reaffirmed the Catholic influence on population assistance funding.

Religious forces are also active in other donor countries, as is indicated by this statement from a British official asked about this issue:
We face – there is a small, but quite vocal opposition to what we do in the way of family planning and I guess in particular with regard to our support of IPPF and UNFPA over their supposed support of the Chinese programme (Bilateral Official A).

The lack of interest shown by successive Austrian, Belgian, French, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish governments towards supporting population assistance is probably due to the strong influence of the Catholic Church in those countries.

6.3.1.5.2 Other Christian groups

Religious opposition to population assistance is not confined to Catholicism and Vatican diplomacy. Several militant Christian organisations have actively voiced their views about population agencies, primarily over the abortion question. One such prominent group has been the American pro-life organisation, Rescue America, in collaboration with its worldwide associates. Infamous for violent demonstrations, bombings and arson attacks on abortion and family planning clinics, harassment of staff and the assassination of abortion doctors, Rescue America attempts to make its views on abortion-related issues known, in order to alter the views of politicians and society. Its protest extends to population agencies that, in its opinion, sponsor abortion-related activities. In March 1993, for example, Rescue America hoped to expand its activities into Europe by linking with its British counterpart, Rescue UK, to protest at IPPF’s activities outside its London headquarters. Rescue America described IPPF in the following manner:

The invitation [picket announcement] calls the federation “the greatest enemy to the human race after its ally, Satan” (Braid, 1993).

And

We regard International Planned Parenthood as the head of the serpent and it’s time to cut off its head (Donald Treshman, Director of Rescue America quoted in Laurance, 1993).

Although its demonstration was foiled, and Mr. Treshman was later arrested and served with a deportation notice (Laurance, 1993), the continuation of Rescue America’s belligerent activities generates media publicity and thereby ensures that the populace will hear its views. This is particularly important in America, for it keeps the highly polarised domestic abortion debate simmering, which, as Chapter Four demonstrated, affects population assistance funding. However, some Christian organisations, such as the
Washington-based Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC), do not oppose the activities of population agencies, and not all right-to-life groups are as militant as Rescue America.

Support for the views espoused by religious bodies does not only come from societal actors, but may also be found among influential parliamentarians who use their positions to advance their beliefs (see 7.2). The perennial debate on the size of American population assistance, determined by the Congress, has as much to do with the influential Right wing of the Congressional Republicans, as it does with appeasing interested constituencies.

6.3.2 Research community

The ability of academics to shape public policy depends largely on the persuasion of the political party in power. Left-oriented parties tend to listen to the views of socialist, liberal-thinking academics, while the right is attracted to those opinions expressing a free-market approach, a continuation of conservative policies and 'traditional values'. Both ends of the political spectrum seek to find academic arguments that either justify their ideology, or make it more palatable.

In the early 1960s, before USAID began offering population assistance, American academics were active in persuading the US Government of the need for family planning throughout the world (see 4.4.1). Academics with a doomsday perspective found particular prominence during the population hysteria (see 4.4.2). A decade later, population Cornucopians such as Kahn (Simon & Kahn, 1980), Kasun (1988a) and Simon (1981a; 1981b; 1986)\(^{26}\), found a sympathetic ear with the Reagan administration. Their notability reflects the administration's desire for arguments to appease right-to-life supporters in the Republican party. The views of population revisionists were instrumental in the stance taken by the US government at the 1984 Mexico City Conference (Harkavy, 1995:81). The 1986 National Academy of Sciences report, *Population Growth and Economic Development* (National Research Council, 1986).

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\(^{26}\) According to the obituary in *The Economist* (1998c:95), Simon used his arguments on lost geniuses to support his prejudices about birth control, which he felt was wrong although not for religious reasons. However, Mumford (1996:321-2) claims that Simon had close ties with the Catholic church through its sponsorship of Simon's Committee on Population and Economy and the Vatican-leaning Heritage Foundation which supported Simon's work.
1986), reflected this shift in scholarly thought by rejecting previous reports and by taking a cautious view of the consequences of population growth.

The academic community's most significant contribution to the policy framework, however, is probably at the recipient level. By producing a cadre of Western-trained population specialists, the academic community created a *force majeure* in advocating population assistance in both developed and developing countries. In developing countries, population experts lobbied their governments to introduce and sustain national population policies, and, with like-minded counterparts in developed countries and population agencies, exerted pressure on the donor community to direct funds to their country.

Arguably, the impact of the academic community has been greater on the workings of population agencies than on the level of funding given by donor governments. Dissemination of research findings through conferences and learned journals can significantly affect the way agencies approach problems. As the leading think tank on population concerns, research conducted at the Population Council has had a profound influence on the view of population issues and the implementation of family planning programmes. Much of the recent discussion on improving the quality of care in family planning programmes, for example, has been inspired by the work carried out in one capacity or another by researchers there (see Bruce, 1990). Equally, by establishing a number of links between changing socioeconomic variables (e.g. increased education for women and girls) and fertility levels, the World Fertility Survey (WFS) and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have led to changes in the directions followed by agencies.

Of interest is the notable absence of demographers in discussions of population issues (McNicoll, 1992:399). For the most part, recent population debates in developed countries have revolved around the views expressed by economists, environmentalists, health professionals, political scientists and sociologists. Rather than forging policy-relevant debates on population issues, demographers generally seem content with producing materials only for themselves, reluctant to disseminate their knowledge beyond the general scope of the discipline. As McNicoll (1992:401) laments:

> Results are now reported on principally to other specialists rather than to a wider audience in the social sciences or public affairs.
6.3.3 Mass media

The mass media is probably the most important societal actor, for it is "the conduit, the pipeline, the funnel regulating the flow of communication between the policymakers (and therefore the policy itself) and others in the political system who might seek any different policy" (Spitzer, 1993:9). The link between the media, public opinion and the political process is plausible, although the causal relationship is often difficult to establish.

Using a three-year study on the perceptions of senior American foreign-policymakers of the role of the media in foreign policy, O'Heffernan (1993:188) reassesses Cohen's earlier assertion (Cohen, 1963:19-30) that the media in its reporting of foreign affairs is largely a handmaiden of the government. He refutes the notion by demonstrating that the "mass media-foreign policy relationship is a continuing dynamic of interdependent mutual exploitation" (O'Heffernan, 1993:208). National governments will use the media to explain and justify their foreign policies. Likewise, the media has forced the visibility of international issues, giving them a sense of urgency and allowing the views of non-state actors to gain legitimacy. Yet how does a concern in the community become an issue?

In his review of public attitudes and ecological matters Downs (1972) proposed the notion of an "issue-attention cycle". Arguing from the premise that public attention

![Figure 6.3 Issue-Attention Cycle](source: Parsons, 1995:115)
rarely focuses on a single concern for long before boredom with the topic sets in, Downs suggests that all issues will go through five stages in the cycle, as shown in Figure 6.3.

In the **pre-problem stage** a problematic issue may have been identified by experts or interest groups, but has yet to capture public attention. Unfolding events lead the public to become aware of the issue in the **alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm stage**. Associated with this revelation are discussions about society's ability to deal with the concern during the **realizing the cost of significant progress stage**. Waning interest and public boredom set in during the **gradual decline of public interest stage**, as either the issue appears too daunting to deal with or solutions are found. Finally, in the **post-problem stage** the issue enters a twilight zone of limited attention and a possible intermittent recurrence of interest (Downs, 1972:39-40).

Downs does not preclude the possibility of an issue going through the cycle again, suggesting that an issue may sporadically recapture public interest once it has reached national prominence. Institutions, programmes and policies created in response to the issue remain as legacies of a time when they initially captured public attention, and they will continue to have some effect once focus has shifted elsewhere (Downs, 1972:41). Work carried out by Peters and Hogwood (cited in Parsons, 1995:117) led them to contend that the issue-attention cycle may be applicable to concerns other than the environment, and that there is a relationship between the cycle and the organisational activities of governments.

The relationship between the issue-attention cycle and the activities of donor governments seems applicable to concerns over world population growth and reproductive health matters. Donor government support for population assistance seems to mirror public interest, with funding increasing in those years of heightened media attention and public support. Evidence suggests a correlation between media coverage of population issues and funding for population assistance by donor governments. The relationship between public opinion and media coverage appears somewhat more tenuous. The average person is rarely asked for his or her opinion on such issues; hence, opinion polls are infrequent and lack continuity in the way the question is phrased. This is especially true outside the United States where the institution of opinion polling has historically been less established. Nevertheless, existing public opinion polls on
population matters from a variety of countries suggest a high degree of support for population assistance, when the media focuses on population matters. Equally, public enthusiasm for population assistance wanes after the media circus has moved on.

Population issues appear to have gone through the issue-attention cycle thrice: initially during the population hysteria when the issue of population growth in developing countries was first brought to the attention of Western societies and culminated in the 1974 Bucharest Conference; again around the 1984 Mexico City Conference; and finally in the early 1990s in the lead-up to ICPD.

In the 1960s, famines in South Asia and environmental concerns linked with overpopulation helped population issues capture media attention and subsequently public opinion. At this point world population issues progressed from the pre-problem stage of the 1950s and early 1960s when only experts were concerned (see 3.1, 4.4.1) to the stage of heightened alarm epitomised by the population hysteria (see 4.4.2). The media played a crucial role in this transition by illustrating examples of Malthusian tragedies and highlighting the perceived consequences of population growth.

Wilmoth and Ball's (1992) assessment of the population debate in American popular magazines between 1946 and 1990 indicates a significant rise in the number of articles on population issues during the years of the population hysteria. The *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* used in their study includes such mass-circulation magazines as *Newsweek, Science, Scientific American, The New Republic, Time* and *U.S. News & World Report*. In the 1950s, an average of 11.7 reports appeared on population growth annually in the influential *New York Times*, but by the 1960s this figure had increased to 40.4, and 42.0 in the 1970s (Simon, 1995:625). The number of articles peaked in 1970 for the Earth Day celebrations and again around the 1974 Bucharest Conference (see Figure 6.4).

More importantly, the emphasis of these reports shifted. Although over 50% of the articles published in any given time period since 1951 had rapid population growth threatens human welfare and that of other species as their prevailing theme, there was an increased number of such reports during the population hysteria. Wilmoth and Ball indicate that by the early 1960s the proposition that “population growth is harmful solidified” (Wilmoth & Ball, 1992:639) itself in the popular literature, and was at its strongest in the late 1960s. During the 1950s, many articles reported on rapid population growth either without further analysis or stressing its advantages. At the height of the
population hysteria in 1966-70, however, over 80% of articles were propounding the view that population growth was "threatening" (Wilmoth & Ball, 1992:640), with the remainder offering no specific commentary. In the *New York Times*, for example, 93% of news stories, 100% of editorials and 86% of letters published on population growth in the 1960s identified population growth as "dangerous" (Simon, 1995:626). Similarly, in the 1970s, 77% of news stories, 82% of editorials and 61% of letters expressed this view. As Simon (1995:626) points out:

> Overall, the general pattern that emerges is that from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s, "population" made news.

Figure 6.4 Number of Articles Addressing Population Matters Indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, 1946-90

![Graph showing the number of articles addressing population matters from 1946 to 1990](image)

*Source: Wilmoth & Ball, 1992:635*

Opinion polls of the time underline this heightened feeling. Gallup Polls in the United States did not regularly assess opinions on birth control and population issues until December 1959 (Piotrow, 1973:20). Polls conducted between 1959 and 1968 (see Table 6.1) reveal a change in attitude towards birth control in particular, as well as support for birth control in developing countries and questions of global population
growth. This reflects, among other things, changing practices in contraceptive behaviour in the United States, particularly among young women (Piotrow, 1973).

Table 6.1 American Attitudes toward Birth Control and Foreign Aid, 1959-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>No opinion/Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1959</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1963</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 1965</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 1967</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1968</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Piotrow, 1973:29

Surprisingly perhaps, much of this shift in attitudes occurred among Catholics. In December 1959, 40% approved of offering foreign aid for birth control to countries that asked for it, but by August 1968 68% were in favour. Among Protestants, 58% approved in December 1959 and 71% in August 1968 (Piotrow, 1973:30).

Other reviews of American public opinion polls confirm this shift in attitudes during the population hysteria (Mindick, 1977:385-8; Simon, 1995:619-21). During the 1960s, never more than one-third of those polled expressed “worry” about world population. However, around two-thirds considered population growth to be a “serious problem” (Mindick, 1977:387). Concern over population growth rose as the decade progressed, and, overall, Americans were more concerned about global population increases than an increase in the United States. In 1971, two polls revealed this increased concern among the American public, with 41% of respondents in one poll stating population growth as a “major” and “immediate” problem and 65% in the other considering population growth as a “serious” problem (Simon, 1995:621).

Canadian opinion polls also reveal a heightened concern over world population growth during the 1960s and early 1970s. A May 1960 Gallup Poll found that 49% had not “heard or read anything of the ‘population explosion’”, while of those who had, 57% “were not worried about this population increase” (Tienhaara, 1974:16, 67). In contrast, a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) poll conducted in January 1971 reported
that 66% felt that world population was growing too quickly, and that the “goal should be either to keep it at its present level (60 per cent) or to decrease it (29 per cent)” (Tienhaara, 1974:15). The CBC report concluded that there was some recognition of the ‘population explosion’ by Canadians, although its relevance only applied to developing countries (Tienhaara, 1974:15-6).

Following the attention surrounding the 1974 Bucharest Conference, media focus on population issues gradually declined towards the late 1970s and into the early 1980s (see Figure 6.4). Population growth issues had seemingly entered the fourth and fifth stage of the issue-attention cycle. American opinion polls showed the number of people who perceived overpopulation as a serious problem declined from 60% in 1974 to 44% in 1978 and 52% in 1982 (Simon, 1995:623).

The issue-attention cycle for population issues was rekindled, albeit briefly, in the lead-up to the 1984 Mexico City Conference. The number of articles addressing population issues rose sharply in that year, only to fall thereafter (see Figure 6.4). The number of reports on population annually in such influential newspapers as the Washington Post and the New York Times declined from 42.0 in the 1970s to 8.2 in the 1980s and 22.7 to 15.2 respectively. For the better part of the 1980s, media attention on population issues was minimal, and views of population issues as a major problem declined. As a percentage of articles, many more reported rapid population as being advantageous compared to the previous two decades.

A sample of opinion polls from this decade reveals this trend of heightened attention towards population issues around 1984. In the United States, 56% of respondents thought that overpopulation was a serious problem, up from 44% in 1978. By comparison, a Canadian study, conducted in the late 1980s, found that just 4% of Canadians mentioned poverty or overpopulation as the most important issue facing the world, behind such issues as the arms race or nuclear war (24%), world peace or war (15%), and world hunger (14%) (CIDA, 1988:25). This suggests that population issues had entered the final stages of the issue-attention cycle by the end of the 1980s. Curiously, 65% of Americans perceived overpopulation as a serious problem in 1991 (Simon, 1995:623), one of the highest figures ever reported, probably reflecting the preparations for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and the renaissance of population and environment issues (see 4.4.5).
Population issues again went through the issue-attention cycle in the lead-up to the 1994 ICPD. The decennial conference inspired numerous feature articles on population and reproductive health matters in major newspapers, the popular press and other media outlets. Again, the issue of rapid population and its consequences was a feature of many reports as well as articles, focusing on the empowerment of women and reproductive rights.

Opinion polls suggest that, at the time of ICPD and immediately thereafter, there was widespread concern over population growth and support for reproductive health activities in developing countries. The first Japanese public opinion survey on population issues, conducted in 1990, found that 68.2% thought that developing countries should try to control their population growth, with 57.8% in favour of Japan offering assistance (Atoh et al., 1991:26). By the second opinion poll in 1995, one year after the Cairo Conference, 71.0% thought the developing countries needed to control their population and, of those, 83.1% agreed that Japan should provide support (Kaneko et al., 1996:36-7). In Europe, there was also public support following ICPD. A 1996 poll of attitudes towards population issues, domestic and international issues and foreign aid in 13 European nations conducted by the London-based Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) on behalf of UNFPA and IPPF, found that 14% of Europeans considered HIV/STDs the most pressing global problem and 12% population growth. Nearly two-thirds (63%) supported making family planning services available in developing countries, and 29% stated that foreign aid should be used for family planning education and services (IPPF Open File, 1997; UNFPA, 1997c).

In the years since, the media attention has shifted elsewhere, and it is probably safe to assume that public interest has as well. If the aim of The Hague Forum, held in February 1999 as part of the ICPD+5 process, was to revive population and reproductive health issues in donor countries as a way of making national governments keep their financial promises made at Cairo, then the Conference seems to have been a failure. From the position of this distant observer, it appears the Conference went relatively unnoticed by the media, being overshadowed by such events as Bill Clinton’s impeachment hearing, the Anwar trial in Malaysia, and the Kosovo crisis. Certainly, no sustained debate on population and reproductive health occurred. Perhaps five years is insufficient time for the global social, political and economic environment to have changed enough to allow for a revived discussion of global population concerns.
Politicians in developed countries are essentially concerned about being re-elected. To ensure this, they follow the discussions in the national media and the views expressed in opinion polls. Being poll driven, politicians will react to the wishes of societal actors if they generate sufficient media attention. If the public does not perceive a concern as an issue, it seems unlikely that decision-makers will either. Funding for population assistance reflects this sentiment, as the media has played an undervalued role in global funding trends for population assistance by its aberrant interest in population questions. The media generated the heightened interest in the 1960s, and was one of the contributing factors to the nonchalant view taken by the general populace throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s. Only decennial international conferences seem to offer the stimuli needed to reactivate the issue-attention cycle, and after a short period population concerns again slide into a twilight zone. The trend in media reporting and public opinion is remarkably similar to the trend illustrated in Figure 4.1.2 on the percentage of ODA going to population assistance, suggesting that a link between media-public opinion and population assistance is tenable. However, more research is required to ascertain the causal relationship.

6.4 Institutional factors and population assistance

Of the three institutional factors presented in section 6.1.2, the government’s autonomy and capacity is arguably the most significant factor affecting funding decisions for population assistance in developed countries. It would not have escaped the reader’s attention that much of the previous discussion has focused on the United States. This has not been coincidental, as the United States is considered a weak state in terms of the government’s autonomy and capacity (see 6.1.2.1), thus allowing societal actors to wield considerable influence. Indeed, it appears that in America societal actors have been instrumental in funding decisions for population assistance. However, this is not necessarily true for other donor nations, where interest groups have seemingly little influence on the decision-making process for population assistance, as reflected by their absence in the preceding discussion. No other country has such an extensive range of interest groups interested in population issues as America, and few have had such an outspoken media. The absence of interest groups in most other donor nations not only reflects a lack of resources, but, more importantly, the form of democracy practised
often precludes widespread lobbying by interest groups. Davis et al., (1993:5) for example, report that “Australian institutions are more closed, producing a comparatively sedate policy making environment”; the same is true of most other nations, especially in strong states. Similarly, the highly regulated media in some states probably prevented the type of coverage found in the United States on such ‘sensitive’ issues as family planning and population concerns.

International factors can also determine the levels of primary funds for population assistance from donor governments. Unlike ‘enforceable’ international laws for such activities as trade, few if any international agreements dealing with population issues carry any more weight than moral responsibility; so many of the resolutions decreed at international conferences can be, and frequently are, ignored. As pointed out in sections 3.3.1.3 and 4.2.2, there have been several conferences at which an increase for population assistance was promised, but this has as yet not materialised. This certainly raises the question of how effective such resolutions are in the absence of any meaningful commitment.

Agreements between countries for bilateral funding carry more weight (see Figure 6.2). If a donor government promises funding to a nation, it is making a decision on how the budget for population assistance is spent and not on the size of the budget. In such instances, memoranda of understanding may be more conducive to donor nations meeting their obligations than promises made at international conferences.

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD in Paris is the closest the international community comes to policing its aid efforts. Peer reviews of individual aid programmes occur regularly, and the findings are disseminated among other members. Committees and working parties also offer donor governments the opportunity for regular discussions on a variety of issues. Those states failing to meet their obligations will not be seen favourably by those member states that are. This process of “mutual embarrassment” allows the policies and programmes of individual donor governments to be scrutinised, which may lead to changes (Cunningham, 1974:60). DAC members seen as not contributing their fair share to issues of perceived importance, such as population assistance, may be prompted by others to improve their performance. It has been suggested to me that this was probably the stimulus behind
Australia's initial funding of population assistance during the population hysteria\(^{27}\), and no doubt this was the case for several other states as well.

### 6.5 Conclusion

It seems that societal actors have a limited effect on decision-making about funding for population assistance, unless there is widespread public pressure. Apart from the predictable flirtation before international conferences, global population issues and reproductive health matters have effectively been off the political agenda of OECD states since the population hysteria of the late 1960s and early 1970s. As Finkle and Crane (1985:16) recognised in the mid-1980s for the United States, "... international population issues never attracted more than a mild interest from the general public ...." In the absence of extensive media coverage, interest groups and the academic community are the crucial societal actors.

The extent to which societal actors may be effective, however, depends on the autonomy and capacity of the nation in question, and the political party in power. Hartmann's assertion that interest groups are important may hold true for the United States, but appears not to be the case in nations where such groups are non-existent or lack financial resources, or where the political system does not allow them to influence decision-making. The ability of interest groups to influence population assistance funding seems to depend more on the receptiveness of the parliamentarians they wish to persuade than their arguments *per se*. Despite this, donor governments continue to fund population assistance. The feeling of international responsibility alone may not be sufficient in sustaining funding levels, which suggests governments have their own reasons for supporting these activities. Thus, the next chapter examines the state factors

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\(^{27}\) I am grateful to James Ingram, former Director-General of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (1977-82) and Executive Director of the World Food Programme (1982-1992), for his insights on this point.
and their role in determining the level of population assistance funding; it also explores the motives of developed countries.
The previous chapter showed that societal actors have limited influence in determining the level of funding for population assistance, especially in strong states and in the absence of media focus on population issues. Thus, state actors — elected and appointed officials (see Figure 6.2) — decide funding for population assistance according to changing political environments and with a range of motives to justify their expenditure.

The relationship between elected and appointed officials, in deciding upon population assistance sums, varies from one country to another and is usually not readily apparent to outside observers. In the United States, the Congress sets the size of the foreign aid budget and its components. In most other countries, the executive determines the amount allocated for ODA in consultation with appointed officials and in accordance with its overall political agenda and its foreign policy strategy in particular (see 2.4), while appointed officials resolve the share of ODA for population assistance, usually in concurrence with administrative directives from the responsible minister.

The first section of this chapter summarises the relationship between elected and appointed officials in establishing population assistance sums. Given the lack of interest displayed by most officials towards population and reproductive health concerns and the absence of such concerns from everyday political discussions, prominent officials with outspoken opinions on these issues can play a decisive role in determining the size of a donor government's population assistance budget, as the second section demonstrates.

As discussed in section 2.4, foreign aid is frequently the result of national security interests and so is, by association, sectoral aid such as population assistance. Drager et al. (cited in Michaud & Murray, 1994:645-7), for example, claim that assistance in the health field is largely unrelated to need and thus quite political. Thus, the third and final section of this chapter looks at the motives of a number of donor governments for their past and continued support of population assistance.
7.1 Executive-bureaucratic apparatus

The executive-bureaucratic apparatus consists of three policy subsystem actors: the executive, the legislature and appointed officials. The particulars of each were discussed in sections 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2. In most donor nations, the executive determines the size of the foreign aid budget and the implementing aid agency decides what sectors should receive support in accordance with directives set by the executive. However, finding such a clear division between politicians and senior administrators is virtually impossible in most donor nations. The size of the foreign aid budget is presented to the legislature as part of the overall national budget. Although the legislature could ask for an alteration for funds allocated for ODA, recent experiences show that this is unlikely, as there is little political mileage to be gained. Likewise, for most politicians population assistance is of little relevance, and unless there are some prominent officials interested in the topic (see 7.2) there will be little discussion in the legislature on the funds that should be allocated.

The division between the executive and the legislature is probably most evident in the United States. Wiarda and Wiarda (1986:180) maintain that presidential leadership is particularly important in the United States. Neither President Carter nor President Reagan was convinced of the need for population assistance, and no amount of lobbying or public opinion polls expressing pro-choice views were going to change their minds. Bureaucracies behave cautiously when the president has such strong views, fearing repercussions if they espouse a contrary view.

Yet American population assistance is also highly dependent on the make-up of the Congress. In obtaining congressional authorisation for its expenditures in the next fiscal year, USAID must defend its broad sectors for assistance as well as large-scale projects at public hearings. Given the sensitivity of population assistance, congressional decisions are largely dependent on the personalities in power and on public opinion (Wolfson, 1983:135). The effect of these differences of opinion between the executive and the legislature in the United States on population assistance is captured in the following statement:

Overall experience shows don't be dependent upon too small a group of donors unless they are very reliable. And the US is an unreliable donor for the very simple reason that the government is not in control of the parliament, or for that matter the parliament in control.
Much depends on the ideology of the political party in control of both the Congress and the Presidency. The Democrats have supported population assistance, while the Republicans have generally been less supportive. During the Johnson years, the Democrats held a majority in the Senate, which eased the passing of bills for large-scale support through the Congress. Similarly, in 1993, when the Democrats controlled both the Congress and the Presidency, the Clinton administration met little resistance in overturning the Mexico City policy (see 4.4.5). However, five years later, and with the Republicans in control of the Congress, Clinton fought a losing battle to get American funding for population assistance.

Ideological differences and agreement between the executive and the legislature can be found in other countries as well. The Christian-oriented Lyons Forum consisting of MPs from the ruling Federal coalition in Australia, for example, has been a contributing factor to cuts not only to Australia’s population assistance, but also to a host of women’s organisations. Unlike the previous Labor government, the current Howard government has not challenged conservative forces in the Senate (see 7.2), reflecting a lack of interest in population-related topics if not to passive support of those conservative forces.

7.2 Prominent individuals

Although appointed and elected officials are the key players in determining funding levels for population assistance, especially a supportive president in the American case, it appears that few have the conviction to be forthright on this issue. This is understandable, as the electorate perceives other domestic and international issues as more important than global population and reproductive health. Thus, in lieu of an overall concern, interested officials may exert an influence far beyond what may otherwise be the case (Conly & Speidel, 1993:14). The following examples from the United States, Britain and Australia show how officials interested in population assistance may significantly influence funding levels.

In the United States, a line of appointed and elected officials has influenced population assistance funding decisions. In the 1960s, senators such as J. William
Fulbright, Ernest Gruening, Joseph S. Clark, Joseph D. Tydings and congressmen Thomas Morgan, Wayne Hays, Paul Findley and James Scheuer played an important role in the eventual support of population assistance by the American government under the Johnson administration in 1965 (Piotrow, 1973:xv-i).

Reimert T. Ravenholt, the first head of the Population Branch at USAID, had a profound affect on American population assistance during his term of office. Recruited in February 1966, he was an interesting choice for the job given his lack of experience of bureaucracies and his epidemiological background (Piotrow, 1973: 99, 123). Ravenholt urged Congress in the mid-1960s to supply developing countries with large quantities of contraceptives and was determined to lift the ban placed by Congress on the provision of contraceptives (Hartmann, 1995:106-8; Piotrow, 1973:125-6, 130-1). In later years, he was a consistent advocate for continued financial support of USAID's population programme.

Outspoken critics of population assistance such as James Buckley, Jessie Helms and Patrick Buchanan in the Reagan-Bush administrations added to, if not induced, pressure to cut population assistance, in addition to the political influences discussed elsewhere (see 4.4.4, 6.3.1.5.1). In the early 1990s, the Clinton-Gore-Wirth alliance expressed its desire to increase population assistance, although the three had seemingly different reasons (see 6.3.1.1, 7.3.2.2). This explains the increase in population assistance as a proportion of ODA from 2.66% in 1992 and 3.77% in 1993 to 4.66% in 1994 (UNFPA, 1996a:32)

As a percentage of British aid, population assistance's share rose from 1.1% in 1989, to 1.58% in 1992 and 1.81% in 1994 (UNFPA, 1996a:32). This increase was primarily due to the personal interest in reproductive health and population issues shown by Lynda Chalker during her time as the Minister for Overseas Development (1989-1997):

Mr Chairman, population is a priority in the [UK]ODA. The impact of population on development is one of the key development issues of the 1990s. Wherever I go I take every opportunity to beat this particular drum (Chalker, 1991:1, see also Chalker, 1989; 1994).

In August 1991, she announced the *Children by Choice not Chance* (United Kingdom. Overseas Development Administration, 1991) strategy that aimed to strengthen Britain's population initiative, which some observers saw as population receiving a higher profile among ODA's priorities (*British Overseas Development*, 1991;

When asked about the influence of Baroness Chalker on people's views of population issues, one respondent stated:

A major influence I think. She's turned reproductive health into a major priority area for [UK]ODA. Ahh – and has raised [UK]ODA's position and credibility in the area kind of internationally as well.

He added:

I don't think we [population/health division] would have had quite the profile that we had in [UK]ODA on, say, reproductive health without Chalker. I think she has been kind of led that a lot, because of her personal interest in the subject (Bilateral Official A).

Australia offers a noteworthy example of how two influential officials of opposing views managed to affect that nation's population assistance funding. Following his re-election to the House of Representatives in March 1993, Gordon Bilney became the Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs, and thus the responsible minister for the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB28). Both he and his superior, Gareth Evans (Minister for Foreign Affairs), were concerned about world population growth and were strong advocates of population assistance (Daly, 1993; Seacombe, 1993). On 7 September 1993, Bilney launched a major population initiative, A World of Choice (AIDAB, 1993), and promised among other things a strategy to reach the internationally agreed figure of 4% of ODA for population assistance by the year 2000. Specifically, he announced that funding was to treble to around A$30 million for the 1993/94 financial year and committed a total of A$130 million for population assistance over the next four years (Australia. Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs, 1993; Sexton, 1993).

The devout Catholic and long-serving Independent senator from Tasmania, Brian Harradine, however, had other views on this initiative. Holding the balance of power in the Australian Senate, he has been a staunch critic of modern family planning per se, and Australia's support of population assistance in particular. He habitually used his position

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28 On 29 March 1995 the Australian bilateral aid agency changed its name from the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) to the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).
to block or amend legislation. He has cloaked his views by repeatedly citing alleged cases of coercive measures, often using China as an example (Harradine, 1992); he asserts that the link between population and economic development is unproved and that the activities of such agencies as UNFPA and IPPF have a negative effect on women’s health (Harradine, 1994a; 1994b).

One week after the Senate passed the budget in October 1993, the Australian press reported that the Government had struck a secret deal with the senator. In an attempt to “massage” (Canberra Times, 1993) Harradine to pass the budget, the government withheld the uncommitted sums of population assistance (approximately $40 million) pending an independent inquiry into the link between population growth and economic development (Seacombe, 1993; Stewart, 1993). Moreover, the government agreed to alter the speaking list at the conference discussing Australia’s ICPD position to cater to Harradine’s views, which prompted one MP to state:

It just confirms the sleazy deal that’s been done (Colin Hollis MP cited in Lagan, 1993).

The decision to freeze the population assistance budget, condemned by the international scientific community and the Australian aid establishment (O’Neill, 1993; Stewart, 1993), came from the cabinet, including Prime Minister Keating, and without the consultation of other executive-bureaucratic officials (Kingston, 1993).

The Independent Inquiry, conducted by a group of eminent international scholars on population issues (Ahlburg, 1994:12), concluded that slowing population growth was advantageous to economic development, and the frozen sums were eventually released. Between 1993 and 1994 the percentage of Australian aid going to population assistance rose markedly from 0.67% to 1.65% (UNFPA, 1996a:32). Both appointed and other elected officials, however, remained cautious not to antagonise Harradine on family planning and population assistance issues, as the threat of his use of his procedural powers to block more significant acts of parliament continued to loom. In 1996 the Howard government slashed A$3.5 million from AusAID’s population assistance budget, at the expense of UNFPA, WHO, IPPF, Population Council and the IUSSP. The timing of these cuts, oddly coinciding with the decision to partly privatise the national telecommunication carrier Telstra, which Senator Harradine initially opposed, led some to believe that a deal had been struck (Brough, 1996). According to Powell (1998) population assistance decline in 1997-8 represented more the wish of the government
and bureaucracy to pacify Harradine than any form of "horse-trading". In July 1999, Brian Harradine lost the balance of power in the Australian Senate.

7.3 Motives of donor governments

In many countries, discussion of population assistance funding never goes further than the bureaucracies that allocate funds. Equally, not every country possesses such outspoken advocates of population assistance as discussed in the previous section. However, a lack of public support by political leaders does not mean that there is no interest in population assistance (see Conly & Speidel, 1993:14). So why do most developed countries continue to make funds available for population activities in developing countries?

As Mason (1995:886) points out, few population analysts have questioned why donors support funding for population activities as a development strategy. Jones (1979:213-4) in his review of aid for population control suggests that donors are concerned over the implications of population growth in developing countries for three reasons: altruism about the effects to developing countries; ecological concerns; and the political consequences for developed nations. In her World Bank report on ODA for population activities, Herz (1984:25-37) offers four rationales that motivate supporters of population assistance in developed countries: to halt the effects of population on economic development; concerns over population and finite natural resources; maternal and child health issues; and improving the opportunities of women. Hartmann (1995:xix) contends that for the past 25 years the population control philosophy, based on the premise that rapid population growth is the primary cause of such things as hunger, environmental destruction, economic stagnation, and political instability in developing countries, "has shaped the activities of most population organizations and many international aid agencies in Asia, Africa and Latin America."

Despite the breadth of these explications, they appear incomplete. The rest of this chapter presents a divergent view on why donor governments commit resources to population activities in developing countries. It proposes that support is driven in part by the altruism, but overwhelmingly by national and international security interests. Although a number of security issues related to population growth have been and continue to be of concern to developed countries, the following three stand out:
economic development, environmental concerns, and migration fears. Only altruism recognises that population assistance need not and should not always be tied to fertility levels and growth rates. Economic development arguments presume that family planning accelerates the road to development by slowing population growth, thereby increasing export markets; other arguments stem from a perceived causal relationship between population growth in developing countries and the future well-being of developed nations.

7.3.1 Altruism

To say that there is no altruism at all in population assistance is specious. A case could be made that there is an element of altruism in all population assistance funding, as contrary to most other forms of aid there is little immediate gain for the donor government, and unlike the construction of bridges and roads, for example, little prestige. Most bilateral, multilateral and NGO employees whom I have had the privilege of meeting are highly dedicated to their jobs and genuinely believe that they are working towards a better world. However, the degree to which donor governments consider altruistic concerns seems to vary.

The shape that altruistic rhetoric takes on has changed over the years. For Jones (1979:213) altruism was a form of protecting developing countries from the perceived deleterious effects of continued population growth. For most others, it is associated with improving maternal and child health and, more recently, reproductive health:

There was no such uncertainty regarding the effects of large families and frequent pregnancies on the health of mothers and children. Indeed, the problem has been recognized by an expert committee of the League of Nations Health Organization as early as 1931. In 1951 a WHO expert committee on maternal care once again drew attention to the problem. Moreover, the fact that small, planned families were healthier than large, unplanned ones, had induced several governments to accept responsibility for providing family planning advice and services. In less developed countries the problem was seen from a national, as well as an individual perspective. High fertility and the resulting high dependency ratios placed a considerable strain on already inadequate health services (Symonds & Carder, 1973:150).

The moral responsibility of developed nations to extend assistance to citizens of developing countries is also frequently cited. In agreeing with the recommendations of the 1969 Pearson Report (see 4.4.2), Rafael Salas (1979:123), for example, noted that the reason for population assistance “is a moral one: that it is only right ...”.

Like aid generally (see 2.4), however, altruism is unlikely to be the primary motive for population assistance by most donor governments; the remaining sections in this chapter discuss other possible motives. Altruistic rhetoric by donor governments may have been used to divert attention from other concerns. Aware of the suspicion in developing countries of donor government involvement in population assistance, the 1974 NSSM 200 report prepared for the United States Government remarked:

We must take care that our activities should not give the appearance to the LDCs of an industrialized country policy directed against the LDCs. Caution must be taken that in any approaches in this field we support in the LDCs are ones we can support within this country. “Third World” leaders should be in the forefront and obtain the credit for successful programs. In this context it is important to demonstrate to LDC leaders that such family planning programs have worked and can work within a reasonable period of time.

To help assure others of our intentions we should indicate our emphasis on the right of individuals and couples to determine freely and responsible the number and spacing of their children and to have information, education and means to do so, and our continuing interest in improving the overall general welfare (Mumford, 1996:77).

That said, it certainly appears that some countries, most notably Scandinavian nations, are more altruistic in giving population assistance than others. Of course, altruism may be an end in itself, allowing donor governments to present themselves as benevolent and reliable members of the international community. Donor governments presenting such credentials at international forums are able to take the moral high ground and exert an incommensurate influence on others.

### 7.3.2 National and international security

United States leadership is essential to combat population growth, to implement the World Population Plan of Action and to advance United States security and overseas interests (President Ford, 26 November 1975 cited in Green, 1993: 311).

Rapid population growth is already a force contributing to violent disorder and mass dislocations in resource-poor societies. Some of these migrants are our near neighbors. Others -- refugees-in-waiting -- press hungrily against the fabric of social and political stability around the world (Tim Wirth (1994:3), Under Secretary of State and Head of the American Delegation to ICPD).

In Chapter Two it was argued that foreign aid was spurred by political motivations, while Chapter Five noted the role of donor interests in determining population assistance disbursements. Being but a small part of ODA, there are undoubtedly national interest motives and security motives behind the provision of population assistance. At the root
of many concerns is the future of Western civilisation given its below-replacement-level fertility, rapidly ageing population and declining numbers (see 4.4.5).

The defence of a country's national security is part of the state's raison d'etre, and it is accepted that all other policies are subordinate to it. Yet comprehending national security is notoriously difficult, especially in the post-Cold War era following the disappearance of the primary security issue that faced Western nations after 1945: the containment of the Soviet Union. For the most part, national security focused on economic and military dimensions, as espoused by the political realist school of thought and Morgenthau's thesis that the attainment and use of power is the state's primary national interest (Evans & Newnham, 1998:345). Indeed, virtually everything from education to road-building has been deemed national security, eliciting a range of definitions through which Romm (1993:5) demonstrates national security's ambiguity. In the post-Cold War period, non-military components are increasingly being taken into consideration.

Of course, security means different things to different states and to decision-makers within these states (Mangold, 1990:4). With its meaning left open to interpretation, national security can take on many forms. As Mangold (1990:6) points out:

States need to feel, as well as actually to be secure, indeed the search for a sense of security, the need to assuage fears is an important determinant of policy in its own rights.

Consequently, much work in international relations is based on "impressionistic evidence" (Mangold, 1990:6). What is considered vital to a nation's security reflects the values of the decision-makers in power, who may consider such issues as economic reasoning, ideological principles and the establishment of a world order (Evans & Newnham, 1998:347-8).

By now, it should be evident that world population growth has been, and continues to be, perceived as a threat by academics and policymakers alike. It has been argued that world population growth poses a security threat to developed countries, which in turn also argue that it threatens the planet's existence. Such national security considerations are taken seriously by policymakers, being the predominant rationale of many donor governments' support of population assistance:
Slowing population growth, serving the political interests of the United States, and improving human welfare were thus linked in the basic argument that would be used for the next forty years [1945-1985] to justify American involvement in the control of population growth in the developing world (Donaldson, 1990a:18).

And:

Very likely, however, the most solid support for population limitation by first-world governments – for instance, by the US Congress, even during the Reagan administration – has neither origin [economic and environmental]: it derives instead from the threat, clearly perceived but rarely expressed, that rapid population growth poses to the stability of the international system and in particular to the security and well-being of the affluent, low-fertility countries – including those that will soon join them (McNicoll, 1994:658).

Moreover, according to at least some American security analysts, policymakers will need to continue taking population growth seriously:

As difficult and uncertain as the task may be, policymakers and strategic planners in this country have little choice in the coming decades but to pay serious attention to population trends, their causes, and their effects. Already the United States has embarked on an era of constrained resources. It thus becomes more important than ever to do those things that will provide more bang for every buck spent on national security. To claim that decreased defense spending must lead to strategic debilitating is fatuous. Rather, policymakers must anticipate events and conditions before they occur. They must employ all the instruments of statecraft at their disposal (development assistance and population planning every bit as much as new weapon systems). Furthermore, instead of relying on the canard that the threat dictates one’s posture, they must attempt to influence the form that threat assumes (Foster et al., 1989:24).

In addressing how population growth impinges on national security, several variables need examining. De Sherbinin (1994) reviewed the relationships between population growth and American national security as identified by the Foreign Policy Community and simplified the main links between population factors and national security (Figure 7.1). Although several variables enter the population and national security debate (see Figure 7.1), nearly all perceived security threats are indirect:

1. **Economic development, immigration and trade:** Economic stagnation in developing countries may create high unemployment among a growing labour force and pressures for some to migrate to the United States. It also limits the ability of developing countries to purchase American exports.

2. **Resources and environment:** Both the world’s and the United States’ economy may adversely be affected by environmental degradation and resource depletion, in which population growth is a contributing factor. A scarcity of resources, and population-
induced environmental degradation, may result in regional conflicts and population displacement, as well as restricting American access to strategic resources.

3. **Political stability in developing nations:** Differential population growth among racial, ethnic and religious groups in a nation’s or region’s population, as well as younger age groups, can lead to instability. Rural-urban migration and migration between developing countries could politically destabilise a country or region.

4. **Geopolitics:** Western nations may see their importance in global affairs decline because of population growth in developing countries. Coupled with this is the disappearance of such Western values as human rights, democracy and market economics. Growth in the number of ‘have-nots’ compared to those who are affluent may affect American interests.

**Figure 7.1 Population Growth and American National Security**

Source: De Sherbinin, 1994:29
At the heart of security issues is the potential for armed conflicts and war, and the threat to the Western way of life. There is nothing new in the argument that population growth and an increase in population density is an underlying factor behind war and conflicts (see for example Choucri & North, 1993; De Bliokh, 1977). In the 1950s and 1960s, global population growth in developing countries was perceived as a breeding ground for the spread of communism (see 3.1, 4.4.1). Demographic imbalances and fear of an unruly youthful population in developing countries have also been identified as an issue:

Rapid population growth is a major contributing element to all these conditions and, in addition, itself creates a large proportion of youth in the population. Recent experience, in Iran and other countries, shows that this younger age group, frequently unemployed and crowded into urban slums, is particularly susceptible to extremism, terrorism, and violence as outlets for frustration (United States, 1980:510).

And:

Unemployment and underemployment are spreading – an overriding social and economic problem in all five countries [in Central America]. The high rate of population growth magnifies these problems. Job opportunities are vanishing, even as a quarter of a million young people are entering Central America’s job markets each year. In a region where half of the population is below the age of 20, the combination of youth and massive unemployment is a problem of awesome – and explosive – dimensions (United States. National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1983:40).

Population growth, compounded by ill-managed economies and the depletion and uneven distribution of resources as well as ethnic tensions, may trigger future wars (Falkenmark, 1989; Homer-Dixon et al., 1993; Myers, 1993: 22-3, 151-164). Fears are particularly high over the Arab World, where political relations are strained and there is a potent mix of water scarcity, indigenous socioeconomic problems, and Islamic fundamentalism. Increased tensions could destabilise the region, affecting the interests of the United States and others (Naff, 1993:137-8). Population pressures in other countries may also damage the interests of donor nations through political unrest, revolutions and civil wars (e.g. Rwanda).

Arguably, national security interests focus on the fear of those who are different and who pose challenges to an accustomed lifestyle. In the 1960s, it was the war of ideology that was the root concern for the Western world. As pointed out in Chapters Two and Four, foreign aid and population assistance are in part by-products of the fear of communism spreading. In the 1990s, and no doubt in coming decades, other concerns
have become prominent and centre on the end of Western dominance in the coming decades (Homer-Dixon et al., 1993; Huntington, 1998; Kennedy, 1993).

The rest of this chapter looks at three security issues noted in Figure 7.1 that have probably been influential in determining population assistance funds: economic development issues, environmental concerns and fears of a mass influx of illegal migrants. These concerns stand out as key motives for donor support in different periods. The economic development issue was a primary motive in the 1960s and 1970s; however, in more recent decades it appears that environment issues and fears of migration have come into their own. Migration fears receive particular prominence for this is both an unacknowledged and underestimated motive for donor governments.

### 7.3.2.1 Economic development

The experience of this decade has also shown that lower rates of population growth can be critical for speeding up economic development and social progress... Our assistance to voluntary family planning programs and support for the work of the United Nations and other international organizations in this field must continue to have high priority (President Nixon, First message to Congress on foreign aid, 28 May 1969 cited in Green, 1993:308).

The population problem in the economic development of the developing world is one of the biggest problems facing us in the 1970s (Masao Sawaki (1971), Director-General, Economic Cooperation Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The economic development motive is firmly grounded in the demographic transition model and presupposes that large-scale aid, including family planning, will help countries to modernise; ensure political stability; secure reliable sources of raw resources; and create a market for the exports from developed countries (see Donaldson, 1990a:24). In the 1950s and 1960s, rapid population growth was widely perceived as hindering modernisation and posing an obstacle to overall development aims. Moreover, as discussed in sections 3.1, 4.4.1 and 7.3.2, analysts believed that the spread of communism could be thwarted by reducing population growth rates in developing countries (see Donaldson, 1990a:23). Consequently, economic development arguments were put forward among the main reasons for supporting population assistance.

Notestein laid down the initial arguments in 1947, when he concluded that given rapidly falling levels of mortality, Asia could not wait for the cultural changes derived from economic growth to start a decline in fertility rates. He maintained that population control at the beginning stages of economic growth would prevent increases being
swallowed up by additional mouths to feed (Szreter, 1993:674). Other economists such as Joseph Spengler and Harvey Leibenstein worked on developing a theoretical framework demonstrating that population growth was an impediment to economic development (Piotrow, 1973:14-5).

However, it was the 1958 publication, Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries, by the demographer Ansley Coale and economist Edgar Hoover (Coale & Hoover, 1958) on India’s development prospects that embedded the belief that population growth obstructed economic development. The core of their thesis was that a reduced rate of population growth would free funds for capital investments, as less would be spent on consumption and social needs. Using India as an example, Coale and Hoover maintained that support of family planning programmes would increase per capita income more than any other government investment.

For nearly two decades after its release, the Coale-Hoover model provided the justification for American support of population assistance (Piotrow, 1973:15; Population Council, 1978:24-5) and the intellectual rationale for support of foreign aid for fertility limitation in developing countries (Harkavy, 1995:36, 79). Economic development arguments were also used by population agencies and other donor nations (see Japanese example above), at a time when many were just beginning to support population assistance. These sentiments were probably loudest expressed by the then head of the World Bank, who stated:

But when human life is degraded by the plague of poverty, and that poverty is transmitted to future generations by too rapid a growth in population, then one with responsibilities in the field of development has no alternative but to deal with that issue.

To put it simply: the greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of the majority of the peoples in the underdeveloped world is rampant population growth. (Robert McNamara (1981:35), President of the World Bank addressing a congregation at the University of Notre Dame, May 1969).

Piotrow (1973:187) maintains that until 1969 American population assistance was primarily justified by the argument that both nations and individuals could advance their progress to prosperity by lowering fertility rates. However, as the population debate took on new dimensions (see 4.4.2), environmental concerns and women’s rights groups demanding more forms of contraception and abortion grew in prominence. Although initially these positions had little effect on the government, they gradually “provided
strong reinforcement for existing programs and increased urgency for new ones” (Piotrow, 1973:187). Increasingly, academics questioned the established intellectual orthodoxy as developing countries shared in the prosperity of the 1960s and the perceived crisis failed to eventuate. Nonetheless, policymakers in developing countries had come to accept that rapid population growth hindered development (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995:227).

Economic arguments again gained prominence in the 1980s. While the World Bank (1985:39-65) and many other donors continued to argue that population growth had a deleterious effect on the economic development of developing countries, in American government circles population growth came to be viewed as a non-issue; reflecting the revisionist position of the Cornucopians and the religious New Right (see 4.4.4, 6.3.2). Free-market forces, it was argued, were sufficient to lower fertility rates in developing countries. The Reagan administration voiced this position at the 1984 Mexico City Conference and subsequently reduced American funding for population assistance:

First and most important, population growth is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon. It is not necessarily good or ill. It becomes an asset or a problem only in conjunction with other factors, such as economic policy, social constraints, need for manpower, and so forth. The relationship between population growth and economic development is not necessarily a negative one. More people do not necessarily mean less growth. Indeed, in the economic history of many nations, population growth has been an essential element in economic progress (United States, 1984:576).

The influential 1986 study by the American National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council, 1986) added further scholarly weight to this position.

Economic arguments for or against population assistance have diminished in significance since the heterodox or revisionist position expressed in the 1980s. Officials of the “population movement”, bemoan the fact that no successor to the Coale-Hoover has emerged to convince economists advising donor governments that rapid population growth is an obstacle to economic development (Harkavy, 1995:81). A notable exception was the Independent Inquiry for the Australian government, chaired by the economist Dennis Ahlburg, which found that population growth did indeed hinder economic development (see 7.2). However, despite the overall apparent recent lack of appeal as a motive for population assistance, some maintain that population growth and economic development arguments are valid. McIntosh and Finkle (1995:227) suggest that the Coale-Hoover model is still of relevance for Africa, given its levels of debt,
poverty and political instability. In their assessment of Asian dependency ratios and foreign capital between 1950 and 1992, Higgins and Williamson (1997:284-5) found that the increase in Asian saving rates since the 1960s, and the subsequent diminishing need for foreign capital, can be explained by a fall in youth dependency ratios as foreseen by the Coale-Hoover model. However, this renewed interest by some academics seems not to have filtered through into the thinking of donor governments.

7.3.2.2 Environmental concerns

I will seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources (President. Johnson, State of the Union Message, 4 January 1965 cited in Piotrow, 1973:89; Green, 1993:305).

Schutz der Umwelt in den Entwicklungsländern und weltweit. Zu rasches Bevölkerungswachstum und zu hohe Bevölkerungszahlen sind mithin für die Gefährdung der Umwelt in den Entwicklungsländern und auf der ganzen Erde.

(To protect the environment in developing countries and around the world. Rapid population growth and high population numbers contribute to the endangering of the environment in developing countries and on the entire planet). Second goal of the German concept paper on population policy and family planning. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (Germany. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, 1991:2).

Concerns over population growth and its environmental consequences have been central to the population debate since Malthus first prophesied over two centuries ago that humankind would outstrip available environmental resources. In the twentieth century, the debate on population and the environment was taken up with renewed vigour by neo-Malthusians during the population hysteria (see 4.4.2). Much of the discussion centred on food supply and a deterioration of agricultural conditions, with population assistance seen as a means of averting the prophesied environmental consequences of unhindered population growth. Population and environmental arguments were no longer advanced so vociferously following the demise of the population hysteria, although it was a reoccurring theme in several national and international reports (see Johnson, 1994:185-202)

As suggested in section 4.4.5, population and environment concerns have experienced renewed interest by DAC members in the 1990s, with politicians responding to the expansion of the Green Movement throughout the developed world. Britain's preparedness (Brown, 1992a; Ryan & Fowler, 1992; Schoon, 1992a; 1992b) to confront the Vatican at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro on family planning and population issues,
for example, is testament to this invigorated interest. In a statement aimed at countering
the pressure exerted by the Vatican and Catholic developing countries for removing
population issues from conference documentation, the British government argued that:

To ignore the doubling of population which has taken place over the last 40 years, and a
further doubling which appears almost inevitable, demonstrates a degree of short­sightedness we are not prepared to countenance. Population growth will have an inevitable
impact on development and the environment.

We should address the massive unmet need for family planning – more than 100 million
couples worldwide (Brown & Travis, 1992).

Other developed countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain
also addressed concerns over world population growth during the Conference’s plenary
session (Johnson, 1994:206-8). Critics of the British government’s position at Rio,
however, claim that the ploy of using neo-Malthusian arguments was to shift the blame
for environmental degradation away from developed to developing countries (Pepper,
1996:279). This criticism surely holds true for other donor nations that steadfastly argue
the population-environment link.

In response to the Earth Summit, the Group of Seven (G7) industrialised nations
passed a statement on the Conference in their economic communiqué which discussed
population issues. It noted that the “Global challenges such as population growth and the
environment can only be met through cooperative efforts by all countries”, and that
“Poverty, population policy, education, health, the role of women and the well-being of
children merit special attention” (G-7 Summit, 1992:584).

Before becoming American Vice-President in January 1993, Al Gore wrote a book
presenting his views on the “environmental crisis” (Gore, 1992:21), in which he stated
that:

No goal is more crucial to healing the global environment than stabilizing human
population (Gore, 1992:307).

Advocating a Global Marshall Plan, Gore maintained that the time was right to create the
conditions necessary for population stabilisation. Specifically, he urged increased funding
for literacy programmes; effective programmes to reduce infant mortality; and the
ubiquitous availability of culturally acceptable birth control methods and techniques.
Asserting that the US should take the leading role in achieving these goals, Gore argued
that America should fully restore its share of funding towards international population
stabilisation programmes and increase its efforts to make birth control available worldwide (Gore, 1992:313-7). Likewise, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs and the American Delegation Head to ICPD, Tim Wirth, had also expressed his views on population and the global environment before the 1992 Democratic electoral win. In reference to the greenhouse effect, Wirth identified in 1987 “high rates of population growth”, energy-efficient technologies and the preservation of forests as policy issues that had “been passed from the world’s scientists to its public policy makers” (cited in Choucri & North, 1993: 249).

Although it is unclear to what extent Gore, Wirth and others were able to implement these intentions once in office, it is probable that the increase in American population assistance during the early years of Clinton’s first term was due to the professed views of the president’s running-partner and his supporters. Curiously, the first statement on US international population policy by the Clinton administration announced America’s commitment:

... to promote international consensus around the goal of stabilizing world population growth through a comprehensive approach to the rights and needs of women, to the environment, and to development (United States, 1993b:403).

Similarly, in March 1994 USAID’s document on sustainable development noted that its operational approach for population and health at the programme level was founded on four principles and objectives including “Reducing population growth rates to levels consistent with sustainable development” (USAID, 1994b:485).

Population and environment issues have been around for over 30 years, and so a case could be made that the environmental issue may not be as pertinent a motive for donor-government support for population assistance as before. One official I interviewed was circumspect about environmental motives, arguing that “the issue has lost part of its appeal ... lost its – its normal on the political agenda in a number of Western – of developed countries themselves” (NGO Official B).
7.3.2.3 Fear of migration

 Practically all population growth takes place in poor countries outside Europe, so of course the temptation to migrate to the rich North must be overwhelming (King & Öberg, 1993:3).

 ... the demographic imbalance between poor and rich societies is producing a migratory flood from the former to the latter, and today's disturbing social and racial reactions to that may be small compared with what happens in a world of 8 to 10 billion people (Kennedy, 1993:95).

 In his book Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, the historian and would-be futurist Paul Kennedy (1993:41-6) gives an account of the Western world being swamped by uncontrolled migration from developing countries. He alleges that Europe, the United States and Australia have already expressed their concern about this prospect. In developed countries with populations that are not only ageing, but also potentially declining in size, the threat of becoming the recipient of large-scale migration worries many. This is particularly true in those European states that have not historically experienced immigration, for it raises such concerns as: losing national sovereignty; fears over the loss of ethnic homogeneity; suspicions over migrants bringing diseases; insecurities over job losses to migrants; jealousy that migrants have access to facilities and services paid for by the taxpayer; and anxieties among present citizens that they may become a minority (see for example Economist, 1989; 1993a; 1996b; 1998a).

 Western Europe's uneasiness stems from the demographic and economic divide between it, its immediate neighbours and the rest of the developing world. Two main migrant flows are identified: the established South-North flow, especially from former colonies, and the East-West flow from the ex-Soviet Bloc (King & Öberg, 1993:2). Many analysts equate the Mediterranean Sea to a line separating two different demographic and economic systems (Findlay, 1996:43; Montanari & Cortese, 1993:213; Springer, 1997:195). North of the divide lies a region with below-replacement-level fertility, high per capita income and an ageing population. South of the line virtually the opposite exists with high fertility rates, moderate per capita income and a youthful population. If a broader definition of the term 'South' is taken, the gap between Western Europe and its former West African colonies is even wider (Findlay, 1996:43-6). As the demographic and economic imbalance between Europe and its southern neighbours increases, it is predicted that millions, particularly from the Maghreb states, will attempt to migrate to the more affluent North (King & Öberg, 1993:3). This, coupled with fears
of immigrants spreading Islamic fundamentalism into Europe, has many worried (*Economist*, 1995).

The Oder-Neisse represents a similar divide between Western Europe and its eastern neighbours (*Springer*, 1997:195). Potentially the same scenario may arise from former communist states of Eastern Europe, as the population is relatively young, their economic and political systems are in a state of transition, and ethnic conflicts threaten to flare up (*Fielding*, 1993:14; *Grečić*, 1993:143-9; *Kupiszewski*, 1996:24-37).

Opinions over the likelihood of mass migration range from those that take a wary view (*Papademetriou*, 1997-98; *Spence & Wedell*, 1993:x) to those who see illegal migration as the most significant threat facing Europe in the post-Cold War era (*Montanari & Cortese*, 1993:229). Although migration to Western Europe has risen substantially since the mid-1980s (*Coleman*, 1997), fears of the wave of immigrants predicted after the fall of the Berlin Wall were unfounded, partly because of the tightening of immigration laws (*Baldwin-Edwards & Schain*, 1994:7; *Economist*, 1997). Nevertheless, *The Economist* (1997) maintains that the fears of mass migration remain. The organised smuggling of at least 400,000 people annually into the European Union by Mafia rings based in Eastern Europe (*Economist*, 1999a), demonstrates that the desire of people to migrate is far from quelled.

Collinson (1993:2) states that the attention given to immigration threats from Eastern Europe following the events of 1989 helped to simultaneously create awareness of the enduring immigration concerns from the South. Politicians are aware of both the need to deal with growing social tensions posed by immigration and the concerns held by many of their ageing constituents who are uncomfortable with changes in the demographic make-up of their society (*Martin*, 1993:1-2). Europe’s present migrant intake has already led to right-wing extremist views and politics (see for example *Economist*, 1998b; *Thranhardt*, 1997; *Vandermotten & Vanlaer*, 1993), and given historical precedents, European governments wish to prevent the rise of nationalist sentiments.

Western European policymakers have responded with two types of defensive strategies: a fortress Europe approach that relies on such traditional methods as border controls and visa regimes to restrict migrants’ entry, and founded in self-interest, a new willingness to confront the root causes of the issues (*Collinson*, 1994:159-60). Thus, migration fears are a potent motive for both foreign aid and developing closer economic
cooperation with sending nations (see for example OECD, 1991b). This has captured the attention of bureaucrats, as exemplified below:

They [EC officials] say that if the EC becomes so obsessed with its own integration (and with Eastern Europe) that it fails to help the poor and teeming Maghreb, it will be invaded by North African boat-people.

The thought is mentioned only in private or in off-the-record press briefings ... But the underlying message is spreading (Economist, 1990a).

The Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Johannes Pronk, asserted at the 1993 European Population Conference that to prevent “unmanageable” migration, root causes such as: demographic pressure, ecological distortions, economic inequalities, political instability, and human rights violations need to be addressed (Pronk, 1993:325). Indeed, the European Union has undertaken a number of measures such as trade promotion and liberalisation, to improve conditions in the littoral states of North Africa and the Middle East in an attempt to halt migration from these countries (Economist, 1994b:42; Garson, 1997). Similarly, large-scale aid to assist stability and prosperity in Eastern Europe by West European states probably has migration concerns as one of its main rationales. Although just one component in the overall aid picture to these regions, the following observations from European-based NGO officials suggest that support of population assistance by the EU (see also 5.3.4) and national governments is at least partly determined by migration concerns:

One rationale is the – based on fear from migration, and that weapon can be successfully used in a number of places to add to the lets say the fund for population related activities. I would say that for example probably in the EC, because of the proximity to the danger of migration from North Africa and from the Southern Mediterranean – generally speaking there is the possibility that this will take place. The new migration from Eastern Europe also might lead some – some of the European Communities – Union’s countries again to really double their efforts in the field of population, but again in order to stop the migration (NGO Official B).

In terms of finding a convincing argument, for politicians to use, it is made somewhat easier because of the migration issue. Politicians are running scared due to xenophobia, racism. They know it will get much worse in a relatively short time (NGO Official – paraphrased cited in Media Natura Consultancy, 1993).

American analysts also express the same anxieties harboured by Western Europeans (see for example Abernethy, 1993:213-310; Bouvier & Grant, 1994:110-8; Brimelow, 1995; Carnegie Commission, 1992; De Witt, 1986:5-6). Like the European frontiers, the Rio Grande represents a demographic faultline between the United States and its Caribbean, Central and Latin American neighbours. Over recent decades, the
United States has received millions of migrants, legal or otherwise, from these and other nations, making immigration a contentious political issue.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that concerns about mass migration from developing countries may have been a consideration in American population assistance decisions. The 1974 NSSM 200 report warns that if population growth in developing countries continues, illegal mass migration, among other things, may potentially disrupt foreign relations in the future (Mumford, 1996:480), while in 1980, the Fourth Annual Report of the National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy entitled *US International Population Policy* found that:

> On balance, these factors add up to a growing potential for social unrest, political instability, mass migrations, and possible international conflicts over control of land and resources. *Demographic pressures will certainly reinforce the frustration caused by absolute and relative poverty*. The near certainty of at least a doubling of the populations of most developing countries within the next two to three decades has particular significance for the United States, which has been the goal of so many of the world's emigrants and refugees (United States, 1980:510).

The study went on to recommend that the United States maintain its leadership in the population field (United States, 1980:512).

Several analysts in the 1986 study *Population Growth in Latin America and U.S. National Security* maintain that continued population growth in Latin America would lead to economic, political and social upheaval, which will ultimately affect the United States. In their opinion, illegal mass migration from this region poses a significant threat to America (De Witt, 1986:4-6; Hayes, 1986:260-1; Saunders, 1986: xvii-xix; Wiarda & Wiarda, 1986:153-4, 168-9), with many of them calling upon the United States government to increase population assistance for family planning purposes to prevent the predicted outcomes (Diaz-Briquets & Macisco, 1986:94; Hayes, 1986:262-3; Stycos, 1986:45). The large sums of bilateral (American) population assistance to Central America (see 5.2.4), especially during the Reagan years, suggest that migration fears figured as a motive alongside other American security interests in the region.

The Clinton administration singled out migration as one of its three concerns in its first statement on an international population policy. Addressing ICPD Prepcom II in May 1993, Tim Wirth stated:

> Uncontrolled migration is fueled by demographic pressures, those same pressures which are challenging our ability to live in peace with our environment. The Cairo process
should reaffirm the priority we place on improving the conditions which force people to move—impoverishment, persecution, and conflict (United States, 1993b:405).

The administration's tacit concern with illegal migration was spelt out more clearly in this largely pencilled-for-omission excerpt from the revised draft of an unreleased 1994 Presidential Decision Directive on Global Population Issues:

This [population growth in developing countries] may result in: disruptive migration flows within and between developing countries, as well as significantly increased pressure to immigrate to the US and other developed countries ... (Mumford, 1996:8).

The government of America's northern neighbour has also responded to growing public concern over immigration. Conly and Speidel (1993:17) report that CIDA has been approached by other Canadian government departments that deal with employment and migration issues to address the underlying causes behind international migration including population growth.

As a country covering a large surface area with a small population, Australia has historically been fearful of an 'invasion' from its more populous neighbours. Over time, this belief has manifested itself in numerous government reports and policies. A 1994 report on the environment recommended increased aid funding to limit "uncontrolled mass migration" (Australia. House of Representatives. Standing Committee on Long-Term Strategies, 1994:92). Similarly, the 1992 government-commissioned inquiry into the major consequences on Australia's population resulting from immigration and natural increase recognised the likelihood of mass population movements from Australia's immediate region (Australia. National Population Council, 1992:96) and concluded that:

As part of the need to address 'root causes' the Committee believes that there is a clear role for Australia in an enhanced foreign aid program to support family planning services and assistance for the creation of a social and economic context favourable to fertility decline.

For Australia it is also important that the process of mass population movement be managed with regional and global co-operation, which will be part of Australia's important task and opportunity for greater responsible external engagement (Australia. National Population Council, 1992:xx).

Mumford (1996:3-4) asserts that like NASSM 200, this Directive, prepared by the National Security Council in conjunction with several other government agencies including USAID, was suppressed by the Vatican and its allies, although he does not elaborate how.
Cocks (1996:213-4) notes that increased support for family planning services could form the “insurance” component of an Australian population policy and advocates the use of foreign aid, in particular family planning assistance, as a means of reducing the chances of future uncontrolled mass migration.

Whether these arguments influence the decisions taken by the Australian government on foreign aid and population assistance is unclear. What is certain is that Australia’s aid programme focuses extensively on the Asia-Pacific region, and that in the 1997-98 financial year, 85% of family planning expenditure was expected to go to Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Stokes, 1998). As one respondent remarked:

So Australia and New Zealand are extremely keen on population assistance in the Pacific, because they have a clear tie. Cynics would say that it’s because they’re concerned about migration into those countries ... (NGO Official D).

7.4 Conclusion

The bureaucratic apparatus in donor countries determines the sums made available for population assistance, with prominent officials often playing a significant role. Evidence suggests that the reasons for this support, however, go beyond the concerns expressed by prominent individuals, explaining why successive donor governments have funded and continue to fund population assistance. The motives of donor governments have varied in importance over the decades. Economic development arguments were strongly propounded in the 1950s and 1960s but have had limited effect in the years since. Thus, it appears that alarmist views and fears affecting the national security of donor governments are the underlying impetus behind population assistance funding. Neo-Malthusian environmental arguments, as suggested in 4.4.2, were prominent during the population hysteria of the 1960s and 1970s and continued to sway politicians in the 1990s. Fears of migration have probably always been an issue for donor countries, but the more open and frank discussion by officials in the 1990s presumably reflects a heightened degree of concern.

It seems that neo-Malthusian arguments have more appeal to elected and appointed officials than to others. Wiarda and Wiarda (1986:181) claim that the former US Secretary of Defense and World Bank President, Robert McNamara, “sold” population policy to President Johnson using national security arguments and that population growth issues need to be linked with national security to receive attention in
the United States. The same holds true for most other countries. Thus, population agencies face the difficult position of espousing reproductive health and overall welfare rhetoric for general consumption, while displaying enough flexibility to appeal to the neo-Malthusian sentiments of those controlling the purse strings.
Finally, we reach the third stage of the framework introduced in Chapter Six: the role population agencies themselves play in determining population assistance trends. While Chapters Six and Seven have discussed the processes in developed countries that influence the overall size of the population assistance pie, this chapter surveys how decisions taken at the agency level determine which nations receive a share and how large the pieces are.

The process of allocating resources is an administrative issue, ideally performed following some predetermined procedure. Based on a review of aid per capita, Griffin (1991:658) concludes that it is "political criteria, not poverty, that determines the allocation of official aid". Chapter Five demonstrated that considerable discrepancies exist among recipients in how much population assistance they receive. Although factors within developing countries explain much of this, section 5.3.4. showed that donor considerations are indeed an issue. Thus, this chapter reviews and assesses a range of theoretical approaches to allocating population assistance and what happens in practice. As with previous chapters, data come from a number of sources, often found only in the archives of various aid establishments, and are supplemented with excerpts from various interviewees.

8.1 The theory

8.1.1 The importance of resource allocation

Exceptionally few organisations will ever have the resources available to them to carry out all the activities they desire. The vast majority have to decide how best to use their available resources, and so for both the private and public sectors, decisions on how to allocate funds are crucial to the success of any operation.

Microeconomics assumes that private sector firms allocate resources with no other consideration than profit maximisation (Lipsey, 1989:170; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995:240-243). In practice, resource allocation decisions in the private sector are taken
according to a variety of organisational goals and plans (Bartol et al., 1996:146-175), usually with profit maximisation as a principal priority (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995:239). By comparison, decisions taken by government bureaucracies, international organisations and non-profit associations, whose funds are raised through taxation, allocated to them by a primary donor or generated through fundraising activities, revolve around how to effectively disburse resources to achieve stated goals or mandates.

As population agencies are either public bureaucracies, international organisations or non-profit associations, they also face the dilemma of how to allocate their resources. Theoretically, agencies respond to requests made by recipients. However, from my experience the role played by recipients in deciding how much funding they receive is frequently circumscribed, especially as requests exceed global funds available. In the main, the influence that recipients exert appears restricted to how funds are spent, rather than how much should be allocated to them in the first instance. Thus, deciding how best to allocate resources is a contentious issue. The following sections first examine various models that have projected future funding levels and that present an indication of where resources are required, and then examine how allocation is carried out in practice.

8.1.2 Resource allocation models

Spurred on by the wish to raise awareness for future funding and the need to efficiently allocate resources, several authors and institutions have over the last two decades devised methodical and systematic criteria to determine funding required for population activities. Resource allocation models are tools that allow projections on the expenditure needed to maintain and improve effective family planning and related demographic services against predetermined goals. While not all models provide ready estimates of the sums the donor community should commit, and to which regions they should be allocated, they often provide the data on such things as the number of contraceptive acceptors and possible contraceptive mix on which future donor funding levels could be based. A number of such models are discussed below.

Berelson and Haveman (1979) presented 19 population experts with a combination of twelve supply and demand strategies for fertility reduction, three levels of a country’s socioeconomic development, and three levels on the government’s
commitment and implementation of a family planning programme, to evaluate the effectiveness of these approaches under differing scenarios. According to their judgements, the greatest reduction in fertility would occur if donors allocated their funds towards those nations with a strong family planning programme and high socioeconomic development, or alternatively to countries with a weak programme and low socioeconomic development. In 1983, Speidel undertook one of the first attempts at projecting actual future costs for donors. Noting that only 20% of married women of reproductive age (MWRA) in developing countries used contraception and that 80% was required for population stabilisation, he stated that a figure of US$1.8 billion excluding inflation was required annually. Speidel (1983:181) did not give estimates for individual countries, but remarked that countries of low socioeconomic status would require increased donor support.

Bulatao (1985:iii, 35, 41) estimated expenditure to the year 2000 by assuming constant costs per contraceptive user and by presupposing that the number of contraceptive users would increase between 2.2 and 2.6 times. He estimated that by 2000 a sum of $7.1 billion would be necessary to achieve the standard World Bank projected fertility decline, and $9.7 billion to achieve a rapid fertility decline. To reach these targets, Bulatao maintained that expenditures would have to grow fastest in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

Gillespie et al. (1989) allowed for changes in the contraceptive method mix (increased usage of Norplant and injectables) and socioeconomic development in their model used to gauge funds needed to reach the UN medium variant projection by 2010. They estimated that the cost of providing family planning services in developing countries by the year 2010 amounted to around US$9 billion annually. How much donors ought to contribute, and what regions should receive funding, were not specified.

The approach taken by Janowitz et al. (1990) looked at the annual costs (e.g. overheads and follow-up schedules) of family planning services to the year 2000 based on current costs and the UN medium projection for population growth. The study based its findings on the number of MWRA rising by 68% from 190 million in 1988 to 320 million by 2000 to lower TFR in developing countries from 4.8 to 3.9. Assuming the 1985 contraceptive mix prevails, the cost of providing family planning in developing countries increases by almost 60% from US$1.2 billion in 1988 to US$1.9 billion in
2000. According to Janowitz et al., the role of the donor community will depend on the part played by local government and the commercial sector.

The model suggested by Kocher and Buckner (1991) measured the costs involved in reaching the UN low, medium and high projections for regions of the world by the year 2010. It took into consideration such things as family planning commodity and service costs, MCH, IEC, policy development, demographic data collection and training. By assuming no change in the proximate determinants except for increased contraceptive prevalence and an unaltered contraceptive mix, the model focused on expanding resource requirements to include IEC, data collection, health and expenditures, and policy development. Regardless of the scenario, the study suggested that most funding would need to go to Asia and Africa.

The Target-Setting software package (Stover et al., 1993) not only determines the number of family planning users, new acceptors and commodities required to reach any specified TFR according to changes in the other proximate determinants of fertility, it can also help to calculate what the family planning programme costs would be to achieve that target.

The work done by Mauldin and Miller (UNFPA, 1994b), on behalf of UNFPA, focused on contraceptive use among women of reproductive age against the costs of providing a standard contraceptive cafeteria, to reach the low UN population projection and replacement-level fertility.

Finally, UNFPA’s (1994a) model forms the basis for the figures on future population assistance funding levels found in the Programme of Action. In coming to its estimates the model considered family planning services, basic reproductive health services, sexually transmitted diseases and basic research and policy analysis. Assuming that 33% of the resource requirements needed for population programmes in developing countries comes from the donor community, external sources should amount to $5.7 billion per year in 2000, $6.2 billion in 2005, $6.8 billion in 2010, and $7.2 billion in 2015 (in 1993 dollars). Estimates given showed that the bulk of future funding would need to be directed towards East and South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

These models and frameworks are just that – models and frameworks. They all have certain limitations and inadequacies that have been pointed out by several commentators (Janowitz, 1993; Janowitz & Bratt, 1992; Robinson, 1993; Zeitlin et al.,
Although these models focus on the future costs for delivering family planning services, they use various approaches to explicating methods of allocating resources. One clear point emerges from these studies: donor funding should concentrate on nations with weak family programmes and low socioeconomic development. However, the reality appears somewhat different, as the following section shows.

8.2 And in practice?

Chapter Five demonstrated that contributory factors other than fertility levels and poverty largely determine funding to individual nations by population agencies. Looking at the disbursement of population assistance, one could almost be forgiven for thinking that all agencies allocate their resources according to similar criteria. Yet a distinction needs to be made between intermediate donors, which need to show accountability towards primary donors, and the often quite convoluted operations of bilateral donors. While it has been extremely difficult to ascertain the resource allocation procedures of population agencies, the following examples highlight differences between them.

8.2.1 Intermediate donors

Resource allocation issues are really only an issue at UNFPA and IPPF as they don’t provide project aid as other intermediaries or they are compelled to give funds to those countries of greatest priority (NGO Official A).

Cline and Sargen (1975:383) urged multilaterals to make decisions on allocating resources free of those political considerations that bilateral agencies faced. Far from allowing themselves to earmark funds by this means, multilaterals, and by implication international NGOs, have to be seen as distributing funds systematically to satisfy their Governing Councils and the donor governments which are the main source of their support:

Ultimately, however, the governing bodies of these intermediate donors, usually composed of representatives of donor and recipient countries, decide upon the final recipients, that is, which developing countries should benefit from the available funds (UNFPA, 1995a:9).

Thus, intermediate donors such as UNFPA and IPPF have devised procedures to ensure an effective global allocation.
8.2.1.1 United Nations Population Fund

During UNFPA’s infant years, the allocation of resources depended on governments making requests for funding, the types of programmes seeking assistance, and the availability of funds from other internal and external sources (UNFPA, 1976:15). Following the increased scope of population activities after the 1974 Bucharest Conference, requests for assistance rose substantially, and with funding to the organisation not keeping pace, a methodical and systematic approach in allocating resources to countries became a necessity (Miró, 1977:433; Salas, 1979:254-5; UNFP A, 1976:4-5).

In 1976, the Fund adopted a system to direct population assistance to those nations of greatest need according to socioeconomic and demographic factors. A country was deemed a priority for UNFPA assistance if the national income was below US$400 per capita and it fulfilled two or more of the following four criteria:

1. Population growth rate of 2.75% per annum;
2. Gross Reproduction Rate of 2.75;
3. Infant mortality of 176 per 100,000 live births;

Initially, 40 countries fulfilled these requirements, three-quarters of these being in Asia and the Pacific, and in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 8.1). A further 13, which would have qualified if a 2% variance in the threshold levels were allowed, were singled out for special attention. Eight of these borderline states were in Sub-Saharan Africa, two in Asia and the Pacific, two in Latin America and one in Europe (UNFPA, 1977a:4).

Until ICPD, this framework guided UNFPA’s resource allocation, although the thresholds were altered regularly. In 1982, the income threshold rose to US$500 per capita, GRR fell to 2.5, IMR to 160 per 100,000 live births, population density to 2.0 people per hectare of arable land, and the rate-of-growth criterion was replaced by an “Annual increment of population of 100,000 or more” (UNFPA, 1982a:15). Six years later the income threshold increased again to US$750 per capita, the infant mortality threshold fell to 120 and a new indicator was introduced: a female literacy rate of 40% or

Changing socioeconomic and demographic conditions have altered the composition of the priority country list, although the number of nations by region has remained relatively consistent (Table 8.1). Throughout the 1980s, the number of priority countries remained over fifty, with most in Asia and the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 58 priority countries identified in 1994, 32 were in Sub-Saharan Africa and 17 in Asia and the Pacific. In total, 78 countries had received priority assistance by 1993 (UNFPA, 1993:5).

Table 8.1 Distribution of UNFPA Priority Countries, 1976-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab States and Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1976 UNFPA, 1977a: Annex
1983-94 UNFPA, 1996c:4

The target set by UNFPA for its allocation of country programme resources to priority countries increased from 66% in 1977 to 75% in 1988, and 80% in 1990. In 1993, however, around 75% of the Fund's country programme resources went to priority nations. UNFPA offered three reasons for not reaching these targets: 1. Imposed ceilings on countries with large populations; 2. Low absorptive capacity; and 3. Civil strife in certain developing countries (UNFPA, 1996c:5).

As a response to ICPD, UNFPA (1996c) introduced in 1996 a revised approach to resource allocation. The new system incorporates income as well as quantitative goals in three areas specified in the Programme of Action: access to reproductive health, mortality reduction and universal education. The following seven indicators, grouped into three categories with appropriate threshold levels, now help establish the countries needing UNFPA priority assistance:
1. Access to reproductive health
   Proportion of deliveries attended by trained health personnel (≥ 60%)
   Contraceptive prevalence rate (≥ 55%)
   Proportion of population having access to basic health services (≥ 60%)

2. Mortality reduction
   Infant mortality rate (≤ 50 infant deaths per 1,000 live births)
   Maternal mortality ratio (≤ 100 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births)

3. Universal education, especially of girls
   Gross female enrolment rate at the primary level (≥ 75 per 100 eligible population)
   Adult female literacy rate (≥50%)

To determine their priority status, countries are classified into three groups according to set criteria:

**Group A** are countries both with low levels of development and falling considerably short of ICPD objectives. Countries that meet only the threshold levels of 0-3 of the above seven indicators, and have a GNP per capita below US$750, fall into this group. UNFPA intends to allocate 65-69% of country-programme resources to this group.

**Group B** includes countries that either meet 4-6 threshold levels or have a GNP per capita exceeding US$750. Country programme resources allocated to this group will amount to 22-24%.

**Group C** includes developing countries that have met the threshold levels of all seven indicators. This group will receive 5-7% of programme resources.

UNFPA also intends to allocate 3-4% of country-programme resources to countries in transition, such as the Central Asian republics. A country’s actual needs and capacities for assistance are also taken into consideration.
The majority of the 60 countries in Group A (see Table 8.2) are in Sub-Saharan Africa (37) and Asia and the Pacific (16). In Group B, most are in Latin America and the Caribbean (18), while Asia and the Pacific (5) and Latin America and the Caribbean (6) are the main regions in Group C. UNFPA hopes to substantially improve the share of funds going to Group A and reduce the proportion of funds going to countries in Groups B and C, although no timeframe seems to have been set (UNFPA, 1996c:15-6).

Table 8.2 UNFPA Priority Countries Post-ICPD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>No. of Countries</th>
<th>Share of resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Current %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group A</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group B</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group C</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNFPA, 1996c:15

The priority country system is not without its weaknesses. For example, there is no guarantee that the views of an individual Governing Council member may prevail in allocating resources (see 3.1.1.2.). Similarly, there are some misgivings that UNFPA misallocates its resources by supporting too many countries, possibly not to the greatest effect. This criticism seems unjust for not only is UNFPA mandated to provide assistance to all developing countries, but if it failed to provide assistance universally, countries deemed unimportant by bilateral donors for whatever reason might not receive any support. Indeed, bilateral donors use the extensive reach of UNFPA and other international organisations as justification for their focus on particular nations.

8.2.1.2 International Planned Parenthood Federation

In the immediate years following IPPF’s establishment in 1952, the organisation suffered from a lack of financial resources to undertake its programme of activities (Suitters, 1973:96). By the early 1960s, however, the funding outlook had improved considerably. In the period 1961-3 IPPF allocated funds for “action programmes” to the following
countries: Barbados, Belgium, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, France, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Israel, Jamaica, Korea, Malaya, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Thailand and Trinidad (Suitters, 1973:259). With the onset of the population hysteria, IPPF received steady funding from donor governments, enabling the Federation to assure its recipient Family Planning Associations (FPAs) of support for long-term programmes (Suitters, 1973:396). For most of the 1960s and 1970s, IPPF pursued a “pragmatic” approach of allocating funds according to the merits of the proposed programme, the capacity of the FPA and the availability of funds from other sources (Wolfson, 1983:159). However, by the early 1980s, declining funds from donor governments in real terms, coupled with an increased number of FPAs offering a wider range of services, meant the Federation was no longer able to meet all the requests from FPAs:

And I think you will find that resource allocation [at IPPF] was never a problem until funding, became scarce – scarce, not so abundant (NGO Official A).

From the mid-1970s onwards processes were initiated to establish a set of criteria to improve resource allocation (IPPF, 1977b:19). A 1977 review (IPPF, 1977a:64) of IPPF’s future for the subsequent 10-15 years noted that Sub-Saharan Africa would become a priority region, with increased demand for IPPF assistance coming from the Arab World and South Asia. The study recognised that:

The continued evolution of priorities designed to strengthen the unique role of the Federation is of major importance in providing a sense of direction for the Federation and in ensuring a rational allocation of Funds (IPPF, 1977a:105).

IPPF’s Budget and Finance Committee recommended in 1979, and Central Council agreed to in 1980, a “Shift of Emphasis” by allocating resources away from prosperous nations to those of greatest unmet need (IPPF, 1980:14). The Shift of Emphasis Policy recommended that more funds be allocated to countries with:

1. High level of poverty as indicated by GNP;
2. High population growth;
3. High infant mortality rate;
4. Low percentages of contraceptive usage (IPPF, 1985b).
To identify countries with these characteristics, IPPF devised two sets of criteria: socioeconomic and demographic factors, and other country factors. Indicators for socioeconomic and demographic factors included GNP per capita; proportion living in absolute poverty; contraceptive prevalence; crude birth rate; infant mortality rate; and the proportion of the population under 15. The country factors taken into consideration were commitment of the government to family planning, availability of family planning services and the availability of other internal and external resources (IPPF, 1985b:A1). To supply the information necessary to operate an efficient resource allocation system, the Federation launched in 1983 its Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Reporting (PPBR) system. This system helped the planning process by distinguishing the resources required for activities at the national, regional and international level on a three-year basis (IPPF, 1987:20).

Funds were first allocated according to these criteria in 1981, with Sub-Saharan African states dominating those nations identified as being of greatest need (IPPF, 1980:14; 1985b:1). Of the 94 FPAs that received grants in 1984, 53 were classified as high-need, twelve as medium, and 18 as low; eleven remained unclassified owing to a lack of information. Almost all FPAs in the Arab World, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa were classified as high-need, with 23 out of 53 high-need countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (IPPF, 1985b:5).

Discrepancy arises in assessing the success of the policy. After two years IPPF reported that this policy had delivered an increase of 30% to countries most in need (IPPF, 1982:7). However, between 1982 and 1984 cash grants to high need FPAs rose by just 3% annually, compared to an annual increase of 7% to all FPAs (IPPF, 1985b:16). A 1985 review of the policy found two basic problems with it. First, there was no target specifying the size of the shift anticipated, and second, there was no timetable for implementing this policy. The review found an expansion of the criteria was needed if an increased share of the Federation's funds were to go to needy countries. The criteria were revised and expanded in 1987 to incorporate indicators for such measures as fertility, infant and child mortality and morbidity, the status of women, dependency ratios, and adolescent needs, as well as financial, political and technical support for population programmes (IPPF, 1987:24).

A significant funding crisis arose at IPPF after the American decision (see 4.4.4.) to defund the organisation in 1984 (IPPF, 1984:1). Although IPPF had always
encouraged its FPAs to generate their own income locally from the government, through fundraising activities and the sale of contraceptives, or through support from other donors, the need for self-reliance gained momentum in the mid-1980s as grants from the Federation to its FPAs declined (IPPF, 1986:1). Until this day, IPPF runs a two-pronged approach of providing resources to those FPAs lacking the financial capacity to sustain their own programmes, while actively encouraging them to find alternative sources of funding wherever possible. Indeed, the ability of the FPA to generate its own funding is an important factor in resource allocation.

Resource allocation concerns were back on IPPF’s agenda in the early 1990s. The process of allocating resources remained highly centralised until the decision in the early 1990s to decentralise the process by assigning the task of allocating resources to the regions (IPPF, 1990a:6). Funds were allocated to individual regions after approval at the meeting of the Budget and Finance Committee, and the regions subsequently allocated resources to FPAs according to such criteria as socioeconomic conditions, the ability of FPAs to effectively spend funds, self-reliance, and historical precedence. Despite these mechanisms, internal politics played a prominent role in funding decisions. IPPF’s volunteer structure allowed national volunteers to have a significant voice in how resources were allocated, making decisions highly political and often unrelated to the performance of individual FPAs (Conly & Speidel, 1993:23). Frequently, those FPAs with volunteers who had substantial power over their respective regional offices were able to capture an incommensurate share of the funding on offer.

A decline in donor funding, and criticism from certain donor countries over the lack of resources directed towards countries of greatest need in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, led IPPF’s Budget and Finance Committee to unanimously adopt in May 1997 UNFPA’s post-ICPD priority country system (see 8.2.1.1). By 2000, 70% of all unrestricted funds will be allocated countries of Group A and 26.5% to Group B. IPPF expects to phase out grants for Group C nations by 2004, to economies in transition by 2005, and to all other countries by 2002 (IPPF, 1997b:103, 111-2).

To further the implementation of its strategic plan, Vision 2000 (IPPF, 1993b), and to increase the share of resources going to countries of “high unmet need”, IPPF created its Vision 2000 Fund in 1993 (IPPF, 1996b:33). Grants from the Fund assist projects that conduct institutional reforms in line with the goals of the strategic plan and in accordance with the realities of the country in which the FPA operates. Up to 9% of
IPPF's annual core funding has gone to the Fund since its inception. Most projects are located in Group A countries, with less funding going to Group B and C nations (IPPF, 1997a:13).

8.2.2 Bilaterals

... the solid secret is in governments (Multilateral Official B).

Bilaterals are for the most part the antithesis of multilaterals, being less than transparent in disclosing the premises on which funding decisions are taken. Some donor governments have enacted draconian measures to prevent publicity on the workings of government departments, and all have legislation that prevents the disclosure of materials considered to compromise national security. Thus, the difficulty for the researcher looking at the resource allocation procedures of bilateral agencies is not establishing what nations received bilateral assistance and how much, but rather how these countries were selected and what determined the sums of population assistance allocated to them.

As both Cline and Sargen (1975:383) and Multilateral Official B suggest, decisions by bilateral agencies are subject to political oscillations that are unknown to most outsiders. As previous chapters indicated, national security arguments and foreign policy interests have largely dictated the spread of foreign aid and the bilateral allocation of population assistance. Donors focus their efforts on countries of particular economic, political and strategic importance to them. Several relationships exist: for example, the United Kingdom with Commonwealth states; Sweden with nations of socialist leanings; Japan with East Asia; and the United States with its allies in Asia, the Middle East, parts of Anglophone Africa and its neighbours in the Caribbean and Latin America (Herz, 1984:110-11). As the following interviewees point out, donors have established patterns in their allocation of population assistance:

Oh, there's a lot of conscious and unconscious territorial dividing up of the world (Int. Consultant B).

Donors, as you know, being from Australia, tend to be fairly regionally specific (NGO Official D).

In 1989-90, 59 countries received bilateral assistance. Only a few countries had several donors: Bangladesh ten, Kenya nine, Tanzania and Zimbabwe five each, four countries had as many donors, while eight countries had three donors each. A total of 21
countries had two donors and another 22 countries had just one donor, usually USAID (Harrington, 1993:169). The usual explanation offered for bilateral agencies focusing their efforts on a select few is to maximise their effect (Herz, 1984:111):

And that you know to get the maximum leverage of your resources you don't spread them too widely or too thinly, but you focus them on your priorities and only on your priorities to get the maximum results (Bilateral Official A).

Although this is undoubtedly true, the countries selected for bilateral funding as shown in 5.3 are not necessarily the poorest or those with the highest level of fertility. How decisions are reached on which countries require funding, and more importantly on how much, is largely an issue of the agency's "constraints and opportunities imposed by its structure and mode of operations" (Harrington, 1993:174).

8.2.2.1 United States

Of all bilateral donors, only the United States has had the resources, staff and delivery capacity to operate an extensive bilateral programme. Smaller donors prefer to allocate resources either exclusively to intermediate donors, or more commonly through a combination of intermediate donors and a limited number of recipient nations (see 4.3). Thus, given the size of America's bilateral disbursements, an elaboration on the decision-making process is clearly unavoidable.

USAID's population assistance budget is determined annually by Congress and is subject to certain fiscal constraints. In particular, at the end of the financial year there is a rush to allocate resources quickly, resulting in dubious projects suddenly being approved, increased funds to particular countries, and possible additional funding for multilateral institutions:

Now at the end of the fiscal year if they don't spend the money they lose it. It hurts. So there's a great scramble at the end of each fiscal year to unload (Int. Consultant B).

This is a problem that USAID does not face alone. Although Congress determines the size of USAID's aid budget and the subtotal for population, it has less influence on the countries chosen as recipients of population assistance and the amounts allocated to them. This decision is left to USAID in accordance with predetermined measures and exogenous factors.
As suggested in 5.3.4, foreign policy interests significantly influence the allocation of America's bilateral population assistance. In the opinion of one former USAID employee:

Well, it's size, strategic importance – I think they're [USAID] primarily political and geopolitical. India is always one of the top ten. Pakistan comes and goes. Bangladesh – The smaller African countries are increasingly expendable, which of course is a general trend. (Pause) I have to say it's political, purely political in terms of visibility (Int. Consultant B).

[Qu: Is there a ‘flavour of the month’ syndrome?] Oh absolutely, and that's why with USAID they're in with this group of countries this year, and three years later it's a whole new ball game (Int. Consultant B).

NSSM 200 (Mumford, 1996:501) stated that the following large and fast-growing developing countries should be supported in a drive to maximise progress towards population stabilisation: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia and Colombia. The report recognised that there were certain impediments, in some cases political factors or diplomatic relations with these countries such as India and Nigeria, or a lack of government interest in family planning in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico and Brazil (Mumford, 1996:516). Curiously enough, many of those countries identified by NSSM 200 remain among USAID's largest recipients. In 1984, two-thirds of US bilateral population assistance went to Asia, with Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Thailand being the major recipients. In Africa the largest recipients included Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zaire (Herz, 1984:112, 117).

In response to a congressional mandate to redirect its population assistance towards more demographically significant countries, in 1992 USAID launched its “Big Impact Globally” or BIG strategy. Emphasis was placed on nations with a population of over 20 million, with smaller countries having their funding either cut or phased out. The main recipients included: India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Zaire, Colombia, Tanzania, Morocco, Kenya and Peru (Washington Memo, 1992). A 1994 overview of USAID activities noted that the agency gave funds to over 50 countries in FY94, with Bangladesh, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, the Philippines, Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Morocco, Turkey and Brazil the main recipients (USAID, 1994a:6).
8.2.2.2 United Kingdom

For most of its existence, Britain's aid agency, like all other government departments in the United Kingdom, has fallen under the auspices of the Official Secrets Act 1911. According to Rogers (1997:1), the attitude of successive governments was that official information should be kept secret and only released when policymakers saw a need or desire to do so. The Act ensures limited public disclosure of official materials, especially those that may compromise national security. As described earlier, foreign aid has several national security overtones, and thus, it is hardly surprising that it is veiled in secrecy far removed from open public discussion. Therefore, it is clearly very difficult to see what dictates Britain's allocation procedures for population assistance.

Nevertheless, it appears that British population assistance is allocated along the same lines as that of ODA, predominantly to nations of the Commonwealth. Wolfson (1983:122) reports that the most important population projects tend to be in Commonwealth states, while the 1991 Children by Choice not Chance initiative assigned priority to the following eight countries: Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania and Uganda, all Commonwealth states (United Kingdom, Overseas Development Administration, 1991:6).

As aid and population assistance are regarded to varying degrees as a national security issue, it is inescapable that decisions pertaining to their allocation of resources will be conducted in seclusion. This is especially true in strong states where the executive-bureaucratic apparatus dominates the decision-making process. Resource allocation decisions by such donors as the European Union and Japan appear nebulous, and, as far as I could verify, largely wrapped up with foreign policy considerations.

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30 The Act was introduced during the Agadir Crisis, under the pretext of the threat to national security posed by Germany and its espionage operations. However, Rogers (1997:13) claims that the real reason for the Act "lay in the assault that democratisation was inflicting on the ruling classes' traditional hold over the state". Section 2 of the Act makes the communication of any information to any unauthorised person by a civil servant, government contractor, or a contractor's employee an absolute offence (Aitken, 1971:22; Delbridge & Smith, 1982:5). It is also an offence 'for a person to receive any official information, knowing or having reasonable ground to believe that the information is communicated in contravention of the Act' (Aitken, 1971:22). The Act requires express authorisation for the disclosure of any official information, and those accused of breaching this law are considered guilty until proved innocent.
8.3 Conclusion

Relatively little research has been done into how decisions of international agencies are made in economic and social fields (Symonds & Carder, 1973:xii).

This chapter has demonstrated that the above statement from the early 1970s has as much currency in the late 1990s as it did then. How resource allocation decisions to individual recipients are made is, in many instances, mystifying and undoubtedly influenced by exogenous political factors on many occasions. The numerous models presented as a means of achieving a systematic distribution appear more useful as benchmarks to gauge the allocation of population assistance, than as tools for executing decisions.

For a brief period, population agencies were members of that enviable club which had more funds than it was able to handle. With the dissipation of the population hysteria, however, population agencies also had to make decisions on allocating resources. Agencies approached this task in a variety of ways. Regardless of the reservations one may have about the resource allocation procedures of intermediate donors, their approach is certainly more apparent than that of bilateral agencies. At best, the decision-making process of bilateral agencies lacks transparency and, at worst, it is extremely secretive. Like foreign aid (see 2.4), it appears that self-serving political interests significantly influence which countries receive bilateral population assistance and the sums allocated.
9 Envoi

A paucity of research investigating the donors’ story of population assistance was the impetus for this thesis. As noted in the Introduction, the few studies on this topic (see 1.1) have tended to concentrate on the policies and programmes pursued by population agencies, paying scant regard to the nature of population assistance, funding trends and what determined them. This study has addressed this gap by attaining the following three objectives, each covered in a separate part of the thesis:

1. To examine the nature of population assistance and its relationship with foreign aid (Chapters Two and Three).

2. To quantify population assistance over a significant time frame by sources and recipients, and to explain why these funding trends occurred (Chapters Four and Five).

3. To analyse the determinants of population assistance (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight).

This chapter reviews the findings for each of these objectives, with the final section speculating on the future of population assistance.

9.1 Summary of findings

9.1.1 The Big Picture

This thesis has tried to avoid the temptation of simplicity offered by focusing on only one agency or a particular period. While most analysts restrict themselves to a discussion of American-based population agencies, this study has deliberately used examples and statements from such diverse donor nations as Australia, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, to present a more comprehensive picture, thereby filling in parts of the story ignored by those focusing on America’s pre-eminent position. Highlighted through this approach are, among other things, the divergent views
of global population issues among donor governments, especially between the Americans and Europeans (see 3.1.1.5).

By taking a historical perspective on global population assistance since the 1950s, this study has revealed influences and trends that are not necessarily apparent. For instance, while the immediate impact of the Reagan administration’s Mexico City Policy in the 1980s was significant for those defunded intermediate agencies and America’s population assistance patterns per se, the global funds available for population assistance soon surpassed pre-Mexico City levels in both current and constant terms (see 4.1.1, 4.4.4). All regions and subregions were affected by the Mexico City Policy, although some saw their level of population assistance funding decline more than others. Subregions, such as the Pacific, heavily dependent on the defunded NGOs and multilateral institutions, or on American bilateral support (e.g. the Caribbean, South Asia) experienced the most pronounced declines between 1985 and 1987 (see 5.2.7).

Similarly, primary funds for population assistance as a percentage of ODA increased substantially before each United Nations decennial conference on population (1974, 1984, 1994), only to fall in the immediate years thereafter, once the attention surrounding these conferences had subsided (see 4.1.2, 4.5, 6.3.3). The current concern of population assistance advocates, that donor nations will not meet the promises made at Cairo, is not without historical precedence, for the population community voiced its concerns over declining primary donor funding in the years immediately following each previous international conference (see 3.3.1.3). If history is a predictor for the future, the present downturn in population assistance funding from primary donors, following peaks in the mid-1990s, may not be remedied until the political and social circumstances change to allow for a revived global discussion of population concerns (see 6.3.3).

Altering views of population issues over time and changing responses by the donor community also become clearer when placed into historical context. The initial concerns of women’s groups and birth control campaigners were superseded when donor governments, fearing the consequences of overpopulation, began supporting interventionist programmes in developing countries, leading to the population hysteria of the 1960s and early 1970s. This drive for fertility limitation through a supply-oriented approach gave way to the socioeconomic development notion following the 1974 Bucharest Conference and to the doubts over the continuing need for population assistance arising from the revisionist ideology espoused by the United States in the
1980s (see 4.4.1-4.4.4). By adopting the 1994 Programme of Action, population agencies appear to have made a complete circle by moving away from demographic issues to return to the welfare arguments espoused in the earlier part of the century. However, reproductive health does not have the same political appeal as the apocalyptic arguments of yesteryear, adding to the growing nonchalance about global population issues found in donor countries (see 4.4.5). Given the multitude of interests seeking money from developed country governments, it seems highly unlikely that the availability of funds for population assistance will ever return to the levels seen during the population hysteria.

The study also reveals that funding decisions are more complex than is often acknowledged. Part Three devised a framework, based on the public policy literature, that makes inroads into understanding the three coexisting arenas – societal actors and state actors in developed countries (Chapters Six and Seven) and the resource allocation procedures of population agencies (Chapter Eight) – on the decision-making processes determining the proportion of ODA to population assistance and population assistance disbursements to individual recipients. Although Piotrow (1973:220-34) discusses the processes in the United States, and Conly and Speidel (1993:13-7) touch upon them for some European countries, this thesis is perhaps the first study to conceptualise a decision-making framework that can be used to elucidate the trends of all donor nations.

**9.1.2 Individual objectives**

By addressing the three stated objectives, individual chapters also offer insights into the population assistance story not previously dealt with in other studies.

*Objective 1. To examine the nature of population assistance and its relationship with foreign aid.*

Population assistance has a dual nature, for on the one hand it is largely determined by the political and socioeconomic factors surrounding foreign aid, and on the other by the changing perceptions of the global population problem and the vested interests of population agencies.

There is an inextricable association between population assistance and foreign aid. Being but a diminutive portion of the larger aid picture, shifts in ODA trends and
influences often affect population assistance trends. For example, economic recessions in
developed countries, and the resulting decline in aid funding, frequently reduced the
sums committed to population assistance by donor governments (see 2.5). During the
Cold War, foreign aid was frequently used by Western nations as just one of many
foreign policy instruments to thwart the spread of communism and to fulfil self-serving
political interests (see 2.4). However, in the absence of a politically compelling
justification, the post-Cold War period has seen an acceleration of the downward trend in
ODA funding of the last few decades. Through the diminishing of national aid budgets,
the present apathy towards ODA by donor governments (see 2.2.2) will affect the levels
of funds made available for population assistance.

Population assistance has an identity problem, for there has never been a
consensus position among interested parties on what constitutes population assistance
and what it is trying to achieve (see 3.1). Over the last three decades, the objective of
population assistance has changed from fertility limitation through the supply of
contraceptives, to the recognition of socioeconomic development and population links,
and to the present reproductive health approach, each reflecting the prevailing thinking
on population concerns at the time (see 3.3.2). Throughout, population agencies have
differed in the types of activities they have supported. Some, such as USAID, have
historically focused strongly on contraceptive delivery, while others, such as UNFPA,
have deliberately taken a much broader approach (see 3.1.1.2, 3.1.1.4). In part, this
problem of defining population assistance reflects the vested interests of population
agencies in keeping the definition deliberately vague to ensure their survival by appearing
responsive to changing situations and by safeguarding the 'turf' they have claimed for
themselves (see 3.2). Although lauded by advocates of population assistance, the breadth
of activities covered by the 1994 Programme of Action has only added to the confusion
about what population assistance is and what it is trying to achieve (see 3.3).
Objective 2. To quantify population assistance over a significant time-frame by sources and recipients, and to explain why these funding trends occurred.

Population assistance trends involve two sides of the same coin. On one side are the funds allocated by primary donors and on the other the distribution of funds to recipients.

While other researchers have assessed global funding trends over shorter periods, none has taken a long-term approach using the variety of indicators adopted in this thesis (see 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). Population assistance trends by primary donors are divided in this study into five distinct epochs: thwarted efforts until the mid-1960s, the population hysteria of the 1960s and 1970s, the 1974 Bucharest Conference, the 1984 Mexico City debacle, and the 1990s. A number of decisive events, as well as changing views of the population problem, characterise each period and have affected the sums of population assistance from donor nations (see 4.4). More than any other donor nation, the United States has influenced population assistance trends through its intellectual leadership in population matters and the size of both government and private funds for population concerns. For the last four decades the USA has been the main source of funding for population activities; however, its dominance has diminished over time as other donor nations have increased their levels of population assistance (see 4.2.2). Taking a long-term view of global population assistance, the research showed that four factors account for most of the historical funding trends of primary donors: the association between population assistance and ODA, the role of alarmists and doomsayers in the public debate over population issues, individuals in a position of power in donor governments, and international population conferences (see 4.5). While fluctuations in ODA funding elucidate most population assistance trends, the other three factors help to explain the exceptions.

Previous studies have presented periodic snapshots of where population assistance has gone by region, but none appears to have examined funding trends either for more than a few years or to recipients by subregion. By displaying figures for the period 1969-1994 by region and subregion, this thesis gives insights not found elsewhere. At the regional level, similarities between ODA and population assistance patterns were observed (see 5.2.1, 5.4); but by analysing subregional trends this study revealed such variations in funding, for example, as those between Anglophone and Lusophone Africa, that would otherwise go unnoticed under the general heading of Sub-
Saharan Africa (see 5.2.6). The inferences drawn by the OECD (OECD. Development Centre, 1973:2) and Wolfson (1983:14) that the main recipients of population assistance are those with the largest population size, highest fertility rates and lowest per capita income, do not necessarily hold. While the leading recipients are often among the nations with the largest population size, the analysis showed that it does not follow that they have the highest fertility rates and lowest per capita incomes (see 5.3). UNFPA (1989:10) claims that population size explains just 35% of the variance in population assistance, suggesting that other factors also determine the sums to recipients. This study offers four reasons to explain why some countries receive more population assistance than others: recipients' perception of population issues, absorptive capacity, graduation and donor interest (see 5.3). These explanations are only sporadically alluded to elsewhere in the literature. Although it is usually unclear which factor has the most influence in individual recipient states, an understanding of these four factors can explain most instances.

**Objective 3. To analyse the determinants of population assistance.**

In analysing the determinants of population assistance two questions on resource allocation need attention: first, what determines the global sums of population assistance; and second, how funding levels to individual countries are settled. Chapters six and seven dealt with the first question and Chapter eight with the second.

The policy framework introduced in Part Three illuminates how decisions on funding for population assistance are brought about. A variety of societal actors such as interest groups, the academic community and the mass media can influence decision-making in donor nations (see 6.3). With population issues receiving limited media attention, except when the issue attention cycle is rekindled by such events as international population conferences (see 6.3.3), the degree to which societal actors impact on population assistance funding decisions depends upon the democratic system of the donor country in question. The leverage that societal actors can exert on the decision-making process in America, for example, is strong compared to their restricted role in nations where the state is largely autonomous (see 6.1.2.1, 6.4).

Given the limited role of societal actors, state actors in donor countries are the key players in determining the sums available for population assistance. In the absence of
public debate on population and reproductive health issues, prominent officials in the executive-bureaucratic apparatus can have a disproportionate influence either positive or negative on funding levels. Such committed and influential advocates as Reimert Ravenholt in the United States and Britain’s Baroness Chalker were largely responsible for increased funding levels from their countries.Equally, the example of the Australian senator, Brian Harradine, demonstrated that the opposite might also occur (see 7.2). The motives for donor governments supporting population assistance frequently go beyond those espoused by their rhetoric. National and international security interests such as the fear of migration, environmental concerns, economic development, and the political stability of developing countries are major considerations, although deciding the most important factor for each donor nation is difficult, as there is certainly an interplay between altruism and these motives (see 7.3). Only the United States has been relatively frank in announcing its reasons for supporting population assistance. Other donor governments are generally more secretive about their real intentions.

The criteria employed by population agencies in their allocation of resources to individual recipients, and the decisions related to implementation of these criteria, are shown to be often far from transparent. Comparison of the resource allocation procedures of intermediate donors with those of bilateral agencies, made it clear that political decisions are more apparent at the bilateral level; multilaterals and international NGOs on the other hand need to be readily accountable (see 8.2).

9.2 Speculating on the future of population assistance

In 1985, the then UNFPA Executive Director Rafael Salas published an article entitled ‘Population assistance is here to stay’ (Salas, 1985a). With such an incisive title, Salas provokes the question, “For how many more years will agencies be needed to support population activities in developing countries?” Although it appears certain that donors will continue to provide population assistance for the foreseeable future, the time of when all developing countries will be able to support their family planning programmes and conduct other population activities is a point of disagreement for those in the field, as shown by the following examples.
Among the senior officials interviewed, there were considerable differences of opinion on how much longer developing countries might have a demand for population assistance. One official stated confidently:

... somebody who joins UNFPA now at the age of thirty may have to retire from UNFPA prior to the regular retiring age, which is sixty. The problem [the need for international population agencies] may be solvable in less than thirty years. I think that's perfectly possible (Multilateral Official B).

Others did not share this point of view. If global population stabilisation remains an important objective for the donor community, then increased and long-term financial commitment will be necessary (McIntosh & Finkle, 1994:270). This is particularly true for many nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are unlikely to have the means to support their own population programmes:

... if you are linking population assistance to the population stabilisation, and if you see that the major problem now and in the near future is in Africa, that population stabilisation is not going to happen before 2070 if not 2100. And, therefore, for another hundred years we still need really population assistance (NGO Official B).

Given the equivocal history of population assistance, a more cautious approach than this in predicting the future would seem reasonable. New funding sources, such as the United Nations Foundation established through a donation by media magnate Ted Turner, the Gates Foundation instituted by Microsoft founder Bill Gates, and other private sector funding, as well as initiatives such as the South-South Collaboration, will probably alter the means through which population assistance is provided. With the prospect of new challenges, different forms of assistance will undoubtedly be granted:

... what actually developed countries are able to contribute may change, and I think that there is always value for everyone in having that kind of interaction. So, yes, what we do and what we may have to offer will change. But that's not to say that there isn't – there won't be some value and some kind of role for a lot of countries. You know, new challenges come along (Bilateral Official A).

Population assistance will undeniably remain until population agencies can no longer justify their existence or primary donors become unwilling to support them. Agencies will need to continue reinventing themselves in the light of changing environmental, political and socioeconomic factors, if they wish to ensure their survival. Activities in the future will almost certainly outlast the emphasis on fertility limitation and
reproductive health concerns, focusing instead on such issues as ageing, migration and urbanisation. The overriding consideration, however, will be whether primary donors continue to see the value of funding a host of bilateral and intermediate agencies dealing with population issues. As this thesis suggests, this question is entwined with political considerations and fraught with bureaucratic and documentary obstacles for the researcher.
List of References


31 The order of contents in The Economist changes depending on where it was published. The page references given here refer predominantly to the Asia-Pacific version.


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Appendix A: Recipients of population assistance
1969-1994

| Asia-Pacific       |  |
|--------------------|  |
| Central Asian States | Armenia; Azerbaijan; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan.  |
| East Asia          | China; Hong Kong; Korea, Democratic People’s Republic; Korea, Republic of; Macau; Mongolia; Taiwan.  |
| Pacific Islands    | Cook Islands; Fiji; French Polynesia; Gilbert and Ellice Islands; Guam; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Micronesia; Niue; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tokelau; Tonga; Trust Territory of the Pacific; Tuvalu; Vanuatu.  |
| South Asia         | Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; Iran; Maldives; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka.  |
| Southeast Asia     | Brunei; Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia; Myanmar; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Vietnam.  |

| Europe             |  |
|--------------------|  |
| Eastern and Southern | Albania; Bosnia and Hercegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czechoslovakia; Czech Republic; Greece; Hungary; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Yugoslavia.  |
| Former USSR        | Belarus; Estonia; Georgia; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova; Russian Federation; Ukraine.  |

| Latin America and the Caribbean |  |
|----------------------------------|  |
| Caribbean                        | Anguilla; Antigua and Barbuda; Aruba; Bahamas; Barbados; British Virgin Islands; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Guadeloupe; Grenada; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; Netherlands Antilles; Puerto Rico; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Trinidad and Tobago; Turks and Caicos Islands.  |
| Central America                  | Belize; Costa Rica; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama.  |
South America
Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Guyana; Paraguay; Peru; Suriname; Uruguay; Venezuela.

North Africa and the Middle East (Arab World)

Middle East
Bahrain; Cyprus; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Oman; Palestine; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Turkey; United Arab Emirates; Yemen, Arab Republic; Yemen, People’s Democratic Republic; Yemen.

North Africa
Algeria; Djibouti; Egypt; Libya; Malta; Morocco; Somalia; Sudan; Tunisia.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Anglophone
Botswana; Gambia; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Malawi; Namibia; Nigeria; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Swaziland; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe.

Francophone
Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Democratic Republic; Congo, Republic; Côte d’Ivoire; Gabon; Guinea; Madagascar; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Réunion; Rwanda; Senegal; Togo.

Lusophone
Angola; Cape Verde; Guinea-Bissau; Mozambique; São Tomé and Príncipe.

Others
Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Mauritius; Seychelles.

Note: Nations are designated by their present names unless they no longer exist.
Appendix B: Geographical disbursement of population assistance

**Global Distribution**

![Graph showing geographical distribution of population assistance](image)

**GLOBAL: NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS**

![Graph showing number of recipients](image)
Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin American Total (Current dollars)

Latin America: Number of Recipients

Latin American Distribution
Latin America: Current Vs. Constant dollars

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Latin America: Channel of Distribution

Caribbean: Channel of Distribution

Central America: Channel of Distribution

South America: Channel of Distribution
North Africa and the Middle East (Arab World)

**Arab World Total (Current dollars)**

- North Africa
- Middle East
- Unallocated/Regional

**Arab World: Number of Recipients**

- North Africa
- Middle East

**Arab World Distribution**

- North Africa
- Middle East
- Unallocated/Regional
Appendix C Charts of main current and per capita recipients by region and subregion
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## Global Top Ten Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ Per Capita)

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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.26 Samoa 0.61 Gilbert and Ellice Is. 0.60 Montserrat 1.67 St. Kitts and Nevis 1.56 Ellice Is. 1.69 Nevis 1.66 Dominica 2.61 Singapore 1.65 St. Kitts and Nevis 1.84 St. Kitts and Nevis 1.87 Dominica 1.73 Cook Is. 2.05</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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### ASIA - PACIFIC top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### ASIA - PACIFIC top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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### EAST ASIA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### EAST ASIA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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## PACIFIC ISLANDS top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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## PACIFIC ISLANDS top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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**SOUTH ASIA** top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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**SOUTH ASIA** top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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<tr>
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<td>Thailand 2,174</td>
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<td>Thailand 6,707</td>
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### SOUTHEAST ASIA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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### LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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CARIBBEAN top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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CARIBBEAN top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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CARIBBEAN top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)
### CENTRAL AMERICA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### CENTRAL AMERICA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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### SOUTH AMERICA: Top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### SOUTH AMERICA: Top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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### NORTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### NORTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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Yemen, Dem = Democratic Yemen  
Yemen, AR = Yemen, Arab Republic  
Yemen reunified in May 1990
### MIDDLE EAST top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### MIDDLE EAST top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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Yemen, Dem = Democratic Yemen  
Yemen, AR = Yemen, Arab Republic  
Yemen reunified in May 1990
### NORTH AFRICA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### NORTH AFRICA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ per capita)

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### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ '000 current)

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### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA top five Recipients of Population Assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ PER CAPITA)

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## ANGLOPHONE AFRICA
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### OTHER AFRICA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ ’000 current)

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### OTHER AFRICA top five recipients of population assistance 1969 - 1994 (US$ PER CAPITA)

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