Shaming and Shame: An Empirical Analysis

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Declaration

The data used in this thesis was collected as part of the Reintegrative Shaming Experiments. Except where indicated otherwise this thesis is my own work.

[Signature]

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July, 1999
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Abstract

Theoretical approaches to shame have often distinguished the emotion from conceptions of guilt or embarrassment. By exploring the dimensionality of these shame-related emotions it is possible to test the distinctions hypothesised by these theoretical approaches as well as the phenomenology of shame. In addition to disagreement on phenomenology and dimensionality, approaches to shame have also differed in their predictions as to why people feel shame. In particular, they dispute the effect of social disapproval, otherwise referred to as shaming. An important issue is whether shame is a response to internalised values or simply a reaction to social pressure. The way in which disapproval is expressed may also have important implications for the emotions that are felt. Reintegrative shaming theory predicts that the effect of shaming is dependent upon whether shaming is reintegrative or stigmatic.

Predictions made about shame and shaming were tested on data drawn from the drink driving component of the Reintegrative Shaming Experiments. This experiment involved 900 subjects randomly assigned to restorative justice conferences and court cases after being apprehended by the Australian Federal Police.

The dimensionality of the shame-related emotions, which was equivalent in court and conference cases, did not reflect expected differences between shame and guilt. A single shame-guilt factor emerged. This factor was defined by feelings of having done wrong, concern that others had been hurt, anger at oneself, feeling ashamed of oneself and one's act, and having lost honour among family and friends. This suggests that distinctions between shame and guilt in earlier studies may be conditional on the context or methodology employed. There were, however, differences between shame-guilt and an embarrassment-exposure factor, which measured feelings of self-awareness and awkwardness. A third factor, involving ongoing feelings that issues had been unresolved, has similarities to earlier research on unacknowledged shame.

Factor analysis revealed that the amount of shaming perceived by subjects was independent of the degree to which cases were perceived as reintegrative or stigmatic. However, in contrast to the predictions made by reintegrative shaming theory, stigmatisation and reintegration were measured as independent concepts rather than
opposite poles of the same concept. As predicted, conference cases were higher in shaming and reintegration but lower in stigmatisation than court cases. The findings provide evidence for the reliability and validity of these measures of reintegrative shaming.

Shaming was found to predict shame-guilt but only when it was by people the subject highly respected. Furthermore, shame-guilt was predicted by the subject’s perception that the offence was wrong, perceptions of having been reintegrated and perceptions of not having been stigmatised. It is argued that shame-guilt should be understood as a product of social influence in which internalised values, normative expectations and social context have an effect. In contrast to shame-guilt, embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame were predicted by perceptions of having been stigmatised and the belief that the offence was less wrong. This highlights the importance of distinguishing between the shame-related emotions, as does the finding that shame-guilt was greater in restorative justice conferences but that embarrassment-exposure was greater in court cases.

Contrary to studies on shame-proness, the shame-guilt factor was positively related to empathy and negatively related to anger/hostility. This may be due to the failure to distinguish between shame and guilt but might also highlight the importance of distinguishing between shame-guilt as a discrete emotion and shame-proness as a personality disposition. It was found that unresolved shame, predicted by stigmatisation, was associated with greater anger/hostility. This finding suggests that the resolution or management of shame may be as important as whether shame is felt. The results highlight the need to complement the theory of reintegrative shaming with insights from Helen Lewis and Thomas Scheff’s work on by-passed shame, the social identity theory perspective of Tajfel and Turner and the ethical conception of shame that one finds in the writing of Bernard Williams.
# Table of Contents

## Chapter 1: Shaming and shame

- The Impact of Criminal Justice Sanctions .......................................................... 12
- Shame and Shaming in Justice ............................................................................ 15
- Conceptualising Shame ..................................................................................... 17
- Measuring Shame .............................................................................................. 19
- Overview of the Thesis ....................................................................................... 20

## Chapter 2: Three conceptual approaches to the emotion of shame

- Shame and Social Context ................................................................................ 25
  - Shame as Social Rejection ............................................................................. 25
  - Shame as the Public Transgression of Shared Values .................................... 29
  - Shame as the Transgression of Shared Values .............................................. 30
  - Shame as a Non-Social Emotion .................................................................... 32
  - Overview: The Social Characteristics of shame ............................................. 33
- Shame and the Self ............................................................................................ 34
  - Psychoanalytic Approaches to Shame and the Self ........................................ 34
  - Social Psychological Approaches to Shame of the Self ................................... 37
  - Affect Theory and Shame .............................................................................. 39
  - Shame as a Loss of Other’s Love ................................................................... 43
  - Overview: self-evaluation and shame ............................................................. 43
- Three Conceptions of Shame ........................................................................... 44

## Chapter 3: The Reintegrative Shaming Experiments

- Procedure ........................................................................................................... 50
- Subjects ............................................................................................................... 53
- Measures .......................................................................................................... 56
- Design ............................................................................................................... 59
- Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 61
Chapter 4: Testing the dimensionality of shame .............................................. 61

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 62
Distinguishing Shame from Related Emotions .............................................. 62
Measuring the concepts of shame, guilt and embarrassment .................. 72

Method ..................................................................................................................... 79
Participants and Procedure ................................................................................... 79
Measures .................................................................................................................. 79
Design ....................................................................................................................... 80

Results ..................................................................................................................... 81
Principal Component Analysis of Court Cases Data .............................. 81
Principal Component Analysis of Conference Case Data ..................... 83
Measuring the Degree of Association Among Factors ......................... 86
Correlations Between Self-Report and Observational Measures of Shame... 87

Discussion ............................................................................................................... 90
Differentiating Shame from Guilt and Embarrassment ......................... 91
Conceptualising Shame ......................................................................................... 94
Future Directions ................................................................................................... 96
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 97

Chapter 5: Testing the Dimensionality in Reintegrative Shaming ............... 98

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 99
Defining Important Components of Reintegrative Shaming Theory .......... 99
Relationships Among Shaming, Stigmatisation, and Reintegration .......... 103
Previous Tests of Reintegrative Shaming Theory ......................................... 104
Measuring Reintegrative Shaming in Restorative Justice Conferences and Court Cases .......................................................... 111

Method ................................................................................................................... 113
Participants and Procedure ................................................................................. 113
Self-Report Measures .......................................................................................... 113
Design ....................................................................................................................... 116
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relationship Between Shaming, Reintegration and Stigmatisation</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparing Self-Report and Observational Measures of Shaming</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparing Shaming Between Court and Conference Cases</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dimensionality of Reintegrative Shaming</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Validity of the Reintegrative Shaming Measures</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 6: The relationship between shame and shaming**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaming in Conceptions of Shame</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegrative Shaming Theory and Shame</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impact of Shame on Other Emotions</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants and Procedure</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing the Relationship Between Shaming and the Shame-Related Emotions</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicting Empathy and Hostility/Anger with the Shame Related Emotions</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegrative Shaming and Shame</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unresolved Shame</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame, Anger/Hostility and Empathy</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Shaming to Shame</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7: An ethical-identity conception of shame ................................................ 172

Summarising Empirical Results on Shame............................................................ 173

An Ethical-Identity Theory of Shame-Guilt ......................................................... 179

Shame-Guilt is Felt in Reference to Values that are Perceived as Ethical ............ 179

The Shaming-Shame Relationship is Mediated by Social Validation.................... 181

Shame-Guilt Involves Threat to an Individual's Identity ...................................... 184

Explaining Empirical Results on Shame-Guilt .................................................... 190

Summary of Propositions ...................................................................................... 194

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 195

Chapter 8: Shame, shaming and criminal justice ..................................................... 195

The Re-Emergence of Shame in Criminology ..................................................... 196

Re-Defining the Role of Shame .......................................................................... 199

Beyond Shame ..................................................................................................... 202

Shaming and Resolution ...................................................................................... 205

Implications for Effective Shaming ..................................................................... 210

Unresolved Shame and Reintegrative Shaming Theory ....................................... 212

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 214
List of Tables

Table 2.1: Different conceptions of shame ................................................................. 46
Table 3.1: Sample and subject loss in the drink driving experiment ......................... 55
Table 3.2: Agreement and Pearson product correlations between observers .............. 58
Table 4.1: Attributes associated with shame and related emotions, and questions
developed to measure them .................................................................................. 76
Table 4.2: Means and (standard deviations) of the observational shame items .......... 80
Table 4.3: Rotated Pattern Matrix of shame-related items for court cases ................. 82
Table 4.4: Rotated Pattern Matrix of shame-related items for conference cases ...... 85
Table 4.5: Pearson product moment correlations between factor scores for court and
conference cases .................................................................................................. 87
Table 4.6: Correlations between observed shame and self-reported shame-related
emotions ................................................................................................................ 88
Table 5.1: Means and standard deviations of interview items across contexts .......... 115
Table 5.2: Rotated factor matrix of the court cases interview data ............................. 118
Table 5.3: Rotated factor matrix of the conference cases interview data .................... 119
Table 5.4: Correlations between reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming .............. 123
Table 5.5: Correlations between self-report and observation measures of shaming ... 126
Table 5.6: Means and (standard deviation) for the self-report and observational scales
for court and conference cases .......................................................................... 129
Table 6.1: Correlations between dependent and independent variables for court (above
diagonal) and conference (below diagonal) cases ............................................. 152
Table 6.2: Beta weights for the hierarchical regression on shame-guilt ...................... 154
Table 6.3: Beta weights for the hierarchical regression on embarrassment-exposure .... 157
Table 6.4: Betas weights for the hierarchical regression on unresolved shame ............ 159
Table 6.5: Beta weights for the regression on empathy ............................................. 160
Table 6.6: Beta weights for regression on anger/hostility ...................................... 161
Table 8.1: predicting recidivism from shame and unresolved emotion .................... 213
List of Figures

Figure 2.1: The Compass of Shame (Nathanson, 1992) ............................................... .42

Figure 5.1: The Effect of Reintegration on Change in Compliance for Different Levels of Disapproval (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1994) ................. 106

Figure 5.2: Confirmatory Factor Loadings .................................................................. 122
Chapter 1: Shaming and shame

The emotion of shame and its relationship with the social process of shaming is the subject of this thesis. Interest in this topic was motivated by the growing recognition of shaming within criminology and the growth of interest in restorative justice. These developments highlight the importance of understanding the emotional responses that occur as a result of wrongdoing or censure, and particularly the emotion of shame. Just as important is how the communication of shaming, or disapproval, within criminal justice interventions affects the emotions of offenders. In addition to this criminological perspective there are also broader motivations for studying shame. The literature exposes a number of conceptual approaches that make different predictions regarding the dimensionality of shame-related emotions and their causes. Furthermore, empirical studies have so far provided only limited support for these differing positions. The relationship between shaming and shame is important to explaining why shame is seen as important to the regulation of behaviour and social relationships.

The Impact of Criminal Justice Sanctions

The effect criminal justice sanctions have on reoffending, and thus the effectiveness of applying sanctions, has always been a central topic in criminology, but also one that is still largely unresolved. A number of perspectives have argued that sanctioning is important in reducing the likelihood of further offending. For example, deterrence theories (Grasmick & Appleton, 1977; Tittle, 1977; Tittle, 1980; Waldo & Chiricos, 1972) have suggested that the individual's perceptions of the likelihood of sanctions being applied and the expected severity of those sanctions will determine whether individuals are willing to offend. These approaches assume the individual weighs up the costs and rewards associated with crime and on the basis of these chooses to commit or not commit crime. The implication is that the criminal justice system simply needs to increase the likelihood and severity of sanctions until offending stops. Such sanctions work to deter the individual(s) punishments are imposed upon but also the general community. The philosophy of criminal law
suggests that another motivation for sentencing may be based upon the need to “publicly repudiate the offence” (Williams, 1983: p. 39). Indeed, an emphasis upon the communicative importance of punishment is evident in a number of approaches (Duff, 1996). For example, recent work by Kahan (1997) argues that the importance of punishment is expressive, the condemnation or stigmatisation of offences is important because it reinforces moral norms.

While these traditional perspectives predict that sanctioning will be effective in reducing crime, this conclusion was questioned, particularly in the 60s and 70s, by labelling theories (Erikson, 1962; Schur, 1973). These suggest that deviance is not inherent to particular behaviours, but rather that a deviant status is socially applied to some behaviours and those who engage in them. This is particularly evident in rituals associated with being arrested for an offence, being tried by a court, being pronounced as guilty, and finally punished (Erikson, 1962). It is argued that this process defines the individual’s social status as one of a criminal. This is reflected in both how the community comes to treat the person and how the person sees themself. The loss of legitimate opportunities associated with being seen as a criminal, and the resulting attraction of criminal subcultures, make the individual more likely to commit crime. The influence of these factors is also facilitated by the individual’s perception of self as delinquent. Thus, the labelling perspective argues that applying the status of deviant to individuals is likely to be self-fulfilling: the application of sanctions, and dramatisation or stigmatisation of criminality, by the criminal justice system is likely to produce more crime.

Although labelling theories have been influential, empirical studies have only provided mixed support for the hypothesis that criminal justice intervention actually increases delinquency (Box, 1981; Braithwaite, 1989). A number of studies have shown that juveniles who are apprehended for offences perceive themselves as more deviant than before, develop greater association with other delinquent juveniles and increase their deviant behaviour (Ageton & Elliot, 1974; Farrington, 1977; Farrington, Osborn & West, 1978). The strongest support for labelling theory comes from the Cambridge longitudinal study of delinquency (West & Farrington, 1977). This study found that in a sample of delinquent boys, those who were caught and convicted
became more delinquent than those who were not caught at all. However, a number of studies have not replicated these findings (Fisher & Erickson, 1973; Foster, Dinitz & Reckless, 1972; Hepburn, 1977; Junger & Junger, 1985). Thus, evidence for the labelling perspective is equivocal.

Reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989) seeks to explain why criticism of the traditional approach by labelling theories has only received moderate support. It does this by identifying when criminal justice intervention reduces crime, as predicted by the traditional approach, and when it increases offending. Braithwaite argues that shaming of offences is important not just because these social processes offer the greatest deterrent, but also because they are important in the development of conscience and establishment of common social norms. However, the theory also suggests that shaming varies in the degree to which it is stigmatising or labelling of the offender. Reintegrative forms of shaming focus not on disapproval of the offender but rather the offence itself as well as explicitly decertifying any deviant status imposed on the offender. In short this is censure which avoids the pitfalls of labelling. At the other extreme shaming can be stigmatising such that it labels the offender and does not decertify that deviant status. The prediction of reintegrative shaming theory is that, consistent with labelling theory, stigmatising shaming does result in more crime but that reintegrative shaming is important in reducing crime. While the theory has received some support (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994) more empirical work is need to properly test this claim.

An important aspect of reintegrative shaming theory is not just the distinction between reintegration and stigmatisation but also that it focuses on the importance of social disapproval rather than the formal sanctions of criminal justice systems. Indeed, it argues that this process of shaming is more important to the reduction of crime than the sanctions imposed by courts. This is because reputation is important to individuals but also because reintegrative shaming appeals to individual's moral values, thus developing and maintaining conscience. Thus, an assumption made by the theory is that shame or the shame-related emotions associated with conscience result from shaming and that they are important to explaining the effect of shaming on offending. Despite this assumption Braithwaite provides almost no analysis of what shame or its
related emotions are. For example, while acknowledging that others have distinguished between shame and guilt, he argues that there is no need to distinguish between shaming and guilt-induction. However, understanding when shame occurs, and differences between it and other shame-related emotions, is important to explaining why shaming may influence whether offenders reoffend. The relationship between shaming and shame is also important for understanding differences between reintegration and stigmatisation and their effect on reoffending. Examining these issues is one aim of this thesis.

**Shame and Shaming in Justice**

Impetus to understand the role of shaming and shame has been increased by their prominence in the development of new criminal justice interventions. In particular, the emergence of restorative justice and restorative justice conferences has highlighted the need to understand the process of social disapproval. The rubric of restorative justice incorporates a broad range of movements within criminal justice towards methods that are not based on retribution. Central themes are the reconciliation of parties associated with a crime and restoration of damage done by offences to victims but also the affected community and the offender. The types of restoration have also been conceptualised broadly. Braithwaite (1996) suggests that the targets of restoration might include property loss, injury, security, dignity, sense of empowerment, deliberative democracy, feelings of justice and social support.

Restorative justice is also recognised by the way it is transacted. One definition arrived at by a working party on restorative justice (McCold, 1997) suggests that it is:

...a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of an

---

1 Restorative justice conferences are known by a number of other names including family group conference, community accountability conferences, community conferences, diversionary conferences, etc. In this thesis they will also be referred to simply as conferences.
The significance of conferences to the restorative justice movement is reflected in the spread of conferencing throughout the world. While conferences started in New Zealand with a legislated youth justice program in 1989, conferences were quickly adopted in Australia, USA, Canada, UK, Singapore, South Africa, Ireland and other places. It is also clear that other restorative programs such as healing circles and sentencing circles in North America implement restorative justice ideals in rather similar ways.

A significant feature of these restorative programs is that they place less emphasis than traditional court approaches on the formal outcomes that are achieved. Strategies to prevent reoffending are not based upon the severity of sanctions imposed but the communication of the harm done to others and disapproval of the actions by relevant others. Thus, important to explaining the effectiveness of restorative procedures is the way in which social disapproval is communicated and when it is effective in changing behaviour. Indeed, Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming theory is already used to explain the procedures used in restorative justice conferences and has been used in the development of conferencing techniques (Braithwaite, 1999; Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994; Hyndman, Thorsbourne & Woods, 1996; McDonald, O'Connell, Moore & Bransbury, 1994; Moore & Forsythe, 1995; O’Connell & Thorsbourne, 1995; Retzinger & Scheff, 1996). It is also apparent that shaming and shame have become important concepts in other regulatory fields. For example, Grasmick and Bursik (1990) found that the expectation of feeling shame/guilt was a predictor of the expectation to offend. There is also some evidence that expectations of feeling shame have an impact upon the perceived likelihood of committing corporate crime (Simpson, 1998).

Although shaming and shame are increasingly seen as important concepts in the regulation of behaviour there is also some concern regarding the effect they have on offenders. Recent use of shaming punishments by courts have emphasised stigmatising shaming and humiliation of offenders (Kahan, 1996). For example, thieves are ordered to wear shirts or carry signs indicating to others that they stole. For many
Chapter 1: Shaming and Shame

in the restorative justice movement such stigmatisation is contradictory to the goals of restoration and is actually retributive in its philosophical basis. Certainly this type of stigmatisation of offenders does not seem conducive to the restoration or reintegration of offenders into the community. Concern that shaming is inherently stigmatising leads to questions about whether shaming should be considered relevant to restorative justice at all, and whether shame is an appropriate emotion for offenders to feel. Research by Maxwell and Morris (Maxwell, 1999) shows that offenders who remember being made to feel bad about themselves during conferences are more likely to be persistent offenders. This research is also supported by empirical studies on shame-proneness and guilt-proneness (Tangney 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992) which suggest that offenders prone to feeling shame respond less appropriately to shameful events than guilt-prone individuals. These findings highlight the question of whether it is positive for offenders to feel shame at all. Furthermore, it seems important to determine whether there are differences between the shame emotions, for example between shame and guilt.

Conceptualising Shame

The failure to find research on shame that presents a consistent answer to questions about the role that shame plays in reintegrative shaming, and more generally in restorative justice, suggests that understanding shame is also an important psychological question. Scholarly interest in the emotion of shame has increased markedly in recent years. The emotion has been seen as relevant to a range of disciplines such as anthropology (Benedict, 1946; Mead, 1937), psychoanalysis (Lewis, 1971; Wurmsker, 1994), sociology (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991), criminology (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990), law (Kahan, 1996), philosophy (Taylor, 1985; Williams, 1993) and psychology (Gilbert, 1997; Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1991). Much of this work has attempted to define what shame is and when it occurs. However, it is also evident that within this literature there is still disagreement about some fundamental questions regarding the emotion. For example, while Wallbott and Scherer (1995) describe shame as a less moral emotion than guilt and more often accompanied by laughter, Lewis (1971) describes it as involving self-directed hostility and perceptions
of being a failure. This disparity highlights some of the differences in phenomenological accounts of shame.

The relationship between shame and related emotions is another area of significant disagreement. The shame-related emotions are described by a large number of words in the English language. The distinction that has received most attention is between shame and guilt, although some attention has also been paid to the distinction between shame and embarrassment. Dimensions upon which shame has been distinguished from other emotions, and particularly guilt, have varied between conceptions, resulting in markedly different characterisations of the emotions. Furthermore, empirical studies have provided only limited support for these conceptual distinctions (Wicker, Payne & Morgan, 1983; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). It is also evident that what empirical research has occurred relies heavily upon differences between emotions as perceived by subjects. Little factor analytical or observational work has been done to test these conceptual distinctions.

Research into shame has also focused primarily upon phenomenological issues. As a result little is known about the causal relationships associated with shame. This is particularly important given the significant conceptual differences. Some approaches have described shame as a reaction to criticism or derision by others. The emotion is characterised as caused by external sources and in relation to values not necessarily held by the individual. The primary alternative describes shame as a reaction to violation of one's own standards. In this approach the source is internal evaluation and thus requires no intervention by others. The result of these differences is a description of two quite different emotions. The description of shame as motivated by external sources describes shame as a non-moral, perhaps even valueless, response to the fear of rejection. In contrast, the second approach emphasises the importance of internalised goals and concern with degradation of identity or self-respect. These accounts of shame also present extreme understandings of the social context in which shame occurs. Either shame is a response to a threatening other (who may either attack or withdraw approval) or there is no social context at all. Neither of these approaches acknowledged that shame occurs in communities where values may be contentious, that shaming may be used to enforce certain values, or that shame
feelings may or may not indicate an acceptance of norms. Thus, understanding the social context in which shame occurs also seems important to developing an understanding of the emotion.

**Measuring Shame**

Measuring an emotion such as shame is not easy because it usually occurs in difficult circumstances where researcher access is a problem. These difficulties were overcome in this research by collecting data on shaming and shame through the reintegrative shaming experiment (RISE). RISE involves four large randomised experiments in which subjects apprehended for particular offences were observed during court cases and restorative justice conferences, and interviewed afterwards. One objective of the experiments was to compare the recidivism rates of offenders who attended the interventions. But another important comparison was the amount and type of shaming that occurred in each context. The degree of reintegrative shaming involved in conferences, as opposed to stigmatising shaming, was an important theoretical issue. Thus, an important purpose of the experiment was the measurement of shaming and shame via observation and post-intervention interviews. Equally important to the methodology employed by this thesis was that the context in which these measures were taken could be assumed to involve both shaming and shame.

This chapter has highlighted a number of important issues regarding both the nature of shame and its relationship with shaming that will be addressed using data from RISE. The primary statistical analyses used are factor analysis and multiple regression analysis. Correlational approaches, such as these, enable this research to address a number of broad issues regarding shame and shaming. The dimensionality of the shame-related emotions is one such issue. It is also possible to examine the way shame relates to a number of factors that are assumed to have important causal relationships with it. While this research cannot test causal relationships it will allow more specific hypotheses regarding the causes of shame to be developed.

It is also worth noting that this thesis is interested in the emotion of shame from a social rather than physiological perspective. A number of theorists have addressed the issue of how emotions or affects relate to physiological patterns
Chapter 1: Shaming and Shame

(Tomkins, 1962, 1963). Another important debate in the literature has been the relationship between cognition and emotion (Lewis, 1992; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Tomkins, 1981). In contrast to such research this thesis is focused upon testing subjects' awareness of feelings associated with the shame-related emotions. As a result it is interested in a social definition of the shame emotions and the social conditions in which these feelings occur.

Overview of the Thesis

Literature from many disciplines on the emotion of shame is reviewed in Chapter Two. It is perhaps surprising that the emotion has not received more attention in psychology and particularly social psychology. As a result the literature review draws upon contributions which have developed in quite different frameworks. Despite this, it is found that theoretical approaches to shame can be described in reference to two primary dimensions. One of these dimensions is the degree to which shame is characterised as a particularly social emotion: that it occurs in reference to others and/or their standards. The second dimension is the degree to which shame is characterised as focused upon the self and identity. From this discussion it is possible to identify three conceptions of shame: the social threat conception, the personal failure conception and the ethical conception. These conceptions capture the primary ways of describing shame and are used to inform the questions asked in following chapters.

Chapter Three outlines the methodology used in RISE and the way in which it relates to this thesis. Observational and self-report measures from a sample of 900 subjects who were apprehended for drink driving were analysed. The procedures through which these subjects came to be in the experiment, and the procedures used to obtain the observational and self-report measures are discussed. Development of the measures used to operationalise shaming and the shame-related emotions are also discussed as well as the techniques employed to analyse the data.

Conceptions of shame have often defined the emotion by contrasting it with related emotions. It is, however, apparent that the distinctions made by different conceptions are not consistent. Furthermore, empirical studies that have examined this
issue are not conclusive in their support for any particular distinction. The
dimensionality of these emotions is important because of its role in the
conceptualisation of shame but also in determining whether shame and other related
emotions have distinct social properties. Chapter Four measures characteristics
associated with shame as well as the emotions it is most commonly compared to: guilt
and embarrassment. These characteristics are used in a factor analysis to determine the
dimensionality of these emotions.

The dimensionality of shaming, reintegration and stigmatisation are examined in
Chapter Five. While reintegrative shaming theory has been tested on a number of
occasions (Lu, in press, Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994; Zhang, 1995) there has been no
evaluation of whether the structure of shaming behaviours is as predicted by the
theory. Evaluation of the dimensionality of these concepts is not only important to
evaluation of the theory but also to developing valid and reliable measures. In this
chapter factor analytic techniques are used to test the dimensionality of these
constructs. In addition, the chapter investigates the relationship between self-report
and observational measures of shaming concepts and their predictive validity in the
context of court and conferences. These provide some further evidence of the theory’s
validity.

Chapter Six uses the measures developed in Chapters Four and Five to test
various predictions regarding the relationship between shaming and shame. While it
might be expected that shaming and shame are positively related, a number of other
hypotheses are evident in the shame literature. Whether the affect of shaming is
moderated by the level of respect subjects have for those who are disapproving is one
hypothesis that is tested. Also tested is the relationship between individual’s
perceptions of wrongdoing and the shame-related emotions. These hypotheses explore
the social context in which shame occurs as well as testing the degree to which the
shame emotions are a reaction to internalised standards. The significance of the way in
which shaming is expressed, whether it is reintegrative or stigmatic, is another issue
addressed in this chapter. Reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989) predicts
that reintegrative shaming and stigmatising shaming have different effects on offending,
it is also expected that they should have different effects upon the emotions
experienced by individuals. Finally, the relationship between the shame-related emotions and empathy and hostility/anger are tested to provide some insight into what the consequences of feeling these emotions might be.

Chapter Seven summarises the results and compares them with previous empirical research. In response to these findings a theoretical framework is proposed to account for the relationship between shaming and shame. This draws heavily on work already done on the psychology of social influence. In particular it is proposed that shame occurs as a result of the perception of violating an ethical norm and that a process of social validation mediates this perception. This approach accounts for findings that respected others’ opinions and reintegrative forms of shaming are significant predictors of shame-guilt. It is also proposed that shame involves a perceived threat to identity that results from having acted contrary to ethical norms that are important in defining identity. Resolution of shame involves a process of resolving these tensions. This accounts for why stigmatisation and low perceptions of wrongdoing in the face of shaming can result in feelings of unresolved shame. A number of key propositions and proposals for how they might be tested are presented.

Shaming and shame have become important concepts in criminology. There is also some concern regarding the stigmatising use of shaming and whether shame itself is a healthy emotion for offenders to feel. Chapter Eight addresses these issues by arguing that the assumption that shaming within criminal justice results in shame has overlooked the importance of shame resolution. It is argued that shame will often occur as a result of criminal justice interventions regardless of whether shaming occurs actively, formally, or at all. What seems to be critical, as indicated by the results in this thesis, is whether shame is resolved. This suggests that the importance of shaming (conceived in the distinctively broad way advocated by Braithwaite) is not necessarily in producing shame but in allowing or facilitating the resolution of shame. This is one explanation for why reintegration as opposed to stigmatisation may be a more productive strategy in the shaming of offenders. The practical implications for restorative justice are also discussed.
Chapter 2: Three conceptual approaches to the emotion of shame

Reviewing the literature on shame is particularly important because in a number of respects it is diverse and contradictory. One attempt, by Harder (1995), to describe the psychological literature on shame identifies three basic schools of thought. The first he identifies is primarily made up of clinicians who focus on the phenomenological experience of shame and its differences from guilt. This tradition involves theorists such as Helen Lewis (1971), Lindsay-Hartz (1984), Schneider (1977) and Wurmser (1994). Tomkin’s (1987) affect theory, which has been extended by theorists such as Kaufman (1996) and Nathanson (1992), defines a second tradition that is based upon a physiological account of the emotions as innate human affects. Finally, the third, but much smaller, tradition identified involves theoretical work on cognitive attribution and appraisal from theorists such as Schachter and Singer (1962). While this may capture the different approaches from within the fields of psychology and psychiatry it is also evident that work from other disciplines has contributed greatly to the study of shame. The work of anthropologists, namely Margaret Mead (1937) and Ruth Benedict (1946), in describing shame cultures as opposed to guilt cultures has had a significant impact. Equally, shame has been discussed by authors such as Williams (1993), Heller (1985) and Taylor (1985) within the discipline of moral philosophy, by Goffman (1959), Scheff and Retzinger (1991) in the discipline of sociology, Kahan (1996) in law and Grasmick and Bursik (1990) and Braithwaite (1989) in the criminological literature.

To understand variation in the way shame has been characterised this chapter will discuss two of the primary debates that have dominated theoretical approaches to the emotion. The first of these debates concerns the question of whether shame is in some important respects a social emotion; either because it occurs primarily in social contexts, as a result of shaming by others, in relation to social values, or because it regulates social relationships with others. The degree to which shame can be described as social in these ways varies markedly across conceptions to the extent that a number of approaches, particularly in recent times, have rejected this emphasis altogether, instead focusing upon shame as an internally generated evaluation of the whole self.

23
The second debate, which evolves from this new emphasis, has primarily focused on the internal structure of shame as opposed to the situation in which it occurs. In a majority of cases this issue has revolved around the idea that shame is distinct because it involves an evaluation of the "whole self" as instigated by some form of personal failure. Beyond this basic starting point there are a number of variations including, most importantly, the psychological structure which they propose accounts for it.

Discussing the literature in terms of these two debates is a worthwhile exercise because it highlights much of the agreement and disagreement in the literature. With a few exceptions (e.g. Lewis, 1971) it is true that conceptions of shame either emphasise one or other of the issues discussed in these debates as being of central importance to the definition of shame. In this way these two debates could almost be said to define a typology of the shame literature: conceptions of shame as a social emotion (e.g. Benedict 1946; Gibbons 1990; Mead 1937) and conceptions of shame as self-evaluation (e.g. Lewis, 1992; Piers & Singer, 1953; Tangney, 1991). In fact it will be argued that the literature can best be described as three general conceptions which vary with respect to the two issues just outlined. These three conceptions each identify a different cause of shame: social rejection, failure to live up to an ideal and being connected to something wrong.

It is also worth noting that much of this literature has attempted to find meaningful ways of differentiating shame from other emotions, and particularly guilt. Indeed, shame has been emphasised as a "social" emotion because this differentiates it from guilt, which is seen as a reaction to internal values. Similarly, shame has been described as a negative evaluation of the whole self, in contrast to guilt, which is described as an evaluation of part of the self, or one's actions. This focus upon differentiating shame and guilt has had such an impact upon understandings of shame that it is perhaps difficult to discuss differing conceptions without awareness of this feature of the literature. This chapter focuses primarily on how different theories have conceptualised shame. The next chapter will explore the dimensionality of the shame-related emotions.
Shame and Social Context

Shame as Social Rejection

Various theories suggest that shame is the product of social pressure to conform; that it is a direct result of hostility or derision by others. In identifying this tradition Lynd (1958) suggests that this earlier formulation, which can initially be found in Freud (1950) and Benedict (1946), is based on a number of assumptions. These are that shame is a more external experience than guilt, that shame does not occur without others’ scorn, that there is a basic separation between oneself and others, and finally that others are seen in relation to oneself as an audience (Lynd, 1958: p. 21).

The conception of shame most consistent with these assumptions is that of the anthropologists Benedict (1946) and Mead (1937). In Benedict’s comparison of Japanese and American society, one difference she highlights is the means by which the two cultures gain conformity from individuals. Simply put, this distinction involved characterising Japan as a shame culture, America as a guilt culture, the difference being that:

True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behaviour, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalised conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other people’s criticism. (Benedict 1946: p. 223)

This characterisation of the two cultures illustrates the suggested differences between shame and guilt. The main distinction being that shame is not only in reference to others but is a reaction to their criticism. In fact, for someone to feel shame “... requires an audience or at least a man’s fantasy of a audience” (Benedict 1946: p. 223). The central role of others suggests that the emotion is based upon an evaluation of the individual according to the values of the “other”. The individual is seen as relatively passive; shame is imposed upon them, as a mechanism of social pressure, whether or not they agree that there is something to feel shame about.

This conception of shame is fairly consistent with that of Mead (1937), which she discusses as playing an important role in the operation of social control among
Chapter 2: Three Conceptions of Shame

American First Nations, Maori, Samoans, as well a number of other cultures. It is suggested that sanctions can either be internal, where the individual is educated such that they obey the standards of their society without the exertion of external force, or external, in which case the individual only obeys standards where forces, such as ridicule, are set in motion by others. While guilt is associated with internal sanctions in which the individual reacts to a disordered state within their own psyche, shame is most closely associated with external sanctions. However, Mead does suggest that shame in some circumstances can become a “relatively internalised sanction”. The example she gives of this implies that in certain cultures shaming practices are subtler, such that individuals can feel shame before a group which does not take an active role in shaming. Due to its particular relevance to the anthropological approaches of Benedict and Mead, it is worthwhile noting that Epstein (1984) comes to quite different conclusions on the basis of studies of Melanesian societies. Epstein argues that there is evidence that shame is not effective due to public reprimands but rather because of the internalisation of the relevant social values.

According to Gibbons (1990) the reason why shame is particularly reactive to social values, as opposed to personal values, is that it is the result of personal evaluation when the individual’s attention is outwardly focused. Based upon Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) theory of objective self-awareness it is argued that two separate sources of motivation underlie social behaviour. One reflects a desire to please the self, whenever the individual’s attention is focused upon the self. In this state of self-awareness the individual is motivated to act in accordance with his or her standards and values, which Gibbons argues are unique to the individual and relatively independent of the social context. When the person is self-aware in this way and has acted in a manner contrary to their beliefs, the emotion that occurs is guilt. In contrast to this, the second motivation occurs when the individual’s attention is oriented towards others and their expectations. This focus is primarily concerned with social norms and impression management and results in the feeling of shame or embarrassment whenever the person violates a social norm in the presence of others (Gibbons, 1990: p. 119). According to Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) theory, an individual’s attention, while able to oscillate between these two subjects of awareness
(self and other), is unable to focus upon both at the same time. Thus, at any moment the individual can only be motivated by either standards of the “self” or standards of the “other”.

One of the interesting features of this conception is the way in which it demonstrates how important the assumption that there is a basic separation between oneself and others, identified by Lynd above, is to this view of shame. It is a primary assumption of Gibbon’s differentiation between shame and guilt that the individual and others are perceived as clearly separate. Indeed, the difference between the emotions rests on the individual’s inability to focus their attention on both at the same time.

The implication of Gibbon’s theoretical approach is that shame results from the perception that one has failed to please others. Scheff (1988; 1990a; 1994; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991) also argues that shame is directly related to one’s social relationships. In providing a theory to explain the relationship between attunement, emotion, communication and co-operation, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) propose an explicit connection between shame and one’s social bonds with others. The theory proposes that the degree of attunement and emotion are reciprocally interrelated: that solidarity causes and is caused by shared pride and that alienation causes and is caused by shared shame. (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991: p. 21)

Attunement describes the health of the social bond between people and thus alienation is conceptualised as being equivalent to having a severed or threatened bond, while solidarity is conceptualised as having an intact bond with others. The emotions of shame and pride are seen as “...automatic bodily sign[s] of....” the health of the person’s bonds with others (Scheff, 1990: p. 15). The implication of this description is that feelings of embarrassment, shame or humiliation, which are all considered variants of shame, are the result of perceived rejection by others. The factor that determines which of these emotions will be felt is the intensity and obviousness of the rejection. Shame is clearly conceptualised as a social emotion in that it only occurs as a result of social relationships and furthermore is almost entirely dependent upon the
individual’s perception of other’s actions. Indeed, in discussing shame as important to understanding social conformity, Scheff (1988) argues that shame is “...experienced by individuals as exterior and constraining...” (p. 395). The individual is seen as passive, except in how they deal with shame once it is experienced. It is argued that while shame can be acknowledged and resolved, much shame is unacknowledged and that this type of shame is related to anger, violence and in turn less secure relationships with others.

A similar emphasis is placed upon social relationships in Leary’s (in press) conception of shame. Baumeister and Leary (1995) argue that the desire to establish and maintain interpersonal relationships is a fundamental motive of human behaviour. As a result people are acutely sensitive of the degree to which others accept them. It is argued that individuals continually monitor others’ reactions towards themself in order to detect social cues that indicate social exclusion. If rejection or disapproval by others is perceived it results in lower levels of self-esteem (Leary & Downs, 1995) but also negative emotions. In particular, shame or embarrassment occurs when the person perceives that their actions have weakened their relationships with others.

Although ultimately arguing that shame can be the result of internal or external evaluation, Gilbert (1997) argues that the importance of shame results from an innate evolutionary need to be seen as attractive by others. It is proposed that in order to prosper, humans and animals need attributes that give them an advantage in survival, in attracting mates so as to reproduce, and preventing competitors from reproducing. The need to be competitive in reproduction, in particular, is achieved in large part by having high social status and thus being dominant in the social structure. In human society the primary strategy in attaining status, and thus gaining useful relationships, is by gaining social attractiveness. Social attractiveness is mediated by the individual’s ability to attract positive attention from others and avoid negative attention. Being seen as unattractive threatens one’s ability to develop status and thus important relationships. In this model shame is a direct result of the perception that one is seen as unattractive and serves “...to alert the self and others to detrimental changes in social status.” (Gilbert, 1997: p. 114; italics in original). Shame is not only a signal to the self but is also a signal to others that one is submissive so as to reduce “attacks”
Chapter 2: Three Conceptions of Shame

which would further degrade one's status. Thus, while Gilbert argues that evaluation of what is attractive can become internalised, this evolutionary approach is similar to others discussed above because shame is primarily concerned with others' evaluations of the self.

Shame as the Public Transgression of Shared Values

Harré (1990) provides a quite different conception in which shame is not simply a response to the perception of social rejection. He describes shame as:

Occasioned by the realisation that others have become aware that what one has been doing has been a moral infraction, a judgement with which I, as actor, concur. (Harré, 1990: p. 199)

In describing shame this way Harré emphasises a number of characteristics. In differentiating it from embarrassment, this definition emphasises shame as a moral infraction; an intentional, serious breach of the moral code, as opposed to a possibly unintentional breach of social convention. As with the theories of shame already discussed, Harré also emphasises the role of others as an audience in the emotional experience. Indeed Harre's definition implies that shame cannot occur without others' awareness of the shameful thing. However, what distinguishes this description of shame from those described above is that shame is dependent upon the individual's own beliefs that they have committed a moral infraction. This suggests that shame results not just from concern regarding one's relationship with others but also concern that one's actions were wrong. In fact, acceptance of the other's judgement is essential, with non-acceptance leading to different emotions.

In shame, I accept the presence of the Other and the restrictions that are imposed...In the case of hate, I do not accept the restrictions and long for the destruction of the Other to restore my freedom. (Harré, 1990: p. 203)
Shame as the Transgression of Shared Values

A number of conceptions acknowledge the role of others in shame but conceptualise them more as psychological entities rather than necessarily representing actual people. Helen Lewis (1971), like Harré, suggests that shame occurs as the result of an “encounter with [an] other” but that it occurs in relation to standards accepted or shared by the individual.

The “other” is at least indirectly implicated as the source of shame... But the self must accept the “other’s” standard of judgement if shame is to be felt. (Lewis, 1971: p. 64)

While the other is obviously important in Lewis’s conception, she suggests that the nature of the other is not necessarily an actual audience. It can be “...a specific significant “other,” or it may be an ill-defined source...” and equally the encounter can occur in “...fantasy or reality” (p. 39). Thus, while shame would seem to occur in relation to others and be experienced as such, actual audience is not required. It is also evident that this description of shame disagrees with at least two of the assumptions which Lynd identifies as defining the external sanction view: shame only occurring in the context of others’ scorn and there being a basic separation between oneself and others.2

Bernard Williams (1993) suggests that the basic experience of shame is “...that of being seen inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition” (Williams, 1993: p. 78). In this way shame is associated with losing face or with the fear of losing face, and is thus characterised as a non-moral and superficial reaction. However, he suggests that to see shame as simply a reaction to others’ expectations is a mistake. The first aspect of this, which Williams describes as a silly mistake, is to think that shame requires an actual audience. He argues that

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2 At least in terms of social values which is what I take her as meaning by this.
If everything depended on the fear of discovery, the motivations of shame would not be internalised at all. No one would have a character, in effect, ... (Williams, 1993: p. 81)

Instead, Williams suggests that the other in shame is an internalised, imagined other. But most importantly, the imagined other is not simply anyone, but rather some kind of abstracted other whom incorporates one's values and attitudes. "The other may be identified in ethical terms. He...is conceived as one whose reactions I would respect" (Williams, 1993: p. 84).

So while Williams maintains that the phenomenological experience of shame involves a sense of being watched by another, he very clearly rejects the notion that it is simply in response to disapproval by others. Nevertheless, Williams argues that shame is in many ways a social phenomenon because the imagined other is not simply a reflection of one's own values but represents a real social view. One’s moral views are not provided simply by the power of reason but are formed by one’s understanding of social reality. In this way Williams describes shame as an emotion that is both based upon the actor’s internalised values and their own social reality.

Whatever it is working on, it requires an internalised other, who is not designated merely as a representative of an independently identified social group, and whose reactions the agent can respect. At the same time, this figure does not merely shrink into a hanger for those same values but embodies intimations of a genuine social reality - in particular, of how it will be for one’s life with others if one acts in one way rather than another. (Williams, 1993: p. 102)

In addressing the same issue Taylor (1985) agrees that shame necessarily involves the feeling of public exposure. She suggests that shame involves the feeling that eyes are upon one and that oneself is connected in some way with something undesirable. However, Taylor also argues that the "observer" is merely a means to an end. The "observer" simply acts to shift the actor's attention to observing themself as
if they were another. Thus, an actual audience is expendable, which is confirmed by experience; not all cases of shame involve public embarrassment. This ambiguity leads Taylor to suggest that identifying the nature of the other is a central issue in understanding shame.

The problem therefore is to give adequate content to the notion of the audience without introducing what is conceptually irrelevant to feeling shame. (Taylor, 1985: p. 59)

Taylor resolves this issue in a similar way to Williams by suggesting that there are two possible audiences involved in shame. The first is an actual audience that claims the actor’s attention. The second audience represents a higher-order point of view that the actor identifies with. It is this second more abstract point of view which is more central to the emotion and which provides the self-directed adverse judgement also necessary to shame.

Shame as a Non-Social Emotion

A large number of theories place almost no emphasis upon shame as a social emotion (Barrett, 1995; Kaufman, 1996; Lewis, 1992; Nathanson, 1992; Piers & Singer, 1953; Wurmser, 1994). Claims that the social context plays a significant role are rejected at a number of levels. Some of these are shared by a number of the theories already discussed above, for example rejection of the claim that shame only occurs as a response to shaming or in reference to others standards. However, what distinguishes these non-social approaches from conceptions already discussed is that others do not play a direct causal role at all. Kaufman summarises this view:

The source of shame can be either in the self or in another, with the result that individuals can experience shame whether or not others are present or watching. Individuals will also feel shame whether or not others are actually doing the shaming. Only the self need watch the self and only the self need shame the self. (Kaufman, 1996: p. 6)
As will be discussed in the next section, psychoanalytic, affect and attribution theories are all used to account for shame. These approaches define shame as a result of internal processes of self-evaluation with little emphasis upon the situation. However, some of these approaches discuss the perception of social threat or feelings of social awkwardness as part of the phenomenology of shame (Wurmser, 1994). In this way concern for the opinions of others is conceived of as a result of shame rather than its cause.

Overview: The Social Characteristics of shame

In the conceptions of shame outlined above, there is a common theme. It is that one of the central characteristics of shame is its social nature. However, apart from describing and listing those conceptions that do focus upon shame as a social emotion, this review also demonstrates the vast differences even within this group of theories. In fact it is possible to identify four distinct views of the social nature of shame. The first of these is the idea that shame is a response to a perceived social threat; that it is a reaction to known ridicule, disapproval or rejection by a definite audience. This conception can be found most clearly in Benedict (1946), Mead (1937), Gibbons (1990), Scheff (1990), and Leary (in press). Harré (1990), who is representative of the second view, agrees that shame occurs only in relation to a real audience but also suggests that shame can only occur if it is consistent with the actor's beliefs. Thirdly, Lewis (1971), Williams (1993) and Taylor (1985) suggest that the other in shame is not necessarily a real audience but may be an abstract imagined other. More significantly, these conceptions suggest that shame occurs as a result of infidelity to values which the individual accepts as valid rather than as a result of pressure to conform to others' demands. However, this group of theories do acknowledge that shame occurs in reference to others and thus are different from the final group of theories which suggest that shame is not distinctively social at all (Barrett, 1995; Kaufman, 1996; Lewis, 1992; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984).
Shame and the Self

Psychoanalytic Approaches to Shame and the Self

Piers and Singer’s (1953) rejection of the internal versus external dichotomy provided one of the first conceptions that emphasised shame as evaluation of oneself. Building upon a psychoanalytic tradition, which had previously given shame minimal consideration, they suggest that while guilt arises from tension between the ego and super-ego, shame is the result of tension between the ego and ego-ideal. The ego-ideal is described as containing elements of narcissistic omnipotence, positive identifications with parental images, positive identifications with other social relationships and finally goals of “instinct mastery”. The combination of these provide values or principles which are presented in the ego-ideal as those values and principles the individual should live up to. The emotion of shame occurs when:

...a goal (presented by the Ego-Ideal) is not being reached. It thus indicates a real “shortcoming”. (Piers and Singer, 1953: p. 11)

In essence, the individual feels shame when he or she has failed to achieve personal goals, whereas guilt is characterised as a reaction to transgression. This key idea of Piers and Singer has had an enormous impact upon later literature; indeed it is evident that most of the conceptions to be discussed below build upon this distinction.

Helen Lewis (1971), as seen in the previous section, emphasised some of the social aspects of shame but equally rejected the suggestion that shame was in any way a less internalised emotion than guilt. Instead, her conception placed considerably more emphasis upon describing shame as an evaluation of the whole self. Like Piers and Singer (1953), Lewis, who also had a psychoanalytic background, characterised shame as conflict between the ego and the ego-ideal.

Identification with the beloved or admired ego-ideal stirs pride and triumphant feeling; failure to live up to this internalised admired imago stirs shame. (Lewis, 1971: p. 23)
In this conceptualisation the self is of central importance. It is the direct focus of the emotion; it is what is being evaluated. Lewis differs from Piers and Singer's conception of shame by contrasting it with guilt in an additional way. While she suggests that guilt is the result of a transgression, in contrast to shame that involves failure, she also characterises guilt as focused primarily on the act or omission rather than the self. This is significant in that it describes guilt as an emotion that is not nearly as concerned with self-evaluation. The person's attention is directed outward at what they have done and as a result the emotion is less crippling and more attuned to acceptance of responsibility. With shame, where the emotion is caused by a deficiency in the self, the cause for shame is seen as involuntary and thus leaves the individual feeling helpless and unable.

Lewis found support for defining shame and guilt in this way from a number of sources including her own clinical observations. However, the distinction between guilt and shame seems to have originated in research conducted on the differentiation construct. Based on perception studies from Gestalt psychology, this research tested the hypothesis that different perceptual styles would lead to different styles of superego functioning (Witkin, Lewis, Hertzman, Machover, Meissner and Wapner, 1954). It was hypothesised that field-dependent persons would be more prone to shame while field-independent persons would be more prone to guilt. Field-independence is an ability to maintain knowledge of position in space independent of other visual cues. As its opposite, field-dependence is defined as a dependence upon this contextual information. Lewis (1971) and Witkin (1965) review a number of studies that suggest these differences in perceptual style are linked to differences in personality.

In addition to this literature, Lewis also reviewed a number of studies suggesting that psychological problems are related to conflict between the ego and ego-ideal. For example, when subjects describe their self-image and ideal self, Rodgers and Dymond (1954) found no correlation between the self-image and ideal self of patients applying for psychiatric treatment. In contrast, there was a correlation of .58 in the descriptions given by a sample of volunteer subjects. However, these studies focus on
psychological problems, rather than emotion, thus providing only limited support for the claim as it relates to shame.

In addition to the hypothesis that shame is the result of tension between the ego and ego-ideal it is also important to note that Lewis characterised shame as a reaction to failure and that this failure precipitates tension and hostility within the self. Lewis, in fact, goes much further than Piers and Singer (1953), suggesting that in shame:

A current of aggression, however, has been activated against the whole self, in both one's own eyes and "others" eyes.

and

...ashamed ideation says:...what an idiot I am ... what a fool ... how awful and worthless I am. (Lewis, 1971: p. 36; italics in original)

The implications of this characterisation are important as they begin to define the relationship between shame and the self. Instead of simply being the result of negative self-evaluation the emotion is seen as an all but consuming hostility towards the whole self. This hostility accounts for those clinical cases where shame is seen as a destructive emotion related to psychological problems.

Leon Wurmser (1994) agrees that shame results from tension between the ego and ego-ideal. However, he deviates from this analysis by suggesting that something more is required for shame to occur.

What is necessary in addition is that the inner wishful image of the self be "betrayed" and that certain self-critical, self-punishing, and reparative processes be set in motion. (Wurmser, 1994: p. 73)

He suggests that if these further conditions do not occur shame does not result, and that the product of a failure to live up to the ego-ideal is simply a loss of self-esteem. Wurmser suggests that the betrayal of one's ideal self implies more than just failure. To actually feel shame it is suggested that this ideal self needs to be experienced as a
complete, perceptual gestalt. In this way shame occurs in relation to a complex understanding of a complete image rather than simply components or aspects of self. Equally central to this experience are feelings that a vulnerable part of oneself has been exposed and fear of contemptuous rejection.

Wurmser outlines a number of steps that characterise the shame experience. The first of these is self-observation, which involves the super-ego exposing the "real self". Self observation is followed by a process of evaluation and then, in shame, by criticism. Like Lewis (1971) this criticism is seen as involving derision and rejection instigated by the super-ego. Finally criticism is followed by punishment which involves a loss of self-love, contempt for oneself and ultimately a loss of self-respect. Unlike a number of other theories (Tangney, 1991) Wurmser associates shame in this punishment stage with atonement by confession.

It is important to point out the contribution of psychoanalysis to the literature on shame through Piers and Singer (1953), Helen Lewis (1971), Wurmser (1981) and others. It was this perspective that began to characterise shame as an internal sanction based upon the perception of failure. Perhaps a second influence that is much more implicit is an approach that characterises shame as involving a degree of hostility or aggression towards the self. This idea seems particularly coherent within the psychoanalytic framework that focuses upon the divisions and tensions between aspects of the individual’s psyche. Although not as explicit, the emphasis upon shame as self-hostility and self-derision is also very much a part of the way shame is described by non-psychoanalytic theorists such as Lewis (1992) and Tangney (1991). Perhaps especially through these two themes, this psychoanalytic approach has had a considerable influence on many theorists in the psychoanalytic tradition (Lansky, 1994; Miller, 1985; Morrison, 1989) and outside of it (Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1991).

**Social Psychological Approaches to Shame of the Self.**

Michael Lewis (1992), in his book *Shame: The Exposed Self*, presents a characterisation of shame similar to those described above, but based upon cognitive attribution theory rather than a psychoanalytic approach. He identifies shame, pride, guilt, empathy, sympathy, envy and regret as secondary emotions distinguished from
the primary emotions by their reliance on self awareness. Four of these emotions (shame, guilt, pride and hubris) are identified as a consequence of not just self-awareness but also self-evaluation. Lewis suggests that several steps are involved in this evaluative process. The first step is an evaluation by the individual of whether some aspect of self is a success or failure when compared to their standards, rules and goals. Once this decision is made the individual can either attribute the success or failure to global or specific aspects of oneself, and it is this attribution that determines the emotion experienced. If we perceive ourselves as successful we can feel either pride (specific) or hubris (global) and equally if we perceive ourselves as having failed we can feel either guilt/regret (specific) or shame (global). In this way shame is seen as focussing upon our whole self whereas guilt is seen as focussing just on our behaviour.

I want to suggest that shame is elicited when the self orients toward the self as a whole and involves an evaluation of the total self, whereas in guilt it is orientation of the self toward the action of the self, either in terms of the actions of the self alone or in terms of the actions of the self as they have affected another. (Lewis, 1992: p. 71)

This is consistent with two of the central features of shame identified by Helen Lewis (1971); firstly that shame is focused on the whole self and secondly that it involves the idea that the whole self is a failure. It is, however, also evident that the distinction between shame and guilt is less pronounced in Michael Lewis’s approach. Indeed the only difference is whether attribution is specific or global. In contrast, Helen Lewis suggests that guilt is associated with transgression rather than failure, and as a result is associated with a different type of conflict. Shame is also more clearly associated with social relationships than guilt in Helen Lewis’s (1971) account.

On the basis of two phenomenology studies Lindsay-Hartz (1984; Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera and Mascolo, 1995) draws some slightly different conclusions about the nature of shame and guilt. In these studies shame was associated with the desire to hide or escape, the feeling of exposure, and the feeling that one is worthless and a failure. Guilt on the other hand was associated with the desire to make amends and the
feeling that we might be a bad person. From these phenomenological differences Lindsay-Hartz suggests that one basic difference between shame and guilt is the level of certainty regarding the conclusions we reach about our self.

In summary, shame transforms our identity. We experience ourselves as being small and worthless and as being exposed. Experiences of guilt only shake up our identity. (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984: p. 696)

This places much less emphasis upon differentiating guilt on the basis that it occurs as the result of transgression rather than failure, or as focused upon the act rather than the self. A second aspect of Lindsay-Hartz’s conception that differs from those discussed above is the way in which failure is conceptualised. Shame is defined by a feeling of certainty that “...we are not who we want to be...” (p. 696). This is different, according to Lindsay-Hartz, from the description by Piers and Singer (1953) and Lewis (1971) of shame as a failure to live up to an ego-ideal. Shame is not a failure to reach highs but a realisation of having reached lows. Despite these differences, shame is again characterised as focusing upon a negative evaluation of the whole self as a response to a personal failure of some kind.

Affect Theory and Shame

A distinct approach to the emotion of shame is based upon Tomkin’s (1962, 1963, 1987) affect theory. The theory argues that humans have nine innate affects which each have distinct patterns of neural stimulation. For example, the affect startle-surprise involves a rapid increase in stimulation while anger involves a high but constant level of stimulation. As well as having distinct patterns of neural stimulation it is also argued that each affect is manifested through particular patterns of muscular and skin receptors in the face and the body which give each affect a particular sensation and facial expression. An important aspect of the theory is that the affects act to amplify pre-existing responses caused by drives or external events. Thus, if the environment causes an uncomfortably high but constant level of stimulation the affect of anger will amplify this as a response within the individual. As a result it is argued
Chapter 2: Three Conceptions of Shame

that affects play an important role in human motivation because for drives or external stimuli to motivate a response depends upon their amplification through affect.

Of the nine affects Tomkins identifies, three are positive and six are negative, although three of the negative affects, including shame, are classified as auxiliaries. Two of the three auxiliaries, dissmell and disgust, relate directly to the drives. They act to prevent the person from being near noxious-smelling objects and from swallowing noxious-tasting objects. Shame is the third auxiliary that acts to inhibit the positive affects of interest and joy. It is argued that shame is activated whenever there is an incomplete reduction of joy or interest. The reduction is incomplete because the subject of the joy or interest remains attractive despite the perception of barriers to enjoying it. An example given is of a small child who wants to observe someone, feeling the affect of interest, but who is inhibited from doing so because the other person is a stranger. In this example the child might be said to feel embarrassment or shyness, both shame affects.

Tomkin's definition of shame affect provides a radically different view of what shame might be. Indeed the range of situations that might elicit shame is only limited by...the innate or the learned sources of positive affect, and secondly on what are either the innate or learned sources of incomplete reduction of positive affect. Such circumstances go far beyond the questions of inferiority and guilt which have dominated the discussion of shame... (Tomkins, 1987: p.144)

As a result, one prediction of this theory is that the underlying affect is the same for a range of socially distinguishable emotions. This range of emotions include all those commonly associated in the shame family such as guilt, embarrassment and humiliation, but also emotions which have otherwise been seen as unrelated. For example, Kaufman (1996) argues that the feeling of discouragement involves shame affect when a failure or defeat is perceived as being only temporary. Tomkins (1987) also discusses shame as present in the feelings of loss associated with the death of a
loved one. In this second case, the loss of friendship as a result of death is an example of the reduction of joy or interest where the person wishes it would continue. What these examples show is that in many respects Tomkin’s affect of shame does not represent, nor does it intend to, common usage of the word shame. Within this broad framework affect theory does not develop a social theory regarding which triggers of emotions are learnt, nor which combinations of affects and feelings come to be grouped into socially recognised emotions.

Although affect theory does not emphasise a “social” definition of shame that is comparable with other approaches, more recent development of the theory in the clinical literature has resulted in a considerable effort to identify the social triggers of shame affect. In introducing the emotion of shame Kaufman (1996) suggests that it is particularly related to transgressions, the development of conscience, and affronts to human dignity. As with the psychoanalytic approaches discussed above these themes come together because “shame is the affect of inferiority”. Shame is again associated with the perception of failure or defeat. However, it is evident that Kaufman does not distinguish between shame and guilt in the same way as previous approaches. He argues that shame cannot be distinguished from guilt on the basis that it is more social or that it is more about the self. Rather, the word guilt has come inconsistently to represent different combinations of affects and feelings, such as: shame about moral issues, the combination of dissmell and anger at the self, distress at the self, etc.

Another theorist who builds upon affect theory is Nathanson (1992; 1997). Like Tomkins, Nathanson argues that shame does not occur as a result of those experiences commonly associated with it, such as exposure of inadequacy. Shame is simply the physiological mechanism that amplifies the triggering stimuli: an impediment to the positive affects. In connecting this affect to the experience of shame emotion, Nathanson identifies a sequence of steps. The first is the physiological reaction to any impediment of enjoyment-joy or interest-excitement. The second step involves recalling memories of all previous moments in which this physiological reaction has occurred. It is within reference to these memories that the individual makes sense of the experience and associates the affect with “feeling”. Once again the concept of failure is emphasised. As Nathanson (1997) says: “Usually it
calls to consciousness that we are less than we might have liked, that we do not measure up to our best hopes for ourselves.” (p. 349). The final stage of shame involves responding to the shame situation. Again the possible responses are developed over one’s life and stored as scripts for possible action. Nathanson identifies four groups of responses that he describes as the compass of shame (see Figure 2.1). Withdrawal involves the desire to be away from others and in some cases can be severe enough that it involves complete social isolation. Attack self is a second strategy in which the individual accepts shame by depreciating themself in relation to others. Avoidance involves somehow distracting attention from the shame experience by focusing upon something which is positive (e.g. a new dress). Finally, attack other deflects shame from the self by reducing the self-esteem of others.

![Figure 2.1: The compass of shame (Nathanson, 1992)](image)

Although Nathanson and Kaufman do associate the feelings felt as a result of shame with inferiority and failure to live up to ideals, it is important to note that affect theory proposes a radically different understanding of shame. Whereas many of the theories discussed above argue that failure is the cause of shame, affect theory describes these feelings as only the phenomenology of the emotion, and not necessarily its phenomenology. These feelings become associated with the affect simply because in the individual’s past impediments to the positive affects have been associated with personal failure. The cause of shame is clearly conceptualised as the impediment itself.
Chapter 2: Three Conceptions of Shame

Shame as a Loss of Other’s Love

Many of the theories that discuss shame as a social emotion do not directly address the way shame relates to the self. In particular, it is evident that this aspect of the emotion is beyond the scope of interest of the anthropological approaches of Benedict (1946) and Mead (1937) which are primarily concerned with interaction between individual and community. Despite this focus a number of themes are evident. Benedict (1946), Mead (1937), Gibbons (1990), Gilbert (1997), Scheff and Retzinger (1991), and Leary (in press) all identify shame as a result of social rejection. Thus, an implication of this approach is that approval or love by others is seen as important to the individual. This is made explicit by Gilbert (1997) who argues that social relationships are of evolutionary importance to the individual. One of the few theorists developing this approach further is Scheff (1996) who suggests that there is a direct link between being accepted by others and one’s own sense of self-esteem. Leary (in press) also argues that the loss of self-esteem results from the perception of rejection but conceptualises that as distinct from the emotional component. It might be suggested that despite an absence of theoretical interest, the emphasis upon social threat by these theories implies that shame involves a loss of love or respect by others that is psychologically important.

Overview: self-evaluation and shame

Among the majority of theories that discuss the relationship between shame and the self there is a consensus that shame is involves an evaluation of the whole self and that this evaluation involves failure. What does vary across these accounts is the psychological perspective taken. As noted earlier, a substantial number of conceptions emanate from a psychoanalytic perspective. This provides an account of shame involving internal tension and ultimately self-directed hostility. A social psychological perspective is taken by Lewis (1992) who argues that the emotions of evaluation, including shame, can be accounted for by processes of attribution. Another group of scholars (Kaufman, 1996; Nathanson, 1992, 1997) use affect theory as a starting point in order to account for the same feelings of inferiority and failure. Unlike those
Theories that focus upon the social context in which shame occurs, these perspectives argue that shame is an emotion primarily concerned with self-evaluation.

**Three Conceptions of Shame**

This literature review has discussed theories of shame in regard to two themes that dominate the way shame has been characterised. The first regards the degree to which shame is a social emotion. The second explores the way shame relates to the self. It is evident that much of this theoretical work has occurred across many disciplines and in a random manner, such that well defined traditions have not developed. As a result, disagreement among theories has not always revolved around the same dimensions nor progressed a consistent debate. Consequently it is not useful to identify a strict typology of the shame literature in which each contribution can clearly be placed. However, it is evident that within the theories discussed three distinct hypotheses regarding the cause of shame can be identified. These three approaches will be used to loosely link the theories of shame into three conceptions. As already implied some theories do not fit neatly into a single conception. One example is the work of Helen Lewis (1971) who presents a broad conception of shame. In such cases the theory is discussed within the conception which best describes it. A brief summary of the each theory identified within the three conceptions is presented below in Table 2.1.

The first conception that can be identified characterises shame as a result of the individual’s perception of social rejected or disapproval. Scheff (1991) and Leary (in press) both describe this as the perception that one’s relationships or social bonds with others have been damaged or destroyed. Gilbert (1997) hypothesises that shame is related to the perception of being unattractive to others, while Gibbons (1990) discusses it as the result of not being approved of. The anthropological perspective of Benedict (1946) and Mead (1937) describe the emotion as a product of perceived disapproval. While these theories vary in their explanations of why people are sensitive to social evaluation they all emphasise the need to be accepted by others. Leary (in press) argues that the need to have strong personal ties is a basic human motive, while Gilbert (1997) suggests that there is an evolutionary need to maintain
Chapter 2: Three Conceptions of Shame

status. Scheff (1996) argues that shame is related to the person’s perception of his or her own self-worth. An important characteristic of this conception is that it describes shame, in the words of Scheff (1991), as exterior and constraining. The individual feels shame as a result of others’ decision to reject. As a result shame, or the fear of shame, is described as a powerful motivation for individuals to continually monitor and work on personal relationships and to comply with social expectations at a broader level. This perspective can be summarised as the *social threat conception*.

The second conception that can be identified is based upon the proposition that shame occurs when as individual perceives that they have failed to live up to their ideals and this leads to the perception that the whole self is a failure. For Piers and Singer (1953), Lewis (1971) and Wurmser (1994) failure is defined by the perception that the ego is not as good as the ego-ideal. Lewis (1992) defines shame as the attribution that the whole self has failed, while Lindsay-Hartz (1984) focuses not on failure to be an ideal but as being undesirable. Finally, affect theorists Kaufman (1996) and Nathanson (1997), despite having a different starting point, again describe the feelings associated with shame as perceived inferiority and failure. While shame may arise from a particular action this conception argues that what is distinctive about shame is that it involves a feeling of failure attributed to the whole self. Unlike other emotions, such as guilt, the focus of attention is the self rather than, for example, a transgression or rule that might have been broken. Significantly, this conception does not suggest that the perception of failure results necessarily from social interaction but rather that it can occur in any context. This perspective can be summarised as the *personal failure conception*.

It is evident from the above discussion that two conceptions of shame can be derived straightforwardly from theories which focused on shame as arising from a social context and those which focus upon shame as arising from an intra-psychic process. The third conception that is evident is one which predicts that shame occurs from the perception that oneself has done, or is in some way connected to, wrongdoing. For Harré (1990) shame is connected to serious transgression as well as the idea of fault. The individual feels shame for having intentionally committed a wrongdoing. This is implicit in William’s (1993) description of shame as resulting
from the perception that an abstract respected other, defined in ethical terms, would think badly of oneself. Taylor (1985) also emphasises the ethical nature of shame. For her shame is tied to the loss of self-respect, which defines what the individual feels is tolerable and what is not. These theories are similar to the personal failure conception in that they argue that shame occurs as a result of violating internalised standards. However, failure to live up to ideals implies a broader range of values than does wrongdoing, which is also more clearly related to transgression than to failure. Finally, this ethical conception of shame is distinct from the previous conceptions in the significance that it gives to social context. Unlike the personal failure conceptions, it acknowledges the importance that others play in feelings of shame but suggests that it is moral influence rather than rejection that is significant.

Table 2.1: Different conceptions of shame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social threat conception</th>
<th>Occurs as a result of criticism / disapproval by others when one has transgressed a social norm (in contrast to guilt which involves internalised values). Mead does suggest the possibility for limited internalisation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benedict (1946) &amp; Mead (1937)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of the perception that one has transgressed a social norm in the presence of others. This reflects a desire to conform to social expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibbons (1990)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of social rejection (as with embarrassment and humiliation). Individuals are motivated to maintain secure bonds with others and shame is the result of these bonds being threatened or severed. Shame results in lower perception of the individual’s self-worth (i.e. self-esteem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheff &amp; Retzinger (1991)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of perceived rejection or disapproval that the individual believes weakens their relationship with others. Is accompanied by lower self-esteem. Is based upon the fundamental human motive to maintain interpersonal relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leary (in press)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of the perception of being seen as less attractive by others. Based upon the evolutionary need to be attractive so as to maintain status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert (1997)</td>
<td>Occurs as the result of the perception that the perceived self (ego) has failed to live up to one’s ideals (ego-ideal).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personal failure conception

<p>| Piers &amp; Singer (1953) | Occurs as the result of the perception that the perceived self (ego) has failed to live up to one’s ideals (ego-ideal). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H. Lewis (1971)</td>
<td>Occurs as the result of the perception that the perceived self (ego) has failed to live up to one's ideals (ego-ideal) such that the failing leads to a condemnation of the whole self. Often occurs as the result of self-evaluation in reference to another - but one which may be an ill-defined, internalised other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wurmser (1981)</td>
<td>Occurs as the result of the perception that the perceived self (ego) has failed to live up to one's ideals (ego-ideal) and that this is a betrayal of the individual's gestalt image of self.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Lewis (1992)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of the perception that oneself has failed in some respect and the attribution that this is due to one's whole self rather than simply an aspect of oneself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay-Hartz (1984)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of the perception that the individual is something they don't want to be and a sense of certainty about this new negative identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaufman (1989)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of an incomplete reduction of joy or interest and results in the feeling of being inadequate or inferior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathanson (1992)</td>
<td>Occurs as the result of an incomplete reduction of joy or interest and results in feelings of failure, rejection, exposure, social embarrassment, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethical conception</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harré (1990)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of awareness by others that one has committed a moral infraction and the actor concurs with this judgement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams (1993),</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of having done wrong based upon the individual's ethical values as formed through an interaction between the individual and their community. Results in the question “Who am I”?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor (1985)</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of one's attention being focused (possibly by an audience) on oneself and the judgement by a higher order audience, which the person identifies with, that something about oneself is wrong. Results in a loss of self-respect.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3: The Reintegrative Shaming Experiments

Subsequent chapters of this thesis use quantitative methods to test the structure of both shaming and shame, and explore the relationship between them. These analyses are performed on data collected as part of the Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (RISE). This chapter will describe the methodology used in collecting the RISE data. Particular attention will be paid to the context within which RISE occurred, the general design of the experiments, the measures employed, and characteristics of the subjects. While much of this methodology is consistent across RISE, this discussion will focus primarily on the drink driving experiment from which data was used for this thesis. Greater detail of the measures and statistical method used for each analysis will be provided in the relevant chapters.

The Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (Sherman, Braithwaite and Strang, 1994) are comprised of four separate experiments that compare the effectiveness of traditional court processes and restorative justice conferences on distinct offence types. The four experiments were defined by the following categories of offences: drink driving with a blood alcohol reading over .08, youth violence with an age limit of 30 years, juvenile property offences where the victim was a private person, and juvenile property offences where the offender was apprehended by security guards. A goal of conducting separate experiments for each offence type was to achieve homogeneity of cases within each experiment. This is important for improving the power of statistical analyses and to aid interpretation of results. In each of the four experiments subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental treatments (court and conference). The Australian Federal Police identified offences which were consistent with the experimental requirements at the time of apprehension, allowing the experiment to randomly assign offenders to treatments as cases became known to the police. Comparison between court and conference cases is based upon a number of criteria, but primarily the prevalence and frequency of re-offending. Other dependent variables include victim satisfaction, procedural justice for offenders, the effect on drinking and drug use, and the estimated cost of the intervention. These criteria are
measured through official records, observations of court and conference cases and interviews with offenders, victims and others.

The comparison between the traditional court system and conferencing became an important one with the spread of conferencing from New Zealand to Australia, USA, Britain, South Africa, Canada, Singapore, and other parts of the world. This spread of conferencing has occurred, in part, because it provides a practical application of restorative justice. A movement towards restorative strategies for dealing with crime emphasises the restoration of harm by offenders to the victims as well as restoration of the offender back into the community (Zehr, 1990; Umbreit, 1985). By attempting to achieve both these objectives conferences provide an alternative form of justice to traditional court processes. However, their use within the criminal justice system does vary greatly across programs. In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) the Australian Federal Police (AFP) has more generally used conferences as an alternative to either court or to formal cautions. The random allocation of cases in RISE means that conferences are used only on cases that would normally have gone to court.

Conferences are a meeting of those people who have been affected by an offence. This usually includes the offender(s), their supporters, the victim(s), their supporters and a facilitator. However, in the drink driving offences studied in this thesis there was no direct victim and in other types of cases the victim is sometimes unwilling to attend. The meeting usually follows a fairly simple format which involves the offender explaining what occurred, the victim telling their side of the story, followed by the victim and offender’s supporters discussing the consequences of the offence. A conference will usually end with a formal agreement that includes a plan to resolve any outstanding issues, such as reparation to the victim. One underlying philosophy of this process is empowerment of the community to resolve the issue (Maxwell and Morris, 1993). At the same time it is also evident that conferences are reintegratively oriented, such that an attempt is made to focus discussion on the offender’s actions (and their consequences) rather than their person, and to control extreme expressions of anger or hostility.
Chapter 3: The Reintegrative Shaming Experiment

It is important to note that drink driving conferences in the ACT varied slightly from this more general format. Many of these conferences were attended by a community representative who replaced a direct victim by discussing more general fears regarding drink driving and the risk that it poses to the whole community. Additionally, these conferences often involved an informational component in which the police officer would provide basic information about blood alcohol levels and risks associated with drink driving. This sometimes included a video that documented the effect of car crashes caused by drivers who were over the legal alcohol limit.

This approach is obviously quite different from court cases that generally are shorter, involve less participation and are less democratic. An important aspect of the experiment is that it only includes cases where there is an admission of guilt by the offender or offenders. This is because conferences can only be used in these circumstances, thus limiting comparison between court and conference to this type of case. In court cases where there is a guilty plea the case usually involves a description of the facts by the prosecutor or police, submissions by the offender, or their solicitor, and finally a sentence handed down by the magistrate. Conferences are often substantially longer than court cases, particularly for drink driving offences where the average length of a conferences was approximately 87 minutes in comparison to court cases that were on average only seven minutes (Sherman, Strang, Barnes, Braithwaite, Inkpen, and Teh, 1998). This difference in length has important implications for analysis of cases where measures, such as observation, are sensitive to the frequency of behaviour occurring. This is particularly true for the drink driving experiment, which was the source of data for this thesis.

Procedure

Recruitment of subjects by the experiment occurred, in most cases, at the time they were apprehended by police. The arresting constable, with the agreement of their supervising sergeant, contacted RISE personnel if the case met a number of conditions. One of these was whether the offence was consistent with the experimental category. In the drink driving experiment this involved the offender having a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater, the offender living in the ACT region, their being no current warrants
or bonds on the offender, the offence not involving a collision, and finally that the
offender admitted to the offence. A second condition of entering the experiment was
the officers’ judgement that the offence was of a seriousness where it would be ethical
to send the case either to a conference or court case. Thus, offences had to be deemed
neither too serious to be conferenced nor too petty to be sent to court. In reaching this
decision the police also had to indicate their own acceptance of whichever treatment
was randomly assigned to the offender. Once contacted, RISE would recheck the
appropriateness of the offence for the particular experiment and assign the offender to
either the court or conference treatment on the basis of pre-generated random
assignments. Police contact with the experiment occurred via mobile phones that were
attended at all times. This was particularly important for the drink drive experiment,
as many offenders were apprehended late at night or early in the morning on weekends.
Twenty-four hour contact was also important because this meant the arresting officer
could make arrangements for the court or conference date at the time of arrest.

While offenders were assigned to attend a conference or court case it is
important to note that conferences are voluntary in nature. An offender can refuse to
attend a conference or at any point during a conference elect to withdraw and instead
have their matter heard at court. Thus, in many respects assignment to this condition
actually involved the offer of attending a conference instead of being summonsed to
court. In all these cases a summons to attend court would have been the normal
option. An important issue for the experiment was whether offenders assigned to the
conference condition would actually choose to accept the offer. The results show that
overwhelmingly subjects did choose the conference option when it was offered, with
only seven (out of 900) refusing.

The voluntary nature of conferencing also had implications for the informed
consent procedure that was employed. Informed consent was gained from subjects at
several stages of the experiment, although not obtained prior to randomisation.
Randomisation simply involved offering some offenders the option of choosing an
alternative to the normal intervention and thus did not require explicit consent to the
randomisation on the part of offenders. This was important because it provided some
protection against the effect knowledge of being randomly assigned might have had on
subject's behaviour or perceptions. However, the subject's consent to attend a conference was obtained by the AFP immediately after randomisation had occurred. If consent was not given the subject was treated through the normal police procedure which involved summons to court. A second stage of consent was required for observation of conference cases. At the beginning of each conference all those in attendance were asked by the facilitator to give consent for observers to be present. This was not required for court cases as these are public hearings. Finally, informed consent was again sought for all subjects prior to being interviewed. This involved mailing information and consent forms to all subjects prior to their being contacted by interviewers. On making contact, interviewers received verbal consent and upon meeting subjects the interviewers gained written consent to continue with the interview.

Data relating to the court or conference case and subjects' reactions to it were collected via observation of the treatment (i.e. the court case or conference) and an interview with the subject. RISE observers attempted to attend the conference and court cases of all subjects. However, a number of factors prevented observers from attending all cases in the experiment. In some conference cases consent to observe could not be obtained while failure to discover the treatment dates also affected observation of both conditions. However, the loss of data was small with observational data collected for 85 percent of all assigned conference cases and 87 percent of all assigned court cases. It is important to note that the percentage of cases for which all proceedings were observed was slightly less: 84 percent in both court and conference cases. This difference occurs because conferences, but primarily court cases, sometimes reconvene more than once. The measures obtained from observation included a systematic observation instrument and a global observation instrument, both of which will be discussed below.

Interviews with all subjects were sought between two and four weeks after final treatment of the case. However, in some cases locating and interviewing subjects took much longer. On average, 40 days passed between the final treatment and the interviewing of subjects. Not all cases were interviewed either because subjects could not be contacted or because subjects refused to be interviewed. However, again a vast
majority of subjects were interviewed, 93% of subjects assigned to conferences and 79% of subjects assigned to court. It should also be noted that a two year follow up of cases is currently proceeding which includes another offender interview. However, these data are not included in this thesis.

Subjects

The drink drive experiment involved a total sample of 900 subjects. These subjects were recruited between July 1995 and December 1997 via the Australian Federal Police. While only drink driving cases that involved a blood alcohol level greater than .08 were eligible, five subjects with blood alcohol levels below .08 were wrongly entered into the experiment. One of these offenders had a reading of only .011, which is only illegal for drivers on a provisional licence.

The guidelines regarding the eligibility of subjects mean that the subjects in the RISE experiment are not fully representative of drink driving cases in the ACT. A large number of drink drivers are arrested with blood alcohol levels lower than .08. Additionally, a much smaller number of drink driving cases are involved in collisions. Both of these groups were excluded from the experiment. A second factor that may have affected the sample of cases collected by RISE was police discretion. Offender attitude or other factors may have impacted upon the decision made by police to enter offenders into the experiment. Indeed, analysis of all drink driving cases in the ACT during 1997 shows that the experiment recruited only 56 percent of eligible cases (Sherman et al., 1998). It is not apparent whether the decision to include or exclude offenders occurred randomly or involved a particular bias. Some of the variation was clearly explained by variable availability and commitment of police to run conferences at different times. The range of breath alcohol readings for subjects in the experiment ranged from very low levels (.01) to more than five times (.26) the legal limit of .05. This suggests that the seriousness of the offence was not necessarily a factor that prevented inclusion of cases in RISE. Cases were entered into RISE at police discretion and thus it may simply have been that some cases, regardless of their characteristics, were not included because arresting officers were not supportive of the experiment. Although the sample is clearly not representative of all drink driving cases
in the ACT it is worth noting that in many respects the RISE cases are typical of the average drink drive case which involves detection of the offence through random breath testing and thus no collision.

Of the subjects in the drink driving experiment it was evident most were male (76 percent) and that many were young (Sherman et al., 1998). While the ages of offenders in the experiment ranged from 17 to 74, the mean age of subjects was 30. It was also evident that approximately 30 percent of subjects were 25 or younger while approximately 60 percent of subjects were 30 or younger.

Although 900 cases were allocated to the court or conference conditions, a number of factors affected the sample that was ultimately analysed. The effect of these is presented in Table 3.1. A significant factor was the abandonment of cases by the AFP. In total 17 cases that were allocated to the court condition and 23 that were allocated to the conference condition resulted in no further action being taken by police. The primary reasons for abandonment of cases were either an inability to locate offenders or a loss of records by the AFP. These cases were ultimately excluded from the analysis simply because the data used in this thesis is dependent upon a case occurring. In addition to these cases it was discovered that a number of subjects, two allocated to the court condition and two allocated to the conference condition, were already in the RISE experiment as subjects. The primary analysis in this thesis is based upon the offender interview. It was assumed that having already been interviewed for a prior offence might have affected these subjects' responses. Given that the numbers were small, an appropriate response was to simply exclude these subjects.

One final factor that affected sample sizes for the two conditions was violation of the allocated treatment. One subject allocated to the court condition and 21 subjects allocated to the conference condition actually received different treatments. In most of these cases the allocated treatment was not received because the subject was given the opposite treatment, that is, these subjects migrate from one condition to the other. In a small number of cases offenders were cautioned. These forms of treatment failure raise an important issue for analysis because they involve a violation of randomisation, and thus threaten comparability of the two groups. In analyses that involved
comparison of the court and conference treatments subjects were analysed according to the treatment they had been randomly allocated to rather than the treatment they received. This was important to maintain the integrity of the random assignment (Gartin, 1995; Peto, et al., 1976). As the number of treatment migrations was so low it was expected that this would not have a significant impact upon the results.

The majority of analyses in this thesis are factor analytic and do not compare treatments. However, separate analyses were often conducted for the two treatment groups to test if the groups had distinct dimensionalities. In these cases subjects were analysed on the basis of the treatment they actually received. Allocating subjects to separate analyses on the basis of allocation would have served no purpose given that there was no comparison between groups and to do so would have introduced unwanted heterogeneity into the correlational structure if the dimensionality being tested did vary between treatments.

Table 3.1: Sample and subject loss in the drink driving experiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>court</th>
<th>conference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment abandoned</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects excluded due to multiple appearances</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects treated other than allocated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial observation of treatments</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete observation of treatments</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview completed</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject unable to be contacted</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview refused by subject</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reason for not interviewing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3: The Reintegrative Shaming Experiment

Measures

Analyses in this thesis were performed on data from two sources in the Reintegrative Shaming Experiments: the global ratings instrument, which was completed at the observation of each treatment, and the offender interview. The global ratings instrument was designed to measure the observer's general impression of what occurred during each treatment. The instrument consisted of eight-point scales and was completed by observers at the completion of each case based upon their perceptions of the event. Questions are of a general nature such as "How much disapproval of the offender's act was expressed?" A list of items that measured aspects of shaming and shame are presented in Table 3.2. In addition to these items the instrument measured a range of concepts believed to be important in understanding the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions. Prominent among these were defiance by offenders (Sherman, 1993), the degree to which the process was procedurally just (Barnes, 1999; Tyler, 1990), whether offenders apologised, whether remorse was expressed, whether the offender was forgiven, the degree to which different parties were able to participate, and how outcomes or sentences were arrived at. A full list of items and their definitions are presented in the Global Observation Codebook in Appendix A.

Development of these measures occurred over a substantial period before being used in RISE. Pre-testing of the instrument involved two phases. An initial informal process occurred where the author and a colleague attended conference and court cases with the instrument in order to evaluate how applicable the items were to each context and whether they measured important variations between cases. This process led to substantial fine-tuning and development of the instrument. The second phase of pre-testing involved a study of the inter-rater reliability of the instrument. Reliability can be measured in a number or ways, for example reliability over time (test-retest reliability), internal reliability (e.g. split-half), and scorer reliability (Anastasi, 1968). However, in a large experiment like RISE it was necessary for observations to be made by a number of different observers. Thus, a critical factor was whether it was possible
to design an instrument that would be reliable between observers. A study was performed (Harris and Burton, 1997) which evaluated inter-rater reliability across the experimental contexts. These included drink driving conferences, property and violence related conferences and court cases of these types. The primary measure of reliability used was the agreement score. This was obtained by calculating the percent of cases that the observers' scores were within one point of each other. Given that the items were scored on eight point scales this was considered a stringent test of agreement (Harris and Burton, 1998). Results from this study, reported in Harris and Burton (1997, 1998), demonstrate that while there was variation across items, most categories were measured reliably between observers (see table 3.2).

Like the global observation instrument, the offender interview underwent considerable pre-testing. This was done by interviewing recent offenders from a range of social backgrounds for a range of offences. An important part of this process involved having interviews performed by different interviewers to identify any ambiguities in the interview. This was particularly important given that interviews were to be performed by many interviewers. Pre-testing resulted in iterative changes until the interview was considered to be clear for interviewers and interviewees.

The interview, which ideally occurred two to four weeks after the treatment, measured a range of topics (see Appendix B). Firstly, it measured the subject's general perceptions of the case, such as whether they were treated fairly during their case (court or conference case) and by the police, whether they agreed with the outcome, and whether they felt defiant or angry as a result of the case. There were also questions regarding the deterrent effects of the treatment. A second category of questions looked at the subject's perceptions of the offence itself. For example, whether they committed the offence, how wrong they thought it was, and what others thought. A third section of the interview included questions about who was at the treatment, whether the subject was treated reintegratively or stigmatically, and how they felt during and after their court or conference case. A fourth series of questions addressed the subject's demographics but also included psychological measures of self-esteem, efficacy and emotionality. The final group of questions addressed drug use and self-reported
### Table 3.2: Agreement and Pearson product correlations between observers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>% agreement</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How much reintegrative shaming was expressed?</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.79**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respect for offender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How much support was the offender given during the conference/court case?</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How reintegrative was the conference/court case for this offender?</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>.58**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How much approval of the offender as a person was expressed?</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How much was the offender treated by their supporters as someone they love?</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How much respect for the offender was expressed?</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disapproval of the offender’s act</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How much disapproval of this type of offence was expressed?</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>.83**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. How much disapproval of the offender’s act was expressed?</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disapproval of the offender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. How much stigmatising shame was expressed?</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. How much disappointment in the offender was expressed?</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.73**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. To what extent was the offender treated as a criminal?</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. How often were stigmatising names and labels (e.g. “criminal”, “punk”, “junkie”, or “bully” used to describe the offender?</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. How much moral indignation did the victim express about the offender’s action?</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. How much disapproval of the offender as a person was expressed?</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offender is forgiven</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. To what extent was the offender forgiven for their actions?</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>.6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. How clearly was it communicated to the offender that they could put their actions behind them?</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>.58**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. How much forgiveness of the offender was expressed?</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shame</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. How much responsibility did the offender take for their actions?</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. How much did the offender retreat from and avoid the attention of others?</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>.64**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. How much was the offender’s speech affected by irregularities, pauses, or incoherence?</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. How uncomfortable (e.g. restless, anxious, fidgety) was the offender?</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. To what extent did the offender engage in hiding (e.g. lowering head) and concealing (e.g. hand covering parts of the face, averting gaze) behaviour?</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. To what extent did the offender accept that they had done wrong?</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. How sorry/remorseful was the offender for their actions</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>.69**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* † The agreement scores for these variables are based upon limited variation in the sample and thus must be treated with caution. The limited variation occurred primarily due to agreement between observers on a score of 1 (“none” of the category).

* p<.05, **p<.01
offending. The self-report offending questionnaire addressed a broad spectrum of criminality for violence and property offenders but in the drink driving experiment focused only upon drink driving. The interview in the drink driving experiment took approximately an hour and 20 minutes to administer.

The format in which questions were asked and responded to varied throughout the interview depending upon the topic of interest. However, all questions involved responding to set items that were read word for word and were answered on set scales. During some parts of the interview, particularly the early stages, the interviewer asked questions and wrote down the answers. In a number of sections the interviewer read the questions but allowed the subject to record their answers in a separate booklet. Finally, in one section subjects read and answered the question themselves unless the interviewer was uncertain about their ability to do so or the subject indicated, in response to a question, that they would rather the questions read out for them. Changing the format in this way had a number of advantages. One was to help maintain interest by preventing what was a long interview from becoming monotonous. A second was to allow subjects greater privacy when answering more sensitive questions. The questions on how reintegratively the subject was treated and how they felt during the case, which are the items used in this thesis were read out by the interviewer but answered privately by the subject.

**Design**

Analyses in this thesis examine the concepts of shaming and shame and test their relationship. In Chapter Four a factor analytic approach is used to test the dimensionality of the shame-related emotions. A factor analytic approach is also used in Chapter Five to test the structure of reintegrative shaming. Despite their similarity there is also an important difference between the methodologies employed in these chapters. The analysis used in Chapter Four is performed with the aim of reducing items measuring feelings associated with shame emotions into interpretable factors. The emphasis is upon discovering what dimensionality occurs and thus principal components analysis is used. In contrast, the analysis of reintegrative shaming items tests whether the relationship between variables is consistent with the predictions of
reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989). As a result this chapter employs a mixture of exploratory and confirmatory analyses to develop measures and then test their dimensionality. Having explored the shame-related emotions and shaming separately, Chapter Six uses multiple regression to test the relationship between shaming and shame.

Analyses of the observational measures of shaming were complicated by some cases having multiple observations of each item. As discussed, both court and conference cases have the potential to be reconvened on a number of occasions. In fact 18 of the subjects assigned to court attended more than one treatment event, while four subjects assigned to a conference attended more than one treatment event. The dilemma resulting from such cases was which observation should be used or whether an average score calculated from all observations should be taken. It was decided to use the maximum score provided by any of the observations. This approach made intuitive sense because a low degree of, for example, shaming in two treatment events does not negate a high degree of shaming in a third. In this case it would still be concluded that a high degree of shaming had been expressed. This is particularly true for court cases where multiple treatment events often occur as a result of procedural issues. In fact pre-testing showed that there was little difference in the dimensionality of shaming regardless of whether the maximum or average score was used.

Statistical assumptions made by analyses were tested prior to analysis. Missing data did not prove to be a significant problem. There were a number of cases where observational data were available but not interview data, or vice versa. This effected only a few analyses in Chapter Five and was resolved by using only those cases for which both interview and observational data were available. Outside of this issue there was very little missing data. Furthermore, data that was missing did not appear to conform to any pattern and thus did not appear to represent a systematic bias. In the factor and regression analyses deletion of cases with missing data was used.

A number of variables in the analysis had non-normal distributions. While this does not pose a serious threat to exploratory factor analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989) it does pose difficulties for confirmatory factor analysis. A number of
measures, which are detailed further in Chapter Five, were taken to address the non-normality of measures, including the estimation of models using more robust statistics. Non-normality and in particular homoscedasticity also have implications for multiple regression analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). There was limited evidence of homoscedasticity in two of the regression analyses. However, transformation of variables did not affect the results of these analyses. The presence of homoscedasticity does not invalidate an analysis but rather weakens relationships between variables. Given that the homoscedasticity was only mild it was not considered a threat to the analyses.

**Conclusion**

Data have been obtained with an experimental design on a large sample of drink-driving offenders. Randomisation was accomplished with few assignment errors, while interview and observational measures of shame and shaming have been obtained with a high response rate. Impressive equivalence of experimental and control groups has been established through a variety of comparisons (Barnes 1999). This data contains measures of shaming and shame that are suitable for the factor analytic and multiple regression analysis techniques used in following chapters. The reliability of observational measures of shaming and shame by independent observers is high.
Chapter 4: Testing the dimensionality of shame

Introduction

Differentiating between emotions has played an important role in the conceptualisation of shame. Anthropologists have used the concepts of shame and guilt to distinguish between types of societies based upon the way communities gain conformity to social norms. Psychoanalytic theorists also began to discuss shame because it defined an alternative form of psychological tension to the better known conflict between ego and superego (guilt). A result of this history is that many conceptions of shame have emphasised those characteristics that contrasted it with guilt or embarrassment. This is evident, as will be discussed below, in both the social threat and personal failure conceptions which both emphasise a shame-guilt dichotomy. Although much less consistent, we will also see that an ethical conception of shame highlights its distinctiveness from embarrassment. It is this comparative approach that has guided much of the empirical research that addresses these emotions. This chapter reviews this empirical work and in turn uses a different methodology to test the dimensionality of shame, guilt and embarrassment occurring in a naturalistic setting.

Distinguishing Shame from Related Emotions

Internal Versus External Judgements

The first conception of shame identified by Chapter Two was the social threat conception, which defines shame as the result of perceiving oneself as rejected by, or as unattractive, to others. Among these theories, some juxtapose shame against guilt (Benedict, 1946; Gibbons, 1990; Gilbert, 1997; Mead, 1937), defining guilt as a non-social, internally generated emotion based upon the individual's moral beliefs. Benedict and Mead argue that unlike shame cultures, guilt cultures depend upon an internalised conviction of sin. Thus, conformity to social norms in these cultures occurs as a result of the individual's belief that those norms are correct rather than because of criticism by others. Gibbon's approach suggests that in a state of self-awareness the individual's attention is on themselves and their own standards. The realisation that one has not
lived up to those standards results in feelings of guilt. Others' judgements do not play a motivating role because in this state of self-awareness the individual's attention is only upon themself. Gilbert associates shame with social standing but suggests that guilt is linked to the evolution of caring and co-operation. As a result, guilt, which involves a real concern for the wellbeing of others and other-oriented empathy, occurs as a realisation of others having been harmed and being in some way responsible for that. It is argued that it is this emphasis upon the health of others that makes guilt a moral emotion. In summary, these theories distinguish shame as being more social than guilt in that it is a reaction to perceptions of disapproval or perceived rejection by others, whereas guilt can be felt in isolation. In addition, whereas shame is felt in reference to social norms, guilt is described as occurring in reference to internalised moral norms.

Distinctions between shame and guilt, and in particular the proposition that guilt is an internal emotion while shame is external, have been important in empirical work on shame. Indeed, this distinction has been explored by a number of cross-cultural studies. One by Kitayama, Markus and Matusumoto (1995) examines differences between Japanese and American subjects in the way they make appraisals of themself. The American subjects relied more upon their own judgement than the Japanese when the appraisals were negative. When judgements of the self were positive, however, Japanese subjects placed greater emphasis upon their own judgement than the Americans. These results are consistent with Benedict's work which suggests that the Japanese are more sensitive to shaming by others while Americans are more sensitive to internal judgements that something was wrong. However, as this study does not address the emotions experienced by subjects, it provides little insight into whether the measured difference in appraisal style represents differences in shame or guilt.

The emotions were addressed in a cross-cultural study by Wallbott and Scherer (1995) that involved subjects from 37 countries being asked to recall situations in which they had experienced a number of emotions including shame and guilt. Across cultures subjects reported that the shame situations were elicited by more external sources than guilt situations, which were elicited to a greater extent by the self. Shame
was also described as the result of being inappropriate rather than having violated a moral code. Analysis of differences between cultures showed that subjects' reports of shame in "collectivist cultures" were much closer to "typical" shame responses, which in comparison to guilt were of shorter duration, caused by less immoral behaviours, and were more commonly accompanied by laughter. This research is consistent with the internal-external distinction between shame and guilt, but also associates shame with less intense emotional experience than is captured by a number of conceptions of shame. As will be discussed later this highlights the difficulty of interpreting such findings, particularly when they are cross-cultural, because of differences in the use of emotion labels.

Another study, by Miyake and Yamazaki (1995), suggests that differences between cultures in the self-conscious emotions may not be as straightforward as implied. The study involved the analysis of Japanese participants' reports of situations they found embarrassing. While in some of the situations the role of others was both important and explicit they also found a second type of shame ("haji") which did not involve others' knowledge of the event. In these cases, subjects simply reported that it felt like they were being watched even though they were not. Although the study provides only limited analysis of each emotion, these results suggest that there may be a more complex story to be told about the "moral" emotions in Japan. Whereas Benedict observed that the Japanese were particularly reactive to public evaluation it seems that feelings associated with less public evaluation also play an important role in Japanese society (also see Lebra, 1983).

Wicker, Payne and Morgan (1983) also studied differences between shame and guilt using self-report measures. One hundred and twenty one subjects were asked to think of shame and guilt experiences and then rate each of them on scales measuring facets assumed to be relevant to the two emotions. The results provide mixed evidence about the extent to which the emotions differed in the degree to which they were social. Wicker et al. (1983) concluded that there was some evidence that shame involved greater self-consciousness and the feeling of exposure but that "...there was no expressed difference in concern for other-valuation versus evaluation by the self..." (p. 36). In both emotions subjects reported that they were more concerned with how
others saw them than how they saw themselves. However, Wicker et al. also found that when feeling shame subjects felt more submissive, inferior, more alienation from others, and a greater fear of rejection. These differences, and particularly differences regarding the fear of rejection, are consistent with the predictions of the social threat conception. Finally, it is worth noting that while finding significant differences Wicker et al. also concluded that there were considerable similarities between the two emotions. Differences mainly occurred in the extent to which certain dimensions were felt rather than their content, emphasising the similarity of these emotions rather than their differences. One aspect of this was that subjects’ responses suggested that there is some social component to both emotions.

Interestingly, a number of scholars (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1995; Jones, Kugler & Adams, 1995; De Rivera, 1985) have argued that guilt is a social emotion in the sense that it is felt in relation to others. These conceptions of guilt, while not contradicting the hypothesis that guilt is a reaction to internal standards, do question the emphasis upon a social versus non-social dichotomy. Both Baumeister et al. (1995) and Jones et al. (1995) report studies that show guilt is related to harming another person. In particular, Baumeister et al. found that experiences of guilt almost always involved harm done to a person in a valued relationship. It is suggested that “transgressions of moral standards” which did not involve others were different to the experience of guilt.

Cheek and Hogan (1983) report a study in which subjects completed identity and moral judgement questionnaires. The identity questionnaire was made up of two sections, one that assessed personal identity and a second that assessed social identity. Correlations between the moral judgement and identity questionnaires showed that personal identity had a higher correlation with guilt whereas social identity had a higher correlation with shame. This was interpreted as supporting the claim that shame is based upon a failure to live up to social standards whereas guilt is a failure to live up to one’s conscience. However, there are a number of reasons to question this interpretation. The first is that the shame scale focused on shame as a social phenomenon to the extent that every question involved references to others; for example, “Not doing as well as was expected of me on a group project”. In contrast
every guilt item emphasised non-social situations; for example, "Not living up to my own expectations". It is therefore not surprising that these scales were correlated with social and personal identity respectively. In essence, the shame and guilt were defined as social and non-social. A second concern regards Cheek and Hogan’s (1983: p. 268) conclusion that because shame is associated with social identity it is therefore based upon a desire to avoid social criticism. The implication is that social values are opposed to or are less internalised than personal values. However, a number of perspectives in the social psychological literature argue that social identity and social values derived from it are as internalised as personal identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987).

Attributing Failure to the Self Versus the Act.

A second distinction between shame and guilt is emphasised particularly by the personal failure conception, which defines shame as the perception that one’s whole self is a failure. It is argued that this occurs in the case of shame because the individual does not distinguish between the act and self (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1991). In contrast, guilt is defined as an emotional response to the perception of a failure or transgression that distinguishes the action from the whole self. It occurs when the person makes a negative evaluation of an act (or a distinct aspect of the self). As a result of the separation between act and the whole self, guilt is described as less painful and less introspective. Thus, it is argued that when feeling guilt people are more focused on the harm done to others and ways to atone for that harm. It is evident that while this distinction between shame and guilt is central to the personal failure conception, it is also similar to a distinction made by Bernard Williams (1993). Williams suggests attention is on the individual’s identity with shame whereas attention is upon the harm caused to others with guilt. It is worth noting, however, that Williams does not place as much emphasis upon shame being about the whole self or perceiving the self as a failure. Furthermore, Williams argues that guilt and shame almost always occur together and thus are complimentary rather than alternative responses.
A number of empirical studies have addressed the issue of whether it is possible to distinguish between shame and guilt on the basis of whether they involve the perception of a specific versus global failure. Wicker et al.'s (1983) phenomenological study addressed this issue with an item measuring respondents' perceptions that "I was unhappy with myself in general (vs only with my behaviour)" (italics in original). The results showed that this item did not significantly distinguish between subjects' perceptions of shame and guilt. However, the study did find that subjects reported being less self-confident and less dominant when feeling shame. This suggests that shame may have a greater affect on perceptions of the self. Using a similar methodology, Tangney, Miller, Flicker and Barlow (1996) found a similar result. In their study no significant difference occurred between subjects' assessments of guilt and shame experiences on an item measuring the degree to which subject's "blamed my actions and behaviour" versus "blamed my personality and my self". Tangney et al. concluded that this particular distinction might have been too abstract for college students.

In an attempt to overcome previous difficulties in empirically distinguishing between shame and guilt on this dimension, Niedenthal, Tangney and Gavanski (1994) employed an alternative methodology using counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking involves reflecting "...on how past events might have otherwise unfolded had some aspect of the situation or their behaviour been different." (Niedenthal et al. 1994: p. 585). It was hypothesised that a shameful context would result in counterfactual thinking which focused upon changes to the person's self. In contrast, it was hypothesised that guilt contexts would involve a greater focus upon aspects of the situation or the person's behaviour that might have been different. These hypotheses were tested in a series of studies in which subjects were either given descriptions of "shame" or "guilt" scenarios, or were asked to generate their own. Subjects were then asked to use counterfactual thinking to identify what could be changed about the scenarios so that things might have been different or better. The results from three studies, two with supplied scenarios and one with scenarios generated by the subjects, showed significant differences between the shame and guilt scenarios consistent with Niedenthal et al.'s predictions.
In a follow-up study the procedure was reversed, with subjects given scenarios and then forced to make changes to either themselves or the situation/their behaviour. It was predicted that counterfactual thinking would guide individuals’ attributions regarding the scenarios they were given. The results show that subjects who were forced to make changes to their self were more likely to report that shame would have occurred in that context. In contrast, subjects forced to make changes to their behaviour or the situation were more likely to report that guilt would have been felt. These results suggest that shame is associated with deficiencies of the whole self whereas guilt is associated with deficiencies associated with behaviour or the situation. However, it is worth noting that most of the characteristics of the self that were changed, even in the shame scenarios, were “transient” rather than “chronic” characteristics. This is somewhat contradictory to descriptions of shame that have emphasised perceptions of failure of the whole self rather than simply transient characteristics.

The distinction between perceiving the self as a failure and feeling bad about behaviour has also been employed to define personality characteristics. Recent work, particularly by Tangney and her colleagues (Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall & Gramzow, 1996), has applied this distinction between guilt and shame to the concepts of shame-proneness and guilt-proneness. This departs from much of the literature that has been discussed so far because it focuses primarily upon shame as a personality dimension rather than as a discrete emotion. Tangney and her colleagues have generated a number of hypotheses based upon the self-act distinction. One hypothesis is that the two personality dimensions would have different implications for the feeling of interpersonal empathy (Tangney, 1991). Shame, it is suggested, is incompatible with “other-oriented empathy” because it is associated with individual’s being self-absorbed. Because guilt is about the act and is less painful to the individual, it is more likely to result in greater feelings of empathy. A second hypothesis is that shame, but not guilt, is linked to the externalisation of blame and anger.
...because shame is such a sweeping negative affective experience, denouncing the global self, it is often experienced as disproportionate with the seriousness of the eliciting situation - as an "unfair" affective response. (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992: p. 673)

Tangney and her colleagues have found support for these hypotheses from a number of studies. In one (Tangney, 1991) it was found that guilt-proneness was positively correlated to an empathic responsiveness while shame-proneness was, in general, negatively related. It has also been found (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992) that shame-proneness was related to anger arousal, resentment, irritability, a tendency to blame others for negative events, and indirect expressions of hostility. These results need to be interpreted with some care, however. Although the shame-proneness and guilt-proneness scales are defined by distinguishing between a focus upon self and behaviour these studies do not directly provide evidence that this is an important distinction between shame and guilt. What they do show is that shame and guilt proneness, defined by tendencies to attribute failure to the self or behaviour, can successfully predict differences in empathy and hostility. A second important point is that these studies are based on shame and guilt as personality traits and thus it is difficult, if not impossible, to extrapolate findings to shame and guilt as discrete emotions.

**Serious Versus Trivial Transgressions**

While differences between shame and guilt have played an important role in the literature on shame, researchers have also attempted to distinguish it from embarrassment. A consistent theme in distinguishing the two emotions is that shame is associated with moral transgressions whereas embarrassment is associated with breaches of social convention. Harré (1990) discusses two dimensions that highlight this difference. The first is a seriousness dimension on which shame occurs as a result of a serious breach, or moral infraction, whereas embarrassment occurs as a result of trivial breaches. The second dimension regards the degree to which behaviours are associated with fault. While shame is more likely to arise from the intentional,
embarrassment is more likely to be the result of an accident. Taylor (1985) argues that embarrassment involves the individual's perception that they are in some way unable to respond correctly to the social situation. Thus, like Harré, Taylor suggests that embarrassment relates to social etiquette rather than moral failure. However, in addition to this, Taylor suggests that embarrassment has a much stronger connection to the social context than shame. In order to feel threatened by the social context such that one feels embarrassment there must be an audience or, at the very least, the fantasy that there is a real audience. Equally, embarrassment involves an adverse judgement regarding the self, but unlike shame this judgement is limited to the single context in which it occurred and as such is not global.

The emphasis upon embarrassment as linked to performance in public is also evident in a number of psychological theories which described embarrassment as a form of social anxiety (Buss, 1980) resulting from states of public self-awareness (Crozier, 1990). Miller (1995) identifies two major theoretical explanations of embarrassment. One, which he calls the social evaluation perspective, argues that embarrassment occurs as a result of public self-awareness. The individual perceives that their public identity is threatened as a result of unwanted social evaluation and a failure to live up to accepted social standards. The second theoretical tradition Miller calls the "dramaturgic" perspective. This perspective argues that embarrassment is not the result of evaluation but rather the result of awkward interaction resulting in the loss of coherent self-presentation and uncertainty regarding how to behave. Evaluating the different approaches to embarrassment is not important here. However, these approaches demonstrate that embarrassment is described as a reaction to the social context and or focused upon impression management.

The differences between shame and embarrassment have received much less interest in empirical studies. However, one attempt to distinguish between them (Miller and Tangney, 1994) had subjects sort characteristics into groups that described shame and embarrassment. The results of this study supported the moral-trivial distinction with shame being described as a more intense emotion that resulted from serious transgressions whereas embarrassment resulted from trivial incidents. Another study by Tangney, Miller et al. (1996) had subjects complete scales in response to
memories of personal experiences. This study also found that embarrassment was perceived as less intense, was of shorter duration, involved less negative evaluation of the self, was less serious and was less related to moral standards. However, the embarrassment experiences were described as involving a greater physiological reaction (e.g. blushing), greater feelings that others were looking, greater concern with others’ thoughts, and the perception that others were more amused. This study replicates the results of the previous study while also providing support for Taylor's (1985) hypothesis that embarrassment is much more reactive than shame to the perception of others’ judgements.

While the literature presents a number of ways in which shame might be distinguished from guilt and embarrassment, it is also clear that empirical work only provides limited evidence to support them. Nevertheless, these distinctions are important to the way the shame-related emotions have been conceptualised. Thus, on the basis of this literature it can be hypothesised that shame and guilt will be distinct in two ways. The first of these is that a shame dimension that includes fear of other’s disapproval or rejection will be distinct from a guilt dimension that includes the individual’s perception of having done wrong (see Hypothesis 4.1). The second prediction is that a shame dimension that includes negative feelings about the self will be distinct from a guilt dimension that includes negative feeling about one’s actions and the consequences of those actions (see Hypothesis 4.2).

**H 4.1** Items measuring fear of other’s disapproval (Items 4, 5, 1, 13, 14, Table 4.1) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure the individual’s perception that they have done something wrong (Item 2, Table 4.1).

**H 4.2** Items measuring negative feelings towards the self (Items 9, 12, 6, Table 4.1) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure concern with one’s actions and the consequences of them for others (Items 11, 3, 20, Table 4.1).
It is also predicted that shame and embarrassment will form distinct dimensions, the latter involving feelings of social discomfort, the former feelings associated with having committed a serious moral breach (see Hypothesis 4.3).

**H 4.3** Items measuring the perception that one has committed a serious moral breach (i.e. acted in a way that is morally wrong (2), hurt others (3, 20) and behaved without honour (13, 14)) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure social discomfort (i.e. feelings of self-consciousness (7, 8, 17)).

In all three hypotheses, empirical distinctiveness and empirical coherence refer to patterns of inter-correlations that are traditionally partitioned using factor analytic procedures.

**Measuring the concepts of shame, guilt and embarrassment**

The empirical literature on shame highlights a number of important methodological issues. A close look at many of the empirical studies suggests that the absence of agreement on a common language for the shame emotions across the literature has impeded research. While defining shame has been the primary concern of research it is evident that variation in researchers’ basic assumptions regarding the classification of emotions may have contributed to studies arriving at contradictory results. For example, Wallbott and Scherer’s (1995) cross-cultural study of emotions reported that shame in “collectivist cultures” was closer to “typical shame” in that it was associated more with laughter, was of shorter duration and caused by less immoral behaviours. This description of “typical shame” contrasts with the descriptions of shame by Helen Lewis (1971), Michael Lewis (1992) and Tangney (1991) as involving painful and overwhelming feelings of the self as a failure. Indeed, the emotion discussed by Wallbott and Scherer is more similar to what Tangney, Miller et al. (1996) discuss as embarrassment. It might be expected that cross-cultural studies encounter even greater problems interpreting their results, as they need to translate the emotion labels and possibly different concepts across languages.
It is also apparent that measuring the phenomenology of emotional experiences provides its own difficulties. Much of the empirical work on shame and its related emotions has attempted to grasp phenomenology by asking subjects to recall their own memories of the emotion and then describe that experience (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, Miller et al., 1996; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995; Wicker et al., 1983). However, it is evident this procedure has its own limitations. Having subjects recall experiences in which they felt a particular emotion requires them to firstly generate their own conception of the emotion and secondly to recall experiences consistent with it. By measuring the phenomenology of these experiences, studies actually report those feelings, physiological changes, etc that conform to subjects’ conceptions of emotions. Furthermore, most of these studies ask subjects to recall and describe several emotions. It might be suggested that these studies simply reflect agreement among subjects about labels used to describe the emotions and the conceptual differences implied by these labels. Measurement of subjects’ naive theories, or conceptual framework, regarding the emotions is an important approach to defining the emotions. Indeed such factors may play an important role in determining which dimensions prove the most useful for distinguishing among the shame-related emotions. However, it is also evident that there has been no empirical work that has attempted to test whether conceptions of shame accurately reflect the dimensionality of feelings that occur in situations. While conceptual distinctions between shame and embarrassment may of themselves prove useful, an important question is whether that distinction can be empirically captured in responses made in particular contexts.

It has been argued that empirical studies of shame have so far provided only limited and inconsistent results regarding the dimensionality of the shame-related emotions, and particularly the relationship between shame and guilt. In part this is because previous empirical studies have been limited by semantic issues and a methodology that emphasises subjects’ naive conceptions of the emotions. It is proposed that by interviewing subjects regarding an event already known to the experimenter, and assumed to involve feelings from the shame family, it will be possible to explore the phenomenology of that event without explicitly asking subjects to recall particular emotions. It is expected that this procedure is more likely to
measure what subjects felt in this context rather than subjects’ conception of what a particular emotion feels like. It is also expected that this type of methodology will avoid some of the semantic issues presented by different understandings of the shame-related words. Finally, this approach will allow a better evaluation of the dimensionality of these emotions through factor analytic techniques.

An important aspect of the factor analytic methodology is developing good measures of the domain to be analysed. In this study the area of interest is defined by shame and the two emotions it has most commonly been compared with: guilt and embarrassment. As was evident from the literature review, descriptions of shame varied markedly (see Table 2.1 in Chapter Two). In order to represent all the possible dimensions of shame, items were constructed that reflected the different conceptions identified within the literature review. These characteristics were centred on the issues emphasised by the three conceptions defined in Chapter Two. A number of these characteristics associated with shame focus upon the social context in which the emotion occurs. These included awareness of criticism or derision directed at the individual and their actions (Benedict, 1946; Mead, 1937), fear of others’ evaluations of oneself (Harré, 1990; Williams, 1993) and feelings that one has lost honour within one’s community (Taylor, 1985; Williams, 1993). Shame has also been described as involving feelings of being a failure (H. Lewis; 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Piers and Singer, 1953) as well as self-directed feelings of anger and hostility (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; Wurmser, 1994). Alternatively, shame is seen as involving the realisation of being associated with something that is against one’s ethical or moral standards (Harré, 1990; Taylor, 1985; Williams, 1993). Finally, a number of approaches suggest that a form of by-passed shame involves ongoing obsessive thoughts regarding the shameful situation, what occurred, its fairness, and how it relates to self (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1990).

A review of the literature on guilt, with particular attention paid to those characteristics described as opposite to shame, also highlights a number of dimensions. While a number of conceptions stress the self-critical nature of shame, probably as many emphasise guilt as an emotion in which the individual is outward looking (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1991; Williams, 1993). Guilt is described as
involving feelings which are focused upon the damage that one caused, and in particular, is associated with the recognition that one has hurt others (Baumeister et al., 1995). It is also assumed to have a much more specific focus upon a particular act or omission (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992). Again in comparison to shame, guilt is associated with the perception that one has broken rules or internalised standards. In this way it is seen as resulting from the individual's perception that they have done something wrong (Benedict, 1946; Lewis, 1971; Mead, 1937; Williams 1993). The perception of having broken rules is also associated with fear of punishment or retribution from those who have been hurt (Nathanson, 1992; Williams, 1993).

Some conceptions associate embarrassment with the knowledge that others are aware that one has breached a social convention (Harre, 1990). This view emphasises the role of an audience, particular feelings of being the centre of unwanted social attention and the fear of evaluation by others (Crozier, 1990). Related feelings are not knowing what to do in a particular situation, or simply a sense of social awkwardness (Miller, 1996). One such situation is being in the presence of others perceived to have higher status (Sachdev, 1990). Grasmick and Bursik (1990) suggest that an important implication of embarrassment is the feeling that one has jeopardised one's future opportunities because others know about the embarrassing event. It is also evident that the concept of humiliation is often used in conjunction with embarrassment to express a similar or stronger feeling (Crozier, 1990).

In the above section a range of attributes are identified which have been associated with the emotions of shame, embarrassment and guilt. These attributes are listed below in Table 4.1 with questions that have been developed to measure them.
### Table 4.1: Attributes associated with shame and related emotions, and questions developed to measure them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awareness that others know that one has acted contrary to social standards.</td>
<td>4. I felt bad in the conference/court case because everyone knew about the offence I had committed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of criticism or derision by others</td>
<td>5. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed because people criticised me for what I had done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of other’s evaluations of the self</td>
<td>1. During the conference/court case I felt worried about what others thought of me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that one has lost honour amongst one’s community</td>
<td>13. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of being a failure for not living up to ideals</td>
<td>9. During the conference/court case I felt that I was a failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that one has done something against one’s moral standards</td>
<td>2. During the conference/court case I felt that the offence I committed was wrong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object of shame becomes the self</td>
<td>12. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed of myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings of anger/hostility directed towards the self</td>
<td>6. In the conference/court case I felt angry with myself for what I had done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessively going over events, possible explanations, justifications, etc, after the event.</td>
<td>21. Since the conference/court have you found yourself continually bothered by thoughts that you were unfairly judged by people at the conference/court case?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Do you feel that some of the things brought up in the conference/court are unresolved in your mind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Since the conference/court have you found yourself unable to decide, in your own mind, whether or not what you did was wrong?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject of attention is act and the harm it caused

Feeling of shame specific to the act

Fear of the possible consequences for oneself (e.g. retribution).

Perception that the specific act does not reflect on the self

Perception that one is the centre of others' attention.

Feeling self-aware and awkward

Feeling uneasy because one feels of lower status.

Feeling of humiliation

Feeling that one has jeopardised future opportunities

3. During the conference/court case I felt bad because the offence I committed might have hurt someone.

20. I felt bad in the conference/court because my actions had hurt others.

11. During the conference / court case I felt ashamed of what I did

19. During the conference/court case I felt worried that I would have to pay in some way for the offence I committed.

18. In the conference/court case I felt good the offence was not typical of my behaviour.

8. In the conference/court I felt embarrassed because I was the centre of attention.

17. During the conference/court case I felt so exposed, I wished I could just disappear.

7. During the conference/court case I felt awkward and aware of myself.

16. In the conference/court case I felt uneasy because I was surrounded by people who were supposed to be more important than me.

15. I felt humiliated in the conference/court.

10. During the conference/court case I felt that I had stuffed up at least some of my future opportunities.

It is expected that the use of self-report measures, such as those presented above, will provide the best means of testing the dimensionality of the shame-related emotions. A number of researchers, however, have suggested that shame can be measured through observation. Tomkins (1962, 1963) and Izard (1971) have argued that the emotions, including shame, can be observed from facial expressions. In particular, they emphasise the loss of tonus in the face and neck muscles (Tomkins,
1987: p. 144) apparent in the downcast face associated with shame. Retzinger (1991) also outlines a discourse analysis for the observation of shame via paralinguistic and behavioural patterns. Shame is often associated with verbal hiding behaviour that includes speaking softly, mumbling, incoherence, and hesitation. Fragmentation or confusion, for example stuttering or other irregularities, can also affect speech. Behaviour associated with shame includes fidgeting and hiding behaviours such as covering of the face or looking away (Retzinger, 1991: p. 74). Other behaviours that might be associated with shame extend beyond these measures of hiding and discomfort. For example, it might be expected that subjects feeling shame will acknowledge that they have done wrong, thus taking responsibility for their actions as well as expressing remorse. It can be hypothesised that observations of shame behaviours (see Table 4.2) will be correlated with self-report measures of shame.

**H4.4 Observational measures of shame will be associated with the self-report measures.**
Method

Participants and Procedure

As reported in Chapter Three, 900 drink drive offenders participated in this study. Participants were randomly allocated to two treatments: court and conference. Observation data were collected during court and conference cases and an interview was conducted with subjects after their case concluded.

Measures

Items developed to measure shame, guilt and embarrassment, and the procedure used to develop them have already been outlined in this chapter. In total there are 23 shame-related items listed in Table 4.1. Each question was read out to the respondent as part of the offender interview and responses were recorded by the subjects in a separate booklet. All questions were responded to by subjects on a five-point scale, indicating whether they experienced each feeling “Not at all” (a score of one) or at the other extreme “Felt overwhelmed by it” (a score of five). Means and standard deviations for these items are presented in Tables 4.3 for court cases and 4.4 for conference cases.

Observation items measuring shame reactions exhibited by subjects during court and conference cases were included in the global observation instrument and completed by observers at the conclusion of each case. The items, which are listed below in Table 4.2, were answered on eight-point scales.
Table 4.2: Means and (standard deviations) of the observational shame items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>conference cases</th>
<th>court cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How much did the offender retreat from attention?</td>
<td>2.68(1.71)</td>
<td>2.47(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How much was the offender’s speech affected by irregularities, pauses, or incoherence?</td>
<td>2.77(1.74)</td>
<td>2.60(1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How uncomfortable (e.g. restless, anxious, fidgety) was the offender?</td>
<td>4.26(1.85)</td>
<td>3.46(1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To what extent did the offender engage in hiding (e.g. lowering head) and concealing (e.g. hand covering parts of the face, averting gaze) behaviour?</td>
<td>2.94(1.92)</td>
<td>2.45(1.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How much responsibility did the offender take for their action?</td>
<td>6.94(1.46)</td>
<td>6.30(1.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To what extent did the offender accept that they had done wrong?</td>
<td>6.61(1.69)</td>
<td>6.03(1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How sorry/remorseful was the offender for their actions?</td>
<td>5.21(2.05)</td>
<td>3.87(2.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Design

Hypotheses 4.1 to 4.3 are based upon predicted distinctions between the shame-related emotions. Each hypothesis predicts that key variables will be associated with certain dimensions and not others. In order to test these hypotheses principal components analysis were conducted so as to partition the shame-related items into interpretable dimensions. Examining the loadings on each factor enables a test of each hypothesis.

Principal component analyses were conducted separately for court and conference subjects. This approach was chosen as it is important to assess any differences in the dimensionality of emotional responses that might occur given the considerable differences between these two types of interventions.

Finally, it should be noted that the analyses were conducted using listwise deletion of cases. Of those cases in which interviews were obtained, very few had missing data, thus the exclusion of these cases resulted in minimal data loss.
Results

Principal Component Analysis of Court Cases Data

Responses to the items measuring shame, guilt and embarrassment from the interviews of 332 respondents who attended court cases were entered into a principal components analysis. Three factors which explain 58 percent of the variance were extracted after consideration of the solution recommended by three criteria: a) eigenvalues > one, b) scree test and c) the simple structure of the solution (Cattell, 1966; Gorsuch, 1983). The three factor solution was rotated using the SPSS varimax and oblimin programs. The correlations between factors were as high as .49 suggesting that the oblimin solution was appropriate (correlations among factors are presented in Tables 4.5). The pattern matrix from this solution is presented below in Table 4.3.

The first factor shows strong loadings for items which measure the participant's perception that during their case they felt ashamed of what they had done; felt bad because they had, or might have, hurt others; and felt that what they had done was wrong. Other significant loadings include feelings of anger at oneself, feelings that one had lost honour or respect among family and friends, feeling ashamed of oneself and feeling ashamed due to others' criticism. What is particularly noteworthy is that items reflecting shame and items reflecting guilt are equally important in defining this factor.

Three items define the second factor. These items are primarily about ongoing feelings as a result of the court or conference case. In particular, feelings that some of the things brought up have not been resolved, continually being bothered by thoughts that one was unfairly judged and an inability to decide whether what one had done was wrong. The ongoing, obsessive nature of these feelings is consistent with the phenomenology of by-passed shame, identified in the work of Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991). In addition to these primary variables it is also evident that there are moderate loadings for items measuring feelings that one had lost respect or honour and that some future opportunities had probably been “stuffed up”. These items with lower loadings appear to focus upon the offender's loss: lost respect and lost opportunities.
Table 4.3: Rotated Pattern Matrix of shame-related items for court cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items (M, SD)</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. During the conference/court case I felt bad because the offence I committed might have hurt someone. (3.11, 1.29)</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed of what I did (2.95, 1.18)</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. During the conference/court case I felt that the offence I committed was wrong. (3.54, 0.93)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I felt bad in the conference/court because my actions had hurt others. (1.84, 1.10)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed of myself. (2.62, 1.29)</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my friends. (1.58, 0.91)</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my family. (1.78, 1.06)</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In the conference/court case I felt angry with myself for what I did. (3.04, 1.19)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed because people criticised me for what I had done. (1.87, 1.07)</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Do you feel that some of the things brought up in the conference/court are unresolved in your mind? (1.54, 0.97)</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Since the conference/court have you found yourself continually bothered by thoughts that you were unfairly judged by people at the conference/court case? (1.61, 1.02)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Since the conference/court case have you found yourself unable to decide, in your own mind, whether or not what you did was wrong? (1.33, 0.83)</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. During the conference/court case I felt that I had stuffed up at least some of my future opportunities. (2.36, 1.22)</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In the conference/court I felt embarrassed because I was the centre of attention. (2.78, 1.35)</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. During the conference/court case I felt so exposed, I wished I could just disappear. (2.17, 1.30)</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. During the conference/court case I felt awkward and aware of myself. (2.89, 1.26)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. I felt humiliated in the conference/court. (2.20, 1.23)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. In the conference/court case I felt uneasy because I was surrounded by people who were supposed to be more important than me. (1.94, 1.13)</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I felt bad in the conference/court case because everyone knew about the offence I had committed. (2.42, 1.24)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. During the conference/court case I felt worried about what others thought of me. (2.48, 1.21)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. During the conference/court case I felt worried that I would have to pay in some way for the offence I committed. (2.95, 1.18)</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. During the conference/court case I felt that I was a failure. (1.62, 0.99)</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of variance explained

|          | 41.5 | 10.3 | 6.4 |

Only loading .3 and above are included in this table.
The last factor is defined by high loadings on items that measure embarrassment as a result of being the centre of attention, feeling so exposed that one would like to disappear, feeling awkward and aware, feeling humiliated, and finally feeling uneasy because one is surrounded by more important people than oneself. A number of other items measure concerns that others knew about the offence and concern regarding other’s perceptions of oneself. The items that define this factor all focus upon the respondent’s discomfort in the situation due to unwanted social attention. This factor appears to measure those feelings that are best described by feelings of exposure or the emotion of embarrassment.

**Principal Component Analysis of Conference Case Data.**

The data from participants in the conference condition (n = 367) was also analysed using a principal components analysis. One item (25) was judged to be an outlier due to having a very low squared multiple correlation and because it loaded poorly across all factors (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989). As a result it was excluded from the analysis. On the basis of the same criteria used in the analysis of the court data, three factors that explained 54 percent of the variance were extracted. Correlations between factors were as high as .38, again indicating that an oblique rotation was appropriate (correlations among factors are presented in Tables 4.5). The rotated pattern matrix is presented below in Table 4.4.

The first factor is defined by items which measure feeling bad because others were, or might have been, hurt; feeling ashamed of oneself and one's actions; feeling that the offence was wrong; and feeling angry with oneself. Other items that had significant loadings on this factor measured concern that others knew about the offence, concern at others' evaluations and criticism, and concern at the loss of respect from friends. These items, and particularly those with high loadings, are very similar to those that defined the shame-guilt factor in the previous analysis.

The second factor also has a high degree of similarity with the factor extracted in the analysis of court cases. Two items with high loadings measured ongoing feelings that some things were unresolved by the case and uncertainty regarding the
“wrongness” of the offence. Other significant loadings appeared for items that captured awareness of having damaged future opportunities, losing respect from family, and ongoing feelings of having been unfairly judged.

The third factor has strong loadings on items measuring feelings of being exposed, humiliated and embarrassed because of social attention. Other items which loaded on this factor measure feelings of awkwardness, feeling ashamed because of having been criticised and feeling uneasy due to being around others perceived to be “more important”. While a number of the loadings are weaker, it is again evident that the defining items are the same for this factor as those for the embarrassment-exposure factor identified in the previous analysis.

As evident from this discussion there is considerable similarity between the analyses conducted for court and conference cases. Three factors with only small differences were evident in both contexts: shame-guilt, unresolved shame, and embarrassment-exposure. This similarity suggests that the dimensionality of shame-related emotion in court and conference cases is comparable and that the hypotheses can be discussed for both contexts simultaneously.

Hypothesis 4.1: *Items measuring fear of other’s disapproval (Items 4, 5, 1, 13, 14, Table 4.1) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure the individual’s perception that they have done something wrong (Item 2, Table 4.1).* This hypothesis was not supported. The shame-guilt factor was measured by item two, which measured feeling that the offence was wrong. Other items loading on this factor measured feeling ashamed because others were critical (item 5) and that one had lost respect or honour among family and friends (items 13 and 14). Thus, both fear of others’ disapproval and the perception of wrongdoing defined shame-guilt. It was evident that many of the items measuring concern for others’ reactions had moderate loadings on both the shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure factors suggesting that this may be a characteristic of both reactions. It was clear, however, that the distinction proposed by Hypothesis 4.1 was not supported.
### Table 4.4: Rotated Pattern Matrix of shame-related items for conference cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items (M, SD)</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. During the conference/court case I felt bad because the offence I committed might have hurt someone. (3.87, 0.97)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed of what I did (3.40, 1.03)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. During the conference/court case I felt that the offence I committed was wrong. (3.83, 0.74)</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In the conference/court case I felt angry with myself for what I had done. (3.30, 1.15)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed of myself (2.95, 1.24)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I felt bad in the conference/court because my actions had hurt others. (2.60, 1.22)</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. During the conference/court case I felt worried about what others thought of me. (2.63, 1.17)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I felt bad in the conference/court case because everyone knew about the offence I had committed. (2.49, 1.18)</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my friends. (1.69, 0.89)</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Do you feel that some of the things brought up in the conference/court are unresolved in your mind? (1.34, 0.74)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Since the conference/court case have you found yourself unable to decide, in your own mind, whether or not what you did was wrong? (1.34, 0.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Since the conference/court case have you found yourself continually bothered by thoughts that you were unfairly judged by people at the conference/court case? (1.26, 0.63)</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. During the conference/court case I felt that I had stuffed up at least some of my future opportunities. (1.73, 0.98)</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my family. (1.80, 0.99)</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. During the conference/court case I felt so exposed, I wished I could just disappear. (1.83, 1.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. I felt humiliated in the conference/court. (1.93, 1.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In the conference/court I felt embarrassed because I was the centre of attention. (2.70, 1.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. During the conference/court case I felt awkward and aware of myself. (3.01, 1.11)</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed because people criticised me for what I had done. (2.28, 1.16)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. In the conference/court case I felt uneasy because I was surrounded by people who were supposed to be more important than me. (1.44, 0.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. During the conference/court case I felt that I was a failure. (1.57, 0.91)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of the variance explained  
36.7  9.9  6.9

Only loadings .3 and above are included in this table.
Hypothesis 4.2: Items measuring negative feelings towards the self (Items 9, 12, 6, Table 4.1) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure concern with one’s actions and the consequences of them for others (Items 11, 3, 20, Table 4.1). Again this hypothesis was not supported. Items measuring feeling ashamed of the self, and anger at the self loaded on the shame-guilt factor as did items measuring feeling ashamed of one’s actions, and feeling bad because others were, or might have been hurt.

Hypothesis 4.3: Items measuring the perception that one has committed a serious moral breach (i.e. acted in a way that is morally wrong (2), hurt others (3, 20) and behaved without honour (13, 14)) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure social discomfort (i.e. feelings of self-consciousness (7, 8, 17). This hypothesis was supported. Feelings that the offence was wrong, concern for having hurt others and compromising one’s own honour loaded on the shame-guilt factor, whereas feelings of social awkwardness form a separate factor of embarrassment-exposure.

Measuring the Degree of Association Among Factors

To examine the relationships among factors, scales were produced for each factor. This was done by summing the variables which loaded cleanly on each factor (i.e. that had a high loading on the factor of interest but low loadings on the other 2 factors). The scale produced for the shame-guilt factor consisted of 6 items (2, 3, 6, 11, 12, and 20) and had a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .88 for court cases and .86 for conference cases. A scale for the embarrassment-exposure factor consisted of 5 items (7, 8, 15, 16, and 17) and had a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .88 for court cases and .80 for conference cases. Finally, the unresolved shame factor was represented by 3 items (21, 22, and 23) and had a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .66 for court cases and .55 for conference cases.

The scales were correlated with each other using the Pearson product moment coefficient. The results are presented below in Table 4.5 separately for court and conference cases. The similarity of correlations in the court and conference cases suggests, as did the factor analyses, that the dimensionality of the feelings measured...
corresponded well across contexts. The correlations show a strong relationship between shame-guilt and embarrassment, but no relationship between shame-guilt and unresolved shame. A moderate relationship is evident between embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame.

Table 4.5: Pearson product moment correlations between factor scores for court and conference cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>shame/guilt</th>
<th>embarrassment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>court cases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>embarrassment</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unresolved emotion</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>conference cases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>embarrassment</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unresolved emotion</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations Between Self-Report and Observational Measures of Shame

It was predicted that the self-report measures of the shame-related emotions would be positively related to the observation of shame. To test this hypothesis, Pearson product moment coefficients were calculated between the observational items and the shame-related emotions for court and conference cases. As can be seen from Table 4.6 the results vary between court and conference cases. In conference cases the first four items, which are measures of social awkwardness, do not correlate with any of the self-report scales. However, the last three items, which measure observations that the offender took responsibility for their actions, accepted that what they had done was wrong and felt sorry/remorse, were all positively associated with shame-guilt. These same items are negatively correlated with unresolved shame, while two of them are positively correlated with embarrassment-exposure.
Table 4.6: Correlations between observed shame and self-reported shame-related emotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference cases</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How much did the offender retreat from and avoid the attention of others?</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How much was the offender’s speech affected by irregularities, pauses or incoherence?</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How uncomfortable (e.g. restless, anxious, fidgety) was the offender?</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To what extent did the offender engage in hiding (e.g. lowering head) and concealing (e.g. hand covering parts of the face, averting gaze) behaviour?</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How much responsibility did the offender take for their actions?</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To what extent did the offender accept that they had done wrong?</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How sorry/remorseful was the offender for their actions?</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Court Cases</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How much did the offender retreat from and avoid the attention of others?</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How much was the offender’s speech affected by irregularities, pauses or incoherence?</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How uncomfortable (e.g. restless, anxious, fidgety) was the offender?</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To what extent did the offender engage in hiding (e.g. lowering head) and concealing (e.g. hand covering parts of the face, averting gaze) behaviour?</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How much responsibility did the offender take for their actions?</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To what extent did the offender accept that they had done wrong?</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How sorry/remorseful was the offender for their actions?</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was less evidence of an association between the observational items and the self-report scales in the court cases. The observation of subjects avoiding attention was positively correlated with shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure. Other than these, the only other significant correlations were negative correlations between unresolved shame and observations that the offender took responsibility for their act and accepted what they had done was wrong. The difference between court and
conference cases is not surprising given the difference between the contexts, particularly in terms of length of proceedings and participation by offenders.

Hypothesis 4.4: Observational measures of shame will be associated with the self-report measures. The results provide partial support for this hypothesis but suggest that observation of social awkwardness is a weaker measure of the shame-related emotions than observation of responsibility and remorse.
Discussion

The principal component analyses identify three primary factors in both court and conference cases: shame-guilt, embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame. Two hypotheses distinguished shame from guilt. Hypothesis 4.1 predicted that items measuring shaming by others and items measuring an internal conviction of wrongdoing would be measured by separate dimensions. The factor analysis did not support this hypothesis with items measuring both feelings loading on the same factor. Hypothesis 4.2 predicted that separate dimensions would measure negative feelings focused on the self and feelings focused upon one's actions and their consequences. Again there was no support for this distinction with these items loading on the same factor. The rejection of these two hypotheses suggests that the feelings associated with conceptions of shame and guilt were not experienced separately in the context that was measured. Hypothesis 4.3 predicted that items associated with a serious moral breach would load on a different factor to items measuring social discomfort. The results provide support for this hypothesis with items measuring awkwardness, embarrassment at being the centre of attention, and feeling exposed loading on a separate factor to the shame-guilt items. While concern about one's social image appeared to be common to both shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure, measures of social awkwardness only loaded on the embarrassment-exposure factor. This is consistent with the prediction that embarrassment is less morally based and also more trivial, but also suggests that embarrassment-exposure is best distinguished in terms of social awkwardness rather than concern for others' opinions. A third factor that measured ongoing feelings that issues were unresolved was also identified by the factor analysis. Finally, there was some support for Hypothesis 4.4 that subjects' perceptions of the shame-related emotions would be associated with observations of subjects' emotional reactions during cases. The relationship between the observational and self-report measures was much stronger in the conference case data than it was in the court case data. It was also evident that observations of remorse and acceptance of responsibility and wrongdoing were much stronger predictors of the self-reported measures than observations of hiding or nervous behaviour.
Differentiating Shame from Guilt and Embarrassment

The Relationship Between Shame and Guilt

One feature of the analysis, which is at odds with much of the empirical and theoretical work on shame is the failure to distinguish between shame and guilt. Importantly, it appears unlikely that this is the result of a failure to represent the domain sufficiently well. As discussed in the introduction, particular care was taken to ensure that all dimensions traditionally used to distinguish between shame and guilt were included. Equally, it is difficult to explain this result simply by suggesting that the context was peculiar. The situation subjects were asked about was one in which both emotions might have been expected. In both court and conference conditions the individual is in a situation where they publicly face up to having violated a law and are possibly aware of having violated their own moral standards. In both situations, but particularly conferences, the harm done to others is discussed, as is disapproval of the offence and the need for reparation.

One possible explanation for the finding that guilt and shame are not differentiated by the factor analysis lies in the methodology. Previous empirical approaches to differentiating shame and guilt have asked subjects to report the phenomenology of previous shame and guilt experiences (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, Miller et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983) or to report what they could have done differently to avoid such experiences (Niedenthal et al., 1994). As argued in the introduction, these studies effectively measure the characteristics subjects associate with their conceptions of the emotions being measured. In some cases it is explicitly or implicitly communicated to subjects that the goal of these studies is to differentiate between guilt and shame. Thus, there is a degree of “methodological forcing” of a distinction that is not a feature of the factor analytic method. What past studies have demonstrated is that subjects are able to conceptually distinguish between shame and guilt on a number of dimensions. In contrast, this study measures the dimensionality of feeling states in a specific situation. Subjects are not told that shame or guilt is of interest but simply respond to the degree to which they experienced certain feelings. This explanation would suggest that while there are widely recognised conceptual distinctions between shame and guilt, which are measured by previous studies, these
distinctions do not necessarily reflect the way in which the emotions are experienced in a context in which wrongdoing has occurred.

If, as these results suggest, there is no empirical reason to distinguish between shame and guilt, the findings reported have important implications for theoretical approaches to these emotions. One implication is that defining the differences between them may deserve less attention than it has traditionally received. Importantly, these results also suggest that the feelings associated with shame and guilt are not incompatible. Some research has suggested that shame may be such a painful emotion that it prevents the individual from focusing on harm to the other (Tangney, 1991). This analysis suggests that where an individual is affected by the harm they have caused others, they are also likely to experience feelings of global self-evaluation. This finding makes intuitive sense. If someone feels guilt about having hurt another person it would seem odd if they did not also feel some shame because their actions had threatened their perception of the kind of person they are and their perception of how others judge them. In conclusion, these results suggest that the distinction between guilt and shame may not be as important as has been suggested.

The Relationship Between Shame and Embarrassment

One distinction supported by the factor analysis is that between shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure. While both the shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure factors included items which signal concern for others’ opinions or evaluations, there appear to be important differences between them on the basis of other attributes. Most noticeably, the items that load exclusively on the embarrassment-exposure factor focus solely on feelings of self-consciousness (eight, 15 and 17). In contrast, shame-guilt is associated with feelings of a more ethical nature, such as how ethically one has acted, whether others have been hurt, what others think of oneself and that one has lost honour in one’s community. Thus, while shame-guilt involves feelings of concern regarding others’ reactions to the shameful act, it is not characterised by feelings of social awkwardness.
This finding contradicts several previous empirical studies on shame. For example, Wicker et al. (1983) found that shame was highly associated with wanting to hide, feeling self-conscious and feeling exposed. Similarly, Lindsay-Hartz (1984) found that the examples which subjects discussed when asked to report an incident of shame included feelings of being exposed, wanting to hide and feeling small. The cross-cultural literature also suggests that similar feelings are associated with shame (Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). Thus, a considerable amount of systematic research on shame has emphasised links with social awkwardness.

Differences between the current and previous studies regarding the distinctiveness of social awkwardness may again be the result of methodological differences. One possible reason for the difference is that while many previous studies have sought to distinguish between shame and guilt almost none have at the same time asked subjects to distinguish these from embarrassment (but see Tangney, Miller et al., 1996). Thus, even if subjects were able to conceptually distinguish between shame and embarrassment, this distinction has been largely ignored. One study that has explicitly addressed this distinction, Tangney et al (1996) also found that embarrassment is associated with greater feelings of self-awareness.

Another possible explanation is that differentiating between these experiences is difficult for subjects. This hypothesis is consistent with the substantial relationship between shame and embarrassment found in this study (a correlation of approximately .5 or .6) which demonstrates that the two emotions are often felt in conjunction with each other. Indeed, the strong association between these two emotions makes intuitive sense. If someone feels shame-guilt because they have been drink driving, then they should also feel embarrassment-exposure when the incident is discussed with others or in front of an audience. This would imply that in many contexts the feelings of shame-guilt will be intimately tied to feelings of embarrassment-exposure and thus difficult to separate. It might be speculated that embarrassment-exposure is distinct from shame-guilt in this analysis because while shame-guilt in the context of a criminal justice case leads to feelings of social awkwardness, this relationship is not reciprocal. Embarrassment-exposure may be felt in a court or conference setting but not flow through to feelings of shame-guilt. For example, a committed participant in a criminal
subculture might feel pride in their crime rather than shame, but they still might feel awkward and exposed while in court.

Despite the high correlation between shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure this analysis suggests that it is important to distinguish between them. The factor analysis shows that shame-guilt is associated with concern that one has hurt others, feeling that the offence was wrong, concern with substantive evaluations by others, anger directed at oneself and loss of honour. In comparison, embarrassment is focused upon the social discomfort or self-consciousness resulting from a social situation. However, the substantial correlation between these factors suggests that this conclusion needs to be tested in other contexts to further validate the distinctiveness of these emotions.

**Conceptualising Shame**

The factor analysis indicates that shame and guilt are not empirically distinct in this data. Although surprising, given the emphasis that has been placed upon distinguishing between shame and guilt, this finding is consistent with aspects of the literature. For example, some theoretical perspectives such as affect theory (Tomkins, 1987; Nathanson, 1997) argue that a single shame affect is the basis for each of these socially constructed emotions. It is also evident that the dimensions upon which shame and guilt have been distinguished are sometimes confused between conceptions of shame and guilt. For example, the social threat conception of guilt and the personal failure conception of shame are similar in that both predict that the emotions occur in reference to internalised standards. Thus, it is not surprising that these two different conceptions of shame and guilt might refer to the same emotion. One conclusion from the empirical results reported in this chapter might be that shame and guilt should be conceptualised as a single emotion, or as two facets of a single emotion. Alternatively they might be considered very closely related and complementary emotions. The results in this thesis certainly question the distinctiveness that has been claimed of them at an empirical level.
Although the social threat and personal failure conceptions are not consistent with the dimensionality of the shame factors, it is evident that all three conceptions are important in predicting the phenomenology of shame-guilt. As predicted by the social threat conception, the shame-guilt factor involves a consciousness or fear of disapproval or rejection by others. Items measuring loss of honour amongst family and friends, shame at having been criticised, and concern about others knowing about the offence all loaded on the shame-guilt factor (although many also loaded on embarrassment-exposure). Consistent with the personal failure conception, shame-guilt measured items that were clearly focused upon evaluation of the self. Examples of this were items measuring "...I felt ashamed of myself." and "...I felt angry at myself for what I had done". Finally, it was evident that shame-guilt was measured by the feeling of having done something wrong, as predicted by the ethical conception. Thus, each of the primary predictions of each of the conceptions of shame is evident in the phenomenology of shame-guilt. Thus, it might be speculated that each of the conceptions has simply emphasised different aspects of the emotion. Indeed different conceptualisations of shame and guilt may have simply identified different facets of a single phenomenon.

Recent work in the field of criminal justice has highlighted the importance of another related emotion: remorse. Indeed, the expression of remorse has for a long time been accepted as a reason for reducing the severity of punishments applied by judges to defendants (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992; Taylor & Kleinke, 1992). Recent research on restorative justice conferences in New Zealand (Maxwell, 1999) has also suggested that feelings of remorse reported by offenders who attended conferences are associated with lower levels of persistent reconviction. Interestingly, there are a number of similarities between the concept of remorse and the shame-guilt factor. In Maxwell's (1999) study remorse was measured by the subject remembering the conference, feeling sorry for what they had done, expressing that they were sorry, feeling that they had repaired the damage they had caused and completing the outcomes of the conference. The emphasis in this measurement of remorse is feeling sorry and the need to make up for the offence. However, others have also suggested that central to the concept are ideas of being responsible for a wrongdoing and the wish that it had not occurred
(Landman, 1993). It can be seen that the concept of remorse shares a number of similarities with shame-guilt, and particularly the recognition of having done wrong and concern for harm done to others. Indeed, Webster’s dictionary defines remorse as a “...gnawing distress arising from a sense of guilt for past wrongs...”. This definition suggests that remorse might be conceptualised as a reparative response emerging from the sense of wrongdoing and concern for others, which is evident in shame-guilt. This would make some sense as the feeling of having done wrong, associated with shame-guilt, would logically result in the wish that the wrong had not occurred and a desire to make it right. Indeed, it may even be that remorse represents a reparative facet of a shame-guilt emotion. These suggestions are given some support by the finding that observation of feeling sorry or remorseful in conferences was correlated with self-reports of shame-guilt. It would seem important for future research to explore further the way in which remorse is related to shame-guilt.

Future Directions

Although it is possible to discuss the extent to which each of the shame conceptions is consistent with the factor structure, it is also evident that many aspects of the shame-related emotions cannot be tested by the phenomenological methodology used in this study. For example, both the social threat and ethical conceptions suggest that shame involves an awareness of disapproval by others. However, it might be argued that the most important difference between these conceptions is the role they assign to shame in this process. The social threat conception describes shame as a direct reaction to the perception of rejection by others or the perception of being unattractive. The individual threatened with shame complies so as to maintain relationships with others. In comparison, the ethical conception describes shame as a reaction to the perception of having done wrong. Nevertheless, perceptions of wrong are largely influenced by social factors and particularly significant others. Therefore, both perspectives imply that concern for others’ opinions will be felt as part of shame. They differ, however, in their analysis of what causes that concern. Such issues will start to be addressed in Chapter Six by examining the relationship between shaming
and shame. However, to fully explore these issues requires much more detailed research designed to draw conclusions regarding causal relationships.

Another important finding in this chapter which requires further attention is the identification of a third factor which was called unresolved shame. This factor shows little evidence of emotion during the experience, apart from items that appear to focus upon actual loss resulting from the event, but also reports ongoing, obsessive feelings after the conference or court case. Although a number of these items were derived from descriptions of by-passed shame (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1991), the presence of this third factor was not hypothesised. Lewis (1971) describes by-passed shame as a defence against the feelings of shame. Among her patients it involved only a brief painful moment followed by almost no feeling. However, the individual appeared cognitively confused or distracted. Over time the individual obsessively reviewed what occurred in the situation and what they did. Discomfort was experienced as a result of the individual not being able to identify what was wrong or what they might have done differently. The similarity of by-passed shame to this factor raises the question of whether there are, as Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991) predict, alternative “shame” emotions. The feelings of loss and uncertainty associated with this factor suggest that unresolved shame might be associated with quite different reactions to shame-guilt. It is important for further research to examine the connection between this emotional reaction and shame-guilt, and its relationship to shaming.

Conclusion

This chapter provides an insight into the structure of the shame-related emotions experienced by individuals who have attended either conferences or court cases having committed the offence of drink driving. Three shame-related emotions were identified in the factor analysis, one was a co-assembly of items measuring shame-guilt, the second measured feelings associated with non-resolution of the shameful situation, while the third was embarrassment-exposure. The shame-guilt factor suggests that a single emotion is associated with feelings of having done the wrong thing, fear of other’s disapproval, concern that one has hurt others, feeling
ashamed of one’s actions, feeling ashamed of oneself, feeling anger at the self and loss of honour amongst one’s community. This chapter has sought to provide a description of the emotion of shame. This, however, answers only some of the questions important to developing an understanding of the emotion and identifies many more questions. Later chapters will attempt to answer some of these questions by exploring the association between shaming and the shame-related emotions.
Chapter 5: Testing the Dimensionality in Reintegrative Shaming.

Introduction

While the last chapter was about the affect structure of shame, this chapter is about the behavioural structure of shaming. Understanding the effects of social disapproval, otherwise referred to as shaming, is essential to developing a more complete knowledge of shame. In the previous chapter a factor analysis of the shame-related emotions identified three distinct factors: shame-guilt, embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame. Both the shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure factors consisted of items that measured the individual’s concern with disapproval by others. This finding is consistent with the social threat and ethical conceptions of shame identified in Chapter Two, which suggest that shaming plays an important causal role in the occurrence of shame. While the factor analysis in Chapter Four provides insight into the phenomenology of shame-guilt, it cannot provide an adequate analysis of why people feel shame-guilt. This chapter will begin to tackle these issues by examining the process of shaming. Reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989) provides one way of analysing shaming. It suggests that social disapproval can be reintegrative or stigmatic. In the introduction to this thesis it was argued that this distinction is important because of the way it synthesises and integrates previous theoretical accounts to better explain the empirical findings in criminology. Having already provided the wider context in which reintegrative shaming was developed, this chapter focuses in much greater detail on the elements central to the theory. In particular, whether the concepts of reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming can be operationalised as predicted.

Defining Important Components of Reintegrative Shaming Theory

A central tenet of reintegrative shaming theory is that shaming plays an important role in the regulation of behaviour. The theory argues that the importance of informal processes of social disapproval have generally been underestimated by criminal justice systems as well as criminological theory. Furthermore, it is hypothesised that shaming is not uniform in the effect it has on behaviour. Shaming
varies along a continuum in the degree to which it is either stigmatising or reintegrative of the individual. It is argued that shaming that is more reintegrative will have a more positive influence on behaviour than shaming that is stigmatising. More strongly, it is hypothesised that stigmatisation will result in negative influence (Makkai and Braithwaite, 1994). This brief description of the central hypotheses of reintegrative shaming theory identifies the three concepts that are essential to operationalise the theory: shaming, reintegration and stigmatisation.

**Shaming = Disapproval**

In his book, *Crime, Shame and Reintegration*, Braithwaite (1989) defines shaming as:

...all societal processes of expressing disapproval which have the intention or effect of invoking remorse in the person being shamed and/or condemnation by others who become aware of the shaming. (Braithwaite 1989: p. 100)

An important aspect of this definition is that the concept of shaming covers a broad range of behaviours. Shaming is not described as necessarily public, humiliating or directed at demeaning the person being shamed. It might, for example, involve a discussion between parents and a child of how an act impacted upon others. A second aspect of this definition is that shaming is defined as "...having the intention or effect..." of invoking certain outcomes and thus is not necessarily intentional. For example, the intention of the parents in discussing how an act impacted upon others may not be to make the child feel shame. Nevertheless, reintegrative shaming theory suggests that we can describe what they are doing as communicating social disapproval, i.e. shaming. Finally, it is worth noting that shaming is not described as an extraordinary event but rather as a social process occurring in everyday life. Thus, shaming can also be thought of as expressions of disapproval that occur in many different social contexts.
Stigmatisation

The concept of disintegrative shaming is largely informed by the literature on labelling theory. This perspective argues that deviance is not a static phenomenon but rather is defined by the societal reaction to any given behaviour. In this way the community is described as defining both what and whom is deviant. It is this second aspect, the labelling of individuals as deviant, which is relevant to the concept of stigmatisation. The action of labelling or classifying the person as having a deviant identity has important social and psychological significance. Erikson (1962) argues that the process involved in being charged with a crime, found guilty of it in a court and then sanctioned is particularly destructive because it ceremonially changes the position of the person in society to that of a deviant. Because such ceremonies in modern society are not followed by ceremonies that decertify this label of deviance, the individual remains marginalised. Labelling is described as a social process that impacts upon the individual in a number of ways. One impact involves a psychological process in which the individual's sense of identity is changed. Social validation that the individual is a criminal, thug, drug-pusher, etc results in the individual thinking of the self in this way. Labelling of the individual also changes his or her status within society such that the community treats them as a deviant, which can diminish their opportunities within society. It is also predicted that where labelling occurs, the individual can come to attain a master status trait in which the new identity of deviance comes to dominate all other identities.

This characterisation of the effect of the criminal justice system on offenders is the basis for Braithwaite's concept of stigmatisation.

Stigmatising is disintegrative shaming in which no effort is made to reconcile the offender with the community. The offender is outcast, her deviance is allowed to become a master status, degradation ceremonies are not followed by ceremonies to decertify deviance. (Braithwaite, 1989: p. 101)
Chapter 5: Dimensionality of Reintegration, Stigmatisation and Shaming

Reintegration

While stigmatisation, based upon the concept of labelling, anchors one end of the shaming continuum, reintegration anchors the other. Unlike labelling theory, which proposes “radical non-intervention” (Schur, 1973), reintegrative shaming theory argues that some forms of shaming produce positive influence. Indeed, reintegrative shaming is in many respects the expression of social disapproval without stigmatisation. The theory argues that the key to this is focusing upon disapproval of the offender’s act without denigrating the offender.

*Reintegrative shaming* is shaming followed by efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community of law-abiding or respectable citizens through words or gestures of forgivingness or ceremonies to decertify the offender as deviant. Shaming and reintegration do not occur simultaneously but sequentially, with reintegration occurring before deviance becomes a master status. It is shaming which labels the act as evil while striving to preserve the identity of the offender as essentially good. It is directed at signifying evil deeds rather than evil persons in the Christian tradition of “hate the sin and love the sinner”. Specific disapproval is expressed within relationships characterised by general social approval. (Braithwaite, 1989: p. 100-101)

The above definition identifies two central aspects of reintegration. The first of these is that for shaming to be reintegrative it must involve forgiveness or some form of decertification of deviance. While many criminal justice procedures act to certify the offender’s deviance, reintegration places an emphasis on the expression of forgiveness once shaming is finished. A second component of reintegrative shaming is that the shaming occurs in such a way that it is respectful of the person. It avoids labelling the offender as bad so that shaming occurs within a continuum of approval of the person. While Braithwaite argues that shaming and reintegration are sequential, it also seems that implicit to the concept of reintegrative shaming is the way in which shaming is conducted.
Relationships Among Shaming, Stigmatisation, and Reintegration

As already discussed the concepts of reintegration and stigmatisation are conceptualised as two poles of a continuum upon which behaviour towards an individual (or collectivity) can be described (Makkai and Braithwaite, 1994). It is also evident that the reintegration-stigmatisation continuum is always paired with the concept of shaming. Thus, all shaming can be evaluated on the degree to which it is reintegrative-stigmatic. This structure identifies two dimensions upon which shaming can be measured: 1) the extent of shaming that occurs, and 2) the type of shaming expressed, i.e. reintegrative-stigmatising. In this way a small degree of shaming, for example mild disapproval, could be either reintegrative or stigmatic, as could a profoundly sweeping act of shaming.

Two predictions regarding the dimensionality of reintegrative shaming can be made. The first of these is that reintegration and stigmatisation are bipolar opposites and as such will form a single dimension. The second prediction is that shaming will form a separate dimension to reintegration and stigmatisation.

**H 5.1** *Reintegration and stigmatisation will form opposite poles of a single dimension.*

**H 5.2** *Shaming will form a dimension independent of reintegration and stigmatisation.*

Braithwaite describes reintegration and stigmatisation as if they are unidimensional constructs, albeit while describing their component features. Since then Makkai and Braithwaite (1994), who have provided the first empirical test of the theory, have represented reintegration and stigmatisation using a facet structure in order to organise the characteristics specified by Braithwaite. This facet structure is in most part an extension of aspects of the original work. It can be seen in the definitions of reintegration and stigmatisation, which are quoted above, that each one can be broken into elements. In particular, stigmatising shaming is defined as lacking forgiveness, labelling of the offender and allowing the offender to develop a deviant master status trait. Reintegration is described as involving forgiveness and an attitude of respect towards the offender. Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) use these
characteristics to propose four facets that define the continuum between reintegration and stigmatisation. These four facets are:

**Reintegration**
- Disapproval while sustaining a relationship of respect;
- Ceremonies to certify deviance terminated by ceremonies to decertify deviance;
- Disapproval of the evil of the deed without labelling the person as evil;
- Not allowing deviance to become a master status trait

**Stigmatisation**
- Disrespectful disapproval, humiliation;
- Ceremonies to certify deviance not terminated by ceremonies to decertify deviance;
- Labelling the person, not only the deed, as evil;
- Allowing deviance to become a master status trait

A facet structure such as the one described here does not necessarily imply that the facets are independent. In many cases facets simply outline those characteristics which describe a single concept. However, it is also possible that these facets may define dimensions that are empirically distinct. In order to test this possibility it is hypothesised that:

**H 5.3** The facets of reintegration and stigmatisation defined by Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) will form distinct dimensions

**Previous Tests of Reintegrative Shaming Theory**

Only a few empirical studies have operationalised and tested reintegrative shaming theory (Lu, 1998, in press), some not very convincingly (Zhang, 1995). Though there are many influential studies where the authors have found the theory to offer a profound interpretation of the pattern of results (Sampson and Laub, 1993; Hagan and McCarthy, 1997; Sherman 1992, 1993). One empirical study by Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) uses reintegrative shaming to explain levels of compliance by

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3 For ease of description these facets will be referred to as facets of respect, forgiveness, labelling and master status trait.
nursing homes to a newly introduced set of 31 regulatory standards. Compliance data were collected from inspectors' reports from an initial round of inspections and a second round of inspections of the same homes 18-24 months later. This provided data on changes in compliance over the period. Interviews were also conducted with the members of the nursing home inspection teams as well as the directors of the nursing homes. A measure of reintegrative shaming was based upon questions in the inspection team interview that addressed the philosophy and strategy inspectors employed in their job. Shaming was measured using a two-item scale that asked inspectors their attitude towards expressing disapproval, while reintegration was measured by a further six questions that measured the facets of forgiveness and respect. It is important to note that the facets of labelling and master status trait were not operationalised. Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) argue that because the offender in the regulatory domain was the organisation rather than an individual it was problematic to measure the extent to which the nursing home director was labelled as deviant. Equally, observational research revealed that the directors of nursing homes were almost never defined as criminals. As a result, it was highly unlikely for a nursing home director to attain a deviant master status trait. Thus, neither the labelling or master status trait facets were measured.

The results from this study provide strong support for the hypothesis that reintegrative shaming leads to higher rates of compliance. A significant interaction between shaming and reintegration-stigmatisation showed that high levels of shaming combined with high levels of reintegration produced a greater increase in compliance than low levels of shaming that were reintegrative or high levels of shaming that were stigmatising (see Figure 5.1). While reintegrative shaming produced a 39% decrease in non-compliance, stigmatising shaming produced a 39% increase in non-compliance. Tolerance of non-compliance (low shaming and high reintegration) also produced an increase in non-compliance, but not as great as that for stigmatising shaming. This pattern of results is consistent with the predictions made by reintegrative shaming theory that shaming is important in changing compliance and also that reintegrative shaming is more effective than stigmatising shaming.
These results have received some support from a recent study by Maxwell (1999) that did not set out to operationalise and test the theory of reintegrative shaming. The object of this study was to survey all the factors that predicted variation in offending six and a half years after a restorative justice conference. As it happened, Maxwell’s “shame” measure was operationally consistently with stigmatisation, as it focused upon denigration of the offender. The results show that those offenders who recall being made to feel bad about the self during the conference were more likely to be persistent offenders. Thus, as with the Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) nursing home study, stigmatising shaming was related to increased offending.

A second test of the theory focuses on juvenile offending and the use of reintegrative shaming in families from different ethnic backgrounds (Zhang, 1995). The study interviewed the parents of male delinquents, of either African-American or Asian-American ethnicity, who were sentenced by a court to “home on probation” for the first time. The study hypothesised that Asian-American parents would use more reintegrative shaming in supervising and managing their children than African-American
parents. The concepts of shaming and reintegration were measured through an interview with the boys’ parents after the court case. Shaming was broken into a number of types: non-verbal (e.g. angry looks), verbal, physical (e.g. spanking in front of others) and communitarian (e.g. talking to others about the offence). These different categories of disapproval were measured using 22 items that were summed to form a scale with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .83. Reintegration was operationalised using a series of questions measuring the parents’ interdependency with the delinquent boy, a question asking whether the parents forgave their child for the offence and another question which asks their opinion regarding their child’s “goodness”. All these items were summed to form a single measure of reintegration that had a Cronbach’s reliability alpha coefficient of .65.

Contrary to expectations, very few differences were found between African-Americans and Asian-Americans in either their use of shaming or reintegration. The most consistent finding from the study was that Asian-American parents used more verbal disapproval of their child’s actions. However, this difference disappeared once marital status was controlled for. Factors that had a positive relationship with shaming were the marital status of the parents, the number of adults living in the household, the frequency with which the family attended religious services and whether the child was born overseas.

It is doubtful that Zhang (1995) has tested the theory of reintegrative shaming in the way claimed. One problem involves the samples used. The study is based on the assumption that Asian-American families have a lower offending rate than African-Americans because of different shaming practices. Yet the sample used was not drawn randomly from the African-American and Asian-American communities but rather from families in which the child had already offended. If shaming practices are related to offending rates, a key prediction of reintegrative shaming theory, then it should be hypothesised that no difference in shaming practices should be found between the delinquent boys’ families. This obviously contradicts Zhang’s hypothesis that differences should be found between offenders from different ethnic groups and possibly explains why no difference was found.
Chapter 5: Dimensionality of Reintegration, Stigmatisation and Shaming

The more important problems posed by Zhang’s (1995) work from the perspective of this thesis relate to the operationalisation of reintegrative shaming. The theory of reintegrative shaming revolves around the idea that shaming can be either reintegrative or stigmatising. However, Zhang (1995) operationalises reintegration-stigmatisation primarily through measurement of interdependency. Braithwaite (1989) suggests that reintegrative shaming is facilitated by interdependency but does not equate the two. Interdependency refers to a reciprocal positive relationship, in this case between the parent and child, and is a much broader concept than reintegration. Furthermore, interdependency is a measure of an ongoing relationship whereas reintegration-stigmatisation is a measure of how an individual or group reacts in a specific context. So while the measurement of shaming is consistent with the theory, the measurement of reintegration has severe limitations.

Both the studies by Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) and Zhang (1995) highlight a number of important issues for operationalisation of the theory. Although Zhang identified four categories of shaming behaviour that are measured with 22 items, he nevertheless reports that these measures may not have been sensitive to subtle forms of shaming. For example, interviewers were aware that parents were ashamed of their children’s behaviour yet were also aware that this was not captured by the shaming items. Furthermore, forms of disapproval, such as spontaneous facial expressions, did not always occur as deliberate behaviours which parents could be asked about:

The problem is how to translate these subtle and involuntary non-verbal cues into measurable variables; and more important, whether parents can remember or are aware of ever using them. (Zhang, 1995: p. 259)

This difficulty may have occurred because Zhang measures shaming through questions which inquire about discrete behaviours the shamer might have used (e.g. Did you...”say to him something like, ‘you are such a disgrace to your family’?”).

In contrast to this approach, Makkai and Braithwaite ask much more subjective questions which require the shamer to report their general approach or attitude to their role as an inspector (e.g. “After I have had a battle with a nursing home, whether I win
or lose, I like to forgive and forget.”). It would seem, on the basis of these studies, that because of its ambiguity, shaming is more successfully measured by questions which allow the subject to report their interpretation of their behaviour rather than identifying discrete behaviours which may represent shaming. However, while Makkai and Braithwaite’s operationalisation of the theory through general questions was more successful, it was also apparent that their research did not measure what actually happened, but rather how inspectors perceived their approach to inspections in general. How well such an indirect measure predicts actual behaviour is uncertain, making this a less satisfactory method of operationalisation. Measures such as Zhang’s, that ask subjects about what actually occurred in the specific situation have greater face validity.

Both the studies outlined above have limitations in their operationalisation of the theory of reintegrative shaming. Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) have operationalised only two facets of reintegrative shaming. Furthermore, they proceed from the assumption that the four facets are inter-correlated even though their own observation suggests that the master status trait facet is almost invariably absent when other facts are present. While they support the predictions of the effect of reintegrative shaming on compliance with the law, they downplay the fact that the concept of reintegrative shaming does not hang together in the way predicted by the theory. Whether or not the four facets are as highly related and whether reintegration and stigmatisation represent opposite poles of one dimension is yet to be empirically tested. The study by Zhang (1995) has greater limitations due to reintegration being inferred from the measure of interdependency. As a result, neither of these studies provides a systematic and detailed operationalisation of the constructs that allows for examination of the relationships between shaming, reintegration and stigmatisation. Finally, it is evident that there are measurement difficulties posed by the fact that shaming and reintegration encompass a range of complex and subtle behaviours.

A number of approaches might be employed to improve measurement of these concepts. One such approach might involve more objective measures of shaming behaviour obtained through observation. An observational approach would be consistent with reintegrative shaming theory which primarily focuses on the behaviour
directed towards an individual rather than on the individual’s attitude towards that behaviour or its end result. Indeed, Makkai and Braithwaite, in judging their measures as preliminary, suggest that reintegrative shaming would ideally be measured through observation. However, at the same time, arguments for a self-report approach can be found in research on measuring stressful events (see Lazarus, DeLongis, Folkman and Gruen, 1985) and their consequences for personal wellbeing. This substantial body of research has moved toward recognising perception and appraisal as more important than the events themselves. It is argued that important psychological factors vary the way in which events are understood by individuals and it is this understanding that is the critical factor, not the severity of the event itself. These findings have implications for the measurement of reintegrative shaming. While reintegrative shaming can be seen as a set of objective behaviours, it is also true that they usually occur in the context of long held relationships. The individual’s interpretation of others’ behaviour as disapproving, reintegrative or stigmatising is based on a multitude of factors relating to the individual’s relationship with others such as, prior knowledge of the person’s feelings, expectations of how they are likely to respond later, expectations of their general standards of behaviour, the context of their relationship, and so on. These considerations suggest that a measure of reintegrative shaming based upon the shamed person’s perceptions may be a more effective measure than one that relies on the objective measurement of behaviour by an impartial observer.

Given the strengths and weaknesses of both the observational and self-report measures, a useful approach is to test measures of both kinds in the empirical context. The use of multiple methods, based upon the principle of triangulation (see Denzin 1988), employs a range of measures with different sources of error; the expectation is that weaknesses of one method will be counter-balanced by strengths of the other and that conclusions will be stronger if they are based on findings that are robust across
methods. This approach also allows evaluation of the degree of external validity of the constructs. It is expected that although observational and self-report measures of shaming, stigmatisation and reintegration will differ in significant ways, they will also provide evidence of triangulation.

**H 5.4** Observational and self-report measures of reintegrative shaming will demonstrate evidence of triangulation.

Measuring Reintegrative Shaming in Restorative Justice Conferences and Court Cases

Reintegrative shaming theory has been used in the research and development of restorative justice conferences and is also seen as a possible explanation of how they work to reduce crime (Braithwaite, 1999, Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994; Hyndman et al., 1996; McDonald, O’Connell et al., 1994; Moore & Forsythe, 1995; O’Connell & Thorsbourne, 1995; Retzinger & Scheff, 1996; Van Ness, 1997). Equally, the framework is widely contested in the restorative justice movement where both discomfort and outright rejection of shame talk are common. Because of this link an experimental comparison between court and conference cases provides a good context in which to develop measures of the theory and to test its predictive validity.

Conferences are believed to be potential more reintegrative than traditional court procedures for a number of reasons. One of the main reasons is that a significant number of the people invited to the conference are those who care for and are respected by the offender. The role of these people is to support and help the offender through the conference. This is quite different from court where there is much less involvement by the offender’s community and where witnesses are sometimes used to harm the offender’s case. A second but related factor is the focus of the conference procedure on the offence and its consequences rather than on the character of the offender. Both these factors mean that conferences involve the offender in a context where people care for and respect them and where they are less likely to be labelled as deviant.

Another important aspect of conferencing is the role of victims and the emphasis on resolving outstanding issues between the offender and victim. As part of
the conferencing process victims are able to relate the impact of the offence upon them and ask for reparation from the offender. In many cases this provides the opportunity for the offender to apologise and make reparation to all those affected, which in turn facilitates the forgiveness of the offender. In most cases forgiveness at an informal and formal level is structured into the conferencing procedure. In comparison, court cases rarely involve victims and so rarely provide the opportunity for the victim to relate the consequences of the offence or for the offender to make direct reparations to the victim. These factors as well as the rational, impersonal nature of court provides much less opportunity for the expression of forgiveness at court.

This thesis reports on data collected from drink drive conferences. These are different from many other conferences because they do not involve a direct victim. In the Australian Capital Territory program this role is sometimes replaced by a community representative whose role is to discuss the consequences of drink driving from the perspective of the whole community. Despite this difference there is no reason to expect these conferences to be less respectful and caring of the offender, less forgiving of the offender, less focused on the evil of the incident rather than the evil of the offender, or more likely to allow the offender to develop a deviant master status trait than other conferences. Indeed, drink driving conference design and facilitator training was oriented towards sustaining these objectives. These differences between court and conference cases suggest that conferences should be characterised by more reintegrative shaming and thus less stigmatising shaming than court cases.

H 5.5 Conference cases will be more reintegrative than court cases.
Chapter 5: Dimensionality of Reintegration, Stigmatisation and Shaming

Method

Participants and Procedure

As reported in Chapter Three, 900 drink drive offenders participated in this study. Participants were randomly allocated to two treatments: court and conference. Observation data were collected during court and conference cases and an interview was conducted with subjects after their case concluded.

Self-Report Measures

Shaming was operationalised using subjects’ perceptions of how much others disapproved of what they had done. Subjects were asked about the disapproval of each person who they felt played a significant role at the conference or court case: “Next, I would like to get some idea about what each of these people thought of the offence you committed. Again starting with ...[Mary]... would you say that s/he: strongly approved, approved...” Responses were recorded on a five-point scale ranging from strongly approved to strongly disapproved. The mean score for all participants identified by subjects was calculated and this provided a single shaming measure.

Reintegration-stigmatisation was measured by a series of 15 questions that assessed the four facets outlined by Makkai and Braithwaite: respect, forgiveness, labelling and master status trait. Four respect items (see items one to four, Table 5.1) asked the offender to indicate the degree to which they were treated as a person who was trusted, cared for and loved. Responses were recorded on a four-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a lot”.

Four forgiveness questions (items five to nine, Table 5.1) asked if others at the case expressed forgiveness for the offender’s actions, that they could put the offence behind them, and that they deserved a second chance. One of these questions (item eight) was reverse scored because it asked if the offence would not be forgotten. A fifth forgiveness item (item 10) asked specifically about each person who the subject remembered as being present at the case: “Next, I would like to get some idea of how much each of these people forgave you at the end of the conference/court case? Starting with...[Mary]...would you say s/he was...” Responses were recorded on a
five-point scale ranging from “very unforgiving” to “very forgiving”. The mean scores for all those at the case were calculated to provide a single measure.

Labelling was measured using four questions (items 11 - 14, Table 5.1). Two of the questions asked if the subject was treated as though they were likely to commit the offence again and if negative judgements were made about their person. The remaining two questions (items 13 and 14) were reverse scored: subjects were asked if others treated them as though they were basically law abiding and if others said that it was not like them to do something wrong. Responses were again recorded on a four-point scale.

The final facet, master status trait, was measured by two items (items 15 and 16, Table 5.1) which asked the subject firstly if they were treated like a criminal and secondly if they were treated like a bad person. Again, responses to these questions were recorded on a four-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a lot”.

The shaming, reintegration and stigmatisation questions were asked with the interviewer reading out each question and the subject recording their answer in a separate booklet. These questions formed one part of the offender questionnaire.
### Table 5.1: Means and standard deviations of interview items across contexts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>conference cases</th>
<th>court cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respect</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Did you learn from the conference / court that there are people who care about you?</td>
<td>3.47 (0.81)</td>
<td>2.12 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. During the conference / court case did people suggest that they loved you regardless of what you did?</td>
<td>2.71 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.13 (1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Were you treated as a trustworthy person in the conference / court?</td>
<td>3.11 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.47 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. During the conference / court case did people talk about aspects of yourself which they like?</td>
<td>2.73 (1.00)</td>
<td>1.75 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forgiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. At the end of the conference / court, or since then, have people made it clear to you that you can put the whole thing behind you?</td>
<td>2.51 (1.12)</td>
<td>2.37 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. At the end of the conference/court case did people indicate that you were forgiven?</td>
<td>2.51 (1.00)</td>
<td>1.88 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Did others at the conference/court case say that you had learnt your lesson and now deserve a second chance?</td>
<td>2.83 (1.03)</td>
<td>1.96 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Even though the conference/court case is over do you still feel that others will not let you forget what you have done?</td>
<td>2.15 (1.11)</td>
<td>2.08 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. During the conference/court case did any of the people who are important to you reject you because of the offence?</td>
<td>1.16 (0.49)</td>
<td>1.16 (0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Offender’s mean perception of forgiveness expressed by those who were present at the case?</td>
<td>0.73 (0.67)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labelling</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Were you treated in the conference/court as though you were likely to commit another offence.</td>
<td>1.58 (0.84)</td>
<td>1.69 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Did people during the conference/court case make negative judgements about what kind of person you are?</td>
<td>1.45 (0.79)</td>
<td>1.53 (0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Did people in the conference / court case say that it was not like you to do something wrong?</td>
<td>2.92 (1.16)</td>
<td>1.81 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. During the conference / court case did people indicate that they accepted you as basically law abiding?</td>
<td>3.36 (0.81)</td>
<td>2.59 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Master Status Trait</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you were a criminal?</td>
<td>1.74 (0.85)</td>
<td>2.00 (0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you were a bad person?</td>
<td>1.70 (0.79)</td>
<td>1.76 (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shaming</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Offenders mean perception of disapproval by those who were present at the case. #</td>
<td>1.51 (0.63)</td>
<td>1.23 (0.70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# These items were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 to 2. All other items were measured on a 4-point scale from 1 to 4.
Design

Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, which make predictions about the dimensionality of reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming, were tested by a factor analytic approach using the self-report data. Unlike the analysis in Chapter Four that was designed to identify meaningful dimensions, the purpose of analysis in this chapter is to test predictions made by theory. The self-report measures developed for this purpose, however, had not previously been used nor had their validity or reliability been tested. In order to explore the measures prior to testing the hypotheses the sample was randomly divided into two parts. On one half of the sample two exploratory factor analyses were performed (one for court cases and one for conference cases) in order to a) explore what dimensions did arise from the data, b) test the reliability and validity of variables used, and c) determine how similar the factor structures are for court and conference cases. The second half of the sample was used in a confirmatory factor analytic procedure in order to test hypotheses 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.

In addition to factor analysis of the self-report items, the association between self-report and observational measures of shaming was tested, as were differences in the shaming measures between court and conference cases. Further details of these analyses are provided below.
Chapter 5: Dimensionality of Reintegration, Stigmatisation and Shaming

Results

The Relationship Between Shaming, Reintegration and Stigmatisation

An Exploratory Analysis of the Self-Report Data

A preliminary analysis of the 17 variables measuring reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming revealed that a number of items (items 2, 5, 8, 9 and 17) had low squared multiple correlations (SMCs). When entered into the factor analysis these items had low loadings on all factors. Accordingly, these variables were considered outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989) and discarded from the factor analyses. Exclusion of item 17 is most significant, as this is the only item measuring shaming. Particularly in this case, a low SMC does not necessarily suggest that the item is a poor measure but might alternatively indicate, as suggested by Hypothesis 5.2, that the item measures a distinct dimension. Thus, although removed from this analysis, the relationship between shaming and the other items will be assessed separately.

A factor analysis of court case data was performed using maximum likelihood extraction. Two factors which explain 51 percent of the variance were extracted after consideration of the solution recommended by three criteria: a) eigenvalues > one, b) scree test and c) the simple structure of the solution (Cattell, 1966; Gorsuch, 1983). These factors were rotated using varimax rotation and are presented in Table 5.2.

The first factor is defined by items which measure the offender’s perception that during their court case people indicated care and liking for them, forgiveness for what they had done, and that it was unlike them to do something that was wrong. These measures are consistent with Makkai and Braithwaite’s (1994) facets of respect, forgiveness and non-labelling and as such represent the concept of reintegration.

The second factor is defined by four items measuring the offender’s perception that they were treated as though they were a bad person and a criminal, that others had made negative judgements about them and expected them to re-offend. These are consistent with the perception of having been labelled by others as well as more specifically having been given a master status trait by those present at court. This factor is highly consistent with Braithwaite’s (1989) concept of stigmatisation.
It is also evident from the factor analysis that items three, 10 and 14 have moderate loadings on both factors. Two of these three items represent the opposite pole of the labelling facet (positive labelling in effect). As such, they capture some of the meaning associated with respect for the offender, which may explain why they load on the reintegration factor as well as the stigmatisation factor.

Table 5.2: Rotated factor matrix of the court cases interview data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>reintegation</th>
<th>stigmatisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did you learn from the conference / court that there are people who care about you?</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. During the conference / court case did people talk about aspects of yourself which they like?</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Did others at the conference/court case say that you had learnt your lesson and now deserve a second chance?</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. At the end of the conference/court case did people indicate that you were forgiven?</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Did people in the conference / court case say that it was not like you to do something wrong?</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. During the conference / court case did people indicate that they accepted you as basically law abiding?</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>-.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Were you treated as a trustworthy person in the conference / court?</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>-.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. offenders mean perception of forgiveness expressed by those who were present at the case</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. During the conference / court case did people suggest that they loved you regardless of what you did?</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you were a criminal?</td>
<td></td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you were a bad person?</td>
<td></td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Were you treated in the conference/court as though you were likely to commit another offence.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Did people during the conference/court case make negative judgements about what kind of person you are?</td>
<td></td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>percent of variance explained</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Table includes only loadings equal to or greater than .3.

A maximum likelihood factor analysis of the same items for conference cases was performed. One item was removed from this analysis (item 10) because it had a very low SMC and low loadings across all factors. Two factors, which explained 45 percent of variance, were extracted on the same criteria that were used for the court
factor analysis. Varimax rotation revealed a factor structure, presented in Table 5.3, similar to that found for court cases. The first factor, which accounts for 23 percent of the variance was defined by items measuring the offender's perception that others at the conference cared for them, liked them, forgave them, thought that it was unlike them to do something wrong and said that they loved them. The primary difference between this factor and the factor extracted from the court cases is the importance of the item measuring the expression of love by others. While this is the most marginal item in the court factor analysis it has the highest loading on reintegration in this analysis. This difference is not surprising in light of our extensive observations of court and conference cases. Expressions of love might be expected to have more shared variance with reintegration in conferences because it is a behaviour that is encouraged in this context. In contrast, the behaviour while remaining an expression of reintegration may be suppressed as inappropriate in court cases.

Table 5.3: Rotated factor matrix of the conference cases interview data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Reintegration</th>
<th>Stigmatisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. During the conference / court case did people suggest that they</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loved you regardless of what you did?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. During the conference / court case did people talk about aspects of</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yourself which they like?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Did others at the conference/court case say that you had learnt</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>your lesson and now deserve a second chance?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. At the end of the conference/court case did people indicate that</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you were forgiven?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Did you learn from the conference / court that there are people</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who care about you?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Were you treated as a trustworthy person in the conference / court?</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Did people in the conference / court case say that it was not like</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you to do something wrong?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. During the conference / court case did people indicate that they</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accepted you as basically law abiding?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were a criminal?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were a bad person?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Were you treated in the conference/court as though you were</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>likely to commit another offence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Did people during the conference/court case make negative</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judgements about what kind of person you are?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of variance explained 23.2 11.7

* Table includes only loadings equal to or greater than .3.
The second factor, which accounted for 11.7 percent of the variance, was again similar to the one found in the court case data. Items measuring the perception of having been treated as a criminal, having been treated as a bad person, being perceived as likely to reoffend, and perceiving self negatively judged defined this factor. The same two items as in the analysis of court case data (items three and 14) had moderate loadings on both factors.

The two exploratory factor analyses reported above suggest that a similar factor structure is present in both court and conference data. Significantly, the structure uncovered in each context is inconsistent with Hypothesis 5.1, that reintegration and stigmatisation are a single dimension, and with Hypothesis 5.3, that the facets of reintegration and stigmatisation would be represented as distinct dimensions. This structure can now be tested using a confirmatory factor analytic procedure to determine how well it describes dimensionality across both conference and court cases. The exploratory analyses also allowed an evaluation of which items provided the best measures of the factors. This is particularly important given that this is the first time that these items have been used, and that despite pre-testing, there had been no thorough testing of their reliability and validity. It was evident that a number of items did not measure factors equally well in both contexts. The perception that others expressed love for the offender was a poor measure in court but not in conferences, while the mean perception of others’ forgiveness (item 10) was a poorer measure in conferences than at court. In addition to variation between contexts it was also evident that a number of items (items three and 14) were relatively poor measures in both contexts because they measured both factors with only moderate success. Items that were not strong measures in both contexts were omitted in the confirmatory analysis.

Testing the Structure of Reintegration, Stigmatisation and Shaming.

Having performed an exploratory factor analysis in order to develop measures of reintegration and stigmatisation, a confirmatory analysis was performed to test whether this structure provided a sound description of the data. The confirmatory
analysis also served to test a number of hypotheses regarding the structure of reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming. Items one, four, six, seven and 13 were predicted by the model to load on one factor called reintegration, while items 11,12,15 and 16 were predicted to load on a stigmatisation factor. The variance of the factors was constrained to equal one, while the factor loadings of variables and the correlation between factors were unconstrained. This model is depicted in figure 5.2.

This model was estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure in EQS version 4 (Bentler, 1993). The goodness-of-fit chi-square of 35.39 (df, 26, p = 0.1) indicated that the model fitted the data fairly well. The high Comparative Fit Index score of .989 as well as residual analysis (see appendix C) supported this conclusion. Although such statistics are said to be fairly robust both in terms of non-normal data and categorical variables (Bollen, 1989), the model was also tested using the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square with the resulting score of 34.14 (df 26, p = .13), which shows little variation from the unscaled score.

This procedure was repeated using polychoric correlations, which are correlations calculated on the assumption of normally distributed categorical data. It should be noted that the sample size is less than ideal for this methodology. The results should therefore be treated with some caution. The resulting chi-square was 82.08 (df 26, p< .00) which implies that the model does not adequately describe the data. However, the parameter estimates did not differ substantially between the polychoric and initial model. It was also evident that the Comparative Fit Index also calculated using the polychoric correlations was .96, indicating a good fit between model and data. The combined analyses suggest that the two-factor model is an adequate description of the data analysed.

Hypothesis 5.1: Reintegration and stigmatisation will form opposite poles of a single dimension. This hypothesis was not supported by the exploratory factor analysis and is inconsistent with the model tested in the confirmatory analysis, both of which define reintegration and stigmatisation as separate and uncorrelated factors. To test if reintegration and stigmatisation are opposite poles of a single dimension the correlation between reintegration and stigmatisation was constrained to -1. The chi-square for this nested model ($\chi^2 (27)=399.23$) indicated that it was a poor fit of the
data. Furthermore, a chi-square significance test indicates that the nested model was significantly worse ($\chi^2 (1) = 363.84, p > .01$) than the unconstrained model. This suggests that the hypothesis should be rejected.

**Figure 5.2: Confirmatory Factor Loadings.**

Hypothesis 5.3: The facets defined by Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) will form distinct dimensions. It was not possible to test a confirmatory model that defined separate factors representing the respect, forgiveness, labelling and master status trait facets, as the limited number of items would prevent identification of the model.
However, the high degree of fit found for the non-facet model together with the low standardised residuals (see appendix C) between forgiveness and respect items and the labelling and master status trait items, provides evidence that the facets are not separate dimensions.

Hypothesis 5.2: *Shaming will form a dimension independent of reintegration and stigmatisation.* To test this hypothesis scales measuring reintegration and stigmatisation were created based on the confirmatory factor structure. The reintegration scale had Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .70 for conference cases and .76 for court cases. The stigmatisation scale had Cronbach’s alphas coefficients of .70 for conference cases and .81 for court cases. These reliability coefficients demonstrate the scales’ reliability in both contexts. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between these scales and the shaming measure were calculated and are presented in Table 5.4. The correlations show no significant relationship between shaming and either reintegration or stigmatisation for conference cases and only a very low correlation between stigmatisation and shaming for court cases. This suggests that both reintegration and stigmatisation are distinct from shaming.

**Table 5.4: Correlations between reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shaming item</th>
<th>Stigmatisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conference cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing Self-Report and Observational Measures of Shaming.

Observational measures of reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming formed part of the global observation instrument which was completed by observers after each conference or court case. Having been present during the case, observers were required to answer questions on the basis of their general impression of events. To serve this purpose, all sources of information, including the duration, quality, and source of
interactions, non-verbal behaviours, and paralinguistic cues were to be taken into account.

Initial analysis of the observational data showed that there were marked differences between the court and conference cases. The observed scores for court cases were so low that most of the items were severely skewed. This was particularly evident for the stigmatisation items, a number of which involved distributions so severe that more than 90 percent of cases recorded the same score. The conference cases involved much more normal distributions. However, again it was evident that the stigmatisation items involved extreme distributions such that most of the cases recorded the lowest possible score. This finding is consistent with Harris and Burton (1998) who reported that the inter-rater reliability of many of the stigmatisation items could not be assessed in their small sample due to the truncated nature of the data. The addition of more cases has not altered this situation. As a result, it was decided that factor analysis of these data would be unfruitful. Indeed, it would be impossible to include most of the stigmatisation items in such an analysis. So as to test the hypothesis regarding triangulation between the interview and observation data (H5.4), items that measured reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming were compared with the self-report measures. These items, listed below in Table 5.7, were measured on eight-point scales ranging from “none” to “very much”.

Hypothesis 5.4: Observational and self-report measures of reintegrative shaming will demonstrate evidence of triangulation. Correlating the self-report measures with selected items from the observational instrument tested this hypothesis. Pearson’s product moment correlations\(^4\), which are presented below in Table 5.5, were performed on court and conference cases separately as the differences in scores between the treatment types had the potential to produce spurious correlations.

These correlations show that in both conference and court cases self-report and observational measures of reintegration correlate significantly, with the exception of

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\(^4\) Havlicek and Peterson (1977) demonstrated that when \(n\) is large, i.e. \(> 100\), the sampling distribution of \(r\) from highly skewed data approximates the sampling distribution of \(r\) from normally distributed data. Thus, despite some items being skewed, Pearson’s product moment correlations were used.
one forgiveness item in the court cases. The correlations, with the exception of this one item, range from .18 up to .45 (median .34) showing quite a strong relationship between observational and self-report measures of reintegration.

Triangulation among measures of stigmatisation was less consistent. For conference cases, two of the three observational items were significantly correlated with the self-report scale. This compared with only one of the three observational items being significantly correlated with self-report for the court cases. However, it was evident that in court cases observation of low forgiveness also predicted stigmatisation. Although not hypothesised this finding is consistent with the facets of stigmatisation outlined by Makkai and Braithwaite (1994). This suggests that in court cases, it may be an observable lack of forgiveness that best captures the expression of stigmatisation.

The results provide no evidence of triangulation between the observational and self-report measures of shaming in either treatment group. However, from Table 5.5 it is evident that observation of shaming at court cases predicted perceptions of stigmatisation. In contrast, the observation of shaming in conference cases was not significantly correlated with subjects’ perceptions of stigmatisation. This result implies that the context in which shaming was communicated, i.e. court or conference, affects the way it is perceived. Significantly, this is consistent with the fact that in the self-report data court cases are significantly more stigmatising than conference cases (see Table 5.6).
Table 5.5: Correlations between self-report and observation measures of shaming.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation items</th>
<th>Self-report measures</th>
<th>Reintegration</th>
<th>Stigma</th>
<th>Shaming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conference cases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reintegration items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much support was the offender given during the conference /court case?</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much approval of the offender as a person was expressed?</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much respect for the offender was expressed?</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent was the offender forgiven for their actions?</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How clearly was it communicated to the offender that they could put their actions behind them?</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stigmatisation items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much stigmatising shaming was expressed?</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent was the offender treated as a criminal?</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much disapproval of the offender as a person was expressed?</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shaming items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much disapproval of this type of offence was expressed?</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much disapproval of the offender’s act was expressed?</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Court cases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reintegration items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much support was the offender given during the conference /court case?</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much approval of the offender as a person was expressed?</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much respect for the offender was expressed?</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent was the offender forgiven for their actions?</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How clearly was it communicated to the offender that they could put their actions behind them?</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stigmatisation items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much stigmatising shaming was expressed?</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent was the offender treated as a criminal?</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much disapproval of the offender as a person was expressed?</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shaming items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much disapproval of this type of offence was expressed?</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much disapproval of the offender’s act was expressed?</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01.
This pattern of results provides only mixed support for the hypothesis that triangulation would occur. There are a number of reasons why the relationship between self-report and observational data is variable. One explanation is that the observational measures were not sensitive enough to detect subtle forms of stigmatisation. Indeed, as discussed, observational measures of stigmatisation had extremely low means and skewed distributions. Another explanation is that the framing used for observation and self-report data were different. Observational data was drawn from the time spent in the courtroom. In contrast, self-report data also included what occurred before and after the case. For example, the self-report measure of shaming was not restricted to disapproval expressed in the case but a more general evaluation of how much particular individuals disapproved of the offence. These issues will be addressed further in the discussion.

Comparing Shaming Between Court and Conference Cases.

Hypothesis 5.5: Conference cases will be more reintegrative than court cases.
To test this hypothesis mean scores for the self-report and observational measures were calculated (see Table 5.6). Differences between the two groups were tested using independent samples t-tests and the Type 1 error rate was protected using Dunn’s multiple comparison procedure (Kirk, 1982). As can be seen from Table 5.6, the self-report measures show that conference subjects perceived more reintegration and shaming but less stigmatisation than court subjects. However, the difference between court and conference for stigmatisation was quite small. These results provide support for Hypothesis 5.5, which predicts that conferences would be more reintegrative than court cases.

The observational scales suggest a similar pattern to the self-report scales. Conference cases were significantly higher than court cases for each of the items consistent with reintegration. This was also true for the two shaming items. However, the stigmatisation items present conflicting results. The more general item measuring stigmatising shaming was not significantly different between court and conference cases. Furthermore, observers reported that offenders were treated more like criminals.
at court but that there was more disapproval of the offender’s person in conference cases. It may be that the court setting inherently treats offenders as criminals whereas this is not a feature of conference setting. Equally, the greater disapproval of the offender in conference cases may reflect the fact that conferences take a longer time and are therefore prone to greater disapproval of the person, even if this is not proportionally greater than the amount of reintegrative shaming expressed. It can be concluded that the observational measures do not provide strong evidence that stigmatisation is either greater or lesser in conferences than in court cases. The results from the observational data are largely supportive of Hypothesis 5.5 even though the observational measures did not consistently show that stigmatisation was less in conference cases.
Table 5.6: Means and (standard deviation) for the self-report and observational scales for court and conference cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-report measures</th>
<th>Observational items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>court mean (SD)</td>
<td>conference mean (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration scale</td>
<td>1.9 (0.8)</td>
<td>2.9 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation scale</td>
<td>1.7 (0.7)</td>
<td>1.6 (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaming item</td>
<td>1.2 (0.7)</td>
<td>1.5 (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reintegration items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much support was the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offender given during</td>
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<tr>
<td>the conference/court case?</td>
<td>2.4 (1.6)</td>
<td>5.8 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much approval of the</td>
<td>2.2 (1.6)</td>
<td>4.8 (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offender as a person was expressed?</td>
<td>2.6 (1.6)</td>
<td>4.6 (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much respect for the</td>
<td>1.2 (0.8)</td>
<td>3.8 (2.5)</td>
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<td>offender was expressed?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How clearly was it</td>
<td>1.5 (1.3)</td>
<td>4.1 (2.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>communicated to the</td>
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<td>offender that they could</td>
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<td>put their actions behind</td>
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<td>them?</td>
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<td><strong>Stigmatisation items</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>How much stigmatising</td>
<td>1.4 (1.2)</td>
<td>1.6 (.96)</td>
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<td>shaming was expressed?</td>
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<td>To what extent was the</td>
<td>1.6 (1.2)</td>
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<td>offender treated as a</td>
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<td>criminal?</td>
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<td>How much disapproval of</td>
<td>1.2 (.6)</td>
<td>2.1(1.2)</td>
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<td>the offender as a person</td>
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<td>was expressed?</td>
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<td><strong>Shaming items</strong></td>
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<td>How much disapproval of</td>
<td>2.3 (1.8)</td>
<td>6.0 (1.9)</td>
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<td>this type of offence was</td>
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<td>expressed?</td>
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<td>How much disapproval of</td>
<td>2.6 (1.7)</td>
<td>4.9 (1.9)</td>
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<td>the offender's act was</td>
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<td>expressed?</td>
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* Self-report scales range from 1 to 4, except shaming which ranges from -2 to 2.

* * p < .05, ** p < .01
Discussion

The results provided mixed support for the dimensionality predicted by reintegrative shaming theory. Hypothesis 5.2 predicted that shaming would be independent of both reintegration and stigmatisation. This was supported by the correlational analyses in which only very low correlations existed between shaming and reintegration or stigmatisation in either the court or conference settings. Hypothesis 5.3, that the facets of reintegration and stigmatisation would form separate dimensions, was not supported. Both the exploratory and confirmatory analyses were consistent with the conclusion that reintegration and stigmatisation are discrete concepts. No support was found for Hypothesis 5.1 that reintegration and stigmatisation are opposite poles of the same continuum. Rather than forming a bi-polar factor, the reintegration and stigmatisation items formed two separate factors that were not correlated in court cases and only weakly correlated in conference cases.

Two hypotheses were advanced regarding the measurement of reintegrative shaming. Hypothesis 5.4, that there would be triangulation between the observational and self-report measures of the three concepts, reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming, was partially supported. Observational measures were significantly correlated with the self-report reintegration and stigmatisation scales, but not the shaming measure. Finally, there was support for Hypothesis 5.5, that reintegrative shaming would be greater in conferences than in court cases. Both reintegration and shaming in the self-report and observation scales where significantly higher for conference cases, whereas stigmatisation was significantly higher for court cases based on the self-report measure. The observational measures of stigmatisation suggest no consistent difference between court and conference cases.

The Dimensionality of Reintegrative Shaming

Despite providing general support for reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994) some important questions are raised by the rejection of Hypothesis 5.1. Reintegrative shaming theory argues that while reintegration involves forgiveness of, and respect for, the offender, stigmatisation does not. Furthermore, it is hypothesised that stigmatisation labels the offender and allows
him or her to develop a master status trait whereas reintegration does not. This suggests a structure in which reintegration and stigmatisation must be a continuum because low reintegration also implies high stigmatisation. The results, however, strongly contradict this structure, instead suggesting that reintegration and stigmatisation are distinct concepts.

While surprising, this finding is consistent with research into other concepts that have been assumed to be bipolar. One example is research by Bradburn (1969) which finds that the self-reporting of “subjective well-being” did not result in a single construct but rather was composed of two independent constructs: positive and negative wellbeing. This finding has been replicated in a number of studies (Bryant & Veroff, 1982; Zevon & Tellegen 1982). The implication of the finding has been problematic because the implication that positive and negative emotions are not opposites is highly counterintuitive. Further research by Diener (1984; Diener & Emmons 1984), however, seems to resolve the problem by showing that while negative and positive poles of emotion are independent when measured over longer periods of time, such as a year, they become more and more negatively related the shorter the time period over which they are measured.

While explaining the effect of time on the measurement of bipolar constructs, the study by Diener and Emmons (1984) nevertheless confirms the findings that positive and negative affect “…are relatively independent in people’s lives” (p. 1115). Indeed, a recent review of studies on attitudes (Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson, 1997) argues that many positive and negative attitudes should be considered as having a bivariate relationship rather than a bipolar one. The studies reviewed suggest that the positive and negative affects resulting from academic success or failure (Goldstein & Strube, 1994) and medical donations (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1993) have bivariate structures. More specifically the study into medical donations showed that participants could be split into four groups on the basis of their positive and negative attitudes. The four groups were characterised by 1) high negativity and low positivity (negative attitude), 2) high positivity and low negativity (positive attitude), 3) high positivity and high negativity (ambivalence), and 4) low positivity and low negativity (indifference). By combining the negative and positive items, attitudes towards blood
donation could be treated as bipolar. In many cases, however, this obscured the reason for a person’s score, e.g. whether a low score was due to indifference or ambivalence. The implication of this review is that in many cases positive and negative reactions are not reciprocally controlled and thus should not be treated as bipolar.

Both the work by Diener and Emmons (1984) and Cacioppo et al. (1997) suggest that many concepts thought of as bipolar may in fact not be. The results reported in this chapter on stigmatisation and reintegration are consistent with these observations because although the concepts have been conceptualised as opposites there is strong evidence from these data that they are bivariate. What is not clear is whether this is the result of the time frame measured, or whether the concepts are not reciprocal.

Time frame may be a factor because it is possible that court or conference cases change in how re-integrative or stigmatising they are over the course of the case, or that participants in court and conference cases vary in how re-integrative or stigmatising they are. Equally, because re-integrative shaming can be split into different facets, it may even be possible that single interactions between people are both re-integrative and stigmatising. One such example is reported by Braithwaite and Mugford (1994), who quote a Maori man at a New Zealand conference as saying to a young car thief “You’ve got no brains, boy ...But I’ve got respect for you” (p. 146). The first part labels the offender as stupid, but the second part communicates respect. Such examples suggest that independence between stigmatisation and reintegration may be a result of the summing of numerous shaming communications. Alternatively, it may be that regardless of measurement, the concepts are bivariate. This would suggest for example that an expression of respect might result in a greater perception of reintegration but not an equivalent decrease in perceptions of stigmatisation. This possibility is also demonstrated by the above example in which labelling of the offender does not seem to indicate the absence of a re-integrative attitude. Indeed, the expression of respect does not seem inconsistent when expressed later in the sentence. The empirical results in this chapter, as well as the relevant literature on bipolar concepts, suggest that reintegration and stigmatisation could be bivariate. Under these circumstances, measurement of the concept that assumes a bivariate structure will
allow assessment of the relationship between stigmatisation and reintegration. This will be particularly important in examining the effect each concept has on, for example, recidivism rates and the emotions experienced by the individual.

While the analysis has highlighted questions regarding the bipolar relationship between reintegration and stigmatisation, the results are consistent with other aspects of the theory. As expected, the facet structure did not represent distinct dimensions but simply defined characteristics of reintegration and stigmatisation. However, it is evident that the four facets did not load on both reintegration and stigmatisation. Respect and forgiveness, the positive facets, loaded on reintegration while the labelling and master status trait facets defined stigmatisation. It would seem most likely that this is related to the finding that reintegration and stigmatisation were bivariate constructs. A low score on forgiveness, i.e. reintegration, did not necessarily imply stronger labelling of the subject. Nevertheless, this suggest that reintegration is defined by the respect and forgiveness facets rather than labelling and master status trait facets. Equally, the labelling and master status trait facets but not respect or forgiveness facets define stigmatisation. Despite this, the results provide strong evidence that reintegration and stigmatisation are discrete concepts that are defined by their hypothesised characteristics (Braithwaite, 1989; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994).

An important prediction of reintegrative shaming theory is that the measurement of shaming would be independent from reintegration and stigmatisation. This is central to the theory as it predicts that shaming can be of either type. A strong association between shaming and reintegration or stigmatisation would refute this basic claim. The results supported the prediction that shaming is independent, with almost no correlation between the measures. In summary, these results provide strong evidence for the construct validity of the reintegrative shaming measures, while also showing that reintegration and stigmatisation are not bipolar as predicted by Braithwaite (1989).
External Validity of the Reintegrative Shaming Measures

Comparison of the observational and self-report measures provides important information about the measurement of reintegrative shaming. The observation of court cases presented particular difficulties because very little shaming behaviour of any type was observed in that context. This highlights an important difference between self-report and observation. Self-report measures include information regarding perceptions resulting from simply turning up to a case, the impact of communication with others present at the case which could not be observed, and the impact of communications with others before and after the formal case. None of this information was captured by the observational analysis. These factors not only presented difficulties in analysis of the data but also may have affected the strength of the relationship between the self-report and observational measures.

An extremely low level of stigmatisation in both conference and court cases made assessing this category particularly difficult, although there was some evidence of triangulation. An important implication of the low levels of observable stigmatisation, particularly in court cases, may be that stigmatisation is not overtly communicated in the way expected. Rather than openly disapproving of the person it may be that stigmatisation is expressed in private or through more subtle gestures, such as a failure to shake hands or smile. Consistent with this possibility was the finding that the observation of disapproval (shaming) and non-forgiveness in court cases were correlated with the perception of stigmatisation. It might be speculated that overt disapproval in a public forum is in itself stigmatising. This highlights an important difference between court cases and conferences. In conferences observed shaming did not result in perceived stigmatisation. Reasons for the difference between contexts may be that conferences are much less public, that those present are primarily supporters of the subject, that the disapproval was more likely to be expressed by a supporter of the subject and that conferences may be perceived as less threatening or hostile than court cases. These factors may affect the way in which disapproval is interpreted. Importantly, this also highlights one process by which court cases may be inherently more stigmatising than conferences. It may be more difficult for courts to communicate shaming without it being perceived as stigmatising. Given this
relationship it may be worthwhile exploring ways in which shaming is communicated other than through the expression of overt disapproval.

The correlations between the observational and self-report measures were not exactly as predicted by Hypothesis 5.4. In particular, the measures of shaming were not significantly correlated in either context. However, there was evidence of triangulation among some of the other measures. In both conferences and court cases, the observational items measuring reintegration were strongly correlated with their measurement in the offender interviews. Observational measures of stigmatisation were less consistent but some items did correlate significantly with the self-report measures. These results are significant given the differences between the observational and self-report measures discussed above. It is also worth noting that in court cases the negative correlation of observed forgiveness with perceived stigmatisation provides some further support for the validity of these measures.

A second measure of the external validity of reintegrative shaming is provided by the distinction between conference and court cases. It was predicted that conferences would be more reintegrative because of their format. Conferences were attended primarily by supporters of the subject, they focused upon the consequences of the offence rather than the offender, and both informal and formal processes of forgiveness were structured into proceedings. The results confirm this expectation, showing that both observational and self-report measures of reintegration and shaming were higher at conferences. In addition, the self-report measure of stigmatisation was higher for court cases. This result provides evidence for the predictive validity of these measures.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the dimensionality and measurement of reintegrative shaming. There was evidence that reintegration and stigmatisation are discrete concepts that are defined by the predicted characteristics. Furthermore, these concepts are distinct from shaming, demonstrating that shaming is neither necessarily stigmatising or reintegrative. An important question addressed in this chapter is whether reintegration and stigmatisation should be conceptualised as bipolar or
bivariate. In the measures developed in this chapter, the constructs are independent and as a result will be operationalised as such in further analyses. In addition to exploring the dimensionality of the concepts, the results also provide evidence for the external validity of the concepts. Observational and self-report measures provided some evidence of triangulation in the measurement of the concepts. Furthermore, the measures differentiated court and conference cases in the direction expected, most effectively when self-report measures were used. What these results demonstrate is that the measures provide an adequate basis for the operationalisation of reintegrative shaming theory.
Chapter 6: The relationship between shame and shaming

Introduction

This chapter seeks to explore the relationship between shaming and shame. It is assumed that shaming of an offender’s act is positively associated with feelings of shame-guilt. However, a review of perspectives already discussed in this thesis reveals a number of predictions that other factors affect this relationship. One such factor is the way shaming is expressed. As seen in Chapter Five, shaming behaviours can be qualified by the degree to which they are reintegrative or stigmatising. Reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989) predicts that offenders will react differently depending upon which of these types of shaming occurs. Another factor which may affect shame is the social relationship between the offender and those who are “shaming” them. A number of conceptions of shame predict that individuals will only be responsive to shaming by those they respect. Furthermore, many of the same conceptions also argue that shame is dependent upon the individual’s own ethical judgement. Given that a number of theoretical perspectives argue that shaming can be a positive social process, the predictions that shame results in negative emotional responses is also tested.

Chapters Four and Five provide the empirical basis for testing these hypotheses. Chapter Four does this by exploring the empirical dimensionality of the shame-related emotions. The dimensionality revealed was largely unexpected because it did not distinguish between attributes that have commonly been associated with shame and guilt. As a result, the focus of this chapter is on describing a shame-guilt emotion which involves feelings that: what one has done is wrong; fear that others will disapprove of oneself; feeling bad that one has, or might have, hurt others; anger at oneself; and feelings of loss of honour. In addition to shame-guilt, this chapter will also examine the relationship between shaming and the other two shame related emotions identified in Chapter Four: embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame. Chapter Five explored the dimensionality of reintegrative shaming and found three distinct factors: shaming, reintegration and stigmatisation. The factor analyses
performed in that chapter show that reintegration and stigmatisation are distinct concepts and that scales developed to measure them are reliable and valid. In contrast to original expectations, reintegration and stigmatisation were found to be independent, rather than bipolar, which is how they are measured in this chapter.

Shaming in Conceptions of Shame

The emotion of shame is inextricably associated with notions of shaming and feelings of exposure to others. As is pointed out by Lewis (1992), the historical origin of the English word shame is skam, which is connected to the desire to hide. The German word scham is connected to ideas of uncovered nudity (Lynd, 1958) as is the ancient Greek word for shame, aidos (Williams, 1993). Williams suggests that the basic shame experience is one of "... being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition" (p.78). Likewise, Satre's (1956) famous example is of a man's realisation that he is being watched while peeping through a keyhole. Consistent with this description is Cooley's (1922) conception of the “looking glass self” which enables all the social emotions. Awareness of an “other” and particularly their critical judgement of oneself is also evident in at least two of the shame conceptions (social threat and ethical conceptions) identified in Chapter Two. The third conception of shame, personal failure, excludes the social context in which shame occurs from their analysis by emphasising the perception of failure. However, even within this conception Lewis (1971) acknowledges the role of others and Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow (1992) measure of shame-proness (TOSCA) suggests the presence of others as an important component.

While the relevance of shaming is acknowledged throughout the literature, the social threat conception argues that there is a direct causal relationship between shaming and shame. This conception can be summarised as defining shame as a response to the perception of rejection by others (Scheff, 1988), or their judgement that one is unattractive (Gilbert, 1997). Many of the theoretical perspectives that comprise this conception make the assumption that shame is felt in reference to an actual other and that the other plays an active role (shaming). This may involve something like rejection, criticism or abuse of the person. This is particularly relevant
in the anthropological literature, which is interested in shame and guilt as the emotional counterparts of social control (Benedict, 1946; Mead, 1937). Shame is seen as a sanction that the community uses to deter or punish those who step outside social norms. As a result the cause or reason for the emotion is characterised as external to the individual because the emotion is about the loss of others' respect for the person rather than the loss of self-respect. The implication of this theoretical perspective is that whenever the individual perceives that they are disapproved of, raising the prospect of rejection or lower attractiveness, then shame will inevitably result.

H 6.1: *Perceived shaming will predict shame/guilt.*

The argument that shame occurs as a direct response to criticism or derision by others is rejected by a number of theoretical approaches. Piers and Singer (1953) were perhaps the first to argue against the assumption that shame only occurs as a result of an actively disapproving other. They suggest that instances of shame occur when individuals are alone, which provides a clear indication that others are not necessary. Instead they, as well as other personal failure conceptions (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Wurmser, 1994), argue that shame is a direct result of the individual’s perception that they have failed to live up to an ideal. This suggests that shame results from not living up to internalised standards. Whether or not this perception occurs as a result of scrutiny and disapproval by others, or in private, is not important to this conception.

The ethical conceptions of shame, with the exception of Harré (1990) also reject the idea that shame is necessarily a reaction to an actual other. This conception, which is identified in Chapter Two, argues that shame occurs as a response to the realisation of having done wrong. Williams (1993) suggests that although the basic shame experience is one of exposure to another, that other might be an imagined other. Similarly Taylor (1985) argues that the basic shame experience involves two audiences, one which draws attention to the self and a second abstract other from which an ethical judgement is made. The first audience, which is comparable with criticism from an actual other, is not necessary, as it is only a mechanism for shifting one's attention. Thus, like the personal failure conception this approach emphasises the importance of
Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Shaming and Shame

an internal attribution in reference to the individual’s own standards. Even though Harré does suggest the importance of an actual observer he too argues that a critical factor is the individual’s agreement that what they have done is wrong. If the individual does not agree, Harré suggests that the restrictions imposed on the individual by others’ disapproval actually result in feelings of hate rather than shame.

Thus, in contrast to the social threat conception, both the ethical and personal failure conceptions argue that shame occurs as a result of violating the individual’s standards. They both predict that having been apprehended for drink driving, it is the individual’s perception that drink driving is wrong that will cause feelings of shame not fear of rejection by others. In this case, the perception of “wrongness” is particularly consistent with the ethical conception but also with the personal failure conception because it expresses a failure to live up to ethical ideals. Of course, the personal failure conception is different to the ethical conception because it also suggests that shame involves a global sense of failure which is attributed to the self. However, whether shame can be described as a global sense of failure will not be tested here. Drawing from the ethical and personal failure conceptions it can be hypothesised that subjects’ perceptions of how wrong the offence was, before their court or conference case, will be an important predictor of whether they feel shame-guilt.

H 6.2: The subject’s perception of how wrong the offence was will predict shame/guilt.

While rejecting the argument that shaming directly predicts shame, the ethical conception argues that disapproval does play an important role in ethical decision making. Indeed, Williams (1993) argues that the social threat conception involves an overstated distinction between guilt as the individual’s independent judgement of wrongdoing and shame as a reaction to other people’s judgement. The distinction is overstated because internalised values cannot exist in social isolation but rather are dependent upon social approval. For example, Williams (1993) argues that if someone held an ethical belief which was refuted by everyone else it would be difficult to distinguish between that individual as “...a solitary bearer of true justice or a deluded crank” (p. 99). Thus, it is questionable whether a sense of guilt can exist simply on the
basis of values derived through rational thought or religious illumination, and in relative independence from the person’s social world. Rather, it is argued that the individual’s own values are strongly tied to their communities which means that disapproval by those communities is of significance.

However, a critical aspect of disapproval according to both Taylor and Williams is from whom it comes. Taylor (1985) argues that the relationship between the person and the audience is critical to whether shame is felt because this determines how the person interprets the audience’s reaction. For example, a man looked upon critically by an audience that is not respected is unlikely to feel shame, and may even feel pride. However, if the observer’s opinion is respected then their critical judgement is much more likely to result in feelings of shame. Williams (1993) who places more emphasis upon the “other” as an abstract entity makes a similar argument. He argues that rather than simply representing an actual person or group the “other” is identifiable in ethical terms and more particularly as someone whose ethical reactions the person would respect. However, the internalised other does not simply represent the individual’s own ethical beliefs but represents a genuine social perspective.

While the ethical conception suggests that shame-guilt is related to internalised values it also suggests that shaming by respected others will influence that judgement. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesise that shaming will result in feelings of shame-guilt, but only when it is by respected others.

H 6.3: The effect of perceived shaming on shame-guilt is conditional on the level of respect for others at the case.

Reintegrative Shaming Theory and Shame

The concept of shaming in this thesis is taken from reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989). As discussed in the previous chapter, this perspective describes shaming broadly as the expression of social disapproval. This definition also explicitly states that the expression of disapproval is not necessarily intentional. As in some of the examples given above, shaming might simply be others knowledge of an act, which in turn results in the individual feeling ashamed. This broad definition is
consistent with the notions of shaming and exposure discussed by different conceptions of shame.

In contrast to the shame conceptions that do acknowledge the role of shaming, reintegrative shaming theory provides surprisingly little analysis of the impact of shaming on individuals' emotional responses. While acknowledging the theoretical distinctions between shame and guilt identified by Benedict (1946) and distinctions between shaming and guilt induction in child development, Braithwaite argues that neither distinction is important from the perspective of a theory of shaming.

In other words, from the perspective of the offender, guilt and shame may be distinguishable, but guilt induction and shaming are both criticism by others. (Braithwaite, 1989: p. 57)

Braithwaite argues that the effectiveness of shaming depends upon a number of factors. The first of these is that individuals are motivated to be accepted by others who they find attractive, and thus are motivated to be attractive to them. Shaming by these people is a clear threat to this relationship and thus proves an effective deterrent. A considerable amount of research on deterrence demonstrates that the informal consequences of being caught for a crime are considered by people as important, and in some cases as more important, than the formal consequences (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986). It is evident that this function of shaming is consistent with aspects of the social threat conception, which argues that fear of disapproval by others is the basic shame context.

A second result of shaming is its relationship to the development and maintenance of internal controls by individuals, conceived of as conscience or super-ego. Shaming is seen as having an effect upon individuals through appealing to the their sense of right or wrong. It is this aspect of shaming which Braithwaite argues is most important to preventing serious crimes.
People comply with the law most of the time not through fear of punishment, or even fear of shaming, but because criminal behaviour is abhorrent to them. (Braithwaite, 1989: p. 71)

The process of shaming also acts to prevent crime by reinforcing the social norms that make committing crime abhorrent not just for the individual but for the broader community. These aspects of shaming are most consistent with the ethical conception which describes shame as a response to having violated norms which one accepts. From these descriptions of how shaming is effective it is clear that reintegrative shaming theory assumes an emotional response similar to that identified by a number of conceptions of shame and with the emotion of shame-guilt found in Chapter Four.

It is evident from the discussion above that many theories of shame hypothesise that various factors affect the shaming-shame relationship. These hypotheses question the degree to which shame is simply a response to social disapproval, arguing that the social relationships within which shaming and shame occur are central to the emotion. From the opposite perspective reintegrative shaming theory also argues that the shaming-shame relationship is not straightforward. The central hypothesis of this theory, as discussed in the previous chapter, is that shaming can be evaluated not just in terms of how strong it is but also in the degree to which it is stigmatising or reintegrative. Current work on reintegrative shaming theory focuses upon the effect these different types of shaming have on offending and recidivism. However, it is also consistent with the theory that the form shaming takes will have different effects upon the individual's emotional response and that this may provide an explanation for the link between shaming and recidivism.

It is proposed by reintegrative shaming theory that the concept of stigmatisation defines one form of shaming. The factor analysis in Chapter Five revealed a factor consistent with the description of stigmatisation as shaming that identifies the individual as evil and leaves them with a deviant identity. This rejection of the individual is associated, in both labelling theory and reintegrative shaming theory, with a tendency for the individual to reject their shammers. This occurs because the act of labelling the offender as deviant, particularly through socially significant
ceremonies, has the potential to change the individual’s identity such that they come to see themselves as deviant, which in turn informs their behaviour. In this respect the stigmatising ceremony comes to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The theory also argues that deviant identities can be supported or enhanced through the association of the individual with others who share similar identities. Subcultural theory (see Braithwaite, 1989: p. 24) argues that deviant groups provide individuals with alternative status systems which allow, or perhaps in some cases actively encourage, delinquency.

The marginalisation of offenders in the way described seems unlikely to result in greater feelings of shame-guilt. This is firstly because individuals who are rejected and disrespected by the social group are less likely to be concerned with maintaining respectability in the eyes of those people who have stigmatised them. They have already lost that respect. Secondly, the loss of ties with community and the development of ties with sub-cultures will shift the individual’s moral values away from those held by the community. Rather than feeling shame for an offence the individual may even feel pride. Thus it can be hypothesised that stigmatising shaming will be associated with lower shame-guilt.

Offenders’ perceptions of having been unfairly judged and being unsure about the “wrongness” of their offence were identified in Chapter Four as a factor that was called “unresolved shame”. This response may be a response to the process of stigmatisation, in which individuals react to judgements that they are bad by rejecting or neutralising claims that the act was wrong. Although unresolved shame as an alternative emotion to shame is not explicitly discussed by Braithwaite (1989), in Retzinger and Scheff’s (1996) various commentaries on Braithwaite's theory they hypothesise that stigmatisation will be associated with an unresolved or unacknowledged shame they refer to as by-passed shame. The third emotion discussed in Chapter Four, embarrassment-exposure, involved feelings of social awkwardness due to being the centre of attention and feelings of being humiliated. It might be speculated that stigmatisation, because of its particularly negative focus upon the individual, will also be associated with greater feelings of embarrassment-exposure.
Reintegrative shaming is shaming which is respectful and forgiving of the individual. It can be hypothesised that reintegration should be different from stigmatisation in two ways. The process of labelling the offender draws attention away from the offence and the harm it has caused and instead focuses on judgements about the offender's person. Reintegration avoids focusing on the offender's person and is thus less likely to result in the offender developing a deviant identity or feeling the need to reject the shamers. A second characteristic of reintegration is that it attempts to reinforce ethical norms in a way that is inclusive of the offender. In this respect reintegration is an appeal to ethical values that are shared by both the offender and the broader community. Thus, the theory predicts that reintegrative shaming will result in greater feelings of shame-guilt. Furthermore, as a result of this orientation it is also predicted that reintegration will also be negatively related to unresolved shame.

**H 6.4:** Shame-guilt will be predicted by higher reintegrative shaming but lower stigmatising shaming.

**H 6.5:** Embarrassment-exposure will be predicted by higher stigmatising shaming.

**H 6.6:** Unresolved shame will be predicted by higher stigmatising shaming but lower reintegrative shaming.

The Impact of Shame on Other Emotions

Reintegrative shaming theory suggests that reintegrative shaming will result in shame, which will in turn reduce the likelihood of re-offending. In contrast to this perspective, work in recent years on shame-proness has associated the emotion of shame with a number of negative responses. In particular, these suggest that shame is less likely to be associated with empathy for others but positively associated with anger and hostility.

Tangney (1991) argues that the emotion of shame is likely to prevent the individual from feeling empathy for others because of its inward focus. Phenomenological studies (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Wicker et al., 1983) report that the experience of shame is both a painful emotion and that it involves a negative evaluation of the self. Neither of these features, it is argued by Tangney (1991), are consistent
with empathy. The intense focus on oneself is incompatible with the outward attention required to take another’s perspective and understand what emotions they are feeling, both central to feeling empathy (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Feshbach, 1975; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). There is some evidence that in order to deflect or avoid the emotion, individuals sometimes use defensive mechanisms such as externalisation of blame. Nathanson (1992) suggests that there are four main defensive mechanisms used to deflect the emotion. These include attacking themselves, attacking others, withdrawal, and avoidance of the situation (see Chapter Two). Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991) also identify a number of defensive mechanisms individuals use to avoid shame, which they describe as by-passed shame and overt/unidentified shame. It is suggested that defensive mechanisms such as these will, in different ways, act to prevent the individual from feeling empathy. Tangney (1991) finds empirical support for the relationship between shame and empathy using measures of shame-proneness, guilt-proneness and a number of measures of empathic responsiveness. Shame-proneness was found to be negatively associated with empathic responsiveness but guilt-proneness was generally positively associated with empathic responsiveness. It is suggested that the positive association between guilt-proneness and empathic responsiveness is a result of guilt being a far less painful emotion and it being focused upon one’s action rather than oneself.

Just as shame has been described as inhibiting empathy, it has also been suggested that shame is positively associated with anger and hostility (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner et al., 1996). Again, it was hypothesised that it is the intense focus upon the self in shame that results in a positive relationship between shame and hostility. Most notably Lewis (1971) suggests that shame involves a sense of anger directed at the self, but when unacknowledged it can become redirected at others. Scheff (1994) and Retzinger (1991) also identify a relationship between shame and anger and in particular suggest that unacknowledged shame can result in shame-rage spirals. A shame-rage spiral is a loop in which unacknowledged shame leads to hostility and anger towards others which in turn leads to increased shame and so on. In order to test the relationships been shame, guilt and hostility, Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al. (1992) had subjects
complete measures of shame-proneness and guilt-proneness, as well as personality measures of anger, hostility and aggression. As predicted, shame-proneness was associated with the disposition to feel anger and hostility but on the whole guilt was not.

The research reviewed above suggests that shame should be positively associated with hostility and negatively associated with empathy. It is also clear that guilt is predicted to be positively associated with empathy and is not correlated with hostility. However, the results of the factor analysis in Chapter Four fail to distinguish between the emotions of shame and guilt, instead suggesting that characteristics of the two emotions formed part of the same emotional response. This finding is particularly interesting given the research reviewed here, which predicts quite different consequences of feeling shame and guilt. Never-the-less, given the importance of shame items in the shame-guilt factor it is reasonable to hypothesise that shame-guilt is related to hostility and empathy.

**H 6.7:** Shame-guilt will predict higher levels of hostility but less empathy.

While some theories just reviewed discuss shame as a singular experience, others distinguished between forms of shame. The shame derivative that has received most attention is Lewis's (1971) concept of by-passed shame, which has also been central to the work of Scheff (1990, 1994) and Retzinger (1991). Descriptions of by-passed shame have some similarities with the unresolved shame factor, found in Chapter Four, which involved subjects reporting little emotion during the case but ongoing feelings that issues were unresolved and that they were unfairly treated. Lewis and Scheff associate this form of unacknowledged shame with the redirection of hostility toward others and distinguish it from acknowledged shame, which they do not associate with the same negative consequences. Thus, in addition to Hypothesis 6.7 it is predicted that unresolved shame will be associated with hostility and lower empathy.

**H 6.8:** Unresolved shame will predict higher levels of hostility but less empathy.
Method

Participants and Procedure

As reported in Chapter Three, 900 drink drive offenders participated in this study. Participants were randomly allocated to two treatments: court and conference. Observation data were collected during court and conference cases and an interview was conducted with subjects after their case concluded.

Measures

The measures described below were used in two sets of analyses. The first set of analyses tests the relationship between the shaming and the shame-related emotions. The second set of analyses tests the relationship between the shame-related emotions and anger/hostility and empathy.

Shaming Variables

In Chapter Five, scales were developed to measure the concepts of shaming, reintegration and stigmatisation. Two scales were formed on the basis of self-report questions contained in the offender interview: Reintegration was measured using a scale with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .70 for conference cases and .76 for court cases, and stigmatisation was measured using a scale with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .70 for conference cases and .81 for court cases. Shaming was operationalised using an item that measured the mean perceived disapproval of significant others present at the case. Details on the development of these scales are presented in Chapter Five.

Subjects’ respect for others at the conference was measured by obtaining the mean score for a self-report item that asked how much the subject respected each significant person at their case. The question asked: “To start, I would like to find out what you think of these people. For each person on the list, could you circle the words which best describe how much you respect them”. Subjects responded on a five-point scale, ranging from “strongly disrespect” to “strongly respect”. The mean score of 1.2 (SD = .76) on this item was high, indicating that subjects generally had high respect for other participants.
Subjects’ attitudes towards the offence was measured by asking “Did you feel, before the conference / court case, that the offence you committed was...”. Responses were given on a five point scale ranging from “totally right” to “totally wrong”. Again the very high mean score (mean = 4.68, S.D. = .68) on this scale indicated that the majority of participants felt the offence was wrong.

**Shame-Related Emotions**

Measurement of the emotions shame-guilt, embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame was based upon measures developed in Chapter Four. The shame-guilt scale was found to have a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 for court cases and .86 for conference cases, embarrassment-exposure had a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 for court cases and .81 for conference cases, and unresolved emotion had a Cronbach’s alpha of .66 for court cases and .55 for conference cases.

**Measures of Empathy and Anger/Hostility**

A number of emotional responses were measured using items from the offender interview. A scale consisting of two items was developed to measure subjects’ empathy for others during the case. The items were: “During the conference/ court case I found myself really affected by the emotions of those who had been hurt in some way.” and “In the conference/court case I began to understand what it actually felt like for those who had been affected by my actions”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .68 for court cases and .68 for conference cases.

A scale was also developed from the offender interview to measure subjects’ feelings of anger/hostility after the case. The scale consisted of 4 Likert items: “You feel bitter about the way you were treated in the case”, “The conference/court case just made you angry”, “You feel that the people who accused you in the conference/court case were more wrong than you were” and “You wish you could get back at the people who were accusing you in the conference/court case.” The Cronbach’s alpha for this scales was .69 for court cases and .69 for conference cases.
Design

The first group of analyses tested the relationship between shaming and the shame-related emotions. Pearson product moment correlations were calculated among the independent variables (the shame-related emotions) and dependent variables (the shaming variables). These provide an initial look at the association between variables as well as addressing hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2. Hypotheses 6.3 to 6.6 are addressed by three hierarchical regression analyses that predict shame-guilt, embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame. Hierarchical regression analyses were used in order to partial out the variance that is explained by variables other than those mentioned in hypotheses 6.3 to 6.6. This method allows assessment of whether each block of variables, and in particular the interaction terms, adds significantly to the variance accounted for by the control variables and the main effects. This test whether interactions should be left out for the sake of parsimony or whether they contribute significantly to the model.

The hierarchical regression predicting shame-guilt tests the interaction between shaming and respect for others present (H 6.3) and interactions between shaming and reintegration, and shaming and stigmatisation (H6.4). The hierarchical regression predicting embarrassment-exposure tests the interaction between shaming and stigmatising (H 6.5). Finally, the hierarchical regression predicting unresolved shame tests the interactions between shaming and reintegration, and shaming and stigmatisation (H6.6). Although the embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame analyses only test hypotheses relating to shaming, reintegration, and stigmatisation, the same set of independent variables were used in all three analyses. The importance of understanding differences and similarities among the predictors of the shame-related emotions means that having a standard set of predictor variables is desirable.

The analyses used centred variables (variable scores minus their mean). This technique protects against multicollinearity among interaction terms (A x B) and their main effects (A, B) (Aiken and West, 1991). Testing for interactions was important for understanding the way shaming, reintegration, stigmatisation and respect were related to shame-guilt, embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame. Tests for
interactions were also used to ascertain whether the independent variables had different effects in the two contexts.

Accounting for differences between the two contexts was an important issue for the analyses. In part this was achieved by including treatment type as a control variable. In addition, the interactions between treatment type and the independent variables were also included as control variables. These interactions test whether the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is different between the treatment types. An example of this is the significant “treatment x reintegration” interaction in the shame-guilt regression analysis (see Table 6.1), which indicates that reintegration is a stronger predictor of shame-guilt in conference cases than in court cases. The advantage of controlling for differences between treatments in this way is that all cases are included in a single analysis, which simplifies the results as well as allowing for statistical testing of differences between treatments.

A second group of analyses tested the relationship between the shame-related emotions and empathy and anger/hostility. Regression analyses were undertaken to predict empathy and anger/hostility. In both analyses the independent variables of theoretical interest were shame-guilt, embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame. The main effect for shame-guilt in each analysis tested hypothesis 6.7. The main effect for unresolved shame in each analysis tested hypothesis 6.8. Entry of embarrassment-exposure into the analyses did not test a hypothesis but was included in the analyses to allow comparison between this emotional reaction and the other shame-related emotions.
Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Shaming and Shame

Results

Testing the Relationship Between Shaming and the Shame-Related Emotions

The shaming and shame-related emotions were intercorrelated using Pearson’s product moment correlations (see Table 6.1). Consistent with hypothesis 6.1, shaming is significantly correlated with shame-guilt for court (.19) and conference (.27) cases. It is also evident that perceived wrongness was significantly correlated with shame-guilt for both court (.37) and conference (.23) cases. This is consistent with hypothesis 6.2.

Table 6.1: Correlations between dependent and independent variables for court (above diagonal) and conference (below diagonal) cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1</th>
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<td>.13*</td>
<td>.29*</td>
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<td>-.21*</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<td>-.29**</td>
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<td>-.14**</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
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Predicting Shame-Guilt

To test the relationship between shaming and shame-guilt more fully variables were entered into a hierarchical regression. Variables were entered in four steps. In step one variables were entered to control for the potential effects of embarrassment-exposure, unresolved shame and treatment type. The shaming measure was included in the equation at step two, allowing a further test of Hypothesis 6.1. In step three measures of reintegration, stigmatisation, respect for others present, and perceived wrongness of the offence were entered into the equation. This allowed a further test of Hypothesis 6.2. Finally interactions between shaming and respect, shaming and reintegration, and shaming and stigmatisation were entered into the analysis. These interactions test Hypotheses 6.3 and 6.4.
The regression analysis predicting shame-guilt is presented in Table 6.2. The control variables of embarrassment-exposure, unresolved shame, treatment type (court/conference) and the treatment by independent variable interactions account for 38 percent of the variance in shame-guilt. Embarrassment-exposure, with a beta weight of .47, was a particularly strong predictor of shame-guilt. This is not surprising given the strong correlation between shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure found in Chapter Four. Treatment type and the treatment by independent variables were also significant predictors. The shaming variable, entered second into the model, resulted in a change in R squared of .03, which although small was significant. The third step entered consisted of all remaining main effects. These accounted for a further 11 percent of variance. Reintegration, respect for others present, and the perception that the offence was wrong all predicted higher levels of shame-guilt. Stigmatisation predicted significantly lower levels of shame-guilt. It is worth noting that the effect previously observed for treatment type is markedly reduced when these predictors were entered into the equation. The fourth group of variables entered into the model, the shaming interactions, did not significantly contribute to the model.

It was suspected, on the basis of the variables distributions, that some of the hypothesised interactions might involve a threshold effect with the interaction only occurring at the extreme ends of scales. For example, because most subjects reported a high level of “respect for others at the case”, it was suspected that only those subjects who reported very highly respect would be different from the other subjects. Equally, because most subjects perceived a high degree of shaming, there was added interest in cases where subjects reported very high shaming. To test this, dummy variables were produced that measured those cases where a high score was recorded for both main effects. For example, the dummy variable equalled one in those cases where the subject reported very high respect for other present at the case and reported that others were very highly shaming. Analyses revealed that the addition of these dummy variables had a significant impact on only the shame-guilt regression and only for the “respect” by shaming interaction. This is presented in the shame-guilt regression analysis as a fifth model in which the shaming by respect interaction was replaced by a dichotomous variable called “high-shaming high-respect”. This model significantly
added to the main effects models with the high-shaming high-respect item predicting significantly more shame-guilt.

Table 6.2: Beta weights for the hierarchical regression on shame-guilt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>model 1</th>
<th>model 2</th>
<th>model 3</th>
<th>model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<td>.48**</td>
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<td>-.05</td>
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</table>
Hypothesis 6.1: Perceived shaming will predict shame/guilt. The significant correlations between shaming and shame-guilt, for conference and court cases, demonstrate a positive relationship between these variables. However, the hierarchical regression analysis shows that with the addition of the high-shaming high-respect item, shaming is no longer a significant predictor. This suggests that shaming only predicts shame-guilt when there is strong disapproval coming from those who are highly respected. This suggests that Hypothesis 6.1 should be rejected in favour of Hypothesis 6.3.

Hypothesis 6.2: The subject's perception of how wrong the offence was will predict shame/guilt. It is evident in Table 6.1 that perceived wrongness of the offence is a strong positive predictor of shame-guilt. This conclusion is supported by the hierarchical regression analysis in which the perception of wrongdoing predicts greater shame-guilt. This suggests that hypothesis 6.2 should be accepted.

Hypothesis 6.3: The effect of perceived shaming on shame-guilt is conditional on the level of respect for others at the case. The significance of the high-shaming high-respect item demonstrates that respect for others present at the case is a significant moderator of shaming. Furthermore, the addition of this item to the analysis resulted in shaming no longer being a significant predictor. This suggests that the effect of shaming is conditional on respect.

Hypothesis 6.4: Shame-guilt will be predicted by higher reintegrative shaming but lower stigmatising shaming. The shaming by reintegration and shaming by stigmatisation interactions tested this hypothesis. Neither was significant and thus the hypothesis should be rejected. It was evident, however, that the main effects for reintegration and stigmatisation did predict shame-guilt in the expected direction. Reintegration was associated with greater shame-guilt while stigmatisation was associated with lower shame-guilt.
Predicting Embarrassment-Exposure

To test the relationship between the shaming variables and embarrassment-exposure a hierarchical regression analysis was performed using the standard set of predictor variables. In the analysis the focus of theoretical attention is the interaction between shaming and stigmatisation (H 6.5).

The regression analysis predicting embarrassment-exposure, presented in Table 6.3, resulted in an adjusted R-square of .4. Only the control variables and main effects entered in model three contributed significantly to the prediction of embarrassment-exposure. The variable that explains the greatest proportion of variance in this analysis was the shame-guilt scale (beta .59) which was a control variable. Unresolved shame also predicted greater levels of embarrassment-exposure, although the size of this relationship was halved when the shaming moderators were added to the analysis. Treatment type was a significant predictor with subjects who went to court reporting significantly more embarrassment-exposure than respondents who attended a conference. This is an interesting finding given that conferences are assumed to be more emotional and shaming than court cases. Outside the control variables, stigmatisation was positively related to embarrassment while the negative beta for prior perception of wrongdoing shows that the less wrong the person thought the offence to be the more he/she was inclined to be embarrassed.

Hypothesis 6.5: Embarrassment-exposure will be predicted by higher stigmatising shaming. Contrary to this hypothesis the interaction between stigmatising and shaming was not a significant predictor of embarrassment-exposure. As mentioned, however, the main effect for stigmatisation was a strong predictor of embarrassment in the same direction predicted by the hypothesis.
Table 6.3: Beta weights for the hierarchical regression on embarrassment-exposure

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>model 3</th>
<th>model 4</th>
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<td></td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>change in R square</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>adjusted R square</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Predicting Unresolved Shame

To test the relationship between the shaming variables and unresolved shame a hierarchical regression analysis was performed using the standard set of predictor variables. In this analysis the focus of theoretical attention is the interactions between shaming and stigmatisation and shaming and reintegration (H 6.6).

The regression analysis on unresolved shame (see Table 6.4) has a final adjusted R-square of .26. As with the previous analyses, the control variables explained a considerable proportion of the variance. Treatment type did not predict the degree of unresolved shame. However, it was evident that the interaction between treatment type and stigmatisation was significant. The beta shows that stigmatisation is a stronger predictor of unresolved shame in court cases than in conference cases. This suggests that the court context may act to augment the impact of any stigmatisation expressed or perhaps that conferences act to dampen the impact of stigmatisation. Embarrassment-exposure and shame-guilt both predicted greater unresolved shame, although the strength of the relationship with embarrassment-exposure was approximately halved by the entry of the shaming moderators. As in the embarrassment regression, neither shaming nor the shaming interactions contributed significantly to the model. However, the main effects for reintegration and prior perception of wrongdoing predicted lower levels of unresolved shame while stigmatisation strongly predicted more unresolved shame.

Hypothesis 6.6: Unresolved shame will be predicted by higher stigmatising shaming but lower reintegrative shaming. As in the previous analyses, the shaming by reintegration and shaming by stigmatisation interactions were not significant. But again the main effects of reintegration and stigmatisation were, and in the directions consistent with the hypotheses.
### Table 6.4: Betas weights for the hierarchical regression on unresolved shame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>model 1</th>
<th>model 2</th>
<th>model 3</th>
<th>model 4</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>1. controls</strong></td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>.31**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
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<tr>
<td>shame-guilt scale</td>
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<td>-.10*</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x reintegration</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x stigmatisation</td>
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<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x shaming</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x respect for others present</td>
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<td>.08*</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>2. shaming</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shaming measure</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. other main effects</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reintegration scale</td>
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<td>-.13**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stigmatisation scale</td>
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<td>.35**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perceived “wrongness” of offence</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean respect for others present</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. shaming interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reintegration x shaming</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stigmatising x shaming</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respect x shaming</td>
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<td>adjusted R square</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Shaming and Shame

Predicting Empathy and Hostility/Anger with the Shame Related Emotions

Empathy was predicted by the shame-related emotions in a regression analysis that controlled for treatment type. This analysis (see Table 6.5) shows that 57 percent of variance in the empathy scale is accounted for by treatment type and the shame related emotions. It is evident from the beta for treatment type beta that empathy is significantly more likely in conference cases. It is also evident that there is a significant positive relationship between the shame-guilt by treatment type interaction and empathy. This shows that shame-guilt is a stronger predictor of empathy in conferences than it is in court cases. The results also show that shame-guilt is a strong predictor of higher empathy. Unresolved shame is a significant positive predictor, although weaker than the shame-guilt scale.

**Table 6.5: Beta weights for the regression on empathy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment type</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>treatment by main effect interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x shame-guilt</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x embarrassment-exposure</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x unresolved shame</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>shame-related emotions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shame-guilt</td>
<td>.58**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>embarrassment-exposure</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unresolved shame</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>constant</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjusted R square</td>
<td>.57**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anger/hostility was predicted by the shame-related emotions in a regression analysis that again controlled for by treatment type (see Table 6.6). Treatment type was a significant predictor of anger/hostility with feelings of anger/hostility more likely to be reported by subjects who attended court rather than conferences. The shame-
Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Shaming and Shame

guilt scale significantly predicted lower levels of anger/hostility. In contrast, the embarrassed-exposure and unresolved shame scales predicted greater feelings of anger/hostility. The unresolved shame scale was the much stronger predictor of anger/hostility with a beta of .41 in comparison to embarrassed-exposure with a beta of .12.

Table 6.6: Beta weights for regression on anger/hostility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment type</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
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<tr>
<td>treatment by main effect interactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>treatment x shame-guilt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x embarrassed-exposure</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatment x unresolved shame</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shame related emotions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shame-guilt</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>embarrassment-exposure</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unresolved shame scale</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjusted R square</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 6.7: Shame-guilt will predict higher levels of hostility but less empathy. This hypothesis was not supported by either of the regression analyses. Shame-guilt was a strong predictor of greater empathy but less anger/hostility.

Hypothesis 6.8: Unresolved shame will predict higher levels of hostility but less empathy. This hypothesis was partially supported. The regression analysis on anger/hostility shows that unresolved shame predicted greater feelings of anger/hostility. However, it was also apparent in the empathy regression analysis that unresolved shame significantly predicted greater empathy.
Discussion

The results do not provide support for the hypothesis (Hypothesis 6.1) that shaming independently predicts the emotion of shame-guilt. Rather, the results suggest that the relationship between shaming and shame was dependent upon the amount of respect the subject had for those who disapproved of their actions (Hypothesis 6.3). However, the results also showed that the prediction of shame-guilt by shaming was not driven by the interactions between shaming and reintegration or the interaction between shaming and stigmatisation (Hypothesis 6.4). This is despite the findings that the main effects for reintegration and stigmatisation were significant. Shame-guilt was independently predicted by the degree to which subjects reported feeling that the offence was wrong prior to the case (Hypothesis 6.2). The results also found no support for the hypothesis that reintegrative shaming (Hypothesis 6.6) would be associated with lower levels of unresolved shame, or that stigmatising shaming would predict greater levels of unresolved shame and embarrassment-exposure (Hypothesis 6.5). Two hypotheses tested the degree to which the shame-related emotions predicted hostility and empathy. The results did not support Hypothesis 6.7 that shame-guilt predicts higher levels of hostility and lower levels of empathy. In fact the reverse was found with shame-guilt positively predicting empathy and relating negatively to anger/hostility. The regression did show that unresolved shame was associated with feelings of anger/hostility, which was consistent with Hypothesis 6.8. However, contrary to this hypothesis unresolved shame was also positively associated with empathy.

Reintegrative Shaming and Shame

The relationship between the shaming variables and the shame-related emotions is inconsistent with the hypotheses informed by reintegrative shaming theory. Indeed, none of the shaming-by-reintegration or shaming-by-stigmatisation interactions were significant predictors of any of the shame-related emotions. The implication is that reintegrative shaming was not important to predicting the emotional responses of subjects. Furthermore, in the shame-guilt regression, where shaming was a significant predictor (ultimately through an interaction with respect), neither reintegration nor
stigmatisation moderated its effect upon shame-guilt. Thus, the relationship between the shaming measure and shame-guilt was the same regardless of whether the shaming was reintegrative or stigmatic. These results raise a number of questions about reintegrative shaming theory. However, interpretation of these results is complicated because the main effects for reintegration and stigmatisation were strong predictors of the shame-related emotions. Furthermore, some of these results seem to be at least counter-intuitive. For example, in the shame-guilt regression analysis reintegration is a strong predictor. Thus, the perception that others were respectful and forgiving is related to greater feelings of shame-guilt. It seems unlikely that the expression of respect or forgiveness on their own would cause shame-guilt, or that shame-guilt would cause the perception that others had expressed respect. One possibility is that an extraneous variable caused both. Alternatively, these results might be explained by the context in which they are measured. In Chapter Five it was noted that the self-report measure of shaming, which asked about the offender’s perceptions of others’ disapproval, was substantially different to the observation of shaming in cases. It might further be argued that neither the self-report nor observation scales measure the fact that simply having to attend court or a conference was an offender is shaming in itself. It may be that the strong association between reintegration and shame-guilt occurred because they are measured within this inherently shaming context. This would suggest that reintegration in a shameful context is associated with greater feelings of shame-guilt.

While the context potentially explains the significance of main effects that intuitively should be unrelated to shame-guilt, it does not necessarily explain the absence of an interaction between reintegration and shaming. Even if the shaming measure did not capture the breadth of shaming communicated at court or conference cases, it did nevertheless predict shame-guilt. It might be assumed that it captured at least some of the shaming that occurred during cases. Thus, what the results suggest is that the effect of this shaming on shame-guilt was not affected by whether or not it was reintegrative or stigmatic. The impact of the context on this result is not clear. It may be that because the context was inherently shaming the reintegration and stigmatisation measures already represent interactions with shaming. This may have
Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Shaming and Shame

prevented or weakened any possible interactions between these measures and the shaming measure. The other possibility is that within a shaming context, reintegration and stigmatisation are independent.

If reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming are at least partially independent what implications does this have for reintegrative shaming theory? One interpretation is that this result is inconsistent with the theory's basic premise that different types of shaming produce different levels of crime. That whether shaming is reintegrative or stigmatising is not important. This conclusion would be simplistic as the results here are based on the emotional reaction to shaming not the recidivism rate. Rather the results suggest that the emotional connection between shaming behaviours and crime may not be as simple as first hypothesised. If all types of shaming (measured by the high-shaming high-respect measure) produce shame-guilt an important question is how central is this emotion to the psychological explanation of reintegrative shaming theory? The positive association between reintegration and shame-guilt and the negative correlation between stigmatisation and shame-guilt suggest that it is important. However, in addition to shame-guilt it is also evident that where the individual is stigmatised, unresolved shame is greater and that the reverse is true where there is reintegration. This is important because, as discussed in Chapter Four, unresolved shame appears to be associated with ambivalence about how wrong the offence was. Analysis in this chapter also demonstrates a positive relationship between unresolved shame and anger/hostility. The relationship between shaming and the emotions may be further complicated by embarrassment-exposure, which was also predicted by stigmatisation. Thus, it would seem that reintegration and stigmatisation may actually result in different patterns of emotion that may all play an important role in reducing or increasing crime. Developing an understanding of how these emotions affect the individual may play an important role in understanding the relationship between shaming and behaviour.
Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Shaming and Shame

Unresolved Shame

One emotional reaction that may play an important role in determining behaviour is unresolved shame. As discussed in Chapter Four, the characteristics that define this response to shaming have a number of parallels with descriptions of bypassed shame (Lewis, 1971). Furthermore, the results reported in this chapter show that consistent with descriptions of bypassed shame, unresolved shame is also associated with anger/hostility. Outwardly directed hostility is clearly identified by Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991) as one response of bypassed shame. It is argued that bypassed shame is one defence against acknowledging the painful feelings associated with shame. But while bypassing the emotion does allow the individual to avoid these feelings it also prevents the individual from resolving the shameful experience. This can result in repetitively and obsessively thinking about the events that led to the initial feeling, but can also result in anger, that in acknowledged shame is directed at the self, being turned outward into hostility towards others (Lewis, 1971). In such cases, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) suggest that unacknowledged shame can develop into shame-rage spirals. Bypassing is therefore a short-term emotional band-aid that results in a long-term festering of the wound. The similarity between the results found here and previous research suggests that the unresolved shame response may be the same one identified by Lewis (1971) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991).

Apart from the obvious similarity between the unresolved shame factor and the concept of bypassed shame, its causes and characteristics are still largely unexplored. Lewis's concept of bypassed shame implied that the emotion is repressed because the individual finds it too painful to deal with. However, the results show that an important factor in determining how much unresolved shame occurs is the degree to which people report feeling that the offence was wrong prior to the case. The less wrong it was perceived to be the more unresolved shame that was felt. This implies that unresolved shame may have less to do with repression than with uncertainty or rejection of the shaming. While the concept of denial has received considerable attention in the shame literature, few perspectives acknowledge the possibility that individuals might reject or question the validity of shaming. Whereas denial suggests
that the individual should feel shame, or is in some sense dysfunctional for not acknowledging what they feel, the concept of rejecting shame implies that the individual might legitimately reject shame because they don't agree with the “shamers”. What is interesting is that there is a moderate relationship between unresolved shame and empathy, which suggests that the response is not necessarily one of defiance. One hypothesis as to why this pattern of results might occur is that unresolved shame is associated with uncertainty regarding the offence and the legitimacy of shaming. Where the individual believes that the offence is less than “totally wrong” in a shaming context, uncertainty is increased. However, where the person believes that the offence was “totally wrong” shaming confirms the person’s view and decreases uncertainty.

Shame, Anger/Hostility and Empathy

Recent empirical work on shame shows that shame-proness is positively related to dispositional hostility but negatively related to the disposition to feel empathy (Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner et al., 1996). The results in this chapter on shame-guilt are radically different from these. The shame-guilt scale was found to be positively associated with empathy and negatively associated with anger/hostility towards others. A number of factors might account for this difference in findings. One of these is that while the subject of this study is an emotion, shame-proness is the measurement of a disposition to feel shame. These are quite distinct and substantial differences might be expected. While the feeling of shame might be considered a fairly universal experience, the work by Tangney and others suggest that some individuals are more prone to feel the emotion than others are. It is not surprising that this personality characteristic, particularly in extreme cases, is associated with the tendency for these individuals not to feel empathy, or even to feel greater hostility, given that a central definition of shame-proness is a strong, negative feeling directed at the whole self.

A second possible reason for the difference in results regards disparities in the emotion measured. This study measured, on the basis of the factor analysis in Chapter Four, an emotion that includes characteristics associated with both shame and guilt. In contrast, studies on shame-proness quite clearly distinguish shame-proness from guilt-
preness. While results from these studies associate shame-proness with hostility and low empathy, guilt-proness is not associated with hostility and is positively associated with empathy (Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner et al., 1996). Despite the importance of this distinction in the shame-proness literature it is still surprising that the correlations between hostility and empathy and the shame-guilt scale, in which shame items were strongly represented, were in an opposite direction to work on shame-proness. This suggests that feelings of anger towards the self and shame about the self, which Tangney associates with shame, are not incompatible with empathy, and are not necessarily associated with hostility.

While differences between these results and previous studies may be the result of guilt and shame not being distinguished, there may also be differences due to differentiation between other emotions. The emotions of embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame were both identified as distinct from shame-guilt in Chapter Four and as a result were measured separately in this analysis. Both of these distinctions may have affected the results. Chapter Four showed that embarrassment-exposure involves feelings of humiliation and awkwardness due to unwanted attention. Consistent with this description, the emotion was not predicted by shaming in Chapter Six and the emotion was actually negatively related to the perception of the offence being wrong. The response would seem to originate from feelings of exposure in the social context rather than bad feelings about the offence. Embarrassment-exposure was also positively related to hostility and not related to empathy at all. Unresolved shame, as discussed above, was found to strongly predict feelings of hostility. The presence of these shame related emotions, which unlike shame-guilt are related to hostility, suggest that it may be important to distinguish between variation in the shame related emotions. Indeed a number of theoretical frameworks already do this (Lewis, 1971; Nathanson, 1992, 1997; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991).
From Shaming to Shame

The conceptions of shame reviewed in Chapter Two made different predictions regarding the role of shaming. An important difference between conceptions was whether shame occurs as a result of perceived disapproval, or whether it results from acting contrary to one's own standards. The results showed that on its own shaming did not significantly predict how much shame-guilt the subject reported feeling. However, in cases where those present strongly disapproved of the offence and were highly respected by the subject, self-reported shame-guilt was greater. Finally, the offender's perception of how wrong they thought the offence was prior to the conference or court case was a strong predictor of shame-guilt.

Although these regressions do not reveal the causal direction of these relationships the results are consistent with a number of conclusions. Firstly, disapproval by others, or fear of rejection, does not explain the results regarding shame-guilt well. One strong predictor of shame-guilt was the perception that one knew that the offence was wrong before the case had even occurred. This is not surprising as the feeling of having done wrong was also measured by the shame-guilt factor in Chapter Four. These results suggest that perceptions that the offence was wrong play an important role, and may even be a pre-requisite to the emotion. Thus, it would seem that there is more to the emotion than simply fear of rejection. In addition to the apparent importance of internalised values, the role of reintegration and stigmatisation also question the relationship between shame-guilt and fear of rejection. The regression analyses show that stigmatisation, which involves out-casting or rejection of the offender, is actually associated with lower perceptions of shame-guilt. On the other hand reintegration, which was positively associated with shame-guilt, involves acceptance and forgiveness of the individual. Not only does this social threat analysis not fully explain these results, but it also seems to contradict the relationship between shame-guilt and reintegration and stigmatisation.

While social rejection does not fully account for these results, it is evident that the regression analyses also imply that shame-guilt was not simply a reaction to one's own perceptions of the offence. Shaming by those who the subject highly respected did predict shame-guilt, suggesting that the individual was reactive to the social
context. Significantly, this result suggests that the effect of shaming is not homogeneous, that it is not simply disapproval that predicts shame but who is disapproving. Although not surprising, this relationship has not received much attention outside philosophical discussion (Taylor, 1985; Williams, 1993). Indeed it has been assumed that shame can occur as a result of any audience. For example, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) observed shame in the responses of people appearing on game shows where the audience was largely anonymous. Given the results in Chapter Four it might be speculated that the emotion observed by Scheff and Retzinger was embarrassment-exposure. This emotion describes feelings of awkwardness due to exposure, or unwanted attention, and was predicted by stigmatisation in the regression analyses. Scheff and Retzinger did not empirically distinguish between shame and embarrassment and in many respects do not distinguish between them theoretically either.

The finding that only shaming by respected others predicts shame-guilt can be explained in a number of ways. If shame is a response to rejection, as argued by the social threat conception, then this finding suggests that individuals are only concerned with rejection from particular people. This explanation has some intuitive appeal because there is little reason to think that people will care what disrespected others think. However, an alternative explanation is provided by the ethical conception of shame. It argues the reason why shaming causes shame is because other’s disapproval convinces the person that what they have done is wrong. In this case the opinion of respected others is considered more valid and their shaming is therefore more influential in convincing the person that what they have done is wrong. This explanation is consistent with the strong relationship between the subject’s perception that the offence was wrong and shame-guilt, which suggests the individual’s internalised values are important. It is not possible, using the data collected in this thesis, to test either explanation of why shaming increases shame-guilt, whether it is through the threat of rejection, through persuasion, or some interaction between these motivations. However, this is an important question that needs to be addressed by future research.
A number of issues relating to the relationship between shaming and shame have parallels in social psychological theories of influence and conformity. A central issue in conformity research is why individuals conform to particular beliefs or behaviours. One answer is that others' behaviour provides important information, particularly in contexts where there is ambiguity. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) identify this form of influence, which is also seen in Sherif's (1936) autokinetic experiments, as informational influence. An alternative approach, identified by Deutsch and Gerard as normative influence, is that individuals conform to maintain acceptance or approval. Indeed, discussion of these two processes of conformity have dominated work on social influence (Asch, 1956; Festinger, 1950; Kelley, 1952; Kelman, 1958; Moscovichi, 1976; Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1991). The concept of normative influence has an obvious parallel with the conception of shame as a response to social rejection. Conformity to a norm occurs so as to maintain approval, but when compliance with the norm does not occur social rejection results in feelings of shame.

A comparison can also be drawn between the ethical and personal failure conceptions of shame and informational influence. Of course, in these conceptions shame can occur without influence at all because it is a response to internalised values. However, the ethical conception explicitly suggests that others who the individual respects play a role in shaming the individual, while the personal failure conception does not argue against this. In this case the individual accepts that the normative values held by others are valid and shame is a response to having violated these accepted values.

The importance of particular people is also evident in the development of ideas regarding reference groups and the role they play in regulating social behaviour (Festinger, 1950; Kelley, 1952; Newcomb, 1943). The notion of a reference group refers to a group with which an individual compares themself and with which they share norms and values (Turner, 1991). Reference groups have been hypothesised to exercise both normative and informational influence. Kelley describes a reference group as:
...denote[ing] a group in which the individual is motivated to gain or maintain acceptance. To promote this acceptance, he holds his attitudes in conformity with what he perceives to be the consensus among group members. Implicit here is the idea that the members of the group observe the person and evaluate him. (Kelley, 1952: p. 411).

This definition clearly emphasises the role of normative influence. Others suggest that reference groups satisfy informational needs or a combination of needs. For example, Festinger (1950) argued that the need to socially validate beliefs leads people to seek consensual support for their beliefs with others who they see as similar (i.e. a reference group). Whether the process of influence is informational or normative, the concept of reference groups may explain why individuals only feel shame if shamed by people they respect. Respect may be a function of perceiving others to be part of one’s reference group.

A number of parallels between the concept of shame (and the results on shame-guilt) and the process of conformity have been drawn. Shame-guilt is a response to having violated norms, whether they are internalised or simply complied with. Understanding how norms are formed, maintained or changed is important to understanding shame and its relationship to shaming. Indeed, it might also be argued that understanding the emotion of shame would improve understandings of conformity. These issues will be discussed in greater length in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Shame-guilt varies according to the person’s beliefs about the wrongness of the offence, others’ beliefs about the wrongness of the offence (communicated through shaming), the relationship between the person and those who felt the offence was wrong (measured by high respect), and finally how others communicate to the person that the offence was wrong (either reintegratively or stigmatically). These results suggest that the link between shaming and shame-guilt may be a dynamic process in which both the shamers and the person being shamed play an active role. The individual is active in the decision to accept others’ opinions as valid, based upon the
respect they have for those people. The shamers are active participants in the process by deciding both that the offence was wrong and by choosing how they communicate their disapproval. Importantly, these findings suggest that shame-guilt needs to be seen as an ethical emotion and that as such it needs to be understood in the context of decisions, both individual and social, about what is right and wrong.
Chapter 7: An ethical-identity conception of shame

This thesis has tested the dimensionality of the shame-related emotions and the relationship between these emotions and shaming by others. Results of these analyses contribute to what is currently known and provide the basis for developing a more detailed theoretical framework for understanding shame. The aim of this chapter will be to develop such a framework. The results of Chapters Four, Five and Six will be briefly summarised in the context of previous research on shame in order to provide a summary of what is known about the emotion. In response to this summary, a new theoretical framework is developed that builds upon previous conceptions of shame identified in the thesis, as well as drawing upon recent work on social influence and cognitive dissonance. Finally, the ability of this new conception to explain a number of empirical findings will be discussed.

Summarising Empirical Results on Shame

Empirical studies on shame (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, Miller et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983) have focused almost exclusively on testing its phenomenology. Furthermore, it is evident that the phenomenology discovered by these studies is largely consistent. One of the clearest findings is that shame involves feelings associated with fear of social disapproval. In particular, subjects report feeling the desire to hide, being socially inferior, self conscious, exposed, rejected by others, physically small, socially isolated and fearful of others' judgement. A second, but related finding, is that shame involves the subject's condemnation of their behaviour. Most studies report that offenders felt that what they had done was wrong. A third dimension apparent across studies is that shame is a very intense, painful emotion. Subjects report feeling tense, depressed and distracted, and that talking about it later remained difficult. Also reported are painful feelings directed at the self, which include anger, worthlessness and disgust. Finally, phenomenological studies show that subjects report physiological changes such as feeling agitated and aroused, blushing and increased heart rate.
The results reported in Chapter Four of this thesis replicate many of these findings (see Table 7.1). The shame-guilt factor was measured by items that expressed fear that others knew about the offence and that others had been critical. The shame-guilt factor was also correlated with the embarrassment-exposure factor, which measured feelings of awkwardness, exposure and humiliation. As in other phenomenological studies, subjects felt that what they had done was wrong. Other items indicated that subjects were angry with themselves and ashamed of both themselves and their act, which suggests that shame-guilt was an unpleasant or painful experience. The only facet not captured by this analysis was the physiological changes associated with shame. These aspects of shame were not measured in the current study.

Despite these similarities there are some important differences between the analysis in Chapter Four and those of previous studies. In particular, the factor analysis resulted in a single dimension measuring characteristics associated with both shame and guilt. This is in contrast to most phenomenological approaches which have asked subjects to explicitly or implicitly distinguish between these emotions and subsequently found significant differences (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, Miller et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983). However, it is worth noting that a high degree of similarity between shame and guilt is evident in most of these studies, suggesting that the results may not be as different as the conclusions based upon them. For example, Wicker et al. (1983) report that "...In only 6 of 68 comparisons in two studies were the two emotions significantly different at p < .05 and on opposite sides of the neutral point. In the majority of cases the difference was one of degree but not direction." (p. 38). While, this demonstrates the similarity between the two emotions, it nevertheless supports the distinction between shame and guilt. It was suggested in Chapter Four that one reason for the difference between results from earlier studies and this thesis may lie in the methodology employed. Previous studies have asked subjects to recall feelings they associate with particular emotions and thus rely heavily upon the subject's conception of those emotions. As a result it is questionable whether measured differences between shame and guilt in such work are simply "...culturally transmitted conceptions of how shame and guilt differ..." (Wicker et al., 1983: p. 38) or
whether they do define distinct emotional reactions that have different psychological characteristics. Although this issue requires further research, the results in Chapter Four suggest that shame and guilt may not be distinct, as previously conceptualised, and at the least are complimentary emotions.

The results in Chapter Four were consistent with research by Lewis (1971), Scheff (1991) and Retzinger (1991) which suggests that unacknowledged shame is a distinct emotional reaction to acknowledged shame. These scholars identify an emotional reaction not characterised by the typical phenomenology of shame but which involves ongoing repetitive thoughts regarding the “shameful” event or situation. The factor analysis in Chapter Four identifies a factor, unresolved shame, with a similar phenomenology. In addition, the regression analyses in Chapter Six found that unresolved shame predicted greater feelings of anger/hostility, which is again consistent with research by Lewis and Scheff on unacknowledged shame. While further work is needed to understand this emotional reaction, the difference between it and shame-guilt highlight the importance of understanding differences in the way people respond to shameful situations. While some subjects in the court or conference cases appeared to acknowledge feeling shame, others were bothered by ongoing feelings (unresolved shame) for some time after the case. While this may be due to differences between cases, such as the way others shamed them, it might also signal individual differences in coping style. This would be consistent with empirical evidence in bullying research (Ahmed, 1999) which shows that there are differences in the strategies children use to cope with shame. These differences in shame management styles predicted whether children reported having bullied others or having been bullied.

In addition to finding an unresolved shame factor, this research also suggest that there may be important differences between shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure. The embarrassment-exposure factor was measured by items that almost exclusively concentrated upon the situation being awkward for the subject. These items included being embarrassed because one was the centre of attention, feeling exposed and wanting to disappear, feeling awkward and aware, and feeling humiliated. Thus, in contrast to shame-guilt, the embarrassment-exposure factor appears much less concerned with having done wrong and is limited to situational factors. The distinction was also
supported by the regression analyses in Chapter Six. In these analyses shame-guilt was predicted by perceptions of having done wrong, shaming by respected others and perceptions of having been reintegrated. In contrast, embarrassment-exposure was predicted by perceptions of having been stigmatised and feelings before the case that the offence was less than totally wrong. These differences demonstrate convincing discriminant validity for the shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure measures despite the reasonable correlation between them (approximately .6). This distinction between shame-guilt and embarrassment-exposure is also consistent with studies on embarrassment (Edelmann, 1987; Crozier, 1990) as well as previous empirical work on the distinction between shame and embarrassment (Tangney, Miller et al., 1996).

A consistent finding in phenomenological studies is that shame involves fear of others’ disapproval, or even others’ knowledge of the shameful matter. This has been an important reason for shame often being described as a distinctly “social” emotion and being seen as an important regulator of social relationships. Indeed the social threat conception identified in Chapter Two hypothesises that fear of disapproval is not just part of the phenomenology of shame but is also its primary cause. However, while the regression analyses in Chapter Six suggest that social disapproval is a predictor of shame-guilt, they also question both its importance and its relationship with shame-guilt. For instance, shame-guilt does not appear as reactive to others’ disapproval as the phenomenology suggests. In the regression analysis shaming is just one of several predictors of shame-guilt and even this relationship is moderated by the degree to which subjects’ respected those who disapproved. Furthermore, the offender’s memory of how they felt about the offence prior to the case (perceived wrongness), was a stronger predictor of how much shame-guilt was reported by subjects. This suggests that shame-guilt is at least in part a response to internal standards as well as disapproval from external sources. Complicating this picture further is the finding that shame-guilt was positively related to the perception of having been reintegrated but negatively related to having been stigmatised. This suggests that the way shaming is communicated has an significant effect on the shame emotions that are felt. An important question raised by these results is what role does shame-guilt play in regulating the relationship between the individual and others.
As is evident from this review, empirical research on shame is still limited in its scope. While its phenomenology has been examined in a number of studies, empirical research is only just beginning to examine issues of why and when shame occurs and what psychological mechanisms might account for it. Despite being called “the social emotion” and being discussed in relation to social regulation and conformity, there has been very little attention paid to shame in the social psychological literature. As a result, little emphasis has been placed upon the effect that social context has on the emotion. The results in this thesis suggest that a number of factors, including how shaming is communicated and by whom, are important to understanding the shaming-shame relationship. Furthermore, existing theoretical perspectives on shame do not adequately address these issues.
## Table 7.1: Summary of Outcomes for Hypotheses Tested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Support for hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 4.1</strong> Items measuring fear of other's disapproval (Items 4, 5, 1, 13, 14, Table 4.1) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure the individual's perception that they have done something wrong (Item 2, Table 4.1).</td>
<td>Rejected (all items loaded on shame-guilt factor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 4.2</strong> Items measuring negative feelings towards the self (Items 9, 12, 6, Table 4.1) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure concern with one's actions and the consequences of them for others (Items 11, 3, 20, Table 4.1).</td>
<td>Rejected (all items loaded on shame-guilt factor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 4.3</strong> Items measuring the perception that one has committed a serious moral breach (i.e. acted in a way that is morally wrong (2), hurt others (3, 20) and behaved without honour (13, 14)) will cohere and be distinct from those items that measure social discomfort (i.e. feelings of self-consciousness (7, 8, 17).</td>
<td>Supported (an embarrassment-exposure factor measuring social discomfort was distinct from shame-guilt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 4.4</strong> Observational measures of shame will be associated with the self-report measures.</td>
<td>Partially supported (observational items correlated with shame-guilt, but less strongly in court cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 5.1</strong> Reintegration and stigmatisation will form opposite poles of a single dimension.</td>
<td>Rejected (reintegration and stigmatisation are independent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 5.2</strong> Shaming will form a dimension independent from reintegration and stigmatisation.</td>
<td>Supported (low correlations between shaming and reintegration and stigmatisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 5.3</strong> The facets of reintegration and stigmatisation defined by Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) will form distinct dimensions</td>
<td>Rejected (The dimensions measure reintegration and stigmatisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 5.4</strong> Observational and self-report measures of reintegrative shaming will demonstrate evidence of triangulation.</td>
<td>Partially supported (evident for measures of reintegration, weaker for measures of stigmatisation, and not evident for measures of shaming)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 5.5</strong> Conference cases will be more reintegrative than court cases.</td>
<td>Supported (reintegration and shaming significantly higher in conference cases).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.1</strong> Perceived shaming will predict shame/guilt.</td>
<td>Rejected (not a significant predictor of shame-guilt).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.2</strong> The subject's perception of how wrong the offence was will predict shame/guilt.</td>
<td>Supported (perceived wrongdoing predicted shame-guilt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.3</strong> The effect of perceived shaming on shame-guilt is conditional on the level of respect for others at the case.</td>
<td>Supported (high shaming by high respect predicted shame-guilt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.4</strong> Shame-guilt will be predicted by higher reintegrative shaming but lower stigmatising shaming.</td>
<td>Rejected (predicted by main effects for reintegration and stigmatisation but not interactions with shaming).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.5</strong> Embarrassment-exposure will be predicted by higher stigmatising shaming.</td>
<td>Rejected (predicted by the main effect for stigmatisation but not the interaction with shaming).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.6</strong> Unresolved shame will be predicted by higher stigmatising shaming but lower reintegrative shaming.</td>
<td>Rejected (predicted by main effects for reintegration and stigmatisation but not interactions with shaming).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.7</strong> Shame-guilt will predict higher levels of hostility but less empathy.</td>
<td>Rejected (shame-guilt predicts lower hostility and higher empathy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 6.8</strong> Unresolved shame will predict higher levels of hostility but less empathy.</td>
<td>Partially supported (unresolved shame predicts higher hostility but also higher empathy).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An Ethical-Identity Theory of Shame-Guilt

The remainder of this chapter outlines a theoretical framework that builds on the current conceptions of shame already discussed but that also seeks to account more fully for the empirical results discussed above. Particular attention is paid to a number of characteristics of shame-guilt that seem essential to understanding the emotion. These include: that shame-guilt is an ethical emotion concerning issues of right and wrong, that shame-guilt plays a role in regulating the relationship between the individual and others, that shame-guilt is not only felt about a particular act but relates to the person's identity, and that shame-guilt is a painful emotion.

Shame-Guilt is Felt in Reference to Values that are Perceived as Ethical

Throughout this thesis the term “ethical values” has been used to describe the beliefs people draw on to make judgements about wrongdoing. This is consistent with the ethical conception of shame (Harré, 1990; Taylor, 1985; Williams, 1993) which draws primarily on contributions from moral philosophy. However, it is important to specify what, at a psychological level, is meant by the term ethical value. Rokeach (1973) has suggested that beliefs can be descriptive, evaluative or prescriptive, and that beliefs constitute both the more specific concepts of attitudes and values. Attitudes are described as focused upon specific objects or situations in contrast to values, which are described as:

...single prescriptive beliefs about end-states (e.g. peace) and modes of conduct (e.g. justice) that transcend specific objects and situations and that are held to be personally and socially preferable to opposite end-states of existence (e.g. war) and modes of conduct (Rokeach, 1973).


It is apparent that research in social psychology, and particularly research on conformity, has more often employed the concept of norms. In large part, norms have been used to describe beliefs occurring at a group level which define how members of a group should and should not act (see Brown, 1990). But it is also evident that they
have been operationalised at an individual level where they are seen as a result of the idiosyncratic learning of values and rules (Schwartz, 1977). An important characteristic of norms is that they express a belief about how people should behave, and thus like values they are prescriptive. This is evident in both personal norms, where Schwartz (1977) describes them as generating feelings of moral obligation, and social norms where they are defined by Turner et al. (1987) as “... any shared standard or rule that specifies appropriate, “correct”, desirable, expected, etc., attitudes and conduct.” (p. 13).

The prescriptive and evaluative elements of normative beliefs are consistent with the emphasis upon right and wrong in ethical values. However, it is also evident that while shame is associated with “serious transgressions” (see Harré, 1990), norms are not restricted in this way. For example, social norms might relate to clothing fashions, the attractiveness of colours, or to the shape of cars. Sherif and Sherif (1969) suggest that norms vary in their degree of importance to the individual and social groups. They argue that norms that are peripheral to group life will have wide latitude of acceptability, making deviations from the norm more tolerable. In contrast, norms that are central to the group’s existence or to the definition of the group will have limited latitude of acceptability, which limits the scope for deviation. The operation of different latitudes of acceptability might be seen in a comparison of judgements made regarding fashion or theft. In most circumstances wearing unfashionable clothing, no matter how unfashionable, will be tolerated by society. The individual might be laughed at but not banished. In contrast, stealing money from other people, even the “borrowing” of only moderate amounts, is met by much stronger disapproval and the possibility of social sanctions such as fines or prison sentences. Thus, almost no level of stealing is acceptable but almost all levels of bad fashion are. Ethical norms can be defined as beliefs about what is wrong and right and in particular what is considered morally acceptable or good. Non-compliance with an ethical norm is considered not only undesirable but also wrong, the latitude of acceptance being very small. In line with Sherif and Sherif (1969) it might also be hypothesised that moral norms are central to the way individuals or groups conceive of themselves, for example, having certain moral values are important to being a member of society or to being human.
The Shaming-Shame Relationship is Mediated by Social Validation

It is hypothesised that a precondition to feeling shame-guilt is the perception that one has violated an ethical norm. Implicit in this is the assumption that the ethical norm is held or is shared by the individual. If the individual did not accept the norm then the cause of shame-guilt would not be the perception of having violated a norm but rather others' reaction to that violation, or fear of their reaction. Thus, an important assumption is that shame-guilt is felt in reference to internalised norms. However, at the same time shame has often been seen as a social emotion because it is assumed to mediate between the individual and society (Lynd, 1958). Indeed, a number of approaches (Barbalet, 1998; Benedict, 1946; Mead, 1937; Epstein, 1984; Scheff, 1988) are based upon the assumption that shame plays a central role in social conformity and should be understood within that context. The finding that perceptions of shaming by respected others predicts shame-guilt (see Chapter Six) supports these perspectives. It is argued that disapproval, or shaming, by others is a cause of shame-guilt but only when the individual accepts their judgement as correct. Thus, shaming acts to influence the person's beliefs or to help confirm what the person already suspected. Research in social influence (Festinger, 1950; Hogg & Turner, 1987) described this process as social validation.

The concept of social validation has been employed by a number of theoretical perspectives which argue that the need to hold valid beliefs is an important motivation to conform with others. In his theory of informal social communication Festinger (1950) identifies two sources of pressure to conform, one of which he calls social reality. This form of conformity is based upon the motivation to hold beliefs that are valid. Beliefs, however, vary in the degree to which they are based upon physical reality, in other words the degree to which they can be confirmed via a physical test. For example, it is easy to physically test whether glass breaks but difficult to physically test if god exists. Festinger argues that beliefs not easily subject to physical reality testing are validated via social reality testing. This form of belief testing is based upon the degree to which others have the same opinion or belief and is said to provide social validation. However, he also argues that social validation can only come from others the individual sees as adequate reference points for their opinion. These
people are identified as those who hold similar opinions to the person, also called reference groups by Festinger.

The role of reference groups in developing and reinforcing norms has been examined in a number of studies. One example is Newcomb's (1943) longitudinal study of students at a small American college. The attitudes of new students arriving at the college changed over time to reflect the left wing views that were normative at the college. Furthermore, these students continued to hold left wing attitudes when interviewed 25 years later (Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks, Warwick, 1967). These researchers concluded that what appeared to be important in producing conformity to the normative values was the role that the college played as a positive reference group in providing social validation for left wing beliefs.

However, Festinger's distinction between social and physical reality testing, and its implications for processes of social influence, have been criticised by a number of more recent approaches to influence. Tajfel (1972), Moscovichi (1976) and Hogg and Turner (1987) argue that physical reality testing does not by itself provide the individual with certainty. They argue that even the most basic forms of physical reality testing rely on social validation because even these require the individual to place an interpretation on the physical facts.

It is true, of course, that technical instruments permit an individual to make decisions about the environment by himself; but even these instruments conceal a consensus, since the mode of action of a tool or the appropriateness of a measuring device must be agreed upon by all if the result of such operations is to carry any information. (Moscovichi, 1976: p. 70)

Thus, it is argued that individuals use social reality testing to validate all beliefs.

A recent theoretical approach to influence that incorporates social validation is based upon social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1991). This theory proposes that individuals' identities are partially composed of their social group memberships (social identities). When membership to a particular social group is
salient, the individual will “categorise” themself according to this identity, perceiving themself as similar on relevant dimensions to others perceived to have the same social identity (e.g. mothers). Furthermore, the individual’s behaviour and attitudes will be guided by this categorisation; the individual conforms to those norms they perceive as consistent with the social group. For example, the social identity of “mother” might be characterised by the norm that mothers are caring, nurturing people. This norm would in turn inform the behaviour of individuals who identified with this social identity.

Hogg and Turner (1987) propose that referent informational influence occurs as a result of the expectation that others who have the same social identity will have the same beliefs and will act in the same way as oneself. When group members’ actions or beliefs are consistent with the individual’s this provides social validation. However, when the individual’s beliefs are inconsistent with those who they expect to agree with, uncertainty will result, making influence more likely.

Apart from assuming that social validation is relevant to all types of beliefs, referent informational influence is also different from Festinger’s theory because the basis of social validation and reference groups is shared social identity. There is considerable evidence that having the same social identity as others results in conformity to norms perceived as salient to that group. For example, using a polarisation paradigm Mackie (1986) found that when participants’ attention was focused upon their group membership, conformity to the group norm, and thus polarisation, was greater. The perception of having a similar identity to others has also been shown to increase conformity in the Asch (1956) paradigm. Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg and Turner (1990) found that if in the standard Asch paradigm subjects perceived the confederates to be in-group members (sharing the same social identity) rather than out-group members, then conformity was significantly greater.

The brief review of research on social validation provides some evidence that individuals conform with social norm because they provide validation for one’s own

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5 The Asch paradigm involved subjects estimating the length of lines with a group they believed to be other subjects, but who were confederates of the experimenter. The responses of the confederates were manipulated to be obviously incorrect in some of the trials. The variable of interest was the frequency that subjects conformed to this incorrect response.
Chapter 7: An Ethical-Identity Conception of Shame

beliefs and that that influence of this type is greater when social norms are held by a valid reference group. Applied to the emotion of shame this research provides an explanation for the effect of shaming on shame. While shame-guilt is felt in relation to the individual's own ethical norms, the research on social validation suggests that these are often norms shared with others. Indeed, the research suggests that individuals rely on others, and particularly reference groups, to confirm and shape what they believe. Shame-guilt might occur in social isolation because the individual has ethical values that are internalised. But it is also evident these ethical values are responsive to the beliefs of relevant others. This suggested that shaming by reference groups would validate an individual's belief that their actions were wrong. Equally, shaming by reference groups would produce uncertainty and influence towards this belief if the individual believes that his or her actions were not wrong, or they were unsure. It is important to make the point that social identity theories do not describe the person as passive. Social identity or membership of reference groups becomes salient because of the perception of similarity. This highlights the importance of the interaction between the individual and their social context. Shaming produces shame-guilt when it convinces an individual that they have acted contrary to an ethical norm. Shaming may also play an important role when it confirms a similar judgement already made by the individual.

Shame-Guilt Involves Threat to an Individual's Identity

Shame-guilt has just been described as occurring when the individual perceives that they have acted in a way that they believe is wrong, and that this perception is based upon ethical norms that are defined in part by the individual's social identity. Indeed it is argued by social identity theories that the values an individual accepts, and thus will feel ashamed for violating, are determined by their identity. This is because social identities entail beliefs that provide the individual with a framework in which to understand the world and their place in it. However, this also highlights the importance of values to identity and the reciprocity of this relationship. This is particularly evident in social identity theory, which predicts that the identity of an individual will be, in part, determined by the similarity they perceive themself and
others to have on particular values. Thus, having certain values is essential to having a particular identity.

If shared social identity is the basis of mutual influence between people (Turner, 1991), it is also a central object of influence: the construction and validation of people’s definition of who they are (and are not) are basic to the task of developing shared norms, values and goals... (Turner and Onorato, 1999: p. 27)

The relationship between normative beliefs and identity means that awareness that one has acted in a manner contrary to one's norms also raises questions regarding one's identity. Indeed, it is proposed that a defining feature of shame-guilt is that it involves a threat to the individual's identity. Threat to identity occurs because the contradiction between the individual's ethical-norms and their behaviour cannot be easily reconciled. In contrast, the violation of non-ethical norms - not fitting in by dressing badly, not concentrating and dropping the ball at a sporting contest, saying something stupid at work - might engender embarrassment-exposure when they occur in public but will not result in shame-guilt. The experience of shame-guilt involves an inconsistency between a global sense of the self and evidence to the contrary. This state is accompanied by a need to resolve this tension. In some respects this is similar to Wurmser's (1994) description of shame as betrayal of a global or gestalt image of the self because it is a threat to the whole framework of one's identity.

An important aspect of threat to identity, because of the reciprocal relationship between identity and belief, is that it undermines certainty. Shame-guilt involves uncertainty regarding identity, the person’s confidence about who they are and how they fit into broader social structures. It calls into question values and normative beliefs much broader than the ethical norm that was violated. These factors highlight the importance of resolution and the role social validation plays in assisting resolution. Resolution occurs via a process of making sense of what has occurred and consequently diminishing the inconsistency between one’s behaviour and one’s sense of identity. This might involve changes in one's identity, as a result of re-evaluating
one's ethical norms, or the justification of one's actions in relation to one's current ethical norms. For example, actions might be justified as a lapse that is put right by apology or reparation. Equally, social validation may assist by confirming particular ethical norms and validating efforts to make right any wrongdoing. In the above example this might be achieved by shaming the person's act but also accepting that the apology and compensation were fair.

It is worthwhile considering the relationship between this notion of threat to identity and research on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) because there are a number of similarities, particularly with recent approaches that have emphasised dissonance in relation to cognitions about the self. Furthermore, empirical studies on cognitive dissonance provide some evidence that behaving contrary to personal beliefs results in feelings similar to those that are associated with the shame-guilt factor in this thesis. Cognitive dissonance theory hypothesises that people strive for consistency between cognitions regarding both actions and beliefs. When cognitions are inconsistent the individual feels a sense of dissonance and is motivated to alter their cognitions so as to make them consistent. One variation on the theory is that of Aronson (1969, 1997) who argues that cognitive dissonance occurs primarily when an element of the self-concept is threatened. Individuals try to maintain a self-concept that is both consistent and positive, which means that engaging in actions that threaten the self-concept are particularly powerful in producing dissonance. The result, as in the Festinger original formulation, is a process of self-justification that involves changing the dissonant cognitions so that they are no longer dissonant.

Another adaptation of cognitive dissonance theory (Steel, 1988; Steel & Liu, 1983) argues that the individual's need for self-affirmation is the motivation responsible for the effect found by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), rather than the need for cognitive consistency. This model is similar to Aronson's in that it suggests the individual is motivated to maintain a view of the self as "adaptively and morally adequate" (Steel, 1988: p. 262). However, Steel (1988) argues that this is distinct from cognitive dissonance because it focuses upon global integrity of the self rather than consistency between specific cognitions. Thus, resolving specific dissonance between
cognitions is not as important as maintaining a perception of overall esteem. As a result, simply shifting attention from troubling cognitions to areas of achievement can maintain overall esteem. Evidence for this is based upon the finding (Steel and Liu, 1983) that the induced-compliance procedure (Festinger and Carlsmith’s experimental paradigm) does not cause attitude change if the person is able to affirm their self-concept. Affirmation of self-concept, for example expressing one’s actual beliefs, will reduce the amount of attitude change resulting from a dissonant event even if it is on an unrelated issue.

While the debate between dissonance theories cannot be adequately addressed here, research into these theories demonstrates that when people act contrary to normative beliefs it produces a feeling of dissonance. Shame-guilt that occurs as a result of violating ethical norms, which is a much more specific set of cognitions than implied by cognitive dissonance theory, may involve a dissonance-like effect. However, shame-guilt does not simply involve dissonance between cognitions, because it is also predicted that shame-guilt involves an undermining of the individual’s identity: their whole framework of beliefs.

Despite differences between cognitive dissonance and shame-guilt it is significant that research into cognitive dissonance provides evidence that dissonance between cognitions can result in psychological discomfort and shame-like feelings. While Festinger did not elaborate on the nature of dissonance much beyond describing it as “psychologically uncomfortable”, the theory argues that it is this unpleasant feeling that motivates the individual to reduce contradictions between cognitions. Some evidence for this claim can be found in research that indicates that the induced-compliance procedure results in increased arousal (Kiesler & Pallak, 1976). More relevant to understanding shame-guilt is evidence that dissonance arising from induced-compliance causes feelings of psychological discomfort. Two studies reported by Elliot and Devine (1994) demonstrated that induced-compliance results in psychological discomfort and that access to a “dissonance reducing strategy” dampens this discomfort. Both studies were based upon the standard induced-compliance paradigm which involved subjects in the experimental conditions being induced to write counter-attitudinal essays. Measurement of attitude allowed assessment of attitude
change but also was hypothesised to allow subjects to engage in dissonance reduction because it enabled expression of attitude change. Across a number of experimental conditions the measurement of subjects’ attitudes and affect was temporally varied to test when psychological discomfort was aroused and when it diminished. The studies replicated the standard induced-compliance effect: attitude change occurred in the experimental condition after the counter-attitudinal essay was written. In addition, where subjects’ feelings (the dependent variable) were measured before the attitudinal measure, psychological discomfort was significantly higher than in the control condition. This suggested that induced compliance did cause psychological discomfort. However, when subjects’ feelings were measured after the attitudinal measure psychological discomfort was not significantly higher than controls. This suggested that the expression of attitude change, a hypothesised dissonance reduction strategy, did reduce psychological discomfort. Elliot and Devine argue that this implies that psychological discomfort is in fact a motivational force to reduce dissonance.

The second study reported by Elliot and Devine (1994) also has relevance to the feelings associated with dissonance. This study asked subjects the degree to which they experienced particular feelings while participating in a dissonance-producing experiment. From these feeling items four factors were identified on the basis of a principal components analysis. The first factor, discomfort, measured feelings of being uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered. The second factor measured negative feeling towards the self: angry towards myself, dissatisfied with myself, disgusted with myself and annoyed with myself. The third measured positive feelings: happy, good, friendly, energetic, and optimistic. Finally, the fourth factor measured feelings of embarrassment and shame. Differences between subjects in the dissonance and control conditions only occurred on the first two factors. In addition, further analysis showed that when the high correlation between discomfort and negative feelings towards the self was controlled for only discomfort distinguished between subjects. What is interesting is that many of the feelings associated with shame-guilt in Chapter Four are represented not just by the fourth factor but also the first (discomfort) and second (negative feelings towards the self) factors. Thus, some of the feelings associated with dissonance would appear to be similar to those measured by the shame-guilt factor. A
second point of interest is the implication that dissonance produced discomfort, which in turn resulted in the negative feelings towards the self.

Cognitive dissonance research suggests that behaving contrary to personal beliefs results in feeling uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered, angry at the self, disgusted with the self, annoyed at the self and dissatisfied with the self, all of which are associated with shame. However, it might be hypothesised that threat to identity also explains other phenomenon associated with shame and, in particular, feelings of social isolation (or withdrawal), difficulties in interpersonal communication, and depression (Epstein, 1984; Lewis, 1971; Nathanson, 1992; Sachdev, 1990). Identity, and particularly social identity, is predicted by a number of approaches (social identity theory) to regulate social interaction. They provide a framework for interpreting the actions of others as well as defining the relationship between the self and others. If shame-guilt involves uncertainty regarding identity then it restricts the individual's ability to interpret others' behaviour, thus inhibiting social interactions. The effects of threat to identity may also have a more general impact upon the individual's ability to interpret their environment because it undermines certainty across a range of beliefs. This broader uncertainty, may lead to feelings of helplessness and depression, that in turn causes individuals to withdraw from social situations.

If shame-guilt does involve threat to identity then this also emphasises the importance of resolving uncertainty. It can be predicted that the speed of resolution will have a significant effect upon the impact of the emotion. In some cases acceptance of wrongdoing readily occurs and is followed by forgiveness from others, which quickly ends the episode. However, at the other extreme shame may persist over long periods because the individual is unable to determine whether their actions were wrong, or are unable to find a way to sufficiently repent, recant or compensate. Examples of this are discussed by Sachdev (1990) in reference to the Maori concept of *whakama*, which is a shame-related emotion incorporating ideas of guilt, embarrassment and humiliation. In some cases *whakama* becomes a severely debilitating experience in which individuals report symptoms including difficulty communicating with others, withdrawal from the community, depression, self-exile, and sometimes suicide. Maori apply two primary treatments which include either building up the individual's esteem
or, if the reason for whakama is a transgression, applying a suitable punishment followed by reintegrating the individual back into the community (Sachdev, 1990). This second approach might be interpreted as assisting an individual to resolve shame-guilt by providing a mechanism to validate their actions as wrong and allowing the person to resolve internal tension through repentance.

**Explaining Empirical Results on Shame-Guilt**

Although the predictions based upon the theoretical framework developed here are not tested they do provide a coherent interpretation of the results in this thesis. It is firstly evident that the predictions of the ethical identity framework are consistent with the relationship between shaming and shame-guilt. The results reported in Chapter Six show that the subject's perception that the offence was wrong predicted greater shame-guilt. The ethical identity framework argues that the perception of having done wrong is a precondition of shame-guilt (though not of embarrassment-exposure), but will only result in shame-guilt when this perception is sufficient to threaten the individual's identity. Nevertheless, it would be expected that the more subjects perceived their actions to be wrong the greater the threat to identity. Thus, this finding is consistent with what an ethical-identity conception would predict. It was also evident in Chapter Six that high disapproval by highly respected others, and only highly respected others, predicted greater shame-guilt. The ethical-identity approach predicts that shaming will results in greater shame-guilt when it provides social validation from reference group members that actions were wrong. While respect is not equivalent to the concept of similarity or shared social identity on which membership to reference groups is based, respect for others may be a function of shared social identity. This would explain why only shaming from highly respect others predicts shame-guilt.

This model of shame-guilt, and particularly its predictions regarding the relationship between shaming and shame-guilt, might provide a psychological explanation for the effect of reintegration and stigmatisation on both shame-guilt and crime. Chapter Six showed that reintegration was associated with increased feelings of shame-guilt, but that stigmatisation reduced shame-guilt. Reintegrative shaming is
Chapter 7: An Ethical-Identity Conception of Shame

where others disapprove of the offender’s act but also attempt to integrate the offender into the community by treating him or her with respect and forgiveness. It might be hypothesised that this type of shaming communicates to the person that they are of the same community as the shamers and thus defines the offender as sharing the same social identity. As that social identity becomes more salient the individual comes to see themself as more similar to that social group and comes to accept that group as an appropriate source of social validation. Thus, it might be hypothesised that reintegrative shaming is effective in producing shame-guilt because it communicates to the person that they share the same identity as the shamers, thus increasing the perception that they are an appropriate reference group.

In contrast to this process, stigmatisation involves out-casting the offender by labelling him or her with a deviant identity. In a fairly direct way this identifies the offender as being different, as not sharing the same social identity. Referent informational influence hypothesises that an out-group cannot influence an individual because its beliefs are not valid for someone who is by definition different. Indeed it is predicted that out-groups (those with different identities) will only be able to use coercion in order to control the individual. In fact there is evidence (David and Turner, 1996) that where attempts to influence are made by an out-group the influence actually exerted is counter-normative: the individual’s attitudes actually move in the opposite direction to those of the out-group. This may be the same phenomenon that criminological theorists such as Cohen (1955) identify when they speak of rejecting one’s rejecters. It can be hypothesised that stigmatisation causes the individual to see the disapproving others as an out-group. This reduces the group’s influence and may even produce counter-influence. This prediction is consistent with the regression analysis presented in Chapter Six, in which stigmatisation predicts lower feelings of shame-guilt.

This analysis of reintegration and stigmatisation has some interesting parallels to research by Reicher and Hopkins (1996) which examines how social identity is used by social actors. Self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987), an extension of social identity theory, hypothesises that social identity is determined by the concepts of accessibility and fit. Fit includes both comparative fit, which is a determination of
which in-group/out-group categorisations will maximise differentiation between and similarity within relevant groups, and normative fit that determines which categorisations makes normative sense given the context. Accessibility is the individual’s tendency to use particular categories depending upon past experience, goals, etc. However, Reicher and Hopkins (1996) argue against an interpretation of self-categorisation theory that suggests that social identity should be seen as the result of simply a cognitive calculation of fit that is determined by the context. Rather they argue that issues of both comparative and normative fit can rarely be taken as given and that social identity is determined in part by negotiation and argument between social actors. The study reported by Reicher and Hopkins uses discourse analysis to analyse the way an anti-abortionist campaigner attempts to influence medical practitioners. The analysis shows that in an attempt to be persuasive the anti-abortionist uses his speech to define anti-abortionists and medical practitioners as in-group members on the basis of a relevant dimension, that is they are both life savers. The importance of this point is that it suggests that the social identities that occur in a conference or court case are not determined simply by structural features of the case but are negotiated by the participants. Participants in a case work to define one another's social relationships (i.e. social identities) through the way they choose to disapprove of the offence, i.e. reintegratively or stigmatically, and how they react to disapproval.

Reintegration and stigmatisation are also strong predictors of unresolved shame. It has been suggested in this chapter that shame-guilt involves recognition of having violated an ethical-norm and that this produces uncertainty about identity and beliefs. In contrast, unresolved shame does not involve recognition of wrongdoing but rather uncertainty about whether one’s actions are shameful. However, it seems likely that unresolved shame involves just as great a threat to identity as shame-guilt. Indeed, an inability to accept or reject accusations of wrongdoing may reflect an even greater conflict between the individual’s behaviour, their ethical beliefs and shaming by others. Thus, an important difference between shame-guilt and unresolved shame might be that uncertainty regarding the wrongness of the offence impedes resolution of threat to identity.
This interpretation of unresolved shame is consistent with the results found in this thesis. The feelings associated with unresolved shame in Chapter Four, centred on feeling unsure whether the offence committed was wrong and feelings of having been treated unfairly. Both of these highlight ongoing uncertainty regarding what was normatively correct. Furthermore, the regression analysis in Chapter Six showed that unresolved shame was more likely in subjects who thought the offence was less wrong. For subjects who felt that the offence was wrong, shaming by respected others produced social validation and feelings of shame-guilt. However, for subjects who thought the offence was less wrong shaming did not validate their beliefs but rather conflicted with them. Some of these subjects seem unable to resolve the uncertainty that occurred as a result of shaming; the individual is neither influenced to feel shame-guilt nor rejects the reference group.

An inability to resolve shame feelings may also be related to the finding that these subjects were more likely to be stigmatised during their conference or court case. It is argued that stigmatisation categorises the subject as having a different identity to the “shamers” and thus encourages them to reject the group’s normative values. This in itself might produce unresolved shame because the overwhelming community view (which the individual may share) is that drink driving is wrong, yet stigmatisation encourages the person to reject this view. Furthermore, if shaming produces uncertainty for some offenders regarding the acceptability of drink driving, then stigmatisation increases the difficulty of resolving this question because it legitimises or encourages rejection of both the ethical norm and the reference group. It does not seem surprising given this conflict that some subjects are unable to reach resolution.
Summary of Propositions

The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter can be summarised by a number of key propositions regarding the three shame-related emotions and their relationship to shaming.

The Shame Emotions

1. Shame-guilt occurs as a result of the realisation that one has acted contrary to an ethical norm and this realisation threatens one’s identity.

2. Unresolved shame occurs as a result of uncertainty regarding whether one has acted contrary to an ethical norm and this uncertainty threatens one’s identity.

3. Feelings of embarrassment-exposure occur when one is exposed, or believes that one may be exposed, in public as non-normative.

Shaming and Shame

4. Shaming will produce shame-guilt to the extent that it validates the offender’s belief, or influences them to believe, that they acted contrary to an ethical norm and that this threatens their identity.

5. Shaming will produce unresolved shame to the extent that it creates uncertainty regarding whether the individual has acted contrary to their ethical norms and this threatens their identity.

6. Shaming will result in shame-guilt or unresolved shame only when shaming is by a relevant reference group.

7. The degree to which shaming is reintegrative or stigmatic will affect whether those who shame the individual are seen as a valid reference group. Reintegrative or inclusive disapproval will reinforce the source as a reference group while stigmatisation or out-casting will diminish the source as a reference group.

While the empirical studies reported in this thesis are consistent with these propositions, this research did not set out to test them. A significant limitation of the correlational analyses reported here is that they are unable to determine causality. Indeed, while the phenomenology of the emotions is important, a greater understanding
of their causal nature will provide greater insight into what psychological mechanisms account for the emotions. This is a difficult task because many of these emotions may not occur within laboratories. Even if they did the validity and ethicality of manipulating individuals to perceive, for example, that they have violated an ethical norm (see proposition one) are difficult issues for experiments. Furthermore, shame-guilt and unresolved shame are both associated with issues of great importance to individuals and occur relatively infrequently in people’s lives. However, there may be a greater scope for studying the emotions in naturalistic settings as done in this thesis. Indeed this work is already occurring, albeit unscientifically, by facilitators who conduct conferences. Factors such as who is invited to conferences and the way conferences are run might be varied so as to produce variable outcomes. Formally studied, these variations may provide a test, for example, of whether the effect of disapproval depends upon the degree to which others are perceived as a reference group (see proposition seven).

**Conclusion**

This framework suggests that a precondition for feeling shame-guilt is the perception that one has violated an ethical norm. Others influence what is perceived as right and wrong through the process of social validation. However, while the perception of wrongdoing may result in shame-guilt, it is the fact that this is inconsistent with one’s identity and thus threatens it that defines the experience of shame-guilt. It is this uncertainty regarding identity from which the feelings of shame-guilt emerge, including those of self-consciousness, uncertainty regarding values, discomfort and anger at the self.
Chapter 8: Shame, shaming and criminal justice

One motivation for studying the emotion of shame was to test Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming by exploring what emotion or emotions are experienced as a reaction to shaming. Chapter Two contributed to this empirically by measuring the shame-related emotions occurring in conferences and court cases and testing their dimensionality. Chapter Five tested the dimensionality of reintegrative shaming and in doing so developed reliable and valid measures of its key concepts. Finally, Chapter Six built upon these chapters to explore the relationship between shaming and the shame-related emotions. This final chapter will discuss the implications of these results for the application of reintegrative shaming theory and more broadly the role shaming and shame play in criminal justice interventions. While the negative self-evaluation associated with the emotion of shame has caused concern (Maxwell, 1999; Tangney, 1991), this chapter argues that shame management is possibly a more important issue. Placing greater emphasis upon shame management also has implications for how shaming is conceptualised within criminal justice settings. Particular attention will be paid to the relevance of shaming and shame to restorative justice as well as more specific implications for how restorative justice conferences are facilitated. While the previous chapter provided a theoretical framework for understanding shame, this chapter instead will focus on the policy implications of the empirical results.

The Re-Emergence of Shame in Criminology

The relevance of shaming to the regulation of behaviour is not new. Shaming has been identified as playing an important role in social control by anthropological studies of Polynesian (Mead 1937) and Asian (Benedict 1946) societies, as well as analyses of European criminal justice practices in earlier centuries (Braithwaite, 1989). Equally well documented is a move away from stigmatising practises in European-based criminal justice systems during the century and a half until the 1970’s (Braithwaite, 1990). However, in the 1980’s and 1990’s a number of developments have re-emphasised the role of shaming. Criminologists (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990)
have begun to explore the effect that the emotions have in criminal justice interventions. In particular, Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming argues that informal shaming that occurs as part of criminal justice practices is of central importance in understanding the effectiveness of such procedures.

A second development is a movement in some criminal justice systems around the world towards restorative justice. Unlike traditional court procedures that emphasise the importance of just sentences these approaches place considerable importance upon resolution of conflict and reparation of harm. In doing so restorative justice emphasises the importance of the relationships among offenders, victims and the rest of the affected community. Reconciliation is emphasised with genuine apologies from offenders often considered by victims and restorative justice practitioners as more important than material reparation (Retzinger and Scheff, 1996). As well as emphasising reparation over retribution (but see Daly, 1999) it is also apparent that this approach aims to convince offenders of their wrongdoing by exposing the offender to the consequences of what they have done. Both of these aims place a much greater focus on understanding the way communities express disapproval of offences. Reintegrative shaming is consistent with this approach because implicit to restoration is reintegration of the offender back into the community. Stigmatisation or outcasting offenders is clearly not restorative.

Finally, it is worth noting that the explicit use of shaming by courts has also become popular again in a way that is quite distinct from, and possibly contradictory to, restorative justice. Recent examples have occurred, particularly in American criminal justice, where shaming has been used in the court system as a deterrent or punishment for convicted offenders. Offenders are ordered to complete “shame sentences” relevant to the crime they commit instead of spending time in jail. Shoplifters have been ordered to stand out the front of shops holding signs declaring that they stole. Drink drivers are ordered to attach “DUI” stickers to their cars, while those convicted of soliciting sex are ordered to sweep the streets (see Kahan, 1996, 1998). Another area of American criminal justice which reputedly incorporates shaming are boot camps where offenders are subject to military-style discipline but are also publicly confronted with their offence. While these approaches to crime have
become more popular there is also concern that humiliation of this type is a regressive step which simply demeans offenders’ dignity (Massaro, 1997) while failing to protect basic human rights or allow rehabilitation. This type of shaming, and criticism of it, has highlighted the question of whether shaming can play a constructive role in the criminal justice system.

Questions are also directed at more private offender-victim reconciliation processes, such as restorative justice conferences. One concern is that shaming a young offender, who potentially has low self-esteem, may actually exacerbate problems rather than prevent reoffending. If offences are committed in part due to low self-esteem, gained through lack of emotional support or a difficult past, surely damaging the offender’s esteem further is only going to exacerbate problems. Such concerns are given some support by studies that have differentiated between shame and guilt, casting doubt on whether shame is actually a desirable emotion for offenders to feel (Zhang, 1995). Tangney (1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992) has argued that shame can be differentiated from guilt because its negative focus is inward upon the individual rather than outward upon the act. Because of this, shame is characterised as not only a much more painful emotion but also as a less productive emotion because it is unlikely to facilitate empathy and reparation and is more likely to result in hostility and anger. As discussed in Chapter Six, Tangney and others (Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner et al., 1996) have demonstrated an empirical relationship between measures of shame-proneness and the dispositions to feel anger and lower empathy. Thus, an important question to address is whether shame is a constructive emotion for offenders to feel.

Such concerns regarding the emotion of shame are also supported by the results of a recent study which examines long-term reoffending by offenders who attended restorative justice programs in New Zealand (Maxwell, 1999). In an evaluation of new youth justice legislation introduced in New Zealand in 1989, Maxwell and Morris (1993) followed 211 offenders who had been referred to restorative justice conferences. In a follow up to this research 67 percent of the original sample of offenders reoffended.

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6 Restorative justice conferences are called family group conferences in New Zealand.
offenders were re-interviewed regarding a broad range of factors believed to predict reoffending, including a number of questions regarding the restorative justice conference. Results from discriminant function analysis show that feelings of “shame: being made to feel a bad person” (Maxwell, 1999: p. 6) in the conference were related to persistent reconviction by subjects. In contrast, feelings of remorse occurring as a result of the conference were negatively related to persistent reconviction.

Re-Defining the Role of Shame

The results reported by Tangney and Maxwell suggest that when offenders feel shame during court or conference cases it is likely to be harmful. Both argue that emotions focused upon the offence will be more productive. For Tangney this emotion is guilt while for Maxwell the healthy response is remorse. As was discussed in Chapter Four, however, both these emotions have been described as involving recognition of wrongdoing, concern for the consequences of one’s actions and a desire to make amends. The implication of their findings is that to avoid damaging offenders’ self-esteem the criminal justice system needs to avoid focusing upon offender’s identity. This is consistent with Braithwaite’s (1989) reintegrative shaming theory which argues that shaming that involves disapproval of the offender’s person will lead to reoffending. Braithwaite, however, also argues that these forms of shaming can be separated from reintegrative shaming which focuses on the offence and its consequences, leading to reduced levels of reoffending. Results in Chapter Five provided support for this distinction. Factor analysis of items measuring reintegration, stigmatisation and shaming showed that the perception that others disapproved of what one did was not associated with perceptions that others were either reintegrative or stigmatic. Thus, in practice it would seem that court and conference cases are able to disapprove of the offence without having a negative focus on the offender’s identity.

However, the results question whether this distinction carries over to the emotions felt by offenders. In particular, the factor analyses in Chapter Four suggest that subjects who felt guilty about what they had done also felt shame. Items that operationalised feelings of anger at oneself, feelings of having lost honour and respect
and feeling ashamed of oneself were measured by the same factor (shame-guilt) as items which measured feeling ashamed of one's actions and concern that others had been hurt by one's actions. Thus, it would seem that where subjects feel remorse or guilt about what they have done, these feelings flow on to feelings of shame.

In some respects this finding is intuitive. Surely someone who recognises that they have done something wrong would also be concerned about what their actions say about the self. An example might be someone who has knocked down and robbed an elderly person. If this individual accepted that their actions were wrong, understood the consequences for the elderly person, and empathised with the victims feelings then it seems likely that they would also feel bad about themselves because they were responsible for what has occurred. Indeed, it might be argued that something would be wrong if they did not. It seems unhealthy and undesirable that individuals could behave in ways they regarded as wrong yet not see their behaviour as directly related to who they are. In a significant sense we might interpret this as a denial of responsibility for their actions. Thus, the healthy response might not be to think “I have done a bad act, but in no way am I other than a good person”. The healthiest response might be, “I have done a bad act. While this tells me something bad about myself that I want to change I am still basically a good person.”

Although intuitive, the finding that shame and guilt co-occur raises questions from the perspective of criminal justice policy. While the studies by Tangney and Maxwell suggest that feelings of shame should be avoided our data suggest that shame will accompany feelings of guilt or remorse. However, the results in this thesis also question how destructive shame feelings are for individuals’ self-respect. While the shame-guilt factor identified in Chapter Four measured the feeling of being ashamed of oneself, it was not defined by feelings of being a failure nor of being humiliated, both of which are indicative of a threat to self-esteem. Post-hoc tests also reveal that the shame-guilt factor did not correlate significantly with Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale (court cases $r = .05$, conference cases $r = -.04$) nor with a question asking if the subject’s “self-respect” had increased or decreased as a result of the conference or court case (court cases $r = -.1$, conference cases $r = .05$). These finding suggest that shame-guilt was not associated with perceptions of a debased self nor was it more
likely in subjects who already had lower self-esteem. It was also apparent in Chapter Six that in contrast to Tangney’s shame-proness scale, shame-guilt predicted lower feelings of hostility and predicted greater empathy with victims. Thus, in some important respects the feeling of shame-guilt that emerged in this thesis is not nearly as worrying as might have been assumed, even though partially measured by anger and shame towards the self.

Disparities between the empirical results on the emotion of shame may be explained by differences in the way it has been measured. While negative feelings directed towards the self are evident in shame-guilt, they are not a generalised loss of esteem in oneself nor a feeling that one is a bad person; it is feeling ashamed of oneself as a result of a criminal offence. Maxwell’s measure, in contrast, is completely about feeling one is a bad person: “Did the way [the conference] was dealt with make you feel that you were a bad person?” Tangney’s measure also focuses upon shame as a negative evaluation of the whole self. Indeed, Harder (1995) argues that the “...tendency to consider almost all negative self-evaluations as shame...is also evident in the wording of the TOSCA [Test of Self - Conscious Affect] scale items.” (p. 382). Harder’s criticism is that measurement of shame by Tangney’s scale is limited to one dimension of the emotion: negative self-evaluation. In contrast, the shame-guilt factor in this thesis measures a range of feelings not evident in these other measures. In particular, shame-guilt also involves feeling that what one had done was wrong, concern that others had been hurt, the feeling that one had lost respect or honour in one’s community, and fear of other’s reactions. It might be speculated that when experienced as part of this broader emotion the negative self-evaluation associated with shame is not nearly so toxic.

As previously pointed out in Chapter Four another important difference is that shame-guilt measures a discrete emotional experience while Tangney’s measure of shame-proness (TOSCA) is a personality disposition. It was argued above that it was intuitive that individuals would make negative evaluations about themselves as a result of recognising that they had done serious wrong. However, what the TOSCA measures in extreme cases is a disposition to make negative self-evaluations in response to a much greater range of situations. An example might be of a person who
trips over at a party and as a result feels that they are a worthless. Thus, it might be speculated that shame-proness measures a tendency to see negative implications for one’s self-image in inappropriate situations. The reasons for this tendency might have to do with low self-esteem or with developmental issues. However, it is this conception of shame as an underlying personality trait that resonates with some concerns regarding the emotion of shame occurring in criminology and other contexts. In particular, there is fear that shaming of vulnerable (shame-prone) individuals may simply make them feel worse about themselves. However, given the apparent differences between results of studies on shame-proness and the present results, it is important to distinguish between the discrete emotion on the one hand and the personality disposition on the other.

**Beyond Shame**

Much interest has been focused upon shame. The results in this thesis, however, also highlight the importance of other shame-related emotions. The factor analysis in Chapter Four identified embarrassment-exposure and unresolved shame factors. While this thesis cannot adequately address the short-term or long-term effects of emotional reactions, it seems likely that these emotions have a number of implications for conceptions of shame within the justice system. The embarrassment-exposure emotion, which measured feelings of unwanted attention and humiliation, is significant because it is a shame-related response that subjects report more of in court cases than in conference cases (see Chapter Four). The impact this emotion has on offenders is not clear but it appears more concerned with discomfort due to public exposure than remorse for the offence. Perhaps more important is unresolved shame which leaves the offender unable to put the case, or the offence, behind them. Subjects feeling unresolved shame reported ongoing uncertainty about how wrong the offence was, were “continually bothered” by thoughts that they were unfairly treated, and were more likely to be feeling anger and hostility towards others present at the case. The elements of uncertainty and non-resolution suggest that this emotional reaction is not simply one of defiance in which the subject is rejecting of the entire process. Rather, these subjects seem unable to decide whether or not they should feel shame-
guilt. In this respect the emotion seems to represent a sense of possible shame which the person is unable to dispel.

While acknowledgement of wrongdoing in shame-guilt is associated with empathy and low hostility, the results suggest that unresolved shame may be destructive for both the offender and the criminal justice system. This suggests that a critical factor for criminal justice interventions may not be whether they produce shame, but how well they assist offenders in the resolution of shame. It was argued above that it seemed necessary in some contexts for people to feel shame, because it acknowledged that they are responsible for their behaviour. It might further be argued, in light of these results, that acknowledgement of shame may be important for the wellbeing of offenders. This is because acknowledgement of shame provides certainty that what they did was wrong, which appears to be psychologically important. Furthermore, acknowledgement of wrongdoing allows offenders to remedy what they have done. Neither of these are possible if shame is unresolved and thus prevents offenders from being forgiven by others or rebuilding their social standing amongst their community. It is important to point out that this is discussed in the context of criminal cases where it is generally assumed that what the person has done is wrong. It might also be argued that in some cases unresolved shame should be resolved by not feeling shame at all.

In many respects this finding is consistent with a considerable body of qualitative research on shame. In her clinical work Helen Lewis (1971) identified a form of shame which although unacknowledged by the person experiencing it had a number of identifiable characteristics. The emotion was different to acknowledged shame because it only involved consciousness of a “wince” or “shock” in feeling associated with doubt about how others see the self. Most identifiably by-passed shame involves an element of cognitive confusion. Lewis describes this:

The back and forth ideation about guilt leaves the patient in an insoluble, plaguing dilemma of guilt thought which will not be solved. (Lewis, 1971: p. 234)
Thus, like the unresolved shame factor, the experience involves an ongoing inability to make sense of the “shameful” event. Lewis also noted that this form of shame was particularly associated with feelings of hostility in subjects. Scheff (1990) extends Lewis's analysis by arguing that unacknowledged shame results in shame-rage spirals. In Scheff's analysis shame is a signal that the bond between the individual and others is threatened. When the feelings of hurt (shame) associated with this rejection are not acknowledged by the individual then this emotion can become redirected as further shame and anger at the self and others (Scheff, 1990: p. 171). Scheff argues that this form of unacknowledged shame is often the cause of humiliated fury and can potentially explain not just individual anger but also conflict between nations (Scheff, 1994). In both Lewis's and Scheff's accounts of shame it is evident that when shame is not acknowledged it manifests itself in an unhealthy reaction. Although Nathanson (1992, 1997) does not discuss by-passed shame, he also argues that individuals cope with or avoid shameful experiences in a number of different ways. Nathanson identifies four reactions that are manifestations of shame: withdrawal, attack self, attack other and avoidance. Each of these behavioural scripts can be expressed to varying degrees that are either more or less healthy. In each case extreme manifestations of these reactions are potentially harmful to the individual and/or others. For example, while attack self might involve gentle self-derision, at the extreme it might also include masochistic behaviour.

The importance of shame management is also reflected in empirical research on school bullies and victims (Ahmed, 1999). A study that investigated shame among school children found differences in the way victims, bullies and other students managed shame feelings. Bullies were more likely to externalise blame rather than acknowledge it. Victims of bullying were more likely to feel ongoing feelings of “persistent” shame about themselves. While the causal relationship could not be determined, the implication, at least for bullies, is that the harmful behaviour may have resulted from an inability to resolve previous shame.
Shaming and Resolution

It has been argued on the basis of results in this thesis and other research that a critical factor for criminal justice is the way individuals cope with, or manage, shame. If attention is focused not on whether individuals feel shame but how they resolve it then this also has implications for how shaming is conceptualised. It suggests that avoiding shaming will not help insulate individuals from shame but may actually make it more difficult for offenders to resolve shame. In an example given above it was argued that it would be intuitive for an offender to feel shame for having attacked an elderly person. In such an example it would be difficult to imagine how a community could insulate that offender from their own sense of shame or repress their own feeling of disapproval. Rather, it would seem that shaming, or disapproval by relevant others, plays an important role in enabling the resolution of shame. Firstly, because it validates that a particular behaviour is wrong and secondly, when reintegrative, helps identify what the individual needs to do in order to reclaim their respectability. Not addressing the issue at a community level denies the individual the chance of acknowledging what they have done and rebuilding their self-respect. It might even be argued that the avoidance of shaming is a naive goal because disapproval and anger will be felt as a result of offences and thus will be expressed even if in very subtle ways. This suggests that shaming needs to be understood in terms of the way it helps resolve shame as much as the degree to which it results in shame.

Before addressing this further it is important to discuss a number of conceptual issues regarding the concept of shaming. The extreme nature of “shaming punishments” has highlighted a particular definition of what shaming is. In particular, these forms of punishment suggest that shaming involves public humiliation of the individual, an explicit or implicit evaluation of the offender, and ongoing implications for the social standing of offenders. However, a substantially different use of the term shaming is employed by reintegrative shaming theory which defines shaming as a broad spectrum of disapproving behaviours ranging from those that are highly respectful of the offender (reintegrative) to those that are disrespectful (stigmatising). The stigmatising shaming evident in the public humiliation of offenders is captured by this definition, but so too are more subtle and positive forms of disapproval. The breadth
of this definition is central to Braithwaite’s theory because it allows the theory to
distinguish between forms of social disapproval. It is by seeking to classify a broad
range of social behaviour on this single dimension that the theory acquires its
explanatory power.

An important implication of differences between these definitions of shaming is
that criticisms of “shaming” in the criminal justice system envisage a substantially
different concept to the one defined by Braithwaite. Indeed a possible criticism of
Braithwaite’s use of the word shaming is that it is not consistent with common usage.
It might be argued that because of cultural values attached to the word shaming it
should only be applied to what he terms stigmatising shaming and that an alternative
label is needed for reintegrative forms of disapproval. Indeed it might even be argued
that the term “social disapproval” better represents the breadth of meaning intended.
Braithwaite intended to provoke 20th century sensibilities by suggesting the 19th
century Victorians, contemporary Asians, and Polynesians among others had more
healthy ways of thinking about shame and shaming. Highlighting, as Scheff (1990a)
puts it, that we have “...become ashamed to be ashamed...” (p. 16; also see Scheff,
1990b). Given that acknowledgement is believed by writers such as Scheff to be
fundamental to healthy negotiation of shame, 20th century sweeping of shame and
shaming under the carpet is unhealthy. The important point made by this discussion
is that the use of the term shaming throughout this thesis, based upon reintegrative
shaming theory, refers to a much broader concept than simply public humiliation, or
even private denigration of the individual.

The importance of differentiating between conceptions of shaming is evident in
discussion of restorative justice conferences, which have been explained using
reintegrative shaming theory. “Shaming” intuitively implies an active, intentional
process. It suggests that the other participants at a conference act with the intention
to make the offender feel the emotion of shame. Moreover, this in turn has been taken
as implying that this is done through a format which is explicitly focused upon making
the offender feel bad about themself or their act. However, this picture is far from
accurate. Conferences are not structured in a way that encourages participants to
intentionally shame offenders, even if in some cases this is what occurs. The structure
of conferences, as well as the style of questions asked by facilitators (McDonald et al., 1994) focus participants upon discussing the consequences of an offence as well as finding solutions to any harms that have occurred. Braithwaite’s (1989: p. 100) definition of shaming includes all behaviour with the intent or result of causing remorse in the offender and/or condemnation by others. An attractive aspect of this definition is that it is inclusive of behaviour, such as discussion of consequences, even where those involved are not aware of shame or shaming. Defined this way shaming is a much more appropriate description of what occurs at conferences. Indeed, results presented in Chapter Six suggested that shaming at court and conference cases was not exhaustively measured through offenders’ perceptions of others’ disapproval. Social disapproval, or shaming, may have been expressed by simply attending a conference or court case, or simply by hearing the consequences of one’s action. In fact one important feature of conferences might be that they are able to communicate disapproval without necessarily expressing it directly. Given Braithwaite’s definition, shaming is an important theoretical tool for understanding this social process. However, it is also worthwhile noting that it is not, and nor does it claim to be, a description of how people understand their own behaviour.

In this thesis shaming was measured as the subject’s perception of others’ disapproval of the act. The results in Chapter Six show that in cases where the offender had a high degree of respect for those present, the perception of strong disapproval was associated with greater feelings of shame-guilt. It was also apparent that shaming did not predict either embarrassment-exposure or unresolved shame. Thus, disapproval of the subject’s behaviour was not associated with feeling that things had not been resolved or that they had been unfairly judged. However, these results do suggest that shaming may play an important role in the acknowledgement that behaviour was wrong.

The offender’s perception of reintegration or stigmatisation was also related to whether shame-guilt was acknowledged in the case and whether unresolved shame occurred afterwards. It was evident that when the shaming context labelling the offender as evil and applied master status traits the offender was more likely to feel unresolved shame and embarrassment-exposure. It might be speculated that this type
of shaming discourages resolution for a number of reasons. It was hypothesised in the previous chapter that stigmatisation may communicate to offenders that they are different to the shaming community, in turn undermining the validity of that community’s beliefs and engendering in the offender a desire to distance themself. While this explanation was drawn from social influence perspectives (Turner et al., 1987) a similar argument is evident in labelling theory (Erickson, 1962) and reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989). It could also be speculated that stigmatisation may be used by offenders to neutralise shame-guilt about the offence on the basis that others’ behaviour had been worse towards them.

The regression analyses also show that stigmatising shaming predicts lower amounts of shame-guilt. Stigmatisation may prevent individuals from acknowledging wrongdoing because it creates a context in which the individual’s attention is focused upon defending themself. The offender may be fearful of admitting wrongdoing because they fear that the response will be further stigmatisation. Of course an alternative hypothesis, because causal direction cannot be tested, might be that denial of shame-guilt is justified by perceptions of stigmatisation. These results are, however, consistent with the argument that stigmatisation reduces acknowledgement of shame-guilt and increases unresolved shame.

The reverse pattern of results was evident for the measure of reintegration. Where shaming of an act is respectful of the offender and attempts to forgive them it is associated with lower levels of unresolved shame and greater feelings of shame-guilt. This is also supportive of the argument that reintegrative shaming assists offenders in the acknowledgement of shame. Just as stigmatisation was hypothesised to alienate the offender from the values of the shaming community, reintegration may help validate the community’s disapproval. Reintegration communicates to the offender that they are a respected member of the community, thus enhancing the strength of this social identity and the validity of its values. Equally, reintegration might allow greater acknowledgement of wrongdoing because the context is not threatening to the offender, thus allowing greater disclosure of the offender’s part.
In the above discussion it has been suggested that reintegration and stigmatisation may have different effects upon the shame-related emotions experienced by offenders. This is not intended to imply that influence is only occurring in that direction. As mentioned above the results reported in this thesis are correlational and thus do not provide information regarding the causal direction of effects. Thus it might be that the emotions of shame-guilt and unresolved shame actually cause the perceptions of reintegration and stigmatisation. It is perhaps more likely that the relationship between shaming and shame-guilt is recursive, with for example, reintegration leading to shame-guilt but this also allowing greater reintegration, and so on. It might also be that lower feelings of shame-guilt result in greater stigmatisation, due to perceptions by participants that the offender is not remorseful, leading to less shame-guilt and greater unresolved shame. Although the causal direction is not known, it is significant that shaming that is reintegrative of the offender is associated with greater acknowledgement of shame-guilt while stigmatisation is associated with unresolved shame.

It has been argued that within criminal justice the distinction that may be of greatest importance is not whether shame or guilt is felt but rather whether feelings of shame are resolved. Furthermore, shaming would appear to play an important role in how shame is dealt with in criminal justice cases. Overt shaming of the individual may result in the on-going negative self-evaluation identified by Tangney (1991) and Maxwell (1999). Citizens who perceived that they have been stigmatised leave conference or court cases with the feeling that matters are not resolved and feeling angry with others. However, reintegrative shaming of the offence by respected others is associated with greater acknowledgement of wrongdoing and remorse during cases and less ongoing negative emotion. Thus, concern that shaming damages offenders’ self-esteem and alienates them from the community seems to be restricted to stigmatising forms of shaming. There is also some evidence that shaming plays an important role in allowing offenders to resolve issues arising from an offence and may even be crucial in resolving feelings of shame-guilt and remorse.
Implications for Effective Shaming

With the assumption that the resolution of shame is important, and that shaming plays an important role in achieving this, the results in this thesis have practical implications for the facilitation of conferences. One factor which, as just discussed, appears to be important in determining whether shame-guilt or unresolved shame occurs is the degree to which shaming is reintegrative or stigmatic. This suggests that facilitators should, where reasonable, steer conferences away from stigmatisation of the offender and provide the opportunity for reintegration. Indeed, a number of elements within the conference structure are aimed at achieving this objectives. Particularly important in conferences are the questions that facilitators ask the participants. A clear objective of these questions is to focus all participants at a conference on the offence that has been committed and the consequences of that offence. For example, the victim is asked “Now let’s find out from (victim) in what way he/she has been affected? (Victim), would you tell us about that” (McDonald, Moore, O’Connell and Thorsborne, 1995: p. 62). Questions to victim supporters and others at the conference also focus upon the consequences of the offence and emotions arising from those consequences. This clear focus allows participants to express their emotions and disapproval but also helps to divert attention from the offender’s person, thus limiting stigmatisation (McDonald et al., 1994). The importance of the way in which these issues are addressed, and the particular questions that are used in conferences, highlights the advantage of facilitators using questions or scripts developed with these specific aims in mind.

Other techniques important to achieving reintegrative outcomes are less easily scripted. For example the re-framing of angry, blaming outbursts into expressions of hurt are another way of refocusing conferences on the consequences of offences rather than stigmatisation (McDonald et al., 1994). The results in this thesis suggest that these techniques are an important, if not a crucial aspect, of the conferencing procedure. Enhancing the possibility for reintegration, and minimising stigmatisation, in this way appears to maximise the possibility of offenders feeling shame-guilt for the offence and minimising embarrassment-exposure or unresolved shame. Qualitative observation suggests that one way such techniques impact upon conferences is by
interrupting negative cycles of stigmatisation followed by defiance or withdrawal by offenders which only increases stigmatisation because it communicates low feelings of remorse. By focusing conferences on the consequences, facilitators seem to reduce stigmatisation and instead encourage reintegration and shame-guilt.

An important finding in the thesis was that the relationship between shaming and shame was moderated by the degree to which the offender respected those who effectively the shamers. In those cases where there was high respect for the others present at the case shaming increased the amount of shame-guilt felt. However, there was no significant relationship where respect was lower. This has important and fairly obvious implications for conferencing. Training of facilitators (McDonald et al., 1994) emphasises the importance of having people who can best support the offender at the conference. A key method of determining this is by asking the offender who they want present, who they respect. In cases where the offender is not initially ashamed of their actions, disapproval by others would appear to play an important role in influencing them to see their actions as wrong. Perhaps even more importantly this type of shaming may help offenders who are uncertain to acknowledge shame-guilt. This suggests that the composition of conferences is important and that a particular emphasis needs to be placed on identifying and inviting those who the offender respects.

The importance that offender supporters play in conferences also has broader implications. A number of approaches to restorative justice, both theoretical and practical, have emphasised the importance of the interaction between victim and offender. A very good reason for this is that the basic philosophy behind restorative justice is of enabling reconciliation and restoration between the victim and offender. A second reason for this focus is the belief that it is having to actually face the victim which produces shame, remorse and empathy in offenders. While not arguing against the importance of these factors, the present results suggest that the offender’s supporters may play a much more important role than is sometimes acknowledged and that this aspect should be given considerable emphasis in practice. Although the role of victims was not assessed, the results might also be interpreted as supporting the use
of conferencing in cases where there is no victim or where victims are unwilling to attend.

The importance of shamers being respected also has important implications for the role facilitators or mediators play in criminal justice interventions. It is unlikely that a facilitator, whether a police officer or another official, will be highly respected by the offender. Even more certain is that the facilitator will not be respected as much or more than the offender’s supporters. This suggests that shaming by the facilitator is unlikely to result in greater feelings of shame on the part of the offender or at the very least will be less effective than shaming by others. Furthermore, if the facilitator is actually seen as an out-group member, dissimilar to the offender on relevant dimensions, then some research (David and Turner, 1996) suggests that shaming by him or her may actually be counterproductive. Although not seen in the results presented in this thesis, this research suggests that shaming by disrespected others may result in the offender feeling less shame and perhaps even seeing the offence as less wrong. These results support training (McDonald et al., 1994) that encourages facilitators to maintain an impartial mediating role rather than actively disapproving of the offence.

Unresolved Shame and Reintegrative Shaming Theory

Discussion of shaming within criminology, and particularly reintegrative shaming theory, has focused primarily upon the emotion of shame. However, the results presented in this thesis suggest that unresolved shame may be just as or even more important than shame-guilt in the prediction of recidivism. What is significant about these results for reintegrative shaming theory is that reintegration does not simply increase shame-guilt and stigmatisation does not simply decrease shame-guilt. Reintegration also reduced unresolved shame while stigmatisation increased it. Thus, predictions of recidivism may need to take into account both emotions. One suggestion is that the ratio of the two emotions might provide a useful tool for understanding the emotional and motivational links between shaming and recidivism.

Table 8.1 illustrates predictions of recidivism that might be made if shame-guilt and unresolved shame are both taken into account. This model suggests that there are
two situations in which clear predictions can be made. The first is where there are high feelings of shame-guilt and low unresolved shame. As the offender is primarily concerned with the “wrongness” of what they have done it should be expected that recidivism will be low. In contrast, the low shame-guilt high-unresolved shame offender feels no shame-guilt during the case and is unsure about the fairness of their treatment and how wrong of the offence actually was. The correlation between stigmatisation and unresolved shame also suggests that bonds between the offender and their community may be weakened as a result of the case. This seems the condition most likely to result in recidivism. The future behaviour of an offender feeling low shame and low unresolved shame is less easy to predict. It would appear that the offender is not emotionally affected by feelings that what they did was wrong. However, it is also evident that they do not feel unfairly treated by the intervention. It seems possible that this low level of emotionality may result in offenders behaving as rational actors: weighing up the desire to offend against deterrents. The offender who feels both high shame and unresolved shame is different again. These offenders feel both remorse for what has occurred but despite this do not feel that important issues were resolved. These offenders may well have the hardest time due to this conflict of emotions. Re-offending in this group may hinge upon how this conflict is resolved, which suggests that re-offending is possible.

Table 8.1: predicting recidivism from shame and unresolved emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low shame</th>
<th>High shame</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low unresolved</td>
<td>Lower recidivism</td>
<td>Lowest recidivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shame</td>
<td>- rationally calculated action.</td>
<td>- remorseful for offence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Highest recidivism</td>
<td>Higher recidivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unresolved</td>
<td>- resentful at treatment, alienated</td>
<td>- remorseful but also alienated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shame</td>
<td>from values and community</td>
<td>from values and community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

213
Conclusion

The results presented throughout this thesis show that the process of shaming and its emotional consequences are complex. The research implies that shaming should be thought of more broadly than as behaviour intended to produce shame. The concept as defined by Braithwaite (1989) embodies a variety of ways in which disapproval is communicated intentionally and unintentionally. It is also true that communities engage in shaming of offenders through a variety of formal, non-formal, organised and non-organised mediums. This shaming seems to play an important role in whether offenders acknowledge that what they have done is wrong, whether they are able to repair the damage they caused, how they are treated by the community, and how they come to feel about themself and the offence. Shaming and its role in the resolution of shame is also important because feelings of guilt and shame, whether acknowledged or not, are often inherently associated with criminal offences. Thus, it is argued that an important aspect of shaming in restorative justice procedures, such as restorative justice conferences, is how it facilitates this process of resolution. In the drink driving component of the reintegrative shaming experiments it was evident that those subjects who perceived that they were reintegratively shamed were much more likely to feel shame-guilt during the case and less unresolved shame afterwards. These results provide strong support for reintegrative shaming theory but also highlight a new understanding of the role shaming and the shame-related emotions play in criminal justice.
GLOBAL RATINGS CODE BOOK

Introduction

In this code book instructions and comments on each question in the global ratings questionnaire are provided. The aim of this is to explain the questions, that is, what they are meant to achieve, and how they should be approached.

The comments accompanying each question enable the observer to clarify key concepts as well as highlight aspects of the questions that are of particular importance. The code book is devised with the following in mind:

The purpose of the experiment is to compare outcomes for court cases with those for conference cases. It is therefore most important that ratings are made according to the same principles in court cases as in conference cases. For the same reason, it is important that the same principles be applied in PCA cases as in theft and violence cases.

Making global observation

The aim of the global ratings questionnaire is to obtain a general, impressionistic view of the content of conferences and court cases. There are several versions of this questionnaire, all of which are designed to record much of the information relevant to, but not directly measured by, the systematic observation instrument. The systematic observation instrument has been designed with simplicity in mind. It is hoped this will allow the observer to devote more observational resources to the details of court and conference proceedings relevant to the global ratings questionnaire.

During observation, the sort of variables worthy of attention are: the duration, intensity, quality, and source of interactions. You might consider how often various participants speak, the quality of their contributions, and their respective influence on proceedings. Another very important mode of interaction will be non-verbal behaviours. These include hand signals, body movements and positions, facial expressions, exchanged glances, and eye contact. At other times, cues such as tone, pitch, loudness, and continuity of speech may be informative.

Some or all of these things will be relevant and worthy of attention at different times. None should be considered systematically or in isolation, however. Instead, it is preferable if the observer is aware of these factors and bears them in mind at a more general level.

You should complete the global ratings questionnaire by referring to your general impression of events and, if need be, by carefully weighing up the importance of specific observations that may be relevant to particular questions. Do not go beyond this weighing-up process and don't agonise over answers.

How to fill in the GR Questionnaire

The global ratings questionnaire should be completed immediately after the conference or court case has ended. It is preferable that you find a quiet place where you will not be disturbed. Answers should be given by circling only one number on the scale associated
with each question your answer should best reflect your opinion or impression of events as they relate to that question. Questions must be answered in the order in which they are presented.

Although the global ratings questionnaire consists primarily of global rating questions, it also seeks details of the nature of the offence, other people present, the type (if any) of victim present, and details about the offender. Some of this information will be forthcoming during the conference or court case, in which case it can be noted by the observer at that time. Other details and any information needing clarification, can be obtained from the police case report after the conference or court case. There are three points of special importance:

1. The observer must record the duration of the court or conference.
2. At the conclusion of a conference the observer must obtain a copy of the outcome agreement.
3. At the conference the observer must obtain full contact details from the offender, victim and their respective supporters.
4. Observers must ensure that the facilitator, and where appropriate the community representative, obtain and complete their respective questionnaires.

1. How much reintegrative shaming was expressed?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
   none very much

The concept of reintegrative shaming is essentially defined by four main facets all of which involve disapproval of the offence (shaming). Depending upon how disapproval of the offence is expressed it can either be reintegrative or stigmatising. Reintegrative shaming is disapproval of the act where:

1.) there is disapproval of the act while sustaining a relationship of respect with the offender

2.) Ceremonies to certify deviance are terminated by ceremonies to decertify deviance, for example, if forgiveness of the offender is expressed by the end of the process.
3.) There is disapproval of the act without disapproval of the offender or labelling the person as deviant.
4.) Deviance is not allowed to become a master status trait. Ie. the person does not leave characterised as a ‘junkie’ or a ‘criminal’, or any other deviant identity.

This question addresses all of the (inter-related) facets outlined above. Essentially reintegrative shaming is concerned with disapproval of the offender's criminal actions while approving of the offender as a person who is capable of being reaccepted into the
community. It is the extent to which participants disapproved of the offence in a reintegrative way that should be considered when answering this question. In answering this question an observer must look for the processes whereby disapproval of the act (offence) is accompanied by a reintegation of the actor (offender) as a person worthy of approval.

**Global Ratings**

1.) How much reintegrative shaming was expressed?

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<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>very much</td>
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2.) Ceremonies to certify deviance are **terminated by ceremonies to decertify deviance**, for example, if forgiveness of the offender is expressed by the end of the process.
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In answering this question an observer must look for the processes whereby disapproval of the act (offence) is accompanied by a reintegation of the actor (offender) as a person worthy of approval.
Respect for offender

2.) How much support was the offender given during the conference?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>none</th>
<th>very much</th>
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Support can be considered as almost anything done to help, encourage, console or assist the offender. This may involve others speaking in favour of the offender, offers to assist the offender, displays of consoling and comforting the offender, of defending (standing up for) and vouching for the offender, or even just the presence of others. Did you feel the offender was supported by others present at the case? It is worth noting that support can come from people simply attending the court case or conference as supporters, so long as they do not undermine the offender.

3.) How reintegrative was the conference for this offender?

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>not at all reintegrative</th>
<th>very reintegrative</th>
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The concern here is whether the conference is in actual fact reintegrative for the offender. While question (1) asks about the type of shaming that occurred, this question focuses upon how reintegrated the offender was at the end of the case. It is important to note that there can be a high degree of reintegration without there being any shame or shaming. Thus we are interested in the extent to which the offender’s character is restored: the extent to which the offender is forgiven, respected and accepted as a person at the conclusion of the case.

4.) How much approval of the offender as a person was expressed?

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>none</th>
<th>very much</th>
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</table>

By approval we mean any favourable endorsements of the offender’s good character. Examples of approving names and labels include ‘responsible’, ‘hard-working’, ‘good girl’, ‘kind’, and ‘trustworthy’. How much did others at the conference express such sentiments.
5. How much was the offender treated by their supporters as someone they love?

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
& 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 \\
not at all & & & & & & & & \\
very much & & & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

This includes treatment of the offender that is inclusive and caring by their supporters. Verbally, this may be expressed directly or through expressions of concern or love. Non-verbally, inclusive treatment may include behaviours such as caring, concerned looks, putting an arm around the offender, etc. To love the offender is more than just to like or respect them, it means to care deeply about the offender.

6. How much respect for the offender was expressed?

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
& 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 \\
none & & & & & & & & \\
very much & & & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

Here we are looking for any statement expressing respect for and/or approval of the offender as a person. Such expressions are positive in nature and have the purpose of confirming or reinforcing the offender's character, status, or integrity.

Disapproval of the offender's act

7. How much disapproval of this type of offence was expressed?

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
& 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 \\
none & & & & & & & & \\
very much & & & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

8. How much disapproval of the offender's act was expressed?

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
& 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 \\
none & & & & & & & & \\
very much & & & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

These two questions are concerned with the extent to which participants expressed that the offence (act) was wrong. However the two questions also make an important distinction between disapproval of the type of act in general and disapproval of the offender's act in particular.

‘Expressed’ is the key word here. The mere appearance of the offender in court or conference is not enough in itself to pass as expression of disapproval either for the act in general or the specific act committed by the offender.
Appendix A: The Global Observation Codebook

Only general disapproval about the type of offence (which does not directly refer to the offender’s specific actions) should be considered when answering question 1. This will often involve disapproval of, for example, shoplifting on the whole (eg ‘shoplifting is such a destructive thing’).

Therefore in answering this question you must code the occasions where the focus of disapproval is directly on the offender’s specific criminal actions. Eg, ‘I think what Michael has done is really stupid’.

**Disapproval of offender**

9.) How much stigmatising shame was expressed?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>very much</td>
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This question is the reverse of question 1, and again focuses on the way in which people disapproved of the offence in the conference. Stigmatisation is the opposite pole of reintegration and thus is also defined by the four facets. Shaming is stigmatising where:

1.) It is disrespectful, humiliating, ie is not done while maintaining a relationship of respect with the offender.
2.) Ceremonies to certify deviance are **NOT terminated** by ceremonies to decertify deviance, ie the offender is not forgiven by the end of the process.
3.) The person is not distinguished from the offence and both are disapproved of and labelled as bad.
4.) Deviance is allowed to become a master status trait. Ie at the end of the process the offender is still seen very much as a ‘criminal’, or some other such deviant identity.

Stigmatising shame involves disapproval of the offender as a person which is disrespectful, which is not forgiving and ultimately suggest that the person is simply a ............ (junkie, criminal, thug etc).

10.) How much disappointment in the offender was expressed?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>very much</td>
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220
Appendix A: The Global Observation Codebook

By disappointment we refer to occasions where others indicate that by engaging in criminal activity, the offender has failed to live up to expectations. This expression may not involve disapproval of the person at all. In fact, disappointment can imply that wrongful behaviour was not expected of the offender because they are usually good.

11.) To what extent was the offender treated as a criminal?

'Treated' is the key word here. The mere appearance of the offender in court or conference is not enough in itself to pass as criminal 'treatment'.

Instead disrespectful, contemptuous treatment is important here. That is, were they treated as someone who has been involved in certain criminal activities before and who will continue to be in similar trouble? Here the offender is deemed permanently reprehensible and is thus seen as unworthy of others' respect.

12.) How often were stigmatising names and labels (e.g., "criminal", 'punk', 'junkie' or 'bully') used to describe the offender?

This question focuses upon the denigration of the offender using specific labels. How often during the case was the offender described or identified as one of a certain (negative) type of person, or, for example a "criminal" or a "thug" etc.

13.) How much moral indignation did the victim party(s) express about the offender's actions?

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The word moral in this context is concerned with what is right and wrong. 'Indignation' is anger/scorn caused by wickedness or misconduct. So this question asks how much the victim parties expressed outraged, self-righteous, anger/scorn at the offence because they saw it as morally wrong. In addition this is connected to the idea that the offender is morally depraved in comparison to the expresser who is morally right.

A N/A response would be warranted on those occasions when no victim party/community representative is present.
14.) How much disapproval of the offender as a person was expressed?

This includes any disapproval of the offender which involves any disrespectful, negative expressions, labelling or name calling, which has the purpose of degrading the offender's character. This question focuses on disapproval of the offender not their act.

**Offender apologise**

15.) To what extent did the offender accept they had done wrong?

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This question asks the observer to judge the extent to which the offender accepted that the offence was wrong. During the case did the offender refuse to acknowledge that what they had done was wrong, partially accepted it (e.g., admitted that it was not right but that it wasn’t that bad) . . . , or strongly agreed/stated it was wrong.

In court, things that the defendant's lawyer says (particularly if you watch the body language of the offender at the same time) can sometimes give a clue to the extent to which the offender accepts that he/she has done wrong. It is important to note that a guilty plea itself is of little discriminatory value, given that they should not have been assigned to RISE if they were unwilling to plead guilty. For the unusual cases where Not Guilty pleas occur, this should have an important effect on the rating.

16.) How sorry/remorseful was the offender for their actions?

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Verbal expressions of remorse should be fairly straightforward. Non-verbal expressions of remorse should also be taken into consideration and primarily involve the attitude and body language of the offender; ask yourself the question 'did the offender seem sorry?' when answering/addressing this question.

17.) When reaching the conference/court outcome, how severe was the offender on themselves?

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Appendix A: The Global Observation Codebook

In deciding upon an outcome for the conference the offender is often important. Did the offender attempt to avoid any inconvenience to themselves (i.e., was it not at all severe on themselves), or did they offer to take on a number of agreements which could be considered severe.

18.) Did the offender apologise?

This is a simple 'yes'/'no' response option, and can include any form of apology indicated below.

Sometimes it becomes evident that an apology has occurred prior to the case. This is not recorded unless the apology is in effect repeated during the court or conference case.

19.) If the offender apologised, what form did the apology take? (state number of times each type was expressed)

1. Verbal
2. Handshake
3. Hug
4. Pat on shoulder
5. Kiss
6. Other

A handshake should be considered an apologetic gesture when it is initiated by the offender toward a party from which the offender seeks forgiveness. Similarly, a hug, pat on the shoulder, or kiss should also be seen as an act of apology when initiated by the offender toward another from whom the offender seeks forgiveness.

Offender is forgiven

20.) To what extent was the offender forgiven for their actions?

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223
This question is not restricted to explicit displays of forgiveness. Forgiveness may be evident simply as an attitude towards the offender. To what extent do you feel the offender had been forgiven by those at the case.

In many cases there will be no discussion or evidence of forgiveness of any kind, when the score will be 1.

It is important to note that there can be no forgiveness in cases where no one feels that the offender has done anything wrong.

21.) How clearly was it communicated to the offender that they could put their actions behind them?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all clearly very clearly

This question is essentially asking if the individuals participating in the case indicated (either explicitly or implicitly) that the offender could put the action behind them (i.e., that they were forgiven and could get on with their life).

Obviously if there is no relevant communication, score 1.

22.) How much forgiveness of the offender was expressed?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
none very much

As opposed to question 20 this question focuses on the expression of forgiveness. To what extent did others express forgiveness of the offender? Expressions of interest are included in the list detailed in Q23 below.

23.) If the offender was forgiven, what form did the forgiveness take? (state number of times each type was expressed)

1 Verbal
2 Handshake
3 Hug
4 Pat on shoulder
5 Kiss
6 Other
Appendix A: The Global Observation Codebook

Any of the above gestures should be seen as an act of forgiveness to the extent that they are initiated by others toward the offender, especially if they are a direct response to any apologetic gesture by the offender.

**Defiance by the offender**

24.) How much did the offender claim their actions were accidental or unintentional?

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This question addresses the extent to which the offender claimed that the offence (actions) occurred by accident or unintentionally rather than on purpose or by design. This includes cases where the offender claims that part of the offence or perhaps just the consequences were not intended. This question should not be confused with responsibility; an offender can accept full responsibility for his/her action but still insist that it was accidental.

25.) To what extent did the offender hold others responsible for their actions?

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This question focuses on the issue of not accepting personal responsibility. Did the offender deny full responsibility by claiming that others were totally or partly responsible, for example ....... "they should have stopped me", or ....... "they provoked me". What needs to be recorded here is the involvement of others who the offender claims should be accountable for the offenders actions.

26.) How defiant (cocky bold, brashly confident) was the offender?

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Consistent with the definition of defiance in the Systematic Observation code book, defiance is to be considered as any "occasion where the offender responds to a request or demand by being deliberately resistant, or by outwardly challenging it." But since the nature of these global questions is more diffuse, defiance in this question should also be seen as an omnipresent attitude of open disobedience or resistance.
27.) How sullen/unresponsive was the offender?

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This is another aspect of defiance where the offender is resentful and uncooperative. However, it is a much more passive defiance where the offender withdraws from the situation by being sullen and unresponsive.

**Consequences of the offender’s act**

28.) How emotionally powerful was the account given of the consequences of the offender’s act?

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<td>very emotionally powerful</td>
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With this question we are interested in the emotional intensity of the communications rather than the extent of them. The account of the consequences could be almost non-existent, very factual (eg. simply a list of damage), or alternatively it could be very emotional (eg the impact it has had on a family). Equally the way in which it is said is of great importance (eg the victim was very upset while relating the consequences). What is important in responding to this question is the way in which the consequences are recounted.

29.) How emotionally responsive was the offender to the account given of the consequences of their act?

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This is concerned with the response of the offender to the description of the consequences of their act. Were they impassive, not affected or were they obviously upset by the consequences for others? Often an offender's body language provides the greatest clue to answering this question.

30.) How much discussion of the consequences (even if not realised) of this type of offence occurred?

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226
This question is concerned with the discussion of consequences of the type of offence (for example 'shoplifting causes prices to rise'). This question does not include discussion of the offender’s actions specifically.

31 How much discussion of the consequences of the offender’s actions occurred?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

none very much

This question is only concerned with the direct results of the offender’s actions (for example, ‘what you did really upset your mother’). It does not include discussion of the consequences of the type of offence.

**Discussion of outcome**

32.) How much did the offender contribute to the conference / court outcome?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 no outcome

not at all very much

Here the interest is twofold. Firstly we are interested in the extent to which the offender participated in formulating the conference/court outcome. Secondly our attention should be on whether or not the offender’s input into this stage of the proceedings was constructive.

Answers to this question should not be adjusted because the offender was not given the opportunity to contribute. If they were not given the opportunity this simply results in a low rating.

33.) How much was the offender coerced into accepting the conference outcome?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 no outcome

not at all very much

Here the focus should be on the extent to which the offender is forced into accepting the court/conference outcome. To what extent is the outcome imposed upon the offender? To what extent did the offender freely agree to the outcome? Obviously, if the offender is given no opportunity to say what they think of the outcome, score 8.
34.) How much discussion of paying a debt to the community occurred?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

none very much

In this question we are interested in discussion that focuses on paying back something to the community for the risk/harm that the offender caused. This does not include repayment of specific individuals (e.g., the victim) but rather the community 'as a whole'.

35.) How much discussion of reparation to the victim party(s) occurred?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

none very much

In this question we are interested in any discussion of repaying the victim for damages or losses incurred by the offender's actions. Offerings of services, contributions of time, energy, or money are all included so long as their aim is to compensate the victim for the consequences of the offender's actions.

If there is no victim party, draw a line through the question.

36.) Overall, how much discussion of reparation occurred?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

none very much

Again, this is a general question on the amount of discussion of outcome that occurred. In answering it, you should weigh-up the amount of discussion about the outcome in general, including discussion of reparation and restoration to the victim party and/or community. You should consider all and any discussion of outcome.

Shame

37.) How much responsibility did the offender take for their actions?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

no responsibility total responsibility

In this question we want to know about how much responsibility or ownership the offender accepted for their actions. Did they fully accept that they did it and are accountable for the offence?
In a conference, an offender who does no more than admit in a perfunctory way that they committed the offence is likely to get a low rating. It follows that a perfunctory guilty plea in a court case should attract the same low rating, if responsibility is not communicated in any other way. However, a court offender who pleads guilty apologetically is likely to attract a higher rating. Here the concern is to acknowledge responsibility which may manifest itself through verbal or non verbal cues.

38.) How much did the offender retreat from and avoid the attention of others?

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This question focuses on the non-verbal cues used by the offender in an attempt to avoid being the focus of attention. Examples of this include physically sinking into the background, deterring questions, attempting to take as little part in the process as possible. Did the offender take an active role in the conference or were they withdrawn from the process?

39.) How much was the offender's speech affected by irregularities, pauses, or incoherence?

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This question focuses upon the offender’s speech. Was the offender’s speech normal or affected by nervousness? Did the offender seem lost for words, stuttery, strained, etc?

40.) How uncomfortable (eg., restless, anxious, fidgety) was the offender?

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The focus of this question concerns the offender body language and more specifically all non-verbal clues which suggested that they were uncomfortable, for example restlessness, constant movement of their hands and/or legs.
41.) To what extent did the offender engage in hiding (eg., lowering head) and concealing (eg., hand covering parts of face, averting gaze) behaviour?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all very much

It is well established that people feeling shame or embarrassment display their feeling with certain body language. This question asks if the offender attempts to hide or withdraw. Did they cover their face or body at any stage? Did they avoid or break eye contact with others?

**Procedural Justice**

42.) What percentage of the conference time was taken up by the facilitator/magistrate talking?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0% 50% 100%

This question simply asks the observer to try to estimate the percentage of time the facilitator/magistrate spoke during the conference/court case. This question can be thought of in terms of how much of the talking was done by the facilitator/magistrate, relative to other participants (ie., did the facilitator do 50%, 20%, 80%, ... of the talking during the conference).

43.) How directive was the facilitator/magistrate?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all directive very directive

This asks to what extent the facilitator/magistrate directed the conference/court case, what was said in it, and what was decided by it. Where the facilitator/magistrate was 'not at all directive' this means that they did not control the conference and played no role in telling the other participants what to do. Where the facilitator/magistrate was 'very directive' they will have controlled the way the conference/court case proceeded, and what people did and decided. Essentially the question asks how much did the facilitator/magistrate steer the case through its stages.
44.) What percentage of the court/conference time was taken up by the offender talking?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0% 50% 100%

This question can be thought of in terms of how much of the talking was done by the offender, relative to other participants. (ie., Did the offender do 50%, 20%, 80%, ... of the talking during court or the conference). In the court context it is important to note that talk by the offender's lawyer does not count.

45.) How much did the offender contribute to the court case/conference?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all very much

This asks how actively the offender was involved in the proceedings (ie., to what extent did they participate in the proceedings? How much of a role did they play in the different aspects of the proceedings? To what extent did they make a contribution to what was happening?) A useful way of thinking about this is: Was the court case or conference different as a result of the offender's contribution?

It is important that this question is not confused with the earlier question 'how much did the offender contribute to the court/conference outcome?' which focuses only on the outcome of the proceeding. This question focuses upon their contribution to the proceedings as a whole.

46.) How much was the offender dominated?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all very much

By 'dominated' we are concerned with the extent to which the offender is controlled by others at the conference/court case. Was the offender able to make decisions for themselves or were their responses and/or decisions imposed upon them by others (eg the facilitator, mum, lawyers etc).
Appendix A: The Global Observation Codebook

**Heckling of offender**

47.) How much moral lecturing was directed at the offender?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
none very much

Moral lecturing is where the offender is lectured on themes of morality, right and wrong, the importance of being good and obeying rules, etc. the question implies at least one party moralising at length to the offender.

48.) How clearly were the possible consequences of future offences communicated to the offender?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 not communicated
not at all clearly very clearly

Possible consequences of future offences refers to things like follow-up court action, further sanctions, acquiring a criminal record, or going to jail. This question includes anything that is a consequence of engaging in further offences and action to be taken against the offender in the event of future offences.

If there is no mention of what might happen if the offender commits future offences, then the 'not communicated' option should be used.

49.) If the possible consequences of future offences were communicated to the offender, to what extent was this done in a matter-of-fact way?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 not communicated
not at all very much

Your answer to this question is conditional on your answer to the previous question. If the consequences are not communicated in question 48, then your answer for question 49 must also be 'not communicated'.

Were the possible consequences discussed simply and in a matter of fact way, so that the offender became aware of them.

50.) How much was the offender harassed?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all very much

232
By harassment we mean persistent and repetitive harping on particular issues. Was the offender continually talked at or bombarded with questions and demands such that they were uncomfortable?

51.) How often was the offender shouted at?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
never very often

Simply, how often did others shout at the offender?

Miscellany

52.) Overall, how emotionally engaged was the offender?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all emotionally engaged very emotionally engaged

This question is concerned with how the offender reacts to the situation, people and the critical stages of proceedings. Are they challenged by events, confused, upset, anxious, and/or remorseful or do they remain distant or uninvolved emotionally?

53.) How much approval of the offender’s criminal actions was expressed?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
none a lot

Did anyone during the case express approval of the offender’s actions (offence)? This includes support for what the offender did, or even reluctance to disapprove of the offence. Did anyone suggest that what was done was okay or that it wasn’t really that bad? Responses to this question should not include justification of the offence based on the circumstances. For example, 'because of x, y and z the offence was ok.' The question is whether they approving of the actual offence.

54.) At any stage of the conference, did the offender cry?

A response of 'yes' should include anything from a definite welling of the eyes (teary) through to floods of tears. 'No' should be used when in doubt.
55.) In deciding upon the outcome how much did the conference/court case take into account principles of:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
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<th>A lot</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repaying the Community:</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
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<td>Repaying the victim:</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventing future offences:</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
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<td>Restoration:</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
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Taking into account what was discussed during the proceeding, and particularly when an outcome was being decided upon, how much did those involved take into account the outlined principles when deciding upon what to do?. This question asks the observer to record the reasons why outcomes were decided upon. Why was it decided that: The offender should do 40 hours community work? What was their reasoning?

Punishment - Is where the outcome is decided upon to penalise or punish the offender in some way. It is usually to 'teach them a lesson' or deter them from doing it again.

Repaying the community - Is where the outcome is decided upon so that the offender can repair harm that they have caused the community.

Repaying the victim - Is where the outcome is decided upon so that the offender can repair harm that they have cause the victim.

Preventing future offence - Where the outcome is decided upon to help the offender not reoffend. This could include the offender not being able to drive on occasions when they might drink, etc.

Restoration - When an outcome is decided upon because it will allow the offender to redeem him/herself and restore their own self-esteem, honour, and others' respect.

Additional questions
56.) Was any tangible agreement relating to this offender reached at the conference/court?

YES.........1
NO.........2

Your answer to this question will almost always be 'yes'. 'No' will be used in the case of a conference when no outcome agreement could be reached or if the case was terminated prematurely. 'No' will also sometimes be used when a court case is part heard or adjourned.
57.) If 'yes', how much consensus was there among conference participants about the conference outcome/agreement for this offender?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
very little consensus very much consensus

When answering this question, you will need to consider how much each participant agreed with the outcome and then weigh these values up to reach a general, average value that will constitute your answer. It is also important to include the views of the offender and police when answering this question.

58.) Was there any reason during the course of the conference to think the offender might have a drug and/or alcohol problem?

YES........1
NO...........2

If the offender's drug and/or alcohol problem is discussed then your answer is 'yes'. If it is only alluded to or hinted at, but this is enough to make you think a drug and/or alcohol problem might exists then answer 'yes'. If in doubt, code 'no'.

59.) Was the above possibility discussed?

YES........1
NO...........2

Only if the offender's drug and/or alcohol problem is discussed should you answer 'yes'. A mere mention of the problem is not enough to warrant an answer of 'yes'. Again, if in doubt, code 'no'.

60.) Was the offender referred to or made aware of any professional agent able to help with his drug and/or alcohol problem?

YES........1
NO...........2
This may occur as simply a suggestion during the case or some cases may include this as part of the outcome.

61.) Record any other relevant details of this discussion. Details of unique difficulties underlying the offender's drug/alcohol problem, past attempts to address the issue, or any other clarifying point may be included.

62.) Were any other problems confronting the offender raised at the conference?

Financial................1
Educational.............2
Employment............3
Health...................4
Language................5
Relationship..........6
Other.....................7

For 'yes' to be your answer there must be an explicit reference to such a problem. It need not be discussed, just raised. If a problem or problems are discussed indicate the type of problem. Use as many categories as needed. Both problems preceding and resulting from the offence are included. If in doubt, 'no' should be used.

63.) If yes, how well were these problems addressed at the conference?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
not at all well very well

In this question we want to know to what extent or how adequately were the problems addressed at the conference/court. In deciding on how to answer this question you will need to consider; how willing participants were to discuss the problem, the extent to which the problem was discussed, whether the offender was made aware of helping agencies, and whether any concrete solutions were agreed upon.
Appendix B: The Offender Interview

The Australian National University
Research School of Social Sciences

ACT Justice Survey

PCA Questionnaire
Part A
First, I want to ask you a few questions about how fair the conference/court was.

1. How fair did you feel that the conference/court was for you? Would you say that it was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very unfair</th>
<th>Somewhat unfair</th>
<th>Somewhat fair</th>
<th>Very fair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. How much did you feel that the conference/court respected your rights? Would you say

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Not really</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>A lot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. How much influence did you have over the agreement reached in the conference/court? Would you say

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None at all</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>A lot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Do you think the outcome you received in the conference/court was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Easy</th>
<th>A little too easy</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>A little too hard</th>
<th>Hard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

5. Do you think the conference/court helped to solve any problems? Would you say

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Not really</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Definitely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Conference Respondents only

6. Did the police explain that you had a right to refuse to participate in the conference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Were you consulted about who should be invited to attend your conference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. How many of the people you wanted to attend your conference were invited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>Only a few</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Nearly all</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9. Compared to the way people are normally treated in this kind of case, were you treated better or worse than others generally are? Do you think

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A lot worse</th>
<th>A little worse</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>A little better</th>
<th>A lot better</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. As a result of the conference/court case, has your respect for the justice system.....

11. As a result of the conference/court case, has your respect for the law...

12. How nervous were you about attending the conference/court? Would you say...

13. How severe did you feel the outcome of the conference/court was for you? Would you say that it was...

I am now going to ask a few questions about what could happen if you committed the same kind of offence again.

14. If you were caught for the same kind of offence again how severe do you think your punishment would be? Do you think it would be...?

15. If you were caught for the same kind of offence again and went to court, how much of a problem would it create for your life? Do you think that it would create...

For Court Respondents only

16. Have you heard of diversionary conferencing?

(If No) In the ACT there is a new procedure to deal with offences called diversionary conferences. In these the offender and the victim meet face to face with their family and friends to discuss an arrangement for resolving the harm that has been caused by the offence.
17. If you were caught for the same kind of offence again and went to a conference, how much of a problem would it create for your life? Do you think that it would create .................

18. If you were caught for the same kind of offence again, how much of a problem would it create for you if your family and friends found out? Do you think that it would create .................

19. If you were caught drink driving again, how much of a problem would it create for your life is your name and offence was printed in the newspaper? Do you think that it would create .................

20. If you committed another offence like the one that got you into trouble, how likely is it that you would be caught? Do you think that it would be?........................

21. How much fun would you get out of committing the same offence again? Do you think it would be .................

I now want to ask you a few more questions on how you felt about the conference/court. I will read out each statement and you can react by telling me how much you agree with it. The possible answers are strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. Give respondent the scale sheet.

22. The conference/court case will help prevent you from breaking the law in the future........................

23. You feel that people who have committed the same offence are treated the same way by conferences/court........

24. You feel bitter about the way you were treated in the case........................
25. The conference/court case just made you angry .................................................

26. What happened in the conference/court case will encourage you to obey the law ..........................................................

27. You feel that the people who accused you in the conference/court were more wrong than you were ............

28. You wish that you could get back at the people who were accusing you in the conference/court .....................

29. Now that it is all over you feel glad that you committed the offence that you did ..........................................................

30. The conference/court case allowed you to make up for what you did ..........

31. The conference/court case allowed you to clear your conscience ..................

32. The conference/court case allowed you to repay society for your offence .......

For Conference Respondents only

33. The government should use conferences as an alternative to court more often .................................................

Okay, I’ve asked you some questions about how you have felt about the conference/court over all. I now want to ask you about some specific aspects of the conference/court.

Again I will read out some statements and ask you to tell me how much you agree with each of them.

34. People were polite to you in the conference/court .............................................

35. You understood what was going on in the conference/court ..........................

36. You understood what your rights were during the processing of the case ......

37. You felt you had the opportunity to express your views in the conference/court .............................
38. All sides got a fair chance to bring out the facts in the conference/court.

39. You felt you had enough control over the way things were run in the conference/court.

40. The conference/court took account of what you said in deciding what should be done.

41. If the conference/court had got the facts wrong you felt able to get this corrected.

42. If you had been treated unfairly by the conference/court or the police, you believe that you could have got your complaint heard.

43. You felt too intimidated to say what you really felt in the conference/court.

44. You felt pushed around in the conference/court by people with more power than you.

45. During the conference/court you felt pushed into things you did not agree with.

46. People in the conference/court spoke up on your behalf.

47. You feel that you were treated with respect in the conference/court.

48a. You were disadvantaged in the conference/court because of your age, income, sex, race or some other reason?

48b. If agree or strongly agree above, What was the reason? (age sex income?)

Race/ethnicity
Sex
Age
Income
Other (please specify)
Now let’s talk about your views on how the police processed your case.

49. When the police arrested you they were rude and abusive.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. The police were fair in the time leading up to the conference/court.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51. The police were fair during the conference/court.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. You felt that you could trust the police during this case.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. The police made you confess to something which you did not do in this case.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54. In general, the police in Canberra enforce the law fairly.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55. As a result of the way your case was handled would you say your respect for the police has.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gone down a lot</th>
<th>Gone down a little</th>
<th>Not changed</th>
<th>Gone up a little</th>
<th>Gone up a lot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part B

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about the offence you committed. By offence I mean the wrong doing which you were accused of in the diversionary conference/court.

1a. In my notes the offence you were accused of committing was

1b. Do you accept that you were responsible for committing the offence, or were one of those responsible. Write out any qualifications.

1c. In short:

   Yes ........................................... 1 → then do all questions
   Partially .................................... 2 → then answer all relevant questions thinking only about the part of the offence which you accept as having committed
   No ............................................ 3 → then discontinue section
2. Do you now feel that the offence you committed was ............................................
Totally right ; In someway right ; Neither right nor wrong ; In some way wrong ; Totally wrong ;

I would also like you to remember how you felt about the offence before the conference/court case.

3. Did you feel, before the conference/court, that the offence you committed was ............................................................
Totally right ; In someway right ; Neither right nor wrong ; In some way wrong ; Totally wrong ;

4. What do your close friends think about what you did? Do they think that the offence you committed was ......
Totally right ; In someway right ; Neither right nor wrong ; In some way wrong ; Totally wrong ;

Again, I will read out some statements and ask you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with them.

5. As a result of your offence your family was hurt in some way. Do you ......
Strongly disagree ; Disagree ; Neither agree nor disagree ; Agree ; Strongly agree ;

6. As a result of your offence, others could have been hurt in some way. Do you........
Strongly disagree ; Disagree ; Neither agree nor disagree ; Agree ; Strongly agree ;

8. You felt after the conference/court case that what you did was just plain stupid........................
Strongly disagree ; Disagree ; Neither agree nor disagree ; Agree ; Strongly agree ;

9. You regret putting other people at risk as a result of your offence ...........................
Strongly disagree ; Disagree ; Neither agree nor disagree ; Agree ; Strongly agree ;

10. As a result of your offence you needed to repay society in some way.....
Strongly disagree ; Disagree ; Neither agree nor disagree ; Agree ; Strongly agree ;

I also want to ask you briefly about how you feel about different offences.

How wrong do you think it is to:

11. Shoplift ............................................
Okay ; Not that bad ; Kind of wrong ; Wrong ; Very wrong ;

12. Start a fight. To hit someone who is not looking for trouble ............................
Okay ; Not that bad ; Kind of wrong ; Wrong ; Very wrong ;

13. To drive when you are over the legal alcohol limit ......................................
Okay ; Not that bad ; Kind of wrong ; Wrong ; Very wrong ;

Tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

14. If we all respected the law, the quality of all our lives would be better. Do you....
Strongly disagree ; Disagree ; Neither agree nor disagree ; Agree ; Strongly agree ;
15. Obeying the law is the best way of making sure that our community is safe...

16. In general, you have respect for the law ........................................

Part C
Now I want to ask you a set of questions about who was with you at the conference/court case and how people in your life reacted at the conference/court case and since then.

1. Let me start by asking who was there. Could you tell me all the people you remember who were at the conference/court case.

You need to include the following groups if the respondent remembers them being at the conference: their supporters, the victim and their supporters, the facilitator or magistrate.

Write the name of each person who was at the conference in the Respondent’s Booklet and code their relationship to the respondent from the list below (please write in both digits):

- Offender’s spouse/partner .......................................................... 01
- Offender’s mother ................................................................. 02
- Offender’s father ................................................................. 03
- Offender’s stepmother/defacto mother ...................................... 04
- Offender’s stepfather/defacto father ....................................... 05
- Offender’s sibling ................................................................. 06
- Offender’s child ................................................................. 07
- Offender’s grandparent ......................................................... 08
- Offender’s other relative ....................................................... 09
- Offender’s friend ............................................................... 10
- Offender’s neighbour .......................................................... 11
- Offender’s co-worker ......................................................... 12
- Offender’s supervisor .......................................................... 13
- Offender’s other ............................................................... 15
- Facilitator/Magistrate ....................................................... 40
- Police informant ............................................................... 41
- Community representative .................................................. 42
- Solicitor ................................................................. 43
- Other ................................................................. 44

Part C, Form 1
In this next section we’re going to do things a little differently. I am going to ask you each question and I would like you to circle your answers in this booklet yourself - this will make your answers totally private.

Please try to answer each question as accurately and honestly as possible. Please circle only one answer for each question. It is no good if you circle two answers or if you don’t circle any answer.

I will explain how to answer each question, and if you are not sure of anything please ask me.
Appendix B

To start, I would like to find out what you think of these people. For each person on the list, could you circle the words which best describes how much you respect them. Let’s start with ......(the person at the top of the list)...... Would you say that you have: a lot of DISrespect for them; some DISrespect for them; neither respect nor DISrespect for them, some respect for them; a lot of respect for them?

Guide respondent through to the bottom of the list and then ask them to turn the page of their booklet.

Again, starting at the top of the list, for each person present, circle the words which best describes how much you depend upon them for support. First, ......(person at the top of the list)...... - would you say that you: don’t depend upon them at all; don’t depend upon them much; depend upon them a little; depend upon them a fair bit; depend upon them a lot.

Next, I would like to get some idea about what each of these people thought of the offence you committed. Again starting with ....... (person at the top of the list) ..... - would you say that s/he: strongly approved; approved; neither approved nor DISapproved; DISapproved; Strongly DISapproved?

Now, I would like you to think about how ashamed or proud you felt during the conference/court case, knowing that each of these people had found out about the offence you committed. Again starting with ......(person at the top of the list)...... - how did you feel about him/her knowing that you had committed the offence: very proud; a little proud; neither ashamed nor proud; a little ashamed; very ashamed?

Next, I would like to get some idea of how much each of these people forgave you at the end of the conference/court case? Starting with ......(person at the top of the list)...... - would you say that s/he was: very UNforgiving; UNforgiving; neither forgiving nor UNforgiving; forgiving; very forgiving?

Next, would you think about how much each of these people respect you as a person. First, would you say that ......(person at the top of the list) ...... has: a lot of DISrespect for you; some DISrespect for you; neither respect nor DISrespect for you; some respect for you; a lot of respect for you?

Finally, I would like you to think about how attending the conference affected you relationship with each of these people. Again starting with ......(person at the top of the list)...... after the conference/court case did you feel: much further apart from them; further apart from them; that there was no change; closer to them; much closer to them?

Part C, Form 2

Now I want to ask you a few questions about how you felt in the conference/court case. What I’ll do is read out the questions and ask you to circle the words which best describes how you feel. Please circle one answer only.

1. Were you treated in the conference/court as though you were likely to commit another offence?

2. Did people in the conference/court say that it was not like you to do something that was wrong?
3. At the end of the conference/court case, or since then, have people made it clear to you that you can put the whole thing behind you?

4. Did people during the conference/court case make negative judgements about what kind of person you are?

5. During the conference/court case did people indicate that they accepted you as basically law abiding?

6. Did you learn from the conference/court that there are people who care about you?

7. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you were a criminal?

8. During the conference/court case did any of the people who are important to you reject you because of the offence?

9. At the end of the conference/court case did people indicate that you were forgiven?

10. During the conference/court case did people suggest that they loved you regardless of what you did?

11. During the conference/court case did people talk about aspects of yourself which they like?

12. Did others at the conference/court case say that you had learnt your lesson and now deserve a second chance.

13. During the conference/court case were you treated as though you were a bad person?

14. Were you treated as a trustworthy person in the conference/court?

15. Even though the conference/court case is over do you still feel that others will not let you forget what you have done?

Part C, Form 3

Now I want to ask you about certain groups of people in your life and how they have reacted since the conference/court case. I will read out each question and ask you to circle the words which best describe how you feel.

1. How ashamed or proud did you feel that your family found out about the offence you committed?

2. How ashamed or proud did you feel that your friends or mates found out about the offence you committed?

3. How ashamed or proud did you feel that the police, the magistrate or other government officials found out about the offence you committed?

4. How ashamed or proud did you feel that other people found out about the offence you committed? (For example workmates, school mates, neighbours, etc)

5. Have work mates, school mates, or other people who were not at the conference/court treated you like you were a criminal since the offence?
6. Do you think that people who were not at the conference/court have treated you with as much respect since the offence?

7. Do you think that people who were not at the conference/court accept that now you have been through the conference you have earned a fresh start?

8. In the week after the conference/court case did your family and friends give you more support or less support than they normally give you?

Part C, Form 4

Now in this next section I want to ask you a few questions about how you get on with your family and how the conference/court case has affected that. I will read out each question and could you please circle the words which indicate how much you agree with the statement.

1. I feel proud to be a member of my family

2. As a result of the conference/court case I feel more proud of being a member of my family

3. The conference/court case has brought my family closer together.

4. My family loves me.

5. I love my family

6. The conference/court case increased the respect we have for one another in my family.

Now let me ask some questions that I will answer on this form.

7. Something I want to ask is how many of your close friends were at the conference/court case with you?

8a. How many of your close friends drive after they have drunk enough alcohol to be over the legal limit? none of them 1 one or two of them 2 a few of them 3 most of them 4 all of them 5 don't know 9

8b. If so, do you think the conference/court case will reduce the drink driving of your friends and other supporters who were at the conference? Would you say definitely 1 probably 2 possibly 3 very unlikely 4 definitely not 5
Part D

An important part of the justice system, that is usually ignored, is how being involved with it can be an emotional experience for many people.

On the questionnaire there are a number of statements which describe how you might have felt in the conference/court. As I read out each statement please try to remember if you felt that emotion at any time during the conference/court case. Then could you please mark on the scale the extent to which you felt it. Please try to answer these questions as accurately as possible. This questionnaire will be totally anonymous.

1. During the conference/court case I felt worried about what others thought of me.

2. During the conference/court case I felt that the offence I committed was wrong.

3. During the conference/court case I felt bad because the offence I committed might have hurt someone.

4. I felt in the conference/court that those complaining about my actions were just sorry for themselves.

5. I felt good in the conference/court case that I was able to face up to what I did.

6. I felt bad in the conference/court case because everyone knew about the offence I had committed.

7. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed because people criticised me for what I had done.

8. In the conference/court case I felt angry with myself for what I had done.

9. During the conference/court case I felt awkward and aware of myself.

10. In the conference/court I felt embarrassed because I was the centre of attention.

11. I felt good in the conference/court case that I was able to do something about the offence I committed.

12. During the conference/court case I felt that I was a failure.

13. During the conference/court case I felt that I had stuffed up at least some of my future opportunities.

14. During the conference/court case I found myself really affected by the emotions of those who had been hurt in some way.

15. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed of what I did.

16. During the conference/court case I felt ashamed of myself.

17. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my family.

18. During the conference/court case I felt like I had lost respect or honour among my friends.

19. I felt okay in the conference/court because my friends thought what I did was okay.

20. I felt humiliated in the conference/court.
21. In the conference/court I began to understand what it actually felt like for those who had been affected by my actions.

22. In the conference/court I felt uneasy because I was surrounded by people who were supposed to be more important than me.

23. During the conference/court case I felt so exposed, I wished I could just disappear.

24. In the conference/court case I felt good the offence was not typical of my behaviour.

25. During the conference/court case I felt worried that I would have to pay in some way for the offence I committed.

26. I felt bad in the conference/court because my actions had hurt others.

27. During the conference/court case I felt sad or depressed.

28. Since the conference/court have you found yourself continually bothered by thoughts that you were unfairly or critically judged by people at the conference/court case?

29. Since the conference/court have you found yourself unable to decide, in your own mind, whether or not what you did was wrong?

30. Do you feel that some of the things brought up in the conference/court are unresolved in your mind?

**Part E**

Now I want to ask you some questions about your background. These are used for statistical purposes only in studies like this so that we can group the answers of similar people together.

1. (Code respondent’s sex)
   - Male .............................................................. 1
   - Female ........................................................... 2

2. What is your date of birth  ____ / ____ / 19 ____
3. In which country were you born?

Austria .................................................. 01
New Zealand ........................................... 02
United Kingdom ...................................... 03
Ireland .................................................. 04
Italy ...................................................... 05
Germany ............................................... 06
Greece .................................................. 07
Malta ..................................................... 08
Netherlands .......................................... 09
Poland .................................................. 10
Former Yugoslavia .................................. 11
Vietnam ............................................... 12
Laos ...................................................... 13
China .................................................... 14
Philippines ............................................ 15
Hong Kong ............................................ 16
Tonga .................................................... 17
Macedonia .............................................. 18
Chile ...................................................... 19
Other (please specify) ................................ 20
Don't know ............................................. 21

4. Are you of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander heritage?

Yes .......................................................... 1
No ............................................................ 2

5. Apart from weddings, funerals and baptisms, about how often do you attend religious services?

At least once a week .................................... 1
At least once a month ................................... 2
Several times a year .................................... 3
At least once a year .................................... 4
Less than once a year .................................. 5
Never ..................................................... 6

6. Since you were born, how many years have you lived in the ACT?

_____ years [ _____ months ]

(If length less than 1 year, specify months)

(If respondent can’t remember - obtain year and month of arrival and calculate)
7. What is the highest grade or year of (primary or secondary) school you have completed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Some of the time</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal schooling</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Grade 1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Year 7 (Form 1)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 8 (Form 2)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 9 (Form 3)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 10 (Form 4)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 11 (Form 5)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 12 (Form 6)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Do (did) you find that school gives (gave) you a sense of accomplishment? Would you say......

9. On average how are you doing (did you do) academically, at school? Would you say:..............

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Well below average</th>
<th>Below average</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Above average</th>
<th>Well above average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Have you obtained a trade qualification, a degree or a diploma, or any other qualification since leaving school? What is your highest qualification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-trade qualification</th>
<th>Trade qualification</th>
<th>Associate Diploma</th>
<th>Undergraduate Diploma</th>
<th>Bachelor Degree</th>
<th>Postgraduate Diploma</th>
<th>Higher degree - Masters or PhD</th>
<th>Certificate</th>
<th>No qualification since leaving school</th>
<th>Not applicable / Still at school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Looking at the answers on this card, which best describes your situation during the last 6 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working full-time for pay</th>
<th>Working part-time for pay</th>
<th>Unemployed and looking for work</th>
<th>Unemployed and not looking for work</th>
<th>Retired from paid work</th>
<th>A full-time school or university student</th>
<th>Home duties</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### For respondents who are employed

12. What type of work do you do? *(Interviewer to code on basis of response to this question)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher professional</td>
<td>doctor, electrical engineer, university scientist, secondary school teacher, lawyer, clergy</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher administrator</td>
<td>banker, executive in big business, high government official, union official</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and lower professional</td>
<td>nurse, artist, primary school teacher, lab technician</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>secretary, clerk, office manager, public servant, bookkeeper</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>sales manager, shop owner, shop assistant, insurance agent</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>restaurant owner, policeman, waitress, barber, janitor</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, electrician</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>bus driver, canner worker, carpenter, metal worker, baker</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>labourer, porter, unskilled factory worker</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>farmer, farm labourer, jackeroo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Is your job permanent or temporary?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. In your job do you supervise other people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. How much authority do you have in deciding how to do your work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very great</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16. If I give you this card, can you tell me the number which indicates the total (gross) annual income from all sources, before tax or other deductions, for you and your family living with you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Card Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $3,000 per year</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,001 to $5,000 per year</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,001 to $8,000 per year</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,001 to $12,000 per year</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$12,001 to $16,000 per year</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$16,001 to $20,000 per year</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,001 to $25,000 per year</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,001 to $30,000 per year</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,001 to $35,000 per year</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,001 to $40,000 per year</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40,001 to $50,000 per year</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,001 to $60,000 per year</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60,001 to $70,000 per year</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$70,001 to $80,000 per year</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$80,001 to $90,000 per year</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$90,001 to $100,000 per year</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $100,000 per year</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. What is your current marital status?

- Never married ........................................ 1
- Now married (including de facto relationships) .... 2
- Widowed ................................................................ 3
- Divorced or separated ..................................... 4

The way in which the justice system affects people often depends upon how they cope with different events in their life and how they feel about themselves. In this next section there are a number of questions which ask about yourself. Could you please answer all of these as honestly as possible by marking on the scale how much you agree with it. Or would you rather that I read out each statement.

If you don’t understand anything please ask me.

**Part E, Form 1.**

1. It takes a lot to get me mad

2. To what extent do you believe people try to be helpful?

3. To what extent do you believe people are mostly looking out for themselves?

4. I frequently get upset

5. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

6. I can resist temptations to break the law.

7. If I can’t do a job the first time, I keep trying until I can.
8. There are many things that annoy me.

9. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

10. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

11. Because of my past I now find it difficult to obey the law.

12. To what extent do you believe that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance?

13. To what extent do you believe that most people try to be fair?

14. When trying to learn something new, I soon give up if I am not initially successful.

15. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

16. I can tolerate frustration better than most.

17. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

18. Failure just makes me try harder.

19. I am always calm - nothing ever bothers me.

20. I am confident that I could resist other people's pressure on me to break the law.

21. I take a positive attitude towards myself.

22. Certain pressures in my life make it difficult for me to obey the law.

23. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

24. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

25. Even under pressure I can resist breaking the law.

26. I am somewhat emotional.

27. I certainly feel useless at times.

28. I give up easily.

29. To what extent do you think most people can be trusted?

30. To what extent do you believe that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

31. At times I think I am no good at all.

32. As a result of the conference/court case I felt that my self-respect increased a lot, increased a little, neither increased or decreased, decreased a little, decreased a lot.
Appendix B

Part F
What I would now like to do is ask you some questions about alcohol and drug use. I will read out each question and ask you to fill in the answers on your sheet. Please try to fill this sheet in as accurately as possible. Any information will be completely confidential.

Part F, Form 1
1. Could you please indicate on the first table how often you have an alcoholic drink of any kind? Do this by circling the number besides your answer.

2. Could you please look at the second table. On a day when you have an alcoholic drink how many drinks do you usually have? (A drink is a glass of wine or regular beer, a nip of spirits, or a mixed drink). Please circle the number besides your answer.

3. Could you please indicate on the third table which of the drugs there, if any, you have tried in the last 12 months. Do this by circling the number beside any of the drugs which you have tried in the last 12 months.

4. Could you please look at the fourth table. If you have recently been using any of these drugs how often would you use them. Please indicate your answer for each drug by circling the number below the words which best describe how often you would use it.

Part H - Drink Drive report.
Finally, I want to ask you some questions about drinking and driving. The main purpose of this is to try to get a rough estimate of how many times you might have driven while over the legal alcohol limit in the 12 months before the conference/court case. But before we get to that, I want to ask you a couple of other questions.

1. Can you tell me what the legal alcohol limit is for someone with a full licence?

2. Do you know how to roughly estimate the number of drinks you can have to be under this limit? Can you tell me that estimate?

3. What is your legal alcohol limit?

I'll just give you some information on drink driving and the legal alcohol limit.

The legal alcohol limit in the ACT is:
.05 for full licence, .02 for p-plates, and 0 for taxi drivers, bus drivers, etc.

I'll tell you how to roughly estimate how much can drink to stay under this limit (only read out the estimate applicable to the respondent)
Appendix B

Estimate for .05 is:

MEN  The government suggests that the average man can have 2 standard drinks in the first hour and one every hour afterward to safely stay under the .05 limit.

WOMEN  The government suggests that the average woman can have 1 standard drink in the first hour and one every hour afterwards to safely stay under the .05 limit.

Estimate for .02 is:

MEN  The government suggests that to stay under the .02 limit you should not drink anything. However most men can have one standard drink an hour for about 3 hours and still remain under the limit.

WOMEN  The government suggests that to stay under the .02 limit you should not drink anything. However most women can have one standard drink an hour for about 2 hours and still remain under the limit.

A standard drink is:

one middy of full strength beer, a schooner, stubby or can of light beer, a nip of spirits, or a standard glass of wine.

This rough estimate means that: (only read example applicable to the respondent)

Examples for male respondents .05

If you have 3 standard drinks in an hour and then drive straight afterwards there is a good chance you will be over the limit.

Or if you have 2 standard drinks in the first hour and then two more in the second hour you are likely to be over the limit.

Or if you have 6 standard drinks and drive within 5 hours you are likely to be over the limit.

Examples for male respondents .02

If you have 2 standard drinks in 1 hour and then drive you are likely to be over the limit.

Or if you have 3 standard drinks in 2 hours and drive you are likely to be over the limit.

Or even if you have 5 drinks in 5 hours you are likely to be over the limit.

Examples for female respondents .05

If you have 2 standard drinks in an hour and then drive straight afterwards there is a good chance you will be over the limit.

Or if you have 2 standard drinks in the first hour and another in the second hour then it is likely you will be over the limit.

Or if you have 6 standard drinks and drive within 6 hours you are likely to be over the limit.

Examples for female respondents .02

If you have 2 standard drinks in 1 hour and then drive you are likely to be over the limit.

Or if you have 3 standard drinks in 2 hours and drive you are likely to be over the limit.

Or even if you have 3 drinks in 3 hours you are likely to be over the limit.

Thinking about all this, how many times do you think you might have driven while over the limit in the 12 months before the conference/court case? It might be helpful for you to think about how often you might have done it in an average week, or an average month.

4. Estimate  

257
5. Do you expect to move house sometime in the next 12 months -- just your best guess?

- Probably not move house ............................................ 1
- Will probably move in the next year .................................. 2
- Will definitely in the next year ........................................... 3

6. We would very much like to get in touch with you again in a year or so. If that is OK, could you please give us the address of a relative or friend who will know your new address in case you have moved by then?

Person to be contacted: __________________________

Relationship to respondent: __________________________

Address: __________________________________________

Street __________________________________________

Suburb __________________________________________

Postcode __________________________________________

Phone Number: __________________________

Work __________________________________________

Home __________________________________________

(Close interview and thank respondent)

Was the entire interview conducted in private? ................. Yes1 No2

Interviewer to sign name to indicate true and correct interview

_________________________ __ / __ / 19 __ ___ am / pm (circle)

Signature __________________________ Date __________________________ Time at end of interview __________________________ Interviewer code __________________________
Appendix C: Standardised Residual Matrix for the Confirmatory Analysis of Reintegration and Stigmatisation Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Item 13</th>
<th>Item 7</th>
<th>Item 4</th>
<th>Item 1</th>
<th>Item 15</th>
<th>Item 16</th>
<th>Item 11</th>
<th>Item 12</th>
<th>Item 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item 13</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 7</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 15</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 16</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 11</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 12</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 6</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


References


Harris, N., & Burton, J. B. (1997). The reliability of observed reintegrative shaming, shame, defiance and other key concepts in diversionary conferences (5). Canberra, Australia: Australian National University.


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References


