The Development of "Reformasi" in Indonesian Politics:
late-1997 to October 1999

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is my own work.

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Introduction

The Republic of Indonesia saw its tumultuous years of political transition since when the Asian economic crisis hit Indonesia in November 1997 until the presidential election was held in October 1999. During this period of political transition, the term 'reformasi' or 'reform' in Indonesian became one of the most frequently used keywords in the Indonesian society. The term was introduced to a wider Indonesian society by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its, so-called, 'reform packages' of October 31, 1997\(^1\) and January 15\(^2\), 1998 which demanded Indonesia's political and economic reforms in exchange for $US43 billion.

A series of movements toward the attainment of socio-political changes of the transitional period was depicted by social commentators and journalists as a 'reformasi movement', and a number of researches on the movement have already been conducted. Many of these analyses have focused on the nature of the social, political and economic system of the New Order regime, the impact of the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997, the role of socio-political institutions, and democratization forces such as opposition figures and student activists, as the key to the comprehension of the reformasi movement and related socio-political changes. When reading those analyses of the reformasi movement in magazines, newspapers and books, one notices two significant and interesting facts. The first is how differently each group or individual participant of the movement defines the term reformasi, and the other is that these definitions used by the same groups or individuals have changed significantly over time. Little attention, however, has been given to such differences and development of the definitions of the keyword, despite they contain useful information that enables to supplement a thorough analysis of the reformasi movement.

Raymond Williams, the originator of the “keywords” approach\(^3\), argues that differences and changes of definitions of keywords are the reflections of differences and changes in interests, values


\(^3\) The “keywords” approach originated from Raymond Williams (1983) Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Fontana Paperbacks, London, was first published in 1976. I refer to the Flamingo edition, which revised and expanded, was published in 1983.
The main purpose of this thesis is to encourage a comprehensive understanding of the reformasi movement and the related socio-political changes in Indonesia during the period of political transition from late 1997 until October 1999 by applying the keywords approach. This thesis firstly follows and discusses the development of the reformasi movement; the understanding of which is essential to the analysis of the movement with the keywords approach. Then, by identifying the word reformasi as the main keyword of this period, this thesis attempts to analyze the development of the meanings of reformasi and discusses the reflection of each speakers' interests, ideas and views of the reality in their meanings of reformasi.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. As this thesis examines the development of the keyword reformasi in the recent political changes in Indonesia, it is necessary to clarify how keyword can be used for political analysis. The first chapter, thus, introduces the "keyword" approach, and analyzes the process of politics of signification and then discusses the role of social rituals in the consolidation of the meaning of keywords.

Chapter two provides the historical and political background of contemporary Indonesia with special focus on the keywords used by Indonesia's first and second regimes. It explains the socio-political conditions of Indonesia, firstly, under Sukarno and the keyword of his regime, 'revolusi', (revolution). Then, it deals with political conditions under Suharto's rule and the establishment of 'pembangunan' (development) as the keyword of the New Order.
The examination of the development of reformasi during the political transitional period of Indonesia is divided into three chapters according to the chronology of the different definitions of the term reformasi as they changed significantly. Chapter three deals with the period from the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 to the fall of President Suharto in May 1998 in which reformasi was introduced and made into the most popular slogan of the time. Chapter four discusses the period between the establishment of Habibie's transitional government to the general election, or pemilu in Indonesian when the official confirmation of meanings of reformasi took place. Then in the fifth chapter, the period from the pemilu to the presidential election, demonstrates the process of the adjustment of the meanings of reformasi by actors. Each chapter is further divided into several sections, each of which focuses on the significant events because this thesis follows a series of the events as the process of the consolidation of the meaning of the keyword reformasi in Indonesian politics. Then, each of the three chapters also focuses on the definitions of reformasi given by several individuals and social groups whom this thesis identifies as actors of reformasi and analyzes what they intended to achieve by using the term. These chapters are written in the style of a biography of the reformasi. These three chapters clarify that the process of the political changes in Indonesia can be analyzed through the study of the keywords. Moreover, at the end of each chapter, the continuities and discontinuities of specific keywords from the New Order era are examined. It hopes to show the changes of emphases, positions and meanings of these keywords 'before' and 'after' the New Order era.

Finally, chapter six analyzes the role of social rituals to induce political changes and consolidate the meanings of the keyword reformasi. It focuses on two main events which took place in the transitional period of Indonesian politics as the most successful rituals in the development of reformasi.

Thus, this thesis attempts to follow the development of the reformasi movement and to analyze the development of the definitions of the word reformasi by using the keywords approach. Considering the fact that such attempt has, to the best of my knowledge, never been conducted, this
"keywords" approach can be an alternative and unique way to discuss the recent political changes of Indonesia.

The purpose of Chapter one is to provide the theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section defines the term “keywords” and introduces the "keyword approach". The second section defines the role of language as "symbolic power" and the description nature of the power. The third section looks for the sources of "symbolic power" in social rituals and examines the roles of rituals for the legitimation of definitions and establishment of keywords.

1.1 The Keywords Approach

The keywords approach was first introduced in 1976 by Raymond Williams in his book *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, where he analyzes the process of the development of keywords in the discussion of culture and society with a lexicon consisting of 313 "binding" words.

This paper adopts the notion of "keywords" defined by Williams as "significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation" and "significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought".

This paper emphasizes Williams' two core arguments. The first core argument is that the keywords approach enables the analysis of the ideas, interests and values of the speakers of those words. Williams says that when discussing culture and society, it is often the case that elements of the issues reside within the differences in the definitions of those keywords themselves. This problem of meaning does not arise because of the misuse or misunderstanding of the words, or that someone is wrong by any linguistic criterion. It arises, Williams argues, because the differences in definitions of keywords are determined by the users’ "different immediate value" and "different formation and distributions of energy and interest". Furthermore, these differences become significant for them.

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*In the 1971 edition, 150 keywords were introduced, and another 21 words were added in 1976 edition, Raymond Williams (1976), *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, Fontana Paperbacks, London.

Ibid., p. 13.

Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid., p. 11.
Chapter 1: The Keywords Approach and Politics of Signification

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4 In the 1973 edition, 110 keywords were introduced, and another 21 words were added to 1976 edition. Raymond Williams (1976), Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Fontana Paperbacks, London.
1 Ibid., p. 15.
5 Ibid., p. 16.
6 Ibid., p. 11.
words when “strong feelings or important ideas are in question”\(^8\). Therefore, what the speakers think is right, important and valuable, in short, how the speakers see reality, can be observed through studying those keywords.

The second point from Williams’ argument that this thesis adopts is that “the language reflects the processes of society and history making”. He insists that “the most active problems of meaning are always primarily embedded in actual relationships... within the structures of particular social orders and the processes of social and historical change”\(^9\). Moreover, Williams argues that some important social and historical processes, more precisely the “new kinds of relationship” as well as the “new ways of seeing existing relationships”, occur within language\(^10\). These processes appear in the language in the forms of “the invention of new terms”, “the adaptation and alteration of older terms”, and “extension or transfer”\(^11\). Therefore, studying the development of keywords, with special focus on the changes of meanings and variations in the keywords themselves, reveals the development of society and history. Such a study also highlights how integral the problems of meanings and of relationship really are.

However, Williams himself acknowledges that cultural and social issues can not all be understood by simply analyzing keywords. The core importance of the keywords approach, he asserts, is its potential to offer a comprehensive understanding of these issues. The analysis of these issues, Williams claims, can not be achieved without being conscious of the words because the words are the elements of these issues\(^12\).

The question remains; in what ways can the keywords approach enhance a comprehensive understanding of political issues? To find the answer, it is necessary to investigate the nature of language as it operates as “symbolic power”. Before turning to “symbolic power”, however, I shall

\(^{8}\) Ibid., p. 11.
\(^{9}\) Ibid., p. 22.
\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 22.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p.22.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., pp. 15-16.
briefly outline the keywords approach in the Indonesian political context.

1.2. Keywords Approach in Indonesian Political Context

The only analysis of Indonesian politics directly applying Williams’ keywords approach was conducted by Michael van Langenberg in 1986. In his *Analysing Indonesia’s New Order State: A Keywords Approach* Michael Langenberg identifies forty keywords which “provide an internal, detailed and comprehensive understanding” of the Indonesian New Order’s state ideology in the areas of power, accumulation, legitimacy, culture and dissent. He argues that it was these keywords that informed, and in a sense imposed on, the Indonesian populace about the state system, ideology, and the functioning of the state. And these words are also located in the ideological discourse of the state itself.

Out of the keywords of the New Order state that Langenberg categorized into the area of power, this thesis introduces two keywords, namely *ABRI* and *bapak*, and selects eight keywords, *orba*, *pembangunan*, *stabilitas*, *ketertiban*, *dwifungsi*, *UUD ’45*, *Pancasila*, and *pemilu* from the area of legitimacy. This selection of the words is largely based on two reasons. First, these are the most frequently used words among all keywords. Second, the degree of the changes in meanings and positioning of these words are more apparent than other keywords when a comparison between the keywords before and after the fall of the New Order regime is made, which will be dealt with in

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14 Ibid., p. 1.

15 Ibid., p. 7.

chapter three. Such a comparison is important as the changes occurred within the same keywords would reflect important social and historical processes in Indonesia\(^\text{17}\).

The introduction begins with two keywords concerning the holders of power in the New Order state. The New Order was a highly centralized state-system formed around two dominant institutions, namely the military and the presidency. ABRI\(^\text{18}\), the generic name for the military, is the key institution upon which the exercise of state power and the internal stability of the state rest\(^\text{19}\). “Bapak” refers to the authoritarian patron or leader of the family collectivity. Suharto, as president, was considered as archetypal “bapak”, the father- and protector-like- figure for the nation\(^\text{20}\).

Keywords in the area of legitimacy, which show on what basis the rulers claim legitimacy, can be divided into two groups. The first group of keywords was used to denounce the misconduct and inability of the old state. The keyword “Orba”, an abbreviation of “Orde Baru” (the New Order), was the word used to differentiate the ‘new’ government led by Suharto from the preceding ‘old’ government. The differences between the two regimes, claimed by the New Order government, can be studied from other keywords in this area. One is “pembangunan” (development), which was the dominant keyword of New Order economic policy\(^\text{21}\). The New Order regime legitimized Suharto’s power by making him a “bapak pembangunan”, and described him as the one who brought economic development to Indonesia and saved the people from extreme poverty under the Old Order.

The word pembangunan was also about social engineering. The realization and continuation of pembangunan, as asserted by the New Order regime, depended on the state system ensuring “stabilitas” (stability) and “ketertiban” (order)\(^\text{22}\). Stabilitas and ketertiban also functioned as the major legal bases on which the claimed legitimacy of the New Order regime rested. These terms were

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\(^{17}\) Refer to Williams (1976), p.22.

\(^{18}\) ABRI is the abbreviation of Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or Indonesian Armed Forces in English.

\(^{19}\) Langenberg (1986), p. 9.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{21}\) The keyword pembangunan had remained to be the consistent doctrine to legitimize the very existence of the New Order before the Asian Economic Crisis hit Indonesia in November 1997 (Langenberg, 1986, p. 19). Also Langenberg (1990), p. 127.

\(^{22}\) Langenberg (1990), pp. 124 – 125.
used to emphasize that the New Order had rescued Indonesian states and civil society from a period of chaos, disorder and mass violence, which refers to the Old Order period, as well as from the abortive coup which brought about the massacre of some five hundred thousand communist party members and supporters in the 1960s. Thus, the New Order government used these keywords as justification for its repressive state power, claiming repression was necessary to attain the social order needed for economic development. Furthermore, it provided legitimacy to ABRI’s “dwifungsi (Dual Function)” which legitimized military dominance of the state apparatus. Dwifungsi articulates the military as “protector of the nation and defender of the nation-state” and “provider of order and stability for economic development.

The other group of keywords in the area of legitimacy was designed to confirm the government’s position by emphasizing its legitimacy in constitution and state ideology. Such keywords were “UUD ‘45” (Undang Undang Dasar ‘45: 1945 Constitution), “pemilu” (general election) and “Pancasila” (five principles). These were used to stress constitutional order, political stability and cultural cohesion as products of the New Order. UUD ‘45 presents that the legitimacy of the New Order rests on the proper constitutional forms. The keyword had been repeatedly used in political context in order to vest legitimacy upon all decisions made by the rulers of the state system. Pemilu sought to legitimize the state by means of a popular will. Finally, Pancasila was emphasized in order to avoid ethnic separatism, theocratic Islam and communist insurgencies. It has been made into the sole philosophical base for all political and social organizations since 1985. For the Indonesian leaders, Pancasila articulated a hope or aspiration for the ideal Indonesian nation state.

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23Ibid. p. 126.  
26 Langenberg (1990), p. 123.  
27 Langenberg (1986), p. 17. In addition, it seems to be very true when Langenberg (1990: p.131) says the importance of pemilu rests on “the elections legitimize the ruling oligarchy of the state-system, and more importantly legitimize the inner core of that oligarchy in the eyes of both the rest of the oligarchy and the populace at large”.

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Thus, those keywords of the New Order informed and imposed upon the Indonesian populace acceptable ideas of the state system, ideology, and the functioning of the state, and provided some shared understanding of models and images of state among elites and masses. As a result, these words contributed greatly to the construction of state hegemony and legitimacy. Understanding that language has been used to create the political reality in Indonesia, it is now possible to propose an answer to the question “in what way does the keywords approach enhance a comprehensive understanding of Indonesian politics?”

1.3. Language as Symbolic Power

One of the most essential roles of language is as a medium of communication, but it should not be treated only as a mere instrument of communication. Pierre Bourdieu in his Language and Symbolic Power (1991) identifies language as a part of the symbolic system, together with art and religion, which exercises symbolic power. According to Bourdieu, symbolic power is:

...a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization... a power that can be exercised only if it is recognized, that is, misrecognized as arbitrary.

Symbolic power is, in short, the power to create social reality arbitrarily without letting people know that they are subject to it or even exercise it. Bourdieu argues that the relations of communication, or linguistic exchange, are also the relations of symbolic power in which the power

28 This view was established by Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of structuralism. It views language as a “structured system” that locates in the faculty of mind. Language (langue) is fundamentally treated as the condition of intelligibility of speech (parole), as the structured medium which has to be reconstructed in order to account for the constant relation between sound and meaning. He also argues that language is autonomous from unit of life, thus power relations of the society, economic and political conditions would not affect the language. F. Saussure (1966) Course in General Linguistics, (eds.) Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaya, (trans.) Wade Baskin, McGraw Hill, New York.
30 Ibid., p. 170.
31 Ibid., p. 164.
relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized\(^{12}\). It is this nature of language to create social and political reality and to reflect power relations in the society that enhance a comprehensive understanding of Indonesian political issues.

The quotation from Bourdieu also suggests that the ‘symbolic system’ itself does not contain a symbolic power in the form of an “illocutionary force” – force effected by the act of the word itself\(^{33}\), but it needs social recognition in order to obtain the symbolic power\(^{34}\). In other words, the production and reproduction of a symbolic power requires, as a condition of its success, a belief in the legitimacy of words and the legitimacy of those who utter them\(^{15}\).

Thus, the discourse on authority needs not only to be understood, but more importantly to be recognized as legitimate in order to exercise its specific effects. Whether this recognition is granted or not, Bourdieu says, depends on the relationship among the properties in three categories, namely the property of discourses, the property of speakers, and finally the property of situations/conditions\(^{36}\).

The property of discourses means that, for a “performative utterance”, or a word with a decisive authority, to be effective, it should have its share of appropriateness in the discourse. The utterance lacks effectiveness if it lacks logic, as well as a good manner, style, rhetoric, syntactic, and substance\(^{37}\). Bourdieu, however, minimizes the importance of this property of discourses for it can be superseded by the other two properties. He strongly denies the existence of “illocutionary force” within the discourses themselves.

Bourdieu gave greater importance to the property of the persons who pronounce the discourses. He says that a “performative utterance” has to be pronounced by an appropriate “person

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 37.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., p.170.
\(^{36}\) Ibid., p. 111.
\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 111 and p. 113.
who has the 'power' to pronounce it”38. The importance of the property of speakers can supersede that of the property of discourses because, according to Bourdieu, in "the use of language, the manner as much as the substance of discourse depends on the social position of the speaker”39, thus it is also important to consider the sources of authority of the speakers. What gives a person recognition as the one “being able and enabled to produce [the] particular class of discourse” is the social institutions or the social classes, which authorize the person to pronounce the discourses40. Therefore, the institution itself also has to have collective recognition from the members of society, and needless to say, the members of the institution. To sum up, an orator her/himself must be given the recognition from an appropriate social institution as a legitimate speaker to represent the institution before her/his utterance is recognized.

A third source of the legitimacy of language, and which is the most important of all, is the properties of the situations/conditions. A “performative utterance”, Bourdieu argues, must be enunciated in a legitimate situation by following legitimate procedures. These may include “ceremonial etiquette, the code of gestures and officially prescribed rites” performed in front of legitimate receivers41. This is the most important property, Bourdieu argues, because situations/conditions are an important element that produces the disposition towards recognition not only for the language to be legitimate but also for the speakers to be legitimate42. An event that possesses all the necessary conditions, he says, is a ‘ritual’. An appropriate social ritual, a ritual which has been socially recognized as valid and effective, can provide the legitimate audience, legitimate in terms of both number and kind, and the legitimate forms, in terms of space, time and procedure. It is in such ritual that the recognition of the authority of language and speakers takes place.

38 Ibid., p. 111.
40 Ibid., p. 113.
41 Ibid., p. 111 and p. 113.
42 Ibid., p. 113.
1.4. Ritual as Sources of Legitimacy

Ritual has an authority to confer recognition to language, speaker and society itself as legitimate. Many scholars have researched different academic fields in order to explain the role of symbols in rituals as well as the role of rituals in a society. This section reviews the studies of rituals and symbols, particularly language, conducted by three scholars who are widely considered as authorities in this field.

One of these is Emile Durkheim who wrote his famous The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life in 1915. Durkheim calls the religious rituals the moments of "collective effervescence", which he describes as the moments beyond the realm of consciousness and reason. He argues that the fundamental category of thought, including space, time, number and person, namely the order of society, is born in religious rituals, and a classification of all things, especially into 'sacred' and 'profane', is made in rituals. In short, it is at the moments of "collective effervescence" when "collective consciousness" and "faith", both of which express and constitute collective realities, are born. The same may be said, no doubt, of the legitimization of language. Rituals can be moments of effervescence when collective consciousness for language, both in terms of existence and meaning, can be recognized as legitimate.

Furthermore, according to his argument, in this moments of collective effervescence, the collective consciousness is materialized in the form of a shared external symbol, the totem. The symbol, he states, projects the collection of the individual consciousness of the members of the society, and at the same time it creates the collective social consciousness. In short, the symbol represents the society which worships the symbol itself. Durkheim, claiming it should be 'material things' for

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43 Emile Durkheim (1965), The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, the Free Press, New York.
44 Durkheim (1965: p.469) describes the moment as when "[v]ital energies are over-excited, passions more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment".
46 Ibid., p. 52.
48 Ibid., p. 253 and p. 262.
human beings' physical necessities, used the totem as an example of such a symbol which can be the symbol of a determined society. However, I shall argue that it is not only material objects but language can also function as such a symbol. In order to argue so, firstly Victor Turner's theory on ritual will be reviewed.

Following van Gennep, Victor Turner holds that all rites of passage (rites de passage) -- "rites which accompany every change of place, state, social position and age" -- are marked by three phases: separation, liminality, and aggregation. Separation comprises symbolic behavior signifying detachment of an individual or group from an existing cultural condition. In the second, liminal period, the status of the subjects of the ritual is ambiguous and invisible; liminal entities are between the positions assigned by law, custom, convention and ceremonial. Turner calls a communion of individuals who submit together to the general authority of the ritual elders in the liminal period of a ritual "communitas", and implies that the rituals are always effective because there are always transitions. In a transition, all roles of the liminal entities are named and all definitions are provided, everything is classified and everything is recognized, and is consummated in the third period.

Turner argues, moreover, that ritual can give definition to all subjects of the ritual. The language itself can be a subject of the ritual, therefore meanings and definitions of the language can be given and recognized as legitimate by the society which organized the ritual. The solidarity among those who use the language with the same definition can be strengthened, and the language can even be the identity of the society, by frequent repetition of the language. This is especially true when there is a problem of definitions between other society. Thus, language also functions as a symbol that projects the collective consciousness of the determined social institution. Moreover, this point

49 Ibid., p. 260.
51 Ibid., p. 94.
52 Ibid., pp. 94 - 96.
53 Ibid., pp. 96 - 97.
54 Rituals are effective in solving social problems, Turner (1969: pp. 94-95) insists, because in a ritual, liminal entities submissively obey their instructors implicitly. They accept arbitrary rites, the given status, name and definition, and then they return to "a relatively stable state once more: by virtue of this, they have rights and obligations vis-à-vis others of a clearly defined and 'structural' type" in the stage of aggregation.
justifies Bourdieu in his argument that ritual separates not only a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, but also a subject and a non-subject of the ritual\textsuperscript{55}.

Clifford Geertz argues that human beings need a symbol system as a mediation in order to relate themselves to the world and other human beings.\textsuperscript{56} Geertz identifies religion and culture as a part of the “symbol system”, and regards ritual as a symbolic representation of worldview and ethos. He calls ritual “model of” and “model for” the society, and describes it as the extrinsic source of information that guides human behavior.\textsuperscript{57} It is “model of” the society because ritual is where symbol structures are manipulated so as to bring them into parallel with the idealized model of the society and reality.\textsuperscript{58} At the same time, ritual is “model for” the society as throughout the ritual, the members faithfully follow what the worldview describes, thus reinforce the faith and legitimacy of the society, the ritual as well as the mediation of the ritual, that is symbols.\textsuperscript{59} As language is a part of the symbolic system, it can be an apparatus of the society in its reality making. Geertz clarifies this point in the concluding chapter, “Afterword: The Politics of Meaning”, in Culture and Politics in Indonesia (1972).\textsuperscript{60} One example he gave in the article was the slogan of the New Order system “One People, One Country, One Language”. He asserts that this slogan has been a symbol representing a hope of the rulers, not a description of reality.\textsuperscript{61} The slogan informed the people with the idealized picture of the society of Indonesia, where the regional differences, ethnic diversities, religious differences were actually the sources of conflict.

These three studies agree, in essence, that ritual is the stage where a society gives legitimacy to its members, its language, and the society itself. Three more things should be mentioned regarding ritual. One is that, as the three authorities agree, a ritual is also important for the sustenance and

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 92 - 93.
\textsuperscript{58} The ritual can be extrinsic information as the subjects of the ritual are provided with pictures of “idealized” society, how things should be done and who is the power holder of the society (Geertz, 1975, p. 93).
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 93 and p. 127.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 323.
revitalization of the legitimacy of the definition, naming and meaning of the society as well as the sacredness of symbols which have already determined in past rituals. Thus, the ritual must be repeated time after time.

Second, a ritual can give legitimacy to the speakers in the ritual. According to Randall Collins (1992), it is in a ritual that the speaker becomes inspired, empowered and even charismatic. An orator who can focus the attention of the crowd and who can express an idea that the audience holds in common gains a high degree of personal energy. Collins explains that the energy for the transformation of the orator comes not from the orator but from the group itself. In other words, a ritual can also be considered as the moment that creates the leader because of the collective consciousness and faith produced and re-produced in the ritual.

Finally, the existence of politics behind the ritual procedure should be well observed. On observation of ritual, Widodo (1991) warns that;

[i]t should be examined critically how those procedures have been decided and how the discourse representing the moment of effervescence has been established. This includes the questions on what and whose authority takes part in its establishment, and to what/whom it is appropriated.

Those who are in charge of a ritual, either persons or institutions, are the ones who are authorized to play politics using the ritual. This means that they are socially recognized to have privileges to manipulate and appropriate the ritual so that the created reality reflects their interests and the way they perceive the world should be. Moreover, they can even, for example, legitimize arbitrary social structures, such as hierarchies. This point is also cited by Bourdieu that “the different classes and class factions are engaged in a symbolic struggle properly speaking, one aimed at imposing the

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63 Ibid., p. 40.
definition of the social world that is best suited to their interests\textsuperscript{65}. This point informs the importance of thorough investigation of the ideologies, background, behaviors, and interests of each participant in ritual for the comprehensive understanding of social and political issues.

Thus, it is certainly valid when Bourdieu says that ritual is the most effective moment that provides, and even creates, all the necessary elements for the property of situations/conditions, an important element that authorizes language as legitimate. It is now clear that the property of situations is the most important among the three properties because it can also strengthen the appropriateness of the property of speakers, and consequently recognize and misrecognize the property of discourse as appropriate.

Conclusion

To sum up, an investigation of binding keywords, as Williams argues, reveals the cultural and socio-political development of the society, and it enhances a comprehensive understanding of those issues. Such an understanding is made possible by what Bourdieu calls the "symbolic power" of language. He argues that the relations of linguistic exchange are also the relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers are actualized. Because of such nature of language, a linguistic exchange can also be regarded as a moment when a political and social reality is created by the dominant group of the society. In order to exercise such symbolic power, language needs to be recognized as legitimate. The most effective place for such a recognition to take place is a ritual, where a religious and social reality is unanimously created.

With the understandings of the keywords approach, of the symbolic power and of the role of rituals in the consolidation of reality, now it is possible to apply this framework to the analysis of

\textsuperscript{65} Regarding this point, it seems that Bourdieu (1991, pp. 166-167) accepts the Marxist tradition that emphasizes the functions of 'symbolic systems' as instruments of legitimization of the established order which help to ensure the interests of the dominant class.
Indonesian politics. However, before turning to the analysis of the recent political changes in Indonesia, the thesis first provides background information of Indonesian politics in the next chapter.

2.1. Sukarno's Reign and Guided Democracy

This section divides the period of the Sukarno's presidency into three parts, namely the period of the Revolution from 1945 to 1949, the period of the Parliamentary Democracy from 1950 to 1959, and the period of Guided Democracy from 1959 to 1966.

The independence of Indonesia was proclaimed by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, who became Indonesia's first president and vice-president respectively, on August 17, 1945, two days after the wartime occupier, Japan, surrendered to the Allied Forces. Although independence was proclaimed, Indonesia did not become substantially independent until 1969, as the Dutch came back and retained their colonial territory. Indonesia had to go through five years of independence war against the Dutch; this period is popularly known as the period of the Revolution. The term 'revolution' (revolusi) in Indonesian was made into a major keyword of this time, together with 'Akhirnya' (nationalism), with an aim to hold together such a large and disparate congregation of islands as a nation to fight for independence.

There were two other important in the period besides the consolidation of these keywords:

One is the establishment of the first constitution of Indonesia, namely the 1945 Constitution on August 19, 1945. It was a short and vague constitution which provided for a powerful presidency. At the


On 'revolusi' and 'Akhirnya', this paper has been inspired by Adam Schwartz (1989), pp. 8-9, as well as by a series of Sukarno's speeches and articles collected in Indonesian Political Thought: 1945-1965, (1976), (eds) Herianto Fatih and Louis Cressel, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Chapter 2: From Revolusi to Pembangunan

Chapter two provides historical and political background in Indonesia. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with Indonesia under the Sukarno regime and the establishment of the term revolusi as the keyword of his rule. The second part introduces the main keyword of the New Order era, namely pembangunan (development), and then describes Suharto’s style of governance for the achievement and the consolidation and legitimization of his regime.

2.1. Sukarno’s Revolusi and Guided Democracy

This section divides the period of the Sukarno’s presidency into three terms, namely the period of the Revolution from 1945 to 1949, the period of the Parliament Democracy from 1950 to 1959, and the period of Guided Democracy from 1959 to 1966.

The Independence of Indonesia was proclaimed by Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, who became Indonesia’s first president and vice-president respectively, on August 17, 1945, two days after the wartime occupier, Japan, surrendered to the Allied Forces. Although independence was proclaimed, Indonesia did not become substantially independent until 1949, as the Dutch came back and reclaimed their colonial territory. Indonesia had to go through four years of independence war against the Dutch: this period is popularly known as the period of the Revolution. The term ‘revolusi’ (revolution) in Indonesian was made into a major keyword of this time, together with ‘kebangsaan’ (nationalism), with an aim to hold together such a large and disparate congregation of islands as a nation to fight for Independence.

There were two other importance in the period besides the consolidation of these keywords. One is the establishment of the first constitution of Indonesia, namely the 1945 Constitution on August 18, 1945. It was a short and vague constitution which provided for a powerful presidency. At the

67 On ‘revolusi’ and ‘kebangsaan’, this paper has been inspired by Adam Schwarz (1999), pp. 6-7, as well as by a series of Sukarno’s speeches and articles collected in *Indonesian Political Thinking: 1945-1965*, (1970), (eds) Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
time of the establishment, Sukarno himself admitted that it was still in a drafting stage and stressed the need for a permanent constitution drawn up by a representative body. The other importance of the period of the Revolution is that the Indonesian army started to possess a consciousness that they had a leading role in nation building because of their contribution as liberators of the nation from the Dutch rule.

The period of the Parliament Democracy was enforced under the 1950 Constitution which replaced the 1945 Constitution soon after Indonesia gained full independence in 1949. The first free and fair general election also took place during this period, in 1955. Despite the Sukarno government’s attempt to establish a solid political ground, this period had been characterized by poverty and disunity of the nation because of Indonesia’s regional and religious diversities and conflicts. The 1955 election, which was designed to preserve stability and to unite the nation, did not leave much contribution to political stability.

Acknowledging the failure of the parliamentary democracy, Sukarno, supported by the military, dissolved the Constituent Assembly, abrogated the 1950 Constitution and re-established the 1945 Constitution in 1959; the era of Guided Democracy began. In order to justify the abolition of parliamentary democracy, Sukarno, again attempted to draw legitimacy from the usage of the keyword revolusi. He repeatedly emphasized the term revolusi in his speech of August 17, which was designed to declare the end of the Parliament Democracy period, and attempted to gain support for his move as well as to induce the unity of the nation.

59 The 1950 Constitution provided guarantee for individual freedom, stipulated parliamentary system of government with president holding a conventional roles, safeguard of the misuse of power by putting in place a system of check and balance for political institutions, and military subordinate to the nation’s civil relationship (Schwarz, 1999, p. 7).
60 In the same year, the election to set up Constitutional Assembly, the body set up the to draft a permanent constitution, also took place. On the 1955 election, see Herbert Feith (1957), *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Interim Reports Series, Cornell University, Ithaca.
61 Schwarz (1999), pp. 11-12.
62 The army already had begun to view its role as the political institution, thus they were not happy with the limited political role in the Parliament Democracy period (Schwarz, 1999, pp. 14-16).
63 Sukarno (1959), “Returning to the Rails of the Revolution”, quoted in *Indonesian Political Thinking*, pp. 99-109. This piece is a translation of Sukarno’s speech of August 17, 1959, and it was initially taken from *Manifesto Politik Republik Indonesia* (1959) Department of Information, Jakarta.
Sukarno also adopted two different ways in his attempt to abate the division and disunity of the nation. First, he attempted to diminish the rivalry between nationalists and Muslim forces by encouraging nationalism emphatically and restraining Islam as a political force\textsuperscript{74}. Second, he formed a supporting coalition of forces which he called \textit{Nasakom}, an abbreviation for nationalists, religious groups and communists. \textit{Nasakom} was designed to unify the different interest groups in the society and to work closely with the military, whose new doctrine called the “Middle Way” started to consolidate its role not only as a military force but also a socio-political force. However, the coalition was highly unstable, and the tension between the forces and the disunity of the society increased steadily. The Guided Democracy gave rise to Indonesian nationalism around Sukarno which he misled to his short-term advantage to the neglect of economic priority.

The accumulated tension between two of the major forces during the Guided Democracy period, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the military, exploded in the shape of the abortive military coup of September 30 in 1965. Six senior army generals were kidnapped and killed by a group of pro-Sukarno officers\textsuperscript{75}, claiming the coup was a preemptive strike aimed at preventing an imminent coup by a Council of Generals\textsuperscript{76}. As a response, the army led by Major General Suharto, at the time in command of strategic troops in Jakarta, or \textit{Kostrad}, announced to the nation that the army was back in charge, and ended the coup by the night of October 1. The army described the coup as a counter revolutionary movement plotted and carried out by the PKI, then, it immediately released anticommmunist forces in the society. In the weeks and months following the coup, some five hundred thousand PKI members and supporters were slaughtered. Suharto then began to take command of the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{74} For example, the Masyumi party, which had been one of the most influential Muslim parties at the time, was banned and many of its leaders imprisoned or exiled. Sukarno wanted to suppress Islam as a political force partially because a rebellion took place in West Sumatra in 1958, which was supported by several leading members of Masyumi. It was said to be backed by CIA (the US Central Intelligence Agency) who was concerning about rising influence of the Indonesian Communist Party. The weaker Nahdlatul Ulama remained a political force, but far weak (Schwarz, 1999, pp. 13-16).
\item \textsuperscript{75} They called themselves “Thirtieth of September Movement \textit{(Gerakan September Tiga Puluh)}” which was later known as \textit{Gestapu}.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Schwarz (1999: p. 19) says it is still unclear whether the Council of Generals ever existed or not.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
civil government on March 11, 1966, when he forced Sukarno to sign an order effectively ceding executive authority to him. He then achieved his own accession to the presidency in 1967.

2.2. Suharto's Indonesia: the establishment of Pembangunan

After the successful suppression of the abortive coup in 1965, and while Sukarno still occupied presidential office, Suharto had begun his preparation for the seizure of power. The priority of the New Order government was manifested in a new keyword 'pembangunan' or 'development' in Indonesian, which refers to economic, political and spiritual development. It also became the claimed source of legitimacy of the new government. Suharto and the military employed three approaches to consolidate and legitimize both the New Order regime and the new approach for governance. These three approaches were: 1) a criticism of Sukarno government, 2) the creation of political and governmental institutions which ensure the dominance of Suharto, and 3) the creation of a “national culture” which justifies the New Order rule. These three approaches were also closely connected with the notion of pembangunan.

First, Suharto and the military emphasized Indonesia’s bitter experience in the past, namely the failure of the parliamentary democracy in the 1950s and the Guided Democracy led by Sukarno as well as the extreme poverty as pretexts for the centralization of power under the president and ABRI. Then, Suharto established a powerful presidency by claiming that the disorder and the separation of the society in the Sukarno era was due to his failure to bring about the unity of the nation and failure to lift Indonesian economy. Suharto also blamed Sukarno for his misapplication of the constitution and Pancasila. Furthermore, Suharto’s camp in the army expanded its influence in politics. The “Middle Way” concept was renamed as “dwifungsi” (Dual Function), and it provided an ideological

Sukarno assigned Suharto ‘to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm and stability of the government and the revolution and to guarantee the personal safety and authority of Sukarno’. This decree was later referred to as Supersemar (Schwarz, 1999, p. 26). Also see Liddle (1996a), p. 36.
justification for ABRI's participation in the socio-political functions in addition to the military activities.

The necessities of the strong presidency and the military's dwifungsi were justified by the principle of pembangunan. The New Order's successful programs of pembangunan, which greatly improved the living-standard of the population compared to the economic devastation in the Old Order, was used to legitimize Suharto's rule. At the same time, it became a source of the legitimacy of ABRI's dwifungsi: stability and order of the nation was assumed as the precondition for the sustainment of pembangunan.

Suharto and the military further strengthened their monopoly of the power by ousting opposition forces from politics by using the failure of the Old Order. Asserting that the New Order regime's priority was to bring about and sustain pembangunan, thus to maintain stability and order, Suharto first repressed members and supporters of the PKI, blaming them as the primary source of disorder of the Old Order. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Suharto had gradually extended his power over non-communist civilian groups, such as the university students, political activists, and Muslim organizations. Muslim groups especially became the new target of oppression, as they were accused as supporters of "extremism", of which are the Muslim opposition wanted to establish a state based on Shari'ah (Islamic Law). The government, throughout the New Order period, often unjustly accused dissidents who disobeyed the New Order government as being supporters of communism and extremism who would disturb the stability and the order of the society, and used this pretext to justify the arrest and the restraint of the oppositions. Moreover, this process was often implemented by the military's extraordinarily elaborate structure of intelligence agencies which were designed to carry out surveillance on the government's and the political parties' activities.

78 Dwifungsi became ABRI's source of power as it enabled the penetration of its influence throughout the government apparatus, including reserved allocations of seats in the parliament and top posts in the civil service. On ABRI and its dwifungsi, see Ian MacFarling (1996) "The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces or 'the Middle Way', The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia, Australian-Defense Studies Center, p.140.

79 Student activism had been well suppressed because of the 1978 Campus Normalization Law.

80 Schwarz (1999), p. 31.

81 On the military's usage of the communist discourse, see Jun Honna (1999), "Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure during the Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts, Indonesia (67), April 1999, Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca.
such activities as "repression", "surveillance", "ideological correction" and "steering". The military's frequent usage of physical power for the conduct of social control, too, greatly contributed to the further consolidation of the dominance of Suharto and the military in politics.

The second approach of the consolidation of his power was Suharto's engineering of the political and governmental institutions so that general parliamentary elections or pemilu, which had been held quinquennially, always guaranteed and approved his rule. One of Suharto's major political engineering was the government's self-conferment of the right to appoint more than one-fifth of the People's Representative Council (DPR), which were for military appointees, and one third of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1967. Thus, the MPR and the DPR were not representative bodies autonomous of the state but instead were totally dominated by Suharto and his bureaucratic and military agents.

The Suharto regime also engineered the system of party politics to create a political environment which further assured Suharto and ABRI's absolute victory in elections. Suharto and the military announced in 1967 that Golkar (Golongan Karya or Function Group), which was originally introduced by the Sukarno regime in 1964, to be the regime's parliamentary vehicle to generate electoral support for the Suharto administration. Golkar housed several hundred smaller 'functional groups' of peasants, labour unions, businesses and interest groups, all of which fixed votes for Golkar in elections.

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82 On the military's intelligent agencies, see Richard Tanter (1990) "The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence Organisations in the Indonesian State", State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia (22), (ed.) Arief Budiman, Monash University, Clayton, for detail.

83 Pemilus were the source of great pride for the officials of the New Order regime, according to Liddle (1996a: p. 43). Election took place only once in 1955 during the Sukarno era.

84 The DPR is the abbreviation of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. The DPR members meet annually and must approve all proposed legislation, including the government's budget (Liddle, 1996a, pp. 42-43).

85 The MPR is the abbreviation of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. The MPR is a superparliament which consists of all members of the DPR plus an additional 500 appointees. The member of the MPR meet quinquennially to elect the president and vice president and to set the Basic Outline of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara) for the coming presidential term. The duties of both the DPR and the MPR are specified in the Constitution of 1945 (Liddle, 1996, pp.42-43).

parties were strongly ‘encouraged’ to dissolve and place themselves in one of the two newly established parties, namely the Development Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; PPP) and the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia: PDI). Moreover, the government regulation on political organizations and campaigns gave the advantage to Golkar and prevented the PDI and the PPP from mobilizing their party members effectively either prior to or during the campaign period. In addition, the regulation was accompanied by the political “floating mass” concept. The populace would become a floating mass allowed to vote once every five years but otherwise to refrain from political activity.

Political parties, which still held a commanding majority in the MPR in the immediate aftermath of Sukarno’s overthrow, were thus deprived of their real influence in politics by the Suharto government’s engineering of the electoral system and the party system. Such political engineering reflect Suharto’s rejection of the old keyword revolusi which was based on the idea of ‘change’ and his approval of pembangunan which justifies a stable political system under his dominance.

Finally, the New Order regime attempted to consolidate and legitimate its rule by promoting the concept of a “national culture”. The national culture, or ‘Indonesian’ culture, is an amalgam of various ethnic and regional cultures re-defined around priyayi (Javanese aristocratic class) tradition. The national culture was designed to create an ideological national boundary, above all ethnic and religious parochialism, of what all Indonesians share.

87 The former Muslim parties gravitated to the PPP, and the PDI attracted adherents of the former nationalist and Christian parties (Schwarz, 1999, p. 32). Moreover, Leaders of the opposition parties were usually hand-picked or approved by the government (Liddle, 1996a, p. 45).
88 Liddle (1996a), p. 45.
89 Schwarz (1999), pp. 32-33.
91 In addition, according to Foulcher (1990: p. 303), tradition and the region are incorporated and disempowered, rather than denied, to align ‘Indonesian’. Regional ‘tradition’ and ‘region’ had to find their place in the national culture.
The concept was promoted by the New Order government, firstly, in order to induce a national unity. As the Sukarno era proved that ethnic, cultural and religious diversities could be a source of disunity, Suharto soon recognized the necessity to hinder the further development of regional and religious separation in society. Moreover, the national culture was, on the one hand, held to be the outcome of a harmonious blend of traditional values and modernization as may be influenced by foreign culture, on the other hand, used as a tool to strengthen a nationalist identity against Western influences.

Another purpose of the promotion of the national culture was to search for “ideological legitimacy”. By synthesizing traditional value and the ideology of the New Order regime, the government had attempted to display that its ideology had been a part of the “national heritage remaining from ancient times”, thus accord with Indonesian way.

The central ideological concept of the New Order, the Pancasila, which was originally introduced by Sukarno in 1945, had been the most obvious example of such national culture. To start with, the Pancasila, a term of Sanskrit derivation for “Five Principles”, namely, belief in one supreme God, Indonesian Unity, Humanitarianism, Democracy, and Social Justice, are deliberately made abstract in order to make it more widely acceptable in a diverse society, thus it could be the common ‘Indonesian’ ideology that unites the people. Later in 1985, the Pancasila was determined as azas tunggal, or the sole philosophical base, of Indonesia.

The Pancasila is about political and social engineering. First, it has been used as an ideological weapon to delimit the boundaries of acceptable political contestation. For any citizen or any social group to deny the Pancasila as azas tunggal is accused of being seditious, or even as a communist or a theocratic Muslim, thus became the target of repression. Second, since the late

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92 Ibid., pp. 304-305.
93 Ibid., p. 301.
94 Ibid., p. 301.
95 Sukarno used it as a pretext to reject the promoters of the Islamic State idea and Suharto for anti-Islamic and anti-communist purposes (Liddle, 1996b, p. 79).
96 Langenberg (1990), p. 123.
1960s, the Suharto regime had claimed that the notion of Pancasila was the product of thousands of years of the Javanese history, and it invested nation and State with the character of a total organism that consists of a benevolent ruler and an obedient populace. The Suharto regime determined the State of Indonesia itself a Pancasila State, encompassing both Pancasila Economy and Pancasila Democracy. What it meant was to seek an ideological justification for Suharto’s determination, and the total control over social, economic and political activities in Indonesia. The achievement of such cultural and ideological domination also enabled Suharto’s discourse of pembangunan to be recognized as legitimate by the wider Indonesian society.

Moreover, the idea of Indonesian state as a total organism was, according to David Reeve, promoted by the political vehicle of the Suharto government, Golkar, the creation of which was also based on adat, or traditional law. Golkar proposed a view of the state as an “organic totality” and an “interdependent harmony”, and this vision of the state was often expressed through metaphor, such as the idealized family or kekeluargaan, and the gamelan orchestra. The vision portrayed that each member has his or her own role to play, and all are loyal to the head of the group, namely the President.

97 Liddle (1996b), p. 80, and also Langenberg (1990), p. 132.
98 Langenberg (1990), p. 132.
99 David Reeve (1990) “The Corporatist State: the Case of Golkar”, State and Civil Society in Indonesia, (ed.) Arief Budiman, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia (22), pp. 151-212. The formation of Golkar was first considered and determined by Sukarno in the 1950s and 1960s, based on the ‘integralistic’ theory of the state formulated by nationalist intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s. The theory of the state was accepted by most nationalists at the time, and it remains one of the most frequently cited nationalist principles in the New Order in the 80s.
100 The characteristics of such vision are: 1) “it involves the primacy and moral superiority of the nation or state”, 2) “the individual does not come prior to the state but is a being in which society ‘makes itself specific’, 3) individuals function in groups, and the groups within the nation; their meaning and their welfare arises from their function in the totality”, 4) “rights are ‘social rights’, which derive from the particular function of the individual within groups and within society”, 5) the individual’s task in society was seen as a holy duty and devoted service”, 6) the fundamental values of the whole system were harmony, order, and calm, unity and totality”, 7) the necessity of maintaining those absolute values required strong government, and 8) the achievement of the harmony means the achievement of harmony and unity with the Law of Nature (Reeve, 1990, pp. 157-160).
Conclusion

In both the Sukarno and the Suharto regimes, keywords made a great contribution to the establishment, consolidation and legitimization of their orders. For Sukarno, one of the most important keywords was revolusi, which was based on the notion of change and reflected heroic, radical and transformative texture of Sukarno’s ideology. Contrary to Sukarno’s order, Suharto emphasized the keyword pembangunan, and he stressed the necessity of stability and order under the authoritarian bureaucracy, but rejected revolutionary changes.

The consolidation and legitimization of the Suharto regime had been derived from the exercise of political, economic, military power as well as political culture. First, Suharto attempted to obtain legitimacy of his rule by differentiating his regime from Sukarno’s order by emphasizing the chaotic socio-political and economic conditions of the past. The keyword pembangunan was especially repeated in order to obtain a legitimacy. Second, the electoral and party system was engineered in order to create a political system which guaranteed the stable dominance of Suharto’s regime. And finally, the New Order regime sought an ideological justification of its hegemony by promoting and interpreting the national culture in ways accord with the government’s interests. These methods successfully ensured the regime’s domination in politics and that in society which lasted for more than three decades.

Having explained the background of the usage of keywords in Indonesian politics of the first two regimes, now it turns to the main topic of this thesis, namely the role of the keyword reformasi in its transitional period.
Chapter 3: The Collapse of Pembangunan

Chapter three to chapter five analyze Indonesia's political transitional period from late 1997 to October 1999. Two major purposes of the three chapters are firstly to follow the development of reformasi movement and that to analyze the development of the meanings of keyword reformasi by applying Williams' "Keywords Approach". It identifies the term reformasi as the major binding word of the period.

The whole transitional period is divided chronologically into three chapters according to historical events and changes in the meanings of reformasi: the period from the Asian Economic Crisis to the fall of Suharto, the period from the establishment of Habibie's regime to pemilu, and finally from pemilu to the Presidential Election. Each chapter is further divided into sub-sections, each of which focuses on the definitions of the term given by several individuals and social groups as actors of reformasi and analyzes what they intended to achieve by using the term.

Chapter 3 deals with the period from late 1997 to January 1998. It is divided into four sections in order to describe the development of the term "reformasi" for major actors of the reformasi movement. The first section discusses the first and second IMF packages, the re-election of Suharto to a seventh presidential term, and the announcement of the new cabinet. These events help to clarify Suharto's ideas on reformasi. The second section focuses on the stances of the opposition groups toward reformasi and student demonstrations in order to clarify the definition of the term as used by opposition groups. The third section describes two events which reflect ABRI's two different ideas about reformasi: dialogs with students arranged by ABRI and ABRI's involvement with the kidnappings of student activists. Finally, the fourth section addresses a series of events in May 1998, a remarkable month when the Suharto regime ended after 32 years of dominance. Four of the most significant events during this period were the Trisakti incident, the Jakarta riots, the occupation of the Parliament house and finally the fall of Suharto. Understanding of these events is necessary in order to show the process of consolidation of the meanings of reformasi, from a word which reflected a

\[101\] On "keywords approach", see Williams (1976). See also chapter 1 of this paper.
jumble of different interests of the people to a word which describes one common goal, namely “the resignation of Suharto”.

3.1. IMF Reform Packages to the Birth of Suharto’s New Cabinet

At the beginning of the Crisis to mid-February, the term reformasi was used only among political elites and economists as an economic jargon simply to mean ‘pulling Indonesia out of the Economic Crisis’. Although acknowledging the necessity of the IMF reformasi packages in order to restore the Indonesian economy, Suharto was reluctant to encourage reform of the existing system. He was aware of the possibility of the emergence of the strong demand for the political reform, which would deprive him of his power and wealth. Suharto’s swaying attitudes between acceptance and denial of substantial reformasi of his system can be best observed by examining his behavior around three events. These are the reception of the first and the second IMF packages, his re-election to a seventh term of presidency which was also accompanied by Habibie being appointed as his new vice-president, and the announcement of the new cabinet members.

IMF Reform Packages

From the early to mid 1990s, many prominent retired officials and political elites had already begun to discuss privately the need for limited reforms to the political system. However, there is no doubt that what introduced the term reformasi to the wider Indonesian society was the IMF’s reform packages of October 31, 1997 and January 15, 1998. The IMF perceived that the depreciation of Indonesia rupiah stemmed not only from macroeconomic imbalances, but also from “a severe loss of confidence in the currency, the financial sector, and the overall economy”. To regain confidence, the IMF requested Indonesia to pledge to commit itself to political reform, together with economic reform, in exchange for US$43 billion bail-out.

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Reformasi meant two things for Suharto. On the one hand, the acceptance of reformasi plans described in the IMF packages seemed to be the only possibility to regain his legitimacy and to ensure his political survival. As his political legitimacy was built on his achievement as “Bapak Pembangunan”, or Father of Development, Suharto needed to restore “pembangunan”, and stabilize the value of the rupiah, to keep his position. In short, Suharto had no choice but to accept these IMF’s plans for reformasi.

On the other hand, however, the acceptance of reformasi defined by the IMF meant a revolutionary change that would result in the destruction of Suharto’s empire supported by the wealth of his family and cronies. One of the most severe conditions that the IMF demanded from Suharto, among other things, was a structural reform that would directly affect those businesses run by Suharto’s family and cronies. This demand was very sensational for Indonesian society as it directly denounced Suharto’s crony businesses as the causes of the weak economy of Indonesia, which no political figure in Indonesia ever had courage to do so publicly.

This dilemma of Suharto propelled him to take an increasingly defiant stance against the IMF reform programs. After signing these IMF agreements, which many people perceived as his declaration of the promise of reform, Suharto soon started to act against the agreements.

The Re-election of Suharto and the Birth of the New Cabinet

Suharto was re-elected for a seventh term on March 10, 1998. His re-election itself was not surprising despite the increasing anti-sentiment among some political figures and students against the
Suharto regime. What upset the society more were the two events that followed the re-election. The first was the election of Bachruddin Jasuf Habibie as the vice president. The selection was highly unpopular among the majority of political elite as well as the Indonesian population when Golkar announced the will on January 21; it was especially so because Indonesian economics was suffering from the economic crisis. The second was the announcement of the new cabinet members on March 14, following Suharto’s re-election. The cabinet members included Suharto’s eldest daughter Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, or “Tutut”, and his closest business friend and golfing buddy, timber baron Mohamad “Bob” Hasan, and many new ministers closely affiliated with Tutut and Suharto’s family businesses.

Around this time, Suharto several times displayed his commitment to reformasi and real change to the current political and economic system, however, it was obvious that he had no real intention for such commitments. Suharto’s rejection of political reform is reflected both in the nomination of B.J. Habibie as his vice president and the new cabinet members. The selection was made in order to safeguard his authority in politics and his wealth. Habibie, who is considered to be Suharto’s seventh child, would approve whatever Suharto proposed because of all the privileges given by Suharto in the past. The new cabinet comprising his family and cronies would also give the full support to Suharto’s decisions as their privileges depended on Suharto’s political and business

106 Habibie was well known for his incompetence for national economic affairs because of his experience as Technology minister and his ‘zig-zag’ theory of inflation and interest rate reduction. The unpopularity of Habibie was not limited to Indonesian. He was unpopular among International business community. The plunge of rupiah to 17,000 to the dollar right after this announcement shows their distrust of Habibie’s credibility. This drastic fall of the value of rupiah also triggered social unrest, including Anti-Chinese food riots. Suharto failed to recover the value of rupiah despite Suharto’s several appeals of his raft for reform after this announcement. Hal Hill (1998) “Habibie can’t stay for long”, in The Last Days of President Suharto, pp. 124 – 126.

107 The new cabinet became well known among demonstrators as the ‘Crony Cabinet’, and it was also secretly dubbed as the 3K cabinet, for Korupsi, Kolusi, Keluarga—or corruption, collusion and family (connection). Jose Manuel Tesoro (1998) “Fortress Suharto”, Asiaweek, March 27.

108 Habibie, not only being given a position of the Minister of Technology for 20 years, he was in control of aircraft, ship and ammunition manufacture and purchasing, dealing within and outside of Indonesia. In addition, the business of Habibie was highly inefficient, and had left enormous drain on the state budget. The funding of his businesses was diverted from other areas and was beyond the control of the Ministry of Finance. Hal Hill (1998), “Habibie Can’t Stay for Long”, Australian Financial Review (22 May 1998).
influence. The selection of his political associates also projected his view of reality that it was neither he nor his crony businesses that were responsible for the economic disaster\textsuperscript{109}.

Although Suharto’s re-election symbolized the peak of Suharto’s power, the prospect for his presidency was gloomy as he failed to present himself as a self-critical leader who was ready for leading reformasi.

Thus, the term reformasi meant a double-edged sword for Suharto. On the one hand, reformasi would bring about the restoration of the Indonesian economy that was necessary to regain the legitimacy of his rule. On the other hand, reformasi would stimulate in the people an awareness of who was truly responsible for the economic and political turmoil of Indonesia.

The symbolic power\textsuperscript{110} to pressure the Suharto government to conduct subsistence reforms did not reside in the term reformasi for two reasons. First, the recognition of the term was still limited, as it was mainly used by elites and political leaders but had not greatly penetrated into the society. Second, the legitimacy of Suharto’s rule was still valid, especially among political elites, including the opposition parties, the PDI and the PPP. In other words, the influence of Suharto’s decision superseded the demands for reformasi during this period.

3.2. Stances of Opposition Figures and Student Demonstrations

This section clarifies the definition of the term reformasi given by the two main opposition groups, namely the popular opposition figures\textsuperscript{111} and student activists. An understanding of the attitudes of opposition elites about reformasi is necessary, firstly because they were widely regarded as the representatives of the people, and secondly because the change of their attitudes on reformasi

\textsuperscript{109} The line up of the new cabinet members also shows Suharto’s distrust of others except for his close friends and family in his fight for the economic crisis as well as his political survival.

\textsuperscript{110} “Symbolic power” in this paper adopts the definition given by Bourdieu (1991). It is the power to create social reality arbitrarily by usage of a symbol. See Bourdieu (1991), Language and Power, and also chapter 1 of this paper.

\textsuperscript{111} While this paper regards Megawati Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais as the most prominent agents for reformasi, however, this part mainly focuses on the stance of Amien Rais. The reason is that he was the most outspoken speaker of reformasi during this time, while other two had left no contribution to the development of reformasi during this time.

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had much influence on intensification of the student demonstrations. The students’ definitions of *reformasi*, needless to say, is very important, as they were the most prominent and influential forces for the development of the term *reformasi*.

*The Stance of the Opposition Figures*

Of all the popular figures, Amien Rais, the head of a 28 million strong ‘modernist’ Islamic organization Muhammadiyah, had been the most prominent speaker of *reformasi*, and had taken a critical stance against the New Order regime. Amien Rais emphasized that fundamental political reform was the precondition for the recovery of Indonesian economy even when many politicians were still reluctant to discuss *reformasi*. Amien Rais’ definition of *reformasi* included the term limitation of a president, the change of the recruiting system of the members of the DPR and the MPR, decentralization in policy making processes, and improvement. He was initially critical about Suharto’s excessive authority, and Amien Rais even nominated himself as a new president to replace Suharto to show his absolute rejection of Suharto’s seventh term. Because of his critical stance against the New Order, Amien Rais was appreciated by many student activists, and so received support from the activist sector as well as from the Muhammadiyah members.

Amien Rais’ idea of *reformasi* had consistently been so-called ‘constitutional’ and ‘peaceful’ reform. His rejection of revolutionary change also came partially from the fact that he was inexperienced in leading demonstrations and rallies. Amien Rais, though remaining a popular leader to many students, lost a part of his supporters’ trust when he gave “one last, last, last chance” to

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112 It is important to note that the students could not be such influential actors of *reformasi* without being amplified by the mass media. However, this point can not be discussed here for lack of space.

113 His criticism became bolder especially after Amien Rais was forced out of the ICMI by ICMI council led by Habibie. Because of his ousting, Amien Rais’ relationship with Habibie became antagonistic.


115 He made it clear that he rejected a violent revolution to replace the current political power holder as it may end up in bloodshed *The Jakarta Post.com* (1998) “Amien Rais Warns against Violent Political Reform”, Jan 28.

116 This attitude of Amien Rais partially stemmed from the nature of Muhammadiyah. The Muhammadiyah consists of elite and intellectuals Islam of Indonesia, and it was not a mass-base organization. A series of rallies in the past shows that it was not Muhammadiyah members who actually confronted with the government, but it was always Megawati’s supporters.
Suharto’s presidency when Suharto was reelected\(^{17}\). Because of his acceptance of yet another Suharto-led government, contrary to his self-nomination, his pace of reformasi was seen to have been slowed down.

Another main actors of reformasi from this group were Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) which is a traditional and rural-Java based organization, and Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president Sukarno and an ousted chairperson of the PDI in 1996. However the former had the misfortune to suffer a debilitating stroke later in 1997, so he and the NU had not been at the forefront of the movement for change\(^{18}\). The latter had been one of the most popular opposition figures against the New Order regime, and she indeed had shown her rejection of Suharto’s presidency for another term, and blamed him for being the reason for the country’s worsening economic crisis\(^{19}\). However, Megawati was far from active in the movement of reformasi through this first period.

### Student Demonstrations

Although students had shown their support for reform as early as the end of 1997, it was mid-February when the number of student demonstrations increased and spread rapidly\(^{120}\). Two major reasons existed for the students to start demonstrations at this time. First, the convocation of the

\(^{17}\) Amien Rais is said to suggest that it is fair to give Suharto “one last chance to overcome the crisis he has himself made” since “he insisted on continuing his presidency for another five years”. However he added that “if after one semester he fails to deliver, then we need a new solution, people power that is non-violent and peaceful”. M. Cohen (1998), “Divided They Stand”, FEER (March 12, 1998), pp.22-25. See also Asiaweek (1998) “He is the Problem”, March 20.

\(^{18}\) Muslim leaders, in general, responded negatively toward Suharto’s new cabinet as Suharto failed to recruit any prominent figures from Muslim group. Because of this, Suharto lost support from ICMI, Muhammadiyah and NU in this tough time (Mietzner, 1999, pp. 74-76).


\(^{120}\) The first major demonstration was held on February 19, 1998 by 2000 students at the University of Indonesia. University of Indonesia is known as one of the most prestigious universities and as the center of student movements ever since the Japanese occupation. Especially Salemba campus of UI has been called, “Kampus Perjuangan” (Campus of Struggle) for their activism. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (1999) “Trends in Indonesian Student Movement in 1998” in The Fall of Suharto, p. 167. There are some other private universities which are well known for their active engagement in the anti-government movements, such as Universitas Nasional and Universitas Almajaya, which exist at the corner of the Semanggi intersection.
General Assembly of the MPR was close and it was the best time for them to appeal their demands to the assembly. Second, and more important, was the increasing frustration against the government officials as well as political elites. The students' disappointment in the government's inability to solve the long-lasting economic crisis, ABRI's inability to stabilize the social unrest, and leading political figures' inability to bring about the serious challenge to Suharto became the real frustration for the students. This made students realize that they themselves had to lead the movement for the attainment of reformasi. Moreover, their frustrations were further intensified after Suharto was re-elected for his seventh term of presidency, and his subsequent announcement of the new cabinet member line up was made.

The most important contribution of the student demonstrations to the development of reformasi is that these became a medium to disseminate the term to every level of the society as the most popular slogan of the movement for political and economic change. In general, what the majority of students meant by reformasi were; 1) Suharto's resignation to establish a strong and clean government, 2) the cabinet be reshuffled, 3) the change of the recruitment system of the MPR members, 4) serious implementation of human rights, 5) democratization, and 6) review of some political laws that regulate the ABRI's dual function. They called for 'reformasi total' or a total reform of the whole system, which includes political, economic and constitutional system.


122 The students chanted "reformasi, reformasi" in the demonstrations, and it became the most popular slogan of the movement. The Jakarta Post (1998) “Students stage massive protest in several cities”, February 27.

123 Not all students rejected Habibie's vice-presidency. He was considered as a reformist among young Islamic students.


125 The term reformasi total had close connection with other keywords. The government tried to confine the field of reform to economy and described the crisis Indonesia is facing with an abbreviation 'krisi Mon (krisis Monetar)' or the monetary crisis. But students insisted it is 'krisi Total' or total crisis, therefore, the students concluded, it needs reformasi total to end the crisis. The Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. “Kurisumon kara Kurisutaru e: Keizai Kiki Go no Indonesia (From KrisiMon to Kristal: Indonesia after the Economic Crisis)” [http://www.ncb.co.jp/International/report/india/letter/9902.htm], acc. April 11, 2000.
Their definitions of reformasi appeared more like ‘revolutionary change’ of the New Order system rather than simple ‘reform’. In a sense, the term reformasi was chosen to be used as their slogan, or as a “hidden transcript” 126, which concealed their revolutionary mind. They feared the government’s oppression if they used revolusi (revolution) as their slogan because they knew that it sounded too radical for the government to tolerate. Using the term reformasi was safer because it had already been well known among various political figures and economists as soon as the economic crisis hit Indonesia127. This idea seems to be supported by Rosihan Anwar, a retired editor, who said in his interview by David Jenkins that what students deep down in their heart mean by reformasi was “Suharto, step down, it’s time for you to go bust”, but nobody says it openly128. Another support can be found in Stanley’s article “Behind the Student Demands” in Inside Indonesia (55). A student activist from Dr Moestopo University in the article said that the word reformasi is “a euphemism for ‘Bring Suharto to justice’. At the moment it is not possible to yell openly”129.

The other importance of the student demonstrations is their contribution to the development of some other keywords of the movement in the process of the penetration of the term reformasi. One of the four keywords this section examines is “Turunkan Harga”, which became a popular slogan together with “reformasi”. ‘Turunkan’ means ‘to bring down’ or ‘to lower’, and ‘harga’ means ‘prices’ in Indonesian, thus it literally means ‘Lower Prices’. At the beginning, the students demanded the cost of basic commodities, foodstuff as well as education, the costs of which had been skyrocketing since July 1997, to be lowered to reasonable prices130. However, this keyword “Turunkan Harga” is more meaningful for its function as a “hidden transcript”. Benjamin G. Zimmer (1998) argued that the term harta stood as a tacit acronym for Harto dan Keluarga, which means

127 An interview with an Indonesian student activist in Australia.
“Suharto and his family”: thus the slogan had a hidden meaning of “Bring down Suharto and his family”.131

Second, the student activists, and also the popular political figures, established the position of the term ‘status quo’ as the antonym of the term reformasi. As the term spread, it constructed an arbitrary division between pro-reformasi and pro-status quo. By using the term, the students and the populist figures classified themselves as pro-reformasi and Suharto and his associates as a pro-status quo and anti-reformasi. It also created a new way to see reality, which describes Indonesian politics as the confrontation between pro-reformasi and pro-status quo.

Third, another interesting term used by the opposition was ‘People’s Power’ to describe people’s support for reformasi. This term was originally used in the Philippines when the people ousted the dictator, late president Ferdinand Marcos, in 1986. By using the same words, it can be inferred, they intended to make a symbolical connection between reformasi in Indonesia and the February revolution of the Philippines, and hoped their struggle would successfully end a dictatorship in Indonesia.

Fourth, in their demonstrations, students demanded the termination of korupsi, kolusi and nepotisme (corruption, collusion and nepotism) which is widely known as KKN.133 As the term ‘KKN’ was used to describe all the conduct made by the New Order regime, and all KKN must be terminated. Moreover, the term ‘anti-KKN’ was used as the synonyms of reformasi.

The study of these four keywords is important in two senses. First, it seems to support the argument of Williams (1976) that the processes of social and historical changes appear in the language in the forms of “the invention of new terms”.134 This argument applies to the case of Indonesian


132 An example of the usage: Right before the re-election of Suharto, with the slogan reformasi, students demanded the government leave behind ‘conservative’ and ‘status quo’ oriented attitudes. They demanded limitation of the presidential term of office, and some simply meant to have a new president (Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, 1999, pp. 176-177). Also The Jakarta Post.com (1998) “Students demand food security, reform”, Feb. 20.


134 Williams (1976), p. 22. Also see chapter 1 of this paper.
political changes of this period. Second, these four keywords are examples of the “symbolic power” discussed by Bourdieu. After being recognized as legitimate by the population, all of these keywords contributed in the creation of the arbitrary social divisions and the establishment of new realities.

In summary, the term reformasi became more popular and more influential as the student demonstrations started to intensify and to demonstrate their meanings of reformasi. Although the term was already well known to the public, the reformasi movement still had not become a national phenomenon. It was due to the fact that the student demonstrations were confined within the university campuses, therefore their message had not yet delivered to other sections of the society.

3.3. ABRI-Student Dialogs and the Kidnapping of Activists

By March 1998, quelling the students became too arduous despite Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto had repeated warning ‘not to ask for radical reform’ and ‘not to leave campuses’. Two events, ABRI’s offer to hold dialogs with students and the kidnappings of activists, best depict the endeavor of ABRI to appease the people’s demand for radical reform at this time.

ABRI-Students Dialogs

Since the end of March, General Wiranto, at least on the surface, committed ABRI to political reform and started to display sympathetic attitudes towards students’ demand for reformasi. Wiranto offered the student activists occasions of peaceful dialogs. In the past, a dialog between the government and representatives from the certain troubled society was an effective strategy of the New

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135 On “symbolic power”, see Bourdieu (1991). Also see chapter 1 of this paper.
136 By the end of March, students were brave enough to denounce Suharto publicly; they openly yelled “trash him, drag him to court!”. M. Cohen (1998), “Campus Crusaders”, FEER (March 26, 1998), pp.22-26.
Order government to solve social problems. By holding a dialog, it can be assumed, Wiranto intended to appease the confrontation between the government, ABRI and the students.

The dialog was, however, unsuccessful in appeasing the conflict between the two parties in two senses. First, it failed to produce any success because the majority of the students declined the invitation for the dialog. Only 50 students turned up for the first major dialog, while attendance of some 300 was initially expected. Second, the dialog ended up only to confirm the wide gap on the interpretation of reformasi between the officials and students instead bridging the gap. What existed was a disagreement on the pace of political reform. Officials showed a slow plan of “gradual” and “constitutional” reform confirming that no ‘revolutionary’ reform is allowed as “it might changes the political structures and the order of the nation which is focused on pembangunan (development)”.

On the other hand, students continued to ask for an immediate reformasi total. In addition, another visible gap between the two groups was the perceptions of reformasi. ABRI claimed that they had been implementing reform in the process of nation building. For students, what officials meant by reformasi vaguely mean change, which may not always be improvement, while students meant improvement, which certainly means change. It can be said that the differences in the pace come from the differences in the immediate interests between the two parties. While ABRI and government officials would lose far more than what they would gain, students had nothing to lose.

Despite its failure to appease the confrontation between the government, ABRI and students, the dialog was remarkably important for the development of the term reformasi. The dialog and Wiranto’s approaches to reformasi forces around that time reflected the positive outcome of the ‘symbolic power’ of the term reformasi. The symbolic power induced the arbitrary change in the

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137 The procedure was that the government selected the representatives from the society or organization facing problem with the government. Persuading the representatives had been considered as persuading the society and organization. Thus in most cases in the past, dialogs were effective in solving social problems.


139 ABRI stated “we have immediate reforms within the next month, and long term reforms over the next 15 years”. “Gradual reforms Suggested”, The Jakarta Post (April 21).

power relations in Indonesia. Under the new social system, a person, for the political survival, was no longer able to depend solely on the patronage of Suharto but also needed the legitimacy given by the people. The phenomenon was the result of the symbolic power of the term reformasi which began to exercise its power to de-legitimize Suharto’s absolute authority. It was the beginning of the new society which is created not by “bapak” (patron) but by “rakyat” (people). Being aware of the change, Wiranto and his associates intended to receive some credit from the people, but not so much yet, by demonstrating to be pro-reformasi, in order to survive in this new era.

Another change induced by symbolic power of the term reformasi was the change of the social system from the elite base to the mass base. This change is reflected in the failure of the dialog. As it is mentioned above, the success of dialogs in the past was heavily due on the social system which gives a small number of elite in society a legitimacy to represent the rest. By this time, however, the students had started to lose the confidence in the political elites whom they had once regarded as the representatives of the people. They began to realize that the reformasi movement was a mass movement without representatives, or some students even regarded themselves as the representatives of the people.

The Kidnapping of Activists

As their sympathetic approach has already been mentioned, it is also necessary to mention more ferocious side of ABRI’s attitudes toward the reformasi activists, namely the kidnappings and disappearances of the activists, both of which have long been part of ABRI’s arsenal against insurgents.

The topic of kidnappings and disappearances of activists had been discussed widely among student activists and Human Rights activists around late April and May, since it was when some

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141 Around this time, Wiranto’s close associate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also met Amien Rais, a critic of the government, and Susilo is said to encourage Amien Rais to continue his criticism toward the government (Mietzner, 1999, pp. 75-76).

142 This attitude can be seen from the style of the students’ demonstrations. For example, demonstrations and rallies were all-mass movement. They held ‘Free Speech Forums’ in their demonstrations, where any students, not only representatives from student groups, who want to speak up can do so on the stage.
victims of kidnapping and torture returned and revealed their experiences. Some active students were reported to have disappeared soon after they started demonstrations in February.

According to their confessions, supported by some witnesses and investigations, there was a high possibility of the military's involvement in those kidnappings. The perpetrators of the abductions of pro-democracy activists are widely believed to be the armed forces intelligence body BIA and a "death squad", which was once headed by Prabowo, the commander of Kostrad and Suharto's son-in-law.

The issue of kidnappings and disappearances provided the student activists with a new reason to protest against the government and Suharto, after Suharto, again, pledged his commitment to reform by signing the third IMF agreement. Moreover, the stories from the survivors of the kidnappings and tortures, even the death of abducted activists, were effective in appealing to the International community and Human Rights organizations which could pressure the government for the implementation of reformasi. As a result of the pressure, the locations of the interrogation and the number of kidnappers were revealed. Some active students were reported to have disappeared soon after they started demonstrations in February.

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143 One of them was Pius Lustrilanang; he was one of many activists reported missing from February and he re-emerged after two month disappearance. On the 27th April, he revealed full details of his kidnapping, torture and death threat by the kidnapper not to talk about his experience, and then he fled to Amsterdam for security reasons. The number of kidnapped was not certain. According to Amnesty International on April 28, the number was 18. *Amnesty International* (1998) "AI 133/98 INDONESIA Disappearance", April, 28, circulated by email. However, according to SiaR (1998) "YLHBI: 50 disappeared since April", April 15, the total number of activists which disappeared since April was estimated to have reached 50.

144 Asiaweekly (1998) "A 'Disappeared' Speaks Out", May, 1. Also, James Goodman (1998) "The Power of the Disappeared", *Inside Indonesia* (55) July-September. Those 'disappeared' activists belong to organization such as the Indonesian Solidarity for Amien Rais and Megawati (SIAGA), the Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy (SMID), the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), the People's Democratic party (PRD), the People's Democratic Alliance (Alera) and so forth.

145 Those activists were said to be abducted by people in military suits, without warrants of arrest. It is assumed that some were even killed by torture, and indeed some unidentifiable corpses were found, which were suspected to be those of 'missings'. *Kompas* (1998) “National Commission for Human Rights re Abducted Activists”, April 25, this news was circulated by TAPOL on 27th April, 1998. Also, SiaR (1998).

146 The issue of kidnappings and disappearance clarified the existing division among the ABRI top officers despite the public demonstrations of unity. The difference in approaches to student activists was commonly interpreted as a division between General Wiranto and Lieutenant-General Prabowo. Prabowo was said to dislike the moderate approach toward the opposition taken by Wiranto, and believe that the only way to govern Indonesia was by military stratagems. Prabowo's ambition was said to be nominated as the position of the Commander in Chief, the highest position in Armed Forces that Wiranto occupied at the time (Mietzner, 1999, pp. 75-76).
detention had begun to be traced, and ABRI had to be more careful in order not to be suspected or confirmed that it was really ABRI who masterminded these kidnappings and killings. Thus, ABRI became something to be less afraid of for the student activists.

During this time, a positive outcome of reformasi movement, namely the reduction of the absolute authority of the two powerholders of the New Order system, “bapak” and “ABRI”, started to be apparent. Therefore, the students started to increase their activity in rallies and demonstrations, fortified by the inability of ABRI to appease the students. The message of students on reformasi, however, had not reached to other groups in Indonesian society yet due to their confinement on university campuses.

3.4. The Fall of Suharto: the End of Pembangunan

The legitimacy of the Suharto government had been fading. Indeed, the government was not able to sustain pembangunan, the source of legitimacy in the New Order era, while at the same time it failed to show its commitment to reformasi, the new source of legitimacy. It was May 1998 when the declining power of Suharto finally generated the end of his 32 years of rule. Three events that exerted significant influence on the resignation of Suharto were the Trisakti Incident, the Jakarta Riots, and the occupation of the Parliament complex. The study of these events shows the consolidation process of the unification of the society in the fight for reformasi, that of the meanings of the term reformasi, as well as of the symbolic power of reformasi.

The Trisakti Incident to the Occupation of the Parliament Complex

147 “Reported Location of Secret Interrogation Center” (April 29), email circulated by TAPOL on May 4.
148 Even at the beginning of May, 1998, Suharto seemed not to be aware of the emergency of reformasi. This attitude can be clearly seen from his announcement on May 1, 1998 which he indicated that political and economic reforms should only be implemented after 2003. He explained that it was because the State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) had already been mandated by the People’s Consultative Assembly, and it runs until 2003. The Jakarta Post.com (1998) “Political Reforms Only ‘After 2003’”, May 2.
Since the end of April, the student demonstrators began to attract the attention of people from other sectors of society. At the same time, the confrontation between the security forces and the student activists rapidly increased as the student demonstrators started to move out of the campuses and onto the streets. The Trisakti Incident took place under such conditions.

On May 12, four student protesters were shot dead at a demonstration at Trisakti University, Jakarta's most prestigious university. The incident was followed by riots in Jakarta which last from 13th May to 14th night. Jakarta's China town became the major target of the riots. Many buildings owned by Chinese-Indonesian businessmen and Chinese stores were attacked, looted, and destroyed. Many were killed and some 400 women were raped. On the morning of May 18, students, whose anti-Suharto feeling reached a climax, started to gather to the Parliament complex and took over to occupy the building. They demanded the legislative body set in motion procedures to force President Suharto to step down, claiming that that until Suharto resigned, they would not leave the grounds.

The Trisakti Incident and the Jakarta Riot further increased the people's distrust in ABRI. Because the New Order's legitimacy was derived from stabilitas (stability) and ketertiban (order), ABRI's inability to sustain these conditions directly meant de-legitimization of the New Order government. Thus, these two events gave the students with the reason for their leading a nationwide rallies on May 26th, right after the Suharto's announcement which ruled out any major political reform till 2003, were joined by workers for the first time in Jakarta. See Straits Times Interactive (1998) “Workers Join Students in Jakarta Protest”, May 3. Also in Yogyakarta, thousands of residents from surrounding kampung joined students in attacking the security forces (Aspinall, 1999, p. 217).

At the night of May 18, some 75 students chose to camp out at the House compound, and the next morning, some 12,000 students from various groups began to arrive (Aspinall, 1999, pp. 217-218). When the Jakarta Riots and the Trisakti Incident took place, it was initially seen as the failure of Wiranto’s moderate approaches and his inability to keep national security. Later on, it appeared that the person who masterminded the shooting of the Trisakti incident as well as the Jakarta Riot was Prabowo and his associates. It is often said that the purpose was to win his rival Wiranto. Prabowo wanted to create such chaos that Wiranto would be unable to restore order. Some social commentator said Prabowo wanted to take power in exactly the same way as Suharto wrested power from Sukarno, and other says he wanted to impress Suharto by sowing chaos and then proving he could control it. However, as his manipulation became well known to the society and to Suharto, Prabowo lost trust from everyone, including Suharto. John MacBeth, “Shadow Play”, FEER (23, July 1998). Also see Asiaweek (1998) “Ten Days that Shook Indonesia”, July 24.
revolutionary change, namely the end of Suharto regime.

The reformasi movement became a nationwide phenomenon as it received full support from the people. There were two elements that increased the unity among the society for the fight for reformasi. First is the role of martyrs. The four students killed at the Trisakti Incident were transformed into pahlawan reformasi (heroes of reform). The symbol gave imaginary unity among the people, thus induced the formation of, what Turner calls, communitas, despite of the differences in the backgrounds, ideologies and demands, for the struggle for reformasi. The other is symbolic power of the term reformasi. The occupation of the Parliament complex functioned as a ritual, which consolidated the meaning of reformasi of this time, namely “Step down of Suharto”. As the meaning was recognized as legitimate by the society, it was able to exercise its power to pressure for the actualization of the definition of the term.

The Fall of Suharto

Suharto was in Cairo for an international conference when the Trisakti Incident and the Jakarta Riot took place. He had to cut short his trip to return to Indonesia soon after the riot erupted. On his arrival, he faced the outrage of the people who now directly denounced Suharto as the direct cause for the disorder in the society and call for his resignation. Demands for his resignation came not only from the people, but also from government officials. On May 18, the DPR chief Harmoko, who had long been a loyalist of Suharto (in addition, many members of the legislature have close connections with the President), surprised the country with an announcement that the House of Representatives leadership supported popular calls for President Suharto to step down

Suharto’s response to their demand of his resignation was, first, he himself set his own terms on how he would step down. He proposed to hold a new general election soon and then convene a
meeting of the MPR to elect the president. His proposal, however, lacked an exact date or deadline. Second, he suggested making a “reformasi committee” comprising of public figures and experts from universities. It would draw up new laws on election, parties and DPR and MPR formation. Third, he also promised the reshuffle of his cabinet and names it the Reformasi Cabinet to replace the Seventh Development cabinet.

May 1998 was the most important month for the development of reformasi because there were some important effects of its symbolic power in the last days of Suharto’s presidency. First, it is obvious that the efficacy of the term reformasi as the symbolic power to create the new reality, namely the division between reformist and status quo was accepted also by Suharto himself. In the case of the establishment of the “reformasi committee” and “Reformasi Cabinet”, Suharto included the term reformasi in the names to display his commitment for reformasi thus to make him look more pro-reformasi. However, the symbolic power was not valid when he used the term, as he had already been a symbol of status quo, or anti-reformasi; he was not considered as an appropriate speaker of reformasi. As the result, neither the reformasi committee nor the Reformasi Cabinet was accepted by the society, and even by those who nominated as members of the committee.

It is worth mentioning that the Megawati’s response to Suharto’s proposals here. Megawati’s associates announced that she backed Suharto’s offer for a new general election, as well as the establishment of the reformasi committee provided she would be included. It is ironic that the person who had been considered as one of the most prominent opposition to Suharto accepted reformasi defined by Suharto.

Second, May 1998 was important month for the development of reformasi because the fall of Suharto was the very outcome of the symbolic power of reformasi. The new reality that “Suharto’s

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158 Amin Rais rejected Suharto’s promise to implement reformasi and to resign, and Amien Rais went on demonstrations. He translated Suharto’s attitudes as Suharto’s attempt to avert further pressure, to buy time to consolidate his power, so that he would not have to step down. And Gus Dur had already singled their request for a speedy peaceful presidential succession by mid-May.
resignation is the precondition of reformasi” which was consolidated at the ritual in the Parliament complex, became the real pressure to the people even to the Suharto’s loyalists. In short, reformasi with its meaning “the resignation of Suharto” was actualized because the definition was recognized as legitimate by the entire society to be the new reality. However, soon after the resignation of Suharto was actualized, the meaning of the term had quickly started to fabricated.

Conclusion

Through the development of the reformasi movement, this chapter has seen the introduction and the penetration of the term reformasi, and the consolidation of the meaning of reformasi at the Parliament complex and finally the actualization of its meaning, namely the fall of Suharto.

To conclude this chapter, a brief comparison between the keywords of the New Order and those of the era of reformasi is made. The keywords which symbolized the power holder of the New Order government, “bapak” and “ABRI” had become the target of the people’s malice. Those keywords in the area of legitimacy, namely “orba”, “pembangunan”, “stabilitas”, “ketertiban”, “dwifungsi” no longer had the power to grant legitimacy to their promoters. All those keywords were replaced by the new keyword “reformasi” which gave efficacy for legitimacy to the operators of the term. Moreover, these old keywords even became a qualification of the status quo. In short, in the era of reformasi, everything connected to the New Order became the symbol of status quo and KKN.
Chapter 4: From the Establishment of a Transitional Regime to General Election

Chapter four analyzes the period between the establishment of Habibie regime in May 1998 until the General Election held on June 7, 1999 by using the keywords approach. This chapter is divided into three sections, and each focuses on some of major events of the period. These events that the first section focuses are the establishment of the Habibie regime, the extraordinary Congress of Golkar and the special session of the MPR. It describes the development of the term reformasi as used by Habibie, Golkar and ABRI. The second section discusses about the Ciganjur Declaration and the Semanggi Incident. It intends to clarify the development of the term reformasi among student activists and the differences in the meanings of the term as used by students and by the major opposition leaders. The third section analyzes the establishment of political parties and the general election. It investigates what the people and the newly established political parties with different interests wanted to achieve by using the term reformasi.

4.1. A Transitional Regime: from Habibie’s Cabinet to the MPR Special Session

The efficacy of the term reformasi as the symbolic power created a new reality after the fall of Suharto. The political reality of Indonesia at this time was described as the war between pro-reformasi against pro-status quo.

At the beginning of Habibie’s presidency, reformasi meant the only way to ensure their ‘political survival’ for those parties and individuals which had a close connection with the New Order government. Their struggle for the political survival can be best observed by looking at three significant political events during this period, namely the establishment of the Habibie regime, the Extraordinary Golkar Congress, and the Special Session of the MPR. The process of the new government making shows Habibie’s and the military’s adaptation to the new reality created by the symbolic power of reformasi. The second event was important as it ensured the survival of Habibie, and the third event specified the adjustment of the meanings of reformasi by his political associates.
The Establishment of Habibie Regime

At 9 a.m. on May 21, 1998 at the Presidential Palace, Suharto read his resignation speech, and Habibie was sworn in as Indonesia’s third president. Among the new cabinet member, which Habibie announced on May 22, twenty ministers were re-appointed from the previous cabinet, and sixteen members were newly recruited. One of two remarkable differences between his cabinet member line up and Suharto’s was the inclusion of three politicians from the two minority parties, the PPP and the PDI, that was the first time in Indonesian history. Another is the exclusion of ministers from the previous cabinet who were often cited as symbolizing KKN, such as Suharto’s daughter Siti Hardjianti Rukmana and Bob Hasan.

Some other reformasi plans Habibie pledged were the promotion of human rights, which can be see in the release of political prisoners and the proposed East Timor referendum, promoting the democratic political system, such as allowing the formation of political parties and the revision of the laws on the DPR, the MPR as well as mass organization, and also officially acknowledging the four victims of Trisakti incident as “reform heroes.”

Soon after his inauguration, Habibie realized the importance of the implementation of rather liberal reformasi program for his political survival. Firstly, the promotion of reformasi was crucial for Habibie because of the new social reality that describes anything to do with the New Order as status quo, or anti-reformasi that were the elements the public strongly rejected. Habibie needed to disengage himself from the past as he has been seen as a symbol of status quo and KKN as a result of the special privileges given to him by Suharto in the New Order period. Another reason for his promotion of reformasi was Habibie’s lack of support from major Muslim organizations and, needless

159 Habibie was initially considered by many as nothing but a transitional replacement and soon would be replaced by a new president who would be elected by a legitimate presidential election.
to say, with ABRI officers at the time of his inauguration. This meant he had to look for alternative support from the civil society.

In order for him to maintain his position, Habibie realized the best way was the adaptation of the meanings of reformasi given by the most powerful force of that time, namely students. Most of reformasi pledges he made in his early presidency were adopted from what the students and the opposition figures demanded as a part of political reform. He himself confirmed that the line up was selected with his inspiration drawn from students and youths demanding for reforms. In other words, for the first few months of his presidency, Habibie was preoccupied to make himself look as a reformist by using the boundary drawn by the oppositions and also to differentiate his regime from Suharto’s regime.

Despite his demonstration as a pro-reformasi president, however, Habibie’s concept of reformasi was no different from the New Order’s, so-called, “gradual” and “constitutional reform”. Habibie administration announced on May 28, 1998, that stated the government would not hold a

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165 It seems that none of Muslim organizations were showing their support for Habibie’s presidency. Habibie’s relationship with the NU was not friendly, either. The NU officials stated that they viewed Habibie’s ascension to the presidency as unconstitutional. Also, Habibie’s relation with the Muhammadiyah was far from smooth. Although Amien Rais, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah, displayed a neutral stance and an allowance of a grace period to Habibie’s, he was highly unwilling to cooperate with Habibie because of their long antagonism. He did not include a single prominent NU figure in the cabinet, while he included the Muhammadiyah officials, Malik Fajar and Adi Sasono. The line up encouraged the already existed rivalry between the NU and the Muhammadiyah. It was clear that the NU was unwilling to support the president who gave more chance for the rival Muslim organization to reflect their influence in Indonesian politics (Mietzner, 1999, p. 91). Even ICMI, an organization which used to be chaired by Habibie, initially tended to keep a distance from Habibie. It was partially because of Habibie’s defending Suharto when ICMI called for a Cabinet reshuffle and a step down of Suharto just before his resignation (Mietzner, 1999, p. 91). See also The Jakarta Post (1998) “ICMI Jump onto anti-Soeharto Bandwagon”, July 23. On the antagonism between Habibie and Amien Rais, see chapter 1 of this paper.


167 Habibie also tried to differentiate himself from Suharto by building his image as an accessible, warm and people friendly leader, contrast to the distant paternalistic Suharto. He displayed his eagerness to debate on sensitive issues such as separatist sentiment and human rights violations in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya, those of which were never discussed openly by Suharto. John McBeth and Michael Vatikiotis (1998) “Behind the Man”, FEER, June 25. He also tried to erase his reputation as a spender from his experience as the Technology Minister, by openly emphasized his concern about people’s basic welfare as well as his defense of “People’s Economy”. The Jakarta Post.com (1998) “Habibie Says He Now Puts People’s Welfare First”, June 18. The issue of “People’s Economy” is often talked about by his long time friend and his cooperative minister, Adi Sasono.
general election until 1999\textsuperscript{168}, while the majority of population sought an immediate election. The whole attempts of Habibie were interpreted by Hermawan Sulistyo as “Habibie was just trying to collect credit points for public popularity until he maintain his power for his political survive”, and once Habibie did, “the reform progress would slow down”\textsuperscript{169}. However, the popularity of Habibie was still so weak that he was not able to overtly show his reluctance to accept students’s sense of reformasi, let alone reformasi total.

The military’s attitudes toward reformasi of this time clearly showed how ABRI perceived the reality. First, the military still saw the role of itself in the promotion of dwifunsi, although the abolition of which was strongly demanded by the public by the time. The military displayed its commitment to fundamental reform, but still guarded the idea of so-called “constitutional reform” for a fear that a radical reform would bring about a problem of national integrity as indicated by continuing religious, ethnic and racial conflict\textsuperscript{170}. Such actions reflected that the military still guarded its old roles in the new era of reformasi, thus it intended to legitimize its existence and dominance by using the old keyword.

Second, the military also accepted the social reality that it needed to support reformasi for its political survival. The military needed to show its commitment to reform as its reputation in the society was so low after the Trisakti Incident and the May riots that the military was impossible to survive without some positive contributions to the reformasi movement. Some of reformasi plans introduced by the military were firstly the separation of police and military which had long been

\textsuperscript{168} The reason for the decision was explained that the change of existing political laws would be completed by 1991. It was confirmed on June22, 1998, in Habibie government’s schedule concerning political reform agenda to peak in December of the following year with the election of a new president and a vice president. Habibie and his regime concluded that these processes would be important for constitutional reform and the legitimization of the next government. The Jakarta Post.com (1998) "Total Reform is Just That", May 29.


demanded by the oppositions\textsuperscript{171}. The separation was completed in April 1999. Since then, the generic name of the military, ABRI, was changed to TNI (Tentara Negara Indonesia: Indonesian National Military). Second, the military also set up an Officers Honor Council to investigate the involvement of Kopassus and Prabowo in the Trisakti Incident and the May riots\textsuperscript{172}. Third, as a part of the military’s support for reformasi, Wiranto announced the separation of Golkar from the military, which was followed by his approach to the popular figures such as Megawati\textsuperscript{173}. By separating the military from Golkar, associates of Wiranto intended to create a reality. They attempted to draw a line between ABRI and Golkar which makes Golkar look status quo and ABRI closer to pro-reformasi.

**Golkar’s Extraordinary Congress**

Golkar’s Extraordinary Congress, which was held in July 1998, was important in two senses. First, it became a good example that reflected anything to do with status quo was rejected even among Golkar members. Second and more important is that the session decided the direction of Golkar’s, as well as Habibie’s, future.

The purpose of Golkar’s extraordinary congress was to decide a new chairman of Golkar to replace Harmoko. There were two candidate, one was Edi Sudrajat who was supported by the group consisted of retired officers and nationalist elements from Golkar. The other candidate was Akbar

\textsuperscript{171} ABRI argued that the police, rather than the armed forces, should have primary responsibility for maintaining law and order, although the military should remain ready to back up the police in disturbances that were beyond the capacity of the police to control. The purpose was said to be minimizing direct confrontations between the army and civilians, after the tragedy of the Trisakti Incident, which deteriorate the relationship between ABRI and the public, and deprived ABRI of its role as the defender of law and order (Crouch, 1999, pp. 144-145).

\textsuperscript{172} Wiranto was initially reluctant on this issue, as he was well aware that this kind of investigations would almost certainly affect ABRI as an institution. However, there was a mounted public pressure, and he agreed to the formation of the council, otherwise, the military would be continuously accused as being status quo (Mietzner, 1999, p. 90). Mietzner looked up the information form “Mengusut Pil Pahit ABRI”, Tajuk 11/1, 23 July 1998.

\textsuperscript{173} The announcement of the separation was also the result of the antagonism between Habibie and Wiranto. It was the time when Habibie started to threat Wiranto that Habibie would deprive Wiranto of his position if he refused to support Akbar Tanjung for the chairman of Golkar in the Extraordinary Congress in July, which will be discussed further in the next part. The motivation of Wiranto behind the announcement was that he wanted to warn Habibie that ABRI still had an ability to enter into a broad based coalition, with popular reformist figures, against Habibie (Mietzner, 1999, p. 98).
Tanjung, backed by the group consisting of the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam: Islamic Student Association) functionaries and bureaucrats from the Habibie Administration. Which of the two would lead Golkar was so crucial a decision as it would have led Golkar, and more so for Habibie’s presidency, to a totally different direction.

Initially it looked as if Edi Sudradjat was in the running, because the influences of retired officers’ were so strong within Golkar. However, Try Sutrisno made some misleading movements prior to the congress, such as to act as if the group led by Edi and Try was blessed by Suharto. It left the perception in the public’s mind that the extraordinary congress was a race between Suharto loyalists around Edi Sudradjat and party reformists around Akbar Tanjung. Since it was the creation of Suharto, Golkar had energetically been attempting to remake itself into a party of the reformasi era. Once such negative image of Edi Sudradjat was created, it was beneficial for many of his supporters to switch their support to Akbar Tanjung in order to secure the future of Golkar as a political institution and of the members themselves.

Thus, the victory of Akbar Tanjung as the result of the extraordinary session of Golkar removed the possibility of presidium to replace Habibie’s presidency. From then on, Habibie began to accumulate his influence within Golkar, therefore turned it into his power base. Thus, the result of the

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174 HMI is Indonesia’s largest student organization and a mainstay of student protest in the 70s.
175 There was an implication that Edi Sudradjat’s victory would mean the convening of a special session of the MPR, which would have in turn elected Try Sutrisno as a presidium. On the other hand, Akbar Tanjung’s election as a chairman meant to secure Habibie’s position as president and to transform the party into a power base for Habibie (Mietzner, 1999, pp. 93-95).
176 It is important to note that Edi once was the most powerful figure next to Suharto as he was the commander of ABRI and the defense minister at the same time.
177 Ibid., pp. 93-95.
178 Ibid., pp. 93-95.
179 From the strong distrust about Habibie’s credibility as a president, most retired ABRI officers in Golkar supported Edi Sudradjat. However, there were two concerns of the military, especially of Wiranto’s, which made its support switched from Edi Sudradjat to Akbar Tanjung, a Habibie’s loyalist. One is that Wiranto wanted to distance himself from Suhartoism, which was the trend of all the other member of Golkar. The second reason was more for Wiranto’s personal survival. It was around July when Habibie realized that his institutional rights as supreme commander, and he implied that he could replace Wiranto at any time if Wiranto did not pledge his support for Habibie. For this reason, Wiranto had to switch his support to Akbar Tanjung in order for him to stay in the position. This was, according to Mietzner, also the reason why the military’s influence on politics tended to decline from July 1998 onwards, and Habibie started to strengthen his own position. See Mietzner (1999), p. 87, for more detail.

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congress made it easier for Habibie gradually to implement reformasi of his own definition and convenience.

The Special Session of the MPR

The special session of the MPR took place from November 10 to 13, 1998. The session was designed as a mean to legitimize Habibie’s presidency as well as the MPR itself whose legitimacy was strongly doubted by the people. Another purpose of the session was to discuss and to put forward the reformasi program of the Habibie government.

Some of the agendas of reform discussed and approved in the MPR special session included: 1) “a timetable for elections in June 1999, to be followed within two months by the selection of a new president”, 2) “opening the way for amendments to UUD ’45 or the 1945 constitution”, 3) “recognition of the need for greater economic and political autonomy in the regions” 180, 4) “a decree to subsume an investigation of Suharto under the general rubric of eradicating cronyism, collusion and corruption” 5) “a decree that expressed the intent to gradually limit the amount of military representation in the DPR” 181.

Ken Young argues that the most substantial progress in 1998 came from Habibie and his cabinet, backed by Wiranto, as these actors pushed reformasi through the special session of the MPR 182. Those meanings of reformasi spelled out at the MPR was a ‘progress’ in a sense that there were some elements which were designed to separate Indonesian political system and political culture from those under the New Order government. And it was also ‘substantial’ as the meanings and the program of reformasi were officially approved by the MPR, the nation’s only legitimate institution which is able to give official meanings to the term reformasi. However, the program was not accepted

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180 Ken Young (1999), p. 86.
181 Some of other reform plans discussed in the MPR session were: 1) “legislation that secured press freedom”, 2) “new laws on parties, elections and the composition and functions of the parliament”, 3) “limitation of the terms of presidential and vice-presidential tenure to two terms”, 4) “laws to took away the extraordinary powers of the president”, and 5) “draft decrees on human rights”.
182 Ken Young (1999), p. 86.
as ‘substantial’ programs by most of the students and other prominent opposition figures. They complained about painfully slow process of the reform program, claiming these decisions were far short of the demands of reformasi total, and these were status quo embracing in nature.

The special session of the MPR was very important, as the meanings of reformasi introduced in the session showed a compromise of those who had been close to Suharto in terms of ‘how far reform must be carried out’. As previously mentioned, the groups and personels which were close to Suharto in the New Order period had to purify their image of KKN and separate themselves from the old government. At the same time, however, they knew if reformasi program was too radical meant the end of their political carrier. In addition, as they are also indebted to Suharto, they could not be too strong on the topic of KKN and Suharto’s trial. Thus, the meanings of the term reformasi approved at the MPR special session were adjusted by Habibie and his associates. Those definitions reflect a bottom line of how much they could sacrifice.

To sum up, reformasi for the government officials and military officers meant ‘political survival’. The first few months of Habibie’s presidency was the time for the status quo forces to adopt themselves to the popular meanings of reformasi, in other words, to the new reality created by the student’s definition of the term. Reformasi, however, was also like a double-edged sword to them. Because they must push reformasi forward in order to survive, but at the same time reformasi total could deprive them of their privileges and the position in the government. Habibie skillfully survived, at least for the time being, by winning the position to lead Indonesia after a serious struggle. In other words, he successfully kept the position to make his meanings of reformasi, namely ‘gradual’ and ‘constitutional’ reform, officially recognized.

4.2. The Semanggi Incident and the Ciganjur Declaration

The Semanggi Incident and the Ciganjur Declaration left significant influences on the development of reformasi. Both events reflect the students’ struggle to actualize their definition of reformasi total. Among the two events, the Ciganjur Declaration is particularly important as it was
the event which consolidated the meanings of the term to be the national agenda. It also showed differences in meanings of reformasi between the students and political leaders.

The Semanggi Incident

Before starting this section, the students’ behavior regarding reformasi since the fall of Suharto in May 1998 must be clarified. The students, who played a very important role in the reformasi movement that led to the resignation of Suharto, continued to be the main force pressing for fundamental political change in this period. However, their contributions to the struggle for reformasi were not as influential as before, because of, as Vedi R. Hadiz argues, the growing separation amongst the students themselves\textsuperscript{183}. Unlike just before the fall of Suharto when all students were more or less united under the same goal, they were now separated due to the difference in perceiving the goals of reformasi\textsuperscript{184}. The separation greatly reduced the influence of students in terms of leadership, organization and participation.

Since a few days before the special MPR session, the student activists held a large demonstration against holding the session. One of four reasons for students to stage demonstrations against the MPR session was that they intended to obstruct the legitimization of the Habibie government because the MPR meeting on November was designed as a means to legitimize the government\textsuperscript{185}. The second reason was to reject the legitimacy of the MPR’s decision, because the


\textsuperscript{184} The students were separated largely into two groups. One is the group of students who demanded Habibie to step down together with Suharto, as they believed that both Suharto and Habibie come form the same corrupt system. Some of groups which belong to this group are Forum Kota (Forkot), or City Forum, Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (FKSMJ) or Jakarta Students Senate Communication Forum. The other is those who supported or at least accepted Habibie’s presidency. This group was consisted of Muslim students. Many of this group operated under the banner of an organization called KAMMI, or the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front (Hadiz, 1999, pp. 109-110). This separation became visible soon after Suharto’s resignation speech among those students who were occupying the DPR building (Hadiz, 1999, p. 113). These two groups soon developed a rivalry against each other (Hadiz, 1999, p.110). See also Loren Ryter (1998) “The Morning After...”, Inside Indonesia (56) Oct.-Dec.

\textsuperscript{185} Aspinall (1999), p. 226.

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students saw the institution as the legacy of the corrupted New Order government. The third reason for their objection against the MPR special session was to reject the new law passed by Parliament earlier. The law constrained the staging of mass demonstrations, especially aimed to prevent demonstrations during the MPR session. By ignoring the law, the students tried to show their rejection of its legitimacy. Finally, the demonstrations were held by the students in order to revitalize and consolidate their demands for reformasi total, which was once widely accepted by the society but became less influential, as the national reformasi agenda. After their goal of reformasi "the resignation of Suharto" was actualized, many student organizations added "a special session of the MPR to elect a new president with appropriate legitimacy", "the elimination of military involvement in government", and also "the trial of former president Suharto for alleged abuses of power" in their meanings of reformasi.

The demonstrations ended up with a bloody crush between police and student demonstrators on Friday 13. Despite causing many casualties and deaths, the students’ rallies, unlike the Trisakti Incident, failed to achieve any of their major demands. First, the protests failed to disrupt the proceedings of the MPR extraordinary session. Second, it failed to press the MPR to produce decrees specifically dealing with an investigation into Suharto’s abuse of power while in office. And third, the protests also failed to install a presidium or people’s committee to replace the Habibie government with the elections, which were the ultimate goal of the student rallies, were not actualized. The students preferred to allow Habibie to be announced, and then they saw no reason to mobilize. The Ciganjur Poor preferred to allow Habibie to be announced, and then they saw no reason to mobilize.

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186 Ken Young (1999: p. 87) say that the students instinctively distrusted changes made by the President and the assembly because these were regarded as a part of Suharto’s regime.

187 It says demonstrations could only be legally held after three days prior notice to the police, and not in the vicinity of such ‘vital’ government buildings as presidential palace (Hadiz, 1999, p. 110).

188 This was demanded only by the group of students who oppose the legitimacy of Habibie’s presidency. But the other two demands were common agenda among most of the students.


190 Eight students and eight others were shot at Atma Jaya University, which located at the corner of the Semanggi Traffic Intersection. The Semanggi killings further deteriorate the relationship between the government and the public, and it triggered a new frenzy of mobilization for demonstrations occurred around the country.


192 Ibid., p. 111.
government and to lead Indonesia through to new elections. In short, the failure of demonstrations and the Semanggi Incident only emphasized the inability of students in political participation.

However, the event was still important because the students displayed their potential unity, despite the differences in ideology, in order to hold a bold mass protest, on a scale similar to that of May 1998, to fight for reformasi.

The Ciganjur Declaration

The Ciganjur Declaration took place on November 11, 1998, and it paralleled with the MPR session where the New Order's parliamentary representatives were discussing their reformasi agendas. The declaration was made after three prominent opposition leaders at the time, namely Gus Dur, Amien Rais and Megawati together with a person of symbolic authority, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengkubuwono X assembled at the house of Gus Dur in Ciganjur. The meeting was organized by student activists in order to establish alternative reformasi plans to ones out by the MPR members.

Despite the hope of the students that the Ciganjur Declaration articulate the students' definitions of reformasi the statement's aims fell short of two of the three major demands made by the students. First is the formation of a presidium to displace Habibie and that the four leaders take over the government until the elections, which were the ultimate goals of the meeting for students, was not actualized. The Ciganjur Four preferred to allow Habibie to be a caretaker, and then stay on to conduct elections, in which they were confident they would win. Second, on the military's
the four leaders preferred to allow a six-year period before it is to be eliminated, while students expected for an immediate military retreat from politics197.

The Ciganjur Declaration, as a result, confirmed an existing gap between the ways the students and the populist leaders perceive the social and political reality in Indonesia. It also reflected the leaders’ old elitist and conservative nature198. Although those four leaders were often taken for granted as pro-reformasi and anti-status quo figures, the Ciganjur Declaration showed that their meanings of reformasi were rather closer to the government’s definition than the students’ idea of reformasi total. Because of all this, there were many students who were disappointed with the declaration.

However, the Ciganjur Declaration still left a remarkable influence on the development of reformasi as it contributed to the consolidation of the meanings of the term. The declaration gave the common meanings and aims of reformasi in Indonesian context, although it was compromising so that the interests of the four leaders were reflected more than those of the students. Moreover, these meanings became a part of the national agenda and a reference point for the reformasi movement. In short, reformasi, again, functioned as the symbolic power to make the people recognize what the four leaders described as the reality is legitimate. The success was due to the role of the Ciganjur Declaration as a ritual to legitimize their meanings of the term reformasi and to confirm the four leaders were reformists by creating an arbitrary boundary between who was reformist and who was pro-status quo.

To sum up, the Semanggi Incident and the Ciganjur Declaration were the two different ways of the students’ attempts to revitalize and consolidate their demands for reformasi total. Unlike the

197 According to Hadiz (1999: p. 113), the four leaders’ decision not to include students’ radical reform ideas and their allowance of Habibie to continue his reform reflected elitist nature that feel much more at home with elite-level bargaining and negotiating.

198 See Ken Young (1999), p. 87, and Hadiz (1999), p. 113. Also, the four leaders’ lack of reaction and backing toward the Semanggi Incident displayed how out of place they were in any scenario that involved mass action.
occupation of the Parliament Complex, the consolidation of their meaning of the term could not be achieved because of their lack of influence in political policymaking. Although the Declaration compromised and failed to reflect the meanings of the term in the sense of students, it was still important in the development of the term reformasi as it became the national agendas and common reference point for the reformasi movement in Indonesia.

4.3. The Establishment of Political Parties and the General Election: Setting up the Rule of Rakyat

This section firstly introduces some of the newly established political parties, then analyzes the importance of pemilu '99 in the development of the term reformasi.

The establishment of new political parties was the positive outcome of the symbolic power of reformasi. However, their political campaign process for its pemilu was a big setback for the development, because they tended to make the meanings of reformasi insignificant during the campaigns. It seems that the repetition of the keyword reformasi became more important than discourse in the campaigns.

The Establishment of the New Political Parties

One reform program Habibie implemented soon after his assumption of office was to allow the establishment of a political party. Ever since his assumption of office in May 21, 1998, new political parties were rapidly established, and by the end of February 1999, as many as 234 political parties were born.

199 Habibie told CNN on June 3, 1998 that anybody can set up a new party as long as “it does not contradict the five-point state ideology Pancasila and the Constitution and stays away from issues related to ethnicity, religion, race and intergrouping”. The Jakarta Post.com (1998) “A Democratic Multiparty System”, June 18. The military was not very happy about the decision because it was concerning about a possible emergence of Islamic party to allow Habibie to recruit his supporters and a potential national disintegration due to the re-emergence of political parties based on religion and on regionalism. Only deal possible for ABRI was, however, to propose certain requirements for new political parties, including the requirement for loyalty to Pancasila, which did not allow religious and regional exclusivism (Mietzner, 1999, pp. 92-93). Also The Jakarta Post.com (1998) “ABRI Presents its Reform Views”, June 12.

This section briefly refers some of major political parties and the result of pemilu\textsuperscript{201}. Golkar, which won each of the last six elections, had to participate in the race with severe disadvantages\textsuperscript{202}. The main disadvantage, needless to say, came from Golkar's being considered as the symbol of status quo and the synonymous of KKN. However, Golkar seemed to receive much support from rural residents, who account for 65% of the total population. The strength of Golkar was its familiarity in the time of uncertainty, and its stand for the secular state principles Pancasila. This was appealing to non-Muslim as many political parties associate themselves with Islam. The result was that Golkar won 22.4% of the total vote, 120 seats of the MPR\textsuperscript{203}.

Among all political parties which said to represent secular minded Indonesians, Megawati's faction of the PDI, which was later named the PDI-Perjuangan (the PDI in Struggle), dominated the race. Her strength lied on the fact that she has long been regarded as a symbol of opposition of the New Order period, therefore she came to be perceived as the symbol of reformasi\textsuperscript{204}. Also her popularity was strengthened by the image of her father, Sukarno, the first President in Indonesia, as the freedom fighter who was denigrated by Suharto. The result of the pemilu was that Megawati's PDI-P won 33.7% of all votes, and 153 seats in the MPR\textsuperscript{205}.

Among 48 political parties which participated in the general election, at least 12 claimed to represent interests of Muslims\textsuperscript{206} who comprise 88% of the Indonesian population. Among them were the PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional: National Mandate Party) led by Amien Rais, the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa: National Awakening Party) headed by Abdurrahman Wahid supported by the NU followers, the PPP which also participated in the last six elections in the New Order period, and other new born political parties such as the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan: PK) and the Cresent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang: PBB). The result was the PKB, the PPP, the PAN winning 12.6%,
10.7%, and 7.1% of total vote and 58, 51 and 34 seats of the MPR respectively. The PK and the PBB ended up only to win 1.4% (7 seats) and 1.9% (13 seats)\(^{207}\).

The Pemilu ‘99

Pemilu or the general election, which was to decide the seat allocation of each political party in the MPR, was held on June 7, 1999. Pemilu was implemented under the new political bills, which changed rules on general election, political parties, and on the composition of the MPR and the DPR. The number of parties to participate in pemilu jumped up from three, namely Golkar, the PDI and the PPP, in the New Order era, to 48 in the pemilu ‘99\(^{208}\).

The pemilu of 1999 was significant in three senses. First, it reflected the change in the meanings of pemilu in Indonesian politics. In the past elections, too, pemilu had also been very important, as it was a ritual in order to confirm and to legitimize the rule of Golkar, although it was always obvious long before the election that the winner would be Golkar. On the other hand, pemilu 99 was the first democratic election in 44 years in which the people actually meant to decide the leader of Indonesia. There were 48 political parties for the people with different interests to choose from, and, unlike in the past, they were free to express their political aspiration\(^{209}\). Thus, the difference

\(^{207}\) Panita Pemilihan Indonesia (PPI).

\(^{208}\) Initially 141 parties had registered with the Ministry of Justice, however only 48 had passed the screening and were qualified to contest in the June 7 general election. Habibie classified those excluded parties into four, namely 1) political parties with religious values as their basis, 2) those with interest group basis, 3) those who follow nationalist democratic political line, and 4) those with social democratic ideology. The Jakarta Post (1999) “48 Parties Eligible to Contest Election”, March 5. Also see Mulyana W. Kusumah (1999) The Jakarta Post (1999) “Entering the Multiparty System”, January 23.

\(^{209}\) The aspiration of people could be clearly seen from the style of the political campaigns. In the past, everybody was strongly encouraged, or sometimes forced, to vote for Golkar among only three legal political parties (the other two were the PPP and the PDI). It was highly challenging for supporters of the opposition parties, especially those who lives in rural areas, to show whom they support for. However for this time, virtually everyone was enthusiastic talking about politics and did not hide which was his/her favorite political party. For example, streets in Jakarta, provincial capitals and other urban and rural areas across the country had been filled with political banners, floods of supporters with party color cloths, and party flags, not only those of Golkar like before, but now those of the PDI, the PAN, the PKP, at strategic points. Many drivers put their favorite party’s symbol on their cars, public buses, and trucks. Political rallies were always filled with people and vehicles with various party colors. Because the competition was so intense, there were many clashes between supporters of rival parties. Some of these clashes resulted in fatal accidents. The Jakarta Post (1999) “Parties Gear Up for Elections”, February 28.
between the pemilu of the New Order and that of 1999 reflected the transformation of the symbolical, regime-legitimizing election to the democratic multi-party election.

Second, the importance of the political parties and their participation in the pemilu lies in the fact that the term reformasi during the political campaign was reduced to a slogan just to win the people’s support. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a special adviser to President Habibie at that time, seemed to be correct when she said in the seminar, titled Reformasi: Indonesia’s Election, that “the word reformasi was reduced to a mere political slogan as interpreted by everyone or every group who was opposed to Golkar and President Habibie”\(^{210}\). Because of the symbolic power, reformasi could exercise its efficacy to draw an arbitrary boundary between reformasi and status quo. Many of those newly established parties used reformasi to oppose the symbol of status quo, namely Habibie and Golkar. No matter what their meanings of reformasi really are, they could differentiate themselves from Golkar and to arbitrarily classify themselves into the categorization of reformist just by repeating the term reformasi. Dewi Fortuna Anwar together with Amien Rais commented in the same seminar that even to most Indonesians, that “political parties translate the meaning of reformasi into their policies is not of major concern” but they only wanted to see “their aspirations fulfilled”\(^{211}\).

And finally, the political campaigns and the pemilu were important as they symbolized the end of Suharto’s political system. The resignation of Suharto in May 1998 ended Suharto’s presidency, but the system created by Suharto, which many perceived as corrupt and unjust, remained in two of the most important political institutions in Indonesia, the MPR and the DPR. The result of the general election of 1999 replaced the representatives of Suharto government, in other words, the members of the MPR and the DPR, with the representatives chosen by the people. Thus, pemilu ’99 resulted in a subsistent transformation from Suharto system to the democratic system of Indonesian politics.


\(^{211}\) Ibid.
To sum up, the general election of 1999 is important in the development of the term *reformasi* firstly because it was another major outcome of the efficacy of its symbolic power. Since the beginning of the *reformasi* movement, the actors were pressing their definitions of *reformasi*, which reflect their value and interest, to be actualized. Those pressures had gradually changed the election law and created the new functions of *pemilu*. As a result, the *pemilu* brought about the transition from the politics of Indonesia engineered by the elite to that determined by the people’s vote.

Another importance of *pemilu* regarding the term *reformasi* is that it also showed that the meanings of the term which was once consolidated by the Ciganjur Declaration started to dissipate. It is claimed that the term became a mere slogan to attract supports in the *pemilu* because of the usage of the term with irresponsible meanings. It was a major step back for the development of the term *reformasi*.

**Conclusion**

The importance of this chapter was that it outlined the consolidation of the meanings of the term *reformasi* which became the national agendas of the *reformasi* movement. After the first achievement of the symbolic power of *reformasi*, namely the fall of Suharto, the meanings of *reformasi* became more diverse as each actor struggled to consolidate definitions of *reformasi* with their own interests to be best reflected. Among all the actors, it was the Ciganjur Four which won the struggle, thus the national agendas for *reformasi* was based on the compromise among those four political elites. This chapter also saw some of the outcomes of the symbolic power of *reformasi* which began to create new rules, new political cultures and new political system of Indonesia.

This chapter concludes by reviewing important changes occurring in the keywords of the New Order period, namely *pemilu* and *ABRI*, which became apparent in this second period of Indonesian political transitional period. First, *Pemilu* continued to become the keyword in the era of *reformasi*, but the nature of the importance changed completely. Second, *ABRI* was, as introduced by
Langenberg (1986), the strongest power holder, only next to Suharto, in the New Order era212. However, due to the series of events which deteriorate the civil-military relationship, reformasi began to exercise its symbolic power to de-legitimize ABRI's dwifungsi. As a result, ABRI had no longer been able to remain as the power holder in Indonesia, and became the object of detest by the people. The keyword ABRI even disappeared officially from the Indonesian politics since April 1999 when the separation of the military and police took place.

This chapter is divided into three sections: The first section deals with the coalition-making process among the political parties after the general election. The creation of a new division of Indonesian society into Muslims and nationalists is also discussed. It argues that the division is the result of the adjustment of meanings by political elites. The second section deals with these events, which show reconfiguration of the meanings of the term reformasi, which were presented at the Ciganjur, because of pressure from society. These events are Megawati's speech, the rejection of the State Security Bill, the Paskal Ball incident, and the referendum over the future of East Timor. Finally, the third section deals with the Presidential Election, which I argue symbolizes the change in the style of Indonesian politics from elitist to more popular.

3.1. Re-emergence of Old Division: Islam vs. Nationalist

The development of reformasi seemed to come in a half-legged due to two closely related factors. First, after possibly the division between pro-reformasi and pro-status quo became less clear but between 'Islam' and 'nationalist' became greater. Second, the meanings of the term, although once consolidated by the Ciganjur Declaration, had been adjusted by political elites so that they did not have to fully implement the reformasi agenda.

These were an indication of the new division between 'Islam' and 'nationalist' before the vote decision of the people on June 7, 1999. Some Muslim organizations, such as the Muhaiyatul Islam and the Ulema (Consultative Council) issued a so-called 'prayer' statement that Muslims should only vote for

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212 Langenberg (1986). See also chapter I of this paper.
Chapter 5: After the General Election to the Presidential Election

Chapter five covers the period between the general election of June 7, 1999 and the presidential election of October 20. This period is important for the development of the term reformasi, for it was the period when the definition of the term, which was once consolidated in the Ciganjur Declaration, become less clear. This was largely due to three factors, namely 1) the decline of pressure from the students due to the disunity among themselves, 2) the birth of a new division of society, and 3) the skillful adjustment of the meaning of the term by the political elites. In this period, especially the last two factors became obvious.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the coalition-making process among the political parties after the general election. The creation of a new division of Indonesian society into Muslims and nationalists is also discusses. It argues that the division is the result of the adjustment of meanings by political elites. The second section deals with those events which show re-confirmation of the meanings of the term reformasi, which were presented at the Ciganjur, because of pressures from society. Those events are Megawati's speech, the rejection of the State Security Bill, the Bank Bali scandal, and the referendum over the future of East Timor. Finally, the third section deals with the Presidential Election, which, I argue, symbolizes the change in the style of Indonesian politics from elitist to more populist.

5.1. Re-emergence of Old Division: Islam vs. Nationalist

The development of reformasi seemed to come to a halt largely due to two closely related factors. First, after pemilu the division between pro-reformasi and pro-status quo became less clear but between ‘Islam’ and ‘nationalist’ became greater. Second, the meanings of the term, although once consolidated by the Ciganjur Declaration, had been adjusted by political elites so that they did not have to fully implement the reformasi agendas.

There was an indication of the new division between ‘Islam’ and ‘nationalist’ before the vote casting of the pemilu on June 7, 1999. Some Muslim organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah and ICMI, supported the fatwa (legal ruling by a Muslim jurist) stating that Muslims should only vote for
Muslim legislative candidates. The polarization of Indonesia between Muslims and nationalists was, however, rapidly accelerated after the vote counting was started. The result, which showed the domination of the PDI-P without being the single most dominant party occupying 50% of the MPR seats, left the possibility that any party can be on the dominant side of the MPR if they could make the right alliance. Such result provided the background to allow such new division to be created.

One of the three main players in the polarization was Habibie, the presidential candidate from Golkar which won the second most seats in the MPR. In order for him to divert the focus of antagonism against him and also to gain stronger influence in the MPR, Habibie used his influence on Islamic organizations, especially ICMI, to stimulate the unity among the Muslim community against Megawati and her PDI-P. The division between Muslim and nationalist was further developed by the PPP, the second main player, which ended up gaining fifth position in the MPR. On June 15, 1999, the PPP endorsed a fatwa to reject Megawati’s presidential candidacy by stating “the Indonesian president is the best Indonesian Muslim son”, not ‘daughter’. As the discussion spread, the PPP’s deputy chairman A.M. Saefuddin began to show his support to Habibie’s bid for the presidency saying Habibie could be the person to reflect Muslim interest better, despite the fact that the PPP used to claim to be a reformist party by denouncing the status quo force, namely Golkar and Habibie. As quite a few Muslim parties and organizations started to accept the new division as a reality, the

213 The purpose of the fatwa was to discourage Muslim voters from voting for Megawati’s PDI-P, which was believed to be an amalgam of nationalist, Christians and secularist elements. It was suspected that Habibie was behind this stance of ICMI. The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “Last-minute Tricks to Sway Voters Snack of New Order”, June 15.

214 Habibie was appointed in 1990 as a chairman of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia) which was established with an intention to attract a new constituency of middle class Muslims to the Suharto camp. ICMI also gave Habibie real credentials within the middle class elements of Islam. See Richard Robison (1998) “A Suspect Pedigree”, and Hal Hill (1998) “Habibie Can’t Stay for Long” in The Last Days of President Suharto, pp. 126-128. See also Schwarz (1999).

215 This argument was later developed by other Muslim leaders saying that women by nature are not allowed to become leaders because it would be against the Islamic law. The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “Much Ado over Megawati, Women Leaders Continues”, July 3. See also, The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “PPP Wants Male, Muslim President”, June 10.

competition between Habibie and Megawati was illustrated less as a competition between reformist and status quo but rather one between Muslim and nationalist\textsuperscript{217}. The third player, Amien Rais made a proposal to form an Islamic faction in the Diet, which he called a “Central Axis” (Poros Tengah) on July 20, 1999. He named Abdurrahman Wahid, who was respected by the people regardless of their religion, as an alternative presidential candidate from the Central Axis consisting of the PKB, the PAN and Islamic political parties such as the PPP, the PBB, and the PK. Amien Rais himself reasoned the formation of the axis force as to preserve the integrity of the nation which seemed to be split into two groups, namely nationalist and Islam, and to reinforce reformasi\textsuperscript{218}. However, the reason was more like, as Usep Ranuwidjaja put it, that Amien Rais took advantage of the polarization to gain more of his influence\textsuperscript{219}. As his PAN only got 7.1\% of total vote in the result of pemilu, he needed to make coalitions with other parties in order for him to be more influential in the MPR. Unlike Usep’s prediction, the coalition did not result in further development of the confrontation between the nationalist parties and the Islamic parties largely due to Wahid’s neutrality\textsuperscript{220}. However, it obviously became an obstruction for the voice of the majority to be reflected in the Presidential Election in October.

To sum up, the new division between Muslims and nationalists was a creation of the political elites’ struggle over power, not a religious struggle. It is doubtful that these leaders of Muslim parties were seriously worried that Muslim interests to be made insignificant by a nationalist leader,

\textsuperscript{217} The Jakarta Post quoted Ikrar Nusa Bhakti as saying that “there were some propaganda from Islamic leaders, as if Megawati’s PDI-P won the elections, it would endanger the Muslims’ interests since most of the party’s parliamentary candidates were non-Muslim” despite the fact that most of the party’s candidate is said to be Muslim. The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “Golkar Remains a Potent Political Force”, July 2.


\textsuperscript{219} The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “Alternative Presidential Candidates ‘May be Harmful’”, July 29. It is also said that it was because of a rivalry between Amien Rais and Megawati which made him make the decision. He is said not to agree with the idea that the PAN’s interests are best served by letting Megawati lead the country. See Jose Manuel Tesoro (1999) “Time to Wait for Results”, Asiaweek, August 6.

\textsuperscript{220} Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of the NU, and his PKB took rather a neutral position on the separation between nationalist parties and Islamic parties. Although after some Islamic parties and organizations showed their rejection of Megawati as the President, Wahid had kept denying that it is wrong that Koran prohibit woman from being a leader. His neutrality, in a sense, reduced the danger of the acceleration of the rivalry between the polarization.
Megawati. Their concern was rather the fear that their own political influence would become insignificant in politics. This polarization was interpreted by some analysts as the return of *aliran* politics of 1955\(^{221}\). These Muslim parties and organizations, such as the PPP and ICMI to name a few, used an Islamic oriented approach to gain popularity and to make the reformasi agendas insignificant.

Thus, as a result of the new division created due to the adjustment of the reformasi agendas by those politicians, the boundary between reformist and *status quo* became blurry. It became an interruption for the *reformasi* movement, as the division showed the failure of the so-called the pro-reformasi parties to come together and to promote genuine reform. The reform agenda, the very reason the entire election process was held in 1999 not in 2002, was rarely mentioned while these leaders engaged in building coalition to ensure their strength and influence in the MPR.

5.2. Re-confirmation of the Definitions of Reformasi

The meanings of the term *reformasi* seemed to become less meaningful after the general election. However, one event revitalized the people's awareness of their roles in the *reformasi* movement at the end of July, namely Megawati’s speech. As a result, the agendas of reformasi once set by the Ciganjur Four in November 1998, were re-confirmed to be valid, thus the consolidation of the adjusted meanings of *reformasi* was averted. Moreover, the revitalization of the awareness of the people could be seen in mass protests against some of the government’s new policies.

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\(^{221}\) *Aliran* politics, according to Clifford Geertz (1965) *The Social History of an Indonesian Town*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, pp. 127-129, is ‘a system where political affiliation is based on ethnicity, culture and religion more than ideology’, and it also assumes that ‘mass political groupings and associations are clustered around similar groupings and associations among the elite’. The result of 1955 election, which was the last election before the one in 1999, was largely due to such a scheme. The 1955 general election resulted in the four biggest parties -- the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the traditional Islamic party Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Indonesian Muslim Council (Masyumi) -- each garnering between 16 percent to 22 percent of the votes. See Herbert Feith (1957) *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Interim Reports Series, Cornell University, Ithaca. See also Hermawan Sulistyo (1999) “No party will win a majority in elections” *The Jakarta Post.com*, June 2. Ichlasul Amal (1999) “The Bumpy Road to True Democratic Society”, *The Jakarta Post.com*, July 3. Olle Tornquist (1999) “World's third largest democracy” *The Jakarta Post.com*, July 3.
Megawati’s Speech

By early July 1999, the people began a huge debate over Megawati’s credibility as a presidential candidate and as a reformist because of her long silence since the general election. The speech of Megawati on July 29 was designed to respond both to the popular demand to break her silence and to Amien Rais’ criticism. In her speech, she reconfirmed that her support for the agendas of reformasi set in the Ciganjur meeting were unchanged.

This paper focuses on the four criteria of reformasi set by the Ciganjur Declaration and by the student activists who called for reformasi total, because these four agendas had been the major interests of Indonesian society as well as International community at the time. These criteria are: 1) Abolition of dwifungsi of the military; 2) Suharto’s trial; 3) Amendment of UUD ‘95; and 4) The independence of East Timor. Megawati commented that she supports the amendment of articles of UUD ‘45, but rejected the changes in the preamble, which mentioned the independence spirit and Pancasila. Regarding dwifungsi of the armed forces, she stated that she still follows what the Ciganjur Declaration stated, namely its gradual abolition in six years. Megawati also supported the conduct of Suharto’s trial and stated it should be conducted fairly under the law. On East Timor, she supported “peaceful and fair referendum” under the supervision of the United Nations to make the final decision whether, or not, to grant East Timor an independence.

In addition, she attempted to strengthen her legitimacy by giving a new definition of the term reformasi. Claiming that the THE PDI-P’s victory in the general election was the people’s choice, Megawati emphasized that whether one cherishes “the sovereignty of the people and democracy” divides reformist from status quo.

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222 One major criticism of Megawati’s policies about reformasi agendas was made by Amien Rais. By the end of June, Amien Rais started challenge her to clarify certain points of her reformasi agendas. Amien Rais reportedly said in the seminar “Reformasi: Indonesia’s Election” that “there are some confusing policies (within the PDI-P), and many similarities between the PDI-P and Golkar, in that they both seem pro-status quo”. Prapti Widinugraheni (1999) “Reformasi’ Little More than Jargon”.

223 Later Megawati was said to support that Suharto should be pardoned after the trial and convicted. See The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “Megawati may ‘Pardon’ Soeharto, aide says”, August 7.

Megawati’s speech was important for the development of reformasi in two senses. First, it reconfirmed the meanings of reformasi defined by the Ciganjur Declaration. Second, it functioned to revitalize the people’s awareness about their role in the reformasi movement. The speech made the people realize that, unlike the New Order era, the demands and participation of the people can be a real pressure in Indonesian politics.

The discourse of her speech showed the dramatic changes in her definitions of reformasi before and after the speech. Before the speech, Megawati and the PDI-P had been criticized for behaving as pro-status quo. Indeed, there were some implications that Megawati, who was confirmed as a reformist in the Ciganjur meeting in November, wanted to make some adjustments of the definitions of reformasi in order for her interests, not people’s interests, to be better actualized. The four criteria mentioned above are, again, brought up as examples. She did not seem to support the amendment of the UUD ‘45, partially because it was her father Sukarno who played the greatest role in its construction. For the elimination of the military’s dwifungsi was also hesitated as the PDI-P was in need of the TNI’s supports. She also preferred to pardon Suharto from being dragged to trial. Megawati seemed to reject the independence plan of East Timor, too, due to her nationalist sentiment. Many similarities between the attitudes of Megawati and Habibie toward reformasi on the four criteria were clearly visible.

In her speech, however, she intended to articulate the voice of the people. What made her change her meanings of reformasi completely was nothing else but the huge demands of the people which pressured Megawati to prove herself a true reformist. Thus, Megawati had no choice but to include the popular opinions about reformasi agendas in her meanings of the term, despite her own preference. The pressure made Megawati adjust her own interests to the popular meanings of reformasi, not vise-versa. As a result, from this point forward people become less susceptible to the

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225 Habibie and Golkar have been widely illustrated as pro-status quo by the public, and they were reluctant about most of those four criteria. Because of the influence of ex-ABRI officers in Golkar and the MPR seats allocated for the TNI, Golkar could not push for the immediate elimination of dwifungsi. Golkar had been highly reluctant about Suharto’s trial, because of the close tie with him in the past. For the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, too, Habibie hesitated as it gave extraordinary power to the president of Indonesia, and he still needed it. However over the issue of referendum on East Timor’s future, Habibie was enthusiastic to push for it.
manipulation of definitions of the term as Megawati’s speech reconfirmed the aims of reformasi. It also revitalized the people’s awareness of their influence in politics.

The State Security Bill and the Bank Bali Scandal

Two most important events which further reconfirmed the meanings of reformasi and the importance of the people’s participation to the movement were the protests over the state security bill and the Bank Bali Scandal.

A new state security bill, sponsored by General Wiranto, the minister of Defense and Security at the time, was submitted to the House for deliberation on July 19, 1999 to replace the one that had been implemented since 1959. Military claimed that the new security bill was made to reflect TNI’s gradual reform policies which aimed to repair the military’s image.

Soon after the draft of the bill was submitted, however, rejection of and criticism against it mounted up among student activists and human rights activists. They rejected the bill because they argued that it would allow “the president to declare a state of emergency in troubled territories and to delegate authority to the military” and he would then be invested with “unlimited power to crack down on threats to state security”\(^{226}\). In addition, the people protested against the bill more because of the forceful manner in which the military pushed the bill through parliament. It sent a strong message to the protestors that the armed forces were not giving up their political role. The bill was protested for its being against one of the essential meanings of reformasi, namely the abolition of dwifungsi of the Indonesian military.

The bill was passed on September 23 as planned, amid widespread protests\(^{227}\). The decision sparked Jakarta’s largest student protests and most violent military crackdown since the previous

\(^{226}\) Many of them interpreted the bill as the law which would allow “the military to carry out investigations and raids, and take over all mail, telecommunications and electronic facilities”, and “a ban or limitation on demonstrations and public exposure through print and electronic media”. The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “State Security Bill Faces Tough Protest”, September 16.

November\textsuperscript{228}. As a result of the protest, the military had to postpone Habibie’s signing of the bill until the public was ‘educated’ about its implications\textsuperscript{229}.

The Bank Bali scandal revolved around the illegal transfer of some Rp. 546 billion to PT Era Giat Prima (EGP), a private firm linked to Habibie’s close associates, in commissions to help the bank to recoup Rp. 904 billion in interbank claims on closed banks\textsuperscript{230}. It is often believed that the money went to Habibie’s backer, known as the Success Team or Tim Sukses to raise funds to help financing Habibie’s presidential race in November\textsuperscript{231}. The worst was that Habibie government appeared to be trying to suppress the detailed report of the scandal\textsuperscript{232}.

This event was particularly important for its role in the consolidation of a meaning of reformasi, because the people’s reaction toward the scandal consolidated ‘the elimination of KKN’ as indispensable to the successful reformasi. It revealed the incompetence of Habibie’s transitional government, which repeatedly displayed to be a new and clean government, with no connection to the New Order era, in the fight for KKN and clean government. Although the money was returned, it did not change the fact that now Habibie was confirmed as a status quo.

The importance of these two events was that the meaning of reformasi was confirmed by the people, not by the elite. The result of the strong protests against the security bill and the Bank Bali Scandal can be regarded as a partial victory of the people in the conflict to define the meanings of the term reformasi.

\textsuperscript{228} Seven People were killed in two days of unrest and dozens were missing. Dan Murphy (1999) “The Power Brokers” \textit{FEER}, October 7.
\textsuperscript{229} The postponing of signing the security bill was not enough for the people. Thus, they continued protesting preferring the scrap of the bill. \textit{The Jakarta Post.com} (1999) “Offer to Delay Bill Fails to Quiet Critics”, September 27.
\textsuperscript{232} It is said that the report might well force Habibie and other top officials from the Success Team to resign. \textit{The Jakarta Post.com} (1999) “House Delays Hearing on Bank Bali Scandal”, September 1. Also see Dan Murphy and John McBeth (1999) “Follow the Money”, \textit{FEER}, September 23.

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The other important event of this period was the referendum in East Timor and the after violence. Soon after Habibie took his presidency, he began to offer East Timor autonomy. He soon revised the plan and proposed the idea of referendum to decide whether East Timor would remain to be a part of Indonesia; if not, Habibie promised, East Timor can be independent. One of the purposes of his showing liberal attitude toward East Timorese referendum was the achievement of more popularity in the International society, especially from Western countries. It is because, for a few month of his presidency, Habibie was seriously in need of international recognition and oversea aids.

The referendum took place on August 31, 1999 under the UN observation. The vote casting was implemented smoothly. However, as soon as the result was announced on September 4 that the overwhelming majority of East Timorese had voted against integration with Indonesia, an outbreak of violence and killing of pro-independence residents by pro-integration militia occurred. The sentiment that this decision would trigger the disintegration of Indonesia was accelerated by TNI's inability to suppress the violence. Thus, the credibility of Habibie, as well as that of TNI as a president, further declined rapidly.

This event, together with the Bank Bali Scandal, severely deteriorated Habibie’s chance to win the presidential election. Habibie’s accountability speech on October 11, 1999 was rejected by the MPR. It can be said that these two events played a major role in the rejection of his accountability.

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233 The western countries had long been accusing Suharto’s government for the violation of Human Rights in East Timor. Habibie’s hoped to gain popularity from the western countries by showing he concerns about human rights violation in East Timor.

234 The decision was, however, made without consulting parliament or listening to the military, so it put him on a collision course with Indonesian nationalism, especially with the military. The military was also concerning that the aspiration for the independence of East Timor might stimulate the separatist sentiment in Aceh and Irian Jaya, where separatist movements have been active for a long time, thus lead to the national disintegration. John MacBeth and Dan Murphy (1999) “Double Whammy”, FEER, September 23.

235 The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “East Timorese Say ‘No’”, September 5. 78.5% of valid votes cast rejected Indonesia’s offer for an autonomy package, and 21.5% voted in favor for it.

236 Megawati, who had been opposing the independence plan, strongly accused Habibie’s decision for inflicting harm to Indonesia as a nation state. It was also strongly criticized as that Habibie sacrificed national stability to enhance his own international standing. The Jakarta Post.com (1999) “Criticisms Mount over Habibie’s East Timor Decision”, September 7. Also see Sangwon Suh and Tom McCawley (1999) “On the Firing Line”, Asiamweek September 24.

237 Even there is a strong speculation that the TNI itself was encouraging the militia.
speech in the MPR. It was ironic, however, as this concession was the only one decision of Habibie which was perceived as pro-reformasi.

To sum up, Megawati’s speech revitalized the people’s awareness of their role in the reformasi movement by articulating and consolidating their meanings of reformasi as the national agendas. Furthermore, it encouraged the people to rejoin the reformasi movement to direct Indonesia toward reformasi. They were less susceptible to the elites’ adjustment, or manipulation, of the term reformasi.

On the other hand, the result of the vice-presidential race was the result of the popular politics. This decisive moment when the elitist politics came into force arrived just before the vote casting started on October 20, 1999, by one of the member of the Ciganjur Four, Amien Rais who was then elected as the chairman of the MPR. The Habibie’s withdrawal from the presidential race, due to the rejection of his accountability speech, was announced on October 20. Soon after the announcement, Amien Rais was said to negotiate and persuade Yusril Ihza Mahendra, of the Crescent Star Party, another presidential candidate besides Habibie, Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid, to pull
out from the race. The purpose was to prevent the anti-Megawati vote from splitting so that the election result would be in favor of Gus Dur, who was nominated by Amien’s Central Axis.

Abdurrahman Wahid was chosen to be the fourth president of Indonesia as the fruit of the negotiation. Megawati, whose party obtained the most popular supports in the pemilu in June, was defeated largely due to the negotiation. It is not too much to say that neither the negotiation process among elites politicians nor the result of the presidential election reflected the outcome of the pemilu on June 7, in short, the political aspiration of Indonesian society.

On the other hand, the result of the vice-presidential race was the result of the popular pressure. What contributed to the shift from elitist politics to more populist one was the riot following the verdict of the presidential election. Megawati’s supporters were outraged because their victory in pemilu was not reflected in the presidential election. Her supporters who gathered up initially waiting for the moment of the Megawati regime’s birth started to vent their anger by setting fire to tires, cars and toll booths, and it developed into clashes between the protesters and police. The riots had made those elites realize that Suharto’s elitist political style, which many elites had been accustomed to, was no longer acceptable in Indonesia.

Fearing riots would become so intensified that security force could not handle them, major competitors of the vice presidency race, Akbar Tanjung and Wiranto, dropped out and gave way to Megawati. As a result, Megawati was elected as the vice-president by wide margin against Hamza Haz of the PPP. Although it was violence with which the people expressed their aspiration, the supporters of the PDI-P, which won 34% of total vote in the general election, was somehow reflected in the presidential race.

Thus, a series of events regarding the presidential election became the milestone of

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239 Riots took place not only in Jakarta, but also Central Java, Solo and Bali, which has long been considered as one of the safest islands in terms of political violence.
Indonesian politics as it symbolized the transition of Indonesian politics characterized as elitists to more populists. The presidential election followed by the riots also can be understood as the people’s pressure to consolidate one of the major meanings of reformasi, namely “the sovereignty of the people and democracy” which Megawati mentioned earlier. It can be also seen as the consolidation of the new social reality which the people had been trying to create by reformasi, namely the political system that reflects popular demands. Megawati’s victory in the vice presidential election can be regarded as the elites’ acceptance of the meaning as well as the new reality. Thus, the result can be described as the major outcome of the symbolic power of the term reformasi.

Conclusion

This chapter saw the revitalization and consolidation of the meanings and aims of reformasi which had once demanded by students, set by the Ciganjur Declaration, and had been trivialized by the elites’ manipulations. Although it was the mass protests with violence, the manifestation of the Ciganjur Declaration was achieved by the pressure from the people.

To conclude, this chapter discusses changes and continuities of keywords between the New Order period and the era of reformasi that could be seen during this period. First, the change of the significance of keywords can be observed from the word UUD '45. The keyword had been used in the New Order period to draw legitimacy for an absolute power to a President of Indonesia, however, it became no longer the source of a legitimacy to a ruler. Instead, one must support the amendment of the UUD '45 in order for the person to gain political legitimacy.

Second, the development of the term Pancasila shows both continuity and discontinuity of its importance in politics. For nationalist leaders, Pancasila remained as the source of legitimacy and solidarity as it encourages the unity of the people despite the differences in ethnicity or religion. On the other hand, for the Muslim forces, the commitment to Pancasila became less obligatory, thus they started openly to view Pancasila as an obstruction for their religious interests to be best reflected in the politics. Instead, they could draw legitimacy from alternative source, namely the Islam.
Chapter 6: On Rituals

Chapter one showed that the legitimization of a word needs to fulfill three properties: the property of discourse, the property of speaker and the property of situation\textsuperscript{240}. It also demonstrates that all the necessary conditions to fulfill the most important property, the property of situation, can be created and provided in rituals. Chapter three to Chapter five described the development of reformasi, and demonstrated the changes and consolidations of the meanings of reformasi taking place around certain important events. It can be said that all of these events, more or less, had sufficient degrees of appropriateness of these three properties. After clarifying these points, now it is able to focus on a role of rituals in the development of reformasi.

This chapter analyzes the role of two events, namely the occupation of the Parliament complex and the Ciganjur Declaration, which functioned as rituals to change and consolidate the meanings of reformasi during the transitional period of Indonesian politics. These events are focused on because these they represent the most successful rituals which brought the most significant changes in the development of reformasi.

6.1. The Occupation of the Parliament Complex: the Formation of Communitas

Among all rituals of the transitional period of Indonesian politics, the occupation of the Parliament buildings was the most remarkable ritual regarding the development of reformasi. The main significance of the occupation was that it successfully functioned as a ritual to legitimize the students’ rendition of reformasi, namely ‘the resignation of Suharto’. In addition, it also functioned as the ritual to transform: first the status of the Parliament complex itself; second, the status of the students by enabling the formation of, what Turner calls, ‘communitas’, a communion of individuals who submit together to the authority of the ritual\textsuperscript{241}. The discussion of this sub-chapter is based on

\textsuperscript{240} See chapter 1 of this paper.

\textsuperscript{241} Turner (1969), pp. 94-96.
Bourdieu’s theory of “symbolic power”\textsuperscript{242}. It first analyzes the ritual by using the three properties, as mentioned above, which Bourdieu argues are necessities for the legitimacy of the language to be recognized. It clarifies in what degree those three properties were fulfilled and contributed to the success of the ritual. Then this section is concluded with an analysis of the success of the ritual in anthropological and political senses.

The Three Properties

The occupation of the Parliament complex as a ritual possessed a very high quality of the property of situation in terms of place, time and audience. To begin with, the venue of the ritual was symbolically the most appropriate place for the opposition to hold the ritual in two senses. First, the Parliament complex allowed the symbolic triumph of the students. The ritual successfully transformed the complex from the symbol of ‘Suharto’s lock on power’ to the ‘symbol of the people’s power’, which was later actualized as the political reality.

The Parliament complex had sanctified on the symbol of “Suharto’s power” before the occupation. During 32 years of Suharto’s presidency, no legislation was passed, nor passionate debates rang out there. In other words, the Parliament complex was the state-theater where social rituals had been traditionally acted out under the Suharto regime in order to legitimize whatever Suharto decided. During the occupation, however, the symbol of the Parliament complex was shifted after the complex experiencing Turner’s model of three phases of ritual: separation, liminality and aggregation. The process of the occupation of the buildings by the students with their signs, banners and graffiti, all of which did not belong to Suharto government, can be considered as the phases of separation, as the process deprived the buildings of the old identity. During the occupation, the identity of the complex was liminal, because either it did not function as it was designed or a new identity had not been conferred yet. The new identity of the Parliament complex was given when the

\textsuperscript{242} “Symbolic power” is the power of language to create social reality arbitrarily without letting people know that they are subject to it or even exercise it. On “symbolic power”, see Bourdieu (1991) “The Social Institution of Symbolic Power” Language and Symbolic Power, pp.105-159.
mounting pressure from the society made the loyalists of Suharto, such as Harmoko and the MPR members, accept the students’ definition of, and ultimate goal of, reformasi, namely the resignation of Suharto. This was the moment of the aggregation when what the Parliament complex symbolized before, namely, Suharto’s power, was transformed into the symbol of People’s Power.243

Second, the venue had the best quality of the property of situation, also in terms of place, because the occupation of the physical space itself was meaningful. In the Suharto era, meetings in public spaces, such as streets, parks, and needless to say, government buildings, were not allowed without permission from the government. The occupation of a public place, especially the political arena for this time, symbolizes the collapse of the government’s control of the masses. Thus, since a ritual is where a new reality is created by symbolic means, the symbolic transformation of the Parliament complex can be regarded as a key to the success of the ritual.

Next, the occupation of the Parliament complex, as a ritual to give recognition to the students’ definition of the term reformasi, possesses the appropriate properties of situation in terms of number of participants and audience. The number of students occupying the Parliament was much larger than in any student demonstrations during the New Order period. Moreover, the number of the participants and the significance of the event were amplified by the media, especially TV, magazines and newspaper, particularly by using the emotive pictures from the occupation site as well as demonstrations and rallies around the city. One most effective picture was the image of thousands of students dressed in their university jackets in the DPR building, which was transformed by the media into the chief iconic symbol of the reformasi movement vs. status quo.245 These images were disseminated by the media to the entire Indonesian population within and outside of the Indonesian archipelago, thus, the number in audience was extended. As a result, the image became a real pressure to force the government officials, such as Harmoko and others, to accept the students’ definition of reformasi as a reality.

244 “A big part of the celebration is experiencing the transformation of work space, or traffic space, or some kind of official space into a playfield” (Schechner, 1993, p. 49).
The properties of time is also important in the ritual at the occupation as it is closely connected to the appropriation of the property of speaker in the ritual, namely the students, by turning them into agents of reformasi. The most important fact which appropriated the property of time was that the occupation took place after the Trisakti Incident which killed four students. The incident provided the opposition a shared symbol which helped to consolidate the solidarity among the oppositions. Given the name pahlawan reformasi or heroes of reform²⁴⁶, these four ‘martyrs’ were transferred into the collective symbol of ‘the struggle of reformists against status quo’ which became a projector of, in Durkheim’s words, “the collection of the individual consciousness” of the activists as well as the whole society²⁴⁷. The symbol strengthen the solidarity among the student demonstrators, thus induced the formation of, in Turner’s words, communitas among the subject of the ritual in the occupation.

The appropriateness of these properties of situations enabled the recognition of the students’ definition of reformasi as legitimate, thus bestowed the symbolic power to transform the status of the students into agents of reformasi. The students also experienced the three phases of ritual as their status were transformed. Even before the occupation, the students had already abandoned their role defined by the society through demonstrations and rallies. The ritual at the occupation, with such a high appropriateness of the situations, allowed the students to unite themselves, thus formed the communitas of the ritual, under the term reformasi with the particular meaning, “the resignation of Suharto”, as the totem of the students. The transformation of the status of the students was firstly recognized only among themselves, however, it was soon recognized by the whole society when their definition of the term, ‘the stepping down of Suharto’ was accepted even by pro-Suharto politicians and actualized as the new political reality.

²⁴⁶ Jbid., p. 217.
²⁴⁷ Durkheim (1965: p. 261) argues that “the part is equal to the whole; it has the same powers, the same efficacy... the smallest drop of blood contains the same active principle as the whole thing” in religious thought. It can be applied to the case of the Trisakti Incident, although it was social and political than truly religious. The blood of the four students contained the same active principle as that of the whole society.
In addition, the property of discourse was the least appropriate of the three properties in this ritual to legitimize the students’ sense of reformasi. The students had been outspoken speakers in the movement, however, the most important was that their speech conveyed their aspiration for change. The content of the discourse itself was not as important.

**Anthropological and Political Success of the Ritual**

The occupation of the Parliament complex was a successful ritual both anthropologically and politically. To start with, the occupation was anthropologically a successful ritual in three senses. First, it was a ritual in Van Gennep’s sense of rites de passage “which accompany every change of place, state and social position.” The occupation, just like the ritual of baptism, wedding, or circumcision, brought about changes to the venue itself as well as to the subjects of the ritual. The Parliament complex was transformed into the symbol of the people’s power, thus providing the best situation for the successful ritual to take place. In the ritual at the Parliament complex, because of the highly appropriate property of the situations, the students were also legitimized as the agents of reformasi, thus as the appropriate speakers of reformasi. In short, the ritual not only provided a favorable situation, but also the ritual itself produced appropriateness for the ritual to be successful.

Second, it was anthropologically a successful ritual particularly in the sense outlined by Durkheim. The occupation became the moment of “collective effervescence” when the “collective consciousness” and faith in the meaning of reformasi, “the overthrow of Suharto”, was recognized as the symbol, which projected the individual consciousness, by all participants and the audience of the ritual.

Finally, the ritual was successful in Turner’s sense, firstly because the students achieved the formation of communitas in the process of the transformation of their status. Secondly, the ritual was successful in Turner’s sense in achieving the symbolic transformation of the status of the Parliament
complex as well as that of the students were achieved through his model of three phases of ritual: separation, liminality and aggregation. 

To sum up, the occupation was politically successful as it induced the biggest change in the last 32 years in Indonesian politics, the resignation of Suharto. The ritual successfully granted reformasi, with the students’ definition, a recognition as legitimate. As Bourdieu argues, the word which was recognized as legitimate exercises the symbolic power to create social reality, in short the meaning was actualized as Indonesia’s new political reality. The symbolic power then produced the pressure to make the entire society, even Suharto’s loyalists, to accept the new view of the reality. Thus it led to the political success of the ritual that it brought about the resignation of Suharto by means of symbolic pressure.

The success of the ritual can also be explained by Geertz’s theory of a ritual as “model of” and “model for” the society. The definition of reformasi defined by the students became a “model of” the society as it presented the idealized worldview of the political reality. As the word was recognized as legitimate, it became the “model for” the society, thus the people followed the description and reinforced the legitimacy of the worldview. Thus, the ritual brought about the political change.

6.2. Ciganjur Declaration: the Anointment of Reformasi Speakers

Another important ritual for the development of the term reformasi was the Ciganjur Declaration. It was important in two senses. First, it was a successful ritual as it set the common meanings and aims of reformasi by the four popular leaders of the time, namely Megawati, Amien Rais, Gus Dur and Hamengkubuwono X, the Sultan of Yogyakarta. However, compared to the

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249 Ibid., p. 95.
250 Geertz (1975: pp. 89-90) calls ritual “model of” and “model for” the society. The ritual is “model of” the society as it describes the idealized model of the society and reality. It is “model for” the society as throughout the ritual, the members faithfully follow what the worldview describes, thus reinforces the faith on the society.
occupation of the Parliament complex, it was less successful, mainly because the legitimization of the meanings conferred by the ritual was not unanimously accepted. The other success of the Ciganjur Declaration was that it became a ritual to confirm those four leaders as the speakers for reformasi. They had long been popular leaders for their engagement in the social organizations, however it was not until the announcement of the declaration that they were confirmed as the embodiment of reformasi.

The following section analyzes the Ciganjur Declaration, again, by using Bourdieu’s theory of the three properties.

**The Three Properties**

First, and the most crucial element among the three properties for the Ciganjur Declaration was, just like the occupation of the Parliament complex, the property of situation in terms of time, audience and place. The time contributed to the symbolical success of the ritual in the Ciganjur Declaration, which took place on November 11 1998, as it paralleled the special session of the MPR. The former was the ritual orchestrated by the students, using the “Ciganjur Four”, namely Megawati, Amien Rais, Abduhrrahman Wahid and the Sultan of Yogyakarta who were selected by the students as mediums to officialize the students’ definitions of reformasi as the national agendas of the reformasi movement. The latter, the MPR session, was another ritual orchestrated by the MPR members to legitimize Habibie’s presidency and his cabinet, in addition to Habibie regime’s definitions of reformasi. This parallel emphasized the boundary between reformasi and status quo, thus it was perceived as the symbolic confrontation of legitimacy between the two parties. As it was the time when anything to do with status quo was highly detested, the people were ready to support the reformasi side of the confrontation from the beginning.

Next, the properties of situations in terms of place and audience were truly meaningful for the ritual at the Ciganjur to confirm the meanings of reformasi and the four leaders as the speakers of reformasi. These properties greatly contributed in the enhancement of the appropriateness of the property of the speakers.
The property of the place was meaningful in the transformation of the status of the speakers, and it enabled the four leaders to go through Turner’s model of the three phases, namely separation, liminality and aggregation, of a ritual. The Ciganjur Declaration took place in a part of South Jakarta\textsuperscript{251}, while the other ritual at the MPR took place, of course, in the middle of Jakarta, which was considered a political arena. The parallel contributed to the differentiation of the Ciganjur Four from the rest of the politicians. Those four leaders were political elites to begin with, however, the location symbolically separated the Ciganjur Four from their status as politicians: it was the phase of separation. In the phase of liminality, the status of the four leaders was symbolically synchronized with the ordinary people, and they came to be regarded as the representatives of the people\textsuperscript{252}. Their separation from the rest of political leaders was important, as it was the time when the people’s distrust of the politicians’ ability to implement reformasi was very high. At the moment the declaration was announced, and when it was adopted, the status of the four leaders was transformed into and confirmed as the speakers of reformasi: it was the phase of aggregation. In short, the appropriateness of the property of the place increased the appropriateness of the property of the speakers.

The other element which increased the appropriateness of the property of the speakers was the property of situations in terms of the number and kind of audience. To begin with, the Ciganjur meeting was orchestrated by groups of students\textsuperscript{253}. The students needed to have representatives who had political influence to articulate the students’ ideas on reformasi. They had no position in the political policy making process, although their status became the agents of reformasi in the ritual at the Parliament complex.

Megawati, Gus Dur, Amien Rais and Hamengkubuwono X, were chosen by the students as the representatives of those students. One reason for this choice was that the four were widely

\textsuperscript{251} The Ciganjur is the part of South Jakarta where the headquarter of the Nudhalatul Ulama as well as the residence of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati are.

\textsuperscript{252} The status of the four leaders became unclear in terms of politics.

\textsuperscript{253} The student group which participated the most in the organizing the meeting was FKSMMJ [Front Asi Makkasiswa untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi: Student Action Front for Reform and Democracy] (Aspinal, 1999, p. 227).
accepted as populist leaders because of their leadership in popular organizations such as the exiled faction of the PDI, the NU, and the Muhammadiyah, moreover the sultan was the symbol of the Javanese. In short, the Ciganjur Declaration was a successful ritual to confirm the four leaders' status, as they were anointed to be the speakers of reformasi to start with. On the other hand, the MPR members are inscribed in the constitution as the people's representatives, however, they did not have the people's recognition to be so. Thus, the ritual at the MPR implemented by the Habibie regime was inappropriate in terms of the property of the speakers. In short, they were not considered as appropriate speakers for reformasi. In short, there was much support for the ritual at the Ciganjur, on the other hand there were a large protest against the meeting at the MPR254; therefore, the ritual at the Ciganjur had the appropriate audiences and the ritual at the MPR did not possess the appropriateness in the property of audience.

Thus, the transformation of their status also directly contributed to the enhancement of the appropriateness of the property of speakers. In addition, it was the success of the ritual itself which increased the appropriateness of the speakers. The Ciganjur Four could strengthen their image as reformists because, as Randall Collins says, the collective energy produced in a successful ritual can also empower the speakers255.

The property of discourse, however, was superceded by the other two properties, just as in the ritual at the Parliament complex. The meanings of the term reformasi stated in the declaration were pro-reformist, more or less, however these meanings were closer to the meanings decided by the Habibie government in the MPR256.

To sum up, the Ciganjur Declaration was a successful ritual in two senses, that it established the meanings of reformasi as a national agenda, and also confirmed the four leaders as the speakers of reformasi. The success in the former sense was, however, controversial, and the definitions of the

254 Since the very beginning of the special MPR session, students were holding a large demonstration against the conduct of the session.
255 Collins (1992), p. 40. See Chapter 1 of this paper.
256 On the definitions of reformasi decided in the Ciganjur meeting, see chapter 5.2. of this paper.
term set in the ritual were not accepted unanimously by the society. The ritual failed in a sense that the intention of the initial organizer of the ritual, namely the students, was not reflected in the declaration. However, it was successful for the Ciganjur Four, as, despite rivalries among some of them, they were able to produce common ground for the reformasi movement.

Whether it was successful or not, the Ciganjur Declaration still have a great importance in the process of the development of the term reformasi. Because the definitions given by the Ciganjur Four were widely accepted as legitimate by the society, these came to exercise symbolic power which put pressure on the society, regime and the political elites to actualize what the definitions describe. Thus, the direction of the reformasi movement in Indonesia was set at the moment when the Ciganjur Declaration became the symbolic power.

Conclusion

The occupation of the Parliament complex and the Ciganjur Declaration were the two most significant rituals in the development of the term reformasi in the transitional period of Indonesian politics. The former was the more important of the two as the meaning of the term produced by the ritual was accepted unanimously, and it induced the immediate and biggest change, namely the fall of Suharto. In addition, the ritual also transformed the status of the students and the complex itself in the process of the ritual. The latter ritual was fairly successful in terms of the confirmation of the status of the four leaders. However, it was less successful in terms of the definition given to the term reformasi, as the meanings stated in the declaration did not reflect the voice of the students, who had initially orchestrated the ritual.

This chapter only focused on these two rituals, however, the role of other smaller rituals in the development of the term reformasi should not be ignored. Each ritual, more or less, possessed the appropriateness of the three properties, and contributed to bring about various changes in the development of the term.
Conclusion

By identifying the word reformasi as the main keyword, this thesis has discussed the development of reformasi movement and analyzed the development of the keyword reformasi by applying Williams’ “keywords” approach. Its main aim was to induce a comprehensive understanding of the socio-political changes during the period of political transition of Indonesia from late 1997 to October 1999.

This paper first found the nature of language as the key to the ability of the keywords approach to enable such a thorough understanding. It found that a comprehensive understanding of such issues can be explained by what Bourdieu calls a “symbolic power” of language, which is an arbitrary power to create social reality. He asserts that the relations of linguistic exchange are the relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers are actualized. In order for a language to exercise its symbolic power, it needs first to be recognized as legitimate, and the legitimization depends on the relationship among the properties of discourse, speakers and situations. Among the three, the most important property is situations which include appropriate audience, time, and place. An event that possesses all the necessary conditions is a ritual.

In order to clarify that a ritual is a stage where a society bestows legitimacy to its members, the society itself and its language, this thesis introduced three propositions put forward by Durkheim, Turner, and Geertz. Durkheim calls the rituals “the moments of collective effervescence”, when the fundamental category of thought as well as the collective reality of society are born. Turner argues that all rituals, consisting of three phases of separation, liminality and aggregation, is effective in bringing about transitions to the subject of ritual and classifications of all roles in the society. Geertz discusses that a ritual is a model of and for the society, and it can be regarded as an extrinsic and intrinsic source of information that guides the behavior of the member of the society. In addition, it should not be ignored that, because of such functions, a ritual can be used as a stage of socio-political engineering by powerholders of the society to create a reality which best reflects their own interests.
This thesis has emphasized two core arguments of Williams: first is that a study of differences in definitions of keywords enables to analyze the ideas, interests and realities of the speakers; second, the consolidation process of keywords reflects the processes of society and history making. Based on these notions, this thesis asserts the study of the development of the keyword reformasi clarifies the changing interests and realities of the actors of reformasi and the development of the reformasi movement itself.

The period between the Asian Economic Crisis and the fall of Suharto, which was dealt with in the third chapter, showed the development of reformasi from the introduction of the word reformasi to the actualization of the efficacy of its symbolic power. The IMF reform packages introduced reformasi to the Indonesian society. It was however initially discussed only among a small number of political elites without much enthusiasm because they were aware that the implementation of reformasi might cause deprivation of their privileges. Since mid-February 1998, students conducted a number of demonstrations and rallies against the skyrocketing price of necessities as well as against the Suharto government itself. These demonstrations brought about the recognition of reformasi to a wider Indonesian society and spreaded the students’ definitions of the term and demands for reformasi total. As the economic crisis dragged on and the social unrest became untamable, the symbolic power of reformasi gradually started to pressure the Suharto regime to alter its policies, however, the pressure had not yet been decisive because Suharto’s authority was still substantial. The definitive events which deprived all the credibility of the New Order government were the Trisakti Incident and the Jakarta Riots in May: these events created an imaginary unity among all level of the society to oppose the Suharto regime. The occupation of the Parliament complex was the milestone of the development of reformasi as it functioned as a successful ritual to consolidate the meaning of reformasi to “the resignation of Suharto”. The acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the definition by the wider Indonesian society enabled the symbolic power of reformasi to exercise its efficacy to bring about the fall of Suharto.

Chapter four, which took up the period between the establishment of the Habibie regime and the implementation of pemilu, showed the development of reformasi from the political elites’
adaptation of the popular definitions of reformasi, witnessed the consolidation of the definitions, to the adjustment of meanings of reformasi. After the first achievement of the symbolic power of reformasi, namely the fall of Suharto, the adaptation of the popular demands for reformasi had become the only way to ensure the ‘political survival’ for all who had connected with the Suharto regime. However because of the separation among the student activist groups after the fall of Suharto, and the political elites’ retrieval of the dominance in politics, the political elites started to struggle for the consolidation of definitions of reformasi in which their own interests to be best achieved. Thus, the direction of the reformasi movement had become disunited. The Semanggi Incident and the Ciganjur Declaration were the two different ways of the students’ attempts to revitalize and consolidate their definitions of reformasi and demands for reformasi total. The declaration functioned as a ritual to consolidate the meanings of reformasi, therefore, to be the national agendas of the reformasi movement, and to confirm the Ciganjur Four as the leaders of reformasi movement. However, the definitions given in the declaration were highly compromising among the four leaders, and failed to reflect the meanings of reformasi determined by the students. The general election of 1999 is another major outcome of the efficacy of the symbolic power of the keyword reformasi. The pemilu became the milestone when the changes in Indonesia’s political culture and political system, as well as the new functions of pemilu, became apparent. The pemilu also showed the transition from the politics of Indonesia led by the elite to that determined by the people. However, the meanings of reformasi, which was once consolidated by the Ciganjur Declaration, started to disperse during the political campaign as it was repeated as a mere slogan to attract supports.

The period between the pemilu and the presidential and vice-presidential election, which is explained in chapter five, saw the process of diffusion, revitalization and re-consolidation of the meanings of reformasi. Soon after the pemilu, the agendas of reformasi, which was once consolidated in the Ciganjur Declaration, became insignificant because of the elites’ adjustment of the meanings of the term. For many of these elites, including the Ciganjur Four, a full implementation of the reformasi agendas would mean the reduction of their interests reflected in political decision making. One example of such adjustment was some Muslim parties’ attempt to divert the focus from reformasi
issues to religious issues: as a result, the reformasi agendas set in the Ciganjur Declaration became blur and the revival of the division between Muslims and nationalists took place. Responding to such manipulation and adjustment of the agendas of reformasi attempted by the elites, the people pressured a popular leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri who also had been implying her reluctance of implementing the reformasi agendas decided by the Ciganjur Declaration, to reconfirm the meanings of reformasi. The revitalization of the agendas of reformasi was thus manifested in Megawati’s speech in November 1998, despite her suspected preference for preserving status quo. The presidential and the vice presidential election represented the two different natures of Indonesian politics: the former was the result of the elitist politics and the latter was the result of popular pressures. Abdurrahman Wahid was chosen as a new president as a fruit of the negotiation among the political elites: the result of pemilu was not reflected in the process of the negotiation. The election result caused riots and mass protests to pressure the political elites to acknowledge that the popular demands, unlike during the New Order era, can no longer be disregarded in the process of the political decision making. The vice-president Megawati was, thus, elected unanimously.

This thesis also clarified Williams’s another argument that the “new kinds of relationship” and the “new ways of seeing existing relationship” take place within language in forms of “the invention of new terms”, “the adaptation and alternation of older terms”, and “extension or transfer”. It argued that the development of the term reformasi itself had been the reflection of the process of new socio-political environment making. Moreover, it discussed that the invention of new keywords was perceived in the process of the development of reformasi, particularly in the early days of the transitional period. Some of the most famous newly invented keywords are “turunkan harga”, “status quo”, “People’s Power”, and “KKN”, all of which reflected the changing views of the oppositions, the inventors of those terms, about the social and political reality in Indonesia.

In the political transitional period, there were some dramatic transfers of the meanings of the keywords of the New Order period. “Bapak” and “ABRI”, which used to be the keywords to signify the dominant power of Suharto and the Armed Forces, were reduced to the target of the people’s
malice, and both disappeared from the main stream of Indonesian politics. Those keywords in the area of legitimacy during the New Order era, namely "orba", "pemibangunan", "stabilitas", "keteriban", "dwifungsi" were no longer the source of legitimacy and became a qualification of the status quo. Instead, the new keyword "reformasi" has become the main source of legitimacy during the transitional period. Pemilu, UUD '45, and Pancasila, also from the area of legitimacy, have continuously been important keywords both in the New Order era as well as in the era of reformasi, however the nature of the importance changed completely. The importance of pemilu increased as it has become the opportunity where the demands of the people really can change the direction of Indonesian politics. The UUD '45 has still been in operation, however, one needs to support the amendment of it in order for the person to gain political legitimacy. The keyword Pancasila shows both continuity and discontinuity of its importance in politics, as it remained to be the source of legitimacy for nationalist leaders, but it is no longer treated as a single national ideology by many Muslims. All the changes took place within those New Order keywords reflect the change of relationships in Indonesia, and ways to view those changes.

Thus, this thesis has found the inter-relationship between political changes and symbolic representations, namely ‘language’, both of which influence each other in the process of its own establishment. It is this inter-relationship that enables the keywords approach to reflect the process of historical and socio-political establishment in a society, thus induces the comprehensive understandings of critical issues of these fields. The result of the experimental application of the keywords approach, thus, appeared to clarify its credibility as a new and unique way to analyze the political change of Indonesia during the transitional period between late 1997 to October 1999. The adaptability of the keywords approach to the exploration of other issues of the similar fields seems highly possible, thus it calls for further exploration of the possible appreciation of this approach.
Appendix 1: The process of the Formation of the Major Political Parties

PDI-Perjuangan

One of the three official political parties of the New Order, the PDI had been split into two groups since 1996 when Megawati was ousted from the PDI as its chair and replaced by Soerjadi. Even after Habibie allowed the formation of new political parties in June, Megawati continued to claim to be the legitimate leader of the PDI and to contest the general election under the old banner rather than establishing a new political party. Habibie, however, withheld recognition of Megawati’s faction, which was more popular than the other faction, as the legitimate PDI. Instead he promoted the officially promoted PDI, and recognized Budi Hardjono as the new chairman of the PDI.

In early October in her party congress Megawati finally accepted the option of making her faction into a new political party, which she named the PDI-Perjuangan (the PDI in Struggle). In its congress in Bali in October 1998, Megawati repeated the new name before 50,000 supporters so that it would also be accepted by her supporters. This new name would be beneficial for Megawati’s faction of the PDI in three senses. First, it would be a compromise so Megawati could participate in the election. Second it would help members differentiate the new party from the rival PDI, and they could identify themselves as reformist and the supporters of other the PDI as status quo. Third, the word “perjuangan (struggle)” would forever remind people that Megawati was the symbol of struggle against the New Order and the status quo. It represented her faction’s years of striving against injustices inflicted on it under the New Order rulers. Megawati’s PDI-P officially became a political party on February 14, 1999.

259 The name, the PDI-Perjuangan, was first introduced by Megawati’s lawyers during her legal challenges against the validity of a June 1996 government sponsored congress. The Jakarta Post (1998) “Megawati’s PDI Mulling New name to Contest Election”, October 9.
Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) announced the establishment of the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB: National Awakening Party) on July 22, 1998. The chairman of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid declared that the PKB was an open organization without ethnic or religious prejudice. The PKB was formed to prevent disintegration of the NU as a political influence since several chapters of the NU had already established their own political parties. The establishment of the PKB also meant their separation from the PPP, the party which used to attract a part of the NU members’ support as it was the only political party that supposed to have given voice for Muslim population.

Amien Rais resigned from the Muhammadiyah’s top post on August 22 to lead his newly formed National Mandate Party. He declared the PAN a ‘modern’ party open to all ethnicities and religions, and it strives for sovereignty of the people, democracy, progress and social justice. The PAN, however, was weakened by the attempt of Amien Rais’s to make the party more broad based than only the Muhammadiyah. It failed to be a party to represent modernist Muslim, and as a result, only about half the members of the orthodox Muhammadiyah remained loyal to Rais.

Amien Rais’s emphasis on the word ‘modern’ could be to differentiate the PAN from the PKB, the party of the NU. By emphasizing his party as ‘modern’, he identified the PKB as ‘traditional’, which sometimes contains a negative image of ‘backwardness’.

The chairman of the PPP, Ismail Hasan Metareum, who used to be famous for his reluctance of criticizing Golkar, also tried to position himself and his organization as government critics in the era of reformasi. There were two significant changes the PPP made in order to disassociate itself from

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the old PPP in the New Order era. First, the PPP showed such attitude by openly criticizing the Habibie government and by presenting a tough stance on controversial issues such as the probe into Suharto’s wealth and the dwifungsi of ABRI at the extraordinary session of the MPR. Such critical attitudes of the PPP toward the government became especially obvious after the party got a new leader Hamzah Haz. The PPP declared to channel the people’s demand for reformasi total, including the trial of Suharto and against KKN.

The PPP also spent considerable energy in cultivating an image as a defender of Muslim interests. Ismail Hasan Metareum announced a return to its former identity as an Islamic party at the end of 1998 and chose Ka‘bah, the black holy shrine in Mecca, as the party symbol. It is not too much to say that such a move was an overt attempt by the PPP to obtain mass support through religious legitimacy.

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