

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

ABOUT FEAR-OF-CRIME

KNOWLEDGE, IDENTITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY

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**HOW DO AUSTRALIAN POLITICIANS,
WHEN IN PARLIAMENT,
TALK ABOUT FEAR-OF-CRIME?**

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby certify that none of the work presented in this thesis has been submitted for credit for any other degree or part thereof. To the best of my knowledge, it contains no material, written or published by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

Signature: 

Date: 5 April 2007

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how Australian politicians, when in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime. Fears and anxieties, not necessarily spurred by criminal behavior, have increasingly been grouped under the phrase “fear-of-crime”. After much research investigating demographic and environmental factors, it is now recognized that political debate on law and order may also affect public feelings of fear. This recognition includes a largely untested assumption that such debates can be depicted as the ‘selling’ of ‘tough’ policies within a ‘law and order auction’. Further research has focused on discovering the impact of these auctions on the public’s level of fear.

I argue that an important step has been missed by these later attempts determining the public impact of political debates. This step is to discover the characteristics of the debates themselves. By identifying these characteristics, there is the potential to develop a more nuanced understanding of the role that fear-of-crime plays in political rhetoric and the impact of such rhetoric on the public’s level of fear. This thesis is intended to begin developing that understanding.

Data is drawn from proceedings within Australian state and federal parliaments from 1960 to 2003. Using a data-driven exploratory structure, the thesis focuses on the analysis of five characteristics:

1. Use of the passive voice, the definite article and nominalization;
2. Use of (war and fight) metaphors;
3. Appeals to common sense;
4. Attributions of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime; and
5. Balancing ideology and expediency in political debate.

Common themes among these characteristics suggest three discourses about fear-of-crime. The protector discourse depicts a passive and frightened public requiring protection from the government to reduce their fear-of-crime. In the supporter discourse, an active and frightened public needs support to protect themselves from crime and reduce their fear. Finally, the manipulator discourse depicts the parliamentarian as selfishly oriented towards personal gain by making use of the public's fear-of-crime.

With these characteristics and discourses identified, I discuss the implications of this research for criminological literature. Common depictions within the literature present political debates as characterized by the use of experiential knowledge about frightened members of the public as dictated by the parliamentarian's political ideology, while parliamentarians attempt to redistribute responsibility for reducing fear. After presenting their theoretical background, I test hypotheses about this description's three main components: knowledge, identity and responsibility. I suggest instead a more nuanced description:

Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by hybridity: of technical and experiential knowledge about a frightened public; of portrayed identities of this frightened public as both active and independent, and passive and dependent; and of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime. The existence of a frightened public serves an evidentiary and not ideological role in parliamentary debates about crime and its control.

I argue that this description is reflective of the complex and hybrid nature of political rhetoric about public fears. To conclude, I provide examples of how this nuanced understanding enhances criminological research by clarifying and sensitizing arguments that critique politicians, and their use, rather than misuse, of fear-of-crime in law and order politics.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC:	-----	Australian Crime Commission
AIC:	-----	Australian Institute of Criminology
ACT:	-----	Australian Capital Territory
ACTU:	-----	Australian Council of Trade Unions
ALP:	-----	Australian Labor Party
APH:	-----	Australian Parliament House
CA:	-----	Content Analysis
CDA:	-----	Critical Discourse Analysis
CLP:	-----	Country Liberal Party (NT only)
CMA:	-----	Critical Metaphor Analysis
(The) Coalition:	-----	Liberal Party of Australia and National Party
CRC:	-----	Criminology Research Council
DLP:	-----	Democratic Labor Party
IDQ:	-----	Individual Document Questionnaire
MP:	-----	Member of Parliament
MLA:	-----	Member of Legislative Assembly
MLC:	-----	Member of Legislative Council
NAA:	-----	National Archives of Australia
NACS:	-----	National Anti-Crime Strategy
NCAVAC:	-----	National Campaign against Violence and Crime
NCP:	-----	National Country Party
NCPP:	-----	National Crime Prevention Program
NLA:	-----	National Library of Australia
NSW:	-----	New South Wales
NT:	-----	Northern Territory
PM:	-----	Prime Minister
QLD:	-----	Queensland
RQ#:	-----	Research Question number 1, 2, 3 or 4
SA:	-----	South Australia
TAS:	-----	Tasmania
VIC:	-----	Victoria
WA:	-----	Western Australia

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Fear-of-crime was first formally 'named' by researchers in the United States of America in the early 1960s (Harris, 1969). Since this time, there have been widespread efforts around the world to examine fear-of-crime. First conceptualized as a fear of street crime or of strangers (Sheley, 1985) with strong racial (i.e., anti-black) overtones (Moeller, 1989; St John & Heald-Moore, 1996), fear-of-crime is now understood to represent a variety of insecurities such as personal safety, job insecurity, housing status and position, personal status, international relations and familial social position (Taylor & Jamieson, 1998). In other words, the phrase "fear-of-crime" can be seen as a codeword for people's fears, worries and concerns about a range of stimuli that are not necessarily classified as criminal by a society's legal system.

Despite this variety in content, one sentiment has been frequently reiterated. Fear-of-crime is so commonplace that it "requires no explanation, no exact location ... Everyone is afraid of crime, whether or not they have experienced it" (Young, 1996: 5). Fear-of-crime is a phenomenon that has been shown to affect the lives of people well beyond those who have been the direct victims of criminal behavior (Zedner, 1997). Many researchers have concluded that it is a major social problem (Archer & Erlich-Erfer, 1991; Liska et al., 1982; Liska et al., 1988) that can be judged to be "as serious as crime itself" (Clemente & Kleiman, 1977: 519).

Concern about levels of fear-of-crime in the community has not been limited to academic circles. There has been growing political effort dedicated to both recognizing and addressing the problem. In Australia, the National Crime Prevention Program was launched by the Australian Government in 1997 with a budget of \$38 million to identify and promote

“innovative ways of reducing and preventing crime and the fear of crime” (Attorney-General's Department, 2004). Attempts were also made to address fear-of-crime specifically in a number of government funded research projects including one appropriating approximately \$13 million in public monies (National Campaign against Violence and Crime, 2000). Parliamentary inquiries such as *Crime in the Community* in 2003/2004 have also been set up to gather information on the public's response to crime. These programs, projects and inquiries have been accompanied by passionate debate from Australian politicians wanting to show their compassion for members of the public who are afraid of crime.

However, in recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the impact that this political debate may have on the number of people who report being afraid of crime. Levels of fear-of-crime have been shown to be positively correlated with the amount of attention given to law and order issues by the political elite (Beckett (1997) see also Braithwaite et al. (1979)). As the public is more likely to respond to political depictions of the events rather than to the events themselves (Witko, 2003), it is conceivable that the very process of shaping or distorting images of crime within law and order politics may be partly responsible for changes in the actual level of fear-of-crime reported in the community (Scheingold, 1984).

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LAW AND ORDER POLITICS

Underlying these empirical results and academic warnings about the potentially negative impact of law and order politics, has been an assumed knowledge about the characteristics of such debates. For example, political speeches, especially in the lead up to elections, have

become grouped under the banner of ‘law and order auctions’ (e.g., Black & Phillips, 2001; Sarre, 2002; Silverman, 2005), where electoral success is perceived to flow to the political candidate promising the most punitive policy on crime – the highest bid. The underlying argument is that politicians will selfishly use law and order, or more specifically fear-of-crime, to support their political agenda (Wilson & Brown, 1973).

Much of the research on law and order politics, fear-of-crime, and criminal justice more generally, is based on this largely untested perception that political debates can be depicted through the analogy of the auctioning off of law and order issues - that such auctions are intended to generate public support by presenting the ‘toughest’ policies on crime that appeal to allegedly frightened constituents. Academic research on politics and fear-of-crime has focused on attempting to discover the impact that these auctions have on the public’s reported level of fear.

However, I argue that it has not been conclusively demonstrated that politicians do in fact talk about fear-of-crime as if they were participating in a law and order auction. In effect, an important step has been missed by these attempts focusing on determining the public impact of political debates about fear-of-crime. This step is to discover the characteristics of the debates themselves. How do politicians talk about fear-of-crime? When are they most likely to debate the issue? What content is discussed? What are their motivations? What are the grammatical or linguistic characteristics of the debates? Are there consistent images used and if so, what are they?

Alternatively, questions can be formulated in regard to the theoretical implications of political debates about fear-of-crime on issues such as responsibility for reducing that fear, attitudes of politicians towards the public (and vice versa), democratic participation and the role of government, and the power of political communication. The answers to these questions, and others, have the potential to complement previous academic research by sensitizing and clarifying results on the impact on public attitudes and opinions of political debates about fear-of-crime. This thesis is intended to make a start in attempting to answer some of these questions and in doing so, argue for a more nuanced understanding of the role of fear-of-crime in political debate.

THESIS PURPOSE: VERIFYING ASSUMPTIONS

The purpose of this thesis is to verify assumptions that have been made by criminologists about politicians' use of opportunities to talk about fear-of-crime. In so doing, I will be checking the accuracy of the foundation premises of previous criminological research and will be providing an empirical evidence-base informing future analyses of the effect of political law and order debates. Without thoroughly testing the accuracy and generalizability of their assumptions, researchers in this field will continue to run the risk of potentially developing insensitive and unreliable theoretical models of the relationship between political debate and public levels of fear-of-crime.

Thus my aim is to demonstrate the necessity for criminologists of developing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. A nuanced understanding will be achieved through empirical analysis of the political debate hypothesised to impact on fear-of-crime. It is not possible to ascertain, in this work alone,

all characteristics of political debate on this topic in every political arena. However, I do want to show that criminologists cannot assume that the law and order auction analogy is always applicable.

Consequently, I argue that the vital first step in analysing the effect of political debate on the public's response to crime is to determine the characteristics of the political debate itself. In this thesis, I seek to demonstrate that it is by taking this first step, by determining the characteristics of the political debates being studied, that researchers can improve their understanding as to why such debates may have an effect on the public's emotional response to crime.

THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DATA

The main question that guides the research is:

How do Australian politicians, when in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime?

To provide answers to this question, the thesis will focus on the debates about fear-of-crime that occur in Australian state and federal parliaments. The thesis will not examine the impact of these debates on the Australian public's level of fear or concern about crime. Instead, this research will begin to determine the characteristics of the debates, identify discourses in use and examine the implications of this nuanced understanding for past and future criminological research. In this way, the focus will be maintained on how politicians talk about fear-of-crime, rather than, for example, their effectiveness in influencing public opinion.

Data will be drawn from formal parliamentary debates as recorded by Hansard. The decision to draw data from parliamentary debates was made to ensure that the data examined was as unmediated as possible. It was an attempt to eliminate the influence that the media has on the content, style and presentation of political debate. Thus, while characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime will be identified by this research, they should not be generalized past the scope of the data from which they were drawn. The research is focused on how politicians talk about fear-of-crime within the social context of Australian state and federal parliaments.

THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis is structured into 14 chapters. After this introduction, the first two chapters present a review of the literature relevant to the research contained herein. The next two chapters will detail the methodology used in the research and provide an overview of the general results gained from these methods. The five chapters that follow present a series of case studies identifying particular characteristics of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime and discussing their potential impact. Chapter Eleven will explore the existence of three suggested discourses, as evidenced by the characteristics identified, that occur in the parliamentary debates studied. The final three chapters will examine the theories behind the concepts of knowledge, identity and responsibility that are entailed in criminological studies of political rhetoric in law and order politics. After testing a number of hypotheses drawn from this literature, I argue that a more nuanced understanding is needed of political rhetoric about fear-of-crime. The specific structure, contents and purpose of each individual chapter will be detailed below.

Chapter Two presents a review of literature on language, political communication and rhetorical techniques that are commonly used in political debate. The review begins with an introduction to language and the general functions that it fulfills in society. From there, the discussion is narrowed to the role that language plays in politics. Three political communication-related techniques of agenda setting, priming and rhetoric are given as a way of illustrating this role. Finally, the categories of persuasion and propaganda will be used as a means of examining how these functions, roles and techniques exist and perform together. The overall purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the literature on political communication and even more simply, to highlight the function that language fulfills in politics and the presentation of particular social realities.

Chapter Three details two histories that are inherently interlinked. The first history is that of the rise to prominence of law and order as a political issue, especially at the federal level. Crime and criminal justice have long been a responsibility of the modern state, to protect their citizens from harm. Under Australia's constitution, that responsibility is held by state governments. However, more recently law and order issues have begun to gain some prominence alongside economic issues in national political campaigns (i.e., at a federal level). This chapter will detail the history of law and order politics, first worldwide and then with a specific focus on Australian political responses to crime.

The second history that will be examined in Chapter Three is that of fear-of-crime. It is a history that is intertwined with both government responses to crime and law and order politics. This chapter will present the development and politicization of fear-of-crime, as well as the academic research and results on the topic. In addition to international sources,

the growing recognition of fear-of-crime in Australia and the political response to that recognition will be examined. Chapter Three seeks to provide a background review of the literature pertaining to law and order politics and fear-of-crime. This review is intended to complement the literature discussed in Chapter Two on political communication and the role of language in politics. It is on the basis of the literature reviewed in these two chapters that an attempt can be made to determine the characteristics of parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime.

Chapter Four presents the methodology used for the research component of this thesis. Given the desire to explore language and the concepts that it embodies, the data collected is necessarily qualitative. Simple quantitative data such as counts and percentages are generated, in the case studies, only as a means of informing the qualitative data. The broad analytical framework that is employed is that of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This framework is chosen because it allows for the analysis of both the linguistic and social factors that exist in the parliamentary debates being characterized. CDA attempts to describe the language that is used, show the shaping of discourse by societal influences and unpack the ideological underpinnings of that language. As such, CDA is an analytical framework that will facilitate the exploratory aims of this research.

Chapter Five gives an overview of the general results to present a description of the documents collected – their authorship, origin and intended audience. A description is also given of the content of the documents. This includes an outline of the types of topics that were collected under the banner of fear-of-crime. While greater detail will be given in later

chapters, this chapter is intended to provide the background context of the documents in which the case studies can be situated.

Chapters Six to Ten contain five case studies that analyze characteristics of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime from the perspectives of language, society and politics. These case studies are intended to act as points of entry along a continuum from the linguistic influence on society to the societal influence on language (see Figure 1.1 at the end of this introduction). Therefore, the case studies are designed to provide general indicators for where further research may be warranted at a later date. While an entire thesis could be dedicated to either one of these influences on their own, it was felt that, at this point, it was necessary to show that parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime should not be treated as homogenous; and to show this through a range of influences.

Chapter Six is the first of these case studies and begins from the perspective of examining particular linguistic features of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. The features are nominalization, passivity (or the use of the passive voice) and the definite article 'the'. It is shown that these features work to depict two images of the public. First, there is a public that is active and able to participate in their own victimization prevention and control their level of fear; and second, another depiction of the public exists simultaneously where the public is passive and dependent on the government for action to reduce their suffering due to the fear-of-crime. It is argued that these dual images of the public, and their impact on the formulation of political responses to the problem of fear-of-crime, will reduce the efficacy of those responses.

Chapter Seven again looks at the influence that language can have on the construction of a social reality. However, this time it is from the perspective of a linguistic form that is strongly bound to the culture in which it is used. In this chapter, the use and impact of metaphoric language in parliamentary debates is examined. General metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors are identified before focusing on the discursive function of metaphors grouped under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR (AACIW). These metaphors define the actors and their roles in a threatening and dangerous reality. In doing so, metaphors serve to maintain an identity of a fearful public. Whereas in Chapter Four, the language used potentially *decreased* the efficacy of political efforts to address actual levels of fear-of-crime in the community, AACIW-related metaphors and the identity of the fearful public may *increase* the effectiveness of political attempts to shape or distort images of crime in order to generate support for parties, individual politicians or policies.

Chapter Eight stands midway on the continuum between linguistic and societal influences. With the intention of studying the data from a perspective that attempts to grant equal weight to linguistic and societal influences, the chapter examines appeals to common sense made in parliamentary debates. Common sense is a body of knowledge rather than a particular characteristic of language; it exists within a group of people as simple, apparently self-evident truths relating to action, human nature and experience. Three common sense statements are analyzed: the streets are dangerous because of crime, the public is afraid of crime and the level of fear-of-crime increases with increases in rates of crime. It is argued that politicians are able to create, manipulate and use the power of common sense that is

granted by its perceived legitimacy and authority in order to portray a particular social reality. Consequently, it is warned that the language of fear may become a reality of fear.

With Chapter Nine, the focus of the case study begins to shift to the influence that society may have on the language that is used. This chapter examines attributions of responsibility that are made by politicians for crime and fear-of-crime. It is argued that politicians want to avoid causal responsibility and the associated blame. The current trends in crime policy towards holding the community responsible are evidence of this desire to avoid blame. However, politicians also want to appear in control and the powerful protector of the community; and accepting attributions of treatment responsibility is a means of creating this image. The language that is used to talk about the problems of crime and fear-of-crime is a key mechanism by which attributions of responsibility are made.

The analysis of the final case study, presented in Chapter Ten, examines the balancing of short-term self-interested advantage in politics (termed “political expediency”) with the dictates of political ideology. It is shown that there is evidence in the debates that politicians are required to balance expediency and ideology. Put more simply, the desire to gain votes and win office is limited by a philosophical stance on policy content. Discussing fear-of-crime was found to be useful for politicians as rhetorical support for their arguments desiring the realization of both their image of an ideal society and the policies which they believed would achieve that society. In this chapter, it is shown how the ideas about society guide the choice of language that is used to discuss fear-of-crime in Australian parliaments.

The five case studies presented in Chapters Six to Ten are intended to form points of entry into the different influences on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime and thereby highlight characteristics of those debates. The main focus of this thesis is on the question of *how* Australian parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime. The analyses of five linguistic/societal case studies have provided suggested characteristics of these debates.

Chapter Eleven seeks to present a potential categorization of these characteristics into three discourses – the protector discourse, the supporter discourse and the manipulator discourse. Each of these discourses is taken from the perspective of the parliamentarian and their speeches about fear-of-crime. This perspective is dictated by the sources from which the data is drawn and the methodological directions that generated and analyzed the data. It is likely that additional discourses may be identified with different data and methods.

The protector discourse depicts the government as in control and protecting the public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The public is legitimately afraid but is passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering. In the supporter discourse, the government argues that it will support the public and cannot be blamed for the actions of the criminals who cause the public to be afraid. The public is active and responsible for their safety, the opportunities they grant to others that threaten that safety and the fear caused by street crimes and other threats in the environment. Lastly, the manipulator discourse depicts the politician as selfishly oriented towards personal gain and making use of only the (self-interested) utility of the public's fear-of-crime.

The final three chapters of this thesis are dedicated to examining the implications of this research for the existent and future criminological literature. Chapter Twelve presents the research gap that this thesis is intended to begin to fill. However, in contrast to its presentation in Chapters One to Three that focuses on practical aspects of political talk about fear-of-crime, Chapter Twelve presents the theoretical aspects of the research gap as drawn from the academic study of crime, justice and the state.

To do this, I use Garland's (2001) study of the social, political and cultural changes that have occurred in regard to the criminal justice state. Then, I outline the criticisms of Garland's work as a means of developing a more comprehensive 'history of the present'. The last criticism given is that Garland does not examine, in sufficient depth, the way in which political rhetoric influences public fear; and it is this criticism that highlights the research gap. While criminologists have attempted to measure levels of fear-of-crime and its correlation with political rhetoric, they have not fully ascertained how politicians actually talk about it. This, I argue, is the first step to a greater understanding of the relationship between fear-of-crime and politics. It is towards this end that this research is directed.

In Chapter Thirteen, I examine the theoretical background and test a number of hypotheses about three components of the general description of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime that can be drawn from the literature. These components are: the type of knowledge claims made by parliamentarians; the type of agency used in the evocation of a fearful public identity; and the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime. By examining these components, I am able to give a description of parliamentary debates about

fear-of-crime that is sensitive to the complex and hybrid nature of political rhetoric on public fears that I argue is currently missed by criminologists. In effect, I attempt to verify researchers' assumptions with empirical data on how politicians, when in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime.

Finally, Chapter Fourteen concludes this work by discussing the implications, of both the data-driven exploratory study and the testing of research questions and hypotheses, for criminological literature. I provide examples of how a more nuanced description of political talk about public fears could extend and improve the study of fear-of-crime. In the final section, I suggest that the way forward is for criminologists, studying fear-of-crime and political rhetoric, to focus on the multidimensional use rather than necessarily the misuse of a politician's opportunities to talk about public fears. This shift in focus would encourage discussion about how fear-of-crime is 'used' and the potential of political rhetoric to decrease as well as increase fear. In effect, it would encourage a more complex yet complete understanding of the political use of fear-of-crime in debates and the impact of those debates on the public's response to crime.

JUSTIFICATION OF APPROACH: INTER-DISCIPLINARY AND EXPLORATORY

While ultimately the aim of this thesis is to expand and contribute to criminological thought, I have taken a fundamentally inter-disciplinary and exploratory approach. Both aspects of this approach need justification because: they go against the strategic direction of current movements in the discipline of criminology; and they comprise an unusual approach for a PhD thesis.

First, the literature, methodologies, analysis and discussions presented here are drawn from multiple academic disciplines. The majority of the chapters draw on knowledge derived from the disciplines of linguistics and political science. Apart from the initial two chapters reviewing literature relevant to the thesis as a whole, criminological literature is not the focus of discussion until the last three chapters. The reason for this seemingly counter-intuitive approach is that when a criminologist hypothesizes that political debate increases the public's fear-of-crime, they are hypothesizing on the impact of language about crime used in the political arena. Crime is the topic, language is the medium and politics is the domain. Hence, criminology is but one of at least three academic disciplines that should be involved in an analysis designed to fully understand the relationship between political debate and public feelings about crime. This thesis makes an original contribution in demonstrating the value of inter-disciplinarity by using linguistics and political science to enhance criminological undertakings to analyse fear-of-crime.


Exploration is the second aspect of the approach taken in this thesis. As stated above, my aim is to demonstrate the necessity of identifying the characteristics of political debate before studying the impact of that debate on the public. To identify potential characteristics and their effects, I wanted to let the data guide the analysis. A data-driven approach encourages the exploration of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime rather than testing for the existence of specific characteristics of political debate identified by or derived from a theoretical perspective. The intention by exploring is to demonstrate to all areas of criminology that investigate this topic, and not just one theoretical perspective, that the identification of the characteristics of these political debates is of vital importance.

The effect of adopting an inter-disciplinary and exploratory approach is potentially a sense in the reader of wariness or threat to the 'correct' order of analysis and generation of new theoretical insights. This thesis does not begin with an exposition of one school's theory, the identification of a research gap, testing of hypotheses to fill this gap and a write-up of results, discussion and conclusions for the original theoretical framework. Instead, I give an exposition of the intersection between criminology, linguistics and political science in regard to one topic: fear-of-crime. Then on the basis of a broad research question, I explore that intersection using five case studies to demonstrate how the research question could be answered. It is only after this sizable work that I take the traditional approach of presenting a criminological theory and a theoretical research gap and testing hypotheses; and even then the theory critiqued is only used as an example for indicating the potential consequences of more nuanced understanding of political debate on fear-of-crime.

It is important to demonstrate to criminologists the necessity of developing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. My aim is not to give a definitive answer but to show the need to ask questions. Through this thesis, I hope to show that the law and order auction analogy is not always applicable because politicians, when in parliament at least, talk about fear-of-crime in many ways. The analysis of just five characteristics of parliamentary debates has identified a variety of ways of talking made up of different knowledge claims, types of agency and locations of responsibility. I argue that benefit to future research efforts will come from discovering such differences by focusing on the multidimensional use, and not only misuse, of political opportunities to talk about fear-of-crime. Thus, the original contribution of this thesis to criminological thought is raising awareness that political rhetoric about fear-of-crime is complex and it is essential

that that complexity is identified in order to better understand the impact of political debate on how the public feels about crime.

Figure 1.1: Flowchart of Analysis and Findings



CHAPTER TWO
TALKING POLITICS

This chapter will present a review of the literature on language, political communication and the traditions of linguistics that inform the present research. It begins by seeking to define what 'language' is and describe the general constitutive parts of that system. From there, the role that language plays in politics will be discussed. This discussion is then illustrated by three common strategies used in political communication (agenda setting, priming and rhetoric) as well as two common types of communication that are used in politics (persuasion and propaganda).

One restriction will be placed on the review of literature presented in this chapter. There is a great body of political communications research studying such topics as:

- Why citizens respond in different ways and how much they do or do not know (e.g. Durr, 1993; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1996; Moore, 1987; Mueller, 1973; Mutz et al., 1996; Tan, 1980; Verba et al., 1997);
- The way in which different types of appeals (particularly fear or threat related) function and their effectiveness (e.g. Beck & Frankel, 1981; Boster & Mongeau, 1984; Janis & Feshbach, 1953, 1954; Leventhal, 1971; Ruiters, 2003; Sternthal & Craig, 1974; Wheatley & Oshikawa, 1970);
- The success or failure of information and political campaigns (e.g. Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; DE Butler & Rose, 1960; Dalby, 1990; Harrop, 2001; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947; Meadow, 1989; Nimmo, 1970);
- The effectiveness of the media in conveying a political message (e.g. Brunt & Jordin, 1987; Miller & Krosnick, 1996; Negrine, 1996; Press & VerBurg, 1988; Welch, 2003; Windschuttle, 1984); and

- Multiple theories (mostly based in political science) about the functioning of political communication (e.g. Graber, 1976; Gusfield, 1963; Jacobs, 1992; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2001; Sigelman & Rosenblatt, 1996)

These topics will not be examined in this thesis. Instead, the focus will be on how politicians (and more specifically parliamentarians) debate issues relating to fear-of-crime. The success or failure of the speeches on their target audience is not of direct consequence for this research. These examples are intended to explore the interactions between language, language usage and language users in the domain of politics. In effect, the first part of this chapter seeks to serve as an introduction to examples of the general use of language and more specifically, political communication.

The standpoint from which language will be approached is discussed in the second part of this chapter in the form of critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. This approach seeks to study the interconnected nature of things, the structures (both personal and social) that influence language usage. The recognition by critical linguists of the two-way interaction between language and social processes makes it a useful theoretical framework for the current research.

LANGUAGE – SYMBOLS AND SYSTEMS

The parliamentary debates that form the data for this research are treated as examples of political communication and language. Very broadly, communication can be understood as the exchange of symbols between two or more people with the intention of conveying a

message, where language is generally used as the framework of organizing those symbols to facilitate effective exchange.

More specifically, language is an arbitrary system of using accepted or conventionalized symbols (Andersen, 1971). An *image* is the first step in the construction of symbols. It is a “subjective representation of something previously perceived. It is an interpreted sensation or, in other words, a meaningful impression, appearance, semblance, or similar mental representation of our perceptions” (Nimmo, 1974: 5-6). Images are largely resistant to change and assist the individual to interpret their sensations. This interpretation of sensations is called a *sign*. When that sign is used to stand for something other than itself, it then becomes a *symbol*. The interaction between signs and images which results in the creation of a symbol is *imagery* – an interaction that is present in all behavior. Thus, language is based on the relationship between and use of signs, symbols and imagery.

In contemporary human society, that relationship between the three elements just outlined is dictated by an arbitrary, conventionalized yet dynamic system: language (Kelley, 1990). Convention prescribes the use and meanings of sounds as they are constructed into words, and later into sentences, conversations, arguments and other forms of verbal interaction. For instance, when learning a language, a person tends to learn to construct sentences “correctly” according to grammatical rules and placing objects into their “right” categories (Widdowson, 1978). It is this arbitrary system of rules of using symbols that form language and facilitates communication.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

On the basis of the above description of language, I will now focus on the language and communication that occurs specifically in the political arena. Political communication is the communication that surrounds political affairs. This type of communication occurs everyday (Herrera, 1996/1997) and is an essential part of the process of democratic politics. Unlike in communicating about medicine or law, there is no significant shift to a different vocabulary. Instead, political communication is identified by its content rather than its form (Corcoran, 1979).

As a result, this type of communication is based on the same tools of imagery, symbols and language as other generalized forms. Symbols themselves are very useful in politics because they can exist in a phrase or two whilst acting as referents to a vast argument (Mutz et al., 1996): they provide instant categorizations, vivid impressions and evaluation of events (Graber, 1976). These benefits granted by the use of symbols provide politicians with the ability to construct a reality for their citizens (Gusfield, 1963; Hinds & Windt, 1991). The words used by politicians can become part of the political landscape and can construct that landscape (Maddox, 1989). Politicians use symbols, most often ordered by language, to arouse, provoke, dissuade, demonstrate strength of commitment and affirm group membership in an effort to control an issue's salience and relevancy to different audiences (Cobb & Elder, 1972). On the basis of the importance of symbols, language and communication in politics, political elites attempt to use words or phrases strategically to convey a desired meaning (Kuklinski & Hurley, 1996), to generate support and acceptance of policies and, ultimately, to win re-election.

In the following two sections, I will present two groups of examples of the potential use of language in attempts to communicate in politics. The first group will provide three different strategies for using language as a means of succeeding or even merely surviving in politics. The second group will detail two types of political communication that are most relevant to the research presented later in this thesis. These illustrations are intended as examples of language, language usage and language users before introducing the theoretical filter of studying language from the perspective of critical linguistics.

STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The way in which politicians strategically use language to communicate with the public will impact on the achievement of their desired goals. Three examples of such strategies will be discussed here – agenda setting, priming and rhetoric. These examples are given as a means of highlighting the strategic thought that occurs in political communication through the choice of language, symbols and imagery.

The first strategy that is frequently discussed in regard to political communication is that of agenda setting. This is the process or contest that is undertaken in negotiating what is discussed and thereby gains a perceived importance (Cobb & Elder, 1972). What topics are discussed in politics can have a dramatic effect on the outcome of the discussion, images of the party and politicians and the public's eventual choices at politically important times such as elections. For a political party to benefit from the discussion of certain issues, the issue itself must arouse strong feelings in the voters, be held disproportionately by one side, and be an issue that demonstrates clear differences between the stances of each side (David Butler, 1979). Agenda setting is a phrase that is used to describe the process by which

problems become political issues or gain the perceived importance or legitimacy to be addressed by the government or parliament (Cook et al., 1983).

Another strategy is to control the standards by which issues are judged. This process is called “priming”. It is the ability to change the “standards that people use to make political evaluations” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). The concept of priming is based on the underlying cognitive assumptions that humans’ attention is highly selective and frequently uses short cuts or rules of thumb in order to make decisions (or “satisficing” (Miller & Krosnick, 1996)) (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). Consequently, the political candidate wants to influence which standards, events or attitudes are brought to mind first (Miller & Krosnick, 1996) and often do so by providing voters with fragmented information on selected issues to raise their importance “by increasing the frequency, strength and extensiveness of the candidate’s statements” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 1994: 529). In taking a priming approach, candidates raise the possibility that individuals will assign particular (hopefully politically advantageous) attitudes to their stored memories which can then be drawn upon in public statements (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000).

The final example of a strategy to be used in political communication is that of rhetoric. Rhetoric is simply persuasive speech (Burke, 1969) but has increasingly gained negative connotations of being a “process of manipulating symbolic devices by human agents to form attitudes or induce actions in other human beings” (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1997: 63). Many scholars argue that the classical form of political rhetoric with its emphasis on persuasion through argument, logic and the presentation of information are rarely heard in modern politics. Instead, such debate has become “oversimplified,

personalized, trivialized, and dramatized” (Whaley & Holloway, 1997: 294). It has also been argued that the classical forms of rhetoric and argumentation have been made obsolete by modern technology’s mediation of political communication (Atkinson, 1984). Technology and the broadcast media have isolated the politician from the public. An example of this danger is the political speech which has largely been discarded as too burdensome on the time and attention of busy publics and has been replaced by rapid sights and sounds presenting fragmented information. The desire of the politicians to engage with the public’s cognitive and rational faculties has been replaced by the focus on the production of a specific emotional reaction (Corcoran, 1979).

At the same time, it could be argued that there are some forms of classical rhetoric that have survived. The error-free broadcast enabled by the use of takes and editing is reflective of the fluency of speech held by the good orator. Similarly tropes, figures and commonplaces are still used to sustain the flow of speech. For example, commonplaces such as “I come before you today” and “no effort will be spared” are used to indicate the authority of the speaker and their intention to say something important. Commonplaces are frequently used in the form of the cliché and the slogan, although the slogan (a string of symbols that gain meaning by repetition and context (Lasswell, 1949)) is indicative of the shift from conveying information or logical persuasion to arousing emotions (Corcoran, 1979).

To summarize these discussions, political communication has been described as the exchange of symbols among political elite(s) (and the citizenry), with those symbols being used as a means of expanding expression, judgment and understanding of politics (Nimmo,

1974). As shown by the examples of political communication strategies, such communication can be used to establish what might be rather than necessarily what is; it is a show of power to effect change and maintain social order through the use of non-violent means and its use is an expression of the values and characteristics of the communicator (Weaver, 1953).

TYPES OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The strategies just discussed as used by politicians can be grouped into general types of political communication of which there are many types. For example: authority or command, coercion, influence, and inducement (Connolly, 1974; Nimmo, 1978; R. Smith, 1997). For the purpose of this thesis, only two types of political communication (persuasion and propaganda) will be investigated in depth. This is done to restrict the discussion to a manageable size. Moreover, it can be argued that parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime are most representative of these forms. For instance, it is not possible to say that the public is afraid because the state demands it of them (authority), has used physical force (force) or the threat of physical force (coercion) to make them feel afraid, or because the state has offered them a reward for being afraid of crime (inducement). Rather it is argued that any examination of debates about fear-of-crime will benefit most from an understanding of political communication techniques that are overtly less forceful and directive but no less powerful: persuasion and propaganda. It is these types of political communication that will provide relevant examples of the cross-influence between linguistic and societal features on the attempted construction of various social realities, and more simply the use of language in politics to communicate on a particular topic.

PERSUASION

In themselves, language and communication form a part of daily life and inherently give the ability to persuade (Andersen, 1971; Brown, 1968; Reardon, 1991). Persuasion allows people to come to mutual agreement on issues (Bettinghaus, 1968), although it does differ from general communication in that persuasion is an attempt to direct the response of the target towards a relatively specific goal. In politics, the ability to persuade is often used to generate attention, increase the comprehension of issues among the audience and the acceptance of policies (Andersen, 1971).

There are four characteristics of persuasion that distinguish it from other forms of political communication. The first is the formation of the intention to change the response of another person/s. Secondly, it is decided that that objective should be reached through the mutual exchange of symbols (i.e., language). Thirdly, the response that is achieved is different to what would have occurred had the exchange not occurred. Finally, the target was free to choose their response (Andersen, 1971; Nimmo, 1978; Reardon, 1991). While there is intent to change another's behavior, persuasion does not impinge on the individual's ability to choose. The persuader may manipulate stimuli and selectively present information but they rely on the receiver being free to choose their response. Once these four characteristics are present, one person is said to have persuaded another.

There are two general categories of appeals that are used to persuade another to change their response. The first is that of logical appeals or appeals made on the basis of reason and argument. The second is what I term emotive appeals. In contrast to logical appeals where the audience is approached on relatively rational levels, emotive appeals aim to cause the

audience to respond with feeling rather than thought. They are appeals that are directed towards the needs and perceived wants of the audience: the basic values, attitudes and beliefs. These appeals tend toward the evocation of fear, anger, discontentment or frustration, gratitude, hope, and pride.

The manipulation of emotions has been a ubiquitous tool of political elites for centuries (Way & Masters, 1996) and set the scene for some of the most powerful and widely accessible methods of persuasive communication. Of the two types of persuasion, emotive appeals are used the most in political messages probably because they are memorable and dissuade the target from critically assessing the message (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1997). The emotional appeal can be useful in the absence of strict “proof” as to the reasons for the desired change. They are also one of the most difficult for the persuader to effect and control. It requires a greater knowledge on the part of the persuader as to the basic values, beliefs and likely emotional response to stimuli that are largely driven by culture. Such appeals only become realized in how and to what the receiver responds.

In summary, persuasion is a type of political communication that focuses on the efforts of one person to change the (voluntary) behavior of another through reasoned argument. To do so, the general categories of logical appeals (argumentation or reasoned discourse) or emotive appeals are often used. Persuasion, as a type of political communication, demonstrates how language is used in politics to voluntarily change the behavior of a target audience.

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is the second form of political communication that will be examined in this section. “Propaganda” comes from the Latin word “propagare” meaning to spread or to grow (Brown, 1968; Larson, 1992). The term “propaganda” was originally used in the English language to revive, propagate and strengthen Catholicism. In this context, propaganda meant to propagate the faith (Qualter, 1985). However, the desire and consequent attempts (actions associated with the term “propaganda”) to manipulate public behavior, control information and manage public opinion have been recorded since Ancient Greece (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986).

Despite these early beginnings, the term “propaganda” did not enter common usage in English until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. At this time, there were significant improvements in the ability to communicate to ever increasingly large audiences through different media. In addition, advancements were also made in transportation technologies allowing greater movement and interactions between different populations. As a result, there was a need to emphasize and impose one’s culture against the tide of other cultures; and propaganda became a tool to do it. This was especially evident in war propaganda during the First and Second World Wars (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Qualter, 1985). As a result, propaganda has become a prominent technique of (non-violent) ruling in the modern world (Combs & Nimmo, 1993).

DEFINING PROPAGANDA

For the purposes of this thesis, propaganda will be defined as “the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a

response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986: 16). This definition highlights some of the key differences between persuasion and propaganda. First, persuasion is the interactive exchange of information where the persuader has the desire for the target to voluntarily adopt his/her views. The propagandist attempts to remove that sense of choice from the target. The communication is no longer an interaction but is one way and tends to be directed at many people.

Second, it is the intention of both parties to satisfy both the needs of persuader and the audiences should the persuader's argument be adopted. In propaganda, it is only the propagandist's needs that are intended to be satisfied (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Reardon, 1991). The resulting conclusion is not a mutual agreement based on the consideration of choices. Propaganda removes that sense of choice and the mutual satisfaction of needs.

Third, it is in the interests of the persuader that his/her intent to persuade is known (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Reardon, 1991). However, because propaganda seeks only one sided satisfaction of needs, the propagandist does not benefit from others having knowledge about his/her intent. Quite often the propagandist will give one intent and follow through with another (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986). The audience would understandably show some resistance to adopting a behavioral change that would adversely affect their situation. In order to avoid that resistance, the propagandist hides their true intention of political communication.

Many different types of propaganda have been identified by academic research. Each type is more a result of an alternative method of division than a fundamentally different type of propaganda. For example, propaganda can be divided into those that have been grouped by:

- (1) Purpose: a positive or negative message being delivered (Fraser, 1957; T. J. Smith, 1989); to agitate or integrate a group of people (Ellul, 1965; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950).
- (2) Source: black (from the 'other side'), white (from 'our side'), grey (source unknown) and sub-propaganda (propaganda that prepares (either side's) people for a later call to action (Ellul, 1965; Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986).
- (3) Context: propaganda that is grouped by the context in which it is delivered. For example: bureaucratic propaganda (Altheide & Johnson, 1980); corporate propaganda (Carey, 1995); treetops versus grassroots propaganda (Carey, 1995); domestic versus international propaganda (Carey, 1995); political versus sociological propaganda (Ellul, 1965; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950; Qualter, 1985).
- (4) Method: senso- versus ratio- propaganda (Chakotin, 1940) or appealing to the emotions or to one's sensibilities.

For the purpose of this thesis, propaganda will be treated as one homogeneous type of political communication because the main aim of the present discussion is to provide an example of the interaction between language, usage and users and political agendas. The remaining discussion about propaganda will be presented in two sections. The first investigates the relationship between the democratic state and propaganda. The second section gives an overview of the general strategies of propaganda. These sections will

review both the overall concept of propaganda and the strategies that are employed to use it to full effect.

STATE USE OF PROPAGANDA

It has already been argued the propaganda is a common part of political communication. However, propaganda was initially considered to be something used solely by totalitarian governments. Despite this beginning, there is now the increasing recognition that:

- “the modern democratic state is, necessarily and inescapably, the propagandist state” (Robins et al., 1987: 7);
- “propaganda is the rhetoric of modern politics, stirring emotions to direct public opinion” (MacDonald, 1989: 29); and
- propaganda is essential part of modern world (Hummel & Huntress, 1949).

Manipulation through propaganda is one of the chief instruments in most forms of government including the democratic state. It allows the image of active participation in the running of the state while at the same time denying the benefits of actual citizen control and government accountability. The public is susceptible to manipulation because: “most people want to feel that issues are simple rather than complex, want to have their prejudices confirmed, want to feel that they 'belong' with the implication that others do not, and need to pinpoint an enemy to blame for their frustrations” (Brown, 1968: 26). As discussed above, political communication has the power to create the political reality for many citizens. In propaganda, this power can be used to manipulate information and create a false sense of reality and ultimately a passive citizen base (Schiller, 1973). This allows the state to claim public support for policies where that support was manufactured by the selective

presentation of information that hides the true agenda and denies public choice by propaganda.

Propaganda and the management of information are strongly linked. “The propagandist seeks to control the flow of information, manage public opinion, and manipulate behavior patterns” (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986: 34). Some would argue that all information is actually propaganda because of the necessity to present selectively that information in order to achieve the purpose desired by those providing the information. “Information has, and is intended to have, a propaganda effect” (Qualter, 1985: 139-140). Others argue that the manipulation of information especially when it is linked to the promotion of fear, is justified because it is a good way to get a message across to the public (Furedi, 1997). Either way, propaganda is reliant on the spread of information to deliver its message to the target/s.

Ultimately, propaganda can be used to influence the reality perceived by citizens because it is directed towards the behaviors of the public (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Qualter, 1985). It does so through the manipulation or influence of the beliefs of the target (T. J. Smith, 1989) rather than direct coercion of force or command (Qualter, 1985). In using propaganda, there is a recognition that attitudes are the source of behavior (Qualter, 1985; T. J. Smith, 1989), and, as a result, some propaganda may be directed towards the manipulation of attitudes despite the main goal of state-based propaganda being to change behavior.

THE STRATEGIES OF PROPAGANDA

As suggested above, the type of propaganda does not substantially change the underlying techniques of the propaganda message. After its use in the World Wars, propaganda in the West was mostly considered to refer only to lies, deceptions and other negatively perceived manipulative tactics of the state to control the citizenry (Bytwerk, 1989; Ellul, 1965; Hummel & Huntress, 1949). However since Jacques Ellul's work in the mid-1960s, propaganda has developed into its modern form whereby a wider variety of objectives are achieved through more diverse strategies than merely lies.

The general characteristics of successful propaganda are now described as encompassing all forms of media through which a message can be delivered to the mass audience (see Carey, 1995; Ellul, 1965; Fraser, 1957; Hummel & Huntress, 1949; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950; Nimmo, 1978; Qualter, 1985). That message must be directed to the masses but appear personal to every individual. To do this, the values, beliefs, group characteristics and emotional responses must be acknowledged by the propagandist.

Consequently, propaganda will be most successful when it is conveying a message that supports and encourages popular sentiments. "People tend to accept as fact what they want to believe and interpret reality in terms of what they already know" (Qualter, 1985: 137). The propaganda message will be clear, and will embody fundamental structures such as sociological presuppositions and social myths. Modern propaganda seeks to create confusion through the use of language that is more emotional than functional. This confusion then allows the state to guide its floundering citizens toward the desired course of action.

Thus I have shown that these strategies are characteristic of a modern version of propaganda that reaches further than merely lies and deceptions. The state is able to use propaganda (and the management of information) in order to fulfill the requirements of democracy to appear to have an informed and participatory public. Language in the form of propaganda assists in the creation of a false reality of participation and the manufacture of public support for the political policies, and functions as a form of social control through initiating and maintaining certain forms of behavior.

CDA – STUDYING POLITICAL LANGUAGE

For the purposes of the research presented in this thesis, I will be approaching the study of how parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime from the traditions of critical linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). This is a linguistic perspective that seeks to elucidate the interconnected nature of things: it seeks to study the (opaque or transparent) structural relationships that are expressed through language use. CDA studies not only texts (instances of written or spoken language use) but also the social processes and structures that produce the text and its meaning (Wodak, 2001). Critical linguists argued that the relationship between society and language was in fact two way – language was both influenced by and an influence on social processes (Fowler et al., 1979). Language enables social interaction while also being a key part of socialization (Kress & Hodge, 1979). In order to capture this reflexive relationship, critical linguistics sought to provide a framework that encompassed the disciplines of linguistics, psychology and sociology; a theoretical framework that studied “syntax and the basic rule systems of the language along with the social uses of language, that is, the relations between language and society and between language and mind” (Hodge & Kress, 1993: 3) (see also Fowler et al. (1979) for a

longer discussion of the history of critical linguistics). It is from this perspective that a two-way relationship between language and society in regard to parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime will be examined in the chapters that follow.

It is important to note that CDA is an approach with many variations between the main proponents rather than a single unified methodology. However, in general, it is characterized by a perceived need to recognize the historical context of all discourses, analyze the relationships between texts, and recognize that language mediates society (thereby adopting a non-deterministic view of language). However, there is no all-encompassing theoretical viewpoint or methodological framework (Meyer, 2001).

In this research, CDA will be used as a guiding approach for recognizing both the linguistic characteristics of and the societal influences on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. It is through this approach and the specific methodologies used for the case studies that the implications from the way in which fear-of-crime is discussed in politics will be drawn out on issues such as perceptions of human agency, identities and relationships between governments, politicians and the public.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

I began this chapter by describing the construction of language as a system of images, signs and symbols where communication is the exchange of those symbols between two or more people. From there I described political communication as the exchange of symbols among political elites (and the citizenry). While political communication can take many forms, two types were singled out as being relevant for analyzing parliamentary debates about fear-of-

crime. The first was persuasion or the attempt to change the behavior of another through communication. The second type of political communication (propaganda) while also attempting to change behavior, did so through the means of manipulation, tricks of presentations and methods of depicting the truth. After these illustrations of how language can be used in politics, I then presented an overview of CDA within which the remainder of this thesis will approach political talk about fear-of-crime. This chapter was intended to highlight the constructed nature of language, the utility of communication in politics, and the strategies that may be employed to achieve a desired behavioral change in an audience through communication.

CHAPTER THREE

TWO HISTORIES OF 1960 TO 2003

This chapter will discuss the history of law and order politics and fear-of-crime from 1960 to 2003. By history, I refer to both the events and the growing body of knowledge relevant to these issues during the 43 years being studied. Both histories are linked by their discovery, development and political currency. Law and order politics gained prominence in the United States in the 1960s, with Britain and Australia to follow shortly thereafter. Fear-of-crime was also “discovered” in the late 1960s in the United States. This phenomenon has since become a substantial part of criminological research and is increasingly gaining prominence in government policies on crime.

After discussing these histories from an international perspective, I will focus on law and order politics and the development of fear-of-crime in Australia. This history will begin with a discussion of Australian law and order politics and government responses to crime and fear-of-crime from 1960 to 2003. Together with the history of fear-of-crime, the history of Australian law and order politics will provide essential information on the social structures in which the parliamentary debates exist. It will also provide an overview of the academic knowledge surrounding the topic of those debates – fear-of-crime. It is on the basis of those structures and the benchmark provided by academic research that the way in which politicians talk about fear-of-crime can be characterized in later chapters.

Before beginning, I want to note that terrorism has been excluded from these histories. This was done because fear-of-crime and indeed much of law and order politics that relates to fear-of-crime has been constructed and debated in terms of fearing domestic crimes such as burglary, rape and assault (see for example the questions in the National Crime Survey and the British Crime Survey attempting to measure fear-of-crime). While such crimes may be

perpetrated by members of an international crime syndicate (as a hypothetical example), it is their domestic nature that is considered when assessing their impact on fear-of-crime. In other words, the underlying motivation of the 'terrorist' crime to use extreme violence to force regime change and the fear that such violence is intended to create in the general populace has not generally been included in debates about fear-of-crime. While this is changing since the events of September 11, 2001 the concepts of fear-of-crime and fear-of-terrorism have not been treated as synonymous by academics and politicians alike, with the type of crime (and its consequences for addressing fear) being the distinguishing feature (see Mythen & Walklate (2006) for a discussion of criminology and terrorism). Therefore, as the subject of this thesis is fear-of-crime and not fear-of-terrorism, the history presented in this chapter will focus on domestic crime related law and order politics and exclude that related to terrorism.

LAW AND ORDER POLITICS

Many western countries such as Australia, United States of America and Britain are now obsessed by crime (Adler, 1983). It is a political and highly emotive issue with few other topics being able to arouse such passionate debate (Downes & Morgan, 1997; Freiberg, 2001; Hogg & Brown, 1998) or such prejudices (Kettle, 1983). Crime is frequently given first priority in news reports and the entertainment media (see research on media influences and cultural indicators e.g., Gerbner et al., 1977; Gerbner et al., 1978; Gerbner et al., 1979; Gerbner et al., 1980; Signorielli et al., 1995); and discussions about crime and other social issues often take precedence over economic issues in many political campaigns (Ratner & McMullan, 1983).

Crime has gained such prominence by becoming symbolic of many tensions, insecurities and anxieties in the late-modern society (Ismaili, 2003). Crime symbolizes far more than just criminal offences; it also reflects civil rights, urban riots, lifestyle changes, race and immigration, economic worries and a general feeling about disorder, authority, status and self-control (Dionne, 1992; Hall Jamieson, 1992; Hogg & Brown, 1998; Rosch, 1985). Crime and law and order are useful codewords – brief referents that belie the complexity of the issues involved.

The phrase *law and order politics* refers to the political maneuvering around issues such as punishment or rehabilitation, crime control and prevention, and legislation (Kettle, 1983) as well as a belief in the underlying need for discipline in a civil society (Brake & Hale, 1992) (see Hinds (2006) for a discussion about conceptions of law and order). Such debates have long been part of local and state government portfolios but have become a mainstay of federal political in the United States from the mid-1960s, with Britain also overtly expressing political concern about crime in the 1970s and Australia in the 1980s (Feeley & Sarat, 1980; Hogg & Brown, 1998; Rosch, 1985; Thranbhardt, 1995; Zedner, 1995; Loader, 2006).

The general political response to crime has been to reinforce the definitions of where the boundaries of citizen behavior lie rather than to protect the public from crime (Rosch, 1985). Law and order politics represent the normative aspects of a society's legal system; the setting of boundaries of behavior and fostering social integration (Zedner, 1995). In what Hinds (2006) calls the politicized conception of law and order, politicians are able to respond to the public demands for protection and the reinvigoration of crime legislation and

policy (Castellano & McGarrell, 1991; Sheley, 1985) with tokenistic policy initiatives that are more effective in gathering votes than addressing crime. Thus the declaration of “war on crime” and the use of “get tough” policies has arguably minimal results for preventing crime but contain highly visible actions such as increased sentences, harsher punishments and the building of more prisons (Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1993). These initiatives gain politicians popularity through their “fight against crime”; and it is within this context of law and order politics that fear-of-crime was first identified.

FEAR-OF-CRIME

The history of fear-of-crime will be discussed in three sections: the discovery of the problem, academic research, and government attempts to reduce the level of fear-of-crime in Australia. It will be shown that fear-of-crime was discovered in the United States during a period of increased focus on the victim in the criminal justice system and the use of victimization surveys in local and national populations. It was also a period of strong racial tensions and civil unrest that some have argued may have influenced the general feeling of insecurity felt by the American public. In response to the discovered the problem of fear-of-crime, academic researchers investigated the effect that variables such as personal and environmental characteristics, the media, policy decisions and the police, and the perceived risk of victimization may have had on the level of fear in the community. These findings are examined below along with the problems that plague this research such as the lack of conceptual definition and measurement issues surrounding fear-of-crime.

THE “DISCOVERY” OF FEAR-OF-CRIME

The phenomenon that is now tagged under the phrase *fear-of-crime* arose out of a question in the National Crime Survey conducted in the United States at the beginning of the 1960s (Harris, 1969). At this time there were two strong influences at work. First, the victim was slowly gaining prominence in the criminal justice system through the efforts of the victimology movement that blossomed fully in the 1970s (Laster & Erez, 2000; Ryan, 1971; Walklate, 1992, 1998).

At the time of the National Crime Survey, there were increasing attempts to gauge the extent of victimization through both national and local surveys of the population (Phipps, 1986). The discovery of fear-of-crime was linked to this burgeoning field of victimization surveys that highlighted the large proportion of the population that felt unsafe walking alone at night¹. General public opinion polls in the United States especially (Harris, CBS news and Gallup polls) also showed that “crime” was increasingly concerning to the public (Erskine, 1974). Consequently, it has been argued that the change in academic and policy thinking to focus on the victim as well as the offender played a significant role in the identification and development of fear-of-crime (Zedner, 1997).

The second influence has been relatively ignored in later academic research and fear reduction policies. This is the influence of race and political action. During the 1960s, the United States was experiencing an influx of racial tension and civil unrest especially

¹ For example: British Crime Survey (e.g. (Box et al., 1988; Hough, 1995; Maxfield, 1987; Simmons, 2002)), National Crime Survey (e.g. (Balkin, 1979; Block, 1993; Brantingham et al., 1986; Killias, 1990; LaGrange & Ferraro, 1989)), and local surveys such as the Islington Crime Survey, Broadwater Farm Survey, Merseyside Crime Survey, Newham Crime Survey (Young, 1988).

concerning the desegregation of public schools and extending the franchise to African Americans. More than two decades later, the case of Willie Horton (a black man who raped a white woman while on leave from a prison where he was serving time for a murder conviction) became a symbol of whites' fears of black men and of violent crime in general (Dionne, 1992). Such a perception of difference, especially racial difference, has been shown to be a predictor of what is now known as fear-of-crime (Moeller, 1989; Pain, 2001; Parker, 1988; Sik Lee, 2000; Skogan, 1995; St John & Heald-Moore, 1995, 1996).

Political action has also been shown to have an influence on the discovery of fear-of-crime (see discussion by (Lee, 2001)). The issues placed on the political agenda during election campaigns in the United States during the 1960s changed to include social issues such as crime as well as the traditional economic issues (Scammon & Wattenberg, 1970). The streets suddenly became "full of violence" and "full of bloody crimes", and the phrase of "violence in the streets" was soon to be heard in the 1964 political campaigns of presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. The phrase *fear-of-crime* was used in speeches made by Attorney General John Mitchell (of the Nixon administration) in response to the high crime rates in Washington, D.C. Later, the *American Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act* of 1968 was passed by Congress as a show of political action against the growing concerns reported about crime (Baker, 1985)².

These actions, along with the results from victimization surveys indicating a rise in public concern about crime and safety, have led some researchers to argue for a connection between political action and fear-of-crime (Collins, 2003; Lee, 2001). For example,

² In Britain, the British Crime Survey was instigated from a similar desire to demonstrate political action against crime while challenging public concern about the perceived rate of crime (Loader, 2006).

Schwartz argued in 2000 that “people seem to be highly concerned with crime only when the media and politicians tell them that they should be highly concerned with crime” (Schwartz & Israel, 2000: 337). Beckett (1997) has also found that “public concern about crime and drugs is strongly associated with prior political initiative on the crime and drug issues” (Beckett, 1997: 10). This thesis is intended to contribute to this body of research investigating the influence of politics on fear-of-crime, while also acknowledging the reciprocal nature of the influence between public fears about crime and political debates.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON FEAR-OF-CRIME

Academic work on fear-of-crime began in the 1970s, with the initial focus being on the risk of victimization (Furstenberg, 1971), the relationship between fear of the police and fear-of-crime (Block, 1971) and the effects of the environment (Conklin, 1971; Poveda, 1972) on fear-of-crime. The impact on public policy was discussed shortly after (in addition to (Harris, 1969) see Brooks, 1974; Erskine, 1974; Skogan, 1976; Wilson & Brown, 1973). It was 1976 before the first research was published on demographic variables and fear-of-crime (Clemente & Kleiman, 1976; Cook & Cook, 1976; Lalli & Savitz, 1976; Sundeen & Mathieu, 1976). Finally, the potential influence from the media and television especially, began to enter academic research on fear-of-crime (Doob & Macdonald (1979) see also Ditton et al (2004) for a review of media literature on fear-of-crime).

The growing body of fear-of-crime research has remained largely focused on these areas with additional disciplines such as psychology making contributions only recently (for more details see the flowchart of fear-of-crime research given in Appendix One). The following sections will give an overview of the research results in the areas of measurement

and definitional aspects, and demographic and environmental variables. It will also highlight some of the problems that have plagued these researchers.

MEASUREMENT AND DEFINITION CONFUSION

A number of different instruments have been used to measure fear-of-crime. These began from the initial 'global' question or a variation on "how safe do you feel walking alone at night?" such as that used in the British Crime Survey and the National Crime Victims Survey amongst many other studies (see Hough, 1995; Mulvey, 2002; Semmens et al., 2002; E. E. Thompson & Krause, 1998; Warr, 2000). Other techniques have included using vignettes or hypothetical scenarios to capture different elements of fear-of-crime (Kelley & Evans, 1992; May et al., 2002), and using demographic and other social psychological variables to indicate fear-of-crime (Farrall et al., 2000; Killias & Clerici, 2000; Skogan, 1987; Van Der Wurff et al., 1989). The subject of how to measure fear-of-crime has itself been the focus of much research, although many substantial problems remain (see discussions in Croake & Hinkle, 1976; Farrall, 2004b; Jackson, 2005; Keane, 1995; Killias, 1990; Pleysier et al., 2005; Schneider, 1981; Thompson et al., 1992; Williams et al., 2000; Young, 1988).

One of the main problems that affect the measurement of fear-of-crime is that there is no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon. The following three definitions highlight the incredible broadness of the definitions that are used in research. Fear-of-crime can be defined as:

- "an emotional reaction of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime" (Ferraro, 1995: xiii)

- “an emotional response to the possibility of a crime happening to oneself or to others that incorporates elements of fear, worry, vulnerability and loss of a sense of security or safety” (Lupton 2000: 24).
- “the wide range of emotional and practical responses to crime and disorder made by individuals to crime and disorder made by individuals and communities” (Pain, 2001: 901)

It is now commonly held that the phrase *fear-of-crime* is used to indicate a wide range of emotions generated by the general category of crime (Hough, 1995) (although some researchers still try to restrict it to worry and anxiety but deny that it is a sole indicator of fear (Johnston, 2001)). While more detail will be given below about defining public fears, this lack of conceptual definition of fear-of-crime is an important factor in the varying success of measurement and fear reduction attempts by researchers and policy makers.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES

The general findings of the academic work on fear-of-crime can be divided into two main groups. The first group comprises of those projects that studied the effect of demographic variables such as gender, age, income and education on fear-of-crime. From this research, it is possible to show that gender is the most reliable personal characteristic in predicting who will and will not be afraid of crime; and that women fear crime more than men (e.g. Alvi et al., 2001; Box et al., 1988; Carcach et al., 1995; Grabosky, 1995; Kelley & Evans, 1992; Phillips & Park, 2004; although Reid & Konrad (2004) argue that the gender difference may lie in the type of crime feared rather than the individual’s gender; and Sutton & Farrall (2005) argue that men may ‘lie’ or suppress their fear when answering surveys).

The research on income is similarly unanimous, showing that those with higher disposable income have lower levels of fear-of-crime (Austin et al., 2002; Carcach et al., 1995; Lebowitz, 1975; Pantazis, 2000). For example, recent studies dedicated to determining the relationship between fear-of-crime and level of household income have suggested that: a) an 496% increase in income is required to offset the impact on happiness from increased fear-of-crime due to a threat of violence while walking in the dark; b) a 115% income increase is needed to offset fear of being home alone; and c) that such increases translate into €13,538 to significantly reduce someone's fear-of-crime (Moore, 2006a, 2006b).

In contrast, the effect of age on the level of fear remains elusive to researchers with greatly differing views still being debated (for example see Biles, 1983; Box et al., 1988; Chadee & Ditton, 2003; Ferraro & LaGrange, 1988, 1992; James et al., 2003; Lebowitz, 1975; McLennan, 1999). Most recently, Moore and Shepherd (2006) have argued that age interacts with fear of different types of crimes: fear of personal harm is greatest at 23 years of age and fear of personal loss is greatest at 45 years of age. While there are attempts being made to unravel the interaction between these main variables, at present the most that can be said for the effect of age on fear-of-crime is that there may be a very minimal positive relationship – fear-of-crime may increase with age.

There is also some debate about the effect that differing amounts of education may have on a person's fear-of-crime. The variation in results stems from the lack of research in the area; most studies that do include education as a variable use it as a means of dividing location or environment rather than people. In other words, some fear-of-crime studies have focused on fear held by people on educational institution campuses rather than the levels of education a person may have (for example see Fisher, 1995; Lalli & Savitz, 1976). However, there is some evidence to suggest that fear-of-crime tends to vary inversely with education (Box et al., 1988; Carcach et al., 1995; Grabosky, 1995).

The second group of research results pertains to environmental influences. It has been found that people who are sensitive to cues of disorder and live in an area with high levels of disorder will be more afraid of crime than those who do not have both of these qualities (e.g. Perkins & Taylor, 1996; R. B. Taylor & Hale, 1986). In addition, the type of environmental space (rural, urban and associated perceived rates of crime) in which people live can also affect the level of fear, but the mechanism for doing this is still in question (Austin et al., 2002; Austin & Spine, 1991; Chilvers, 1999; Conklin, 1971; Gray & O'Connor, 1990; Maxfield, 1984). However, the amount of social support that is available and the level of social cohesion in an area are generally considered to be of little consequence for a person's fear-of-crime (Ross & Joon, 2000; Sacco, 1993; Yin, 1982).

DEFINING FEAR-OF-CRIME

The complexity of these research findings on fear-of-crime has led to a general consensus among involved scholars that fear-of-crime is representative of more than previously acknowledged. One group of researchers has made the statement that "fear' is now

routinely used as all-encompassing shorthand to refer to anxieties about crime” (Hough, 1995: 1) (although a recent study has attempted to separate fear-of-crime from concern about crime and their associated predictor variables (Amerio, 2005). In addition, Ditton and colleagues have argued that not only does the label “fear-of-crime” include fear-related emotions such as anxiety or worry but also anger about crime (Ditton et al., 1999). This latter emotion has been shown to be a more commonly felt emotional response to crime (Carvalho & Lewis, 2003).

Taylor and Jamieson (1998) and Jackson (2004) argue for the wider variety of emotional response, stimuli and cultural beliefs as being captured under “fear-of-crime”. This is a natural progression from the works of (Lee, 2001) and (Beckett, 1997). These scholars called for a type of research that recognizes the complexity of the concept itself. Fear-of-crime, they argue, is not solely a measure of an individual’s response to criminal behavior (their experienced fear). Instead, it incorporates: (a) a variety of other insecurities such as personal safety, job security, housing status and position, personal status, international relations and familial social positions; and (b) the cultural attitudes towards crime, social change, relations and the conditions conducive to crime. This variety is evident in the scope of the criminological area of “fear-of-crime” that encompasses local through to national crime prevention, security and safety initiatives and the changing social movements that change the social reality (I. Taylor & Jamieson, 1998). Thus “fear-of-crime” could be seen as a codeword for people’s fears, worries and concerns about any range of stimuli that are not necessarily defined as criminal.

In summary, this section has sought to give a general introduction to both the development and recognition of the problem of fear-of-crime and the academic knowledge that has been generated about the phenomenon. It was shown that fear-of-crime was first recognized through a combination of influences from victimology, racial/civil unrest and political action. In response, academics have studied the effect of demographic and environmental variables on the public's level of fear. However, much of this research has been plagued by measurement and definitional problems that have reduced the generalizability, reliability and validity of the results. It is on the basis of this introduction that fear-of-crime will be discussed specifically as it occurs in Australia. Before doing this, however, the following section will detail law and order politics in Australia. This will be done to provide information on the social structure and relations in which the parliamentary debates that form the data for this research were produced.

AUSTRALIAN LAW AND ORDER POLITICS

In Australia, law and order has become a significant and ubiquitous issue in politics. It rises to the fore in most election years and in most levels of government, when both the government and the opposition aim to show the advantages that their policies have over other party's stances to make the streets safer and to be stronger against criminals. As discussed above, some have called this the *law and order auction* and believe that the success of law and order to catch votes has eclipsed the motivation to implement effective crime control policies (Sarre, 2002).

This section will give an overview of the history of Australian law and order politics at a federal level and introduce the main government institutions responsible for crime

prevention, control and justice. Specific details of state level political responses to crime and fear-of-crime will be given in Chapter Ten. While government responses to crime and the administration of justice are traditionally the purview of state level politics, the decision was made to focus on federal level politics in order to clearly demonstrate the increasing prominence and salience of such issues in the political arena.

THE HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN LAW AND ORDER POLITICS

To give an indication of the history of Australian law and order politics, I will highlight changes in the platforms and policy speeches of the major political parties. In the policy speeches of the 1950s to 1960s, it is evident that there was a convergence of economic policies followed by a dramatic polarization of these same policy issues in the 1970s (see below). The 1980s signaled an international convergence to more conservative and right-wing policies especially on social issues (McAllister & Moore, 1991). These trends have continued into the 21st century with law and order policies focusing on increased punitive and reactionary responses to crime.

Before beginning an overview of the history of Australian law and order politics, it is necessary to provide a cautionary note about platforms and policy speeches. In theory, the platform of a political party is a guide to the political reality in which that party exists. It reveals the “public intentions of the parties” and share the characteristic of being “coins in a political game” (Hawker, 1982: 1-2). They can be used by a party as propaganda to promote their own survival or by interest groups to place pressure on the party to act. The platforms provide a statement of party ideology which is readily comparable to other

political parties and in theory, give the electorate a means of distinguishing between the parties.

Furthermore, the platforms are relatively durable documents that are not prepared specifically for an election (McAllister & Moore, 1991). Instead, this role is undertaken by the policy statement. Policies provide a public face to the competition between political parties. They give a concise form of the agenda which the party promises to follow should they be elected. In electing that party to office, the electorate is said to give the government a mandate to carry out their policies.

In practice, however, the policy speech and the platform hold differing values in the political strategies of each party. For example, in the Liberal Party of Australia, the platform is not binding on parliamentary representatives, but the ALP platform does bind members. The Liberal Party platform reflects the leaders' politics; the ALP platform reflects the politics of the caucus. Different again, the platform of the Australian Democrats is intended to be reflective of the whole membership of the party through the participatory democratic process of construction (Hawker, 1982). Consequently, the platform of each party will contain not only differences in ideology but also differences that stem from organizational factors.

In the same way by 1970, the policy speech had slowly begun to decline in favor of piecemeal releases of policy statements issued throughout the election campaign. Quite often the majority of the policy content has been delivered prior to the policy speech and thus the speech, as part of a campaign "launch", has become a mere formality. The policy

speech has seen a decline in importance due to a convergence in ideology between previously opposed socialist and capitalist parties, by the emergence of catch-all parties and by survey results that show the public not using the policy speech to choose between parties (McAllister & Moore, 1991).

As a result of the decline of the policy speech and the problems discussed in regard to political platforms, the following historical sketch of law and order politics in Australia should be understood as providing only the broad context for investigating political debates about fear-of-crime. More detailed discussion of events, parties, policies and so on will be given as required in later chapters (especially Chapter Ten).

LAW AND ORDER IN POLITICAL PLATFORMS

Despite their great prominence today, law and order politics and the political treatment of (street) crime has not always been on the agenda at the national level. The early federal platforms of many political parties included no mention of crime or even law in the early 1960s and 1970s (see for example: Liberal Party of Australia, 1960, 1971). In other years, the topic of law only arose in the field of law reform and constitution-related legal matters (see for example: ALP, 1967, 1973; Liberal Party of Australia, 1974, 1982).

It was not until the 1980s that the law and order issue with its current focus on street crime truly emerged in Australian politics. The notable absence of policy on law and order that was evident in earlier platforms is contrasted by more recent versions that have pages and even chapters devoted to the topic (see for example: ALP, 1998, 2000, 2004; Liberal Party of Australia, 1994).

One reason for the late arrival of law and order onto the federal political scene may be due to the fact that the division of powers in the Australian constitution places the responsibility for law and order issues squarely on the states. This includes the portfolios of policing, criminal justice and corrections, and community initiatives (Sarre, 2002). State policies will be discussed in Chapter Ten. However, the constitutionally derived division of powers that sees responsibility for laws, police and so on, makes the rise of law and order politics at the federal level more notable.

LAW AND ORDER IN POLITICAL POLICY SPEECHES

A comparison of the federal party leaders' policy speeches from 1960 to 2003 reveals that the issue of law and order as it exists today did not emerge until the 1984 election. Statements of policy on legal issues began in 1969 with the then leader of the opposition Gough Whitlam calling for legislation to protect human rights and civil liberties and the liberalization of censorship laws (Whitlam, 1969). The phrase "law and order" was used by Whitlam in 1972 under the heading of "Freedom and Democracy". This time Whitlam promised law reform and the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) (Whitlam, 1972). In 1974, as an incumbent party, Labor mentioned the establishment of the Australian Legal Aid Service, furthering the progress of the FOI Act and reforms of the structure of the courts and appeals to the privy counsel were mentioned under the heading of "The Law". Labor policies on civil liberties were also clarified with the proposed introduction of an Australian Bill of Human Rights (Whitlam, 1974).

It was not until 1975 that the Liberal Party included policies relating to legal issues in their policy speech. Fraser pledged to introduce laws to protect privacy and anti-discrimination

legislation (Fraser, 1975). Once on the scene, the Liberal Party initiated the first policy statement that is suggestive of the slant of “law and order” that was to come. In 1980 under the heading of “drugs” Fraser assures the electorate that if re-elected they would work with the States to combat the problem of illicit drug use (Fraser, 1980).

The 1984 federal election saw the issue of “law and order” as referring to criminal matters establish itself in the national political context. The ALP under the leadership of Bob Hawke spoke in relation to organized crime and drug use. Hawke promised to provide an “unrelenting attack on organized crime” through increased Australian Federal Police (AFP) resources. The problem of drug use was to be combated with the education of young people and attempts to rehabilitate drug users back into the community. Hawke also heralded the establishment of the National Campaign against Drugs. The statement ended with “this is one fight we must fight together” (Hawke, 1984).

The Liberal Party also made a statement about law and order in their 1984 policy speech. Similar to Hawke, Peacock promised to “crack down hard on drugs” and show “no mercy on organized crime”. He also suggested the concept of coordinated activities from a special surveillance command run by the Australian Defense Force out of northern Australia (Peacock, 1984). These statements made by both parties are strongly predictive of the stance taken by political parties today.

The problem of law and order was now firmly established in policy speeches at the federal level. In the 1987 election, Hawke promised to continue the law enforcement initiatives of previous years and to provide adequate resources to the National Crime Authority (NCA),

the AFP and the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (Hawke, 1987). Howard on behalf of the Liberal Party (in opposition) met this statement with a pledge to provide additional powers to the AFP and NCA to fight organized and drug-related crime. In particular, the NCA was to have stronger powers to use surveillance on phone lines (Howard, 1987).

By the turn of the 21st century, it was clear that law and order was a political issue at the federal level. This has been demonstrated through the brief analysis of party's platforms and policy speeches since 1960. The main purpose of providing this history has been to show that law and order has gained increasing salience and prominence on the political agenda. Specific details on each political party's ideology and policies relating to crime will be discussed in Chapter Ten. The following section will introduce the main government institutions that are responsible for criminal justice and crime control in Australia.

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO CRIME AND FEAR-OF-CRIME

The following section details some of the initiatives, agencies and departments that are responsible for addressing crime and fear-of-crime across Australia. The discussion begins with programs that have been set up by individual governments to tackle specific issues such as crime prevention, community safety and fear-of-crime. These programs, along with the agencies and departments to be discussed later, play an important role in both advising the government on crime matters and the implementation of the resultant policies.

NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM (NCPP)

The National Crime Prevention Program (NCPP) is a continuation of efforts and funding committed to the National Campaign against Violence and Crime (NCAVAC). The NCAVAC was a feature of the Coalition 1993 election policy “Law and Justice for Us All”. The Howard government supported the campaign by a further commitment of \$9.2 million from 1996 to 1999. It sought to address a range of issues such as fear-of-crime, burglary, crime committed by young people, crime in indigenous communities and sexual violence (Sarre, 2002).

Launched in 1997 with \$38 million in funding, the NCPP continued with many of these objectives of identifying and promoting “innovative ways of reducing and preventing crime and the fear of crime” (Attorney-General's Department, 2004). With further government funding of \$20 million through the Howard 2004-2005 budget, the program seeks to increase the involvement of Australian communities in crime prevention primarily through a grants program for trialing prevention approaches. The program is situated within the portfolio of the Minister for Justice and Customs and involves a strong emphasis on developing partnerships both within the community and between the community and local governments (Attorney-General's Department, 2004).

THE NATIONAL ANTI-CRIME STRATEGY (NACS)

The National Anti-Crime Strategy was a nation-wide state and territory government initiative beginning in 1994. NACS was coordinated from South Australia with each state or territory assigning a minister to be responsible for implementing the initiatives at a local level. The Strategy was intended to address issues of crime prevention through a national

approach. It was hoped that crime prevention would assist in the control of crime where criminal justice responses had failed; and that the national approach would reduce duplication of efforts across Australia. The Strategy focused on key areas such as the development and promotion of best practice in crime prevention, and bipartisan commitment to crime prevention action. These areas touched on issues included fear-of-crime and community safety, government roles in crime prevention, and the evaluation of crime prevention efforts (Crime Prevention Unit, 2003).

THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY (AIC)

The Australian Institute of Criminology is a Commonwealth statutory authority that was founded in 1973 for the purposes of “conducting criminological research; communicating the results of research; conducting or arranging conferences and seminars; and publishing material arising out of the AIC’s work” (AIC, 2004). The AIC also provides policy advice and consultation services to governments and to private industry. It operates under the Criminology Research Act of 1971 and also falls within the portfolio of the Minister for Justice and Customs.

THE CRIMINOLOGY RESEARCH COUNCIL (CRC)

Similar to the AIC, the Criminology Research Council is also a Commonwealth statutory authority operating under the Criminology Research Act of 1971. The CRC controls and administers the “Criminology Research Fund”. This fund is designed to provide researchers in universities, government departments and other institutions with funds to undertake criminological research. The research itself can be in a variety of areas such as sociology,

psychology, law, statistics, police and so forth but must be policy-oriented with research outcomes that are applicable in multiple jurisdictions (CRC, 2004).

THE AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION (ACC)

The Australian Crime Commission is the resulting organization from the amalgamation of three agencies in 2003: the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (established in 1981 to “provide a national criminal intelligence service for law enforcement), the National Crime Authority (established in 1984 to “provide an effective countermeasure to Australian organized crime”), and the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments (established in 1994 to “provide strategic intelligence advice on emergent criminal issues) (ACC, 2004). The amalgamation was intended to increase coordination and effectiveness of intelligence collection and analysis while decreasing the duplication of materials and resources.

The ACC is primarily focused on the collection, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence and information to law enforcement agencies. Current special investigations and intelligence operations include: south east Asian organized crime, established criminal networks, firearms trafficking, money laundering and tax fraud, Victorian established criminal networks, amphetamines and other synthetic drugs, vehicle rebirthing, identity crime, and people trafficking for sexual servitude. The activities of the ACC are scrutinized by an inter-governmental committee, a parliamentary joint committee and the ACC board (ACC, 2004).

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

At a federal level, the Attorney-General's Department is responsible for law and justice in Australia. The Department is divided into four groups: Civil Justice and Legal Services, Criminal Justice and Security, Information and Knowledge Services, and Corporate Services. The Criminal Justice Division of the Criminal Justice and Security group is most relevant to the issues discussed in this thesis. It is "responsible for legal and policy advice, and for the administration and improvement of legislation and international arrangements ... relating to criminal law and criminal justice process". The National Crime Prevention Program is also administered by this division (Australian Government, 2004).

At a local level, the state and territory governments hold powers over law and justice as given by the Australian Constitution. Each state/territory also has an Attorney General who is the principal adviser to the (state/territory) government on legal, constitutional and legal policy issues. As the most senior member of the Bar, s/he may represent the crown in some litigation matters. In NSW, the Department of Justice and the Attorney General's Department were amalgamated in 1901 to form the Department of Attorney General and Justice (NSW Attorney General's Department, 2004). A similar arrangement exists in Queensland (Queensland Government, 2004). These departments manage the courts, tribunals, laws and justice programs within each respective state.

In Victoria, the Department of Justice answers to four Ministers who cover six portfolios (The Attorney-General, Minister for Police and Emergency Services, and Minister for Corrections, Minister for Consumer Affairs and Minister for Gaming and Minister for Racing). The department is responsible for the "reform, administration and enforcement of

the law in Victoria”. This includes police and prosecution of offenders, the court and prison system, other tribunals designed to protect citizens’ rights, emergency services, gaming, racing, liquor licensing and trade measurement, legislation and legal advice to the Government (Department of Justice, 2004).

The departments in Western Australia, South Australia, Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania have a very similar role to that of Victoria. Each department functions to provide systems and services for the provision of law, legal and policy advice, licensing, correctional services and criminal justice. Crime prevention is taken up to varying degrees in each state as discussed above in regard to NACS. The state and territory departments are responsible for the implementation of services at a local community level as well as the provision of advice to their premiers or chief ministers and the government. These departments are also concerned with protecting the rights of the individuals – both victims and offenders of crime (see for further information: (ACT Department of Justice and Community Safety, 2004; Justice Tasmania, 2004; Northern Territory Government, 2004; SA Department for Correctional Services, 2004; WA Department of Justice, 2004)).

THE POLICE

The police in the modern state are traditionally viewed as the frontline against crime. In Australia, there are eight police services: one federal and seven state- or territory-run services. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) “enforces Commonwealth criminal law, and protects Commonwealth and national interests from crime in Australia and overseas. The AFP is Australia’s international law enforcement and policing representative, and the chief

source of advice to the Australian Government on policing issues” (AFP 2005). It is an organization that undertakes targeted work as directed by the Government (for example, combating organized crime, transnational crime and money laundering) and also provides protection services to dignitaries and crucial witnesses. Community policing services are provided to the ACT, Jervis Bay, Norfolk Island and Christmas Island. Finally, the AFP maintains a network of liaison officers in more than 20 countries and contribute to overseas peacekeeping missions. The AFP is a statutory authority established by Federal Parliament in the Australian Federal Police Act of 1979. Though it is part of the Attorney-General’s portfolio, the AFP Commissioner reports to the (Federal) Minister for Justice and Customs.

Each of the six state-based police services come under the auspice of their respective state law and parliaments:

- New South Wales Police was formed in 1789 and now comprises 13,300 sworn officers (NSW Police, 2005);
- Victoria Police was established in 1853 and has developed to an organization employing 13,100 people including Police, Public Servants and Protective Security Officers (VIC Police, 2005);
- Western Australia Police employs over 6,000 people with almost 5,000 of them being sworn officers (WA Police, 2005);
- Queensland Police Service was established in 1864 and in 2005-2006 had a funded strength of 9,378 police officers and 3,360 staff members (QLD Police, 2006);
- Tasmania Police employs 1,139 officers (TAS Police, 2006); and
- South Australia Police, as at 30 June 2006, had 4,283 police officers supported by 1,125 unsworn employees (SA Police, 2006).

The two territories in Australia have had a more complex policing history. The first police in the NT were officers from the SA Mounted Police (from 1870), in 1911 policing came under control of the Commonwealth, and in 1978 when the Territory won self-government it was given full control of the police. In December 2003, it comprised 760 sworn officers with 227 uncommissioned officers. In the ACT, the AFP are contracted to provide community policing services despite the Territory having gained self-government in 1989. There are approximately 790 sworn and unsworn officers assigned to ACT Policing.

Each of these police services have the similar goals of protecting the community and its property by enforcing the law, maintaining order, monitoring road safety and so on. Most relevant to this thesis, there is a strong rhetoric of working to create a safe environment through community partnerships, crime prevention and crime reduction. This rhetoric is acted upon by the development of ties with partners such roads authorities, Crime Stoppers and Neighborhood Watch organizations. Similarly, there is an increasing uptake in the use of community volunteers in administrative role to promote links with the community and enable sworn officers to concentrate on traditional police activities.

In summary, the programs, agencies and departments that have been discussed here function to create the law and criminal justice environment in Australia. From the local neighborhood level increasingly becoming involved in crime prevention to the national federal level of departments and agencies addressing organized crime and collecting criminal intelligence, such efforts necessarily affect the discussions about and actions on crime and fear-of-crime. Their discussion here was intended to describe the basic functions

and portfolios of each body as a means of indicating the social structures in which the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime are situated.

HISTORY OF FEAR-OF-CRIME IN AUSTRALIA

Fear-of-crime in Australia has mostly been studied in the context of international research and their results. General demographic and environmental variables' contribution to fear-of-crime has been studied through national or state based population surveys. Like the US, Australia also has a National Crime Victims Survey that has been run by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) since 1975 (Biles, 1983). This survey is run at irregular intervals, however, with surveys only occurring in 1975, 1983, 1990, 1998 and 2002. More recent results are being published in the ABS' *Crime and Safety* statistics. The main focus of this survey is to measure victimization and its impact (Kelley & Evans, 1992).

State based surveys of crime levels and perceptions of safety are also conducted but little academic analysis has been done with the data on fear-of-crime because of a lack of access to ABS unit record data. One exception to this has been in QLD, where Carcach and Mukherjee have published a number of articles based on the data from the Queensland Crime Victims Survey and those run by the ABS and AIC (Carcach, 1999; Carcach et al., 1995; Carcach et al., 1998; Carcach & Mukherjee, 1999; Mukherjee & Carach, 1998; Mukherjee et al., 1990). The following section chronologically details the academic research focusing on fear-of-crime in Australia.

Wilson and Brown (1973) were among the first to investigate fear-of-crime in Australia and did so with an emphasis on policy implications. They found that while there was a high

degree of public concern about crime it was not as high as that reported in America (Wilson & Brown, 1973). This result was consistent with other research completed at approximately the same time. The authors observed that the Australian public did not report a level of fear comparable to that reported in the US and that those feelings of fear were limited to specific pockets of the community (Braithwaite et al., 1979).

However, Wilson and Brown also found that Australians were still modifying their behavior in similar ways to Americans such as avoiding talking to strangers, walking the streets at night and being out alone. The authors concluded that because little had been done to address public concern about crime, they were “fighting only half the battle and losing the war by default” (Wilson & Brown, 1973: 106). While this work was based on a survey of Australians, the influence of American research was strongly evident through the rhetoric and the conclusions drawn.

The majority of work on fear-of-crime in Australia for the next 10 to 15 years was focused on the elderly and associated variables such as social support and community cohesion. The focus on the elderly at this time is probably due to a similar international direction being taken in fear-of-crime research. In 1983, Biles wrote that the elderly were reporting significantly higher levels of fear than younger people in the National Crime Victims Survey of 1975 based on the global question (a measure later found to be inappropriate for use with older people) (Biles, 1983).

Mugford (1984) also found that older people were probably more fearful of crime but that the influence of other variables such as social support, demographics and especially gender

may reduce the level reported (Mugford, 1984). In 1990, Green tempered the level of concern about crime attributed to the elderly in Australia by arguing that other concerns such as lack of transportation and health are more important than crime (Green, 1990). Research into fear-of-crime among the elderly in Australia has continued since these early efforts (see Costello, 1996; Grabosky, 1995; James, 1993; Ranzijn & Howells, 2002).

1990 saw the publication of the first research on fear-of-crime in rural areas of Australia. Gray and O'Connor (1990) studied perceptions of crime in Walcha, NSW – a small country town populated by less than 2,000 people at the time. The authors found that although the level of fear-of-crime was less than that reported in city areas, crime itself is perceived as significant problem in some parts of rural Australia (Gray & O'Connor, 1990). Gray and O'Connor called for greater recognition of community characteristics in the study of fear-of-crime. The need for such recommendations was justified by the research coming mainly from the US where research on environmental variables was having a significant influence on the conclusions drawn about the strength of demographic variables.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, work on fear-of-crime in Australia again reflected international trends. The focus changed to study the implications of risk on fear. This change began through the work of Warr and associates in the US (see for example Warr, 1987, 1990, 2000) and the common findings from many researchers that fear-of-crime was not directly related to risk of victimization. Lupton published two articles (1999, 2000) that focused on perceptions of risk and also types of environmental spaces. These articles highlighted the influence of the unpredictable stranger and the dangerous “other” on levels of fear-of-crime, as well as the perception that some areas are more risky than others for

personal safety (Lupton, 1999, 2000). Lupton's writings show the growing influence of theoretical models about risk and safety on the analyses of fear-of-crime.

The strong influence of interdisciplinary theory that was evident in Lupton's work has matured into the self-reflective criminology written by Murray Lee out of the University of Sydney. Based on doctoral work, Lee (1999) published a genealogy of fear-of-crime in the style of Foucauldian analysis. Lee situated the research on fear-of-crime firmly within previous criminological traditions and pressures of social movements in more recent times (Lee, 1999). This analysis culminated in a further publication that cited the circularity of creation in the history of fear-of-crime between government attempts to reduce it and the levels reported in surveys and other academic work (Lee (2001) see also Farrall (2004a)). Both Lee, Lupton and their colleagues have participated in the changing focus of criminological research on fear-of-crime internationally to incorporate theoretical notions of risk, crime control and government efficacy begun by Garland (for example Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2003).

So far I have traced the journey of the relatively meager writings of researchers on fear-of-crime in Australia. It is evident that little is known about fear-of-crime in Australia specifically and that much of the policy decisions have, by necessity, been based on American and British sources of research. While Australian work has followed and sometimes led international trends in this field, they have been mostly based on comparative data sources or theoretical foundations based on overseas results.

GOVERNMENT RESEARCH ON FEAR-OF-CRIME

There have only been two (major) attempts by the Australian government to ascertain the impact of fear-of-crime and possible strategies for fear reduction in the community. Most recently, the Minister for Justice and Customs referred the matter of crime in the community (victims, offenders, and fear of crime) to the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs in May 2002. The terms of reference for the inquiry directed the committee to “inquire into the extent and impact and fear of crime within the Australian community and effective measures for the Commonwealth in countering and preventing crime” (Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2003).

This committee made five recommendations in 2004 specifically about fear-of-crime. It sought to encourage state and territory governments to work more closely together with organizations to collect data on underreporting of crimes. This was particularly in the areas of crimes against women. The Committee also recommended that there be greater representation of ethnic groups in Australian police forces in order to reduce ethnic-based crime and fear-of-crime in these communities. The fourth recommendation was that statistics of the level of fear-of-crime in the community be published in order to reduce fear-of-crime. Finally, the committee praised the work of the National Community Crime Prevention Programme and recommended further funding be made available (Bishop et al., 2004).

The second attempt was a major academic research project. Fear-of-crime was identified by the National Anti-Crime Strategy (NACS), the Criminology Research Council (CRC) and the Commonwealth Government’s National Campaign Against Violence and Crime as a

priority for research and action. This resulted in the Centre for Cultural Risk Research at Charles Sturt University being commissioned by the CRC to undertake stage one of the project: a consultancy intended to “explore the ways in which people conceptualise and manage fear, especially in relation to the risk of becoming a victim of crime” (National Campaign against Violence and Crime, 1998: 2).

The fear-of-crime project team began with literature review of qualitative and quantitative work on the topic and also took in research on risk communication and the media. The fieldwork was divided into three studies. First, the Main Study involved qualitative interviews and focus groups of 148 participants drawn from Sydney, Wollongong, Bathurst, and Hobart. The second study looked specifically at fear-of-crime in public spaces and again used focus groups and long interviews. This study drew its participants from Sydney and the Blue Mountains areas who were regular users of the commuter rail link. The Transport Study also sought qualitative information from rail staff to elucidate expert versus lay persons’ feelings of fear on public transport. Finally, the third study investigated the impact of the media and audience viewing patterns on fear-of-crime.

The main findings of both the literature review and the results of three fieldwork studies were produced in a two-volume 610 page report. The fear-of-crime project team concluded that, similar to other academic research, age and gender were the strongest predictors of fear. The types of offences feared differed between the genders. The project team found that public transport was a source of fear for many people and that older people have a more generalized and pervasive fear than younger people. Additional conclusions were also given about the contexts in which people are afraid, levels of fear, relationship with actual

risk of victimization and fear/crime reduction strategies. The then Minister for Justice, Amanda Vanstone, promised to use these conclusions and recommendations in implementing practical projects to make the community safer (National Campaign against Violence and Crime, 1998, 2000).

These two attempts by the federal government to gather information on fear-of-crime demonstrate the political recognition of academic research on the issue and the problem itself. They also highlight the intertwined existence of law and order politics and public concerns about crime with both becoming increasingly prominent in politics at local, state/territory and national levels. It is within this dynamic social and political context that parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime have occurred, the characteristics of which will be the subject of later chapters.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

In summary, this chapter has provided an introduction into law and order politics first at the global level. This introduction described the rise to prominence of the 'crime problem', the politicization of that problem, the political utility of crime politics and the effect that such politics have had on academic research into crime. The history of fear-of-crime provides a classical example of these events from its discovery and political adoption in the United States to its importation by different continents. It has been shown that the development and sustenance of fear-of-crime research is inextricably linked to the political utility of law and order issues.

Finally, I gave an overview of law and order politics in Australia at the federal level. This was followed by an examination of the academic research carried out by Australian authors on fear-of-crime in this country. That examination, sadly, highlighted the lack of specific knowledge held by academics or by the Australian government. The only two attempts by the government to understand more fully fear-of-crime has been a federal inquiry and the NCAVC initiative and projects that stemmed from it. These attempts were argued to indicate the coexistence of law and order politics and fear-of-crime. It is on the basis of the social and political environment depicted by these two histories – law and order politics, and fear-of-crime – that the following examination of the debates surrounding fear-of-crime by Australian politicians will be undertaken.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will present the methodology employed to gather and analyze debates in Australian parliaments about fear-of-crime. The data is largely qualitative with simple quantitative counts and percentages given to indicate frequencies of use only in cases where it informs the text-derived analysis. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, the methodology is intended to explore debates surrounding fear-of-crime. Consequently, the aims, research questions and even the potential analyses presented in this chapter are broad. They are intended to provide the freedom to let the data guide the analysis rather than the analysis being directed by a theoretical framework or proposition. Individual hypotheses drawn from criminological literature will be empirically tested in Chapter Thirteen. The chapter following this will give an overview of the general results with specific characteristics being discussed in later chapters.

AIM

The aim of this research is to begin to identify characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime in Australian parliaments.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research question guiding this research is:

How do Australian politicians, in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime?

This can be divided into more specific research questions of:

RQ1: What are the characteristics of debates on fear-of-crime?

RQ2: How and by whom are debates on fear-of-crime used?

RQ3: When (in what situation) are debates on fear-of-crime used?

RQ4: What discourses are evident in debates on fear-of-crime?

METHODOLOGY THEORY

The following methodology is based on four points. First, it is primarily qualitative research. Techniques of such research are drawn from many different disciplines and in general do not favor one method over another. The main objectives of qualitative research stresses the socially “constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003: 13).

Secondly, this research is mostly involved with unobtrusive qualitative data. Such data has advantages over the obtrusive qualitative methods in that it is non-interactive and the data itself exists outside the research process (i.e. is not generated through the research) (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2004).

Thirdly, the research analysis and results are based on a corpus of documents. A corpus is intended to identify what is central and typified in the language being studied (Stubbs, 1996). This is in marked contrast to the techniques employed by linguists following the generative grammar traditions for example, where sentences are examined in isolation from the context.

Finally, the research is based in the guiding principles of CDA. The theoretical background to CDA has been explained in Chapter One. However, specific methodological approaches and analyses will be explained in each of the case studies.

DATA SOURCES

Data was sourced from on-line databases from Australian Federal and State parliaments. These databases commonly contained Hansard records and transcripts from committee proceedings. Some parliaments also maintained an on-line source of media releases and political publications. The time period for which these databases were accessible was approximately from 1980 for the Federal Parliament and from 1990 for most state parliaments. The ACT Legislative Assembly and WA Parliament were exceptions, coming on-line in 1995 and 1997 respectively.

HANSARD

The main content of Hansard is the full report or transcript of Members' speeches in parliament, with petitions, ministerial responses, motion notices, questions on notice (and their answers), results of divisions and requests for information from the Speaker also included. It is important to note that there have been some questions raised over the level to which Hansard is a verbatim record of debates in the parliament. The official description of Hansard states that:

The debates are substantially the verbatim reports, with no unnecessary additions, with repetitions and redundancies omitted and with obvious mistakes corrected, but on the other hand leaving out nothing that adds to the meaning of a speech or illustrates an argument. (APH, 2003: 587)

Chilton (2004) has further confirmed that (the British) Hansard ‘corrects’ the speeches of members through removal of instances of discursive repair (self-corrections by speakers) and transformation of interrogatives into preferred format (e.g., “would my right honorable friend...”). In effect, Chilton argues, Hansard presents an idealized model of the events of each session (Chilton, 2004). Given that the focus of this research is to determine the characteristics of how parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime, it was felt necessary to ascertain the level of impact that such correction may have on the potential analysis of data drawn from the Hansards.

To do this, four sessions of question time (approximately one hour in length) in the House of Representatives and the Senate were recorded on audio tape. While all sessions of parliamentary sittings are broadcast on public radio (alternating between the House of Representatives and the Senate), question time was chosen as the session with the greatest possibility of impromptu, unplanned and spontaneous speech including mistakes and repairs. The transcript of each session was obtained from the Hansard (comprising 34,211 words) and checked against the audio version of the parliamentary debate.

PROTOCOL-DETERMINED SPEECH

It was found that the changes made by Hansard to that which was said in parliamentary debate could be classed into two categories: protocol determined speech and the transformation of spoken word into written text. Protocol-determined speech is the characteristics of the text that have been deleted or added to conform to Hansard preferred format. For example¹, parliamentary protocol dictates that all answers to questions are directed through the Speaker of the House (or the President in the Senate). However, the “Mr Speaker” or “Mr President” is generally deleted from the written text. The following statement was made by Treasurer Peter Costello (House of Representatives Question Time, 15 September 2005:

Verbatim:

The task ahead **Mr Speaker** will be to reform the industrial relations system. The task ahead **Mr Speaker** will be to bed down a competitive regime in relation to Telstra. **Mr Speaker**, are there any alternative views on managing the economy? **Mr Speaker** the opposition did say that they planned this term to build their creditability in relation to the economy.

Hansard:

The task ahead will be to reform the industrial relations system. The task ahead will be to bed down a competitive regime in relation to Telstra. Are there any alternative views on managing the economy? The opposition did say that they planned this term to build their creditability in relation to the economy.

¹ The differences between the verbatim and Hansard transcriptions have been highlighted in bold font for all examples in the following section.

In this example, as in the majority of Hansard texts analysed, “Mr Speaker” has been deleted from the written transcript.

Protocol-determined speech also includes the addition of phrases such as those referring to asking a supplementary question as the following statement by Senator McLucas demonstrates (Senate Question Time, 13 September 2005):

Verbatim:

Thank you Mr President. Why did the minister fail to ensure that the extreme impact of the government’s proposals on parents of children with disabilities was not taken into account in the first place?

Hansard:

Mr President, I ask a supplementary question. Why did the minister fail to ensure that the extreme impact of the government’s proposals on parents of children with disabilities was not taken into account in the first place?

Corrections were also made to the spoken text of the parliamentary debate in regard to full names and position titles. For example, Mark Vaile then acting Prime Minister stated (House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005):

Verbatim:

I welcome comments made by the **EU Trade Commissioner**, Peter Mandelson, that trade barriers are ineffective and only distract domestic industries from becoming competitive.

Hansard:

I welcome comments made by the **EU Commissioner for External Trade**, Peter Mandelson, that trade barriers are ineffective and only distract domestic industries from becoming competitive.

Similarly, the text of a statement made by Treasurer Peter Costello was changed to confirm to the correct and full title preferred by Hansard (House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005):

Verbatim:

I understand that the shareholding minister, Senator Minchin has indicated that the government will not be voting against that resolution.....

Hansard:

I understand that the shareholding minister, Senator Minchin, **the Minister for Finance and Administration**, has indicated that the government will not be voting against that resolution.....

In summary, protocol-determined speech comprises a category of alterations that are made by Hansard during the transcription of parliamentary debates. These alterations included: the deletion of the explicit protocol-determined directing of the speech; the addition of preferred format for indicating the desire to participate in the debates; and the corrected names and titles of those involved.

TRANSFORMING SPOKEN WORD TO WRITTEN TEXT

The second category of alterations made by Hansard involved modifying the parliamentarian's speeches to conform to the traditions of written rather than spoken word. This comprised four main changes: hesitancies, repetitions and duplications, interjections, and clarity of speech. Each of these will be discussed below.

First, the spoken answers given by many of the parliamentarians were punctuated by hesitancies such as *um*, *er*, *ah* and so on. For example, Attorney General Phillip Ruddock made the following statement (House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005)²:

Ah the **er** measures that we are pursuing will be **ah** will be **ah** advanced in those discussions **um** with the leaders, **um** and **er** when that has been concluded and agreement is reached, because a number of these measures still require **ah** the **er** **ah** the willing engagement of the states and territories, **ah** when that has occurred **um** drafting of the more detailed provisions will commence.

While such hesitancies are common in speech, the written transcription of these words is not required for pragmatic purposes and provides only a distraction for the reader.

Second, due to the hearer's need to process immediately what is said because of the inability to re-read the text, spoken word tends to have more repetition of the main points in

² The underlined text indicates words that were in the verbatim recording but not included in the Hansard transcript. This will be discussed in detail below.

an arguments. For example, Leader of the Opposition Kim Beazley stated ((House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005):

Verbatim:

Relevance Mr Speaker. I wanted to know whether the debate today is going to be gagged. **Is it going to be gagged?**

Hansard:

Mr Speaker, I rise on a point of order on relevance, I want to know whether the debate today is going to be gagged.

Similarly, Treasurer Peter Costello stated (House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005):

Verbatim:

When the government did its last fuel tax inquiry, the fuel tax inquiry noted that there had been 44 inquiries into the oil market since 1983 Mr Speaker, **44 inquiries into the oil market since 1983**. I can assure the House that the problem in this industry is not a lack of inquiries. There have been 44 in the last 20 years.

Hansard:

When the government did its last fuel tax inquiry, the fuel tax inquiry noted that there had been 44 inquiries into the oil market since 1983. I can assure the House that the problem in this industry is not a lack of inquiries. There have been 44 in the last 20 years.

In these examples, Beazley and Costello are seeking to emphasize their points through repetition – a feature that is less necessary in written text where the reader is able to return to earlier parts of the text at will. The speaker may also duplicate words or phrases that have been said not because of a desire to emphasize a point but to gain ‘thinking’ time. This was evidenced in to the Phillip Ruddock example given above with the duplication of *will be*.

A particularly common feature of question time that is not consistently transcribed by Hansard is interjections from other parliamentarians or the disciplining of those parliamentarians by the Speaker of the House or President of the Senate. For example: the following interchange took place in the House of Representatives 12 September 2005:

Mr Gavan O’Connor – My question is to the Acting Prime Minister –

Indistinguishable Interjections

The Speaker – Order! Order! Order! The member for Corio has the floor.

Interjection – Settle down big boy!

Mr Gavan O’Connor – Is the Acting Prime Minister aware that there has been little or no investment to the upgrade exchanges in regional South Australia.....[continued]

Hansard transcribed this as:

Mr Gavan O’Connor –My question is to the Acting Prime Minister. Is the Acting Prime Minister aware that there has been little or no investment to the upgrade exchanges in regional South Australia.....[continued]

At other times, Hansard has recorded the interjections. For example:

Mr Dutton - We know that since the program started 90,000 people have become self-supporting and independent through that scheme.

It's ours! It's a Labor program.

We know that it has been an incredibly successful scheme—

Yes, and who set it up?

which has been supported and refined by this government. When I was in Hobart recently,

These examples seek to show that while Hansard transcribes some (probably when identifiable) interjections during parliamentary debate, the general noise that accompanies much of question time is not transferred into the written format.

The fourth change that is made by Hansard to transform the spoken parliamentary debates into the written text is what can be categorised as ensuring some clarity of speech. This includes deleting self-corrections by the speaker such as:

Verbatim:

For example, we have got **Mr Sample, er Mr Speaker**, we've got something like 700,000 children in Australia are growing up in jobless households

Hansard:

For example, something like 700,000 children in Australia are growing up in jobless households. (Mr Andrews, House of Representatives 15 September 2005)

Verbatim:

... and given the Commonwealth's powers as recognised under the **CSDTA**
sorry CSTDA.....

Hansard:

.. and given the Commonwealth's powers as recognised under the CSTDA....
(Senator Siewert, Senate 14 September 2005)

Ensuring clarity of speech also includes formalizing the language and correcting tenses. For example:

Verbatim:

If the minister **wouldn't** work for \$2.27 an hour, can he explain why the government is insisting that people with a disability should?

Hansard:

If the minister **would not** work for \$2.27 an hour, can he explain why the government is insisting that people with a disability should? (Senator Sterle, Senate 13 September 2005)

Verbatim:

It was quite strict criteria because we had to ensure that we got the budget back into surplus....

Hansard:

There were quite strict criteria because we had to ensure that we got the budget back into surplus.... (Senator Patterson, Senate 13 September 2005)

These changes to tense, formalization of language and the deletion of speaker's mistakes ensure clarity of speech in the transcribed versions of the parliamentary debates. This, combined with the removal of hesitations, duplications and repetitions, and interjections result in the idealised model of debate argued by Chilton (2004); an ideal that is further reinforced by changes made due to protocol determined speech.

The sum result of these changes made by Hansard can be seen in the final example given below. The lines marked by Arabic numerals represent the verbatim transcription and the Roman numerals represent the Hansard transcription. Spaces have been added to ensure matched words are aligned.

Statement by Philip Ruddock (Attorney-General)

House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005

1	I	er	thank	the	Leader	for	his	question.	I	assume	he	is			
i	I		thank	the	Leader	of	the	Opposition	for	his	question.	I	assume	he	is
2	referring	to	the	joint	press	release	between	the	Prime	Minister	and				
ii	referring	to	the	joint	press	release	between	the	Prime	Minister	and				
3	myself	in	relation	to	measures	that	were	announced	last	Thursday					
iii	me		in	relation	to	measures	that	were	announced	last	Thursday				
4	and	er	as	I	recall,	there	were	attached	to	that	ah	document	some	further	
iv		As	I	recall,	there	was		attached	to	that		document	some	further	
5	elaboration	but	er	the	point	we	have	now	reached	is	that	after	the		
v	elaboration.		The	point	we	have	now	reached	is	that	after	the			
6	discussion	with	state	officials,	involving	Commonwealth	officials								

vi discussion with state officials, involving Commonwealth officials

7 ah that er operate er as a legal reference group, preparations are under

vii that operate as a legal reference group, preparations are under

8 way for the meeting to be held on the 27th of September, ah jointly

viii way for the meeting to be held on 27 September, jointly

9 involving the Prime Minister, premiers and er and territory leaders.

ix involving the Prime Minister, premiers and territory leaders.

10 Ah the er measures that we are pursuing will be ah will be ah

x The measures that we are pursuing will be

11 advanced in those discussions um with the leaders, um and er when

xi advanced in those discussions with the leaders, and when

12 that has been concluded and agreement is reached, because a number

xii that has been concluded and agreement is reached, because a number

13 of these measures still require ah the er ah the willing engagement of

xiii of these measures do require the willing engagement of

14 the states and territories, ah when that has occurred um drafting of

xiv the states and territories, drafting of

15 the more detailed provisions will commence. Some consideration has

xv the more detailed provisions will commence. Some consideration has

16 been given er already to that process, um but the detailed

xvi been given already to that process, but as for the detailed

17 legislation er will undertake the normal review that we would expect

xvii legislation we will undertake the normal review that we would expect

- 18 um through the party room structures on this side of the House with time
- xviii through the party room structures on this side of the House with time
- 19 for your colleagues to also consider the matters
- xix for your colleagues on that side of the House to also consider the matters
- 20 and er parliamentary committee examinations as appropriate. Um and er
- xx and for parliamentary committee examinations as appropriate.
- 21 we hope to get the passage of that legislation before the end of this year.
- xxi We hope to get the passage of that legislation before the end of this year.

Within the 34,211 words used as a sample corpus to study the changes made by Hansard during transcription, 444 differences were found between the verbatim and Hansard texts (excluding hesitations of um, er, ah etc). It should be remembered that this corpus comprised of question time transcripts for the express purpose of gaining a sample of the most impromptu speech possible. The frequency of many features of this speech such as hesitancies, clarity of speech and protocol-determined speech changes could be expected to be less in recitations of written speeches during bill readings and so on. With only 7% of the documents collected for this research being from Question Time the spread of these higher frequencies is considered to be somewhat constrained.

Nonetheless it is important to acknowledge that the data for the proceeding research is not a 100% verbatim record of parliamentary debates. This may have some unquantifiable impact on the research findings presented in the first and second case studies that have a strong focus on the linguistic characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime. However, the changes made by Hansard during transcription do not change the pragmatic intentions of the speaker

as reflected in the language used, despite presenting a syntactically idealized version of events. Therefore, it is argued that the overall intentions of the approach used in this research and the goals of the research itself will not be impacted unduly by Hansard's transcription practices.

DATA GENERATION

The purpose of the approach presented here is to isolate data that will display the characteristics of debates on fear-of-crime in Australian parliaments. As such, it focuses solely on material that has been produced in an Australian parliament and excludes material which is produced from the media or other agency. Data was generated from the following political or government documents that originated during the period of 1980 to 2003:

- Parliamentary debates, papers, question time debates and questions
- Media releases
- Committee proceedings, papers and reports
- Political party platforms, position papers, policies and other documents in their manifestos.

Not all databases provided the same access to such documents. The following table outlines the type of documents that were available from each parliament and the starting date of access.

Table 4.1: Availability of Documents From State and Federal Parliaments

State	On-Line Items Searched	Begun	State	On-Line Items Searched	Begun
Federal	ParlInfo Web (Hansard) Parliamentary Library E-Briefs Vital Issues Seminars Parliamentary Papers Committee Reports	Not Listed	WA	Hansard Committee Reports Publications	1997
			TAS	Hansard Committee Reports Publications	1992
NSW	Research Papers Bills Digests Inquires Index Committee Reports Archival Records Hansard	1991	NT	Hansard Committee Reports Publications	1990
			ACT	Hansard Committee Reports	1995
VIC	Hansard Committee Reports	1991	QLD	Publications Committee Reports Hansard	1990
SA	Hansard Committee Reports	1993			

KEYWORDS

Individual documents were initially identified through keyword searches available in the data sources listed above. Two main keywords were used – “crime” and “fear of crime”. While it was anticipated that the search results returned under the keyword “crime” were of a very wide scope, it was hoped that these searches would also identify documents which were exceptions to where fear-of-crime has traditionally been found. In addition, the phrase “fear of crime” may not always be used. Instead, other tag words such as “safe streets”, “home invasion”, “mugging” and “public safety” were employed to describe the same phenomenon. Instances of not using fear-of-crime and the substitution of different phrases to describe the issue are of relevance to the study and were included through the wider catchment capabilities of the keywords suggested.

After this initial trawl, documents were identified through the bibliographic references listed in the original keyword documents as well as the dictates of parliamentary protocols. For example, under many Acts which provide for statutory agencies there is a reporting requirement. Should the anticipated number of reports not be identified initially, more targeted searches were undertaken. Alternatively, when a Bill that is introduced to the House on, for example, extending the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) in city streets and the transcript of second reading speeches not be captured by the initial search, individual searching was done to ensure that a comprehensive corpus of documents was generated.

A pilot of the keyword searches was carried out to check the feasibility of what was proposed. The pilot was conducted through online sources and excluded records dating before approximately 1993. Also excluded due to the resource demand of more manual searching methods, were State based committees and publications, political party documents and media releases. From this pilot search, 614 documents were identified that contained the phrase “fear of crime” and 6,444 documents under the keyword of “crime”. Included in these figures are the transcripts of 85 federal committees that would potentially provide examples of longer and more detailed participation in discourses relating to fear-of-crime (APH, 2004a, 2004b). On the basis of these results, it was estimated that approximately 1,000 documents would be identified as applicable to the study through the methods proposed.

Table 4.2 below gives a summary of the searches, keywords and number of documents collected from each state’s on-line databases. As predicted, 6,485 documents were

identified through the use of the keywords. While some keywords were used purposively, all databases were searched using the words: “fear of crime”, “concern about crime”, “fear” and “crime”, “home invasion”, “mugged” and/or “mugging”, and “perception of crime”. The crimes of home invasion and mugging were used as case studies for identifying records that relate to specific crimes. Upon reading the documents, 969 were identified as containing a potential reference to fear-of-crime.

DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOLS

The data was collected using the questions listed in the data specifics table given below.

Table 4.2: Data Collection Fieldwork Search Results

#	Database	State	Parameters	Key Words	From	Results^	Selected'	Date	\$
0	Referenced	from other documents (miscellaneous sources, parameters, words, dates etc)							
1	ParlInfo	Fed	all collections	fear of crime	*	226	2	24/06/04	76
2	ParlInfo	Fed	all collections	fear of crime	*	225	49	9/07/04	
3	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	fear; crime	*	236	34	14/07/04	
4	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	fear; crime	*	236	9	19/07/04	43
5	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	fear; crime	*	611	1	19/07/04	
6	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	fear; crime	*	611	40	21/07/04	105
7	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	fear; crime	*	611	57	23/07/04	
8	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	fear; crime	*	611	7	28/07/04	
9	ParlInfo	Fed	committee proceedings	fear; crime	*	283	34	31/07/04	
10	ParlInfo	Fed	all collections	home invasion	*	144	6	4/08/04	
11	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	mugged; mugging	*	133	1	4/08/04	3
12	ParlInfo	Fed	committee proceedings	mugged; mugging	*	19	2	4/08/04	
13	ParlInfo	Fed	all collections	public safety; crime	*	57	4	4/08/04	
14	ParlInfo	Fed	chamber	burglary; crime	*	73	8	9/08/04	9
15	ParlInfo	Fed	committee proceedings	burglary; crime	*	74	1	9/08/04	
16	Library	Fed	Publications	fear of crime & fear; crime	1/01/96	0	0	10/08/04	
17	Library	Fed	Publications	crime	1/01/96	32	29	10/08/04	
18	APH web	Fed	E-Briefs	(list without search)	*	1	1	12/08/04	
19	APH web	Fed	Vital Issues Seminars	(list without search)	*	0	0	12/08/04	
20	Library	Fed	Publications	safety	1/01/96	0	0	12/08/04	
21	APH web	Fed	Parliamentary Papers	crime	*	55		12/08/04	
22	APH web	Fed	Parliamentary Papers	fear of crime	*	0	0	12/08/04	
23	APH web	Fed	Committee reports	(list without search)	*	4	3	12/08/04	
24	NSW PH	NSW	Hansards & Papers (by keyword)	not appropriate search				16/08/04	
25	NSW PH	NSW	Hansards & Papers (by sitting day)	fear; crime; safety; law	1/01/91	42	17	16/08/04	

#	Database	State	Parameters	Key Words	From	Results^	Selected'	Date	\$
26	NSW PH	NSW	Research Papers	(list without search)	1/01/94	5	4	16/08/04	
27	NSW PH	NSW	Hansards & Papers (by sitting day)	fear; crime; safety; law	1/01/91	49	24	18/08/04	
28	NSW PH	NSW	Bills Digests	(list without search)	1/01/03	140	0	18/08/04	
29	NSW PH	NSW	Inquires, Committee, Archives	(list without search)	1/01/03	0	0	18/08/04	
30	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	fear of crime	1/01/94	9	14	18/08/04	
31	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	fear; crime	1/01/94	86	22	18/08/04	43
32	NSW PH	NSW	Hansards & Papers (by sitting day)	fear; crime; safety; law	1/01/91	18	7	23/08/04	
33	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	fear; crime	1/01/94	86	21	23/08/04	
34	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	Fear of crime	1/01/91	42	33	23/08/04	
35	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	home invasion	1/01/91	9	0	30/08/04	
36	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	mugging	1/01/91	1	0	30/08/04	
37	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	mugged	1/01/91	14	1	30/08/04	
38	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	public safety; crime	1/01/91	28	0	30/08/04	
39	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	community concern; crime	1/01/91	29	6	30/08/04	
40	VIC PH	VIC	Committees	(list without search)	1/01/91	14	0	30/08/04	
41	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	fear; crime	1/01/91	389	5	30/08/04	10
42	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	fear; crime	1/01/91	389	5	31/08/04	
43	QLD PH	QLD	Publications	(list without search)	1/01/90	256	4	31/08/04	
44	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	public concern about crime	1/01/91	5	1	31/08/04	
45	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	fear about crime	1/01/91	70	0	31/08/04	
46	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	home invasion; fear	1/01/91	77	3	31/08/04	31
47	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	home invasion; fear	1/01/91	77	28	2/09/04	
48	QLD PH	QLD	committees; documents etc	fear of crime; public concern, community concern, public safety; home invasion; mugging; mugged	1/01/90	15	11	2/09/04	
49	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	mugging; mugged	1/01/91	32	4	6/09/04	
50	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	fear of crime	1/01/90	56	35	6/09/04	58
51	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	fear of crime	1/01/90	56	23	9/09/04	

#	Database	State	Parameters	Key Words	From	Results [^]	Selected ^l	Date	\$
52	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	fear, crime	1/01/90	608	2	9/09/04	
53	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	concern about crime	1/01/90	9	7	9/09/04	
54	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	fear of victimization	1/01/90	1		9/09/04	
55	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	public safety; crime	1/01/90	277		9/09/04	
56	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	perception of crime	1/01/90	10		9/09/04	
57	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	home invasion; fear	1/01/90	35	4	9/09/04	7
58	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	home invasion; fear	1/01/90	35	3	13/09/04	
59	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	mugging; mugged	1/01/90	16	2	13/09/04	
60	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	fear of crime	1/01/93	12	12	13/09/04	
61	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	concern about crime	1/01/93	3	3	13/09/04	
62	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	perception of crime	1/01/93	1		13/09/04	
63	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	public safety; crime; fear	1/01/93	73	2	13/09/04	16
64	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	public safety; crime; fear	1/01/93	73	14	16/09/04	
65	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	home invasion; fear	1/01/93	28	6	16/09/04	
66	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	mugging; mugged	1/01/93			16/09/04	
67	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	fear; crime; not fear of crime	1/01/93	336	14	16/09/04	34
68	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Legislative Council)	fear of crime	1/01/93	20	18	20/09/04	
69	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Assembly)	fear; crime; not fear of crime	1/01/93	336	20	20/09/04	
70	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Legislative Council)	concern about crime	1/01/93	2	1	20/09/04	
71	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Legislative Council)	perception of crime	1/01/93	0		20/09/04	
72	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Legislative Council)	mugging; mugged	1/01/93	25		20/09/04	
73	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Legislative Council)	public safety; crime; fear	1/01/93	57		23/09/04	
74	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Legislative Council)	crime; fear	1/01/93	287	20	23/09/04	30
75	WA PH	WA	Hansard	fear of crime	1/01/97	37	25	23/09/04	
76	SA PH	SA	Hansard (Legislative Council)	crime; fear	1/01/93	287	10	26/09/04	
77	WA PH	WA	Hansard	fear; crime	6/03/97	289	32	26/09/04	37
78	WA PH	WA	Hansard	fear; crime	6/03/97	289	5	27/09/04	

#	Database	State	Parameters	Key Words	From	Results^	Selected'	Date	\$
79	WA PH	WA	Hansard	concern about crime	6/03/97	6	3	27/09/04	
80	WA PH	WA	Hansard	perception about/or crime	6/03/97	8	5	27/09/04	
81	WA PH	WA	Hansard	mugged; mugging	6/03/97	34	1	27/09/04	
82	WA PH	WA	Hansard	home invasion; fear	6/03/97	19	2	27/09/04	
83	WA PH	WA	committees; documents etc	(no list)	6/03/97	258		27/09/04	
84	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Assembly)	fear of crime	1/01/92	20	19	28/09/04	
85	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Assembly)	fear; crime	1/01/92	50	20	28/09/04	
86	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Assembly)	concern about crime	1/01/92	3	3	28/09/04	
87	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Assembly)	perception of crime	1/01/92	0	1	28/09/04	
88	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Assembly)	home invasion	1/01/92	21		28/09/04	
89	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Assembly)	mugged; mugging	1/01/92	3		28/09/04	
90	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Legislative Council)	fear of crime	1/01/92	4	4	28/09/04	
91	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Legislative Council)	fear; crime	1/01/92	14	3	28/09/04	
92	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Legislative Council)	concern about crime	1/01/92	2	2	28/09/04	
93	TAS PH	TAS	Hansard (Legislative Council)	mugged; mugging	1/01/92	3	1	28/09/04	
94	TAS PH	TAS	committees; documents etc	(no list)	1/01/92	50		28/09/04	
95	WA PH	WA	Hansard	perception of crime	6/03/97	8		30/09/04	
96	SA PH	SA	committees; documents etc	(no list)	1/01/93	40		30/09/04	
97	VIC PH	VIC	Hansard	perception of crime	1/01/91	47	1	30/09/04	
98	APH web	Fed	all collections	concern about crime	1/01/60	49	10	30/09/04	
99	APH web	Fed	all collections	perception of crime	1/01/60	24		30/09/04	
100	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	fear; crime (incomplete)	1/01/60	608	12	5/10/04	
101	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	fear NEAR BY crime (1 para)	1/01/91	7	7	5/10/04	
102	NSW PH	NSW	Hansard	perception of crime	1/01/91	23	6	5/10/04	
103	QLD PH	QLD	Hansard	fear \10\ crime NOT fear of crime	1/01/60	29	17	5/10/04	
104	ACT PH	ACT	Hansard	fear of crime	1/01/95	11	4	5/10/04	
105	ACT PH	ACT	Hansard	concern about crime	1/01/95	3	1	5/10/04	

#	Database	State	Parameters	Key Words	From	Results [^]	Selected [!]	Date	\$
106	ACT PH	ACT	Hansard	perception of crime	1/01/95	4	2	5/10/04	
107	ACT PH	ACT	Hansard	home invasion	1/01/95	6	2	5/10/04	
108	ACT PH	ACT	Hansard	fear 1\ crime	1/01/95	132	13	5/10/04	
109	ACT PH	ACT	Hansard	mugged; mugging	1/01/95	6		5/10/04	
110	ACT PH	ACT	committees; documents etc	(no list)	1/01/95	1		5/10/04	
111	NT PH	NT	Hansard	fear of crime	1/01/90	15	18	5/10/04	
112	NT PH	NT	Hansard	concern about crime	1/01/90	23	7	5/10/04	
113	NT PH	NT	Hansard	perception of crime	1/01/90	8	3	5/10/04	
114	NT PH	NT	Hansard	home invasion	1/01/90	35	2	5/10/04	
115	NT PH	NT	Hansard	mugged; mugging	1/01/90	8		5/10/04	
116	NT PH	NT	Hansard	fear; crime	1/01/90	194	17	5/10/04	
117	NT PH	NT	committees; documents etc	(no list)	1/01/90	1		5/10/04	
					Totals	6,485	969		

* The start date is not given for the available records in the Federal parliament on-line databases

[^] Numbers in bold face represent new searches

[!] Selected records are those that were not duplicates from another search and were related in some way to the key words

^{\$} This column sums the total number of records selected per search where the search has been completed over a number of days

DATA MANAGEMENT

Once completed, the IDQs were entered into a purpose built Microsoft Access database. There are a number of reasons that Access was used to manage the data produced from the study. First, the form facility allows data cleaning checks to occur automatically upon entry of the data. This prevented a large number of typographical errors, errors of form such as text in a number field, and missing data. Second, the relational setup of Access (compared to the flat structure of Excel) means that queries can be constructed to assist in cleaning and analysis of individual elements from each IDQ. In addition, it will facilitate the extraction of the rich text data into a suitable qualitative analysis program. Third, Access is compatible with the Word mail merge function that allowed the use of form documents for the presentation of argument structure examples if required. These qualities made Access an effective data management tool for this study.

DATA SPECIFICS

The following section will provide details of the data that was collected. There were two main concerns when developing the final list of data to be collected. First, that list needed to be practicable in length. Above, it was suggested that approximately 1,000 documents would be included in the corpus of this study. Their eligibility would be determined by the use of certain key words such as “public safety” or “fear-of-crime”. However, in an attempt to gather documents that discussed fear-of-crime under different labels, broader keywords such as “crime” would also be used. Such searches were expected to return a great number of documents with some being judged as unrelated to the present research.

Consequently, the questions asked about each document needed to act as a filter from what is essentially a ‘tick and flick’ form to indicate very basic details and the level of significance held by a discussion of fear-of-crime in that document; to detailed analyses of argument and grammar, verification of “facts” and statements by the authors, and the investigation of the social context in which the text was made. That filtering process was intended to gather basic details of at least 1,000 documents collected but to ensure feasibility, detailed analysis conducted on far fewer documents depending on their relevance to discussions about fear-of-crime.

STAGE 1

This stage is designed to gather quickly basic information about the debates. The main focus was to capture the details of the source, target, topic of debate, production of the text, presentation, main objective and the level of significance that the subject of fear-of-crime held within the text. The level of significance for fear-of-crime was vital to determine how much further information should be collected (as the following Table 4.3 demonstrates). The level of significance then formed a filtering system of the documents into a final corpus.

Table 4.3: Criteria for Stage Completion

0% (not mentioned)	End
<10% (mentioned once)	Complete to Stage 2
10-25% (approx 2-5 mentions)	Complete to Stage 2
26-50% (short discussion)	Complete to Stage 3
51-75% (moderate discussion)	Complete to Stage 4
75%-100% (main topic)	Complete to Stage 4

STAGE 2

Stage 2 was designed to gather information from texts where the subject of fear-of-crime was at least mentioned. The feedback from piloting the research design showed that such texts are sometimes only referring to fear-of-crime without entering into further discussion. For example, a speaker may state that the NCPP is intended to address crime and fear-of-crime in the community and then proceed to talk about funding amounts for the AFP. While it is important to collect information about even brief references such as these, it was considered unfeasible to collect the same amount of information as for texts that focused on fear-of-crime as their main topic. Instead, at this stage details were gathered on the inferred meaning of the text, the key words and phrases used, genres, tenor and mode of the discourse, and further details about the production of the text. These can be seen in the data specifics table below.

STAGE 3

At this stage, the texts were judged to have a short discussion relating to fear-of-crime, public safety, security and so forth. Consequently, greater details about the language, arguments and rhetorical devices used were able to be collected. Information about the control of discussion, topic and agenda was also gathered. The focus of this stage was on how documents discussed their topic, the language used and the discursive relationship between the participants. Stage 3 was intended to capture characteristics of talking about fear-of-crime specifically that would be present in a minimum of a short discussion but would not be present in the pithy references examined in stages 1 and 2.

STAGE 4

The questions asked in stage 4 were designed to gather detailed information about the social context in which the instance of discourse occurred. In addition, questions were asked that required reference to external documents such as determining accuracy of the claims. A small amount of further information was also gathered about the language used compared to other documents such as the creation of new lexical items and rewording. However, most information about language use/usage has already been identified in previous stages.

It was at this point that the questions turned to detailed examination of the social context of the debates. These questions range from the relationship of the instance of discourse to social relations and identities, to the social and political effects of that discourse, and knowledge assumptions that are made by the authors. It was expected that many of the answers to these questions would be found outside of the document itself and may not be apparent until during the analysis of the final data set.

Each of these four stages was designed to work as a filter for the relevancy of the different debate subjects encountered. Table 4.4 gives the number of documents that were analyzed in each stage.

Table 4.4: Number of Documents Analyzed per Collection Stage

Stage Completed	Number of Documents
Stage 1	969
Stage 2	783
Stage 3	35
Stage 4	19

Each was intended to gather more detailed data than the last stage, resulting in a comprehensive data set produced for a selected group of documents where each instance of text was a moderate to lengthy discussion related to fear-of-crime in Australian parliaments.

DATA CLEANING AND FINALIZATION

The collected documents (n = 969) were cleaned using two methods. First, the answers for each question were checked to be within the possible parameters as well as there being an answer for each question. Secondly, the tables in which there were corresponding fields were checked for consistency. Additional information about each politician was also gathered, checked for consistency and added to the collected data. These cleaning processes resulted in 12 changes being made to the data.

A smaller subset of data was then extracted and this formed the main data source for the following analyses and discussions. Due to the wide scope of the data generation and collection methods and the varying amount of resources online and effectiveness of each parliament's search engines, it was not always possible to search comprehensively all or even the same type of documents from each state. However, it was considered necessary to standardize the document type so as to restrict the influence it may have on rhetoric, presentation, style and so forth. Similarly, it was also necessary to hold the type of author constant because of the influence that each person's role within politics will have on the texts produced.

Therefore, the final data set fulfilled the following criteria:

- a. The text was produced between 1st January 1960 and 31st December 2003 inclusive (n = 968)
- b. The author was a state or federal member of an Australian parliament (n = 829)
- c. The text contained at least one mention of fear-of-crime in its broadest conceptualization (n = 755)
- d. The text was recorded and disseminated by Hansard (n = 720)

In total, 249 records were discarded leaving a final data set of 720 pieces of political text about fear-of-crime. Smaller data sets were at times isolated in each of the case studies presented in later chapters. The methodology for isolating these data sets will be given in those chapters.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The aim of this research is to examine the characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime in Australian domestic politics. Four research questions have been proposed that cover the characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime and how, by whom and when these debates occur in politics and identify possible discourses on which they participate. The research approach is based on critical discourse analysis of a variety of political and government documents written from 1960 to 2003 and sourced from the online databases housed by state and federal parliaments. A final data set of 720 documents was collected from these sources based on a specific set of selection criteria. The following chapter will present an overview of the general results. On the basis of these results, five specific characteristics ranging from micro to macro levels will be examined in parliamentary debates about fear-

of-crime. Individual methodologies will be explained at the beginning of each of these case studies.

Table 4.5: Data Specifics Table

No	Stg	Question	No	Stg	Question
1	1	Who is the source?	24	3	Was an argument being made?
2	1	Who is the author?	25	3	What argument structure is used?
3	1	When was it written?	26	3	What rhetorical device is used?
4	1	What is the document?	27	3	Was the use of this rhetorical device fallacious?
5	1	What is the dissemination tool?	28	3	What is the hidden objective?
6	1	What is the expected distribution?	29	3	What is the theme?
7	1	Who is the target audience?	30	3	What type of voice is used for the active clauses?
8	1	What type of presentation is used?	31	3	What supporting evidence is presented?
9	1	What is the overt objective?	32	3	Is there evidence of over-wording?
10	1	What is the main topic of discussion?	33	3	Are metaphors used?
11	1	Was fear-of-crime the main topic of discussion?	34	3	Is the metaphor related to fear-of-crime*?
12	2	What is the inferred meaning?	35	3	What factors influence the choice of the metaphor?
13	2	What is the area of knowledge referred to?	36	3	Is document meaning ambiguous?
14	2	From what perspective is the knowledge presented?	37	3	Are there equal rights and obligations of participants in the discourse?
15	2	What are the key words or phrases?	38	3	What turn-taking rules are in operation?
16	2	What is the genre of the discourse?	39	3	What is the exchange structure?
17	2	What is the type of activity?	40	3	What type of questions are used?
18	2	What is the tenor of the discourse?	41	3	What form of politeness is used for questions?
19	2	What is the mode of the discourse?	42	3	Is there equal control of the topic between participants?
20	2	What is the rhetorical mode of the discourse?	43	3	What is the system of topic control?
21	2	How is the text produced?	44	3	Are nominalizations frequent?
22	2	How is the text expected to be consumed?	45	3	What is the main modality used?
23	2	Has the final text been processed by others?	46	3	What is the modality?

No	Stig	Question
47	3	Who set the agenda?
48	3	How are the agendas set?
49	3	How is the agenda policed?
50	3	What formulation systems are used?
51	3	What processes are used?
52	4	Was the author's statement accurate?
53	4	Is there evidence of rewording?
54	4	Does the text contain new lexical items?
55	4	What theoretical, cultural or ideological significance do new lexical items have?
56	4	What motivations for use of the theme are there?
57	4	What would characterize the instance of discourse?
58	4	What social relations are relevant to the discourse?
59	4	What are the effects of the discourse on the social relations?
60	4	What are the relationships between orders of discourse?
61	4	What are the political effects of the discourse?
62	4	What assumptions are made by the source of the knowledge of the target?
63	4	What are the systems of knowledge and belief required by this discourse?
64	4	What social identities are relevant to the discourse?
65	4	What are the effects of the discourse on the social identities?

CHAPTER FIVE
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This chapter provides an overview of the data collected as previously outlined. It will present general information about the documents collected such as authorship, audience and contents. The data analyzed has been restricted to the quasi-quantitative – counts of categories and percentages. More in-depth analysis utilizing both these quantitative and the qualitative text-rich data will be given in the case studies that follow. The intention of this chapter is to provide the broader context within which to understand the analysis of characteristics of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime that is presented in the case studies.

DOCUMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

This chapter will provide an overview of the general results about the documents themselves. This will be done in three groups. First, the temporal authorship of the documents (time and place) will be examined. The politicians who authored the documents will not be discussed in this chapter in order to avoid undue overlap with the discussion presented in Chapter Ten. Second, the details of the target will be presented. This includes the source, dissemination and distribution of the document, as well as the presentation and intended audience. Finally, the contents of the documents themselves will be analyzed. This group will focus on the topic that is discussed with separate space given to the topic of fear-of-crime and types of fears that were identified in the debates. This chapter is intended to describe the general characteristics of the documents with the following case studies beginning to investigate the characteristics of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

AUTHORSHIP

This section investigates characteristics of the author – the time period and where it was written. Details of the politician who spoke the document into the Hansard and their affiliated political party will be discussed in greater detail in the case study presented in Chapter Ten. Only general information about the politicians involved in debating about fear-of-crime will be provided in this section.

First, the time period from which each document was collected was examined. The restriction to on-line documents limited the range of time from which documents were collected. For the majority of parliaments, this meant that documents were collected from approximately 1990 onwards. Federal, ACT and WA parliaments were the only exceptions to this beginning from 1983, 1995 and 1997 respectively (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Number and Percentage of Documents Collected By State and Date

Parliament	Available Dates	Collected Dates	#	%
Federal	Not Listed – 1 Jan 2004	23 Mar 1983 – 27 Oct 2003	140	19
NSW	1 Jan 1991 – 1 Jan 2004	29 Oct 1991 – 4 Dec 2003	114	16
SA	1 Jan 1993 – 1 Jan 2004	4 Aug 1993 – 12 Nov 2003	118	16
QLD	1 Jan 1990 – 1 Jan 2004	4 Dec 1990 – 19 Aug 2003	102	14
WA	6 Mar 1997 – 1 Jan 2004	25 Mar 1997 – 19 Nov 2003	73	10
VIC	1 Jan 1991 – 1 Jan 2004	27 Mar 1991 – 19 Nov 2003	59	8
TAS	1 Jan 1992 – 1 Jan 2004	15 Sept 1992 – 12 Jun 2002	47	7
NT	1 Jan 1990 – 1 Jan 2004	20 Aug 1991 – 16 Oct 2003	45	6
ACT	1 Jan 1995 – 1 Jan 2004	12 Dec 1995 – 27 Nov 2003	22	3

Second, the state from which the documents were sourced was analyzed. The largest groups of documents came from the Federal, SA, NSW and QLD parliaments (66%). It is probable that WA would be one of the top discussants of fear-of-crime if their on-line records dated back to 1990. It is noteworthy that the greatest number of documents mentioning fear-of-

crime came from the Federal Parliament given that law and order are traditionally (and constitutionally) a state responsibility.

Finally, general analysis of the author and their affiliated political party was undertaken. There were 397 politicians that mentioned fear-of-crime within the on-line documents (Table 5.2). The states with the highest number of documents also had the highest number of politicians who mentioned fear-of-crime. The smaller producing jurisdictions such as the ACT, NT and TAS had the higher ratio of documents per politician, although this may be the result of a smaller sample size.

Table 5.2: Counts of Politicians and Documents by State

State	Number of Politicians	Number of Documents	Ratio Docs/Politicians
NSW	100	165	1.7
QLD	70	116	1.7
SA	62	135	2.2
WA	58	95	1.6
VIC	52	82	1.6
TAS	28	63	2.3
NT	19	43	2.3
ACT	9	21	2.3

The majority of politicians in Australia are associated with a particular political party. There were 12 parties that were identified in this research (Table 5.3). Over all of the documents, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) clearly mentions fear-of-crime more than the Liberal Party of Australia. However, both of these are higher users than the other parties. This follows the number of politicians that mention fear-of-crime when broken up by political party. The ratio of documents per politician by political party shows the Australian Democrats discussing fear-of-crime more than other parties, with the Australian Greens and

the Country Liberal Party in the NT following. Again, the higher ratio for these parties may be due, in part, to the smaller number of documents collected.

Table 5.3: Counts of Documents and Politicians by Political Party

# of Docs	Political Party	# of Politicians	Ratio Docs/Poli
310	Australian Labor Party	186	1.7
252	Liberal Party of Australia	133	1.9
47	National Party	28	1.8
41	Australian Democrats	12	3.4
29	Independents	18	1.6
18	Australian Greens	7	2.6
13	Country Liberal Party	5	2.6
5	One Nation Party	4	1.3
3	Christian Democrat Party	1	3
2	Shooters Party	1	2
2	A Better Future for Our Children Party	1	2
1	United Australia Party	1	1

In summary, documents were collected from 1990 for most State and Territory parliaments and 1983 for the Federal Parliament. Most of these documents came from SA, NSW and QLD in addition to those collected from the federal level. On average, each politician that mentioned fear-of-crime did so in two documents. Finally, the ALP and the Liberal Party were the parties that most often mentioned fear-of-crime out of the 12 parties identified in the documents collected. More detail will be provided in Chapter Ten about the author of the documents.

DOCUMENT ORIGINS AND TARGET AUDIENCES

The following section investigates the audience for whom the documents were judged to have been intended. There were a number of results for this section that were stipulated by the final inclusion criteria for the documents themselves. For instance, all documents were

sourced from an Australian parliament and all documents were disseminated by Hansard (including the committee Hansard). The results for the source, the methods of dissemination and distribution as well as the style of presentation used in the document will be presented below.

There was remarkable consistency through many of the results with regard to the target audience details (Table 5.4):

- **Source:** The majority of the documents came from the lower houses of the parliaments (67%) with roughly one third coming from the upper house.
- **Type:** Of the documents, 20 were transcripts of discussions (3%), five were a written response to a question (0.7%) and 695 were transcripts of speeches (97%).
- **Distribution:** The expected distribution of the documents generally aligned with the level of parliament from which it was sourced. 583 had an expected distribution of the relevant state (81%) while 137 (19%) had an expected national distribution.
- **Audience:** The majority of the documents were judged to have a target audience of fellow parliamentarians (n=700, 97%). Three documents were targeted towards the general public while the remaining seven were transcripts of discussion with no apparent target.
- **Style:** Finally, the vast majority of the documents were presented in a serious style (99%) with seven being presented in an emotional style (1%).

Table 5.4: Source of Documents by State

Parliament	All	Lower	Upper	Committee
Federal	140	88	51	1
NSW	114	48	64	2
QLD	102	82	11	9
VIC	59	43	16	0
ACT	22	22	0	0
NT	45	44	0	1
WA	73	49	23	1
SA	118	71	47	0
TAS	47	36	6	5
Total	720	483	218	19
	100%	67%	30%	3%

In summary, all documents came from an Australian parliament and were disseminated by Hansard. The expected distribution was mostly state based (81%) and the type of document was generally a transcript of a speech (97%). Virtually all were seriously presented (99%) and were targeted towards other politicians (97%).

CONTENTS

This section investigates the topics that were discussed with an emphasis on the frequency with which fear-of-crime is debated and the type of fear. There were 14 main topics that were the focus of the documents that mentioned fear-of-crime (with a further 16 that were discussed by only one or two). This demonstrates the variety of topics under which fear-of-crime is mentioned and is believed to be relevant.

- **Crime (16%)** - There were 116 documents where the main topic was crime. These documents discussed crime rates and statistics, and more specific

crimes such as stalking, juvenile crime, firearm offences, graffiti, racially and sexually based crimes and violence against women.

- **Government/Policy (14%)** - There were 97 documents that discussed government and government policy. These documents discussed the government in terms of their particular policies on crime, women, police and emergency services, law and order, juvenile crime and domestic violence. Broader government policies and performance especially in regard to election promises were also discussed at length.
- **Legislation (14%)** - There were 102 documents that focused on legislation. All of these documents were looking at specific pieces of legislation against crimes.
- **Police (11%)** - There were 81 documents that talked about the police. These documents were focused on police resources, numbers and practices/powers.
- **Criminal Justice System (9%)** - 62 documents had their main topic as the criminal justice system. These documents discussed mandatory sentencing, bail, drug courts, penalties and sentencing, prisons, alternatives to prison and the victims of crimes.
- **Politics (8%)** - There were 58 documents about politics. These documents crossed over (but were not double counted) with other topics such as crime, crime prevention, legislation, community safety and so forth. The main focus of these documents was the political use of and action on law and order issues.

- **Agencies and Funding (7%)** - There were 50 documents on government agencies and spending policies. These were particularly focused on police and other law enforcement agency resources, and local and federal government budgets (e.g., senate estimates).
- **Crime Prevention (5%)** - There were 34 documents that were focused on crime prevention. These documents mainly looked at crime prevention initiatives at different levels of government. There were also brief discussions about juvenile crime, drugs and violence against women.
- **Safety (4%)** - 27 documents were mainly focused on safety. These documents discussed safety in terms of children, violence, police numbers and women.
- **Fear-of-crime (2%)** - There were 13 documents with the main topic of fear-of-crime. These documents discussed fear-of-crime in terms of the elderly, the elderly and youths, police and public relations, and violence and perceptions of safety.
- **Terrorism (2%)** - Terrorism was discussed in 13 documents with a focus on Bali, Iraq, Australian national security and legislative preparedness.
- **Security (1%)** - There were nine documents about security. These documents discussed security in terms of national and private security and security in specific areas such as work places or schools.
- **Violence against women (1%)** - There were nine documents about violence against women (1%); and nine about community values and opinions. This last set of documents tended to argue about community support for tougher penalties and sentences.

- **Miscellaneous (6%)** - The remaining 40 documents looked at a variety of topics such as: alcohol, animals, discrimination, education, gangs, housing, immigration, media, older persons, poverty, privacy, business, race, tax, unemployment and victims.

FEAR OF CRIME

The majority of documents had only a brief mention of fear-of-crime (56%). These were documents that made only one reference to fear-of-crime (broadly conceived). Documents that had two to five references made up 38% of the total. There were very few documents that contained even a small discussion about fear-of-crime (n = 41, 6%).

Table 5.5: Number and Percentage of Documents by % of Discussion of Fear-of-Crime

	<10%	10-25%	26-50%	51-75%	75-100%
#	404	275	27	6	8
%	56	38	4	1	1

This suggests that fear-of-crime is something that is considered important to mention but not necessarily important to discuss. The possible reasons for this result will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

In collecting the documents, the notion of fear-of-crime was kept as broad as possible. This meant that documents about perceptions of public safety as related to crime, perceptions of crime, security and so forth were all collected under the banner of fear-of-crime (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Type of Topics Collected Under “Fear-of-Crime”

Type of Fear	%	Type of Fear	%
Fear of crime	27	Fear as a prisoner/criminal	0
Fear of street crime	23	Concern about terrorism	0
Concern about crime	9		
Political use of fear	6	Other fears	4
General fears	6	- <i>anxiety about crime</i>	0
Fear for safety	5	- <i>fear about crime</i>	1
Fear of terrorism	5	- <i>fear of harassment</i>	1
Fear as a witness	4	- <i>fear of organized crime</i>	0
Fear of violence	4	- <i>perception of crime</i>	2
Fear of guns	1	- <i>perception of fear</i>	0
Altruistic fear	1	- <i>safety (general)</i>	0
Fear of white collar crime	1	- <i>worry about crime</i>	0
		Total	100

The main type of fear that was discussed was fear-of-crime (27%). The fact that it is the most frequently used phrase is potentially artificially created through the search words used. A fear of street crime such as murder, rape, robbery, mugging etc was used in 23% of the documents. Hence together with fear-of-crime, a fear of street crime accounted for 50% of the types of fear mentioned. These results suggest that there is at least some consistency in what type of fear is mentioned under fear-of-crime. When the phrase itself is not used, fear of street crime and a concern about crime are the topics to which reference is most likely to be made. This does not elucidate what is meant by the phrase fear-of-crime itself but it is probable that the types of fears mentioned specifically (as outlined in Table 5.6) would be good guides.

The strongest conclusion that can be drawn is that topics which mention fear-of-crime are varied. Furthermore, within these topics fear-of-crime tends to be mentioned but rarely discussed as if it were assumed what is meant by ‘fear-of-crime’. It is evident from the

types of crimes mentioned under the banner of fear-of-crime that street crime, general and specified crime and safety were the main meanings.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Thus to summarize this chapter on the document demographics, it was shown that in the time period of 1983 to 2003, most documents mentioning fear-of-crime came from the federal, SA, NSW or QLD parliaments. All documents were sourced from an Australian parliament and disseminated by Hansard with the majority of the documents having an expected readership based in their respective state and were presented in the form of a serious speech directed at other politicians. There were 14 main topics that were discussed with only 2% of the documents discussing fear-of-crime as their main topic. When they did, it was evident that the fear related to street crime, crime in general or specified crimes and safety. Many of these results will be investigated in more detail in the case studies presented in later chapters.

CHAPTER SIX

“THE FEAR OF CRIME”

ABSTRACT ENTITIES AND HUMAN AGENCY

This chapter presents the first of five case studies focusing on specific characteristics of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. While undertaking the collection and general analysis of the data for this research, a strong duality was noticed. In 29% of the documents, a person's feeling of fear in response to crime was referred to as "fear of crime"; in the other 30% that response was referred to as "*the* fear of crime" (41% did not use the specific phrase). This case study investigates three (micro or syntactic) features of language that were highlighted by this duality – the use of the definite article, nominalization and passivity. Studying such features is intended to provide an indication of the influence that language can have on the understanding of the society depicted in debates about fear-of-crime. This will be contrasted, in later chapters, with the impact of macro or societal influences on language.

CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY & STRUCTURE

In order to examine the duality and its linguistic features, a specific dataset was isolated. For the purposes of this chapter, only those documents that referred to either the distinct phrase "fear of crime" or fear of an identified offence were included in the smaller data set. This was done to maintain the focus on the function of the linguistic characteristics being examined and the emotional response of fear emphasized by parliamentary discussions. Consequently, the final data set consisted of 363 documents (50% of the main corpus) from Australian parliamentary Hansards from 1982 to 2003.

The chapter is divided into five sections. First, I will demonstrate the simultaneous linguistic existence of the two concepts of fear of crime. The public's concrete fear of street crimes such as robbery, home invasion or sexual assault exists along side an abstracted

version of the generalized fear of crime. The evidence for this is drawn from the characteristics of the language used to talk about fear of crime by Australian parliamentarians. It is argued that the use of the definite article and the process of nominalization has allowed the abstract concept of fear of crime to become separated from the experience of, and emotional response to, crime.

The second section highlights one more linguistic characteristic of parliamentary debates on fear of crime – passivity or the use of the passive voice. These are sentences beginning with *by* or where the agent is omitted altogether. The location of agency is an important distinguishing feature between the two conceptualizations being discussed. It will be argued that through these three features of language an abstracted concept of fear of crime is evident. The third section will detail the theory and consequences of transformations such as nominalization and passivity based on previous research.

In the fourth section, I will examine the consequences that the abstracted version has had on the location of agency. When using the term “agency” I refer to a human’s capacity for independent action where that action is independent in so far as it has been made based on a choice between alternatives. In effect, this concept of fear of crime has become an independent entity that can take on its own agency. Public agency is consequently denied by this entity. The political impact of the existence of the two concepts of fear of crime will be examined in section five. Here, I will outline the resulting contradicting messages that are delivered to the public about the location of agency. In the concrete concept, the public is seen as able to participate actively in reducing their fear; in the abstract concept, the public is denied that agency by the focus on another entity. It is argued that these

contradicting messages may reduce the effectiveness of political and government effort to respond to community demands. I will conclude this chapter by recommending that greater awareness and clarification be given to the type of fear of crime being discussed.

THREE LINGUISTIC FEATURES OF FEAR OF CRIME

Three linguistic features have been chosen to be examined in the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. These features have been chosen for two reasons. First, previous research especially has found them to be important characteristics of political discourse (Fairclough, 1992). Second, differences between the duality noticed in the debates are constructed using those features. Therefore, the use of the definite article, nominalization and passivity will be examined below before a discussion of the implications of the use of these linguistic features.

THE DEFINITE ARTICLE – ‘THE’

As stated above, there was a duality noticed in parliamentary debates on the public’s fearful response to crime: fear of crime versus *the* fear of crime. The most overt difference between these two phrases is the use of the definite article or *the*. For example, the following two quotes both discuss actions that are being taken by the Federal government to reduce both crime and public feelings of fear in response to crime¹.

The aims of the forum are.... empowering and encouraging local groups to work in partnership with government agencies **to reduce crime and the fear of crime.** (Ellison, 2003)

¹ Emphasis has been added in all quotes in this chapter.

We have allocated \$13 million to the National Campaign against Violence and Crime which aims **to reduce crime and fear of crime** across Australia.

(Newman, 1996)

In both quotes, the phrase “to reduce crime and (the) fear of crime” is used. The only difference between them is the use of the definite article *the*. The definite article is a neutral type of demonstrative reference – what Halliday calls a “form of verbal pointing” (Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 57). It usually indicates the location of a person or object in relation to the speaker. *The* is neutral because it does not differentiate between singular or plural, or place or time as do other demonstratives such as *this*, *these*, *here*, *now* and so on. It indicates that the proceeding item is specific and identifiable either from the information provided in the associated text or from the surrounding environment (Halliday & Hasan, 1976).

Thus one function of *the* is to indicate substance. By so doing, the definite article is restricted to use with words that denote objects or something containing substance - nouns, noun phrases and compound nouns. Verbs do not require the use of the definite article because they do not denote substance (Sorensen, 1959). However, in the parliamentary documents studied, *the* was placed with the phrase *fear of crime*, or when trying to reduce repetition the speakers used *the fear* instead. The verb *fear* had come to denote an object or something of substance – a nominal.

NOMINALIZATION – VERBS TO NOUNS

A verb is transformed to a noun through the process of nominalization (Fairclough, 1989). The general test for an instance of nominalization is to ask: can I put the ‘object’ (i.e. that

which is denoted by the noun) in a wheelbarrow? The following are examples of nominalization using a restrictive clause (indicated by the brackets).

- (a) the boy (who was tall) rode the bike
- (b) the *tall boy* rode the bike
- (c) the person (who loved cars) drove over the cat
- (d) the *car lover* drove over the cat

In these examples, (b) and (d) involve nominalizations as shown by the italics. Each example demonstrates the transformation of a sentence containing a restrictive clause (e.g. who was tall, who loved cars) into a noun phrase (e.g. tall boy, car lover). It is possible to think of each resulting nominal being put into a wheelbarrow because the tall boy and the car lover are perceived as objects containing substance, in contrast to their original verbs of *tall* and *love*.

The phrase *fear of crime* is derived from the verb *fear*. This is a verb indicating a psychological state experienced usually by the subject. For example:

- (e) Oliver fears crime
- (f) Oliver's fear of crime

Fear of crime (f) is the nominalization of 'fears crime' (e) (see Spencer & Zaretskaya (2003) for further examples and discussion of the nominalization of stative verbs). Fear of crime can be perceived as an abstracted object that can be possessed by Oliver or any other member of the public. It is a noun phrase that contains substance and can therefore take the definite article *the*.

PASSIVITY – THE PASSIVE VOICE

There is one other feature of language that impacts on the two uses of the phrase *fear of crime*. This feature is passivity or the use of the passive voice. In the passive voice, the goal is the subject and the agent is either passive (a phrase beginning with ‘by’) or omitted entirely (Fairclough, 1992). While the type of voice used in a speech may alter during its course, each of the documents collected in this study was assessed on its overall voice type. It was found that the majority of documents (76%) were presented in the passive voice. For example:

(g) Fear generated by irresponsible sections of the media has forced the situation where pollsters put pressure on political parties and subsequently on members of Parliament to adopt very strong overreactions to questions relating to law and order. (Macdonald, 1995)

(h) Attempts have been made to dampen down that concern on the basis that it is not justified and that it is some sort of hysterical response to a false perception. (Nile, 1997)

In the first example (g), the agent is present but occurring within the sentence after *by*. This is in contrast to an active version of this sentence that might have been: “Irresponsible sections of the media have generated fear.....”, or “Members of Parliament have been pressured into adopting very strong overreactions...”. In the second (h), the agent is omitted. It is not clear who has been making the attempts, although the context implies that it is other parliamentarians.

In summary, the duality noticed in the concepts of fear-of-crime used in the parliamentary debates is differentiated by three linguistic features: the definite article, nominalization and passivity. The following section will begin to examine the effects of these features.

THE EFFECTS OF TRANSFORMATIONS

Two of the three linguistic features discussed in this chapter (nominalization and passivity) can be classed under the heading of transformations. The theory of transformations is generally regarded as Noam Chomsky's major contribution to the study of language beginning with *Syntactic Structures* in 1957. In this chapter, a broader definition of transformations will be used that reflects the influence of critical linguistics: "transformations are a set of operations on basic forms, deleting, substituting, combining, or reordering a syntagm or its elements" (Hodge & Kress, 1993: 10) (the differences between this definition and the concept of transformations used by Chomsky is discussed in Hodge & Kress (1974)).

Hodge and Kress (1993) identify two underlying functions of transformations: economy and distortion. The speaker is able to transform one form of an utterance into another or collapse multiple models into one. This allows the speaker to economize on the number of variables to be included in each utterance. However, the audience is then required to reconstruct the transformed form to its original structure based on implicit meanings; and it is as a result of this that "transformations always involve suppression and/or distortion" (Hodge & Kress, 1993: 35). In order to reconstruct the original intended meaning, the audience has to interpret the code presented in the transformation, creating the impression (if not the requirement) of the existence of privileged knowledge.

Nominalization and passivity are two types of syntactic transformations; and, as such, they also function to economize and distort language and meaning. To look at nominalization first, it simplifies an argument by reducing the number of variables (agents, actions, etc.) that need to be included in the statements (R. Hodge & Kress, 1993); thereby economizing on the details about who does what (Fowler et al., 1979). For example:

A: More street lighting is needed to reduce the public's fear of being mugged
by youths at train stations

B: More street lighting is needed to reduce the fear-of-crime at train stations

The argument presented in example B is a simplified version of that presented in example A. The details of agents and actions are deleted through the transformation of “public’s fear of being mugged by youths” into “the fear-of-crime”. The number of variables that needed to be included has been reduced through nominalization. In other words, nouns tend to be more manageable in general conversation (Vendler, 1968) because they use fewer words to describe the same thing (Kies, 1985).

A further function of nominalizations is to allow the deletion of participants or agents that are responsible for or are affected by the verb. In other words, there is no reference to the agent that effected the action described by the verb or the agent that was affected by that action. General categories of agents may be recoverable from the context but specific identities will not (Kress, 1983). The deletion of the agent and its implications will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections of this chapter.

Finally, this type of transformation removes the need to indicate tense (signifiers of time, past, present, future etc.) and modality (signifiers of truth value) (Fowler et al., 1979). This has the effect of removing the ‘action vitality’ from the verb. Verbs become static as a consequence of the loss of tense, modality and agent. The actions become timeless, sometimes to the extent of becoming new words separated from their origin (relexicalisation).

In effect, these functions enable verbs that tend to be about actions, to become nouns that tend to describe objects and abstract notions and concepts (Hodge & Kress, 1993). Nominalization creates an abstract world in which objects exist that can only be seen through language. A nominal represents “qualities and processes as ‘abstracted’ from things and time respectively” (Goatly, 1996). This process of turning a verb to a noun turns something that was concrete or based securely in reality into something that is abstract (Fairclough, 1992). This effect of nominalization will also be discussed in the following section specifically in regard to parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

The second type of transformation discussed in this chapter was passivity or the use of the passive voice. Three (of five) effects of using the passive voice that were identified by Hodge and Kress (1993) will be examined here. First, one effect of using the passive voice is to change the order in which the content of the sentence is presented. The theme of a sentence indicates what it is about and is generally given in the first position (the rheme comprising the remainder). Such information is perceived as more prominent (Kress & Trew, 1978) and as a result gains greater emphasis than the remainder of the sentence. The passive voice rethematizes a sentence by inverting the order of the agent with the affected;

and thereby changing the sentence from being about the agent to being about the affected (Hodge & Kress, 1993).

Rethematization may change the role that is taken on by the agent. For example, placing the agent in the rheme may give the impression that that agent is *affected* rather taking on an *affecting* role. This connotation of agency (a role of action and potentially causality) is traditionally given to the agent (identified in the theme). Consequently, using the passive voice alters the role of the agent that is interpreted by the audience (Fowler et al., 1979).

Secondly, the agent is no longer directly linked with the verb. If the agent is given at all, the link between action and actor is given by the preposition *by*. The effect of this change is to weaken the syntactically given causal connection between who did what (Hodge & Kress, 1993). Finally, passivity allows the agent to be omitted entirely. This may occur because it is obvious or unknown or because the author wishes to diffuse responsibility (Lamb, 1991). Irrespective of motive, the syntactic effect of deleting the agent is to remove reference to the cause of the action. Examples of these effects will be given in later sections of this chapter.

These types of transformations – nominalization and passivity – combine to create the impression of a “formal” and “impersonal” language (Fowler et al., 1979). The roles and the complexities of these relationships between agents and/or objects are simplified through deletion. Actions are objectified and abstracted, removed from time, location and cause. Most simply, such transformations allow the details of who did what, when and why to be

presented at a level of transparency (or opacity) that most benefits the intentions of the author.

TRANSFORMATIONS OF FEAR OF CRIME

When transformations of debates about fear-of-crime occur using these two linguistic characteristics, the common result is that the original agent is removed. This leaves the abstract object *fear of crime* sitting alone in the wheelbarrow without an owner to link it back to a reality. The abstract concept consequently is perceived as an entity that is not tied to a particular time or space (termed a “third-order entity” by Goatly (1996)). This entity is an object of (abstract) substance that can take on its own goals and agency. It also makes it difficult for the audience to situate blame and responsibility, and can highlight or hide subjects at whim. By doing so, these features help to release the concept of fear of crime from the experiential reality while working to construct another. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to examine these particular social consequences of nominalization and passivity when combined with the definite article (i.e. the creation of an abstract entity) and its political consequences for the location of agency in debates about fear of crime.

I wish to argue that there exist simultaneously two concepts of fear of crime. The first is a concrete fear of street crimes such as robbery, murder and home invasion. The second is a generalized fear of crime that has been abstracted both conceptually and linguistically from the base emotional responses to specific criminal events. This process of abstraction has been assisted through nominalization, the use of the definite article and the passive voice. Based on the results of this study on parliamentary discourses, over half of the documents

(56%) that used the phrase *fear of crime* or discussed a fear of street crime displayed the linguistic characteristics discussed above for the abstract entity. More specifically, *the fear of crime* was discussed in 61% of the documents that used that particular nominal. Consequently, it is argued that in the time period examined, an independent entity termed *the fear of crime* exists along side, though potentially with considerable overlap, with the public's original fears about crime. The following section will examine the consequences of an abstracted fear of crime.

INDEPENDENT AGENCY OF THE FEAR OF CRIME

This section will examine one particular social consequence of the abstract entity of the fear of crime – the negotiation of the location of agency. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “agency” as: “Action or instrumentality embodied or personified as concrete existence” (OED, 2001) In academia, there have been a number of explicit and implicit definitions of agency ranging from those focusing on constraint, to the un-structured component of social life, to individual choice, and to human action in general (see Hays (1994) for a discussion of the range of definitions). Across these definitions, (the capacity for) agency is generally seen to be a characteristic of or internal to human beings (Doty, 1997; Sewell Jr, 1992); where that characteristic is implied by the existence of social structures in a particular society.

Agency and social structure are generally agreed to be interconnected with neither able to exist independently of the other (Carlsnaes, 1992; Hays, 1994). Agency in sociology has “usually referred to the capacity of actors to operate “independently” of social structure” (Casper, 1994: 848). Both entities are relevant to the study of social behavior but scholars

lack a way of conceptualizing these entities and their relationship (Wendt, 1987; Wight, 2003). Attempts to do so have become known as the agency-structure debate.²

While the debate is now into its later generations, there are two assumptions that underlie all of the discussions. First, human beings undertake purposeful actions and these actions help to reproduce or transform their society. Second, society is constructed on social relationships: the structure of which also structures the interactions between humans (Wendt, 1987). Both of these assumptions see the relationship between agency and social structure as being variable, differential and reflexive.

In this chapter, the focus is on agency. It does not intend to contribute explicitly to the agency-structure debate but does draw on its treatment and understanding of the relationship between agency and social structure. Instead, I will be investigating the two locations of agency in parliamentary debates about fear of crime. I will define the capacity for agency as a *human's capacity for independent action* where that action is independent in so far as it has been made based on a choice between alternatives. 'Choice' is being constrained in this definition in the three ways outlined by Hays (1994): it does not necessarily imply intentionality; it is socially shaped and can be collective; and is patterned and comprehensible (Hays, 1994). Consequently, I will talk about agency in terms of 'a capacity for agency' or 'independent action'.

² For further discussion of this debate a variety of views can be found in: (Archer, 1990; Bieler & Morton, 2001; Carlsnaes, 1992; Clark, 1998; Doty, 1997, 1999; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1979; Hays, 1994; Outhwaite, 1990; Sewell Jr, 1992; Suganami, 1999; Wendt, 1987; Wight, 1999, 2000, 2003)

AGENCY OF AN ABSTRACT FEAR OF CRIME

On the basis of this brief overview of agency, I now wish to argue that the use of the abstract entity called ‘the fear of crime’ has allowed the public’s capacity for agency to be denied. Instead, that agency is placed in an abstract entity; and when this occurs, the public becomes a passive sufferer of the fear of crime, unable to take action against it. It needs to be emphasized here that the two concepts of fear of crime being discussed in this paper (concrete and abstract) exist simultaneously in parliamentary debates during the time period examined.³

Also it is recognized that while the discussion of a concrete and abstract fear-of-crime has been set up as a distinct duality, there are elements of abstraction in the concrete fear-of-crime and vice versa. This overlap is unavoidable and inevitable given the nature of language as an arbitrary organization of symbols. In other words, language itself has elements of concreteness and abstraction in the concepts that it is used to symbolize. With this overlap duly acknowledged, the duality will be maintained because it serves to portray clearly the differences in the concepts of fear-of-crime identified in parliamentary debates.

In what follows, I will show the two different locations of agency that are evident in the concepts of fear of crime. To do this, I will begin with the concrete concept of fear of crime. A member of the public is afraid of a specific type or instance of crime. For example:

³ Documents were collected dating back to 1988 for the abstract entity and 1982 for the concrete concept of fear of crime. Given that there are only two documents that used the phrase at all before 1990 and that these are necessarily only federal documents, the difference of six years is not considered indicative of possible trends so has not been counted as significant.

I support the motion also because some residents in affected areas of Wollongong are literally locked in their homes; they are too scared to go outside homes for **fear of break and enter offences**. (Campbell, 2002)

Even in Adelaide people are now afraid to walk the streets at night for **fear of being mugged, raped or even murdered**. (Foreman, 1982)

It is evident in these passages that the (concrete) fear of crime being discussed is linked to a locality, a type of crime and results in a specific behavioral response. More importantly for this discussion, it is the public who are afraid and it is the public that takes the action to avoid the potential victimization. The public are seen in these texts as containing the capacity for agency – for active and independent action initiated by their own emotional response to crime. Agency in the concrete fear of crime is located in individual or collective members of the public.

However, there is a different location of agency in the abstract concept of fear of crime. This occurs partly as a result of nominalization where the process that is normally associated with a particular human agent is changed to a nominal that has no associated agent (Kies, 1985; Schleppegrell, 1997). Consequently in the abstract concept, feelings of fear felt by the public are not linked to any particular area, demographic or type of crime. In fact, those feelings are no longer linked to a person. It is simply an unbound emotional response to a nondescript crime.

The fear of crime has a debilitating effect on the way a person views the place in which they live. It affects the way people conduct their lives. (Ede, 1993: 7839)

Crime and **the fear of crime** impacts on everybody and more so on certain members of our community; for example, the elderly, many of whom are too scared to leave their houses at night. (Ravlich, 1998)

Each of these quotes refers to the consequences that may result from the fear of crime. The second quote even lists the demographic type of victim (the elderly) and resulting actions (not leaving the house at night). As such, it might appear that they are examples of the concrete concept of fear of crime. However, I argue that they are examples of the overlap acknowledged above. The difference is that in the concrete concept the capacity for agency lies in the individual member of the public who is feeling afraid. In the two quotes above, the abstract entity has taken on that capacity for agency. The elderly stay at home because that is the impact that the fear of crime has on them rather than staying at home because they are afraid of crime.

To say this in more general terms, in the abstract concept of fear of crime, the capacity for agency lies in the entity itself rather than in the community member. No longer is there a member of the public that is afraid of being attacked and consequently does not leave their home. That fear has instead become an entity that affects the general (unspecified) behavior of the person impacting on their quality of life. The public therefore becomes passive. In effect, their capacity for agency is denied. In this abstracted concept, the public suffers

from the fear of crime like one suffers from the imposition of taxes. They do not feel afraid but are affected by the fear of crime.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ABSTRACT ENTITIES

While there are general consequences of locating agency in an abstract notion of fear-of-crime such as increasing public fear because of their passivity (see for example research on fear felt during air raids in (Rachman, 1977, 2002)), given the focus of this research it is the consequences in the political arena that will be discussed in greater detail. There are two political consequences of this abstract entity of fear of crime that are of importance here. The first is that political rhetoric and government initiatives can focus on addressing that entity rather than the fear experienced by the public. It should be stressed here that just as the abstract and the concrete concepts of fear of crime exist side by side, so too do the political responses to these concepts. Therefore, there are some programs that are attempting to reduce (concrete) fear of crime.

Fear of crime is a major issue in the community. Statistics show that older people are the least victimized. However, older people fear for their safety. The government already provides resources through local councils as part of the Home Assist program, a HACC funded service, to undertake security work on people's homes. (Wotton, 1994)

I refer to some of the initiatives raised in the Ministerial statement, such as safety and security information material that will provide practical advice aimed at reducing women's **fear** and victimisation. The introduction of this material

will provide practical advice to women subjected to domestic violence. (Barker, 1991: 741)

At the same time, there are programs that are trying to reduce the fear of crime across Australia or across a particular state or territory.

The Carr Government is committed to trying innovative measures to reduce crime and **the fear of crime** in our society. (Whelan, 1995)

A record number of police are working hard across the State to reduce crime and **the fear of crime** in our community. (Watkins, 2003)

These last two passages show that government and political effort is being used to ‘sell’ policies addressing the fear of crime where the details of that fear are not identified. In contrast, the first two passages outlined government policies that were intended to address fears that stemmed from identified crimes or potential situations of criminal victimization. Therefore, just as the concept of fear of crime is split between a concrete and abstract base so too is the government and political response to it.

Fear of crime can either be addressed as directly proportional to crime rates or as linked to general unidentified fears and insecurities. These general fears may touch on issues such as community cohesion and homogeneity, perceptions of difference and even socio-economic status. In effect, political effort is directed towards either a public that feels afraid because of crime or towards an independent entity that puts fear into the public and is not

specifically related to the occurrence of crime. Government and political direction must choose between two targets that are increasingly becoming two separate issues.

I would argue that this split is problematic because governments are at once trying to reduce people's fears about specific crimes while also trying to reduce the prevalence of the fear of crime. In the first case, government effort is directed at a public that is considered to have the capacity to act independently. That public is expected to participate actively in fear-reduction programs mostly by taking responsibility for their own victimization prevention.

In the second case, government effort is directed at a public without agency and without the ability for active participation. The public in the abstract concept cannot be expected to participate actively in reducing their fear. Instead, that expectation falls on political and government leaders, community workers and police. The assimilation of fear of crime into parliamentary debates has thus recognized an abstract entity that denies public agency and active participation in their own response to crime.

Consequently, the public are exposed to two different arguments that both occur under the banner of fear of crime. When the concrete concept of fear of crime is used, the argument attempts to convince the public that they should act to reduce their fears and that they are in fact largely responsible for the opportunities they provide to potential offenders. When the abstract concept of fear of crime is used, such arguments are contradicted by the image of the public as unable to help themselves and dependent on government or political action. It

is arguable that these contradicting arguments limit the effectiveness of any government or political effort to reduce either concept of fear of crime.

The second consequence of this abstract entity of fear of crime is the impact that discussions about such an entity may have on the public's conception of their social reality. While the impact of language on perceptions of reality and identity will be discussed in greater detail in the case studies that follow, it is important to note at this point that discussion of a passive and agency-less public at risk from an abstract threat may increase the public's level of fear and concern about crime.

Such an effect is suggestive of the "mean world syndrome" put forth by Gerbner and colleagues through the Cultural Indicators Project begun in 1967 (see for instance Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner et al., 1977; Gerbner et al., 1978; Gerbner et al., 1980; Gerbner et al., 1979; Signorielli et al., 1995). Derived from research into the contribution that television viewing makes to perceptions of social reality, the mean world syndrome refers to the positive relationship between hours of viewing and perceptions of the world as a mean and dangerous place where people are "just looking out for themselves", "cannot be trusted" and where individuals need greater protection (Gerbner, 1998: 124). The world becomes a place of increased mistrust and apprehension, a world of danger (Gerbner et al., 1980).

Extrapolating from this research, parliamentary debates, responses and programs that are directed at an abstract conception of fear-of-crime where the public is passive and unable to act, may contribute to the perception of the world as a mean and dangerous place. The

consequence of this may be a “heightened sense of risk and insecurity ... [that] is more likely to increase acquiescence to and dependence upon established authority, and to legitimize its use of force...” (Gerbner & Gross, 1976: 93-94). The political attempts to address the abstract entity of fear of crime may not only create public demand for that action but also create the dependency and passivity that is characteristic of such an entity. Thus, the language that is used in parliamentary debates about fear of crime may create or at least assist in the maintenance of the seeming inevitability of feeling afraid – of the adoption of a fearful identity and the creation of a common sense notion of fear (both of which shall be discussed in the next two chapters).

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the process of construction and the political consequence of an abstract entity of fear of crime. To do this, I examined the linguistic features of nominalization and the use of the definite article and passive voice. These features exposed a duality in parliamentary debates on fear of crime. There were two concepts of fear of crime that exist simultaneously in the time period studied. The first was a concrete concept that was based in specific times, places, people and crimes. The second concept was an abstracted and generalized fear that generally held no details about times, crimes and so on. The location of agency in each concept was discussed with the latter seen to deny public agency on fear of crime. Finally, I examined the political consequences of the dual concepts and the use of two contradicting arguments in parliamentary debates. These contradictions were argued to potentially lessen the effectiveness of efforts to reduce fear of crime and may indeed increase levels of fear in the community.

In conclusion, it is hoped that politicians, academics, advocacy groups and all people who talk about fear of crime will take the time to consider both the definitional boundaries of what they are discussing and the impact of their use of language. It is clear from the confusion between the uses of the two versions of fear of crime that there is a lack of conceptual clarity about both. Through the adoption of fear of crime into parliamentary debates, a tension is evident in the location of agency. On the one hand, the public are seen as active and able participants in their level of fear and on the other, they are dependent on government action to reduce the fear that plagues them. This tension and contradiction is evident throughout parliamentary debates on fear of crime in Australia. I argue that this potentially lessens the effectiveness of government and political effort to reduce community fears about crime.

CHAPTER SEVEN

METAPHORS AND THE

IDENTITY OF THE FEARFUL PUBLIC

This chapter seeks to examine data collected from parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime from the perspective of a culturally-bound linguistic form and its impact on the depiction of social reality. In the previous chapter, purely linguistic forms were analyzed. This chapter will maintain that focus on linguistic forms but on a form that has greater overt influence from the society in which it is used. The use of non-literal language in the form of metaphors was chosen for this purpose because of its reliance on cultural knowledge to be understood (Musolff, 2004). Such language was frequently identified throughout the documents. Studying metaphoric language will provide an opportunity to assess the characteristics of the debates evident through the linguistic depiction of reality - the actors, identities and social relations.

INTRODUCING METAPHORIC LANGUAGE ABOUT FEAR

In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the impact that political debates may have on fear-of-crime in the community. Levels of public concern about crime have been shown to be positively correlated with the amount of attention given to issues of law and order by the political elite (Beckett, 1997). This reinforces an earlier statement that “(f)ear of crime may be responsive to the law and order posturings of politicians who find it convenient to paint a picture of society as being under threat from within” (Braithwaite et al., 1979). In addition, research has demonstrated that the public is more likely to respond to political depictions of the events rather than to the events themselves (Witko, 2003). It is thus possible that the very process of shaping or distorting images of crime within law and order politics may generate fear-of-crime (Scheingold, 1984).

The susceptibility of feelings of fear to political communication provides an opportunity for studying the use of non-literal language. This type of language is a potential source of ambiguity in ordinary life (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983). Much of everyday communication involves instances of language usage that are interpreted literally. For example, there is little ambiguity in the sentence *please sit down on the chair*. In contrast, the sentence *please take a seat*, while meaning the same as the previous sentence, can be met with the confused response of *take it where?* The second sentence is an example of non-literal language. The literal interpretation of non-literal sentences may give only nonsense, a confused guesstimate of the speaker's wishes or be interpreted as requesting something that is impossible (Ortony et al., 1978).

In previous research, it has been suggested that fear-of-crime is particularly susceptible to the influence of one type of non-literal language – that of metaphors (Sparks et al., 2001). Figurative speech, like metaphor, enables the speaker to draw upon associations and images from numerous and eclectic discourses. These can then be applied to one specific discourse to assist in achieving the speakers' goals. For example, metaphors of war signal the existence of a threatening if not lethal enemy; game metaphors indicate the need for deception and crafty moves; while accountancy metaphors suggest a utilitarian calculation of costs and balances (Archer & Cohen, 1998; Gozzi, 1998, 1999/2000; Lakoff, 1992, 1995). Each metaphor evokes different emotional responses and actions from the audience.

CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

In what follows, I will examine metaphors that were identified in Australian parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime and their implications for the political representation of the

public's identity. This will be done in three sections. The first section will present a brief discussion to define metaphor. Theories on the comprehension of metaphors have been excluded from this overview because the success of the instance of political communication is not under examination. It is primarily a discussion focusing on the use of language by Australian parliamentarians when talking about fear-of-crime.

This first section will also present the methodology of Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) which guided the examination of metaphors and the implications of their use. The research has been guided by the general approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CMA was developed partly from CDA and focuses specifically on analysing metaphors. The three stages of CMA – identification, interpretation and exploration – will be used to examine metaphoric language and its impact on political representations of the public's identity.

In the second section and using CMA, metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors will be identified. Under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR (henceforth AACIW), the discursive function of these metaphors will be explored through an examination of their possible linguistic, conceptual and pragmatic roles and functions.

At this stage, it will be evident that the common thread between each metaphor being examined is the identity of a fearful public as defined by the identity of a threatening criminal. To explore this further, the third section will present an overview of the Copenhagen School's concept of identity within their 'securitization' theory. Using this as a base, I will examine the influence that AACIW metaphors may have on the construction and use of a fearful public identity and the implied threat of the criminal.

The purpose of these discussions is to highlight the impact of AACIW metaphors in parliamentary representations of the public's identity. I argue that an attempt is made to create a reality of a defensive society. In this society, the rhetoric of violence depicts the criminal as being an imminent and significant threat to a fearful public. However, in parliamentary representations of these identities, only that of the fearful public is expressly discussed (the threatening criminal is only implied). I argue that as a result, the identity of the fearful public becomes divorced from its defining cause (the criminal) and instead becomes dependent on political rhetoric for definition, guidance and sustenance. This presents the potentially dangerous opportunity for that identity to be used to gain political advantage.

METAPHOR –THEORY & METHODOLOGY

Derived from the Greek *metapherein* meaning to carry from one place to another (Miller, 1979), the basic characteristic of metaphor is transfer, whether that be of an understanding or experience from one thing to another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a) or of meaning (Ortony, 1975). The Oxford English Dictionary defines a metaphor as a “figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable” (OED, 2001). However, this definition can be criticized for not acknowledging the cognitive, pragmatic or rhetorical characteristics of the trope (Charteris-Black, 2004).

To counter these shortfalls, Charteris-Black (2004) defines a metaphor as

A linguistic representation that results from the shift in the use of a word or phrase from the context or domain in which it is expected to occur to another context or domain where it is not expected to occur, thereby causing semantic tension (Charteris-Black, 2004: 21)

This definition characterizes metaphor as: 1) a linguistic phenomenon; 2) a relative concept where the meaning of words change over time; and 3) open, thereby allowing any word to be a metaphor providing it involves a change of use between the source and the target domains (normal to non-normal use) (Charteris-Black, 2005).

In *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis* (2004) and *Politicians and Rhetoric* (2005), Charteris-Black outlined the development and stages of CMA. It is a form of analysis that utilizes the cognitive approach to metaphor. This approach originated in Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) work *METAPHORS WE LIVE BY* and treats metaphor as a cognitive phenomenon that is part of human conceptualisation and its use as more complex than the simple choice of a linguistic expression (Chilton, 2004) (further works taking a cognitive approach to political metaphors include: Chilton & Lakoff, 1995; Lakoff, 1992, 2001, 2003; Musolff, 2004).

A key part of the cognitive approach to metaphor is the mapping of ideas and understanding from a source to a target domain. Image schemas (derived from bodily interaction with the physical environment) are the source of these mappings and can be discussed in terms such as containment, spatial orientation and motion. When forming the source of metaphorical mappings, these image schemas provide the materials of

conceptualization: a metaphor allows something abstract to be conceptualized in terms of knowledge of something that is concrete or something that is unknown in terms of something that is well known. Thus, the cognitive approach to metaphor is focused primarily on how concepts are formed rather than on the specific words and phrases that are used as a result of those concepts (Chilton, 1996).

Lakoff and Johnson argue that conceptual metaphors seek to explain the motivations for the systematic use of metaphoric expressions and that related conceptual metaphors may function as subcategories of each other (see (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b: 9)). In an effort to make explicit this hierarchy in which one conceptual metaphor may entail other conceptual metaphors, a distinction is made in CMA between conceptual metaphors and conceptual keys. A conceptual metaphor is defined as “a statement that resolves the semantic tension of a set of metaphors [metaphoric expressions] by showing them to be related” and a conceptual key is defined as “a statement that resolves the semantic tension of a set of conceptual metaphors by showing them to be related” (Charteris-Black, 2004: 21-22).

For example, it could be said that there are three levels of metaphor: first, metaphoric expressions that are explicitly stated in the text (e.g., *Australia is standing along side its allies*); second, conceptual metaphors explain the concept that links the systematic use of multiple metaphoric expressions (e.g., AUSTRALIA IS A PERSON); and third, conceptual keys explain the relationship between the use of multiple conceptual metaphors (e.g., A NATION IS A PERSON). These three levels will be used in this chapter as a means of examining the metaphoric language used by parliamentarians in discussing fear-of-crime.

THE METHODOLOGY OF CMA

CMA incorporates three stages of analysis. The first stage is metaphor identification. As any word can be used metaphorically there is a need to identify metaphoric expressions based on a particular definition. The Charteris-Black (2004) definition of metaphor given above will be used in this case study.

This definition is based on a set of three criteria that outline the characteristics of metaphor (any or all of which may be present in one metaphor to differing degrees). The first is a linguistic criterion where a word or phrase creates semantic tension by reification, personification or depersonification. The second criterion is focused on the pragmatics of metaphor use or where the user seeks to influence opinions and judgments by persuasion. The final criterion that is argued to potentially characterize metaphor is the conceptual shift that underlies the use of metaphor to map partial aspects of the referent in a linguistic expression from the source to the target domain (Charteris-Black, 2004).

To identify metaphoric expressions, a sample of texts derived from the main corpus is read closely to identify candidate metaphoric expressions (by the definition presented above) where each use of the word or phrase is checked to determine if it is being used literally or metaphorically. However, the corpus constructed for this chapter comprises 61,511 words (see below). It was therefore feasible for all texts to be examined for metaphoric expressions rather than isolating a small sample of the texts.

The second stage is metaphor interpretation. This is the identification of conceptual metaphors and conceptual keys and will be done in this chapter by the manual identification of common themes between metaphoric expressions used. The final stage is

metaphor explanation involving the identification of the social agency involved in the production of a particular metaphor and their intention in the use of that metaphor (i.e., metaphor's discursive function). This will be done by combining the results from the second stage with illustrations of the possible roles and functions that metaphors may play in debates about fear-of-crime. While such an explanation can be used to look at the ideological and rhetorical motivations behind metaphors in this chapter, the results of CMA will focus on a discussion of the impact of metaphoric language on parliamentary representations of the public's identity.

METAPHORS IN FEAR-OF-CRIME DEBATES

For the purposes of this chapter, documents were only included where there was at least one discussion of fear-of-crime. This excluded those that merely mentioned it in passing. For example, a parliamentarian may say: "this government is addressing crime and fear of crime" where the remainder of the speech discussed legislation giving police the power to use lethal force. In such cases, fear-of-crime was mentioned as if part of a headline statement and did not form the topic of debate. A *discussion* about fear-of-crime was operationalized as a speech containing five or more references to the public's anxiety-related emotional response to crime, perceptions of safety from crime, and/or behavioural changes. Such a decision was made in order to maintain the focus on metaphors in debates about fear-of-crime rather than in debates about government spending or policy, a piece of legislation and so forth.

As a consequence of these parameters, the results presented in this chapter are based on 41 documents (6% of the main corpus; the reasons for such a substantial number of

documents being excluded is discussed in Chapter Eight). The data on which this chapter is based, as opposed to the entire corpus of 720 documents, is held electronically. The 41 documents examined in this chapter comprised 61,511 words. While the main corpus was drawn from two levels of parliament (state and federal) with potentially differing time periods, 99% of the texts examined for this chapter were drawn from state parliaments and were all produced between September 1991 and November 2003.

METAPHOR IDENTIFICATION

Using the definition of metaphor given above, each document was read closely to identify candidate metaphoric expressions with computer-assisted word searches being used to check for occurrences of the identified candidate metaphoric expressions that may have been missed when read manually. 796 examples of word-forms or phrases were identified. The largest definitional criterion (40%) that these fulfilled was through the linguistic characteristics of:

- reification (for example: “In the amount of *time we spent* on this subject, I *spent some time* on the issue” (Hidding, 1998) under the conceptual metaphor of TIME IS MONEY);
- personification (for example: “get the state *back on its feet*” (Smith, 1995) – STATE IS A PERSON; “Rokeby is a suburb that is so *tightly in the grip* of crime” (Quick, 1994) – CRIME IS A PERSON); and
- depersonification (for example: “a strong *inflow* of women but they did not seem to be *flowing* up all that high” (Hidding, 1998) – WOMEN ARE LIQUID).

The cognitive criterion was the next most frequent means (31%) of identifying candidate metaphors in the fear-of-crime corpus. These are metaphoric expressions that are involved in a shift in the conceptual system. For example, the dramaturgical expressions of *play*, *part*, *performance*, and *role* were frequently found in discussing job descriptions and accountability: “This is an important matter and one in which we all *play a part*” (Hidding, 1998) or “local members of Parliament to *play a leadership role*” (Lavarch, 1997). Such metaphoric expressions assist the language user to depict the work of the government, for example, as clearly defined and part of a larger context. By doing so, metaphors can change the way in which the work of the government (and their success or failure) is conceived.

The final 29% of the candidate metaphors fulfilled, as their main characteristic, the pragmatic criterion. This means that metaphoric expressions were being used to influence opinions and persuade the hearer. For example: “to the *snake oil salesman* this is acceptable” (Macdonald, 1995) where the *snake oil salesman* is being used metaphorically to refer to (with negative connotations) a politician; or “The Minister has *slashed* the overtime budget” (Dunworth, 1991) with *slashed* being used to reflect (and convince others of) the opinion that the budget changes have involved drastic cuts, potentially ill-considered and reckless. These types of metaphoric expressions often reflect the speaker’s intentions and their opinions or emotive judgments about the subject matter. Each metaphoric expression identified, though classified under one particular criterion, may also display characteristics of the other criteria to varying degrees.

METAPHOR INTERPRETATION

121 conceptual metaphors were identified by manually searching for common themes between metaphoric expressions used and their context. Conceptual metaphors are overarching statements in the form A is B that seek to release some of the semantic tension by showing how particular metaphoric expressions are related. For example from the texts studied, under the conceptual metaphor of POLICY MAKING IS A JOURNEY, *steps*, *paths*, *directions* and *courses* are taken, governments *progress down the track* and occasionally they *turn around* or change *tack*. Alternatively, the conceptual metaphor of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS attempts to release some of the semantic tension surrounding descriptions of people as *cowering*, *lurking*, being afraid to *venture* out and feeling *caged*, *scuttling* around the streets, or even simply *hanging about*. These conceptual metaphors seek to identify the relationship between multiple metaphoric expressions and thereby elucidate possible reasons for their use.

While a conceptual metaphor may go some way in dispersing the semantic tension created by the systematic use of metaphoric expressions, conceptual keys seek to understand the relationship between multiple conceptual metaphors. Such keys have been identified by analysing the context in which conceptual metaphors occur and the common themes between these occurrences. The largest group of conceptual metaphors (n = 11, Table 7.1) fell under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR. This conceptual key was apparent as a common theme between conceptual metaphors realised in the texts as metaphoric expressions such as *fighting*, *enemies*, *weapons*, and *targets*; where the community, governments and politicians alike have declared and are engaged in a *battle*

against crime and criminals. With 168 examples, this conceptual key covered 10% of the metaphoric expressions identified (n = 28; Table 7.2).

Thus, based on the identification of metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors associated under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR, it is possible for parliamentarians to depict a reality in the following way: an army of soldiers (the public, police and government officers) armed with weapons (information and law) and guided by generals (politicians) and their strategies (public policy) are actively fighting a war to protect (home) territory against enemies (crime, social problems and fear) that target victims (of crime).

Given that the main focus of this research is on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime, further analysis was undertaken on the corpus for this case study to identify metaphors used in relation to fear. Using the same methodology as previously described, metaphoric expressions related to fear were identified based on 45 word-forms (Table 7.3). These surface metaphors were then grouped under six conceptual metaphors (Table 7.4). The conceptual metaphors in turn suggest the conceptual key of FEAR IS AN ENTITY. The importance of this conceptual key is that fear is not talked about in terms of an emotion felt by a person. It is something that is talked about as if it were external to that person; whether fear is abstract or concrete, an object, liquid or container, it is an entity that is separate from the person who feels afraid.

Table 7.1: Conceptual Metaphors identified under the AACIW Conceptual Key

Conceptual Metaphor	Example	#
Victims are targets	... criminals who want to <i>target</i> the most vulnerable people... (Lawson, 2003)	56
Government and/or Politicians are generals	It had a brief to report to the government on ways and <i>strategies</i> to address crime ... (Elliott, 1995)	23
Crime is an enemy	The police in Prahran continue to <i>fight a losing battle</i> against violent crime in that area (Hayward, 1991)	23
Law is a weapon	The legislation is <i>aimed</i> at gangs of people ... (Schipp, 1994)	17
The State is a supporter of the war effort	<i>Support</i> for victims of crime needs to be constant ... (Humphries, 1997)	12
The home is the front line	The front door has become the <i>enemy territory</i> (Gash, 2001)	10
Information is a weapon	... public statements and publications whose <i>aim</i> or outcome achieves little more than fuelling hate (Greig, 2003)	7
Fear is an enemy	There are no specific funds to <i>combat</i> fear of crime (Hidding, 1998)	5
The public are soldiers	Blackshirt vigilantes <i>marching</i> to the home of a timid, shy person (Zollo, 2003)	4
The police are soldiers	... wonderful if the police had this as part of their <i>armoury</i> (Hidding, 1998)	4
Governments are soldiers	My department has broadened the <i>target</i> group to include all older people ... (Gash, 2001)	3
Social problems are enemies	We have always prided ourselves on finding other ways to <i>combat</i> problems ... (Gash, 2001)	2

Table 7.2: Metaphoric expressions identified under the AACIW Conceptual Key

Metaphoric Expression*	Number of Examples	Metaphoric Expression	Number of Examples
Aim	10	Hit	1
Armour	1	March	1
Attack	45	Mark	2
Battle	1	Prison	3
Brace	1	Protect	2
Charge	11	Rocket	1
Combat	3	Serve	1
Enemy	2	Siege	2
Escape	5	Strategy	18
Fight	10	Strike	2
Flak	1	Struggle	2
Force	6	Support	12
Fortress	1	Tackle	8
Front	3	Target	13

*The metaphoric expressions included in this table have been grouped by lemma (e.g., attack) rather than word-form (e.g., attacked, attacks, attacker etc).

The implications of separating fear in this way and the creation of an abstract entity have been discussed in depth in the previous chapter (Chapter Six): metaphoric expressions used in relation to fear, and under the conceptual key of FEAR IS AN ENTITY, support the findings presented in Chapter Six. Fear-of-crime is frequently conceptualized as an abstract entity that is able to take on independent agency – attacking victims while the state battles against it in a war on crime.

So far in this chapter, I have outlined both a theoretical and associated methodological approach to metaphor. I then gave a brief overview of metaphors in the parliamentary debates identified using CMA. The main focus of the remainder of this chapter will be on war- and fight-related metaphors that can be grouped under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR¹ (AACIW). The following sections will explore this conceptual key and its associated metaphors with the intention of discussing their discursive function(s). This will be done by combining the results just given with illustrations of AACIW metaphors within a discussion of their possible roles and functions in debates about fear-of-crime. Such an exploration will highlight the political representation, through the choice of metaphoric expressions, of the public's identity as fearful and vulnerable.

¹ For ease of expression, I will discuss AACIW metaphors for the remainder of the chapter. By AACIW metaphors I mean the metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors found under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR.

Table 7.3: Metaphoric Expressions in FEAR IS AN ENTITY

Metaphoric Expression*	Number of Examples	Metaphoric Expression	Number of Examples
Address	3	Has	4
Area	1	High	1
Backdrop	1	Highlight	1
Base	2	In	5
Big	1	Level	1
Bring	1	Low	1
Build	1	Oppose	1
Cater	1	Overcome	1
Centre	2	Phrase	4
Compound	1	Play	1
Concede	1	Prey	1
Corrode	1	Put	1
Create	11	Revolved	1
Damp	1	Rise	2
Down	1	Spread	1
Emanate	1	Statistic	2
Evidence	2	Stir	1
Exaggerate	1	Symptom	1
Feed	1	Take	2
Focus	1	Talk	1
Grab	1	Top	1
Gulf	2	Wide	2
Handle	1		

*The metaphoric expressions included in this table have been grouped by lemma (e.g., create) rather than word-form (e.g., created, creates etc).

Table 7.4: Conceptual Metaphors in FEAR IS AN ENTITY

Conceptual Metaphor	Example	#
Fear is an object	... we <i>handle</i> the subject [fear-of-crime] intelligently and rationally ... (Sercombe, 1994)	30
Fear is created	... that fear has been <i>created</i> by the action of loiterers ... (Zollo, 2003a)	21
Fear is alive	... having helped to <i>feed</i> the fear of crime, then to <i>feed off</i> the fear of crime ... (Griffin, 1999a)	9
Fear is a liquid	... those fears are often, if anything, more <i>corrosive</i> than some of the realities of crime (Sercombe, 1994)	8
Fear is a container	... people in the western suburbs of Sydney who now live <i>in</i> genuine fear. (Hazzard, 2003)	6
Fear is a gas	Even children sense the <i>cloud of anxiety emanating</i> from their parents (Dunworth, 1991)	2

METAPHOR EXPLORATION

AACIW metaphors seek to transfer the language and associated imagery of overt violence and militarized action into another domain. Such war metaphors have become common in many areas of public life such as law and order politics, marketing, management, medicine, social work and psychology, sports, public relations, and risk management (for examples of some of these see Boyd, 2003; Gustavsson, 1991; Heng, 2002; McMichael, 2002; Scrimger & Richards, 2003; Whysall, 2001). In this case, the target domain was crime.

AACIW metaphors involving the target domain of crime will be explored by presenting illustrations of the use of these metaphoric expressions within a discussion of the roles and functions that AACIW metaphors may play in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. These roles and functions will be examined from three perspectives (linguistic, cognitive and pragmatic) though in each case, the focus will be maintained on the discursive function of metaphors.

It should be noted at the outset that the mapping of metaphors of violence, fights and wars onto the domain of crime may be partly topic-triggered because of the semantic blurring between the domains. War and crime both contain elements of violence. For example, the crime of assault does (by definition) involve the use of violence where one person could be described as literally attacking the victim. Therefore, the subject matter of the debates as well as the speaker's persuasive intentions may determine the choice of metaphoric expression. While the influence of the topic itself is acknowledged, it is argued not to diminish the importance of the results presented in this chapter because through the

methodology of CMA, literal uses of word-forms are excluded during the second stage of analysis (metaphor identification). Instances of using *attack*, for example, as a means of describing one particular instance of criminal victimization have been excluded because they represent a literal use of the word-form rather than a metaphoric expression. Consequently, it is the use of metaphoric expressions and their implications that are the subject of this chapter.

ROLES OF AACIW METAPHORS

Possible linguistic, cognitive and pragmatic roles will be used to structure the following discussion about the discursive function of AACIW metaphors. I will argue that AACIW metaphors, when used by parliamentarians, fulfil the role of ensuring consistent language, of helping the community to understand crime as a negative aspect to society requiring urgent attention and of providing persuasive rhetorical evidence based on strategically constructed representations. Through these roles, AACIW metaphors function to help depict an image of a threatened society and fearful public.

To begin with the first possible role of AACIW metaphors, the language used in the examples given above consisted of a set of terms grouped to an underlying conceptual metaphor (and conceptual key). Such systematicity between all levels of metaphor is noted as a standard characteristic of this trope (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b: 7-9). In effect, metaphors come with a series of preset terms that match the topic and tone of the headlining term. For example, Whysall lists a number of elements or images that are associated with war-related metaphors such as “revenge, suffering, casualties, ‘collateral damage’, war crimes, prisoners, and necessary adverse impacts on non-combatants”

(Whysall, 2001). Such terms are to be found among metaphoric expressions given in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 above. These associated images and terms can be used for structuring discourse, for providing innovative language within the bounds of a conceptual metaphor and for creating a consistent depiction of all actors involved.

AACIW metaphors are also useful for the populist politician when conceptualizing crime, fear-of-crime and law and order in general (Steinert, 2003). The texts studied showed that the use of such metaphoric expressions were intended to help the audience to understand the concept of crime as something that is bad, distasteful or detrimental to society and that action is urgently required. The negativity with which war and fighting is regarded was transferred to crime. For example:

(1) However, we do think that a great deal needs to be said about the *war against organized crime* which is being *fought* in this country, or which we believe should be *fought* in this country, and the *war against ordinary crime*, traditional crime, which affects the entire spectrum of Australian society because society as a whole is under threat ... What of the second priority – the *fight against organized crime*? It is not a *fight* we are concerned about; it is a *war* for the *survival* of a decent society, for the *protection* of the young, for the *security* of our families and homes, for *freedom* from fear in the streets and for the *integrity* of the very institutions on which the criminal justice system is based (Spender, 1986).

This example (1) shows that while metaphoric mappings are partial, it is the urgency, magnitude, severity and even actions associated with wars, fights and violent behaviour in general, that are transferred to discussions of crime through these metaphors (Boyd, 2003;

Yanow, 1992). In cases where there is overlap between the source (war) and target (crime) domains such as the use of violence, war-related metaphoric expressions helped to emphasize (or even escalate) the urgency of the action proposed. As a result, AACIW metaphors provided a means by which politicians could signal their determination to address the problem of fear-of-crime. In this way, the use of these metaphors reflects the way in which the speaker understands and wants others to understand crime. The implications of this will be discussed below in the section on the functions of AACIW metaphors.

Following on from the changes effected in the conceptualization of crime, AACIW metaphors also have a pragmatic role in providing rhetorical evidence with the intention of persuading. In the texts studied, the interaction between members of the public is represented as constrained by (through the public's fears of) criminal behaviour. For example, the elderly were often depicted as living with a fortress mentality of having bars on their windows, locks on their doors and restricting their lifestyle because they dare not leave the house after 4 p.m. Consequently, the community and government must conduct a fight against or war on criminal behaviour in order to maintain and even liberate social interaction, to free the captives. The pragmatic role of AACIW metaphors enables the speaker to justify their proposals based on their own representation of the public's experience of crime and fear-of-crime.

So far I have argued that AACIW metaphors have the role of providing consistency in the language used; of helping the community to understand that crime is a negative (urgent and sizeable) aspect of society; and finally of using a parliamentarian's own representation of the public's experience of crime to achieve the speaker's persuasive goals. In simple terms,

the use of AACIW metaphors emphasizes the argument that crime is detrimental to society, restricts or reduces the public's quality of life and requires urgent attention. It is how these roles function in Australian parliamentary debates that highlight less allegedly self-evident consequences.

FUNCTIONS OF AACIW METAPHORS

One function of metaphor can be to help soften the discomfort with which social change or the unfamiliar is often regarded. Metaphors can function as a bridge from the known to the unknown through the process of mapping – a process discussed earlier in regard to cognitive approaches to metaphor. In this case, the known or more clearly delineated concept is the popular images of war – of being under siege, of restricting lifestyles to stay at home to protect belongings and people. These (partial) images of war are mapped onto crime. In this latter unknown or less clearly delineated concept, the threat comes from within the state; and the criminal and victim are more difficult to identify. For example:

- (2) The women say that not only do they fear for their own safety but also for the safety of their children. They consider it is not sufficiently safe to allow their children even to visit the local shop to buy milk. ... I put to the House that the police in Prahran continue to *fight a losing battle against violent crime* in that area because of inadequate personnel and resources. (Hayward, 1991)

This example (2) shows that these AACIW metaphors enable the public to understand that they should respond to the unknown as they would to the known domain – they should respond to crime as one would to a war. In conjunction with the roles discussed earlier, the rhetoric advises them to stay inside in fortress-like homes to fight off the marauding forces.

Another function of AACIW metaphors is to allow the complex problem of crime to be simplified to criminals and non-criminals. Metaphorical mappings can be used to polarize the social identities involved in a discourse. Consequently, discussions of a problem tend to be focused on what can be done about the threat that is facing us because of them, the 'other', the criminal. It allows the speaker to focus discussions on the savageness of the enemy rather than the weakness of the target (Boyd, 2003). Enemies are identified, created or assumed. Differences within the group are ignored. At the same time, a General is identified that will lead the side to victory through effective strategy, use of weapons, training of soldiers and funding (Gustavsson, 1991). For example:

(3) ... the outbreak of violence which has manifested itself in the past 12 to 18 months has been *tackled* in a more professional way by the Victoria Police. ... The crimes being *targeted* are not robberies; they are vicious acts without a motive. ... Nonetheless, motiveless crimes occur with innocent people being the victims. (Smith, 1995)

In this example (3), the identities presented are homogenous groups where the Victoria Police act as soldiers controlling an outbreak of violence; criminals act viciously and without motive; and victims are innocent people. The speaker is able to use these identities to argue for urgent action against the savage enemy facing the innocent victim.

The simplification that can occur through AACIW metaphors may help the public to understand crime and it may help politicians to convey the need for certain actions to be taken. However, it also hides the complexity of the problem which, if not also addressed, reduces the potential for success that any state effort may have. Instead of encompassing all the issues that may cause criminal behaviour or fear-of-crime, responses to such issues

are simplified to the political party promising the toughest laws or the most resources to police. The complexity of the answer is hidden by the function of metaphor to simplify the problem to its polar extremes.

Finally, AACIW metaphors can function to help present the social reality that is desired by the speaker. In the texts studied, criminals are portrayed as being external to society. The threat is outside. This assists in both the creation of a collective public identity and the description of society as a complete homogenous entity. Society as a whole is under threat from criminals in the same way that an invading force would threaten a nation. Consequently, AACIW metaphors help parliamentarians to attempt to unify society by focusing on an external threat. The menacing 'other' has been used many times in politics (see for example: Coser, 1972; Edelman, 1988) such as focusing a fear of the 'other' on witches (Erikson, 1966) and sorcerers (Kuhn, 1990) (The literature on 'othering' will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Twelve). In this case, it is the criminal 'other' that is highlighted by AACIW metaphors in political attempts to represent a particular social reality. For example:

(4) At present many people live in fear. Their homes are like *fortresses* with bars on the windows, extra security and locks on doors. Worse still, many are frightened to leave their homes. The older citizens in our society should not have to live in that atmosphere. (Nile, 1997)

(5) In watching the way people walk and talk in their local communities, I have noticed a change, especially in the older people who now clutch their purses, wallets and bags of shopping for dear life. They spend a lot of time looking behind them, crossing the street if there are strangers on the footpath and so on.

Even when they stop for a cup of tea with a friend at a café, they hang onto all their stuff, and rather than look at one another as they speak ... The front door has become the *enemy territory*. They say that it is just better to leave it locked as then nothing can happen. (Gash, 2001)

These ((4) & (5)) are examples of the use of metaphoric expressions related to fights and wars to help present a reality containing a threatened society where this society is delineated by the savage criminals depicted in political rhetoric.

The culmination of these three possible functions of AACIW metaphors leads to the linguistic representation of a society where criminals are excluded based upon their transgression of boundaries of behaviour. Crime and criminals are kept out through the castle walls of rhetoric about tough legislation and well resourced police. Ultimately, it is a reality where the safety of innocent people is threatened and society is on the defensive reacting to the criminal force that has laid a violent siege.

AACIW METAPHORS AND IDENTITY

The common theme throughout all metaphors discussed here is the political representation of a public identity that is characterized by feelings of fear, insecurity, innocence and vulnerability; and that this fearful identity is defined by the identity of the threatening criminal. The following section argues that the use of AACIW metaphors serves to reinforce and elevate to prominence the identities of a fearful public and threatening criminal. This argument will be made by first presenting the general theory on identity and then a more specific framework developed by the Copenhagen School. On the basis of that

framework, the identities emphasized by AACIW metaphors in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime will be examined. It is argued that the identities involved are becoming separated from each other in parliamentary discussions about crime and fear-of-crime.

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL IDENTITY– THE THEORY

Identity is most simply described in metaphorical terms as a “place in the social world” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). This place represents characteristics such as gender, age and ethnicity. Identity functions to allow distinctions to be made between “us” and “them” or “s/he” and “me” (Kaelberer, 2004; Waever et al., 1993) – a socio-psychological distinction that occurs in all human interaction (Ottosen, 1995). It is a dynamic conception (McSweeney, 1998) that changes in both number and focus throughout one’s lifetime (Sturmer & Simon, 2004).

There are a number of different scholarly definitions of identity depending on the author’s theoretical perspective. For instance in Identity Theory, identity is the self-categorization of oneself into a role and the consequent assumption of the values, meanings and expectations that are associated with that role (Stets & Burke, 2000). The focus is on individual differences that distinguish one person from another (Turner & Onorato, 1999). In Social Identity Theory, identity is generated through the knowledge that one belongs to or shares certain characteristics with a particular social group or category (Stets & Burke, 2000). It is a more inclusive form (we or us) of self-definition compared to individual identity (I or me) (Sturmer & Simon, 2004). Social identity is focused on a ‘shared sense of “we”’ (Futrell & Simi, 2004), where one’s place in the world is shared with others.

The formulation of identity that will be used in this chapter is that used by scholars such as Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and their colleagues (known as the “Copenhagen School” (Williams, 1998)) when discussing “securitization” (Wæver et al., 1993). Discussions of security have been gradually extended from the military security of states and nations to how objects in the economy, environment and so on become the subject of security debates. The Copenhagen School termed this latter process as ‘securitization’. Williams (1998) describes this as “the socially and politically successful ‘speech act’ of labeling an issue a ‘security issue’ [which] removes it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics, casting it as an ‘existential threat’ calling for and justifying extreme measures” (Williams, 1998: 435).

In the process of securitization, identity is featured in two ways. First, it is the means by which societies are classified. Identity in this case becomes the focus of the threat that initiated the discussions about security. This is societal security or where the actions of the state are generated by perceptions that a society’s identity is under threat (Wæver et al., 1993). Such behaviour is evident in the actions called for by the parliamentarians quoted above.

An identity is also created by the process of securitization. Specific boundaries are drawn between “us” and “them”. In seeking to oppose an enemy, the state must define what or who that enemy is. The created (enemy) identity is homogenous, monolithic and denies the reality of a multiplicity of identity. Discussions about security issues are, by definition, exclusionary and require clear boundaries about the identity that must be excluded from society (Williams, 2003). The persecution of created or real enemies is a means by which the state can renew and reaffirm social identities (Bergesen, 1984; Luostarinen, 1989;

Ottosen, 1995). It is this second feature of the creation of identity that will be drawn upon below.

IDENTITY, AACIW METAPHORS AND FEAR-OF-CRIME

The participation in the creation and/or maintenance of a fearful public identity and the implied threat of the criminal was the common thread through all of the metaphoric language discussed here. In the texts, the identity that was most frequently and overtly mentioned was that of the fearful member of the public. This was especially evident in discussions about fear-of-crime amongst the elderly.

(6) The elderly people said they felt as if they were under siege and they should keep all their money in the bank. Some of them said they should have some means of self-defence at hand and that they did not go out after 4.00pm. They kept their doors and windows locked and often did not answer the door if they were not expecting a visitor (Elliott, 1995: 777).

(7) The point I was making is that often when I knock on the door of a home I see a little old lady open a window at the other end of the house because she is too frightened to open her front door (Lester, 1995: 12569).

In the examples (6) and (7) the elderly person is depicted as vulnerable, fearful, weak and defenceless. Similar descriptions are also given of women, children and victims (especially when discussing crimes such as stalking or domestic violence). Men are discussed as either fearful for their own lives or that of their family. In each case, there is at least one member of the public that is afraid.

The identity of the fearful public is almost certainly generated through many factors. However, the use of AACIW metaphors in discussions about crime and fear-of-crime transfers not only the language of strategies and attacks but also the fear and urgency associated with violent and warlike behaviour. Through talk of a war on crime or a fight against fear-of-crime, criminal behaviour becomes a frequent and imminent threat of substantial magnitude that will have severe consequences for any victim. This makes criminal behaviour appear pervasive, high-risk and likely – factors that tend to increase feelings of fear. Therefore, political discussions about reducing fear-of-crime by conducting a war on crime may increase the level of fear felt in the community.

It is interesting to note that the identity of the threatening criminal is mostly implied rather than expressly discussed. The threat that makes people afraid was frequently maintained as an abstract concept that did not take the form of a person or type of person. This supports the argument made by some scholars that crime is increasingly being depicted as a danger that comes from anywhere at any time (Valier, 2002). The whole of society is represented as under a universal yet undefined threat known only as the ‘criminal’.

For example, in the passage (8) below, the focus is on the need of people to feel safe (an element of fear-of-crime). The reason for them not feeling safe because a person may cause them injury or such like is not mentioned. It is only implied.

(8) Every South Australian has the right to feel safe in their homes, in their streets and in their communities. Parents must be confident in the knowledge that, when their children go to school, they are not at risk. They need to feel confident that, when their teenagers are visiting the city, they are safe. The

elderly need to be confident of living in their homes without fear of invasion.
(Brokenshire, 2001)

Some of this lack of overt discussion that locates the threat in the criminal may be a result of the study's focus on fear-of-crime. Texts that discussed crime (and perhaps offenders) were excluded if they did not also contain a discussion of fear-of-crime. It is possible that such exclusion may have artificially inflated the level to which the identity of the fearful public was raised above that of the criminal.

However, it remains noteworthy that there should be such isolation of the two identities in parliamentary discussions that lay the boundaries between "us" and "them". Through AACIW metaphors and especially those relating to war, there is an attempt to set up the offender as the enemy. Yet in discussions where the definition of "us" – the fearful public – is being espoused, there is no mention of the opposite that is required to clarify who "we" are. As a result, that identity relies on the rhetoric of political debate for its definition. This may in part account for the level of fear-of-crime reported in the community being found to be influenced by political posturing. Political rhetoric involving metaphoric expressions of wars, fights and violent behaviour enhances the ability for appeals to the identity of the fearful public to be made with greater potential effect. This ability is extended by the fearful identity of the public being divorced from a criminal other. Consequently, there may be the temptation to manipulate the 'fearful public' for political ends such as to gain support for policies, changes in legislation and ultimately, win re-election.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, I began with a brief examination of the theory surrounding metaphors – definitions, approaches and the methodology of Critical Metaphor Analysis. Through roles in language, cognition and social interaction, metaphor has the potential to function effectively to soften the perceived threat or discomfort generated by social change, simplify complex issues and to construct a particular reality. These roles and functions were used to structure the discussion about metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors grouped under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR.

It was shown that these AACIW metaphors assisted parliamentarians by providing a consistent body of language. Parliamentarians were able to argue, or more often state but not argue, that crime was detrimental to society, restricted quality-of-life and required urgent attention. Furthermore, AACIW metaphors were shown to function as a means of defining the actors involved in crime (e.g. criminals and victims) as well as attempting to establish roles and locations of engagement. The use of such metaphors simplified the debates to their polar extremes and provided rhetorical evidence in support of the exclusion of the threatening criminal based on their transgression of state defined boundaries of behaviour. It was argued that the effect of using AACIW metaphors was to present a reality where the safety of innocent persons is threatened in a society that is struggling to assert its dominance over the criminal forces. The common thread throughout all AACIW metaphors was the use of the identities of the fearful public and the threatening criminal. Metaphoric language increased the usefulness of these identities in Australian parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

In concluding, I emphasized the dangers in regard to fear-of-crime that may result from the political manipulation of such identities. In parliamentary debates, one danger lies in the potential increase in fear-of-crime that may result from the framing of crime in terms of AACIW metaphors. Urgency and severity was transferred or emphasized through the use of these metaphors. The imagery that is used escalates the perception of that threat and potentially the community's fear-of-crime.

A further danger was identified by the apparent separation of the fearful public identity from that of the criminal. It was argued that without anchorage to that which contained the threat or the stimulus for fear, the characteristics fear-of-crime would become dependent for definition on political rhetoric such as that containing metaphors of violence, wars and fights. Such a situation demands great restraint from politicians not to use the increasingly rhetoric dependent identity of the fearful public for political advantage.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FEAR-OF-CRIME AS COMMON SENSE

This chapter will examine a particular feature of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime that reflect as equitable an influence as possible between linguistic and societal forces – common sense. Instead of being a linguistic form specifically, common sense is a body of knowledge that represents through language what is assumed to be ‘understood by everyone’ in a particular society. Appeals to common sense knowledge about fear-of-crime were frequently used in the documents collected; at times such appeals seemed to entirely dominate the debates as politicians replaced arguments based on objective evidence for arguments relying on common sense. Such appeals to common sense provide an opportunity to examine both the way in which images of reality are embodied in language and the way that these images are contested through language.

CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

During a Joint Standing Committee on Migration meeting regarding the deportation of criminals, a witness remarked “of course we must fear crime” (Johnston, 1997: 121). Furthermore, it was evident very early in the data collection that while fear-of-crime was a favorite issue for politicians to mention when discussing crime and criminal victimization, it was not a favorite issue to discuss. Only 41 (6%) of the 720 documents from the past 21 years contained a discussion of fear-of-crime (operationalized as more than five mentions). This chapter seeks to examine the reason(s) behind why there are so few political discussions about fear-of-crime when it is an issue that is frequently mentioned. It will be argued that fearing crime is perceived as common sense by politicians and therefore, its existence does not need argumentative justification.

To make this argument, I will first examine the notion of common sense – its definition, characteristics and functions. I will then outline the common sense statements that have been made about crime and fear-of-crime by researchers internally and in Australia. After adding further statements that I argue are perceived as common sense by politicians based on the analysis of the debates collected, I will focus on three main statements to which appeals were frequently made. These are that it is common sense that: the streets are dangerous because of crime; the public is afraid of crime; and the level of fear-of-crime is positively correlated with the rate of crime. I will then demonstrate that such statements are used as if they are common sense and will suggest possible resulting functions of such statements. At this point, it will hopefully be evident that fear-of-crime is not widely discussed in Australian politics because fearing crime is perceived as common sense.

In the final section, I wish to discuss one effect of the use of these common sense statements in Australian politics. It is argued that they provide politicians with fuel to create enough political noise to drown out alternative arguments. Debate over issues is restricted or even silenced altogether. Instead, public policy is presented as common sense with its associated authority, legitimacy and power. The course of action proposed thus becomes the only course that any ‘sensible’ person would take.

WHAT IS COMMON SENSE?

To begin the argument that fearing crime is common sense, it is important to understand what common sense is. It is related to thought processes such as judgment, truth and knowledge. However, it tends to be less well defined than these (van Holthoon & Olson, 1987). Below, I will outline the academic knowledge of common sense and its relationship

to human interaction, understanding and social realities. The analysis presented by Geertz (1975) will be used as a means of characterizing 'common sense' as opposed to other forms of knowledge. Finally, three general functions of common sense will be examined. The theoretical arguments made in this section will be used as a structural basis for the remaining discussions in this chapter.

KNOWLEDGE OF COMMON SENSE

In general, common sense is defined as a body of knowledge that is transmitted to all within a group where that knowledge relates to practical action, human nature and experience (Lindenberg, 1987; Luckmann, 1987). To use common sense is to use a quality of judgment based in simple or self-evident truths (Joseph, 1994; van Holthoon & Olson, 1987). To not use common sense does not mean that the person is stupid or intellectually retarded; rather it means that they are not able deal well with everyday practical problems (Geertz, 1992 [1975]).

Common sense is a basic belief within a society. It forms fundamental presuppositions of knowledge (van Holthoon & Olson, 1987). However, where some forms of knowledge tend towards abstraction, common sense is a general body of knowledge that focuses on practical life, the ordinary reality, and the way to deal with life pragmatically (Luckmann, 1987). It is sourced directly from experience rather than a reflection or contemplation on that experience (Geertz, 1992 [1975]).

Consequently, common sense is based in the familiar reality where every person has the same ability to use that knowledge (Geertz, 1992 [1975]). It is common precisely because

the knowledge is shared between others who participate in the normal routines of day-to-day life (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This egalitarian or objective basis allows it to be used by and applied to all humans of sound mind. The very existence of common sense relies on the uniformity of human nature and experiences (Lindenberg, 1987). Common sense helps people to understand the reality of everyday life by providing a practical guide for action (Black, 1979).

Common sense has an advantage over other forms of knowledge in that it is held to be inherently 'legitimate', 'real', 'proper', 'taken-for-granted' and generally 'good sense' (Brewer, 1984). Common sense gains much of its authority from its basis in everyday experience – of presenting life as it is, neat and in total. In effect, the world and its events makes common sense 'right' (Geertz, 1992 [1975]).

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMON SENSE

Intuitively, common sense is characterized mainly through its practicality (Beyea & Nicoll, 1999). However given the fragmented theoretical history of common sense as a concept (Brewer, 1984), it is difficult to determine what specifically makes a piece of knowledge common sense. The most in-depth analysis of common sense was given in 1975 by Clifford Geertz. A brief explanation of the six characteristics identified will be given in this section.

Geertz begins with “naturalness” or the atmosphere of ‘of course’-ness that surrounds common sense. It is the representation of certain matters in their simplest form with the statement appearing intrinsic to the reality. The second characteristic is “practicalness”. As necessitated by the definition given above, common sense applies to actions that can be

taken by people in real world situations. Accusing someone of lacking common sense is synonymous with accusing them of being impractical.

The third characteristic identified by Geertz was that of “thinness”. This can also be termed “simplicity” or “literalness”. This characteristic relates to the tendency of common sense towards brevity and depicting issues solely as they are with nothing more or less. Geertz admits that this characteristic is difficult to define in more explicit terms than simply appealing to the reader’s own experience of common sense.

The name of the fourth characteristic is also tenuous – “immethodicalness”. Where ‘facts’ drawn from science are required to be based in strict accepted methodology, common sense delights in inconsistency. In the body/ies of knowledge that form common sense, there are many statements of fact that contradict each other. In effect common sense is (at least) dilemmatic. There is always an opposing argument to that given and both are seen as common sense (Billig, 1991). This may be reflective of the general inconsistency and contradictions through which people experience social reality (Leurdijk, 1997). Alternatively, Gramsci argues that common sense is inherently eclectic and disjointed with its stock of knowledge being drawn from many ideologies across time. This allows contradictions to exist in common sense knowledge without tension (Hall et al., 1977).

Perhaps the love of inconsistency also stems from the fifth characteristic of common sense. It is ad hoc – drawn from jokes, stories, gossip and rumour. There are no formal theories or evaluations conducted to construct statements of common sense. It is drawn upon and transmitted as required by the practical situation faced.

The final characteristic of common sense is “accessibleness”. This has been implied through the previous discussions. By definition, common sense needs to be accessible to all of sound mind. Geertz goes so far as to say that statements of common sense will not only be understood by that person but that that person will then embrace the argument in their own situation (Geertz, 1992 [1975]). These six characteristics of common sense will be used below to demonstrate the nature of statements made about fear-of-crime in Australian parliaments.

THE FUNCTIONS OF COMMON SENSE

Lindenberg (1987) argues that there are three functions through which common sense becomes an important element of civilization. First, common sense functions as a baseline for human interaction. When interacting with other people, we presuppose that they share a “network of interconnected beliefs about the world and our own relation to it” (Beyea & Nicoll, 1999: 3). These beliefs guide our actions, provide support for our assertions and explain our behavior. Therefore, common sense is generally considered to function as a guide for action (Black, 1979; Luckmann, 1987).

Second, common sense provides a reference or benchmark against which other knowledge can be judged. Findings from academic research as well as from friends’ stories and anecdotes are checked by the audience against their own common sense. Does it ‘sound’ right? In effect, people use the body of knowledge generated by common sense to judge if new information is plausible based on a society’s collective experience.

Finally, rhetorical appeals can be made to common sense (Lindenberg, 1987). Such appeals are like an act of faith. Commonsense relies on assumed similarities and reasonableness between human beings (van Holthoon & Olson, 1987). In arguments, common sense can be appealed to as a means of closing the argument. If a person has accepted a piece of common sense knowledge which forms the premise for the argument, they are forced to accept the conclusion. The argument is (hopefully) closed without further debate (Aden, 1994; Billig, 1996). The implications of this ability of common sense to restrict debate will be discussed further below.

To summarize this section about the theory of common sense, I have shown that it is generally understood as a body of practical knowledge transmitted within a group. This knowledge provides a guide for human action and helps people to understand the reality of everyday life. I then outlined Geertz's six characteristics of common sense knowledge that distinguish it from other forms of knowledge. Finally, I presented three general functions that common sense plays in social interaction. The theoretical arguments examined in this section will be used as a structural basis for arguing that fearing crime is perceived as common sense by Australian politicians.

FEAR CRIME! IT IS COMMON SENSE.

In the criminological literature, a number of authors have made statements on what is common sense when it comes to crime. Tilley and Laycock (2000) list some common sense statements about crime that they believe are held by people in the United States. For example, they state that it is common sense that: (1) offenders are uncommon and substantially different from the rest of us; (2) if a particular crime is prevented in one place

it will pop up elsewhere, or in some other form; (3) an increase in numbers of police officers will produce a commensurate reduction in crime levels; (4) the more severe the punishment the lower the crime levels; (5) there was less crime in the 'good old days'; and so on (Tilley & Laycock, 2000).

Similarly in 1998, Hogg and Brown listed a number of common sense statements about people's preconceptions of crime in Australia. These were arguing that it is common sense that: (1) crime rates are soaring, (2) the level of crime is worse than ever, (3) New York and Los Angeles are our future, (4) the criminal justice system is soft on crime (5) there is a need for increased police numbers with more power, (6) we need tougher penalties; and (7) victims should be able to get revenge through the courts (Hogg & Brown, 1998).

Based on the analysis of parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime in Australia, I can reiterate some of those listed above and add some further statements. For example, parliamentarians used the statements that it is common sense that: (1) women should (not have to) fear being raped; (2) elderly people and women are vulnerable to criminal victimization; (3) victims are afraid of re-victimization by the same offender; (4) victims' fear of offenders increases positively with the perception that that offender is armed; (5) mothers fear that their children will use drugs and believe that they should chaperone their children for protection against crime; (6) people should fear crime on public transport; and the list could continue. These statements are examples of appeals made to common sense as perceived by Australian parliamentarians when talking about fear-of-crime.

For the purposes of the remainder of this chapter, I wish to focus on three main common sense statements (CSS) referring to crime and criminal behavior. These are:

- CSS (Streets):** It is common sense that the streets are dangerous because of crime¹;
- CSS (Public):** It is common sense that the public is afraid of crime; and
- CSS (Crime):** It is common sense that fear-of-crime increases with the crime rate.

In the following section, I will demonstrate the commonsensical nature of these statements by discussing the six characteristics of common sense described by Geertz (1975). A number of characteristics are evident in identical fashion through all three CSSs. To avoid repetition, the six characteristics will only be discussed individually in regard to CSS (streets) with only isolated characteristics being examined for CSS (public) and CSS (crime).

CSS (STREETS)

- (a) Law-abiding citizens are afraid to walk the streets in many areas
(Lynn, 1996)

It is common sense that the streets are dangerous. A watcher of an evening news report stating that an elderly woman had been mugged in the park could say “Ah yes, the streets are dangerous.” Such a statement has an aura of naturalness to it. Of course! It is obvious. Whether it be from parental advice or stories from friends, CSS (streets) has accumulated that feeling of something that is expected – it is ‘natural’.

Attached to that common sense knowledge is the practical advice to stay off the street.

¹ For the convenience of brevity and partially dictated by the context of the data from which this statement is drawn, I will refer to the danger in CSS (streets) as coming from crime. In doing so, I am not excluding or denying that the street may be dangerous for many other reasons.

(b) Others have suggested that the next step will be a curfew. An artificial curfew exists now, because people are too scared to walk on the streets after dark, and even in daylight hours in many cases. (Schipf, 1994)

The general implication of this quote is the practical advice of “stay off the streets”. The speaker is arguing that if you are afraid of crime, avoid the criminal threat that is (of course) found on the street and stay indoors.

Such advice is widely adopted because of the “thinness” character of the common sense statement. It can be understood in a literal form that is pithy and direct. Politicians could advise the public to take action to reduce their fear-of-crime. However, this statement lacks both the practical nature just described. It is consequently difficult to take literally and as a guide for action. Instead, the appeals to common sense are simple to understand – do not walk on the street, especially not alone at night.

However, typical to common sense, there is also the opposing view that that the streets are not dangerous. Rather it is indoors that the danger lies. This is what Geertz termed “immethodicalness” or the adoption of both sides of a contradiction. The other side of a perception of dangerous streets has been given prominence through awareness campaigns on domestic violence, elderly abuse and more recently sexual violence. I would still argue that the notion that the streets are safer than indoors has not managed to overcome the image of the home as a place of safety or become an equal to the common sense statement that the streets are dangerous.

Geertz also argued that common sense was ad hoc. Statements or pieces of knowledge are developed and disseminated as needed by circumstance and experience. The belief that the streets are dangerous is passed from mother or father to their children when they warn them to be careful walking home after school; or by work colleagues who offer to walk each other to their cars if leaving work at night; or by safety awareness campaigns and so forth. The message that the streets are dangerous gets passed on and reinforced by such behavior.

(c) We know of the aura of violence that surrounds some streets and parts of cities and makes them unsafe, in the view of many citizens, for them to enjoy recreation and even just go to work or go about their normal business without fear or anxiety. (Tate, 1988)

Everyone can understand the statement that the street is dangerous. As the speaker in (c) said, “we know...”. Everyone walks on the streets and common sense says that such public areas are dangerous for reasons such as strangers, the unknown, and the uncontrollable. That the streets are dangerous becomes a piece of knowledge that is accessible to all.

Therefore, I would argue that the statement within political discourses on fear-of-crime that *the streets are dangerous because of crime* has become common sense. The statement appears obvious, contains practical advice, is simple and direct, disseminated by need and is accessible to all. The six characteristics identified by Geertz as indicating common sense are fulfilled. It is common sense that the streets are dangerous because of crime.

CSS (PUBLIC)

(d) No doubt people are very much afraid. (Kirkby, 1994)

(e) The truth is that Queenslanders are scared. (Borbidge, 1995)

Based on the political rhetoric analyzed, it could be stated that of course people are afraid of crime! There is no doubt that this is the case and no question that it should be that way. CSS (public) implies that people will change their behavior because of their fear-of-crime. One possible behavioral change is avoidance such as staying off the streets as described by CSS (streets). Again the advice is widespread and practical because it is simple, direct and pithy. This allows it to be adopted when needed and disseminated across many groups. The very statement itself seeks to encourage all to understand that they are afraid of crime. Consequently, it is a statement that is accessible to all and political rhetoric argues that it is increasingly being embraced by members of the population. It is common sense that the public is afraid of crime.

CSS (CRIME)

(f) Fear has escalated through the community as more and more people become aware of an increase in crime in this State. (Gallacher, 2000)

(g) Statistics supplied by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics show that last year in this State one person was murdered every three days; 12,000 people were robbed; 150,000 people were either assaulted or threatened with assault; 131,000 homes were broken into and 46,000 vehicles were stolen. This,

plus the daily saturation in the news of stories about crime, makes it not difficult to understand why the fear of crime is so pervasive in our society. (Mark, 1998)

An allegedly very simple link between crime and fear-of-crime is posited by CSS (crime). If the rate of crime increases, the level of fear-of-crime will also increase. Ultimately, fear-of-crime is generated by crime. As the speaker in (g) states, this is not difficult to understand. Therefore, if you want to lower the level of fear-of-crime, lower the crime rate. Simple, direct and short. Something that everyone should be able to understand because it is common sense (Taylor & Jamieson, 1998).

In summary, I have sought to show that the three statements that are appealed to as common sense in political discourses about fear-of-crime are indeed common sense. I have done this by showing that each fulfills the six characteristics identified by Geertz (1975). Therefore, it is spoken of by Australian parliamentarians as if it were common sense that: the streets are dangerous because of crime; the public is afraid of crime; and that increases in fear-of-crime are caused by the similar increases in the rate of crime.

COMMON SENSE: FACT OR FICTION?

It is worthwhile at this point to briefly compare these three common sense statements with statistical reports and research conclusions. The first CSS was that the streets are dangerous because of crime. The resultant implication is that people are afraid of the (criminal) threats that exist on the street. There is support for those implications: with fear being linked with the 'unpredictable stranger' that creates a reputation of a particular place as being risky

(Lupton, 1999); or similarly that cultural diversity and neighborhood heterogeneity and the associated racial and cultural misunderstandings serve as key factors in predicting fear-of-crime (Lane & Meeker, 2000); or that the community's level of control over the streets will influence their level of fear-of-crime (see for various theories: Gibson et al., 2002; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Ward, 1986). Though less influential than personal characteristics, research evidence does support the conclusion that the characteristics of the environment have the potential to increase a person's fear-of-crime.

This leads to questioning the actual statement itself: the streets are dangerous because of crime. It is important to remember here that this statement is drawn partly from the context in which parliamentarians described people as being afraid of crime. As a result, it is more appropriate to question CSS (streets) by asking what location has the highest incidence of crime than whether it is crime that makes the streets dangerous. In order to answer this initial question, the following table gives the proportion of crime by their (selected) location as reported most recently by the ABS (ABS, 2002, 2004).

Table 8.1: Proportion of Offenses by Location

%	Murder		Assault		Sexual Assault		Robbery	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Dwelling	58.5	54.6	36.7	38.4	62.2	64.7	6.1	6.4
<i>Total Residential</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>58.3</i>	<i>40.7</i>	<i>42.1</i>	<i>64.4</i>	<i>66.6</i>	<i>6.7</i>	<i>7</i>
Street/Footpath	13.1	17.2	22.8	21.7	8.2	6.7	38.2	41.7
<i>Total Community</i>	<i>22.2</i>	<i>29.5</i>	<i>36.8</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>20.9</i>	<i>19.9</i>	<i>55.2</i>	<i>58.6</i>
Retail	3.9	-	8.9	9.3	2.9	2.9	25.8	23.4
<i>Total Other</i>	<i>10.5</i>	<i>9.3</i>	<i>19.8</i>	<i>20.3</i>	<i>9.8</i>	<i>9.7</i>	<i>35.2</i>	<i>32.4</i>
<i>Unspecified</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>2.7</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>4.8</i>	<i>3.9</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>2.0</i>
<i>Total Offences</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>

It is evident from this table that in all crimes except robbery, a residential building or land is the location of the largest percentage of each crime. For example, women's fear-of-crime is often said to be largely a fear-of-rape (e.g., Carmody, 1984; Lupton, 1999; Pain, 1991; Warr, 1984) and that sexual assault is a 'shadow' that falls over all other crimes for the female victim (Ferraro, 1995). With the majority of sexual assaults occurring in the residential dwelling (62.2%), this would suggest that the appeal to CSS (streets) is erroneous. The streets are not the place where a woman should be most fearful of being raped. However, this is not the case for robbery which does often occur in the community (55.2%) or more specifically on the street or footpath (38.2%). Such statistics do support the statement that the streets are dangerous because of crime. However, this dependency on the type of crime in determining the correctness of the CSS means that the research evidence and statistics can only partly support a parliamentarian's appeal that the streets are dangerous because of crime.

The second appeal to common sense stated that the public is afraid of crime. CSS (public) can be checked against 'fact' in two ways. First, is it true that the *majority* of people are afraid of crime? In 2000, the National Campaign against Violence and Crime (NCAVAC) reported that 41% of Australians were afraid of crime. While national research on Australian's fear-of-crime is scarce (see Chapter Three), this figure is supported by Australian state-based research and those conducted overseas that reported an average of 35% of the population being afraid of crime (a range of 17%-50% – see Bonta, 2001; Carcach et al., 1995; Hartnagel, 1979; Semmens et al., 2002; Warr, 2000). Despite being a substantial proportion, 41% does not provide a factual basis on which to base the blanket statement that the public is afraid of crime: a statement that is used to imply that *all* members of the public are afraid.

CSS (public) can also be checked against research studying the emotional response to crime. As discussed in Chapter Three, there are a number of problems with scholarly understandings of fear-of-crime, the most crucial of which are the lack of a universal definition and the wide variety of instruments used to measure the phenomenon. This has meant that *fear-of-crime* is often used as shorthand for the wide range of emotions that may be generated by the general category of crime (Hough, 1995). Moreover, recent studies have shown that anger, and not fear, is the most common emotional response to crime (Clark, 2003, 2004; Ditton et al., 1999). This again challenges the validity of the statement that the public is afraid of crime because while a small number may be fearful it is likely that a larger number will be anxious, worried, irritated or angry. As a result, CSS (public) or claims that the public is afraid of crime is not supported by research evidence.

The third CSS argues that increases in fear-of-crime are caused by increases in rates of crime. This statement is not directly supported by research evidence. In fact, fear and crime are only loosely related with high crime areas not necessarily equaling high fear areas (Lupton, 2000). Location and socio-demographic variables are better predictors of fear than official statistics of crime rates (Garofalo & Laub, 1978). However, there is some support for disorder increasing a person's fear-of-crime (whether that be physical disorder of poorly maintained buildings and yards or social disorder such as youths hanging around an area or drunken adults staggering home) (Alvi et al., 2001; Kelley & Evans, 1992; Perkins & Taylor, 1996; R. B. Taylor & Hale, 1986).

There are three problems or qualifications to the finding that disorder may increase a person's fear-of-crime: (a) that disorder has only been determined to influence an individual's fear-of-crime rather than a neighborhoods' level of fear because (b) disorder

only affects fear-of-crime when that individual is sensitive to the cues of disorder held in the environment; and finally (c) it is not yet clear what role perception of crime risk may play in the relationship between disorder and fear-of-crime (LaGrange et al., 1992). These problems mean that disorder may only increase a person's fear-of-crime in a limited number of cases.

The third problem is also the reason why (at least) a loose connection between fear and crime is still acknowledged amongst researchers despite only a weak causal relationship being identified between the two variables. *Perception* of the crime rate as being either high or low (and the subsequent perceived risk of criminal victimization) does influence a person or community's fear-of-crime. This conclusion has come from attempts to explain the different levels of fear in urban and rural areas. Urban areas tend to be stereotyped as being filled with fearful people hiding from vicious criminals while rural residents are seen as a close community dealing only with mild deviance.

The most basic explanation for the different levels of fear is that cities are perceived as high crime areas with an associated high risk of victimization (both of which cause residents' fear-of-crime to be higher) (Chilvers, 1999). City dwellers perceive a higher rate of crime and believe that that rate is increasing. Researchers argue that it is these perceptions that cause them to fear for their safety (Conklin, 1971), with the absence of such perceptions explaining the lower levels of fear in rural areas. Such an explanation strongly links fear-of-crime with crime through a resident's perception of the crime rate: people who live in a high crime area *and* perceive the rate to be high will have their level of fear influenced more by the crimes they are aware of than those who live in a low crime rate area (Carcach et al., 1995; Conklin, 1971; Maxfield, 1984). Therefore, the CSS (crime) (fear-of-crime

increases with the crime rate) is not directly supported by the research evidence because the important qualifying detail of a resident's perception of crime is generally omitted.

In this section, I have sought to verify the accuracy of the three common sense statements that are appealed to by parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. It has been shown that there is only partial support from research evidence and statistics for CSS (streets) and CSS (crime) and no support for CSS (public). In other words, the streets are sometimes dangerous because of crime and the level of fear-of-crime does sometimes increase because the (perception of the) rate of crime but that the majority of the public are not *afraid* of crime.

Overall then, it can be argued that politicians speak of fear-of-crime as if the concept itself is common sense. Given that only 6% of the documents collected contain a discussion of fear-of-crime, there appear to be few who feel that such a concept needs argumentative justification. Fear-of-crime is frequently mentioned yet rarely discussed because it is common sense. However, these common sense statements themselves are not consistently supported by the facts provided by research evidence and statistics. This raises the question of why such inaccuracies have been sustained and become widely used in the parliamentary debates studied. As a means of answering this, the following section will examine the uses that these particular common sense statements about fear-of-crime may serve in Australian politics.

WHAT USE IS COMMON SENSE ABOUT FEAR-OF-CRIME?

In the section above that asked *what is common sense?*, I outlined three functions that common sense fulfilled as given by Lindenberg (1987). These were: a baseline for human interaction, a reference for judging knowledge, and as evidence against which to appeal during an argument. In what follows, I wish to again examine these functions but this time in the context of the three common sense statements made by Australian parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. These are intended as mere suggestions about the possible outcomes of such functions, with the underlying usefulness for gaining power to be discussed in the following section.

First, it was said that pieces of common sense knowledge function as a baseline for human interaction. If the three common sense statements (streets, public and crime) function in this way, what are the possible resultants of human interaction? It is possible to say that people would abandon using the streets without accompaniment or use them only when driven by necessity. Their fear of potential victimization would promote such avoidance behavior. Fear-of-crime itself would be increased at any upward movement of the crime rate. In this way, the three CSSs may act as a guide for individual and group behavior.

In addition, common sense also forms a benchmark against which to judge other forms of knowledge. This has already been noted with regard to CSS (streets) where contradictory ideas struggled to be heard. Thus any attempt to argue that the streets are safe, that the public should not be afraid of crime and that fear-of-crime is not positively correlated to crime rates will remain overshadowed and possibly never reach the status of common

sense. This is because such statements are compared by the public against their common sense and it 'just doesn't sound right'.

Finally, common sense can provide evidence to be used in support of a particular argument. This is probably the most common function of the three common sense statements discussed by parliamentarians in relation to fear-of-crime. For example, arguments were found for: providing extra lighting on the street; giving funds to elderly people to improve the security of their homes; more resources (staff and funds) to police and greater legal powers; setting up national and state bound government projects; tougher penalties for offenders including reintroduction of the death penalty; and so on. All of these arguments were based on evidence provided by the three common sense statements discussed in this chapter about fear-of-crime.

THE POWER OF COMMON SENSE

Underlying these three functions is the authority of common sense and its ability to generate power through control of those set lines of knowledge. In this final section, I wish to emphasize the political power or utility that is contained in common sense and the consequent dangers that may arise in the political manipulation of that knowledge. To do this, I will first explain the utility of common sense in argumentation and general rhetoric. I will then show that the power of common sense lies in it being a naturalized discourse. This allows common sense to hide alternative arguments, situations, social relations and so on that differ from the dominant depiction of reality. Such ability contains both the political power and danger of common sense. If, as some would argue, common sense is generated

by the elite but adopted by all (Hayden, 1991), the political manipulation of it is a powerful weapon.

Before beginning this argument it is important to note that not every piece of knowledge, colloquialism, story or anecdote becomes common sense. There are a couple of necessary prior steps. First, language needs commonality to function. Without common mental systems and shared linguistic mechanisms, language would not fulfill its role in human interaction (Turner, 1987). Without some assumed uniformity of human nature and experience, language could not find the commonality through which to function. This is the same commonality that is required for the existence of common sense knowledge and understanding.

Second, language allows issues to be discussed in certain ways. Common sense arises when that method of discussion become 'natural'. Naturalization occurs when words, phrases, knowledge, beliefs, social practices and so on lose their connection with a particular ideology (Fairclough, 1989). They become embedded in practical knowledge about action rather than prescriptive belief (Joseph, 1994) and consequently become regarded as the knowledge that we call 'common sense'. In effect, common sense could be described as a naturalized discourse. It is from this naturalization that common sense gains the 'of course'-ness and other characteristics described by Geertz (1975).

SILENCE! ARGUMENTATION AND COMMON SENSE

The naturalness of common sense provides the source of its utility in argumentation. Common sense is useful in arguments because it is able to stand in the place of actual

substantive evidence. As described above, common sense gains authority because of the perception that it is 'legitimate', 'real', and 'proper', (Brewer, 1984). It is based in the everyday events that all people have potentially experienced directly or indirectly. The world and its events become evidence for the 'truth', 'rightness' and authority of common sense (Geertz, 1992 [1975]). By appealing to common sense in an argument, the speaker is appealing to a "local cultural logic of the nature of things [that] seems likely to have inherent believability without need of substantiation" (Hayden, 1991: 105). The authority of common sense makes it a strong opponent to all other forms of reason, logic and research findings.

As a result, common sense can be used to not only provide evidence for a particular argument; but also restrict or silence counter arguments. Common sense may silence any temptation to even consider data that would contradict its maxims (Hayden, 1991). The ability of common sense to make something appear correct because that is just 'the way things are,' means that an alternative explanation has to argue against the weight of worldly experience - against the weight of the known reality. Understanding life in a different way would require a powerful imagination, a new 'gut response', new emotional reactions and ultimately a new psyche (Cintron, 2000). Resistance to such change thus stems from the assumption that everyone already knows how the world works. They know it because it is common sense!

COMMON SENSE IMAGES OF REALITY

So far, I have argued that common sense draws its power from its existence as a naturalized discourse that silences alternative ways of talk and thought. I now wish to argue that this

power has deeper political significance (Hayden, 1991). For the purposes of this discussion I will use Smith's (1997) definition of power as an all encompassing term that describes the ability of one individual to change the behavior or disposition of another (Smith, 1997).

The argument can be simply stated as those who control common sense are in a powerful position to control the dominant image of reality. Language is generally accepted as a means of creating a perception of what is real in the world of human interaction. For example, it can assign names to issues and thereby characterize or define them (Larson, 1992). Language is a means of providing an interpretation of events; and control over that interpretation is a source of power by which individual's behavior or disposition can be changed. When a way of talking about things becomes naturalized it becomes common sense – the way it is. Therefore those who can cause their linguistic maxims to be perceived as common sense (i.e. a naturalized discourse) are in a powerful position to control the dominant image of reality.

Hayden (1991) argues that common sense is ultimately generated by political elites. This is despite it thriving among the 'common' people. Shared cultural themes are invoked in political argument. If accepted, those themes can become common sense. The details of common sense are dynamic and change through constant restatement. Political elites have the advantage over others in participating in this restatement because of their access to mass communication and their image as authority figures. Consequently argues Hayden, they are better positioned to structure the development of common sense toward their own particular agenda.

Shared cultural themes may be used in many arguments for many ends but Hayden argues that once a course of action has been established (through its assimilation into the practical knowledge of common sense) it becomes perceived as the only course of action available. For example, the treatment of undocumented asylum seekers as criminals has been argued as common sense to many Australians (Pickering, 2001), as have the pejorative maxims and beliefs for the treatment of African Americans that fall under 'common sense racism' (Brewer, 1984). Therefore, political argument can selectively use certain cultural themes (and exclude others) with the aim of altering common sense and gaining control of its associated power to define reality (Hayden, 1991).

THE POWER OF COMMON SENSE ABOUT FEAR-OF-CRIME

To conclude this chapter, I will return now to the three common sense statements that were identified as frequently used in Australian political arguments about fear-of-crime. These stated that it is common sense that: streets are dangerous because of crime, the public is afraid of crime and the level of fear-of-crime is positively correlated with the crime rate. I argue that these common sense statements are reiterated in political rhetoric on crime because of their ability to generate power in the hands of politicians.

As described above, Australian politicians have used an appeal to these common sense statements in order to argue for a number of different activities such as providing extra lighting on the street; giving funds to elderly people to improve the security of their homes; more resources to police and greater legal powers; tougher penalties for offenders; and so on. Appeals to common sense are generally made when there is an absence of conclusive evidence or when the speaker wants to tap into the passions of the audience (Hayden,

1991). Both reasons ultimately seek to end debate on an issue by appealing to what is already accepted by the audience.

I argue that in the case of fear-of-crime, Australian parliamentarians have sought to use these common sense statements because of their associated power to control the dominant image of reality. The political noise devoted to exclaiming that the streets are dangerous and that the public is afraid of crime drowns out alternative discourses. Arguments are presented as immutable that there should be more police to reduce crime, or that penalties for criminal behavior should be increased and thereby reduce fear-of-crime. Other alternatives struggle to be heard in what has become known as the “law and order auction”.

Arguments such as these are presented as common sense with all its associated authority, legitimacy and power. The course of action proposed thus becomes the only course that any ‘sensible’ person would take. Yet it is a common sense that is arguably at the mercy of political rhetoric and manipulation. The danger is that the rhetoric may become the reality – one where the streets *are* dangerous because of crime, the public *is* afraid of crime and *do* become more afraid if the crime rate increases.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

I began this chapter by questioning why fear-of-crime was a topic that was frequently mentioned by politicians but *infrequently* discussed. The answer was captured in a comment by a committee witness – of course we must fear crime. It was argued that fearing crime is perceived as common sense by politicians and therefore, its existence does not need argumentative justification. This argument was made by first defining common sense

generally as a cultural body of knowledge and more specifically as knowledge that is characterized by naturalness, practicalness, thinness, contradictions, an ad hoc nature and being accessible to all. Common sense functions as a baseline for human interaction, a reference by which to judge knowledge and a source of evidence against which to appeal. I then demonstrated these characteristics and functions of common sense as found in the political debates about fear-of-crime.

In discussing appeals to common sense about fear-of-crime, I highlighted the power that is inherent in such appeals. This power stems from the perceived legitimacy and authority of common sense which then acts to silence alternative arguments. In effect, those who control the body of knowledge that is considered to be common sense, also control the dominant image of reality. As a consequence of their position, political elites have an opportunity to manipulate common sense to serve their own agenda. In the case of debates about fear-of-crime, it was argued that appeals to common sense have prevented consideration of alternatives to increasing police numbers and penalties when attempting to reduce public fear about crime.

CHAPTER NINE

SHIFTING THE RESPONSIBILITY

This chapter is the first of two case studies that examine the data of political debates about fear-of-crime from the perspective of societal influences on the use of language. In doing so, these chapters seek to first determine one or more particular social relation(s) and investigate how the speakers use language in order to bring about those relations. In this chapter, attributions of responsibility for crime and fear-of-crime are analysed. Theoretical research and applicable empirical results suggest that politicians are attempting to shift the burden of responsibility for these issues onto the community. While the research presented in this chapter supports that suggestion for causal responsibility, it is argued that politicians are keen to maintain the perception that they are responsible for “treating” the problem. Attributions of responsibility provide an opportunity by which to examine how attempts to change social relations are made and embodied in language use.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME AND FEAR-OF-CRIME

Over at least the last decade, it has been argued by scholars that responsibility for crime, crime prevention and community safety is increasingly shifting from the government to individual members of the community. Crime control is argued to have surpassed the sole ability of government-run law enforcement agencies and must be shared between these and the community (Garland, 2001). Responsibility for maintaining social order increasingly lies on citizens as well as government agencies of criminal justice.

Such a shift has been made by encouraging citizens to accept their role in preventing and coping with crime by: political rhetoric and public relations campaigns (Zedner, 1995); by supporting informal and voluntary efforts of crime prevention; and ultimately by encouraging individuals to accept personal responsibility for their own protection (Lacey &

Zedner, 1995; Stanko, 1995). Such encouragement is often framed in terms of public empowerment (O'Malley, 1997) or active citizenship (Zedner, 1995). Collective action to help those in need is rejected in favour of individual responsibility for crime prevention (Laster & Erez, 2000).

Within this shift, fear-of-crime has been treated as a concept akin to crime – something that needs to be reduced. This assumed similarity is reflected in the strategies proposed to solve the problem of fear-of-crime. These include: increased street lighting, precautionary or restricted citizen behaviour, more police or changed police practices and tougher penalties for offenders. Such focus on increasing levels of intensive and intrusive policing, the meting out heavier sentences and decreasing the level of discretion available to judges has been described as characteristic of modern law and order responses (Sarre, 2002). They are not responses specifically dedicated to reduce fear-of-crime. This lack of a dedicated response is potentially the result of the common sense view of fear-of-crime that it is, literally, a fear of crime (Taylor & Jamieson (1998) see also Chapters Six and Seven).

Consequently, it can be argued that individual members of the community are increasingly being asked to be responsible for their own fear-of-crime. Precautionary and restrictive behaviour is encouraged under the guise of awareness campaigns. Community initiatives such as Neighbourhood Watch schemes seek to reduce the public's fear. Residents are instructed to improve the security of their home to make it a less attractive target for prospective criminals (Fleming, 2005). These actions and encouragements have been interpreted as indicating that the government is sharing (or shedding) its own responsibility

for reducing crime and fear-of-crime. Individual members of the community must now be responsible for the protection of their own property and person.

The key concept throughout these debates has been the attribution of responsibility. Most of the studies investigating such attributions have focused on those that are made by citizens to each other or to public figures. For example, the public evaluation of political agents and their subsequent voting behaviour, particularly in the area of economic well-being, has been a favourite of political scientists (Abramowitz et al., 1988; Iyengar, 1989, 1996). In this chapter, I am primarily interested in the opposite perspective of attributions of responsibility – those that are made *by* politicians.

To examine the attribution of responsibility from this perspective, I use the case study of Australian parliamentary debates mentioning fear-of-crime. For the purposes of this chapter, documents referring to terrorism were excluded in an attempt to maintain the focus on a fear of domestic crimes. The resulting corpus of 621 documents spanned a period 21 years from 1982 to the end of 2003. Each speech was analysed for the type of responsibility attributed, by whom and for what. Techniques of blame avoidance and control are also identified. From this analysis, I provide supportive evidence for the theories of Weaver (1986) and Iyengar (1989): politicians do try to avoid blame and do prefer to hold treatment responsibility over causal responsibility.

However I also show that in the majority of cases, it is the government that is held responsible for fear-of-crime. The community was held responsible in only 9% of the documents. This finding raises possible challenges to the argument that the government is

attempting to shift responsibility from themselves to the public. It also questions the role of political rhetoric in establishing the location of responsibility – do actions speak louder than words?

ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY – THE THEORY

In many academic discussions about responsibility for law and order, ‘responsibility’ is considered as one homogenous concept. This section and indeed the entire chapter, seeks to show that there are at least two types of responsibility that should be considered – causal and treatment responsibility. Each type has different implications for blame and control and for the timing of the events themselves. I argue that sensitivity to these differences would enhance the academic discussions about the attempts to shift responsibility for crime control.

Individuals automatically attribute responsibility for events, situations and behaviours. Such attribution is a powerful influence on the individual’s attitudes and opinions (Iyengar, 1996). Traditionally, responsibility is defined in terms of morality, accountability and causality in which people are liable for either praise or blame (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Sagarin & Kelly, 1985; Shaver, 1985). This type of responsibility is known as causal responsibility. A person is held causally responsible for an event when they are perceived to be part of the reason for the event or problem occurring. This type of responsibility is retrospective: it is concerned with events that occurred in the past and cannot be attributed for events occurring in the future.

Causal responsibility is matched with a second type called treatment responsibility (Brickman et al., 1982; Iyengar, 1989, 1996). In treatment responsibility, the focus shifts from the cause of events to “who or what has the power either to alleviate or to forestall alleviation of the problem” (Iyengar, 1989: 879). In this case, a person is held responsible for finding the solution to a problem and not for causing the problem (Brickman et al., 1982). The events for which someone can hold treatment responsibility can only occur in the future.

In addition to these distinctions of causal and treatment responsibility and the temporal positioning of the events, Brickman (1982) argues that when responsibility is assigned to a person so too is blame or control. “We assign blame to people when we hold them responsible for having created problems. We assign control to people when we hold them responsible for influencing or changing events” (Brickman et al., 1982: 369). Therefore, a person who holds causal responsibility will be blamed for unwanted or negative events and praised for positive events. Someone who holds treatment responsibility will be perceived to hold the power to control or influence the events: to mitigate the consequences and attempt to prevent its reoccurrence. This is why treatment responsibility can only be assigned for events occurring in the future. It is illogical to speak of having the power to control an event that has already happened.

As a result of the different connotations between these types of responsibility, politicians want to emphasise the appearance of treatment responsibility and avoid causal responsibility (Iyengar, 1989). By avoiding the latter, a politician is also avoiding blame. Weaver (1986) argues that politicians are primarily motivated by the desire to avoid blame.

The desire to take credit for popular actions is secondary to avoiding blame for unpopular ones. He argues that this desire is primary because voters tend to remember or be more sensitive to actions that have been done to them rather than those that have been done for them (Weaver, 1986). Consequently, the politician will want to take responsibility for future events and show that they wield control.

In summary, I have described two types of responsibility. The first was causal responsibility where a person is perceived to hold responsibility for causing a past event to occur and incurs blame or praise depending on the social valence of the event. The second was treatment responsibility where a person holds responsibility for controlling the resources that may change future events. This person is given the image of control. The different connotations of these types of responsibility impact on the behaviour of politicians. They want to emphasise their ability to control events (i.e. treatment responsibility). At the same time, politicians want to avoid being blamed for events that have already happened (i.e. causal responsibility). In what follows, I wish to show that sensitivity to these different types enhances the academic analysis of the location of responsibility for crime control and prevention.

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY – THE PRACTICE

Each of the documents was analysed for four pieces of data: the existence of an attribution of responsibility; the identity of the person who was seen as responsible; the type of responsibility (treatment or causal); and the technique used in response to that attribution. It was found that the majority of documents (85%) attributed responsibility for something to someone. Despite the talk of rights and responsibilities being a general indicator of locating

a party on the right or left of the political spectrum (Saul, 1995), there was no difference found when dividing the attributions by the politician's associated political party or by the holding of office (i.e. the politician being in the role of government or opposition). The results of these four pieces of data will be examined in the following before investigating the implication for the location of responsibility for fear-of-crime and crime control.

TREATMENT RESPONSIBILITY – SOLUTIONS AND CONTROL

The most common form of responsibility attributed was treatment responsibility (74%). This is where a person is seen as holding the responsibility for solving a problem rather than for specifically having caused it or both. It is about events that may occur in the future and not about events that have already happened. For example:

- (a) Juvenile crime does occur. Crimes are committed by young people, and it is the responsibility of the Government generally to do something about it. Government, of whatever persuasion, must provide the programs which will work towards preventing crime and breaking the cycle of repeat offenders.
(Woodgate, 1996: 44-45)

In this passage, Woodgate is attributing responsibility to the government to prevent juvenile crime. The government is not blamed for causing the events but is seen as being capable of preventing and controlling future events. As described earlier, this is characteristic of treatment responsibility.

In the majority of cases (63%), it was the government that was held responsible for the problems relating to fear-of-crime:

(b) People living in fear and uncertainty in their homes do not care where the solution comes from – local, state or federal government – they just want a solution. All levels of government have a responsibility for community security. (Latham, 2002)

Mark Latham, then a federal MP in opposition, is attributing responsibility for community security to the government; he is arguing that all levels of government have the ability, resources and obligation to act to reduce the public's fear-of-crime. Again, the government is not being blamed for generating that fear in the first place but is being held responsible for providing the solution to the problem.

Of the 63% where the government was held responsible, 55% of those attributions were made by the government themselves:

(c) However, that concern spreads in a broader way today because of organisation crime and because of the growth and expansion of illegal drugs. There is a fear there and there is no capacity within the States to address this problem. So it comes back to a national responsibility, a responsibility that is clearly being taken up by this Government, the Hawke Government. (Wright, 1988)

In this passage, the author is eager to attribute treatment responsibility for addressing the fear created by drug-related crimes to their own political party. Such behaviour indicates that governments do not mind holding this type of responsibility.

The authors of the remainder of the documents attributed responsibility for reducing fear-of-crime to variety of agencies. The police were cited in 15% of the documents. The community was only held responsible in 9%. The implication of this finding will be discussed in depth in the following section.

In these documents, treatment responsibility was mostly directed at solving the problem of fear-of-crime (59%). It is likely that this result is falsely generated by the methodology employed to select the original corpus of documents. Only debates that mentioned fear-of-crime were included. Hence it is not surprising that most of the responsibility identified was for fear-of-crime. It is still important to note the other topics that were mentioned as a government responsibility to solve despite their lower frequencies. For example: crime prevention (21%), crime rates (11%), crime in general (4%) and community safety (5%). These topics all intersected with fear-of-crime in some way and shared with it the attribution of treatment responsibility.

The most common technique proposed to control these problems was the use of or the creation of legislation (24%):

(d) Elderly Australians are the pioneers of this country; they developed it, protected it, and gave us the wealth, peace and prosperity that we enjoy today. Every night in their homes they are forced to live in fear ... We have a responsibility to ensure that elderly people who live in fear are given every protection the law has to offer. (Lynn, 1998)

In this passage, Lynn argues that the government is upholding their responsibility to reduce fear-of-crime by increasing the penalties for home invasion involving elderly victims, by using legislation. Other techniques included increasing penalties (16%), government programs (10%), using the police (resources, powers or practices - 8%) and public relations campaigns (4%). There were a number of other solutions that were proposed only infrequently such as government conferences, rehabilitation of offenders, changing public services, restricting citizen behaviour and encouraging community initiatives.

When these results were combined with the listing of topics of responsibility, it was found that different techniques were proposed for different topics. In general discussions about crime, no solution tended to be given (64%). The focus instead was on the need for an (undefined) action:

(e) Mr Deputy Speaker, the community's fear of becoming a victim to crime is no longer based on perceptions. It is firmly rooted in reality and the people are demanding action. They are rightly asking, 'Will I be next?' The government must act as a matter of urgency and not just knee-jerk 'hang 'em high' reactive policies. The causes of crime must also be addressed as well, and urgently.
(Gard, 1997)

This passage emphasises the need for action to address crime, to reduce the public's fear-of-crime. The focus of the speech is on the responsibility to respond to that need rather than on the techniques to be implemented to fix any identifiable problems.

However, for other topics, there were typical techniques that were frequently suggested. In crime prevention, legislation (31%) and community initiatives (12%) were most often proposed as a means of upholding this responsibility. Crime rates were to be solved by increasing penalties (30%) or using the police (practices, resources, or powers – 28%). In discussions about safety, politicians tended not to give a strategy for this responsibility and talked in general terms of action (44%) or alternatively, the proposed strategy employed legislation (28%). Fear-of-crime was to be reduced by legislation (24%), increased penalties (20%), or the police (26%). The differences in the strategies highlighted the variation in political perceptions of the problems and the feasibility of strategies to address them.

In sum, it was found that treatment responsibility was most often attributed in the documents examined. Politicians saw each other as responsible for solving problems relating to fear-of-crime such as crime, crime prevention, community safety and for reducing the level of fear itself. The government was mostly held responsible for solving these problems, followed by the police. Politicians used legislation and arguments for increased penalties as a means of addressing these problems. The lack of a dramatic difference demonstrates the dominance of the typical law and order response discussed in the introduction to this chapter (Sarre, 2002).

These results support previous research in two ways. First, they show that in response to fear-of-crime, politicians tend to rely on typical punitive responses to law and order issues such as creating new legislation, increased penalties or using the police. The results also

show that politicians do not attempt to reject treatment responsibility and are in fact the sources of the majority of documents attributing responsibility to them.

CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY – SITUATION AND BLAME

Causal responsibility was attributed in far fewer documents (26%). As with treatment responsibility, the vast majority of attributions were found for causing fear-of-crime (95%). The other topics of crime prevention, crime and community safety were also similar to those mentioned above in regard to treatment responsibility.

Politicians were named most frequently as being responsible for causing fear-of-crime (51%). This group can be divided into the government (28% - example f), the opposition (9% - example g) or politicians in general (usually described as “we” – 14% - example h).

(f) At the outset, I make the point that these statistics leave egg on the faces of a number of members opposite who have been attempting to whip up a frenzy of fear in the community about crime. ... Let us have a quick look at some of those results. On the Sunshine Coast, where the local coalition members have been trying to create fear among their constituents, the rate of reported crime has fallen by a very significant 6.7%, including a very impressive 7.3% drop in property crime. (Barton, 2000: 4283)

(g) In fact, there is no doubt that the scare tactics employed by members opposite, when in Opposition, worked to the extent that many people, particularly older people, became fearful and isolated in their own homes. If the

then Opposition was to be believed, the situation in Queensland was alarming, with crime rates escalating and spiralling out of control. (Bird, 1996: 1931)

(h) Although it appears that we are not learning from what is happening across the nation, as I said, the debates that we are having seem to be about fostering fear and promoting fear instead of working to alleviate that fear and actually reduce crime (Dundas, 2003: 4837)

The prevalence of the attribution of causal responsibility to politicians with its connotations of blame, indicates that such an attribution may be used as an accusation that the public's fear-of-crime is used for political advantage (discussed in detail in Chapter 9).

After politicians, the media were named in 23% of the documents. Criminals were only identified as causing fear-of-crime in 19% of the dataset. This is despite the dominance of the commonsense view of fear-of-crime that it is an emotional response to criminal behaviours. The remaining documents identified poverty, academia, the criminal justice system and the community as bearing some blame for causing fear-of-crime (all below 4% each).

Most of the documents attributing causal responsibility assigned blame on another person with no indication of the technique used by the other person to avoid that blame (84%). It is not possible to identify the other person's response to the accusation because of the analysis of the documents as individuals rather than as entire discourses on a particular issue. In addition, parliamentary protocols may not provide opportunities for rebuttals of the

accusations. The techniques of blame avoidance in debates about fear-of-crime would consequently benefit from further research.

As an indication only, there were some blame avoidance techniques that were evident. For example: circling the wagons (i.e. spreading the blame over as many politicians as possible (10% - example i)); diffusing the issue (2% - example j); and agenda limiting, denial of a problem, passing the buck and finding a scapegoat (1% each).

(i) I have sought to urge everybody who talks about this sort of issue, and crime in general, to act with a sense of responsibility to the way in which they promote a particular issue or set of circumstances, so that we do not unnecessarily beat up crime to the extent where ordinary citizens, who are only exposed to the facts or what they believe to be the facts through the media, suffer heightened fear as a result of that hype. (Griffin, 1999c)

(j) There can be little doubt that there are many older citizens, particularly women, who are genuinely afraid that they may become victims of 'home invasion' even though, in reality, that is unlikely to occur. Now is not the time and place to debate the very real problem of fear of crime. ... The core of the problem is that there is no one, or any, simple solution. ... All of this has had the quite appalling effect of raising the fear of crime in those who have the least reason to fear it, and taking the debate about how to deal effectively with crime back over 20 years. (Griffin, 1999b)

It is possible that blaming the media (23% (reported above)) is actually a method of blame avoidance by politicians to deny their own responsibility for causing fear-of-crime. The data in this study cannot support nor disprove this possibility. As discussed above, these techniques can only be treated as indicative of those used by politicians to avoid blame for creating fear-of-crime.

Unlike treatment responsibility, all but one attribution of causal responsibility were made by the opposing party:

(k) The government continues to mouth off about crime. It seeks to run a criminal justice system based on a political agenda. The government seeks to engage in whipping up community hysteria and fear, but it does not provide appropriate resources that measure up to the community's requirements.

(Sercombe, 1993: 349)

In the one document that did hold an attribution against the speaker's party, it was one of the few examples of blame avoidance where the speaker was reporting the accusation made by another politician so that they could avoid the blame by 'passing the buck' to the community. That the vast majority attributed responsibility to someone else, supports Iyengar's (1989) theory that politicians attempt to avoid causal responsibility in preference to accepting treatment responsibility.

In summary, the results for the attributions of causal responsibility were highly homogenous. The majority of documents identified the problem of fear-of-crime as that for which a person may be held responsible. Politicians were named in the majority of

documents as the cause of this fear. The attribution of causal responsibility may function as an accusation or political weapon to criticise the opposing party. This was evident in the nearly complete lack of attributions of causal responsibility onto the speaker and in the indications of attempts to avoid any accusations of blame launched by another politician.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

To recap, I have discussed two different types of responsibility that are assigned for events in the future or in the past. When treatment responsibility is attributed, the person assigns control over or the power to solve events that may occur in the future. When causal responsibility is attributed, the person attaches blame for those (negative) events that had already occurred for which they hold the target as responsible for causing. Blame is to be avoided by politicians whereas the image of holding control and power is to be desired.

The results of the case study show that politicians wish to be seen as someone that did not cause the problems relating to fear-of-crime (blame avoidance) but are ready and willing to help solve the problem (treatment responsibility). An image of being seen to respond to a problem is a political necessity even in situations such as natural disasters when no causal responsibility can be attributed. The results of this and previous research show that when the cause of a situation can be attributed to someone, politicians take care to avoid that type of responsibility and the associated blame.

Such solutions may involve the creation of new legislation or increasing the penalties in existing legislation. Police practices, resources and powers were used more sparingly and mostly in relation to reducing the level of fear-of-crime. These solutions, proposed by both

sides of the political spectrum, indicate the growing trend towards right-wing policies that emphasize the individual, challenge civil liberties and freedoms and privatise means of social control and security. Such strategies are typical in modern responses to problems of law and order.

At the beginning of this chapter, I gave an overview of the argument that the community is increasingly being given responsibility for their own safety and protection from crime. Evidence for this argument has generally been given through abstracted studies of modernity, or through studies of privatisation of security services and the consequent citizen perception of the withdrawal of the state (e.g. Crawford, 1998; Crawford & Lister, 2003; Garland, 2001; Zedner, 2000). It was argued by these and other scholars, that crime prevention, victimization prevention and the management of fear-of-crime is increasingly the job of the community and individuals. In other words, politicians and state bureaucrats were attempting to attribute treatment responsibility to the community.

However, through the results of this study, I have shown that in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime, the government is the agent most frequently given treatment responsibility for crime and fear-of-crime. The community was only attributed responsibility in 9% of the documents. Thus, when responsibility is analysed from the opposite direction (government to citizen versus citizen to government), there is a different location of responsibility. The government and not the community appear responsible for reducing fear-of-crime.

IMPLICATIONS OF ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY

To conclude, I wish to explore two possible paths that could be followed to examine the implications of this result. The first is to challenge the accuracy of previous research that found responsibility for crime was being shifted from the state to its citizens. It could be said that previous research has been largely one-way, taken from the perspective of the citizen's perception of the failure of government to fulfil their responsibility for public safety. This has hidden the government's perspective of where they believe responsibility for crime control lies. Consequently, the push to shift responsibility from government to citizen may not be as pronounced as previously argued.

Alternatively, I could take the second path and argue that political rhetoric is belied by political action. The actions of politicians and government agencies speak louder about the location of responsibility than do their words. This argument can be made because the data for this study were parliamentary debates such as second-reading speeches on bills before the parliament, responses to questions without notice during question time, or committee reports and transcripts. Such debates, when mentioning fear-of-crime, tended to be as much about attacking the opposing political party (point-scoring) as about the proposed solution to crime, crime prevention or community safety. Attributing treatment responsibility may be a preparatory measure for later political gain. If the government holds treatment responsibility for crime rates and the rates rise, the opposition may be able to blame such rises on poor management (i.e. they attribute causal responsibility). Said loudly and frequently enough at election times, it may tap into people's fears and grant a change in government. Therefore, attributions of responsibility for fear-of-crime in political debates

may be a tactical (and rhetorical) measure. ‘Real’ attributions may only be found or implied by government actions.

In truth, I would argue that neither of these arguments about the implications of the study findings is entirely right, or entirely wrong. The actions of the government departments through programs like the National Campaign against Violence and Crime, and the efforts of police around Australia to encourage community involvement in crime control, do indicate the government’s belief that the community can and should contribute to their own safety. The government wants the community to take on treatment responsibility for crime.

At the same time, political rhetoric argues that the government holds the majority of treatment responsibility for issues relating to crime and fear-of-crime. They accept that responsibility and are actively implementing a variety of (currently right-wing) strategies intended to fulfil that responsibility. The results from this study and previous research show that what politicians do not want is *causal* responsibility. This is where I argue that the two paths cross.

In encouraging community members to take on treatment responsibility, the government has also covertly attempted to pass on causal responsibility. Individuals are responsible for their ensuring their own safety. When crime occurs, as it inevitably will, the government is then able to locate blame on the victim for not taking the necessary precautions. As the once NSW Minister for Police and Emergency Services said:

- (1) In many ways that fear is sensible. The community should be encouraged to be sensibly responsible with regard to unnecessary exposure to activities which

might lead to adverse effects from crime. For example, people should be actively encouraged to be concerned about wandering down the back streets of the city at night. That activity should not be encouraged, because clearly it raises the potential of mugging or other adverse behaviour. The normal precautions that people take – where they walk at night and how they lock up their homes – are all sensible precautions, are taken generally because of a fear of crime. The fact that the level of that fear is much higher than the actual rate of crime is in many ways not deleterious but beneficial to the community as a whole (Pickering, 1992: 354)

Edward Pickering is arguing that the community should take responsibility for the opportunities they present to offenders. Fear-of-crime is a useful tool by which to ensure that the community does accept that responsibility. However, the searching questions that are often asked after criminal victimisation such as “why didn’t you do something to prevent this from happening?” are directed at the community or the individual and not at the politician. The community becomes akin to another government department that the politician directs to implement its policies. Failure to do so negates any causal responsibility and blame that can be laid against the policy-maker. The very existence of crime and fear-of-crime is evidence of that failure and therefore the blameworthiness of the community.

It is sensitivity to these issues that I argue has been missed by scholarly constructions of responsibility as a homogenous entity. By taking a simple binary model, I have shown differing locations of responsibility and strategies that are used in response to those

attributions. While agreeing with previous research that highlights the shift in responsibility for crime control from government to citizen, I have also shown that politicians are very keen to keep one type of responsibility. Increasingly, politicians are holders of a disarmed form of treatment responsibility for issues surrounding fear-of-crime, crime and law and order in general. The findings from this study suggest that the community are holders of a far more volatile form of treatment responsibility – one that easily translates into causal responsibility and blame.

CHAPTER TEN

BALANCING EXPEDIENCY AND IDEOLOGY

This chapter presents the last of the case studies examining the interaction between language and society. The case study seeks to analyze the data from the perspective of certain “sets” of images of society and their attempted realization through the use of language. More simply and generally, the case study is intended to investigate how images of society are reflected in language. In this chapter, the political ideologies of the major Australian parties are used as examples of the sets of images about society that may be held by Australian parliamentarians. However, parliamentarians typically see a need to balance their ideological principles with their desire to reap short-term political advantage such as in electoral or policy success. The tensions between ideologically driven and politically expedient behavior are key elements in the strategies employed in party competition. This chapter seeks to examine how this tension and resultant strategies influence the language that is used in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

To do this, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section details the theory that exists on political party competition; it will begin with the work of Downs in 1957 and then will outline the contributions of other authors to explaining how and why political parties behave in certain ways. Using that outline as a base, the example of law and order politics will be used as a case study for examining the balance between ideologically and expediently driven party behavior. The literature reviewed in this first section will provide the foundation on which to examine the balancing of the same types of behavior specifically when discussing fear-of-crime. The second section will present three types of politically expedient uses of fear-of-crime that are identified by Australian parliamentarians. The third section will look to the other side of the scale by detailing the

potential impact that political ideology may have on crime policies and discussions about fear-of-crime.

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it aims to highlight attempts to balance ideologically and expediency driven political behavior when debating fear-of-crime. It does not attempt to place a numerical figure on this balance or to treat these two types of behavior as dichotomous variables. There will always be some overlap between behavior that gains advantage in winning elections for example or advantage in reinforcing a particular image of society. Instead, the chapter seeks to highlight the co-influence of these types of behaviors on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. This leads to the second purpose of this chapter – to examine the impact that such behaviors (and implied motivations) may have on the way in which parliamentarians talk about public fears. More simply, it provides a case study on how society impacts on language use.

POLITICAL PARTY COMPETITION

In 1957, Downs presented an argument that has remained central to the study of party strategy in dominant party political systems (Greene, 2002). His argument was that the primary motivation for a competitive political party is to maximize their electoral support. These vote-seeking parties formulate their policies and political strategies with the intention of maximizing their vote in order to control government (Downs, 1957). In effect, Downs saw political parties functioning in competition as vote-maximizers (Strom, 1990).

Following on from this, Strom (1990) discussed two additional typologies of political parties: office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. The office-seeking party also tries to

maximize their electoral support. However they do so for the purpose of gaining access to the benefits of political office such as political or governmental appointments (Muller & Strom, 1999). In a two party dominant system like that existing in Australia, it is not possible to tell the difference between vote-seeking and office-seeking parties because maximizing the vote also grants the benefits of office (Harmel & Janda, 1994). The final typology discussed by Strom is the policy-seeking party. This type of party wants to maximize its influence on public policy. Such a party may not need to gain office in order to achieve this goal (Budge & Laver, 1986). However, being in office does have instrumental value in heightening policy influence (Strom, 1990). These preferences for votes, office or policy will be identifiable in all parties and each may become dominant in different situations within the same party (Kitschelt, 1994).

BALANCING EXPEDIENCY AND IDEOLOGY

Within his model of competitive party behavior, Downs examined the balancing of self-interest and ideology by competing political parties. From the basis of rational choice theory where actors are assumed to adopt the most cost-efficient means towards their desired ends, Downs argued that these means would be directed towards self-interested ends (the self-interest axiom). Actors are seen as rational and selfish, choosing strategies that will lead to the largest payoff identified (Riker, 1962). Downs argued that politicians will act "solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office" (Downs, 1957: 28). This perspective understands self-interest to drive the development of policy and political strategy in competition.

Downs also argued that not only is policy and strategy beholden to self-interest, each party's ideology is developed in order to assist in maximizing their share of the vote. Parties attempt to maximize their votes by positioning their ideas around the opinions of the greatest number of voters. Under this theory, the content of a party's ideology is determined by its utility in gaining electoral support. Consequently, a candidate's platform and their motivating ideas and beliefs, are designed to match that of the electorate (Sullivan & Minns, 1976). "Party members choose an ideology which will win votes, not one they believe in, since their objective is the acquisition of office, not the creation of a better society" (Downs, 1957: 111). Downs argued that while maintaining an ideology may become a subsidiary end in itself and at times conflict with the self-interested goal of maximizing votes, winning elections and the power this confers would ensure that the latter took precedence over ideology.

There remains some debate about the dominance of self-interest over ideological principles in directing party behavior in competition. For example, some argue that it would be erroneous to simplify the desires of party members to the gaining of office (Schlesinger, 1991); and that parties infrequently pursue strategies directed purely at short-term vote maximization (Kitschelt, 1994). Instead, parliamentarians will have policy goals that require gaining office in order to achieve them and would be unlikely to directly oppose these goals for the sake of winning office on a different election platform (Budge & Keman, 1990). While this chapter does not seek to contribute to the debate over whether self-interest or ideology has a greater or lesser impact on party behavior *per se*, these criticisms highlight the tension that exists in attempting to balance these two influences.

This debate does draw attention to the fact that balancing ideology with the goal of winning office presents a constant difficulty for political parties. To win office requires a broad-base of electoral support; and to gain this base may necessitate some pragmatic decisions being made about election promises and policy that deviate from ideological principles. However, should the party move too far from the ideology of its core constituency for electoral gain, that broad-base will again be threatened (Singleton et al., 2003). The case study presented herein represents an example of that struggle to balance ideology and expedient behavior.

EXPEDIENCY AND IDEOLOGY IN LAW AND ORDER

Based on previous research, it is evident that political parties are balancing ideology and self-interest in political debates about law and order issues. For instance, it can be argued that debating law and order issues grants political advantage to the parliamentarian. It makes good political sense (Schwartz & Israel, 2000). Addressing crime provides opportunities for symbolic policy initiatives that enhance popularity and electability (Fairchild & Webb, 1985; Goldsmith, 1999); and that address emotional needs rather than practical ends (Freiberg, 2001). Politicians are able to respond to public demands for protection with short-term and highly visible initiatives such as the reinvigoration of crime legislation and policy (Castellano & McGarrell, 1991; Sheley, 1985). Debating law and order issues may deflect attention from more pressing and tenacious problems (Body-Gendrot, 2001; Weatherburn, 2004) and change the way in which these problems are perceived by the general public (Chevigny, 2003; Glassner, 1999). From such benefits, some researchers argue that parliamentarians gain (and make use of) short-term political advantage by discussing law and order issues.

There is also the argument that law and order debates follow the dictates of ideology rather than self-interested agendas. For example, a claim has been made that the politics of law and order are the politics of the right (Dahrendorf, 1985); and the widespread adoption of the associated punitive and legalistic policies around the world is part of a broader international swing to more conservative politics (Ratner & McMullan, 1983). These policies tend to be characterized by increased publicity and public concern about “street crime” and widening criminalization (i.e. more actions being classed as criminal) (Horton, 1981). In effect, these authors argue that the political response to crime has been to reinforce a definition of appropriate citizen behavior rather than to protect the public from crime (Rosch, 1985). The politicization of crime has allowed parliamentarians to follow and implement their ideological worldview. In effect, parliamentarians are able to reinforce their concept of an ideal society and how to achieve it (King, 1989).

To summarize previous research examining the self-interested or ideological motivation for law and order debates, it can be said that there are two groups. The first argue that self-interested motivations have dominance in influencing the ‘use’ of such debates; the second argue that ideology has the dominant influence over characteristics of law and order politics. In effect, researchers from both groups are arguing over the amount of influence that self-interested and ideological motivations have on law and order politics.

RESEARCHING EXPEDIENCY AND IDEOLOGY

On the basis of this review of the research literature on the political balancing of self-interested strategies for short-term advantage with ideological principles, I seek to provide evidence towards the following question:

What is the balance between ideology and expediency in day-to-day parliamentary debates that focus on fear-of-crime?

By asking this question I seek to a) clarify previous research arguing for differing balances of expedient or ideological motivations for the use of law and order issues and fear-of-crime more specifically; and b) to use the findings as a case study indicating the possible influence that images of society as well as societal structures have on the way in which parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime.

I will use the term 'expediency' to cover actions that can be perceived as directed towards self-interested ends that grant short-term political advantage. This advantage is not necessarily limited to electoral gains and consequently, covers advantages that may benefit immediate policy goals.

The term 'ideology' will be used in this chapter to describe a coherent and interrelated set of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior (Carlsnaes, 1981; Hinich & Munger, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; Singleton et al., 2003). Political ideas form 'semantic constraints' that guide the actions, interpretations and thoughts of actors in politics (Kitschelt, 1994). As a worldview, an ideology contains an intrinsic definition of what is good and what is bad; a definition of a good society and the means by which to achieve it (Downs, 1957; Hinich & Munger, 1994). Therefore, discussions and policies about crime may reflect the politician's beliefs about society and the changes that should be made in order to bring about this society.

With these definitions in mind, I will provide evidence for the question above in the following way. I will first outline the methodology that was used to isolate data specific to this chapter from that collected from parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime in Australia. A brief overview of the results relating to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal Party of Australia and National Party Coalition (the Coalition) will then be given. From there, I will present the claims of political self-interest that are made by parliamentarians against other parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. To contrast these claims, I will describe the ideologies of the two parties. This will then be narrowed down to the political parties' responses to crime. Based on these descriptions, I will attempt to find evidence of a rationale within the ideologies of the ALP and the Coalition for discussing fear-of-crime. The final section will discuss the balance of ideology and self-interest that was found in parliamentary debates about crime and fear-of-crime.

The examinations presented in this chapter will show that there are three main claims of political expediency that are charged against parliamentarians: the increase of fear to generate support for a party; the use of fear as a political tactic to generate support for a policy; and the creation of fear to set the agenda and generate political noise. Out of this analysis, I argue first that differences along party lines suggest an ideological influence on the use of fear-of-crime; and secondly, that differences identified based on the role of the political party as being either in opposition or in government indicate a functional aspect (i.e., self-interested) to the use of fear-of-crime. On the basis of an analysis of the ideological influences that may affect the way in which parliamentarians discuss fear-of-crime, I find that this type of fear forms rhetorical evidence for the 'truth' of the politician's ideology. I argue that this balancing of ideology and expediency highlights the utility of

fear-of-crime in political debates about law and order; and that with that utility comes the danger that such debates will increase the level of fear in the community.

Before beginning I wish to clarify that by making these arguments, I do not wish to deny that some members of the public are rightly afraid of crime. My comments relate solely to the realm of political rhetoric. It is through this rhetoric that parliamentarians attempt to depict (and make dominant) their image of reality. Parliamentarians rarely argue the “truth” of something. They argue that that something should be supported (Manning & Robinson, 1985). It is the use of fear-of-crime within these arguments that I will investigate in this chapter.

In addition, I will discuss political discussions about community concerns and fears based on crime under the short-hand phrase “use of fear-of-crime”. This is done for ease of expression and should not be confused with politician’s own fears about crime or even a measurable level of fear felt by members of the public. In this chapter, “the use of fear-of-crime” refers solely to the role that political discussions about this type of fear play in Australian politics.

METHODOLOGY


In order to answer the question posed in this chapter, a smaller dataset was isolated using two criteria (see Figure 10.1). The first was that only documents dated between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2003 were included. This was done to ensure the social context in which the documents were authored was the same (as far as possible) for all states,

territories and levels of parliament. Therefore, earlier documents from the federal parliament were excluded (4%).

The second criterion was that only documents authored by parliamentarians associated with the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal Party of Australia or the National Party were to be included. This criterion reduced the number of documents to 586 (81% of the total). The decision to limit the discussion to only these parties was made because of two concerns. First, it would not be feasible in a single chapter to examine in detail the ideology and political policies of all 12 parties contributing to fear-of-crime debates over a time span of 13 years.

Second, the Coalition and the ALP dominate the Australian (two-party) political system. These political parties have long acted as a rural and urban wing, or formalized factions of the same conservative party with similar ideologies (Cook, 2004; Siaroff, 2003). While National Party members were only responsible for 8% of the documents collected, they were included to ensure complete representation of the Australian political scene.

Figure 10.1: Selection Criteria for the Ideology Case Study



GENERAL RESULTS

Based on the exclusion criteria specific to this chapter, 586 documents were identified that had at least one mention of fear-of-crime. The documents were authored by 336 parliamentarians, 182 associated with the ALP (54%) and 154 with the Coalition (126 from the Liberal Party (38%) and 28 from the National Party (8%)). The majority of these documents were sourced from state parliaments (n = 477, 81%). This section will present general quantitative results that begin to describe the documents involved in this case study – their topics, number, as well as political party affiliations and that party’s role in parliament.

While the methodology of the study was designed to specifically identify instances of discourse on fear-of-crime, it was found that in most cases (94%), parliamentarians mentioned but did not discuss fear-of-crime (the reasons behind this have been discussed in

detail in Chapter Eight). As a result, the mentions become dependent on the host discourse for their contextual definition.

As discussed in Chapter Five, there were a variety of topics in which these mentions of fear-of-crime were found. These covered some 30 different individual topics ranging from crime, government policy, legislation, police, politics, safety, and security to poverty, education, racism, housing and even nuclear waste disposal processes. The following table, based on the specific data set used in this chapter, provides the percentage of aggregated topics in which fear-of-crime was mentioned or discussed:

Table 10.1: Percentage of Aggregated Topics Mentioning Fear-of-Crime


Topic	# of Docs	%	Topic	# of Docs	%
Crime Policy ¹	128	22	Safety & Security	32	5
Crime	94	16	Social Policy ³	32	5
Crime Legislation	80	14	Crime Prevention	29	5
Police	68	12	<i>Fear-of-Crime</i>	13	2
Government ² & Politics	66	11	Miscellaneous	5	1
Government Budgets	39	7			

1. These policies focused on crime, women, police and emergency services, law and order, juvenile crime and domestic violence.
2. These policies cover education, housing, health, immigration, poverty, race, and unemployment
3. These focused on government performance against measures such as election promises.

The main topic in which fear-of-crime was mentioned was crime-related policies such as those for police and emergency services, law and order, juvenile crime and domestic violence (22%). Public fear was also mentioned in regard to criminal acts of behavior (16%), legislation in response to crime (14%) and police practices, powers and performance (12%). Only 2% of the documents had fear-of-crime as their main topic.

Overall, there has been an increase in the number of documents produced each year that mention fear-of-crime. In the four year period between 1990 and the end of 1993 there was an average of 19 documents produced each year that had at least one mention of fear-of-crime. In the same time period a decade later, there was an average of 58 documents per year mentioning fear-of-crime. It should be noted that some of this increase may be falsely generated by the databases of the Australian Capital Territory (begun in 1995) and Western Australia (begun in 1997) not covering the initial time period. However, in general, the slope of the trend-line presented on the figure below indicates that the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime increased by approximately 14 documents each year.


Figure 10.2: Total Number of Fear-of-Crime Documents from 1990 to 2003



Furthermore, no one particular political party was found to be responsible for the increased discussion of fear-of-crime. On average, the ALP was the source of 54% of the documents each year with a standard deviation of 15%. Liberal Party members were responsible for producing 39% of the documents each year (standard deviation of 13%). However, the


variability in the total number of documents being produced each year that mentioned fear-of-crime, from this data, cannot be said to be a result of particular political party fluctuations in debate content. The proportions authored by each party remain largely constant despite the total number of documents increasing each year.

Figure 10.3: Number of Fear-of-Crime Documents by Political Party



At some stage over the 13 years investigated, there has been a change of government in each state and territory parliament as well as the federal parliament. This provides an opportunity to study the potential for differing uses of fear-of-crime when each political party is in government or in opposition. The table below shows the changes in government and proportion of governments held by each political party per year.

Figure 10.4: Changes in Government by State, Year and Political Party



From the research conducted for this thesis, it was found that both parties mentioned fear-of-crime less when they were in opposition than when in government. The difference in frequency of mentioning fear-of-crime was most pronounced for Coalition members with a 36% drop in the number of documents produced when in opposition.

Table 10.2: Fear-of-Crime Documents by Role in Parliament and Political Party


	Government	Opposition	% Change
ALP	162	141	-15%
Coalition	163	120	-36%

This finding that both parties mention fear-of-crime less when in opposition suggests that the mentioning of this type of fear is partly a consequence of the party's role in parliament. The role of an opposition party is to scrutinize the performance of the governing party and to provide an alternative government to the electorate (Henderson, 1988; Punnett, 1973). A good opposition will ensure good government by controlling the government's legislation,

providing a means for minority views to be expressed and for the government to be removed by an organized opposition appealing for votes against it (Ionescu & de Madariaga (1968) see also Dahl (1966)). While the relationship between the use of fear-of-crime for political advantage and a party's role in parliament will be discussed in greater length in the next section, it can be argued from these descriptive results that fear-of-crime is potentially considered to be less beneficial to a parliamentarian in fulfilling the role of an opposition party than a government party.

The final descriptive result to be given here is the combination of those discussed above. The following figure depicts the changes in the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime produced each year by government and opposition parties:

Figure 10.5: Fear-of-Crime Documents by Role of Party in Parliament and Year




This figure demonstrates three main points. First, that while (in total) fear-of-crime is mentioned more by government members there has been greater variability in the number produced by government parliamentarians. Second, it also shows that since approximately

1997 the number of documents produced by parties in either role has been increasingly similar. Third, the figure indicates that it was government parliamentarians who were largely responsible for the drop in the number of documents produced in 1996.

These points are supported by Figure 10.6 below that divides the data this time by political party: government parliamentarians have the strongest influence over the trends in political debates about fear-of-crime. In addition, the figure shows that government and opposition parties remain closely aligned irrespective of which particular party is fulfilling either role. The trends of an ALP government and Coalition opposition are similar to each other as are the trends of a Coalition government and ALP opposition. However, the trends between these groups at times vary markedly. Again these findings highlight the potential influence that a party's role in parliament may have on their treatment of fear-of-crime – one party may be responding to another's treatment of the public's fear.

Figure 10.6: Fear-of-Crime Documents by Political Party, Role and Year



From these general results, it is possible to say that ALP parliamentarians have mentioned fear-of-crime more than Coalition parliamentarians (54% v's 46% respectively); the number of mentions from both parties has been increasing steadily having now reached an average of 58 documents per year; both parties mention fear-of-crime more when in government than in opposition; and finally, the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime produced by government and opposition parties remains similar regardless of which particular party is fulfilling each role.

These descriptive quantitative results suggest that the *volume* of documents containing a mention of public fear is influenced by political party dictates. However, they also suggest that the *frequency* with which fear-of-crime is mentioned in Australian parliaments is

influenced by institutional factors such as the fulfillment of a government or oppositional role. The following section will detail *how* fear-of-crime is used in Australian parliaments.

POLITICAL USES FOR FEAR-OF-CRIME

This section will examine the way in which fear-of-crime is ‘used’ in Australian parliaments as identified by parliamentarians themselves. To do this, passages were identified in which parliamentarians commented on the use of fear-of-crime by other parliamentarians (8% of total). These passages were seen as conceptually distinct from political responses to fear-of-crime or from government programs to address fear in the community. By focusing on these passages, the intention was to isolate commentaries on how fear-of-crime was used by parliamentarians (as judged by other parliamentarians). Determining how parliamentarians perceive fear-of-crime to be used is intended to function as a proxy against which comparisons can be made with the literature reviewed earlier and the ideological motivations to be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

Given the adversarial nature of Australian politics, it is not surprising that these passages criticized the other party for their use of fear-of-crime. At such times, claims of political expediency were made: parliamentarians argued that other parliamentarians were using debates about fear-of-crime as a means of gaining short-term political advantage. In effect, they argued that motivations for using fear-of-crime were dominated by self-interest. The following section will give examples of the three main groups of critical claims that are made about the use of fear-of-crime for political advantage:

- Criticism 1: the increase of fear to generate support for a party;
- Criticism 2: the use of fear as a political tactic to generate support for a policy;
- Criticism 3: the creation of fear to set the agenda and generate political noise.

CRITICISMS OF THE USES OF FEAR-OF-CRIME

Criticism 1

Parliamentarians try to increase fear-of-crime in the community with the intention of generating support for their party.

The most frequent criticism of the political use of fear-of-crime (38%), made by one side of politics against the other, referred to attempts to increase the level of fear in the community. This was described as ‘beating up’, ‘whipping up’, ‘playing on’ or simply increasing fear-of-crime. It was argued that parliamentarians used fear-of-crime in this way to generate support for their party.

- (a) If there is any way of telling whether we are in an election year, it is the increasing hysteria that comes from an Opposition bereft of talent, ideas and policies. Recently we have all witnessed and heard some of the thoughtless and hysterical efforts on the part of the Opposition to beat up the law and order issue. ... In closing, I urge the Opposition not to beat up fear in the community unreasonably for the sake of short-term political gain. (Redford, 1997)

In this quote (a), it is assumed that there is already a level of fear in the Australian community about crime. The political rhetoric is charged with increasing that level in order to generate a public demand for the policies of the opposition. Such a use of fear-of-crime is politically expedient because it has the potential to gain public support for the party

promising to reduce that fear. In effect, the criticism is made that parliamentarians are generating a false public demand for their policies, through their rhetoric on fear-of-crime.

Criticism 2

Parliamentarians use fear-of-crime as a political tactic to generate support for a particular policy

Another criticism was to argue that fear was part of an arsenal of political tactics (31%). This included using fear-of-crime as a tool: for political 'point-scoring' during debates and question times; in a political campaign; and as part of a strategy to win the support of the electorate for particular policies.

(b) The previous Government and this Government have cynically used the fears within the community to drive an agenda of getting tough on crime (Watson, 2001: 5489).

(c) In fact, there is no doubt that the scare tactics employed by members opposite, when in Opposition, worked to the extent that many people, particularly older people, became fearful and isolated in their own homes. If the then Opposition was to be believed, the situation in Queensland was alarming, with crime rates escalating and spiraling out of control (Bird, 1996: 1931).

These quotes (b) and (c) indicate that discussions about fear-of-crime can be criticized as a tactic for political gain. Like the first criticism, this is based on the assumption that at least some members of the public such as elderly people and women are afraid of crime; and that political rhetoric can increase that fear. However, this criticism goes further. It links up political rhetoric and increased levels of fear with attempts to generate support for (or

against) particular policies. For example, these policies included proposals for safe injecting facilities for illicit drug users, mandatory sentencing and public awareness campaigns on issues such as handbag thefts, knife attacks and rising crime rates. Such use indicates the perception that a fearful public is more dependent on and malleable to the wishes of the government. The criticism thus lies in the use of the political rhetoric of fear to encourage the public to support policies that may otherwise have been considered with skepticism in a less fearful atmosphere.

Criticism 3

Parliamentarians try to create fear-of-crime in the community in order to control the agenda and generate political noise.

The first two criticisms of the political uses of fear-of-crime each relied on that fear already being present in the community. The final group criticized a politician for generating and creating fear-of-crime (25%).

(e) I have noticed that some members of the Liberal Party have gone around that area trying to create an image of fear and saying that crime is out of control.... (Haermeyer, 2003: 447)

(f) The pattern of this government is clear: strike fear into the hearts of Australians and tell them there is a problem... (Faulkner, 2003)

This final criticism accuses the target of not only using fear for political advantage but also creating the fear in the first place. There is no assumption here that the public is afraid of crime prior to exposure to political rhetoric. Instead, the understanding of crime as

something to be feared is, in effect, taught by the parliamentarian. The insinuation of this criticism is that the parliamentarian is attempting to set the agenda and thereby create enough political noise to drown out discussions of other problems. While priming and agenda setting are commonly used in politics as discussed in Chapter One (see for example Cook et al., 1983; Iyengar & Simon, 2000; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000), this claim of political expediency criticizes the inclusion of fear in this process.

The final 6% of passages that criticized the way in which parliamentarians discussed fear-of-crime, focused on fear as a reason to respond in a certain way. These were not included as political responses to fear-of-crime because the focus was on the use itself rather than on the fear. The remaining passages criticized parliamentarians for developing legislation that was based on an unnecessary fear that had been created by the political discussion itself. The perceived inability of legislation to reduce or address community fears was a common theme throughout these passages. The main criticism here was that the government was responding to the wants of the majority while that want was generated out of fear – a fear that has been increased or created by the government. This criticism has not been included in further discussions as its elements are subsumed under the three main claims described above.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE USE OF FEAR-OF-CRIME


As the purpose of this chapter is, in part, to investigate the influence of self-interest on the use of fear-of-crime, it is important to examine the details of the authors who make these criticisms. There was little significant change in the proportion of the type of criticisms made when divided by political party:

- Criticism 1 comprised over 40%;
- Criticism 2 comprised over 30%; and
- Criticism 3 comprised approximately 20% of all critical documents.

In general, all parliamentarians criticize each other for the same uses of fear-of-crime for the same amount of time.


However, a difference was found in relation to the number of documents produced by each political party that criticized another for their use of public fear. On average, the ALP accounted for 69% of the passages that criticized others for the expedient use of fear-of-crime. The 31% sourced from the Coalition was divided with the Liberal Party producing 24% and the National Party producing the remaining 7% of passages. This dominance of the ALP for criticizing the political use of fear-of-crime is disproportionate to the number of documents collected per political party (54% for ALP; 46% for the Coalition).

Figure 10.7: Comparison of % of Critical Documents by Political Party



Such a result suggests that the ALP not only spends more time talking about fear-of-crime but also spends more time (disproportionately) criticizing others for the expedient use of fear-of-crime than do the Coalition. When divided into the percentage of documents produced by the parties when in government or opposition roles, it was found that the ALP does not change its behavior between each role; and the Coalition dedicate less of their time criticizing the political use of fear-of-crime when in opposition than in government.

Figure 10.8: % of Critical Documents by Political Party and Role in Parliament



This finding suggests that the use of fear-of-crime is dictated at least in part by the ideology of the member's political party. The judgment of what is considered acceptable use largely depends on the member's ideology – their principles and values – rather than institutional factors such as a party's role in parliament. This findings supports the general result presented earlier that argued the political party dictated the volume of documents but not the frequency of documents mentioning fear-of-crime. Therefore, in the following section, the ideology of each political party will be examined in search of directives for the use of fear-of-crime.

In summary, these discussions have outlined three main criticisms of political discussions about fear-of-crime: the increase of fear to generate support for a party; the use of fear as a political tactic to generate support for a policy; and the creation of fear to set the agenda and generate political noise. The results on the demographics of parliamentarians show that the frequency with which the criticisms are made are not reliant on the political party making the criticism. Instead, differences were found in the number of documents (i.e., volume) produced by each party and proportion of time spent criticizing others. Therefore it can be argued based on the results presented above that parliamentarians (like many researchers) consider fear-of-crime to be used mostly for self-interested ends, to be motivated by political expediency. However, that which is overtly stated may differ from the implicit (ideological) motivations for discussing fear-of-crime in certain ways. The following section will examine the ideological impact on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE ALP AND THE COALITION

As a comparison to the claims of political expediency, I now wish to examine the influence that the ideological stances of the ALP and the Coalition may have on political discussions about fear-of-crime. In this section, I will give an overview of the broad ideology of each party. The section following will describe their individual policies on law and order and the way in which these policies reflect the ideology of the ALP and the Coalition partners.

The discussion of ideology will be done within two restrictions. First, as defined in the introduction to this chapter, the term 'ideology' will be used to describe a coherent and interrelated set of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior. Secondly, the distinctions between the parties are made recognizing that each party's ideological stance is influenced by that of other parties within the Australian political system; and that there are factions and tendencies within each party that follow their own ideological variation. These restrictions (the reasons for which will be discussed in detail in the Conclusion of this thesis) unfortunately necessitate a certain level of abstraction and generality.

IDEOLOGY OF THE ALP

To begin, the ALP, with its affiliated trade unions, holds a broad ideology that is a combination of labourism that strives for the economic improvement of workers and the social democratic mix of socialism and liberalism that seeks equality through parliamentary process, power and incremental progress. The party is required to balance the sometimes competing demands of union political activity with electioneering and the demands of winning votes and/or office (Taylor, 1993) – a feature that is an example of the constantly

shifting dynamics of party preferences for vote, office or policy seeking behavior discussed at the beginning of this chapter.

Since the 1970s the ALP, along with social democratic parties around the world, has faced growing pressure to adapt to postindustrial societal order and an international economy where the location of value and power has shifted from labor to capital (Piven, 1992). Pressure to change has also been created through the diversification of voter salient issues from the traditional social democratic concerns of income equality and protection of the worker's social security to individual's privacy, environmental protection and identity politics. In response to these pressures, the Australian Labor government of the 1980s and 1990s pursued policies directed towards economic asceticism such as that displayed in the reform of health and environmental policies and the vigorous support that was given to affirmative action programs for women (Kitschelt, 1994) – policies traditionally espoused by right-wing parties.

This change in Labor policy is indicative of the influence that neo-liberal thought has had on the overall ideology of the party in recent decades. The ALP is now pursuing more conservative policies than previously (Piazza, 2001). Globally, left parties have integrated, to an unprecedented degree, opinions traditionally trumpeted by the right such as deregulation, liberal laissez-faire governance, privatization and the free market (Schwartz, 1994). More specifically, this swing to the right is evident in changes made by left parties in their law and order policies towards more legalistic responses to crime (Kelsey, 1993; Ratner & McMullan, 1983); and is evident in the ALP crime policies discussed below.

Thus, while the ALP remains on the left of the political spectrum, its strands of social democratic thought are showing clear signs of neo-liberal influence.

IDEOLOGY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY

The dilution of socialist influence within the ALP has seen the anti-socialist/anti-labor stand on which the Liberal Party of Australia was founded, lose its unifying effect. Historically, the Liberal Party developed as a response to Labor's perceived socialism and as an attempt to prevent undue class interests from dominating parliament (Jaensch, 1994). Consequently, the party was originally built on a strongly anti-socialist (i.e. anti-labor) platform that saw these doctrines as a threat to capitalist growth and economic prosperity (Simms, 1982).

Today, the ideology of the Liberal Party is a combination of economic liberalism (concerned with the economic rights of the individual), social liberalism (emphasis on providing opportunities for individuals to develop their full potential), and conservatism (emphasis on traditional family values and minimalist government) (see for example Liberal Party of Australia, 2004a, 2004b). Over the years, there has been a shifting dynamic between these types of liberalism and their interaction with conservative thought. Economic liberalism has been dominant since approximately 1980 (Brett, 2002).

Ultimately, liberalism is inseparable from individualism. This is a belief in the creative talents and responsibilities of the individual. Where the ALP focuses on the collective community, the Liberal Party believes in "the innate worth of the individual, in the right to be independent, to own property and to achieve, and in the need to encourage initiative and

personal responsibility” (Liberal Party of Australia, 2004a: 3). Liberals want a society where as many people as possible are working to take care of themselves; a society where they can enjoy the resources and act to be ‘independent, self-reliant and responsible’ (Emy, 1994).

In the resulting combination of beliefs in Liberal ideology, freedom is valued more highly than equality; and more specifically, there is an emphasis on an individual’s freedom to choose. The focus on the free market is an example of this emphasis on freedom of economic choice (Fraser, 1978). As a result of this emphasis, there is generally support for only limited government intervention to address inequality because these inequalities are accepted as a natural result of differing levels of individual potential. Instead, government action is directed at encouraging individuals to develop that potential by rewarding initiative and innovation.

However, these liberal ideas exist in tension with conservative ideas within the party. For example, where Labor tends to trust people to regulate their own behavior and places blame for transgressions on a poorly functioning society, conservative members in the Liberal Party seek the imposition of rules, conventions and laws in society as a means of creating order (Singleton et al., 2003). The shifting tensions between liberalism, individualism and conservatism are a key characteristic of Liberal Party ideology and are intensified by the close coalition partnership with the National Party.

IDEOLOGY OF THE NATIONAL PARTY

The National Party is generally considered to be the most conservative party in Australian politics (Woodward, 1985, 2002). Like the Liberal Party, the Nationals posit the principles of economic rationalism and laissez-faire governance where individuals are seen to have economic freedom to participate in the free market and where government services are provided only in areas in which private enterprise fails. However following their conservative trends, it is a party that has a strong emphasis on upholding traditional values such as the role of the family and “the spirit of national pride” in a strong and sustainable society (The Nationals Victoria (2005) see also The National Party of Australia, 2004; The Nationals Queensland, 2005). It is by unashamedly positing the sectional manifesto of representing the people of rural Australia (Woodward, 2002) and representing the distinctive economic base and political culture held in these areas (Jaensch, 1989) that the National Party function as the rural wing of the Coalition.

However, these sectional interests do at times bring the National Party into conflict with its coalition partner the Liberal Party. While their social policies have tended to remain largely similar, tension has been especially evident in each party’s proposed economic policies. The National Party has always been able to exert more influence in the Coalition than their limited number of seats in parliament would suggest (Woodward, 2002). Consequently, the National Party has been the leader in setting coalition policy to serve the interests of rural Australia in many portfolios (take for example, the debate over the privatization of Telstra from 2000 to 2005 where the National Party sought to protect the interests of rural Australians). In part, it is this ability of representing the interests of rural Australia that has maintained the longevity of the Coalition during the time period studied.

COMPARING IDEOLOGIES

While there are many differences, similarities and cross-influences that could be drawn out between the parties' ideologies, one particular point will be emphasized here in preparation for later discussion. The conception of the role of the government differs between the ALP and the Coalition. The Coalition has spearheaded a strong push towards the privatization of public services. It is a party that desires a minimalist role for the government – a reflection of conservative strands of opinion (Batavia, 1997). In contrast, the ALP believes in a more interventionist role. It is the government that helps the individual to realize their full potential, the economy to grow and the Australian society to flourish. A Labor government thus seeks to be the guardian of the common good (although this aim is showing signs of weakening under neo-liberal influence). This is based on the belief that the government must have the power to effectively deal with private interests that challenge equality and freedom (Singleton et al., 2003). The differing expectations of the role of the government will become evident in the crime policies proposed by each party.

In summary, the ALP and the Coalition are generally considered to be representative of left and right ideologies respectively. The ALP posits a largely social democratic platform that provides a mix of socialism and liberalism; the Coalition's combination of liberalism and conservatism serve to produce beliefs positive towards minimalist government, individual rewards as well as supporting the traditional formulation of the nuclear family and nationalism. The changing political and societal environments in which these parties operate have led to a swing to the right in ALP ideology with the adoption of many liberal opinions. It is the influence of these ideologies on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime that will be the focus of the remaining sections of this chapter.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND CRIME

On the basis of the ALP and Coalition ideologies discussed above, I will now give a brief overview of each individual party's crime policies. It is within these policies that evidence may be found of a relationship between a party's ideology and the political use of fear-of-crime. To do this, I will first outline the general trends in crime-related policy direction that have been taken by each party. Secondly, I will demonstrate how each of these policies reflects the beliefs and opinions about society that have been discussed above. Finally, I will examine how fear-of-crime is discussed in these policies and attempt to identify any ideological rationale for how fear-of-crime is debated in the political ideology of the ALP and the Coalition.

For the purposes of this chapter, each party will be treated as if it followed a single homogenous set of beliefs and values. Individual tendencies, factions and state differences will be ignored. By doing so, I do not wish to downgrade their importance; rather it is hoped that this will simplify the comparisons that need to occur. This simplification is a heuristic device to allow the proposed analysis. The general conclusions drawn in this chapter are intended as guides for focal points of later research as they would benefit greatly from more detailed examinations by state and factorial/tendency differences to fully highlight the complexity of the issues involved.

IDEOLOGY, CRIME AND THE ALP

To begin, the ALP approaches crime under the banner of ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. Members seek to “provide greater security for all Australians and their families” through the provision of adequate funds and other resources to law enforcement agencies; the support of law reform in order to provide those agencies with greater powers of investigation; and the development of uniform national criminal laws.

The ALP is also committed to ensuring that all persons accused of an offence have a right not to incriminate themselves, have access to legal representation and for evidence that is improperly or illegally obtained to be generally inadmissible. The principles of restorative justice are used by the ALP to attempt to instill responsibility in the offender and restore a sense of security in the victim and their community (ALP, 2004).

These national policies and intentions are reflected at a state level with virtually all Labor governments developing policies that explicitly reflect the intention to be tough on both crime and the causes of crime. Common actions include: increased numbers of police; increased support for victims of crime; use of the principles of restorative justice to rehabilitate offenders; and crime prevention and community safety projects (for examples see state websites listed at www.alp.org.au). There are also some state-specific actions such as: building new prisons and putting more resources into prisoner rehabilitation (ALP VIC, 2004); self-defense laws in response to home invasion and biker-gang related crimes (ALP SA, 2004); mandatory sentencing (ALP NT, 2004); and the incorporation of research on crime and justice into policy decisions (ALP ACT, 2001).

The policies of the ALP on crime show the influence of their social democratic ideology. Underlying their approach to crime and social justice generally is a sense of collective responsibility for the well-being of the community (Howe, 1992). The role of the community (as against the individual) is emphasized through the use of crime prevention and community safety initiatives. Communal responsibility for crime is also demonstrated through the use of programs designed to rehabilitate offenders; and victims are acknowledged through the principles of restorative justice. At the same time, the promises of more police and tougher penalties show the trend towards the right (Kelsey, 1993; Ratner & McMullan, 1983) that was discussed above and the greater adoption of legalistic response to crime. Indeed, it has been argued by some that the ALP slogan of “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” is reflective of the adoption of punitive policies by the Left that are traditionally those posed by the right (Zedner, 1995).

IDEOLOGY, CRIME AND THE LIBERAL PARTY

The Liberal Party’s response to crime has reflected the beliefs, values and opinions held in social/economic liberalism, individualism and conservatism. The policies developed by Liberals around Australia show the influence of this position. At a federal level, the Liberal Party has promised greater funding for agencies and departments so that they can provide ‘stronger law enforcement’ and be ‘tough’ on crime (Liberal Party of Australia, 1998). At a state level, greater police powers are promised in Victoria (Liberal Victoria, 2003). The State Liberals in Tasmania propose “tougher measures” against crime (The State Liberals, 2003). The Liberal Party in Western Australia has called for mandatory sentencing and “tougher penalties” for offenders (Black & Phillips, 2001). Finally, there is a strong

emphasis in the platform of The Liberals in the ACT on the introduction of harsher penalties for law breakers (Canberra Liberals, 2004).

Overall, Liberal policy has been directed towards tightening laws, increasing police powers and encouraging individual responsibility for the prevention of victimization. The individual is understood as the mechanism through which the decision to commit a crime is made and the opportunities that are afforded criminal behavior are given. This placement of the individual as central to policy and to crime reflects a similar placement in the ideology of the Liberals. The policies also demonstrate the expansion of state- and law-based means of social control that characterize the beliefs and actions of the right.

IDEOLOGY, CRIME AND THE NATIONAL PARTY

At a federal level, National Party crime-related policies are those of the Coalition Government rather than each partner of the Coalition presenting separate policies. Consequently, the Nationals discussed increased funding to the National Crime Prevention Programme and the National Community Crime Prevention Programme (e.g., The Coalition Government, 2004). The ideology reflected in these federally funded and implemented policies is thus a combination of the liberal/conservative mix of the Coalition and not solely that of the National Party.

A similar problem is faced in analyzing the ideology reflected in state policies of the National Party. However, at this level the crime policies of the National Party reflect their sectional support base of rural Australia. There are calls for greater funding to attract and keep more police officers in country areas. Legislation is tightened to address a perceived

leniency towards re-offenders especially. These measures include the implementation of mandatory sentencing, harsher parole measures and changing police practices. Finally, the use of firearms as part of rural community life is recognized. The National Party seeks to protect the community from irresponsible and/or criminal use rather than prohibit the use of all firearms (see *The Nationals Victoria (2005)* and *The Nationals WA (2005)* as examples). Thus in general, the crime-related policies of the National Party mirror those of their coalition partner but are tempered by a particular focus on the problems facing rural Australia.

As a result of these problems, the remaining discussions will address Coalition ideology and fear-of-crime without distinguishing between the Coalition partners. This decision has been made for two reasons. First, the strong similarity and co-influence between the crime-related policies of each party restrict the possibility of determining the ideological source of each policy. Second, as discussed above, there is the general perception that the two parties function as rural and urban wings of the same conservative party especially concerning social policies. This again reduces the distinctions that can be made between the policies on crime of each of the parties. Consequently, the remaining discussions will analyze the relationship between parliamentary discussions of fear-of-crime and the ideologies of the parties in Australia's two-party system – the ALP and the Liberal/National Coalition.

SUMMARY OF IDEOLOGY, CRIME AND POLITICAL PARTIES

In this section, I have discussed the crime policies of each political party. Key differences between the parties were the collective versus individual responsibility for crime and the rehabilitation versus the punishment of offenders. The Coalition calls for stronger laws and

penalties was not explicitly matched by ALP policies and debates; and following their strains of individualism and liberalism, the Coalition did not consistently follow ALP demands for crime prevention or community safety projects. However, both parties did call for (more) money and resources to be given to police and law enforcement agencies.

Those policies reflected the general beliefs, values and opinions of each political party; and as such, demonstrated their ideal society and means of achieving it. For example, the Coalition's desire for a society of independent individuals working to achieve their full potential in a free economic market is to be achieved in part by individual responsibility for crime. When individuals fail this responsibility, it is the various arms of the law that will punish them. The law is thus an essential reactive mechanism to maintain the society as imagined by members of the Coalition.

In contrast, the ALP desires a society of communities that are sensitive, but not subservient, to the needs of the individual. This society is to be achieved in part by communal action against and responsibility for crime. Individuals, who forgo that responsibility, are rehabilitated into the community rather than punished by exclusion. In effect, communal action is placed above individual responsibility¹. Law and order for the ALP is a means of achieving a society focused on the common good rather than individual gain. From these highly simplified examples, it is possible to see the interaction between crime policy and ideology in their struggle to achieve the parliamentarians' image of an ideal society. In the following section, I wish to attempt to determine the influence that that interaction has had on the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

¹ The very recent trend towards the use of restorative justice initiatives (that emphasize individual responsibility) is threatening the traditional direction of Labor platforms.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, CRIME POLICIES AND FEAR-OF-CRIME

To find the extent to which political ideologies influenced discussions about fear-of-crime, the 586 documents that formed the dataset for this chapter were re-examined. This time, the focus was not on the criticisms of the political use of fear but on the way in which each political party discussed fear-of-crime. It was hoped that an analysis of the beliefs about fear-of-crime would yield information on how the use of such fear fits in with the general beliefs of each party.

It was found that both the ALP and the Coalition discussed fear-of-crime in largely the same way: it was used as evidence or support for the need for specific pieces of legislation; women, children and the frail aged were considered most vulnerable both to crime and to feelings of fear; parliamentarians of both persuasions argued for the right of people to be free from fear and to feel safe; and the media was overwhelmingly seen as something that increases fear-of-crime. In these passages, there was little overt evidence to distinguish the different ideologies of each party.

However, there were contrasts found in three areas. First, there was a different emphasis placed on the type of crime that were discussed in regard to fear. For example, the ALP was responsible for all discussions about feelings of fear in the community because of anti-social behavior. They were also responsible for the majority of the discussions about fear from graffiti (71%), drug-related crimes (70%) and domestic violence (67%). In contrast, Coalition members focused on home invasion (75%), multiple violent crimes (75%),

organized crime (75%), specified violent crime (75%), stalking (83%) and gun related crimes (90%)².

The second area of contrast was the debates about tougher sentencing for offenders (including mandatory sentencing and truth in sentencing). The Coalition was responsible for 73% of the arguments for tougher sentencing based on fear-of-crime. These policies were intended to reduce the public's fear-of-crime by: offenders being placed in prison for longer periods; reducing the discretion afforded judges in individual cases; and eliminating the presumption of parole.

The third area of contrast between the parties was in their depiction of the role of the police in fear-of-crime. Both parties called for, in the debates studied, more police with more resources to reduce fear. More specifically, the ALP spoke the most (72%) about using the police or of police practices (e.g. high-visibility policing, community policing, and police beats/shop-fronts). The presence of police was intended to reduce fear-of-crime. However, the Coalition wished for the police to have greater powers based on the argument that police currently do not have sufficient legislative power to protect the public and make them feel safe. For the ALP, it was the presence of police to prevent crime that was to reduce fear. For Coalition members, that fear would be reduced by greater police power to investigate crime.

² The Coalition was responsible for 100% of the passages on computer crime and unspecified violent crimes. However, these groups consisted of only one or two passages each and consequently were not included in the final analysis.

As with the crime policies discussed above, these propositions to address fear-of-crime demonstrated the influence of different elements of each political party's ideology. The division in time spent discussing particular crimes could be explained by a differing emphasis that is placed on the individual and the community in each party's beliefs. The contrasting arguments for and against tougher penalties for offenders may demonstrate the different political desires to punish versus rehabilitate offenders and the implications of such desires for individual or collective responsibility for criminal victimization. Finally, the differing conceptions of the role of the police may highlight the interventionist versus minimalist concept of government and the prevention versus prosecution focus of the ALP and the Coalition respectively. It would thus be possible to argue that the ideological stance of the political party does have an influence on the crime policies in which fear-of-crime is discussed.

However, there is one important aspect of the role of fear-of-crime in these discussions. In these contrasting areas, fear was used as rhetorical evidence for the argument presented as one would use crime statistics or victimization survey data. The presence of fear-of-crime in the community was used as evidence of a perceived need for government action, as support for proposed legislation or government initiatives, and as an indicator of the success (or failure) of legislation and other government activities. The ideology of each party was reflected in the crime and social justice policies. Fear-of-crime itself was not the focus of the discussions. In effect, that fear formed rhetorical evidence for the 'truth' of the politician's beliefs, values and opinions about the world.

BALANCING FEAR-OF-CRIME, EXPEDIENCY AND IDEOLOGY

In this chapter, I have sought to examine the balance between expediency and ideology that is sought by Australian parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. To do this, I began with the claims of political expediency that were made by parliamentarians against other parliamentarians in Australia. These claims were grouped into three main areas: increasing fear to gain support for the party; the tactical use of fear to gain support for a particular piece of policy; and the generation or creation of fear as a means of setting the agenda for discussion. These criticisms highlight methods of using fear-of-crime that parliamentarians considered to be motivated by self-interest.

It was also argued that the use of fear-of-crime may be (implicitly) motivated by ideological principles. Consequently, I then attempted to examine the influence that the ideology of each political party has on the policies developed and presented by parliamentarians. It was found that the beliefs of the party are reflected in the crime policies presented. Fear-of-crime is found within these arguments but not as arguments themselves. Fear functioned as evidence for the proposed success of a particular policy on crime. In other words, the presence of fear-of-crime in the community is used as evidence for the need for a particular policy on crime. These policies reflect the political party's ideology. Fear-of-crime is used as evidence for the truth of the party's beliefs and opinions about the world, for the 'truth' of the image of society and the mechanisms (i.e. crime policies) to make that image a reality³.

³ The use of crime in this way has been suggested by King (1989).

In this chapter, I have sought to examine the balance between ideology and expediency that is evident in political discussions about fear-of-crime. While an exact numerical figure cannot be placed on the balancing of ideology and expediency, these discussions do highlight the utility of fear-of-crime in political discourse. It has been shown that parliamentarians perceive fear-of-crime to be useful in gaining self-interested advantage during the workings of political competition. It has also been shown that fear-of-crime is perceived to be useful in achieving the realization of one's ideal society by provided evidence of the 'truth' of that image. Discussing the public's fears and the government's response is useful in politics irrespective of the mixture of influence from concerns of expediency and ideology. This finding is supported by the mixed influence that institutional factors such as being in the government or oppositional role have on the way in which fear-of-crime is debated in Australian parliaments. Despite the inability to demonstrate that the scales are tipped one way or the other towards ideology or expediency in guiding these debates, the results contained in this chapter do nonetheless highlight the utility of talking about fear-of-crime.

There is of course, a danger that lies with the utility of fear-of-crime. The debates about fear-of-crime by parliamentarians may increase the level of actual fear that is felt in the community. This warning has been sounded by academics such as: "[P]eople seem to be highly concerned with crime only when the media and politicians tell them that they should be highly concerned with crime" (Schwartz & Israel, 2000: 337 (see also Beckett 1997; Braithwaite et al., 1979)). The process of shaping or distorting images of crime within the politics of law and order may generate and spread fear-of-crime (Scheingold, 1984; Steinert, 2003). It is this danger that needs to be kept in mind when considering the utility

of talking about fear-of-crime, whether that utility is derived from expediency or ideology, in parliamentary debates about law and order.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter sought to examine the data from the perspective of how images of society are reflected in language. It is a case study that is situated on the far extreme of the continuum between language and societal influences on the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. On the basis of Downs' theory of political party competition, theoretical research was presented that suggested parliamentarians balance ideological principles with their desire for short-term self-interested political advantage. Empirical evidence from Australian politics was then presented in regard to the balancing of these tensions in debates about fear-of-crime. On the basis of this evidence it was argued that fear-of-crime is a useful topic in politics because it assists in the realization of a particular image of society by providing support for the means of its achievement and it provides support for policies, programs, arguments and other activities that are perceived to grant short-term political advantage. This utility also heralds a hidden danger that such debates about fear-of-crime may raise the level of actual fear felt by members of the community, irrespective of whether the issue is being "used" for ideological or expedient reasons.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THREE DISCOURSES ON FEAR-OF-CRIME

The purpose of this thesis has been to explore and characterize Australian parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. This chapter has the aim of bringing together all of those characteristics and identifying commonalities that may indicate the presence of discourses relating to fear-of-crime. To do this, I will present a discussion of the three discourses that, I argue, are evident in the debates about fear-of-crime based on the results of the case studies. The implications for criminological research of both those discourses and the research presented in this thesis will be discussed in the Chapter that follows.

Based on the case studies examining the data from various perspectives of linguistic and societal influences, particular characteristics were identified in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime (see Figure 1 given at the end of the Introduction to this thesis). The commonalities and sources of overlap between these characteristics serve to highlight three particular ways of organizing parliamentary talk about this type of fear (i.e., three discourses). The discourses identified are the following:

- The Protector Discourse – The government is in control and protecting the public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The public is legitimately afraid but is passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering.
- The Supporter Discourse – The government will support the public but cannot be blamed for the actions of criminals who cause the public to be afraid. The public is active and responsible for their safety that is threatened by, and their fear that is caused, by street crimes and other dangers in the environment.

- The Manipulator Discourse – The parliamentarian is selfishly oriented towards their personal gain and sees only the utility of the public’s fear-of-crime.


These discourses have been identified by studying the commonalities between the results of the previous chapters. While acknowledging that the case studies formed only portals into the characteristics of fear-of-crime debates, the results still have the capability of suggesting the existence of these discourses. Verification and expansion of these discourses would occur with further research into other linguistic and societal influences not studied here.

DISCOURSE 1: THE PROTECTOR DISCOURSE

The government is in control and protecting the public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The public is legitimately afraid but is passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering.

Figure 11.1 below depicts the links between the case studies in the first of the discourses identified in political debates about fear-of-crime – the protector discourse.

Figure 11.1: The Protector Discourse



The description of the protector discourse can be broken into four segments based on their source case study. Segment A (“the government is in control and protecting the public”) is drawn from Case Study 4 (Chapter Nine) that examined attempts to shift responsibility for crime and fear-of-crime. It was argued that the actions of governments were suggestive of an attempt to shift causal responsibility and its associated blame onto the public but for treatment responsibility and the associated image of control to remain firmly in the hands of government and political representatives. As will be discussed below, this image of control facilitates the political utility of fear-of-crime.

The debate about responsibility for fear-of-crime also served to define the roles and responsibilities of actors in the discourse. This definition was assisted through the use of war-related metaphors as discussed in Case Study 2 (Chapter Seven). The government has the responsibility and the ability (through control of the arms of law enforcement etc) to ‘treat’ fear-of-crime. The government argues that it will protect “us”, the frightened public,

in the war on crime; it is the commander-in-chief of the forces that do battle with “them”, the threatening criminal.

The characteristics of public fear (Segment B) that generate these identities and responsibilities were given mainly through Case Study 1 (Chapter Six). Two conceptions of fear-of-crime were identified: one as an abstract entity and the other as a concrete fear of an external stimulus. In the protector discourse, it is the abstract conception of fear-of-crime that is dominant. This is indicated by the unspecified nature of the threat emphasized through the use of war-related metaphors (discussed in Chapter Seven) and through the treatment of the “problem” of fear-of-crime (discussed below). These commonalities suggest the dominance of this concept of fear-of-crime in the protector discourse.

The consequence of this abstract entity in the discourse is that the government is protecting the public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). In Chapter Six, it was argued that this concept is causeless in that the link to a particular agent has been removed; it is no longer possible to identify the actor, only the affected. It is also rendered timeless and placeless through further linguistic deletions of the classifications of modality and tense. This abstract concept of fear-of-crime affects the public with little or no reference to when, where and why. It is to protect the public from this fear-of-crime that the government needs to utilize its control and protect the public.

Segment C (“the public is legitimately afraid”) is again suggested through the results of a combination of the case studies. In Chapter Seven, the use of war-related metaphors was argued to construct the identity of a fearful public. Chapter Eight showed that this fear (and

the associated identity) gained a sense of legitimacy because of its grounding in commonsense. Finally, in Chapter Ten, members of the public reporting that they are afraid was rarely the topic of contention. Instead, parliamentarians debated government responses, legislation, police practices and so on that were in response to this fear. It was rarely questioned in the arguments in this discourse that the public is afraid. These results support the notion that in the protector discourse, the public is considered to be legitimately afraid.

The final segment (D) refers to the public being “passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering”. This segment again stems from the results of Case Study 1 on agency and abstract entities. Given that the concept of fear-of-crime being used in this discourse is abstract and removed from reality, the consequences discussed for this type of fear need also to be applied to the discourse itself. The abstract fear-of-crime takes on its own agency and thereby denies that of the public. Due to their inability to protect themselves, the public becomes dependent on the government for protection against the fear that plagues them. Fear-of-crime, as an independent entity, is something that affects members of the public rather than the public feeling afraid. Thus, the concept of fear-of-crime renders the public as passive and dependent on government action to remove that fear.

In summary, the characteristics of political debates about fear-of-crime can be organized into three discourses, the first of which has been discussed above. The protector discourse depicts the government as being in control and protecting the public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). At the same time, the public is portrayed as being legitimately afraid but passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their

suffering from fear-of-crime. The following section will analyze a number of particular aspects of social practices in which this discourse exists and the impact that the discourse itself has on those practices. This analysis will provide a deeper examination of the social identities and relations involved, as well as the ideological and political effects of the protector discourse.

SOCIAL PRACTICES AND THE PROTECTOR DISCOURSE

The following sections will first discuss the social identities and relations that are involved in the protector discourse. Second, the ideological effects and thirdly the political effects of the discourse will be examined. By integrating both the results of the case studies and a general analysis of social practices, a greater understanding of the effects of the protector discourse on the social reality will be sought.

SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF PROTECTION

There are three key social identities that are used by the protector discourse. The first is the image of the public as vulnerable to crime. This image was particularly applied to the elderly with slightly less emphasis being placed on vulnerability when discussing the fear-of-crime among women and children. Vulnerability among these demographics was used as reasons for why the parliamentarian's arguments should be accepted. Parliamentarians used arguments based on the reason that such people were afraid because of a perceived vulnerability to criminal victimization (e.g., inability to physically defend oneself due to frailty). The main focus of such debates was whether people were afraid of their

vulnerability to crime. At no stage was there questioning of the image of the elderly, women and children as being vulnerable. It was accepted as the prevailing social identity.

The second social identity was that of the public being in need of government protection. This identity is, in part, connected to the image of certain sub-groups of the population being vulnerable to crime. However, the desire for protection was depicted as being felt by all members of the community. The public in the parliamentary debates were described as 'demanding', 'crying out for' and 'expecting' government action to make people aware of possible criminal behavior; that the level of the fear-of-crime in the community made it imperative that the government act to address crime. Public fears about crime formed the impetus for them wanting greater protection.

The final social identity that was evident in the protector discourse was for the government to be the protector of the community. This identity has been discussed in-depth in Chapter Nine in regard to responsibility for crime and fear-of-crime. That responsibility (and thus certain aspects of the identity as a protector) was shared amongst the various arms of government. Government programs were run at national, state, and council levels with federally-run programs intended to gather information and council-run programs designed to address specific grass-roots problems. Consequently, the identity of protector was taken up at the federal level through the collection of information about the fear-of-crime, while protection was given through local council initiatives to fix individual problems such as low street lighting or anti-social behavior that may cause public fear. Each level of government argued that it had taken on that identity of a protector of the community in some way.

The police were also described as an instrument of government used to protect the public. Such discussions focused on increasing police numbers, visibility, presence and contact with the public. Despite different topics and themes, the discussions were all following the same principle: the more police that are perceived to be on the streets 'protecting the public', the lower the public's level of fear-of-crime. Police practices such as high visibility policing, community policing, police beats and shop-fronts and police volunteers were directed to increasing the perceived presence of the police in the community. These strategies were intended to deal with the fear-of-crime through the management of perceptions rather than reducing the crime rate. The dislocation of public fear from crime as evidenced by police strategies to address it, supports the concept of the fear-of-crime as an independent entity (a key part of the protector discourse and discussed in detail in Chapter Six).

In summary, the protector discourse relies on the recognition of three social identities. First, the public, and in particular women, the elderly and children, are seen as vulnerable to crime and (therefore) afraid. Second, the public is argued to be in need of and demanding government protection from crime. Third, all levels of government have sought to take on the identity of the provider of that protection for the community through programs and the gathering of information. In particular, the police are used to help construct this identity by altering the perception of their ability to protect every individual. Each of these identities have inherent roles and responsibilities that guide the way in which people interact, the construction of the social structures in which they interact and ultimately the way they talk about and respond to the problem of crime and the fear-of-crime.

SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PROTECTION

In the protector discourse, there are also certain social relations that were created and/or reproduced through the identities just discussed as well as through the general body of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. The first social relation that is relevant to the protector discourse is the relationship between the community and the government. As indicated in the discussion above of social identities, this relationship is one where the public is vulnerable and in need of protection from the government with the government seeking to fulfill that role of protector. The relationship between the community and the government was discussed in the debates collected from both the perspective of the community and their perceived role of the government, and the perspective of the government and their perception of how the community is feeling (about crime). In each case, concerns about issues of safety, protection and fear from crime were paramount. The main characteristic of this set of social relations was one of dependence of the public on the government.

The relationship between parliamentarians and police was also touched on by this discourse. The police were generally seen as an arm of the government and as a consequence, take on the role of protecting the public in ways discussed above. However, this particular relationship is between police and *parliamentarians* as against government members. As a result much of the debates involved in this set of social relations are dominated by opposition comments criticizing the police for not doing enough to acknowledge the fear-of-crime in the community. In contrast to the relationship between the community and the government, the parliamentary debates analyzed depicted the

interaction between parliamentarians and police as being an antagonistic one-sided diatribe against the police.

Parliamentarians' relationship with the community also contrasted with the government's relationship with the community. Where the government sought to show action on law and order issues, parliamentarians were concerned with public emotive sentiment. Parliamentarians (on both sides) attempted to demonstrate their empathy with the fears of the public, to show that they not only recognized the public's fear but also gave that fear legitimacy and rationality. It was evident that such displays of empathy (along with criticisms of these displays to be discussed in regard to the manipulator discourse below) were part of a competitive strategy (see Chapter Ten).

Thus, there are three main social relations that are referred to in the protector discourse: the protective role of the government over a vulnerable and frightened public; the antagonistic one-sided critical relationship of parliamentarians to police; and the strategic empathetic relationship between the parliamentarian and the community. These relations, combined with the social structures described in Chapter Three, serve to highlight aspects of the social reality in which the protector discourse exists, creates and maintains.

THE IDEOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE PROTECTOR DISCOURSE

Each discourse will have an ideological effect on both the speaker and the target audience. The same definition of ideology will be used here as was given Chapter Ten: ideology is a coherent and interrelated set of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior. As such, a particular organization of words and sentences into a discourse will necessarily

affect the messages, images and beliefs that those words and sentences are intended to convey. This in turn will change the way in which a person responds both to the discourse itself and to the external subject matter. In other words, the framing of an issue will change how the audiences respond in terms of their beliefs, values and principles as well as their overt behavior. This is the ideological effect of discourses.

In order to examine the ideological effects of the protector discourse specifically, the associated assumptions made by the speaker about the knowledge of the target audience and the required belief system(s) will be discussed in the sections below. Following on from this, the behavioral changes that were depicted in the parliamentary debates as resulting from fear-of-crime will be given as a means of highlighting the component of ideology that guides human behavior. It should be noted that this thesis does not seek to empirically test the behavioral effect of parliamentary discourses about crime. As a result, the behaviors depicted in the discourses will be used as a proxy for the behavior desired by the ideology. While benefiting from further research, it is the combination of knowledge, beliefs and (suggested) behaviors that will identify the ideological effects of the protector discourse.

Knowledge and Beliefs about Protection

In the majority of instances of communication, there are some assumptions made by the speaker about the knowledge of the target audience. In the protector discourse, it was commonly assumed that all parliamentarians had knowledge about fear-of-crime. This knowledge encompassed research on the issue, types of crimes that may provoke fear, and definitions of the fear-of-crime itself. The focus of this assumed knowledge on the

“problem” of fear-of-crime as against the experience of it or the occurrence of crime contrasts with that assumed in the supporter discourse. It also supports an abstract conception of fear-of-crime and suggests that the “problem” has “solutions”. More fundamentally however, it allows a wider array of issues to be collected (strategically) under its banner. This facilitates the utility of discussing fear-of-crime in politics.

In addition to an assumed base of knowledge, the protector discourse also requires that the audience has a particular belief system if they are to accept unchallenged the maxims within the discourse. For the purposes of this discussion, a belief system refers to a distinct organization of knowledge, elements of discourse, as well as social relations and identities, that guide expectations about how a society will function. It refers to the beliefs about how a society should work, about the roles that people take and the responsibilities that they hold.

In the case of the protector discourse, the assumptions about knowledge combine with the social relations and identities discussed above to indicate that it is the government’s role and responsibility to protect the vulnerable in the community from the problem of fear-of-crime. It is a combination of beliefs stemming from: the identities of the public as vulnerable and in need of protection and the government as the provider of that protection; the relations between the community, government, parliamentarians and police; and finally the assumed knowledge about the problem of fear-of-crime itself. This belief system, as given by the protector discourse, provides a strong influence on expectations of how society should function, parliamentarians should act and citizens should behave.

Behavioral Changes in Search of Protection

The last part of the ideological effects to be examined here is that of the behavioral changes in members of the public that are described by parliamentarians to be as a result of fear-of-crime. In general, the behavior of citizens in response to fear-of-crime was not dependent on the discourse being used by the parliamentarian. The argued effect of fear-of-crime is to change behavioral patterns in an attempt to reduce that fear. Members of the public are seen to withdraw from the street and into their homes. The home takes on significance as a sacred place of safety. Physical and personal measures are then taken to ensure that that safety is not compromised. These behaviors will be discussed in greater detail below.

Fear-of-crime was argued to affect the community in four ways. First, there was argued to be a change in the way in which people interacted with each other. For example, there may be a redefinition of what is personal and what is public, a weakening of the social fabric of the community or attacking the heart of the community and reducing social standards of behavior. Fear-of-crime was argued to have affected interpersonal networks in society making people more distant from each other and changing the standards by which people operate. In effect, fear-of-crime reduced the level of informal social control that was exercised and expected to be exercised.

Secondly, fear-of-crime restricted or changed the community's behavior. Restrictions were evident in the use of the community for activities in public places. More general arguments were also made that fear-of-crime restricted the quality of day-to-day lives. The behavior of the community was perceived to have changed either generally or in an attempt to avoid victimization by looking around them for threats, closing doors and changing previously

frequented public places. All of these behaviors could be described as attempts by the community to reduce their perceived risk of victimization and thereby their fear-of-crime.

Thirdly, there were two specific behavioral changes that were frequently discussed by parliamentarians. The first was the effect of fear-of-crime on people's use of the streets. Here, people were either prevented from walking the streets purely from fear or prevented because of fear generated by darkness. In these situations, it was the location and the levels of lighting that was seen to generate fear-of-crime, rather than a specific type of crime or offender. The streets were argued to be a place of fear and a place to be avoided.

The second specific type of behavioral effect was to stay at home. This type of behavioral change was manifested through people not going out because of a fear of an unspecified crime, or a fear of home-related offences such as break and enters. People also did not go out because of the amount of light (i.e. after a certain time of day or at night). Finally, the elderly especially were argued to 'build fortresses' for their own protection. These arguments emphasized that it was the streets or even just 'outside' and the time of day that create fear. Homes appear to be places of safety and people feel a need to protect those places either through physical barriers or through simply being at home.

The fourth and final behavioral change that was discussed by parliamentarians as resulting from fear-of-crime focused on the use of physical and environmental changes. These responses were generally to build walls around homes, fit bars onto doors and/or windows, lock doors or simply (excessive) expenditure on unspecified security measures. Within these responses, there was frequently a 'fortress' or a 'prisoner' mentality described. Being

able to describe a ‘mentality’ seemed to give the parliamentarian a ready-made symbol that conjures up dramatic images of the negative effects that fear-of-crime may have. Again, the home is considered to be a place of safety and there is perceived to be a general need to protect that place through security measures.

In summary, the political debates about fear-of-crime depicted four types of behavioral changes in the public in response to that fear: a change in the social relations between members of the public, restricted or changed behavior (including avoiding walking the streets and staying at home) and the promotion of physical and environmental changes especially around the home. These behavioral changes were discussed irrespective of the political persuasion of the speaker or the discourse in which they were mentioned.

However, the discourse did affect the purpose for which they were mentioned. In the protector discourse, these behavioral changes were used as evidence for the need for government action to protect the community from crime and the fear-of-crime. Parliamentarians argued that the public should not have to change their behavior in this way because it was the government’s responsibility to protect the public. Again, the social relations and identities and the assumed knowledge already discussed are evident in these arguments relating to the behavior of the public and the role of the government. While there were behavioral changes identified by parliamentarians, these changes were used in much the same way as fear-of-crime itself is used in parliamentary debates – as rhetorical support for the conclusions of the argument (see the discussion in Chapter Ten).

Thus, the ideological effects of the protector discourse are to portray reality in terms of a public that is vulnerable to and fearful of crime and a government that will protect them from crime. It is a reality in which the government acts to address crime, spurred on by empathetic parliamentarians who recognize the plight of the public and believe that more should be done for protection in response to the problem of the fear-of-crime. The behavioral changes of the public are simply evidence of their vulnerability and their need for protection.

THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE PROTECTOR DISCOURSE

Finally, the political effects of the protector discourse can be discussed on the basis of the results of the case studies, the social identities and relations and the ideological effects examined above. Examining the political effects seeks to examine the reasons behind the development and maintenance of a particular discourse; to ask what purpose a discourse serves.

In the case of the protector discourse, there were two main political effects identified. First, the discourse allows parliamentarians to show action on law and order issues in general and more specifically, on issues relating to the fear-of-crime. Action is demonstrated through political speeches recognizing the public's fear and the behavioral consequences of that fear as well as more traditional means such as implementing government initiatives and changing police practices. As described above, the type of knowledge about the fear-of-crime among parliamentarians required by this discourse enables action to be demonstrated in a wide variety of domains due to the perceived magnitude and urgency of the problem.

The second political effect of the protector discourse is that it places the government in a position of control. The social relations and identities inherent in this discourse construct the public as passive, vulnerable, responsible (and blamed) for their victimization and yet dependent on the government for protection. Meanwhile the government takes on responsibility for protecting the public granting them an image of strength and power through their control of the means of securing that protection. These two political effects of the protector discourse combine to create an image of a government that is actively and effectively serving the needs of the public in a responsive manner.

SUMMARY OF THE PROTECTOR DISCOURSE

The protector discourse depicts the government as being in control and protecting the public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). At the same time, the public is portrayed as being legitimately afraid but passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering from fear-of-crime. This way of organizing particular characteristics of the parliamentary debates studied was then analyzed in regard to its existence in and influence on aspects of social practices – identities, relations and ideological and political effects.

There were three social identities involved in this discourse: the public as vulnerable to crime and (therefore) afraid, the public in need of and demanding government protection from crime, and the government as the provider of that protection. There were also three main social relations that were referred to: the protective role of the government over a vulnerable, dependent and frightened public; the antagonistic one-sided critical relationship

of parliamentarians to police; and the strategic empathetic relationship between the parliamentarian and the community.

The ideological effects of the protector discourse are to portray reality in terms of a public that is vulnerable to and fearful of crime and a government that will protect them from crime. There were two political effects identified as resulting from the protector discourse: parliamentarians were able to show action on law and order issues, and the government was able to show that they are in control. The two political effects of the protector discourse combine with the ideological effects to create an image of a government that is actively and effectively responding to and serving the needs of the public.


Thus the protector discourse, identified in political debates about fear-of-crime, serves as a means of organizing statements about a passive, frightened and dependent yet responsible public that seeks the protection of an empathetic/responsive and able government from the effects of a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The discourse seeks to create a reality in which the government acts to address crime, spurred on by empathetic parliamentarians who recognize the plight of the public and believe that more should be done for protection in response to the problem of the fear-of-crime.

DISCOURSE 2: THE SUPPORTER DISCOURSE

The government will support the public but cannot be blamed for the actions of criminals who cause the public to be afraid. The public is active and responsible for their safety that is threatened by and their fear that is caused by street crimes and other dangers in the environment.

As with the protector discourse, the supporter discourse is derived from the characteristics identified in the case studies of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. Figure 11.2 below depicts how the description of this discourse was drawn together from those case studies.

Figure 11.2: The Supporter Discourse



The description can be divided into six segments. Segment A (“government will support the public” is drawn from the definition of actors’ roles that was identified through the use of fight-related metaphors described in Case Study 2 (Chapter Seven). Fight-related metaphors were argued to set the role of government as one of support – where the government was supporting the community in their fight against crime and fear-of-crime.

Segment B (“cannot be blamed”) is the other half of the characteristic of the protector discourse “government is in control”. In the supporter discourse, the government wishes to maintain treatment responsibility for law and order issues. Treatment responsibility grants images of control of resources to fix problems whereas causal responsibility grants potential blame for the event occurring. Therefore, in both the protector and the support discourses, the government maintains treatment responsibility and attempts to shift causal responsibility to the community.

However, there is a different emphasis in the supporter discourse. The focus is no longer on the ability to control the resources of the state and utilize them for the protection of the public. Instead, emphasis is placed on the inappropriateness of attributions of causal responsibility to the government. The government is presenting itself as not being responsible for the criminal events occurring and therefore they cannot be blamed for any fear that the public may feel. It is the negative effect of blame associations that is inherent in attributions of treatment responsibility (as against the positive effect of granting the image of control) that is emphasized in the supporter discourse.

Segment C (“actions of criminals who cause the public to be afraid”) is a group of characteristics that are drawn from three of the six case studies: Case Study 1 on agency and abstract entities, Case Study 2 examining violence metaphors, and Case Study Three discussing common sense statements about fear-of-crime. Each of these case studies defined the actors involved in the cause of fear-of-crime. Criminals were depicted as being the reason for the public’s fear. In the agency- and metaphor- related case studies, this was done through the definitions of “us” versus “them”, constructions of identity and the setting of roles for actors. The agency case study in particular identified a concrete conception of fear-of-crime (as against the abstract entity conceived of in the protector discourse) that had a strong link between fear and the criminal act. Case Study 3 examined common sense statements about fear-of-crime and its link with rates of crime. These results identified the characteristic in some parliamentary debates that public fear-of-crime was caused by the actions of criminals.

Segment D (“the public is active”) sees the follow on from the use of the concrete concept of fear-of-crime in segment C. When a causal link is maintained between fear-of-crime and crime, public agency is not denied. The public is described as being active and able to participate in their own victimization prevention and fear reduction. This was demonstrated in detail in Case Study 1 (Chapter Six).

Segment E (“responsible for their safety and fear”) is a characteristic that was identified in Case Study 4 investigating attributions of responsibility (Chapter Nine). It was shown that the government is attempting to shift causal responsibility onto the community. In other words, the community is increasingly considered to be responsible for the opportunities

they provide to offenders as well as protecting themselves against possible criminal victimization. Coming along with that responsibility for safety and feelings of fear-of-crime, is also the blame for criminal events – the blame that is denied by the government in Segment B.

The final segment (F) referred to “street crimes and other dangers in the environment” as being the reason that the community is responsible for their safety and fear. This characteristic was identified through the case studies that examined the use of violence metaphors and appeals to common sense. In particular, fight-related metaphors were found to be used in conjunction with specific (street) crimes or events not necessarily criminal but that are considered to provoke feelings of fear (e.g., anti-social behavior). Certain environments were also discussed as being fear-evoking such as dark alleyways or ill-lit parks. The relationship of these perceived threats to safety and the resultant feelings of fear were captured by the common sense statements examined. It was the street that was the source of threat and as a consequence, a source of fear.

In summary, the supporter discourse was identified out of commonalities between particular characteristics that were identified in the case studies. It is a discourse that depicts the government as taking a supportive role of the public. In doing so, the government rejects attempts to lay blame at their feet for the actions of criminals that cause the public to feel afraid. Instead, the public is considered to be active and responsible for their safety and reduction of fear, where threat to that safety is a result of street crimes and other dangers in the environment. In contrast to the protector discourse, the supporter discourse is heavily focused on the causal link between crime and fear-of-crime. It also

almost reverses the roles and relationships taken by the public and the government. These and other features of the social practices will be discussed in the following section.

SOCIAL PRACTICES AND THE SUPPORTER DISCOURSE

This section will discuss the social practices that influence and are influenced by the supporter discourse. It will follow the same structure and rationale as the discussion of social practices and the protector discourse – the social relations and identities, and the ideological and political effects. As a consequence, some justifications will be omitted in order to reduce duplication with the previous sections.

SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF SUPPORT

The public are given a complex mix of two identities; of being at once active and responsible while also being fearful. Much of the first identity has already been discussed in Chapter Nine. The public is active and responsible. In effect, they are considered to be rational players in their own experience of life. The second identity given to the public is that of being fearful. This is a state that is traditionally perceived as being irrational (see for example the ir/rationality debates in regard to fear-of-crime: Ferraro, 1995; Lotz, 1979; RI Mawby, 1988; Mawby et al., 2000; Mugford, 1984; Ward, 1986). The combination of these two identities results in the public being responsible for the need to rationally respond to their irrational fears. It is an identity that is praised for its proactive stance but derided when action is taken because it is action initiated by an irrational reason.

The government has a far more simple identity in this discourse. They are there to support the public. However, this support is given at arms length with little evident desire to get involved in the issues between the community and outsiders for whom they hold no responsibility. The supporter discourse portrays the government as agreeing that the fight against crime should be fought and promising to support the public in doing that. While not fully passive, the role taken by the government is less active and involved than that taken in the protector discourse.

SOCIAL RELATIONS OF SUPPORT

These identities are reflected in the three sets of social relations evident in this discourse. The first was the relationship between members of the community, with a subset of this being the relationship between the community and criminals. Fear-of-crime was described as a result of the actions of certain members of the community against others. Specific groups of people were described as being afraid – elderly, women, and children – and the focus was on the fear these people felt rather than the criminal actions. As a result, the relationship between members of the community was depicted from the point of view of the fearful and their actions and demands. The relationship was one where there were deviant subsections of the community preying on fearful people who were then acting in response to those deviants. Such a relationship reflects the identities described above. The public is at once fearful and active, and the government is not directly involved.

The second set of social relations was between the government and the community. As a general category of social relations, the relationship between the government and the community has been discussed at length in regard to the protector discourse. However,

when the supporter discourse was used the government initiatives, funding and programs were given not with the intention of 'protecting' the public but with the intention of 'helping' them. This reflects the secondary role which the government takes in this discourse.

Similarly the final set of social relations relevant to the supporter discourse was also described with regard to the protector discourse above. This is the relationship between the parliamentarian and the community. Parliamentarians were described as attempting to demonstrate their empathy with a fearful public. Such displays sought to provide a sense of legitimacy and rationality to public fear (although in the case of the supporter discourse this sense is limited by the perception of irrationality attached to the identity of the fearful public). The overlap between these discourses indicates both the common ground on which they exist and a potential place of tension in regard to the display of empathy as a protector or as a supporter.

In summary, this section has described the social identities and relations involved in the supporter discourse. It has been argued that the public is given a complex mix of two identities by this discourse. First, the public is seen as active and responsible for their own protection. Secondly, the public is given the identity of being afraid. When combined, these identities exist in tension through the complex mix of behavior in response to an allegedly irrational feeling. The identity of the government is more straightforward as a supportive mentor. These identities influence the social relations that were evident in the discourse. Crime and fear-of-crime were depicted as a result of the relationship between members of

the community with the government there as a supporter and occasional mediator rather than as champion – like a parent of squabbling siblings.

THE IDEOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE SUPPORTER DISCOURSE

With these social identities and relations in mind, the ideological effect of the supporter discourse can be outlined in terms of the assumed knowledge of the target audience, the required belief system and the behaviors that are described within the supporter discourse.

Knowledge and Beliefs about Support

Similar to the protector discourse, those using the supporter discourse tended to assume that their audience would have some knowledge of fear-of-crime (i.e., related research, types of crimes and definitions). While this indicates that fear-of-crime is again being set up as a “problem” to be fixed, it is tempered in this case by the other two domains of assumed knowledge required by this discourse. It was assumed that the audience would first, have some (direct or indirect) experience with criminal victimization and second, have an understanding of crime statistics. These latter two assumptions of knowledge reflect the causal link between crime and fear-of-crime that is evident in this discourse; and as a consequence, tie the potentially abstract problem of fear-of-crime to incidents of criminal behavior.

Associated with these assumptions in knowledge is the requirement of a particular set of beliefs in order that the maxims of the discourse are accepted. For the supporter discourse, this belief system was that levels of fear-of-crime are related to the incidence or rates of crime. This again reinforces the concrete concept used in this discourse - that this type of

fear truly is a fear of crime. Without this belief, the arguments referring to the causal relationship between these phenomena would be rejected as would the identities and relations described above.

Behavioral Changes in Search of Support

The final element of the ideological effects is in the behaviors that are described in the discourse. As stated above, the type of behavioral changes that are argued by parliamentarians to be a result of fear-of-crime were not dependent on the discourse being used. Instead, the way in which those behaviors were used within the argument differed in relation to the discourse. In the supporter discourse, government action was called for in order to support the public in their fight against crime. While parliamentarians acknowledged that protection did need to be given in some form, it was the public's responsibility to protect themselves (despite at times needing government help to do so).

From these discussions, it can be said that the ideological effect of the supporter discourse was to create a reality based on the belief that fear-of-crime was felt as a result of criminal behavior and the experience of such behavior was understood by most people. It is a reality where the behaviors of the public are intended to protect themselves from criminal victimization; and in situations when their ability falls short of their responsibility, the government functions to support the public in ensuring protection.

THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE SUPPORTER DISCOURSE

The main political effects of the supporter discourse are two-fold. First, parliamentarians are granted an opportunity to show action on law and order issues in general and more

specifically, on issues relating to crime and fear-of-crime. Similar to the protector discourse, action can be demonstrated through recognition of feelings of fear as well as implementing government initiatives and programs or changing police practices. However in this discourse, those actions are specific to crime or to fear-of-crime. In the protector discourse, the required knowledge allowed parliamentarians to incorporate a variety of issues within the problem of fear. The strong causal link between crime and fear that pervades the supporter discourse prevents this. Parliamentarians are required to show action against crime because crime is the reason for the public feeling afraid.

The second political effect of the supporter discourse is to shift the burden of responsibility for victimization prevention and the reduction of fear to members of the community. As discussed in detail in Chapter Nine, the community is increasingly being asked to take causal responsibility (and blame) for crime and fear-of-crime. The supporter discourse reflects this trend with the government taking a secondary role and depicting a public that is active and able to participate in their own protection.

These two political effects of the supporter discourse combine to frame the action demonstrated on law and order issues in a different manner. Whereas in the protector discourse the government depicted itself as leading the battle against crime, the supporter discourse sets the purpose of any action to be helping those fighting crime. Consequently, there is a different standard by which the success of the action is judged because governments only have to demonstrate that their action has helped the public rather than showing that it reduced crime rates or levels of fear. Ultimately, the political effect of the

supporter discourse is to limit the scope of responsibility for addressing crime and fear-of-crime.

SUMMARY OF THE SUPPORTER DISCOURSE

The supporter discourse has been argued to present a reality where the government seeks to help the public in their attempts to address crime and fear-of-crime. The public takes on a complex mix of two identities: of being frightened and of being active and able to participate in their own safety and protection. In this discourse, the threat to that safety and the reason for public fear is clearly depicted as being a result of street crimes and other dangers in the environment. This focus on the causal link between crime and fear-of-crime is maintained throughout the mix of social identities and relations, and the ideological and political effects of the discourse. As a result of this mix of social practices, the supporter discourse provides the opportunity for the parliamentarians (and those in government especially) to shift the burden of responsibility onto the community and deny attributions of blame, while demonstrating action and empathy towards the public.

DISCOURSE 3: THE MANIPULATOR DISCOURSE

<p>The parliamentarian is selfishly oriented towards their personal gain and sees only the utility of the public's fear-of-crime.</p>

The manipulator discourse is about politics rather than governance. A discourse with a focus on brinkmanship rather than serving the community, it pervades much of what is said and debated in politics. This discourse was perhaps most explicitly investigated in Case

Study 5 (Chapter Ten) that examined the balancing of political ideology with behaviors for short-term advantage. However, many of the implications discussed at the end of each case study also speak to the manipulator discourse.

For example, AACIW metaphors and the identity of the fearful public were argued to potentially increase the effectiveness of political rhetoric about crime in order to generate support for parties, individual parliamentarians or policies. Parliamentarians may also be able to create, manipulate and use the power of common sense that is granted by its perceived legitimacy and authority to allow the language of fear to become a reality of fear. Finally, changing attributions of responsibility allow for the control of images related to control and effectiveness. These implications that have been drawn from the characteristics of political debates about fear-of-crime all speak in some way to the manipulator discourse.

However, it is the purpose for which such characteristics are used that give the manipulator discourse its distinct flavor. The rhetoric, power of common sense, ideology and locations of responsibility are used in this discourse to further distinctly *political* ends. The aim is to gain political advantage in party competition. It is a discourse that has strong negative overtones of deceit, egoism and manipulation; and as such, the use of the discourse functions as a means of regulating parliamentarians' behavior through criticism. The manipulator discourse, while in this thesis conceived in terms of debates about fear-of-crime, is likely to be identifiable in political discussions about many issues and social problems.

SOCIAL PRACTICES AND THE MANIPULATOR DISCOURSE

The social practices in which the manipulator discourse exists and influences differ from those discussed for the supporter and protector discourses in that the focus is on politics. In the other two discourses, politics formed merely the forum through which governance occurred and crime and fear-of-crime were addressed. In the manipulator discourse, that focus is reversed with emphasis being placed on the politics itself with minimal reference being made to the problem of fear-of-crime. This orientation will be evident in the discussion of social practices below. Given the focus of this discourse on politics, the political effects will be discussed throughout the sections below and not separately as occurred when examining the protector and supporter discourses above.

SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF MANIPULATION

Reflecting the discourse's focus on politics, the social identities and relations involved also emphasize politics rather than governance. The social identities referred to are: that the public is interested and participating in politics; and that parliamentarians are untrustworthy and self-interested. The identity of the public as interested and involved in politics stems from the assumption that criticizing a fellow parliamentarian for manipulating public fear for personal gain will have some kind of costly impact. This cost often assumes that such criticisms may damage their public image of honesty and accountability which in turn may reduce the public's likelihood of supporting them in the next election.

Furthermore, the public identity of being interested in politics was not openly discussed in the way that occurred for the public as vulnerable or frightened. These latter identities

needed argumentative justification in most cases – indicating that they may still be contested identities in the process of being formed. However, there was no such contest for a politically interested public identity. This identity, given through the principles of democratic government, was taken for granted in the manipulator discourse.

The second identity involved in this discourse was that the parliamentarian is untrustworthy and self-interested. In contrast to the interested public identity, the image of the parliamentarian was contested. Indeed, that image is the ultimate target of the discourse itself. The underlying claim of this discourse is that parliamentarians, may at times, manipulate and use public fears to make use of the malleability of public support that it creates – a frightened public is expected to be more likely to accept greater infringements on civil liberties in the hope that it generates feelings of safety and security. In regard to law and order issues, such infringements embodied in legislation and increases in police powers provide opportunities for demonstrable short-term action.

However, this strategic use of political and government action needs to be motivated by a desire to serve and respond to the demands of the public. The manipulator discourse is based on the identity of a parliamentarian who is motivated by greed and personal gain to manipulate those actions and demands. It is the identity of the self-interested parliamentarian that is the focus of this discourse and it is a source of contestation as to who takes on that identity.

SOCIAL RELATIONS OF MANIPULATION

As a result of the identities of the politically interested public and the self-interested parliamentarian, the social relations center on the role of the parliamentarian. The first social relation is that between the parliamentarian and the government. This was discussed in detail in Chapter Ten. Suffice it to say here, this relationship is largely adversarial between opposition and government parliamentarians utilizing strategies of attack and defense in order to gain votes and achieve office and policy goals.

The second social relation is between the parliamentarian and the community. It is a relationship that is common through all of the three discourses identified. In each case, parliamentarians are attempting to show empathy with the public. However, in the manipulator discourse this empathy is influenced by the identity of the parliamentarian as being untrustworthy and is tinged with similar questions over their motives. Given the focus of this discourse on the image of the parliamentarian and the centrality of politics, motivations for displaying empathy tended to be attributed dominance over the display itself.

In summary, the social atmosphere in which the manipulator discourse operates is largely one of cynicism. The public is assumed to be interested in politics and their voting behavior is the ultimate target of political strategy. However, the main focus of this discourse is the contestation over the identity of the parliamentarian. Parliamentarians have a strong negative identity of deceit, manipulation and self-interest in this discourse; and the discourse itself is part of the battle to avoid that identity. As a consequence, the social relations of politics (parliamentarians, government and the community) form the main

ground on which to contest that identity; and the actions of parliamentarians such as the display of empathy become liable for criticisms of manipulation of public fear for self-interested advantage.

THE IDEOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE MANIPULATOR DISCOURSE

The ideological effect of the manipulator discourse can be demonstrated through the assumed knowledge, required belief system and behavioral effects in the target audience. In the manipulator discourse, an assumed knowledge of the problem of fear-of-crime is secondary to knowledge of politics and the workings of government. This order is not surprising considering the extent to which this discourse is removed from the public and their fear. To utilize this discourse effectively, knowledge of the parliamentary conventions and “tricks” of politics is far more important and is also assumed of the target audience.

Similarly, the belief system required by this discourse bears little relevance to feelings of fear in the community. Instead, those hearing this discourse need to believe that public opinion (and thus voting behavior) is open to change by political rhetoric. The criticisms inherent in the manipulator discourse would have little value if public opinion was not influenced by what is said in political debates in parliament or in the media. The criticisms, and the utility of the discourse itself, rely on their ability to ‘cost’ the target parliamentarian in some way. While the behavioral changes that are potentially a result of the discourse provide the last element of ideological effects, this thesis does not empirically study the behavioral impact of the political discourses about fear-of-crime and will therefore leave such a discussion for future research.

In summary, the ideological effect of the manipulator discourse is situated in the realm of politics, government and least of all governance. This discourse seeks to create a reality where the opposing members of parliament are deceitful and self-interested, where they would manipulate public fears for political gain. As a result the identities and relations are highly contested as parliamentarians vie for control over the direction of the manipulator discourse.

SUMMARY OF THE MANIPULATOR DISCOURSE

The manipulator discourse identified in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime focused on politics rather than governance, on political strategy in party competition rather than serving the community. It is characterized by questions over the motivations that direct the debates about fear-of-crime. The manipulator discourse posits that much of political behavior is motivated by the desire to gain advantage over competitors, and debating issues related to fear-of-crime is but one strategy in gaining that advantage. As such, it is a discourse in which the identity of the parliamentarian is the source of greatest dispute as users seek to control their own public image. Any action by a parliamentarian then becomes liable for criticisms of self-interest. The ideological and political effects of this discourse are to create a reality where the opposing members of parliament are perceived as untrustworthy, deceitful and self-interested – thereby hoping to cost those parliamentarians valuable public support. The manipulator discourse is inherently linked with political competition and is largely removed from the public, crime and fear-of-crime.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter sought to bring together all of the characteristics of political debates about fear-of-crime that had been identified through the previous chapters. In some respects, it was intended to function as both the final chapter of analysis of those debates and as a summary chapter of the characteristics themselves. With these functions and goals in mind, each of the three discourses were presented through first, a short description and an explanation of the source of the segments of that description, and secondly a deeper examination using the focal points of the social identities and relations involved in, and the ideological and political effects of, the discourse as a system of organization. The last goal was to be able to respond to the main question posed by this thesis – how do parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime?

The protector discourse, identified in political debates about fear-of-crime, serves as a means of organizing statements about a passive, frightened and dependent yet responsible public that seeks the protection of an empathetic/responsive and able government from the effects of a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The discourse seeks to create a reality in which the government acts to address crime, spurred on by empathetic parliamentarians who recognize the plight of the public and believe that more should be done for protection in response to the problem of fear-of-crime.

The supporter discourse presents a reality where the government seeks to help the public in their attempts to address crime and fear-of-crime. The public takes on a complex mix of two identities: of being frightened and of being active and able to participate in their own safety and protection. In this discourse, the threat to that safety and the reason for public

fear is clearly depicted as a result of street crimes and other dangers in the environment. The supporter discourse provided the opportunity for the parliamentarian (and those in government especially) to shift the burden of responsibility onto the community and deny attributions of blame, while demonstrating action and empathy towards the public.

Finally, the manipulator discourse focused on politics rather than governance, on political strategy in party competition rather than on efforts to serve the community. This discourse posits that much of political behavior is motivated by the desire to gain advantage over competitors, and debating issues related to fear-of-crime is but one strategy in gaining that advantage. As such, it is a discourse in which the identity of the parliamentarian is the source of greatest dispute as users seek to manage their own public image. Any action by a parliamentarian then becomes liable for criticisms of self-interest. The manipulator discourse creates a reality where the opposing members of parliament are perceived as untrustworthy, deceitful and self-interested – thereby hoping to cost those parliamentarians valuable public support. The manipulator discourse is inherently linked with political competition and is largely removed from the public, crime and fear-of-crime.

Thus in response to the initial question posed by this thesis, it can now be argued that, in general, Australian parliamentarians, in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime in three ways: (a) in terms of a passive and frightened public requiring protection given by the government to reduce their fear-of-crime; (b) in terms of an active and frightened public requiring support in their attempts to protect themselves from crime and reduce their fear-of-crime; and (c) in terms of political competition where discussing fear-of-crime is but one strategy

used by the self-interested parliamentarian to gain short-term advantage. The implications of talking about fear-of-crime in these ways will be discussed in the Chapter that follows.

CHAPTER TWELVE
THEORIES AND IMPLICATIONS

In Chapter Four of this thesis, I presented the methodology that I intended to use to examine parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. The purpose of this research was to challenge or at least verify the assumptions made in the literature about how politicians ‘used’ fear-of-crime. I then developed, and carried out, an exploratory data-driven study. Using CDA as the guiding approach with individual methodologies detailed in each case study, I identified specific characteristics about the parliamentary debates, examined the broader implications of these characteristics, and finally, drew out three discourses that were evident as a result of the analysis of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

My intention in this chapter is to begin situating the research contained here, within the existent body of criminological literature. In contrast to most of the previous chapters, this chapter is primarily theoretical: its purpose is to present the research gap that this thesis is intended to address. To do this, I will first use Garland’s (2001) expansive study of the social, political and cultural changes that have occurred in regard to the criminal justice state as a means of providing an overview of the environment (including scholarly environment) in which the debates about fear-of-crime were produced.

I will then use the criticisms that have been made of *The Culture of Control* as a means of indicating where further work is needed to produce a more comprehensive ‘history of the present’. These criticisms, together with Garland’s work itself, serve as a mechanism to highlight the theoretical research gap that this thesis is intended to begin to fill. The chapter that follows will test a number of hypotheses about how politicians talk about fear-of-crime, as drawn from the criminological literature, with a view to establishing a base from which to discuss the theoretical implications of the work contained in this thesis.

HISTORICAL & THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

In this section, I will use the 12 indices of changes that are presented by Garland in *The Culture of Control* to provide a succinct description of the history and the present climate in which the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime were produced. I will then present some of the criticisms of Garland's work in order to highlight where there are perceived inadequacies in his explanation and alternative fields in which change needs to be acknowledged. Through this discussion, I hope to detail the environment in which the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime were produced, and to situate the current research in the already existing criminological literature.

THE CULTURE OF CONTROL – A SUMMARY OF CHANGES

In 2001, David Garland published *The Culture of Control*. Garland's intention in this work was to explain the shift away from penal welfarism to a culture of control that focuses on punishment and incapacitation rather than rehabilitation and correction. He sought to identify and examine the broad themes and changes that have occurred in the crime control field. This is a field that he sees as including "policing, sentencing, punishment, criminological theory, penal philosophy, penal politics, private security, crime prevention, the treatment of victims and so on" (p.x). Garland identifies themes by comparing the policies and practices that existed up until the 1970s with those that exist today in the first decade of the 21st century. This mainly secondary comparative analysis is focused on cultures of control in Britain and the United States. In doing so, Garland presents a history of penal and social change, the criminal justice state, and the changing influence of the

social, economic and culture forces of late modern society on criminological thought, crime policies and popular culture. It is within this changing environment that the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime occurred and consequently, these changes need to be acknowledged in order to discuss the implication of the way in which parliamentarians talk about public fears.

Garland argues that the contemporary arrangements for controlling crime have been shaped by two forces: first, the social organizations of late modernity; and second, the free-market driven, conservative politics dominating UK and US politics during the 1980s. Rather than asserting that the changes in crime control were merely a response to these two social forces, Garland seeks to describe the processes by which those forces changed crime control measures and the mechanisms by which crime policy was changed by contemporary culture and social relations.

While Garland's main focus is the transformation of the penal system and increasing punitiveness, I wish to use the history he gives of social change and crime control since 1970 as background for later discussions about the hypotheses for the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. These changes in contemporary crime control are identified under 12 'indices of change' or sets of observations about the transformations in the crime control field. A brief summary of each will be provided below. Further information about these changes can be found in Garland (2001).

1. **The decline of the rehabilitative ideal:** this was the erosion during the 1970s of rehabilitative goals as a core role of penal institutions. While Garland acknowledges

that rehabilitative programs still continue in prisons and elsewhere, he argues that these concerns have been subordinated to other penal goals such as retribution, incapacitation and risk management.

2.The re-emergence of punitive sanctions and expressive justice: in the last 20 years, late modern societies have seen the re-emergence of penalties whose specific and explicit goals are retribution. Such “just deserts” policy goals, with their concern for fixed sentences, have allowed politicians to espouse openly punitive sentiments and present increasingly draconian laws. Garland provides examples of the re-emergence of punitive measures such as the death penalty, chain gangs, corporal punishment, shaming and public notification of some types of offenders. Expressive justice has also re-emerged as politicians express public outrage, anger and resentment when discussing crime and penal policy. Garland notes that the feelings of the victim, the victim’s family or a fearful and outraged public are now routinely appearing in rhetoric supporting new laws. The tone of official discourse has changed with this adoption of language that seeks to condemn and punish at the behest of public sentiment.

3.Changes in the emotional tone of crime policy: Garland argues that the emotional temperature of crime policy has shifted from ‘cool to hot’. This shift has occurred through the increased salience of fear-of-crime in the 1970s. Instead of afflicting only the ‘worst-off’ individuals or neighborhoods, fear-of-crime is now recognized as a major social problem. Garland argues that public fear and insecurity are a “characteristic of contemporary culture” (p.10). Fear-of-crime (“a collectively raised consciousness of crime” (p.163)) is combined with the assumption that crime rates are increasing and that the government lacks the ability to control crime. This

fearful, angry public has influenced the formulation of public policy to be increasingly based on stereotypes of unruly youths, predators, career criminals and fearful members of the public demanding protection.

4. The return of the victim: Noting bills colloquially known by the name of the victim (e.g. “Megan’s law”¹, “Jenna’s law”², and the “Brady Bill”³), Garland argues that the interests and feelings of (direct and indirect) victims are consistently invoked in support of punitive measures. The symbolic figure of the victim has become someone who is representative of the public. Victimage is a common and collective experience rather than atypical and abnormal.

5. Above all, the public must be protected: this theme has developed out of a sense that security is urgently needed, danger needs to be contained and, in general, risk needs to be identified and managed. Garland cites increasing use of policies that: use prison as a means of incapacitation, de-emphasize parole and probation, increase sentences and introduce community notification laws. In these policies, the emphasis has been on effective law enforcement and crime control rather than civil liberties and rights of prisoners / offenders.

6. Politicization and the new populism: crime control issues have now become part of electoral competition where policies are partisan and mistakes are scandals. Where previously crime policies were developed by professional experts, they are now

¹ “Megan’s Law” refers to a collection of American state laws that require persons convicted of any sexual assault to notify the law enforcement authorities of their whereabouts. The first law was passed in New Jersey in 1994 after a convicted sex offender sexually assaulted and murdered his neighbor Megan Kanka.

² “Jenna’s Law” (1998 *New York Law Chapter 1*) was part of the move towards ‘truth in sentencing’ where pre-determined sentences and periods of post-release supervision are set. This law also requires victim notification upon release of certain inmates. Jenna Grieshaber was murdered by Nicholas Pryor, released after serving two-thirds of a prison sentence.

³ The Brady Bill is named after James Brady who was shot by John Hinckley during the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan on March 30, 1981. The *Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (1993)* requires that background checks for individuals be conducted a firearm may be purchased from a person holding a federal firearms license.

constructed with a view to providing political advantage and being based on public opinion rather than evidence-based research. Such politicization and populism has seen a convergence of policy proposals from the parties studied in the US and UK: all parties have attempted to create policies that are seen by the public as 'tough' and 'smart'.

- 7. The reinvention of the prison:** Using rates of imprisonment as evidence for his case, Garland argues that the purpose of the prison has changed from a penitentiary, reformatory, correctional facility to now being directed towards incapacitation and retributive punishment. The view of the prison as being the last resort has been reversed with the institution becoming an indispensable means of responding to public demands for protection and retribution.
- 8. The transformation of criminological thought:** Garland argues that criminological theories have progressed from an 'eclectic mixture of abnormal psychology and sociological theories' to focus on control. These latter theories see criminal behavior as a problem of a lack of control rather than deprivation. Crime itself is taken to be a normal feature of society and individuals are treated as being first and foremost self-serving: individuals will commit criminal behavior if there is not adequate control to restrain them. Garland emphasizes one genre of control theories which he calls 'the criminologies of everyday life'. These criminologies are those such as rational choice and routine activity theories. Such theories treat crime as an event which are not based in pathology or extraordinary motivation. As a result, official policies to address crime (that are based in these theories) tend to focus on the criminal event rather than the criminality of the individual.

- 9. The expanding infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety:** Based on the criminologies of everyday life, there have been increasing efforts by government and community groups to form 'preventative partnerships' that are dedicated to preventing crime, reducing fear and increasing security. These programs that attempt to build informal social controls and self-policing activities in a community exist in marked contrast to the punitive and divisive policies that are presented in populist crime policies.
- 10. Civil society and the commercialization of crime control:** These preventative partnerships are part of a larger movement that sees the locus of crime control being spread between public and private agencies. In the late modern society, Garland argues, the state has begun to reduce its monopoly on crime control and encourage crime reduction activities on the part of communities, individuals and commercial entities. At the same time, there has been an increase in the private security sector, reaching a point where it is recognized as a partner of the state in the provision of security for the public. Similar attempts at spreading sources of crime control between public and private spheres can be seen in the policing and penal sectors.
- 11. New management styles and working practices:** The changes already discussed in the points above have had a consequence for the explicit functions of criminal justice agencies. For example, Garland argues that the police now present themselves as a responsive public service dedicated to maintaining order; prisons as holding offenders rather than rehabilitating them; and sentencing as following a formula of fixed and rigid guidelines. Similarly, managerialism has narrowed discretion and regulated work practices by emphasizing performance indicators and cost-effectiveness of interventions.

12. **A perpetual sense of crisis:** Garland argues that much of the last 20 years of the 20th century were characterized by a sense of crisis: he talks of unrelenting upheavals, unmistakable malaise and demoralization with constant reforms, new legislation and policy development. This has now transformed into a sense that the actions being undertaken have been tried and have failed (either through implementation or through a faulty theoretical base). As a result, the public is growing less confident in the criminal justice provisions and politicians grow less likely to seek advice from criminological experts or personnel. In short, the criminal justice system is seen to be at a dangerous point where trust should not be placed in any one individual or group.

These 12 indices of change are used by Garland to demonstrate both the breadth of the crime control field and the benefit of understanding the field in its entirety. Garland continues from this point to flesh out his argument about changes in the penal system. He begins by developing a history of the modern penal-welfare state in the early 20th century, fleshing out the transformations (the 12 indices listed above) that have occurred in response to the penal-welfare state and its perceived flaws, and then finally to an examination of how the social changes of late modernity have assisted in creating a changed environment in comparison to the 1970s.

For my purposes, I wish to use these indices as background for the characteristics of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. In other words, they form a catalogue of both the changes that have led to and the characteristics of the political and social environment

in which the parliamentary debates occur. Specific indices or elements of Garland's later case studies will be drawn upon as appropriate in the discussion of the hypotheses below.

Before doing so, however, I will present an overview of Garland's perceived role for fear-of-crime within the social, cultural and political changes that he details in late modern societies. As well as providing a more complete picture of Garland's argument, this overview of fear-of-crime will be drawn upon in later discussions of the criticisms that have been made of *The Culture of Control*. In turn, these criticisms will be used to highlight the research gap which this thesis is intended to begin to fill.

GARLAND AND FEAR OF CRIME

Fear-of-crime, in a very broad conception, is integral to Garland's argument about the changing culture of control in late modern societies. He argues that the new politics of crime control are socially and culturally conditioned; that the policies that have emerged must find resonance with the 'cultural sensibilities' of the community in order to be effective. In order to examine the cultural sensibilities that have given the punitive policies support, Garland begins by arguing that the 'victim' has taken on an independent symbolic existence. No longer is the victim an abnormal, individual and atypical figure but has now become representative of a collective and common experience. The rising figure of the victim has shifted debate from rational and instrumental goals towards expressing emotions and righteous indignation. Garland argues that: "If the centre-piece of penal-welfarism was the (expert projection of) the individual offender and his or her needs, the centre of contemporary penal discourse is (a political projection of) the individual victim and his or her feelings" (p.144).

From here, Garland argues that to understand the new penal culture it is necessary to explore the new meaning of victimhood with its changed experience of crime and resulting insecurity. It is this insecurity and anxiety, and the antidote expression of anger and outrage, that Garland refers to under the title of fear-of-crime. However, for the most part, Garland adopts a wide conception of fear-of-crime or what he terms a “collectively raised consciousness of crime” (p.163) to examine as part of the new meaning of victimhood. In what follows, I will present a brief overview of Garland’s argument concerning fear-of-crime. The purpose of this overview is to (a) provide a more complete picture of Garland’s argument about the social changes that have resulted in the present focus on expressive justice, retribution and incapacitation; and (b) provide background to the criticisms made of *The Culture of Control* and from there, the research gap identified for this thesis.

Garland argues that high rates of crime have become a normal social fact in the US and UK. As a result, the general population has developed a new ‘collective experience of crime’. Garland focuses this argument by saying that it is the middle class that have developed this collective experience. Once an event that was almost exclusively experienced by the poor, the high crime rates of the 1960s meant that the signs of crime and disorder led to fear-of-crime becoming a routinized part of the middle class’ daily life. Fear-of-crime then combined with the general insecurities felt by the population as a result of the rapid social change and economic recession during that decade. As time progressed into the 1970s, there developed a two-way interaction between these anxieties and reactive politics. The politics developed off the back of these anxieties, and in turn, the politics focused those anxieties into a set of attitudes, with a named problem and scapegoats.

Garland argues that the new middle class concerns about crime were affected by three social developments. First, the typical household changed into a complex and fragile organization that required management, scheduling and co-ordination to a degree not required before. The fragility of the household left many members of the middle-class feeling vulnerable to the effects of crime and resulted in the increased experience of anxiety, resentment and anger about the imposition of crime and the dangerous world.

Second, Garland argues that changes in crime policy during the 1960s may also have resulted in the middle class' new experience of crime. It is suggested that a major state response to the rising rates of crime was to 'define deviance down': in effect to tolerate low level crime and dedicate resources to serious crimes. As a result, minor offences went unchecked and signs of disorder became more apparent and prevalent. This changing landscape, combined with increasing rates of crime and fear-of-crime, led many to believe that the state was retreating from the problem, leaving them unprotected.

Third, the mass media (or more specifically television viewing) had a strong influence on the popular perception of crime. Garland highlights TV's "focus upon national rather than local news; its affinity for crime as a theme; its sympathetic portrayal of individual victims who have suffered at the hands of criminals and been let down by an uncaring, ineffectual system" (p.157) as factors in transforming the perceptions of crime by the middle class to seeing it as close and common. Garland argues that the mass media "tapped into, then dramatized and reinforced... [and] institutionalized that experience" (p.158) of crime. As a result, the salience of crime in everyday life was increased for the middle class.

Garland argues that these three changes are not in themselves sufficient to explain the changes in the social attitudes to crime. Instead, the changes demand actions and responses. Garland lists two responses: first, the victims' movement and its goals of increasing recognition of the interests of the victim; and second, the use of social and situational crime control measures (otherwise known as 'informal social control') through crime prevention programs in order to cover a perceived inadequacy in state-run criminal justice agencies. Based on these responses, certain precautions such as installing security devices, locking doors, changing behavior on the streets and so on have been adopted as routine precautions. Similarly, urban planners have followed public demand and adapted designs to increase security (for example, gated communities). These adaptations, so frequently argued to be prompted from fear-of-crime, are argued by Garland to have resulted in 'settled cultural effects' (p.163): they have become part of common sense and the routines of everyday life.

The cultural effects are termed by Garland to be the 'crime complex' of high crime societies. This complex then has an effect on politics and policy as citizens become conscious of crime and fearful of victimization. The identity of the victim is imposed upon them (or is voluntarily adopted) and forces them to engage with crime and crime prevention. This in turn generates an ambivalent response that oscillates between accepting new behavioral adaptations of avoidance and feeling a sense of frustration and anger at the irritation of crime. The combination of fear and powerlessness prompts calls for action from the public which then finds political representation and ultimately political action.

It is this crime control complex with its patterns of "social routines, cultural practices and collective sensibilities" (p.164) that form the foundation for current crime control

strategies. They result in policies of preventative partnerships and punitive segregation based on the themes of: “expressivity, punitiveness, victim-centredness, public protection, exclusion, enhanced control, loss-prevention, public-private partnership, [and] responsabilization” (p.165). Yet at the heart of these strategies, is the new collectively raised consciousness of crime – fear-of-crime –giving such strategies meaning and purpose.

Using as a foundation the foregoing discussion about fear-of-crime and the changing culture of the criminal justice state, I will now use the criticisms that have been made of *The Culture of Control* as a means of situating the research undertaken in this thesis within the criminological theory already established. These criticisms will also highlight perceived inadequacies of the summary and explanations given by Garland; and as a consequence, provide a more comprehensive account of the changes in crime control, public policy on crime and criminology that have lead to the current environment in which parliamentarians discuss fear-of-crime.

THE CULTURE OF CONTROL – THE CRITICISMS

Garland’s *The Culture of Control* has been criticized in a number of areas. The first criticism lies in his choice of a comparative methodology and its perhaps unintended consequences. Beckett (2001) criticizes Garland’s decision to deemphasize differences between the United States and Britain in order to emphasize the qualitative aspects of the field of crime control. However, she does acknowledge that such a decision allows Garland to identify less than obvious dimensions of the field and the generalizations allow for explanations of changes over time. Other criticisms made by Beckett include:

1. not acknowledging further the differences between each country's political and institutional differences. Beckett cites the decentralized nature of the US political system as having important implications in relation to the influence of public opinion (Savelsberg (2002) makes the same criticisms for the differences between the US and Germany);
2. the different scope of the welfare state in each country. Similarly, Hannah-Moffat (2002) has also criticized Garland for giving only a partial history of the penal welfare state that does not acknowledge its punitive aspects. This point is made by Russell Hogg (2002) but in the context of a lack of recognition of the detriments of the 'social democratic solidarity project';
3. underemphasizing the role of racial tension in the United States in the transformation of responses to crime (a point also made by Hannah-Moffat (2002));
and
4. ignoring differences between Britain's and the United States':
 - incarceration rates: These rates act as a proxy or a comparative measure of the two country's propensity to ascribe prison sentences. As a result, the differences in the incarceration rates between the countries may have important implications for Garland's argument.
 - crime rates: Jock Young (2002) raises the difference between the United States and other late modern societies such as Western Europe and Japan in terms of their crime rates. Young argues that such differences are on a scale comparable to key criminological variables such as age and gender, and cannot be ignored.

This lack of acknowledgement within the methodology of the differences between the countries, also lead Beckett to criticize the use of a research design that openly denies the ability to evaluate the argument. This denial stems from Garland's disclaimer that variations between countries in the patterns of social, economic and cultural relations and its responses to crime are evidence of the mediating effect that human actors may have on the effects of structural pressures. Beckett argues that the disclaimer underestimates the scope of the variations between late modern societies and instead such variations should be able to be used to test Garland's argument.

The criticism made by Beckett (2001) and Hannah-Moffat (2002) of providing only a partial history of the welfare state was extended by Savelsberg (2002) with a focus on the analysis of causal factors. Savelsberg (2002) argued that Garland provided an oversimplified account of the causes for the social changes he identified because he focuses on the institutional nature of the state. "In addition, historically sedimented nation-specific cultures, affected by religious traditions and historical contingencies contribute to shaping emergent cultures of control, in combination with and despite common structural challenges and pressures of globalization" (p.700). Savelsberg argues that the explanatory model provided by Garland needs to be more complex in order to account for the differences between nation states.

Young (2002) raised a further criticism of Garland's work arguing that there was an inappropriate de-emphasis of some strands of criminology such as feminism and critical criminology. These types of criminology, Young argued, provide a narrative that fits closer to everyday life in late modern societies than do the control theories emphasized by

Garland. Furthermore, Young criticizes the absence of these focusing on inequality in the criminologies that are drawn upon: criminologies such as the anomie tradition of Durkheim and Merton as well as the Marxist influences in critical criminology. While Young acknowledges that they are mentioned by Garland, the criticism is made that such mentions are not elaborated to an appropriate degree. In short, Young is arguing that Garland's criminologies are providing only one voice of everyday life (see also Savelsberg (2002) who argues that the selective approach taken by Garland in regard to discussing the different strands of criminology, is short-sighted and prematurely ignores what each has to say about control and crime).

Young (2002) also criticizes Garland for his "metanarratives of succession" (p.238). By this, he is referring to the way in which the penal welfare system transforms into a new culture of control, social deprivation theories transform into control theories, and social democratic politics is replaced by neo-liberalism and the rise of the New Right. Young argues that Garland has not given sufficient emphasis to the overlap and simple co-existence of these trends.

The final criticism by Young of Garland is that *The Culture of Control* produces poor policy outcomes. While Garland does speak of crime prevention and preventative partnerships as a means of mediating the effects of the new crime control complex, Young argues that there needs to be significant structural changes to address the problems of crime and punishment that have been identified.

The criticisms discussed up to this point have been given as a means of providing a more complete history of the environment in which parliamentary debate about fear-of-crime occurs. However, it is the third criticism made by Beckett (2001) about the argument presented in *The Culture of Control* that provides the link to the theoretical hypotheses being addressed by this chapter. Beckett highlights the perceived neglect of the role of political and cultural discourses in the development of the ideas behind the new culture of crime control and penal policy. In addition, Garland stands accused of having neglected several bodies of evidence that, Beckett argues, may alter the interpretations and as a result, give politics a greater role in the transformation of crime control.

“In sum, the empirical evidence for several of Garland’s key claims is quite mixed, and, I think, casts doubt on his argument that consequences of late modern social organization — rising crime rates, official disregard of minor forms of disorder, and widespread loss of faith in correctionalism – triggered the transformation of the crime control field”. (p.915)

Instead, Beckett argues that Garland’s focus on the structural and experiential basis of changes in the culture of crime control has led him to underestimate the impact of public, political and cultural discourses in these changes. She argues that these discourses have the “power to shape beliefs, perceptions and emotions” and by ignoring this power, Garland denies their ability to give expression to and potentially reinforce “preexisting perceptions of and anxieties about order” (Beckett, 2001: 139). In effect Beckett is arguing for the reciprocal recognition of the ability of political discourse to influence public perceptions of crime and feelings of insecurity and anxiety upon which Garland bases so much of his argument.

It is this perceived ability of political discourses to express and even construct the public's fears and insecurities that provides a basis for the current research. With such a central role being given to the public's raised awareness of crime and the resulting feelings of insecurity, Garland argues that politicians have taken the presented opportunity to represent the public's frustration, irritation and fear as well as to champion their demands for action. Similarly, the crime policies developed have been directed towards expressive ends either through a political desire to represent public fears or through the need to find public support for the policies (with a fearful public wanting punitive policies).

Given the centrality of fear-of-crime to the discussion of political action, Beckett (2001) argues that Garland has not examined in sufficient depth the interaction between political discourses and those feelings of insecurity: that political discourse has the potential to influence public fears of crime. This potential to influence has been highlighted in many of the studies reviewed in earlier chapters, and as previously described, criminologists have taken up the cause to determine to what extent levels of fear-of-crime are influenced by political rhetoric. This thesis was intended to verify the assumptions that are made by such researchers about the homogenous style and content of that rhetoric.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter was to situate the exploratory data-driven study of previous chapters within the body of criminological literature and to establish the research gap that it intended to begin to fill. To do this, I first used Garland's *The Culture of Control* as a means of presenting the environment in which the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime were produced. This environment included the changing influence of the social,

economic and cultural forces of late modern society on criminological thought, crime policies and popular culture. I then used the criticisms that have been made of *The Culture of Control* as a means of indicating where further work is needed to produce a more comprehensive ‘history of the present’.

It was the last of the presented criticisms, together with Garland’s work itself, which served as a mechanism to highlight the theoretical research gap that this thesis is intended to begin to fill. Garland was criticized for not acknowledging sufficiently that political discourse has the potential to influence public fears of crime, as well as public fears influencing the talk of politicians. While criminologists have attempted to determine the level to which fear-of-crime is influenced by political rhetoric, I argued that a ‘gap’ had been left: how do politicians talk about fear-of-crime?

The following chapter will test a number of hypotheses about how parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime. The research questions and hypotheses are drawn from the criminological literature and tested with the exploratory data-driven study contained in previous chapters. By doing so, I attempt to demonstrate the importance of a more nuanced understanding of political discourses about fear-of-crime – of filling the identified research gap. The broader theoretical implications of this research will be discussed in the Conclusion.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

COMBINING DATA AND THEORY:

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter will present a description of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime that can be derived from previous research on political rhetoric, crime and public fears. This description has three components: the type of knowledge claims made, the identity of the public that is portrayed and the process of negotiating responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime. Focusing on each of these components separately, I will examine their theoretical background and test a number of hypotheses that can be derived from that background, using the empirical data from the present research. The results of this process of hypothesis testing and theoretical review will be discussed in the final chapter. A more nuanced description of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime than is currently assumed by criminologists will be presented. It is this complex and hybrid nature of political rhetoric that I argue needs to be recognized by those studying how politicians talk about public fears.

Having established the research gap for this thesis from a theoretical perspective in the previous chapter, I now wish to combine this overview with the literature reviewed in Chapters Two and Three especially. This will then be followed by a review of the research questions, the characteristics examined and the three discourses identified. Each of these reviews will be brief in order to avoid excessive repetition with what has already been given in detail in earlier chapters. It is at this point, that I will present the hypotheses that are intended to serve as a link between what has essentially be a 'real' world or a-theoretical focus on the specifics of parliamentary debates with a discussion of their theoretical implications for criminologists studying the crime control field. In effect, the hypotheses are intended to rephrase the findings about the characteristics of parliamentary debates into a form that tests the claims made in the criminological literature.

In Chapter Three of this thesis, I argued that many western countries (late modern societies) such as the US, UK and Australia are obsessed by crime. It is a subject that has come to symbolize much more than simply the violation of behavioral boundaries. Law and order politics is a phrase that refers to the political maneuvering around the issues of crime and its control. The changes in law and order politics have been detailed in a practical sense in Chapter Three and a theoretical sense, by Garland in Chapter Twelve. Suffice it to say here that this topic in politics has seen increasing demands made upon it for retribution from the public and the rhetoric employed by politicians have developed an overtly expressive quality.

It is in this expressive quality that fear-of-crime plays a central role. In Chapter Three, I presented the history of fear-of-crime – from its ‘discovery’ in national crime surveys to its acceptance as a social problem requiring state intervention. This central role of fear-of-crime has also been examined by Garland who argued that in the increasingly expressive nature of crime policy, the image of an angry and fearful public has become integral to political debate; and as a consequence, has become a stated reason for the changes towards punitive and retributive crime policies.

As discussed in Chapter Three, during this evolution of fear-of-crime and law and order politics, academics have devoted much effort to learning more about this type of fear. Research has covered such topics as: ways of predicting fear from demographic and environmental factors, the impact of the media, ways of using policing practices to reduce fear and the influence of crime policies and political rhetoric more generally on levels of fear-of-crime in the community. It is this last point that is of most importance to the current

research. I argued that much of the literature focusing on the fear-of-crime within law and order politics was based on a largely untested assumption that (all) politicians use fear-of-crime as if they were part of a law and order auction: using fear-of-crime as evidence for the need for their crime policies which they argue are 'tougher' than their opponents. Scholars have then focused their research on the impact of such rhetoric on levels of fear-of-crime. I argued that that assumption needed verification and developed the following research question around which to conduct an exploratory study:

How do Australian politicians, when in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime?

The study to provide answers to this question sought to identify discourses that exist within parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime; and to do so based on characteristics drawn from unmediated political debate (hence parliamentary debate). Rather than attempt to identify all linguistic, social, and political characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime, I focused on five case studies existing on a continuum between linguistic and social influences. These were:

Linguistic Influences

- Case Study 1: Use of passive voice, the definitive article (“the”) and nominalization
- Case Study 2: Use of metaphors (more specifically those of war and fights)
- Case Study 3: Appeals to common sense
- Case Study 4: Location of responsibility in fear-of-crime debates
- Case Study 5: Balancing ideology and expediency

Societal Influences

Each of these case studies: examined a characteristic of the fear-of-crime debates, presented the results drawn from data collected, and discussed those results with reference to the relevant theory.

After examining five case studies of characteristics of those parliamentary debates, I identified three discourses that were present:

1. Protector discourse – a passive and frightened public requiring protection given by the government to reduce their fear-of-crime;
2. Supporter discourse – an active and frightened public requiring support in their attempts to protect themselves from crime and reduce their fear-of-crime;
3. Manipulator discourse – political competition where discussing fear-of-crime is but one strategy used by the self-interested politician to gain short-term advantage.

The identification of these discourses formed the conclusion to the exploratory, data-driven part of this research. Having examined the characteristics and discourses found within the parliamentary debates, I now wish to combine the theoretical literature reviewed at the

beginning of this thesis, the theories drawn upon when discussing the individual characteristics in the case studies, and the background literature reviewed in the previous chapter on the social, cultural and political changes that have occurred during the period when the parliamentary debates were produced. On the basis of this existing body of literature, the following description can be given of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime:

Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by the use of experiential knowledge about frightened members of the public as dictated by the parliamentarian's political ideology, while parliamentarians attempt to redistribute responsibility for reducing fear.

There are three components to this description:

1. the type of knowledge claims used as supportive evidence in arguments by parliamentarians;
2. the identity of the public that is portrayed through the arguments made by parliamentarians; and
3. the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.

In the description above, political ideology is treated as an independent variable influencing the type of knowledge claims made by parliamentarians and the type of identities portrayed of the public in the debates. As such, the role of political ideology will be investigated within components one and two.

COMPONENT ONE: KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS IN CRIME DEBATES

1: The type of knowledge claims used as supportive evidence in arguments about fear-of-crime by parliamentarians.

This component is concerned with the type of knowledge claims that are employed by parliamentarians when debating fear-of-crime. The type of knowledge is indicated by the evidence that is drawn upon by the parliamentarian to support their argument. For instance, the use of crime statistics, research evidence and criminological theories on deviancy would indicate that a technical knowledge is being employed. This can be contrasted with arguments that are based on public opinion, testimony and other such claims to common sense, with these being indicative of the use of experiential knowledge. The dichotomy between technical and experiential knowledge claims has become traditional in relation to the type of claims made in a legal setting (e.g., Valverde (2003)).

The purpose of this section is to identify the knowledge claims that are used by parliamentarians when arguing about fear-of-crime (and indirectly each other's crime policies). I will test a number of hypotheses about knowledge claims, made by parliamentarians. These will be based on the evidence and arguments presented in the criminological literature. The hypotheses are:

1. experiential knowledge is increasingly being used by parliamentarians as supporting evidence when debating fear-of-crime;
2. right-wing parliamentarians and political parties talk about fear-of-crime more than left-wing parliamentarians and political parties (and its null hypothesis: there is no difference in the proportion that representatives from each political party talk about fear-of-crime); and

3. right-wing parliamentarians are responsible for the majority of the increase in the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime.

For the purposes of hypotheses 2 and 3, “right-wing parliamentarian” is used to refer to a member of the Liberal or National parties, and “left-wing parliamentarian” refers to a member of the Australian Labor Party as discussed in Chapter Ten.

After exploring these hypotheses and testing their validity for this dataset, I will argue that there is a hybridity of experiential, technical and ideological knowledge claims being made by parliamentarians when debating fear-of-crime. However, I find no support for arguments that common sense or experiential knowledge is dominating public debate of this kind. In addition, I find only minimal support for those arguments presenting right-wing political ideology as responsible for the majority of the rising frequency with which fear-of-crime is being debated in parliament. These conclusions, while challenging some previous research, highlight the hybridity in the type of knowledge that is drawn upon in argumentation.

THEORIES ON KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS

In the criminological literature studying the use of research evidence by politicians and other officials when developing public policy, there have been calls for more informed public policy debate. Some argue that the responsibility for increasing the use of research evidence in policy debates lies with the politician. For example, Weatherburn (2004) argues that policy initiatives proposed by many Australian state and territory governments have, at best, only tenuous justifications. This, he argues, is because they are not forced to explain the details of how their policies will reduce crime (Weatherburn, 2004). It is hoped by such

authors that the inclusion of research evidence may encourage more evidence-based justifications of crime policies and, as a consequence, more effectively achieve their stated purpose.

Others have argued that criminologists need to reconsider the presentation of their research and even the type of methodologies they choose in order to be more relevant to politicians when developing public policy. Sarre (2002) argues that policy makers face particular difficulties when trying to draw on research. These difficulties include: the quality of research, reaching a consensus on the recommendations from research, getting parliamentarians to adopt the recommendations and making the recommendations operational. Although Sarre does place responsibility on the academic for increasing the use of research in public policy development, this conclusion is tempered by arguing that such recommendations still need to make themselves heard over “the din of a law and order ‘auction’” (Sarre, 2002).

Sherman (2005) also finds that criminologists must bear some responsibility for their lack of influence in policy development. Sherman argued that the majority of published criminology was analytical rather than experimental and, as a result, tended to lack the clear operational conclusions and recommendations needed for the development of public policy. In this respect, the influence of analytical academic work on public policy development was reduced by the tendency to draw timid or highly qualified conclusions that made it difficult to generalize findings and recommendations to other areas (Sherman, 2005).

By contrast, Dixon (1995) argues against privileging the role of the expert. Instead, the author suggests that politics and public policy will always reflect some less than rational decision making. Dixon argues two points: first, that political debate about crime should be informed and look beyond using such debate for short-term advantage; and second, that criminology should take on the role of informing public debate and policy-making rather than dictating policy decisions. Dixon supports the view that the discipline is better placed to inform than to dictate because of the often tentative and contradictory findings that are produced by criminologists (Dixon, 1995).

Meanwhile other researchers see responsibility for creating an informed policy debate resting on both politicians *and* criminologists: that it is in fact more worthwhile to study the type of knowledge that is drawn upon by policy makers. Freiberg (2001) argues for the inclusion or recognition of emotional or affective dimensions of crime. He argues that a rationalist approach to developing public policy is undermined by the emotive tendency of law and order policies. These emotive policies resonate with the public, appearing to meet their psychological needs. Freiberg argues that responses to crime must address instrumental, emotional and functional (i.e., producing social cohesion) elements.

However, for Freiberg, crime policies are directed more at the emotional than the instrumental level. Crime policies are successful when they are comprised of symbols and rhetoric that resonate with common sense, common myths and common experiences of the community. Consequently, argues Freiberg, the most successful politicians are those who understand the emotional undercurrents of society. The results of research evidence are less powerful in speaking to this undercurrent than the emotive policies currently finding favor

in political agendas (Freiberg, 2001). In other words, a claim to experiential knowledge about a media report of an elderly woman being bashed will have more resonance with the public than an argument based on reduced statistically indicated risk (i.e., an argument based on technical knowledge).

Valverde (2003) challenges this dichotomy between experiential and technical knowledge. She argues that there are many types of knowledge claims that are used (in the field of law) and rejects the Foucauldian view that law is becoming dominated by expert and technical knowledge. In effect, Valverde is arguing against the traditional dichotomy of knowledge fields that is made by those making a sociological study of law. This dichotomy has been expert (technical) versus experiential knowledge; or high status knowledge such as psychiatry, psychology, clinical medicine, statistics and epidemiology versus low status knowledge used by ordinary folk in their everyday lives and by state and private sector business people in regulatory and administrative tasks. Instead, Valverde argues that there is a hybridity of those types of knowledge rather than a dichotomy (Valverde, 2003): speakers will use *both* experiential and technical knowledge in an argument rather than one or the other in isolation.

EXPERIENTIAL VERSUS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE

The hybridity emphasized by Valverde between experiential and technical knowledge claims is supported by data presented earlier in this thesis in regard to parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. Chapter Eight questioned why parliamentarians mentioned but rarely discussed fear-of-crime. It was argued that they did not often discuss fear-of-crime because being afraid of crime was perceived as common sense and therefore argumentative

justification would have been redundant. Everyone knows that crime is something to be feared, and for the most part, the consequences of that fear are also assumed to be known by all.

This result presented in Chapter Eight can be extended through the analysis of numerical data showing the ratio of statistics and/or research evidence to rhetorical claims based on common sense that are present within the parliamentary debates studied. For example,

“In the amount of time we spent on this subject, I spent some time on the issue of the statistic of fear of crime in the community. It is something that now is a statistic that the ABS actually tracks. There is only one grab so far at about 70 per cent which I understand is in national terms relatively good. Of course it means that about 150 000 people out there do not feel all that safe in the community. But for all that we have to take what we can (Hidding, 1998).”

Such data indicates that statistics and research evidence were used in 49% of the debates with the remaining 51% drawing on evidence drawn from experience such as common sense, public opinion and personal testimony. A CHI-squared goodness of fit test shows that the different proportion of experiential to technical knowledge used by parliamentarians is not statistically significant ($p = 0.991$).

This result supports the argument for a hybrid use of types of knowledge. Evidence-based research findings and crime statistics were used by parliamentarians to support their arguments. Similarly arguments were also based on common sense, or what ‘everybody knows’. In effect, the evidence from this research and that reported in previous studies,

suggests that there is a hybridity of knowledge claims that are used by parliamentarians and politicians more generally when debating public policy initiatives on crime and fear-of-crime.

Moreover, other authors wish to examine knowledge claims further and posit a changing balance between types of knowledge. For example, Garland (2001) argues that:

The dominant voice of crime policy is no longer the expert or even the practitioner but that of the long-suffering, ill-served people – especially of ‘the victim’ and the fearful, anxious members of the public. A few decades ago public opinion functioned as an occasional brake on policy initiatives: now it operates as a privileged source. The importance of research and criminological knowledge is downgraded and in its place is a new deference to the voice of ‘experience’, of ‘common sense’, of ‘what everyone knows’ (Garland, 2001: 13).


In effect, Garland is arguing that experiential knowledge has become (or at least is going through a process of becoming) dominant over technical knowledge claims. This argument is seconded by authors reviewed in this and previous chapters who argue that common sense is overriding statistical and research evidence in their influence on public policy development. Based on the results of an extension to Chapter Eight, I have already shown that overall there is no significant difference between the proportions of types of knowledge claims. However, this result is silent about the trends over time of the use of experiential and technical knowledge. To test these trends, I hypothesized that:

Hypothesis One: Trends in Experiential Knowledge

Experiential knowledge is increasingly being used by parliamentarians as supporting evidence when debating fear-of-crime.

Based on the data collected for this research, the following chart (Figure 13.1) depicts the proportion of experiential to technical knowledge claims over time from 1991 to 2003.

Figure 13.1: Percentage of Experiential or Technical Knowledge Claims



From this chart, it can be seen that there appears to be great variation in the proportions used each year of both types of knowledge claim. For the purposes of the hypothesis being tested, experiential knowledge claims were isolated for further analysis. The focus of the hypothesis is on whether there has been an increased use of experiential knowledge about fear-of-crime: is common sense coming to dominate parliamentarians' arguments?

In order to test the trend of this type of knowledge claim, random variation was reduced using exponential smoothing (damping factor $w = 0.3$) and represented on the graph below


as a forecast line (Figure 13.2). Linear regression modeling of that forecast line was then used to quantify the trend in the use of experiential knowledge claims. This modeling produced a trend line of:

$$y = 0.457 - 0.00472t$$

(where t = the number of years past 1991).

Using this formula, a trend line was generated and plotted on the graph below.

Figure 13.2: Percentage of Experiential Knowledge Claims (forecasts and trends)



The linear regression for experiential knowledge shows a small *decrease* in the percentage of documents produced each year (-0.5%) using experiential knowledge claims as evidence in debating fear of crime. As a result, the hypothesis that experiential knowledge is increasingly being used by parliamentarians as supporting evidence when debating fear-of-crime is disproved: common sense is not coming to dominate parliamentary debate on this topic.

So far, I have examined the theoretical basis for the arguments that there should be a more informed policy debate and that there should be greater recognition of the hybridity of the

types of knowledge claims made. I sought to test the argument that there is a hybridity of knowledge claims through the qualitative results of this research. Furthermore, I sought to examine the potentially changing balance of experiential and technical knowledge by empirically testing hypothesis one. To this point, I have focused on using the data collected for this research to verify the arguments surrounding only two of the types of knowledge claims. However, a third type of knowledge has been highlighted in the literature as having a strong influence on political rhetoric and the formulation of public policies. It is to this type of knowledge that I now turn.

IDEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

Tilley and Laycock (2000), like Valverde (2003), also challenge the dichotomy of knowledge. However, they make this challenge by examining three different types of knowledge claims: evidence-based research, common sense and ideology. Tilley and Laycock argue that evidence-based policy is good in theory but faces many difficulties in combining evidence and policy. In addition to what has been said above, these authors suggest that much of the research relevant to crime policies is technically weak. For instance, single studies with results of questionable generalizability, programs that are specific to a particular environmental area only, or research that yields valid but un-useable policy-relevant findings (i.e., findings that cannot be made operational).

In contrast, Tilley and Laycock argue that common sense ideas (experiential knowledge) about crime are an important influence on crime policy development and are often resistant to contradictions from research evidence. Policy development, they argue, begins from the basis of common sense knowledge ('folk knowledge' or what people already know). The

sources of common sense can be: media reports of crime, dramas and documentaries, fiction, personal experiences of crime and anecdotes of other's experiences. These sources, Tilley and Laycock argue, reproduce public interest in crime and criminals as well as the popular images of them. These common sense understandings, or knowledge based on people's own experience of crime, are important influences on policy-makers, politicians and practitioners.

Finally, Tilley and Laycock extend the traditional dichotomy between experiential and technical knowledge by recognizing the impact of ideas on policy development. They highlight the influence of ideology on a policy makers' openness to ideas; that there is a strong tendency when formulating public policy to approach crime in ideological terms. For example: "Crime is wicked so some wickedness must be rooted out to deal with it. Individuals must be blamed, or defective social arrangements must be held responsible" (Tilley & Laycock, 2000: 215). Tilley and Laycock argue that these images and other understandings given through ideology are more powerful and resonate better with policy-makers than much of the social scientific research. It is suggested that social scientific research's concern with explanation rather than judgment and the tendency to suggest a clinical rather than an emotive/affective approach to reducing crime is responsible for their evidence's lack of influence on ideological and common sense knowledge.

The influence of ideology that is recognized by Tilley and Laycock is evidenced in the area of law and order politics. The 1980s saw the publication of a number of texts arguing that policies about law and order were mainly found under the purview of the political right. These arguments came after over a decade of increasing energy being spent on debating

law and order issues at the national level in the United States (the UK and Australia were to follow later). For instance in 1981, Horton argued that with the right's general focus on economic advancement through free market forces, their political and ideological policies were designed to manage the effects of monetary exploitation. As a result, Horton argued, the right had become associated with increased publicity and public concern about "street crime" (what he described as working class crime and crimes committed by African Americans) and widening criminalization where more behaviors were becoming controlled by legal regulations (Horton, 1981).

As discussed in Chapter Ten, Dahrendorf (1985) also argued that law and order is usually part of the political right's policies. He claimed that law and order had taken over from earlier class struggles in being an arena in which social responsibilities are negotiated. Describing class struggles as the "dominant expression of the unsociable sociability of man", Dahrendorf argues that instead social aggression now manifests itself in more individualistic and occasional ways. Violations of law by individuals, gangs and crowds are prominent examples (Dahrendorf, 1985). It is this individualistic view of criminal behavior and society more generally that matches that adopted by the political right.

More recently, authors have enhanced this argument by adding that not only have the right increased the prominence of law and order issues in political debate, they have also changed the type of law and order policies being proposed. These have become punitive, legalistic and reactive policies. Garland (2001) argues that criminal justice has become less autonomous and more populist with shorter term policies that are less likely to follow expert advice. Garland summarizes this 'political culture of crime control' as:

“a kind of retaliatory law-making, acting out the punitive urges and controlling anxieties of expressive justice. Its chief aims are to assuage popular outrage, reassure the public, and restore the 'credibility' of the system, all of which are political rather than penological concerns” (Garland, 2001: 173).

This new political culture of crime control described by Garland has formed around the transformation of penal welfarism to now focus on prison as the predominant response to criminal behavior at the expense of the rehabilitative and welfare-oriented response. In terms of political ideology, these changes in law and order policy orientation can be described as a shift from left to right as a result of the increasing pervasiveness of neo-liberalism.

This swing to the right had been evident since the early 1980s. For example in 1983, Ratner argued that debates and policy directions taken under the law and order banner had allowed increasingly punitive and repressive responses to crime instead of looking at the causes of crime. While Ratner did argue that such responses were typical of the political right, he did so within the broader framework that the responses to issues such as crime, punishment and law and order demonstrated the international swing to right – that even traditionally left parties were proposing law and order policies that focused on punitive rather than rehabilitative measures (Ratner & McMullan, 1983).

A more recent example of this shift to the right and the influence of neo-liberal thinking was given by Zedner (1995). Zedner then noted that opposition parties in Britain (e.g. Labor) had shifted their rhetoric in a bid not to be classed as ‘soft on crime’ compared to

the Conservatives (hence the slogan of “tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime”). Zedner argues that while this slogan may allude to the social factors that may be influential in the occurrence of criminal behavior, it is also representative of the adoption of more punitive policies typical of the right by traditionally left political parties (Zedner, 1995).

At the heart of these debates about the changes from a rehabilitative to a punitive ideal, from left to right on the political spectrum, is the place that law and order issues have in a political party’s ideology. In Chapter Ten of this thesis, I referred to ideology as a coherent and interrelated set of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior; a set of beliefs that contain not only an image of society but also a way to achieve it. Therefore, by studying the place that law and order issues have in a party’s ideology, authors seek the role that each party gives to these issues not only as something to be addressed but also as something to be used to achieve their desired image of society.

For instance, Zedner (1995) used a comparative approach between Germany and Britain to highlight the peculiarities of domestic debates: to challenge the seemingly self-evident nature of law and order in British political life. Since 1979, law and order has been a staple of general election manifestos and the subject of political debate in Britain. These law and order debates have developed a life of their own becoming independent of criminal justice policy and almost independent of crime itself. Zedner argues that these debates are more about reproducing assumptions about the state’s role in maintaining social order (and help to determine what that role should be) than ensuring law and order (Zedner, 1995). In this way, ideology can both be constructed and be served through law and order debates.

By attributing responsibility for the increasing prominence of law and order politics to the political right, the authors paraphrased above are arguing that such issues or the prominent approaches to such issues play a greater role in the right's ideology than that of the left. In other words, the ideological knowledge claims made by the right will have a greater propensity than the left to use law and order related actions as a solution to a wide variety of problems. Consequently, their ideas about the world would lead right-wing politicians to talk about crime more than left-wing politicians. In effect, knowledge claims based in ideology both guide the arguments that are made and support their premises.

Given these arguments, I hypothesized that:

Hypothesis Two: Ideological Talk about Fear-of-Crime

(H₁) Right-wing parliamentarians and political parties talk about fear-of-crime more than left-wing parliamentarians and political parties.

(H₀): There is no difference in the number of documents mentioning fear of crime produced by representatives of each political party.

In Chapter Ten, I showed that out of the two major political parties in Australian politics, it was the Australian Labor Party (representative of the left) that discussed fear-of-crime more than the Liberal/National Party Coalition (representative of the right) – 54% to 46% respectively. However, a CHI-squared goodness of fit test indicates that this difference in the proportion by which each party discusses fear-of-crime is not statistically significant ($p = 0.933$) and therefore the null hypothesis is not rejected. From these results, there is no difference in the overall frequency with which parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime when grouped by their ideology (as indicated by their membership in a political party). This

would suggest that ideological knowledge claims are not a driving force on political debates about public fear.

However, similar to the theoretical arguments surrounding experiential knowledge, the statement that “law and order politics” (as characterized by punitiveness and a “just deserts” mentality) are the politics of the right comes with the associated statement that the *increasing prominence* of law and order in national politics is the responsibility of the right. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that:


Hypothesis Three: Ideology and Increasing Prominence of Fear-of-Crime

Right-wing parliamentarians are responsible for the majority of the increase (>50%) in the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime.

Given that political talk in its transcribed and written form is being analyzed, the phrase “number of documents” is used here to refer to the number of individual speeches that mention fear-of-crime. Each speech in its entirety is counted as one document irrespective of the number of times fear-of-crime is mentioned within that particular speech.

Before testing hypothesis three, it is necessary to verify its underlying assumption that there has been an increase in the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime over time. To check this assumption, the number of documents produced each year that mention fear-of-crime was plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.3).

Figure 13.3: Number of documents per year that mention fear-of-crime




This graph displays an apparent strong increase in the number of documents that are produced each year mentioning fear-of-crime. In order to analyze this trend more fully and study productivity from all federal *and* state parliaments, the number of documents between 1990 and 2003 was isolated. A forecast line was generated using exponential smoothing to remove some of the random variation (damping factor $w = 0.5$). A linear regression model was then generated based on this forecast line:

$$y = -19.8 + 3.88t$$

(where t is the number of years past 1990, $R^2 = 0.89$)

A trend line based on this formula was then plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.4).


Figure 13.4: Number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime (forecast and trends)



From this analysis, it is evident that there has been an increase of (close to) four documents each year between 1990 and 2003 that mention fear-of-crime. This result supports the underlying assumption that there has been an increase in parliamentary talk about fear-of-crime.

Therefore to test the hypothesis that the right is responsible for the majority of the increase (> 50%) in documents mentioning fear-of-crime, the number of documents produced by Coalition parliamentary members only were isolated as representatives of the political right. This data is plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.5).

Figure 13.5: Number of Documents mentioning fear-of-crime authored by the Coalition




A visual inspection of this graph indicates that the number of documents authored by the Coalition appears to be bi-modal with a peak in 1997 and a lesser peak in 1994/1995. Again, to analyze this trend in more detail, a forecast line was generated by exponential smoothing ($w = 0.5$), and a model based on linear regression was produced:

$$y = 2.09 + 1.95t$$

(where t is the number of years past 1990, $R^2 = 0.78$)

The forecast and trend lines are plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.6).

Figure 13.6: Mentions of fear-of-crime authored by the Coalition (forecasts and trends)



This analysis indicates that there has been an increase of 1.95 documents each year authored by Coalition members. Such an increase represents 50.2% of the total increase in documents mentioning fear-of-crime each year. The data presented herein provides only very minimal support for the hypothesis that the right is responsible for the majority of the increase in parliamentary talk about fear-of-crime. This finding of the right dominating the trend is tempered by the earlier result that, overall, there is no significant difference in the proportion of time spent by each political party in discussing fear-of-crime. Therefore, there is only minimal support for the argument that ideological knowledge influences parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.

Thus, in this component, I examined the knowledge claims that are made by parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. I began by exploring the calls the more informed public policy debate about law and order issues and the research on the type of knowledge claims that are made. Based on this literature, I then presented and tested three hypotheses:

1. experiential knowledge is increasingly being used by parliamentarians as supporting evidence when debating fear-of-crime;
2. right-wing parliamentarians and political parties talk about fear-of-crime more than left-wing parliamentarians and political parties (and its null hypothesis: there is no difference in the proportion that representatives from each political party talk about fear-of-crime); and
3. right-wing parliamentarians are responsible for the majority of the increase in the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime.

From the findings of this process, I can conclude that there is a hybridity of experiential, technical and ideological knowledge claims being made by parliamentarians when debating fear-of-crime. However, I find no support for the arguments that common sense or experiential knowledge is dominating public debate. Further, I find only minimal support for arguments that right-wing political ideology is responsible for the majority of the rising frequency with which fear-of-crime is debated. This support is further tempered by results showing that overall there is no significant difference in the quantity with which parliamentarians of different political persuasions talk about fear-of-crime. In sum, the knowledge claims that are made by parliamentarians when debating public fears about crime appear not to be dictated by the type of knowledge claim itself: they will use common experiences, research evidence and ideological images as needed to best support their argument.

COMPONENT TWO: IDENTITIES IN CRIME DEBATES

2: *the identity of the public that is portrayed through the arguments made by parliamentarians.*

This hypothesis is drawn out of a long history of criminological investigation about the 'other'. In a study of the Puritan community that settled in Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630, Kai Erikson (1966) sought to investigate the role of deviant forms of behavior in the social life of a community and through this study, examined the role of 'us' and 'them' attitudes. Erikson began from Durkheim's 1895 argument in *The Rules of Sociological Method* where he argued that crime was a normal part of society and in fact, a functional part of society because it increases the solidarity of a community when people come together to express outrage, focusing group feeling and emphasizing common interests. In effect, deviance functions to ensure social organization (Durkheim, 1926, 1938).

Erikson argued that communities are places that contain cultural and geographical boundaries. Those boundaries are maintained by defining conduct that is outside of them as being inappropriate or immoral. As such, a society's behavioral boundaries are learnt through the observation of the behavior of its members. Deviant behavior is argued by Erikson to be the most effective means of teaching boundaries; deviant behavior itself is determined by the community's response (for example, by confronting the deviant or calling on the police to confront them). In this way, deviancy serves a normative role that reinforces societal boundaries of behavior and core values. Erikson concludes from this argument that in controlled quantities, deviant behavior is important in preserving the stability of the social life of a community.

Within Erikson's argument, the perceived boundaries of a group play a crucial part in establishing the identity of those who are in and those who are out of a group. In the case of deviant behavior, Erikson argued that this type of behavior:

“... by marking the outer edges of group life, [boundaries] give the inner structure its special character and thus supply the framework within which the people of the group develop an orderly sense of their own cultural identity”
(Erikson, 1966: 13).

Erikson argues that the boundaries of behavior and the community's reaction to violations of those boundaries have a normative role *and* an identity forming role. In this way, the distinctions of 'us' and 'them' become important to a community's sense of identity and the solidarity among members.

The process of 'othering' is part of developing those distinctions of 'us' and 'them'. Zedner states that “[p]erceptions of what constitute prevailing crime problems derive in part from the identification of these groups as a source of potential menace” (Zedner, 1995: 522). Following on from Erikson's argument, focusing on a dangerous other in political rhetoric allows a politician to define the boundaries of acceptable behavior. They are able to argue that the dangerous other challenges society's normative codes and seeks to change societal values (Garland, 2001). It is a means of confronting 'them' in order to reinforce the definitions of 'us'.

However, this normative function of 'others' can be used towards political ends with the existence of that 'other' being largely based in political rhetoric. As an example of this

argument, Ratner (1983) argues that the international swing to the (political) right has been legitimated by the use of “folk-devils” (he gives examples of welfare scroungers, liberal spendthrifts and terrorists) that challenge the images of nation, family, and authority. This “enemy within” is argued by Ratner to have created a moral climate that accepts monetarist economic policy while deflecting attention away from the negative consequences of such policy (Ratner & McMullan, 1983).

The concept of a ‘folk devil’ is attributable to Stanley Cohen’s (1973) study of Mods and Rockers of the 1960s. Cohen argues that deviancy, and more specifically the identification of people or a group of people as a threat to society, is socially constructed. Based on disaster research, Cohen uses the stages of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to describe the process by which societies respond to and facilitate a moral panic. While Cohen concentrates on the media’s role in whipping up public concern about particular types of behavior, he discusses the construction and labeling of ‘folk devils’ during the inventory phase. This is a process of whereby deviants are identified and labeled:

“The deviant is assigned to a role or social type, shared perspectives develop through which he and his behaviour are visualized and explained, motives are imputed, causal patterns are searched for and the behaviour is grouped with other behaviour thought to be of the same order” (Cohen, 1973: 74).

The original labels can lead to the evocation of secondary images where the events of ‘real’ world are transformed into myth. Cohen gives the example of the drug addict who is created into the mythology of the dope fiend with the associated attributions of being ‘dirty, degenerate, lazy and untrustworthy’. It is by creating such folk devils (and their

mythologies and stereotypes) that the state responses developed during a moral panic can survive long after the demise of the perceived threat. Through this process of labeling and the creation of folk devils, politicians and other social commentators are provided with ready-made images from which to draw support for their proposed policies.

Similarly, Garland argues that, on the whole, criminals are seen as wicked and different from us and that the images of dangerous ‘others’ have a utility in political rhetoric to generate support for proposed crime policies:

... the images conjured up to accompany new legislation tend to be stereotypical depictions of unruly youth, dangerous predators, and incorrigible career criminals. Accompanying these projected images, and in rhetorical response to them, the new discourse of crime policy consistently invokes an angry public, tired of living in fear, demanding strong measures of punishment and protection.” (Garland, 2001: 10)

The interesting point in this quote is that not only is the identity of the dangerous other described and used to effect but also the identity of a fearful and angry public is made explicit. The source of the identity of this frightened public and that of the dangerous criminal has been discussed above in regard to Garland’s theory on the role of fear-of-crime and the frightened middle class (the ‘crime complex’) in the transformation to the new culture of control. However, it is noteworthy that the dangerous ‘other’ (criminal) has an influence in the construction of the identity of a frightened public.

The argument of the growing prominence of the identities of a fearful public and dangerous criminal was discussed in greater detail in Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis in regard to parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. Chapter Six argued that there are two identities of the public that are consistently referred to in the parliamentary debates examined: (a) active and able to participate in their own victimization prevention and control their level of fear; (b) passive and dependent on the government for action to reduce their suffering due to the fear-of-crime. Chapter Seven argued that the war metaphors associated with action against crime define the roles of the actors as a fearful public in a dangerous and imminently threatening environment. These results provide support for arguments about a fearful public and dangerous other: the dominant identities discussed in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime are those of the frightened public that is threatened by the criminal.

However, this supportive evidence is given with a qualification. Variations were identified in the conception of the public and their agency or their ability to act independently. While both may be fearful, one identity of the public is able to act to control their level of fear and participate in their own victimization prevention. The other identity is passive and dependent on the government for action to reduce their fear-of-crime.

A similar set of variations in the attribution of agency has been discussed by Lacey & Zedner (1995). The authors described different concepts of the community: as an agency that pursues social policy and is thus responsible for it; or as the focus for local policy initiatives involving particular interventions; or as the beneficiary of policies intended to regenerate feelings of cohesiveness, security and solidarity. These identities fluctuate

between an active and passive conception of the public by the state (Lacey & Zedner, 1995).

Within a study examining the development of actuarial reasoning in risk management and its implications for politics, crime prevention and the interaction between state and citizen, O'Malley (1996) examines variations of agency in different political ideologies. He describes the liberal subject as someone who is rational, responsible, knowledgeable, calculative, active and self-directive. This subject interacts differently with the authorities and professionals compared to the identities constructed by other ideologies. O'Malley argues that welfarism involves a subordinated "client" who interacts with a professional service provider of superior knowledge and status. In contrast, the subject in prudentialism enters into "partnerships" with public authorities or is a "customer" of the service. This change in relations is demonstrated by the rhetoric of "working together against crime" and "partnerships with police" (O'Malley, 1996).

O'Malley (1996) further argues that the free market requires a morally responsible individual whereas socialized risk-management techniques encourage collectivization and social dependency. The rational, responsible, autonomous and free individual pictured by neo-liberalism rejects the correctional and therapeutic aims of previous criminal justice policies that are based on welfare-oriented recognition of the links between crime, social deprivation and social justice. Previously, O'Malley (1992) had argued that it is this individual that is central to neo-conservative and New Right discourses. These discourses involve an individual that is entrepreneurial, naturally free, self-reliant, responsible and liberated from the constraints of the welfare state (O'Malley, 1992). In 1996, O'Malley

argued that the new conception of the (liberal) subject is that of the rational choice actor thinking in cost-benefit terms where criminal behavior occurs when the gains outweigh the costs or risks. Criminality is no longer caused by social and psychological factors.

This rational choice actor was also detailed by Garland (2001) during his discussion of the rising prominence of the criminologies of everyday life. Garland argued that the changes in criminological thought had altered the criminal to being a rational actor, responsive to disincentives and fully responsible for their actions. It had also pushed the victim into being responsible for the opportunities they allowed potential offenders. In this way, behavior (including criminal behavior) had become rational, intentional and conscious. Thus, Garland from an analysis of criminological thought and O'Malley from an analysis of risk management and political ideology, both detail the changing image of individual agency.

However, I would argue that the dual conceptions of agency portrayed of individuals by parliamentary discourse, is indicative of the criticism made by Young (2002). Young argues that Garland's description of the social, political and cultural transformations does not acknowledge the overlap and co-existence of these ideas. On the basis of Young's argument, the dual conceptions of individual agency found represented in parliamentary debates may be suggestive of the overlap between the penal welfare state and the new punitive culture of crime control: the passive and dependent individual may be reminiscent of the subordinated client in the welfare state (as described by O'Malley above) while the active and participatory individual is reflective of the conception of the liberal individual under rational choice and control theories. The dual existence of these representations in the

parliamentary debates studied is supportive of Young's criticism of *The Culture of Control* and its metanarratives of succession.

In order to investigate these arguments that there are different conceptions of individual agency dependent on the author's political persuasion, I hypothesized that:

Hypothesis Five: Political Ideology and the Agency of a Fearful Public

There is no difference in the type of agency involved in the fearful public identity that is drawn upon by the different political ideologies.

To test this hypothesis, a contingency table was constructed that counted the number of documents mentioning a passive or active fearful public grouped by the author's political party (Table 12.1). For the purposes of this test, a parliamentarians' membership in a political party was used as a proxy for their adoption of a particular ideology.

Table 13.1: Passive or Active Fearful Public by Political Ideology

	Passive	Active
ALP	70	45
Coalition	55	54

A CHI-squared test of a contingency table was then used to test for a significant difference between these combinations thereby indicating that depiction of a type of agency can be aligned with a particular political ideology. No significant difference was found between the political parties (and therefore political ideology) in terms of their evocation of a passive or active fearful public ($p = 0.1168$). Therefore, the null hypothesis was supported.

This result challenges the arguments presented above that posit ideology as the determinant in the type of public agency depicted: that liberal politicians will talk in terms of an active,

rational actor while left-wing political will talk in terms of a passive and dependent actor. While this is not to say that there are different levels of agency depicted in political rhetoric, the findings do suggest that political ideology may not be the determining factor in deciding which type of agency is evoked.

Thus, in this section I have sought to examine the identities of the public that are evoked by parliamentarians in their debates about fear-of-crime. I began by exploring the literature on 'othering' and the rising prominence of a fearful public identity. These arguments were supported by the qualitative descriptions given in earlier chapters: when talking about fear-of-crime, parliamentarians do discuss a fearful public that is under threat from a dangerous criminal.

I qualified this by highlighting the different types of agency that were evident in the debates. A fearful public could be depicted as being active and capable of participating in their own fear-reduction, or they could be described as being passive and dependent on the government to reduce their fear-of-crime. These different types of agency have been examined in a number of academic texts where the type of agency evoked is dependent on the author's political ideology. However, I found no statistical support for the argument that political ideology was the determinant in depicting passive or active agency. In sum, there is theoretical and qualitative support for the use of the identities of a criminal 'other' and a fearful public in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. However, there is no support given by this data for the hypothesis that the type of agency varies between political parties/ideologies in their evocation of a fearful public.

COMPONENT THREE: RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIME DEBATES*3: the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.*

Over at least the last decade, it has been argued by scholars that responsibility for crime control, crime prevention and community safety is increasingly shifting from the government to individual members of the community. Garland (2001) argues that the new culture of crime control has seen government-run law enforcement agencies, and through them the state, try to shift responsibility for controlling criminal behaviours. Through a process of “responsibilization”, he argues that crime control has surpassed the limits of the state and must be shared by government, community organizations, commercial businesses and individuals in a civil society (Garland, 2001). As a result, responsibility for maintaining social order increasingly lies on citizens as well as government agencies of criminal justice.

Similarly, Zedner (1995) observes that over the past decade, the focus on the state’s role has seen a change as British governments have increasingly tried to rid themselves of responsibility for law and order. They have attempted to shift that responsibility to families, schools, churches and the media. This has been done by emphasizing their potential contribution to social stability. “The message here was clear: that as a society we could no longer expect the onus for maintaining order to lie solely with central government nor with the formal agencies of criminal justice” (Zedner, 1995: 524). Instead, institutions such as schools, families and the media are expected to take on at least some of the responsibility for maintaining order in the community.

O’Malley (1996) argues that in this shift, the state and private agencies have taken on the role of educator, of providing empowering knowledge and skills. “Information is provided

about local crime rates, about how to recognize suspicious persons, how to make the home and its contents secure, how to recognize and avoid high-crime-risk situations, about the value of insuring and marking property, and so on” (O'Malley, 1996: 201). Such information is intended to promote true autonomy and to emphasize the “irrationalities of irresponsibility” while discouraging reliance on the state. The individual will invest in improving their personal and property security, for example, by making use of private security agencies or installing physical barriers to crime such as locks, shutters and alarms. By doing so, they will be fulfilling their responsibility to deter crime and maintain order in their community.

This shift in responsibility acts to relieve pressure on police forces and politicians to control crime (O'Malley, 1992). Zedner (1995) argues that governments can deflect attention by: diffusing (political) responsibility away from the legal system and onto the community; supporting informal and voluntary efforts at crime control; and by encouraging general members of the public to protect themselves, engage in crime prevention and increase the use of community-based penalties. These strategies form part of a rhetoric of an “active citizen” (or an “empowered public” (O'Malley, 1997)) which has been used to promote a greater sense of responsibility by members of the public to maintain order in their communities and work with formal agencies such as the police.

Similarly, O'Malley (1992) argues that punitiveness or “just deserts” sentencing has received increased use because of this focus on individual responsibility. Increasingly punitive sentencing is justified through a perceived lack of worth of developing a program of sentencing to rehabilitate a person when societal factors of criminal behavior are only

recognized as risk-enhancing factors that are predictive of behavior rather than an explanation for action taken. The consequence of this change for the application of criminal justice is that rehabilitative or therapeutic interventions are considered to be inappropriate because there is nothing “wrong” with the individual – they made the rational choice to commit the crime. From this position has risen the focus on punitive or “just deserts” sentencing: it is a way of increasing the cost of criminal behavior with the hope that potential offenders will be deterred from such behavior because the gains no longer outweigh the cost or risks (O'Malley, 1992, 1996).

In summary, there is a consensus in the literature that states are trying to shift at least some of the burden of crime control and prevention away from government-run law enforcement agencies and onto members of the public. This has been done by emphasizing individual responsibility for victimization prevention, for protecting one's own person and property. States create these active citizens or empowered publics by providing information and education about how to avoid being a victim of crime. This seeks to raise awareness of individual responsibility and discourages reliance on the state.

On the basis of this literature, I hypothesized that:


Hypothesis Six: Responsibility Shifting from State to Non-State Actors

(H₁) Responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime is increasingly being shifted from state to non-state actors

(H₀) There is no difference in the number of documents attributing responsibility from state to non-state actors for addressing fear-of-crime

To test this hypothesis, a clustered column chart was constructed to depict the changing number of documents over time when grouped by the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime (Figure 13.7). For the purposes of this hypothesis, the location was simplified to either a state actor (e.g., police) or a non-state actor (e.g., the community).

Figure 13.7: Proportion of Responsibility Attributions to State or Non-State Actors



Overall, responsibility was attributed to state actors 55% of the time with non-state actors comprising 45%. A CHI-squared goodness of fit test indicated that this difference in proportions was not statistically significant ($p = 0.913$). This suggests that there is little difference in the frequency with which parliamentarians attribute responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime to either actor.

In order to test the claims in the literature that responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime was *increasingly* being shifted state to non-state actors, the percentage of documents attributing responsibility to non-state actors was isolated for analysis of its trends. This was


done by linear regression modelling of the trendline based on a forecast line generated through exponential smoothing ($w = 0.3$).

$$y = 0.691 - 0.023t$$

(where t is the number of years past 1984, $R^2 = 0.23$)

The forecast and trend lines are plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.8).

Figure 13.8: Responsibility Attributions to Non-State Actors (forecast and trends)



This analysis indicates that there has been a 2.3% *decrease* over time in proportion of attributions of responsibility to non-state actors for addressing fear-of-crime. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (H_1) is rejected: responsibility is not increasingly being attributed to non-state actors.

CAUSAL VERSUS TREATMENT RESPONSIBILITY

However, it was found in Chapter Ten of this thesis that there are two different types of responsibility that are assigned for events in the future or in the past. When treatment responsibility is attributed, the person assigns control over or the power to solve events that

may occur in the future. When causal responsibility is attributed, the person attaches blame for those (negative) events that had already occurred for which they hold the target responsible for causing. Blame is to be avoided by politicians whereas the image of holding control and power is to be desired.

Based on the qualitative results presented and the literature reviewed in Chapter Nine, the argument was posited that politicians wish to be seen as someone that did not cause the problems relating to fear-of-crime (blame avoidance) but are ready and willing to help solve the problem (treatment responsibility). An image of being seen to respond to a problem is a political necessity even in situations such as natural disasters when no causal responsibility can be attributed. The results of this and previous research show that when the cause of a situation can be attributed to someone, politicians take care to avoid that type of responsibility and the associated blame.

Therefore, it could be argued that parliamentarians are only trying to shift the (causal) responsibility for causing (fear-of-) crime and the associated blame for (fear-of-) victimization. Causal responsibility and blame for victimization are passed onto the public. “[R]ising-crime rates are repackaged as providing evidence not of the failure of law enforcement but of the negligence of the general public in protecting their property and persons” (Zedner, 1995: 525). It is this blame and negative imagery that is to be avoided by the politician and parliamentarian because of its threat to their political credibility, to their image as an effective and active representative of the public.

In contrast, holding treatment responsibility or the responsibility to fix problems and control future events is to be desired by the parliamentarian. It is a low-risk option that allows them to argue for a change in law and order policies, debate alternatives and criticize their opponents. All this can be done without the risk of being blamed for the poor performance of the crime policies because that lies with individual citizens after the transference of causal responsibility.

In short, it can be said that these two types of responsibility, and their consequences for the situating of blame and control, combine to create an environment where parliamentarians can argue that they have been acting to control crime but that they cannot be blamed for any increases in the crime rate or even specific instances of criminal victimization because it is the public's individual responsibility to protect themselves and their property.

To verify this argument, the following hypotheses were stated:

(H₁) Causal responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime is increasingly being shifted from state to non-state actors

(H₀) There is no difference in the number of documents attributing causal responsibility from state to non-state actors for addressing fear-of-crime


To test these hypotheses, the data on the attributions of causal responsibility to non-state actors was isolated. The slope of the trend over time was tested using linear regression modeling on an exponentially smoothed forecast line ($w = 0.5$).

$$y = 0.208 + 0.0204t$$

(where t is the number of years past 1984, $R^2 = 0.32$)

The forecast and trend lines are plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.9).

Figure 13.9: Causal Responsibility Attributions to Non-State actors (forecast and trends)



The slope of the trend estimate shows that there has been a 2% increase in the number of documents attributing causal responsibility to non-state actors over the time period investigated. However, a CHI-squared goodness of fit test on the overall proportions of attributions to either state or non-state actors indicates that there is no significant difference ($p = 0.779$) in the changing location of causal responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.

Thus, after exploring the arguments that the state is attempting to shift responsibility for crime control and victimization prevention onto the community, I found no evidence in parliamentary debates that such a shift was occurring in regard to addressing fear-of-crime. A similar lack of evidence for a shift in the location of responsibility continued when the type of responsibility (causal) was specified. These results suggest that should such a shift be being attempted, it is not reflected in the political rhetoric that is employed by parliamentarians.

ALL COMPONENTS AND AN ADDITIONAL VARIABLE*The political party's role in parliament – government or opposition*

Before summarizing this chapter, I briefly wish to introduce one more variable into the testing of the three components above. In Chapter Ten, I discussed the different roles of a political party depending on whether they are a party in government or in opposition. It was found that fear-of-crime was mentioned less (though not significantly less ($p = 0.92$)) by opposition parties than by incumbent governments, irrespective of a political party's ideological persuasion. Given this, I sought to determine the impact of the party's role in parliament on the type of knowledge claims used by parliamentarians; the type of agency used in the evocation of a fearful public identity; and the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.

Based on the data collected for this research:

- There was no significant difference in the type of knowledge claims made by parliamentarians in government or in opposition ($p = 0.56$);
- There was no significant difference in the type of agency attributed to the frightened public by government or opposition members ($p = 0.58$);
- There was no significant difference in the type of responsibility (causal or treatment) attributed by government or opposition members ($p = 0.27$); and
- There was no significant difference in the type of responsibility attributed to state or non-state actors by government or opposition members ($p = 0.9$).

From these results it is evident that the role of a party in parliament does not have a statistically significant bearing on the way in which the parliamentarian talks about fear-of-crime: their use of knowledge claims, agency or the attribution of responsibility.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter sought to test a number of research questions and hypotheses about how parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime, as drawn from the criminological literature. On the basis of this existing body of research, the following description was given of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime:

Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by the use of experiential knowledge about frightened members of the public as dictated by the parliamentarian's political ideology, while parliamentarians attempt to redistribute responsibility for reducing fear.

There were three components to this description:

1. the type of knowledge claims used as supportive evidence in arguments by parliamentarians;
2. the identity of the public that is portrayed through the arguments made by parliamentarians; and
3. the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.

In the description above, political ideology was treated as an independent variable influencing the type of knowledge claims made by parliamentarians and the type of

identities portrayed of the public in the debates. As such, the role of political ideology was investigated within components one and two. The description and its components were then tested using the results and the data from the research contained in this thesis. The chapter that follows will discuss the findings of this hypothesis testing, and the broader implications for the criminological literature.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CONCLUSION: VERIFYING ASSUMPTIONS

Thus far, I have sought to take the motivation, logic and results from an exploratory, data-driven study and situate them in the criminological literature with the ultimate intention of reexamining the results of that study from a theoretical perspective. To do so, I began, in Chapter Twelve, by presenting an overview of the 12 indices of change that Garland (2001) identified as influencing the changes in the criminal justice state. These indices of change were used as a catalogue of changes that have shaped the environment in which the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime occurred.

After also giving an overview of the role of fear-of-crime in *The Culture of Control*, I then used the criticisms that have been made of Garland's work as a means of highlighting the research gap applicable to this thesis. Beckett (2001) argues that given the centrality of fear-of-crime to his discussion of political action, Garland does not examine in sufficient depth the interaction between political discourses and feelings of insecurity. This ability of political rhetoric to influence public sentiment has been the motivating factor for many scholars who have attempted to quantify the extent to which fear-of-crime is increased or decreased by what politicians say. However throughout this thesis, I have argued that these researchers have only assumed the style and content of rhetoric on fear-of-crime. This thesis is an attempt at verifying those assumptions: with these last three chapters being an attempt to situate this research into the relevant body of criminological literature.

Having established the research gap, I then summarised the assumptions made by researchers about political rhetoric on fear-of-crime:

Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by the use of experiential knowledge about frightened members of the public as dictated by

the parliamentarian's political ideology, while parliamentarians attempt to redistribute responsibility for reducing fear.

This description had three components: the type of knowledge claims used by parliamentarians; the type of agency used in the evocation of a fearful public identity; and the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime. From a discussion of the relevant theory and testing of empirical hypotheses, it can be concluded that:

1. There is a hybridity of experiential, technical and ideological knowledge claims being made by parliamentarians when debating fear-of-crime. However, there is no support for the arguments that common sense or experiential knowledge is dominating public debate or that right-wing political ideology is responsible for the majority of the rising frequency with which fear-of-crime is debated.
2. There is theoretical and qualitative support for the use of the identities of a criminal 'other' and a fearful public in parliamentary debates about fear of crime. However, there is no support given by this data for the hypothesis that the type of agency varies between political parties in their evocation of a fearful public.
3. The data presented here does not support the argument that the state is attempting to shift responsibility for crime from itself to non-state actors. This lack of evidence for a shift in the location of responsibility persists when the type of responsibility (causal) is specified.

Within components one and two, it was shown that political ideology does not greatly influence the frequency with which fear-of-crime is mentioned in parliamentary debates. In addition, political ideology does not significantly influence the whether the fearful public is portrayed as passive and dependent on the state or active and independent of the state in addressing fear-of-crime, crime control and victimization prevention.

Based on these conclusions, the description given above could now be more accurately expressed as:

Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by hybridity: of technical and experiential knowledge about a frightened public; of perceived identities of this frightened public as being both active and independent, and passive and dependent; and of responsibility for reducing fear-of-crime. Finally, the existence of a frightened public serves an evidentiary and not ideological role in parliamentary debates about crime and its control.

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUANCED UNDERSTANDING

It is this complex and hybrid nature of political rhetoric that is missed by some criminologists when they make assumptions about how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. In Chapter Eleven, I concluded the exploratory, data-driven study by arguing that parliamentarians talked about fear-of-crime in three ways or as part of three discourses: one that protects the public, one that supports the public and one that manipulates other politicians. Now within this and previous chapters, I have highlighted the hybridity of knowledge claims and identities that are used within the parliamentary debates. By assuming political rhetoric is homogenous in style and content, researchers deny

themselves the ability to determine why such rhetoric has an influence on the public's fear-of-crime.

For example, Jock Collins (2003) argues that fear-of-crime is something “that politicians of most sides of the political spectrum find irresistible to exploit in an opportunist, though dangerously myopic, way” (p.6) or that it is “compounded by the political opportunism of state politicians on all sides of the political spectrum” (p.31). The results contained in this thesis support his argument that politicians of both sides use fear-of-crime: it forms evidence for their arguments. However, I would maintain that public insecurity is not always used towards opportunistic ends nor does fear-of-crime remain in the realm of state politics.

Lee (2001) argues that fear-of-crime has become a tactic of governance in that “we are expected to govern our risks of becoming a victim of crime through being subjected to images and narratives of the results of poor self-governance — we are imaged as, and indeed asked to become, fearing subjects” (p.481). The research presented herein partially supports the redistribution of responsibility to citizens. However, I have also shown that politicians are keen to keep the responsibility for ‘fixing’ the problem of public fear. Similarly, I have shown that there are contrasting perceptions of agency held by the ‘fearing subject’. An understanding of these differences in responsibility and agency may have allowed Lee to provide a more detailed conception of the politicians/state’s role in the ‘feedback loop’ of the genesis of fear-of-crime.

Schwartz and Israel (2000) argue that “people seem to be highly concerned with crime only when the media and politicians tell them that they should be highly concerned with crime” (Schwartz, 2000: 337). Similarly, Beckett (2001) argued that “political elites have played a leading role in calling attention to crime-related problems” (p.7) and that “political initiative played a crucial role in generating public concern about crime and drugs” (p.23) (Beckett, 2001). My challenge to these authors would be to answer *how* political discourse impacted on fear-of-crime. What was it about the way in which a politician was talking about crime or drugs that generated public concern about these issues? Was it the shifting location of responsibility or passive agency ascribed to them or a different characteristic altogether? I argue that without attention given to such details, the conclusions that political discourse influences fear-of-crime does not reflect the necessary complexity to account for the phenomena.

Finally, let me return to the scholarly work by Garland (2001) with which I began. *The Culture of Control* was a work that was intended to examine the demise of penal welfarism and the culture of crime control that replaced it. Within the new crime control culture, Garland gave fear-of-crime a central role in what he termed the ‘crime complex’ of high crime societies. In effect, the new experience of crime and victimhood that was felt by the middle-classes led to a resulting insecurity and anxiety. This insecurity and its antidote expression of outrage and anger spurred political action in the form of support for punitive policies focused on punishment and incapacitation. While Garland does describe a two-way interaction between fear-of-crime and reactive policies during the 1970s especially, Beckett (2001) criticizes him for not giving sufficient recognition of the ability of political rhetoric to influence public fears. The research contained herein would suggest that political

rhetoric about fear of crime is not as homogenous as *both* authors portray, with particular challenges being raised to Garland in terms of the overlap and co-existence of changing ideas in the social, political and cultural trends that he detailed.

These challenges to previous conclusions represent the implications of this research for the existent literature on fear-of-crime and political debates. The data and its results have provided an insight into the complexity with which parliamentarians have talked about public fears. It was this complexity that I argued had been missed by criminologists when researching the topic. A nuanced understanding has indicated areas in which previous (and future) work could be extended and refined. In other words, asking how fear-of-crime is being ‘used’ in a particular political situation is important to gaining an accurate picture of how talking about fear may impact on actual reported levels of fear.

CONCLUSION: THE FINAL WORDS

To conclude this thesis, I wish to offer a way forward. I suggest that researchers studying the interaction between public fear and political debate on crime should focus on the use of talking about fear-of-crime, instead of its misuse.

The background to the current research was a tendency of criminologists to focus on the misuse of political debate about public fear and then to examine how such judged misuse impacts on the actual level of fear reportedly felt by the community. The research contained herein has demonstrated the potential of focusing on the ‘use’ of talking about fear without the necessity of negative connotations being associated with that talk. In other words, by working under the assumption that politicians are misusing their opportunities for speech,

criminologists have been expecting to see increases in reported levels of fear-of-crime whenever politicians are talking about it. The onus is then on the criminologist to explain why the reported levels of fear do not always increase during a so called law and order auction. I argue that this onus is created by the dominant assumption underlying much of the research that politicians are already and will continue to misuse opportunities to talk about how scared the public allegedly feels about crime.

Shifting the focus from misuse to use has two effects. First, researchers are encouraged to determine how fear-of-crime is actually used in political debates. This thesis has shown that it is used to support many arguments, irrespective of ideology, topic or conclusion. In itself, talking about fear-of-crime can take on many forms depending on the language that is used (e.g., words and metaphors), the knowledge claims that are made or the identities that are represented. Through a detailed analysis of these forms, I have argued that political debate, in parliament at least, is not characterized only by misuse: it is characterized by hybridity of use. I argue that this hybridity arises from parliamentarians using, and not solely misusing, speaking about fear-of-crime for their own self-interested purpose.

The second effect of focusing on use is that it allows the researcher to consider increases *and decreases* in levels of reported fear when attempting to find correlates with political rhetoric. The current research has demonstrated the potential importance of this open-mindedness. If a politician talks about supporting the community in their fight against fear, agency or ability to act remains with that community. Feelings of fear may decrease rather than increase as a result of such speeches because the public are or remain empowered: they are allowed not to be the 'frightened public'. Consequently, studying the

multidimensional use of fear-of-crime by politicians, rather than solely the misuse, allows the researcher to consider, from the beginning of a research project, the complex and complete impact of talking about fear.

Thus in response to a perceived lack of knowledge about how politicians (when in parliament) talked about fear-of-crime, I have sought to provide descriptive characteristics of the debates, an analysis of the effect of those characteristics and finally the theoretical context and implications of a non-homogenous understanding of political talk about public fears. While further research is needed into the nature of debating fear-of-crime in electoral politics especially, it is hoped that this research will prompt recognition of the benefits of a more sensitive and in-depth understanding of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. I have sought to show that it is only through such an understanding that future research will be better able to ascertain how political talk about fear-of-crime affects the “real-world” emotional response by the public to crime.

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APPENDIX ONE

FEAR-OF-CRIME

Publications about Fear-of-Crime by Topic and Year of Publication

Year	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
1968							
1969					(Harris, 1969)		
1970							
1971		(Conklin, 1971)			(Block, 1971)		(Furstenberg, 1971)
1972		(Poveda, 1972)					
1973					(Wilson & Brown, 1973)		
1974		(Bahn, 1974)			(Erskine, 1974) (Brooks, 1974)		
1975							
1976	(Lalli & Savitz, 1976) (Clemente & Kleiman, 1976) (Cook & Cook, 1976) (Sundeen & Mathieu, 1976) (Lawton, Nahemov, Yaffe, & Feldman, 1976)				(Adams & Smith, 1976) (Skogan, 1976)		
1977	(Clemente & Kleiman, 1977)				(Greenstein, 1977)		
1978	(Jaycox, 1978)	(Garofalo & Laub, 1978) (Patterson, 1978) (Hunter, 1978)			(Heng & Maxfield, 1978) (Baumer, 1978)		

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
1979	(DeFronzo, 1979) (Braungart, Hoyer, & Braungart, 1979) (Braithwaite, Biles, & Whitrod, 1979)	(Harnagel, 1979)		(Doob & Macdonald, 1979)	(Lotz, 1979)		(Balkin, 1979)
1980	(Yin, 1980) (Lawton & Yaffe, 1980) (Braungart, Braungart, & Hoyer, 1980)	(Pollack, 1980) (Lewis & Maxfield, 1980)			(Unknown, 1980) (Lewis, 1980)		(Tyler, 1980)
1981	(Ollenberger, 1981) (Cook, Fremming, & Tyler, 1981)	(Taub, Taylor, & Dunham, 1981) (DuBow & Emmons, 1981) (Jaehnig, Weaver, & Fico, 1981)	(Schneider, 1981)	(Gordon & Heath, 1981)	(Garofalo, 1981a) (Lewis & Salem, 1981)		(Garofalo, 1981b)
1982	(Yin, 1982) (Clarke & Lewis, 1982) (Lee, 1982b) (Norton & Courlander, 1982) (Toseland, 1982)	(Liska, Lawrence, & Sanchirico, 1982) (Hunter & Baumer, 1982) (Lee, 1982a) (Lavrakas, 1982) (Newman & Franck, 1982)	(Wright & Masters, 1982)				
1983	(Biles, 1983); (Jeffords, 1983) (Finley, 1983) (Janson & Ryder, 1983) (Lee, 1983)	(Murray, 1983)		(Baker, Nienstedt, Everett, & McCleary, 1983)	(Balkin & Houlden, 1983)		(Warr & Stafford, 1983)

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
1987	(Brillon, 1987) (Ortega & Myles, 1987) (Junger, 1987) (Normolye, 1987) (Maxfield, 1987) (LaGrange & Ferraro, 1987) (Sacco & Glackman, 1987) (Stanko, 1987)	(Akers, La Greca, Sellers, & Cochran, 1987) (Smith, 1987)	(Ferraro & LaGrange, 1987)	(Gunter, 1987) (Heath & Petraitis, 1987) (Zillman & Wakshlag, 1987)	(Williams & Pate, 1987) (Brown & Wycoff, 1987)		(Warr, 1987) (Skogan, 1987) (Box, Hale, & Pack, 1987) (Gates & Rohe, 1987)
1988	(Box, Hale, & Andrews, 1988) (Parker, 1988) (Stanko, 1988) (Mawby, 1988) (Smith, 1988) (Ferraro & LaGrange, 1988) (Donnelly, 1988)	(Belyea & Zingraff, 1988) (Liska, Sanchirico, & Reed, 1988) (Rohe & Burby, 1988)	(Young, 1988)		(Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988) (Winkel & Vrij, 1988)		(Gomme, 1988)
1989	(Fattah & Sacco, 1989) (LaGrange & Ferraro, 1989) (Moeller, 1989) (Gordon & Riger, 1989) (Holgate, 1989)	(Van Der Wurff, Van Staaldumein, & Stringer, 1989) (Smith, 1989) (Krannich, Berry, & Greider, 1989) (Baba & Austin, 1989) (Burby & Rohe, 1989)			(Home Office, 1989)		

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
1990	(Killias, 1990b) (Stanko, 1990) (Parker & Ray, 1990) (Sacco, 1990) (Hale, Pack, & Salkeid, 1990) (Gardner, 1990)	(Gray & O'Connor, 1990) (Skogan, 1990) (Warr, 1990)	(Killias, 1990a)	(Liska & Baccaglini, 1990) (Winkel & Vrij, 1990)	(Figgie, 1990) (Bennett, 1990)		(Rucker, 1990)
1991	(Pain, 1991) (Thompson, Bankston, & St Pierre, 1991) (Boers, 1991)	(Covington & Taylor, 1991) (Vrij & Winkel, 1991) (Austin & Spine, 1991) (Archer & Erlich-Erfér, 1991)			(Ouimet & Coyle, 1991) (Fisher, 1991) (Bennett, 1991)		(Smith & Hill, 1991a) (Smith & Hill, 1991b)
1992	(Ferraro & LaGrange, 1992) (Bernard, 1992) (Arthur, 1992) (Parker & Onyekwuluje, 1992)	(LaGrange, Ferraro, & Supancic, 1992) (Keane, 1992) (Saltiel, Gilchrist, & Harvie, 1992) (Fisher & Nasar, 1992)	(Thompson, Bankston, & St Pierre, 1992)		(Norris & Kaniasty, 1992)		
1993	(Stanko & Hobdell, 1993) (McDaniel, 1993)	(Sacco, 1993) (Nair, Ditton, & Phillips, 1993) (Atkuis, Husain, & Storey, 1993) (Taylor & Covington, 1993)		(Fisher, 1993) (Williams & Dickinson, 1993)			(Coston, 1993) (Forde, 1993) (Parker, 1993)
1994	(Goodey, 1994) (Bazargan, 1994)	(Hale, Pack, & Salkeid, 1994)					(Walklate, 1994)

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
1995	(Carcach, Frampton, Thomas, & Cranich, 1995) (Stanko, 1995b) (Skogan, 1995) (Hartless, Dittton, Nair, & Phillips, 1995) (Keane, 1995) (Miethel, 1995) (Stanko, 1995a) (Hough, 1995) (Herlihy, 1995)	(Fisher, 1995) (Taylor, 1995)		(Sacco, 1995)	(Pratt, 1995) (Scheingold, 1995) (Grabosky, 1995)		(Pain, 1995) (Ferraro, 1995)
1996	(Ferraro, 1996) (Hale, 1996) (St John & Heald-Moore, 1996) (Weinrath & Gartell, 1996) (ABS, 1996)	(Perkins & Taylor, 1996) (Painter, 1996) (Haghighi & Sorensen, 1996)		(Heath & Gilbert, 1996)	(Garland, 1996) (Ditton, Bannister, Gilchrist, & Farrall, 1996) (Brown & Polk, 1996)		(Rountree & Land, 1996) (Hale, 1996)

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
1997	(Walklate, 1997) (Madriz, 1997a) (Benson, 1997) (Madriz, 1997b) (Goodey, 1997) (Chiricos, Hogan, & Gertz, 1997) (Houts & Kassab, 1997) (Joseph, 1997) (Pain, 1997) (Alvarez & Bachman, 1997) (Valentine & Holloway, 2001)	(Boroah & Carach, 1997) (Hollway & Jefferson, 1997) (McGarrell, Giacomazzi, & Thurman, 1997)	(Farrall, Bannister, Ditton, & Gilchrist, 1997)	(Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997)	(Taylor, 1997) (Houts & Kassab, 1997)		
1998	(Gilchrist, Bannister, Ditton, & Farrall, 1998) (Greve, 1998) (Keane, 1998)	(Thompson & Krause, 1998) (Walklate, 1998) (Reid, Roberts, & Hilliard, 1998) (Rountree, 1998) (Mesch & Fishman, 1998) (Stanko, 1998) (Harris & Jensen, 1998)		(Pratt, 1998)	(Taylor & Jamieson, 1998)		(Winkel, 1998)

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
1999	(Graycar, 1999) (Carcach & Mukherjee, 1999) (Lupton, 1999) (Ditton, Bannister, Gilchrist, & Farrall, 1999) (Ditton, Farrall, Bannister, Gilchrist, & Pease, 1999) (Tulloch, 2000) (Pantazis, 2000) (National Campaign against Violence and Crime, 2000) (Lane & Meeker, 2000) (Sik Lee, 2000) (May & Dunaway, 2000) (Koskela & Pain, 2000) (Farrall, Bannister, Ditton, & Gilchrist, 2000)	(Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999) (Taylor, 1999) (Carcach, 1999) (O'Mahony & Quinn, 1999)	(Northern Ireland Department of Health, 1998)		(Carcach, 1999) (Lee, 1999) (Robert & Pottier, 1999)		
2000		(Cochran, Bromley, & Branch, 2000) (Adams & Serpe, 2000)	(Williams, McShane, & Akers, 2000) (Auditors, 2000) (NHDC, 2000)	(Chiricos, Padgett, & Gertz, 2000)	(National Crime Prevention Council, 2000) (Garland, 2000) (Schwartz & Israel, 2000) (Warr, 2000) (Hope & Sparks, 2000) (Blood, Tulloch, & Enders, 2000) (Dadds, 2000)		(Lupton, 2000) (Mawby, Brunt, & Hamby, 2000) (Killias & Clerici, 2000)

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
2001	(Bannister & Fyfe, 2001) (Pain, 2001) (May, 2001)	(Alvi, Schwartz, DeKeseredy, & Maume, 2001) (Ellin, 2001) (Walklate, 2001) (Chandola, 2001)			(Bonta, 2001) (National Crime Prevention, 2001) (Silverman & Della-Giustina, 2001) (Sparks, Girling, & Loader, 2001) (Johnston, 2001) (Body-Gendrot, 2001)		(Unknown, 2001)
2002	(May, Vartanian, & Virgo, 2002) (Ranzijn & Howells, 2002) (Sacco & Macmillan, 2001)	(Semmens, Dillane, & Ditton, 2002) (Irving, 2002) (Taylor, 2002) (Gibson, Zhao, Lovrich, & Gaffney, 2002) (Hunter, Krannich, & Smith, 2002) (Ravenscroft, Uzzell, & Leach, 2002) (Semmens et al., 2002)		(Eschholz, 2002)	(Los, 2002)		(Kanan & Pruitt, 2002)

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
2003	(Katz, Webb, & Armstrong, 2003) (Stiles, Halim, & Kaplan, 2003) (James, Graycar, & Mayhew, 2003) (Moreton, 2003) (Lane & Meeker, 2003a)	(Crank, Giacomazzi, & Heck, 2003) (George, 2003) (Crime Prevention Victoria, 2003) (Doran & Lees, 2003) (Doran, 2003/2004) (Lane & Meeker, 2003b) (Robinson, Lawton, Taylor, & Perkins, 2003) (Schreck & Miller, 2003) (Dammert & Malone, 2003) (Carvalho & Lewis, 2003)	(Ditton, Chadee, & Khan, 2003) (Taylor, 2003) (Carvalho & Lewis, 2003)	(Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003)	(Chevigny, 2003) (Anonymous, 2003) (Christmann, Rogerson, & Walters, 2003)	(Gabriel & Greve, 2003) (Clark, 2003) (Brown, 2003)	
2004	(Walklate, 2004) (Reid & Konrad, 2004a) (Reid & Konrad, 2004b) (Tulloch, 2004) (Blythe, 2004) (Acierno, Rheingold, Resnick, & Kilpatrick, 2004) (Mawby, 2004) (Phillips & Park, 2004)	(O'Beirne, Demney, & Gabe, 2004) (Spelman, 2004) (Phillips & Smith, 2004) (Miceli, Roccoato, & Rosato, 2004) (Jackson, 2004b) (Allen, 2004)	(Pleysier, Vervaeke, & Goethals, 2004) (Hirschfeld, 2004) (Jackson, 2004b) (Farrall, 2004b)	(Boulahanis & Heltsley, 2004) (Fisher, Allan, & Allan, 2004) (Van den Bulck, 2004) (Ditton, Chadee, Farrall, Gilchrist, & Bannister, 2004) (Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004)	(Jackson, 2004a) (Barber & Doob, 2004) (Allender, 2004) (Reisig & Parks, 2004) (Noaks, 2004) (Weisburd & Eck, 2004) (Salmi, Gronroos, & Keskinen, 2004)	(Clark, 2004) (Booth, 2004) (Farrall, 2004a) (Hough, 2004) (Farrall & Gadd, 2004)	(Vacha & McLaughlin, 2004) (Rader, 2004)

	Demographics	Environment	Measurement	Media	Policy	Psychology	Risk
2005	(Sutton & Farrall, 2005) (Fetchenhauer & Buunk, 2005) (Sutton & Farrall, 2005) (Khan, Byrne, & Livesay, 2005) (Pain et al., 2005)	(McCrea, Shyy, Western, & Stimson, 2005) (Bridenball & Jesilow, 2005) (Wallace & May, 2005) (Kershaw & Tseloni, 2006) (Doran & Lees, 2005) (Palmer, Ziersch, Arthurson, & Baum, 2005)	(Pleysier, Pauwels, Vervaeke, & Goethals, 2005) (Ditton, Khan, & Chadee, 2005) (Jackson, 2005)		(Roh & Oliver, 2005) (Silverman, 2005) (Xu, Fiedler, & Flaming, 2005) (Millie & Herrington, 2005)	(Amerio, 2005) (Whitley & Prince, 2005)	(Muller, 2005)
2006	(Moore, 2006a) (Moore, 2006b) (Lumeng, Appugliese, Cabral, Bradley, & Zukerman, 2006) (Moore & Shepherd, 2006) (Dolan & Peasgood, 2006) (Bayley & Andersen, 2006) (Snedker, 2006) (Schafer, Huebner, & Bynum, 2006) (AIC, 2006)				(Braman & Kahan, 2006)		(Jackson, 2006)

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